

DAVID BEN-GURION AND MOSHE SHARETT AS
FOUNDERS OF ISRAELI STRATEGIC CULTURE:
AN OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

A Master's Thesis

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Bilkent University 2022

To my family



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STRATEGIC CULTURE: AN OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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ABSTRACT

DAVID BEN-GURION AND MOSHE SHARETT AS FOUNDERS OF ISRAELI STRATEGIC CULTURE: AN OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH

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This thesis examines the microfoundations of two Israeli strategic culture schools attributed to the first two prime ministers of Israel, David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. Historical accounts attribute Ben-Gurion to a realist orientation, while they attribute Sharett to an idealist orientation. However, these orientations rely on interpretive methods and lack empirical testing. By utilizing operational code analysis as a well-established foreign policy analysis tool, I empirically test to what extent these attributions are reflected in their political beliefs. This thesis employs an automated content analysis method via ProfilerPlus software based on the Verbs in Context System (VICS) procedure to code leaders' speeches as data. The results show that Ben-Gurion's instrumental beliefs (image of Self) reflect a conflictual

image of the political universe as a Type DEF realist leader, while Moshe Sharett's instrumental beliefs reflect the cooperative characteristics of Type A idealist leadership typology, which align with the historical accounts. As for the philosophical beliefs (image of Other), the findings surprisingly show mixed results. Findings reveal that Sharett's results differ from his historical accounts, while Ben-Gurion's results confirm his historical accounts. Both Ben-Gurion and Sharett viewed Other as Type B realist leader. This thesis shows how the synthesis between individual-level variables and structural explanations of foreign policy orientations can advance the explanatory value of international relations theories.

Keywords: Operational Code Analysis, Foreign Policy Analysis, Strategic Culture, Israeli Foreign Policy, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett

ÖZET

İSRAİL STRATEJİK KÜLTÜRÜNÜN KURUCULARI OLARAK DAVID BEN-GURİON VE MOSHE SHARETT: OPERASYONEL KOD YAKLAŞIMI

Ergurum, Ahmet

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez İsrail'in ilk iki başbakanı David Ben-Gurion ve Moshe Sharett'e nispet edilen iki İsrail stratejik kültür ekolünün mikro-temellerini incelemektedir. Tarihsel analizler, Ben-Gurion'a realist bir eğilim atfederken, Sharett'e idealist bir eğilim atfetmektedir. Fakat, bu yönelimler yorumlayıcı yöntemlere dayanır ve ampirik testlerden yoksundur. Köklü bir dış politika analizi aracı olan operasyonel kod analizini kullanarak, bu açıklamaların liderlerin siyasi inançlarına ne ölçüde yansıdığını ampirik olarak test etmekteyim. Bu tez, liderlerin konuşmalarını veri olarak kodlamak için Bağlamdaki Fiiller Sistemi (BFS) prosedürüne dayanarak ProfilerPlus yazılımı aracılığıyla otomatik içerik analizi yöntemini kullanmaktadır. Sonuçlar, Ben-Gurion'un araçsal inançlarının (Benlik imajının), DEF Tipi bir realist lider olarak siyasi evrenin çatışmacı bir imajını yansıtırken, Moshe Sharett'in araçsal inançlarının ise uzlaşmacı A Tipi idealist liderlik tipolojisinin niteliklerini yansıttığını ve tarihsel analizlerle uyumlu olduğunu göstermektedir. Felsefi inançlara

(Öteki'nin imajına) bakıldığında, çalışmanın bulguları şaşırtıcı bir şekilde karma çıkmaktadır. Çalışmanın bulguları, Sharett'in veri analiz sonuçlarının tarihsel açıklamalardan farklı olduğunu ortaya koyarken, Ben-Gurion'un sonuçlarının ise onun hakkındaki tarihsel analizleri doğruladığını göstermektedir. Hem Ben-Gurion hem de Sharett Öteki'ni B Tipi realist bir lider olarak algılamıştır. Bu tez bireysel düzey değişkenler ve yapısal dış politika yönelim açıklamalarının sentezlenmesinin uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin açıklayıcı değerini nasıl geliştirebileceğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Operasyonel Kod Analizi, Dış Politika Analizi, Stratejik Kültür, İsrail Dış Politikası, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The traditions of strategic orientations like realism and idealism are largely based on historical and philosophical accounts that are not tested empirically (Feng, 2007; Walker & Schafer, 2007). These systemic level approaches that are also in line with neorealism and neoliberalism theories of International Relations are foreign policy orientations whose microfoundations are not scrutinized enough with solid methodology (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Individual level actors like state leaders and their beliefs and personality traits that influence the decisions are disregarded by structural approaches (Hagan, 2001). For structural theories, decision-makers are assumed to act rationally, constrained by the international system, and the role of the agency is not considered to be of explanatory value (Bueno De Mesquita, 1981; Keohane & Nye, 1977; Mearsheimer, 2001; Schelling, 1966). Nevertheless, as Hudson (2005: 1) argues, “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers acting singly or in groups.”

As a macro-level concept of IR, strategic culture, simply as collectively shared traditions, beliefs, and values, is assumed to shape the strategic choices of decision-makers that can have a long-lasting legacy for the states (Johnston, 1995). It is based on the assumption that leaders “associate themselves closely with dominant historical narratives or traditions,” which renders the analysis of individual decision-makers specifically relevant to the study of strategic culture (Lantis, 2009: 473). The patterns of foreign and security policies of state leaders may have a considerable role in shaping the foreign policy orientations of states like realist versus idealist or offensive versus defensive that can be found in various cultures.¹

Considering the points above, it is fruitful to examine leaders to analyze the microfoundations of these strategic cultural traditions or foreign policy orientations of states, which constitutes the main focus of the thesis. Hermann and Hagan (1998: 126) argue that “leaders define state’s international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies ... help frame governments’ orientations to international affairs.” Their place in influencing foreign policy has been primarily examined and led to an acknowledgment that “who leads matters” (Hermann, 1980; Kaarbo, 2017; Levy, 2003; Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin 1962). Given the importance of leadership in foreign policy, the way leaders see reality gains significance (Levy, 2013).

¹ Walker and Schafer (2007) analyzed the US presidents of Woodrow Wilson and Theodor Roosevelt and assess whether their belief system is associated with the realist and idealist strategic cultures. Similar approach is also adopted by Rezzi (2021) for the analysis of the US and Iranian leaders. Feng (2005) analyzed the strategic cultures of Chinese leaders and tested whether they follow offensive or defensive strategic cultures.

Scholars of political psychology approach to Foreign Policy Analysis argue that cognitive models like the belief systems of leaders have a substantial impact on the decision-making process and strategic interaction between actors since beliefs filter the information from the environment and guide the behaviors (George, 1969; Hermann & Kaarbo, 2020; Leites, 1953; Walker, 1977; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Building on this observation, it is possible to argue that the founding leaders and influential figures making their marks on the nations' history especially makes more sense since they mostly play an essential role because their preferences are institutionalized and turned into a menu of strategic choices of the next leaders.

However, it is interesting that there is a lack of studies examining the interaction between personal attributions of leaders like beliefs associated with certain strategic cultures and foreign policy behavior. Historical accounts ascribe leaders to certain orientations, i.e., referring to Roosevelt as realist and Wilson as an idealist (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Turning them into hypotheses and testing them empirically not only for leaders in the West but also in Non-Western contexts will contribute to the Foreign Policy Analysis, International Relations theory, and regional studies. Yet, Non-Western leaders are especially under-examined in the literature on leadership and foreign policy, and the application of the FPA tools to regions like the Middle East and North Africa seems lacking and deserves further attention (Brummer, 2021; Darwich & Kaarbo, 2020; Özdamar, 2017).

To address the gap and research problem, I examine Israel's first and second prime ministers, David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. It is a logical case selection because strategic cultures come to appear in the formative periods as a characteristic

body of beliefs and behaviors concerning the use of force (Petrelli, 2017). David Ben-Gurion is the founding prime minister of Israel and has a substantial legacy in Israeli politics. Moshe Sharett is the first foreign minister and second prime minister of Israel who took place among the founders of Israel. “Approximately between 1949 and 1956, two different ‘schools of thought’ developed within the Israeli strategic community, epitomized by David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett (Shertok), who alternated as prime minister during this eventful formative period” (Petrelli, 2017: 21-22). Ben-Gurion is mainly regarded as of a realist orientation, while Sharett is discerned as having an idealist strategic orientation. These two political leaders arguably represent Israel's two schools of strategic culture. Thus, this thesis will focus on the belief system of these two leaders from the MENA region to analyze the microfoundations of their foreign policy orientations. To that aim, the field of foreign policy analysis offers “microfoundational theories” that can address the research problem (Hudson, 2010).

1.1. Theory and Research Design

The main theoretical framework of this thesis is Operational Code Analysis, which is a well-established analytical tool of Foreign Policy Analysis (George, 1969; Leites, 1951; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Operational code analysis offers a robust methodology to systematically and empirically measure the belief system of leaders (George, 1969; Walker & Schafer, 1998, 2006a). In operational code research, a causal mechanism is established between belief systems and foreign policy decisions (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Operational code analysis conceptualizes the belief system of leaders into two analytical categories of political beliefs, which is the

leader's view of the political universe and the instrumental beliefs that are about strategies to achieve the goals (George, 1969).

Based on the historical account briefly outlined above, two leaders' legacies in the Israeli foreign policy arguably rely upon two adverse psychological bases, which need to be tested empirically. In other words, there are two different leadership and worldview accounts regarding the microfoundations of their strategic behavior. Ben-Gurion is often regarded as "an adherent of the Realist" (Brecher, 2016) and "more offensive" (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013) orientation, "activist" (Sheffer, 1996), and "hawkish" (Shlaim, 1983) leader. However, Moshe Sharett is viewed as "dovish" (Shlaim, 1983), "liberal" (Sheffer, 1996), and "moderate" (Brecher, 2016; Shapira, 2014). Building on this literature, this research seeks to investigate the extent to which the belief system of individual leaders reflects the strategic cultural traditions to which they are attributed.

To be able to test these historical accounts, there is a need to identify and compare the belief systems of Ben-Gurion and Sharett with the norming group of world leaders through a typology of beliefs relying on attributes related to realist and idealist strategic orientations with regard to the sources of conflict and cooperation and tools for handling crises among states. To address this need, I will use a well-established foreign policy analysis theory, operational code analysis, and its tools as a way of "extracting paradigms in strategic cultures" (Rezzi, 2021: 300). I employ Walker and Schafer's (2007) framework of the realist-idealist continuum based on Holsti's (1977) revised leadership typology to locate Ben-Gurion and Sharett in this continuum based on the data analysis of their speeches.

The method of this thesis is the automated content analysis via ProfilerPlus software based on the Verbs in Context System (VICS) scheme, which was introduced by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998). VICS answers George's (1969) ten questions to obtain the operational codes of leaders by utilizing a computer software program (Profiler Plus) and a dictionary of transitive verbs illustrating the exercise of social power to extract those verbs attributed to Self and Other from a text (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). It enables comparing leaders' belief systems with the other world leaders and paves the way for statistical tests (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Also, automation enables reducing errors, human bias, and strong coding reliability (Schafer, 2013; Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

The data used in this thesis is the political statements of Ben Gurion and Sharett. For the data selection, I adopted Walker and Schafer's (2006a) criteria for analyzing the operational codes of leaders. There are 12 speeches for Ben-Gurion, amounting to more than 72000 words, and 11 speeches for Sharett with more than 42000 words. This thesis's main limitation is language. The study used English texts in the process of gathering data for this research. Despite the fact that ProfilerPlus software offers text analysis in different languages like Spanish and Turkish, the software does not have the Hebrew version. Also, the dataset is limited to a total of 23 speeches. Based on the criteria of Walker and Schafer (2006a), I need to exclude various speeches. Therefore, I had to count on only the ones satisfying their data selection parameters to meet the criteria. Yet, these numbers are not problematic for producing

meaningful analysis. Various operational code research utilized similar numbers of textual data relying on concerns over data availability and data selection criteria.²

1.2. Research Questions and Findings

The main research question of this thesis is, to what extent does the belief system of individual leaders reflect the strategic cultural traditions? Also, there will be other research questions that this thesis will investigate. What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Ben-Gurion and Sharett? Do Ben-Gurion's philosophical beliefs reflect a hostile image of the political universe? Do Ben-Gurion's instrumental beliefs reflect a propensity to choose military force to achieve his political goals? Do his scores correspond to realist leaders? Do Moshe Sharett's philosophical beliefs reflect a friendly image of the political universe? Do Moshe Sharett's instrumental beliefs reflect a propensity to employ diplomatic means? Do his scores correspond to idealist leaders?

Based on the historical accounts of the leaders, I will test the following hypotheses:

H1: As a realist, Ben-Gurion's philosophical beliefs will reflect a hostile image of the political universe and a pessimistic view of the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals.

H2: As a realist, Ben-Gurion's instrumental beliefs will reflect a propensity to prefer military force to attain his political goals if diplomatic means should fail.

² Following studies can be examined to have an idea on this point. Malici and Buckner (2008) analyze Ahmadinejad (n=13) and al-Asad (n=13) operational code with similar numbers of data. Feng (2005) investigated Mao's (n=18) operational code based on the analogous numbers.

H3: As an idealist, Moshe Sharett's philosophical beliefs will reflect a friendly image of the political universe and an optimistic view of the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals.

H4: As an idealist, Moshe Sharett's instrumental beliefs will reflect a propensity to employ diplomatic means and a corresponding reluctance to employ force to achieve political goals.

H5: Ben-Gurion's philosophical and instrumental scores will reflect a more realist orientation compared to the norming group

H6: Sharett's philosophical and instrumental scores will reflect a more idealist orientation compared to the norming group

This research found that Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief about the nature of the political universe is mixed, with a propensity toward a friendly view. Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief about the direction of the strategy is somewhat cooperative.

Sharett's I-1 score is higher than Ben-Gurion's score, which is in accordance with the expectations based on the historical account. The results demonstrated that while Sharett and Ben-Gurion ascribe different typologies to themselves (Type A idealist and Type DEF realist, respectively), both leaders attributed Other to Type B realist.

1.3. Contribution and Importance

This thesis will contribute to Operational Code Analysis, Foreign Policy Analysis, and International Relations kinds of literature in multiple ways. First, this thesis will contribute to OCA research by examining two leaders from the MENA region that is under-scrutinized (Brummer, 2021; Darwich & Kaarbo, 2020; Özdamar, 2017). This contributes to our understanding of the foreign-policy making of the MENA states

and the role of leaders. Additionally, by applying a well-established theory of Foreign Policy Analysis, namely OCA, this thesis also contributed to the growing literature on showing the applicability of the FPA method and tools to Global South cases (Feng, 2007; Malici, 2008; Özdamar, 2017; Thiers, 2021). Moreover, this thesis integrates the individual level of analysis with the macro-level, which can increase the explanatory value of the International Relations theories (Hagan, 2001). Lastly, the thesis will contribute to Israeli foreign policy and strategic culture studies by empirically examining two influential leaders of Israeli politics. Since analyses of Ben-Gurion and Sharett mostly rely on historical accounts, the quantitative investigation of the leaders' beliefs can gain new insights into our understanding of their policies.

1.4. Overview of the Study and Chapters

This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis and offers the outline of the study. The second chapter extensively reviews the literature on Operational Code Analysis from multiple perspectives, Israeli strategic culture, and Ben-Gurion and Sharett to provide a ground. The third chapter presents the research design and methodology of this thesis. The fourth chapter reveals the data analysis and empirical results. The fifth chapter discusses the results of this study and its implications. The last chapter concludes the study and summarizes the main points of the thesis. The next section will offer the literature review to have a background and detect the gaps in the research field, which also shows the importance of the study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter aims to review the literature on Operational Code Analysis and its use in strategic culture research. As the theoretical framework of the thesis, Operational Code Analysis will be utilized to examine the belief systems of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett to test whether their beliefs reflect the foreign policy orientations that historical accounts attribute to them. This literature review will help map the field of research and show the gaps in the studies. In this way, this section will help to outline possible venues of contribution to the FPA field.

2.1. Foreign Policy Analysis Approach as a Subfield of IR

Foreign Policy Analysis is a subfield of the International Relations discipline that “seeks to explain the foreign policy of primarily nation-states based on microfoundational theories that explore the decision-making behind the policy.” (Hudson, 2010). Foreign policy analysis is an agent-based, empirical field of study that has a long and established place within IR. Various research programs in

International Relations like the balance of power and democratic peace have placed inadequate weight on the role of leaders and groups in decision-making. Yet, trying to explain various historical phenomena without delving into the role of leadership seems to be lacking considerably (Levy, 2004). Individuals or groups in the decision-making processes began to be scrutinized more deeply. From the early Cold War years, the need for actor-specific approaches has been expressed, and various works have been conducted by researchers to address the issue (Hudson, 2005).

Scholars who argue for the actor-specific approaches did not find the structural explanations satisfactory or comprehensive enough (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962). Many studies are conducted by adopting actor-specific approaches with diverse tools and approaches (Hermann, 1980; Holsti, 1962; Leites, 1953). The resultant comprehensive literature pushed numerous IR scholars to argue that “who leads matters” (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001). The place of state leaders in foreign policy decision-making has arguably become established in the contemporary Foreign Policy Analysis literature (Hermann & Kaarbo, 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). This emphasis on leadership also increased the importance of explaining the psychological variables that can impact the foreign policy behaviors of the state by arguing that “psychology cannot be divorced from politics in explanations for foreign policy.” (Levy, 2013).

Cognitive and psychological characteristics have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention and have constituted a crucial part of foreign policy analysis (Holsti, 1962; Jervis, 1976; Leites, 1951, 1953; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Biases, heuristics, beliefs, perceptions, and personality traits have been scrutinized to help explain

leaders' foreign policy behavior and decision-making process (Hermann & Kaarbo, 1998; Hermann et al., 2001; Holsti & George, 1975; Jervis, 1976). In the FPA literature, there is a strong emphasis on the significance of the beliefs by claiming that beliefs function as “cognitive maps” (Holsti, 1976: 20), which “establish the boundaries within which the decision is made” (Holsti, 1976: 35). Building on that observation, cognitive approach within the FPA literature has developed various tools, techniques, and methods to analyze cognitive factors in shaping leaders' decisions, such as Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) and Operational Code Analysis (OCA) (Hermann & Kaarbo, 2020; Schafer & Smith, 2020). While LTA concentrates on leaders' personalities to make inferences from them about foreign policy behavior (Hermann et al., 2001), OCA focuses on leaders' belief systems about Self and Other in the political universe to draw inferences about the decisions (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Yet, Operational Code Analysis is much more suited to the purposes of this research as a well-established research program with its rigorous method of examining the belief system of leaders.

2.2. Operational Code Analysis

Operational Code Analysis, operating within the cognitive/psychological paradigm (Jervis, 1976), is a leadership assessment approach that concentrates on the leaders' political belief system (Walker, 2011; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). A causal mechanism is established between the belief systems of leaders and foreign policy decisions (George, 1969, 1979; Leites, 1951; Walker, 1983, 1990; Schafer & Walker, 2006a) since they filter the information about the world and guide decision-makers regarding what they should “hold to be true” (Renshon, 2008: 828). Nathan Leites (1951, 1953) introduced the operational code construct as conceptions of a political

strategy to analyze the decision-making style of the Soviet Union in his work *The Operational Code of the Politburo*. Leites brought cultural, cognitive, and motivational factors together to examine Lenin, Stalin, and other Bolshevik leaders based on their public statements. Leites' approach, relying on qualitative content analysis, was considered time-consuming and costly.

