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ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND LOGIC OF ATTACK:
UNGOVERNED SPACES IN SOMALIA AND IMPLICATION
ON NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY**

Ph.D. THESIS

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Ankara, 2021

ONAY SAYFASI

Israel Nyaburi NYADERA tarafından hazırlanan “Zorlu Çatışmalar ve Saldırı Mantığı: Somali'deki Denetimsiz Alanlar ve Ulusal ve Bölgesel Güvenlik Üzerine Olası Yansımaları” adlı tez çalışması aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oy birliği / oy çokluğu ile Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı’nda Doktora tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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BEYAN

Bu tez çalışmasının kendi çalışmam olduğunu, tezin planlanmasından yazımına kadar bütün aşamalarda patent ve telif haklarını ihlal edici etik dışı davranışımın olmadığını, bu tezdeki bütün bilgileri akademik ve etik kurallar içinde elde ettiğimi, bu tezde kullanılmış olan tüm bilgi ve yorumlara kaynak gösterdiğimi beyan ederim. Tarih (29-09-2021)

Israel Nyaburi NYADERA



APPRECIATION

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr., Bingol for his support, throughout my program. I also thank members of my thesis committee and jury for their valuable input to the study. Special thanks also to Prof. Dr., Onder, Prof., Dr. Guliz, Prof. Onditi for their guidance and support through out my study. For my family, without you I would not have made it. Your support and encouragement kept me going each day. My friends, I also wish to express my sincere gratitude for standing with me. Most of you were part of this journey, collaborated in research, debates and shared ideas. I cannot thank you enough. Dr. Nazmul, Ayten, Salah, Kisaka, Brian, Marwa, Felix, Billy, Mustafa, Hared, thank you for your contribution to this study. I wish to also express my humble appreciation to YTB for the funding that enabled me to complete this program.



ÖZET
ZORLU ÇATIŞMALAR VE SALDIRI MANTIĞI: SOMALİ'DEKİ DENETİMSİZ
ALANLAR VE ULUSAL VE BÖLGESEL GÜVENLİK ÜZERİNE OLASI
YANSIMALARI

Somali'de son otuz yılda yerel çatışmalardan terörizm, sınır ötesi kaçırma olayları, insan kaçakçılığı, korsancılık, göç ve suikastlarla dolu bir bölgesel güvenlik krizine evrilen hızlı bir dönüşüm yaşandı. Bir yandan bölgede yaşanan çatışmaların yarattığı etkilere duyulan kaygılar giderek artarken, diğer yandan da yarım milyondan fazla insanın ölümü ve diğer milyonlarca insanın da yerlerinden edilmesiyle sarsılan ülkenin karşı karşıya kaldığı bu insani dram sıklıkla bölgede yürütülen akademik çalışmaları geri planda ve barış elçiliği denemelerini ise sonuçsuz bıraktı. Bu tez Somali'nin Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki yerel ve bölgesel güvenliği nasıl ve niçin etkilediğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada resmi devlet raporları, akademik çalışmalar ve medya yayınlarının yanı sıra sivil toplum kuruluşları tarafından hazırlanan belgelerin bir araya getirilip incelenmesi marifetiyle nitelikli bir araştırma yaklaşımı benimsendi. Somali ve bölgede yaşanan saldırılara müdahil olan aktörleri ve eğilimleri analiz etmek amacıyla çeşitli çatışma raporlarını içeren veri tabanından alınan bilgiler değerlendirildi. Tez altı bölümden oluşmakta olup, birinci bölüm karmaşıklık ve denetlenmeyen alan teorileri bağlamında Somali'de yaşanan çatışma ortamının incelenmesi ile başlamaktadır. Bu bölümde ayrıca, çalışmada kullanılan metodoloji ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alındı. İkinci bölümde Somali toplulukları arasındaki kabile yapılanmaları ve çatışmanın doğasını şekillendiren 'zayıf-bağılantılı' ağların kökenleri araştırıldı. Üçüncü bölümde Somali'deki istikrarsızlıkların sömürgecilik sonrası ve tarihsel kökenlerine ilave olarak barış çabalarının tarihsel süreci ve bunların neden başarısız olduğu tartışıldı. Dördüncü bölümde, Somali'deki çatışmaların karmaşık yapısına değinildi ve saldırı mantığı ve çatışmaların yıllar içindeki dönüşümü ele alındı. Beşinci

bölümde Somali’de yaşanan çatışma ortamının ulusal ve bölgesel güvenlik üzerindeki olası sonuçları tartışılırken, altıncı ve bulguların açıklandığı bölümde Somali’deki çatışmalar ile toplumun sosyo-ekonomik, siyasal ve toplumsal birliktelik unsurları arasındaki bağlantı noktası irdelendi. Çalışmada, Somali’deki durumun bölge üzerindeki etkilerinin, sıklıkla göz ardı edilen üç meseleden alevlendiği öne sürüldü. Bunlardan ilki suç örgütlerine yapılanma, eğitim alma ve ülke içinde ve dışında saldırılar düzenleme imkanı veren ülke içinde denetimsiz alanların oluşumudur. İkincisi ise çatışmanın bir iç çatışmadan çok organize suç haline dönüşmesi ve bunun var olan durumu kontrol edilmesi güç bir hale getirmesidir. Bu durum yalnızca Somali ve komşu ülkelere ciddi güvenlik tehditleri oluşturmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda barış çabalarını da zayıflatarak söz konusu suç eylemlerinin daimi aktörlerine ülke içindeki istikrarsızlıktan faydalanmaya devam etme imkanı tanıdı. Çatışmanın bölgesel bir boyut kazanmasına etki eden üçüncü unsur ise bölge ülkelerinin, ülke içindeki saldırı mantığını güçlendirmeye devam eden krize müdahil oldukları algısıdır. Çalışmada söz konusu bu üç unsur, Afrika Boynuzu’nda barış ortamının önündeki kritik engeller olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Somali, Çatışmanın Dönüşümü, Denetimsiz Alanlar,

ABSTRACT

INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND LOGIC OF ATTACK: UNGOVERNED SPACES IN SOMALIA AND IMPLICATION ON NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The situation in Somalia has over the last three decades transformed rapidly from a domestic conflict into a regional security crisis characterized by terrorism, cross border kidnappings, human trafficking, piracy, migration and assassinations. While there is growing concern over the conflict's impact on the region, the humanitarian situation in the country which has seen the death of over half a million people and millions others displaced often overshadow academic research conducted in the region and preoccupy efforts of peace ambassadors. This thesis aims to examine how and why the situation in Somalia affects domestic and regional security in the Horn of Africa. The study adopts a qualitative study approach by interrogating official government reports, academic and media publications as well as documents from non-governmental organizations. It uses information from various conflict reporting databases to analyze the trend and actors involved in attacks within Somalia and the region. The thesis consists of six chapters, it begins by examining the Somali conflict within the context of complexity and ungoverned space theories. In this chapter the methodology adopted in the study is also discussed in detail. The second chapter examines the clan configuration among Somali communities and the origins of 'soft-bond' networks which have shaped the nature of the conflict. The third chapter of the thesis explores the colonial and historical origins of instabilities in Somalia as well as the history of peace efforts and why they failed. In chapter four, I assess the complexity of the conflict in Somalia and discuss the logic of attack and the transformation of the conflict over the years. Chapter five discusses the implications of the Somali conflict on national and regional security, while chapter six which is also the findings section discusses the nexus between the Somali

conflict and the socio-economic, political and cohesion aspects of the society. The study argues that the impact of the situation in Somalia on the region is aggravated by three issues often overlooked. One is the emergence of ungoverned spaces in the country that allows criminal groups to recruit, train and carry attacks within and outside the country. Second is the transformation of the conflict itself from a civil war into organized crime making the situation intractable. This has not only continued to pose serious security threats to Somalia and her neighboring countries but also undermined peace efforts as perpetrators of these criminal activities continue to benefit from the instability in the country. The third element that has made the conflict adopt a regional dimension is the perception of the involvement by regional countries in the crisis which continues to influence the logic of attack in the country. The study identifies these three issues as critical barriers to peace in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords: Somalia, Conflict Transformation, Ungoverned Spaces,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	:Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AFP	:Agence France-Presse
AIAI	:Al-Itixaad Al-Islaami
AMISOM	:African Union Mission to Somalia
BBC	:British Broadcasting Corporation
CNN	:Cable News Network, Inc.
CSP	:Centre for Systemic Peace
FARC	:Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FSAU	:Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
FSI	:Failed State Index
GIDD	:Global Internal Displacement Database
ICANN	:Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICU	:Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	:Internally displaced persons
IFLO	:Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia
IGAD	:Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMO	:International Maritime Organization
ISIS	:Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NGO	:Non -governmental Organisations
NPA	:New People's Army
OAU	:Organization of African Unity
OCHA	:Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONLF	:Ogaden National Liberation Front
OSLA	:Oromo, Somali, and Afar Liberation Alliance
RKM	:Ras Kamboni Movement
SDA	:Somali Democratic Alliance
SICC	:Supreme Islamic Courts Council
SNA	:Somali National Alliance
SNM	:Somali National Movement

SPM	:Somalia Patriotic Movement
SSDF	:Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	:Transitional Federal Government
TNG	:Transitional National Government
UAE	:United Arab Emirates
UCDP	:Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	:United Nations
UNDP	:United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	:United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	:The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	:Unified Task Force
UNSOM	:United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC	:United Somali Congress
USC	:United Somali Congress
USF	:United Somali Front
USP	:United Somali Party
WHO	:World Health Organisation

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the two major world wars and consequently the Cold War, one can observe that conflict has undergone tremendous changes. A significant shift has been from interstate conflict to a more predominant intrastate conflict. Martin Van Creveld, a military historian, in his works *Transformation of War* (1991), was among the first scholars to give an extensive analysis of the changing nature of war. He noted that despite a vast decline in interstate conflict, the emergence of organized violence is on a steady rise.

Münkler (2005) and Kaldor (2006) have come up with a set of unique characteristics that distinguish what they term as “new wars” from the previous interstate conflicts. Also, they noted that these new types of conflict are predominant in the Middle East, South East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The first characteristic given to contemporary wars is that the cost of civilian loss is very high perhaps because there is a deliberate attempt to inflict more pain by targeting civilians. Second, they are widespread and omnipotent since seldom are they fought in a fixed battleground or period. The line between crime and war has become almost invisible in contemporary wars (Kaldor, 2006: ix). Terror tactics and Guerilla warfare are increasingly being used (Münkler, 2005: 3).

Lobell & Mauceri, (2004: 2) assert that a modern state has an essential function of maintaining security and internal order. This is emphasized by Clapham who adds that a country is “the only legitimate and acceptable form of rule and that all of the world’s people, and all of its territory, therefore” (Clapham, (2004: 80). In Somalia, the emergence of several clan-based militias catalyzed the collapse of the state as these groups not only threatened the states monopoly of power, but they also made it difficult for the state to carry out its administrative duties in some territories (Gebrewold, 2005: 203). Clan elders offered support to these militia groups thus providing them with the much-needed legitimacy that would

enable them to operate in such areas. The clan-based militia did not emerge overnight on the wake of the collapse of the state of Somalia in 1991 they are part of the transformation of the conflict in Somalia. Traces of structured clan groups whose objective was to use force to achieve their goals began to appear after Somalia was defeated in the Ogaden War by Ethiopia in 1978. The then president Siad Barre is believed to have been an essential architecture of this form of groups which at the beginning appeared less significant but would later lead to dangerous consequences for the country. Siad Barre himself acted as a warlord when he opted to unleash force on civilians mostly in Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

Civilian militia groups quickly got hold of and asserted themselves in the political landscape of Somalia. One cannot fail to notice that at the center of their emergence was the much-prized control of the country's political economy which members of the Marehan clan (the biggest beneficiaries of Barre's regime) were keen on defending. Siad Barre was able to manipulatively convince members of his Marehan clan that an attack on his government, including criticism and demand for reforms, posed a direct threat the entire clan's Social, economic and political interest. Apart from the civilian militia, the government also had its militia groups which were used to repel any form of attack on the government of the day. This state-centric militia just like their civilian counterparts was structured around clan identity of those at the top of the government.

The collapse of the Somali state has had a significant impact on the difficulty of solving the conflict in Somalia. The absence of a central authority with vast legitimacy has meant that critical institutions that are supposed to protect lives and secure property are missing and, in their place, non-state actors have emerged. Again, efforts to try and re-establish a central authority since 1991 has proved to be difficult with the previous efforts being challenged by the various armed groups and self-declared autonomous territories (Menkhaus, 2004: 16). It is important to note that by the time the state was collapsing, visible signs of such

occurrence were already visible way back to 1969 and beyond. First of all, Somalia had not celebrated a decade since independence when the 1969 coup occurred. This means the country was still in very early stages of state building which is often characterized by weak institutions. When the military took power in 1969, it deconstructed the rudimentary structures of democracy that had been put in place at the time such as the judiciary, legislature and the civil service creating a vacuum of the country's governance system. At the time of the collapse, the government had lost control over the economic and political space in Somalia (Zartman, 1995: 9).

Clan patronage and militia once again come under the critical spotlight in the events surrounding the collapse of the Somali state. Here, we observe that the far-reaching consequences of clannism do not only end with political instability, it goes further to create a fertile ground for the emergence of other non-state actors (with different objectives and interests) which have taken control of different territories after the total collapse of the state. Not only were state institutions incapable of solving the problems that led to the crisis, clanism which had infiltrated other sectors such as political party and security forces meant that the country could not save itself from. State agencies became autonomous and started to operate without any form of coordination or to receive instructions from a central authority. Agencies that were supposed to ensure there were law and order in the country became the very institutions that disobeyed law and order. Instances where state officers began to define their salaries and allowance became a common occurrence. On the periphery, clans were organizing themselves in some ways to protect their survival and security. This was made possible by the emergence of different warlords in different parts of the country.

With economic challenges on the rise, groups of young men were efficiently recruited to become members of pirate organizations that wreak havoc in the entire horn of Africa. The

sustainability of this practice relied on the lucrative sums of money that these groups were able to receive from ransom on merchant ships and the lack of government to regulate and punish such offenders in their territories. The absence of police and military in certain parts of the country particularly along the coastal line allowed some of the hijacked ships to be brought to the shores of Somalia. Young, wealthy pirates became a role model for many youths in Somalia who wanted to emulate a similar lifestyle. Piracy received a global response, and within a short period it had become a dangerous endeavor. Different countries and organizations had launched counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia forcing many to abandon the trade. This resulted in loss of income and growing resentment among the youths who became vulnerable to being recruited into terrorist groups.

Once again ungoverned spaces in Somalia provided a haven for terrorist groups to recruit train and launch local and regional attacks. Many young, unemployed and remorseful youths became targets of groups whose objective were to reign terror. Territories, where government administrators and security forces cannot reach, became infiltrated by different terrorist organizations which in turn began to not only collect taxes from the locals but also provide public goods such as clean water, education, and security. Terrorism has further worsened the situation in Somalia in many ways. The vice has been a practical obstacle to peace as governments that have been put in place through the various peace efforts have been under constant struggle of power and territory from terrorist groups. Equally, massive human losses particularly government officials have been witnessed as a result of the various attacks on key government institutions such as parliament. Terrorism has meant that the government's sphere of influence in Somalia is limited to a few pockets of territories. These territories where an established government can no longer have control over are considered as ungoverned spaces, and they have played an important role in the failure to achieve sustainable peace because the new actors in the conflict have interests that can only be

achieved in an anarchic system. Therefore, any efforts towards peace will disrupt the activities of these non-state actors thus explaining why they are not keen on having a peaceful Somalia.

Context/Background of the study

When the government by Said Barre was overthrown in 1991, what followed was the disintegration of crucial institutions that sustain governance and demographic alterations in Somalia. The absence of a functioning central government rendered the state at the mercy of warlords who began to violently scramble for control of state assets both in the urban centers and in the rural areas that were under their spheres of influence. Events that surround the months between 1991 and 1992 were so devastating displacing over 1.5 million people and leaving 25000 others dead (Healy & Bradbury, 2010: 10).

Although the people who witnessed the disintegration of the state describe it as burbur ('catastrophe'), what the conflict has done to the Horn of African country nearly three decades is captured on the FSI (Foreign Policy 2008 -2011) where Somalia was the top country (Daniels 2012; Hansen 2013; Makinda 1999).

Since then the conflict has transformed from a civil war to a complex mixture of terrorism, piracy and sectarian violence. The impact of the crisis is no longer affecting the people of Somalia alone, but new threats have emerged threatening even regional countries. This comes on the background of a region whose member countries have yet managed to satisfactorily solve other pressing challenges such as disease, poverty, unemployment, low levels of literacy and underdeveloped infrastructure.

Problem Statement

Most countries in the developing world experiencing conflict have found themselves trapped in a self-sustaining and deep-rooted situation that is proving resistant to swift resolution of

their conflicts (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 2005: 4). It has also been established that conflicts today are not static but keep changing with time to take up different forms and actors. Certain factors are responsible for affecting the intensity and nature of the conflict, but often such factors always remain hidden and less visible throughout the conflict period. The flare-up new dynamics and drives to the conflict and in many cases, the emphasis is made on the new drives and dynamics instead of the primary causes. Somalia has been at war with itself for now slightly over three decades.

With increased domestic and international actors involved, a fragile government, strong ideological differences, and competition among parties involved in the conflict the prospects of peace seem far beyond the reach of many peace mediators and efforts. The main research question is; to what extent has the Somali conflict transformed, who are the actors involved and what is the implication of this on the local and regional security. Previous studies have sought to emphasis on the role of clan identity on the conflict with little attention given on the rapid transformation of the conflict and more importantly how these transformations are affecting the national and regional security of Somalia and neighboring countries respectively.

Research Questions

The research questions will include;

- ✓ What is the nexus between ungoverned territories and the conflict in Somalia?
- ✓ How has the conflict in Somalia affected national and regional security?
- ✓ What factors shape the logic of attack in Somalia?
- ✓ How can the problem of Ungoverned territories be addressed for sustainable peace?

1.1 The Aim and Significance of the Study

This study comes at a time the conflict in Somalia appears to have been overshadowed by other global events such as the war in Yemen, the conflict in Syria, trade wars between the US and other countries, the global efforts against ISIS, climate change and concerns over growing populism in the world. The Somalia crisis may also be overshadowed by its own fatigue as conflict resolution actors seems to lose pace with the rapidly changing nature of the conflict and the actors.

This research aims to examine how, and which factors have led to the transformation of the conflict in Somalia. This will not only reopen the debate over how the conflict can be dealt with, but also give a new insight over how much has changed since the crisis begun in 1991. The thesis aims introduce new academic concepts in explaining the conflict, most notably the idea of ungoverned spaces and how such spaces increase the level of vulnerability for the country in question as well as regional states.

This will contribute to the existing literature which has not only to be dominated by explanations of how identity has led to the conflict but also make clear conceptual distinction between ungoverned spaces and failed states. This distinction is important in the sense that it redefines how the two situations can be dealt with as well as why ignoring ungoverned spaces and focusing in reestablishing the collapsed state system may not yield tangible results.

The study examines the nexus between intractable conflicts, ungoverned spaces, and logic of attack impact on the national and regional security of Somalia and the Horn of Africa respectively. The study also gives an account of how the conflict has changed over time. This thesis will, therefore, add on new narrative to the understanding of why the conflict in Somali remains unresolved as well as broaden the scope to which the impact of the conflict.

Another important impact of this study is that by coming up with new narrative to the conflict, it will also give a new perspective as to why previous peace initiatives have failed and given some proposed recommendations that actors involved in the peace process can adopt in their efforts to bring peace which has remained elusive for nearly three decades. In other words, the audience of this thesis include among other players involved in peacebuilding in Somalia, Students and researchers with interest on protracted conflicts in Africa and beyond, policymakers such as constitution-making organs in Somalia as well as general audience interested with the socio-political, economic and cultural aspects of Somalia.

It is my understanding that the previous peace efforts have focused on the establishment of a central government through various coalition pacts while ignoring the ground realities such as how this new authority will have a monopoly of force and legitimacy across the whole country. The degree to which the Somali's are attached to their traditional practices and the need to configure a governance structure that is unique to the political, social and cultural aspects of Somalia needs to be examined. This research will be proposing a three-tier level of government in which traditional leaders will act as a bridge between the state and the people. This approach aims to try and establish a legitimate authority and address the challenge of ungoverned spaces.

Delimitations

Delimitations refer to the parameters that an author seek to confine their study. In other words, it refers to the areas (both thematic and statistical) which will be included in the or excluded in the study. This study has focused on three broad thematic areas, which combined offers an in-depth analysis of the situation in Somalia. One of the themes is the concept of ungoverned spaces, which has not attracted a lot of attention in analyzing Somalia partly

because when the central government collapsed in the early 1990s, the country was declared a failed state, a tag that has persisted despite the changes experienced in the country. Indeed, the turn of the millennium has seen great changes in the country's political landscape including the formation of the TFG and later the Federal government of Somalia. These changes have been accompanied by relative stability in some federal states such as Somaliland, Puntland and Jubland. Therefore, with the presence of a recognized government in Mogadishu, the status of the country changes from a fully failed state to a state facing the challenge of ungoverned spaces.

The second thematic area included in the study is the intractable nature of the conflict which looks at how the situation in the country has changed over time but keeping one thing constant, violence. The country remains vulnerable to new forms of threats that have also gone beyond the national boundaries of the country. New actors as well as new strategies of attack have made it difficult for those attempting to forge peace in the country to come up with a comprehensive plan. Given the importance of identifying the deep-rooted areas to help formulate a peace approach that is relevant to Somalia has to take into account the intractable nature of the conflict. Unlike other traditional civil war and political violence intractable conflicts are very complex and difficult to resolve using contemporary peacebuilding strategies.

The third aspect that has been included in the study is the concept of logic of attack. This is also a theme that has not featured a lot in existing studies on Somalia, yet as this study finds, there is a unique trend that informs us a lot about the nature of the conflict. First, understanding who attacks what during this crisis is essential to avoid blanket conclusions that can deny us an opportunity to identify the real issues affecting the country. The logic of attack is therefore a useful tool to understand how and why the conflict is spreading in Somalia and across the region.

Some key areas that have been excluded in this study is the more common analysis of the conflict from a clan lens. While I acknowledge the important role that clan identity is playing in Somalia, it should not be lost that the impact of clan identity is significantly shaped by other structural and socio-economic factors. Plus, the issue of clan identity in the Somalia conflict has been broadly addressed. Another issue that has been excluded in the study is the humanitarian and aid elements in for Somalia. Most of the studies on the Somalia conflict have reflected on the humanitarian response to the war-torn nation and therefore, given the vast existence of literature on the related topics, humanitarian response to the country has been excluded.

CHAPTER 1.

1. UNDERSTANDING SOMALIA CONFLICT FROM COMPLEXITY AND UNGOVERND SPACE THEORIES.

In this chapter, I discuss two theories that help to put the conflict in Somalia within a broader academic context. The chapter examines the complexity and the ungoverned spaces theories to explain the transformation of the conflict, the intractable nature of the conflict and why peace efforts have found it difficult to achieve sustainable stability. The conflict in Somalia has undoubtedly attracted the attention of researchers from multi-disciplinary backgrounds. This has led to a varied interpretation of the causes of the conflict, its impact, and more importantly varied recommendations on how to address the conflict. There are those who have examined the cultural causes of the conflict Osman (2007), some have looked at how regional dynamics such as the intervention of Ethiopia and Kenya accelerated the conflict Ingiriis, (2018) while others have discussed the impact of colonialism, inequality and marginalization in Somali politics, authoritarianism especially during Siad Barre's regime.

Other factors such as the role of warlords and access to weapons have also been used to discuss the conflict in Somalia. However, despite the existence of a lot of literature on the conflict, few have attempted to show the nexus between these different drivers and how they combine to cause one of the world's longest conflicts. This thesis acknowledges the difficulty in analyzing the conflict in Somalia and with that adopts three theoretical frameworks to provide a more elaborate understanding of the conflict.

The author begins by emphasizing that no single driver/cause in the Somalia conflict can independently explain the situation in the country and more importantly, solving only one of these drivers may not guarantee sustained peace. Therefore, by combining three

frameworks this study is able to provide peace advocates with a new perspective that can accelerate peace efforts.

Secondly, most of the existing studies have been limited in analysing the national and micro-causes and impacts of the Somalia conflict and give little relevance to regional and international factors. This study argues that there is a strong nexus between what is happening within Somalia and regional security. It identifies that while the conflict emerged as an internal civil war, it has rapidly transformed into a threat not only on the country's national security but also regional and international security. The study will focus on the national and regional threats and leave the impact of the Somalia conflict on international security for future research.


Indeed, the consequence of internal conflicts on regional security is not unique to Somalia. Indeed, there are many examples of internal conflicts that have continued to affect the security of entire regions (*see* Adebajo, 2002; Lee, 2010; Forsberg, 2016). More recently, the conflict in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, and others has had devastating consequences on regional security and in some cases international security. The Sahel region is also an example of how internal vulnerabilities and conflicts can spread across the border and affect other countries.

In order to address the gap that often limits analysis of conflicts to a single country or a single issue/drive, this study adopts the complexity theory which is an innovative framework that allows the researcher to include various issues that affect conflict but can easily evade the attention of conflict research. The key assumptions of the complexity theory include: (1) human dynamics are not linear and cannot be effectively understood using Newtonian approaches. (2) that human dynamics occur in social structures that are multi-layered and affect origin, trends, and resolution of conflicts. (3) that conflicts are not only unpredictable

but also not very easy to control. (4) that although conflicts among humans are unpredictable, they often generate patterns that can be used to effect positive change.

In addition, the study adopts the ungoverned space framework. This approach is very useful in studying the conflict in Somalia and its security implications on the state and region. Ungoverned space theory is founded on the assumption that territories that the state control is missing or potentially disputed/challenged can become grounds for groups and individuals intending to threaten security. It fits well in the analysis of Somalia given the situation in the country when it comes to governance and government control of the territory. Since the central government collapsed in the early 1990s, Somalia has become a territory under siege from different groups and people who not only seek to gain control of the country but also exert their influence. Some scholars have also raised the issue of economic interest that has seen different groups compete for space and power in the Horn of Africa country (Randall, 1993; Oliveira, 2013; Webersik, 2006). Figure (5) below shows some of the territories in Somalia that are under the control of non-state actors.

Figure 1: Territorial occupation of terrorist groups



Source: PolGeoNow (2021)

While the government in Mogadishu has made tremendous progress in reclaiming some of the territories, non-state actors are only part of the actors challenging the central government authority internally. Territories such as Puntland and Somaliland have shown signs of rebellion and to some extent shown a desire to become independent of the central government. These territories that are not under the control of the central government not only challenge peacebuilding efforts but also national and regional security.

Apart from the complexity and ungoverned spaces theories, the study adopts the logic of attack theory to explain the trend and nature of attacks. The author observes a unique trend in the victims of attacks in Somalia and regional countries. The thesis seeks to show that socio-political and economic dynamics tend to influence the behavior of different actors in Somalia and turn affect the outcome of the conflict. This is important because most of the peace efforts towards Somalia have ignored the implications of the conflict on regional security and the need to involve regional actors in the peace process. In other words, efforts to forge national peace in Somalia without addressing the violence and attacks that target regional countries mean that those countries have resolved to pursue their security interests inside Somalia.

This has not only resulted in intervention by regional states but also led to support of different actors within Somalia which results in prolonged and protracted conflict. Therefore, a combination of complexity theory and ungoverned space theory will provide a broader analysis of the conflict in Somalia. But first it is essential to revisit the most commonly used lens in analysing the conflict in Somalia, which is the nexus between clan identity, politics and conflict. While this approach offers very important framework, it falls short of explaining the transformed nature of the conflict.

1.1 Emergence and Transformation of the Somalian Conflict

The stability of the Siad regime was drained by the defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden War as clan conflicts continue to escalate. In April 1978, the unsuccessful military coup heralded the establishment of two opposition groups: the SNM, whose supporters are mainly from the Isaaq clan of the northern regions, and the SSDF, having supporters from the Majeerteen clan of the Mudug region in central Somalia. The two groups were formed in 1982 and assumed operations from Ethiopia's bases. These constraints, including that from Somalia's Western backers, influenced improved relations between Siad with Kenya and Ethiopia. However, the endorsement of a peace agreement (1998) with Ethiopian Leader, Mengistu Haile Marian, required each party to discontinue upholding anti-government guerrillas in Somali ironically resulted in the civil war in Somalia.

The SNM besieged government forces in their home region after the closure of Ethiopia's bases, harboring resentment that left abandoned towns in the hands of government forces. As a result of a peace treaty with Ethiopia, Ogaadeen Somali felt betrayed and abandoned his obligation, laying siege to Siad's clansmen. Siad eventually became distracted by survival and joined his hold on Mogadishu. Following the footsteps of the SSDF and SNM, opposition groups' clans-based guerrilla proliferated rapidly. Siad sought asylum amongst his clansmen after being subdued by the Hawiye-based USC forces in January 1991. Subsequently, all the clans with access to military equipment stores in the country set up their area of control outside Mogadishu. In the south, the government had fallen apart and only functioned at the local level in the northern region controlled by SSDF. The SNM declared the 1960 federation invalid in May 1991 after gaining control of the former British Somaliland northern region and consequently the northern region become independent and referred to as the Republic of Somaliland.

The appointment of a USC transitional government in Mogadishu initiated hostility between rival Hawiye clan factions. The capital was destroyed by the troops from two rival warlords Ali Mahdi Muhammad of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), and Gen. Muhammad Farah Aydid of the SNA and fought with Siad's militia clan, the Somali National Front (SNF) took control of the Sothern coast and hinterland. This resulted in a state of war that affected the grain-producing region resulting in the famine in the northern Somalis. Efforts to supply relief food prove futile due to systematic looting by militias. Through a peace-making effort by the UN, the United States intervened leading a multinational force that involved approximately 35,000 troops in December 1992, which imposed peace on belligerent clans and eased supplies into areas struck by famine.

Peace and disarmament treaties were signed by 15 Somali factions in January and March 1993, unfortunately by June insecurity intensified. By March 1994, American and European forces were withdrawn. Following an unacceptable number of casualties. Whilst the UN force lessened military units mainly from under-developed countries, the civil war persisted. Eventually, a year later the UN troops evacuated. Efforts to restore peace over few years have failed as clan feuds between clans persist, SSA and SNA dominating warring factions.

The country continued to be torn apart the SSDF emerging in 1998 predominating the northeast identified as Puntland declaring its plan to self-govern. However, Puntland did not fully independence from Somalia contrary to the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, it instead maintained its state as an autonomous region in the country with the aspiration of reuniting the country to a federal republic.

More than 10 peace Conferences addressing the warfare in Somalia were held in the 1990s but failed tremendously. However, the 2000 peace treaty that took place in Djibouti gave forth to a three-year Somali's governing plan. There was an establishment of a Transitional

National Assembly consisting of clans' representatives and later within that year a TNG was formed. However, there was some resentment over the authority of TNG within the country, there was constant opposition against the new government hindering its efforts to rule effectively.

In 2002 series of peace talks commenced being sponsored by the IGAD held in Kenya which yield a new transitional government referred to as TFG. In 2004, there was the inauguration of a transitional parliament, and in October same year Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed was elected by the parliament as an interim president for five years. As most of Somalia, specifically Mogadishu remained unsafe, the new government of Somalia continues to operate in Kenya. The Somali coast was struck by a tsunami in the same year resulting in over 700 casualties, thousands of people being displaced, and ruining fishing communities' livelihood.

For the first time since its establishment, the transitional parliament held a meeting in *Baydhabo* (Baidoa), Somalia in February 2006. *Baydhabo* was believed to be safer than the Somali capital city, Mogadishu where civil war accelerated. In June 2006, the situation worsen as Mogadishu and southern regions of Somalia become under the control of the ICU conquering the clan warlords' militias. Moreover, the ICU changed its name to the SICC and renewed its organizational structure. The authority of TFG was challenged by SICC which heightened hostilities.

Since TFG was internationally recognized as the legal government in Somalia Ethiopian troops were sent to Somalia to defend it receiving complete support from the international community. SICC was presumed to have links with Al-Qaeda, more particularly the militant faction referred to al-Shabaab which were letter confirmed to be true. The tension remained even after attempts at peace talks were held between the SICC and the TFG. Ethiopian and Somali troops enforced a synchronized ground and air war which forced SICC out of

Mogadishu in January 2007. The SICC fell apart but the al-Shabaab survived and continued to raise terror over the years. The United Nations Security Council permitted African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) in February 2007 which unfortunately restricted its obligation. Somalia continued to suffer from violence and warfare, in addition to famine, drought famine. In 2008 Yusuf resigned as the president due to criticism he faced on handling peace efforts.

In January 2009, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected as the president. Within the same year, the TFG's mandate was extended by the transitional government for another two years which was later extended for one more year in 2011. The transitional government agreed to adopt Shari'ah (Islamic law) in April 2009 which was applied throughout the country. This was perceived to allure the ICU/SICC.

The term 'warlord' is referred to as an entrepreneur in a failed state or a failed entrepreneur. The agenda of the civil war was reframed in different ways by the Cold War and Globalization. At the reign of armed groups, Charles Taylor represented leaders with no ideological background in the Anglo-Saxon world. Internal conflicts during the Cold War were viewed as liberation struggles which now are regarded as transcendent that fuel ethnic feuds and violence. Warlord is among the neologism that tends to make sense of the state of affairs in Afghanistan, Liberia, or Sierra Leone. Other suggested notions include 'Violent entrepreneur'. These alternatives proved less successful partially due to academic critique (it is the market derivative from which these 'entrepreneurs' operate) but also due to the phrase warlord epitomized the interpretation of the non-political and vicious figure.

The Warlord concept is of synoptic origin to an extent used by scholars to study Chinese history in the period 1916-28. The conflicts in which the Chinese Tsuchin were involved gave rise to a model that was coherent to several different processes; the deterioration of

nationalism into religious sectarianism and/or regionalism, the rise of officer strata of lower-ranking and the military hierarchy disintegration; and the encumbrance imposed upon the population through violence and extortion (Robert 1989; Giustozzi, 2005). This analysis concentrates on the matter of eminent interest for academia; the state weakening and collapse; the rise of military entrepreneurs whose character was discovered by patrimonial logic; and establishment of military apparatus that eliminated any threat to its leader, making him an interlocutor ready to trade or exploit natural resources for international interest.

Whilst the studies in China concentrated on distinct periods of history with the term being linked to the fall of the dynasty and imperial bureaucratic class destruction attempts to define the concept of warlords have failed (Clapham, 2002; Reno and Reinner, 1998) . Christopher Clapham definition considered three key dimensioned which include, personal rule, economic resources monopoly, and the actual use of coercion expressing dominance. According to all authors writing on the concepts, warlordism is connected to state decay, however, the link seems to be problematic. In Somalia, it is a result of state collapse (Menkhaus, (2004). At some point cause collapse of the state (Reno, 1999). Armed movement Self-destruction has been linked to warlordism (Menkhaus, 2007) which is not a necessary consequence of state failure.

Conventionally, the theory is expected to illustrate the cause and the effect. Presumably, the main component of ‘warlordism’ is spawned by the state’s crisis. According to most experts, countries experiencing civil war and warlords are described as ‘collapsed states’, yet it is evident that the condition is attributed to a dictatorial regime and/or a dysfunctional administrative apparatus. However, aspects of the state are barely considered. In the case of Somalia for example, there have been limited attempts to define the exact aspects of state failure that are beyond administrative capabilities virtual absence.

What was the effect on the capitalists? How the army was reorganized? What of the social fabric? How regional actors in and outside Somalia compelled and restrained such a process? How and to what point that this particular form of downfall contrives the political and military actors' decisions that arose at the beginning of the war? (Marchal and Messiant, 1987). Furthermore, the discourse of collapse state believes that the state was properly functioning at one point in history, (that is almost approaching a Weberian manner): we are facing a normative debatable state definition (which do not apply to European states), and its evidently enough such state did not exist in history considering this case (Reno, 1999).

The 'personal rule' aspect is the second weak dimension of the paradigm warlord. It is considered as the central element of a deemed reality and alienates other components in the vision conjured by warlordism. Eventually, everything has to be linked to the warlord. For instance, in all definitions, the warlord entirely controls the military apparatus. Nonetheless, the existence of armed groups relies on both resources and social conditions, even though according to Charlton and May (1989), the irrelevancy of notions like 'militarism' is accepted. The would-be warlord may have little influence over those conditions.

About the old debate, both 'offer' and 'demand' are applied by the warlords and military leaders (Gambeta, 1993). For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Chad, as depicted by Martin Doornbos (1982) 'it is often heard that' "those in possession of a gun can play *hakama* [government]...youth had two options only, either to become *suwaar* [rebel] or go to Sudan Menkhaus (2007), further elaborates that "I am a fighter" is 'the magic sentence' seemed to pave the way to rights and excuses of all misdeeds of all sorts of activities (Menkhaus, 2006b). In Somalia, warlords were not only ready to have this status but also forced into this position to perform certain roles and obligations that provided others with opportunities.

This is to mean that warlord candidates were to accept certain social patterns that were beyond his desire: his people were dependent on him as he was to them. Furthermore, since the only hegemonic tool for the warlord is coercion, associations with other social groups were based on either submission or opposition. These form an inadequate knowledge of complexities that may be created by the social bonds. How, then can the existence of other actors enjoying military might but coexist together with warlords be interpreted? For instance, Oliver Roy maintains that warlords of Afghan differ from drug traders in Afghanistan and that both sides respected the agreements made (Roy, 2004). In Somalia businessmen able to coordinate private army as a warlord would barely be identified. Although the defining term for their relations cannot be obedience. Therefore, warlord is not regarded only as an armed group boss.

A practical critique in the Somali context focusing on one case, Somalia, allows us to raise other questions and certainly arrive at answers that are not in line with the generally accepted use of the term 'warlord'. The exercise in all cases ought to be repeated; as illustrated by Antonio Giustozzi (2003:48-52) in the case of Afghanistan, the results tend to challenge aid institutions, donors, and indolent academics.

Considering accuracy, the list of disputed assumptions includes; the perceptual that all warlords are the same. No distinction is made among them. According to history, some were political leaders at some point, for instance, Mohamed Farah Aydiid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, while others rose arose from vanquished military commanders lacking political backgrounds such as Abdi Qaybdiid and Omar Finish. These people may eventually appear the same to foreigners, yet Somalis do not regard them interchangeable. Even though all warlords establish and manage their military apparatus, some received essential uphold from other constituencies (Ali Mahdi and Aydiid serving as a good example).

Others attained their goals which enabled them to gain popular support, not coercion only. For instance, the existing president Abdullahi Yuusuf (Battera, 1999: 83), of the transitional federal government formed Puntland in 1998. This seemed possible due to substantial support from Ethiopia and military superiority in contrast to leaders from that area, Puntland has epitomized a regional feeling as its existence in 2007 illustrates its success. This accomplishment is still unattainable to many. Unfortunately, greater number of the 24 warlords who attended the reconciliation conference from October 2002 to 2004 in Kenya had different agents far from the agenda for change. All warlords have been assumed to be clan-based even though it has not been always the same in Somali crisis history as noted earlier since the clan will always split.

For instance, Somalis considered Omar Finish and his rival Muuse Suudi as cousins, although the Transitional National Government empowered the former to oppose the latter. To prove that in cases the process means the same, two mistakes have to be made: The first one is, the mistaken belief caused by Somali's society's segmentary modelling, that all the clans function the same way internally which is not true. Historically, Migration and urbanization differentiated each clan, yet they claim a greater number of commonalities.

The second misconception is based on the reason behind clan division. As it has been noted emergence of new leaders within clans was a result of divisions that existed even before the civil war; at times they were an entrepreneur who gained support from allies, powerful within their clan, other clans, and even foreign states. Examples of such cases are Osman Atto and Omar Finish. Examples of the first scenario include Mohamed Qanyere Afrah and others with rich socio-political implications. Despite not being a political revolution, the civil war in Somalia led to drastic changes that were connected to the state that prevailed before 1991. Additionally, the position and power of Siad Barre's rule were often given to people who ceased to be members of their sub-clan or their lineage.

Labour and social division among sub-clan has also been witnessed in Côte d'Ivoire, (Dembele, 2003: 57). The economic and political elite of Abgaal came from one particular clan, even though he claimed they were conquered by a dictatorship as other Hawiye clans. Division of labor was destroyed by the Civil war, as expected Muuse Suudi and Ali Mahdi originated from other clans. This is an example of the Somaliland political situation that keeps on reoccurring.

The emergence of warlordism wasn't linked to personal entrepreneurship. However, some tend to act like traditional leaders. In 1992, the international community intervention was promoted by the traditional leader. Since not all clans had 'Sultan' or 'Boqor', political or factional entrepreneurs created them to get complete foreign support. Subsequently, the emergency of the warlord meant that the group of interest could be heard, gain attention from the international community, and rule over another warlord. Sub-clan was barely recognized. For example, during Mohamed Farah Aydiid rule, no meetings were held by his clan without his permission (contra the 'pastoral democracy' depicted by Ion Lewis). Nevertheless, this was applicable in all cases. His antagonist Ali Mahdi lacked the power to apply the same allegiance.

Support or dissidence could not be the only terms that describe the bond between the warlords and the clans. Even though coercion is the factor, it concentrates more on warlords while clan support is not well elaborated. Mohamed Qanyere Afrah avoids contest by coercing his clan. His brutal thug made him the most distasted. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, he was the most respected: for example, he aired out his clan's concerns not only to Somali leaders but also to the international community. The warlord concept has been labelled as predatory behaviour. Conclusively, certain officials in all cabinets in Somaliland, Somalia, and Puntland have been named as the greediest by the Somalis.

