



T.C.
CANKIRI KARATEKIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT

**THE INSTABILITY OF PEACE IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA**

Moubarak Charmarkeh HALANEH

MASTER'S THESIS

Supervisor

Asst. Prof. Dr. Şuayip TURAN

Çankırı – 2024

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CURRICULUM VITAE	Hata! Yer işareti tanımlanmamış.

SCIENTIFIC ETHICS STATEMENT

From the proposal stage to the conclusion of the study titled *The Instability of Peace in the Horn of Africa*, which I prepared as a master's thesis, I strictly adhered to academic ethics and rules, obtaining all of the information in the thesis within the framework of academic ethics and tradition, and preparing the thesis in accordance with the rules of writing. I declare that I mentioned every source as a reference and that the works I used are listed in the bibliography.

24/10/2024

Signature

Moubarak Charmarkeh HALANEH

THESIS ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

ÇANKIRI KARATEKIN UNIVERSITY

TO THE DIRECTORATE OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

This study titled *The Instability of Peace in the Horn of Africa* prepared by *Moubarak Charmarkeh HALANEH* was found successful *unanimously* as a result of the thesis defense held on *24.10.2024* and was accepted as a Master's thesis in the *Department of Political Science and International Relations* English by our jury.

THESIS JURY MEMBERS (Title, Name and Surname)

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APPROVAL

This Thesis has been accepted by the jury determined in the session of Çankırı Karatekin University Institute of Graduate Studies Administrative Board, dated 23/10/2024 and numbered 21/02

Prof. Dr. Ersoy YILMAZ

Director of the Institute

PREFACE

Above all, thanks to almighty Allah for enabling me to achieve my thesis. Without guidance, support, clear and timely feedback from my supervisor, Asst. Prof. Dr. Şuayip TURAN, this research paper would not have been successfully accomplished. Whenever I felt overburdened or exhausted with the research, he was there to fill me up with hope and energy. I wish to thank him for his tireless assistance. I would like to express my gratitude to my friends, co-discipliners and family, who have supported me throughout this process. Their advice, encouragement and discussions have been essential to the success of this work. I hope that this thesis is the fruit of many years of effort, reflection and research and will make a significant contribution to the academic debate. Finally, very special thanks to my parents, brothers and sisters, together with our relatives for their prayers and support to my family during my absence.

24/10/2024

Moubarak Charmarkeh HALANEH

ABSTRACT

Thesis Title : The Instability of Peace in the Horn of Africa
Author of the Thesis : Moubarak Charmarkeh HALANEH
Supervisor : Asst. Prof. Dr. Şuayip TURAN
Department : Political Science and International Relations
Type of Thesis : Master's.
Acceptance Date : 24.10.2024

This thesis investigates the Instability of peace in the horn of Africa, a region defined by a complex interaction of political, social, and economic factors. The horn of Africa regions faces significant challenges of conflict and instability, making it one of the most unstable regions. The region is currently experiencing high levels of political violence and instability, from the civil conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, to militia and Islamist militant activity in Kenya, to the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia. The primary purpose of this research is to identify the root causes of peace instability in the horn of Africa, addressing key research question concerning strategies for managing and resolving conflicts in the region. This study methodology uses a qualitative analytical approach. The research begins with an examination of the historical context of the states in the horn of Africa, with a particular focus on their geopolitical positioning. The second part of the thesis focus on the concepts of conflict, peace studies, and international security, examining the trajectory of various causes of conflict and the collapse of state structures in the horn of Africa. Additionally, the study addresses the ongoing humanitarian crises affecting the region. The thesis concluded that addressing the instability in the horn of Africa requires the commitment of peace and reconciliation among regional actors and the international community for the goal of establishing sovereign states and promote democratic governance.

Keywords: Instability, Peace, Security, Conflict, Democracy

TURKISH ABSTRACT

Tezin Adı	: Afrika Boynuzu'nda Barışın İstikrarsızlığı
Tezin Yazarı	: Moubarak Charmarkeh HALANEH
Tez Danışmanı	: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şuayip TURAN
Bölüm	: Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Türü	: Yüksek Lisans
Kabul Tarihi	: 24.10.2024

Bu tez, Afrika Boynuzundaki barışın istikrarsızlığını araştırmaktadır. Bu bölge, siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik faktörlerin karmaşık bir etkileşimi ile tanımlanır. Afrika Boynuzu bölgeleri, çatışma ve istikrarsızlık açısından önemli zorluklarla karşı karşıya olup, bu durumu en istikrarsız bölgelerden biri haline getirmektedir. Bölge şu anda Sudan ve Etiyopya'daki iç savaşlardan, Kenya'daki milis ve İslamcı militan faaliyetlerine, Somali'deki Al-Şebab isyanına kadar yüksek düzeyde siyasi şiddet ve istikrarsızlık yaşamaktadır. Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, Afrika Boynuzundaki barış istikrarsızlığının kökenlerini tespit etmek, bölgedeki çatışmaların yönetimi ve çözülmesine yönelik stratejilerle ilgili anahtar araştırma sorularını ele almaktır. Bu çalışma metodolojisi, nitel bir analitik yaklaşım kullanmaktadır. Araştırma, Afrika Boynuzundaki devletlerin tarihi bağlamının incelenmesiyle başlamakta olup, özellikle bu devletlerin jeopolitik konumlanmasına odaklanmaktadır. Tezin ikinci bölümü, çatışma, barış çalışmaları ve uluslararası güvenlik kavramlarına odaklanmakta, Afrika Boynuzundaki çatışma nedenlerinin ve devlet yapılarını çökerten dinamiklerin izini sürmektedir. Ayrıca, çalışma bölgedeki devam eden insani krizlere de değinmektedir. Bu tezi, Afrika Boynuzundaki istikrarsızlığın ele alınmasının, bölgesel aktörler ve uluslararası toplum arasında barış ve uzlaşma taahhüdünü gerektirdiğini ve bu amacın, egemen devletlerin kurulması ve demokratik yönetişimin teşvik edilmesi olduğunu sonucuna varmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İstikrarsızlık, Barış, Güvenlik, Çatışma, Demokrasi.

ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
AENF	Alliance of Eritrea National Front
AIAI	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
BMA	British Military Administration
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CFS	Cote Francaise des Somalia
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution
DML	Democratic Marxist League
EAC	East African Community
EEBC	Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
ELM	Eritrean Liberation Movement
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPPF	Ethiopia People's Patriotic Front
EU	European Union
FPCI	Four Power Commission of Investigation
FPPP	Four Point Peace Proposal
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
HLD	High-Level Delegation
HOA	Horn of Africa
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
L/C	Letters of Credit
LPAI	League Populaire African for Independence
MCC	Military Coordination Committee
ML	Muslim League

NEBE	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NUF	National United Front
OAU	Organization of African Union
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization
OFDM	Oromo federalist Democratic Movement
OFC	Oromo Federalist Congress
POW	Prisoner of War
PGE	Provisional of Eritrea Government
PMP	Party Movement Populaire
PEDJ	People’s Front Democracy and Justice
RPP	Popular Rally Progress
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SYC	Somalia Youth Club
SYL	Somalia Youth League
SDU	Somalia Democratic Union
SRC	Somalia Revolutionary Council
SOS	Somalia Shilling
SNC	Somalia National Congress
SPM	Somalia Patriotic Movements
SSDF	Somalia Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TPLF	Tigray People’s Liberation Front
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
U. S	United States
UN	United Nations
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UNSCR	United Nation Security Council Resolution
USA	United States of America
UXO	Unexploded Ordinance
UMP	Union for Presidential Majority
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNEF	United Nation Emergence Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
USAD	United States Department Defence
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front



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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The Horn of Africa is a strategically significant region, with the geopolitical positions of the states within it holding great importance. The ongoing struggle against terrorism, coupled with the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations and the African Union, demonstrates that this region occupies a critical intersection of local, regional, and global dynamics (Cormier-Salem, 2009, pp. 5-23). According to some experts, the Horn's uniqueness is largely rooted in the enduring state customs of the former Ethiopian empire, which have persisted beyond the territorial boundaries agreed upon by Menelik II and the European powers in the 19th century (Gascon, 2009, p. 22). On the other hand, some argue that the region's challenges stem directly from Ethiopia's difficult post-colonial situation and Somalia's resistance to these imposed borders, whose political aim was the reunification of all Somalis into a single state (Clapham, 2013).

The Horn of Africa's unique and distinctive trajectory of state formation has significantly influenced how its political actor's approach both internal and external political and security matters. The principal issues of the borders were designed to maintain colonial borders and prevent conflicts over territorial claims, yet in the Horn of Africa, these borders often do not align with the region's social and ethnic realities. As a result, the political actors in this region tend to approach security, governance, and diplomacy through lenses that reflect both the historical experiences of state fragmentation and the ongoing struggles for self-determination, national unity, and territorial integrity. This divergence in state formation and political discourse contributes to the region's vulnerability to conflict and instability, as internal divisions and external interventions often challenge the established political order. Dogmas of pan-Somali nationalism are violated by Somaliland's unilateral proclamation of independence and its political aim to establish a state and a nation (Marchal, 1993). Although most of the root causes of the current conflicts in the horn of Africa date back to European colonialism in the region, the origins of the current conflicts can be largely attributed to this experience. The European colonial powers

partitioned the once independent component parts of the horn of Africa in the late 1800s and after the construction of the Suez Canal, unifying different regions and nations into geographical divisions. (Woodward, 1996).

The Horn of Africa experiences frequent interstate conflicts, marked by the strong influence of external actors shaping its security agenda. The region is further defined by deep political divisions and inadequate regional collaboration, hindered by substantial gaps in infrastructure, communication, and transportation networks. The region faces vulnerabilities at the state level, such as internal political instability, a low capacity to provide security, and deficiencies in social development (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Cardoso, 2015). The Ethiopian state underwent significant transformations during the 1990s. The loss of government troops and Eritrea's subsequent independence marked the end of three decades of conflict with nationalists in Eritrea by 1991. Following the departure of Haile Selassie to Zimbabwe, Meles Zenawi assumed the presidency as the leader of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of opposition parties. The administration of Mengistu Haile Mariam, known as the Derg in Amharic, was defined by a harsh interpretation of Marxism and will be remembered for its brutal policies in Eritrea, its violent repression of internal dissent, and the detrimental effects on Ethiopia's economy.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict began in May 1998 and lasted for two years, primarily driven by political and economic factors. A boundary dispute in the town of Badme served as the immediate catalyst for the conflict. In December 2000, at the request of both parties, the international community deployed the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to oversee the ceasefire, demilitarize the border region, and facilitate the work of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), which was tasked with delineating the 621-mile border. Both nations committed to recognizing the EEBC's demarcation as definitive and legally binding. The peace process initially progressed smoothly, with no further confrontations occurring, and the establishment of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) marked a significant step towards stabilizing the region (Healy, 2008).

A bloodless revolution in 1969 led to the overthrow of the government by military ruler Siad Barre. As a result, the state effectively controlled the land, with clans subordinated to it. This marked the beginning of a policy that set national priorities. However, Somalia soon experienced severe political, social, and economic disintegration. Barre's autocratic style, concentration of power, and clan rivalries contributed to the collapse of his regime in 1991, despite his efforts to resolve the country's political and economic challenges. South-central Somalia remained deeply fragmented even after Somaliland and Puntland, in the northwest and east of the country respectively, established their own administrations by the late 1990s, capable of performing most governmental functions. Following the signing of the Djibouti peace agreement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in 2008, the African Union became actively involved in Somalia's peace process, playing a central role in promoting stability. The peace agreement called for the rapid withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force. However, the security vacuum left by the Ethiopian withdrawal allowed Al-Shabaab to resurge and reclaim lost territory in South-Central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu (Memar, 2012).

1.2. Research Questions

This research will focus on the following questions for the thesis:

- 1.** What are the primary factors contributing to the persistent instability in the Horn of Africa?
- 2.** What strategies have been effective in managing and resolving conflicts in the Horn of Africa?

1.3. Hypothesis

The research hypothesis refers to the proposed answers to the questions concerning the objective of the research, formulated in a way that allows observation and analysis to yield a conclusive response

The objective of this research is to identify and analyze the primary factors contributing to the persistent instability in the Horn of Africa, examining the interplay between political, economic, and social dynamics, as well as the role of regional and international interventions.

The analysis of the hypothesis aims to examine conflict management and resolution strategies in the Horn of Africa, which involve a dynamic interaction between traditional mediation institutions, regional efforts, and international interventions designed to address the underlying causes of conflict.

Traditional conflict resolution systems, such as elder councils and community dialogues, play a crucial role in local conflict prevention. However, they can be hindered by larger-scale political disputes. Additionally, regional initiatives sponsored by organizations such as the African Union (AU) and IGAD have produced uneven outcomes, primarily due to the slow implementation of peace agreements and a lack of sustained political commitment.

1.4. Literature Review

Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998, pp. 621-634) highlight that East Africa, including the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, and the historical East African nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, remains among the world's most conflict-prone areas. Despite advances in conflict resolution across much of Africa, this region continues to face enduring instability. Ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, South Sudan, southern Somalia, Darfur, and Eritrea, alongside heavily armed communal clashes in other areas, significantly weaken security at regional, national, and local levels. Transnational criminal networks also seek refuge in isolated, unmonitored border regions, claim Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998, pp. 621-634). East Africa

continues to grapple with the long-term repercussions of prolonged armed conflicts, widespread violent crime, extremism, intercommunal clashes, political instability, mass displacement, human rights violations, and systemic governance failures.

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa are profoundly influenced by historical legacies, particularly those associated with colonialism, which imposed artificial borders and weakened political structures. Colonial authorities delineated territories with minimal consideration for existing ethnic and social divisions, creating the foundation for enduring interstate and intrastate conflicts, colonial legacies fostered border disputes, resource struggles, and ethnic rivalries, which have consistently made it challenging for post-colonial states to attain stability and unity (Clapham, 2017, p.72).

Zartman's research, which investigates both the concept and mechanics of state collapse, argues that it is more than just a post-colonial event. Zartman argues that a state's incapacity to maintain sovereign authority over the nation's identity and intangible sources of power results in the breakdown of authoritative control (Zartman, 1996).

The Horn of Africa has historically experienced intense conflict, characterized by both guerrilla warfare and conventional interstate wars (Clapham, 2017). Today, each country in the Horn faces new socio-economic and political crises and conflicts. These issues seem to be persistent and stubborn. Although some improvements have been observed, they are fragile, as seen in Ethiopia today. Overall, the extent of violent conflict and security challenges in the Horn of Africa is greater than in any other region of the continent. This area has experienced both civil wars and interstate wars, making conflict a prevalent and ongoing issue (Clapham, 2017).

Socioeconomic challenges and ethnic divisions are significant drivers of conflict in the Horn of Africa, contributing to ongoing instability and complicating efforts for peace. Factors such as poverty, resource scarcity, and environmental stress play a crucial role in escalating tensions, as these shortages often lead to intercommunal and interethnic conflicts, with groups vying for essential resources (De Waal, 2015, p. 142).

These socioeconomic conditions are closely linked to ethnic and identity politics, as internal divisions based on ethnicity shape political alliances and heighten tensions. The divisions, such as those between Ethiopian and Somali communities, have deep

historical roots and are perpetuated by ongoing cultural and territorial disputes. Consequently, ethnic identities serve as powerful mobilizing tools, with groups frequently perceiving compromises as threats to their existence. This dynamic poses significant challenges to peace-building and national unity (Kaplan, 2008, p. 27).

Theories from peace and conflict studies provide essential frameworks for analyzing the ongoing instability of peace in the Horn of Africa. Securitization theory, as presented by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998), explains how specific issues are framed as existential threats to security. This framing often justifies military responses and can escalate tensions. In the Horn of Africa, where securitization is a common approach, this framework sheds light on how conflicts are maintained through social constructs that authorize exclusionary and frequently aggressive policies, these theories underscore the complexity of conflict and peace-building efforts in the region, showing that both material conditions and socially constructed narratives contribute to the ongoing instability (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998, p.33)

Terlinden and Debiel (2004) identify a critical flaw in many peace processes: the disproportionate focus on the nation's elite, often to the exclusion of opposition groups and broader social actors. Their analysis points to the tendency of peace negotiations to become top-down affairs, where political elites and international actors drive the agenda, sidelining the concerns of marginalized communities and opposition forces. This elite-centric approach can result in peace accords that are not truly inclusive or representative of the wider population (Terlinden and Debiel, 2004, p.19).

The role of non-state actors, particularly militant groups, has also been crucial in perpetuating instability in the Horn of Africa. The rise of groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia is often linked to both local grievances and the regional geopolitics of the war on terror. The group's insurgent activities, as well as the international responses to counter terrorism, have contributed to ongoing conflict, with efforts to establish peace being undermined by the persistent threat (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

External actors, including neighboring states and international organizations, significantly impact the security of the Horn of Africa, influencing peace efforts. Menkhaus (2007) notes that interventions by the African Union (AU), the United

Nations (UN), and foreign governments are often driven by strategic interests. These interventions can unintentionally escalate local tensions. Moreover, regional powers frequently involve themselves in the Horn's conflicts to safeguard their interests, which can distort peace processes and exacerbate conflicts. Therefore, the role of external actors is complex, underscoring the need for coordinated and impartial efforts to promote sustainable peace (Menkhaus, 2007, p. 364).

Peace-building mechanisms in the Horn of Africa have garnered significant scholarly attention, particularly concerning their effectiveness in addressing regional conflicts through local reconciliation processes. Studies indicate that while traditional peace-building approaches often led by international organizations offer crucial resources and frameworks, they may not fully resonate with or meet the needs of local communities. Bradbury and Healy's (2010) analysis, highlights the potential of indigenous reconciliation processes, which are deeply rooted in cultural practices and community values, to foster more sustainable peace by directly engaging those affected by conflict. However, the success of these local mechanisms hinges on their integration with international support in ways that respect local autonomy, underscoring the importance of contextually sensitive and culturally relevant strategies (Bradbury and Healy, 2010, p.95)

1.5. Methodology

The study employs a qualitative approach to investigating the origins and dynamics of peacekeeping instability in the Horn of Africa. The main objective is to explore the factors contributing to the breakdown of peace in the region, thereby addressing the central research question. An in-depth investigation of these aspects is carried out by examining primary and secondary sources utilizing a variety of documentary methodologies.

The research primarily relies examination of scholarly journals, books, reports, dependable online documents, and other relevant internet sources. In addition, a documentary-style approach has been taken, allowing for investigation and study of reports on reconciliation programs and peacekeeping methods by international and regional entities (such as the African Union, the UN, IGAD, and others). This study's

primary goal is to thoroughly examine the underlying and contextual factors that contribute to peace instability in the Horn of Africa. The present research takes into account several elements, such as insurgent wars, processes of reconciliation, and external variables that impact stability and security in Eastern Africa. These include concerns of regional cooperation and governance, geopolitical and economic dynamics, and interventions for external actors. In addition, the study examines the specific challenges in incorporating sustainable peace processes while taking into account both regional conditions and global initiatives.

The purpose of this study provides a detailed explanation of the reason peace remains fragile in this key region, as well as to provide alternative solutions for more effective conflict resolution and long-term stability in the Horn of Africa.

1.6. Thesis Structure and Overview of Content

This research title the instability of peace in the Horn of Africa. The thesis will be structured into several chapters, each addressing specific aspects of conflict management and resolution in the Horn of Africa. The first chapter, entitled Introduction and Literature Review, will provide an overview of the main research and theory related to conflict in this region, while establishing the objectives and methodology of the study. This chapter will also introduce the key concepts that will be developed throughout the thesis.

The second chapter will be devoted to a presentation of the states of the Horn of Africa, covering their historical dimension, their economic evolution and their political contexts. This section will highlight the social, political and economic particularities of each country in the region, and examine how these factors have helped to shape the dynamics of conflict.

In the third chapter, the analysis will focus on the concepts of peace, conflict and security, clarifying the different typologies of conflict that characterise the region. This chapter will also explore the security strategies adopted at local, regional and international level, and assess their effectiveness in preventing and managing conflicts. The fourth chapter will offer an in-depth analysis of the specific conflicts that have shaken the Horn of Africa. This chapter will assess the humanitarian,

regional and international impacts of these conflicts, while putting into perspective the political and diplomatic responses of local and international actors. A critique of humanitarian interventions and regional cooperation will also be included, in order to understand the limitations and successes of different approaches to conflict management.


The final chapter will look at the prospects for reconciliation and peacemaking in the region. This chapter will analyse the peace efforts undertaken by both international and regional actors, focusing on the involvement of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other key players. The objective is to provide suggestions for bolstering long-term peace mechanisms in the Horn of Africa while considering the forthcoming prospects and challenges.

2. THE STATES OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

The history of the Horn of Africa includes inter-state conflicts, the decolonization process, civil wars, and an unprecedented number of National Liberation Movements. It is a 1,900,000- square-kilometer territory in East Africa bordered by Kenya and Sudan, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, located at the crossroads of the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and the Indian Ocean, and home to about 100 million people. This geographical location, along with the region's history, explains the strong feeling of identity among its residents. The Nilo-Hamitic ethnic group inhabits the Horn of Africa, and they resemble Arabs but have significantly deeper coloring. The Horn of Africa is home to Africa's earliest civilisations, including the Kush in northern Sudan, the Aksun in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Punt. Today, the Horn of Africa is the site of long-running hostilities, including boundary disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as chronic instability and disagreements between the Afar and Issa peoples in Djibouti. The Horn of Africa is a region rich in customs, culture, and the self-assured attitude of its people, despite its economic poverty. The land itself, whether it is an arid desert or mountains covered with snow, shows the diversity and beauty of Africa. The Horn is now divided from its Arab neighbors by the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (LeGouriellec, 2013).

The Horn of Africa is a strategically important geostrategic region, serving as a key focal point for global diplomacy and international organizations. It hosts numerous diplomatic missions, including those of the African Union (AU), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), as well as various UN agencies based in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The region holds significant geopolitical importance for international powers, notably the United States and several European countries. In addition to its strategic location, the Horn is rich in natural resources and lies near two critical international maritime trade routes: the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This chapter will cover the Horn of Africa countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti.

Figure 1.1 Horn of Africa



2.1. ETHIOPIA

2.1.1. History of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is one of the oldest nations in northeastern Africa, is situated within the Horn of Africa a region named for its horn-shaped geography separating the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean. The country shares borders with Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north and northeast, Kenya to the south, Somalia to the southeast, and Djibouti to the east. Historically, the region was recognized by outsiders as Abyssinia. This name is believed to have originated from "Habashat," the name of one of the ethnic groups inhabiting the Ethiopian highlands prior to the Christian era. The term "Ethiopia," of Greek origin, was used in classical times as a general, somewhat vague label to describe the African landmass to the south of Egypt. The earliest specific use of the term in relation to the Ethiopian region appears in Greek texts, particularly in the context of trilingual inscriptions during the reign of King Ezana (Zewde, 2002).

Emperor Ezana's actions were driven by the need to protect Axum's trade routes, particularly in ivory and other commodities, as the kingdom faced competition from

the Sudanese state of Meroe. As the Axumite army advanced into Sudan (Kush), it saw little opposition. At the confluence of the Atbara and Nile rivers, Ezana erected a stela, expressing gratitude to the Christian community and emphasizing the relative ease with which the region was conquered. The Axumite intervention in Sudan (Kush) was part of a broader strategy to restore stability, similar to the Axumite involvement in South Arabia during the early sixth century, where Judaism was resurgent and Christians were persecuted, including Axumite merchants. Axum was at the height of its power, and Christianity had expanded in tandem with the empire's surrounding agew regions (northern welo), indicating the end of Axum's governmental control in Arabia. Commercial activity at Adulis remained, and the linkages to South Arabia were preserved, notably with Mecca's debouchment, but the connection was lost in the middle of the seventh century when Islam won in Arabia (Marcus, 2023, p.261).

Aksum ruled over 1,25 million square kilometers, which included northern Ethiopia, Eritrea, northern Sudan, southern Egypt, Djibouti, western Yemen, and southern Saudi Arabia. Aksumite naval power also declined over time, the Dahlak Archipelago from Aksum, which converted to Islam in the ninth century and came under the authority of the Ethiopian emperor. The majority of the Nile and the Red Sea came under the rule of the Islamic empire. Muslims led by Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi invaded Ethiopia between 1528 and 1540, moving from the lowlands to the southeast of the nation, forcing the emperor to seek safety in the mountains. Many scholars attribute the origins of hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia to the Ethiopian-Adal War, a military conflict that took place in northern Horn Africa between the Ethiopian empires and the Adal sultanate between 1529 and 1559. The war was known as the conquest of Futuh Al-Habash, or the conquest of Abyssinia. The Walashma dynasty ruled the medieval Muslim sultanate of Ifat, which had its capital at Zeila and was situated in the Horn of Africa. The Ifat and Adal Sultanates, which are located in what is now northern Somalia, Djibouti, and eastern Ethiopia, were controlled by the Muslim aristocratic family known as the Walashma dynasty (Mekonnen, 2013).

Menelik II, Emperor from 1889 until his death in 1913, set out from the center province of Shoa to subdue and merge "the territories and people of the South, East,

and West into one Empire". Ras Gobena's Shewan Oromo militants assisted him in expanding his empire to the south and east, while also advancing road development, power, and education. Emperor Haile Selassie and King Sorodom Sihanouk were preoccupied with power and self-glorification, while victory over Italian forces at Adwa in 1896 formed a crucial component of the Ethiopian national epic, the memory of the emperor's departure to England. As a result, the URSS planned a large-scale shipment of weapons, combat drones from Cuba, and military advisors from the Soviet Union to Ethiopia. Somalia Forces had been driven out of the Ogaden by March 1978. On March 15, 1978, the final unit of Somalia left Ethiopia, signifying the end of the War. From the late 1970s until 1988, the United States recognized Somalia as a client state during the Cold War in exchange for the use of Somalia's bases and access to expert influence over the region. The two nations decided in 1988 to remove their armed forces from the border (Mekonnen, 2013).

2.1.2. Ethiopia's Economic and Political Situation

2.1.2.1. Ethiopia's Economic Situation

The Ethiopian economy has been widely hailed as a "miracle," with the government praised for having successfully emulated the economic strategies of the East Asian Tigers and adapting them to the Ethiopian context. Over the past decade, the government has consistently reported double-digit growth rates, according to official figures. However, staff from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been unable to corroborate these figures, instead estimating a more modest growth rate of 7-8% per year (IDA-IMF, 2011). In September 2017, the IMF projected a 9% growth in Ethiopia's GDP from the 2015-16 to the 2016-17 fiscal years. While Ethiopia's economic progress is undeniable, challenges remain. Despite the widespread presence of millions of small businesses across the country, obtaining reliable data on the informal sector particularly in relation to agricultural production continues to be difficult, as official institutions struggle to accurately capture this significant portion of the economy (Evans, 2012).

Ethiopia's economic and development strategies are based on a hybrid model that combines the neoliberal principles of market liberalism with the concept of the developmental state (Fantini and Puddu, 2016). While the government rhetorically endorses free-market ideals, it positions free-market capitalism as the foundation for Ethiopia's broader economic prosperity. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is intended to act as the leading political force, guiding the population under the banner of a party that represents the people. However, in practice, the implementation of free-market principles is significantly constrained, as the political and economic systems being constructed are described as "revolutionary democratic." Within this framework, the government takes an active role in driving infrastructure development, identifying market inefficiencies, and guiding, as well as intervening in, the market to ensure alignment with its developmental objectives. (Lefort, 2015, pp. 357–394).