Alexander George (1969) revised Leites' (1951, 1953) work after long neglect of his novel construct. George's study was an attempt to refine Leites' theoretical fundamentals and operationalization. Although George (1969: 192) regarded Leites' work as "that might fill some of the needs for a behavioral approach to studies of political leadership," and found (1969: 193) Leites' works as of "unusually complex nature" along with the doubts about their generalizability. To increase the value of the approach, George (1969) came up with the idea that Leites' (1953: 15) conceptualization of operational code could be reformulated as a 'belief system' rather than "the conceptions of 'political strategy' "in Bolshevik ideology.

According to George's (1969) design, operational codes are constructed to reply to a series of questions, namely philosophical and instrumental beliefs, which help comprehend the way in which leaders regard world politics. There are ten questions in total to measure the belief system of the leaders. The first set of questions helps researchers to designate how a leader perceives the political universe and the role of the "Other" that the leader encounters. This set of questions is categorized as philosophical beliefs. The responses to the second set of questions uncover perceptions of the leader's view of 'Self' to offer cognitive maps of the respective leader's means to attain foreign-policy goals (George, 1979; Walker, 1990). The

second set of questions is defined as instrumental beliefs. Considering them together, both philosophical and instrumental beliefs signify leaders' attitudes regarding the decision-making of foreign policy (Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

Table 1. The Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs in Operational Code Construct

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code	The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
P-1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or of conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other? P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? P-4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction? P-5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?	I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? I-4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests? I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

Source: George (1969); Walker & Schafer, (2006a)

Ole Holsti (1977) utilized Alexander George's (1969) ten questions regarding leaders' beliefs about Self and Other to build a 2x3 typology of leaders building on their different operational code belief systems. Holsti's (1977) contribution also extends to establish ties between operational codes and IR theory, i.e., with reference to Kenneth Waltz' (1954) three images (human nature, state, and system). Holsti (1977) defined six types of operational codes (A, B, C, D, E, F), relying on the nature and source of conflict categorized by Waltz (1954). Stephen Walker later revised these categories and then reduced them to four types (A, B, C, DEF) (1983, 1990). This revised version then has turned out to be a long-lasting framework. Walker's revised typology appears in Table 2 and is based on the replies to P-1, I-1, and P-4 values (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Pessimist leaders (D, E, F) are combined and identified as a single unit because they regard the conflict as permanent, which is independent of their view of the source of conflict. It is because there is no noteworthy difference in the rest of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs in D, E, and F kinds (Walker, 1983, 1990),

The types of leaders in the upper quadrants are characterized as idealist leaders who have faith in the cooperative nature of the political world; nevertheless, they diverge in the extent to which control over historical development is attributed to Self and Other. Type A leaders think that their degree of control is low, whereas Type C leaders think their control is comparatively higher. This situation indicates that Type A leaders are more tended toward cooperative strategies and tactics compared to Type C leaders, although both types of leaders have overall cooperative foreign policy dispositions. When it comes to types in lower quadrants, they are realist leaders who have a faith that the political world is hostile yet diverge in their

attributions regarding the historical control of self and other. Type DEF leaders attribute less control, whereas Type B leaders ascribe more control to self. These types of leaders are disposed to conflictual orientation concerning tactics and strategies, yet Type B leaders are less likely to be cooperative (Schafer & Walker, 2006a, 2007). In other words, Type A and Type C leaders choose to settle the issue with their political rivals. Type B and Type DEF leaders choose domination rather than settle or submit. This new construction of 2x2 games is utilized for representing and estimating different strategic environments through Brams' (1994) Theory of Moves approach, which is based on the game theory assumptions.

The operational code research program made progress through the utilization of various scholars and re-formulations (Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1983, 1990). The scholarship of contemporary operational code analysis utilizes a content analysis procedure named "Verbs in Context System" (VICS), developed by Walker, Young, and Schafer (1998).

Table 2. Contents of the Revised Holsti's Operational Code Typology (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 13).

Type A Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A “conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major source of risk of war. Opponents are often influenced to respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force. Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit	Type C Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible. Other resources than military capabilities are useful. Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit
Type DEF Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are the major source of risk of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final recourse. Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit	Type B Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks. Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit

Note: Instrumental beliefs are in bold; philosophical beliefs are not.

Table 3. The Verbs in Context System Indices for Beliefs in Leader's Operational Code

	Elements	Index	Interpretation
P-1	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to -1.0 hostile
P-2	REALISATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of others' tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation** for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of control)	Self (P-4a) or Other (P-4b) Attributions (Self plus Other Attributions)	1.0 high to 0.0 low selfcontrol
P-5	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of control)	1 minus [Political Future x Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low Role
I-1	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of tactics)	1 minus Absolute Value [%X Minus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
I-5	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of power)	Percentages for Exercise of power Categories a through f	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward	a's frequency divided by total	
	b. Promise	b's frequency divided by total	
	c. Appeal/Support	c's frequency divided by total	

Note: All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between 1.0 and -1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range. Source: Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, & Michael D. Young, 1998. (Retrieved from Feng, 2007: 11).

The VICS scheme helps produce quantitative indices for leaders' beliefs. The VICS scheme uses verb-based attributions since verbs are regarded as a leader's linguistic representation of perceived power relationships, and they demonstrate beliefs about

self and others in terms of cooperative and conflictual attributions in the political universe. VICS concentrates on transitive in these public sources, encodes them based on their direction, and scales them according to their intensity. Although the earlier work using the VICS construct is based on hand-coding (Crichlow, 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2001), Social Science Automation³ developed software that facilitates the analysis.

ProfilerPlus is an automated content analysis software that uses leaders' speeches, interviews, books, and statements to identify the attributions regarding the exercise of power by Self and Other. ProfilerPlus software has since been commonly used to encode the transitive verbs in leaders' public statements to create quantitative indices that refer to philosophical and instrumental beliefs. P-1, I-1, and P-4 values are master beliefs and are used to determine leaders' perception of self and other in Holsti's revised typology. For Hudson (2005: 20), this system is "revolutionizing the field of leader assessment in FPA." This innovation was a significant moment for the FPA in the sense that it became possible to carry out studies through at-a-distance inferences along with increased replicability compared to the previous qualitative content analysis.

The development of VICS and ProfilerPlus has become a serious intensive and paved the way for numerous works. It enabled a computer-based automated content analysis that was different from the previous hand-coded works. By utilizing ProfilerPlus, another development in the literature brought about by the introduction

³ The software is developed by Social Automation Company and open to use for researchers (<https://profilerplus.org/>).

of a norming group of world leaders calculated through 164 speeches for 35 world leaders (Malici & Buckner, 2008). It enabled (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 43):

comparing mean scores across different leaders; comparing means of one leader for one or more time periods; comparing means of different types of leaders, such as first versus third world, democratic versus nondemocratic, or capitalist versus communist; or using the data as independent variables in regression models.

OCA offers a substantial advantage in terms of presenting a dynamic or interactive approach. Operational code analysis maps not only the individual leader's perception of Self but also of Other. Accordingly, the similarities and differences between a leader's perception of Self and Other pave the way for organizing a leader's "subjective game" (Maoz, 1990; Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 13). It is constructed as a simple 2×2 game matrix, underlining "Self's possible choices toward Other and the corresponding choices toward Other and the corresponding choices toward Self" (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 13). These games illuminate how views infer preferences to Self and Other and how these inferred preferences impact strategic choice. Subjective games are valuable representations of 'real world' contexts a leader faces by offering heuristics as cognitive shortcuts to make preferences and expecting the preferences of others (Brams, 2009).

Representing a leader's subjective games and expected moves/behaviors are obtained by a combination of the Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) developed by Walker (2004) and Brams' (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM). This blend presents a significant accomplishment in the literature on OCA regarding charting a leader's preferred political outcomes and anticipated strategies through the endogenization of their preferences (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Therefore, contrary to traditional game theory, "what emerges is a model in which preferences are not assumed, but

systematically derived” (Malici, 2009: 37). TIP is a formal deductive model to understand how a specific perception impacts a leader’s preferences regarding the political outcomes as a result of interaction with others.

Table 4. An Expanded Version of Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)⁴

Self & Other Values Preference Order in a 2 X 2 Strategic Game
Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate = (Appeasement)
Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit = (Assurance)
Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit = (Stag Hunt)
Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, <), then Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock = (Chicken)
Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, =), then Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit = (P. Dilemma)
Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, >), then Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit = (Bully)

Three master beliefs (P-1, I-1, and P-4) constitute the limits of rationality for Self and Other by indicating the corresponding rank order for preferences, for the political outcomes of settlement, deadlock, domination, and submission (by using the game-theoretical concepts). The model of strategic interaction is based on the calculated differences between master beliefs in relation to cooperation versus conflict. The signs used in the TIP propositions refer to if a leader’s I-1 and P-1 indices are above

⁴ A “+” indicates above and “-” indicates below the norming mean. <, >, and = indicate below, above, and within the norming average range, respectively, which is $P4a \pm 1$ SD. Norming scores for $N = 164$ are $P-1 = +.30$, $SD = 0.29$; $I-1 = +.40$, $SD = 0.43$; and $P-4 = 0.22$, $SD = 0.13$. Norming averages are drawn from Schafer and Walker (2006b), courtesy of Mark Schafer. For another study using the same norming sample, see Malici and Buckner (2008) and Malici (in Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011). Retrieved from Özdamar and Canbolat (2018: 21).

(+) or below (−) the mean for the norming group of world leaders ($I-1 = +.33$; $P-1 = +.25$, $n=35$). The symbols used for the P-4a and P-4b indices signify if these indices are greater than ($>$), less than ($<$), or within ($=$) one standard deviation ($SD = .10$) of the mean ($P-4 = .21$) regarding the norming group of world leaders. This offers six different propositions vis-a-vis rank of preference for both Self and Other as represented in Table 4.

The use of TIP with the VICS indices combined with subjective games bears fruits. Many studies have been carried out on various leaders from the US, the Middle East to China (He & Feng, 2013; Feng, 2007; Özdamar & Canbolat, 2018; Walker & Schafer, 2007). These works present robust analyses and interesting cases for strategic interactions between actors in global politics (Malici, 2005; Schafer & Walker, 2006a; Marfleet & Miller, 2005; Malici & Buckner, 2008).

All these developments, from tools like ProfilerPlus to theories like TIP, helped the Operational Code Analysis research program to be more robust, quantitative, and reproducible (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Scholars examined the belief system of individual leaders from different angles. For example, there are some works that examine the change or continuity in a leader's operational code. This research agenda started following Johnson's (1977) *Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior*, which examined the extent to which the operational code of leaders changed depending on the external factors pressurizing leaders on foreign policy matters. Holsti (1970) scrutinized the operational codes of John Foster Dulles. Feng (2005) investigated the change and continuity in Mao Zedong's operational code. Starr (1984) examined the political beliefs of Kissinger and demonstrated

stability in his beliefs. Related to this research agenda, Cognitive Consistency Theory argues that operational codes are hard to change and they persist throughout one's life. This theory has been supported by various works and led to a thriving field of literature (Crichlow, 1998; Feng; 2005, 2006, 2007; Schafer & Crichlow, 2000; Walker et al., 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

Operational codes analysis has been applied to understand various world leaders to analyze the causal mechanism between their beliefs and foreign policy decisions. These leaders include Donald Trump, Hilary Clinton, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson from the US (Walker, Schafer, & Smith, 2018), Mark Rutte from the Netherlands (Willigen & Bakker, 2021), European far-right leaders like Le Pen and Geert Wilders (Özdamar & Ceydilek, 2020), German leaders (Malici, 2006a), Vladimir Putin (Dyson, 2001; Dyson & Parent, 2017; Herd, 2022; Schafer, Nurmanova & Walker, 2021), Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong (Feng, 2005). The proliferation of the OCA literature from many countries and historical/contemporary cases enriched and deepened the Foreign Policy Analysis field with a focus on leadership studies.

In sum, going back to the heart of the theory, the main assumption of the operational code research program is that leaders matter in determining states' foreign policies and whose belief systems operate as causal mechanisms to grasp the reason for a certain decision (Snyder et al., 1962; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Analyzing their beliefs can contribute to our understanding of global politics and advance the Foreign Policy Analysis field and IR theories, which ignore the belief system in their explanations.

2.3. Operational Code Analysis and IR Theories

The operational code research program has been utilized as a tool to make progress in the IR discipline by integrating OCA's robust methodology into Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Various works of operational code analysis help build bridges between the agent-based and structural analysis of foreign policy and international politics (Feng, 2005; Malici & Malici, 2005; Walker, 2004; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1999). Structural theories of IR do not offer analyses of the individual leader's mindset, perceptions, and psychology that help explain a certain policy or behavior (Hagan, 2001). They assume that leaders' beliefs reflect the domestic and foreign realities. Yet, cognitive approaches emphasize that beliefs operate as a causal mechanism independent from realities and therefore do not have a passive role. Beliefs guide the behaviors and decisions of leaders by influencing the way leaders to see the world by reacting to the information coming from the environment (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962). Structural theories also did not examine the microfoundations of their perspectives to test whether they merely reflect the realities.

The synthesis between beliefs and structural explanations of foreign policy offers a way to increase the explanatory value of concepts and assumptions within these theories by testing them with the scientific and reproducible methodological rigor of the operational code analysis (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Integrating beliefs with structural theories produced various pieces of research on topics like strategic culture, offensive-defensive strategy, democratic peace, and agent-structure debate.

The link between beliefs and strategic culture has been subject to various studies. The integration of leaders' beliefs and strategic culture seems to be a good match (Feng, 2007, Rezzi, 2021). Stephen Walker and Mark Schafer (2006a: 50) argue Leites' (1951, 1953) emphasis on the "social dimension of a leader's operational code as a psycho-cultural construct similar to the conception of strategic culture in contemporary international relations theory." Walker and Schafer (2007) examined to what extent the belief system of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson reflects the strategic cultural orientations that historical accounts ascribed to them. According to accounts of US diplomatic history, both leaders represent two different foreign policy and strategic orientations. Accordingly, the realist tradition is represented by Roosevelt, while the idealist tradition is identified with Wilson. Walker and Schafer (2007: 748):

assess the extent to which Realism and Idealism as variants of American 'strategic culture,' i.e., as a mix of shared worldviews and strategic orientations, are embedded in the belief systems of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to guide the conduct of American foreign policy.

They use operational code analysis for their study and examine different periods of leaders in the post. They constructed a realist-idealist foreign policy orientation and associated them with different types of leadership styles based on Holsti's (1977) typology.

They argue that the operational codes of Roosevelt and Wilson lend support to the historical accounts as both leaders bear differences "in their beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the most effective means for protecting and achieving their political goals." (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 770). This study is important in terms of examining beliefs to demonstrate the 'microfoundations' of foreign policy

orientations and strategic cultures. The use of operational codes to capture the microfoundations of traditions in foreign policy like realism vs. idealism presented a fertile venue for research to test other state leaders and locate them in the foreign policy continuum based on their empirical analyses rather than historical accounts. There may be rival historical accounts for leaders' orientation, and empirical testing via operational code research can contribute to the historical research, as their study did. Also, realist vs. idealist foreign policy traditions are mostly philosophical accounts without empirical ground. Therefore, Walker and Schafer's study enables an empirical way of investigating the historical cases and theories of IR.

Feng (2005) assessed whether Mao Zedong was a Confucian idealist or a Parabellum realist in the framework of Chinese strategic culture. Many accounts argue that China has an aggressive strategic culture. Is Confucian thinking have any effect on Chinese decision-makers? Which kind of cultural aspect does have an impact on the beliefs of Chinese leaders? These are the main questions the book tries to answer. Feng concentrated on the leaders' beliefs by using operational code analysis and observed the changes in beliefs across time and context. Feng (2005: 121) argues that Chinese leaders, except Mao, were "either close to the average world leader in their major beliefs about cooperation and conflict (Deng and Zhou) or more cooperative and friendly than the average world leader (Jiang, Hu-Wen)." Therefore, he argues that Chinese leaders are not clearly realists. Also, he found that the beliefs of leaders change depending on the time and context.

In another study, Feng (2006) examines Alastair Johnson's argument that China has a culture of offensive realism, which guides an aggressive Chinese foreign policy.

Feng uses operational code analysis to analyze the beliefs of Mao Zedong to test whether his belief system mirrors the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture. The author argues that Johnston's argument is not completely correct. Feng claims that, in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War, China showed a defensive pattern, which demonstrates a more complex case. Mao appears as a defensive realist rather than an offensive one. Mao is less able to utilize cooperative tactics like rewards, and his view of the political universe is hostile. In times of war and crisis, his operational codes were more hostile and prone to the use of force. His analysis is a valuable contribution to research on beliefs and culture nexus in terms of showing the interaction between a leader's beliefs and cultural norms.

Malici (2006a) examined the post-Cold War German foreign policy and evaluated whether the expectations of Realism that Germany would be more unilateral and pursuant to power politics came true. The author shows the opposite that German foreign policy followed the 'culture of reticence,' which is "a culture of restraint and accommodation that can be traced to well-defined sets of fundamental beliefs of German society as a whole and German political elites in particular" (2006a: 38). Malici (2006a: 41) adopted "operational code analysis as a tool for discerning the culturally informed propensities of actors." Malici's article contributes to the culture and foreign policy nexus literature and IR theory.

The author argues that cultural and ideational variables can be examined scientifically by employing replicable methods. In that way, Malici (2006a: 59) states that researchers can avoid subjectivism and conduct empirical studies. Also, the

author levies criticism on neoliberal institutionalists and realists by arguing that a mere structural examination of international relations lacks serious elements and that IR should be more attentive to the agent-based factors in international relations.

Malici (2006a: 59) finds the neoliberal argument of the German constitution preventing a more “dominating foreign policy” claim inadequate because it disregards the fact that the political culture of Germany, which approaches the military suspiciously, leads to these laws

P. O'Reilly (2013) examines the development and impact of the Rogue Doctrine on the US strategic culture after the Cold War. The author also tests whether this doctrine has a place in the worldviews of two US presidents: William J. Clinton and George W. Bush. O'Reilly (2013: 68) uses the operational code construct to analyze the beliefs of two leaders and test the extent to which they reflect a specific strategic culture, the Rogue doctrine. O'Reilly (2013: 58) found that there are obvious differences between their “perceived interaction with rogue versus nonrogue states.” When these leaders encounter rogue states, their perception of self demonstrates a significant change, and they become more inclined to pursue aggressive policies like the use of force toward rogue states. Whether cooperative or conflictual strategy to be followed by leaders depends on the status of the other states in interaction. This study contributes to strategic culture and operational code research by showing how the operational codes of two US presidents reflect the strategic culture tradition of the Rogue Doctrine.

O'Reilly's (2012) another study examined how leaders' beliefs about the international environment influence their nuclear proliferation decisions. The

interplay between Self and Other is regarded as having a critical role in a leader's strategic calculation. Therefore, nuclear proliferation decisions are seen as a function of following one's self-interest and expecting the reactions of others. To examine the beliefs of leaders, the author uses operational code analysis and tests how beliefs shaped the decision of 'going nuclear.' By analyzing the cases of South Africa and India, O'Reilly (2012) shows the strategic interactions of Indian leader Vajpayee and South Africa's Vorster by examining their beliefs. This study makes an important contribution to nuclear proliferation research in the context of strategic culture and OCA, which offers an original perspective on the issue.

Another study relevant to nuclear proliferation is carried out by Seyed Hamidreza Serri (2021), who examines the strategic cultures of the US and Iran and their impact on bilateral relations between 1989 and 2018. The author extracted the strategic cultures by utilizing operational code analysis and the Theory of Inferences of Preferences. Serri (2021) argues that if both countries consider Iran's nuclear proliferation as crucial to their national security, then these states will embrace the Deadlock strategy. On the other hand, if both Iran and US regard the matter as secondary to their national security, then a preferable strategy for the US is Dominate and for Iran is Submit. Serri's research makes a policy-relevant contribution to the Iran nuclear issue and the nexus between the culture and beliefs of leaders by offering insights into a hot topic in world politics.