Considerably, it is important to bear in mind that the history of state position in Somalia has been linked to predation and is not only attached to specific individuals. Somalia's history of counterfeit money implies that warlords might not be successful predators as perceived. 28. Moralistic judgments obscure analysis. If it was possible to engage in the intricacies of the Somali case, the misconception list would certainly be extended. More importantly, the warlord model weaknesses should be emphasized.

However, it does not mean that warlords do not exist in Somalia, but according to the author, they are fewer than deemed. It might be argued that, in politics, terms are not used per their right meaning; this is perfectly true, except politics is not the expertise of academia. By adopting this label to all armed leaders, the Somali arena became impenetrable by leaders responsible for the management of the Somali file, as either aid workers, diplomats, or Somali politics were reduced to the relationship established between those figures. Other aspects were barely considered or relegated to the second or third position. The international community failed to recognize the arising of other collecting actors due to their inability to understand how Somalia's armed factions operated. The Islamic Courts understood the importance of the factional system to the society and therefore they were easily weakened.

1.2 Politics, Clannism and Conflict

At the mention of Somalia, what comes to mind is a picture of the country engaged in continuous internal conflicts that have had massive effects as far as disruption of human life and destruction of property to an extent that these unfortunate events do not fall short of a catastrophic definition. However, the most common question is why Somalia experiences this extent of instability even though it is one of the few nation states characterized by a homogeneous population with a common language, religion, history, and culture. This is better understood if we put clan identity in the context of politics in Somalia.

The political atmosphere in Somalia is one characterized by the Machiavellian principles where the political players usually warlords backed by their clans and very rich individuals who continue to amass a lot of wealth in the midst of all this chaos and ultimately but illegitimately acquire political power act swiftly to thwart any form of threat to their domination. Towards this end, a lot of casualties some of whom include their own personal foot soldiers are realized. To the warlords, it's a matter of 'eat or be eaten, survive or die' ideology.

Indeed, the happenings in Somalia have concerned international actors in various ways. The importance of the Indian Ocean trade route both to the East African states as well as Middle East countries such as India cannot be more emphasized. The instability in Somalia greatly interfered with this route due to piracy in the ocean. Fleets security could no longer be guaranteed. This has been the status of things since the collapse of military rule in 1991. Earlier military operations failed especially after matters became complicated with the emergence of the al-Shaabab Terrorist group.

The situation was so dire that neighboring countries such as Kenya were forced to directly engage the group by sending soldiers to Somalia in 2010 under their operation termed 'Operation Linda Nchi.' To this moment the operation is still going on 7 years later and as matter of fact, it has evolved to become a much bigger operation under the banner of AMISOM banner of the African Union. Soldiers are drawn from Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

Many would agree that the approach of bringing foreign forces to Somalia and their efforts to try and reconcile warlords and politicians who are the primary impediments towards the restoration of peace and ultimately stability will take a long time for any progress to be realized. This is because each of these groups is only motivated by their selfish ambitions

for power and self-preservation. From the heinous crimes they have committed to ensuring their self-preservation it will be foolhardy not to argue that these group of people is not bothered in any way by moral codes of society, and neither will they be held back by laws. This is why the main objective by peace mission of trying to restore the relations between these corrupt elites will continue not to bear fruits as this method has continuously been proven unsuitable to Somalis through their culture and experiences.

1.3 Intractable conflict and the crisis in Somalia

With over thirty years of conflict in Somalia, it is important to first put the nature of the conflict into context before discussing the theories. The situation in Somalia and other conflicts of similar nature have been described by scholars as intractable conflicts (Mwagwabi, 2011; Ullán de la Rosa & Arrey, 2021; Makhubela, 2010). According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary (2005), the word intractable means “not easily governed, managed or directed; not easily manipulated or wrought; not easily relieved or cured.” Three characteristics formulate an intractable conflict. One, for a conflict to be considered intractable, it has to be *protracted*. Protracted conflicts are conflicts that have existed for a long period of time, such as the Somalia conflict that begun in 1991 and continues to date (2021).

Coleman (2000) and Putnam & Wondolleck (2003) add that protracted conflict also includes those that experience cynical patterns. That is a combination of peace and violence from time to time. In addition to these characteristics, Crocker et al, (2005) opine that intractable conflicts are also very difficult to resolve through mediation or negotiations. This is true of the Somalia case where over five major peace efforts sought to attain a political settlement, but they all failed.

The second characteristic of intractable conflicts is that they involve violence that both the fighter (i.e., those directly involved in the hostilities as well as third parties acknowledge that they are destructive violence (Mitchell, 2014). This means that intractable conflicts have huge emotional, financial, and physical traumatic consequences. The third characteristic of intractable conflict is that despite efforts to transform, manage or resolve the conflict, the violence tends to persist (Kreisberg, 2005).

Intractable conflicts, therefore, represent those conflicts that are extremely difficult to resolve while on the other hand, tractable conflicts are simple and easy to resolve. Interestingly, not all intractable conflicts begin as such. It is however how the initial conflict is handled that can result in intractable or tractable conflict. This represents the trend of most contemporary conflicts such as the ones that emerged during the Arab spring in 2011.

At their initial stages, be it in Yemen, Syria or Libya, the protests seemed harmless and would have been resolved once clear demands by the protest leaders were met. However, the way in which these protests were handled resulted in a very different situation with protestors who were initially waving banners now carrying guns and becoming organized into militia groups. This is also similar to what happened in Somalia, at the initial stages, the groups that were pushing for the government of Siad Barre to step aside were organized at the beginning. But after President Barre was removed, this unity of purpose among the protest leaders vanished leading to the rise of different actors and agents that have made the conflict extremely difficult to understand and resolve.

The origin of intractable conflicts can also be associated with irreconcilable moral differences. This is because at the core of conflicts is the question of what is good or bad as well as what/who is right or wrong. The interpretation of these values is often affected by ideological, cultural, social, political, and religious and competing world views. The other

factor that leads to intractable conflict is the question of “who gets what” or rather what others call distributional issues. When people are struggling over the allocation or control of resources, political power, land, wealth, employment opportunities, and critical needs such as water that may not have a clear alternative then the conflict is likely to persist for long.

The conflict is likely to be even more destructive and bitter if the variables are distributed unequally. This is also closely related to the problem of domination be it at the social and/or political level. If there are sentiments around unjust social and political or even sometimes economic representation then those who are disadvantaged in this situation are likely to pursue violence. Having mentioned the circumstances that would lead to intractable conflict, it is important to remember that the presence of one or more of these features may not necessarily make a conflict intractable, but each of them will certainly increase the probability of conflict becoming intractable.

The challenge of dealing with conflicts that have the potential of becoming intractable is that these conflicts transform to become intractable much faster than it would be to resolve the conflict. The level of skill, commitment, compromise needed to avoid a conflict from becoming intractable is not easy to come by especially if identity politics is involved in the conflict. Identity tends to push the stakes in a conflict so high so that even a simple conflict that could have been resolved early ends up becoming intractable as conflicting parties put their ethnic, clan, race, religious or social identity first. Resolving conflicts requires both parties to compromise and come up with a middle ground however if the skill to bring the protagonists to some sought of agreement is lacking, then the conflict will continue longer than necessary.

Noteworthy, compromise, especially when it means giving up some of the things that an individual or group values is not easy. More so if the conflict resolution is seen as one group

as a win-lose for them then they may not be willing to settle for an agreement which in many cases turns the conflict to become intractable. In situations where even though the conflict is continuing a majority of the society is not affected intensively then there is a likelihood of such conflicts becoming intractable.

For example, if there is an active conflict characterized by sporadic attacks that occur months or years apart and if the damage/loss or number of people killed are few then we are likely to see limited efforts in resolving such conflicts. In addition, if the society is having other challenges such as poverty, health crises, unemployment, and confrontative foreign policy, then the conflict may not be focused on as much as it should be. In Somalia, it is not surprising to find domestic efforts to resolve the conflict non-existent as the focus is on power competition, ideological rivalry, clan disagreements, economic instability, and constant foreign policy spat with neighbouring countries. This explains partly why the conflict has become intractable.

The problem is when a conflict becomes intractable or rather perceived to be, the cost of getting out of the conflict is seen as higher than sustaining the conflict. The situation, therefore, ends up in a vicious cycle of violence that further increases the intractability of the conflict. For example, strategies such as attacking civilians, suicide bombings, and other desperate actions are associated with intractable conflict since the protagonists view the possibility of peace as less likely.

In case there are credible signs that the conflict is moving away from intractability, then peacebuilding advocates and negating groups will find it easy to bring the warring parties to a negotiating table. This means that for intractable conflicts, peace efforts may be more effective if they start by reducing the perception that the conflict is intractable, thus reducing

the stakes. It is also prudent to begin by acknowledging where the reality is that a conflict is intractable. This will easily lead to efforts aimed at searching for a way out.

Ideally, despite being stuck in a morass of intractable violence, actors, agents, and stakeholders can have hope that a possible solution is on the horizon, and they only need to be skilful in dealing with the crisis. Even in instances where we have prolonged violence such as the case of Somalia, we can rely on simple steps such as passing laws that could strengthen governance systems and participation in the country or even develop terms and conditions that may lead to a long-term cease-fire. In the next section I will discuss the application of complexity theory in Somalia. It offers an in-depth perspective of the conflict nature and transformation over the years.

1.4 Complexity Theory and the Somalian Conflict

Complexity theory is not a single concept but a combination of either different theories or some elements of existing theories. The theory traces its roots from a range of natural science disciplines including biology, mathematics, computer simulation, chemistry, and physics (Kauffman, 1993: 1995: 2000; Waldrop, 1992). The complexity theory emerged from an understanding that the Newtonian scientific paradigm had serious limitations, especially when applied to systems that were complex. The Newtonian paradigm had also been challenged by discoveries made in the field of quantum physics (Holland, 1995: 1998).

However, these new discoveries were only limited to certain parameters and the general consensus was that in the absence of another theory with radical assumptions, the Newtonian paradigm was still the most practical approach. The universal application of complexity theory to broader disciplines including human and social settings came of age following years of sharing knowledge across time and distance (Lemke, 2000: 190).

In comparison to *complicated* systems which may include several elements interacting as is the case with the wiring of a ship or aircraft engine, if one chooses to study only parts of a whole, say a small section of these engines, it is extremely difficult to predict conclusively the function of the engine. Therefore, when dealing with a complicated system, sufficient effort is needed to know and determine the outcome. On the other hand, *complex* systems are very difficult to study and determine an outcome due to the high number of actors and agents involved. It is this aspect of a complex system (i.e involves different actors and agents) that makes it not only relevant but also highly applicable in a human setting.

Elements of complexity theory from natural sciences have indeed been increasingly adopted in various disciplines of social sciences. Mitleton-Kelly (2003: 2) describes the adoption of complexity theory in social sciences as “*an explanatory framework that helps us understand the behavior of a complex social (human) system.*” These sentiments are captured in his later publication when he explains that;

“how individuals and organizations interact, relate, and evolve within a larger social ecosystem. Complexity also explains why interventions may have unanticipated consequences. The intricate inter-relationships of elements within a complex system give rise to multiple chains of dependencies. Change happens in the context of this intricate intertwining at all scales. We become aware of the change only when a different pattern becomes discernible.” (Mitleton-Kelly, 2007).

To understand the relevance of this theory not only on natural sciences but also generally in social science and conflict in particular. I will discuss some of the characteristics of the complex theory.


Self -organization: this feature is based on the assumption that the complex system is characterized by actors and agents that operate independent of any external influence or governance and with that produces a new order. According to Lemke (1993: 247), it is the environment within which these agents are operating within that defines the nature of self - organization of the system and not an autonomous or internal process.

The idea of self-organization emerged from the works of biologists Maturana & Varela (2012) who were conducting research on biological systems. They came up with the concept of *autopoiesis* to refer to the internal processes that saw different components affecting each other and, in the process, affecting the entire system. This is what Walby (2003: 6) describes as “ a system reproducing itself.” If we look at how many actors are involved in the Somali crises, and how the actions of those different actors affect the behavior of others we can see that the situation has become what we see today due to the impact of self -organization.

Emergence: This is another hallmark of complex theory in the sense that it focuses on the emerging characteristics of the ‘whole’ system that are a result of the structure and activities of the components. The number of active actors in Somalia are so many and significantly shapes the situation in the country as we see it today. Mitleton- Kelly (2003) contend that;

“Emergent properties, qualities, patterns, or structures, arise from the interaction of individual elements; they are greater than the sum of the parts and may be difficult to predict by studying the individual elements. Emergence is the process that creates new order together with self-organization (Mitleton- Kelly 2003: 19)

Figure 2: The number of actors that have actively shaped Somalia's conflict environment between 2000 and 2016.



Source: Author compilation from different sources.

The system or outcome will also be significantly influenced by random external or internal fluctuations. In our case, events and activities happening inside or outside Somalia can shape how the trajectory of the conflict.

Nonlinear: the third assumption is that there is no proportional causal connection between the agents and actors. Existing scientific myths and assumptions tend to promote the idea that a large input will automatically lead to a large output (be it of force or other factors and variables). Similarly, small input will also lead to a small output. However, when dealing with complex systems theory, this assumption is disputed. Instead, it accommodates the idea that in complex situations, the input can result in a different output. That is, there is no proportionality. For example, when a terrorist group targets a country, they may use few attackers and the casualties can also be low, however, the response of the government that has been attacked could lead to massive military operations that may result in much bigger destruction and casualties.

Applying complex systems theory in social sciences has also benefited from these assumptions. Even more, important is the application of complex systems theory to social settings where behavior and interaction seem to be not only complex but also difficult to predict. This has seen the application of this theory in social science disciplines such as Sociology, Development, Psychology, Management, International Relations, and even economics (Wheatley, 2006; Senge, 1999; Ramalingam et. al., 2008; Groves & Hinton, 2004; Fowler, 2008a; Vallacher, 2002; Harrison, 2006; Walby, 2007). When it comes to research in peace and conflict which are always considered to be interdisciplinary in nature, this study will show that the complexity theory applies to the understanding of the conflict.

1.5 Complexity theory: Essentials

Eight essential elements in complexity combined offer a robust tool for analyzing events in natural and social sciences. These elements include; coevolution, agent-based system, fitness, punctuated equilibrium, self -organization, fitness landscape, emergence, self -organized critically (Kauffman 1993; 1995, 2000; Axelrod, 1997, Lewin, 1992; Richards, 2000).

Coevolution: this essential of complexity theory presents the argument that nothing can be able to evolve by itself without being affected or shaped by other factors. Proponents argue that every individual, organism, species, develops and adopts characteristics as a result of interacting with other elements in an environment. According to Lumsden and Wilson, (1981), any change in the features of the environment or elements/actors in the space will change the nature of other elements in the setting.

More importantly, if the change is occurring on different/several actors at the same time, then the ability to predict and therefore stop the changes becomes more difficult and complex. This is known as the “butterfly effect.” This assumption considers human social

networks to be complex and non-linear. What is important about co-evolution on conflict analysis and more specifically this study is the inclusion of the environment in analysis. Looking at how the conflict in Somalia has transformed and evolved the impact of the environment (ungoverned spaces) and how the actors and events are being influenced by changes in other actors signify the relevance of complexity theory in studying conflict in Somalia (Fowler, 2008b).

Fitness: Fitness is defined within the complexity theory as the extent to which one is able to cope with complexity. For an organism to be considered fit and make opportunities from challenging situations, it ought to be able to deal with many variables and process information fast. The theory assumes that all forms of life exist in an environment that is either ordered hierarchically (ultra-stable) or chaotic (instability). Fitness exists between the spectrum of chaos and stability. It assumes that if an organism moves extremely either towards chaos or ultra-stability then it will lose its fitness.

Ultra-stability often leads to instances of rigidity which makes such societies difficult to change while those in chaos are also difficult to change due to the complexities of chaos. Somalia has indeed lost its fitness by moving extremely towards chaos and little stability. Hierarchy has been lost at the governance (political), social and economic level. There is no defined order in the country and therefore efforts to resolve the conflict ought to take into consideration the likelihood of adopting measures that will ensure the country regains its fitness.

Punctuated equilibrium: According to Gould (2002), whenever evolution is taking place, there is always surges in avalanches of extinction and speciation. He observes that species do not die gradually but tend to quick development, then for a long-time ender change before suddenly dying. However, because of self-organization, and mutation, different species are

able to find their niche and cling to it. That is with changes in the environment, these species also change to adapt. This idea has come under criticism from scholars such as Ridley (2002:11) who argue that “what appears as ‘punctuation’ may emanate from an incomplete fossil record or analytical confusion between the record and analytical confusion between individual, class, and species.”

But this critic has been deconstructed on the grounds that even if punctuation is to happen as Ridley (2002) and others assume, it is very difficult to determine the duration of the equilibrium under such circumstances, especially in politics. In particular, this has been proved by scientists in the 1990s who observed that meteorological, physiological, and geological events occur in many cases later or earlier than focused. In 2002, cosmologists were caught up in the debate of whether it was the big bang or the contraction and contraction that occur every 14 billion years that led to the creation of the universe.

Despite the pertinent issues raised on the adoption of punctuated equilibrium in analyzing conflict, it is certainly a useful tool to analyze conflicts. In the case of Somalia, there is clear evidence that actors are adopting new mutations and self-organization in order to survive in the conflict environment (Coleman, 2000). One of the ways they are adapting to the changes is how the shifting loyalty between state and non-state actors depending on which one has an upper hand in their territory as will be explained under the framework of the ungoverned space. This has a significant impact on the conflict in general and informs the attack strategy of the non-state actors nationally and regionally. In addition, the works of Menkhaus (2006a), Raeymaekers et. al (2008), Feldman & Slattery, (2003) have broadly discussed how the political and economic spheres in Somalia have adapted to the conflict.

Emergence: the result of coevolution leads to the rise of new organisms that are at times stronger than the individual actors. This can be understood by looking at the biological

observation that “an infant's brain can learn more rules than are contained in its genes. Sometimes evolution seems to manifest a spontaneous order for free.” In a conflict environment, the changes that emerge as a result of the conflict become even more difficult to deal with since they are stronger than the previous crises.

In Somalia, the collapse of the government in 1991 was triggered by a civil war that could have been easily solved using the political process. However, the conflict environment that emerged as a result of the conflict permitted other forms of violence such as terrorism, piracy, kidnapping which are more difficult to deal with. The groups that have emerged (e.g., terrorist, pirates, and traffickers) are more difficult to build consensus with compared to political parties which may be willing to adhere to existing laws.

Self-organized critically: this refers to the delicate balance between chaos and order. This equilibrium is often denoted with the metaphor of a pile of sand in which if an additional grain of sand is added then the whole pile will collapse. Such fragility explains the collapse of the Somalia central government in 1990. At that time, the events affecting the stability of the country had reached the bliss point whereby even the government which is considered to have the monopoly of force and power could not withstand forces against it.

Some consider unending corruption, authoritarian tendencies, nepotism, marginalization, and poor policies (both domestic and foreign) as the main causes of the collapse. The fragile situation in Somalia did not end with the collapse of the central government. To date, the conflict is so delicate that attacks can happen anytime, and any form of miscalculation could return the country back to a full-scale war. A good example is the 2020 political crisis that was caused by the president's attempt to push his term limit. This action was met with fierce resistance and could have led the country back to a fully-blown civil war.

Fitness Landscape: According to proponents of complexity theory, coevolution results in two situations that can affect the fitness of actors within the system. One situation is whereby an actor is seen as being on peak rising and the other is when the actors are considered to be at peak declining. In conflict, the defense and offensive capability of actors determines the fitness landscape. If the attackers become more powerful as a result of acquiring more offensive capabilities, the fitness of the possible victims in that landscape will drop as they become vulnerable to attacks. However, if the potential victims acquire better defensive capabilities, then there is a higher likelihood for their fitness to increase since they are able to deter attacks.

This study argues that the environment plays an important role in determining the level of fitness of different actors. For example, if there is a high number of groups fighting for different interests as in the case of Somalia, the fitness landscape becomes difficult for those living in such an environment. However, if the number of violent groups are few and there is a stable government, there is a higher probability that the group will be defeated thus increasing the fitness landscape of the country. Peacebuilding efforts in Somalia should therefore focus on the possibility of reducing the offensive capabilities of non-state fighters in the country.

Agent-based systems: proposes that for purpose of achieving mutual gain, independent actors, organize themselves in a manner that they follow some informal rules to maximize their interests. More often, these rules do not emanate from a central authority, and they are not formally planned. The objective for these actors is to enter into cooperation with each other in order to survive. This interrelationship describes the situation in Somalia during the conflict. For example, due to the ongoing violence, security especially for people involved in business cannot be guaranteed by the central government.

Therefore, they turn to violent groups that have different interests to provide them with security in exchange for financial or material support. These groups do not exist primarily to offer security, but in exchange for money and supplies, they can cooperate with local traders and provide security for them. Other groups such as traffickers will need to pass their goods and services in different territories across the country, they will therefore be willing to cooperate with different gangs that control various ungoverned spaces in Somalia in order to facilitate their trade.

An agent-based system is an innovative tool for analysing conflicts much deeper than the causes and impacts of violence. It allows one to look at the interplay between different actors and how their interests shape their behavior and level of cooperation. Depending on the nature of cooperation between non-state actors, the level of conflict can increase, decrease, or be easily solved.

Self-Organization: this assumption touches on the impact of actions, whether planned or not, by actors that are interdependent within a system. Self-organization is able to result in the generation of a system that can allow actors to cope with the complexities being experienced in the particular setting. In the case of Somalia, this can be seen in the delicate political organization of federal states which while some have boycotted (Somaliland and Puntland) the interdependence of the remaining federal governments with the central government in Mogadishu allow Somalia to be considered as a state otherwise it would have easily crumbled and dissolved. Interdependence is also very important for the different actors as well as agents operating in Somalia to have their things done.

1.6 Merits of Complexity Theory in Conflict Analysis

The complexity approach in analyzing conflicts especially intractable conflicts such as the one being experienced in Somalia has several merits. According to Fowler (2008),

complexity principles and ideas are applicable over a scale and time span making them flexible enough to keep up with changes within social spheres especially those that may have unpredictable outcomes such as conflicts. Complexity theory is important because it also provides for a deeper, nuanced, and conceptually linked analysis of a phenomenon.

This theory addresses the challenge of oversimplifying conflicts that emanates from a tendency by scholars to focus largely on the actors involved in the conflict and sometimes overlook other relevant variables such as the environment, logic of attack that are key in understanding conflict and framing resolution strategies. Instead of only looking at the agents and actors who are involved directly or indirectly in a conflict situation, complexity theory offers a broad and comprehensive framework that takes into account other factors that affect the process and outcomes of complex systems such as conflicts.

Therefore, by focusing on the process and interactions rather than the agents and actors we are able to assess less visible aspects that shape and drive conflict events. By examining the complexity and the environment of the conflict, policy makers and strategists can be able to develop sound measures of addressing prolonged conflicts. This makes complexity theory particularly important for Somalia which has for over three decades failed to achieve sustainable peace as a result of growing complexities in the conflict. Given the challenges that emerge when researchers establish narrow boundaries and limits when identifying the scope of their conflict research, the complex theory provides more awareness of a case study since it illuminates the artificial boundaries narrow the study of conflicts to actors and not processes.

The complex theory also helps the researcher to understand the possible impact of their actions and in the process and therefore raise self -consciousness. Given that our institutional, personal, group mandate or interest could shape our analytical approach (e.g.,

funding, prestige, attachment) it is important that we explicitly make it clear that our analytical process can be affected by these factors. The complex theory does well in addressing this methodological oversight since it identifies that interventions to the complex system are as a result of processes or non-linear relationships that can affect the outcome because the researcher may end up favoring one perspective or the other.

Some of these biases could be a result of the researcher's cultural, historical, ideological connection or prejudice on the issue. Moreover, it is evident that due to our mental model our understanding of what events or actions amount to conflict or how/when we experience conflict transformation differs from person to person. The complex theory assumes that the inter-personal and intra-personal complexities caused by the “mental models” mean that the impact of our personal biases on our analysis of conflict means that our interpretation of events is not only related to the conflict situation but also integral. These sentiments are echoed by Jones (2003) who opines that since there is no one “objective reality” anyone who sets out to analyze a phenomenon will be affecting it with their interpretations.

Similarly, when observing a conflict, it is difficult for one to be a neutral observer. This argument is brought out clearly by Coleman (2006) when he argues that;

“Analyzing conflicts is a dynamic process that brings the analyst together with the situation being analyzed in an unfolding process through which the analyst begins to perceive, shape, and interpret the pattern of events in question.” (Coleman, 2006: 334)

When developing a report on a conflict, the area or relations that we focus on, who we invite to participate in the interviews, the events that are included as well as the process involved in the analysis may produce unintended outcomes and biases. This is also true in the experience of implementing the decisions made through such studies. The kind of decisions that humanitarian organizations (in directing the allocation of funds and other resources) or

mediators (in determining which individuals or groups will be invited to the negotiating table) can shape the direction of a particular conflict in a significant way.

In addition, issues that concern researchers and decision-makers can also tilt our view of conflicts. For example, in the 1990s analysis of conflicts was preoccupied with identities (ethnic, clan, religious, etc.). It is not surprising that the conflict in Somalia has also been dominated by clan identity as the cause and potential solution. Yet as this study will show, the situation in Somalia is more complex as the violence has spread beyond the national borders of Somalia thus diluting the notion of the clan -identity as the sole cause of the violence in Somalia.

1.7 Origins and Debates on ungoverned Spaces

Existing pieces of literature trace the origin of ungoverned spaces to civil wars and entropy (Stigall, 2013; Núñez, 2014). Civil wars that have occurred in the post-Cold War era in places such as Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and the former Yugoslavia have resulted in failing or failed states with features of uncontrolled or uncontested territories. Governing coalitions in different areas were disrupted as the international system was being redesigned following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This disruption was particularly challenging for some conflict-prone regions which faced increased power contestation as governments began to alter their rational cost-benefit calculation especially with the use of force (Gourevitch, 2005).

While the focus of this origin looks at the post -cold war era, ungoverned spaces have existed as far as the treaty of Westphalia and the origin of modern states. This is what explains why the early states especially in Europe showed commitment to bring satellite states under the control of a centralised government (Krasner, 1999). Similar efforts made by post-colonial

governments to consolidate their territories sometimes using excess force can be attributed to concerns over possible threats posed by ungoverned spaces.

More recently, mistakes by governments have accelerated possibilities of ungoverned spaces across the world. From systematic and deliberate marginalization, nationalist, authoritarianism and racist policies, injustices, corruption, and other forms of governance malpractices have led to a decline in state loyalty (Lenshie, 2018). The result has been the emergence of different hostile groups that seek to displace government control from their territories.

These hostile groups are able to easily gain local support from citizens who feel that their rights and privileges in the country are undermined and seek alternative leadership. Some of these groups have in turn introduced leadership structures that fill the gap that the government has left. This includes not only political and economic issues but also security which has become a common feature in ungoverned spaces. Some of the hostile groups can guarantee security to traders in exchange for them paying taxes. In Somalia, Al Shabab has been involved in the provision of public goods including education, security, water, and food aid during drought in areas under its control (Nzwili, 2017).

In relation to the above, carelessness, oversight, neglect, and errors committed by medium and great powers within the international system have left crises in different parts of the world that have not only propped up hostile groups but also led to increased instability and collapse of governments. The collapsed governments have resulted in vast territories of ungoverned spaces characterized by fierce competition among different groups (Prinz & Schetter, 2021; Lloyd, 2016). Some of these mistakes have been a result of efforts to find means of dealing with a growing number of civil wars in the 1990s and post 2011. The strategies adopted in the process have had limited success with some cases entire countries

being reduced to rambles. As witnessed in Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan as well as Somalia failed strategies have resulted in more violence in many countries.

Who does Ungoverned Spaces Threaten

Policymakers and academicians contend that ungoverned spaces do pose a threat to national and international security because these are rare spaces on which hostile non-state actors, principally insurgents and terrorist groups can recruit, recuperate, organize, and train. It is this perception that has informed military operations not only in Somalia but also in Yemen, Northern Syria, Waziristan, Afghanistan, among others. The threats emanating from ungoverned spaces can be classified into two levels.

One is a threat to human security/human beings and the other is a threat to international security. Since the 1990s, these two categories are considered central to global governance and international economic order. Yet there is an unacceptably high number of loss to human lives from violence taking place in areas that fell in the category of ungoverned spaces such as Somalia and also Congo, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Liberia, Colombia, and Lebanon. therefore, governments and international organizations have begun to give importance to ungoverned spaces given the disruption and disorder failed states and civil wars they had to global governance.

The other entity threatened by ungoverned spaces is neighbouring countries, which as we will see in this study have to deal with the flow of criminal networks and refugees into their territories. In addition, important principles of good governance such as rule of law, transparency, and human rights are often violated in ungoverned spaces (Ottaway & Mair, 2004). In this study, I argue that the persistent insurgencies, organized crime, and dissent being experienced by many countries should be attributed to ungoverned spaces more specific threat to human security. This is because the extreme scenario where the

government is either unwilling or unable to provide personal and economic security may result in such gaps that may be filled by hostile non-state actors.

These actors may pose a threat to the government and state even though sometimes such threats do not affect public safety, national security, or global governance. That is, loyalty to the state is often a result of people depending on the state to provide certain public goods. In the event an alternative actor, irrespective of its relationship with the state is able to provide these goods effectively, then it will not be surprising to find that loyalty will shift from the state to these new actors. This helps us to understand why groups such as Al Shabab that are based in Somalia are able to gain massive local support since the central government is unable to provide some of the public goods being offered by the Al Shabab.

Traditionally, states have been able to attract loyalty not just because of aspirational or normative reasons, but also the ability to provide judicial, regulatory, and security functions through their bureaucracies. These functions are significantly being challenged by other actors in recent years. In this evolutionary sense, states are then justified to feel threatened by the actions of non-state actors even though they do not pose any immediate threat. Furthermore, ungoverned spaces have affected how sovereignty is perceived and the attitude towards sovereignty across international institutions and governments. This may in the short or long run have a devastating impact on the state system as we know it.

Indeed, some of the governments and international organizations have been working closely with subnational groups and non-state actors controlling ungoverned spaces despite protests from the legitimate government of the territory. The long-term effect of states directly engaging with hostile and renegade groups controlling ungoverned spaces at the expense of legitimate governments is an area open for future empirical research. This dilemma is upheld by the constraints of state-building by international organizations following human rights,

humanitarian, or civil war disasters in which the juridical sovereignty is weakened. States that experienced weakened sovereignty (Jackson, 1993).

The shift in the attitude on the concept of sovereignty is then strengthened by the growing calls for the United Nations to adopt the idea of “contingent sovereignty.” This will mean classifying countries based on the nature of the regime/government which may likely end up legitimizing non-state actors.

1.7 Debates on State fragility

The rise in frequency of intra-state conflicts has led the emergence and development of the concept of “ungoverned spaces” that has drawn attention amongst scholars and policymakers seeking to understand statehood (legitimacy, territoriality, and sovereignty) and the activities of armed non-state actors by specifically looking at the factors that shape how they interact (Clunan and Harold, 2010). This preoccupation has also led to some scholars to adopt the concept by expanding it to other realms such as the cyberspace and global finance in order to demonstrate how non-state actors evade state surveillance and undermine sovereignty (Palan, 2006; Raab and Milward, 2003). However, in the context of this study, ungoverned spaces is used to exemplify the threats that they pose to states, that is, those states that are either categorised as failed states or those that are unable to exercise sovereignty effectively.

More importantly, cognizant of the threat that fragile states pose to international security, several governments of the developing countries and international organizations have emphasised on the presence of ungoverned spaces as one of the fundamental basis for external interventions to such territories. The threats attached to ungoverned spaces have long been considered in international law specifically under the principle of *uti possidetis juris* (as you possess under law) that equates to the understand that earlier internal

administrative boundaries can be interpreted as international boundaries purposely to avoid conflict driven by struggle over territories (Simons and Turner, 2007).

In this regard, several definitions of ungoverned spaces have been put forward by literature on state failure. The RAND Corporation,- one of the global leading non-profit research think-tank established in 1948 contributed to this discourse by arguing that: “ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states; poorly controlled land, maritime borders or airspace; or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend” (Rabasa et al., 2007: 1). In other words, this conceptualisation locates ungoverned spaces within the boundaries of security threats that are countered through mechanisms such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacebuilding, and, or reconstruction.

Equally, the US Department of Defence advanced this literature by defining ungoverned spaces as areas where a central government or the state does not have the capacity or is not willing to control, govern effectively, or influence local populations, and where neither a local nor autonomous government does not exercise effective governance because of lack of capacity, absence of political will, weak legitimacy, conflict, or presence of restrictive norms of behavior (Lamb, 2008).

Contesting ungoverned spaces: proponents, critics, and a common ground

The concept of ungoverned spaces has attracted debate between scholars who have acted as proponents of the concept and those who have provided a critique. As a concept, ungoverned spaces is inherently connected to the other concept of failed states which has equally received much attention since the Cold War and the subsequent invasion of Iraq following the historic 9/11 events. Indeed, for the US and her Western allies, these events had far-reaching influences such that national and international security were analysed to be under threat of poor governance in other countries.

In particular, poor governance was seen as a driver for the emergence of conflicts and with it, the rise of violent non-state actors that could hinder or threaten national interests of Western powers such as access to natural resources, trade, and spread instability (Lamb, 2008). Under such conditions, criminal and far more radical and extremist groups with defined targets to create harm to Western countries or international security, could not only emerge, but also have ideal places to hide, mobilise, plan, and execute their attacks (Patrick, 2011).

Proponents of ungoverned spaces therefore lay emphasis on the security nexus and this can be seen particularly in literature on American foreign policy on security. In this regard, reference can be made to the establishment of the Failed State Task Force in 1994 by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the main purpose of predicting states that are likely to transition in the failed state category, and the 2004 National Military Strategy that directly identified ungoverned areas as security threats.

Another programme:- the Ungoverned Areas Project under the US Department of Defense was also established to work towards the elimination of ungoverned spaces and the risks they possess through building partnerships that enhance the capacity of host member states to maintain strong border and territorial control (Logan and Preble, 2006). It is important to highlight that proponents of ungoverned spaces emphasize that indeed these areas or regions are not so much `ungoverned` rather it is the absence of the state that creates an alternative political order that becomes occupied by non-state actors such as warlords, terrorist organisations, rebel groups, militias, and religious or traditional elites (Lake, 2009).

As a consequence, a direct link is established between the question of ungoverned spaces, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of a state- concepts that are considered as inherent rights and distinctive features of a state. Recognising the threat that ungoverned spaces can

potentially pose towards the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states therefore necessitates urgent remedies that put focus on ensuring good governance and effective sovereignty. Several proposals have been put forward in this regard which include but not limited to increasing the legitimacy of government, ensuring law enforcement, economic development, provision of better public services, building legal and judicial capacities, and regulation (Homer-Dixon, 2010; Zürn and Leibfried, 2005).

A study by RAND on ungoverned territories in 2007 that covered regions such as the East African Corridor, Guatemala-Chiapas Border, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, the North Caucasus, West Africa, Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc, and the Colombia-Venezuela Border marked the territories as potential hideouts for terrorist groups because of their ungovernability. The ungovernability of these territories were premised on measurements that took into account the extent of state monopoly of violence in those areas, extent of state control of territorial borders, the level of state penetration into the society, and the vulnerability of the areas to external intervention.

Collectively, these factors influence how state institutions function and in circumstances where they fail to perform their roles, then power or authority vacuums emerge and become filled by other violent non-state actors whose success in establishing an alternative source of authority depends on the level of local acceptance of state legitimacy, and the degree of cooperation with other dissatisfied groups. The presence of violent armed groups that occupy ungoverned spaces and who challenge the authority and legitimacy of the de jure state is not unexpected. Thus, more often, ungoverned territories become characterised by coercion as the main instrument of maintaining cohesion, and this can also have the impact of accelerating the fragmentation and ultimate dissolution of existing systems of governance.

Other studies such as Logan and Preble (2006) have also raised critiques to the concept of ungoverned spaces by pointing out the manner in which measures of state failure or weakness are done and the definitional limitations that have continued to be evasive to consensus. Critics of ungoverned spaces as a terminology argue that its link with state failure is inaccurate because even violent non-state actors find a certain level of rule of law and infrastructure beneficial to their activities rather than a state of total anarchy which characterises failed states (De Groot et al., 2011; Menkhaus and Shapiro, 2020). As such, it is possible that some states do not meet the distinct categorisation of outright failed states but rather reflect the features of state weakness.

Indeed, this understanding was behind the renaming of the State Failure Task by CIA to the Political Instability Task Force while the World Bank also dropped the “failed state” definition in its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment to the continuously measurable “fragile states” terminology. Critics also pinpoint that often ungoverned territories are within countries and not encapsulating the entire country, that is, that it largely involves small pockets within a sovereign territory and therefore linking ungoverned spaces with state failure can only occur under circumstances in which ungoverned spaces consumed an entire polity.

Another critic is raised with regard how state authority is understood. In the mainstream discourses, the state is largely examined from the Westphalian prisms where the authority of government is considered as indivisible and final within the various sovereign territories. In addition, although there is ongoing debates on the division of authority within and between different levels of government as well as between the society and state, statehood is equally understood from the Weberian perspective of the monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a sovereign territory. However, more question are raised in cases where

states such as North Korea may have monopoly on the use of violence within its territory but whose characterisation in Western literature is that of a fragile or weak state.

As such, it can be deduced that the Western understanding of legitimacy is one premised on rational-legal authority instead of social history, charismatic authority, or traditional authority as it is the case of North Korea.

In this research, the author argues that although the state, conceived in the Westphalian model with emphasis on legitimacy, sovereignty, and territoriality, violent non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab are involved in ‘governing’ the ungoverned spaces despite their lack of both domestic and international legitimacy and this ability is based on two key reasons. First, since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, subsequent efforts to establish a well-functioning government at the national and regional level has remained elusive thereby significantly hampering the creation of institutions and systems of governance.

This has consequently translated weak capacity of the government to provide critical public services to residents. Non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab have there been able to seize the weakness of the state by providing public services such as security, justice, healthcare, and education, thus, building their own legitimacy at the local levels where there is no presence of the legal state machineries (Reno, 1999). Secondly, non-state actors have also been able to use coercion to enforce cooperation from local residence in the “ungoverned spaces”. In the case of Somalia, Al-Shabaab has been able to establish its own institutions such as Jaysh al-Hisbah- the police wing of the organisation to implement its authority over its spheres of influence in Somalia (Hansen, 2013).

Strong state, weak state, fragile state, a nexus

There has been a strong debate on whether ungoverned spaces are even ungoverned. This idea is often pushed by those who argue that the perceived ungoverned spaces are actually

governed by some other actors. Such literally interpretation of ungoverned spaces is very problematic. First it appears to legitimize other forms of actors as long as they exercise authority over specific spaces and people. But this is a politically dangerous conceptualisation since the definition of what constitutes a state is well elaborated. None of the definition of states consider non-state actors which have forcefully taken control of territory as legitimate actors. Therefore, in the event that these actors have taken control of territory, we describe the territory as ungoverned since the internationally recognised government no longer has control of such territories.

Others are quick to describe states that are facing serious violence or contested authority as failed or weak states. This classification is often selective as it leaves us with challenges of describing whether France (1789), Russia (Bolshevik revolution, 1917), American war of independence or even the Irish revolution as causing those countries to become failed states. Certainly, they were not, a failed state is one that has reached an irredeemable level such as Somalia in 1991 when the government had just collapsed. However, as efforts to restore central control of the country are on-going, the country transition from failed states to ungoverned spaces. Meaning that there is contestation of spaces between the government and non-state actors. Below I discuss some different definitions of states and bring forth the challenges in classifying states that are vulnerable. This means that while a state can be weak, fragile, failed or collapsed, it can also experience ungoverned spaces.

The debate on state failure is relatively new gaining momentum in the early 1990s when the US emerged as the real winner of the Cold War after the disintegration of the rival Soviet Union. The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, propagated this debate within the United Nations although early works by scholars had captured the confusing discussion as a quasi-state and dual regime debate to refer to states that allegedly were independent only by virtue of international courtesy but they did not have internal capacity for positive

sovereignty (Jackson, 1987). This debate between failed states, weak states, fragile states, early states and collapsed states is far from being over.

For the failed states for instance, observers have criticized even the use of the word 'fail' to states arguing that it is fallacious and that the word 'fail' is meant for things like exams and marriages (Leigh, 2012). It does not apply to the state at all means because states have different governance dynamics, are exposed to varying degrees of external pressure and in some cases states have a unique historical background to the troubles they face. Other states have unfortunately lumped into the failed states category for not aligning with the colonial powers interests despite functioning properly from the top central leadership to the grassroots.

The distinction between the failed states and the weak states is also a thin line with commentators using the definitions interchangeably. Ibrahim Kalin for instance, refers to failed states as states that are largely unable to establish order and security over the lengths of their borders (Kalin, 2015). The qualities described such as the lack of functioning state institutions, loss of trust and rule of law are equated to both failed states and weak states. The collapsed states on the other hand equated to the civil war and other internal conflicts which pushes the meaning attached to the failed state to a situation where by the original state has reached a point of almost no return to rule of law and order. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace identifies the weak state as the earliest indicator and form of state failure that required robust and urgent intervention to reverse (Ottaway & Mair, 2004).

