KARADENİZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY * INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PHD PROGRAM

TRANSFORMATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 1945-2020

PhD DISSERTATION

Ekrem OK

NOVEMBER-2024

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Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgür TÜFEKÇİ

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APPROVAL

Upon the submission of the dissertation, **Ekrem OK** has defended the study **"Transformation of Humanitarian Intervention: A Comparative Perspective, 1945-2020"** in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at Karadeniz Technical University and the study has been found fully adequate in scope and quality as a thesis by **unanimous** vote on **18/11/2024**.

Committee Member		Decision		Signature
Title - Name and SURNAME	**Mission**	**Accept**	**Refuse**	
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November, 2024 Ekrem OK

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ABSTRACT

One of the leading controversies in international relations over the last few decades is the question of "what is to be done when a state is unwilling or unable to stop a humanitarian crisis within its territory?". The concept of humanitarian intervention emerged as a possible solution to this question, and it implies a military intervention by a third-party country or a group of countries, or an international organization in the internal affairs of a country with a group of people suffering from human rights violations with or without target states' consent. It is noteworthy that after the Cold War, there was an increasing willingness amongst academics, states and non-governmental organizations to address humanitarian issues. They began to breach the wall of non-interference and attach less importance to the concept of national sovereignty. On the other side, post-Cold War interventions mainly relied on manpower, and interveners carried out missions beyond providing security. For that reason, many regarded the post-Cold War period as the "golden age" of humanitarian intervention. However, this post-Cold War period paradigm has no longer persisted. A significant transformation occurred in the methods of humanitarian intervention towards the late 1990s and in the state interests regarding intervening in humanitarian crises by the early 2000s. The main research question of this dissertation is how and why the nature of humanitarian intervention has transformed, particularly regarding state interests and intervention methods. To address this question, this research analyzes eleven cases of humanitarian intervention between 1945 and 2020 using a comparative research analysis method, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative research methods. At the end of the analysis, this research concludes two significant transformations in humanitarian intervention regarding intervention methods and state interest. The first transformation concerns the intervention methods, characterized by the replacement of manpower with airpower as the main intervention method and the narrowing in the scope of the interventions. The second transformation is the decline in state interest regarding intervening in humanitarian crises, leading states to adopt a more cautious and reluctant approach.

Keywords: Humanitarian Intervention, The Transformation of Humanitarian Intervention, National Sovereignty, Human Rights, Non-Interference

ÖZET

“Bir devlet, kendi topraklarında yaşanan bir insani krizi durdurmak istemediğinde veya durduramadığında ne yapılmalıdır?” sorusu, son yıllarda uluslararası ilişkilerin önemli tartışma konularından biri haline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda, insani müdahale kavramı, söz konusu soruya olası bir çözüm olarak ortaya çıkmış ve üçüncü bir ülkenin, bir ülkeler grubunun veya uluslararası bir örgütün, hedef devletin rızası olup olmadığına bakılmaksızın, ciddi insan hakları ihlallerinin yaşandığı bir ülkenin iç işlerine askeri müdahalede bulunmasını ifade etmektedir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, akademisyenler, devletler ve sivil toplum kuruluşları insani meselelere giderek artan bir ilgiyle eğilmişlerdir. Bu süreçte, “müdahale etmeme (non-interference)” duvarında gedikler açılmış ve “ulusal (national sovereignty)” kavramına daha az önem atfedilmeye başlanmıştır. Aynı dönemde, gerçekleştirilen insani müdahalelerin büyük ölçüde kara gücüne dayandığı, müdahalecilerin ise güvenlik sağlamanın ötesinde çeşitli misyonlar üstlendiği görülmüştür. Bu nedenlerle, birçok kişi Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemi insani müdahale konseptinin “altın çağı” olarak tanımlamıştır. Ancak, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki bu paradigma günümüzde artık devam etmemektedir. 1990’ların sonlarına doğru insani müdahale yöntemlerinde, 2000’lerin başında ise devletlerin insani krizlere müdahale etme konusundaki ilgisinde önemli bir dönüşüm yaşanmıştır. Bu tezin temel araştırma sorusu, insani müdahalenin niteliğinin, özellikle devletlerin ilgisi ve müdahale yöntemleri açısından, nasıl ve neden değiştiğidir. Bu soruya yanıt bulabilmek için çalışma, 1945-2020 yılları arasındaki on bir insani müdahale örneğini, hem nitel hem de nicel araştırma yöntemlerini içeren karşılaştırmalı analiz yöntemiyle analiz etmiştir. Analizin neticesinde bu araştırma, müdahale yöntemleri ve devlet ilgileri açısından insani müdahalede iki önemli dönüşüm tespit etmiştir. İlk dönüşüm, müdahale yöntemlerinde gerçekleşmiş olup, ana yöntem olarak insan gücünün yerini hava gücünün aldığını ve müdahalelerin kapsamının daraldığını ortaya koymaktadır. İkinci dönüşüm ise insani krizlere müdahale etme konusundaki devlet ilgisinin azalmasıyla ilgilidir; bu durum, devletlerin daha temkinli ve isteksiz bir tutum benimsemesine yol açmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsani Müdahale, İnsan Hakları, İnsani Müdahalenin dönüşümü, Ulusal Egemenlik, Müdahale etmeme

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Apodeti	: Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia
AQI	: al-Qaeda in Iraq
AU	: African Union
CENTCOM	: United States Central Command
CJTF-OIR	: Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve
CPPCG	: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Daesh	: al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham
EO	: Executive Outcomes
ECOWAS	: Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
Fretilin	: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
ICC	: International Criminal Court
ICISS	: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
INTERFET	: International Force East Timor
IS	: Islamic State
ISF	: Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JJT	: Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
KLA	: Kosovo Liberation Army
KRG	: Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq
KVM	: Kosovo Verification Mission
LAS	: League of Arab States
LDK	: Democratic League of Kosovo
MPR	: Indonesian Parliament
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	: Non-governmental organizations
NTC	: National Transitional Council
OIC	: Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPC	: Operation Provide Comfort

OUP	: Operation Unified Protector
PRIF	: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
R2P	: Responsibility to Protect
RUF	: Revolutionary United Front
RPF	: Rwandese Patriotic Front
SLA	: Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	: Sierra Leone People’s Party
SDF	: Syrian Democratic Forces
SRC	: Supreme Revolutionary Council
TNI	: Indonesian Armed Forces
UCDP	: Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UDT	: Timorese Democratic Union
UNAMET	: United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIR	: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	: UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNLF	: Uganda National Liberation Front
UNMIK	: United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNOSOM	: United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	: United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNITAF	: Unified Task Force
UNTAET	: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
ZHS	: Zone Humanitaire Sûre

INTRODUCTION

One of the leading controversies in international relations over the last few decades is the question of “what is to be done when a state is unwilling or unable to halt a humanitarian crisis within its territory?” (Hehir, 2010: 11) or “what if a country creates such a crisis?” To clarify by metaphors, “should we intervene if a criminal attempts to harm a neighbor’s children and the father is incapable of stopping the criminal?” or Archibugi (2004: 3)‘s metaphor, “should we intervene if our neighbor’s husband beats up his wife?”. The concept of humanitarian intervention emerged as a possible solution to this dilemma. It implies a military intervention by a third-party country or a group of countries, or an international organization in the internal affairs of a country with a group of people suffering from human rights violations with or without target states’ consent.

Although some problems in practices and some state’s efforts to follow their interest under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention led to an erosion in the reliability of the concept and the justification of interventions, it is clear that powerful states who have the potential to intervene are called to intervene in most humanitarian right violations. Unfortunately, states that have the potential to intervene do not have a standardized set of criteria to determine whether or not to engage in interventions. As a result, a state may prefer to intervene in one state with human rights violations while preferring not to intervene in another state facing a similar situation. This dichotomy shows us that the decision to intervene or not to intervene is influenced by multiple factors, from politics to economics as well as humanitarian motives.

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, some radical changes occurred in the international system. The concept of international security has become more diverse; not only military matters but also social, economic, environmental and humanitarian matters have become subjects of security. The concept of humanitarian intervention was also one of those affected by this wave. Humanitarian intervention gained increased attention during the 1990s. Academics, states and international organizations began to breach the wall of non-interference and attach less importance to the concept of national sovereignty. The sanctity of national sovereignty was reduced, and the opinion that all states have a “responsibility to protect” human rights gained more attention. After the Cold War, there was an increasing willingness amongst great powers, rising regional powers and non-governmental organizations to address human rights violations.

International organizations became more organized and focused on human right violations after the Cold War. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were less inclined to veto resolutions about humanitarian issues (O'Hanlon & Singer, 2004: 78). In the first decade after the Cold War, interventions mainly relied on manpower and were not just limited to providing security; like in East Timor and Somalia, interveners undertook a wide range of tasks, including building roads and civic centers, holding elections, and vaccinating children.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

This dissertation is built on the following hypotheses: the humanitarian intervention paradigm observed during the post-Cold War period has no longer persisted. A significant transformation occurred in intervention methods of humanitarian intervention towards the late 1990s and in state interests regarding intervening in humanitarian crises in the early 2000s. The main research question of this dissertation is how and why the nature of humanitarian intervention has changed, particularly regarding state interests and intervention methods. Moreover, in light of the current transformational trends, how might humanitarian interventions look in the future?

The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze the transformation of humanitarian intervention, with a particular focus on state interests and intervention methods. It aims to provide a comprehensive explanation of the underlying reasons and motivating factors behind this transformation and, lastly, to project the future of humanitarian interventions in light of current transformational trends.

Limitations and Scope

"Transformation" is a broad and multifaceted concept; that is why this dissertation restricts the analysis to only two aspects of transformation. The first aspect is the transformation in the methods of humanitarian intervention. In simpler terms it is about how humanitarian interventions are conducted in the field. The difference between how they intervened in 1990-2000 and how they have intervened since 2001. The second aspect is the transformation in the state's interest in intervening militarily in human rights violations. To get straight to the point, are the states willing to engage in humanitarian issues as in 1990-2000, or are they more cautious and reluctant? Are the permanent members of the UNSC still less inclined to veto resolutions about humanitarian military intervention or vice versa? This dissertation also limits the time interval for selecting the cases. The time period of the study will be limited between the beginning of the Cold War and the first two decades of the twenty-first century, namely 1945-2020. This period is selected to analyze the first and second transformations following the Cold War and after 2001, respectively.

Methodology

The time-period of this study is subdivided into three distinct time intervals: Cold War Period: 1945-1990, Post-Cold War Period: 1990-2000 and Post-9/11 Period: 2001-2020 (See, Figure 1). All periods were separated by momentous events - the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks- that ushered in a new era in International Relations. Comparing cases from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War Period will show the paradigm after the Cold War. Comparing cases from the Post-9/11 Period to those from the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods will highlight the differences and similarities in interventions and help to determine the transformation in humanitarian intervention regarding state interest and intervention methods.

Figure 1: Visual Illustration of Time Intervals



Cases in these time intervals are selected according to identified case selection criteria, and these cases, likewise, are examined according to the case examination criteria. Identifying the case selection criteria is a critical stage of the research process because there is no generally accepted definition and criteria for humanitarian intervention. According to Simon Duke (1994: 27), humanitarian intervention appears to have two prerequisites. First, there must be a human rights violation, which must be proven; second, this violation must shock human consciences and humiliate the international community.

Moreover, taking the principles of the just war tradition as a model, Paul Christopher (1996: 112-114) set out four criteria sufficient for determining the permissibility of humanitarian intervention: just cause, proportionality, last resort, and public declaration by lawful authority. Daniel Archibugi (2004) argues that the International Law Commission would draft guidelines to determine which case has a humanitarian emergency, and the UNSC would approve it.

On the other hand, Wheeler (2000: 52) asserts that no example of intervention since 1945 meets all these criteria, and it does not make sense to think that future interventions will. Due to this lack of consensus, this study sets out its own criteria for selecting the cases. The selected cases will be examined according to case examination criteria using a comparative analysis method, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative research approaches in this dissertation.

Case Selection Criteria

Before determining if an intervention is humanitarian, it is necessary to define the concept of humanitarian intervention. After concluding on a definition, it can be decided whether it is the case or not. However, as in all other social science concepts, building a consensus on a definition of humanitarian intervention is challenging. On the other hand, it is possible to reach some common criteria from these definitions. This study determined five criteria for case selection. Four of these criteria were based on other definitions, while the last one is specific to this study (See, Table: 1).

The first criterion is the "humanitarian emergency". There must be a humanitarian emergency in the target country. This criterion differs humanitarian intervention from military interventions with other stimuli. The second criterion is that the target country must be unwilling or unable to halt the humanitarian crisis within its territory, or it must be among the creators of the crisis. This criterion separates humanitarian intervention from humanitarian aid or relief. The third criterion is that the intervention should be conducted through military instruments. This criterion distinguishes humanitarian intervention from non-military attempts. The fourth criterion is that the intervention must have a humanitarian dimension. This criterion separates humanitarian intervention from other military operations.

The last criterion distinguishes this dissertation from other forms of humanitarian intervention definitions. Intervention without the consent of the target country is frequent in many definitions (see, Hehir, 2010; Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003; Roberts, 2001). However, this dissertation does not necessarily require lack of consent to classify it as humanitarian. Instead, it prefers "with or without consent". In other words, this dissertation could also regard the interventions with consent or invitation as a case, in addition to those conducted without consent. Lack of consent is not required for an intervention to be considered humanitarian (See, Figure 2). The 1992 Somalia, 1994 Rwanda and 2000 Sierra Leone interventions are proper examples of intervention with consent. However, a sub-question is required to accept a case in interventions with consent. In such cases, the perpetrator of the crisis must be a non-state actor. This sub-question is about the state's inability to halt the humanitarian crisis. If a country is unable to stop a humanitarian crisis within its borders, it may consent to other countries stepping in to do so.

Table 1: Case Selection Criteria

Case Selection Criteria					
Cases	First criterion (Humanitarian emergency)	Second criterion (State's inability or unwillingness)	Third criterion (military intervention)	Fourth criterion (Humanitarian Dimension)	Fifth criterion (consent)

Figure 2:Flowchart Regarding Fifth Criterion



Case Examination Criteria

Humanitarian intervention is a comprehensive concept. It is possible to analyze this concept from many perspectives. As highlighted in the literature review section, many studies examine humanitarian intervention in various ways. However, this dissertation sets specific limits on the cases examined to avoid becoming overwhelmed by the extensive amount of information. Therefore, this dissertation is limited to two transformations in humanitarian intervention and will not extend beyond these. The first is the intervention methods, specifically how the states intervene in the field, and the second is the state's interest in militarily intervening in human rights violations within the borders of another country.

The primary examination criterion for the first transformation (intervention methods) is to analyze the role of manpower and airpower. In other words, is their role “main” or “assist”? This will serve as the key indicator of the transformation of intervention methods. The second examination criterion is to assess the intervener’s manpower strength. This will reveal the trend in manpower - whether it has increased or decreased- from 1945 to 2020. The third criterion is to clarify the scope of the interventions. This is another crucial indicator of the transformation in intervention methods. The last criterion is the casualty figures, which will indicate whether the transformation in intervention methods has had a positive effect on casualties. In summary, the table of examination criteria for the first transformation is as follows.

Table 2: Case Examination Criteria for the First Transformation

Case Examination Criteria for Intervention methods					
Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties

In the second transformation, a state’s interest in militarily intervening in human rights violation will be analyzed in the context of UNSC resolutions. The UNSC resolutions are one of the best indicators of states’ attitudes towards humanitarian issues and how these attitudes have evolved over time. The first examination criterion is the “number of sessions”. The number of UNSC meetings focused on the examined case provides important data about state interests. The second criterion is the number of drafted and adopted resolutions. The data regarding “drafted resolutions” and “adopted resolutions” are crucial as they indicate both the UNSC’s interest in the case and the level of consensus or controversy among its members. Another criterion is whether the UNSC describes the pre-intervention situation as “a threat to peace and security.” This recognition by the UNSC is crucial for demonstrating the severity of the situation and paving the way for intervention. If the UNSC declares a situation within a country as a threat to peace and security, it signifies that immediate action is required to address the threat. The fourth criterion is the existence of UNSC authorization. Authorization represents UNSC’s clearest and strongest support. However, as the final criterion, in the absence of UNSC Authorization, the lack of UN condemnation or disapproval regarding the intervention can be perceived as indirect support. In summary, the table of examination criteria for the second transformation is as follows.

Table 3: Case Examination Criteria for the Second Transformation

Case Examination Criteria for the Stata Interests						
Interventions	Number of Sessions	Drafted Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention

Literature review

In conducting a comprehensive review of the existing literature on humanitarian intervention, it is beneficial to categorize existing literature under three main categories: (1) the theoretical studies of humanitarian intervention, (2) case studies related to humanitarian intervention, and (3) the transformation of humanitarian intervention over time. Figure 3 highlights the most frequently recurring keywords in the literature on humanitarian intervention. The co-occurrence analysis of keywords presented in Figure 3 reveals the primary topics and emerging trends within this field of study. As shown in Figure 3, theoretical studies constitute the largest portion of the humanitarian intervention literature. Since humanitarian intervention is closely tied to the principle of national sovereignty in international law and the prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter, theoretical debates on the concept remain central in literature. Some scholars have contributed to the literature through comprehensive theoretical handbooks that explore and analyze both the concept of humanitarian intervention and specific examples of interventions (A. J. Bellamy & Dunne, 2016; Hehir, 2010; Pattison, 2010; Tesón, 2003; Weiss, 2016; Wheeler, 2000).

Figure 3: Co-Occurrence Analysis of Keywords in Humanitarian Intervention Literature[1]



The theoretical debate on humanitarian intervention centers on the tension between sovereignty and intervention. This dichotomy is mainly about whether humanitarian reasons justify overriding state sovereignty. The traditional understanding of sovereignty, rooted in the Westphalian system, emphasizes non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Some scholars share this perspective, arguing that humanitarian intervention challenges the principle of sovereignty. For example, Ayoob (2002: 81) contends that respecting state sovereignty is essential for maintaining international order. Shen (2001: 9) argues that humanitarian intervention is used to justify overriding the principle of non-intervention without a solid legal or moral basis. He views it as a tool for sustaining dominance and supremacy. Humanitarian intervention was not criticized solely for contradicting national sovereignty. Ok & Tüfekçi (2022) summarized the arguments against intervention into three main categories: the problem of abuse, the problem of futility, and the problem of legality.

The problem of abuse refers to the exploitation of humanitarian intervention for ulterior motives. In other words, states may misuse humanitarian intervention to pursue their political,

[1] All studies on humanitarian intervention in the Web of Science are exported. Minimum number of occurrences of a keyword is four.

economic, or strategic objectives under the guise of altruism. Shen (2001: 10) argues that although there are bona fide actors, the debate over the permissibility of humanitarian intervention essentially revolves around interests, power, and dominance. The most compelling evidence for this claim is the inconsistent responses of states to countries facing similar conditions. For example, as Weiss (1994: 61) pointed out, the situation in Somalia prompted an international response, whereas neighboring Sudan, which experienced equally severe suffering in 1992, did not.

The problem of futility refers to the possibility that humanitarian intervention may cause more harm than good. The most recent example is the 2011 intervention in Libya, which was supposed to halt a humanitarian crisis but deepened it (Ok & Tüfekçi, 2022: 92). Kuperman (2013a: 134) argues that the intervention in Libya significantly worsened security and humanitarian suffering both within Libya and in neighboring regions. Lastly, the problem of legality refers to the absence of a legal foundation for humanitarian intervention under international law. Under international law, the only lawful uses of force are self-defense or interventions carried out with the host state's consent or authorization from the UNSC.

On the intervention side of the theoretical debate regarding sovereignty, arguments typically center on two main points: humanitarian intervention does not breach sovereignty, or sovereignty may be justifiably overridden when human rights are at stake. For example, Duke (1994: 35) argues that humanitarian intervention does not threaten a state's territorial integrity or political independence. In fact, it could be considered under Chapter VII provisions, as severe human rights violations pose a threat to international peace and security. For this reason, it would not be a violation of the target state's sovereignty. Moreover, the view that intervention to relieve suffering may be morally justifiable, even if not legal, has been increasingly voiced by scholars, especially after the 1990s (Hehir, 2010; Krieger, 2007). Tesón (2005b: 147) also argues that sovereignty should not be permitted to be used by tyrants as a shield against intervention in cases of human rights violation.

The intervention front was broader than merely countering arguments against humanitarian intervention. The core of the discourse within the pro-intervention camp focuses on ethical considerations. As Fine (2007: 81) asks, should the international community remain passive in the face of atrocities like genocide and ethnic cleansing, particularly when intervention is feasible? Many proponents of intervention argue that, regardless of legal constraints, there is a moral obligation to act to protect civilians from genocide and mass atrocities (A. J. Bellamy & Wheeler, 2014: 481). Failure to fulfill this moral obligation can lead to catastrophic consequences. For instance, Mirza (2020: 6) argues that a timely and coordinated international intervention might have prevented the Rwandan genocide. However, not intervening resulted in devastating consequences for the Rwandan population.

This moral obligation to intervene has led some scholars to frame humanitarian intervention within the context of the Just War theory, which provides a framework for the legitimacy of war. For instance, Walzer (1997: 107) argues that humanitarian intervention is justified when it responds to acts that “shock the moral conscience of mankind” and has a reasonable likelihood of success. Fixdal & Smith (1998), contend that all concerns raised by humanitarian intervention fit within the just war framework. Similarly, Davenport, (2011) argues that saving innocents from crimes against humanity is a *“just cause”* for war. Fiala (2007) also tests the Iraq intervention with the JWT. He argues that it was unacceptable to use military intervention to bring democracy because the absence of democracy is not a just reason to resort to war. On the other hand, Tüfekçi (2018) argues that even if an intervention meets Just War criteria, it does not guarantee positive outcomes.

Just War theory, however, is not the only theory through which humanitarian intervention is examined. Since the realist perspective asserts that altruism and moral values have no place in international relations, realists are skeptical about humanitarian justifications. According to Mason & Wheeler (1996), consequentialist realism opposes humanitarian intervention for four reasons. First, there is no universal consensus on the definition of oppression or the circumstances under which humanitarian intervention is justified. Second, any rules for humanitarian intervention are prone to misuse for ulterior motives. Third, predicting the success of an intervention or estimating its costs is impossible. Lastly, even when interventions succeed, they may fail to prevent future oppression or may result in the emergence of new forms of oppression. Moreover, Fiott (2013) challenges the view that realism is inherently opposed to humanitarian intervention, arguing that this perspective emerged from particular historical contexts and the ideas of specific thinkers. Tesón (2003) presented a liberal argument for humanitarian intervention, asserting that non-interventionism is both morally and practically indefensible. Archibugi (2004) proposes a cosmopolitan framework to address questions such as when intervention is necessary, who determines its necessity, how it should be executed, and who should carry it out. From a feminist perspective, Cudd (2013) argues that humanitarian interventions often reinforce masculine norms. As a result, interventions in states with systemic discrimination against women can worsen conditions for women, even when peace is achieved.

The second part of the literature focuses on case studies of humanitarian intervention. While theoretical perspectives offer valuable frameworks for understanding the concept, case studies are examined to explore the practical implementation of these ideas. Analyzing case studies not only tests the validity of existing theories but also uncovers new theoretical insights and emerging trends in intervention practices. In literature, post-1990 interventions dominate case studies. Figure 3 highlights Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Libya, and Syria as the most frequently examined cases in humanitarian intervention studies. These case studies cover a wide range of perspectives offering a variety of analyses on humanitarian interventions.

The most common types of case studies analyze whether the intervention qualifies as humanitarian and analyze its outcomes. For example, Clarke & Herbst (2012) argue that intervention in Somalia ended poorly, with troop casualties and unachieved goals. Steinke (2015) contends that the intervention in Kosovo significantly contributed to the development of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine by saving tens of thousands of lives. Roth (2006) argues that the 2003 intervention in Iraq does not qualify as a humanitarian intervention, as humanitarian concerns were not the primary motive, nor was there a humanitarian emergency. Kuperman (2013a) examined the intervention in Libya and argued that it worsened humanitarian suffering and increased regional instability. By analyzing Libya and Ukraine interventions, Tkachuk & Tufekci (2024) argue that both have imperialist aims, whether overt or covert. They contend that both are imperialist humanitarian interventions designed to prioritize the interests of the interveners. Based on the analysis of intervention outcomes in the 1990s, Seybolt (2007) argued that future efforts should prioritize enhancing the chances of success to justify humanitarian interventions.

While these are the most common types of analyses, case studies are not confined to them; other studies examine a broader range of issues. For instance, some scholars investigate individual countries' policies on humanitarian intervention. For example, Averre & Davies (2015) analyzed Russian policies and argued that while Russia does not reject the principles of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it challenges the Western liberal interpretation of R2P by criticizing its implementation. Bucher et al. (2013) compared the news media in Germany and France to examine how media coverage influenced foreign policy decisions regarding the intervention in Libya. Choi (2013) analyzed US interventions and argued that they align more closely with liberal perspectives, asserting that the primary purpose of intervention is to protect the rights of victims. Davis (2011) examined China's policy on humanitarian intervention and challenged the notion that China's stance is absolutist. He argued that China supports interventions authorized by the UN Security Council and consented to by the target state. Newman (2021) examined the UK's Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention and argued that, in exceptional circumstances, the UK considers interventions without the consent of the target state or authorization by the UN Security Council to be permissible. Singh (2020) analyzed India's stance on humanitarian intervention and argued that, while initially cautious, India became a proponent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) after adopting its "three-pillar principles" in 2009. However, the Libya intervention prompted India to advocate for greater restraint in the use of force under R2P. Gerhards et al. (2024) analyzed public attitudes toward humanitarian interventions and argued that citizens in modernized countries with post-materialist values support human rights but oppose enforcing them through military force.

Some scholars focus on the methods of intervention employed by interveners. Byman & Waxman (2000) argue that the use of air power during the Kosovo intervention played a pivotal role in compelling Belgrade to surrender. Contrary to the view that Belgrade's surrender was driven by the threat of a ground invasion, Stigler (2003) claimed that the decisive factor was the threat of intensified aerial bombardment. Moreover, Arkin (2001) describes the Kosovo intervention as “the most precise application of air power in history.” Conversely, Agüera (2001) criticizes the overreliance on air power, arguing that it damaged Serbia’s infrastructure, failed to prevent ethnic cleansing, and caused significant collateral damage. Barrie (2012) argued that air power was decisive in Libya’s intervention, enabling the rebels to defeat Gaddafi’s better-equipped and trained forces. Similarly, Lambeth (2021) contends that air power dominance in Iraq and Syria allowed Iraqi and Syrian ground forces to dismantle ISIS effectively. Meanwhile, Gizelis & Kosek (2005) and Pashakhanlou (2017) emphasize the significance of local participation in humanitarian interventions. They argue that for effective reconstruction and peacebuilding, it is crucial to involve local communities. A lack of local participation can potentially lead to cognitive dissonance among the local population, which in turn, may undermine the long-term success of humanitarian efforts.

The third section of the literature focuses on studies related to the transformation of humanitarian intervention. A consensus appears among researchers on the transformation in humanitarian intervention with the end of the Cold War. Because the end of the Cold War pushed the rivalry between the two superpowers into the background, the international community became interested in other issues. The subject of security was diversified; non-military matters, such as society, global warming, economy, and humanitarian crises, started to be both subjects of security and issues that attracted the international community’s interest. This transformation is also reflected correspondingly in UN Operations. Kenkel (2013) provides a comprehensive analysis of the transformation in UN peace operations. Additionally, the works of Brzezinski (1991), Buzan (1997), and Dockrill (2005) offer valuable insights into the broader transformation of international security. These scholars critically examine the shift in priorities and approaches, emphasizing the need for a more nuanced understanding of security in the post-Cold War era.

The works regarding humanitarian intervention’s transformations mainly focus on the first transformation after the Cold War. For example, Weiss (1994) states that, in the post-Cold War period, especially since the Iraq intervention, a growing number of analysts and members of international communities began to be convinced that there is a right to intervene for humanitarian reasons. Barnett (2005) also focuses on two ways humanitarianism has been transformed: the first one is that its purpose has been politicized. The humanitarian actors have a closer relationship than before with politicians. The second is the institutionalization of humanitarianism, namely, to work more professionally than before. The reason, he argues, for this transformation is significant changes in the environment around humanitarianism.

O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) point out the international community’s increasing willingness after the Cold War to resolve humanitarian crises. The permanent members of the UNSC were less inclined to veto resolutions about humanitarian military intervention, rising powers in regions with humanitarian problems were more willing to do their part, and governments and international organizations made considerable efforts. Therefore, the international community's military capacity for intervention should be increased to meet this increasing demand. Walling (2015) indicates the changes in the concept of state sovereignty caused by human rights norms. Bagaric & Morss (2005) argue that humanitarian intervention should become, more systematically, a task on nations, a categorical imperative (a philosophical concept of Immanuel Kant). Otherwise, states will act based on their interests, and in cases where there is no state interest, people will suffer.

In conclusion, the literature on humanitarian intervention is a complex and deeply contested field. However, significant attention has been given to the post-Cold War period, and very few works specifically focus on developments and transformations in humanitarian intervention after 2000. As international dynamics evolve with emerging powers, changing norms, and new forms of conflict, further research is needed to understand how these changes have influenced the principles, practices and intervention methods of humanitarian intervention in the twenty-first century. Addressing this gap would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary humanitarian intervention and its future course.

CHAPTER ONE

1. UNDERSTANDING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXT

As a controversial concept of the last few decades, humanitarian intervention stems from ethical concerns about whether to intervene in cases of mass human rights violations, genocide, or other atrocities within an independent country. Although humanitarian intervention is not a new phenomenon, its visibility increased significantly in both theoretical and practical contexts after the Cold War. There was a growing willingness among academics, states, and non-governmental organizations to address humanitarian issues. States, international organizations, and scholars began to challenge the principle of non-interference and placed less emphasis on the concept of national sovereignty. The inviolability of national sovereignty was diminished, and the idea that all states have a "responsibility to protect" their people from human rights violations gained greater recognition. Great powers, emerging powers, and international organizations were more interested in and increasingly willing to address humanitarian crises.

Unfortunately, controversy is also apparent regarding the definition of humanitarian intervention. As in all other social science concepts, a generally accepted definition of humanitarian intervention is lacking. However, it is possible to reach some common criteria from these definitions. The Case Selection Criteria section, outlined in the Introduction, sets out the criteria for selecting the cases to be analyzed in this study. These were as follows: First is the existence of a humanitarian emergency. Second is the unwillingness or inability of the state to address the crisis. Third is the use of military means. Fourth is the existence of a humanitarian dimension in intervention. Fifth is consent: both interventions with and without the consent of the target state can accepted as humanitarian, but in cases of consent, the crisis must be caused by a non-state actor, highlighting the state's inability to manage the crisis (See the Case Selection Criteria section for detailed explanations of these criteria.) Considering all of these criteria, this study offers the following definition of humanitarian intervention:

"Humanitarian intervention is military intervention by a third country, group of countries, or an international organization to internal affairs of a country with a group of people suffering from human rights violations either with or without the target states' consent"

1.1. From Past to Present: An Analysis of Humanitarian Intervention.

For a deeper understanding of humanitarian intervention, it is crucial to explore its historical developments. This section provides a brief history of humanitarian intervention from theoretical and practical perspectives. The first subsection reviews the theoretical discussion of humanitarian intervention from ancient times until the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2005. The second subsection explores the practical history of humanitarian intervention, in other words, from the first known intervention to the beginning of our time interval (1945). The interventions discussed in the second subsection are alleged instances of humanitarian intervention before World War II. It is important to note that these interventions were not selected based on the case selection criteria of this dissertation. Some scholars have referred to these interventions as humanitarian in literature. They will be briefly presented in the context of the practical history of humanitarian intervention. Subsequent interventions from 1945 onward constitute the cases of this dissertation.

1.1.1. Theoretical History of Humanitarian Intervention

Although the concept of humanitarian intervention gained much of its reputation after the Cold War, its roots can be traced back to ancient times. However, it is important to note that the contemporary understanding of humanitarian intervention as we know it today did not exist before the twenty-first century. Therefore, to find humanitarian intervention's traces in history, the focus should not be on tracing the specific concept of humanitarian intervention itself but rather on saving innocents in another country from persecution, oppression, and/or violence. While humanitarian intervention is a relatively new concept, fighting for the sake of humanity, aiding oppressed people, fighting against tyrants, and bringing justice to wrongdoers are much older traditions in history. Nardin (2002: 58) contends that the moral basis of humanitarian intervention is rooted in this tradition. Although similar terms like "intervention on the grounds of humanity" and "intervention on behalf of the interests of humanity" appeared in English and French literature, the specific term "humanitarian intervention" was first used in 1880 by William Edward Hall (Chesterman, 2002: 30). Therefore, rescuing innocents in another country was previously discussed under a different terminology: just war.

The theoretical origins of humanitarian intervention are generally attributed to the thoughts of Hugo Grotius. However, it is possible to find philosophers who shared similar perspectives before Grotius. Even some of these philosophers appear to have played a role in shaping Grotius's ideas. Plato was among the early philosophers who discussed war for a just cause. He believed wars could be justified if they had a "just" reason. Moreover, wars could be unjust if they were driven by unjust reasons and involved unethical methods, such as mistreating prisoners or civilians (Hilpold, 2015:

64). Furthermore, Aristotle contended that a war can be just in cases where we are subjected to aggression or have been wronged, and the objective of the war is to achieve peace (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 14).

Marcus Tullius Cicero, one of the forefathers of the just war theory, also developed formal conditions for just war, including requirements like negotiations, approval from a priest, and a formal declaration of war. He also discussed concepts such as self-defense, assistance to others, and reparations for injustice suffered (Hilpold, 2015: 65). Saint Augustine argued that while war may be evil, some are ordained by Providence because they are just. The key is a just cause, such as defending a nation, avenging injuries, or punishing wrongdoers. Avenging wrongs perpetrated by another state was one of the principles of the just war outlined by Thomas Aquinas (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 15).

Of the Early Modern and Renaissance periods, one of the most-known precursors of humanitarian intervention is Hugo Grotius. Lauterpacht (1946: 46) considers Grotius's ideas to be "*the first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention- the principle that the exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops where outrage upon humanity begins*." However, it is worth mentioning that there were noteworthy progenitors before Grotius, such as Francisco Suárez, Francisco de Vitoria, and Alberico Gentili. Among them, Meron (1991: 110) argues, Grotius acknowledged Gentili's influence on his ideas but did not reference Suárez.

According to Suarez, if a Prince restricts the common rights of nations without a justifiable excuse, this constitutes a just cause for war. Suarez adopted a more cautious approach than Grotius, restricting the right of intervention solely to the injured party. If the injured party refrained from intervening, then no other actor should undertake intervention. A wrongdoer is only accountable to the one who was wronged. Moreover, Suarez also emphasized the vulnerability of such interventions to abuse, contending that the reasoning in question should be valid; otherwise, open-ended interventions would create opportunities for abuse (Meron, 1991: 113). Francisco de Vitoria believed removing an unjust and despotic ruler is possible as a last resort, particularly when there was no other way to secure peace and security (Hilpold, 2015: 72). Especially in situations like human sacrifice and cannibalism, Vitoria believed intervention was justified (Heraclides, 2015: 20).

