THE KANTIAN THEORY OF THE SUBLIME AND HUMANIST POLITICS

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Ph.D. in Arts, Design and Architecture
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
October 2013

THE KANTIAN THEORY OF THE SUBLIME AND HUMANIST POLITICS

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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TUĞBA AYAS

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

ARTS, DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

October 2013

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Art, Design and Architecture.

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ABSTRACT

THE KANTIAN THEORY OF THE SUBLIME AND HUMANIST POLITICS

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Ph.D. in Art, Design and Architecture

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October 2013

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant's rendition of cosmopolitanism and the sublime have been quite popular separately in various discussions on politics and aesthetics since the late 90s. In today's political conjuncture the Kantian sublime is consulted in describing the social disasters that had broad repercussions in international public. This study argues that in this century, Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism together with its close relevance to human rights stands in an unusual relation with the sublime due to the feeling of distant suffering caused by social disasters. Moreover, this relation indicates that Kant's cosmopolitanism and sublime can be tools for contemplating contemporary world politics. The present study seeks to disclose this present relationship and the regained value of Kantian philosophy in the face of a new world order through examining a) Kantian cosmopolitanism normatively, as in its original version and; theoretically as in the discussions on its revival in late 90s; b) the transformation of the Kantian sublime after 1945; and c) the state of distant suffering in the face of social disasters of the 20th century interpreted as sublime and its relation to ideal of cosmopolitanism.

Keywords: Kant, Cosmopolitanism, Aesthetic experience, Sublime, Distant suffering.

ÖZET

KANTÇI YÜCE TEORİSİ VE HUMANİST SİYASET

Ayas, Tuğba

Doktora, Sanat, Tasarım ve Mimarlık

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ahmet Gürata

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Ekim 2013

Alman filozof Immanuel Kant'ın kozmopolitanizm anlayışı ve yine filozofun Yüce nosyonu, 90'lı yılların sonundan itibaren politika ve estetik temalı farklı tartışmalarda popülerlik kazanmıştır. İçinde yaşadığımız bu yüzyılın siyasal konjonktüründe ise Kant'ın Yüce nosyonuna uluslararası toplumda yankı bulan toplumsal felaket olaylarını betimlemek için başvurulmaktadır. Bu çalışma bu yüzyılda Immanuel Kant'ın insan haklarıyla yakın ilişkili olan Kozmopolitanizmi ile Yüce nosyonu arasında, sosyal felaketlerin yol açtığı "distant suffering" (ırak ızdırap) olgusu üzerinden sıra dışı bir ilişki ortaya çıktığını iddia eder. Bu durum, Kant'ın kosmopolitanizm ve yüce nosyonlarının günümüz uluslararası siyasetinde yararlı birer analiz aracı olabileceğine işaret eder. Bu çalışma bu iki Kantçı nosyon arasında işaret edilen ilişkiyi ve yeni dünya düzeninde Kant felsefesinin geri kazanmış olduğu değeri ortaya koymak için a) Kantçı kozmopolitanizmi hem orijinal normatif versiyonu hem de 90'ların sonunda bu nosyonun tartışmalara konu edilen teorik biçimi ile; b) Kantçı yüce anlayışını klasik anlamı ve 1945 sonrası geçirdiği dönüşümü bağlamında; c) 20. yüzyılın yüce olarak betimlenen toplumsal felaketleri karşısında ortaya çıkan uzak felaket haberleri ve bunların kozmopolitanizm ideali ile olan ilişkisini bağlamında inceler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kant, Kozmopolitanizm, Estetik deneyim, Yüce nosyonu, Uzak Felaketler.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help of so many people in so many ways. Foremost, I thank my parents Neriman and Recep Ayas and my brother Tolga Ayas for their absolute love. I would like to express my loving thanks also to Onur Önol who tirelessly and gently helped me to get back on track when I was adamant I could no longer go on.

I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman whose help, stimulating suggestions and encouragement helped me in all the time of research for and writing of this thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to Melih Başaran and Elif Çırakman for their many thought-provoking comments on parts of the thesis. I would also like to thank other examining committee members and Kurt Ozment, Ahmet Gürata, Ersan Ocak and Costantino Costantini and Nilgün Bilge for their time and consideration.

I gratefully acknowledge the intellectual generosity I have found in valuable discussions with Mahmut Mutman, Burcu Yalım, Emre Koyuncu, Fırat Berksun, Gökçe Gerekli and Zafer Aracagök during the first years of my doctoral studies. I also thank my friends Gülüzar Eymur, Serkan Eymur, Can Önol and Savaş Göçmen for being supportive throughout dark times.

I feel very lucky to have experienced a special community at Sakarya University. I especially thank my roommates Bilgen Aydın Sevim and Tülay Çelik for their friendship. I would like to thank Pınar Güzelgün for creating high spirits in her mood of 84 generation which delivered joy to my hectic world. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Nejla Civan, Zuhal Karagülle, Gülhan Belkıs and Seher Türk for encouraging me in the last phases of the thesis and supporting me with prayers and Turkish coffee.

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METHOD OF CITATION

Kant's works are referred to in-text by the following abbreviations. The works are cited from the English translation edition given here. References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the pagination of the first and second editions in the traditional manner of the letters 'A' and 'B' respectively.

CJ- Critique of Judgment (1790), James Creed Meredith (trans). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952.

CPR- Critique of Pure Reason (1781, first edition; 1787 second edition), edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

MM- The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) in *Kant: Political Writings* Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.1991, 131-175.

PP- "Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795) in *Kant: Political Writings* Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.1991, 131-175.

IUH- "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" in *Kant: Political Writings* Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.1991, 41-53.

FMM- *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785). Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, trans., 2008.

Lyotard's works are referred to in-text by following abbreviations:

AS- *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime*, Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans., 1994.

D- *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*. Georges Van Den Abbeele, trans., 1988.

CHAPTER I:

INTRODUCTION

In the post-war period, the phenomenon of globalization has spread worldwide and changed the flow of discussions of politics effectively. In contemporary times, the three dimensions of globalization that are, drastically increased cross-border trade, the Internet and identity politics have blurred the concept of border in the classical sense. As one of the outcomes of discussions of globalization, the idea of breaking down of borders both socially and economically towards a global polity has attracted great attention. The possibility of this idea has inevitably recalled the ancient notion of cosmopolitanism which is basically grounded on the assumption that the world is a great village and all the peoples of the world are its habitants.

The history of the ideal of cosmopolitanism can be traced back to ancient Greece and through time different versions of cosmopolitanisms are envisioned by many thinkers. Due to the dramatic decline of nationalism after the WWII, cosmopolitanism with its ideal for a cosmopolitan world has gained more attention than ever. In the post-war era, Immanuel Kant's cosmopolitan vision has often been revisited more than the ancient followers of the notion such as Socrates, Marcus

Aurelius or Alexander the Great. The prevailing elements of the Kantian model of cosmopolitanism such as perpetual peace, a world federation, spirit of commerce and the right of hospitality made it popular among scholars in the discussions of the fate of nationalism (Nussbaum, 1997; Calhoun, 1997; Calhoun, 2006) and in that of the possible new forms of cosmopolitan thinking in the twentieth century (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann,1997; Wood, 1998; Williams, 1992; Calhoun, 1997; Honneth, 1997; Cheah and Robins, 1998).

In the 1990s and especially during the second half of the decade, Kant's political views gained much more attention than they had ever before. The possible reasons given by Kant scholars vary. For instance, according to Allen D. Rosen, since Kant is known to be one of the founders of classical liberalism, due to the growing interest in liberal politics Kant's political thought finally gets the attention it deserves (1993: vii). For Hans Reiss, one good but ignored reason for Kant's return to political discussions is that political principles suggested by Kant indicate "basic human aspirations" and thus, cannot be overlooked since they "become a part of the stock of current ideas" (1991: 272). According to Otfried Höffe, both in the debates of legitimatization of right and state and, also in that of the philosophy of freedom in an age of nuclear armament one could consult Kant as much as other political thinkers. And this fact suggests that his cosmopolitan ideal is still persuasive (2006: xvi). Furthermore, his provisional thought on the power of commerce in mutual relations of states and possible antagonist tendencies of states towards other states due to their concerns relating commonwealth are experienced respectively in world history.

But be that as it may, Kant did not write a distinct political work and this fact puts a damper on Kant's reputation, which depends on his magnificent

Critiques, when it comes to the possible application of his notions to political theory. It is undeniable that some of the Kantian views cannot compete with the present political circumstances. As Rosen rightly puts that "his property qualification for the electoral franchise, his absolutist conception of sovereignty, and his unwillingness to admit any right of revolution" remain indefensible (1993: 209). Additionally, Kant's provisional assumptions remain too much attached to the ideal of a nation-state with respect to the transnational character of world politics. However, some proponents of the theory of nationalism (Nussbaum, 1997) who are also in search of a normative ground that could regulate today's multifaceted political life are in favor of the Kantian view.

The transnational dynamic structure of today's politics changes in an insane speed and it seems that no structure or theory supplies a solid ground for defining the present precisely or predicting the future accurately. Even in such conditions, mostly due to the hope to find a "new" normative ground for dynamic political practices, Kant's political thought is still relevant to contemporary discussions. For instance, Kant is consulted in the assessments of some contemporary issues of transnational space of world such as international organizations both profited and non-profited, refugee rights and military intervention. As an *Aufklärer* from eighteenth-century Europe Kant is seen as a distant resource for contemporary politics. Furthermore, long before the inevitable alteration of nationalistic perspective into a transnational political structure in the post-war era, the history of political thought was driven by dialectics and negative politics especially after Hegel. In those times, Kant was never seen as a leading philosopher in political thought. Moreover, with his strictly normative and critical political stance, Kant's political thought does not have much to offer for our time. Nevertheless,

interestingly enough, in post-war period Kant's possible contribution to world politics is sought both in his aesthetics as well as his political views.

This present study focuses on Kant's aesthetics and its implications for contemporary world. Although, it is not easy to derive a political agenda from Kant's aesthetic theory, a patient observation shall unearth the contemporary political import of his aesthetics. The possible relationship between aesthetics and politics is already addressed by thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard. Among these names, Arendt and Lyotard applied in particular to Kant's aesthetics in order to expose the link between aesthetics and politics. In their own unique approaches, they both focused on Kant's third critique. As a result, Arendt claimed that between the two judgments of taste, the judgment of beautiful offers more than just aesthetic or subjective concerns whereas Lyotard made the same claim for the other judgment of taste, namely the sublime. First by following and then by criticizing these two approaches, this study aims to reach a "new" reading of Kant's sublime besides the mainstream readings on Kant and his political relevance today.

The present study is divided into six chapters. At the outset of the study there is a brief section that strolls around the vast history of the concept of cosmopolitanism in order to remind notion of cosmopolitan thinking in a nutshell. This section constitutes the first part of chapter two and it aims to introduce a pathway for the following section that concerns Kant's well known political views on the concept of right and world peace.

After introducing the Kantian political elements, the possible reasons for the rising popularity of the Kantian political thinking will be explored. Indeed, the fact that it is revisited by many scholars in debates of current politics- better to say; in

cosmopolitics- is a fundamental motivation for the present study. It will be contended that the present ways in which the Kantian notions are taken up are in no way successful in order to reach a consensus on cosmopolitanism.

Kant's politics cannot respond to a desire of finding a solid normative ground for political regulation. It is mainly because his politics is strictly bound up with his ethics due to the fact that in Kantian system the categorical imperative *governs* all possible human actions. Driven by this principle, Kantian ethics is a duty-based, thus, a deontological ethical system rather than a consequence-based ethics. With its roots in Kant's deontological ethical system, Kantian politics remains an insufficient source for the dynamic transnational political space. Thus, if what is at stake here is to find a formula, this study indicates the impossibility and futility of giving any kind of static formulation relaying on Kant's politics. The third part of the second chapter will try to address the problematic structure of the Kant's universal politics. The section will end with the inference that for a fruitful Kantian politics that would function in this century, which has already given up universalist frames, we should turn our attention to his aesthetics. Due to the peculiar character of the faculty of judgment which is concerned with particulars more than universals and, also due to the contemporary appearance of the sublime in international politics in particular, Kantian aesthetics seems to present an alternative ground for a political reading. Yet, it is significant to point out here that this study will not propound immediate practical or feasible solutions to the concerns of political practices.

The third chapter tries to present a thorough analysis of the theory of the Kantian sublime. The faculties involved (the imagination and reason) will be traced back to the first *Critique* in order to richen the promising appearances of each for

an alternative reading that would open Kantian aesthetics to a political approach. In this framework, the sublime appears to be a possible ground to reject humanist politics and its universal approach to recent debates on politics. It will be argued that the Kantian sublime in its unique mode can reveal a ground which is not normative or in other words, which differs from the universalist approach within Kant's system. On this ground one can treat the plurality and difference in their heterogeneous character without reducing or pushing them into rigid universal categories.

Following the assumptions above, this study will propose a new ground for reading the Kantian politics through the philosopher's third *Critique*, the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Thus, the fourth chapter evaluates the possible political import of the sublime. There are different approaches that reflect on the political repercussions of aesthetic judgments. This kind of attempt is surely not new. To name a few, Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard are well-known scholars who have meticulous works on Kant's third *Critique*. In the fourth chapter, Arendt and Lyotard will be revisited as their insightful attempts furnish the way of this study in many aspects. Arendt will be visited for her assessments on judgments of taste and *sensus communis* as a plural will. Yet, this study does not support her reading since; Arendt's approach unfortunately culminates in a search for a universal criterion even if this criterion is to be decided by the majority of people. Lyotard's views on Kant's aesthetics are resourceful and most helpful to construct a mental map for this study. By comparing and contrasting these views, the central assertion of the study will be that the sublime, as an aesthetic moment, is impregnated with more than solely aesthetic concerns. Indeed, from the point of view of the first *Critique*, the sublime means an anti-humanist moment in the

Kantian philosophy. Thus, the end of Chapter four elaborates the anti-humanist aspect of the sublime.

Chapter five assesses the contemporary value of the Kantian sublime and its unusual relation to cosmopolitanism. In contemporary world politics, the sublime is attributed to international social disasters and turned into adjective of acts that are most immoral. This chapter claims that the catastrophic social disasters of the twentieth century such as The Holocaust and Hiroshima created a ground for the contemporary nexus between the Kantian cosmopolitanism and the sublime. The attempt to describe such horrifying events called upon the sublime whereas the cosmopolitan thinking is accounted as one of the after effects of the mentioned instances. Therefore, they enabled the Kantian cosmopolitanism to the Kantian aesthetics relate in such a unique way that in contemporary times, the sublime turns into a tool of politics whereas cosmopolitanism transforms into an aesthetical experience. If this relationship is analyzed, it can be seen that Kant's possible contribution to today's political agenda appears much different from any normative framework it has ever been attached to. A political philosophy that is centered on this new relationship can make both the Kantian cosmopolitanism and aesthetics more effective than it is. Humanist philosophy of Kant is firmly attached to the notions of nation-state, duty, universalism etc… In this frame there seems no ground for a non-determinacy that is almost the nub of today's political agenda. This study claims that today the sublime can supply a ground for reassessing the value of aesthetics together with its non-cognitive, thus, non-determinable character. Non-rationality of aesthetics in Kant can be read as an opportunity of the Kantian frame to catch an alternative approach to cosmopolitan politics.

CHAPTER II:

KANT AND THE COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL

2.1. On the Notion of Cosmopolitanism and Kant's Appeal to the Notion

If mind is common to us all, then so is the reason which makes us rational beings; and if that be so, then so is the reason which prescribes what we should do or not do. If that be so, there is a common law also; if that be so, we are fellow-citizens; and if that be so, the world is a kind of state. For in what other common constitution can we claim that the whole human race participates?

Marcus Aurelius

The word 'cosmopolitan', comes from Ancient Greek, from the word *kosmopolitēs* which means 'world citizen' (Heater, 1996: 7). As a notion, cosmopolitanism is based on the idea that all human beings, living on earth can be seen as members of a single community, where all peoples are conceived as citizens of the world despite all differences. The quest for cosmopolitanism has been an item of debate since ancient times. It is first propounded by an ancient school of philosophy, The Cynics and later developed in ancient times by another school, the Stoics as well as Jewish, Christian, and Muslim thinkers in medieval age.

As cosmopolitan thought is known to be developed by the Cynics first, the word *kosmopolitēs* is known to be used firstly by Diogenes the Cynic, a famous Cynic, who is known to live in a tub. He is reported to say 'I am a citizen of the

world '. It is widely accepted that by these words Diogenes refuses any local connections or memberships related to any particular polis because he seeks defining himself in a more universal frame by withdrawing himself from any kind of categorization implying a discrimination regarding class, status or gender. In this sense, Diogenes' cosmopolitanism is both an *individual act of liberation* and a *moral sensibility*. The Cynic cosmopolitanism does not go further than rejecting the conventional thinking. However, one significant contribution of the Cynic cosmopolitanism is that it paved the way for "a critical sensibility" in cosmopolitan imagination. This critical aspect of the Cynic cosmopolitanism emphasized the restricted world view of the republic in Greek polis (Delanty, 2009: 20).

Before Diogenes, passages that have a cosmopolitan voice are also noticed in the writings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. For instance, Socrates is also known to answer a question on his origins by saying that he is not from Athens but from the world. In *Protagoras* Plato writes, "I count you all my kinsmen and family and fellow-citizens– by nature not by convention" (Heater, 1996: 6). As for Aristotle, in *Politics* he mentions that a world state would be possible. However, none of these passages is regarded as cosmopolitan statements because none of them indicates the notions of world citizenship, world state or a world federation. Besides, especially in the case of Socrates, he uses the word *kosmios* (universe) not *mundum* (world) to explain that he associated himself with all life and so, with humankind in particular. Thus, with respect to these famous three philosophers the themes with a cosmopolitan content usually do not go further than being just logical statements.

The Stoics give cosmopolitanism its core political focus. They improve the notion of cosmopolitanism by grounding it on a moral philosophy that is based on

the notion of virtue. They believed in human sociality and claimed that human beings have the potential to share a world in a cosmopolitan sense (Sellars, 2006: 133).

When the notion of unity of mankind is concerned, another celebrated historical figure, Alexander the Great, comes to the fore. He ruled the broadest empire that the Western world had ever seen. He was a general with a desire of merging the races of Greeks, Macedonians, Persians and Medes. He tried to extend the lands under his reign through conquest in order to achieve his goal of uniting the mankind. Even if he did not succeed empirically, his intention was in accordance with the cosmopolitan ideal: uniting all differences by ignoring difference as a principle of discrimination or domination. In this sense, by his conquests Greek language and culture is carried further from the closed system of the Greek polis (Delanty, 2009: 22).

Taken as a whole, global politics was not of a high importance in the Hellenistic age. The existing ideas of the age were developed into a more systematic schema by the Stoics who followed the path of the Cynics. According to the Stoic philosophers, we are members of at least two communities. The first is the community that we are born into and the second is the one in which we recognize all human beings as our fellow citizens. In this way, the Stoic idea of *cosmopolis* becomes of moral and social life.

For both the Cynics and the Stoics, the notion of *cosmopolis* was not understood as a proper political system such as a 'constitution for universal state'. In *Cosmopolis*, all human beings would be equal and subject to law of nature against the social and cultural diversities. Thus, for the Cynics and Stoics, this is served as the core of the concept of *cosmopolis* (Heater, 1996: 1-21).

In the long tradition of ideas with cosmopolitan content, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus have great influence on Kant's cosmopolitan ideal with regard to the idea of unity of mankind. In her article "Kant and Cosmopolitanism", Martha Nussbaum states that Kant is deeply indebted to Cicero and Marcus Aurelius. She argues that Ancient Greek cosmopolitanism is not only the origin of the concept but it also inspires much of the Kantian cosmopolitan ideal (1991: 1). From the Stoic cosmopolitan ideal "Kant appropriates—the idea of a kingdom of free rational beings, equal in humanity, each of them to be treated as an end no matter where in the world he or she dwells" (Nussbaum, 1997: 36). Following this idea, Kant asserts that we share the same structure of mind and our rational minds presuppose a common participation in law. Thus, our rationality leads us to a polity, a cosmopolitan polity, even if there is no empirical correspondence in the form of a constitution (Nussbaum, 1997: 36).

We may summarize Nussbaum's argument on Kant's debt to Stoic philosophy— especially to Cicero and Marcus Aurelius— as follows: firstly, Kant strictly follows Cicero in his belief that the peoples of the earth have entered a universal community due to the *organic interconnectedness* which is emerged out of the conditions of the earth. Secondly, when Kant writes on cosmopolitan law that is defined as the unwritten complement of the international law, he closely follows Cicero and Marcus Aurelius. Moreover, Kant's thoughts on the hospitality right and the free speech of the philosopher for the good of the public also seem to be influenced by these thinkers.

In addition to the ancient cosmopolitanism of the Greco-Roman world, there is also a tradition of classical cosmopolitanism shaped by the spirit of the eighteenth century. Among the representatives of eighteenth-century

cosmopolitanism such as Erasmus, Rousseau, Grotius, Pufendorf, Kant is counted as "the true inaugurator" (Cheah, 2006) and the best representative of modern cosmopolitanism. As Delanty puts it, in Kant's works "the ambivalence of the eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism as somewhere between a new universalism and international law was encapsulated" (2009: 31).

Kant refers to Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau in his essay "Idea toward a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan View".[1] Yet, his intentions are different from the former because he does not bestow favors on heads of the state like Abbé de Saint Pierre. Furthermore, his approach also differs from Rousseau's since he also does not merely indicate injustices the heads of the state cause. He addresses not a specified class of rulers but humanity as a whole. International law which immediately springs from collective reason as a component of living in and being a member of the community of humankind is the central concern and element of his cosmopolitan reflections (Wood, 1998: 61). Before proceeding to the elements of Kantian cosmopolitanism, let us learn more about the historical conditions of the eighteenth century in the following section.

2.1.2 The Age of Enlightenment and Kant, the *Aufklärer*

The eighteenth century, in which Kant was born and lived most of his life, "critically" affected the direction of the dominant intellectual life. It was the Age of Enlightenment[2]. It began in the late 17th century and survived the entire 18th century. It was an age of a cultural movement of intellectuals emphasizing the reason and individualism. It was the beginning of modernity. All components of

[1] Here after cited as *Idea.*

[2] The name is not widely accepted until the nineteenth century.

tradition and traditional life-"religion, political organization, social structure, science, human relations, human nature, history, economics, and the very grounds of human understanding- was subjected to intense scrutiny and investigation" (Wilson, 2004: ix) in the age of Enlightenment. Moreover, in this century, the western world was in an age of struggles in social, governmental and individual states. For the present purposes, in order to trace the development of the Kantian politics to its roots a brief overview of the eighteenth-century Germany can be instructive here.

In 1748 (the time young Immanuel was a 24 year-old), Germany was not a state in the form of a single nation state like France and England. Rather it was a loose confederation of states. As a confederation of states, it consisted of over three hundred autonomous territories which belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. This number was more than the rest of the Europe in total. These autonomous German states were governed by territorial despotic princess. Due to the lack of a common law established by the German kings, each prince was the guarantor of both the peace and the justice of the land he ruled.

The period between 1648 and 1815 is known as the age of absolutism in Germany. Many rulers desired to "maintain their own armies, establish loyal bureaucracies… and administering the territory in a profitable way" (Fulbrook, 1990: 71-2). The rise of Brandenburg-Prussia may be the most significant political change of this period. In late eighteenth century, Prussia became a powerful rival to Austria for dominance of German affairs.

The peculiarly German variant of the Enlightenment, *Aufklarung*[3], tended to sustain the role of worldly rulers. However, at the same time, it was frequently embedded in the process of secular rule with quite progressive effects, as implied in the notion of 'enlightened absolutism' which was popular among the supporters of natural law theory (Fulbrook, 1990: 72-3).

In the eighteenth century, social transformation in Germany had long lasting effects. Feudal aristocracy was transformed into a bureaucratic aristocracy. Educated people were raised into civil servants and minor court officials. Then they later emerged as new middle class. In the late eighteenth century, an astounding literary revival is experienced by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). Also, the eighteenth-century Germany had many great composers like Corelli, Vivaldi, Albinoni, Handel, Bach and his sons particularly Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Telemann, Ramaeau, Stamitz, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Gluck and Boccherini.

In the eighteenth century, an expanding reading public caused a great increase in publications. Not only books but also kinds of printed materials like newspapers, magazines and periodicals were published. Reading and discussion for the sake of personal development was a rising trend. Many societies, associations and organizations emerged in the second half of the century such as scientific or reading societies, educational associations and freemasons' lodges (firstly in Hamburg in 1737). Reading societies were particularly common in Germany and present in almost every big German town. The ideas of the age were spread through these societies not merely among intellectuals or aristocrats but also among other classes of society. In Germany, the clubs of Rhieland, Mainz, Landau, and Cologne

[3] The German expression *Aufklarung* is known to indicate the era from the 1780s onwards.

were democratic organizations with between 200 and 300 members. Intellectuals as well as clergy and merchants, artisans and peasants attended these clubs which supported the interaction of ideas (Im Hoff, 1990: 207-18).

Another colorful element of the social life in the eighteenth century was coffee houses. Beginning from the late seventeenth century, they emerged and spread widely in many cities such as London, Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna and Leipzig. In a coffee house, one could read newspapers, watch chess tournaments and engage in political discussion while having a cup of coffee. Anyone, even women, could enter coffee houses without hesitation (Outram, 2006: 59). The societies and coffee houses supplied a productive social ground of the ideas which led to revolution. In these places rational thoughts on life in general even if many societies were banned after when they were thought to be sharing ideas on political or religious matters. The phenomenon of coffee houses marks a discursive space, a *public sphere* where people perform political participation through talking. Jurgen Habermas formalizes the public sphere as follows:

> The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason (*öffentliches Räsonnement*). In our [German] usage this term (i.e., *Räsonnement*) unmistakable preserves the polemical nuances of both sides: simultaneously the invocation of reason and its disdainful disparagement as merely malcontent griping (1991: 27).

The *people's public use of their reason* is no doubt deeply influenced Kant and shaped his thoughts on the freedom of speech. He lived this dynamic historical period in Königsberg. The city was the administrative centre of East Prussia as well

as a legal, military and educational centre with mutual connections to Europe (Guyer, 2006: 16). Kant was a great name for this period. But until his critical philosophy which is known to end the dominant effect of Leibniz-Wolffian[4] form of rationalism, the eighteenth-century German intellectual thought has been driven by Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), and Christian Wolff (1679-1754).

In this promising historical period, Kant indubitably identified himself as an *Aufklärer*. His identifying himself as an *Aufklärer* in the specific German sense of the term is closely related to Fredrick II and his determined intention to turn Prussia into a highly cultured and intellectual kingdom (Zammito, 1992: 17). Kant's thoughts on political matters are surely shaped by the social and cultural factors of the eighteenth century which emphasized rationality and individualism. Manfred Kuehn writes that even if Königsberg is not a center of any significant events of the age, Kant's intellectual thoughts are an "expression of and response to these changes" and moreover, "his intellectual life reflected most of the significant intellectual, political and scientific developments of the period" (2001:20).

2.2. On Kant's Political Philosophy

Kant, the philosopher of the age of Enlightenment, did not write any books, any distinct treatises or critiques for a political philosophy. Thus, unlike his three great Critiques, his political thought was not particularly applied or accepted as a noticeable contribution to systematized theory of political thought. We learn his political views primarily from his short essays that are penned by the philosopher

[4] Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is generally considered one of the two founders of the German *Aufklarung*. He is known as the most eminent thinker between Leibniz and Kant.

in a broad period of time[5] and from the Doctrine of Right *(Rechtslehre)*, the first part of his book *The Metaphysics of Morals* (*Die Metaphysik der Sitten*) published in 1797. The Doctrine of Right entails Kant's final thoughts on the notion of right, since it is the latest work of the philosopher on the subject. In the Doctrine of Right, Kant announces that freedom is an innate right of an individual. He also claims that individuals, if they are eager to preserve their freedom, have a duty to enter into a civil constitution that is driven by the social contract. Apart from the Doctrine of Right, which is focused on the notion of right, Kant's political essays were on the freedom of public speech in *Enlightenment*; on history in *Idea*; on the notion of state in *Theory*; and on the international relations of states in *Perpetual Peace*.

It is a known fact that Kant's magnificent Critiques get considerable attention from the readers. His political essays, on the other hand, are not united into another Critique. Single appearances of these essays caused a negligence of Kant's political views. In addition to this, the language of his political writings has a more plain style of language in comparison to the demanding and most of the time stringent language of his Critiques. In his political essays, Kant focused on the urgent political matters of his time. Thus, the language he used was more particularistic and thus, different from that of his critiques. This change in the language is considered as another reason for the negligence of the readers. It is also considered as the reason of philosopher's exclusion from the list of distinguished political philosophers that entails Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau. In other

[5] "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784) ,"Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784); "On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not apply in Practice" (1792); "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795); "The Contest of Faculties" (1798). Here after these essays will appear as *Enlightenment*; *Idea*; *Theory*; *Perpetual Peace*; *The Contest*.

words, not the weight of his writings but the relative place of his political essays in his critical system is blameworthy for the negligence of his name in political philosophy.[6] Whether these reasons are valid or not, it is a fact that Kant's name has not been often cited in political theory till the rise of phenomenon of globalization. It is agreeable that exclusion of Kant from political theory is a serious mistake since Kant's political writings or essays "grow organically out of his critical philosophy" (Reiss, 1991: 3). In other words, these essays grew specifically in the historical background of the eighteenth century. They each reflect the spirit of the Enlightenment and the influences of the French and American revolutions as well.

The first thing that catches the attention of a Kant reader is that his political essays lack the pure theoretical character or the language of other three Critiques. The essays were penned after fervid social and political changes of those times and thus, they are necessarily written in relation to particular social and political instances. Considering this, the particularistic attitude in the essays would be regarded as deceptive in terms of universal thinking. Yet still, the Kantian characteristic of all those essays is determined as the search for *a priori* principles which can realize the universal right and perpetual peace. Because Kant thinks that the idea of a state must not be derived from any particular example but from an *absolute ideal* of the possibility of peoples' living together under rightful laws. Therefore, the idea of the state as an absolute ideal and freedom as an innate right emphasize the *a priori* character of Kant's approach. And this transcendental (*a priori*) employment of reason drags him into metaphysics (MM 174).

[6] In contrast to this general view, relaying on the Doctrine of Right, Roger Sullivan defends Kant by stating that Kant had already given the highest place to the notion of state thus, to his political philosophy by declaring that "a state is an essential part of our necessary moral goal on earth- the freedom of ends in political form; and obedience to the laws of such a state is a moral duty, as sacred as if they were divine commands". See Sullivan, 1989, pp. 258-60.

Another expected aspect of Kant's political writings is the characteristic and the influence of dominant trends of thought in the eighteenth century. In this century, Hobbes and his famous *Leviathan* which suggested relinquishing from all individual rights for the sake of protection from the state of war was criticized heavily by theorists of the theory of natural law (*jus naturae*).

Natural law was a system that combined the Classical Roman law[7] and the Bible's Ten Commandments. It is not derived from the lives of men as communal beings but from the life of man as an individual and as a citizen. Natural law theory was developed into an international and cosmopolitan thinking by the great names of 18th century such as Hugo Grotius[8], Samuel Pufendorf[9] and the Abbé de Saint Pierre.[10] Most defenders of natural law theory believed in enlightened monarchs and their ministers who would supply a constitution which guarantees the rights of individuals in terms of the natural law. This notion paved the way for the liberalistic approaches of the following decades.

Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Contract Social* (1762) had a revolutionary effect on eighteenth century politics. He defined the republic as the ideal form of a government. If natural law theory is one fundamental source for Kant's thought, then Rousseau and the social contract theory is the other that impressed Kant deeply. Kant recognized Rousseau as the first thinker who had emphasized the

[7] The Classical Roman Law says*: Juris praecepte sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere*, ('The principles of law are as follows: live honestly, do harm to no man and give everyone his due').

[8] His three volume book *De Jure Belli ac Pacis- On the Law of Peace and War* that seeks a foundation for the natural law, analyses the five legal authorities of the time respectively as 'reasons of state', common law, philosophical doctrines, Roman law and lastly the divine law (Im Hoff, 1990: 81-2).

[9] Pufendorf's work was followed by Christian Wolff , John Locke and Anthony Shaftsbury.

[10] He had already written on the notion of a league of nations in 1713.

distinction between ‘natural man’ and ‘cultural man’ within a socially constituted definition of freedom.

In “Conjectural Beginnings of Human History” Kant analyses Rousseau’s essays “On the Influence of the Sciences” and “On the Inequality of Man”. He agrees that as a physical species the human race has its moral aspect and its natural aspect. According to the nature of man, each individual is to fulfill its destiny alone. Yet, man is also a moral species and can develop into a community. Rousseau deals with the problem of culture in *Émile* and in the *Social Contract* where he seeks a course for culture to take in order not to hinder the development of human species. According to Kant, in the antagonism between the nature and the culture of man the *genuine evil* that decreases the quality of human life lies (1991: 227-8).

Detecting this conflict between nature and culture in Rousseau’s view, Kant tries to avoid from this conflict by postulating the social contract as an *a priori* principle of reason. In other words, Kant treats the social contract as Idea of reason acting like a norm rather than a historical fact. According to the philosopher, social contract as a historical fact would mean to be bounded by a *pre-existing civil constitution* inherited from the previous nations. The presupposition of a *pre-existing civil constitution* necessarily conflicts with the idea of a “coalition of the wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a common, public will for the purposes of rightful legislation…” (Kant, 1991: 79). Instead, an *original contract* must entail the principle of an eager agreement with majority. In this way, a lawful civil constitution and so commonwealth can be achieved without any coercion. Since an original contract, which entails the universal agreement, resources from being rational subjects, an agreement on a civil constitution can be launched

without any external condition because all man are subject to the very same principles in the realm of rationality.

This point that Kant makes with regard to Rousseau is apparent in his famous essay *Perpetual Peace*, as well as in many of his other political essays. Kant is after a vindication of the validity of a republican government in the light of present political developments of the age of Enlightenment such as French Revolution.

Relying on the records of his academic life, it can be said that Kant's interest in politics was always present in his thoughts. He gave a lecture on the "Theory of Right" in 1767 long before he published his *Critique of Pure Reason*[11] in 1781. Furthermore, we see that his essays *Enlightenment* and *Idea* were written before his third *Critique*, *Critique of Judgment*[12]. All his political writings were written after 1790. He never organized these into a systematic book but his political views were even present in *CPR* (Reiss, 1956:191).

As a fervent defender of human freedom in the age of enlightenment, Kant was a liberal for he was against any patriarchal government. According to him, political freedom evolves from the definition of man and it is definitely a -philosophically- provable right of man. This view was a great contribution to Germany's political development. His views were criticized by his successors such as German Romantics, for they had seen Kant as the "arch-enemy" and, also by Hegel whose thoughts have dominated the historical studies of politics and law after Kant. Yet, Kant's liberal approach influenced thinkers like Fredrich Schiller and Alexander von Humboldt as well as Jakob Friedrich Fries and Sir Karl Popper.

[11] From now on will appear as *CPR*.

[12] From now on will appear as *CJ*.

While his emphasis on man's continuously developing intellectual and thus, political maturity was found interesting by the contemporary politics, his approach was undervalued during the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

2.2.1. Kant's Ethics and His Political Thought

Between Kant's morals and politics there exists an ambiguous yet profound relationship. The Kantian ethics can be found in three works of the philosopher: *Fundamentals of Metaphysic of Morals*[13] (1785), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797). Among these, as we have seen in the previous section, *The Metaphysics of Morals* caused the view that Kant's political philosophy is derived from his practical or moral philosophy.

When dealing with political issues Kant clearly takes his ethical views for granted and sees the categorical imperative as the fundamental principle of political right. In favor of this claim, Christine Korsgaard writes that for Kant, the emergence of the rights of man and the abandonment of speculative metaphysics are not unrelated and, taken together they participate in the discussion of the scope and the power of reason. The limits of theoretical reason are surpassed by practical reason which announces that every human being is free and autonomous. In Kant's ethical works, this dictate of practical reason is given as the legitimate ground for politics as well as morality (2004: 3). More specifically, Kant's political views are grounded upon the foundations of his moral philosophy and have their primordial support from the fundamental principle of morality, i.e. the *categorical imperative*. This link between Kant's ethics and politics has been a contentious matter but, in

[13] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*. This work is also translated in English as The Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals or Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals.

the end, it is widely recognized that Kant's practical and political philosophy aim at "the possibility of realizing a moral political order through interventions in social-political reality by autonomous reason" (Apel, 1997: 82).

Kant's practical philosophy basically follows his critical philosophy of the first *Critique*. It represents the objective validity of theoretical reason. It seeks the answer for one question: "What ought one to do?" Kant explicitly states that the answer of the question cannot be found in the empirical world or among contingent beings. The answer must be a universal formula that can be applied to all possible human actions. Hence, in practical reason we are to find a principle that will be treated as an abiding law and regulate all human actions. This principle is an *a priori* principle of morality according to which we will know how we ought to act. Kant introduces this fundamental principle as the categorical imperative or the absolute *a priori* command of our pure practical reason and thus, that of morality.

