

OPENING THE BLACKBOX:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH MILITARY

Ph.D. Dissertation

METİN GÖRCAN

Department of Political Science and Public Administration
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
March 2016

To Senem...



**OPENING THE BLACKBOX:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH MILITARY**

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

METİN GÜRCAN

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

March 2016

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınli
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Prof. Dr. İhsan BAL
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Uğur GÜNGÖR
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Halime DEMİRKAN
Director

ABSTRACT

OPENING THE BLACKBOX: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TURKISH MILITARY

Gürcan, Metin

P.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil

Co- Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper

Co- Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı

March 2016

The existing research on Turkish civil-military relations (CMR) in general and on civilianization process since the early 2000s in particular tends to neglect the military side of the story. Despite the fact that the literature on Turkish (CMR) has expanded enormously in the last decades, the literature is dominated by mostly descriptive and argumentative “outside-in” insights, provided by the “civilian” researchers. Indeed, the absence of internal empirical insights from within the Turkish military, which is still a black box waiting to be opened in scholarly terms, would be listed as the first shortfall in the literature of Turkish CMR.

This research aims at opening the blackbox of the Turkish military and emphasizes that not only exogenous factors but also endogenous factors from within the military should be taken into consideration when analyzing the changes in the Turkish civil-military relations. The following research questions direct this study: Why, how, to what extent, in which domains, and through which mechanism has Turkish military been transforming itself? How does this transformation affect first the military’s organizational culture, and then Turkish CMR? To answer these

questions, this research is based on the eclectic theoretical design benefiting both from the model of gradual institutional change and culturalist approach to the military.

This research seeks to follow an approach from multiple angles (e.g., TAF as a security organization, as a social institution and officership as a profession) as well as from multiple levels (e.g., institutional, individual) with the use of original and primary data (in-depth interviews with 82 officers from different ranks and services and surveys applied to 1,401 officers, a representative sample of officer corps in terms of rank and service distribution). This multi-method design reflecting insights from different levels of analysis provides an opportunity to the research for triangulation of the findings for more external validity.

Simply, by revealing the High Command's attempts to transform TAF's security culture, elucidating dynamics influencing change in the TAF's social culture and examining differentiation within the officer corps, this research provides a snapshot of the Turkish military and an empirical discussion of those endogenous factors influencing the Turkish CMR.

The findings show that the differentiation among the TAF's security culture, social culture and officer corps' professional culture in terms of change types (layering, drift, conversion, displacement), change agents (subversives, opportunists, symbionts, insurgents) change pathways (emulation, adaptation, innovation) creates a power-distributional effect of change, which according to this research, yields to gradual institutional transformation within the TAF. This research suggests that while the TAF's security culture and social culture have been changing, as of May-September 2015, as the ranks decrease, there are some major trends influencing the

professional culture of the officer corps, such as the increasing heterogenization and diversification of the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps and change from value-centric officership to focusing on financial goals and career opportunities. The findings of this research also falsify taken-for-granted assumptions in the literature conceptualizing the TAF is a rigid organization immune to change and a homogenous entity with a fixed institutional order.

Keywords: Turkish military, civil-military relations, institutional change



ÖZET

KARAKUTUYU AÇMAK TÜRK SİLAHLI KUVVETLERİNDE DÖNÜŞÜM

Gürcan, Metin

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ersel Aydınllı

Mart 2016

Türk sivil-asker ilişkileri hakkında oldukça geniş bir literatür olmasına rağmen literatürdeki çalışmaların tamamına yakını Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK), kurumu yakından tanımayan ‘sivil’ araştırmacı ve akademisyenlerin ‘dışarıdan’ yaptıkları gözlemlerle tanımlanıp tarif edilmeye çalışır. Fakat sivil-asker ilişkilerini daha iyi anlamak ve akademi için hala açılmaya bekleyen bir karakutu olan TSK’yı daha yakından tanımak için muvazzaf TSK personelinin ‘içeriden’ yaptığı çalışmalara büyük ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.

İşte bu çalışma hem bireysel hem de organizasyonel analiz düzeylerinde, kalitatif ve kantitatif yöntemler kullanarak TSK karakutusunu açarak bu eksikliği doldurmayı amaç edinmektedir. Bunun için de son on yılda TSK’nın bir güvenlik aktörü, sosyal bir kurum ve bir meslek olarak subaylık alanlarında yaşadığı kurumsal dönüşüme odaklanır. Çalışma şu araştırma sorularına cevap arar: Niçin, ne dereceye kadar, hangi alanlarda ve hangi mekanizmalarla TSK son on yılda kendini dönüştürmeye çalışmaktadır? TSK’nın yaşadığı kurumsal dönüşüm süreci onun

kurumsal kültürünü ve sivil-askeri ilişkilerini nasıl etkilemektedir? TSK demokratik konsolidasyonun bir parçası olan sivil kontrolü ne dereceye kadar içselleştirmiştir? Bu soruları cevaplamak için eklektik bir teorik dizayn benimseyen çalışmada hem tedrici kurumsal değişim gibi kurumsalcı yaklaşım hem de modern ordulardaki değişimi açıklayan kültürcü yaklaşımlar bir arada kullanılmaktadır.

Aynı zamanda çoklu bir araştırma yöntemi benimseyen çalışmada hem kalitatif (kurumsal analiz ve değişik rütbe ve kuvvetlerden 82 muvazzaf subayla derinlemesine mülakatlar) hem de kantitatif (TSK’da görev yapan subayların temsili bir örnekleme olan 1401 subayla anket) teknikler aynı anda kullanılmaktadır. Bu sayede karmaşık bir kurum olan TSK ile ilgili bulgular birbirleri ile kıyaslanarak kontrol edilmektedir (*triangulation*).

Çalışmanın bulgularına göre TSK’nın güvenlik kültürü ile sosyal kültüründe ve TSK’da görev yapan subayların profesyonel kültürlerinde değişim tipi, değişim aktörleri ve değişim süreçleri ile değişim modları açısından bakıldığında bir farklılaşma olduğu görülmektedir. Bu farklılaşma TSK’daki değişimin gücün farklı şekillerde dağıldığı ve kullanıldığı tedrici kurumsal değişim modeli ile açıklanabileceğini göstermektedir. Yine bulgular TSK’nın güvenlik kültürü ile sosyal kültürü bir değişim içinde olduğunu, Mayıs-Eylül 2015 dönemi itibarı ile de, TSK’da görev yapan subayların da arasında gerek rübelere gerekse görev yaptıkları kuvvetlere göre farklı görüş ve fikirlerin olduğunu göstermektedir. Örneğin, subay kadrosu içinde rütbe düştükçe heterojenlik artmakta, değerlere önem veren subay tipinden maddi imkanlar ile kariyer fırsatlarına önem veren subay tipine geçiş görülmekte, subaylığın kolektif bir kimlik olmaktan çıkarak daha bireyseldi bir kimlik haline geldiği görülmektedir. Ayrıca bu çalışmanın sonuçları genelde

literatürde ‘değişmez ve zamana karşı dayanıklı’ bir kurum olarak tarif edilen TSK’nın sosyo-politik çevre ve küresel güvenlik ortamındaki değişimlere göre değişme çabası içinde olduğunu da vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk ordusu, sivil-asker ilişkileri, kurumsal değişim



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
LIST OF PHOTOS.....	xiv
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Research Puzzle	5
1.2. Research Questions.....	17
1.3. Research Method.....	19
1.4. Findings	25
1.5. Road Map.....	33
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW	37
2.1. Historical terrain.....	38
2.1.1. Turkish Civil-Military Relations (CMR) before 2000.....	38
2.1.2. The Coalition Government: Civil-Military Relations (2000–2002)	42
2.1.3. The First AKP Government: Civil-Military Relations (2002–2007)....	44
2.1.4. The Second AKP Government: CMR (2007–2011)	50
2.1.5. The Third AKP Government: CMR (2011–2015).....	54
2.2. Exogenous Arguments to Explain Civilianization of the CMR.....	58
2.2.1. The EU Effect Argument.....	58
2.2.2. The Governmental Power Argument.....	61
2.2.3. The Changing Threat Perceptions Argument	65
2.2.4. The Emergence of New Political Elites Argument.....	68

2.2.5.The Changing Public Opinion towards Military Argument.....	71
2.3.The Mentality of a Military.....	76
2.3.1.Setting the Stage: A “Black box” Waiting To Be Explored.....	78
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION.....	86
3.1.Benefiting from Both Huntingtonian and Janowitzian Approaches.....	88
3.2.The Military Change.....	93
3.2.1.Institutional Track: The Approach of Gradual Institutional Change	96
3.2.1.1.Mahoney and Thelen’s Explanation of the Modes and Types of Actor of Gradual Institutional Change.....	100
3.2.1.2. Institutional Characteristics and Modes of Change.....	101
3.2.1.3.Types of Actors and Institutional Change.....	103
3.2.2.Sociological Track: Explaining Change through Culture.....	107
3.2.2.1.Defining the TAF’s Organizational Culture.....	113
3.2.2.2.The Cultural Sources of Military Change.....	115
3.3.Hypotheses Aimed to be Tested in the Research.....	117
CHAPTER IV: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS	124
4.1. Transformation of the Turkish Military as a Security Actor.....	128
4.1.1.The Start of Sophisticated Discussions about the Transformation (August 2011-August 2012)	128
4.1.2.Institutionalization of the reformist approach within the TGS (August 2012-August 2013).....	135
4.1.3.The Expansion of the Debates about Transformation to Force command (August 2013- August 2014).....	138
4.1.4. Consolidation of Transformation (August 2014 -August 2015).....	140

4.1.5. Public Relations: The field best reflecting change in TAF.....	142
4.1.5.1. The content analysis of TAF’s press releases between 2003-2014.....	145
4.1.5.2. The Period of General Hilmi Özkök (2002-2006).....	149
4.1.5.3. The Period of General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2006-2008).....	154
4.1.5.4. The Period of General İlker Başbuğ (2008-2010).....	162
4.1.5.5. The Period of General Işık Koşaner (2010-2011).....	164
4.1.5.6. The Period of General Necdet Özel (2011-2014).....	166
4.1.5.7. A general evaluation of the 283 statements released between 2003-2014.....	171
4.1.6. Internationalization: The driver of TAF’s transformation as a security organization	175
4.1.6.1. TAF’s graduate-level education abroad.....	177
4.2. The TAF as a Changing “Social Institution”	178
4.2.1. The empowerment of gender-friendly policies in TAF	147
4.2.2.NCOs vs. the High Command	183
4.2.2.1.The first phase: Strategy of Silence.....	184
4.2.2.2.The second phase: denial and counter-accusation	185
4.2.2.3.The third phase: strategy of engagement and rehabilitation.....	188
4.2.3.Civilian activists vs. the High Command on allegations about violations of soldiers’ rights.....	191
4.2.4.High Command versus the headscarf: And the winner is the headscarf.....	194
4.3.Officership as a changing profession.....	197
4.3.1.Generalship as a profession.....	201
4.3.2.Staff Officership as a profession.....	206

4.3.3.Colonelship as a profession.....	215
4.3.4.Lt. Colonelship as a profession.....	215
4.3.5.Majorship as a profession.....	217
4.3.6.Captainship as a profession	217
4.3.7.Lieutenantship as a profession.....	218
4.4.Discussion.....	219
CHAPTER V: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS.....	237
5.1.Conducting the Survey	240
5.1.1.Content of the Survey	242
5.2.The Analysis of the Survey Findings.....	245
5.3.Discussion.....	314
CHAPTER VI: GENERAL DISCUSSION	330
6.1. Transformation of the TAF’s security culture.....	330
6.2. The transformation of the TAF’s social culture.....	342
6.3. Transformation of the officer corps’ professional culture.....	345
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION	351
BIBLIOGRAPHY	357
APPENDICE	
A. SURVEY	369

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. AKP's election successes since 2002.....	62
Table 2. The summary of the content analysis of TGS's press releases between 2004-2014.....	143
Table 3. The summary of the TAF's change as an institution.....	226
Table 4. The service and rank distribution of officer corps in the TAF as of April 2014.....	239
Table 5. The distribution of the survey sample in terms of service and rank.....	240
Table 6. Education level of respondents with respect to ranks.....	247
Table 7. School distribution with respect to ranks.....	248
Table 8. Number and ratio of contracted officers in the TAF.....	249
Table 9. Geographic distribution of the respondents.....	252
Table 10. The level of education among officers' Fathers with respect to ranks...	254
Table 11. The main reason in becoming an officer.....	261
Table 12. The main reason in becoming an officer with respect to rank.....	262
Table 13. The split between seniors and juniors with respect to reasons for becoming an officer	263
Table 14. Perceptions on TAF's success in combatting terrorism with respect to ranks.....	265
Table 15. The distribution of international posts among respondents.....	266
Table 16. The distribution of satisfaction with respect to ranks.....	268
Table 17. Satisfaction among the seniors and juniors.....	268
Table 18. Satisfaction with respect to ranks.....	269
Table 19. Prioritization with respect to ranks.....	271

Table 20. Importance attached to the “cohort spirit” with respect to rank.....	273
Table 21. Perception about the decrease on TAF’s reputation with respect to ranks.....	274
Table 22. Perception about TAF’s primary task with respect to ranks.....	276
Table 23. Perception about TAF’s need for reforms with respect to ranks.....	277
Table 24. Level of optimism about TAF’s deterrent capabilities with respect to ranks.....	278
Table 25. Perception about the most Important factor for a strong TAF’s with respect to ranks.....	279
Table 26. Perception about NATO with respect to ranks.....	280
Table 27. Perception about positive affect of civilianization in the CMR with respect to ranks.....	282
Table 28. Level of nationalism wit respect to ranks.....	283
Table 29. Political stance with respect to force command.....	284
Table 30. Political stance with respect to ranks.....	285
Table 31. Political stance within the Seniors and Juniors.....	285
Table 32. Perception about whether secularism under threat with respect to force commands.....	287
Table 33. Perception about whether secularism under threat with respect to ranks.....	288
Table 34. Perception about whether “unity of state” under threat with respect to force commands.....	289
Table 35. Fasting with respect to force commands.....	290
Table 36. Fasting with respect to force ranks.....	290
Table 37. Fasting among seniors and juniors.....	291
Table 38. Belief in afterlife with respect to ranks.....	294
Table 39. Level of internalization of democracy with respect ranks.....	298

Table 40. Inclination to the military rule with respect to ranks.....	300
Table 41. Perception about whether the military’s influence decreased in the last decade with respect to ranks.....	301
Table 42. Perception about military payment through payment with respect to ranks.....	304
Table 43. Perception about “professional military” with respect to ranks.....	305
Table 44. Perception about woman empowerment within the military with respect to ranks.....	306
Table 45. Perception about “elitist view” within the military with respect to ranks.....	308
Table 46. Perception about whether rule of law is superior when contradicting with orders with respect to ranks.....	311
Table 47. Prevalence Internet usage among the respondents with respect to ranks.....	314

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Conceptual map of civilian and military domain interactions.....	13
Figure 2. Transformation of TAF's organizational culture.....	29
Figure 3. Mahoney and Thelen's explanation of gradual change.....	82
Figure 4. Mahoney and Thelen's analytical space for modes of change.....	84
Figure 5. The distribution of the TAF's military personnel as of April 2014.....	237
Figure 6. Number of contracted officers in the TAF.....	249
Figure 7. Transformation of TAF as a security organization.....	330
Figure 8. Transformation of TAF as a social institution.....	342
Figure 9. Transformation of officership as a profession.....	345
Figure 10. Transformation of TAF's organizational culture.....	348

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Conceptual map of civilian and military domain interactions.....	11
Figure 2. Transformation of TAF's organizational culture.....	24
Figure 3. Mahoney and Thelen's explanation of gradual change.....	82
Figure 4. Mahoney and Thelen's analytical space for modes of change.....	84
Figure 5. The distribution of the TAF's military personnel as of April 2014.....	188
Figure 6. Number of contracted officers in the TAF.....	204
Figure 7. Transformation of TAF as a security organization.....	279
Figure 8. Transformation of TAF as a social institution.....	285
Figure 9. Transformation of officership as a profession.....	288
Figure 10. Transformation of TAF's organizational culture.....	290

LIST OF PHOTOS

Photo 1. A photo attached to the release about the Van Earthquake.....137



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I swear by my honor that, in peace and at war, on land, in sea, and in air, always and everywhere, I will serve my Nation and my Republic with truth and honesty, that I will obey the Law and my superiors, and that I will not hesitate to willingly and lovingly sacrifice my life for the honor of soldiership and the greatness of the Turkish flag.

The Turkish Military Oath¹

The question of “how to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do with the military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do” reflects a long-standing debate in political science. Peter Feaver calls this paradox the “civil-military *problematique*.” That is, because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we have created for protection (1996). This implies the need to have protection both “by” and “from” the military. Since the beginning of the third wave of democracy, which, according to Samuel Huntington, started on April 25, 1974 in Portugal with a military coup that turned out to be a revolution and gradually evolved into a democracy (1991), the civil-military *problematique* has become one of the biggest challenges to democratization. In the literature, there is now a consensus that, for liberal democracy to persist, the military must be subordinated to the democratically elected civilian authorities (Burk 2002: 7-29; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Desch, 1999). Therefore, this *problematique*, in Adam Przeworski’s words, “constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation” (1991).

¹ Article 1 of the Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).

Turkey is definitely among those states in which this *problematique*, or the question of how to accommodate desire for civilian control and the need for military security, has prevailed for decades. It is unlikely for anyone interested in the Turkish politics, particularly Turkey's democratization, not to notice this *problematique* and consult to the field of civil-military relations (CMR), or as Nil Şatana points out, "democratization in Turkey cannot be studied without reference to its CMR" (2008: 362). Therefore, the Turkish CMR has always been a source of intellectual curiosity when attempting to understand Turkey's quest for democracy.

Despite the fact that Turkish CMR has a rich literature in size, the literature includes only "outside-in" insights by the "civilian" researchers who have sought to explore the military with research of the "other." In the work entitled *Qualitative Methods in Military Studies* by Helena Carreiras and Celso Castro emphasize the need for more "social research of familiar" and "social research from within," in addition to the "social research of the other" to better understand strategic preferences and behaviors of modern militaries. This suggests that some amount of "insider-ness" is needed to get a more accurate understanding of civil-military interactions (2014: 18-24). Indeed, the absence of "inside-out" insights from within the Turkish military would be listed as the first shortfall in the literature of Turkish CMR. Another handicap of the literature may be the dominance of dichotomous approaches, which stereotypically conceptualize Turkish CMR as a power relation between the "secular, patriotic, and modern soldier" versus "the elected, but inefficient and anti-secular politician" (2001: 15) Ersel Aydınli summarizes the roles of soldiers and civilians in this traditional image as follows:

Weak, elected officials carry out the day-to-day business of government while a strong, popular military establishment keeps its eye on them, ready to step in

and mount the occasional *coup d'état* in order to keep the national modernization process on track (2012: 100-108).

To sum up, the literature of the Turkish CMR not only lacks “inside-out” insights generated by the “social research of familiar” and the “social research from within,” but also, in the great majority of works, CMR appear as a game of zero-sum power politics between soldiers and elected politicians. The dependent variable of a great majority of works in the literature is, therefore, the degree of conflict between civilian governments and the military, and the major dilemma to be explained is the “why” of the question of whether relations between one particular government and the military is distant or close, and “how” dynamics that shape the military influence over civilian politics. Thus, the explanatory variables are some specific historical events, or domestic/international logic of the political context in the examined period, or the prestige and personality of civilian and military actors involved. As a result, the main themes of the existing literature are either the preferences or behaviors of civilian and military elites or their strategic interactions when playing the zero sum game of power politics.

In the Turkish CMR literature, however, the military side of the story has mostly been neglected, except for few works available in the literature such as the Mehmet Ali Birand’s 1991 classical *Shirts of Steel*. The fundamental consequences of this negligence are two assumptions implicitly “taken for granted” by a great majority of work in the literature. The first assumption is the conceptualization of the Turkish military, or Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), as a homogenous entity (Jenkins, 2001). That is, the military has always been conceived as a monolithic agent with durable values, norms and preferences. Simply, for decades, scholarly works assumed that the military has always had a strict hierarchical organization and its “official view,” which implies a blend of Kemalist principles, strictly secular and

elitist-modernist world view on which the TAF has traditionally based its value system, staunchly secular references, a nationalist stance, and a modernist perspective (Jenkins, 2001). The second assumption is that the Turkish military is an organization immune to time and change. That is, mostly in the literature, the Turkish military's internal structures, the processes, formal and informal institutions, its organizational culture, the norms and values it embraced, and more importantly, the opinions and attitudes of the officer corps are perceived as "unchanged" phenomena. Thus, the military side of the CMR has been treated as given, taken-for-granted, and fixed (resisting change). For instance, it has always been emphasized in the literature that the Turkish military is a homogenous Kemalist, staunchly secular and nationalist organization with a modernist stance (Harris, 1998: 177-200), which has assumed a self-appointed role of guarding the state and national interests against all internal and external threats (Jenkins, 2001: 15), but nonetheless, scholarly analyses do not provide room for the possibility that these characteristics may change over time, and that different - even sometimes conflicting - point of views may emerge within the Turkish military.

Why has the military side of the CMR always been in heavy fog, or why does then the TAF still remain as a "black box" waiting to be explored by academics with "inside-out" insights? Surely, this is not Turkish academia's fault. Difficulty with opening this black box may likely be associated with the TAF's "self-imposed" distance from the academic world, the lack of civilian expertise on security issues in the academia, and a general absence of a cooperative environment and mutual trust between the TAF and the academia. Exaggerated secrecy restrictions that are common in defense matters in Turkey may have exacerbated the impact of these obstacles. Thus, scholars have had limited access to the military, which in return, has

limited the number of studies conducted by civilian researchers on the military. An attempt to take a holistic picture of the TAF on socio-cultural, security-related and political issues may, therefore, shed light on (confirm or falsify) the common portrayal of the TAF as a monolithic and homogenous organization with unchanged norms, values, and ways of thinking and doing things (i.e. organizational culture).

1.1. Research Puzzle

Since the early 2000s, certain domestic crises have taken place that directly affected the Turkish CMR. The main ones can be sorted as follows: the rise of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, the AKP) in Turkish political scene; the presidential crisis in 2007 which led to the “e-memorandum,”² a controversial TAF statement released on the official website of the Turkish General Staff on April 27, 2007; coup allegations followed by trials such as *Sledgehammer* and *Ergenekon*, in which many retired and active high ranking military personnel were detained, arrested, and given sentences; the resignation of Işık Koşaner in August 2011, the then-Chief of Turkish General Staff, and two service commanders allegedly in reaction to the government’s silence toward the investigation and trial processes of the military personnel (Letsch, 2011); the initiation of the Kurdish opening in 2009 and then the resolution process following the three-decade-long, bloody PKK-initiated violence; TAF’s reluctance to mobilize Gendarmerie forces during the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Ankara, which started in Istanbul and shook Turkey’s political climate for nearly two months (Göle, 2013: 7-14), despite the fact that the AKP ordered them to do so;³ the discussions regarding

² To learn more about the “e-memorandum,” please see <https://prezi.com/gt6ufmerifq1/2007-e-memorandum/> (accessed November 12, 2014).

³ Please see: <http://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/852873-jandarma-olaylara-karismali-mi> (accessed December 12, 2014).

splitting the Gendarmerie command from the TAF (Gürcan, 2014a); the disagreement between the AKP government and the TAF on paid military service (Gürcan 2014d); the method of discharging alleged Gulenists from the TAF (Gürcan, 2014c); debates over Turkey's souring relations with NATO (Idiz, 2014b); the transfer of the Peshmerga forces fighting against the Islamic State (IS) forces in Kobane (Idiz, 2014a). All the aforementioned factors may be listed as major recent domestic incidents that would affect the stability of the Turkish CMR. It is also worth noting foreign policy-related crises such as the Cyprus referendum regarding the Annan Plan in 2004 (Wright, 2004), the Arab Spring and the developments in Egypt between 2009-2013,⁴ the conflict in Syria that started in 2011 and then turned into a civil war,⁵ as well as recent debates on Turkey's military strategy over the developments in northern Syria. One should also add the differentiating perspectives in Turkish foreign policymaking between the military and civilian elites rooted from the increased tension in the region mainly due to the confrontation between Russia and western world over Ukraine, the energy resources crisis, and consequently increasing military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea (Gürcan, 2014b), or debates on how to tackle the Iraq and Syrian border security (*Al-Monitor*, "Turkey's border security problem...") would directly lead to a crisis between the elected civilians and the military in Turkey.

Despite all these major internal and external developments and events, which could easily destabilize Turkish CMR when considering the consequences of the similar incidents in the country's political history, it would be fair to claim that

⁴ Please see: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/07/20137493141105596.html> (Accessed November 14, 2014).

⁵ Please see for more: <http://projects.nytimes.com/watching-syrias-war> (Accessed November 14, 2014).

Turkish CMR has been resolute enough to get through all these crises with no direct confrontation between the “secular” military and “pro-Islamic” AKP governments, and no increase in the military’s influence in the politics in the last decade. Instead, particularly from 2007 onwards, the year which marked the occurrence of the *e-memorandum*, there has emerged more or less a cooperative environment between the democratically elected AKP governments and the TAF, which reflects “a delicate harmony,” but surely not “confrontation.” For Fuat Keyman, it would be appropriate to characterize this shift from confrontation to delicate harmony “as a transition from a tutelary to a post-tutelary era in Turkish politics” (*Radikal*, “Post-vesayet, Sivilleşme, Demokratikleşme...”). Press photos taken on Victory Day in 2011 showed General Necdet Özel, then the chief of the Turkish General Staff saluting Abdullah Gül with respect, whose election to the presidency the military had objected in 2007, may be the symbolic sign of this shift (*Today’s Zaman*, “New rules in place...”). One should also note that this date marked the first time in Turkey’s history, the country’s civilian president, not the Chief of General Staff, received greetings on the occasion of the Victory Day as the chief-in charge.

This then begs the question as to what accounts for this possible leaning toward further civilianization?. How has the Turkish CMR survived through all these crises? What is the prime driver of this recent shift from confrontation to delicate harmony in the Turkish CMR? Why didn’t all these internal and foreign policy-related crises, for instance, result in the military’s increasing influence, or even an intervention, of politics in Turkey, which was a case in Egypt in June 2012? Simply, given Turkey and Egypt’s more or less similar CMR experience as Steven Cook proposed (2007), why have some CMR in the region (e.g. Egyptian case) worsened,

yet but we see a substantial degree of demilitarization and civilianization in the Turkish case during the last fifteen years?

As explained in the chapter on literature review, the works seeking to explain the civilianization of the Turkish CMR and harmony between the civilians and the military in the last decade may be classified into five arguments.

The first argument places emphasis on the Europeanization. According to this argument, the prospect of EU accession and the subsequent necessity to fulfill the EU's political criteria was the main incentive behind Turkey's civil-military reforms carried out in the last decade. The EU process has led to reforms to secure civilian supremacy over the TAF and greater transparency in the Turkish CMR (Toktaş and Kurt, 2010: 387-403). To comply with EU demands, Turkey diminished or ended military representation in civilian government bodies, introduced greater transparency in defense spending and policymaking, and improved parliamentary oversight of the military (Narlı 2009: 56-83). The EU-caused reforms were the result of a grand political concession in Turkey for future membership in the EU. According to this approach, the reforms were also accepted by the "pro-western" TAF, even if they meant the military lost autonomy and political influence (Kuru 2012: 37-57).

The second is the "governmental power" argument. This argument implies that, since AKP's coming to office in 2002, Turkey has enjoyed a decade of almost unprecedented political stability with single party majority governments, who have both the intent and capability to diminish TAF's political influence. The electoral success of the AKP in obtaining a plurality of votes in three successive general elections, three successive local elections in the last decade, the constitution referendum in 2012 and recent presidential elections in August 2014 have all

increased the political stability in Turkey (Gidengil and Ekrem, 2014). According to Fuat Keyman (2014: 19-31), these electoral victories since 2002 have caused an electoral hegemony and elevated the AKP to the position of the “dominant party” in Turkish politics. Linda Michaud-Emin suggests that, if there is high degree of governmental power that provides political stability and a dominance of civilian politics, then a healthy civil-military balance can be attained. This has been the case for Turkey since 2002 (Michaud-Emin, 2007: 36).

The third line of argument underlines the agency of the newly emerged elites. This argument suggests that the increasing influence and determination of civilian elites with more conservative religious values have become more prominent within political institutions, the state bureaucracy, business, and education after the AKP entered office. This trend has then marginalized the traditional Kemalist elites, an important segment of which comprises high-ranking officers and state bureaucracy. Along this line of thought, the emergence of new elites deprived the military of many of its former allies in the state apparatus, the business community, institutions of higher education and the media, and made it more difficult to influence and intervene in the political decision making process (Kuru, 2012: 37-57).

The fourth argument underlines the “changing national threat perceptions,” suggesting that, the traditional national threat perceptions in Turkey (particularly internal ones) have drastically changed since the 2000s, and this change has led to a decrease in military influence in politics. According to this argument, TAF’s unchallenged control in defining what constitutes security or other threat to the nation serves to promote its own legitimacy and perpetuate its veto power in politics. Indeed, through its weighty influence in the political system, TAF has the capacity to “militarize” the national security as “regime issues.” Ümit Cizre notes that the TAF

has branded, for instance, Islamist movements and Kurdish separatist PKK as internal threats to the secular character and integrity of the state. She, however, contends that TAF's privilege of determining which issue is to be assigned as "national security matter" has been degraded in the last decade, and this yields to civilianization in the CMR (Cizre, 2011).

The fifth argument emphasizes the "changing opinions and attitudes of society towards the military." This approach suggests that public opinion in Turkey, while still supportive of a strong military, has grown less positive to the idea of military intervention in politics. According to this argument, for instance, due to the accusations, arrests and trials of a number of senior officers of conspiracy and coup plans during the famous cases of *Ergenekon*, *Sledgehammer* and *Izmir Spying*, popular support for military as an institution and military's role in civilian politics seem to have waned (Sarigil, 2011: 264-278). Yaprak Gürsoy, in her work supported with quantitative insights from the Eurobarometer surveys, suggests that, after 2008, there is drop in the number of respondents who declared their trust in TAF. For her, in the 2010 survey, the Turkish public does not seem to differ from its European counterparts and it trusts the military at around the same level as western democracies. She suggests that the critical factor that seems to have led to the drop in trust levels is *Ergenekon*, which has implicated hundreds of lower- and higher-ranking still serving and retired officers in attempts to stage coups against the AKP (Gürsoy, 2014). Then, this decrease of popular support of TAF's influence over politics has led to the military's retreat from the politics.

It may be appropriate to aggregate these five arguments into one category: the package of exogenous factors, which includes all non-military processes, institutions, and agents affecting Turkish CMR. As one may easily notice, all the above-listed

arguments involve a common assumption. That is, the decline of the military's political power occurred despite, not because of the will of the TAF over the past 15 years.

Is this package of exogenous factors, however, sufficient to fully explain the recent shift towards civilianization in the Turkish context? Some scholars are dubious of this question. Particularly after 2007, for instance, Ali Karaosmanoğlu argues that the "EU effect" in the Turkish CMR has become "completely irrelevant" to explain the recent harmony (Gürsoy 2014), particularly after 2007, a year considered as the beginning of Turkey's to join the EU (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001). However, his work does not provide empirical evidence for this claim. He stresses that many works in the literature assert that changes between 2002 and 2006 were due to the EU effect, but then he asks about post-2007 changes and how to explain the close and effective collaboration of the Turkish military with the civilian decision makers? Karaosmanoğlu assumes that the answer to this question is the "internalization of the civilian control by the soldiers" (2011).