In the 1990s, the Ethiopian government implemented an industrialization policy known as "Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization" (ADLI), which capitalized on the country's abundant labour and land by prioritizing small-scale farmers. As part of broader structural adjustment and debt reduction efforts, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi oversaw the simultaneous transition to a federal state and a market-oriented economy. The birr was devalued, most prices (except for petroleum) were liberalized, and customs duties were reduced from 230% in 1991 to 20%. Economic growth accelerated significantly after 2000, with the GDP growth rate increasing from 6% in 1995 to 10% between 2005 and 2015. According to the FAO, agricultural productivity also surged, with cereal harvests doubling between 2000 and 2016. This growth was driven not only by agriculture but also by the expansion of the services, construction, and urbanization sectors, with the urban population rising from 15% to 19%. However, with the exception of the manufacturing sector, the expansion of services and industry has been accompanied by a decline in agriculture's contribution to GDP. While Ethiopia's manufacturing sector grew at a pace comparable to that of Kenya and Rwanda between 2000 and 2015, its contribution to GDP remained below the African average, which is 7% excluding South Africa (Chaponnière, 2018, pp. 55-74).

Ethiopia's economy is among the fastest-growing in the world. Its GDP growth rate of 9.7% in 2013 and its average rate of 10% over the previous ten years are very competitive when compared to comparable nations' average rates of 6.2%. Ethiopia's GDP per capita increased during the previous seven years, more than tripling from \$171 in 2005 to \$550 in 2013, despite the country's rapid population expansion. With 70% of export revenue and employment for four out of every five workers, agriculture is the largest economic sector. The agriculture industry had growth of 7.1% overall last year. The government's top aims include expanding the use of contemporary agricultural methods, lowering input costs, promoting micro irrigation networks, facilitating finance availability, and assisting farmers in producing high-value crops for export. By building the groundwork, Ethiopia is on track to meet its 2025 target of becoming a middle-income nation. The nation is growing its industrial sector, which now makes up 12.3% of GDP, by diversifying into new items for European markets and exporting textile and leather goods. This is due to the economy's growing integration with global value chains (African Development Fund, ADF, 2013-2022).

Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I,II), the economy has gradually shifted from being predominantly agrarian to a more diversified structure, with a growing contribution from the service sector to GDP. These plans have been supported by efforts to transform the economy from one primarily reliant on agriculture to one focused on industrial development. Export revenues, which were as low as USD 1 billion in 2005, steadily increased before declining during the Great Recession of 2009 (Mishra, 2011). Between 2006 and 2017, Ethiopian exports averaged USD 631 million annually, peaking at USD 984 million in the second quarter of 2012. However, despite a rise in export volumes from 2014/2015 to 2015/2016, reduced export profits due to falling commodity prices led to unsatisfactory changes in export earnings over the past three years (World Bank, 2016).

Ethiopia is an attractive destination for Chinese firms seeking industrial investment opportunities. According to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ethiopia ranks among Africa's top destinations for Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), following Nigeria and roughly on par with South Africa and Zambia. From 1992 to

2016, China emerged as Ethiopia's leading source of direct investment, surpassing Turkey and India in both the number of projects (20.7%) and the capital invested (17.9%), according to the Ethiopian Investment Commission. Chinese businesses play a significant role in the construction of various types of infrastructure in Ethiopia and across Africa, with financing largely provided by China. Estimates indicate that China currently funds more infrastructure projects in Africa than the World Bank. Chinese firms are frequently responsible for executing major infrastructure projects, including the construction of roads, railways, telecommunications networks (Nicolas, 2017, pp.16-18).

On the eve of the Johannesburg summit, the BRICS group, an economic coalition established in 2009 in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, underscored its growing economic significance. At this summit, the group reaffirmed its commitment to reshaping the global order in a way that enhances the influence of the "Global South." The selection of the six nations by BRICS was made with considerable strategic intent. In an interview with *La Tribune Afrique*, the speaker emphasized, "We are witnessing a major geostrategic shift." Ethiopia and Egypt have prioritized each other within Africa, largely due to geopolitical and economic factors. While the five core BRICS members are politically sensitive and new members are chosen by consensus, there may be political considerations in the selection process. However, Pape Demba Thiam noted in his conversation with LTA that "economic expansion was, in my opinion, the most important criterion, given that BRICS is, first and foremost, an economic bloc." Experts argue that Ethiopia's inclusion is significant due to its historical context it is the only African nation never to have been colonized its large population (120.3 million), and its strategic geopolitical position. "The African Union's capital is, after all, in Ethiopia," stated a pan-African specialist. "Having Ethiopia is, in a sense, having access to all of Africa." (Ristel,2023).

2.1.2.2. Ethiopia's Political Situation

Early in the 1990s, Mengistu Hailemariam, the head of the communist military dictatorship known as the Derg, fled Ethiopia, sparking the country's democratic transformation. Despite attempts by students and grassroots organizations to enact significant social and economic reforms, the ruling class closely controlled electoral politics throughout both the Derg and Haile Selassie's imperial governments. The EPRDF leadership fundamentally altered the Ethiopian state's institutional framework after 1991, mostly by drafting a new constitution. The creation of a federal system based on ethnolinguistic identities, the 1993 independence vote in Eritrea, and the planning of multiparty elections were the major shifts of this era, after it, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) armed forces restructured to become the EPRDF, turning their military triumph into a political one. Since then, the EPRDF has maintained control over the political system. the creation of a multiparty system, the EPRDF has stayed in power for the last fifteen years (Smith, 2007).

The national election of May 2005 marked a significant transformation in Ethiopia's political landscape. By November 2004, opposition political groups had formed alliances based on divergent policy ideologies and nationalist agendas. The major political parties, including the ruling EPRDF, the UEDF, and the CUD, as well as smaller parties like the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), ran campaigns centered around specific pledges and policy proposals. Both the ruling party and the opposition agreed on a formula for allocating access to key state-controlled media outlets, including television and print media. The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) established key political party forums at multiple levels to address disputes, which were particularly effective during the pre-election period. Despite this, the dismissal of several foreign observers and public figures, including those from the African Union, the European Union, and the Carter Center, raised concerns. Notably, for the first time, public debates involving prominent candidates from major political party coalitions provided a platform for discussion on some of the most contentious and significant political issues, including ethnic self-determination, economic development, language and education policy, and land ownership (Smith, 2007).

The TPLF maintained the ideologies and guiding principles from its guerrilla days and continued to serve as the EPRDF's central political decision-making body. This included the adoption of Leninist "democratic centralism" and "revolutionary democracy," which promoted capitalism and the free market while retaining strict control over the government and party through five-year development plans. During this period, the EPRDF intensified its control over the state. Between 2007 and 2009, the parliament passed several laws under the pretext of national security, effectively suppressing dissent and insulating the government from any external scrutiny. This gave authoritarianism a veneer of legality. In the 2010 elections, the EPRDF purportedly won 99.6% of the vote; however, this outcome was widely seen as manipulated, signaling to the opposition that any challenges to their rule, especially in light of the events of 2005, would come with severe consequences. Meles Zenawi's political strength, strategic acumen, and ability to secure international funding and support enabled the system to endure. His leadership was rarely questioned by the international community, which often misinterpreted the true nature of the situation within the country. Despite claims of economic success, promises of federalism, and democratization, dissatisfaction with the EPRDF's ethnic-based politics, its firm grip on power, and allegations of corruption began to spread (Meles, 2012).

One of the primary concerns following the death of Meles Zenawi was the potential for internal power struggles within the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) over the vacant leadership position, which could hinder a smooth transfer of power. This anxiety was heightened by Meles's autocratic leadership style and the multiethnic composition of the ruling party. The EPRDF came to power in 1991 following the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam's Marxist military regime (1974–1991). The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), one of the four ethnic-based factions that formed the party, had played a dominant role in the alliance. After Meles's death, the nomination of Hailemariam Desalegn, a Protestant from the historically underrepresented southern region, as deputy prime minister, offered early indications of Ethiopia's political trajectory. The party managed to organize the transition relatively well, appointing a new national leadership with a balanced representation of ethnic groups. The three deputy prime ministers came from the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the TPLF, and the Oromo People's

Democratic Organization, while the new prime minister represented the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement. However, as party politics and government affairs were closely intertwined, bureaucrats within the EPRDF remained highly politicized, complicating the governance structure. (Aalen, 2014, p.192).

The transition of power was largely uneventful, Ethiopia experienced its largest anti-government protests in 25 years during 2015 and 2016. According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a government-affiliated body, at least 940 individuals were killed during the crackdown on the protests. Order was only restored after a state of emergency was declared from October 2016 to August 2017. The protests were primarily driven by the country's two largest ethnic groups the Oromo (in the south and west) and the Amhara (in the north) who felt marginalized. They perceived the Tigrayan minority, which has dominated the Ethiopian political landscape since 1991, as being overrepresented in the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and believed there was an unequal distribution of wealth and restrictions on individual freedoms. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stated, "I have done all I can to solve Ethiopia's problems," but he also acknowledged, "I see my resignation as vital in the attempt to carry out reforms that would lead to lasting peace and democracy." According to state radio Fana, Merera Gudina, a prominent opposition figure who had been jailed at the start of 2016, was released in mid-January, marking a significant event as the first high-profile opposition leader to be freed since Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn's January 3 pledge to release many political prisoners. Merera Gudina, leader of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), emphasized that "fundamental change is what the people are asking for." One of the key demands of the Oromo protesters, who constitute the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, was his release. The Oromo, who make up around 35% of the population, believe that it is their right to hold the office of prime minister (Virginie, 2014).

Ethiopia has experienced significant changes, particularly after Abiy Ahmed was appointed prime minister and head of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of ethnically based political parties, in 2018. This period was marked by a nationwide uprising driven by grievances over the

expansion of Addis Ababa's borders into the Oromia region. Protests, fueled by rising interethnic tensions, continued throughout 2018 and ultimately led to the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, who was succeeded by Abiy Ahmed, a prominent figure from the Oromia region. Abiy initiated a series of reforms that were widely recognized both internationally and domestically as significant steps toward political change. His administration introduced greater political transparency by releasing political prisoners and lifting restrictions on opposition groups. Moreover, one of Abiy's most notable achievements was the restoration of diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea, ending a decades-long conflict between the two nations (Breuning and Ishiyama, 2021, pp. 985-987).

2.2. Eritrea

2.2.1. History of Eritrea

Adulis marks the beginning of Eritrea's historical narrative. Situated on the Red Sea coast, Adulis was a significant port during the Pharaonic era, referred to by the Greeks as "Troglodytic." Greek seafarers from Egypt frequently made port at Adulis, a settlement that dates back to the third century BCE. The port was strategically located at the mouth of a well-defended harbor, across from the island of Orine (Dahlak), and not far from the present-day town of Massawa, merchants gathered valuable commodities such as spices, skins, ebony, amber, gold (traded for meat or salt), ostriches, giraffes, lions for circus performances, elephants for warfare, and slaves which were sold for high prices in Alexandria or Aqaba. The people of Adulis also engaged in trade with villages across the Red Sea, at Ocelis on the coast of Happy Arabia and on the island of Diodorus (Perim). In 528 AD, the traveler Cosmas Indicopleustes visited Adulis and, after his visit, retreated to a convent on Mount Sinai (Kutschera, 1993).

Eritrea is one of the oldest territories in Africa and the Middle East. It forms a significant part of the ancient geographical region known to Egyptian pharaohs as the Land of Punt, located in the Horn of Africa. The Land of Punt, often referred to by ancient Egyptians as the "Land of the Gods," was believed to be rich in a variety of commercial goods. Commercial exchanges between Punt and ancient Egypt are documented as early as circa 2500 to 2480 BCE, beginning during the 5th and 6th

dynasties, and continuing frequently through the 17th and 18th dynasties. The Red Sea, which has long been recognized in historical texts, is the source of Eritrea's name. The name "Eritrea" derives from the Greek term Erythraia, which was later adopted by the Italians through the Latin translation Mare Erythraeum. Archaeological evidence indicates that farming and cattle breeding were practiced in Eritrea as early as the first millennium BCE (Murtaza, 1998, p.203).

The fall of the Aksumite Empire led to economic isolation for Aksum, causing the city to decline. The highlands were subsequently ruled by the Bahr Negus, also known as the "King of the Sea." Initially referred to as *Ma'ikele Bahr*, meaning "the land between the Red Sea and the Mereb River," the kingdom later adopted the name *Medri Bahri*, or "the Sea Land," in Tigrinya. Its capital, Debarwa, was located 25 kilometers south of present-day Asmara. When Mara Takla Haymanot established Abyssinia, later known as the Ethiopian Empire, in 1137, *Medri Bahri* remained a separate political entity. During this period, the Bahr Negus alternated between aligning with and opposing neighboring Muslim states and the Abyssinians, depending on the geopolitical context. The region eventually became part of the Ottoman province of Habesh Eyalet, which included portions of the Red Sea basin, following the Ottomans' capture of Medri Bahri at the end of the sixteenth century. For a brief period, Massawa served as the provincial capital before the Ottomans lost control of the interior regions of present-day Eritrea. In 1846, the Ottoman-controlled Habesh Eyalet was seized by Muhammad Ali Pasha's Egyptian forces, who expanded its boundaries significantly, extending into western Eritrea (Tesfagiorgis, 2010).

In 1948, after the "Four Powers" (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union) were unable to reach an agreement, Eritrean pro-independence parties formed the "Independence Bloc" to advocate for the organization of a referendum on self-determination. On December 2, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 390 A (V), establishing a loose federation in which Eritrea was placed under Emperor Haile Selassie's control while maintaining its own administrative and judicial structures, flag, two official languages (Tigrinya and Arabic), and control over its domestic affairs, including police, local administration, and taxation. Emperor Haile Selassie made moves that looked to threaten Eritrea's autonomy. The attempts by Ethiopia to undermine the Federation

were met with protests by Eritreans. Students staged large-scale protests in 1957, and trade unions organized a four-day national strike in 1958. The demonstrators were shot at by Ethiopian forces, resulting in casualties. Ethiopian forces compelled the Eritrean Parliament to dissolve on November 14, 1962. The official annexation of Eritrea as the fourteenth province of Ethiopia (Cliffe and Davidson, 1988, pp.12-14).

2.2.2. Economic and Political Situation

2.2.2.1. Eritrea's Economic Situation

The Eritrean government have significantly harmed people's wellbeing and economic prospects by highlighting rather than lessening harsh external and environmental restrictions. After a 30-year conflict, the newly independent nation of Eritrea was left with a severely damaged infrastructure, ineffective industry, unsuccessful livestock and agricultural businesses, careless exports, a weak private sector, and extreme poverty. In order to advance market-driven economic recovery and poverty reduction, the government developed a macroeconomic framework and concentrated on rebuilding its social and economic infrastructure. The overlapping man-made and natural crises have hindered Eritrea's economy, which has not yet fully recovered due to unresolved conflicts with Ethiopia and government intrusions. Eritrea has extraordinarily high rates of poverty and is one of the world's poorest nations. According to the World Bank, Eritrea's total national income in 2005 was US\$ 0.97 billion, with a per capita income of US\$ 220. Additionally, Eritrea has some of the worst rates of malnutrition and food insecurity worldwide. The war's biggest detrimental effect on the country's economy has been the loss of Eritrea's principal export market and trade partner. From US\$200 million in 1997 to US\$80 million in 2003, Eritrea's exports of products and services fell off significantly. The growth rate has declined, which is indicative of the war's economic impact (albeit the prolonged drought also had a major role in the reduction). Nonetheless, GDP growth is anticipated to decrease to just 1.5% in 2006 and 1.3% in 2007, respectively (African Development Bank Group, 2023).

Eritrea's economic performance has been limited since independence by poor foreign investment (particularly in non-mining sectors), bottlenecks in the infrastructure, and declining assistance inflows. Despite this, the economy expanded by 8.7% in 2011 as a result of the Massawa cement factory's output of cement and the resumption of full operations at the gold and silver Bisha mine. GDP growth is forecast to have dropped precipitously to 5.5% in 2012. This decline was primarily caused by an unexpected decline in output at the Bisha mine, a decline in the price of gold throughout 2011–12, and a decline in remittances from Eritreans living abroad. Growth is anticipated to pick up to 7% in 2013 before somewhat declining to 6.5 percent in 2014. According to the African Development Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's joint publication, the African Economic Outlook 2013 (AEO), private consumption and public investment are thought to have been the main forces behind real GDP growth in 2011 and 2012. In 2011, Eritrea's economy was dominated by the service sector, accounting for 58.9% of GDP. Restaurants, lodging facilities, whole sale and retail commerce, public administration, and the armed forces all made significant contributions to the sector's growth. The industrial sector is progressively absorbing a larger portion of the Eritrean economy. Despite this, it has a negligible economic impact. According to the AEO, the primary barriers include limited infrastructure, a lack of contemporary agricultural methods and tools, insufficient rainfall, and funds for growth and investment. Investment potential exist in the export of live animals, dairy and meat products, hides, skins, and leather, horticulture, and cash crops including cotton, flowers, and coffee. Eritrea now grows wheat, sorghum, lintels, beans, millet, barley, and teff as crops (Negash, 1998, p. 313).

Real GDP growth has slowed from 2.5% in 2021 to around 2.3% in 2022. This slowdown is partly due to the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its impact on energy, fertiliser and food prices. Russia and Ukraine supply almost all of Eritrea's wheat imports, and oil accounts for 71% of the country's energy consumption. the impact of COVID-19 on value chains, climate shocks and the ongoing conflict in northern Ethiopia. Growth in 2022 was driven by industry and services on the supply side and by private consumption and investment on the demand side. With 50% of exports consisting of minerals, gold, and copper, and with government income rebounding due to rising global metal prices, fiscal consolidation

has brought the budget deficit down from 4.1% of GDP in 2021 to 2.2% of GDP in 2022. Eritrea's excessive debt persists. The current account surplus decreased from 13.5% of GDP in 2021 to 12.2% in 2022, which is indicative of an increase in imports brought on by rising oil and food costs globally. In 2022, inflation increased from 4.5% to 7.5% as a result of rising energy and food costs. The financial industry is still centered on banks offering a small range of goods. On the official market, one US dollar is worth 15 nakfas. Due to higher international metal prices, which are being driven by the industrial and services sectors on the supply side and private consumption and investment on the demand side, as well as the rise in public and private consumption that is consistent with the recovery in economic activity, real GDP growth is predicted to be 2.6% in 2023 and 3.1% in 2024 (African Development Bank Group, 2023).

2.2.2.2. Eritrea's Political Situation

The formation of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) has long been shrouded in mystery. Pool (2001), a seasoned scholar on Eritrean politics, provides the most authoritative account of the early developments within the movement. According to Pool, a significant internal schism emerged in 1973, resulting in the formation of a dissident faction known as the manqa. This faction issued a statement criticizing the leadership, which was labeled as 'the destructive movement' in EPLF literature. The statement raised concerns about Isaias Afwerki's leadership style and his use of physical force against dissenters. Despite these internal conflicts, the EPLF, which ultimately took control of Eritrea in 1991 when its fighters entered Asmara, was a highly organized and disciplined movement. All aspects of life within the organization were tightly controlled and centralized. In February 1994, at its third congress, the EPLF formally changed its name to the People's Front for Democracy and Justice PFDJ (Pool, 2001, p.77).

The People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), Eritrea's ruling party, is known for its "arbitrary and despotic modes of governance" and "erratic and unstable rules." President Isaias Afwerki, however, attempts to project an image of popular support, arguing that the country faces serious external threats that necessitate strict

discipline and militarism. For the first time in over thirty years of unwavering loyalty and silence, the leadership of the PFDJ came under public scrutiny due to internal dissent within the organization. The first democratic elections in Eritrea were scheduled to take place under the oversight of a committee led by Mahmoud Sherifo, the Minister of Local Government. However, President Afwerki dismissed Sherifo in February 2001 and instructed his staff to report directly to the President's office. In an interview following his dismissal, Sherifo explained, "I believe it is because the President has no intention of allowing political parties to form before the elections." In August 2001, nearly two thousand students from Asmara University were bussed to a camp in the scorching desert south of the port of Massawa. In May of the same year, fifteen members of the PFDJ's Central Council, known as the G15, signed a letter addressed to every member of the ruling party. By the end of 2001, the Eritrean political elite had become deeply divided. President Afwerki and his closest allies remained in power, while the reformers, either imprisoned or exiled, were forced into opposition (Plaut, 2002).

The organized political opposition has its headquarters outside of Eritrea; parties and armed groups primarily have their headquarters in Ethiopia, while alternative media and civic organizations are primarily centered in Europe and North America, though they are also present across the Middle East and even as far away as Australia. The third iteration of a loose coalition of internationally based groups opposed to the EPLF/PFDJ, first formed in March 1999 as the Alliance of Eritrean National groups (AENF), is the center of the political opposition and represents the majority of the opposition. Early in 2010, the Eritrean Federal Democratic Movement (EFDm), al-Khalas, Islah, and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) united to establish the Eritrean Solidarity Front (ESF), a coalition devoted to the "Restoration of Muslim rights." As a result, the two main political factions that make up the opposition in exile have quite different goals. Based in Ethiopia, they rely on this nation for their continued existence, growth, and gatherings for their several councils, committees, and forums. Ethiopia is still the only nation that can let the Issayas to reside in Asmara and flexibly regulates the movement against them. On the other hand, Issayas has adopted a highly assertive stance toward neighboring governments and has shown no reluctance to back any opposition movement to the Ethiopian government, even if

doing so means causing instability throughout the Horn of Africa (Connell, 2011, pp. 419-433).

As Issayas Afäwärqī explained in interview “As such, since independence our foreign policy has been based on principles capable of creating a conducive atmosphere for solidarity and cooperation among peoples of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. This, however, does not mean that we are confined to the regional aspect and isolate ourselves from the international arena, maintaining relations with Asia, Europe, America and the other continents”.

Eritrea maintains strong connections with Yemen and Sudan and would want Egypt to play a role in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, particularly in the Red Sea region by Ambassador Muna Omar, special envoy of the acting Egyptian President, visited Asmara on August 13, 2013. President Issayas Afäwärqī visited Egypt from October 8 to 10, 2014, at the request of President Abdulfatah Al-Sisi, with the goal of boosting bilateral ties. The Arabian Peninsula is a physically and politically significant region for Eritrea. Since the 1998-2000 conflict, Asmara has viewed the Djiboutian administration of Ismaïl Omar Guelleh as Ethiopia's puppet in the area because to favored contacts between the two nations (Bach and Mesfin, 2015).

2.3. Somalia and Djibouti

2.3.1. Somalia

2.3.1.1. History of Somalia

The earliest writings on Africa prominently feature the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa, especially the accounts of Arab geographers' voyages dating to the ninth century A.D. At that time, part of the region was inhabited by a predominantly agricultural Bantu-speaking population, known by Arab writers as the Zanj. These people were mainly concentrated in the arable areas between the Scebeli and Giuba rivers. Isolated communities of Bantu villages still exist along and between these rivers. The ancestors of the contemporary Somali and neighboring Ethiopian populations had already settled in the interior north of the Zanj area by the tenth century. The port of Zeila is considered the most significant Arab settlement on the

Somali coast, serving as the hub for trade between the ancient Christian kingdoms of Ethiopia and Muslim Arabia. Simultaneously, Arab and Persian traders dominated the port towns along the coast facing the Arabian Peninsula. Ethiopian ivory and slaves, alongside Somali incense and animal skins, were exchanged for metal goods and fabrics brought by Arabian and Persian dhows. The early origins of the Somali people remain uncertain, though educated Somali communities often trace their genealogies to Arabian settlements. The expansion of the Somali population during this period was likely influenced by the strong evangelical traditions of Islam, as well as the economic advantages of controlling the trade routes to the interior (Kaplan, 1969).

The Abyssinian Empire in the Horn of Africa was involved in extended attrition warfare for several decades. Ahmed Gran was killed in battle when the Abyssinian monarch Galawdewos, with Portuguese assistance, decisively defeated the Muslims at Lake Tana in 1542. However, the conflict persisted until the 1570s, when the Oromos invaded both Abyssinia and Somalia. Even at the height of his military strength, Ahmed Gran was either unable or unwilling to establish a lasting government over the region. The nomadic pastoralists of Somalia, who supported Gran's cause, were determined to fight for Islam. According to the Ottoman Empire, Turkish involvement in Gran's early expeditions to the Horn of Africa played a key role in his campaigns. This period also saw significant agricultural growth and increasing trade in the region (Nelson, 1982).

Sayyid Mohamed, then began to educate the Somali people by informing them of the negative consequences of the colonial invasion. Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hasan stated that "infidel invaders have come to surround us; they have come to corrupt our ancient religion, to settle our land, to seize our herds, to burn our villages, and to make our children their children". Following this, Sayyid Mohamed (1920, p.18) wrote to several colonial rulers in different regions of Somalia, asking them to band together and resist the colonizers. Similar to this, he also sent a letter to the colonial powers, saying, "Go away from my country to your own if you wish peace. I have no cultivated fields, no silver or gold for you to take. All you can get from me is war" (Samatar, 1982). Sayyid Mohamed (1920, p.18) managed to assemble tens of thousands of soldiers into a powerful army since the colonialists apparently did not

go, the opposition really got going. The Dervishes persisted in their ferocious resistance to the colonial powers. In the meantime, many offensive expeditions were launched by the British colonial authority in close cooperation with Ethiopia and Italy. But the colonial offensive's coordinated efforts were met with resistance by the dervishes using hit-and-run guerilla tactics, other regions of Somalia saw the emergence of resistance formations as a result of the Dervishes' armed campaign to liberate their homeland from outside control. In 1920, the British colonial force used its first systematic aerial bombardment in Africa on Taleh, the Dervishes' headquarters and command (Lewis, 2019, pp.79-80).

Two decades of resistance, the military defeat of the Dervish movement has been the subject of scholarly debate. I.M. Lewis, a prominent authority on Somali studies, attributed the Dervishes' collapse to what he described as "a massive tribal onslaught on the new Dervish headquarters in the Ogaden" (Lewis, 1980). However, this assertion is surprising, as it overlooks the critical role of the first organized use of air power on African soil. According to Touval, the campaign against the Dervishes involved "detachments of Indian troops and King's African Rifles," supported by six aircraft, as well as Somali troops recruited by colonial powers. Despite the defeat of the armed resistance, the Somali people's determination to achieve liberation from colonial rule remained undiminished (Hess, 1964, pp. 415-433).

The two Somali colonies were governed by the British military administration from 1941 to 1949. During this time, the military administration guaranteed better working and wage conditions and gave Somalis the opportunity to become subordinate officials in the gendarmerie and civil service. In response, the British supported the establishment of the Somali Youth Club (SYC), the country's first contemporary political organization, which was founded in Mogadishu in May 1943. The SYC experienced rapid membership growth, reaching an estimated 25,000 members by 1946. In 1947, the organization changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL). The SYL stated that its goals were to unite Somali Territory, provide widespread access to modern education, advance the Somali language by adopting a standard written form, and protect Somali interests, including resisting the return of Italian colonial rule (Kaplan, 1969).

The Trusteeship Agreement allowed the Italian government to hold the trust territory's first democratic election in 1956 (Finkelstein, 1955). The pan-Somali organization known as the Somali Youth League (SYL), founded by nationalists in 1943, won 43 out of 60 seats. As a result, Abdullahi Isse, a member of the SYL, was chosen by the MPs to form the first internal Somali government. Aden Abdulle Osman was also elected by members of parliament as the president of the Legislative Assembly. The British protectorate held its first democratic election in February 1960 in a similar manner. The Somali National League (SNL) secured a resounding majority in the assembly. Somali officials decided on parliamentary democracy as the country's system of government following independence and the unification of the two regions. From 1960 to 1968, Somalia established a notable record of free and fair parliamentary elections, with many peaceful handovers of power during that period (Samatar and Samatar, 2008, p.10).

President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was slain by one of his bodyguards on October 15, 1969, while on a tour to the northern region of the nation. This occurred just seven months after he assumed office as president of the republic, and may have been a premonition of things to come. The military overthrew Somalia's democratically elected civilian administration on October 21, 1969, just one week after the president was assassinated. This marked the successful and sudden end of the country's nascent multiparty democracy (Payton 1980). Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre led the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which successfully usurped power. However, it is important to recognize that other African countries have also had military takeovers of power. Somalia is hardly the only example. In post-independent Africa, coup d'états were the most common method of overthrowing governments two decades after the wave of decolonization in the 1960s (Johnson, 1984, pp. 633-666).