Graeme P. Herd wrote another contemporary and policy-relevant study (2022) that examined the degree to which Russia's strategic orientation is the outcome of its Tsarist and Soviet strategic culture and Putin's own operational code. Herd argues

that there are two factors that explain current Russian behavior. First, there was an imperial strategic culture with deep historical roots affecting Putin's policies. Secondly, the belief system of Putin and the decision-making elites influence strategic choices. In other words, Herd claims that Russian strategic behavior is a result of the mix of these factors. Putin has different operational codes depending on the issue and distinguishes his principal beliefs and context-specific strategic thinking (Herd, 2022: 156). Herd (2022: 156) argued that "on occasions where Putin himself has no fixed policy preference, the operational code may act as a default setting." Herd's book is a significant contribution to the literature at the intersection of OCA and strategic culture by examining the Russian case.

With regard to liberalism, there are various works that have contributed to the kinds of literature on both OCA and IR theory. Walker and Schafer (2006b) analyze whether the belief systems of leaders portray a substantial difference in determining if democracies are non-violent and the reason they do not go to war with one another. Also, they test whether beliefs "represent some of the underlying cultural norms from their respective democracies" (2006b: 562). Using operational code analysis, they examine and compare the beliefs of two democratic leaders, Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. Walker and Schafer (2006b) found that both leaders see democracies as more friendly than non-democracies as well as they have less cooperative beliefs vis-a-vis the nondemocratic countries. Blair and Clinton showed cooperative behavior in the case study of the Kosovo conflict. Walker and Schafer argue that the findings support the democratic peace theory.

Their research contributes to pieces of literature on both liberalism and OCA by examining a theory, which is mainly researched at the state and structural level, through an individual level of analysis. Therefore, this study advances the agendas of both lines of research by a fruitful synthesis of OCA and democratic peace theory. It is important because Schafer and Walker argue that democratic peace theory assumes democratic leaders internalize the countries' peaceful values and democratic culture, but the beliefs of leaders may have a defining impact on the decision-making, and leaders may not internalize the democratic norms (Elmann, 1997a, 1997b; Hermann & Kegley, 1995, as cited in Schafer & Walker, 2006b). Therefore, an individual level of analysis helps to analyze the microfoundations of a theory by an empiric analysis of the belief systems of leaders, which also helps explain behaviors among them.

Marfleet and Miller (2005) examined the bargaining process of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002 by focusing on the converse positions taken by the US and French leaders, Bush and Chirac. The resolution aims to establish an inspection mechanism for disarmament in Iraq. The US has little faith in resolution to bear fruits, while France underlined the value of resolution, diplomacy, and multilateral work within the UN. Following the resolution, the US tried to convince states in favor of a military operation, yet the proposals given to UNSC were not accepted. France's response was a 'no' to proposals and tried to increase the number of states against the US motions.

On March 18, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq after leaving the bargaining table. Then, the Iraq war began with the US-led invasion. Marfleet and Miller's (2005) study analyzed both leaders' beliefs regarding the

events, policies, possible responses, and narratives of one another in the bargaining process. The operational code analysis reveals that both leaders “had inaccurately gauged the preferences of the “other” in the subjective interpretations of the political environments” (Marfleet & Miller, 2005: 355). They also overestimated their impact and showed overconfidence in gathering supporters. This research also contributed to a better understanding of the contingencies in international institutions’ viability by examining leaders’ beliefs in the bargaining process.

Malici (2008), in his book *The Search for a Common European Foreign and Security Policy*, examines the German, French and British leaders in the efforts to bring about the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) within the EU. Malici (2008: 5) claims that the viability of international institutions depends on leaders and their cognitions. His cases for testing the stances of the aforementioned countries' leaders are the Kosovo War (1998–1999), the Afghanistan War (2001–2002), and the Iraq War (2003). Malici (2008) argues that focusing on structural explanations is not enough to grasp the efforts toward CFSP without cognitive variables. Common security and foreign policy desires are “dependent upon the compatibility of the mental models of key decision-makers on the European continent” (Malici, 2008: 142). He makes a case for the merits of individual level of analysis and cognitive factors in grasping institutional viability. In sum, it can be argued that the works in the nexus of Liberalism and OCA mainly focused on democratic peace theory and institutions.

With regard to constructivism, there are some works that offer an analysis based on the synthesis with OCA. Malici (2006b) examines Gorbachev and Reagan’s belief

systems to chart their impact on one another's beliefs and behaviors. He argues that Gorbachev implemented the *altercasting* strategy, which “entails continuous gestures (moves and tactics) that an opponent would not expect and the goal of transforming the very beliefs of an opponent” (Malici, 2006b: 128). With the help of this strategy, Malici (2006b) argues that Gorbachev influenced the process and structure of the Cold War as a result of their interactions with Reagan. Through operational code analysis, he mapped the learning of leaders in international politics and how it shaped the end of the Cold War.

Malici (2006b) argued that the synthesis of constructivism and cognitivism could help the explanatory value of research. Constructivism is largely based on interpretivism as a method, which led to many critics. Operational code analysis is a useful tool to study ideational variables or “make the unobservables observable” (Malici, 2006b: 128). OCA helps produce reproducible, systematic, and empiric analyses of ideational variables that can aid in avoiding subjectivism. His research is illuminating in terms of analyzing ideational variables via methodologically robust ways that can contribute to Constructivism literature, as in the case of the agent-structure debate shown in the study. Also, it contributes to OCA and foreign policy analysis literature by taking insights from constructivism.

In another related study in the context of constructivism, Cameron Thies (2006) examines the Asian Financial Crisis from a socio-cognitive perspective. Thies’ analysis includes central bankers of nine East Asian states between 1997 and 1999. The author argues that the Asian Financial Crisis was a result of “a clash of monetary cultures” (Thies, 2006: 219). On the one hand, there were Keynesian-Kantian

monetary culture characteristics of East Asia, whose central bankers advocate cooperation that can decrease exchange rate volatility in times of crisis. On the other hand, there was Neoclassical-Lockean culture that supported floating currency. The Asian Financial Crisis was a threat to the core economies of the world, and the response by the IMF and the US to the crisis brought about a clash of monetary cultures. Thies (2006: 223) argues that the clash of cultures can pave the way for grasping “how key agents constructed the Asian Financial Crisis as it unfolded.”

Thies examined the belief systems of key governors of central banks by utilizing operational code analysis. Thies (2006: 222) argues that “constructivism and the operational code construct appear to be a good match.” because “the operational code construct expects beliefs to have mirroring, steering, and learning effects, thus serving as causal mechanisms that link macro and micro-structural levels in the constitution of identity.” It is an interesting contribution to the nexus between Constructivism and OCA from a political economy perspective that is not often adopted. Thies’ (2006) study also contributes to the arguments of how ideational variables can be tested via reproducible methods as used in operational code analysis.

The examples mentioned above demonstrated the significance and benefits of synthesizing belief systems with International Relations theories in diverse areas.

Walker and Schafer (2006a: 240) argue that:

The microfoundations of actions and interactions between states do not undermine macro-theories of world politics so much as enrich them. Without bringing agents into their analyses, they remain problematic, in that they are underspecified and relatively incapable of taking more than a “first cut” at explaining what puzzles them. Operational code analysis offers one set of methods and models to address this problem with more robust results.”

I agree with Walker and Schafer's argument in terms of the fruitful dialogue between structural theories and belief systems. It is especially valid when it comes to cultural explanations and ideational variables. It is because these explanations are largely based on the historical or interpretive methods that can create problems in terms of producing generalizable and testable scientific outcomes. Operational code analysis offers a reproducible, empirical, and systematic analysis of the ideational factors that contribute to IR theories and OCA literature through borrowing concepts from other theories. In that context, building on this literature and argument, this thesis will also utilize Operational Code Analysis to analyze the strategic culture of two Israeli leaders, David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett.

2.4. Strategic Culture

Jack Snyder (1977) inquired about the Soviet Union's potential policies toward a limited nuclear war. Snyder made critiques of game theory's assumptions by regarding it as too general and abstract. The author argued that without being informed by cultural explanations, the game theory had not much to offer for forecasting Soviet behavior. The US and Soviets had two different perspectives on nuclear wars due to organizational and historical experiences; therefore, Snyder introduced the concept of 'strategic culture' to explain the difference. For Snyder (1977: 8), the concept refers to "that sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other." Snyder further refines the concept and draws attention to the role of the cognitive component by stating that "habitual behavior is largely cognitive behavior" (Snyder 1977: 8).

To be more specific, the author made emphasis on the cognitive aspect of the concept of the strategic culture. Snyder (1977: 9) defined strategic culture as “the body of attitudes and beliefs that guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate.” Following Snyder’s work, the concept has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. From the 1980s onward, works mainly focused on macro-level explanations like geography and history to investigate the difference between US-Soviet nuclear strategies.

Gray illustrated strategic culture as “modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from the perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization... and from all of the many distinctively American experiences” (Gray, 1981: 22). Gray also had an emphasis on historical patterns and experiences that define strategic behavior and thinking. Gray’s definition of strategic culture, too, was at the macro-level; however, although there was a growing literature on strategic culture scholarship, there is no agreed-upon definition of the concept (Lantis, 2009; Lock, 2017). To address this point, Johnston (1995) argued that strategic culture should offer empirical forecasts that would be comparable to other theoretical perspectives. Moreover, it should have “empirical referents (e.g., symbols and ranked preferences) which can be observed in strategic culture objects (e.g., texts, documents, doctrines)” (Johnston, 1995: 49). To realize these points, Johnston argues strategic culture should have a Central paradigm and an Operational paradigm. These two paradigms, Johnston (1995) argued, can be extracted by content analysis methods like symbol analysis.

The Central paradigm of strategic culture concerns the strategic environment, the place of war, and the use of force, which comes out of past experiences. The Operational paradigm explains the sequential preferences for strategic choices, which affects the behaviors of the state (Johnston, 1995: 46–49). Alastair Johnston's definition offers an analytical reconfiguration of the strategic culture concept. In a project on comparative strategic cultures at Australian National University, Alan Macmillan, Booth, and Trood (1999: 8) defined the concept as “a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values, and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture.” Likewise, this definition also puts an emphasis on beliefs, values, and historical experiences concerning the use of force, which seems to be one crucial aspect that scholars agreed on the concept of strategic culture. For example, Johnston's (1995: 36) understanding of strategic culture refers to thoughts regarding “the role and efficacy of the use of military force in interstate political affairs.” Also, similarly, Gray's understanding (1999: 50) renders strategic culture “relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes.” In this context, when it is considered the components of the use of force and psychological factors, Bloomfield's (2012: 452) expression of “strategic cognitive schemas” can also be regarded as a compact summary of the concept.

Snyder's understanding seems to resonate even today and has been adopted by various studies (Lantis, 2002). Defining the concept as “a set of semipermanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns socialized into a distinctive mode of thought” (Snyder, 1977: 8), Snyder also calls for attention to the individuals. Elite ideas and

strategies have a long-lasting impact on states by turning them into specific strategy schools (Lantis, 2002: 104). Strategic culture studies are often lamented for their ineptitude in delivering testable theories (Libel, 2016). Although this is an innovative and valuable concept for understanding states' security and foreign policies, the approach lacked methodological rigor. Some scholars argue that Operational Code Analysis could strengthen the concept by offering its methodological rigor and well-established theoretical insights (Feng, 2005; Herd, 2022; Rezzi, 2021; Walker & Schafer, 2007).

Since the main aim of Operational Code Analysis is to demonstrate how beliefs impact actors' regard of the political universe and the appropriate strategies, Alexander George's questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs can reveal the strategic cultures. Rezzi (2021) argues that OCA and TIP offer a robust way of extracting paradigms (Central and Operational, which are very similar to philosophical and instrumental beliefs) in strategic cultures. Building on these observations, operational code analysis with the VICS scheme is a logical choice to extract strategic cultures by integrating its methodological rigor that strategic culture lacks.

1.4.1. Israeli Strategic Culture


Israel is an interesting case to examine strategic culture since it has a distinct place in the Middle East. Lawrence Sondhous (2006: 78), in his *Strategic Cultures and Ways of War*, argues that: "Of course, the state of Israel must be central to any discussion of the Middle East, and Israel has perhaps the clearest, most distinctive strategic culture and way of war of any country on earth." Building on historical experiences

like Nazi Holocaust, Jews developed a series of beliefs, norms, and values to protect themselves (Giles, 2009). It is not rare to find various occasions of immigration, exiles, pogroms, and violence toward Jews in history (Shamir, 2019). The impact of psychological and cultural aspects of Jewish history has molded “the environment in which Israeli strategy has been formulated” (Handel, 1994: 542). Petrelli (2017: 15) states that this background explains the:

self-perception and attitude of Jews, and later Israelis, as *am levadad yishkon*, a “people dwelling alone.” Such a motif, consolidated in the Diaspora through a long history of negative experiences that left their mark on the Jewish psyche, was subsequently transposed into the new geopolitical reality of the Yishuv.

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel was declared to be independent and found itself surrounded by states that were hostile or, at least, of unfavorable view toward the existence of the state of Israel. For thirty years, no Arab states recognized Israel as an independent state. This adversity with Arabs “left Israel in the worst security situation of any state on earth, and it responded by developing arguably the world’s clearest, most distinctive strategic culture” (Sondhaus, 2009: 83-84). This situation also leads to a siege mentality among Israelis, which refers to being encircled by hostile states.

Figure 1. Israel's Geographical Vulnerability (Handel, 1994: 536)



Geography, ethno-religious relations, history, wars, and influential figures have shaped the Israeli strategic culture (Giles, 2009). It is not monolithic but has different strands of strategic culture. To better understand, it is valuable to concentrate on the early periods and key figures. As Petrelli (2017: 5) argues, “scholars agree that, as a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force, strategic cultures take shape through formative periods.” Similarly, the roots of Israel’s strategic culture and doctrine date back to the late 1940s and 1950s and still resonate today.

David Ben-Gurion, the founder of Israel and Defense Minister, and Moshe Sharett, the first Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister, were referred to as having a notable impact on the formation and development of Israeli strategic culture.

According to Petrelli (2017) and Del Sarto (2017), Ben-Gurion and Sharett represent

two different schools of thought within the Israeli strategic community. Petrelli

(2017: 21-22) encapsulates these schools as:

a hawkish, activist, security-centered school of thought stood against a moderate one who privileged a tailored use of force, negotiation, and diplomacy. Conceptually, the ‘activist’ school headed by Ben- Gurion and the ‘moderate’ school headed by Moshe Sharett could be viewed as expressions in the realm of policy and grand strategy of the two ethos (offensive and defensive) developed by the Zionist community between the end of the nineteenth century and 1948.

It was assumed there would be a prolonged fight with the Arabs, and war rather than diplomacy would be the way to resolution. The activist school emphasizes an inward-looking, Israel-centric worldview and regards Arabs as “fanatical enemies” (Petrelli, 2017: 22). Use of force is the only tool to be employed and peace would bring out as a result of the realization for the Arabs that Israel cannot be defeated. Ben-Gurion advocated for the principle of self-reliance that guided the Israeli foreign and security policy (Horowitz, 1983).

Ben-Gurion’s ideas and strategies constituted the foundations of Israel’s classic national security policy in general and defense doctrine in specific (Bar, 2020, Freilich, 2018). It is argued that the “realpolitik-inspired Ben-Gurionist strategic approach” (Petrelli, 2017: 22) has been the most dominant and influential perspective in informing national security and foreign policy till today. Ben-Gurion states that there are three pillars of the defensive strategy of Israel: “deterrence, early warning, and military decision” (Freilich, 2018: 23-24). He laid down this defense strategy in the aftermath of the State of Israel’s establishment by underlining Israel was “a small island surrounded by a great Arab ocean extending over two continents.” (Del Sarto, 2017: 135). This conception of Israel was used by other Israeli leaders in the following decades and was commonly shared by the Israeli people.

On the other hand, proponents of the ‘moderate’ school of thought pioneered by Moshe Sharett had not an imagination of an enduring, unavoidable conflict with the Arabs (Petrelli, 2017). Contrary to the previous one, this school has more optimism about the relations between Israel and the Arab world (Petrelli, 2017; Shalom, 2002). Although they agreed that the “use of force remained an unavoidable weapon of last resort,” the moderate school argued that the use of force should be selective and a weapon of last resort (Petrelli, 2017: 22). For them, Israel has no resources to deal with the combined Arab forces. Diplomacy and negotiation are preferable ways of dealing with foreign and security issues. Israeli policymakers have less favored this approach compared to the previous one. Moshe Sharett’s “peace-oriented” approach is influenced by Chaim Weizmann, the ‘moderate’ leader of the World Zionist Organization in the pre-state period (Brecher, 2016). Sharett was more attentive to the UN’s effort, tried to harmonize Israel’s aims with the international community, and paid attention to world public opinion (Brecher, 2016).

1.5. Literature on Ben-Gurion and Sharett

Studies on David Ben-Gurion and Sharett are overwhelmed by biographical and historical accounts (Shapira, 2014; Sheffer, 1996). In terms of Ben-Gurion’s foreign policy, there are many works to consider, such as Gal (2004), Shalom (2002), Shapira (1996), Shlaim (1983), Seliktar (2015), and Bialer (1990). Studies on the Ben-Gurion foreign policy help grasp the historical period from different perspectives like ideology and identity. Also, there are works on the leadership of Ben-Gurion from various angles. Brecher (2016) made a comparative analysis of David Ben-Gurion with Nehru with a focus on the impact of charisma. He also

compares and contrasts Ben-Gurion with Sharett in terms of their personality and approaches. Kabalo (2017) analyzes the communication strategy of Ben-Gurion with the public. There are also studies comparing the leadership and foreign policies of Ben-Gurion with the foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (1988) compared the Ben-Gurion and Sharett foreign policies with an emphasis on conflict management.

Caplan (2020) discusses the foreign-policy understandings of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett based on the division of activist-militant versus diplomatic-moderate. Caplan also examined how these two leaders viewed the United Nations. Similarly, studies on Sharett are dominated by historical accounts. Sheffer (1996) wrote an extensive biography of Sharett with the title of *Moshe Sharett: Biography of a Political Moderate*. Sheffer also portrays how Ben-Gurion and Sharett adopted differing approaches. The author argues that Sharett's (1996) view of Israel represents a more humanitarian approach compared to Be-Gurion's activist camp. In an article, Sheffer (2015: 17) examined Sharett's legacy and argued his "legacy has particular promise for the solution of protracted conflicts like that which has endlessly lingered on between Jews and Palestinians and Arabs in the Middle East." Yegar (2010) examined the role of Moshe Sharett in the establishment and development of Israeli diplomacy. The author argues that Sharett's views and working style have an impact on the structuring of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Yegar, 2010). In sum, the studies on these leaders rely predominantly on historical accounts.

2.7. Operational Code Analysis of Israeli Leaders

In the FPA literature, it is interesting to see very few studies analyzing the belief systems of Israeli leaders via Operational Code Analysis. Scott Crichlow (1998) examined the changes in operational codes of two Israeli prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. Crichlow (1998) argued that both Rabin and Peres demonstrate notable changes in their operational codes that facilitate taking part in the peace process. Peres showed greater change in his beliefs compared to Rabin because, Crichlow (1998) argues, Rabin was already an idealist leader and, thus, more prone to be cooperative, while Shimon Peres was a pragmatic leader, and thus his environment had an impact on his beliefs. Crichlow (1998) preferred to examine these two leaders because they possessed great influence on Middle East politics largely due to their impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Scott Crichlow (1998) also made a methodological argument that detailed information and leaders cannot be merely explained by VICS analysis but also should be supplied by qualitative research. This approach is noteworthy and qualitative assessments of leaders can also greatly contribute to the leadership research and can fill the blanks left by statistical analysis of VICS.