In the *Fundamentals of Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), which is accepted as Kant's first book on his moral thought, Kant defines categorical as absolute and imperative as command. On the absolute or categorical character of the command Kant writes that "everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity" (FMM 7). By this assertion the categorical imperative claims for absolute respect and obedience. Kant continues by an example:

> The precept, "Thou shalt not lie", is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason (FMM 7).

It is necessary to write that the term “everyone” in the above sentence refers to “rational beings”, because Kant defines morality as rational beings’ acting according to the categorical imperative. The condition of being a rational being is the use of reason and the use of reason necessitates self-determination, i.e. autonomy.

The notion of autonomy is taken to be the core of the Kantian theory of right and Kant’s political philosophy by many scholars (Gregor 1963; Mulholland 1990; Weinrib 1992; Sullivan 1994). The notion of an autonomous individual necessitates a right to external liberty. This external freedom is supplied by the commitment of individuals to legal protection. Mary Gregor claims that by the capacity to be autonomous, an external liberty is assured since this right should be respected by every other man. The lawful constraint that this state bears is “contained analytically in the concept of outer freedom” (1963: 43). Similarly, according to Mulholland, autonomy necessitates an external milieu that would supply “a non-teleological constitutive structure” (1990:2). Furthermore, for Sullivan, “the power of the autonomy is what gives every person moral authority and status against the might of the state” (1994:15). Weinrib claims from another angle that the external relationship and the autonomy is united in the concept of right in Kant and “accordingly, the union of the externality and freedom in the concept of right permits law to be understood as an idea of reason with practical reality” (1992: 24).

The notion of autonomy in Kant necessarily corresponds to the concept of freedom in two senses: positive and negative. Positive freedom necessitates realizing the categorical imperative as a constraint upon one’s actions. According to Kant, negative freedom in the sense of autonomy indicates that one takes the

control of his or her own life and voluntarily abandons himself or herself to the moral law (Beck, 2008: 187). The sense of negative freedom (autonomy) and the moral law distinguish man who is subject to the laws of freedom from other things that are necessarily and merely subject to the laws of nature. Thus, in Kantian morality a rational being is strictly autonomous and free. Yet, according to Kant, the autonomy and freedom mean that the individuals admit the categorical imperative as the ultimate guiding principle for their actions.

In Kant, freedom in the ordinary sense of the word appears as the right to lawful freedom and, it is defined as *a priori* component of humanity. In "Metaphysical Elements of Justice" Kant writes:

> Freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity (1965:43-4).

This formulation of freedom, as we shall see soon, will provide the sufficient ground for the notion of justice. According to Kant, the categorical imperative, which introduces the law of freedom, in accordance with which one must act, will be recognized by all rational beings who beat the call of their desires or inclinations and by that they will determine their will independently (FMM 72). To be fair to Kant's notion of categorical imperative, we must state that Kant does not intend to say that this principle actually exists but must be treated *as if* it exists. In other words, rational beings who can choose freely that is, independent of the influence of the inclinations of their nature must act as if in accordance with a universal moral law i.e. the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is good in-itself. It does not tell us whether an action is good or not as a means to

something. The good of the categorical imperative comes form its accordance to reason.

Kant provides three formulations of the categorical imperative. The first commands: "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (FMM 39). This imperative is free from any kind of contingent end and it "would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary" (FMM 32). This first formulation is the necessary shape of the categorical imperative and it considers the *form* of the imperative.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative seeks the *content* and commands that rational beings must be treated as ends. It is formulated as follows: "So act as to treat humanity, whether thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (FMM 47).

In the third formulation, we see the "principle of autonomy" at work. According to Kant, rational subjects create the moral law themselves and they subject to that law without an external obligation. They are subject to the law that they legislated as a result of their autonomous willing. From this fact the third formulation, the autonomy of the will follows: "Always so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law" (FMM 58). The nexus between autonomy and morality is clear when Kant writes:

> That the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality. For by this analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy (FMM 58).

In the light of these three formulations it is clear that in the case of morality the categorical imperative- without an alternative- is the only principle that can be adopted freely. In this sense, we should recognize that for Kant freedom is not the freedom of choosing among some options but instead it is the "power of self-determination" (Becker, 1993: 82). Therefore, according to Kant, rational beings are free as long as they adopt and act in accordance with the categorical imperative. Furthermore, they may act immorally but if they know that they acted wrong, it should be realized that they are capable of such awareness only because they have recognized the categorical imperative (FMM 41).

In its relation to politics, as the ultimate principle of pure practical philosophy (or metaphysics of morals) the categorical imperative appears as the absolute principle of all deliberate actions of man. In *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant is concerned with how this principle is to be practiced by human beings. This work consists of two parts, respectively, the "Doctrine of Right" and the "Doctrine of Virtue". As pointed out earlier, Kant expresses most of his political stance in the former part of the book where in his remarks a logical connection can be traced between ethics and jurisprudence or better to say; between his practical and political philosophies. For instance, according to Kant the notion of legislation has two forms, ethical and juridical, and

> If legislation makes no action of a duty and at the same time makes this duty the incentive, it is ethical. If it does not include the latter condition in the law and therefore admits an incentive other than the Idea of duty itself, it is juridical (1965: 19).

From the above paragraph it is clear that for Kant, the duty in ethics is never taken as coercion whereas in jurisprudence the duty is externally motivated and a person

has some other incentives for his actions. In that case jurisprudence (doctrine of right) for Kant is "the body of those laws, that is, externally legislated" (1965: 33).

We must notice here the distinction of two kinds of duty in Kant, namely perfect duty and imperfect duty. The former implies the duties that every action of a subject must accord with any circumstances. For instance, "killing oneself" or "defiling yourself with lust" or "stupefying oneself" are the examples for perfect duties that every subject must fulfill by avoiding them.

Imperfect duties imply those duties that entail principles to adopt but they are not necessarily acted upon in every action, for instance, self-perfection. Following from these definitions, we see that jurisprudence, for it applies to the external relationship of one person to another, entails concerns about imperfect duties. Since Kant defines the categorical imperative as the sole constraint on the will of rational beings, it appears as the definitive principle of how a rational being, if it ever calls itself rational, must act. Following from this point, justice emerges as the external complement of the categorical imperative.

In addition to its relation to morality, justice or the theory of right (*Ius*/ *Rechtslehre*) must have "immutable principles" which provide guidance and convenience. They are to be looked for in pure reason rather than among empirical laws since a theory consisting solely of empirical laws can just be like the wooden head in Phaedrus' fable: charming but without brains (MM 132). Therefore, the concept of right, when it is taken- as it must be- in relation to obligation (i.e. the moral concept of right), is applicable three specific conditions.

The first condition concerns mutual external relations between people. It aims to regulate human actions or deeds that appear as the practical consequences

of their free will in order to make sure that there are no violations of freedom. In the second condition, the concept of right guards the freedom of choice of both individuals, thus, it focuses on the relationship between the wills (*Willkür*) of two people. Lastly, the concept of right is not concerned with the aim of the will, which is the material aspect of it, but with only the form of the interaction between two wills. In other words, it is concerned with the form of freedom of each will in their conformity with a universal law (MM 133).

The ethical duty commands us to act in accordance with our perfect duties. Yet, as for the imperfect duties, since our duty is to adopt them but not necessarily, it is possible to act in accordance with them but they need to be regulated by some law in order not to violate the very principle of freedom. In this sense, the concept of right is given by Kant as follows: "Right is therefore the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom" (MM 133). Now nothing other than morality can compel the individual to make this a maxim for himself or herself. Following this, the universal law of right is: "let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law" (MM 133). On the point of the continuity and preservation of this universal law which entails the right to external freedom, Kant indicates that logically if it is ever possible to hinder the right to external freedom, the authority to use coercion must be allowed (MM 134). Thus, justice or right can appeal to coercion in order to guarantee this right to external freedom in a universal scale.

The practice of the innate right to external right entails both the right to security in oneself and the right to possess things outside of oneself. According to

Kant, in order to benefit from both these rights people must abandon themselves to the law. Since,

> experience teaches us the maxim that human beings act in a violent and malevolent manner, and that they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercive legislation supervenes (MM 137).

Yet, Kant thinks neither the experience nor knowledge is the cause of *public legal coercion* but,

> (O)n the contrary, even if we imagine the men to be benevolent and law-abiding as we please, the a priori rational idea of a non-lawful state will still tell us that before a public and legal state is established, individual men, peoples and states can never be secure against acts of violence from one another, since each will have his own right to do what seems right and good to him, independently of the opinion of others (MM 137).

From this detection pertaining to the nature of man, the following result is derived: *Exeundum e statu naturali*! The state of nature must be abandoned. People must willingly enter into a state of civil society if they ever wish to enjoy their rights. By this means, both the right to be secure and possess things in peace is guaranteed by the state which, under these circumstances, appears as a "union of an aggregate of men under rightful laws". This phrase is followed by a crucial passage in which Kant writes that

> in so far as these laws are necessary a priori and follow automatically from the concepts of external right in general (and are not just set up by statute), the form of the state will be that of a state in the absolute sense, i.e. as the idea of what a state ought to be according to pure principles of right. This can serve as an internal guide (*norma*) for every actual case where men unite to form a commonwealth (MM 138).

It is clear from the paragraph that the laws that constitute a state are by no means derived from empirical realm or experience. On the contrary, due to their *a priori* character they would govern any kind of state that is to be established. In

this sense, neither the commonwealth of people nor the welfare of the state is about happiness or well-being of people but instead they imply the "conditions in which the constitution most closely approximates to the principles of right; and reason, by the categorical imperative, obliges us to strive for its realization" (MM 143).

In the Kantian system, there is no sufficient way of constructing a state other than the guidance of reason. In this sense, Kant is the first among the social contract theorists (such as Hobbes and Locke) who find the ground of establishing state in pure practical reason alone (Kersting, 1992: 144). In Kant, the voluntary act of giving up the unlimited freedom becomes a necessity that derives its power from the pure reason. In this peculiar position the social contract emerges as the will of the reason rather than people's (IUH 28). Thus, Kant's original contract is a document of reason and by this means "Kant transforms the contractualistic act of foundation of state rule to a practical idea of Reason which functions normatively as the principle of political justice" (Kersting, 1992: 149). Furthermore, if we follow Kant's *hypothetical social contract*, we notice that for human beings accepting to submit themselves to the social contract is a must, "because their consent is a necessary manifestation of their humanity, i.e. it is known a priori that, inasmuch as a being is rational, and one to whom the concept "human" applies, this being necessarily consents to the social contract (Becker, 1993: 96).

Following this, state or civil state that Kant expects, has three a priori principles. First one concerns the freedom of every member of society as a human being. Kant formulates this principle as follows:

> No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to

> pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law—i.e. he must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself (Kant, 1991: 74).

The second principle concerns equality of each man with all the others as a subject. According to Kant, except from the head of state, who by right coerce others without being coerced by the law, all members of a state bear the same rights before the law.

We see that the third principle is the independence of each member of a commonwealth as a citizen (Kant, 1991: 74). Among these three principles, only the last one takes historical and social circumstances into account (Williams, 2006:1). According to Kant, the legislation for commonwealth

> (R)equires freedom, equality and unity of the will of all the members. And the prerequisite for unity, since it necessitates a general vote (if freedom and equality are both present), is independence. The basic law, which can come only from the general, united will of the people, is called the original contract (Kant, 1991: 77).

Independence then appears as the last condition of the civil state and more importantly it implies the condition of being a citizen that is, to participate in legislation. A citizen, in these circumstances, is the one who is free and equal with others before the law and is the one who can vote in legislation. Thus, the people who are to be called independent (*sibisufficientus*) citizens are the ones who possess some property that enables them not to serve any master. Kant writes that in order to be an independent citizen one

> must be his own master (*sui iuris*) and must have some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support himself. In the case where he must earn his living from others, he must earn it only by selling that which is his, and not by allowing others to make use of him; for he must in the true sense of the word serve no-one but the commonwealth (Kant, 1991: 78).

Hence, in contrast to freedom and equality, independence has a peculiar relationship with economic development. According to Kant, poverty hinders independence to flourish. It is surprising to see an empirical or in this case a historical motive as an attribute of an *a priori* principle in Kant. Independence under these circumstances appears as both a right and a duty in Kant. Our independence is bound up with our participation in legislation. As a member of the commonwealth, a citizen, and a co-legislator it is our duty to participate in the exercise of the power (Williams, 2006: 372-3).

Following these three *a priori* principles, the original contract appears as the fact of reason- as it is an Idea of reason- rather than a historical fact. It basically entails the unity of the will of all the individuals of a community. Kant writes the following in *CPR*:

> I understand by idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now under consideration, are transcendental ideas. They are the concepts of pure reason, in that they view all knowledge gained experience as being determined through an absolute totality of conditions (*CPR* A327 B383).

Therefore, once something is determined as an idea of reason, it gains the practical reality immediately in the Kantian system of thought. Then, as one of the ideas of reason, the Idea of social contract cannot be found in experience as incorporated in a specific state. Rather, it serves as a guide which

> obliges every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will (Kant, 1991: 79).

Hence, according to Kant, the notion of social contract is an idea of reason that regulates the experience in politics of state. Together with the transcendental

principle of right it guarantees the external security of acting freely in accordance with the moral law. Thus, the principles and concepts of morality, determined by pure practical reason in its solitude are supported by justice or right in external world. Moreover, they unavoidably and immediately apply, since the idea or principle of pure practical reason has immediate application in empirical world for Kant.

In order to construct a general frame for Kant's late political stand, *The Doctrine of Right* should be the source because in this section of the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant amalgamates all his views in his essays. *The Doctrine of Right* is popular among scholars who seek for an account of the notion of right in Kant, since the Kantian political philosophy seems to be derived from a philosophy of right. It is mainly because it seems to give a more concise theory of right though it is written almost fifteen years after his political essays.

In *The Doctrine of Right*, Kant gives his full attention to define the relationship between the concepts of right and freedom. While elaborating this relation Kant excludes individual freedom, which is the ground of actions pertaining to morality, from his query. It is basically because free action of an individual concerns merely his own self and concludes in either being moral or immoral. However, in *the Doctrine of Right*, especially in *Part II: Public Right*, Kant is concerned with a new form of freedom comes to the fore: freedom as the ground of all actions of political subject. In *The Doctrine of Right*, freedom of an individual is defined as being limited by the freedom of another individual. This conditioned freedom, as we will see later, necessarily culminates in giving oneself to coercion willingly. This voluntary submission to the law constitutes the very principle of right. Thus, according to Kant, in political or communal life of man,

the principles of right are the only criteria for an accurate political action. In this attempt, the universal principle of right appears as follows: "Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right" (MM 139).

This principle is not a restriction on the freedom of individual. It suggests that one should be aware of individual freedoms of other people. Thus, it requires a concedence of a plurality of freedoms. According to this picture, the categorical imperative organizes our inner decisions and moral actions whereas for our external relations, we have the universal principle of right as the guarantor of common public relations. Following this, in the crowd of freedoms in order to prevent the clash of choices based on the freedom of individual there is one thing to surrender: Law.

According to Kant's formula of universal right, the freedom of individual is safe only if the coercion of law is admitted or in other words, only if the individual submits to surrender himself to coercion. Through this formula, the moral principle as the inner guide of human soul finds its complement, that is, the universal right in the external world. The universal character of principle of right corresponds to a form or *a priori* principle in the Kantian political philosophy.

Kant's contribution to the diversity of theories of right[14] is no doubt due to the transcendental i.e. *a priori* position that he attributes to right. Kant defines

[14] Kant's theory of right stands between Rousseau's and Hobbes' due to its reasserting the priority of individual. Kant seems to favor Hobbes' theory in that the individual is given natural rights but in his theory of rights, he modifies this natural right and applies it without its baggage of cruel natural behavior as Hobbes suggests. He also favors Rousseau in his understanding of rights but unlike Rousseau, he imagines individual independent of collective consciousness. Like Hobbes he thinks that the natural state of man is war but also thinks like Rousseau that the state of war does not necessarily need an absolute sovereign authority. By means of self-limitation and self-regulation, the people can admit the priority and superiority of law and peace.

theory of right as "the sum total of laws which can be incorporated in external legislation" (MM 132). The concept of external right does not derive from the "end which all men have by nature" i.e., happiness. This would probably call the diversity of tastes into discussion of politics, so Kant appeals to duty which underlies autonomy rather than heteronomy like the concept of happiness (Reiss, 1956:179). Adding this to the *a priori* character of rights, they appear as the preconditions of sociable freedom. It is at the same time the restriction to live coexistent freedoms in the Kantian theory of right.

Right is, then, a restriction to an individual's freedom in order that the freedom of individual can be harmonized with that of others' under the rules of a general law. Following this, public right is the distinctive quality of external laws which make this constant harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows (MM 132).

The theory of right is a theory of a positive right if an external legislation exists. The concept of right in its relation to the moral concept of right appears in three conditions. First, it is applicable only to the mutual exterior and empirical side of relations between two individuals whose actions can affect each other. Secondly, it is concerned with the relationship between the wills of two people. Lastly, the concept of right is not concerned with the aim of the will, which is the material aspect of it, but with only the form of the interaction between two wills. In

other words, the concept of right is concerned with the form of freedom of each will in their conformity with a universal law.

According to Kant, ethics makes it necessary for us to regard this principle as the maxim of all our actions to be able *to act rightly* which means not being a hindrance to freedom by the action we do *freely*. Kant writes that the law of reciprocal coercion is like a *construction* of the concept of right. This is because for Kant the law of reciprocal coercion represents the concept of right in a "pure *a priori* intuition by analogy with the possibility of free movement of bodies within the law of the *equality of action and reaction*". He continues to explain that it is "just as the qualities of an object of pure mathematics cannot be directly deduced from the concept but can only be discovered from its construction",…"a general, reciprocal and uniform coercion " is which makes any representation of the concept [of right] possible" (MM 135).

Public right is divided into three kinds: political, international and cosmopolitan right. With regard to all three types of rights, we see a *transcendental* concept of public right which is the *formal attribute of publicness*. All three derive their legitimacy relaying on this transcendental formula which says: 'All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public' (PP 125-6).

In accordance with the above formula political right appears as the system of laws for individuals who are members of a state. Political rights of individuals work as the guarantor of the order and freedom in order to live in a just society. These rights are crucial, since in the absence of such a dispute over will and right, a disorder may occur like the one similar to the state of nature that Hobbes describes.

The international right or the right of nations represents the right of a state in the community of all other states in their mutual relations. According to Kant, international right involves the rights concerning war. It concerns the right to declare war or the right of a state after war or the right of states to struggle in order to prevent war. The latter can be by means of forcing a constitution which will keep the world in peace. Thus, according to the elements of international right; 1) Interstate relations lack right, 2) Therefore, they are surrounded by risk of war, if there is not already one and 3) both in order to protect the privacy of the internal relations of states and to keep the external relations of states free from aggression a federation of peoples is needed; 4) This idea of federation should not culminate in a universal single state but it should be understood as the confederation of states or a universal union of states. According to Kant, perpetual peace is the "ultimate end of international right" and it is grounded on notion of *duty*. Following this, it can well be realized (MM 171).

For cosmopolitan right, Kant writes that it emerges out of the gathering of political and international right. Since as in earth we live in a finite geography, each nation is necessarily in some kind of contact with each other. According to Kant, every nation has the same right to live on the earth and the mutual relations of nations constitute a *community of action* (*commercium*). Hence, commerce is the way that nations may interact with each other without being inimical to each other. To demand to commerce is a right for Kant and it is called a *cosmopolitan right* of the nations (MM 137).

Up to this point, we have consulted *The Metaphysics of Morals* and *The Doctrine of Right* in particular. In the latter, Kant announces "*There shall be no*

war" as a categorical imperative that the moral-practical philosophy commands. Hence, for Kant perpetual peace both morally and politically is the ultimate end.

Besides Kant's theory of right, which is given in his latest moral work, there are some other essays in which Kant brings up some central notions for understanding his political stand. In the next section, three of his essays on history will be consulted.

2.2.2. On Kant's Political Essays

Kant's essay *Enlightenment* (1784) attracted great attention both in his time and long after his death. This essay is obviously aimed to define the age of Enlightenment in which the very conceptions of man and freedom are seriously changed through passionate discussions of intellectual world.

The essay announces the motto of the Enlightenment as: *Sapere Aude*![15] (Have courage to use your *own* understanding!). Taken seriously, this advice can save a community from its immaturity or inability of using one's own reason. For Kant, the only means to achieve this is freedom: the "freedom to make *public use* of one's own reason". Public reason stands in opposition to the private reason of the individual and it is the means that can bring enlightenment to a community. Kant writes:

> …by the public use of one's own reason I mean that use which anyone may make of it as *a man of learning* addressing the entire *reading public*. What I term the private use of reason is that which a person may make of it in a particular *civil* post or office with which he is entrusted (1991: 55).

Pertaining to this distinction, if a man is a "private" military officer, then he must follow orders. If he is a citizen then he must pay taxes, as a clergyman he must teach according to directions of his church. But "as a member of a complete

[15] The qoute belongs to Horace and originally means "Dare to be wise" (footnote in Reiss, 1991: 273).

commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society" he might criticize these deeds in writing. This corresponds to what Kant speaks of as "using one's own reason publicly" and enjoying the unlimited freedom while performing this. Absolute freedom should be allowed for printing materials and to people in public use of their reason. The expression of thoughts in print carries the potential of enlightening the public. But it should be noted that Kant believes that the age is not *enlightened* but keeps the hope of enlightenment. The process is slow and much time is needed "before men as a whole can be in a position (or can even be put into a position) of using their own understanding confidently and well in religious matters, without outside guidance" (1991: 58).

Another crucial essay to review is *Idea* (1784). Allen Wood states that in this essay we can find Kant's attitude on the history of philosophy in its fullest sense. The essay is also significant in the sense that it precedes Kant's application of natural teleology in the third *Critique* (2007: 107).

Idea is loaded with such relations pertaining to history and nature as well as political matters. In the essay, Kant makes a swift transition from morality to politics. He writes that we formulate the concept of freedom of the will by reflecting in metaphysics, but whatever its conception may be, the material consequences of the will's freedom are necessarily subjected to natural laws. In other words, human actions are freely willed actions that appear in the phenomenal world. This appears as the first step of the transition. Any action or event in the phenomenal world necessarily entails a net of relations both with nature and with actions of other men. Next, we see nine propositions in the name of the guiding principles to history which is defined as the attempt to give the account of the phenomena consisted of human actions.

First principle is a presupposition: *All the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their end* (IUH 42). This is an indisputable fact for Kant. Arguing otherwise suggests a random nature instead of a law-governed one. Following the first proposition, the second proposes that man's "*natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the individual*. From this it is obvious that for Kant individual improvement does not supply a progressive step in the history of human species.

The third proposition asserts that nature gave man reason and willed that man should

> produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason (IUH 43).

The mentioned inner capacities are triggered by nature's means such as the principle of *antagonism within the society* which leads to a *law-governed society* in the end. The latter appears as the fourth proposition. Kant recognizes antagonism in society as the *unsociable sociability* of men which means "their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threats to break this society up". Kant sees this inclination in the very nature of man and continues that:

> Man has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this state more like a man, that is, he feels able to develop his natural capacities. But he also has a great tendency to live as an individual, to isolate himself, since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas (IUH 44).

Hence, nature is appreciated by Kant because it supports discord where man wishes concord. It fosters the natural impulses of man that are basically

> …the sources of the very unsociableness and continual resistance which cause so many evils, at the same time encourage man towards new exertions of his powers and thus towards further development of his natural capacities (IUH 44).

The key to recurrent improvement and more prominently to realizing nature's utmost end, which is actualizing the whole innate potentials, lies in achieving a just *civil society*. This highest objective is possible in a society where *unsocial sociability* of man (*antagonism*) is continuous and members have the greatest freedom in so far as they "co-exist with the freedom of others". After achieving a civil constitution, the problem grows into the "external relationship" with other states. In the case of mutual relations of states, nature intrudes again by means of wars. Even if they are non-pleasant, they bring new networks of relation between states. Kant elaborates three types of possible ideas on the mutual relationship of states. We may believe that random collision of states will accidentally cause an order (like in Epicurus' clashing world of atoms) or we may also believe that nature "follows a regular course" which gradually brings the "highest level of humanity" or as a third possibility we may think that it is not decidable nor predictable whether the intention of nature will bring good or evil in the end. The underlying question of these three suppositions is "whether it is rational to assume that the order of nature is *purposive* in its parts but *purposeless* as a whole." Kant intends to read the savagery of the states as a functional tool in transition to a more civilized condition.

In the eighth proposition of the essay which follows from the previous one, history is visualized in its ultimate duty:

> The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally-and for this purpose

> also externally-perfect constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely (IUH 50).

In the end of this continuous process, *cosmopolitan existence* will be achieved after a great endeavor of mankind which will be prepared by many more revolutions and by all their transforming affects. A cosmopolitan existence acquired this way will have the promise of realizing all the capacities of human kind.

Ninth or the last proposition of the essay is as follows:

> A philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect civil union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself.

According to Kant, even if nature does not have a plan or purposeful end, this idea can serve as a "guide to us in representing an otherwise planless aggregate of human actions as confirming, at least when considered as a whole, to a system" (IUH 52). Related to this notion of planless character of human actions in *Theory*, Kant writes that the diversity and conflicting appearance of the ends of *men* as individuals does not necessarily yield the world to function randomly. For by *providence* they will be given the right route coherent with the natural purpose.

This optimistic voice of history has lost its hope by the drastic incidents of the 20th century, however, in Kant's understanding as well as the empirical there is a moral-teleological sphere for history. It is not only because the empirical facts are positive that we feel optimistic about history but also because it is the requirement of our moral side that we should be optimistic about progress of history. The two sides can be reconciled in deeds of the moral politician or the philosopher in Kant (Williams, 1992: 11). Thus, even in the empirical realm the things are not very

promising or rather horrible, in the reflective level, Kant believes that history is progressive and there is no doubt that the day follows the night. This was also applicable to the French Revolution which according to Kant's strict political view is a rebellion against the sovereign and thus in this sense it is wrong, illegitimate and immoral. However, in the reflective level, the French Revolution was a clear step forward in the history of mankind for Kant (Williams, 1992: 3).[16]

As regards to Kant's most famous political work *Perpetual Peace*, we know that it was written in 1795 and a year later in 1796 an enlarged version of the treatise was published. In the second edition, a "Secret Article of Perpetual Peace", in which the permission of kings for philosophers' speaking freely and publicly on the warfare and peacemaking, is added to the essay.[17] It is a common view that the treatise was inspired by the conclusion of the Treaty of Basel of 1795.[18] The treatise may be read both as an "expression of support for the Republic itself and for the Prussian policy of peace with France" and as an intention of not to keep silent on the issues that concerns general public other than religion (Wood, 1998: 59).

The treatise is opened by a playful note that insinuates that perpetual peace always carries the risk of being a mere dream. Once, writes Kant, there is a Dutch innkeeper who has an inn with a signboard on which there hangs a humorous

[16] Peter P. Nicholson (in Williams 1992) takes up Kant's treatment of the French Revolution as follows: From the point of Kant's moral-juridical theory, it is both forbidden and immoral to rebel but from the perspective of his philosophy of history individual man can act in a collective movement like rebelling (264). Nicholson thinks that this attitude causes an inconsistency when the French Revolution is considered. Kant's rejection of political intervention seems to contradict with his support of the enthusiasm of people who are the spectators of French Revolution.

[17] According to James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, the audience of the treatise is not only the princes and rulers but also the public of all enlightened citizens of the world, thus "Kant's ill-ease at the political implications of such an audience compelled him to add" this secret article (1997: 2).

[18] The Peace of Basel of 1795 involves three peace treatises that France made with Prussia in April 5; with Spain in July 22 and with Hessen Kassel (Hesse Cassel) in August 28.

inscription saying ‘perpetual peace’ on a picture of a graveyard. Kant by this satirical example warns his reader that he is well aware that ‘perpetual peace’ can be a far ideal to expect for this world.

The treatise consists of two sections. In the first section, we see six *preliminary* articles concerning the peace among states. In the second section, three *definitive* articles and two supplements deal with the form of the three constitutions (*ius civitatis*, *ius gentium* and *ius cosmopoliticum*) which can supply an approximate formula of perpetual peace. The preliminary articles that are necessary for the peace among the states are the following:

1) “No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war”; 2) “No independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift”; 3) “Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) will gradually be abolished altogether”; 4) “No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state”; 5) “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state”; 6) “No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include employments of *assassins* (*percussores*) *or poisoners* (*venefici*), *breech of agreements, the instigation of treason* (*perduellio*), within the enemy state, etc.” (PP 93-6).

Kant explains that although all the preliminary articles are *prohibitive* in their mode, the first, fifth and sixth articles are of the *strictest* sort whereas the rest are not because in accordance with circumstances they can let some *subjective latitude* (PP 97).

As to the second section of the treatise, it considers the *definitive* articles of perpetual peace among the states. According to Kant, a state of peace is different from a state of nature. In general, the latter is a state involving a risk of war because it lacks order or lawful application. Because of this fact, the state of peace should be formally instituted and it follows that the men who ever have the slightest possibility of mutual relationship must be subjected to one of three civil constitutions[19] below:

-*Ius civitatis*: A constitution which concerns a nation and cares the civil right of the individuals of that nation.

-*Ius gentium*: A constitution which considers the international right of states in mutual relationship of states with each other.

-*Ius cosmopoliticum*: A constitution which is grounded on cosmopolitan right of the citizens of a universal state of mankind constituted by both individuals and states of the world.

Three definitive articles of the second section follow this footnote and they each correspond to the forms of civil constitutions indicated above. The first article asserts that "the civil constitution of every state should be republican." This republican constitution has three fundamental principles;

-*Freedom* should be possessed by all the members of a society as men,

-As subjects all men should affirm their *dependence* on just one and the same particular legislation,

-*Equality* of every citizen in front of law should be fostered.

[19] Kant gives these three forms of institutions in a long footnote (PP 98-9).

The republican constitution, with all these three principles, appears to be the pure product of the *original social contract* which is, according to Kant, an idea of reason. It is the guarantor of making and enacting laws in a righteous manner. Republicanism, therefore, appears to be the "original basis" for any kind of civil constitution because it is derived from the pure concept of right. It offers a valid alternative to the other types of states such as autocracy, aristocracy or democracy. In a republic, the government and the legislative power are separated and this, as a principle, amplifies it's the representative character.

Indeed, the formula of a perfect rate of representation is given by Kant as follows: "the smaller number of ruling persons in a state and the greater their powers of representation, the more the institution will approximate its republican potentiality, which it may hope to realize eventually by gradual reforms" (PP 101). Kant seems to believe that ruling persons are necessarily moral and just, since he prefers a system regulated by a ruling class over democracy. Following this formula, in Kant's political system despotism is seen mostly in democratic kind of states. This is mainly because

> democracy establishes an executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual without his consent so that decisions are made by all the people and yet not all the people. This means that the general will is in contradiction with itself, and thus also with freedom (PP 101).

Here the key concept is representative system because Kant insists that "if the mode of the government is to accord with the concept of right, it must be based on representative system" (PP 102).

The second definitive article suggests a federation of peoples or free states for the sake of security of nations in international arena. The rights of nations should be based on this federation. The federation is not proposed as a state of an

international kind. In other words, Kant does not suggest the fusion of all nations into one and, likewise all states into a single international state. It is suggested that a federation of states is a structure where all states co-exist separately. This federation is necessary due to the lack of an external tribunal to judge the claims of states against each other. Thus, in the absence of such an external objective authority, war becomes the occasion where states "seek their rights". In such a picture, achieving perpetual peace among states needs more than peace pacts. Thus, a "particular kind of league, which we might call a pacific federation (*foedus pacificum*) is required" (PP 104). This federation's primary aim must be preserving the freedom of the confederated states, while it tries to prevent war. According to Kant, "...this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus, leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality" (PP 104).

"*Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality*" is the third definitive article of *Perpetual Peace*. Kant warns us immediately in the opening sentences of the account of the article that not philanthropy but right is the main concern of all the articles in the treatise. With the concept of cosmopolitan right, we see that the principle of *hospitality* raises its voice. It is argued that a man must have a right to approach (not to enter) to a land that he does not belong.[20] Perhaps, he is not always wanted in the land he arrives but he is to be treated nice, even if he is send away or rejected by the land owners. Violence should be condemned, since we are members in a universal community, "a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere (PP 108).

[20] Kant seems to struggle with the invasive character of colonialism. Cosmopolitan right does not mean to have a right to enter to others' land but to ask to communicate, trade or travel.

As to the guarantor of perpetual peace, nature appears with a purposive function in the form of providence. "It appears as the underlying wisdom of a higher cause, showing the way towards the objective goal of the human race and predetermining the world's evolution…" (PP 108). By this means, nature aims to produce concord. Its arrangement is three-folded. Firstly, by supporting life on earth; then by distributing peoples all around the earth by means of struggles or wars the nature caused the states to have some legal and economic relations with each other. Thirdly, by the same means that she drives the peoples all around the world, she makes them to connect to each other. Each region of the world has its own diversity of natural products those become the means for exchange among different states (PP 109-10).

Perpetual peace as an objective of nature for humanity is also in accordance with the moral duty which is imposed on us only by the practical reason without any external constraint. However, since duty is given only by practical reason, nature uses human inclinations in order to achieve its purpose. Reason makes perpetual peace a duty for man and in this way, the ideal of perpetual peace gains universal validity. Yet, nature does not abandon perpetual peace only to human inclinations. The wars, the *religious* and *linguistic* differences among states and lastly, the *spirit of commerce* are the genuine means of nature to support perpetual peace.

In addition to these means, there exists another article for realization of perpetual peace. It is the *secret article* of the treatise. It says: "The maxims of the philosophers on the conditions under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states which are armed for war" (PP 115). This is the most interesting article of the essay. It gives philosophers the permission to talk *freely* and *publicly*

on the *universal maxims of the warfare*. This kind of thought results from Kant's belief that the thought of philosophers are necessarily in accordance with universal reason. In other words, a philosopher always reflects on the commonwealth of all states.

2.3. On the Return of the Kantian Cosmopolitan Ideal in the Twentieth Century

The notion of cosmopolitanism has always been popular among scholars. Yet, there are some who think that the very core of cosmopolitanism opposes to existing forms of solidarity and community. For instance, Calhoun contends that cosmopolitanism with its universal normative character offers to ignore national, religious, local or ethnic forms of attachment which are indeed some "positive sources of meaning" (1997). According to him, nationalism is an important asset in *imagining the world* and in this sense, it is not a "moral mistake" (Calhoun, 2002:1; 2006:8). Furthermore, cosmopolitanism emerges as a threat not only to nationalism but also to cultural diversity by its all-embracing character (Calhoun, 2002: 885).

The discussions regarding cosmopolitanism and attempts to reinvigorate the ideal have gained velocity in the face of the phenomenon of globalization. According to Fine (2007), the emergence of new cosmopolitanism is triggered by the political changes after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, for it paved the way for the uptrend of human rights, international law and global approaches in governance. Thus, from 1989 onwards, cosmopolitanism entered into an interdisciplinary dynamic in the field of social sciences. . In the face of this fact, "visions of cosmopolitanism have mutated from an intellectual ethos to an institutionally grounded global political consciousness" (Cheah, 2006: 491).

The possible relation between cosmopolitanism and globalization is seen as inevitable by many scholars. For instance, according to Beck, "by placing globality at the heart of political imagination, action and organization", globalization forms the basis of this new cosmopolitanism (1999:9). Delanty claims for a closer bind between globalization and cosmopolitan thinking and contends that "the normative significance of globalization…necessitates a new kind of imagination, which can be called the cosmopolitan imagination" (2009:2). In this sense, a number of contemporary approaches regard new cosmopolitanism as being aware of the changing world and being open to cultural differences (Hannerz, 1990; Cheah and Robins, 1998; Tomlinson, 1999; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). Thus, cosmopolitanism now is defined as a mode of "extensive global consciousness" (Robertson and White 2005: 349–51) and an "embodied way of being in and moving around the world" (Molz, 2006: 2) or "a willingness to engage with the Other" (Hannerz, 1990: 239). These approaches ground on the inevitable transnational character of contemporary politics. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism today is counted as both subjective and particular. Thus, it refers to particular transnational experiences. This means that the ideal is not applied necessarily in its Western rendition. In this sense, it is not surprising to find that new cosmopolitanism is usually identified with the attempt of getting rid of national inclinations or the link between nation-state and the theories of social sciences. It criticizes traditional social sciences by asserting that new world order requires a new understanding of relations of humanity which is based on mutual interdependence (Fine, 2007: 1-2).

Due to the transnational cultural flows now we can talk about the plurality of cosmopolitanism(s). According to Vertovec and Cohen, "a proposed new

politics of the left, embodying middle-path alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism" (2002:1) constitutes the face of new cosmopolitanism. In accordance with this, we can talk about the plurality of cosmopolitanisms such as Asian specific (discussed by Aihwa Ong, Louisa Schein) or African specific cosmopolitanism (by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Tiyambe Zeleza). Deriving from this changed character, Paul Rabinow defines new cosmopolitanism as "an ethos of macro-interdependencies, with an acute consciousness (often forced upon people) of the inescapabilities and particularities of places, characters, historical trajectories, and fates" (1986: 258).