2.3.1.2. Somalia's Economic Situation


Somalia's pervasive poverty affects nearly half the population, with young people, women, and children being most vulnerable due to high unemployment rates. Literacy remains critically low, especially among young women, with only 30% of

school-age children attending school, and a mere 40% of these being female. According to the UNDP, healthcare accessibility is severely limited and often costly, presenting significant barriers to essential medical care. Over one million Somalis have fled the country, while nearly the same number have been displaced internally (UNHCR, 2011).

Oil and gas are abundant in Somalia. It will be crucial to examine how these resources can be utilized to enhance the country's economic status rather than exacerbate and prolong the military conflict. The camel remains the foundation of Somalia's economy. Nomads are required to travel vast distances between pastures and water sources, as much of the Somali peninsula is covered by desert. Around 65 percent of the population lived a pastoral or semi-pastoral lifestyle. Another significant part of the economy was the plantation sector, which employed only 5% of Somalis but generated more than half of the country's export revenue. A small business class, consisting of shopkeepers and foreign traders, made up the third component of the economy. One year after his successful coup d'état, on October 20, 1970, President Mohammed Siyaad Barre made the following announcement:

“In our Revolution, we declared that we have overthrown the system of consumerism based on imports and that we are free to choose our own destiny. In order to realize the aspirations of the people of Somalia, to achieve a better life, to realize their full potential and to fulfill their dreams, we declare that Somalia is a socialist state. Undoubtedly, Siyaad intended to appease the Soviet advisors who had contributed to the coup's triumph by stating this. Previously, he had little to no knowledge of Marxism and Leninism and frequently humiliated himself in public by making frequent and ignorant statements on socialism (Laitin and Samatar, 1984, pp. 58-72).

Figure 1.2 SNBS and IMF (2022-2025 projections)



The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that, subject to enhanced national security, the GDP might grow by 3.1% in 2023 (Figure 2). In 2020, the global pandemic brought on by Covid-19 caused Africa's GDP to undergo its worst economic slump in fifty years, when seen more generally at the regional level. It decreased from 3% of GDP in 2019 to 1% in 2020 before increasing by 6% in 2021 (SNBS and IMF, 2023) (Figure 2.2).

In May 2021, the monthly inflation rate for food and non-alcoholic drinks decreased to (- 1.98%) from (+5.5%) in May 2020, according to the Somali National Bureau of Statistics. However, the total inflation rate was roughly unchanged. Nevertheless, due to the drought and rising gas and oil costs, inflation in housing, water, electricity, and gas increased from a low of 0.43% to 12% in May 2020. Due to dollarization and the precipitous drop in oil prices, inflation has been restrained. Food and non-alcoholic beverage prices have been rising since January 2022. This can be attributed to the significant reduction in food supply brought on by the conflict in Ukraine, which halted the import of wheat, fertilizer, and oil goods. With the exception of a 6.1% spike in 2017 that was mostly due to the drought and an 8.3% peak in 2022 that was driven by rising food and oil costs worldwide, annual inflation has been comparatively constant (SNBS and IMF, 2023).

The Somali Shilling (SOS) saw a decline in value during the last 10 years, going from 22,254 per US dollar in 2015 to 26,036 in 2021. This may be attributable to CBS's lack of control over the exchange rate, the availability of SOS, and the fact that the majority of payments made through mobile money platforms are made in USD. Trade (goods and services), net income earned overseas, and net current transfers are the three primary parts of the current account. There has been a continuous current account deficit in Somalia. This is a result of our reliance on imports of basic and intermediate commodities. In 2019, 2020, and 2021, the current account deficit increased to 10.4%, 10.8%, and 17.1% of GDP (CBS and IMF, 2019).

The Global Economy (2018), 5.21% of the GDP is made up of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to Hassan, Mohamed, and Isak (2018), urban regions provide over 70% of economic development. Furthermore, the efficient operation of the private sector and the diaspora's aid both made significant contributions to the nation's economic prosperity (Webersik, Hansen, And Egal, 2018, p.22). An additional important component of the Somali economy is the informal commerce with surrounding countries, FDI, and remittances from the Somali diaspora. Recently, foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased in Somalia due to the country's increasingly stable political and security conditions. It's possible that the recent financial and economic changes had an impact on the direction as well. The Global Somalia Diaspora (2019) estimated that the diaspora in all parts of the world contributed over 1.3 billion dollars yearly to Somalia. Remittances from Somali immigrants made almost 35% of the nation's GDP in 2014 (UNOCHA, 2014).

Turkey and Somalia's commercial and economic ties were sluggish throughout the 2000s but have experienced significant growth since 2011. Other interests, particularly commercial ones, emerged shortly after Turkey established itself as a major humanitarian actor (Wasuge, 2016, p. 15). According to Abdulle (2019, p. 467), Turkey has been investing in the long-term development of its economic ties with Somalia. In the six years between 2011 and 2017, Turkey transitioned from being a minor economic player to becoming Somalia's fifth-largest importer (Rossiter & Cannon, 2018, p. 5). Moreover, Somalia has been regarded as being "under close watch" by Turkey not only in terms of politics but also in commerce, the economy, and culture. In recent years, Turkey has become a major source of

imports for Somalia. Due to its open-door policy toward Somalia, Turkey ranked sixth among exporters to Somalia in 2011. Turkey's share of Somalia's imports has steadily increased, rising from 2% in 2011 to 7.1% in 2019 (DEİK, 2017).

" The US Treasury Department added in a separate statement on Wednesday that Washington intends to cancel 100 percent of its remaining claims, "bringing the total amount of U.S. debt relief for Somalia under HIPC to around \$1 billion." The aim is to "support Somalia as it continues rebuilding its economy," Treasury said. "For Somalia to move forward in the positive economic direction we all needed, we had to reform our laws, systems, policies, and practices," said Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. "We are very pleased with the debt relief, because our currency is almost destroyed, as Somalia has not officially issued banknotes for about 32 years" says Abdulkadir Mohamed Roble (Africanews, 2023, p.1).

2.3.1.3. Somalia's Political Situation

The Somali Republic is a unitary republic with a representative democratic system of government, as stipulated in the preamble of its constitution. Freedom of religion is a significant civil right guaranteed by the Constitution, despite Islam being the official religion of the state and Islamic philosophy serving as the primary foundation for its laws. A multiparty parliamentary system, based on the 1960–1961 constitution drafted during Somalia's independence, was in place until 1969. However, the system ultimately collapsed due to the temptations of self-interest and conflicting lineage interests, despite the Somali people's inherent tendency for democratic expression and political organization. On October 21, 1969, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), a military-led group of army commanders, seized power. The SRC claimed authority to enact laws, administer justice, and govern the country. Major General Siad Barre, the Commander of the Army at the time, led the first 25 officers that comprised the SRC. The first Charter of the Revolution, which was the SRC's declaration of its takeover, outlined the goals of the new military rule: eliminating corruption and tribal nepotism, introducing a standard written Somali language, eradicating illiteracy, and accelerating social, economic, and cultural development (Nelson, 1982).

Historically, the clan system, which underpins the agrifood-based civilization, has been a driving force behind the political organization of the Somali people. In addition to shared language, religion, physical characteristics, pastoral and agrifood practices, and customs, the people of present-day Somalia also share kinship links with the Afar peoples of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, the Oromo, Saho, and Beja of Ethiopia, and the Boran of northern Kenya. These groups are regarded as forming one ethnic community, as they share the majority of traits typically used to define a "nation" or "nationality." The Somali population is divided into six clan-families: Hawiye, Darod, Isaaq, Dir, the Rahanweyn bloc, and the Issa-Gadabursi bloc. Each clan is further subdivided into subclans, sub-subclans, and so on. The sub-subclan, or what is known as the Diya-paying group, represents the most stable level. It consists of close relatives bound by a specific contractual partnership, under which they are obligated to pay and receive blood reparations in unison (Lewis, 1988).

In 1950, the Italians returned to manage their old territory of Somalia under United Nations trusteeship, and the British Somaliland Protectorate was reestablished. The British military's benign paternalism throughout its 41–50-year reign over Somalia fostered the growth of nationalist political organizations. In fact, British military was instrumental in the founding of the first significant nationalist organization, the Somali Youth League, in its original form in Mogadishu. self-determination in the "Western Somalia" region of eastern Ethiopia. The political leaders of both nations hurriedly worked to prepare British Somaliland for independence so that it could unite with Somalia upon its independence in 1960. In any case, on June 26, 1960, the British Protectorate gained independence, and on July 1, 1960, it merged with Italian Somalia to establish the Somali Republic, which was governed by a coalition of the ruling classes in both regions. In a combined meeting held in Mogadishu, the two legislatures elected Adan Abdulle Osman (Hawiye), the assembly president from the previous republic, as the state's acting head of state. Following careful negotiations spanning two weeks, Prime Minister Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke (darod), These roughly mirrored the distribution of seats in the assembly, with the north (33) and south (90) representing all the political parties and main clan groups. The Minister of Defense is now Abdullahi Isse, the Prime Minister of Somaliland, whilst Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (Lewis and Mayall, 1991, pp. 94-124).

The Somali National Movement (SNM), founded in London in early 1981, primarily garnered support from the northern Isaaq tribes. However, it quickly moved its operations to Somali towns and villages in Ethiopia, near the northern border of the Somali Democratic Republic, which was led by Siad Barre. The United Somali Congress (USC), an armed movement focused on the Hawiye clan family inhabiting the central regions of Somalia, including the capital city of Mogadishu, was indirectly established with support from the SNM. In 1988, the SNM launched an invasion of northern Somalia and conducted several successful assaults following the Mengistu-Siyaad Accord. The situation in northern Somalia was dire for the interim administration. By October 1990, SNM fighters had driven Siad Barre's forces from nearly all of Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer, and Sanaag. Political control over blockaded garrisons in Berbera, Burao, and Hargeysa was also gained by the end of January 1991. That same year, there were signs of a growing free press emerging in both northern and southern Somalia. In addition, the temporary government in Somaliland took steps to separate the judiciary from the executive and legislative branches. Authorities were committed to adhering to the two-year timeline for an independence referendum and multiparty elections, and they established a Constitutional Committee chaired by the National Assembly's chairperson (Adam, 1992, pp. 11-26).

In Somalia, official, self-declared governments represent the most evident examples of subnational governance. A quick inventory reveals four levels of political organization: transregional, regional, district, and municipal. Since 1990, Somalia has seen the establishment of numerous regional and transregional entities. Among these, two states have attained significant functional capacity: Puntland, an autonomous region in the arid northeast of the country, and Somaliland, a self-declared separatist state in the northwest. Other notable entities include the Benadir Regional Authority, established in 1996, and the Bay and Bakool regions, which were administered by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army from 1998 to 2002. These regional states were actively supported by the "building-block approach" to state-building in Somalia, a strategy backed by foreign donors during this period. In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) declared itself a federal administration, which further invigorated regional state-building efforts in Somalia. Proponents of a unitary state argue that decentralization would lead to the balkanization of Somalia,

undermining the prospects of restoring a unified Somali identity and providing neighboring Ethiopia with opportunities to employ divide-and-rule tactics (Menkhaus, 2006, pp.74-106).

The military overthrow of the elected government in 1969, Mohamed Siad Barre assumed control and ruled for 21 years. In March 2024, Somalia's parliament unanimously adopted significant constitutional reforms aimed at restructuring the country's electoral system. Among the proposed changes, the president of Somalia will gain the authority to directly elect their successor, who will also have the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister. After several weeks of intense deliberation, the first four chapters of Somalia's interim constitution were amended by the bicameral federal parliament. According to Lower House Speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe, a substantial majority of MPs supported the constitutional revisions. "The amendments garnered the support of 212 members of the Lower House and 42 members of the Upper House, with no abstentions or rejections." Consequently, the modifications were adopted unanimously, as confirmed by Madobe. In March 2023, President Hassan Sheikh Mahamoud committed to dismantling the complex, clan-based indirect voting system, which has been in place for over 50 years. Recently, an agreement was reached to implement a one-person, one-vote system for municipal elections scheduled for June 2024, as announced by the federal government and four of the federal states (Voanews, 2024).

2.3.2. Djibouti

2.3.2.1. History of Djibouti

Ethiopia's history has long been associated with the Horn of Africa, and Djibouti specifically. Throughout its violent history, Ethiopia has gone by several names, including Habesh, Axum, and Abyssinia, and as a result, people outside of Ethiopia frequently confused it with the Horn of Africa. One explanation holds that this misconception was caused by the tale of Menelik I. According to the belief, Menelik I established the Christian kingdom of Axum, which was connected to the Eastern Church, as the son of the Jewish King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. He was

born upon his mother's return to her kingdom in Jerusalem. After visiting Jerusalem as an adult to acquire abilities and study the "Law of Moses," he established a dynasty in Axum, which is today a part of Ethiopia. The existence of Christians in the Horn of Africa particularly captivated and enthralled European rulers, drawing visitors from all over the world to this well-known black Orthodox Christian state. The nation's defense against Islam attacked it from all directions in the fifteenth century. Threatening the Christian State from both the north and the south were a number of Islamic Sultanates that had unified under the Islamic State of Adal, formerly known as Dankali (an early term for Afars). The village of Harar served as the regional capital and the first Islamic State (Zewde, 2002).

The French reexamined their involvement in the Red Sea, and Obock established itself as a crucial coaling station along the Suez route for France throughout its colonial incursions into Madagascar and Asia. Viscount Léonce Lagarde was designated by the French Government on December 29, 1883, as a commissioner in Obock, with the authority to negotiate and delineate the acquired area. During the early 1900s, Ethiopia's diplomatic ties were reinforced by France and Great Britain. The Franco-Ethiopian railway was opened, providing Ethiopia with connection to the rest of the Christian world and creating a corridor on the Red Sea. In 1890, Djibouti was created by Léonce Lagarde. A European residential district and a palace were constructed for him as the first Governor. His first action was to establish commercial relations with Ras Mokenen, the Emperor of Ethiopia at the time, and to select the center region for the new French colony. While Léonce Lagarde retained his position as governor, he also became France's ambassador to Ethiopia when the French colony changed its name to Les Côtes Françaises des Somalis (CFS) in May 1896. The opposition organized the first anti-colonial march in Djibouti in 1949, and in the 1951 elections, Mr Said Ali Coubeche was elected as the CFS's first deputy in Paris. The first territorial assembly was established in 1957. From 1957 to December 1958, Mahamoud Harbi Farah served as the first indigenous vice president of the Djibouti Government Council under French colonial control, as well as secretary-general of the Parti Movement Populaire (PMP). He was a staunch pro-independence Issa politician who ardently pursued independence (Omar, 2001).

The official position of the French language, education, foreign policy, military defense, and the ability to remain in Djibouti were among the many benefits that France received from those collaboration accords. From July 1976 until May 11, 1977, the French government instituted a transitional administration. Abdallah Mohamed Kamil, President du Conseil de Government, oversaw the interim administration. Eventually, the TFAI became the Republic of Djibouti on June 27, 1977, when it became a member of the international community. Songs, dances, and other demonstrations of independence were communicated through local languages. Hassan Gouled Aptidon Following the country's independence, he was chosen as the only candidate in the national elections of 1981 and 1987, and he went on to become Djibouti's first president. Founded in 1981, his Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (Popular Rally for Progress) was Djibouti's sole political party until the early 1990s (Dirie, 2020).

2.3.2.2. Djibouti's Economic Situation

Djibouti's economic performance was strong in the years immediately following its independence. According to the World Bank (1984), real GDP growth averaged 3% annually as a result of significant increases in both state and private sector investment between 1978 and 1982. However, the Djiboutian economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks due to its heavy reliance on imports and the provision of foreign services. As the 1980s drew to a close, demand from expatriates for local products and services declined sharply, which in turn negatively affected the value of the services Djibouti offered on the global market. Economic instability in the early 1990s further exacerbated these challenges. The already fragile economy was deeply impacted by several factors, including the massive floods of 1989–1990, national civil unrest from 1991–1994, and regional conflicts in Ethiopia and Somalia during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led to a significant refugee crisis. In the early 1990s, economic rehabilitation in the newly independent Eritrea and increasing competition for the region's port and transportation services intensified the strain on Djibouti. The government faced mounting domestic and external deficits (Emerton, 1998, pp.3-8).

The Djiboutian economy is largely dependent on its geostrategic location in the world, given its tiny size, harsh heat, lack of substantial natural resources, and lack of arable land. Three sources account for the lion's share of Djibouti's income: the International Port of Djibouti, which has served as Ethiopia's main landlocked transshipment hub since its war with now-independent Eritrea; the Djibouti-Ethiopian Railroad; and sizable US and French military bases, which each contribute \$30–\$36 million a year. Additionally, the nation receives help of \$100–300 million yearly. This amounts to between \$130 and \$700 per person in help alone. Because of Djibouti's exceptionally high rates of poverty, it might be challenging to observe any changes or immediate effects from these monies or other sources of income. This implies that government money primarily helps the elite at the expense of the poor, as is the case in the majority of rent-based economies. It is true that the economy is rentier, which encourages high degrees of nepotism, corruption, and political meddling (USAID/GWIT,2004). Additionally, it is reported that the President personally oversees each of the nation's major revenue generators. Djibouti is located at the base of the Red Sea, adjacent to the world's second busiest sea route. The fact that fifty-two boats and four million barrels of oil traverse the strait every day highlights its significance, making it the world's fourth busiest waterway and the only one bordered by turmoil (thus the name Strait of Tears). Djibouti's strategic value is bolstered by the fact that it is a peaceful and democratic region, wedged between the progressively unstable Yemen to the north and the failed state of Somalia to the southeast. As is typical of developing "logistic hub" economies, the majority of Djibouti's GDP is generated by the services sector, which in this instance includes banking, commerce, transportation, and logistics. With military stations in Djibouti, China, the US, France, Japan, and NATO all support regional security and stability. The macroeconomic overview of Djibouti from 2000 to 2018 shows that it is a rapidly developing nation that is seeing appreciable growth in several important areas, most notably tourism and logistics services. Real GDP growth in Djibouti increased from 3% in 2005 to 4.8% in 2006 and 5.4% in 2007, with the rise in foreign direct investment (FDI). The high of FDI in Djibouti was attained in 2007. 2009 saw the completion of a number of significant investment projects, such as the Doraleh Container Terminal, however there were few new FDI on the same scale, led to a decline in GDP growth to 4.8% in 2010 (Mowlid, 2019).

The ports of Djibouti are essential to its military and economic geostrategic importance. They serve as both a platform for the transshipment of products and a conduit for commerce with Ethiopia. the removal of bulk and container goods from bigger ships for distribution to ports in East Africa and Arabia. Together with the expansion of port facilities and demand, trade volume has increased dramatically. The amount of cargo handled by the ports in 2009 was 11 million tons, which was twice as much as it was just five years prior. Due to its reliance on Doraleh, Ethiopia continues to be Djibouti's top customer for all port services, although this sometimes leads to disputes over fees and taxes. Ethiopia and Djibouti's economic interdependency took a different turn when Ethiopia started providing hydroelectric electricity to Djibouti, notwithstanding the absence of collaborative ventures in private equity. Previously, oil-fired generators that were getting old and unreliable were the costly source of electricity in Djibouti. 'Following Djibouti's connection to Ethiopia's electricity grid in 2011, retail and industrial domestic tariffs were cut significantly, easing pressures on household and business budgets'. The independence of South Sudan in 2011, with its economy largely dependent on oil exports, has influenced a fresh regional outlook among Djiboutian and regional elites. In February 2012, finance ministers from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, alongside the ministry of mining and petroleum, formalized their cooperation by signing a tripartite memorandum of agreement in Addis Ababa. The result of the rivalry between the Juba–Djibouti and Juba–Lamu lines is therefore a crucial factor in the developing discussion about regional integration (Styan, 2013).

Pairault (2020, pp.2-3) observes a significant increase in the debt service burden between 2019 and 2021. The debt servicing burden escalated from \$48 million in 2019 to \$82 million in 2020, representing a 71% year-on-year increase, and further to \$104 million in 2021. In response, Exim Bank restructured several loan agreements, extending the grace period and the project timeline. Preliminary data indicate a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio to 71%, with a target of 41% by 2021. Additionally, GDP growth estimates for the period between 2019 and 2024 range from 7.3% to 8.6%. Chairman of the Djibouti Port Authority, whose enterprises are among the country's most heavily indebted, stated: "We are not concerned about our

level of debt." According to Hadi, the burden of debt repayment will fall on those who use the services such as ships and traders rather than the taxpayers. Journalist François Soudan reports that President Guelleh justified the nation's rising debt by pointing out that "no country has developed without going into debt" (Soudan, 2017).

2.3.2.3. Djibouti's Political Situation

Djibouti gained independence from France in 1977, making it a relatively young nation. The political landscape of Djibouti has historically been polarized between the Issa and Afar ethnic groups. Since independence, the Issa have dominated government, military, and civil service positions. Their influence has extended to the distribution of goods and services, which helps maintain compliance with the government. In contrast, the Afar have expressed dissatisfaction with the centralized nature of politics, which is predominantly controlled by the president. Djibouti's president issues various laws, regulations, and policies directly through Presidential Decrees. National Assembly, the country's 65-member legislature, is in session for only two months each year and functions primarily as a rubber stamp for presidential decisions. Its powers are limited, and it has no authority to approve or reject the president's appointments to key positions such as ministers, judges, or diplomats. Djibouti is home to two main ethnic groups: the Issa and the Afar. The Issa, who are of Somali heritage, make up the majority of the population and inhabit the southern third of the country. The population of Djibouti has surged significantly due to large-scale immigration from Somalia and Ethiopia. The Afar, originating from Ethiopia, inhabit the northern two-thirds of Djibouti and have been present in the region for centuries. Despite the generally stable portrayal of intergroup relations, underlying tensions persist, occasionally escalating into civil conflict, especially during the 1990s (Brass, 2008, pp.5-6).

In November 1991, the Afar, led by the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), began an uprising after fourteen years of political and economic marginalization. Initially, the Gouled government termed it "external aggression," anticipating French intervention. However, France maintained a neutral stance, merely mediating the conflict. Neighboring countries with significant Afar

populations were apprehensive about pan-Afar and pan-Somali nationalist movements potentially causing internal instability. Internal discord among FRUD's leadership in 1994 led to the organization's disintegration. The war was substantially resolved later that year with the signing of a power-sharing deal between the government and the main FRUD group; nevertheless, the definitive peace accord was not to be completed until 2001. A few FRUD officials were appointed to government ministries as a result of the 1994 accord, and in 1996 FRUD was granted permission to register as an official political party. Major political repercussions resulted from the escalating military conflicts. Fourteen members of parliament and the Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reforms were among the ministers who resigned on January 14, 1992, after Mohamed Djama Elabé, the Minister of Health and Social Affairs, did. Twenty members of parliament total 14 representatives and administrative reforms (several of the ministers who resigned were also members of parliament) represent a "parliamentary opposition" of 65 members in all, according to this group in the National Assembly (Abdillahi, 2021, pp.177-219).

A transitional government, headed by a prime minister from the opposition ranks, was demanded at the conclusion of the June 20–24, 1992, meeting in Paris by representatives of the majority of the major opposition groups, united under the banner of the Djibouti Opposition Front. A second vote held on September 4, 1992, endorsed a proposal to limit the number of legal political parties to four. The government's proposed constitution, which allowed for multiparty activity, was adopted by approximately 97% of voters. However, on December 18, 1993, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and other members of the United Opposition Front (FUOD) boycotted the parliamentary elections. In the presidential election on May 7, 1993, President Gouled secured re-election to a fourth term, defeating four other contenders by a wide margin. By mid-1994, Prime Minister Gourad and the newly appointed FRUD Secretary General, Ougureh Kifle Ahmed, were reportedly engaged in covert negotiations. Ali Mohamed Daoud, a proponent of peace talks with the government, had assumed the presidency. Despite these efforts, by early 1996, significant divisions emerged within the administration. Moumin Bahdon Farah, Secretary General of the RPP and Minister of Justice, led those who believed the accord had not achieved genuine stability or peace in Djibouti. The United Opposition Front (FUOD) and the Democratic Renewal Party

(PND) experienced factionalization following the formation of a coalition by the Group for the Democracy of the Republic (GDR) in preparation for the 1997 parliamentary elections. In the December 19, 1997, elections, the RPP and the new FRUD electoral coalition won all 65 seats in the National Assembly (54 seats for the RPP and 11 for FRUD), securing a reported 78.55% of the vote. The Party of Democratic Renewal received 19.19%, while the National Democratic Party garnered 2.25% (Brass, 2008, pp.5-6).

The RPP chose Ismail Omar Guelleh, a former cabinet secretary and Gouled's nephew, as its candidate when Gouled declared in 1999 that he would not run in the April presidential election. Moussa Ahmed Idriss, the opponent for Guelleh, who stood for a tiny alliance of opposition parties, was soundly defeated. On April 9, Guelleh handily outperformed Idriss with 74.09 percent of the vote. Idriss received just 25.78% of the vote, despite receiving the support of the recently established unified opposition in Djibouti. Djibouti's political landscape had the possibility to shift and several new, legally recognized political parties may have been established. One such modification occurred in the shape of the Union for the Presidential Majority (Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle; UMP) coalition, which was established in and comprised the RPP and FRUD preparation for the 2003 legislative elections. the administration's declared objective of increased government involvement, Guleed was the sole candidate on April 8, 2005. The former president passed away on November 21, 2006. On February 8, 2008, the UMP once more gained all 65 seats in assembly elections. President Guelleh was permitted to seek a third term, which was shortened to five years, per 2010 constitutional provisions. He also had the authority to choose Prime Minister Dileita and form a new government, keeping just nine ministers from the previous administration (Peter, 2024).

3. CONCEPTS OF PEACE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY

Conflict, peace, and security are enduring concerns within the field of international relations and political science. These concepts are not merely understood as the absence of conflict or inter- and intra-state violence. For decades, scholars and practitioners have focused on these issues as central subjects of international discourse, especially within the framework of regional and international organizations, in efforts to understand their interrelations, roles, functions, and underlying causes. Over time, these themes have gained increasing prominence in the Horn of Africa, a region historically marked by geopolitical challenges and instability. This region is often considered a critical juncture where global, regional, and international interests intersect and conflict, rendering the study of peace and security particularly complex. Since the dawn of civilization, humanity has continually faced challenges related to war, peace, and security. Throughout the 20th century, academics, diplomats, strategists, and politicians developed and tested various strategies to establish durable peace and security between nations and peoples. In Africa, armed conflict continues to inflict significant suffering, disrupting economic activities and leaving the continent vulnerable to humanitarian crises, including widespread displacement (Colard, 1997, p.353).

3.1. Notion of Peace

Peace is described as "a situation in which conflicts are resolved without resorting to direct military force." This peace is reduced to the absence of conflict; it occurs from the triumph of law over force, or from the balance of the forces present; or, again, from the absolute dominance of one power over all others. This notion of peace has an important cultural dimension; peace is more an internal state of mind and also the absence of war or violent conflict. Gandhi based his philosophy and strategy on the concept of Ahimsa, which literally means "non-violence." (Galtung, 1969, pp.167-191). By interpretation, this notion defines peace as a source of calm mind or without fear of living in a world of tranquillity or absence of violence.

The term "peace" has been used to defend both the honorable and the immoral deeds of history, and to define "peace" is to step right into the purview of human ambitions

and define the sphere of the desired, the feasible, and the reasonable. A variety of approaches are used by ethnography to contribute to the process of defining peace. This interpretation of peace includes the peaceful resolution of social disputes as well as the absence of interpersonal violence. These ideal depictions of "peaceful" communities are typical of traditional, pre- colonial, or resistance societies (Howell and Willis, 1989).

Positive peace is a more expansive idea that might be likened to social justice. Anthropologists have tried to define it inductively by suggesting two sorts of empirical studies. The first step was to describe several types of violence other than physical and direct violence (such as structural, symbolic, epistemic, and ontological violence, among others) and propose positive peace as a result of their removal; however, the boundaries of this 'dark anthropology' (Ortner, 2016, pp.47-73).