Similarly, putting emphasis on the military side of the story along with the exogenous factors, Metin Heper suggests that, in the post-2002 period, the Turkish military has increasingly questioned the wisdom of intervening in politics, and officers have concluded that "civilians have the right to be wrong" (Heper 2011) which replaced distrust of civilians. For him, the notable change among the officers from the military's traditional ideology to critical thinking has led to this questioning. Accordingly, endogenous factors within the TAF, such as the change in the military's perception on democracy, may have played role for the decision to intervene in politics or not. Therefore, the "democratic moods" of all four Chiefs of General Staff in the post-2002 period would be the prime driver of the civilianization

of Turkish CMR. To sum up, by emphasizing top generals' statements in the TAF, Heper argues that since 2002, starting with the period of Gen. Hilmi Özkök and followed by the periods of the succeeding chiefs of staff, Turkey's CMR has resembled those in liberal democratic regimes due to the change in the military's perception of three issues (2005: 215-231). These are: change of democracy from a "rational end point" to achieve the best policy option which leaves no room for the mistakes of the civilians politicians to a more liberal perspective, and change from Kemalism as an ideology to Atatürkism as a "world view" open to change, and lastly change from ideological thinking to critical thinking. Agreeing with Heper, Ersel Aydın, draws attention to the significance of the trial processes which involved serving and retired high ranking officers such as *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer* cases in transforming the military's relations with the civilians from an "absolutist" agenda to a "gradualist" one. Aydın then argues that the discourse and policies of the last three chiefs of Turkish General Staff (TGS) – Gen. Hilmi Özkök, Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt and Gen. İlker Başbuğ – serve as evidence that the military is adapting to this paradigm shift. He then contends that, with the completion of this adaptation, Turkey may very well be "leaving the coup era behind" (2009: 581-596).

Recalling the facts that the CMR is a relational concept and the military side of the story matters as well while studying CMR, could one suggest that this package of exogenous factors may be necessary but not sufficient to fully explain the recent shift towards civilianization and harmony in the Turkish CMR? In this recent trend of civilianization, could the endogenous factors within the Turkish military indeed play role in addition to the package of exogenous factors? Could change of perception within the officer corps regarding the military's guardianship role, or civilian supremacy, or the acceptance of rule of law, for instance, be among those

endogenous factors explaining the recent civilianization? Ersel Aydınli suggests that this transformation from a military-dominated system into a more civilian one “stems from dynamics within the military itself as well as from outside causes” (2012: 100-108). Then, turning to internal factors, can one make a further distinction between those related to the military’s practices and those related to certain characteristics in the nature of the military?

Figure 1: Conceptual map of civilian and military domain interactions



As presented by Figure 1, the ultimate concern of this research is the possible sources of the civilianization process in Turkish CMR over the last 15 years. In theoretical terms, there might be two types of sources in the process of civilianization: “military” and “non-military.” The great majority of existing works in the literature focus on purely “non-military” factors and conditions such as the

argument of the EU effect or the argument of the empowered civilian elites who have triggered or promoted civilianization process in the Turkish CMR in the last 15 years (Arrow 1 in the figure). Some works, albeit few, in the literature address some hybrid sources like changing threat perceptions (Arrow 2 in the figure). The literature has so far neglected possible military sources of this civilianization (Arrow 3 in the figure) or assumed that they do not matter much. This research's primary focus will be those possible military-related factors, which might have played a role in civilianization process. One should also note that 1, 2, and 3 do not replace the others, but complement one another as contributing to the outcome (the civilianization of the CMR). This piece of research does not seek to determine whether endogenous or exogenous factors have promoted the civilianization process in Turkey during the past 15 years. This research, concentrating on Arrow 3 and emphasizing its bidirectional nature, is more concerned with the reciprocal relationship between the civilianization process and the military change, particularly the institutional transformation within the Turkish military.

Additionally, one may notice that no empirical evidence is provided for TAF's institutional change. Neither the optimistic types of explanations emphasizing that change in the Turkish military's patterns of thinking and strategic behaviors as a way to explain the recent civilianization provides scholarly inferences from within the TAF, nor do the pessimistic types of explanations placing emphasis on the exogenous factors taming the military. The optimistic type of explanations, which only relies on the agency of the chiefs of general staff, would, for instance, provide qualitative insights derived from discourse analysis of the statements, speeches, preferences, and behaviors of the chiefs such as Hilmi Özkök's mild attitude towards the principle of civilian supremacy and democracy (Heper, 2011) Gen. Ilker

Basbuğ's War Academy speech in 2009 (Şimşek, 2014), and Işık Koşaner's preference of resignation in reaction to the AKP government's silence regarding the trials the officers involved (Canan-Sokullu, 2013). That is, the remarks from the chiefs in their speeches and their strategic preferences are presented as the primary sources of this optimism.⁶ One should, however, note that the source of this optimism in the literature does not reflect empirical insights regarding the general mood within the military. As in the case of the optimistic type, the pessimistic type does not provide empirical evidence to prove its primary assumption of "due to the TAF's self-important mood and its interventionist mentality, TAF should be kept under control with exogenous control mechanisms." Then both for the optimistic and pessimist explanations available in the literature, the TAF's own mentality, whether being interventionist as latently proposed by the pessimists or is getting more non-interventionist as implied by the optimists, is a "given fact." That is, currently, we still do not have concrete evidence to ascertain whether the TAF is still interventionist or professional, homogenous or heterogeneous, changing or standing still. Simply, these assumptions we notice in the literature on the TAF's mentality have not been empirically analyzed, and thus have not been confirmed or falsified through comprehensive analyses based on solid empirical evidence. This appears as a significant gap in the literature that should be filled.

This gap in the literature is mentioned by Zeki Sarıgil with the following words:

...Organizational attributes and dynamics within the military emerge as crucial variables. Despite this, most approaches treat militaries as black boxes, paying scant attention to their organizational culture. The above typology also remains

⁶ Please see the following clipping for İlker Başbuğ's speech at the Turkish Staff College on April 19, 2009. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24956726/> (accessed June 2, 2014).

Please see the following link for Hilmi Özkök's change of command speech in September 2006: <http://www.mevzuatdergisi.com/2006/09a/02.htm> (Accessed June 2, 2014).

limited in that sense. The typology, which is primarily concerned with the military's relations with the social and political spheres and actors, does not really allow for its organizational characteristics. However, further progress in establishing civilian supremacy in the Turkish context requires paying much more attention to the military's organizational culture, which appears to be an important source of praetorianism (2011: 265-278).

Similarly, Şule Toktaş and Ümit Kurt conclude their work with the following sentence: "There still remains the question over the degree of mindset change in the military regarding the democratic expansion process" (2010: 403).

Could the TAF's recent submission of the civilian supremacy in Turkey over the last 15 years be only an illusory, haphazard, and tactical one mainly due to the political context, or might have the TAF internalized civilian supremacy? Put differently, is this process of civilianization of the Turkish CMR irreversible? What can be said about the extent of the internalization of the democratic norms by Turkish officer corps?

If the TAF's changing mentality is one of those drivers of this civilianization, then in what sense and through which mechanisms is this the case? How does the TAF currently define itself as a social institution and security organization? Is the TAF a homogenous organization as we assume in the literature? How does the TAF currently define society and describe some significant concepts such as military profession, democracy, secularism, civilian control of the military, the unity of the state, conscription, and conscientious objection?

The overall objective of this research is to elucidate the following two questions. To what extent do endogenous factors play a role in Turkish military's submission to civilian supremacy in addition to those above-listed exogenous ones? What sort of endogenous factors may have created the outcome of the Turkish military's loss of its capacity (or willingness) to influence politics in the last decade?

Instead of turning to the exogenous factors, this research turns to the Turkish military, or the agent itself, which carries utmost significance but is generally neglected. Thus, to answer these questions, this piece of research will both qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the Turkish military as an institution to understand “why, how, to what extent, in which domains and through which mechanisms” it has been transforming itself, and particularly to what extent it has internalized the norm of civilian supremacy. To achieve this, it seeks to understand the extent, nature, and characteristics of change the TAF has been experiencing in the past fifteen years. Therefore, the provision of “inside-out” insights from within the Turkish military would be a must to get a more accurate picture of the relational nature of CMR.

1.2. Research Questions

The following research questions will direct this body of research:

- Is the package of exogenous factors sufficient to fully explain the recent civilianization in the Turkish CMR over the last decade? If “No,” then what sort of factors might have contributed to this outcome in addition to exogenous (or non-military) factors?
- Is the TAF a monolithic and homogenous organization as commonly assumed in the literature?
- Do all officers in the TAF think and behave alike concerning military as a profession, a security organization, and a social institution?
- What is the extent and nature of change in the Turkish military? If change exists, then in which domains has it changed and what can be said about the characteristics of this change?

- In the “military as a profession” domain, what are the variables defining the professional ethos in the TAF? Are there any differences among the Turkish officer corps in terms of ranks and service?

- In the “military as a social institution” domain, how does the TAF define society? What does the TAF think about the concepts such as politics, democracy, secularism, and civilian control of the military? Has there been a generational difference on the attitudes and opinions of the junior (lieutenants, first lieutenants, captains, and majors) and senior officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals) in the TAF? If that is the case, then in what sense and in which realms? Is there a cross-sectional attitudinal differences between the land force, Air Force, the Navy and the Gendarmerie in the TAF? What are the opinions of the Turkish officer corps on political concepts such as democracy, secularism, the civilian control of the military? What are the political views of the officers in the TAF? How does the Turkish military change as a social institution?

- In the domain of the “military as a security organization,” what are roots of the TAF’s threat perception? How does the TAF define its roles and missions? Has there been a change in the traditional conceptualization of the TAF as “the guardian of the state” against the internal threats such as religious fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism? Do variables such as NATO, knowing a foreign language and serving in an international mission, or fighting against terrorism have an impact on the thinking patterns of the officers in terms of the TAF’s tasks and role in the society?

- Adding a further question: Is there any variance across ranks and officers from different force commands in terms of attitude towards military’s role in political system and towards civilians, etc.? If there is, what factors account for that variance?

1.3. Research Method

In order to answer the questions listed above, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive analysis that spans time, employ both qualitative and quantitative data and provide both casual and descriptive inferences (multi-method analysis) at the organizational and individual levels (multi-level analysis). Such a comprehensive approach would help us open the black box of the Turkish military. Therefore, a single case research method using multiple data sources at the different levels of analysis can both get better grasp of the current patterns of military's organizational culture in a holistic fashion, and conduct causal analysis of change in the Turkish military. Simply put, our dependent variable is the Turkish military's strategic culture, and the research phenomenon is institutional change in the Turkish military over the last fifteen years. Thus, for this research, to get a more valid and holistic picture of the Turkish military, the Turkish CMR literature needs such single case studies using multiple data sources generated with both qualitative and quantitative techniques in a complementary fashion. This is why this research was designed as a single case study utilizing multiple data gathering techniques both at the individual and organizational levels.

This research is multi-level because it both attempts to examine, at the organizational level, the change in the Turkish military as an institution over the last decade, and, at the individual level, the opinion and attitudes of the officer corps. It utilizes multiple data sources (both qualitative and quantitative). In the qualitative strand, on the one hand, it applies both textual/ discourse analysis (statements and speeches of top brass of the TAF and TAF's press releases since 2004, for instance) and in-depth interviews with serving and retired officers. In the quantitative strand, on the other hand, the research has a representative survey applied to the serving

officers to examine the possible factors contributing to military change in the last decade.

Why does this research follow this methodological approach? Complex institutions such as militaries are inherently hard to grasp in its entirety with one research method and to be captured by a single way of data collection technique. Thus, no single method or means of social research can achieve the objective of this research, which is to get a “valid” and “holistic” picture of the Turkish military and factors that have shaped this picture. Therefore, this research embraces “triangulation” as its methodological strategy believing that it is useful to “triangulate” in order to compensate the weaknesses of other data collecting techniques to have a current holistic view of the Turkish military’s organizational culture and possible factors affecting it. Indeed, the use of qualitative and quantitative methods in studying the same phenomenon (i.e. institutional change) to get a more “valid” picture has received significant attention among scholars and researchers. As a result, it has become an accepted practice to use some form of “triangulation” in social research.

Jacob Alexander notes the following:

By combining multiple observers, theories, methods, and empirical materials, researchers can hope to overcome the weakness or intrinsic biases and the problems that come from single-method, single-observer, single-theory studies. Often the purpose of triangulation in specific contexts is to obtain confirmation of findings through convergence of different perspectives. The point at which the perspectives converge is seen to represent reality (2001).

Triangulation, actually a military technique seeking to use multiple reference points to locate an object’s exact position, is a process of verification that increases validity of casual and descriptive inferences, which this research equally takes into consideration when studying military change. By incorporating several viewpoints and data sources in the social research, triangulation is used to combine the

advantages of both the qualitative and the quantitative approach during the same time frame and equal weight to compare data results or to validate, conform or corroborate qualitative findings with quantitative ones. The researcher seeks both to merge the findings of the qualitative and quantitative approaches, which should interact with each other to interpret and transform data during analysis, to supplement measures of social and political behavior drawn from interviews and questionnaires with measures drawn from physical trace evidence, test any given hypothesis repeatedly using the different measures of key concepts, and lastly to treat the hypothesis as more credible if all the tests converge in support.⁷ Triangulation is thus not aimed merely at validation, but at deepening and widening one's understanding, and tends to support interdisciplinary research.

Triangulated techniques are helpful for crosschecking and used to provide confirmation and completeness, which brings balance between two or more different types of research. So, the purpose of triangulation is to increase the credibility and validity of the results (Creswell and Clark, 2010: 58-64). In fact, there are many different approaches to triangulation, with articulate proponents for each approach. Norman Denzin distinguished four forms of triangulation: data triangulation (retrieve data from a number of different sources to form one body of data), investigator triangulation (using multiple observers instead of a single observer in the form of gathering and interpreting data), theoretical triangulation (using more than theoretical positions in interpreting data) and methodological triangulation (using more than one research method or data collection technique). Of the four methods, methodological triangulation best reflects the most common meaning of the term. Methodological

⁷ For more, please see the International Encyclopedia of Political Science: <http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/intlpoliticalscience/n619.xml> (accessed December 23, 2014).

triangulation may generally involve multiple methods of data collection (focus groups, sample surveys, participant observation in field settings, content analysis of texts, interviews, and so on) (Denzin, 1970).

Why does this research embrace triangulation as the method to study change in the Turkish military? To better capture the nature, extent, and characteristics of change the TAF has been experiencing over the last fifteen years, and factors leading to this change, one needs a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the TAF. In this portrayal, only the usage and interpretation of both descriptive and casual inferences in a complementary fashion may increase the validity of the research findings. That is, beyond the analysis of overlapping variance, the use of multiple measures may uncover some unique variance within the TAF, which otherwise may have been neglected by a single research technique. Thus, by combining forms of evidence, this research project may generate a scholarly richer and more complete body of knowledge about the Turkish military.

Then, the research's qualitative analysis includes three strands. The first strand is qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004) of official texts released by the Turkish military, such as press releases and a discourse analysis of statements made by military elites through media outlets. The second is the institutional analysis of TAF's strategic preferences and behaviors over the last decade. Then, to achieve the objective of yielding the analytically rich qualitative insights to triangulate the quantitative findings, semi-structured in-depth interviews with the focus group of 80 serving officers in the TAF were conducted.

At the end of the methodological introduction, it is also significant to note that the author is fully aware of the challenge of reflexivity coming with his "insider" status when doing this research. The challenge of reflexivity is that it is not possible

for a social researcher to be detached from what he or she is observing. That is, the reflexive process challenges the researcher to explicitly examine how his or her research agenda, assumptions, methods, personal beliefs, and more importantly, emotions enter into the research. Mainly because of this reflexive process in research, the researcher may unconsciously become an active part of knowledge production rather than remaining a neutral bystander throughout the research. How can a researcher prevent the effect of his position on his research? He/she should first recognize the challenge of reflexivity, and then stay firm by both becoming methodologically self-aware and by following a constant process of assessment of his own contribution and influence both in cognitive and emotive domains in shaping the research findings. The extent of the researcher's provision of his findings and how he presents them are two factors that directly reveal this notion of becoming self-aware. Lastly, the critical capability to make explicit that his position and the possible impacts of this position on the research findings constitutes the third factor shaping methodological self-awareness. The author, having resigned from the military in January 2015, at the rank of major in the second year of this project and since becoming a civilian since, assures the reader that he can critically engage in his findings so as not to be so submissive to his career in the Turkish military. One should also note that the author's both being an active service member of the Turkish military and a resigned officer provides him a unique position to enjoy different degrees of insiderness. During the first two years of his research, the author conducted "social research from within" the Turkish military, after his resignation in January 2015 and becoming civilian, the author then started conducting the "social research of the familiar" of the Turkish military. This was a stimulating point for the author, enabling him to look from different angles to his academic subject of the

Turkish military. One should note that the research design and author's academic focus on his academic subject of the Turkish military has not changed after his resignation. One may assert that, throughout the thesis, the author has an attitude of "I know what I am doing, and thus, you should trust me," and this attitude could be a validity-related problem, as it would automatically raise the question of "Why should I trust you?" The author knows that trustworthiness cannot be self-declared, meaning that trust has to be earned and maintained. Reliability, the degree to which a measurement tool produces stable and consistent results, is not a problem for this piece of work, as any researcher may replicate this research by operationalizing exactly the same protocols, and then compare/contrast the findings of this research and the findings of his/her research. The question is, however, whether the findings of this research portrays "accurate" or credible picture of the TAF. This is in fact a question about validity, the concept implying the necessity that the results obtained meet all of the requirements of the scientific research design. The author's assertive attempt to maintain his objectivity when studying his old institution as his scholarly subject, his attempt to conduct the research with a representative sample to generalize findings back to the officer corps, and his methodological self-awareness emphasizing his strict adherence to his multi-method and multi-level research design for more triangulation of findings would be stated as three factors consciously utilized by the author to maximize the both the internal and external validity of the research. Lastly, one should also note that, as to be seen in the literature review chapter, there is not a single scholarly work in the literature so far claiming to take 'the accurate' picture of the TAF enabling one to compare the approximate truth of propositions, inferences and conclusions. The author is fully aware that this inherent deficiency constitutes as a setback for this research. Last but not least, this high degree of

insiderness and “you should trust what I say” attitude felt in some parts of the dissertation would be the weakest- when recognizing the fact that this research is the first of its kind in the literature, but also the strongest side of the research.

1.4. Findings

The findings of this study show that the TAF has both been in a technical transformation as a security organization and in a civilianization process as a social institution. Furthermore, in the domain of officership as a profession, the findings suggest that, as of May-September 2015, as the ranks decrease, there are five trends influencing the professional culture of the officer corps: the increasing heterogenization and diversification of the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps, the change from a collectivist mentality to an individualistic one, change from an elitist to an egalitarian view of society, change from “absolute obedience to the orders” to “respect for the superiority of the law,” and, lastly, the change from value-centric officership to focusing on financial goals and careers. For the first time in the literature, the findings of this study indicate that there are differences between the organizational cultures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, particularly in the domain of TAF as a security organization and on socio-political issues.

The findings of this study elucidate that while the transformation shaping the TAF’s security culture, which implies TAF’s ways of thinking and doing things about security-related issues, seems to be a consciously-designed and planned process by the High Command in top-down fashion, the fundamental dynamic influencing TAF’s social culture is the confrontational, and to some extent, frictional interaction between the High Command and juniors, and between the High Command and outsiders. The transformation shaping the professional culture among the officer corps would, in turn, be defined as a more coincidental and arbitrary

process of change when compared with other domains. One should also note that, at first glance, the “militarization of the military” trend shaping the TAF’s security culture and the “civilianization of the military” trend influencing both TAF’s social culture and officers’ professional culture may be seen as conflicting change processes leading the TAF in opposite directions. However, just to the contrary, in light of the findings of this research, changes in three different domains are reinforcing, mutually bolstering one another. It is the power distributional effect that emerges as the first outcome of this type of transformation comprising three different change dynamics in three different domains that semi-independently affect one another. The power distributional effect within the TAF’s existing institutional order leads to a “healthy” environment yielding to a more gradual institutional change within the TAF.

In the domains of TAF as a social institution and officership as a profession, though, generally “drift” and “conversion” appears as being the modes of change. *Subversive* elites exhibiting non-compliant behavior in each of these three domains and also subversive and insurrectionary juniors appear as important change actors. The change processes flowing out from all three domains are ultimately flowing towards the TAF’s organizational culture pool through two change pathways: *emulation* driving the change in TAF’s security culture and *adaptation* driving TAF’s social culture. Lastly, at the end of the day, these incremental changes in the TAF’s security and social culture as well as the professional culture of the officers directly affect TAF’s organizational culture. The changing organizational culture of the TAF is, in turn, affecting CMR. Turkish CMR is also affected by change in social-political context in Turkey. Simply put, as is seen from the chart above, one should note that there is a bilateral relationship between the TAF’s organizational

culture and Turkish CMR. This bilateral relationship, in fact, creates a reciprocal causality between the two. TAF's organizational culture is under the direct influence of TAF's security culture, social culture, and the professional culture of the officer corps. The changing Turkish CMR is, in turn, returning back to the very beginning of the causal mechanism explained above with a feedback mechanism and directly affects the TAF. Owing to that, the change takes place in a cyclic fashion, a reciprocal causality appears between the change in the TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR. It is evident that some amount of insidership enabling one to carry out social research from within and social research of familiar is needed to observe this reciprocal causality between TAF's organizational culture shaped by non-military changes in the Turkish CMR and Turkish CMR shaped by changes from within the TAF's organizational culture. As this research obviously elucidates, Turkish CMR is a bi-directional relational concept, meaning that the changes both in the civilian and military sides of the relationship may have the capacity to influence the nature, characteristics, and evolution of CMR.


It is also worth emphasizing that the findings of this research falsifies of some taken-for-granted assumptions in the literature, such as TAF is a "fixed" organization immune to change of that it is a homogenous entity with a rigid institutional order. In light of the findings, this research offers that one should provide room for the possibility that the drivers and characteristics of TAF's organizational culture may change over time, and that different - even sometimes conflicting - point of views, approaches, and ways of doing things may emerge within the Turkish military. In the in-depth interviews, the author observed that the military leaders at the moment, yet they cannot clearly conceptualize and define, feel the power-distributional effect of gradual institutional change within the TAF, and

thus are inclined to concentrate more on TAF's organizational transformation. In the quest for this transformation, the military leaders know what to change (the outmoded force structures and processes) and why to change (sources of necessity for change), but do not have a methodological expertise to answer to the question of "how to change?" This increasingly inward-looking approach has been strengthened with the increased ambiguity in the system yielding to a need for transformation is, for instance, another reason explaining how Turkish CMR has survived through domestic and foreign policy-related crises in the last decade. Then, one may contend that not solely those five exogenous approaches seeking to explain the civilianization of the Turkish CMR in the decade, but also the endogenous factors addressed in this research, such as increased uncertainty within the system and change in the TAF's security, social and professional cultures would explain the recent civilianization in CMR. One may then suggest that the High Command's dilemma about how to first confront and then manage uncertainty within the TAF and change affecting it constitutes as the first and foremost endogenous factor preventing the military from intervening the politics as, for the High Command, more involvement in civilian politics means more uncertainty and increased pressure for change in the military. This prospect leads to a disinclination for the intervention to politics, allowing for more room for civilianization in Turkish CMR. As explained in the literature review chapter, all exogenous (or non-military) explanatory approaches such as EU effect, the empowerment of the elected civilians, political stability, and changing socio-political context may be necessary explanations for civilianization. The High Command's dilemma on how to cope with existing uncertainty and change, as well as how to manage change in organizational culture may be proposed as an

endogenous factor that has made the High Command retreat from the hostile civilian territory and withdrawal to the military terrains.

Overall, how can one summarize the transformation of the TAF's organizational culture? The conceptual and causal diagram presented below, which encapsulates the sum of all research findings, would be a configuration summarizing the transformation:

Figure 2. Transformation of the TAF's organizational culture



What does this figure tell one about the change in the TAF? As seen, change was first affected by the change in the global security environment, is occurring in three main domains. The change in the domain of the TAF as a security organization shaping the TAF's security culture is a deterministic process as it is under the full control of the High Command.⁸ The fundamental determinant shaping change in the TAF's social culture is, however, the friction between High Command and "the agentless change" implying a change process not primarily run by a particular

⁸ The High Command refers the council comprising all four-star generals in the TAF and is headed by the Chief of General Staff (As of May 2015, there are 12 four-star generals in the TAF). The High Command summons in a monthly fashion to discuss the strategic preferences and decisions of the TAF.

change agent. In the domain of officership as a profession, in turn, change shaping the professional culture of the officer corps is a process running in a completely agentless fashion. In the domain of the TAF as a security organization, the change mode is generally ‘layering’ that is to be explained in the theory chapter, and, sometimes, passive layering. In the domains of the TAF as a social institution and officership as a profession, though, generally ‘drift’ and ‘conversion’ appears as being the modes of change. Again, subversive elites exhibiting non-compliant behavior in each of these three domains and also subversive and insurrectionary juniors appear as important change actors. The change processes flowing out from all three domains are ultimately flowing towards the TAF’s organizational culture pool through two change pathways: emulation driving the change in the TAF’s security culture and adaptation driving the TAF’s social culture. Lastly, at the end of the day, these incremental changes in the TAF’s security and social culture as well as the professional culture of the officers directly affect the TAF’s organizational culture. The changing organizational culture of the TAF is, in turn, affecting CMR. Turkish CMR is also affected by change in social-political context in Turkey. Simply put, as is seen from the chart above, one should note that there is a bilateral relationship between the TAF’s organizational culture and Turkish CMR. This mutual relationship, in fact, creates a reciprocal causality between the two. The TAF’s organizational culture is under the direct influence of TAF’s security culture, social culture, and the professional culture of the officer corps. The changing Turkish CMR is, in turn, returning back to the very beginning of the causal mechanism explained above with a feedback mechanism and directly affects the TAF. Owing to that, the change takes place in a cyclic fashion, a reciprocal causality appears between the change in the TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR. It is evident that some

amount of insiderness enabling one to carry out social research from within and social research of familiar is needed to observe this reciprocal causality between TAF's organizational culture shaped by non-military changes in the Turkish CMR and Turkish CMR shaped by changes from within the TAF's organizational culture. That is why this research sought to emphasize that Turkish CMR should best be studied through a holistic approach that provides scholarly insights both from the civilian and military side of the CMR to go beyond existing dichotomous explanations conceptualizing CMR as a zero-sum power politics between soldiers and elected politicians. The binary and power-based approaches, however scholarly, not only overlook the highly interactive and transformative character of CMR but also disregard the reciprocal causality between the TAF's organizational culture and CMR. As this research obviously elucidates, Turkish CMR is a bi-directional relational concept, meaning that the changes both in the civilian and military sides of the relationship may have the capacity to influence the nature, characteristics, and evolution of CMR.

It is worth emphasizing that the findings of this research falsifies of some taken-for-granted assumptions in the literature, such as the TAF is a rigid organization immune to change of that it is a homogenous entity with a fixed institutional order. In light of the findings, this research offers that one should provide room for the possibility that the drivers and characteristics of the TAF's organizational culture may change over time, and that different - even sometimes conflicting - point of views, approaches, and ways of doing things may emerge within the Turkish military. In the in-depth interviews, the author observed that the military leaders at the moment, yet they cannot clearly conceptualize and define, feel the power-distributional effect of gradual institutional change within the TAF, and thus are inclined to concentrate

more on TAF's organizational transformation. In the quest for this transformation, the military leaders know what to change and why to change, but do not have a methodological expertise to answer to the question of "how to change?" This increasingly inward-looking approach has been strengthened with the increased ambiguity in the system yielding to a need for transformation is, for instance, another reason explaining how Turkish CMR has survived through domestic and foreign policy-related crises in the last decade. Then, one may contend that not solely those five exogenous approaches seeking to explain the civilianization of the Turkish CMR in the decade, but also the endogenous factors addressed in this research, such as increased uncertainty within the system and change in the TAF's security culture, social culture, and the professional culture of the officer corps would explain the recent civilianization in CMR. One may then suggest that the High Command's dilemma about how to first confront and then manage uncertainty and change affecting TAF constitutes as the first and foremost endogenous factor preventing the military from intervening the politics as, for the High Command, more involvement in civilian politics means more uncertainty and increased pressure for change in the military. This prospect leads to a disinclination for the intervention to politics, allowing for more room for civilianization in Turkish CMR. As explained in the literature review chapter, all exogenous (or non-military) explanatory approaches such as EU effect, the empowerment of the elected civilians, political stability, and changing socio-political context may be necessary explanations for civilianization. The High Command's dilemma on how to cope with existing uncertainty and change, as well as how to manage change in organizational culture may be proposed as an endogenous factor that has made the High Command retreat from the hostile civilian territory and withdrawal to the military terrains.

1.5. Road Map

This study proceeds as follows:

The Literature Review (2nd chapter) first presents literature from political science seeking to explain the recent civilianization and shift from “confrontation” to “delicate harmony” between the civilian governments and the military in Turkey. Particularly, it attempts to provide a thorough overview of the five arguments emphasizing the exogenous factors, the combination of which has likely been to contribute to the recent civilianization. This chapter, then twisting its grasp to the military culture and dynamics leading to change in the military, provides insights from Samuel Finer’s classical book entitled *The Man on Horseback* in which the Turkish military was classified as one of those “self-aware” militaries with an interventionist “mentality” (1962: 62). Then, in the light of the Finer’s conceptualization, this chapter turns to the few available works in the literature zooming in the military and providing endogenous scholarly insights within the military. Particularly, the themes from Mehmet Ali Birand’s *Shirts of Steel*, the only available source which presents a “holistic picture of the Turkish military” as of early 1990s, are presented in a detailed fashion to better compare and contrast the findings of the research with Birand’s findings.

Coming to the Theoretical Discussion (3rd Chapter,) the first thing that should be mentioned is that, as complex organizations relying on men, women, and other resources provided by society, being founded on values, norms, and rituals as well as producing security (and kinetic power, if required) for polities with means and ways available to achieve the strategic objectives, militaries are often studied by scholars of separated disciplines: Political Science, International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, History, Administrative Sciences and Economics, and Security

Studies. The knowledge and scholarship of these studies is rich in diversity, despite the fact that they often seem disconnected. This research's hope is that it makes these connections explicit so as to better understand the transformation of the Turkish military during the past fifteen years. To better understand this transformation, this research, which seeks to follow a multi-method approach at different levels of analysis for the triangulation of the findings, conceives its theoretical setting as a dual-track construction. While the first track seeks to explain the Turkish military's change with institutional analysis, the second track, with a sociological twist, aims to understand this change through the examination of the evolution of the Turkish military's strategic culture. It is this theoretical diversity that enables this research to get through the challenge of studying the complex phenomenon of the military. That is why this chapter on theoretical discussion starts with the classical debate between Samuel Huntington (the institutionalist track) and Morris Janowitz (the sociological track), which date back 60 years but is still relevant for contemporary debates regarding CMR. First, Huntington's 1957 *The Soldier and the State* and Janowitz's 1971 *The Professional Soldier* not only methodically combined empirical research on CMR with systematic theorizing for the first time, but also initiated the split of civil-military research into a sociological tradition and a strand of political science (Feaver, 2009). That is, political science studies of CMR, on the one hand, has followed Huntington's institutionalist tradition, and are mostly concerned with the question of how civilian political leaders can maintain civilian control, or, the subordination of the military under legitimate elected civilian leaders. Military sociology, on the other hand, concentrates more on the cultural norms, values, and societal factors affecting the relationship between soldiers and civilians. Because this research sits at the intersection between institutional analysis and military sociology,

but Huntingtonian and Janowitzian approaches are equally important. At the end, this chapter concentrates on the general literature and theoretical discussions on both the institutional and sociological tracks to better highlight those dynamics leading to change within the Turkish military. Particularly, this chapter emphasizes the model of gradual change institutional change proposed by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010) and the sociological framework for military change proposed by Theo Farrell and Terry Teriff (2002). .