Yael Aronoff (2014) examines the political psychology of Israeli prime ministers. Aronoff (2014: 4) defines hawkish and dovish leaders in Israeli politics. The author evaluates what kind of leaders are more likely to alter and “whether new information presented by the events was entirely ignored, or how it was interpreted.” To that aim, Aronoff’s (2014: 5) analytic approach combines different ways of defining “cognition and attitude: ideology (drawing on Alexander George’s work on the operational code), individual time orientations (derived from Robert Jervis’s use of

the rate and magnitude of incoming information), cognitive openness, emotional intelligence, and risk propensity.” Aronoff found that it is hard to see a conversion in leaders due to hard-line ideology’ firmness and the prevalence of conflict. Although it is not purely OCA research, Aronoff contributed to the literature by taking insights from the operational codes of Israeli leaders in this comprehensive book analyzing six leaders.

A recent study carried out by Mark Schafer, Joshua Lambert, and Stephen G. Walker⁵ (2022) examined the bases of the master beliefs in the operational code attributed to the state of Israel as a complex adaptive system that is embedded in the public statements of Israeli leaders: Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu. They argue that leaders’ personality variables impact their operational code beliefs. When there is a higher level of Distrust in a leader, leaders’ beliefs about Other are more conflictual. Additionally, they found that when the actor’s Self Confidence is high, his beliefs about others are conflictual accordingly. This research contributes to the operational code analysis of Israeli leaders with its comprehensive approach by also taking insights from Leadership Trait Analysis, another tool of FPA research.

Other than Crichlow (1998), Aronoff (2014), and Schafer, Lambert, and Walker’s (2022) study, there seems to be no research using OCA to analyze the belief system of Israeli leaders. Although there are some studies using other leadership analysis methods like Leadership Trait Analysis (Kesgin, 2019, 2020), operational code analysis as a tool of foreign policy analysis in the study of Israeli politics is

⁵ The paper was presented at the 2022 ISA Conference. I obtained the paper by the courtesy of Professor Mark Schafer.

immensely missing. It is interesting because there are various works that examine the Israeli-Arab conflict from a psychological perspective (Sharvit & Halperin, 2016). Assessments of Israeli leaders from a cognitive/psychological perspective would also contribute to that line of research. Therefore, this lack of cognitive study of Israeli leaders by using OCA may also mean that the study of Israeli decision-making and foreign policy, as well as the psychological analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, will miss the insights that can be provided by OCA.

Besides the lack of Israeli leaders' assessment through at-a-distance methods, especially the OCA, there is also no study of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett utilizing this approach. In addition to their noteworthy place in Israeli strategic culture, as leaders who founded Israel and occupied significant posts like prime ministry at a tumultuous time and volatile geography, the empiric assessment of their beliefs does matter. It is because, as political psychologists argue, the political beliefs and personalities of leaders are especially meaningful “in new or uncertain situations” (Schafer & Walker, 2006b: 565). Their period of 1948-1963, in which these two leaders held posts, fits the aforementioned argument. Therefore, I argue that studying these leaders' beliefs in the context of strategic culture makes a lot of sense. When the points mentioned above are considered, this thesis has the potential to contribute to the study of Israeli foreign policy analysis by examining the belief systems of these two influential leaders in the formative periods whose legacy persists today.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter will introduce the research design, methodology, research tools, and hypotheses of the research. “A research design is a plan for collecting and analyzing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator to answer whatever questions he or she has posed” (Ragin & Amoroso, 2011: 28). Based on this definition, the design of this thesis aims to answer the main research question of this thesis: To what extent the belief system of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett reflect the strategic cultural traditions that historical accounts attribute to? This thesis will use ProfilerPlus software by using the VICS scheme to obtain the operational code scores of the leaders.

3.1. The Puzzle

Foreign Policy and Middle East Politics are the fields of research that intrigue me. My journey as a student of International Relations presented me with various historical cases and analytical tools. Cognitive approaches to foreign policy and individual level of analysis offered various case studies from different countries, leaders, and time periods. Considering my interest in Middle East politics, my

readings suggested that Israel is an interesting case to study, and I tried to understand the country's foreign and security policy orientations. It appeared that David Ben-Gurion, the founding leader of the state of Israel, and Moshe Sharett as the first prime minister had an influential legacy on the strategic culture of Israel.

However, the literature focusing on the period they held the posts is predominantly based on historical accounts. I encountered some generic expressions of their foreign policy orientations like 'hawkish' and 'dovish' or 'realist' and 'idealist.' Yet, these accounts are based on interpretive methods or empirically untested statements defining their strategic orientations. As a student of Foreign Policy Analysis, I was curious about the microfoundations of their decisions and foreign/security policy behaviors. I could not find sufficient studies that applied FPA tools and methods to study empirically these leaders, which would have illuminated the two schools of Israeli strategic culture. This situation presented me with a puzzle regarding whether Ben-Gurion and Sharett were realist and idealist leaders, respectively, based on the empirical tests by employing FPA tools.

3.2. Research Questions

Based on the literature review, my main research question is, to what extent does the belief system of individual leaders reflect the strategic cultural traditions? There are also other questions that this thesis will attempt to answer:

- 1) What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Ben-Gurion and Sharett?
- 2) Do Ben-Gurion's philosophical beliefs reflect a hostile image of the political universe? Do his scores correspond to realist leaders?

- 3) Do Ben-Gurion's instrumental beliefs reflect a propensity to choose military force to achieve his political goals? Do his scores correspond to realist leaders?
- 4) Do Moshe Sharett's philosophical beliefs reflect a friendly image of the political universe? Do his scores correspond to idealist leaders?
- 5) Do Moshe Sharett's instrumental beliefs reflect a propensity to employ diplomatic means? Do his scores correspond to idealist leaders?
- 6) How do their operational codes differ from each other?

3.3. Research Design and Methodology


This research will analyze the leadership of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett in the context of the strategic cultures they are attributed to. The method of this thesis is automated content analysis, which will be carried out via ProfilerPlus software for coding by utilizing the VICS scheme. This allows strong coding reliability, and the outcome can be compared with a norming group of world leaders calculated by the ProfilerPlus software (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). The level of analysis of this thesis will be the individual level of analysis. FPA research has a great emphasis on the individual level of analysis with its diverse tools and methods. Individual-level analysis with a focus on the beliefs of leaders will help reveal the microfoundations of the foreign policy orientations of the leaders. Also, the unit of analysis of this thesis is two Israeli leaders. Yet, ProfilerPlus provides scores for verb-based utterances concerning each speech of leaders (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). This is not sufficient to be a unit of analysis. Therefore, to be able to obtain the scores for each leader, I need to aggregate all raw scores of each text. Then the indexes will be calculated for operational codes.

In terms of conceptual clarification, beliefs are used to denote “how leaders are likely to interpret their political environments and map the political terrains in which they operate” (Hermann & Kaarbo, 2020: 74). Beliefs filter the information from the environment and guide human decision making. The research on the beliefs of the policy-makers concentrated on their operational codes, namely their “philosophical and instrumental beliefs that set executives’ parameters for action” (Hermann & Kaarbo, 2020: 74). The philosophical beliefs indicate how leaders view the political universe, while the instrumental beliefs refer to the tendency of leaders to choose the suitable strategies to achieve their goals (Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

Verbs in Context System (VICS) scheme is a content analysis technique utilized in this research to get the operational codes of the leaders by making inferences regarding the belief system of leaders from their speeches (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). VICS procedure follows a certain procedure and concentrates on the transitive verbs in a leader’s public statement and the attributions concerning the exercise of power to Self and Other to create quantitative indices for philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006a; Schafer, 2013). Power is here used to denote “the interplay of different kinds of control relationships between the self and others in the political universe, including the positive sanctions of authority, influence, and reward versus the negative sanctions of resistance, threat, and punishment” (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998: 177). VICS concentrates on the six attributes of verbs and their contexts, which are: “subject, verb category, the domain of politics, tense of the verb intended target, and context” (Walker, Schafer & Young, 2003: 224). VICS assigns the actions of verbs to Self (S) or Other (O). The

attribution is about the tense of verbs like past, present, and future. The verb in the text can be attributed to a positive or negative valence. All transitive verbs are grouped as cooperative or conflictual behavior as a word or a deed (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003: 224). The procedure is represented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Steps in the Verbs in Context System for Coding Verbs



A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980 address to the nation: "Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan ..."

1. Subject. The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase “have invaded” is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. Targets and Context. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979–88.

The complete data line for this statement is: other –3 foreign past Afghanistan Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict 1979–88. Source: Walker et al. 1998. (Retrieved from Feng (2007: 10).

“The balance, central tendency, and range of attributions between Self and Other and among the categories of conflict and cooperation for the exercise of different forms of political power indicate different underlying general beliefs” (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 759). P-1 (the nature of the political universe), P-4 (control over historical development), and I-1 (the political strategy of the agent) are the master beliefs. The VICS indices regarding these master beliefs take a value between –1.0 and +1.0 and measure the balance of attributions as cooperative attribution versus conflictual attribution by Self (I-1) and Others (P-1) or the balance between both cooperative or conflictual attributions (P-4) between Self and Other (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 25–51; Walker & Schafer, 2010). All other values like P-4a and P-4b are derived from these three beliefs.

These master beliefs locate a leader in Holsti's (1977) revised typology. The horizontal axis denotes the leader's belief in control over historical development (P-4). The upper half of the vertical axis depicts the degree of cooperation, while the lower half of the vertical axis depicts the degree of conflict based on the attributions of a leader to Self (I-1) and Other (P-1). These master beliefs help locate the image

of a leader for Self (P-4a, I-1) and Other (P-4, P-1). The place of self in a quadrant refers to the leader's strategic choices regarding diverse political outcomes with reference to the norming group constituted of 35 leaders around the globe from different time periods and geographies (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003). The scores of these norming groups are P-1 = +.28, SD = .20; I-1 = +.39, SD = .23; P-4a = .21, SD = .07; P-4b = .79, SD = .07 (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Having the norming group scores is important because they constitute the midpoints to differentiate leaders based on whether their scores are above or below the ones of average world leaders (Walker & Schafer, 2007).⁶

I measure the beliefs of Ben-Gurion and Sharett with quantitative indices based on the VICS scheme in order that the hypotheses stemming from each historical analysis can be tested and the results assessed in a detailed way. Historical accounts and scholars of Israeli studies attribute realist orientation to Ben-Gurion, while idealist orientation to the Sharett. "A leader's beliefs may reflect and resemble the assumptions and explanations associated with a general theory of international relations." (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 749). To be more specific, Crichlow (1998: 700) states that:

if one were to predict the basic components of the operational code of an idealist, one would likely expect the idealist to see his or her political environment as essentially cooperative, and to be predisposed to interacting with others in a cooperative way. Realists, on the other hand, would likely see their world as conflictual, and respond to it in kind.

⁶ There are various versions of the norming group dataset. Yet, principal studies of operational code research utilized the same data on all the average leader's belief scores comprising both the mean scores and standard deviations, see Schafer and Walker (2006a), Schafer and Walker (2006b), and Walker and Schafer (2007). This thesis will also adopt this version of the norming group.

It refers that both theories can be associated with and are based on individual cognitive characteristics (Herz, 1951), which also resonates with Snyder (1977) and other strategic culture scholars' emphasis on the elite beliefs as explained in Chapter 2. The final aims and overall view of the political environment perceived by leaders distinguish realists and idealists (Smith, 2020). Thus, this study will adopt the definitions and assumptions made in Crichlow's (1998) and Walker and Schafer's study (2007) by attributing cooperative worldview and optimism to idealist orientation and conflictual worldview and pessimism to realist orientation. These IR theories are also used in the literature as strategic cultures and foreign policy orientations (Crichlow, 1998; Feng, 2007; Walker & Schafer, 2007). Based on the broad definition of strategic culture, this thesis will also use strategic culture and foreign policy orientations interchangeably.

Apart from these definitions and operationalization, I also utilize a theory of inferences about preferences related to diverse belief systems, which enables a connection between the beliefs and foreign policy strategies of Ben-Gurion and Sharett and permits the analysis of the consistency between their political beliefs and foreign policy tendencies from the historical examples. The leaders' operational codes are ordered in a hierarchical way. Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) relates the kinds of beliefs in Holsti/Walker typology to preference rankings regarding the political outcomes of settlement, domination, deadlock, and submission, which offers a connection with beliefs and foreign policies of leaders and helps to assess the congruence between their beliefs and foreign policy orientations described in historical accounts (Walker, 2004, 2007). Considering the

aim thesis that explains the micro-foundations of strategic culture, it will fit my thesis.

While this thesis will attempt to locate Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief system along the realist-idealist continuum of strategic cultures/foreign policy orientations, these "cultural archetypes represent the logic of 'bounded rationality' associated with cognitive consistency theory" (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 753). The model of bounded rationality suggested by Herbert Simon (1985) assumes that a decision-maker does not act perfectly rational and "is *steered*⁷ by his/her system of beliefs in the identification of options, end/means calculations, and choice of action" (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 6). In other words, rationality is constrained by the psychological mechanisms that influence the decision-making process. This model constitutes an alternative to the rational actor model or "substantive rationality" model that assumes a decision-maker acts based merely on cost-benefit calculations and utility maximization (Simon, 1985, Walker & Schafer, 2021).

Yet, scholars of the "cognitive paradigm" argue that the costs of making fully informed and perfectly rational decisions are high. Therefore, people embrace various cognitive shortcuts (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) and simplify the decision-making process in a complex world (Jervis, 1976). Walker and Schafer (2006a: 8) argue that "If we think of the operational code in terms of steering effects associated with bounded rationality, then the quantitative indicators of the operational code are appropriate explanatory variables." Operational codes as belief systems surround rationality, filter the information and influence the decision-

⁷ Emphasis belongs to Walker and Schafer.

making (George, 1969; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). This thesis also adopts the bounded rationality model and its assumptions that are in line with the cognitive approach of Foreign Policy Analysis that puts an emphasis on cognitive predispositions.

This thesis utilizes ProfilerPlus,⁸ the automated content analysis software that retrieves and encodes the verbs in public statements of leaders to examine the operational codes of leaders based on the VICS scheme. ProfilerPlus is useful for at-a-distance leadership assessment compared to hand-coded analysis due to, among many, speed and efficiency (Marfleet & Walker, 2006; Schafer, 2013). Also, computer-based content analysis via ProfilerPlus helps prevent human bias and error in coding. Since all the procedures of the VICS are computerized, this thesis, thanks to ProfilerPlus, will ensure 100% coding reliability (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Therefore, as an advanced at-a-distance method (Schafer, 2013), and a commonly used tool by researchers in operational code analysis, ProfilerPlus will be employed for this thesis.

3.4. Data

This thesis used the speech texts belonging to Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett as its data for calculating the operational codes of leaders. The time period of the texts collected for Ben-Gurion was between 1948-1954 and 1955-1963, when he was the prime minister. The time period for Moshe Sharett was between 1948 and 1956 when he was the foreign then prime minister of Israel. The Prime minister and foreign

⁸ Social Science Automation company developed the language parser software program, Profiler Plus. ProfilerPlus sends the scores in Excel files to the researchers in a short time. Accessible through www.socialscienceautomation.com.

minister are central figures in developing foreign policy in Israel constitutes the reason why these periods are chosen. The texts are mainly collected from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.⁹ Other sources include the Jewish Virtual Library,¹⁰ a comprehensive and reliable source for research on Israel, the Center for Israeli Education¹¹ for one of Moshe Sharett's speeches, Sharett Web Doc,¹² and the Moshe Sharett Heritage Society,¹³ which offers an archive for Sharett's speeches. Many speeches of David Ben-Gurion are accessible in both the Jewish Virtual Library and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In these cases, I chose the ones on the foreign ministry's website since it is an official resource.

3.4.1. Data Selection

I followed Walker, Schafer, and Young's (1998: 182) four criteria for foreign policy speeches when I sampled the public statements: "(1) the subject and object are international in scope; (2) the focus of interaction is a political issue; (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflictual." In addition, there is another rule that public statements should have at least 15 verbs at the minimum (Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

Table 5. The Basic Features of the Dataset

Leaders	Number of Speeches	Number of Total Verbs	Number of Total Words
Ben-Gurion	12	1913	72318
Sharett	11	1486	42313
Total	23	3399	114631

⁹ https://www.gov.il/en/departments/ministry_of_foreign_affairs/govil-landing-page

¹⁰ <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/>

¹¹ <https://israeled.org/documents/>

¹² The website publishes the speeches of Sharett in his diary, My Struggle for Peace: The Diary of Moshe Sharett.

¹³ https://www.sharett.org.il/cgi-webaxy/item?en_index

Following these criteria also requires eliminating various speeches on issues like domestic politics. Therefore, I was able to collect 23 speeches with 114631 words in total. In terms of the number of verbs, the ProfilerPlus coded 3399 verbs in total. After I collected the speeches, I cleaned the data for analysis. I turned the documents into a txt file format and then the UTF-8-BOM format that ProfilerPlus needed for processing. Since the ProfilerPlus has no dictionary in Hebrew, even if it had, my insufficient knowledge of Hebrew would not enable me to analyze the speech in the original language, which constitutes the main limitation of this thesis. Therefore, I used English texts in the form of either delivered in English or translated to it.

3.5. Case Selection

I chose David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett's leadership to analyze microfoundations of the foreign policy orientations due to several reasons. First, both leaders are referred to as having a notable impact on the Israeli strategic culture and foreign policy. Various scholars argued that Ben-Gurion and Sharett represent two schools of thought within the Israeli strategic community (Petrelli 2017: Del Sarto 2017). The differences in orientation and leadership can be summarized as (Petrelli, 2017: 21-22):

a hawkish, activist, security-centered school of thought stood against a moderate one who privileged a tailored use of force, negotiation, and diplomacy. Conceptually, the 'activist' school headed by Ben-Gurion and the 'moderate' school headed by Moshe Sharett could be viewed as expressions in the realm of policy and the grand strategy of the two ethoses (offensive and defensive) developed by the Zionist community between the end of the nineteenth century and 1948.

Ben-Gurion was the founding leader of Israel and held the posts of prime minister (17 May 1948 – 26 January 1954 and 3 November 1955 – 26 June 1963) and defense

minister (14 May 1948 – 26 January 1954 and 21 February 1955 – 26 June 1963). His foreign policy behavior and defense strategies formed the basics of Israel's classic national security policy in general and defense doctrine in specific (Bar, 2020: Freilich, 2018; Horowitz, 1983). Moshe Sharett was the country's foreign (15 May 1948 – 18 June 1956) and then prime minister (26 January 1954 – 3 November 1955). He was an important figure from the pre-state (Yishuv) period and took part in the most significant episodes in Israeli history until the late 1950s.

In addition to their notable place in Israeli strategic culture, as leaders who founded Israel and occupied significant posts like prime ministry at a tumultuous time and volatile geography, the empiric assessment of their beliefs does matter. It is because, as political psychologists argue, the political beliefs and personalities of leaders are especially meaningful “in new or uncertain situations” (Hermann, 1976; Holsti, 1976; Greenstein, 1987; Hagan, 2002¹⁴, as cited from Schafer & Walker, 2006b: 565). Their period of 1948-1956, in which these two leaders held posts, fits the aforementioned argument. Regarding the time scope and the importance of the leaders, Sheffer (1983: 97) made a concise argument:

The period has a special significance, as it was when both Ben-Gurion and Sharett were at the apex of their political careers; each had achieved fame, credibility and recognition among Israelis, in the Jewish Diaspora and the non-Jewish world, and they saw themselves - and were regarded - as the senior leaders in the Israeli political hierarchy.