Peace studies are credited to Johan Galtung, who wrote an article titled "Three approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding." Therefore, the premise behind this idea of peace is defined as the absence of violence and violence as any intentional act or psychological condition affecting a person. "If peace is viewed as the opposite of violence and that is all it is about, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal.". This is an investigation of two types of peace: positive peace for human civilization and negative peace achieved by the absence of conflict and violence. In our view, peace is the absence of conflict or hostilities between armed forces or nations on the same continent, as well as political and security stability amongst governments in the same region (Galtung, 1976).

3.1.1. Peacekeeping and the Emergence of Ideas about Peace

3.1.1.1. Peacekeeping

Boutros Ghali's peace agenda focused on "building and strengthening the United Nations' capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, within the framework of the charter and in accordance with its provisions" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, pp.11-12). Aiming to strengthen the political and military foundation of the United Nations system and protect the legal and political standing of individuals and

minorities under the jurisdiction of states that are unable or unwilling to fulfill their basic duty to ensure the security of their citizens, peacekeeping is portrayed as an institutional tool for creating global security arrangements and structures. Collective security refers to states' convergent expectations regarding the limitation of force in international relations, their mutual reliance on each other for security, and their common goal of maintaining global peace and security (Galtung, 1969, pp. 167-191).

United Nations peacekeeping has become a vital tool for the global community in managing complex crises that endanger global peace and security. Ensuring international peace and security is a primary objective of the UN, aimed at shielding future generations from the devastation of war. Under the United Nations Charter, particularly Chapters VI and VII, peacekeeping is a significant function of the Security Council, which holds the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Chapter VII outlines the measures for responding to threats, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. Every member of a United Nations peacekeeping force, whether military, police, or civilian, is obligated to adhere to international human rights laws. Peacekeeping encompasses various tasks undertaken by the UN and other international bodies to secure global peace and security, with key objectives including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding (Jenkins, 2013).

The Secretariat has continued to strengthen peacekeeping efforts by increasing staffing levels within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. This expansion has enhanced military planning and expertise within the Office of Military Affairs (as part of the 2007–2008 reforms), while also establishing new structures in 2007 to address cross-cutting issues such as rule of law and security sector reform. Furthermore, the police division has been significantly bolstered. Additionally, the division's structures have been streamlined, and logistical support has been provided by the Department of Field Support (DFS) since 2007 (Novosseloff, 2009, p.92).

The United Nations has embarked on an ambitious quest to replace the balance of power with collective security as the primary driver of international relations, thereby reinforcing its role as the peace guarantor. The goal was to embed the principle of "one for all, and all for one," fostering intergovernmental cooperation

over rivalry. The Security Council's initiation of the first peacekeeping mission in November 1956, marked by the deployment of the iconic blue helmets, significantly and enduringly enhanced the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts. This effort led to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), an auxiliary body supporting collective security, marking the formal commencement of peacekeeping as a global governance instrument. This strategy is grounded in the "Holy Trinity" doctrine of peacekeeping, encompassing three key principles: obtaining consent from the involved parties, maintaining the impartiality of UN forces, and employing minimal necessary force. The concept of the "fog of war," as articulated by the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, has parallels with the diplomatic-military practice of the "peacekeeping fog." This concept highlights the inherent imprecision and uncertainty that often surround military peacekeeping missions. After a prolonged period of partial resolution of political and financial entanglements, attention has now shifted toward the operational and legal uncertainties of peacekeeping. The consent of the parties remains critical, as peacekeeping is not a tool for enforcing collective security or peace. In this context, soldiers wearing blue helmets are regarded as "guest" forces, with their protection governed by a Memorandum of Understanding or a Force Status Agreement (Hatto, 2021, pp. 57-69).

Understanding the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping specifically the nature and scope of regional force interventions, the mechanisms through which regional forces cooperate with the UN, and the advantages and limitations of deploying regional forces instead of UN forces is essential for grasping the full dynamics of peace operations. In the post-Cold War era, the UN Security Council has increasingly emphasized regional peacekeeping. However, implementing many peace programs has proven difficult, as nearly every region of the world has faced the challenges of interstate conflicts. Due to structural limitations and resource constraints, the UN has struggled to adequately address all conflict-ridden regions globally. The establishment of regional peacekeeping organizations was anticipated by the UN's founding members, who wisely incorporated provisions for such initiatives into the UN Charter. The role of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security is explicitly detailed in Chapter VIII of the Charter. According to Article 52, regional arrangements, alliances, or entities are encouraged

to make every effort to resolve local disputes before submitting them to the Security Council for further action (ASPJ Afrique and Francophonie, 2010).

3.1.1.2. Emergence of Ideas on Peace

The concept of peace, while historically celebrated for its humanitarian and ethical appeal, has evolved to encompass a range of political and legal dimensions. Scholars argue that modern peace extends beyond the mere absence of conflict, embracing notions of social justice, structural stability, and international cooperation (Bull, 1977, p. 72). This perspective contrasts with earlier views, such as those of Grotius in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, which defined peace primarily as a framework for managing war (Grotius, 2005, p. 104). The treaties of Nijmegen in 1678 and the Peace of Ryswick in 1697 demonstrated that war and violence were likely to recur in the pursuit of victory. René Descartes (1596–1650) was similarly engaged with the promotion of peace, particularly in the wake of the Westphalian and Münster peace agreements, at the request of the Swedish queen. This led to his writing on the theme of "The Birth of Peace" as a form of intellectual entertainment (Goyard-Fabre, 1994, pp.17-18).

Immanuel Kant's key book "Project for Perpetual Peace" was published in 1795, in the midst of years of war and political turmoil in Europe. This visionary document advocated principles and circumstances for achieving long-term peace among nations. Kant proposed novel concepts in it, such as the prohibition of aggressive wars, republican democracy as a peaceful political system, and the need for binding international treaties to resolve conflicts. In the spring of 1796, Europe's attention was drawn to Napoleon Bonaparte's military adventures. His audacious campaign in Italy paid off, as he quickly and spectacularly emerged victorious, becoming a national hero in France and attaining hitherto unheard-of international fame. For a while, the turmoil of war and Napoleon's ascent to power eclipsed Kant's thoughtful conversations on philosophical peace. The Austrians, devastated by military setbacks at the hands of Bonaparte, found themselves in a perilous situation. As Bonaparte prepared to traverse the eastern Alps into Vienna, Kant, often known as the "Sage of Königsberg," deepened his philosophical musings. He wrote "First Metaphysical

Principles of the Doctrine of Law" in 1797, in which he investigated the philosophical basis of justice and law, most notably through his renowned definition of categorical obligation. Thus, while Bonaparte's achievements dominated the news, Kant represented the continuance of a profound and timeless meditation on the nature of peace, justice, and morality in human affairs (Lederach, 1997, p.19).

The Treaty of Campoformio, signed by Napoleon Bonaparte on April 18, 1797, marked a pivotal moment in European history, concluding a series of transformative events that had unfolded since the onset of the French Revolution. At the time, Bonaparte, serving as General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy, had conducted a highly successful military campaign in Italy, delivering significant defeats to Austria and its allies. Although his military prowess suggested the potential for an unimpeded march into Vienna, Bonaparte was acutely aware of the limitations of military power and the necessity of diplomacy in achieving sustainable outcomes. The political context of the period played a decisive role in shaping the Treaty of Campoformio. Bonaparte recognized that a durable resolution to the conflict with Austria required more than military success; it necessitated strategic diplomatic engagement to consolidate territorial gains and foster lasting peace. The treaty represented a delicate balance between military achievements and the imperatives of international diplomacy. Beyond ending hostilities between France and Austria, it also underscored Bonaparte's adaptability as a statesman. While already celebrated as a military strategist, his role in brokering the treaty demonstrated his capacity to navigate complex political landscapes and negotiate peace. For many, Bonaparte's efforts symbolized the possibility of stability after years of turmoil and violence, enhancing his reputation not only as a military leader but also as a credible political figure. The treaty thus became a turning point in his career, solidifying his authority and establishing him as a leader capable of steering France toward stability and prosperity. In this regard, the Treaty of Campoformio was not merely a diplomatic agreement; it was instrumental in consolidating Bonaparte's political and military influence, shaping his trajectory as a transformative figure in European history (Lederach, 1997, p.19).

The UN General Assembly's resolution in 1948 to support the Security Council's efforts to broker a cease-fire in Palestine represented a watershed moment in efforts to end the region's conflict. The UN wanted to establish a framework to promote peace and stability by choosing a mediator and assigning him particular responsibilities. The mediator's mission was to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the future situation in Palestine. This entailed participating in discussions with the many parties involved in order to establish equitable and long-term solutions to territorial and political claims. It was also critical to work closely with the Security Council-appointed Truce Commission for Palestine. They should work together to eliminate conflicts and create peaceful conditions. Hague Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes Article 4, highlights the mediator's duty in balancing conflicting claims and calming tensions. The process of resolving conflicts peacefully was made easier by the use of this strategy, which was essential in fostering an atmosphere of trust and collaboration between the conflicting parties. Efforts were made to find a long-term, peaceful resolution to the Palestine problem through collaboration, mediation, and encouraging communication between the parties, as evidenced by the UN-appointed mediator's intervention (Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, 2011, pp.132-135).

3.2. Notion of Conflict

Conflict is a fundamental aspect of both human nature and societal existence. It permeates every facet of individual life, frequently disrupts human groups, and serves as a driving force in shaping history and influencing the future. Human societies are inherently marked by conflict, which consistently undermines the dynamics of intersubjectivity and fuels interpersonal violence, interethnic tensions, and interstate wars. This section aims to define the term "conflict," explore its typology, and examine the processes involved in conflict resolution.

The phrase "conflict" refers to a battle, struggle, or "armed conflict." It implies the meeting of opposing forces, the fight between reason and passion, and hostile attitudes (the resolution of a conflict). Conflict is characterized as a fight for control of values, ideals, position, power, and precious resources. According to this definition, conflict is a battle between two or more parties to enforce their ideals or

claims over the others. Conflict is widespread. Conflict reflection from a theoretical perspective was not recognized as a study subject until after World War II. Conflict is therefore defined as a relationship condition based on hostility. This might be because to the presence of opposing forces at the same time, disagreement over values, beliefs, or viewpoints, rivalry when participants are fighting for the same objective or possession of the same thing (person, property, status, territory), or emotional enmity (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999, p.14).

Conflict is defined by Julien Freud as follows: "an intentional confrontation or clash between two individuals or groups of the same species who manifest hostile intentions towards each other, generally concerning a right, and who, in order to maintain, assert, or re-establish that right, attempt to break the resistance of the other, possibly resorting to violence, which, if necessary, may lead to the physical annihilation of the other" (Freud, 1983, p. 63).

Conflict is defined as a disagreement between people or organizations in society (or between cultures). It might happen "when a decision cannot be taken by the usual procedures". This widely recognized concept is based on organizational sociology, which demonstrates that conflicts are determined by organizational models and power relationships, Conflict may also be characterized as a dispute, antagonism, or conflict between two or more international relations participants. It can occasionally help to overcome opposing dualisms, such as in international relations. According to Cornu, conflict is "any opposition of views between States of such a magnitude that the search for a solution may lead to the use of force" (Cornu, 1970, p. 117).

Zartman defines a conflict as "a dispute that underpins the clashes between the parties involved." Clearly, there is a conflict of interest between the participants in international relations, which manifests itself in the form of war." (Zarteman,1990, pp.16-17). Two perspectives help us comprehend the conflict, there are two types of designs: objective and subjective. In the objective conception, conflict can be defined as a competitive situation in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of positions and each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with that of the other party. In the subjective conception, conflict is attributed to an incorrect perception of a subjective situation. Complementary interests or incompatibilities are what cause a situation to be interpreted as incompatible. It is a subjectively

subjective disagreement in this instance. When two interests cannot be materially realized simultaneously, there is an incompatibility of viewpoints (Burton, 1969, p. 5).

3.2.1. Typology and Cause of Conflict

Contemporary conflicts are unique due to the autonomy and diversity of collective actors, the emphasis on status and values over material goods, and the increased influence of transnationalism. The emergence of a new type of belligerent logic on the global stage poses a significant challenge to strategists, particularly those schooled in the framework of the Cold War. During this historical time, the bipolar paradigm opposing the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the logic of conflict. During that time, strategists were used to thinking about nuclear deterrence, ideological conflict, and geopolitical competition between superpowers. Globalization, with its associated economic, social, and technical complications, has altered the very character of international conflicts. The growing interconnectedness of economies, communities, and communication technologies has generated vulnerabilities and possibilities for both state and non-state actors (Bertrand and Marie, 1995, p.181).

Conflicts that are exploited occur when they manifest in an open and apparent manner, typically through direct actions between the parties involved. These disputes arise from direct conflicts of interest and disagreements between the parties. In contrast, latent conflicts may stem from historical rivalries, ideological disputes, or competition for strategic resources. Exploited and latent conflicts represent two distinct stages in the international conflict process. These conflicts can take various forms, including military confrontations, economic rivalries, or territorial disputes (Kamyabi, 1998, p. 159).

3.2.1.1. Type of Conflicts

Conflicts in international relations can take many different forms and are often related to territory, the interest being pursued, and the domain or form.

3.2.1.1.1. Armed Conflict

International armed conflict is a complex concept that often extends beyond the traditional boundaries of war declared between states. It can take various forms, ranging from direct confrontations between sovereign states to conflicts involving non-state actors and transnational organizations. The key factor in determining an international armed conflict is the presence of armed hostilities between two or more parties, whether they are sovereign governments or non-governmental entities. The term "international armed conflict" refers to any armed conflict that occurs between two or more parties, regardless of whether one of the parties formally recognizes a state of war. This holds true even if each party disputes the existence of a conflict (Mova, 2001, p.464).

Armed confrontations vary in severity, length, and territorial extent. They might be subnational, global, or regional. Civil wars and insurgencies, criminal violence, intra-army clashes, and terrorism are all distinct phenomena. Nearly one-third of the world's subnational wars occurred in Africa in 2009. Even if they tend to decrease and travel from West Africa to the East, they are particularly concerned in Sudan and Darfur, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are those who argue that the new forms of war are more decentralized and more driven by ethnic factors, plundering, and predation, while the old forms were more ideological, centralized, and characterized by grievances. With the major powers withholding some of their backing, multidimensional, more intranational guerrillas replaced the ideologically opposed and broadly supported fights of the Cold War era (Holsti, 1991).

3.2.1.1.2. Unarmed Conflict

Unarmed conflict, as defined by Jean Barrea, is a competitive scenario in which one side seeks to dominate or displace the other, highlighting a dynamic of strategic rivalry without the use of physical force or weaponry. Essentially, it is a form of conflict driven by the desire to control or influence a particular location, resource, or position of power. Unarmed conflict can manifest in various contexts, including politics, economics, and social affairs. While unarmed conflicts may not result in immediate or visible physical damage, they can be as intense and consequential as armed conflicts. Moreover, this type of conflict underscores its inherently strategic nature (Barrea, 1980, p. 323).

In fact, the definition of non-violent conflict provided by Jean Barrea helps us comprehend the nature of the so-called "struggle of interest" that existed between the US and the USSR during the Cold War, which lasted from the end of World War II until the Soviet Union's dissolution through Perestroika. The two superpowers engaged in severe political, economic, and ideological competition during this battle. The USSR and the US adopted different sides in a conflict of interests that was multifaceted. This featured economic rivalry tactics like industrial warfare, in which all parties fought for dominance in vital industries including heavy industry, technology, and innovation. A struggle for ideological dominance also raged, with both sides attempting to use diplomacy, propaganda, or the backing of political groups to advance their own political and intellectual systems on a worldwide basis. In order to get a strategic edge in the area of information and communication, the two superpowers have engaged in cyberespionage, sabotage, and hacking operations. Cyberwarfare has also been a significant component of this conflict (Barrea ,1980, p. 323).

3.2.1.1.3. Economic Conflict

The idea of economic warfare is frequently vulnerable to many interpretations and lacks a defined and widely acknowledged definition. This uncertainty stems in part from the complexities of global economic and political connections, as well as the various ways that state and non-state actors might employ economic techniques to achieve their aims. Economic warfare is a type of unconventional conflict that uses

economic tools to attain political, military, or strategic goals. Economic sanctions, cyberattacks on economic infrastructure, industrial sabotage, financial market manipulation, and economic intelligence operations all have the ability to damage or destabilize a prospective opponent (Fontanel and Coulomb, 2006).

This definition separates war from nonviolent forms of competition such as business, athletic, political discourse, or religious advocacy by focusing on the critical role of physical force and weapons. Unlike other confrontations that may utilize economic or diplomatic tactics, war is uniquely characterized by its dependence on aggressive and destructive measures (Bouthoul, 1972, p. 43). According to Van Bergeijk and Van Marrewijk (1992, p. 12), economic sanctions carry hidden costs, including a likely reduction in economic efficiency due to the application of new constraints, challenges in determining the precise impact of the sanctions, and increased uncertainty in international markets, which can foster protectionist policies and support domestic production (Fontanel and Bensahel, 1992, pp. 9-50).

The primary source of contention, according to many Ethiopians, was economic concerns. Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut argue that economic issues played a critical role in both the onset and escalation of the conflict. Before the conflict, the two governments recognized that their disputes were primarily economic. Even after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991, the Ethiopian birr remained the de facto currency between them. From 1993 to 1996, Ethiopia shifted its development strategy to focus on industrial expansion, predominantly in the Tigray region. This strategic shift breached the economic agreements outlined in the Asmara Pact (Girmay, 2010).

3.2.1.1.4. Political Conflict

Political conflict arises when individuals, organizations, or entities with opposing interests, values, or ambitions clash within a political system. This sort of conflict can occur at numerous levels of government, such as within a nation, a local community, or on a global scale, and it can take many forms, ranging from ideological differences to power conflicts. Political disputes can be caused by a range of circumstances, including disagreements on political, social, or economic concerns,

competition for control of resources or institutions, ethnic or religious conflicts, or efforts for independence or autonomy.

This conflict is defined by a battle over a state's direction and management, particularly inside its institutions of power, disturbing the smooth operation of public affairs. However, this may take many other forms, including ideological disputes, border conflicts, and security conflicts. The first sort of political strife in Africa coincided with the issue of colonialism. First and foremost, there was the power struggle that preceded or accompanied the issue of decolonization. Following the war for independence, there were several territorial and boundary disputes, as well as the stability of the hard-won independence. However, the bulk of political confrontations stem from discontent with political institutions and the government. This refers to the loss of legitimacy as a result of corruption or ineffective policies, as well as the shift to political engagement. Political discrimination and the hardship that disadvantaged groups face are at the heart of practically all wars. This discrimination may be connected to inadequate access to positions of political power at the national or regional level; recruiting within the police or military apparatus, administration, the right of veto, the freedom to freely organize, and the right of everyone to legal protection (Benoit and Alii, 1997, pp. 47-70).

The Afar minority population's sense of political and economic marginalization is the main structural factor contributing to violence in Djibouti. Economic marginalization was combined with political dissatisfaction on the side of the Afar. The Afars did not appear to be as engaged in commerce or other forms of gainful activity before to independence as the Issa were. After the country gained independence, the Issa economic elite became the dominating force in the economy by acquiring the land and businesses abandoned by Europeans through loans from the Commercial Bank of Somalia's Djibouti branch. According to Laitin and Samatar (1984), the Somali clan system is "centripetal and centrifugal, at once drawing the Somalis into a powerful social fabric of kinship affinity and cultural solidarity while setting them against one another in antagonistic clan interests" (Laitin and Samatar, 1984).

3.2.1.2. Point of View of the Interest Pursued

3.2.1.2.1. Conflict of Interest

Conflict of interest is a type of political and strategic conflict between state or non-state actors that want to grow their influence, power, or interests at the expense of others. This sort of conflict is frequently motivated by geopolitical, economic, or ideological factors, and it can materialize as a succession of competitions and confrontations in a variety of disciplines. At the international level, power struggles frequently manifest as rivalries between big powers or regional blocs vying to expand their spheres of influence and safeguard their strategic interests. This rivalry can emerge in foreign policy, national security, international trade, military alliances, and diplomacy. Conflicts of power interests between rival or neighboring governments vying for supremacy in a certain area can also occur at the regional level. Ideological disagreements, historical or ethnic rivalries, economic rivalry, and territory claims can all serve as catalysts for these wars.

Contemporary imperialism varies from its traditional historical forms in that it is more sophisticated and less blatant in its techniques, yet it has the same logic of dominance and control. In economic terms, contemporary imperialism can manifest itself as neocolonialism, in which developed countries exert economic influence over developing countries by exploiting their natural resources, dominating their markets, and imposing economic policies that benefit their own interests. It can also take the form of dominant players on a global scale promoting political and cultural beliefs, norms, and models. Modern imperialism can take political forms such as attempts to meddle in other nations' internal affairs, whether by military action, overthrowing a regime, arming rebel groups, or imposing economic sanctions. These actions can result in bloodshed, the deaths of civilians, injury to civilians, and long-term harm to the infrastructure and societies of the targeted nations.

The United States established a strategic alliance with Ethiopia, motivated by political and geopolitical interests, During the Eisenhower administration. Ethiopia was integral to the U.S. Cold War strategy against the Soviet Union, especially in the Horn of Africa, under the "Politica Sciana" policy. In discussions about Eritrea's

potential independence, the U.S. argued that an independent Eritrea would be weak and susceptible to Soviet influence and aggression. As a result, the U.S. endorsed Eritrea's union with Ethiopia to bolster regional stability and counter Soviet expansion (Kendie, 2005, pp. 304–305).

3.2.1.2.2. The Humanitarian Conflict of Interest

Conflicts between humanitarian interests like defending human rights, easing the suffering of marginalized groups, and offering humanitarian aid and other interests like political, economic, strategic, or security interests give rise to conflicts of humanitarian interests. A scenario when political or strategic reasons impede humanitarian relief is known as a conflict of humanitarian interest. To control resources, destabilize the enemy, or hold onto power, for instance, warring sides may impose restrictions on humanitarian organizations' access to civilian populations during armed conflicts. The right to humanitarian assistance is a concept that has evolved throughout time in reaction to major humanitarian emergencies. It refers to the prospect of actors intervening in a state, even without its agreement, in the event of a widespread violation of human rights. The right to humanitarian intervention refers to the international community's legitimacy to interfere in a sovereign state's internal affairs in order to prevent or terminate catastrophic human rights violations or humanitarian disasters. This principle is closely connected to the notion of an international duty to safeguard vulnerable populations from extreme human rights abuses and emphasizes the obligation to provide humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations. During the 1990s, the notion of a 'right to humanitarian intervention' gained significant traction, particularly following international military actions in Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000). Initially advanced by scholars and legal advocates in the 1980s, this idea underscored the imperative of intervening to protect civilian populations from grave violations of human rights and atrocities perpetrated by armed groups or authoritarian regimes, providing a moral and legal foundation for such interventions (Fontrier, 2009).

3.2.1.3. From Spatial Perspective

3.2.1.3.1. Internal Conflict

Internal conflicts, often referred to as intranational conflicts or civil wars, are armed disputes that occur between various groups, factions, or parties within the borders of a nation. These conflicts arise from a variety of complex, multidimensional factors. Their motivations can stem from disparities in wealth and social inequality, ethnic or religious prejudice, political tensions, competition for natural resources, aspirations for independence, or failures in governmental administration and governance. Internal conflicts are defined as violent or potentially violent political disputes that are primarily rooted in domestic issues rather than systemic ones. Such conflicts typically involve armed violence or threats of violence within a single state's boundaries. Examples of internal conflicts include armed wars, separatist movements, challenges to state sovereignty by criminal organizations, ideological battles, and revolutions all of which often involve power struggles between civilian and military leaders (Damrosch, 1993).

Internal war is the most common type of armed conflict in today's international system, causing enormous suffering, huge stakes, and violent combat. Internal conflict frequently entails intentional attacks on civilians. Internal conflict can impact the interest and occupy the attention of distant powers and international institutions. War can directly harm the national interest of distant powers, and internal conflict can imperil foreign nationals. During Liberia's civil conflict, US Marines were forced to rescue US Americans who had become stranded there. Internal disagreement can pose a threat to political and ideological allies (Brown, 1996, pp.3-8).

Brown categorizes a broad range of external factors that contribute to internal conflict as "bad neighbors." (Brown, 1996, pp.3-8). These are uninvited parties that incite conflict and support governments or rebel groups that resort to violence to resolve internal issues. For example, in the 1990s, both African governments and their former foreign backers continued to provide arms, training, and support to allies engaged in civil wars across the continent. In the case of the civil war against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the former Rwandan government received weapons

from South Africa, France, Egypt, and nine other countries (Goose and Smyth, 1994, pp. 86-96).

Some scholars think that such actions contributed to Somalia's state breakdown. However, the most comprehensive empirical assessment of economic policy-making under the Siad Barre government reveals that it was precisely the regime's refusal to follow the IFT's agenda that led to economic catastrophe (Mubarak, 1996).

3.2.1.3.2. International Conflict

An international conflict is defined as an armed confrontation or collision between two or more sovereign nations or international entities, which is frequently driven by competing interests, geopolitical rivalries, territorial claims, economic disputes, or ideological differences. These confrontations often take place on an international scale and may entail the use of military action, diplomacy, economic sanctions, or other forms of pressure to achieve the goals of the concerned parties. The origins of international wars can be diverse and complicated. They might stem from historical rivalries, territorial claims, border conflicts, rivalry for natural resource control, ideological or religious divisions, challenges to governmental legitimacy, or regional domination.

The definition of international relations refers to the behavior and interactions of states within the international system. These interactions shape the system's structure, as well as the nature and intensity of internal conflicts. International war is a process, rather than a definitive end, much like peace. There are many ways to characterize interstate conflicts, but they generally involve neighboring states engaged in territorial disputes. For example, there have been several wars between Ethiopia and Somalia (1964, 1972, 1985, 1987, 1988) over the Ogaden region, which is administered by Ethiopia but is home to Somali clans. Interstate disputes can sometimes escalate, drawing in other states and evolving into regional wars that affect multiple nations within a specific geographic area. Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen on behalf of the royalists and Egypt's support for the republican side during Yemen's civil war (1962–1970) are examples of direct involvement in a civil conflict. When two governments engage in military combat, it can escalate tensions

and potentially lead to an international conflict. A notable example of this is the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the Soviet Union attempted to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, prompting the U.S. Navy to threaten to sink any Soviet ships approaching the waters surrounding Cuba (Bercovitch and Fretter, 2004).

Adopted in December 1974, UN General Assembly Resolution 3314(XXIX) is a crucial source for defining war, especially when it comes to State-to-State aggression. According to this resolution, aggression is defined as any act by which a state uses military force to violate the political independence, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of another state, or in any other way that is not compliant with the United Nations Charter. A State's sovereignty is said to be attacked by aggression when its political independence, territorial integrity, or other sovereign rights protected by the UN Charter are violated. With the help of this concept, the international community will have a legal and normative framework for evaluating and handling conflict situations between States (Doublav, 1981, p.264).

3.2.1.3.3. Dispute Resolution

Conflict resolution is a multifaceted method for settling conflicts and tensions between opposing parties in a calm and constructive way. This method may be implemented at a variety of levels, including interpersonal, communal, national, and worldwide. It often involves numerous phases and can employ a range of tactics and processes, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and diplomacy. States need to be presented alternative options since using force to settle international disputes is not an option. These are called "peaceful" since they don't entail the use of force. The following methods are recommended by international practice: judicial settlement, conciliation, inquiry, mediation, arbitration, and good offices. The UN Charter's Article 33 also permits use of regional agreements or organizations (UN, 2010).

Negotiation is a form of dispute resolution that includes only the people involved, with no involvement from a third party. The procedure is founded on the premise that the parties may reach an agreement without using formal channels. Negotiation can be distributive, in which parties strive to maximize their personal profits, or

integrative, in which the goal is to produce a win-win conclusion by probing the parties' underlying interests. This approach is extensively employed in diplomatic and economic situations when long-term connections must be maintained (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011).