Other scholars have also found it necessary to interchangeably use the terms failed states and fragile states to refer to states with internal conflicts that result in ungoverned spaces

and potentially spillover to bordering territories (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007). The condition of state failure whether weak, fragile, collapsed or failed is an enabling and motivating condition for actors outside the state to try and capture state power and apparatus through unorthodox means.

For the case of fragile states, (Baranyi & Powell, 2005) observe that it is either the inability or the unwillingness of just some states to provide public essentials. Accordingly, this makes state fragility as a condition that is solely at the control of the state in question when it is willing or so wishes. Another important addition is to the debate on state fragility is the matter of extent or degree that the state in question is able to provide essentials. This moves the debate further to other state failure conditions as there is no limit/boundary clearly separating the state failure conditions from each other. Patrick gives an interesting analogy broadening the debate to look at state strength across four parameters instead of simply state failure. According to him many states have varying capacities in the four parameters of providing security, credible and legitimate political institutions/environment, sound economic management and social welfare (Patrick, 2006).

The main point brought forward by Patrick is that every state has at some point failed its citizens on either one of the parameters if not all. However, despite the lack of commonality in the understanding of the terms associated with state failure, a large majority of academicians and policy makers conclude that state failure is responsible for devastating humanitarian crisis, as well as legal and severe security consequences of international scale.

Malek, although he does not escape from the temptation of classifying weak and failed states as one and the same thing, his tabulation is important in understanding the points of

departure between a properly functioning state and one under facing any of the conditionalities of state failure described by the confusing terminologies (Malek, 2006).

Thürer while bringing international law perspective into the debate uses the term failed state to refer to a condition where the state has either disintegrated or collapsed. In international law, failed state refers to the total or partial collapse of institutions, law and order with potential outbreak of violence. According to Thürer, the term 'Failed' is too broad and extreme that even totalitarian regimes will be considered as failed. He also dismisses the condition of state without government as being too narrow as some other functions of the state might be functioning (Thürer, 1999). He therefore defines a failed state as one that retains legal capacity but has lost the ability to exercise it.

Rotberg acknowledges that it was easy to differentiate between the strong states and the weak states but very difficult to establish the same distinction between weak states, failed states and collapsed states (Rotberg, 2003). He dismisses the mere presence of violence within the state as equivalent to a failed state nor the absence of violence an indicator of a strong state. A failed state in his views faces onslaught from insurgent groups and the extent of failure can be understood by analyzing the territory the state can control. This places countries like Syria that can only manage to control the capital and some communities into the category of failed states. Rotberg holds that a collapsed state is just but a version of a failed state that is both rare and extreme. Collapsed state represents a vacuum or a hole of authority with only inhabitants left, not citizens. In the collapsed state scenario illegitimate and unrecognized sub state actors may capture the trappings of the state such as the Taliban take during the dramatic collapse of the internationally recognized government in Afghanistan. Rotberg maintains that a failed state is the holding middle ground with forward movement to a weak state and backward sliding to a collapsed state always possible.

Kaplan on his part highlights the uniqueness of the fragile state as compared with the other types of states due to their different socio-political functioning dynamics. The fragile states bear unique challenges to security and development. Kaplan mainly focuses his analysis on the horizontal relationships within the society which have been ignored yet they are important in the stability and development of the state such as the ethnic-religious relations (Kaplan, 2014). Kaplan points out that there are many fragile moments that challenge all kinds of state whether strong or weak. The fragile moments represent shocks such as economic depression and contested elections that threaten institutions and spark transitions especially in states with limited resilience. The length of the fragile state condition is determined by the institutions and the people, with states not experiencing deficiencies in population cooperation and institutional delivery moving out of the crisis as fast as possible. Osaghae adds to the debate on fragile states defining them as states characterized by poor governance, underdevelopment, unstable population, legitimacy crisis and security challenges from ungoverned spaces (Osaghae, 2007). For him, the fragile state does not exhibit the finality status he associates with the failed states and collapsed states. The fragile state carries with it the opportunity to strengthen it with the right timely interventions. However, the opportunity is never easily predictable either towards the state recovery or total failure.

Hagesteijn brings the comparison of the early state and the mature state. She defines the early state as simply the predecessor of the mature state. The early state is triggered by the enormous threats faced by the existing state such as war, economic and population pressures (Hagesteijn, 2008). Early state is on the way towards the realization of the functions similar


to the modern state. The factors responsible for the development of the early state such as war, conquest and economic hardships are the same ones responsible for state failure but for the case of the early state in the reversed order with a decentralizing effect. Another distinction is in the formation of the early state which is an internal autonomous process whereas fragile state requires the intervention of the external influence to regain stability. Ikpe makes the debate even more interesting proposing a model to understand fragile states. The model puts into consideration the state capacity to deliver and the states social and political resilience (Ikpe, 2007).

1.8 Modeling Ungoverned Spaces

To understand ungoverned spaces, I argue in this study that territorial spaces can be divided into three situations. (1) governed spaces, which refers to areas where the state has full sovereignty and legitimacy from the people and other non -state actors. (2) are contested spaces that refer to areas that are partly under the control of the state and partly under the control of non -state actors. In such cases, loyalty is also split either evenly or unevenly between the state and other non -state actors. (3) are ungoverned spaces, at this stage, the state has lost control of the territory or space which is now under the full control of other actors and not the state.

These three categories are not static, and a region can fluctuate between ungoverned, contested, or governed space at any time. This is well represented in the figure (7) below.

Figure 3: Model of ungoverned spaces



Source: Nyadera & Massaoud (2019)

The bar arrows above the graph represent the various shifting positions on the nature of spaces (i.e. ungoverned, contested or governed) through time. Curve BCD (red in color) represents groups that seek to counter the authority of the state while curve ACA represents the government/state authority. The X-axis represents the intensity of the conflict while the Y-axis represents time. Point C marks the time (BPt -T) when the authority of the state and groups countering the authority of the state (BPt -I) are equal. This point can be considered the breaking point. The green curve (DD'D'') shows the intensity of conflict between the actors involved over time.

Starting from point B, the non -state actor has taken control of space (ungoverned space) and is fully in control. However, given that there is already an existing legal authority of the state in the area where the non -state actor is attempting to assert its authority, the existing authority of the state, however, limited is represented by point A' on the graph. In other

words, given that much of the world territory falls under some legal sphere of influence and jurisdiction of a state, it is difficult to find a space that is lacking some sought of the claim therefore point A' cannot start from zero on the graph. The territory under the control of non-state actors becomes contested when the government begins to implement measures aimed at retaking the territory. However, given the fluidity of the confrontation outcome between the state and the non-state actors, space can return to ungoverned or governed depending on which side has an upper hand in the confrontation. Sometimes if the confrontation to capture the space does not result in an outright winner, the area will remain contested until such a time when the government can recapture the space and put it under its full control.

If the state can affect more military force against the non-state actor, the shift as represented in the arrow bar in the graph will start to move towards governed spaces especially when the efforts lead to a movement eastwards of BPt-I, BPt-T. But if the non-state actor is able to put up strong resistance, the territory will remain disputed/contested at point C. The trend we can witness when the state begins to pursue efforts to take over the territory under the control of the non-state actor is represented by a movement from point A' to point C' and further to point A'. The speed at which this will happen depends on the strategy, strength, and the nature of the confrontation involved in the process.

In the event that the state has an upper hand, the authority of the non-state actor will decline as shown in curve B to C and how if further declines to B. Use of force as a strategy is expected to dominate the early stages of the curve especially between D to D'. these stages include B to C and A to C for the non-state actor and state actor curves, respectively. However, the use of force is expected to decline after point C especially if the state has an upper hand. From this point, it is expected that the soft power approach will be adopted as the state will be implementing measures that can boost its legitimacy.

These include organizing local elections, investing in social services (such as health centers, schools, infrastructure), set up administrative and law enforcement centers, among others. It is expected that despite the state winning and implementing soft policies, it will still face opposition. This explains why the conflict curve D, D', D'' cannot begin at zero because there will always be some elements of resistance.

The conflict intensity will be at its climax at point D a short period before the breaking point (BPt-I, BPt-T). The explanation for this trend is that non-state actors will be broken and start to retreat when the conflict is at its highest (point D). Point D marks the point in the trend of the conflict where the confronting parties will opt to deploy their maximum capabilities to try and tilt the direction of the conflict in their favor. This explains why the military and violent confrontations rise higher than other stages of the conflict. The change in authority from a non-state actor to the state becomes more visible as the conflict passes point D given that the non-state actor will be retreating from the spaces which were previously under its control. Once the state has taken over the territory, there will be a decline in violence as depicted in the curve between D' and D''.


There is the probability that the non-state actor may have an upper hand and even defeat the state in the confrontation. In this case, the authority of the state will be lower than the BPt-I mark while the authority of the non-state actor will be above point BPt-I. That makes it nearly impossible to achieve the breaking point which is represented as C in the graph. The state of the space can therefore be either ungoverned as the authority of the state will be significantly diluted or it can remain contested as the government tries to retake the territory. According to Perkins (2014), the government could also choose to abdicate the territory and leave it to the non-state actor as was the case with the government of Pakistan in the Waziristan region controlled by the Taliban.

Conflict especially contemporary violence is manifested in different forms and nature and even by different actors. Therefore, it will not be surprising to experience different types of violence in the process of curve D, D'. D''. The question that explains the change in nature and manifestation of the violence rests on the understanding of the complex relationship between the population, non -state actors, and the state.

This complex relationship determines not only who is attacked but also who condemns who particularly at the early stages of confrontation when the government attempts to take control of the ungoverned spaces (from D to D'). The population tends to give their support to the group that seems to have an upper hand or winning the conflict. This is often a rational choice to avoid victimization or punishment in the future. It is important to note that at point C where there is no clear dominant party in the conflict, the population may be reluctant to show open support for either side.

To further enhance the relevance of this theory, it is important to discuss ways in which the government is likely to solidify control of ungoverned spaces once the non -state actor is displaced. This will go a long way in not only gaining back the geographical control of its territory but also discourage and deter possibilities of new emerging national threats such as civil wars. Re-establishing state legitimacy, control, and authority in areas that had once been considered ungoverned spaces will require a gradual process. These efforts include a number of commitments and responsibilities from the state to the people and from the people to the state as shown in the figure (8) below.

Figure 4: Model Social contract between the people and the state



Source: Source: Nyadera & Massaoud (2019)

The figure (8) helps us to quantify state authority among the population. Given the difficulty in defining state authority (Giddens et al., 2011: 402–453; Best, 2002: 12 -22), we adopt variables such as its ability to enforce the law, develop and maintain economic infrastructure, provide basic social welfare and services, as well as implement general polity conduct. In addition to its physical presence in the territory. The components of authority can be quantitatively measured as shown in the table (4) below.

Table 1: Components of Authority

Component of Authority	Measurement
Law Enforcement	police forces, military posts and personnel, courts, public prosecutor, prisons, directorate of criminal investigation, and border posts
Social Services	The number of schools/teachers, hospital/doctors/nurses, sports and recreational facilities, cultural and religious centres.
Political institutions	Administrative centres and personnel, public participation in the policy-making process, local government institutions, tax collection systems

Economic services	Number of financial institutions able to operate in the region, government build markets, security of business enterprises, business registration centres, subsidies, support for agricultural activities, roads, irrigation systems, and facilities.
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Source: Compiled from Michener & Burt (1975) and Hershovitz, (2010)

The question of ungoverned spaces is not only about understanding the fragility of Somalia and the impact that on regional security, it also helps us to understand the stakes involved in attempting to retake ungoverned spaces and perhaps even means by which the government can be able to retain its authority and influence in the territory.

1.9 Ungoverned Spaces Theory and its application in Somalia

Research on ungoverned spaces has and remains influenced by studies on state failure that gained momentum in the 1990s. According to Rebasa et al., (2007), “Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states; poorly controlled land or maritime borders or airspace; or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend.” This definition has remained dominant for decades, yet it is derived and constitutes discourse on state failure as a basis of understanding ungoverned spaces. This definition, however, makes the concept of ungoverned spaces essential in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stabilization, counter-narcotics, peace building, and reconstruction doctrines.

Other scholars consider the emergence of ungoverned spaces as being a product of conceptualization by international organizations and governments which were confronting a new phenomenon after the Cold War era where there was the increasing collapse of state provision of public goods (Nyadera & Massaoud, 2019; Clunan, 2020; Diggins, 2011). Therefore, based on this definition, ungoverned spaces would refer to social, political, and

economic areas where the government/state is weak, absent, or contested or where it is struggling to exercise “effective sovereignty” (Diggins, 2011; Lenshie, 2018).

Despite its continued use of the concept, the definition of ungoverned spaces remains contested. There those who consider regions that are considered as ungoverned spaces as simply being governed “differently” (Clunan & Trinkunas, 2020). Indeed, there are territories such as the Waziristan region in Pakistan and Parts of Somalia that are controlled by clan-based or tribal governments to areas controlled by insurgencies such as persistent insurgencies territories under the FARC in Colombia or even cyber spaces such as the ICANN where the state has little control but there is a form of effective governance.

Therefore, the concept of ungoverned space should not be about the presence or absence of the state per se but rather the contested spaces between and within the state where other actors control and the impact of such contestation on national and regional security (Jackson, 1987; Risse, 2008). Moreover, the significance of ungoverned spaces for practitioners and academicians goes beyond its contested definition. Two main concerns emerge whenever the concept arises. First is the general concern is the negative consequences territories that have limited formal state control may have on national, regional, and international security.

This concern has historical and even contemporary examples of the dangers of large territories being in the hands of subnational actors such as the case in Syria. The second issue that makes ungoverned spaces an important policy and research area is citizen’s welfare. There is a general consensus that for development to be effectively implemented, governance is a necessity (Smith, 2007; Baland et al., 2020; Boeninger, 1991).

Government authority and stability is needed to facilitate key development goals and foundations including but not limited to regulating credit markets, curriculum development for schools, cash transfers, engagement with foreign entities as well as provision of

economic and social infrastructure. On the contrary, ungoverned territories tend to be characterised by low-income, peripheral, resource-poor areas. These make it difficult for the state to marshal sufficient incentive to legitimize its control of these territories. Other scholars argue that investment by the state in different parts of its territory is often guided by cost-benefit rational decisions.

That means, potential revenues from mining (Shapiro & Vanden, 2020), agricultural productivity (Callenet al., 2019), and threats of interstate conflict (Lee, 2018) influence government investment decisions with areas of low reward being neglected. Therefore, in this study, the concept of ungoverned spaces will be used to refer to “softened sovereignty” meaning it looks beyond the mere absence of the state. Thus, the study adopts a definition that describes ungoverned spaces as territories that have been in part or whole been involuntarily or voluntarily ceded to actors that are not legally recognized as or by other sovereign authorities.

By adopting this definition, this study seeks to deviate from the approach by existing academic and policy literature that focuses only on fragile, failed, and failing states (Hönke, 2008; Risse & Lehmkuhl, 2006). It seeks to include both cyber and physical spaces that can allow non-state actors to carry out activities that may in turn threaten the security of the state and its citizens. It is important to note that the perception of threats towards the state has increasingly changed since the early 1990s following the end of the Cold War. The concern that sovereignty-free and quasi-sovereign territories can pose a threat to states and international security is indeed not only visible in Somalia but also in South Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, the Philippines, Southern Colombia, Libya among others (Dugas, 2014).

In addition, when studying ungoverned spaces, one should avoid being carried away by the idea that these spaces can only produce extreme scenarios all the time. Indeed, some

researchers paint an image of extreme possibilities where ungoverned spaces are synonymous with extreme threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and a catastrophic network of criminal groups (Zaitseva, 2020). This study seeks to emphasize that while ungoverned spaces do degenerate into threats, it does not mean all ungoverned spaces would pose the same threat at all times. This is why studying ungoverned spaces using a case study is significant as it will allow us to explore the unique aspects of the situation and why the existence of ungoverned spaces in Somalia has resulted in national and regional threats.

1.10 Methodological Approach.

Methodology in research constitutes the process of data collection, interpretation, analysis, and presentation (Price & Ball, 2014). While there are three prominent research methods, qualitative, mixed method and quantitative, this study relied on the qualitative method. The decision to select a qualitative method was informed by two factors. First is the strength of qualitative methodology tools in examining the Who, Why, What, When and Where questions which are central in answering the research questions of this study.

The second reasons is the flexibility of qualitative especially during a global pandemic such as COVID -19 which can severely hinder collection of primary data. Quantitative data or methodology is useful for one seeking to examine how many or how much questions. The study does not aim to quantify how the Somalia conflict but rather explore more qualitative issues such as the obstacles to peace, factors that enable the conflict to affect regional and national security and the actors involved. These questions are essential for anyone interested in proposing peace in the war -torn country.

Given that the conflict has continued for three decades now, stopping the violence and establishing peace and security in Somalia and the Horn of Africa ought to be a matter of urgency. By relying on qualitative data, the study has been able to capture other important

aspects of the conflicts such as how the conflict has transformed over the years, the nature of threats both direct and indirect emanating from the conflict as well as the socio-economic, demographic and political features of Somalia. These information goes a long way in exposing some of the less studied and analysed aspects of the conflict. In broadening the scope of studying the conflict in Somalia and discussing the multidimensional factors affecting and resulting from the conflict, we are able to give more sustainable recommendations for peace in the country.

1.11 Research Design

This study has adopted two approaches of qualitative research, namely case -study and grounded theory approach. Research design encompasses the measurement, collection and analysis of data. In qualitative methodological approach, the interpretation and presentation of data is done using descriptive and non -numerical manner. This makes qualitative method very useful in studying people's social economic and political aspects and investigating how they interact in their setting, their reactions, level of organisation as well as what triggers friendship and rivalry. According to Yadav, Nepal & Jain (2007), descriptive research is often applied by researchers intending to conduct preliminary studies or explanatory studies. It allows researchers to collect, interpret and summarise data and respond to their research questions.

Descriptive approach has also been adopted for this study because it enables a researcher to simultaneously evaluate different variables but at the same time investigate how these different variables are collectively affecting a phenomenon. In this case, the various characteristics of the conflict in Somalia can be best examined independently and collectively to give a better explanation of the complexity in the Somalia conflict. It has allowed the author to examine the problem of ungoverned spaces, how it has accelerated the

conflict in Somalia, how the conflict has in turn led to displacement and how these displacements have affected the economy. It has also enabled the author to look at the logic of attacks, how such attacks lead to intractable conflicts and how the contracted conflict has led threats in the country and the region.

1.12 Sources of Data

Information for this study have been derived from three broad sources. one is document analysis, which include both electronic and print media, second is statistical databases and third include observation.

Document Analysis

According to Bowen (2009: 27), an important source of data in research is by systematically and thematically analysing printed and electronic documents. This is a very useful approach since existing documents provide valuable information that can be included in a study. Existing literature in a study that involves long or historical events such as the Somalia conflict since some of the historical accounts that cannot be observed are documented and well preserved.


By looking at existing publications on a specific topic, a researcher can identify the gaps and underlying issues that have been ignored in the previous research. It also allows the researcher to analyse the trends in the conflict from a historical perspective. Looking at the Somalia case, much of the existing literature have looked at the challenge of clan identity and regional actors but have overlooked the impact of ungoverned spaces and logic of attack.

For academic publications, I searched several online databases on conflict, Somalia, and African studies, civil wars. I relied mainly on including, Sage Journals, Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), Springer Link, Web of Science Pro Quest, ResearchGate Taylor & Francis, SCOPUS, ScienceDirect, ERIC and JSTOR. The search terms included mainly

the following ‘Somalia civil war’, ‘ungoverned spaces’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘conflict resolution’. The author analysed the publisher of all the journals included to ensure that only peer reviewed publications were included in the study.

Using the PRISMA tool, the literatures were screened based on the following inclusion/exclusion criteria: (1) publication type: academic journals; (2) language of publication: English; (3) full text is available through the university's library or the database websites; (4) mainly focused on the conflict in Somalia, Ungoverned spaces and conflict transformation literature. Articles were excluded if they did not demonstrate up to date information on the conflict, focus on Somalia and the horn of Africa, or the actors, factors and nature of violence in the country; (5) empirical research. Thus, reviews, editorials and commentaries were excluded. Finally, 763 literature were included for analysis and review in the current study as shown in figure 12 below.

Figure 5: PRISMA tool for the inclusion and exclusion of literature in the study.



Source: Author Compilation.

Therefore, using multiple secondary sources, I have been able to identify background information and insights as well as verify information by cross checking facts in from different sources. Cross checking information from secondary helps improve the verifiability of the information as bias that would have arisen from interviewing an individual with personal and emotional experience. Patton (1990, in Bowen, 2009: 28) had identified the challenge that can arise from depending on a single narrative or source.

Apart from academic publications, the study also relied on reports from local and international media houses, documents from government and non -governmental organisations as well as fact sheets, statistical reports, dissertations, and personal blogs/testimonies. These complemented the academic publications well since the last two

years posed serious challenges with collecting primary data. First is that conflict environments such as Somalia are very risky to conduct field studies especially for foreigners. Second and which is perhaps the most important is that the COVID -19 pandemic brought about numerous restrictions and challenges for researchers intending to collect primary data. Nonetheless, existing secondary sources were able to fit in well in this study.

Statistical Databases

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): this data base hosted by the Uppsala University is one of the oldest sources of data on organised conflict. The 40 year database has also influenced the significantly the definition of civil wars and how armed violence is studied globally. The advantage of UCDP is that its database consist of information across the world that is updated timely and systematically (Croicu & Kreutz, 2017). Its timeseries data also provides comparison between different countries.

Another merit of relying on this database is that the information provided on the UCDP dashboard contains different aspects of conflicts including but not limited to conflict resolution and dynamics. Every year, the centre provides an annual report which consist of analysis of armed conflict during the year. In addition, UCDP provides an updated definition of key concepts such as actor in conflict, battle -related deaths, ceasefire agreements, who is a civilian, intra and inter- state conflict, fatalities, intensity levels, non -state conflict among others. These definitions are particularly important in this study because many studies on Somalia conflict have either ignored or overlooked the distinction between some of this key concepts.

The strength of UCDP data is that it focuses on the events as the unit of analysis. This means that data collected focuses on the actual hostilities and have been used to show information on the number of deaths, actors involved in the Somalia conflict and the nature of those

events, that is who carried out the attacks and against who. This has been very useful in determining the logic of attack and the impact of the Somalia conflict on national and regional security. Events as unit of analysis are defined by UCDP as;

The incidence of the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death in either the best, low or high estimate categories at a specific location and for a specific temporal duration (Sundberg and Melander, 2013)

UCDP collects data using the Dow Jones Factiva aggregator search string. This data is then filtered using the “intelligent indexing”. In addition, sources from media are also used under the condition that the event is extensively investigated before reporting. Media sources are taken from reputable global media houses such as CNN, AFP, Xinhua, Reuters or Agencia EFE (Baum & Zhukov, 2015). Local news are also monitored using BBC local channels as well as non -English local media houses. Annually, UCDP collects approximately 50,000 news sources which are then analysed and coded physically by their employees. The coded information consists of the aggregate of the following variables; (1) state-based armed conflict, (Eck & Hultman, 2007) (2) non-state conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2002) and (3) one-sided violence(Sundberg, Eck & Kreutz, 2012).

Furthermore, given the categories of violence that UCDP examines, their data becomes very useful for this study. UCDP looks at three types of conflicts. One is where the actors involved are neither a government of a state, the other is conflict which include at least a state actor and the third are violence that target civilians. The conflict in Somalia fits well in this typology of conflict where different categories of actors and unarmed civilians are caught up in the violence.

Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP): Another database I relied on is the CSP which uses open sources to compile information on peace and conflict across the world. The analysis of CSP focuses on trends in global conflicts, conflicts in Africa, fragile states, and the war list. CSP keeps data related to conflicts such as displacement of persons, terrorist attacks, political violence, state failures and military coups. The data is robust covering 167 countries taking into account only countries with a population of over 500,000 people.

I used the information from this database' global conflict trends to understand what is going on across the world and put the situation in Somalia within a global context. The global trend data shows which countries have experienced violence since 1947, the nature of violence that have been taking place during this time, estimated number of people killed from conflicts across the world since 1947 as well as refugees displaced during this period. It also provides information on democracy and autocracy since 1946 as well as governance since 1800. After putting the Somalia conflict in a global context, this data showed that the conflict in Somalia is one of the most prolonged conflicts with high number of civilian deaths, displacements and complexity since the early 1990s.

The second level of analysis is state fragility which CSP offers analysis of nearly 380 instances of political violence that resulted into state fragility. These include 36 conflicts that are still on going among them the situation in Somalia. Fragility is determined based on whether the political violence is major (meaning at least 500 people are killed as a result of direct consequences of the violence) or not. Somalia qualifies to be part of the fragile states since the number of fatalities exceed 500 and the conflict is both sustained and systematic. The types of violence covered in this database are classified as episodes and include communal, inter, or intra-state conflicts which can also be characterised as either international, ethnic, civil, and genocidal warfare and violence.

Another importance of data from CSP is that these data analyses more details on the impact of conflicts so as to include casualties, resource depletion, fatalities, population displacement, damage on infrastructure. It also analyses other impacts of conflicts that are often ignored such as the psychological distress and trauma on the people who have experienced the violence disruption of the society's social psychology and political culture of people in their collective units such as race, tribe, ethnicity, or religion. In terms of methodology, CSP offers ten categories of warfare as shown in the table (7) below;

Table 2: Categories of warfare under the CSP model

Category	Characteristics
Expressive or Sporadic Political Violence.	Here conflict erupts as mainly an expression of dissatisfaction or anger over how a group is treated. Objectives are often not well defined, small militant groups are involved and use of low level technology can be witnessed. They occur at a specific place and time and affect small number of people.
Limited Political Violence	Well defined but limited objectives and confined to achieving specific goals. Events are generally confined in a particular spatial or time and can be characterised by terrorism acts. Population displacement can occur in the short term while the technology used is low.
Serious Political Violence.	Here the strategic authority is often the objective of attack. Prolonged violence characterised by focused operations targeting group leaders, militia members and defence from the

	armed group. It leads to larger displacements in thousands and death can also be between 10,000 and 50,000.
Serious Warfare.	Covers a much larger area and the technology of war can be available but not extensively used. The war could be protracted with periods of dormancy often restarted by sporadic attacks. Displaced population can be over 100, 000 and the number of death can be between 50, 000 and 100,000
Prolonged and Substantial Warfare.	This conflict objectives and goals are not well defined. Technology capable of destruction is high. Causes of such conflict are matters that are difficult to negotiate or compromise. Conflict may be confined to one region but the number of displaced persons can be more than one million. Deaths can range between 100,000 and 500,000. War efforts can consume over 25% of local production. Granting autonomy is a means of resolving such conflicts.
Extensive Warfare.	There is external support but limited, development stalls in the short time while other impacts can be persistent. Displacement of people can go up to two million while the number of deaths can climb to one million. The war consumes 40% of the society's production. In order to control territory or resources, belligerents often result to ethnic cleansing.
Pervasive Warfare.	The use of technology is much higher. The role of external actors increase as destruction hinders production. long term development is stalled while the culture of the warfare determines

	mobilization and social roles. Displacement of population can reach five million while death exceeds one million. 50% of the local production is consumed by the conflict.
Technological Warfare.	The conflict is characterised by technology causing serious destruction of productive capacity and resources. Civilians are not often deliberately targeted by in the attacks, but they tend to be victims of the effects of the violence. Mostly the warring parties have similar capabilities, and they target each other's military objectives. Displaced population can reach ten million while people killed can exceed two million. The war consumes 60% to 90% of local production.
Total Warfare	Massive destruction of the country is experienced while combatants and unarmed civilians are deliberately targeted. The societies ability to act and react is the main objective of the adversary. The warring parties have nearly similar capabilities and compromise is considered as unacceptable. Displaced persons can be more than 20 million while over five million people can be killed in such a conflict. 90% to 100% of local production goes to supporting the war while both parties will seek the other to surrender unconditionally. This affects humanitarian efforts.
Annihilation and Extermination.	Extensive, deliberate, indiscriminate and destruction of infrastructure and human resource. The target of destruction is the society. There is unequal capabilities of power and

	technology. The Holocaust and the bombing of Japan with nuclear weapons can be examples.
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Source: CSP (2021)

This categorisation of the conflict offer a unique insight into the process of conflict transformation and potentially the different stages the Somalia conflict has undergone. A keen analysis of the different categories shows that at some point the conflict in Somalia experienced the first six stages including; expressive and sporadic political violence, limited political violence, serious political violence, serious warfare and now one can say that it is a prolonged and substantial warfare.

Observation.

The conflict in Somalia can be considered as historical and contemporary (Old and New). It is historical because it begun over three decades ago and contemporary because it continues to manifest itself even today. Therefore, it requires a blend of research techniques that will be able to bring forth the historical events of the conflict which has been well documented in existing literature and capture events as they happen which means taking into account observation skills. The author being a resident of the Horn of Africa, has been able to experience direct and indirect impacts of the conflict from Somalia including the refugee crisis, the Garissa University, Westgate mall and the Dusit 2 Mall attacks by the Somalia based Al Shabab group.

In addition, the author has interacted with intellectuals, bureaucrats and displaced persons from Somalia and was able to observe the impact of the conflict through such interactions. Such first -hand experience of the conflict provides the author with valuable insight of the conflict before examining the literature. The author has also conducted research and

published over four peer-reviewed articles on Somalia thus giving him prior experience working on the prolonged conflict.

1.13 Ethical Considerations

Ethical norms are vital when conducting any research so as to ensure that one does not violate the society's traditions and customs. In dealing with human subjects, it is important to seek proper consent for participants in the study and this consent should be voluntary. In this study, the author has ensured that all necessary ethical considerations are observed. These included but not limited to; ensuring that credit on third party sources is given through proper citation, unconfirmed generalisations, prejudice and bias are avoided, ensuring that copyright policies are applicable in finding and using documents in the study.

1.14 Intractable conflicts, logic of attacks, Ungoverned spaces in Somalia

The study finds that the intractable nature of the conflict in Somalia is as a result of a number of domestic, regional and international factors which must be addressed if the country is to benefit from sustainable peace. In looking at the international dynamics of the conflict, the crisis in Somalia was at its highest during the Cold War conflict that has divided the world between western and eastern leaning blocs led by the USA and USSR. While there was no direct physical violence between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw pact, the Cold War executed several inter and intrastate conflicts. Somalia was not immune to this international force. For one, the two great powers had significant interest in winning support from any country across the world and since the then Siad Barre had opted to engage all be it strategically with the two superpowers, he quickly become unreliable with his double -play of the supper powers and thus disposable. At the time when violence broke out in Mogadishu, Siad Barre had no support from the superpowers thus leading to the collapse of his government. Regionally, Somalia had embarked on a risky manoeuvre to take on

regional countries (Kenya and Ethiopia) with its 'greater Somalia' project that sought to unify Somalia dominated territories in Kenya and Ethiopia with Somalia. In Ethiopia, these efforts had resulted into the bloody Ogaden war while in Kenya it had led to the Wagalla Massacre.

At the time opposition forces were overwhelming the government of Somalia, the government had little support from the two biggest countries in the region (Ethiopia and Kenya). This explains why the allegations that both Kenya and Ethiopia supported the opposition groups is not far-fetched. After the conflict had begun, another dynamic that made it worse is the weakness of the UN organization. This institution had been established with the core mandate of ensuring peace and security across the world yet the events that occurred in the 1990s raised serious questions over its capacity and efficiency. Indeed, the UN had not only failed to prevent the violence in Somalia in 1991-3, it also failed to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the violence that had erupted in the Balkans around the same period. Perhaps this was a clear sign that countries needed to establish regional organisations to compliment UN efforts as it was clearly overwhelmed with the number of conflicts at the time.

Another factor that is worth mentioning are the failure or incompatible nature of the previous peace efforts. This study finds that while national, regional and international actors had failed to stop the violence from erupting (preventive response) peace efforts that were attempted in the decade between 1991 and 2001 were equally unable to provide sustainable peace. Not only was the crisis generating an unprecedented humanitarian disaster, but the attitude and approaches used during the peacebuilding efforts were equally problematic. These peace efforts and their organizers overlooked critical issues that were at play in Somalia. First was an attempted military intervention approved by the UN and led by the USA which failed terribly (all be it with some valuable lessons on how not to intervene).

The military approach led by 'western' country distrusted by both parties of the conflict meant that the USA was not going to get the much needed support to achieve its objective. Instead, that failed operation became an important propaganda tool by different warlords in Somalia that enabled them to win more local support. This worsened the conflict in the country and emboldened different warring factions which claimed victory over a 'superpower.' This made the different warring parties very reluctant to engage in any meaningful dialogue that could bring peace in the country.

As the conflict ravaged the country, the emergence of a war economy made the conflict even more intractable. The illegal market trafficking of goods, services and people in Somalia quickly gave rise to other bigger activities such as piracy, extortion and money laundering. The war economy in Somalia not only produced a new class of wealthy elites who developed interest in politics and economy, these elites also became sceptical of peace as a stable Somalia would disrupt their illegal activities. They therefore use their economic power to sustain the conflict.

Another reason why the Somalia conflict remains intractable is because conflict is local. This aspect of the conflict is often overlooked as many rely on the macro -and meso drivers of the conflict. Micro -dynamics of the Somalian conflict offer a very interesting explanation to the sustained conflict and should not be overlooked. The rivalry between clans and the collapse of the traditional peace-making structures have left local rivalries to dominate the conflict in Somalia. It is indeed true that these local rivalries explain the logic of attack and the problem that has emerged from renegade states such as Somaliland and Puntland. This is why the thesis dedicated a whole chapter on clan configuration and conflict. It does not only aim to show why the different groups are fighting but also why local and micro-dynamics are important in understanding the intractable nature of the conflict. In addition, it is important to note that the micro factors are important in revealing that there is a

disconnect between the motivations of the current conflict and the original factors that led to the outbreak of the conflict in the first place. Similarly, by looking at the micro factors, this thesis finds weaknesses in the identity narrative of the Somali conflict. While existing studies emphasize that identity is a major cause of the conflict, this thesis finds that identity is a product of the conflict as people began to look for affiliations much stronger than before. Identity is therefore seen as a strategy of war and a means of survival not just a cause of the conflict.

It is difficult to explain the reason why the conflict has failed to progress without looking at the issue of leadership (or perhaps best put, lack of leadership). Somalia is not the only country experiencing one form of war or the other, what makes it stand out from other cases though is the level of defragmented leadership at the beginning of the conflict and later nearly the lack of charismatic leadership, a statesman respected and perhaps even feared by both sides of the conflict if we are to adopt a Machiavellian approach. Indeed, post-conflict societies that have been able to transition to stable and peaceful countries often have a leader who was able to bring unity amid crises. A leader who is willing and capable of compromising with different actors while still giving hope to the rest of the society. If such a leader is to be found in Somalia, then there is a higher likelihood that the conflict would be addressed. Of course, the country does have leaders today, all of whom have their own strengths (and weaknesses) but that charismatic leader capable of working together with different actors and reach a solution still lacks. After all, majority of those who become leaders (at least at the national level) are often holding dual-citizenship from other countries and have been living abroad for a long time.

Then there is the role of the diaspora, these are men and women who left the country and have now become stable abroad. They are often praised for the remittances (some of the highest remittances in the continent) to their family members are also credited for helping

more family and extended relatives to move abroad. The Somali diaspora is also known for their strong political involvement in the various countries they live in rising to positions of members of parliament, mayors, ministers and community leaders in countries such as the USA, Canada, Norway, United Kingdom and others. Apart from these positive attributes, the diaspora is known also for their support for different warring parties in Somalia. They provide resources and moral support to different groups that have kept the conflict going on. Therefore, the intractable nature of the Somali conflict is a complex combination of different dynamics.

Logic of Attack

The aspect of logic of attack in this study is informed by two important questions. Who is the conflict in Somalia threatening. And why do we have inconsistency on the targets of attack inside Somalia and in the region. These two questions are significant not only for military strategists who would wish to counter such attacks, but also for conflict resolution actors involved in Somalia. The essence is to give those involved in seeking peace in Somalia a deeper understanding of the conflict dynamics and allow them to come up with appropriate measures. First the study finds an interesting trend on how attacks are being carried out in the conflict.

At the early stages of the conflict, the confrontation was largely between the opposition militia and government forces. At that stage, civilians were not necessarily targeted as the objective was to overthrow the government. Therefore, the logic of attack at the time was to target government assets within the boundaries of Somalia (that's important to note). After the government was overthrown, the conflict transformed, and new actors started to be involved in the conflict. At this stage, one can establish that the conflict motivation were not necessarily political but included cultural, identity, social and economic. This means that

there are deliberate attacks on civilians, for other reasons such as revenge and criminal motives.

Then the conflict became increasingly economical. Actors involved were more interested in controlling resources including foreign aid this means that the logic of attack expanded to include humanitarian workers and foreigners. More so as other economic practices such as piracy and kidnapping for ransom started becoming popular, foreigners started being targeted more often thus the logic of attack was that foreigners were better targets for economic reasons than local citizens. Then when terrorism and the war on terror began, the logic of attack changed significantly. It was no longer economic drivers to attack foreigners but also a terrorist strategy. This also saw the expansion of the conflict from the boundaries of Somalia to neighbouring countries, which is an important component of this thesis. As the conflict transcends the boundaries of Somalia, this study also establishes the activities of different Somali based groups in other regional countries change. For example, attacks in Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are fully targeting civilians, with little economic interests visible but more of political and ideological reasons. Meanwhile attacks inside Somalia have been targeting foreign troops especially those under the banner of the AMISOM and government officials and assets.

Understanding the logic of attacks in a conflict environment is a concept that ought to be explored for many reasons. In Somalia, it helps us to understand who the actors are, why they are carrying out certain attacks, who they are targeting and other dynamics of the conflicts. Since the logic of attack has not featured a lot in Somali conflict, it is best if future studies could further explore the concept with the aim of making better conflict resolution policies.

Then there is the issue of ungoverned spaces which has been used to understand the conflict in Somalia and why it threatens regional states. Therefore, the thesis does not aim to use the ungoverned space theory to explain the situation in Somalia but to use it to discuss the reason why the conflict is prolonged and why the conflict has become a threat to neighbouring countries. So, the debate of whether ungoverned spaces are same as failed or collapsed states has been address extensively in this thesis. The study finds that the narrative that ungoverned spaces are simply 'governed' by other actors and should not be considered ungoverned as being problematic and could have severe implications on our understanding of the state and the concept of sovereignty. Intense violence has been experienced globally at different times and in different countries. Starting with the French revolution, the Russian revolution, the American war of independence the world wars and other intense conflict have not been used to describe those states as collapsed states. It is true that due to the conflict, the government of Somalia is finding it difficult to fulfil some of its obligations, but this cannot be used to justify the take over of territories by non -state actors and describe such spaces as 'governed.' In other words, the situation in Somalia ought to be studied more critically than relying on generalised description of states using liberal and neo -liberal lenses. The thesis models the concept of ungoverned spaces around contested spaces and how these spaces are used to generate threats to a country or a region.

With regard to threats, the study finds that the conflict in Somalia is generating different forms of threats affecting the country and the region. This is an important area of study because by looking at the nature of threats and the actors being affected by these threats; we are able to come up with proper responses. The thesis finds that the conflict in Somalia has led to threats that affect human security, which in this case needs to be address as the main people being affected are vulnerable members of the society, mostly women, children and youths. Death and displacements attributed to the conflict continue to affect the country and

the region in different ways while challenges such as human rights abuse, marginalisation, separatist calls and piracy are other threats that have emerged as a result of the conflict. The conflict has also led to the problem of political legitimacy in Somalia and gave the region a perceived reputation of insecurity which then scares away investors and tourists. The implication of the conflict on the region is far reaching and will need collaborative efforts to address.

In sum, this study has integrated the use of ungoverned space theories to the conflict in Somalia this approach has not been used to either understand the conflict impact on the country or in the region. Suggests that the country has moved from a fully failed state to ungoverned spaces and emphasize how space has become important for actors in the conflict. Meaning a state failure, state fragility or vulnerable states are not condemned to remain in these positions, but it is important that we take the necessary efforts to understand the flexibility of conflict environment and adopt the changes that are occurring on our studies. The thesis also examined the transnational nature of the conflict through various threats. This has been neglected by researchers of the Somalian conflict as it finds a unique trend and bias on who the conflict is threatening and why. The study therefore provides a framework for peace building, one that will focus more on resolving ungoverned spaces (contested spaces) rather than the prioritising macro -level state building approach which turns out to overlook micro and meso -dynamics. The thesis proposes that future research can explore (1) the impact of soft and hard bond networks in transnational threats, (2) role of national and international actors including state and non -state actors can be explored, (3) Post conflict political and economic structure for the country need a better scientific understanding.

CHAPTER 2.

2. CLAN CONFIGURATION AND SOFT -BOND NETWORKS IN SOMALIA


Having examined the theoretical aspects of the conflict in Somalia, I will now discuss the implications of identity and how soft bond networks among the clans in Somalia are created. These less studied features will be important in understanding the nature and intensity of regional attacks from Somalia to neighboring countries which have a significant number of citizens with Somalia origins. But first we discuss the geography of Somalia.

2.1 Somalia's Geography

Geography plays an important role in understanding conflicts and more specifically in relation to ungoverned spaces. The Federal Republic of Somalia is situated within the region of the Horn of Africa. To the northwest it neighbors Djibouti, the Indian Ocean to the east, Ethiopia on the west, on the north is borders the Gulf of Eden, and neighbors Kenya on the Southwest region. Somalia has a unique geographical coastal feature which ranks as the longest in the entire African continent.