The Qualitative Analysis, (4th Chapter,) being the first empirical chapter, seeks to point out the “whats, whys, and hows” of the reaction of the TAF to the changing socioeconomic and political context from 2002 onwards at both organizational and individual levels. The first aim of this qualitative analysis is to determine the patterned preferences and behaviors of the TAF when addressing to the institutional challenges it has faced as an organization in the last decade. These institutional challenges could either be: political, such as the “desecuritization” of the Kurdish question and the transfer of the decision making responsibility from the military to the civilian elites on the PKK-related issues; economic, such as the relative decline of the monthly wages of the military personnel when compared to their civilian counterparts; or social, such as the changing public perceptions regarding the military. These institutional challenges could also be rooted within the military such as the struggle of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for their status and rights against the Turkish General Staff, or out of the military like the allegations of abuses on the soldier rights and debate over the allegedly high levels of suicide rates within the military. How and through what kind of institutional mechanisms has the Turkish military first responded and then addressed those challenges to change and adapt to the new environment? Simply, these are the sorts of questions this

chapter seeks to elucidate. In this chapter, the qualitative content analyses of the statements of the top brass in the Turkish military and the Turkish General Staff's press releases since 2004 are provided to better understand the nature of change particularly in the strategic narratives of the Turkish military in the last decade. This chapter then, turning to individual level, provides the findings of the semi-structured in-depth interviews of 87 military elites among whom are still serving and retired officers.

In the fifth chapter, entitled Quantitative Analysis and being the second empirical chapter, twisting its grasp to the quantitative approach, this chapter provides statistical analyses based on the data derived from the survey research applied to 1,400 officers in the Turkish military, a representative sample of the officer corps in the Turkish military.

The sixth is the chapter aiming to provide a general discussion that combines two discussions presented at the end of the previous empirical chapters. In this discussion, the endogenous factors within the military are explained with Thelen and Mahoney's model of gradual institutional change.

The last is the conclusion chapter providing a summary of the key findings, theoretical and practical implications of the research and possible venues offered by this research for the future researches.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This piece of research attempts to shed light on the institutional change that the Turkish military has been experiencing over the last fifteen years. For a clearer understanding of the military's institutional change, this chapter will explore possible explanations in the literature as factors in making the Turkish military more submissive to civilian control. This elucidation will allow for the audience to better compare and contrast the picture of the Turkish military portrayed in the literature with the findings of this research.

The first part of the review provides a brief overview of the nature and basic characteristics of Turkish CMR before the 2000s to better assess the extent and nature of change in Turkish CMR over the last fifteen years, the prime exogenous (or non-military) factor affecting this research's dependent variable (DV) of the Turkish military's transformation. After providing a brief introduction including the political and legal reforms affecting Turkish CMR from 2000 onwards, the second part of this chapter turns to explanations cited in the literature as the factors leading towards civilianization of Turkish CMR. As seen in the introduction chapter, all arguments proposed in the literature as the factors changing the character of Turkish CMR, and then, making the military more submissive to civilian supremacy are exogenous, or non-military ones. In this part, the review critically engages in the debate and discusses why these non-military factors may have been necessary, but not sufficient,

to fully explain the recent civilianization noticed in Turkish CMR. The review then classifies all explanations for civilianization available in the literature into two categories; that is, the “pessimistic perspective,” which does not take into account the endogenous factors within the Turkish military as the sources of the civilianization of Turkish CMR, and the “optimistic perspective,” which implies the possibility that endogenous factors may have played a role in the process of civilianization.

After elucidating these perspectives, the review then seeks to provide a picture of the Turkish military as portrayed in the literature to better compare/contrast it with the findings of the research. To provide conceptual insights at the beginning of this part, this chapter first reviews Samuel Finer’s classic *The Man on Horseback* (1962). Particularly, Finer’s conceptualization of mentality and motivation of militaries as the endogenous drivers for military intervention and his classification of Turkish military as an example of those “self-aware militaries inclined to intervention” take notice. After this conceptual *prelude*, the review then turns to Mehmet Ali Birand’s *Shirts of Steel* (1991), the first ever source-providing insights from within the Turkish military. Birand’s work is highly relevant for this research, as the insights from this work would be defined as a snapshot of Turkish military as of early 1990s. At the end of this part, some other scholars’ observations/findings about the characteristics of the Turkish military are provided as well to enrich the literature’s picture of the Turkish military.

2.1. Historical Terrain

2.1.1. Turkish CMR before 2000

The Turkish military has always been an important actor since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Hale, 1994). Gareth Jenkins writes:

The role of the military in Turkey is rooted in Turkish society, history and culture. The military has always lain at the heart of how Turks define themselves; and most still regard the institution of the military as the embodiment of the highest virtues of the nation (7-9).

In addition to its empowered status and pre-eminent role in Turkish socio-cultural life (Jenkins 2011:7-9), the Turkish military has been entrusted by laws recognizing its “special status.”⁹ The Turkish military, as Zeki Sarıgil puts it, “has had a special position of *de facto veto player* in the Turkish political system” (2010: 463-483). During all interventions, the Turkish military has adopted a profile for itself of being above politics, that is of being distant to fractional demands but certainly in defense of the state’s interests and for the sake of whole nation. This may be defined as an illustration of a hegemony construction in Gramscian terms, in which the military disperses its values to the society and state’s bureaucratic machine by making the soldiers hegemonic and dominant in the political system, but in a tacit way.

Ersel Aydınli suggests that the nature of Turkish CMR reflects the centuries-long historical experience of the Ottoman Empire (and its gradual decline), a distressing War of Independence (1919-1923), a Cold War that was essentially quite hot in Turkey, and an enormous modernization project which was eventually adopted to the Turkish military itself (Aydınli 2009). He then concludes that, after the initiation of the multi-party system in 1946, the Turkish military was never the Army

⁹ The three main laws relating to the status and legal responsibilities of the TAF are:

The Turkish Constitution (1982): Please see for the full text of the constitution: http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf (accessed January 14 2015).

Particularly, Chapter 3 of the Constitution privileging military judicial system as an independent judicial branch in the state, Article 145 regulating the military judicial system, Articles 156 and 157 regulating the Higher Military Courts, Article 117 regulating the national defense, the Article 118 recognizing the National Security Council as an constitutional institution and assigning tasks to it.

The TAF Internal Service Law (1961), please see for the full text (Turkish): <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.4.211.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2015).

The National Security Council Law (1983): please see for the full text (Turkish) <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/kurumsal/mevzuat/mgk-ve-mgk-gensek-kanunu> (accessed January 12, 2015).

of a single party, and it was never the tool of radical politicians. Yet being a guardian one, it was also never truly a predatory military that wanted permanent power possession with a long-term vision, always having returned power promptly to the civilians after the various military interventions. Along the same lines of Aydınlı, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu highlights that, after grasping the control of administrations, the military immediately assigned the power to the civil governments and passed into the multiple-party regime (2011). This is one of the important characteristics that make the situation in Turkey different from the military dictatorships of Latin America (Lion-Perlin, 2011) and the Middle East (Satana, 2011). David Lion-Perlin, for instance, finds that while the Turkish military ruled for brief periods, relying instead on extracting legal constitutional guarantees to maintain influence, Latin American militaries ruled for lengthier periods with less constitutional rewriting (Lion-Perlin, 2011). However, for Karaosmanoğlu, after each coup, the Turkish military, has expanded its “autonomous,” or “above-politics” sphere of influence by making changes to the constitution as well as other laws and legal regulations. The military, for instance, achieved important privileges through constitutional and legal regulations to intervene in the political Service Law, the State Security Courts (DGMs), the right of the military to select one of the members of the Higher Education Council (YÖK), and the right of the Secretariat General of the National Security Council (MGK) to nominate one member of the Supreme Board for Radio and Television (RTÜK). The military also directly intervened in politics through informal mechanisms, such as public statements, press releases, and declarations given by top-ranking officers. The reason for this, according to Aydınlı, is that the military was never convinced that the level of democracy in Turkey and the quality

of civilian politics were good enough to become fully subordinate to them (Aydınlı, 2011).

One could then assert the military, during much of the Republican Period shared political power with civilian governments, with Steven Cook's words, "to rule" by leaving the daily routines of governance to the civilian governments (2007). Through its role as the protector of the whole nation and the guardian of the state both against internal and external threats, the military has had a powerful position in the affairs of the state, which eventually led to the ability to decide the fate of governments and politicians as well as a privileged position in the eyes of the people. On four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997), the military directly intervened to change the course of the political system and to replace the government. All were effective for the military in the sense that the military was able to change the course of events in their own favor. Directly placed under the office of the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of Defense, and the Chief of General Staff remaining in fourth place on the state protocol list after the President, the head of Parliament and the prime minister, the military enjoyed sufficient autonomy to influence decisions made by the political leadership. These decisions were not only on security-related issues but also in other domains such as judicial and legislative processes as well as matters in budgetary, education, broadcasting (Karakaş, 2012). The officer corps has been a privileged group in Turkish society, respected and trusted by the population and enjoying special privileges in the form of high quality education, secure employment, housing, and various other welfare benefits (Jenkins, 2001). Generally, the military and society have had a good and strong relationship (Sarıgil, 2014). Known for its adherence to law and order and incorrupt ways, the military has been the most trusted institution in the country, recording much better in opinion polls

than any other civil-political organization (Gürsoy, 2011: 293-308). For instance, a Gallup poll in May 2007 found that Turks are more likely to express confidence in the country's military than any other national institution with 81% of respondents said they have confidence in the military.¹⁰ Similarly, the Eurobarometer opinion poll of 2008 indicates that the vast majority of Turkey respects the military as an institution and a total of 84% of Turks named the military as the most trusted institution in the country (Jenkins, 2008). One should also note that military interventions in politics were also, by and large, accepted by the society as a necessity during times of political unrest (Heper and Güney, 2000: 635-657).

In sum, one may suggest that, until the turn of the millennium, CMR in Turkey were characterized by relatively weak civil-political institutions and political elites, on the one hand, and a strong military institution and powerful generals on the other, or in Zeki Sarıgil's words, "the period of military supremacy rather than a civilian supremacy" (2014: 168-190). However, during the last decade, the power dynamics has changed in favor of the civilian institutions. But how has this shift started, or which factor caused the beginning of this shift? Turkey's EU candidacy process, which led to the wide-ranging EU harmonization packages, the first of was taken by the three-party coalition comprised of the Democratic Left Party, the Nationalist Movement Party, and the Motherland Party in 2000, was the answer that was proposed in the literature (Toktaş and Kurt, 2008).

2.1.2. The Coalition Government: Civil-Military Relations (2000–2002)

Turkey was declared a EU candidate country at the European Council's Helsinki Summit in December 1999, upon which several democratization reforms

¹⁰ Please see for the poll results: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/28351/military-turkey-elicits-highest-levels-public-confidence.aspx> (accessed June 12, 2015)

were introduced to meet the requirements for a full membership. One dimension of these reforms was concerned with the democratization of Turkish CMR, aiming to eliminate the military's privileges and autonomous status within the political system. In contrast to some who associate the civilianization of Turkish CMR with the first AKP government's ruling period that started in 2002, Sarıgil suggests that, in fact, the decline of the Turkish military's political influence was triggered by the EU's decision of granting candidacy status to Turkey after the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Sarıgil, 2007: 39-57). Simply, when the EU recognized Turkey as an official candidate country for membership, Turkey was forced to initiate major legal and institutional changes to curb the military's political powers. The result of the summit decisions triggered a rapid reform process. This first wave of civilianization can be grouped under three broad reform categories, namely: reforms strengthening the civilian power over defense-related issues, reforms curbing the military's presence in the judiciary, and reforms amending the structure of the MGK. In addition, the reforms aimed at increasing democratic liberties, such as the freedom of speech and minority rights. Several packages that were enacted in the early 2000s changed the anti-terror law and granted the right to broadcast and obtain education in languages other than Turkish, including Kurdish (Gürsoy, 2012: 735-760). Accordingly, in 1999, the seats of the military judges were removed from the DGM. In 2001, an amendment was made to Article 118 of the Constitution, increasing the number of civilians participating in MGK meetings by adding the Minister of Justice to the MGK, the latter of which was comprised of five military members (Chief of General Staff and four Force Commanders) and four civilian members (the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense). In addition, in the Article 118 of the Constitution, the statement of "Any MGK

decision would primarily be taken into consideration by the Cabinet” was changed to “would primarily be evaluated by the Cabinet” not to degrade the credibility of the cabinet.

2.1.3. The First AKP Government: Civil-Military Relations (2002–2007)

After the AKP entered office as a single party in the 2002 general elections by receiving 34.28% of total votes, the seventh harmonization package was implemented in 2003.¹¹ Through this package, the method of electing the MGK Secretary General from among civilian members was ensured; the authority of the chief of general staff on selecting and assigning a three-star general as the MGK Secretary General was transferred to the Prime Minister for a civilian bureaucrat; the monthly meetings of the MGK were determined to be held bi-monthly; and the authority of the MGK Secretary General was drastically narrowed. Most importantly, while the authority of the MGK was reduced to an advisory role on issues such as determining, assigning, and applying the national security policy of the state, an explicit initiative was presented to the Prime Minister and his cabinet about whether or not to apply these decisions. Therefore, the MGK was legally turned into an advisory body. Within the scope of regulations made after the military’s 1971 memorandum, which increased the political autonomy of the military, the DGM were established and entrusted with “the task of trying the crimes related directly to national security and crimes against the Republic, with its qualities such as the unity and integrity of the state with the country and the nation, and having a free democratic order determined in the Constitution.” The military judges in these courts were removed.

¹¹ Please see for the full texts of all harmonization packages (in Turkish): <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/abuyup.pdf> (accessed January 16, 2015).

In May 2004, the eighth harmonization package was approved in parliament, and this new package brought increased civilian supervision of defense expenditures by expanding the Court of Auditors' purview to oversee the budget, including what was previously considered confidential property. In this reform process, the DGMs, which had included both military and civilian members, were completely abolished; the provision allowing for the selection of one member of the YÖK by the General Staff was removed from the Law on Higher Education, and the provision allowing for the nomination of one member of the RTÜK by the MGK's Secretariat General was repealed from the Law on the Establishment of and Broadcasting by Radio and Television Corporations. Among these reforms, one should note that the reform of the MGK was a remarkable step toward curbing the military's capacity to intervene in politics in a direct and formal fashion (Michaud-Emin, 2007: 25-42). The military is no longer represented in institutions that oversee higher education and the media (Lagendijk, 2010: 12), and military judges no longer serve on the benches of DGM (Jenkins, 2007: 339-355). Several amendments made in conjunction to the harmonization packages, increasingly restricted the military courts' jurisdiction regarding hearing court cases against civilians, and in 2006, finally ended the trials of civilians by these courts during peacetime (Gürsoy, 2011: 293-308). One should note that the first AKP government (2002–2007) intensely supported Turkey's EU bid, kept a distance from political Islam, and refrained from any direct confrontation with the military on critical political issues such as the headscarf and secularism (Keyman and Öniş, 2007: 9-34). In a way, the pledge to the ideal of EU membership provided the AKP with legitimacy, which had been under inquiry by the military due to the party's Islamist background. This legitimacy indirectly served to lessen the military's political power. It is likely that both the AKP and the military tried to

accomplish a *modus vivendi* with each other by equally respecting the EU process (Heper, 2011). It is, however, important to note that the self-proclaimed role of the Turkish military—that is, dominating the national security agenda by way of securitization, especially on issues such as political Islam and Kurdish nationalism—continued.

It is also worth mentioning the changing strategic preferences among military elites. Some suggest that, despite the deep-rooted involvement of the Turkish military in civilian affairs due to institutional background and historical experience, another important factor that shapes this relationship is the personality of the individuals in the position of the chief of staff. For example, during Gen. Hilmi Özkök's term of office as Chief of General Staff between 2002 and 2006, the Turkish military had a relatively low political profile. The military respected the AKP's election victory in 2002. Özkök did not force the AKP leaders and the political elites to come to terms with the military's opinions on security issues but instead opted for methods of negotiation and persuasion. Özkök was in favor of a more democratic solution as he questioned the understanding and rationale of direct or indirect involvement of the military in the political scene. In line with the conventional TGS's ideal of westernization, General Özkök also supported Turkey's EU membership. Metin Heper summarizes Özkök's relatively liberal attitude with the following words:

Özkök was also of the opinion that pious people might pursue secular politics. He wished to develop a *modus vivendi* with the AKP. At times, he changed his mind when the AKP government came up with a persuasive argument. Most significantly he kept restlessness under control among some commanders at the top particularly about “the hidden agenda” of the AKP government. When he spoke up, often he seemed to appease the detractors of the AKP government within the military: “The February 28 was the consequence of certain developments in Turkey. The effect would not be different if the cause continues to exist (2011: 241-253).

After the relatively smooth period of Hilmi Özkök, Turkish CMR severed in the following period when Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt was appointed in 2006 and remained in office until 2008. The friction between the AKP government and the military increased during the period of the 2007 presidential elections. The military sought to change the AKP's decision to nominate Abdullah Gül, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, as its presidential candidate. The military's strategic preferences and behaviors before and during the presidential elections process were reminiscent of previous military involvements in political processes. In a conference on April 12, 2007, the Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt announced that the military must concern itself with the presidential elections as the President of the Republic was also the Commander in Chief of the Turkish military. He also stated that, "as a citizen and as a member of the armed forces, I hope someone who is loyal to the main principles of the Republic and committed to the secular, unitary structure of the state—not just in words, but in essence—will be the President" (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 91). Yet, despite this warning and the military's other formal and informal mechanisms to influence the government's decision, the AKP did not rescind Abdullah Gül's candidacy to be president. In reaction, on April 27, 2007, the military introduced a new way of expressing its opinions about developments in the Turkish political system. The Turkish General Staff published a memorandum on its official website warning of the danger to secularism (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 91-93). It was the harshest statement by the military since the intervention on February 28, which was a confrontation with the Welfare Party coalition in 1997.

The e-memorandum stated the following:

It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb the fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently....An important portion of these activities was carried out with the permission and the knowledge of administrative authorities, who were supposed to intervene and prevent such incidents, a fact which intensifies the gravity of the matter.¹²

The direct method employed by the military to block Gül's nomination for the presidency led to some criticism in civil society as well. One should note that some civil society organizations, the media, and business circles alike gave significant support to the AKP in its standoff with the military. Even participants in demonstrations against the AKP expressed their ambivalence towards the military with the slogan "No *Sharia*, but no coup either" (Toktaş and Kurt, 2008). Thus, the military did not achieve its main objective to organize public, press, and non-governmental organizations against the AKP government in overturning its decision to hold Abdullah Gül as its presidential candidate. With this civilian response, citizens, including both opponents and proponents of the AKP, sent a clear message that the military needed to keep out of this debate. This is a very critical juncture in Turkish CMR, in the sense that the legitimacy of the military as a veto player in the political realm was questioned by the public, giving authority to civilian rule rather than to the military's guardianship role. That is why, in 2009, General Yaşar Büyükanıt confessed that he was the one who had penned the e-memorandum but was against the idea of shutting down the AKP (2009, "Retired General confesses..."). It is also worth remembering that, in September 2011, the very first month after his appointment as the chief of General Staff, General Necdet Özel,

¹² In a well-known TV news program called "32. Gun" broadcast on Channel D on May 5, 2009, then-Chief Yaşar Büyükanıt declared that he wrote the text of the e-memorandum himself.

removed the controversial April 27th statement from the official website of the Turkish military (www.tsk.tr).

In sum, the CMR in the AKP's first governmental term (2002–07) would be marked by two entirely contradictory stages. The first stage is the period up until 2006 when there was a robust motivation for EU membership by the government; a positive pro-Turkish climate amongst the political and bureaucratic elite of the EU and its member states; an enormous legislative reform process that emphasized the civilian supremacy in Turkish politics; Gen. Hilmi Özkök, who as Chief of the General Staff, stuck to democratic processes and respected civilian supremacy; and smooth relations between the AKP and the military which seemed to tacitly endorse the EU candidacy process. The second stage, however, would be marked by a change of office in the Turkish General Staff; a more enthusiastic Chief of Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt, who often reminded the military's guardianship role of the Turkish state; chaos during the presidential nomination and election processes as well as the military's involvement in these processes with Büyükanıt's public speeches and e-memorandum published on the TAF's official website; AKP government's counterattack by making public speeches against the memorandum in favor of democracy instead of using executive power in appointing or resigning military cadres or retreating; reactions by some civil society institutions to the military for this attempt of direct intervention in politics, political instability and civilian incapacity in the outbreak and, later on, in the management of the crisis in Turkish CMR. The general elections in 2007 were timely for the civilian elites to stress the importance of parliamentary democratic politics. As a last note, Gül's presidency can be considered both a success of elected civilians over the military in a delicate

political matter and an indicator of the military's declining ability to shape the politics.

2.1.4. The Second AKP Government: CMR (2007–2011)

The AKP won the 2007 general elections by increasing its share of the national from 34.3% in the 2002 general elections to 46.7%. A self-confidence empowered by the election results endowed the AKP with new life to rekindle the reformist spirit of Turkish CMR. In June 2007, however, the publication of the diaries of retired general Özden Örnek on weekly *Nokta* was followed by an alleged coup conspiracy against the AKP government and eventually triggered the ignition of a legal investigation, later to be known as the *Ergenekon* case (Aydınlı, 2011). More than 300 people, including journalists, academicians, and retired and active duty military officers from various ranks, were implicated in the coup plans and were put on trial in October 2008. In early 2010, another alleged plot entitled *Balyoz* (Sledgehammer) was discovered, resulting in the start of a separate trial in December 2010 against almost 200 suspected retired and serving officers. The number of armed forces personnel being prosecuted was unprecedented in Turkish history, especially once it is considered that *Balyoz* and *Ergenekon* led to the arrest of one-tenth of generals and admirals in the TAF, a group including both retired and serving four-star generals (Aydınlı, 2009). Yaprak Gürsoy suggests that the exposure of alleged coup plots in 2008 and the following trials of the retired and serving officers have shaken the guardian role of the Turkish military in politics (2012: 191-211). Indeed, this is an accurate observation as investigations into the coup plans have also discouraged officers from political expression.

In January 2010, the AKP government abolished the Police-Public Security Cooperation (EMASYA) protocol, which had formed one of the legal bases for the

military to carry out internal security operations in urban areas. In August 2010, for the first time in more than two decades, the AKP government got involved in the decisions of the High Military Council regarding promotions. Later in the year, the government prepared a constitutional package, which was approved by the majority of the electorate in a referendum on September 12, 2010. The package included changes such as soldiers would be adjudicated in civilian courts for non-military offences, it would be possible to try the generals who had staged the military intervention of 1980, and the decisions of the High Military Council on purges from the military would be subjected to judicial review. Accompanying these legal changes, the inclination of civilians to challenge military autonomy in practice has also increased. A 2010 constitutional amendment permitted military officers to face trial in civilian courts for criminal offenses against state security. The execution of this constitutional order made a significant contribution to decreasing the military's ability to informally yet directly intervene in politics through statements, declarations, and press releases given by high-ranking officers. This amendment almost completely ended the military's usage of such informal mechanisms to influence politics.

In the second governmental term of the AKP, to bypass these newly appeared restrictions in the political context, the Turkish military started to change its communication strategy. After Gen. İlker Başbuğ replaced Yaşar Büyükanıt as the Chief of General Staff in 2008, the Turkish military initiated a new media and public relations strategy to directly inform the public about security matters as an actor independent of the government. This shift in the communication strategy would be defined as being respectful of civilian authority, meaning not being in an open dispute with the elected civilians, but instead being open to discussing security

matters with the public. To achieve this, the military extended the accreditation list to include new media outlets, which had not been invited to their events before. In this new approach, high-ranking generals briefed these media outlets about military operations against targets of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and accepted questions in press conferences. As the Chief, Gen. İlker Başbuğ was interviewed by many leading journalists in the media during this time (2010: "Başbuğ: A demoralized..."). In his speech at the War Academies Command in Istanbul on April 14, 2009, for instance, General Başbuğ articulated the military's position vis-à-vis the main internal political issues, such as the Kurdish question, the *Ergenekon* case, and political Islam. Despite the fact that form and style of his speech seemed softer compared with previous speeches by former chiefs of general staff, the content of his speech indicated that Turkish CMR was still not in line with a democratic one. What this speech indicated was that, as of time period between 2008-2010, the military still attempted to exert its influence on politics and that the military's involvement in political and public affairs still continued. As to be seen in the first empirical chapter providing an institutional analysis of the Turkish military's change, this method of communicating directly to the public against the elected civilians was to create a backlash effect that eroded the public image of the Turkish military.

While the Turkish military followed the method of directly communicating with the public to complain about the preferences and behaviors of the elected civilians and behaviors the military deemed improper or anti-secular, the AKP government continued for more civilianization. The newly-founded Secretariat for combating terrorism called the Secretariat for Public Order and Security under the realm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2009 is another sign of the shift in the state's security structure. The new Secretariat's aims contain the recruitment of

civilian security specialists to develop strategies to fight terrorism and to coordinate intelligence services of the state. One of the problems in the democratic control of the military has been the Turkish National Intelligence Organization. It is currently a semi-independent organization under military dominance, whereas constitutionally, it is an office under the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an intelligence organization under the General Directorate of Security. The military also has its own intelligence organization. The new Secretariat aims to civilianize these different units of surveillance by way of creating a coordination center at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In sum, through various institutional reforms, the Turkish military's power in politics has been significantly narrowed by reforms carried out by the AKP governments and the fact that the public embraced these reforms despite the military pleading with them not to do. For instance, the military could not react to the government's lifting of the ban on headscarves in universities in 2010, the amendment allowing officers to be tried in civilian courts the same year, and the government's negotiations with the leader of the PKK, known by the public as the Oslo Process (Akyol, 2015).

It is likely to suggest that, as of 2009, the only rigid domain in which elected civilians confronted the military with was the Kurdish question and the armed conflict between the PKK and the security forces. On October 19, 2009, 34 members of the PKK surrendered through the Habur border gate along with peaceful demonstrations organized by the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP). All returnees were freed as part of the rapprochement and reconciliation initiative of the AKP without legal proceedings. Then-Prime Minister Erdoğan said that he is “considering far-reaching steps to resolve the conflict” (2009,

“In a symbolic move...”). Indeed the same year, state television channel TRT launched a groundbreaking channel *TRT Şeş* broadcasting in Kurdish.¹³ The Turkish military reacted strongly against the warm reception and the release of the PKK members without penalty (2009, “Turkey denies Öcalan...”). Families, veterans, and friends of martyrs protested against celebratory events welcoming members of the PKK (2009, “Martyrs’ families continue...”). The then-Secretary General of the General Staff Gen. Ferit Güler said in a weekly press conference that “the developments which took place on October 19 and the following days are unacceptable” (2009, “Military and HSYK...”). Government officials shared a similar criticism by saying “excessive celebration will have negative repercussions for the Kurdish resolution” (2009, “Reception for returnees...”). Historically, in military discourse, practice, and mindset, the Kurdish question was provoked by PKK terrorism. Accordingly, there was no need for a political solution but a fight against terror. The AKP’s recent Kurdish resolution project, which is likely to result in the purge of the PKK in the long run, has been purely a civilian initiative. It was met with relative silence by the military, reflecting the military’s confirmation of the ongoing process. One may then suggest that the resolution process, despite its all shortcomings and drawbacks, contributed to the process of desecuritization, demilitarization, and civilianization in the Turkish polity, particularly as the hottest issue of the Kurdish question and ongoing PKK-initiated conflict in southeastern Turkey (Gürsoy, 2012: 191-211).

2.1.5.The Third AKP Government: CMR between 2011–2015

¹³ The first public broadcasting in Kurdish took place in June 2004, following 2001 amendments by the coalition government. At that time, it was for only two hours in a day.

The AKP won a third term in parliamentary elections by increasing its vote to 49.8% during the 2011 general elections. With this result, the AKP became the only political party in Turkish history to win three consecutive general elections, each time receiving more votes than in the previous election. This is indicative of the empowerment of the single party majority in Turkish politics.

After Gen. İlker Başbuğ's retirement, Gen. Işık Koşaner became chief of general staff on August 27, 2010. Then chief Gen. Koşaner did not follow Başbuğ's approach of direct communication with the public during his term in office. However, he continued to defend the military against investigations carried out during the alleged *Ergenekon* case and coup plans by using both formal and informal mechanisms, especially via strategic talks with the Prime Minister and the President, and released press statements on the General Staff's website. He made these statements in a milder manner compared with Başbuğ. However, an unanticipated development occurred in July 2011. On July 29, 2011, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the government would not approve of the promotion of detained officers in the Supreme Military Council, which would start on August 1, 2011 (Yıldız, 2013). After this, then-Chief Koşaner pointed out that a total of 250 officers, 173 active and 77 retired, were detained and these detentions were against universal legal principles, fairness, justice, and conscientious values. On the same day, Chief Koşaner, along with the Land, Air and Naval Force Commanders, resigned by requesting their retirement. While Turkey confronted mass resignations of its commanders for the first time in the country's history, public opinion turned fearful over the possibility that Turkey was heading toward a serious crisis. However, the government weathered the storm in a very short time by assigning a new command echelon, including the General Staff. The EU viewed the event as Turkey "becoming

a more democratic country in which democratic institutions have control over military decisions” (Letsch, 2011).

Another critical juncture towards civilianization was the revision of Article 35 of the military’s Internal Service Law. The previous version of this article stated that “the duty of the TAF is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as defined in the Constitution.” That is, this article was an important legal justification for the military leaders to legitimize the coup of 1980. In July 2013, Article 35 was revised a “the duty of the armed forces is to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers coming from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to fulfill the duties abroad according to the decisions of the Parliament and help maintain international peace.” With this revision, which placed emphasis to external threats, the military’s ability to use the pretext of internal threats to stage coups and intervene in politics was abolished.

In August 2011, General Necdet Özel, a general with moderate views and strong democratic commitments (2011, “Profile of Necdet...”) was appointed as the new Chief of the General Staff. When taking his soft engagement approach with elected civilians into account in the domain of CMR (Gürcan, 2015),¹⁴ one may assert that Necdet Özel has disinclined from direct confrontation with the political elites as a “reformist dove,” (Gürcan, 2015) particularly with regard to the *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer* cases.

¹⁴ Please see the Cansu Çamlıbel’s interview with Bilgin Balanlı, a four-star Air Force general who was arrested and jailed four years during the Sledgehammer trial: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28656351.asp> (accessed April 5, 2015).

The 2013 EU Turkey Progress Report, in fact, summarizes the civilianization of Turkish CMR over the last decade as follows:

Civilian oversight of the security forces Civilian oversight of the security forces was further consolidated. The General Staff abstained from exerting pressure on political issues beyond its remit. A law overhauling the Turkish Armed Forces' disciplinary system, adopted in January 2013, provides for the conversion of disciplinary tribunals into administrative disciplinary committees, the abolition of solitary confinement and the strengthening of appeal mechanisms for disciplinary punishments. The report of an inter-party Parliamentary Commission tasked with investigating coups and alleged 'deep state' networks was published in December. Judicial investigations into the 1980 coup and the 'Postmodern Coup' of 28 February 1997 continued. In November, a Court heard the two surviving perpetrators of the 1980 coup via videoconference. 103 suspects have been charged with involvement in the 28 February 'Postmodern Coup' of 1997.