The distinction between the old and new cosmopolitanism is due to the unique position the latter occupies between universalism and pluralism. New cosmopolitanism receives many labels: Vernacular cosmopolitanism (Homi Bhabha), discrepant cosmopolitanism (James Clifford), rooted cosmopolitanism (David Hollinger), actually existing cosmopolitanism (Bruce Robbins), national cosmopolitanism (Martha Nussbaum) and situated cosmopolitanism. All these cosmopolitanisms variously discuss the possibility of a response to a transnational realm, which brings up issues of diversity and particularity. A closer look in different kinds of new cosmopolitanism shows that the new cosmopolitan thinking does not see diversity as a problem as the old universalist approach does. The common aim is to develop a new cosmopolitan framework in which it is possible to cope with the unavoidable diversity of cultures in the experience of living. In this sense, what makes the new cosmopolitanism intriguing is "its determination to maximize species-consciousness, to fashion tools for understanding and acting upon problems of a global scale, to diminish regardless of colour, class, religion, sex and tribe" (Hollinger, 2002: 238).

Kant's return to political philosophy of the twentieth century corresponds both to the discussions of globalization and also to the significant changes in the political life of the world. After World War II, parallel to the policies of United Nations, the notion of perpetual peace has rendered possible and "the idea of a cosmopolitan order" has been taken up in politics (Habermas, 1997: 126). According to Axel Honneth, it is after 1991, "with the collapse of the Soviet Union, [that] the world appeared to have moved a significant step closer to the Kantian project of a perpetual peace" (1997:155). Even if the exact date or instance that calls for a Kantian political stance cannot be defined, it is mostly agreed that Kant has returned to political discussions in the late 90s.

A direct application of Kant's political stance to the present political circumstances seems impossible (Lutz-Bachmann, 1997: 61), but still quite a number of theorists are known to try to appropriate or deconstruct the Kantian cosmopolitan elements to contemporary politics (Rawls, 1999; Benhabib, 2004; Held, 1995; Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997; Habermas, 1997; Cheah and Robbins, 1998). From a philosophical approach, Höffe sees Kant's political approach as adoptable to the contemporary political conjuncture:

> The "application" of the categorical imperative to right and the state and to their specific tasks leads to a legal and state ethics that recognizes the authorization to use coercion as an integral element of right and law, develops the principle of human rights, and grounds the basic institutions such as property and criminal punishment. Above all, it overcomes the prevailing tendency to restrict legal and political philosophy to the "national" level, and responds to its concentration on single communities with a global and cosmopolitan perspective (2006: 2).

However, for the political sociologists who think an appropriation is possible, all discussions around cosmopolitanism and its Kantian model deal with the new forms of social relations of nations gained currency by United Nations,

international courts, the idea and preservation of human rights and mechanisms for rendering peace (Fine, 2007: 4).

The new cosmopolitanism's appeal to Kant is due to its contention that if they are rethought, the thought of Enlightenment and especially Kant will fit the recent context of world politics. In this sense Cheah summarizes *four modalities* of Kant's modern cosmopolitanism that constitute the nub of contemporary discussions in international relations as follows:

> (1) a world federation as the legal and political institutional basis for cosmopolitanism as a form of right; (2) the historical basis of cosmopolitanism in world trade; (3) the idea of a global public sphere; and (4) the importance of cosmopolitan culture in instilling a sense of belonging to humanity (2006: 487).

The motto of scholars who seek a remedy in Kant for a normative cosmopolitan theory is 'to think Kant against Kant'.[21] Rethinking universal character of right is more consistent with the theory of world citizenship than that of citizenship in relation to independent states (Fine, 2007: 4). The main tenet of this "new cosmopolitanism" is given to be the reassessment of the *normative value of nationalism*. Fine writes that "the universalistic character of the idea of right, once swamped by the self-assertion of one nation against another, is best suited to the identity of *world citizens* and not to that of citizens of one state against another" (2007:4).[22]

Fine criticizes the approach of "new cosmopolitanism" by contending that it is never new because it strictly follows the natural law theory and thus, Kant as the

[21] Karl-Otto Apel, in Kant's "Towards Perpetual Peace" as Historical Prognosis from the Point of View of Moral Duty" in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal. ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann.

[22] Fine states that his aim is agreed upon by many thinkers such as Habermas (1997), Höffe (2006), Apel (1997).

best representative of it. Even if Fine does not claim for a refusal of the natural law theory, he believes that a critical approach to it would enable us to situate the cosmopolitanism somewhere between the old tradition of natural law and social theory which concerns the application of natural law to empirical realities. The nub of what Fine entitles cosmopolitan social theory is that the decision of whether the new social forms regarded as cosmopolitan can *supersede* the nation-state or reconcile with existing forms of nation-state is not fruitful for contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism. "Cosmopolitan social theory acknowledges the accomplishments of political modernity in developing a universal conception of humanity and it looks to the growth of new social forms to sustain this conception of humanity" (Fine, 2007: xii).

Fine's distinction of two tendencies in discussions of cosmopolitan is valuable for the present study for it shows how, whether given as opposing or not, the existing discussions of cosmopolitanism does not ever think to criticize or interrogate the very conception of humanity. And in this sense apart from the natural law theory, the Kantian core of these theories is the universal conception of humanity. By this indubitable assumption in mind all discussions around cosmopolitanism and its Kantian model are concerned with the new forms of social relations of nations.

In order to be more specific about the method or routine of these approaches whether entitled "new cosmopolitanism" or "cosmopolitan social theory", some specific concerns will be taken up such as globalization and hospitality rights in discussions of which Kant has emerged as central figure or point of conversation.

In the anniversary year, 1995, of his essay "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Skecth", it was a common view among majority of the Kantian

scholars that both in a theoretical and practical sense the cosmopolitan ideal is still relevant. For instance, Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann in an introductory piece to a group of essays they edited in 1997, write that although the normative aspects of Kant's cosmopolitanism are both challenged and defended, the one thing that many agree is that the modern ideal of peace must be positive and cosmopolitan (1997: 6).[23] According to the authors, any scholar who wishes to reconstruct Kant's cosmopolitan ideal would face three challenges: the complex effects of globalization; "internal sovereignty of nations as a condition of global order"; and the contrast between local and cosmopolitan citizenship.

The first challenge entails a series of problems such as the worldwide networks and transnational civil societies brought by the phenomenon of globalization. In Kant's understanding, world peace of the 18th century was supported by nature that served to mankind by causing *discord* and unintended relations among states. Also by the power of commerce and the sharing of peaceful thoughts against the war are the mechanisms that would lead the world to eternal peace gradually. Yet, in the twentieth and more drastically in the twenty-first century globalization accelerated the decay of nationalism and brought about the consideration and discussions of annihilation of borders.

In the light of the contemporary state of world politics at the end of twentieth century for instance, Habermas contended that Kant's approach should be revised in a much more dialectical manner. That is that Kant's understanding of progress should have been more dialectical. The main point of Habermas' remark is that globalization and its effects are two sided; in one side it creates opportunities

23 Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann write that in additon to themselves this point is commonly accepted by the writers who partake in the collection, namely by Martha Nussbaum, Karl-Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Kenneth Baynes and David Held.

for new forms of governance but in the other side it threatens the democratic style. If we jump to the core of Habermas' understanding, he suggests that for the implementation and preservation of human rights United Nations can be reformed.[24]

The second challenge is the problem of national sovereignty and its relation to global order. For Kant, a plurality of nations with their educated, enlightened people, the violations of human rights are condemned globally. In such a milieu public opinion is the mere authority. The public opinion of a nation-state and cosmopolitan public sphere in which these violations are condemned are not external to each other. In other words, cosmopolitan public sphere is maintained in each society and state. In the movement of "new cosmopolitanism" some scholars[25] deny the Kantian suggestion of internal sovereignty of a nation-state. Instead they look for some structure "stronger" than a world federation of free states and "weaker" than a single world republic (Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann, 1997: 13).

The third challenge is the understanding of pluralism. The Kantian understanding does not seem to allow for differences and it identifies itself with a unitary structure either in a nation-state or in a federation consisting of free states. Therefore, Kant's conception of tolerance must be worked for reconciling the concern for protecting minorities and keeping a universalistic approach. The most significant level where this concept is mostly exposed is the right of hospitality. On this subject let us take a glance at two different approaches.

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24 See Habermas' "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years's Hindsight" in Bohman and Lutz-Bachman, 1997, pp. 113–55.

25 These are the names mentioned before; Martha Nussbaum, Karl-Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Kenneth Baynes and David Held.

Pauline Kleingeld, for instance, in the light of the developments that came from the very idea of globalization complains about the negligence of some political principles of the Kantian political philosophy such as cosmopolitan law. According to Kleingeld, due to the article of cosmopolitan law's limited scope compared to the other two definitive articles of Perpetual Peace, it was seen not as a separate article but as a part of the second article. Also colonialist aggression of Europe which was told as "cultural mission" was in contradiction with the content of cosmopolitan law. Lastly, due to the belief that cosmopolitan law cannot be institutionalized without a single world republic it did not receive much attention till twentieth century. Focusing on solely the cosmopolitan law in order to account for the recent changes in international law and its impact on individuals, she draws attention especially to the status of refugees and this area under discussion.

The right to hospitality as the center of cosmopolitan law has almost predicted the contemporary debates of refugee rights even if Kant did not seem to concern much about refugee groups of his time such as Jews. Kant writes that a country can reject the visitor or traveler to enter its land without causing his death or destruction (*Untergang*). In today's context this would have serious implications. If we are to follow Kant's cosmopolitan law it is compulsory to accept a refugee who will be killed or arguably who will be destructed or tortured. But Kleingeld proposes that we could extend the scope of *Untergang* from death to any *mental destruction* or *incapacitating physical harm*. Furthermore, Kant's cosmopolitan law admits some limitations on the rejection of refugees which enables people to preserve their rights to make contact (1998: 77).

Kleingeld, obviously a Kantian scholar writes these in 1998 and favors the Kant's cosmopolitan law in discussions of refugee rights. It is significant not to

ignore the Kantian political principles that are still relevant to contemporary political issues such as-the right of hospitality which is defined as a right of all human beings- but it is also crucial not to ignore the altering structure of world politics.

From the end of the 20th century let's come to the first decade of the 21st century. Seyla Benhabib reminds us the sheer fact that

> The evolution of cosmopolitan norms, from crimes against humanity to norms extending to refugee, asylum and immigration have caught most liberal democracies within a network of obligations to recognize certain rights claims. Although the asymmetry between the '*demos'* and the '*populus'*, the democratic people and the population as such, has not been overcome, norms of hospitality have gone far beyond what they were in Kant's understanding: the status of alienage is now protected by civil as well as international law; the guest is no longer a guest but a resident alien, as we say in American parlance, or a "foreign co-citizen", as Europeans say (2006: 36).

Benhabib emphasizes the fact that political communities do not have to bear a unity of cultural identities. On the contrary cosmopolitanism now is gone far beyond by multiple allegiances of language, ethnicity, religion, and nationality (2004:174-5). For a new kind of understanding in visiting rights of man Benhabib suggests further analysis and thought must be given to the possible relation of hospitality right and contemporary immigration rights. This particular approach insinuates a new cosmopolitan thinking which reaches to individual level in contrast to the cosmopolitan project that aims at consensus between states as in classical cosmopolitanism.

Several scholars and examples can be given in relation to Kant's present engagement in contemporary political discussions. Yet, as a future section entitled "Kant's Transcendent Politics" tries to explicate, a hope for a new kind or genre of normativity that can allow the transition from pure theoretical to practical concerns

regarding world politics lies beneath all these discussions. The endeavor to define and limit the content of political ideals necessarily culminates in endless discussions between the scholars. Yet, the abandonment of such an attempt seems to let oneself into chaos. Reminding that Kant's progressive look is limited by the perspectives of his own time is not saying something genuine but reading the whole Kantian philosophy by keeping this fact in mind is still significant for the upcoming sections.

In the endless attempt to derive a normative ground from Kant's political views seems futile in the face of the very nature of politics. Furthermore in the contemporary times, the abstract normativity that cosmopolitanism offers renders it more like a utopian ideal than a political project, so it is often accused of being an empty signifier which has no proper substance or empirical standpoint. (Skrbis et al., 2004: 132). This section concludes by the claim that the re-appropriation of the Kantian political stance in its determinate, prescriptive frame is rendered problematic in the sense that it does not promise much than it achieved in the eighteenth-century political life. The following section goes over the normative or prescriptive character of Kantian political stand.

2.4. Kant's Politics: Inconclusive or Provisional?

Human beings are distinguished from the other animals due to use of reason. As rational beings, they are capable of thinking and willing. They have both innate rights and acquired rights. According to Kant, the primary innate right is freedom. As we have mentioned earlier, freedom is classified as positive and negative by Kant. The negative freedom is the state of absolute freedom i.e. being independent of the laws of nature, whereas the positive freedom refers to willing as a rational

being that is, self-determination in accordance with the moral law. Hence, a free subject is the one who admits the categorical imperative and acts according to it in any instance. As free rational beings act according to their will, the results of the actions appear as external events (i.e. phenomena). From the moment that they are performed they are subject to the laws of nature and would be a cause of another event.

Besides the moral character, man has also a social character that necessitates interrelation. In this sense, the acquired rights escort the innate right to freedom. Acquired rights are basically to possess things and to be secure. In accordance with these two rights, interrelations of two human beings necessitate some guarantee to exercise these rights in peace. Although it is everyone's duty to act in accordance to the moral law, according to Kant, man has a malevolent character that can jeopardize the realization of this duty. This fact makes the existence of an external law necessary. As a result, in order to realize their freedom people need to hear the call of reason saying that the state of nature should be abandoned. Justice or right is considered in connection to the moral law, the freedom it provides to man and the action as the consequence of this free choice. In this regard, the principle of right appears as transcendental and it suggests that people are free when their actions are compatible with the rights of freedom of other people.

This task is parallel to the three formulations of the categorical imperative that concern 1) acting in a universal fashion, 2) the value of man as an end in himself and 3) acting in accordance to the kingdom of ends.

Moral law recognized as the rational component of humanity and man's moral capabilities allow for "the highest end intended for man", namely

sociability. The moral law, which is a guide for us to perform the right action in any possible environment, is formulated and contemplated by the pure reason alone. It is formulated by reason in such a way that it has a universalizing power and it can be followed all throughout history. Since, for Kant and the other Enlightenment philosophers, reason bestows man with humanity and sociability in particular, it is solely the reason that can control the present and shape the future.

According to Kant, in the realm of ends, things have either price or dignity. Man has dignity and cannot be replaced with any other thing or by any other man. Thus, each man is unique and deserves respect solely because of his dignity. The universal character of reason that all men share supplies a ground for the right action to be actualized and, again because of this universal sharing, the right action can be easily recognized and logically accepted by others. As a species, human beings have powers and capacities that can be activated collectively rather than individually. These capacities improve through time. In this sense, history can be the record of this progress.

The *a priori* (*Angeboren*) character of the idea of state, which is literally defined as an Idea of reason by Kant, provides the philosopher with a unique position in the traditional history of political theory. Together with the transcendental principle of right, this Idea is accepted to govern the realm of human actions. Nevertheless, Kant's political views do not seem to suggest a schema to govern the empirical complexity of the interrelations between states.

The obvious reasons why this study claims that the Kantian politics remains inconclusive can be summarized in the following steps:

1) Moral subject in its autonomous and free character acts in coherence with the moral law's command. All free subjects willingly admit the reign of moral law. Yet, human nature is weak and man can be beaten by his desires, appetites or inclinations. Thus, even if every man is doomed to act morally and thus, has a right to be secure and to possess, still there can be some man who would act against the command of the moral law. Hence for the external consequences of the *Willkür*, we need laws to assure that people act in accordance with the moral law whose external support is law or justice.

2) The regulation of justice is supplied by the social contract (an idea of reason) and the transcendental principle of right. Thus, these sterile abstract principles are supposed to regulate all kinds of actions in the empirical world.

3) Politics by definition presupposes endless relations within its dynamic structure. It requires more than to be regulated by some transcendental principle or concepts. Most importantly, the regulation, in the sense of Ideas of reason's performing it, is not distinguished from determination. When Kant writes about the transcendental conditions of our experience, he also defines and determines the limits of cognition. Ideas of reason address to totality of experiences, the possible endless appearances of which is restricted or rather governed by various a priori elements of pure reason such as the categories and, space and time as pure a priori intuitions. These transcendental concepts and conditions are exposed as the governors of the experience. What this study intends to say is that to even if to regulate, govern or determine do have different meanings in Kant, they all remain in an ideal level. Without the mediation of the third *Critique*, political experience remains regulated by the Ideas of reason in an ideal fashion. Yet, the problem with political life is that it deals with real more than ideal. In the face of a necessarily

particularistic structure of political life Kantian Ideas are invited to "regulate" what cannot be regulated according to static structures.

Jean-François Lyotard, who favors the Kantian Idea because of its regulative character, warns us that the notion of totality is problematic in the sense that it culminates in determination of content for the Idea which necessarily ends in terrorism. It is because of the fact that which obligates is always absolutely beyond the grasp of mind for Kant. In this sense, it remains transcendent and furthermore, to the prescriptive politics followed by the Idea that concerns all possible instances in a totality, transcendence is always immanent (1985: 72).[26]

In Kant's philosophy, reason has always implied a transcendent authority. Kant's "tribunal" of reason is indeed the "jurisdiction" of the realm of transcendence. It is this jurisdiction in which the moral law is comprehended in its impossibility of being comprehended. This, in turn, becomes the "condition of possibility of freedom" in Kant (Çırakman, 2005: 315-6).

Reason with its ideal principles fails to regulate the real experience in the case of political experience. Yet, on the contrary, by claiming to achieve so, it extends the scope of its moral principles, thus it has to commit a transcendent attitude. To put it another way, the Kantian morality extends its exercising power in a fashion that can be called transcendent. Reason, responsible of the totality or unity of all possible experience, has to intrude into empirical world. Kant writes that in their relation to the sensible or empirical world, the ideas of reason remain transcendent. An Idea of reason does not affect immediate sense experience. It affects our knowledge in its totality pertaining to the objects of sense experience in

26 In relation to prescriptive language games Lyotard continues by saying that "What is being called the transcendence of the prescriptive is simply the fact that the position of the sender, as authority that obligates, is left vacant. That is, the prescriptive utterance comes from nothing: its pragmatic virtue of obligation results from neither its content nor its utterer" (1985: 72).

their multiple appearing. At the theoretical level the possibility of the representation of the unconditioned totality of appearances is problematic. The representation of an unconditioned totality surpasses appearances and in this respect, it is transcendent. If we concern this impossibility in the realm of politics where the Idea of reason is responsible for regulating the progress of history by regulating the political life of man, we can easily see that an attempt of representing or in this case determining the content of the Idea is necessarily transcendent. In other words, as far as reason is considered the ultimate authority in the mechanism of political decision, it is unavoidable that political sphere is limited to rational causes that are defined necessarily by reason. In this sense, Kant's wish to realize a moral-political order is an open attempt to "rationalize politics in the name of morality" (Cheah, 1995: 168).

It is understandable that Kant seeks professed principles for man's political life. Yet, he presents such a complex structure that in the end, in his political essays, as Elizabeth Ellis puts it rightly, what is defined is "a world in which the moral argument is ubiquitous, but inconclusive, concretely effective, but only indirectly" (2008: 3). According to Ellis, Kant himself was aware of the fact that the diversity of man's practical action cannot be simply regulated by abstract principles. At this point, she presents a cogent opposition to the general assumption that Kant's politics are solely grounded on his ethics which is often defined as a sterile abstract system of principles. According to Ellis, Kant's political essays are not only about formalistic abstractions but they are also loaded with effective arguments on practice of politics. She summarizes these arguments as follows:

> how to trick the monarch into making himself obsolete; why permanent rule-giving of any kind is illegitimate; why freedom of expression matters; why gradualism is to be preferred to revolution; why intelligentsia should get special

rights; how regime change occurs; what institutions promote international peace; how one should treat of foreigners…(2008: 7).

No doubt that these arguments are the main reasons of Kant's allure to twentieth century political discourse. Furthermore, Ellis states that Kant knew the fact that even if all human agents are governed by the categorical imperative, in existing societies of the time the political authority can be different. That is why he applies to "asympotitic imagery to describe the human condition in which we may hope to approach ideals but never to achieve them conclusively" (Ellis, 2008: 2). In this attitude, Ellis sees a provisional insight and contends that Kant defends this provisional right which is the right that "applies in the absence of universally authoritative political judgment" when he writes that one should "always leave possibility…of entering a rightful condition" (Kant qtd. in Ellis, 2008:8). This attitude is significant for the present study in the sense that what Ellis draws attention to in Kant's approach supports new readings of his ethics and politics.[27] What this study claims is that when his cosmopolitan approach is concerned, in the present time, his aesthetics has also a saying on politics. And this study contends that this can be uncovered by analyzing the sublime and, by following its altered version following the WWII in the 20th century. His theory of the sublime, when it is analyzed in the contemporary fashion that it has appeared in, supplies an opportunity for Kant's cosmopolitan ideal to be interpreted as provisional rather than inconclusive. In order to substantiate this claim in the following chapter the Kantian rendition of the sublime will be elaborated in detail.

27 The claim that Kant's ethics and politics distilled from his ethics are not necessarily sterile and empty abstract principles has also been supported by Christine Korsgaard and Barbara Herman.

CHAPTER III:

KANT'S AESTHETICS AND THE SUBLIME

Kant's thoughts on aesthetics are found in his third and last critique. The third branch of Critical philosophy, the *Critique of Judgment*, was published in 1790. After scrutinizing the theoretical and practical uses of reason, in his last critique Kant focuses on reflective judgment which is for Kant, a shared terrain, and thus a possible bridge between the theoretical and practical realms. This feature of the critique made it controversial. The third Critique has attracted considerable attention from Kant scholars and has triggered endless discussions on the nature of aesthetic judgment in past decades. Scholars have suggested many different readings of Kant's aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic judgment is subjected to the laws of sensibility as determinant judgments. Thus, transcendental conditions are also applicable to aesthetic judgment as well as they are applicable to determinate judgments. Yet, aesthetic judgments or judgments of taste are immune to Universals. Moreover, they have a partial autonomy of their own. This autonomy is grounded upon a particular singular aesthetic experience. Dealing with particulars impedes any determinate definition concerning the very nature of the particular. Due to this complex nature, the third Critique has attracted the attention of both structuralist and post-structuralists readers.

The systematic reading of the Critique is divided into three due to intentions of scholars. The first group scholars tend to read the third *Critique* in terms of Kant's epistemology, thus, transcendental principles of ordinary empirical experience (Cassirer, 1938; Guyer, 1997; Matthews, 1996; Ginsborg, 1990; Gasché, 2003). The second group approaches the third *Critique* in an ethico-moral sense and tries to understand it as the actualization of freedom in accordance with practical reason (Henrich, 1992; Munzel, 1999). The third group of scholars claims that the two parts of the third *Critique* complement each other and they bring the nature and freedom together (Makkreel, 1990; Zammito, 1992).

In the following sections of this chapter, the first *Critique* will be visited in order to address the unique structure of the aesthetic judgment. Yet, this study does not agree with the scholars who turn to *CPR* because, this study does not aim to subsume the reflective judgment into determinate judgments. The aim of the study is to investigate the undecidable structure of reflective judgment in order to evaluate its possible political repercussions.

The fourth chapter focuses on Jean-François Lyotard's work as a representative of the poststructuralist approach. Since Lyotard's approach to the Kantian sublime is a fundamental inspiration for this study to investigate the potential of the sublime for politics, Lyotard's approach will be mentioned in a more detailed fashion.

3.1. Reflective Judgment and the Third *Critique*

It is not easy to outline what Kant claimed for the third *Critique*. This is also detected by prominent Kant scholars. For instance, Guyer speaks of the third *Critique* as both "complex and "obscure" (2000: 32). Lindsay claims that judgment

"as elaborated in the third Critique is new" (1934: 222). Allison, on the other hand, affirms that the *Critique* carries "innovations" and "developments", yet, states that this is not a deviation from the Kantian critical approach (2000: 79).

The critique is divided into two main parts: *The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* and *Critique of Teleological Judgment*. The first, which is the main concern of the present study, deals with reflective judgment. In the preface of the first edition of the third *Critique* dated 1790, Kant writes that *judgment* appears as a middle term between *understanding* and *reason* and thus, between the faculties of *knowledge* and that of *desire* respectively. Since, understanding deals with the realm of natural concepts and reason with the concept of freedom, philosophy is divided into two realms, the theoretical and the practical. Accordingly, understanding is in charge of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature whereas reason does this by means of the concept of freedom. Since these two realms are distinct in their representation of their objects (sensible in the case of understanding and as supersensible in that of reason), there is no possibility of passing from one to another by means of theoretical use of reason.

In the third *Critique*, judgment is introduced as a middle term. It is not defined as a faculty in the sense of prescribing laws but as having some principle in itself. The principle of judgment has validity in searching for subjective *a priori* laws. And in the Kantian understanding, it is combined with desire more than knowledge and its use makes the transition possible. We know that Kant mentions judgment in the first *Critique* as well. Yet, the judgment in its reflective capacity seems to be "new" (Lindsay, 1934: 222) or in other words, the reflective capacity is overlooked by Kant in the first *Critique* as he was occupied by the theoretical use of reason (Allison, 2000: 83).

According to Kantian philosophy, the first level of human cognition is appearances that are given by the sensibility. They are entitled as perceptions whenever the consciousness enters. As to apprehension (*Auffassung, apprehensio*), it is defined as the action of the imagination, "since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them" (*CPR* A120). Yet, this action of the imagination as apprehension does not entail determinate connections among appearances. This is due to the fact that apprehension is "only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition" and does not offer a "connected existence in space and time" (*CPR* B219). Thus, it is the "immediate awareness of an individual representation" (Cassirer, 1938: 231).

Following this remark through the third *Critique*, we may say that according to Kantian philosophy, we apprehend objects of experience in two ways. In one, an object of an intuition can be apprehended with reference to some concept. Thus, to the given representations belonging to the object, the faculty of the understanding applies the pure categories and the manifold of representations is grouped under the concept of the object in question. Consequently, the judgments we pass on the object have a determinative character concerning the relation between the representations and the concept of it.

The apprehension of the objects of intuition can also take place in *mere apprehension* in which the *form* of the object is apprehended without reference to any concept, thus, without an aim of definite cognition. Furthermore, if this mere apprehension of the *form* of the object pleases the subject then we say that the representation is referable to the subject (*CJ* VII). Basically, this is the state when a subject judges something as beautiful as a result of feeling a pleasure in the

presence of an object. To sum up, the feeling of pleasure, according to Kant, results from a mere apprehension of the form of the object without reference to the concept of that object and the representation of the object refers solely to the subject than the object itself. To put it differently, the pleasure does not result from sensation of the object. Its source is in the form of the object for "reflection generally". Kant writes that "the pleasure can express nothing but the conformity of the Object to the cognitive faculties brought into play in the reflective judgment, and so far as they are in play, and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the Object" (*CJ* VII). With the subjective formal finality, Kant means the finality that turns on "what is purely subjective" and in this sense natural beauty can be seen as the presentation of the concept of this formal (merely subjective) finality (*CJ* VIII).

The feeling of pleasure is the source of four aesthetic reflective judgments which are: agreeable (*iucundum*), beautiful (*pulchrum*), the sublime (*sublime*) and good (*honestum*). All these are the judgments of taste and they have two necessary conditions: *subjectivity* and *universality*.

Kant writes that as well as the determinate judgments which are necessarily have universal character, aesthetic reflective judgments demand universality. For instance;

> A singular empirical judgment, as, for example, the judgment of one who perceives a movable drop of water in a rock-crystal, rightly looks to every one finding the fact as stated, since the judgment has been formed according to the universal conditions of the determinant judgment under the laws of a possible experience generally. In the same way one who feels pleasure in simple reflection on the form of the object, without having any concept in mind, rightly lays claim to the agreement of everyone, although this judgment is empirical and a singular judgment. For the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, though subjective, condition of reflective judgments, namely the final harmony of an object (be it a product of nature or of art) with the mutual relation of the faculties of cognition, (imagination and understanding,) which are requisite for every empirical cognition (*CJ* VII).

The conclusion derived from the example above is:

> The pleasure in judgments of taste is, therefore, dependent doubtless on an empirical representation, and cannot be united *a priori* to any concept (one cannot determine *a priori* what object will be in accordance with taste or not—one must find out the object that is so); but then it is only made the determining ground of this judgment by virtue of our consciousness of its resting simply upon reflection and the universal, though only subjective, conditions of the harmony of that reflection with the knowledge of objects generally, for which the form of the Object is final (*CJ*, VII).

According to Kant, the judgment of taste is aesthetic due to the fact that in discerning what is beautiful or not we do not appeal to understanding or the representation of the Object but to the imagination, the Subject and the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. According to Beatrice Longuenesse, (and apparently for Kukla who quotes her) this does not mean that judgment of taste is radical in the critical system. Longuenesse writes that judgment of taste is

> the culminating point of Copernican revolution that began with the first *Critique*. For the ground of the assertion of the predicate in the judgment of taste is intuited from of the object precisely insofar as it is *synthesized by the subject*, So in the object, what grounds the assertion of the predicate 'beautiful' are just those features that depend on the *synthesizing activity of the subject* (qtd. in Kukla, 2006: 26).

The theory of beautiful follows from the capacity of the faculty of taste to estimate aesthetically. In this "experience" of the estimation of the form of an object, the cognitive faculties, the imagination and the understanding celebrate the harmony of their temporary union on the form of the object. To put it another way, the harmony of the form of the object with the structure of our cognitive faculties is approved in the free play of the two faculties in question. It is the "intrinsic organization and orientation of human consciousness" that is revealed by this free play (Zammito,

1992: 292).[28] The harmony achieved by means of the form of the object results in a feeling of pleasure and as a result, the object is called beautiful.

Kant gives the four crucial characteristics of the judgments of beautiful in four moments. They are respectively as follows:

—*"Taste* is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion *apart from any interest*.29 The object of such a delight is called beautiful" (*CJ* 211: 50).

— "The *beautiful* is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally" (*CJ* 218).

—"Beauty is the form of *finality* in an object, so far as perceived in it *apart from the representation of an end*" (*CJ* 236)[30].

—"The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized as object of a *necessary* delight" (*CJ* 238).

Other than the beautiful, the third *Critique* presents another kind of aesthetic judgment that is, the sublime. The Sublime appears first in comparison to the beautiful. It is defined as pleasing, too. It is not bounded by determinate but reflective judgments. Again as in the beautiful, in the sublime, the delight presented to the subject does not result from the immediate presentation of an object

[28] Posy insistently writes that "the harmony that Kant speaks…would be simply the natural cooperation between these faculties that occurs in ordinary perception: the understanding guiding the reproductive imagination in arranging the manifold and presupposing the productive imagination in expressing its rules" (1991: 38).

[29] This feature is called *disinterestedness* and it has been the most influential among the other third characteristics of the judgment of the beautiful. It is cited by many scholars as much as the thinkers like Arendt and Lyotard. The notion has basically constructed the base for the claim that the Kantian aesthetics can have a political import.

[30] In the third moment as to the concepts of end and finality Kant writes that "an end is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its Object is finality (*forma finalis*).

(governed by the imagination) but from an "indeterminate reference" to some concepts. Yet, this time the reference is to the concepts of reason.

Apart from the resemblances, the beautiful and the sublime differ in many aspects. First of all, the latter is all about the *form* of an object and it results from the harmony between the faculties of the presentation (imagination) and the pure concepts (understanding). Basically, the form of the object in question awakes the feeling of accord between the representation of the object and the very structure of the faculty of the understanding. In Kant's language, the form of the object represents nature and the harmony between the two faculties of the mind designates that a form of nature is in accord with the structure of the understanding.

In the case of the sublime, the form is not the issue, since in this case the representation of *limitlessness* is concerned. To put it another way, the beautiful is somehow limited, for it is concerned with the states of the faculties in relation to one another in the very act of mere representation of the form of the object. But in the sublime the relation of the faculties is issued without having recourse to the form of the object. Thus, in the case of the beautiful, the representation of an indeterminate concept of understanding arises while in the sublime that of reason does. Furthermore, the delight experienced escorts to a representation of *Quality* in the first and that of *Quantity* in the second.

The most striking characteristic of the sublime is that even if it is triggered by an object of nature, it goes far beyond of the presentation of the object. Thus, Kant writes that for the sublime we must look for a ground "merely in ourselves and the attitude of the mind that introduces sublimity into the representation of nature" (*CJ* §23: 93). Therefore, the sublimity is something that can be discovered in the mind and the process is triggered by the object.

Recall that judgment is not a product of the third *Critique* solely. No doubt it is also vital for the first *Critique*, where it is responsible for knowledge claims. Thus, it always already exists as an element of cognition. However, when cognition is concerned, we are interested only in its *cognitive* or *objective* character. Yet, it can also be examined with respect to the *mental state* from which cognition arises.

A similar case is valid for the faculties of the imagination and the understanding in judgment of taste. Kant writes that "one can also consider this relation of two faculties of cognition merely subjectively, insofar as one helps or hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the state of mind, and [is] therefore a relation which is sensitive (which is not the case in the separate use of any other faculty of cognition)" (*CJ* First Intro VIII)[31]. This is basically the sensation of the relation between the faculties (of the imagination and understanding) with regard to the mental state of subject within an act of cognition. However, put this way, it appears as if the aesthetic judgment is necessarily bound up with and follows from cognition. Yet, Kant also indicates that the reflective judgment corresponds to an independent feeling of harmony that is attained between the imagination and understanding in a mode prior to a conceptual employment. Thus, in this way, the reflective judgment emphasizes the relation of these two faculties with respect to the subject.

3.2. The Kantian Theory of the Sublime

The word sublime is derived from the Latin word *sublimis* (from *sub*: up to and *limen*: lintel) meaning look up to. In Oxford English Dictionary it is defined as "set

[31] All First Introduction references belong to the Critique of the Power of the Judgment translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (2000, Cambridge University Press: New York).

or raised aloft, high up". As a notion the sublime has its roots back to the 1st century. The word is known to be used firstly by *Longinus*,[32] a teacher of rhetoric known to have written a treatise entitled *On the Sublime* in which he narrates the merits of good writing. As an adjective for a good writing it means delightful, inspiring and overwhelming.

In the long history of the term (almost two thousand years), the 18th century has been its golden age since both in Britain and Germany, theorists wrote on the subject recurrently. The reference of the concept of the sublime has changed by the 18th century. It has begun representing power or nature as a whole rather than the sense of power merely in the works of art. In debates, the focus of the aesthetics was "how we are formed as subjects and how as subjects we go about making sense of our experience" and these questions were taken to fall under the title of the experience of the sublime (Ashfield and De Bolla, 1996: 2).

Kant's thought on the sublime is influenced by some 18th century names such as Shaftesbury, Addison, Silvian, Pope, Dryden, Burke and Lord Kames (Coleman, 1974:121). However, Burke and Moses Mendelssohn are particularly significant names in relation to Kant's use of the term. Burke was influential in British aesthetics and both senses of the sublime (nature as a whole and as emotional reaction) indicated above can be traced in Burke's book *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (Kirwan, 2005: vii). He writes: "ideas of the sublime and the beautiful stand on foundations so different, that it is hard … to think of reconciling them in the same subject,

32 Because his first name is unknown, Longinus is sometimes referred as Pseudo-Longinus. Paul Crowther introduces these three texts as "arche-texts" on sublime, claiming that they are in commensurable in their treatment of the concept. See, Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism, 1996, Oxford University Press, USA, p.115.

without considerably lessening the effect of the one or the other upon the passions" (Burke, 1998: 103).

As for German aesthetic theory in the same period, Mendelssohn publishes an article entitled "On the Sublime and Naïve in the Fine Sciences", one year before releasing his detailed review of Burke's work on the beautiful and sublime. By these two particular works, he is known to introduce the notion of the sublime to German literature. Yet, concerning the contemporary treatment of the concept, the three texts on the sublime are accepted to be written by Longinus, Burke and Kant.

Kant's theory of the sublime carries some elements from conventional view. According to John Zammito, Kant has already accepted the relation of the notions of unboundedness and infinity with the sublime after Longinus. Moreover, the psychological aspect of this experience is first postulated by Addison. Later, it is developed by Burke's remark that it contains discomfort and gratification. This is accepted by Kant before he transfigures this theory and relates it to morality (1992: 277). As for Kant's contribution to the theory before his third *Critique*, we know that in 1764, he publishes *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*. The work is a short treatise. It deals with the sublime character of morality. Also the moral character of the beautiful and the sublime is emphasized. No doubt that it is a phase of transition with respect to Kant's later work on the matter. Since the history of the notion of the sublime is vast and not directly relevant to the purposes of present study, for now it is sufficient just to note that

even long before Kant and especially among the 18th century thinkers the sublime has already been a popular subject of discussion.[33]

As for the rating of the notion in more recent times, Rudolf Makkreel in 1984 writes that the concept of the sublime is neglected in the contemporary aesthetic studies, yet it was of great interest in the eighteenth century (1984: 304). However, in the following years, around 1990s, the notion of the sublime becomes a matter of discussion and research again by the raise of the post-structuralist current. Many aspects of the notion have been reanalyzed by prominent Kant scholars. In particular, the role of the imagination and the two modes of the sublime in their relation to the different faculties of the mind and the notion of a supersensible faculty introduced in the third *Critique* are focal points of interpretations.

