

THE ASCENT OF MORALITY, FROM NON-HUMAN TO HUMAN
ANIMALS: AN EMOTION-BASED ACCOUNT

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ANIMALS: AN EMOTION-BASED ACCOUNT**

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ABSTRACT

THE ASCENT OF MORALITY, FROM NON-HUMAN TO HUMAN ANIMALS: AN EMOTION-BASED ACCOUNT

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The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether morality is uniquely human, and to argue that emotions are the basis of morality in the sense that moral behavior is produced by emotions. In order to support my suggestion, I first intend to investigate the nature and function of emotions. Furthermore, I adopt an evolutionary perspective suggesting that our biology pushed us toward caring about certain things surrounding us. In accordance with this assertion, I endeavor to examine whether moral judgments and moral beliefs can be illustrated in a non-cognitivist way from the perspectives of both naturalist philosophers and evolutionary scientists. Accordingly, I defend the view that moral judgment is a non-propositional, psychological attitude. From a contemporary perspective, we might argue that Hume's interpretation of moral judgment adopts a non-cognitivist and non-propositional attitude. Moreover, moral judgment does not express a proposition that describes facts and is truth evaluable; rather, it expresses feelings. In this sense, moral judgment is a psychological inclination to feeling a specific emotion and, accordingly, the particular emotion comprises approval or disapproval in terms of moral judgment.

Finally, since moral judgment is considered to be the most significant element of being a moral agent and if I can explain moral judgment in precisely the way I describe above, then it will open the room for morality among animals. In other words, my position that moral judgment is non-propositional supports the idea that we may attribute morality to non-human animals.

Keywords: Animal Morality, Evolutionary Ethics, Emotions, Non-anthropocentric ethic, Non-propositional judgments



ÖZ

İNSAN HARİCİ HAYVANLARDAN İNSAN OLAN HAYVANLARA AHLAKIN YÜKSELİŞİ: DUYGU TEMELLİ BİR YAKLAŞIM

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Bu tezin amacı, ahlakın yalnızca insana özgü olup olmadığını araştırmak ve ahlaki davranışın duygular tarafından üretildiği anlamında duyguların ahlakın temeli olduğunu tartışmaktır. İleri sürdüğüm bu fikri desteklemek için öncelikle duyguların doğasını ve işlevini araştırmak niyetindeyim. Ayrıca, biyolojimizin bizi çevreleyen şeyleri önemsemeye ittiğini öne süren evrimsel bir bakış açısını benimsiyorum. Bu iddiaya uygun olarak, hem natüralist filozofların hem de evrimci bilim insanlarının bakış açılarından ahlaki yargıların ve ahlaki inançların bilişsel olmayan bir şekilde açıklanıp açıklanamayacağını irdelemeye çalışıyorum. Buna göre, ahlaki yargının önermesel olmayan, psikolojik bir tutum olduğu görüşünü savunuyorum. Çağdaş bir perspektiften, Hume'un ahlaki yargı yorumunun bilişsel ve önermesel olmayan bir tutum benimsediğini iddia edebiliriz. Dahası, ahlaki yargı, olguları tanımlayan ve doğruluğu değerlendirilebilir bir önermeleri ifade etmez; daha ziyade duyguları ifade eder. Bu anlamda ahlaki yargı, belirli bir duyguyu hissetmeye yönelik psikolojik bir eğilimdir ve buna göre belirli duygu, ahlaki yargı açısından onaylanma veya onaylanmamayı içerir.

Son olarak, ahlaki yargı ahlaki bir özne olmanın en önemli unsuru olarak kabul edildiğinden ve ahlaki yargıyı tam olarak yukarıda tarif ettiğim şekilde açıklayabilirsem, hayvanlarda ahlaka yer açacaktır. Başka bir deyişle, ahlaki yargının önermesel olmadığı görüşüm, insan olmayan hayvanlara ahlak atfedebileceğimiz fikrini desteklemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hayvan Ahlakı, Evrimsel Etik, Duygular, İnsanmerkezci olmayan Etik, Önermesel olmayan Yargılar





To all beings who feel

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office
than to serve and obey them
Hume (1739/2007, p. 266)

Since the Ancient times, what moral rules are (descriptive), what they should be (normative), and why there are these rules (explanatory/metaethical) have been a matter of debate. My research question, as to whether morality is exclusively human morality or there can also be nonhuman (animal) morality, requires a clarification about the nature of morality. I believe inquiries into moral rules, trying to distinguish between right and wrong, and to construct new moral theories will not tell us much about the nature of morality, as a natural phenomenon. When we regard morality as a natural phenomenon, even when exclusively about humans, the temptation to ask why it must be uniquely human cannot be resisted. Those who investigate human nature merely from socio-psychological perspective, in order to understand the nature of morality, often argue that human morality can be understood only as an emergent phenomenon. Surprisingly some sociobiologists (now evolutionary psychologists) happily agree with seeing morality as an emergent *human* phenomenon. In a sense, they assert that humans are the only species that can cross the boundaries of their biology for creating culture extending beyond their nature, and that morality can only be produced by culture, i.e., human culture. In accordance with this assertion, what is observed in nonhuman animals is mostly considered as merely *moral-like* behavior (Aaltola, 2012; J. Callicott, 1984; Campbell, 2007; Dacher Keltner, Horberg, & Oveis, 2006; Killen, M., & de Waal, 2000) or “building blocks of morality” (Joyce, 2006), rather than genuine moral behavior. Only very few in the scientific community believe “at least a core subset of the

psychological capacities that underlie human morality are far from uniquely human, but are rather things that we share with many social animals” (S. Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 1152). It is a highly questionable discrimination between very similar behaviors which are recorded by scientific experiments in non-human animals, which will be elaborated in the following sections in detail. The question I have in mind is whether the so-called moral-like behaviors are evidence for some kind of morality in nonhuman animals.

There is an underlying reason for the distinction between human behaviors and nonhuman animal behaviors: humans change the environment surrounding them by their cumulative knowledge and technology while nonhumans adapt to the environment with their restricted behavioral repertoire. However, I believe that it should be questioned whether we need, and it is accurate, to distinguish between human and nonhuman behavior. If we expect exactly the same behaviors, we may not find unequivocal moral-like behaviors in all human individuals. Although everyone agrees that moral-like behaviors have been adequately observed in some animals, many argue that these are not moral behaviors, thus, we cannot attribute morality to non-human animals. If we consider, for instance, the views that associate moral behaviors with emotions, then we might start wondering in what ways human moral behavior would be different from “moral-like” behaviors of animals, since humans and animals share many emotions. So, what makes us think of human moral behavior any different from non-human moral-like behavior?

If moral behavior has evolved through evolutionary processes, and the pre-human behavior is called *merely* moral-like, human evolution may seem to be cut off from earlier evolution. Perhaps, we should call nonhuman behavior “primordial moral behavior” (Dacher Keltner *et al.*, 2006) in order to point out more continuous change in time. Since primordial moral behavior is quite different from moral-like behavior by its very definition, it would be more plausible to use it instead of moral-like behavior in order to refer to the origins of morality in the evolutionary process. Primordial moral behavior mainly has a

reference to temporal change as a more primitive version of moral behaviors in the evolutionary process. On the other hand, moral-like behavior does not point to the evolutionary process, although it shares common features with moral behavior, but it is not exactly as the same as moral behavior. According to the social intuitionist approach (Haidt, 2001), daily living activities such as food sharing and playing are the starting point for morality by which we can trace evolutionary origins. This is an alternative approach to rationalist since moral judgments are not a consequence of reasoning and reflection. The question that Haidt (2001) asked, “what model of moral judgment allows a person to know that something is wrong without knowing why?”, is important to head towards morality in the light of evolutionary thinking. According to the social intuitionist approach, “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments” (Haidt, 2001). The moral intuition language can misguide the reader; however, Haidt warns us that moral intuition is not a kind of reasoning, rather it is a quick response. The social part of this approach also comes from the presence of others who supply interpersonal demands such as cooperation and commitment.

I think the moral-like-behavior language does not comply with other possible conceptions of morality because it is a very conservative approach to morality. Then, what are these characteristics that humans attribute to themselves for themselves? These characteristics are reason, free will, self-consciousness, language, and so on. They not only possess these characteristics, but also declare that they are the sole species who have those. Therefore, they are the sole species who have morality. Even if they encounter very similar behaviors in nonhuman animals, for instance, getting angry when noticing some inequality (Brosnan, 2013), and punishment for promoting cooperation (Raihani *et al.*, 2012)¹, since they have the prejudice mentioned above, they call them *just* moral-like behavior. Hence, everything in all cases always points to the same creatures, namely humans, the sole owner of morality, and to the characteristics that only they have. Therefore, we need to question whether morality is possible without

¹ These examples will be elaborated in detail later.

resorting to these characteristics. If it is possible, then nonhuman behaviors should not be merely moral like. The distinction between moral and moral-like behaviors is similar to the distinction between social and moral behavior which, according to some, is very rigid. What makes us think that there is such a sharp distinction? Are not social behaviors as significant as moral behaviors? Do we attribute some divine property to moral behaviors in order to differentiate them from other social behaviors when we encounter them in non-humans?² Perhaps, if we identified all moral behavior with social behavior, and refuse the distinction, the problem would vanish. Some also think that social behaviors involve moral behaviors, for moral behavior is just a subset of social behavior.

I think humans have always distinguished themselves from other species and enjoyed the privilege of being a unique kind. I humbly think that this feeling-privileged has often been misleading in the history of science, and still continues to be so. However, since the modern evolutionary theory does not distinguish between animals and humans so rigidly regarding other matters what could be the reason for this feeling of privileged and whether there is a valid ground to have such a feeling? Since the agricultural revolution, that occurred around 10,000 years ago, humans have been accepted to be the creator and the first owner of culture.³ They think that something was unique to them, such as language, art, science, religion, etc. People who separate themselves from other species by these characteristics have tried to protect their privileged status. The point missed here is that each single species may have a feature that renders it unique. As the lack of wings or sharp claws do not always cause us to be deficient, the same is true of other species. However, the idea was that if humans were the only one with these characteristics, then they were the only rational beings. They developed the same idea for their behaviors that humans were the

² Although many empirical studies have been conducted on this problem, which will be detailed in later chapters, it is still not resolved.

³ It has begun to be claimed that it goes back to 12.000 years ago; but it is another matter of debate.

only beings who have morality. However, my claim here is that rationality is not necessary for morality.⁴

Furthermore, analyzing moral behavior would enable us to gain significant insight into what exactly morality is. In the second chapter, I will present the traditional definition of morality and I will then try to define morality's boundaries to the extent that non-human animals can also be involved in morality's functioning. If we were to list the expectations, then we might discover a manner by which to present a model for the emergence of morality; namely, this model explains how morality can maintain a social order, has a prosocial tendency, involves an indirect benefit to the self, motivates helpful behaviors, provides both care and support, and enforces or improves integrity. If I aim to attribute morality to non-human animals, then it seems appropriate to adopt an evolutionary perspective. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I will examine the evolutionary origins of morality. In light of these explanations and interpretations, I suggest tentatively that emotions are the basis of morality in the sense that moral behaviors are exhibited by means of emotions. By doing this, I plan to expand the scope of moral behaviors from human species to some animal species. It should be noted that many commentators who accept moral emotions as the basis of morality restrict it to humans believe that similar behaviors that are moral-like apply to non-human primates (Dacher Keltner *et al.*, 2006). For this very reason, I aim to criticize not only those who defend traditional rational ethics, but also those who both defend naturalized ethics and restrict it to humans, such as Joyce, Keltner, Prinz, Ayala, and Searle. This assertion requires a discussion of emotions.

The first thing I will do to support my suggestion is to investigate the nature and function of emotions, which I will then examine in Chapter 3. I will also study the functioning and nature of emotions through the theories put forward about emotions. Once this task has been completed, I will proceed by trying to

⁴ I will not discuss the question of whether some other species are also rational at least for now since it is the concern of another discussion.

understand the relationship between emotion and morality in Chapter 4. Although we can rationally justify our moral actions, we have emotions that accompany these moral actions; I will aim to understand and elucidate why this is. Moreover, I will try to clarify how an emotion can turn out to be a moral emotion. I will not call it a “moral emotion”, but this term is applicable, at least provisionally. In the 5th and final chapter, I will put forward my approach to emotions and morality, which emerged from the problem of categorizing emotions, in light of all of the data obtained from the literature. Therefore, I will suggest that the attribution of categorical distinction to emotions as basic, non-basic, social, non-social, or moral should be rejected. This suggestion not only excludes the characteristic features of emotions, but also enables an inclusive analysis, the aim of which is to determine whether or not emotions share a common feature. I will try to explain it as follows: first, emotions evolved to have adaptive functions in order to meet specific survival-related needs. However, emotions then acquired new functions after socialization. I will explain how emotions gain new function through exaptation.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT IS MORALITY?

Attempting to define morality is trying to determine the boundaries of morality. A definition of morality can pave the way for answering whether the boundary circumscribes only humans or it can be expanded to include non-human animals, and how far it can be expanded. So, I suggest that we should abandon the old-fashioned and orthodox definitions of morality and make room for new ones.

Although the answer to “what is morality?” seems to be applicable to all societies or cultures at first in the sense that it is regarded as a system that leads to good (whatever it is) and right (whatever it is) behaviors, it apparently differs for philosophers and societies. The most common and agreeable answers may be listed as follows: “certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group, or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or, normatively referring to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons” (Bernard and Gert, 2020), and, “moral virtue; behavior conforming to moral law or accepted moral standards, esp. in relation to sexual matters; personal qualities judged to be good” (“Morality,” n.d.).

When we think about the concepts in these definitions, it will be possible to give different answers to the question of morality because some concepts in these definitions are problematic. The first one is “rational”. We all understand more or less what rational means. However, who or which beings are rational and what the conditions of rationality/being rational are rather vague. In addition, the reason why rationality should be a necessary condition of morality is also ambiguous. Having rationality as a necessary condition of morality can be seen

consistent with traditional moral philosophies. I personally have reservations for the view that rationality is a necessary condition of morality.⁵

I think such problematic concepts should actually alarm us to question our position about morality. The relationship between morality and rationality seems like moving in a circle. Rationality does not entail morality as morality entails rationality. Still, if we look closely, we see that the concept in the definition of morality defines itself. That is, morality is defined by rationality and those who say that rationality is necessary for the definition of morality are also those who think that they possess rationality. In such statements as “humans are the mere species who are rational” and “morality is uniquely human”, the terms ‘rational’ and ‘morality’ seem to be allocated to humans, thereby restricted to humans. To be more precise, this restriction can be expressed as follows: even though the concept of human being does not exist in the definitions of morality given above, it is accepted what is meant by rational being is merely humans⁶ as an indubitable consequence of such an inference. The definitions also suppose rationality to be human attribute since the definition does not refer to the rational *beings*, but it refers to the rational *persons*. When we see moral-like behaviors in rational beings, we attribute morality to them. When we see such behaviors in non-rational beings as well, should we attribute morality to them as well? Should we call them rational, moral or both? Then, we have to change our definition of morality. I think that it is moral behaviors themselves that should lead us in what direction we should go if we want to make such a change. Hence, re-definition of morality requires whether we encounter moral behaviors in a species or not.

2.1. Evolutionary Origins of Morality

I think the belief that morality is uniquely human is taken for granted and rarely questioned. Questioning this uniqueness may put an end to some human

⁵ I will refer to various empirical research that indicate otherwise in this study.

⁶ Very few agree that non-human animals are also rational.

privileges like moral superiority. Non-human animals exhibit similar behaviors under experimental conditions.⁷ The question is, shouldn't we then attribute moral quality to these behaviors?^{8,9} I will not adopt the orthodox attitude that morality is uniquely human toward morality, and I will try to interpret non-human animal behavior in the same way as human behavior. So, we need to touch upon the general consideration about the evolutionary origins of morality. In this context, let me review very briefly evolutionary aspects of morality such as altruism and cooperation. I will address de Waal's own observation on cooperation:

I have regularly seen chimps use long sticks as ladders to get across hot wire surrounding live beech trees; one chimp holds the stick while another scales it to reach fresh leaves without getting shocked. We have also videotaped two adolescent females who regularly tried to reach the window of my office, which overlooks the chimp compound at the Yerkes Field Station. Both females would exchange hand gestures while moving a heavy plastic drum right underneath my window. One ape would jump onto the drum, after which the other would climb on top of her and stand on her shoulders. The two females would then synchronously bob up and down like a giant spring; the one standing on top would reach for my window every time she came close (de Waal, 2016, pp. 188–189).

It does not make much sense to explain cooperative behaviors of these two monkeys as automatic and instinctive behavior. It is quite clear that it indicates to the ability to act together and for each other which is a social behavior. Fitzpatrick (2017) states that altruism and cooperation are the central issues

⁷ In many experiments, it has been observed that some non-human animals have language learning skills (American Sign Language) and highly complicated behaviors such as accountability, learning, recognizing objects/persons, predicting the behaviors of others and acting accordingly.

⁸ If the behaviors we encounter in non-human animals are the same as our own behavior and we regard ours as moral behavior, admitting that the behaviors of non-human animals are not moral behavior may not be consistent.

⁹ Here, I do not discuss whether or not other living beings have moral value for us and they are situated in the domain of morality. Most likely, they are; moreover, the moral agent-moral patient distinction is needed to clarify it. However, what I address here is whether we can approach non-human animals as moral agents.

about morality arguing for a naturalistic account.¹⁰ A behavior is altruistic if it increases the fitness of other organisms in the evolutionary sense (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 17), and a behavior is altruistic if it is motivated by the ultimate desires for the well-being of others in the psychological sense. In the psychological sense, altruistic motives allow one to take care of their children, or to help others. In the evolutionary sense, Sober (1988, p. 83) claims that “it is better to be selfish, [but] it is better to live among altruists than among selfish individuals”. Altruistic behaviors can be advantageous within the groups because altruists care for the benefits of others in those groups. Altruistic behaviors are also encountered in a variety of species from bees to humans.

[Evolutionary biology] claims to explain such apparently altruistic traits as the bee’s barbed stinger and human morality. These and other characteristics are said to be only apparently altruistic because individuals who help others receive benefits in return or promote their “genetic self-interest” by helping copies of their own genes that are found in the bodies of others (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 6).

This consideration is the reason for addressing the selfish/egoistic^{11,12} and altruistic behaviors because helping behaviors sometimes are performed to

¹⁰ E. O. Wilson (1975, p. 3) identifies altruism as the central theoretical problem of sociobiology.

¹¹ Sober & Wilson (1998, p. 202) use terms evolutionary altruism and evolutionary selfishness versus psychological altruism and psychological egoism, even the terms coincide.

¹² At first it may not be so easy to make a distinction between an egoist and selfish, and the question of why such a distinction should be made can arise. I will try to make them clear respectively. First, there is a very thin line separating them: “Egoist individual desires their own well-being, and nothing else, as an end in itself. If you care about the well-being of others, this is only because you think the well-being of others is related to benefiting yourself” (Sober & Wilson, 1998, pp. 224–225). The meaning of others is different for the egoist and selfish in terms of the relationship between one and other. Egoists tend to lean towards their own interest, and egoists do not equate themselves with others; they establish a hierarchy entirely by themselves and for themselves as me-before and me-after in a certain time. In other words, they always compete with themselves demanding to be more than themselves. The selfish is similar with the egoist in the sense that they both tend towards their own interest. However, the selfish always constructs their living space in a place where others reside. She establishes a hierarchy over others, and behaving in order to have a better position than others. The distinction between egoist and selfish is important with regard to how the other is approached by both egoist and selfish. The way that one approaches to others specifies the position of egoist and selfish in terms of moral behavior. That is, the egoist can help others by caring for one’s own well-being, assuming that helping others can also benefit oneself because egoism can be dominant in human

receive benefit in return which makes altruistic behaviors difficult to understand. When selfish behavior is self-directed, altruistic behavior is other-directed. To clarify, “[w]hen self-interest and the welfare of others coincide, it will be impossible to say whether the resulting behavior was produced by egoistic motives, by altruistic motives, or both” (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 249). For self-oriented, self-directed individuals to be able to maintain their lives in a social environment, their behaviors need to be other-directed even if their thoughts and ultimate goals are self-interested since we cannot always understand the ultimate goal of others whether they are self-interested or care for the welfare of others. The question of why this would be important can arise. At first glance, it seems inessential for this subject to take place in this study. However, the possibility of self-directed behaviors being regarded as moral behaviors may enable behaviors that are triggered by unappreciated emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust to be regarded as moral behaviors. The question arises about whether moral behaviors are triggered by self-directed or other-directed reasons. Although the egoist helps others to receive benefit in return, altruist also helps others to receive benefit in return (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 6). It would not be incomprehensible to say that helping others for receiving benefit in return is self-interest even for an altruist. Altruism is required for morality from evolutionary perspective, and moral behaviors are regarded as altruistically motivated by the desire to promote the welfare of others without receiving benefit in return.

Donating to charity can be considered as a behavior that only benevolent humans exhibit. However, a very egoistic person can make a donation when she comes across a charity advertising (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 242). The result of the behavior seems to be positive on the surface, but in reality, the egoistic person does it to satisfy merely their ego. Thus, those who act with egoistic motivations

motivation. However, the selfish does not have motivation to help others. On the contrary, selfish may even think that helping others can be disadvantageous for oneself. So, egoist can behave seemingly moral, but selfish cannot behave so.¹² On the other hand, some others claim that egoism and selfishness is incompatible with morality assuming that self should be excluded, and welfare of others should be prior to one’s own welfare (Stich *et al.*, 2010, p. 148).

can exhibit a moral behavior (at least from a consequentialist perspective). How does it happen? Egoistic behavior can be defined as self-directed behavior that provides the fulfillment of a person's self as self-confidence or self-esteem. An egoist, at first, aims to fulfill her needs or desires. The charity example above may be related to self-esteem because she wants to be seen and known as a benefactor person, and she is strengthening her self-confidence through which she believes she can be more than what she is now. When we think of an egoist who does somebody a favor, we need to know whether this kindness will create a positive feeling about her. At first, she seems to consider the benefit of the other, but then she certainly receives a share from it. It can be inferred that it is much more than being self-directed. This profit can provide satisfaction for her ego, but she estimates the consequences.

Furthermore, being self-directed does not mean that it need be egoistic/selfish. For instance, even if smoking is harmful to health, the individual continues to smoke so as not to be deprived of the pleasure of smoking.¹³ Apart from passive smoking, smoking has nothing to do with others. It is just something that concerns oneself. It would have been selfish if there had been a benefit, but we can only mention the enjoyment of smoking here; instead of profit, we could speak of the harm. Such harm has no advantage over others. It is a situation that is completely self-directed although smoking is associated with situations such as conforming to social environment, habit, and enjoyment. However, that smoking is a selfish/egoist behavior is not plausible to admit. That is to say, every selfish/egoist behavior is self-directed; however, every self-directed behavior might not *always* be selfish/egoist. Moreover, it is considered as if altruism means that it is *always* other-directed. However, altruistic individuals also regard welfare for themselves (Sober & Wilson, 1998, p. 246).

The other important point about evolutionary origins of morality is our similarities/differences with our closest relatives, namely chimpanzees, that are

¹³ The example of smoking is not about moral behaviors; however, it is a good one for indicating the distinction between the concepts of self-directed, other-directed, selfish, egoist, and altruistic.

often questioned and compared. Chimpanzees are intriguing subjects to see if morality can indeed be approached from evolutionary perspective. However, those who argue that morality is uniquely human would object to this. The questions, “Do chimpanzees punish others for impure acts or violations of duties? And if they do not, why do they not? Are there species-specific characteristics or facets of social organization that make humans care about purity or duties while chimpanzees do not?” (Keltner *et al.*, 2006, p. 212), point to the lack of some characteristics in chimpanzees in social organizations. Keltner *et al.* think that chimpanzees do not punish others for violations like we do by asking these questions. In a sense, according to them, morality is uniquely human, and we cannot find the traces of morality in the evolutionary past. However, humans may not be the only species that care for and punish others when we look closer to animal behavior. Chimpanzees punish others for many acts and violations. Perhaps Keltner *et al.* are saying that chimpanzees do not have the third party punishment that is an objective decision making system, executed by someone other than those who do the harm or get harmed in a conflict and violation. Although there are those who assert that third party punishment is not part of chimpanzees’ social organization (Riedla *et al.*, 2012), some observations have encountered events in which individuals who do not harm or do not get harmed, but witness the event, do not punish others as third party but solve the problem. For instance, a female chimpanzee solves a problem between two young chimpanzees who cannot share a branch of tree by splitting it into two, without punishing them by taking the branch from them when they do not come to an agreement about who gets the tree branch (de Waal, 2016, p. 176). This might not be an example of third party punishment, but might be an example for third party reconciliation. This observation shows that the third party punishment may not be the foremost property for the social maintenance; rather, third party reconciliation may be sufficient.

Two female chimps were sitting in the sun, with their children rolling around in the sand in front of them. When the play turned into a screaming, hair-pulling fight, neither mother knew what to do because if one of them tried to break up the fight, it was guaranteed that the other would protect her offspring, since

mothers are never impartial. It is not unusual for a juvenile quarrel to escalate into an adult fight. Both mothers nervously monitored each other as well as the fight. Noticing the alpha female, Mama, asleep nearby, one of them went over to poke her in the ribs. As the old matriarch got up, the mother pointed at the fight by swinging an arm in its direction. Mama needed only one glance to grasp what was going on and took a step forward with a threatening grunt. Her authority was such that this shut up the youngsters. The mother had found a quick and efficient solution to her problem, relying on the mutual understanding typical of chimpanzees (de Waal, 2016, p. 67).

We can see the quote above when chimpanzees encounter a problem, it is subtly resolved by third parties. We also see that this third person has authority as the alpha leader in the group. Besides, chimpanzees can be a good starting point; however, to focus solely on chimpanzees is a sort of “chimpocentrism” in the words of de Waal, which is another version of anthropocentrism (de Waal, 2016, p. 162).

The obvious common ground between current evolutionary and developmental approaches is that, instead of looking at human morality as coming from the outside—imposed by adults on the passive child, or imposed by culture on a fundamentally nasty human nature—it is generated from the inside. What we mean by “inside” is *not* that things happen in isolation from outside influences: evolution operates on the basis of ecological pressures, which come from the outside, and development takes place in constant interplay with the outside world. What we mean instead is that the decision making and emotions underlying moral judgments are generated within the individual rather than being simply imposed by society. They are a product of evolution, an integrated part of the human genetic makeup, that makes the child construct a moral perspective through interactions with other members of its species (Killen, M., & de Waal, 2000).

The quote above points to the connection between morality and the social environment from an evolutionary perspective. Although morality is thought to be generated externally—as a product of human culture, or imposed rules—it may not occur external to us. That is, we may find the rules that should be obeyed and behave accordingly by our internal experiences. It may occur internally in us by means of evolutionary products, such as emotions. Emotion as a product of evolution points out to a state—an internal state. Even though emotion is internal to us, it plays a significant role in the interaction that individuals establish with others. Moreover, this role of emotion is to ensure occurrence of moral judgments/behaviors in the interaction between individuals.

CHAPTER 3

EMOTIONS

Emotions are the cornerstone of this thesis because I adopt an emotion-based understanding of morality. In accordance with it, the conception of morality that the present dissertation highlights will hereafter allow its code of conduct to be formed by individuals with regard to emotionality. In this chapter, emotion theories, types of emotions, and the relationship between emotion and morality will be examined.

The answer to the question as to why we should prefer emotions instead of reasoning in order to investigate the foundation of morality is hidden in the characteristics of emotions. In this regard, Plutchik (1980) claims that emotions have adaptive functions, they allow us to react quickly. We do not think about too long while we decide or act; we behave as if we already knew what was right or wrong. Moreover, at this point, the questions that should be answered may be like the following. What kind of emotions is involved in social settings? Do we need a distinct kind of emotions, namely “moral emotions”, in the first place? Then, what might emotions hint at about morality? What might we understand from this hint about emotions in individuals while taking into consideration morality? The question is whether one of the fundamental functions of the emotions is to elicit moral behavior in a group or a society. Since emotions arise in individuals, how can emotions be effective within a group? If emotions are individual adaptations how can they have social functions as well? Can group selection be a significant factor for it? To investigate these questions can lead us to a better understanding of the nature of emotions.

In order to show the significance of emotions regarding the essence of morality, I will first investigate various conceptions of emotions in the literature. Second, I

will inquire into studies and debates about the origin of emotions. Then, I will also examine what the function of emotions may be.

The first modern and rather broad description of what an emotion is may be “a distinct bodily expression” (James, 1884, p. 189). William James made a comprehensive conception of emotions by stating that “bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion (*ibid.*, p. 189-190).” The conception can be misleading since it gives us the impression that James may have said that two things happen respectively when emotion arises; a bodily change, and afterwards the perception of this change, since James stated that “bodily manifestation must be first interposed” (*ibid.*, p. 190). However, he emphasized that emotion is both a bodily expression and it is perceived. Accordingly, this perception of the change in the body is called emotion.

Paul Ekman¹⁴ was the first to distinguish certain emotions as *basic emotions*, namely fear, anger, disgust, sadness, enjoyment, and surprise, by investigating these emotions in different cultures. He concluded that basic emotions are universal since the facial expressions that appear are the result of these emotions that are the same in different cultures (Prinz, 2004). Later, Ekman expanded his list of basic emotions to include “amusement, contempt, contentment, embarrassment, excitement, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame” (*ibid.*, p. 2). Ekman has nine criteria (nonetheless, he accepts that the last four criteria are interpretative, but they are consistent) to determine whether an emotion is basic. There are also specific criteria designated by Ekman to prove that basic emotions are innate. These are facial expressions (each basic emotion has a specific facial expression), presence of emotions in other primates (we share basic emotions with other primates), distinctive physiology (basic emotions have also distinctive patterns of autonomic nervous system activity), distinctive universal in antecedent events (basic emotions have evolved to deal with fundamental life-tasks; each basic emotion has a distinctive

¹⁴ Some references to Ekman are in Prinz (2004).

fundamental task, and it is universal), coherence among emotional response (there are autonomic changes in the body during an emotional state), quick onset (basic emotions occur so quickly before one is aware that they have started), brief duration (for seconds, not minutes), automatic appraisal (appraisal without awareness), and unbidden occurrence (unrestrainable by us, so we do not choose what we feel) (Ekman, 1992). These distinctive universal expressions are robust evidence to distinguish basic emotions by research on facial expressions across different cultures. Other emotions have not been accepted as basic emotions not because they do not have facial expressions, but because they have not been studied enough cross-culturally yet to emphasize their universality. Emotional expressions are also essential to the development and maintaining of social relationships. However, Ekman does not insist that basic emotions are universal by evolution; an emotion can be universal by social learning for all members of the species. By doing that, he paves the way for the social constructionist to accept the universality of emotions.

Both emotions and their effects as behavioral response take us to investigate the origin of emotions in order to find the underlying reason for the emergence of both emotion and behavior. There are mainly two distinct approaches to the origin of emotions. The approaches endorsed by evolutionary psychologists is that emotions are adaptations, namely the products of natural selection. They also accept guilt, love, jealousy as adaptive emotions. The other approach is that emotions are socially constructed and they vary across different cultures. This view is supported by social constructionists such as Averill and Solomon. Both approaches are supported by considerable evidence.

In fact, both evolutionary psychologists and social constructionists have strongly supported their claims. From the viewpoint of evolutionary psychology, emotions are bodily responses associated with the autonomic nervous system. However, evolutionary psychologists underrate the influences of social-cultural learning. They are mostly interested in how emotions evolved. On the other hand, social constructionists overrate the cognition, and pretend as if emotions

did not depend upon our biology. As an alternative, Prinz (2004) suggests a *unified* theory that treats all emotions as structurally similar, instead of offering hybrid theories, which state that some emotions are adaptive, and some emotions are socially constructed. According to this unified theory, non-basic emotions consist of basic emotion and cognitive judgment and because of their cognitive aspect, non-basic emotions are modifiable by cultural variation. “All emotions are typically (if not always) accompanied by expressive behavior and bodily responses, all are motivating, all are eruptive, all are valenced, and all can affect attention and memory. All emotions also seem to involve overlapping brain structures, and all can be affected by the same clinical conditions” (Prinz, 2004, p. 8). For Prinz, it seems that all emotions are bodily responses in the brain activities, motivating behaviors. Moreover, when such a distinction between evolved and constructed emotions is provided, the definition of emotions might alter since emotions are not bodily, but rather cognitive states. For instance, “guilt is not associated with bodily state, rather it is associated with complex patterns of behavior; anger is not an animal reflex, but a sophisticated moral attitude” (Prinz, 2004, p. 6-7). Furthermore, he points out that other theorists do not care about what emotions really represent. “We run when we are afraid. Why? It’s certainly not because our hearts are racing. Fear makes us run because fear represents danger. Sadness represents loss, anger represents offenses, and so on” (*ibid.*, p. 13). Such emotions have the function of danger detector. Accordingly, Prinz proposes an embodied appraisal theory: emotions are embodied because they are perceptions of bodily changes, and they are appraisals because they represent matters of concern.

There are also those who define emotions in the following way:

One broad evolutionary model views emotions as superordinate cognitive programs that help us to activate and select the subset of cognitive strategies best suited to deal with particular adaptive problems in social cognitive tasks. Another cognitive function of emotions—such as love and guilt—may be that they operate as commitment devices, helping us to sustain long-term adaptive strategies against superficially attractive short-term rewards (Forgas, 2008, p. 95).

This understanding of emotions supports that emotions enable individuals to adapt to social environments in which they exist. Individuals do not survive by only adapting to climate and weather conditions, and by finding solutions to nutrition or health problems, but also deal with others surrounding them. So social conditions of individuals have been also studied at cognitive level. The process explaining the association of emotions with social situations in brain regions at cognitive level is as follows:

Neural structures associated in emotion processing, such as amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex, also participate in social information processing. Conversely, neural structures involved in social cognition, such as orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex, fusiform gyrus, and inferior frontal gyrus, are also involved in emotional processing. These findings are consistent with evolutionary principles suggesting that the pressures for dealing with significant stimuli led to the comingling of structure and function in the social and emotional brain areas. Thus, emotion regions tend to be involved in the processing of social stimuli, and the social-cognitive regions are also involved in the processing of emotional stimuli. The adaptive advantage of responding flexibly to social stimuli may have been enhanced by co-opting affective neural systems that originally evolved to deal with hedonic events (*ibid.*).

Although it is mostly assumed that emotions affect the self directly, the studies about emotional brain areas show that emotions are also sensitive to social stimuli. This also supports the view that humans devote themselves to concern about social conditions that do not have a direct affect for their own self (Haidt, 2003). In this sense, concern, as other-oriented emotion, has important interpersonal functions to maintain the social relationship such as drawing us together or pushing us apart under appropriate circumstances. Emotions are primarily for oneself, but they do not have to be just for oneself, because individuals are not only intrapersonal beings, but also interpersonal ones.¹⁵ Whereas emotions are intrapersonal reactions and arise to solve intrapersonal problems, they have also interpersonal effects to maintain the social relationships and to solve the problems that arise in social relationships (Dacher Keltner & Haidt, 1999; B Parkinson, 1996).

¹⁵ Intrapersonal is self-oriented and the objects of emotion intrapersonally are individuals themselves. Interpersonal is other-oriented and the objects of emotion interpersonally are others.

These aspects can be explicated as the effect of an emotion arising in an individual upon another individual's behavior. The effect of an emotion arising in an individual upon another individual's behavior may be twofold: revealing an emotion in an individual by a behavior of another individual and revealing a behavior in an individual by an emotional expression of another individual. What we understand from these aspects is that emotions are not just intrapersonal reactions that have an effect only on individuals' own behaviors; they are also social reactions and have effect on both emotions and behaviors of others. Hence, it can be asserted that the nature of emotions is also associated with sociability.

Now, the question is how emotions that occur in the bodies of the individuals can have such an influence on others. When a specific emotion arises in an individual's body, a specific bodily response, such as facial expression, appears, which is different from other bodily responses of emotions such as sweating, increase in the heart rate, dryness of the mouth (LaBar, 2016, p. 761). Person's facial expressions transfer the information about their emotions to another person. This information transfer influences both the emotion and the behavior of the other who are exposed to that expression (Van Kleef, 2009). This can be called an emotional communication that enables social interactions by facial or behavioral expressions without appealing to any verbal exchange about the emotional states. Keltner and Haidt (1999) support this idea by stating that "emotional expressions *help individuals know others' emotions, beliefs, and intentions*, thus rapidly coordinating social interactions" (p. 511). It is plausible to say that social interaction is maintained effectively in the way that the transfer of the information about emotions occurs and it accelerates the process of this transfer. Hence, the transfer has a significant effect on social interaction in order to obtain the emotional information about others regarding changing or modifying behaviors and emotions. And accordingly, it is both a natural and a social reference to have the knowledge of others' emotion and to associate the emotion with a certain behavioral trait or change. Since reproduction and survival rely on raising the young and caring for their needs, comprehending

emotional state of others is significant. Empathy allows one to quickly and automatically comprehend the emotional states of others. “It is essential for reproduction, since mammalian mothers need to be sensitive to the emotional states of their offspring, when they are cold, hungry, or in danger. Empathy is a biological imperative” (de Waal, 2016, p. 132). We can emphasize the biological necessity of *having knowledge* of the emotional states of others *without* appealing to high cognitive capabilities. Biological background of empathy can be originated by the parental care long before our species evolves (de Waal, 2008).

3.1. Theories of Emotions

In contemporary studies, emotions have been approached from psychological, behavioral, cognitive, philosophical, biological, and cultural perspectives and have been interpreted differently in accordance with each of these perspectives. I will briefly introduce them in the background to support the claim that morality is based on emotions.

3.1.1. Psychological Theories of Emotions

Let me start with the psychological theories. The first of the psychological theories I want to touch upon is the somatic theory, which claims that emotions are just bodily changes. This theory is based on the philosophy of William James according to whom, the emergence of an emotion is like the following: first, one perceives an object, then this perception causes a bodily change, such as increase in the heart rate, dryness in the mouth, trembling in the body, and spasm in the stomach, etc. The feeling of this bodily change is called emotion (James, 1884). What is important for James’s theory is that emotions are felt bodily. If bodily feelings are gone, one cannot address emotional experience. That is why this is called *somatic feeling theory* of emotions. After James, Damasio developed his theory that is the same in the base structure as the somatic theory, but differs in

the range of the body. The differences that Damasio (1994) put forward can be listed as follows:

- i. Emotions are bodily changes at the levels of chemicals in the brain.
- ii. There is no need for conscious awareness.
- iii. There can be changes in the brain, but not always in the body.

According to Damasio, the range of bodily changes can be expanded to the level of chemicals in the brain such as changes in hormone levels. The chemicals in the brain can change unconsciously, and unconscious neural changes can be observed in the fMRI. Damasio considers the unconscious neural changes as emotions (Prinz, 2004). Damasio's somatic theory fundamentally differs from James's theory with reference to feelings. For Damasio, in order for an emotion to emerge, there may not be bodily feelings in an individual since it emerges in the brain.

Psychological theory of emotions can also involve behavioral theories of emotions. According to behavioral theories, generally, one can detect an emotion by appealing to behaviors. Of course, behaviors are not independent from bodies, but in detail, behaviors are another dimension of emotions. Since behaviorists such as Skinner, Watson and Ryle are allergic to inner mental states, they prefer to explain emotions by external factors. One assertion about behavioral theory is that there are certain behavioral dispositions associated with certain emotions. For example, babies express distress when constrained and exhibit joy when gently stroked. Another assertion by behavioral theory is that emotions are not behavioral dispositions, rather emotions are behavioral responses to rewards or punishments (Prinz, 2004).

On the other hand, cognitive scientists, such as Solomon and Lazarus, became disinterested in the link between emotions and behavior. They focus on brain level activities such as memory, attention, categorization, reasoning, and thought. Solomon and Lazarus asserted that these faculties interact with

emotions in systematic ways. In the studies of memory, they found that it is easier to recall events when a person is in an emotional state that is congruent with the events that the person recalls. In categorization studies, different emotions tend to promote different actions. Cognitive theorists claim that emotions are identical to thoughts or emotions give rise to certain thoughts (Prinz, 2004). This theory conflicts with the somatic theory. According to cognitive theory of emotions, body is irrelevant. It does not mean that there is no bodily change when an emotion arises; it means that emotion and thought are strongly cohesive and body does not take a significant place in this relationship. Of course, when an emotion arises, bodily changes, facial expressions, and subjective experiences accompany it (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2013). For example, fear can be defined as a belief that there is a danger present and a desire to avoid danger. According to the cognitive theory, emotions are evaluative judgments that construct our world. For instance, anger arises from a solid judgment that one has been violated.

Aside from these, the philosophical theory adopted by Grice, Pitcher and Bedford assumes that emotions are propositional attitudes (Prinz, 2004). Indeed, cognitive theory can subsume the philosophical theory in the sense that emotions are constituted by cognition, not by bodily reactions. A proposition can be described using a declarative sentence. Moreover, a propositional attitude is a mental state consisting of a representation of a proposition and an attitude toward that proposition. Attitudes toward these propositions include believing, supposing, desiring, and so on. Emotions as propositional attitudes means that emotions are attitudes directed toward propositional objects.

3.1.2. Biological Theories of Emotions

When it comes to the biological theory, namely biological reductionism, one hypothesis is that evolution chooses things that confer a survival (and/or reproductive) advantage and if evolution furnished us with emotions in order to detect bodily changes, then detecting bodily changes provides a survival

advantage (Prinz, 2004). Biological reductionists such as Griffiths, Damasio, and Plutchik assert that emotions are adaptations and they are specific psychological responses that evolved to solve various problems faced by our ancestors such as anger that arises with violation, fear that arises with danger, disgust that arises with contaminated food. It is assumed that there are some universally shared emotions, and these emotions that are innate are called basic emotions.¹⁶

This theory is highly supported and hard to refute. Now the following questions arise: How and why have non-basic emotions emerged? What does non-basic emotion mean? What is the difference between basic and non-basic emotions? However, the problem is not with the basic emotions, rather with the so-called non-basic emotions. (I discuss this problem below.)

3.1.3. Social Constructionist Theories of Emotions

To answer the questions above, social constructionism comes on the stage. Social constructionists such as Armon-Jones and Averill assert that emotions are socially constructed, which makes them products of nurture rather than nature (Prinz, 2004). Social constructionists claim that non-basic emotions are cognition-based emotions. They can be learned, transformed, renewed, socially constructed, and culturally-variable. What are their arguments? The strongest one is obvious: not all cultures share the same emotions. They insist that love and jealousy are rather modern emotions, which primitive tribes do not have in their repertoire. Social constructionists believe that the life style of primitive tribes support their approach. At least in some primitive tribes, such concepts as

¹⁶ Ekman's nine criteria for basic emotions are addressed above. As a reminder: presence of emotions in other primates (we share basic emotions with other primates and this is consistent with the evolutionary explanation; Ekman accepts that all emotions are not shared by both humans and other animals; some emotions might have emerged only in humans), distinctive physiology (basic emotions have also distinctive patterns of autonomic nervous system activity), distinctive universal in antecedent events (basic emotions have evolved to deal with fundamental life-tasks), coherence among emotional response (there are autonomic changes in body during emotional state), quick onset (basic emotions occur so quickly before one is aware that they have started), brief duration (for seconds, not long for minutes), automatic appraisal (appraisal without awareness), and unbidden occurrence (unrestrainable by us, we do not choose what we feel) (Ekman, 1992).

mother, father, wife, and husband do not exist. In these tribes, each child is child of every individual in the community, so they are referred to as shared property, unlike children in modern families. Love and jealousy that preclude sharing something with someone cannot be present in such tribes. However, is this evidence sufficient for social constructionism?

The fundamental dichotomy on the study of emotion arises from the views of biological reductionists and social constructionists since, I think, biological reductionists cannot explain non-basic emotions well, while social constructionists cannot explain basic emotions. Of course, they develop some explanations, but there has been an explanatory gap. To fill this gap, the hybrid theory has been developed which admits that some emotions are adaptations, whereas the other emotions are socially constructed. Those who adopt a compromising attitude as the hybrid theory does, like Oatley and Johnson Laird, assert that emotions have biological basis, but human mind transcends and changes this biological basis; that separates humans from other species (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000). They claim that some emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust are adaptation in all mammals, while other emotions such as guilt, shame, and empathy are uniquely human since these emotions are socially constructed. The claim that these emotions are socially constructed is the idea behind another claim that uniquely human emotions are high-cognitive emotions.