Gentili argues that while a foreigner may not interfere in the administrative affairs of other states, such as roads, bridges, and highways, he may do so when it concerns human rights and a citizen's freedom. He views this as a just cause for war (Meron, 1991: 115). He believed that a common human society binds people and that harming one individual would undermine humanity. Gentili regards it as a human duty to act against a tyrant who oppresses their people, even if that tyrant harms only his subjects (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 21). Meron (1991: 116) believes we owe a greater debt to him

(Gentili) than any other writer of his era for developing the concepts of common rights, the interests of humanity, and humanitarian intervention.

Influenced by these philosophers, Grotius discussed the right to wage war to protect the innocent in Chapter XXV of Book II of his magnum opus "*De jure belli ac pacis*- The Law of War and Peace" (Grotius, 2003). Grotius also maintained a bolder attitude on this matter compared to Suarez. He acknowledged the potential for abuse in such interventions but maintained that occasional abuse should not invalidate the right of intervention (Meron, 1991: 111). Grotius refers to natural law in his justifications. According to him, the right to punish is based on natural law, which existed before civil societies (Nardin, 2002: 61,62). This natural law allows states to act as temporary guardians, safeguarding subjects of foreign countries who suffer from cruelty by their rulers. It also grants them the right to punish any action that violates natural law (Criddle, 2015: 475-482).

With the increasing significance of the principle of non-intervention following the Westphalian Peace of 1648, it became increasingly challenging for a country to justify its intervention in another state. More robust justifications were required. Nardin (2002: 59) argues, before Westphalia, no specific justification for humanitarian intervention was required in the absence of the principle of non-intervention. Starting with the Peace of Westphalia, however, the main principles of international law have revolved around sovereignty, independence, and non-intervention (Heraclides, 2015: 23). Meron (1991: 62) believes that this shift can be understood as a response to the idea that every state has the right to enforce natural law. Many legal scholars during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were inclined to restrict the grounds for state intervention in the internal affairs of other states. This tendency was the core of the European international system in the nineteenth century (Rodogno, 2016: 23).

However, even after Westphalia, some philosophers still approved such interventions. Samuel Pufendorf argued that if a victim of oppression requests assistance, anyone may justly assist, and this assistance is not only a right but also a duty. Emmerich de Vattel shared a perspective like Pufendorf's. Vattel also maintained that such intervention was permissible if the oppressed had already taken up arms and had a just cause (Heraclides, 2015: 23).

Henry Wheaton, Theodore Dwight Woolsey, Sir Robert Phillimore, Egide Arntz, William Harcourt, Thomas Joseph Lawrance and Alphonse Rivier were among the notable contributors to the concept of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century. They supported the idea of humanitarian intervention on legal and moral grounds. In the twentieth century, Paul Fauchille, Antoine Rougier, Georges Scelle, John Westlake, Hersch Lauterpacht, Ellery Stowell and Nicolas Politis were among the main contributors to the concept of humanitarian intervention (Heraclides, 2015: 25).

Since the world faced the most devastating wars in the first half of the twentieth century, substantial progress was achieved regarding peace and humanity in the second half of the twentieth century. Significant steps were also taken during this period to strengthen the theoretical basis of humanitarian intervention. The recognition of human rights in the UN Charter in 1945 (UN Charter, 1945), the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) in 1948, and the recognition of genocide as a crime (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951) -along with the obligation of states to prevent and punish genocide- in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) in 1951 were among the crucial milestones.

The twentieth century introduced various modern legal concepts to the world. Notably, "war crimes", "crimes against humanity", "genocide", and "ethnic cleansing", along with terms like "massive violation of basic human rights", "mass atrocity", and "mass crimes" were among the concepts introduced for the first time after World War II. Nevertheless, terms like "massacre", "atrocity", and "extermination" were commonly employed before World War II (Rodogno, 2016: 22). Despite all these positive developments on humanitarian issues, the principle of non-intervention remained the primary norm during this period. Newly independent states strongly supported non-intervention, considering it a safeguard against the external interference of powerful states (Hehir, 2010: 173).

With the arrival of the 1990s, humanitarian intervention gained increased attention. Academics, states and international organizations began to breach the wall of non-interference and attach less importance to the concept of national sovereignty. The sanctity of national sovereignty was reduced, and the opinion that all states have a "responsibility to protect" human rights gained more attention. In addition to "great powers", rising powers in regions with humanitarian problems were also more willing to participate in addressing these issues. Moreover, international organizations became more organized and focused on human right violations after the Cold War. As countries intervened for humanitarian purposes during the 1990s, the discussions on humanitarian intervention became fiercer and sharper (Ok & Tüfekçi, 2022: 81). Criticisms against humanitarian intervention also intensified during this period.

To address these criticisms and establish a systematic framework for humanitarian intervention, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was formed under the initiative of the Canadian government. In December 2001, the commission concluded its work, and "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (Evans et al., 2001) was published. This time, they prefer to use the term "responsibility to protect" instead of the much older term "humanitarian intervention" Kofi Annan (2000) articulated the underlying reason for this change in a speech before the report's publication: "*Such military* *intervention should not, however, in my view, be confused with humanitarian action. Otherwise, we will find ourselves using phrases like "humanitarian bombing", and people will soon get very cynical about the whole idea."* For detailed information about the responsibility to protect, see section 1.2. Clarifying the Boundaries: What Humanitarian Intervention Is Not?

1.1.2. Practical History of Humanitarian Intervention.

The further back in history one looks, the more challenging it becomes to find examples of humanitarian interventions, as the modern form of humanitarian interventions did not exist in those days. Nonetheless, the practical history and earliest examples of humanitarian intervention can be traced back to the nineteenth century. While all instances of humanitarian intervention are controversial, those that were carried out at a time when basic human rights were not discussed and terms such as 'war crimes,' 'crimes against humanity,' 'genocide,' 'ethnic cleansing,' and 'violation of basic human rights' were unfamiliar, are even more controversial.

The most distinctive features of the nineteenth-century interventions were that they were religious-oriented and that the European powers were the main determiners of who was (and was not) human and of which action was (and was not) a massacre. Rodogno (2016: 22,26) calls this selectivity "civilizational asymmetry." According to him, nineteenth-century interventions carried out by European powers were biased and selective. They focused solely on saving specific groups of people, namely the Ottoman Christians, while ignoring other groups, such as the Ottoman Muslims. In fact, most of the interventions cited as humanitarian interventions in the nineteenth century were carried out against the Ottoman Empire under the pretext of safeguarding non-Muslim populations. The target state was mostly the Ottoman Empire, and the rescued strangers were predominantly Ottoman-Christian populations (Rodogno, 2016: 26).

The joint intervention of Britain, Russia, and France in the Greek War of Independence was among the nineteenth-century interventions that were cited as humanitarian. The Greek War of Independence, which began in 1821 and led to the establishment of the Greek state in 1828, was marked by a series of violent events. These events and massacres led to the joint intervention of Britain, Russia, and France on the Greek side.

Greeks were among the long-standing subjects of the Ottoman Empire, living under Ottoman rule for around 400 years from the late fourteenth century. The rise of nationalism in Europe after the French Revolution of 1789, and discontentment with Ottoman rule, led the Greeks to seek independence from the Ottoman Empire. For this purpose, three Greek merchants founded Filiki Eteria -Hetairia Philike, *Φιλικὴ Ἑταιρεία*- in 1814 at Odessa (Phillips, 1897: 20,21). Before this date, the Greeks had also attempted an uprising known as the Orlov Revolt in 1770 during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, but Ottoman forces managed to suppress it (Armaoğlu, 2019a: 182).

Alexander Ypsilantis, the aide-de-camp of Tsar Alexander I, was appointed to lead the Russian organization of Filiki Eteria. Ypsilantis initiated a failed uprising in Moldavia with three thousand soldiers. Two weeks later, Demetrios Ypsilantis, the brother of Alexander Ypsilantis, launched another uprising in the Peloponnese, the Morea. Unlike the first uprising, this one quickly spread throughout the Peloponnese and the islands (Armaoğlu, 2019a: 183-185). The conflict between the Ottoman Porte and Ali Pasha of Ioannina, the governor of Yanya, revealed a power gap in the region and provided a great opportunity for the Greeks to take up arms (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 107). This conflict played a crucial role in the spread of the rebellion.

In the first months of the uprising, 15,000 to 20,000 Muslims in the Peloponnese, particularly in Tripolitsa, were murdered without mercy or remorse, and "this tragedy was barely noticed in Europe" (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 108). The Muslim population of Morea was estimated at 25,000. Within three weeks of the outbreak of the revolt, not a single Muslim remained except for those who managed to escape to the cities. Neither sex nor age was spared. (Phillips, 1897: 48, 61). News of the mass killing of thousands of Muslims by Greek rebels in the Morea had caused hysteria in Ottoman Porte (Ozavci, 2023: 228). In return, Sultan Mahmut II hanged the Patriarch of Constantinople, religious head of the Greek nation, before the gate of the Patriarchal Palace for having knowledge of and covertly supporting the rebellion. After being suspended for a day or two, his body was dragged through the streets and thrown into the sea (Phillips, 1897: 76,77). This incident mobilized European public opinion and internationalized the problem.

Greek rebels initiated another uprising in Chios in the first half of 1822. The news of the rebel attack in Chios intensified the Sultan's fury and strengthened his determination to suppress the revolt, leading to the dispatch of fresh forces to Chios. Confronted with the advancing Ottoman force, rebel forces retreated, leaving the people of Chios abandoned (Phillips, 1897: 92-94). What followed was carnage like that which occurred at Tripolitsa. According to Heraclides & Dialla (2015: 109) out of the remaining inhabitants, approximately 25,000 were reportedly killed. However, unlike Tripolitsa, this massacre shocked Europe and garnered support for the Greek cause.

When the Ottoman Empire struggled to quell the uprising, the Sultan requested assistance from his Governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha. He offered him the Governorship of Crete in exchange for his support (Armaoğlu, 2019a: 188). Mehmet Ali Pasha agreed to dispatch his army and navy under the command of his son, Ibrahim Pasha. After Ibrahim Pasha's arrival, the Ottomans regained control over several areas, such as Kasos and Psara. The combined Otto-Egyptian armies quickly secured control of these two islands, but this was followed by destruction and mass killing of the

Greek inhabitants. By 1827, the ‘rebellion’ had been largely quelled in numerous locations (Ozavci, 2023: 229).

Before the Battle of Navarino, two agreements were proposed to the Ottoman Porte: the Russian initiative, the Petersburg Protocol, and a joint agreement of Britain, Russia, and France, known as the London Agreement. Both proposals essentially offered the Ottomans an autonomous Greece. The Ottoman Empire rejected both offers as it considered Greece its own territory and the course of the conflict was in the Ottomans’ favor (Armaoğlu, 2019a: 191-194). After rejection, Ottoman forces faced a blockade on August 31, 1827, which eventually led to the Battle of Navarino on October 20, 1827, and the defeat of the Turkish forces (Chesterman, 2002: 37). In this war, six thousand Ottoman soldiers were killed, and the Otto-Egyptian fleet, consisting of 64 ships, was destroyed (Armaoğlu, 2019a: 194). Shortly after Navarino, Tsar Nicholas declared war upon the Ottoman Empire on April 26, 1828. Defeated by Russia, the Porte had no choice but to accept Greece’s independence (Chesterman, 2002: 37). While the “humanitarian” dimension may not be entirely convincing, largely due to the selective focus on the massacres of one of the parties, many authors cite it as a humanitarian intervention under the pretext of putting an end to the post-Navarino violence.

The second intervention in the nineteenth century cited as humanitarian was the French-led intervention in Lebanon and Syria in 1860-1861. This intervention was carried out as a result of an intense conflict between the Maronite and Druze populations in Lebanon, which was a part of Syria under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Greece’s intervention, Lebanon is not a complex and contentious case. However, it is not possible to assert that the intervention was entirely motivated by humanitarian concerns. On the other hand, a shared feature in both events is that the actors in the conflicts took advantage of the power gap caused by the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire.

The historical connection between France and the Maronite Christians dates back to 1250 when King Louis IX signed a charter with the Maronites. With this charter, France guaranteed the protection of Maronites as if they were French subjects. Since then, France has assumed the role of the “protector” of Latin Christians in the Levant. On the other hand, the British assumed almost the same role for the Druze (Finnemore, 1996; Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 136).

The Druze strongly opposed Tanzimat reforms, which granted legal equality to Christians in the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Maronites sought to establish Maronite rule under the French protectorate. In this tense atmosphere, the Maronites were the first to take action. They prepared to attack the Druze, aiming to either eliminate them or force them out of the region. The Druze heard about these preparations and were prepared to counter the Maronites’ attack (Franck & Rodley, 1973: 282; Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 136,137). A minor incident on May 22, 1860, involving a group of ten or twelve Druze who had been fired on, triggered widespread violence between the two groups in Lebanon (Lutsky, 1996: 135). The Druze not only emerged victorious in the battle on the field but also initiated a massacre of the Maronites, resulting in the killing and expulsion of thousands of Maronites (Hilpold, 2015: 94).

The failure of the Ottoman local leaders to stop the conflict and prevent massacres paved the way for the involvement of European powers. Ottoman local officers were accused of collaborating with the Druze, and the French ambassador at the Porte proposed to the French Foreign Minister a military operation targeting both the Druze and Ottoman local authorities. The Ottoman Porte condemned the atrocities. Abdulmejid personally expressed sorrow for the massacres in letters to Napoleon III and Queen Victoria, promising to restore order, punish the guilty, and secure justice for everyone (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 138,139).

France's intervention plans alarmed both Britain and the Ottoman Porte. Sultan Abdulmejid, to nullify France's plans, dispatched one of the empire's seniors, Fuad Pasha, to the region. With emergency powers, Fuad executed the perpetrators. Under Fuad Pasha's orders, 168 people were executed, including Ahmad Pasha, the city's governor. Furthermore, 325 people were sentenced to hard labor, and 145 were exiled. Fuad Pasha primarily punished Muslims to appease France. The Turkish troops quickly "restored law and order" in the region before the French forces arrived (Lutsky, 1996: 136; Traboulsi, 2007: 37). On the other hand, Britain was also involved in order to turn it into a joint intervention, aiming to constrain France's role in the intervention; on August 3, 1860, Austria, France, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire collectively signed a protocol to deploy twelve thousand European troops for six months to aid Ottoman forces in stopping violence (Finnemore, 1996).

The French troops in Lebanon did not engage in military actions. Instead, they served as peacekeepers, as Fuad had already alleviated the violence in the region. The French soldiers focused on humanitarian tasks, such as burying the dead, cleaning streets, and rebuilding houses, villages, and farms. The ambassadors of the Six Powers signed the Beyoglu Protocol on June 9, 1860. Lebanon emerged as an autonomous region separate from Syria called the Règlement Organique, known as the *Mustasarrifiyy*. The six Lebanese communities were represented in a twelve-member Administrative Council based on their percentage. Despite remaining a part of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon fell under the collective tutelage of the European powers and remained so until the First World War (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 140,141).

French forces intervened after the Ottomans had maintained order and when the situation had turned against the Christians, who had initiated the conflict. These are some aspects of the intervention that deserve criticism. On the other hand, the intervention forces only participated in humanitarian activities and duly withdrew within the agreed-upon period (originally six months, extended three months later to nine months). For these reasons, the intervention in Lebanon has been cited as an example of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century.

The third intervention in the nineteenth century cited as humanitarian was the United States' intervention in the Cuban War of Independence. This intervention was carried out as a result of a series of events involving Cuba, Spain, and the United States. This intervention was also controversial due to US motives for intervention and the situation in Cuba in the aftermath of the intervention. However, as previously noted, it is crucial to acknowledge that controversies are a common feature of nineteenth-century interventions.

Situated just ninety miles from Florida, Cuba held a strategically significant location, controlling crucial seaways that connected the Atlantic Ocean with the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Cuba became a major producer of sugar cane and tobacco, with the United States as the island's main customer. There was also a significant increase in North American investment, particularly in plantations, mills and mines in Cuba. This increase in investment increased Cuba's economic importance to the United States. Cuba became a major market for US manufactured goods and an important source of raw sugar, tobacco and minerals. These economic relations played an important role in shaping the ties between the two countries. Due to this importance, US leaders were concerned that if Spain lost control of its Central and South American colonies, Britain or France might take over Cuba and threaten the United States (Offner, 1998: 19).

Given its significance, the United States attempted to purchase Cuba many times. However, Spain, considering Cuba as a gift from God, consistently rejected these offers and signaled its unwillingness to give up Cuba without a fight (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 198, 199). Furthermore, the US also covertly negotiated annexing Cuba through the "Ostend Manifesto", which suggested that the US should resort to war if Spain refused (Burns, 2022: 56). Despite all these initiatives, none succeeded, and Cuba remained a Spanish colony until 1898.

After two unsuccessful attempts in 1868 and 1879, Cuban troops initiated the final fight for independence against Spanish forces on the island in 1895. However, this time, it was different. The rebellion rapidly spread, leading Spain to deploy over two hundred thousand troops to Cuba under the command of General Valeriano Weyler Nicolau. Spanish troops managed to regain control of the majority of the island, but they were unable to remove the Cuban insurgents from the central war zone. During these conflicts, it is estimated that approximately four hundred thousand Cuban civilians died. This news increased the calls for intervention and provoked anger towards Spain in the United States (Burns, 2022: 19, 20).

Two important events during this period led to tension between the US and Spain. The first event was the leak of an undiplomatic letter from the Spanish ambassador to the United States, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme. In this letter, he ridiculed President McKinley as a feeble leader and criticized McKinley's policies. The second incident was an onboard explosion that led to the destruction of the US battleship Maine in Havana (Chesterman, 2002: 43). In this explosion, 266 officers and men out of 354 were killed. Both the US and Spain investigated the reasons for the explosion and landed on different causes. While the US claimed it was caused by an external factor, possibly a mine or a torpedo, Spain contended it resulted from internal combustion. However, public opinion in the United States had already convicted Spain as guilty (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 205).

Congress subsequently passed a resolution in April 1898, granting the President the authority to employ military force to intervene in the Spanish-Cuban conflict. As a result, war broke out between the US and Spain, and the US imposed a naval blockade on Cuba. In almost every clash, the US army prevailed over the Spanish forces. The United States Army invaded Cuba, Luzon, and Puerto Rico, and secured the surrender of Santiago de Cuba. Additionally, the Navy seized Guam. On 15 August, the two countries signed an armistice (Offner, 1998: 22,23). Both before and after the intervention, the US consistently declared that they had entered the war for humanitarian reasons, aiming to assist and liberate the Cubans (Heraclides & Dialla, 2015: 207-208). With this intervention, the US removed Spain from the Western Hemisphere, marking a significant turning point for the US as it entered the global power competition.

However, the United States did not grant full-fledged independence to Cuba after it was liberated from Spain and fell under American control (Paterson, 1996: 342). The US did not withdraw from Cuba after the departure of the Spanish forces, and this situation persisted until the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Until the revolution, the US occasionally intervened politically and militarily on the island. While humanitarian reasons were a factor, US self-interest appeared to play a significant role in this intervention. However, self-interest in an intervention does not necessarily exclude it from being categorized as a humanitarian intervention, especially in the nineteenth century. For these reasons, the US intervention in Cuba in 1898 has been cited as an example of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century.

1.2. Clarifying the Boundaries: What Humanitarian Intervention Is Not?

Humanitarian intervention is frequently mistaken for several related but separate concepts. It is crucial to understand not only what humanitarian intervention is but also what it is not. The most frequently confusing concepts with humanitarian intervention include humanitarian action, humanitarian aid, military intervention, and some UN concepts such as Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding, and Peace Enforcement. Apart from these concepts, it is also essential to clarify the distinctions between humanitarian intervention and R2P. Despite the differences among these terms, they are also interconnected and can coexist.

In some cases, one concept may adequately define the situation, but in others, more than one may be necessary to define the situation accurately. While they are sometimes used interchangeably, distinguishing characteristics set them apart. Clarifying boundaries and understanding the differences are essential for accurate discussion and analysis.

Humanitarian action and humanitarian aid are distinct from humanitarian intervention, primarily due to the absence of military force. Unlike humanitarian intervention, which may involve military intervention, humanitarian action and humanitarian aid are mainly undertaken by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They primarily focus on providing life-sustaining services such as healthcare, shelter, food, and water to sustain life. Moreover, humanitarian intervention involves armed conflict, but humanitarian actions and aid do not require the use of force. They are also provided in situations like famine, starvation, natural disasters, and other emergencies. In other words, humanitarian action and humanitarian aid refer to the efforts of aid workers and NGOs (Hehir, 2010: 12). On the other hand, humanitarian intervention may also include humanitarian action, but humanitarian action and aid do not include military intervention.

Military interventions differ from humanitarian interventions regarding objectives, motivations, and justifications. Military intervention is the intentional use of armed force by states or groups of states to achieve some political or strategic objectives. Based on their features, interventions may take various forms, such as invasion or occupation. Von Hippel (2000: 3) states that military intervention is the use of military force to influence a country's decisions in a particular direction that it would not have taken independently. In summary, military interventions are predominantly motivated by political or strategic interests, while humanitarian interventions primarily focus on relieving human suffering and protecting civilians.

Furthermore, humanitarian Intervention differs from peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement regarding objectives, approaches, and contexts. Humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping are often conflated because both involve the presence of foreign states, particularly under the leadership of a superpower or a rising power within another country (Tkachuk & Tufekci, 2023: 77). Peacekeeping is a technique used to maintain or restore peace in conflict-affected areas. Contrary to humanitarian intervention, which concentrates on ceasing humanitarian crises, peacekeeping primarily focuses on maintaining pre-existing peace. Additionally, three key principles are necessary to initiate UN peacekeeping missions. The first principle is that the consent of the primary parties involved in the conflict is necessary to initiate peacekeeping. The second principle is that peacekeepers must remain impartial and treat all parties involved in the conflict equally. The third principle is that the use of force is only permissible in the event of self-defense and to protect the assigned objectives (*Principles of Peacekeeping | United Nations Peacekeeping*, n.d.). However, in humanitarian intervention, the consent of the parties is not necessary in order to take action. Even if there are instances of humanitarian intervention with consent, it is not necessary to obtain the consent of the parties involved to launch a humanitarian intervention.

The UN peacekeeping website (*Terminology | United Nations Peacekeeping*, n.d.) defines peacemaking as: "Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement." Like humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping is carried out in the context of ongoing conflicts. However, the primary distinction between the two concepts is in their implementation. Humanitarian intervention generally involves the use of military force, whereas peacekeeping primarily relies on non-military techniques, mainly diplomatic efforts. Moreover, while humanitarian intervention seeks to restore peace and security, peacekeeping seeks to maintain an existing peace.

Peacebuilding refers to a long course of action aimed at consolidating post-conflict peace and preventing the re-emergence of conflict. These actions involve addressing the conflict's underlying reasons and improving the conditions necessary to establish enduring peace. Barnett & Kim (2007: 37) define peacebuilding as an external intervention intended to reduce the state's risk of relapsing into war. Moreover, Doyle & Sambanis (2000: 779) describe peacebuilding as a process to address the sources of hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution by enhancing social, economic, and political institutions. In summary, peacebuilding refers to a process that does not require the use of force and concentrates on sustainable solutions to conflicts in the post-conflict period. Conversely, humanitarian intervention involves the use of force and addresses ongoing conflicts.

Among UN peace operations, peace enforcement is the one that is the most similar to humanitarian intervention. The key phase in this concept is "enforcement". Peace enforcement uses force to "enforce" a truce or ceasefire on parties that are unwilling to comply with it, in conflict situations, such as violating a ceasefire (R. Caplan, 2022). While peacekeeping uses lightly armed force to monitor conflicts and maintain stability with the consent of the parties, peace enforcement uses more powerful and heavily armed forces to enforce peace, even without the consent of the involved parties (Carter, 1995: 324). According to Tubbs (1995: 8), peace enforcement serves as a method for conflict termination rather than conflict resolution. Peace enforcement shares similarities with humanitarian interventions regarding the non-requirement of consent and the application of force. However, unlike peace enforcement, humanitarian intervention does not aim to enforce, keep, or restore peace. Instead, humanitarian intervention aims to halt humanitarian crises and protect people suffering from violence through military means.

Figure 4: Differences of the Concepts



Among the concepts discussed in this section, R2P is the term most closely related to humanitarian intervention. These two terms are so interconnected that they are often used interchangeably. Both R2P and humanitarian intervention aim to stop mass human rights violations, genocide, or other atrocities within a foreign country. Nevertheless, several aspects concerning their scope, principles, and implementation make them distinct. In the literature on humanitarian intervention, scholars attempt to address the question of "what should be done if a population is subjected to severe harm and the sovereign state is either unwilling or incapable of putting an end to it." Essentially, the R2P can be considered an attempt to answer this question. To find an answer to this question, the Canadian Government sponsored the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000 (Evans, 2015: 19). After a year of work, the commission introduced its report titled "Responsibility to Protect" (Evans et al., 2001). UNSC confirmed, and heads of state and government adopted this report unanimously in the 2005 UN World Summit (Bellamy, 2010: 143).

In 2009, Ban Ki-moon presented a three-pillar strategy concerning R2P: Pillar I, "The State's Protection Responsibilities"; Pillar II, "International Assistance and Capacity-Building"; Pillar III, "Timely and Decisive Response"(Report of the Secretary-General, 2009). However, in the original ICISS report, the responsibilities were described as "Prevent," "React," and "Rebuild." As one of the co-chairs of the ICISS, Evans (2006: 27,28) clarified this distinction by arguing that these are alternative ways of presenting the same material. In other words, according to Evans, in Pillar I, a state is responsible for fulfilling all three roles: prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. In Pillar II, if a state requires assistance, the international community is responsible for helping other states fulfil the roles of prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. Furthermore, in Pillar III, the international community is responsible for fulfilling the roles of prevention, reaction, and rebuilding. Evans employs a cake metaphor to illustrate this distinction. A three-layer cake, equally divided, each layer symbolizes prevention, response, and reconstruction. The slices of the cake symbolize the respective responsibilities of the State (Pillar I), other states (Pillar II), and the International Community (Pillar III). See Figure 5 for a visual illustration of the pillars of R2P.

Figure 5: Three-Pillar Structure of R2P



R2P can be considered a formal and more complicated version of humanitarian intervention. Both concepts are invoked in human rights violations, genocide, or other atrocities. Both concepts emphasize protecting people from violence. However, the intervention methods and intervention timing of these two concepts are different. According to Erdogan (2016: 35), their main difference is the broader application of R2P compared to humanitarian intervention. humanitarian intervention is initiated when people are at immediate risk of death or facing a severe humanitarian emergency. However, R2P engages before the conflict to address and eliminate the root cause of conflict, during the conflict to stop conflict, and after the conflict to consolidate peace and prevent the re-emergence of future conflict. In other words, while humanitarian intervention steps in specifically during the conflict period, R2P steps in before, during, and after conflict periods.

Another distinction lies in their methodologies. While humanitarian intervention primarily involves military intervention, R2P includes non-military attempts, including diplomatic, political, and economic measures. Military intervention is the last resort once all other methods have been exhausted. Moreover, R2P requires UNSC authorization to intervene, but humanitarian intervention does not require such authorization (Bellamy, 2010: 143).

1.3. Cases of the Dissertation

The cases in this dissertation were selected based on the identified case selection criteria. Nevertheless, the selection does not imply that the chosen cases are true examples of humanitarian intervention. Neither among the cases of this dissertation nor in the history of humanity can any intervention be called a pure humanitarian intervention. For this reason, this dissertation does not assert such a claim. These criteria only help us to find cases to analyze. This dissertation selected thirteen military interventions (East Pakistan, Cambodia, Cyprus, Uganda, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leon, Libya, and Syria) for possible cases. After careful analysis with the case selection criteria, eleven interventions (East Pakistan, Cyprus, Uganda, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Libya, and Syria) have been considered appropriate to be included as cases. Interventions that were analyzed but did not meet the case selection criteria are not included in the following sections; only the selected cases are discussed.

1.3.1. Cases of Cold War Period

The Cold War Period refers to the years between 1945 and 1990. Many fundamental human rights documents, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (Macfarlane, 2002: 34) were adopted during this period. However, these efforts were not fully reflected in practice during the same period. It was only after the 1990s that states began to pay more attention to humanitarian issues. Even though this period was characterized by the absence of significant conflict, there were still some military interventions in various parts of the world.

The characteristic of the Cold War was the competition between the two superpowers. Both superpowers recognized the sphere of interest of the other and mostly preferred not to interfere there. Moreover, when one of these superpowers intervened in its own sphere of influence, the other tended to content itself only with condemning or criticizing. The USSR’s 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia interventions, and the US’s 1965 Dominican Republic, and 1983 Grenada interventions are good examples of this tendency. The inspirations for these interventions were not humanitarian but political. In these interventions, they both desired not to resolve conflict or relieve human suffering but to gain relative power over their rivals in the global bipolar struggle (Macfarlane, 2002: 38,39).

However, this dissertation is looking for interventions with a humanitarian dimension that meet the case selection criteria. Since human rights were not as appealing during the Cold War as they were after the Cold War, it is challenging to find interventions in which the intervener explicitly declares the humanitarian purpose of the intervention. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the humanitarian dimensions in the statements of the policymakers and government agencies.

The first intervention of the Cold War Period is India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan, known as Bangladesh, today. India intervened in East Pakistan due to Pakistan's violence against Bengalis. This violence caused the deaths of over one million Bengalis until 1971 when India intervened. This intervention both ended the suffering and led to the independence of a new state, Bangladesh (Wheeler, 2000: 55). Even if the figures regarding the sufferers vary, Bangladeshi authorities claim that nearly 3 million died, 200 thousand women were raped, 10 million migrated to India, and 30 million were displaced (Jahan, 2012: 250). In this respect, the first criterion, the humanitarian emergency, is met. Pakistan was among those responsible for the crisis, so the second criterion is also met. India intervened militarily, which means that the third criterion is met. In its justification for intervention, India referred to the human suffering in East Pakistan before the intervention, which met the fourth criterion (Wheeler, 2000: 60–65). India's intervention lacked the consent of the target state. So, the fifth criterion is met. As a result, India's 1971 intervention in East Pakistan is the first case of the Cold War Period in this dissertation.

The second case of the Cold War Period is Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus in 1974. Türkiye intervened on the island because of a series of ethnic conflicts that began in 1955. The Turkish intervention put an end to the junta regimes led by Nikos Sampson and restored a democratically elected government led by Makarios. It also put an end to EOKA's violence against both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who supported Makarios. Although exact figures vary, thousands of people were killed and tens of thousands displaced as a result of EOKA's attacks. Shortly before the Turkish intervention, Greek Cypriots who supported Makarios were also targeted by EOKA. Within four days of the coup, 2000 Makarios supporters were killed by EOKA militants (Campbell-Thomson, 2014; Türkmen, 2004). The first criterion, a humanitarian emergency, is therefore met.

The Makarios government was unable or unwilling to stop these atrocities. Moreover, the subsequent junta government was one of those responsible for the crisis. This means that the second criterion is met. Türkiye intervened with military force, meaning the third criterion is also fulfilled. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit announced the intervention in his own words: "We are going to the island not for war, but for peace, and to bring peace not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks"

(Arslan, 2021). Moreover, the intervention was entitled “Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı - Cyprus Peace Operation” by the Ecevit (Yıldırım, 2004: 78). This fulfils the third criterion, the humanitarian dimension. Türkiye intervened without the consent of the Cypriot Government, thus fulfilling the last criterion. For all the reasons above, the Cyprus intervention is the second case of the Cold War Period.

The third case of the Cold War Period is Tanzania’s 1978 Intervention in Uganda. The sequence of events leading up to the intervention started when Ugandan President Idi Amin annexed Tanzania’s Kagera Salient. The intervention ended after Tanzania entered deep inside Uganda and brought about the demise of Idi Amin’s rule. According to the Human Rights in Uganda report by Amnesty International in 1978, except for the disappearances, the death toll committed by the Idi Amin government in Uganda was between 50,000 and 300,000 (Human Rights in Uganda, 1978: 13). Therefore, the existence of a severe humanitarian emergency meets the first criterion. The second criterion is also met, as the Ugandan Government was the perpetrator of the crisis. The military criterion is met since what happened between Uganda and Tanzania was a war.

Before and during the Intervention, President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere built his justification on the argument that Idi Amin threatened his own people and the neighboring countries. He also called several times for regional and international organizations to take action against Idi Amin before the intervention. As a last resort, Nyerere decided that the crisis in Tanzania and Uganda would not end without overthrowing Idi Amin. For this reason, he intervened in Uganda and brought Idı Amin’s rule down after the Ugandan Army withdrew from Tanzania (Wheeler, 2000: 117–122). So, this intervention has a humanitarian dimension, which means the fourth criterion is met. Finally, the last criterion is also met because Tanzania intervened without the consent of Uganda. In conclusion, Tanzania’s Intervention in Uganda is the third case of the Cold War Period.

Table 4: Cases of Cold War Period

Possible Cases of Cold War Period	1st criterion (Humanitarian emergency)	2nd criterion (State's inability or unwillingness)	3rd criterion (Military intervention)	4th criterion (Humanitarian Dimension)	5th criterion (consent)
East Pakistan, 1971	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cyprus, 1974	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cambodia, 1978	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
Uganda, 1979	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

1.3.2. Cases of Post-Cold War Period

The Post-Cold War Period, the first decade after the Cold War, saw an increase in international interest in human rights and the concept of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, unlike the Cold War Period, most humanitarian interventions were carried out during this period. For this reason, this period can be characterized as the "golden age" of humanitarian intervention. The first case of this interval is the US's Iraq Intervention in 1991. The US intervened in Iraq due to the crisis that started with the Kurds being stuck on the Türkiye-Iran border after they rebelled against the Iraqi Government. While the exact figures vary, 1.5 to 2 million Kurds fled to the Türkiye-Iran border, which was hard to reach, cold, and mountainous (McQueen, 2005: 27). In addition to those problems in the region, neighboring countries faced a severe refugee influx. Thus, the Iraq Intervention meets the first -humanitarian emergency- criterion.

The second criterion is met because the Saddam government was one of the conflicting parties. Since the intervention was military, the third criterion is also met. The initial aim was to provide humanitarian aid to the masses fleeing to the north of Iraq. However, military intervention was started when it was obvious that this would not be possible without securing the region (Tubbs, 1995: 17). Accordingly, the fourth criterion, the humanitarian dimension, is met. The intervention was carried out without the consent of the Iraqi government, which means that the last criterion was also met. In sum, the 1991 Iraq intervention is the first case of the Post-Cold War Period.

The second case of this time interval is the 1992 Somali intervention. It was only when the conflict between local factions in Somalia reached the level that prevented humanitarian aid that intervention seemed to be the only option. Hence, in Somalia, a humanitarian emergency existed. The Somali Government was not responsible for this crisis, but it could not stop it and provide security, which means the second criterion is met. The intervention was carried out militarily. So, the third criterion is fulfilled. The humanitarian dimension of the intervention is detectable from the UNSC resolution on December 3, 1992, which was *"to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia"* (United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, 1992). In this regard, the fourth criterion is fulfilled. Finally, the intervener did not ask for the consent of the Somali government, which means that the last criterion also exists. Because of these reasons, the 1992 Somalia intervention is the second case of the Post-Cold War Period.