Amendments made to the Law on Provincial Administrations, which is used as the legal basis for the use of military force upon request of governors in domestic security incidents, gave civilian authorities a broader oversight of military operations. In July, the Internal Service Law of the Turkish armed forces, which broadly defined the duties of the military and contained one article to justify military intervention in politics, was amended. Military service has been re-defined and the amendment also clarified that members of the Turkish Armed Forces cannot engage in political activities. Civilian oversight of the Gendarmerie's law enforcement activities, in particular, remained insufficient. There was only limited access to the Turkish Court of Accounts audit reports on security, defence and intelligence agencies. Military and civilian judicial investigations into the December 2011 Uludere incident in which 34 civilians lost their lives as a result of a military airstrike remained subject to a secrecy decision and were not finalised. No administrative measure was taken to punish any individual for the incident. A parliamentary investigation report was published — with dissenting opinions — but did not clarify political or operational responsibility (2013 EU Progress Report).¹⁵

The report also emphasizes the following points in Turkish CMR as the missing ones:

The civilian and military court systems continued to run in parallel. Increasing civilian control of the military requires the amendment of legal provisions on the composition and powers of the Supreme Military Council. Pending the finalization of a new constitution, the Chief of the General Staff continued to report to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of Defense. Overall, progress was made in consolidating civilian oversight, in particular with the

¹⁵ European Union, Turkey 2013 Progress Report. October 16, 2013. Please see for the full report: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014).

parliamentary investigation into past military coups and legislative amendments, confirming the profound shift in the balance of civil-military relations in favor of the civilian authorities. However, further reforms are needed, particularly as regards the military justice system and civilian oversight of the Gendarmerie (2013 EU Progress Report).

In fact, when reviewing the literature seeking to explain the civilianization and the military's diminishing political influence over the last fifteen years, one can find five major arguments, all exogenous in the literature.

2.2. Exogenous Arguments Attempting to Explain Civilianization of the CMR

2.2.1. The EU Effect Argument

The main point of the EU effect argument is that the EU harmonization process in Turkey has required reforms in Turkish CMR to secure civilian supremacy over the TAF and greater transparency in its affairs, meaning that the EU emerges as an important external factor which initiated this change (Güney and Karateklioglu, 2005: 439-462).

After Turkey's accession to candidacy status at the European Council's Helsinki Summit in 1999,¹⁶ one particular EU requirement for Turkey to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria was the elimination of the involvement of the military in civilian affairs and politics. Meeting this requirement would mean that Turkey

¹⁶ In the Copenhagen Criteria, the articles concerning the CMR are presented below:

The representative of the National Security Council on the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK), responsible for preparing the regulations for the implementation of laws such as broadcasting in languages other than Kurdish, would be withdrawn.

The representative of the National Security Council on the High-Education Board (YÖK) who oversees the administration of universities would be withdrawn.

The decisions of the Supreme Military Council would be no longer immune from judicial oversight or review, assuming that the judiciary would also become independent.

Extra-budgetary funds available to the military, for example the defense industry support fund, would be brought under full budgetary control of the Parliament.

Please see for more about the Copenhagen Criteria: Emerson, Michael. 2004. "Has Turkey fulfilled Copenhagen political criteria?" *Center for European Political Studies Brief* :48.

would have the same CMR standards as those of other EU member states. To achieve this objective of civilian supremacy and oversight, Turkey abolished or reduced military representation in civilian governmental bodies, introduced greater transparency in defense policymaking and budget, and improved parliamentary oversight of the military” (Narlı, 2009: 56-83). So, the EU membership process required Turkey to enact certain political reforms, particularly in Turkish CMR as, among these reforms, the establishment and consolidation of civilian supremacy and oversight over TAF was a prime one. This argument also suggests that these reforms were also accepted by the TAF, even if they meant that the military lost autonomy in the state structure and political influence. Why, then, did the TAF obediently endorse these EU-mandated reforms? The answer is that the TAF, which has always cared for Westernization and supported the modernization of Turkey, perceived the EU candidacy process and possible membership as an important step forward for the country to become a fully democratic European country with a strong economic and political structure, and surely with a more modern military. Embracing an institutionalist approach, Sarigil answers why the Turkish military, a veto player in the Turkish political system, has accepted its loss of power in the last decade by proposing the concept of “rhetorical entrapment” (Sarigil, 2007). He suggests that the Turkish military’s commitment to further integrate with the EU on several occasions has led it to get rhetorically entrapped. Thus, the military refrained from blocking the civilianization process due to the likely damage such an action would cause to its ideational interests (legitimacy and credibility) (Sarigil, 2007). For Sarigil, when this institutional model is applied to the civilianization of Turkish CMR, one can draw the following conclusions. First, for him, the EU played an important role in changes in Turkish CMR because the EU was the primary factor

that led to shifts in power relations among the civilian and military sides in post-Helsinki Turkey. Second, even though the military was highly concerned about the consequences of reforms for its own political powers, it could not block them due to the likely damage such an action would cause to its legitimacy and credibility.

The military also believed that the EU membership process offered the best options in confronting domestic threats such as political Islamism and Kurdish separatism (Kuru, 2012: 37-57). So, particularly between 2002-2007, the TAF's commitment to the ideal of the EU membership provided legitimacy to the AKP, which had been under scrutiny by the TAF due to its Islamist background, and indirectly served to reduce the TAF's political power. For Toktaş and Kurt, this EU-imposed legal and institutional framework, which functioned as an "exogenous" control mechanism, has necessitated democratization in Turkish CMR and has served as an external stimulus in empowering the civilian voices for the civilianization of the military-dominated legal and institutional setting in Turkey. For them, the EU effect has strengthened the stance of political elites vis-a-vis military elites (Toktaş and Kurt, 2010). In the same vein, for Ümit Cizre, the adoption of EU harmonization reforms played a significant, but not sufficient role in AKP's strategy to reduce the military's influence in politics. For her, in spite of the recent developments that curb the TAF's role in the politics, the TAF did not abstain from undermining the AKP government. She then concludes that the reform packages, which represent a major move towards weakening the military's role in politics, has not really led to a significant disengagement of military officers from politics, nor to a rethinking of their role in areas that should be under civilian control (2008: 132-171). Similarly, Hale Akay emphasizes that the constitutional changes and the legal amendments in accordance with the EU's Copenhagen criteria were perceived as a

mistake by some of the generals. Yet, the option of staging a coup was closed, since public opinion at the time was pro-EU and supported the reforms. Accordingly, she asserts that, “indirectly, the EU-induced reforms of 1999 and 2005 contributed to the split in the military and the weakening of the armed forces” (Akay, 2009: 297).

From 2005, however, despite the fact that Turkey has slowed down the EU reform process and Turkey’s EU bid has lost its positive impact on Turkish CMR, the trend of civilianization of Turkish CMR has continued. This observation may lead to questions about the explanatory power of this argument. In this vein, Ali Karaosmanoğlu highlights that many works in the literature assert that changes between 2002 and 2006 took place due to the EU effect, but then he asks: “what about post-2007 changes and how to explain the close and effective collaboration of the TAF with the civilian decision makers?” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011). If it is assumed that the explanatory power of the EU membership process has been diminishing when it comes to the TAF’s commitment to Turkey’s democratization, one may then assert that some other dynamics, either exogenous or endogenous, could in fact be the drivers of the TAF’s continued commitment to the democratization process.

2.2.2. The Governmental Power Argument

The followers of this argument suggest that, since 2002, Turkey has enjoyed a decade of almost unprecedented and continuous civilian political empowerment with three succeeding majority, single party governments formed by the AKP, which have had both the willingness and capability to restrict the military’s influence over political matters.

Table 1: AKP's Election Successes over the Last Decade

2002 General Elections	2004 Local Elections	2007 General Elections	2009 Local Elections	2010 Const. Referend.	2011 General Elections	2014 Local Elections	2015 June 7 General Elections	2015 Nov 1. General Elections
34.28% 363 seats	41.67%	46.58% 341 seats	38.39%	Votes for yes: 57.88%	49.83% 327 seats	43.39%	40.87% 258 seats	49.5% 317 seats

For this approach, which poses a negative correlation between the extent of civilian political power accumulation in a polity and the military's power to influence politics, if there is a strong government, which provides political empowerment of elected civilians, a healthy civil-military balance can be attained. But if there were a weak and inefficient government, it would be relatively easier for the military to become involved in the civilian sphere (Michaud-Emin, 2007: 36). When taking the electoral popularity as a proxy for governmental power, for instance, only five years after Turkey's first ruling "Islamic government was forced to step down through military pressure, the AKP won 34.28% of the vote in November 2002" (Pope, 200: 322). The party has held an unprecedented single-party rule by popular vote in three general elections since 2002 and remains a very strong political power. Furthermore, as seen in the above-presented table, the portion of the vote that the AKP claimed has only increased over the years. In 2007, the AKP held 47.6% of the vote and then 49.8% in 2011. Until the Gezi Park protests in June 2013, it seemed that nothing would stand in the way of the AKP's re-election. However, an increase of fractionalization within the Islamic sector of Turkish politics in recent years has

caused many scholars to speculate about the ability of the party to retain power. Nevertheless, despite these concerns, the party was able to again gain majority support in municipal elections that took place March 30, 2014. The results of the election have allowed the AKP to maintain control in Istanbul and Ankara, with AKP grabbing a 45% of the total vote. This representation marks an increase from 39% support in the 2009 municipal elections (Balci, 2014). When faced with a choice between AKP and other parties, the population voted with outstanding approval of the AKP, giving the ruling party 46.7% of the vote in July 2007 (Pope, 2000: 322). The party's ability to increase "its share of votes from 47% to 49.9% in the 2007 and 2011 general elections respectively left no question about the public's preference and forced the military "back into their barracks" (Aknur, 2012: 234). Moreover, during the governance of the AKP governments, Turkey experienced sustained economic growth, adding to the popularity of and support for the AKP – also from constituencies that do not identify with the ideological aspects of the party. This has greatly empowered the civilian government, enabling it to change existing institutions and practices. Civilianization of Turkish CMR has been an important objective of the AKP, and due to its parliamentary majority and large voter constituency; it has been possible for the AKP governments to push for reform regarding CMR. The strong performance and political tenacity of the AKP has also made it difficult for the Turkish military to influence policymaking during the AKP governments or to resist the governments' attempt to curb its autonomy. So, for this approach, under the favorable and stable political and economic conditions Turkey has enjoyed in recent years, the Turkish military would have been hard pressed to find the necessary legitimacy to become yet again involved in politics.

What would be the limitations of this argument? The latent assumption of this argument is that, after many confrontations with a single party majority rule empowered by the victories in three elections and popular base, the military has tacitly and unwillingly accepted and endorsed the supremacy of the civilian political power. So, this argument proposes a sort of zero-sum game between the military and elected civilians in which all losses of the civilians are exploited by the military to expand its influence. It is likely to suggest that, in the summer of 2013, due to the Gezi protests (Göle, 2013), and on December 17 and 25, 2013, the alleged corruption investigations made public (Oruçoğlu, 2015), the AKP's unrestricted political authority has been severely challenged. The military, however, has not seemed to take advantage of this imbalance which would provide a window of opportunity to intervene in politics. Similarly, the military did not exploit the foreign policy-related crises that caused fierce friction between the AKP elites and Turkey's traditional allies in NATO, such as the parliamentary motion for the cross-border operations in Syria (Gürcan, 2014e), instead it kept its position of sitting on the fence. Why, then, is the Turkish military so unwilling to fill these power vacuums caused by AKP's confrontations with the domestic and international actors?

It also worth remembering that, on May 27, 1960, the Turkish military intervened in politics by carrying out a *coup d'état* against the Democrat Party (DP) government under Adnan Menderes (Pelt, 2104). One should note that, despite the fact that Menderes' DP won three consecutive elections with a great majority and governed Turkey as a single party for a decade, the military did not refrain from taking action. Thus, one may suggest that, in the Turkish case, having high degree of governmental power would not really be enough to prevent the military's intervention in politics. The intervention against a strong government is not only limited to the Turkish case.

In September 2006, for instance, Thai Rak Thai Party led by Thaksin Shinawatra, which formed single-party government after getting the overwhelming majority of the votes (60.7%) in Thailand's 2005 general elections, was overthrown in a military coup organized by the Royal Thai Army (Beeson, 2008: 474-490). Both the Turkish military's coup against the DP government and Thai Army's coup against the Thai Rak Thai Party's government indicate that the explanatory power of this argument of may fall short (McCargo, Zarakol, 2012).

2.2.3. The Changing Threat Perceptions Argument

According to this third approach, the prime source of the TAF's unchallenged control is its role in defining what constitutes security issue or threat to the nation, a privilege which serves to promote its own legitimacy and perpetuate its veto power in both domestic politics and foreign policy making (Cizre, 2011). For this approach, through its weighty influence in the political system, TAF has the capacity to militarize and thus "securitize" some political issues as issues directly related to the survival of the state. For Ümit Cizre, for instance, TAF has branded political Islam and the Kurdish issue as internal threats to the secular character and integrity of the state (2011). She further contends that the main instrument affecting the superiority of the TAF in Turkish CMR has been this change of traditional national security discourse (Cizre, 2003: 216-217). This change of discourse, in which once TAF decided on what counts as a security threat and what the response should be, from 2002 onwards resulted in a reduced role for the TAF in politics.

During the last decade, Turkey has also actively sought to engage its neighboring countries in political dialogue and economic cooperation, using so-called soft power to achieve foreign and security policy goals. These developments have contributed to a more general shift in responsibility for and expertise on

security policy issues from the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to government ministries, reducing further the role of the TGS in security policy formation. For Ersel Aydınli and Nihat Ali Özcan, this new trend of civilianization of foreign policy issues was also supported by the military, which, by the turn of the millennium, had grown weary of its ability to eradicate the threat posed by political extremism, and therefore more willing to consider a political response to security questions (Aydınli, 2006: 77-90).

In fact, this argument fits well for Michael Desch's model, which is built on the pillar that the strength of civilian control of the military is fundamentally shaped by structural factors – especially international and domestic threat environments – within which the state operates (2001: 11). In this line, a state that is operating in a low external and high internal threat environment like Turkey of 1990's has the weakest civilian control of the military, and thus the worst CMR. Conversely, a state that operates within a high external and low internal threat environment is likely to have strongest civilian control of the military, and thus the best CMR because the military cannot find any opportunity to engage in civilian politics. While states within both high external and internal threat environments are likely to have generally poor CMR, states with both low external and internal threats are mostly indeterminate and will have mixed results (2001: 22).

If one seeks to explain the current status of Turkish CMR with Desch's model, one may suggest that, since the foundation of the Republic, Turkey has seemed to operate within a "constant" security environment characterized as one of relatively low external threat as it has never directly engaged in inter-state war. Turkey, for instance, chose to remain neutral in World War II, and soon after, modestly participated in the Korean War strictly as a member of the United Nations

(UN). Although having gained NATO membership following its involvement in Korean War in 1951, and since then remained a significant ally of the US, the Cold War never exposed a direct external threat to the national security of Turkey. Turkey maintained relatively stable and thus immune to the heightened international pressure during Cold war years. Since then, Turkey's Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 on the grounds that the Cypriot National Guard had organized a coup to annex the island to Greece, and the Turkish military's provision of 2,000 troops to Afghanistan/Kabul have been the only other instances of involvement in interstate combat. Therefore, in a nutshell, Turkey has consistently operated in a relatively stable security environment with low levels of international threat throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century, receiving no direct security threat from an adversary state, and having been involved in interstate combat only in minimal fashion, mostly as part of international coalitions through the UN or NATO.

Conversely, Turkey has had a constant relatively high internal threat environment since the transition to multi-party politics in 1946, which has shadowed most external military operations. The two main internal threats from which the military has always derived its power and legitimacy in politics and popularity among public continue to be the threat to territorial integrity, or to be more precise, separatist Kurdish ethno-nationalism and the threat to the secular character of the Republic by forces of political Islam. The military's continuing efforts to maintain and intensify the specters of these two national security threats, coupled with the Republic's "obsessive anxiety" in preserving national unity in the face of such perceived divisive forces, then further legitimized these threats and the military's hardline stance (Bilgin, 2008: 593-614). In this line, every military coup to date has been justified referring to internal unrest and turmoil caused by domestic political

divisions through the lines of these threats. Thus, the structural environment that the Turkish military has constantly operated in is one of “low external and high internal” threat environment. In the light of Desch’s model, Turkish civilian control over the military would then be extremely weak, and Turkish CMR poor, as domestic threats in the absence of external threats “divide the state and focus everybody’s attention inward.” This, coupled with the Turkish military’s unique historical role in the state and its perception by the people have given the military astonishing power over political affairs, as is obvious from the unrestrained history of frequent coups and military interventions in civilian governments from 1960s onwards. Thus, Desch’s model may be successful at explaining the outcome of Turkish CMR prior to 2002. However, for this model, one should then note to follow a shift in the degree of civilian control of the military could be explained as a consequence of the reconfiguration in the structural threat environment of the state. However, as one may easily notice, Turkey’s structural threat environment (low-external and high-internal) has fundamentally remained unchanged for both the periods from 1945 to 2002 as well as the post-2002 period of AKP rule. Thus, it is likely to suggest that Desch’s structural threat-based model ultimately fails in fully explaining the shift in CMR in the latter period.

All of these studies, which paid close attention to the role of internal threats, were valuable. However, it is no longer possible to explain CMR in Turkey through internal threats because, although these threats continue, the military’s intervention in politics has been significantly narrowed through several institutional reforms.

2.2.4. The Emergence of New Political Elites Argument

For this approach, a new stratum of elites with more conservative religious values and less sympathy towards the military has become influential within political

institutions, the state bureaucracy, education, and business, marginalizing the stratum of traditional Kemalist elites, an important segment of which has great sympathy towards the military, and thus are submissive to the TAF's influence over politics.

The change in CMR in Turkey would also be linked to the emergence of a new class of political elites in Turkey in the last decade, starting in earnest with the liberalizing reforms introduced under the AKP's first and second governments rule between 2002-2007. The emergence of this new class of political elites and state bureaucrats deprived the military of many of its former allies in the state apparatus, the business circles, institutions of higher education, and the media. This made it more difficult to influence and intervene in the political decision making process in Turkey. Following Serif Mardin's center-periphery model (Mardin, 1972: 1), elites in Turkey may be broadly classified into two ideological categories: a secularist or Kemalist elite dominating and controlling state, politics, and business for most of the period after 1923 and an Islamist counter-elite that become prominent beginning 1990s onwards (Göle, 1997: 56-88). Due to their role as guardians of the Republic, senior military cadres have constituted a central group within the Kemalist elite, and a bastion for the defense of Kemalist values in state structures and in civil society. While not rigorously Islamist, the background of many leaders in the AKP is similar to that of the Islamist counter-elite described by Nilüfer Göle. In particular, after the coming to power of the AKP in 2002, this new class of political elites, espousing more conservative and religious values than the traditional secular state establishment, rose to positions of power in state institutions, the business circles, media, and the academia – including former Kemalist strongholds such as the senior cadres of judiciary and significant ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Ministry of National Education. In light of

this argument, one may then suggest that the senior cadres of the TAF, being staunch defenders of Kemalism and secularism, have become more isolated and contained as new political elites within the government, new elites in the state bureaucracy, business, judiciary, and academia have had the upper hand.

To answer the question of what explains the rise and fall of military tutelage over Turkish democracy, Ahmet T. Kuru argues that the military's civilian allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and the media had provided it with political power. For him, the reason why these civilians supported military tutelage over democracy was due to their ideological fears of Islamic reactionism, Kurdish separatism, and communism. Since 2007, the military's political influence has declined due to the weakening of its ideological allies and the rise of a counter-elite, mainly the alliance of the pro-Islamic conservatives and the liberals. Kuru then suggests that these pro-Islamic conservative politicians and elites have legitimized their rule and restricted the military's way of justifying its interventions in politics by replacing the old Islamist rhetoric with a new "conservative democratic" discourse, successfully adapting to international conditions such as Turkey's candidacy to the EU and its integration in the world economy, as well as forming an alliance with liberal intellectuals (2012: 37-57).

This may then beg the question as to whether or not these so-called counter-elites are homogenous. When taking into consideration the split between liberal elites favoring the EU and AKP elites which has become visible after the 2010 Constitutional Referendum (Kalaycıoğlu, 2011: 1-22) as well as the recent division among Islamic elites such as the Gülenists versus the Erdoğanists (Taştekin, 2015), the explanatory power of this argument, which tends to see the group of counter-elites as a monolithic entity and homogenize all Islamic counter-elites into a mono-

block, has seemed to wane. One may also suggest that if the rise of counter-elites weakened the influence of bureaucratic-military elites, then the current divisions among counter-elites should empower the military, which is not the case. The recent divisions among conservative elites did not yield to a re-empowered military, a phenomenon weakening the explanatory power of the counter-elite argument.

2.2.5. The Changing Public Opinion towards Military Argument

This approach emphasizing the public's altered opinion of the military simply suggests that the Turkish public, while still supportive of a strong military, has grown less positive to the idea of military influence in politics in recent years.

According to this approach, which focuses on societal and cultural factors, the TAF is still the most popular and trusted institution in the country, notwithstanding the large number of senior officers accused of conspiracy and coup plans, but popular support for military intervention in politics seems to be on the wane (Sarigil, 2011: 265-278). This change, for Aydınli, can be seen as a reflection of the consolidation of Turkish democracy, and signaling the beginning of a new era when military's political interventions would no longer be seen by the Turkish public as feasible or desired (Aydınli, 2011). As the TAF always cares and emphasizes the significance of the "unity of military and nation" at every occasion, it is possible to suggest that public opinion matters greatly to the TAF. This inclination to cite the strong bond between the military and the nation by the TAF may be seen as a historical legacy of almost mythical proportions in Turkey (Narlı, 2009: 61), and the TAF owe much of their privileged status to the support they enjoy in the nation. Sarigil notes that, among military officers, there is a sense of superiority and a strong disregard and distrust of politicians and politics, but not of the citizens of the country (Sarigil, 2011: 265-278). That is why, whenever the military elites decided to

intervene, the justification for these interventions were always the same: in the name of the nation. Thus, given the special bond between the military and society in Turkey, it would be appropriate to contend that the shift in public opinion against military interventions in politics has most likely mattered to the TAF and has been an important factor when considering how to respond to the policies of the civilian governments.

Similarly, Nilüfer Narlı emphasizes that the change is not only in the Turkey's institutional context, there is also a change in the mindset of the citizens, a trend that eventually changes the political culture in Turkey (2005). For Ümit Cizre, for instance, the reason why the TAF was not aggressive to the trials such as *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer* was the critical impact of the victory of the “yes” votes in the historic referendum of September 12, 2010 (2011). For her, these “yes” votes meant a red light shown by the society to the TAF. For Ersel Aydın, these trials functioned as catalyst for the change and reform in Turkish CMR by changing public opinion towards the military (2011).

The first thing that should be mentioned as a shortfall for the argument is that, it tends to ignore structural and institutional factors such as changing threat environment and legal reforms, which have paved the way for this civilianization. That is why this argument, emphasizing only the pressure on the military rooted from the societal factors but neglecting other factors, seems to fall short when sufficiently explaining the recent civilianization.

One common aspect of all these five approaches is that as they explain the civilianization process in Turkish CMR in the last decade, they solely rely on exogenous factors and dynamics. In other words, they focus on non-military variables and factors shaping the CMR since the early 2000s. In addition, all these

above-listed arguments assume that the decline of the military's political power occurred despite, not because of the will of the Turkish military. It is likely to suggest that these approaches, all of which have substantial degree of explanatory power, are analytically distinct but not mutually exclusive. That is, one can defend some or all of them as they explain the declining political role of the military.

The existing literature may also be classified into two main groups in terms of the impact of the CMR on the Turkish military and Turkish military's capacity for change. That is, the first explanation seems pessimistic about the TAF's internal capacity and willingness for change. Thus, it seems to rely on exogenous factors when explaining the recent civilianization. Gürsoy, for instance, not trusting to the highest echelon of the TAF as noticed in the works of Heper, Karaosmanoğlu, and Aydınli, draws attention to the extent of the institutionalization of the legal setting, and the impact of the exogenous legal institutions on the relationship between the military and civilians. For her, the presidential crisis in 2007 showed that legal reforms and amendments alone could not lead to behavioral changes among officers who were "inherently" inclined toward interventions. The coup allegations called into question the earlier belief that the entire military cadre tacitly endorsed the rule of the AKP and the reforms during the party's first five years in power. Consequently, for her, from the perspective of the AKP, future amendments and civilianization should depend on cracking down interventionist elements in the TAF with more legal institutionalization (Gürsoy, 2012). Similarly, Ümit Cizre suggests that the adoption of harmonization reforms for the EU membership played a significant, but not sufficient, role in AKP's strategy to reduce the influence of the military in politics. For her, in spite of the recent developments that curb the TAF's role in politics, the TAF did not abstain from undermining the AKP government. She

then concludes that although the reform packages represent a major move towards the weakening in the military's role in politics, this has not really led to a significant disengagement of military officers from politics nor led to a rethinking of their role in areas that should be under civilian control (2008). Carrying the argument one step further with the inclusion of the "mentality" problem, Hale Akay asserts that although the EU-induced reform process has changed the power, function and composition of the MGK, these new set of institutionalizations did not result in effective civilianization of the MSK mainly because of the absence of the mentality shift in the NSC cadres (2009: 22). She stresses that when the AKP came to power in 2002, some groups among the public and factions within the military regarded a cabinet with Islamist roots as a threat. The electoral success of the AKP and the difference of opinion on whether this was a threat to the secular Republic contributed to the disunity of the armed forces. One may then conclude that the prevailing assumption in this camp is that, particularly in the post-2002 setting, the inconvenience of the external opportunity structures first caused a split in the higher echelons of the TAF, and then deterred the TAF from intervening in the politics yet it still holds the "self-important" mood and interventionist mentality.

The second type seems to be an optimistic explanation as it emphasizes that the TAF is a "learning organization," which derives its lessons from its encounters with civilians, and seeks to adapt to the changing socioeconomic, political, and cultural context in Turkey. The followers of this type trusts to the TAF's endogenous capacity for change. The last sentence of Metin Heper's conclusion in his recent article entitled "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Towards a Liberal Model" is as follows: "It seems from 2002 onwards, the High Command has arrived at the conclusion that the military should no longer play a guardian role even if in its view

civilians made a ‘mess of things’” (2011: 241-252). In the same vein, pointing out the divide within the TAF in the post-2002 setting by proposing that there are the “gradualist” and “absolutist” camps within the TAF, Ersel Aydınli asserts that the rise of the gradualists in the Turkish military would eventually lead to the restructuring the military’s place in the Turkish politics. He defines gradualists as those in the military who remain respectful of the judicial processes such as *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer* cases and absolutists as those in the military who aim to block political system in Turkey. For him, the gradualists – “who seem to be the rising force in the military,” have clearly been playing a crucial role in rather significant transformations taking place in Turkish CMR (2011). Examining the previously overlooked changes in the TAF with respect to its structure and its relations to the society, Nil Şatana argues that “the lengthy but persistent transformation of the Turkish military toward a ‘postmodern military’ paradigm in incremental ways that naked eye cannot detect, makes the consolidation of democracy more likely in Turkey and other democratizing countries (2008). She further continues:

The military’s force structure is slowly modernizing with more professionals and fewer conscripts. The professional officers are trained for managerial soldier-statesman skills as well as traditional combat leadership. Instead, it occasionally explains itself to the media through dinners and social events. The public attitude toward the military is still positive but civilians no longer see military intervention as a viable option. As the Turkish society becomes more tolerant of different lifestyles, women train and serve in the military in the same conditions as their male peers. Finally, spouses of military officers are more educated and independent than they were a couple of decades ago (2008: 357-388).

Şatana then contends that the paradigmatic changes within the military contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. She however, warns that, as with any other institutional change, this process is slow and risky (2008: 357-388).

As seen in the debate between the optimistic and pessimistic perspectives about the Turkish military, the overall question sits at the heart of the Turkish military's mentality.

2.3. The Mentality of a Military

The natural question that follows is how one can conceptualize the mentality of the military. Samuel Finer, in his classic 1962 book entitled *The Man on Horseback*, concentrates on this question. In this book, Finer takes CMR literature to another level by addressing military identity and possible means of military influence aside from direct intervention. Turning to the classical question in the CMR literature, Finer's theory attempts to elucidate the following question: Why doesn't the military more often intervene in politics? For him, taking their hierarchical and disciplined organizational structures endowed with arms and public respect into account, it is surprising that they do not attempt to exert their influence on the "weaker" civilian government more often (1962: 4). He suggests that, to intervene in politics, a military must both have the "occasion" and "disposition." He defines occasion as an external opportunity structure that paves the way for intervening to the politics such as a major breakdown in the political order, a major crisis in the political system, a power vacuum in a state and the state of emergency due to internal conflicts. Finer distinguishes disposition for intervention from an occasion. He further divides his concept of disposition into the categories of motive and mood. The disposition to intervene is related to motive include: the manifest destiny of soldiers, nationalist interests, sectional interests of the officer corps, and mixed motives of military (1962: 20-52). Dispositions to intervene that are related to mood include: self-awareness and elevated self-esteem of the military as a security organization (1962: 20-61). Finer's distinction between the concept of motive, a

bridge concept from the cognitive domain that connects occasion to the mood, and the concept of mood, a deeper one that is related to the emotive domain, articulate the difference between preconditions and inaction versus preconditions and action. For Finer, a motive must be backed with mentality to transform into actual intervention. Finer suggests that there are three main motives for intervention. The “Manifest Destiny of the Soldiers” is the first (1962: 32). It is the belief that the military’s role is that of the saviors of the nation. The second is the belief that the military has the unique unbiased view and can better define what is in the countries best national interest. The last and most common motives of intervention are: class interest, regional interest, corporate self-interest, and the motive of individual self-interest (1962: 40). All or some of the motives may come into play at any certain time, depending on the circumstances.

Finer notes that “Mentality is more difficult to describe than motives,” as this concept belongs to the emotive domain (1962: 61). The mentality of a military, or “will to intervene,” for Finer, takes root from the centralized command structure, hierarchy with a depersonalized authority, the significance of rank but not individual, discipline, which requires unquestioning and prompt obedience because of the nature of the mission of this organization, the indoctrination of new members, living arrangements, and lack of communication with the outside world, and finally “Esprit de Corps” that emphasizes isolation and self-sufficiency (1962: 14). The self-awareness rooted from these phenomena reflects the objective peculiarities of the military life. Specifically, Finer emphasizes that this self-awareness “that permits the military to conceive that they have a unique duty, a duty of supererogation, to watch over the national interest” (1962:63). The military cultural knowledge that they are separate and different from the civilian population drives the mood. There are two

elements that induce mentality. They are a sense of power, where the military believe nothing can stop them from getting their way and a grievance. Frustration, an emotion that comes from grievances, also plays a role in mood. When frustrated the military acts predictably, “by responding with anger and humiliation,” “projecting blame onto the civilians,” “rationalizing this reaction” and “compensating for the frustration” by “taking it out on the objects of their censure” (1962: 62).

This sense of first grievance and then frustration would be defined as a difference of opinion on a political issue (foreign policy, for instance) between military officers and the politicians. In this sense, Finer, in his book that was published four years after the 1960 coup in Turkey, categorizes the TAF as a “self-aware” military that have a heightened opinion of themselves relative to the government or to civilians in general. He then notes that this sentiment of supremacy over civilians, in this type of military, goes beyond a professional pride in efficiency. It is this self-awareness that constitutes the source of mood. What then can be said about the TAF’s mood? Is Finer’s suggestion of the “self-aware” military when defining the TAF’s mood still relevant? To answer this question, unfortunately, Turkish CMR literature offers very limited insights as the works reflecting the Turkish military’s mentality.