3.2. Negative and Positive Emotions

The question of whether moral emotions should be negative or positive is another concern of moral emotion theories. Some claims that positive emotions bring about positive behaviors, and negative emotions cause negative behaviors whereas others claim that negative emotions promote positive behaviors avoiding negative behaviors. So, we need to discuss emotions that are regarded as positive and negative, and how they have influence upon behaviors. Positive emotions are mostly associated with satisfaction/pleasure. They are expected to provide higher status and approval in the social environment. They are

considered to praise self and the other; in social relationships, the attitude toward positive emotions is “approach” (Solomon & Stone, 2002). Positive emotions are also considered to motivate individuals to follow the rules. On the other hand, negative emotions are mostly associated with upset/pain; they are expected to give lower status and disapproval in the social environment. They are considered to blame self and the other; in social relationships, the attitude toward negative emotions is “avoidance” (Solomon & Stone, 2002). These are what are expected from positive and negative emotions. However, when emotions are examined one by one, it can be the opposite of the expected. For instance, *Schadenfreude*¹⁷ cannot be counted as a positive emotion; however, it is associated with pleasure which is a characteristic of positive emotions. Guilt and shame are complicated in the sense that they are negative emotions toward the self because they make individuals feel upset; yet they are positive emotions toward others motivating the individuals to follow the rules by changing their behavior and to maintain attachment in social relationships. The same is true for fear: it makes individuals feel upset yet it motivates them to follow the rules by avoiding the inappropriate behaviors that society prohibits. In fact, emotions that are classified as positive or negative might not be so different.

Anger is one of the so-called negative emotions. Although anger has a more dominant and negative effect than other emotions from an evolutionary point of view, it emerges as a reaction that motivates behaviors against violations. Anger then becomes a kind of instrument for maintaining social order. So how does this happen? In order to discuss such a condition where anger arises, first of all, there must be a social environment in which such violations as humiliations, threats, and injustice occur even if this environment includes only two individuals or millions of individuals. The point at issue is that an inequality may cause violation when such a violation occurs between two individuals. In such a situation, anger arises in the individual who is exposed to violation of equality. However, it might not be an obstacle for the individual to react against the violation. Besides, if justice turns into injustice in the sense how Thrasymachus

¹⁷ *Schadenfreude* is Pleasure derived from others' suffering or misfortune.

understands it,¹⁸ anger emerges as an inner stimulus in the individual, who notices that there is a social violation. When it is recognized that the ruler who maintains the order is actually disruptive, intensive anger emerges.

Whereas both negative and positive emotions stimulate important social interactions (Rimé, 2009), the negative emotions function as a warning, indicating the need for a motivated reassessment of potentially undesirable responses and may also benefit certain interpersonal behaviors (Forgas, 2008). If we face a challenge, negative emotions arise rapidly and we change our behaviors by cutting off communication or creating a different kind of communication.

Affect also influences information processing. Negative affect can reduce or eliminate such common judgmental mistakes as the fundamental attribution error (Forgas, 1998) by triggering more accommodative and externally oriented thinking (Bless & Fiedler, 2006). Affective influences on processing strategies also influence eyewitness accuracy (Forgas, Vargas, & Laham, 2005). Participants in a negative mood had better eyewitness memory for complex events that they had observed because they were less likely to incorporate misleading information into their eyewitness account (Forgas *et al.*, 2005). These results confirm that negative affect can produce adaptive cognitive benefits in information processing, reducing judgmental errors, and improving eyewitness memory (Forgas, 2008, p. 98).

Emotions manage information processing, and the processing of information in a way requires reconsideration of emotions as a communicative device. In a sense, negative emotions, in case of eye witnessing, prevent the misinformation and undertake an important task in order to provide order in the social environment. In this context, anger and disgust can be considered as the leading emotions among these negative emotions. In fact, it is commonly known that in some cultures negative emotions are recommended to be avoided, in others they are encouraged to maintain social order (Boiger, Mesquita, Uchida, & Barrett, 2013). The idea that one can be moral if negative emotions like anger and

¹⁸ “[Just] is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (Plato, 338c2–3).

disgust are avoided is prevalent. However, even if we may tend to identify morality exclusively with positive effects, we cannot still ignore that morality has negative aspects, or even the negative aspects can be addressed as the headstone of morality.

Are these emotions really negative? What should we understand by negative? It is possible that the perceived impact of an emotion in the society may be negative independently of the emotions. “Negative emotions occur when circumstances interfere with goal-reaching. If the pursuit of a goal is substantially slowed down, or if it is blocked, this results in a negative emotional state (e.g., sadness, anger, fear, shame, etc.). It also stimulates social exchange. In addition, it activates the attachment system” (Rimé, 2009, p. 62). The important issue here is not whether an emotion is negative or positive, but whether an emotion takes place in a social context. That is, a negative emotion that emerges in a social context has a positive impact as well as a negative impact.

Accordingly, emotions can provide social interactions, to involve the other in a way, not to be merely self-directed. In this sense, we should examine how negative emotions such as anger and disgust affect the society when considered as social emotions. Since anger is advised to be avoided in some cultures like Buddhist culture that teaches calmness and serenity, it is mostly accepted that one can only be moral if they avoid anger. However, it should be noted that the avoidance is expected to be practiced by the ruled rather than the ruler. People who are supposed to conform to this advice, however, are those of lower status. On the other hand, those with higher status do not have to suppress their feelings. Another emotion that is regarded as a negative emotion is fear. Fear must have emerged as an adaptation to promote survival in defensive encounters (LeDoux, 2012). It has several benefits including detection of threats, flexibility of response repertoires, avoidance of danger (LaBar, 2016, p.761). Although fear has adaptive function, it also has a social aspect, such as social communication of threat (LaBar, 2016, p. 756). Given the defensive motivation of fear, the social

aspect of fear is encountered in the transmission of threat information. When a threat is detected by an organism, the alarm call is emitted to others who share the same environment. The intensity of threats causes different types of frequency of alarm calls that involve both vocal and facial expressions (LaBar, 2016, p. 757). These alarm calls provide the safety of the environment by defending others against threats not only by individuals themselves, but also by others who share the same environment.

Fear in an individual may trigger behavioral responses to defend the other under threat. For instance, a mother's fear may cause her to act in various ways for her child (Churchland, 2011, p. 30). Fear may cause the mother not to leave her child alone in a possible danger. Fear can give rise to moral behavior such as caring for others. In this regard, fear is not just an emotion felt by those who are under threat but is also an emotion felt when one establishes a bond with others under current or potential threat. Fear is an emotion that appears in order to avoid danger that is not only life-threatening, but also social environment-threatening when individuals put themselves in such a situation as LaBar (2016) stated above. In addition to external threats, our own behaviors can be a threat to ourselves. These behaviors can put us in danger. As long as we do not avoid the behavior that puts us in danger, we are not completely safe. So, the avoidance of danger can be replaced with the avoidance of the behavior itself. What does "to avoid behavior" mean? How is this possible? And how can our behaviors put us in danger? When we are excluded or disapproved, we lose the safe environment provided by social attachment. So what we actually avoid is being excluded or disapproved. Fear can be elicited by the idea of losing this safety. Then, we need to change our behavior to avoid that fear. To be more precise, we avoid that behavior in practice. If we avoid the behaviors that endanger the safe environment, the threat will cease. Fear is still life-sustaining emotion in order to cope with threats. Because the social environment that provides safety has been established, we expect the continuity of this situation. In this regard, fear keeps us alert not to be excluded from the social environment. So, if we think that one of our behaviors would harm us, we avoid it. In this sense, moral behavior does

not occur in solitude. It seems that being with others may be required. So, we should look for the condition that sociability takes place in order to obtain moral behaviors.

3.3. Social Emotions

Social emotions and moral emotions have been sometimes interchangeably used. One of the disputes about moral emotions is whether social emotions are identical with moral emotions. My attempt, here, is to seek answers to the following questions: “Are moral emotions social emotions? Are all social emotions also moral emotions? What emotions are social emotions? And are all emotions social emotions?”

To begin with, it is crucial to examine whether the characteristics of basic emotions are same as or similar to the characteristics of social emotions. Social emotions are considered to stem from social associations. Accordingly, the social associations motivate individuals (i) to gain approval by meeting the expectations of others and (ii) to gain affection, such as love or admiration of others (Ross *et al.*, 1994). Here is a possible answer:

Human emotions are—at least partly—social because they have evolved in a way that led to the incorporation of socio-cognitive considerations into evolutionarily older structures in order to deal with the complexities of human social life. Even the supposedly “basic” emotions of happiness, sadness, anxiety, anger, and disgust are regarded as social because they involve mostly social objects (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008, p. 134).

I agree with the above view because it claims that all emotions have social characteristics; but some emotions are not only partially, but fully social. I would go even one step further suggesting that emotions are not social, but all emotions involve social context, which means that emotions can arise both in social and non-social context. Sociability is *naturally* included in emotions in the sense that basic emotions require being with the others. In other words, the evolution of so

called emotions basic, non-basic, social, moral, and so on, has been possible within a social environment.

What does it really mean for an emotion to be non-social? Comparing basic emotions with social emotions, the characteristics of these two classes that are supposed to be quite different are not robust enough to admit this distinction. In fact, concerning basic emotions, we can observe the same properties attributed to social emotions. I think these characteristics support my conviction. First of all, it has been argued that whereas social emotions are both positively and negatively attributed, basic emotions are mostly negatively attributed (Ross *et al.*, 1994). The negative basic emotions are believed to be anger, fear, disgust, and sadness; the positive one is happiness, and the surprise is indefinite which is why I excluded surprise because it is neither positive, nor negative. Then, do we have to accept that negative emotions do not have positive aspects? For instance, anger is regarded as a negative emotion. However, anger occurs against the violations of one's or groups' rights. Do we regard the standing against the violation of rights as a negative aspect of anger? There are very negative emotions in the set of social emotions that are pride¹⁹, shame, guilt, jealousy, envy, anger and *Schadenfreude*. How can we also so sharply separate negative and positive? For instance, although I listed pride with negative emotions it may also be considered a positive emotion.²⁰ Secondly, social emotions are identified in the way that they have exclusively social concerns associated with the social importance such as status, power, affiliation, and caring about others as attachment since social emotions provide social regulatory functions such as acquiring and sustaining social relationships (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). On the other hand, basic emotions might capture social concerns as well, even if they do not have exclusively social concerns as social emotions (*ibid.*). These social concerns may include tasks, purpose, or cooperation in which individuals take

¹⁹ It is a negative emotion in the sense that it implies an extremely high opinion of oneself.

²⁰ It is a positive emotion in the sense that it suggests respect and esteem, admiration felt towards others or themselves.

part. When some concerns are exclusively social since they are directly associated with social relations, other concerns may not be exclusively social since they are indirectly associated with social relations. For instance, fear is thought to be a non-social emotion since it is indirectly associated with social relations. However, fear can also arise from the lack of social support which refers to a social concern in the relevant context.

The question of how a basic emotion can include social concerns can be answered as follows. Since an individual would be afraid of being rejected or excluded from the society, they behave accordingly. One may object that fear arises for survival reasons mostly, thus social concerns are just by-products; fear arises to avoid isolation which is bad for survival, hence one needs to maintain belonging to the society in order to increase the chance for survival. Maintaining belonging to society alludes to a social concern for affiliation. However, fear is also thought to be a vital emotion in order to maintain safety in a non-social context (*ibid.*) Is safety really a non-social concern? Being isolated indeed brings forth insecurity, whereas being with others gives confidence. Fear of being isolated indicates such a social concern, and it reminds the requirement for being with others. Since social emotions are thought to be regulating social relationships and include social rules and norms, social emotions play an important role as social regulatory function. “Guilt, shame, embarrassment, and jealousy are social emotions because they necessarily depend on other people’s thoughts, feelings or actions, as experienced, recalled, anticipated or imagined at first hand, or instantiated in more generalized consideration of social norms or conventions” (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). This statement does not exclude basic emotions from being social emotions since fear, anger, and disgust also depend on other people’s thoughts, feelings or actions. On the contrary, basic emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust provide regulating social relationship to the extent that basic emotions contain intrinsic motivation to maintain social regulation which is based on evolutionary roots.

It also raises the question whether change in behavior due to fear can be interpreted as “reading others’ mind”, for the lack of a better term. An experiment might help examining this question. Some emotions, so-called *vicarious emotions* (Atsak *et al.*, 2011) in rats arise for the sake of other, not for just itself, which is considerably intriguing. The study was conducted in order to detect empathy in social animals such as rats since it is acknowledged that some social animals have it. Physical reaction that basic emotion causes involves a social concern since it plays a communicative role. The experiment goes as follows: two female rats are put in a divided cage. One of them is referred to as the Demonstrator and its function in this experiment is to be given electric shocks. After the electric shock, she has freezing response as a physical reaction.²¹ The other rat, referred to as the Witness, just observes the Demonstrator. She also freezes (the essential part of the experiment is here) even though she is not given electric shock (*ibid.*) So how did such a physical reaction occur in this rat merely by witnessing the other rat who is given electric shock? And did she recognize something? These questions are important because such a physical reaction can only occur as a result of emergence of an emotion. She recognizes not only aversive behavior, which is freezing, but also recognizes the emotion of fear, which is a subjective state. Furthermore, when fear arises, freezing occurs as a reaction to electric shock. Fear typically brings forth freezing reaction; however, here the opposite has occurred. That is, the freezing reaction of the Demonstrator brings forth fear in the Witness. The Witness recognizes the emotion (fear) of the one whom she observes. Accordingly, she shares the same emotion with the other —the emotion is transmitted— and she shows the same behavior as freezing. The freezing behavior of the Demonstrator indeed is displayed as an alarm call but the Witness is also in a cage, what she can do is also to freeze as an alarm call. This experiment results in the Witness showing empathic behavior, and what she felt is empathy since the behavior of the Witness includes self-reflection, and “reading” of the Demonstrator’s mind.

²¹ The effect of electric shock is revealed in some individuals as freezing which is one of the primary adaptive responses of fear.

I think this behavior is a reaction initiated by fear, not by empathy. Fear arises from the electric shock, freezing occurs from fear; this is the expected situation. What is unexpected is that the emotion of fear is transmitted interpersonally. A rat has the feeling of fear for the other rat that has that feeling. The experiment shows that rats are not only physiologically similar to us in terms of understanding and for finding medical cures, but they are also similar to us regarding cognitive flexibility. They have an emotional state that is shared by at least two of them just by observing or being exposed to threat. As social behaviors are those that have others as their targets (e.g., help or aggression) and/or shape the nature of one's contact with them (e.g., cooperativeness, avoidance) (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008), the behavior of the rat (the Witness) can be explained as social behavior since her behavior includes the other as its target. Even though the emotion arises individually, it is also directed towards the other. The freezing reaction of the Demonstrator can be regarded as a communicative act because the Demonstrator asks for help with an alarm call. The freezing reaction of the Witness can also be regarded as a communicative act because the alarm call reaches the Witness, and she reacts (replies) with the same reaction. Although the freezing reaction in one's action is supposed to protect oneself from the danger, it can transform into a communicative act.

This experiment can teach us thinking about fear in a different way. For instance, I do not only fear from falling, I also fear due to (observing what happens to) someone who may fall. When we see someone is going to fall, we feel as if we will fall, we put ourselves in the other's place. We feel the same for others. Fear arises not only for us, but also for others, as just it happened in the rats mentioned above. Freezing reaction is the emotional response of fear. However, even if it will be explained with empathy, it could be a version of fear in the rat example.

Leary, Barrett, and Campos assert that one of the criteria for social emotions is self-consciousness (in Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). Self-conscious emotions are intrapersonal, self-directed, and for-themselves. The object of emotion is mostly

the individuals themselves, not the others. However, social emotion is meant to be other-directed toward the others, and the object of emotion should be the others. However, in what degree should we regard an emotion as self-conscious; even consciousness is very ambiguous to evaluate properly? Why are not fear and anger also self-conscious emotions, as guilt, shame, empathy are self-conscious emotions? What should we expect from an emotion to consider it as a self-conscious emotion? Fear and anger are thought to be non-social, hence it seems that they are not considered as self-conscious. “Self-conscious emotions, on the other hand, are seen as emotions that arise when individuals become aware that a certain event or situation impinges on their self-evaluation or welfare. Frequently mentioned examples are shame, guilt, pride, and embarrassment” (*ibid.*, p. 136). This explanation of self-conscious emotions is also not enough to evaluate self-consciousness itself because becoming aware is not clearly identified. When social emotions require awareness, why should not it be the same for basic emotions? What does it mean to become aware of a certain event? When a primate fears, it can recognize that it felt something, and that it felt it itself—even if it may not know what it felt—since it changes its behavior in accordance with its feeling. Hareli & Parkinson (2008) build the foundation of social emotions not on self-consciousness, but on social concerns. They also maintain that social emotions evolved to deal with social problems, referring to social concerns which do not require self-consciousness.

Whereas some accept the claim that emotions are inherently social (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008), some completely reject it (Lively & Weed, 2016, p. 66). Others, who prefer to be moderate and not orthodox about it, admit that some emotions are sometimes social, and some emotions are completely social. Social emotions require having a social function, a social goal, or a social object as a defining characteristic of social emotions. What is meant by social emotion is not variable; rather it is meant that it is based on the relation with others, heading towards others. In order to distinguish between social emotions and basic emotions, some believe that social emotions evolved later and are more complex than non-social or basic emotions. On the other hand, some early-developing and

supposedly basic emotions are considered to be social emotions by some theorists (e.g., anger, shame and disgust) (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). What they mean by complexity and whether the difference between basic emotions and social emotions is so clear cut are variable to arise in different conditions, not constant to arise in certain conditions. How can one say that basic emotions are not complex? The emergence of emotions as a subjective experience may also be complex in the sense that a basic emotion can arise in different conditions. For instance, fear can arise not only under the condition of danger, but also of isolation, and of loss.

Besides, Hareli and Parkinson state that “fairness appraisal can be seen as primarily social because it involves orientation towards issues that are only important in the context of social life, ... and in a nonsocial context, fairness, responsibility, and intention are meaningless” (2008, pp. 138–140). In such a condition, a basic emotion, such as anger, that involves fairness, responsibility, and intention can take place in the set of social emotions. It is thought that anger is associated with fairness, responsibility, and intention because anger arises under these circumstances. For instance, there are various studies on experimental games, such as the ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is as follows:

...[T]he ultimatum game, [is] played in pairs (typically anonymously). One subject, the “proposer,” is given a lump of money to divide with the other subject, the “responder.” The proposer’s offer is communicated to the responder, who also knows the total amount of money to be divided. The responder then decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If he rejects the offer, then neither he nor the proposer gets any of the money. The consistent finding (in most cultures, but see Henrich *et al.*, 2004) is that low offers (e.g. 20% of the total allocation) often get rejected. That is, the responder often decides to take nothing rather than a low offer (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, pp. 126–127).

As is seen above, the ultimatum game involves fairness and cooperative behavior. In accordance with it, unfair offers can evoke anger in the ultimatum game, regardless of the fact that it is a game (Dubreuil, 2015, p. 476). So it seems that anger occurs in social contexts, and accordingly anger can be one of

the social emotions.²² The fact that basic emotions involve some social context such as fairness, responsibility, and intention may not necessarily indicate that basic emotions are social. However, it may prevent basic emotions from being identified as non-social emotions. It seems that an emotion involving social context is associated with social behavior. Anger occurs both towards and against a behavior or a stance; it does not occur in the absence of such. In the case of anger directed against others and their behavior, the other may not be present at the time anger arises in the individual. Moreover, sometimes anger is directed to an inanimate object. However, this is not evidence against the social character of anger. Anger can also be directed towards the individual who is not present at the time, which is widely-known psychological response model in the literature.

One of the most important reasons for a claim that emotions are social is that emotions are communicative. By its very nature, communication is social and conveys information to others. Emotions enable this communication by their own expressive responses. Social ground of emotions also includes emotional communication which involves the information that an individual has is transmitted to other individuals by facial expressions or behavioral stance, not by verbal expressions. Since emotional reactions affect the witnesses who encounter these reactions, *emotions both serve as incentives or deterrents for other individuals' social behavior* (Keltner & Haidt, 1999, p. 511). The characteristics of emotions which are “coordinating social interactions, solving social problems, (e.g. injustice, establishing attachments, negotiating status hierarchies)” (*ibid.*, p. 516) make emotions social.

It is also argued that the emotional states of animals alter their behaviors (Mendl *et al.*, 2011). In contemporary studies, emotions in animals are measured not

²² In order to be able to argue that anger is definitely social, one must show either that anger is a social adaptation (that is, anger was selected primarily for its social function) or that anger had first evolved under nonsocial conditions (selected for its nonsocial function) but later was exapted (that is, put in a new use) for solving social problems; hence it has gained a new function.

with conscious components, but with behavioral and neurophysiological components. For instance, bees can have negative emotional states to alter decision-making. The question is to what extent this claim is relevant in animal society. To answer such a question there are new studies that investigate emotions even in invertebrates. Insects are mostly regarded as possessing reflex behaviors, but recent studies show that they behave emotionally state-dependent. Bees are the subjects of the studies in one experiment. The hive of the bees is shaken as if predators attacked the hive. The findings are quite interesting. The hormones²³ of the bees such as dopamine, octopamine and serotonin decreases after the hive shaking. It is argued that this change corresponds to a certain emotional state like depressed or anxious states in humans. Accordingly, bees make their “decisions” to develop new behaviors for unexpected threats (Mendl *et al.*, 2011). This can be considered similar to hormonal changes in humans or other mammals that corresponds to fear or anger, but it raises a question whether it is prevalent in invertebrates.

Another interesting study about invertebrates, namely in *carpenter ant Camponotus fellah*, is about social privation which causes behavioral change in these social animals (Koto *et al.*, 2015). While separation from conspecifics in mammals causes some diseases such as obesity, diabetes and stress, ants show more dramatic results when isolated from their social environment: decline in lifespan approximately within a few days compared to other ants who continues to live in social environment (*ibid.*). What is the cause of such a drastic change? In the case study, there are different groups, which are given or not given food. The experiment is controlled with different groups to be measured accurately. In one setup, isolated individual ants are given food while others are not; in another setup, an ant group is given food while another group is not given food. Indeed, although all ants ate the same amount of food, what may be the cause of decline in lifespan of both individual ants and ants in group? The study results as follows: Under starvation, there is no difference in lifespan between individual

²³ The question of whether invertebrates have hormones might be raised. Recent studies seem to confirm that invertebrates carry hormones.

ants and ants in a group. Isolated individual ants have the shortest lifespan, whereas ants in groups have the longest lifespan. Individual ants also digested foods at a slower rate than ants in group. Isolated ants may have instinctively accumulated food in their crops so that they may not find food enough on their own, so they have the shortest lifespan. The researchers also find that being isolated from the social environment causes physiological changes like digestion problems.

Although all ants have enough food, and will also have thereafter, why the ants who are given food would act like this is unclear. The only problem they have to deal with is being isolated from the social environment in which they lived. So, we need to investigate the socially isolated condition of ants since their bodies exhibit physiological reactions to such a condition. The question that comes to mind is whether social privation can cause behavioral anomalies. In the study, it is encountered that isolated ants spend more time near the nest wall, and less time in the nest compared to in-group ants. It can be inferred that individual ants try to construct their own social environment of which they are deprived. These anomalies—digestion problems, decline in life span, and behavioral differences—point to the fact that ants may have stress under the condition in which they are deprived of their social environment just as we humans do. The other interesting part of this study is that when ants are left without food, the life span does not differ from the others; the life span highly reduces when ants are isolated from their social environment. The alteration in the life span might not be related to the food; however, it surely is related to the social environment and digestion.

3.3.1. Social Aspect of Emotions from a Naturalistic Perspective

The psychological, biological, and social constructionist approaches to emotions have been explicated above. It seems as if there would be no room for suggesting another approach to emotions. However, I believe that the concepts that are employed to explain emotions by these approaches need to be re-examined. In

this context, the known dualities like “nature/nurture” and “biological/social” should be reassessed as to what they really are or are meant to be. The natural or biological is considered as opposed to the social: natural is innate, inevitable, and involuntary whereas the social is flexible, variable in time or in places, and learnable. I suggest that social is ultimately natural in the sense that socialization is an adaptation or perhaps initially a byproduct that evolved to solve certain environmental problems.²⁴ Thus, my position is not hybrid (which endorses the above-mentioned kinds of dualism) but naturalistic because I believe that socialization as ultimately an adaptation is significant for understanding our nature since emotions are both natural and social. Accordingly, I will focus on these approaches about emotions, and analyze the nature of emotions in the light of the naturalistic perspective. To repeat, since socialization can be explained as a result of biological evolution, the emotions that are produced by socialization are also natural.

Let us begin with socialization as an adaptation (or a series of adaptations). How can socialization solve environmental problems? There is a specific reason for it: survival and/or reproduction. In fact, almost all mammal species are social in different degrees and live in groups, not by themselves. Concerns such as safety (protection from the threat of predators), sharing limited food resources may push individuals to be social (more accurately, favors individuals that have greater social skills like social emotions). Then, what exactly does this have to do with emotions? Since emotions arise in an individual, how can they be effective in groups? In other words, if emotions are owned by individuals, how can they have social functions as well? Although an individual has an emotional experience within themselves, the visibility of emotions as emotional expressions gives us a hint to reconsider what an emotion really is. Why should the individual need to show their emotional states to others? Or why would emotions have evolved to be manifested at all? I will try to explain the social aspect of emotions in detail.

²⁴ It may be the result of a feedback mechanism; in order to solve some problems certain organisms developed social emotions or exapted already existing emotions that were further developed by the parallel development of social structures and so on.

Brian Parkinson (1996), the first to boldly defend the argument that *emotions are social*, paved a wide path for reconsideration of emotions. According to him, although emotions are internal and individual reactions, emotions are transmitted directly from one to other. The reason for the emergence of basic emotions may not always and necessarily be social, but the individuals always and necessarily acquire the information that they will transmit to the other by emotions and convey this information to the other through bodily expressions. Both personal concerns and concerns regarding others can be solved interpersonally by the transmission of the emotional expression. Basic emotions meet the requirements of being social as having consequences for others, being communicative, and having one's current relationship to others. Parkinson approaches emotions as communication that is social since emotions themselves are mostly inherently directed towards an audience. Parkinson (1996) discusses emotional expression by referring to it as a rehearsal of an interpersonal experience. An emotion may arise independently of whether there is an audience or not. Still, we tend to share it with others. Then, the question arises whether emotions have emerged in a social environment. Two approaches can be put forward as follows: (1) Emotions had not been social from the outset, but later they have been exapted and gained social function; consequently, emotions became social. (2) Emotions evolved in a social setting, thus gained social functions. No matter how emotion may have evolved at first, mammals acquired this trait.²⁵

Van Kleef (2009) is one of those who carries the torch and has studied the social aspect of motions. Van Kleef has developed "emotion as social information" (EASI) theory by using to the argument that "emotions are inherently *social*" which was put forward by Parkinson with the idea that emotions are best

²⁵ I do not mean that mammals acquire emotions through social learning. A social animal that unfortunately remains isolated from its conspecifics surely experiences emotions. For instance, fear arises in a situation where the existence of another (a predator) is a threat which is a social situation.

understood as social phenomena rather than individual phenomena.²⁶ “We do not just feel our emotions—we also express them in social interaction” (Van Kleef, 2009, p. 184). Emotions influence not only one’s own behavior, but also observer’s behavior. Since emotions transfer information about the emotion of individuals to others, Van Kleef has explained how emotions influence social/interpersonal relationships through the information transferred. Van Kleef also emphasizes the applicability of his theory of social function not only for emotions defined as social, but also for emotions defined as basic.

...[c]himpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans preferred the hidden contents of a box to which the (human) experimenter had reacted with a smile rather than with disgust. These studies indicate that non-human primates have the capacity to use others' emotional expressions to determine their own course of action (Van Kleef, 2018, p. 2).

In the previous chapter, I summarized Ekman’s basic emotion theory, which was initially quite popular, but disregarded later, only to emerge again due to further explorations with regard to emotions in both humans and animals. Keltner *et al.* (2019) recommend what we should do about basic emotion theory (BET). BET briefly focuses on the interpersonal and intrapersonal effects of emotions involving signaling behavior, physiology, and action tendencies. Furthermore, BET has opened new approaches to emotions regarding social functioning which is directly associated with interpersonal effects of emotions. How can such emotions, which are subjective experiences, enable an individual to communicate with others? The statement “emotions are grammar of social living” (Keltner *et al.*, 2019) can give us a hint about it. Emotions as grammar of social living can be interpreted as emotions sustain the social regulation in the interaction between individuals. It is intriguing to prefer to use the word “grammar” to explain emotions. The word “grammar” already refers to something linguistic. Emotion does not contain a linguistic term, but it still contains linguistic properties such as communication. Communication is considered to be an act of transferring information through individuals or groups.

²⁶ Van Kleef (2018, p. 1) also states that his theory is consistent with the experiences of non-human social animals.

Others are required for communication; otherwise, there would be only an information *that could not be transferred*, which is not communication. Emotions can also enable such a communication. How can emotions do that? Communication is thought to occur by the presence of voice, in other words by the presence of verbal expressions. However, emotions are nonverbal; furthermore, they are also preverbal, which means that communication here is maintained via social interaction using information and the responses evoked in others. The same information transferring process is provided by emotional expressions. The information here is the emotion that occurs in an individual. In the case of transferring information, emotion provides support to others by exchange and reading of emotional expressions. In this sense, emotional expressions are considered as sophisticated social tools that provide communication about one's intentions and requests to others.

Scarantino (2017) states that emotional expressions are associated with speech acts without appealing to language at all. He defines emotional expressions as communicative acts in his theory of affective program. By his own words, "emotional expressions are a means not only of expressing what's inside, but also of directing other people's behavior, of representing what the world is like and of committing to future courses of action" (Scarantino, 2017, p. 165). Moreover, emotional expressions include not only the expresser's internal experience but also a tendency to direct others' behavior for future actions. Darwin paid attention to the communicative aspect of emotional expressions and suggested that emotional expressions may have played a significant role in explaining the evolution of language. By his own words, "language owes its origin to the imitation and modification, aided by signs and gestures, of various natural sounds, the voices of other animals, and man's own instinctive cries" (Darwin, 1871, p. 56). Both Darwin and Scarantino associate emotional expressions and communication; however, they diverge at the point of the evolution of language. Scarantino compares his position with Darwin's regarding the relationship between emotions and language, however, Scarantino does not suggest that emotions are included in part of the evolution of language.

According to Scarantino, despite the communicative function of emotions as nonverbal expressions, language has emerged as a new communicative force of verbal expression.

Emotional expression is a kind of nonverbal communication that at least two individuals share information about both themselves and the surrounding environment. According to Scarantino (2017), this nonverbal communication involves some functions that Scarantino combines with Searle's types of speech acts. Searle (1979) developed five types of speech acts for the language usage that are assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations which are the criteria of communication types of a language. According to Searle, speech acts are as follows: "We tell people how things are (Assertives), we try to get them to do things (Directives), we commit ourselves to doing things (Commissives), we express our feelings and attitudes (Expressives), and we bring about changes in the world through our utterances (Declarations)" (Searle, 1979, p. viii). Scarantino applies these types of speech acts to the emotional expressions by using four types out of the five criteria which are expressive, imperative (instead of assertive), declarative, and commissive function of expressions. The expressive function of emotional expression, the Expressives, provides natural information transfer. The imperative function of emotional expression, the Imperatives, is the demand of doing something/making change from the recipient of the information. The declarative function of emotional expression, the Declaratives, is to represent how things are in the world. The commissive function of emotional expression, the Commissives, is to commit the signaler to a future course of action as verbal communication involves as it is expected (Scarantino, 2017). We see these criteria in nonverbal emotions as a communicational expression without appeal to any speech acts.

Facial expressions are important social signals that enable us to detect the feelings of others and behave accordingly. Since most non-human animals except mammals do not have facial muscles, they do not have emotional facial expressions. Hence, the research about facial expressions are limited to

mammals. A wide range of mammal species, such as primates, horses, dogs, pandas, are also capable of distinguishing the feeling of others through facial expressions (Proops *et al*, 2018). There is also evidence that these social animals are capable of remembering the facial expressions of others, either their conspecifics or their human owners. In an experiment, domestic horses were shown photographs of human faces with several emotional expressions such as anger or happiness. After several hours, these horses met these humans in person, but this time humans had neutral expression on their faces. Not only did the horses comprehend the emotional expressions in the photographs, they also remembered them and reacted positively or negatively according to the expressions in the photographs as they remembered them (de Waal, 2016). Kluger Hans is another example about facial expression and emotions recognition in non-human animals:

The black stallion was known in German as Kluger Hans, translated as Clever Hans, since he seemed to excel at addition and subtraction. His owner would ask him to multiply four by three, and Hans would happily tap his hoof twelve times. He could also tell you what the date of a given weekday was if he knew the date of an earlier day, and he could tell the square root of sixteen by tapping four times. Hans solved problems he had never heard before... If the owner or any other questioner stood behind a curtain while posing their question, the horse failed. It was a frustrating experiment for Hans, who would bite Pfungst if he got too many answers wrong. Apparently, the way he got them right is that the owner would subtly shift his position or straighten his back the moment Hans reached the correct number of taps. The questioner would be tense in face and posture until the horse reached the answer, at which point he would relax. Hans was very good at picking up these cues (de Waal, 2016, pp. 82-84).

This is also considerably significant example not to verify that the animal has sufficient intelligence to calculate, but to show the importance of emotions in non-human animals, especially between species. The fact that Hans gives the correct answer stems from his comprehension of his owner's body language and emotional expressions and reaction accordingly. When he sees his owner stressed, he keeps tapping his hoof—he knows he has not reached the correct answer—and when he sees his owner relaxed, he understands that he has reached the correct answer and stops.

Emotional expressions also point to the trustworthiness of the individual who shows emotional expression. “In one study, Krumhuber and colleagues found that people trust interaction partners more, and will give more resources to those partners, if the partners display authentic smiles (which have longer onset and offset times) compared to fake smiles, which have shorter onset and offset” (Keltner *et al.*, 2019, p. 13). It seems emotional expressions are significant for providing trustworthiness. If people trust such individuals more, they are more likely to cooperate with them. Moreover, there are also other specific features to distinguish authentic smiles with fake or deliberate smiles that can be noticed visually. Since there are visible differences between authentic smile and fake smile, the individual can easily distinguish the intention behind that facial expression.

The Duchenne marker is the name for the contraction of the muscle around the eye, the orbicularis oculi, pars lateralis. This muscle is responsible for the lifting of the cheeks, narrowing of the eye-opening and wrinkles around the eyes. There is a neural basis to the distinction between smiles with and without the Duchenne marker (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). There are other indicators. False smiles tend to be more asymmetrical (Ekman, Hager, & Friesen, 1981), are shorter in onset and offset duration (Hess & Kleck, 1990; Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005) and show more irregularities such as pauses and intensity changes (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Hess & Kleck, 1990) compared to felt smiles. The supporting literature implies that the interpretation of smiles is a matter of a relatively invariant abstraction of the specific expressive qualities of different smiles: people acquire basic knowledge about the diagnostic areas and prototypical features of felt and false smiles and then assess the similarities between a perceived expression with the features of the stored memories (Niedenthal & Maringer, 2009, p. 125).

Even a child who is confronted with a fake smile will be disturbed even if she cannot fully comprehend what it exactly is. This fake smile that she has never encountered before comes as an expression which sounds uncanny, not as an emotional expression with which she is familiar.

Darwin conducted the earliest and quite extensive research on emotional expressions, and suggested that both humans and animals (he calls them lower animals) have emotional expressions (Darwin, 1890). The detail of the emotional expressions includes different types of expressions in different emotions, facial

(muscle over the face and the movement of lips, eyes, eyebrows, forehead, nose) expressions, postural (head droops, shoulders raised), behavioral expressions, erection of the hair on the body and so on. The significant part of these expressions is that almost all mammals show similar expressions. Darwin did not limit his research just to mammals. He also obtained similar results with birds, not by facial but by other behavioral expressions. Since non-mammal animals do not have facial muscles, they cannot move their faces like mammals do, and facial expressions are not flexible but rather mechanical movements. A bird's head movement would be a best sample for a mechanical movement. We do not encounter flexibility in a bird's face. Yet, it does not mean that birds do not have emotional expressions. They ruffle their feathers to make them look bigger under a threat. Darwin compared this expression with the erection of the hair in mammals under a threat. Other similar emotional expression in almost all animals is to tremble when afraid. The detailed description of the expression for fear among mammals is "the wide opening of the mouth and eyes, with upraised eyebrows, so as to see as quickly as possible all around us, and to hear distinctly whatever sound may reach our ears" (Darwin, 1890, p. 325).

The available evidence on facial expressions and emotion-specific physiology support a universalist position (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Keltner *et al.*, 2003) at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis... Although *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* was a best seller in its day, it would be largely ignored by psychologists for nearly a century afterwards. In the early 1960s, however, several theorists revived evolutionary accounts of emotion and extended Darwin's rich observations about facial expression to controlled studies of the universality of expression (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1962; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). These early evolutionary accounts were soon complemented by updated theories (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), ethological studies (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Krebs & Davies, 1993), and philosophical analysis (Wright, 1971), which, together, have given shape to an evolutionary approach to emotion (Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006, pp. 116-117).

To sum up, emotional expressions of individuals transfer the information about their emotions to others. This information transfer influences both the emotion and the behavior of others, who are exposed to that expression. This can be referred to as emotional communication that enables social interactions by facial

or behavioral expressions without appeal to any verbal announcements of emotional states. Emotions communicate socially relevant information via bodily expressions. Emotional expressions also help individuals know others' emotions, beliefs, and intentions, thus rapidly coordinating social interactions. The transfer has a significant effect in order to obtain the emotional information about others regarding changing or modifying behaviors and emotions, and accordingly, it is both a natural and a social reference to have the knowledge of others' emotions and to associate the emotion with a certain behavioral trait or change. The negative emotions also function as a warning, indicating the need for a motivated reassessment of potentially undesirable responses and may also benefit certain interpersonal behaviors. If we face a challenge, negative emotions arise rapidly and we change our behaviors by cutting off communication or creating a different kind of communication.

3.4. Extended Emotions

Emotions, being social to the extent that they are also shared and transmitted, are known in the literature as “extended emotions” (Krueger & Szanto, 2016), meaning that an emotion can extend beyond brain and body and be shared by multiple individuals. What does “emotion can extend beyond body and brain” mean? An emotion that occurs in an individual is recognized by others; the same emotion also occurs in others. Although extended emotions are shared emotions, an emotion undoubtedly arises inside the individuals' brain and is expressed bodily. Extended emotions are interpretable by both the material culture that is not directly important for our claim but has indirect connection and social context. Material culture can regulate and manipulate emotional state such as playing music, turning lights up or down, or lighting candles (*ibid.*) that requires external objects from emotional individuals. Socially extended emotions are also included in both dyadic relations and multiple relations that the social environment encompasses.

The transfer of an emotion to other individuals is also a sort of being exposed to a certain emotional condition. In such a condition, sharing the same emotion at that time provides emotional support. In addition to the need for the other in a certain emotional situation, the emotion to be extended to others support individuals to cope with that situation. This is prevalent both for primate and human infants to seek contact with others at the time of uncertainty and distress (Rimé, 2009), and provides to enhance social bonds.

Although individuals experience their emotions in their own bodies, individuals reflect their emotions to others by facial, postural, and verbal expressions. This reflection includes more than just an understanding of others' emotions. It would be more significant to inquire how it could be and what the consequences of it are, instead of the questioning the possibility of it. Michael (2011) has proposed a minimal criterion to accept shared emotion. When individuals express their emotions, observers perceive them; the only criterion for shared emotion are that shared emotions are expressed by one individual, and the expression is perceived consciously or unconsciously by another individual (*ibid.*) Hence, it might not require mutual awareness of the emotion transfer by individuals. Such a transfer is an efficient way to spread information, whether it is relatively important to others or not (*ibid.*) Since the emotion expressions are quick, they can be developed to influence others quickly.

3.5. Arguments about emotions in animals

Following Darwin's understanding of emotions through evolution of humans and non-human animals, a number of views have been developed so far about emotions in animals, some of which are as follows:

- i. Non-human animals do not have emotions.
- ii. Non-human animals have emotions; however, it is not the same as what humans have.

- iii. Non-human animals and humans share *some* emotions homologously, these are basic emotions. Other emotions are human emotions.²⁷
- iv. Non-human animals and humans share emotions homologously, including some non-basic emotions.

The first view has been abandoned a long time ago. Even the most orthodox approach that denies the presence of emotions in non-human animals accepts the idea that animals have at least an affective state like *pain*. Nowadays even the emotional state of octopus whose nervous system is quite different from mammals is being discussed (see, Godfrey-Smith, 2016). Those who adopt the second view, ask such questions as “what distinguishes human and animal emotions?” or “what makes an emotion human?”. They have developed some criteria to answer these questions: “volitional control, subjective report, and stimulus-decoupled elicitation” are among the few (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014, p. 196). According to Anderson and Adolphs (2014), volitional control over one’s emotions is a characteristic of adult human emotions that is not shared with nonhuman animals. They indicate that volitional control over emotional expressions also plays an important role for human social communicative tendency, which is the hallmark of emotions in order to have an influential action on conspecifics. The other criterion is the subjective report. Anderson and Adolphs (2014) assert that humans mostly announce their emotional states by verbal reports, and we do not grasp their emotional states just by observing their behavior. The last criterion is stimulus-decoupled elicitation, according to which while emotions occur in non-human animals by direct encounter of specific stimuli (e.g., a predator), emotions in humans may occur by prediction or recalling of such stimuli. Furthermore, because of their high cognitive abilities, humans also render the stimulus of emotion states possible by creating thoughts, imaginations, scenarios that they have never in fact experienced before.

²⁷ According to those who argues in favor of this view, some emotions, namely basic emotions, evolved to meet the fundamental needs necessary for survival, and humans and animals share them homologously because distinctive physiology and chemical reactions of these emotions are encountered both in humans and animals.

I disagree with the criteria that volitional control, subjective report, and stimulus-decoupled elicitation are necessary for the experience of emotions for various reasons. First, what one feels is clearly transmitted to others through their emotional expressions like facial, postural, behavioral expressions. One may try to suppress what one feels; however, the expressions reveal it anyway. Moreover, if it were possible, an unhappy person would have been able to control their emotions or eliminate the emotion that makes them unhappy. If an emotion were only a thought, they would not feel unhappy if they could eliminate the thought. However, an emotion is not a thought. Hence, individuals do not always seem to have control over their emotions. One may object to the idea that emotions cannot be controlled, from the perspective of cognitive approach. According to the cognitive approach, emotions comprise of bodily change, a subjective experience, a facial expression, a new action, and a cognitive appraisal (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014). For instance, the facial expression of fear cannot be eliminated as easy as one thinks. One can try to control one's facial muscles, but this effort reveals itself by another uncontrolled expression. Still, even for the cognitive approach to emotions, emotions involve facial expressions which is the inevitable physical reaction. Secondly, as for the subjective report, the degree and the willingness for the utterance of one's own feelings varies among different humans. Due to the conditions where individuals sometimes consider that they can be manipulated by virtue of their emotions by others—there are negative aspects of emotions (being manipulated) as well as there are positive aspects of emotions—they mostly try not to report their emotions. Besides, they do not even have to say what they feel. Emotional expressions already show themselves without appeal to verbalizing them what they feel. The stimulus-decoupled elicitation, however, is quite different. It is correct that humans render emotion states possible by creating thoughts, imaginations, and scenarios that they have never in fact experienced before, with their high cognitive abilities. However, the stimulus-decoupled elicitation does not alter the physiological and mental impact of the emotion emerging. To clarify this, let's consider fear. When an imaginary or real stimulus causes fear to emerge, fear is experienced with a similar physiological and neurochemical

change under certain conditions. It does not mean that fear is just a human emotion or fear is experienced by humans differently, although fear is shared by both humans and non-human animals. It indicates only that one can develop a different stimulus that causes fear to emerge.

The third view that non-human animals and humans share *some* emotions homologously, which are basic emotions, and that other emotions are human emotions is probably the most popular approach about emotions in non-human animal (see Haidt, 2003; D. Keltner *et al.*, 2006; LeDoux, 2012; J. Prinz, 2014).

The Oxford Companion to Animal Behaviour asserts that “animals are restricted to just a few basic emotions,” and the main difference between human and animal emotions has been proclaimed to be that “animals don’t have mixed emotions.” Whether animal emotions are pure and simple, however, cannot be ascertained without a scientific program to study them... If humans report high anxiety while showing amygdala activation and rats exhibit flight and freezing responses when their amygdala is electrically stimulated, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that we are dealing with one and the same state, that is, fear. The same argument has been applied to emotional attachment, joy, anger, and so on, boosting the case for evolutionary continuity (de Waal, 2011, p. 191).