3.2.1.3.4. Negotiation

Negotiation is a complicated dynamic that includes conflictual and cooperative processes with the goal of settling a conflict by avoiding, at least temporarily, force, violence, and the use of power, and which entails the parties' mutual acceptance (Launay, 1982). His side of the equation is that "negotiation is the *raison d'être* not only of the diplomatic agent as head of mission, but of diplomacy as a whole, and all other forms and aspects of a diplomat's official action are subordinate to it" (Merle, 1982, p. 5).

Guy Olivier Faure describes negotiation as "a process by which two or more parties interact with the aim of reaching an acceptable position regarding their differences" (Faure, 1998, p. 155). As Jeffrey Rubin notes, what counts most in negotiation "are the perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions with which each protagonist enters the arena rather than an objective measure of differences". Negotiation's usefulness as a foreign policy tool has long been explained by the anarchic structure of the international system. Negotiation is one of the only methods to encourage cohabitation between sovereigns in the absence of a legitimately superior authority with a monopoly on the permissible use of violence or a legal framework that imposes itself as a reference for all nations. Negotiation is generally the initial step in dispute resolution. It entails direct communication between opposing parties with the goal of establishing a mutually agreeable solution. Negotiations might concentrate on different parts of the disagreement, such as geographical claims, rights, economic interests, or political considerations (Rubin, 1991, pp. 97-110).

3.2.1.3.5. Good Offices

An international organization or a third party using good offices might intervene diplomatically to help two states resolve a disagreement or war. They seek to resolve disputes peacefully by encouraging communication, discussion, and mediation amongst the involved parties. Supporting the facilitation of negotiations: An international organization or third state, private correspondence Discussions between the disputing parties and the impartial mediator may take place in private at good offices. A third state or international organization may put up compromises or settlement formulae that take into account the interests and concerns of all parties involved in order to facilitate collaboration, based on the parties' conversations and exchanges. By promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes between States, good offices play a crucial role in international diplomacy's efforts to advance peace, security, and stability (Rousseau, 1976, p.253).

3.2.1.3.6. Mediation

Mediation is a type of negotiation that includes a third party. When the parties involved are at odds, a third party might come in handy. Their function varies depending on the situation, from tight neutrality to blatant suppression. Far from being unbiased, the mediator may function as a "communicator," "enunciator," or even "manipulator" .In accordance with the dictionary of international law terminology, mediation is "the action of one or more third States, of an international body, exceptionally of a private person, which, at the request or with the consent of the States concerned, seeks, by means of persuasion, first to bring States between which a dispute exists or has broken out closer together, to bring them back to undertake or resume negotiations by suggesting a basis of agreement or solutions capable of reconciling opposing interests, without seeking to impose any particular solution" (Zartman, 2002, pp. 80-97).

In contrast to good offices, the mediator takes an active role. He tracks the progress of discussions until the problem is settled. Mediators have a variety of strategies for countering the obstacles that are preventing agreement. In cases of intergroup conflict, they may convene meetings with adaptable, highly motivated

representatives from both disputing parties to address issues. Additionally, they may engage with the negotiators' constituencies to build support for the negotiation process or resolution (Wall and Lynn, 1993, pp.160-194).

3.2.1.3.7. Investigation and Conciliation

Investigation and conciliation are two dispute settlement methods used in international relations to resolve conflicts between states. Although they are similar in their objective of achieving a peaceful resolution of disputes, they differ in their approaches and mechanisms. An investigation is a neutral third-party inquiry into the facts underlying a state dispute or conflict. The investigation's goal is to acquire evidence, establish facts, and explain disputed problems. This inquiry may be conducted at the request of the conflict parties or on their own initiative by international actors such as regional groups or UN agencies. Once the investigation is completed, the findings can be used to resolve the issue by giving the parties involved with objective information about the events and circumstances underlying the disagreement. This can assist the parties communicate and negotiate more effectively, allowing them to better grasp each other's viewpoints and concerns. This is a technique in which the parties to a dispute designate persons, typically independent, to determine the facts. In theory, the investigators' function is confined to objectively recording the facts in a report. This technique has the benefit of depoliticizing disagreements. The probe might possibly be handled by an international tribunal or another international organization (Lunda, 1995).

Conciliation is an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism that promotes a collaborative approach to resolving disputes without resorting to binding judicial procedures. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, "conciliation is a non-adjudicatory and non-adversarial process in which a neutral conciliator helps parties reach a reasonable settlement of their dispute" (Halsbury's Laws of England, 2019). The process of conciliation is voluntary, and the conciliator is powerless to force a resolution on the parties. The joint decision of the parties to settle their differences peacefully through an ADR mechanism is the sanctity of conciliation, just like it is for any other ADR procedure. The conciliator acts independently and impartially to

help parties achieve an acceptable resolution to their disagreement. A conciliator facilitates constructive discussion, clarifies misconceptions, builds trust, and fosters a conducive environment for collaborative problem-solving (Browne, 1933, pp.460-464).

3.2.1.3.8. Arbitration

Arbitration is a more formal method in which one or more individuals, known as arbitrators, render a binding judgment based on the arguments of both parties. This strategy is frequently utilized in international commercial disputes because it allows the parties to avoid national court systems that may be viewed as biased or inept. Arbitration is thus an essential mechanism for resolving international conflicts (Born, 2012, p.181).

Arbitration is a peaceful conflict resolution procedure in which contending parties present their case to one or more unbiased individuals, known as arbitrators, for a final judgment. Arbitration is one of the oldest approaches to resolving disputes peacefully between nations; arbitration includes a broad spectrum of theoretical and practical methodologies. While its applications may vary, arbitration can be viewed as a cohesive institution, given that the core principles common to different arbitration frameworks often surpass the distinctions in their implementation. This consistency highlights arbitration's lasting significance and flexibility in addressing conflicts on an international scale (Smith, 2020, p. 153). Arbitration, in reality, attempts to meet a general demand on both a national and international scale. There are three primary types of arbitration, each with their distinct characteristics. Ad hoc arbitration is a type of arbitration in which the parties directly appoint the arbitrators and specify the procedural rules that will apply to their dispute. Ad hoc arbitration is frequently utilized for small-scale disputes or when the parties seek greater control over the process. Institutional arbitration: In institutional arbitration, the parties engage a recognized arbitration institution to manage the arbitration process; institutional arbitration frequently provides a guarantee of quality, effective supervision, and worldwide acceptance of arbitral rulings. Ad hoc-institutional arbitration: This type of arbitration has elements of both ad hoc and institutional arbitration. The parties may opt to employ an arbitration institution's rules and

administrative services while preserving some freedom in arbitrator nomination and processes conduct (Lunda, 1995).

3.3. Notion of Security

The security sector includes varied and multi-disciplined actors who originate and practice in a variety of fields. Because of the complex nature of security, both society and business lack a clear grasp of what security is. Furthermore, the existing definition of security is so wide that it is unworkable. Security is a wide and comprehensive notion that encompasses several characteristics critical to the well-being, stability, and safety of individuals, communities, and nations (Manunta and Manunta, 2006, pp. 629-657).

In terms of definition, "security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its objectives without disruption or harm, and without fear of such disturbances or injury." (Fischer and Green 2004, p. 21). According to Craighead (2003), a classic definition of security involves the provision of private services aimed at defending persons, data, and property, in the interest of public health and personal safety. Another Notion of security is the absence of threats, hazards, or dangers that could jeopardize the safety, integrity, or stability of individuals, groups, or nations. This encompasses the protection of fundamental elements of existence, such as social order, environmental sustainability, political sovereignty, economic stability, physical safety, and psychological well-being (Fischer and Green, 2004, p. 21).

The concept of security can be expanded to encompass national defense and security, including the use of force to maintain control over a state's population. It can also involve public policing by state employees. Additionally, security can be defined in terms of risk management, loss prevention, crime prevention, and security technology. Buzan (1984) broadened the definition to include political, economic, sociological, environmental, and military dimensions, redefining security in a larger international context. This broader view requires governments to move beyond

"excessively self-referential security policies" and consider the security interests of neighboring countries (Buzan, 1984, pp. 109-125)

3.3.1. Timeline about Security Issues in Africa

3.3.1.1. 1945-1960: Decolonisation and Political Instability

Africa experienced a significant decolonization period during the 1950s and 1960s, with numerous countries attaining independence from European colonial rule. This transition was marked by political unrest and violence, as newly independent governments struggled to establish stable governance while grappling with the enduring legacies of colonialism. The Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), a protracted conflict between the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) and French colonial authorities, was one of the most significant struggles of this period. The brutality of the war was evident in the large-scale atrocities committed by both sides and the high civilian death toll. The conflict highlighted the deep-seated divisions within colonial communities and underscored the intense struggle for national sovereignty (Horne, 1977, p. 45). Algeria's final independence in 1962 marked a pivotal moment in the broader decolonization movement. However, it also established a model for the complex and often violent processes of state-building that characterized post-colonial Africa (Evans, 2012).

The Congo Crisis, which began in 1960 following the Belgian Congo's independence, highlights the volatile character of the postcolonial transition. The crisis was sparked by the sudden and badly managed evacuation of Belgian colonial officials, which resulted in immediate internal unrest. The new Congolese administration, led by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, faced considerable obstacles from separatist movements in mineral-rich regions like as Katanga, as well as a power struggle among competing groups (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2013). The situation swiftly became a complicated confrontation involving a variety of internal and external parties, including the United Nations, which intervened to restore order and assist the new administration. The UN's role, however, was fraught with controversy and problems, underscoring the constraints of foreign intervention in the setting of deeply rooted local disputes (Cox, 2010, p. 55). The Congo Crisis

demonstrated not just the fragility of newly independent governments, but also the complexity of foreign intervention in post-colonial conflicts.

The political landscape of Africa was profoundly and permanently impacted by the early post-colonial battles of the 1950s and 1960s. Many African governments' subsequent wars and governance issues have their roots in the bloodshed and instability of this era. For example, the Algerian War of Independence left a legacy that shaped political movements and revolutionary tactics throughout the continent, and the Congo Crisis brought to light the possibility of state failure and the challenges of instituting efficient governance in recently independent countries (Mbembe, 2001, p. 45).

3.3.1.2. 1960-1975: Conflicts and Civil Wars

Significant internal wars erupted throughout Africa between 1960 and 1975, chief among them being the Nigerian civil war, popularly referred to as the Biafran War (1967–1970). The attempt at independence of the Biafra area, spearheaded by Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu in reaction to mounting ethnic tensions and separatist aspirations, set off this conflict. Ethnic and regional tensions were heightened by the conflict, which resulted in a serious humanitarian disaster with millions of fatalities and excruciating suffering among people. The battle brought to light the profound differences that exist within Nigerian society and the difficulties associated with achieving national unity in a nation whose ethnic identities are many and sometimes at conflicts with other identities (Achebe, 2012, p. 78).

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) have long been in conflict. During the post-colonial period, these factions received backing from various international powers, intensifying the struggle for control in Angola. The fierce battle for national dominance and substantial international interference characterized this conflict, which started after the nation gained independence in 1975. With Soviet assistance for the MPLA and American and South African support for UNITA and the FNLA, the war was made worse by the geopolitical objectives of the Cold War. The struggle

lasted until the 1975 peace treaty, underscoring the intricacy of African regional conflicts and the influence of outside forces on civil wars (Hanlon, 1991, p. 142).

Between 1960 and 1975, Ethiopia had significant internal conflicts, most notably the civil war and the Eritrean uprising. Political rivals and rebel organizations grew more hostile to Haile Selassie's imperial rule. One of the longest-lasting wars was the Eritrean revolt, which started in the 1960s and was fueled by separatist goals and ethnic tensions heightened by the centralizing policies of the Ethiopian government. The Haile Selassie regime was overthrown and the Marxist Derg dictatorship was established as a result of the civil war that broke out in the 1970s. This time period demonstrated the difficulties of governing a nation with a wide range of ethnic and regional identities (Marcus, 2002, p. 200).

3.3.1.3. 1975-1990: Prolonged Crises and Ethnic Tensions

Extended crises and ethnic tensions characterized the years 1975–1990, culminating tragically in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The genocide exposed the severe effects of ethnic divides that had been made worse by years of social unrest and discriminatory laws. When Hutu extremists planned a systematic genocide against Tutsis and moderate Hutus in April 1994, the violence broke out, killing over 800,000 people in only three months. The genocide's horrors brought to light not just the intensity of interethnic conflict in Rwanda but also the international community's shortcomings in effectively preventing or intervening in humanitarian crises. Unresolved ethnic conflicts have the tragic potential to erupt into mass bloodshed, as seen by the Rwandan genocide (Des Forges, 1999, p. 134).

The Sudanese civil war, which started in 1955 and grew more intense starting in 1983, is a prime illustration of Africa's ongoing instability. Ethnic and theological differences between the primarily Christian and animist south and the Muslim north fueled the conflict. Millions of people have died, millions more have been displaced, and there is a serious humanitarian catastrophe as a result of the two decades of conflict. Internal conflicts were heightened by the fight for autonomy and political demands, which also brought attention to how difficult it is to establish long-lasting peace in such a deeply divided environment. Although the conflict ultimately

resulted in Southern Sudan's secession in 2011, it left a legacy of brutality and enduring tensions (Johnson, 2003, p. 75).

The Angolan conflict, which began after the country's independence in 1975, is a significant example of a prolonged crisis. The civil war was marked by intense fighting between the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), with substantial international involvement. The Cold War intensified the conflict, with the Soviet Union and Cuba supporting the MPLA, while the United States and South Africa backed UNITA. There was a severe humanitarian catastrophe brought on by this battle, which caused immense suffering for the people of Angola. Angolan society has been deeply impacted by the battle even after the combat ended in 2002, albeit it was a turning point in the war (Funai, 2005, p. 180).

3.3.1.4. 1990-2000: Humanitarian Crises and International Intervention

The 1990s were characterized by significant humanitarian crises, with the Darfur conflict serving as a prime illustration of the modern difficulties associated with crisis management and international engagement. When ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing campaigns erupted in Darfur in 2003, Janjawid militias with the backing of the Sudanese government were responsible. Significant human rights breaches, a dire humanitarian situation, and widespread population displacement were the results of this catastrophe. Though they have been criticized for their inefficiency and tardiness in ending the violence, international interventions such as the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and humanitarian missions have been implemented to lessen suffering (Morrison, 2004).

The international involvement in Somalia during the 1990s served as an example of the intricate difficulties that peacekeeping operations face when dealing with civil conflict and state breakdown. Under UN auspices, the United States spearheaded Operation Restore Hope in 1992 with the goal of bringing humanitarian relief and peace to a nation riven by hunger and civil unrest. Fighting between regional factions and attacks on foreign soldiers, which culminated in the Mogadishu ambush in 1993, quickly hampered this task, nonetheless. The challenges faced by Somalia brought to

light the boundaries of foreign action in situations when local players are sharply divided and antagonistic toward external Powers (Rashid, 1998).

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 sparked a range of foreign responses many of which were criticized for being sluggish and ineffectual. Following the slaughter of about 800,000 people in a few of months, the world community came under fire for allegedly failing to act quickly enough to stop or prevent the crimes. Operations that followed, including the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), came under fire for not doing enough to stop the killing and safeguard people. These comments have sparked a discussion about the limitations of humanitarian involvement in situations of severe violence and the role that the international community should play in avoiding genocide (Power, 2002, p. 320).

3.3.1.5. 2000-2010: Terrorism and Regional Instability

Boko Haram emerged as a key factor in this dynamic in Nigeria when terrorism became a big worry in Africa throughout the 2000s. Boko Haram, which was founded in 2002, has escalated its attacks on security personnel and civilians, committing violent crimes such as mass kidnappings and suicide bombings. There is a major humanitarian crisis in northeastern Nigeria as a result of the group's opposition to both the Nigerian government and Western education. A modest international reaction has not been enough to stop the bloodshed, which has resulted in significant human displacements and infrastructure loss (Walker, 2012).

The extremist organization Al-Shabab conducted intense violent campaigns in Somalia, worsening the nation's already existing instability. Al-Shabab, a terrorist organization that was formed from the ashes of the Union of Islamic Courts group, increased the intensity of its attacks on civilians, soldiers of the African Union, and government officials. The group has imposed a harsh government and fostered a general atmosphere of terror across a sizable portion of southern Somalia. The ongoing humanitarian catastrophe has been made worse by frequent attacks and takeovers, which have also made it more difficult for outsiders to stabilize the nation and carry out reconstruction plans (Lewis, 2008).

Humanitarian and security issues became worse in the Sahel area over the past ten years due to an alarming growth in armed organizations and wars. In nations like Mali, Niger, and Chad, the state's authority has been eroded, which has given rise to a variety of militant organizations, including those connected to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. These organizations have taken control of territory, attacked security forces, and made living circumstances for the local populace exceedingly insecure. Armed war has left millions of people uprooted, increased food shortages, and restricted access for humanitarian aid, aggravating humanitarian problems (Eibner, 2014).

3.3.1.6. 2010-Present: Persistent Instability and Contemporary Challenges

The spread of weaponry and the emergence of armed organizations brought about by Libya's turmoil since 2010 have had a significant effect on regional security. After Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, the nation fell into anarchy and anarchy resulted, with different armed factions seizing control of different parts of the country. This disarray made it easier for weapons to proliferate unchecked throughout the Sahel and beyond, which exacerbated neighboring nations like Mali and Niger's violent conflicts. Regional tensions have increased and humanitarian situations have deteriorated as a result of the protracted armed conflicts in these nations, especially are made worse by the weapons in circulation (Hoffman, 2015, p.88).

In 2010, environmental disasters such as severe droughts in the Sahel region have intensified conflict and forced migration. Severe weather has resulted in food shortages and water problems, heightening tensions between local groups and fueling resource disputes. These shortages have resulted in enormous population displacements, with migrants seeking more stable living conditions in already congested locations or crossing borders in dangerous circumstances. This condition has exacerbated humanitarian crises in the region and hampered attempts to end current conflicts (Schrader, 2016, p.22).

Geopolitical instability and insufficient local capability provide barriers to international collaboration in tackling security issues in Africa. Logistical challenges

and competing interests amongst international powers frequently impede stabilization attempts, such UN missions and regional initiatives like the G5 Sahel. Furthermore, inadequate infrastructure and political unpredictability frequently restrict local capability to handle emergencies. These elements make security and development plans more difficult to implement successfully, necessitating a more flexible and coordinated response to today's crises (Aning and Dorina, 2020, p.50).

3.3.2. Theoretical Background of Securitization in Africa

International relations, political science, and security have all been used to analyze the securitization issue in general (McSweeney 1996; Baldwin 1993). The goal of the current effort is to apply international law and human rights to the conversation and give it a stronger African context.

Securitization is described as a speech-act process where a political community collectively constructs an understanding to view something as an existential threat to a valued entity, thereby justifying urgent and extraordinary measures to address the perceived threat (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p.5). The Copenhagen School's approach to securitization is particularly valuable for its political analysis of security agenda-setting. Barry Buzan's 1983 work, *People, States, and Fear*, expanded the security concept to include non-military sectors like economics and the environment. This school was among the first to merge this broad security perspective with Ole Waever's constructivist focus on the politics of security. Traditionally, Security Studies have centered on war, regarded by realists as the ultimate threat to survival. From this perspective, the primary goal of security is maintaining peace and preventing violence through military means, defining security as the threat, use, and control of military force (Walt, 1991, pp. 211-239).

The concept of human security contributes a new and significant perspective to the security, human rights, democracy, and development discourse. It stresses the importance of the individual as the referent and the sector as non-military, rather than the state. Individual security is the first line of defense for the state. Stated differently, national security is contingent upon human security. Thus, the secret to maintaining state sovereignty is public sovereignty. Buzan's broader definition of

security-related variables lends credence to the human security discourse (Buzan, 1991).

The primary objective of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in May 1963, was to institutionalize and legitimize statehood across Africa, particularly among the continent's newly independent governments. Pan-Africanism, as a result, came to be defined largely by the defense of African governments and political systems (Tieku, 2007, pp. 26-37). In the face of challenges such as forging a cohesive national identity, stabilizing fragile nation-states, and fostering rapid economic growth, the OAU and many African leaders often prioritized these political and developmental concerns over issues of human rights and democracy. For instance, M'Baye And Ndiaye (1982), the father of the African Charter, wrote: "Therefore, it appears that the African governments have clearly sacrificed rights and freedoms for the sake of development and political stability." There are justifications and explanations for this circumstance. Everyone's focus is only on the possibility of higher living standards when mobilizing the public to ensure economic and social progress. Thus, it became common to view inactivity as a transgression and the practice of some liberties as an assault on public order even in the absence of any abuse. The "securitized" atmosphere that resulted from this process created ideal conditions for Africa to be incorporated into Cold War politics and wage proxy wars on behalf of the east or the west, using securitization as a tool to further specific foreign policy goals that were ideologically driven. The securitization process has become more international at this point (M'Baye and Ndiaye, 1982, p. 599).

The events of September 11th led to a shift in global priorities, further undermining democracy by adopting a security-first approach. This shift in securitization altered international relations, especially with Africa, moving from a focus on development and humanitarian aid to one on risk, fear, and security (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 55). Following the 2001 attacks, the U.S., in its National Security Strategy, identified Africa's underdevelopment and instability as major risks contributing to terrorism. This redefined Africa's relationship with the U.S., framing it through security concerns rather than developmental aid (Donnelly, 2007, p. 115).

Strengthening and building state mechanisms to combat terrorism is the main goal of the new securitization from outside agenda. In order to "allocate aid based on

previous good performance criteria and on presumed efforts by recipient countries in the war on terror," the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) was created one year after the September 11 attacks. Traditional security concerns and state capacities are now the main emphasis, overriding other national demands (Van Wyk 2007; Aning, 2010, pp. 7-25).

The East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), the Maritime Security Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) are a few examples of regional counterterrorism operations in Africa that are funded and managed by the Defense Department, with some support from the State and CIA. African regional counterterrorism operations are provided with a justification that ties security risks on the continent to the USWOT. In order to help regional nations defeat Al-Qaida and related movements and secure coalition support to lessen the underlying conditions that terrorists attempt to exploit, for instance, the Chief of Command of CJTF-HOA described the organization's primary mission as engaging in "joint and combined training and operations." (Trafton, 2006, pp. 18-19) The securitization debate in Africa has been solidified by military operations, including peacekeeping missions, the establishment of AFRICOM (US Africa Command) in 2006, and the increasing deployment of Western military and security forces for various "development" projects, particularly in northern Kenya (Williams, 2008).

The "Section 1206 funding" initiative, launched in 2005, temporarily empowered the Pentagon to "train and equip foreign military forces" for counterterrorism and stability operations (Nina, 2011). This initiative followed the unsuccessful U.S. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993 and the subsequent criticism from Western capitals after the Rwandan genocide. In response to these failures, international funders quickly withdrew from direct peacekeeping involvement in Africa, shifting support efforts towards indirect assistance, such as training and equipping local forces. The governments in Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda have skilfully mediated this significant shift in donor ties with the continent by promoting the idea of "African solutions to African problems" (Adibe, 1997, p. 478).

3.3.3. Theoretical Background of Peace-Building in Africa

Peacebuilding is the process of achieving lasting peace by addressing the underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian issues that lead to violent conflict and preventing its recurrence according to former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *Agenda for Peace* (1992, p.57). Boutros-Ghali (1992) emphasizes that peacebuilding involves national or international actors supporting and strengthening systems to promote stability and prevent conflicts from reemerging. The main goal of peacebuilding is to reduce harmful behaviors in conflict situations and shift the mindsets of key actors involved (Call and Cousens, 2007).

□ Liberal Peace Building Theory

The concept of "Liberal" refers to the principles, laws, strategies, and values employed in the resolution of conflicts (Tziarras, 2012, pp.2-3). The liberal peacebuilding framework relies on external organizations, mechanisms, and processes to assist nations in recovering from conflict, natural disasters, and civil strife, the liberal peace building strategy refers to the utilization of external bodies, processes, and organizations (Jones, 2018, p. 87). The liberal peacebuilding approach, used by Western international peace mediators, focuses on three primary issues as the foundation for peacebuilding: democratization, economic transformation, liberalization, and pacification (Newman and Richmond, 2009, pp.11-13).

The liberal peacebuilding strategy, inspired by Paris (1997), focuses on using formal and external organizations, structures, and institutions to resolve violent conflicts. It includes several key elements: the prompt holding of democratic elections, the promotion of market liberalization, the increase of humanitarian aid, the reinforcement of the rule of law, and the support of litigation and retributive justice (Hoffmann, 1995, Reilly 2008, pp. 157–182).

This perspective supports the notion that war-torn nations can and should be rebuilt through interconnected transformational strategies, such as market democracy and political reforms. Liberal organizations like the United Nations, European Union, United States, World Bank/International Monetary Fund, and other international non-

governmental organizations, operate based on this premise to promote peace in Africa (Herring, 2008, pp. 47–64).

□ Traditional Peace Building Theory

Prior to the arrival of colonialism, the traditional African approaches to peacebuilding and conflict resolution were centered on moral behavior in terms of outlook on life. It also addressed concerns of mutual respect and human dignity. The idea behind this was that each person's humanity is linked to the humanity and dignity of other members of the community (Abiodun, 2000; Mabovula, 2011, pp.38-47). Specifically, the African traditional civilization has long established peaceful and conflict-resolution techniques as part of its traditional peace-building strategy. These include the customs, theories, dialogues, folktales, and local worldviews that are used in conflict situations as well as African rituals and belief systems (Bamidele, 2014, pp. 11–28).

The focal point of every peacebuilding process is indigenous or local actors, whose participation is essential to its success (Gawerc, 2006, pp. 435- 478). The African Union Report (2020) from states that the goal of peace-building is to improve people's and communities' ability to settle disputes amicably. The most crucial element in the accomplishment of any African peacebuilding project is local ownership of the peacebuilding process. Furthermore, in order to create a lasting peace, the traditional African peacebuilding approach entails determining the structural cause of a conflict and applying traditional African ethics and principles, such as truth-telling, chanting songs, mediation, cooperative problem-solving, rituals, pacification, and oath-taking. This approach to resolve conflicts in the war-torn countries in Africa helps to protect and promote human life and dignity (Issifu and Asante, 2016, pp. 9-21.)

As part of the peacebuilding process, Rwandans initiated mass trials using their traditional court system, known as gacaca courts. This system played a crucial role in bridging the gap between the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the local populace. Gacaca courts heavily relied on community involvement and active participation. The process began with identifying the relatives of the victims of atrocities committed during the civil war and genocide (Wasonga, 2009, pp. 27–38.).

The South Africans employed both the liberal peace building technique known as TRC/formal court system and the traditional peace building strategy known as Ubuntu as part of their peace building process. The TRC's structure was established under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, and amnesty petitions started to come in for the Commission in 1996 (Cangialosi, 2012). As a result, ubuntu places a high value on resolving disputes and fostering harmony in African communities. In South Africa's post-apartheid healing and reconciliation process, this served as a continual point of reference. "Forgiveness, healing, reconciliation, and restorative justice" are highly valued in African traditional conflict resolution and reconciliation rituals (Murithi, 2008, pp.16-30).

□ The hybrid peace-Building Theory

The hybrid peace theory underpins this research, widely utilized in contemporary peacekeeping and conflict studies. This theory is vital in highlighting the importance of culture, power, and identity in peacebuilding. It posits that social and political processes such as peacemaking, peacebuilding, and post-war reconstruction should focus on the interaction between pre-hybridized actors and structures. Consequently, hybrid peace builders work with local, national, and international actors, applying relevant norms and principles throughout the peacebuilding process (Yamashita, 2014, pp.1-4).

In Africa, state institutions play a major role in fostering peace. This is especially true when the main goal is to stop violence or a conflict relapse from happening. Building peace depends on the host state, its institutions, and its administration. According to King and Mathews (2012) national governments must back their international partners. As crucial players in promoting peace, the government and state institutions have significant responsibilities to play. When foreign partners leave the peacebuilding process, national governments have a crucial role as stakeholders in maintaining the process (United Nations General Assembly, 2016).