Somalia is the most homogeneous country in Africa in relation to religion, culture, linguistic and ethnic characteristics. In terms of percentages, 85% of the approximately 15 million population size are ethnic Somalis and occupy much of the Northern part of the country. The southern part is largely dominated by minority ethnic groups who consist of 15% of the population (Bruton, 2010). Majority of the population are Muslims (Sunni) (Hassig *et al.*, 2017). Additionally, the official languages spoken in Somalia are the Arabic and Somali languages.

Figure 6: Map of Somalia



Source: UN Cartographic Section (2019)

Historically, the Somali stretch has been an important centre of global commerce with its various empires dominating the trade routes. However, this was disrupted in the 19th century when the Italian and British empires entered treaties with Somali empires enabling them to gain control of some parts of the coastal trade routes which they later used to establish two colonies namely the Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland in the 1920. Italy later lost its control of Italian Somaliland in 1941 to the United Nations Trusteeship (Tahir, 2021:53 -4). In 1969 the Supreme Revolutionary Council seized power from the British declaring independence of Somalia and ushering a new era of self-governance.

This era was however short-lived as a series of reasons led to the overthrow of Said Barre's government in 1991 and this political development was quickly followed by a complete collapse of the Somali national government (Besteman, 1996a). In the face of an absent legitimate government, several armed groups emerged to scramble for the power vacuum that had occurred when the government collapsed. Until the early 2000s when efforts to restore a central government begun to bore fruits, the country was in a state of anarchy with

religious and customary laws being used as an alternative to the absence of a justice system to solve disputes (Elmi & Barise, 2006).

A temporary government structure in the form of the Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in 2000 after the signing of peace accord between the warring parties. This accord was rebranded later to be known as Transitional Federal Government enjoying the support of both regional and international organizations (Sage, 2002). With its new mandate and support, the Transitional Federal Government managed to restore few institutions of governance such as the national parliament, the military and the public service commission and recapture much of the territories that had been taken by militia and terrorist groups (Addow, 2016; Gomsrud & Gaas 2010).

However, conflict continued between the different factions in Somalia such as conflicts between the state and armed rebels or, among the different rebelling factions themselves. There is still sharp division on which territories form the Federal Republic of Somalia since regions such as the Somaliland and Puntland have declared independence from Mogadishu though with little international recognition (Johnson & Smaker, 2014; Hesse, 2010). Terrorist attacks are still very common, kidnappings, piracy and inter clan conflicts are also very much visible (Shay, 2017; VandeBerg & Gilmer, 2014). The devastating effects of the seemingly unending violence in Somalia are what has attracted the attention of policy makers, academics and international organizations to Somalia. This thesis is also seeking to examine the main cause of the violence in Somalia with the hope of offering policy recommendations as solutions.

2.2 Clan Configuration in Somalia

The most important and consistent socio-political pillar in Somalia has and continues to be the clan -system, which is further divided into the clan, clan -family, sub-clan, mag-paying


group and primary lineage (Gundel, 2009: 3). Somalia constitutes of a single dominant ethnic group (90% of the total population) known as the Somalis who are organized in terms of clans. According to Lewis (1961: 4), the highest limit of a clan structure is the clan - family level which has a long and unfixed genealogical length capturing several generations of common ancestry. The second highest limit is the clan level, usually going back to about 20 generations.

The Clan has a territorial limit and often acts as a political unit characterized by common pastoralist movement and same settlement area (Kapteijns, 2002). Members of a clan are attached not to a sense of belonging to the same territory, but rather a similar agnatic descent. Although clans tend to have a sought of leadership hierarchy mostly led by a clan leader, it does not have a centralized political system of any sought. Mag-paying group level is the third in the clan hierarchy and it is the most important level of social organization (Gaas, 2018; Muhammed, 2018). It is a relatively larger group of 4 -8 generations capable of paying fines which totals to about 100 camels if one of their members is accused of homicide. In Somalia, the mag -paying group is governed by a social contract known as the *xeer*, a sought of customary law (Aden, 2011, Reuben, 2021).

The people of Somalia are considered to be descendants of a larger Cushitic group of people which also includes; the Afar, the Beja, the Oromo and the Saho who spread to other regions within and around Horn of Africa. Cushitic group is also referred to as Hamitic (Brons 2001: 90; Bradbury 1994: 08). There are several myths trying to explain the origin of the Somali people from a historical contest. Some scholars trace the Somali lineage back to the Arabs and more specifically to the Quraysh lineage associated with Prophet Mohamed and his followers in the early years although the actual lineage is still not unanimously agreed upon (Brons 2001: 92).

Some other scholars argue that the clans in Somalia can be traced back to different lineages. They place the pastoralist clans in the lineage of a group known as the Samaale, and the clans that engage in agriculture such as the Mirifile and Digil, to the lineage of Sab (Pitek, 2018; O'Connor, 2015). This myth seems to differ with the first one that says Somalis originated from the Quraysh lineage of Prophet Mohammed but rather that they descended from the lineage of Agiil Abuu Taalib the cousin of Prophet Mohamed. Lewis (2002) points out the Isaaq clan as being descendants of Ali Abuu Talib the brother of Agiil Abuu Taalib who married Fatima the daughter of the Prophet. Figure (2) shows how the Sab clan is further divided.

Figure 7: Representation of the Agro pastoral clans (Less influential in politics)



Source: Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), Somalia Clans, 2017


Another narrative rotates around a man of Arabian origin known as the man in the tree who became their ancestor after marrying a Somali girl and established a patrilineal lineage of Somalis with roots from the Arabian Peninsula (Sheik-Abdi, 1977; Cassanelli, 2016). This narrative originates from ancient African mythology but was accepted as one of the official myths when the people of Somalia converted to Islam (Ahmed, 1995). This myth in extension gives the Somali people an African origin that only changed with the marriage of the Somali girl to the man from Arabia. Nonetheless, Lewis (2002: 04) concludes that the

Somali people origins tracked back to Arabia which is where the two myths place their common ancestry.

The nomadic clans of Somalia (Darod, Isaaq, Dir, Hawiye and, Rahanweyn) refer to themselves as the nobles in contrast to the artisans or agriculturalist clans (the Sab). There are five large clans in Somalia which are then divided into smaller units (Nuscheier, 2019). Of these, the Hawiye and Dir are believed to be descendants of Irir Samaale possibly that's where the ethnonym *Somali* originated. The Darod and Isaaq clans are believed to have originated from Abdirahman al-Jabarti and Ishaak ibn Ahmed respectively (Mukhtar, 1996).

Both who it is believed that they married women from the clan of Dir and that is what created a matrilineal connection between the two clans and the samaale lineage of the nobles. The Sab clan is the fifth and their name is used to show the distinction between them and the noble samaale clan (Busatta, 2008). That said, other sources indicate that Samaale and Sab were the sons of *Hiil* the common ancestor of all the clans in Somalia. Figure (3) shows the main pastoralist clans that also play an important role in Somalia politics

Figure 8: Representation of the pastoralist clans (Most important political players)



Source: Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) (2017)

Some sub-clans, in Southern Somalia, were not initially associated with the five dominant clans but later came to be assimilated into the big five (Hoehne, 2010). For example, the *Gaalje'el* in *Hiran* who also occupy some other parts of the country trace their origin to *Gardheere Samaale*. The Garre of North Somalia was initially divided into two, *Quranyow* of *Mahamed Hiniiftir Mahe* of the Dir lineage and married the daughter of *Tuuf* and second is the *Tuuf* which has claimed to be *Garre Samaale*.

In the Northeast, there is Degoodi clan which originated from *Gaaje'el* lineage but is also associated with the *Gardheere Samaale* (Mohamed, 1997). In Hiran region, the *Hawaadle* sub-clan trace their origin to the *Meyle Samaale* while the Ajuraan sub-clan found in North Eastern province, lay claim of their origins to be *Maqaarre Samaale* (Jimale, 1995: 130). The Sheekhaal sub-clan claim ancestry from Sheikh Abadir Umar (Burton, 1966: 165).

The following are the clans in Somalia;

Table 3: Dominant clans and the affiliated sub -clans

Clan	Sub -Clan
Darod Clan	Leelkase, Dishishe, Dhulbahante, Majeerteen, Ogaden, Marehan, Mora'ase, Awrtable, Jidwaq, and Warsangali
Dir Clan	Gadabuursi, Affa, Madahweyn, Habar Makador, Quranyow, Garre,Surre, Bursuk, Madawini (<i>Gure Gurgura Garire</i>), Biimaal, Madigan, (Gaadsen)
Isaaq Clan	Habr Awal, Arap, Garhajis Ayoup, Tol Jecle and Habar Jeclo
Hawiye Clan	Abgal, Gugundhabe (Galjecel, Murule, Baadicadde), Murusade, Gorgate (Wadalaan, Silcis, Haskul) Hiraab (Gidir, Duduble, sheekhaal, Habar)
Rahanweyn Clan	Jiddu, Digil Dabarre, Garre, Tunni, Geledi Mirifle Jilible, Hadame, Harin, Jiron, Eelay, Leysan. These five are the major clans, however there are several other smaller clans

	namely; Ashraaf, Gaboye, Benadiri, Bravanese and Carab Salaax
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
Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) (2017)

2.3 The concept of Kinship and Conflict in Somalia

Kinship in Somalia is based on two important principles, one is a social contract and the other is a blood relation. This complex relation means that blood relations form the identity aspect of kinship while these relations are cement through a form of social contract (Mohamed, 2007: 6-12). Kinship in Somalia is often characterized by being a member of a clan and tracing one's origin back to a common ancestor with the other members of the clan. The above figure explains how the clans are divided in Somalia with the five dominant groups being the Hawiye, Darood, Digile, Dir, and Mirifle, and Isaaq (Webersik, 2004).

These clans provide the basis upon which clan leaders are able to bargain for political power with other clans. The larger the clan, the easier it is to get a better deal (Mohamed, 1997). When there is clan rivalry, these kinship identities become even much stronger against the rival thus explaining why it is possible that clan members will be willing to go to whichever extent in order to secure their clan supremacy and/or interests (Besteman, 2014). Kinship also creates very strong loyalty that then shapes how Somalis relate individually and as a group with each other.

Figure 9: Clan distribution across the country



Source: Abikar, 1999

2.4 The Minority Clans

In Somalia, minority groups are referred to as clans or sub-clans for the sake of assimilating them into the clan structure of the country which is significant in the political and social spheres of the country. Minorities are collectively referred to as the Sab and among them, one can find the bondsmen and the ‘outcaste’ as well as some descendants of the Bantu lineage and other Arabic speaking groups found along the coastal strip such as the *Barawanis* and *Bajunis* (Hill, 2010). The general expression is that minority groups have their culture and languages not accepted nor respected and the groups are not counted (Lwanga-Ntale & Owino, 2020).

Minorities in Somalia have different characteristics, size, and structure of their clans.

Sometimes the term minority does not necessarily mean being few in numbers. Indeed, using

numbers to determine minorities in the Somali case can be misleading since some of the minority groups are the majority in some of the local municipalities as it is the case of the Bantus who dominate several municipal councils in South Central Somalia (Hinds, 2013). A better analysis of who can be considered as a minority is to look at how the government of the day treats certain clans (Wirtz et al., 2018). The lack of dominance in the country's political and economic spheres is what makes a clan to be considered a minority in Somalia. Another example is the members of the Sab clan who unlike the Bantus become a minority because they are geographically scattered and do not live in one specific area where they can dominate (Farah, Hussein, & Lind, 2002).

Some clans such as the *Biymaal* who at the local level are considered as minorities since they live in small groups in various regions of the country but due to their dominance in the country's politics and economy, they cease to be considered as minorities at such a level (Buluma, 2013). Therefore, should there be a need, such clans can be able to move from areas where they are minorities to areas where they are the majority and get the necessary protection. Such complexities mean that when it comes to assessing the risk or vulnerability during the conflict, such possibilities of change pose valid challenges. Such generalization poses a challenge to asylum providers who may depend on the general classification of clans and not factor in the other realities. Below is an assessment of the minority clans in Somalia.

The Sab

Historically members of the sab group were considered to be the bondsmen of the more dominant nomadic clans (Lewis, 2019). They had to rely on a Somali patron also referred to as an *abbaan* in order to have any form of contact or relations with the dominant Somali clans. Internally the sab clan is subdivided just like the rest of the bigger clans in Somalia. Inter-marriage between members of the Sab clan group and those considered to be "noble"

nomadic clans is not accepted nor allowed. Ownership to livestock or land as well as engaging in various social economic and political activities by the Sab clan is equally denied (Abdullahi, 2001).

The only activities or profession that members of this clan are allowed to practice are those which are despised and often at times individuals from this clan are referred to based on the degrading profession they do. As a response, clans under the Sab group opt to keep to themselves their secrets from the other dominant clans (Collins, 2009). They keep secrets on skills such as handicraft and construction of homes which forces the other clans to depend on them if they need these services. The Sab groups have their own language which they speak although these languages are quickly being diluted by the Somali language and are disappearing (Laitin, 2019). Some of the subgroups that form the sab clan include:

Gabooye/Midgan

The Gabooye occupy areas predominantly in the North of Somalia and consist of Midgan (Shoemakers, poison maker, hunters, and gatherer as well as hairdressers), the Tumaal (Blacksmiths) and members of the Yibr. Members of the Gabooye /Midgan subgroup include Howleh, Muuse Dhariyo, Hawraar Same, Habar Yaquup and Madigan. Some of these groups can be found in small numbers in the southern region of Somalia (Lattimer, 2008).

Yibr clan

The Yibr sometimes referred to as the *Yibro* occupy lands in areas such as the coast in *Bosasso* and Mogadishu, *Burco*, and *Borama*. They are minorities in the south and often distinguished from the Gabooye clan who dominate the South (de Waal, 2020). The Yibr are early descendants of Hebrews who settled along the horn of Africa in the early years. According to Luling (2006) this intentional or an anti -semitic outlook by other groups but

was and continues to be an allegation made by the Yibr people themselves as a way of dignifying the status of their cast.

This idea although has been disputed by different quarters, it does have some level of merit and not entirely baseless. In the 1970's there was a huge campaign to discredit their assertion, however, there is a historical basis to believe that before Christianity and Islam were introduced in the region, there was a clear relationship between the Somali people and the Jews. In the present day, the Yibr still use the Aw-Barkhadle (a religious center commemorating Sheikh Yusuf AlKownin) located between Berbera and Hargeisa as proof to their claim (Reese, 2000; Diriye, 2019).

Historically, members of this group had a mythological role in the society and did not engage in any other functions. In exchange for good fortune newly married couples or parents of newly born babies offered them gifts known as *Samanyo* (Kirk, 1904). This and other superstitious deeds made the clan to enjoy some level of protection before the unification of Mogadishu and Hargeisa. The government in the 1960s banned their traditional practices including *Samanyo* custom (Ali, 2021). Members of the Yibr clan have in the recent years been under suspicion from radical Islamists and members of the Al Shabab due to the growing anti-Jewish attitudes and the fact that they claim they descended from the Hebrews. Despite the fact that today they are Muslims, they can still come under attack in areas such as South-Central Somalia.

Sheikhal (Sheikhash)

The Sheikh (Sheikhash) is a group which mainly derives its identity from religion. Luling (2006) describes this group as “by one account they all trace descent in legendary terms from the same ancestor, Sheikh Faqi Omar, who traveled around Somalia and married wives in each location” (Luling, 2006). They are a typical example of constructivists who use their

identity to escape oppression and marginalization. Their religious identity enables them to access almost any part of the country. They are sometimes affiliated with the Hirab faction of Hawiyes. The ability to change their clan identity has enabled them to pursue two important strategies after the civil war broke out (Mahamud, 2014).

One was that they formed groups to promote non-violence and education specifically around the capital city. They formed the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia which is an umbrella organ for stakeholders in the sector of education and the Islamic organization al-Islah to promote non-violence (Saggiomo, 2014; Dagne, 2009). The second strategy was to establish an association with the United Somali Congress which was the political wing of Hawiye clan. General Aideed, and the Hawiye clan. This led to the formation of 'Martileh Hirab' (meaning guests of Hirab) (Compagnon, 1990). Today they have three representatives in the Somali parliament.

The Biymaal, the Garre and the Bagadi / Iroole

The Biymaal are a minority group within the larger Dir clan group and while based on this they may not be considered as a minority, this group has been oppressed by other clans, particularly the Hawiye clan, Darood and Ogaden. On the other hand, Garre, are sometimes categorized as members of the Digil / Rahanweyn group but at times treated as a distinct group. Just as the Garre, the Bagadi / Iroole are sometimes classified as members of the Digil / Rahanweyn group and are mostly found in Lower Shabelle (Iazzolino, 2016). This group has come under attack from the Al Shabab during the recent years and have a long history of oppression by the Hawiye clan.

Coastal Groups

The long Somali coastal strip is home to some of the country's minority groups. They include Benadiri, Bajuni, Barawani, and Reer. The Bajuni and Barawani trace their origin from the Arabia peninsula (Dua & Menkhaus, 2012).

Bantus (Jareer)

Members of the Bantu clans in Somalia mostly occupy the Southern region and main occupation is agriculture. Some of the sub-clans under the Bantu umbrella include the *Reer*, *Shabelle*, *Gosha*, *Shiidle*, *Makane*, or *Mushungli*. Majority of these group speak languages associated with the Bantus, however, there are some who can speak Swahili and Arabic (Eno & Eno, 2014). The Bantu clan is a unique group in Somalia in many ways.

This is seen by the fact that even the dominant clans in Somalia, those who consider themselves as noble and thus have constantly made efforts to assimilate the smaller minority groups into their clans, find the Bantus to be too different for them to be assimilated into the 'noble clans' and thus sideline them (Deramo, 2016). This has exposed members of the Bantu clans to marginalization as well as constant attacks from other clans. In response, some of the bantu sub-clans have started to arm themselves reducing the likelihood of being attacked. This has made some of the Bantu to participate directly and indirectly in the on-going conflict (Kahyana, 2020).

Rer Hamar

Although this group belongs to a bigger clan of the Benadiri, they are often considered as minorities in the country because of their culture and language. They are mostly found in Shangani and Hamarweyne of Central Mogadishu (Abbink, 2009). They are of Arabic decent and not as homogeneous as other Somali clans. They trace their lineage to the ancient people who lived in the urban districts of Hamar and Shangani Districts. Unlike other

minorities, the *Rer Hamar* own property, particularly in the capital. They have two lineages, first, the *Gibil Madow* who have a mixture of Somali descent and the *Gibil Cad* who are more or fewer Arabs. This explains why the '*Qalimoshube*' a smaller group but within the *Rer Hamar* are discriminated against due to the darker color of their skin which means they may not have directly descended from the Arabs (Kassim & Issa, 2017).

Due to their small size, the *Rer Hamar* join up with other clans to further their political power since they are not able to command enough support on their own. By ganging up with bigger clans, this political approach enables them to avoid being marginalized by other clans. Indeed, one can observe that gradually, the *Rer Hamar* are no longer subjected to targeted attacks that were widespread during the early years of civil war. That said, discrimination amongst them has not ended per say but there are a number of reasons that are hindering direct targeting as was seen in the past (Farah, Hussein & Lind, 2002).

One of the main examples is that members of the *Rer Hamr* group that was able to seek asylum abroad published the grievances of the group at the international stage attracting the attention of the world to their suffering. Secondly, some members of the group were able to maneuver and get positions in the central, regional and local governments across the country thus being able to address the clans' needs. The increased political influence is accompanied by increased advocacy as well as the '*Mukulal Madow*' (black cat) phenomenon which are both working towards reducing the threats on the group at least compared to the Bantus (Hansen, 2013).

The Asharaf

They can be divided into two lineages Digil-Mirifle Asharaf and Benadiri Asharaf and are scattered in different locations of the country. Their main occupation is teaching religion, a form of Islam that is traced to Fatima the daughter of the prophet Muhammad. Their

association with the daughter of the prophet enables them to get protection and easily integrate with other Somali clans. That said, although the host community may not directly oppress them, there have been instances where when the host clan is at war with the other clans, the Ashraf too have been targeted (Hoehne, 2015). Even more specifically, the group is today under threat of the Al Shabaab terrorist organization which does not recognize nor respect their version of Islam. Some members of the clan have also risen to key positions in government such as Sharif Hassan, who was a cabinet minister (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2013).

2.5 The Concept of Clan Protection in Somalia

Perhaps to better understand the role of clans in this conflict idea of clan-protection needs to be explained. Fundamentally, it is important to give reference to a popular saying among the Somalis that “Either be a mountain or attach yourself to one” (Ahmad, 2014). Clans have developed a strong principle of pride and always seek to be respected. Any form of humiliation of the clan is considered unacceptable and clan members will go to extreme lengths to protect the clans’ dignity. One of the ways of ensuring this is through forming alliances with strong clans for purposes of protection (Horst & Nur, 2016). Meaning for many Somalis, the clan is an important unit of security, perhaps more than even the state, which in theory is supposed to provide security to all its citizens.

Such protection does not come for free, and some form of reward is expected. Weak Somali clans attach their identity to strong clans commonly referred to as *gaashaanbuur* (pile of shields) and forming a *gaashaanbuur* coalition (Castagno, 1964). The extent of assimilation of a weak clan to a strong clan may depend on the degree of what status the strong clan will gain for associating with the clan, appendage, the number of members of the clan, or whether the weak clan pretends to be what they are not. In the event that a weak clan has been adopted, the stronger clan benefits from their political and economic support while the

weaker clan will gain protection as well as payment of *mag* on their behalf should there be a need (Salzman, 1978).

Clan Protection in Current Conflict

The idea of protecting individuals is actually historical and has been upheld by Somalis for many years. Previously people were obliged to provide protection to whoever came to them seeking protection and failure to provide such protection was considered as disowning an important obligation. However, the recent civil war has created a massive humanitarian crisis that makes it difficult for members of the potential host clan to fail in this practice (Owinow & Reuben, 2021). This has created or increased a situation of vulnerability for the weak clans and more importantly among the children and women who form the lowest cast in the societal hierarchy. It gets worse if one is a child or a woman from one of the minority clans or those who do not belong to the 'noble clans' (Hansen, 2013).

Their suffering is highly felt if the said group is among those living in internally displaced camps. The state of lawlessness and disorder in the country is being exploited by many young people who are free to attack and abuse members of the minority clans in the internally displaced camps (Owinow & Reuben, 2021). This impunity is perpetuated by most members of the host community who extort and abuse the vulnerable segments of the community. Such abuses could indeed be avoided if the clans involved would enter into a new *Xeer* which puts the responsibility on the stronger clan to protect the weaker clans. There are some clans that have resulted in other much more extreme measures in order to protect other clans. For example, they argue that the *dia* -payment (where the offender pays 100 camels to the victim) is not sufficient to curb the way crime and gang violence (Reno, 2003).

Agnatic and Affinal Ties in Somalia

Somali clans are classified further into several sub-clans whose structure and number of divisions depend on the size of the main clan. Apart from acting as the basic political unit, clans also determine interior boundaries within the country's clan -family structure upon which individuals differentiate themselves from one another. Lewis (1961) adds that the very nature of a clan unit allows it to traverse across a wider and more general land area. For example, the Darood clan is a larger unit that consists of the Lel-Kase, Yusuf, Absame, Harti, and the Saad clans. The Harti clan is classified into the Dashishe, Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli sub-clans (Talle, 2021). This, therefore, means that the Warsangeli sub-clan, as well as the three other sub-clans (the Majeerteen, Dashishe, and Dhulbahante) all, have a common ancestry in Harti. Geographically, these four clans have historically occupied land that is owned by the Darood clan-family. Despite these lands being large and thus scattering the communities widely, this does not affect their sense of belonging and identity as part the Darood clan (Hoehne, 2016).

Harti is, therefore, the founder of the Harti clan and all the sub-clans attached to it share a sense of common origin. To trace their Harti decent, members of this clan use the patrilineal descent which largely relies on the male lineage (Bryden, 1999). Currently, members of the Harti sub-clans are able to count back 20 generations to Harti, their common ancestor. This approach of tracing one's own identity back to a common ancestor is a common practice among the Somali clans and the Harti case used here is just but one of the examples. We can attribute the coexistence and strong cooperation among the agnatic clans to the corporate clan identity that can be traced back several generations.

Abdi describes this further as “Within a clan, the general area in which its members are concentrated is for the purposes of grazing in principle open to the stock of all those of its constituent lineage segments” (Abdi, 2010: 30 -34). The clan is able to assume the function of being the highest political unit because of the clans’ ability to accommodate their lineage segments. That said, however, it is only through consensus that a clan is able to realize its political objectives. Since the structure of the clan does not provide for an internal central authority, a vacuum is created which then clan elders step in to fill. This explains why clan elders are important players in the Somali conflict and politics.

An important approach adopted by most of the clans in Somalia is to attempt to build links and alliances with other clans through among other means intermarriages. The most basic level of clan identity is the primary lineage which is followed by the diya-paying group which is largely politically motivated and clan members tend to stick to it to achieve their interests (Egge *et al.*, 2011). Clan identity in Somalia is considered primordial and one cannot change from one clan to another. Genealogy, on the other hand, ties one Somali to the other and also determines upon whom will one depend or politically affiliate themselves with based on their agnatic connection. The affinal ties and links a clan gets through intermarriage compel them to cooperate with one another meaning marriage vows do not only bound the husband and wife together, but it also attaches the community as well (Mohamed, 2007: 22 -28).

Affinal linkages that clan system in Somalia creates leads to a wide web of elite cooperation (Menkhaus, 2018). Belonging to a particular clan enables one to enjoy the benefits of affinal linkages that the rest of the clan gets from the other clans. On the contrary, it also creates a situation of we against them, whereby clans that are closely affiliated tend to create an alliance against the ‘others’ who are not part of their cycle (Burgess, 2013). This again adds value to the argument that attaches clan identity in the ongoing conflict in Somalia. Lewis

argues that “The bond is important too in providing a channel of information between affinely linked yet hostile lineages; and affine often play a major part in negotiation and in the settlement of disputes” (Lewis, 1961: 140). Noteworthy, despite the ongoing conflict, cross -clan and sub-clan ties seem sanction rigid agnatic and affinal ties which in turn create political alignment among the clans (Hearn & Zimmerman, 2014). Affinal ties in the Somali clan system acts as a counterbalance to the uterine ties that also exist.

Uterine Ties

Lewis argues that Somali’s “main theme of politics” is derived from an agnatic generation which is responsible for distinguishing clans from each other. It is observable that the sub -clans can change in size and structure differently, therefore, a group that could be a sub-clan today can become bigger in size and potential that it can move to the level of diya-paying or primary lineage group (Dyer, Tecle, & Awan, 2017). Clans that numerically remain inferior remain classified as a sub-clan. This means that agnatic segmentation does not translate to “equipoised units” since there are anomalies presented by “by the recognition of the irregular growth and by the importance given to the uneven distribution of man-power and fighting potential” (Lewis, 1961: 159).

The concept of uterine ties is able to explain the existing inequalities which it attributes to polygamous marriage (Hoehne, 2016). In Somalia, the Sharia law gives permission to a man to marry up to four wives, a practice that is prominently observed. The impact of this, however, is that it leads to a rise in the number of families where siblings have the same father but different mothers who are from different clans. And in turn, such polygamous marriages have proved to be the basis of morphology that makes some people to be ramified while others are not (Ali, 2016). The impact of this is numerical disparities that have a direct impact on conflict and fighting among clans, uterine ties thus offer weak clans a platform to

form an alliance with other subgroups in order to counterbalance the strength of dominant clans in the country.

2.6 The Heer Contracts and Traditional Conflict Resolution

Heer or social contracts are important pillars in the clan system of Somalia as it helps strengthen the values established by the clan system. *Heer* contracts are second in the hierarchy of significant principles in the political life of Somalis (Samatar, 1993). Lewis points out that *heers* play the role of “calling into effect the implicit values of agnation” and provide a form of the contractual basis on which clans at all levels enter into (Lewis 1961: 153). *Dia*-paying groups discussed earlier, then localizes the political contracts that are established by the *Heer*. In addition, *heers*, through the social contracts, provide *dia* -pay groups with a stable political unit that are characterized by collective responsibilities for the actions by members of their groups (Renders, 2007). In some cases, political responsibility as Lewis points out that unity among the clans with political interest is not restricted to *dia* -paying groups alone, he adds that “When any order of lineage, be it clan, primary lineage-group, or *dia* -paying group, acts as a corporate political unit against another, it generally does so in terms of a contractual treaty binding all its members” (Lewis, 1961: 160). Agnatic connections are at the same time very influential factors in determining the nature and kind of *heer* agreement that a group can enter into.

If one combines *heer* and kinship, a clear image of the main drivers of the country’s political system becomes visible (Besteman, 1996b). The distinction between the two is that kinship in Somalia is straining and cannot be refuted while *heer* contracts are not straining and one group can shift from one agreement to the other or they can be modified, abrogated, or rescinded (Waldron, 1997). Most of the *heer* agreements are found to be concerned with “collective defense and security and to political cohesion in general” Lewis, 1961: 161).

This means that heer contracts represent “a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights, and duties. It binds people of the same treaty (*heer*) together in relation to internal delicts and defines their collective responsibility in external relationships with other groups” (Renders, 2007a).

The *heer* attaches legal attributes to social issues such as homicide, insult and wounding and extend to other problems such as defamation and adultery. In case either of the above rules is broken, the sheik will interpret the sharia and direct that the offender compensates the victim. In the event that a person from one of the clans that have a heer agreement is found guilty of the murder of a member of the other group, an agreed fine of 100 camels must be paid. If the clan is not able to raise the 100 camels, then an equivalent substitute either in monetary form or other livestock may be accepted. (Mohamoud & Mohamoud, 2006).

In some other groups, for example, the Mahamuud Garaad and the Faarah Garaad sub-clans of the *Dulbahante* clan accept payment of 120 camels in case it is the murder of a man and for a woman who has been murdered, 60 camels have to be paid (Hearn & Zimmerman, 2014). The compensation can also be higher in case the nature of the homicide is one that brings disgrace to humanity and the community or if the victim is an individual of higher social status (Schlee, 2001). This is achieved by putting into effect the *samirsiis* procedure which is expected to promote reconciliation and satisfaction on the part of the affected group (Ali, 2016). The high compensation is intended to show that the dignity of the aggrieved clan is respected and upheld. The whole idea of having the heer contract among clans is to ensure continuity to peace and coexistence (Renders, 2007).

However, despite this being a long practiced and highly respected tradition, the ongoing civil war appear to overshadow its significance (Nur, 2020). The main question thus remains, what impact this war has on the social pillars of the Somali communities whereby traditional

practices of significant relevance to peace are being ignored (Nyadera & Ahmed, 2020). Having the *samirsiis* clauses inserted in the *Xeer* contracts is a visible sign that Somali clans were keen on preserving peacemaking one to wonder why such a rich culture could not help ending the ongoing war? The importance of the *heer* contracts is that they go beyond the average man and women but also seek to protect not only the children but also the unborn fetus. Arguably, in many cases, and perhaps generally, however, the death of a child requires the same compensation as that of an adult (Schlee, 2001).

Thus, the *Gadabuursi* even exact payment of full blood-wealth for a miscarriage caused by a blow inflicted on a pregnant woman” (Lewis, 1961: 164). *Heer* contracts have a sophisticated means of determining whether the individual who committed the act did so intentionally or not (Nyadera, Mohamed & Agwanda, 2019). This means that in case the act committed was involuntary then the perpetrator will be treated with the necessary fairness which in most cases would mean a reduced sentence or fine. Indeed, as Lewis observes “accidental deaths are more susceptible to amicable settlement than premeditated death” (Lewis, 1961: 164). The *heers* also open up a unique feature about Somali’s conflict and possibly the solution to it. This is the function of elders in conflict resolution as stipulated in the *heer* agreements. We have already looked at the argument that protracted conflicts need unique approaches in order to solve them and in this case, the elders may be influential and need to be given a special position in the future peace processes (Nyadera, Mohamed & Agwanda, 2019).

From another perspective, one can argue that in fact, it is the collapse and failure of the *heer* system that has seen the conflict in Somalia reach the extent it has today. Even more importantly, we need to look at how the *heer* system socialized the Somali society’s view of concepts such as justice and conflict resolution (Renders, 2007b). It may also be important to examine how deep such socialization is affecting their response to injustice. One of the

most prominent examples is the response to a murder or homicide that has not been paid for. In most cases perhaps a similar revenge may take place thus creating a cycle of violence that very few approaches can resolve (Abdile, 2012). Somali's traditional justice system is based on compensation of the victims by the perpetrator and since in the ongoing conflict there is little possibility of compensation, the offended party will consider the killing of members of their groups not just as part of a conflict but an insult to their dignity and disrespect as a clan (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019).

2.7 Clan Based Militia in Somalia

The conflict in Somalia has been highly influenced by clan armed groups that fought against the government and among themselves (Vinci, 2006). They include, Somali National Movement which was established in Ethiopia which is one of the earliest clan groups in Ethiopia. It was constantly at war with the government in the 1980s, in 1988 it attacked Hargeisa and Burao towns in Northern Somalia (Skjelderup et al., 2020). After the government collapsed, other clan based political outfits with robust military wings emerged such as the Somali Social Democratic Front, whose leaders led by Abdullaabi Yusuf had been sent to Ethiopia on exile in the early 1980s. The SNA and the SPM consisted of former soldiers in the national army before it collapsed (Ssereo, 2003). Later on, there was SDA headed by Mohammed Farah and USC commanded by Ali Mahdi.

Table 4 : Clan based of the armed group.

Clan Affiliated Political Militia	Clan
Somali Social Democratic Front	Marjeteen
Somaliland National Movement	Issaq
Somalia Patriotic Movement	Rahawin Digil
Somali National Army	Ogaden
United Somali Congress (A)	Hawiye -Abqal

Somalia National Alliance	Hawiye
United Somali Congress (B)	Habr -Gedir
Somali Democratic Alliance	Gadabursi
United Somali Party	Dolbahante
Somali Democratic Movement	Digil and Rahawein
United Somali Front	Esa

Source: Ssereo (2008)

In the early 1990s, opposition fighters formed a coalition consisting of the SDA, the SNM, the SPM and SNA that overthrew Siad Barre (Makinda, 1993). However due to a clear vision, lack of unity and an already fragile state on the brink of collapse, the success of the opposition coalition in removing Siad Barre also marked the collapse of Somalia as a state. The weak clan -based opposition coalition of clan armies did not hold for long after their victory because instead of establishing a national army and a government of national unity they all reverted to small clan -based militia group thus creating a vacuum due to lack of a national army (Nyadera, Mohamed & Agwanda, 2019).

This was also worsened by the fact that a single clan could not form an arm alone and needed the support of other clans. Therefore, the inability to form a national political outfit to replace that of Siad Barre caused the stalemate that led to the crisis we see today. After looking at the structure of Somalia's clan system and the strong bond clannism has on the individual, it is easy to determine that the position of clans in the on -going conflict is inevitable. In the next chapter the researcher tries gives a general background of the conflict in a global context, how it has transformed, and efforts made to forge peace.

CHAPTER 3.

3. COLONIAL AND HISTORICAL ORIGINS SOMALIA'S INSTABILITY

With a good understanding of the identity issues in Somalia from chapter 2, I will now examine the origins of the conflict which in many ways has traces of identity influence in it. In this chapter I will assess what existing literature show regarding conflicts in general and the conflict in Somalia particularly. The chapter will begin with a broad discussion of contemporary conflicts which seems to involve more non -state actors than traditional conflicts. The chapter also discusses the circumstances and events that led to the collapse of the Somalia government in 1991, as well as the actors involved in the Somalia conflict from a historical perspective in order to give the reader a context of the conflict and how it fits into contemporary conflicts. The chapter also highlights the previous peace efforts and identifies gaps in the processes that will be useful in formulating recommendations in this study.

3.1 Nature of Contemporary Conflicts

The 21st century warfare has undergone tremendous changes. A major shift has been from interstate conflict to a more predominant intrastate conflict. Creveld (1991), was among the first scholars to give an extensive analysis of the changing nature of war. He noted that despite a huge decline in interstate conflicts, the emergence of organized violence within the state is on a steady rise. Münkler (2005), Kaldor (2006) and Pettersson (2011:6) have come up with a set of unique characteristics that distinguish what they term as “new wars” from the previous interstate conflicts. They noted that these new types of conflicts are predominant in parts of Middle East, Africa, Latin America.

The first characteristic given to contemporary wars is that the cost of civilian loss is very high perhaps because there is a deliberate attempt to inflict more pain by targeting civilians.

Second, they are being widespread and omnipotent since seldom are they fought in a fixed battleground or time period. The line between crime and war has become almost invisible in the contemporary wars (Kaldor, 2006: ix). Terror tactics and Guerilla warfare are increasingly being used (Münkler, 2005: 3).

The Somalia conflict fits in the context of new wars in two ways. First, it follows the trend of wars that are predominantly intra -state where citizens are fighting against each other. Interestingly, before the outbreak of the civil war, Somalia was one of the countries involved in a number of inter -state conflicts thrice with Ethiopia and Kenya too. This shift from interstate to intrastate makes an important feature in the context of new wars. The second way in which the context fits into the new war is the loss of civilians in the war. Classical wars were fought between armies in defined locations. This meant that there were very few civilian casualties in the wars however if when we look at the conflict in Somalia, it is fought in different locations leading to huge number of civilian losses.

The literature on conflict cases across the world has increased with the ‘greed vs. grievance’ theory being among the most prominently used debate in explaining the conflict. Collier (cited in Porto, 2002: 8), first introduced this theory citing that most conflicts are caused by economic reasons/ grievances. However, sociologists have argued that most conflicts are caused by identity particularly the theory of socio-psychology and how it influences intergroup conflict (Cuhadar & Dayton, 2011).

Immanuel Wallerstein (1973) introduced an important approach of analyzing African conflict based on class. He argues that conflicts in Africa can be understood through the lenses of class which was becoming a predominant concept in academics and politics (Wallerstein 1973:376). Although the idea of class was not dominant among Africans with some even working towards diluting the concept in Africa, its role in conflict has not been

explored sufficiently. There are those who believe that class plays a very important role in conflicts globally and African countries are not exempted. I believe that the class conflict in Somalia could have been the main motivation for the 1969 coup orchestrated by Siad Barre who later ruled with an iron fist. However, his ethnicization of security agencies, resource distribution and politics led to the uprising in 1991.

The dynamics of turbulence in Somalia has become so complex to explain it with only one theory. In this chapter, we will explore the relevant theories that can help us understand what is ailing the Somali community and, in the process, causing conflict amongst themselves. In our analysis, we will use the concepts of ethnicity and intractable conflicts to examine the conflict in Somalia. The theories will help provide a clear assessment that will explain the different aspects of conflict in Somalia and why specific actors are engaged in the war. The international system is characterized by states as principal actors in many areas.

While these states are treated as equal actors and with similar responsibilities and obligations irrespective of their level of development, there is a general classification that categorizes states as fragile, developed, underdeveloped, failed, developing or hegemony (Clapman 2004; Rotberg 2004; Herbst, 2004; Conrad & Stange, 2011). The most important distinction among the above categories regard the state's monopoly over power and central politics. Somalia as a state falls between the fragile, underdeveloped and some scholars may put it as a failed state since the central government collapsed and lost control of the country to small autonomous regional governments.

Important note is that the conflict in Somalia is increasingly becoming intractable. Intractable conflicts is a term increasingly being used to refer to the kind of conflicts that are characterized by episodic violence and bouts which keep on recurring from time to time (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 2009: 493). These conflicts seem to pose a unique challenge

to peace ambassadors as they appear to be resistant, but not to mean impossible, to resolve through peace-making or negotiated settlement.

Realist theorists have considered protracted conflicts to be high-stake and best won through control, domination and counter control. Protracted social conflicts (also referred to as “enduring rivalries conflicts”) are distinguished from other kinds of conflicts in either of these three ways: persistence, destructiveness and resistance to peaceful means of solving the problem (Coleman, 2006: 532). Some scholars such as Azar’s (1978) define protracted conflicts as “as a mixture of socio-ethnic and interstate elements that defy traditional settlement methods and generate escalating perceptions and behaviors” (in d’Estree, 2009: 150). One can associate the case of Somali conflict to results of other studies which indicate that most efforts towards crisis are only meant to maintain the conflict at its minimum; some of them are only ‘frozen’ temporarily and remain unsolved. This explains the episodic nature of intractable conflicts.

Many at times, more emphasis is placed on violent and overt conflicts while non-violent and latent conflicts are ignored (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 100). This indicates a simplistic view that the termination of conflict at one stage or the absence of violence for some time may mean peace. As we will observe later in this research, pre-colonial Somali clans were not living side by side in peace or under a single united administration but rather there were frequent conflicts over control of resources, land and trade routes. The coming of Europeans has been accused of causing division among the clans or be it in an exaggerated form.

In fact, clans in Somalia looked at the Europeans as a common enemy and therefore opted to ‘freeze’ their traditional rivalries against themselves and defeat the common enemy. This does not necessarily mean that the pre-colonial rivalry among the clans was solved, or they were at peace. One of the assumptions, in this case, is that the very fact that the main objective

of unity among the different clans in Somalia was to defeat the European colonialists, without any elaborate post-independence agenda as to how they would cement their unity and create an inclusive state means that the unforeseen conflict was already inevitable.

Crooker (2009) points out that failure to provide a lasting solution to the underlying problem has sometimes led to the false assumption of peace simply by looking at the fact that violent confrontation has declined or suspended. Some scholars refer to this kind of situation as the conflict in abeyance (Mayer, 2000; Wolf, 2006). The potential for such conflicts to recur cannot be ignored (Crocker et al, 2009: 492). Away from the pre-colonial rivalry, similar instances of suspended or frozen conflict continue to be witnessed in the case of Somalia and are often at times mistaken to mean the end of the war. This explains why analysts and the media have sometimes appeared surprised that an attack has occurred after a duration of peace.