The third case of the Post-Cold War Period is the 1994 Rwanda intervention. Rwanda was intervened due to the civil war between the armed forces of the Hutu government of Rwanda and Tutsi's Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsis were systematically killed in just 100 days in 1994 (G. Caplan, 2012: 447). In addition to the deaths, severe migration influx was another issue. For example, 600 to 700 thousand Tutsi refugees lived outside Rwanda before the intervention (McQueen, 2005: 98). All this demonstrated the humanitarian emergency. With this, the first criterion is fulfilled. As the Hutu government of Rwanda was among those responsible for the crisis, the second criterion is also met. Both interventions, led by the UN and France, were carried out militarily, which means the third criterion is completed. Although mixed motives influenced France's intervention decision, and many criticized its role during the civil war, according to the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) (*Rwanda 1994 | HMI Dataset*, 2024), the declared intention of saving strangers and France's emphasis on the intervention's impartiality were not undermined. Therefore, the fourth criterion is also met. For all the reasons above, the Rwanda intervention is the third case of the Post-Cold War Period.

The fourth case of the Post-Cold War Period is the 1999 East Timor intervention. East Timor, once a Portuguese colony, was occupied by Indonesia and became a province of it. During the separation from Indonesia, internal conflicts and the struggle between pro-independence groups and pro-Indonesia or autonomy groups led to the UN's intervention and later administration. Before the intervention, approximately 1500 people died, 250,000 people -nearly one-third of the entire population- became refugees, and most were forced to migrate to West Timor. Seventy percent of the public infrastructure was destroyed. The houses of those refugees, public buildings, and official documents were burned. Electricity, water, and communication infrastructure was destroyed (Gorjao, 2002: 315; Ingram, 2012: 4). Therefore, in East Timor, the first criterion is met. The East Timor government failed to resolve this crisis, so the second criterion is fulfilled. The intervention was carried out militarily, which means the third criterion is met. The UN stated the intervention's aim in the phrase "restore peace and security in East Timor" (*UNMISET: United Nations Mission of*

Support in East Timor - Background, 2006). Thus, the fourth criterion is completed. The East Timor government consented to this intervention. Nevertheless, the perpetrator was a non-state actor, and the government could not end the humanitarian crisis. So, the last criterion is also met. Due to these reasons, the East Timor intervention is the fourth case of the Post-Cold War Period.

The fifth case of the Post-Cold War Period is the Kosovo Intervention in 1999. The intervention in Kosovo happened due to persecution and ethnic cleansing by the Serbian forces against the Albanians during the dismantling of Yugoslavia. The fear of there being a new Bosnia played an essential role in the Kosovo intervention. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (*Serbia (Yugoslavia): Kosovo*, 2021), in 1988, armed fights broke out, and the death figure rose rapidly as the warring parties' retaliatory actions became increasingly severe. Therefore, Kosovo met the first, humanitarian emergency, criterion. The second criterion is also met as the Yugoslavian government was responsible for the crisis. The intervention was performed militarily, which means the third criterion is also met. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) publicly stated the reason for the 1999 air campaign was to "halt the humanitarian catastrophe" (*Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999)*, 2022). So, the fourth criterion is fulfilled. The intervention in Kosovo occurred contrary to the Yugoslavian government's will, which means the last criterion is also completed. For all the reasons above, it is concluded that the Kosovo intervention is the fifth case of the Post-Cold War Period.

The last case of the Post-Cold War Period is the Sierra Leone Intervention in 2000. The UK intervened in Sierra Leone in 2000 due to domestic turbulence and conflicts, which had lasted since the 1990s, sometimes more harshly, sometimes stagnant. According to the UCDP (*Government of Sierra Leone - RUF*, 2020), from the outset of the conflict in 1991 until the UK intervention, approximately 5,500 people died alone in conflicts between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Also, in the same period, the total death toll is estimated to be around 50 thousand. In addition to those deaths, there were terrific mass displacements and kidnappings. Likewise, 500 thousand people became refugees in this decade and almost the same number of people were displaced (Horn et al., 2006: 110).

Moreover, roughly 90 percent of the buildings in the eastern suburbs of Freetown were destroyed by the RUF (Williams, 2001: 156). Therefore, Sierra Leone meets the first criterion. Because Sierra Leon authorities were unable to stop the humanitarian crisis and ensure security, this intervention fulfils the second criterion. The intervention was carried out militarily. So, the third criterion is fulfilled. The UK neither declared a humanitarian intervention initially nor intended to attempt to perform such a thing. The UK planned first to evacuate the endangered UK and Commonwealth citizens (Ucko, 2016: 7). However, thanks to later developments, more troops were deployed to help UNAMSIL and the local government. Thus, the fourth criterion, the humanitarian dimension, is met. The Sierra Leone government consented to this intervention (Ucko, 2016: 7). Still, the perpetrator was a non-state actor, and the Government could not stop the humanitarian crisis, which means the last criterion is also met. For these reasons, the Sierra Leone intervention is the last case of the Post-Cold War Period.

Table 5: Cases of Post-Cold War Period

Possible Cases of Post-Cold War Period	1st criterion (Humanitarian emergency)	2nd criterion (State's inability or unwillingness)	3rd criterion (Military intervention)	4th criterion (Humanitarian Dimension)	5th criterion (consent)
Iraq, 1991	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Somalia, 1992	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Haiti, 1994	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
Rwanda, 1994	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
East Timor, 1999	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Kosovo, 1999	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Leone, 2000	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

1.3.3. Cases of Post- 9/11 Period

The Post-9/11 Period refers to the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Unlike the second one, the Third one is not an intervention-rich period. In fact, the outset of this interval can be regarded as the end of the golden age of humanitarian intervention. Although this interval represents a broader time (20 years), the number of cases in the Third Interval is not even half of the second one. Furthermore, this period also witnessed profound shifts in international relations. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, showed that nothing would stay the same in world politics. This incident is also critical for humanitarian intervention, so it is the outset of the Post-9/11 Period.

The first case of the Post-9/11 Period is the Libya Intervention in 2011. NATO intervened in Libya when protests turned into a conflict between the Gaddafi government and opposition forces in Libya. The conflicts between these forces spread throughout the country, becoming a battlefield for both parties. According to Cherif Bassiouni, head of the UN Human Rights Council mission to

Tripoli, within the first four months, 10,000-15,000 people died in the conflict between Gaddafi and Opposition forces (Reuters, 2011). All this tells us that the humanitarian emergency was real in Libya. Hence, the Libya intervention meets the first criterion. The second criterion is also met because the Gaddafi government was one of the conflicting parties. The intervention was carried out militarily, which means the third criterion is completed. UNSC authorized this intervention and stressed the humanitarian dimension of the intervention in the clause "*take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and populated areas under threat of attack"* in resolution 1973 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, 2011). In this regard, the fourth criterion is completed. The intervention in Libya happened without the consent of the Libyan Government, which means the last criterion is fulfilled. Because of these reasons, the Libya Intervention is the first case of the Post-9/11 Period.

The Iraq-Syria intervention in 2014 is the last case of the Post-9/11 Period. More precisely, this intervention was not against the Syrian or Iraqi Government but against ISIS, which gained regional control and became increasingly dangerous. Notorious for its civilian massacres in Syria and Iraq, ISIS was also known as IS or Daesh. According to UCDP (*UCDP - IS - Civilians*, n.d.; *UCDP -Iraq*, n.d.), ISIS massacred many ethnic groups under their so-called caliphate's rule in Iraq and Syria. Apart from massacres against Muslim, Assyrian, and Christian minorities, the UN recognized the 2014 massacre against the Yazidis as a genocide (*UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: ISIS Is Committing Genocide against the Yazidis*, 2016). During this genocide, it is estimated that 5,000 men were killed, and 7,000 women and girls were abducted and forced into sexual slavery (Miller, 2015). It can be concluded that the region was facing a humanitarian emergency.

The Iraqi and Syrian governments were unable to stop ISIS, solve this humanitarian crisis, and provide the region's security, so the second criterion is fulfilled. The intervention was carried out militarily, which means the third criterion is met. The Combined Task Force announced the purpose of the intervention to stop the "rising threat posed by ISIS" whose "unconscionable atrocities shocked the world and destabilized the region" (Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve - History, 2015). Thus, the fourth criterion is completed. The region was entered at the request of the Government of Iraq (*Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve - Our Mission*, 2017). As the perpetrator was a non-state actor, the last criterion is also completed. Considering all these reasons above, it would be correct to accept the Syrian-Iraq Intervention as the last case of the Post-9/11 Period.

Table 6: Cases of Post-9/11 Period

Possible Cases of Post-9/11 Period	1st criterion (Humanitarian emergency)	2nd criterion (State's inability or unwillingness)	3rd criterion (Military intervention)	4th criterion (Humanitarian Dimension)	5th criterion (consent)
Iraq, 2003	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
Libya, 2011	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Iraq-Syria, 2014 (against ISIS)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

CHAPTER TWO

2. COLD WAR PERIOD: 1945-1990

2.1. East Pakistan Intervention, 1971

2.1.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

Present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar were under British rule as British India from 1858 to 1947. Britain gained control of this region from France at the end of the Seven Years' War with the Treaty of Paris in 1763. During the Second World War, Britain announced its intention to grant independence to India after the war, and it followed through; in 1947, two independent states emerged: India and Pakistan (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 502,503). Following independence, Pakistan consisted of two distinct wings: East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The partition of British India was carried out hastily and without meticulous planning. The partition errors have led to unresolved problems in the relationship between India and Pakistan. Aside from the renowned Kashmir conflict, both countries also had disputes over two cities: Junagadh and Hyderabad. The principles guiding the partition of these three states were ambiguous. For instance, the Hindu-majority regions of Junagadh and Hyderabad were ruled by Muslim families. Furthermore, these states were located within India and did not share a border with Pakistan. On the other hand, the Muslim-majority region, Kashmir, was ruled by a Hindu Family (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 38).

India and Pakistan had different policies towards these states. In Junagadh and Hyderabad, Pakistan advocated for the supremacy of the monarch's will. In contrast, in Kashmir, it advocated for the supremacy of the people's will. Conversely, India argued against Pakistan's hypothesis in each case. Since Junagadh and Hyderabad were not geographically close to Pakistan and remained within Indian borders, they had no option but to accede to India. However, Kashmir is situated between both countries and has the potential to join either. That is why the Kashmir issue remains unresolved to this day. The Kashmir dispute resulted in two wars between India and Pakistan in 1947 and 1965 (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 39,40).

Figure 6: British India before 1948

This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart.

Another anomaly in the partition of British India was the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan by one thousand miles, and Indian territory lay between the two wings of Pakistan. Furthermore, it was not only the geographical distance that separated the two sides of Pakistan; the ethnicity, language, and culture between the two wings of Pakistan were also separate (Haider, 2009: 538). The common ground between the two sides of Pakistan was religion. The two regions were Muslim, but religion was apparently not enough to hold the two regions together. Despite constituting sixty percent of the total population of Pakistan, East Pakistan was dominated politically and economically by West Pakistan (Walsh, 2006: 221).

The military and bureaucracy were also under the control of the West. The relationship between the East and the West became increasingly polarized as the Western part became more prosperous and industrialized. For example, at the time of partition, the per capita income of the West was ten percent higher than that of the East, and by 1969, this gap had widened to 60 percent. The East felt like a colony of the West (Wheeler, 2000: 56). Alongside economic problems, there was also cultural tension. The Pakistani government attempted to establish Urdu as the only national language despite it being spoken by only two percent of the population in the East. This imposition initially sparked opposition but later turned into resistance during the bloody language movement of the Bengalis in 1952 (Haider, 2009: 538; Wheeler, 2000: 56). In response to this socio-economic discrimination, the Awami League was formed by East Pakistanis, eventually winning the election, and altering the fate of the country.

Figure 7: Indian Subcontinent in 1970



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart.

Moreover, all this economic and social unrest culminated in a violent mass uprising known as the "Grave Magnitude" and the subsequent overthrow of General Ayub Khan (Haider, 2009: 538). General Yahya Khan, Ayub Khan's successor, promised to hold elections to establish a civilian government (Wheeler, 2000: 56). It was at this stage that a revolutionary amendment was made that would change the fate of the country. The principle of equal representation of the two wings in the National Assembly was abandoned. Consequently, East Pakistan, comprising nearly sixty percent of the total population, was allowed to secure a majority in the election, and indeed, it did. The Awami League's primary arguments in the campaign centered on the treatment of the East as a colony and the six-point program, which was their main solution to address the East's issues. (Talbot, 1998: 192–199).

Table 7: Election Results 1970-1

Elections	West Total	East Total	Total
National Assembly Election Results	138	162	300
Provincial Assembly Election Results	300	300	600

Source: (Talbot, 1998: 200,201)

According to the results, the Awami League won so decisively that it would have secured control of both wings of Pakistan (Bass, 2015: 234). However, General Yahya Khan and the West Pakistan bureaucracy did not intend to hand over supremacy and the office to the winner. In the post-election negotiations, the Pakistan People's Party from the West demanded equal rights for political parties in drafting the constitution. Nevertheless, feeling robbed of the achievements of its victory, the Awami League rejected this demand (Marwah, 1979: 558). When the negotiations deadlocked and unrest escalated, bullets were involved.

President Yahya opted for a military solution -Operation Searchlight- to address the unrest in East Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani army initiated a brutal crackdown, leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths, approximately ten million refugees fleeing to India, and 30 million displaced people within the country (Bass, 2015: 234; Jahan, 2012: 250). Following this crackdown, the Awami League leaders declared independence and established a government-in-exile (Haider, 2009: 540). The civil conflict in East Pakistan was a significant challenge for India, especially in dealing with the economic and social burden of nearly ten million refugees (Gill, 2003: 11). The influx of refugees was so intense that by the end of June, it had reached an average of 60,000 per day (Marwah, 1979: 560).

Despite the prohibition on refugees getting jobs, roughly three million refugees were not in the refugee camps; they entered the labor market, which resulted in a decline in wages and a surge in prices. Moreover, this sudden, uncontrolled, and irregular influx of refugees resulted in social unrest in the receiving states of India. The allocation of government resources to sustain the refugees irritated the local Indian people. The refugees were concentrated in the most troubled cities, like West Bengal, which had previously witnessed years of insurgency and violence. The disproportionate distribution of refugees was evident when considering the influx of refugees in the Indian state of Tripura, constituting 60 percent of the overall population. Tripura's population was 1.5 million, while the count of Bengali refugees who migrated there was 900,000. Due to these reasons, India dismissed any proposals that did not address the refugee problem (Sisson & Rose, 1990: 179–181; Talbot, 1998: 208).

India engaged in diplomatic efforts to both secure international relief assistance for the refugee burden and to exert global pressure on Pakistan. Furthermore, India signaled the possibility of armed intervention by asserting that it was not responsible for the problem but would take action if necessary. On the other side, India covertly provided training and armament to guerrilla forces and led them to establish bases to conduct warfare against Pakistan from within Indian territory (Haider, 2009: 541, 542; Wheeler, 2000: 58,59). The civil war evolved into a situation of mutually assured destruction, characterized by a brutal and seemingly never-ending cycle of raids, ambushes, bombings, sabotage, and assassinations (Gill, 2003: 12).

Pakistan received information indicating India’s preparations for an attack. In a pre-emptive move, Pakistan launched air strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December. The aim was to destroy India’s airpower before it took off. However, India anticipated the attack, preventing Pakistan from destroying any warplanes. Consequently, it was Pakistan that initiated the war. After fourteen days of war, Pakistani troops were defeated in the east. When Indian forces advanced deep into Bangladesh, the Pakistani army did not have a defensive plan and subsequently surrendered in Dhaka on 16 December. The surrender of Pakistan led to the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh. (Bass, 2015: 235; Talbot, 1998: 211; Wynbrandt, 2009: 201). After the war, the Pakistan army’s defeat triggered political turmoil within Pakistan. General Yahya Khan had to resign, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, assumed power as the head of the civilian government.

2.1.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

The figures analyzed in this section do not cover the military power and casualties of the conflicting parties, East Pakistan, and West Pakistan, but instead focus on India’s military strength in intervention. Although finding precise figures for this intervention is challenging, as they differ among sources, average estimates of the intervener’s strength will be adequate. This is because this dissertation focuses on determining the presence of manpower in humanitarian interventions and assessing the levels of this presence (increasing or decreasing) over time. India initially played an indirect role in the Bangladesh Liberation War, as it covertly provided training and armaments to guerrilla forces, allowing them to establish bases within Indian territory to conduct military operations against Pakistan (Wheeler, 2000: 58).

India mobilized all components of its military- air, land, and sea - for this intervention. However, the core strength of India’s intervention rested predominantly on its ground forces, while airpower and naval forces were employed in supporting roles. India deployed five corps (three in East Pakistan and two on the China border), 12 squadrons, and 12 naval units. More than half of its total manpower was mobilized. This force was strategically distributed, with 320,000 troops on the western front to counter Pakistan's 240,000 troops in the west and 160,000 troops on the eastern front to confront Pakistan's 75-80,000 front-line troops (Gill, 2003: 71–77; Marwah, 1979: 565).

During the 1971 Indian intervention in East Pakistan, most losses in the Indian army occurred within the land force. Although estimates vary, it is believed that India lost between 2,300 and 3,800 soldiers, while 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers were injured, and 900 soldiers went missing or were captured. In addition, 69 tanks and ten artillery pieces were lost during the war. In the air force, losses ranged from 56 to 58 aircraft, resulting from air-to-air combat, being shot down by ground fire, or destruction on the ground due to Pakistani air strikes. India's naval losses in the conflict were minimal. The only significant loss was the INS Khukri, a Blackwood class frigate (Bass, 2015: 235; Gill, 2003: 65).

The primary focus of India's intervention in East Pakistan was on providing military assistance. India's assistance to East Pakistan, both prior to and during the conflict, was focused solely on military matters. Before the intervention, India covertly supported the Mukti Bahini by providing training, arms, logistical support, and bases. During the intervention, the scope of the Indian intervention was limited to military engagement with Pakistani forces. Therefore, the scope of the Indian intervention can be classified as only "providing security". The first intervention of the Cold War Period, the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, shares characteristics with pre-1990 interventions. With a force of approximately half a million, the role of manpower can be classified as "main". Although the airpower engaged in air-to-air combat apart from protecting land forces, it was not the main force. In an intervention where airpower is the main force, there would not be nearly half a million land troops involved. Therefore, the role of airpower in this intervention can be classified as "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and scope of East Pakistan Intervention is presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of East Pakistan Intervention

Intervention	**Role of the Manpower**	**Strength of the Manpower**	**Role of the Airpower**	**Scope of the Intervention**	**Casualties**
East Pakistan, 1971	Main	480,000	Assist	Providing Security	2,300 - 3,800

2.1.2. Pakistan Intervention at the UNSC

Operation Searchlight, initiated by President Yahya on 25 March 1971 to curb the East Pakistani independence movement, led to a massive humanitarian catastrophe. With the start of this operation, hundreds of thousands died in East Pakistan, ten million fled to India, and 30 million were internally displaced. In addition to the killings, many Bengalis were tortured, raped, went missing, and had their property destroyed by the Pakistani Army (Bass, 2015: 234; Jahan, 2012: 250). However, despite the mass killings and the influx of refugees it caused, this humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan did not receive substantial attention from the UNSC. Before 1971, the year of the Pakistan crackdown and Indian intervention, the last meeting in which the UNSC convened with the agenda of India and Pakistan was in 1965 because of the Second Indo-Pakistani War. Moreover, despite the mass killings and the influx of refugees in East Pakistan, the UNSC was convened for the first time for the Pakistan agenda on 4 December, one day after Pakistan launched air strikes on Indian airfields. This clearly shows that the UNSC was concerned with the conflict between India and Pakistan, rather than the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan.

In 1971, the UNSC convened nine times to address the situation on the India/Pakistan subcontinent (on the 4th, 5th, 12th-16th, and 21st of December), resulting in the drafting of three resolutions. Two of these three resolutions, on the 5th and 13th of December, were vetoed by the USSR, while Resolution 307, on 21 December, was adopted. In Draft Resolution 10423, dated 5 December, the UN called for an immediate ceasefire and, crucially, declared the hostility between India and Pakistan as an "*immediate threat to international peace and security"* (United Nations Security Council Drafted Resolution 10423, 1971). However, the USSR vetoed this resolution. In Draft Resolution 10446, dated 13 December, the UN reiterated its call for a ceasefire and reaffirmed the situation as a threat to international peaces and security. However, unlike the previous one, this Draft Resolution also called upon "*all parties concerned to take all possible measures and precautions to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area*" (United Nations Security Council Drafted Resolution 10446, 1971). Even though it was after India's intervention, India could have strengthened the legitimacy of its intervention by relying on this resolution. However, the Draft Resolution was again vetoed by the USSR.

Resolution 307 was adopted on 21 December; however, Pakistan had already surrendered on 16 December. In other words, the UNSC adopted a resolution after India had defeated Pakistan when the conflict appeared to have already concluded. However, Resolution 307 stated that the situation in the area "*remains a threat to international peace and security*" and called upon "*all those concerned to take all necessary measures to preserve human life*" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 307, 1971). As the conflict had ceased, it is possible to interpret that this resolution was adopted to maintain the ceasefire and promote relief and rehabilitation in the post-conflict situation.

Since the UNSC declared the post-intervention situation, rather than pre-intervention, as a threat to international peace and security, the relevant section in the table is marked "No." Moreover, an important point was that despite the absence of UNSC Authorization for the intervention, the UNSC resolution did not condemn (Wheeler, 2000: 70) or disapprove Indian intervention and did not mention Pakistan's rights over East Pakistan. One might interpret this as the UN not regarding India's intervention as an invasion or aggression. In summary, the East Pakistan Intervention at the UNSC are presented in Table 9.

Table 9: Summary of the East Pakistan Intervention at the UNSC

Case	Number of UNSC Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
East Pakistan, 1974	9	3	1	NO	NO	NO

2.2. Cyprus Intervention, 1974

2.2.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

Cyprus, the third-largest island in the Mediterranean, has historically attracted the attention of major powers owing to its strategic location. Covering an area of 9,251 square kilometers, Cyprus is located 64 kilometers away from Türkiye, 402 kilometers from Rhodes (the nearest Greek island), and 740 kilometers from Athens. Since dominating the seas is essential for a great power, Cyprus's history has been marked by the rivalry of major powers. Cyprus is a vital location for any power seeking to dominate the seas. Consequently, Cyprus was ruled by many great powers of their respective eras, including Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Venetians, the Ottoman Empire, and the British Empire.

Although various powers dominated Cyprus in the past, it was during Ottoman rule that Orthodox Christians developed a strong sense of unity. This can be attributed partly to the Ottoman ruling practice known as the "millet" system. On the one hand, the "millet" system allowed religious communities a certain degree of autonomy, but on the other hand, it disallowed social integration among the religious groups. For example, intermarriage between Orthodox individuals and Muslims was not tolerated. Moreover, the proportion of villages with a mixed ethnic population decreased from 43% to 36% between 1891 and 1931 and further declined to 18% by the time of independence in 1960 (Akgün et al., 2005; Kaufmann, 2007: 210; Solsten, 1993: 17,18). There was a lack of social integration, and day by day, social polarization continued to intensify.

The island was governed by a small Ottoman bureaucracy, assisted by the Greek Orthodox clergy. The manner of governance varied, sometimes repressive and sometimes indifferent, depending on the sultan's and local officials' persona and incidents in the region. For the most part, the Ottoman government's attitude towards its subjects was good as long as they did not rebel. In the early stages of Ottoman rule, the majority of the population was engaged in agriculture. In later periods, however, the Orthodox subjects concentrated on trade, while the Muslim population was mainly involved in the bureaucracy and the military (Akgün et al., 2005; Dodd, 2010: 2; Solsten, 1993: 17,18).

Following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), Britain assumed the administration of Cyprus, using it as a base to protect the Ottoman Empire against Russian threats. This provisional succession became permanent in 1914 when the Ottomans entered the war against the Allies. Under British rule, Cyprus was offered several times to Greece, which later pursued policy unification with Cyprus. (Akgün et al., 2005; Solsten, 1993: 19). During the Balkan Wars, Britain aimed to establish a naval base in Argostoli, Greece, in order to control Italy in the Adriatic. Greece was offered Cyprus in return for agreeing to this exchange. Subsequently, at the beginning of the First World War, Britain presented Cyprus to Greece again, this time in exchange for Greek participation in the war against the Central Powers. In 1915, Britain made a third offer of Cyprus to Greece, including Western Thrace and Dedeagatch, dependent upon Greece joining the war. But Greece missed these opportunities. In the last two offerings, Greece believed that Germany would win the war, and the Germans had already offered Cyprus to Greece. Following World War I, Britain officially declared Cyprus a Crown colony (Fouskas, 2001: 101,102).

The first riot under British rule was in 1930-31 over the British proposal to raise taxes in the wake of the Great Depression of 1929. This proposal led to widespread public outrage and mass protests in October 1931. The protests resulted in the loss of several lives, many injuries, and the burning of the British Government House in Nicosia (Solsten, 1993: 22). Following the end of World War II, Greece and Greek Cypriots initiated an adamant campaign for enosis (union with Greece). In 1950, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus conducted a plebiscite on enosis among Greek Cypriots, excluding Turks, and the result showed 96% in favor of unification with Greece. Subsequently, Greece appealed to the United Nations for the implementation of self-determination in Cyprus (Fouskas, 2001: 106; Türkmen, 2004: 70), which internationalized the issue of Cyprus. Furthermore, this appeal allowed Britain to involve Türkiye in the Cyprus issue.

In 1954, the guerrilla organization EOKA (The Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) was established under the leadership of Cypriot-born George Grivas, and in 1955, it initiated an armed campaign against the British presence on the island. The mobilization of EOKA marked a crucial milestone in the history of Cyprus. On the political front, the political leader of the enosis, Makarios

III, was elected as the Archbishop of Cyprus. In his inauguration, he pledged to reunite with "Mother Greece." In the summer of 1955, Britain organized a conference in London to discuss the Cyprus issue and invited representatives from both Greece and Türkiye. This meeting marked Türkiye's official entry into the Cyprus issue. On the Turkish side, in 1957, Turkish Cypriots on the island formed a secret organization named Volkan, which was later renamed the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı - TMT), to counter the attacks of EOKA (Akgün et al., 2005; Dodd, 2010: 20; Solsten, 1993: 27–31). EOKA aimed to eliminate all obstacles to enosis. Since the biggest obstacle to this goal was the British at that time, Britain was its first target. Following the opposition of Turkish Cypriots to enosis and their advocacy for "taksim" (partition), they also became the target of EOKA. After the departure of the British, the Turkish Cypriots became the archenemy of the EOKA.

Unlike the Greek Cypriot's enosis cause, the Turkish Cypriot's taksim idea did not include a unification with Türkiye. The possibility of becoming a minority in a state governed by the enosis ideology and EOKA leadership compelled Turkish Cypriots to advocate for the taksim thesis (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 61). The taksim thesis was a kind of counterargument to enosis. Turkish Cypriots implied that if Greek Cypriots wished to unite with Greece, it would have to be without them and a part of the island.

Intercommunal clashes peaked in 1958 and led to the spread of civil war across the island. The civil war on the island significantly worsened relations between Türkiye and Greece, two NATO allies. Under pressure from the US and Britain, Türkiye and Greece entered bilateral negotiations and agreed on an independent Cyprus in February 1959 (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 407,408). Following this agreement, Cyprus officially became an independent republic with the Treaty of Establishment. Britain, Türkiye, and Greece assumed the role of guarantors of the constitutional order and right to deploy military force on the island with the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance.

The new constitution established a presidential system with a Greek Cypriot president, Makarios, and a Turkish Cypriot vice president, Fazıl Küçük. The new system implemented a rigorous system of checks and balances, where each leader held veto power over the Council of Ministers' decisions regarding security, defense, and foreign affairs. The Council consisted of seven Greek and three Turkish members, and in the House of Representatives, the composition was 35 Greek to 15 Turkish members. In the elections, each community voted for its respective representatives. For instance, Turks could not vote for the president, and Greeks could not vote for the vice president. Membership in the civil service was likewise divided along similar lines. In this new system, if both sides were willing to cooperate, the system functioned effectively; however, if one or both sides opted for deadlock, the system became unworkable (Dodd, 2010: 42,43; Hannay, 2005: 4). Moreover, the new constitution explicitly prohibited both enosis and taksim (Campbell-

Thomson, 2014: 61). The new constitution established a delicate balance between the two communities. However, constitutions with such a delicate balance are common in countries with the potential for civil war.

Nevertheless, independence did not bring peace to the island. Three years later, Makarios, who had reluctantly signed the Establishment Agreement, began actively working against the new order. Makarios and his ministers formulated a strategy known as the Akritas Plan, which involved persuading the international community to support constitutional amendments and the revocation of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. Furthermore, the plan included provisions for the violent subjugation of Turkish Cypriots should they challenge these changes. Under this plan, Makarios abrogated the constitution and proposed a 13-point amendment. He then began visiting various capitals, including Türkiye, to persuade them to support the amendment. In protest of these actions, Vice-President Fazıl Küçük and the Turkish ministers ceased their participation in the government. Makarios turned this protest into an opportunity, passing a bill to establish a National Guard composed of Greek Cypriots and appointing Grivas as its head (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 591; Solsten, 1993: 34–36).

Makarios's administration also prevented the return of the Turkish vice president and ministers to the cabinet. In 1965, in the absence of Turkish ministers, the Council of Ministers approved the revision of the electoral law, abolishing separate elections for the vice president and members of the House of Representatives. This revision meant that Greek Cypriots, holding the majority, would win all the seats in both elections (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 62,63). Meanwhile, EOKA initiated armed attacks on Turkish Cypriots, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of men, women, and children. Nearly 30,000 people were evacuated from 103 villages, which EOKA subsequently destroyed following the departure of the residents (Türkmen, 2004: 73). Among the attacks by EOKA in 1963-64, the attack in Nicosia on December 21, 1963, known as Bloody Christmas or Black Christmas, shocked the world.

On the political front, Makarios imposed an economic blockade and movement restrictions on the enclaves controlled by Turkish Cypriots. The majority of Turkish Cypriots resided in these blockaded and isolated enclaves. Makarios upheld this blockade until 1968 (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 63; Heraclides, 2011: 120; Kaufmann, 2007: 213). On 4 March 1964, the UNSC adopted a resolution to deploy a peacekeeping force on the island. EOKA, aiming to strengthen its position before the arrival of the UN peacekeeping force to the island, initiated further attacks. In response, Türkiye's parliament authorized the government to intervene in Cyprus (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 593; Türkmen, 2004: 74).

However, a strongly worded letter from US President Lyndon B. Johnson to Turkish President İsmet İnönü deterred Türkiye from intervening on the island. The threat implied that NATO would not guarantee Türkiye's protection if Türkiye intervened in Cyprus and faced Soviet aggression (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 593, 594). After dissuading Türkiye, the US invited the Prime Ministers of Türkiye and Greece and proposed the renowned "Acheson Plan". Under this plan, Greek Cypriots would achieve enosis, and in return, Greece would hand over the Kastellorizo island and a base in Karpas to Türkiye. Cyprus would be divided into several districts, and some of the administration would be assigned to the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios rejected the plan, describing it as a form of "taksim"(Akgün et al., 2005; Solsten, 1993: 36).

In 1967, Grivas initiated another attack on two Turkish villages, Boğaziçi and Geçitkale. Once again, Türkiye threatened to intervene. However, this time, by bombarding some EOKA positions and deploying the Turkish navy at Iskenderun, Türkiye demonstrated its determination. To avert a military landing, Türkiye demanded the removal of Grivas and 12,000 Greek soldiers from the island. An agreement was reached among the parties involved, resulting in the withdrawal of Grivas and roughly 12,000 military personnel from Greece who had been covertly brought to the island. Moreover, Makarios' restrictions and blockade on Turkish Cypriots were also lifted (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 602; Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 65; Dodd, 2010: 83). The withdrawal of approximately 12,000 Greek military personnel from the island in 1967 helped prevent a potential Greek-Turkish war in 1974 when Türkiye intervened (Birand, 1999).

Furthermore, in April 1967, a group of colonels staged a coup d'état in Greece, which marked a significant historical milestone for the Cyprus issue. The new military administration in Greece, an ardent supporter of enosis, believed that Makarios was not doing enough to achieve enosis. For this reason, Grivas was clandestinely sent to the island, where he established a new terrorist organization named EOKA-B in 1971 (Heraclides, 2011: 120; Türkmen, 2004: 75). Meanwhile, a letter from Makarios to Greece's administration, accusing Greece of events in Cyprus, was leaked in a newspaper in the UK. The leak of the letter deteriorated already strained relations between Makarios and the Greek military junta. Following the leak of this letter, the military junta in Greece decided to remove Makarios (Armaoğlu, 2019b: 604). From that moment onwards, EOKA-B targeted not only Turkish Cypriots but also Greek Cypriots who supported Makarios. There were two assassination attempts on Makarios, and he survived both attempts. However, they managed to oust Makarios. After a terrorist attack on the presidential palace, they falsely announced Makarios's death (Akgün et al., 2005; Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 66; Kaufmann, 2007: 212).

Shortly after, Nicos Sampson was declared the provisional president of the new government. He was perhaps the worst candidate for the presidency from the perspective of the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye. Sampson was a notorious murderer, known as the "Butcher of Omorphita," infamous for his massacres during 1955-59 and 1963-64. Furthermore, he did not try to conceal this reputation; on the contrary, he publicly boasted about his involvement in these conflicts and the massacres he was associated with. During his election campaign for the House of Representatives in 1970, he openly relied on this reputation as an election strategy (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 66; Kaufmann, 2007: 214; Solsten, 1993: 42).

In December 1974, in an interview, Makarios revealed a plan, the Iphestos Plan, which had previously been presented to him by Brigadier Ioannides, one of the leaders of the new Sampson administration. The Iphestos Plan was a meticulous plan for the ethnic cleansing of Turkish Cypriots on the island. The plan meticulously outlined all details, including which villages would be annihilated, who would perform specific duties, and even in which places victims would be buried (Türkmen, 2004: 76,77). On July 17, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit flew to London to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. Türkiye's demands from the Greek military junta included the dismissal of Sampson, the withdrawal of Greek military officers, and the restoration of constitutional order (Akgün et al., 2005). Nevertheless, both the Greek and Cypriot administrations believed that Türkiye was bluffing and would not intervene, as they had threatened to do so in 1963 and 1967 but did not take action.

Encountering the close prospect of enosis and with Turkish Cypriots living in terror, Türkiye, under the leadership of Ecevit, concluded that the only option was military intervention. In the early hours of July 20, Türkiye intervened in Cyprus. Three days later, the Greek junta collapsed due to the Turkish intervention, and Constantinos Karamanlis, the last democratically elected prime minister, was reinstated in Greece. Moreover, Makarios returned to Cyprus following the resignation of Nicos Sampson from the presidency (Dodd, 2010: 115; Heraclides, 2011: 121; Solsten, 1993: 43). Two failed conferences were held among the three countries between Türkiye's first and second interventions, but no solution was reached.

Other countries believed that the collapse of the military regimes and the restoration of democratic governments in both Greece and Cyprus were sufficient, and that Türkiye should not advance further. However, Türkiye insisted on a permanent solution to the recurrent violence on the island. For the short term, Türkiye demanded the establishment of a security cordon around the corner of the island where Turkish troops were trapped. Moreover, following the first intervention, ethnic cleansing began in the Greek-held areas, and it was necessary to evacuate Turkish Cypriots from the enclaves within these areas. For the long term, Türkiye offered a cantonal system, with five cantons allocated for Turkish Cypriots (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 68; Dodd, 2010: 117; Kaufmann, 2007: 215).