The United Nations Agenda for Peace, established in 1992, laid the groundwork for significant international involvement in peacebuilding in Africa and beyond. To fulfill this commitment, the international community has created various organizations and structures to support global peacebuilding efforts. Key entities include the Peace Building Commission (PBC), the Peace Building Fund (PBF), and

the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO). The PBC is the primary organization for large-scale peace initiatives in conflict-affected nations, supported by the PBSO, which manages the peacebuilding fund and promotes global peacebuilding objectives (United Nations, 2010).

The Peacebuilding Commission has three primary objectives: serving as a central platform for international actors to convene, mobilize resources, and propose integrated strategies and priorities for post-conflict peacebuilding, thereby enhancing inter-institutional coordination; focusing on reconstruction and institution-building efforts crucial for state functionality; and developing expertise and best practices to ensure continuous and consistent funding for peacebuilding initiatives.

The United Nations has deployed nine missions to Africa. Since 2004, the highest number for any region and the most since 1991. By 2005, many of these missions were in neighboring countries, including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan, as well as Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. There is a broad consensus in the peacebuilding community on the need for regional approaches, reflecting both practical considerations and the regional nature of conflicts across the continent (Heldt and Wallensteen, 2004).

UNAMSIL successfully completed several key elements of its mandate, including the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of over 72,000 former combatants. Additionally, it organized national and local elections, assisted in rebuilding the security forces, and facilitated the repatriation of nearly 300,000 refugees. Regarded as one of the UN's greatest achievements, UNAMSIL is praised in part for its amazing comeback from a near collapse in 2000 following the capture of 500 peacekeepers by Revolutionary United Front insurgents (Reno, 2001, pp. 149-161).

African leaders viewed the decision to rely on AU peacekeepers, police, and monitors as an opportunity to strengthen the organization's position as the continent's preeminent political and military authority. However, the developments in Darfur quickly demonstrated that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was grossly inadequate, necessitating a substantial "scale-up" of the operation to bring about meaningful improvements in both security and humanitarian conditions in the region (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005).

The United Nations is generally responsible for coordinating foreign donors, multilateral organizations, international financial institutions, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, the corporate sector, and other entities involved in peacebuilding. The individual tasked with implementing the global community's objectives is typically either a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) or a Resident Coordinator (United Nations, 2010). The European Union (EU) is a significant international player in the promotion of peace in Africa. The United Nations Trust Fund in Liberia received the largest contribution from the EU, accounting for 31% of the overall amount. The money was used for a number of UN programs in Liberia that involved demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration. In an effort to promote peace in Africa, the EU has also encouraged cooperative contacts with continental and regional organizations (Knight, 2008, pp. 24-52.).

4. CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa is marked by frequent interstate conflicts, significant involvement of external actors in the regional security agenda, intense polarization, and limited interaction capacity among countries. The region also suffers from infrastructural, communication, and transportation deficits, alongside vulnerabilities such as internal political instability, low security capacity, and deficiencies in social development (Buzan and Wíver, 2003). For many years, the Horn of Africa has been recognized as one of the most volatile regions, with prolonged interstate warfare and internal dissidence, hosting some of the longest-running civil conflicts in Africa (Cardoso, 2015).

The Horn of Africa faces severe socioeconomic challenges, with its states marked by instability and poor social indicators like low per capita income and a low Human Development Index (Mengisteab, 2011, p. 67). During the Cold War, its strategic location near the oil-rich Middle East and the Suez Canal attracted significant attention from superpowers since the 1970s. After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the region's strategic importance decreased significantly. Following a disastrous humanitarian operation in Somalia (1992-1994), the US strategically withdrew from the Horn of Africa (Schmidt, 2013).

The Horn of Africa experienced a period of *détente* from 1991 to 1994., followed the rise to power of new leaders such as Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea. This period saw heightened political engagement, numerous regional initiatives aimed at resolving conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti, and efforts towards economic integration among regional countries (Cliffe, 1999, pp. 89-111). This chapter will examine the Eritrean-Ethiopian and Somalia conflicts, as well as their causes and repercussions in the Horn of Africa.

4.1. Eritrea-Ethiopian Conflict

4.1.1. Distant Causes

Italy used Assab and Massawa as strategic outposts to expand into Ethiopia's interior. This expansion led to Italy's defeat at the Battle of Dogali in 1887. In 1889, Italy pressured Ethiopia into signing the Treaty of Wuchale, which granted Italy control over Eritrea and established a protectorate over Ethiopia. However, differences in the interpretation of the treaty led to conflict, culminating in the Battle of Adwa in 1896, where Ethiopia decisively defeated Italy. Despite this setback, Italy succeeded in establishing Eritrea as a colonial entity in 1890. The boundary between Ethiopia and its colony Eritrea was established by the Treaty of Wuchale and subsequent agreements signed in 1900, 1902, and 1908. These agreements defined the 1,000-kilometer border, which remains a point of contention between Ethiopia and Eritrea to this day (Zewde, 2002).

In 1941, the Italian East African Empire collapsed. From 1941 until 1952, Eritrea was placed under British mandate following Italy's defeat in World War II. During this period, the Italian business and industrial community assisted the British military government in establishing a number of small-scale enterprises in the region. The British envisioned Tigray as part of an independent state formed from the eastern section of Eritrea (Kendie, 2005, pp.17-18). Their plan aimed to give Ethiopia control over Assab while uniting the western portion of Eritrea with Sudan. As a result, the establishment of political parties played a significant role in shaping Eritrea's national consciousness. The United Nations was consulted, as the global superpowers could not reach a consensus on whether Eritrea should be an independent nation or integrated into Ethiopia. In 1952, it was decided that Eritrea and Ethiopia would form a federation after three committees were sent to assess the aspirations of the Eritrean people. During the federation, Eritrea began to make a significant contribution to Ethiopia's economy. Eritrea's industrial strength remained robust until the late 1970s, and by the mid-1970s, it was estimated that Eritrea housed over 35% of Ethiopia's industrial sector (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000).

In 1960s, "the border between the two entities took on the character of an administrative division rather than an internationally recognized boundary." Eritreans

were outraged by the Ethiopian government's actions, leading them to launch a violent, three-decade-long campaign against two successive Ethiopian administrations. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the first liberation movement following the abolition of the federation, was founded in Eritrea's Muslim-majority provinces. In the early 1970s, a splinter group from the ELF, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), emerged. Prior to the EPLF's rise to dominance, the two movements engaged in years of conflict. With backing from the Arab world and the Eritrean diaspora, the EPLF adopted a more inclusive program and continued its struggle for independence (Abraham, 2004).

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was established by students in 1975 to seek the liberation of Tigray. It later expanded its mission to liberate Ethiopia from the military regime that had governed since 1974. Members of the TPLF belong to the same ethnic group and share a common language and culture. The EPLF embraced the Soviet model of socialism, whereas the TPLF adhered to Maoist ideology. The EPLF was also threatened by the TPLF's independence movement, as stated in its 1976 platform, as The TPLF's Greater Tigray was intended to include Tigrinyan speakers in the highland of Eritrea. The EPLF avoided defeat only because of TPLF support for guerilla war strategy. The TPLF viewed ethnic and religious identity as paralyzing forces whose political expression was inherently antithetical to national-building. Ethiopia's strategy was perceived as a threat to Eritrea's goals, particularly because Eritrea's population includes seven distinct ethnic groups. According to two prominent academics, several of these ethnic groups, such as the Afar, Saho, Tigrinya, and Kunama, are found on both sides of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border (Abbay, 1998).

Ethiopia's ethnic federalism policy poses a direct threat to Eritrea's nation-building efforts, which is a significant concern for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000). The military government's dissolution in 1991 was made easier by the two groups' tight coordination. The Ethiopian government was put in place temporarily by the TPLF and other rebel forces. In Asmara, the EPLF simultaneously erected a provisional administration. On April 27, 1993, a referendum was held, and Eritrea was formally recognized as an independent state (Young, 1996, pp. 123-144).

4.1.2. Immediate Causes

Eritrea's gaining independence and the TPLF taking control of Ethiopia in 1991, the two countries established a close alliance encompassing economic, security, political, and social aspects. Following the 1993 vote, they signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on July 13, 1993, formalizing state-to-state cooperation. Consequently, a series of agreements and protocols were implemented to coordinate their economies and, presumably, ensure peace and security in the Horn of Africa (Taddesse, 1999). After 1991, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) marginalized other members of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) alliance. This marginalization led to the radicalization of the excluded parties, pressuring Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to adopt a more aggressive stance along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. On the other hand, ethnic identities in Eritrea lack a separate political representation because the country has a unitary state system. Religious and ethnic parties were forbidden under the Eritrean constitution border (Gilkes and Plaut, 1999).

Trade and investment became major points of contention between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Between 1993 and 1997, Ethiopia adopted a new trade strategy, and Eritrea made the nakfa its official currency in 1997, worsening tensions. Eritrea proposed using two currencies of equal value, but Ethiopia, favoring hard currency, rejected this. The 1992 Transit Trade Agreement designated Assab as Ethiopia's free port. On September 27, 1993, both nations signed the Asmara Pact, encompassing a combined military agreement, monetary and fiscal policy alignment, and the creation of a free trade area (Villicana and Venkataraman, 2006, p. 297).

The Eritrean government argued that Ethiopia's trade policy was driven by fears of Eritrea's substantial contribution to the Ethiopian economy. From Eritrea's perspective, Ethiopia's trade strategy aimed to impose restrictions on Eritrean goods to protect Tigray's emerging industries. "A rivalry between the two regimes for controlling the economic resources of Ethiopia" was another factor contributing to the economic dispute (Negash and Tronvoll, 2000).

Ethiopia deviated from the Asmara Pact's economic agreement and focused on developing its industrial base, with the majority of enterprises centered in Tigray between 1993 and 1996. These businesses, like those in Eritrea, were capable of meeting local demand and exporting surplus to other sections of the country. The government of Eritrea engaged in illicit trafficking, including the trafficking of foreign currency and the trafficking of coffee and oil seeds, as well as other Ethiopian products. Without really producing any cocoa beans, Eritrea effectively rose to prominence as an exporter of cocoa beans while also actively participating in the black market in Ethiopia, forging goods, and conducting illicit commercial dealings that ultimately hurt Ethiopia's economy (Taddesse, 1999).

Eritrea benefited from a positive trade balance as a result. For instance, Eritrea sent goods to Ethiopia in 1996 and made around 85 million birrs. Furthermore, Eritrea's food consumption was heavily reliant on Ethiopia. Eritrea needed about one million tons of grain yearly, but it only produced 200–250 tonnes. As a result, a large portion of Eritrea's food imports came from Ethiopia. However, the price of teff and other food products increased as a result of importing food goods from Ethiopia in hard money. In light of free trade, Eritrea cautioned the Ethiopian government to reconsider its nearly protectionist stance. The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea deteriorated due to Ethiopia's unwillingness to cooperate. Prior to the conflict in May 1998, both countries adopted protectionist measures to safeguard their interests, which posed a threat to Eritrea's state-building efforts. Eritrea's vulnerability to Ethiopia's economic policies led President Afewerki to resort to force. Franklin Steves argues that Eritrean industrialists urged Afewerki to protect their interests, suggesting that the Eritrean air strikes on Tigray's industry in June 1998 were not coincidental but aligned with the escalation of the war. Lara Santoro notes that the Eritreans had a clear objective to eliminate competitors (Steves, 2003).

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Issayas Afeworki played significant roles in the conflict's inception. Both were successful guerrilla leaders in their respective liberation movements, the TPLF and EPLF, but failed to transition into effective statesmen once in power (Abbink, 1998, pp. 31-32). Both governments exhibited totalitarian tendencies, assuming absolute authority. Issayas believed that the conflict would bolster his political power in Eritrea and lead to

regime change in Addis Ababa, compelling Ethiopia to abandon its industrialization plans and revert to the free trade agreement. Following its independence in 1991, the Eritrean government aspired to become the "new Singapore" by 2015, with an economy centered on services and exports (Lata, 2014).

4.1.3. Impacts of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict

On May 6, 1998, an unprovoked military incursion by Eritrea into Ethiopian-controlled territory escalated into a full-scale conflict between the two nations. In response, the Ethiopian Parliament swiftly passed a resolution demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean forces from its territory. Eritrea's refusal to comply with this demand led to the rapid militarization of both states, with each side mobilizing substantial troop numbers. Ethiopia amassed an estimated 350,000 to 400,000 soldiers, while Eritrea mobilized approximately 200,000 to 250,000 troops. Both nations also invested heavily in military procurement, collectively spending hundreds of millions of euros on arms acquired from suppliers such as Russia, Ukraine, Italy, China, and Bulgaria. Between 1998 and 2000, their annual expenditure on arms acquisitions averaged approximately \$300 million. The conflict unfolded along the 1,000-kilometer shared border, with heavy fighting concentrated at key flashpoints, including Badme, Zalambesa, and Bure. Despite attempts to mediate the conflict, including a U.S.-brokered cessation of hostilities, both sides continued to engage in military offensives, including airstrikes, throughout the period (Gilkes and Plaut, 2000).

4.1.3.1. Humanitarian Impacts

The conflict has significantly impacted the economy, society, and politics of both countries. The fighting led to tens of thousands of fatalities on both sides, with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 deaths. Additionally, the conflict displaced approximately 650,000 individuals internally. The humanitarian crisis escalated as both nations arbitrarily deported large numbers of their citizens. Ethiopia, since 1998, was accused of deporting about 67,000 Eritreans without trial or appeal, citing

national security concerns. Before the conflict, the Eritrean government had expelled around 125,000 Ethiopians (Seybolt, 2001). As reported by Tāwoldä G/Tinsae, the battle resulted in huge internal displacement in both nations, as citizens left the war zone. The war displaced almost 316,000 individuals in all, and many of them lost their livelihoods as a result (Abraham, 2001, p.530). The internal displacement mainly affected residents of Humära in the west, Badmä and the Yirga triangle around Šheraro, between the Mārāb and Tākāzze rivers; Tsorāna and Zalem-bässa; Alitiena and Irob, and the northern Dänkāli depression. The conflict left lasting memories in the minds of Mäqällä's students. Many people and victims' relatives still vividly recall the brutal killing of innocent children in Aydär. The Eritrean leadership claimed that the bombing was aimed at a military target. However, the use of cluster bombs resulted in the tragic deaths of 58 students and civilians at Aydär Elementary School, injuring 185 others (Tronvoll, 2003, p. 186).

There are conflicting accounts on the treatment of Eritreans in Ethiopia. Between 120,000 and over 500,000 people of Eritrean descent were thought to be residing in Ethiopia in 1998. Eritreans were deported from Ethiopia for two reasons: one, they posed a security concern; second, they obtained Eritrean citizenship by participating in the referendum, thereby renouncing their Ethiopian citizenship. A Human Rights Watch report supported this investigation as well. During deportation, Ethiopian detainees faced torture, discrimination, and other humiliating treatment. They were imprisoned for varying durations days, weeks, or months before being transported to the Eritrean border or forced to transit through Djibouti. Eritrea deported an estimated 70,000 Ethiopians during the war. The consequences of these deportations are profound. Mixed families continue to endure prolonged separation, as communication between the two nations was severed throughout the conflict (Amnesty, 1999).

4.1.3.2. Economic Impacts

The interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea caused a severe economic downturn. Trade, tourism, and investment plummeted due to heightened perceptions of danger. The conflict had devastating effects, as both countries, among the world's

poorest, spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the war (The Independent, 13 May 2000). These funds, which could have supported essential development projects, were instead diverted to military expenditures and arms procurement (Shinn, 2004).

The subsequent drought and ensuing food insecurity further damaged the economy of both nations. Due to the assistance conditions imposed by donors and development organizations, who believed that the two governments were engaged in an unjust conflict, starvation increased even more. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were excluded from international lending organizations' loans and the right to debt cancellations for more than two years (Ibid). Unlike Ethiopia's appeal to the world community, Isaias's demagoguery and disdain for his role as the leader of the proud and self-sufficient Eritreans also prevented the starving people from receiving relief from outside. The combined effect of all these variables was a decrease in both nations' GDP and investment rates, which raised inflation rates, exchange rate depreciation, declining foreign exchange reserves, and rising defense spending (Sleet, 2020).

"Asmara experienced a severe labor shortage in factories and development projects, while foreign investment in Eritrea virtually ceased." (Mesfin, 2011, p.45). Meanwhile, Ethiopia's economy suffered as it shifted its reliance from the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa to the port of Djibouti. The impasse continues to have a significant impact on both developing nations. In order to maintain a sizable force of between 150,000 and 200,000 soldiers near the border, both countries are depleting their limited resources. The conflict led to the destruction of homes, highways, and bridges. The loss of infrastructure and essential services severely disrupted the daily lives of the population. Water contamination and a widespread lack of clean drinking water were also direct consequences of the destruction in conflict zones (Lorton, 2000).

4.1.3.3. Political Impacts

The conflict incited disputes and factionalism within the major political parties in Ethiopia and Eritrea, specifically the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). This turmoil also caused rifts within the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), leading President Isaias

Afwerki to detain fifteen prominent figures and key military personnel. Growing opposition to Isaias has been fueled by criticism of the government's staunch anti-Sudanese policies, corruption, lack of democratic pluralism, and economic mismanagement. Additionally, there have been occasional rumblings of unrest within the military. Notably, two activists, General Sébhat Afram and Major General Tākélay Häbtä Séllassie, exposed their fellow associates and had them imprisoned in secret detention (Lyons, 2006).

Ethiopia is in a significantly stronger political position than Eritrea, particularly in light of the 2005 elections' handling, which saw the greatest voter participation in the nation's political history. However, the violence that followed the 2005 election and the ensuing consolidation of power rendered the political landscape even more dire. The democratization process was both directly and indirectly impacted by laws passed after 2005, such as those pertaining to the press, civil society, terrorism, and elections. The impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia further provided the TPLF with a pretext to demonize opposition candidates by claiming that they were working with the EPLF (Barnes, 2006).

4.1.3.4. Regional Impacts

The Ethiopia-Eritrea war has significantly threatened regional security. The shifting of Ethio-Eritrean border tensions into Somalia signaled a potentially perilous extension of the 1998 conflict, further destabilizing regional relations. Following Operation Sunset, Eritrea initiated a new front in Somalia, advancing aggressively into the country's weaker northern regions. Ethiopia was thus forced to fight on two fronts: the north and the south. Moreover, opposition forces have received support and shelter from Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea believe that the other's government is on the brink of collapse, leading them to support domestic rebel movements. The Eritrean government has provided significant assistance to groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and others. By siding with the PFDJ during the 1998–2000 conflict, the OLF was seen as betraying the people of Ethiopia by committing acts of treason. Under the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law, the OLF is

classified as a terrorist organization and has been implicated in numerous attacks, including bombings in the capital and surrounding areas (Gilkes, 1999).

The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict also destabilized Djibouti. In 2008, Eritrean forces took control of Djibouti's northern regions to exert pressure on the US and France, who have military bases there, and to compel Ethiopia to comply with the border commission's ruling. Eritrea aimed to pressure Ethiopia, whose imports and exports heavily rely on Djibouti's port. Meanwhile, Sudan, previously isolated, managed to establish relations with both Ethiopia and Eritrea due to the conflict and the resulting stalemate, which unexpectedly turned out to be advantageous. Sudan's relationship with Ethiopia worsened following the unsuccessful 1995 attempt in Addis Ababa to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. The incident was allegedly supported by the Islamist-dominated administration in Sudan at the time. Sudan and Eritrea did not have cordial ties since Sudan was frequently accused by Eritrea of aiding the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (Kibreab, 2009).

4.2. Somalia Conflict

4.2.1. Causes of the Somali Conflict

4.2.1.1. Internal Causes of Conflict

Clan elders' function as a mediator between clans during conflicts by using customary laws or "Xeers" had been severely weakened, if not completely rendered ineffective, by the pre-colonial states' judicial systems, and when those states fell, clan elders struggled to resolve the issue at hand (Ethnopolitics, 2003, pp. 25-27). In Somali society, clan-families are traditionally led by chiefs who provide leadership and direction. However, these leaders often fall short in their duties, failing to mobilize members effectively and instill a sense of loyalty within the clan. Thus, clan solidarity is continually threatened. The clan's complex structure might lead to division among its members. Clan members who lack education are more likely to carry firearms and follow leaders' orders. Research shows that single-ethnic societies, like Somalia, are more susceptible to conflicts and wars compared to multi-ethnic ones. Some clan warlords claim their actions are morally justified, while religious

leaders often frame them as holy wars. Continuous manipulation by these leaders has perpetually opened the door to increased violence among Somalis (Lewis and Mayall, 1994, pp.94-124).

Conflicts over power and influence in Somalia intensified when politicians and clan chiefs began to exploit clan affiliations as leverage. This shift in dynamics between various clans led to the formation of new political and economic alliances based on strategic interests, rather than traditional family ties. The protracted struggle was driven by the aspirations of powerful clans to control strategically important regions at the expense of weaker clans. The Somali conflict was particularly notable in that no single tribe or group was able to establish statehood or exert dominance over others, thus preventing complete chaos and lawlessness. Clan rivalries necessitated the creation of militias to protect their tribes. However, because many of the new recruits were from more remote clans, they were less likely to adhere to conventional norms and conventions, which in turn facilitated the commission of atrocities. According to Lewis (1994), the situation in Somalia is as follows:

In 1991, the prevailing trend was for major Somali clans to form their own militia movements, following the examples set by the SSDF, SNM, USC, and SPM. The availability of modern weaponry enabled clans to become effectively self-governing entities within their areas of influence. This often led to violent conflicts, resulting in significant civilian casualties. By 1992, the political landscape of the Somali hinterland resembled the descriptions provided by European explorers in the 19th century, but with spears replaced by bazookas and Kalashnikovs. Outsiders, including foreigners and members of other clans, could only access or pass through these areas with the residents' permission, typically involving the payment of fees or protection money (Vinci, 2008, pp. 69-76).

Anti-colonial movements used the Islamic faith to achieve their goals, strengthening its status as part of society and national identity. During the 1898–1920 battle between British and Somali Dervishes, religion was used to motivate clan soldiers against foreign invasions. From 1943 to 1956, the SYL worked closely with religious leaders to gain popular support for their cause through preaching. Throughout Somalia, many religious groups formed with the goal of using religion to gain power. The only differences were in methodology and network. Diverse religious

philosophies prompted some Al-Itahad Al-Islami and Al-Shabaab encourage international Jihadists to fight with them. International terrorists and criminals now use Somalia as a safe haven to avoid punishment. In 2008, an armed confrontation erupted between hardline Al-Shabaab militants and Ehlu Sunna. Ehlu Sunna was mostly eradicated from the country's south and limited to municipalities in the center. However, they proved to be a powerful army, successfully repelling Alshabaab. The battle between opposing religious organizations has exacerbated the country's divisions (Hansen, 2014).

“The downfall of the Somali military regime, a pronounced divide emerged between reformist and conservative religious factions. The reformist groups, receiving financial backing from Arab states, quickly mobilized and equipped radical elements in a bid for control over Somalia's political and economic landscape. In contrast, conservative religious organizations, largely supported by local communities, aimed to preserve their traditional power structures. Among the significant groups that emerged during this period was a moderate coalition that later adopted the name Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama. This group entered into direct armed conflict with Al-Shabaab, another prominent Islamist faction, as both sought to dominate the process of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia” (Hansen, 2013, p. 45).

The clan system has become a source of division and strife even though it still offers vital social services like justice, social security, and physical protection (Lewis,1994). This is because different political factions use the clan system for their own gain. Furthermore, it is among the main reasons why the war has persisted. It is still used by rival factions to suppress the rise of a powerful state headed by a different clan or to maintain their control over politics and the state (Osman, 2008, pp. 93-124).

The military dictatorship that seized power in a bloodless coup in October 1969, following the assassination of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, Somalia's democratically elected president is held responsible for many of the country's current problems (Jamal, 2013, pp. 8-9). The national constitution was immediately replaced with Scientific Socialism, a political strategy aimed at aligning the country with the Soviet-led bloc of that era. Subsequently, the government took control of the country's economic resources, land management, and distribution through a

nationalization program. Public dissatisfaction arose due to the uneven allocation of nationalized assets, favoring the president's close relatives and supporters. People's fundamental rights as citizens of the country have been deprived due to a high degree of socioeconomic inequality, nepotism, clan favoritism, and badly thought-out economic policies. A number of desperate clans took up guns to oppose their administration until it collapsed in January 1991, demonstrating the unparalleled degree of public suspicion of their own government (Jamal, 2013).

The statelessness of the country has led to a growing dependence on clans for protection and resources. This issue has been further exacerbated by the scarcity of resources, resulting in conflict between sub-clans within each major clan since 1991. The infighting among rival groups has prevented farmers from cultivating their land on time, leading to widespread hunger and starvation. Thousands have died, while many others have been forced to seek refuge in neighboring states or become internally displaced persons (IDPs) within their own country. Additionally, the widespread cutting of trees for charcoal production and other purposes has contributed to severe desertification, while extraordinary population growth has further strained the country's resources (David, 1996, pp. 125-142).

Siad Barre's regime was succeeded by a fierce competition for resources and a power struggle across Somalia. Clans vied for control over strategic towns and dominance in the region. Clan identity gradually supplanted formal governmental institutions, becoming the primary source of security and protection. Access to resources became increasingly dependent on the power and influence of one's clan (Interview with Adar, Nairobi, 2015). Another respondent identified unemployment as a significant driver of instability and insecurity in Somalia. "I believe that unemployment contributes substantially to Somalia's conflicts. When young people are unable to find employment, they often become desperate. Many resort to piracy, while others join groups like Al-Shabaab or are recruited by warlords to fight on their behalf. Some young individuals even set up roadblocks to extort money from passing vehicles. Security incidents would likely have decreased if there were more job opportunities" (Magan, 2016, p.47).

4.2.1.2. External Causes of Conflict

The divisive legacy of colonial rule is a fundamental source of the conflict in Somalia. The country was divided into five regions, each governed by a different colonial power. For example, the British established protectorates over Somaliland and the Northern Frontier District (NFD). Ethiopia was given the Ogaden region, Italy controlled southern Somaliland, and France annexed the Somali coast, which is now known as Djibouti. It is widely accepted that this partitioning sowed deep mistrust and hostility among clans. Even more problematic was the favoritism shown by colonial powers toward certain clans at the expense of others. This preferential treatment, based not on merit but on compliance with colonial objectives, created lasting divisions. The repressive colonial culture was perpetuated by postcolonial states, which continued to favor certain clan-families over others. This favoritism was not based on any inherent superiority but rather on the clans' adaptation to and cooperation with colonial rules and agendas (Kioimbugua,2013).

Colonial forces used clan-characteristics to separate and govern the Somali people, as seen in other African countries. In each colony, clan-groups were implicitly formed and taught to harbor distrust and animosity toward one another. While some clans were friendly, others were viewed as adversaries. The ally clans were well-prepared and armed to defeat their rival clans. Almost the same approach was used in Somalia to quell anti-colonial insurgencies. The colonial powers' tactical prevented the colonists from facing a united Somali front that would have opposed them as a common adversary in their own country and instead kept them mired in a bloody internal strife. Moreover, the post- independence nations of Somalia received a similar inheritance. Clannism was encouraged and employed as a means of gaining or retaining power by the ruling class (Ismail, 2010). As a result, Ogaden began opposing Isaaq pastoralist traffic because they perceived the latter's unrelenting movement as a danger to their own existence. The Isaaq clan benefited from the colonial rulers' separation of the Somali country at the expense of the Ogadens. In an effort to isolate Ogaden pastoralists in eastern Ethiopia, the Isaaq pastoralists were granted unrestricted access to Haud when Somaliland was declared a protectorate under British authority in 1897. Additionally, the British provided significant armament to the Isaaq clan to encourage more raids on the Ogadens after their

prolonged conflict with the Dervishes, a Somali resistance group led by Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, also known as the Mad Mullah, in Somaliland. This action further heightened the rivalry and distrust between the two clans (Zewde, 2008).