2.3.1. Setting the Stage: The “Black Box” Waiting To Be Explored

Maybe, mainly due to these facts stated above, almost all academic researches on CMR done by the military personnel have not been able to promise scholarly insights within the black box of the Turkish military. This absence of “inside-out” observations would be stated a fundamental disadvantage preventing us from getting a more accurate picture of Turkish CMR. Among those works written by the military personnel on the CMR, Staff Major Hakan Şahin’s unpublished PhD

dissertation entitled *The Society and the Politics in Turkey: Reading the Military Members' Memoirs*,¹⁷ First Lieutenant Ömer Eryılmaz's master's thesis entitled *Turkey in the Triangle of the 1950–1960 era, the 1960 Military Coup, and the 1961 Constitution*,¹⁸ first Lieutenant Mustafa Uygun's master's thesis entitled *Civil Military Relations in Turkey: Motives Behind the Shift of Power From Military to Civilians after the Interventions*,¹⁹ First Lieutenant Nihat Dumlupınar's master's thesis entitled *Regulation of Private Military Companies In Iraq*²⁰ may be defined as promising works despite the fact that they do not provide enough number of “insider's insights” to open the black box.

Coming to the domain of Turkish military as a subject of cultural and organizational studies, the literature produced by the still-serving or retired military personnel seems more promising. Retired Colonel Abdulkadir Varoğlu's article titled *Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces* (Varoğlu, 2005), Retired Colonel Abdulkadir Varoğlu and Retired Colonel Ünsal Sıgır's piece titled *Turkish-Dutch Encounters during Peacekeeping* (Varoğlu and Soeters, 2004: 354-68), Retired Colonel Uğur Güngör's unpublished PhD dissertation titled “*The Analysis of Turkey's Approach to Peace Operations*” (2007), Retired Colonel Haldun Yalçinkaya's article entitled *The Nongovernmental Organizations–Military Security Collaboration Mechanism: Afghanistan NGO Safety Office* (2012: 489-

¹⁷ This work was presented as a PhD dissertation to the Political Science Department of Istanbul University in 2010.

¹⁸ Please see the following link for the full text of the thesis:

http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/41373/14Mar_Eryilmaz_Omer.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed December 2, 2014).

¹⁹ Please see the following link for the full text of the thesis:

http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32913/13Mar_Uygun_Mustafa.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed December 2, 2014).

²⁰ Please see for the full text of the thesis:

http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar_Dumlupinar.pdf (accessed December 2, 2014).

510), Retired Colonel Salih Akyürek and Retired Major Adnan Bıçaksız's Turkish book entitled *Sivil-Asker İlişkileri ve Ordu-Toplum Mesafesi (Civil-Military Relations and Military-Society Gap)*²¹ may be sorted as prominent examples in the literature, yet all mostly fall short in the provision of insights within the Turkish military.

The fact that the endogenous dynamics shaping the TAF have not been analyzed in detail so far does not necessarily mean that this dimension of Turkish CMR has completely been ignored in the literature. In his classical book entitled *Shirts of Steel* (1991), for instance, Mehmet Ali Birand provides one of the most important resources on military sociology. *Shirts of Steel* (1991), as an observation of the TAF from the inside, delves into the underlying causes of the attitudes and opinions of the Land Forces War Academy cadets on phenomena such as politics, politicians, society and the founding principles of the Republic (1991).

The first insight noticed in this work is the author's excessive emphasis of Kemalism as an ideology shaping the minds of the officers. For Birand, "Kemalism is instilled as a religion among officers" (1991: ix). In his lecture to the cadets, the commander of the War Academy notes that "your flag will be the great Atatürk. Your ideology will be his principles, your aim will be the direction he showed us. You will follow unswervingly in Atatürk's footsteps" (1991: 3). And he continues "we are opposed to anybody, no matter whether they are there by the grace of the ballot box, or the votes of the National Assembly, who attempts to violate Atatürk's principles. We have right to act to this end in the interests of our people, and for their protection" (1991: 22). This attitude of "Ataturk has entrusted the country to me"

²¹ Please see the following link for the full text of the book:

<http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/139/sivil-asker-iliskileri-ve-ordu-toplum-mesafesi/#.VH2jVTGsXCI> (accessed December 2, 2014).

has, for Birand, led to a mutually existing distrust to the civilian politicians. In his book, Birand provides a telling quote from a high-ranking officer, “They [politicians] may lie and deceive people to suit themselves. I have yet to hear anything favorable about politicians. My people are poorly educated. They may be misled by politicians and the self-interested” (1991: 23). In this way, Birand places emphasis on the Turkish officer corps’ proclamation of the superiority of the national interests and putting the interests of the country and the nation above all.

Birand provided his observations on the demographic backgrounds of the officer corps as well. For Birand, for instance, the desire to make the family happy is a prime motivation for a great majority of the officers’ decision to join the military (1991: 4). He nonetheless notes that some join military for material benefit (1991: 23), and few for the love of soldiering, the love of country, and the special feeling of belonging to a military nation (ideational motivations). According to Birand, the inadequacy of the civilian schools and the superiority of the education available at military is another factor for Birand that motivates the cadets to join the military. Birand presents the following direct quote from the War Academy commander: “Young men do not come to soldiering because they are in love with the career but on the whole to find employment and security” (1991: 10). This suggests that the desire to gain prestige and social status and economic motivations far exceeded the love of soldiering and the love of country. He also underlines that all the characteristics of the Turkish officer derive from middle-class influences, from his manner of speech to his world outlook, from his attitude in performing his duties to the way he regards civilians and politicians.

Birand’s other emphasis on the characteristics of the officer corps would be listed as follows: Autonomous, homogenous, modernist, a pro-Western mentality

prevalent among the officers, dissatisfaction and annoyance to anything civilian, a mutual distrust to the politics *and* attempt to be outside and above politics, the dislike towards anything uncertain, high sense of moral responsibility, the aristocratic way of officer ship, soldiering as a way of life, the feeling of superiority from the rest of the society and isolation from the rest of the society, a strong sense of superiority over civilian, a staunchly secular modernist perspective blended with nationalist themes, the difference between the generals and other officers, high levels of sensitivity in hierarchy, as well as a robust “elitization” process in military schools. According to Birand, self-sacrifice is the key factor shaping the attitudes and behaviors of officers who are very hierarchical, centralized and disciplined, high levels of duty and high awareness of threat perceptions.

It has been two and a half decades since Birand wrote these sentences. It is unfortunate to note that, since Birand’s classic *Shirts of Steel*, not even a scholarly work providing insider’s insights on the opinions and attitudes of the officer corps in the Turkish military has been published. Honoring the merit of Birand’s work, two points should be mentioned as pitfalls of *Shirts of Steel*. The first point is the fact that the book is a relatively outmoded work, and the second is its limited scope, which is solely concentrated on the cadets in the Military Academy, not officers in various ranks and services. As the book is a case study based on interviews with a limited number of cadets, it does not really provide a general picture of the TAF. The main reason for not having such research providing the real picture of the TAF so far has been the lack of comprehensive quantitative data. Given the changes in Turkish CMR over the last decade, the question must then be asked to what extent Birand’s above-presented observations and arguments have held their relevancy at the

beginning of 21st century? Or can we suggest that the traditional guardianship role of the TAF, the attitudinal background of which was craftily laid out by Birand, is over?

According to Gareth Jenkins, who provides an more up-to date picture of the Turkish military as of early 2000s yet not as comprehensive as Birand. According to him, the traditional guardianship role of the military has been ongoing (2001: 21-35). For Jenkins, the Turkish officer corps is still elitist, paid well slightly higher than the other government employees, staunchly Kemalist, nationalist, living in an excessively disciplined, strictly hierarchical setting (2001: 34). With a “reluctantly interventionist” mentality which implies the taking of action only when they believe that the government is unable to cope with critical threats, they are also still contemptuous of politics and politicians, thus, very sensitive to the internal threats (political Islam and Kurdish separatism) (2001: 35). He also notes that, even though there is little difference in terms of salary, there is still a huge gap in prestige between the rank of colonel and general, and states “promotion from colonel to general also represents the tightest bottleneck in an officer’s career, with an average of 24 new generals, equivalent to around 5% of annual graduates of military academies” (2001: 25). In the same vein as Jenkins, Ersel Aydınli suggests that the Turkish military still holds absolute control over the internal indoctrination of its personnel, drawing its members from the heart of the society, but then doing its best to keep them independent from popular national and international ideas and trends. For Aydınli, the Turkish military is not the Army of the elite, but is rather an elite-making institution. It recruits cadets largely from rural Anatolian towns, but with its carefully crafted and closed institutions, turns these Anatolian kids into a unique new societal elite — a group neither completely inside nor outside of society. In many cases, while the immediate relatives of this new elite carry socially common ethnic

and religious identities, the officers themselves become stripped of these identities through the military's own "eliticization" process and absorb an institutional identity. Interestingly, they still feel a part of society and believe that they are the true representatives of the society (2009). Aydın, emphasizing the division within the military, also notes that the Turkish military is not as homogenous as it seems; that is, in the last decade, there appeared to be two groups within the military leadership. The first is a traditional conservative majority group that views the Turkish military as the ultimate guard of the status quo — the Republican regime, its territorial integrity, and its political parameters as established at the beginning of the Republic (e.g., secularism, assimilation into a unified national body, and the primacy of security over politics). The second is a smaller, more progressive group that views the Army's mission as one of guarding the ongoing transformation and modernization of the nation, without stalling this forward movement in the name of protecting the status quo — even if this means change within the military itself and its relationship with politics. It is difficult to trace any specific origins of such progressive thinking, but it is clear that Turkey's rapid process of integration with transnational organizations and global markets and the EU (Aydın, 2009) would be the main drivers. Aydın, however, emphasizes that there is no major distinction between the two groups with respect to the military's ultimate institutional goal: seeing Turkey become a modern, Westernized, Europeanized country. The division has more to do with the two camps' degrees of cautiousness. To make an analogy with the world of mutual funds, the conservatives in the military represent a more risk-averse, long-term investment, while the progressives can be seen as a riskier, speedier, growth fund. The growth fund types feel that the Turkish nation is ready for the completion of the modernization and democratization process, which requires

putting its ultimate trust in the political realm, with the military's job being, at a maximum, one of protecting this transformation in support of the civilian leaders. They see a better chance for the preservation of the essence of Atatürk's revolutions via forward movement rather than an emphasis on the *status quo*. The conservatives, on the other hand, emphasize Turkish society's ideological and social fragmentation, and argue that revolutionary and risky moves — foregoing the watchful eye of the guardian Army — would be disastrous. Their conservativeness is embedded in the strong conviction that “defending the country” means much more than simply defending the country's borders. Rather, their inherited mission is more statically defined as guarding the achievements of the early Republican revolution, and can be better understood as coping with broader regime security concerns rather than territorial security (Harris, 1965: 59). The risk-averse conservatives remain cautious about the political realm's capacity to deal on its own with the country's many problems, and see the need for a continued military presence in politics to guide the nation through a difficult transformation to modernity.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

Modern militaries are complex organizations relying on human force and other resources provided by society, being strictly founded on both an institutional setting and a framework of values, norms and rituals, and producing security for polities with means and ways available to achieve the strategic objectives. This inherent complexity reflecting the structure-culture-action nexus often means that scholars study militaries with separated disciplines: Political Science, International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, History, Administrative Sciences and Economics, and Security Studies. The knowledge and scholarship of these studies is rich in diversity, despite the fact that they often seem disconnected as they look like “separate tables” (Lichback, 2009: 4). This hope for this body of research is to make these connections explicit to better understand the Turkish military’s transformation in the last decade. To better understand this transformation, this research, which seeks to follow a pragmatic multi-method approach at different levels of analysis (i.e. data and method triangulation), conceives its theoretical setting as an eclectic construction which borrows theoretical elements from both institutionalist literature and literature on military sociology. This eclectic theoretical construction seeks to select what appear to be the best elements in various theoretical approaches in the literature to explain change within the military. In this sense, this research does not aim to propose an institutionalist versus military sociology dichotomy; instead it endeavors to benefit from both in a complementary fashion by cherry-picking

relevant elements of both approaches. That is why, this research seeks to explain the Turkish military's change with a theoretical framework in which one may see some elements from James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen's theory of gradual institutional change (2010) at the organizational level, and some elements from Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff's military sociological approach at the individual level (2002). It is this eclectic construction that enables this research to get a big-picture pragmatism and to get through the challenge of studying the military, a highly complex institution that would be defined as a messy center of convergence.

General CMR literature revolves around the nature of relationship between what is civilian (governments, civil society, academia, media, thinks thanks) and what is military. As Peter Feaver states, CMR "is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level" (2011: 211). It is mainly because of the problem of explaining the complex relationship between what is civilian and what is military, historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and military strategists have all made important contributions to expand the scholarly grasp of the field. The three categories proposed by Feaver on CMR research in political science are normative studies, which mostly follow sociological approaches that endeavor to explain how civilians (elites and civil society) and militaries should interact to achieve and maintain democratic and civilian control; empirical or descriptive studies, which mostly follow institutional approaches and examine the characteristics, nature, and evolution of CMR in a particular polity; and theoretical works, which attempt to explain factors or conditions that are most likely to produce outcomes such as military interventions or effective civilian control of the military (2011: 214). When following Feaver's categorization, it likely to suggest that this research sits at the

intersection of the theoretical and empirical analysis categories. It is, on the one hand, theoretical work because, maybe for the first time in the literature, it seeks to follow an eclectic theoretical design seeking to provide novel aspects on endogenous factors and processes from a multi-method perspective. It is also an empirical analysis emphasizing those endogenous factors within the Turkish military as the prime drivers of Turkish military's change by providing quantitative and qualitative "inside-out" insights from within the Turkish military. As seen in the review chapter, the military factors contributing to the shift in the Turkish CMR and being affected by this shift in a reciprocal fashion have been omitted in the literature. In this sense, this piece of research suggests that only an eclectic theoretical construction using several pieces of literatures from institutional theory (popular in both political science) and military sociology can adequately explain the changes that have occurred in CMR over the years.

This chapter starts with a brief presentation of research conducted by Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1971) to fully grasp theoretical elements found in the CMR literature.

3.1. Benefiting from both Huntingtonian and Janowitzian Approaches

Work done by both Huntington and Janowitz dating back 60 years is still relevant for the contemporary debates regarding CMR. First, Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*, did not only methodically combine empirical research on CMR with systematic theorizing (Feaver and Seeler, 2009) for the first time but also led to the emergence of different paths within research on CMR. That is, political science studies of CMR, on the one hand, have mostly followed Huntington's tradition, and, are mostly concerned with the question of how civilian political leaders can maintain civilian control, or the

subordination of the military under the legitimate elected civilian leadership. Janowitz, on the other hand, concentrates more on the cultural norms, values, and societal factors affecting the militaries, and the relationship between the soldiers and civilians.

During the heady years of the Cold War, Huntington proposed a solution to reconcile two apparently incompatible social imperatives: the need to construct an institution powerful enough to defend American society against the Soviet threat, while, at the same time, ensuring civilian control so that this armed institution could not become a threat to society itself. Simply put, Huntington's solution to this *problematique* was the maximization of the separation between what is military and what is civilian. According to Huntington, the way to achieve this is to foster "military professionalism," which is the development of a genuine conservative military mindset focused on corporateness, social responsibility, and expertise in the management of violence.

The field of military sociology following Janowitz's work, on the other hand, has been concerned with the reciprocal influence of military and society. In *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz's main message was that, just like other social subsystems, the military is subject to technological, socioeconomic, and political changes. Therefore, the role and missions, norms and values, and more importantly, self-perceptions of the military's officer corps, as well as the function of the modern military institution itself, should not be considered as a "given fact" or constant, but change in line with the prevailing value system and dominant norms of the greater society. In this tradition, military sociologists focused on issues such as the bureaucratic organization of the military, the sociology of military personnel and their families, as well as the racial and gender integration in the military. Particularly,

Janowitz's understanding of military professionalism may be useful in the Turkish case as it sees the institution of military both as a product of tradition and hierarchy, but may be more importantly, as an agent shaped by its environment. This understanding provides for a more dynamic grasp of the military both as a profession, as a security organization, and as a social institution because it gives officer corps agency and suppose that they are fully aware of their "influence" on politics and society in addition to being an actual product of them (1971: 420).

For almost next six decades, both the Huntingtonian and Janowitzian approaches have remained primary points of references for much of scholarly research in the field of CMR. While military sociology that followed the Janowitzian tradition has become a well-established subdiscipline of mainstream sociology, the Huntingtonian strand has remained as the subdiscipline of the larger discipline of political science.

While Janowitz agrees with Huntington on separate characteristics of the military and civilian world, he differs from his predecessor on how the military would be denied from posing a threat to democracy and society from which, in fact, it was created. For Janowitz, the military world is conservative and always prone to resist to societal changes and that it is highly unlikely that the military will adapt to changes as fast as its society could. Then, Janowitz, challenges to the Huntington's objective control and proposes outside intervention, or "subjective control" in Huntington's words, as the most viable instrument that may facilitate the change of the military in a timely and effective manner. Janowitz, who then opposes Huntington's primary assumption that sees the inherent gap between the military and the civilian as it is, seeks to shrink the gap either by civilianization of the military or the militarization of the society. For Janowitz, the civilianization of the military, that

means equipping the military with the norms and expectations of the society, is the wiser strategy in diminishing the gap. That is why he encourages the use of conscription and reserve officer training programs, the collaboration of military in universities in the realms of education and technological researches so that the broadest level of influence of society on the military may be settled. Simply put, for him, the more societal norms and attitudes are digested by the military, the smaller the attitudinal and behavioral differences between these two worlds, and consequently the greater the likelihood of establishing and maintaining the civilian control over the military. Thus, the key difference between the two is that Huntington separates civilian and military domains, but Janowitz defends the integration or entanglement of those domains. In sum, together, Huntington and Janowitz defined the civil-military playing field. Huntington implored civilians not to attack the conservative military culture, while Janowitz lamented the consequences of a conservative military drifting too far from civilian society.

It is also worth mentioning Charles Moskos, who followed in the footsteps of Janowitz, introduced a “post-modern military” framework, which maintains that modern militaries of the Western world have significantly changed in terms of their culture (leadership, organization, professionalism, and so forth) after the end of the Cold War (Moskos and Williams, 2003). Even though criticism exists on the explanatory power of the concept of post-modern military, this study believes in the value of the Moskos’s postmodern framework as it suggests that not only the civil society and the political institutions vary over the years but so does the military. In the book, *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Moskos and his co-authors define the “postmodern military” as a more compact and mostly voluntary armed force, whose priorities are both national security and humanitarian-

disaster relief missions abroad (external and internal), and characterized by the increasing convergence of civilian and military domains, socially and functionally (2003). To put it differently, first the global security environment where the nation-state is not considered the “referent actor” any more in international relations and requires militaries to review their traditional roles and missions. Second, modern societies of the Western world have changed and become more liberalized after the end of the Cold War as ideology becomes less divisive; the military, in turn, becomes more permeable by the civilian society.

In the general CMR literature, one of the major theoretical debates has been around Charles Moskos’s dichotomic categorization of militaries as ideological or idealist ones versus professional or career-oriented ones. This debate is engaged in the question of whether modern militaries of the world are becoming less ideological or idealist in nature and more professional or career-oriented one. Moskos suggests that, due to new societal and economic dynamics in modern societies, such as the replacement of conscription by a volunteer force recruited by labor force market dynamics, the military service is being transformed from a value-based vocation to an economically-based job. The phrase “idealist military” refers to a military primarily oriented by its traditions, patriotic values, and a sense of community; the phrase “career-oriented military” refers to a military primarily oriented by *homo economicus* and generally business principles. For Moskos, a career-oriented military more closely resembles a marketplace economy, where people are competitively recruited and paid salaries and bonuses based on skills and manpower needs (1977: 41-50). Moskos maintains that the potential outcomes of the move away from the idealist model of military organization towards an career-oriented model is that soldiers, instead of being motivated by a desire to serve the “common good” are

more concerned with pay, benefits, and the quality of working life. A career-oriented military contains a greater division of labor with an increasing specialization of skills. Members may work much like civilians by logging in a particular number of hours at the job, but then leave the work environment and their colleagues to live and socialize offsite. Members identify less with the organization as a whole, and more with others in their occupation, to include people outside of the organization.

In sum, this research, emphasizing the need for an eclectic theoretical approach including both institutional and sociological tracks to better elucidate the endogenous factors contributing to the military change, first presents the theory of gradual institutional change promulgated by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010) in the hopes that this is the best institutional approach addressing the Turkish military's change. It then, turning to the military sociology, examines the theoretical framework proposed by Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (2002) proposing culture, politics, and technology as three pathways whereby military change occurs.

3.2. The Military Change

For Carl von Clausewitz, the intellectual father of the modern military thinking, military learning and military change were a simple matter: "If in warfare, a certain means turns out to be highly effective, it will be used again; it will be copied by others and become fashionable; and so, backed by experience, it passes into general use and is included in theory" (von Clausewitz, 1984: 9). Simply put, in the battlefield where every mistake is paid with the lives of the soldiers, if something works, militaries will change their doctrines and practice accordingly. If something does not work, they pay the price with their blood.

At first glance, one may think that, as the large status quo-oriented bureaucratic organizations, militaries are designed to produce routine, repetitive, and

orderly actions and seek to follow a “traditional way of thinking and doing things.” This would then imply that they prefer continuity, not change (Farrell and Terriff, 2002: 4). Military rigidity covering all structures, processes, institutions, and relations from dress codes, rituals, and parade practices to the operational procedures is suggestive of rigidity and conservatism in military thought. This view holds that militaries, as institutions inherently emphasizing resiliency and continuity, prefer to preserve tried and tested strategies, structures, processes, and relations rather than adopting new ones.

Militaries, however, may have both willingness and capacity for change. That is why, over the past decade, which has been marked by structural changes in the contemporary global security environment and changes in state-society and state-individual relations, there has been increased scholarly interest in the nature and behavior of military organizations, with a particular emphasis on why and how they change. In the first decade of the 21st century, many scholars studying military culture and military philosophy suggest that the militaries of the modern world have been changing as fast as the societies they defend. The central reason for these militaries to undertake change is quite straightforward. The end of Cold War has resulted in a changed global strategic environment in which many traditional strategic templates and enactments no longer apply. The goals, strategies, and structures of modern militaries change accordingly in this new global strategic setting that has mainly been shaped by technological and scientific change in information technologies, such as budgetary pressures, societal changes, and the changing nature of conflict. In his famous book entitled *The Warrior Ethos*, Christopher Cooker (2007) suggests that there are three factors determining the nature, extent, and characteristics of military change in the first decade of the 21st

century: changes in the military technology, changing threats, and changing societal norms and values. Emphasizing that “modern soldiers have been becoming what they defend [society] and against what they defend [threats] and how they defend [technology],” (2007:12) Cooker argues that even the very concept of “warrior soul,” which constitutes the core of soldierhood, and is associated with heroism, courage, sacrifice, mental toughness, and physical fitness has been transforming since the dawn of the 21st century with the influence of societal factors, hi-tech weapon systems, and newly emerging threats. What theoretical terms can be employed to explain this transformation that has forced modern militaries to change and adapt?

The theoretical literature addressing military change divides the primary contenders for understanding military change into two categories: those that look at change as a response to the external environment, as is generally embraced by the literature on Turkish CMR, and those that look at change as something internally generated.

A prominent external source of change suggested in the literature, for instance, is a change in the nature of the threat. Scholars from the realist thinking argue that military change is likely only when the threat environment (or the perception of it) changes. This approach is reminiscent of the argument of changing threat perceptions in the Turkish security culture and Desch’s threat-based model introduced in the chapter on literature review. Another source of external change would be the political direction an organization receives. If one looks at the relationship between elected civilian elites and military organizations as a hierarchy, one might expect the military to change when civilian leaders ask (or force) it to do so. Following this line of thought, Peter Feaver’s principal-agent analysis (2003) argues that military organizations are agents of the government. Therefore, they

suggest, one must look to the preferences of the principals (civilian leaders and ultimately the electorate) and the structure of monitoring as the key variables that affect the military's preferences for change. This approach is united in its focus on civilian leaders as initiating or mediating the process of military change, meaning that the military should change to accommodate civilian demand.

Those approaches seeking to explain change solely through the examination of nature, characteristics, and evolution of the political or strategic context or environment external to the military may, however, fall short when taking the direct connection between the military factors and change agents, structures, and processes into account. Similar to non-military ones, the gradually unfolding military factors can be equally consequential for patterning human behavior and for shaping substantial outcomes affecting and being affected by the CMR. That is why, one may need a model concentrating on change from within rather than the one caused by the exogenous factors, and an incremental change rather than an abrupt one.

3.2.1. Institutional Track: The Approach of Gradual Institutional Change

In their book entitled *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power*, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen first suggest that, once created, institutions often change in subtle and gradual ways over time (2010: 1). They argue that, although less dramatic than abrupt and wholesale transformations, these slow and piecemeal changes can be equally consequential for patterning human behavior and thus for shaping substantive political outcomes. They then propose a new framework for analyzing incremental change, which is grounded in a power-distributional view of institutions.

In fact, Mahoney and Thelen underline the exact point this research seeks to highlight during the chapter on literature review. As they note:

In the literature on institutional change, most scholars point to exogenous shocks that bring about radical institutional reconfigurations, overlooking shifts based on endogenous developments that often unfold incrementally. Indeed, these sorts of gradual or piecemeal changes often only ‘show up’ or ‘register’ as change if we consider a somewhat longer time frame than is characteristic in much of the literature (2010: 2).

This provides an accurate observation as the traditional approach in the institutionalist literature often concentrates on stability over variability, continuity over change, and persistence of institutions over their transformation. That is why, nearly all definitions of institutions, whether explicitly or implicitly, imply the enduring and persisting nature of institutions that structure human preferences and behaviors and that cannot be changed easily. This inherently existing connection between institutions and persistence makes traditional approaches in the sociological, rational-choice, and historical institutionalist branches easier to explain continuity and stability rather than change and transformation. To overcome the challenge of explaining change, traditional approaches in these three major branches of institutionalism, exogenous shocks shaking institutions in an abrupt fashion are mostly considered as the sole factors in causing institutions to change (2007: 39-57). Zeki Sarigil agrees with this by pointing out that institutionalist approaches, which provide structure-based arguments, give ontological primacy to structures, or in other words, structural factors are being “exogenized” as the institutional explanations pay more attention to the impact of institutions on political outcomes and behaviors while neglecting institutional change. When it comes to explaining change, historical institutionalists, for instance, frequently call attention to “critical junctures,” often understood as periods of contingency during which usual constraints on action are lifted or eased (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 341-369). Ira Katznelson, for example, sees institutions as mostly constraining in periods of “stable” politics, but argues that

critical junctures open up opportunities for historic agents to alter the trajectory of development (2003: 270-301).

In the same fashion, to explain change, sociological institutionalists often point to an exogenous entity or force- for example, new interpretative frames whether endogenous or imposed from outside. Rational choice institutionalists also face problems when confronted with institutional change. For Mahoney and Thelen, the basic difficulty faced by the rationalists is related to a view of institutions as coordinating mechanisms that sustain particular equilibrium, which makes it difficult to conceptualize the gradual processes of endogenous change (2010: 6). In short, all three variants of institutionalism provide answers to what sustains institutions over time, as well as compelling accounts of cases in which exogenous shocks or shifts prompt institutional change. What they do not provide is a general model of change, particularly one that can comprehend both exogenous and endogenous sources of change.

This insight then lends itself to the question of when does endogenous institutional change take place. For Mahoney and Thelen, institutional change often occurs precisely when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors of change to displace existing rules completely or to implement them in new ways and means (2010: 4). How can then one get through the challenge of explaining institutional change? For Mahoney and Thelen, approaches that can comprehend both exogenous and endogenous sources of change in a dynamic political environment and that concentrate on the power-distributional implications of institutions as the “animator of change” are needed (2010: 14). They then suggest that the following questions must be addressed if any institutional analysis aims to go beyond traditional trends in the literature, which mostly attempts to locate the


sources of institutional change through the exogenous shocks and environmental shifts.

- Exactly what properties/domains of institutions do permit change?
- How and why do the change-permitting properties of institutions allow (or drive) actors to carry out behaviors that foster the changes (and what are these behaviors)? How should we conceptualize these actors?
- What types of strategies flourish in which kinds of institutional environments?
- What features of the institutions themselves make them more or less vulnerable to particular kinds of strategies for change?

This research embraces the idea that answering these basic questions is a critical step if scholars want to explain change within the Turkish military over the last fifteen years. As the theory of gradual institutional change put forth by Mahoney and Thelen theory emphasizes the fact that institutions are vulnerable to change not just by exogenous shocks in moments of crisis but by endogenous processes on a more ongoing basis. In reaching the exact theoretical “neurological point” this research seeks to touch upon, their theory would hold the key to understanding the endogenous processes through which such change can be accomplished. Particularly, their orientations to develop casual propositions about the connections among particular types of institutions, strategies for change, and modes of gradual institutional transformation would be handy to elucidate the effect of these endogenous processes in the transformation of the Turkish military.

3.2.1.1. Mahoney and Thelen's Explanation of the Modes and Types of Actor of Gradual Institutional Change

Figure 3: Mahoney and Thelen's explanation of gradual change (2010: 15).



Mahoney and Thelen explain this figure with the following:

Here the characteristics of both the political context and the institution in question together drive the type of institutional change we can expect. Political context and institutional form have these effects because they shape the type of dominant change agent that is likely to emerge and flourish in any specific institutional context, and the kinds of strategies this agent is likely to pursue to effect change (Mahoney and James, 2010: 15).

They then propose four modes of institutional change. These are:

Displacement: the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones.

Displacement is present when existing rules are replaced by new ones. This kind of change may well be abrupt, and it may entail the radical shift that is often featured in leading institutional theories. The rapid, sudden breakdown of institutions and their replacement with new ones that accompanies revolutions obviously involves displacement. Yet displacement can also be a slow-moving process. This may occur

when new institutions are introduced and directly compete with (rather than supplement) an older set of institutions.

Layering: the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones. Layering occurs when new rules are attached to existing ones, thereby changing the ways in which the original rules structure behavior. Different from displacement, layering does not introduce wholly new institutions or rules, but rather involves amendments, revisions, or additions to existing ones. Such layering can, however, bring substantial change if amendments alter the logic of the institution or compromise the stable reproduction of the original “core.”

Drift: the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment. Drift occurs when rules remain formally the same but their impact changes as a result of shifts in external conditions. When actors choose not to respond to such environmental changes, their very inaction can cause change in the impact of the institution.

Conversion: the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment. Conversion occurs when rules remain formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways. This gap between the rules and their instantiation is not driven by neglect in the face of a changed setting (as is true with drift); instead, the gap is produced by actors who actively exploit the inherent ambiguities of the institutions. Through redeployment, they convert the institution to new goals, functions, or purposes.

Understanding these different modes of institutional change – including the roles that institutional supporters and challengers typically play within each – sets the stage for explaining why and how one type of institutional change rather than another typically occurs.

3.2.1.2. Political Context, Institutional Characteristics and Modes of Change

In their book, Mahoney and Thelen suggest that differences in the character of existing institutional rules as well as in the prevailing political context affect the likelihood of specific modes of change (2010: 18-20). The key issue is how to conceptualize the dimensions of institutions and of political context that matter the most for explaining variations in modes of institutional change. To overcome this, they ask two broad questions:

1. Does the political context afford defenders of the status quo strong or weak veto possibilities?
2. Does the targeted institution afford actors opportunities for exercising discretion in interpretation or enforcement?

The analytic space presented below answers these two questions.

Figure 4: Mahoney and Thelen's analytical space for modes of change

		Characteristics of the Targeted Institution	
		Low Level of Discretion in Interpretation/ Enforcement	High Level of Discretion in Interpretation/ Enforcement
Characteristics of the Political Context	Strong Veto Possibilities	Layering	Drift
	Weak Veto Possibilities	Displacement	Conversion

As the table (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) suggests, differences in veto possibilities and the extent of discretion in institutional enforcement and interpretation are associated with different modes of institutional change.