The theory of the sublime finds dissimilar interpretations among Kant scholars. This is most probably because of the *indeterminate* nature of reflective judgment that is open to interpretation more than any other Kantian notion. For similar reasons, the sublime in particular has been an object of interest. Its relation to morality and to the whole critical philosophy is analyzed by many scholars. There seem to be three poles in the interpretation of the sublime. Some scholars tend to read the sublime from a perspective closer to a moral point of view (Crowther, Crawford) and some approach the notion of the sublime from a more aesthetic point by seeing it as a judgment of taste like the beautiful (Kirwan, Matthews, Guyer, Makkreel). Some interpret it as having a potential for more than aesthetical realm (Lyotard). There are also several scholars who have invented new

33 One of the early debates on the eighteenth century aesthetics concerned the development of the particular Kantian sublime. In 1960, Samuel Holt Monk wrote that the British debate on the sublime has paved the way for the Kantian "autonomy of the subject". For more on the debate and contributors see, The sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory by Andrew Ashfield and Peter De Bolla.

notions out of the theory of the sublime, such as “moral sublime” (Clewis), “noble sublime” (Myskja), and a new sublime in relation to mental states (Allison, Clewis). In addition to its return to the discussions of the Kantian aesthetics, the sublime has broad repercussions in literary theory. Although what is claimed in discussions of the notion in literary criticism have little do to with what Kant has intended, the sublime has been popular for some time.

Other than its aesthetic character, particularly after the Second World War, the theory of the Kantian sublime has been visited by political intentions. The images of war as they are represented by the media have started a discussion generally entitled the aesthetization of politics.

This study contends that a theoretical discussion of the sublime can uncover an alternative layer for the possible political character of the Kantian aesthetics. The query on the elements of the sublime must be theoretical which means to say that in order to investigate the potential of the sublime we must apply to the first *Critique*. It is mainly because of the fact that for Kant it seems that the aesthetic is just the subjective side of human experience. This means that in the aesthetic what changes are not the structures of the faculties but just the relation between them. However, a close analysis of the sublime suggests the possibility of a change in regimes of some faculties such as the imagination. In order to expose this state, it is best for our purposes to unstitch the net that constitutes the theory of the sublime in order to knit it again in a reconstructive mode.

To accomplish this aim, the first *Critique* will be visited in order to elaborate the elements of the sublime in comparison to their appearance in the first *Critique*. A return to the first *Critique* seems inevitable since Kant himself uses terms from this critique when he describes the mathematically sublime. Therefore,

there seems to be no better way to visit the first *Critique* from time to time, since - not surprisingly -the object in the sublime "experience" is subject to the determinant or *a priori* conditions of the first *Critique* even though the sublime is not a determinant judgment.

The judgment of the sublime is controversial when it is evaluated in terms of the theoretical reason. The value of it as an ordinary experience seems to compel Kant's metaphysics. In an aesthetic mode it exposes a unique relation between the faculties of thinking imagination and reason. Following this path would pave the way for the present study to claim a contemporary return of the sublime in a more complex fashion in which politics can be addressed.

In the last chapter, the contemporary return of the sublime in relation to international politics will be elaborated. Yet, it must be noticed that the appropriation of the sublime by political sociologists as well as philosophers is mainly driven by the fact that the sublime is an unusual or extraordinary encounter with nature in Kant's philosophy. This means that the sublime is already problematic and almost enigmatic for the Kantian thought. Therefore, in the present study the sublime will firstly be examined in terms of its value and place in the whole Kantian system. Since, considering the epistemological and metaphysical repercussions of this experience are significant to understand the contemporary sublime and its relation to political thinking in a cosmopolitan way.

In the following sections, first, the two modes of the sublime will be elaborated in terms of aesthetic estimation they suggest. Aesthetic estimation in the third *Critique* will be compared to mathematical estimation in the first *Critique*. Since the sublime is also an experience of subject, by taking recourse to some notions of the first *Critique* such as magnitude, intuition and apprehension, the

aesthetic estimation and the experience that the sublime suggests will tried to be evaluated.

Secondly, the faculty of the imagination will be elaborated in detail. In order to expose the alterations in Kant's employment of the faculty, the functions of the faculty in the first *Critique* and the later appearance of the faculty in the third *Critique* will be examined. This rather long section tries to reveal the significance of the imagination in aesthetic estimation as a faculty that can and thus, its potential for a political mode of thinking that might be grounded on the Kantian aesthetics.

Lastly, the controversial relation between the morality and the sublime will be taken up. Although the present study does not necessarily reads the sublime in relation to the Kantian morals, the connection of the sublime to moral self is significant for comprehending the contemporary relation of the Kantian cosmopolitanism and the sublime detected upon the social disasters of this century.

3.2. 1. The Mathematically Sublime (*das Mathematisch-Erhabene*)

The delight in the sublime has four modes. It is universal in its Quantity; it is independent of any interest in its Quality; it is subjectively final in its Relation; and it is necessary in its Modality. All four modes apply to each kind of the sublime.[34]

Different from the state of the mind, that is in *restful contemplation* in the beautiful, the sublime implies a *mental movement* (*CJ* §24). This mental movement is the movement of the imagination and it is either towards the critical reason

[34] Allan Lazaroff in his "The Kantian Sublime: Aesthetic Judgment and Religious Feeling" contends that there are two different kinds of sublime. Furthermore, he claims that they are distinct in their structural elements. Mathematically sublime carry the relations of quality and quantity and dynamically sublime those of relation and modality.

(faculty of cognition) or the practical reason (desire). The former corresponds to the *mathematically* sublime, and the latter to the *dynamically* sublime.[35]

In the third *Critique*, the section that deals with the mathematically sublime is opened with the definition of the sublime. *Absolutely great* is the phrase Kant uses to define it. Then, he continues: "*that is sublime in comparison to which all else is small*" (*CJ* § 25). Following this definition, Kant distinguishes the state of being great from the state of being a magnitude as well as differentiating being great from being *absolutely great*. The latter equals to a non *comparative magnum* which indicates something that is "great beyond all comparison".

The act of defining something as absolutely great is not grounded upon the understanding because this requires a concept of such an object that can be compared to the object that is absolutely great. Even if we do not seem to easily decide whether it connotes a pure concept of understanding, an intuition or a concept of reason, according to Kant, we must be sure that assertions of being great, small or absolute are necessarily concepts of the judgment and "must introduce as basis of the judgment a subjective finality of the representation with reference to the power of judgment" (*CJ* §25). Therefore, *absolutely great* is necessarily an issue for judgment and an object for the aesthetic estimation. Still, there is no doubt that in the foundation of it resides the notion of magnitude. Therefore, to make an elaborate analysis of the mathematically sublime let us summarize the notion of magnitude and the mathematical (logical) estimation and the aesthetic estimation respectively.

[35] Allison claims that if the sublime is founded in the predisposition of the moral feeling, then not only the dynamically sublime but also the mathematically sublime should be underlined by the moral feeling. See, Allison, 2001, p. 335.

The notion of magnitude (*quantum*) appears in the discussion of the application of the pure concepts of the understanding to possible objects of experience. Kant writes in the first *Critique* that the synthesis of pure concepts of the understanding can be applied either in a *mathematical* or a *dynamical* employment. With respect to these employments, there are four principles of pure understanding. They are; *axioms of intuition* and *anticipations of perception* which are subsumed under the mathematical employment and; the *analogies of experience* and *postulate of empirical thought in general* which are registered under the dynamical employment.[36] For the sake of simplicity, in this section only the mathematical employment and its two principles will be analyzed.

The mathematical employment of the synthesis of the pure concepts of understanding is concerned with *intuition*. The principles of mathematical use of the concepts of pure understanding are *unconditionally necessary* because they indicate the *a priori* conditions of intuition which are in the end the necessary conditions of experience in general (*CPR* A160 B200). Thereby they suggest *intuitive* kind of certainty.

The first principle, the *axioms of intuition* suggests that "all appearances are, in their intuition, extensive magnitudes" or in other words, "all intuitions are extensive magnitudes" (*CPR* A162 B202). Magnitude (*quantum*) refers to the consciousness of the synthetic unity of a manifold in intuition. A magnitude is entitled *extensive* when the representation of the parts enables that of a whole with respect to the intuitions of an object of experience. Concerning an extensive

[36] For the application of the mathematical and dynamical principles to aesthetic judgments there are many different views. For instance, Lewis Beck claims that "aesthetic judgments do not employ the dynamical categories and principles of substance, causality and existence…But the mathematical categories and principles certainly do apply…The concepts which Kant holds do *not* play a role in the construction of (pure) aesthetic experience are not categorical concepts but empirical" (1978: 45).

magnitude, the mind can proceed from parts to whole by successively advancing from one part to another in time. In the successive progress from parts to whole, the mind treats these appearances as aggregates thus, the apprehension proceeds in a cumulative manner in which each part is necessarily linked to the previous one. In this regard, mathematical synthesis in its relation to extensive character of a magnitude is a composition (*compositio*) consisting of homogenous units.

The second part of the principles regarding pure understanding is grouped under the title of anticipations[37] of perception.[38] These principles offer that "in all appearances sensation, and the real which correspond to it in the object (*realitas phenomenon*), has an *intensive magnitude*, that is, a degree" (*CPR* A166 B208). In the *Proof* of the argument, Kant writes that as the objects of our perception, appearances are different from space and time (i.e., pure forms of intuition) because in addition to intuition, they contain "the real of sensation as merely subjective representation, which gives us only the consciousness that the subject is affected, and which we relate to an object in general" (*CPR* A166 B207). Kant suggests that sensation is not something represented *in itself*. Moreover, its magnitude is not *extensive* but *intensive*. In the act of apprehension, the magnitude of a sensation can be the object of empirical consciousness in a particular time. When this happens, the magnitude of a sensation, which equals to zero before it is presented in consciousness, increases to a given magnitude. This potential feature of sensation is entitled *intensive magnitude* which is a "degree of influence on the sense [i.e. on the special sense involved], must be ascribed to all objects of perception, in so far as the perception contains sensation" (*CPR* A166 B208). To

[37] Kant writes: "all knowledge by means of which I am enabled to know and determine a priori what belongs to empirical knowledge may be entitled an anticipation" (CPR A166 B208).

[38] "Perception is empirical consciousness, that is, a consciousness in which sensation is to be found" (CPR A166 B207).

put it another way, all appearances as far as their sensation (i.e. their reality) is concerned, has *intensive magnitude* that refers to a degree of reality. As for the proper definition of an *intensive* magnitude, Kant writes that a "magnitude which is apprehended only as a unity, and in which multiplicity can be represented only through approximation to negation = 0" is an *intensive* kind of magnitude (*CPR* A168 B210).

Following the two principles above, Kant concludes that all appearances are continuous magnitudes in themselves with their *extensive* magnitudes (with regard to their intuition) and *intensive* magnitudes (with regard to sensation and so their reality).

The extensive quality of a magnitude presupposes a specific number of homogenous units. In the case of estimating the magnitude of an object of intuition, there are two basic elements that we employ: multiplicity (number) of units and the magnitude of the unit (the measure). The exact result of how great something is can only be achieved by logical or mathematical estimation (estimation of magnitude with recourse to the concepts of number). For the process, the estimation of the magnitude of a unit which is used as the measure is a necessary first step. The very act of defining a unit as a measure is tricky because it would mean infinite regress if we consider that for each unit we must find a smaller unit to be its measure, thus, we can never pass to the estimation of the object that we desire in the first place. Therefore, we need to apply comparison, and thus, judgment in each intuition to find the fundamental unit, since the magnitude of a unit or the measure is not some constant from which we can build up an *absolute* concept of magnitude.

Comparison is performed by an aesthetic kind of estimation which relies on an immediate grasp and comparison of some magnitudes familiar to subject.[39]

The assignment of finding a measure for the estimation of the magnitude of an object is not an essential act merely in an aesthetic estimation. All mathematical (numerical) or logical estimation is also grounded on aesthetic estimation because of this fact. In the very act of logical or mathematical estimation, the needed estimation of the fundamental unit must, therefore, lies in the immediate grasp of it in intuition, and the use our imagination can put it in presenting the numerical concepts: i.e. all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is in the last resort aesthetic (i.e. subjectively and not objectively determined) (*CJ* §26).

Mathematical estimation, after finding a measure or a base unit, can be limitless since it works with numbers and obviously numbers can go infinite. However, aesthetic estimation cannot progress infinitely because it is grounded on judgment. In aesthetic estimation, the measure is found by a comparison between units formerly known to subject. This very feature of aesthetic estimation is what causes the feeling of the sublime in the first place.

Aesthetic estimation is defined as the estimation of a magnitude in *mere intuition* which is performed by eye. Thus, it surely has a limit and

> where it is considered as an absolute measure beyond which no greater is possible subjectively…, it then conveys the idea of the sublime, calls forth that emotion which no mathematical estimation of magnitudes by numbers can evoke (unless in so far as the fundamental aesthetic measure is kept vividly present to the imagination): because the latter presents only the relative magnitude due to the comparison with others of a like kind, whereas the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in an intuition (*CJ* §26).

[39] In the case of an intuition where we are to decide something is great, basically the comparison of the possible measures known to subject are at work. Following this, the peculiar feature of the judgments upon the greatness of a subject is that the very act of comparison claims for the universality of the judgment concerning merely the aesthetic estimation of the greatness.

To sum up, in the very act of estimating the magnitude of any object, the faculty of the imagination goes through two phases namely, apprehension (*Auffassung*, *apprehensio*) and comprehension (*Zusammenfassung*, *comprehensio aesthetica*). In the former phase, in order to estimate the magnitude of the object the imagination decides a *quantum* (a fundamental unit) to use as a measure. The first base (apprehension) is of an aesthetic kind and it indicates a mere intuition by the *eye*. Later, in the second, the (cumulative) estimation(s) of the magnitude in question are gathered to access the final decision on the estimation of the magnitude of the object. Generally, mathematical (or numerical) estimation is achieved in this manner. However, with the mathematical sublime which is concerned with the *size* of (a piece of) nature, we see that apprehension goes to infinity in giving the consecutive intuitions on the magnitude of the object. Yet, the comprehension of these continuously registered intuitions cannot be aggregated into a single intuition. In the helpless state of the imagination, reason still requires totality in the case of the presentation of infinite as it does for all other representations. Lyotard writes that the trouble of the imagination is not because the mathematical composition fails but because the outcome of the composition appears *unpresentable* for the imagination. "The mathematical synthesis creates a problem, not in itself once again, but because it is supposed to be doubled by an "aesthetic" synthesis: the presentation of the infinite" (*AS* 92-3).

This demand for the presentation of the infinite or even to think it, Kant writes that some faculty which necessarily "transcending every standard of sense" is required (*CJ* §26). This faculty must be a supersensible faculty in that it allows the mind to *think* the "given infinite without contradiction" by passing beyond the narrow limitations of human sensibility. Put otherwise, the presentation of a given

infinite is not possible but by the mediation of a feeling of a supersensible faculty it can at least be thought.

In the following lines, Malcolm Budd's remarks on the representation of a given infinite in Kant's aesthetics will be taken up in order to reflect more on the mathematically sublime.

Budd recalls the definition of space in the first *Critique* where Kant writes: "space is represented as an infinite *given* magnitude" and also it can be thought as "containing an infinite number of representations *within* itself" (*CPR* B40). Budd's point is successful in exposing that in Kant's system we can speak of the representation of a *given* infinite contrary to what he suggests in the case of the mathematically sublime. Yet, we should also remember that the representation of space as a given infinite or its being thought as containing infinite number of representations is possible due to its being represented as an *a priori* intuition, not as a concept or a representation. Thus, in the case of the mathematically sublime, Kant seems to suggest us that other than representing the object which claims infinity in its size as an *a priori* intuition, we do not have a chance to represent the infinite size of it in *one* single intuition. The reverse would be similar to representing an object entailing infinite number of intuitions *within* itself —which is impossible and contradictory in Kant's understanding. Now, Budd seems to be aware of this fact but he still asks his question which actually has quite a point:

> Given that I am concerned to form an aesthetic estimate of the magnitude of an object that confronts me, why should its immense size impose upon me the requirement to attempt to estimate aesthetically, not its own magnitude, but an infinite magnitude, a task that requires an impossible aesthetic unit of measure and so violates the imagination? (2003: 128).

This point seems crucial but it is not elaborated by Kant in length. We just know that Kant warns us that any object of nature cannot be called the sublime but,

"instead of the object, it is rather the cast of the mind in appreciating it that we have to estimate as *sublime*" (*CJ* §26). Budd is quite right in his point but it should not be forgotten that from the side of mathematical synthesis, the immense size of the object is not impossible to estimate. On the contrary, a mathematical synthesis can go to infinity since it operates with numbers. That is, if we are dealing with the exact estimation of the object, it is not a problem at all. However, what Kant writes is that the mathematical composition obtained by the successive addition of the units reaches very great magnitudes. In this state, the subject both fails to find a fundamental aesthetic unit which is normally found by comparison of the possible measures known to the subject and to represent this continuously growing composition in one single intuition.[40] In the face of this difficulty, it is the sensation[41] felt by the subject paves the way for the idea of the infinity. Therefore, it is not the estimation of a magnitude but the sensation that evokes in subject is the cause of this need for the estimation of an infinite.

The fact that the sublime cannot be attributed to the object necessitates calling it a *feeling*. Kant clearly states that neither the form nor the greatness of the object is in question in the sublime. As to what happens, Kant writes that our faculty of representation is compelled to transcend its own limit during its attempt to represent the object that is *absolutely great*. This struggle or mental movement is present because the imagination must progress *ad infinitum* in accordance with the wish of reason that always seeks for the *absolute totality*. Kant writes:

[40] Lyotard contends that the meaning of the word "measure" is different in aesthetic estimation from mathematical estimation. In the former, for imagination it designates the maximum magnitude presentable at once. In the latter for understanding there is no maximum numerical magnitude. Understanding can process through very large numerical magnitudes (*AS* 102).

[41] Lyotard indicates that the concept of sensation is changed through the third critique and it no longer carries an empirical content about an object. It indicates the state of the subject in the occasion of the object (*AS* 9).

> Precisely because there is a striving in our imagination towards progress *ad infinitum*, while reason demands absolute totality, as a real idea, that same inability on the part of our faculty for the estimation of the magnitude of things of the world of sense to attain the idea, is the awakening of a feeling of a supersensible faculty within us; and it is the use to which judgment naturally puts particular objects on behalf of this latter feeling, and not the object of sense, that is absolutely great, and every other contrasted employment small. Consequently, it is the disposition of the soul evoked by a particular representation engaging the attention of the reflective judgment, and not the Object, that is to be called sublime (*CJ* §25).

The feeling of the sublime is a feeling of pain in respect of the inadequacy of the imagination. On the other hand, it is a feeling of pleasure as to its implication that in comparison to the ideas of reason everything is insignificant. According to Kant,

> the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord with reason's laws, and a displeasure that makes us alive to the feeling of the supersensible side of our being, according to which it is final, and consequently a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility falling short of the ideas of reason (*CJ* §27).

As for the relation of the imagination to reason pointed out above, it is obvious that the failure of the imagination and the discomfort comes with it must not be a surprise. Moreover, it is final for the imagination to fail. Ideas that are present for reason cannot be represented by a faculty with a finite limit. Therefore, the sublime experience does not annihilate mental capacities of subject or does not mean that the critical system has derailed. Since reason is aware of the limit of the imagination and still requires it to represent the Ideas (in this case the absolute whole), we should think that the sublime does not signify a destructive force or moment for subject but on the contrary, it paves the way for realizing the omnipotence of reason and its Ideas. In this sense, the mathematically sublime can be seen as final for theoretical reason and the dynamically sublime, as we will soon

suggest, is purposive for the practical reason.[42] This claim briefly grounds on the fact that the former is concerned with the *size* and thus concerns theoretical thinking and the latter with the *might* of nature and the faculty of desire with recourse to the notion of free causality.

3.2. 2. The Dynamically Sublime (*das Dynamisch-Erhabenen der Natur*)

> Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening rocks, thunder-clouds piled up the vault of heaven, borne along with flashes and peals, volcanoes in all their violence of destruction, hurricanes leaving desolation in their track, the boundless ocean rising with rebellious force, the high waterfall of some mighty river, and the like, make our power of resistance of trifling moment in comparison with their might (*CJ* §28).

According to Kant, nature when experienced as described above triggers the feeling of the sublime. As obvious, this time it is not the size but the might of the nature leads us into this feeling. Nature is represented in such a manner that it appears as a source of fear. It is this representation of nature that Kant calls dynamically sublime. In Kant's words "nature considered in an aesthetic judgment as might that has no dominion over us, is dynamically sublime" (*CJ* §28).

The difficulty confronted in the aesthetic estimation of the extensive magnitude of an object regarded as the mathematically sublime is that of finding a measure for the estimation of the size which is judged as absolutely great. In the case of the dynamically sublime, the formless object is judged as the absolutely strong. Moreover, this time it is not the absolute whole but the absolute causality is implied by Idea of infinity.

[42] Generally this view is accepted by most scholars. Yet, Patricia M. Matthews in her article entitled "Kant's Sublime: A Form of Pure Aesthetic Reflective Judgment" asserts that both modes of the sublime are purposive for the practical reason (1996: 168). Paul Crowther also suggests that mathematically sublime is purposive for the practical reason as dynamically sublime, see his *Kantian Sublime*, p. 119.

The fact of the dynamically sublime is that "in the immeasurableness of nature and the incompetence of our faculty for adopting a standard proportionate to the aesthetic estimation of the magnitude of its *realm*, we found our own limitation" (*CJ* §28).

The crucial point of this experience is that the subject has a sensation of the "beyond" of cognitive limits. In this peculiar circumstance, there exist two kinds of absolute: the absolute limit of aesthetic comprehension and the absolute that is required to be represented. For the sake of the unity of the subject, these two have to be synthesized. Yet, it is obvious that the imagination is incompetent to do so and more importantly these two absolutes cannot be reduced to one another. Lyotard warns us that if we are to understand the alleviation of this potentially destructive moment in the form of a dialectical frame, we are doomed to a kind of transcendental illusion in the Kantian sense. It is because the solution necessitates a dynamical synthesis. This kind of synthesis suggests *discursive* certainty pertaining to the objects of experience. The dynamical employment of the synthesis is concerned with *existence*, that is, it deals with existence of possible objects of empirical intuition which are accidental by nature. The necessity of it is occasional and thus, it can be employed *mediately* and *indirectly* (*CPR* A160 B199/200). It entails the principles of the *analogies of experience* and *postulate of empirical thought in general* which allow discursive certainty.

In this fashion, dynamical synthesis implies a *nexus* that is imposed on phenomena in order for relating the phenomena into a systematic whole. Different from mathematical synthesis which is concerned with the homogenous units of an object of experience, dynamical synthesis temporarily unites two phenomena that are not necessarily exist or appear together.

Back to the discussion of the dynamically sublime, Lyotard suggests us a reading of this experience as a dynamical synthesis of the two absolutes that are absolutely heterogeneous. The reason why he rejects a possibility of a dialectical solution for the difficulty in this specific sublime mode is that such kind of a presupposition culminates in the relativization of the absolutes and in a transcendental illusion in the end. Instead, he suggests that the heterogeneous absolutes that cannot be reduced to one another can be synthesized by a dynamical synthesis without annihilating the Kantian schema (*AS* 130-1).[43]

The fear and exaltation felt in the dynamically sublime are also signs of this two heterogeneous absolutes and their synthesis respectively. The fear in the moment of confronting the Idea of absolute causality that is present in reason and that is required to be represented by the imagination on the demand of reason is coupled with a feeling of adoration in the subject when it is realized that it is no business of faculties of human mind to represent the unintelligible cause of phenomena, i.e. the absolute first cause.[44]

Nature as a "power which is superior to great hindrances" (*CJ* §28) becomes an object of attraction when we realize that we are secure that is, when it is felt that this might of nature has no dominion over us. We confront our own limitation and a *pre-eminence* over nature even it seems immeasurable. Thus, nature is called sublime because it "raises the imagination to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the

[43] This remark is valuable in that the notion of a dynamical synthesis might aid to rescue Kant from the accusation of suggesting new authority to imagination that are never existent in the first critique. See chapter five in *AS* for Lyotard's argument in which he refuses a dialectical approach in the solution of the crisis in the dynamically sublime deserves attention.

[44] It is important to keep in mind that for Kant absolute bears no relation to anything than itself. In this sense it is categorical. It is in this sense that the absolute limit of imagination and the absolute first cause cannot be relativized, fused or related.

sphere of its own being, even above the nature" (*CJ* §28). Then, what the object of nature that evoke the sublime feeling does is to "raise the forces of the soul above the height of vulgar common place, and discover within us a power of resistance of quite another kind, which gives us courage to be able to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature" (*CJ* §28).

It is not appropriate to treat the two modes of sublime as excluding each other even if they differ in many respects. Whether from the perspective of theoretical reason or that of practical reason, the result of the sublime feeling is the appreciation of the superiority and omnipotence of reason and its Ideas. Furthermore, if we recall that sublime is considered as final for reason, it is seems quite right to ask that why do we bother to look for some other implications than witnessing the power of reason. The point is that without the purposive character, the sublime would refer to the annihilation of the human mind, since the imagination fails and subject feels pain and displeasure. Yet, in the end, subject overwhelms the difficulty without a change in the capacities of mind. In this process, it is the *how* that matters for the whole critical thought. In each mode of the sublime, the failure of the imagination to represent the absolute and its confrontation of its own absolute limit imply two valuable results for the whole critical system. The first one is that the failure of the faculty of representation can be read as the sign of its existence. In other words, when something cannot be represented and this causes displeasure or pain for subject, it means that before this moment subject has a faculty of representation that works well. Since Kant is usually accused of pre-determining or presupposing the transcendental faculties of the mind before experience and thus, failing to escape from the trap of the question

of ontological existence, the failure of the imagination can be read to imply an indirect evidence for the existence of this faculty.

The second result is that as mentioned above, in each mode of the sublime there exist two different absolutes which, in the end, are synthesized for the sake of the security of the subject. In the mathematically sublime, the absolute measure of the imagination and the absolute whole that the representation of which is required by reason from the imagination; and in the dynamically sublime, the absolute limit of the imagination and absolute causality are synthesized. Lyotard suggests that it is a dynamical synthesis in which two heterogeneous objects can be related with recourse to a nexus that is imposed upon them. In reflective judgment which is liberated from determinant or objective structure, subject finds a possibility to *think* reflexively. In other words, in the judgment of sublime subject does not represent or think objectively but *feels* and thus judges lawlessly. Since the object of thinking is the absolute which bears no *relation* to anything other than itself, the subject cannot *think* but *feel.*

3.2. 3. On the Role of the Imagination

John Zammito in his extensive work on Kant's third *Critique*, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, rightly puts that the place of third *Critique* within the whole critical philosophy requires an examination of its *innovations* in relation to the first *Critique* and the limits that is defined as constraints of reasoning. It is true, as Mary Gregor (1985)[45] once has written that the third *Critique* evokes a feeling as if Kant had never read the first *Critique*. It is just this feeling that makes one wonder whether the *innovations*, as Zammito puts, suggested by the third *Critique*

45 See Gregor's "Aesthetic Form and Sensory Content in the Critique of Judgement" in The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant , ed. Richard Kennigton, pp.185-99.

are *contradictory* or *developmental* (1992: 45). Keeping this question in mind, in this chapter of the present study, the elements of the Kantian sublime will be focused since the thesis claims that the answer does not exclusively contain one or the other but it necessitates a possibility that keeps both at the same time. To put it otherwise, the negative answer would be the annihilation of critical frame whereas the positive answer would be ungrounded with respect to what Kant writes in the third *Critique*. However, it is the violation and affirmation that immediately follows it, are what constitutes the power of the sublime for this study.

In order to substantiate this claim, the notion of imagination will be analyzed. In the first part, the faculty of the imagination will be traced back through the first and third critiques. In the light of these observations, by comparing the roles that are given to this faculty in each critique the potential of the sublime through this faculty will be uncovered.

Imagination as a faculty or a simple function of the mind has been a great deal of discussion long before Kant. In particular in the eighteenth century, similar to the notion of the sublime, many words have been written in the aim of assessment of this faculty. Kant's treating of the imagination has also been discussed by many scholars. It seems that for the significance and the exact role of the faculty it is hard to reach a determined consensus.

It is not wrong to think that the popularity of the faculty in Kant's wake has accelerated ever since its unique disposal in the third *Critique*. Many scholars elaborated its place both in cognition and aesthetics due to its new appearance in

the third *Critique* since, in this last critique it is almost an equal of understanding or reason.[46]

In this section, the pre-conceptual or rather non-conceptual realm addressed by the aesthetic experience of beautiful and the sublime is analyzed by tracking the two different states of the imagination corresponding to judgments of taste. It is also believed that the relation of the imagination with the other faculties namely, understanding and reason might enlighten the task of judgment as a mediator between the theoretical and practical aspects of human mind.

Regarding both the A-edition of transcendental deduction in the first *Critique* and also its role in the third *Critique*, some thinkers claim that the imagination should be accepted as a faculty. For instance, Martin Heidegger defines the imagination as a "common root" between the sensibility and the understanding. Rudolf Makkreel, following his analysis of synthesis through critical philosophy, states that the imagination of the third *Critique* should be treated separately from that of the first *Critique*. Sarah Gibbons writes that "(i)magination, in its connection with understanding and reason, is a characteristically human capacity, and therefore a clarification of its functions and of reason's dependence on it allows us to characterize a distinctively human kind of knowing" (1994: 2). Lastly, Jane Kneller suggests that the creative power of the imagination can be used to realize the highest good that morality requires. Although there are several other scholars engaged in the discussions on the

46 See especially Makkreel's Imagination and Interpretation, Peter Strawson's "Imagination and Perception" in Ralph C. S. Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); J. Michael Young, "Kant's View of Imagination", Kant-Studien, 79 (1988). Also see Carl J. Posy's "Imagination and Judgment in the Critical Philosophy" in Kant's Aesthetics, ed. Ralf Meerbote (1991) in which he claims that the imagination of CPR in its objective, "earthbound regulated" sense applies also to Kant's aesthetics as well as his ethics (in Kant's Aesthetics, ed. Ralf Meerbote).

imagination and its role, these names will suffice for the sake of simplicity of the present argument.

The following section will turn to the first *Critique* in order to remind the mission of the mentioned faculty in cognition. After that, the third *Critique* will be visited in order to look closer to the position of the faculty in aesthetic realm. Beneath the comparison of different appearances of this faculty lay the aim to compare cognitive experience and aesthetic "experience". The section that deals with the third *Critique* consists of two sections. In the first section, the role of the imagination regarding to arts will be visited and then, the state of the imagination in the judgments of the sublime will be taken up. In this section, Rudolf Makkreel's and Lyotard's analysis of the imagination will be considered in order to denote the differences as well as the parallel points of a transcendental and poststructuralist approach. This is because within this brief comparison the present study shall contend that declaring the sublime as an elevation above the sensible limit following imagination's failure is a misinterpretation which culminates in overlooking the potential of aesthetic reflective thinking. From this ground the ground to discuss the anti-humanist aspect of the sublime can be found.

3.2.3.1. The Imagination in the first *Critique*

The notion of imagination as a faculty or a simple function of the mind has been a great deal of discussion in the Kantian scholarship. Although in *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) Kant never dedicates a separate section to the imagination, the section entitled The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding[47] is accepted to entail much of his view of the imagination. Kant revised this A-edition of

[47] Hereafter *Deduction.*

Deduction in the second edition of the *Critique* in 1787 and, in the late, i.e. B-edition of Deduction, omitted almost the entire earlier edition.

Before focusing its preliminary functions, it is useful to remember that Kant defines it as one of the "three original sources of the soul". As the others are *sense* and *apperception*, together with *imagination* these three sources entail the conditions of all possible experience.

Roughly put, the first faculty is sense that is responsible from receiving stimuli in the form of raw material. Apperception involves the consciousness of the received and processed intuitions in a subject. Imagination, regarding its function, stands between the two and has a central role in cognition. Furthermore, as sense and apperception, it cannot be derived from any other faculty of the mind and it has both an empirical and transcendental employment. It is responsible for the synthesis of the manifold, *a priori synopsis* of which is the function of *sense* (*CPR* B127). In the following lines, we will recall its position in the Kantian understanding of cognition.

Now, we see that in the A and B editions of the Deduction, Kant takes up the function of the imagination in the process of fabricating knowledge. First of all, the very process of producing knowledge is led by the *synthesis* which is the staple of cognition. Kant writes, "by synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping (*begreifen*) what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge" (*CPR* A77 B103). This act of synthesis of a manifold that can be empirical or *a priori* is the first level of human knowledge and it is a result of the faculty of the imagination, "a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (*CPR* A78 B103).

According to Kant, representations would mean nothing to each other in the absence of a synthesis that the imagination enables. The synthesis is the essential operation appealing to the representations of both empirical and *a priori*. It is "the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping (*begreifen*) what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge" (*CPR* A77 B103). Synthesis is the staple of cognition and it is a result of the faculty of the imagination, which is, according to Kant, "a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (*CPR* A78 B103). It compares and connects the representations given by sense in the form of a *synopsis*. The synthesis is achieved in three different forms. They are respectively, the apprehension *of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, their* reproduction *in imagination,* and *their* recognition *in a concept* (CPR A97).

The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition entails the synthesis of a manifold of intuitions into a single representation. To put it another way, it is the synthesis of apprehension that represents a manifold as a manifold. In Kant's own words:

> Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, *in so far as it is contained in a single moment*, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the *synthesis of apprehension,* because it is directed immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be presented as a manifold, and as contained *in a single representation*, save in virtue of such a synthesis (*CPR* A99).

Hence, the synthesis in apprehension serves as the first ordering of the manifold of intuitions. It does not entail any connection or necessity. In apprehension, empirical intuition is just placed together.

The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination is the ability of recalling past representations in imagination. The various representations of an object are connected in a *synthetic unity* in such a way that the representation can be reproduced or made vivid again in the imagination. Indeed, the reproducibility of appearances is a requisite for the experience to have a sense. Otherwise no experience would be possible. Kant writes:

> When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise *(CPR* A102).

Following the paragraph, Kant writes that the two kinds of synthesis, namely that of apprehension and reproduction are dependent on each other. Since the synthesis of apprehension constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever—of those that are pure a priori no less than of those that are empirical—the reproductive synthesis of the imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination (*CPR* A 102).

The reproduction of the past intuitions has no root in empirical realm. By this means, reproduction appears as an *a priori* act which by being *a priori* implies immediately a transcendental character regarding Kant's understanding. Hence, its

transcendental employment is a necessity in the construction of a concept which can be defined as a representation related to the understanding.

The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept implies the unity of synthesis that enables us to *think* concepts. The representations regarding the object are subsumed under a concept and only by this means we can think of an object and have knowledge of it. Different representations of the object are identified as belonging to the same object by this very unity of synthesis. The act of counting is given as a proper example: While counting we add a unit to another successively and without this unity of synthesis we would not be able to proceed. The concept of the number is built upon the "consciousness of this unity of the synthesis". As for the notion of "concept" Kant also writes that

> All knowledge demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed, be quite imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for instance, as the unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances. But it can be a rule for intuitions only in so far as it represents in any given appearances the necessary reproduction of their manifold, and thereby the synthetic unity in our consciousness of them. The concept of body, in the perception of something outside us, necessitates the representation of extension, and therewith representations of impenetrability, shape, etc (*CPR* A106).

The notion of the concept as the most convenient means of our knowledge necessitates the unity of the representations belonging to the same object under a general category. In this process, the faculty of the imagination appears as the primary faculty as it enables understanding to operate by subsuming the diverse representations of an object of experience under the concept of the object.

Kant never writes on the faculty of the imagination at length in any of his works. Nevertheless, we see that the imagination rules in the first *Critique* more

than in any of the other two critiques. The section above is based on a summary of the *Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding A.*

The *B* section of the *Deduction* is the one that is restated in the second edition of the *CPR*. In this section the imagination is defined as the "faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*" (*CPR* B151). As to its relation to sensibility Kant writes that "Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to *sensibility*" (*CPR* B151). Yet, in the following lines we see that the imagination can go beyond empirical laws:

> (i)n as much as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense *a priori* in the respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility *a priori*; and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the *categories* must be the transcendental synthesis of *imagination* (*CPR* B151/ 2).

The transcendental synthesis of the imagination is a deed of the understanding that it applies on the sensibility. Put otherwise, the transcendental synthesis of imagination implies the act of understanding in which it determines the sensibility internally (*CPR* B153). Due to its transcendental character it is the basis of all other possible applications of understanding concerning the objects of all possible experience.