The theory of mixed emotions mentioned in the above passage is another approach to human emotions. Mixed emotions are higher emotions that consist of the mixture of at least two or more basic emotions, such as guilt which is considered to be the mixture of fear and sadness which are basic emotions (Prinz, 2014, p. 251). Although those who adopt the view that some emotions are uniquely human also think that non-human animals also have emotions, thus we should treat them properly (i.e., ethical considerations toward nonhuman animals) they still argue that these emotions are limited, and non-human animals do not have as wide scale of emotions as humans do. They think that due to the features that only humans have, such as high cognitive capability, language, and culture, humans have human emotions that distinguish humans from non-human animals. These emotions are called social and/or moral/self-conscious emotions. Although non-human animals appear to pursue their lives in accordance with social circumstances, they are considered to be not social enough. Human sociality is called *ultrasociality* in order to demonstrate its higher social function

(Keltner *et al.*, 2006). What makes humans ultrasocial? The key point of ultrasociality is claimed to be *commitment*. Commitment provides the long-term relationship that is quite significant in human social life. Parents devote themselves completely not only to their offspring but also to others they care about (Keltner *et al.*, 2006). What Keltner *et al.* have in mind is that commitment in humans provides the long-term relationship which they think animals do not have. They do not accept the relationships in rats as ultrasocial because they think they are all siblings, and it does not count as helping others, if others include only their family members. However, such a commitment is encountered in animals as well. Below is a good example of a long-term relationship among chimpanzees:

[Geisha is] Mama's adoptive daughter. Unlike the others, Geisha never took any break to eat or socialize and stayed with the corpse all the time. She acted like people do at a wake. A wake was originally a period during which mourners kept vigil over a deceased person at home. Probably humans originated wakes in the hope that their loved one would come back to life, or else to make absolutely sure that he or she was dead prior to burial. Geisha is the daughter of Kuif. Mama had taken her under her wing after her mother's death. This was logical, given how tight Mama was with Kuif. Now, after Mama's death, it was Geisha who spent the most time with the corpse, even more than Mama's biological daughter and granddaughter. All the females visited in total silence, an unusual state for chimps. They nuzzled and inspected the corpse in various ways, or spent time grooming it (de Waal, 2019, p. 49).

The names and behaviors can be complicated at first. Mama, a female chimpanzee in Burgers Zoo, Netherlands, had adopted her friend's daughter, Geisha, after her friend died. Mama had a long life (1957-2016). Although there is no biological relationship between Mama and Geisha, their relationship is so strong that Geisha did not leave the corpse of Mama for a long time. It is obvious that there is a commitment between them. Although de Waal does not entitle it as a long-term relationship it does seem so. If ultrasociality means long-term relationship as Keltner *et al.* claim, it is obvious that animals do have it.

Moreover, Patricia Churchland (2011) argues that commitment and care are shared by most mammals, not just humans, particularly by mothers and their

offspring. To demonstrate her point, the author refers to rats (and not to chimpanzees or other species closer to humans regarding emotional expressions) for their valence of commitment (Churchland, 2011). She is also one of those who reject the view that only humans are moral.

We could engage in a semantic wrangle about whether these values are really moral values, but a wrangle about words is apt to be unrewarding. Of course only humans have human morality. But that is not news, simply a tedious tautology. One might as well note that only marmosets have marmoset morality, and so on down the line. We can agree that ants are not moral in the way humans are, and that baboon and bonobo social behavior is much closer to our own. With no home movies to give us clues, we do not know whether the social behavior of other hominins—for example, *Homo erectus* or *Homo neanderthalensis* or *Homo heidelbergensis*—was very close to the social behavior of modern humans. Perhaps we can leave it at that, pending deeper scientific understanding (Churchland, 2011, p. 26).

According to Churchland, mammals are motivated to show commitment and care for others because social problem-solving is grounded and shaped by them. Moreover, she agrees that social behavior and moral behavior seem to have the same spectrum of actions. She supports her claim of this single continuum with “neuroscientific data showing that whether a subject sees a merely social event or a conventionally “moral” event, the same regions of the prefrontal cortex show increased activity” (Churchland, 2011, p. 60).

Second, what does “humans are ultrasocial but non-human animals are not” mean? One may claim that when humans reach the large masses like millions of people, other mammals can only reach small masses, at the utmost, a few hundred individuals. Is it the sign of ultrasociality? What about ant colonies, one of the prime examples of eusociality, that can reach 300 million individuals? The condition of being social should be evaluated in terms of what makes humans social, what makes non-human animals social, and whether the conditions of both are the same or different. Sociality was once considered to be a human condition. However, we have firm knowledge that we are not the only social beings. From mammals to the insects, such as ants, bees, wasps, and termites, non-human animals conquer the earth as social beings. Indeed, the animals —

especially land animals— dominate the environment by the social system (Wilson, 2012, p. 94). The highest level of sociality is considered to be the true social condition of “eusociality”. These insects fit this definition that social organization is maintained where various behaviors such as parental investment, nutrition, and division of labor can be observed. In this sense, this social organization is defined as “the class of ecological relationships that include competition, cooperation, and dominance in the acquisition of mates or resources, as well as competitive or cooperative care of offspring” (Whitehead, 1997). This social organization sometimes requires altruistic behavior where individuals may reduce the number of their offspring or shorten their lives in the reproductive sense in order to allow others to live longer and produce more offspring which is mostly and highly observed in the relationship between worker bees and queen bee. Being social is an adaptive feature for various reasons. It has advantages for survival over solitary individuals in the sense that the division of labor can provide food transportation and safety to all members in the social organization. The answer to the question of what makes humans social would be the same as the answer to the question of what makes non-human animals social. Humans are called *eusocial* for having “flexible alliances, not just among family members but between families, genders, classes, and tribes” (Wilson, 2012, p. 20). The other mammals, on the other hand, have well-set relationship mostly among their families. The flexible alliances are considered to be the consequences of high cognitive capabilities that humans have such as language. No wonder, language also manages the social relationships among individuals in the way of reaching the large masses, and it provides greater advantage for maintaining safety. Moreover, the concept of sociality has not lost its meaning in the case of non-human animals that do not have human-like language. Besides, chimpanzee status is also based on flexible alliances in which some individuals support others:

[D]ominance manifests itself in two very different ways. First, there is social influence, or power, as reflected in who can defeat whom and who weighs in most heavily when a conflict in the group occurs. The outcome of these confrontations is not 100 percent predictable, particularly since chimpanzees

constantly form shifting alliances. Incidental reversals in the social hierarchy are far less rare than with other animal species. That is why the chimpanzee hierarchy is so often termed "flexible" and "plastic." A young chimpanzee of not more than two or three can sometimes put an adult male or female to flight or even coerce them into doing something. These are not just playful incidents; they can be serious conflicts, such as the occasion when Jonas, with his mother's support, forced Franje to suckle him (de Waal, 2007, p. 81).

Another reason for adopting the view that non-human animals and humans share some emotions homologously, and that these are basic emotions is that while basic emotions are considered to be *adaptive* emotions (see, Haidt, 2003 and Prinz, 2004), other emotions are *constructed* (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 2000) by humans for maintaining healthy relationships in their social environment. This argument seems hard to deny because of its wide recognition; however, there is still some room for skepticism. Emotions like empathy, guilt, and shame are considered exclusively human emotions. What makes them human? The answer lies in high human cognitive abilities. Shame and guilt are claimed to require self-consciousness, which is the indication of high cognitive ability. Shame is quite different from other so-called human emotions. It is elicited by the information of the feelings or thoughts of others about oneself. It can cause weakening in social relationships (Gilbert, 2003). As long as one keeps being ashamed, they distance themselves from social environment. It can be disadvantageous to maintain social relationship. However, an emotion should enable the individual to be accepted and not to be excluded in the society. Shame is a self-oriented emotion. One may experience shame when they are not being treated well after they do something, when they do not meet expectations of others or when social norms are violated. Moreover, shame is considered to be one of the important human emotions since it involves the sense of self (self-awareness) (M. Lewis, 1992) of which basic emotions are considered to be deprived. This sense of self is the meta-cognition that can be defined as what one thinks or feels about how others think or feel about them. Hence, shame is considered to be a human emotion for it is a self-conscious emotion. Moreover, the emotional expression of shame, i.e., blushing, is considered to be unique to our species, universal among humans. From the evolutionary perspective, it is a

communicative tool for measuring the trustworthiness of others, that is, whether one is lying or deceiving others. The bodily expressions of shame are lowered head and face, slumped shoulder, avoiding eye contact, down eyelids, and mostly shrinking body posture which look diminish stature (de Waal, 2019). When shame is experienced one desires to be invisible, feels like sinking into the ground since others are upset, annoyed, or frustrated for what one has done. Interestingly, these expressions look morphologically the same in primates and other animals (de Waal, 2011). The parallelism of the emotional expressions of shame in humans and animals will provide us to reconsider the claim that shame is uniquely human. “Chimpanzees crawl in the dust for their leader, lower their body so as to look up at him, or turn their rump toward him, which makes them vulnerable. Dominant chimps may emphasize the contrast by literally walking over a subordinate, or running past him while moving a lifted arm over his back, giving them no other choice than to duck into a fetal position” (de Waal, 2019, p. 164). I find it surprising that it is not interpreted as the expression of shame by other researchers. Rather, it is conceived as an expression of *submission* which is said to be different from shame.

Another so-called human emotion, namely guilt, is also other-oriented emotion. Guilt includes care-giving, and avoiding doing harm to others. Guilt is also a kind of emotion that demonstrates regret for a particular behavior that damaged a relationship. Guilt may help repair this relationship. Experimental studies show that non-human primates exhibit the expressions of anxiety after aggressive behaviors that damage their social relationship, and change their behaviors to the positive actions that repair the relationship such as licking the injuries they made (de Waal, 2011). That is why guilt is mostly associated with sorrow/sadness for others (Gilbert, 2003) since what one does affects others, and not directly themselves, yet their response, the guilt, is an individual's emotional response toward their own action, caused by realization provided by others. Moreover, when brain activities of both humans and non-human animals are monitored, it is hard to say that they do not share the same emotions when the same brain

activities at the same brain region of both animals and humans are observed. Perhaps it is the result of incomplete data about animal behavior.

The idea that animals experience emotions the way that humans do makes many scientists uneasy, since animals cannot verbally report any emotions that they experience, and these emotions presupposes a level of consciousness that these scientists are unwilling to attribute to animals. Considering how similarly animals behave the way we do when they experience certain emotions, share our physiological reactions and some facial/bodily expressions, and possess the same sort of brains, it would be strange if they experienced emotions radically differently or even they did not have them at all.

There is one more thing that should be noted: guilt and shame as human emotions are distinguished as the ground of the evaluations of the behavior of the self (Gilbert, 2003). As shame is the evaluation of the self, guilt is considered to be the evaluation of the behavior of the self. To be more specific, under a particular circumstance where shame emerges, individuals associate it with their selves. While under a particular circumstance where guilt emerges, individuals associate it with their behaviors, not with their selves. Gilbert (2003) also claims that the evolutionary origin of shame can be traced back to the way that animals can detect and cope with social threats. So, shame can be a warning signal of social threats to the self with automatic defenses.

The human emotions mentioned above are distinguished from basic emotions by the characteristic of being constructed. Still, there are those who argue that guilt and shame evolved for particular purposes in the human species (Gilbert, 2003). Evolutionary approach and social constructionists introduce different scenarios; however, they attribute the same characteristics. That is, while the former adopts the view that human emotions have emerged as a result of evolutionary process (since shame is considered to be an automatic defense to protect one from threats posed by others on other occasions, and guilt is considered to be motivation for care-giving and avoiding doing harm to others), the latter adopts the view that

they have emerged as cultural products. What they have in common is that human emotions come about due to high cognitive abilities that humans have. Although I agree with Gilbert that both shame and guilt may have emerged as a result of evolutionary process, I still tend not to believe that they are uniquely human, as I tried to explain above.

Furthermore, given that emotions are adaptations through the evolutionary process, we should ask how far we should go back in the evolutionary past of emotions through species. De Waal draws our attention to the high adaptive value of emotions in this process, and he compares emotional states with the feeling of body temperature and increased heart rate. He states that “A rise in core body temperature and increased heart rate not directly attributable to the eliciting stimulus—for example, mild handling by an experimenter—has been measured in mammals, reptiles, and birds, but not amphibians and fish. On the basis of this so-called emotional fever, it has been argued that the first elements of vertebrate anxiety emerged after the amphibians” (de Waal, 2011).

De Waal does not deny the presence of so-called human emotions to other species. He argues that we share all emotions with other mammals. Furthermore, according to de Waal, all emotions are biological, none is more basic than others (we cannot just say that animals have basic emotions, the end of the story), and none are uniquely human. To support his idea, he puts forward a common ground to link the animal and human emotion which is the sameness of physiological structure in accordance with the evolutionary continuity: “This is a logical position given how closely the emotions are tied to the body and how all mammalian bodies are fundamentally the same” (de Waal, 2019, p. 187). Hence by eliminating any distinction, we can reach a general definition of emotion that de Waal made. I shall also adopt this definition in my thesis.

An emotion is a temporary state brought about by biologically relevant external stimuli, whether aversive or attractive. The emotion is marked by specific changes in the organism’s body and mind—brain, hormones, muscles, viscera, heart, etcetera. Which emotion is triggered is often predictable by the situation

in which the organism finds itself, and can further be inferred from behavioral changes and evolved communication signals. There exists no one-on-one relation between an emotion and ensuing behavior, however. Emotions combine with individual experience and cognitive assessment of the situation to prepare the organism for an optimal response (de Waal, 2011, p. 194).

The fourth argument is that non-human animals and humans share emotion homologously.²⁸ Perhaps the only studies that one can find in favor of this argument have been/are still being produced by Frans de Waal and his team. Although most studies about animal cognition and animal emotions do not make a statement about guilt and shame in animals, they suggest that our closest relatives, chimpanzees show strong empathy (de Waal, 2009). Chimpanzees can read another chimpanzee's body language and respond accordingly. This seems striking at first, but considering that chimpanzees can use the information gained from the reading of another's body language for their own benefit, and also embrace the same emotion that another has. This is called *emotional contagion*; one's adopting the same emotion as the other. When one's emotion (and emotional expression) is observed by the other, emotion triggers the same emotion in other, and the other behaves accordingly. We can also address it as *empathy*. (de Waal, 2011) Accompanied with empathy, the other so-called human emotions, hope and worry as future oriented, revenge, forgiveness, gratitude as past oriented, and also pride seem present in adult apes and in other mammals like dolphins, elephants, chimpanzees (de Waal, 2019, pp. 147-157). De Waal regards gratitude as follows:

Based on thousands of observations, we have found that chimpanzees share food specifically with those who have been kind to them in the past. Every morning, when the apes gather in the climbing frame to patiently tend each other's hair, we measure who grooms whom. In the afternoon, we provide them with shareable food, such as a few large watermelons. Melon owners allow anyone who has groomed them to remove pieces from their hands or mouth, but not individuals with whom they failed to interact in the morning—they may resist the latter individuals and sometimes even threaten them. Sharing patterns

²⁸ Frankly, I alternate between the third and the fourth arguments since both arguments may seem to be viable options for the purpose of my thesis. However, I am afraid presently that it can be difficult to defend animal morality on the basis of basic emotions, if I choose the third argument. (My concern here is that I may be accused of underestimating morality.) As for the fourth argument, the empirical evidence may not be sufficient—studies that so-called human emotions are also animal emotions are still at a very early stage.

thus change from day to day depending on the distribution of earlier grooming. Since the time span between the two events is several hours, the sharing requires memory of past encounters and positive feelings about enjoyed services. We know this combination as gratitude (de Waal, 2019, pp. 147-148).

It may seem a bit extreme to attribute hope to animals. However, hope may be just the condition of looking forward to something expected or missed like. It may become plausible accepting it if we consider “a monkey looking for a lucrative trade, a chimpanzee trying to improve his status, a dolphin searching the ocean for her lost calf, wolves setting out on a hunt, or a herd of elephants following an old matriarch who knows the last watering hole in the desert” (de Waal, 2019, pp. 157-158).

3.6. Some Concerns about Animal/Human Emotions

Although Darwin himself published on emotional expressions and his followers shared this ambition, even a century after, there are still disputes about it. Some warn us to be cautious in asserting that non-human animals have emotions and demonstrate emotional expressions. The reason for such a warning stems from two concerns. The first concern is about whether the emotion that is felt by humans is the same as the emotion that is felt by non-human animals. The second concern is about whether attributing emotion to non-human animals is anthropomorphizing. Such concerns seem to be eliminated by both quite old and recent empirical studies and findings. First, the expressions of emotions among mammals (both humans and non-humans) are universal (Darwin, 1890, Ekman, 1972, Keltner *et al.*, 2019, de Waal, 2011). This should be persuasive enough a finding. “The so-called play face of primates is homologous with human laughter. Not only does the facial expression resemble laughter, but the accompanying hoarse vocalizations do as well, here uttered by an adolescent male bonobo being tickled in the side by an adult male” (de Waal, 2011, p. 197). Not only has the sameness of vocalization of the emotions, but also of laughter in primates renders the findings of expressions very exciting. If both animals and human did not share the same emotions, why would the expression of a specific

emotion be the same for both animals and humans? One may object to the idea that the vocalization of the emotions in primates is the same as in humans by arguing that emotional expressions of a specific emotion can be learned by imitation from humans. Of course, it can be learned. However, the same emotional expressions are observed in different cultures, and even in different species, which cannot not be a coincidence. Although some facial expressions are considered to be plausible only for primates because they are evolutionarily closer to us than other mammals, they are also encountered in dogs, felids, and ungulates (de Waal, 2011). These observations support the belief that non-human animals have emotions in the same way that humans do. It seems as if an expression were the natural consequence of an emotion both for humans and animals.

Secondly, in order to explain that humans and animals share emotions homologously, we need to clarify what we understand by individual experience. We do not even know whether human individuals feel the same emotion in the same way or in the same degree. Does each individual experience exactly the same emotion, but to a different degree? How can we overcome such a problem? Even if we cannot be sure that they are exactly the same, we can suggest that there is an affinity between them. If there was not, we could not even say, “um, I understand you well, I have had the same experience that you have just told us.” Moreover, if we do not share the same emotions and feelings, drugs would be useless. However, our belief in medical science is quite high. We get painkillers for pain, and we get emotion regulating drugs for affective disorders. Even literature, which we do not count as reliable, has benefited from the affinity of emotions and has influenced the masses so far. To be precise, I do not think that the same emotion is felt to the same degree by each individual; however, the same emotion is felt to a certain degree. It can be explained by analogy that can be measured objectively by, for instance, fMRI. Yet, the problem here is not a difference in degree. Let us consider the primary colors that are red, yellow, and blue. All the other colors like purple, pink, brown, and orange whose name we know are derived from three basic colors. There are millions of colors the names

of which we do not even know, even if they have names—in fact, the colors are referred to by numbers, like #fff567. A particular shade of yellow is represented by this number, the precise tint, tone, and shade of it. We can compare millions of colors on the color scale to those on the “emotion scale”. One can relatively easily say which color that is, but it is very unlikely to say what the tint, tone or shade of the color is. In intersubjective reality, each individual supposes to perceive the same color tone after the seeing process from eye to brain, but subjective experience may even prevent them from knowing which tone they see due to the lack of information or optical illusion. There are quite interesting experiments on this subject.²⁹ The same brain activity in the same region of the brain can be observed when their brains are monitored in fMRI. However, we may not have the knowledge of the degree to which emotion is felt, and how the feeling is when experiencing it by the definition of subjective experience.

Thirdly, in order to show that humans and animals share emotions homologously, we need to look at the behaviors that occur after emotions arise in animals. What we can encounter is the similar behaviors that emerge as a result of the emergence of the same emotions, which is not a coincidence. The fact that a human, a chimpanzee and a rat who are faced with an unfair situation can become angry and have behavioral changes indicates a certain level of similarity in terms of eliciting stimuli, and reinforcement effects (See, de Waal, 2016, Blanchard, R., Blanchard D., 1989, and Quirk, G., Beer, S., 2006). I think there

²⁹ Recently, the photograph of a gold/blue striped dress, that created surprise about color vision and occupied the social media, has also been studied scientifically. This event is about a photograph of a dress which is perceived differently by those who look at it. Whereas some sees a gold and light blue dress, others see a black and dark blue dress. (I thought for a while that those who say that dress is black and dark blue are just joking.) The tones of blue may be explained easily. But how can a color be perceived by ones as gold, by others as black? Philosophers have had thought-experiments about qualia problem, but this is like the qualia problem incarnated. One of the studies explains this phenomenon as follows: “Here we show, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), that those who perceive The Dress as white/gold have higher activation in response to the image of The Dress in brain regions critically involved in higher cognition (frontal and parietal brain areas). These results are consistent with theories of top-down modulation and present a neural signature associated with the differences in perceiving The Dress as white/gold or blue/black” (Schlaffke *et al.*, 2015).

are certain well-established evolutionary facts about emotions: Emotions of humans and non-human animals have evolved by natural selection. Emotions have evolved exclusively for adaptive reasons, which is to enhance survival and reproduction.

Panksepp (2005) stated that the fundamentals of emotional feelings are contained in the evolved emotional action device of mammalian brains, that emotions reproduce the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, and that emotional feelings are shared homologously by all mammalian species. Panksepp is also bold in his claim that basic emotional feelings were the first subjective experiences to exist on earth, and without them consciousness may not have emerged in primate brain. So emotional experiences are a candidate for the first form of consciousness that evolved long time before humans existed (Panksepp, 2011).

On the other hand, some researchers agree with Darwin, Panksepp and de Waal that basic emotions are shared by mammals; however, they deny that these emotions are homologous to human emotions because emotions are defined with reference to human behavior. Animal emotions are “emotion primitives”.

In contrast to Darwin, we argue that, in such organisms, these primitive emotion states are not necessarily homologous to the specific psychological categories that define human emotions (fear, anger, happiness, and so forth). Rather, these states have certain fundamental properties, which we term “emotion primitives,” or evolutionary building blocks of emotion, which are shared across emotions and across phylogeny, even if the species-typical behaviors that express them are not. According to our view, therefore, the question is not whether flies have “fear” or some other emotion present in humans that one should try to “model” in *Drosophila* (Iliadi, 2009) but, rather, whether they have central states that have features that are characteristic of emotion states in general (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014, p. 188).

Anderson and Adolphs’ position is quite interesting and unique one that I have not encountered before. Still, it is not a complete denial of specific characteristics of emotions. They argue that humans and animals do not share emotions homologously. However, there is something they call emotion

primitives and stand for emotions, since they have fundamental properties of emotions. If something shares the same function with another thing and produces the same behavior, why would it be a different thing? Due to the authenticity of this approach, for the present moment, I neither accept nor deny it.

It is plausible to say that all these theories in fact lead us to the conclusion that emotions are not entirely individual, but that they interact with others in a way, and that various behaviors emerge as a result of this interaction. After all, emotions rarely begin from within. They are generally caused by some external stimulus. In order for emotions to represent external conditions, it would have to be the case that emotions are reliably caused by those conditions. When a specific emotion is experienced, by monitoring the brain activity by fMRI, the marks of emotion can be detected in various areas of brain as imaging the activity, since the brain area that detects bodily changes is clearly activated. In this sense, emotions seem to be perceptions of bodily changes and we can affirm it as internal. Furthermore, it can be asserted that emotions consist of biochemical reactions. However, it does not indicate that there is no association between the emotion that emerges in an individual and the environment that surrounds the individual. It is not probable that an emotion is independent from the environment that surrounds the individual, which renders it social when the environment is a social environment.

3.7. Emotions and Other Affective States

The term ‘emotion’ is often used interchangeably with the terms describing other affective states such as feelings, moods, sentiments, affects, motivations, and motives. When they are used interchangeably, what they mean can be understood. Still, it does not mean that there cannot be a mistaken usage. It is indeed true that emotions have similar characteristics with other affective states. However, there are specific characteristics that clearly distinguish them. I will compare and contrast these affective states with emotions for a clear understanding of the function and the benefit of emotions in social context.

3.7.1. Feelings

Let me start with ‘feeling’ that is sometimes used in exactly the same sense as ‘emotion’. Even it is used interchangeably, the distinction between emotion and feeling has been made since the ancient times. Aristotle thought that emotion has different characteristics from feeling (distress or pleasure), action tendency (desire for action), and bodily changes (Prinz, 2004, p. 10). For instance, he suggests that anger is an emotion that can cause distressing feeling for an action that may be revenge, and the bodily change when anger arises is the boiling blood in the heart. Still, it is controversial whether these two correspond to the same thing or not, which raises further questions with regard to their nature and characteristics. Looking at the definitions of ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’, one again encounters a variety of meanings. When considered the same, they both refer to mental states corresponding to some biochemical reactions. When they are considered different, emotions are adaptive responses for survival; feelings are subjective experiences of these emotions. In this sense, one can infer that emotions are objective bodily changes while feelings are subjective bodily states that are considered to be known only by those who have them (de Waal, 2019, p. 10). For example, fear, an emotion, is experienced by all individuals without exception; pleasure, a feeling, is a bodily state which we cannot know how it is felt. To be sure, emotions, too, occur in subjects. However, emotions are objective in the sense that emotions occur independently from individuals’ will. On the other hand, what makes feelings subjective is rather that emotions are *felt* at different levels in each individual.

Before the notion of emotion as a bodily state was argued by William James (1884), emotions were considered to be judgments or at least a judgment with a feeling. Emotions had been attributed a cognitive component, but not bodily component. With James, the definition of emotion has changed (recalling his definition that emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body). By the definition of emotion as the *perception* of the bodily change, James refers to a conscious state. He puts forward that if we exclude consciousness, we have

nothing left behind regarding both feeling and emotion (James, 1884). If such perceptions are conscious, they qualify as feelings. But if they occur unconsciously, they are not feelings (Prinz, 2005). I can tentatively say that emotions can occur unconsciously as well since they emerge as bodily reactions to certain conditions. Furthermore, when we are unconscious under anesthesia we may not feel pain. When we are conscious under local anesthesia we say that *we do not feel anything at all*. The question arises as to whether there is actually pain somewhere in our body that we do not feel, since the drug prevent us to feel it, or there is no pain to feel because of the action of the drug. Although we were unconscious under anesthesia, we might have the pain itself if bodily reactions or at least brain functions can be an indication for the presence of such experience. There are several researches concerning whether unconscious experience of an emotion is possible (Borsook & Becerra, 2006; Hudetz, 2008; Kussman *et al.*, 2016; MacDonald, Naci, MacDonald, & Owen, 2015; Price, 2015) One of them is as follows:

[T]here is accumulating evidence that there may be non-conscious or unconscious processing of fear by the medial prefrontal cortex. While disturbances of network properties (including those in the medial prefrontal cortex) during impaired consciousness (viz., coma) or anesthesia, prior work in animals under general anesthesia show that nociceptive signals activate somatosensory pathways (Kussman *et al.*, 2016, p. 9).

That there is a response to pain is expected in this research. Since neuron activations are observed by fMRI under unconscious condition, the result is consistent with the expectancy. That is, neuron activation has occurred as a change in the brain even if one does not feel the pain when one is unconscious and one does not remember that pain when one is conscious. Although the research tells us that one does not feel anything unconsciously, I doubt whether this fact amounts to saying that one does not experience anything at all.

There is a clear distinction between emotion and feeling independently of their relation to consciousness. It is true that emotions are felt. Feelings are the somatic experiences of any conditions that are felt such as cold, hot, nausea,

pain, and pleasure.³⁰ The view that somatic experience of feelings does not contradict the awareness condition of feelings. After all, I think, feeling pain requires some level of awareness.

Ordinary language usage can be misleading by referring them as the same thing. However, it is indeed different to say that “emotions are felt” and “emotions are feelings”. When we say “I feel sad”, we do not imply that sadness is a feeling. We rather imply that we have a feeling that an emotion has arisen in our body. So, we can illustrate it by saying that “I feel X” does not entail that “X is a feeling” (Prinz, 2005).

3.7.2. Moods

Another affective state different from emotion is mood. Mood and emotion are considered to be related but still they are distinct. Mood resembles emotion somehow. But how can we differentiate between an emotion of anxiety and an anxious mood? The clue lies in the cumulative experiences of the individual. If an individual experiences an event for several times, the emotional state may develop in accordance with the event and this can be a specific emotion. For example, if one is constantly exposed to experience sad events, one can find oneself in a sad mood that one cannot avoid. If an individual experiences that event frequently, the experience increases the degree of the emotional state. So, it may develop a long-term arousal mood state (Mendl, Burman, & Paul, 2010, p. 2899). The first and the most distinctive difference between them is the length of emotion and mood. Emotions are short-lasting—even immediate—responses; on the other hand, moods are long-lasting responses in/to a situation (Prinz, 2004). Anger is an instant response to a certain situation like being treated disrespectfully, for instance, someone is cutting in the line, irritable mood can endure even for days when your boss is treating you with constant humiliation. Irritable can be the long-lasting version of anger. Depression is a mood disorder

³⁰ “Somatic” actually is a general term. It can be used for any part of the body such as muscle system, digestive system, and endocrine system. In this context, it refers to the nervous system. Moreover, the effects of psychological experiences can be examined by bodily reactions.

that can last even for years. Secondly, both emotion and mood have positive or negative valence like good mood/emotion and bad mood/emotion. Yet, moods do not have specific terms as emotions (anger, fear, joy), they are mostly designated with their positive and negative valences such as negative mood and positive mood. Both emotions and moods are sometimes referred to by the same term such as sad, irritated. Moreover, moods can arise by physiological, psychological, and environmental change. Emotions can also be influenced by these changes; however, emotions are mostly directed at an object. For instance, hormonal change can affect the emotion that we have; however, it is not the main reason for having a certain emotion. It only plays secondary role for altering the level of the emotion. On the other hand, moods are dispositional (Prinz, 2004). What dispositional means here is that whereas emotions are responses to certain situation or object, moods do not require an object to arise.

If an animal is in an environment in which it experiences frequent threatening events, and hence its emotional state is often in the Q4 quadrant, it may develop a longer term high-arousal negative mood state that mirrors this cumulative experience. If it is frequently successful at avoiding these events, or it is in a generally safe environment, a longer term low-arousal positive mood state (Q2: ‘relaxed’/‘calm’) may result. On the other hand, if it is in a plentiful environment and successful at acquiring fitness-enhancing rewards, it is likely to exhibit a mood state that is centred on the Q1 quadrant, whereas a low-resource environment and failure to acquire rewards will lead to a predominantly Q3 mood (Mendl *et al.*, 2010, p. 2899).³¹

If an animal encounters a condition that is often threatening, and has a specific emotion that is negative, the emotion turns into the negative mood that expands the animal’s daily routine. On the other hand, if an animal often inhabits a safe environment, it may develop a positive mood. Colombetti (2014) states that “animals must have moods, which they experience corporeally as different ways in which the world impresses itself on them since they can experience and make sense of the world” (p. 14). We can intuitively comprehend their experience of this kind, but we cannot exhibit it this way. However, we can observe it in a way.

³¹ Positive and negative states are schematized in quadrants. Positive affective states are in quadrants Q1 (high: excited, happy) and Q2 (low: calm, relaxed), and negative states in quadrants Q3 (low: sad, depressed) and Q4 (high: anxious, fearful) (Mendl *et al.*, 2010, p. 2896).

3.7.3. Sentiments

Another affective state that may share the same sense with emotion and should be differentiated from it is sentiment. Sentiment is something like an attitude toward one's occurring emotion (Prinz, 2004). It is not a longstanding state like mood, not an occurrent state into which one can enter like emotion. Whereas emotion, feeling, and mood are approached as something that is felt or experienced in the same way, a sentiment comes along with an emotion. For instance, if you have a positive attitude towards others, they turn into someone about whom you experience positive feelings in the presence of them. You can feel peaceful when they are with you, sadness when you are apart. If you have a negative attitude towards others, they turn into someone about whom you experience negative feelings in the presence of them. As Prinz (2004) states that one can even feel *Schadenfreude* when one has a negative attitude towards one another.

The condition of having an attitude toward something indicates that sentiment is also dispositional. This is where sentiment can be compared to emotion since the utterances of sentiments may be the same as of emotions such as "I hate rainy days" (Prinz, 2004). Yet, "hate" does not refer to the emotion that is experienced at the current time; on the other hand, it refers to the disposition after one has experienced the emotion until it becomes an attitude. Sentiments are similar to moods by being dispositional. However, there is a difference between them. Whereas sentiments are attitudinal, moods are not. For instance, if you do not like previous films of a director, you can respond negatively to the following films made by her/him. It is an attitude toward a film director, and we do not need to explain it with mood since disliking does not occupy our minds whole week or month. Moreover, moods are toward different particular objects, while sentiments are toward a particular object. For example, one can experience anxiety mood for going across the street, running across others, getting stuck in the elevator, briefly for everything that surrounds them corresponding to

mobility. We cannot explain sentiments for such a condition. One cannot enter into a condition like mood.

To sum, sentiments are neither rapid response like emotions, nor longstanding states like moods. Sentiments are attitudes toward one's occurrent emotion. In this sense, sentiments accompany an emotion whether that emotion arises or not at the current time. About sentiments, we can tentatively say that they are present in animals as something that accompanies emotions since sentiments come with emotions. They do not need to be appraisals, interpretations, or evaluations. However, they emerge as an attitude depending on the frequency of repetition of emotions as in moods.

3.7.4. Motivation

Emotions can be motivations for certain conditions under which one can need to deal with. Still, it does not mean that an emotion and motivation are the same things. When a motivation is the matter of subject, it is considered to have mostly positive valence. However, motivations may have negative valence as Prinz argues that fatigue can be a motivation for seeking rest, just as hunger is a motivation for eating (Prinz, 2004). We associate fatigue and hunger with each other, and interpret them as the cause or effect of the disease or negative conditions. However, these are vital necessities in the sense as follows. If there was no feeling of hunger, there would be no need to eat, and there would be no search for food. Therefore, there would be starvation. Moreover, if there was no feeling of fatigue, there would be no need for rest and one would keep doing what they are doing. This would result in death. In fact, the reason for the negative approach here is our approach to fatigue or hunger. If we change our approach, we can find that fatigue and hunger are the motivation for survival. Since these motivations emerge as sensations, they are not emotions. There are experiments about motivation in terms of hunger and wanting to eat which is quite interesting.

In rats, the liking system involves the shell of the nucleus accumbens, the ventral pallidum, and the brainstem region. Wanting involves the dopamine projection system from midbrain to nucleus accumbens. If one creates a lesion in the wanting system of a rat, the rat will not eat. It will starve to death. But if you force the same rat to eat agreeable food (e.g., something sweet) it will display behavior that suggests it enjoys the experience. It likes food, but it doesn't want food. Conversely, one can stimulate the wanting system to achieve wanting without liking. A rat in this condition will eat everything you give it, including foods that it dislikes. It will gorge itself on foods that cause it to display aversive reactions at every bite (Prinz, 2004, p. 195).

Sections found in the brains of rats are associated with the feeling of hunger and wanting system. If a disorder is created in the willing system of rats, no matter how much they are hungry, they do not want to eat and will starve to death. When the opposite change is made to the willing system of rats, they will eat even when they do not like the food. Can we say that free will is the illusion of “wanting”? Do we really want to, or do we fall into the illusion that we need it or that we want it because we are inclined towards it? Here I do not question whether the rats have free will. The question indicates to an essential problem that has occupied our minds. We may not be able to conduct such an experiment in humans for ethical reasons. However, I believe that similar results would be achieved. At least in such a result, there will be no obstacle for us not to think again of our own belief in the free will of our own species.

Plutchik puts forward the differences between emotion and motivation that Prinz (2004, p. 192) listed:

- i. Motivations, unlike emotions, are aroused endogenously.
- ii. Motivations, unlike emotions, are aroused in the *absence* of survival-related events (e.g., we get hungry when food is absent).
- iii. Motivations, unlike emotions, are naturally directed at a very narrow range of objects (e.g., food and water).
- iv. Motivations, unlike emotions, occur before a search process, not after an evaluation.
- v. Motivations, unlike emotions, often occur on rhythmic schedules, not after randomly occurring environmental events.

Prinz criticizes the list with some concerns. He affirms the first claim, but states that it is *not always* true. Motivations like hunger and desire to have sex may not be always aroused by internal factors. The sight of an attractive potential partner may give rise to the feeling of sexual attraction. The sight of a delicious fruit can trigger hunger even if one is not hungry at all. People who have memory impairment such as anterograde amnesia, thus cannot generate new memories, may eat meal as if they had not eaten before, even when they had eaten (Prinz, 2004, p. 192). This claim also goes against the second claim since the presence of external factors can influence the rise of motivation. Moreover, emotions are mostly aroused in the *presence* of threat or violation of something. However, emotions are also aroused in the absence of safety when abandoned, excluded or exposed to be alone. Third, emotions can arise from almost all sorts of objects even if the object does not exist at all, or does not exist at the present time. In the fourth one, Plutchik accepts the idea that emotions are appraisals. It is true that emotions *may* occur with an evaluation, or evaluations *may* alter the degree of what is felt emotionally. However, it does not mean that it is the only way that emotions can occur. Emotions occur as an immediate bodily response that one can experience in a situation that one is confronted.

Prinz himself also distinguishes between emotion and motivation. According to him, the action tendencies are motivations (Prinz, 2004). On the other hand, he indeed does associate emotions with action tendencies, but it is a weaker association than motivation. What he puts forward is that emotions lead to motivations.

Motivation has also vital role in animals' lives as affective states like emotions. Motivations are directed at a very narrow range of objects compared to emotions. So, they are easy to be detected compared to other affective states. One cannot deny that motivation is shared by humans and non-human animals for survival and reproductive reasons.

In sum, it can be argued that emotions are affective states, but there are other affective states that are not emotions, such as feelings, moods, sentiments, motivations and so on. Some precedes emotion, some comes after emotion, and some brings forth emotion. They can be interchangeably used which may not be problematic for daily usage; however, it may be problematic in academic usage. The question may arise when examining the role and scope of emotions in non-human animals: whether non-human animals have these other affective states or whether we can only talk about emotions in non-human animals. If they do not have these other affective states, would it be a problem for my thesis, or if they do have these other affective states, can I draw upon them? I am inclined to think that the former is not a threat for my perspective. I will evaluate it as I proceed with my study.

CHAPTER 4

EMOTION AND MORALITY

In this chapter, I am going to try to explain emotion-based morality without resorting to high cognitive abilities. In this context, what makes emotions moral will be the focus of this debate. Although in the literature emotions are regularly distinguished as moral and non-moral, one wonders if such a sharp distinction is really possible. If possible, is such a sharp distinction defensible? Defending it requires putting forward how such a distinction is made, that is, what the criteria are for this distinction. Can the same emotion involve both moral and non-moral aspects? Or are some emotions distinctively moral? Some emotions are also distinguished as moral and non-moral in themselves such as anger and moral anger, disgust and moral disgust. Is it a linguistic distinction referring to two features of disgust, or does it point to two completely different emotions? Moreover, there are quite similar emotions that are distinguished as moral and non-moral such as remorse and regret. Unlike disgust, there are two different words here. While one is considered moral, the other is considered merely social, but not moral.³² What kind of quality can make an emotion moral or withhold an emotion from being moral? In accordance with the answers given to the question above, the validity of the previously proposed criteria in the literature will be critically examined (some of them are listed below). This chapter will be structured in relation to the answers to these questions.

Those who study moral emotions do not appeal only to a single moral emotion. For them, there are several moral emotions such that each has distinctive feature. Thus, a criterion that works for one may not be applicable to another emotion.

³² Regret and remorse may look the same to us since our native language is not English. However, while regret is defined as “sorrow, distress, or disappointment due to some external circumstance or event”, remorse is defined as “deep regret or guilt for doing something morally wrong; the fact or state of feeling sorrow for committing a sin” (Oxford English Dictionary).

So, we need to put forward criteria that would describe moral aspects of an emotion. Accordingly, we can make an evaluation about which and how emotions are counted as moral.

4.1. Criteria

In the literature, for an emotion to gain the status of a moral emotion there are some criteria, such as the following:

- Moral emotions are essential concerns/cares for others' as well as one's own welfare.
- Moral emotions promote social behaviors.
- Moral emotions arise in the situations involving violation of norms, fairness, justice

Even if the criteria above may appear valid to differentiate between moral and nonmoral, I think they do not provide us a clear-cut distinction. Indeed, the same emotion can be basic, social, and moral. In this sense, one may wonder whether these correspond to the same emotion, or they are distinctive emotions.

Let us examine the above criteria in order. The first criterion tells us that each emotion that concerns others and cares for the benefit of others is a moral emotion. However, it does not mean that the concern is only for others, sacrificing is only for others, without looking after themselves. Nor does it mean things related only with others. For instance, fear does not usually involve social situations, and actually is a sudden response to situations such as threats. It may be labeled non-social, but it can also be social, and even moral; when one cares for others, fear of losing them also arises. Empathy can be another emotion in order to explain concern and care for others' welfare. Understanding is the key point for empathy concerning one's sharing the experience one feels with others. Empathy is directed towards understanding others. When others are confronted with problems, empathy arises and it ensures robust care for others.

This criterion takes us to the social-moral debate, that is, whether there is social-moral distinction or they can be counted as the same. Then, we need to evaluate the social-moral distinction. The distinction is discussed together with the notion of moral norms/rules and conventional norms/rules. Moral norms are regarded as independent from an authority, and justified with reference to others' rights, and are universal, whereas conventional norms are regarded as dependent on authority, locally applicable (compared to moral norms) (Machery & Mallon, 2010, p. 32). Machery & Mallon (2010) also regard moral norms a distinct type of norms related to moral judgments. To distinguish moral norms and conventional norms, we need to understand whether there is a distinction between moral judgments and normative judgments. According to those who believe that moral-conventional distinction can be made clear-cut, the strongest argument is that even young children grasp the distinction between moral and conventional norms. Children may think that moral rules are more important, less permissible, less authority dependent and more serious than conventional rules (Nichols, 2004, p. 6). According to the argument, children may comprehend the distinction between "You should clean your plate" and "You should not lie to your parents" as different types of rules. Both rules come from parents (authority), and in the violation of the rules, children may be punished such as playing games more than parents asked for in that day. How can a child comprehend the distinction? Can a child comprehend different types of rules when a greater punishment is imposed in breaching a rule that is considered to be moral? A child regard a rule as more important and serious if child breaks that rule and receives a greater punishment. However, it is still questionable if one means that a child can make moral-conventional rule distinction. Moral-conventional rules cannot be distinguished since some of the norms are more important and serious than others. There might be less serious rules among moral rules. Then, should we have taken the less serious ones into the cluster of conventional rules?³³ I think the distinction between moral and conventional rules is not very clear, and it is a demarcation problem as to where to draw the line. Can the distinction between the rules "You should clean your plate" and

³³ I certainly do not argue that some moral rules are more important than other moral rules.

“You should not steal” be intelligible in the perspective of a child’s understanding? However, the rule “You should not pull your friend’s hair” seems in the middle of the rules in the sense that it may not be so serious, it is childish; but it is also harmful. So, to what extent harm is acceptable and where should we include this rule?

The distinction between moral and conventional rules originally comes from the discussion about normative cognition that is considered to be a product of evolution. A possible definition of a norm can be as follows: “norms are attitudes toward types of actions, emotions, thoughts, or other traits. These norms are typically shared by many members of a given group and regulate people’s behaviors, thoughts, emotions, characters, and so on” (Machery & Mallon, 2010, p. 12). Machery and Mallon (2010) think that it is mostly mistaken to substitute morality with normativity. They argue that there are several reasons to think in this way. First, normativity subsumes morality. For instance, playing chess has some norms; however, it has nothing to do with morality. Secondly, norms are universal. The strongest argument about its universality is that all cultures have norms whether they are the same or different. The existence of norms in all cultures also initiates the discussion of whether norms are innate. Children are born disposed to learn norms.

Indeed, the ambiguity of moral-conventional distinction is supported by historical conditions. When moral rules were regarded as divine, moral rules were authority dependent (the Church) and locally applicable. For example, in the 6th century, the church prohibited people to be buried with their wealth so that their wealth is given to the church (Machery & Mallon, 2010, p. 31). The church also prohibited masturbation since it was a crime although no one was a victim in this act (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, p. 123). So, the church was inclined to moralize in favor of itself. Still, people with low socioeconomic status and politically conservative assume that there can be victimless crimes (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993).