They then note the following:

Where would-be agents of change face political contexts with myriad veto possibilities, it will be difficult for them to mobilize the resources and assemble a coalition that can displace the existing institutional rules. Hence, displacement is unlikely in the context of strong veto possibilities. Likewise, efforts at active conversion will be difficult in such a context, since veto powers also apply to the realm of rule enactment. Instead of displacement or conversion, drift and layering are more promising as strategies of change in political environments with strong veto players. This is true because drift and layering do not require making any direct changes to the old institutions and do not rely on altering the rules themselves or actively shifting their enactment. With drift, institutional change grows out of the neglect of an institution, or more precisely, the failure to adapt and update an institution so as to maintain its traditional impact in a changed environment. Powerful veto players may be able to defend existing institutions against outright displacement, but their veto powers are often insufficient to prevent drift since doing so typically requires supporters to take active steps to shore up support for an institution as the social, economic, or political context shifts. Monarchical political institutions, for instance, were gradually rendered into mere institutional vestiges as royal powers time and time again proved unable to successfully defend the old ways in a changing environment marked by rising parliamentary forms and their supporters. With layering, institutional change grows out of the attachment of new institutions or rules onto or alongside existing ones. While powerful veto players can protect the old institutions, they cannot necessarily prevent the addition of new elements (2010: 20).

3.2.1.3. Types of Actors and Institutional Change

After addressing the questions of institutional change and elucidating the modes of change that are most likely to drive such change in diverse institutional settings, one may ask the following question: exactly who are the agents behind such change? Why do they bother themselves generating such change? From a distributional perspective, the first answer would be that there are two types of agents: the losers and the winners of institutional change. When taking into account the fact that the ambiguities inherent in situations and uncertainties existing in

institutional enactments forces us to go beyond this dichotomic conception, one needs a new framework which can exceed this dualist and reductionist conception.

Mahoney and Thelen suggest four basic change agents after asking the questions of whether the actor involved seeks to preserve the existing institutional rules and whether the actor abides by the institutional rules (2010: 23-25).

Insurrectionary: This type of change agent constantly seek to eliminate existing institutions and rules, and they do so by actively and visibly mobilizing against them. They reject the status quo and do not always abide by any rules. The insurrectionary may be, therefore, associated with the patterns of displacement as more rapid displacement of institutions is precisely his/her goal.

Symbiont: The type of change agent comes in two attributes – parasitic and mutualistic. In the parasitic type, this actor exploits an institution for private gain even as they depend on the existence and broad efficacy of the institution to achieve this gain. Parasites can flourish in settings where expectations about institutional conformity are high, but the actual capacity to enforce those expectations is limited. In the mutualistic type, symbionts also thrive on and derive benefit from the rules but use them in novel ways to advance their interests. In this case, however, in contrast to the parasites, mutualists do not compromise the efficiency of the rules or the survival of the institution.

Subversive: This type of change agent who seeks to displace an institution, but in pursuing this goal they do not themselves break the rules of the institution. Instead, they effectively disguise the extent of their preference for institutional change by following institutional expectations working within the system. From the outside, they may even be seen as the supporters of the institution. Depending on the political-institutional context, they may both encourage conversion and the kinds of

neglect that promote drift. Either way, subversion brings change as developments on the periphery make their way to center.

Opportunist: This type of change agent has ambiguous preferences about institutional change. They do not either actively seek for preserving the status quo or visibly try to change the rules. Opportunist instead exploits whatever possibilities exist within the prevailing system to maintain his/her interests. Indeed, the weight of opportunists within an institution can be a major source of institutional inertia. One should also note that opportunists' preference for making use of existing possibilities over the riskier strategy of active mobilization makes them natural allies of the institutional supporters. That is why, when they do emerge as the agent of change, opportunists often engage in strategies of conversion: ambiguities in the interpretation or implementation of existing rules provide the space for them to redeploy these rules in ways unanticipated by the initial designers.

To sum, one can generalize about the affinity between particular type of agents and modes of change as follows:

Insurrectionaries seek rapid displacement but will settle for gradual displacement. Symbionts seek to preserve the formal institutional status quo, but their parasitic variety carries out actions that can cause institutional drift. Subversives seek displacement but often work in the short run on behalf of layering. Opportunists adopt a wait-and see approach while pursuing conversion when it suits their interests. How can we adapt the approach of Mahoney and Thelen to the case of TAF? According to them, institutional change can be an unintended by product that grows out of distributional struggle in which not party explicitly sought the change that eventually occurred. This is exactly the case of the TAF for the purposes of this piece of research. Which exact properties of institutions, for instance, permit change within

the TAF? How and why do the change-permitting properties of the TAF allow (or drive) actors to carry out behaviors that foster the changes (and what are these behaviors)? For the TAF, the answer to that question is every type of process, actor, structure and relation in the domains of the TAF as a security organization, social institution, and officership as a profession. Simply put, Mahoney and Thelen's power-distributional perspective of the gradual institutional change model provides a framework to explain the above-presented changes of the TAF: as a security actor, as a social institution, and officership as a profession.

Then one may conclude that, in an organization such as the TAF, change occurs through distributional effects of institutions, which trigger distrust of the pre-existing norms and divisions among those who hold the power at the elite level in the institution. Or, through elite-mass friction, change can occur if institutions disadvantage subordinate groups to the point that they organize and come to identify with one another, thereby increasing their power and capacity to break prevailing institutional arrangements. These two possibilities correspond to the themes of "divided elites" at the TAF as a security organization domain and "united subordinate groups vs. military elites" at the TAF as a social institution level that are emphasized in explanations of change. It is thus likely to suggest that, through distributional effects of institutions, the mega trends which will be emphasized in the following chapters, such as the prevalence of non-compliant thinking and behavior have forced each officer to choose one institutional identity in terms of his/her attitude towards institutional change. Unsurprisingly, the portfolio of the identity includes four types of change actor (insurrectionary, symbiont, subversive, opportunist) proposed in the Mahoney and Thelen's approach.

3.2.2. Sociological Track: Explaining Change through Culture

Soldiers, indeed, live and operate separately from the general society to be both functional and effective. To be successful in the battlefield, soldiers must learn to give their loyalty to their “comrades in arms” and to put personal considerations aside for the good of the service and the unit in which they serve. In doing so, they may nurture *esprit de corps*, a higher sense of responsibility to uphold the morale of the military as whole. In modern militaries, this ethical consideration, which nurtures the “common spirit” in the fraternity, may vary, but it exists to some degree in the militaries of all long-standing democracies.²² The sense of isolation from the rest of the society, the comrades in arms mentality, the common spirit, professional ethos, discipline, ceremonies, and symbolic rituals are, in fact, indicators of a distinct culture unique to militaries within a particular society. Simply put, military culture sets soldiers apart from the civilian world. Thus, efforts to compare the military to a business organization or a social group tend to fail as the military’s mission and tasks are different, in that the soldiers stand a higher chance of losing his\her life than in other professions.

The term culture does not lend itself to the kind of short, sharp, and clear definition usually sought by soldiers. It is a concept that transcends traditional academic boundaries in a sense that it is often used differently by historians, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists (During, 1993:1). One should also note that most academic works defining military culture reflect American perspectives (Johnson, 1995:32-64). Despite this deficiency, the definition provided by Donna Winslow is a good basis for further discussions. She states that culture

²² Please see the “Immersion” period of U.S. Marine Corps at the beginning of the training of the newly admitted soldiers. <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/class186/part1-mainbar-a.php> (accessed 12 August 2011).

represents the behavior patterns or style of an organization that members are automatically encouraged to follow. Culture shapes action by supplying some of the ultimate aims or values of an organization and actors modify their behavior to achieve those ends. It establishes a set of ideal standards and expectations that members are supposed to follow and organize people's daily worlds by locating the self and others in them and making sense of actions and motives of others (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009: 5).

It is important to remember that culture is not only a set of values, or ethos, it is also customary style used in organizing action (Winslow, 2009). According to Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):

Military culture is an amalgam of values, customs, traditions, and their philosophical underpinnings that, over time, has created a shared institutional ethos. From military culture springs a common framework for those in uniform and common expectations regarding the standards of behavior, discipline, teamwork, loyalty, selfless duty, and the customs that support those elements (CSIS Report: "American Military Culture in the 21st Century").

Then it is likely to assert that the essence of military culture is "how things are thought and done in a military organization" (CSIS Report, xviii). Indeed, with the words of Colin S. Gray, "culture comprises the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience" (Gray, 1999: 131). Peter J. Katzenstein takes culture and identity as important determinants of security-related issues. As culture is about identities and loyalties, culture provides each security actor not only a framework through which the "meaning" is constructed, motives, loyalties and interests emerge, and subsequently a "self" is formed, but culture also

provides a certain understanding of other actors who are interacting in the same context (Katzenstein, 1996: 4).

Military culture then determines how soldiers interact with one other, how they fulfill their missions, how they see themselves and the others in the civilian world, and, perhaps more importantly, what kind of attitudinal framework and behaviors they expect from civilians. Military culture also implies some values such as honor, devotion to duty, service to the nation, and subordinating oneself to those in command and also ceremonial/symbolic behavior, such as saluting, uniforms, and reporting, among others. These are the values, in fact, that one may notice in all militaries of the world, surely within varying degrees, as they are integral parts of military culture for all militaries. Some values may be unique to a particular country. The conceptualization of technology as an asset that may only be kept at the strategic level in the Russian military (Mansoor, 2011) or bilingualism in the Canadian military, *Kibbutzim* in the Israeli military,²³ the impact of material superiority, massive firepower, and advanced technologies over the US military's fighting style (Adamsky, 2010) serve as examples of this.

Regarding the integral parts of the military culture, James Burk has developed a model of military culture that includes four essential elements: discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, cohesion, and esprit de corps.²⁴ Given the difficulty in developing a clear, concise statement of military

²³ A *kibbutz* is an Israeli commune, or intentional community. Due to the reflections of *kibbutzim* the Israeli Military, for instance, the military uniforms are not as shiny as the ones in the western militaries, the insignia representing ranks and qualifications are not so much cared in the military system, and personal charisma plays more important than the ranks in the military.

²⁴ Please see the discussion of these four factors in James Burk, *Military Culture*, in Lester Kurtz and Jennifer E. Turpin (eds) *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict* (San Diego, Academic Press, 1999).

culture that includes all of the nuances, Burk's model can be used to frame the discussion on military culture.

- *Discipline*: the important features of the disciplinary regime in the military. Both include the self-discipline of each individual soldier serving in the military, as well as a fair and open military justice system.
- *Professional ethos*: based on the hard lessons of war fighting learned in wars, military operations, and exercises. Includes values of duty, which includes the imperative of ensuring that all military actions support and reinforce the basic societal values. Duty includes the concept of accountability to the chain of command, the civilian authority, and the society. It also entails loyalty to Turkey, superiors, and subordinates alike. The pursuit of professional knowledge, self-examination, and self-improvement are also essential components of the concept of duty.
- Integrity, which refers to doing the right thing in an open and transparent manner, both moral and physical courage,²⁵ loyalty, selflessness.
- *Ceremony and etiquette*: the most visible manifestations of military culture. Every aspect of TAF ceremonies and etiquette, including its style on parade, dress, awards, parades, and hierarchical considerations are important. Cohesion and esprit de corps are directly related to the ceremony and etiquette. Ceremonies such as the change of command, retirement dinners, and badge replacement ceremonies are intended to mark significant moments during an individual's service or in a unit's history. They are also intended to remind the serving, retired personnel, and civilians of TAF's proud tradition of service and past accomplishments.
- *Cohesion and esprit de corps*: essential for combat effectiveness.

²⁵ Moral courage is defined as a necessary ethos to do the right things when confronted with difficult choices. Psychological courage is the traditional concept on the battlefield.

With a strategic-culture centric understanding, the cultural factors *internal* in the military may be categorized into three main domains.

a. Military as a security organization, with goals, means and ways of operating

The classic conceptualization of the military as a security organization, as well as the military's role in domestic and international security environments are all included in this domain. On the other hand, factors external to the organizational boundary of the military may either be the relations between the military and the wider society in which the military is situated or relations with other governmental and non-governmental organizations, including with international partners and adversaries (Moskos, 1988).

b. Military as a social institution, including its values, roles, and organizational structures

The topic of the military as a social institution overlaps with the topic of military as a profession. Nevertheless, these two domains can be addressed as two separate areas of research. Certainly, the military can be studied as any other primary social institution, such as family, religious, economic, educational, and governmental institutions in terms of a system of roles based on beliefs and norms, structures, functions, patterned behaviors, and adaptation for change. The military can be studied in terms of how it deals with general social issues, such as the changing characteristics of the society, the changing place of the military in the society, the rise of women in the workforce, diversity, and inter-generational attitudes. The military can also be studied as a large organization in terms of bureaucracy, innovation, adaptation to the changing context, the hierarchical boundaries, and the impact of technology. However, by applying the method of differences, the goal here

should be to concentrate on that which is relatively unique to the military as an institution, instead of what it has in common with other institutions (Siebold, 2001: 140-159).

In this way, Guy Siebold states the following:

The statement that the purpose or primary orientation of the military, as an institution of the defense of the society or sovereign is basically true, but it is too abstract. More concrete and useful is the assertion that the primary orientation of the military as an institution and as a set of organizations is to take raw “materials” such as recruits, weapons, systems and doctrine and work with them to produce capable combat units (land, sea and aerospace) ready to engage the enemy on the battlefield (2001: 140-159).

Military sociology must then ask how that orientation permeates the vision used for planning formal/informal values, structures, and processes for the objective of turning these raw materials into capable “armed servants” in an effective and efficient fashion. This study includes the opinions of the Turkish officer corps’ on political concepts such as democracy, secularism, and civilian control of the military in this domain, meaning the addition of politics into the sphere of what is social. The reason for not addressing politics as a distinct domain, and instead including politics into this domain is not to intimidate the respondents by asking direct political questions while conducting both the survey and in-depth interviews.

c. Officership as a profession of arms

The profession of arms can be described in ways typical of any profession; that is, one can study how members of a profession are recruited, selected, socialized, indoctrinated, assigned, trained, promoted, educated, and retired. One can also examine how the profession constructs and controls occupational boundaries. The military profession is very hierarchical (as a means of control), heavily socialized (for internal control), and full of explicit rules, regulations, checks, and

counter-checks for external control (Watson, 1999: 55-72). At the center of the profession of arms, for instance, is what might be referred to by a cluster of such terms as the military mind, the warrior spirit, the cohort spirit, and military ethos. These terms represent the question for the profession of what it means to be military personnel in a given time and society, or what the profession stands for. Indeed, military ethos of a given time and society is at the sociological center for study of the profession of arms. Thus, it is important to consider this domain to better elucidate the “Turkish military’s way of doing things.”

3.2.2.1. Defining the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)’s Organizational Culture

Defining a specific military culture for the TAF is not an easy task. It is principally difficult in an organization as diverse as the TAF with three services, the Gendarmerie Command, the Coast Guard, and a force structure based on a mix of professional personnel and conscripts. There is no doubt that each of these “parts of whole” has developed a distinct culture based on their own unique operational necessities, organizational requirements, historical backgrounds, and traditions. In other words, the military culture and organizational climate of a special force team, an infantry company in the Army, a fighter squadron in the Air Force, and joint operation center in the General Staff, a military hospital, and a military academy will be distinct from one another. At first glance, one may suggest that the result is that there is probably no unitary TAF culture that can be applied across the entire institution. The “parts” must, however, share an understanding of the core military values and ethos as these are essential to the concept of military professionalism. “Jointness” is, for instance, a value transcending all services in the TAF’s military culture. Or, the “cohort spirit, or the common spirit of the same year academy graduates” is another significant

value prevailing in all services and putting its stamp on the TAF's military culture. For instance, the Air Force in the TAF tends to be defined as the service "worshipping at the altar of technology" regardless of the national origin. The Army, on the other hand, tends to emphasize the soldier over technology and tries to develop a warrior ethos that stresses the team over the individual. Unfortunately, until now, there has not been a single scholarly work addressing the Turkish military's institutional culture regarding CMR, the officer corps' attitudes towards civilians, or their self-categorization within political system or in society.

Is the TAF's strategic culture immune to change or not? To show that the TAF's culture is not immune to change, Uğur Güngör, for instance, suggests that international peace operations, which the TAF has been involved in throughout the past two decades, have played a major role in the transformation of the TAF's mentality in line with emerging security conceptualizations. This suggests human, societal, and global dimensions of security (2007). As a concluding remark, Güngör asserts that the TAF's high visibility and large-scale involvement of peace operations such as the ones in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Somalia has not only enhanced Turkey's soft power image in the globe but has also increased the experience and know-how of the TAF. Similarly, Abdulkadir Varoğlu placed emphasis on how the Afghanistan experience impacted thinking patterns as well as the modes of operations of Turkish officers. He and his colleagues suggest that, particularly junior Turkish officers, have been becoming so adept at working with militaries from other nations, especially if they are deployed in areas that are culturally distant from their own (2004: 354-368).

In his article entitled *Turkish Security Culture: Evolutionary or Carved in Stone?*, Ali Karaosmanoğlu states that policy misfit has to be minimal in order for change to occur. In a sense, ideational change has to precede institutional change (2013). For him, along with a new understanding of democratization, Turkish security culture has been moving towards a regime with more political initiative and less direct military influence over politics, which is “a pattern that one may call conditional military subordination to the civilian democratic government” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2013). These works are, in fact, indicators for the argument that the TAF as a security organization can change and adapt to the changing environment. During the literature review, however, the author did not come across any scholarly works addressing the domains of the military as a profession and the military as a social institution. This gap in the literature does not allow for one to reflect more on the TAF, which is now “a black box waiting to be explored.”

3.2.2.2. The Cultural Sources of Military Change

Turning to cultural norms within the military, sociological approaches explain change by examining factors within the military itself. For Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, there are three pathways whereby military change occurs; these are “innovation,” “adaptation” and “emulation.” Innovation, implying that the military is a security organization, involves developing new tactics, strategies, and structures to adapt to new military technologies. Adaptation involves adjusting existing military means and methods to tune up to newly emerging societal and cultural factors. Adaptation can, and often does, lead to innovation when multiple adjustments over time gradually lead to the evolution of new means and methods. Last, emulation involves importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other military organizations (2002: 6).

Farrell and Terriff then propose three basic sources of military change: cultural norms, politics and strategy, and new technology. Cultural norms are inter-subjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action (2002: 7). Norms are inter-subjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social practice. Norms constitute actors and meaningful action by being situated both in social roles (e.g., military professionals) and in social environments (e.g., interstate war versus intrastate conflict). In addition, norms regulate action by defining what is appropriate (given social rules, moral codes, etc.) and what is effective (given the laws of science). In short, norms make meaningful action possible by telling military actors who they are and what they can do in any given situation. In this way, cultural norms define the purpose and possibilities of military change (Katzenstein, 1996). In the theoretical literature, two approaches have been suggested as the engine for military change. The first is the “process of planned military change” by “visionary military elites” who seek to mobilize new ideas and interests behind new beliefs and identities. This process of planned cultural change implies instrumental use of culture by military elites to promote their interests. Edward Rhodes (1999), for instance, suggests that, in the 19th century, the development of powerful US Navy and US efforts for naval supremacy in that particular century was an elite-driven process sought for planned change in the country’s strategic culture. The second approach emphasizes an “external shock” to the local cultural system that can undermine the legitimacy of existing normative framework. For instance, some military strategists argue that the development of antimilitarist strategic culture in post-war Germany and Japan was triggered by complete defeat and humiliation after surrendering in World War II (Katzenstein, 1996: 251). Or, Emily O. Goldman suggests that the strategic necessity

rooted from the external shocks of being defeated in a series of wars was the prime motor of change for the Ottoman military in the 18th and 19th centuries (2002: 74).

The second source of change proposed by Farrell and Terriff is strategic; that is, a changing threat to national security. Most scholars recognize that strategic pressures that operate through political processes may lead to military change. Barry Posen, for instance, argues that military change is most likely when strategic considerations, particularly the prospect of a defeat or a change in the adversary's strategy triggers a political process that is primarily internal to the military organization (Posen, 1984).

The last source of military change is technological developments. For some scholars, there is a direct connection between the concept technological determinism in a Darwinian-like order of succession and military change. Yet, sociologists challenge technological determinism as the prime motor for change because they assert that, in the last analysis, social networks determine the success or failure of particular technological designs, the followers of this approach ascribe a much greater role to technology in shaping military change (Gürcan, 2013: 1-3).

3.3.Hypotheses Aimed to be Tested in the Research

In the light of the above-mentioned theoretical framework, there emerge three hypotheses one regarding the ideological rigidity of the TAF, one regarding the attitudinal differences among the officer corps, and one related to the cross-sectional cultural differences among three force commands. These are the following;

H1: The TAF is in the process of becoming a more heterogeneous and less ideological military.

In his 2012 piece entitled *Civil-Military Relations Transformed*, Ersel Aydınli suggests that an ideological split distinguishes officers who favor rapid and military-directed paces toward modernizing and Westernizing Turkey from those inclined toward a more gradual approach that trusts civilians more. He then follows:

The former (we might call them the “absolutists”) believe that until Turkish society and politics mature, they must be carefully guided by the strong hand of the state and, above all, by its armed forces. The latter (or “gradualist”) group argues that coups and other harsh tactics are counterproductive and that working with the civilians is a better way of achieving modernization (2012: 100-108). He then contends that “absolutism among the Turkish military appears to be in irreversible decline, and the gradualists seem to have won” meaning that the TAF has become less ideological (Aydınli, 2012: 100-108).

The Turkish military, or a *de facto* veto player of the Turkey’s political system, has embraced two tasks of guarding the state and protecting its founding principles, particularly the ones emphasizing the Kemalist, secular, and nationalist character of the state (Jenkins 2001: 6). This grip has played a critical role in influencing the political course of the country – both implicitly and by direct military interventions. Since the first military coup in 1960 (Hale, 2011: 12), the role of TAF in politics has by and large been the guardian of the state and the whole nation. Eric Nordlinger defines this guardian role as one in which the military aims governmental control with the objective of maintaining the status quo and correct what they identify as malpractice or a deficiency (1977: 22). According to Nilüfer Narlı, “the military built as a covert guardianship model that permitted it to use various forms of intervention, ranging from a coup to controlling and influencing the civilian political process through formal and informal mechanisms” (2011: 215-225). For Toktaş and

Kurt, the military has performed this “self-proclaimed” guardianship mission through securitizing Turkey’s political problems. On the basis of its conceptualization and definition of “national security” and “threats,” the Turkish military constructs the security agenda, and sets both internal and external mechanisms to support this agenda. The traditional themes of securitization in the Turkish case have been political Islam and Kurdish nationalism, which have indirectly pushed the military to become involved in Turkish politics. If the governments did not take sufficient measures to deal with these national security issues, the military threatened to intervene in politics; and, on some occasions, forced civilian governments to resign (Toktaş and Kurt, 2010: 387-403). Which ideology does then one talk about within the military? TAF is also seen as the only legitimate guarantor of Kemalist ideology. In order to emphasize the “guardian” role of the TAF to protect secular, nationalist, and modernist characteristics of the nation state, the TAF has always inclined to stress Kemalist ideology in particular, the founding ideology of the Turkish Republic designed for sweeping socio-economic, political, and cultural reforms.

Following from this, how did Kemalist ideology shape the military’s internal and external affairs? It is first worth recalling that the TAF intervened to “guard” the Kemalist system four times in the past 55 years - in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. In 2007, with a controversial press release, or *e-momerandum* (BBC, “EU warns Turkish...”) the below-presented statement was published on TAF’s official website regarding the crisis on the Turkish presidential elections:

The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. ... the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely

opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary...Those who are opposed to the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's understanding “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk” are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute (BBC, “Excepts of the Turkish Army Statement...”).

According to Article 35 of the Internal Service Act (1961), which could not be removed until 2013, the primary task of the military was to “safeguard and defend Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the constitution.” Because the Kemalist ideology in general is enshrined in the constitution, the military’s primary task is to “look after” the Kemalist ideology, or the guiding philosophy of the Republic. Moreover, Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulation states that the “Turkish military shall defend the country against internal as well as external threats if necessary by force” (Heper, 2011: 241-252). Thus, one may then suggest that the military has self-claimed authority to define threats that present existential danger to the state and its founding ideology.

Is this rigid ideological stance the case for the TAF, or has the TAF been becoming less ideological military? This study hypothesizes that, for almost a decade, the TAF has been becoming a more heterogeneous and less ideological military.

H2: The attitudes and opinions of junior level officers (lieutenants, first lieutenants, captains, majors) are different from those of senior level officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals).

As no single scholarly piece exists addressing the altitudinal differences within the officer corps, this research cannot provide insights from the literature. This piece of research, however, could provide some factual insights on statistical facts on the origins and characteristics each and every rank. Among officer corps, in terms of their origin, there were two types of officer in the TAF a decade ago; that is, military high school/war academy graduates and civilian high school/war academy graduates. Currently, however, there are seven types of officers in terms of their origin in the TAF; that is, military high school/war academy graduates, civilian high school/war academy graduates, civilian university graduates (contracted officers), foreign war academy graduates (the US, South Korea), officers with a non-commissioned officer background, and officers with a contracted specialist background. One should also note that the ratio of war academy graduates, the category that constitutes the backbone of the officer corps, has drastically decreased from 90% to 60% from 2006 onwards with the inclusion of contracted officers into the TAF. It is worth mentioning that, from 2004 onwards, there has been a sharp rise in the ratio of civilian university graduate contracted officers and NCO-background officers within the officer corps. This heterogeneity in the origins would inevitably come up with varying attitudes and opinions when interpreting social realities, yet the TAF have been trying hard to standardize young officers through military education and through other means. A decade ago, being appointed as a lieutenant required eight years of education (four years for military high school and four years for military academy) and nearly 80% of all lieutenants were spending eight years in military schools. At the moment, however, Major Y.E., a civilian university graduate, who is working in the Turkish General Staff notes the following:

It takes on 10 months to commence his service as a lieutenant in the Turkish military. And now, the level of eight-year military school graduates among the total population of the lieutenants in the Turkish military has dropped to 40%. Sixty percent comes from different origins.²⁶

Then, in the light of these statistical facts about the diversifying origin and changing characteristics of the officer corps, this study hypothesizes that there are attitudinal differences among ranks within the officer corps.

H3: Each force command (Army, Navy, Air Force) has its “unique” organizational culture that promotes diversity and heterogeneity within the TAF.

Again, regarding this hypothesis, there is no single scholarly piece in the literature. When turning to mere facts, however, one may easily notice that each force command has different military high schools, war academies for undergraduate education, staff colleges and postgraduate institutions for post-graduate education. Different educational institutions would also mean differentiation in the ways and means of thinking and doing things in each force command. Besides, as “jointness,” the key concept which provides opportunities for joint-posts and ways/means of doing things within the TAF, has not been fully achieved in the military, meaning that the great majority of the personnel in each force command cannot easily find joint-working environments with the officers from different force commands. The fact that officers are prevented from interacting with other officers from different force commands also constitutes a cultural barrier hindering homogenization and standardization of organizational culture within the TAF. In this sense, this study hypothesizes that, despite some improvements to achieve jointness, all force

²⁶ From the interview with Major Y.E. conducted on May 23, 2015 in Ankara.

commands would still have different organizational cultures, thus differentiating ways and means of thinking and doing things.

This research is an exploratory one inductive in nature that is seeking to move from specific observations to broader generalizations. These tentative hypotheses presented above address specific research areas this study seeks to explore and finally end up fostering some general conclusions and theoretical frameworks. The precursor to these hypotheses is the research question of this study: whether the endogenous factors leading to change within the military's organizational culture play role at the recent civilianization in the Turkish CMR or not. These hypotheses are formulated to pare down of this overall question into something testable for the following empirical chapters.

CHAPTER IV

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY'S TRANSFORMATION

This chapter will provide a qualitative analysis of the military's transformation. At the organizational level, this transformation has shown itself in mainly three different domains that can be conceptualized as the following:

- The domain of TAF as a security organization,
- The domain of TAF as a social institution,
- The domain of officership as a profession.

This chapter will be divided into sections to better elucidate the military's transformation in each domain.

The first section touches upon the period of August 2011-August 2012 in which TAF had, for the first time since the 1990s, a clear understanding that they need a structural self-check to achieve the objectives of familiarizing with and situating themselves within Turkey's changing socio-political context at the domestic level and to adapt to changes in the global security environment at the international level. This period, in which the author also witnessed closely thanks to his post as a project officer at the Turkish General Staff (TGS), started with TAF's attempt for an assessment of the damage it had done in the last decade. This period, thus, marked the attempt to both conduct and institutionalize this assessment of the damage process by performing various official workshops within the TGS. Despite the fact that TAF had already been discussing the need for a transformation from the

beginning of the 2000s, it is likely to suggest that the self-reflecting debate about learning more of the damage caused in the last decade and how to institutionalize a transformation. The main objective of this section is to reveal how the military started conducting a self-check on its own decade-long transformation. Furthermore, this section will show that this reflection is more of a self-check process for the military as it represents the first time that the military has acknowledged that its transformation process is a crucial subject to be scrutinized and managed by its own terms.

The second section will feature an institutional analysis of the Turkish military's transformation as a security organization throughout the past decade. The second will delve into the reasons and *telos* of the military's transformation and reconstruction process, which is called "Force 2033 Vision." This section will also explore the implications of how TAF adapted to Turkey's dramatically changing socio-political context by analyzing TGS press releases between 2003 and 2014. Focusing on an interval of 11 years, this analysis will be conducted by using the "qualitative content analysis" method. This analysis will track changes in the military's communication strategies, particularly the altering in tone, language usage, thematic structures, and discourse of TGS's press releases. This will allow for great insights on how and why the military changed its strategic discourse to adapt to Turkey's socio-political context. This section will also analyze TAF's endeavor to increase its visibility on the international stage, a process referred to as the "internationalization" of the Turkish military by this thesis, and its relation with institutional transformation.

In an attempt to analyze the military as a social institution, the following section will highlight TAF's efforts to adapt to Turkey's changing social context by

looking to the cases that shed light on TGS' confrontational interactions with junior-level officers, such as the struggle of NCOs and their struggle for rights and status within the military; the push for embracing more gender-friendly policies; the increasing awareness of the violations of the rights of soldiers, as well as the rate of suicides among soldiers; and the loosening of the headscarf ban.

The next section delves into the concept of officership as a profession and insights derived from in-depth interviews conducted with officers at various ranks. Thus, there will be interviews from high-ranking officers like generals all the way down to lowest ranks, such as NCOs. Through these interviews, this section will endow noteworthy insights regarding how the officers conceive changes about their profession. Also, a comparison will be made between junior-level officers (lieutenants, captains, and majors) and senior-level officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals) to see better that how these officers conceptualize and describe change of their profession, and how their attitudes and opinions regarding their profession resemble or differ from one other will be analyzed.