Therefore, I argue that studying these leaders' beliefs in the context of strategic culture makes much sense in addition to the absence of a study analyzing these

¹⁴ This citation is made incorrectly by Walker and Schafer (2006b). The date of Hagan's publication is 2001. Since the phrase is cited with the references as cited in the main source, I cite it as it appears in the Walker and Schafer's article (2006b).

leaders by using the Operational Code Analysis. These points constitute the rationale for choosing the case for my study.

The case selection also constitutes one of the possible ways of contributing to the FPA and International Relations of the Middle East literature. Hermann (2001) argued that FPA models and tools are primarily applied in Western contexts. The leaders of non-Western countries are not investigated enough and constitute a problem in better understanding the foreign policymaking in the Global South (Brummer, 2021; Özdamar, 2017). The regions like MENA deserve more attention to apply and enhance FPA tools. Darwich and Kaarbo (2020: 235) rightly assert that "given the centralized nature of foreign policymaking in Middle Eastern states, leaders and their personalities are a critical gap in current IRME research." Building on these observations, this study will attempt to contribute to FPA and IRME kinds of literature by addressing this gap in the literature with its case selection and tool.

3.6. Hypotheses

This historical account of two leaders' legacies in Israeli foreign policy relies upon two diverse psychological bases. In other words, there are two conflicting accounts regarding the microfoundations of their strategic behavior. Ben-Gurion is often regarded as 'an adherent of the Realist' (Brecher, 2016), 'hawkish' (Shlaim 1983: Lissak, 1983), and 'more offensive' (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013). However, Moshe Sharett as a leader is viewed as 'dovish' (Shlaim, 1983; Lissak, 1983), 'liberal' (Sheffer, 2015), and 'moderate' (Brecher, 2016; Sheffer, 1996). These adjectives ascribed to the leaders denote that they show different characteristics (Shlaim, 1983; Brecher, 2016). Besides, they are attributed to different strategic

schools and foreign policy orientations, as outlined above in Case Selection and explained in Chapter 2. Based on this literature, my main research question is, to what extent does the belief system of individual leaders reflect the strategic cultural traditions? To test the historical accounts of the leaders, I utilize operational code analysis to determine whether the views of Self and Other in their statements are in line with historical accounts. Based on historical accounts, I expect to find that David Ben-Gurion is a realist (Type DEF or Type B) leader while Moshe Sharett is an idealist (Type A or Type C) leader. These theoretical expectations and the beliefs related to each type of belief system bring me to suggest the following hypotheses:¹⁵

H1: As a realist, Ben-Gurion's philosophical beliefs will reflect a hostile image of the political universe and a pessimistic view of the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals.

H2: As a realist, Ben-Gurion's instrumental beliefs will reflect a conflictual propensity to prefer the use of force to attain his political goals if diplomatic means should fail.

H3: As an idealist, Moshe Sharett's philosophical beliefs will reflect a friendly image of the political universe and an optimistic view of the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals.

H4: As an idealist, Moshe Sharett's instrumental beliefs will reflect a propensity to employ diplomatic means and a corresponding reluctance to employ force to achieve political goals.

¹⁵ When I suggest hypotheses, I utilized Walker and Schafer's (2007) study on Roosevelt and Wilson's strategic culture. Since the study is very similar to mine, I adopted the way they formulized hypothesis.

H5: Ben-Gurion's master belief scores are statistically different from the norming group of world leaders

H6: Sharett's master belief scores are statistically different from the norming group of world leaders

Similar to many works, this thesis will test their hypotheses by employing automated content analysis carried out by the Profiler Plus software and statistical significance tests.

To conclude, this thesis will test the extent to which the belief system of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett reflect the strategic cultural traditions that historical accounts attribute to them. The case of these two Israeli leaders has the potential to contribute to the literature by examining the microfoundations of the foreign policy orientations by employing the operational code analysis via the VICS scheme. This study also bears on the IR theories by showing the microfoundations of the foreign policy decision-making of leaders. The OCA research program offers a reliable tool to measure and assess beliefs as aspects of strategic culture. The next chapter will show the results of the data analysis.

CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This section will introduce the biographies of David Ben Gurion, who is the first prime minister and founder of Israel (1948–53, 1955–63), and Moshe Sharett, the foreign (1948–56) then second prime minister (1953–55), which will provide background information for the empirical analysis in this chapter. This background is important because it will give us clues about life experiences and personalities that can be illuminating when their belief systems are analyzed. The operational code analysis of leaders will reveal where they are located in the realist-idealist spectrum. Then, the results of the data analysis with a discussion will be presented.

4.1. Biography of David Ben-Gurion

David Ben-Gurion was born in Plonsk, Poland, in 1886 and obtained his Jewish education in a Hebrew school founded by his father, Avigdor Green, one of the founders of the Zionist movement (Shapira, 2014). Young David was influenced by the ideas of Zionism and believed that Jews should immigrate to Palestine to revive Israel. When he was a teenager, he founded a youth group dedicated to the revival of

the Hebrew language and Zionist principles. When Ben-Gurion turned 18 years old, he moved to Warsaw and became a teacher in a Jewish school. In his 20's, he arrived in Palestine and settled there as a farmer in Galilee, northern Palestine. Ben-Gurion pioneered a socialist-Zionist party called "Poalei-Tzion" ("Workers of Zion"), and in the 1907 party convention, it was declared that independence was the primary aim (Shapira, 2014). Then, he moved to Saloniki and established ties with Jewish people living there.

In 1912, he studied law at Darülfunun (Istanbul University). He aimed to facilitate the immigration of Jews to Ottoman Palestine. He moved to Israel for vacation; however, when World War I broke out, Ben-Gurion was deported to Egypt because of the suspicion of the Ottoman elites for Zionist activities. He moved to New York and continued his efforts to raise awareness about the Zionist cause. Ben-Gurion established ties with American Jewry, held certain fame, and then returned to Israel and took part in the British army's Jewish Legion, headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky (Shapira, 2014). Under British rule, he was among the founders of the Ahdut ha-Avodah Party and national trade union, the Histadrut. Ben-Gurion became the secretary-general of Histadrut and represented it in the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency. In 1930, his party merged with "HaPoel Hatza-ir" and formed the "Workers' Party of the Land of Israel" (called "Mapai" by its Hebrew acronym) (Shapira, 2014). In 1935, Ben-Gurion became Chairman of the Jewish Agency. Ben-Gurion took part in every significant decision of the Zionist movement since the 1920s in various roles ranging from delegate to chairman. He was in favor of a gradual approach on the path to declaring statehood.

British Rule limited the Jewish settlement in Mandatory Palestine by publishing the White Paper in 1939. Ben-Gurion opposed this decision and called for a struggle against the British administration (Horowitz, Lissak, & Hoffman, 1978). He encouraged Jewish immigration to forbidden areas. However, he sided with the British army's efforts when World War II began. After WWII, Ben-Gurion rejected proposals for compromise with British rule. There were clashes between British rule and Ben-Gurion's organization. In 1942, he advocated for the independent Jewish state in the Biltmore Program. There was a rising tension with Arabs, and he placed security issues as a primary priority. He assumed the defense abilities of the Yishuv and trained members. On April 18th, 1948, Ben-Gurion became the leader of the People's Administration and was also in charge of security matters of the Yishuv. On May 14th, 1948, when the People's Council declared the State of Israel, Ben-Gurion became the Prime Minister and Defense Minister. The decision to establish Israel was taken at the United Nations General Assembly with the backing of the US and the Soviets.

David Ben Gurion decided to dismember all the underground or resistance militant groups and then formed a single national army, the Israeli Defense Forces (Shapira, 2014). For Ben-Gurion, the state of Israel was a continuation of Jewish history, which was interrupted since the Roman Empire exiled them from Palestine. As a part of his nation-building efforts, Ben-Gurion attached importance to the immigration of Jews from the world to the newborn state. This would strengthen the Jewish character of the state and fuse with the ones settled there beforehand. In terms of foreign policy, he said, "it is not important what the Gentiles¹⁶ say, important is what

¹⁶ It refers to "the entire gentile (non-Jewish) world." (Caplan, 2020: 27).

the Jews do” (Shalom, 2002: 64). The historical experience influenced Ben-Gurion’s foreign policy orientation. He “espoused realism in the light of Britain’s betrayal of the Zionist movement, of the Arabs’ fierce opposition to Zionism, and of the tragic outcome of Jewish powerlessness in Europe” (Navon, 2004: 2). Arab countries did not recognize the state of Israel and started a joint military operation against Israel, which resulted in an Israeli victory. The US and Britain were not content with the policies of Ben-Gurion. Also, the Soviets were arming the Arab countries, which isolated Israel further and gave the Soviets a foothold in the region.

In 1953, Ben-Gurion stepped down from the government, and Moshe Sharett claimed the position of prime minister in January 1954. Ben-Gurion came to power again in 1955. He became the defense minister and then prime minister (Shapira, 2014). Due to the war in Algeria and the united Arab stance led by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, France aligned with Israel in the region. Egypt received a great number of arms from the Czech Republic, and Israel received from France (Caplan, 2015). Nasser prevented the passage of Israeli ships from the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. There was also an ongoing process regarding the funding of the Aswan High Dam project, which halted with the British and American offers canceled. Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, which France and Britain controlled. In 1956, there was a war between the Egypt-led Arab armies and the armies of France, Britain, and Israel (Caplan, 2015). Ben-Gurion tasked the army with the takeover of the Suez Canal to remove threats emanating from the Arab military concentration. Israel held the peninsula within a few days and made possible the passage of Israeli ships from the Strait of Tiran. After the end of the war, Israel agreed to withdraw its army and gained the right to navigate in the strait.

Ben-Gurion created a strong army in the region and desired to achieve nuclear power to deter the Arab forces that outnumbered them (Bar-Joseph, 1982). In June 1963, he stepped down from the government in the face of the growing opposition to this leadership. Although he broke ties with his party, Mapai, two years later and then formed a new party, Rafi, his party gained ten seats against the forty-five seats of Mapai. In 1970, he abandoned politics when he was 85 years old. He lived in the Negev until his death in December 1973.

Ben-Gurion trained the next generation of leaders like Shimon Peres, Moshe Dayan, and Abba Eban. He also had adverse relations with political figures like Moshe Sharett and Golda Meir, although the second group was much more experienced than the first group of leaders. Brecher (2016: 118) argued that while Ben-Gurion was the “*voice of violence* as a path to the achievement of a viable peace with the Palestinians,” “Moshe Sharett was the genuine *voice of peace* throughout his tenure as de facto Foreign Minister of the Jewish community aspiring statehood, from 1933 to 1948, and as Foreign Minister of Israel from 1948 to 1956 including a brief period as Prime Minister (1953-1955).”¹⁷ Brecher (2016: 168) argued that they presented “contrasting personalities” and worldviews. Moshe Sharett also expresses this situation in an interview carried out by Brecher: “I am quiet, reserved, and careful; Ben-Gurion is impulsive, impetuous, and acts on intuition” (2016: 162). Ben Gurion was decisive and courageous, while Sharett was hesitant and cautious. Also, Ben-Gurion held the belief that rebellion was the only way out of the renaissance of the Jews. Sharett, similar to Chaim Weizmann, regarded this flow of history as natural.

¹⁷ Italics belongs to Brecher.

These statements mark the differing characteristics of the leaders, which also influence policy-making.

4.2. Biography of Moshe Sharett

Moshe Sharett was born in Kherson, Ukraine, in October 1894. He immigrated to Ottoman Palestine along with his family in 1906. Sharett studied law in Istanbul, and, following World War I onset, he participated in the Ottoman army by serving as an interpreter. After the war, Moshe Sharett studied at the London School of Economics in 1922 (Sheffer, 1996). During his stay in the UK, he was involved in a Zionist socialist movement and became the editor of a newspaper. Also, Sharett met with influential figures like Chaim Weizman, the World Zionist Organization leader, whom he admired (Sheffer, 1996). Following the return to Palestine under the British mandate, he claimed the position of the head of the political branch of the Jewish Agency in 1933, an organization that is part of the World Zionist Organization and that encourages Jews to settle in the historic land.

During this period, he became famous for his successful negotiations for Polish refugees deported by the Soviets to Tehran. Sharett aimed to return them to Palestine, and his negotiations in Tehran bore fruits. Under the British mandate, he was detained for Zionist activities for a few months. In 1947, he played an important role in the United States for the adoption of the partition plan (Sheffer, 1996; Sofer, 1998). In 1948, after the independence of the state of Israel was declared, he became one of the founders of the state and the first foreign minister. In the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, he was in charge of foreign affairs. Sharett initiated and forged diplomatic ties

with numerous countries. He made various agreements with countries like Syria and Lebanon as part of the ongoing conflict processes.

Following Ben-Gurion's leave from prime ministry in 1954, Sharett was elected by Mapai, his party, to take over the position. He maintained economic development policy; *aliyah*, Jewish immigration to Palestine; aimed at more stable relations with the Arab world, and seemed to have a more conciliatory approach. Before Ben-Gurion left his position, Sharett submitted his plan concerning Israeli Defense Forces to reinforce Israeli security against a possible war with the Arabs. Sharett was in favor of non-military ways by:

activating solutions to the refugee problem by a bold and concrete offer on our part to pay compensation; restoring good relations with the Great Powers; ceaseless effort for an understanding with Egypt. Each of these courses of action is liable to get us in a vicious circle and yet we are not exempt from struggling and trying” (Shlaim, 1983: 185).

This also showed the divergence of understanding and a means to an end between the two leaders, which can be found in other cases.

When Nasser took power in Egypt from General Naguib and Adib Shishakli was ousted in by a military coup in Syria in 1954, Sharett, Defense Minister Pinhas Levon, and Chief of Staff of IDF, Moshe Dayan, came together with Ben-Gurion for a consultation about the Israeli reaction. Moshe Dayan and Pinhas Levon were very close to Ben-Gurion's worldview and advocated an “activist” view of defense and foreign policy. Ben-Gurion and Levon were in favor of sending a military force to the border between Israel and Syria. Sharett was firmly against any military plan which would end up in failure. While Ben-Gurion was more prone to taking military risks, Sharett was more averse to taking unnecessary risks and meddling in the

internal affairs of the Arab states (Shlaim, 1983). Sharett prioritized diplomacy and negotiation while he was dealing with the crises. Yet, Levon and Dayan were more in line with the idea of “active military deterrence” (Shlaim, 1983: 187).

However, Sharett’s prime ministry was short-lived. There was a serious clash between his moderate line of defense and foreign policy with a more activist and tougher approach within the party and the government. In 1955, Ben-Gurion again became the prime minister of the country, and Sharett was the foreign minister (Sheffer, 1996). During this period, he made visits to European countries and the US to deliver Israel’s position to the Czech arms agreement with Egypt. He failed to secure an arms deal with the US. Yet, he left the foreign ministry due to disagreements within the party and government. Sharett retired from politics and did not take another role in the government and began to work in a publishing house, and chaired the World Zionist Organization. He died in 1965 in Jerusalem.

The section above outlines the biographies of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. They represented two different actor characteristics and demonstrated two different approaches to defense and foreign policy. This observation is not only made by historians or scholars but also by their colleagues as well. Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff, stated, “Ben Gurionism' expressed firmness, activism, leadership, concentration on vital matters and going forward fearlessly even when doing so involves many risks and difficulties. 'Sharettism' symbolized accommodation, recoiling from action and acceptance of what is available at the expense of what is desirable” (Shlaim, 1983: 181).

Shimon Peres, who took roles in the 1950s and was a student of Ben-Gurion, made a similar observation regarding the difference in an interview in 1966: “Ben-Gurion respected the personal qualities of Sharett, his precision, and thoroughness; he thought of him as a brilliant technician; but he felt that Sharett lived in an artificial world where gestures, words, were given great importance” (Brecher, 2016: 165). He also described the approach of Ben-Gurion as “worldly realism.” Abba Eban, who was the permanent representative of Israel to the UN from 1948 to 1959, regarded Sharett as someone who “incarnating the public conscience” (Brecher, 2016: 165). In sum, these two leaders portrayed two different approaches and personalities. The biographies of the leaders will be helpful to give a background for the following data analysis based on their speeches.

4.3. Data Analysis

ProfilerPlus coded 23 speeches in total. I obtained the raw scores, aggregated them for each index, and calculated the mean scores. The results provide interesting and illuminating insights for Ben-Gurion and Sharett as well as the Israeli Strategic Culture. Below I presented the scores for each philosophical belief, which refers to the leader's perception of Other, and instrumental beliefs, referring to the leader's perception of Self. Philosophical beliefs guide leaders in evaluating the nature of the political universe and other leaders. Instrumental beliefs are the beliefs prescribing to the leader the most appropriate strategy and tactics for achieving the goals (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Among these scores, three of them are defined as the master beliefs that impacted the rest of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

They are P-1, I-1, and P-4 scores. P-1 index refers to the leader's view of the nature of the political universe. A leader may have a hostile or friendly view of the political environment based on his operational code analysis. I-1 index signifies the direction of the strategy to achieve the goals. A leader may adopt a cooperative or conflictual strategy. P-4 index denotes a leader's belief in control over historical development. This index shows the locus of control attributed to Self (P-4a) over the flow of history and the locus of control attributed to Other (P-4b) (Walker & Schafer, 2003). A leader's belief in control over historical development can be low or high based on the score obtained from operational code analysis. The table below shows the scores for interpreting the master beliefs.

Table 6. Scores for Evaluating the Master Beliefs of P-1, I-1, and P-4 (Walker & Schafer, 2003; Renshon, 2009).

P-1 Nature of the Political Universe (Hostile/Friendly)						
Hostile				Friendly		
Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very
-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+0.25	+.50	+.75
I-1 Direction of Strategy (Conflict/Cooperation)						
Conflict				Cooperation		
Very	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very
-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+0.25	+.50	+.75
P-4 Control over Historical Development (Very Low/Very High)						
Control				Control		
Very Low	Definitely	Somewhat	Mixed	Somewhat	Definitely	Very High
-.75	-.50	-.25	0.0	+0.25	+.50	+.75

4.3.1. Findings

Table 7 shows the political and instrumental belief scores of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett compared with the mean scores of the norming sample of world leaders via two-tailed difference of means tests. To begin with philosophical beliefs, Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief about the nature of the political universe is mixed, with a tendency toward a friendly view. Ben-Gurion scored slightly ($P-1 = 0.195$) more than Moshe Sharett ($P-1 = 0.165$). However, both leaders saw the political universe as less friendly than the norming group of world leaders ($P-1 = 0.30$). $P-1$ is also a master belief, and both leaders' scores are significantly different from the norming group (at $p < .05$ level).

Regarding the operational codes for realizing the political goals and values, both Ben-Gurion and Sharett displayed a little optimism ($P-2 = 0.035$, $P-2 = 0.030$, respectively). Another similar score appears in predicting the political future. Both Ben-Gurion and Sharett's scores show that the predictability of the future is mixed, with a tendency toward high ($P-3 = 0.189$, $P-3 = 0.152$). When it comes to the belief regarding the control over historical development, which is also a master belief, both leaders scored mixed with a tendency toward high ($P-4 = 0.143$, $P-4 = 0.112$), which is significantly different from the norming group (at $p < .01$ and $p < .001$ levels, respectively). Ben-Gurion's score on belief in mastery of historical development is higher than Sharett's, although both leaders scored below the norming group of world leaders. Interestingly, both leaders scored very high in their belief in the role of chance ($P-5 = 0.973$, $P-5 = 0.987$). While Sharett put a slightly higher belief on the role of a chance than Ben-Gurion, both leaders' scores are above the norming group.