Somalia's instability largely stems from the Cold War tensions between the East and West. Its strategic position in the Horn of Africa, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, and accessibility to Asia and the Far East attracted significant attention from both superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Initially, Moscow gained Mogadishu's goodwill by opposing America's assistance for Ethiopia. After new military administrations took control, Russia's shift to Addis Abeba prompted Washington to build ties with Somalia. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States ceased all aid to Somalia, which led Western allies and multilateral institutions to do the same. In Ethiopia, clan-based factions engaged in conflict with state troops, placing significant pressure on the government's ability to deliver military, social, and other essential services. After the demise of the autocratic administration in January 1991, the country experienced civil conflict and starvation (Healy, 2010).

"Somalia became a battlefield of superpower rivalry for its strategic position. This means that the conflict between Somalia and its neighboring countries in the region, such as Ethiopia were meddled in constantly by the superpowers to serve their strategic interest (Mohamoud, 2006, p.106). Somalia's strategic position on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, had attracted the attention of both superpowers, the US and USSR, especially during the cold war to gain and maintain access to Middle Eastern oil in the late 1960s and early 1970. The Soviet Union strongly supported Somalia's military and gave considerable financial aid. In 1977 after the friendship agreement was reached between the USSR and Ethiopia, Somali regime was disappointed and in turn, shifted its alliance by seeking support of the West, particularly the US. Thus, the successive military support from superpowers continuously contributed the regime to be in power and the country to be a full of arsenal (Mulugeta, 2009, p.10). As a result, increasing internal opposition led the collapse of the state in 1990."

4.2.1.3. Role of Regional States

Foreign powers guided by their strategic interests, both support and oppose various political factions in Somalia. Ethiopia and Kenya, as the primary neighboring countries, have been deeply involved in the Somali conflict. Ethiopia's intervention has been a key and ongoing factor in the perpetuation of the war (Baris, 2006, p.52).

Kenya profited on Somalia's chaos by turning it into a hub for Somali business people and entrepreneurs. Kenya capitalized on this situation to become a significant political and economic power in the region. Recently, Kenya's approach to Somalia has shifted from a passive stance to an active involvement in Somali politics. Al-Shabaab threats to Kenya's national security are said to be the reason for Kenya's backing of Juba land's creation and subsequent military action. Kenya's military invasion without the consent of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was perceived as a threat to Somalia's territorial integrity and the government's efforts to promote peace and stability. The UN Security Council authorized Kenya to deploy troops to Somalia to combat Al-Shabaab and assist the FGS in establishing law and order. However, Kenya's unit in Juba land did not receive direct instructions from AMISOM's senior leadership in Mogadishu. Additionally, Kenya has deployed its navy into Somali waters to combat piracy (Eriksson, 2013, pp. 31-37).

The conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia dates back to the 19th century when Ethiopian imperial armies, led by Menelik II, conquered the Ogaden region in the mid-1890s. Several colonial powers supported Ethiopia's expansion as part of the scramble for Africa. After their victory over Italy in East Africa in 1948, the British returned Somali pastoralists to Ethiopia. Conflicts over this territory led to wars in 1964 and 1977 between the neighboring states. Ethiopia is believed to have significantly influenced the Somali conflict by supplying weapons and ammunition to allied factions within Somalia. Ethiopia has historically been against any attempt to install a strong, centralized administration in Somalia out of concern for potential future hostilities with its neighbor. Instead, it gives additional power to the regional states (Eriksson, 2013, pp. 31-37).

“Regional powers have consistently hindered any efforts by the Somali people to establish peace and security within their own country. Each state has its own strategic interests to pursue. For example, Somalia hosts peacekeepers from Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi. However, it is clear from their actions that there is little to no cooperation among these forces. This lack of coordination suggests that each country is pursuing its own agenda, which only serves to further complicate the situation” (Eriksson, 2013, pp. 31-37).

Somalia has become a new theater of conflict between the two sides due to Ethiopia's insistence on a federal administration composed of decentralized states inside the country and the Arab states' resistance to a centralized one. Everyone aims to demonstrate whose power is evident in the current political upheaval in Somalia. In 1964 and 1977, Ethiopia perceives a strong, unified state supported by Arab powers, especially Egypt, as a threat to its national security. Arab nations believe that the only way to hold Ethiopia in check is to establish a strong state in Somalia. To achieve the desired results, both parties have been providing financial and military support to their ally in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2013, pp. 8-10).

4.2.2. The Consequences of the Conflict in Somalia

Somalia's crisis has negatively affected various aspects of the nation, including its economy, politics, and society. This section explores the political, economic, and social consequences of the Somali crisis.

4.2.2.1. The Political Consequences

Somalia's social structure is deeply fractured. Despite decades of conflict, there remains no legitimate authority with full control over the entire country. Efforts toward more inclusive political processes may be hindered by concerns that traditional, informal power structures continue to dominate key political activities, such as elections. The landscape is marked by a mixture of formal and informal power dynamics, economic activities, and municipal governance, creating significant challenges for both domestic and international actors engaged in Somali politics. Additionally, the infighting that has crippled government institutions prevents them from delivering public goods to the Somali population. Indeed, the Federal

Government of Somalia has limited control over Mogadishu, the nation's largest city, and maintains only a weak hold on southern Somalia. Informally known as 'black cats,' unofficial gatekeepers take advantage of the state's incompetence and lawlessness. Both official and informal corruption are rampant, and the government's security forces, in terms of military capacity, operate more as private paramilitaries under the control of militia commanders than as a national military (Menkhaus, 2013).

The collapse of governmental institutions has led to the privatization of all public resources. In essence, rampant corruption, the absence of a formal government wielding control over physical force, and disillusioned, unemployed youth have created an environment where militia leaders, politicians, warlords, and criminals thrive. These groups show little interest in fostering political and economic processes that could pave the way to peace and stability. In this environment of political unrest and instability, clannishness has grown to be a significant irregular structure of government. In the absence of a strong central government, clan leaders have been instrumental in fostering peace and resolving conflicts throughout Somalia. Besides serving as a source of justice in rural areas, clan structures have been vital in selecting the current federal parliament, the South West regional state parliament, and the upper house of Somaliland. However, there are also formal systems of government that have the legislative, executive, and judicial branches similar to those of a contemporary nation-state. Currently, there are several regional state administrations in Somalia (Webersik et al. 2018. p.22). Following the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed Somaliland's independence, severing ties with the southern regions. Henceforth, this region was referred to as the Republic of Somaliland, marking it as one of the key entities to emerge from the disintegration of the Somali central government. Internationally, it is regarded as an independent area of Somalia and announced its independence from the south in 1991. In Somaliland, clan and state building were rendered incompatible by incorporating the former into the state government structure. It was the clan chiefs, whose relentless efforts and ideas had made it possible for the development of a reasonably contemporary state that reflects on its communal requirements without being dictated by any external partners as to what should be done, thereby earning them the label "backbone of state" In

Somaliland, candidates for the council of elders must be vetted and approved by the clan they represent. Among its many functions, this organization mediates disputes between parties, including as the government and its citizens, and negotiates peace agreements between state clans and government officials (Guevara, 2012).

The collapse of the Soderre/Ethiopia peace conference in Bossaso in 1997 reignited Puntland's ambitions to establish its own state, which it believes could serve as a stepping stone towards a federal system for Somalia. The Puntland constitution was subsequently accepted, and the region was officially named Puntland. Initially, the proposed state was divided into three regions: Bari, Nugal, and North Mudug. Puntland's council of elders, or 'isimo,' appoints members to the parliament, although they do not function as legislators in the same manner as their counterparts in Somaliland. Puntland was envisioned as a precursor to federalism in Somalia, operating under a centralist system (Johnson, 2008). However, with Puntland, Jubaland, Southwest, and Galmudug establishing themselves as powerful federal member states, the prospect of a centralized, unitary system of governance seems increasingly improbable. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) remains weakened, embroiled in clan politics, and perceived as biased, further complicating any attempt at centralization. Additionally, Somaliland's status is a critical issue that must be handled delicately and diplomatically, as its disenfranchisement is a significant challenge to Somalia's federal transition. The federal system envisioned requires states to collaborate and delegate authority to a central body responsible for managing military, finance, foreign affairs, and other national matters of common interest (Bryden, 2013, pp. 1-25)

In reality, the full impact of the occupation in Mogadishu did not become evident until several months after the ICU government fell. Following the Ethiopian Army's invasion of the Somali capital and the US air force's bombing of communities along the Somalia-Kenya border, most of the courts' leaders fled to Yemen and then Asmara by September 2007. The Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) emerged as the political wing of the anti-terrorism front. In the latter half of 2008, Al-Shabaab's political and ideological stance became increasingly radical, especially after the US designated the organization on its "terror blacklist" in March 2008. The US and TFG's unwillingness to confront the rebellion, which was repeatedly

portrayed as the work of a “smaller branch of Al-Qaeda,” contributed to the emergence of a regime of conditionality (Menkhaus, 2004).

Piracy in Somalia has evolved through several stages, largely influenced by the prevailing circumstances. One of the primary consequences of the turmoil in Somalia has been the rise of piracy. The country has lacked a functioning government for over twenty years, which has exacerbated the problem. Some argue that Somali fishermen initially resorted to piracy as a response to the illegal fishing practices of foreigners in their waters. The primary driver of Somali piracy, according to these claims, is the threat posed by illicit fishing to both commercial and subsistence fishermen along the coastline. Piracy has had significant ramifications not only for Somalia but also for foreign nations. Since the early 1990s, persistent piracy off the coast of Somalia has significantly impacted global trade and security, leading to substantial international intervention (Weldemichael and Hassan, 2012).

4.2.2.2. Socio-Economic Consequences

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, mainly due to ongoing armed conflict. Decades of violence have destroyed much of the nation's infrastructure and diminished public trust in government institutions. As a result, around half of the Somali population lives below the international poverty line. The most vulnerable groups in Somalia include youth, women, and children. With two-thirds of the population unemployed, literacy rates are particularly low, especially among young women (UNICEF, 2017). In addition to the persistent hostilities hindering national development, Somalia's population has been further weakened by recurrent floods and droughts. With the absence of an effective government to act as a stabilizing force, the Somali people are left to cope with emergencies such as illness, droughts, and floods on their own. Currently, around one million Somalis are internally displaced, while over a million have fled the country (UNHCR, 2011).

The Somali community found it extremely difficult to deal with 2011 being the driest year in decades. As severe food insecurity emerged in some areas of South Somalia throughout the summer, the drought turned into a significant food catastrophe. The

United Nations declared famine in Lower Shabelle and Bakool on July 20th (UN News Centre, 2012).

The violence in Somalia has led to extensive migration and displacement, resulting in the country having the fourth largest refugee population in the world. Before the military government was overthrown, a number of Somalis had already left the country. However, the majority of exiles fled as refugees once the civil war began. This massive movement started in the northern regions (now Somaliland) in late 1988 and spread to the southern provinces in 1991 as the conflict between the military administration and rebels intensified into a full-scale civil war. There were 478.3 thousand Somali immigrants worldwide in the 1990s, compared to 20.7 thousand in 2005 and 52.1 thousand in 2019. In 1990, 6.6% of global migrants were Somalis; this figure dropped to 0.2% in 2005 and then rose to 0.3% in 2019. Most Somalis arriving in Kenya and Ethiopia headed to refugee camps, which played a crucial role in aiding migrants affected by drought and food insecurity. Some migrants, however, used these countries as transit points en route to the Arabian Peninsula or southern Africa. The UNHCR, in partnership with the global humanitarian organization CARE, oversees the camp. In the first eleven months of 2011, more than 160,000 new refugees arrived in Dadaab, primarily from the drought-stricken southern and central regions of Somalia (Dar and Khan, 2011). During the drought and famine, these camps faced significant humanitarian challenges, including overcrowding, high levels of malnutrition, and the prevalence of diseases. Overcrowding in refugee camps has severe consequences, including increased demand on resources, increased illness risks, and increased insecurity for vulnerable populations. Tensions arose between locals and refugees due to unequal access to basic needs, as well as camp strain on resources, during a period of widespread food poverty. The International Monetary Fund stated that although a boost from construction and telecommunications may somewhat offset the impact of the drought, Somalia's economy is predicted to decline dramatically this year. The IMF predicted in a statement that the country of Horn of Africa will have a 2.5 percent growth in GDP this year, down from an expected 3.4 percent in 2016. It is anticipated that funding from donors, remittances from the Somali diaspora, and foreign direct investment would continue to support the Somali economy. The agriculture sector has been negatively impacted by the drought, which will be

somewhat compensated by operations in the construction, telecommunications, and service sectors. This is the primary reason for the economic slowdown. The IMF projects inflation to increase to 2.7% this year from 1.5% in 2016. Since 1991, clan militias have wreaked havoc on Somalia, causing decades-long strife. In recent years, it has also experienced hunger, marine piracy, and an insurgency led by Al Shabaab, an organization affiliated with al Qaeda (IRIN News, 2011b).

4.3. Consequences of the Crisis in the Horn of Africa

4.3.1. Humanitarian Consequences

Food security has been a longstanding issue in the Horn of Africa, largely due to ongoing conflicts, unstable economies, severe poverty, and vulnerability to climate shocks. This region is home to some of the most food-insecure populations globally. Historically, conflict has been prevalent both within and across borders in this area. Consequently, the region hosts a significant number of refugees and internally displaced persons, all of whom face heightened food insecurity. When violence displaces large groups from their homes, land, and livelihoods, food insecurity inevitably worsens (Sleet, 2020).

Conflict has a lot of effects because it restricts access to food, which makes food insecurity worse for both the host communities and the migratory populations in the area. Moreover, conflict leads to a substantial decrease in economic growth, which worsens poverty and food insecurity. This has led to stagnation in poverty reduction efforts in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa, while the rest of the world has seen considerable progress in this area. Many studies show that children's access to food in the Horn of Africa is negatively impacted by violence (Arcand et al., 2015, pp. 249–279).

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that a study examining conflict data and advanced agricultural technologies assessed the impact of violent conflict on agricultural production, including livestock and various crops. The study revealed a significant decline in production in conflict-affected areas. This reduction is primarily attributed to worker fatalities, asset depletion, displacement of

populations, environmental degradation, and the destruction of infrastructure such as schools, healthcare facilities, and other social services. Research indicates that decreased agricultural productivity and income contribute to conflict by reducing job opportunities, raising prices, and increasing grievances (FAO, 2016).

Food instability, recurring illness outbreaks, limited access to health care, flooding, and conflict-related population relocation all contribute to Ethiopia's persistently high risk of malnutrition. These unfavorable occurrences caused acute malnutrition to sharply increase, which resulted in SAM admissions to previously unheard-of heights. A significant degree of malnutrition was found in several areas of the Somali region, according to SMART nutrition surveys carried out in January. In Hargele, GAM and SAM rates reached 23.4% and 3%, respectively. Approximately 0.8 million under-five acutely malnourished children and 0.2 million pregnant and lactating women (PLW) are anticipated to require life-saving emergency nutrition interventions in drought-affected areas annually. In many areas of central and southern Somalia, acute malnutrition has reached critical levels, with the number of severely malnourished children being admitted to treatment facilities rapidly increasing, showing a two to four-fold rise in some districts. Approximately 329,500 children under the age of five in Somalia are expected to be severely malnourished out of 1.4 million children, representing over 44 percent who are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition. In the Horn of Africa, displacement brought on by internal conflict is a persistent and complex problem that has a big impact on the affected communities as well as the region as a whole. Conflict-related displacement has caused a multitude of problems for individuals and groups, such as health problems, upheavals in the social and economic order, and the failure of essential services (Bentil and Asekere, 2021).

4.3.2. Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

The United States has regarded the Horn of Africa as a crucial hub for international terrorism. After the National Islamic Front took control of Sudan in 1989, the regime aimed to create a haven for extremist Muslim groups globally. Throughout the 1990s, Sudan openly hosted terrorists, including Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

members, enabling them to operate across the broader Horn of Africa. In 1993, during the incident in Mogadishu, Somalia, eighteen American soldiers were killed, an attack that some researchers have linked to Islamic terrorists. After a five-year, terrorist activities in the region resumed, leading to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998. These attacks resulted in over 200 deaths and more than 4,000 injuries. In November 2002, terrorists, allegedly supported by Al-Qaeda, launched an attack using a shoulder-held surface-to-air missile on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and made a failed attempt to down an Israeli passenger plane. The Horn of Africa, home to several fragile, corrupt, and unstable states, has long been considered a sanctuary for Islamist militants. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the region was placed under intense scrutiny by counterterrorism experts, and it remains a key strategic focus in the global fight against terrorism (United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

Al-Qaeda's significant local presence was confirmed when the Kenyan government acknowledged that a senior member of the terror network was planning an attack on Western targets. The American embassy in Nairobi was bombed in 1998, proving the existence of terrorist groups, but it took the governments a while to recognize the risks as being specific to the region. Additionally, there have been conflicting allegations of connections between the Qaeda branch in Kenya and al Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI), the main extreme Islamist organization in Somalia. This is due to the apparent movement of some of AIAI's top leaders between Kenya and Somalia. Through a Muslim organization called Al Haramīn, which has set up social services and religious schools, the Dabaab Refugee Camp on the border between Somalia and Kenya has served as a training ground for Islamic extremists. Throughout the Cold War, airbase, port access, and over-flight agreements have all been crucial components of Kenya-U.S. relations concerning security cooperation. Over 500 Kenyan security officers have received training from the United States thanks to approximately \$3.1 million in anti-terrorism support from the country. Aside from these projects, there are additional initiatives like Safe Skies for Africa, which is an American effort that has donated \$1 million worth of airport security equipment (Khadiagala, 2004, p. 24).

Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant threat to Kenya and the wider Horn of Africa region (Anderson, David, and McKnight, 2015, p.9). Although the militia group was ousted from its strongholds in southern Somalia, including the ports of Kismayo and the capital, Mogadishu, in September 2012, it continues to possess the resources and capabilities to pose a danger. The loss of Kismayo, a key revenue source for Al-Shabaab, resulted in a significant decline in its financial resources, as the port's control was transferred to the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), reducing Al-Shabaab's ability to generate income from imports and exports. Another major source of funding for Al-Shabaab comes from certain Muslim countries, which, through front groups, feel obligated under Islamic law to support jihad (Taamby, 2005).

Ethiopia has extensive knowledge on terrorism, after overthrowing emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, a Marxist-Leninist administration engaged in state terrorism. Ethiopian Airlines has a history of airline hijackings. In 1995, an Egyptian terrorist cell conspired with forces in Sudan to murder Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak as he landed in Addis Ababa for a cell of African Unity meeting. This incident hastened the deterioration of relations with Sudan. Al ʾUttihad al Islamiya (AIAI), a Somali organization, along with local groups like the Oromo Liberation Front, the militant wing of the Ogadeni National Liberation Front, and the now-defunct Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, have been involved in kidnappings, attempted assassinations, and road mining. However, it appears that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations from the Middle East have not instigated any terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. Ethiopia participated in the US-led Frontline state policy against Sudan together with Eritrea and Uganda. The current situation presents a policy dilemma for the United States, which rightly considers Ethiopia a reliable ally in the fight against terrorism and a partner for collaboration on security matters. This collaboration includes working together on counterterrorism efforts and sharing intelligence training with Ethiopian security personnel (Shinn, 2004).

Djibouti is a crucial entry point for upper East Africa, and there has been a persistent belief in the potential for international terrorist activity in the area. However, Djibouti's significance lies more in its transit capabilities rather than its potential as a base for international terrorist organizations (United States Institute of Peace, 2004). Since 1999, however, the advent of a proactive president in May 1999 one of whose

goals was to restimulate a contentious reconciliation in Somalia may have contributed to the country's attraction to foreign terrorists. Unfortunately, given the paucity of resources, it is conceivable to respond to the terrorist danger by turning a blind eye. The United States was asked to offer logistical support for the police, gendarmerie, and training, as well as to modernize the commercial aspect of the joint military airport, until 2001. Many temporary American military forces were stationed in Djibouti between 1992 and 1995 in order to assist in quelling an ethnic Afar dissident movement. This initiative coincided with the Gulf War in 1991 and the UNOSOM/UNITAF operations in Somalia. In October 1993, the United States withdrew its defense attaché from Djibouti, significantly reducing the U.S. military presence and resulting in the closure of both the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Department of Defense (USAD). Ongoing cooperation with the Republic of Djibouti is grounded in the strategic understanding that, due to its advantageous location in the Horn of Africa, the United States requires a stable and favorable platform in the region (Schermerhorn, 2004, pp.7-9).

Terrorist groups may operate with relative impunity in Somalia due to its status as a failed state. One of the most prominent extremist Islamist organizations in the country is Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI). Although Somalia has not experienced significant terrorist attacks on its own soil, it has not been completely free from terrorist activity. The country has neither been a direct target of large-scale terrorist strikes nor served as a major base for such organizations. Somalia has not proven to be a particularly fertile ground for al-Qaeda, though it has been used as a staging area for terrorist operations targeting neighboring Kenya. Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya's political agenda aims to establish Islamic rule across the entire Horn of Africa, including parts of eastern Ethiopia. After the Ogadenia cell of AIAI carried out attacks on Ethiopian government targets in the mid-1990s, the group was designated as a terrorist organization. The Somali administration has responded to terrorist threats in a limited and localized manner, primarily due to the absence of a functional central government. Often, local authorities see the fight against terrorism as an opportunity to secure foreign aid and assistance. The U.S. military presence in Djibouti has facilitated the rapid deployment of international forces against terrorist targets in Somalia, acting as a deterrent to terrorist activities within the country. Additionally, the U.S. has provided substantial support and training to the border police forces of

Ethiopia and Kenya, aiming to prevent Somalia from becoming a key transit hub for terrorists traveling between these nations (Menkhaus, 2004).



5. RESTORING PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa has been plagued by conflict since the 1960s, encompassing armed disputes, ethnolinguistic tensions, religious radicalism, terrorism, border and territorial conflicts, civil wars, and political and ideological tensions. These conflicts have profoundly impacted the region, resulting in widespread poverty, loss of life, and displacement. Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, in particular, face ongoing conflicts that threaten regional peace and security. Achieving peace in the Horn of Africa is possible, but it requires sustained efforts to address the root causes of conflict, such as extreme poverty, suffering, lack of freedom, and profound inequality and injustice. Additionally, factors like extreme inequality, oppression, abuse of power, and various forms of fanaticism whether based on race, clan, or religion significantly contribute to the region's conflicts and wars.

The ethnic groups in the Horn of Africa have coexisted and interacted for decades, primarily through commerce and shared heritage. Sustainable development inherently requires peace and stability. The Brundtland Commission of the United Nations, in its 1987 report, defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Discussions about sustainable development often implicitly call for disarmament and significant reductions in the number of combatants on all sides, focusing on internal normalization. For many observers, these circumstances represent only technical steps toward establishing a new, supposedly "peaceful" political environment.

This chapter focuses on three key aspects: the involvement of the international community in the conflicts in the Horn of Africa; the regional agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, aimed at reconstructing state apparatus; and our contribution, which includes evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of peace restoration and exploring future prospects.

5.1. The Involvement of the International Community

5.1.1. In the Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict

The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict refers to a series of military, political, and diplomatic confrontations between the two neighboring countries, primarily between the 1960s and the early 2000s, although tensions have persisted beyond this period. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia stems from a complex array of historical, geographical, and political factors, including colonial disputes and internal ethnic rivalries. Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea in 1962 led to Eritrea's struggle for independence, sparking a brutal liberation war that culminated in 1991 with the overthrow of Ethiopia's military government. Even after Eritrea gained legal independence in 1993, conflicts over boundary delineation, notably around the town of Badme, escalated tensions and ultimately to outright combat between 1998 and 2000. The absence of a long-lasting peace has severely damaged bilateral ties, leaving periodic skirmishes and an unsettled de facto border in place despite a formal ceasefire in 2000 and attempts at resolution by international mediators.

5.1.1.1. UN in the Eritrean-Ethiopian Conflict

“There would be no need for government if mankind were angels. There would be no need for either internal or external checks on governance if angels ruled over humans. The main challenge in establishing a government run by men over men is that it must be capable of governing its citizens first, and then it must be compelled to govern itself” (Madison, 1788, p. 322-323).

After the initial border hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea at Badme on May 6, 1998, regional and international entities sought to resolve the conflict. On June 3, 1998, Susan Rice, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, and Paul Kagame, then Vice President of Rwanda, formulated a four-point peace plan for a lasting resolution. While Ethiopia accepted the plan, Eritrea rejected it. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) led mediation efforts and developed a Framework Agreement based on the four recommendations. Once again, Ethiopia accepted the agreement, but Eritrea rejected it (Prendergast, 2001).

A significant development occurred in Algeria on June 18, 2000, when both sides committed to an instantaneous end to hostilities. Following the parties' request for UN support in implementing the ceasefire, the Security Council established the UNMEE in July 2000. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on December 12, 2000, following further discussions between Ethiopia and Eritrea held in Algiers (Negash and Trovoll, 2000). The dispute is still unresolved ten years after the landmark Algiers Agreement was signed. The failure of several players to progress implementation, which has resulted in ongoing impasse, will be examined in this chapter.

5.1.1.2. U.S-Rwanda Peace Plan

The accord can be seen as a victory for Eritrea in several respects. It ensured that the decisions of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission were accepted as final and binding, even though Eritrea faced a military defeat, by successfully negotiating for the border to be drawn according to colonial conventions, particularly those of 1900, 1902, and 1908. Two primary features of the Algiers Agreement were the creation of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and a Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). According to Article 4(2) of the agreement, the boundary had to be drawn in accordance with "pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law, [but] shall not have the power to make decisions *ex aequo et bono*." According to Article 4 (15), its judgment would be definitive and enforceable. Under UNMEE's supervision, the TSZ would act as a buffer zone between the two forces. Following the EEBC's delimitation and demarcation ruling, the TSZ and UNMEE would both be abolished (Zondi and Rejouis, 2006, pp. 73-93).

On June 5, 1998, the Ethiopian Air Force launched an attack on Asmara Airport, following Eritrea's bombing of a school in Mekelle, which resulted in student casualties. Eritrea contended that the United States had foreknowledge of Ethiopia's plans, evidenced by the evacuation of all embassy staff from Asmara a day earlier after receiving an advanced warning from Washington. This situation raised significant concerns about the U.S.'s involvement in the conflict and the broader peace plan. Additionally, the U.S. mission was led by a relatively young and

inexperienced diplomat, which both Eritrean and Ethiopian authorities interpreted as indicative of Washington's lack of seriousness regarding their disputes. In November 2004, Ethiopia's announcement of a five-point plan gave new momentum to international efforts to push for bilateral discussions. The main points of the proposal included the acceptance of the principles of the peace plan, but with the stipulation that the disputed areas could only be resolved through bilateral dialogue to demarcate the border. Ethiopia, however, continued to pursue an alternative process to address its concerns outside the framework of the Algiers Agreement, which had granted sole authority to the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) for the demarcation of the border (Healy and Plaut, 2007).

Ethiopia faced unprecedented criticism from various international actors, including the United States and the United Nations, as well as academics and media commentators. Patrick Gilkes (2002) provides an exemplary case when he states, "The Boundary Commission Decisions, in fact, will do nothing at all to improve relations within those previously single and united communities torn apart by the war, even those from the same ethnic groups." In December 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit claimed that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) made a flawed assessment when it awarded the city of Badme to Eritrea, a territory that had been administered by Ethiopia for decades and was the flashpoint of the 1998-2000 conflict. When the cease-fire was agreed upon, it should have been obvious that the Ethiopian government would not accept the annexation of land that had been controlled for a considerable amount of time prior to the battle (Patrick, 2002, pp. 89-102).

5.1.1.3. The Organization of African Unity's Effort

The main focus of the OAU summit, held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from June 1 to 10, 1998, was the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. To aid the negotiation process, the OAU chairman, along with the heads of state from Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, and Rwanda, created a High-Level Delegation (HLD). Ethiopia expressed its approval of the Framework for Peace, Progress, and Partnership (FPPP) when the HLD met with the parties on June 18–19, 1998.