The last section, designed as a theoretical discussion, will explore the findings of this institutional analysis within the model of institutional change as proposed by Mahoney and Thelen, as well as the cultural model seeking to explain change within the military as proposed by Farrell and Teriff. The power-distributive perspective explaining gradual institutional change put for by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) provides a framework to explain the above-presented changes of TAF: as a security actor, as a social institution, and officership as a profession. Thus, in this chapter Mahoney and Thelen's model of gradual institutional change will be utilized to explain the transformation the TAF has been experiencing for a decade. After reading this chapter, one would easily notice that, within TAF, it is evident that what

animates change is the power-distributional implications of institutions. However, the place that one expects incremental change to emerge is precisely in the “gaps” or “gray zones” between the rule and its interpretation (division among elites) or the rule and its enforcement (division between elites and subordinate groups). This is an analytic space that other conceptions of institutions (as behaviors in equilibrium, or as scripts) essentially rule out by definition; but, as a practical matter, this is exactly the space in which contests over – and at the same time within – institutions take place. That is, in the domain of TAF as a security organization, for instance, the High Command (particularly Chief and deputy Chief of the TGS)²⁷ meets one as the prime change agent of the top-down transformation. Change in this domain is implemented under the full control of the military elites and mainly shaped by the change in the international security environment. That is why, it looks like an elite-driven process that seeks to adapt TAF to the contemporary global security environment by “emulating” the ways of thinking and doing things of the other modern security actors in the globe, particularly NATO. In contrast to this, in the domain of TAF as a social institution, change arises primarily as first commencing from the bottom and developing generally by confrontational interactions between the military elites and junior-level personnel or emerging with the inclusion of the outside actors in civil society. Change then goes to the top and, by dictating its own reality to the military elites, evolves into a process that the High Command cannot keep under its full control and manage accordingly. In this sense, it is likely to assert that, in this domain, change is to some extent an arbitrary process partly controlled by the High Command and partly driven by random dynamics such as the existence or absence of

²⁷ By saying high command of TAF, it is meant the personnel at the rank of General/Admiral including the Chief of the General Staff, the 2nd Chief of the General Staff, Force Commanders and Army commanders. As of August 2015, there are 12 full generals in TAF.

public awareness and media support to the issue at hand. One should note that, in this domain, the High Command, after first ignoring and then counterattacking the change demanding insiders or outside actors, cannot find another option but to submissively accept the existence of the problem and attempt to adapt its institutional order to fulfill change demands. In the domain of officership as a profession, however, one may talk about an “agentless change” process as no actor can fully control the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps. The differentiation among three domains in terms of change types, change agents, change pathways, and change modes therefore, creates a power-distributional effect of change in TAF, which according to this research, yields to gradual institutional change within TAF.

Then, it would be better to start with a general overview of when and how the debate within the military about the need for an institutional transformation started to better elucidate which actors led this process, which kind of structures and mechanisms were established for the operationalization of the institutional transformation.

4.1. Transformation of the Turkish Military

4.1.1. The Start of Sophisticated Discussions about the Transformation (August 2011-August 2012)

August 2011 marked the resignation of then-Chief of the General Staff, General Işık Koşaner, and three force commanders. This moment in time served as a critical juncture that tempted TAF to realize the fact, or “grim reality”²⁸ with the words of a general interviewed, that it needs to conduct a damage assessment (or a self-check) and transform itself if necessary. Similar to moving indoors from the cold, this admittance pushed the whole military as an organization to race the necessity of fundamental self-reflection and to examine themselves critically about traditional ways of thinking and doing things. Those taking office after the resignations - the

²⁸ From the interview with a general conducted in İstanbul on May 17, 2015.

new Chief of the General Staff General Necdet Özel, and then Deputy Chief of Staff General Hulusi Akar - initiated this self-check process within the military.

Immediately following this realization, the TGS preferred to retreat to its own territory and focus only on issues regarding the military. What would be, then, the main reason for the military's self-check process, which has resulted in a strong urge for institutional transformation? The main reason for such a change of strategy is the failure of previous strategies that had been adopted by previous chiefs of the TGS. After all, as the following qualitative content analysis of the TGS's press releases indicate, the period when General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2006-2008) was in the office, the military's attitude towards civilian politics can be called "direct confrontation" because the military openly challenged with the civilian political elites and was in a power struggle with the AKP government. Then, when General İlker Başbuğ (2008-2010) took office, the military adopted the "indirect confrontation" attitude in which the TGS tried to place pressure on the political realm and indirectly aimed to shape it by interacting with certain political and civil society actors that the military had already been aligned with. And lastly, in the period during which General Işık Koşaner (2010-2011) ran the office, the military had adopted an attitude of "strained harmony," meaning that military elites bargained with the political actors behind the closed doors in hopes of silently getting what it wanted. However, none of these endeavors was able to create enough support for the military at the societal level or produced enough force to change the views of political elites within AKP governments. In an interview conducted with a general in İstanbul, he addressed the failure of these last endeavors of the military - direct confrontation, indirect confrontation, and strained harmony attitudes - as the main reasons in failing to be able to bargain with politicians to get what it wanted. In addition, the incompetency

of the military leaders in solving trials and investigations such as *Sledgehammer* and *Ergenekon* while its prominent serving or retired officers was apparent. The general highlights the following:

These were really hard times for TAF not because of highly tense government-military relations for the last decade, but there has been a lot of pressure on the military both from the media and the judiciary, there have been intensified conflicts with the forces of the PKK between 2005 and 2010 all along with the political instability of the Middle East, which has been in its climax because of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. In addition to all of these, the military had to cope with the tension between the US and Turkey, which immensely intensified after the Hood Event (Çuval Olayı) on 4 July 2003. General Özel rightfully followed a new attitude called **delicate harmony** [emphasized by the author]– mainly seeking for a retreat to the military’s own territory- after experiencing the failing of previous attitudes, which had been adopted by Büyükanıt, Başbuğ, and Koşaner. The main principles of this new attitude for the military was being committed to the rule of law, being on lawful ground no matter what, and being indifferent to political developments. I think the reason why he adopted such an attitude lies in the traumatic process that the military went through after the trials and investigations like *Sledgehammer* and *Ergenekon*. After all, the initial discussions regarding the military’s obligatory retreat, the strategies to get through this traumatic process, and the institution’s continuing transformation took place in the General Staff only towards the end of 2011.²⁹

Indeed, in 2011, there was a push for an analysis of the current state of the military as a security organization, which was called a “damage assessment analysis” by TGS headquarters. In this period, TGS headquarters established new workgroups under each of its directorates.³⁰ The formation of these groups, which were comprised of officers of lower ranks like captains and majors with academic background, was a solid indicator of understanding the newly emerging sentiment that was generated by the High Command (the chief and deputy chief of the TGS) for the institutional transformation within TGS headquarters. These working groups allowed for an

²⁹ From the interview with the general conducted in İstanbul on May 17, 2015.

³⁰ Main directorates in Turkish General Staff headquarters are as follows: Personnel Directorate (J1), Intelligence Directorate(J2), Operation Directorate(J3), Logistics Directorate(J4), General Planning and Principles Directorate, Warfare Electronic Information System(MEBS) Directorate and General Secretariat.

opening of alternate information channels other than traditional bureaucratic-hierarchical ones. These newly founded workgroups allowed scholarly ways of thinking and doing things and for decisionmakers to be fed alternative information channels without institutional constraints. These working groups can be said to have endeavored to offer unorthodox scholarly analyses to the High Command in the following three fundamental fields:

- The change in the global security environment,
- The change within modern militaries and NATO,
- The socio-political change in Turkish CMR.

Analyses and reports were prepared in the assemblies conducted monthly until August 2012, about the way in which TAF managed its reputation and the preservation of its image in society, the structural transformation which should be experienced by TAF as a security actor, counter-terrorism efforts, enforcement of the institutional loyalty among TAF personnel and their families, violations of soldiers' rights, soldier suicides, and TAF's communication strategies. This was then presented to the High Command and the proposals accepted were turned into the executive orders from the TGS chief and issued for full implementation.

After this year-long process of "damage assessment," it can be said that two main approaches emerged after discussions to be utilized for crisis management. These two, in fact, contradicted each other.

The first of these was the **status quo-focused approach**. The main argument of this approach was that anchoring TAF to the abiding system of foundational values such as strictly secular and elitist-modernist world view of Kemalism, without accounting for the changes in the last ten years in the global and societal dynamics

and in the Turkish CMR (especially in the military-government relations), would be the best method for overcoming the crisis period. In this approach, which could be summarized as “we should anchor ourselves to our traditional values to get out of the crisis period in better shape,” the aim is to hold on tightly to the value system adopted by TAF since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. This value system includes primarily values such as Kemalism, secularism, nationalism, guiding the nation, patriotism, and safeguarding the Republic against all internal and external threats. Merely by that means, the military could escape the “degradation period” of the last decade relatively unscathed. The defenders of this approach asserted that, particularly in the past few years, public conception and opinion could be manipulated very easily with perception management techniques and changed as desired. In this way, by not adapting to society and public perception, TAF was ensuring that it would not slide to other ideological and security stances. According to this approach, TAF’s trying to take position in accordance with public conception, which is prone to manipulation, would be a strategic mistake. Hence, TAF has to steep its strategy in the value system, which constitutes its “essence” or “essential soul”³¹ with a status quo-focused approach.

The other one emerging from the damage assessment process is the “reformist approach.” This approach argues that the process of change in the global security environment, socio-political changes in Turkey, and the change in the Turkish CMR render the transformation of TAF compulsory. According to the reformist approach, if TAF cannot go through a structural transformation in the light of the ten-year crisis period for adapting to both global and societal change in Turkey, it will fall behind

³¹ From the interview with Colonel M. conducted in Ankara on April 27, 2015.

both its age and the society. As a result, it will become an “outdated”³² Army whose “legitimacy is being extensively questioned by the society.”³³ For this reason, TAF has to examine changes in the following three fields and begin a detailed transformation process both materially (in organizational, tactical, and technical terms) and cognitively (in institutional culture and mentality) which handles all of those. These fields are the ones presented below:

- The change in the global security environment,
- The societal change in Turkey,
- The change in the CMR.

According to the reformist approach, it is possible for an organization such as TAF to self-reflect and self-criticize its existing set of values and norms, which has traditionally been thought to be immune to changes and new interpretations. The main objective in this approach is “transformation without breaking away from the tradition, that is, transformation without changing.”³⁴ The TAF has to revise the value system it gathered from the past, its attitude of conduct, the technical equipment, and its standardized operational procedures to become a hi-tech military with strong societal legitimacy. But, according to the reformist approach, “having that transformation incrementally is another obligation.”³⁵

The most apparent difference between these two approaches is that they have different epistemologies, and thus different modes of interpretation of Turkey’s current socio-cultural and political context. The status quo logic seems to see the current socio-cultural and political landscape, dominated by the AKP, as a *temporary*

³² From the interview with Major T. conducted in Ankara on January 12, 2015.

³³ From the interview with Major T. conducted in Ankara on January 12, 2015.

³⁴ These remarks were made by Gen.Hulusi Akar in a meeting the author had been on April 2013.

³⁵ These remarks were made by Gen.Hulusi Akar in a meeting the author had been on April 2013.

deviant discourse in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, it would be wiser, for the *status quo logic*, to conform to the traditional value system offered by the Turkish military, and interpret socio-cultural and political realities through the lenses of TAF's established set of values. For the *status quo logic*, this deviant discourse is peculiar to Turkey, which implies that it is shortsighted when assessing global trends such as the transformation of nation-state system, the changing relationship between individual and state, the diminishing visibility of militaries in Western societies, constraints on defense budgets, demands for the recognition of cultural and other differences and the rise of the identity politics all over the world as a reaction to the homogenizing attempts of states. For the *status quo logic*, it would be dangerous to anchor military values in society's current value set, which has been easily shaped by mass media manipulations, and thus should not be trusted. The *status quo logic* is confident that Turkey will return to its original state, or "factory settings,"³⁶ thus it is important to preserve the established value set of the Turkish military. A retired colonel, for instance, posed the following question:

To what extent is it proper to trust already-manipulated current societal values, which will be totally different five years later? Then, the "compass" which has been institutionalized in each officer by the military will show the "true path" to where an officer should navigate.

For the *status quo*-focused approach, officership is a way of life that surrounds one and his family 24/7, the officer and his family should bear all material and psychological burdens such as temporary budget deficits, marriage problems, health problems, long and risky deployments, or the uprooting of fast deployment cycle to honor the officership. The reformist approach, in contrast, tends to place more trust in the society's current value set than the *status quo logic*, and seems to embrace these values along with the military's established value set. In fact, the reformist

³⁶ These remarks were made by Gen.Hulusi Akar in a meeting the author had been on April 2013.

approach, in this sense, could be defined as an approach that endeavors to accommodate the military's established value set and society's current value set.

In fact, in this period, it was seen that the emphasis that the TAF needs a structural transformation was not only uttered in the assemblies at the TGS corridors but also voiced in other platforms and by the civilian decision makers. For instance, in his speech on April 5, 2012 at the Staff College, then-President Abdullah Gül emphasized how “the great transformation observed in strategic balances” changes the traditional conceptions of security and strength in the globe. In his speech, Gül's following statements are noteworthy:

New threats and opportunities arising at the global level are making new security conceptions and new order searches gain acceleration. As a result of that, we are witnessing all over the world that substantial reforms are being made for the armed forces to obtain the most effective and optimal structure.³⁷

According to Gül, TAF's transformation with a new reformist spirit is compulsory. In this reform, there are three principles that the military must adopt: the joint-ness, prevention of duplications, and supply of the procurement by the national defense industry at the high possible level.

4.1.2. Institutionalization of the reformist approach within the TGS (August 2012-August 2013)

Between August 2012 and August 2013, it is possible to say that, of the two approaches designated after the damage assessment process, the reformist approach came to the forefront of the TGS mainly due to the High Command's reformist sentiment. It is for this reason that the Project Management Department was established in November 2012 as a sub-command directly attached to the TGS

³⁷ Please see for the full text of the speech (Turkish): <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/abdullah-gul-konusmalar/371/82551/harp-akademileri-konferansinda-yaptiklari-konusma.html> (accessed April 10, 2015).

deputy chief to contribute scientific analyses to the High Command's decision making. As its head, the mentioned department has a brigadier general with an MA degree in international relations and has a qualified staff with both master's and PhD degrees abroad. This department started to prepare analyses and reports about issues ordered by the High Command. Besides that, the establishment of the Conduct Offices within the directories of the General Staff to help commanders of all directories with decision making was another indicator of the reformist approach.

Again, this period is the one when TGS' structural reorganization occurred. Three examples of substantial reorganization within the TGS carried out in this period are the appointment of qualified staff to the Press and Public Relations Department, the attachment of new branches and sections (like the Branch of Internet and Social Media) to the Press Department, increasing the cadres of the Armed Forces Operation Command Center (AFOCC) from which General Staff headquarters follows all the activities of TAF units, and the appointment of a Brigadier General as its head. Additionally, in this period, a new approach was adopted about the problems of non-commissioned officers' (NCOs) serving in the military, which had captured media and public attention. To deal with the well-being and lack of motivation among NCOs, a General Staff NCO office was established as a directly attached branch of the TGS Chief. After the establishment of this office, the TGS Senior NCO post was formed and an NCO was assigned to this post. Then, the offices of the Senior NCO in the headquarters of all force commands were established as well.

In addition, between August 2012 and August 2013, the Reputation Management Working Group was established for the first time within the TGS to develop new strategies for managing the reputation for both the internal public

opinion of TAF (TAF personnel, their families, and close associates) as well as the society as a whole. In the following stages, communication experts, including the author of this thesis joined this working group. This working group played an important role primarily in increasing the loyalty of TAF personnel to the institution, and secondly, in the development of the most effective communication strategies for society.

On the other hand, criticisms were also made within the TGS about efforts to transform during this period. The most important of those criticisms is that one of the most essential principles of TAF transformation as a security actor, “joint-ness,” is not taken into consideration satisfactorily, coming especially from the staffs of the Air Force and Navy. This criticism emphasizes that the Army dominates the management of the transformation process, a dynamic that harms jointness for the Air Force and Navy. Especially, no appointments made to the newly established departments and branches in the General Staff directories from the naval or Air Forces’ officers have caused a serious resistance and discomfort against appropriation of the transformation process. The appointment of generals from the Army as the heads of newly-established departments and also appointment of staff from the Army to the branch directorates of the branches caused discomfort from the top to the bottom.

In this respect, Captain İ. from the Navy draws attention to the following issues:

How much joint shall TAF be? The answer to this sincere question is directly related to the vision and the security architecture of Turkey. If the country partly wants to be in a global position and to include commitments promising to protect its citizens everywhere in the world, then the dimension of jointness will reach out to a dimension of expeditionary forces starting from the peace, but if a joint-ness covering the framework of an operation field of our surrounding seas and present land borders is to be considered, a joint-ness of less coverage starting from crisis/tension phase can be thought of. However, when the projects TAF is carrying out at the moment and is planning to have

at the near future are taken into account, it is impossible to think that the field of interest of TAF is limited merely to our mentioned borders. Thanks to those abilities that will be obtained in expense of billions of Turkish lira, when it is taken into account that we will be able to transport our warplanes to intercontinental distances, our vision must be extended far beyond. If you have that vision, you must be speaking of a force projection. In the face of this situation, your naval forces which has a geopolitical definition of three-fourths of the world, should be larger and you need to approve the transformation of the General Staff headquarters and other crucial bases from land-oriented organizations to naval/air-function-oriented organizations. From now on, the changes in the global security environment dictate to us that the domination of the land forces within TAF is over. In my opinion, the main force of the future is either naval forces or the Air Forces, but certainly not the land forces. In that case, why not does a naval or air general become the General Staff headquarter instead of an Army general?³⁸

4.1.3. The Expansion of the Debates about Transformation to Force Commands (August 2013- August 2014)

Between August 2013 and August 2014, debates about the transformation started within the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. To manage the transformation by means of scientific methods and under a single executive branch, branches such as the Project Management Department of TGS headquarters were established in each force command. The aim of establishing each branch, which are directly attached to the force commander, was to provide guidance and consultancy for the force commanders' decisions and executive orders and to ensure the standardizations for joint-ness in implementation.

In this period, as one of the first instances of TAF's structural transformation in, the Air Force and Missile Defense Command, which gathers the main fighting units of the Air Force under a single framework of a commandership, was established in Eskişehir on August 5, 2014.³⁹ As the main affiliation of this commandership, the Vice Commandership and United Air Operation Centers

³⁸ From the interview with Captain İ. conducted in May 13, 2015 in Ankara.

³⁹ Please see the related press release on the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces (Turkish): <http://www.hvkk.tsk.tr/tr/HaberDetay.aspx?IcerikID=6348&ID=93> (accessed April 12, 2015).

Commandership was established in Diyarbakır to manage the air operation from a single center, and the land and naval coordination units were formed in Eskişehir together with the Air Defense Command, which manages air missile defense from a single center and uses the right to engage. Employed at the strategic projects in the Air Force, Captain S. makes it clear how Air Force projects primarily have been built up like the F-35 project, which calls for the need to shift to advanced technology and to net type of war architecture, each of which was used as an instrument of self-confidence:

The Turkish Air Force is competing and taking concrete steps in the way of being a space power. For example, it is planning to procure 100 F-35A until the year 2021 to replace with the F-34 Phantom II planes in the inventory of the Air Force within the F-35 JSF project which it considers to be the project which will lead the Turkish Air Force up to space. Again, the latest efforts are the clearest indication of a technology-centered transformation, such as a project develop a national warplane, the national air missile project, the Wing Guidance Kit project, which will transform classic ammunition into winged and guided ammunition, as well as advanced mobile and stationary radar projects. Even if we will not see it, the next generation will certainly witness a war in space. Therefore, if Turkey wants to be a great country in the future, it must manage to transform its Air Forces into a space power. This is also our goal.⁴⁰

Again in this period, it is interesting to note that the naval forces, which were hit the hardest which in the *Sledgehammer* and *Ergenekon* cases, took substantial steps towards transformation to overcome the institutional trauma it had experienced. Employed at the Project Management branch of the naval forces headquarters, Captain İ. comments on the following:

It is normal that national interests have reached a global projection for a country that aims to be listed among the top ten economies of the world with its GNP of 2 trillion dollars, which will be one of the 32 countries in the world by entering the league of nuclear power using countries with two nuclear plants, and will obtain the potential of production capacity with its population of 90 million in the year 2023. Right at this point, the Navy, probably the force that best envisages the future, has had a great shift with the pool invasion ship project of \$1.2 billion, a military base deployment for Qatar, a capacity increase for Somali, a waving flag at the Asian-Pacific

⁴⁰ From interview with Captain S. conducted in Ankara on March 12, 2015.

region especially for the last few years, and the acceleration of steps taken to implement this project, which was its last move.⁴¹

He also emphasizes that the Navy considers these ambitious projects as confidence-building means for its personnel “to grasp the future with a new breath.”⁴²

4.1.4. Consolidation of Transformation (August 2014 -August 2015)

In this period, the most important formal text emphasizing the need for a transformation and restructuring was the “Defense Reform Report” issued with the signature of the then-President Abdullah Gül in August 2014.⁴³ The transformation activities by the TGS, parallel to the Presidential Defense Reform, were commenced under the tutelage of Abdullah Gül, carried out by a working group composed of veteran soldiers, diplomats and scholars, and shared with the public under the name of “TAF-2033 Restructuring,” as it was commonly referred to in the press. These transformation that were started by the General Staff headquarters long before the Defense Reform studies were collected under a vision document issued by a civilian political power for the first time, the attempt done in the developed countries.⁴⁴ It is rather interesting that, for the first time, the Presidency prepared a report emphasizing the urgency of TAF’s comprehensive transformation and a restructuring process and rendering this process sustainable. In this document, the reforms realized in the CMR were aligned as follows:

- Civilians were appointed to the Secretariat General of the National Security Council (NSC), the number of civil members of the NSC was increased, the

⁴¹ From interview with Captain İ. conducted in Ankara on April 15, 2015.

⁴² From interview with Captain İ. conducted in Ankara on April 15, 2015.

⁴³ Please see for the full text of the speech (Turkish): <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/dosyalar/2014-08-22-SavunmaReformu.pdf> (accessed April 13, 2015).

⁴⁴ The transformation efforts mentioned in the countries like the USA and the United Kingdom were designated under names like ‘Horizon 2020’ and ‘Future Force 2020’.

coordination and monitoring authorization of the NGC was transferred to the Vice Prime Ministry,

- The duties and authorities of the General Secretariat of the NGC were restricted, the number of military staff in the institution was diminished,
- New regulations were prepared for the supervision of military expenditures by the Court of Accounts
- The field of the military jurisdiction was restricted.
- The General Staff Headquarter, the Force Commanders, and the Gendarmerie General Commander were added among the people who can be judged by the Constitutional Court with the role of Supreme Court,
- The possibility of application to jurisdiction about the dismissal decisions was given except for the promotion acts of the Supreme Military Council and the forced retirements due to lack of position.
- Civilian elites undertook a determining role for the preparation of the National Security Policy Document (NSPD)
- New regulations were prepared for the utilization of TAF for internal security.⁴⁵

Again in this report, it is interesting that clues in the form of principles were shared about how TAF's transformation and restructuring should be. According to the report, it is advised to establish working groups about the subjects below and to enter into a sustainable transformation process with the information those groups produce.

- Abilities of the military and structure of the force

⁴⁵ Cumhurbaşkanlığı Savunma Reformu Raporu (Security Reform Report of Turkish Presidency); for the full report, please see <http://www.tcbb.gov.tr/dosyalar/2014-08-22-SavunmaReformu.pdf> (accessed December 10, 2014).

- Method of defense
- Procurement and logistics of defense system
- Conscription system
- Education and training in military schools
- Source allocation and auditing⁴⁶

General Staff headquarters established a working group starting from July 2014 with the one person from each force command who had an academic background. As a result of the changes in command structures in August 2015, the “TAF 2033 Vision” gained pace.

4.1.5. Public Relations: The field best reflecting change in TAF

Press and public relations are among the most notable fields indicating that TAF is attempting to transform itself organizationally. An analysis of TAF’s changing communication discourse, therefore, may constitute an example of TAF’s efforts for adapting to the changing socio-political context in Turkey.

Nuran Yıldız (2007), a professor at the Faculty of Communication at Ankara University, who was also a consultant between 2009-2010 for then-Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, compares communication strategies of TAF and other modern militaries in her book *Tanks and Words (Tanklar ve Sözcükler)* in detail and criticizes TAF’s traditional communication architecture. Similarly, Özgür Ekşi, in his report entitled “General Staff headquarters – Press Relations,” critically analyzes traditional communication methods and practices among TAF. In both studies, the criticisms are related to the fact that TAF’s communication with the media is discrete and one-sided, that reactions against TAF’s accreditation practices can be seen in both the media and in the public, that the language TAF uses for the public is

⁴⁶ Ibid.

“peremptory and cliquey,” and that both the content and the tone used in its occasional political statements is not appropriate.

Hence, TAF started to change its communication architecture since 2010 in the light of those criticisms. The “Strategic Communication” model, which NATO implemented, has been taken as a base in TAF’s transformation of the communication strategy. For this issue, a 2012 article entitled “Strategic Communication and Its Applicability in the Security Sector” written by the author of this thesis in 2011 calls for a reorganization of and a change for the traditional communication architecture of TAF. From 2009 onwards, the following steps have been carried out in the given order for the institutionalization of that transformation:

- In 2009, the Press of the General Staff and the Branch of Public Relations under the control of a colonel was upgraded to the level of a department and a General (Brigadier General Metin Gürak) was appointed to its head. Due to that, the press and public relations unit, which was working within the Secretariat General as a branch directorate, became more important.
- Since 2010, the general, who is the head of Department of Press and Public Relations, started going to the General Staff headquarters for a daily presentation. Owing to that, press and public relations started to be conceptualized as an important management function at the TGS.
- In 2010, the number of staff personnel in the Department of Press and Public Relations (PRD) was increased, and qualified and experienced personnel in the field were appointed anew.
- Beginning from 2012, the duration the head of the department, which was one year normally, was increased to 2 or 3 years.

- Since 2012, analyses which examine the positive and negative visibility of TAF in the media every 3 months, have been conducted.
- In 2013, civilian positions, which can consult the TGS Chief, were opened.
- In the year 2013, the content of the website www.tsk.tr, which is the main platform utilized by TAF to inform the public, was revamped.
- In 2014, due to the increasing importance of the social media, the Branch of Internet and Social Media was established. The official Facebook account and YouTube channel of TAF was also started (Gürcan, 2015).

In spite of all those steps, the TAF Chief has stated the deficiency in this field felt by the High Command from time to time. For instance, on October 23rd, 2013, General Necdet Özel, then-Chief of TAF, said to journalist Murat Çelik:

We need to go through a deep-scaled change in the field of press and public relations. As the armed forces, we will conduct that work with civilian and professional staff from now on. Besides that, we will also appoint a civilian political consultant again. This person may be from political sciences (2013).

The comment from Murat Çelik to these statements is as follows:

The Commander thinks that there are deficiencies and malfunctions in TAF's communication. In fact, this is a familiar argument we always have seen in his predecessors also. The opinion that TAF cannot express itself exactly and, therefore, can't communicate with the public properly.⁴⁷

The most apparent example elucidating TAF's transformation in the field of press and public relations is the press releases it publishes on its official website. In fact, when the press releases TAF published on its website in the last ten years are analyzed, the change in the strategic discourse TAF uses with respect to the CMR in terms of content, style, and tone is easily recognizable.

⁴⁷ October 31, 2013. "Necdet Özel: TSK'ya sivil basın sözcüsü geliyor," *T24*. Please see <http://t24.com.tr/haber/tskya-sivil-siyasi-danisman-geliyor,242990> (accessed December 10, 2014).

4.1.5.1. The content analysis of TAF's press releases between 2003 and 2014

The main aim of this section is to demonstrate TAF's ability to adapt and change according to changing socio-political contexts. To do this, the section seeks to carry out an analysis of the content and tone of the 283 press releases published on TAF's official website, www.tsk.tr, between 2003 and 2014. TAF's efforts to match its strategic discourse to the changing socio-political context as well as the overall change in TAF strategic discourse are clearly visible through this analysis. From this, we can conclude that unlike what the literature assumes, TAF is not an institution completely immune to change; it, too, is a social organization that tries to adapt to changing socio-political contexts.

Why are press releases significant?

The press releases at TAF's official website of www.tsk.tr represent the official stance of TAF as an institution and, therefore, are prepared through a meticulous process with the utmost care at the TGS. The process begins with the Chief of Staff personally commanding the Head of the Department of Press and Public Relations (PRD) to start preparing a draft press release about a given issue. In other words, the chief determines when and on what issues of press releases. Consequently, the Head of the Department of PRD prepares the first draft in a cohort with a team of communication specialists and others.⁴⁸ This draft is, then, taken to different departments that are deemed relevant, to obtain their views and to coordinate their approval. Lastly, the draft is taken to the Deputy Chief for a coordinated approval. Should the Deputy Chief approve, the final draft is taken to the Chief of the General Staff. After his final approval, the text is released. Should the release contain any pictures and or maps/figures, these too are individually scrutinized by the Chief of

⁴⁸ Under General Necdet Özel's term (2011-2015), military judges have also joined this team.

the General Staff. It is, therefore, possible to claim that each release reflects both the views of the Chief and the TGS. It is important to remember that these statements are the primary means through which the Turkish military informs civilian politics and society at large, and each sentence and each and every word of these statements are carefully reflected on before being published. Therefore, one could analyze changes in TAF's strategic discourse through scrutinizing the 283 releases made during the 11 years between 2003 and 2014, under generals Hilmi Özkök, Yaşar Büyükanıt, İlker Başbuğ, Işık Koşaner, and Necdet Özel through the method qualitative content analysis.

Providing an example of qualitative content analysis could be useful to better elucidate the reason why this method was chosen. For example, under Hilmi Özkök, a press release had been published on the TAF website as a reaction to the burning of the Turkish flag by the protestors at the Nowruz celebrations in March 22, 2005 in Mersin (*Hürriyet*, "Thirty-two detained...". The full text of the release entitled "Deplorable insults directed at the Turkish flag during Newroz celebrations" is reproduced below:

Great Turkish Nation, (Millet)

A group of individuals who have no sense of values, have taken innocent Newroz, the coming of Spring, to such a level of impertinence so as to attack the symbol of the mighty Turkish Nation, the glorious Turkish Flag, each corner of which has been drenched in the blood of our martyrs.

This is a heinous and treacherous act.

Friend and enemies alike should know that neither this Country's Indivisible Unity nor the glorious Turkish Flag as a symbol of this unity will ever be left unprotected. First, the mighty Turkish Nation and, later, the Turkish Armed Forces that has emerged from among this nation, is prepared, just as their ancestors were, to protect and to secure their Country and Flag to their last drop of blood. It [The TAF] has sworn an oath. Those who misinterpret its solemnity, gravity, and patience, those who act under false pretenses, those who dare to test the Turkish Armed Forces' Love of Nation and Flag, would be better advised to first review the pages of history.

On the other hand, 9 years later, the full text (*Hürriyet*, “Turkish authorities confirmed...”) of TAF’s response to the taking down of a flag within the premises of a military unit in the Diyarbakir 2nd Air Force Command is as follows:

Following the death of an individual who lost his life on the 7th of June 2014 in Lice, Diyarbakır, certain groups who gathered for the funeral held unlawful demonstrations in the Bağlar province county, on June 8, 2014.

The demonstrating groups have used stones to attack a watchtower located at the Northern District of the 2nd Air Force Command, located near the cemetery where the funeral in question was being held.

Among demonstrators, some of whom were kids, one individual who had masked his face, jumped over the entrance of the security gate and entered the vehicle control area between two fences, climbing onto the flagpole. Despite the task force sent to the area firing two warning shots into the air and verbally cautioning the individual, they nevertheless took the flag down the pole.

Against such actions that we evaluate to be taken for provocative purposes, using children and women, intending to cause civilian deaths, incite mass demonstrations and overall hamper our capacity for toleration, TAF has sought to respond in a calm and collected manner.

The TAF vehemently condemns the act launched by this individual, who has no sense of value, on the symbol of the mighty Turkish Nation, the mark of our independence, the Turkish Flag, each corner of which has been drenched in the blood of our martyrs. The TAF respectfully assures the public that it will closely follow that the perpetrator behind this attack is found and receives the appropriate punishment and that no person or group can take down the Glorious Turkish Flag from the pole upon which it waves.