Following the failure of the Geneva Conferences to find a solution, Türkiye launched its second intervention on August 14, 1974. Two days later, having controlled 36 percent of the island, Türkiye declared a ceasefire. Most Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island fled to the North, and most Greek Cypriots in the northern area fled to the South. A small number, nearly 10,000 in each part, remained in their respective areas. Unlike the first intervention, which was condoned internationally, the second intervention faced fierce condemnation from many countries and international organizations (Akgün et al., 2005; Heraclides, 2011: 121). In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots established the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, and eight years later, they declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Figure 8: Cyprus Map



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

2.2.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

Türkiye's 1974 intervention in Cyprus was a classic pre-millennium intervention. It was heavily dependent on manpower, and airpower was used to assist and reinforce them. At the time of the Turkish intervention, the TMT was already a militia fighting EOKA-B. In other words, EOKA-B was in conflict with both the TMT and the Turkish Armed Forces in 1974. However, as the TMT was an island militia, its figures will not be included in this section. The following figures only represent the strength of the Türkiye forces during the 1974 intervention in Cyprus.

Türkiye’s military presence on the island of Cyprus, which had ceased in 1878 when control of the island was transferred to the British Empire under the Cyprus Convention, was reinstated in 1959 following the London-Zurich Treaties. The Treaty of London and Zurich, which granted Cyprus independence from the United Kingdom, consisted of three treaties: the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. According to the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Türkiye were authorized to deploy military contingents on the island. Greece was allowed to station 950 officers, while Türkiye could station 650 (Campbell-Thomson, 2014: 60). Therefore, the Cyprus Turkish Peace Forces Regiment was formed in 1960, with a strength limited to 650 troops.

Türkiye’s intervention in Cyprus was carried out in two phases: the first on 20 July and the second on 14 August. On 20 July 1974, Türkiye launched its intervention with a seaborne landing west of Kyrenia. The 6,000 amphibious and commando forces were followed by approximately 1,000 paratroopers dropped north of Nicosia. By the time of the second intervention on 14 August, Turkish forces on the island had increased to their highest number, comprising 40,000 troops, 400 armored vehicles, and 225 tanks, including 175 M-47/48s and 50 M-113s. During these two Turkish interventions, clashes with EOKA-B resulted in approximately 1,500-2,000 deaths and 2,000 wounded, excluding Turkish Cypriot irregulars (Birand, 1990: 166, 364; Cyprus: A Changing Military Balance?, 1984: 9; Kaufmann, 2007: 215; Solsten, 1993: 219, 220)

The scope of the Turkish intervention in 1974 was predominantly centered on “providing security.” The security of the Turkish Cypriot community was the primary concern of the Turkish intervention named “Operation Atilla”. In the first intervention, the objective was to counter EOKA-B terrorism targeting both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who supported Makarios; the second intervention aimed to establish a security cordon for the besieged Turkish troops and to evacuate Turkish Cypriots who were subjected to ethnic cleansing in Greek-controlled areas following the initial intervention (See Section “2.2.1. Background and Rationale of the Intervention” for further information). In summary, the scope of both interventions was “providing security”. With a force of nearly 40,000 troops, the role of manpower in the Turkish intervention can be classified as “main,” while the role of airpower was “assist”. The “casualties” section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and scope of Cyprus Intervention is presented in Table 10.

Table 10: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Cyprus Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Cyprus, 1974	Main	40,000	Assist	Providing Security	1500-2000

2.2.3. The Cyprus Intervention at the UNSC

The process leading to the 1974 intervention began in 1954, the year when EOKA was established and launched its campaign of terrorism, targeting initially the British presence on the island and, subsequently, the Turkish Cypriot community. Between the establishment of EOKA in 1954 and the Turkish intervention in 1974, the island experienced three significant periods of intensified conflict and turmoil: the crisis of 1955-1959, the crisis of 1963-1964 (Bloody Christmas), and the crisis of 1967. Despite the fierce inter-communal conflict between 1955 and 1959, the incidents of this period were not featured on the agenda of the UNSC. This oversight was primarily because Cyprus was under British control during that period. Cyprus first appeared on the UNSC agenda during the 1963-1964 crises. Despite this late attention, Cyprus was the most addressed intervention by the UNSC among the interventions of the Post-Cold War Period.

Between 1955 and 1974, the UNSC convened 78 times to discuss the Cyprus issue, with the highest number of meetings occurring in 1964 (25 meetings) and 1974 (18 meetings). During these 78 meetings, the UNSC drafted 40 resolutions, 39 of which were adopted (see Graph 1). Only one draft was vetoed by the USSR; however, it was adopted the following day. Hence, one could argue that almost no UNSC resolutions on Cyprus were vetoed between 1964 and 1974. This pattern indicates a consensus on the Cyprus issue within the UNSC. The highest number of resolutions were adopted in 1964 and 1974, the years of Bloody Christmas and the Turkish intervention, respectively.

It is worthwhile to analyze some of the 39 resolutions adopted between 1964 and 1974. Resolution 186 declared the situation in Cyprus as "*likely to threaten international peace and security*" and recommended the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force (United Nations Security Council Resolution 186, 1964). Following the escalation of the conflict on the island, the UNSC called for an "immediate ceasefire" in the same year with Resolution 193 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 193, 1964). Apart from these, almost all UNSC resolutions up to July 1974 were adopted to extend the duration of the peacekeeping forces on the island. Although the UN Security Council convened several times in 1967 and before 1974 for the Cyprus agenda, it did not adopt any resolutions for the crises during these periods.

Graph 1: Number of UNSC Resolutions on Cyprus Issue between 1964-1974



Following Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus on 20 July, the UNSC adopted Resolution 353 on the same day, describing the situation in Cyprus as a "serious threat to international peace and security." The resolution called for a ceasefire, demanded an end to military intervention, and requested the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from the island (except those permitted by international treaties). It also called for Greece, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom to enter into negotiations (United Nations Security Council Resolution 353, 1974). All resolutions adopted until the second phase of the intervention on 14 August restated the calls mentioned above by the UNSC. Following Türkiye's second intervention on 14 August, the UNSC adopted Resolution 357 on the same day, which called for a ceasefire and the resumption of negotiations (United Nations Security Council Resolution 357, 1974). Moreover, the UNSC expressed its disapproval of unilateral military actions in Cyprus in Resolution 360 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 360, 1974) and noted the large number of displaced people and their need for humanitarian assistance in Resolution 361 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 361, 1974).

UNSC Resolution 186 acknowledged the pre-intervention circumstances as, to some extent, a threat to international peace and security. This intervention was carried out without UNSC Authorization, yet, in cases lacking UNSC Authorization, the absence of UN condemnation or disapproval can be perceived as indirect support. However, the UNSC explicitly declared its disapproval in Resolution 360 in this intervention. In summary, the Cyprus Intervention at the UNSC are presented in Table 11.

Table 11: Summary of the Cyprus Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	Number of Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
Cyprus, 1974	78	40	39	NO	NO	YES

2.3. Uganda Intervention, 1979

2.3.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

Although Tanzania's intervention in Uganda appeared to stem from Idi Amin's coup d'état in 1971, a deeper understanding of the situation necessitates examining the underlying factors that led to Idi Amin's rise to power, specifically Uganda's political landscape before his regime. Uganda was one of the British East Africa Protectorate countries, alongside Kenya, Zanzibar, and Tanzania. Britain adopted indirect rule in Uganda due to a lack of sufficient human resources for direct rule and to avoid potential confrontation with the local people. The Buganda Kingdom, one of the notable kingdoms within Uganda, played a central role in Britain's indirect rule system. Buganda[2] served as the main pool of human resources for senior roles during the colonial era, with most hierarchical positions within British local administration being filled by Baganda officers. On the other hand, some people from other regions of Uganda were a source of labor, while others were recruited into the army (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 2; Nyeko, 1986: 18; Okello, 2002: 174–177).

The privileged status of the Bagandas and the deprivation of other regions fueled resentment among other ethnic groups, leading to the rise of anti-Baganda feelings in the country. This preferential treatment was not confined solely to the job roles held by Bagandas. Compared to other regions, Buganda was more developed, with better educational opportunities, social services, and economic conditions. Additionally, due to their higher level of education, Bagandas held higher-paying jobs (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 2–5). During colonial rule, recruiting the army from various ethnic groups was considered a privilege for Bagandas. However, after independence, this practice became a disadvantage as it meant they would not have an influence over the army. As a result of these divisions, Uganda was unable to develop national unity to hold all ethnic groups together, and it became independent in 1962 in an environment of ethnic fragmentation.

This lack of national unity may also emanate from the absence of a war of independence. Unlike some other colonial countries, Uganda gained independence without a war of independence

[2] Or Waganda. It refers to people of Buganda.

against the colonial state. In fact, Uganda did not gain independence; it was granted it (Nyeko, 1986: 16). Following independence, Mutesa II assumed the presidency, and Milton Obote became prime minister. Obote was an educated and widely respected figure in the country, while Mutesa II held the title of Kabaka, the title of the king of Buganda. Even though they jointly assumed leadership of the country, the two government partners shared different perspectives. Obote was among those who believed that Buganda should not enjoy privileged and dominant status and aimed to remove this supremacy. Conversely, within the Lukiiko - the Parliament of the Kingdom of Buganda - there were calls for Buganda to withdraw from the Kingdom. The Bagandas backed these calls, believing that living under their king and institutions would be preferable to the national government and its institutions. In response to these calls, Obote deployed the army led by Idi Amin to Buganda, ordering an invasion of Mutesa II's presidential palace. Mutesa II fled into exile, and Obote abolished all monarchies as well as the roles of president and vice president. He subsequently introduced a new presidential role vested with all executive powers and declared himself president (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 6,7; Leonard Boyle, 2017: 6,7; Nyeko, 1986: 18).

Following his presidential declaration, Obote embarked on a campaign to consolidate his power, purging his opponents from the army, party, and various assignments. Obote not only purged his opponents but also arrested and imprisoned them. In their stead, he appointed people from his ethnic allies and tribesmen. This wave of purge led to the galvanizing of an anti-Obote camp that aimed to oust him. In 1964, the military revolted due to issues related to payment and working conditions. However, Obote adopted a different approach, met the army's demands, and even promoted the mutiny leader. This was because the army held a central position in Obote's governance. The military became aware of the significance of its own role through this mutiny. Moreover, Obote's power relied heavily on the army, and as the level of violence in Uganda rose, so did his dependence on the military. In an attempt to reduce this dependence, Obote organized paramilitary groups directly under his command, which, in turn, disturbed the army (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 8,9; Leonard Boyle, 2017: 7). The involvement of the military in politics was a conscious decision by Obote. Because the army supported him, there was nothing wrong with strengthening it. However, he did not anticipate the army turning against him.

While Milton Obote attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in January 1971, Idi Amin seized control of Uganda. Indeed, the coup's signs were evident in a discussion between Obote and British Prime Minister Edward Heath. During a moment of increased tension, Heath responded angrily to accusations of racism, remarking, "I wonder how many of you will be permitted to return to your own countries after this conference." As anticipated, the international media warmly welcomed Idi Amin's coup, and Britain promptly recognized the new regime (Umozurike, 1982: 301,302).

However, Julius Nyerere, who maintained a close relationship with Obote, refused to recognize the new regime and granted Obote and his supporters asylum in Tanzania. When nearly 1,000 of Obote's armed soldiers crossed from north-western Tanzania into southern Uganda, advancing towards Kampala, Idi Amin's forces attacked a Tanzanian town near the border (G. Roberts, 2014: 693). However, the mediation of the Somali President averted further conflict, leading to the signing of the Mogadishu Accord between the two countries. The Mogadishu Accord mainly obligated both countries to withdraw their forces at least six miles from the border and to cease all military activities against each other (Msabaha, 1985: 34). This initial interaction marked the beginning of the conflict between Tanzania and Uganda.

Initially, Idi Amin emerged as a new hope for people intimidated by Obote's despotism. He released all political prisoners and appointed the majority of his ministers from outside the military. He repatriated the body of Kabaka, who had died in exile, for burial in Uganda, symbolizing a restoration of honor. However, this positive atmosphere did not last long. Idi Amin became a more brutal dictator than Obote. On many issues, he resumed from where Obote had left off. Amin abrogated parliament, banned political parties, removed local councils, and appointed military governors (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 9).

Figure 9: Map of Region



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

Idi Amin perpetrated the killing of thousands of Obote's tribes and his ethnic allies under suspicion of loyalty to Obote. His secret police force also killed thousands without trial. The Chief Justice was assassinated after voicing concerns about some unlawful actions, the Vice Chancellor of Makerere University was killed following the Council's refusal to grant Obote a doctorate, and the Archbishop of the Anglican Church was shot after discussing the mistreatment of Christians. The British also found themselves the target of Idi Amin. Amin expelled nearly 40,000 Asians who held British passports, confiscated their assets and businesses, and transferred them to Amin's associates. Moreover, Idi Amin had himself carried by white Britons, symbolically retaliating against the practice of Britons being carried on the shoulders of local people during the early colonial period (see Figure 10) (Umozurike, 1982: 302, 303).

Furthermore, Idi Amin's decisions exacerbated the economic situation. The production of cotton, tea, sugarcane, coffee, and tobacco was drastically reduced. The price of essential daily commodities, such as milk, meat, sugar, and petrol, experienced a sharp increase. The black market became the only way to access these needs. The American trade boycott on Uganda's coffee exports further worsened the situation (G. Roberts, 2014: 693; Umozurike, 1982: 303).

Figure 10: Four British carried Idi Amin

Source: Sheikh-Miller, 2021

As Idi Amin's repression escalated, a growing number of people fled the country. These exiles became organized and began to prepare to oust Idi Amin. As these exiles increased, factions emerged, leading to the formation of many irregular, unorganized anti-Amin groups (see Table 12). Tanzanian President Nyerere set aside the differences among these groups and united them under a single cause:

the removal of Idi Amin. Together, these exiles formed the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) thanks to Julies Nyerere (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 10–13).

Table 12: The anti-Amin groups in exile

Dissent Group	Bases
Uganda Human Right Group	United Kingdom
Uganda Action Group	United Kingdom
Popular Front for the Liberation of Uganda	United States of America
Uganda Freedom Unio	United States of America
Relief Educational Training Uganda Refugees Now (RETURN)	United States of America
Africa Study Group	United States of America
Uganda Study Group	United States of America
Kikosi Maalum	Kenya, Zambia, United Kingdom
Save Uganda Movement	Tanzania
Uganda National Unity and Reconciliation	Tanzania
Uganda Society	Kenya
Uganda Discussion Group	Kenya
Uganda Nationalist Organisation	Kenya
Uganda Liberation Movement	Kenya
Uganda Liberation Group	Zambia
Uganda National Movement	Zambia
Nairobi Consultative Committee	Kenya
Negotiating Committee for Democratic Unity	Tanzania
Moshi Discussion Group	Tanzania
Ad Hoc Committee for Promotion of Unity	Tanzania
Muthaiga Discussion Group	Kenya

Source: Golooba-Mutebi, 2008: 11,12

In 1978, Sudanese recruits in the army revolted, and Amin dispatched loyalist groups to suppress this mutiny, but they managed to flee Kagera, the southern border of Uganda. Under the excuse of pursuing the mutineers, the Ugandan army launched an invasion into the Kagera Salient, Tanzania. In November 1978, Amin declared the annexation of the Kagera Salient. This was an excuse for Amin as the Kagera Salient had been a longstanding territorial claim of his. On the other hand, Kagera was also a base for the incursions of anti-Amin fighters from Tanzania. Amin's forces committed murder and rape against the local population, looted what they could carry, and burned the rest of the local people's property. Meanwhile, the Tanzanian Army was focused on the southern border with Mozambique, and it would require weeks to reach Kagera to launch a counter-offensive (G. Roberts, 2014: 695).

While the Tanzanian army prepared for a counterattack, Idi Amin proposed a withdrawal on the condition that Nyerere would neither invade Uganda nor support anti-Amin groups. However, Nyerere, resolute in his intention to oust and punish Idi Amin, rejected Amin's offer, and launched a counterattack. In December, the Tanzanian Army effectively forced Ugandan forces to retreat to the border. However, Nyerere was convinced that the security of Kagera could only be assured if the Ugandan army were removed from the high ground near the border. Subsequently, the Tanzanian army, accompanied by armed anti-Amin groups, initiated a counter-offensive, causing the Ugandan army to retreat northward. In the meantime, Obote called on all Ugandans to "overthrow the regime of death" and emphasized that the liberation of Uganda should not rely on foreign troops (G. Roberts, 2014: 697–699; Wheeler, 2000: 114,115).

Tanzanian troops maintained their advance, capturing two cities near the border, Mbarara and Masaka. Tanzanian and anti-Amin forces advanced towards the capital. After capturing Entebbe Airport, they effectively cut off the flow of external aid to Amin's forces, eventually leading to Kampala's fall on April 10. A few days after the fall of the capital, the combined Tanzanian and anti-Amin forces managed to remove Amin's forces from all cities. Three days later, the chairman of the UNLF, Yusuf Lule, became the president (G. Roberts, 2014: 700–701; Twaddle, 1979: 218; Umozurike, 1982: 304).

2.3.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

The Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1979 shared characteristics with earlier Cold War interventions. The intervention was characterized by a heavy reliance on manpower, with the airpower providing support and reinforcement. Tanzania initially played an indirect role in the civil war by permitting anti-Amin groups to use Kagera as a base for their attacks against Idi Amin's forces. Tanzania's direct involvement in Uganda started after Ugandan forces advanced into Kagera Island, Tanzania, under the pretext of pursuing rebels and subsequently annexed the island.

During Uganda's invasion of Kagera Island, Tanzania was dealing with Mozambique on its southern border. It took Tanzania several weeks to respond to Uganda's invasion. Initially, Tanzanian forces, around 4,000, together with approximately 1,000 Ugandans, launched a dual-front attack. Over the subsequent months, Tanzania deployed 30,000 to 50,000 troops equipped with machine guns, anti-tank weapons, and mortars into Uganda, accompanied by 2,000 anti-Amin forces. Apart from the 1,500 civilians killed by Amin's forces during the invasion of Kagera Island, Tanzania suffered the loss of 373 soldiers by the end of the intervention. Of these, only 96 were killed by enemy fire; the remaining deaths were due to accidents (Acheson-Brown, 2001: 7; Avirgan & Honey, 1982: 3,56,196; Umozurike, 1982: 304). These figures do not include casualties of the anti-Amin forces.

The scope of the Tanzanian intervention was primarily focused on "providing security" to Uganda. Nyerere believed that Tanzania's security depended on Uganda's security and Uganda's security depended on the removal of Idi Amin. The scope of Tanzania's intervention before the operation was to provide military assistance to anti-Amin forces. During the intervention, the scope was limited to direct military engagement with Amin's forces. In summary, the scope of Tanzanian intervention was "providing security". With a force of nearly 30,000-50,000 troops, the role of manpower in the Tanzanian intervention can be classified as "main," while the role of airpower was "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and scope of Uganda Intervention is presented in Table 13.

Table 13: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Uganda Intervention

Intervention	**Role of the Manpower**	**Strength of the Manpower**	**Role of the Airpower**	**Scope of the Intervention**	**Casualties**
Uganda, 1979	Main	30,000-50,000	Assist	Providing Security	373

2.3.3. Uganda Intervention at the UNSC

This section will be the shortest of all sections, analyzing the interventions at the UN. Despite the numerous human rights violations and massacres committed by Idi Amin's regime between 1971 and 1979, Uganda's invasion of Kagera Island in 1978, and the subsequent conflict between the two countries in 1979, none of these events were addressed by the UN, including both the UNSC and the UNGA. There were no UNSC meetings specifically addressing the agendas of Uganda or Tanzania. Consequently, the number of draft or adopted resolutions related to these agendas was also zero. However, this indifference at the UNSC was unanticipated by both Uganda and Tanzania. Both countries had assumed that the events would significantly impact on the UNSC agenda.

On 13 February 1979, Idi Amin requested a Security Council meeting to address the border situation, but the request was dismissed due to improper wording. Six weeks later, Amin renewed his call for a meeting, but he retracted his request after the African group at the UN advised against it. On the other hand, while engaged in military conflict, Tanzania also focused on justifying its intervention on the international stage (Wheeler, 2000: 120-123). However, neither did the UNSC discuss the events upon Amin's request, nor did Nyerere have to defend his intervention at the UN. Moreover, although the UNSC did not authorize Tanzania's intervention, it neither condemned nor disapproved it. In summary, Table 14 presents the Uganda Intervention at the UNSC.

Table 14: Summary of the Uganda Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	Number of Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
Uganda, 1979	0	0	0	NO	NO	NO

CHAPTER THREE

3. POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: 1990-2000

3.1. Iraq Intervention, 1991

3.1.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

The Iraq Intervention holds a critical place both in the literature on humanitarian intervention and Iraq's future. While the uprisings that precipitated the intervention began after the Gulf War, the underlying causes of these revolts trace back much further. For a comprehensive understanding, it is essential to examine the long-standing issues and the root causes behind these uprisings. Iraq is one of the most ancient countries with a history that dates back to the dawn of human civilization around 3500 BC (Abdullah, 2006: 5). Many great powers dominated this region until Iraq gained its independence in 1958. The Persians, Greeks, Islamic Caliphates, Ottomans, and British each ruled this region during different periods of history.

From the sixteenth century to 1914, the Ottomans ruled Iraq through its three major regions: Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad, which were the three largest cities. However, the governor of Baghdad functioned much like a first among equals. The Ottomans, who preferred decentralization in the regions under their rule, granted these governors a degree of autonomy. During their rule, the Ottomans fought to keep the Shiite Safavids out of Iraq, where most of the population was Shiite. However, the First World War marked the beginning of a new era in Iraq. One day after the Ottoman Empire allied with the Central Powers in the First World War, the British army landed in Basra. By the end of the war (1918), Britain had secured control over Baghdad and Mosul (Abdullah, 2006: 7-11).

Britain unified these three cities under the name of Iraq within the League of Nations Mandate, overseen by Britain, and appointed Prince Faisal I as the King of Iraq. However, mandating Iraq, which was accustomed to the decentralized regime of the Ottoman Empire, proved challenging as Iraqis periodically rebelled against the new centralized regime. In order to eliminate the causes of the insurgency, Britain decided to grant some authority to local tribal leaders, including tax collection, police administration, and the enforcement of customary tribal laws within their territories. In the meantime, while granting concessions to tribal leaders, Britain also reinforced central authority by appointing tribal leaders, allocating funds, and enforcing stricter oversight over urban areas. Nevertheless, these new measures escalated tension (Abdullah, 2006: 7–12; Arı, 2014: 450,451; Tripp, 2007: 30).

The Hashemite monarchy under the British Mandate lasted until 1958. In that year, a group of soldiers led by General Qasim staged a coup, overthrowing the monarchy and establishing the Republic of Iraq. Between 1958 and 1968, Iraq grappled with political instability, marked by a series of military coups. In 1968, the Ba'ath Party assumed authority, ruling for approximately 35 years, with ten years under Hassan al-Bakr and 24 years under Saddam Hussein (Arı, 2014: 456,457; Tripp, 2007: 143,144). Saddam Hussein officially assumed power in 1979 and governed until 2003. His oppressive regime played a central role in numerous major conflicts that had profound regional and international implications. He also did not hesitate to target his own citizens, and all these factors contributed to his reputation as one of the "last great dictators of the 20th century" (*The Blundering Dictator*, 2007).

On the other hand, the Kurds are one of the main ethnic groups in Iraq, making up about 17 percent of the population and residing mainly in the northern region of the country. During Ottoman and Persian rule, the provinces inhabited by Kurds experienced loose central control. However, the Kurds were discontented with the centralized administration under the British mandate and the subsequent Republic of Iraq. The Kurds in Iraq have long desired an independent or at least autonomous administration in Northern Iraq. Their revolts, which could be traced back to 1880, had been staged one after another against central authorities. It is possible to argue that the Kurds' desire for independence or autonomy was fueled by promises made by both foreign states and Iraqi rulers. For example, the Treaty of Sèvres, signed with the vanquished Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, pledged autonomy to the Kurdish people. However, this commitment evaporated when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk won independence and founded a new republic. Another example is Saddam Hussein, who promised the Kurds autonomy in 1970 before becoming president (Abdullah, 2006: 13; Arı, 2014: 462; Black, 1993: 24,25).

The other rebels in the 1991 insurgency, the Shiites, accounted for approximately 60 percent of Iraq's population and largely resided in the southern regions. The Shiites sometimes challenged the central government, although not as frequently and thoughtfully as the Kurds.. One reason for this was that some Shiites were integrated with non-Shiites by residing in Baghdad or working for the central government. There was also a distinction in the motivations behind the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings. While the Kurds primarily revolted for ethnic reasons, seeking autonomy and independence, the Shiites' revolt was mainly driven by economic, political, and, subsequently, religious factors. Particularly after 1979, under the influence of Iran, religious factors became more significant, contributing to Iraq's decision to attack Iran (Arı, 2014: 463).

For both the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south, 1991 represented an ideal time to rebel against Saddam Hussein. After eight years of a war of attrition with Iran, Saddam experienced further defeat by coalition forces in Kuwait. Consistently pursuing adventures that ultimately resulted in frustration, Saddam Hussein was steadily losing domestic and military power. Indeed, Saddam failed to maintain the wave of patriotism that arose in the last phases of the Iran-Iraq war. Aside from the small minority who supported Iran during that conflict, a significant number of Kurds and Shiites fought for Iraq against Iran. However, public sentiment during the Gulf War was largely different. Many Iraqis internally opposed this conflict. There was widespread hope among the people that, even if it resulted in destruction, it might lead to the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime (Jabar, 1992: 3,5).

Nearly all elements of Iraq's army were deployed in Kuwait, except for most Republican Guard units. Saddam Hussein retained Republican Guard units in Iraq as a precaution against potential uprisings, as Iraqi intelligence had reported that rebel groups were distributing heavy and light weapons to its attackers, along with protective masks against potential chemical attacks. This signaled a preparation for revolt in the North (Bengio, 2012: 197; Cline, 2000). A speech by President Bush (1991) on February 15, further motivated the groups that were prepared to revolt: "*But there is another way for the bloodshed to stop. And that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands - to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside, and to comply with the United Nations resolutions and then rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.*" The rebels read this speech as a sign of US support if they attempted to overthrow Saddam.

On February 28, a well-known but unverified anecdote claims that a tank officer retreating from Kuwait turned his gun and fired at a poster of Saddam near Basra, sparking the uprising in the South. The uprising rapidly grew and spread to all major Shiite cities within a short period. Insurgents targeted key components of Saddam's regime, including the mayor's office, the Ba'ath Party's provincial headquarters, and the police and intelligence offices. In essence, they assaulted every symbol of Saddam's regime they encountered. The slogans of the Shiite rebels were religious-oriented, calling for an Islamic revolution and a Shiite ruler, similar to Iran. Within just a few days, Shiite rebels succeeded in seizing control of nearly all major cities in the south (Goldstein, 1992; Marr, 2018: 228).

Three days following the uprising in the south, another uprising started in the north. The timing of the northern uprising was more advantageous than that of the southern uprising because regime forces had withdrawn from the north to protect the capital and suppress the southern uprising. Furthermore, nearly 60,000 Iraqi soldiers defected, bringing their military equipment with them. By February 20, Kurdish rebels had gained control of most major northern cities, with Kirkuk being the most significant. This oil-rich city has been a source of contention between the Kurds and the central government since the 1970s. More than 75 percent of the Kurdish population in Iraq was under their control. They announced the establishment of a regional self-governing body. In both the northern and southern rebellions, the sequence of events followed a similar pattern: seizing key sites within the cities, such as the mayor's office, Ba'ath Party headquarters, secret police (mukhabarat) buildings, prisons, and military garrisons, while targeting every symbol associated with Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, between 600 and 700 Ba'athists and regime supporters were killed during these uprisings (Bengio, 2012: 197,198; Jabar, 1992: 8; Marr, 2018: 230; Tubbs, 1995: 21).

However, despite being surrounded by insurgents in both the South and North, Saddam Hussein unexpectedly consolidated his forces and initially directed them to the South. Realizing that he could not fight on two fronts at once, Saddam decided to suppress the southern insurgency first. This decision led the Kurds to believe that Saddam's forces were not strong enough to operate against them. On 6 March 1991, Saddam Hussein appointed his tough cousin, Hasan Ali Al-Majid, to quell the rebellion and announced that he had authorized presidential powers for his commanders responsible for suppressing the uprising (Bengio, 2012: 198). The Republican Guard swiftly and brutally recaptured all cities held by Shiite insurgents, killing tens of thousands of people, and destroying sacred Shiite shrines and cemeteries. Tens of thousands fled across the border to Iran (Cline, 2000; Marr, 2018: 231, 232; Yildiz, 2004: 36).

After restoring order in the south, Saddam's forces proceeded northward with full force and resources. First, Kirkuk was seized, and subsequently, all the cities were recaptured by 3 April. Using helicopters, gunships, fixed-wing aircraft, and heavy artillery, the Iraqi army decisively overwhelmed the Kurdish rebels. When the uprising in the north ended in early April, Saddam Hussein once again assumed control over the entire country. The Iraqi army's extensive use of phosphorus shells led the Kurds to fear that Saddam would seek vengeance, reminiscent of the events in 1988. This concern triggered a mass exodus of Kurds to the borders of Türkiye and Iran (Bengio, 2012: 199; Marr, 2018: 232; Tubbs, 1995: 21).

This exodus attracted the international community's attention and prompted calls for intervention. An estimated two million people, nearly half of the Kurdish population in Iraq, fled to the mountainous border areas, marking the most enormous influx of refugees in the last 40 years up to that date. International agencies reported between 500 and 1,000 deaths per day. Türkiye and Iran appealed to the United Nations to take action to halt the refugee influx, as they were unable to handle an influx on such a scale (Cockayne & Malone, 2006: 125; Marr, 2018: 232). On April 5, 1991, the UNSC Resolution 688 condemned the Iraqi government for oppressing civilians, demanded that Iraq cease these actions, and insisted on allowing humanitarian aid to reach the people in the region (United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, 1991).

However, Türkiye believed that this was not a solution. It proposed the establishment of an UN-protected safe haven within Iraqi borders to solve the problem definitively. The United States, Britain, and France agreed with this suggestion, and the United States announced the establishment of a "no-fly zone," prohibiting any military air activity north of the 36th parallel. Furthermore, they subsequently initiated Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and deployed ground forces. Over the following three months, coalition forces expanded the safe haven as Iraqi forces withdrew (Cockayne & Malone, 2006: 127; Tubbs, 1995: 22–25). In April 1991, the Revolutionary Command Council granted amnesty to Iraqis who participated in the rebellion. By September, nearly all Iraqi Kurdish refugees were persuaded to repatriate. Additionally, a small military unit remained in Türkiye for some time in case of further attacks from the Iraqi Army (Haulman, 1991: 182; Marr, 2018: 234; Yildiz, 2004: 41).

Figure 11: No-Fly Zones

This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

3.1.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

The intervention in Iraq, marking the first intervention of the Post-Cold War Period relied predominantly on manpower, with airpower providing support and reinforcement. Before military intervention, the intervener often indirectly involved the country, as in previous interventions such as providing arms, military training, and logistic support. However, there was no indirect involvement in Iraq until the military intervention. The US even denied the insurgents' request for access to captured Iraqi weapons (Abdullah, 2006: 67). Direct engagement by US-led coalition forces started after the US announced the establishment of a no-fly zone following resolution 688.

The US-led Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) initially started with 5,000 US troops, 2,000 from Britain, 1,000 from France, and a smaller Dutch contingent. Between April and June 1991, when coalition forces reached their maximum size and diversity, the total strength was 23,000 personnel from 11 countries deployed for OPC. Airpower was extensively used in OPC to airlift emergency aid to the region, protect and support 23,000 ground troops, and maintain the no-fly zone.

Türkiye was the main base for conducting air operations during the operation. Following the withdrawal of Iraqi troops in July, a 5,000-strong rapid deployment force was stationed in Incirlik to respond in case of potential Iraqi reprisals. During the operation, Saddam's forces neither resisted nor attacked Coalition forces, resulting in no combat casualties for the Coalition. However, the OPC resulted in the loss of 26 people due to a tragic "friendly fire" incident. Two US F-15s patrolling the northern no-fly zone mistakenly shot down two US UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, resulting in the deaths of 26 people (About the Eagle Flight Detachment Memorial Monument, n.d.; Bengio, 2012: 200; Cockayne & Malone, 2006: 132; DiPrizio, 2002: 23; Haulman, 1991: 179–188; Rudd, 2004: 226; Wheeler, 2000: 151).

Unlike previous interventions, the scope of the intervention in Iraq was not limited to providing security. OPC was focused on emergency relief, providing security, and refugee resettlement (Rudd, 2004: 225). US-led coalition forces kept Saddam's forces out of the no-fly zone, providing security for the region while airlifting humanitarian aid. After Saddam's forces retreated, the coalition assisted the displaced Kurds to resettle. Therefore, the scope of the intervention in Iraq can be classified as "wide-ranging." With a force of 23,000 troops, the role of manpower in the Iraq intervention can be classified as "main," while the role of airpower was "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and scope of the Iraq Intervention is presented in Table 14.

Table 15: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Iraq Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Iraq, 1991	Main	23,000	Assist	Wide Ranging	26

3.1.3. Iraq Intervention at the UNSC

Following Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, the Shiites in the South and the Kurds in the North revolted against Saddam's regime, believing that the regime had been seriously weakened by defeat. However, after regrouping quickly, Saddam's forces initially bloodily quelled the Shiite rebellion in the South by massacring tens of thousands of people and then advanced to the North. Saddam's brutal methods of suppressing the uprising and his previous records led the Kurds to flee to the Iran-Türkiye border, fearing Saddam would engage in revenge killing. The UNSC response to situation in Iraq differed from that of previous interventions. For example, unlike previous interventions, the UNSC addressed the pre-intervention situation in Iraq.

In 1991, the year of the uprising, the suppression of the insurgency, and humanitarian intervention, the UNSC convened 15 times for the Iraq agenda. However, not all of these meetings focused on the situation of the Iraqi civilian population. Some addressed Iraq's disputes with Iran, and others with Kuwait. Only three out of the fifteen meetings addressed the situation of the Iraqi civilian population. Following these meetings, three resolutions -688, 706, and 712- were adopted. The most significant was Resolution 688, which explicitly addressed the situation of Iraqi civilians. Resolution 688 condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, demanded that Iraq end this repression, insisted on allowing humanitarian aid to reach the people in the region, and, most importantly, declared the massive flow of refugees resulting from this repression as "*a threat to international peace and security"* (United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, 1991). With Resolution 688, the UNSC, for the first time, clearly described a humanitarian crisis as a "*threat to international peace and security*" (Hehir, 2010: 223). Resolution 186 also used the phrase "to threaten international peace and security" but included the qualifier "likely" before it. The other two resolutions primarily focused on recalling Resolution 688 and providing humanitarian relief to the civilian population in Iraq (United Nations Security Council Resolution 706, 1991; United Nations Security Council Resolution 712, 1991).

Although the US-led coalition that carried out the intervention in Iraq relied on Resolution 688, this resolution did not explicitly refer to military intervention. In other words, Resolution 688 did not include phrases such as "*authorize all members*" to "*take all necessary means*," which could be interpreted as an authorization for military intervention. Although the UNSC did not authorize the intervention, the absence of condemnation or disapproval by the UNSC could be interpreted as an indirect endorsement. In summary, the Iraq Intervention at the UNSC are presented in Table 16.