However, Eritrea insisted that the FPPP was a closed chapter and considered the OAU's proposal as a new initiative. An Ambassadorial Committee (AC) was quickly formed to assume the responsibilities of the High-Level Delegation (HLD), despite the initial failure of the HLD's visit. The AC was tasked with investigating the conflict and collecting intelligence, particularly on the contested territories. After conducting site inspections, the AC submitted a comprehensive report to the HLD on August 1–2, 1998. This report became the basis for developing the OAU's conflict resolution framework. The primary consensus between the parties was to resolve the disputed boundary through delineation and delimitation (Negash and Trovoll, 2000).

On December 17, 1998, during the OAU summit, Meles Zenawi advocated for a return to the status quo ante bellum, accusing Eritrea of sabotaging the peace process. He also informed the assembly about Eritrea's infamous border skirmishes with each of its neighbors (Kjetil and Trovoll, 2004). Afeworki dismissed Ethiopia's claims as baseless, stating that "Ethiopia's shrill and offensive language is designed to drown the facts in a sea of accusations" during his speech to the OAU Central Organ. While expressing gratitude for the OAU's commitment to resolving the crisis, President Afeworki highlighted the primary points of disagreement with the OAU's proposals, specifically the withdrawal of troops and the restoration of civil governance in Badme. He proposed that the border's delineation will immediately take care of the Badme problem. While acknowledging the opinions of both sides, the OAU's Central Organ fully supported these recommendations as the suitable foundation for resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute. In addition, the parties were urged to “cooperate with the HLD with a view to creating the necessary conditions for the speedy implementation of the Framework Agreement” (Kjetil and Trovoll, 2004, pp.50-60).

5.1.1.4. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

The Algiers Peace Agreement, a comprehensive peace accord signed by both countries on December 12, 2000, was facilitated by the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. Prior to this, on June 31, 2000, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) through

Resolution 1312 (2000). One of the primary objectives of UNMEE was to operationalize the procedure for confirming the cessation of hostilities. To achieve this, UNMEE's peacekeeping forces were stationed in the border area and tasked with keeping the military forces of the two countries separated. They monitored the entire border between Ethiopia and Eritrea to ensure compliance. The United Nations Security Council ended UNMEE's mandate on July 31, 2008, following repeated hostilities and obstruction of UNMEE's activities by Eritrea. These actions included harsh limitations on UNMEE personnel's travel and other hostile conduct. According to Jonathan Ewing, there is a far greater chance of a return to conflict now that UNMEE's mandate has been terminated. It is a different case whether this is based on actual facts or a forecast of potential outcomes. Ewing asserts that the UN's decision has resulted in a diplomatic vacuum, with the international organization nearly abandoning its mediation efforts, despite the lack of resolution on the highly contentious issue of the precise location of the common boundary. Without peacekeepers to oversee the situation on the ground, even minor miscommunications or mistakes could potentially lead to the resumption of hostilities. In actuality, an abundance of evidence suggests that both sides have been resupplying, updating supply depots, moving substantial amounts of military equipment, and training soldiers close to their shared boundary (Ewing, 2008).

In January 2008, Eritrea said that it would no longer let UNMEE soldiers to remain on Eritrean territory, with the boundary being essentially established. The UNMEE's continuous presence within Eritrea constituted to occupation, according to a letter sent by President Issaias Afeworki to the Security Council in January 2008, as the line was essentially drawn. In February 2008, Eritrea cut off food supplies to UN soldiers, causing a setback for UNMEE. As a result, the UN moved UNMEE soldiers from Eritrea to Ethiopia while the Security Council discussed how to operate from there. Ethiopia welcomed the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) but insisted that any future missions be separated from the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), a stance that negatively impacted the peace process and UN efforts. On July 30, 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1827, which officially terminated the UNMEE on July 31, 2008 (Lie, 2009).

Meles Zenawi has vowed that he will not return to war with Eritrea. However, both nations have deployed soldiers along the border after UNMEE left. Both nations have the largest militaries in sub-Saharan Africa. According to estimates from the World Bank and the International Institute of Strategic Studies in 2008, Eritrea's military consists of 320,000 personnel, while Ethiopia's military comprises 138,000 personnel. Following Eritrea's 1991 independence, all Eritreans aged 18 to 40 were required to serve in the military for 12 to 18 months (Kimbali, ,2008).

5.1.2. In the Somali Conflict

The Somali conflict, one of the longest and most intricate civil wars in modern history, has its origins in the colonial period and intensified post-independence. It has been marked by internal power struggles, clan-based violence, and external interventions, contributing to widespread instability. The conflict is characterized by the collapse of the central state, the rise of warlordism, the emergence of extremist groups, and persistent humanitarian crises. Beginning in the 1990s, it exemplifies the dramatic collapse of a centralized state, resulting in political, social, and ethnic fragmentation. Following the overthrow of the Siad Barre administration in 1991, Somalia entered a prolonged civil war marked by clan rivalry and territorial disputes.

The lack of a strong central government has facilitated the emergence of extremist Islamist groups like al-Shabaab, which aim to enforce strict interpretations of Islamic law. As a result, Somalia has become a fertile ground for both foreign intervention and international humanitarian aid. However, internal conflicts and international rivalries have hindered efforts to establish an effective central government, further exacerbating the country's persistent instability.

5.1.2.1. The UN in the Somali Conflict

The United Nations has worked closely with the people and government of Somalia to promote security and stability. After a prolonged transition period, a new Federal Parliament and Government were elected in 2012, with the aim of bringing about political change and realizing the vision of a peaceful, federal Somalia. This

agreement was achieved through an extensive consultation process. The international community has pledged to support Somalia's efforts. Through collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia, its federal member states, civil society, regional organizations, and foreign partners, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) oversees the UN system's operations in the country. The DPPA also facilitates the Secretary-General's good offices and supports political reconciliation and peacebuilding. On March 17, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 746 (1992), endorsing the Secretary-General's plan to dispatch a technical team to Somalia to establish a mechanism for monitoring ceasefires. The team was also tasked with devising a comprehensive strategy to ensure the fair and efficient distribution of humanitarian aid. From March 23 to April 1, the team was in Somalia. Following consultations, Letters of Agreement were signed by General Aidid on March 27, 1992, and Interim President Ali Mahdi on March 28, 1992, outlining the procedures for overseeing the ceasefire and the plans for the equitable distribution of aid (UNMEE, 2007).

5.1.2.2. Establishment of UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II

The United Nations' intervention in Somalia was marked by the establishment of two consecutive missions aimed at stabilizing the country, which was engulfed in a prolonged civil conflict. These operations, known as UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia I) and UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia II), took place from 1992 to 1995 with the objectives of restoring peace and rebuilding state institutions. Despite significant efforts, these missions experienced serious obstacles, highlighting the limits of international participation in complicated conflicts (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2011, p. 132).

UNOSOM I was initiated in April 1992, following the international community's appeal for aid in the midst of a humanitarian crisis and escalating political instability in Somalia. Initially meant to offer humanitarian assistance and safeguard aid routes, UNOSOM I sought to establish a climate conducive to the country's rehabilitation. This mandate was bolstered by the deployment of the US-led Operation Restore Hope, which is part of a larger mission to provide security in areas most impacted by

famine and internal violence (Ayoob, 1995, p. 47). UNOSOM I faced growing opposition from Somali armed groups, especially those associated with warlord Mohamed Farah Aïdid, despite its humanitarian and law enforcement goals. UNOSOM II's actions were intensified as a result of UNOSOM I's shortcomings, especially with regard to its inability to disarm these organizations and bring about a durable peace (Bercovitch, 1996, p. 102).

UNOSOM II was deployed in May 1993 to reinforce Somalia's peacekeeping capabilities as part of a larger pacification and rebuilding plan. This second mission sought to strengthen the Somali state and establish more direct authority over anarchic zones. The objective of UNOSOM II was to disband militias, protect civilians, and help Somalia's political and democratic processes (Lyman, 1995, p. 58).

On March 3, 1993, the UN Secretary-General recommended to the UN Security Council that the status of UNITAF be changed from a temporary operation to a permanent one. UNITAF was able to enforce the provisions of the charter under Chapter VII. UNITAF's mission was "to complete the work of UNITAF in terms of de-ministerialization and de-commodification, and to assist the people of the Republic of Somalia in the reconstruction of its social and political system, its economy, and its institutional framework." On 5 March, the UN Secretary General appointed a Turkish Lieutenant General (LGM) Kevik Bir to serve as the force commander and appointed a retired Admiral Jonathan Howe to serve as his Special Representative for Somalia to supervise the transition. The mandate included "the prevention of any re-emergence of violence and the taking of appropriate measures against any factions that have violated or threaten to violate" (UN, 2003'a). On March 26, 1993, the Security Council agreed to expand the scope and size of UNOSOM based on the Secretary-General's proposals, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 814 (1993) authorized the extension of UNOSOM's mission for a "trial run" that concluded on October 31, 1993. The Council urged all parties involved in the Somali conflict to ensure the security of all organizations providing assistance and to comply fully with their agreements, particularly the Ceasefire Agreement and the Disarmament Agreement. Additionally, it called on all States,

especially neighboring ones, to support the enforcement of the arms embargo established by Resolution 733 (UNMEE, 2007).

5.1.2.3. The African Union's Peacekeeping Efforts in Somalia: AMISOM and Its Legal and Operational Framework

The African Union (AU), a regional organization, has initiated peace operations across the continent, particularly in areas affected by internal conflicts and civil wars where UN missions have often struggled, especially in Somalia. Within the AU, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) is responsible for overseeing such operations. Consequently, the AU decided to deploy a peacekeeping force known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to assist in the country. The AU Peace and Security Council formally established AMISOM on January 19, 2007, to replace Ethiopian troops stationed in Somalia. To sustain the African Mission in Somalia, the AU required approximately 8,000 troops. Initially, four countries indicated their willingness to contribute soldiers. However, only Uganda and Burundi fulfilled their troop commitments. Uganda offered 1,600 troops, Nigeria 850, Ghana 350, and Burundi up to 1,600 troops (Kioko, 2003, pp. 807-826).

In February 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the current African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), comprising 8,000 African peacekeeping personnel, through Resolution 1744. The legal framework for AMISOM's deployment in Somalia includes the use of force in accordance with the UN Charter and the African Union Constitutional Act. The core principles of the African Union Constitutional Act, explicitly stated in Article 4, are "peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states," "prohibition of the use of force or threat," and "non-interference by member states in the internal affairs of another" (Hull, Svensson, and Axe, 2008, pp.26-28).

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) established the "AMIB Concept" or "Burundi Model," which refers to the idea of operational self-sustenance by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) that underpins the logistical support for AMISOM. This model was promoted once again during the planning stages of AMISOM, as the burden of sustaining the TCCs proved to be too heavy for the union with its limited

resources. Consequently, AMIS adopted a different approach that yielded comparable results (Kagwanja, 2006, pp. 72-86).

5.1.2.4. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was founded in 1986 to coordinate efforts among Horn of Africa governments to address recurring droughts and famines. In 1996, its mandate was expanded to include conflict management, resolution, and prevention. Since then, IGAD has been instrumental in maintaining regional stability and security. Nevertheless, the region's peace efforts have been hindered by the evolving nature of conflicts and the involvement of external actors. Prior to IGAD's leadership in the Somali peace talks, the United Nations and the United States were the primary actors attempting to establish a central administration through negotiations, according to Medhane (2002). IGAD took on a more active role in initiating and supporting the Somali peace process after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia and the end of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1995. Since then, Somalia has remained a central focus of IGAD's agenda, with the organization facilitating numerous peace processes aimed at establishing a central government in the country (Farah, 2007, pp. 173-195).

During their meeting in Khartoum in 2002, the IGAD Heads of State and Government gradually decided to work towards establishing lasting peace and security in Somalia. They agreed to back the Eldoret peace and reconciliation conference, which would involve representatives of the Somali people in efforts to form a national administration. The Eldoret peace talks culminated in the signing of the 'Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principles of the Somali National Reconciliation Process' on October 27, 2002. This declaration explicitly stated that no party would resort to violence to resolve disputes. These peace efforts marked a significant milestone in Somalia's history, demonstrating both collaboration and a reasonable convergence of interests between the international community at large and IGAD member states in particular. What makes these efforts noteworthy is that more IGAD countries than ever before have stepped forward to

finance the peace process. Despite continuing discord and conflicting interests among member states, the IGAD nations displayed a remarkable level of unity. The peace negotiations led to the establishment of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Menkhaus, 2004).

The peace accord in Djibouti was finalized in late 2008. Prior to this, IGAD had implemented several initiatives to address these issues and support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu. In early 2005, IGAD recognized its shortcomings, and in January of that year, during a summit in Abuja, the heads of state and government decided to submit a draft proposal to the African Union (AU) summit. This plan included deploying the TFG to Somalia and establishing the IGASOM peacekeeping force. The IGAD Foreign Ministers approved the IGASOM deployment strategy during their meeting in Nairobi in 2005. Additionally, the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was approved by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1725 in December 2006. Despite these efforts by IGAD, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), like its predecessor, the Transitional National Government (TNG), continued to struggle with legitimacy issues. The TFG's stability was undermined by clan rivalries, disagreements between the Prime Minister and the President, and internal conflicts within the parliament. Above all, President Abdullahi Yusuf was tasked with implementing the decisions made by IGAD. However, in 2008, he resigned in response to external pressure. Overall, the TFG underwent changes in 2008 as a result of the Djibouti peace deal, driven by internal disagreements within the administration and a decline in national security (Healy, 2008).

5.2. International Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements

International agreements, whether bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral (involving multiple countries or organizations), play a crucial role in resolving conflicts, particularly in the context of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. These agreements are designed to address the underlying causes of the conflict, facilitate ceasefires, and promote long-term peace by fostering dialogue, cooperation, and

mutual understanding. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and other global and regional actors are essential in overseeing these agreements and ensuring their compliance.

Bilateral and multilateral agreements in the Horn of Africa are crucial for conflict resolution and regional cooperation, though their effectiveness is often hindered by complex geopolitical factors. Bilateral agreements, typically made between neighboring countries, aim to manage diplomatic, economic, and security relations. This is exemplified by the peace accords between Eritrea and Ethiopia during the 1998-2000 conflict, which were facilitated by international mediation. These bilateral agreements are occasionally weak owing to competing interests and external influence, notably from large nations and international organizations. At the same time, multilateral accords, such as those organized by the African Union or the Arab League, strive to provide answers to common regional concerns such as terrorism prevention, peacekeeping support, and natural resource management.

5.2.1. Peace Agreement in the Eritrean-Ethiopian Conflict

The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict (1998-2000) was a brutal and devastating war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, primarily over territorial disputes and political tensions. The war led to tens of thousands of deaths and extensive displacement on both sides. In response, international efforts were made to broker peace through various bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The Algiers Peace Agreement, signed in 2000, is widely regarded as a crucial effort to resolve the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which erupted in 1998 over territorial disputes, primarily concerning the town of Badme. The agreement was negotiated by the United Nations and the European Union, with the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) playing a significant role. Eritrea refused to recognize the final judgment of the Boundary Delimitation Committee (BDC), and Ethiopia continued to occupy disputed regions, resulting in a state of 'cold peace'. This deadlock emphasizes the necessity of local players' political will and collaboration in effectively implementing peace agreements, as well as the limits of foreign diplomacy when confronted with national interests and internal constraints.

5.2.1.1. The Four Point Peace Proposal and the OAU Framework Agreement

Wallensteen (2007), mediators addressing interstate territorial conflicts where one party has unilaterally changed the situation on the ground through force face a crucial decision: whether to accept the newly created status quo or insist on restoring the pre-conflict conditions (*status quo ante bellum*) as the foundation for peace agreements. Wallensteen contends that although political realities often limit the applicability of the *status quo ante bellum*, it remains a fundamental principle in resolving interstate territorial conflicts. This principle is supported by international law and standards. The peace proposals aimed to restore the pre-May 1998 status quo. Disagreements on this crucial issue prevented the peace process from stopping hostilities. The four-point peace plan included provisions for reconstructing the civilian government and withdrawing Eritrean troops from Badme, redeploying them to their positions before May 6, 1998. This clause was also part of the OAU framework agreement presented to the parties on November 7 and 8, 1998. The third section of the framework agreement clearly recommended that Eritrean soldiers redeploy from Badme and its surrounding areas to their previous positions before May 6, 1998. However, the Eritrean government initially refused to accept both the OAU framework agreement and the four-point peace plan. The situation changed after Ethiopia launched a series of large-scale military operations against Eritrean positions along the western front. In February 1999, Ethiopia initiated "Operation Sunset," targeting Eritrean troops in Badme. Following intense fighting over four days (February 23–26), Ethiopian forces successfully breached Eritrean defenses and retook Badme. The day after losing Badme, Eritrea announced its acceptance of the OAU framework agreement (Kinfu, 2004).

After Eritrea ratified the framework agreement, Ethiopia began to oppose the OAU's peace initiatives. Ethiopia sent a list of queries seeking clarification and deemed the technical arrangements the accompanying document to the framework agreement unsatisfactory. Ethiopia suspected Eritrea's real motives for agreeing to the peace plan, viewing Eritrea's ratification of the OAU framework agreement as a strategy to buy time, rearm its forces, and launch counterattacks on Badme. Ethiopia would have liked to carry on with its military activities. Ethiopia started aggressive offensives on several fronts in May 2000. Ethiopia entered deep into Eritrea's territory after fierce

fighting and took control of regions that weren't even on its list of claimed territories or under its administration (Crisis, 2002).

5.2.1.2. The Algiers Peace Agreement (December 2000)

Ethiopia and Eritrea officially ended their border conflict by signing the "Agreement on the cessation of hostilities between the peoples of the two countries" on June 18, 2000. The official commitment to end hostilities was made by the two nations when they signed this agreement. No significant armed conflict has occurred between the two nations since the ratification of this pact. The two nations signed the comprehensive peace agreement known as the Algiers Peace Agreement on December 12, 2000, after extensive negotiations facilitated by the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Earlier, on June 31, 2000, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) through Resolution 1312 (2000). According to Ewing (2008), the UN's decision created a diplomatic vacuum, with the international body essentially giving up on mediating the dispute, despite its failure to reach a compromise on the contentious issue of the actual location of the common boundary. Without peacekeepers to monitor the situation locally, any small miscalculation or mistake could lead to war once more. A significant amount of data indicates that both sides have been acquiring new weapons, updating supply stations, moving substantial amounts of military gear, and training personnel for combat (Ewing, 2008).

The Algiers Peace Agreement established that Ethiopia and Eritrea would present their disagreements to two separate committees that would operate apart from one another. The first key element of the Algiers Agreement was the establishment of the Boundary Commission, tasked with "delimiting and demarcating the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law." The second significant feature was the creation of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (the "Claims Commission"), which had the responsibility of resolving, by binding arbitration, all claims for loss, damage, or injury related to the conflict, resulting from breaches of international humanitarian law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law.

Additionally, the establishment of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and a temporary security zone (TSZ) were fundamental components of the Algiers Agreement. According to Article 4 (2) of the agreement, it was required to draw the boundary in accordance with "pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law, [but] shall not have the power to make decisions *ex aequo et bono*." According to Article 4 (15), its judgment would be definitive and enforceable. Under UNMEE's supervision, the TSZ would act as a buffer zone between the two forces. Following the EEBC's delimitation and demarcation ruling, the TSZ and UNMEE would both be abolished. The international community's efforts to force bilateral talks gained traction in November 2004, when Ethiopia offered a five-point plan. The proposal said that "we accept it in principle, but through bilateral dialogue, we have to resolve the disputed areas to demarcate the border". With this pronouncement, Ethiopia continued to advocate for an alternate method to address its issues outside of the Algiers Agreement. This was in violation of the agreement itself, which left exclusive responsibility for demarcation with the EEBC (Zondi and Rejouis, 2006, p.75).

5.2.2. Peace Agreement in the Somali Conflict

The Somali conflict, ongoing for several decades, stems from a complex mix of political, ethnic, and clan-based tensions, historical factors like colonial legacies, the collapse of the central government, and ongoing instability caused by armed groups such as Al-Shabaab. Despite international and regional efforts to negotiate peace agreements and stabilize Somalia, lasting peace remains elusive due to the country's fragmented political landscape, weak institutions, and persistent insurgency.

The peace accords in the Somali conflict have been crucial attempts at stabilization amid a prolonged civil war. However, their success has been impeded by both internal and external forces. Numerous agreements negotiated since the early 1990s, including the Djibouti Agreement of 2008, aimed to eliminate political instability and restore central authority. The Djibouti Agreement, in particular, led to the creation of a transitional administration headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, with support from the international community, especially the African Union and the

United Nations. Despite these accords contributing to political progress, the ground situation has remained unpredictable. Efforts to establish lasting peace face significant challenges due to issues of governance, foreign interference, and the presence of terrorism (Elmi and Barise, 2006, p. 87).

5.2.2.1. Djibouti I and II

The fall of Siyad Barre in early 1991, President Hassan Guled Aptidon of Djibouti initiated the Djibouti I and II processes. Representatives from various groups, including the Somalia Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), participated in these sessions, which were sponsored by Egypt, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. However, General Mohammed Farah Aideed's USC (Hawiye Habr Gidir) faction and the Somalia National Movement (SNM), representing the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, refused to participate in the discussions. Aideed criticized the Djibouti process and strongly opposed Ali Mahdi Mohamed's interpretation of the Djibouti II agreement, arguing it recognized his right to the position of acting president (Menkhaus, 1997).

On January 29, 1991, the USC leadership appointed affluent hotelier Ali Mahdi Mohamed as acting president of Somalia without consulting other opposition factions. This appointment led to violent clashes between Mahdi's supporters and those opposed to him, as perceived by various parties that had resisted the Siyad Barre dictatorship (Issa-Salwe and Ciisa-Salwe, 1994). General Aideed claimed that Ali Mahdi was appointed "on the instigation of Siad Barre" (Abraham, 2002).

5.2.2.2. The Sodere Process

The Sodere process, coordinated by Ethiopia, was another major national reconciliation conference for Somalia. In response to the ongoing chaos in Somalia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CPMR) and appointed Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, as its first chairman. More than a year after the withdrawal

of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) peacekeeping forces, Ethiopia organized the Sodere process to address Somalia's instability. By this time, the international community had largely lost interest in Somalia following the withdrawal of US forces in early 1994 and the departure of UN troops later that year. This disinterest stemmed from the costly and ineffective nature of the previous military engagements, which resulted in significant losses and minimal outcomes, as well as the continued sabotage of humanitarian missions (Abraham, 2002).

Several factors made the Sodere process a turning point in Somalia's mediation history. First, following the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces, it marked the first opportunity for positive communication among the country's major political actors. Second, it included nearly all of the leaders of the clan factions. Third, it was the only initiative up to that point that incorporated the principles of inclusivity and power-sharing. Since, The National Reconciliation Conference (NSC) has operated from its headquarters in Addis Ababa. Consequently, many Somalis have viewed the NSC as a "tool of Ethiopia." It has been argued that Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia is a primary and enduring factor contributing to the continuation of the Somali conflict (Elmi and Barise, 2006, pp. 32-54).

5.2.2.3. The Arta Process

The Addis Ababa peace deal influenced the Arta peace process by contributing to the establishment of a governmental structure (Moore, 2003; Makhubela, 2012). President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti initiated the Arta peace process to form the Transitional National Government (TNG). Despite the Ethiopian government's deliberate attempts to undermine the process, based on suspicions that Islamist groups like Al-Ittihad were in control, IGAD supported the initiative (Tadesse, 2002; Makhubela, 2012). Around 3,000 delegates participated in the Arta peace process, which aimed to construct a government framework. Major clans, including the Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirfile, and Dir, were allocated 44 seats (Adare, 2001, pp. 12-21).

The Transitional National Government (TNG) was initially set to function for three years, ending in August 2003. However, President Abdi Qassim extended his

mandate by invoking provisions of the 1960 Somalia Constitution. Despite being elected by civil society groups, traditional elders, professionals, and academics, the administration faced significant challenges due to the exclusion of armed groups. This exclusion effectively limited the TNG's authority to a small part of Mogadishu. Ethiopia's concerns about the TNG's potential affiliations further hindered its progress. Although the Arta process was transparent and supported by IGAD and Arab nations, Ethiopia remained hesitant to accept the summit's outcomes (Elmi and Barise, 2006, pp. 32-54).

5.2.2.4. Formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in Nairobi between August and October 2004 after extensive negotiations involving various Somali groups, with support from IGAD. The TFG replaced the Transitional National Government (TNG). It was formed based on the "4.5 formula," which allocated power among Somalia's four major clan-families—Hawiye, Darod, Digil-Rahanweyn, and Dir—as well as minority clans making up the 0.5. The talks also led to the enactment of a Transitional Federal Constitution (TFC) (Crisis, 2002).

IGAD launched the Mbagathi peace process in 2002, amid the collapse of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the growing strength of Mogadishu's warlords, which posed threats to the national security of Ethiopia and Kenya. The peace accord was based on the notion that establishing state institutions would bring an end to the fighting in Somalia (Lewis, 2008; Makhubela, 2012). Financial support for the peace process, which began in Eldoret, Kenya, was provided by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) (Menkhaus, 2003; Makhubela, 2012). The Mbagathi process led to the election of President Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed and the formation of the transitional federal government. However, Adam (2008) observes that the administration struggled to exert effective control over the region.

CONCLUSION

This study explores the enduring instability of peace in the Horn of Africa, a region characterized by continual conflict and turmoil despite regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace. Widely regarded as one of the most conflict-prone areas on the African continent, the Horn has endured numerous and protracted conflicts. The legacies of colonialism, which imposed arbitrary borders and disrupted traditional governance structures, have contributed to ongoing tensions and disputes. Additionally, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes, often with weak institutions and a lack of inclusive governance, has further complicated the peacebuilding process. This research examines the complex nature of conflict in the Horn of Africa, encompassing inter-state conflicts like the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict of 1998-2000, and intra-state crises such as the collapse of Somalia, ethnic divisions, contested borders, and resource competition. These factors have consistently fueled tension, presenting ongoing challenges for policymakers and peacebuilders. The study also underscores the significant role of non-state actors and transnational threats in shaping the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa.

The rise of militant groups like Al-Shabaab has not only destabilized Somalia but also created regional security threats through border attacks and the spread of radicalism. Similarly, the emergence of piracy off the coast of Somalia has disrupted international shipping lanes, posing a significant threat to global trade and maritime security. Non-state threats are a major challenge to state sovereignty, further weakening the already fragile institutions in the region. Furthermore, the responses to these challenges the world over especially in the counterterrorism measures after the September 11 attacks has pulled the Horn both of advantages Africa and further disadvantages into as the the center presence of of international external geopolitics. Additionally, the international community's approach has largely been reactive rather than proactive, which has impeded the creation of comprehensive strategies to address the underlying causes of instability in the Horn of Africa.

This analysis underscores the crucial role of regional organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and international bodies such

as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). Despite initiating numerous peace efforts, including mediation and peacekeeping operations, these entities' effectiveness has often been undermined by divided regional interests, limited resources, and inadequate strategies to address the root causes of conflict. Furthermore, the lack of sustained political commitment and coordination among these organizations has significantly impeded the success of peace-building measures.

This study emphasizes the importance of adopting a multi-dimensional approach to peace-building in the Horn of Africa. Efforts should prioritize addressing structural inequalities, fostering inclusive governance, and supporting regional integration to mitigate cross-border conflicts. Additionally, the international community must engage in long-term strategies that extend beyond reactive interventions, focusing instead on development, education, and institution-building to create conditions for sustainable peace.

The findings of this thesis emphasize the necessity of global collaboration in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. International actors need to transcend short-term, interest-driven interventions and commit to long-term, locally informed strategies that empower communities and bolster state institutions. Such an approach will not only mitigate immediate conflicts but also address systemic vulnerabilities undermining peace. Ultimately, the instability of peace in the Horn of Africa illustrates the intricate challenges of governance, development, and international relations. Overcoming these challenges demands a comprehensive and cooperative strategy that aligns local, regional, and international efforts. By adopting this multidimensional framework, stakeholders can pave the way for enduring peace, fostering a more stable and prosperous future for the Horn of Africa.

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