Following Kant in the B-edition of the Deduction Sarah Gibbons, in *Kant's Theory of Imagination*, rightly puts that from A to B-edition "Kant 'demotes' the imagination from a 'fundamental faculty of the human soul' (A 124) to a mere function of the understanding" (1994: 37). Yet, Gibbons also adds that this is not a change of status but mostly that of a terminology. Here the point that concerns us is

that none of the sections of Deduction deals directly with the imagination. Furthermore, the role of imagination is much less emphasized in the B-edition. It appears only when Kant explains the application of the categories (the pure concepts of understanding) to the possible experience. Generally Kant gives an account of the central importance of the synthesis and the imagination *en passant*. Nevertheless, if we consider the crucial role of both synthesis and imagination as the faculty which enables synthesis, then it is not unfair to say that the imagination provides the fundamentals of the human cognition in producing knowledge.

The crucial function of the imagination is pointed out as mediation by many commentators of Kant.[48] Heidegger makes the most interesting remark regarding the state of the imagination. He favors the A-edition of the Deduction so much that he claims to find the 'first specimen of phenomenology' in it (Llewelyn, 2000: 33). The imagination is the "common root but unknown" root of the "two stems of human knowledge", that are the sensibility and understanding (Heidegger, 1990: 110).

Gibbons (1994) argues that the imagination has a much closer relationship with perception than it is usually treated by Kant. She drives attention to Kant's definition of understanding with respect to the unity of apperception and the synthesis of imagination. Kant writes that "the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding" (*CPR* A119). Following this, Gibbons argues that apperception opens a space for the imagination to realize its function. This remark is noteworthy because it states that apperception might be another possible "common root" like imagination. This remark might not seem

[48] See especially Strawson's "Imagination and Perception", pp.82-89; J. Michael Young, "Kant's View of Imagination", pp.140- 64; Makkreel's *Imagination and Interpretation,* , pp. 2, 153.

vital for our argument. Nevertheless, it is valuable at least to highlight some indeterminate-in the sense of unrestricted- uses of the imagination.

The theory of the imagination in *CPR* provides us with two different kinds of uses of the imagination: the empirical use and the transcendental use. The empirical use of the imagination is also called the reproductive imagination. It entails the synthesis of intuitions in apprehension and reproduction. It is necessary for the continuity of knowledge because experience necessitates the "reproducibility of appearances" (*CPR* A101). Kant mentions about this reproductive character of the imagination also in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.* He writes that imagination can be reproductive, when it is a "faculty of derivative presentation of the object (*exhibition derivativa*), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously" (Kant, 2006:60).

The transcendental use of the imagination resides in its function in the act of schematizing. When imagination is responsible for producing a *schemata* in order to subsume the intuitions (particulars) given by the sensibility under a concept (universal), it is called the *productive* imagination or "figurative synthesis" (CPR B151). We learn about this productive side of the imagination when Kant seeks for the answer of the question: "How…is the *subsumption* of intuitions under pure concepts, the *application* of a category to appearances, possible?" The *application* of a category to appearances requires for a third kind of representation which must be *homogenous* both in category and appearance. Moreover, it must be in one aspect *intellectual* and in another aspect *sensible*. Kant calls this kind of a representation the *transcendental schema* (*CPR* A138 B177). The transcendental schema is a product of the imagination. It is not equal to an image of the object. It

is universal and, it can never be represented in one single representation that has an image. To put it differently, the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the reproductive imagination whereas the schema of a concept is that of *a priori* imagination (*CPR* A141 B180). Following this, then, the schema of a concept is a means for us to subsume a particular representation under a specific concept of a thing. For instance,

> The concept of a 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent *in concreto*, actually presents (*CPR* A 141).

Because of the unknown mechanism of this act of the schematization, Kant writes that schematism is "an art concealed in the depths of human soul" (*CPR* A141). The unknown portrait of the schematism causes the view that Kant's usage of schema is sometimes ambiguous. For instance, Donald Crawford rightly asserts that "on the one hand it is characterized as both a product of the imagination and intuition, on the other hand, it is said to be a rule or universal procedure of the imagination which exists only in thought" (2003: 153). According to Jonathan Francis Bennett, Kant uses 'schematism' because temporality should be added to the concepts. By this operation schematism enables *conditionality* or "if-then-relatedness". Bennett writes that by applying schematism, Kant hopes to account for causality (1974:58-9). [49] On this controversial issue a very pretentious claim comes from Lyotard. He favors most the third Critique among Kant's critiques. About the schematism and the hidden art of human soul he writes that "taste discovers the secret of the 'art concealed in the depths of the human soul' that the

49 Indeed many scholars hold that schematism is either a sign of failure of Deduction or as unnecessary. This point is far beyond the remit of this paper, yet still Allison, Bennett, Guyer and also Wilkerson- who is most harsh on Kant on the subject where he writes: "the Schematism serves no useful purpose and can be ignored without loss" (1976: 95),- can be visited for the relevant discussion on schematism and Deduction.

schematism conceals and cannot reveal when the powers of thought are absorbed in the "serious" matters of knowledge" (AS 88).

It is not easy to sum up the role of the imagination in the first *Critique* even if it has a function strictly determined. Its place in the cognitive hierarchy of the first *Critique* may be roughly defined inferior to understanding. However, synthesizing *a priori* intuitions i.e., space and time, the very conditions of experience, synthesizing the manifold of intuitions and producing images makes it hard to regard it as supplementary faculty. Furthermore, the categories are also situated high in this hierarchy, yet they have to *employ* synthesized intuitions to perform a proper cognition and in this sense the imagination's function is prior and in this sense, more elementary than the categories (Schlutz, 2009: 85).

Michael Young states that the imagination, besides its "being a necessary ingredient for perception itself (*CPR* A 120)" has a capacity to "see more than the eye meets". In other words, the theory of the imagination in Kant does not merely entail mental imagining but also a capacity to *interpret* by which it can supply more than sensible awareness (1988: 142). Alexander Schlutz draws attention to another angle with respect to the imagination. Besides the positive, necessary and fruitful side of theory of the imagination, he reminds the violence that it brings down upon itself later in the sublime. Moreover, in *Anthropology* in § 28-36, Kant introduces a new power of the imagination called *fantasy*. This is a power of imagination when it produces images involuntarily. According to Schlutz, if we consider all the appearances of the imagination in Kantian philosophy, we realize that

> Simultaneously necessary and dangerous for the unity of the system in its synthetic and its disruptive function, imagination can thus only have a paradoxical and painfully conflicted position within the transcendental framework. At once the solution for the most vexing conceptual problems

> and a dreaded intrusion of lawless irrationality into the court of reason, the faculty opens up a conceptual abyss that the Kantian system, in spite of its rigorous unifying mechanisms, remains unable to close (2009:139).

The next section takes up the "perilous" side of the imagination which, in the end, can be read as an opportunity for the Kantian political subject that should be freed from any kind of unity for good.

3.2.3.2. The Imagination in the third *Critique*[50]

Needless to say, in the third *Critique* the imagination has a much more substantial role. As the servant of understanding in cognition, the imagination is promoted to a more significant role in the aesthetic estimation of the object in the third *Critique*. In other words, the supporting role of the imagination in *CPR* is transformed into a one-to-one relationship with the faculties of understanding or reason. In the third *Critique*, imagination's act of mediating between sensibility and understanding—together with schematization and three syntheses which are always defined in a strictly determined objective fashion—turns into an indeterminate relationship with understanding. Furthermore, in the third *Critique*, a new occasion which can never hold for theoretical reason is introduced between the imagination and the highest faculty in the hierarchy of human mind namely, reason. Surely, these prefatory observations are mostly anticipated concerning Kant's aim for unifying the theoretical and practical aspects of human mind or his notion of kingdom of ends. Yet, this fact cannot prepare a Kant reader to what s/he will find in the third *Critique* regarding to new appearances of the faculties in aesthetic reflection.

50 In this section, I want to summarize two different views on the theory of the imagination. The analysis of its role in the judgment of beautiful will be analysed in the next chapter while the sublime will be claimed to be an anti-humanist point in the Kantian philosophy. In this section Makkreel and Lyotard's approaches will be revisited as two representative examples of transcendental and poststructuralist interpretations of the imagination in the third Critique.

As we already know, in the first *Critique* imagination is defined as one of the three original sources of knowledge which are not derived from any other faculty (*CPR* B127). In this sense, imagination is given a high status with respect to sensibility. The duties of imagination in the first *Critique* seem significant in terms of their contribution to understand the subject in an objective fashion. Its tasks are backbones of production of knowledge. Since with Kant we merely deal with *how* we know and consequently with subject just in terms of the conditions given as response to this "how" question, the process of production of knowledge exposes us the structure of the mind and if it is not too much to say, of man in the first *Critique*.

In the third *Critique*, in aesthetic reflection, imagination comes forth with its new face peculiar to aesthetic reflection. Briefly, the "lively play" that it performs in the judgment of taste, its productive and spontaneous, in Kant's words "self-activating" (*selbstthätig*) mode and lastly, its being the "author of the voluntary forms of possible intuitions" in arts can support the argument that the tasks of the imagination altered and in a sense expanded in the third *Critique* (Makkreel, 1990: 46).

Considering the changes in its tasks, imagination seems freer under the reign of faculty of judgment. The freedom of this faculty is mainly attributed to its being independent of the concepts. In the very encounter with an object in aesthetic reflection, the imagination operates without appealing to either concepts or the categories. Since the imagination is solely concerned with mere *form* of the object no concepts are invited. This act of the imagination seems ambiguous in some respects. Kant's treatment of the imagination in the faculty of judgment leaves us

in wonder in terms of the quality of this freedom. Referring to the relation of the imagination with concepts in terms of freedom Guyer rightly puts that

> It is not clear whether the mere *presence* of any concepts—the mere knowledge of their applicability to a given manifold, or even the mere fact of such applicability—is sufficient to constrain the imagination, or whether the imagination can always abstract from concepts known to apply to objects. In other words, it is not clear whether the freedom of the imagination is a negative condition, which obtains only if a given object presents or forces no concepts on the mind, or a positive condition, a power of the imagination by which it can actually free itself of the constraints of whatever concepts actually —and perhaps even obviously—apply to the given object (1997: 223).

Even if the quality of the freedom is an open question, as regards to its being reproductive or productive in action, Kant explicitly writes that

> If, now, imagination must in the judgment of taste be regarded in its freedom, then, to begin with, it is not taken as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an activity of its own (as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions) (*CJ, General Remark following* § 22).

In the following lines of this paragraph, Kant warns us that in its *free lawfulness*, the imagination accords with the understanding. This is not to say that the imagination is autonomous because it is not self-determined or it cannot generate laws like understanding. For this reason, the *free lawfulness* means "conformity to a law without a law". It is not an objective conformity but a subjective conformity of the imagination to understanding.

If we recall the productive imagination from the first *Critique*, we see that in its productive function, the imagination operates in an *a priori* fashion. Similarly in the third *Critique*, the productive imagination generates new forms- even if *how* it does so remains to be a relevant question. The application of the notion of the productive imagination becomes clear in the sections where Kant deals with arts and genius.

As concerns arts, Kant withdraws himself from the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment which claims that the aim of art is to contribute and indeed to provide the perfection of humanity (Kneller, 2007: 45). Kant's views on art are focused on the creation rather than the evaluation of art work. Yet this interest in the creation of art work is somehow "from outside, disengaged from immanent artistic process, and assessing it with "cold-blooded" detachment (Zammito, 1992: 131).

An art work is created by an artist/ genius who rules art. Art, nature and genius complement each other in Kant's definition of genius as follows: "Genius is the innate mental aptitude (*ingenium*) *through which* nature gives rule to the art" (*CJ* §168). The talent of an artist is an "innate productive faculty of the artist". From this productive faculty of artist either a *tasteful* or a *soulless* work emerges.

In the third *Critique* (section §49), the power of creation by the imagination (in its productive fashion) turns up as a

> (P)owerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature. It affords us entertainment where experience proves too commonplace; and we even use it to remodel experience, always following, no doubt, laws that are based on analogy, but still also following principles which have a higher seat in reason (and which are every whit as natural to us as those followed by the understanding in laying hold of empirical nature (*CJ* §49).

Hence, the power to create "new" forms is indeed to remodel the registered content of experience. Nature's given perceptions can be reorganized in a newly fashion by means of the employment of the productive imagination. And it is by this means we get a sense of our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical employment of the imagination), with the result that the

material can be borrowed by us from nature in accordance with that law, but be worked up by us into something else—namely, what surpasses nature (*CJ* § 49).[51]

An unnatural form can be grasped in this way and since its parts belong to nature; the production Kant talks about is more like a collage. At this point, what needs attention is not what the imagination can create but the free space to move that is bestowed upon the productive imagination in *CJ*. Even if it is not in an absolute sense, still we can talk about an extension in the function of the imagination.

The performance of the imagination in arts is seen fruitful by some scholars on the matters of social life. Jane Kneller, for instance, sees the creative power of the imagination as a potential source for the realization of the highest good that morality required and asks: "Why not suppose, then, that the imagination, when allowed freedom in aesthetic reflection to produce what Kant calls the Aesthetic Ideas ("inner intuitions"; (*CPJ*, §49, 5: 314 [182]), may thereby capable of "schematizing" rational ideas like that of the highest good?" (1990: 227).

Kneller believes that the power of the imagination in the third *Critique* deserves the adjective "transformative". She focuses on the notion of aesthetic Ideas and suggests that the imagination, similar to its role in poetry,— which is trying to "give sensible expression to rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation, and so on" (*CJ* §49)— can undertake a mission to realize the moral good. Yet, Kneller's attempt is not blind to what Kant said concerning the representation of "moral condition of society". She reminds the fact that Kant did say that morality can be symbolized by reflective judgment. However, it cannot be schematized in the form of sensible

51 Zammito believes that this passage "unquestionably talking about the noumenal freedom of the subject" (1992: 284).

representations that would correspond to a representation of the moral world. For Kneller, Kant overlooks the power of the imagination in its free play where it can "portray moral Ideas". The imagination only schematizes in the first *Critique* but Kneller, following Kant on arts, insists that an individual exhibition of the Ideal of beauty is accessible if artist can unite "pure ideas of reason" with a "very strong imagination". To this, she looks as a possibility to achieve a non-symbolic portrait of moral world.

If the Ideal of beauty can embody morality in individual human beings, then it should be equally possible (if not equally easy) to portray the social dimension of morality in the human community. If this is the case, then the imagination in its free reflection may be "applied" in the service of the ideal of beauty to enable us to believe in the possibility of the highest good as a result of human agency alone (Kneller, 2007: 55).

As for the reason why Kant does not give the chance to the imagination, Kneller focuses on two possibilities. First is that Kant favors the interest in the beauty of nature as a sign of good morals but as to the interest in beautiful arts, he believes that it is not enough to designate being moral. Simply put, Kant misses the opportunity to assess the possible link (1990: 229). The second possible reason is Kant's political views. Kneller writes that the notion of imaginative freedom would culminate in rebellion that Kant never favors, since he credits the motto of enlightenment that is, "Think for yourself!". According to Kneller, if it is the case that "humanity progress morally even through such "evils" as revolution, it would be plausible for him to hold that human imagination is equipped to "envision" this

progress, that is, to exhibit it in the imaginative Ideal of a moral human community" (1990: 230).[52]

Kneller's suggestion, with its ideal of moral human community, puts a lot on the shoulders of the imagination as a faculty. Kant would probably find the potential freedom and the power of the imaginative freedom problematic due to the different appearances of the imagination in his philosophical system. Imaginative freedom would be akin to fantasy in Kant's existing system. Moreover, Kneller's suggestion seems to overlook the problematic structure of moral politics. Within Kant's universalist frame, imagination would still be in the service of categorical imperative and thus, what it *envisions* as an ideal is necessarily pre-determined.
The next section will search out the most intriguing appearance of the imagination in the third Critique: imagination in the sublime.

3.2.3. 2.1. The Imagination in the Analytic of the Sublime

This section claims that a detailed analysis of the sublime in the *Analytic of the Sublime* reveals that the sublime remains an anti-humanist moment in Kant's humanist philosophy. To substantiate this claim, this section takes recourse to Makkreel's and Lyotard's analyses of the sublime in terms of the functions of the imagination.[53]

Makkreel's approach represents a transcendental reading of the imagination in the sublime whereas Lyotard's view on the matter exemplifies a poststructuralist

[52] Kneller's argument on the importance and potential of the creative imagination is not the only one. Crawford also sees the theory of the creative imagination as central to Kant's aesthetic theory.

[53] As Guyer reports, there are many different interpretations of sublime such as deconstructionist, psychological and ideological (1993: 188). See Paul de Man's "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant for instance. For a Marxist's approach see also George Hartley's Abyss of representation: Marxism and the Postmodern Sublime (especially chapter two where Heartley asserts that "our experiencing of the sublime as a spatial problem is due to our being at base creatures of discourse").

perspective. Makkreel elaborates the imagination in a strictly Kantian sense and in the end concludes that the imagination in the sublime addresses a transcendent metaphysics in terms of its use and appeal of the supersensible substrate for the unity of faculties. Lyotard's approach leads us to a new reading of both the imagination and the reflective judgment. Through examining the power of the imagination in the sublime Lyotard reveals the political potential of reflective judgments. Comparing this approach to Makkreel's, this study shall try to address a ground for reading the sublime as an anti-humanist moment.

Let us begin by assessing the possible usage or non-usage of staples of the imagination's acts i.e., synthesis, schematization, and categories in the third *Critique* are discussed in order to understand the imagination in the third Critique. On the applicability of the three syntheses in the third *Critique* there are different approaches.

Makkreel states that since aesthetic apprehension is non-determinant and subjective, the synthesis cannot be applied by the imagination. Thus, non-conceptual and reflective mode of thinking in aesthetic realm does not require any kind of synthesis. He writes that "Kant's text supplies no direct evidence for equating the aesthetic apprehension of the imagination with the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, for there is no mention of synthesis in his account of aesthetic apprehension without a concept" (1990: 50). Concluding his argument Makkreel asserts that synthesis should be excluded from the aesthetic apprehension since Kant himself writes in *CJ* (§22) that the imagination is not reproductive in the judgment of taste.[54]

[54] Makkreel also takes up the opposing views of Guyer and Allison. See Part two in his book Imagination and Interpretation in Kant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 45-67.

In contrast to this view, Guyer thinks that the imagination can synthesize a manifold without applying a concept and, in this sense it is possible for the imagination to work by excluding the last level of the three-fold synthesis, i.e. synthesis of recognition in a concept (1997: 85-6). However, according to Makkreel, claiming that aesthetic judgment entails synthesis in order to preserve the cognitive import of aesthetic judgments will culminate in placing the "aesthetic imagination in a pre-cognitive sphere, contributing, in effect, an unconsummated or inferior mode of knowledge" (1990: 51). Makkreel supports his argument by stating that Kant does not apply "experience" but "apprehension" in aesthetic realm, and thus the three syntheses are not required in aesthetic apprehension.[55]

Makkreel refuses the notion of synthesis for reflective thinking and instead he contends that the categories remain relevant to aesthetic thinking yet, they are used differently. The imagination takes up a role of the presentation and specification of the categories. In an attempt of performing a transcendental interpretation of the tasks and deeds of the imagination, he suggests that the imagination does not synthesize but "specify the categories reflectively to organize pure mental contents" (1990: 53).

The use of categories in judgments of taste has been a matter of discussion. Makkreel claims that in aesthetic comprehension mathematical categories are still relevant (1990: 71). He reports that Mary Gregor also contents that mathematical categories are applicable because we can still speak of measurableness and form of

[55] Makkreel's this argument is indeed a response to Crawford's claim (in Kant's Aesthetic Theory, 1974) which suggests that experience of art object is not different from the ordinary experience in application of the reproducibility of apprehension and therefore, it is problematic for Kant to argue that aesthetic imagination is not reproductive. For Makkreel, in the aesthetic realm it is not experience but apprehension is what is at stake. For details see page 50 in Makkreel.

the object in judgments of taste. Lewis White Beck writes that only mathematical but not dynamical categories are applicable.[56]

A sound criticism to Makkreel's transcendental approach is Lyotard's claim that the three syntheses are applicable and indeed are presupposed by the axiom of composition that is the basis of objects of experience. Makkreel assumes that reflective judgment is not precognitive at all but, following Kant, it necessarily relates cognition in general.[57] Conversely, Lyotard admits a pure subjective synthesis and the "comparisons" that are used to regroup the purely subjective syntheses by simple reflection. He follows Kant in the first *Critique* where Kant defines reflection (*reflexio*) as the "state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we are able to arrive at concepts" (*CPR* A260 B316). Reflection requires in every instant that we compare things. In its operation reflexive headings are four in number: identity/difference, inner/outer, determinable/ determination and agreement/ opposition (*CPR* A263 B319). These four headings are the core of reflective judgment and they are distinguished from categories by the fact that they do not present the object according to what constitutes its concept (quantity, reality), but only serve to describe in all its manifoldness the comparison of the representations which is prior to the concept of things (*CPR* A269 B325).

As for the other task of the imagination that is given by theoretical reason, namely schematizing Makkreel quite rightly draws our attention to the fact that

[56] See Gregor in "Aesthetic Form and Sensory Content" in *the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, ed., Richard Kennington, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985);p.195; and Beck in *Essays on Kant and Hume*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978), p.56.

[57] For Makkreel's detailed argument see p.50-6 and for Lyotard's claim see AS 105. Following the sentence, Makkreel writes that "the non-synthetic functions of the imagination developed in relation to aesthetic consciousness and reflective judgment disclose unexpected cognitive implications" (1990: 51).

schematization- since it is the act of subsuming intuitions under the concepts by means of schema of a concept provided by the imagination- is left out in the case of reflective judgments. Both Lyotard and Deleuze seem to agree with this point. Deleuze writes that imagination schematizes only when understanding presides, or when understanding has the legislative power. It schematizes only in the speculative interest. When the understanding takes up the speculative interest, that is, when it becomes determining, then and only then imagination is determined to schematize (Deleuze, 1984: 18).

Even if they differ deeply in their fundamental assertion relating to transcendental character of the aesthetic judgments and their place in the critical framework, according to both transcendentalist and poststructuralist approaches the role of imagination and its import in the third *Critique* deviates noticeably from that of the first *Critique*.

The difference between the transcendental and poststructuralist view of the sublime is exposed clearly in the action of the imagination concerning the sublime. The operation of the imagination in the aesthetic apprehension of the object called sublime needs attention and a delicate analysis due to the fact that Kant's examination of this operation carries the risk of an earthquake for the critical frame.

The key passage is where Kant writes that "Measurement of a space (as apprehension) is at the same time a description of it" and thus, it is an "objective movement in the imagination" and it is a "progression" (*CJ* §27). Yet, following these lines Kant continues by stating that when we consider "the comprehension of the manifold in the unity, not of thought, but of intuition, and consequently the comprehension of the successively apprehended parts *at one glance*," we register "a *retrogression* that removes the time-condition in the progression of the

imagination, and renders *co-existence* intuitable" (*CJ* §27). *Intuiting co-existence by removing the time condition* would mean one thing for Kant's system: disturbance of inner sense. According to Kant, "the time-series is a condition of the internal sense and of an intuition" and hence, by *rendering co-existence intuitable* by *removing the time condition*, the imagination performs subjectively and it "does violence to inner sense—a violence which must be proportionately more striking the greater quantum which the imagination comprehends in one intuition" (*CJ* §27).

To elaborate the effects of this alteration of function of time, we need to consult *CPR* again. As we already know the imagination and its transcendental use which is called the productive imagination is responsible from the production of *a priori* intuitions that govern the whole possible experience, i.e., time and space. Time is "the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state" (CPR A33/ B50). Under its authority, imagination intuits in a successive mode. For instance, in counting I am aware that each time I add a unit successively and by the *consciousness of the unity of synthesis* I know the number. The imagination operates in a successive or serial manner and this is given as the ordinary function of it in the first *Critique*. Conversely, a possibility for intuition of coexistence (*Zugleichsein*) is given in the section that deals with aesthetic apprehension of an object in the third Critique.

In *CPR* in the section where Kant deals with Third Analogy, the notion of coexistence proposes that "things are coexistent when in empirical intuition the perceptions of them can follow upon one another reciprocally" (*CPR* A211 B257). Hence, coexistence means that two manifolds of intuitions exist at one and the same time. However, due to the basic fact of the imagination that the appearances

are apprehended successively under the necessity of time, it is not possible to *intuit* two appearances at one time as perceptions. Instead, the imagination apprehends them in sequence and the understanding *comprehends* their relation as coexistence. Following from this, it is easy to derive that coexistence is a link not intuitable but only comprehensible, thus in Kant's theoretical reason it is from a higher degree and can have nothing to do with the imagination.

Nevertheless, while the apprehension in the first *Critique* is necessarily successive, in the third *Critique*, the imagination can cease the progressive sequence of time and enable the intuition of coexistence. According to Kant, this is not a new function of the imagination. What we witness in the estimation of an object of nature is a *subjective movement* of the imagination. The intuition of co-existence is a violation with respect to the inner sense which is conditioned by time sequence. Yet, Kant writes that the attempt of the imagination to apprehend a magnitude in a single intuition is a "mode of representation, which, subjectively considered, is contra-final, but, objectively, is requisite for the estimation of magnitude, and is consequently final" (*CJ* § 27). Therefore, in the subjective movement, the annihilation of inner sense is unavoidable for the sake of intuiting an object of nature that evokes the sublime feeling in us.

On this notion of violation Makkreel makes a striking remark. He states that the violation of inner sense by the imagination is a "radical claim" that could mean to suggest a "mode of intuition that transcends time, then this would mean a violation of the critical framework" (1984: 308). This claim itself can be interpreted very well as radical depending on Kant's views on time. He clearly states that all appearances are subject to time and it is time that can "determine them as existing in a twofold manner, either as in succession to one another or as

coexisting" (*CPR*, Proof of First Analogy). This fact is repeated in several sections by Kant and it is hard not to take the "violation of inner sense" as a violation to the critical thinking.

Makkreel himself also does not favor this option. He prefers to interpret the "violation of internal sense" as a "possibility of negating mathematical or linear form of time".

Makkreel supports his argument by suggesting two kinds of corrections in the translation of some concepts. The first one is that the word *Augenblick* which is translated as "comprehension in a glance" (by Bernard and Meredith) should rather be translated as "comprehension in an instant". Following Kant in *CPR*, Makkreel claims that the instant is a limit point for time line. Thus, the violation of inner sense by the imagination cannot be interpreted as transcendence but rather as a limitation of time. According to Makkreel, this limitation and the instant that represents it enable aesthetic estimation (1984: 308).

Makkreel's remark is worth noting because it addresses the sublime as a sign of the possibility of abandoning the linear kind of thinking. This remark is favorable because it can mean that the third *Critique* and the judgment-in their very mechanism- deny the linear or serial apprehension. This implies an alternative kind of thinking or comprehension. In such an alternative comprehension, a complex net of relation can be comprehended as co-existent in a non-linear fashion.

However, this thesis does not read the regress of the imagination as the "basis for an integration of the faculties", even though the idea of breaking from the perception of the linear time is alluring. Yet, Makkreel reads the regress of the imagination and the supersensible substrate implied in this moment as a "transcendental idea that allows us to assume the mutual purposiveness of nature

and the subject in aesthetic judgments" and in this sense, the "sublime points to the possibility of an overall integration of our faculties of the mind (1990: 83).

The main reason why Makkreel admits a unity between the faculties of the mind is that he maintains that the aesthetic judgments are grounded in what Kant calls the "supersensible substrate of humanity" and through this concept of humanity in aesthetic judgments "form is elicited from the content of experience, rather than imposing upon it" (1990: 86).

According to this schema, the sublime is unveils the relationship between the supersensible substrate of humanity and aesthetic judgments. A presupposed, thus, transcendental unity between the faculties is exposed best by aesthetic comprehension, since it signals a "unity between the finite and the infinite that characterizes the human subject in the feeling of the sublime" (Makkreel, 1990: 87).

On the opposite side, Lyotard in his close reading of the sublime presents a dazzling alternative analysis of it. He contends that the judgment of taste *promises* subject whereas the sublime *threatens* it. In the judgment of the beautiful, by the harmony of the faculties the subject is promised. Whereas in the sublime, the very conflict of reason and the imagination *threatens* the unity of faculties in such an extraordinary way—despite the fact that in this cruel conflict, in the end the subject appreciates the moral law within himself or herself. The pith of this remark lies in its repercussions for the Kantian subject. Viewed as above the subject is never given but promised.

In this section, I tried to emphasized that Kant's aesthetic theory can be read both from a transcendental and poststructuralist perspective.[58] If the sublime is handled in a transcendental manner, even if the transcendental approach provides a support for Kant's intention for the wholeness of his critical philosophy, the possible political theory or approach that would flourish within this structure is necessarily moral if not unitary, universal or prescriptive. On the opposite side, what Lyotard proposes seems radical for Kant in terms of the relation of faculties. It would not be surprising to find that Kant would be upset in the face of such a suggestion. Yet, Lyotard in his close reading of the sublime presents a dazzling alternative analysis of it. His analysis is significant for this study especially with regard to what it proposes for the subject.

3.3. The Sublime and Moral Feeling

The objective of this section is to review the moral attitude of the mind evoked in the sublime and to underlie the distinctness of the sublime from the moral realm. The relation between morality and the sublime is controversial and, because Kant never gives a proper account of it, there are different interpretations regarding this relation. For instance, Crowther contends that the notion of sublimity is grounded on moral ideas. Indeed, he writes: "Kant's first formulation of his mature theory of the sublime is to be found in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1795) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788)" (1989:19). Furthermore, he contends that Kant "reduces sublime to a kind of indirect moral experience" (1989:166).

[58] I am well aware of the fact that Lyotard is not the only post-structuralist thinker who has written on sublime. Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Paul de Man and John Sallis and several other names can be raised in such a discussion. I must declare that I do not intentionally exclude their remarks. However, these remarks are peripheral to the present discussion. For the sake of simplicity, I shall merely refer to their arguments *en passant* in relevant sections.

Robert Clewis is another scholar who attributes a significant value to this relation. Admitting that he diverges from the traditional view on the Kantian sublimity, he claims that "moral sublime" might be a third kind of sublime other than the mathematically and the dynamically sublime. Clewis indicates that Kant himself gives a sign of moral sublime when he writes that the *sublime represents the moral law aesthetically better than the beautiful does*. He defines moral sublime as

> the effect on consciousness when the moral law, or some representation or embodiment thereof, is observed or perceived aesthetically rather than from a practical perspective. That is, an experience of the sublime is one of the moral sublime if and only if something moral, such as an idea, object, mental state, act, event or person, elicits the sublime in an aesthetic judge who observes, imagines, hears or somehow reflects on that object (2009: 84).

According to Clewis, the moral sublime leads the subject to reflect on freedom more directly than the other two types of the sublime do. What Clewis suggests with moral sublime is interesting in the sense that it is defined as a reaction to a mental state with moral content. For instance, according to Clewis, "responding aesthetically to the mental state of a righteous anger" can be an example pf the moral sublime (2009: 84).

It is well known that both modes of the sublime imply a particular nexus with reason. The relation experienced is complex because a) with respect to the leap of the imagination, the hierarchy of the faculties is somehow violated and, b) as a result of the encounter of the imagination with reason's enforcement, the subject discerns the existence of a *supersensible* faculty that can *transcend every standard of sense*. The more complex matter is the relation of this newfangled supersensible faculty with the moral end of reason because we know that it is not

quite equal to reason. Yet, somehow it supports the awakening of the subject to the moral ideas.

When Kant speaks of the supersensible faculty he speaks of some faculty that he does not often mention. He distinguishes this faculty from reason and writes that it cannot be determined. Consequently, it is not something that we can *cognize*. Yet, we can *think* it as being evoked in mind by the imagination's reaching its limit in the act of aesthetic estimation of an object. In sublime reason compels the imagination to estimate the object in *singular intuition*. This command is not peculiar to aesthetic estimation. We know from the *CPR* that reason always craves for the *absolute*. Reaching its limit when aesthetically estimating the object, the imagination is strained. In the case of the mathematical sublime, the strain of the imagination is *extension* and, in the dynamical sublime it is the *might*. Now, ambiguity of the relationship between reason and this supersensible faculty appears when Kant writes that the feeling of the sublime requires an "attitude of mind resembling the moral" (*CJ*, General Remark following §29). Although both share the characteristic of "exceeding the realm of nature", Kant never states that they are the same. Indeed, he makes a quick explanation to ward off the doubt that even the feeling of beautiful resembles the moral feeling because of the fact that the "immediate pleasure in the beautiful in nature presupposes and cultivates a certain *liberality* of thought". However, Kant reminds us that in the case of the beautiful, the represented freedom is like that of a *play* rather than the freedom of "exercising a law-ordained *function*" in view of the fact that the only freedom allowed by the law is the freedom of reason to "impose its dominion upon sensibility" (*CJ*, General Remark following §29).

This is a minute point with an intense content. Kant reminds us that the enthusiastic notion of *free play* between the faculties can be deceitful and to claim for the autonomy of the imagination grounded on this notion would not be quite incorrect. Since, in the case of cognitive judgments, the faculty of the imagination is always bounded by the understanding whereas in that of the judgment of the sublime by reason. Yet, the position or the mode of this faculty slightly changes in the sublime following the fact that it represents the dominion of reason. To put it in Kant's words, the dominion of reason is "exercised through the imagination itself as an instrument of reason" (*CJ*, General Remark following §29).

In the act of estimation the particular call by the imagination in vain is a call for reason to step forward. This takes place when the enlargement of empirical thought is attained by the imagination: "Reason inevitably steps forward as the faculty concerned with the independence of the absolute totality, and calls forth the effort of the mind, unavailing though it be, to make the representation of sense adequate to this totality" (*CJ*, General Remark following §29).

In another passage, Kant interprets the intrusion of reason as the revelation of the moral law to us aesthetically. In the end, a reference to the supersensible faculty is also revealed. To put it another way, the "intellectual and intrinsically final (moral) good" is revealed by the sublime.[59]

In order to see the details of the relationship of reason (as the faculty of Ideas) and the sublime, it is necessary that we examine the modes of the sublime in terms of this relation. Firstly, we recall that each mode of the sublime refers to the relation of the imagination with different aspects of reason. The mathematically sublime is related to the faculty of cognition (theoretical reason) and, the

[59] Kant thinks that rather than beautiful, the moral law can be represented by the sublime.

dynamically sublime is related to that of desire (practical reason). In the former, the imagination fails to estimate the magnitude of an object which evokes the Idea of the absolute whole. Reason demands this idea to be represented -in the form of a *totality* of the intuitions given by apprehension (the primary function of the imagination). Now, if we recall that Ideas are the "concepts of pure reason, in that they vision all knowledge gained experience as being determined through an absolute totality of conditions" (*CPR* A327 B383), then, the failure of the imagination to represent the Ideas which are always already present to reason is not a surprise either for the imagination or reason. Yet, reason still demands. In this insistent desire of reason, we are to find the reflective judgment that appears as a complement to theoretical reason. It is complementary to the whole critical philosophy in that it reconciles the two distinct faculties of the mind in a non-cognitive and temporary way. This capacity of reflective thought will be revisited in the later parts of the study.

In the dynamically sublime, this time the might or the power of the object is troublesome for estimation. In this particular difficulty, the imagination strives for representing the form of the object in one single intuition. Through this struggle

> "[t]he proper mental mood for a feeling of the sublime postulates the mind's susceptibility for ideas, since it is precisely in the failure of nature to attain to these—and consequently only under presupposition of this susceptibility and of the straining of the imagination to use nature as a schema for ideas—that there is something forbidding to sensibility, but which, for all that, has an attraction for us, arising from the fact of its being a dominion which reason exercises over sensibility with a view to extending it to the requirements of its own realm (the practical) and letting it look out beyond itself into the infinite, which for it is an abyss. In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which, thanks to preparatory culture, we call the sublime, merely strikes the untutored man as terrifying (*CJ* §29).

According to this, in the absence of the presupposition that the feeling of the sublime necessarily depends on the moral ideas, therefore, the practical reason,

the sublime appears as an appalling experience for the subject by making him feel miserable and stressed. Yet, following Kant's view that the feeling of the sublime changes from *repulsion* to *attraction*, we may well say that this feeling of terror is somehow the next feeling of the sublime that is followed by attraction.[60]

For the sake of the clarity of the argument, we must ask why we need this dependence on moral ideas in the sublime experience to ease the stirred soul. The sublime is basically experienced in an instant[61] and within this instant first, the imagination fails to estimate and then, reason supports it to restore the order by enabling the imagination to proceed to its limit. When the maximum capacity of the imagination is not enough, in other words, when the imagination reaches its cognitive limit (or absolute limit), a sensation evokes pertaining to which we can speak of the tendency to feel or hear the call of the moral ideas. This means that in imagination's failure the subject feels pathetic whereas in the face of the absolute idea, it develops an awareness of the might of reason which it can never grasp cognitively.

In this particular awareness, an emphasis or insinuation is made within the enthusiasm of this experience: The mind entails a faculty that *transcends* "every standard of sense" and the sublime appears as a "mere capacity of thinking which evidences" this fact (*CJ* §25). The phrase "mere capacity" of thinking deserves attention in the sense of its possible relation to the reflective thinking. It seems that this mere capacity signals a new aspect of the mind. Recalling that unlike beautiful,

[60] Indeed Kant mentions the feelings of *repulsion* and *attraction* as arising *simultaneously* rather than successively (*CJ* §27).