Since most of the underlying triggers of conflict have not been comprehensively addressed in Somalia, we are considering situation in the country to be 'frozen'. The country is currently Balkanized into territories controlled by clan-based militia with national government commanding Mogadishu which is the capital city with the support of African Union troops. Whether the expulsion of dominant militia groups from Mogadishu by AMISOM and the presence of the central government in the capital will hinder future attempts to retake the capital is still debatable. Several attacks on civilians and government institutions such as the parliament being attack can mean that the militia groups are still keen on restoring their command of the capital city and other economically viable towns in the country. This argument is supported by Perry (2013: 14).

Farah and Azar (1981) added an important characteristic to their description of intractable conflicts. They argue that such conflicts represent a deep-rooted radical, religious and ethnic

animosities and that they should be analyzed and solved differently using different means from other conflicts which do not have similar traits (in d'Estree, 2009: 150). They also added that power differences and structural inequalities among different groups particularly when these mean unequal distributions and sharing of resources lead to conflict. More frequent than not will conflict arise where the dominant groups use their positions and numbers to dominate, abuse and control weaker or smaller groups (Coleman, 2006a: 534). One characteristic that is dominant in this kind of situation is that the dominant group will rely on intergroup differences like gender, race, class and, or, ethnicity to cling on power. According to Crocker et al. (2009: 492), such conflicts have historical bases such as pre-colonial rivalry, colonialism, racism, ethnocentrism, human rights or religion.

Noteworthy, sources of intractability cannot be entirely responsible for the conflict. In fact, no matter what or which side causes the first conflict, scholars agree that there are several other factors that may end up affecting the conflict, some even overtaking the initial cause of the conflict (Crocker et al., 2009: 495 & Coleman, 2006b: 534). Coleman (2006b) points out other factors such as the warlords who benefit from smuggling, the sale of arms and control of natural resources during the war may affect the conflict and make any efforts towards a peaceful settlement impossible. Others like Deutsch (2006: 43) identify oppression and denotes it as experience of widespread, systematic and repeated injustice as an important cause of conflict. Oppression in the recent years has taken the form of unquestioned symbols, habits and norms in the existing rules and the resultant effects of such institutions and rules.

The oppressive regime of President Siad Barre is one that can be used to explain the conflict in Somalia through the concept of oppression. It is indeed unfair for academics, media and policy makers to generalize the conflict in Somali as one solely embodied on the consequences of colonialism and ignore the fate and suffering by those who were caught up

in the wrong side of President Barre's regime. To undermine the actions of those who have been under systematic oppression may deny us an opportunity to better understand the conflict. Most important of all is that these incidences of oppression are based on identity and in the case of Somalia clan identity.

This argument is highly supported by scholars such as Dweck et al., (2006: 317) who argue that prejudice can be an underlying cause or a catalyst in conflict. They add that irrespective of whether prejudice existed before or after the conflict, what is clear remains that any exaggerated belief on the motive of another group or individual often makes reconciliation and peacemaking very difficult. The case of Somalia provides a good laboratory on how difficult it is to solve intractable conflicts.

Among the above-mentioned theories, this study has established that the case of Somali's conflict can be explained through a multidimensional approach. That is, there are assumptions of both the group-conflict, social identity and intractable conflict theories that can assist in the understanding of the conflict. The group conflict theory provides a basis to explain the causes of Somali's conflict by looking at the scarce resources which in turn forces individuals to gang up in a group, mostly ethnic groups, in order to increase their chances of getting more resources.

Scholars associated with the social identity theory have contributed in explaining the Somali conflict. This school of thought has argued that the conflict in Somalia is centered around identity. For them, it is difficult to understand the situation of the conflict without looking at how the different warring groups are formed, the basis on which one belongs to one group and not the other as well as the psychology of 'we' against 'they.' They identify social identity to be a dominant feature in the Somali case.

While this study agrees that identity has played a crucial role, its impact could have been much more stronger during the beginning of the conflict but allegiance changed over time. In addition, scholars have challenged the reliance of identity in explaining the initial trigger to the conflict. In many cases, identity does not explain the mechanisms that result into conflict. After all, there are many societies with diverse identity that do not face conflict. This thesis adds that for use to understand the causes of conflict, we need to be able to attach the underlying motivation that push people to become violent at a particular time. Nonetheless, identity does explain how the conflict has transformed over time and how allegiance is formed. For example, membership to piracy, terrorist and militia groups has broadened not only cutting across different clans but also recruitments from outside Somalia has increased. The conflict has thus become intractable theory with little explanations in the existing literature explaining why the conflict is taking long or why it has been difficult to get a permanent solution to the problem, especially the explanation that mostly the underlying causes are ignored, and most solutions are channeled towards symptoms of the problems. The unique abilities of these theories provide a better basis for understanding the conflict in Somalia as opposed to other existing theories such as colonialism.

3.2 Tracing Instability in Somalia.

Possibly, the pre-colonial history of Somalis is too extensive and profound, many questions have been raised particularly the identity and where originally Somalis came from and indeed due to the lack of resources of the written literature or academia, most of those questions have not yet agreed. In fact, this happened because of the poetry culture of Somalis, the society merely used the poet as a method of expressing and documenting their historical moments. Perhaps, this sheds light on the nature of pastoral society in which the literacy was very rare. The social structure of Somalis has always been based on a clan-based identity even in the historical setting.

Somalis societal structure has been always deconstructed into two. That is; the southern agri-pastoralists and the nomads in the northern part of Somalia who had a clan division settlement that influenced the political unity of the society. Even though they were not a single clan group but a combination of a large collection of clan federations widely dispersed all over with power distributed amongst and within families, sub-clans and Diya-paying groups which was a significant political unit amongst the pastoralists in the in the northern part of the country (Pham, 2010).

Before the 19th century, historical underpinnings of the Horn of Africa was clouded by protected Somalian expansion from the North and the rise and decline of the Islamic civilization. To a certain extent each of these two themes has its own particular history, but at no time over the centuries was one entirely independent of the other. The Somalis gradual enlargement on their country was not achieve by movement in the hinterland only, nor was events ran on the coast without their effect in the interior (Lewis, 2002: 18) but by the mid-19th century, a chance of state approaching equilibrium had been attained between the outward pressures of movement in the interior and the inward trend from the coast: if anything, perhaps, the balance was tipped in favor of the hinterlands which had come to exert a dominant political influence over the coastal settlements.

To some extent there is historical documentation of the coastal regions. However, history about the interior, historians continue to heavily rely on oral traditions. The Hamitic Somali community from the Gulf of Aden expanded gradually to plains of northern Kenya and indeed is one of most sustained expansion though, it was not a migration into an entirely empty land it was only extended by war and bloodshed (Ahad, 2014).

Regarding the administrative structure in the pre-colonial period, the society employed both the Sharia law and customary law in conflict resolution on issues regarding disagreements

over water and pasture, family matters, compensations and presiding over criminal offenses (Fleming, 1964). According to Rýdlová (2007: 19), both customary law and sharia law differ in the sense that sharia law prosecutes individuals for crimes while in customary law, there tends to be the inclusion of a collective lineage responsibility for a given crime.

Customary law on the other hand has been used as a tool of reconciliation and settling the disputes and it has deeply interlinked into the clan system relative to descent and egalitarian contract laws which are complimentary in the security structure in the society (Schlee, 2013). Sharia and customary laws regulate the behavior of people in the society both within the individual clans but also towards other members of the wider Somali community (Samatar, 1992: 10). Indeed, an analysis of these systems illustrate that power vested by both the sharia and customary law embody that of today's modern state. As such, pre-state Somalia clan councils were considered as the fundamental governmental institutions (Said, 2018).

Summarizing this, the pre-colonial Somali society political culture was described as an egalitarian 'pastoral democracy' although excluding women and non-nomads from this system (Adan, 2015). Until colonialism came they did not have a formal, centralized government and instituted authority. The clan -elders are regarded with respect and often decide policies. Individualism, independence, and pride are a strong part of the culture (Samatar, 1997). At the same time family affiliation is considered to be very important. For example, nomadic society has a concept of shared responsibility for violence or accidents, which is visible in the payment of blood-wealth (Fox, 2000). The nomadic society is in some ways similar to the individualistic Western society but lacks individuation which is seen as the basis for nationalism (Teutsch, 1999: 23).

However, in that period, the fundamental determinant of conflict was the struggle for power and resource. Indeed, this thesis reinstates the argument that previously, often, conflicts witnessed in Somalia were due to confrontations over natural resources such as pasture and water which was vital for their livestock. In this sense, there was a widely accepted Somali traditional legal systems that addressed these kind of situations (Elmi & Barise 2006).

Indeed, the conflict and factors causing the conflict had existed during that time. However, the key transformation happened when Somalia attained independence and a majority of the population became involved in rural to urban migration that consequently changed the types of resources needed and the means of acquisition (Gundel, 2002). The political class became conscious that those in political power of the state would be in control of all the nation's resource. So, the struggle was changed to the state level, more specifically relative to access of state or government resources, the employment of civil servants and control of state financial resources and thereby, replacing the previous system of competition. This, in turn, made the conflict more sophisticated and pushed it to another level within the state palace which became more dangerous and cartographic (Majid & McDowell, 2012). This demonstrates that the primary cause of the Somali conflict are more than the civil war, it's deeper and far that it seems. Most importantly, has a lot to do with the social perception and approach towards the access of resources and nature's providence.

3.3 Post-Independence Era and Optimism

Conflict in many African countries has been associated with colonialism by various scholars particularly those leaning on postcolonial theory (Elmi & Barise, 2006:32 -44). Their assumptions are often based on a utopian understanding of the African continent, perhaps images of peace, prosperity, and growth. The reality is that this was not often the case. Scarce resources forced communities to strengthen their identity ties more specifically the clan

and/or ethnic groups in order to survive. Undoubtedly, colonialism worsened the scarcity as the colonial economy and administration distorted the existing means of survival that the societies were used to. In response, the historical rivalry had to be put aside in order to face a common enemy, who in this case was the colonial master (Agwanda *et al.*, 2021).

A critical point that is worth remembering is that contact with the Europeans exposed African societies to a global sociopolitical and economic system for the first time (Khayre: 2016). This formed part of the inspiration as to why African fought against the mighty European powers with determination because they expected, perhaps naively, that independence would mean an immediate prosperity, political freedom as well as economic growth (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019). Most African countries at the time and still up to date overlooked the cost of achieving political freedom and stability, economic growth and prosperity. This is what characterized the post-independence Somalia as we will now examine (Nyadera & Massaoud, 2019).

3.4 The Short Spell of Democracy in Somalia (1960 -1969)

The year 1960 marks an important event in the history of Somalia as it was the year when the Northern British protectorate of Somaliland and the Southern Italian colony of Somalia united to form one single state, Somalia (Samatar, 2016). However, today the Southern part of Somalia (Previously Somaliland) is one of the regions that have declared independence from Somalia arguing that they are no longer part of the Union with Somalia (Omaar, 2004). What they are challenging is whether there was proper legislation on the act that unified the two regions as well as the fact that they were an independent entity before the rest of Somalia and therefore has a right to choose their future destiny (Adam, 2008).

The unification of the south and the northern parts also laid the seeds for future political instabilities in the country (Elmi, 2014). There are allegations that division on key issues

such as how executive positions were going to be shared were not agreed upon and instead of looking at long-term solutions, parties involved opted to suppress the grievances. According to Brons (2001: 161), the southerners dominated key areas of the government such as the civil service and the security apparatus.

Brons (2001 164 -9) goes ahead to argue that from the beginning, the process of unifying Somalia was characterized by serious flaws in that it was seen as an amalgamation of a clan-based government and that the decree by President Aden Abdulle Osman that led to the formation of unified Somalia sparked clan-based politics in the country. A simple look at the composition of the parliament in Mogadishu shows that there was going to be a serious problem ahead. For example, out of the 123 members of parliament, 90 were from the south and 33 were from the north indicating an unbalanced parliament and representation.

As the legal framework was being prepared in 1960, another serious mistake may have happened, first, lack of experience on democratic governance and management of modern states meant that the inexperienced leaders opted to adopt the constitutions that the Italians and British used to administer the south and the north during the colonial era. There was no effort made to write a constitution that will consider the unique features of the Somalia society (Goodman, 1993).

Instead, they combined to constitutions with different political structure that is the Somaliland constitution that was based on a centralized system of government while the British Somali constitution was coined around a decentralized system of government (Millman, 2013). This confusion would later have far-reaching consequences, particularly in Somalia's political landscape as they had shaped the various clans' perception of government structure and therefore the people of Somaliland became uncomfortable being

part of a union that was gearing on to a decentralized government system yet their experience with the Italians was based on a centralized system (Lyons & Samatar, 1992:23 -34).

The period between 1960 and 1969 however bumpy as it may be, was a good opportunity for Somalia to lay down the foundations of unity peace and prosperity. This was the period where architectures of Somalia socio-political and economic spheres had the chance to make things right. Leaders enjoyed legitimacy across the divide, the decision was made in somewhat a democratic process and perhaps the policies that were adopted at the time would have been binding (Samatar, 2016: 88). This was the time when the country needed visionary leaders who could change the mentality of clan identity into a force of tolerance and unique social setting made of diversity. Somali leaders would have been mindful of the fact that the biggest reason as to why imperial powers were able to colonize Somalia was the jealousy and disunity among the clans in the past. Unifying the clans beyond simple narrative should have been the highest concern of the government (Musau, 2013: 8)

Failure by the civilian government in 1960 to 1969 to come up with policies that would encourage pan -Somali and unity were overtaken by events that have seen the country stall in a cycle of violence and political instability. Looking back, 1960 to 1969 was the only time Somalia had a civilian government that enjoyed legitimacy across the different regions in the country (Thompson, 2020). Lewis (2002: 164) and Brons, (2001: 160) both describe this period as one that saw the government characterized by strong institutions that ensured checks and balance and most importantly a population that was patriotic and proud to be Somalis. Women were well represented in the political spheres and by 1963, women were taking an active role in politics in the country. Women have however been slowly pushed to the periphery of decision making in the country as Somalia disintegrated into war (Abdi, 2007; Gardner, & El 2004).

Early signs of trouble were also becoming clear day by day as the government tried to hold on to power and control of the country (Mishra & Abdullahi, 2020). Economically the country became independent with a weak economic base that denied the government administrative capacity to implement some of its policies. This made the 'Greater Somalia' project that was very popular during the struggle for independence to lack adequate support due to low levels of motivation and failure to drive the people's worldview beyond ethnic circles.

Politicians continuously used clan identity and support to climb and cling on to power giving an advantage to the dominant clans to have bigger control of the government (Lewis, 2002: 168). In the 1960s, the state started to show clear signs of a weak state which based on Rotberg's (2004: 4) definition of a weak state means that those states that typically harbor linguistic, ethnic/clan, religious and other forms of social rivalry that were already visible in Somalia.

Mounting clan tensions began to affect the operations of the democratic government if events that led to the 1962 decision by members of the Isaaq clan to walk out of the coalition government is anything to go by (Ledesma, 2018). This crisis was a reflection of the fact that the political parties that existed at the time were purely clan-based and not driven by any sought of ideology. National interest was and still continues to be overshadowed by clan-based politics because it seems that each clan is keen on pushing on their own interest and not for the nation (Gilkes, 1989).

Mohammed Ibrahim Egal's decision to withdraw from the coalition government was based on the argument that the Northern clans were being side-lined in the government's development agenda (Prunier, 1990). Clan motivation is still considered to be the reason behind an attempted military coup in 1961 by large soldiers from the north (Federal Research

Division, 1992: 73). Competition for political space became much complex and was done through mobilization of larger social units such as the clan.

The 'Great Somali' project is central to the country's political and social organization during the early years of independence. Many scholars have argued that the colonial boundaries were a source of Somalia's problems and that the imperial powers are to be blamed for the chaos that erupted in Somalia and many other parts of Africa. However, such argument has a lot of limitations even though its proponents have valid reasons to argue that the partitioning of the continent during the 1884 Berlin Conference was done without the input of Africans (Craven, 2015; Förster et al., 1988). To this extent, the argument is valid however, it does not consider several other factors such as the boundaries were meant to define Europeans' sphere of influence in the continent and not administrative units in the post-independence Africa. In fact, Africans are the ones who transformed these boundaries to state boundaries as they became independent. In most cases, all ethnic and clan groups within the region participated in the struggle for independence and that's why they became part of the new states (Kisaka & Nyadera, 2019).

For example, the Somali clan in Kenya or Ethiopia were vital in the struggle for independence for both respective countries and deserves the full right to be citizens of the same countries (Teshome, 2009; Gbenenye, 2016;). The emergence of conflict in among different communities in Africa is not and should not be solely based on the idea of boundaries since boundary disputes are not unique to Africa alone but affect all other countries from China -India to Turkey -Greece to Northern Ireland -Ireland to Lebanon Syria, Australia -Indonesia, Bahrain and Qatar, Russia -Japan, France and Italy, United Kingdom and Spain, Croatia and Serbia, Canada and Denmark as well as hundreds other territorial disputes across the world (Shahabuddin, 2019).

These, however, do not necessarily lead to conflict. Instead, marginalization, discrimination, unequal distribution of resources, dishonoring agreements, majority dominance and unfair political representation. These are the factors that need to be emphasized and the Somali case is no different. The situation got from a shaky democracy to authoritarianism in 1969 following a military coup.

3.5 The Military Regime (1969 -1991)

On 15th October 1969 marked the turning point of Somalia's political future. A presidential guard shot and killed the president of the Republic of Somalia; Abdirashid Ali, sparking a series of events that culminated with Siad Barre by then a General in the Somali army declaring a coup. The military established an SCR and began a process of nation building. At first, their efforts were welcomed by the society as Barre's military regime had scored highly in the nation-building process (Brons, 2001: 171).

Nyadera & Ahmed (2020), point out that the gains made touched on the very basic foundation of the Somali people as ignorance, poverty, and disease were at the top of the military regime agenda. The previous government, although was democratically constituted, had shown signs of violating the rights and freedoms of citizens. However, people's hopes were quickly dashed when open favoritism of Siad Barre's clan became open. Multi-Party politics was suppressed, and clan continued to be seen as a source of political domination and wealth accumulation. Clan hegemony became consolidated in Somalia's political sphere during this period.

Barre and his advisors perhaps sought to calm down the growing animosity and disappointment when he declared a new political ideology known as scientific socialism on the day the country was marking its first anniversary since the military coup took place (Clark, 1992). This proclamation was followed by two important events, first, it launched a

nationwide campaign against clanism and tribalism and secondly, it marked Somali's shift from the west to the Soviet Union bloc. These two would later have severe consequences on the country. Despite the anti-clan narrative, the military regime continued to perfect the art of clan consolidation.

There were deliberate efforts by Siad Barre to bestow power to the Dulbahunte clan and matrilineal Ogaden clan (Barre's own patrilineal clan). The scientific socialism did not only discourage clan politics (in the narrative) but also banned the practice of political Islam in Somalia. This, Barre argued would help achieve national unity and economic development under his scientific socialism ideology. The military government also radically introduced secularism through militarization and regimentation of the society (Tadesse, 2002: 16).

Under Siad Barre, the ideology of scientific socialism failed to achieve its intended objective and people's trust in the regime became increasingly low. Meanwhile, clan conflicts had started to emerge in low tempo, but the military regime abetted these events and did not take any decisive measures to solve the problem. Adam, (2008:8) argues that these inter-clan confrontations were sparked by memories of the previous wars and competition for resources. In supporting this argument, Lake & Rothchild (1998: 294) state that the main cause of clan/ ethnic driven conflict is fear of the future as a result of experiences of the past. This means that the clans in Somalia are aware of the past experiences they had with each other and that's why each clan is keen to maintain its survival and benefit on economic development through whichever means.

Somalia became increasingly militarized during Siad Barre's regime who took advantage of the global tensions caused by the cold war era to gain a vast array of weapons from the two blocs (Bradbury 1994: 10). Somalia at the time did not just benefit from getting arms given by the US and Soviet Union, Siad Barre expanded his scope to countries like Iraq, the

apartheid regime in South Africa, East Germany, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Italy, as well as Libya (Brzoska, 2004). The significance of this support in understanding the conflict in Somalia today is that through the militarization of Somalia, Barre's regime was able to suppress any form of grievances and rebellion allowing his clan mates to embark in a spree of corruption, nepotism, and tyranny.

The absence of legal and peaceful means of addressing problems only resulted to more anger among the affected clans who would later use force to try and have their voices heard and have a share of the national cake (Nyadera, 2018). In addition, most of the weapons received were spread widely across the country though unequally among the clans with Barre's Darod Clansmen being the biggest beneficiaries. The weapons continue to be used in the conflict today. Somalia became a major source of black-market weapons which in turn enabled the emergence of clan-based militia (Osman 2007: 99). Bradbury (2008) contends that Siad Barre and his government played a significant role in easily providing civilian access to weapons and nurturing a culture of political patronage in Somalia adding that these combined with the huge investment in arms would have a devastating outcome in the long run as we see today. The emergence of third generation militia and unending clan security dilemma in Somalia are associated with the availability of weapons that the military regime had sought from all over the world during the Cold War era (Nyadera & Islam, 2020).

The pretext of soliciting these huge numbers of weapons was the border dispute Somalia had with Kenya and Ethiopia (Barnes, 2007). However, the scale upon which the military regime went in this quest is not proportional to the country's economic ability. For example, statistics between 1980 -1985 indicate that military spending combined with that of other security agencies constituted three-quarters of the country's budget which is higher than Somalia's total export revenue (Ledesma, 2018).

According to Adam (2008: 55), by that time Somalia had acquired 24 MIG-21 squadron, 25 MIG-17s, 30 MIG -19s; six- transport planes, a Shenyang fighter jet; 250 medium Soviet-made tanks; several guided missiles boats over 37, 000 soldiers were attached to the Navy (Adam, 2008: 58) such heavy investment on the military meant there was very little budget for development and priority was given to the clans that were close to power. By late 1980, Barre had reduced his strong criticism of clan-based politics to mere narrative and began to practice instrumentalist approach of clannism/ethnicity to remain in power.

The formation of SSRP after the military coup was to guide the country during the transition period from a military regime to a civilian regime (Behr, 2020). It consisted of a five-member Political Bureau and a 73 -member Central Committee. Of our concern is the composition of the SSRP regarding the issue of clannism. The top decision-making organs of the SSRP were overrepresented by three sub-clans namely; Ogaden, Marjeten and Dulbahunte. The three are from the larger Darod clan of Siad Barre (Duale, 2014).

When the military regime was finally transformed into a civilian government, but with Barre still at the top, in 1979, the new constitution failed to sufficiently address issues of equality and equity. As Barre was being sworn in as the president in 1980, already his popularity had significantly declined following the defeat by the Ethiopians during the Ogaden war and a stagnant economy.

Brons (2001: 175) observes that the decision by Barre to invoke Article 83 of the Somali constitution that gives the president the powers to declare state of emergency was as a consequence of the internal rebellion that was caused by dissatisfaction in Barre's leadership. His actions during the time became similar to the period when the military first took over the government in 1969 and as things got out of hand, the state of Somalia was fast heading for collapse due to internal anarchy (Kasfir, 2004: 61).

Clannism acted as a catalyst in the collapse as seen by the behavior of the three dominant clans in government. For example, in 1989, cabinet ministers from the sub-Marehan clan were operating outside the framework of the ruling party. This led to defragmentation of the government as the other partner clans developed a feeling that the president was deliberately side-lining them from government affairs and using the Marehan clan in his operations.

To put this into context, Garg (2019) reveals that more than half of the high-ranking government officials came from Said Barre's own clan or those clans that offered him an unquestionable support. Within the army, the disproportion was even much higher as elite forces in the tank and artillery brigade, as well as the head of a newly established Southern Command were dominated by close clan members and headed by General Maslah, Siad Barre's son.

Individuals from Ogaden and Dulbahunte clans who constituted the military regime grew increasingly suspicious and as discomfort grew, the president decided to abandon the ruling party framework and focus on the dealing with members of his own Marehan clan whom he perceived to be more loyal (Mahlasela, 2016). Adam acknowledges the existence of deep-rooted clan suspicion among Somalis when he argues that "Somali clans normally compete, occasionally they are in conflict and even resort to violent warfare, but traditional mutually reciprocal relationships deter them from attempting to impose permanent domination, to this end," (Adam, 2008: 120).

The president armed young men from his clan to battle the Isaaq and Hawiye clans which he described as enemy clans who to be clearer, opposed his way of leadership other groups such as the Darod sub-clans were also alienated (Makhubela, 2016). What we see during this period is a complete upgrade of clan hegemony by using well equipped and well-

structured forces as compared to the previous times when clans fought each other using indigenous methods.

In perhaps an attempt to divert domestic challenges, Barre launched an attack on Ethiopia purposely to curve Ogaden region in Ethiopia and making it part of the Somali State. It is believed that Barre was banking on the Support of the Soviet Union to help defeat Ethiopia which at the time was a western ally (Leeson, 2007). Help did not come, and Somalia was defeated in the war by Ethiopia in 1979. However, it is the consequence of the war that raises more concerns. First, over one million refugees crossed over from Ethiopia -Somali ethnic group dominated the region of Ogaden into Somalia. This created a humanitarian crisis that was worsened by the already huge financial cost of the war that also claimed the lives of very many people on both sides. These series of events led to a catastrophic result that saw the state of Somalia collapse and has since been characterized by instability to date (Pham, 2011).

3.6 1991 State Collapse

Lobell & Mauceri, (2004: 2) assert that a modern state has an important function to maintain security and internal order. This is emphasized by Clapham who adds that a state is “the only legitimate and acceptable form of rule and that all of the world’s people, and all of its territory, therefore” (Clapham, 2004: 80). In Somalia, the emergence of several clan-based militias catalyzed the collapse of the state as these groups not only threatened the states monopoly of power; they also made it difficult for the state to carry out its administrative duties in some territories (Gebrewold, 2005: 203).

Clan elders offered support to these militia groups thus providing them with the much-needed legitimacy that would enable them to operate in such areas. The clan-based militia groups did not emerge overnight but their presence predates the violence that started in 1991.

Traces of structured clan groups whose objective was to use force to achieve their goals began to appear after Somalia lost during the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1978. President Siad Barre is believed to have been an important architecture of this form of groups which at the beginning appeared less significant but would later lead to dangerous consequences for the country (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009). In fact, Siad Barre himself acted as a warlord when he opted to unleash force on civilians mostly in Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

Civilian militia groups quickly got hold of and asserted themselves in the political landscape of Somalia. One cannot fail to notice that at the center of their emergence was the much-prized control of the country's political economy which members of the Marehan clan (the biggest beneficiaries of Barre's regime) were keen on defending (Little, 2003). Siad Barre was able to manipulatively convince members of his Marehan clan that an attack on his government, including criticism and demand for reforms, posed a direct threat the entire clan's Social, economic and political interest. Apart from the civilian militia, the government also had its own militia groups which were used to repel any form of attack on the government of the day (Hills, 1997). This state-centric militia just like their civilian counterparts was structured around clan identity of those at the helm of government leadership.

The collapse of the Republic of Somalia has had a big impact on the difficulty of solving the conflict in Somalia because the absence of a central government has meant that critical institutions that are supposed to protect lives and secure property are missing. Yet again efforts to try and reestablish a central authority since 1991 has proved to be difficult with the existing ones still being challenged by the various clan -militia (Menkhaus, 2004: 16). Notably, by the time the state was on the brink of collapsing, visible signs of such occurrence were already visible way back to 1969 and beyond.

First, Somalia had not celebrated a decade since independence when the 1969 coup occurred. This means the country was still in very early stages of state building which is often characterized by weak institutions. After the military ceased political power in 1969, it deconstructed the rudimentary structures of democracy that had been put in place at the time like the judiciary, legislature and an institution of civil service creating a vacuum in the country's governance system. At the time of the collapse, the government had lost control over the economic and political space in Somalia (Zartman, 1995: 9).

Clan patronage and militia once again come under the important spotlight in the events surrounding the collapse of the Somali state. Here, we observe that the far-reaching consequences of clannism do not only end with political instability, it goes further to cause a total failure of the Somali state (Makhubela, 2016). Not only were state institutions incapable of solving the problems that led to the crisis, clanism which had infiltrated other sectors such as political party and security forces meant that the country could not save itself from. State agencies became autonomous and started to operate without any form of coordination or receiving instructions from a central authority.

Agencies that were supposed to ensure there were law and order became the institutions that disobeyed law and order. Instances where state officers began to define their own salaries and allowance became a common occurrence. On the periphery, clans were organizing themselves in several ways to protect their survival and security. This was made possible by the emergence of different warlords in regions in the country (Bryden, 2003).

3.7 The Rise of Warlords in Somalia

Warlords emerge in most cases because of two main reasons namely; to perpetuate clan/ethnic hegemony and dictatorship over the others. Somalia was lacking basic institutions that could prompt practice of good governance and the kind of leadership that

promote national interest first and put national unity top of their agenda. These conditions were set by the military rule and the collapse of the state. Since the 1980s, there were several militia groups emerging in Somalia and the most important criteria of membership was clan identity and lineage (Crocker, 1995).

Those who led these militia groups came to be referred to as the warlords. These are men who were able to enrich themselves and gain a lot of wealth through ruthless means. They cemented their position in the state's political economy through smuggling of people and goods, arms sale and control critical routes that were used to transport humanitarian supplies (Peterson, 2014; Clarke & Herbst, 1996). These individuals became instrumental in what came to be referred to "triangle of death" that describes suffering caused because of the civil war and famine in 1991 in areas such as Baidoa, Mogadishu, and Kismayo. Warlords benefited a lot from the ongoing civil war not just economically, but also through the skillful use of ethnic animosity and divisions to gain control of different regions and territories within the collapsed state (Bakonyi & Stuvøy, 2005).

The collapse of the state also saw institutions such as the military being disintegrated and most of the military commanders and army generals became warlords. Recruitment was made easier among the young people who at the time were inspired by American films and actors such as Rambo and their clan identity (Nyadera & Salah, 2020). As looting and killing spread across the country, business owners were without option than to form their own militia factions to provide security to their properties from being looted thus creating another category of warlords. In some cases, the business community allied themselves with their own clan warlords in order to benefit from their protection (Bolton, 1994).

This became an important source of finance for the warlords as businessmen such as Mohammed Ali Mahdi provided financial support to USC; a militia group led by General

Mohammed Farah who was from his own sub-clan. Yoroms (2011: 31). argue that the emergence of civilian militia groups in Somalia was because of the failure of the state to offer and guarantee human security. This means that different groups with different interests decided to form militia outfits when the state collapsed with the intention of providing the services that ought to be provided by national government, top of the list being security.

The consequence of having these clan-based militia groups in Somalia is that it significantly affected the country's clan-based political system creating a huge security dilemma. This was worsened by the availability of arms after state armories were looted. Gebrewold (2005: 203) contends that the overthrow of Siad Barre in Somalia and president Mengistu Mariam in Ethiopia was because of the availability of weapons most of which were supplied from Somalia in the early 1990s.

Until very recent, warlords across Somalia have entered into pacts and agreements by sharing territories among themselves. For example, warlords from the Abgal sub-clan, Habr Gidir Ayr sub-clan, Habr Gidir Saad sub-clan and Murosade sub-clan all of which are under the larger Hawiye clan met in Mogadishu in 2005 and divided the capital among themselves. The Hawiye clan has always assumed sphere of influence of the capital city which is the main pillar of Somalia's political and economic spheres (Hansen, 2003).

Crocker, et al (2009: 495) suggests that the rare unity exhibited by warlords during such agreements where they shared territories is largely driven by the desire to maximize profit and facilitate their trade in weapons. Therefore, the agreement by the warlords based in Mogadishu was to ensure that there was the continued maximization of profit and assertion of individual power in the region without affecting the balance of power between the warlords that would disrupt their activities.

More importantly is that the Mogadishu meeting among warlords reflected their belief that the failure and absence of institutionalized state authority was beneficial to them and therefore any form of a political solution in the country had to be resisted (Nyadera, Ahmed & Agwanda, 2020). This explains why the country has faced longer periods of instability. In other words, Somalia shows that the militia groups are not threats to the state, and rather, it is the state and any efforts to reestablish a stable central government structure that threatens the warlords and militia groups.

The above is the basis on which critics of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia argue that it was simply an illusionary power-sharing deal agreed on by the warlords in a formal way of sharing the national cake among them. Indeed, it appears that the TFG became a formal platform on which some clan militia could take away power from other illegitimate clan militias and terrorist groups such as al Shabab efforts that have not succeeded fully to date (Shinn, 2011). These events support the assumptions of the third-generation theory which state that militia groups can enter into unwritten agreements to ensure a stable government is not established since these kinds of the group only thrive in situations where there is anarchy.

None of the militia groups seeks control of the whole country or even lay claim to be acting as a central government but instead, they are contented with the existing status quo since if to act as a central government will mean they have to excursive responsibility which they may wasn't too. Efforts by the clans to balance each other militarily confirms the assertion that clan-based political systems account for civil war and political instability witnessed in Somalia. Even Al Shabab a self-declared off shout of Al Qaeda is supported and protected by the Habr Gidir clan (Masters & Sergie, 2015).

The warlords are keen on ensuring that they do not have a direct confrontation with each other unless the other group is posing a threat to their strategic interest (Hills, 1997: 36-40). Interestingly, even though they seem to be interested in the war being prolonged, they tend to avoid long battles. Militia groups are keen to ensure a delicate balance of power since they are fully aware of the outcome whenever two powerless factions fight which is none of them will win. Therefore, the survival of militia groups headed by warlords depends on the balance of power (Nyadera Asal, & Agwanda, 2021).

More specifically to the Somalia case, cleavages among the sub-clans of the Hawiye clan led to complete collapse of political party structures and the invention of clan militia (Brons, 2001: 208). To understand the role of clan in supporting the various militia groups one needs to revisit the meeting held in Rome, Italy by members of the Hawiye clan on January 1989 while another section of Hawiye clan member in Mogadishu calling themselves “Manifesto-group” emerged to rival the diaspora group (Lewis, 2002: 262). The USC formed in Rome under the leadership of General Mohammed Farah from Hawiye Clan while the Somali National Movement which attracted members from Ogaden and Isaaq clans had affiliations to the Somali Patriotic Movement.

Abdullah Yusuf led the Somali Salvation Democratic Front which was dominated by members from Darod clan, Somali National Front belonged to the Marehan clan and was led by General Morgan nicknamed “Butcher of Hargeisa” because of the role he played in the massacre of civilians in Somaliland during the military rule (Abdullahi, 2004). The Mirifle and Digital clans belong to the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). While on the surface they appear to be political parties these are militia groups coined around ethnic identity (Ali, 2011).

The strong man syndrome exhibited by Siad Barre influenced the emergence of warlords within clans as each of them wanted to produce a strong person. This sought of clan organization was pre-colonial as Lewis (2002: 263) echoes what European explores of the nineteenth century such as Burton described as “a land of clan republics” where explores needed the permission and protection from the clan leaders to traverse their boundaries.

3.8 A History of Peace Efforts in Somalia

Somalia’s ongoing conflict has attracted the attention of both local and international community who have made efforts to mediate peace among the warring parties. However, the efforts seem to bare no fruit as it tend to provide temporary peace and later on violence recommence. Unsuccessful efforts like these have been elaborated base on various ground which include agreements failing to take into account the main cause of conflict in addition to failure to come up with deals that would satisfy all clans. Subsequently, the peace efforts have been impaired by distrust and disaccord among the warring parties. The following are efforts made by conflicting parties for peace discussion

The 1991 Djibouti Peace Conference

In an attempt to bring the conflicting parties to a peaceful agreement in order to cease war, Djibouti’s president invited them for a talk to seize fire. The main protagonist at the time were groups affiliated to General Aideed and Ali Mahdi. Over 14,000 civilians had been killed with 42,000 injured (Shortland et al., 2013). Djiboutian government failed to get support from its neighboring countries Somalia, Egypt, and Italy (Lyons & Samatar, 1995: 29). Unfortunately, when the peace conference was conducted diplomacy had already paused. The conference failed since there were no road mark to guide the parties. Furthermore, during the proceedings, some representative had vicious confrontations.

Additionally, Mogadishu sunk into the abyss of violence as a result of civil war propelled by militia groups who evaded the law since they were not answerable to any state institution (Harding, 2016). Even if there was some agreement between the parties, implementation would prove futile as there was no functional superior institution above the militia in Somalia to restrain indemnity among the factions of third-generation militia. While the banana republic sprout, the Somali state fell apart and collapsed completely as a result of lack of social contract that binds the citizens and the state (Samatar, 2000).

General Aideed failed to participate in a Peace Conference held in Djibouti whose goal was to settle the intensified confrontations of militia in Mogadishu regardless of conference invitation to the warring factions. Despite causing structural problem or peace progress, General Aideed absence did not prevent the conveners who moved forward to hold the conference (Menkhaus, 2007).

There was a demand for the conference to hold in order to commence peace process among the conflicting parties such as General Aideed, was a political indiscretion for any conditions concerned with inclusivity in commencing on a peace process. Furthermore, according to some representatives at the conference together with Aideed, it is alleged that the organizers were not neutral and accused Egypt and Italy who were believed to halt is expropriation (Lyons & Samatar, 1995: 29).

Moreover, the Somaliland National Movement declined to be involved in the conference claiming it was not part of the conflict after announcing independence in May 1991 (Lyons & Samatar, 1995). President Hassan Gouled main agenda of the conference was to appeal for the formation of a transition government. However, this was being controlled by Italy and Egypt who desired a specific candidate Mr. Mahdi to head the transitional government (Adam, 2008: 156).

Djibouti Peace Conference discontinued due to the conference's wider framework and mediation process which was disapproved as it went against the basic principles of neutrality (Mayer, 2004: 85). Many believed the conference was unsuccessful because the actors failed to relent at an early stage. Notably, it can be perceived that parties involved especially General Aideed were yet to encounter mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) meaning both parties desired to defeat their opponent and take control of the country (Zartman, 2008: 54)

General Aideed's allies moved forward and advanced against Ali Mahdi's allies and Barre's overthrown government. The final group had not experienced major defeat despite the former acquiring more control hence showed unwillingness to join peace agreement if they desired complete victory (Kasaija, 2010). Elaborately, the organizers of the conference failed to provide enough incentives not only to bring the two parties together but also make them sign a peace deal which would eventually lead to power sharing (Zartman 1999: 291). The war continued since Djibouti conference concluded without substantial agreement.

Evidently at this stage most decorated commanders and generals of Somali government seem to side with the militia groups, providing them with tactical and strategic advice. Clannism also played a major role in the conference where none of the militia leaders was ready to compromise in the sense that political power of Somalia be offered to the other clan member. According to Vinci (2009: 72) an attempt was made to manipulate recommendations made during the conference by armed factions who sought to exploit military influence in Somalia. Seemingly, this clearly demonstrates that various factions still appraise military actions as the best tool for conflict resolution.

During the conference, it was noted that the militia group received massive support from their own clan, and it was a good chance not to betray their support base by submitting to their 'enemies' agreement. Subsequently, the gap created in 1991 by the fall of state resulted

to the wearing aftermath of this conference since mediators involved concentrated on filling the political gap rather than the main cause of conflict and also the impact of General Aideed's absence at the conference since he is considered to have had a powerful military force following Siad Barre's fall (Koko, 2010).

Fundamentally, Djibouti Peace Conference did not only lack international credibility but also Somalia's credibility since it lacked ammunition from Somalia's citizens who were divided along clan affiliations which experienced exploitation by the militia groups that believed this is an advancement of the next phase of the conflict. According to Sahnoun (1994: 10) lack of zeal to compromise was a reflection of negative image to other parties within and outside the continent who may have interest in taking part in Somali peace. It was vividly clear that the militia groups were unprepared to back the conflict via a negotiated peace process. Additionally, UN was not only reluctant to discuss Somalia's issues but also failed to give any assistance towards the peace process.

Concurrently, amidst the conference activities, violence in Mogadishu escalated. In 1993, the Addis Ababa conference followed immediately after Djibouti conference. At that time various militia factions had gained more power of influence in diverse regions in Somalia. The political power of the state was under the control of militia groups who were in constant fight against each other. Distinctly, Addis Ababa peace conference was deemed to have a stronger and advanced support by the international community (Apuuli, 2011).

The Conference in Addis Ababa (1993)

Through the Somali National Reconciliation Conference convened in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, second attempt was made to bring peace in 1993 at the decree of UN with the presence of US in Somalia. (Bradbury, 1994: 22). Furthermore, according to Lewis (2010: 129), UN exploited the existing tranquil brought by soldiers in the capital city. Accordingly, based on

this study National Reconciliation conference was held without lack of knowledge on the dynamics since it was a judiciousness decision. The conference planning and implementation was subjugated by the UN and hence became unsuccessful at some point to reach an accord of what was going on as it had desolated Somali case for a long time (Mukhtar, 2007).

Just prior the official launching, the process of how the conference was structured was criticized by civil societies due to the presence of militia groups despite being the practical aspect for any peace agreement to be achieved in conflict. Moreover, civil society organizations believed that delegate's selection should be transparent and democratic even though Somali had already disintegrated into domestic anarchy. This precisely means that any peace deal ought to involve all parties inclusive of armed militia groups.

According to Osman, (2007: 104) remarks, Addis Ababa conference failed due to the criterion used in delegation selection which did not consider the importance of clan identity rather most of the delegates were chosen from Mudug region by the organizers. It is estimated that, out of fifteen militia groups present, eleven were from the Mudug clans and this was not supported as clannism was being used as a tool of power at the conference which was deemed at a continuance of the Djibouti process. More significantly, the issue related to organizational power structure and clan balancing was not addressed at the conference hence viewed as unsuccessful due to the absence of key actors in the conflict.