Third criterion above involves some concepts such as fairness, justice, and violation. Such concepts remind us especially the emotion of anger since anger is associated with these concepts. The other moral emotions are mostly associated with moral conditions not concepts. When one encounters an unfair condition anger arises as an inevitable emotion, although from an evolutionary point of view, anger emerges as a reaction that motivates behaviors against threat and violation. One who can suppress their feeling with anticipating payoff may still have anger. Even if one is unaware of such concepts above, it occurs involuntarily. For instance, let us consider two young siblings. If older one takes greater portion of the sweet than the younger one, the younger will surely react. This reaction is inevitable even in the societies where children are raised with doctrines like being respectful and obeying their elders. Guilt is another moral emotion that occurs in the situations that involve violations of rights and justice. Guilt appears in a condition that an individual's behavior causes a violation against another. However, once guilt is experienced, it comes forth again and again in order not to cause a violation again. Accordingly, guilt can minimize violations.

There may be other criteria to define moral emotions. However, other criteria would not be new, but supporting the first three criteria. Moral emotions surely require the presence of others, others can be both excluded or included. Other criteria can be as follows:

- Moral emotions are beneficial to others and/or to the social order.
- Moral emotions support, enforce, or improve the integrity of the social world.
- Moral emotions regulate harm/violation/punishment.
- Moral emotions motivate cooperation/promote reorganization.
- Moral emotions are response to wrongdoing/injustice.
- Moral emotions are communicative.
- Moral emotions motivate to act morally.
- Moral emotions motivate to act towards norm violation.

Each moral emotion has a distinct characteristic. A criterion to meet a common ground may not be as easy as expected. So, we need to examine moral emotions and answer such questions as what is meant by moral emotion and what functions a moral emotion has.

4.2. Moral Emotions

Haidt (2003, p. 853) defines moral emotions as “emotions that are intrinsically linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or of persons other than the agent”. Furthermore, moral emotions quickly arise in the presence of moral violations when both intrapersonal and interpersonal conditions occur and bring forth moral behaviors. In this sense, shame, guilt, regret, embarrassment, contempt, anger, disgust, gratitude, envy, jealousy, *Schadenfreude*, admiration, sympathy and empathy are counted as moral emotions (Hareli & Parkinson, 2008).

Haidt (2003) regards moral emotions as a respond to moral violations or motivation to moral behaviors. What violations do not count as moral violation? Since emotions are innate reactions, not culturally given properties—even though they can be modified by the social environment in which individuals are exposed to—we have the opportunity to trace morality in prelinguistic animals and children.

Although moral reasoning has been studied more often compared to moral emotions, moral emotions have been drawing attention lately. Furthermore, over time, different emotions have been described as moral emotions. Whereas research on guilt, shame, empathy, and sympathy have taken place greatly, anger and disgust have not been studied that much. Afterwards, whereas research on anger, shame and disgust have increased widely, research on guilt as a moral emotion has decreased (*ibid.*) It is not that research has been stuck in different emotions at different periods. It is important to note that emotions have been reassessed in defining moral emotions. The traditional acceptance about

rationality of being necessary condition for moral reasoning is too solid to abandon easily. It seems that it is considered to be sufficient not to dig down deeper; however, it is inadequate to explain morality regarding non-human world.

After clarifying the subjects of social and moral emotions, what we do next is to make it clear whether moral emotions are different kind of social emotions. What is the difference between social emotions and moral emotions? Furthermore, is there really a difference between them? If there is not, what makes them different is not clear.

We may first start with two contemporary accounts of “moral” emotions, Robert Solomon, a philosopher and Jonathan Haidt, a psychologist. I will try to explain both accounts in order. Solomon adopts a cognitivist account of emotions that is described in the chapter on the theory of emotions, and he applies his account to moral emotions. He (2007) states that “emotions are constituted or structured by evaluative judgments”. These judgments vary for different emotions. For example, anger and guilt involve judgment of responsibility, pride involves judgment of entitlement and so on (Solomon, 2007, p. 167). Solomon accepts that these distinctive moral emotions are constituted by suprapersonal moral judgments.

In his early writings, Solomon (1973) does not accept emotions as physiological occurrences as William James claimed, but rather as rational and purposive. According to him, one can have an emotion without feeling anything; however, one cannot feel anything without having an emotion. This idea takes him to claim that emotions are judgments—both normative and moral judgments (Solomon, 1973, p. 27). Solomon distinguishes emotions from other judgments that he calls “cool judgments” concerning long-lasting contemplation. Emotions, on the other hand, are necessarily quick responses under the condition that one needs to deal with. Here, Solomon leaves some room to abandon his cognitivist emotion theory. Emotion can surely bring about a judgment, an evaluation;

however, emotion cannot necessarily be a mere judgment, if emotions are necessarily quick responses.

Solomon, then, adopts the theory of basic emotions and believes that they are a product of evolution but he argues that moral emotions are not part of basic emotions. The emotions that Solomon approves as distinctively moral are guilt, shame, and grief. They are distinctively different moral emotions; however, feeling responsible for what one has done is shared by these emotions and they require higher cognitive abilities. According to Solomon, moral emotions do not always require the same action tendencies; on the contrary, some moral emotions may result in withdrawal and these emotions govern the process of withdrawal. Solomon also states that moral emotions are also social emotions. Although moral emotions are social emotions, they differ from each other in their social context, not only in the sense that they include other people, but also in the sense that each moral emotion evokes some behaviors that cause different consequences under different contexts in social order (Solomon, 2007, pp. 95). Furthermore, Solomon defends that moral emotions are substantively different from non-moral emotions. For instance, moral indignation is the moral form of anger. Anger does not always include moral aspect; but moral indignation necessarily does; thus, moral indignation creates moral judgment (Solomon, 2007, p. 20). “Moral indignation, an emotion in which one accuses the other not just on one’s own behalf but on the behalf of some moral principle” (Solomon, 2007, p. 24).³⁴

According to Solomon, there are other emotions similar to anger and moral indignation that may be distinguished as moral and non-moral. They can be nearly the same emotions, still one has moral aspect, but the other does not. Regret and remorse are mentioned as examples. According to Solomon, regret

³⁴ We can see that Solomon adopts a Kantian approach to morality, in the sense that an act is right neither for one’s own self, nor for the society, but for the moral principle itself. Heading towards morality with higher cognition would require such a thing, otherwise it would be bestial or related just to interest that cannot be accepted as moral—especially Kant and his followers would think so this way.

cannot be felt under moral conditions, since it does not require commitment to someone as remorse does. For instance, one can feel regret for missing someone's wedding, or for not reaching their earlier goals. Neither involve moral aspect. On the other hand, remorse points to a deep responsibility so that one can ascribe remorse as a moral emotion. One can feel remorse for committing a crime, or some other type of harm to others. I think remorse resembles guilt since both are self-punishing emotions in the sense that guilt and remorse are both deep feelings to have responsibility after recognizing that what has been done is wrong.³⁵

Haidt positions himself on the other side of the spectrum of the theory of moral emotions, i.e., as a non-cognitivist. Haidt's general opinion about morality is actually not restricted to emotions. He prefers 'moral intuition' that includes moral emotions as well. According to Haidt, moral emotions are one type of moral intuitions. So, he (2001, p. 814) proposes the *social intuitionist approach*, briefly that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). This model is developed as an alternative to rationalist approach that all our moral judgments come from our rationality. Haidt conducts an experiment about the source of moral judgments.

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was it OK for them to make love (Haidt, 2001, p. 814)?

The majority of people in the experiment responded that it is wrong. However, since there is no danger of inbreeding, no harm suffered by either of them, why is it wrong? When responders could not find a rational answer, they would just say "I don't know, I can't explain it, I just know it's wrong" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814).

³⁵ I will discuss later the similarity between remorse and guilt in the sense that they are both self-punishing.

The social intuitionist model is an attempt to explain the conditions under which we make moral judgments. Accordingly, this approach suggests that moral intuitions precede and directly give rise to moral judgments. The social intuitionist model also rejects the traditional approach based on consciousness with reasoning power that generates moral judgments.

After explaining the social intuitionist model about where our moral judgments come, we can proceed with what Haidt thinks of morality as such. He suggests two definitions for moral emotions: “that respond to moral violations or that motivate moral behavior” and “that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (Haidt, 2003, p. 853). Furthermore, even moral emotions are linked to the interest or welfare of society, they are not necessarily positive emotions. In fact, the actions that moral emotions cause do not always have to be agreeable. “The human social world is a miraculous and tenuous co-construction of its participants, and any emotion that leads people to care about that world and to support, enforce, and improve its integrity should be considered a moral emotion, even when the actions taken are not ‘nice’ ” (Haidt, 2003, p. 855). He classifies moral emotions into two: the large family of *the other-condemning emotions* (contempt, anger, and disgust) and *self-conscious emotions* (shame, embarrassment, and guilt) and the relatively small family of *other-suffering emotions* (compassion, sympathy, empathy) and *other-praising emotions* (gratitude and elevation).

The position of Prinz (2004) about moral emotions is also worthy of attention. We can tentatively say that Prinz stands between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. He adopts the embodied appraisal theory as I explained in the previous chapter (Chapter 3. Emotions). The embodied appraisal theory obviously includes both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. It may seem like a conflict, but Prinz has an explanation for it. It is appraisal because a judgment requires cognition and embodied because it is also physiological. According to cognitive theory of emotions, emotions are disembodied appraisals. But for Prinz, emotions are neither merely mental states nor perceptions of bodily

changes but both of them. They are mental representations of bodily changes. Prinz uses the term *core relational themes* for the representation of bodily change which is a relationship between an organism and its environment (p. 51). That's how he applies the embodied appraisal model to moral emotions. Prinz's inquiry about morality begins with a question as to where moral values come from. Although Prinz accepts that "morality is a normative domain" (2007, p. 1), he asks us to pay attention to another domain in order to find where moral values come from, which is the descriptive domain. Why does doing bad things make us feel bad? Why do we also have a feeling accompanying our moral judgments? What kind of relationship is there between feeling and thinking, or is there really such a relationship? The answer that Prinz gives is that "we are epistemically sensitive to norms" (2010, p. 11). In other words, one's feelings connect them to their environments saturated with norms.

Prinz also distinguishes between basic emotions and moral emotions. He (2007, p. 69) states that basic emotions are the sources of moral emotions. For instance, anger as a basic emotion is also the source of moral anger, i.e., indignation. In other words, indignation that stems from anger is not a basic emotion, a (non-basic) moral emotion. Indignation is directly related to justice. It occurs under the condition in which injustice is committed against individuals. For instance, indignation arises when authority fails to maintain justice. On the other hand, anger not only arises in justice related situations but also arises in provocation, harm, threat, and offence. Anger is considered not to meet the condition of being a moral emotion because it arises in non-moral conditions. Anger may also arise in physical harm, which is a violation but not directly related with injustice. Prinz argues that moral anger is a central moral emotion since many of moral rules are prohibitions against rights violations and injustice, and moral anger also arises against rights violations and injustice.

Since Prinz finds basic emotions as the source of moral emotions, all moral emotions contain in themselves at least one basic emotion. Contempt, according to Prinz, is an other-blaming emotion that is a moral emotion. He thinks that it

may be a blend of anger and disgust. Contempt arises when transgressions are committed against community in moral contexts. There are those who deny that contempt is a blend of anger and disgust since anger is an approach emotion, but disgust is a withdrawal emotion. So how can these two emotions which are approach and withdrawal types come together to form a moral emotion? Prinz explains it with the criteria about facial expressions in Ekman's basic emotions theory. Because contempt has both the facial expressions of anger and disgust simultaneously when it arises Prinz thinks that a universal facial expression of contempt is compatible with the hypothesis that it is a blended emotion (Prinz, 2007, pp. 74 -75).

Moral disgust can be another other-blaming emotion that arises from physical repulsion, i.e., disgust. Like anger, Prinz distinguishes physical/ordinary disgust from moral disgust. "Ordinary" disgust occurs by physical aversion that is a negative response that comprises of digestive rejection in the mouth, nose, and gut for contaminated food. However, moral disgust requires moral conditions. Although the reaction of moral disgust resembles bodily reaction, which is physical repulsion, it is directed toward persons and events. So, Prinz admits that moral disgust is derived from the basic emotion, i.e., disgust. Moral disgust can be mostly directed at mass murderers, pedophiles, etc. The best-known example of moral disgust is revealed by an experiment in which subjects were asked to put on a sweater that was said to have belonged to Hitler. Subjects refused to wear that sweater even when they were offered money. Here, the apparent emotion they expressed is disgust (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008a). Although pollution is a physical condition, it is used metaphorically in moral domain. Those who put on that sweater, of course, will not be polluted physically, but they still feel like being polluted.

Shame and guilt are other moral emotions that almost no one would deny. Moreover, the main feature that distinguishes these two emotions from other emotions is that they are self-blaming emotions, whereas the earlier ones are other-blaming emotions. While the latter are reactions to injustice, violations of

rights involving other people guilt and shame may emerge in cases of injustice, violations of rights involving one's own. Accordingly, individuals blame themselves in such conditions for carrying the burden of violations.

Tangney *et al.* (2007) also agree that shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride are moral emotions. The common feature of these emotions is being members of the family of "self-conscious emotions". Tangney *et al.* distinguish positive and negative moral emotions. Moral emotions are mostly negative emotions, but there are positive moral emotions as well. The notable difference between negative and positive emotions is that negative emotions occur after unapproved behaviors and then individuals change their behaviors to approved behaviors whereas positive emotions occur after approved behaviors. Both are associated with approved behaviors that are morally acceptable in the social environment. This association is essentially about supporting approved behaviors. A negative emotion that arises as a result of unapproved behavior renders the possibility of approved behavior. A positive emotion, on the other hand, already results in an approved behavior. There is a moral standard that is determined by norms, consistent with approved behaviors. The violations of norms is the appearing of the unapproved behavior—that is, the expectation is not met.

Rozin *et al.* (2008, p. 763) are not entirely in agreement with the distinction between emotions and moral emotions. They designate biologically evolved disgust as the core disgust, which is one of Ekman's basic emotions. There is also culturally evolved disgust, namely moral disgust, which is an abstract and ideational emotion. They claim that disgust is physiologically the same as moral disgust, but their functions are different. How do we know that physiological reaction remains the same? There are fMRI studies with subjects playing the ultimatum game, which investigate the brain area associated with ordinary disgust. Hence, moral disgust has the same physiological reaction with nonmoral disgust. I think both are the same emotions manifested differently in different contexts; for instance, moral disgust is just physical response to moral norm violations.

In fact, although these pioneers of cognitive theory of moral emotions above talk about what moral emotions are/should be, they do not specify any concrete criteria about them. There is nothing in common about those emotions accepted to be moral emotions, except that they are self-conscious emotions.³⁶ It may even happen that these theories lose their reliability because of the deficiency of concrete criteria for moral emotion. A criterion might be as follows: x is an emotion that responds to violation; then, x is a moral emotion. That is, if an emotion responds to moral violations, then it is a moral emotion. This example seems to suggest that it is a criterion for a moral emotion. I think almost all so-called moral emotions can meet this criterion. It seems at first sight this criterion cannot embrace all moral emotions such as positive emotions because moral violation requires intervention and negative emotions arise in the presence of intervention. Accordingly, moral violation can only elicit a negative emotion. However, it may not be how it seems. We can derive the conclusion that not only negative emotions such as anger, guilt, and shame but also positive emotions such as empathy and compassion can meet the criterion. The only difference between them is that when anger, guilt, and shame encounter directly with moral violation, empathy and compassion encounter indirectly with moral violation via another's suffering. Still, each emotion has specific characteristic to be a moral emotion and each emotion refers to moral concepts such as fairness-anger, punishment-guilt, and care-empathy.

I think the defenders of cognitive theory of moral emotions agree at least about one thing which is that guilt is definitely a moral emotion compared to other emotions. Whereas it is mostly claimed that shame occurs in a broader range of situations including both moral and non-moral transgressions, guilt is specifically linked to moral transgressions (Tangney *et al.*, 2007). However, we need to examine whether other cognitivists who follow the pioneers have developed other criteria or not. Accordingly, each moral emotion should be explained respectively. So, I will begin to examine so-called the stronger moral

³⁶ The criterion of self-consciousness can also be objected because anger is regarded as a moral emotion that occurs without it.

emotions which are guilt, shame, empathy, and compassion. Then I will proceed to talk about *less strong or weaker moral emotions* which are anger, contempt, and disgust.

4.2.1. Guilt

Guilt has been almost always regarded as a moral emotion for several reasons that are linked to the characteristics of guilt. In a general sense, guilt is a negative feeling that arises in the case of aversive events. It is apparently regarded as a moral emotion in the sense that it merges the feelings of distress about another person's well-being with a sense of individual responsibility (Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2013, p. 359). One may wonder whether a similar claim can be made for disgust or sadness that may also arise in aversive events; however, guilt is distinguished from disgust or sadness by the fact that guilt is regarded as a self-conscious and self-oriented emotion that seems to require self-reflection and self-evaluation. What might be the consequences of the self-oriented quality of an emotion? Guilt may be elicited mostly by distress from the consequence of one's behavior on others. To be clear, when one feels having the responsibility towards others, and does not accomplish what the responsibility requires under those circumstances, one feels some kind of burden that is guilt. Guilt mostly appears as a result of one's behaviors that threaten individuals with whom one has an attachment relationship rather than with strangers. When one violates an autonomy rule against a member of one's own group, one has the concern accompanied with an emotion expressed as guilt (Prinz, 2007, p. 76). Solomon also agrees with the idea that one feels like one bears a burden when one experiences guilt (2007, p. 95). Guilt is also not only a burden on an individual; it is also punishment of oneself. This is the reason why guilt is also considered as an "agitation-based" emotion because another's distress is experienced as one's own distress (Eisenberg, 2000). According to Haidt (2003, p. 861), new research opposes this because guilt is not related to punishment, rather guilt motivates reparative behaviors. Haidt also claims that guilt as self-punishment is a traditional approach discussed by psychoanalysts.

Smith & Lazarus (1990) are also among the pioneers of cognitive theory of emotions. They examine guilt as a moral emotion. As guilt is a self-conscious emotion, the object of the emotion is self. Smith & Lazarus distinguish guilt and anger with the object of blame. That is, if it is guilt, blame is toward individuals themselves, whereas blame is toward others, if it is anger.

The core relational theme producing guilt is “self-blame”, which means holding oneself accountable for an important, motivationally incongruent situation. Like anger, guilt motivates the person to do something to remove the source of harm, but because the focus is on oneself, it takes the form of a desire to make reparations for any harm the person has caused (e.g., Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967). In addition, guilt is painful and therefore self-punishing (Wallington, 1973), which reduces the probability that the person will continue to engage in the harmful behavior in the future (Smith & Lazarus, 1990, p. 620).

Guilt, as a moral emotion, has also a different position among the other moral emotions since it is the most directly associated with morality compared to all other emotions. All conditions in which guilt emerges have moral transgression or moral responsibility.³⁷

Other emotions do not have such a narrow range that guilt has. Emotions except guilt can take place in non-moral contexts; however, Prinz and Nichols (2010, p.132) suggest that guilt plays exclusively a moral role. Even in non-moral

³⁷ I wonder about the extent to which we are morally responsible for others. Let us consider a thought experiment about the relationship between moral responsibility and guilt. Suppose that I think I unintentionally/accidentally harmed someone. The accident occurred in such a condition that the result would not change under any circumstances. It has also not been a condition that required me to be more careful because it would have been so in any case. If I could change the conditions, there would be an option, so it would be plausible to argue about responsibility. It would have happened regardless of my presence there; however, I feel guilty as if I could have changed. For example, I pass by a tree-lined road, and I notice that a tree is falling over someone outside the road. I am passing through there by chance and I am far away to reach and save her/him, even if I passed there earlier or later. Despite the knowledge that I cannot save her/him, I feel guilty. Am I morally responsible for one's getting hurt under this condition? If I am not morally responsible because I am situated there accidentally, why do I feel guilty? It raises the suggestion for guilt not to arise only in the moral conditions. Is the context counted as moral just because we feel guilty under the condition which is accidental? We can argue that the conditions under which we feel guilty may not have to be in moral context.

contexts, guilt can have a moral stance. For instance, one can feel guilty when going off diet. Although diet takes place in a non-moral context, one may moralize having a certain kind of diet.

Surprisingly, guilt can sometimes arise as a burden in situations such as having better conditions than others, although there is neither responsibility for others in those conditions, nor violation or superiority toward them. There are also interesting examples about guilt.

As Baumeister *et al.* (1994) point out in their review, people feel guilty when they fare better than other people, even if they are not responsible for the inequity. The most famous and troubling example of this is survivor guilt. People who survived the Holocaust, the nuclear attack on Hiroshima, the AIDS epidemic among gay men, and other great catastrophes often report feeling guilty about surviving, especially if friends and family members were killed. Guilt is also experienced by those who keep their jobs when others are laid off, those who receive greater benefits than someone who worked just as hard, and even those who are recipients of unrequited love (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, p. 133).

The guilt experienced by the Holocaust or Hiroshima survivors is not indeed a real blame. However, those who carry this burden feel guilty as if they caused these disasters. They may feel guilty as if others were allowed to die so that they may live, or as if others deserved to live less than them.

Prinz (2004, p. 20) accepts the theory of Lazarus that emotions are explained with core relational themes. Core relational themes are the source of appraisals of emotions at basic level and each emotion corresponds to a different core relational theme that is the inner judgment that one makes. For instance, “core relational theme of anger is a demeaning offense against me and mine, of guilt is to have transgressed a moral imperative, of shame is to have failed to live up to an ego-ideal, and of disgust is to take in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea” (Prinz, 2004, p. 16). Prinz agrees that emotions correspond to core relational themes, but he goes against the idea that emotions cannot occur without judgment. He suggests rather that emotions represent core relational themes without making judgment about them (2004, p. 65-66). Guilt is the only

emotion identified with morality in core relational themes. It indicates guilt to be a moral emotion if it arises under any circumstances. The core relational theme of guilt is provided as transgression of moral rules. However, this description is not sufficient for distinguishing guilt from anger or shame. The fundamental difference is that guilt emerges when *one* violates a rule, not *others*. One punishes only oneself, not others. Accordingly, guilt can be interpreted as a self-stimulation that warns us when an action is wrong, especially about one's own behavior. Still, guilt is severe if the victim of the transgression is in-group or loved ones. When such a transgression may result with separation or exclusion, guilt is likely to emerge (Prinz & Nichols, 2010). Exclusion is a significant concept that one can meet with harmful behavior. There is a high possibility of exclusion in violations against the individuals or the group to which one belongs. One has the knowledge that one can be excluded when one harms others. Although not every harmful behavior results in exclusion, it is probable to be so. Guilt appears when there is a threat of exclusion. Given that guilt emerges to avoid exclusion from the group, we can see the resemblance of guilt to fear. Exclusion points to fear because one fears to be excluded from one's surrounding social attachment. Prinz suggests that (2014, p. 321, 2007, p. 77) guilt as a moral emotion comprises of basic emotions which are fear and sadness. Exclusion can be a good feature to see the resemblance between guilt and fear.

4.2.1.1. Criticism toward Social and Moral Characteristic of Guilt

According to Nelissen *et al.* (2013, p. 360), guilt does not generate prosocial behavior that is supposed to repair interpersonal violations of norms and to cause self-punishment. People committing a violation of a norm experience guilt only when they remember that what they have done is a violation. This guilt-induced self-punishment does not really help victim or solve the problem between the offender/perpetrator and the victim. On the other hand, guilt can be a destructive emotion for one who experiences it, such as having depression, obsessive compulsiveness, and psychosis. Nelissen *et al.* do not find adequate the behaviors, such as confession and apology, motivated by guilt for repairing the

relationships. On the contrary, guilt causes self-punishment that damages the person who experiences it. Furthermore, when people have excessive concern for a specific person because they experience guilt for that person, they mostly disregard others. So, they are merely concerned with the victim, not with others, which only means prosocial behavior in dyadic relationships, not prosocial behavior in collective relationship when more individuals are involved.

Social aspect of an emotion has importance in interpersonal situations. Guilt is regarded as a social emotion with its relationship-oriented nature such as repairing relationships with others. However, de Hooge (2012) suggests that the behaviors following guilt do not cause repairing relationships, rather they cause avoiding negative feeling. Moreover, she claims that the third persons expect the transgressor to contribute to reparative behaviors. For instance, when one forgets acknowledging the birthday of someone who cared about one can feel guilty because it may damage their relationship. Another person who is aware of it can fix the situation by getting them together. That is, reparative behavior is maintained by a third person, rather than the one who feels guilty and the victim. De Hooge (2012, p. 1189) also claims that one's reparative intentions and social behaviors decrease when damage is repaired.

4.2.2. Shame

Shame and embarrassment can be said to belong to the same family. They have a common origin of submissive behavior. Although in non-western cultures they can be accepted as the same emotion, western people distinguish shame and embarrassment as follows:

Shame is elicited by the appraisal that there is something wrong or defective with one's core self, generally due to a failure to measure up to standards of morality, aesthetics, or competence. Embarrassment, in contrast, is said to be elicited by appraisal that one's social identity or persona within an interaction is damaged or threatened, most commonly because one has violated a social-conventional rule but also at times because of events beyond one's control" (Haidt, 2003, p. 860).

It seems that shame differs from embarrassment by the presence of core-social self in one's self-evaluations. While shame is linked with violations of moral norms, embarrassment is linked with violations of conventional norms. Furthermore, shame is considered to include extreme tendency to withdraw, which can even give rise to suicide. However, embarrassment is considered to be associated with less serious conditions under which individuals have tendency to withdraw. Besides, both shame and embarrassment include the motivation to withdraw. Shame and embarrassment can be felt mostly when one is surrounded by higher rather than lower status. When there is a hierarchical social structure, shame and embarrassment mostly arise in individuals as the initiator of withdrawal behavior.

On the other hand, there are those who believe that there is no universal moral-conventional distinction since some cultures, such as India, do not have that (Haidt, 2013, p. 283). In Indian culture, it is universally wrong for widows to eat fish. The rule comes from the belief of reincarnation after death and doing such a thing is considered to be disrespectful toward one's deceased husband (Haidt, 2013, p. 285).³⁸ In many cultures, one's respect to an authority or to a group by the representation of one's self is considered a moral attempt. When self has failure, shame comes forward. In some cultures, shame is central moral emotion as a self-regulative emotion (Haidt, 2003, p. 860). In most human cultures the proper presentation of the self is a profoundly moral enterprise, in which one shows respect for authority and for the group. The failure to be vigilant about one's presentation may bring shame and dishonor to the self and to one's (interdependent) kin. One's presentation stands out when one violates both a moral and a social rule. I agree that one feels shame when one violates a moral rule, but I also admit that the moral-conventional rule distinction is not clear-cut since one may experience the same emotion when one violates a social norm.

³⁸ I think that the lack of the social-moral distinction still does not exclude the presence of social rules like "do not point your finger at people, and do not wear your shoes indoors".

4.2.3. Guilt and Shame

Guilt and shame have already been examined separately above. Yet, the reason why I want to deal with these two emotions together is that even though we now accept that guilt and shame are distinct emotions, there was not such a solid distinction before. The father of psychoanalysis, Freud, in his foremost works, regarded the shame experiences of the patients as guilt experiences in 1900s, even though he later abandoned this stance. Although Freud's followers persisted to ignore the distinction relying upon his earlier works, the attempt to distinguish between shame and guilt has been proceeded by post-Freudians such as Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962), Jacobson (1954), Piers & Singer (1953), (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 12-13). Even in 90s, there have been disputes whether these emotions are different manifestations of the same emotion or distinct emotions (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). That is, guilt and shame have some similar characteristics in a sense and they differ in other ways. Whereas both guilt and shame are self-oriented emotions, they are social emotions in the sense that they arise in the violation of rights of others by the person who experiences these emotions. However, despite the fact that these emotions are both social, guilt is experienced in a private context while shame in a public one. In order for guilt to arise, offence or violation does not have to be known by others or one does not have to be surrounded by others. Furthermore, one can feel guilt only when one is left privately on their own. On the other hand, shame is experienced when one is faced with one's own violation of the rights of others under the circumstances where one is surrounded by others.³⁹ Emotions such as anger, disgust, and fear mostly stem from external reasons; someone else is hurt, something else is dangerous, or disgusting. However, guilt and shame stem from internalized reasons. In other words, they arise because of what one does. What one does is also related with others; however, the emotion itself mostly arises by one's own actions, not by external actions. In accordance with this fact, guilt and shame are often associated with self-caused harm (Prinz,

³⁹ One can also experience shame when one is on their own. However, it would be merely a repetition of the emotion experienced earlier.

2007, p. 77).⁴⁰ Yet, self-caused harm varies in guilt and shame by the focus of evaluation. Helen B. Lewis (1971) is one of the first noticing the difference between guilt and shame in their evaluation.

The experience of shame is directly about the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus. In guilt, the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself the focus of the experience (Lewis, 1971, p. 30).

Prinz (2007, p. 77) also accepts the distinction between guilt and shame by their direction tendency. Whereas guilt is an action-directed emotion, shame is an agent-directed one. One feels guilty by their actions judged as wrong for the violation of the rights of others and wrongness is attributed only to one's action, not to one's personality. Guilt is an emotion involving the feeling, "could have done otherwise". On the other hand, when one feels ashamed by their actions judged as wrong, one also feels unworthy, corrupted, even dirty as impure or repugnant. An example may clarify this. Suppose that people who commit sexual crimes feels shame, they may also feel impure, as if what they did made them inhuman which comes with the feeling of dirty. Whereas guilt is associated with an act one commits, shame is associated with one's own self. One can feel guilty for what one does, or fails to do. On the other hand, one can feel shame for what one is or what one fails to be (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, p. 135). In feeling ashamed, one feels like a bad person. However, it is not applicable to guilt. One can feel guilty without feeling like a bad person. For guilt, however, there may be a sense of how I did such a bad behavior. In other words, guilt is like, I *did* such a bad thing; whereas shame is like, *I* did such a bad thing.

Guilt also includes autonomy norms about how we treat others, avoiding of harm and violation of rights. Shame, on the other hand, is considered to include community norms concerning public goods and social order. In accordance with

⁴⁰ We feel guilty mostly when we do wrong to our closest ones because we care about them and we have attachment with them. By our misbehavior, we may disappoint them and cause damage to that attachment. In this sense, guilt can be a punishment that we actually inflict ourselves as self-caused harm.

these norms, Prinz (2007, p. 77) suggests that there is also an emotion which is a blend of guilt and shame. We might not have a word for it yet; however, we can feel it. For instance, one who commits crime can feel both guilt and shame at the same time because first, one feels ashamed because one would like to hide from others who may not treat them well anymore (as a community norm). Secondly, one can also feel guilty for causing someone harm, only for the act itself (as an autonomy norm).

Tangney (1996, p. 1257; 1998, p. 8) suggests that guilt and shame lead to very different motivations in interpersonal context. While the motivation of shame reveals itself as avoidance response, the motivation of guilt reveals itself as corrective response. Whereas shame motivates concealment or escape, guilt typically motivates reparative action—confessions, apologies, and attempts to undo the harm done. Guilt was once accepted as an emotion that causes harm than good.⁴¹ Recently, it has changed and considered as a social emotion which plays a positive prosocial role (Prinz & Nichols, 2010). Although guilt arises after the harm is done, it promotes reparative actions. There is also one more thing about the motivation of guilt: it is considered to have special association with empathy (Tangney, 1998). How can guilt as a negative emotion and empathy as a positive emotion come together? To comprehend the relation between them appropriately, we need to review the characteristics of empathy. Empathy is morally sanctioned, and often associated with helping (Machery & Mallon, 2010, p. 35). Helping takes us to the altruism debate coupled with empathy. Empathy is characterized as an other-oriented emotional reaction to understand someone's suffering and this emotional reaction often results with the behavior of helping. Empathy is often compared with personal distress. However, someone's suffering is personal distress concerning self-orientedness, and empathy is other-orientedness. Indeed, a positive attribution to empathy is not as easy as it looks. Whereas empathy is an unpleasant and aversive emotional

⁴¹ For Freud and some post-Freudian theorists, guilt is regarded as a negative emotion because it gives rise to a sort of internal conflict between ego and superego that also damages the self, resulting in some psychological disorders such as anxiety and depression (see Prinz & Nichols, 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

reaction, it can cause something pleasant. Altruism can be described as the product of this emotional reaction to another's distress (Stich, Doris, & Roedder, 2010, p. 170). That is, empathy engenders altruistic behavior. On the other hand, some argues against the idea that empathy causes genuinely altruistic desire by stating that empathy might engender helping behavior without altruistic desires. One can also exhibit empathic behaviors not with altruistic desire but with egoistic desire such as *eliminating or avoiding* unpleasant or aversive emotional reaction that is caused by another's distress. Moreover, people are sometimes motivated to help for avoiding other negative emotional experiences such as guilt or shame. Because they believe that if they do not help, they will experience these negative emotions (Stich *et al.*, 2010, p. 189).

Both empathy and guilt are supposed to prevent violations of the rights of others. Empathy and guilt also provide motivation for reparative action by understanding another's distress (empathy) or by confession and apology (guilt). Since the focus on guilt is the behavior, one who experiences guilt is inherently decentered from oneself and heading towards others. In this sense, someone else's pain—which the possessor of guilt causes—may become one's own pain by empathic concern. Studies about the relation between empathy and guilt support the idea that guilt is mostly related with empathy as other-oriented concern (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 82). So, when guilt is heading towards others, it inherently promotes other-oriented empathic concern. Although guilt arises by violation of other's rights, the behavior motivated by guilt maintains positive relationship outcomes. One who feels guilt also experiences empathy for victims of their transgressions at the same time. On the other hand, the feeling of shame restrains empathy since shame is a self-oriented emotion. Guilt is also self-oriented emotion; however, there is difference in this self-orientedness. I think that both the object and subject of shame are oneself while the subject of guilt is oneself, and the object of guilt is the other. Hence, it can be inferred that shame is too self-oriented an emotion to feel empathy for others simultaneously. There are also other reasons that shame may not cause empathy like guilt. When shame arises, all evaluations that one makes are self-oriented such that one

interrupts the communication with others. So, interpersonal concerns would be restrained by the individual who feels shame. Furthermore, one acts as if the only responsibility one has were toward oneself, ignoring the responsibility toward others (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 81-85).

Tangney and Dearing wonder “how shame-prone and guilt-prone dispositions relate to the dispositional empathy?” (p. 86), because, it seems, while some people exhibit more shame-prone dispositions, some people exhibit more guilt-prone disposition. Besides, some people are more empathic than others. According to various researchers, while shame-prone people are not as much as empathic guilt-prone people are quite empathic (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 86).

Both guilt and shame requiring certain cognitive abilities seem to emerge later in the development of an individual in contrast, to basic emotions that emerge very early in life because the former require explicit self-recognition (Tangney, 1998, p. 9). When one encounters a condition in which one is threaten, one can feel such emotions as sadness, anger, disappointment. However, guilt and shame arise from a recognition of one’s own behaviors, not from external factors. It requires the ability to distinguish between self and other. While both guilt and shame arise from one’s own negative behaviors, they differ in terms of the types of events that evoke these emotions.

The most common antecedents for which shame was the dominant emotion were: (a) poor performance, typically academic; (b) hurting others emotionally, such as hurting a younger sibling’s feelings; (c) failing to meet others’ expectations, typically those of a parent about school; (d) disappointment in oneself, which usually involved not reaching a personal goal; and (e) role-inappropriate behaviour, such as failing to act appropriately at a family reunion. The most common antecedents for which guilt was the dominant emotion were: (a) failures at duties, which typically involved not studying enough; (b) lying, typically to one’s parents or a romantic partner; (c) neglect of another, such as not calling a friend for a long time; (d) breaking a diet or exercise regime; and (e) cheating, typically on exams (Keltner & Buswell, 1996, p. 161).

The antecedent conditions for guilt are exclusively moral transgressions, whereas the conditions for shame have a broader range, involving both “moral” and “nonmoral” transgressions (Tangney, Youman, & Stuewig, 2009). Guilt is associated with actions that harm others or violate duties, while shame is associated with failure to meet social standards that one learns as significant. In accordance with all these conditions, Tangney *et al.* conclude that the behavior occurring by guilt makes guilt “more” moral emotion compared to shame.

Another important distinguishing characteristic between guilt and shame is their expressions. While shame has a distinctive bodily expression, guilt is considered not to have any (Dacher Keltner & Buswell, 1996; June Price Tangney *et al.*, 1996). Shame comes with the feelings of worthlessness and powerlessness, which make one shrink or “being small”. Shame also causes one to feel exposed and disapproved which evokes one to escape or to hide or “to sink into the floor and disappear” (Tangney *et al.*, 1996, 1257). The emotional expressions of shame can be as follows:

“...shrank in size, slumped their shoulders, and lowered their heads, exhibiting all the signs of shame and failure. This is also the typical reaction when people fail to meet expectations or anticipate trouble after having violated a norm. The word shame is thought to come from an earlier word that means “to cover.” We lower our face, avoid the gaze of others, bend our knees, down our eyelids, and generally look miserable and diminished in stature. Our mouths droop, and our eyebrows arch outward in a distinctly unthreatening expression. We may bite or bulge our lips, or hide our face behind our hands as if we wanted “to sink into the ground.” We say we’re ashamed, but we also know that people are angry with us, or at least irritated and disappointed.”(de Waal, 2019, p. 210).

I think shame has emotional expression because it arises in public. It needs some sort of communication due to the presence of others. From a sociobiological perspective suggested by Gilbert (1997, p. 131), shame has an important role in a community for retaliation among individuals. In a modern society, it turns out to be a litmus to assure one’s trustworthiness in a social environment that relies on mutual trust. (Tangney, Stuewig, Malouf, & Youman, 2013, p. 494-495). The presence of others is required in such a trust issue that one who transgress can sustain one’s trustworthiness by clear signs of shame. The appeasing is

maintained by communicative signal, it is considered to be adaptive (Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012, p. 398). The communicative function of shame has adaptive benefit not only in the sense of displaying but also of *observing* the emotional experience. Individuals identify the committed members of the group (who follow social norms) by observing emotional expressions of others (Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012, p. 400). On the other hand, guilt does not have clear emotional expression because, I think, it happens in the absence of others around, and does not require non-verbal communication. In the case of transgression, the appeasement is provided not by emotional expression unlike shame, but by direct verbal communication resulting from guilt for repair of relationships. This verbal communication is maintained by confession and apology to repair or strengthen relationships.

According to Haidt (2003), guilt is an emotion that has already been studied a lot and accordingly accepted widely as a moral emotion. So, studying guilt may even be outdated now since the range of moral emotions are expanded outside the self-conscious emotions like guilt, shame and empathy. Yet, Haidt also has something to say about guilt. Haidt asserts that guilt is often confused with shame even by native speakers. However, there is a psychological difference between guilt and shame. Guilt appears when individuals attribute their action as bad, whereas shame appears when individuals attribute themselves as bad. Although guilt arises in the case of violation of a moral norm as shame, guilt can be distinguished from shame by having burdensome responsibility. The violation that reveals guilt causes harm and suffering in others, and unlike shame and embarrassment, guilt comes forth in communal relationships and attachments, rather than in hierarchical interactions. Guilt does not just occur by the appraisal that one has caused harm, it also occurs whether or not harm causes a threat of exclusion from the community. In accordance with this characterization of guilt, guilt mostly appears in socialized individuals with whom one who feels guilt has close rather than distant relationship (Haidt, 2003, p. 861). Furthermore, guilt has the tendency to motivate one to apologize and confess for repairing or improving relationship, rather than withdrawing after harming oneself or others like shame.

4.3. Basic Emotions as Moral Emotions

According to the CAD hypothesis proposed by Rozin *et al.* (1999), three emotions, contempt, anger, and disgust (CAD) are responses to violations of three types of moral codes: community, autonomy, and divinity. Accordance to Shweder's model, in the CAD hypothesis, emotions are associated with moral codes; contempt is associated with community, anger is associated with autonomy, and disgust is associated with divinity. These three emotions are considered to prompt people to repair their relationships with behaviors caused by these emotions. Three moral codes are suggested by Shweder for different aspects of moral domain (Rozin *et al.*, 1999). These aspects especially emphasize moral violations. The community code is linked with the hierarchical moral violations. In this kind of violations, an action can be wrong when a duty is not followed in accordance with community rules. Contempt is associated with community code because contempt involves hierarchical relations between individuals and groups. Accordingly, contempt is triggered by the violation of community rules. The autonomy code is linked with individual moral violations such as violation of rights, individual freedom, justice, fairness, and liberty. An action can be wrong when an action is directly against oneself, or affects others' rights. Individual can be regarded as the source of moral authority in the autonomy sense. Anger is associated with autonomy code because anger with appraisals is triggered by an insult or violation of rights when it directly affects individual conditions. Finally, the divinity code is linked with spiritual or natural order violations that, some may believe, is disrespecting of God; for others it can be disrespectful of the Mother Nature. In this kind of violations, an action can be wrong if one cannot protect the soul or the world from degradation.

4.3.1. Anger

Haidt claims that anger is one of the underappreciated moral emotions. His brief search in PsycINFO shows that anger is considered an immoral emotion because anger can possibly cause destruction or violence in society. Haidt claims that the

reason for not adopting anger as a moral emotion is that young children and non-human animals like dogs, rats also show anger deprived of having well-formed morality. However, anger is a significant emotion that “is not just a response to insults in which case it would be just a guardian of self-esteem, but a response to unjustified insults, and anger can be triggered on behalf of one’s self, as well as oneself” (Haidt, 2003, p. 856). Even in cross-cultural studies, anger is mostly associated with moral concerns such as being betrayed, insulted, treated unfairly, and violated. As I can understand, Haidt takes a different path compared to others mentioned above. According to him, anger as a moral emotion is also a basic emotion.

The substantial characteristic of anger distinguishing it from the other emotions is that anger can be strongly triggered when any injustice is perceived, even if it does not directly involve the self. Anger can be felt intensely in third-party situations. Although anger can be seen as a disruptive emotion, one stands against the violations of rights and tries to fix the order under the condition where others obeys. In other words, anger prompts direct action to maintain moral order (Haidt, 2003, p. 859).

I think Haidt does not make a clear distinction between moral and non-moral emotions. He (2003, p. 855) grades emotions from simpler forms to more advanced ones. The simpler forms do not qualify as moral emotions. As it is seen above, anger that young children and non-human animals have is a simpler form of anger that is not regarded as moral emotion.

Haidt argues that each emotion plays a role in human life. “Moral emotionhood is a matter of degree and that any emotion is a moral emotion to the extent that it has disinterested elicitors and prosocial action tendencies” (Haidt, 2003, p. 864). Even fear, as so-called a non-moral emotion, participates in moral emotionhood to the extent that fear can support behaviors regarding following and respecting rules.

Solomon preserves anger as a basic emotion while distinguishing it from moral indignation. His interpretation of basic emotions is, however, quite different from Ekman's. Both Solomon and Ekman's understandings of basic emotions share only the fact that emotions are part of our evolutionary heritage, including physiological responses that we share with other animals. Solomon assigns significant value to anger as supplying a way of engaging with the world. Hence, "no emotion, and especially anger, is just an evolved neurological response" (Solomon, 2007, p. 14). We can infer that what Solomon has in his mind is that it is just the tip of the iceberg. Anger has a neurological-hormonal-muscular core. Solomon claims that the cognitive part of anger is often ignored. Besides the physiological phenomenon, Solomon suggests that anger necessarily involves judgment. The judgment by means of anger is mostly about being wronged or offended. He approaches anger not as another basic emotions lasting only seconds, but as a special emotion that lasts days, weeks, even months. Combining all the arguments that Solomon made, anger may be out of the list of basic emotions. However, he is not willing to adopt anger to be a moral emotion either. Anger is always about something and it is a way of interacting with others, and of situating oneself in the world. The social aspect of anger distinguishes it from other emotions like frustration and rage. The judgment contained with anger represents a stance toward the world.⁴²

A principal emotion motivating punishment of norm violators is a form of anger—phenomenologically and behaviorally, many people respond to transgressions against norms as if they constituted transgressions against the self. Because the eliciting conditions are different from that of simple anger and because the evolutionary function of the emotion necessarily differs from that of simple anger, this emotion can be usefully distinguished using the term moral outrage (Fessler, 2010, p. 376).

⁴² It sounds surprising that Solomon did not accept anger as a moral emotion after his favorable treatment of it (like a moral emotion) and the position he gives to it with respect to other emotions. The reasons that Solomon provides do not seem to be sufficient. On the contrary, Solomon gives important information to keep in mind that anger has a sharp stance and active tendency engaging with the world compared to moral indignation, shame, even guilt. Yet, when he (2007, p. 27) says that "anger sometimes feels right" one may wonder if anger is also a moral emotion.

Although anger is a response to harm and transgression towards oneself and others' welfare, anger with the moral connotations mostly required to be distinguished with basic version of it. Fessler (2010) is one of those who distinguishes basic anger and moral anger, not as distinctive emotions but as different forms of an emotion. In this sense, we can suggest that his approach to moral emotion is closer to Haidt than to Solomon.