[61] I use the word *instant* in order to indicate that I do not presuppose duration between the attempt of imagination and the intrusion of reason in the mentioned state. To put it another way, I think that their successive appearance can be ignored or better should be treated as if coexistent.

the sublime does not have an object, we can say that it is indeed such a capacity that it can operate without an object.

Parallel to the feeling of pain and pleasure in the subject, Kant mentions about a moral feeling that arises in the sublime. Now, we know that Kant equates the moral feeling with the respect for the moral law (Guyer, 1993: 358). As the respect for the moral law, the moral feeling is defined as an *interest in* acting accordingly as the law commands (Kneller, 2007: 64). However, the feeling of the sublime "does not produce an interest and thus, does not immediately involve *agency*, or the incorporation of an incentive into a maxim of action" (Clewis, 2009: 133).

According to Clewis, "practical reason naturally takes an interest in what can (indirectly) promote morality by revealing freedom. Reason's interest in sublimity thus derives from the latter's basis in human freedom" (2009: 135). This is another way of saying that wherever the notion of freedom appears we have to think of the practical freedom as its source. Yet, the moral law is determined and the subject is free as long as s/he acts in accordance with this law. Different from the sublime, the good is grounded on a conceptual base. The good and thus, the moral behavior come with a determined kind of freedom, limits of which is determined by the supreme moral law. But, the sublime benefits from the advantage of standing between the sensibility and the practical reason—as Kant states so for the faculty of judgment and its applications. The reason and its ideas receive a reference that makes the subject rediscover the fact that reason dominates sensibility. This is the basic or cursory definition of the state in the sublime.

On the matter of the relation of the sublime feeling to the moral feeling, Lyotard has a striking argument. He accepts the affinity of the moral feeling and

the sublime considering the absolute idea (idea of causality) in the dynamically sublime, but he also contends that Kant should have added the faculty of desire to the discussion of the sublime. He states that Kant addressed this relation many times, but somehow he acted shy to assert it and also that such a move may have enabled the reader to understand the foundation and the power of the sublime in a better way (*AS* 118).

Respect is the moral feeling that is felt in the sublime. Yet, no doubt Kant does not intend to equate it with the sublime feeling. Lyotard, as many Kant scholars, does not suggest otherwise and he emphasizes this difference as follows: "The sublime feeling is an emotion, close to unreason, which forces thought to the extremes of pleasure and displeasure, from joyous exaltation to terror; the sublime feeling is as tightly strung between ultraviolet and infrared as respect is white" (*AS* 228). According to Zammito, respect is felt because moral feeling "attends the subjective supersensible directly, while the sublime involves a "subreption", whereby it seeks it in an object of nature" (1992: 300). What makes the sublime unique for this study is that it basically commences as a simple estimation of an object and ends in the revelation of feeling of a supersensible faculty which transcends every standard of sense. Its potential to reach out the moral ideas and respect is also another significant feature of the Kantian sublime. In its Kantian rendition, it is a though but in the end a positive experience because it reminds to the subject the power of faculties of human mind with respect to and in the face of sheer power of nature.

The reference of the sublime to a supersensible faculty, moral ideas or the feeling of respect is abandoned, when in the 20th century the sublime is recalled in descriptions the extreme violence perpetrated on human beings in the social

disasters such as the Holocaust and Hiroshima. As we will see, the contemporary sublime is a morally crippled experience. However, interestingly, the lost moral connection of the sublime is supplied by a new kind of experience of cosmopolitan thinking. This study entitles this new experience "cosmopolitan aesthetic experience". In the next chapter the relationship of the classical sublime and this cosmopolitan aesthetic experience will be elaborated. But before this, there are other inferences to make on the sublime while it is still in its Kantian rendition.

3.4. Anti-humanist Sublime

> If he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master…But this master will also be an animal who needs a master
> Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose"

> To breed an animal with the right to make promises—
> is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself
> in the case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man?
> - Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals II, § 1

> I am myself by inclination a seeker after truth. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge and a restless desire to advance it, as well as a satisfaction in every step I take. There was a time when I thought that this alone could constitute the honor of mankind, and I despised the common man who knows nothing. Rousseau set me right. This pretended superiority vanished and I learned to respect humanity. I should consider myself far more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that one consideration alone gives worth to all others, namely, to establish the rights of man. (Remarks on the "Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime" XX: 44)

This section analyzes the sublime in terms of its value as an experience and evaluates the possibility of a theory of the sublime. The sublime is a complex and almost a cryptic moment in a system like Kant's. It is such that the fundamentals of the Kantian philosophy cannot remain untouched when we dare to analyze it. The notion of time as well as the binary couples like internal/ external; phenomenon/ noumenon; and subject/ object lingers in an odd position in this aesthetic "experience".

We know that from Hegel and on, the analytical and thus, Kant's strictly positive attitude has been severely criticized by many thinkers (Nietzsche, Adorno, Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida). His restless attempt to delineate the limits of knowledge left him in a world firmly described on its positive side but haunted by a negative existence i.e., noumenon. Despite the incredible burden that the notion of limit puts on his shoulders, Kant denies the knowledge of the existence of a "beyond". The divided world of human being is defined by the very conditions of the appearances of some unknown entity. His insistent belief in epistemology instead of ontology drags Kant into a problem in which he occasionally confronts the question of the position of noumenon in his philosophy. His perspective does not let him to evaluate the possible value of the notions like limit, externality and negativity. Considering that especially the notion of negativity has almost driven the whole history of thought after Hegel, it is obvious that Kant can only have little to say in politics driven by this notion. The modern mind and its appeal to universalistic and descriptive analytical frame in politics have been abandoned long before. Therefore, a return to Kant's suggestions that were promising back then is an only hopeful try. Yet, in a meticulous attempt, the notions like negativity, non-identity, difference and plurality can be traced back to the Kantian aesthetics. With this belief in mind, it is again the Kantian aesthetics where we can find a ground to discuss the relationship of subject-object in a non-cognitive "experience" that will help thinking in a different way than the universalistic perspective. In this sense, the Kantian sublime offers and affords a non-Kantian reading that would enable Kant to return to political discussions from a very different angle than he is identified with in his life time. Since the progress of history of thought is towards a

more particularistic mode, a rereading of the Kantian sublime may suggest an alternative thinking.

The subject of the first and the second critiques are always defined in terms of *a priori* elements of human mind such as inner sense, categories and many other transcendental principles in the first *Critique*. The freedom of subject is determined with respect to the categorical imperative and its voluntary realization in subject's deeds.[62] Until the third *Critique* the subject has experienced himself or herself in an objective manner. In this sense, it can clearly be stated that for Kant *aesthetic* equals to the same thing as *subjective*.

In Kant's aesthetics, the mental state of subject in relation to sheer form of the object culminates in a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This does not indicate a new territory but a change in the perspective that has been objective so far. The aesthetic and thus, subjective state requires its own mode of thinking which is declared to be reflective. It is significant to recall once more that although the aesthetic experience differ from ordinary experience with respect to the interactions of the faculties of mind, similar to the ordinary cognitive experience, in aesthetic experience objects of experience are still treated as having a *form* and *content*. However, in aesthetic and hence, reflective thinking, we are only interested in the form but not by any means in the content which necessarily calls for the categories of understanding. In this sense, the encounter with an object in aesthetic experience entails a concern merely on the *form* of the object. The result of this reflective mode for subject is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure that paves the way for a judgment of taste.

[62] "Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object" (*CPR* A546-7 B574-5).

The sense of negativity we pursue here is taken as it appears in the Kantian texts; from a perspective that entails temporary *disunion* of faculties, *failure* of the imagination, and ceaseless desire of reason (when it demands the representation of an idea) and, the feeling of *pain* and *fear*. It is significant to note that for Kant these discontinuities or short-circuits are in service of a strictly positive, thus, determinate aim in the end. In other words, disunion or failure does not remain as such but they are always final for a higher end: Unity.

As we have seen earlier, these negative and upsetting chains of events are in continuity with their opposites by the help of a supersensible substrate/ faculty in us. Recall that this supersensible is the principle of humanity and, the negative side of the whole sublime instance is final for human mind within the perspective of this principle. In the end, interpreted as above, the sublime is like a masochist festival in which as subjects we cherish our mental capacities.

In the encounter of an Idea of reason either in the form of absolute whole or absolute causality, our mental capacities meet and *know* their own finite limits and *feel* the beyond. As a result of this- inability of knowing but- feeling, we appreciate our capacities as human beings by developing an awareness of the supersensible substrate of humanity. But we must not forget that the short circuit of the imagination is resolved by the violation of inner sense. Kant never gives a clear account of his notion of inner sense. However, he writes that inner sense is related to the temporal relations of the representations. Thus, it is related to time which is the "form of inner space" and thus, "the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever" (CPR A33/ B49). Following this, when the imagination extends itself in the sublime, it damages time and its successive structure. It is only after the inner sense is annihilated that the imagination is capable of intuiting co-existence. This

point is significant in reading the sublime in a quite different fashion than it is suggested.

In the moment of crisis, which is not due to the dissemination of faculties but the difficulty to relate them, the only way out is to destruct the ordinary structure of inner sense which progresses successively. We know that inner sense is the very basis of the subject since it is the governor of the possible sense experience and *a priori* structure of mind. Furthermore, we know very well that neither the first nor the second *Critique* can admit or even imagine of a violation of inner sense. Yet, in the third *Critique*, annihilation of inner sense is the only way to reconcile the faculties under the rubric of a supersensible substrate. In this sense, we can rediscover the fact that in the objective aspect of experience that covers the experience of the form (mathematical categories) and the content (dynamical categories), the inner sense operates necessarily and non-alternatively in a successive manner. Whereas in the aesthetic, thus, subjective experience, the ordinary (objective) operations, the inner sense, the imagination and even reason are derailed.

It would not be too much to argue that the subject of Kant's critical philosophy cannot be separated from *a priori* elements of mind. As *a priori* intuitions, space and time surely are the fundamentals of empirical experience together with pure concepts of understanding, i.e. categories. Following Kant from the first to the second *Critique*, it is detectable that these *a priori* elements govern theoretical and practical aspects of human subject. If man or human subject is defined with regard to faculties of the mind in their strictly determined ways of functioning in the first *Critique*, which is the case here, then what the sublime depicts in relation to the state of subject is inhuman or anti-human.

The central significance of this implication is that Kant is not a philosopher who could tolerate a transcendent moment in his system and so, when the sublime is introduced as a failure of faculties and a moment of silence in the eyes of objective frame, it is the principle of humanity that comes to rescue the Kantian frame.

The problem of the philosopher is his absolute rejection of a possibility of transcendence in the immanency of his system. In other words, he does not acknowledge the possibility that the sublime might be a transcendent moment in the whole Kantian philosophy because it is in its very structure non-objective. It is not surprising to notice that if Kant would ever to consider this possibility he might have used the word transcendental instead of transcendent. But in that case, the sublime should have been determinable or at least graspable by faculties of mind. Yet, the sublime is again a wet blanket. The result is: Kant presents a principle of humanity in order to reconcile with the inhuman character of the sublime and the implications it carries. This "transcendental" principle supplies the union of realms.

It is already stated that in this particular study, two main stream readings of the sublime is of interest. It can either be read by keeping the transcendental frame in which the failure of faculties is interpreted as final for encountering the faculty supersensible (in the form of principle of humanity) and the union of faculties as supplied by reflective judgment. Or a poststructuralist stand can be taken and it can be argued that the disunion of faculties is the disclosure of their being distinct from each other in such a way that they cannot be united at all.

The political ground that is sought for today cannot flourish from the first approach since it suggests that we should read the sublime in affinity with the

respect for moral law. Hence, in this picture a prescriptive and thus, Universalist politics would necessarily be arrived at.

It is the second approach that seems to promise for fruitful grounds for an alternative political thought. Employing Lyotard, this opportunity can be found in the mode of reflective thinking and in the implications of the sublime for the Kantian subject.

If we consider that the Kantian subject is defined unavoidably referring to its mental capacities, then the failure of the imagination and it's doing violence to inner sense address a pre-cognitive and thus, an anti-humanist instant. To make one thing clear, the sublime is not issued here as an authentic experience in which subject externalizes itself. Neither it indicates a *transcendent* place/ space/ area that is discovered. In the sublime, thinking *reflects* on itself by means of its reflective capacity. The mind has to reflect on itself in its inability to represent either the size or might of nature or on its awareness of the failure of the capacity to represent. Sublime is not addressed here as an authentic experience but still in the end, the failure of the imagination, awareness of mind's power, the feeling pain and pleasure all address an *experience*.

Kant does not suppose a "before" of the subject. The subject cannot be separated from the a priori transcendental elements that are, space and time. Moreover, through inner sense we intuit ourselves and our inner states and thus, the subject without inner sense is not subject at all. Kant writes that

> whatever the origins of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense (*CPR* A98–9).

Then, when we are talking about the annihilation of inner sense or failure of the faculty of representation, we cannot simply ignore these unusual alterations

assuming that they are final for some supersensible substrate without falling into the trap of metaphysics.[63] To put it another way, since in the two other critiques Kant designates different and new divisions of human mind, form the third *Critique* a reader familiar with the Kantian system would expect that the sublime discloses a potential capacity which stays dormant. It would be a capacity to *feel* existence of the moral which is intelligible but cannot be *known*. However, the sublime unearths both the weakness and the power of subject with respect to the supreme moral law. In a sense what the sublime describes is a painful encounter with an Idea of reason which cannot be represented by the faculty of representation. The most painful moment of this uncanny experience is mediated by a supersensible faculty which appears in the form of supersensible substrate of humanity. In this way, the conflict or dissensus of the faculties of reason and the imagination is resolved. With recourse to the supersensible substrate which is a transcendent authority that cannot be *know*n, the union of the faculties is assured.

The claim of the present study that the sublime is anti-humanist moment in Kant's philosophy does not mean that the sublime insinuates a "going beyond the human condition". Such a claim would inescapably culminate in metaphysics because for Kant the human condition which defines and limits human subject cannot be surmounted or trespassed. Therefore, sublime does not address a *beyond* or *beneath* of human condition.

What do we mean by anti-humanist, then? It is useful to remind that Kant's subject is necessarily *rational* in its cognitive self. In other words, rational reason

[63] This line of thought is supported by Guyer (1997) and also by Zimmerman (1963). They both claimed that Kant's application of supersensible faculty is a sign of his attempt to find a metaphysical ground for the judgment of taste. Indeed, for Zimmerman metaphysics of Kant is much more central as writes: "it is essential to bear in mind the metaphysical significance of aesthetic experience in order to make sense out of the so-called "four moments" of aesthetic judgment" (1963:333).

presents itself in the form of two complementary realms; theoretical and practical. If we consider that the sublime belongs to neither, then the very experience of the sublime seems questionable. Since it is an aesthetic experience, it is not exactly a rational or cognitive experience.

According to Kant, experience is not something "given". We know that "all cognition commences *with* experience but it does not all…rise *from* experience" (*CPR* B1). It means that in Kant's rendition of the notion, experience is grounded on both the raw sensory data received by sensibility and the active process that our mind performs on this raw data by its *a priori* laws. An ordinary sense experience, thus, is triggered by the raw sense data supplied passively by sensibility and the cognition of the objects of sense is reached at the end of an *a priori* process of the understanding. Yet, in the sublime the raw data supplied by sensibility transcends any measure that human imagination has. The trigger of the sense experience in the sublime is nature's sheer might or size which disrupts the ordinary order of the faculties of the mind. Moreover, we know that in the sublime no knowledge of the object is produced by understanding and its *a priori* laws, since the sublime belongs to reflective thinking. It is pre-conceptual and it describes a reflective performance of the mind which is enacted on the mind itself. Again no knowledge arises from this self-reflection. In this sense, we can either call it pre-cognitive or non-cognitive but one thing is clear that the sublime does not belong to the realm of cognition. It is this sense of the sublime that this present study calls non-objective, non-experience. In the very act of reflecting on itself, the human mind awakens to the very power of itself which implies the world-constitutive power of human mind. Yet, it is significant to note that the sublime is also the experience where subject *feels* the *incomprehensibility of moral law*. Therefore, the sublime does not

make itself equal to the allowed comprehension of this incomprehensibility. It is not a claim for transcendence or any kind of externality in a metaphysical way since a metaphysical postulation or principle is sure of the existence of its object as an empirical reality. Assuming otherwise would be claiming that the imagination trespasses the very border of phenomenon vs. noumenon distinction.

According to Guyer, for Kant the popular idea of the sublime is a means to "symbolize the secure dominance of reason in human life" and, furthermore, the limits that are set and experienced in the sublime do not restrain the comprehension but indeed they "reveal the extent of reason's power of comprehension (1993: 191).[64] Now, it is this "secure dominance" and the assumed infinite power of reason is what is problematic as we have seen earlier. The sublime, as long as it is read as the encounter with the incomprehensibility of the moral law falls into the trap of metaphysics. Furthermore, to attribute a metaphysical content to the sublime for the sake of suggesting a new realm for political thinking would be a futile attempt. Now, then what does it mean to claim that the sublime is anti-human in its pre-conceptual and thus pre-categorical mode?

Paul de Man, in his article "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant" asserts that the sublime can neither be a transcendental nor metaphysical principle, since it is a linguistic principle. To assume otherwise means to lose the "inherent coherence" and to resolve in the "aporias of intellectual and sensory experience" (1995: 342). The pith of this remark is that the sublime, viewed as a linguistic principle, can supply an opportunity in language in which we can interrogate the very concept of man. The insistence of this present study on the anti-humanist

[64] Guyer writes these lines in opposition to psychoanalytical and ideological interpretations of the sublime. In the former interpretations, he writes, sublime is seen a "symbol of the inevitable manifestation of the irrational forces suppressed by the superego of human rationality" and in the latter it is a "tool to teach the individual fear and submission…" (1993: 189-90).

aspect of the sublime mostly grounds on this possibility. The sublime and its anti-humanist feature are supported by its aesthetic character. The deviations of limits and abilities of the faculties can easily be attributed to the aesthetic. Yet, left at this point the Kantian aesthetics is doomed to be analyzed through the first and second Critiques. Thus, the third *Critique* can rightly be comprehended necessarily with regard to or in comparison to the cognitive or practical realms, since Kant himself explicitly indicates that judgment is expected to supply the unity of kingdom of ends in its mediating fashion. If we are to understand the aesthetic as absolute or as bearing no relation to anything other than itself, then we must attribute new functions and even names for the faculties involved. But if we are to understand it merely appealing to the first and second Critiques, in other words, to the objective and practical realms then, the clashes of functions or operations of the faculties that are involved is inevitable. In this sense, the Kantian aesthetics bears serious problems. The most vital point to emphasize must be that aesthetics necessarily implies subjective or subject related state in aforementioned aesthetic encounters. If we are to define an aesthetic experience different from ordinary experience defined in the first *Critique*, then in a Kantian universe we have to describe the transcendental conditions of this experience. Since there is no sufficient evidence to claim so, we have to admit that aesthetic "experience" is a non-cognitive "experience" of the faculties of mind. It is a stretching of the mind in the form of reflective thinking. It is in no way a permanent elevation (*Erhebung*) above the limit of sensibility or as an experience of a transcendent space. In this very subjective state, the sublime insinuates an anti-human, non-cognitive, non-objective non-experience. The anti-humanist aspect of the sublime corresponds to this moment of ectasis.

The Kantian sublime in its negative and challenging aspect opens the way for a contemporary approach to Kant's philosophy for its possible political import. Within its unique position in the Kantian system, the sublime in its negative mode of pleasure offers a path to follow in today's political discussions. This is not to say that Kant had already shown the way long before. What is intended here is that in the light of the alterations in world history, the political discussions, for instance, those on democracy, have long been influenced and somehow regulated by the notions of negativity, non-identity and plurality rather than some analytical and historical theories such as the social contract theory. In such a complex web of discussions, Kant's political essays written in the Age of Enlightenment are unfortunately inconclusive in their prescriptive character. The most significant and, in our case, efficient aspect of the sublime lies in the possibility of reflecting aesthetically.

In the next chapter, two representatives of the interest in the third *Critique*'s political potential will be visited. Both Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard suggest invaluable interpretations of reflective thinking and its possible role in future politics.

CHAPTER IV:

POLITICAL IMPORT OF THE KANTIAN AESTHETICS

Kant draws a sharp distinction between the disinterested aesthetic judgment and the impartial political judgment. The classical Kantian approach for impartial political judgment lost its only possibility to be realized- or rather became futile- after 1945. Yet, Kant's aesthetics has become a popular theoretical framework in criticism.

A significant early recourse to the Kantian aesthetics is performed by Hannah Arendt. She evaluated the judgment of beautiful in its many potential aspects through aesthetical to political. She decided to take the judgment of beautiful as a model for political judgment. The probable reason why she did not appropriate the judgment of the sublime instead of the beautiful might be that the beautiful applies to common sense which is for Arendt, a vital element in obtaining a consensus that would culminate in a just society. In this sense the judgments of the beautiful presuppose *communicability*. Whereas the sublime is strictly a subjective experience of the agent in solitude and in the end of which a respect to moral law arises. Since Arendt desires to derive a political approach from the judgments of taste for Kant, she focuses on the judgments of the beautiful.

Before focusing on the political repercussions of the sublime, it is useful to visit Arendt's thoughts on the Kantian aesthetics. Her attempt is significant because it emphasized the futility of laws constituted according to universals. The way

Arendt discusses the action of judging helps comprehend the urge to find a universal-free principle for politics. Hence, Arendt's analysis of the judgment of taste and that of beautiful in particular is crucial, even if the main focus of the present study is the sublime.

As to Kant's theory of the sublime, following 1945s, it has abandoned its classical Kantian load, the reference to moral law. And it has begun to refer to the horrific historical violence acts. Initially, the Holocaust and Hiroshima are called the sublime. Such a reading is suggested by some poststructuralist thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard and Theodor Adorno. The present study will take recourse to Lyotard's approach to the sublime. This approach entails a meticulous analysis of the sublime as an experience and a moment in Kant's philosophy. Lyotard evaluates the sublime in terms of its possible ontological and epistemological repercussions for Kant's Critical philosophy.

The notion of the sublime has been taken up not only by philosophers. In contemporary discussions in the field of international relations the concept is used to refer international terror attacks. A recent example known as 9/11 is the attack on the World Trade Center on September 2011. These specific examples will be considered in the last chapter, thus, the present chapter will evaluate the approaches that investigate the possibility of a sublime politics or a politics of the sublime.

4.1. Freed *Doxa*: Hannah Arendt on Judgment of Taste

Hannah Arendt was one of the influential political theorists of the 20th century. She is well known with her remarkable claims on totalitarianism, anti-Semitism and crimes against humanity. She writes that her work and essays aim to:

> …gain experience in *how* to think; they do not contain prescriptions on what to think or which truths to hold. Least of all do they intend to retie the

> broken thread of tradition or to invent some newfangled surrogates with which to fill the gap between past and future. Throughout these exercises the problem of truth is kept in abeyance; the concern is solely with how to move in this gap–the only region perhaps where the truth eventually will appear (1993: 14).

The importance of her thought for the present study resides in her remarks on the Kantian philosophy, in particular the Kantian aesthetics which she applies in order to account for her understanding of politics. She is known to praise Kant for robbing man of his security by destroying the unity of thought and Being. She contends that after Kant, the reality of things except that of individual has become questionable. The universal values and the notion of absolute are shaken so terribly that, like once Shelling indicated, no universal can subsist anymore. The emphasis is on the individual intent upon establishing the autonomy or, in Kant's terms, the dignity of man. For this, the philosopher of the French Revolution is a well merited name for Kant who freed the subject from the theory of pre-existing essences. However it may be, Arendt also thinks that Kant failed to further his attack against the unity of Being because he did not get rid of the concept of Being as a given. Put otherwise, in the Kantian philosophy the concept of Being is reintroduced again to philosophy as the ultimate source of human cognition.

Reviewing Arendt's political thought is significant in order to comprehend her appropriation of the Kantian aesthetics. The peculiar feature of her political thought is that she refuses the interest of political philosophy in "man in the singular" and claims that her work was concerned with man in a plural sense. According to her, men appear as individual in many roles- for instance, the philosopher, the scientist, the artist, the historian etc… but when it comes to political commitment, human beings need to be taken in their plurality because the modes of human existence lived in solitude do not provide a political stance on

their own. Therefore, politics should consider man necessarily with respect to his mutual relations with others.

Arendt's political thinking is mostly marked by her criticism of modern politics. Politics originally always wishes to work with impartial opinions of different individuals which can co-exist even if they are diverse in themselves. Yet, Arendt thinks that modern politics lacks this attitude. She holds the Greek philosopher Plato responsible for this and announces him 'the original sinner'. According to her, Plato who preferred truth over opinion (*doxa*) altered the structure of politics forever. She states that in the ancient times, physical violence in the mutual relations of the citizens of the polis was prevented by method of *persuasion*. Persuasion was effective and it was also free from the 'non-violent coercion', i.e. truth.[65] Arendt develops the contrast between truth and opinion in her essay "Truth and Politics". According to the essay, the binary opposition of truth versus opinion has its roots in the ancient world. In *Gorgias*, Plato postulates an antagonism between communication by dialogue and by rhetoric. The philosopher ie., the truth teller, communicates by means of dialogue, while the demagogue, the persuader communicates by rhetoric (1993: 233). In the mentioned piece, Plato declares the superiority of truth over opinion. Arendt believes that truth is compelling and has a despotic feature. From the perspective of politics, the compelling or despotic character of truth comes from its wish to be acknowledged and to set aside debate which is the very essence of politics. Arendt writes:

> The modes of thought and communication that deal with truth… are necessarily domineering; they don't take into account other people's opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly political thinking (1993: 241).

[65] According to Arendt, we can classify truth as rational and factual. The former consists of mathematical, scientific and philosophical truths. The latter concerns the human affairs and also it is political by nature (1993: 241).

In this picture, agreement is forced by truth. Consequently, as the elements of political thinking, neither judgment nor decision is possible for humanity in a community where the notion of truth is in charge. What is striking in Arendt's remarks on the position of truth in modern politics is that truth presents itself in the form of "it seems to me". Thus, it pretends to be the opinion of people but actually what is at stake here is the transformation of factual truths into alleged opinions of people. In other words, factual truths can manipulate the opinion of peoples. They can seem as real or as free opinions of peoples. According to Arendt, this feature is of factual truths which have relevance to immediate or common political reality (1993: 236-7).

In summary, in Arendt's understanding, truth is the concern of the philosopher whereas opinion, related to politics, is the concern of the citizen. To put it differently, in the case of philosophical truth man is treated in his singularity but truth in this fashion is unpolitical in its nature. In contrast to truth, opinion is formed by discursive and representative thinking and it is valid by free agreement and consent (Arendt, 1993: 247). Not surprisingly, in the case of man's political life, this coerciveness of truth culminates in a compulsory agreement on the matters whereas the plural character of humanity necessitates respect for different opinions of different individuals.

Following all above, decent politics can be achieved only by free speech and action that would reveal the opinion of the individual which is formed in an impartial process led by the act of representative thinking, that is, "thinking in the place of everybody else". To achieve a free and thus the best decision of the community in the form of a judgment is only possible in this way. What Arendt seeks and- at least partially- finds in Kant is that the Kantian aesthetics presents an

opportunity to communicate or to exchange opinion with others which is treated equal to the ability of thinking by the philosopher (1993: 234). Pertaining to Kant's aesthetic judgment Arendt writes: "I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them" (1993: 237). However, we should note that representation here is not simply adopting other's views or developing empathy. The diversity of the viewpoints that one can imagine in mind provides a rich capacity in order to represent other's views in a more valid way. The more points of view considered, the more valid the opinion is (1993: 241). According to Arendt, this corresponds to the nub of Kant's 'enlarged mentality', possible political inferences of which are not recognized by the philosopher.

Kant's influence on Arendt is obvious in her concedence of the existence of the faculties. She determines the three faculties of the mind as thinking, willing and judgment. She asserts that all faculties relate to each other but thinking and judgment has an internal link in judging right from wrong since judgment prevents man from doing evil (1978: 1, 5). It has the capacity to make us take a break and think what is going on around us. In this sense, it supplies awareness. However, it has also a destructive side, an inclination to nihilism. In particular, it has a "destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in morals and ethics" (Arendt, 1978: 1, 175). In its close relation to judgment, thinking paves the way for judgment. However, when its capacity of destruction is concerned we should know that it needs judgment to save it (Fine, 2007: 121).

As regards to willing, Arendt was uncomfortable with the identification of freedom with free will. According to her, freedom was a product of politics and in

contrast to the faculty of will it is not a modern phenomenon but had its origin in ancient *polis* (Fine, 2007: 122). In addition, Arendt admits that Nietzsche is right in saying that "to will is to command". Thus, she sees a domineering aspect in willing without forgetting its important relevance to some modern conceptions like morality, right and responsibility.

Parallel to her ideas on the faculty of willing, Arendt is critical of Kant's free will arguing that the alleged "free" subject of the Kantian morality is not free indeed. It is claimed by Kant that individual as a moral being is ultimately free in deciding his actions whereas the actions as the results of individual's own will are necessarily subjected to the causal laws of nature. In this sense, according to Arendt, the freedom of human individual given by Kant is somehow an "unfree freedom". She is convinced that

> (A)t the same time that Kant made man the master and the measure of man, he also made him the slave of Being….Just as man comes of the age and is declared autonomous, he is also utterly debased. Man never seemed to have risen so high and at the same time to have fallen so low (2005: 171).

According to Arendt, the above problem results from Kant's treatment of freedom in his ethics. In Kant's ethics, freedom that is mentioned is primarily an individual concern that excludes the existence or the opinions of others. It is related to use of one's own reason and action that result from individual's free will. In this sense, in his ethics, Kant emphasizes the subject as an individual and mentions of freedom as the freedom of the individual. However, in Kant's essays recognized as political, freedom appears as making "*public use of one's reason at every point*".[66] Yet, Arendt thinks that freedom is closely related with action and it is never just the expression of an individual's opinion on a political instant. Hence, for Arendt there

66 "What is Enlightenment?" (p.4-5).

is no point to appeal to Kant's political essays or his ethics for a political philosophy. Instead, according to Arendt, in the *CJ*,

> freedom is portrayed as a predicate of the power of imagination and not of the will, and the power of imagination is linked most closely with that wider manner of thinking which is political thinking *par excellence*, because it enables us to "put ourselves in the minds of other men" (1982: 102).

This definition of freedom fosters what Arendt wishes as a ground for decent politics. Freedom which is an artifact of politics is exercised by reflective thinking which is a peculiar kind of thinking where imagination can enable us to consider opinions of others. This is the nub of Arendt's political approach: to take others into account.

The strength of the reflective judgment resides in the potential consensus to be arrived. In this sense, reflective thinking differs from speculative thinking. In contrast to the latter, it is grounded on common sense. It requires communication and agreement of others in the end such that it is "one, if not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass" (Arendt, 1993: 221).

Besides this notion, the charm of the Kantian aesthetics for Arendt comes from the thought that the judgment of taste is immune to the coercive character of universal concepts. It can work without appealing to a concept or a universal in a particular occasion relating to an object.

Arendt asserts that for Kant's real political philosophy, one should turn to the third *Critique*, reminding that Kant himself also mentions of his political essays as "play with ideas" or "mere pleasure trip" (1982: 7). The concepts or notions of the third *Critique* such as *sensus communis*, enlarged thinking and exemplary

validity are the favorite Kantian elements for Arendt to structure a path in her account of how politics must be performed.[67]

It is mentioned earlier that in the core of Arendt's political view lays the notion of man in the plural. In her analysis of the concept of man, she applies to the Kantian philosophy on the matter. In her "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy" Arendt's pursues a close reading of Kant's aesthetics. One of the fundamental questions of her endeavor is the question of man in Kant's philosophy.

In *Lectures on Logic*, Kant writes that the "philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense of the word" can be summarized in four questions:

What can I know?
What ought I to do?
What may I hope?
What is man?

According to him, the relevant answers lie respectively in metaphysics, morals, religion and anthropology (1992: 538). Following this claim, Arendt retraces three different perspectives of man corresponding to the first three questions in the works of the philosopher. Her original claim is that none of these questions can lead us to the answer of what *zōon politikon*, a political being is. Moreover, the question "How do I judge?", which obviously has a strong link to the concept of action, should have been the main focus of the interest in the third *Critique* simply because this is the only possible question that really concerns the "condition of human plurality" (Arendt, 1982: 20). The notion of plurality is also implied in the second *Critique*, since it deals with what a human being ought to do. There cannot be any sense to conduct our behavior unless there are other men. Yet, the answer of the question concerns all intelligible beings for those that moral laws

[67] Arendt in her essay "The Crisis in Culture" gives a detailed account of her reasons for seeing taste as relating to politics. See *Between Past and Future*, pp.197-226.

are valid for. In other words, the sense of plurality that the second Critique implies does not necessarily and merely concern human beings in particular. It is for all intelligible beings. Furthermore, according to Arendt, besides the fact that the second *Critique*, the practical reason, insists on imperatives, it is not concerned with the "public content" which is decisively what distinguishes politics from morals (1982: 18). It privileges individual and, the proper way of conducting the self suggested in the *Critique* lefts the notion of human plurality in a second order relevance. In this sense, the Kantian subject of the practical reason appears too much self-interested for acting politically.

Arendt focuses on the question "How do I judge?" and she claims that the answer of the question concerns only human beings but not all intelligible beings. She also contends that for the possible answer of this question in Kant's philosophy, we should turn to the third *Critique*. According to Arendt, in the *CJ*, man is given neither as an intelligible nor as a cognitive being. The first part of the critique concerns men in the plural and the second part concerns the human species in general (1982:13). Therefore, Arendt insists that this question should have been raised in the *CJ* (1982: 20). Following this, Arendt summarizes the approach to the concept of man in the whole Kantian system as follows:

> Human species = Mankind = part of nature = subject to "history", nature's ruse = to be considered under the idea of "end", teleological judgment: second part of *Critique of Judgment*.
>
> Man = reasonable being, subject to the laws of practical reason which he gives to himself, autonomous, an end in himself, belonging to a *Geisterreich*, realm of intelligible beings = *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Critique of Pure Reason*.
>
> Men = earthbound creatures, living in communities, endowed with common sense, *sensus communis*, a community sense; not autonomous, needing each other's company even for thinking ("freedom of the pen") = first part of the *Critique of Judgment*: aesthetic judgment (1982: 26-27).

In the light of the above schema, Arendt argues that as an end in himself the individual is merely interested in himself or herself and the moral achievement. Thus, the existence of other people serves like a limit according to which the individual conducts his behavior. In this sense, there is no ground for Arendt to attach Kant's political philosophy to the moral law, since apparently the individual of the second *Critique* is more concerned with his individual self than the others. Moreover, as the moral principles are defined as being *a priori,* they are independent of individual's will, in other words, they come naturally with reason as the conditions attached to the core of being human (Arendt, 1982: 20).

In her essay entitled "What's Existential Philosophy?" Arendt makes a sharp inference on the concept of self that

> …if since Kant the essence of man consisted in every single human being representing all of humanity and if since the French Revolution and the declaration of the rights of man it became integral to the concept of man that all humanity could be debased or exalted in every individual, then the concept of self is a concept of man that leaves the individual existing independent of humanity and representative of no one but himself– of nothing but his own nothingness. If Kant's categorical imperative insisted that every human act had to bear responsibility for all of humanity, then the experience of guilty nothingness insists on precisely the opposite: the destruction in every individual of the presence of all humanity. The self in the form of conscience has taken the place of humanity, and being-a-self has taken the place of being human (2005: 180-1).

In the paragraph above we can easily follow the core of her critique of the notion of human dignity grounded on an individual's uniqueness. The essence of man necessarily excludes man's sociability when it is grounded on the concepts of inherent value or dignity as in Kant's approach. To put it differently, valuing man on the grounds of his individuality and privileging the individual will eventually lead evil doing in politics. Instead, Arendt, as mentioned earlier, favors the notion

of taking as many viewpoints as possible in deciding about political matters in particular. Similarly, in her essay "The Concept of History", Arendt writes that Kant's postulation, saying that the agent of moral realm, who is free in his will, does not appear in the phenomenal world, is "pitting the dictate of the will against the understanding of reason" and more importantly it establishes moral law as distinct from natural laws. As a consequence, instead of purging the greatest evil, i.e., the thought, this kind of postulation "makes freedom disappear– quite apart from the fact that it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom" (Arendt, 1993: 145).

When considered like this, the Kantian moral act appears as legislation and likewise the criteria of being a "man of good will" seems to legislate rather than obey. This aspect of the Kantian morality together with reason and its unshakable authority serves the ideal of truth in its imperative mode and, it cannot offer a fertile ground for political development of man. Moral subject is surrounded by dictates of the reason and he does need to do what is commanded out of necessity. In these circumstances, there is no room for decision on a political action. This is merely because politics by definition assumes that man is a part of a society or community. Thus, in Arendt's understanding there can be no possible gate for politics in Kant's authoritarian ethics. Hereby, Arendt turns her attention to the Kantian aesthetics in which she sees the real ground for Kant's politics.