Table 16: Summary of Iraq Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	**Number of Sessions**	**Draft Resolution**	**Adopted Resolution**	**Threat to Peace and Security**	**UNSC Authorization**	**Disapproval of the intervention**
Iraq, 1991	3	3	3	YES	NO	NO

3.2. Somalia Intervention, 1992

3.2.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

The civil war and crisis in Somalia, coinciding with the intervention in Iraq, were initially overlooked but later received significant attention and a subsequent extensive intervention after international community pressure. The intervention in Somalia featured a noteworthy aspect. In interventions featuring an uprising against dictators, a chain of events leading to intervention typically escalates before the dictator's removal. However, in Somalia, events leading to intervention intensified after the overthrow of the dictator. The intervention in Somalia is more complex and comprehensive in nature and requires a thorough understanding of the root causes of the civil war.

Before colonialism, Somalia was a pastoral and nomadic society, its social structure rooted in clan families, and primarily self-governed under harsh living conditions. Critical to Somali identity and society, clan systems were highly complicated. While there are five principal clans - Hawiye, Darod, Isaaq, Dir, and Rahanwein - each clan comprises its own subfamilies that further divide into numerous lineage segments (see Figure 12), each with distinct traditions and cultural norms. These clans occasionally clashed over the possession of resources such as water, livestock, and farming fields (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995: 3,4; Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 8).

Figure 12: Somalia Clan System



Source: Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 9

Somalia's geographical isolation shielded it from international politics until the opening of the Suez Canal in the nineteenth century. This event made the Horn of Africa strategically important, sparking European competition for regional dominance. Britain, France, and Italy partitioned Somalia carelessly, ignoring the presence of ethnic Somalis who resided in present-day Djibouti and the Ogaden region, northern Kenya. Britain, in the north, and Italy, in the south, maintained their colonial rule even after World War II (see Figure 13) until the declaration of an independent and unified Somali Republic on July 1, 1960. However, neither of the two countries that ruled Somalia for decades prepared it for self-governance (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995: 4,5). One could argue that the lack of adequate support from Western countries influenced Somalia's rapprochement with the USSR after independence.

Figure 13: Somalia before Independence.



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

In the early years of independence, Somalia failed in its first experience of democracy. The parliament was unable to tackle the challenges facing the Somali people, and in October 1969, General Siad Barre seized power through a bloodless coup. The Somali people welcomed Barre's coup d'état, and in the early years, there was public optimism for his regime. He declared the adoption of 'scientific socialism' as his guiding ideology and vowed to end clan loyalties and tribal identities. He criticized the clan system in Somalia and introduced measures to weaken the influence of the clans. He established political and administrative institutions to assume specific clan roles (Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 14; Makinda, 1993: 19). Barre viewed the clan system as the source of the country's problems. Indeed, Barre aimed to replace this clan system with a unified citizen consciousness, a common Somali identity.

However, history followed a different course than planned. During his rule, Barre pursued an extremely tribalist policy, relying exclusively on the Marehan, Ogadeni, and Dhulbahante clans, the clans of himself, his mother, and his son-in-law, respectively. From his inner circle to officers in institutions, all positions were filled with members from these three clans. Barre governed Somalia with an iron fist, implementing an authoritarian, centralized, one-party system. The military became politicized, and opposition was not permitted. Following Barre's coup in 1969, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) dissolved the constitution and prohibited political parties. By 1979, Somalia was governed without a constitution. On the other hand, Barre maintained a strong alliance with the Soviets. This alliance lasted until the war with Ethiopia in 1977. Unable to secure the desired support from the Soviets in this conflict, Barre once again turned to the West. However, this war also revealed Barre's weaknesses. Following this defeat, Barre faced enormous pressure, and members of other clans publicly criticized him (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995: 6; Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 14; Makinda, 1993: 19–22).

In 1986, Barre survived a near-fatal car accident, which prompted three allied clans to conspire to seize power in case of his potential absence. This plotting ultimately led to the collapse of the alliance among these three clans. In addition to these three clans, other clans also desired Barre's removal. Nearly all clans, except Barre's own, agreed that Siad Barre needed to leave. In response, Barre offered negotiations to his opponents in 1989 and 1990, but they rejected the offer, insisting on his removal from power. Conversely, Barre was determined to remain in power. Barre chose to crush the opposition with brutality. His security forces dealt ruthlessly with rebels and their supporters, bombing civilian areas, planting land mines, poisoning wells, and destroying livestock. However, rather than suppressing the insurgency, Barre's brutality encouraged more rebel movements (Makinda, 1993: 21–25).

By late 1990, widespread opposition to Siad Barre's regime culminated in a full-scale civil war in Somalia. General Aideed's forces advanced from the Ethiopian border and seized critical positions in Mogadishu. Furthermore, some police and military divisions deserted the regime to join Aideed's forces. Eventually, on January 27, Siad Barre fled the capital and retreated to his clan's homeland near the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. Siad Barre left the country in a far worse condition than when he assumed power. Conversely, General Aideed, who played a significant role in removing Barre from power, emerged as a strong military leader (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995: 12,13; Yuusuf, 2021: 73, 74).

However, Barre's defeat in January 1991 led to the further disintegration of Somalia, as the opposition forces had no common ground other than their desire to remove Siad Barre. They hated each other, and there were also enemies among these clans. Moreover, following Barre's overthrow, Ali Mahdi Mohammed from the Hawiye clan, which had joined the anti-Barre struggle in the final months before Barre's fall, assumed power without consulting other clans. However, General Aideed and other clan leaders rejected Ali Mahdi's leadership (Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 22; Makinda, 1993: 27). Therefore, a new bloody chapter in Somalia's history opened.

The power vacuum following Barre's fall led to the emergence of several major factions, the most powerful of which were those led by General Mohammed Aideed and Ali Mahdi. In June and July 1991, Djibouti President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, supported by Egypt and Italy, organized a conference to reconcile the parties. Aideed boycotted the conference because his supporters were not invited, while Ali Mahdi saw the conference as recognition of his presidency. Instead of fostering reconciliation, this conference only worsened the situation. Ali Mahdi considered himself the legitimate president because other factions endorsed him at the Djibouti conference. On the other hand, Aideed believed the presidency was his right since it was his forces that overthrew Siad Barre (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995: 15; Yuusuf, 2021: 81,82).

The Italian government sent a delegation to mediate between the two conflicting leaders. However, Ali Mahdi prevented their visit to General Aideed. In response, Aideed's forces attacked the airport to obstruct the delegation's arrival, resulting in their withdrawal. Ali Mahdi retaliated by attacking Aideed's residence. This marked the beginning of the Mogadishu War, which lasted until March 1992 (Yuusuf, 2021: 82). Only anarchy dominated post-Barre Somalia, not Ali Mahdi or Aideed. Ali Mahdi did not even control Mogadishu. In sum, there was no government but plenty of opposition (Makinda, 1993: 30).

In this anarchic atmosphere, looting became the most significant problem, with many armed youth gangs emerging specifically for this purpose. It was an environment where anyone with an AK-47 could loot. Looting became an area of rivalry among various gangs and clans, fighting each other to dominate areas rich in looting opportunities. Mogadishu became a chaotic and lawless city, where bodies were abandoned in the streets, with no one daring to bury them. And other cities across the country were facing similar situations. Additionally, these conflicts devastated agricultural and livestock production (Wheeler, 2000: 174; Yuusuf, 2021: 83–85).

This situation led to a massive famine in Somalia, culminating in an estimated 400,000 people dying from starvation in 1992 alone. Some non-governmental organizations operated in Somalia, providing aid such as food, clothing, and medicine, under challenging conditions. The primary obstacles to their work were the lack of security and logistical support. Armed gangs hijacked food aid convoys and even robbed starving civilians. They stockpiled some of the goods they stole and sold the remainder. These gangs demanded a share of the incoming aid in exchange for offering security to aid organizations against attacks. These organizations had to comply with this protection racket to ensure that aid reached the famine victims. Boutros Ghali reported that the primary challenge was not the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies but the protection of convoys transporting these to warehouses and distribution centers. Hundreds of thousands of people perished not due to a shortage of food but because it could not be distributed (Katz, 1993: 3; Makinda, 1993: 42; Thakur, 1994: 388; Wheeler, 2000: 176).

The UN's initial action was to propose mediation to the conflicting parties. Ali Mahdi accepted the proposal, and Aideed also agreed to it, albeit with reluctance and suspicion. The UNSC established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) through Resolution 751 and appointed fifty United Nations observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu (United Nations Security Council Resolution 751, 1991). However, the ceasefire had little impact on the chaotic conditions in Mogadishu and failed to prevent the widespread looting of relief supplies and extortion of humanitarian agencies in the city (Hirsch & Oakley, 1995: 17–21; Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 30–31).

At this stage, the UN appointed a special representative, Mohamed Sahnoun, to lead and coordinate UN operations in Somalia. Sahnoun accomplished much in a short period. During his tenure, food convoy robberies and starvation rates decreased, and he brokered a ceasefire between Ali Mahdi and General Aideed. However, before the ceasefire could be concluded, he resigned over disagreements with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Meanwhile, the US launched Operation Provide Relief to alleviate hunger and airdropped supplies to the regions that were facing severe difficulties. Yet, this attempt also failed, as more than eighty percent of the supplies sent by the US were confiscated, and it ignited a new conflict among groups attempting to seize the airdrops. All this demonstrated that a solution could not be achieved without the use of force. The UN also shared this view; the pro-diplomacy Sahnoun's resignation meant an upcoming policy shift. The UN decided to adopt a coercive approach towards these armed factions (Makinda, 1993: 43; Tripodi, 1999: 141; Yuusuf, 2021: 86,87).

In December 1992, the UNSC described the situation in Somalia as "a threat to international peace and security" and authorized member states to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, 1992). The US offered to lead a 37,000-strong multinational force to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. On 9 December 1992, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), known as Operation Restore Hope, was launched. The objective of the operation was to halt militias, warlords, and armed gangs, in other words, acting as a police force to ensure the appropriate distribution of supplies. The UNITAF had three primary functions. The first was to secure the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu to facilitate the arrival of foreign aid. The second was to open and secure the routes to the feeding centers, ensuring aid distribution. The third was to pave the way for UNOSOM II (Katz, 1993: 4; Makinda, 1993: 70; Yuusuf, 2021: 88).

In the short term, UNITAF led to numerous positive outcomes in Somalia, securing almost all supply routes for transporting relief goods from ports to distribution centers. During UNITAF missions, Mogadishu's port and airport were constantly active, and gang activity, including the looting of relief supplies and protection rackets, significantly declined, thus improving overall security and, consequently, reducing the death toll from starvation across the country. The US believed that the mission had achieved its objectives. However, Boutros-Ghali believed that more permanent measures were required. He maintained that UNITAF should neutralize the heavy weapons of the organized factions and disarm irregular forces before withdrawal to ensure a secure environment for humanitarian efforts and national reconciliation. Without disarmament, Somalia would return to the pre-intervention situation after UNITAF's departure. Conversely, the USA did not share this perspective. The US regarded disarmament and demining as long-term and high-risk operations due to the uncertainty surrounding the quantity of weapons in the country, the duration of the operation, and the potential reaction of the Somalis to the disarmament. The US planned to withdraw most of its forces once supply routes were secured (Makinda, 1993: 71–74).

The policy shift was followed by a change in the US administration. In early 1993, US President George H.W. Bush was succeeded by Bill Clinton. Under the new President's administration, Boutros-Ghali's pressure on the international coalition to disarm conflicting factions resulted in the adoption of UNSC Resolution 814, emphasizing "the crucial importance of disarmament". On May 4th, Operation Restore Hope was completed, and General Johnston of UNITAF was replaced by Turkish General Çevik Bir for UNOSOM II (Tripodi, 1999: 147). Events during UNOSOM II would validate Boutros Boutros-Ghali's initial emphasis on the necessity of disarmament.

3.2.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

The US-led coalition intervened in Somalia as armed factions hindered the distribution of humanitarian assistance to those suffering from famine. This intervention primarily relied on manpower, with airpower providing support and reinforcement. In addition to US-led coalition forces, military forces were deployed to Somalia under UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II. However, as UNOSOM I and II were peacekeeping operations, this section will only provide data regarding the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), also known as Operation Restore Hope, which was launched on 9 December 1992.

On 29 November, before the intervention, Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented the UNSC with a wide range of options, from withdrawing from the country to permitting UNOSOM I to use force. Among the options, Boutros-Ghali favored an intervention by an authorized group of states (Wheeler, 2000: 183). Following the authorization of Resolution 794, the US offered to lead a multinational force of 37,000 troops, including 28,000 from the US (Yuusuf, 2021: 88). Although the number of US troops did not reach the proposed 28,000, the US-led coalition ultimately reached approximately 44,000 troops from 21 countries, exceeding the proposed 37,000 (Lyons & Samatar, 2010: 40; Makinda, 1993: 73).

It is challenging to obtain exact figures for UNITAF casualties as available data tend to focus either on the US alone, excluding other coalition countries, or encompass all three operations (UNOSOM I, UNITAF, UNOSOM II). However, the Humanitarian Military Intervention Dataset by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) calculated the total number of casualties in UNITAF and UNOSOM as 175 (*Somalia 1992-1995 | HMI Dataset*, 2024). On the other hand, the UN reported that the casualties regarding only UNOSOM II were 154 (*UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II) - Facts and Figures*, n.d.). It can, therefore, be estimated that UNITAF alone had 21 casualties. On the other hand, Mullenbach (2013)'s dataset calculated UNITAF casualties to be 51.

The scope of the Somalia intervention can be classified as "wide-ranging." Operation Restore Hope aimed to assist people suffering from famine caused by factional conflict and anarchy in Somalia. When UNITAF handed over authority to UNOSOM II, they carried out a wide range of tasks, including digging wells, building roads, and vaccinating children, as well as providing security (Miller & Moskos, 1995: 616). In summary, the scope of the Somalia intervention was "wide-ranging." With a force of 44,000 troops, the role of manpower in the Somalia intervention can be classified as "main," while the role of airpower was "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the Somalia intervention is presented in Table 17.

Table 17: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Somalia Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Somalia, 1992	Main	44,000	Assist	Wide Ranging	21

3.2.3. Somalia Intervention at the UNSC

The humanitarian crisis in Somalia caused by civil war, famine, and disease resulted in widespread suffering and death, and it was one of the most severe of its time. Between 300,000 and 350,000 people died in 1992 alone due to civil war, famine, and disease (Wheeler, 2000: 174). This humanitarian crisis in Somalia prompted significant discussion and action in the UNSC. This section focuses on UNSC resolutions between 1990, the beginning of the civil war, and 1993, the year UNITAF was transferred to UNOSOM II.

Between 1990 and May 1993, the UNSC convened seven times to address the situation in Somalia. As a result of these discussions, the UNSC drafted and adopted seven resolutions. However, the UNSC did not address Somalia in 1990 and 1991, during the civil war and anarchy. The UNSC convened on the Somalia agenda for the first time in 1992, the year of the massive famine. In its first meeting on Somalia's agenda, the UNSC adopted Resolution 733. In Resolution 733, the UNSC called on conflicting parties to cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and implement an arms embargo on Somalia. Additionally, the resolution emphasized the safety needed for providing humanitarian assistance, the primary justification for the 1992 intervention, and urged the conflicting parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid and personnel (United Nations Security Council Resolution 733, 1992).

In Resolution 751, the UNSC started the process by establishing UNOSOM I, deploying fifty observers to monitor the ceasefire, and appointing a special representative to Somalia (United Nations Security Council Resolution 751, 1991). As the situation further deteriorated in Somalia, the UNSC authorized an increase in the strength of UNOSOM I in Resolution 775 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 775, 1992). Further, in Resolution 794, the UNSC described the situation in Somalia as "*a threat to international peace and security*" and authorized member states to "*use all necessary means to establish... a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia*" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, 1992). With this resolution, the UNSC authorized member states to conduct a military intervention in Somalia.

In Resolution 814, the UNSC recognized the necessity of disarming factions and transferring from UNITAF to UNOSOM II (United Nations Security Council Resolution 814, 1993). Subsequently, UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993. The Somali intervention was the first intervention authorized by the UNSC and one of the few humanitarian interventions in which the pre-intervention situation was declared a threat to international peace and security. In summary, the Somalia Intervention at the UNSC are presented in Table 18.

Table 18: Summary of the Somalia Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	**Number of Sessions**	**Draft Resolution**	**Adopted Resolution**	**Threat to Peace and Security**	**UNSC Authorization**	**Disapproval of the intervention**
Somalia, 1992	7	7	7	YES	YES	NO

3.3. Rwanda Intervention, 1994

3.3.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

The intervention in Rwanda occurred following one of the most horrific genocides in the world after World War II. The intervention in Rwanda was highly controversial for two main reasons: first, it was delayed, as France intervened three months after the genocide, and second, France had supported the genocidal Rwandan government. The genocide was committed in just 100 days following the death of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, whose plane was shot down above Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. This incident was only a catalyst, not the cause. To comprehend the background and rationale behind the intervention, it is essential to understand the seed of the hate between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda.

Rwanda differs from other African countries in terms of specific characteristics. This small, mountainous country benefits from fertile soil and a temperate climate. Pre-colonial Rwanda was a monarchy with a strong kingdom. Unlike other countries in East Africa, Rwanda was governed by a centralized, hierarchical, and orderly system. Upon their arrival in Rwanda, Europeans were fascinated by this order. The country's administrative structure was segmented into province, district, hill, and neighborhood levels, each overseen by an appointed chief. Exact figures may differ, but the pre-independence population of Rwanda was comprised of three groups: approximately 1 percent Twa, 17 percent Tutsi, and the remainder Hutus. It was suggested that these groups had distinct physical appearances. The Twas were significantly smaller, the Hutus were broader and shorter, typical of Bantu peoples, and the Tutsis were taller and slimmer. Indeed, apart from their appearance, these three groups did not differ. They spoke the same language, followed the same religion, shared the same myths, resided in the same regions, and often intermarried (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 27; Guichaoua, 2015: 3; Straus, 2006: 20).

The arrival of Europeans in Rwanda is recognized as the onset of hostility between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Rwanda first became a German colony in 1884, following the partitioning of Africa among European countries. This lasted until 1918, when Germany was defeated in the First World War. The Germans did not disrupt the existing order, in which the monarchy and most senior positions were held by Tutsis, with Hutus managing neighborhood levels under Tutsi oversight. The German adoption of an indirect rule system under Tutsi leadership reinforced Tutsi dominance in Rwanda (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 27,28). Following its defeat in World War I, Germany was compelled to relinquish its colonies. The colonial protectorate of Rwanda was transferred to Belgium, which administered Rwanda via the Belgian Congo until its independence in 1962 (See Figure 14).

Figure 14: British and Belgian Colonies after World War I



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart.

On some policies, the Belgians abandoned German practices, whereas on others, they adopted an even more radical variations of German methods. They attempted to measure Hutu and Tutsi "scientifically", further advancing the idea that Tutsis and Hutus were different (G. Caplan, 2012: 448; Straus, 2006: 21). They abandoned segmented administrative structures such as province, district, hill, and neighborhood levels, consolidating them into a single system led by Tutsis. Moreover, Hutus were also deprived of higher education, which was essential for attaining senior roles in public institutions (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 28, 29). Consequently, Hutus were excluded not only from the lowest levels of administration but also prevented from ascending to senior positions.

Prioritizing the Tutsis over the Hutus was a classic divide-and-rule policy, preventing the subjects of Rwanda from uniting against a colonial power (Tatum, 2010: 39). However, the most striking change was the introduction of ethnic identity cards. The Belgians aimed to identify who was Tutsi and who was Hutu officially. To achieve this, they introduced an identity card indicating people's ethnicity in addition to their personal information (see Figures 15 and 16). The process of determining ethnicity was superficial, classifying people as Hutu or Tutsi based mainly on their appearance. Another criterion was wealth; someone having many cows could acquire a Tutsi card, stressing the superficiality of determining Tutsi or Hutu identity. These ethnic identity cards significantly facilitated the identification of Tutsis by the murderers in 1994. The roots of the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi can be traced back to such practices during the colonial era. While there was little harmony between these two communities before the colonial period, systematic violence between them did not exist before the arrival of colonial powers (G. Caplan, 2012: 449; Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 29).

Figure 15: Rwanda Ethnic Identity Card: A Tutsi



Source: Tabaro, 2015

The Tutsis were contented with this dominance and believed in their inherent superiority over the Hutus. On the other hand, the Hutus, who were treated as lower class, viewed this as unjust and intolerable. However, they attributed their harsh treatment to the Tutsis rather than the colonial powers, believing they were not Rwandans but outsiders, more than even the Belgians. The outcome of these beliefs was a Hutu revolution (G. Caplan, 2012: 449; Straus, 2006: 21; Tatum, 2010: 40).

Figure 16: Rwanda Ethnic Identity Card: A Hutu


Mod. 3

BMSW
000584

Ubwoko (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, Naturalisé)
Ethnie
Aho yavukiye .. RUSHAKI II.
Lieu de Naissance
Italiki yavutseho .. 1970
Date de Naissance
Umwuga .... Etudiante
Profession
Aho atuye ... RUSHAKI II.
Lieu de domicile
Amazina y'uwo bashakanye NTAHOBORI
Noms du Conjoint ..... ARSENE Shalon
Nº C.I. 32 398/Mba
Umukono cyangwa igikumwe cya nyirayo
Signature ou l'empreinte du titulaire

Amazina y'abana n'igihe bavukiye
Noms, prénoms et date de naissance des enfants.

Amazina Noms et Prénoms	Yavutse kuwa Né le	Igitsina Sexe
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		
11.		
12.		

Source: Tabaro, 2015

In 1959, the Hutus rebelled against the Tutsi administration, and by 1961, the Tutsi regime had been overthrown. Nearly 20,000 people were killed, and 150,000 were forced into exile in neighboring countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Congo, and Burundi. The mass purge ensued following the establishment of the Hutu government; Kayibanda expelled the Tutsis from their positions and implemented a quota system restricting their access to education and employment. Under his leadership, hostility was the key characteristic of the relationship between Tutsi and Hutu (G. Caplan, 2012: 450; Jones, 2015: 227; Tatum, 2010: 40, 41). At the same time, the exiled Tutsis attempted to regain power to return to the country. In response to these attempts, Kayibanda escalated oppression and attacked the Tutsis within the country (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 31; Kuperman, 2004: 7).

In the early 1970s, the Kayibanda administration faced criticism for its ineffective governance and favoritism towards his home region. As internal tensions escalated, Habyarimana, the highest-ranking officer in the army, overthrew the Kayibanda administration in a coup d'état. The Tutsis were satisfied with the removal of Kayibanda, as Habyarimana pledged to end ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi. Indeed, he partially fulfilled this promise. Violence against the Tutsi ceased during his rule, and peace and stability prevailed. In addition to political stability, Rwanda experienced economic growth under Habyarimana's rule; he opened Rwanda to the world and secured international development assistance. However, in return, Habyarimana transformed Rwanda into a totalitarian one-party state. Although physical violence against Tutsis ceased under Habyarimana, discrimination persisted. Habyarimana maintained the identity card and quota system, and the Tutsis remained political outsiders (G. Caplan, 2012: 450, 451; Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 31; Kuperman, 2004: 7, 8).

However, Habyarimana’s initial success did not last long. Habyarimana’s administration encountered three challenges. The first was the deterioration of the Rwandan economy; the second was international pressure regarding the Tutsi situation; and the third was an organized Tutsi movement in neighboring countries. Faced with these challenges, Habyarimana’s administration became increasingly corrupt and authoritarian (Kuperman, 2004: 8; McQueen, 2005: 98). Since 1980, the second generation of exiled Tutsis had organized themselves and established the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda in 1987. Before the official formation of the RPF, they assisted Yoweri Museveni in overthrowing the Ugandan government in exchange for material support and shelter (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 32; Hehir, 2010: 181). This not only led to support from Uganda but also provided them with the necessary experience to overthrow the Rwandan government.

In October 1990, the RPF initiated an attack from southern Uganda into Rwanda, sparking a four-year civil war. In response to these attacks, Habyarimana scapegoated all Tutsis. The RPF’s successful strikes in 1991 and 1992 compelled Habyarimana to enter negotiations. Indeed, the initial purpose of the assault was to compel Habyarimana to agree to the repatriation of Tutsi refugees, but success on the battlefield bolstered the Tutsis’ demands (G. Caplan, 2012: 452; Jones, 2015: 227; Kuperman, 2004: 10).

After several rounds of negotiations, the RPF and Habyarimana reached an agreement. The agreement, known as the Arusha Accords, was signed on 4 August 1993 in Tanzania. The Arusha Accords altered the structure of the government and army and approved the repatriation of Tutsi refugees. Until the elections for the new government, the agreement specified a transitional government as well. Furthermore, it called for an international peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire and provide security in Rwanda during the transition period. However, another group was deeply discontented with this agreement. The Hutu extremists feared that, at best, they would lose their privileges, and at worst, they would face deadly retribution (Hehir, 2010: 181; Kuperman, 2004: 10; McQueen, 2005: 99; Straus, 2006: 24,25).

In response to the call in the Arusha Accords, the UN decided to “establish a peace-keeping operation under the name United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months,” as outlined in UNSC Resolution 872 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 872, 1993a). UNAMIR’s mandate included providing security for Kigali, monitoring the ceasefire during the final phase of the transitional government before elections, investigating breaches of protocol by the armed forces, and reporting on incidents involving the gendarmerie and police (McQueen, 2005: 101, 102).

Hutu extremists perceived the Arusha Accords as a victory for the RPF and a defeat for the Hutus. Furthermore, Hutu extremists were excluded from the transitional government, which represented almost all parties, a factor believed to have escalated tensions. The event that ended the ceasefire and triggered the genocide was the assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, when his plane was shot down as he returned from Tanzania, where he had been negotiating a transitional government. It remains unclear who was responsible for the shooting down of the plane, but it is widely believed that extremist Hutus carried out the action. However, Hutu extremists blamed the Tutsis for the assassination and started killing (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 36, 153–156; Kuperman, 2004: 12).

The killing started within hours; Hutu extremists blocked the roads and checked identity cards. The hiding places of the Tutsis were broadcast on the radio, marking them as targets. Not only Tutsis but also moderate Hutus were targets for the Hutu extremists. Initially, the killing was confined to Kigali, but upon realizing the UN would not intervene, it spread throughout the entire country. In just 100 days, between 500,000 and 1 million men, women, and children, mostly Tutsis, were killed. Additionally, thousands were raped, tortured, and maimed. Even the lowest estimate of 500,000 represents three-quarters of the total registered Tutsi population. This was the largest bloodbath after the Second World War (G. Caplan, 2012: 458; Hehir, 2010: 183; McQueen, 2005: 103; Tatum, 2010: 41).

Towards the end of the civil war, the French government decided to launch a military mission in Rwanda to maintain a humanitarian presence until UNAMIR II could be deployed. France assured that this mission would not interfere with the military dynamics of the ongoing conflict (McQueen, 2005: 124, 125). On 22 June 1994, the UNSC adopted Resolution 929, authorizing member states to "use all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 929, 1994). One day later, France launched Operation Turquoise, deploying multilateral forces from seven different countries. France created a safe zone - *Zone Humanitaire Sûre* (ZHS) - in one-fifth of southern Rwanda. Indeed, France intervened in the civil war on the side of the Rwandan government but did not intend to engage in conflict with the RPF. The massacre ended not due to France's efforts but because the RPF defeated the government forces and secured control over Kigali. Although the government forces outnumbered the RPF, they were defeated as their focus was on killing civilians rather than fighting the RPF (Hehir, 2010: 183; McQueen, 2005: 126; Tatum, 2010: 49).

Although it was widely criticized, France's mission in Rwanda achieved relative success. It was estimated that the France-led mission saved approximately 13,000 to 15,000 Tutsi lives by sheltering them in camps. They also improved security in the southwest, enabling NGOs and international organizations to provide more assistance and significantly improving the living conditions for both Hutu and Tutsi civilians in the ZHS. By August 12, 1994, over 1.5 million people resided in ZHS camps. Furthermore, they effectively preserved the inviolability of the safe zone. The French mission clung to the time frame outlined in Security Council resolution 929. They withdrew on August 22, 1994, upon the arrival of the UNAMIR II contingent (McQueen, 2005: 141, 142).

3.3.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

The French-led coalition's intervention in Rwanda was highly controversial, both due to its delayed reaction and France's earlier support for the genocidal Habyarimana government. This intervention, Operation Turquoise, primarily relied on manpower, with airpower providing support and reinforcement. Before the intervention, France was indirectly involved in the civil war by delivering weapons to the Hutu-led Habyarimana government and training the Rwandan army (Grünfeld & Huijboom, 2007: 33, 233). The direct intervention of France with multinational coalition forces began the day after UNSC Resolution 929.

At its maximum size and diversity, Operation Turquoise comprised 3,400 troops, including 2,900 French military personnel, of which 1,200 were combat troops, and 500 troops from seven African states. The operation included 100 armored vehicles, 600 other motorized vehicles, ten helicopters, and 12 combat aircraft. All troops and equipment were airlifted to the region as other forms of transportation were not possible (Kuperman, 2004: 45, 46; McQueen, 2005: 126). Exact figures for casualties among the French-led coalition throughout the operation are not well-documented in available sources. However, Mullenbach (2013) calculated the fatalities in Operation Turquoise at zero. Given that France had no intention of engaging in armed conflict with the RPF and that the RPF avoided armed conflict with France, Mullenbech's figure appears reasonable.

The scope of the Rwanda Intervention can be classified as "wide-ranging". Although the intervention did not prevent the genocide of the Hutus, it protected the Tutsis from retaliatory killings. It is estimated that the French-led coalition saved approximately 13,000 to 15,000 Tutsis, primarily by safeguarding them in camps. In addition to providing security, they also provided hospitalization, medical consultations, and care services and distributed tons of aid to Rwandans (Kuperman, 2004: 50; McQueen, 2005: 141). In other words, the operation not only focused on providing security but also on humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the Mullenbach (2013) dataset defined the purpose of Operation Turquoise as "providing security" and "protecting/delivering humanitarian assistance". In summary, the scope of the Rwanda intervention was “wide-ranging.” With a force of 3,400 troops, the role of manpower in the Rwanda intervention can be classified as “main,” while the role of airpower was “assist”. The “casualties” section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the Rwanda intervention is presented in Table 19.

Table 19: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Rwanda Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Rwanda, 1994	Main	3,400	Assist	Wide Ranging	0

3.3.3. Rwanda Intervention at the UNSC

The genocide in Rwanda was one of the largest and most horrific bloodbaths ever seen since the Second World War. In just over 100 days, between 500,000 to 1,000,000 -by the government’s account, more than a million- people, mostly Tutsi, were killed. Even the lowest estimate amounted to over three-quarters of the Tutsi population. Thousands were raped, tortured, and maimed (G. Caplan, 2012: 458, 459; Tatum, 2010: 49). The impact of this atrocity was clearly minimal as the UNSC did not respond effectively. This section analyses UNSC resolutions from 1990, when the RPF launched its offensive, to the 1994 arrival of UNAMIR II.

Between October 1990 and August 1994, the UNSC convened 19 times with Rwanda on the agenda. As a result of these discussions, the Council drafted and adopted 12 resolutions. The UN Security Council did not address Rwanda until 1993. In its first meeting, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 812, noting the increasing number of refugees and displaced persons and the threats to civilians due to ongoing conflict. It also proposed “*a neutral demilitarized*” buffer zone between the two forces to “*monitor the implementation of the ceasefire*” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 812, 1993). In Resolution 872, the UN Security Council established UNAMIR, with primary mandates including contributing to the security of Kigali, monitoring the ceasefire, and coordinating humanitarian assistance (United Nations Security Council Resolution 872, 1993b). When the ceasefire collapsed following the assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April, the UNSC once again called for a ceasefire in Resolution 912 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 912, 1994).

In Resolution 918, the UNSC described the situation in Rwanda as “*a threat to peace and security*” of the region, implemented an arms embargo on Rwanda, and highlighted the consequences of genocide, stating that “*the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law*” (United

Nations Security Council Resolution 918, 1994). In Resolution 929, the UN Security Council authorized member states to "*use all necessary means... to conduct the operation to... achieve the humanitarian objectives*" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 929, 1994). The UNSC both described the pre-intervention situation as a "*threat to international peace and security*" and authorized the intervention of the French-led coalition. In summary, the Rwanda intervention at the UNSC is presented in Table 20.

Table 20: Summary of the Rwanda Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	**Number of Sessions**	**Draft Resolution**	**Adopted Resolution**	**Threat to Peace and Security**	**UNSC Authorizat ion**	**Disappro val of the interventi on**
Rwanda, 1994	19	12	12	YES	YES	NO

3.4. East Timor Intervention, 1999

3.4.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

East Timor, officially known as Timor-Leste, is among the few countries to achieve independence in the twenty-first century. However, the journey to independence for this small Southeast Asian country began much earlier. Before becoming independent, it experienced an extended period of colonial rule, invasion, genocide, humanitarian intervention, and administration by the United Nations. East Timor holds a significant place in the literature on humanitarian intervention. The intervention in East Timor is a significant example of how the international community's approach to humanitarian issues evolved after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it is one of the few humanitarian interventions with consent.

East Timor occupies the eastern half of the island of Timor, surrounded on the northwest by Indonesian West Timor. The division of Timor Island into eastern and western regions dates back to the colonial era. The Portuguese established their first presence in the region with the conquest of Malacca in 1511. On the other hand, the Dutch, who controlled much of the Indonesian archipelago, gradually extended their influence over the western part of the island, securing control of West Timor by 1656. Despite some border disputes before the late nineteenth century, this division between the Portuguese and the Dutch endured until the decolonization period following World War II (See Figure 17). The Portuguese ruled East Timor for more than four centuries, except for a brief period during World War II when it was invaded by the Japanese. While the Dutch East Indies gained independence within five years following World War II, Portuguese control in East Timor was restored and lasted until 1974 (Chalk, 2001: 30; Dunn, 2012: 281; Fox & Babo-Soares, 2003: 6).

Figure 17: Southeast Asia before World War II



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

While Indonesia fiercely criticized Dutch colonialism in West New Guinea, it largely overlooked the Portuguese colonial presence in East Timor. This was partly because of East Timor's lack of economic and strategic value. Before the late twentieth century discovery of offshore oil, East Timor was not regarded as economically valuable. Furthermore, Indonesia's policy on East Timor was to support its right to self-determination without asserting any territorial claims over East Timor. The decisive moment leading to decolonization occurred not in East Timor but in Europe. Maintaining the colonies was becoming increasingly challenging for Portugal, whose economic situation was deteriorating. It seemed pointless to some in Portugal to maintain control of this remote, poor, and underdeveloped country, which also held no value for tourism or trade. The Portuguese military supported decolonization, whereas the government was reluctant to relinquish East Timor (Chalk, 2001: 31; Dunn, 2012: 282, 283).

Following the death of long-time Portuguese ruler António de Oliveira Salazar in 1970, leftist soldiers favoring decolonization seized power in 1974. The new government announced recognition of East Timor's right to self-determination. This was supposed to clear the road to East Timor's independence (Berlie, 2018: 16; Voon, 2002: 52). Within weeks after the announcement, several parties emerged in East Timor to participate in the elections. To comprehend the path to Indonesia's invasion, one must analyze three political factions centered around three main choices: integration with Indonesia, maintaining ties with Portugal, and attaining full independence (Kingsbury, 2009: 43, 44).