4.3.2. Contempt

Contempt is another moral emotion for Haidt, as in the CAD hypothesis. Contempt is considered to be a blend of anger and disgust (Prinz, 2007), but it has been mostly labeled as disgust in several studies. Ekman and Friesen had also previously considered contempt to be a variant of disgust, and later decided to be completely different from anger and disgust (Haidt, 2003). In the CAD hypothesis, contempt, anger and disgust are associated with each other in the sense that each emotion involves disapproval of others, as a negative evaluation of others. Compared to the *heat* of anger and disgust, contempt is considered to be a *cool* emotion because when one feels contempt about someone, one is indifferent towards the object of contempt (Rozin *et al.*, 1999, p. 575). Contempt is regarded a moral emotion because it is triggered by the violation of community rules. So, it involves hierarchical relations between individuals and groups.

Rozin *et al.* (1999, p. 575) claim that “contempt differs from disgust and anger in that it does not have a clear animal origin”. So, they may regard contempt as a moral emotion directly. On the other hand, Miceli and Castelfranchi (2018) distinguish basic and moral contempt.⁴³

[M]oral contempt includes all of the features of basic contempt: comparison of oneself with the target; evaluation of the dispositional kind, relative to a trait of

⁴³ I suppose what they mean by basic contempt is non-moral contempt. They do not refer to the basic emotion in the sense that Paul Ekman meant it because they do not address the characteristics of basic emotions.

the target which is remarkably negative and salient to one's own standards; and consequent dislike, pessimistic feelings about the target's future improvement, and disrespect. In addition, however, the negative evaluation is not an evaluation of mere inadequacy. It is an evaluation of responsible harmfulness. The target of moral contempt is perceived as a wrongdoer (Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2018, p. 210).

As it is seen above, moral contempt is a future-directed emotion with negative impression that implies that one feels contempt when one cannot change the behavior of the wrongdoer or one is not worth the effort to do so. In addition to that, contempt is a sort of punitive reaction to wrongdoer. So, unlike anger and disgust, contempt is neither an approach emotion, nor a withdraw one. To exclude from the social environment may be plausible to restrain one's harmful behavior on others in accordance with the community norms. Miceli & Castelfranchi (2018, p. 212) also suggest that contempt is not only associated with community norms, but also with autonomy norms which associated with anger. For instance, contempt can be elicited towards a man who beats up his wife, from the point of view of both the wife and bystanders. One can assume that anger is elicited in this situation as autonomy norm violation. Anger and contempt can even appear together (Fischer & Roseman, 2007, p. 103). However, the man also loses dignity both himself and his wife due to his misbehavior.

4.3.3. Disgust

Disgust is the last emotion of the CAD hypothesis. Haidt (2003) also distinguishes different forms of disgust as simple and complex to describe its moral tone. All forms of disgust involve a motivation to avoid from intoxication and contamination, and to protect oneself or the group from impurity. Rozin *et al.* (2008, p. 764) suggest five stages of disgust from biological evolution to cultural evolution. The first stage is labeled as *distaste* disgust whose function is to protect body from poison that is detected by bad taste. The second stage is *core* disgust, which is a reaction to food as a contamination sensitivity, whose function is to protect the body from disease/infection from food/eating, body

products, and animals. The third stage is *animal nature* disgust whose function is to protect body and soul and to deny mortality within the context of hygiene and death. This stage also involves biological contagion and infection such as venereal diseases, hair to hair infection by parasites from an unclean person. For instance, the odor of dead bodies also may seem disgusting because it reminds us of our animal vulnerability towards death.⁴⁴ Fourth stage is *interpersonal* disgust whose function is to protect the body, the soul, and the social order from direct and indirect contact with strangers or undesirables. Interpersonal disgust noticeably keeps one away from social interaction with others who are not acquaintances. It can be an adaptive function for reducing infection risks. And, the last stage is *moral* disgust whose function is to protect social order from certain moral offenses.⁴⁵ Disgust also enables determining the boundaries of groups. According to Rozin *et al.* (2008), disgust expands by the fear of animal nature of mortality and the desire of transcending it. All forms of disgust involve disentanglement of the physical contact in the sense that all forms of disgust involve core disgust. The disease avoidance mechanism is linked to the social avoidance mechanism in the way that they both involve a kind of protection from things that may cause harm. Rozin *et al.* also link the forms of disgust metaphorically with the words “taste” and “distaste” to indicate aesthetic judgments. In Hindu India, food and eating take place predominantly in social and moral domain. On the other hand, there is a certain concern about disgust to be a moral emotion. It may easily condemn minorities in groups, being obese, having different sexual preferences, or disabled. So, qualifying disgust as a moral emotion may feel uncomfortable to many Westerners. Accordingly, there are those like Nussbaum who suggest that disgust should play little or no role in legal system or in the legislation (in Rozin *et al.*, 2008, p. 766).

⁴⁴ Death-disgust relationship is interpreted from a psychoanalytic perspective. Still, it is worth considering why humans want to make a distinction with animals.

⁴⁵ In the original table, the stages of disgust start with zero, and end with 4.

Rozin *et al.* (2008) admit that disgust is cognitively complex compared to other basic emotions. There are also neurophysiological studies that indicate an overlap in brain areas activated by core, animal nature disgust and moral disgust (Rozin *et al.*, 2008, p. 768). The fmRI studies that show a relationship between disgust and activation of brain areas (the areas are the anterior insula, the basal ganglia, and parts of prefrontal cortex) are currently available. However, there are also fmRI studies that show a relationship between disgust and moral judgments which seems quite interesting and also supporting arguments that disgust is a moral emotion (Moll *et al.*, 2005; Rozin *et al.*, 2008). In the fmRI studies, subjects were examined while they were given statements describing neutral and emotionally charged scenarios with moral and non-moral violations. These scenarios specifically preferred to trigger disgust (with both moral and non-moral connotations) compared to other basic and moral emotions.

Direct comparison between basic and moral emotions revealed that basic emotions activated the right anterior insula and adjacent frontal operculum, while the moral condition activated the medial orbitofrontal (OFC), frontopolar, and medial frontal cortices and the posterior third of the superior temporal sulcus (STS), mainly in the right hemisphere (Moll *et al.*, 2005, p. 69).

The fmRI results suggest that disgust with non-moral connotations activated different brain areas than disgust with moral connotations. There are also several experiments showing a relationship between disgust and moral judgment. One of them was mentioned above which is about wearing “Hitler’s sweater”. The “Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment” article by Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan (2008) includes four experiments about this relationship from simple manipulation to complex manipulation of disgust. They are unpleasant but harmless. All experiments include control groups in which participants are not subjected to any manipulation during the experiment. The first experiment is about the relationship between bad smell and moral judgment. There is an odor manipulation with fart spray at low levels in the experiment area. The expectancy for the results is that the moral judgments of those who are exposed to bad smell compared to the moral judgments of those who are not exposed to bad smell are influenced by disgust. However, the results are not consistent with

the expectancy. Some reacted with effective disgust, whereas others did not (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008, p. 1101).

The experimenters wanted to see whether personal differences contributed to disgust on moral judgments. To measure this, they conducted another experiment to evaluate also personal differences by examining bodily and emotional awareness of participants. In this experiment, while the control group sits at regular desks, experiment group sits at disgusting desks with old, dirty, and sticky chairs; next to the desks, there are trashes, tissues, remnants of foods. Control group is given the same desks; however, they are clean, and there are not any disgusting objects around. In the second experiment, all questions are about moral judgments—whereas some questions involve moral violation with disgust (a man who ate his dead dog, starving survivors of a plane crash consider cannibalism, and a man deriving sexual pleasure from playing with a kitten), others do not involve disgust (finding a wallet and not returning it to its owner, a person falsifying his resume, and preventing the death of five men by killing one man). After the experiment, participants completed the report about how they felt during the experiment. The results are evaluated with the measurements of the personal differences with bodily and emotional awareness of participants. The result is that low-pbc participants (those who have weak awareness of personal body consciousness) were not affected by disgust manipulation compared to high-pbc participants (those who have strong awareness of their personal body consciousness). On the other hand, high-pbc participants expressed severe moral judgments in the experiment group that sat on the dirty desks compared to participants who sat on the clean desks. There is a relationship between disgust and moral judgment because they also acquired some findings about disgust that disgust has not only influence on moral judgments involving disgust, but also influence on moral judgments not involving disgust. Whereas high-pbc participants responded more severely to moral judgments that involves disgust, the rates of low-pbc participants did not differ between moral judgments that involves disgust and those that do not involve disgust (Schnall *et al.*, 2008, p. 1102).

In the third experiment, participants are asked to write about an event—as much detailed as possible—that made them feel physically disgusted. Afterwards, participants are asked the same questions as in the second experiment about moral judgments both involving and not involving disgust. The expectancy of this experiment is that disgust would alter the severity of moral judgments for high-pbc participants. The expectancy is consistent with the results. Whereas disgust makes moral judgments more severe for high-pbc participants, for low-pbc participants there is no effect.

In the last experiment, the manipulations for participants are the film clips; one includes a scene from *Trainspotting* involving a disgusting toilet (disgust manipulation), one includes a scene from *The Champ* where a boy watches his father die (sadness manipulation), one includes a scene about whales from the documentary *Planet Earth* that is emotionally neutral. Participants watched scenes randomly. Participants were asked the same moral questions that involve and do not involve disgust as in the experiment 2. One of the results is that induced disgust made moral judgments more severe than induced sadness. Moreover, high-pbc participants who were exposed to the disgust manipulation have considerably higher grades of disgust than participants who exposed to sadness manipulation.

Four experiments may be suggesting a causal relationship between physical disgust and moral condemnation. The results are interpreted as follows. First, disgust influences the moral judgments that involve and do not involve disgust. Second, disgust has no effect on nonmoral judgments. Third, some people who are more sensitive to their own bodies have tendency to be affected by disgust manipulation for moral judgments. And last, the significant relationship between disgust and morality is absent with induced sadness that did not show similar effects on moral judgments (Schnall *et al.*, 2008, pp. 1105-1106).

Even if disgust as a basic emotion is shared with nonhuman animals, Rozin *et al.* (2008, p. 770) argue that it is absent in nonhuman primates. As I understand, by

the absence of disgust they should mean animal-nature disgust and the following stages of disgust mentioned above. That is, distaste and core disgust that is shared with nonhuman animals is a basic emotion, whereas animal-nature disgust, interpersonal disgust and moral disgust are rather complex. On the other hand, some argue that physical disgust and moral judgments are linked in the sense that moral judgment is influenced by embodied information that is obtained by disgust (Eskine, Kacirik, & Prinz, 2011). Disgust manipulations experiments above are physical manipulations such as dirty desks, fart sprays but influence moral judgments. So there can be a link between physical disgust and moral judgment, and distinct types of disgust may not be so distinctive. So, we may have a room to abandon the argument that core disgust merely implies to the physical contaminations whereas moral disgust implies to the moral violations. Rather, we can adopt the idea that disgust may be triggered both physical contaminations and moral violations.

4.4. Other Moral Emotions

Other-suffering emotions such as empathy, sympathy, and compassion are considered moral emotions because people have emotional reactions for others' suffering. There is research suggesting that even children in their first year show emotional reactions for others' suffering, and when they are two, their emotional motivation makes them help the one who suffers (Haidt, 2003, p. 861). Other-suffering emotions are some kind of distress at another's distress. Some claim that other-suffering emotions are not emotions at all; they do not have facial expressions, bodily reactions, and a certain appraisal. They are affective states from which stem another's emotional state. They imply a kind of recognition concerning another's emotional state. In addition to being excluded as an emotion, empathy is also considered to involve other emotions partially such as sadness, anger, and guilt; and, compassion is such an emotional state that involves guilt.

Other-praising emotions can be defined as positive emotions unlike the emotions explained above. Positive emotions appear in the safe conditions in which one is not required to focus attention to a problem. On the contrary, positive emotions cause decrease in the effect of negative emotions, and encourage for constructing new relationships, strong social bonds. Gratitude can be a negative emotion since it has the feeling of indebtedness; however, gratitude motivates to act prosocially including contribution to social well-being. Other-praising emotions, such as gratitude, awe, and elevation, make one feel warmth and affection toward others. How gratitude differs from elevation in moral sense is that whereas gratitude is, to a certain extent, self-interested, elevation is disinterested, which means that elevation is likely to desire helping others and encouraging them to be better, not only a desire to make oneself better (Haidt, 2003, p. 864). It is obvious that other-praising emotions seem to be not as intriguing scientifically as other moral emotions, such as guilt, shame, and disgust since they have not been studied extensively. According to Haidt's research on PsycINFO, there are only 47 articles that include title or key phrase of gratitude, and only 11 articles for awe (Haidt, 2003, p. 863).

4.5. Moral Cognition and Emotions

Moral emotion theorists do not fully deny the impact of cognition as a component of moral judgments. They do not come to an agreement as to whether or not cognition and emotion have equal effect on moral judgement or one of them has greater weight than the other. In this section, I will examine some contemporary approaches to moral cognition that are congruent with moral emotion approaches. This examination will be a preliminary to what I will discuss in the next chapter, namely how moral emotions emerge.

Motivation internalists sometimes suppose that moral judgments are constituted, at least in part, by emotions. Judgments are mental states, and to say that they are partially constituted by emotions is to say that the mental state of judging, for example, that killing is immoral is constituted by a mental representation of killing along with an emotional state directed toward that represented act. Externalists argue that judgments can be made without motivation, but they

often agree with internalists that, when motivation accompanies a judgment, it derives from an emotional state. In other words, internalists and externalists usually agree that emotions contribute to moral motivation for those individuals who are motivated to act in accordance with their moral judgments (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, p. 113-114).

Emotions are involved in making moral judgments; however, to what extent they are involved is not certain. Still, emotions are believed to contribute to moral judgments to a certain extent. One approach is that moral judgments can be motivated by emotions. It does not mean that emotions are the sole source of moral judgments, but plays a role at least partially as the source of motivation. The relation between moral judgment and emotion is that both are mental states that are representations of an act. Internalists argue that emotions always take part in moral judgment, whereas motivation externalist assume that moral judgment does not always require motivation. However, the common ground internalists and externalists share is that motivation more often comes from the emotions in making moral judgment.

Prinz and Nichols (2010) describe some different accounts of the roles and weights of emotions and reason below:

1. Rational genesis: the judgment that something is moral or immoral is typically arrived at through a process of reasoning that can occur without emotions.
2. Rational essence: when emotions arise in the context of moral judgment, they are contingent in the sense that a token of the very same judgment could have occurred in the absence of those emotions.
3. Emotional motivation: emotions play a central and reliable role in motivating people to act in accordance with their moral judgments.
4. Emotional genesis: the judgment that something is moral or immoral is typically arrived at as a consequence of emotional feelings.
5. Emotional essence: when emotions arise in the context of moral judgment, they are necessary in the sense that a token of the very same judgment would not have occurred in the absence of those emotions.
6. Emotional essence (constitution): emotions are necessary to moral judgments because they are essential parts: moral

judgments are psychological states that include emotional states as parts, and a judgment would not qualify as moral if these emotional states were absent (2010, pp. 116-118).

The first three are rationalist approaches with embracing emotions that can also be called affective rationalism. The fourth can be the approach that Haidt adopts. According to Haidt, we do not make judgments through reasoning, rather we make judgments through intuitions that are also gut feelings. The fifth one is the approach that Nichols adopts. If an emotion accompanies moral judgment, the same judgment cannot occur again in the absence of that emotion. The sixth is constitutional approach that Prinz adopts. According to Prinz, moral concepts involve emotions, and when one encounters with these concepts, emotional response arises (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, p. 117).

It is widely accepted that emotions play a role in moral judgment and moral motivation such as that emotions help people recognize whether an action is morally wrong, and that emotions motivate people for prosocial behaviors. Empirical researches (Prinz & Nichols, 2010) show that both are true in a sense that emotions can motivate to behave in morally appropriate ways, and lead to behave in accordance with the arising judgment. The question is whether emotions generate moral judgments or emotions arise as a consequence of moral judgments. In which part of moral judgments do emotions take place? It is important to emphasize that one can be motivated toward prosocial behavior without judging that it is appropriate. The approaches above are directed to figure out how emotions and moral judgment relate.

Greene *et al.* (2001) suggest a dual mechanism for making moral judgments, namely reason and emotions. According to their dual-process theory, moral judgment is the product of both intuitive and rational psychological processes. The question of whether emotions influence the cognitive process or the cognitive process triggers emotions in making moral judgments can arise. Dual-process theory suggests that there is no sole psychological process in making moral judgments; under different conditions, different mechanisms (affective or

cognitive mechanism) operate. For instance, in high affect cases, emotions are at work while reason works in low affect conditions. His previous fmRI studies (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) seem to support this view that both cognitive and emotional processes play significant role in moral judgments. In these fmRI studies, some moral dilemmas, namely trolley examples, were given to the subjects.

A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say yes (Greene *et al.*, 2001, p. 2105).

In the survey, most people said that it is morally appropriate to redirect the trolley to save five people instead of letting five people die. It is a utilitarian calculation that maximizes the number of lives saved when making moral judgments. When some changes are made in the trolley dilemma, decision also surprisingly changes.

You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no (Greene *et al.*, 2001, p. 2105).

In this case, most people said that it is not morally appropriate to push the large person. The results show that utilitarianism does not always work. In the switch case, people tend to make a decision that saving five lives by sacrificing one is more sensible. Greene *et al.* (2001) wonder as to what makes it morally appropriate to sacrifice one life to save five lives in the switch case but not in the footbridge case. Greene (2009, p. 581) clarifies the reason for different moral judgments in these cases by stating that “characteristically deontological judgments (e.g. disapproving of killing one person to save several others) are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian

judgments (e.g. approving of killing one to save several others) are driven by controlled cognitive processes”. Emotions are critical to distinguish between these two cases. In the footbridge case, emotions influenced people’s moral judgments. As Greene *et al.* (2001, p. 2106) suggest, “the thought of pushing someone to his death is, we propose, more emotionally salient than the thought of hitting a switch that will cause a trolley to produce similar consequences, and it is this emotional response that accounts for people’s tendency to treat these cases differently”. Whereas the switch dilemma involves a decision mechanism that paved the way for people to calculate as 1 to 5, the footbridge dilemma involves more complicated decision mechanism that cannot be solved by the classical utilitarian approach because the dynamics of the decision has changed. So people engage with their emotions. Indeed, in each case, the consequence does not change; either one or five will be killed. Greene *et al.* (2001) interpreted people’s different attitudes towards these moral dilemmas as “personal” and “impersonal”. Personal moral judgments occur by social-emotional responses while impersonal moral judgments occur by social-emotional responses and cognitive processes. (Greene *et al.*, 2004, p. 389).

Personal moral dilemmas and judgments concern the appropriateness of personal moral violations, and we consider a moral violation to be personal if it meets three criteria: First, the violation must be likely to cause serious bodily harm. Second, this harm must befall a particular person or set of persons. Third, the harm must not result from the deflection of an existing threat onto a different party. One can think of these three criteria in terms of “ME HURT YOU.” The “HURT” criterion picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful violations (e.g., assault rather than insider trading) while the “YOU” criterion ensures that the victim be vividly represented as an individual. Finally, the “ME” condition captures a notion of “agency,” requiring that the action spring in a direct way from the agent’s will, that it be “authored” rather than merely “edited” by the agent. Dilemmas that fail to meet these three criteria are classified as “impersonal.” (Greene *et al.*, 2004, p. 389).

Different types of moral dilemmas (personal and impersonal) generate different patterns of neural activity in the brain. Personal moral dilemmas occur as a result of the conflict between strong emotional response and a response held by reasoning of cognitive control. Moreover, fmRI studies shows that brain areas associated with emotion and cognition have greater activity for personal moral

judgment compared to other activities by cognitive processes (Greene *et al.*, 2004, p. 391).

When they examined the neural activity in people's brains by fMRI, the results were consistent with the expectation and with what participants have said (Greene *et al.*, 2001): they observed that there is an increasing activity in the brain regions associated with emotions when people respond to personal moral dilemmas like the footbridge case. Besides, they also observed that there is an increasing activity in the brain regions associated with cognitive processes such as memory and reasoning when people respond to impersonal moral dilemmas like the switch case. In the footbridge case, one takes the decision immensely personal because harming someone will be committed by oneself. So the alarm "Do not give harm" is potently evoked. Emotion interacts with the rational decision. On the other hand, in the switch case, the decision is independent from one's personal condition. So one can interfere without engaging with people in this case. Emotions do not interact with the rational decision in impersonal conditions.

The experiment was not intended to make any normative claims about which judgments and source of judgments are morally right or wrong. Instead, the aim is to investigate why sacrificing one person seems appropriate to people in the first case, but not in the second. According to Greene *et al.* (2001, 2004), neither cognition nor emotion is sufficient to explain all kinds of moral judgments. Different conditions seem to start different processes in making judgments.

While the switch case is simply letting one die in order to save five, the footbridge case seems like deliberately harming someone, not just saving five lives. If avoiding intentional harm lies at the foundation of morality, Cushman *et al.* (2010) suggest that we need to find out where the feeling of avoiding harm comes from. One responds negatively to harm depending on one's emotional reactions. So, the basic moral judgment is given: harm is bad. Accordingly, the

thought of harming someone prompts an emotional reaction in footbridge case because it is personal.

Haidt does not suggest a dual process theory like Greene. He even finds Greene's theory very traditional in spirit (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 807). He does not reject the role of cognition in moral judgments either. Haidt does not suggest a non-cognitive theory of emotions. His theory also involves cognition such that moral intuitions and moral reasoning are two kinds of cognition (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Moral psychology has been supported by the conflict between emotion and cognition for a long time. However, Haidt proposes a model to moral psychology grounded by the synthesis of intuition (including emotions) and reasoning. Haidt's model is labeled the social intuitionist model defined thus, "moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning" (Haidt, 2001, p. 817). Moral intuitions (including emotions) produce moral judgments. He says, "moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; moral reasoning is a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). People aspire to justify their intuitive responses by reasoning. So, reason is an instrument to rationalize their moral judgments generated by intuitions. Although the social intuitionist model is not incompatible with dual process theories, it still favors an "intuitive primacy principle". According to this principle, intuitions arise first, reasoning appears later (Haidt, 2013, p. 1001). Haidt defines moral intuitions and moral reasoning as follows:

[M]oral reasoning can be now defined as conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people in order to reach a moral judgment. To say that moral reasoning is a conscious process means that the process is intentional, effortful, and controllable and that the reasoner is aware that it is going on (Bargh, 1994)... [M]oral intuition can be defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence, (good-bad, like-dislike) without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. Moral intuition is therefore the psychological process that the Scottish philosophers talked about, a process akin to aesthetic judgment: One sees or hears about a social event and one instantly feels approval or disapproval (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).

Moral psychology has long been occupied with the distinction of cognition and emotion (or affect). Haidt suggests that such a distinction is irrelevant in the sense that affect cannot occur without cognitive processing as a neural activity. Moral reasoning and moral intuition are both cognitive process to make moral judgment. Unlike Greene's model, according to Haidt, moral intuition and moral reasoning are not two different processes that operate independently of each other achieving different results. Rather, reasoning is contributive to the intuitive processes in the social intuitionist model in order to scan the verifying data coming from external factor. Moreover, reasoning is the initiator for new intuitions (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 807).

Prinz defines himself as a constructive sentimentalist (a version of emotional constitution model) by adopting a non-cognitivist approach. His non-cognitivist approach is a form of social constructivism, not only grounded in cultural, environmental variation, but also grounded on the biological core of emotions (Prinz, 2004, p. 20). He aims at integrating biological ground to social ground by stating that moral emotions consist of non-moral emotions and non-moral judgments. While cognitivists argue that judgments prompt emotions though non-cognitivists do not refuse that judgments trigger emotions, they suggest that emotions do not necessarily require judgments to be initiated (Prinz, 2007, p. 63). In other words, Prinz argues that emotions can occur without judgment as he addresses below:

It is plausible that the emotions under consideration can be triggered by perception, in the absence of judgement. Consider guilt. Imagine that I accidentally step on your foot, and you squeal in pain. I might feel a sharp pang of guilt, and begin making amends before I have formed any judgements or thoughts. Notice how people immediately and instinctively hold up their hands apologetically and defensively and raise their eyebrows when they bump into each other (J. J. Prinz, 2009b).

Prinz does not approach cognition like Greene and Haidt do. Rather, Prinz approaches cognition as a conceptual process that judgments are constituted

by.⁴⁶ That is why he does not believe that judgments are required for emotions. If we do something wrong, we experience guilt or shame. Or if others do something wrong, we experience anger, disgust, or contempt. In his model, not only morality is constructed in the cultural/historical transmissions, but also emotions are constructed. However, this construction is not the product of the cognitive process. It may seem, at first, a contradiction that Prinz both adopts constructionism and non-cognitive approach. He defends his view as follows:

On such an account, emotions are differentiated by their cognitive causes, and are, thus, ineliminably linked to cognition. A non-cognitive theorist might admit that emotions get their identity, in part, from the conditions under which they arise while denying that those cognitions need be cognitive (Prinz, 2007, p. 52).

Prinz's non-cognitivist approach comes from embodied appraisal theory. Embodied appraisal theory is an integration of both embodiment and appraisal that are distinctive. "To appraise is to represent something as having some bearing on one's interests or concerns" (Prinz, 2004, p. 52). Accordingly, the common stance on this point is that appraisals are disembodied. However, Prinz (2004, p. 77) adopts appraisal as embodied in the sense that "emotions represent change in organism-environment relation by tracking changes in the body". He accepts non-cognitive approach because he thinks that emotions are embodied. But emotions are also appraisals that are representations of the relationship between an organism and its environment that bears on well-being (Prinz, 2004, p. 25). For cognitive theorists of emotions, emotions are responses to judgments. Cognitive theorists also treat appraisals as disembodied. Non-cognitivists do not deny that judgments cause emotions to arise, they only deny that judgments are not the only thing to initiate emotional arousal. Prinz denies it because an emotion involves the representation of the relationship between an organism and environment. For example, fear involves the representation of the danger, and representation does not require cognition. Emotion itself creates the judgment in

⁴⁶ According to Prinz (2004, p. 23), cognitivists committed to the claim that emotions require concepts, and judgments are constituted by these concepts. For instance, fear involves the concept of danger, sadness involves the concept of loss. Prinz does not agree with this claim because he thinks emotions do not require concepts.

this relationship. So, emotion is constructed in the relationship between an organism and environment surrounding the organism.

Consider the case of thoughts that are triggered by perceptual experiences. You see a dog and automatically form the thought that there is a dog in front of you. This thought, and its constituent concepts, does not occur as a result of organismic control. It is a reflex-like response to your experience. It qualifies as a thought because the representations it contains are under organismic control in a *dispositional* sense. You *can* willfully form thoughts using your dog concept. Being a thought only requires being made up of representations that are capable of being controlled by the organisms that has them. Thinking, in contrast, requires actual effort. A cognitive act is an act of generating a thought under top-down control. Thoughts produced automatically in the course of perception are unthought thoughts. We have them without thinking. They are cognitions, but not acts of cognition (J. J. Prinz, 2004, p. 46).

Prinz states that emotions can occur together with judgments, but emotions can also occur without judgments. According to Prinz, cognition is not a necessary component for emotions. Cognitive theorists assert the view—which Prinz does not accept—that one cannot feel guilty without making judgment that one has done something wrong. It seems easier to accept the claim that basic emotions do not require cognition because they arise as physical responses. However, Prinz defends that it is also applicable to guilt and shame because Prinz objects to the basic and non-basic emotion distinction. Emotions constitute judgment, for that very reason one should not say that emotions should contain judgments, which might end up with a circular account. One may feel strong guilt before making any judgments that what one has done was wrong. On the contrary, judgment comes after the emotion occurring.

Nichols accepts the significant role of emotions in moral judgments. But Nichols suggests another approach which is called “Sentimental Rules” account to defend his claim. Unlike other emotion-based moral accounts, Nichols adopts a rule-based moral account in which normative rules are a necessary component of moral judgments. Nichols argues that normative rules provide emotions a motivational potency, accordingly admits the motivational role of emotions in making moral judgments. He also agrees that moral judgments occur by the

interaction of emotion and reason. So, he accepts both emotional and rational genesis that are mentioned above (Prinz & Nichols, 2010, p. 117). He also rejects rational essence principle because moral rules have a distinctive role but accompanied by emotions in Nichol's sentimental rules theory. In accordance with his theory, Nichols distinguishes moral rules from conventional rules: whereas moral rules are "unconditionally obligatory, generalizable, and impersonal insofar as they stem from concepts of welfare, justice, and rights", conventional rules are "part of constitutive systems and shared behaviors whose meanings are defined by the constituted system in which they are embedded" (Nichols, 2004, p. 5). So, we can infer that moral rules are independent of authority, while conventional rules are dependent on authority. Conventional rules (school norms, table norms, religious norms, norms of etiquette etc.) are not based on emotions. They differ from norms prohibiting behavior that harms others, namely moral rules (Nichols, 2004, p. 116). To understand his Sentimental Rules account, we need to see the different layers suggested by this account. The bottom layer is where there are core moral judgments. Core moral judgments are basically the capacity to recognize the harm-based violations. According to Nichols (2004, p. 7), harm-based violations are "serious, authority independent, generalizable and that the actions are wrong because of welfare considerations". To recognize harm-based violation as different from conventional violations is a substantial capacity to generate moral judgments. Core moral judgments are generated by a normative theory (basically a set of rules prohibiting certain behavior) and an affective mechanism.

Core moral judgment depends on two mechanisms, then, a normative theory prohibiting harming others, and some affective mechanism that is activated by suffering in others. Core moral judgment thus implicates what I will call "Sentimental Rules," rules prohibiting actions that are independently likely to elicit strong negative affect. The set of rules or normative theory prohibits actions of a certain type, and actions of that type generate strong affective response (Nichols, 2004, p. 18).

The normative theory and the affective mechanism are independent; nevertheless, they engage to generate distinct moral responses (Nichols, 2004, p.

29). One should pay attention how these two mechanisms, namely normative theory and affective mechanism, work together and also independently. For example, children begin to exhibit distress and concern for another's suffering before their second birthday. Meanwhile, they cannot make moral judgments before their second birthday (Nichols, 2004, p. 18). Nichols (2004, p. 18) suggests that the affective mechanism is not crucial for making moral judgments. However, the affective mechanism that promotes responding others' suffering is involved in moral judgments. If one experiences negative affect about a transgression, the transgression is considered to be serious (Nichols, 2004, p. 28). That is, affectively negative transgressions are more serious than affectively neutral transgressions. For instance, disgust-based transgressions are quite serious and accordingly they can be distinguished from conventional ones.⁴⁷ So, when a violation of a rule is recognized, this recognition activates affective mechanism. It brings forth a kind of aversion to moral transgression, and elicits behavioral response.

The second layer is perhaps the acquisition of core moral judgments. Nichols finds this acquisition in the developmental processes. Studies about child development in making moral judgments have shown that children around the age of three have core moral judgments. According to these studies, children begin to distinguish moral transgressions from conventional transgressions before their third birthday. Children make clear distinctions between moral transgressions and conventional ones at the age of three and a half years. Before the fourth birthday, children respond differentially to moral transgressions and conventional transgressions (Nichols, 2004, p. 90). The recognition and distinction of moral transgressions from conventional transgressions is

⁴⁷ Nichols (2004) does not explicitly say that disgust-based transgressions are moral transgressions. However, he states that disgust-based transgressions are less permissible and more serious with high sensitivity. They are also clearly distinguished from conventional transgressions. Moreover, he claims that they are non-conventional transgressions. Conventional transgressions are affectively neutral, whereas non-conventional transgressions are affectively negative. In accordance with it, disgust-based transgressions provoke non-conventional responses.

considered an evidence for the presence of core moral judgments in children in their early years. Even though children have core moral judgments, their understanding of guilt develops considerably later—as developmental psychologists assert that children comprehend complex emotions like guilt, shame and remorse around the age seven. They surely recognize one’s emotional state from one’s bodily expressions like facial expressions or posture of others. However, they may have difficulty interpreting those bodily expressions because they cannot comprehend whether the expressed emotion corresponds to a negative or neutral emotional state. This does not have to lead to the conclusion that children do not make moral judgments. Children very early acquire the foundation for making moral judgments, the foundation to be improved later by developmental processes. Grasping harm-based violations does not require guilt, it can occur with the basic emotions. So, it supports Nichols’ theory of core moral judgments. One can also see how children grasp moral transgressions with basic emotions below:

In another study, the experimenters showed the subjects images of two individuals, each of whom had committed a moral violation. One of the children had a happy expression and the other had a sad expression. The subjects were asked to rate how “bad” the children were. While most four-year old children judged the happy and sad transgressors as equally bad, “the majority of 6-year-olds and almost all 8-year-olds judged the person who displayed joy to be worse than the one who displayed remorse” (Nunner-Winkler and Sodian 1988, 1329). So, between the ages of four and eight, children are gradually developing the idea that moral transgressions are and should be accompanied by some negative affect. But the findings make it seem unlikely that three- and four-year- old children are capable of “invoking a normative assessment of the *appropriateness*” of feeling guilty in a range of situations. As a result, the understanding of core moral judgment seems to be present in young children well before the capacity for judging when it is appropriate to feel guilt (Nichols, 2004, pp. 90-91).

The experiment suggests that the understanding of non-basic emotions, such as guilt develops comparatively late in children and accordingly children younger than 6 years old cannot associate the moral transgression with emotion. Neo-sentimentalists claim that there may be more effective emotions than guilt with

which children can make normative judgments.⁴⁸ Nichols agrees that there may be other emotions doing this, but it should be demonstrated. Besides, he (2004, p. 96) distinguishes the capacity for making moral judgments from the capacity of the understanding a normative situation corresponding to a moral emotion like guilt. He also insists that children have both affective mechanism that render possible core moral judgments and the normative theory prohibiting behavior that harms others. It also seems consistent with the experiments on children.

One of the studies on children's capacity for distinguishing between moral-conventional rules is done by Judith Smetana who produced rules with nonsense words such as 'piggie', 'frummel', 'wuffle' and then tested if children grasped the rules when placed in a story. For example, children comprehend that "You shouldn't piggie at school, but it is okay her to piggie at home" is a conventional rule even though they do not know the word piggie. If the rule comes from parents such as "You shouldn't piggie neither at school, nor at home", children understand that it is a moral rule (Nichols, 2004, p. 104). This study also supports Nichols that children have core moral judgments based on rule. Children recognize the moral context by core moral judgments. When children know the rules, they correlate the rules with the context in which they encounter.

On the Sentimental Rules account, reactive distress or concern plays a crucial role in leading people to treat harmful transgressions as wrong in a distinctive way. Thus, these relatively simple, primitive emotions supply the sentiment to moral judgment. No further moral feeling is invoked as a necessary part of core moral judgment. the relatively primitive emotions of reactive distress and concern lead us to treat harm norms as distinctive (Nichols, 2004, p. 63).

As it is seen above, Nichols suggests that "relatively simple emotions" might lead to making moral judgments. It is also appropriate for children to make moral judgment. In addition to harmful transgressions, children also distinguish

⁴⁸ Neo-sentimentalists such as D'Arms, Jacobson, and Gibbard object to Nichols's Sentimental Rules Theory. They claim that the capacity to make moral judgment is not present in young children because they lack an understanding of normative appropriateness with emotions. In responding to their objection, Nichols (2004) emphasizes a deficiency in their theory that although they insist that moral judgments should have corresponding appropriate emotions, they are not clear about which emotions these are supposed to be.

whether a harmful action is intentional or unintentional. Children's judgments about moral violations are influenced in accordance with the intentions of others. Children around four years old can judge the intentional harm as worse than the unintentional one (Nichols, 2004, p. 104). The normative theory prohibiting behavior harmful to others is based on the capacity of understanding others' actions as intentional or unintentional, it is "mindreading" as Nichols puts it.⁴⁹ One can be able to distinguish conventional transgressions from moral ones in the sense of mindreading that Nichols puts it. Moreover, one may also cause other's suffering intentionally; however, this action may not be counted as morally wrong. For instance, "applying an anti-infective to a child's scraped knee causes the child sharp pain, but we do not judge this to be morally wrong. Among other things, the normative theory provides the basis for distinguishing wrongful harm from acceptable harm" (Nichols, 2004, p. 17).

Moral rules are the essential aspect for making moral judgments. We have rules for preventing harm to others; and we have an affective system to respond to harm for both oneself and others. Nichols's Sentimental Rules account suggests an interaction between these rules (norms prohibiting behavior that harms others) and the affective system. The important point here is that neither reason nor emotion alone produces moral judgment. Each one accompanies the other. It is not that there are rules, and people apply rules. Emotions are not also required to determine completely both judgment and behavior. According to Nichols, moral judgment is the product of the interaction of rules and emotions. Nichols agrees with the idea that the interaction between norms and emotions may seem arbitrary because it is obvious that "our moral norms prohibit harming others and we have an affective system that is built to respond to harm in others" (Nichols, 2004, p. 116). Still, Nichols keeps silent on how this interaction would be

⁴⁹ Indeed, there are some problems about intentions and making moral judgments. Knobe and Doris (2010, p. 334) offer *unfulfilled intentions* to explain the problem. There may be some intentions that one has not already got into action. To answer this question, they ask the subjects whether they assign praise or blame for unfulfilled intentions (for good or bad intentions) and the results seem noteworthy. The subjects reply that an action does not require praise if the intention is bad, but it still is not performed; on the other hand, an action requires blame if the intention is bad, even it is not performed. There is intention/action asymmetry.

maintained. The moral rules that we have interact with emotions. This interaction produces moral judgment and moral behavior. The main reason for the interaction between moral rules and emotion is that emotion is a significant factor for preservation and the transmission of cultural heritage.

[C]ultural items that are likely to elicit a basic emotion will be more culturally fit than cultural items that are affectively neutral. This is significant because insofar as there are eliciting conditions for basic emotions that are broadly consistent across cultures, we can expect cultural items that have those features to be better remembered and hence have greater cultural fitness (Nichols, 2004, p. 127).

As it is seen above, the initiator characteristic of basic emotions ensures the preservation and transmission of cultural items. Emotions influence the way one remembers things greatly since one cares more about the information that one emotionally embraces.⁵⁰ Transmission of cultural items, accordingly, is also applied to the transmission of norms.

⁵⁰ There are recent studies to show the relation between memory and emotion which supports the argument above (see (Ed.). Christianson, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1991)

CHAPTER 5

EMBODIMENT AND MORALITY

I approach morality from an evolutionary perspective throughout my dissertation. I have so far examined theories of emotions concerning morality. I then examined moral emotions and moral cognition in relation to the theories of the emotions that were examined. The path that I now intend to take, based on previous examinations and the path that crosses and connects all of these examinations, shall be an investigation into how morality is related to moral-conventional (or social) distinctions. Following that analysis, I will deal with the ontological problem of whether there are distinctive moral emotions and with the epistemological question of whether emotions reliably contain morally relevant features or properties. I find it problematic to categorize emotions as moral, non-moral, social, and nonsocial. In the previous chapters, I discussed the categorical distinctions, the usage, and possible consequences of emotions from different disciplinary perspective. However, I intend to question this categorical distinction, instead of taking it for granted and accepting that there is one. Hence, I suggest rejecting the attribution of categorical distinction to emotions as basic, non-basic, social, non-social, or moral. This suggestion does not only exclude the characteristic features of emotions, but also enables an inclusive analysis that emotions share a common feature. The common feature that they share emerge from the interaction between an individual and the environment; that is to say, there is no emotion independent of the environment. I will try to clarify this claim in the paragraphs that follow.

5.1. Environment, Social Context and Emotions

I suggest that there may be no distinctive, moral emotions at all. Instead, each emotion may have some moral characteristics that enable individuals to ascribe

praise or blame to particular behaviors, including guilt and shame, which are considered by some to be genuinely moral emotions. What does it mean to say that there is no such a categorical distinction like moral, non-moral, social, non-social emotion, but that emotions still retain a moral characteristic? How would such a claim be possible? From an evolutionary perspective, most emotions probably evolved to solve some specific problems—which I have examined the evolution of emotions in detail in Chapter 3—and these emotions were exapted to deal with new social problems in different species after socialization. Due to the lack of evidence as to when exactly emotions evolved, it would be difficult to make any claim about whether or not they evolved before socialization, during socialization, or after socialization.⁵¹ However, what is known is that all emotions are also somehow hypersensitive to recognize, detect, and cope with social threats and concerns. No assistance from cognition/cognitive centers is needed, therefore, given that one can respond to threats through emotions. I think that disgust is not a non-social emotion; instead, disgust originally arose in a non-social context. It acquired a social characteristic during socialization, namely exaptation. We need to examine the social context when emphasizing the relation and contrast between cognition and emotion in order to comprehend emotions' social characteristics.

Social context is commonly understood as the connection between an individual and others, given a condition produced by culture, social norms, and social interactions. In this connection, one's behavior and daily experiences are affected, and accordingly, one's position in the society varies. This ensures the structure of the society that is being shaped (Sieggell, 2003, p. 183). That is, one's relationship with the other results in acceptable behaviors, and these sets of behaviors create a structure in society. A detailed definition of social context might also be as follows:

We define social context as the sociocultural forces that shape people's day-to-day experiences and that directly and indirectly affect health and behavior

⁵¹ Some critics still claim that emotions evolved in the social context and evolved to serve social functions (Bliss-Moreau *et al.*, 2018, p. 2).

(Pasick & Burke, 2008). These forces include historical, political, and legal structures and processes (e.g., colonialism and migration); organizations and institutions (e.g., schools, clinics, and community); and individual and personal trajectories (e.g., family, interpersonal relationships). Notably, these forces are coconstitutive, meaning they are formed in relation to and by each other and often influence people in ways of which they are not consciously aware (Burke, Joseph, Pasick, & Barker, 2009, p. 56S).

This definition may be agreed upon by many. Terry & Hogg (2000) add more information to this definition. According to them: “People’s attitudes are developed and expressed as behaviors in a context that is social; it contains other people who are actually present or who are invisibly present in the social norms that define social groups to which we do or do not belong” (Terry & Hogg, 2000, p. 2). So, we can understand social context as the interaction between an individual and others who are affected by the same social conditions. Conversely, social context has primarily been accounted for through cognition. Smith & Semin (2004, p. 53) have developed the term ‘socially-situated cognition’ to explain how cognition and social context are interrelated. According to them, the context has to be necessarily and always social so that cognition comprises of the interaction between the individual and the environment. In this sense, Smith & Semin (2004) state that cognition depends on the social context.

According to Caporael, sociality, survival, and reproduction are closely tied in human evolutionary history: “Too small a group would have a higher risk of perishing; too large a group strains the carrying capacity of the environment. Selection for sociality is thus a function of the physical parameters of the species morphology and ecology.” (Caporael, 1997, p. 282). By articulating the occurrence of sociality through evolution, she also means that it is, in a sense, necessary, at least for humans. She (1997, p. 277) also defends the idea that human cognition is inextricably embedded in the social structural context in which it occurs, from an evolutionary view at least. Caporael accepts that human cognition evolved to serve social functions. Following this view, she (1997) states that an organism’s survival and reproduction always occur in a social

context. Then, what should I understand by the idea of social context in relation to my view that one's behavior is firmly linked with another in the environment, since the social context precisely emanates in an environment that is shared with others? Not only do I agree with the remarks about the social context, provided above, which is the connection between an individual and others, which affects one's behavior, and which is closely tied in the environment, I also want to add some additional points. Furthermore, and most importantly, I want to touch upon why social context is significant. I agree that social context affects one's daily experiences and behaviors. However, I do not think that social context is merely institutional, or that it concerns the structure of society. Instead, individuals' experiences and behaviors are affected because the social context occurs in the shared environment in which one individual dwells with others; one's behavior develops in precisely this interaction because perception comprises the interaction between an individual and the environment. Automatic reactions and reflexes are not even fully independent of this environment. I intend to explain the interaction between individuals and the environment not through cognition or any cultural instruments, but through emotions. When individuals express their behaviors and emotions, the context in which that expressed emotion occurs is social because the emergence of emotion indicates that the body and the environment are interacting. There can be no individual independent of an environment surrounding them.