Furthermore, there had been an existing conflict between General Aideed and United Nation on who to choose delegates of the conference in a situation which rendered UN improve for a transparent process (Elmi, 2010: 22). Consequently, the UN gained victory based on the nature of selection for delegates but failed to commit towards the implementation of the

recommendation which were raised during the conference since General Aideed had declined to observe the resolutions established at the conference.

The signing of the in-fine agreement in 27th March 1993 asserted the demobilization and ceasefire accord and also stipulation for the transitional government institutionalization through the political and administration structure reformulation by representatives of the fifteen militia who engaged in the conference. Exclusively, it did have provision for a transitional government to be established. This was to take into account the existing eight regions and the administrative councils and units were to remain the same (Nyadera & Ahmed).

The Transitional National Council was obligated to choose three representative in addition to the reservation of one female regionally in the eighteen region, Mogadishu with 5 seats and each of the fifteen militia groups to nominate participants for the conference in Ethiopian capital. The suggested administrative bodies were to be functional within two years. Likewise, committees were established to coordinate civilian's disarmament, compose constitution draft, agreement and resolution of dispute (Bradbury, 1994: 23). The agreement implementation timeframe was purported upon in the conference and the endorsement of Transitional Charter was availed.

Table 5: Signatories of the Addis Ababa peace process:

Group Name	Leader
Somali Democratic Alliance	Mohammed Abdulahi
Somali National Front	Omar Haji
Somali National Democratic Union	Ali Ismail
Somali National Union	Mohammed Rajis
Somali African Multi Organization	Mohammed Arobu
Somali Democratic Movement	Abdi Mayow and Nur Mohammed
Somali People's Movement	Aden Abdullahi and Hashi Ahmed

United Somali Party	Mohammed Abdi
United Somali Congress (A)	Mohammed Qanyere
United Somali Congress (B)	Mohammed Aideed
Southern Somalia National Movement	Abdi Warsame
Somali Salvation Democratic Front	Mohammed Musse
Somali Democratic Alliance	Mohamed Abdullahi

Source: Author Compilation from Mukhtar (2006 & 2007), Johnson & Abdirahman (2010).

There was accommodation of the signatories' diverse interests within the Addis Ababa Agreement scope since they included factoring lineage, clans and patronage of whom they represented their various interests. Despite being initiated by the United Nations, the conference received no devotion from this international institution. Additionally, there was no provision of incentive to support implementation processes.

Lewis (2010: 115), stated that the desire to establish central government in Somalia motivated the organizers of the conference. However, according to this study government establishment is presumed to be a valid outcome of conflict resolution processes hence be the final result of conflict resolution process which focus on the public involvement and participation.

Moller (2009: 14) opines that the approach of establishing central government is a state building process initiated on the international system structure that is based on statehood hence absence involvement with statelessness. Furthermore, this process failed to consider the processes and situation that surround inception of Somalia as a state. Also, during that time militia groups were considered as the state, as checks and balances did not exist.

According to Bradbury (1994: 26), while the Addis Ababa conference was going on, political maneuvering characterized the conference. Leaders of the different militia groups were keen on showing they had control of their regions of influence so as to increase their bargaining power on the negotiation table. Subsequently, two conferences that concentrated

on Kismayu, regions near Juba, Mudug and Galhabuud region were initiated. Conclusively, another conferences spearheaded by UNSOM was convened in Jubaland after Kismayu Peace Process.

Contrarily, a local initiative by the clans of Merahan, Majerten and Habr Gidir founded the Galkiyo process and failed to fend support on UN due to General Aideed involvement. This initiative experience military setbacks turned over to General Aideed by Abdullahi Yusuf's militia group due to conflict over grazing land. According to Lewis (2002: 287), General Aideed participated in Ethiopian agreement following his defeat.

The Galkaiyo process' origin was not clear however, it provided parts of assumption Lewis (1994). Initially, he deemed Galkaiyo process might be initiated by General Aideed and Abdullahi Yusuf. Secondly, Galkaiyo process is believed to be a seized initiative of the clan elders which was later under the control of the two military heads whose aim was to fortify their support base after the Addis Ababa conference. Addis Ababa process was clearly combative by militia leaders who viewed it as a stage for military power projection.

With regards to diplomatic peace establishment, Bradbury (1994: 28) opines that General Aideed instituted the peace agreement draft for the Central and Southern Somali with the desire to attract financial and logistic support from UNSOM. Nonetheless, UNSOM declined te request since UN structure would fail to achieve its precept of acting neutral in mediation process which associated militia factions. However, Vinci (2009) stressed on UN conduct in Somalia as it was perceived more as an actor rather than a mediator in its operation in balancing power among militia factions as a result it tempered with it goal of getting a long-term solution of the dispute.

Furthermore, Mudug dispute resulted to SSDF disintegrating into a military and political groups with their military success against General Aideed which propelled then to take part

in the Addis Ababa conference where they became a signatory (Lewis, 2002: 287). Unfortunately, UN made a blunder with their attempt to block General Aideed's political and military agenda, thus violating basic principle of mediation (Mayor, 2004: 85).

General Aideed's marginalization attempt led to polarization of the environment of the existing poor relations between General Aideed and UNSOM leading to the death of over twenty-four Pakistani UN peace keeping soldiers. Other militia factions were against the way UN handled clan-based political system in Somalia. Conclusively, the entrenchment of clan-based political system has made it a main feature for political system in Somali (Rotberg, 2004: 6)

The presence of General Aideed was find significant in the Addis Ababa process was only realized when the conference was called off after General Aideed pulled off from the conference. He was able to influence Addis Ababa conference proceedings based on the capacity of his militia (Stevenson, 1993). The mediating actors disregarded the organization capacity who uphold the capacity to considerably transform Somalia's conflict status should the mediation team befriend him. Contrarily, mediation actors were distracted by General Aideed defeat by a rival militia group hence hindering the efforts of peace agreement. Certainly, the foregoing events attributed by the disagreements between General Aideed, and UN forces illustrated a key obstacle to Addis Ababa peace process (Barnes & Hassan, 2007).

Additionally, the exit of UNITAF from Mogadishu as a result of in-depth conflict with militia allies to General Aideed signified a complete fall of the Addis Ababa process since the Transitional National Council failed to succeed due to lack of effective political goodwill. The stratagem of different actors in the conflict could be reflected in their peace process organization in certain regions of influence with some gaining UN support.

According to Zartman (2008: 17), it was too early to resolve the conflict due to intense and still existing conflicts among the militia factions.

Various issues were not well addressed which include disarmament of several armed groups. Clan elders whose presence was considered crucial in socio-political and cultural ways in Somalia were disregarded also most importantly, the decision to exclude General Aidede together with his troops in this process regardless of his influence in the fallen state (Adam, 2008: 99; Rutherford, 2008: 146).

Reviewers perceive that failure to address the main cause of war in Somalia such as conflicts over grazing fields during the negotiations. For instance disputes over grazing lands in the region of Mudug were not discussed to favor faster political solution whose aim was to establish a central government. In addition, ineffective framework was used to pursue the ceasefire and disarmament so as to control the militia factions.

The Cairo Peace Conference (1997)

The Cairo peace conference was co-sponsored by the government of Egypt, Yemen and Libya where a number of leaders of over twenty-eight warring groups participated. Ironically, the warring groups had already acquired external allies and were already divided into two camps. Diversely, Libya supported some groups while Ethiopia supported other groups (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 40). Mahdi and Aidede were the representative of SNA and the SSA respectively. Nonetheless, the main goal of the conference was to make attempts of convincing the key actors involved in the conflict to create a unifying government before other processes could be applied.

According to the organizers of the conference, they believed that by putting up a government violence would immediately stop. Unfortunately, differences arose sooner as the members disagreed over the kind of government to be adopted (Mbugua, 2004). As the dispute

intensified, the group which was supported by Ethiopia were compelled to protest over being ignored. As soon as General Nur and Ahmed the leaders of this group left the conference, the meeting subsided again hence Somalia lost another chance to find solution to the deep rooted war (Elmi & Barise, 2006: 39 -40).

Fundamentally, the collapse of Cairo process became an impenetrable moment as the two alignment leaders left for Addis Ababa. Subsequently, it can be concluded that the Addis Ababa and Cairo peace processes lacked proper structural frameworks to resolve the ongoing conflict. The state reestablishment buttoned up by central government was only a short-term solution experienced in Somalia. Notably, there are different views on conflict resolution actors since conflicts analysts are believed to concentrate more on the long-term shifts and progress of conflict while the resolution experts tend to be more preoccupied by the short-term conflict resolution strategies as revealed in Addis Ababa and Cairo peace processes (Kriesberg 2009: 29).

The Arta Peace Conference (2000)

In 2000, President Ismail Omar of Djibouti commenced on the effort to mediate a peace treaty for Somalia after Addis Ababa and Cairo peace processes proved unsuccessful (Ngubane, 2000). The IGAD regional community, Libya, Egypt, Italy and the US were in support of the new agenda.

Approximately 60% of the 256 representative in the conference were previously members of the legislative arm of government of Siad Barre (Abdulle, 2005) hence the legitimacy of the whole process was questioned even before its implementation began. TNG and TNA did not only lacked support from the entire Somali community, but also other militia factions headed by Dhere Mohammed, Musa Saudi, and Abdullahi Yusuf Aideed. Putting political power on the spotlight was deemed as a tool of failure hence it pushed the perception that

the existence of Transitional National Government was to benefit the sub-clan who gave more strong political support.

For example, Murphy (2011: 75) stated that the Transitional National Government gained attention from Habr Gidir of the Hawiye clan who had dominated few sections in the capital. Furthermore, warlords and other major clan groups did not give full support to the Transitional Government as it was presumed of preserving marginalizing of certain groups (Murphy, 2011). In addition, very small area in Mogadishu was under the authority of the Transitional National Government but the rest of the city was under the control of militia groups (Lewis, 2008: 82).

Major actors such Sakat Hassan in the Arta peace process had positive impact on the peace process since he was able to appease areas under the governance of the Transitional Government by fostering a genial understanding with Islamic leaders like Shaik Dawir who initially accuse the US of allying with Al-Qaeda terrorist group as a result the relationship had unprecedented influence on Somalia's political dynamics (Teddase, 2003: 60). Subsequently, Islamic courts became popular in both Mogadishu and adjacent region while the Transitional National Government struggles to achieve validity both locally and internationally.

Lack of support to resolve the cause of conflict and the formation of effective framework to address the existing causes can be contended as the sole cause of the failure of Arta peace process. Once again, the focus on central government establishment before conflict resolution actualities tested to a short-term strategy for a stable peace agreement, particularly for a deeply rooted conflict that previously resisted military resolution.

Risse (2011: 11), stated that the Salat Hassan's aspiration for global recognition was aimed to establish Somalia's sovereignty whose state power capacity had completely failed and

could not save itself against states or outside forces. Nevertheless, this study recommends that Salat Hassan's Transitional National Government should have focused on amalgamation of domestic legitimacy covering class and various sub-clans

In 2000 the international legitimacy of Somalia's Transitional Government was compromised by Ethiopia following its statement that the position of Ethiopia on the Arta peace process was partial and moved ahead to organize all groups which were previously opposed by the Arta peace process (Nakaya, 2003).

The international legitimacy of the Transitional National Government of Somalia had been undermined extensively by Ethiopia when in 2000, it stated that Ethiopia's position on the Arta peace process was incomplete and proceeded to organize all the factions that had been opposed to the Arta peace process. Moreover, Elmi and Barise (2006) claim that also exploited the dissatisfaction of some of the actors who were in Arta most of whom were not happy with the positions they were given.

The Mbagathi Peace Conference (2004)

Following the previous unsuccessful peace processes, Mbagathi Conference was convened by the Intergovernmental Authority on Developmental (IGAD) (Menkhaus, 2018). Still it also disregarded the significant dynamics that made the previous peace efforts unsuccessful. Distinctly, the conference was convened at a time when there was a global security challenge following the September 9th terrorist attack in 2001 in the US. As a result, Somalia was perceived by the American government as either a viable host ground for the Al-Qaeda terrorists or were associated allies hence the administration of President Bush was bound to influence the outcome so that a pro-American actors would lead the new government. American was believed to be more engrossed about its foreign and domestic interests rather

than the existing issues in Somalia. The war on terrorism was a significant tool in the United States Policy and impacted its global behavior (Mohamed, 2009).

The Bush administration regarded Somalia's ungoverned space a relevant target for militia group with global aims. The bombing of embassies in Nairobi and Arusha in 1997 was deemed to have been organized in Somalia and the participants were trained in some militia camps within the country (Campbell, 2020). The departments were therefore focused on an associate in Somalia to cooperate with the US security agencies so as to end terrorist activities in Horn of Africa. This was American's ambitious goal since Somali's public opinion was ultimately against western actors (Malito, 2015).

The public had been convinced that the foreigners intended to destroy social, cultural and religious pillars of Somalia. Likewise, Menkhaus (2003: 19), a state building theorist was hesitant to accede that would have a positive outcome for the Somalis since the process was hijacked by external actors and had their own interests. Secondly, those who conveyed the conference were not keen at the locals, attitude towards the state. For those who experienced Siad Barre rule, they perceived government as a club of cronies whose focus was on benefiting themselves while acquiring power over the rest (Compagnon, 1992). According to the resent survey such attitude is still in existence, people lack complete trust on different arms of government

Similar observation shows the international actors in peace negotiation showed biasness towards a certain governance system which is the current state system (Moller, 2009: 14). Consequently, the attitude is later brought in negotiation table and disregard what Somali people are accustomed to in relation to governance system and what they believe can be effective for the in bringing peace. Concerns have also been raised over what they termed as compulsion with state building contrary to concentrating on creating peace.

Amidst the deep-rooted war in the horn of Africa nation, the actors were busy designing a state which they believed would yield productive tool to achieve peace. By the time the conference was being convened in Kenya, the militia factions was already taking control of large part of the country over TNG as it was a result of peace initiative that was established by regional and international actors. Moreover, propaganda was being spread by the militia that an illegitimate government was imposed by the external actors and Kenya and Ethiopia were viewed as initiators of this act.

Notably, this study conclude that a neo-realistic comprehension of security interests enclosed by balance of power concept became an important aspect in deciding mediation in to conflict through different mediating countries without focusing on coming up with tenable solution to the conflict. Additionally, this ignored interests was more elaborate by narrow perspective of national security out of context that Somalia's security is the key issue of the stability of the region and by putting ahead national interest of regional states.

The Mbagathi conference was also unsuccessful because of the disapproved representation terms that administered for four larger clans which include; Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Digil, where each appointed sixty-one representatives in the parliament and thirty-one seats were taken by the remaining coalition in the legislative arms of government. Consequently, Brown (2001: 211), affixed the affirmation on the identity of clan in solving conflict that was open for inquest by self-assertive politicians who are motivated by prejudice and gaining wealth.

CHAPTER: 4

4. COMPLEXITY OF SOMALIA CONFLICT: FEATURES AND ACTORS

To understand the complexity in the Somalia conflict, one needs to closely examine the features of the conflict and the actors involved. In this chapter, I examine the complexity of the Somalia conflict by looking at how the conflict has transformed over the years and how the involvement of multiple actors at the national, regional and international level complicate efforts towards peace building. But first, I discuss the logic of attack which presents a unique explanation on who is being targeted and why.

4.1 Logic of Attacks in Somalian Conflict

Another important framework that will help explain the nature and extent of violence in Somalia and the region by examining the logic of who is targeted during attacks. Many studies especially those examining terrorist activities seem to ignore this crucial approach. Perhaps this is a result of the existing popular accounts that seem to generalize terrorist attacks as random and indiscriminate. However, I wish to argue that attacks are not necessarily random or indiscriminate but rather the choice of who and where to be targeted is often deliberate, intentionally chosen to achieve specific goals and objectives.

For example, when one examines the attacks carried out by the NPA in the Philippines between 1990 and 2007 of the over one thousand attacks, 73% of the those targeted were government institutions, property, and officials such as the police while few of its attacks were directed to non -government entities. If you are to compare this trend of attacks with that of Fatah's military wing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, whose majority of attacks in the last ten years consisted of soft targets and fewer attacks on government entities.

These two groups enjoy local support, have secular ideologies, their leadership structure is strong and hierarchical, and have control over territory. They also lack access to huge natural

resources and direct support from the state yet despite these similarities, their choice of target seems very different (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009).

Existing studies such as Salehyan, Siroky & Wood (2014), Asal et al. (2015), and Weinstein (2007) present a case that these group targets would be civilians. As seen in the two examples, this is not the case. Furthermore, such divergence in the choice of targets for attacks is not unique to the two groups only. In Syria, the choice of who and where to attack by the majority of the non-state actors involved in the violence between 2012 and 2015 shows a very interesting trend.

An analysis of the targeted entities by the different groups reveal that 40% of the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham group were directed towards civilians, the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant carried out 75% of its attacks on civilians while 81% of the attacks carried out by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) were directed towards government entities (Brown & Schulzke 2015).

What this framework seeks to explore is why do we have different groups opting to attack different targets? In the case of Somalia, this is a critical question since the targets of attacks by groups such as Al Shabab also vary when the attacks are carried out in the country or neighbouring countries. The dilemma in this debate is under what circumstances are civilians likely to be attacked more.

A review of existing literature reveals that most studies on violence and terrorism have focused on the lethality, definitions, causes, actors, and frequencies of attacks (Crenshaw, 2007; Hoffman, 2018; Ruby, 2002; Martin, 2017). While these studies offer important insight into understanding conflict and violence, they do not offer explanations as to why specific groups and regions are likely to be attacked. Understanding the why and which

groups are vulnerable to attacks, peace, and counter-terrorism efforts can also be tailored to be more effective.

Of course, attacks on civilians have been analyzed in existing studies but in isolation without assessing the choice of attacks on civilians in the context of other choices that could be selected such as state properties, military barracks of decision-makers. Therefore, by looking at studies that focus on attacks on civilians in isolation we can conclude that they have several shortcomings. These include but are not limited to not explaining discriminatory attacks as a strategy. They also fall short of exploring if other options that can be attacked are complements or substitutes.


In studies by Polo & Gleditsch (2016), Drake (1998) Kalyvas (2006), Weinstein (2007), Abrahms & Potter (2015), Asal *et. al* (2009), attacks on civilians are seen as being motivated by ideological commitments, lack of attractive alternatives to attack or principal-agent problem rather than a cost-effective strategy. In the case of Somalia, understanding the strategy of the groups involved in the conflict is an important starting point to understand how the actions of those groups affect national and regional security. In particular, by understanding the choice of target by fighting, this study will explore the balance between mobilizing support and inflicting harm on the adversaries (Kalyvas, 2006).

Al Shabab, the main non -state actor involved in Somalia's violence is relatively small and weaker compared to the coalition of countries and other regional and international actors involved in trying to stop the group's activities. Therefore, the choice of its targets needs to ensure maximum utility and support among its followers (Abrahms, 2013). This may explain its decision to target mostly civilians than government officials or assets in neighbouring Kenya and Uganda.

Al Shabab is relatively a small group in resources compared to the combined force of the Kenyan, Ethiopian, Ugandan Rwandan, and the Somali army currently involved in the counter-terrorism operations in Somalia (Masters & Sergie, 2015). By targeting civilians, the group can get a lot of publicity through the media, it requires fewer resources to target civilians and difficult for the government to predict and prevent attacks on civilians. In addition, looking at the areas Al Shabab has carried out attacks in neighbouring countries, they target civilian places popularly visited by foreigners, education institutions, and revellers watching foreign football matches. These targets are particularly important in gaining local support and legitimacy.

Contrary to their attack on civilians in neighbouring countries, Al Shabab attacks in Somalia tend to target government assets and personnel. This is an important strategy for the group which may not want to lose legitimacy by attacking fellow citizens even though most of their attacks in Somalia also kill civilians. This information is presented in the figure (9 & 10) below.

Figure 10: Number of targeted attacks in Somalia between 2010 and 2020



Source ACLED (2021)

Number of Attacks (n) = 10, 811


Total number of Fatalities (f) = 29, 593

Attacks targeting civilians (c) = 1, 752

Death of Civilians (d) = 3650

NB: the above numbers represent cumulative totals between 2010 and 2020

Figure 11: Number of targeted attacks in Kenya between 2010 and 2020



Source ACLED (2021)

Number of Attacks (n) = 416

Total number of Fatalities (f) = 1, 484

Attacks targeting civilians (c) = 286

Death of Civilians (d) = 761

NB: the above numbers represent cumulative totals between 2010 and 2020

The two figures above show that out of the 10, 811 attacks in Somalia by Al Shabab, only 1,752 were directed on civilians. In terms of the fatalities, out of the 25, 593 only 3650 were civilians confirming that Al Shabab attacks in Somalia target government entities more than the civilians. this is however not the case in Kenya as more civilian fatalities have been recorded. I argue that three issues determine whether attacking government assets is more beneficial than attacking civilians. These include repressive strategies by the government, existence of strong in-group–out-group cleavage which define membership, level, and type of support a group. Thus, a combination of the level of antagonism between the general population and the terrorist groups’ local constituency and the terrorist reliance on internal

vs external support will define the target preference (government or civilian) for a terrorist group.

To put it into context, groups that get much of their support from external actors will not be constraint by the potential of losing local support and will have a tendency of attacking civilians locally and internationally (Carter, 2016). The groups that enjoy local support will be trying to avoid backlash from their local supporters in case they attack civilians. attacks by such groups will thus be directed to government targets or those with low -output in terms of civilian losses. However, groups that face out-group antagonism but still have local support often find themselves facing competing incentives.

If the government chooses to respond to such groups using indiscriminatory force (that is targeting their supporters with no direct involvement in the terrorist groups' activities) then such a group may opt to attack civilians in exchange. Groups with low out-group antagonism, meaning those who do not support their activities are not involved in try to disrupt the group, behave differently. In this case, there are high chances that despite strong repression from the government, the group is less likely to shift its attacks on civilians instead increase their retaliation against the government (Koehler, 2020).

Given that most attacks carried out by subnational actors have social or political objectives beyond the victims of the attack, makes these attacks somewhat channels of communication (Di Filippo, 2020; Byman, 2020). However, the objective of sending a message cannot be effective if there is no direct connection between the purpose and target. That is the choice of a target for the attack also acts as a 'signal' of understanding the terrorist intentions and goals. The group will use its targets to communicate its goals to the audience the message is intended to reach (the state) (Polo, 2020; Gill et al., 2020). One such communication can be interpreted in an instance where a terrorist group opts to attack government assets and

infrastructure. The signal here is that the group shows capabilities to strike but opts to minimize the chances of killing or hurting civilians (Conrad & Greene, 2015).

Moreover, a key notable objective of terrorist groups is to discredit the government, make it appear weak and unable to protect its citizens, impair government operations, impede its administrative activities, make state officials demoralized. This can be achieved when attacks are directed towards entities with important symbolism to the government, civilians with roles in government as well as pro-government regimes and local administrators (Kydd & Walter, 2006: 66). There are several examples of such instances such as attacks on new police recruits in Afghanistan by the Taliban who wanted to discourage people from cooperating with the government.


Similarly, the PKK targeted attacked entities that symbolize the Turkish state (Ünal, 2016: 59). Terrorist groups have also opted to destroy communication and transport infrastructure, gas, and oil pipelines, as well as power lines without attracting severe backlash as would be the case if civilians were attacked. Non- state actors perpetuating violence also seek to present attacks on government assets and personnel such as police and the military as being legitimate targets (combatants). This is particularly useful for groups that seek to show that their attacks discriminate against civilians.

Soft targets are those targets that are attacked yet they do not have a direct relation with the government or decision making. These include civilian assets such as restaurants and shops, private citizens, and NGOs. Such targets are easy to attack especially for transnational terrorist groups and they do spread fear much faster. Sustained attacks on civilians can also make the government lose legitimacy (Stanton, 2013). However, Abrahms (2013: 664) opines that a strategy to attack civilians can in the short or long -run be counterproductive since such actions are seen as lacking moral restraint, uncontrolled and indiscriminate.

Equally important, targeting civilians puts the subnational group at the risk of losing the support of civilians who may be sympathetic to the group’s call among the population being targeted.

Indeed, while subnational groups such as terrorists and separatists can attack both soft/civilian and hard/government assets and personnel, a specific group will tend to have a very *relative* preference of the two. That choosing the target of the attack is not necessarily interchangeable but part of a deliberate strategy to send a particular message or achieve certain goals. For example, a study by Polo (2020) illustrates the variation in the target choice by different groups as shown in the figure (11) below.

Figure 12: Percentage of attacks against civilian vs. government targets by different groups (1995–2017)



Source Polo (2020)

The figure above shows that while some groups have a greater interest in targeting civilian populations, others tend to focus their attacks more on government entities. For instance, between 1995 and 2007, over 85% of the attacks perpetrated by the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists were on government

targets and less than 20% of their attacks were perpetrated against civilians. In contrast, 70% of attacks by subnational groups such as UNITA of Angola, Algeria's Armed Islamic Group, and the Hamas were on civilians.

This trend has been seen in attacks carried out by subnational groups in Somalia. Their strategy to attack more government entities in Somalia and more civilian entities in neighbouring countries offers a unique insight into the groups' strategy and approach. Yet few studies have focused on the general impact of target choice on a group's violence strategy. One interesting study by Sani'n & Wood (2014) on the role of ideology in selecting target attacks challenges the general narrative that ideology is a strategic source.

For Sani'n and Wood, ideology is not a strategy but rather a normative commitment which does not explain why a group would change its target as it is with the case of groups in Somalia. Given that most subnational groups have two key objectives, that is to coerce the government and to gain support whether locally or internationally, (Pape, 2003) then their action would be shaped to a larger extent by these two objectives rather than ideology when choosing the target.

While targeting either government or civilian entities is an option for non-state actors, and both have different costs. Attacking civilians may be an easy option but has a higher political cost risk. However, these political costs may not be the same for all groups in all cases. Depending on the identity of the civilian, the political cost can be higher or lower among different groups.

For example, attacking civilians considered to be from an enemy state or 'outsiders', traitors, or even collaborators with external actors may have low political risk among the supporters of the group that carried out the attack. This perhaps explains why Somali-based group Al Shabab does not face serious backlash from their local supporters whenever they carry out

an attack on civilians in neighbouring countries. Having strong popular support is key objective decadent groups seek to achieve. Most of them are well aware and seek to attract positive public opinion on their course.

This support is necessary since civil wars and large-scale violence perpetrated by terrorist groups rely on the population for material support and recruitment of fighters. Social ties also play an important role in determining the level of backlash a group could face in the event it attacks civilians. If there are strong social ties between the targeted civilians and communities supportive of violent groups, then the group is at risk of a higher political cost. If there are little or no social ties, the backlash could be lower.

The theoretical and conceptual frameworks adopted in this study seek to examine conflicts more broadly. It is true that while conflicts can emerge internally within a state, their impact across the region cannot be taken for granted. More so given that while there could be similar patterns in terms of actors and drivers between national and regional conflicts, there are unique issues that distinguish national and transnational violence and there thus need different responses and approaches. Table (5) below shows some of the features that characterize internal and regional conflicts.

Table 6: Features of internal and external conflicts

Level of Analysis	Actors/Agents	Drivers	Events
Internal	Government	Economic factors	Revolts
	War Lords		Attacks on government facilities
	Terrorist group	Religious ideology	Protests
	Political parties	Political ideology	Calls for cessation
	Clan/Ethnic group		Internally displaced persons
	Local leaders/authorities	Ungoverned spaces	

Regional		Rebel groups	
		Marginalization	
	Regional governments	Ideology	Terrorism
	Terrorist groups	Intervention	Attacks on civilians
	Regional organizations	Interference with domestic issues	Piracy
	Pirates	Support to opposing sides	Kidnapping
	Transnational kin/clans		Refugees
			Collateral damage

Source: adopted from Onditi *et al.*, 2021

It shows that while peace advocates can be preoccupied with internal events, the result of conflicts that have become transnational can easily become intractable. This is because local agents (such as terrorist groups and pirates) can use their activities at the regional level to generate resources and support for their domestic course. For example, Somalia-based terrorist group Al Shabab has used attacks on Kenya and Uganda to seek support from other international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Similarly, proceeds from illegal activities such as piracy, human trafficking, kidnapping, and black-market goods have profited warring factions inside Somalia (Agbibo, 2015).

Ungoverned spaces have two implications for the conflict. One, it allows various groups to establish authority, support, and collect revenue in different parts of Somalia (Ojo, 2020). Rivalry for the control of these different territories results in violence with devastating implications on the citizens. It also allows for the emergence of other forms of criminal activities which are characterized by violence. For example, ships and their crew that are taken by pirates off the coast of Somalia are normally held in territories that are under the control of non-state actors.

This is also true for those who have been kidnapped for ransom as well as trafficking of humans, weapons, and goods. Most of these factors have domestic implications, in many cases promoting violence. The second impact of ungoverned spaces is on regional security whereby groups that intend to cause transnational attacks can have ample space to train, organize and launch attacks from these territories that are not under the control of the government (Downey, 2021). While the impact of these ungoverned spaces has not been well examined, the improvement in attacking skills as witnessed during the Westgate Mall, Garissa University, and the Disut 2 plaza attacks show that ungoverned spaces offer fighters with an opportunity to get high-quality training. They then use this training to carry out regional attacks. Thus, this study highly recommends that discussions on peacebuilding in Somalia should also integrate strategies on how ungoverned spaces will be addressed. The complexity of the conflict can also be seen with the transformation of the crisis as discussed below.

CHAPTER 5.

5. IMPACT OF THE SOMALIAN CONFLICT ON NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Chapter 4 has given us a background of the nature of conflict in Somalia by discussing the actors involved and the characteristics of violence being witnessed. In this chapter, I will analyze the nature of threats emanating from the conflict in Somalia and its implications on the national and regional security. We begin by looking at how national security in Somalia has been threatened as a result of the conflict before looking at the impact on the security of neighboring countries.

5.1 National Security

According to international observers and Somalia experts, the clash between al-Shabaab and TFG with the help of AMISOM in 2011 in districts like Howlwadag, Daynile, Hodan, Wardhingley and parts of northern Mogadishu, could be described as one of the deadliest confrontations since the onset of this conflict until the extraction of al-Shabaab forces from the capital city, Mogadishu in 2011 (Shabelle Media Network, 2011).

As the reports from AMISOM suggested, al-Shabaab withdrew from 90-95% of the city, even though confrontations were still being witnessed during the same periods in the regions found in the northern sections of the capital (OCHA 2011a). However, the impact of this withdrawal of al-Shabaab on security in the city was that on another hand, al-Shabaab announced their new strategy of fighting against the TFG and AMISOM in the form of retaliatory of counter-attacks. On the 12th August 2011, al-Shabaab spokesperson Sheikh Ali in an interview stated that al-Shabaab had troops in the capital city and attacks against TFG and AMISOM will continue until the group achieves their goal of instituting a Somali Islamic State (Shabelle Media Network 2011).

AMISOM plays a significant and proactive role in battles against al-Shabaab for Mogadishu (Williams, 2018). They were pro-active, regarding the deployment of foot-soldiers and heavy military artillery used in thwarting any advancements or progress made by the al-Shabaab. However, despite the presence of the African Union and other international armies, there has been heavy losses of civilians witnessed especially in 2011 when tens of thousands of people escaped and sought refuge in the capital city because of humanitarian crisis worsened by severe drought conditions that gripped the southern regions and which resulted of more than 60,00 people to migrated to Mogadishu from January to mid-August at the same year (UNHCR 2011b).

Human Security

The war confrontation with the al-Shabaab terrorist group which began in February 2011, claimed at the time even more civilian lives in Mogadishu. According to a United Nations report, the first week of security operations in Mogadishu, 62 were killed and 232 were wounded (UN Security Council 2011). Additionally, WHO (2011) document that hospitals in the capital and its environs provided treatment to over 5200 patients admitted due to weapon-related injuries. During the month of May 2011, the city's three largest hospitals treated 1,590 patients suffering from weapon-related injuries with half of these patients falling under the category of children under five years old.

However, civilian casualties reduced significantly in areas that had been evacuated by the civilian who had fled to other regions. In contrast, when the clashes between al-Shabaab and TFG with the assistance of AMISOM was around the populated areas, the civilian casualties had increased, for instance, from the intense fighting witnessed in Bakar market which also doubled up as a key residential location (WHO, 2011b). Therefore, civilians were more

exposed to weapon-related injuries as they could be easily caught between the crossfire of the confrontations between the al-Shabaab and AMISOM forces.

Besides fighting, observers claimed that the safety of civilians in the capital Mogadishu which was under the control of AMISOM forces and those of the TFG, was riskier than those in the al-Shabaab-controlled areas. According to interview documentation by Landinfo (2011), Somali refugees who had been interviewed in Nairobi drew a conclusion that indeed the understanding of control can be misleading in the context of Somalia and that, spheres of influence better capture the situation.

This is because the regions that were allegedly under control of the TFG forces were overwhelmed by dynamics such as undisciplined soldiers who were accused of participating in criminal activities such as robbery, extortion, illegal trade and sexual abuse of women and girls. However, quantifying the extent to which these crimes were perpetrated is a very difficult to assess and whether they were systematic. Furthermore, in 2009 and 2010 a survey conducted by a British polling institution, conducted a study in 15 districts out of the total 16 districts in Mogadishu and concluded their research by identifying that majority of the respondents stated that food insecurity and unemployment as their biggest challenges and followed by conflict and lack of security (Robinson et al., 2014).

And these could be the reasons why many young in Somalia joined Al-Shabaab for the sake of job to survive and had their daily lives. Additionally, even though the population in Mogadishu had become worn-out by the conflict, the TFG still had a massive following and support from the masses. Concurrently, internal political tensions involving the executive (president) and parliament (prime minister), casted doubts over the ability of TFG to bring stability and secure the citizen's lives. The poll also pointed out that support for the terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab was low (Botha & Abdile, 2014).

However, various observers argued that tough economic conditions and the influential private sector players in the capital city of Mogadishu whose interests were not necessarily well served by state control drive the conflict (Warsameh, 2010). Those who are relatively poor are locked out of basic services such as access to electricity or water which was sold at relatively expensive prices ranging between 10,000-15,000 Somali shillings for a 20-litre container (Warsameh, 2010).

Reports by the Shabelle Media Network (2011) indicate that over a long period of time, Bakara market which was a key center of economic activities within Mogadishu became a major source of finance and revenue collection al-Shabaab relied on and the area experienced some the most intense clashes between group and TFG with assistance of AMISOM. As such, by the fact that it also doubled up as a residential area, the fighting, therefore affected both the residents as well as those families in other regions who were supported by the economic activities in the Bakara market. The TFG alongside with AMISOM forced worked hard and finally succeeded to reopen the market, while the economic activities and trade have come back into normal.

The sections of Hamar Jabjab, Medina, Wayne, Dharkenley and Hamar Waaberi had been comparatively lesser impacted by conflict but nonetheless became extremely crowded as refugees from other regions in Somalia came to seek refuge. In the section of Medina, there was relatively better stability even though the region was under the strong sphere of influence of the Abgal. However, in 2010, observers noted that the conditions were more deteriorated compared to the 1990s for both local populations and humanitarian agencies. International organizations only managed to access the region following the end of the first civil war in 1993. This had been through an intervention by the United Nations forces and address the humanitarian crisis (Childress, 2010).

The prolonged conflict for over three decades created an environment that did not foster any form of development agenda or reconstruction. What resulted is a sharp increase in the rates of extreme poverty in Mogadishu more widely than first experienced in the 1990s. It therefore became to extremely difficult to aid the incoming wave of refugees. The foundation of the Somali clan system became impaired. However, Landinfo (2001), reinstates that the clan system for Somalis is still safe both Somalia and abroad in diaspora despite the great challenges as the population is manifesting strong will to adopt to new conditions (Landinfo 2011).

Southern Somali Region

The confrontations between TFG forces backed by the AMISOM and terrorist groups in the southern regions of Somalia was not as heavy and widespread in the entire region but rather was localized to battle-ground areas and towns. Mogadishu was a key issue for a long time as well as other strategic cities such as Kismaayo, the capital city of Jubaland Federal State, Beled Weyne and various cities in Galdadud which have been ousted from terrorist groups in recent years (Nyadera & Ahmed, 2020).

As the nature of the nomadic society in which water and grazing are very significant for their routines, clan conflicts over the water and grazing is always expected but are usually addressed through negotiations. Accordingly, international conflict observers (2021), the clan system is thriving in the regions within well central Somalia. As such any forms of disagreements or conflicts that may arise are resolved through traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in which elders are able to stop further escalation of conflict that may arise into a physical conflict confrontation involving different sides.

Notably, these conflicts according to (Childress, 2010) provided opportunities to Islamist radical groups to exert influence while other clans offered support to refugees so as to

establish alliances and defeat other clans. This attraction played well into the hands of the vulnerable clans as an alliance with al-Shabaab strengthened their influence as they became more powerful and therefore, this drive towards radicalization was not a question of ideology but rather the quest for power.

The major challenges to the residents who settled in the southern regions of Somalia have been those regarding humanitarian assistance. The repeated draughts that ravages every year in the horn of Africa have been a very critical and worst. However, the difficulty in providing humanitarian support can also be attributed to the provision of security which is very unreliable in light with the security challenges faced by the region. The absence of an environment that enhances growth translates to poor service delivery in crucial sectors such as health especially for those living in the rural areas. According to FSNAU (2010), the ratio of doctor to patient is 1: 25,000 respectively patients. Half of these professionals lack the appropriate training and academic qualifications while 15% of the children under five years are severely malnourished.

The Galmudug and Mudug Regions

Galgaduud and Mudug regions which currently are under the administration of the Galmudug regional state. Various militia groups, administrators and clan leaders are autonomously controlling parts of the region. In the northern part of the region, the most prominent administrative institution is the Puntland regional government. Meanwhile the Galmudug regional state territory covers South Mudug. Puntland's politics and population is dominated by the sub-clan Majerteen from the larger Darood clan (Prunier, 2009). The Suleiman, Gedir Saad, and Ayr sub-clans of the larger Hawiye clan dominate the central parts of Mudug and some are settled in the Northern savanna of Galgaduud. Further south is largely settled by

members of the *Duduble* and *Murusade* sub-clans. *Himaan* and *Heeb* regions have been included as part of the larger *Galmadug* regional state in the recent years.

The coastal regions of *Hibbyo* districts which is controlled by clan-based factions were highly objected to intense competition over the control of the strip to the extent that al-Shabaab militants resorted to exploring family ties in local authority administration to maintain control of the coastal strip. The al-Shabaab for a period of time maintained the control over the southern sections of Galgaduud and UNHCR (2011c) provided estimates of internally people to amount to 149,000 and in Mudug at 84,000.

The Situation in the Almadug Regional

In 2006, the sections of the Galgaduud and Mudug regions were combined to establish the Regional State of Galmudug with its capital at Galkacyo. The region has been dominated by the numerically superior Saad sub-clan of the *Hawiye* who maintain a greater influence within the region. Moreover, the dynamics in Mudug region which is administrated by two regional states is highly complicated, however, the security status in wide sections of the region has been pretty good in the line the security situation in Puntland which is one of the most peaceful and secured areas. Lately, after the comprehensive and inclusive agreements, the region's peace and reconciliation have been at its peak, harmony between regional states has been achieved with the facilitation of FGS.

Separatism (secession)

The northwest part of Somalia was under the control of the SNM in early 1991, however, it sought peace negotiation instead of attacking clans that support the government (Ingiriis, 2021). In May 1991, a big conference (*shir* in Somali) was held in Bur'o after a series of preliminary meetings where clan representatives, traditional authorities, and guerrilla commanders took part (Hoehne, 2019). The leadership of SNM did not support secession,

the guerrilla leaders wanted the political system of Somalia to be changed while the rank and file of the movement supported secession. They recalled ravages caused by the civil war, including, unrelenting measures against the northwest civilians by the previous Somali government. Besides, the state of affairs in Mogadishu was worrying.

During the meeting in Buro, there was a massive demonstration around the place with armed civilians as the capital descends to a point of turmoil (Kreuter, 2010). In May 1991, the non-Isaaq clan's delegates together with SNM leadership were impelled to proclaim the independence of the Republic of Somaliland (Gordon, 2020). However, these actions were taken without considering the future outcome (Doornbos, 1982). Unfortunately, the move was not only denounced by political leaders but also by the wider population in Southern Somalia. Following a series of warlordism and civil war, they had no choice but to embrace the change. The efforts of the international community through the UN to restore peace in Mogadishu prove futile.

The territorial claim was the main decisive factor of Somaliland; the former British Protectorate borders were applied in the declaration of the republic. Remarkably, the Eastern regions occupied by the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli were not controlled by the SNM (Renders & Terlinden, 2010:730). Subsequently, conflict erupted between Somaliland and Puntland which led to the advancement of the state formation in Somaliland. Despite that, the leaders of the major descent groups from the Northwest including those who opposed SNM initially, backing up the government accepted the peacemaking. The SNM led the establishment of a two-year interim government (Ingiriis, 2021).

Restoring law and order to the newly declared state was unsuccessful. The effectiveness of the government failed due to the increased number of armed militia, state revenue insufficiency, destruction of infrastructure, and division within the SMD. Peace and national

charter were endorsed in early 1993 a new “national” clan conference in Borama following a series of local peace conferences. The national charter operated as a provisional constitution in Somaliland. The government branches that include executive, judicial, and legislation were separated while a bicameral parliament was introduced comprising of a House of Elders *Golaha Guurtida*, mostly known as *Guurti*) and the house of representative also referred to *Golaha Wakiilada* (Hoehne, 2009).