In terms of instrumental beliefs, both leaders moderately tended to adopt conflictual strategies for their goals ($I-1 = 0.360$, $I-1 = 0.423$). $I-1$ is also a master belief, and Ben-Gurion's score is significantly different from the norming group (at $p < .05$ level). When it comes to tactics to attain the goals, both leaders are of very similar scores and adopted nearly somewhat conflictual ways ($I-2 = 0.153$, $I-2 = 0.174$). Both leaders have similar risk orientation scores and are somewhat risk acceptant ($I-3 = 0.259$, $I-3 = 0.289$). Ben-Gurion's preferred timing of the action is very conflictual than Sharett's, which is a serious discrepancy between the scores of the two leaders that are not found contrary to previous scores.

Ben-Gurion had a greater tendency to switch between cooperative and conflictual tactics higher tendency to shift between cooperative and conflictual tactics ($I-4a$) and between words and deeds ($I-4b$), ascribed a considerably lesser utility to *Promise* tactics ($I-5c$) and more utility to *Appeal* tactics ($I-5e$) as a means of goal attainment. Sharett ascribed much less utility to *Promise* and *Reward* tactics ($I-5b$ and $I-5a$) and more utility to *Appeal* and *Threaten* tactics ($I-5c$ and $I-5e$) as a means of goal attainment. The results confirm Hypothesis 5, which postulates that Ben-Gurion's master belief scores are statistically different from the norming group of world leaders. The analysis also supports Hypothesis 6, which postulates that Sharett's master belief scores are statistically different from the norming group.

Table 7. The Operational Codes of Ben-Gurion and Sharett Vis-A-Vis the Norming Group

Political Beliefs	Ben-Gurion (n=12)	Sharett (n=11)	Norming Group (n=164)
P-1 Nature of the Political Universe (Friendly/Hostile)	0.195*	0.165*	0.301
P-2 Realization of Political Values (Pessimistic/Optimistic)	0.035**	0.030*	0.147
P-3 Predictability of Political Future (Low/High)	0.189*	0.152	0.134
P-4 Control Over Historical Development (Low/High)	0.143**	0.112***	0.224
P-5 Role of Chance	0.973	0.987***	0.968
I-1 Strategic Approach to Goals (Cooperative/Conflictual)	0.360*	0.423	0.401
I-2 Tactical Pursuit of Goals (Cooperative/Conflictual)	0.153	0.174	0.178
I-3 Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)	0.259	0.289	0.332
I-4 Timing of Action			
a. Cooperation/Conflict	1.360***	0.486	0.503
b. Words/Deeds	0.841**	0.471	0.464
I-5 Utility of Means			
a. Reward	0.235	0.093*	0.157
b. Promise	0.014***	0.080	0.075
c. Appeal/Support	0.431	0.488	0.468
d. Oppose/resist	0.185	0.143	0.154
e. Threaten	0.119*	0.488***	0.034
f. Punish	0.235*	0.093	0.112

*Average Leader's mean for a sample (n=35) of world leaders from different regions and eras. Significant differences between leader and norming group indices at the following levels: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

After demonstrating the operational code scores of leaders, I will locate both leaders in the realist-idealist spectrum based on quantitative results. Master beliefs are used to locate a leader in one of the four quadrants in Holsti's (1977) leadership typology. Self indices are I-1 and P-4a, while Other indices are P-1 and P-4b. These Self and Other images are located on a coordinate system. The horizontal axis corresponds to P-4 scores of historical control, while the vertical axes correspond to P-1/I-1 scores regarding the political universe and the strategy to achieve goals. Self image of leaders is determined by the I-1 and P-4a scores. Other image of a leader is determined by P-1 and P-4b¹⁸ scores.

The operational codes of leaders are "considered to be manifestations or articulations of the diagnostic prism and the prescriptive codes that originate from the cultural milieu in which the leader finds himself or herself" (Malici, 2006a: 42). The philosophical and instrumental beliefs are used to place a leader into one of the quadrants of the Holsti's revised typology of leadership. The two types of leadership in the upper quadrants (Type A and Type C) are defined as idealists since they have a common view of the cooperative nature of the political environment. However, they vary in the degree of control over historical development ascribed to Self and Other. The two types of leadership in the lower quadrants (Type DEF and Type B) are defined as realists since they have a common view of the cooperative nature of the political environment. However, they vary in the degree of control over historical development ascribed to Self and Other.

¹⁸ Since ProfilerPlus does not directly provide a P-4b index, I obtained the index by applying the I-P-4a formula (Schafer & Walker, 2006a).


The figures below show Sharett and Ben-Gurion's images for Self and Other typologies. The plots are drawn based on the z-scores for Self and Other indices calculated by subtracting the mean for the sample of world leaders from each leader's score in Table 8 and dividing by the standard deviation for the sample of world leaders.¹⁹ It is necessary to locate leaders in the realist - idealist spectrum based on the z-scores since the aggregated operational code scores will be statistically meaningful when compared to the norming group of world leaders.

Table 8. Standard Deviation Z-Scores for Deviations in Beliefs from Norming Group for Sharett and Ben-Gurion

Beliefs / Leader	Sharett	Ben-Gurion
P-1	-0.47	-0.37
I-1	0.05	-0.09
P-4a	-0.88	-0.63
P-4b	0.88	0.63

¹⁹ For similar use of z-scores for plotting, see Malici (2006a), Walker and Schafer (2007).

Figure 3. Self Images of Sharett and Ben-Gurion²⁰



The results show that Ben-Gurion and Sharett attributed different typologies to their belief of Self and Other. To begin with, Sharett's image of Self corresponds to Type A. This type of leader has an optimistic view of prospects for cooperation. The conflict stems from impulsive responses and miscommunication. The future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is not high. Also, Type A leaders "establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force" (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 13).


²⁰ The I-1 and P-1 indices are plotted on the same axis because they both capture the strategic orientation of actors. While I-1 is about self's strategic orientation, P-1 is about self's perceived strategic orientation of Other.

Type A leaders are “moderate idealists” that “lack the propensity to make waves in the political universe that comes with a higher sense of historical control” (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 753). It is possible to argue that Moshe Sharett bears on the characteristics of Type A leadership typology, which also overlap with the historical accounts of his leadership and strategic orientation. He is known for emphasizing negotiation and diplomacy and avoiding escalatory foreign policies. Therefore, the results of the data analysis confirm Hypothesis 4.

On the other hand, Ben-Gurion’s image of Self is Type DEF. This type of leadership falls under the category of realist leaders, and such leaders follow limited aims adopting moderate means in the recognition that the use of force can be necessary depending on the rival. Type DEF leaders are “moderate realists” that “lack the propensity to make waves in the political universe that comes with a higher sense of historical control” (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 753). For them, unequal distribution of power is a serious cause of war. The future is not much predictable. Analysis shows that Ben-Gurion’s image of Self reveals a more conflictual strategic outlook relative to the norming group of world leaders. Ben-Gurion is known for emphasizing national security and prioritizing defense strategy over foreign policy considerations. He resorted to the use of force when he saw it necessary. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2 that Ben-Gurion’s instrumental beliefs reflect a hostile image of the political universe as a realist leader. The result is in line with the historical account of Ben-Gurion, who was often referred to be a realist leader.

Both leaders demonstrate having a different view of Self in terms of enjoying a cooperative and conflictual orientation in terms of tactics and strategies. Although Ben-Gurion similarly attributed himself less historical control relative to world leaders, he attributed himself more control over history compared to Sharett. This positioning of leaders renders Ben-Gurion a realist and Sharett an idealist, stemming from the master beliefs regarding the nature of the political universe and the most effective strategies and tactics. In the realist perspective of international politics, such leaders regard conflict as a constant feature of world politics; therefore, security is a principal concern (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Whereas "idealists who share a belief in the cooperative nature of the political universe but differ in the degree of control over historical development attributed to self and other" (Walker & Schafer, 2007: 751).

Figure 4. Sharett and Ben-Gurion's Image of Other



With regard to the image of Other, the results show that both Ben-Gurion and Sharett shared the same typologies in their belief in the nature of the political universe.

Sharett and Ben-Gurion's image of Other corresponds to Type B, which fails to support Hypothesis 3 and supports Hypothesis 1. The analysis demonstrates that both leaders attributed a more conflictual strategic outlook to Other relative to the norming group of world leaders. Sharett attributed Other more historical control compared to norm groups. Although Ben-Gurion similarly attributed Other more historical control relative to world leaders, he attributed Other less control over history compared to Sharett. Nevertheless, both leaders demonstrate having a common view of Other in terms of attributing a conflictual orientation in terms of tactics and strategies. Utilizing the common terms of international relations, what appears is a situation of a liberal/idealist leader in Sharett operating in a world filled with realist Others. This positioning of leaders renders both leaders realists stemming from the master beliefs regarding the adverse nature of the political universe and the most effective strategies and tactics.

The analysis above shows that while Sharett and Ben-Gurion attribute different typologies to themselves (Type A and Type DEF, respectively), both attributed Other to Type B realist. The coordinates of Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b) that are used to locate leaders help produce predictions with regard to strategic preferences over the goals of settle, submit, dominate, and deadlock (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). In this context, Walker and Schafer (2006a) offered the Theory of Inferences about Preferences, which is a formal deductive model to understand how a specific perception impacts a leader's preferences regarding the political outcomes as a result of interaction with others. These preferences are charted based on different propositions.

Table 9. An Expanded Version of Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)²¹

Self & Other Values Preference Order in a 2 X 2 Strategic Game
Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate = (Appeasement)
Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit = (Assurance)
Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit = (Stag Hunt)
Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, <), then Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock = (Chicken)
Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, =), then Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit = (P. Dilemma)
Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, >), then Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit = (Bully)

Three master beliefs (P-1, I-1, and P-4) constitute the limits of rationality for Self and Other by indicating the corresponding rank order of preferences for the political outcomes of settlement, deadlock, domination, and submission (by using the game-theoretical concepts). The model of strategic interaction is based on the calculated differences between master beliefs in relation to cooperation versus conflict. The signs used in the TIP propositions refer to if a leader's I-1 and P-1 indices are above (+) or below (-) the mean for the norming group of world leaders (I-1 = +.33; P-1 = +.25, n=35). The symbols used for the P-4a and P-4b indices signify if these indices are greater than (>), less than (<), or within (=) one standard deviation (SD = .127) of

²¹ A "+" indicates above and "-" indicates below the norming mean. <, >, and = indicate below, above, and within the norming average range, respectively, which is P4a $\pm$ 1 SD. Norming scores for N = 164 are P-1 = +.30, SD = 0.29; I-1 = +.40, SD = 0.43; and P-4 = 0.22, SD = 0.13. Norming averages are drawn from Schafer and Walker (2006b), courtesy of Mark Schafer. For another study using the same norming sample, see Malici and Buckner (2008) and Malici (in Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011). Retrieved from Özdamar and Canbolat (2018: 21).

the mean ($P-4 = .22$) regarding the norming group of world leaders. This offers six different propositions vis-a-vis rank of preference for both Self and Other, as represented in Table 5.

Table 10. Ben-Gurion and Sharett's Leadership Typologies and Ranked Strategies

Leader Images	Operational Codes	Idealist/Realist	Expected Strategic Preferences
Ben-Gurion (Self)	Type DEF	Realist	Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit
Ben-Gurion (Other)	Type B	Realist	Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit
Sharett (Self)	Type A	Idealist	Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit
Sharett (Other)	Type B	Realist	Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit

When we apply this procedure, the result will offer the preferred strategy rankings of Ben-Gurion and Sharett. While Ben-Gurion's I-1 score is less than the mean belief score for the norming group (0.40), Sharett's I-1 score is bigger than the mean of the norming group. P-4a score of both leaders is within the one standard deviation of the norming group (0.13). Based on the TIP procedure, the scores of the Self for Ben-Gurion correspond to Proposition 5, while Sharett's preferred strategies are in line with Proposition 2. This means that Ben-Gurion preferred conflictual strategies, and Prisoner's Dilemma became the most likely strategy vis-a-vis other leaders while devising foreign policy. Therefore, his preference ranking is domination (4),

settlement over (3), deadlock over (2), submission (1). On the other hand, Sharett preferred cooperative strategies, and Assurance became the most likely strategy vis-a-vis other leaders while devising foreign policy. Therefore, his preference ranking is Settle (4), Deadlock over (3), over Dominate (2), over Submission (1).

With respect to the preferences they attributed to Other, both Ben-Gurion and Sharett assigned Other Type B leader conflictual operational codes. P-1 scores of Ben-Gurion and Sharett are less than the mean belief score for the norming group (0.30). P-4b scores of Ben-Gurion and Sharett are within one standard deviation (0.13) for P-4b of the average world leaders. Based on these scores, it can be inferred that Ben-Gurion and Sharett's view of Other's strategic preference ranking amounts to Proposition 5 in the TIP procedure. This proposition ascribes Other (leaders) to pursuing the Prisoner's Dilemma strategy. This refers to Ben-Gurion and Sharett having the belief of Other that adopted the conflictual orientation towards Self. Their preference ranking of Other in the image of Ben-Gurion and Sharett domination (4), settlement over (3), deadlock over (2), submission (1).

In conclusion, this section offered the biographies of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. Then, the results of the data analysis are presented. The section revealed important findings regarding the microfoundations of the foreign policy orientations of the leaders. The leadership typologies of leaders and their preferred strategies are also portrayed. The next section will discuss the empirical findings and offer theoretical insights based on the results.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

In this section, I will discuss the data analysis results and underline how these beliefs could have acted as microfoundations of their foreign policy. I will evaluate the scores of both leaders for Self and Other and try to portray how these beliefs might have influenced some of their foreign policy decisions. In this way, this section discusses how microfoundations of foreign policy decisions can be analyzed by examining the operational codes of leaders. Also, the section offers the possible contributions of this research and theoretical implications.

5.1. Discussion of the Results

The previous chapter presents the data analysis, and the leaders' strategic cultural orientation is defined. We hypothesized that Ben-Gurion's philosophical and instrumental beliefs reflect a realist foreign policy orientation, while Sharett's only instrumental beliefs reflect an idealist orientation. However, contrary to expectations derived from historical accounts of Sharett, his image of Other falls under the category of realism. Sharett's analysis is surprising; however, there might be various

explanations for it. One of the possible explanations is that Israel's path to the establishment and the subsequent process is characterized by numerous conflicts, communal fighting, wars, and struggle carried out by a relatively small community. This created an environment of insecurity and suspicious views of others. It is argued that the belief of Jewish people towards the outside world can be summarized with two slogans, "the whole world is against us" and "a people that dwells alone," which "reflect a set of negative attitudes to the outside world which are firmly entrenched in Israeli political culture" (Caplan, 2020: 27).

The fact that scholars and his contemporaries viewed Sharett as an idealist because he continuously made an emphasis on diplomatic means, humanitarian values, and negotiation compared to other leading figures in the state like General Moshe Dayan, who were more inclined toward a hardline approach. In other words, the decision-making elite of Israel seemed to be more hardliner than Sharett, and thus they regarded him as an idealist with a comparative perspective. Sofer (1998: 107) argued that "Ben-Gurion's successor as Prime Minister, saw things from a diplomat's viewpoint more than any other of Mapai's²² leaders." A similar point is made by Sheffer (1996: 7), who wrote a biography of Sharett:

it was clear that, although Sharett was a loyal leader of the same camp and party, his demeanour, views, and politics were different not only from those of Ben-Gurion but also from those of the rest of the Labour movement's tough and ruthless front-line leaders.

The historical account of Moshe Sharett and his view of Self is also supported in my data analysis, revealing that his belief system appeared to be idealist when compared to the world leaders.

²² Israeli leftist party that was in power at that time.

Based on the data analysis and TIP propositions, his preference order of the strategy prioritizes the Settlement strategy. This result also supports the historical account that attributed Sharett to a conciliatory approach. Shalom (2002: 179) stated that “Sharett claimed that a political settlement would strengthen Israel’s security because the Arab states would be committed to keeping the peace according to the spirit and letter of the Armistice Agreements.” Sharett prioritized settlement strategy with Arabs and tried to fortify his argument by claiming that this policy would enable Israel to buy cheaper oil from Arab states and possible avenues for economic development (Shalom, 2002). Thus, it is possible to argue that the historical account reflected his belief of Self associated with idealist strategic culture, which had an impact on his foreign policy and strategic choices.

On the other hand, Ben-Gurion’s results demonstrate that my expectation derived from historical analyses and data analysis converge on the outcome that he was a realist leader in terms of both his image of Self and Other. In one of his speeches, he stated that “Israel stood up by its own strength and will stand firm only if it trusts first and foremost in itself as a power of growing greatness” (Brecher, 2016). He made emphasis on the self-reliance and strategic autonomy of Israel (Horowitz, 1993). Besides, one of the basic tenets of his “approach to the problem of Israel’s political orientation was a fundamental lack of trust in the outside world” (Bialer, 2015: 217). Ben-Gurion believed and stated various times that “there is one world bloc which wants to destroy us-and that is the Arab bloc” (Bialer, 2015: 217). There were also blocs like “Islamic nations,” “India,” and the “Communist bloc” that had varying degrees of the problem with the existence of the “Jewish people” that Ben-

Gurion believed (Bialer, 2015: 217). These thoughts reflect a distrust of Other and a pessimistic view of the political universe.

The aforementioned statements can be interpreted as realist premises of self-reliance and distrust of others (Waltz, 1979). Ben-Gurion laid down Israeli defense doctrine and declared various parameters in which self-reliance took a significant place. He regarded Israel as “a nation dwelling alone,” and although alliances were useful for maintaining the balance of power, they were temporary (Freilich, 2018: 27). For him, Israel should rely on its power as much as possible and develop its own defense products (Freilich, 2018). Sofer (2004: 4) argued that Israel’s

foreign policy has been fashioned, out of necessity, on a model of political realism, namely, on a calculated balance between power and political means. The ambivalence towards international guarantees, global conventions, and multilateral resolutions is also a reflection of a deep conviction in realist reasoning.

In line with these points, Ben-Gurion, whose school of strategic culture overall dominated Israeli decision-making for long years, reflected realist beliefs and approaches.

Furthermore, Ben-Gurion’s belief of higher self-control over historical development compared to Sharett reveals itself in policies and events. It is possible to argue that the divergence between the attentiveness to the responses of the international community is related to the belief in control over historical development. Brecher (2016: 162) argued that “Ben-Gurion’s indifference to ‘what will the Goyim²³ think’ occasionally created a major international political crisis for Israel from which he could not easily extricate himself.” In 1953, there was a discussion regarding the

²³ Goyim refers to “the entire gentile (non-Jewish) world.” (Caplan, 2020: 27).

appropriate response to border infiltrations by Arabs, and “Ben Gurion and his followers advocated a policy of severe and prompt military retaliation” (Shlaim, 1983: 183; Seliktar, 2015: 70). He was convinced that management of conflict with neighbors had to rely on deterrence via “controlled use of force” (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1988: 331; Seliktar, 2015). To prevent conflict and increase deterrence, Ben-Gurion also desired to have nuclear power, which reminds us of what Waltz (1981) once favored more states with nuclear weapons for stability and hindrance of the conflict. Ben-Gurion viewed it necessary to increase the power of the Israeli Defense Force since he stated that this “will root out our neighbors' dream that Israel can be annihilated” (Bar-Joseph, 1998: 156). It means that if the Israeli army was powerful enough, the country would be more deterrent, ruling out the idea of attacking Israel in the eyes of the Arab leaders. For Ben-Gurion, a moderate approach to the conflict and border incursions would be perceived by the Arabs as a signal of weakness (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1988).