The first party, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), aimed to establish a federation with Portugal. The second, the Timorese Social Democratic Association, later renamed the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), advocated for independence with a socialist direction. The third, the Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia (Apodeti), supported integration with Indonesia. Faced with increasing Indonesian support for Apodeti, UDT and Fretilin formed a united front early in 1975, advocating for full independence, opposing integration, and denouncing colonialism. However, shortly after that, the UDT, discontented with Fretilin's socialist agenda, withdrew from the alliance and convinced by Jakarta, sided with Apodeti. Despite being isolated, Fretilin, backed by the majority of the rural population, implemented a policy shift, initiated an armed struggle, and swiftly overcame the combined UDT-Apodeti forces, securing control over nearly all of East Timor by September 1975. It declared the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on November 28, 1975 (Chalk, 2001: 31, 32).

Fretilin's dominance disturbed Indonesia, which initially had no claim on East Timor and supported self-determination. Indeed, the potential rise of Fretilin to power catalyzed Indonesia's policy shift. Indonesia's concern regarding Fretilin, particularly within the Indonesian army, stemmed from its socialist nature. Concerned about sharing a border with a Marxist country, Indonesia attempted to prevent Fretilin's rise through covert operations. When non-military efforts failed to prevent Fretilin's rise, the Indonesian army ultimately resorted to armed struggle and annexed East Timor on 7 December 1975. Indonesians justified the invasion by claiming that the majority of the population desired to integrate with Indonesia. Moreover, another justification was an alleged invitation from the defeated UDT. In the subsequent years, Indonesia convened a legislative assembly comprised of carefully selected delegates. These delegates voted for integration with Indonesia in this staged assembly. Therefore, East Timor was supposedly exercising its long-debated right to self-determination. However, the UN never recognized Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor (Chalk, 2001: 32, 33; Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 68, 69; Voon, 2002: 53).

The killings in East Timor, which continued until the 1999 intervention, began in the early days of the occupation in 1975. East Timorese were subjected to killings, rapes, and torture, along with large-scale public executions. Fearing persecution, thousands of Timorese sought refuge in Fretilin-controlled mountain districts. Many Timorese died in these mountainous districts due to famine and related diseases, as Fretilin was unable to meet the basic needs of the tens of thousands of people seeking refuge in this area. When the food situation in Fretilin-controlled areas reached a critical point, Fretilin leaders urged their people to return to Indonesian-occupied regions. However, upon their return, they encountered inhumane treatment, facing execution and torture on suspicion of supporting Fretilin. East Timor was effectively isolated from the outside world until 1979. Indonesia did not grant access to the territory even to the International Red Cross until the latter half of 1979, nearly four years after the invasion (Dunn, 2012: 286–289). Due to this isolation, the situation remained unknown or was ignored by those who were aware.

However, by 1979, Indonesia could no longer conceal the events in East Timor, as they finally allowed a limited number of international aid workers to deliver humanitarian assistance. Tragedy began to surface as these workers witnessed widespread human suffering. They estimated that between one-tenth and one-third of East Timor's population had died in the four years following the invasion. However, the most striking event that shocked the world was the Santa Cruz Massacre. On 12 November 1991, the Indonesian army opened fire on 2,000 unarmed demonstrators at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, resulting in the deaths of nearly 300 individuals. However, British cameraman Christopher Wenner captured footage at the Santa Cruz cemetery. The film was smuggled out and transmitted to the British BBC, garnering global attention to the situation in East Timor (Berlie, 2018: 17, 18; Dunn, 2012: 290, 291; Kingsbury, 2009: 60).

Several factors towards the end of the 1990s led to a policy shift in Indonesia. The initial factor was the resignation of Indonesian President Suharto, which led to his civilian vice president, B. J. Habibie, assuming power. The second factor was the economic and political turmoil in Indonesia. The third factor was international pressure on Indonesia regarding the East Timor issue. Combining all these factors, President Habibie announced in January 1999 that the people of East Timor would have the opportunity to vote for either independence or autonomy. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement requesting the UN to conduct a ballot on independence or autonomy in East Timor. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to conduct a popular consultation through a direct, secret, and universal ballot. The Indonesian government was responsible for maintaining security during the electoral process (Chalk, 2001: 34; Gorjao, 2002: 315; Nordquist, 2013: 110; Voon, 2002: 54, 55).

In addition to the reasons mentioned above, another factor contributing to the Habibie government's agreement to the referendum was the belief that the pro-autonomy camp would win, leading to a permanent resolution of the East Timor issue. However, some factions within the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) were possibly less confident of a victory at the ballot box and did not intend to relinquish East Timor. For this reason, several senior generals in the Indonesian Army organized a militia force composed of East Timorese minorities in favor of Indonesian rule, providing them with arms, military training, and funding. They started to target and eliminate pro-independence Timorese. Although these commanders operated outside the army's official chain of command, the army leadership was believed to be aware of their actions. However, contrary to expectations, the military's violence and intimidation ultimately backfired, leading to increased support for independence. Many East Timorese began to see independence as the only solution to ensure their long-term security (Dunn, 2012: 293; Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 70).

Despite months of attacks and intimidation, a "popular consultation" was held on 30 August 1999. The question was simple: "Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor?" and "Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor?" With an unexpected 98.6 percent turnout, the result was a rejection of autonomy by 78,5 percent (UNAMET Electoral Unit, 1999). These results indicated that Indonesia would now have to relinquish its administration of East Timor and initiate the process towards independence. The results were surprising for the Habibie administration but not for the military groups that had been attempting to intimidate the pro-independence Timorese. They were even prepared for these outcomes.

Within hours of announcing the results, pro-Indonesian armed groups launched Operasi Guntur (Operation Thunder). The outcome of the operation was the death of 1,500 Timorese and approximately 250,000 refugees, most of whom were compelled to flee to West Timor. There was organized sexual abuse of women and the destruction of between 60-80 percent of East Timor's infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and public institutions. They were well-prepared for this outcome, knowing precisely who supported independence and where they lived. All these actions were carried out systematically (Dunn, 2012: 294; Gorjao, 2002: 315; Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 73; Voon, 2002: 56).

In contrast to 1975, the genocidal atrocities in 1999 garnered rapid global attention. President Habibie had to consent to a military intervention both because the situation in East Timor was out of his control and due to intense international pressure (Chalk, 2001: 36; Dunn, 2012: 294). On 15 September 1999, UNSC resolution 1264 authorized "the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure" to "restore peace and security" and "take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264, 1999). Five days later, a 9,000-strong coalition force, International Force East Timor (INTERFET), led by Australia, was swiftly deployed to East Timor. Indonesian troops began withdrawing from East Timor upon INTERFET's arrival and rarely clashed with them. The INTERFET forces could enter the main regional towns in East Timor without encountering any significant resistance (Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 74; Voon, 2002: 56).

On 28 September, Indonesia agreed in principle to transfer all authority over East Timor to the United Nations. On 28 October, the last formal link between Indonesia and its claim to East Timor as its "27th province" was dissolved when the Indonesian Parliament (MPR) recognized the outcome of the popular consultation in East Timor. This vote symbolized the end of the 25-year Indonesian rule in East Timor. Indonesia withdrew from East Timor, which it had invaded for 25 years, leaving it completely devastated and deprived of the most basic infrastructure elements (Dunn, 2012: 294; Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 75). On 25 October, UNSC Resolution 1272 established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), granting it overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor. It was authorized to exercise all legislative and executive powers, including the administration of justice (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272, 1999). The UNTAET in East Timor operated until independence in 2002.

3.4.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

The Australia-led coalition's intervention in East Timor was one of the few interventions that both the UNSC authorized, and the target state consented to. Australia, the intervener, was neither a former colonizer nor involved in East Timor before the military intervention. On the other hand, Australia was the only country that could intervene quickly because it was the closest to East Timor, which had been surrendered by Indonesia. Otherwise, as Annan noted, the United Nations would have taken months to act, leading to irreversible consequences (Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 75). The intervention of Australia-led coalition forces began five days after UNSC Resolution 1264.

The Australia-led coalition, INTERFET, mainly consisted of Australian troops, with Thailand providing the second-largest contingent. INTERFET was supported by forces from a wide range of countries, including Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. INTERFET started with 3,000 troops, and at its peak, it reached nearly 11,500 troops. The Special Air Service Response Force Group accompanied these troops (Cotton, 2004: 72; East Timor Independence | Royal Australian Air Force, n.d.; Two Very Different Operations - Australian Army, 2011; Kingsbury, 2009: 74). INTERFET faced no serious threat from Indonesian forces except for a few engagements. The first serious engagement was on 10 October 1999, when INTERFET troops clashed with Indonesian security personnel, and the second on 18 October, when twenty militiamen attacked a five-man Australian patrol. In both engagements, INTERFET suffered no casualties (Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 74).

The scope of the intervention can be classified as "wide-ranging". The INTERFET mission aimed to secure East Timor, but security was not the only need. The East Timorese also suffered from famine and disease and lacked even basic humanitarian needs. Therefore, apart from providing security, INTERFET also secured the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, because Operation Thunder destroyed between 60-80 percent of East Timor's infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and public institutions, INTERFET also carried out tasks such as repairing roads, government buildings, churches, and airports, running medical clinics, building sewage systems, and even removing garbage (Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 75). In summary, the scope of the East Timor intervention was “wide-ranging.” With a force of 11,500 troops, the role of manpower in the East Timor intervention can be classified as “main,” while the role of airpower was “assist”. The “casualties” section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the East Timor intervention is presented in Table 21.

Table 21: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of East Timor Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
East Timor, 1999	Main	11,500	Assist	Wide Ranging	0

3.4.3. East Timor Intervention at the UNSC

Between the Indonesian invasion in 1975 and the Australia-led coalition intervention in 1999, East Timorese people were subjected to killings, rapes, and torture, along with large-scale public executions. However, Indonesia effectively isolated the events in East Timor from the world until 1979, when it allowed limited access to foreign aid workers. After that, the world gradually began to witness what was happening in East Timor. The most striking event that shocked the world was the Santa Cruz Massacre, in which the Indonesian army opened fire on 2,000 unarmed demonstrators (Dunn, 2012: 286–290). Although the world began to realize what was happening in East Timor, the earliest UNSC resolutions on East Timor before the 1999 intervention were adopted in 1975 and 1976 (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Number of UNSC Resolutions on East Timor between 1975-1999



Between December 1975, when Indonesian control in East Timor began, and October 1999, when UNTAET was established, the UNSC convened 24 times with East Timor on the agenda. As a result of these conventions, the UNSC drafted and adopted eight resolutions. Following the Indonesian invasion in 1975, the UNSC called for Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor in Resolutions 384 and 389. On 5 May 1999, after Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement requesting the UN to conduct a ballot on independence or autonomy in East Timor (Voon, 2002: 55), the UNSC established the “United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct a popular consultation” with Resolution 1246 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1246, 1999).

However, following the end of the referendum on 30 August 1999, pro-Indonesian groups launched an armed campaign. Upon the deterioration of the situation in East Timor, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, declaring the situation a “threat to peace and security” and authorizing the “establishment of a multinational force... to restore peace and security in East Timor”. It also authorized “the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264, 1999). After INTERFET provided security in East Timor, the UNSC established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) with Resolution 1272. UNTAET would administer East Timor with full legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272, 1999), until 2005. The summary of the East Timor Intervention at the UNSC is presented in Table 22.

Table 22: Summary of the East Timor Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	Number of Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
East Timor, 1999	24	8	8	YES	YES	NO

3.5. Kosovo Intervention, 1999

3.5.1. Background and Rationale of the Intervention

The Kosovo intervention holds a special place in the history of humanitarian intervention. In Eastern Europe, the troubles resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia dominated nearly the entire decade following the end of the Cold War. The events leading to an intervention in Kosovo were part of this period. The period was marked by internal conflict, atrocities, and genocide, with the international community failing to intervene in some instances before they occurred, such as the genocide in Bosnia. In fact, the absence of a significant massacre at the time of intervention was one of the main criticisms of the Kosovo intervention. However, such criticism is unfair; it was more important to intervene before atrocities were committed. Pre-emptive action was undoubtedly better than reacting post-factum, as evidenced by the situations in Rwanda and Bosnia. Additionally, in Bosnia and Rwanda, the international community saw firsthand what happens when they don't intervene at the right time.

Although Kosovo's intervention resulted from Slobodan Milosevic's persecution of Kosovo Albanians, the animosity between these two ethnic groups has deeper historical origins. During the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, Serbs fought for a Christian coalition against the Ottomans, while Albanians fought on both sides. The Kosovo Wars of 1389 and 1448, followed by the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, marked the onset of Ottoman dominance in the region, lasting into the twentieth century. The 1389 Battle of Kosovo was of profound significance to Serbian nationalists, who regarded Muslim Albanians as allies of their "invaders," intensifying the longstanding historical tensions between Serbs and Albanians. The early twentieth century marked the end of more than five centuries of Ottoman rule in the region. Following World War I, Kosovo was incorporated into the newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2004: 6, 7).

After the German and Italian invasion during World War II, Yugoslavia was re-established in 1943 as a federation consisting of six federal units (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) under communist leadership (See Figure 18). Kosovo's status within Yugoslavia was initially ambiguous. In March 1944, Josip Broz Tito announced that regions such as Vojvodina and Kosovo would be granted greater autonomy, allowing their people to decide which federal unit to join. In April 1945, representatives from Kosovo's 'National Liberation Council' declared their intention for Kosovo to become a province within Serbia. Subsequently, on 3 September 1945, Serbia's 'People's Assembly' established the 'Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija' as part of Serbia. A year later, Serbia enacted a constitution detailing Kosovo's autonomous right, encompassing the management of its economic and cultural development, budget planning, and the protection of citizen rights. Thus, Kosovo's autonomy was constitutionally guaranteed (Malcolm, 2002: 314–316; Wheeler, 2000: 244).

Figure 18: Yugoslavia after WWII

This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

During the Cold War, Tito attempted to overcome ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia by promoting a socialist, collective "Yugoslav" identity that embraced all citizens. Yugoslav literally means "South Slav," referring to the Slavic peoples living in the southern part of the Slavic-speaking regions. Tito witnessed some success in these efforts. Different ethnic groups could peacefully coexist, if not harmoniously, and there were instances of marriages between various groups during his rule. Tito was also the leader who granted autonomy to Kosovo and abolished the oppressive practices of the colonial period. For this reason, Albanians still regard him with respect. However, Yugoslavia failed to maintain Tito's order following his death in 1981. The resurgence of Serb nationalism and the rise to power of Milosevic in 1986, the leader of the Serb nationalist movement, alarmed other ethnic groups and led to their own ethnic and nationalist reactions (Malcolm, 2002: 314; Wheeler, 2000: 244).

However, Milosevic's rise to power was not the beginning of the unrest. Tensions in Kosovo were already escalating even before Slobodan Milosevic's ascension in 1987. On 11 March 1981, a student found a cockroach in his soup in the University of Prishtina's dining hall and angrily threw his food tray. This incident resonated with other students, who were also dissatisfied with their living conditions, igniting a broader protest. This protest was unexpected for the Serbs, who regarded the Kosovars as the major beneficiaries of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, granting them expanded autonomy and rights, including education in Albanian. However, the reasons behind the Albanians' protests were different from what the Serbs perceived. They were demonstrating against their worsening economic conditions and their status as second-class citizens (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2004: 8; Malcolm, 2002: 334).

One of Milosevic's initial moves upon assuming power was to revoke the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989. Furthermore, Milosevic consolidated Serbian dominance and intensified repression, thereby igniting a resurgence of ethnic conflict across the former Yugoslav Federation. In reaction to this decision, the Kosovo Assembly proclaimed independence for Kosovo; it was not an official independence but rather resembled a parallel state structure spearheaded by Ibrahim Rugova to oppose Serbian governance over Kosovar Albanians. With this revocation, Kosovar Albanians not only lost their autonomous privileges but also faced dismissal from their jobs, were denied access to state healthcare, and were prohibited from receiving education in Albanian. Facing these challenges, some Albanians backed the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, advocating a more moderate approach, while others supported the armed resistance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Hehir, 2010: 202; Lambeth, 2001: 6; Teran, 2007: 8).

Milosevic's discriminatory measures included closing Albanian newspapers, radio, and television stations, shutting down the Albanian Institute, and renaming streets from Albanian to Serbian names. Furthermore, a new Serbian curriculum was implemented in universities and schools. In the mid-1990s, a significant step was taken to resolve the conflict among the subjects of Yugoslavia: the Dayton Agreement. However, the Dayton Agreement made no provisions concerning Kosovo. The failure to address Kosovo in the Dayton Agreement frustrated Kosovan Albanians and increased support for the KLA. Rugova's nonviolent resistance efforts failed to progress after the Dayton Agreement (Hehir, 2010: 203; Raut, 2017: 169). Despite Richard

Holbrooke raising the issue of Kosovo with Milosevic during the Dayton negotiations, the complex and intense nature of the discussions resulted in Kosovo's exclusion from the Dayton Agreement (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2004: 10).

Following the disappointment of the Dayton Agreement, the violence between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo began to escalate. Between 1996 and 1998, the KLA used covert tactics, but by early 1998, it had become sufficiently confident and well-equipped to initiate an offensive against Serbs in the mountainous area of Kosovo. Two key events in 1998 and 1999, the massacre of the Jashari family and the massacre at Racak, significantly changed international involvement in the Kosovo conflict. Adem Jashari was a prominent figure in Prekaz and a member of the KLA. On 28 February 1998, Serbian forces decided to arrest Adem Jashari. Within a week, a tragic operation resulted in the death of 58 members of his extended family. The second incident was the Racak massacre. Three Serbian police officers were ambushed and killed by the KLA near the village of Racak. Following this, Serbian forces launched an assault on the village, claiming to have eliminated several dozen KLA militants. However, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) arrived the following day and discovered 40 bodies, predominantly older men dressed in peasant clothes, exhibiting signs of deliberate execution, according to William Walker, the leader of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) (Bellamy, 2002: 69; Pinos, 2018: 42, 43; Raut, 2017: 170; Wheeler, 2000: 258).

In response, Milosevic declared Walker persona non grata and issued an order for his expulsion (Lambeth, 2001: 8). And yet, a substantial influx of internally displaced persons and refugees, with an estimated total of 300,000 fleeing to Albania and Macedonia, made the situation in Kosovo impossible to ignore (Hehir, 2010: 205, 206). The initial sign of this international involvement was UN Resolution 1199, which explicitly highlighted the "*excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces*," underscored "*the need to prevent this from happening*," and, crucially, characterized the situation in Kosovo as "*a threat to peace and security in the region*" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, 1998).

Another measure was NATO's signal of intervention through the approval of launching air strikes against Serbia if Serbian leaders persisted in refusing negotiations with their Kosovar counterparts. These developments spurred intense diplomatic efforts towards peace negotiations, leading the Contact Group (comprising the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) to call for an end to the violence and to invite the belligerents - the Yugoslav government and the KLA - to a negotiation meeting on 6 February in Rambouillet, France (Lambeth, 2001: 8; Pinos, 2018: 48; Steinke, 2015: 47).

The Contact Group's proposal included disarming the KLA, withdrawing Serbian forces from the region, and deploying a NATO force comprising 30,000 troops for oversight. The Group's objective was to reinstate Kosovo's autonomy and institutions, while postponing the decision on independence for three years. However, the first round of talks in Rambouillet failed, prompting the initiation of the second round of negotiations in Paris on 15 March. In the subsequent negotiations, the KLA consented to the agreement that proposed significant autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. However, Serbia rejected it, opposing the presence of foreign troops. In the meantime, as negotiations were underway, Milosevic was preparing for Operation Horseshoe, his planned ethnic cleansing campaign, viewing the negotiations as a strategic opportunity. Milosevic not only rejected NATO's peace proposal but also launched a large-scale assault on entire villages and civilian infrastructure with 40,000 troops, tanks, artillery, and mortars. This offensive destroyed the KLA headquarters and displaced thousands of ethnic Albanian civilians (Lambeth, 2001: 9; Raut, 2017: 171; Steinke, 2015: 47).

As a final ultimatum, President Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to warn Milosevic in Belgrade about NATO strikes if the violence in Kosovo did not cease. However, this time, Holbrooke's sole mission was to convey the warning without engaging in negotiations. After a four-hour meeting, Milosevic ignored the warning. Subsequently, Holbrooke returned to NATO headquarters, and on 23 March 1999, NATO authorized the launch of air strikes under Operation Allied Force. The operation was a 78-day continuous air strike campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, planned as a short-term effort to force Milosevic to surrender and agree to the Rambouillet Accords (Lambeth, 2001: 9, 10; Pinos, 2018: 55; Steinke, 2015: 47, 48).

By the end of Operation Allied Force, the death toll reached 10,000, including those killed by Yugoslav forces. NATO executed 38,400 sorties, deploying 26,614 munitions, with the US undertaking more than 60 percent of all flights and conducting over 80 percent of strikes. The operation was completed on 10 June with a Military Technical Agreement between the army of the FRY and NATO (Hehir, 2010: 208–210). Yugoslav forces withdrew from Kosovo, and the Security Council established an interim civil and security presence in Kosovo, known as the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), through its resolution 1244 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 1999).

3.5.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

Kosovo was notable for being the first in many respects in the history of humanitarian intervention. For example, the intervention in Kosovo was the first to be led by an international organization, NATO. Prior to Kosovo, interventions were conducted either by a single state or by a group of states under the leadership of one state. Moreover, Kosovo was also a milestone in terms of intervention methods and the scope of the intervention. With the Kosovo intervention, airpower began to replace manpower as the main force, and the scope of interventions became limited to providing security. Before Kosovo, interventions primarily relied on manpower, with airpower assisting ground forces in the field. However, this trend changed with the Kosovo intervention.

The initial sign of the intervention was UN Resolution 1199, which explicitly highlighted the "*excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces*," underscored "*the need to prevent this from happening*," and, crucially, characterized the situation in Kosovo as "*a threat to peace and security in the region*" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, 1998). In the early stages of planning the intervention, air and ground force options were among the possible considerations. However, there was no consensus on ground forces, and US and allied leaders decided that an air campaign was the best course of action (Cohen & Shelton, 2000: XXI). During the intervention, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties, with 15,000 flown by allies and the rest by the US. Of these sorties, 10,484 were strike sorties, releasing 23,614 air munitions. Operation Allied Force deployed 18,400 personnel ashore (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2004: 246; NATO Operation Allied Force, 1999; Pinos, 2018: 55).

However, no ground troops were involved in this operation, so these personnel were not stationed in the conflict zone. Instead, they were likely assigned to ensure the effective conduct of air operations. NATO completed the operation without any combat casualties. During the operation, as a rule of engagement, NATO aircraft operated at altitudes high enough to avoid attacks from Yugoslav defenses (ICTY, 2000). For this reason, the operation was even described as "zero-casualty warfare." However, two engineers died while clearing unexploded NATO cluster bombs (Rogers, 2000: 169; Special Report | Funeral of Welsh Gurkha, 1999).

The scope of the intervention can be classified as "providing security". In this intervention, OAF forces targeted Serbian forces approaching Kosovo Albanians. They did not perform any tasks other than providing security to the Kosovo Albanians through the use of airpower. In summary, the scope of the Kosovo intervention was solely "providing security." This intervention was heavily dependent on airpower, with manpower used to support air operations. In other words, the role of airpower was "main," while the role of manpower was "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the Kosovo intervention is presented in Table 23.

Table 23: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Kosovo Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Kosovo, 1999	Assist	18,400	Main	Providing Security	2 (non-hostile)

3.5.3. Kosovo Intervention at the UNSC

The troubles resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia dominated much of the decade following the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe. Two major humanitarian crises erupted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia during this period. The international community failed to prevent the atrocities in the first major crisis in Bosnia. This failure influenced the discussion of the Kosovo crisis on the UNSC. The international community did not directly address Kosovo before 1998, treating the Kosovo crisis as part of the Bosnian conflict. Even the Dayton Agreement did not include a provision for Kosovo, which frustrated the Kosovars. This section focuses on UNSC resolutions from 1998, when violence between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians began to escalate, to June 1999, when the Military Technical Agreement was signed between the army of the FRY and NATO.

Between 1998 and 1999, the UN Security Council convened 12 times with Kosovo on the agenda. As a result, the UNSC drafted six resolutions and adopted five of them. In the first convention, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1160, which condemned the "use of excessive force by the Serbian police" and the "acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army". Additionally, it imposed an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160, 1998). The subsequent resolution was a cornerstone in the Kosovo Crises. In Resolution 1199, the UNSC stressed the gravity of the situation, stating that the "indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army" had led to "numerous civilian casualties" and the "displacement of over 230,000 persons". It also underlined the deterioration of the situation and emphasized "the need to prevent this from happening." Furthermore, it described the situation in Kosovo as "a threat to peace and security" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, 1998). Despite all this, Resolution 1199 lacked authorization for member states to intervene. However, the emphasis on Serbian violence and the need to stop it, as well as the description of the situation in Kosovo as "a threat to peace and security," were important rationales for intervention.

On the other hand, as indicated before, for an intervention carried out without UNSC authorization, the absence of UN condemnation or disapproval can be perceived as indirect support for the intervention. Since the start of OAF, none of the three resolutions adopted by the UNSC either condemned or disapproved of the intervention. Furthermore, Resolution 1203 re-emphasized the "need to prevent this from happening" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1203, 1998) while the operation was in progress. Additionally, Resolution 1244 welcomed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's acceptance of the principles for a political solution that ended OAF (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, 1999). The summary of the Kosovo Intervention at the UNSC is presented in Table 24.

Table 24: Summary of the Kosovo Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	Number of Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
Kosovo, 1999	12	6	5	YES	NO	NO

3.6. Sierra Leone Intervention, 2000

3.6.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

As the last case before the 9/11 attacks, the Sierra Leone intervention shared several features with the 1990-2000 interventions. As with other instances, the imminent causes of the civil war, which escalated towards the end of the twentieth century, were post-independence events. However, the root causes can be traced back to the country's colonial legacy and the historical animosities arising from this legacy. Although the British intervention in Sierra Leone was initially planned as an evacuation operation, circumstances led to its evolution into a large-scale intervention to end a long-standing civil war.

Sierra Leone, situated on the southwest coast of Africa with natural resources and a significant natural harbor, now enjoys peace following a prolonged civil war. The first Europeans to discover Sierra Leone were Dutch and Portuguese explorers. However, the British were the first to colonize it. By the mid-1700s, Sierra Leone had become a significant slave trading hub, serving as a meeting point for European traders and their African counterparts. In 1784, the British established Freetown as a settlement for formerly enslaved people, and its name reflects this origin. Following the British Parliament's prohibition of slavery in its colonies in 1807 and its subsequent efforts to combat the slave trade in Africa, Freetown emerged as a base for patrolling the West African coast for slave-trading ships. Following the arrival of freed slaves, Freetown evolved into a diverse city inhabited by European settlers, formerly enslaved people (Krios), and indigenous peoples. Eventually, in 1808, Britain declared Freetown a Crown colony, and in 1896, it proclaimed the area surrounding Freetown as a protectorate (Dorman, 2016: 32; Evoe, 2008: 34, 35).

Figure 19: Mano River Region



This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

While Freetown was significant for Britain, most of Sierra Leone was not. In Sierra Leone, the British governed Freetown directly while adopting indirect rule over the remaining territory. Further, Freetown served as the headquarters of the British governor, who was responsible for overseeing British territories in West Africa. In Freetown, the British appointed the Krio people to senior roles. Furthermore, the Krios also dominated professional positions, including those of doctors, teachers, businessmen, and clergy. The privileged status of the Krios, who constitute ten percent of the population, led to a socioeconomic divide and discontent between them and the indigenous African populations, the Temne and Mende, who together constitute sixty percent of the population. Although most of the colonial period was peaceful, the indigenous peoples occasionally revolted against British rule due to tensions stemming from this discrimination (Dorman, 2016: 29–34; Evoe, 2008: 35).

Sierra Leone achieved independence in 1961, uniting Freetown and the surrounding protectorate into one country, and adopted a parliamentary democracy. In the subsequent 1962 election, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Milton Margai, a Mende, secured a parliamentary majority, and he became Sierra Leone's first prime minister. The Mende-led government faced criticism for favoritism towards their own tribe, leading to their loss in the 1967 elections. In the 1967 elections, Siaka Stevens, a Temne, emerged victorious and became the new prime minister. However, shortly after assuming power, he was ousted in a military coup by Brigadier David Lansana, a Mende. He imposed martial law, leading to a countercoup organized by non-Mende soldiers that reinstated Stevens as Prime Minister again. In 1971, Sierra Leone became a republic, with Stevens assuming the presidency (Dorman, 2016: 34, 35). After becoming a republic, Sierra Leone turned into an autocratic, single-party state with an economy largely dependent on diamond revenue. A small elite, predominantly Mende, gained the majority of this income (Ucko, 2016: 3).

Despite high expectations for development after independence in 1961, in the early 1990s, Sierra Leone's governmental system started to unravel due to economic mismanagement, loss of support from major powers, and regional instability. Under these circumstances, a new organization, the RUF, emerged in Sierra Leone with substantial external support, primarily from Liberia and Libya. It was founded by Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Sierra Leone Army. Initially, the RUF was intended to combat corruption, but this goal was swiftly overshadowed by a desire to control Sierra Leone's resources (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014, p. 86; Bindi & Tufekci, 2018, p. 9; Ucko, 2016, p. 3).

In March 1991, the RUF launched its first offensive across the border from Liberia. The initial attackers consisted of Sierra Leonean dissidents, Liberian fighters, and mercenaries. The RUF swiftly took control of the Kono district and its valuable diamond mines, forcing the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) to retreat. After securing the diamond revenue, the RUF used it to finance its armed campaign. Discontented with the Sierra Leonean government's inability to stop the RUF, the military, under the leadership of Valentine Strasser, orchestrated a coup d'état in April 1992 and exiled President Joseph Saidu Momoh. However, Strasser also failed to overcome the RUF This ineffectiveness resulted in the RUF controlling key diamond areas in Sierra Leone by 1995. With the loss of its primary source of income, the government could not finance the fight against the RUF, further diminishing its capacity to engage in conflict resolution. By April 1995, the RUF had advanced to within 35 km of Freetown (Dorman, 2016: 38; Evoe, 2008: 44).

Recognizing its inability to cope with the RUF, the Strasser government sought foreign assistance. Strasser contracted Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African-based private military company, to expel the RUF from the country. However, lacking the funds to pay EO, Strasser offered them a share of £840,000 from the Kono diamond mines. EO achieved significant success in a short period. Despite its limited size, EO, leveraging technological superiority and a disciplined structure, rapidly cleared the coastal areas and recaptured the Kono diamond mines. Furthermore, EO began to train the SLA. By 1996, EO, SLA, and the Kamajors- a local group fighting against RUF for years- successfully regained control of nearly all the diamond mines. In January 1997, EO officially departed from Sierra Leone (Dorman, 2016: 39; Evoe, 2008: 46–49).

Meanwhile, Strasser encountered significant pressure to step down. When Strasser refused to resign, he was ousted in a coup by his Defense Minister, Julius Maada Bio, who pledged to hold elections and kept his promise. Despite the ongoing war with the RUF, Sierra Leone conducted its first parliamentary and presidential elections in thirty years. Following the election, the Sierra Leone People's Party, under the leadership of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, emerged victorious and assumed the presidency. Under pressure from Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of African Unity, and the Commonwealth States, the new civilian government initiated peace negotiations with the RUF. Consequently, peace negotiations resulted in the Abidjan Accord, ending the civil war (Levitt, 1998: 364, 365; Roberson, 2014: 4).

However, the Abidjan Accords were short-lived due to the reluctance of both parties to adhere to the agreement. In the absence of the Executive Officer, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), comprised of military officers under the leadership of Major Johnny Koroma, ousted the democratically elected government. In essence, this coup represented an internal takeover of the country by the RUF, as the AFRC invited the RUF to join its council after seizing power. President Kabbah fled to Guinea following the coup. However, before his departure, Kabbah officially requested that Nigeria and ECOWAS intervene and reinstate him to power (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014: 86; Levitt, 1998: 365; Ucko, 2016: 4). This was the second time Sierra Leone had requested foreign assistance against the RUF.

Until 1998, the RUF and its allies perpetrated widespread acts of killing, looting, and sexual assaults, particularly against the Krio community. More than 400,000 people fled from Freetown within three months, a situation that deeply shocked the international community. No country recognized the Koroma regime (Dorman, 2016: 40; Evoe, 2008: 50), and the UNSC banned the sale or supply of petroleum and petroleum products, arms, and related materials to Sierra Leone (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, 1997). At Kabbah's request, before fleeing to Guinea, ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, deployed 10,000 troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force in March 1998. Following intense combat, ECOMOG and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF-Kamajors) removed the AFRC/RUF coalition from Freetown, enabling Kabbah's return to power. By April, they had secured control of 90% of Sierra Leone, including the diamond mines. In October 1998, Sankoh, leader of the RUF, was captured by Nigerian officials (Evoe, 2008: 51). As a result, the RUF was once again stopped by a foreign intervener.

Although all indicators pointed to the RUF's defeat, the dynamics shifted following the announcement of Sankoh's death sentence after his trial in Freetown. Reinforced by Liberian rebels and mercenaries from Burkina Faso, the RUF initiated a new robust offensive, "Operation No Living Thing," targeting diamond areas. After securing 70% of the countryside and diamond regions, the RUF began advancing towards Freetown. Leveraging this position, in 1999, Sankoh travelled to Lomé, Togo, for new peace negotiations with Kabbah, resulting in the Lomé Agreement (Evoe, 2008: 54, 55). The Lomé Accord reinstated Kabbah's authority and granted a general amnesty for all RUF combatants for their war crimes. Furthermore, the accord established a power-sharing government, granting RUF leader Foday Sankoh the position of Vice President, seven ministries, and control of the mineral resources. This agreement established a UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which replaced the ECOMOG troops (Harris, 2014: 113).

The peace achieved through the Lomé Agreement was short-lived. Some factions within the RUF claimed they should continue their fight until the end. Forces loyal to Sam Bockarie, leader of a breakaway faction, denounced the Lomé Accord and clashed with RUF troops loyal to Sankoh. Moreover, following UNAMSIL's takeover from ECOMOG, the RUF halted disarmament, and Sankoh exploited his position to conduct secret diamond dealings. In addition, the RUF attacked Kenyan peacekeepers, confiscating their weapons upon their arrival in Sierra Leone. They also ambushed Zambian peacekeepers, seizing their weapons and uniforms, which were then used to attack other UNAMSIL units. During this period, rumors of an upcoming coup by Sankoh spread throughout the capital (Evoe, 2008: 56; Harris, 2014: 114; Ucko, 2016: 4). These incidents served as the final straws.

Britain, as a former colonizer and chief supporter of peace, was concerned by the collapse of Lomé. On 6 May, the RUF attacked the towns of Lunsar and Rogberi, which constitute the land route from Freetown to the airport, making the evacuation of British nationals from Sierra Leone impossible. On the following day, Britain indicated its intention to intervene by announcing the deployment of a "spearhead battalion" consisting of around 700 troops. By 8 May, Britain had initiated "Operation Palliser," securing Lungi Airport and other vital locations in Freetown to evacuate British citizens without any substantial resistance (Dorman, 2016: 76; Ucko, 2016: 4; Williams, 2001: 154). Once the evacuation mission was substantially finished, Blair faced the risk that the withdrawal of British forces might lead to the collapse of UNAMSIL and Kabbah's government. Consequently, he decided to undertake protective operations and assist UNAMSIL and the SLA (Evoe, 2008: 65).