Henceforth, a political order that was termed as a hybrid was established that that involved both “modern” and “traditional governance elements” (Menkhaus, 2007). Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal who was considered a competent Isaaq politician became an elected president for two years although he did not take part in SNM struggles. However, he relished respect as an elder statesman. Before the 1969 coup and the consolidation of Somaliland with the Italian administered territories, Mohammed Egal served as the head of Somaliland (Huliaras, 2002). He was able to implement policies effectively since his Isaaq/Habar Awal clan head economic positions providing him with financial support. Member of the *Gadabuursi* clan and also the commander of SNM Abdurahman Aw Ali Tolwaa become the vice president. Ultimately, the political framework of the country was established *Boorama* conference for subsequent years (Renders, 2007; 439-402).

Also, it marked a point to which SNM surrendered its power allowing the civilian regime to rule which was an unexpected move in the whole African nations. After the *Boorama* conference, a new conflict erupted. After Abdurahman Tuur, the previous SNM-chairman and president of Somaliland had lost his position, the *Gerhajis* alliance—himself and other influential personalities from the clans Habar Yoonis and Idagale—abandoned the secessionist project and turned to the south, joining the warlord government of Mohamed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu (Ogwari, 2015). They also associated with the UN, which in 1992 sent a “humanitarian” intervention force referred to United Nations Operation in

Somalia to Somalia. Egal and his administration declined UN intentions of extending their operation in Somaliland.

Besides controlling the airport of Hargeysa, Idagalle militias rejected the access of the government. Other than the port of Berbera, the airport served as the second most significant economic and political asset as it serves in the transport of both goods and people, including, the international NGOs representatives. Taxes collected at the airport by the Idagalle militias was not shared with the government. Gerhaji's alliance supported the militias as the Idagalle militias threatened the government (Roy, 2004). Consequently, the government's move to seize Hargeysa Airport by setting troops resulted in the emergency of conflict which extended to Hargeysa town and Buro. There was civil unrest and sporadic violence within the two towns from mid-1994 to mid-1995. Hundred lost their lives as others fled the town for safety. However only the polity part of Somaliland was affected.

Despite having no state administration, harmony persisted among the Isaaq clans in the Northeast of the Sanaag region and the non-Isaaq clans of the west and east. Traditional authorities and community leaders exercised governance at a local level (Nyadera and Ahmed, 2020). The international community influenced the local governance from the mid-1990s onwards through financial support that assisted in reconstruct infrastructure like schools, and during local peace meetings, incidentals such as fuel for transport and food were catered for. Additionally, arms and ammunition were provided when needed (Cilliers and Dietrich 2002:13)

Prime minister Shirdon and the new SFG's greatest concerns focused on the future status of the Lower Juba region (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). It seemed burdensome to enact an effective administration. The fate of Sheldon's cabinet presumably relied on the success or the failure in the field of administration.

Following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in early 2009, Kismayo immediately became Al-Shabab territory. Ras Kamboni Movement (RKM) was created by Hizbul Islam and some Ras Kamboni brigades who fought Ethiopian troops and combined forces with the TFG (Maulani et al., 2020). The RKM under the leadership of Ahmed Madobe received unanimous support from Kenya whose objective was to create a special buffer zone that protected the Lower Juba from al-Shabab's infiltration in Kenya. secular regional administration known as Jubaland Initiative was established in 2010 by the residents of Somalia in the Juba region to create a self-governing state on Somaliland and Puntland. In April 2011, Jubaland established an independent administration. The region's name was later changed to Azania with Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (Gandhi), as newly elected president, who was once the national defense minister (Muragu et al., 2020).

Ahmed Madobe rejected the advancement, and this led to a dreadful crisis amongst the allies as RKM might shift to backing up Al-Shabab (Brazhalovich et al., 2016). However, it did not occur as RKM assisted the Kenyan initiative *Linda Nchi* which was launched in October 2011. Despite its initial hesitancy, TFG gave Kenyan military operation full support while subordinately supporting Jubaland Initiative and the whole operation of the establishment of an autonomous state (Besançon & Dalzell, 2015:117- 119). In 2012, the election of the new president changed the situation. The formation of Jubaland was declared illegal by Hasan Sheikh Mohamoud and his government and appealed the processes to be impeded until the parliament enact laws and territorial boundaries of the initiated regional states within federal Somalia (Roland and Messiant (1987).

However, the statement did not halt the process. Consequently, approximately 870 delegates from Gedo, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba assembled at the end of February 2013, a Transitional State Charter for Jubaland was signed after one month of discourse, and the new FMS is expected to entail all the three pre-1991 regions and the delegates (Reno, 1999).

Deaths

While the conflict in Somalia has resulted into a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions, knowing exactly how many people have died due to the direct or indirect impact of the conflict is a challenge. The lack of data means the estimated number of people killed since 1991 could be higher or lower. The lack of data in Somalia goes beyond the number of casualties killed in the conflict to other areas of significant importance. For example, Somalia is one of the few countries in the world that does not feature in the United Nations Development Program's compiled human development index due to lack of data. Furthermore, there are increasing numbers of people dying from other causes such as drought, famine, COVID-19 and infant mortality (Nyadera & Agwanda 2020).


While these causes may not be directly caused by the conflict, they can still be attributed to the chaotic environment that has been created by the conflict. However, despite such direct association of severe consequences of drought, famine, and the pandemic to the conflict, data compiling organizations such as ACLED, the United Nations, World Bank as well as OCHA tend to avoid compiling the number of people who die as a result of indirect reasons. This means that there is a bigger likelihood that the number of deaths directly or indirectly associated to the conflict is much higher.

The human cost (death) in the Somalia conflict is worrying since it has been worsened by three elements responsible for the highest numbers of conflict-related deaths globally. Kossele & Shan (2018) and Kossele (2020) classify these three issues as (1) civil war, (2) political strife and (3) terrorism. First the civil war which at its peak in 1991 led to the death of over 9,000 people in the first year of the conflict and the number of deaths associated with the civil war continued to average over 5000 casualties per year for over two decades. As

the civil war showed signs of decline in the terrorism begun to rise in the second half of the 2010s.

Attacks in different parts of the country have added to the already high death rate due to conflict. Specifically, Al Shabab, a self-proclaimed sympathizer of al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for most of the attacks. While majority of those killed from terrorist activities in Somalia are government officials, 36% of the people killed as a result of terrorism are civilians. Also, despite al Shabab controlling much of the southern part of the country, most of its attacks have been conducted in the capital city Mogadishu (Momanyi, 2015). The challenge of defeating al Shabab is that it relies on unconventional methods of attacks that leaves little or no patterns. The group has relied on suicide bombings, track bombs, roadside hidden bombs and planting bombs on buildings. Figure (13) below shows the number of people killed between 1990 and 2021 as a result of the conflict.

Figure 13: Number of people killed per region




Source: Author compilation ACLED 2021, CSP (2021), UCDP (2021)

Economic impact

The economic fortunes of Somalia have dwindled since the onset of the civil war in 1991 (Shortland et al., 2013). But before the conflict began, the economy had become seriously weekend by a failed economic strategy introduced by the then president Siad Barre. Barre had introduced an economic model close to communism known as Scientific Socialism which like other Marxist inspired approaches focused on nationalization of enterprises in the oil, banking, insurance, real estate and industrial sectors. While this failed economic experiment partly led to the collapse of his government, the resulting civil war did not improve things either (Musa & Horst, 2019). The last two decades Somalia, a country which depends mostly on agriculture and livestock has been ranked among the poorest countries in the world. Moreover, between 1990 and 2000 the country did not feature in any global economic ranking whether by the World Bank or IMF as shown in figure (14) below.

Figure 14: Somalia's GDP between 1991 and 2021



Source: UNDP (2021)

Displacement internally

Displacement trends in Somalia, whether protracted or new can be associated with various interlinking factors. These include conflicts that are persistently reoccurring, acute and chronic food shortages which can be explained by the continuous instability that affect

farming activities as well as climate change (Drumtra, 2014). Other reasons for the internal displacements include human rights violations, unemployment and economic crises which create limited opportunities and domestic political instabilities.

Over 30 years of war have left nearly 50% of the population in poverty thus creating a serious cycle of economic instability (World Bank, 2017). For example, due to high levels of poverty, the government is unable to raise sufficient tax revenues and is forced to either depend on external donors or have to cut on public expenditure to meet its budget limits. This has left over 5.9 million people to heavily depend on donations from regional and international actors. To that extend, a new form of displacement, that is one that forces people to move to areas that they will be near donations can also be experienced (Yasukawa, 2020).


In addition, the collapse of the Barre government in 1991 also meant that state monopoly on the use of force was severely compromised. Amid the anarchy and chaos, different groups, motivated by different goals and objectives have persistently been at war or taking over territories forcing people to flee as they these groups either unleash violence on civilians or attempt to force new ideological, social, or cultural practices on them (Birkeland, 2009). Even with the establishment of a civilian government in 2012 that was backed by the international community, it has remained a very difficult task to retake the entire territory and put it under the federal government control.

Citizens who find themselves in areas we consider to be ungoverned are therefore at the mercy of different armed groups which can lead to further displacements. Violence between groups such as Al -Shabab and either government troops or Africa Union backed AMISOM soldiers has been blamed for causing high levels of civilian casualties. Similarly, drone strikes have created fear among civilians who try to move to places where there is less

likelihood of being attacked, thus leading to displacement. Apart from violence, Al -Shabab has continued to impose taxes on farms, household goods and livestock on an already struggling population. Given the severe punishment one risks being subjected to incase they fail to pay these taxes, many opt to flee and become internally displaced (Mohamoud, Kinyiri & Nor, 2015).

When it comes to inadequate food security, two important historical accounts matter. The devastating drought that resulted into famine between 1991 and 1992 as well as the second national famine in 2011 remain embedded in the history of the country (Salama et al., 2012; Maxwell et al., 2012). Apart from these two droughts which left millions displaced, an equally severe drought occurred in 2017 that left over 1.2 million people displaced. These natural disasters only tell a small part of Somalia's history of facing numerous challenges at a time. A combination of drought, famine, locust attacks and conflict have affected food production in unprecedented levels. In 2020, over 979,000 people were displaced due to floods. The figure (15) below gives an idea of the number of people who have been in the last decade (2009 to 2020).

Figure 15: Internally displaced persons in Somalia between 2009 and 2020



Source: Author compilation UNHCR (2021) and GIDD (2021)

Recurring shocks that can be associated by natural hazards, conflicts and violation of human rights can explain the high number of internally displaced persons (Shortland et al., 2013).

But it will do justice if we are to examine the deep -rooted factors that create an environment of such vulnerability (Shukla, 2014). One of the factors is ungoverned spaces. What these spaces do is create a situation where centralized and coordinated action is greatly undermined. Without proper government interventions for example, predicting, monitoring and preventing natural disasters becomes difficult. Equally, once a disaster has occurred, it is very difficult to respond swiftly and timely due to insufficient structural and institutional (Nyadera & Ahmed, 2020). The limitation within the legal structure means that perpetrators of human rights violations will hardly be punished and may continue to commit atrocities with impunity knowing very well that there is no strong mechanisms that will bring them to justice.

To avoid falling victim of human rights abuse, one has to flee hot spots and seek safety in other parts of the country leading to increased internal displacements. Other factors though statistically insignificant but relevant in the context of internal displacement are people who move from one place to another to pursue livelihood needs. First it is important to note that majority of people in Somalia are traditionally nomadic pastoralists who move from one place to another in search of pastures.

Given the slow pace of modernization in the agricultural sector, many continue to practice nomadic pastoralism same way as they did nearly a century ago. This practice involves moving from one region to another and given the growing threat of conflict and climate change, few even return from where they came from, adding to the number of displaced persons (Konczacki, 2014)..

What is concerning about the status of internally displaced persons in Somalia is that many of them end up settling in unplanned and informal settlements that expose them further to new and in some cases more dangerous threats. Sometimes these IDPs end up settling on

privately or undesignated land which results to them being evicted forcefully adding up to their misery (Abdisalan, 2012). Sometimes, it is the very bad conditions that characterize these settlements such as lack or inadequate sanitation facilities, lack of privacy, overcrowding (which can be worse during the COVID -19 pandemic) and lack of access to water and food that force people to leave. This means that many of the internally displaced persons end up being displaced more than once, leading to a protracted displacements with dangerous impact on the victims.

Even more concerning is the level of discrimination and marginalization of members from communities considered to be minorities (*see chapter on clan structure*). Being from the minority groups means that one endures far more suffering than other displaced person. Clan identity remains an important aspect of socio -economic and political organization in Somalia. One needs to belong or at least associate themselves with either of the large clans otherwise they will find it difficult to maneuver in an already fragile state. For minority IDPs, getting protection from the larger clans comes at a cost, otherwise one will not be easily welcomed in the territory. Marginalization based on clan identity continues to undermine the process of healing in the country (Lwanga-Ntale & Owino, 2020).

One unique characteristic of the internal displacement in Somalia is that it largely happens within and between urban areas (Bakonyi et al., 2019). That is, large movements of people occur in urban areas which tend to be the closest on could get to basic amenities compared to the rural areas of the country. Urban areas are also the epicenter of conflicts as different groups and warlords attempt to get control of urban areas (Horst & Nur, 2016). These conflicts force people to move from one part of the urban area to another or from one city to another. According to a government of Somalia report of 2019, over 80% of people displaced internally in Somalia were living in urban areas.

Some of the urban areas offer refuge to the internally displaced due to their relative peace. One such urban area is Hargeisa, a relatively peaceful and stable city in Somaliland region which continues to attract a decent number of internally displaced people. A total of 14 settlements exist in Hargeisa and has been home to many IDPs fleeing economic hardships and conflicts from central and southern parts of the country (Fanning, 2018).

Between 2016 and 2018, there was a spike in the number of IDPs (UNHCR, 2019). While food insecurity is blamed for this acceleration, understanding why there was a severe food shortage in the first place requires that we look at the protracted conflict. A combination of drought and conflict set the stage for deteriorating conditions since farmers who may have been required to work extra hard in order to cushion losses that could have been affected by the drought had now fled their farms due to conflict (UNHCR, 2020: 35). While the government and donor agencies responded with donations, failure to address the main problem of displacement caused by conflict means that the problem became prolonged unnecessarily.

Other causes of displacement that have been experienced in the last five years include 60,000 displaced as a result of food insecurity, 407, 000 displaced mostly from the city of *Belet* in the state of *Hiraan* by floods mostly caused by the 2019 El Nino rains (Ogallo 2019). In 2019 alone, 188, 000 people were displaced by violent activities perpetuated by al -Shabab in the South -East region with Lower Shabelle being affected the most as this is the center of operations by the African Union led AMISOM forces and the Somalia National Army are trying to take back territory from armed groups. As violence increased, many people moved to urban areas as remote areas are not well supplied with humanitarian supplies.

5.2 Impact of the Somali Conflict on Regional Security


In this sub-section I will discuss how the conflict that begun as a civil war in Somalia has now spill over to regional countries posing various threats to the security of the region.

Piracy

The Horn of Africa is a vast expanse in the north-eastern part of the continent facing Indian Ocean to the south-east the Red Sea to east and on the western side, the Nile Basin. It stretches for hundreds of kilometres to Arabian Sea, bordering the Gulf of Aden from the south and extends from Bab-el-Mandeb in the north-western side to Cape Guardafui on the eastern side connecting the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea thus becoming a significant trade route for commercial ships (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). Conventionally, the region comprises 4 key states: Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. However, it also includes the neighbouring states of Kenya and Sudan.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further intensified activities in the Gulf of Aden by increasing the number of ships that passed through gulf. The trade route that required ships to go through the Cape of Good Hope had just been reduced by over a thousand kilometres. This elevated geo-strategic position of Horn of Africa Region in the global economy, especially for the European market which accounts for much of the commercial ships that transit the canal (U.S. Department of Transport, 2008). In 2009 alone, an estimated 33,000 commercial ships and 6500 tankers passed through the Gulf of Aden and the number has recently doubled due to the shorter distance provided enabled by the Suez Canal (Shortland, 2015).

Figure 16: Sea routes off the Horn of Africa



Source: Library of Congress, (2018)

Therefore, the maritime region of the Horn of Africa is without doubt important for global trade. It provides important routes for maritime commerce between Europe and Asia as well as North America and Asia. Aside from the cargo shipping, the region also provides a significant route for transportation of world's gas and crude oil. Its proximity to Iran and other oil exporting countries in the middle has also led to the increase in the number of oil tankers and it is approximated that 12% of the world's oil transporting tankers pass through the Gulf of Aden on their way to the European Markets (World Bank, 2013).

The nature of commercial activities taking place in the region makes it a favourable ground for piracy. Historically, pirates have demonstrated a penchant for regions with large coastal areas where commercial activities are high, national naval forces are ineffective and security apparatus are unproductive and these are the very features that characterised the Horn of

Africa region making it one of the most insecure maritime regions in the world, notorious for organised crime, illegal fishing, irregular migration, and piracy.

Pirates operating in the waters off the horn of Africa mainly originate from Somalia. These pirates are claimed to be disenchanted fishermen who lost their sources of livelihoods as a result of foreign exploitation thus left with no alternative livelihood sources (Bowden & Basnet, 2012). The surging unemployment rates and illiteracy in Somalia which stand at 65 % and 70 % respectively have over the past years continued to create a pool of prospective recruits who heightened piracy activities between 2005 and 2013. An interaction between poor economic situation and the absence of a functioning government in Somalia has legitimised piracy as a source of living for the disenchanted youths (Rice & Steward, 2008).

According to Lang (2011), there were an estimated 1500 pirates in Somalia and the number was expected to increase annually by at least 200. This meant that the operation areas of the pirates would expand to include the coastal regions of East Africa and Arabian Peninsula (Geopolicity, 2011). Noteworthy, pirate groups have operated in Somalia since early 1990s. These pirates masqueraded as maritime security trained by international security firms and given the authority to extort fine and intercept foreign vessels. Based on the extortive nature of the pirates, it is agreeable among policy makers and scholars alike that profitability is the main the main motivation factor for the pirates.

The persistence of the pirates is attributed to a number of reasons largely the worsening economic and political situation in Somalia but importantly the military experience that most pirates gained from the civil war is worth mentioning. Besides, the huge ransoms obtained by pirates have in the long run enabled them to acquire more sophisticated weaponry like rocket propelled grenade and AK-47 rifles and to improve their operational capabilities along the Gulf of Aden (Kaunet & Zwolski, 2014). Therefore, military experience coupled

with the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons enabled the pirates to capture hundred of ships and thousands of hostages.


The geo-strategic position of the Horn of Africa makes it a favourable location for piracy activities. According to IMO, an organization that collects data on attempted or executed acts of piracy since 1982, piracy embedded in major maritime waters but the waters off the Horn of Africa have been severely hit in the recent past. Pirates' tactics and acquisition of sophisticated weaponry has enabled them to divert their attention from small ships to large commercial ships and oil tankers (Kaunet & Zwolski, 2014). The hijacking of *M/V Maran Centaurus* a crude oil tanker loaded with \$ 150 million worth of oil in 2009 is an important turning point of the pirates' operations.

Another crude carrier, *Sirus Star* was also captured while transporting crude oil worth over US\$ 100 million. Other ships that were captured in 2009 include the Ukrainian ship *Faina* which was transporting Russian –made armoured war tanks to Kenya, French *Yatch* and *Maersk Alabama* contracted by World Food Program to deliver food assistance to Somalia. These incidences illustrate the operational capabilities of the pirates (Shortland, 2015).

Between 2005 and 2013, it is approximated that a total of 149 ships were captured by pirates who obtained an estimated ransom of US\$ 385 million translating to US\$ 5 million per captured ship (World Bank, 2013).

This had an insidious effect on the intensity of trade along the Gulf of Aden and it is estimated that there was a 7.4% decrease in trade through the gulf. This came with an increase in the cost of trade for merchants due to the increased shipping cost of goods (Besley, Fetzer & Mueller, 2015). Between 2010 and 2017, over \$ 1.4 billion in losses, \$ 240 million spent by ship owners to hire private security guards to offer protection to their ships while on transit and over 1100 personnel were attacked.

Figure 17: Global Piracy Attacks between 2010 and 2020



Source: International Maritime Organization Annual Piracy Report (2021).

From the graph above, piracy activities in the Horn of Africa significantly heightened after 2005 in two main facets: first, there is an apparent increase in the number of attacks from 50 in 2006 to nearly 250 in 2008. Secondly, during the same period the operational capabilities of the pirates is also said to have immensely increased. According to Burlando, Cristea and Lee (2015), while the pirates confined their activities to a maximum distance of 500 kilometres off Somalia in 2005, they were able to expand their operations to more than 1500 kilometres off the coast of Somalia. The World Bank also reported that pirates attacked ships that were sailing over 3600 kilometres off the coast of Somalia (World Bank, 2013).

The term Somali piracy has gained notoriety in the last decade to refer to the activities of Somalia-based groups whose income is derived from attacking and hijacking ships in the high seas. The main targets of these groups have been foreign vessels sailing across the Gulf of Aden as well as the Indian Ocean. According to Kraska & Wilson (2009), the genesis of piracy in Somalia can be traced back to the beginning of the Somali civil war when armed local militia recognized the salience of ransoms in advancing their political course. Initially,

piracy in Somalia was largely a battle for political control of coastal regions between various clans.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Somali piracy represented a small fraction of global piracy and a larger portion of the incidences were conducted by the Asians. However, the seeds of Somali piracy were gradually germinating through privateer activities and as such many pirates emerged from private security companies that were operating in Somalia. The first piracy incident that involved a demand for ransom occurred in 1994 and was conducted by *Majerteen* militia – one of the dominant clans in Somalia (Kapteijns, 2014). Since then piracy activities began to emerge in waters off the Somali coast and the pirates later delved into the deeper waters in the Gulf of Aden.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia was at its highest peak in 2011, a year that recorded 237 attacks (Martínez-Zarzoso & Bensassi, 2013). According to Jack Lang's report of 2011, there were an estimated 1500 pirates in Somalia while in the same period analysts had projected an annual increase of pirates by around 200-400 pirates per year. The burgeoning number of pirates had an effect on the size of their area of operation and as such their area of operation expanded in 2011 to include the Arabian peninsula, Indian Ocean and the East African Coast.

Piracy in Somalia developed into a hugely lucrative enterprise with structures and networks reminiscent of the sophisticated drug trafficking cartels that have existed in the world's history. Historically, drug trafficking networks have been found to be durable and hierarchical in nature and according to Ploch, Blanchard, O'Rourke, Mason, & King (2012) Somali Pirates exhibited these features. Somali National volunteer Coastguard formed the largest and most sophisticated pirate syndicate. The group largely operated in Kismayu and

was supported by other pirates groups like Somali Marines and Marka group that operated in Putland and Central Somalia respectively (Samatar, Lindberg, & Mahayni, 2010).

These networks comprised of hundreds of unemployed youth, dozens of fishermen and armed militia. Raymond Gilpin (2009), these groups of young men were associated with various clans in Somalia. Hawiye and the Darood clans have been found to have very strong affiliations to the pirates. By linking up with the clans, the pirates are accorded the much-needed protection and support, a situation that complicated on-shore operation that targeted pirates (Besley, Fetzer, & Mueller, 2015).

The clans and the warlords supply the pirates with expertise in hostage management and ransom negotiation. The hostage holders also known as *illalo* in the local dialect and negotiators also known as *dilals* are provided to the pirates by the clans and the warlords. This network of warlords and powerful clan leaders employ a copious of threatening and violent techniques like beatings and exposure to extreme heat to control their hostages. They also utilise psychological techniques like sending death threats to hostages' families and allowing hostages to communicate with their family members. In some cases, the hostages are not used as a source of ransoms but as a bargaining chip to secure the release of imprisoned pirates.

Somali pirates are considered to have advanced military training as a result of their experience in the civil war that spanned over ten years. Besides, they are a group of well-armed men with weapons that largely originate from Yemen through a network of illicit traders. According to the UN monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea, some of the sophisticated firearms are also believed to originate from the Transitional Federal Government. These sophisticated artilleries enabled the pirates to change their targets from small fishing boats to big commercial ships. The attack on *M/V Maran Centaurus*, an oil

tanker transporting crude oil worth over \$150 million, in 2011 revealed the capacity and mission of the Somali pirates (Nollkaemper *et al.*, 2017).

Even though a number of pirates groups expanded their areas of operation to reach as far as Seychelles, most of the groups operated from the coasts in central and southern Somalia as well as Putland. Their main ports of operation included Hobyo, Eyl, Harardheere and Garad. Their operations in these areas were made possible by the weak security and political structures in Putland and Mogadishu where the corrupt government officials benefitted from the ransom money (Nyadera, Ahmed and Agwanda, 2020).

The existence of weak political and economic structures provided a number of challenges to the EU's counter-piracy operation and the operation was further complicated by the geopolitical context on one hand and the prevailing local conditions on the other hand. In the 21st century, the rise in piracy incidents at the Somali coast raised international concern. However, in early 2012 the cases declined as a result of Somalia's political strides, advancement in security practices on ships, and presence of international naval in the region.

Terrorism

Brutal clashes between local militia and foreign troops in 1995 in Somalia led to the withdrawal of international forces, but it did not signify victory but simply a judgment either rightly or wrongly, that foreign intervention was worthless in Somalia (Rutherford, 2008). The international community paid little attention to “nation-building” as states continued to collapse and an eruption of civil war. Somalia did not represent the crucial interest of the great power and posed danger to international security.

All that changed with 9/11. Series of undesirable events in Somalia could not be ignored; According to the new conventional wisdom, failed state pose an imminent danger to both regional and international security, and the war-torn Horn of Africa nation briefly moved to

the head of the queue as “next up” after Afghanistan in the war on terror. However, it did not take long to realize that Somalia deserved less dramatic measures than a complete invasion (Miyandazi, 2012).

Despite the efforts to contain Somali terrorist threats through dispatching of US military anti-terrorism task force to neighboring Djibouti, airspace surveillance, combative intelligence gathering, and security forces cooperation of the neighboring countries, Israel Targets in Kenya were ambushed in November 2002, and it was linked to Somalia (Butime, 2014). *Al-Qaeda* operatives were allegedly spotted in Mogadishu in early 2003. Once more, the state of war on terror seemed to befall Somalia (Agbiboa, 2015).

Somalia and transnational terrorism relationship are not what it appears to be, despite the warnings from Somali leaders. Firstly, Somalia is not a conducive environment for terrorist operations for groups such as *al-Qaeda*. Irrespective of a predominantly Muslim population, recurring civil war, and state collapse, contemporary Somalia has very little resemblance with Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.

Secondly, terrorism in Somalia is a new phenomenon not fully adopted in Somali society. *al-Itixaad alIslaami* (“The Islamic Union”), a Somali affiliate of Bin Laden gained military support from *al-Qaeda* while the neo-Wahhabi school of Islamic (*Salafism*) with Saudi Arabian origin provided it with ideological inspiration. Nonetheless, *al-Itixaad* relied on the Arab peninsula’s wealthy patrons for financial support like any other jihadist group (Deforche, 2013; Pantucci, 2013). Within Somalia, the most persuasive feature of *al-Itixaad* is the financial clout; proclivity to violence or theological pedantry receive little attention from the Somalis

Thirdly, terrorism in Somalia has received regional attention rather than international. The main docket of Somalia’s Islamic groups is not based on Osama bin Laden’s pan-Islamic

rage, but simply the formation of an Islamic state in Somali and neighboring areas like Ethiopia and Kenya inhabited by Somalis. Henceforth, few Somali militants have embraced global jihad.

Finally, Islamists in Somalia together with domestic and foreign forces compete to fill the political vacuum in their collapsed state in a divided crowded political arena. Recently, geopolitical, ethnic, and religious tension has been influenced by Islamist politics and terrorism making the Horn of African one of the most insecure regions of the world (Hesse, 2013).

Somalia poses threat to international security as a center for regional concerns than as a connection in the chain of transnational terrorism. The only solution to Somalia's transgressions is the restoration of the national government. However, according to successive peacemakers, it might not be as easy as it seems or have expected outcome; a weak, negligent or non-proxy Somali government would not only exacerbate terrorist threat but also regional instability. Unluckily, that's the expected results of international peace-making attempts in Somalia, except if approached with more earnest and international devotion than ever before. I will discuss some of the main terrorist groups in Somalia starting with *al-Itixaad al-Islaami* and Al Shabab.

Whether *al-Itixaad al-Islaami*, the Somali militant group is associated with a transitional terrorist or not, it's partially a perspective matter. The organization's missions are confined to regions of the Horn of Africa inhabited by Somalis, and its members are all Somalis (Deforche, 2014). AIAI has extended its operations in the Ethiopian heartland particularly in Dire Dawa and Dire Dawa. Additionally, it is alleged that the Ethiopian operation of AIAI act independently, hence regarded as a domestic rebellion against Ethiopian rule instead of transitional terrorism (Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, 2007).

Conversely, little else about *al-Itixaad* is Somali: Its activities are sustained through financial support from foreign countries and so is their ideology and military knowledge (Ahmed, 2020: 11). The rise of *Al-Itixaad* began in the mid-1970s when the draconian crackdown on the establishment of religion in the country was launched by seemingly “socialist” military rule under General Mohamed Siad Barre, 10 Sheikh were executed whilst 23 others were arrested in the process. Many religious leaders and their followers in Somalia sought exile in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, where “jihad” became a popular curse against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2020: 14).

Not many Somalis joined the Afghan *mujahidin*, however, a number of them were entangled with ideological undercurrents that conquered the Muslim world, and personal and organizational were established. This resulted in the emergence of radical Islamic Somali leaders, and it assisted in explaining not only *al-Itixaad*’s Wahhabi theological creed but also its “jihadist” rhetoric (Reno, 1999). During this period, those leaders who opted to stay in Somalia passively resisted the religious policies of Barre’s government and propagandize their Islamic faith. For instance, in 1978 one of Wahhabi the *al-Itixaad* predecessors the *Al-Jamaa’a al-Islamiyya* was formed. *Al-Jamaa’a* eventually changed its name to *al-Itixaad* in 1982 and carried on with its operation tactically until the fall of the Somali government in 1991 (Charlton and May 1989).

Somali Islamists from the diaspora imported some radical new ideas, before the fall of the Barre regime. The foreign experience of Jihadists subsequently inspired them to advocate for arms as a way of dethroning the bigoted regime which ensures the inception of an Islamic state. Eventually, the formation of a new organization, *al-Itixaad al-Islaami* was declared by a group purported to be Wahhabi religious school followers in late 1990 (Gordon, 2020). However besides sharing loyalty to the Wahhabi precept the association between the *al-Itixaad* movement and the 1980s non-violent predecessor is not well defined.

Interestingly the members of *Al-Itixaad* perceived themselves as *Salafiyya* to distinguish themselves from Arabian of Wahhabism (Bryden, 2003: 75). Nonetheless, compared to other Somali Salafis AIAI is the only one fully asseverated militant agenda, whose spokesmen recount it as the “Da’wa and Jihad” movement (Shay, 2008: 21). These movements advocate for Islamic state establishment in Somalia, as well as a justice system deriving from Sharia law and Islamic principles; dismissal of capitalism, secular politics, democracy, communism, and claim: the spread of Islamic faith.

The most significant military attempts of *Al-Itixaad* were not aimed at the United States or other western powers but against the Somali-inhabited region in Ethiopia under Ethiopian authority; a crusade it referred to as “jihad” in opposition to Christian dwellers. Following the correspondence of *al-Itixaad* objectives and that of clan-based ONLF, their membership coincident, and their activities are synchronized occasionally. *Al-Itixaad*’s military operations have not only targeted Ethiopian forces but also civilians (as well as members of the international humanitarian organization) whom they believed to be the Ethiopian government. Videotapes acquired from such attached have been purportedly used in fund mobilization campaigns of *al-Itixaad* overseas (Marchal, 2002).

The affiliates of *Al-Itixaad* based in Ethiopia are not confined to ONLF. Presumably, the organization has been associated with the IFLO, later on in 1997 new Ethiopian rebel organization known as the OSALA was launched by AIAI (Samantha, 2007). Unfortunately, it’s hard to evaluate the extent of this collaboration as it might not have produced concrete results. There has been divided opinion between Somalis and foreigners as to whether AIAI is a terrorist group or not. Regardless of the current nature of the organization, it’s impenetrable to dissociate it with terrorism: *al-Itixaad* has been linked to several terror attacks in both Somalia and Ethiopia (Abdullahi, 2006).

Al-Shabab also referred to as “the youth” is a revolutionary group based in Somalia. The group formerly invaded the capital Mogadishu and part of Somalia’s countryside, fortunately, the intervention of the African Union–led military campaign in recent years has driven them away from prime population centers. Even so, the prevailing insurgency not only threatens the security of war-torn Somalia but also surges fatal attacks against civilians and Western forces in the region.

Somalia is among the most impoverished country in the world which has experienced a series of militant groups in decades of political disruption. As stated by analysts, the Salafi militant group the al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI, or “Unity of Islam”) that emerged in the 1990s after Said Barre’s regime collapsed in 1969-1991 is believed to have brood al-Shabab leaders. AIAI involved Middle East–educated Somali extremists who were partially armed and funded by al-Qaeda’s chief, Osama bin Laden (Thomas, 2013: 414-418).

A rift erupted between AIAI’s old guard, which came up with a political front consisting of young members who resolved to establish (a Greater Somalia) Islamic rule foundation. Eventually, the revolutionists amalgamated with Sharia courts referred to Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and operated as its youth militia. In June 2006, Al-Shabab and ICU took over the capital instilling fear in neighboring Ethiopia (Barnes & Hassan, 2007: 123).

In December 2006, Somalia was invaded by Ethiopia, a majority Christian nation, and threw ICU out of Mogadishu. According to the analysts, the intervention which came as an intercession from the transitional government of Somalia radicalized al-Shabab. Al-Shabab moved to the south following the retreat of ICU to the neighboring countries influencing guerrilla assaults, on Ethiopian forces including assassinations and bombings. Experts revealed that insurgency surged up during that period, thus a large part of central and southern Somalia was under militia control (Abdullahi, 2006).

According to Rob Wise (2020), a counterterrorism expert, the occupation of Ethiopians contributed to the transformation of the group from a moderate Islamic movement to a more robust and radical armed faction in the country. Addis Ababa said the intervention was a “reluctant response” to calls by the ICU for jihad against Ethiopia and its renewed territorial claims against both Ethiopia and Kenya. It further emphasized that intervention was reinforced by the Africa Union and the United States, among others. Between 2006 and 2008, the al-Shabab ranks were expanded by the new Islamist-nationalist fighters from approximately four hundred to thousands. Moreover, it strengthened the tie between al-Qaeda and the group during this period. The terrorist network was applauded by the al-Shabab leaders, however, they condemned what they termed as U.S crimes against Muslims worldwide.

In February 2008, al-Shabab was pronounced a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. Subsequently, in 2012 the leadership of Al-Shabab declared their devotion to al-Qaeda. There have been several studies that indicate that the different factions have different goals within the group, however, al-Shabab as a whole maintains its main agenda of turning Somalia into an Islamic State (Warner & Weiss, 2017). The group’s leaders are divided into nationalists who aim at getting rid of the central government, from militants with transitional goals. In recent years hard-liners within the group have gained prestige, this is according to an expert on al-Shabab at the Atlantic Council, Bronwyn Bruton (2020). She further expounds that those regarding themselves as al-Shabab have embraced Sharia law. They cling to the idea of opposing the Western-backed government.

Al-Shabab enforces its discordant interpretation of sharia in areas it controls, banning several entertainments like music and movies, the selling of narcotic plant (khat), smoking, and beard shaving. Suspected adulterers and thieves have been stoned or amputated (Menkhaus, 2002). As famine loomed in 2017, the group forbid cooperation with

humanitarian agencies forcing over eight hundred thousand civilians to flee their homes, according to United Nations.

The current leader of al-Shabab is Ahmed Umar also identified as Abu Ubaidah. He took over in 2014 after Ahmed Abdi Godane who was killed by the U.S. drone strike. Many experts perceive that the fall of Godane might hasten the scramble for power, since Umar's rule lacks Godane's shrewd tactics, and chances of him maintain a fractious group in control might fail. Recent reports from the experts state that al-Shabab is still a unified organization (Molfetas, 2014).

Over the years, al-Shabab is believed to have benefited from various source of income which includes other terrorist groups, extortion of aid groups, farmers and local business, piracy, kidnapping among other (Sheriff, Uke & Adams, 2015; 48-50). This is following counterterrorism experts. The Eritrean government has been suspected of funding the group but disputed the allegations. Despite the UN ban on Somali charcoal export from 2012, Al-Shabab has managed to swindle operations through the establishment of taxation points of illicit charcoal trade raising to \$7.5 million per year. Latterly, al-Shabab has completely turned-on smuggling contraband goods particularly sugar across Kenya, raising tens of millions of dollars annually. It is believed that the Kenyan forces have been involved in the scheme since 2015 (Sheriff, Uke, & Adams, 2015).

In early 2007, African Union was authorized by the UN Security Council to lead a peacekeeping force whose acronym is referred to as AMISOM. It was commissioned to protect the transitional government of Somalia that was established in 2004 but had gained power in Mogadishu (Nyadera & Ahmed, 2020). Uganda was among the first nation to dispatch forces into Somalia under AMISOM, and it sustained the largest band within the regional force with more than six thousand troops.

Other military forces came from Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Djibouti contributing to a total of twenty thousand troops of AMISOM. The initial strike of the al-Shabab outside of Somalia occurred in the Ugandan capital of Kampala where suicide bombings were coordinated with over seventy-four people succumbed to death. The group spokesman stated that that was a message for those countries that intend to send troops to Somalia will face similar attacks (Agwanda & Asal, 2020).

Al-Shabab admitted to being responsible for the 2013 attack on Nairobi shopping mall that claimed the lives of 67 people and university in the city of Garissa attacked in 2015 that killed 148 people, in addition to the DUSIT 2 hotel attack in 2019. This series of attacks was the deadliest in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi that claimed the lives of more than two hundred people.

Refugees

Migration has become one of the most securitized issues since the turn of the millennium. A combination of terrorism attacks across the world, fragile economic situation and emergence of populist leaders has led to growing cases of xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism and torture cases among migrants (UNHCR,2020). Concern for policy makers has been whether migration poses a threat to a country or not. This question can be answered by looking at two forms of migration. One is regular migration which is formal and well-coordinated by the government and international agencies. Such migrants often end up confined in refugee camps where they are catered for (Lindley, 2014).

The other type of migration is the informal migration which can also affect genuine refugees fleeing persecution but there is limited capacity to accommodate as formal refugees. In this case such migrants end up living illegally in urban and rural areas and sometimes getting involved in illegal activities (Ahrens et al., 2016). There are many people who feel

concerned that refugees could give non-state actors an opportunity to sneak in their sleeper cells in the country with the aim of gathering intelligence, recruitment, spreading terrorist ideology, train or carry out attacks. While such concerns cannot be fully ignored, there is need for genuine investigations to ensure that real refugees are not victimized.

There are three factors that have led to massive displacement of Somalis outside the country, namely the collapse of the state, conflict and drought. More recently activities of groups such as Al Shabab are also to be blamed for increased displacements of refugees. To understand the magnitude of the refugee crisis, we have to look at the numbers. Between the year 1991 and 1992, more than 800, 000 citizens of Somalia had been displaced in Kenya and Ethiopia. Below I will discuss the displacements to Ethiopia and Kenya respectively (Wahlberg, 2017; UNHCR, 2020).

Somalia refugees to Ethiopia

Majority of the people who were displaced to Ethiopia (and to some extent Djibouti) was as a result of the Somalia government response to the activities of the Somalia National Movement (SNM). This movement was operating mainly from Somaliland and near the border with Ethiopia. Therefore, as the government embarked on ariel bombardment, majority of the civilians crossed the border to Ethiopia. By December 1991, over 625, 000 Somalia refugees were registered in Ethiopia (Force, 2008).

Nine camps were established to host the refugees each of them was classified along clan identity. A few other Somalis with the means were able to settle among the locals across the country. Interestingly since Ethiopia also has a sizable number of ethnic Somali citizens, some destitute Ethiopian -Somali citizens also rushed to the camps and were registered as refugees (Force, 2008). Moreover, a number of Ethiopians who had fled from their country to Somalia in the early years were also forced to seek refuge in the camps while around 500,

000 Ethiopians fleeing from Somalia during the conflict were settled among the local communities with UNHCR providing financial and food donations for 6 months.

The arrival of refugees to Ethiopia was a humanitarian crisis that took more than one year before the conditions improved. This was worsened by the fact that most refugees had to walk for weeks to reach the camps which were strategically located across the border with Somalia (Leurs, 2014). While the location of the camps was accessible to the refugees from the Somalia side, they were too remote from markets and lacked connecting infrastructure on the Ethiopian side making life in these camps even after the first year very difficult (Carruth, 2018). As the violence started to reduce, some refugees began to return back to Somaliland but not before many other undocumented refugees sneaked out of the camp and started living among the communities to escape the harsh conditions in the camps. The refugee crisis in Ethiopia had serious socio-cultural and economic implications (Leurs, 2014).

Somali Refugees to Djibouti

Some refugees especially from the Isaaq clan totaling to 90,000 opted to move to Djibouti, a small country neighboring Somalia with a population of less than 500,000 people. This movement posed a big challenge to the small nation that was at the time facing an economic crisis marked by 60% inflation rates. In addition, a total of 13,000 refugees who had fled Ethiopia in the earlier years for other reasons were already living in Djibouti. This means that one in five people in the country at the time was a refugee (Hammond, 2013).