One intriguing example of the social environment and individuals' relationship with it can be provided by observing the behavioral changes of rhesus macaques after the natural disaster in Puerto Rico, Cayo Santiago Island, in 2017 (Testard *et al.*, 2021). This example is relevant to showing how environmental changes enables individuals to improve their social connections. Both the behaviors and social networks of rhesus macaques on the island changed and improved in the aftermath of this natural disaster, which is called Hurricane Maria. The rhesus macaques became more social after the hurricane. Monkeys that once lived in isolation developed a social connection after the hurricane. Those who had dyadic relationships established broader relationships and increasingly engaged

in affiliative interactions. The experiment focused on two aspects to measure the new connections that were being forged among rhesus macaques. One measure was proximity: how far one monkey sat from another monkey. The experiment's results show that, following the hurricane, rhesus monkeys are increasing in terms of their proximity to other monkeys than they had before. The second measure is grooming: monkeys were also fifty percent more likely to be found grooming after the hurricane than before. Monkeys who increased their proximity after the hurricane also displayed an increase in grooming behavior. Moreover, rhesus monkeys spent more time in grooming or proximity to other monkeys. Although the hurricane did not cause mass mortality for the island's rhesus monkeys, the death rate was still higher in the months after the hurricane. After the hurricane, quite a few individuals lost their grooming partners, so monkeys had a greater number of potential grooming partners, and rhesus monkeys improved their grooming network in the process. As an interesting detail of grooming, females were observed to be more likely to groom males; females made males more connected. This is consistent with the role played by females in promoting group relations in animal societies. The results also show that monkeys enlarged their social networks to include more partners, but that this did not improve the quality of their relationships. Monkeys did not show an increase in interactive behaviors with their formerly acquainted partners. The experiment runners also support this outcome by stating that weak connections were positively associated with survival. Strong connections that increase local structure cause small groups to form and they may become larger groups. Therefore, this may be the reason why the quality of their relationships is not improved, even as the social networks of monkeys expand. An increase in social relationships was not distributed uniformly across the population. Instead, monkeys that had been socially isolated before the hurricane showed the most significant increases in affiliation. Furthermore, rhesus monkeys became more tolerant of each other. Social bonding with more individuals may require greater tolerance of other individuals because having fewer individuals in a group makes it easier to maintain the social order. So, how should we evaluate all of these changes after a natural disaster concerning my thesis? Increased network and

attachment imply the need for security. Thus, we can accept that improvements in social relationships supplies social support. Social support is significant in adaptations to extreme environmental change. Even those who have lived in isolation have established social relationships by virtue of environmental change and have created a pervasive network. The main explanation for this improvement of social networks is, of course, the motivation for survival. However, survival motivation also augmented the behavioral changes of monkeys and they became more tolerant of each other. Unfortunately, there is no information about emotions in the article. However, I would like to speculate that if there were, it would be concluded that the emotions arising in monkeys, by virtue of environmental change, had an essential role in changing their behavior in this social context. We also encounter the intimate relationship that monkeys share with the environment in this example, something which does not distinguish the animate object from the inanimate object that surrounds an organism, referring not to the personal environment, but to the interpersonal environment. The relationship with the environment fosters an active involvement of beings with their surroundings. Young's view on the environment (1986, p. 86) as a dynamic system in which animate and inanimate beings have occupied and interacted with each other can clearly be observed here. This interaction ensures that the information conveyed by the emotion is transmitted to others. It is probable that not all monkeys were inclined to engage in network improvement at the same time. Some of them tend to do it, and this information spread to the other monkeys, and the others followed suit.

Oliveria (2005, p. 481) explains social context, in terms of the social modulation of hormones, as an adaptive mechanism. He states that there is a threefold relation between social context, behavior, and hormone levels. The social environment in which animals live stimulates the production of hormones because individuals communicate and generate social status within a given social environment. Accordingly, animals alter their behaviors through the rise of their hormone levels according to the social context. Oliveria's (2005, p. 482) view also supports my idea because he states that "[hormones] respond in an adaptive

way to the social context, preparing the animal for the social interactions that it has to face in its everyday life.” Oliveria examines hormones, rather than emotions, in relation to the social context. However, hormones are also the physiological (proximal) cause of emotions. Agreeing with Oliveria, I think that emotions respond to the social context and enable individuals to behave according to the conditions they encounter, since hormones are the physiological source of emotions. In this sense, we might say that emotion enables the interaction with the world. The interaction between an individual and the environment is conditioned by emotion. Social context is internalized adaptively, and social context inevitably emerged from this interaction. Moreover, emotions also render the possibility to share experience (Van Kleef, 2010, p. 331). Emotion is socially shared with others who share the same environment because emotion carries information about the environment, and this information can be transformed into others through the very characteristics of emotion. An emotional expression can be communicated by an individual, and that expression is perceived by another individual who shares the same environment. Perception by another individual of one’s emotional expression causes another individual to find themselves in an affective state. It may, consequently, lead to an interaction between these individuals. Emotions’ survival function is so prominent that their social functions remain in the background. However: “[h]uman emotion evolved—that is, came to be via natural selection—in an inherently social context; human emotions are therefore not separable from their social nature” (Bliss-Moreau, Williams, & Karaskiewicz, 2018, p. 1). That is, the survival and social function of emotion are both parts of an inseparable whole of the nature of emotion. The traces of the social context in which emotion arises can be pursued in nonhuman animals as well:

When humans’ social needs are not being met, the potent experience of loneliness occurs, perhaps to provide a signal to modify behavior in order to meet social needs. Consistent evidence across animal species—specifically that monkeys also demonstrate behavioral and biological patterns consistent with loneliness (Cacioppo *et al.*, 2015; Capitanio *et al.*, 2014)—suggests that nonhuman animals may also have a social baseline. Considering how social context underpins affective processes in mammals, including modern humans, is

but one example of how adopting a TCE for the study of EvoEmo changes how we understand the interplay between emotions and social context (Bliss-Moreau *et al.*, 2018, p. 5).

Sociality in animals, as well as in humans, has a significant place as a life-sustaining occurrence. In the social setting, emotion plays an influential role in maintaining behaviors. Emotion enables the individual to be in a social context and emotion prevents one from becoming isolated from that social context. The environment also renders such sociality possible since individuals adopt shared concerns in the environment. Emotions are also sensitive to the social context in such an environment. But if emotions are shared, then they take place in a social setting. For instance, parents' grief over the death of their child is experienced separately, but is shared as being one and the same (Salmela, 2012, p. 34). As Salmela (2012, p. 41) also states: "the embedded context influences the way in which individuals emotionally appraise the situation." In the instance provided above, parents share the same social concern as the loss of their child, and the emotion that emerges in these parents is shared in this social context.

Moreover, when an individual and the environment interact, the emotion that the individual feels in this interaction is permanently embedded in that social context (Brian Parkinson & Manstead, 1993, p. 315). It is a factual claim that social context has the potential to be internalized by individuals who share the same environment. One might wonder what it means to have emotions embedded within the social context. It is a kind of emotional embeddedness within the social context that concerns the interaction between the individual and the environment. The social environment triggers the relationship between the hormones and an individual's behavior by giving feedback to hormones (Oliveira, 2005, p. 481). There is a threefold relationship between the social context, hormone levels, and social behavior:

Androgens influence the production of a number of social behaviors involved in communication interactions between animals. In turn, these social interactions among a network of individuals will shape the social context in which these animals live, which subsequently will modulate their androgen levels (Oliveira, 2005, p. 482).

Emotion is predisposed to process contextual information; accordingly, the emotional responses are regarded as context-sensitive responses. The fluctuating level of hormones in an individual provides the variation of behavior in the social environment. Even a small amount of change in hormone levels influences social interactions between individuals. None of the views that I have advanced mean that there is a single objective reality that can be perceived. On the contrary, reality occurs within social contexts and emotions emerge corresponding to the information that is perceived by the body. Nevertheless, what is perceived and accordingly the information derived from that perception may be inaccurate. The behaviors that arise from this deficiency may also vary, depending on this emotional information.

Hence, I believe that social context is not only cognitively constructed, but that it is also emotively embodied. I may explain what I mean by social context as an embodied interaction as follows. Embodiment means how the body experiences and processes the information obtained by the interaction between an individual and the environment. What an individual recognizes is the emotional experience itself, instead of a representation thereof. The representation of the emotion is the expression that still may not require a cognitive component. So, social context takes place in the body as though the individual experiences it. How can this be possible? Empirical studies support the view that there is an embodied link that involves social information processing between two individuals who share the same environment (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Heyes, 2010; Keysers, 2009; Kilner & Lemon, 2013; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Wenlai & Huili, 2020). How can embodiment and representation accompany each other because representation refers to cognitive processes in the mind whereas embodiment rejects this? Appraisals are representations of an organism-environment relationship in the cognitive approach. In the non-cognitive approach: “emotion is a product of representations of the situation and representations of how the situation impacts on the self” (Parkinson & Manstead, 1993, p. 298) and so emotional responses are representations of an organism-environment relationship. Each internal state

(i.e., emotion) is an automatic consequence of some event that took place in an individual's environment (J. J. Prinz, 2004, p. 48). "In this approach, the environmental stimulus affects people by increasing their arousal as measured physiologically" (Farshchi & Fisher, 1999, p. 64). That is, the environment stimulates sensory information, which also requires communication that is provided by emotions, and emotions have the internal representation of environmental information. For instance, the environment presents a physical danger to me. The information that I am in danger is forwarded to me through an embodied factor, which takes place through my emotions:

Each emotion or affective state is represented by a central organizing node. Nodes that represent beliefs, antecedents, and physiological patterns associated, for instance, with fear, are linked to the fear node in memory. When an emotion is experienced, the relevant node in the network is activated. Activation then spreads to associated nodes, making those ideas more likely to come to mind and to influence subsequent information processing. Conversely, activation of associated information in the emotion network can also generate the emotion itself (Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009, pp. 1120-1121).

As we can see in the quote above, representation is addressed through an account of embodiment, not through appraisals or consciousness. By representation, I understand that bodily representation concerns the relationship between the environment and the organism, not the mental representation regarding the formation in mind. That is, bodily representation is based on environmental information. Moreover, the fact that I adopt a non-cognitive standing does not mean that I deny the activity of neurons in the brain; after all, it would be insane not to accept this. Instead, I deny that emotions are deliberate and conscious, arising from appraisals. Emotion does not emerge in the brain independently from embodiment. What is perceived as bodily is orchestrated in the brain. In accordance therewith, I also agree with the idea that "embodiment refers both to actual bodily states and to simulations of experience in the brain's modality-specific systems for perception, action, and introspection" (Niedenthal *et al.*, 2005, p. 184). Embodiment essentially consists of the operation of information being processed about emotion:

[w]e don't confuse our body parts with those of others. In a situation where one observes many sets of hands working jointly on a task, there is no confusion as to which hands are yours. This may be the most fundamental aspect of your sense of self. The feeling of being distinct from other objects and persons is one component of the sense of embodiment (Carruthers, 2008, p. 1303).

Embodiment enables individuals both to be aware of their being in the environment and to distinguish themselves from other objects and individuals in that environment. Embodiment improves emotional responses towards both to the environment's social and nonsocial stimuli. We can also expand our view on the intimate relationship between individuals. The social stimuli that emerge from the environment also develop intimate relationships between individuals, and facial responses to social stimuli result automatically on the basis thereof (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003, p. 48). For example, embodied mimicry has been observed in mother-infant and married couples (Barsalou *et al.*, 2003, p. 51). Embodied mimicry provides harmony in married couples over time since they mimic each other's facial expressions when sharing empathy and when complying with each other. The mother-infant relationship also improves in embodied communication with facial mimicry as the mother reflects her caring and shares her sympathy with her child. So, we might say that social stimuli elicit embodied responses in the self without hesitation.

It has been found that an individual who observes another individual's emotional response can share a similar emotional experience. This is because the neurons that burn in the brain during the emotional experience also burn in the brain of the other individual who witnesses the emotional experience. These are called mirror neurons. Mirror neurons were initially encountered in primates, and they are considered to be necessary for acting on the basis of an understanding of others and are as automatic as adaptive functions (Cook *et al.*, 2014, p. 177). Mirror neurons are considered to be adaptive since the genetic disposition to develop mirror neurons can be traced back to evolutionary ancestors of the vertebrates and invertebrates (Cook *et al.*, 2014, p. 181). Based on the brain activities analyzed, mirror neurons have also been found in songbirds (Prather, Peters, Nowicki, & Mooney, 2008, p. 305), marmosets (Suzuki *et al.*, 2015, p.

4), and in another primate species, the *Pan troglodytes* (Hecht *et al.*, 2013, p. 1020). Mirror neurons are also believed to be an adaption to enact an understanding, since mirror neurons not only fire when both humans and nonhuman primates perform an action. Mirror neurons also fire when they observe a similar action being performed by another individual (Heyes, 2010, p. 575). So, mirror neurons are considered to be a channel from an individual through another individual, thereby advancing the ability to understand the behaviors of others.

Mirror neurons are agreed to be a mechanism that primates employ to understand the behaviors of their conspecifics (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004, p. 172). Individuals can also understand the emotional experiences of others through these mirror neurons. Claiming that they understand experiences would actually be a mistake, given that mirror neurons involve precisely the same content as experience. As Heyes (2010, p. 575) has stated, mirror neurons seem to serve as the bridge between one individual to another. So, we are socially tied to another individual at the neuron level, given that we experience the emotional state of another. Moreover, mirror neurons can be affected by the social context of the observed action (Brown & Brüne, 2014, p. 196). Social context, as information processing by the interaction between an individual and the environment, includes an embodiment in this sense.

The functioning of mirror neurons manifest themselves in two significant adaptive roles in social life. First, mirror neurons ensure fast learning, such that an organism comes to learn new actions through imitation. Learning through imitation indicates embodiment as knowledge acquisition. Second, these mirror neurons are associated with social contagion, by recognizing emotional states of others (Niedenthal *et al.*, 2005, p. 191). Living in a social environment requires the capability of complying with others. Animals, as well as humans, have the capability to grasp what others are doing and to understand how their emotions are expressed. Social animals have evolved both the capability to show their emotional states and to recognize the emotional states of others through mirror

neurons. Through mirror neurons, individuals obtain information about the emotional states of others; individuals share their emotional states in accordance with these neurons (Ferrari & Coudé, 2018, p. 67). The same brain areas are activated when encountering others' emotional expressions, such as disgust. This implies that our internal experiences can be shared with others through embodied mirror neurons (Gallese, 2009, p. 523). Whether or not individuals embody the behaviors of others is not questionable, because synchronized imitative behaviors and mimicry in particular have been observed in both mothers and infants of nonhuman primates and humans (Niedenthal *et al.*, 2005, p. 190). Specific neural mechanisms underlie this embodiment. Mirror neurons are involved in an individual's production of imitative behaviors and mimicry.

When we encounter someone, we literally embody them to understand their emotional states and behaviors. Mirror neurons also make a critical contribution to social behaviors and are also regarded as the underlying reason for social behaviors, given that mirror neurons ensure the emotional connectedness between individuals. This connectedness comes from mirror neurons' flexibility characteristic, which also possess context sensitivity. For instance, "mirror neurons show responses not just that sensory and motor neurons 'fire together' but that the event provoking firing of one predicts the event provoking firing of the other" (Cook *et al.*, 2014, p. 182). Hence, social behavior is relational in terms of the mirror neurons' context-sensitive properties. This relational nature, between the observer and others observed, is provided by the significant source of emotional information, which enables us to make the intimate relationship between our emotional state and the embodied experience of the emotional states of others. We can also associate mirror neurons with a kind of empathy for the close involvement and attribution of the emotional states of others in the context of social behavior. As I have addressed previously, embodied mimicry, learning through imitation and mimicking, has a firm ground in social relationships, such as in marriage, friendship, and family bonds. Substantial problems in social interactions arise when there is a deficit of information acquisition through embodied mimicry (i.e., autism) (Niedenthal, 2007, p. 1004).

The context-sensitive property of mirror neurons is important to understand the intimate relationship between our emotional states and the embodied experience of the emotional states of others. So, emotions should contain the social context as embodied interaction. If emotion did not contain the social context as embodied interaction when faced with a threat, then one would first have to think that it is a threat, and then that thought would elicit emotions; eventually, one would take actions to avoid it. Cognitivists tend to interpret it in this way. However, it does not take that long for an emotion to arise when faced with a threat; emotion arises as a bodily/embodied representation of the threat. Emotion does not require a social concept, but includes a bodily/embodied representation of the social context, given that emotion is experienced in the body and mirror neurons have a social context-sensitive property. In this sense, a threat has a social context and it is included in the emotion. To clarify this, let us consider the following example. As I have discussed in Chapter 4, some researchers differentiate disgust into primary disgust and moral disgust; in fact, it can even be further separated into five different stages (Rozin *et al.*, 2008b, p. 764). Disgust arises as a reaction of avoidance of or aversion to particular things in the different context being moral or non-moral, because disgust may arise in all of these contexts. Since context is recognized in an embodied way, there is no need for cognitive recognition. Rozin *et al.* (2008) suggest that disgust originally evolved to reduce infection risks, but was later shaped by social forces to serve the function of maintaining social distance as a social approach and avoidance by cultural evolution. Thus, disgust has expanded to encompass a much wider range of stimuli. Purity norms of disgust must have transformed into moral norms in accordance therewith. I tend to both agree and disagree with this claim. I can agree that disgust has expanded to encompass a much wider range of stimuli containing social and moral contexts. Emotions have included both moral and non-moral contexts in this sociality.

I can further support my claim that there are no distinct emotions like moral and nonmoral disgust in another way. First, there are also no distinctive bodily expressions of primary disgust and moral disgust. Body products such as feces,

vomit, and blood can be disgusting to the same extent as moral offenses. So people can show the same facial disgust expressions for both conditions (Rozin *et al.*, 2008b, p. 763). This is the reason why emotions were exapted and gained new social functions. This supports my claim that there are no distinct moral emotions because there is no new emotion for such a condition. Disgust meets this requirement as arising in a social context. Secondly, there are no distinctive psychological states of moral and nonmoral emotions. If there were distinctive emotions, like primary disgust and moral disgust, then these bodily experiences of emotions or feelings would differ. Even the place in which the *so-called* moral disgust is felt is the same as the place in which the *so-called* primary disgust is felt: the stomach. We keep the same distance from someone who has a severe contagious disease as we do from another who has committed a moral offense. We have developed aversive feelings such as nausea for both of them in our stomach. For instance, *so-called* primary disgust motivates the avoidance of or aversion to particular things and moral disgust motivates the avoidance of or aversion to specific kinds of moral violations. The only difference is the context that I have touched upon above that the emotion itself is as if it “recognizes” the context. Moll *et al.* (2005, p. 69) have tested the areas of the brain in which the subjective experience of emotions by fMRI. They reported that core disgust and moral disgust have partially overlapping brain areas when subjects are investigated by fMRI. It seems plausible to me that the activation of partially overlapping brain areas shows that there may not be distinctive emotions, such as core disgust and moral disgust. Instead, they can be the same emotion. Emotion does not necessitate thought, but emotion does not pose an obstacle to the generation of a thought.

Let me deal with another emotion, namely guilt, which is considered a genuinely moral emotion. First, I think that guilt is a culturally exaggerated emotion, especially in western cultures. Guilt is certainly an evolutionarily developed response and is experienced as an intense feeling within the body; however, guilt becomes varied in its emergence within different social contexts. Although guilt arises due to harm or violation to others or oneself, guilt may also arise without

any harm having been done to others. For instance, giving birth to a boy is significantly crucial in some cultures. It is understood that a woman should be punished if she does not give birth to a boy. This cultural norm is so internalized that she feels guilty even if she has done no harm. The idea that “you harmed our family” is imposed upon the woman who gave birth to a daughter. The definition of guilt is not violated, since there is harm in principle that the woman could not meet the responsibility that the society/family expects from her. However, this sense does not correspond to any apparent harm, even though the woman experiences the feeling of guilt bodily. Here, we can see that guilt has acquired a moral aspect by being culturally altered. Guilt involves various elements by manipulation or motivation.

Second, guilt is claimed to be a social emotion that competes with other emotions (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994, p. 243). However, guilt may not contain much social concern in each case; it appears that it may even contain nonsocial concerns. For instance, eating delicious (albeit unhealthy) junk food does not contain any social concern. One can violate one’s health by eating unhealthy foods, but this matter confronts an individual violation, not a social one.⁵² Likewise, other emotions can also have similar conditions. For instance, anger’s adaptive function is self-defense. However, anger not only arises where self-defense is necessary, but it also arises under the conditions that justice is deficient. Furthermore, if there are no distinctively moral emotions, and instead each emotion can have a moral aspect, then how did morality emerge? From a non-cognitivist perspective, Prinz (2009, p. 168) suggests that morality appears as a by-product or spandrel⁵³ of emotions that have evolved for adaptive functions in the cultural evolutionary process. Prinz thinks that “they are

⁵² I do not address the individual violation in this dissertation since it has a wide range, including suicide, that would require another dissertation-length examination

⁵³ “Spandrels—tapering triangular space formed by the intersection of two rounded arches at right angles—are necessary architectural by-products of mounting a dome on rounded arches. Each spandrel contains a design admirably fitted into its tapering space” (Gould & Lewontin, 2014, pp. 581-582). Gould and Lewontin (1979) used the term spandrel by analogy to explain that a trait does not have to be an adaptation, but may also be a by-product of evolution.

nonmoral emotions that have been adapted to ground moral norms” (2009a, p. 184).

I have just been arguing that our universal moral norms could be products of cultural evolution, rather than biological evolution. However, this should not be interpreted as the claim that cultures devise these norms from scratch. Each may be built up on innate tendencies that do not initially qualify as moral. Perhaps we are innately disposed to avoid harming others or to avoid incest, but not innately inclined to regard such behaviors as morally wrong (J. J. Prinz, 2009a, pp. 178–179).

By adapting, Prinz does not mean biological evolution; instead, he means cultural evolution. However, Prinz stresses that this should not be understood a claim that cultures produce these moral norms. Instead, Prinz argues that moral norms are based upon innate tendencies that are not viewed as expressly moral. In other words, we are inclined to avoid bringing harm to others, but we are not inclined to regard such behaviors as morally wrong (2009a, pp. 178–179). Conversely, Ruse argues that morality is adaptation.

We think we ought to do certain things and that we ought not to do other things, because this is our biology’s way of making us break from our usual selfish or self-interested attitudes and to get on with the job of cooperating with others... in order to make us “altruists” in the metaphorical biological sense, biology has made us altruists in the literal, moral sense.... Morality is no more—although certainly no less—than an adaptation, and as such has the same status as such things as teeth, eyes and noses (Ruse, 1995, p. 241).

I might agree with both Prinz’s and Ruse’s ideas that morality is a by-product or adaptation. However, explaining it via exaptation seems more plausible. A social environment was initially formed to meet the requirement for the emergence of morality, and morality was established in that same environment. A by-product is a sort of derivative product; this can be observed in Prinz’s example of a social environment in which guilt emerged as the by-product of sadness. From here on out, I will try to clarify how much I agree and disagree with Prinz in the emergence of emotions and morality. By-products and exaptations are not the same thing in biology, but exaptation does not contradict a by-product because a feature that appears as a by-product can be exapted later. That is, it can gain

functionality while it remains dysfunctional, or it can gain different function when it has another one. While Prinz explains some emotions—in his own words, basic emotions—in terms of evolution, he believes that other emotions such as guilt and shame have not evolved. He claims that they emerged culturally and, therefore, he approaches it from a cultural point of view, while restating that morality is a by-product. Contrary to Prinz, I rely on evolutionary biology for all of the emotions examined because I take exaptation as a kind of adaptation. In this sense, emotions acquire some adaptive functions before socialization and then they may acquire a social function after socialization.

In Chapter 3, I analyzed the nature of emotions. By their very nature, emotions involve information about what individuals experience in the environment that surrounds them and this information is conveyed to others through emotional expressions. In this way, I came to the conclusion that emotions play a communicative role. Even if the emotion arises in a non-social context, one shows the bodily response of the emotion as if it were transmitted to others—which seems to be a rather intriguing characteristic of emotions. Accordingly, I suggest that emotions may have some properties of language in the prelinguistic period. First, the communicative function of emotions is significant; after all, emotions are accompanied by bodily expressions. Each emotion has a different bodily expression, and these bodily expressions carry information about what one is experiencing. As a brief reminder, the types of speech acts for language according to Scarantino (2017) also suggest emotions: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. These types of speech acts are also found in emotions as nonverbal communication. Emotional expressions can give information about how things are (assertives) such as dangerous, unfair, and disgusting. Emotional expressions can give directive (directives) such as “help me”, “share it”, and “leave it”. Emotional expressions can show commitment (commissives) such that an individual can show her commitment to a future action to a signaler. Emotional expressions can express an individual’s experiences and attitudes (expressives). Emotional expressions can also represent how things are in the world (declarations). In this sense, emotions can

be described as the *preverbal/nonverbal* language that contain the functions of language without any speech. We can witness some level of communication without any language or act of speaking at all. Secondly, now that the possibility of communication has been discussed, I will turn to disgust. We can vomit contaminated food, or we can have an aversion to contaminated food through the reaction of disgust. We have a sense that we need to pass the information on to another—information about the contaminated food—and it is almost a social duty to do so. These/all emotions may have been exapted for social roles (the nonverbal role played by emotions is also involved) in social animals. In fact, these emotions, due to their disposition for social utility, may have supported socialization of mammals/higher mammals. We do not have to think of others all the time in order to save others; emotions have already emerged to meet this requirement.

5.2. What is So Unique about Morality?

We, humans, are social animals. We have social norms and have an established social order to meet the standards that we have made. Nevertheless, we think that we are more than that. We also believe that we are moral beyond being social. Then, what might the relationship and distinction between being social and moral be exactly? I believe that morality cannot be conceived in an environment in which sociality has not evolved. As there can be no private language, *à la* Wittgenstein, I think that there can be no private morality either, given that morality implies sociality.

Now I wish to discuss whether animals can recognize moral contexts. While discussing how emotions generate moral behaviors, I previously concluded that moral context is acquired in an embodied way as the informational content of emotions. Animals acquire moral context recognition, much like humans do, through emotions, without appeals to high-level cognitive processes. There would be a problem in their behaviors when faced with situations if they do not possess context recognition. I will try to explain context recognition through

psychopathy. For those who claim that reason is sufficient for moral behavior, one should remember that psychopaths do not have any problems with their reason, and they are actually known to be intelligent. Psychopaths do not have any cognitive disability; they have average intelligence; they sometimes seem quite brilliant. However, they have poor moral context recognition. What is wrong with psychopaths? Psychopaths can be completely rational and *know* some actions are morally wrong, but they do not act accordingly since they do not have the motivation to do so (Nichols, 2002, p. 287). They also cannot distinguish between moral and conventional, which indicates that they do not have moral context recognition. They cannot recognize the difference between playing with food and pushing someone. What provides the motivation to act morally, and why can psychopaths not “sense” the moral-conventional distinction? According to studies, psychopaths have a deficiency in their affective response to harm in others, so they show no response to threatening stimuli for harm-based normative violations (Nichols, 2002, p. 300). Psychopaths do not learn to avoid committing acts that harm others, given that they do not experience an aversion to harming others. The results of experiments with psychopaths, the Footbridge trolley example, shows that they would perform the action of sacrificing one person to save five (Pletti, Lotto, Buodo, & Sarlo, 2017, p. 353). This also shows that the participants have a deficiency of emotional response to harmful acts. The results are inconsistent with the choices of individuals who are not psychopaths. Sacrificing one to save five is a burden for an average person, but psychopaths do not experience such a feeling at all. They respond in a way that they choose people to a greater extent because they have the knowledge that it is better to do so. It might be plausible from a utilitarian perspective, but it is still clear that individuals with psychopathy do not have moral context recognition. If morality were something that could be taught culturally, then we could make sure that psychopaths learn it and would force them to act morally in society. However, we seem to fail at this point. Psychopaths do not merely lack feelings such as guilt or empathy, but they also lack emotions such as fear, sadness. So, they cannot identify the emotional/facial expressions of others when others feel fear, anger, or disgust. Their moral

context recognition does not improve because they cannot identify the emotional states of others (Blair, 2005; Hastings, Tangney, & Stuewig, 2008; Marsh *et al.*, 2011). Affective deficit prevents them from accessing information from harm-based normative violations. Although emotion is underrated in relation to reason, the case of psychopaths shows that the possession of emotions has a significant place in accessing the information that certain behaviors is harmful, distinguishing between moral and conventional, and providing motivation to act morally. This actually makes the rationalist approach problematic. It is not just that norms make sense and that one follows them. Norms are not just something that we can quickly acquire within the society and norms are not independent of emotions. In other words, emotions accompany norms. Emotional deficiency inhibits psychopaths' moral context recognition. The problem is that we, humans, overintellectualize human morality (Andrews & Gruen, 2014, p. 194).

I think norms that can change, but that which produced the norm remains the same. I aspired to understand and to explain its nature throughout this thesis: emotions. Emotions take their form according to relations, situations, and context, as it has been frequently stated previously. For instance, disgust evolved from the avoidance of contaminated foods, but we also have aversive feelings for some moral violations, such as incest. An emotion can be both moral and non-moral in different contexts. Although it may seem obvious that there is a clear distinction between social and moral norms, there is no easy way to find some criteria that might serve as the basis for this distinction. Emotions are considered to draw a distinction between them, but I do not think that this is so. I think society can manipulate individuals into experiencing emotions in different contexts. The example given above, that a society that values giving birth to boys can make females feel guilty if they cannot give boys to their family, is an important one to understand different contexts. This social norm is so moralized that females feel intense guilt when they do not meet these requirements. Probably, all the situations that we call moral were actually social, but we have just called it moral. What I mean is that emotions have no moral implication content. We identify that the context is social, non-social, or moral through our emotions; accordingly, there are no distinctive emotions, and this extends to

social, moral, non-social emotions too. Emotions acquire different characteristics within the context. These characteristics do not create a categorical distinction, we can say that there is a matter of degree between social and moral. After all, we are the ones who make these distinctions conceptually. Therefore, there is no distinction between disgust and moral disgust. There is only one emotion that is experienced, and this emotion arises based on the context of whether it emerges within a social or non-social context. So, we are the ones who determine whether certain behaviors are praiseworthy or not. We are the ones who can determine that animal behaviors are also “moral” or not. We do this so that we cannot ignore the emotions experienced by animals and their behaviors in accordance with these emotions. So, the moral-social distinction is an artifact and there is no such genuine distinction. My approach rejects a moral-social distinction.

Another reason for the way in which the social and the moral differ, albeit only by degree, is that what is moral changes from time to time and from society to society. What is moral ceases to be moral, or conversely, what is immoral gains a moral ground. For instance, killing avoidance is the norm, but when the situation changes—such as in war—it becomes a praiseworthy thing that is expected. Or, as a conventional example, smoking in the presence of adults was once immoral, but now it is mostly acceptable. As another example, consuming meat was a subject of intellectual debate until the mid-70s, then it started to be critiqued as a serious violation of morality. We spoke about our responsibilities towards the environment and ecosystem indirectly, because we had harmed humanity previously, but now the issue has turned into respect for nature, for the sake of nature itself (J. B. Callicott, 2013, p. 159). We can understand how variable morality is, even for humans, so we can arrive at the conclusion that there is a matter of degree in moral-social distinctions. Therefore, our current system, according to which we attribute morality, is relatively new.

Reason exists in humans, but it still not morality’s primary origin; emotion is what brings out morality. Reason play a secondary role, the role of deeming certain things as moral. I might speculate that certain things were baptized as

moral long after Homo Sapiens first evolved. Therefore, when language evolved, people did not call it moral in the first instance. They might have called something bad, others worse. That morality is a separate category has been theorized and intellectualized as an afterthought. Even today we can still clearly see the difference in degree. After all, an emotion is neither moral, non-moral, nor non-social, social. We can only interpret it according to a context in the environment in which individuals find themselves. The emotion that an individual experiences is still the same emotion in a different context; the reaction is also the same reaction. Emotion is what makes a context comprehensible. Individuals acquire the knowledge of what context is through emotions. It enables animals to avoid these behaviors because they know that they can be punished when they do things that are unfair, just like humans—because there is punishment. Most mammals feel emotional distress when they encounter conspecific suffering. It may not mean that they find the causing of harm to be morally wrong, but it implies that they behave in such a way that they avoid causing harm to others. Animals may have internalized harm avoidance in such a way that they experience empathetic distress for others when others are harmed. It supports the view that we can also comprehend the harm in this way; however, we can also justify our behaviors in a different manner than theirs. This involves our comprehension of the consequences of context through their emotions.

5.3. The Possibility of Non-Cognitive and Non-Verbal Moral Judgments

In this section, I aim to discuss whether moral judgments and moral beliefs can be illustrated in a non-cognitive sense. Joyce (2006) approaches morality from an evolutionary point of view and takes a compromising position, straddling pure cognitivism and pure non-cognitivism. His position seems almost like accepting morality in animals. However, he does not ascribe morality to animals in the end. According to Joyce, moral sense is a product of biological natural selection. Nevertheless, he defines morality as a uniquely human attribute in the evolutionary process. I will attempt to show how Joyce's position supports my

argument. We might begin by asking whether we judge animals' behaviors as either morally blameworthy or praiseworthy. If we do then, I think, we can hardly deny that animals are moral agents. According to the evidence and arguments I have given so far, from the point of view of our moral standards, there is no reason why we should not consider *at least* some of their behavior moral. What about animals themselves? Do they make moral judgments about their own behaviors? We do not know that, and perhaps we never will. Joyce (2006) accepts that animals are moral subjects and he seems to have no problem (perhaps and for the sake of argument) with the claim that animals are moral patients. However, he does not clearly state that animals are exclusively moral agents just because they are moral subjects. According to Joyce, moral agents are those whose actions count as being either morally blameworthy or praiseworthy by us (2006, p. 76). Joyce does not pass a clear judgment about whether animals can be moral agents. Still, he does not find it problematic to attribute goodness or badness to animals when animals satisfy some specific criteria. For instance, we can call a dog a *well-behaved dog* because it fulfills its duty and protects the house, or we can call a dog a *bad dog* when it attacks our guests (Joyce, 2006, p. 76). In a broad sense, "an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and 'agency' denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity" (Schlosser, 2019, p. 1). Being an agent is associated with being capable of acting. In a narrow sense, "an agent is a being that are capable of intentional action." (*ibid.*, p. 2) This conception seems that it is too demanding because agency can be explained without reference to intentional actions. There are other conceptions for agency. According to Frankfurt (1971), there is a difference between human agents and other agents. Human agency requires second-order desires—desires that are directed at first-order desires (which are directed at goals and actions). On the other hand, Velleman (1992) puts forward that mental attitude is necessary for being an agent. First-order desire is not sufficient to attribute agency to a being, reason should accompany the desire to act for meeting the requirement. According to Velleman (1992, 463) an agent's role is to mediate "between reason and intention, and between intention and bodily movements". One can have this potency by mental attitude. He ascribes moral agency a mental attitude

since he distinguishes the conceptions of agent with subject of behaviors. Putting aside the fact that Bratman agrees with Velleman, he suggests that mental attitude is for self-governance, not for being an agent, and self-governance is required for an agent to justify their behavior done under certain motivations. He states that humans are more than purposive agents and looks for core feature of human agency (2000, p. 35). He agrees with the idea that animals may be intentional beings: however, intention is not sufficient for being an agent. Bratman depicts of an planning agency—organized, coordinated, future-directed plans of actions (2000, p. 40).

In the light of these perspectives, we can ask whether nonhuman animals can be capable of moral agency without having intentional actions. We can state that the all actions of human beings need not to be explained with ascribing intentional actions, because intentional actions can be required for justifying behaviors, not for acting. One of those trying to answer this question, Behdadi (2021), recommends that we should abandon the capacity-focused approach and prefer the practice-focused approach. He argues that moral agency can be attributed to social animals if we head towards the practice-focused approach. According to Behdadi, assessment of empirical data from observations and behavioral experiments on social mammals meets the requirements for being a moral agent. Social play behaviors show interaction containing social norms, expectations, sanctions. During play, each animal assess each other's behaviors, and send signal when necessary. Each animal is sensitive both for emotions and behaviors of others. Moreover, there are studies for showing that animals were planning to remember the behaviors of individuals and their social interaction, or even to solve tasks involving tool use (Behdadi, 2021, p. 240).

So, moral agency designates beings whose behaviors are subject to moral requirements. I think, animals can satisfy this requirement by reacting to others' actions in this sense. For instance, dogs both withdraw from the behaviors that we disapprove and are inclined to those behaviors that we approve and, therefore, we can attribute moral agency to a dog. According to another

generally accepted view, a condition of being an agent is to be able to attribute agency to oneself. This view requires self-consciousness as a condition for agency. However, I think, it is not a necessary condition of agency. Even if animal were aware that they were agents in a way we did not know, we would *need to* look at their behavior since we could not ask them about it. Behaviorism might be an option—maybe the only possibility in the case of animals—that we cannot ignore because we can just observe their behavior.

Another criterion for moral agency is that they have moral beliefs. What is the relation of a moral belief to one's position as a moral agent? Individuals acquire beliefs from their environment, by observing the behaviors of others, and by perceiving how these behaviors make them feel. Joyce also agrees (perhaps, again for the sake of argument) that animals may have beliefs. Animals may have beliefs involving relational properties such as sameness, or difference, and of being someone's mother (Joyce, 2006, p. 81). They may form beliefs about their mental states or those of others. Animals may also form beliefs about how desires can be satisfied, such as in the pursuit of food (Joyce, 2006, p. 78). Furthermore, animals may also form beliefs about expectations, such as what will happen next. Even if Joyce agrees with the idea that animals have beliefs, he still insists that animals do not have *moral* beliefs. He thinks that moral beliefs require thick concepts. When a dog encounters another dog, it knows that it is a dog. However, Joyce does not ascribe beliefs involving jargons like *cur*⁵⁴ to a dog (2006, p. 84). However, I think, we do not know exactly what concepts animals are capable of having. There are reports of animals having senses of humor with unexpected and out-of-context usage of words with sign language that have been taught to them by researchers. For instance, Koko, a female gorilla, was taught American sign language and acquired the ability to show her own internal emotional states, including humor, deception, and insults through sign language (Gamble, 2001, p. 173). "You dirty toilet" is one of Koko's favorite epithets. Even though Koko knew that teeth would be brushed with a

⁵⁴ *Cur* means dog but it is a jargon for humiliating someone. Dog is not used for humiliating, but *cur* is.

toothbrush, she replied “foot” to the question of what she uses to clean her teeth, and she burst into laughter when she placed her foot into her mouth. Such examples show that animals can also use some concepts not only with their original meanings but also with their connotations.

Another reason to reject the claim that animals are not moral agents concerns whether thick concepts are necessary for moral behaviors. In order to ascribe moral belief to animals, I need to explain it in terms of their behaviors. It does not seem plausible to assume that the usage of the concept such as dog is insufficient, whereas a jargon term like cur is sufficient to meet the condition of both moral judgments and moral behaviors. The usage of a word in different meanings is related to how the language is used, not how to behave. One can ask whether concepts can be represented according to some behaviors and whether moral concepts can correspond to these behaviors. If moral concepts are provided by behaviors, is verbal language still a requirement for moral concepts? Can we think of the possibility of a pre-verbal concept, such as fairness, as an emotional expression instead of a linguistic one? Joyce (2006, p. 87) accepts that animals may have beliefs involving evaluative terms, though they are not language-users. When an animal performs a particular behavior, it seems plausible to think that that animal makes an evaluation about that behavior. To that end, behaviors are the site in which we can apply and attribute moral judgment in animals, a topic this thesis has maintained and will continue to argue. What is sufficient for moral behaviors? I disagree with the idea that the measure of the question of what morality is should be confined to human morality alone. Most scientists believe that (at least some) animals have consciousness, even though their consciousness may not be exactly like human consciousness; this might be because humans are the sole beings who talk about moral behaviors and, similarly, they are also the only beings who can talk about their internal states. If it is possible to attribute consciousness to animals, then it should be possible to attribute morality to them in much the same way; it might even be simpler to attribute moral agency to individuals who have consciousness. I do not claim that “consciousness is, therefore, morality is.”

What I mean is that, in the past, even now, both most philosophers and scientists, despite having a lot of empirical/ experimental evidence, have refrained from attributing consciousness to animals, but later some of them abandoned this approach. Not attributing morality to animals may also stem from such an attitude. This is one of the reasons why I do not take human morality to be the paradigm of morality. To clarify this, perhaps it should be noted that morality does not have to manifest itself only *one* way.

The way in which we usually understand morality seems to be overrated in the sense that even secular scientists seem to think it is like a God-given, divine, characteristic. In fact, morality is simply a means that regulates social life in order not to be deprived of fundamental needs such as security, and not to be excluded from society, not much of that, and it does not require very high cognitive or cultural elements. Perhaps we should restrict our focus to the social function of morality. What does morality do? That is, what is its function? Morality provides social regulation to the population of social animals. This is clearly observable when we examine the function of morality. By animal morality, I do not mean proto-morality or moral-like behaviors—which I examined in chapter 1—and I do not mean human morality either; human morality is, in principle, animal morality in the sense that social concerns are solved and maintained by morality. We should not expect animals to make moral judgments, not verbally at least.⁵⁵ Animals may not evaluate their own behaviors or the behaviors of others in the same way that we do. However, they evaluate the behaviors of others in a way that helps them take action.

Male chimpanzees, when fighting with females, generally refrain from using their large canine teeth, with which they could do a great deal of harm. It has been observed that on the rare occasions that a male did employ his dangerous canines against a female, the victim's protesting tone of voice changed—a change to which the whole colony responded with barks of complaint, and

⁵⁵ My suggestion may pave the way morality for ants or flies. I think, morality is a graded thing, and one can even say that ants have morality, maybe at a very low level. It does not bother me, and it does not contradict my view, rather I would gladly embrace it. I do not make a moral/social distinction anyway. *We* make this distinction.

sometimes with a group of females chasing off the aggressor (Joyce, 2006, p. 80).

In this observation above, we see that a male chimpanzee who uses his canine teeth when fighting with a female is “condemned” by the whole group. There seems to be the view that this chimpanzee deserves to be punished by the group. These barks of complaint can be interpreted as the punitive response. However, Joyce does not believe that it might involve a moral judgment. However, the question remains: can we judge them as having performed moral behaviors or not? I think that this implies a non-verbal evaluation that guides moral behaviors. As with the reminder of the cur/dog conceptual distinction above, animals may not appear to be moral agents; however, these behaviors are clearly non-verbal evaluations. Former would be excessively anthropomorphic. We may even say that they create their own moral system, and they seem to have everything else that qualify as moral behaviors. I think the claims of those who deny animal morality boils down to the fact that animal morality does not precisely match our own. This seems incredible to me and I do not think that it has to be so. Even if animals do not create a moral system, they can still be a part of it, but we will not be able to detect it with an anthropomorphic mind-set.

Let us consider moral judgments in a Humean way. According to Hume, morals cannot be derived from reason. He states that reason can neither prevent nor produce action or emotion (2007, T.3.1.1.8).⁵⁶ Reason is associated with truth and falsehood. Conversely, morality is not associated with truth and falsehood; instead, it is associated with approval or disapproval. Actions, in this sense, cannot be the articulation of a truth or a falsehood. The rules of morality are not derived from reason and it does endow us with the question of either ‘what’ or ‘how’ concerning morality. Yet, reason is the faculty employed to discover why we act in *that* way. Obviously, Hume is not a moral realist. Moral judgments,

⁵⁶ References to Hume’s work *A Treatise of Human Nature* start with T (for Treatise) and are followed by Book, Part, Section, and paragraph number in parentheses in the text.

which are the effects of actions, do not involve either truth or falsehood; they can only be true or false in the eyes of others and this indicates approval or disapproval.

Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the *real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc'd either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason (Hume, 2007, T.3.1.1.9).

We can clearly see that actions cannot be attributed any truth or falsehood in the quotation above. Reason is associated with matters of facts, not with actions. However, this means that reason does not address what we *should* do either.