The first significant engagement between British forces and the RUF occurred on 17 May. RUF forces attempted to capture the airport from British troops, but they failed and were forced to retreat. On the same day, British forces captured and arrested RUF leader Sankoh. Meanwhile, military reforms were enforced following the guidance of British advisors and trainers; the SLA was restructured into the Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA). The RSLA began to advance into areas previously controlled by the RUF. This advancement was due not only to Britain's military support for the RSLA but also to financial aid to the Sierra Leonean government and initiatives to disrupt the RUF's financial and arms resources. For this purpose, Britain led the UN in adopting sanctions and an embargo against Liberia, the primary sponsor of the RUF. These sanctions effectively cut off external support to the RUF (Roberson, 2014: 8, 9; Ucko, 2016: 4,5).

Meanwhile, a serious incident involving the capture of 11 British soldiers by the West Side Boys, an aggressive faction of the AFRC, escalated tensions further. Following unsuccessful negotiations, British forces initiated a rescue mission named "Operation Barras". On the 16th day of the kidnapping, British commandos launched an offensive on the West Side Boys' camp, resulting in the deaths of at least 24 rebels and two hostages. The RUF's military defeat, substantial loss of external support, and the capture of Sankoh compelled it to join in peace negotiations. By January 2002, 72,000 combatants, including 24,000 from the RUF and 37,000 from the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), had registered in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process. In January 2002, President Kabbah announced the end of the war in Sierra Leone, and the UN completed its withdrawal from the country in 2005 (Harris, 2014: 115, 116; Roberson, 2014: 9).

3.6.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

Although the United Kingdom intervened in Sierra Leone after the Kosovo intervention, it exhibited characteristics similar to pre-Kosovo interventions. In other words, it heavily relied on manpower, with airpower providing support and reinforcement. However, in the preceding section, we declared the Kosovo intervention a milestone for both the methods and scope of interventions. The main reason the Sierra Leone intervention has pre-Kosovo characteristics is that the two interventions were conducted close together, with less than a year between them. This brief interval was insufficient for the transformation prompted by the Kosovo intervention to be realized.

The intervening country, the UK, had been involved in Sierra Leone for many years. It was the colonizer of Sierra Leone until independence and, in the years leading up to the intervention, served as the chief supporter of the Lomé Accord. The UK initially intended the operation to be a non-combatant evacuation mission, but it quickly evolved into a six-week military intervention. The UK intervention started with a 700-troop evacuation mission, and later peaked at 4,500 troops, of whom 1,300 were on the ground (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014: 87; Iron, 2019: 2; Williams, 2001: 154). According to the UK Ministry of Defense, there were five UK fatalities during the Sierra Leone intervention, one of which was due to hostile action and the other four due to other causes (UK Armed Forces Deaths: Operational Deaths Post World War II, 2021: 3).

The scope of the intervention can be classified as “wide-ranging”. After averting the immediate threat to Freetown, the British trained SLA troops and officers, reinforced UNAMSIL, funded the disarmament process, and attempted to curtail the illegal diamond trade, which had led to violence (Ucko, 2016: 26; Williams, 2001: 155). In summary, the scope of the Sierra Leone intervention was “wide-ranging.” With a force of 1,300 troops, the role of manpower in the Sierra Leone intervention can be classified as “main,” while the role of airpower was “assist”. The “casualties” section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the Sierra Leone intervention is presented in Table 25.

Table 25: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Sierra Leone Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Sierra Leone, 2000	Main	1,300	Assist	Wide Ranging	5 (1 hostile, 4 non-hostile)

3.6.3. Sierra Leone Intervention at the UNSC

This small country in the Mano River region, Sierra Leone, endured coups, civil wars, and instability for many years. Until the declaration of peace in January 2002, a decade of conflict in Sierra Leone resulted in an estimated 50,000 deaths, 500,000 refugees, and 500,000 internally displaced persons out of a population of 6 million (Albrecht & Jackson, 2014: 87). To understand how these outcomes were reflected at the UNSC, this section focuses on UNSC resolutions between March 1991, the year of the first offensive by the RUF, and January 2002, the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone.

Between March 1991 and January 2002, the UN Security Council convened 47 times with Sierra Leone on the agenda. As a result, the UNSC drafted and adopted 21 resolutions. Following the ousting of Kabbah, the RUF and its allies perpetrated widespread acts of killing, looting, and sexual assaults, particularly against the Krio community. More than 400,000 people fled Freetown within three months, a situation that deeply shocked the international community (Dorman, 2016: 40; Evoe, 2008: 50). During this time, the UNSC passed its first resolution. In Resolution 1132, the UNSC described the situation in Sierra Leone as “a threat to international peace and security in the region,” demanded that the junta relinquish power, and imposed an arms embargo (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, 1997). Following Kabbah’s return to power, the UNSC terminated the arms embargo on the Sierra Leone government and imposed a new one on non-governmental forces, i.e., the RUF, with Resolution 1171 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1171, 1998). Moreover, the UNSC condemned the “continued resistance of remnants of the ousted junta and members of the RUF and established UNOMSIL with Resolution 1181 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181, 1998).

In Resolution 1260, the UNSC welcomed the signing of the Lomé Accord and called for the RUF and other armed groups in Sierra Leone to disband and disarm (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1260, 1999). However, as indicated in the preceding section, the Lomé Accord was short-lived, and violence erupted again in Sierra Leone. In Resolution 1270, the UNSC once again described the situation in Sierra Leone as “a threat to international peace and security in the region” and established UNAMSIL (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270, 1999). Despite all this, the intervention in Sierra Leone lacked authorization from the UNSC. On the other hand, as indicated before, for an intervention carried out without UNSC authorization, the absence of UN condemnation or disapproval can be perceived as indirect support for the intervention. Since the start of the UK’s intervention, none of the resolutions adopted by the UNSC either condemned or disapproved of the intervention. The summary of the Sierra Leone intervention at the UNSC is presented in Table 26.

Table 26: Summary of the Sierra Leone Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	**Number of Sessions**	**Draft Resolution**	**Adopted Resolution**	**Threat to Peace and Security**	**UNSC Authorization**	**Disapproval of the intervention**
Sierra Leone, 2000	47	21	21	YES	NO	NO

CHAPTER FOUR

4. POST-9/11 PERIOD: 2001-2020

4.1. Libya Intervention, 2011

4.1.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

The 2011 intervention in Libya by NATO and allied forces was one of the few humanitarian interventions of the twenty-first century. It is exceptional in several respects. Notably, it was the first intervention conducted with UNSC Authorization in the twenty-first century. This is the first intervention conducted under the R2P framework, which was introduced in 2005. Moreover, among the countries that experienced regime change after the Arab Spring protests, Libya was the only one where the regime was ousted after a foreign intervention. Although the immediate cause of the intervention in Libya was the Gaddafi government's violent response to the Arab Spring demonstrations, it is necessary to look further back to understand the root causes.

Libya is one of the largest countries on the African continent, bordered by Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, and Niger, with a coastline of 1,770 kilometers along the Mediterranean Sea. Over 90 percent of the land is desert or semi-desert, leaving only 1 percent as habitable land. Therefore, the majority of the population resides along the Mediterranean coastline. The main regions are Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan in the south. These three regions were separate entities under the Ottoman Empire but were unified during Italian rule. However, these regions did not wish for unification. As these regions are geographically isolated from each other, they have significantly different interests and perspectives, leading to Libya being described as an "accidental state" (Chivvis, 2013: 21; Vandewalle, 2012: 40).

Figure 20: Map of Maghreb Region

This map was created by the author using a base map from MapChart

Libya was originally inhabited by Berbers and had been historically dominated by various powers, including the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans. During Byzantine rule, Libyan people transitioned from paganism to Byzantine Christianity. Following the decline of Roman rule in the fifth century AD, the Islamic period began in Libya. This Islamic period consisted of two different phases: the introduction of Islam by the Arabs and its persistence under Ottoman rule. Before the onset of Ottoman rule, the region experienced a brief period of Spanish control. In 1551, the Ottomans, led by Turgut Reis (Dragut), besieged Tripoli and terminated the Spanish presence. During the Ottoman period, Libya was divided into three provinces: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, with Tripoli often serving as the regional capital and administrative center. Like other regions under Ottoman control, Libya enjoyed considerable autonomy under local rulers. Ottoman rule in Libya lasted until the 1911 Italo-Turkish War (Battle of Tripoli) (Lobban Jr & Dalton, 2014: 21–28).

Taking advantage of the Ottoman Empire's decline, Italy declared war on the Ottomans to seize Libya and establish it as a colony. In October of 1911, Italy captured Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, and Tobruk. Italian colonial rule subsequently merged Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan into a single colony named Italian Libya. When Italy entered World War II, Libya served as a strategic base for Italy's North African campaign and became one of the major battlegrounds. However, Allied forces eventually removed the Italians from Libya. Following Italy's expulsion, Libya was divided between France and Britain, with the French controlling Fezzan while the British managed Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Upon Italy's surrender, it renounced all claims to its colonies, including Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland, in the 1947 Treaty of Paris. Later, in 1955, Libya declared independence as the United Kingdom of Libya, with King Idris al-Sanussi becoming its first leader (Lobban Jr & Dalton, 2014: 37–48; Oyeniyi, 2019). Since its independence, Libya's name has changed several times over the years. Initially known as the United Kingdom of Libya in 1955, it was renamed the Kingdom of Libya in 1963. Following a change in regime in 1969, it became the Libyan Arab Republic, and in 1977, it was renamed again to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. This title was later extended to the Greater Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Currently, the country's official name is the "State of Libya" (Erdağ, 2017: 22,24).

King Idriss fostered close ties with the West, particularly with the United States. During the 1950s, the US provided substantial aid to Libya and, in return, maintained access to the Wheelus and al-Adem airbases in Libya. However, this relationship caused discontent among Arab nationalist groups, notably within the army. Eighteen years after independence, the Free Unionist Officers - Arab nationalist officers in the Libyan Army led by Muammar Gaddafi - overthrew King Idris and ended the Senussi monarchy. Muammar Gaddafi became the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the de facto head of state, marking the beginning of his rule, which lasted for more than four decades. As one of his first actions, Gaddafi immediately initiated negotiations with the United States and Britain to terminate agreements allowing foreign military bases in Libya. Moreover, he expelled Italian residents and nationalized Italian-owned assets, including the oil industry. He closed a British air base in Tobruk and the Wheelus US Air Force base in Tripoli (Bruce St John, 2006: 208,209; Chivvis, 2013: 21,22; Oyeniyi, 2019).

Throughout Gaddafi's rule, Libya underwent a notable state formation influenced by his ideological framework, as described in his renowned Green Book. His theory presented an alternative to both capitalism and communism. His theory was an eclectic blend of Arab nationalism, socialism and Islam. In Libya, which consists of 140 clans and tribes, Gaddafi implemented a tribe-based policy for distributing public resources and managing tribal unification. He primarily depended on and empowered his own tribe, the Qadhafa, particularly in crucial positions. He neglected Eastern Libya, particularly Cyrenaica, leaving the region underdeveloped during his rule. In foreign policy, he adopted an anti-Western stance until the 2000s. Gaddafi became one of the most despised figures in the West due to his active support for international terrorist activities and direct involvement in murderous attacks in the West. Gaddafi was not only isolated from the West but also from his neighbors due to his support for opposition forces against governments in Africa. Gaddafi's aggressive attitude in foreign policy and discriminative attitude in domestic politics set the stage for the revolts that began in 2011 (Chivvis, 2013: 22, 2015: 12; Erdağ, 2017: 26–28; Hehir, 2013: 2).

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a critical turning point for Gaddafi's Libya. Gaddafi dramatically abandoned his previous policies after realizing the risk of suffering a similar fate to Saddam Hussein. As an initial action, Gaddafi dismantled his nuclear and chemical weapons program and renounced terrorism. Libya acknowledged its involvement in specific international terrorist activities and committed to compensating the victims. Libya quickly started reintegrating with the West and the wider international community. Gaddafi began visiting European capitals and making business arrangements. This led to the normalization of relations with the US; sanctions were suspended, Libya was removed from the State Department's list of terrorism sponsors, the travel ban was lifted, and in 2009, the two countries exchanged ambassadors. In 2002, Libya announced significant economic reforms to liberalize its economy and attract foreign investment. This initiative was followed by trade and defense agreements. Western oil companies and investors began returning to Tripoli, and tourism started to develop. However, these changes did not result in a shift in the regime's nature; Gaddafi's Libya remained a repressive country, although slightly less repressive. (Chivvis, 2013: 22,23; Hehir, 2013: 2; Vandewalle, 2012: 173–183). Between 2000 and 2010, Libya underwent significant transformations in its economy and foreign policy, yet these shifts did not lead to any major changes in its political landscape.

In December 2010, the protests sparked by the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in response to government officials confiscating his handcart quickly began to dominate international media coverage. His act triggered a large-scale uprising against Zine El Abidine Ben Ali by Tunisians already dissatisfied with their government. At the height of the demonstrations, Tunisian President Ben Ali fled the country. Meanwhile, in Egypt, protests intensified a month after Bouazizi's self-immolation, and mass demonstrations in Cairo forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign on February 11 (Chivvis, 2015: 11; Ok, 2021: 86,87). Inspired by the developments in Tunisia and Egypt, many opponents in Libya anticipated that nonviolent protests would lead to similar changes. They planned to protest on February 17, 2011, marking the fifteenth anniversary of the Abu Salim Prison massacre in 1966. Upon noticing the preparations for the protest, the government arrested Fathi Terbil, an activist and lawyer representing the families of the prisoners killed in the 1996 Abu Salim Prison massacre, urging him to halt the planned demonstrations. However, this arrest backfired as hundreds gathered outside the police headquarters in Benghazi to protest against Terbil's detention. The police's attempts to disperse the crowd escalated into large-scale demonstrations, which had spread nationwide by February 17 (Daalder &

Stavridis, 2012: 2; Oyeniyi, 2019: 178,179; Prashad, 2012: 93–94). The Libyan government's efforts to suppress protests inadvertently led to more mobilization, providing an excellent example of the Streisand Effect.

The protests quickly became violent, and the escalation of this violence justified the intervention. Although the Western narrative at that time was built on the Gaddafi government's violent response to peaceful protests, this narrative was slightly different from or incomplete compared to reality. Gaddafi's forces used violence, yet the Libyan opposition was also armed and violent from the outset. Initially, government forces used non-lethal methods such as rubber bullets and water cannons. Protesters attacked and set fire to government buildings, including the Interior Ministry and the People's Hall in Tripoli. In Zawiya and Zintan, protesters set fire to police stations and security buildings. In Darna, they set fire to a police station, resulting in prisoners being burned to death in their cells. They used arms, Molotov cocktails, bulldozers, and vehicle bombs to capture the city's army garrison in Benghazi, and by 21 February, the rebels seized control of Benghazi (Kuperman, 2013b: 193; Oyeniyi, 2019: 179,180; Prashad, 2012: 95,96). Capturing an army garrison and a city is impossible without armed strength. The protesters' resort to violence led Gaddafi's forces to retaliate.

In this phase, Gaddafi adopted a more aggressive approach towards the opposition. Fearing a wider spread of demonstrations, Gaddafi ordered military jets to bomb Benghazi on 21 February. Actually, one of the reasons for Gaddafi's change in attitude was the shift in protesters' demands from protesting the arrest of Fathi Terbil to calling for the overthrow of Gaddafi. Gaddafi's forces started to use live ammunition, heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, warplanes, and helicopter gunships against the demonstrators. The Libyan government's violent retaliation inevitably affected many unarmed people (Kuperman, 2013b: 194, 195; Lobban Jr & Dalton, 2014: 132; Oyeniyi, 2019: 180). In a television program, Gaddafi expressed his anger towards the protestors by labelling them "rats and cockroaches," referencing Tiananmen Square and promising to "clean Libya house by house" of protesters (Chivvis, 2013: 27; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012: 3). After this speech, things began to turn against Gaddafi. The speech literally backfired. Gaddafi's threats were perceived as a dire humanitarian threat to his opponents. Given Gaddafi's history and personality, it was not surprising that the risk of mass atrocities was perceived as both real and imminent (Bellamy, 2011: 5; Lobban Jr & Dalton, 2014: 132).

The initial fractures in the Gaddafi regime emerged from within his own circle. Many cabinet members, ambassadors, army generals, and officers resigned to join the opposition. While people on the Gaddafi side were defecting, the opposition was growing and uniting. In March 2011, the Libyan opposition united under the National Transitional Council (NTC), an interim government established in February. The NTC called for international intervention, specifically for the establishment of a no-fly zone and air strikes against Gaddafi's forces (Chivvis, 2015: 13,14; Erdağ, 2017: 30; Oyeniyi, 2019: 182). The first international response was the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1970. Resolution 1970 imposed an arms embargo and travel ban on Libya. Additionally, the resolution froze the assets of Gaddafi and his children and referred the events in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, 2011).

However, despite the sanctions, arms embargo, and international pressure, Gaddafi's forces, strengthened by mercenaries, quickly reorganized, and pushed back the disorganized and ill-equipped rebels. In early March, they advanced eastward and recaptured several cities and towns near Benghazi. As Gaddafi's forces advanced towards Benghazi, fears of retaliatory killings grew due to his previous public threats. In response, the UNSC adopted a new resolution on 17 March (Chivvis, 2015: 17; Oyeniyi, 2019: 186). UNSC Resolution 1973 was a pivotal moment in the conflict. This resolution recognized the Libyan conflict as a *threat to international peace and security*, established a *ban on all flights in Libya's airspace*, and authorized all member states to *take all necessary measures* to protect civilians (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, 2011). The pressure from regional organizations for a no-fly zone also played a decisive role in the adoption of this resolution. Notable among these were the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the League of Arab States (LAS) (Bellamy, 2011: 4; Wamulume et al., 2022: 8).

While the US assumed the lead in enforcing a no-fly zone, France was the first to take action. During a discussion of potential NATO or coalition intervention at a meeting in Paris, France launched airstrikes against Gaddafi forces in Benghazi. This was followed by the US sending over a hundred Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles against critical targets and the Royal Navy's strikes, albeit on a smaller scale. These strikes significantly damaged Gaddafi's air defenses, command and control structures, and radar systems. The US then decided to continue military operations against Gaddafi under the NATO framework, initiating Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Fourteen NATO countries and four non-NATO partners were involved in OUP, but only six of the NATO states participated in air-to-ground strike missions (Chivvis, 2015: 21–27; Erdağ, 2017: 31; Vandewalle, 2012: 204).

Figure 21: Libyan No-Fly Zone



Source: Chivvis, 2015: 22

NATO's airstrikes quickly degraded Gaddafi's military capabilities. This allowed the rebels to consolidate their power and expand their control over Libya, achieving superiority with the support of NATO's air cover. Gaddafi's forces were compelled to declare a ceasefire and negotiate with the opposition. The African Union (AU) proposed a ceasefire and agreement, but the opposition rejected it because the agreement did not include provisions for Gaddafi's removal. On 20 August, opposition forces launched their final offensive towards Tripoli, successfully capturing the city, although Gaddafi managed to escape. In September, the UN recognized the NTC as the legal representative of Libya. On 23 October 2011, Gaddafi was brutally killed by opposition forces, marking the end of the conflict and the Gaddafi era (Oyeniyi, 2019: 187,188; Prashad, 2012: 97).

4.1.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

As the first humanitarian intervention of the twenty-first century, NATO's intervention in Libya has several unique features. Notably, it was among the few humanitarian interventions conducted with UNSC authorization. The difference from previous interventions authorized by the UNSC was that, for the first time, intervention was carried out against the will of a functioning state (Bellamy, 2011: 1). It was also the first intervention conducted under the R2P framework, introduced in 2005. Furthermore, it was the first intervention authorized by the UNSC that caused a regime change in the target country. Before the Libyan intervention transitioned to the NATO framework, France and the US conducted airstrike operations against Gaddafi's forces. However, this section analyzes OUP, which involved 14 NATO countries and four non-NATO partners, including the US and France.

NATO launched the intervention in March 2011. According to NATO statistics, the OUP involved over 260 air assets and 21 naval assets from sixteen countries at its peak. These air assets completed over 26,500 sorties, including over 9,700 strike sorties. Moreover, NATO deployed 8,000 troops. However, these troops never engaged in conflict with Gaddafi's forces and were never deployed on the battlefield. NATO stated that 8,000 troops were assigned to support the mission as service personnel (NATO, 2011b, 2011a, 2018: 328). NATO completed the mission without suffering any casualties, aside from financial costs (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012: 3).

In this case, the scope of the intervention is difficult to classify as merely "providing security" because it extends beyond that. Although the OUP's mission initially focused on civilian protection, involving a maritime embargo and a no-fly zone, it gradually evolved into providing air support to the rebels. NATO prevented Gaddafi's forces from retaking Benghazi and other eastern Libyan towns and cities from opposition forces, thereby preventing Gaddafi's forces from defeating the rebels. Shortly after that, the Gaddafi government announced a ceasefire (Barrie, 2012: 63; Mueller, 2015: 26; Oyeniyi, 2019: 187). In other words, OUP helped the opposition win against the better-equipped and well-trained Gaddafi forces. In summary, the scope of the Libya intervention was "assistance to combatants". This intervention heavily depended on airpower, with manpower used to support air operations. In other words, the role of airpower was "main," while the role of manpower was "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the Libya intervention is presented in Table 27.

Table 27: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Libya Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Libya, 2011	Assist	8,000	Main	Assistance to Combatants	0

4.1.3. Libya Intervention at the UNSC

The Libyan intervention is one of the few that captured global attention, primarily because it was part of the broader wave of popular protests known as the Arab Spring. The international community was already focused on the Middle East due to the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, and

Libya joined this focus following its own protests. When the protests turned into a civil war, demands for intervention increased. After the rebels captured Benghazi, the second largest city, Gaddafi expressed his anger towards the protesters by labelling them "*rats and cockroaches*" on a television program, referencing Tiananmen Square, and promising to "*clean Libya house by house*" of protesters (Chivvis, 2013: 27; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012: 3). This speech escalated fears of reprisal killings by Gaddafi's forces. The impact of these incidents on the UNSC was similarly profound. The UNSC adopted its first resolution on Libya just nine days after the demonstrations spread nationwide on 17 February. This section analyzes only UNSC resolutions from 2011, the year of the beginning of the protests and the start and end of the OUP.

In 2011, the UNSC convened 24 times with Libya on the agenda. As a result of these meetings, the UNSC drafted and adopted six resolutions. Less than two weeks after demonstrations spread nationwide, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970. This resolution imposed an arms embargo and travel ban on Libya, froze the assets of Gaddafi and his children, and referred the events in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the ICC prosecutor. Moreover, Resolution 1970 preferred the phrase "*may amount to crimes against humanity*" to describe the situation in Libya (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, 2011). In a subsequent meeting, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973, describing the situation in Libya as "*a threat to international peace and security*". Moreover, it authorized "*member states... acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements... to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*". Resolution 1973 also decided to establish a no-fly zone (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, 2011).

Moreover, in Resolution 2009, the UNSC established UNSMIL (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2009, 2011). Six days after Gaddafi's death on 23 October 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2016, welcoming "*the positive developments in Libya which will improve the prospects for a democratic, peaceful and prosperous future.*" The resolution modified some provisions of the arms embargo, terminated some asset freezes, and ceased some measures introduced by earlier Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2016, 2011). The summary of the Libya intervention at the UNSC is presented in Table 28.

Table 28: Summary of The Libya Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	Number of Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	UNSC Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
Libya, 2011	24	6	6	YES	YES	NO

4.2. Iraq-Syria Intervention, 2014.

4.2.1. Background and Rationale for the Intervention

The 2014 intervention in Iraq and Syria was launched to stop the Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (Daesh) which caused global alarm in the 2010s through its brutal massacres and rapid territorial expansion. Numerous countries participated in the campaign against ISIS. However, this section will focus on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the most extensive and comprehensive, led by the United States. To comprehend the fundamental reasons leading to the intervention against ISIS, it is essential to examine the connotations embedded in its name, specifically, “the Islamic State, Iraq, and Syria”. The analysis must include ISIS’s evolution from its establishment in 1999 to its declaration as the Islamic State in 2014, alongside developments in Iraq following the US invasion and in Syria in the wake of the Arab Spring.

In the 2010s, when the world first became aware of ISIS’s atrocities, many believed it to be a newly established terrorist organization. However, ISIS had operated in various regions under different names before the 2010s. It was initially established as Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) in 2000 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian criminal. Zarqawi initially aimed to fight against Jordan’s monarchy, but after failing, he joined the mujahideen (resistance) in Afghanistan against the USSR. He started to run an Islamic militant training camp in Afghanistan. Zarqawi’s journey in Iraq began with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan; following this, Zarqawi moved to Iraq. Zarqawi’s JTJ resisted the coalition forces and their allies in Iraq. What distinguished JTJ from other terrorist groups was its methodology. Unlike other groups that relied on guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, raids, and hit-and-run attacks, JTJ extensively used suicide bombers. JTJ targeted a wide range of groups, including Iraqi security forces, UN personnel, Shiites-having particular hostility towards them-Kurdish officials and civilians, and even humanitarian workers (Hashim, 2014: 69, 70). Although JTJ comprised 14 percent of all paramilitary forces in Iraq, it was believed to be responsible for half of the suicide attacks by late 2004 (Jacoby, 2023: 1).

In 2004, Zarqawi formally aligned with al-Qaeda, and his organization was subsequently renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This allegiance with Osama bin Laden enabled Zarqawi to attract more recruits, as well as funding and logistical support. Zarqawi established a rigid, inflexible, and exclusionary ideology, stating that those who did not conform to his beliefs were subject to ex-communication (takfir) and death. Although AQI and al-Qaeda Central (AQC) shared similar ideologies, their strategies diverged, particularly regarding AQI’s acts, which led to significant civilian casualties. This was the beginning of tensions between AQI and AQC. In addition to strategic variations, there was also a difference in enemy perception. Bin Laden did not share Zarqawi’s extensive focus on targeting Shiites and attacking sacred Shiite sites. Following Zarqawi's death in a US airstrike in 2006, a new phase began: AQI announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. After the declaration of ISI, Sunni tribes began to distance themselves from it, as their primary aim was to expel American forces, not to establish an Islamic state. Following the promise of economic support and integration into the Iraqi security services by the US, Sunni tribes began to combat ISI in 2008. Losing the support of the Sunni tribes, ISI faced a vital hit in 2010, when 80 percent of its leadership, including Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was either killed or captured in a US-Iraqi operation. By 2010, ISI appeared to be defeated; yet the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the civil war in Syria would facilitate the resurgence of ISI. The developments in Iraq and Syria are crucial for understanding this resurgence. (Graham, 2018: 4; Hashim, 2014: 71–73).

Between 2003 and 2005 in Iraq, the relationship between Sunni tribal leaders and the US-led coalition was predominantly hostile. The Sunnis were dissatisfied with their loss of power and the increasing influence of Shiite Iran in the country. Furthermore, the power-sharing arrangement among the ethnic groups in 2005 also intensified the Sunnis' resentment. According to the 2005 power-sharing compromise, the president would be a Kurd, one of his deputies a Sunni and the other a Shiite, the prime minister a Shiite, and the speaker of the parliament a Sunni. Despite the president being Kurdish and Sunni, the prime minister held executive power, leading to Shiite predominance in the country's governance. After 2003, the administration in Iraq failed to establish an inclusive national identity and to rebuild state institutions. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki adopted sectarian policies, alienated Sunnis, and disregarded Sunni grievances regarding discrimination. These policies exacerbated ethnic and sectarian tensions, consequently boosting support for ISI (Arı, 2017: 402; Gerges, 2016: 11,12, 99).

On the other side, Syria, which borders Türkiye to the north, Israel to the south, and Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq to the east, is among the countries most impacted by the Arab Spring movement, which began in 2011. In contrast to its other borders, the eastern boundary between Syria and Iraq lacks geographical features that separate the two countries. For this reason, the tribes along this border have members from both countries. By 2011, eighty percent of the Syrian population was Arab. Religiously, 60 percent of the country followed Sunni Islam, while the remaining 40 percent comprised minorities such as Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others. Despite being a minority, the ruling Assad family and senior security officials were Alawites. The Alawite reign in Syria started with Hafez al-Assad's rise to power in 1970 through a military coup. Following Hafez al-Assad's death in 2000, his son, Bashar al-Assad, also an Alawite, assumed the presidency. In 2011, widespread protests against the Assad regime started, aligning with the regional Arab Spring movement (Mumford, 2021: 10; Watson, 2021: 13, 14).

Initially, the Arab Spring protests in Syria could not offer an environment that led to ISI's resurgence because they were peaceful protests. Motivated by successful protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt, people marched on the streets to demand economic improvements, freedom, and social justice rather than sectarian or ethnic grievances. With a few exceptions, the protests remained mostly peaceful. However, the arrest of students for anti-government graffiti sparked violence. Initially non-sectarian, the Syrian uprising transformed into a sectarian civil war, with dissent against Assad becoming militarized and radicalized over time. This shift was partly attributed to the Assad regime's approach to managing the protests. Following the Syrian armed forces opening fire on protesters, demonstrators retaliated by attacking government buildings. The protests then spread to other cities, including Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Latakia, Jasim, and Baniyas, with calls for Assad's overthrow. By the Autumn of 2011, insurgents had taken control of parts of several Syrian towns and cities, which led to Syrian defense forces responding with tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Peaceful protests calling for social and political reform escalated into a sectarian civil war (Ford, 2019: 3; Gerges, 2016: 15; Momani & Hakak, 2016: 896, 897).

As the protests escalated into violence, a wide range of armed factions emerged in Syria, each with a different religious, ideological, and ethnic character and, in some cases, different foreign sponsors. Despite the differences among these armed groups, they unified with the shared objective of overthrowing Assad (Mumford, 2021: 10; Watson, 2021: 14). The portrayal of the civil war in Syria was that Sunni groups conflicted with an oppressive Alawite minority government. This was a highly suitable environment for ISIS to expand and gain support, given that they acted as representatives of the Sunnis and viewed the Shiites as their archenemy.

Alongside Iraq's dysfunctional state structure, which intensified conflict with the Sunnis, and a power vacuum in Syria following the onset of the Syrian Civil War, the ascendancy of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to leadership after Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's death also played a significant role in the resurgence of ISI. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi transformed the organization into an efficient and well-disciplined structure, which includes boards, councils, and even an intelligence service (Hashim, 2014: 73,74). These organizational reforms were primarily envisioned by former colonels who had served in Saddam's army, notably Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi, also known as Haji Bakr. He strategically established missionary centers to recruit members, collect intelligence on rivals, and control communities (Ohlers, 2017: 200).

Following their near extinction in 2010, these developments resuscitated ISI under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The power vacuum in the north and the Sunni-Shiite aspect of the conflict prompted Baghdadi to decide to fight against the Assad regime. He covertly dispatched some leaders to Syria to establish a Syrian Affiliate of Al Qaida. In 2012, they founded Jabhat al-Nusra, which rapidly became popular and secured a crucial position within the Syrian opposition movement because of its notable advancement against Assad's forces. Following Al-Nusra's capture of the Syrian provincial capital, Raqqa, in April 2013, Baghdadi broadcast the link between ISI and Al-Nusra. He declared that ISI had established, financed, and supported the Al-Nusra Front. He also declared a merger of these two organizations under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), with Raqqa as its capital. Empowered by gains in Syria, ISIS launched a new offensive in Iraq (Hashim, 2014: 77; Watson, 2021: 15–18).

In this new offensive in Iraq, ISIS captured significant territories, including Fallujah and Ramadi, and advanced towards Mosul. The response of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to ISIS's advance was deeply tragic. Weakened by prior conflicts and with the reduced loyalty of Sunnis to the Maliki government, the ISF experienced significant desertions, particularly among Sunni soldiers. Deserters also handed over substantial military assets to ISIS. ISIS captured a significant quantity of arms and equipment, including armored vehicles, mortars, and artillery pieces belonging to the ISF. Having achieved significant advances in Syria and Iraq, ISIS positioned itself as the defender of Sunnis against the Alawite regime in Syria and the Shiite government in Iraq. This strategy was largely successful; thousands of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq joined ISIS to combat their governments despite not aligning with its extremist ideology. After these territorial gains in Syria and Iraq, ISIS proclaimed its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and declared the areas under its control as a caliphate on June 29, 2014, renaming itself the Islamic State (IS). After the declaration of the caliphate, there was a rise in the number of people joining IS and those surrendering to IS (Gerges, 2016: 13; Graham, 2018: 6,7; Hashim, 2014: 78, 79).

Starting from late 2013, the Iraqi government sought assistance of any kind in its fight against ISIS. Even if there was a global expectation that ISIS should be punished not only for the atrocities it committed but also for proudly broadcasting footage of its executions, an effective response could not be mounted before ISIL achieved significant advances. This was partly due to the US's reluctance to embark on a new venture in Iraq, having only withdrawn from the country in 2011. The Obama administration viewed the 2011 withdrawal as a significant achievement in foreign policy, marking the conclusion of a prolonged conflict. The US declared that it would not redeploy troops to Iraq, emphasizing that the conflict was Iraq's responsibility. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government asserted that it did not request ground forces from the US, expressing confidence in their military capabilities. The turning point was the IS's assault on Mosul. Following Mosul's fall in June 2014, President Obama announced that the US would enhance support for the Iraqi military without engaging in combat operations, including deploying 300 special operations soldiers to assist Iraqi forces. This mission explicitly excluded combat against ISIS, except for self-defense (Watson, 2021: 19, 20).

Figure 22: Areas under the influence of IS at its greatest extent.



Source: Remarks at Herzliya Conference - United States Department of State, 2018

However, two incidents in August prompted a direct US response: IS's capture of the strategically crucial Mosul dam and the IS assault on the Yazidis in northern Mosul, leading tens of thousands of Yazidis to seek refuge. Furthermore, the urgent humanitarian crisis caused by IS in Syria and Iraq was intensifying. Tens of thousands of Syrians and Iraqis were displaced due to the actions of the IS. Around 1.5 million people were living in areas under the control of armed groups like IS or were significantly affected by the ongoing conflict. Besides causing humanitarian harm, IS also destroyed numerous antiquities in the region. In response to these developments, President Obama announced on August 7 that he had authorized US airstrikes against IS (Sterio, 2015: 327, 328; Watson, 2021: 24, 25).

On 9 August 2014, US aircraft hit IS forces advancing towards Erbil and Mount Sinjar, saving an estimated 40,000 besieged Yazidis. The US forces not only hit targets but also provided food, water, and medical supplies via cargo planes. This initial response quickly diminished the ISIS threat to Erbil. After securing Erbil and preventing a massacre, the US subsequently focused on recapturing the Mosul Dam due to fears that IS might demolish the dam and flood the cities. By 18 August, Iraqi forces, with the assistance of US air support, removed IS from the Mosul Dam. This initial phase of US intervention lacked a comprehensive plan or strategy comprising only limited and sporadic airstrikes against IS in the case of an immediate threat (Lambeth, 2021: 3; Watson, 2021: 25–27). This phase can be described as one that slows but does not stop the advancement of IS.

Two months after the first airstrike, on 17 October 2014, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) declared that the campaign would be named Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). While the United States assumed leadership of the operation, the coalition against IS consisted of 77 countries and five international organizations. In this coalition, Türkiye and the Netherlands concentrated on stopping ISIS's recruitment activities, Italy and Saudi Arabia aimed to undermine its financial resources, Germany and the UAE focused on providing humanitarian aid, and the US led military operations (CJTF-OIR History, n.d.; Mission of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve Fact Sheet, n.d.; Jacoby, 2023: 2, 3).