To begin with, in the third *Critique*, a judgment of taste requires that the subject necessarily visualizes herself or himself as a member of aesthetic community. Arendt implies that being political and acting accordingly needs much more willing and consciousness than simply having some moral principles that are

bestowed to man as the very conditions of being human. Aesthetics is similar to politics, since

> in aesthetic no less than in political judgments, a decision is made, and although this decision is always determined by a certain subjectivity, by the simple fact that each person occupies a place of his own from which he looks upon and judges the world, it also derives from the fact that the world itself is an objective *datum*, something common to all its inhabitants (Arendt, 1993: 222).

Arendt thinks that despite the affinity between aesthetics and politics, Kant does not take *action* into account in any of his works. In her third lecture on Kant, she points out that the needs of man such as to communicate, think publicly and publish freely are mentioned in Kant's critiques whereas the question of political action is never asked (1982:19). The mentioned needs of man correspond to in *sociability*, the primary principle of any political encounter.

The principle of sociability is central to Kant's aesthetics, since it provides the legal ground to call something beautiful. When we deal with the object that we are about to call beautiful, the imagination makes the other subjects present in mind by "enlarging the thought" in such a way that we actually think *as if* we are in public and moreover, as if every individual is in agreement with us. In other words, we call something beautiful by thinking that it is beautiful for all.

The principle of sociability or publicness applies also to the Kantian morality since the philosopher declares that "withdrawal from the public realm is evil". Thus, we can say that publicness is actually the "transcendental principle" that rules all of human actions in Kant's philosophy. In practical philosophy the publicness in mind is of actor's, who should necessarily operate in accordance of this fact, whereas in aesthetic realm, the essential condition for a beautiful object is the *communicability*. By this means, it is the judgment of the spectator which

"creates" a "space" for communicability (Arendt, 1995: 63). For Arendt this clearly means that the public realm is formed by spectators not by actors.

The Kantian subject has a moral duty to conduct his behavior for good. Moreover, the categorical imperative[68], the highest principle of morals, compels the individual to act with the awareness of the others' existence. Yet, this is in a form of command. In this sense, as Arendt rightly puts, the Kantian moral subject does not actually or empirically recognize the others as individuals while s/he has the awareness of the others. This is rather a matter of assuming the existence of "others" in a very general sense rather than recognizing individuals. Thus, in the Kantian morality we must always keep in mind that there are others so that our behavior can become a maxim for all, at least in principle. For Arendt, this high form of morality and the notion of publicness it employs cannot cope with the diverse and ebullient character of political life. She thinks that if there is ever a key for decent politics, it is grounded on mutual recognition of one another as individuals and also on acting according to the quintessential realm of *Humanitas*.

The Roman term *Humanitas* is of great importance to understand what Arendt had in mind for her understanding of political subject. It refers to the highest level of being human, the noblest personality which is extant or everlasting in one's self. This personal element is activated necessarily in public space. It is not something to be controlled, or something to be acquired in solitude. It requires the public space and it can be acquired by the one who throws "his life and his person into the venture of the public realm—in the course of which he risks revealing

[68] It commends that one should always act in such a way that the act can become a general law. In Kant's words: "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law".

something which is not “subjective” and which for that very reason he can neither recognize nor control” (Arendt,1995: 73-4).

Apart from its ambiguous content, the concept *Humanitas* together with communication- in the sense that Karl Jaspers uses- constitute pretty much the core of the formula that Arendt had in mind. The dynamism and diversity of human world cannot be governed with some *a priori* principles. For a decent practice in politics which will aim at perpetual peace, public realm plays a fundamental role by conducing the emergence of the very humanness of human beings.

The evident difference between Kant’s and Arendt’s approaches on the dignity of man appears as follows: Arendt refuses the dignity that is bestowed on man but holds that in the world of human affairs; in mutual relations what is noble is acting respectfully. In this sense, we do not inherit the dignity but we earn it. Whereas according to Kant, man has dignity as a result of his incommensurable value. This difference is the principal motivation of Arendt’s interest in the third *Critique*. She criticizes Kant for being deeply attached to a tradition that regards philosophy identical with contemplation. In this sense, it is understandable that the promise of a political philosophy cannot be more than chasing eternal and valid principles for the account of present political incidents. Yet, “politics deals with men, nationals of many countries and heirs to many pasts; its laws are the positively established fences which hedge in, protect, and limit the space in which freedom is not a concept, but a living, political reality” (Arendt, 1995: 81-2). For this reason, Arendt invites us to turn our focus and energy to the judgment of taste which is by definition supposes a space for the subject and community at the same time.

The judgment of taste is one of reflective judgments, so first of all, it is free from or out of the reign of any concept. Moreover, we necessarily reflect upon the possibility of the agreement of others with our judgment, even if the experience takes place in solitude. The agreement of others is found in the imagination's *enlarging the thought*. In this way, both existence and opinion of others-on the form of the object- are taken into account in a form of communicability. This communicability is called *sensus communis*. In aesthetic experience of the subject, it appears as if a sensation affecting our judgment of taste makes us feel that on the form of the particular object that we are about to call beautiful, we have everyone's approval. Following this, it is clearer why Arendt privileges the third *Critique* over the second in her remarks on Kant's political views. It comes from her insistent belief that judgments which depend on moral principles are not "real" judgments, since moral principles are bestowed on us simply by being human. Moreover, morality is a realm of the individual *qua* individual. Thus, there is no room for a political community in morality.

Judgment, on the contrary, is the faculty which necessarily assumes man in community. By applying "enlargement of thought", it thinks from the standpoint of other men (*CJ* §40). Moreover, it is a distinct capacity of our minds which deals with particulars and finds some exemplary in these particulars to subsume them under a universal.

In the light of these points, since thinking is applying universals upon the reflected thing, Arendt favors judgment "as a peculiar talent which can be practiced only but cannot be thought". Hence, what Arendt declares is that judgment, if it can deal with the particular *qua* particular, does not need "regulative ideas of reason" to

operate. It can successfully deal with contingencies or with unique, particular incidents of history; it can judge and give verdict. She writes that:

> most concepts in the historical and political sciences are of... restricted nature; they have their origin in some particular historical incident, and we then proceed to make it "exemplary "- to see in the particular what is valid for more than one case (1982: 85).

As for the use of judgment of taste in politics, unlike Kant, Arendt thinks that taste[69] is not necessarily and merely attributed to aesthetic judgments. It can also be applied to judgments of political scope in order to judge about a political action's being right or wrong.

The assumed relevance of the judgment of taste resides in the operation of the imagination that can recreate representations free from a concept. Without appealing to a concept, representation enables a disinterested position for the viewer. For Arendt, this disinterested position of viewer is the key to a non-subjective political judgment because by this means, sensations are turned into disinterested re-presentations.

The next step is reflecting on the pleasure and displeasure that is caused by these representations. The very state of feeling pleasure or displeasure by a representation can itself be pleasing or non-pleasing. On this level what is at stake is not the disinterested representation of the object but the judgment of the feeling. This is approbation or disapprobation, and it is an afterthought. This decision is made according to the criterion of communicability or publicness (Arendt, 1982: 69).

The idea of publicness or communicability is grounded on *sensus communis*, the guide of all men in the universe. It reminds each individual that man belongs to a community and hence s/he must judge with awareness of this fact.

[69] Arendt quotes from Kant that taste is the "feeling of contemplative pleasure" (1982: 15).

For the sake of clarity, Arendt's argument can be summarized as follows: Both because of divergences among persons and the various possibilities for political events or occasions, the domain of politics should always be open to revision. Yet, a universally controlled or regulated kind of history is not an alternative for politics because it is doomed to end in tyranny. In this regard for Arendt, the Kantian universal politics necessarily culminates in repression. However, the Kantian reflective judgment is valuable since it promises an escape from universal politics and its totalitarian inferences. She appeals to the judgment of taste where she finds a space to make her own remark on politics. She writes that

> The activity of taste decides how this world, independent of its utility and our vital interests in it, is to look and sound, what men will see and what they will hear in it. Taste judges the world in its appearance and in its worldliness; its interest in the world is purely "disinterested", and that means that neither the life interests of the individual nor the moral interests of the self are involved here. For judgments of taste, the world is the primary thing, not man, neither man's life nor his self (1993: 222).

In the representation of an object supplied by the imagination without reference to a concept, a disinterested pleasure or displeasure arises. The judgment relating to this feeling is that of taste. When the subject reflects upon this feeling of pleasure or displeasure the feeling is judged according to the principle of communicability. In other words, we judge and evaluate this feeling by relaying on *sensus communis* that always reminds us to be a member of a community. This schema provides Arendt with a model for the mechanism of sound political judgment.

The reflection upon an action which pleases or displeases necessitates considering public good and, in this way, the results of an action can be properly judged. The disinterestedness as the principle of political judgment can provide the non-subjective ground for decision. To judge as a member of community and to

decide considering the public good will bring about consensus and thus, the justice to society.

Arendt's motivation for judgments of taste lied in her belief that a new and urgent set of laws should be sought for the well-being of humanity. In the preface to the first edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* she wrote:

> Antisemitism, imperialism, totalitarianism-one after the other, one more brutally than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities (1958: iv).

The difficulty of realizing such a project can be seen in the diversity of the modern and postmodern approaches to the ancient ideal of the cosmopolitanism as we have indicated in the second chapter of this study. Arendt's call for a new set o values regulated by common reason of all the people in the world is the most right principle in terms of human rights. Yet, the search for such principle carries the danger of the falling the same trap that the world once experienced in WWII. Such a cosmopolitan approach may always entail the risk of being regulated by some particular authority. In the last chapter, we will search for a contemporary mode of cosmopolitanism which is experienced in an individual level.

4.2. Lyotard and the Kantian Sublime

Like Hannah Arendt, Jean-François Lyotard refuses the application of universal norms. He founds the roots of this thought in political realm of the Ancient Greece. His search for a politics free from coercive, norm-based universal laws and grand narratives directs him to the Kantian aesthetics and reflective judgment in particular. Yet, unlike Arendt, he refuses consensus based politics by claiming that it culminates in terrorism. He states that "consensus is a component of the system,

which manipulates it in order to maintain and improve its performance. It is the object of administrative procedures" (1993: 60-1).

Lyotard's interest on political judgment revolves around Kant's third *Critique* and particularly around reflective judgment. He thinks it can be taken as a model for political judgment since the third *Critique* reveals the heterogeneous structure of discourse. In this way, it presents an alternative to terroristic attempts of language in which new ideas are silenced. The charm of the reflective judgment and that of judgment of taste is grounded on the fact that they work with indeterminate concepts instead of some universal or *a priori* ones. In particular, judgment of sublime is free from any notion of consensus or common sense. Lyotard interprets this feature of the sublime as respect for heterogeneity. In *Instructions Païennes*, Lyotard announces himself as a "Kantian" but "not the Kant of the concept or the moral law but the Kant of the imagination, when he cures himself of the illness of knowledge and rules" (36) (qtd. in Carroll 1987: 173).[70] This is because Kant would never consider aesthetic judgment for a mode of political thinking. However, for Lyotard, aesthetic judgments can be a model for understanding justice in postmodern times in which it seems hard to follow a single universal law among different phrase regimes. In this sense, in Lyotard's understanding judgment must correspond to "the way our faculties interact with each other as we move from one mode of phrasing to another, i.e. the denotative, the prescriptive, the performative, the political, the cognitive, the artistic, etc." (Aylesworth, 2005).

[70] Carroll continues by writing: "In Le différent, Lyotard clearly identifies with the Kant he characterizes as a "critical watchman" who maintains at all costs the distinction among the cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic realms and resists the temptation to derive the latter from the former. Such derivation is the principal symptom of the "illness of knowledge", and in the ethical-political realm, Lyotard argues, it has often been fatal".

To discover Lyotard's position with respect to the politics, it is useful to remind that he favors heterogeneity and, he is opposed to politics based on consensus. Lyotard rejects any kind of determinate knowledge pertaining to ethics or politics. As Readings explains that Lyotard denies *cognitive description* in case of politics. He believes that political realm is "an uncertain process of indeterminate judgment". Following this, according to Lyotard, justice cannot be something *authoritative* and it cannot be grasped once and for all. Thus, Lyotard does not favor the attempt to *define* the political but instead he focuses on "a politics of difference" when he tries to "determine the identity of the political" (Readings, 1991: xvi).

For the possible grounds of politics, Lyotard goes back and forth between the position of a pagan as in the Sophists and that of the Kantian Idea as it appears in the third *Critique*. For the possible common ground of the two approaches Lyotard says:

> There is no reason of history. I mean that no one can place himself or herself in the position of an utterer on the course of things. And therefore there is no court in which one can adjudicate the reason of history. This is a Kantian position if one thinks of the second Critique, or even the third Critique. It is quite apparent what Kant is attempting to bring out in the second Critique: it is a language game that would be completely independent of that of knowledge. There is no knowledge in the matters of ethics. And therefore there will be no knowledge in matters of politics. That is also the Sophist's position (1985: 73).

Following this assertion, Lyotard reemphasizes that no determinate knowledge of practice exists: "there are contingencies; the social web is made up of a multitude of encounters between interlocutors caught up in different pragmatics. One must judge case by case" (1985: 73-4). What is called "conventionalism" in Sophists' thought states that something is judged as just when it is convened that it is just. Although the philosophy of opinion is free from "rationalist terrorism", the law of

convention may culminate in admission even of Nazism. In the face of this horrible risk Lyotard turns to the Kantian notion of Idea. He favors it by stating that a Kantian Idea is not equal to the notion of concept or opinion but it corresponds to judgment in reflective use, to the "maximization of concepts" outside of sensibility. Lyotard emphasizes that he does not suggest a rational politics. He explains the possible reason for this as follows:

> … rational politics, in the sense of the concept, is over, and I think that that is swerve of this *fin-de-siècle*. We have had an attempt, since the Jacobins, to elaborate and implement a rational politics; this attempt has been pursued throughout the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth; it is presently collapsing (1985: 75).

Seeing this collapse as an opportunity, Lyotard explains that his aim is to find a way to articulate the philosophy of opinions and the Kantian notion of Idea which has an unlimited use. The Kantian use of Idea as a regulator, even if it does not allow us to decide in every particular event, can prevent us from the perils of the philosophy of opinion. "It is not even able to give us contents for prescriptions, but just regulates our perspectives, that is, guides us in knowing what is just and what is not just" (Lyotard, 1985: 77). There is one significant point remains unsaid that Lyotard concedes the usage of the Kantian idea under one condition that it should give up the claim of totality. The notion of totality is what drags the notion of Idea into the discourse of metaphysics (Lyotard, 1985: 88).

Keeping this point in mind we can say that the combination that "doing a politics of opinions that would give us the capacity of deciding between opinions and of distinguishing between what is just and what is not just; and to have this capacity of deciding, one must effectively have an Idea" (Lyotard, 1985: 88) seems what Lyotard argues for today's politics which has already given up the rationalistic attitude for good.

According to Lyotard's assessments of the *CJ*, he suggests that reflective judgment can also be applied to politics and in this sense; politics does not require another critique but an additional third part to the third *Critique* (1985: 88). It is basically because a fourth critique that particularly deals with politics would be reducing the heterogeneity of political judgments. In *Différend*, Lyotard attributes the lack of a fourth Kantian Critique to the radical heterogeneity of the political. He writes that:

> The Critique of political reason was never written. It is legitimate, within the particular limits that remain to be determined, to see in the dispersion of the historical-political texts of Kant a sign of the particular heterogeneity of the political 'object'" (1988:130).[71]

Lyotard writes that the third *Critique* unearths the striking fact that understanding, reason and judgment are *phrase*[72] *genres* that have *différends* between them. In other words, they cannot be unified or completely translated into one another as the Kantian philosophy desires. In this respect, the third *Critique* implies also the failure of Universalist approach. In Lyotard's thought it is the sublime that is taken into serious consideration in order to denote *différend* and its political implications in particular.

Lyotard claims that politics appears as a genre but it is not a genre at all. When it takes place as a genre it differs from one authorization to the other according to the "normative prefix" that determines the authorization type. Yet, politics is not at all a genre, "it bears witness to the nothingness which opens up with each occurring phrase and on the occasion of which the *différend* between

[71] Here after the references to *Différend* will appear as D.

[72] *Phrase* is French term same as the phrase in English. Yet, it is *not* a grammatical—or even linguistic—entity (it is neither the expression of a complete thought nor the minimal unit of signification), but a *pragmatic* one, the concern being with the possibility (or impossibility) of what can (or cannot) be "phrased", of what can (or cannot) be "put into phrases" (Glossary of French Terms, *Différend*: 194).

genres of discourse is born" (*D* 141). In other words, politics is not a genre but "the threat of the différend… It is the multiplicity of genres, the diversity of ends, and par excellence the question of linkage… (It) consists in the fact that language is not a language, but phrases, or that Being is not Being, but *There is*'s" (*D* 138).

As a clear example of what Lyotard calls *différend* the case of plaintiff is striking. The example refers to the argument that claims the existence of gas chambers in Auschwitz. According to the court, the only legitimate proof of this claim can be supplied by an eye-witness. In the absence of the eye-witness the crime cannot be proved. Yet, the existence of a living eye-witness means that the crime is not committed. In the face of this situation, the plaintiff becomes the victim because s/he cannot argue the case in the system of court. Lyotard calls the case a *différend* where the "plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason the victim" (*D* 9). According to Bill Readings, what the *différend* needs is not a new trial, "but an as yet unthinkable tribunal" (1991: 124).

The necessity of judgment appears in these cases of *différend* where the plaintiff is forced to silence. Since judgment makes the passage between heterogeneous genres of the phrase, it gives the voice to the *différend*. For the faculty of judgment —even if Lyotard is not sure that it is a faculty at all— and its mediation between two faculties he uses the archipelago as an analogy, where

> each genre of discourse would be like an island; the faculty of judgment would be, at least in part, like an admiral or like a provisioner of ships who would launch expeditions from one island to the next, intended to present to one island what was found (or invented, in the archaic sense of the word) in the other, and which might serve the former as an "as-if intuition" with which to validate it. Whether war or commerce, this interventionist force has no object, and does not have its own island, but requires a milieu—this would be the sea—the *Archepelagos* or primary sea as the Aegean was once called (*D* 130-1).

As for the sublime and its political import, Lyotard writes that the sublime indicates a *différend* which occurs in silence. The pleasure and the pain in the sublime feeling imply the inability of expressing the wrong [*tort*][73] of the *différend*, and the possibility of creating new phrases of discourse respectively. Hence, we see that he does not read the sublime necessarily as a political moment but as an example of *differend* which constitutes the basis of political realm. To support the main argument of this study, his thoughts and assessments on the sublime will be revisited soon in order to expose the anti-humanist aspect of the sublime. However, now the focus will be on his *Lessons on the Analytic of Sublime*.

In his book *Lessons on the Analytic of Sublime*[74], Lyotard goes over the sections § 23-29 of *CJ* with his fine comb in order to "isolate the analysis of a *différend* feeling in Kant's text, which is also the analysis of a feeling of *différend*, and to connect this feeling with transport that leads all thought (critical thought included) to its limits" (*AS* x). Through the pages striking and rousing arguments are revealed. Most important of all for this project is the one where Lyotard asserts that the sublime is the signal of the failure of Kant's intention of unifying the whole critical project. This is roughly because the sublime reveals that faculties are never to be unified. The third *Critique* does have an import more than it is known to have.

Lyotard refuses the main stream interpretation of the role of the *CJ*. He thinks that if *CJ* ever achieves unification as Kant aimed, it is not due to teleological principle (the objective finality of nature) but necessarily due to the reflexive mode of thinking which comes into the open in aesthetical realm. He

[73] A wrong [*tort*] is defined as damage [*dommage*] accompanied by the loss of the means to prove the damage" (*D* 5) as in the case of the plaintiff.

[74] It is a collection of lectures that Lyotard gives on the Analytic of the Sublime. Here after *AS*.

argues that the aesthetic judgment reveals the original mode of the critical thought. The reflective manner of judgment makes a non-prejudged thinking possible. This is the only accurate way to interrogate the critical system; reflecting without appealing to concepts or *a priori* conditions. Lyotard mentions of this approach as being open to a feeling. He writes that, "the mode of critical thought should be by definition purely reflective. Moreover, aesthetic judgment reveals reflection in its most "autonomous" state, *naked*, so to speak" (*AS* 6). This character of reflective judgment implies and opens a space for different types of determinations or descriptions other than those of the understanding. This type of thinking is free from the bind of knowledge and rationality.

The reflective judgment which promises a non-prejudged approach has two kinds of unique operations; *heuristic*[75] and *tautegorical*. The heuristic aspect of the reflective judgment indicates a transcendental pre-logic which cannot be placed in a genealogy. Lyotard writes that "Much more than a genealogy, one should see in the reflexive moment a kind of *anamnesis* of critical thought questioning itself about its capacity to discover the proper use of the transcendental locations…(*AS* 33). Thus, in its heuristic mode, reflection discovers the legitimate uses of the categories of the understanding. It is emphasized that taste can reveal itself by escaping the logic of the categories since reflective judgment does not *think* nor *act* but merely focuses on the states of itself. In the aesthetic way, it is not the object that is thought but instead the feeling of the subject or the very state of feeling is what is attended.

The heuristic aspect of reflective judgment as a transcendental activity makes it prior to the categories of the understanding. However, it is not valid to say

[75] The term has its root in Latin word *heuristicus*; to discover.

that reflection produces the categories. On the contrary, in its heuristic function; reflective judgment discovers some modes of purely subjective synthesis, that is, the "comparisons". These are called "headings" and grouped as follows: identity/ difference, agreement/ opposition, inner/ outer, determinable/ determination. These headings are the modes of the reflection which are similar to the categories of the understanding. Hence, these general aesthetic titles- are the means of reflection that- assist thinking which needs a "principle of differentiation that has only a subjective value but with which the use of the category is made possible and legitimate" (*AS* 38).

The second, tautegorical function of reflective judgment operates as follows: The sensations in question inform the mind of its own state. These sensations operate as tautegory which involves the immediate awareness of thinking of its own state of feeling. Thus, the subject feels pleasure or displeasure and at the same time is aware of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure without counseling understanding. In this function, reflective judgment does not look for any discovery, unlike the case of heuristic function, it does not contribute to the knowledge of an object either but it indicates the state of subject in relation to the object. The reflective character of the judgment provides both the awareness of (1) the [action of] feeling and (2) the state of feeling pleasure or displeasure.

The tautegorical[76] character of reflective judgment is also significant because according to Lyotard, it is that which is misunderstood as the autonomy of the subject by many authors including Hannah Arendt. He rejects all sociologizing and anthropologizing readings of Kant's aesthetic common sense and states that the promise of communicated happiness cannot be grasped logically. What judgment

[76] Lyotard writes that the term tautegorical "designates the identity of the form and the content, of "law" and "object", in pure reflective judgment as it is given to us in the aesthetic" (*AS* 13).

of taste detects and Kant tries to address by the term "free play" is the optimal agreement between the faculties of the understanding and the imagination only outside of the scope of knowledge or rationality or morality. The awareness of this state is occasional and never determinable. He writes the "union of the faculties is felt on the occasion of a certain sunset, on the occasion of this particular Schubert Allegro" (*AS* 19). In this sense, the assertion that the judgment of taste is both universal and necessary appears as a severe error since this *unison* occurs each time as new and evaporates till another *unpredictable occurrence* of a form. The ephemeral character of this unity and, taste pertaining to this unity relates to the subject in such a way that it promises the subject.

As Lyotard puts it, taste cannot be felt by the subject because the notion of a subject necessitates the unity of the faculties in their harmonious cooperation. In other words, taste remains outside of the system by preceding the subject and promising it.

In the case of the beautiful, the unity of the faculties promises a subject that will come as a synthesis. However, in the sublime feeling, as a sensation no unity of subject or of the faculties is promised. In this condition, the subjective character of the sublime, as in the case of the beautiful, grounds on the act of judging of the very state of feeling in the singular occasion. Thus, in a word, for Lyotard, the term "subjective"-in the *CJ*- indicates a reflective thinking where thought is aware of its state. If the question is ever the subject, reflective thinking is the only means to continue the query. However, for aesthetic judgment the notion of the subject still makes no sense since judgments of taste precedes and promises the subject as synthesis, the unity of faculties, whereas the sublime "threatens to make him to disappear (*AS* 144).

According to Lyotard, the sublime feeling is vital for it designates the absolute limit of reflection (or the absolute limit of aesthetic apprehension performed by the imagination). As an aesthetic thinking it informs the subject of its own state which this time reports disunion, displeasure in front of a form that cannot be formed by the imagination. The desire of limitlessness is experienced and as a consequence the sublime which is defined as *mere appendage* "exposes the "state" of critical thought when it reaches its extreme limit—a spasmatic mode" (*AS* 56). According to Lyotard, the "legitimacy" of the sublime depends on a "double defiance" that the sublime presents. On the one hand, the imagination struggles to present what it cannot present. Reason, on the other hand, desires what is forbidden and seeks to find its Ideas in sensible intuition (as objects of sensibility). In these two attempts "thinking defies its own finitude, as if fascinated by its own excessiveness (*AS* 55-6). Sublime's being a *spasm* corresponds to this double bind of inhibition-desire (for the absolute).

Lyotard claims that the sublime feeling implies a *différend*. The *différend* in the sublime is due to the incommensurability of the finite and the infinite. The form (finite) "removes itself from its finality in order to try to put itself at the measure of another party" (the infinite). To this, Lyotard calls a gesture without which a *différend* never occurs. In the above gesture, what occurs is not that the imagination and reason cannot *understand* each other. On the contrary, both the imagination and reason can understand and know the *idiom* of the other. However, they cannot meet the demand of the other with its own idiom. The pain or suffering results from this kind of opposition of the faculties. However, the solution is never the communication of the two opposing parties. Therefore, according to Lyotard, the

negative presentation in the sublime is "the demonstration of the inanity of the demand that the absolute be presented" (*AS* 152).[77]

4.3. The Transformation of the Kantian Sublime After 1945

The current attempts that have been going on from the late 90s in order to revitalize the spirit of Kant's writings in this age are doomed to fail, if they basically try to derive principles that would promise sheer consensus in today's political conflicts. Kant belongs to the social contract tradition of early modernity to which the political theory of the time was formal and strictly analytical. In its rational grounds the political theory sought to deduce objectively correct principles for regulations of political life. In accordance with both this tendency of political theory and also with his epistemology, Kant's political views insist on the progress of history. He interpreted the destructive forces that reigned over time such as wars as agents of progress.

The Kantian aesthetics, on the other hand, is appreciated by its possible value for political thinking. I have cited Arendt for her valuable remarks on judgment of beautiful and, Lyotard for his striking and illuminating analysis of reflective judgment and the sublime. Arendt's position is valuable in that it presents an approach that aims at a non-universalist but still prescriptive political formulae. Lyotard's, on the other hand, suggests a debatable *instruction* in that we may

[77] In addition to its political implications, the sublime moment also addresses to avant-garde art. Lyotard thinks that the beautiful that refers to universal principles in art is left for the sake of sublime the "presentation of unpresentable". He employs the Kantian sublime while he gives an account of the abandonment of the principle of "reality" in avant-garde art works. According to him, similar to the impossibility of representing the Ideas of reason, avant-garde painting presents "negatively" and "it will therefore avoid figuration or representation. It will be like Malevich's squares; it will enable us to see only by making it impossible to see; it will please only by causing pain" (1979: 78-9). In this context the artist of today deserves the title of genius in the Kantian sense, as far as s/he creates without recourse to pre-established rules. Moreover, Lyotard sees the sublime as a necessity to "get an idea of what is at stake in modernism, in what are called avant-gardes in painting or in music" (1991b: 135).

employ a mixture of the Kantian Idea and pagan politics. Among his propositions, that reflective judgment must be Kant's precious means for a possible political view and that Kant needs not a fourth critique but a third section in the third *Critique* are especially noteworthy. His analysis of the analytic of the sublime is most attractive since one of the main concerns of the present study is to claim an anti-humanist title for the sublime in relation to its aesthetic value. Even if it seems as a remote possibility for Kant's systematic philosophy, the sublime can supply a ground for reading the Kantian aesthetics beyond mere aesthetics. In an edited volume on Kant's aesthetics, John McCumber writes:

> There are moments when even the most rarified philosophical texts betray a certain helplessness on the part of their creators-helplesness that is not mere confusion of folly, but a kind of rational desperation occasioned by the authors' discovery that without their intentions, or even against their will, something foreign and unsought, yet intelligent, is surging into their philosophy (McCumber, 2006:266).

This corresponds the exact feeling that motivates this study. The sublime holds a similar kind of moment since it surely carries some non-Kantian tenets. Yet, the notion of the sublime in Kantian rendition did not get the attention it deserves till 1980s. For instance, Francis X. Coleman in 1974 contended that a twentieth-century reader most probably sees the sublime as "irrelevant" (85). Paul Guyer was another name who found the Kantian sublime uninteresting for "modern sensibilities" in 1979. (Lap-Chuen, 1998: 23). A decade later, this line of thought was still popular among some scholars. On the matter, in 1984 Mary Mothershill noted that Kant's sublime is not relevant to our times because of the very reason that it is not as a "standing" concept as beautiful is. This meant that beautiful is a concept like that of right or knowledge that resists time and interpretation. Whereas the sublime merely

> picks out a collection of ideas which is basically local; the components hang together for a while…and are then dispersed. A philosophical theory that places any weight on such a collection will come sooner or later, to look dated and to resist interpretation" (Mothershill, 1984: 232-233).

In a slightly different manner, Lap-Chuen supports the negative argument that the theory of the sublime is not possible and he writes that

> the very idea of a theory of the sublime runs against the generally accepted opinion that experiences or objects which have been referred to as sublime cannot be explained, not only because they lie beyond cognitive explanation, but also because they are of infinitely many and even radically different kinds such that the term 'sublime' serves only as a convenient umbrella label for them. Applicable to such a wide range of objects of so many different kinds at the limit of rational explanation, the term does not seem to admit of a general theory at all (1998: xiv).

Similarly, Jane Forsey contends that if we are ever to theorize sublime, we are necessarily tied up with Kantian terminology. Then, the sublime cannot be defined as an *object of experience*, or it cannot be *a description of the cognitive failure of a given subject*. Moreover, if we are to consider the possibility of its being a feeling, then it cannot be theorized at all. In short, the theory of sublime is impossible in its historically defined form (2007: 388).

All these arguments indicate the impossibility of a theory of the sublime in its Kantian rendition. From the point of view of the Kantian architectonic the sublime has a positive and supportive stand. However, we know that this line of thought is abandoned after an unexpected uptrend in the sublime. This is mostly due to the interpretations of postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard and Adorno. The postmodern query of the sublime is neither about what the radical sides of the sublime as an aesthetic experience are nor what the possible repercussions of the sublime for the whole Kantian system are. According to Lap-Chuen, "postmodern version of the sublime is treating human thought and culture as an essentially creative, inventive, constantly changing construction" (1998: xv). Its possible

relation to morality and epistemology are evaluated but it is new that the Kantian notion of the sublime is accepted to mean something other than aesthetics.

In its Kantian rendition, the sublime promises very little to politics. However, it has become a valuable tool for implying the singularity of some political incidents in world history. Its possible potential for politics follows the discussions of the horrible aesthetic dimension of the Holocaust. The singularity of the event and the helpless state of human imagination in the encounter of it is tried to be addressed by recourse to the Kantian sublime. The measureless extent of terror and suffering of spectator's imagination reminded this old category.[78]

Dominick La Capra (2000) contends that modern thought has a tendency to link the traumatic events to the sublime by "transvalueing it and making it the basis for an elevating, supra-ethical, even elated or quasi-transcendental test of the self of the group" (93) and he thinks that this is exampled in the case of Nazi ideology. Similarly, Readings reminding Walter Benjamin's famous saying, "all efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war", contends that aesthetization of politics means to apply judgments of taste to politics. It functions as follows: It is aimed that the judgment and thus the idea of beautiful is to be realized in society. Yet, fascism makes a turn in this realization process and the sublime becomes the criteria (1992: 413). The sublime at stake here is the dynamically sublime.

According to Readings, what Fascist politics of the sublime wishes is to "present the unpresentable" and furthermore, this corresponds to the attempt to represent all. This is the essence of totalitarianism and "fascism as a form of

[78] Indeed, the expression "Holocaust sublime" is applied to address the aesthetic dimension of the event. The expression is applied to the images of the Nazi camps by Carol Zemel. Zemel indicates that the term Holocaust-sublime and what it refers is raised by many thinkers such as Emil Fackenheim, Jean-François Lyotard and Eli Friedlander. See her "Emblems of Atrocity: Holocaust Liberation Photographs" in *Image and Remembrance: Representation and the Holocaust,* ed. Shelley Hornstein and Florence Jacabowitz, 2003, USA: Indiana University Press, pp. 201-19.

totalitarianism, presents an essentially Romantic politics of the sublime that replaces cognition by will: the just is derived not from objectively known truth… but from subjectively willed truth… (1992:141). In this case there can be no consensus, yet totalitarianism wishes to reach universal community. Thus, by applying to politics of the sublime, which can never supply consensus, all that the totalitarianism causes is terror and kitsch (1992:419).

The different formulations of the sublime above addresses one question related to its political value: Should there be a politics of sublime or a sublime politics? According to Readings (1992), a sublime politics "would attempt to subject politics to the radical indeterminacy of the sublime as a questioning of rules and criteria", whereas the latter "would be the attempt to construct a politics on the basis of the rules and criteria offered by a sublime aesthetic" (441). Politics of the sublime corresponds to the attempt in which the sublime is applied for a model. This is the endeavor of thinkers such as Jameson and Eagleton. Sublime politics, on the other hand, is defended by postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard. This attitude takes the sublime in order to indicate that any attempt to reach consensus is inconclusive because consensus requires identity. The bitter result of identity politics is clear and thus, the sublime emphasizes the unpresentable. Lyotard's sublime, hence, is antitotalitarian, as the thought of social bond as hostage to a radical uncertainty. This addresses a politics of dissensus (Readings, 1992: 422-3). If we witness the raise of dialectics and negative politics in today's political thought, Kant's sublime seems to offer some fruitful ground for his proper and reasonable return. It is not his political views but the aesthetics of the sublime that promises at least a considerable sense of negation (with its non-synonymous

partners such as non-identity and plurality) instead of rigid positive analytical frame that has long been abandoned in the history of political thought.

In contrast to these approaches to the sublime and its possible political repercussions, for Ned O'Gorman political sublime is an oxymoron. He admits the unorthodox character of the sublime yet he refuses it to be radical in the sense of producing differentiation. The sublime can "produce a kind of sheer difference, cannot produce differentiation, for the latter requires predication and modification, which the sublime precludes. The political sublime is therefore an oxymoron" (2006: 891). Furthermore, following Donald Pease, O'Gorman states that the sublime serves for "conservative purposes" and thus in this sense, it "has repeatedly represented a retreat from politics centered on historical, contingent, and relatively (in)determinant political processes, in favor of a historical and radically (in)determinant orientations" (2006: 891). According to O'Gorman, the significance of the sublime in relation to politics does not reside in any political vision but its "sheer rhetorical lure". In this sense, for postmodern theorists the sublime corresponds to the "radical epistemological indeterminacy, interminable signification, extreme affective dislocation, indecipherable social networks, vast technological vistas, and disruptive ruptures" that addresses the "essence" of postmodern thought (2006: 893).

Other than the discussions on the potential of the sublime as a theoretical ground or principle for a new politics, there is a line of thought that take recourse to the sublime as a tool for the analyses of some political incidents in history. In the next chapter, the focus will be the re-appropriation of the sublime as a tool for international politics.

CHAPTER V:

KANT'S COSMOPOLITANISM AND SUBLIME TODAY

This chapter shall try to disclose the relation of Kant's cosmopolitanism to his theory of the sublime. Therefore, this chapter shall argue that in today's political conjuncture the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism together with its close bind of human rights stand in an unusual relation with the sublime. This mentioned relation grounds on the feeling of distant suffering which is a well-known phenomenon of this century due to some unfortunate social disasters. The temporary relationship between cosmopolitanism and the sublime emerges usually in the encounters of international disasters in recent world history. The distant suffering that is caused by the exposure to the news of the disasters is known to trigger a contemporary cosmopolitan solidarity. This schema needs more attention since there is an uptrend in reading this relationship as a key path to contemplate the contemporary world politics. In international politics and theories Kant's cosmopolitanism and his sublime are counted as valuable tools for analysis.

If we can speak of a "cosmopolitan feeling" today, it is in the very moments of seeing the images of an international disaster, or of political incidents of enormous scale such as terrorist acts, mass demonstrations, popular protest, etc. There is no ideal determinable procedure at the end of which we will reach

cosmopolitanism as a rational end. It flourishes in our minds in the moment we receive the news of an event of sublime nature in the media. I would like to draw attention to the temporal, passing or ephemeral nature of this experience, which is formed by the media. I contend that it is this passing moment, the trace of this fading experience, which constitutes a paradoxical ground for all the philosophical, jurisprudential and political debates on cosmopolitan rights, laws or even government, and yet such debates and arguments completely overlook this momentary experience, except as rhetorical introduction or example.