On the other hand, Sharett was seriously concerned about the long-term possible adverse impacts “which retaliation was liable to have on Israel's relations with her neighbors and on her international standing” (Shlaim, 1983: 183). He was in favor of more consideration of the timing and scale of the military operation on the grounds of the concerns over the possible responses of the international community and the likely fueling of the conflict. Thus, political accommodation and restraint would be the best approach to adopt against the infiltrations (Isacoff, 2018; Schindler, 2013), which can be interpreted as a more cooperative approach, as his I-1/P-1 score indicates.

Notwithstanding, for Ben-Gurion, national defense considerations were a priority over foreign policy considerations (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1988), and he argued that “it is not important what the Goyim (nations other than Israel, non-Jews) think, rather, what the Jews do” (Brecher, 2016: 162), which shows a relative disregard of what foreign audience would think about Israel. Consequently, the ‘activist’ camp of Ben-Gurion, along with General Dayan, gained the upper hand in the debate, dismissing Sharett’s view, and realized their aims through which Major Ariel Sharon carried out a military operation in Jordan. The US and European states condemned the use of force, and the US “froze the first instalment of a \$26 million grant” (Schindler, 2013: 107), which frustrated Sharett in the face of the deteriorating foreign relations.

In the operational code analysis, when there is a higher score of the historical control index for Self, it means that it is more likely that a leader’s choices tend to follow escalatory foreign policy. It is revealed that Ben-Gurion’s score of historical control for Self is higher than Sharett’s. Various scholars point to the question of appropriate response to reprisals as one of the most apparent cases of divergence for the appropriate strategy (Sheffer, 1983; Shlaim, 1983). The disagreement over the reprisals is also an important example in terms of explaining the microfoundations of foreign policy. The example shows how psychological factors like belief systems may have an impact on leaders’ strategic choices. Interestingly, this observation is also expressed by Ben-Gurion, who attributed “Sharett’s moderate approach to his psychological makeup” (Shapira, 2014: 207). In sum, both my expectations based on the historical record and my data analysis converge.

Another significant point is that both leaders regarded the Other as a Type B leader. This may arise from the fact that Israel is a small country surrounded by larger Arab states with more powerful armies. The leadership of Israel had the image that their country was encircled by hostile Arab states seeking their destruction. In this sense, both leaders assigned Other a conflictual orientation and strategies like Prisoner's Dilemma, as their data analysis reveals. They attributed other leaders to higher control over historical development and a hostile approach. Type B leaders are confident of their power and follow their optimal aims. For them, the opponent is possible to deter, the political future is relatively predictable, and tactics may change, but ends remain constant. Control over historical development is possible. Ben-Gurion and Sharett regarded Other as a realist Type B and expected policies in that line of understanding.

The results for Sharett's image of Other are contrary to my expectation that Sharett's philosophical beliefs would reflect idealist beliefs based on his biographies and historical analyses. Sharett's image of Other occurred to be a realist, which may be due to reasons I described above, such as the sense of the weakness of the newly established state. Another possibility might arise from my limited dataset and translated speeches. Yet, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a dominating theme in the speeches, which can be another possible cause of the result. Sharett's typology and TIP proposition expect a conflictual orientation toward Self is meaningful with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Shlaim (1983) argued that Sharett aimed to reduce tension and hostility among the Arabs by pursuing accommodation. Sharett argued that response to the Arab hostility by use of force would eliminate all the peace efforts and increase the hostility. Also, in 1954, Israel held secret talks with

Egyptian representatives to achieve an understating and resolution. “Sharett was exploring every possible avenue for bringing about an accommodation between Israel and Egypt” (Shlaim, 1983: 187). The rigid use of force against the border infiltrations would deteriorate the talks with Egypt and damage the flow of economic aid from the US along with efforts for an arms deal and security guarantees (Shlaim, 1983). It can be argued that Sharett put foreign policy considerations over defense concerns (Shlaim, 1983), and Sharett’s response to Other is in line with TIP Proposition 2 (Assurance).

Also, Sharett attributes more control over historical development to Other than Ben-Gurion attributes. Sharett was more attentive to what the international community and world public opinion thought about Israel. For him, it matters not only because Israel needed international support and legitimacy from the UN and great powers but also because quantitatively superior states surround Israel. For Sharett, the establishment of the state of Israel was a direct outcome of international acceptance, and he also believed Israel’s “survival was dependent upon external assistance, particularly in the form of arms supply” (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1988: 332).

Ben-Gurion also made an effort to secure an arms deal with France in the face of rising tensions and expected military force by the Arabs. His score of control over historical development for Other is also somewhat high but lower than Sharett. He “was further disillusioned regarding the support of the great powers ... The failure of the United Nations and the 1950 Tripartite Declaration to stabilize the armistice lines and the refusal of both the United States and Great Britain to supply Israel with arms or establish security arrangements” constituted a non-cooperative image of Other, in

specific of great powers and the UN (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1988: 331). As for neighbors, he believed that Arab states had a hostile and conflictual orientation toward Israel and sought its destruction. Also, based on the TIP propositions, Ben-Gurion's image of Other is in line with Proposition 6, whose most preferred strategies are Dominate and Deadlock. This reflected an expectation that the Arabs would not favor peace with the Jews and choose the strategies prioritizing conflict rather than accommodation and cooperation. One of the central features of his defense doctrine is deterrence. This also seemed to be in congruence with the historical account as briefly touched upon above.

5.2. Implications and Contributions

The discussion of the results in tandem with the microfoundations of their foreign policy offers significant insights and implications for IR theory, Operational Code Analysis, strategic culture, and Israeli foreign policy. Firstly, macro-level theories and concepts are underspecified without testing their micro-level mechanisms, assumptions, and variables (Kertzer, 2017; Walker & Schafer, 2007, 2011). Macro-level theories of IR like realism, liberalism, and constructivism do not offer analyses about the individual leader's state of mind, perceptions, and psychology that aid in clarifying a specific policy or behavior. The structural theories assume that leaders' beliefs are reflections of domestic and foreign realities (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). However, cognitive approaches underline those beliefs can operate as a causal mechanism and do not have a passive role (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Beliefs guide the behaviors and decisions of leaders by influencing the way leaders to see the world by reacting to and filtering the information coming from the environment (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1962). The synthesis between beliefs and structural

explanations of foreign policy presents a path to augment the explanatory value of concepts and assumptions within these theories by testing them with the scientific and reproducible methodological rigor of the operational code analysis (Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

Walker and Schafer (2006a: 240) argue that:

The microfoundations of actions and interactions between states do not undermine macro-theories of world politics so much as enrich them. Without bringing agents into their analyses, they remain problematic ... Operational code analysis offers one set of methods and models to address this problem with more robust results.

They emphasized the significance and benefits of synthesizing belief systems with International Relations theories in diverse areas. Operational code typologies can be connected with strategic culture by “addressing themes such as war and peace, perceptions and assessment of threat, the utility of force, and the possible outcomes of using force” (Feng, 2005: 641). Analyzing operational codes as an individual-level variable, thus, allows evaluation of whether the adopted beliefs of a leader come out consistent with the anticipations of strategic culture (Malici, 2006a; Feng, 2005).

Moreover, the use of operational codes to capture the microfoundations of traditions in foreign policy like realism and idealism presented a strong way for research to test and locate leaders’ beliefs in the foreign policy continuum based on their empirical analyses rather than historical accounts (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Also, realist and idealist foreign policy traditions are mostly philosophical accounts without empirical ground. However, the systematic analysis and empiric measurement of political beliefs associated with realist and idealist traditions via operational code analysis contributed to decreasing subjectivity and augmenting the possibility for the

comparative study of beliefs, allowing the scientific examination of the connection between foreign policy cultures and behavior (Malici, 2006a; Young & Schafer, 1998). Beliefs can “expand and shrink the menu of strategic choice available to policymakers” (O’Reilly, 2014: 223). Operational code analysis offers a reproducible, empirical, and systematic analysis of the ideational factors associated with strategic cultural traditions like Realism and Idealism that contribute to IR theories by bridging “the gap between agent-oriented and structural-oriented explanations of foreign policy and world politics” (Schafer & Walker, 2006a: 238).

Further, investigating microfoundations of theories and concepts paves the way for “unpacking the black box of causality” by positing the process through which effects are produced” (Kertzer, 2017: 84). Microfoundational research strengthens our explanations of social phenomena and causal mechanisms. In other words, “analytical reduction provides better specifications of the actual causal mechanisms (individuals and groups) responsible for producing observable effects and outcomes” (Leon, 2010: 35). It enables completing the structural theories, enhancing them further and function better (Hagan, 2001, Kertzer, 2017). Most structural-level theories and approaches rely on micro-level assumptions but remain untested; for example, models of coercion have specific assumptions regarding the ways in which civilians react to violence (Kertzer, 2017). Empirical testing of these assumptions would contribute to the theories’ explanatory power. Also, these structural theories are grounded on such lower-level “building blocks” and “theoretical assumptions” that “are causally linked to outcomes” (Lake and Powell, 1999: 21–25, as cited in Leon, 2010: 32).

Structural theories are underspecified without a focus on agency and cognitive variables (Walker & Schafer, 2011). Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001: 68) argue that:

their capacity to explain relevant trends or events hinges on a wider range of implicit psychological assumptions that it is useful to make explicit. In this sense, these macro theorists are already more psychological than they think. And when we shift attention to each tradition's explanatory shortcomings, we believe these can be at least partly corrected by incorporating other psychological assumptions into the conceptual frameworks.

Many structural theories include psychological assumptions that are not clearly and extensively laid out (Goldgeier & Tetlock, 2001; Kertzer, 2017). For example, according to realists, states are power or security maximizers, while liberals and institutionalists argue that states are “wealth or utility maximizers” (Goldgeier & Tetlock, 2001: 67). To give a more specific example, Kenneth Waltz argues that bipolar international systems are more stable than multipolar systems since in the latter, states are more ‘risk-acceptant’ given the uncertainty. Waltz ‘black-box’ the mechanisms that state, and, more specifically or essentially, decision-makers are influenced by the systemic factors and then show more risk acceptant personality traits. Macro-level theories disregarded the individual-level actor characteristics and under-theorized the micro-level processes (Kertzer, 2017; Schafer & Walker, 2006a), and theorists like Waltz (1979) and Alexander Wendt (1987) do not attribute much explanatory value to micro-level explanations. Their assumptions about state behavior like security maximizers without delving into the role of agency create loopholes in the theories.

As Mowle (2003: 562) argued, “a state's behavior is not reflexive; rather, it flows from the way its foreign policy decision-makers understand what is happening.” Characteristics of actors like their belief systems and worldviews impact policy

decisions (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). The value of microfoundational research, thus, is “to explicate these assumptions theoretically or validate them empirically” (Kertzer, 2017: 86). Agent-based models of Foreign Policy Analysis offer tools for empirical testing of micro-level mechanisms embedded in these IR theories and help identify (Özdamar & Ceydilek, 2020). In this way, this thesis will help advance the IR theories by bringing cognitive variables into account.

Apart from the benefits of synthesis, the case selection also allows contributions to the literature on FPA and OCA. Hermann (2001) argued that FPA models and tools are largely implemented in Western contexts like the US. The leaders of non-Western countries are not assessed enough and signify a problem in better understanding the foreign policymaking in the Global South (Brummer, 2021; Özdamar, 2017). The regions such as the Middle East and North Africa deserve more attention to apply and enhance FPA tools. Darwich and Kaarbo (2020: 235) made the case that "given the centralized nature of foreign policymaking in Middle Eastern states, leaders and their personalities are a critical gap in current IRME²⁴ research." Building on these observations, this study attempted to contribute to FPA literature by addressing this gap in the literature with its case selection and tool. In other words, the contributions of this thesis became arguably possible thanks to the research design. Case selection allowed comprehensive contributions to the various kinds of literature. Choosing not only a Middle Eastern country has implications as outlined above, but also a historical case study with quantitative methods, as Fordham (2019) argues, permits theoretical development, more precise arguments, and mechanisms. In that context, considering the reasons above, this thesis offers

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contributions to International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Operational Code Analysis.

Also, this thesis can offer insights into the Israeli foreign policy orientations and strategic culture. I preferred David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett's leadership to analyze microfoundations of the foreign policy orientations. Both leaders are referred to as having a long-lasting impact on the Israeli strategic culture and foreign policy. Scholars argued that they represented two different schools of thought within the Israeli strategic community (Shalom, 2002; Petrelli, 2017; Del Sarto, 2017). Ben-Gurion's leadership and ideas are associated with the 'activist' camp, while Sharett's ideas are associated with the 'moderate' school. Their ideas and policies have had a long-lasting impact on Israeli foreign policy and strategic choices as the founding and influential leaders of Israel, though Ben-Gurion's school of thought became more dominant over the decades. It is because "national leaders, having been commonly socialized into institutionalized modes of thought and behavior, were expected to exhibit similar beliefs, reflecting a common strategic culture" (O'Reilly, 2014: 221).

Isacoff (2018: 42) argued that the dominance of Ben-Gurion's camp in the debates with Sharett's camp when they were in power led "ultimately to the institutionalization of the use of force as the preferred means of dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict for many decades thereafter." Their positions on various occasions provided a menu of strategic choices for the leaders in the future. Therefore, these observations underline the importance of the two leaders for the politics of Israel, which can have implications for the study of other Israeli leaders.

Most accounts of these leaders are historical. Yet, there is an apparent lack in utilizing the Foreign Policy Analysis tools and methods for analyzing these leaders. Also, this thesis can contribute to the Israeli strategic culture and deterrence by bringing insights from leaders' beliefs that can shape their use of force and strategies. This thesis can make a humble contribution to Israeli foreign and strategic policy by assessing Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief systems.

To sum up, this study empirically showed that Ben-Gurion had realist beliefs by attributing hostile views of the political universe and conflictual strategic choices for Self and Other. However, the analysis for Moshe Sharett offered a mixed result for his belief system. While he has idealist beliefs for Self, he attributed realist beliefs for Other, which was contrary to my expectations. By assessing these leaders' belief systems, the thesis empirically locates them in a realist-idealist continuum, which is so far located by interpretive methods and historical accounts. Also, this thesis can offer implications for understanding the microfoundations of the foreign policy behaviors of the two leaders by empirical examining their belief systems. It is because structural accounts and historical accounts may fail to uncover and explain micro-level variables.

In conclusion, this section discusses the previous chapter's empirical findings. I evaluated the scores of both leaders for Self and Other and tried to show that these beliefs might have influenced some of their foreign policy decisions. In this way, this section discussed how microfoundations of foreign policy decisions could be analyzed by utilizing the operational code analysis. Also, the section deals with the possible contributions of this research and its theoretical implications.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This chapter will present a summary of the aims, research questions, and hypotheses that are tested in the study. Then, the section will summarize the main findings of the research. A brief discussion of the implications of the research will be presented. Also, the section will offer some areas for future studies that can be conducted.

The main purpose of this research is to test whether and in what ways David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett's philosophical and instrumental beliefs reflect the associated realist or idealist beliefs and strategic choices. This thesis aimed to locate leaders in the realist-idealist continuum based on their operational codes. The studies on Ben-Gurion and Sharett's foreign policy policies are overwhelmingly based on the interpretive methods or empirically untested statements defining their strategic orientations. Analyzing the microfoundations of their decisions and foreign/security policy behaviors by utilizing Foreign Policy Analysis is lacking. My main research question is, to what extent does the belief system of individual leaders reflect the strategic cultural traditions? I also sought answers to the following main questions:

1) What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of Ben-Gurion and Sharett?

2) Do Ben-Gurion's philosophical and instrumental beliefs reflect a hostile and conflictual strategic orientation? Do his scores correspond to realist leaders?

3) Do Moshe Sharett's philosophical and instrumental beliefs reflect a friendly image of the political universe and cooperative strategic orientation? Do his scores correspond to idealist leaders?

This research assessed the leadership of David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett in the context of the strategic cultures they are attributed to. The method of this thesis is automated content analysis, which is carried out via ProfilerPlus software for coding by utilizing the VICS scheme. This allows strong coding reliability, and the data analysis is compared with a norming group of world leaders calculated by the ProfilerPlus software (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Individual-level analysis, together with a concentration on the beliefs of leaders, help uncover the microfoundations of the foreign policy orientations of the leaders. Verbs in Context System (VICS) is a content analysis technique used in this study to obtain the operational code scores of the leaders by making inferences about the belief system of leaders from their speeches (Walker & Schafer, 2003, 2006a).

VICS follows a certain procedure and concentrates on the transitive verbs in a leader's public statement and the attributions concerning the exercise of power to Self and Other to create quantitative indices for philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). The data of this thesis is statements belonging to Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. The time period of the texts collected for Ben-

Gurion is when he held the post of prime minister. For Sharett, the textual data is collected for the period when he was foreign and prime minister. I eliminated various speeches based on Walker and Schafer's (2006a) sampling criteria.

6.1. Findings

The operational code analysis of Ben-Gurion and Sharett offers significant results in understanding the microfoundations of Israeli foreign policy and strategic culture. In terms of master beliefs, Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief about the nature of the political universe is mixed, with a tendency toward a friendly view. Their scores of control over historical development are also mixed, with a more tendency toward a controllable view. Both leaders' P-1 and P-4 scores are statistically different from the norming group. Also, Ben-Gurion and Sharett's belief about the direction of the strategy is somewhat cooperative. Sharett's I-1 score is higher than Ben-Gurion's score, which is in line with the expectations based on the historical account. Yet, merely Ben-Gurion's score is statistically different from the norming group. The results support Hypotheses 5 and 6, which claim that both leaders' master beliefs are statistically different from the norming group of world leaders.

Master beliefs of leaders are utilized to locate a leader in one of the four quadrants in Holsti's (1977) leadership typology. Self indices are I-1 and P-4a, while Other indices are P-1 and P-4b. For statistical significance purposes, Z-scores for Self and Other indices are obtained by subtracting the mean for the sample of world leaders from each leader's score and dividing by the standard deviation for the sample of world leaders. It is needed to locate leaders in the realist - idealist spectrum based on the z-scores of the mean scores of operational code indexes to compare to the

norming group of world leaders. The analysis above demonstrated that while Sharett and Ben-Gurion attribute different typologies to themselves (Type A idealist and Type DEF realist, respectively), both attributed Other to Type B realist.

The historical account of Moshe Sharett is in line with the characteristics of Type A leadership typology. He is known for his emphasis on negotiation and diplomacy and avoidance of escalatory foreign policies. Therefore, the results of the data analysis support Hypothesis 4. The analysis demonstrated that Ben-Gurion's image of Self reveals a more conflictual strategic outlook relative to the norming group of world leaders. Ben-Gurion is known for his emphasis on national security and prioritized defense strategy over foreign policy considerations. He resorted to the use of force when he saw it necessary. Therefore, the results of data analysis support Hypothesis 2 that Ben-Gurion's instrumental beliefs reflect a hostile image of the political universe as a realist leader. As for the image of Other, the results surprisingly show mixed results. Both Ben-Gurion and Sharett shared the same typologies in their belief in the nature of the political universe. Sharett and Ben-Gurion's image of Other corresponds to Type B, which fails to support Hypothesis 3 and supports Hypothesis 1.