Figure 23: Coalition Strikes against the IS



Source: Lambeth, 2021: 5

By the end of 2015, the ISF had recaptured Ramadi, supported by an OIR airstrike. Unlike previous airstrikes, this time, the Coalition adopted a different strategy that led to success by attacking multiple fronts simultaneously. Following this success, questions were raised about why such a strong strategy for combating ISIS had not previously been implemented. This prompted a strategic shift known as Phase II. In this second phase, the number of airstrikes escalated from fewer than 200 a month in August 2014 to over 3,000 a month by mid-July 2016. Additionally, OIR focused on eliminating ISIS leaders and targeting ISIS-controlled oil fields and production facilities, which were crucial financial resources. On 6 June 2017, in Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expelled IS from Raqqa with the support of Coalition airstrikes. In Iraq, by 17 November 2017, ISIS had been ousted from its last urban area. Although no official announcement regarding the end of

OIR has been made, on 30 April 2018, the leadership of CJTF-OIR decided to deactivate its Baghdad headquarters, marking the end of major combat operations (Lambeth, 2021: 5–10).

4.2.2. Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of the Intervention

This intervention, which began in Iraq and later extended to Syria, is an example of a case where the perpetrator is a non-governmental actor rather than a state. This was a classic post-Kosovo intervention that relied heavily on airpower, with manpower assisting in the conduct of air missions. The interventions in Iraq and Syria were due to the inability of their governments to halt the massacres, and the rapid expansion of IS within their territories. Before OIR, the United States conducted airstrike operations against IS and deployed 300 special operations soldiers to Iraq to evaluate opportunities for training, advising, and supporting Iraqi security forces (Watson, 2021: 19,20). However, this section analyzes data from the US-led OIR, which involved 66 countries.

The US repeatedly stated before the operation that ground troops would not be deployed and that the conflict "belongs to the Iraqis". Likewise, the Iraqi government asserted that US troops were unnecessary, claiming that the Iraqi Army was strong enough. Moreover, fighting IS was not part of the mission; deployed troops were prohibited from engaging the enemy except in self-defense (Watson, 2021: 19, 20). Therefore, the primary framework of the OIR mission was an air campaign. By August 2017, CJTF had conducted 24,566 strikes, with 13,331 in Iraq and 11,235 in Syria (*Operation Inherent Resolve*, n.d.). At its peak, nearly 10,000 personnel were deployed to Iraq and Syria during OIR (Mcinnis, 2016). However, as previously mentioned, these personnel were deployed for training and assistance missions. According to the PRIF-HMI dataset, the contributors to CJTF-OIR lost 116 troops during the operation (*Iraq 2014- | HMI Dataset*, n.d.). However, this number included deaths outside Iraq and Syria, as well as non-hostile fatalities. Therefore, it is crucial to specify how many of these deaths occurred within Iraq and Syria and were the result of hostile actions. It was estimated that approximately ten of the deaths were due to hostile actions. The majority of these deaths resulted from ISIS attacks on fighting proxies (*2 US Army Soldiers Killed Fighting ISIS in Afghanistan | Fox News*, 2017; Calamur, 2016; Glenn, 2016).

The scope of the intervention can be classified as "assistance to combatants." The two primary pillars of OIR were air support and train-and-assist missions, both of which were provided to proxies fighting against IS in the region. This was due to problems arising from the intervention's overreliance on airpower. Militants learned to circumvent air strikes by using tunnels, camouflage, and hiding in cities. Additionally, airpower alone cannot completely eliminate IS militants' control over the region (Hashim, 2014: 80). The ground forces were clearly needed, and the Coalition met this requirement through various proxies. In Iraq, coalition partners included the Iraqi Defense Forces and the Peshmerga from Northern Iraq. In Syria, they initially aimed to establish a militia group called the New Syrian Forces (NSF). However, when this aim failed, they organized several Arab militia groups with the YPG[3] under a new name: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Coalition trained and equipped these groups and provided them with consultancy and, most importantly, air support (Watson, 2021: 26–40).

In summary, the scope of the Iraq-Syria intervention was "assistance to combatants." This intervention heavily relied on airpower, with manpower supporting air operations. In other words, the role of airpower was "main", while the role of manpower was "assist". The "casualties" section includes only the death toll; the wounded, missing, or captured are not included. The summary of military strength, casualties, and the scope of the Iraq-Syria intervention is presented in Table 29.

Table 29: Summary of Military Strength, Casualties, and Scope of Iraq-Syria Intervention

Intervention	Role of the Manpower	Strength of the Manpower	Role of the Airpower	Scope of the Intervention	Casualties
Iraq-Syria, 2014	Assist	10,000	Main	Assistance to Combatants	116 total, 10 hostile deaths

4.2.3. Iraq-Syria Intervention at the UNSC

As one of the most vicious and extremist terrorist organizations in history, IS dominated the international agenda for almost a decade with its massacres, terrorist attacks, and rapid advances in Iraq and Syria. In addition to using conventional terrorist methods, IS also used the internet and social media to disseminate its propaganda and broadcast footage of its executions to spread fear worldwide. However, the UNSC did not take the actions of this terrorist organization as seriously as did other actors in the international community. By the time the UNSC adopted its first resolution on ISIS, they had made significant advances and were moving towards Erbil. The first UNSC resolution was adopted six days after the US launched airstrikes against IS forces advancing towards Erbil, before the OIR.

Between 2014, the start of the OIR, and 2019, the removal of IS from all territories it previously controlled, the UNSC convened 28 times with IS on the agenda. As a result of these conventions, the UNSC drafted and adopted 11 resolutions. In its first meeting with IS on the agenda, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2170. Resolution 2170 condemned IS's actions and called upon member states to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to "*ISIS, ANF, and other groups associated with Al-*

[3] Associated organisation of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) - designated as a terrorist organisation mainly by Türkiye, European Union and NATO.

Qaida". Additionally, it imposed sanctions such as asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170, 2014). In all resolutions concerning IS, the UNSC defined IS terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. In Resolution 2249, the UNSC went a step further, describing IS as "a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and security"(United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, 2015).

In Resolutions 2178 and 2199, the UNSC focused on preventing both the human and financial sources of IS (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, 2014; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199, 2015). In Resolution 2249, the UNSC called upon member states "*to take all necessary measures... on the territory under the control of ISIL... to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL*" (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, 2015). In other words, Resolution 2249 authorized member states to combat IS in Syria and Iraq. All other resolutions up to 2019, when IS was removed from its final stronghold, addressed the ongoing combat with IS. The summary of the Iraq-Syria intervention at the UNSC is presented in Table 30.

Table 30: Summary of the Iraq-Syria Intervention at the UNSC

Interventions	**Number of Sessions**	**Draft Resolution**	**Adopted Resolution**	**Threat to Peace and Security**	**UNSC Authorizat ion**	**Disappro val of the interventi on**
Iraq-Syria, 2014	28	11	11	YES	YES	NO

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

First Transformation: From Ground to Sky, The Dominance of Airpower

The most significant transformation in humanitarian intervention is observed in the intervention methods. Two changes in intervention methods were observed in this dissertation. The first change in these methods is the replacement of manpower with airpower as the main intervention method. During the Cold War and the first decade after its end, the primary intervention method was manpower, with airpower providing assistance and protection to ground forces in the field. However, this trend began to shift, especially after the Kosovo intervention. Interveners started to prefer airpower as the primary intervention method, with ground forces used only to coordinate the effective use of airpower.

In East Pakistan, manpower was the main component of the Indian intervention, with 320,000 troops deployed on the western front and 160,000 troops on the eastern front to confront Pakistan. In Cyprus, the Turkish intervention demonstrated a significant reliance on manpower, with 40,000 troops deployed. Similarly, in the last intervention of the Cold War Period, manpower was the main component of Tanzania's intervention in Uganda, with between 30,000 and 50,000 troops deployed. In all three interventions, the role of airpower was to protect and support ground forces. During the Cold War, because the concept of humanitarian intervention was not as widely recognized as it became after the Cold War, states intervened at the risk of war. This can be observed as in the Cyprus intervention which had the risk of a Türkiye-Greece war. This is why the amount of manpower in these interventions was quite high.

This trend lasted during the Post-Cold War Period until the Kosovo intervention. In Iraq, the 23,000 deployed personnel were the leading actor protecting Kurds fleeing north from Saddam's forces. In Somalia, the US-led coalition's intervention heavily depended on manpower, with 44,000 troops deployed. Similarly, in Rwanda and East Timor, manpower was the main component of the French-led coalition's intervention, with 3,400 troops deployed, and of the Australia-led coalition, with 11,500 troops deployed. Airpower was responsible for various auxiliary roles in all four interventions, such as observing the no-fly zones, airlifting aid to the regions, and protecting the manpower on the ground. However, in the Kosovo intervention, airpower started to replace manpower as the primary intervention method.

In fact, Kosovo could have been an intervention relying on manpower like previous interventions. Both air and ground options were under consideration in the early stages of planning. Since they failed to reach a consensus on ground forces, US and allied leaders decided that an air campaign was the best course of action (Cohen & Shelton, 2000: XXI). During the intervention, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties, and no ground troops were deployed to the conflict zone. However, the subsequent intervention in Sierra Leone exhibited characteristics similar to pre-Kosovo interventions, primarily relying on manpower with 1,300 troops deployed and airpower providing support and reinforcement. The main reason the Sierra Leone intervention has pre-Kosovo characteristics is that the two interventions were conducted close together, with less than a year between them. This brief interval was insufficient for the transformation prompted by the Kosovo intervention to be realized.

The effects of the Kosovo intervention were more visible in the interventions of the Post-9/11 Period. Airpower dominated the interventions in this interval. For example, in Libya, the main mission of OUP was air operations, with over 26,500 sorties completed, of which over 9,700 were strike sorties. NATO deployed 8,000 troops, but they were assigned to support the mission as service personnel (NATO, 2011a, 2011b, 2018: 328). Likewise, in Iraq and Syria, the primary framework of the OIR mission was an air campaign, completing 24,566 strikes, with 13,331 in Iraq and 11,235 in Syria (*Operation Inherent Resolve*, n.d.). At its peak, nearly 10,000 personnel were deployed to Iraq and Syria during OIR for training and assistance missions (Mcinnis, 2016). In neither the Libya nor the Iraq and Syria interventions was manpower utilized as a combat force.

The second change in intervention methods is the narrowing of their scope. In the Cold War Period, interventions focused solely on “providing security”, whereas in the Post-Cold War Period, they were replaced by more comprehensive interventions. However, with the introduction of airpower in the Kosovo intervention, comprehensive interventions were replaced by interventions limited to providing security, as seen during the Cold War period. In the Post-9/11 Period, the scope of interventions moved from providing security to providing air support to combatant proxies. The interveners abandoned their role of providing security and limited their involvement to providing proxies training, arms, and air support.

Beginning with the interventions of the Cold War Period, the primary focus of India’s intervention in East Pakistan was on providing military assistance. India’s support to East Pakistan, both before and during the conflict, was exclusively centered on military matters. The scope of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was predominantly focused on providing security. The security of the Turkish Cypriot community was the primary concern of this intervention. Similarly, the scope of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, both before and during the intervention, was limited to providing security. Nyerere believed that Tanzania's security depended on the security of Uganda, which depended on the removal of Idi Amin and the end of the civil war in Uganda.

However, in the Post-Cold War Period, interveners started to undertake a wide range of tasks in addition to providing security. For example, in Iraq, OPC focused on emergency relief, providing security, and refugee resettlement (Rudd, 2004: 225). In Somalia, UNITAF carried out a wide range of tasks, including digging wells, building roads, and vaccinating children, in addition to providing security (Miller & Moskos, 1995: 616). In Rwanda, the French-led coalition provided hospitalization, medical consultations, and care services, and distributed tons of aid (McQueen, 2005: 141). East Timor may be the intervention in which interveners undertook the largest number of tasks. In East Timor, the Australia-led coalition carried out tasks such as repairing roads, government buildings, churches, and airports, running medical clinics, building sewage systems, and even removing garbage (Sebastian & Smith, 2000: 75). Nevertheless, in Kosovo, Operation Allied Force focused solely on providing security to the Kosovo Albanians through airpower. While in Sierra Leone, the old trend continued. The UK carried out a wide range of tasks, including training SLA troops and officers, reinforcing UNAMSIL, funding the disarmament process, and attempting to curtail the illegal diamond trade (Ucko, 2016: 26; Williams, 2001: 155).

In the Post-9/11 Period, interventions became even more limited. The interveners replaced their role as the leading providers of security with that of assisting the actors trying to provide security. For example, in Libya, airstrikes prevented Gaddafi's forces from retaking Benghazi and other eastern Libyan towns and cities from opposition forces. In other words, the intervention helped the opposition win against better-equipped and well-trained Gaddafi forces. Similarly, in the Iraq and Syria intervention, the two primary pillars of OIR were air support and train-and-assist missions, both provided to proxies fighting against IS in the region. The recipients of this support were the Iraqi Defense Forces and the Peshmerga in Iraq, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria.

Table 31: Summary of data regarding Intervention Methods.

Time Intervals	**Interventions**	**Role of the Manpower**	**Strength of the Manpower**	**Role of the Airpower**	**Scope of the Intervention**	**Casualties**
Cold War Period (1945-1990)	East Pakistan, 1971	Main	480,000	Assist	Providing Security	2,300 - 3,800
	Cyprus, 1974	Main	40,000	Assist	Providing Security	1,500-2,000
	Uganda, 1979	Main	30,000-50,000	Assist	Providing Security	373
	Iraq, 1991	Main	23,000	Assist	Wide Ranging	26

Post-Cold War Period (1991-2000)	Somalia, 1992	Main	44,000	Assist	Wide Ranging	21
	Rwanda, 1994	Main	3,400	Assist	Wide Ranging	0
	East Timor, 1999	Main	11,500	Assist	Wide Ranging	0
	Kosovo, 1999	Assist	18,400	Main	Providing Security	2 (non-hostile)
	Sierra Leone, 2000	Main	1,300	Assist	Wide Ranging	5 (1 hostile, 4 non-hostile)
Post-9/11 Period (2001-2020)	Libya, 2011	Assist	8,000	Main	Assistance to Combatants	0
	Iraq-Syria, 2014	Assist	10,000	Main	Assistance to Combatants	116 total, 10 hostile deaths

Underlying Reasons for First Transformation.

The previous section demonstrates the transformation of the intervener's methods. This section aims to describe the underlying reasons for this transformation and the events that contributed to it. Starting with the replacement of manpower with airpower as the main intervention method, it is necessary to clarify what states need and what airpower can offer to understand underlying reason for the transformation. Although the Post-Cold War Period (1990-2000) can be labelled as the golden age of humanitarian intervention, and despite most humanitarian interventions being carried out during this period, the decline in states' interest in humanitarian crises also began in this era. On the other hand, international society's interest in humanitarian crises and pressure to intervene to solve problems or save sufferers increased during the same period. While the timing of the interventions in Iraq and Somalia was relatively appropriate, subsequent interventions were delayed. For example, the intervention in Rwanda began after the genocide had already ended, and in East Timor the intervention occurred after years of massacres and persecutions. The timing of the Kosovo intervention was relatively better, but this was because the cost of non-intervention had been well understood in Bosnia. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the UK intervened ten years after the start of the civil war.

States seem reluctant to address humanitarian crises or, in Wheeler's words, to engage in "saving strangers" in a third country. Deploying troops to another country involves significant economic expenses, as well as the risk of casualties and failure. In the event of such outcomes, the state would lose domestic support. On the other hand, when states choose not to intervene, they can face intense pressure from the international community or may become bystanders to genocide, as witnessed in Bosnia and Rwanda. Consequently, states found themselves in a dilemma between the risks of intervening and the consequences of not intervening. They required an alternative that would mitigate these risks and alleviate the pressure to intervene.

In this regard, the airpower offered states exactly what they needed. It freed states from the costs and risks of deploying manpower (Wheeler, 2000: 268), thereby reducing casualties, and it also shielded them from accusations of non-involvement in crises. In other words, airpower enables states to engage without taking significant risks. Actually, there were instances of manpower-based interventions without any casualties among the intervening forces, such as in Rwanda and East Timor. However, when states choose manpower as their primary intervention method, the risk of casualties will always exist. So much so that in interventions where airpower was the primary method, there were very few hostile casualties and no combat casualties at all (see Table 33).

Cost efficiency is another advantage of airpower. Air operations are expensive but more cost-effective than deploying ground forces. The deployment of ground troops necessitates extensive logistical and infrastructure preparations and maintaining deployed troops for extended periods can be financially draining. Moreover, air assets can be rapidly mobilized, providing a quicker response than ground forces. Preparations for the deployment of ground forces take time, and responding late in humanitarian crises can potentially result in massive humanitarian disasters.

During interventions, airpower is highly effective in protecting no-fly zones against both air and ground attacks. Moreover, it plays a crucial role in maintaining cease-fires and deterring target forces from launching offensives. Even when on standby, its presence plays an important psychological role. The aerial demonstration can dissuade forces from violating cease-fires or launching offensives against those under protection. Moreover, airpower prevents target forces from concentrating and maneuvering. However, the total destruction of an army, armed group, or organization by airpower is rare; it serves better as a deterrent force rather than a compelling one (Haun, 2019: 161, 162; Tubbs, 1997: 47–49).

The Kosovo intervention holds a crucial position in this transition, marking a significant milestone in humanitarian interventions. Before the intervention, both air and ground options were under consideration. Because they failed to agree on ground forces, US and allied leaders decided that an air campaign was the best course of action (Cohen & Shelton, 2000: XXI). In other words, the failure of the Allies to reach an agreement on ground forces led airpower to become the primary intervention method in humanitarian interventions. However, this was not the only reason. The success of airpower in Kosovo is one of the most significant factors that contributed to the transformation. At the end of the 78-day air campaign, Yugoslav forces withdrew from Kosovo, and the mission was completed without any casualties or troop deployment.

On the other hand, airpower has some drawbacks. For example, it cannot act as a stand-alone force, and natural conditions like terrain and weather can easily affect its efficiency and increase the risk of collateral damage. Airpower can be devastating in flat, open terrain and clear daytime conditions (Haun, 2019: 161). However, in adverse terrain and weather conditions, the effectiveness of airpower may decrease. Even under the best circumstances, airpower cannot act as a stand-alone force; it cannot hold territory or completely destroy an army without ground forces. Moreover, target groups or armies can evade airstrikes by concealing themselves and dispersing. For example, the Serbian army in Kosovo hid its armor and used civilian vehicles to avoid air strikes (Haun, 2019: 145). In Syria, the IS militias used tunnels and camouflage, hiding in cities to avoid air strikes (Hashim, 2014: 80). As indicated in the previous passages, airpower alone can be a deterrent force. However, it needs to be closely coordinated with strong and adequate ground forces to become a powerful coercive force (Tubbs, 1997: 48, 49). Lastly, the potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties are other significant drawbacks of airpower. In the interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Iraq-Syria, where airpower was the main intervention method, there was a significant amount of collateral damage and civilian casualties.

The transition from manpower to airpower in intervention methods was also the reason for the change in the scope of interventions. Interveners used to perform a wide range of tasks beyond providing security, including refugee resettlement, building roads and government buildings, and even removing garbage. However, they ceased undertaking these sorts of activities because they no longer deployed ground forces to conflict zones. This is why the scope of the intervention transited from a “wide ranging” to “providing security” in the Post-Cold War Period. As indicated in the previous passage, airpower cannot act as a stand-alone force and needs to be closely coordinated with a strong ground force to become a powerful coercive force. This requirement transformed the scope of humanitarian interventions from “providing security” to “assistance to combatants”. In the Libya and Iraq-Syria interventions, interveners met these requirements through local proxies -in Iraq, the Iraqi Defense Forces and the Peshmerga of Northern Iraq, and in Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)- and limited the scope of their intervention to air assistance for these proxies.

In summary, this dissertation observed two changes in the methods of humanitarian intervention. The first is the replacement of manpower with airpower as the main intervention method. The second is the narrowing of the scope of interventions. Both transformations represent a new trend, not a reversion to the old. States are now moving away from land-based interventions and limiting the scope of their interventions to providing air support to combatants. However, this support could change the power balance in the region by strengthening these proxies, which may not be the priority of the interveners.

Graph 3: Transformation in Intervention Methods



Second Transformation: End of the Golden Age

Another transformation in humanitarian intervention is the decline in state interest regarding intervening humanitarian crises. After the Cold War, states showed more interest in humanitarian issues, and the UNSC was less inclined to use its veto power. As a result, the period from 1990 to 2000 saw the highest number of interventions per year (see Graph 5). It is plausible to suggest that this trend is unique to the Post-Cold War Period. This trend neither existed in the Cold War Period nor resumed in the Post-9/11 Period. This section describes the decline in state interest following the end of the Post-Cold War Period. The following section attempts to explain the underlying reasons for this transformation and the events that contributed to it.

Graph 4: Number of Intervention/years



Although the interventions in the Cold War Period were not officially declared as humanitarian interventions, they significantly alleviated severe humanitarian crises in the countries where they intervened. However, despite the severe humanitarian crises, these crises did not receive notable attention from the UNSC. For example, the crisis in East Pakistan began with Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971. Despite months of mass killings and a refugee influx, the UNSC first convened with Pakistan on the agenda on 4 December, a day after Pakistan launched air strikes on Indian airfields. Although Cyprus was the intervention most addressed by the UNSC during the Post-Cold War Period, it first appeared on the UNSC agenda during the 1963-1964 crises. Until the intervention in 1974, it only once, in Resolution 193, called for an "immediate ceasefire". Moreover, despite the high number of UNSC resolutions on Cyprus, most of these resolutions concerned the biannual renewal of the UN peacekeeping force mandate rather than responding to crises. Uganda was the best example of the UNSC's indifference. Despite numerous human rights violations and massacres committed by Idi Amin's regime between 1971 and 1979, Uganda's invasion of Kagera Island in 1978, and the subsequent conflict between Uganda and Tanzania in 1979, none of these incidents were addressed by the UN, including both the UNSC and the UNGA. Even when Idi Amin requested a Security Council meeting to address the border situation, the request was dismissed.

The UNSC's recognition of a crisis as a threat to peace and security is a crucial indicator of the seriousness and gravity of the crisis. However, in all interventions during the Cold War Period, unlike in the Post-Cold War Period, the UNSC defined the intervention itself, rather than the preceding humanitarian crisis, as a "threat to peace and security". The main point is that during the Cold War Period, the UNSC focused more on interventions rather than on the preceding humanitarian crises.

On the other hand, except for Cyprus, the interventions in East Pakistan and Uganda were neither condemned nor disapproved by the UNSC. The absence of UN condemnation or disapproval of the intervention can be perceived as indirect support.

The Post-Cold War Period shows a significant increase in state interest regarding intervening humanitarian crises. Not only did the number of resolutions increase, but the UNSC also addressed crises before interventions. In all interventions, the UNSC described the pre-intervention situations as a "threat to peace and security". Three of the six interventions (Somalia, Rwanda, and East Timor) were authorized by the UNSC, while the other three interventions were neither condemned nor disapproved of by the UNSC. Furthermore, although it did not authorize the intervention, as in the case of Kosovo, the UNSC welcomed the agreements reached after the intervention. During the Post-Cold War Period, the UNSC established a customary practice whereby the most legal scenario for an intervention is when a pre-intervention situation is defined as "a threat to peace and security", and member states are authorized to intervene.

After analyzing the Libya and Iraq-Syria interventions of the Post-9/11 Period, one could conclude that this customary practice continues. In both interventions, the UNSC described the pre-intervention situation as a "threat to peace and security" and authorized member states to intervene. However, this would be a wrong conclusion. Given that this practice was followed in only two interventions over a 20-year period, it is clear that states were less willing to engage in humanitarian crises than they were during the Post-Cold War Period. In other words, the UNSC maintains this practice in cases where it has decided to act. However, it is now much more cautious and reluctant to make such decisions. The number of UNSC activities per year also confirms this declining trend (see Graph 6).

Graph 5: UNSC Activities Per Year by Time Interval (1945-2020)



Table 32: Summary of data regarding State Interest.

Time Intervals	Interventions	Number of Sessions	Draft Resolution	Adopted Resolution	Threat to Peace and Security	Authorization	Disapproval of the intervention
Cold War Period (1945-1990)	East Pakistan, 1974	9	3	1	NO	NO	NO
	Cyprus, 1974	78	40	39	NO	NO	YES
	Uganda, 1979	0	0	0	NO	NO	NO
Post-Cold War Period (1990-2000)	Iraq, 1991	3	3	3	YES	NO	NO
	Somalia, 1992	7	7	7	YES	YES	NO
	Rwanda, 1994	19	12	12	YES	YES	NO
	East Timor, 1999	24	8	8	YES	YES	NO
	Kosovo, 1999	12	6	5	YES	NO	NO
	Sierra Leone, 2000	47	21	21	YES	NO	NO
Post-9/11 Period (2001-2020)	Libya, 2011	24	6	6	YES	YES	NO
	Iraq-Syria, 2014	28	11	11	YES	YES	NO

Underlying Reasons for Second Transformation.

In the Cold War Period the main agenda of international relations was the competition between the two superpowers in every field. During this period, issues other than the struggle between the two superpowers were regarded as low politics, and the idea of intervening in a country for humanitarian reasons was not yet popular. In fact, interventions during this time interval are considered humanitarian due to their consequences. The main driver of the interventions in the Cold War Period, except for Cyprus, was the negative impact of the conflict on the intervening countries. For example, India faced a massive wave of migration due to the conflict in East Pakistan. Tanzania, on the other hand, suffered the occupation of its land (Kagera Island) due to the civil war in Uganda. In other words, Tanzania and India were the countries most significantly affected by the crises in which they intervened.

As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the UNSC did not address pre-intervention humanitarian crises during the Cold War Period due to the characteristics of the Cold War era. However, except for Uganda, the UNSC showed interest in East Pakistan and Cyprus only after the interventions had started. The reason for this was the possibility that these interventions could lead to major political crises. For example, the crisis in East Pakistan had the potential to escalate into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. Similarly, the intervention in Cyprus could have led to a conflict between the two NATO allies, Türkiye and Greece. On the other hand, the Uganda intervention was not addressed by the UNSC at any stage, as it was viewed primarily as a regional issue rather than a global or major political threat.

The transformation in the Post-Cold War Period was closely linked to the changes in the international system following the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War brought about several transformations in the international system. However, two of these changes significantly influenced the course of humanitarian intervention in the Post-Cold War Period. The first was the shift in the structure of the international system from interstate disputes to intrastate insurgencies (Chopra & Weiss, 1992: 98). Second, subjects of security broadened, encompassing non-military issues such as social stability, global warming, the economy, and humanitarian crises, all of which began to attract significant international attention.

The change in the international system was reflected in the 1991 Iraq intervention. Unlike the Cold War Period, the UNSC addressed the pre-intervention humanitarian crisis in all interventions during the Post-Cold War Period. For example, in Iraq, the UNSC, for the first time, described a humanitarian crisis as a "threat to peace and security." In Somalia, Rwanda, and East Timor, the UNSC identified the pre-intervention humanitarian crises similarly and also authorized member states to conduct military interventions. Although the UNSC did not authorize member states to intervene in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, it described the pre-intervention humanitarian crises as "a threat to peace and security." Even this was crucial because when the UNSC declares a situation within a country as a threat to peace and security, it signifies that immediate action is required to address it. The Post-Cold War Period saw the highest level of state willingness to address humanitarian crises, a trend that was also evident in the actions of the UNSC. Unlike the Cold War period, the UNSC addressed humanitarian crises in the pre-intervention stage and demonstrated a commitment to resolving them. During the Post-Cold War Period, the UNSC established customary practice. According to this practice, the most legal scenario for an intervention is when a pre-intervention situation is defined as "a threat to peace and security," and member states are authorized to intervene.

The previous section indicated that states were less willing to engage in humanitarian crises during the Post-9/11 Period compared to the Post-Cold War Period. The so-called golden age of humanitarian intervention, with six interventions in ten years, was followed by a new era with only two interventions in 20 years. In the Post-9/11 Period, UNSC members were more inclined to use their veto power compared to the Post-Cold War Period. States are now more cautious and reluctant to engage in humanitarian crises. However, in the Post-Cold War Period, the concept of humanitarian intervention began to gain relative acceptance. In Hehir's words, it became legitimate, even if not legal (Hehir, 2010: 52). This relative acceptance enabled some states to pursue their interests under humanitarian justification; in other words, they started to abuse the concept. The first major example of this abuse was the Second Gulf War in 2003. The Bush administration initially justified the intervention with claims of Iraq's WMDs and ties to Al-Qaeda. However, when no WMDs or significant terrorist links were found, it shifted to a humanitarian rationale, declaring the goal was to "liberate" the Iraqi people to maintain support for the intervention. The misuse or abuse of the humanitarian justification in Iraq seriously undermined confidence in humanitarian intervention (Ok & Tüfekçi, 2022: 90–93).

The second major example was the Libya intervention in 2011. It is one of the most criticized humanitarian interventions, perhaps the most criticized one. A humanitarian intervention, which was supposed to solve the humanitarian crisis and resolve the violence, instead increased the violence in Libya. It helped one of the belligerents to win and led to a regime change in the country. If a humanitarian intervention results in a regime change, states will hesitate to use it again. Moreover, after the Libya intervention, calls for intervention in Syria were primarily vetoed by Russia and China, who were concerned it could lead to a regime change similar to that in Libya (Ok & Tüfekçi, 2022: 92). In summary, states have become more cautious and reluctant to engage in humanitarian issues during the Post-9/11 Period mainly due to the observation that humanitarian interventions are susceptible to abuse, as evidenced by the 2003 Iraq and 2011 Libya cases.

CONCLUSION

"Change is the only constant in life."

Heraclitus

Change and transformation are fundamental realities of the world. The world is in a constant state of transformation, and so are international relations. No international order, dynamic, or system has remained unchanged throughout history. Embracing change is crucial for survival, both in the world and in international relations. States that failed to adapt to changes in the international system have either collapsed or lost their position in the global order. However, noticing the transformation is more important than embracing it. This dissertation aims to highlight the transformation in the concept of humanitarian intervention after the millennium, specifically in the areas of intervention methods and state interests.

In fact, the concept of humanitarian intervention experienced its first transformation after the end of the Cold War. This was primarily due to the radical changes in the international system following the end of the Cold War. Significantly, the concept of international security diversified. Unlike during the Cold War, not only military matters but also social, economic, environmental, and humanitarian issues also became subjects of security. Furthermore, the structure of the international system evolved from interstate disputes to intrastate insurgencies. This new era was marked by several intrastate conflicts, including those in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone (Chopra & Weiss, 1992, p. 98; Ogurlu & Dag, 2023; Ok & Tüfekçi, 2022, p. 82).

The severe human rights violations committed during these civil wars drew the attention of the international community and provoked strong international reactions (Hehir, 2010: 51). Academics, states, and international organizations began to breach the wall of non-interference and attach less importance to the concept of national sovereignty. The sanctity of national sovereignty diminished, and the belief that all states have a "responsibility to protect" human rights gained more attention. This view advocates that states should not stand idly by in the face of crimes against humanity and should intervene, including militarily, if necessary, to stop these crimes (Ok & Tüfekçi, 2022: 82). This increase in theoretical interest was also reflected in practice, with the period from 1990 to 2000 witnessing the highest number of humanitarian interventions (see Graph 3).

Graph 6: Percentage of Cases by Time Intervals.



Due to this increase in both theoretical and practical interest in humanitarian intervention in the Post-Cold War period, many considered it the "golden age" of humanitarian intervention. However, this dissertation identifies two major transformations in humanitarian intervention regarding intervention methods and state interest. The first transformation concerns the intervention methods, characterized by the replacement of manpower with airpower as the main intervention method and the narrowing in the scope of the interventions. During the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods, interventions relied heavily on manpower, with airpower playing a supportive role. However, starting with the Kosovo intervention, airpower emerged as the main intervention method, enabling states to minimize the costs and risks of deploying manpower and from accusations of non-involvement in the crises. By the Post-9/11 Period, interventions became even more limited in scope, focusing primarily on providing air support to warring proxies in the field. This narrowing of scope was closely tied to the transition to airpower. While intervening with airpower, interveners cannot undertake missions that manpower can. However, as air power alone was insufficient, the need for ground forces further narrowed the scope of intervention, shifting from providing security to providing air support to proxies.

The second transformation is the decline in state interest regarding intervening in humanitarian crises. While the Post-Cold War era initially saw an increased willingness to address humanitarian crises, this enthusiasm did not continue in the Post-9/11 Period. The problem of abuse contributed to this transformation, notably in the 2003 Iraq War and the 2011 Libya intervention. These interventions demonstrated the potential of humanitarian intervention to be misused and highlighted the unintended consequences, leading states to adopt a more cautious and reluctant stance.

Consequently, it would not be inaccurate to suggest that the so-called golden age of humanitarian intervention comes to an end.

To address the question of how humanitarian interventions might look in the future in light of current transformational trends, the examination of these two transformations reveals the emergence of a new trend: States are likely to adopt a more cautious and reluctant approach toward the concept of humanitarian intervention. However, if they decide to intervene, the intervention will be limited mainly to providing air support to one of the belligerents. States will likely continue to avoid deploying manpower to conflict zones, limiting their ground forces' rules of engagement to coordinating airpower and maintaining contact with the belligerents they support.

However, a modification can be expected in the nature of new air-based interventions. With the advancement of technology, crewed aircraft are likely to be replaced by unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, and remotely controlled weapon systems. Moreover, in the absence of a proxy to provide support, artificial proxies may be created, as seen in Syria, or new actors, such as private military contractors, may enter the scene as the recipients of the intervener's support. However, both air-only interventions and assisting warring proxies have some drawbacks. For example, natural conditions like terrain and weather can easily affect airpower efficiency, and striking targets with fighter jets carries the risk of collateral damage. On the other hand, collaborating with local proxies could strengthen these proxies and may lead to a change in the power balance of the region. For instance, the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (KRG), which cooperated with and received air support as part of the OIR, held an independence referendum in 2017 despite the objections of the Central Government.

On the other hand, the disadvantages of airpower - such as natural conditions, collateral damage, and evasion - can be minimized as technology advances. It will be possible to see aerial vehicles with more advanced radar systems that are less affected by natural conditions. Moreover, unmanned aerial vehicles with advanced sensors and targeting systems would provide more precision, thereby reducing the risk of collateral damage. Target groups or armies can evade airstrikes by concealing themselves and dispersing. However, UAVs with stealth capability are more challenging to detect, making it harder for target groups to evade them. Moreover, UAVs also provide quicker responses for interveners than fighter jets, as they do not require complex infrastructure to be launched. In summary, states will likely continue to be more cautious and reluctant to engage in humanitarian interventions. Airpower is expected to remain the primary intervention method, though there may be changes in its form.

Despite these findings, this dissertation emphasizes the need for further research on factors driving state decisions to intervene in humanitarian crises and intervention methods. Understanding the reasons underlying state's decision to intervene can also shed light on why states choose not to intervene in certain situations or what circumstances must be met for a state to decide to intervene. Future studies could explore questions such as: What political, economic, or strategic factors motivate states to act? How do relationships between intervening and target states- such as historical ties, alliances, colonial legacies, or economic dependencies- affect the likelihood of intervention? Moreover, future studies could focus on the potential risks of using local proxies, such as their long-term effect on regional stability or their potential association with terrorist organizations. Exploring new strategies to reduce overreliance on airpower and proxies could help improve the effectiveness and ethical considerations of future interventions.

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