According to Hume, sentiments/emotions are also psychological motivations that do not have propositional content and so they are not associated with the content of reason, which applies to propositions (Sugden, 2006, p. 365). Sugden also considers Hume's decision theory via emotions, rather than reasons, as a non-propositional decision theory. From the perspective of contemporary metaethics, we might suggest that Hume adopts a non-cognitivist and non-propositional perspective, which denies the claim that moral judgments express propositions that state facts and are truth-evaluable. Yet, it instead holds that they express feelings. In this sense, a moral judgment is a psychological inclination that is enabled by feeling a specific emotion and, accordingly, the particular emotion comprises approval or disapproval as a moral judgment. Richards' account (2017, p. 148), a contemporary view, also accepts that moral judgments can be "our immediate response to someone in distress, which elicits a desire or need to help —the archetypal example of impulsively jumping into a river to save a drowning child." If we take decisions for granted through emotions and accept that moral judgments are a psychological inclination exclusively, not a higher cognition, then we can assume that moral judgments are grounded in non-

propositional approval or disapproval. Clarifying another issue, concerning images, will be helpful in order to elaborate further about the condition of non-propositional moral judgments. Images or other expressions can present a visual argument without necessarily being propositional (Roque, 2015, p. 177). Emotional expressions can substitute linguistic propositions for moral judgments when perceptual or mental images produce non-linguistic thought. This seems consistent with Hume's account of mental content. As a brief reminder of Hume's philosophy, all ideas come from perceptions that are impressions and ideas: "[A]ll our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent" (Hume, 2007, T 1.1.1.7). There is no mental content unless that which is perceived. We perceive objects in the environment surrounding us, and all mental content is obtained through perception. Accordingly, the following idea occurs: "When the impression of one becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea of its usual attendant; and consequently we may establish this as one part of the definition of an opinion or belief, that 'tis an idea related to or associated with a present impression" (Hume, 2007, T 1.3.6.15). Belief is also acquired by impressions and feelings that act independently of reason. In this context, Hume provides an answer about what the predicament might be for animals as follows:

According to this system, then, every animal that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every animal, must be susceptible of all the same virtues and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame to human creatures. All the difference is, that our superior reason may serve to discover the vice or virtue, and by that means may augment the blame or praise. But still this discovery supposes a separate being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which depends only on the will and appetite, and which, both in thought and reality, may be distinguish'd from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same relations, with respect to each other, as the human species, and therefore wou'd also be susceptible of the same morality, if the essence of morality consisted in these relations. Their want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality, but can never hinder these duties from existing; since they must antecedently exist, in order to their being perceiv'd. Reason must find them, and can never produce them (Hume, 2007, T 3.1.1.25).

According to Hume, we do not produce right or wrong (virtue and vice in his terms) by reason. We act not according to the ideas, but with the impressions that we perceive and the passions (emotions) that arise as a result of impressions. This is also prevalent in animals and the only difference is that we know why we should do what we do, but animals do not. I do not ascribe to animals a metaethical position; I only question whether their behaviors could be explained in moral terms, which still seems to me to be possible.

We can summarize the polemic in one fundamental question: is visual perception, as a cognitive activity, different from language? In a pioneering work, Arnheim argued this: many concepts are perceptual, and insofar as shapes are concepts, we can perceive the visual concept of roundness independently of its lexicalization through verbal language (Arnheim 1969, p. 27). More recently, Bermúdez argued that understanding nonlinguistic thought requires developing a non-propositional alternative to propositions (Bermúdez 2003, p. 38), since nonlinguistic thought hardly matches propositional knowledge. All this has consequences for visual argumentation because the dominant stance in the philosophy of language is that arguments are based on propositions. So, if visual arguments are non-propositional, how can they be arguments? To be sure, some philosophers argue that visual experience can have propositional contents and thus fulfills the truth conditions of beliefs (Siegel 2010). A compromise would be to consider that propositions (and the kind of representation they involve) cannot fully account for the richness of visual images and the way they are able to express arguments (Roque, 2015, p. 180).

If we juxtapose the argument outlined above with Hume's views, then we can see that thought without language is rendered possible and we can see, accordingly, that so too is non-propositional moral judgment. We also do not have to verbalize the judgment generated by emotional expressions in order to recognize and transmit it to others. Just as a moral proposition articulates an attitude, an emotional bodily expression also articulates an attitude.

I think, moral behaviors can substitute for moral judgments in a sense that emotions generate moral behaviors that are embodied productions as non-propositional judgments. Let me handle this claim with an example. Suppose that an individual is violated by unfair division of labor, the emotion that emerges causes certain behaviors. That is, the emotion produces non-propositional judgment. We observe this non-propositional judgment as one's

behavior. Taking moral judgment on a non-propositional basis can reduce the difference between humans and non-human animals in a sense, and it would seem more reasonable to attribute morality to animals. Boniolo (2006, p. 35) also suggests that “moral judgments are nothing but the nonintentional consequences of certain interests of a given human population *to follow* certain kinds of behavior—which are praised—and *not to follow* other kinds—which are blamed.” In this sense, moral judgment can occur in an individual, independently of reason.

It is evident that animals do not have the language that we have. That notwithstanding, there are many properties that animals do possess and which I have attempted to show throughout the four chapters above. I have also tried to explain the view that communication can be achieved through emotional expressions, even without verbal language, in chapter 2. Concerning grooming, we can suggest that the grooming that takes place between two chimpanzees does not just involve the removal of parasites, but that we can clearly state that grooming is also a kind of social bonding, something that Joyce also admits (2006, p. 92). Grooming is conducted reciprocally. The reciprocal grooming represents trust and it maintains social interaction between individuals. It is an abuse of confidence when either party rejects grooming. It is not only a rejection of the behavior of grooming, but it is also an evaluation that it did not respond to my grooming. In the rejection of grooming, the individual has an evaluation of its relationship with others. This evaluation can be observed by the gestures and reactions of the animals, such as screaming, broadcasting this information to those around. We can appoint it as a kind of evaluation. Cognitivists would not count it as a language, so the claim follows that this case would not include a moral evaluation.⁵⁷ Can the reason for the chimpanzees’ reaction be the evaluation that it was wrong not to reciprocate grooming? We can certainly suggest that the chimpanzees’ reaction can be a pre-verbal communicative language. An animal does not explain or describe the situation that is being dealt

⁵⁷ I do not claim that animals have language. What I propose is that emotions have preverbal language characteristic. Here I suggest, unlike cognitivists, there is no need for language for such evaluations as seen in the grooming example above.

with in hand gestures, but it can react by screaming. We can state that there is some kind of complaint being lodged here. An animal complains that another one does not reciprocate. However, there is a code of conduct among chimpanzees for grooming and chimpanzees react to the violation of this code of conduct. There is even a code of conduct about how different genders should behave. For instance, male chimpanzees do not attack female chimpanzees in fights. Why can we not call this moral behavior? Why would a pre-verbal moral judgment be impossible? Joyce does not ascribe moral judgment to animals; from what I can tell, no one ascribes moral judgment to animals. Does judgment have to be something that is thought and expressed in a grammar? We can allow some room for an evaluation of such a judgment in a liberal sense. Whether moral judgments are non-propositional judgments may be highly controversial. However, the embodied characteristic of emotions paves the way and supports my claim.

Animal morality can also be defended by claiming that language may not be necessary for morality. Can we still insist that moral judgment is essential to behave morally? If animals are punishing and reacting, when they realize that someone has failed to engage in equal sharing, then why do we need language to attribute them morality? I can tentatively say that we can attribute moral behaviors to animals even if they cannot make a verbal linguistic judgment. In this sense, fairness can be a pre-verbal moral concept that can be expressed by behaviors, which I have also stated previously.

If now I generalize my previous statement and say, 'Stealing money is wrong' I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning—that is, expressed no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written 'Stealing money!!'—where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. Another man may disagree with me about the wrongness of stealing, in the sense that he may not have the same feeling about stealing as I have, and he may quarrel with me on account of my moral sentiments. But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradict me. For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And the

man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition (Ayer, 1936/1971, pp. 110-111)

As seen above, Ayer does not accept that the statement “Stealing money is wrong” can be either true or false, given that the statement that stealing money is wrong does not say anything about whether the statement is true or false. Instead, this statement indicates a moral disapproval of some feelings about stealing money. In this sense, we might not need propositions as moral judgments to express our moral approval or disapproval of certain kinds of actions. Following this line of argumentation, it might not be necessary for a moral statement or proposition to express one’s belief about certain situations. The emotional expressions for such situations already indicate whether one’s behavior will be approved of or not. Even if “stealing money is wrong” arrives in the form of a proposition, Ayer claims that it contains a hidden emotional expression. Morality can comprise the total of the verbal or behavioral expressions of moral feelings in certain situations. Here, too, we obviously regard animal morality in all cases in which we observe that animal behaviors are also moral responses and that their emotions turn into behavioral expressions. To that end, higher abilities (the intellectual/cognitive characteristics that are considered necessary to making moral judgments) are not required. Ayer is a pure non-cognitivist, and I am not that orthodox about non-cognitivism; I have a hybrid view that I have implemented throughout the thesis. The reason that I address a remark to Ayer here is to show that a verbal linguistic judgment is not necessary for morality. Linguistic judgment does not give us any information about whether or not the judgment is true. Moreover, linguistic judgment actually shows us hidden emotional expressions. In this sense, morality can be understood through emotional expression without linguistic judgment, something which Ayer also supports.

Furthermore, one can utter regret about something even if one has no real regret at all; it is a linguistic convention. The emotional expression, not the verbal

deception, reflects reality in this respect. This may manifest itself in a claim like the following: “Sorry. But I do not regret it.” The second sentence nullifies the first one (Joyce, 2006, pp. 54-55). In this sense, if the expression of a belief has any significance, then emotional expressions can be more reliable when compared to verbal statements. Joyce also puts forward linguistic properties, such as German and kraut: “To say “Hans is a German” is to describe Hans as having a certain nationality. To say “Hans is a kraut” is both to describe Hans as having that nationality and to express a derogatory attitude.” (Joyce, 2006, p. 54). Joyce also claims that the ability to make a distinction between Germans and krauts is only possible with language. That animals cannot recognize such a distinction says a lot of things linguistically; however, it does not say much in moral terms. Fairness is an evaluative concept, like kraut is. We do not need animals to use kraut to express a derogatory attitude because they show their attitudes by their emotional expressions. A witness can understand the attitude in much the same way as what the demonstrator *really* means. The grooming example, given above, relates to an unfair situation, and the one who was exposed to the unfair situation expresses an attitude.

Joyce states that moral concepts such as desert, justice, and deserve are necessary for moral judgments (2006, pp. 67-68). Joyce also states that animals lack concepts that he considers to be significant in terms of the concept for morality, such as in terms of how conflict is managed. Primatologists often encounter instances in which an animal has behaved unjustly to another and in which a third animal has intervened. An intriguing study ensues as third parties police impartially and maintain conflicts among primate group members without taking sides (Flack, de Waal, & Krakauer, 2005, p. E129). Could primates that behave in this way have a thought that “it deserves it”? To have a belief or feeling that “punishment is justified”, “it does not deserve consolation or good behavior, it deserves punishment” can substitute for the concept of desert. Moreover, it is obvious that animals understand each other’s behaviors. How would they perform their behaviors if they did not understand each other’s behaviors, or intentions? As a concept, morality may be something that animals

cannot understand. One's objections might begin and end with this: if people think, then they are moral, but animals are not. However, people actually often behave impulsively. Their motivation is often to avoid punishment. So, can we say that people are not moral most of the time? Are we moral beings only when we think? People do not have a grand hierarchy of moral judgments; they just reckon like, "if I do this, what will happen to me?" Primates can make the same kind of reckonings.⁵⁸

In this context, we can consider of Kohlberg's theory of moral development that involves moral stages (Kohlberg, 1973, pp. 631-632). Stage 1 is the pre-conventional level and in this level individuals perform in terms of consequences of actions, such as either punishment or reward. Stage 2 is the conventional level in which individuals both conform to the social order and they are loyal to the social order for maintaining, supporting, and justifying it. Stage 3 is the autonomous level where individuals judge a rule by abstraction. According to Kohlberg, most people cannot even pass stage 2. We have seen how emotions are significant and effective when individuals perform an action and make decisions through the subject of moral behaviors and moral judgments, which I have studied in a previous chapter (Chapter 4). At this condition, we have concluded that they acted according to their internal feelings, which they justified retroactively. They do not act autonomously by abstraction while behaving. In this sense and at Stage 3, individuals believe that it is wrong for me to do this or that because it seems to contradict another principle. The significance of this contradiction with this principle is because it would be wrong for me to do this because society forbade it, at least according to those who did not pass to Stage 3. They prevent themselves from doing so because they think that "I will be punished if I do." In this sense, we can conclude on the basis of Kohlberg's theory that a very small proportion of people can actually consider themselves to be moral subjects, since the vast majority of people do not achieve Stage 3. Even such a definition of morality almost seems to describe philosophers alone. This is because this definition of morality is too demanding,

⁵⁸ Relevant observations are in previous chapters (Chapter 3 and 4) studied by Haidt and Greene.

even when compared to Joyce's definition. It is no wonder true if we approach morality like this, that would be another extreme. I am not willing to agree with the idea that being human is equal to being moral. However, moralizing is another thing that we do. Accordingly, I agree with the idea that there has to be a middle point between equating being human with being moral and philosophizing morality. What is implied here is that the minimal cognitivist morality that I object to is also too demanding.

It is absurd to suggest that humans *have the potential* for moral judgment since primates also have that same potential. Even a primate, as far as we know, is in Stage 2 of Kohlberg's moral development. Then, why do we not attribute morality to them, even though we know at least that much about them? This might be because of how we define morality: when we define it as abstract principles, and in terms of understanding these abstract principles, then many people will fail to fall under this definition. Most people may not be able to learn these principles, due to cultural, educational, and economic factors. Does this mean that people will not be punished for what they do? If morality is something that should be learned at an early age, like language, then people do not seem to meet the requirements in this respect. Perhaps we will never be able to explain this sort of morality to some, or we might not be able to explain it at all. Perhaps we will not be able to teach morality because it is too late, and people have already matured into adulthood. All that remains is to punish them for what they do without expecting them to comprehend it. Perhaps this is exactly what we are doing to many people. How many people really say: "I deserve the punishment". Some people intended for punishment cheat readily if they have the chance. People may say: "what I've done is wrong", and they may give up doing wrong, not because they think that it is wrong, but because they are afraid of getting caught. In this account, people cannot be viewed as moral subjects. Perhaps we are being unfair to them when we judge people legally because they could not comprehend the events that they brought about. Do we consent to this consequence? We can see that each claim can be justified and that sociological data also support this. People either attribute it to god, explain in terms of god

(the god who punishes, frightens with eternal punishment), or fear that the state, society, or tribe will punish them. Even the emotion that arises is fear, rather than guilt, shame, or embarrassment, which are considered to require high cognitive faculty. People are afraid of their relatives humiliating them and of excluding them from a safe environment. In this sense, we can say that fear is more effective, when compared to guilt, at least for avoiding undesirable behavior. How did avoiding a behavior become a norm? How do we explain norms in evolutionary terms? For example, the norm of avoiding harming children; if one harms another's child, one's individual fitness will increase. But in such a situation, how can we guarantee the ability to protect our children from someone else's harm? How do we protect them from danger? In this context, the evolutionary drive is a kind of social contract by which to avoid harm; I will not hurt yours, and you will not hurt mine. This norm has ultimately enhanced fitness. Gibbard (1992, p. 61), adopting a non-cognitive/emotivist's approach, defines the acceptance of a norm simply as a way to coordinate, like a biological function. Gibbard views human normatives from a naturalistic perspective and claims that we are an evolved species who can feel what it makes sense to do. So, the capacity to accept a norm is a biological adaptation. Acceptance is a state of mind, but acceptance is also expressed by feeling. Gibbard claims that internalizing a norm, following rules for social interactions, are what we share with mammals. Socially significant emotions tend to be coordinated. Emotions coordinate actions. Gibbard attributes all of these to language, but since the biological basis has been well-established, this explanation does not lose its validity even without the necessity to appeal to language. Accepting a norm involves three components: a belief, a feeling, and an action. A norm emerges when these three components come together.⁵⁹

Nature has allowed us to evolve in ways that allow us to be genuinely good, not constantly calculating whole sequences of behaviors and reciprocal benefit as the measure of well-being. In other words, nature handled this with emotions,

⁵⁹ I am not interested in a question such as which one occurred first and which revealed the others, I think that either component can trigger the other.

without appealing to constant calculation with a larger brain. We are also not at the level of intelligence to calculate every action as appropriately good or bad. This does not mean that we do not calculate; we specifically calculate mutual favors where necessary. However, the social relationships that we have are too wide to constantly be calculating our behaviors. This is how our biology has pushed us toward. Perhaps we value certain things because evolution drives us to care about things. Accordingly, I do not claim that the statement “animals have morality” is undoubtedly true. In this thesis, I have aimed to intimate the possibility of the existence of morality in animals. There may not be a position in the literature at present that I might occupy and in which animals have morality with this level of clarity. I have tried to reveal this clarity throughout this thesis. In so doing, I have tried to set certain limits upon morality and have endeavored to explain it within that limit. As Joyce (2006, p. 222) has claimed: “Why has Mother Nature granted us this bounty? Not for any laudable purpose, (...) but simply because being nice helped our ancestors make more babies”, morality is not just for being good, it also enhances fitness from an evolutionary perspective. Joyce tried to undermine our confidence in our moral judgments and I have been doing a similar thing, albeit from a different perspective.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

As the title of this study suggests, I am trying to develop a new framework for morality based on emotions by considering the relationship between non-human animals and human animals. At the beginning, my conviction was that if I could clarify this relationship, then including non-human animals in this framework could be justified; thus, I have tried to develop arguments to this end. In order to accomplish this task, I first had to figure out what moral approach I should adopt. If I want to attribute a moral sense to non-human animals, then it seems appropriate to use an evolutionary perspective. Therefore, I examine the evolutionary origins of morality in Chapter 2. The traditional definitions of morality limits morality to humans. Nevertheless and perhaps surprisingly, there are also those who adopt the view that morality has its origins in evolution, but are convinced that morality is exclusively a human affair. For this very reason, I try to criticize not just those who defend traditional rational ethics, but also those who both defend naturalized ethics and restrict it to humans such as Joyce, Keltner, Prinz, Ayala, and Searle.

In order to address the research question, I first had to argue that these conceptions of morality are inadequate or incorrect and I had to introduce a new one. However, it was not easy to develop a new understanding of morality. Doing so would require writing an additional, altogether different study. Therefore, I only touch upon some problems with traditional conceptions of morality in Chapter 2. I think that the main problem with these views is that they are somehow circular. In other words, morality is considered to be uniquely human, because, I think, humans are the ones who decide what morality is. I speculate that the questions of what is moral and what is not are cultural, and it may even have occurred at some stage in human evolution—I speculate since

that there is no concrete evidence for that. In this way, even though there is no moral/conventional distinction in some human populations, maybe we are the ones who call them moral. Morality is defined as a set of rules and behaviors that are followed by rational beings. I wanted to question whether these behaviors really involved rationality at all. Could a deeper, inner motivation reveal moral behaviors instead? If there is an inner motivation to reveal moral behaviors, then there may be evolutionary mechanism underlying these behaviors. Behaviors such as altruism and cooperation are often encountered in examinations of the evolutionary mechanism. These behaviors are seen as automatic behaviors in animals. However, animals, like humans, do not always engage in altruistic behaviors and cooperate; they can and do act selfishly and act only for their own benefit and this can come at a price, of course. This means that they do not perform behaviors more automatically than humans do and that they behave in accordance with the situation that they encounter. This price is decided by the conditions of the group around them. Acting altruistically provides long-term benefits, while being selfish can result in short-term benefits, both in terms of safety and nutrition, exclusion from the group, distrust, and failure to provide supplies. Peers and the group may even punish individuals for not avoiding behaviors that threaten the safety of others.

Care is one of the most fundamental hallmarks of morality and takes root characteristically between a mother and her child. Care enables the mother to meet her child's basic needs, ensures her safety, and prevents her from being harmed. Animals do not just either punish or care; they can also compromise. Punishment may not always be the right behavior and reconciliation may be more applicable to certain scenarios. Animals even engage in third-party reconciliation. Those who refuse animals moral sense claim that there is no third-party punishment among them. However, this objection is answered by the observation of third-party reconciliation among animals (de Waal, 2016, p. 176). I have tried to develop an understanding of morality different from traditional ethics, such as deontological and virtue ethics, by adopting Hume's understanding of morality. The present study has proceeded by trying to

understand the nature of morality and how it works, rather than how morality should be. As a result, I have come to the conclusion that moral rules are not that which we reach with our reason, and which only requires us to use our reason while we act, but moral rules are those that we reach through an internal mechanism, namely emotions. One can be excluded from a group by violating the group's rules and so one can be deprived of the material to provide for one's basic needs like food, resources, and safety. Emotions motivate us to follow the rules through the desire to avoid inappropriate behaviors that society prohibits. Why has my focus been on emotions? Why have I chosen to focus on emotions over rationality in both humans and non-human animals? There are many who work in the fields of animal cognition and animal consciousness. If I argued that animals have self-consciousness, and that they are therefore moral, then it would be easier to support my claim, but it would not be true. I investigate the possibility of morality without an appeal to a higher cognitive function. As can be seen, such a possibility is plausible due to emotions' characteristics. Moreover, we have feelings that accompany our moral judgments. This does not mean that we do not use our reason when we act morally. On the contrary, we use our reason to explain and to justify our behaviors and to question why we do it. However, most fundamentally, we act not because of thinking, but feeling. There is an evolutionarily simple reason for this: individuals would not always have much time in real life to justify their actions or act after having thought through the consequences. It takes us longer to think than to act and we often need to act very quickly. Emotions, conversely, provide an evolutionary advantage and allow us to act immediately. Therefore, I have tried to understand the nature of emotions by asking the following questions throughout my thesis. "What are emotions like, how do they motivate us, what functions do they have, do they each have a separate function?" The chapter that follows, which examines emotions, addresses these exact questions.

The first thing to do was to investigate the nature and function of emotions in order to determine whether there is an emotion accompanying action. I deal with this concern in Chapter 3. I also examine the function and nature of emotions

through the theories that have been put forward about emotions. Each emotion initially emerged individually, and each have different functions. The main theories examined are psychological, biological, and social constructionist in nature.

The first modern and rather broad description of emotions after Hume is that the perception of the patterned changes in the body and that the emotion is our feeling of the same changes as they occur; this view was advanced by William James. This definition emphasizes the embodied aspect of emotions, but ignores the functional aspect thereof. Paul Ekman was the first critic to define emotions' unique characteristics, such as fundamental life-task, distinctive physiology, and bodily responses. Emotions enable humans to adapt to social environments in which they exist, given that individuals survive by not only adapting to climate and weather conditions, and by finding solutions to nutrition or health problems, but also by dealing with the others that surround them. Emotions are primarily for oneself, which means that emotions enable a person to protect themselves against the hazardous conditions that surround them. However, emotions do not have to be just for oneself, because individuals are not just intrapersonal beings that are self-oriented, but are also interpersonal beings who are other-oriented and who can maintain social relationships and solve problems that arise in social relationships. One's emotional expressions enable other individuals to perceive and to interpret a person's underlying emotions, thereby maintaining social relationships.

Emotional changes and emotional expressions emphasize the somatic/bodily aspects of emotions, but the cognitive theories conflict with the somatic theory. The body is irrelevant according to cognitive theories. Of course, this does not mean that there are no bodily changes when an emotion arises; instead, it means that emotion and thought are strongly bound and the body does not play a significant role in this relationship, quite unlike the biological and psychological theories of emotions. For example, fear can be defined as a belief that there is a danger present and that there is a concomitant desire to avoid that danger. When

it comes to the biological theories, one hypothesis is that evolution chooses things that confer a survival (and/or reproductive) advantage and if evolution furnished us with emotions in order to detect bodily changes, then detecting bodily changes provides a survival advantage. Emotions evolved to solve various problems faced by our ancestors, such as anger that arises with violation of order, fear that arises alongside danger, disgust that arises with possibly contaminated food, and so on. Social constructionist theory opposes biological theory by arguing that emotions are socially constructed. They can be learned, transformed, renewed, socially constructed, and are culturally-variable.

Apart from interpreting emotions differently, another important common point found in these theories is that they categorize emotions differently. While some distinguish basic and social emotions, others reject such a distinction. Some argue that there is a different version of basic emotions that turn into social emotions. I am of the opinion that emotion is a bodily activity, but this does not mean that it is independent of the activity of the neurons in the brain. I present my views on this categorical distinction in Chapter 5.

After examining the emotions, I try to explicate the relationship between emotions and morality in Chapter 4. It seems that morality is not just something we produced, built, or constructed, but it is rather a necessary condition for our being able to live together. We tend to live together as social creatures, but this is not easy to achieve. One of our most basic instincts, the “feeling of security”, makes us dependent on others and forces us to be together. Belonging to a group and being compatible oblige us to obey the rules. If we do not obey the rules, we will be excluded from the group and deprived of our ability to meet our most basic need, security. I am not claiming that we act this way consciously, but we tend to do so. We need others from the moment at which we are born. Our mothers are our safest shelter, our first place of confidence. The main reason why I approach this thesis from an evolutionary perspective is that we share this feeling with other social species—with mammals at least. Since these social creatures also need security, they want to belong to the group and want not to be

excluded. The threat of exclusion forces one to obey the group's rules, thereby making one more "compliant". Those who do not follow the rules are punished by being excluded. Perhaps the most crucial question of my entire thesis might be phrased in the following way: "Is it possible, independently of what is said about morality, to attribute morality to non-human animals?" To answer such a question, we must first answer another question: "How did morality emerge?" I will try to answer this question by recounting a study that addressed this exact question. When we act morally, we think that we are acting rationally. However, there is something intense that accompanies our moral actions and our thoughts; namely, emotions. If our moral behavior consists only of our thoughts, then why do emotions arise in addition to our moral actions? In order to answer this question, I emphasized the importance of emotions in our moral behavior.

A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say yes (Greene *et al.*, 2001, p. 2105).

In the survey, subjects said that it is morally acceptable to switch the trolley, to save five people by letting one person die. It is actually a utilitarian calculation that maximizes the number of lives saved when making moral judgments. When some changes are made to the trolley dilemma, the decisions of subjects also change in a surprising way.

You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no (Greene *et al.*, 2001, p. 2105).

According to the study results, most people did not find it morally appropriate to push the large person. In the switch case, people tend to decide that it makes more sense to sacrifice one for saving five lives. Greene (2009, p. 581) answers the question of why moral judgments are altered in these cases by stating that

“characteristically deontological judgments (e.g. disapproving of killing one person to save several others) are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments (e.g. approving of killing one to save several others) are driven by controlled cognitive processes”. In the footbridge case, moral judgments of subjects are affected by emotions. Indeed, the result does not change in each case; either one or five people will die. Yet, while people make a decision to sacrifice one person for saving five person in the switch dilemma, people have a different decision mechanism that cannot be solved with the classical utilitarian approach as the decision dynamics change in the footbridge dilemma.

The common view is that guilt was a human moral emotion exclusively, although this commonly held view is not universally held. What is the peculiarity of guilt that set it apart from other emotions? The phenomenon of guilt has posed one of the biggest challenges to my thesis for two reasons. 1. Do animals have guilt? 2. If animals do not have guilt, then can we not attribute them morality and do we count other emotions as inadequate for morality? In this regard, I need to revisit experiments on animals in order to get rid of any doubt about whether humans and animals experience the same emotions. It has been tested many times the idea that similar emotions activate similar areas of and these emotions exhibit similar behaviors in animals and humans whose brains are imaged in fMRI devices. Therefore, based on such data, I focused on the results of such a commonality.

Prior to a revisit of the findings of Chapter 5, I wish to mention the following consideration. All of the information I gleaned from the extant literature and all of the data I accumulated paved the way for Chapter 5. This chapter also includes all of the theories that supported and opposed all of the arguments found in my thesis. I needed to understand each emotion fully before placing it in the appropriate category. I would not have been able to find my own way had I not studied the theories that opposed my hypothesis. If I had not examined studies on animal behavior, then it would not have been possible for me to

abandon the idea of how different they are from us. Everything I have learned about animals have made me think of *how alike we are*. This does not mean that we are exactly alike. We have art, science, and literature that make us who we are. However, this was not about the emergence of morality; and for our emotions to provide us with the ability to grasp everything else in this sociability and to act accordingly. Therefore, in the 5th and final chapter, I put forward my approach to emotions and morality in light of all these data obtained from the literature. This approach emerged from the problem with categorizing emotions. Therefore, I suggest rejecting the attribution of categorical distinctions to emotions as basic, non-basic, social, non-social, or moral. This suggestion not only excludes the characteristic features of emotions, but also provides an comprehensive assessment of emotions that share a common feature. That is, there are no distinctive emotions, as social, moral, non-social either; emotions acquire these characteristics within a specific context. These characteristics do not produce a categorical distinction; therefore, there is no such distinction between disgust and moral disgust, anger and moral anger. There is only one emotion that is experienced, and this emotion arises based on the context of whether it is social or non-social. We are the ones who entitle behaviors as either praiseworthy or not. I have tried to explain this in the following way: First, emotions evolved to have adaptive functions in order to meet some specific survival-related needs. However, emotions acquired new functions after socialization. I suggest that emotions acquired a new function through exaptation. These emotions were exapted to deal with new social problems after socialization in species. All emotions are somehow hypersensitive to recognize, detect, and cope with both social threats and concerns. No assistance is required from cognition/cognitive centers, given that emotions can respond to threats. One example of the social function of emotions can be found in the communicative function of emotion, such that emotions can be described as the *preverbal/nonverbal* language that contains the functions of language, but does not involve any speech. We can ascribe some level of communication and act of speaking to emotions without any language. For instance, we have a sense that we need to communicate information acquired by emotion to others—

information about the contaminated food. Whether or not the emotion contains a social context, we tend to express the knowledge that emotion has. So even a so-called nonsocial emotion can play a communicative and social role. These emotions may have promoted the socialization of mammals/higher mammals because of their predisposition to social efficacy.

Although emotions are primarily for oneself—emerge in a non-social context, emotions *often* appear in a specific social context. However, they do not always have to appear in a social context. If an emotion arises from a social context, then that emotion can still emerge as either self-oriented or other-oriented. Just as guilt can be felt for oneself or another, fear can be felt for oneself or for someone else. Disgust is not a social emotion, nor is it a non-social emotion. Disgust must have arisen in a non-social context but has acquired social function during socialization. Individuals' experiences and behaviors are affected since the social context occurs in the shared environment in which one and others dwell and one's behavior develops in this interaction. Automatic reactions and reflexes are not independent of this environment. That is why I try to explain the interaction between individuals and the environment not through cognition, but through emotions. The social environment in which animals live stimulates the production of hormones because individuals acquire social status within a given social environment. Animals alter their behaviors according to the rise in their hormone levels in accordance with the social context. Emotions also make it possible to share experiences. Emotion is socially shared with others who share the same environment since emotion carries information about the environment; this information can then be transferred to others through the characteristics that are inherent to emotion. The emotional expression is communicated by an individual, and that expression is perceived by another individual who shares the same environment. Having another individual perceive our emotional expression might cause that one to find themselves in an affective state. This interaction may, consequently, lead to another interaction between these individuals. Emotion's survival and social functions are parts of an inseparable whole that comprises of the nature of emotion. The traces of the social context, in which

emotion arises, can be pursued in nonhuman animals as well. When an individual and the environment interact, the emotion that the individual feels in this interaction is permanently embedded in the social context (Brian Parkinson & Manstead, 1993, p. 315). Social context can be internalized by individuals who share the same environment. In this sense, social context can be a kind of emotional embeddedness concerning the interaction of the individual and the environment. The contextual information can be processed by emotions; accordingly, the emotional responses can be regarded as context-sensitive responses.

An individual observing the emotional response of another individual may have the similar emotional experience. During this emotional experience, some neurons are activated in the brain. It is an intriguing finding that the neurons that are activated in the brain during the emotional experience also are activated in the brain of the other individual who encounters this emotional experience. These neurons are called mirror neurons first having been encountered in primates, and are considered to be necessary for perceiving the action of others. Mirror neurons are like a source of the ability to understand the behaviors of others. The context-sensitive property of mirror neurons is important to understand the intimate relationship between our emotional states and the embodied experience of the emotional states of others. So, emotions should contain the social context as embodied interaction. Disgust originally emerged to lessen contamination risks but was later shaped by social dynamics to maintain social distance as approach and avoidance by cultural evolution. In other words, disgust has expanded to respond to a much wider range of conditions. I think there are no distinct emotions like moral and nonmoral disgust. There are no distinctive bodily expressions of primary (i.e., nonmoral) disgust and moral disgust. I think, disgust has moral and nonmoral characteristic for different contexts. Both basic disgust and moral disgust are felt in the same part of the body, in the stomach. When one experiences both moral and nonmoral disgust, one performs the same emotional reaction. Both moral and nonmoral emotion motivates the avoidance of or aversion to particular things. Moreover, the current

experimental studies support it. According to Moll *et al.* (2005, p. 69), primary disgust and moral disgust are partially overlapped in the subjects whose brains are examined by fMRI. They reports that same brain locations are activated for both moral and nonmoral situations. These all show that there are no distinctive bodily expressions of primary disgust and moral disgust, and support my claim that there are no distinctive moral emotions because there is no new emotion for such a condition. The striking resemblance in the behaviors of animals and humans is not merely a visual resemblance. The commonality of brain activities and areas of emotions observed in fMRI devices, and the fact that these emotions produce similar behaviors was not a coincidence, but a consequence of evolution. Therefore, this is how our biology has pushed us toward caring for things. Perhaps we value certain things because evolution has driven us to care about these things. Nevertheless, I do not claim that the statement “animals have morality” is undoubtedly true. In this thesis, I have just tried to argue for the possibility of animal morality.

All of the cases of what we call moral are actually social, but later we started to refer to some of them as moral. What I mean is that emotions have no moral implication content. We identify the context as social, non-social, or moral through our emotions. I think that the difference between the social and the moral is only a matter of degree. There is also no such a clear distinction between moral and social rules, as Nichols (2004) tried to make. These rules change according to the context that cultural regulation permits. Killing in combat is praiseworthy, but avoiding killing is the most deeply held norm in other contexts.

I think that the moral-social distinction is an artifact, not a genuine distinction. This whole thesis has attempted to reject the artificiality of this distinction. The claim that morality is a separate category has been theorized, and was intellectualized as an afterthought. Hence, an emotion is neither intrinsically moral nor non-moral, given that emotions are neither social nor non-social. We can only interpret emotions in relation to a context in an environment in which

the individual exists. An emotion that an individual experiences is still the same emotion in a different context; the reaction is also the same reaction. Emotion is what makes this context and determines how the person comprehends it.

When an animal performs a particular behavior, it seems plausible to think that that animal makes an evaluation about that behavior. Evaluation can be both moral or nonmoral. However, it is the social context that makes it moral and the way we call moral that behavior in that social context. To that end, behaviors are the site in which we can apply and attribute moral judgment in animals; this is a topic that this thesis has maintained and for which this thesis will continue to argue. What is sufficient for moral behaviors? I disagree with the idea that morality should be confined to humans alone. I do not suggest that animals make a verbal evaluation in the way that we do. However, the gestures and reactions of animals, such as screaming can be regarded a nonverbal evaluation. An example can be given as follows:

Male chimpanzees, when fighting with females, generally refrain from using their large canine teeth, with which they could do a great deal of harm. It has been observed that on the rare occasions that a male did employ his dangerous canines against a female, the victim's protesting tone of voice changed—a change to which the whole colony responded with barks of complaint, and sometimes with a group of females chasing off the aggressor (Joyce, 2006, p. 80).

The barks of complaint are the reaction of other chimpanzees to the aggressor which means that he deserves punishment by the group. It can be read as the retributive response. There *has* to be a response for the inappropriate behavior to maintain the social order. I think that we should focus on the social function of morality, rather than searching for some intrinsic characteristics that would distinguish morality from sociality. Morality is just a social regulation in a population of social animals. This is visibly accessible when we examine the behaviors of both humans and nonhuman animals in their social life. Functionally, human morality and animal morality are the same: It serves to help solve social problems.

In the first chapter, I try to develop an understanding of morality by adopting Hume's understanding, rather than traditional ethics provided by Aristotle and Kant. Hume argues that morality cannot be derived from reason. He also states that reason cannot produce action since reason is correlated with truth and falsehood, not with action. On the other hand, morality is not correlated with truth and falsehood, rather it is correlated with actions which brings forth approval and disapproval. Moral judgments do not involve either truth or falsehood. From the perspective of contemporary metaethics, Hume adopts a non-cognitivist and non-propositional perspective, which denies the claim that moral judgments express propositions that state facts and are truth-evaluable. It instead holds that they express feelings. In this sense, a moral judgment is enabled by feeling a specific emotion and, accordingly, we can say that a particular emotion comprises approval or disapproval as a moral judgment does. If we take decisions for granted through emotions, then we can assume that moral judgments are grounded in non-propositional approval or disapproval. If a moral judgment is enabled by feeling a specific emotion, we can see, accordingly, that so is non-propositional moral judgment. We do not have to verbalize the judgment generated by emotional expressions in order to recognize and transmit it to others. Just as a moral proposition articulates an attitude, an emotional bodily expression also articulates an attitude.

My thesis' contribution to the literature is as follows: I have paved the way for the studies concerning animal emotions and animal behaviors in Turkey and I have aimed to fill such a gap in the literature. In addition, I have approached the issue of animal morality from another perspective that examines it through emotions, not through animal consciousness. Although my predecessors wanted to accept the existence of morality in animals, they referred to this type of behaviors that they encountered in animals as primordial morality, or building-blocks of morality by definition. I have an intention to call it animal morality. So, what do I mean when I dare to claim that animals are moral? Am I saying that animals and humans are exactly the same? No, of course not. There are differences. The first thing that we see are their behaviors, but what we learn is

that these behaviors occur as a result of their emotions. Contrary to common belief, animal behaviors are not automatic. There may not be limit to what animals can do, we might be deceived by the unexpected nature of the games that they play, just as primatologists are constantly confronted and still surprised. It is obvious that our language has taken us to a different stage. I am not ignoring what we produce, but that is beside the point. As I try to explain in this thesis, emotion has a non-verbal linguistic aspect. It is not fictional; on the contrary, it has a realistic structure in terms of communicative and information-carrying characteristics that individuals need more information about, particularly about how we act within it.



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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Sakin Hanoğlu, Derya

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

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EDUCATION

Degree Graduation	Institution	Year of
Ph.D.	METU Philosophy	2021
MA	İstanbul University Philosophy	2014
BA	Yeditepe University Philosophy	2012

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2015-2021	METU Philosophy	Research
Assistant		

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

“What is an Emotion?” Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy 2019. September 18–19, 2019. University of Salzburg. Salzburg, Austria.

“Can Basic Emotions Pave the way for Sociality?” International Interdisciplinary Summer School 2018. The Neurobiology of Moral Conscience with Patricia Churchland. June 4–8, 2018. Tübingen, Germany.

“Güçlünün Ahlakı ya da Güçlünün Ahlaksızlığı: Duygular Ahlakı Yargılarımızı Nasıl Etkiler?” (The Morality of the Stronger or the Immorality of the Stronger: How do Emotions Effect Our Moral Judgments?) *Lisansüstü Öğrencileri Kolokyumu*. DTCF, Ankara University. 18 Mayıs 2018. Ankara, Turkey.

“Hayvanlarda Ahlak: Dil ve Duyguya Doğalcı bir Yaklaşım” (Morality in Animals: A Naturalistic Approach to Language and Emotion), Istanbul International Congress on Philosophy. May 2–4, 2018 / Istanbul University, Faculty of Letters. Istanbul, Turkey.

“İnsan Doğası”na Dair Bir Eleştiri: Doğalcı ya da Kültürcü olmak Tek Seçenek mi?” (A Critique of “Human Nature”: Beyond Naturalism and Culturalism), 2nd International Symposium on Philosophy, Education, Art and History of Science. Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University. 3–7 Mayıs 2017. Muğla, Turkey.

“A Naturalistic Account of Morality” Newton Fund Conference on the Philosophies of Mind, Language and Action, September 19–23, 2016. Sao Paulo, Brazil.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

İNSAN HARİCİ HAYVANLARDAN İNSAN OLAN HAYVANLARA AHLAKIN YKSELİŐİ: DUYGU TEMELLİ BİR YAKLAŐIM

Bu alıőmaya baőlarken hayvanlarda ahlakın bizimkine birebir benzediđi dőncesinden yola ıkmadım—ki sonuca da o őekilde varmadım. En nihayetinde biz szel dilimiz sayesinde dnyayı anlama bakımından anlatıcı (narrative) bir tr olarak sadece deneyimlemiyoruz, varolanları yorumluyoruz. Dolayısıyla insan harici hayvanların deneyimlerinin bize benzer olup olmadığını araőtırmak istedim. Bu yola baőlamamın bir sebebi de evrim kuramının insan yceliđi (human supremacy) fikrini terk etmemiz konusundaki haklılıđı olmuőtur. İnsanlar kendilerini her zaman diđer trlerden ayırdılar ve eősiz bir tr olmanın ayrıcalıđını yaőadılar. Alakgnlllkle, bu ayrıcalıklı duyunun bilim tarihinde ođu zaman yanıltıcı olduđunu dőnyorum. İnsan yceliđi konusunda ahlak da byle bir konumda yer aldıđından dolayı “Ahlak insana zg mdr?” őphesine kapılmadan geilmeyecek bir yola oktan girmiőtim. Bu yol bize apaık ayrımların (clear-cut distinctions), siyah-beyaz ikiliklerin (dichotomy) yerine trler arası devamlılık (continuity across species) sunuyor. Ahlak kurallarını sorgulamanın, dođru ile yanlıőı ayırt etmeye alıőmanın ve yeni ahlak kuramları inőa etmenin bize dođal bir grng olarak ahlakın dođası hakkında pek bir őey anlatmayacađını dőnyorum. Ahlakı dođal bir grng olarak ele aldıđımızda, yalnızca insanlarla ilgili olsa bile, ncelikle neden yalnızca insana zg olması gerektiđini sormamız gerekiyor. Dolayısıyla, bu soru beni ahlakın dođasını evrim bađlamında anlamaya alıőmaya yneltti. Yani, ne iyidir ne ktdr gibi bir tartıőmaya girmedim, dolayısıyla metaetik bir alanda pozisyon aldım. Bu alıőmanın baőlıđından da anlaőılacađı zere insan harici hayvanlarla insan hayvanlar arasındaki iliőki iin, aralarındaki farkı gzeterek yeni bir ereve izmeyi amaladım. Bu ereve ahlaka duygu temelinde bir yaklaőımla őekillendi. İnsan ile insan harici hayvan arasındaki iliőki iyice aık kılındıđında ahlak alanının iine insan harici hayvanların da dahil edilme

olanağının açılabilceğini fark ettim ve bunu göstermeye çalıştım. Bir makânın, karşısındaki makânın elektrik şokuna maruz kalmaması için aç kalmayı—hem de iki hafta boyunca—seçmesini ahlak benzeri davranış olarak açıklamamız makul mudur? Elektrik şokunun acı verdiğini bilen ve karşısındakinin acı çekmesini istemeyen— yemekten alıkoyulmak gibi kendi çıkarına ters düşse bile—bir canlıdan bahsediyoruz. Bu davranışı açıklamamız için hayvanın sadece davranışını değil, deneyimlediği duyguları da hesaba katmamız gerekiyor. Dolayısıyla iddiam, duyguların açıklanmasını gerektiriyor. Bunu yapmadan önce nasıl bir ahlak modelini takip etmem gerektiğini bulmam gerekiyordu. İnsan harici hayvanlara ahlakı atfedeceksem evrimsel bir perspektiften yararlanmam uygun görünüyordu. Ancak evrimsel perspektif ile ahlakı açıklamaya çalışan birçok bilim insanı dahi, insan harici hayvanlarda rastladıkları davranışları ahlaki davranış yerine ahlak benzeri davranışlar (moral-like behaviors) olarak tanımlamaktadırlar. İşte tam da bu nedenle bu tezde sadece geleneksel rasyonel (ussalcı) etiği savunanları değil, aynı zamanda Joyce, Keltner, Prinz, Ayala ve Searle gibi hem doğalcı etiği savunanları hem de onu insanlarla sınırlayanları eleştirmeyi amaçladım. “İnsanların davranışları ahlaki, insan harici hayvanların davranışları ahlak benzeri ise böyle bir ayrımı sağlayan şey nedir? Bir davranışa ahlaki davranış atfetmenin koşulu nedir?” gibi sorular etrafında tezim şekillendi. Ahlakın geleneksel tanımı insanla sınırlı bir tanımdır. Bu tezi yazmam için öncelikle bu tanımı bir şekilde yetersiz ya da hatalı bulup yeni bir tanım ortaya koymam gerekiyordu. Ancak tanım vermek o kadar kolay değildir. Neredeyse tüm tezi kapsayan bir çalışmanın sonucu olacaktır. Dolayısıyla ikinci bölümde geleneksel tanımlardaki sorunlara değindim ve ahlakın neliği üzerinden evrimsel kökenlerini inceledim. En temel sorun tanımın döngüsel olmasıydı. Ahlak, rasyonel (ussal) canlılar tarafından uyulan birtakım kurallar bütünü, davranışlar olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Rasyonel olma özelliği sadece insana atfedildiğinden dolayı ahlak insana özgüdür gibi bir sonuç çıkmaktadır. Bense bu davranışların rasyonel olmakla ilgili olup olmadığını sorgulamak niyetindeydim. Rasyonalite yerine daha içsel bir mekanizma ahlakı ortaya çıkarabilir mi? Bunun imkanını göstermeye çalıştım. Evrimsel mekanizmayı anlamaya çalışırken özgecilik (altruism) ve işbirliği (cooperation) gibi davranışlar sıklıkla karşıma çıktı. Bu

davranışlar sanki otomatik davranışlarmış gibi hayvanlarda olağan şeyler olarak görülüyordu. Ancak hayvanlar da tıpkı insanlar gibi her zaman özgeci davranışlarda bulunmuyorlar. Bencil davranışlarda bulunup sadece kendi çıkarları için davranışta bulunabiliyorlar. Tabii bu davranışları bir bedel ödemelerini gerektiriyor. Bu bedel ise bireyleri çevreleyen grup tarafından belirlenmiştir. Hem güvenlik hem de beslenme açısından özgeci davranışta bulunmak uzun süreli yarar sağlarken, bencil davranmak kısa süreli yarar sağlasa da güven kaybı, gruptan dışlama, erzak sunulmama gibi durumlarla sonuçlanıyordu.