This study contents that cosmopolitanism is not an ideal to be achieved and rendered full in the future. Its only possibility of actualization is a moment of the sublime feeling. In the Kantian sublime, the subject is shaken to the bones and feels the power of the grandeur of nature. Yet, in the end we are soothed by the power of reason, which reminds us our own human power over nature. In the contemporary events of the sublime nature the awe and fear caused by excessive violence and atrocities are turned into a temporary feeling of world citizenship. Cosmopolitan feeling is caught in a fleeting moment. It is this temporary moment in which idea of cosmopolitan is practiced momentarily.

This last chapter seeks to disclose this present relationship between cosmopolitanism and sublime and the regained value of the Kantian philosophy in the face of a new world order. This relationship is addressed through examining the state of distant suffering in the face of social and natural disasters of 20th century interpreted as sublime and its relation to ideal of cosmopolitanism.

5.1. Humanity in Crisis: The Sublime in the Twentieth Century

As mentioned earlier, the Kantian sublime has been visited by a wide range of scholars from poststructuralist thinkers to some IR scholars for its possible political repercussions (Lyotard, 1998; Pease, 1984; Readings, 1992; Kearney, 2003; O'Gorman, 2006; Bleiker and Leet, 2009; La Capra, 2010).[79] Although there are serious problems in defining its definite political stance, the Kantian rendition of the concept is accepted to be a valuable opportunity or a key moment for the nexus between politics and aesthetics.

Since the concept has been recalled defining the malignancies of the 20th century, it turns out that in the 20th century, it is not nature but the "traumatic power and the violence of social forces displace nature as the site and trigger of the sublime" and this meant that the very core of the notion has changed now (Ray, 2009: 139).

The trigger of the contemporary reflections on the subject started after WWII invalidated the assumption that by the authority of universal reason there exist universal political norms that provide the well-being of all peoples of the world. The ideal of humanity, respect for civil rights, and inherent dignity of humanity were all negated first by the news of the Holocaust and then Hiroshima towards the end of the war.

After the Holocaust was known to the world, the shock was colossal. The chain of events was contrary to all kinds of humanistic ideals or the authority of

[79] The appropriation of the sublime is not limited to the names that are announced here. The contemporary reflection of the sublime has many other dimensions than aesthetic or political. See, Kenneth Holmqvist and Jaroslaw Pluciennick, 2002, "A Short Guide to Theory of the Sublime", Style 36 (4): 718-37.

sound reason. It marked the epic failure of reason and universal thinking. Hence, to *represent* or even to *speak* of the event required a new set of criteria or concepts.

At the end of the war, Hiroshima hit the human imagination deeply once more as the other incomprehensible disaster the war generated. After the Holocaust, the destruction caused by the atomic bomb *Little Boy* has represented the other event that changed the conception of extreme violence in modern history. According to Gene Ray, even if these two events are not identical or equivalent crimes, there is a "persistent linkage between the two names [that does] imply a shared political and ethical failure, as well as a common legacy of diminished human dignity and increased insecurity that all latecomers will have to bear" (2005: 21). Not surprisingly, after almost seventy years, the effects of these events still linger and people are still trying to *contemplate* the unimaginable.

In modern times the disappointment that these events cause on human imagination is best described by Adorno's words on Auschwitz:

> Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. To write poetry after the holocaust is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied contemplation (1981: 34).

Adorno also condemns the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And in a radio talk he states that: "one cannot dismiss the thought of that the invention of the atomic bomb, which can obliterate hundreds of thousands of people literally in one blow, belongs to the same historical context as genocide" (Adorno qtd. in Ray, 2005: 21).

Lyotard is another influential mind whose interpretation of Auschwitz is also razor-sharp as he writes: "The historian asks: What is human? What is

impossible? The question we must answer is: Do these words still have a meaning? Shouldn't we believe the inhumanity reported by the testimonies of Auschwitz? (1988: 18). He refuses all possible narrative representations of the event and states that the name Auschwitz is surrounded by a *silence*, a silence that implies a *différend*, a wrong (*tort*) which by its nature cannot be put into words or cannot be attained other than a feeling (1988: 56). According to Kearney, Lyotard's interpretation carries Adorno's dictum a step further as the philosopher demands *silence* for the representation of incommensurable, unspeakable, unimaginable terror revealed in Auschwitz (2001: 494).

Describing Auschwitz or Hiroshima as sublime in the strict Kantian sense would be a misinterpretation because the incidents did not carry any positive transcendental goal for moral self of subject as Kant's sublime promises. Yet, in the above remarks of these two thinkers, the preliminary alterations in the late modern notion of the sublime could be noticed. The impossibility to comprehend and speak of the Auschwitz was the most challenging state for reason. In the encounter of the horrific images of the war, the shock and the helpless state of human imagination assigned a radical limit to the faculties of the imagination and judgment with respect to human inflicted violence. In attempts to express the effects of the event on human imagination, the notion of the sublime in its Kantian rendition supplied a theoretical ground to *address* that which cannot be conveyed by classical representation.

In its classical version, Kant's sublime entails a *negative presentation* which is neither a representation of a sensible nor the representation of nothingness. According to Kant, the sublime "must in every case have reference to our way of thinking" and the mode of presentation in it can only be negative with respect to

the sensible. The *presentation of the infinite* that the imagination desires in accordance with its wish i.e., "thrusting aside of the sensible barriers" could merely be a *negative presentation* (*CJ* §29). Therefore, if we are to talk about a representation in the sublime experience, it would not mean indicating or exposing an object of representation but merely *addressing* the existence of something that cannot be *positively* represented.

The delicate representation of Auschwitz is thought in this way both by Adorno and Lyotard. According to Gene Ray, Adorno favored the Kantian sublime in terms of the negative presentation it offers because:

> For Adorno, [this] method of evoking without invoking, consistent with the traditional Jewish ban on images…would be central to his theorization of an "after Auschwitz" ethic of representation. It is thus one figure of thought in which he links, albeit indirectly Auschwitz and the sublime (2005: 22).

For Lyotard, the negative presentation of Kant's sublime suggested the fact that there is something that cannot be presented. According to Lyotard, "the silence that surrounds the phrase Auschwitz was the extermination camp is not a state of the mind, it is the sign that something remains to be phrased which is not, something which is not determined" (1988: 57). Thus, for Lyotard, the fact "that there is an unpresentable" can only be presented "negatively" (Ray, 2005: 22).

In the particular example of Auschwitz, we can detect significant deviations of the late-modern sublime from the classical sublime. Firstly, the trigger of the sublime feeling is altered. It turns out that in the 20th century, the "traumatic power and the violence of social forces displace nature as the site and trigger of the sublime" (Ray, 2009: 139). Therefore, it lacks the complementary part of the classical sublime that offers the reassurance of power of human reason and a feeling of pleasure. The feeling of absolute terror strips off the pleasure

principle. Secondly, the beholder in the classical Kantian sublime now corresponds to the spectators of distant disasters whose experience is indirect or mediated. Victims do not simply have the position to cherish their own capacities over nature like in the earlier version of the sublime experience. Due to the immense damage caused by social disasters, they usually suffer from a lethal impact as real witnesses. Therefore, the spectator is the only witness whose imagination is struck by the mediated images of the violence and terror released by the sublime event.

In his discussion of Auschwitz, Lyotard takes up the difficult example of the victim who cannot offer the evidence of people put into the gas chamber because there is no eyewitness who is not dead and victim at the same time (1988: 12). It also marks the shift from eye witness/victim to witness/ spectator. The spectators of this event who see the images of the camps as the evidence of extreme violence are as safe as Kant's subject is in the encounter with nature that will lead to a judgment of the sublime. Kant writes in *the third Critique* that a lethal fear cannot be a source for the sublime feeling because "it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously intended" (Kant, 2000: 144). Following this, it is evident that what we mean by the sublime in social disasters does not correspond to the lethal terror that the victims suffered. Nor the thrill of the spectator culminates in a negative pleasure. In the twentieth-century sublime experience "the terror of the sublime becomes permanent ghastly latency, compounded by the anguish of shame" (Ray, 2005: 5). In this sense the sublime can only be a theoretical frame which can at best sympathize with the shock of the imagination in the encounter of such violence. Lyotard gives an account of this particular inability by the following example:

> Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects but also the instruments used to measure earthquakes directly and indirectly. The impossibility of quantitatively measuring it does not prohibit, but rather inspires in the minds of the survivors the idea of a very great seismic force. The scholar claims to know nothing about it, but the common person has a complex feeling, the one aroused by the *negative presentation of the indeterminate* (1988: 56-7).

This "complex feeling" is what constitutes the nub of Lyotard's argument. I think in contemporary times this feeling corresponds to the power which transforms the spectators into cosmopolitan agents who, as the spectator of the mediated experience of social disasters, are eager to respond in cosmopolitan terms.

5.2. Mediated Sublime: The Sublime in the Twenty-First Century

As the compelling and rigid nature of universal laws was proved futile, in the postwar period, the social sciences had to question the fundamentals of universal politics. In the search for a new set of concepts, the Kantian rendition of sublime was one of the notions that are applied. Once it was applied to understand the horrendous aspect of the war and then, it is also referred in the discussions of nature of future politics. What presented an opportunity in this regard is the autonomous character of the sublime. The classical sublime escapes from the limitations of the universal laws of sensibility due to its aesthetic character. Yet, it has its own law, so it is not chaotic in the end. This feature of autonomy of the Kantian sublime has become essential in the contemporary political discussions.

More recently, in the field of international relations, the sublime is applied as a framework to interpret international terror attacks. Amongst the unfortunate events contemporary global politics generated, the one that held the title "sublime" is the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. It is not the only instance of international terrorism but it is sorted the biggest in death toll among

recent attacks. Furthermore, the range of the shock is amplified by the fact that the attack was performed against the country with the most formidable intelligence services. The news of the attack had a broad repercussion in the press. Images of the collapse of the Twin Towers left the world struck with consternation. In the endless debates around the event, it is regarded as an instance of terror which has an effect on the imagination much like the sublime (Bleiker and Leet, 2006: Kearney, 2003; Ray, 2009; Silverman, 2002).

The aesthetic aspect of this particular example was so strong that Silverman claimed that the attacks were "quintessentially sublime". Furthermore, Karlheinz Stockhausen described the event as "the biggest work of art ever anywhere, for the whole cosmos" (qtd. in Battersby, 2007: 21). Clearly, the attacks can be described as the sublime however, if we consider Kant's, it is not possible to describe them as proper examples of Kantian sublime (Battersby, 2003: 85).

Several deviations from Kantian sublime can be registered in the particular example of the 9/11 attacks. To begin with, Kant writes in the third *Critique* that a lethal fear cannot be a source for the sublime feeling because "it is impossible to find satisfaction in a terror that is seriously intended" (Kant, 2000: 144). Yet, the use of the sublime in the 20th century indicates three significant shifts in the appropriation of the notion. Firstly, the complementary part of the classical sublime that offers the reassurance of the power of human reason and a feeling of pleasure following it are lost forever. The feeling of absolute terror "becomes ghastly latency, compounded by the anguish of the shame" (Ray, 2005: 5). Bleiker and Leet do not seem to agree on this point as they write:

> (a)ll too often the experience of dislocation wrought by the sublime is countered immediately with heroic and masculine understandings of the political, which seek to mobilise the unleashed energy for projects of mastery and control. The sublime appears to invite its own dissolution as

> whole nations attempt to obliterate the conditions of possibility of ambivalent experiences (2006: 714).

Second, the position of the beholder in the classical Kantian sublime now corresponds to the spectator whose experience is indirect or mediated. In this century, due to the great damage caused by social disasters, the real witnesses usually suffer from a lethal impact. Therefore, as victims, they do not simply have the position to cherish their own capacities over nature or the evil act in the event, like in the earlier version of sublime experience. The spectator is the only witness whose imagination is struck by the mediated images of the violence and terror the sublime event releases. In his discussion of Auschwitz Lyotard takes up the difficult example of the victim who cannot offer the evidence of people put into the gas chamber because there is no eyewitness that is not dead but victim at the same time (*D* 12). This remark addresses also the shift from eye-witness/victim to witness/ spectator. As the only alive witnesses whose knowledge is mediated, spectators are the distant sufferers. This brings us to the third deviation. Now, the terror the victims suffered from is relived through mediated images staged by live broadcasts. The spectatorship of such events is inherent to today's sublime feeling. For instance, according to Bleiker and Leet, the 9/11 attacks cannot be thought without the fact of its being "televised instantaneously around the world" (2006: 715). This recognition corresponds to the significant role of the media in the discussions of contemporary sublime. Indeed, the media appears as a major field of cosmopolitan experience, which has three dimensions: this is an experience of sublime nature, which has to do with a distant suffering and a cosmopolitan feeling.

5.3. The Kantian Sublime and Distant Suffering

The Kantian sublime is never a destructive moment in Kant's system. It is a quite different kind of cherishing the cognitive faculties. The failure of one faculty is the means for a higher kind of wakefulness. Hence, the Kantian sublime is never about suffering from nature. Yet, in the vast history of the concept, there is one particular natural disaster that is accepted to have influenced the thought on sublime deeply: the Great Lisbon earthquake of 1755. It was a mega thrust earthquake with a range of 8.5-9.0 in magnitude and affected a large area causing the death of thousands of people. It was neither the greatest nor one of the greatest earthquakes in measure or in the size of destruction in the world history back then. However, it was the disaster which deeply influenced Europe and it is admitted to lead the emergence of seismology due to endless scientific speculations following the disaster (Larsen, 2006; Ray, 2009; Sliwinski, 2009).

Astonished by its might and effects, Kant wrote three separate essays on Lisbon earthquake. According to Larsen (2009), the earthquake has influenced Kant so deep that he not only have left theological accounts of the notion of infinity but also changed his value system. In the three essays he tried to explain the disaster scientifically rather than supernaturally. Thus,

> the speculative methods and sarcastic rebuffs of the logical deficiencies in the arguments of other scholars have disappeared in favour of meticulous reports on empirical details of the widespread effects of the disaster across the continent together with cautious suggestions of causal explanations (2009: 362).

Abandoning any reference to providence, Kant has stripped the freedom of man off the divine intervention and designed it as limited only by incomprehensible nature. The notion of sublime and the free human subject who exercises his power in the

face of enigmatic and incomprehensible nature in the sublime experience might have well be grounded on the profound effects of the earthquake on the philosopher (Larsen, 2009: 365). Still, it is significant to note that Kant never described the Lisbon earthquake as sublime later in his third *Critique*. This attitude shows that let alone a social disaster, Kant's sublime is never merely attributed to a natural catastrophe even if it is mighty enough to erase cities from the map. One possible reason of this is that perhaps the earthquake was seen by Kant as more of a destructive moment than a simple trigger of a feeling in subject. The might of it was so destructive that for the unfortunate people who witnessed the event, it was a complete defeat against nature.

Kant seems to have overlooked the social consequences, since he was so engaged with the possible scientific explanation and future prevention from the earthquake. When the news has reached to other parts of the world, the immediate effect was a shock and following it, a distant kind of suffering. Sharon Sliwinski suggests that the Great Lisbon earthquake is the disaster that "marks one of the first instances in which subjects became spectators faced with the ethical and political implications of regarding distant suffering" in Europe and "the circulation of eyewitness reports and images appears to have produced an intense affective climate that provided fertile ground for the notion of a singular humanity" (2009: 31).

As a humanist, Kant focused on his novel notion of human freedom that is independent of providence. This particular disaster has led him from the idea of god to a potent incommensurable nature. However, he never wrote on the social aspect of the disaster and never explicitly linked it to his notion of sublime. More interesting than this is for our present concern is that Kant gives war as an example

of the dynamically sublime. It is an exciting remark because war might be as long-suffering as an earthquake but it is not of nature. Still, Kant does not mention the Great Lisbon earthquake in third *Critique* but he accepts war as the dynamically sublime.[80] Comparing to Kant's treatment of the Great Lisbon earthquake as merely a natural catastrophe but not sublime, his approval of war is stipulated by respect for civil rights of man. Thus, as far as "order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians" are provided, Kant sees "something sublime about" war (*CJ* §28). The key content of this remark lies in the respect for human rights. Surely, the Lisbon earthquake has surpassed any measure of destruction in the matter of rights of civilians, since let alone evoking the feeling of the sublime, it took numerous lives. Contrary to such a disaster, the Kantian sublime appears to be a disruptive moment but only for good reason: Cherishing of human reason and its capacities and, reassurance of human power over nature.

5.4. Kant's Cosmopolitanism, Sublime and Distant Suffering

Cosmopolitanism has been dealt as an ideal for centuries but as mentioned in the introduction, this ideal has been widely criticized for not having an empirical value or because it assumes that the real world operates strictly according to universal principles of human rights. The Kantian cosmopolitanism receives its share from severe criticisms such as early as Hegel's. Robert Fine, however, defends the Kantian, enlightenment cosmopolitanism by emphasizing that Kant was not a blind optimist. He writes:

[80] As Kant remarks: 'War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude" (*CJ* §28).

> Kant was well aware that cosmopolitanism might be considered ‘‘fantastical’’ because European states continued to relate to one another more like atomised individuals in a Hobbesian state of nature than legal subjects under international law. His obstinacy, however, was to hold that the idea of a cosmopolitan condition was nonetheless right and that it was necessary to look beyond immediate circumstances to longer-term historical tendencies to see the justification of the cosmopolitan point of view: to the inter-connections of peoples around the world, to the consequence of travel and movement across borders, to the expansion of commodity exchange between nations, to the risks and costs associated with war, and not least to the education of modern republican citizens (2009: 12-3).

Not surprisingly, after WWII, empirical hope has fade out in the face of war. As well as the ideal of humanity, that of cosmopolitanism damaged severely. Living on the same earth or carrying the same essence of humanity did not help us to recover the traumatic effects of the war. Hence, the very ideal of cosmopolitan thinking as well as that of humanity have taken a fatal impact back in late 1990s.

In order to make sure that such violations will not be repeated, beginning with the Nuremberg Trial (1945), the ideal of human rights has gained a positive existence through the Universal Declaration of Human rights (1948), European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Yet, even after horrible experiences contra human rights, the norms in these declarations, conventions or covenants are ignored at times. However, it is the fact that they did not exist before WWII but they do now, even if they are violated clearly and distinctly (Fine, 2009: 16). The worse is that in the present circumstances, “in political argument appeal is now regularly made to the idea of human rights either to justify state actions or denounce them (Krisch qtd. in Fine 2009: 16).

In this century, the endless condemnation of the Holocaust goes parallel with contemporary incidents of violations of human rights. Neither the collective

memory nor the strict universal norms of human rights declarations or covenants are effective to stop the violence that is practiced to terminate the international terrorism in the name of the peoples of the world. The fate and value of so called humanitarian interventions are disputed widely. Yet in the end, it is astonishing to discover that today in order men, who are all subjected to and protected by international law, to *feel* that they all live in the same world, some social or natural disasters seem obligatory. In these circumstances, the ancient ideal of cosmopolitanism, which now loses blood in midst of debates those that discuss the very criteria of it, seems to tie its hopes to the state of distant suffering caused by these social or natural catastrophes.

The opportunity of sublime events or incidents is that the moment in which any nationality loses its validity in the face of the horrible events. The collective grief is a moment in which every responsible and sane citizen in any country feels grief and empathy. The cosmopolitan ideal that entails the feeling of being the citizen of the world is felt truly in these dark times. And unfortunately it is not the trade or world federation that postulates the laws for a world citizen but the sudden breaks in history or natural disasters that supply the ambiance for a thought that we live on the same planet and the incidents that effect human beings in one corner can touch the others that live in the furthest points on earth. A cosmopolitan existence or the feeling of a world citizen arises in these moments of distant suffering. Let us turn our attention to the analytics of this experience thorough the particular example of the 9/11.

In today's world a late-modern subject can notice two significant facts. Firstly, international politics is defined as almost a locus that produces awe and fear and it is seen as the very nature of global politics (Bleiker and Leet, 2006).

Secondly, the contemporary world is defined by transnational experiences in all fields, and the media is held responsible for the mobility of transnational information all around the world. The late-modern sublime that I try to indicate in the present paper emerges at the intersection of these two conditions. The most apt example for the late-modern sublime, then, is the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. On that day, images of the collapsing Twin Towers left the world struck with consternation. Nearly 3,000 people died and not surprisingly, the news of the attack had a broad repercussion in the worldwide media.

Due to "a very explicit aesthetic dimension" (Bleiker and Leet, 2006: 717) and a shocking effect on our imagination, the attacks are regarded as "quintessentially sublime" (Silverman, 2002: 1) though it is not wrong to hesitate for a moment before calling the event the sublime due to "the hideous nature of pain and loss involved" (Kearney, 2003: 41).

In the particular example of the 9/11 attacks the late-modern sublime deviates from both the classical Kantian sublime and the sublime aspects of the Holocaust and Hiroshima at least in one crucial aspect. Only after three minutes of the first plane crash to the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the moments of terror was broadcast live worldwide on TV. This caused a bizarre kind of a shared experience of disaster and not surprisingly has blurred the distinction between direct witness and spectator. This particular example of mediation of the 9/11 attacks has altered the existing state of news of distant suffering that was usually performed following the event. In the televised experience of the 9/11, the spectatorship is so embedded in the event that the 9/11 attacks cannot be thought without the fact of its being "televised instantaneously around the world" (Bleiker

and Leet, 2006: 715). The media carried moments of real terror simultaneously into our homes while we remained as "the spectators at a safe distance". According to Kearney, this kind of televised experience generated a feeling of "suffering 'as if' [spectators] were present to the terror" and he defines this both as "modern America's first traumatic experience of alien Terror on its own soil"; and also as a feeling of "detachment by virtue of their real absence from the scene itself (as when Bush said to Congress, 'We are a Nation awakened to danger')" (2003: 41).

The possible relation of the Kantian cosmopolitanism and the sublime that I try to address here is grounded in this mentioned alteration in the state of spectatorship. Recall that Kant's cosmopolitan vision presupposed as early as the 18th century that we have entered a universal community and a violation of rights can be felt in the farthest corners of the world. I think Kant's foresighted remark is *empirically* validated in the mediation of the news of the attacks on the Twin Towers. Kant never writes of the nature of this feeling but I believe that now in the very example of this unfortunate event, we have a chance to scrutinize the cosmopolitan feeling that Kant once addressed. Moreover, surprisingly this feeling is engaged with the sublime understanding of the philosopher.

Describing the 9/11 attacks as the sublime certainly suggests that the world's experience of the event is aesthetic rather than cognitive or logical. The first reaction of the world was not logical, either. The media, gone mad by the possible repercussions of the attack and took over the reality of the incident and transformed it into a *media event*. Following the 9/11 attacks people, who turned on their television in order to get timely factual information, saw a ghastly sequence and replay of the images of blasting planes, collapsing of the two giant towers or unfortunate victims jumping one by one to their death to escape the flames. I

believe that between the first and almost simultaneous experience of the attacks and the rerun of horrific images over and over again, a cosmopolitan feeling is evoked. It is similar to what Kant meant when he wrote that a violation of rights is felt in the far away corners of the world. I think we can see this cosmopolitan attitude in the registered immediate reaction of spectators which is usually accompanied by collective grief and commemoration of the victims.[81]

To substantiate this claim I would like to draw upon Lilie Chouliaraki's *The Spectatorship of Suffering*.[82] Chouliaraki observes different attitudes in the news text in relation to both the portrayal of the sufferer and the narration of the suffering on screen. She proposes a hierarchy of disaster news as *adventure*, *emergency* and *ecstatic* news. As to their relation to a cosmopolitan attitude, each type of news indicates different levels of global relations of power. Among these, *ecstatic news* presents us a *truly historic time* by unfolding the event *moment by moment*. Furthermore, they emphasize a demand for action in the relationship between the spectator and the victims and thus, cause an immediate cosmopolitan sensibility (2008:377). Chouliaraki offers the mediation of the 9/11 attacks as a typical example of ecstatic news due to the undecidable character of the attacks. According to her, their undecidability follows from "a dialectic of openness and

[81] There are basically two sides that evaluate the possible effects of the media on cosmopolitan thinking. The optimist approach claims that as globally broadcasted events, the distant disasters gather nations around empathy or pity towards the victims. This basically shows the potential of the media in cultivating a cosmopolitan sensibility (Thompson 1995; Tomlinson 1999). The pessimists, on the contrary, accuse the media and in particular television of distancing spectators morally from the sufferers (Habermas 1989; Robins 1994). See, John B. Thompson, Media and Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995; John Tomlinson. Globalisation and Culture. London: Polity, 1999; Jurgen Habermas. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989; Kevin Robins. "Forces of Consumption: From the Symbolic to the Psychotic". Media, Culture and Society, 16:449–68, 1994.

[82] Surely, my selected example of Chouliaraki's approach of ecstatic news does not capture the full dynamic or all sides of the mediation. Nor I intend to consider a detailed account of it. For the sake of a philosophical enquiry of the cosmopolitan feeling that I plan to expand, here I restricted my account to the sublime aspect of the mediation of the 9/11 as ecstatic news.

closure, a dialectic with space and time dimensions. In terms of space, the event is mediated simultaneously as a local tragedy and as a global political fact. In terms of time, the event is mediated simultaneously as contingent, as news, and as making history" (2006: 158).

Chouliaraki's example of an eight-minute shot of the Manhattan skyline burning exposes the mechanism of the mediation of the images as the sublime. She describes the aesthetic quality of the scene as a *tableau vivant*. According to her,

> The camera's gaze centers on the fumes covering the city and, simultaneously, couples two image themes- the grey sky and the clear turquoise seawater. In aesthetic terms, the camera couples the horror and awe of the sublime with the domesticity and friendliness of the beautiful (2006: 173).

According to Chouliaraki, considering the analytics of the mediation of ecstatic news brings us to the fact that the time in the mediation of the events such as the 9/11 corresponds to what Heidegger calls *ecstatic temporality*. According to Heidegger, in order to know something, say a sensible event, one must go out of the event as a requisite for finite knowledge. Such an act of knowing is at the same time a constant 'standing-out-from', the event. This is what Heidegger calls *ecstasis*. Relying on this, we can say that the ecstatic character of the mediation of disaster news indicates both a going-out and standing-out-from the broadcasted event. In relation of the media to the disasters, this distancing or spacing addresses the inevitable loss of the presence of the event itself.

What Heidegger's concept of ecstasy implies is that mediation only provides a *horizon without fixing knowledge*. In Heidegger's words, as the condition of finite knowledge, the "standing-out-from…, precisely in the standing, forms and therein holds before itself—a horizon." (1990: 84). This implies that no fixed framework can be decided for what the spectator response will be to the

spectacles of suffering, before any account of the diversity of local media and manifold of cultural contexts in which such spectacles or images are received.

Chouliaraki admits that the sublime would also lead to denunciation of suffering. Yet still she contends that the sublime with its aesthetic aspect *moralizes* the spectator. Moralization is achieved through symbolic meaning. Two strategic inversions constitute the core of the moralization of the spectator: an *inversion in time* (*anachronism*) and an *inversion in space* (*anatopism*). With an inversion in time, a past reference is produced. In the case of the 9/11, Pearl Harbour suffering is linked to the attacks in an "eternal flow of history". With the inversion of the space, separate locations are equalized and a close proximity is enabled. Thus, with both an *anachronistic* and *anatopic* structure, the sublime "construes a moral horizon" (2006: 174).

The cosmopolitan thinking that I would like to address is generated by this moral horizon in the mediation of the suffering. It requires to be defined as an aesthetic experience, since it follows from the sublime as its moral component. Therefore, the cosmopolitan feeling here is not intellectual or rational as in Kant's reason-based cosmopolitan view. It is of a different kind, an aesthetic kind. In this sense, the aesthetic experience I address here also differs from the discussions of existing cosmopolitanism(s) that seek for normative principles.

In order to analyze cosmopolitanism as an aesthetic feeling similar to the sublime, I would like to take recourse to a fundamental distinction between experience as *Erlebnis* and experience as *Erfahrung*. Simply put, *Erfahrung* is an empirical or cognitive experience which refers to learning or an abstraction. On the contrary, *Erlebnis* corresponds to life experience. More significantly, while *Erfahrung* has to do with generality and thus, universal thinking, *Erlebnis* refers to

a kind of experience that is by its nature individual and singular. Following this distinction, we might say that the kind of cosmopolitan experience which is at stake here recalls *Erlebnis*.

Then, how do we understand the singularity of experience here? What do we mean by it? In order to comprehend this, the relation of this experience to the sublime nature of the event needs to be emphasized. Jean-Luc Nancy's understanding of the sublime might be of help at this point. In his account of the sublime, Nancy makes a distinction between representation and presentation. Representation is a signification, which requires conformity or agreement. Contrary to this, in presentation what is at stake is "the event and the explosion of an appearing and disappearing which, considered in themselves, cannot conform to or signify anything" (1993: 2). What I tried to address in this study can be seen as an *explosion of appearing and disappearing* of a cosmopolitan aesthetic feeling as the complementary part of the late-modern sublime. Thus, the core of my argument can be formulated as follows: today the self-enjoyment of reason or the self-presentation of the imagination in the classical sublime is lost in the encounter with the mediated images of catastrophic events that is now accepted to trigger the sublime feeling. The inhuman (and often also immoral) images are tried to be compensated by a cosmopolitan feeling or '*(e)motion*', as Nancy might say. This feeling is experienced as a limit experience.

In the 21st century, it is not the limit of sensibility as in the classical sublime, but that of humanity that is confronted. The spectator-subject, who shares the unimaginable terror through some mediated images at the limit, encounters a cosmopolitan horizon instead of the self-enjoyment of reason. In the classical sublime, reason saves the imagination from crisis by recalling the ultimate

principle of humanity whereas the very occurrence of the contemporary sublime is triggered by a scene of inhuman violence. This time the distress to overcome is not as easy as reviewing the mental capacities of man as in Kant's sublime. And yet, as the damage strikes humanistic thought, reason has to apply to a cosmopolitan feeling that would remind us the idea of living in the same world and thus, restore the moral principle of humanity. Due to the humanistic nature of reason, cosmopolitan feeling is *expected* to be felt by any spectator in the encounter of a distant suffering in the form of a violation of rights. In other words, this feeling demands to be represented in some communal sense which would later culminate in a cosmopolitan action. However, what Bill Readings wrote about Kantian sublime, applies here to this cosmopolitan feeling: it "demands to be shared but it cannot the object of a social representation" (1992: 414). It cannot be permanently represented or enter into an economy of reproduction because it appears as the complementary, moralizing part of an aesthetic (sublime) experience. In other words, it cannot be abstracted or rationalized as some rationales. Hence, it is inevitably and merely experienced as a *horizon* at the limit, through the limit.

CHAPTER VI:

CONCLUSION

This study has set out to substantiate the claim that the Kantian aesthetics and in particular the sublime is more relevant to contemporary political discourse than Kant's political thought which is famous for his cosmopolitan ideas on world peace. In order to validate this claim, in Chapter II firstly, Kant's political philosophy was revisited in its cosmopolitan perspective and its close relationship to Kant's ethics. As we have mentioned earlier (in page 51), it is recognized that Kant's practical and political philosophy aim at "the possibility of realizing a moral political order through interventions in social-political reality by autonomous reason" (Apel, 1997: 82). In accordance with this idea of moral-political order what is offered by Kant for the individual is to act with respect to a right which is "the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom" (p.27; MM 133). Following this, what is offered for international public in order to achieve perpetual peace are forming a world federation, recognizing rights of hospitality and acknowledging the power of commerce.

The second part of Chapter II indicated that all these Kantian ideas are found their places in discussions concerning United Nations, international courts of justice and refugee rights in a transnational public sphere in the late 90s. Yet, in the

search for a universal criterion to overcome the inevitable outcomes of globalization, that is, the pluralism and multiculturalism, Kant's thought is taken to be provisional but insufficient to the task.

Besides the normative search for a criterion to regulate the transnational world, in the late 90s, Kant has become once more popular in discussions, but this time by his aesthetics. Aesthetics was never an element for Kant in his political schema. Bearing this in mind, the third chapter provided the sublime in its original version in Kant's aesthetics. After analyzing the two modes of the sublime and the role of the imagination, it was stated that the sublime meant more than an aesthetic moment. It represented an anti-humanist moment, a moment prior to categories of the understanding. In its unique mode the sublime was described as a non-rational, non-cognitive non-experience in this study.

In the next chapter for the evaluated political import of the Kantian aesthetics Hannah Arendt and Jean-François Lyotard were visited as the two thinkers who take Kantian aesthetics into account in political discourse. They focused on the judgments of taste and the sublime respectively. Arendt's study on Kant is valuable because she drew attention to *sensus communis* and enlarged mentality that might well be applied to political thought. Following the formation of the aesthetic judgments of beautiful Arendt claims that the public sphere, the ultimate principle of which is *communicability*, is constituted by spectators but not by acting agents. This helped understanding the power of the spectator in this century in which we are surrounded by mediated images all around.

Lyotard's reading of the sublime mattered to this study because Lyotard unearthed the unique character of the sublime for the Kantian philosophy. For him, sublime is a moment of conflict, dissensus which *threatenes* the unity of the

subject. Therefore, what is experienced in the sublime is the reflective mode of thought that is prior to any concept, thus prior to the understanding and language. In accordance with this, sublime addresses a silence. This mode of the sublime is significant for this study in understanding the mode of the cosmopolitan aesthetic experience offered in the face of the mediated sublime events. The end of Chapter IV expressed the transformation of the sublime in the 90s. Sublime provided a framework to describe the horrendous state of human imagination in the face of the Holoacust and Hiroshima respectively. And when we come to the 20th century, the sublime feeling was called for the feeling that results mostly from immoral human acts. Due to this historical fact, the classical sublime lost the aspect of moral feeling, which used to complement it.

After separate theoretical discussions of cosmopolitanism and the sublime in earlier chapters, Chapter V provided the empirical instance of the contemporary link between the two. It is argued that today, due to the necessarily transnational structure of the world in the convergence of the Kantian sublime, its mediation and the state of distant suffering, cosmopolitanism was offered as the alternative moral feeling that can restore the lost moral aspect of the sublime. Moreover, it was contended that cosmopolitanism as a moral feeling which can complement the contemporary sublime is of an aesthetic origin in accordance with the sublime.

Following all above, aesthetic cosmopolitan reaction mentioned in this study interpreted as a universal Kantian morality-motivated aesthetic reaction which comes prior to a possible moral-political order desired by the Kantian cosmopolitanism, which is secured by autonomous reason. Furthermore, if in the sublime, reason and morality are involved and if the sublime means experiencing the imperative aesthetically, reflectively and non-determinatively, then the sublime

of this century carries a new kind of extensive (may be even moral) connectivity in the aforementioned aesthetically experienced cosmopolitan feeling.

On the mode of this experience, it was argued that this individual experience of spectator-subject cannot be represented *positively* in a normative form. Thus, in the end we cannot claim for this mode of cosmopolitan feeling more than what Kant argued for the presentation of the infinite in the classical sublime: a *negative presentation*. This implies that now cosmopolitanism cannot be represented as some universal concepts or regulations. It is rather a feeling, an attitude, which admits singularity. Lastly, if we are to ask what would be inferred from cosmopolitanism as an aesthetic experience, the answer is that it creates a cosmopolitan spectator whose identification with the images of the distant suffering carries a potential to be transformed into a cosmopolitan solidarity.

As for the possible state of this experience, Lyotard's sense of the sublime was recalled as he claims that the sublime is the moment before the subject, the language and thus, before the faculties. Any solid cosmopolitan agenda that is experienced as a *horizon* (Nancy) in this sublime event is necessarily before any kind of determined cosmopolitanisms. In this sense it is said that this aesthetic cosmopolitan feeling transcends various present cosmopolitanisms by being not normative.

On the state of spectator/ actor it is inferred that today's mediated sublime events enable a convergence between Kant's sublime and his cosmopolitan view and by this means, they supply a second chance for the Kantian cosmopolitan world by means of revealing a potential ground for a cosmopolitan public. From the perspective of the spectators, they reveal a potential for a spectator/actor in Arendtian sense. Different from the Holocaust and Hiroshima, now the spectator is

not only a spectator but also somehow a potential actor who can feel like acting just after hours from the disaster or just after being exposed to the suffering images of others on television. To the crisis of the imagination in the encounter of horrific images which clearly indicates that human beings are not by definition respect the lives of other human beings, reason comes forward and in the helpless endeavor to show that we care for the others, we decide to participate in condemns or aid pledges. In other words, today's sublime events and the response they get indicate a form of cosmopolitanism in the form of a feeling that has the potential of leading to a cosmopolitan act such as aid pledges, boycott etc... Today's mediated sublime events are the locus where the inable, helpless, compassionate and ashamed spectator of the Holocaust and Hiroshima can be changed into a spectator/ actor in Arendtian sense. The lost moral aspect of the sublime is actualized in the action of the spectator who autonomously decide to participate in aid pledges, boycotts etc…Yet, we should be aware that this is not an aesthetic reaction anymore. In Kantian philosophy, it is a reaction of a moral and autonomous subject and it will affect the other people since it is performed in sensible world, in the phenomenal world. If we consider all these, it can be said that in today's sublime events a kind of Kantian aesthetic response could lead to an act decided by free will and performed by free individuals who are aware of the rights and freedom of the others and who act upon this principle.

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