Based on the TIP procedure, the results offer the following preferred strategy rankings of Ben-Gurion and Sharett. While Ben-Gurion's I-1 score for the direction of strategy is less than the mean belief score for the norming group (0.40), Sharett's I-1 score is more than the mean of the norming group. P-4a scores of self-historical control in the view of Ben-Gurion and Sharett are within one standard deviation

(0.13) of the mean regarding average world leaders. Based on the TIP procedure, the scores of the Self for Ben-Gurion correspond to Proposition 5, while Sharett's preferred strategies are in line with Proposition 2. This means that Ben-Gurion preferred conflictual strategies, and Prisoner's Dilemma became the most likely strategy vis-a-vis other leaders while devising foreign policy. Therefore, his preference ranking is Domination (4), Settlement over (3), Deadlock over (2), Submission (1). On the other hand, Sharett preferred cooperative strategies, and Assurance became the most likely strategy vis-a-vis other leaders while devising foreign policy. Therefore, his preference ranking is Settlement (4), Deadlock over (3), over Domination (2), over Submission (1).

With respect to the preferences they ascribed to Other, both Ben-Gurion and Sharett assigned Other to Type B realist leader operational codes. P-1 scores for the belief of the nature of the political universe of Ben-Gurion and Sharett are below the mean belief score for the norming group (0.30). P-4b Other-historical control scores of Ben-Gurion and Sharett are within one standard deviation (0.13) for P-4b scores of the norming group. Relying on these scores, it is possible to infer that Ben-Gurion and Sharett's view of Other's most preferred strategies corresponds to Proposition 5 in the TIP procedure (Prisoner's Dilemma). This refers to Ben-Gurion and Sharett having the belief of Other that adopted the conflictual orientation towards Self. Their preference ranking of Other in the image of Ben-Gurion and Sharett is Domination.

The study also has some limitations. Arguably, the biggest limitation is language. The study used English texts while collecting data for this research. Although

ProfilerPlus offers text analysis in different languages, the software does not have the Hebrew version. Yet, even if it offered a Hebrew version, my minimal knowledge of Hebrew would not suffice to read and select the appropriate speeches. Besides the language limitation, the dataset is limited to a total of 23 speeches. Based on the criteria of Walker and Schafer (2006a), I had to eliminate various speeches. Much textual data did not have enough numbers of words so that ProfilerPlus could offer meaningful analysis of the verbs. Therefore, to meet the sampling criteria, I had to count on only the ones satisfying the criteria.

6.2. Implications

The implications of this research are multiple. Firstly, the thesis shows how the synthesis between beliefs and structural explanations of foreign policy orientations can advance the explanatory value of International Relations theories by integrating individual-level variables. Structural theories of IR do not attach importance to the leaders and their impact on foreign policy behavior (Schafer & Walker, 2006a). States act rationally and are constrained by “institutional rules, roles, and other social norms as well as power distributions,” which emphasizes the state or system level, “omitting the microfoundations of foreign policy decision making by leaders and small groups” (Walker, 2011; 24). For example, Realism disregards the place of leaders, belief systems, and cognitive processes. This approach, Malici (2006a: 58) argues, is “to deny the social character of politics and to rob actors of any consciousness.” Although “Structures may provide some broad brushstrokes” to grasp state acts, “without accounting for individual-level psychology, the models will always be underspecified” (Schafer, 2013; 306). In line with this observation,

Foreign Policy Analysis approach underlines that “All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers acting singly or in groups” (Hudson, 2005: 1).

The cognitive approach of Foreign Policy Analysis argues that beliefs can offer insights into understanding state behavior since leaders are the decision-makers and executors of the policies (Schafer & Smith, 2017). The beliefs of leaders filter the information from the environment and guide leaders in the decision-making processes (Schafer & Smith, 2017; Schafer & Walker, 2006a). Thus, a causal mechanism is established between beliefs and foreign policy decisions (Schafer & Walker, 2006a; Feng, 2007). Integrating individual-level variables into structural theories and concepts can help understand the foreign policy decisions and advance the field by bridging the Foreign Policy Analysis field and International Relations theories (Hagan, 2001; Walker & Schafer, 2007; O’Reilly, 2014). It is because efforts of IR theory can benefit from the micro-level approach of FPA; as Most and Starr (1989: 99) argued, “the most fruitful avenues for theorizing and research are likely going to be at the micro-level in which the focus is on decision making, expected utility, and foreign policy interaction processes.” Thus, building on this argument, delving into the beliefs of leaders and integrating them into the structural approaches has significant potential.

Besides, Walker and Schafer (2006a: 240) argue that: “the microfoundations of actions and interactions between states do not undermine macro-theories of world politics so much as enrich them. Without bringing agents into their analyses, they remain problematic ... Operational code analysis offers one set of methods and

models to address this problem with more robust results.” Building on this observation, this thesis can enrich the structural theories of IR by bringing individual-level variables and testing concepts and assumptions of structural theories with empirical analysis (Schafer & Walker, 2006a).

In that vein, the thesis showed how operational code analysis could be used to capture the microfoundations of strategic cultures like realism and idealism. These strategic orientations are overwhelmingly based on philosophical or historical accounts without an empirical base (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Yet, Operational Code Analysis offers scientific and reproducible methodological rigor to test these strategic orientations (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Therefore, considering the points above, this thesis can contribute to the concept of strategic culture, which relies mostly on interpretive methods by synthesizing with the well-established FPA approach of Operational Code Analysis’ robust methodology (Malici, 2006a; Walker & Schafer, 2007; Rezzi, 2021).

Moreover, this study’s significance also reveals itself in utilizing Operational Code Analysis to analyze non-Western leaders who have not gotten enough attention and denotes an obstacle to better comprehending the foreign decision-making in the Global South (Brummer, 2021, Özdamar, 2017). This study shows and contributes to the growing literature on the applicability of FPA tools like OCA to regions like the Middle East (Özdamar, 2017; Özdamar & Canbolat, 2018). In this context, this study can contribute to FPA literature by addressing this gap in the literature with its case selection and tool. Also, Darwich and Kaarbo (2020: 235) put forward that "given the centralized nature of foreign policymaking in Middle Eastern states, leaders and their

personalities are a critical gap in current IRME research." This means that this study can address this gap in the Middle East research by examining the two Israeli leaders' belief systems, which are also lacking in the literature.

Furthermore, Israeli foreign policy and strategic culture research is another literature that this study can address. Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett's accounts are overwhelmingly historical. This thesis offers empirical testing of the historical arguments and better locates the leaders in their respective foreign policy orientations. In sum, considering the reasons above, this thesis can present significant contributions to International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, Operational Code Analysis, IRME, and Israeli foreign policy kinds of literature.

6.3. Future Research

Studies in the future can examine other Israeli leaders' belief systems by using operational code analysis and try to locate them in the realist - idealist continuum. They might examine which tradition they belong to in a comparative manner. A thorough analysis of Israeli leaders' operational code analysis, which is lacking, can not only contribute to the foreign policy analysis literature but also to strategic culture studies of Israel. Belief changes of different leaders, crisis responses, and diverse case studies can enrich the literature. In addition, the Arab-Israeli conflict can be examined based on the dyads of Palestinian and Israeli leaders. Different episodes of conflict can be explained by the study of psychological accounts of the leaders and their philosophical and instrumental belief systems, which can further our understanding of the conflict.

Also, there can be a comparative study of founding leaders in the Middle East; comparing and contrasting their belief systems can be illuminating to understand not only the leaders but also the possible venues of institutionalization of their policies. Israeli leaders' relations with the regional states and superpowers can also be another avenue for research. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Israeli leaders' operational code analysis as dyads would be a favorable contribution to understanding regional crises. Examining the relations with neighboring states can increase our understanding of the ways in which psychological factors influenced in the past and play a role currently. However, it appears that coding leaders in their native language can increase the explanatory value of the research. A Hebrew version of ProfilerPlus software would greatly contribute and pave the way for multiple studies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Speech Sample Coded for Ben-Gurion and Sharett

a) Ben-Gurion's Speeches

Title of Document	Audience	Date	Type	Number of Words
BG1) David Ben-Gurion: Address to Knesset on the Results of Sinai Campaign	Parliament	05.03.1957	Speech	6923
BG2) David Ben-Gurion: Speech to Knesset on Situation in Sinai	Parliament	21.02.1957	Speech	4071
BG3) Israel's Foreign Policy	Parliament	04.02.1952	Book chapter (speech)	2571
BG4) Israel Among The Nations	Parliament	?.10.1952	Book chapter (speech)	27102
BG5) The Failure Of The Armistice 14	Parliament	02.11.1955	Speech	2196
BG6) David Ben-Gurion: Speech to the United Nations Demanding Security Guarantees	UN	23.01.1957	Speech	2421
BG7) David Ben-Gurion: Speech to Knesset Reviewing the Sinai Campaign	Parliament	07.11.1956	Speech	2119
BG10) Prime Minister Ben-Gurion Statement to the Knesset Regarding the Tripartite Arab Pact	Parliament	06.05.1963	Speech	2364
BG11) Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on the situation along the Israel-Syria frontier	Parliament	10.04.1962	Speech	2695

BG12) To America's Jewry	Open Public Meeting	03.09.1950	Book chapter (Speech)	4198
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Ben-Gurion, D. (05.03.1957). David Ben-Gurion: Address to Knesset on the Results of Sinai Campaign. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/29%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Ben-.aspx>

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Ben-Gurion, D. (06.05.1963). 10) Prime Minister Ben-Gurion Statement to the Knesset Regarding the Tripartite Arab Pact. Retrieved February 18, 2022, from <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/6%2>

[0Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Ben-G.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/3%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Ben-G.aspx)

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To America's Jewry. In Ben Gurion, David. *Rebirth & Destiny of Israel* (1954). <https://heionline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/rbdsirs0001&id=544&collection=cow&index=>

b) Moshe Sharett's Speeches

Title of Document	Audience	Date	Number of Words
MS1) Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett to the Israel Knesset	Parliament	15.06.1949	7145
MS2) Shall We Live in our State as a Diaspora People?	Mapai Activists' Meeting	10.1.1952	3311
MS3) Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Sharett on the Ma-aleh Akrabim incident- 24 March 1954	Parliament	24.03.1954	1993
MS4) Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Sharett- 4 November 1951	Parliament	04.11.1951	1839
MS5) Israel and the Middle East: The Essentials for Peace and Progress	National Press Club	10.04.1953	2809
MS6) Peace Can Be Won	Forum	23.04.1949	1772
MS7) German Reparations	Parliament	09.01.1952	6724
MS8) Un General Assembly Sixth Session	UNGA	15.11.1951	3583
MS9) 81 - Excerpts of FM Sharett Opening Address to the Knesset, January 2, 1956	Parliament	02.01.1956	2628
MS10) 34 - Sharett Reply, Knesset Debate, November 15, 1954	Parliament	15.11.1954	2269

MS11) We Shall Not Relinquish the Plundered Property	Open Public Meeting	12.01.1952	8240
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Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett to the Israel Knesset. (2018, July 03).

Retrieved February 17, 2022, from

<https://israeled.org/resources/documents/israeli-foreign-minister-moshe-sharett-israel-knesset/>

Sharett, M. (10.01.1952). Shall We Live in our State as a Diaspora People? In The reparations controversy: The Jewish state and German Money, De Gruyter.

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<https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110255386.275/html?lang=en>

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<https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/9%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Foreign%20Minister%20Sha.aspx>

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[webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=15](https://www.sharett.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=15)

Peace Can Be Won. (23.04.1949). Retrieved 17 Feb 2022, from

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[webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=18](https://www.sharett.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=18)

German Reparations. (09.01.1952). Retrieved 17 Feb 2022, from

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[webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=24](https://www.sharett.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=en&ID=880900_sharett_new&act=show&dbid=MS_articles_eng&dataid=24)

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Note: Some of the speeches may not be accessible anymore since, for example, their links may expire. To reach the speeches, in such cases or for any other inquiries,



Appendix B. Raw and Aggregated Scores of Each Textual Data for Ben-Gurion (Each speech in list coded with an abbreviation like BG1 in order)

Speech	Self+3	Self+2	Self+1	Self-1	Self-2	Self-3	Other+3	Other+2	Other+1	Other-1	Other-2	Other-3	I1	I2	I3new	I4a	I4b	I5ap	I5pr	I5re	I5op	I5th	I5pu	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P-4b	N verbs					
BG1	6	0	20	4	1	10	23	15	72	13	8	37	0,2683	0,0163	0,194765	1,268293	0,780488	0,487805	0	0,146341	0,243902	0,097561	0,146341	0,3095	0,0615	0,140306122	0,196172	0,972476	0,803828	209					
BG2	2	0	8	3	0	3	26	4	38	27	12	37	0,25	0,0417	0,203125	1,25	0,625	0,5	0	0,125	0,1875	0,1875	0,125	-0,0556	-0,088	0,117013889	0,1	0,988299	0,9	160					
BG3	2	0	6	0	0	3	18	1	27	8	2	14	0,4545	0,090900004	0,28595	1,454545	0,909091	0,545455	0	0,181818	0,272727	0	0,181818	0,3143	0,1381	0,222693878	0,135802	0,969758	0,864198	81					
BG4	7	1	22	3	1	2	103	8	160	60	11	140	0,6667	0,3148	0,307407	1,666667	0,5	0,611111	0,027778	0,194444	0,055556	0,083333	0,194444	0,1245	-0,0118	0,234414008	0,069498	0,983709	0,930502	518					
BG5	3	0	9	5	0	4	9	3	13	6	3	18	0,1429	0,0159	0,156463	1,142857	0,666667	0,428571	0	0,142857	0,190476	0,238095	0,142857	-0,0385	-0,1282	0,158579882	0,287671	0,954381	0,712329	73					
BG6	7	0	3	0	1	1	17	6	23	6	3	21	0,6667	0,5278	0,3	1,666667	1,333333	0,25	0	0,583333	0,083333	0	0,583333	0,2105	0,0482	0,16066482	0,136364	0,978091	0,863636	88					
BG7	4	0	5	1	0	4	19	3	19	7	2	20	0,2857	0,0952	0,155102	1,285714	1,142857	0,357143	0	0,285714	0,285714	0,071429	0,285714	0,1714	0,0524	0,231020408	0,166667	0,961497	0,833333	84					
BG8	2	0	28	0	0	0	23	1	71	20	1	9	1	0,3778	0,850667	2	0,133333	0,933333	0	0,066667	0	0	0,066667	0,52	0,248	0,29190448	0,193502	0,943502	0,806452	155					
BG9	7	4	19	8	3	14	30	16	86	22	6	48	0,0909	-0,0485	0,075702	1,090909	0,763636	0,345455	0,072727	0,127273	0,254545	0,145455	0,127273	0,2692	0,0481	0,148150888	0,209125	0,969018	0,790875	263					
BG10	1	0	1	1	0	0	20	1	22	5	2	12	0,3333	0,3333	0,2	1,333333	0,666667	0,333333	0	0,333333	0	0,333333	0,333333	0,3871	0,2097	0,248907388	0,046154	0,988512	0,953846	65					
BG11	2	0	1	0	0	1	13	8	33	14	10	25	0,5	0,3333	0,25	1,5	1,5	0,25	0	0,5	0,25	0	0,5	0,0485	-0,068	0,070675841	0,037383	0,997358	0,962617	107					
BG12	2	1	2	4	0	6	19	5	27	5	3	36	-0,3333	-0,2667	0,125333	0,666667	1,066667	0,133333	0,066667	0,133333	0,4	0,266667	0,133333	0,0737	-0,0877	0,247955679	0,136364	0,966188	0,863636	110					
Average													0,360475	0,15265	0,25871	1,360471	0,840645	0,431295	0,013931	0,23501	0,185313	0,118	0,235	0,194	0,035	0,18935	0,142	0,972	0,857	1913					
																						614	01	55	192	7234	896	732	104						
Norming Group													0,401	0,178	0,332	0,503	0,464	0,468	0,075	0,157	0,154	0,034	0,112	0,301	0,147	0,134	0,224	0,968	0,776						

Appendix C. Raw and Aggregated Scores of Each Textual Data for Moshe Sharett (Each speech in list coded with an abbreviation like MS1 in order)

Speech	Self-3	Self-2	Self-1	Self+1	Self+2	Self+3	Other-3	Other-2	Other-1	Other+1	Other+2	Other+3	11	12	13new	14a	14b	15ap	15pr	15re	15op	15th	15pu	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P-4b	N verbs
MS1	4	4	2	15	5	6	43	7	31	72	14	39	0,44 44	0,1 944	0,098 148	0,555 556	0,55 56	0,41 667	0,111 111	0,111 111	0,166 667	0,416 667	0,1111 1111	0,213 6	0,069 6	0,12689 2261	0,148 76	0,981 123	0,851 24	242
MS2	5	0	2	9	0	3	21	9	14	36	9	21	0,26 32	0,0 175	0,195 568	0,736 842	0,84 21	0,47 368	0	0,263 158	0,157 895	0,473 684	0,2631 5789	0,2	0,051 5	0,08006 6116	0,147 287	0,988 207	0,852 713	129
MS3	0	0	1	2	0	0	28	2	7	12	1	11	0,33 33	0,1 111	0,466 667	0,666 667	0	0,66 667	0	0	0	0,666 667	0	- 0,213 1	- 0,262 3	0,32340 7686	0,046 875	0,984 84	0,953 125	64
MS4	1	0	0	6	0	1	17	3	7	29	2	17	0,75	0,2 5	0,512 5	0,25	0,5	0,75	0	0,125	0,125	0,75	0,125	0,28	0,088 9	0,20554 6667	0,096 386	0,980 188	0,903 614	83
MS5	1	0	0	6	1	2	24	0	2	25	6	11	0,8	0,3 667	0,304	0,2	0,6	0,6	0	0,1	0,2	0,6	0,1	0,235 3	- 0,019 6	0,21574 3945	0,128 205	0,972 341	0,871 795	78
MS6	0	0	0	1	0	0	11	1	7	15	5	12	1	0,3 333	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0,254 9	0,124 2	0,12525 9516	0,019 231	0,997 591	0,980 769	52
MS7	2	2	2	18	0	6	43	8	24	66	2	54	0,6	0,2 667	0,296	0,4	0,53 33	0,6	0,066 667	0,066 667	0,2	0,6	0,0666 6667	0,238 6	0,106 6	0,21449 1484	0,132 159	0,971 653	0,867 841	227
MS8	0	2	0	3	0	4	13	12	1	24	3	20	0,55 56	0,4 815	0,229 63	0,444 444	0,88 89	0,33 333	0,222 222	0	0,444 444	0,333 333	0	0,287 7	0,168 9	0,10016 8887	0,109 756	0,989 006	0,890 244	82
MS9	4	5	2	6	1	3	16	9	11	16	5	17	- 0,04 76	- 0,0 635	0,047 619	1,047 619	0,66 67	0,28 571	0,238 095	0,190 476	0,142 857	0,285 714	0,1904 7619	0,027	- 0,009	0,06208 9116	0,221 053	0,986 275	0,778 947	95
MS10	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	9	2	40	2	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,347 8	0,123 2	0,19839 3195	0	1	1	92	

MS11	10	15	7	15	6	8	84	54	10	79	8	46	-0,0492	-0,0437	0,025423	1,04918	0,5902	0,2459	0,245902	0,163934	0,131148	0,245902	0,16393443	-0,0534	-0,1103	0,018973394	0,178363	0,996616	0,821637	342
Average													0,4227	0,174	0,288687	0,486392	0,4706	0,48836	0,080363	0,092759	0,142546	0,488361	0,09275875	0,165309	0,030155	0,151912024	0,111643	0,986167	0,888357	1486
Norming Group													0,401	0,178	0,332	0,503	0,464	0,468	0,075	0,157	0,154	0,034	0,112	0,301	0,147	0,134	0,224	0,968	0,776	