Sober'ın (1988, p. 83) dediği gibi “bencil olmak daha iyidir, ancak özgecilerin arasında yaşamak bencillerin arasında yaşamaktan daha iyidir.” Yani bencilce davrandığımız takdirde kısa vadede avantajlı olsak da uzun vadede dezavantajlı konuma düşeriz. Peki bu düşünceyle mi hareket ediyoruz? İnsanları ve hayvanları her zaman bencilce davranmamaya—her zaman özgeci de değiliz sonuçta—iten nedir? Bu konuda bize yardımcı olacak kavramlardan biri önemdir (care). Önem anne ile çocuk arasında başlar. Annenin çocuğuna dair temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılaması, güvenliğini sağlaması, zarar görmesine engel olması önem vermesi sayesinde. Hayvanlar da tıpkı insanlar gibi önemseyen canlılardır. Bunun otomatik davranışlar olduğu iddia edilse de pek çok çalışma hayvanlardaki önemseme davranışlarının beyinde insanlara benzer hormonların (oksitosin, serotonin gibi) salgılanarak ortaya çıktığını göstermiştir.

Hayvanlar sadece önemseyen canlılar değil, aynı zamanda yapılan ihlallere karşı ceza veren, hatta anlaşmazlıklarda uzlaşmaya varan canlılardır. Cezalandırma her zaman doğru davranış olmayabilir, uzlaşma daha makul olabilir. Gruptan dışlamak, ceza verip karşımıza almak yerine ortak noktada buluşabiliriz. Hatta öyle ki hayvanlarda üçüncü şahıslar tarafından problem çözme (third party reconciliation) bile vardır (de Waal, 2016). Yani iki birey arasında ortaya çıkan sorun kendileri arasında çözülemediğinde, soruna dahil olmayan üçüncü bir şahıs sorunu çözerek uzlaşma sağlar. İnsanlarda sıkça tanık olduğumuz böyle bir durumun hayvanlarda olması bizi ilk başta şaşırtsa da hayvan davranışlarının

otomatik olmadığını, belli motivasyonlar ve görüler ile sağlandığını kabul edebiliriz. Üçüncü şahıslar tarafından cezalandırma olmadığını söyleyerek hayvanlarda ahlakın imkanını ortadan kaldırmaya çalışanlar olmuştur (Keltner et al., 2006), ancak üçüncü şahıslar tarafından uzlaşmanın daha üst düzey bir durum olduğunu söyleyerek bu iddiayı geri çevirebiliriz.

Ahlak literatürünün büyük bir kısmını kaplayan Aristoteles ve Kant etiğinin hayvanların davranışlarını açıklamak için pek elverişli olmadığını düşündüğüm için Hume'un ahlak anlayışını benimseyerek geleneksel ahlakın dışında bir ahlak anlayışı geliştirmeye çalıştım. Bu çalışma ahlakın nasıl olması gerektiğinden ziyade, ahlakın doğasını ve nasıl işlediğini anlama üzerinden yürütülmüştür. Bunun sonucunda ahlaki kurallara akılla ulaştığımız, davranışta bulunurken sürekli aklımızı kullandığımız bir şey değil de daha derin, içsel bir mekanizma ile ulaştığımız bir şey olan duygular olduğu kanaatine vardım. Bu sonuç, biz ahlaki davranışta bulunurken aklımızı kullanmıyoruz anlamına gelmiyor. Aksine davranışlarımızı açıklamak, davranışlarımızı doğrulamak, neden öyle yaptığımız konusunda gerekçe bulmak ve sorgulamak için aklımızı kullanıyoruz. Ancak en temelde düşünerek değil, hissederek davranıyoruz. Bunun evrimsel olarak basit bir sebebi var: gündelik hayatta sürekli davranışlarımızı haklı çıkarmak ya da düşünerek harekete geçecek kadar uzun vaktimiz yok. Daha kısa sürede harekete geçmemiz gerekiyor. Duygularımız bize evrimsel olarak bu konuda avantaj sağlamış oluyor. “Bu davranışın doğru ya da yanlış olduğunu *hissediyorum*” diyebiliyoruz. “Bu yanlıştır” düşüncesine eşlik eden duygulara neden sahibiz? sorusu oldukça ilgi çekicidir. Bu sebeple tezimin ilerleyen bölümlerinde duyguların doğasını da anlamaya çalıştım. “Duygular nasıl bir şeydir, bizi nasıl harekete geçirir, nasıl bir işleve sahiptir, hepsinin ayrı bir işlevi var mı yoksa ortak bir işlevden bahsetmek mümkün müdür?” gibi sorular etrafında duygular bölümü şekillendi.

Düşüncelere eşlik eden duygular hakkında sıklıkla adı geçen bir deney var. Deneyde deneklere verilen soru ve alınan cevaplar şu şekilde: Rayından çıkmış bir tramvay, şu anki rotasında ilerlerse önündeki beş kişiyi öldürecek. Onları

kurtarmanın tek yolu, tramvayı beş yerine bir kişiyi öldürecek alternatif bir raya çevirecek bir düğmeye basmaktır. Bir kişi pahasına beş kişiyi kurtarmak için düğmeye basar mıydınız? Çoğu denek bu soruyu evet olarak yanıtlıyor (Greene ve diğerleri, 2001, s. 2105). Düğmeye basarak beş kişinin ölmesi yerine kurtarılmış olması mantıklı geliyor. Ancak tramvay deneyinde bazı değişiklikler yapıldığında deneklerin kararı şaşırtıcı bir şekilde değişir. Bu sefer yaklaşan tramvay ve beş kişi arasında, rayları aşan bir yaya köprüsünde irice bir yabancının yanında duruyorsunuz. Beş kişiyi kurtarmanın tek yolu, bu yabancıyı köprüden aşağıya, raylara itmektir. Bunu yaparsan yabancı ölecek, ancak vücudu tramvayın diğerlerine ulaşmasını engelleyecek. Bu yabancıyı ölüme iterek diğer beş kişiyi kurtarır mıydınız? Çoğu denek bu sefer hayır olarak yanıtlıyor (Greene ve diğerleri, 2001, s. 2105). Sonuç aslında aynı olsa da—bir kişi yerine beş kişiyi kurtarmak—yanıtlar değişiyor. Çoğu kişi iri insanı itip öldürmenin ahlaki açıdan uygun olmadığını düşünüyor. Sonuçlar, faydacılığın her zaman işe yaramadığını gösteriyor. Peki bu iki deney arasında değişen nedir? İlkinde beş kişiyi kurtarmak doğru iken, ikincisinde neden doğru olmadı? Greene ve diğerleri, (2001) bu durumu duyguların belirlediğini söylüyor. Düğmeye basarak beş kişiyi kurtarabilirsiniz. Ancak bir kişiyi iterek öldürmek o kadar kolay alınabilen bir karar olmayacaktır, dolayısıyla duygular insanların ahlaki yargılarını etkilemiş olacaktır.

Davranışlarımıza eşlik eden bir duygu varsa, bu durumda öncelikle yapılması gereken duyguların doğasını, işlevini araştırmaktı ki tezin 3. bölümünde bunları irdeledim. Duyguların işlevini ve doğasını, duygular hakkında ortaya atılan kuramlar üzerinden inceledim. Duygular hakkındaki ilk modern tanımı William James yapmıştır. Ona göre duygu, olguların algılanmasıyla bedende meydana gelen değişiklikler ve bu değişikliklere ilişkin hislerimizdir (1889, p. 189-190). Bu duyguların özelliklerinin ve işlevlerinin tanımını yapan ilk kişi ise Paul Ekman olmuştur. Ekman, duyguları temel duygular olarak tanımlamış ve duyguları bu şekilde açıklamıştır. Ona göre, bu duyguların kendine has özellikleri vardır. Ancak duyguların yine de her biri bazı ortak özelliklere sahiptirler: Duyguların kendine has yüz ifadeleri vardır. Duygular ayırt edici

fizyolojik özelliklere sahiptirler. Duygular, hayatta kalmak için temel yaşamsal ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere evrimleşmişlerdir. Duygular kısa sürer, ortaya çıkması için farkındalık gerektirmez ve kaçınılmazdır, ne hissedeceğimizi seçemeyiz. Her duygu yaşamsal ihtiyaçları karşılamak üzere farklı adaptif (uyarlanımsal) işlevlere sahip olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Örneğin korku, tehdidin tespiti ve müdahale ile tehlikeden kaçınmayı sağlamak için, öfke tehdit ve ihlale karşı davranışları motive etmek için, tikslenme ise enfeksiyon risklerini, zehirlenmeleri azaltmak için belirli şeylerden kaçınma tepkisi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Ekman'dan sonra duyguların işlevi ve özellikleri hakkında psikolojik, biyolojik, sosyal yapısalcı, bilişsel, melez gibi çeşitli kuramlar gelişmiştir. Duygu reaksiyonları ve duygu ifadeleri, duyguların somatik/bedensel yönlerine vurgu yapar. Psikolojik duygu kuramları genellikle duyguların ya bedensel yönüne yahut bilişsel yönüne vurgu yapar. Ancak bilişsel kuramlar bedensel/somatik kuram ile çelişir, yani bilişsel kuramlara göre beden önemsizdir. Elbette bu, bir duygu ortaya çıktığında bedensel bir değişiklik olmadığı anlamına gelmez; bunun yerine, duygu ve düşüncenin güçlü bir şekilde bağlı olduğu ve biyolojik ve psikolojik duygu kuramlarının aksine, vücudun bu ilişkide önemli bir rol oynamadığı anlamına gelir. Örneğin korku, bir tehlikenin var olduğu ve bu tehlikeden kaçınmak için eşlik eden bir istek olarak tanımlanabilir. Biyolojik kuramlar söz konusu olduğunda, evrimin hayatta kalma (ve/veya üreme) avantajı sağlayan duyguları seçtiği ve eğer evrim bedensel değişiklikleri tespit etmek için bize duygular verdiyse, o zaman bedensel değişiklikleri tespit etmenin hayatta kalma avantajı sağladığı söylenebilir. Duygular, biyolojik kuramlar açısından, atalarımızın karşılaştığı, çeşitli sorunları çözmek için gelişmiştir. Sosyal yapısalcı kuram, duyguların sosyal olarak inşa edildiğini savunarak biyolojik kuramlara karşı çıkar. Buna göre duygular öğrenilebilir, dönüştürülebilir, yenilenebilir, sosyal olarak inşa edilebilir ve kültürel olarak değişkenlik gösterebilirler.

Bu kuramların duyguları farklı yorumlamalarının dışında başka önemli bir noktası da duyguları farklı sınıflandırıyor olmalarıdır. Kimileri bazı duygular sosyal, bazıları değildir diye ayırım yaparken, kimileri böyle bir ayırımı reddeder. Kimileri temel duyguların sosyal duygulara dönüşen farklı bir versiyonu olduğu görüşünü savunur. Ben duygunun bilişsel olmayan, bedensel bir reaksiyon olduğu görüşündeyim. Ancak kognitif olmayan bu görüş duygunun beyindeki nöronların aktivitesinden bağımsız olduğu anlamına da gelmez. Kategorik ayırım konusundaki görüşlerimi de 5. bölümde tartıştım.

Bunları inceledikten sonra duygu ile ahlak arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamaya çalıştım. Ahlak aslında sadece ürettiğimiz, kurduğumuz, yapılandırdığımız bir şey değil, bir arada yaşayabilmenin zorunlu koşuluydu. Sosyal canlılar olarak bir arada yaşamak istiyoruz—ki bu aslında o kadar kolay bir şey değil. İsteme kavramını istenç, özgür irade gibi kullanmıyorum, bir arada yaşamaya meyilli olduğumuzu anlıyorum. En temel içgüdülerimizden biri olan “güvenlik hissi” bizi diğerine muhtaç kılıyor, bir arada olmaya itiyor. Gruba ait olmaya, uyumlu olmaya, kurallara uymaya zorluyor. Eğer bunları yapmazsak gruptan dışlanırsınız ve en temel güvenlik ihtiyacından mahrum kalırsınız. Bunları bilinçli bir şekilde düşünüp, buna göre hareket ettiğimizi düşünmüyorum. Bu davranışlarımızın içsel bir açıklamasının mümkün olduğunu düşünüyorum. Doğduğumuz andan beri “diğeri”ne ihtiyaç duyuyoruz. En güvenli sığınağımız, ilk güven mekânımız annemizdir. Bu tezi evrimsel, natüralist (doğalcı) bir açıdan ele almamın temel sebebi bizim bu ihtiyacımızı diğer türlerle—en azından memelilerle, sosyal canlılarla—paylaşıyor oluşumuz. Diğer sosyal canlılar da güvenlik ihtiyacı duyduğu için gruba ait olmak, dışlanmamak *istiyor*. Dışlanmamak için grubun kurallarına uyuyor, “uyumlu” oluyor. Kurallara uymayan, tıpkı bizim yaptığımız gibi cezalandırılıyor. Bu durumda tezimin belki de en can alıcı sorusu ortaya çıkıyor: İnsan harici hayvanlarda ahlakın imkanından bahsetmek mümkün müdür? Ahlaki davranışta bulunurken rasyonel bir şekilde, düşünerek hareket ettiğimizi sanırsınız. Ancak ahlaki davranışlarımıza, düşüncelerimize eşlik eden güçlü bir şey var: duygu. 4. bölümde ahlaki davranışlarımız sadece düşüncelerimizden meydana geliyorsa, ahlaki davranışlarımıza ek olarak

duygular neden ortaya çıkıyor? sorusunu hedef alarak duyguların ahlaki davranışlarımızdaki önemine açıklamaya çalıştım.

Eğer duygular ahlaki davranışları üretiyorlarsa, bunların hangi duygular olduğunu da söylemek gerekiyor. Tüm duygular mı yoksa bazı duygular mı? Bu konuda tamamen olmasa da neredeyse ortak görüş suçluluk duygusunun istisnasız her durumda ahlaki bir duygu olmasıdır. Peki suçluluk duygusunu diğer duygulardan ayıran, kendine özgü durumu neydi? Suçluluk duygusu bu tez için zorlu imtihanlardan biri oldu. İlki, suçluluk duygusu hayvanlarda var mı? ikincisi, eğer yoksa hayvanlarda ahlaktan bahsedemez miyiz? Diğer duyguları yetersiz mi sayacağız? Öncelikle hayvanlardaki duyguları insan duygularıyla benzer olup olmadığı şüphesinden kurtulmamız gerekiyor. Hayvanların davranışlarını değerlendirirken sözlü bir dile sahip olmadıklarından dolayı yararlandığımız ilk kaynak davranışlarıdır, davranışlarını izler, değerlendirir ve yorumlarız. Gözlemlediğimiz ve yorumladığımız kadarıyla sosyal durumları düzenleme konusunda hayvanlarla pek çok ortak davranış sergilemekteyiz. Hayvanların davranışlarında görülen ilgi çekici benzerlik sadece görsel bir benzerlikten ibaret değildir. Bu konuda ayrıca deneysel olarak pek çok çalışma yapılmış ve duygulanım sırasında fMRI cihazlarında beyinleri görüntülenen hayvanlarda ve insanlarda benzer bölgelerin aktif olduğu ve benzer davranışlar sergiledikleri birçok kez test edilmiştir. Aynı duygunun benzer hisler üretip üretmeyeceği sorunu sadece insan-hayvan ikiliğinde değil, insanlar arası durumlarda da devam etmektedir. Dolayısıyla fMRI sonuçlarının insan-hayvan duygu benzerliğini göstermez diyenlerin, insanlar için de böyle bir benzerliği kabul etmemesi gerekir. fMRI cihazlarında görülen beyin aktivitelerinin ortaklığı, bu aktivitelerin duygu kısımlarının ortaklığı ve bu duyguların benzer davranışlara sebep olması tesadüf değil, insanlarla hayvanların davranışlarındaki evrimsel bir yakınlığa işaretir.

Sosyallik, temel duyguların başkalarıyla birlikte olmayı gerektirmesi anlamında *doğal olarak* duygulara dahildir. Ancak sosyal duygular ve sosyal olmayan duygular diye ayırım yapıldığı takdirde duyguların sosyallığı içerme durumu göz

ardı edilmiş olur. Dolayısıyla, duyguların sosyal olmadığını, ancak tüm duyguların sosyal bağlamı içerdiğini, bu da duyguların hem sosyal hem de sosyal olmayan bağlamda ortaya çıkabileceği anlamına geldiğini öne sürerek bir adım daha ileri gidiyorum. Yani, duygulara temel, temel olmayan, sosyal, sosyal olmayan, ahlaki olan ya da ahlaki olmayan olarak yapılan kategorik ayrımlardan vazgeçmeyi öneriyorum. Bu öneri hem duyguların kendi karakteristik özelliklerini dışlamıyor, hem de duyguların ortak bir özelliği paylaştığına dair kapsayıcı bir analizi mümkün kılıyor. Yani sosyal, sosyal olmayan gibi keskince ayrılmış duygular yoktur; duygular bu özellikleri belirli bir bağlam içinde kazanırlar. Bu özellikler kategorik bir ayrım üretmezler; bu nedenle, örneğin tikslenme ile ahlaki tikslenme, öfke ve ahlaki öfke arasında böyle bir ayrım yoktur. Yaşanılan tek bir duygu vardır ve bu duygu, farklı bağlamlarda sosyal ya da sosyal olmayan bir şekilde ortaya çıkar. Tüm duygular, sosyal tehditleri tanımak, tespit etmek ve bunlarla başa çıkmak için oldukça hassastır. Duyguların tehditlere yanıt verebildiği göz önüne alındığında, bilişten herhangi bir yardıma gerek yoktur. Yani, başkalarını kurtarmak için her zaman başkalarını düşünmek zorunda değiliz; duygular bu gereksinimi karşılamak için yeterlidir. Duygular, ilk olarak, hayatta kalma ile ilgili ihtiyaçları karşılamak için adaptif (uyarlanımsal) işlevlere sahip olacak şekilde evrilmişlerdir. Ancak sosyalleşme sonrasında duygular yeni işlevler kazanmıştır. Duyguların eksaptasyon (exaptation) yoluyla yeni bir işlev kazandığını öne sürüyorum. Böylelikle duygular sosyalleşme sonrası yeni sosyal problemlerle başa çıkmak için de ortaya çıkmış oldu. Örneğin iğrenme, başlangıçta enfeksiyon risklerini azaltmak için gelişti, ancak daha sonra sosyal mesafeyi koruma yahut kaçınma işlevine hizmet etmek için sosyal bir durumda şekillendi. Bu nedenle, iğrenme, çok daha geniş bir uyaran yelpazesine yanıt verecek şekilde genişlemiştir. Belki de iğrenmenin saflık normları ahlaki normlara dönüştürülmüştür. Prinz (2004) normlara epistemik olarak duyarlı olduğumuzu ifade eder. Bense normlara doğal olarak duyarlı olduğumuzu düşünüyorum ki tüm bu duygu durumları da bunu destekler niteliktedir.

Ayrıca ahlaki ve ahlaki olmayan iğrenme gibi belirgin duyguların olmadığı kanısındayım. Çünkü, öncelikle, temel (yani ahlaki olmayan) tiksinden ve ahlaki tiksintinin ayırt edici bedensel ifadeleri yoktur. İnsanlar her iki durum için de aynı yüz iğrenme ifadelerini göstermektedirler. Bu tiksinden sosyalleşme ile yeni durumlarda da ortaya çıkmasının bir göstergesidir, başka bir duygunun ortaya çıkmasının değil. Dahası, ahlaki olan ve ahlaki olmayan duyguların ayırt edici psikolojik durumları yoktur. Temel iğrenme ve ahlaki iğrenme gibi iki farklı duygu olsaydı, bunların duygusal deneyimleri de farklı olurdu. Sözde ahlaki iğrenmenin hissedildiği yer bile, sözde temel iğrenmenin hissedildiği yer ile aynıdır: mide. Şiddetli bulasıcı hastalığı olan biriyle, ahlaki bir suç işleyen biriyle benzer şekilde uzak kalmayı tercih ediyoruz. Her ikisi için de mide bulantısı gibi itici duygular geliştirdik. Örneğin, sözde birincil iğrenme, belirli şeylerden kaçınmayı motive ederken; ahlaki iğrenme, belirli ahlaki ihlal türlerinden kaçınmayı motive eder. Moll ve diğerleri (2005, s. 69), duyguların öznel deneyiminin beyin alanlarını fMRI ile test ettiğinde, deneklerin temel iğrenme ve ahlaki iğrenme ile ilgili durumlarda beyinlerinde aktive olan bölgelerin kısmen örtüştüğünü sonucuna ulaştılar. Bu durumların hepsi, temel iğrenme ve ahlaki iğrenme için ayırt edici olmadığını gösterir ve böyle bir durum için yeni bir duygu olmadığı için ahlaki duygular diye farklı duygular olmadığı iddiamı desteklemiş olur. Hayvanların ve insanların davranışlarındaki çarpıcı benzerlik bu bakımdan sadece görsel bir benzerlik değildir. fMRI cihazlarında gözlemlenen beyin aktivitelerinin ve duygu alanlarının ortak olması ve bu duyguların benzer davranışlar üretmesi tesadüf değil, evrimin bir sonucudur. Bu nedenle, biyolojimiz bizi bir şeyleri önemsemeye bu şekilde itti. Belki de bazı şeylere değer veriyoruz çünkü evrim bizi bu şeylere önem vermeye itti. Yine de “hayvanlarda ahlak vardır” ifadesinin kuşkusuz doğru olduğunu iddia etmiyorum. Bu tezde, sadece hayvan ahlakının olanağını tartışmaya çalışmış oldum.

Bir duygu sosyal bir bağlamdan kaynaklanıyorsa, o duygu yine de kendine yönelik veya başkasına yönelik olarak ortaya çıkabilir. Suçluluk kişinin kendisi veya başkası için hissedilebildiği gibi, korku da kendisi veya başkası için

hissedilebilir. Sosyal bağlam, bireyin ve diğerlerinin yaşadığı ortak çevrede meydana geldiğinden ve kişinin davranışları bu etkileşimde geliştiğinden, bireylerin deneyimleri ve davranışları etkilenir. Otomatik tepkiler ve refleksler bu ortamdan bağımsız değildir. Bu yüzden bireyler ve çevre arasındaki etkileşimi bilişle değil, duygularla açıklamaya çalışıyorum.

Bireylerin belirli bir sosyal çevre içinde sosyal statü kazanması nedeniyle, yaşadığı sosyal çevre oksitosin gibi hormonların üretimini uyarır. Sosyal çevre hormonlara geri bildirim vererek hormonlar ve bireyin davranışları arasındaki ilişkiyi tetikler (Oliveira, 2005, s. 481). Sosyal bağlam, hormon seviyeleri ve sosyal davranış arasında üçlü bir ilişki vardır. Duygu, bağlamsal bilgiyi işlemeye yöneliktir; buna göre, duygusal tepkiler bağlama duyarlı tepkiler olarak kabul edilir. Bireydeki hormonların dalgalanan seviyesi, sosyal çevredeki davranışların çeşitliliğini sağlar. Hormon seviyelerindeki küçük bir değişiklik bile bireyler arasındaki sosyal etkileşimi etkileyebilir. Anne-bebek ilişkisi, anne şefkatini çocuğuna yansıttığından ve sempatisini paylaştığından, yüz mimikleriyle somutlaştırılmış iletişimde de gelişti. Dolayısıyla, sosyal uyaranların tereddüt etmeden benlikte somutlaşmış tepkiler ortaya çıkardığını söyleyebiliriz. Hayvanların, sosyal bağlamda hormon seviyelerindeki artışa göre davranışlarını değiştirmeleri kolaylaşır. Duygular, sadece deneyimin karşı tarafa aktarılmasını sağlamaz, aynı zamanda deneyimlerin paylaşılmasını da mümkün kılar. Duygu, çevre hakkında bilgi taşıdığı için, aynı ortamı paylaşan diğer kişilerle sosyal olarak paylaşılmış olur; bu bilgi duygunun doğasında bulunan bedensel olarak dışa vurma özelliği aracılığıyla başkalarına aktarılabilir. Duygunun bedensel ifadesi birey tarafından karşı tarafa iletilir ve bu ifade aynı ortamı paylaşan başka bir birey tarafından algılanır. Başka bir bireyin duygu durumumuzu algılaması, o kişinin kendisini de benzer duygu durumunda bulmasına neden olabilir. Bu etkileşim, sonuç olarak, bu bireyler arasında başka bir etkileşime yol açabilir. Duygunun yaşamsal ve sosyal işlevleri, duygunun doğasını oluşturan ayrılmaz bütünün parçalarıdır. Duygunun ortaya çıktığı sosyal bağlamın izleri, aynı zamanda insan olmayan hayvanlarda da izlenebilir. Sosyal bağlam, aynı ortamı paylaşan bireyler tarafından içselleştirilme potansiyeline sahiptir. Birey ve çevre

etkileşime girdiğinde, bireyin bu etkileşimde hissettiği duygu kalıcı olarak sosyal bağlama gömülü olur (Brian Parkinson & Manstead, 1993, s. 315). Çevrenin bireylerin davranışlarını değiştirmesi hakkında ilginç bir örnek de Porto Riko, Cayo Santiago Adası'nda meydana gelmiştir (Testard ve diğerleri, 2021). 2017'de adada kasırga meydana gelmiş ve adada bulunan resus makaklarının davranış değişikliğine sebep olmuştur. Kitlesele ölümlere sebep olan kasırga sonrasında, makakların daha çok sosyal bağ kurmaya çalıştıkları gözlemlenmiştir. Kasırgadan önce daha uzak mesafelerde yaşayan makaklar, daha yakın mesafelerde yaşamaya başlamışlardır. Ayrıca ikili ilişkilerini de geliştirmişlerdir. Tımarlamaya daha çok zaman ayırmaya ve daha çok kişiyi tımarlamaya başlamışlardır.

Başka bir bireyin duygusal tepkisini gözlemleyen bir birey, benzer bir duygusal deneyimi paylaşmaktadır. Bunun nedeni ise, duygusal deneyim sırasında bireyin beyinde aktive olan nöronların, duygusal deneyime tanık olan diğer bireyin beyinde de yanmasıdır. Duygu deneyiminin paylaşılması esnasında iki bireyde de aktif hale gelen bu nöronlara ayna nöronlar denir. Bu nöronlara ilk olarak primatlarda rastlanmış ve diğerlerinin hareketlerini algılamak için gerekli oldukları düşünülmüştür. Yani ayna nöronların primatların otomatik davranışlarının sebebi olarak görülmüştür. Ancak ayna nöronlar bundan çok daha fazlasıdır. Primatlardan sonra bu ayna nöronlara insanlarda da rastlandığında, bu nöronların işlevinin otomatik davranışlar üretmek olduğu değil, bilakis diğerinin davranışını anlamak ve ona göre davranmak üzere geliştiği ortaya çıkmıştır. Ayna nöronlar, bir bireyden diğerine bir kanal gibidir, başkalarının davranışlarını anlama yeteneğinin bir kaynağı olarak ifade edilebilir. Ayrıca ayna nöronlar, gözlemlenen eylemin sosyal bağlamından etkilenebilir (Brown & Brüne, 2014, s. 196). Ayna nöronların bağlama duyarlı özelliği, duygusal durumlarımız ile başkalarının duygusal durumlarının somutlaşmış deneyimi arasındaki yakın ilişkiyi anlamak için önemlidir. Dolayısıyla duygular, somutlaştırılmış etkileşim olarak sosyal bağlamı içermelidir. Ayna nöronlarla ilgili olarak farelerle yapılan bir çalışma örnek gösterilebilir (Atsak ve diğerleri, 2011). Kafese konulan iki fareden birine elektrik şok veriliyor. Elektrik şoku

verilen fare fiziksel tepki olarak donakalma reaksiyonu gösteriyor. Korku duygusu tipik olarak donakalma reaksiyonunu ortaya çıkarıyor. Diğer fareye elektrik şoku verilmiyor, o sadece izleyici konumunda. Deneyin ilginç kısmı burada başlıyor. Sadece izleyen fareye elektrik şoku verilmediği halde o da donakalma reaksiyonu gösteriyor. Yani izleyici farede de korku ortaya çıkmıştır. Elektrik şoku verilen farenin duygusu, onu izleyen fareye de geçmiş oluyor, yani duygu paylaşılmış oluyor. Elektrik şoku verilen farenin donakalma tepkisi aslında yardım çağrısı olarak okunabilir. Çünkü kafesin içerisinde kapalı kalmış ve elinden bir şey gelmiyor. Ancak izleyici fare de kafesin içerisinde kalmış ve o da başka bir şey yapamıyor. Bu deneyi “zihin okuma” olarak da yorumlayabiliriz, korku gibi temel bir duygunun sosyal bir bağlamda diğerine aktarılmış ve paylaşılmış olarak da görebiliriz. Ancak kesin olan bir şey var ki o da iki farenin de aynı deneyimi paylaşmış olmasıdır.

Ahlaki dediğimiz olguların tümü aslında sosyaldir, ancak daha sonra bazılarını ahlaki olarak adlandırmaya başladık. Demek istediğim, duyguların aslında hiçbir ahlaki içeriği yoktur. Bağlamı duygularımız aracılığıyla sosyal, sosyal olmayan veya ahlaki olarak tanımlarız. Buna bağlı olarak, sosyal ve ahlaki arasındaki farkın sadece bir derece meselesi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ayrıca Nichols'un (2004) yapmaya çalıştığı gibi, ahlaki ve sosyal kurallar arasında net bir ayrım yoktur. Bu kurallar, kültürel düzenlemenin izin verdiği bağlama göre değişir. Öldürmekten kaçınmak en derinden tutunduğumuz norm olarak karşımıza çıkarken, başka bir durumda ise savaşta öldürmek övgüyle karşılanır. Dolayısıyla, ahlaki-sosyal ayrımın gerçek bir ayrım değil, yapay, ürettiğimiz bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bütün bu tez bu ayrımın yapaylığını reddeden bir şekilde yürütülmüştür. Ahlakın ayrı bir kategori olduğu iddiası aslında teorize edilmiş ve sonradan bir düşünce olarak entelektüelleştirilmiştir, gerçek bir duruma karşılık gelmez bu açıdan. Dolayısıyla, duyguların ne sosyal ne de sosyal olmadığı göz önüne alındığında, bir duygu özünde ahlaki ya da ahlaki olmayan olarak tanımlanmamalıdır. Duyguları ancak bireyin içinde bulunduğu ortamdaki bir bağlamla ilgili olarak yorumlayabiliriz. Bireyin yaşadığı bir

duygu, farklı bir bağlamda hala aynı duygudur; reaksiyon da aynı reaksiyondur. Duygu, bu bağlamı oluşturan ve kişinin onu nasıl anladığını belirleyen şeydir. Bir hayvan belirli bir davranışı gerçekleştirdiğinde, o hayvanın o davranış hakkında bir değerlendirme yaptığını düşünmek akla yatkın görünmektedir. Bu bakımdan davranışlar, hayvanlarda ahlaki yargıyı uygulayabileceğimiz ve atfedebileceğimiz yerdir. Hayvanların davranışlarına ahlaki davranışlar diyebilmemiz için gerekli olan şey nedir? Bu soruyu sormamın sebebi, bu davranışların yalnızca insanlarla sınırlı olması gerektiği fikrine katılmıyor olmamdır. Çünkü hayvanlara sosyal davranış atfedilirken, ahlaki davranış atfedilmez. Halbuki ahlaki davranışlar da sosyal davranışlardır. Bu sebeple, ahlaki sosyallikten ayırt edecek bazı içsel özellikleri aramak yerine, ahlakın sosyal işlevine odaklanmamız gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Bu anlamda ahlak, bir sosyal hayvan popülasyonunda sosyal düzenleme üretir. Ahlakın işlevini incelediğimizde bu açıkça gözlemlenebilir. Hayvan ahlakı ile, Bölüm 1'de incelemiş olduğum ahlak benzeri davranışları kastetmiyorum ve birebir insan ahlakını da kastetmiyorum. İşlevsel olarak insan ahlakı ve hayvan ahlakı aynı olduğunu düşünüyorum: Sosyal düzenin sağlanması, korunması, güvenlik gibi temel ihtiyaçlardan alıkoymama, toplumdan dışlanmama için uyulan belli kurallar bütünü ve daha fazlası da değil. Bu kurallara uyulacak davranışlarda bulunulduğu takdirde de ahlaki davranışta bulunulmuş olur.

Hayvanlara ahlak atfetmek için bazı kriterleri karşılaması gerektiğini düşünenler, ahlaki yargıda bulunma, ahlak öznesi olma kriterleri getirirler. Hayvanların en azından sözlü olarak ahlaki yargılarda bulunmalarını beklememeliyiz. Hayvanlar kendi davranışlarını veya başkalarının davranışlarını bizim yaptığımız gibi değerlendirmeyebilir. Peki ahlaki yargıda bulunma kriterini başka türlü bir açıklamaya başvurarak karşılayabilir miyiz? Bu soruya evet cevabını verebilmek için, bu konuda Hume'un felsefesinden yararlanmayı uygun gördüm. Yani, ahlaki yargıların sadece sözlü olarak ifade edilen, önermeler şeklinde olması gereken bir şey olarak değil de önermesel olmayan, psikolojik bir tutum olarak da açıklanabileceğini düşünüyorum.

Hume'un felsefesini hatırlayacak olursak, ona göre ahlak akıldan türetilemez. Hume, aklın, eylemi veya duyguyu ne engelleyebileceğini ne de üretemeyeceğini iddia eder (2007, T.3.1.1.8). Akıl, doğruluk ve yanlışlık ile ilişkilidir. Ahlak ise doğruluk ve yanlışlıkla ilgili olamaz, aksine, onaylama veya onaylamama ile ilişkilidir. Bu bakımdan eylemlere doğruluk ya da yanlışlık atfedilemez. Dolayısıyla, ahlak kuralları da akıldan türetilmez ve bize yalnızca ahlak ile ilgili "ne" ya da "nasıl" sorusunu verir. Akıl, yalnızca neden böyle davrandığımızı keşfetmek için kullanılan yetidir. Ahlaki yargılar doğruyu veya yanlışlığı içermez. Çağdaş bir perspektiften, Hume'un, ahlaki yargıların olguları ifade eden ve doğruluk açısından değerlendirilebilir olan önermeleri ifade ettiği iddiasını reddeden, aksine bilişsel ve önermesel olmayan bir bakış açısı benimsediğini iddia edebiliriz. Çünkü, Hume'a göre, ahlaki yargı, olguları tanımlayan ve doğruluğu değerlendirilebilir önermeleri ifade etmez; daha ziyade duyguları ifade eder. Bu anlamda belirli bir duygunun hissedilmesiyle ahlaki bir yargıya varılır ve buna göre belirli duygu, ahlaki yargı açısından onaylanma veya onaylanmamayı içerir. Dolayısıyla ahlaki yargılar olguları tanımlamak ya da doğruluğunu değerlendirmek yerine, bilişsel ve önermesel olmayan, belirli bir duygunun ortaya çıkması sonucunda meydana gelen psikolojik tutum olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Duygular aracılığıyla verilen kararları alırsak, ahlaki yargıların önermesel olmayan onaylama veya onaylamama temeline dayandığı sonucuna ulaşabiliriz. Belirli bir duyguyu hissederek ahlaki bir yargı mümkün kılınıyorsa, buna göre, bunun önermesel olmayan ahlaki yargı olduğunu görebiliriz. Duygusal ifadelerin ürettiği yargıyı tanımak ve başkalarına iletmek için söze dökmek zorunda değiliz. Ahlaki bir önermenin bir tutumu ifade etmesi gibi, duygusal bir bedensel ifade de bir tutumu ifade edebilir.

Ahlaki yargılara bilişsel olmayan bir açıdan açıklayarak çalışmamı destekleyen biri de Haidt'dır. Ona göre (2001, p. 814) ahlaki yargılar hızlı ve otomatik görülerin/sezgilerin (intuition) bir sonucudur. Öne sürdüğü bu iddiasını desteklemek için şöyle bir düşünce deneyi yapar ve insanlara sorar: İki kardeşin korunarak seks yapmaları—yani hiçbir şekilde sağlıklı çocuklar dünyaya gelmeyecek—hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Deneye katılan insanlar bunun

iğrenç olduğunu ve ahlaki olarak da yanlış olduğunu ifade ederler. Evrimsel olarak birinci dereceden (anne-çocuk, baba-çocuk) ve ikinci dereceden (kardeşler) yakın akrabaların seks yapmaları halinde hastalıklı doğan çocuklardan ötürü kaçınma durumu gerçekleşmiş ve zaman içerisinde enstet normu haline gelmiştir. Norm halini almadan evvel zaten tikslenme duygusu ile bireyler bu durumdan kaçınmış oluyorlardı. Sonrasında ise norm haline geldiği için günlük hayatta sebebi düşünülmeden yanlış olduğu yargısına varılır. Haidt, kardeşlerin fiziksel ya da psikolojik olarak kesinlikle zarar görmediklerini, sağlıksız çocukların dünyaya gelmeyeceğini, hatta böyle bir sırrı paylaşmalarının birbirlerine daha yakın hissetmelerini sağladığını söylese bile denekler bunu kesinlikle kabul etmezler. Deneklere bunun sebebi sorulduğunda “Bilmiyorum, nedenini açıklayamıyorum, ama yanlış *görünüyor*” diye cevaplarlar. Haidt bu durumu, yani hiçbir sorun olmasa dahi ortada bir sorun olarak görünen bu durumu açıklamak için *sosyal görüş modelini* öne sürer. Bu modele göre görüşlerimiz ahlaki yargılarda bulunmamızı açıklamaya yönelik bir girişimdir. Yani görüşlerimiz ahlaki yargılara yol açar. Akıl yürütmeyi ise sadece bu görüşlerimizi haklı çıkarmak için yaptığımız girişimler olarak yorumlar. Yani ahlaki yargıların oluşması için, rasyonaliteye, bilince, akıl yürütmeye ihtiyacımız yok. İçsel deneyimlerimiz bunu zaten *doğal bir şekilde* ortaya çıkarıyor.

Hayvanların bizim sahip olduğumuz bir dile sahip olmadığı açıktır. Bununla birlikte, hayvanların sahip olduğu ve bunu açıkça göstermeye çalıştığım birçok özelliği var. Ayrıca, iletişimin ve ahlaki yargıların sözlü dil olmadan da duygusal ifadelerle sağlanabileceği görüşünü bir örnekle açıklamaya çalışacağım. İki şempanze arasında gerçekleşen tımarlama yalnızca birbirlerinin parazitlerin ortadan kaldırmak için değildir. Tımarlama, aynı zamanda karşılıklı olarak yürütüldüğü için bir tür sosyal bağ oluşturmaktadır. Tımarlama karşılıklı bakımı temsil etmesinin yanı sıra güveni de temsil eder ve bireyler arasındaki sosyal etkileşimi sürdürmek için iyi bir zemindir. Taraflardan biri tımarlamayı reddettiğinde bu güvenin kötüye kullanılması olarak yorumlanabilir. Tımarı reddedilen, tımarlamayı reddeden diğeriyle kurduğu ilişkisinin bozulduğunu fark eder. Böyle bir durumda da hayvanların çığlık atma, bu bilgiyi etrafındakilere

yayma gibi tepkilerle gözlemlenebilir. Bu davranışları bir nevi değerlendirme olarak düşünebiliriz. Şempanzelerin tımarına karşılık bulunmamasına dair tepkisinin konuşma öncesi iletişimsel bir dil olabileceğini öne sürmek oldukça akla yatkın görünüyor. Dolayısıyla bir hayvan, ele alınan durumu el hareketleriyle açıklamaz veya tarif etmez, ancak çığlık atarak tepki verebilir. Burada bir çeşit şikayet olduğunu söyleyebiliriz, diğerinin karşılık vermediğinden ötürü şikayet. Tımarın karşılık bulmamasından dolayı tepki gösteren şempanzenin davranışı sözlü bir dil içermeyen bir ahlaki yargıya neden karşılık gelmesin? Ortada karşılıklı tımarlanma kuralına karşı bir ihlal ve bu ihlalden doğan bir tepki var. Bu durum şu soruyu akla gelebilir: Şempanzelerde bizim yaptığımız türden ahlaki yargıların yokluğunda bile onları ahlaki davranışlar sergiliyor diye yargılayamaz mıyız? Kanaatimce, şempanzelerin bu davranışlarının, davranışlarına rehberlik eden sözel olmayan bir ahlaki değerlendirme olarak önerilebileceğini düşünüyorum. Aksi, fazlasıyla antropomorfik (insanbiçimci) olurdu. Hatta hayvanların kendi ahlaki sistemlerini oluşturduklarını bile söyleyebiliriz. Ahlaki davranış olarak nitelendirilen diğer her şeye sahip görünüyorlar. Bence hayvan ahlakını inkar edenlerin iddiaları, hayvan ahlakının bizimkilere tam olarak uymadığı gerekçesine dayanıyor. Hayvanlar ahlaki bir sistem oluşturmazlar bile, yine de onun bir parçası olabilirler.

Tezimin literatüre katkısı şu şekilde ifade edilebilir: Hayvan duyguları, hayvan davranışları ve hayvanlarda ahlak sorunu ile ilgili çalışmaların önünü açmayı ve literatürde böyle bir eksikliği fark edip bu boşluğu doldurmayı hedefledim. Ayrıca hayvan ahlakı konusuna, hayvan bilinciyle değil, duygularla inceleyen bir perspektiften yaklaştım. Hayvanlarda ahlakın varlığını kabul etmek isteyenler dahi hayvanlarda karşılaştıkları bu tür davranışları ilkel ahlak ya da ahlakın yapı taşları olarak tanımlamayı tercih etmişlerdir. Bense bu davranışlara hayvan ahlakı demek niyetindeyim. Peki ben hayvanda ahlak vardır deme cüretinde bulunduğumda ne yapmış oluyorum? Hayvan ile insan tastamam aynıdır mı demiş oluyorum? Hayır, elbette fark var. Ancak diğer insanları anlamaya çalışırken de bu farkı göz ardı ediyoruz. Yoksa diğerinin duygularının varlığını

hiç yokmuş gibi görmezden gelmiş olacağız. Gördüğümüz ilk şey davranışydı, ancak bilgisine eriştiğimiz şey de duygularıyla bu davranışların gerçekleşiyor oluşudur. Sanıldığıının aksine bu davranışlar otomatik değildir. Hayvanlarının yapabileceklerinin sınırı da oldukça geniştir, tıpkı primatologların sürekli karşılaştıkları ve hala şaşırdıkları gibi beklenmedik oyunlara gelebiliriz. Dilin bizi oldukça ileri bir aşamaya getirdiği aşikar. Ürettiklerimizin sınırı olmayacak, ürettiklerimizi yok saymıyorum, ancak konu bu değil. Eğer dilin ahlak üzerindeki etkisinden vazgeçemiyorsak, duygunun dilsel özelliğine bakmamız gerekiyor. Bu ne demektir? Duygular sosyalleşme öncesinde her ne kadar hayatta kalma, üreme, tehdit ve enfeksiyon riskinden korunmak olsa da duyguların çok önemli bir özelliği var: bedensel olarak duygunun ifade edilmesi. Duyguyu yaşayanın etrafında biri olsa da olmasa da sanki karşı tarafa aktarması gerekiyormuşçasına bedensel olarak duygunun bilgisi dışı vurulur. Bu bakımdan duygunun iletişimsel (communicative) ve bilgi taşıma özelliği açısından sözel olmayan bir dilsel yönü olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu bilgiye erişen diğeri ise diğerini kurtarmak ya da korumak üzere harekete geçiyor.

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