The government of Djibouti aware of the constraints facing the country was not quick to establish the refugee camps or even recognize the refugees. Most refugees were therefore left in the mercy of relatives and well-wishers in the country (Moret, 2006). Interestingly even when the government reluctantly began to recognize refugees, it first opted to use the very strict definition of refugees as adopted in the Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees document adopted in 1951 (Ben et al, 2021). At the time of the Somali refugee crisis, most countries in Africa were using the definition adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1969 (Hammond, 2013).

The Djibouti government position meant that one had to provide proof that they were individually at risk of being persecuted back at home and not the more general requirement of the OAU which emphasized on groups than individuals. During the early stages of the refugee movement to Djibouti, there was no official policy that allowed for the integration of refugees in the community. However, as the situation became even more difficult in Somalia, the government opted to reach out to the European Union and the UNHCR for support (Hammond, 2014).

Displacement to Yemen and Kenya

As groups seeking to oust the government of Siad Barre gained momentum in South Central Somalia and Puntland region, the flow of refugees also accelerated towards Kenya and Yemen using the port of Bossaso. Between 1991 and 1992 alone, the number of Somalia refugees in Yemen had gone up twice from 30,000 to 60, 000 while Kenya received an additional 280, 000 refugees from Somalia on top of those who were already in the country (Hammond, 2014). The challenge of dealing with refugees at the time was that a severe drought had resulted into serious malnutrition meaning the people were not just fleeing violence, but they were facing certain death due to malnutrition. In fact, infant mortality rate was 35 time higher than the acceptable rate (Ikanda, 2018).

The drought particularly made the minority clans such as the Rahanweyn clan who unlike other pastoralist Somalia clans were agriculturalists. They did not have armed militia or the political voice in the midst of chaos in the country and that is why majority of them fled to Kenya and Yemen. At its peak, Kenya hosted over 800,000 refugees most of who were

Somalis (UNHCR, 2020). In 2021 the number has reduced to about 430, 000. The government of Kenya has raised concerns over the sustainability of the Dadaab and Kamkuma refugee camps in the North of the country citing that the camps had become breeding grounds for terrorism. In March 2021, the Interior Ministry issued the UNHCR with a strong ultimatum to close the over 30-year-old camps. The government has insisted that the camps are allowing groups such as Al Shabab to operate in the country following several attacks that were claimed by the Somalia based group (Ministry of Interior, Kenya, 2021)

Given the ultimatum from the government of Kenya to close the camp, UNHRC has negotiated for June 2022 to be the deadline to close the camps (Orwenjo et al, 2021). They intend to request most of the Somali refugees to voluntarily return home or be relocated to a third country. Other refugees, from other countries such as South Sudan and DRC Congo may be granted Kenyan residency as part of this negotiations (Orwenjo et al, 2021). The concern of the government is further enforced by the fact that many Somalia refugees have taken advantage of the sizable Somalia native citizens in Kenya to get the Kenyan passport through corruption. This has affected the ethnic demographic numbers in the country forcing the government to introduce a new registration system using technology in an attempt to clean up the civil registry of those who corruptly acquired the citizenship (Islam et al., 2021).

In this chapter the I have provided specific thematic threats of how the conflict in Somalia has affected national and regional security. While the assessment was purely made based within the context of existing academic framework, it is difficult to divorce the tragedy that has befallen the country and the region. The next chapter, I will discuss the findings and make an analysis of the conflict using the political, economic and social tools.

5.3 Regional and international dynamics to the Somalian Conflict


The conflict in Somalia can also be examined from a regional and international dimension. Actors and interests beyond the traditional domestic players have also impacted on the conflict significantly (Islam & Cansu, 2020). It is important to note that international legitimacy is essential for a country's stability and in many cases, regional and international efforts can overcome domestic challenges and provide solutions in instances where the national government has failed. Such efforts were attempted in Somalia at different times of the conflict's history (Islam et al., 2020). The most important of these periods was the United Nations led UMISOM I and UMISOM II during the early stages of the conflict.

The said international efforts had the potential to solve the conflict in Somalia had better strategies, local support and adequate resources were provided. However, the weakness of UN lead efforts in Somalia during the early stages of the conflict including the disastrous attempt by the US special forces to capture General Aided at the heart of Mogadishu only reduced the chances of solving the conflict (Nyadera & Ahmed, 2020). Once the Somalia question was abandoned by the international community for nearly a decade, it created room for serious manipulation and transformation of the conflict that by the time renewed efforts were being made address the problem in the early 2000s, the situation was out of control.

Apart from the failure by the United Nations, regional organizations in Africa such as the OAU which was later transformed to the African Union as well as IGAD, the East African Community and the Arab League which Somalia is a member either lacked the capacity or chose to ignore the crisis in Somalia (Agwanda, & Özoral, 2020). Despite the many weaknesses facing these regional organizations, there way in which individually or through a broad collaboration between these regional organization that solution for Somalia could have been found. Today we talk about a fragmented state in Somalia, but equally important is the fragmented nature of the international community.

The figure (22) below shows different international and regional actors involved in Somalia, each with their own specific interests and approach. Instead of collaborating to address the challenges in Somalia, there has not been any serious effort to combine regional and international efforts towards Somalia. The figure (22) below shows a fragmented relationship between the government of Somalia and different local, regional and international actors.

Figure 18: Fragmented relations between the government of Somalia and different actors



Source: Designed by the author from the study (2021)

In conclusion, three decades of generational conflict has inflicted a lot of pain and suffering millions of people in and out of Somalia. It is important that sustainable solution on the crisis in Somalia is found. There is hope if the given the changing demographic characteristics dominated largely by youths. Regional and international actors can also contribute positively towards peace in Somalia. This will need commitment, respect and allowing indigenous people and approaches to be part of the peace process.

CHAPTER 6:

6. THE NEXUS BETWEEN POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, COHESION AND CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

In this chapter, I examine how the conflict in Somalia has affected national and regional security by analysing thematic issues that define the broader definition of security. I begin by looking at the domestic socio-economic implications and then analyse the regional implications.

6.1 The nexus Politics and Conflict in Somalia.

Political Legitimacy

The general conflict situation in Somalia has affected the political fortunes of the country. One of the direct and more obvious impacts is the consequence of the conflict on democratic processes in the country. Particularly when it comes to openness and representative government. First, it is important to remember that after the collapse of the central government, the country was without a civilian government for more than two decades. It was only until the establishment of the TFG in 2004 that a form of government was in place (Hesse, 2010). However, due to the problem of ungoverned territories, the central government based in Mogadishu only controlled a small radius around the capital while the rest of the country was under the control of other groups including renegade federal members states, warlords, and terrorist groups. It took too long for the TFG to even get the support of various members of the international community (Dagne, 2007).

Back at home, while there were pockets of optimism among the pro-government citizens, the level of confidence in the government, bureaucratic process and even its institutions was very low. Not only among its citizens but also within government institutions themselves

(Loubser & Solomon, 2014). For example, some of the renegade federal member states have begun to bypass the central government and directly engaging in foreign policy agreements with other countries, actions that should be reserved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mogadishu. Instances of such insubordination resulted in the diplomatic spat between the government in Mogadishu and countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Kenya (Arieff, 2008; Johnson & Smaker, 2014).

Secondly, the process of selecting those who represent the people in the various arms of government has been very controversial. The 4.5 election rule that has been promoted as one of the best models for the country since 2011 is seen as favouring some communities over others (Ahmed, 2019). After all, since it was implemented, the 4.5 election rule has not translated to any major peace situation in the country, and it is worth reconsidering. Despite the reasons given for not organizing a one-man-one-vote system of election, the one adopted puts the power to elect people's representatives in the hands of a few people. The elders who dominate the selection process of members of parliament who then, in turn, elect the president do not include other important segments of the society including gender balance, youths, and representatives of various civil societies (Ahmed, 2019). Mature representative democracies are always led and governed by individuals who are directly elected by the people. The current political situation in Somalia does not instil much people's confidence in the government.

The manifestation of the government's lacking legitimacy in Somalia can also explain the unending rise of armed groups across the country. These groups are not only engaging in conflict but also providing basic needs to the people where the government has failed (Mwangi, 2012). As earlier discussed, groups such as al Shabab are involved in providing humanitarian aid, water, and even education thus shifting legitimacy from the absent government to the non -state actors who are visible and solving people's problems. There

has been a series of civil disobedience, especially in Mogadishu as protestors express disapproval of government decisions especially as a result attempt to postpone elections (Mwangi, 2012). This resulted in mass demonstrations and protests that led to death. Political transition even in Mogadishu has not been smooth as many consider Somaliland, a renegade state to be better organized than the national government when it comes to political transition.

There are concerns that the conflict environment is also giving the political elites not to exercise openness. Transparency in Somalia is very low, there is limited accountability, corruption is thriving in Somalia as the country ranks very high on the corruption index (Hollyer et al., 2014). Because much attention is diverted to the conflict, leaders are not sufficiently held accountable partly because the institutions that are supposed to hold them accountable are also very weak or non-existent. To sum up the political legitimacy indicator, we provide the table (8) below.

Table : 7Political legitimacy indicators

Indicator	Status in Somalia
Level of Confidence in the government	Low
Space for a peaceful demonstration	Inadequate
Frequency of riots/protests	High
Evidence of corruption at the federal level	High
Evidence of corruption at the local level	High
Political Rights	Low (exercised by few people)
Representativeness of the government	Low (leaders are largely selected)
Leadership transition	Sometimes peaceful

History of leadership transition	Defragmented country affects the national transition
How are elections perceived	Highly centralized among few people
Election monitoring	Limited to few parts of the country
Politically motivated violence (assassinations)	Frequent
Armed Insurgents	Frequently reported across the country
Terrorism	Frequent. (car bombs, suicide bombs, and ambush)

Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

Public Service

How has the conflict in Somalia affected public service? This is an essential question that policymakers and donor agencies have to ask in formulating a response to the Somalia crisis. Public service denotes the basic functions of the state and how services such as education, water, sanitation, electricity, connectivity (internet), health, transport infrastructure among other things are provided to the people (GSDRC 2021). Public service broadly defined also examines a state's ability to offer protection and guarantee security for its citizens. This includes protection from violence, terrorism, hunger, and health crisis. Functions of the public service ought to improve the lives of the ordinary citizens, however, there are instances where the public service narrows its focus to the ruling elite and do little to serve the general public.

In that case, most of the country's resources are channelled towards expenses in the presidency, the prime minister's office, the central bank, the legislature, diplomats among other elites. Somalia's public service is facing several challenges; from inadequate staff to inadequate resources to sustain their workforce and keep up with emerging trends such as e-governance as well as inadequate skills. In addition to these challenges is the problem of nepotism and favouritism which in turn undermines the effectiveness of the public service

(UNDP, 2021). Even among the members of the public, there is a severe imbalance in service delivery between the urban and rural populace. Infrastructure in the country is not well maintained, access to basic sanitation, water, health, education, or security continues to undermine general development in the country. All these challenges are worsened by the conflict.

Table 8: Public Service Indicators

Indicator	Situation in Somalia
Equality in public service	Unequal between the elites and the citizens as well as between the rural and urban population
The general condition of the public service	Weak with inadequate resources and personnel
Access to health services	Access to medicine is low, insufficient hospitals, the ratio of health practitioners to citizens is too high, infant mortality remains high, inadequate sanitation, access to clean water is limited
Access to education	Increasing enrolment but inadequate facilities such as schools, girls are generally disadvantaged, literacy level is average but lower among girls.
Access to shelter	Most poor people struggle to access proper housing. IDPs are also badly affected.
Status of infrastructure	The country is facing a big shortage of tarmacked roads, there are few airports with limited capacity, the railway is non-existent while fuel prices are pushed up by low supply.

Source: author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

Human Rights and Rule of Law

Given that the conflict has created an environment where the rule of law is seldom applied, how is the government upholding fundamental human rights amid the conflict? Are human rights as well as the rule of law upheld in Somalia? This question is best understood from

the complexity of ungoverned spaces. This is because the government only has control of few parts of the country which means that it is difficult for it to ensure that human rights are protected in areas it does not have control. As a result, it is important to note that non -state actors have continued to abuse human rights in different parts of the country while the rule of law is least taken into consideration (Fragility index, 2021).

Some of the non -state actors are practicing their legal frameworks which do not uphold human rights at all times (Nyadera, 2018). Amid the chaos of the conflict, political, social, and legal rights including those of minorities and vulnerable groups are not protected. The judiciary is politicized, the military is often defragmented to pursue political goals both at the national and local level, political opponents especially those from minority clans are suppressed particularly by the 4.5 rule (Ahmed, 2019). These abuses affect both institutions, individuals, and groups of people. There is no application of key international practices and norms on human rights including gender equality, fair administration of justice, punishing those who perpetrate human rights abuses, among others. To better understand the status of the rule of law and human rights we use the following summary.

Table 9: Human Rights Indicators


Indicator	Status in Somalia
Are rights protected	The government has limited capacity to protect human rights
Civil Rights	The absence of a written constitution undermines the ability to enforce civil rights
Right to Life	While this is a very important aspect, frequent attacks, poor health systems and
Level of freedoms	Freedoms such as speech, movement, and religion are generally restricted.
Violation of rights	Both the government, non -state actors, and foreign military forces have been accused of violating rights such as child labor, child soldiers, torture, forced deportation, and displacement.

Level of openness	Low as independent media and access to information is undermined by different actors.
Justice	Low. This is because, individuals responsible for committing atrocities during the conflict, economic crimes, and violation of the constitution are not punished. Instances of illegal detention, arbitrary arrests, and bad conditions in the prison affect justice.
Power-sharing	Imbalanced between the central and the local government as well as among political elites and different arms of government.

Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021).

To give a summary of the political implication of the conflict in Somalia, I have compiled data on political legitimacy, Human rights, public service and average of all indicators between 2006 and 2021 (GSDRC, 2021). The graph shows high levels of uncertainty with constant sharp changes in the indicators. These changes can attribute to the three decades of conflict in Somalia. This particular indicators show political impact at the domestic level

Figure 19: The political situation in Somalia between 2006 and 2021



Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

6.2 The nexus between Conflict and Economy in Somalia.

The economic implication of the conflict in Somalia cannot be taken for granted. Not only has the economic infrastructure been destroyed, but the conflict environment scares away

potential investors. To better explore the situation, we need to examine a number of indicators. One is how the economy has declined since the onset of the conflict. This can be measured in form of the Gross National Product, the rate of inflation, level of unemployment, the poverty rates in the country, debt, level of productivity, income per capita, as well as the level of business failure. for the case of Somalia, the conflict has made it impossible to collect data related to these indicators between 1990 and 2011 (UNDP, 2021; GSDRC, 2021).

Indeed, while there is a lack of statistics to measure the indicators above, empirical evidence even if taken in comparison with other regional countries shows that the conflict has had a negative impact on the economy of Somalia. Reports of sudden drops in revenue from local and international trade, the national currency losing value with the local currency against the dollar rate standing at 1 US\$ to 46,000 SoSh (UNDP, 2021). Regulating business activities has become very difficult because of the ungoverned spaces that exist in the country. This means that the government finds it very hard to collect revenue from taxes which it has to compete for with other non state actors (Pape & Wollburg, 2019).

In looking at efforts being undertaken to curb the declining economic fortunes, the spillover effects are not helping much either. Not only has the country ended up indebted with Breton woods institutions such as the world bank whose conditions do not always help to address the challenges but rather make them worse but also the country has become heavily dependent on foreign aid which similarly does not solve the underlying problems. Instead, both the central and federal member states are seeking external support in a manner that is not coordinated which undermines the country's sovereignty. Evidence of countries from the Gulf, Middle East, Europe, America, and Africa working with different groups and entities for purposes of development without taking into account the central government has led to diplomatic problems. Somalia has also become a hub of illegal economic activities

including capital flight, money laundering, tax evasion as well as corruption, and embezzlement.

Uneven Economic Development

Of even bigger concern is the emerging uneven development in the country both in terms of individuals and regions in the country. Institutionalized marginalization was blamed for the nature of ethnic, clan, religious and racial discrimination. These issues are perhaps not taken seriously given the near homogeneity of the majority of people in the country. There is a strong emphasis on ethnic identity which classifies the majority of people as Somalis. But other sub-identities are often ignored with devastating consequences. The four or five dominant clans tend to assume monopoly in politics and economics while minorities are not given serious consideration (Ahmed, 2019). The so-called 4.5 formula which gives the four dominant clans bigger allocation while the minority represented by the 0.5 is left to share the resources and opportunities left. This formula prioritizes entitlement rather than merit.

Uneven development is also perceived or felt between rural and urban areas. The number of kilometres of tarmacked roads, hospitals, social services, schools, electricity supply, and other resources is unevenly distributed (Nurhussein, 2008). As we earlier observed, given that the government only controls a small fraction of the country, it is unable to implement projects in ungoverned spaces that are under the control of armed non-state actors.

Inequality in the country is both a reality and a perception with the perceived inequality creating animosity between different clans (Nyadera & Ahmed, 2020). To what extent does the government provide equal opportunity for personal or collective growth? This is an important question in understanding the fate of a country's economy given its importance for public sector growth. Such opportunities include subsidies especially for small and

medium scale enterprises, connectivity, security, and a safe environment to do business among others which are lacking in Somalia currently.

Brain Drain and Human Flight

The conflict in Somalia has also contributed significantly to the problem of brain drain. As a result of displacement, the flight of educated elites and young people to Europe, the Middle East, and the USA has impacted the country's ability to rely on its own population to trigger sustained development (Lindley, 2008). While brain drain is not a unique problem facing the people of Somalia alone, and that it is a challenge facing countries globally, the number of people who have left Somalia to seek better opportunities elsewhere is much higher. Today, it is not surprising to find that each person in the country knows a relative or two in Europe, the USA, the Middle East, or other African countries capable of inviting them. Even more disturbing is the number of young people exiting the country to seek asylum and/or citizenship elsewhere. Scholars who have studied the causes and impact of brain drain have concluded that it has a very negative impact on any country that suffers from the challenge (Dietz et al, 2020).

Today, many people of Somalia origin are holding important government positions including ministers in countries like Canada, members of parliament in countries such as the United States, and various local government positions in countries such as the United Kingdom (Seyoum & Camargo, 2021). The question of whether this huge human resource that is well trained and experience intends to return home one day is still unclear. But what matters is whether the conflict and the ungoverned territories can be resolved to create a conducive environment for people to live, work and build the country. The table (11) below gives a summary of the economic situation in the country.


Table 10: Economic situation in Somalia during the conflict

Indicator	Status in Somalia
Interest Rates	Unstable and unpredictable
Inflation Rates	Difficult to project. Unstable
Productivity & GDP	Low level of productivity, very low GDP
Unemployment Rates	Very high unemployment. Much higher among women
Economic justice	High levels of inequality, marginalization, corruption is also high
Education and training	Improving but heavily affected by the conflict. Inequality in access to education is also high
Access to jobs	Nepotism is high, favoritism and connection play a big role.
Business environment	Low amount of FDI, investment is also low and disproportionate, largely more investment is done in urban areas
Brain Drain	Very high both professionals and politicians are leaving the country. Over 50% of members of parliament hold dual citizenship
Remittances	Cash inflow from the diaspora is very high.

Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021).

The impact of the conflict on domestic economic situation in Somalia is worrying. As indicated in the figure (19) below, the country's economic fortunes have struggled to rise making only small progress in the general economic growth, brain drain, and economic inequality.

Figure 20: Economic trends in Somalia between 2006 and 2021



Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

6.3 The nexus between conflict and Social aspects in Somalia.

Population and environmental factors can impact a country's demographic pressure and that is what Somalia as a country continues to experience. Population growth has been identified by economists as one of the serious threats to economic development. But this impact is even worse among countries where planning for population growth is not well managed. Amid the conflict, Somalia has not been able to properly plan for the country's population growth. This has resulted in demographic pressures with unprecedented consequences (Hassan et al., 2019).

Even worse, while there has been a lack of proper planning in the past for population growth, Somalia has a 6.4% fertility rate, meaning each woman has approximately six children. However, it also has one of the highest infant mortality rates 107 deaths per every 1000 births. In addition, the maternal mortality rate in the country is at 1, 200 per 100,000. The maternal mortality rate in Somalia is twice that of the African continent (which stands at about 640 /100, 000) and more than five times that of the world (which stands at 260/100, 000) (GSDRC, 2021; Fragility index, 2021)

Despite the high infant mortality rate, Somalia's population consists of a high percentage of youths. In the efforts of bringing stability to the country development partners have recognized the need to deal with the booming young population. On the one hand, these young people are special targets for recruitment by armed groups, while on the other hand, the youths can be an important pillar in the reconciliation and peacebuilding process.

The ungoverned territories make it difficult for the government to coordinate effectively the efforts aimed at enhancing youth participation in the country. Equally important is the diversity within the different demographic ages. For example, with growing education and religious fanaticism, there seems to be a lack of consensus among the young people with regard to the future of the country. Some will want to see a more religious-oriented country while others would want to see state and religion separated (Mohamed, 2014).

Population pressure affects the access of such as public health as controlling diseases becomes very difficult as a result of the ungoverned territories and lack of resources due to the negative impacts of the conflict. When the rate at which the population is growing becomes unsustainable, dealing with pandemics and endemics such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic becomes very difficult as the government's ability to carry out testing and vaccination of its citizens becomes stretched (Ouma et al., 2020).

The conflict also leaves many children orphaned to form the war or high levels of maternal deaths meaning that these children grow up in very vulnerable to socio-economic challenges (GSDRC, 2021; UNDP, 2021). Food supply is also a big challenge when there is no proper population planning since the government is unable to have proper estimates of the number of people and agricultural production across the country given a large number of ungoverned spaces. This results in high levels of malnutrition in the country, starvation especially is the unplanned population growth is characterized by unending conflicts, drought, famine, and

poor agricultural practices. There is also pressure on the environment as unplanned population growth leads to unplanned housing which can lead to clearing huge tracks of land and forests to provide land for housing and agriculture. In addition, when the government is not able to plan and prevent or at least predict natural disasters it has a big toll on the citizens.

Table 11: Social situation in Somalia during the conflict.

Social Indicator	Status in Somalia
Infant and Maternal deaths	High
Fertility rate	High
Food and Nutrition	Low, frequent famines, droughts and starvation
Malnutrition	High
Environment	High rate of deforestation, recurring natural disasters
Resources	Low level of resource use and exploitation

Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021).

How has the conflict resulted in external interference in Somalia? This question seeks to explore the extent to which external actors affect and influence economic and security activities in the country. Since the outbreak of the conflict in 1991, there has been a number of interventions in Somalia some of which did not end up well. For example, the delta force operation that attempted to capture General Aidi, a warlord who had taken control of Mogadishu ended up with the shooting down of American black hawk helicopters and the killing of several soldiers (Fishel & Daze, 1998). Consequently, two UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions also ended up with attacks of UN troops in the 1990s (Kenning, 2011). In the end, there were over two decades of disinterest from the international community to deploy troops in Somalia.

However, the first decade of the new millennium saw new forms of interventions in the country. Apart from numerous counter-piracy operations that involved multiple countries, there has been the deployment of African Union and regional country's military forces.

AMISOM, the African Union-supported mission in Somalia has over 20,000 troops and was deployed in 2007. Countries contributing troops to this mission include Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (Williams, 2018). It is important to note that Kenya was not initially part of the AMISOM troops when it intervened in the country in 2011 citing terrorist attacks launched and organized from Somalia (Freear & De Coning, 2013).

Apart from the military intervention, Somalia is today subjected to a vicious scramble by countries from the gulf and the middle east, each seeking to stamp its authority in the country. The 2017 crisis among Arab countries only worsened the situation. Qatar, which has been working closely with the Farmajo government was blockaded by its neighbours the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Cannon, 2019). This crisis had a spill over effect in the regions as counties were being pushed to choose sides between the Saudi & UAE bloc and Qatar. Somalia was caught up in this battle of titans which threatened its economic and national security.

These Gulf countries have exported their rivalry to the region demanding smaller states to adopt certain foreign policy positions which in itself is a violation of these countries' integrity (Oxford Analytica, 2018). Increasingly, countries in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia and Kenya have been accused of interfering with Somalia's political processes while Eritrea has been mentioned in various reports as one of the countries providing support to Al Shabab. The table (13) below shows the situation of intervention in Somalia.

Table 12: Trends regarding intervention in Somalia.


Indicator	Status in Somalia
Factions being supported by external actors	Yes
External troops present in the country	Yes
Attacks by foreign militaries	Yes, especially drone strikes by foreign countries inside Somalia.

Military assistance and training	Yes, the Somalia military is being trained by different countries.
Peacekeeping missions	Yes, different missions have taken place at different times.
Police training	Yes, being done by various counties
Economic interventions	Yes, the country depends largely on foreign aid

Source: Adopted from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

The social situation in the country has also been disrupted. The conflict and ungoverned spaces have worsened the conditions of what was already a fragile post -colonial Somalia state. From the figure (20) below, I illustrate how the conflict has resulted into demographic pressure, external interventions and a crisis of internally and externally displaced persons.

Figure 21: Social trends in Somalia between 2006 and 2021



Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021).

6.2 The nexus between Conflict and Cohesion in Somalia.

Cohesion is an important fabric for any society especially in efforts for nation and state-building. This study establishes that the conflict in Somalia and ungoverned spaces have negatively affected cohesion in the country. The first indication of threat to cohesion is the frequent insecurities as a result of attacks from different groups. Since the 1990s the country

has experienced deaths as a result of battle, terrorism, mutinies and attempted coups, attacks on public institutions such as the parliament and the presidential palace while organized crimes such as kidnappings, homicides, and extrajudicial executions have diluted public trust in the judiciary and the security agencies. These two institutions are important in achieving cohesion as it allows citizens to trust that the government to deal with emerging threats swiftly and without bias (Marangio, 2012).

In the absence of such important feelings, citizens would opt to deal with issues in their way and by means which often lead to a spike in violence. In some instances, sponsored factions are used to intimidate political opponents, especially during demonstrations. These actions tend to push citizens to extreme opposite positions especially when they feel that non -legal methods are used to suppress their opinion and voices (Ssereo, 2003). The so-called actions of the “deep state” which include irregular activities by the country’s intelligence and security apparatus aimed at serving the interest of few people in the presidency of the elite class reduce the level of trust and cohesion in a country which is the case with Somalia.

The control of the country’s military is fragmented as the central government, regional federal states, as well as external powers, have been accused of influencing the rather weak military of Somalia. The presence of militias spread across the country, paramilitary and private military groups pursuing different interests also undermine any possibility that the country could have national-level cohesion (Islam & Hossain, 2020).

The relationship between the citizens and security agencies in the country also speaks volumes on the challenges facing the country in terms of its ability to achieve cohesion. As observed in the previous chapters, Somalia’s security agencies were characterized by nepotism, clan favoritism, and discrimination even before the collapse of the central government (Altowaitee et al, 2020). This means the citizens, especially those from minority

communities feel that they are not well represented in the country's security forces and have little trust in the activities of these agencies.

This is because state agencies were previously and perhaps continue to be used to perpetuate state-sponsored violence which combined with a weak judicial system leaves many people helpless (Islam et al., 2020). Similarly, the government approach to dealing with the insecurity in the country is below satisfactory as not only violence continues to be senselessly executed but external actors are taking over the management of security in the country which could undermine the country's sovereignty. Both the government and external forces are accused of using excessive force which goes unaccounted for with the citizens being the biggest losers in the process.

For cohesion to be achieved arms proliferation, especially illegal arms in the hands of unauthorized persons should not be allowed. In countries where there is a high number of illegal weapons that cannot be accounted for, there is a low level of trust among the citizens. This is even worse in highly polarized societies such as Somalia where clan identity shapes socio-economic and political interactions (Ouma et al., 2020). Unless proper disarmament is conducted in Somalia, peace, and cohesion will be very difficult to come - since it is these weapons that are being used to create instability, capture territories, and make it difficult for the government to provide services and exercise its authority across the country. Surprisingly, the issue of arms proliferation in Somalia has not been well addressed within the academic and policy areas. It has been ignored at the expense of political and economic solutions, yet it is a very critical area of concern (Mohamed, 2014).

The challenge of factionalized elites has emerged in Somalia amid the conflict. This aspect means that state institutions are fragmented along with clan, religious, ethnic, class, and racial lines (Mwangi, 2012). It also means the gridlock and brinkmanship between the ruling

political elites. Furthermore, it covers the issue of using nationalism, communal irredentism, xenophobia, ethnicity, and so-called community solidarity to entrench division, hatred and sustain a grip on power.

While extreme cases of the factionalized elite have been experienced in different stages of human history and various countries such as Hitler's Germany and Greater Serbia narrative, Somalia is not any different (Guzina, 2003). One cannot better understand the ongoing conflict in Somalia without taking into account the political narrative and rhetoric of the country's elites. The "greater Somalia" project that seeks to bring together Somalia ethnic people in Ethiopia, Kenya, and other countries in the Horn of Africa created distrust and eventual animosity between Somalia and her neighbours (Al-Safi, 1995). How such animosities have worsened the conflict situation in Somalia can be a question for future researchers.

Furthermore, cohesion can be examined by looking at the process through which leaders ascend to power, are the modes of election considered free and fair? For this, we look at the tenants of what constitutes a free and fair election. One of the main components of a free election is that there has to be an equal chance for all contestants to run and win the elections. This is certainly not the case in Somalia as the set conditions make it difficult for clan minorities, youths, and women to compete and win top seats (Farah, 2021).

Political reconciliation is also an important measure of reconciliation, yet it remains elusive in the Somalia crisis. Previous peace efforts were characterized by boycotts and walk-outs by politicians representing different groups as they failed to gain consensus on key issues affecting the country (Mwangi, 2012). Political reconciliation will be very important in pushing for sustainable peace in Somalia and political leaders will have to put their individual and clan interests aside for the sake of national interest.

Related to the above, citizens need to also embrace efforts that would lead to establishing a stronger national identity and denounce attempts by different groups and federal member states to separate from the country. Citizens will play an important role in cementing a strong national identity by avoiding or debunking any form of extremist rhetoric. In addition, society ought to get rid of the strong stereotypes that currently exist. While this is an issue that has yet to catch the attention of researchers and policymakers as it should, Somalia has a very strong divide in clan, religious and cultural stereotypes (Elmi, 2010).

More often, these stereotypes are used as a scapegoat to blame others for the problems facing the country without addressing the underlying issues that are causing the problem. Where there is a level of stereotype within a society, there is no respect and appreciation of cross-cultural practices. Given the importance of culture to a society, there is a high possibility that conflict can ensue (Nyadera, 2018).

Another thing worth observing is that when the government has little control over its territory, it has limited ability to ensure wealth and resources are fairly distributed among the citizens. This creates a wide gap between the rich and the poor. In the process, this determines those who are negatively affected by the conflict. For example, as the conflict continues to ravage the country, those with the means have been able to evacuate their families to other countries. This applies even to the political elites whose families are living comfortably abroad. For those without the means, they have to remain in the country and face the violence as well as the negative consequences of ungoverned spaces. This wide gap between the rich and the poor also undermines the growth of a formidable middle class which is essential in the sustained development of a country. With the mentioned level of inequality, cohesion becomes very difficult to achieve (Cramer, 2003; Robinson, 2003; Vogt, 2018).

The question of grievances unique to a particular group can, directly and indirectly, affect and be affected by conflict as we can observe in the case of Somalia. Grievances of different groups in a society can be attributed to political and social as well as economic issues. At the center of most group grievances are issues touching on representation, access to resources, public services, employment in the public sector, and being allowed to practice their religious, cultural, and social beliefs without any interference (Islam et al., 2020). Historical factors such as how certain groups were treated by previous governments can create a feeling of grievance.

These grievances can be accelerated by perceived denial of opportunities such as the 4.5 formula in Somalia, denial of independence which could have been triggered by initial grievances and the group is denied independence it becomes a second form of grievances that can push a community to result to violence (Ahmed, 2019). In some cases, the dominant groups or government can identify a particular group to be targeted with repression, in Somalia, many specific groups are on the government radar as renegades and therefore need to be dealt with. The table (14) below gives a summary of cohesion indicators and the status in Somalia.

Table 13: Cohesion trends in Somalia during the conflict


Cohesion Indicator	Status in Somalia
Group grievances	Exists at different levels and touch on political, social and economic spheres.
Truth and Reconciliation Framework	Weak, despite the conflict, there have been no sustained efforts to establish a truth and reconciliation forum
Victims being compensated	These efforts have not begun despite widespread atrocities and loss

Prosecution of war criminals	There are many groups headed by different individuals that are accused of committing war crimes but have not been prosecuted
Inter-group relations	High levels of nepotism, clannism, and ethnicity.
Communal violence	Exists. Mass violence between different clan-based militias has taken place in many instances over the last two decades.

Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

Another important aspect of the conflict in Somalia is its implications for cohesion in the country. Not only has the conflict created an environment that needs urgent cohesion measures to be put in place, but the continued violence also undermine efforts to implement cohesion among the people thus worsening the situation. The figure (21) below shows the trend in cohesion between 2006 and 2021 have been on the decline.

Figure 22: Cohesion situation in Somalia between 2006 and 2021.



Source: Author compilation from GSDRC (2021), Fragility index (2021), UNDP (2021)

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined three fundamental questions regarding the conflict in Somalia. Number one is nature of the conflict which the study finds has become intractable due to a number of oversights in the peace efforts including lack of emphasis on the impact of the second issue that has been examined in this study which is ungoverned spaces. Addressing the challenges that lead to the emergence of these spaces and reclaiming back spaces that are not under the control of the government should be prioritized peace efforts. The study also examined the logic of attacks, that is what factors shape the trends of the conflict. The study find the following issues are responsible for the continued crisis in Somalia and provides some recommendations;

Incompatible peace process: this study has examined the previous peace efforts in Somalia from the 1991 peace conference held in Djibouti, to the 1993 Addis Ababa conference, the Cairo meeting of 1997, the 2000 Arta peace process, and the 2004 Mbagathi conference held in Nairobi Kenya. While there are some other peace efforts that have been attempted elsewhere, these five are perhaps the most robust efforts to date. Despite the organization efforts, resources and determination to bring peace through these conferences, these attempts never resulted to sustainable peace. The question is why? And what needs to be done if the country is to overcome the nightmare of conflict that has not only become protracted by also transformed. My analysis of the peace efforts identify a number of shortcomings that could undermine the attainment of sustainable peace.

The first shortcoming is the neglect of indigenous peace process. Somalia's history is not only characterized by numerous cases of conflict, but also ingenious peace and conflict resolution strategies that ensured the conflicts that emerged from the nomadic communities were well addressed. One of these strategies is the *Xeer* tradition that was practiced through

a Diya -paying group approach. The idea behind this traditional conflict resolution practice was to discourage conflict by adopting collective punishment and in some case punishing the individual. Those found guilty of violence were punished through payment of fines in form of camels a process that involved the accused clan of extended family. This practice ensured that justice for the victims was found as well as making violence practices very costly that people could prioritize dialogue. While this practice can appear outdated and even primitive, it does reflect an important weakness of the five previous peace efforts. That is, none of them extensively attempted to address the issue of justice for the victims. Other countries that have overcome previous conflicts such as South Africa and Rwanda did so by ensuring that victims of the conflict were recognized and compensated or even apologized to.

The nature of conflicts can make punishing perpetrators of violence very difficult especially with the contemporary conflicts that feature powerful non-state actors. That is why post - conflict peace advocates have encouraged societies to at least adopt truth, justice and reconciliation process that will not only aim at creating an environment of forgiveness but also having the perpetrators acknowledge their mistakes. To this extent the failure of previous peace efforts can be blamed on their failure to establish a solid post -conflict justice system of at least a peace and reconciliation framework.

Political goals: The second reason why the conflict remains difficult to resolve is also associated with the previous point. Apart from failing to advance a justice system, the previous peace efforts focused more on the political price. In all the five conferences there was little discussion on how the country ended up becoming one of the longest conflicts in history. Indeed, serious attention has rotated around power sharing agreements which is a very difficult goal to achieve when many actors in a conflict environment have more or less

the same power. This explains why many representatives opted to walk out of the meetings when it became apparent that they will not be granted the country's leadership.

This focus on political power undermined the discussion of other critical issues such as a new constitution that would address some of the non-political grievances that caused the conflict. In addition, representatives during the previous peace conferences were only political actors with other stakeholders such as member of the civil society, youths and gender representatives, the business community, academics, or even member of the religious groups were not given the needed attention.

Similarly, fascination with political power make the actors involved in power sharing to overlook the humanitarian implications of the conflict. Therefore, there is need for different groups to build consensus, make sacrifices and most importantly trust building which has also been lacking in the process. Suspicion among the organizers and participants has also not helped to establish the much-needed peace in the country. Trust building is often neglected especially in hurriedly organized peace conferences yet without peace, coming up with resolutions or implementing resolutions will be very difficult.

Lack of political goodwill and political leadership has also made it difficult for peace advocates to bring an end to the conflict in Somalia. The country is not only fragmented geographically, the ideological orientation of political leaders and leaders of warring groups is also seemingly unreconcilable. One of the clear examples of such division is seen between the government and extremist groups or the government and the local government authorities. The absence of a national vision or visionary leader to navigate the country and its people through complex peace process is a big challenge for Somalia. Africa has many examples of visionary leaders who to charge in leading their countries through peace process such as Nelson Mandela. Perhaps Somalia's conflict could benefit from unrivaled leadership

with a bigger national vision. As it stands today, there seems to be a general lack of political goodwill in the country as each group takes a tough stand on their ideology at the expense of the citizens.

Ungoverned spaces is another reason for the prolonged conflict is the impact of ungoverned spaces. This cannot be emphasized enough given the impact it has so far had on the conflict. Unfortunately, this is an aspect of the conflict that has often been overlooked. The reality is the central government has insignificant control of the country's territory which means the various groups are able to do anything without being regulated by the government. This can include training, arms trafficking, and recruitment of fighters.

It allows groups that control different territories to introduce ideologies that can result in growing cases of extremism and intolerance. Ungoverned spaces also allow foreign fighters, trainers, and extremists to enter the country and provide motivational, strategic and military training to the local fighters thus increasing their efficiency. When it comes to financial flows, ungoverned spaces make it possible for different groups to receive funding and support. Funding is essential for the warring groups to motivate their fighters as well as procure weapons and war equipment. If funding to these groups is disrupted, they would likely be weakened.

War economy is often overlooked when examining the causes of prolonged conflicts in a country. In Somalia, it is increasingly becoming evident that the conflict has led to a war economy with immense benefit at least for the few who get to control the market in ways that can no longer be overlooked. The securitization of politics in the country's capital city of Mogadishu has enabled political brokers, political entrepreneurs and war profitters to benefit massively from internationalized and internal war economy. If described differently, the economy, politics and conflict in the country are intertwined. The situation in Somalia

has been described as a 'stateless economy' or 'economy without a state' yet wealth accumulation among those strategically placed has been on the rise at incredible levels. This unconventional, unregulated market and economy continues to be an important factor in sustaining the conflict. Groups have emerged to take the role of development working closely with international organizations and governments profiteering from the various activities organized to support the local population.

Apart from that trafficking of untaxed goods locally and to regional countries characterizes the unconventional economy often with hidden people controlling the trade. Similarly, massive trade on natural resources help to sustain the conflict. For example, Al Shabab while controlling the port city of Kismayo, was involved in charcoal trade of unparalleled value. The group cut trees in the areas they controlled without considering the environmental impact. Revenue from the charcoal trade was so huge that it could easily sustain the group's activities. In addition, due to the weaknesses of the government, different groups are involved in revenue collection from local traders in form of protection taxes, this money ends up enriching few individuals while empowering them to continue perpetrating violence. If the conflict in Somalia is to end, beneficiaries of the war economy are likely to lose a lot. This could mean that they may be intentionally involved in sabotaging peace efforts.

Lose -lose outcomes of peace efforts: The idea that a peace process could create a losing situation for both parties has been overlooked in analyzing many protracted conflicts, yet this underlying factor is responsible for the continued conflicts across the world. I argue here that once conflicts have continued for decades and that different actors have somewhat 'normalize' the situation, adapting to different socio-economic and political behaviors within the context of the conflicts makes solving such conflicts extremely difficult to solve. This is because the beneficiaries of the conflict are afraid of losing the gains they have been

able to make over the years. In the case of Somalia, the central government, federal member states, non-state actors have all crafted a share of the country's economic, territorial and political spheres under their control. The country is so fragmented that no single actor can claim to have popular support and legitimacy for over half the country.

Since the conflict begun in 1991 to date, the different actors (both state and non-state actors) have only strengthened their grip over the areas, people and resources that they control. Some of these groups have become so powerful and so much enshrined in their respective jurisdictions that for them to surrender this control it will need a huge incentive. Since some of them are non-state actors and even considered terrorist groups while some such as the Somaliland region have organized nearly a state within a state and with that considered as renegades it will be very difficult to integrate them in a new formal government.

Nonetheless, looking at the discussions around peacebuilding in Somalia as well as the previous peace efforts, there has been little or no consideration of the kind of incentives that would force the different actors to agree and surrender their control over different assets, territories and resources. Given that a peace process aimed at restoring the national sovereignty of the country is likely to disrupt such controls perhaps leading to loss of wealth, influence and prestige there will be a lot of opposition from these beneficiaries to bring about peace. Undoubtedly, any serious peace efforts will lead to a loss for current beneficiaries of the conflict and unless guarantees, sacrifices and compromise is agreed upon, then there will be very little chances of sustainable peace in the country.

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