Carrying out a qualitative content analysis of these texts, published by TAF on two separate occasions, we can note certain striking points:

First, the text from 2005 is dominated by very harsh rhetoric and is addressed directly to the perpetrators. Moreover, the press release is harsh despite events taking place outside military premises. These harsh statements sometimes reach a level of insults with phrases such as “individuals who have no sense of values,” “such a level of impertinence so as to attack the symbol of the mighty Turkish Nation,” “this is a heinous and treacherous act.” On the other hand, the text moves on to stress TAF’s strength and decisiveness. The message contains a direct warning that TAF’s honorable stance and patience should not be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness.

The text ends with a clear threat, making it possible to claim that the main aim of the text is to teach a lesson to its addressees and underline the strength and deterrence capabilities of TAF. It is also interesting that the last section contains a veiled reference to history. Interestingly, throughout the message the term “TAF” is continuously deployed as the subject of sentences, without resorting to the passive voice or indirect speech, thus underlining TAF as a unitary institution.

The first thing that strikes us about the statement from 2014 is its relatively softer tone, despite referring to an incident committed inside military premises. The second important aspect is that the statement is written in a polite tone and is directed not at the perpetrators but at the public as a whole. It is possible to observe that this statement contains no insulting comments or direct threats, and the basic premises of the statement are to inform the public about the details of how the incident took place. The course of the text first provides the reader a brief summary of the event, following with information on how this event came about, and ends by first stressing that “civilian citizens could have been harmed,” and later underlining TAF’s efforts to stay “calm and collected” against demonstrations. In the last paragraph, TAF’s belief and expectation that the perpetrators will be apprehended and punished in accordance with the appropriate legal processes, and highlights that TAF will be monitoring these developments. Contrary to the first statement, this statement refrains from referring to TAF in the first person singular and instead opts for the first person plural “we,” placing it within passive voice and null subject sentences. This preference has the effect of softening the tone of the statement.

To sum up, comparing the two statements; whereas the first statement could be characterized as directly addressed to the perpetrators, where TAF has made harsh, almost insulting remarks, a threatening and decisive message, the second statement

presents itself as an informative text that has been written to the public in general, with a softer tone. In the first statement, the “traitors” are directly threatened and are harshly reminded that the “TAF’s solemnity, gravity, and patience” shouldn’t be tested, whereas in the second statement TAF complains about the perpetrators of the event to the public and demands from the authorities that the perpetrators are “captured and receive the appropriate punishment,” while at the same time reminding, in a soft tone, that TAF will be closely monitoring the process.

As this preliminary example demonstrates, this study seeks to provide an analysis of the TAF’s changing strategic, through a comparison of both the content and the tone and style of 283 press releases published on the TAF official website between January 10, 2003 and June 28, 2014.

4.1.5.2. The Period of General Hilmi Özkök (2002-2006)

-The May 5, 2003 statement is one that refutes media stories. One can define this statement as a harsh criticism of the media reports and comments regarding the agenda of the NSC meeting, especially the promotion of generals. The statement leaves the impression of threatening the reader and contains sentences such as “TAF’s goodwill in not intervening in debates surrounding everyday politics should not be misinterpreted and abused,” highlighting first secularism and second democracy. As it also becomes clear from this statement, TAF was discomforted by the news stories published around the NSC agenda and general-rank appointments, and found it necessary to express this discomfort with a harsh tone, directly addressing the individuals doing the reporting.

-The statement from June 22, 2003 regards military matters. This statement contains an evaluation of global, regional, and internal threats, explaining that “the time for a cautious restructuring has come,” and declaring that the previously 18-month

compulsory military service had been lowered to 15 months. The general style of the statement is structured to give the impression that the duration of the service has been shortened due to TAF's internal demands. In other words, the statement is notable for giving the impression that the compulsory service has been shortened not due to the efforts of the government, but due to TAF's demands. While the statement covertly implies that shortening the service period was TAF's decision, it also excludes any references to the "civilian government."

- On September 14, 2003, the Chief of Staff released a statement informing the public that he met members of YÖK on matters related to military education and higher education. As it is obvious from the statement, as of September 2003, a Chief of Staff in Turkey is able to hold meetings with the members of the YÖK on the education system, and can publish an online public statement about these meetings.

- The statement dated November 6, 2003 criticizes the fact that the wife of AKP deputy Mustafa Elitaş, who happens to wear a headscarf, had attended the October 29th Republic Day Reception held at the Kayseri Officer's Club. According to the statement, the headscarf ban on military premises was violated. With this statement, TAF's sensitivities about secularism and the ban on headscarves in military areas was expressed to the public.

- The statement released on December, 31 2003 can also be categorized as refuting news stories. The statement reads:

On December 30, 2003, certain media organs have published stories indicating that an MP (member of parliament) has expressed discomfort regarding a photo of Supreme Leader Atatürk as a Field Marshall hanging in parliament, the existence of a Parliamentary Guards Unit ensuring the security of the parliament against outside threats as well as its staff's "food prayers" and "Yes sirs"; adding that the civilianization of the parliament should be initiated by the military and referring the matter to the Chief of Staff.

Although not mentioning him by name, the statement strongly criticizes Fehmi Hüsrev Kutlu, the AKP MP in question, both of his anti-secularist rhetoric as well as his antimilitarist stance. In the following sections, Kutlu's anti-secularist statements were harshly criticized, claiming that anti-secularist acts are fueled by such statements: "Such irresponsible statements clearly prepare the groundwork for the backward incidents we have witnessed near the İstanbul Fatih Mosque, which has upset us as a nation." The following section of the statement criticizes the comments regarding the Parliamentary Guards Unit and adds,

The Chief of Staff, who has served in many modern and democratic countries, has visited many more and has personally observed kings and princes dressed in military uniforms, as well as military officers holding ceremonies in parliaments and ensuring the security of these premises from outside threats. However, the Chief of Staff has never met an individual who interprets this issue within the framework of civilianization of the parliament or who expresses discomforts regarding uniforms and soldiers. The Chief of Staff, the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces - an organization that is an inseparable part of this nation - representing its every aspect and proudly bearing the title "National Army," expresses deep concerns regarding such rhetoric and events.

- The March 16, 2004 statement is about the media stories that claimed incidents of profiling during the implementation of the Security and Public Order Protocol (EMASYA). This statement refutes these stories and explains that such cases of profiling were conducted beyond the knowledge of the General Staff and that this is an error committed by the individual staff. "It is true that in every activity carried out by the staff, certain problems may occur due to human error. The disheartening aspect of this story is that such a problem has been associated with an institution and has been generalized to blame and harm the wrong offices and individuals." The statements that immediately follow are interesting:

The Turkish Armed Forces, which is the home of many martyrs and veterans who have sacrificed thousands of lives, arms, legs, eyes for the comfort and serenity of the public, will continue to bury all unjust and bitter

criticisms in its memory and heart, trusting the final judgment regarding such criticisms to the good sense of our mighty people, while expressing our gratitude to the positive criticisms that give us the opportunity to improve, to celebrate our successes and to increase our diligence.

- The statement on May 6, 2014 was published with the purpose of communicating concerns that the changes to the Law of the Higher Education Board would damage the secular education system. This statement demonstrates that, as of 2004, TAF could directly share its concerns about the secular education system being tarnished, with the public. The statement reads:

Institutions and social aspects whose commitment to the fundamental characters of the Republic are beyond doubt, could not be expected to embrace the changes proposed in this draft law. It is our belief that at a time when Turkey already deals with the utmost delicate issues, clearly the changes in this draft would unnecessarily bring about further serious problems and, therefore, the relevant institutions will treat the matter with the necessary caution and good sense, and, furthermore our Mighty Nation will demonstrate the appropriate sensitivity. The Turkish Armed Forces' thoughts and attitude regarding the Republic's character as a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law is the same as it has always been and will continue to be so. It is unthinkable for anyone to mistake or to doubt the Turkish Armed Forces' thoughts and attitudes on this matter.

- The statement dated May 25, 2004 very harshly responds to corruption allegations regarding the construction site of the Special Forces in Oğulbey, Ankara. It warns the media that the secrecy of the investigation was being violated. As it is obvious from the statement, TAF is capable of criticizing corruption allegations published in the media on the basis that the principle of the secrecy of investigation was being contravened.

- Media stories and claims that the scope of the Şemdinli investigation (Jenkins, 2008) would be expanded to include the generals were harshly criticized in a statement dated March 8, 2006. The statement closes with the sentence, "Legal investigations on the conduct of generals and admirals can only be conducted by the General Staff Military Prosecutor, with the order and approval of the Chief of the

Staff,” which demonstrates how sensitive TAF was, as of 2006, regarding news stories and claims about generals.

- In the March 20, 2006 statement, TAF criticizes the prosecutors conducting the Şemdinli investigation. The harsh tone of the statements directed at the prosecutors is immediately striking.

Against these unjust and mistaken allegations directed at the Turkish Armed Forces, firstly those who are constitutionally obliged to do so should immediately take a stance against the representatives of the twisted mentality behind these attacks, by revealing them to the public without any heed paid to status, office or standing, by disclosing this attack with all its dimensions, and by taking the appropriate legal action. In this framework, we have already taken the necessary initiative with the relevant authorities, regarding the Public Prosecutor who prepared the indictment. The Turkish Armed Forces is wholly aware of these initiatives planned against it and will continue to pursue the matter till the very end through legal means.

- In two statements dated July 12, 2006 and July 31, 2006, TAF had strongly reacted to news stories and claims regarding the resignation of generals prior to the Supreme Military Council in August 2006. The July 12 statement reads: “Media outlets have been publishing stories regarding the resignation of a major-general, which contains stories and commentary that is both misleading in referring to unnamed individuals, and is incriminating of certain institutions and individuals.” Read alongside the July 31 statements, it becomes clear that, as of 2006, TAF saw the rank of being “general” as an untouchable position and, therefore, is having to feel obliged to publish a statement.

A General Analysis of the General Hilmi Özkök Period

In terms of the content analysis of the press releases, this study defines General Özkök’s period as the period of “active hostility” towards elected civilians. The first years of the statements in the Özkök period between 2003 and 2004, are mainly focused on “foreign policy,” as this period saw the Iraq invasion in 2003 by the US, the disagreements in the parliament regarding Turkey’s role in the war, the Hood

event,⁴⁹ and tensions with the US. It is significant to note that the statements regarding counterterrorism increased in number especially after 2004 and stressed that the PKK-KADEK was marginalized, passivized, and that this was TAF fulfilling its duties. The statements made during the Özkök period present a general attitude of bickering with the media, and an effort to respond to any media coverage, news story, or claim that is interpreted to be about TAF. Moreover, it is equally noteworthy that overtly nationalist and grandiloquent expressions are used to complain to the public at large, of individuals, groups or circles that are evaluated to have written stories siding against TAF. Also, these statements often underline the strength and resolve of TAF, constantly providing a covert message that the “TAF is aware of everything and is closely watching the developments.” Again especially during 2006, expressions such as “TAF is united in one voice and breath. The attempts to Balkanize TAF are in vain” are repeated once every four statements. It is clear to see that all of the statements released in this period respond to any negative claim or criticism directed at TAF in a harsh and reactionary tone. It is again interesting to note that whereas the statements of this period often contain references to secularism and sometimes to democracy, there are almost no references to the rule of law.

4.1.5.3. The Period of General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2006-2008)

- The statement dated September 2, 2006 contains the following: “The claims that an extraordinary protocol was carried out during the parade held on August 30th celebrations at the Atatürk Culture Centre, do not represent the truth.” This statement is a good example of the continuing reactionary and harsh attitude taken towards the

⁴⁹ Please click on the following link for news on the Hood Incident: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3067319.stm (accessed April 4, 2015).

press that continued under Yaşar Büyükanıt. In other words, the news stories and claims regarding the protocol are still evaluated to merit an official statement.

- The statement dated September 5, 2006 contains harsh expressions against the rising public sentiment, perhaps expressed for the first time in the 30 years of the struggle against the PKK, that “TAF is incapable.” The statement is intended to answer the claims that there are insufficient provisions of bulletproof vest and the harsh comments are noteworthy. “The counterterror units of TAF are provided with steel vests as per the character and risk assessment of the mission. If necessary, TAF already has the resources and the ability to produce steel vests.” This statement is supported with emotional expressions, on the one hand, accusing the originators of the claims and, on the other, making an indirect assertion that can be read as: “We don’t need bullet proof vests, and if we did, we would produce them ourselves!”

- The statement dated October 9, 2006 responds to the allegations that just surfaced, about the retired non-commissioned officers who had lost their lives in Ankara, receiving different protocols from commissioned officers and that non-commissioned officers were discriminated against. The statement carries a tone that embraces denial and goes on the counter-offensive, expressing certainty in how the claims were not accurate and that the protocols were in line with relevant legislation.

A certain newspaper released a story on October 8, 2006 that the funeral proceedings of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in Ankara were being held at different mosques. The allegations in this story are wholly untrue. TAF applies the same principles in all the funeral proceedings of our martyrs, from private to general, without any concern for rank or office. The funeral proceedings of martyrs are held in the mosques determined by the Garrison Command, taking into account the wishes of the martyr’s family. The Ankara Garrison has determined the Kocatepe Mosque as appropriate to this end.

- The statement released on March 1, 2007, protests news stories that the views expressed by the Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt during his visit to the US were his

“personal views” and stresses that the “views of the Chief of Staff are the views of TAF as an institution.”

- The statement on April 24, 2007 came just before the more well-known statement that is popularly referred to as the “e-memorandum” and stresses that the Chief of Staff’s comments on the presidential elections were being distorted. It is significant that the statement stresses “moral values” to the press for the first time. The statement is significant for shedding light on the psychological background of the April 27 e-memorandum. The Turkish General Staff published a memorandum on its official website warning of the danger to secularism.⁵⁰ It was the harshest statement by the military since the confrontation with the Welfare Party coalition in 1997 — the February 28 intervention. The e-memorandum stated the following:

It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently.... An important portion of these activities was carried out with the permission and the knowledge of administrative authorities, who were supposed to intervene and prevent such incidents, a fact which intensifies the gravity of the matter.⁵¹

- The last two articles of the April 27 e-memorandum once again read as a confrontational declaration:

In short, anyone who opposes the view that “How happy is he, who says I’m a Turk,” expressed by the founder of our Republic, Great Leader Atatürk, is an enemy of the Turkish Republic and will continue to be so. The Turkish Armed Forces continues to preserve its unshakable determination to fully satisfy its clear and legally-prescribed roles to safeguard these qualities, and is certain in its commitment and belief in this determination.

- The May 29, 2007 declaration reads as a harsh negation of certain stories in the press. It is interesting that the statements are on counter-terrorism and that for the first time the name of a newspaper *Sabah* is included in a press release.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.91-93.

⁵¹ In a well-known TV news program called “32. Gun” broadcast on Channel D on May 5, 2009, the former General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Yaşar Büyükanıt declared that he wrote the text of the e-memorandum himself.

- For the first time the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), without mentioning it and referred to as “a party in Diyarbakır,” was criticized and its activities were condemned in a statement published on June 9, 2007.
- The statement released on June 20, 2007 criticizes news stories regarding a visit by the representatives of the Strategic Research Centre (SAREM) working under the General Staff, to a famous meeting organized by the Hudson Institute in the US.⁵²
- The statement of 21 October 2007 is the first of five consecutive statements regarding the Dağlica attack.⁵³ These statements demonstrate that TAF suffers from a complete communication failure subsequent to such terror operations with heavy losses, while the general tone of the statements are one of denial and counter-offensive.
- The reaction against retired TAF staff and members of the press who have criticized TAF following the Dağlica attacks is indicated in the harsh comments of the November 18, 2007 statement:

Certain individuals and media organizations are engaging in hateful and spiteful attacks towards TAF in an unthinkable and unacceptable manner. These individuals are using certain information and experiences obtained in active service, to express wholly distorted or unreal claims and behaviors that are insulting, that tarnish relations of inferiority-superiority within the military, and that destroy the sense of confidence placed in officers and commanders. Ostracizing these individuals from TAF is a natural and precautionary measure to protect this institution.

- The statement on December 22, 2007 is the first one to inform the public regarding air operations in Northern Iraq. This statement stresses the determination

⁵² “Belated denial by Turkish military on Hudson scenarios” Today’s Zaman, June 21, 2007.

⁵³ Ali Ersan Erol “From Uludere to Dağlica” ResearchTurkey Forum, June 27, 2012. Please see: <http://researchturkey.org/from-uludere-to-daglica-impotency-of-the-powerful/> (accessed february 20, 2015).

and deterrence by also sharing images of laser-guided missiles that hit PKK targets in Northern Iraq with full accuracy.

- The January 1, 2008 statement is the first time the PKK was addressed with the harsh comments below:

On the other hand, it bears reminding that the collaborators that support the illegal activities of this organization are responsible, in the highest degree, of the citizens, soldiers and security forces whose blood has been spilt.

- As the criticisms in the press and public persisted, TAF abandoned the strategy of denial and counter-offensive, and released the most comprehensive and harsh statement about the Dağlica attack in January 19, 2008. Below is an excerpt:

The recent period has seen many news stories and comments being released about Dağlica attack on October 21, 2007 and the incidents that followed, creating an environment of intense debate. The Dağlica events have been interpreted in different ways according to the past knowledge and experiences, inclinations, and missions of individuals or their affiliated institutions. Certain circles, who have made anti-militarism into a tool of economic gain, are distorting the events for their own purposes. Claims that have been put under doubt, prejudice, and vengeance are being highlighted while overlooking the fact that a heinous attack in Dağlica has been overcome through the exemplary sacrifice of the lives and blood of 12 sons of this nation.

The TAF has a well-founded tradition of feedback and self-criticism, and will investigate the Dağlica events in every detail. After a detailed administrative inquiry, taking the testimonies of all the relevant personnel from every rank, TAF has decided to begin legal proceedings regarding 8 soldiers. While an administrative inquiry has been carried out, taking the matter to a trial is desirable in terms of the transparency it provides to members of the media and public. The Turkish Armed Forces' attitude here is the clearest indication of its self-confidence and belief in the rule of law. In fact, the public is acutely aware that the Turkish Armed Forces have never had any doubts carrying unlawful activities to the courts. In this sense, it is unthinkable for the Turkish Armed Forces to discriminate against anyone, and the principle of its evaluation is not based on rank or relations, but rather on personal merits and actions.

Every institution may contain individuals who are at fault. However, in order to talk of institutional fault, we would need to wait for the findings of the administrative and/or legal proceedings.

As these facts remain and the legal proceedings are still under way, TAF leaves it to the public to decide whether the people who find in themselves

the authority to incriminate institutions and individuals in their comments are, in fact, committed to the principle of the supremacy of the law.

Moreover, those who try to use this and similar incidents to harm the Turkish Armed Forces and to tarnish its determination in fighting terrorism and protecting the fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic, will find their attempts in vain.

-The February, 22 2008 statement informs the public about commencing “Operation Sun” (*Güneş*) (*Reuters*, “Turkey launches major...”). It is worthwhile that a lot of visual material regarding the operation was released in the days following this statement. After releasing the images of the air strikes, TAF implemented a direct media policy for the first time and produced daily press briefs to inform members of the media.

- March 4, 2008 saw another harsh statement directed against claims and questions in the media and the public regarding “Why was Operation *Güneş* brought to an end so quickly? Was it brought to an end with pressure from US?” This statement reads:

The Chief of Staff and other generals have made their public and media statements in the clearest and most comprehensible manner...

Despite all this good will and transparency, the comments expressed on March 4, 2008 targeting the Turkish Armed Forces from sources outside the media are interpreted as unjust and uncivil attacks on an institution that is putting up the life of its staff in the struggle against terror.

The Turkish Armed Forces would always avoid entering into debates with institutions and individuals in politics; however, for the first time in its 24 year struggle against terrorism, it is being made the target of such meaningless attacks. These attacks hurt the Turkish Armed Forces’ resolve in fighting terror more than the traitors.

The Turkish Armed Forces leave it to the immense prudence of the Turkish Nation to evaluate these attacks directed against it.

- In a statement released on May 17, 2008, politician Fikri Sağlar’s comments regarding the “Dolmabahçe meeting” were harshly criticized.⁵⁴ The Dolmabahçe meeting was held between then-Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and the then-Chief

⁵⁴ Please see: <http://www.gazetevatan.com/genelkurmay-ve-basbakan-a--fikri-saglar-dan-yanit-179010-gundem/> (accessed February 16, 2015).

of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt. The content of the meeting has remained a secret (*Hürriyet Daily News*, Turkish President: Dolmabahçe...).

Vatan, a newspaper, has featured an immoral and unfounded new story on its coverage on May 17, 2008 that refers to completely unfounded claims by Fikri Sağlam, originally published in another paper.

As the Prime Ministry has already published a press release on the incident, the General Staff doesn't see it necessary to publish a second one.

However, it is certain that the necessary legal action will be taken against those who have carried out this immoral attack.

- The statement published on July 18, 2008 also contains resentful expressions. The statement complains of the increasing levels of the criticisms pointed towards TAF and contains a call on the public, urging them to take TAF's side on this matter and actively support TAF:

The circles which claim to be defenders of freedom and democracy are looking for the next opportunity to draw the Turkish Armed Forces and its members into disputes, and have become focal points damaging Turkey's stability.

No matter the source, one would naturally expect not only the Turkish Armed Forces but also its real owner, the glorious Turkish nation, to demonstrate their legal and democratic reaction against the unlawful attacks directed towards the Turkish Armed Forces through such news stories.

The excerpt below from the July 31, 2008 statement is also interesting:

In an attempt to make personal gains or damage to the Turkish Armed Forces, we have been receiving letters with false names and signatures that are supposedly contain incriminating information about our staff or high command. These attempts to damage the reputation of our members are both unethical and criminal.

When TAF could no longer pursue those who criticize it through legal means, it has opted to stress morality in its statements. This is the first example of an increasing tendency to stress morality.

A general analysis of the period of General Yaşar Büyükanıt:

The period of General Büyükanıt may be defined as the period of “direct confrontation.” Nearly all of the TAF statements between August 2006 and August 2007 are about foreign policy, as this was a quiet period in terms of counterterror activities. However, parallel to the increasing number of the PKK attacks following May 2007, we see an explosion of statements on the side of TAF. There are 8 press releases on the Dağlica event alone. It is also important to note the frequent highlighting of deterrence, technology, and determination in statements, supported by the use of maps and images, beginning with the statements after the December 2007 air operations. Again, it is worth noting that in the same period, images of the air operations were released to the press and these images were used as a successful way of countering the allegations of “failure and insufficiency of the campaign against terror.” Criticism directed towards the early termination of operation *Güneş* conducted on the border in February 2008, received an especially harsh reaction. Nevertheless, it is striking to note that the harshest criticism was reserved for the news stories and claims regarding the *Dolmabahçe* meetings. None of the statements made during the Büyükanıt period highlight democracy or the rule of law. However, when TAF recognizes that it has legal recourse against the claims and criticisms brought towards it, the statements begin to highlight morality and ethics. Moreover, with this period, one begins to see TAF appeal to public opinion and condemn its critics to the judgment of public conscience. One can also draw attention to the obvious use of nationalist themes in the statements. Again, one can note the very harsh statements directed against the PKK or politicians that side with the PKK.

4.1.5.4. The Period of General İlker Başbuğ (2008-2010)

- The first statement of the Başbuğ period expresses that TAF was closely following the process in the aftermath of 18 September 2008 when military personnel was put under custody.
- The statement on September 8, 2008 concerns the Aktütün Raid (*Today's Zaman*, "Security flaws in Aktütün...").
- The statement 8 October 2008 below, is a harsh response to a news story published in Akit entitled "The general who played golf after Aktütün":

Certain media organizations have recently published news stories regarding the Chief Commander of the Air Forces, General Aydoğan Babaoğlu.

As the Chief of the Air Staff had been in Antalya, until the evening hours, he was not informed of the casualties suffered during the conflict that broke out in the Bayraktepe period on Saturday, October 4, 2008.

It is upsetting and curious that, despite these facts, this incident was used to tarnish the Turkish Armed Forces without confirming the story first.

- There have been 6 more statements on Aktütün that followed this. The tone of the statement on February 12, 2009 is written in colloquial language and is far too personal for an institution. This hints that Başbuğ had personally penned the statement. With this statement, one can observe that TAF's communication strategy was becoming "personalized" under Başbuğ. For the first time, the first person plural "we" was used. It is an attempt to both directly inform the public and take sides on a debate. At the same time, it openly challenges its addressees.

As the excerpts below make clear, TAF had for the first time began to ask questions and endeavor to justify its position by appealing to emotional statements.

If the newspaper in question had access to this information before, why has it waited till February 11, 2009? We hope the members of the media and public acting with common sense will answer this question in a sound manner. Furthermore, we believe that the sources who have leaked or produced the story acted in a haste, bankrupt and helpless manner."

Whereas it is a criminal offence to breach article 157 of the 5271 Code of Criminal Procedure in the name of journalism, why is this offence still being committed? Do the people committing this act have no respect, at least, for ethical values?

We would like to thank print media for their prudence and sensitivity, as the original story that first appeared in a newspaper on 11 February 2009 was by-and-large not reprinted on February 12, 2009, with the exception of a few newspapers...

The Turkish Armed Forces is closely and carefully following the developments, and will stand tall in continuing to fulfill its duties with the whole chain of command united and will refrain from being made to serve the interests of those who would like to provoke it. Our biggest strength is our being the Army of the Turkish nation.

- The statement on June 15, 2009 included harsh expressions regarding the document entitled “Action Plan against Fundamentalism” in public (*Today’s Zaman*, “Col. Çiçek: Document...”).

A General Analysis of the 2008-2010 General İlker Başbuğ period

In terms of the content analysis of the press releases, Başbuğ’s period may be defined as the period of “indirect confrontation.” The Başbuğ period can be summarized as one that started with terror events and ended with custodies and court proceedings. The distinctive aspect of the Başbuğ period is the complete personalization of TAF’s communication strategy due to the “Başbuğ effect,” as indicated by the excerpts above. The statement portrays an attempt by Başbuğ to integrate the institutional identity of TAF within his person. Additionally, there exists a visible drop in the number of written statements due to Başbuğ’s preference of direct speech and permitting interviews with members of the press. Furthermore, the Weekly Press Briefing meetings conducted during the Başbuğ period also influenced this drop in this number. It is also noteworthy that the statements contain an elitist attitude and do not feature an emphasis on democracy or the rule of law.

This period saw an intensification of the conflict with PKK and a legal investigation that included members of the military. Some of the most frequently used words were “PKK,” “terrorist organization,” “Air,” “terror” and “our planes.”

4.1.5.5. The Period of General Işık Koşaner (2010-2011)

-The first statement of the Koşaner period is on December 17, 2010 about the Kurdish language debate. The statement, reproduced in its entirety below, demonstrates that TAF had been a side in the debate on the Kurdish language.

The Turkish Republic - the greatest achievement and gift of the Great Leader Atatürk to the Turkish people - is founded on a democratic structure and a legally-sound basis, where popular sovereignty exists and notions such as “unitary state” and “nation-state” are a fundamental aspect of the founding philosophy. Such principles are the basis of the Turkish Republic’s achievements today.

The 3rd Article, of the first four entrenched articles of the Constitution contains the declaration that: “The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.”

A common language, culture, and ideal are the most essential elements of nationhood. History presents us with many heartbreaking examples of the results of forgoing a common language.

We are watching with concern, as the founding philosophy of our Republic is brought to a point of being fundamentally changed, through certain recent public debates over “our language.”

The Turkish Armed Forces has always had a role and will continue to play a role in protecting the nation-state, the unitary state and secular state also defined in our Constitution under the title of protecting the independence and unity of the State, the Turkish nation, the Republic, and democracy.

- For the first time in a statement dated January 24, 2011, the principle of the rule of law was emphasized adding that the case was being followed in silence. Again, it is worth mentioning that the statements below constitute a first in TAF’s attitude towards legal proceedings involving its staff:

As an institution committed to democracy, rule of law, and constitutional values, the Turkish Armed Forces is following the trial process in patience, silence and calm, despite suggestions to the contrary, and in this framework

expresses its belief in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and its expectation that this process will reveal the truth.

- The statement on February 7, 2011 can be interpreted as TAF signaling that it wants “to stay out of politics.”

On 6 February 2011, several media outlets have featured some evaluations by certain leading politicians of two large political parties, concerning the Turkish Armed Forces.

It is saddening to watch these political leaders try to draw the Turkish Armed Forces into ordinary politics, especially as the very same politicians take every opportunity to argue that the Turkish Armed Forces ought to stay out of politics.

In a period when the sources of instability are intensifying around us with no end in sight and the Turkish Armed Forces are doing their utmost to fulfill their security duties in the best manner, it would benefit neither the country nor any political view, to use the Turkish Armed Forces in matters of political debate.

Politicians who would like to win public support for their views would be expected to be more prudent in their statements regarding the Turkish Armed Forces and not pursue politics through the military.

- The April 6, 2011 statement complains to the public, regarding the court’s decision not to release the individuals under custody in the Balyoz case (Jenkins, 2014). This marks another first for TAF as it has published the full decision of the court on its website alongside its own statement as an appeal to public opinion.

The legal proceedings regarding a planning seminar held during 5-7 March 2003 in the 1st Army General Command, as well as the attempts to link this seminar with a plan to allegedly stage a coup, are still underway.

On April 5, 2011, the appeals of 163 military staff still under custody, to be released for a trial without arrest, have been refused for a second time by the appeals court ruling for the continuation of their arrest.

The Turkish Armed Forces have especially avoided statements and actions that may amount to intervening in the legal process, but have made several statements that refrained from effecting the trial, informing the relevant authorities, explaining beyond any doubt, the content of the seminar, how it was conducted, what it included, who it involved through what chain of command. Similar issues are also clearly present in the report prepared by the expert, who was chosen by the public prosecutor.

While these are the facts, it is difficult to understand why 163 retired and serving members of the Turkish Armed Forces are still under arrest.

Therefore, we publish the decision to continue the arrest of these individuals for the purposes of informing the public.

- The statement on July 26, 2011, is about the wave of terror that started with the Silvan attack in July 14, 2011, resulting in the deaths of 13 members of the military.

An analysis of the General Işık Koşaner Period

General Koşaner's period, which only lasted a year, can be defined as the period of "strained harmony," and witness the fewest number of statement. Two issues ought to be underlined in these statements. First, the majority of the statements concerns legal proceedings the staff has been involved in (5 of the 13 statements are on this); second, for the first time, we see an emphasis on democracy and the rule of law.

4.1.5.6. The Period of General Necdet Özel (2011-2014)

General Özel's period is the period of "delicate harmony." The statement on October 20, 2011 regarding the death of 24 members of the military (*Today's Zaman*, "PKK kills 24 security...") during a conflict in Çukurca, for the first time, uses emotional phrases alongside of an emphasis on determination and deterrence.

Members of TAF will continue to serve their country, in a manner that represents our ancestors, under the testimony of our glorious martyrs who have entrusted these lands to our protection...

We pay our condolences first to the families of our martyrs, then to our Glorious Nation as a whole. May our martyrs' souls rest in peace. We also wish the injured a quick recovery.

- The statement dated November 2, 2011 contains the first use of a photograph.

The photograph depicts TAF's activities following the Van earthquake.

Photo 1. A photo attached to the release about the Van Earthquake



- The statement dated October 24, 2011 emphasizes TAF's wish to stay out of everyday debates: "The Turkish Armed Forces have embraced the principle of staying out of everyday debates and, instead, only releasing informative statements to the public, on issues directly relating to them."
- The May 3, 2012 statement contains interesting phrases responding to media criticisms of TAF that are evaluated as attempts to tarnish TAF.

Recently, the frequent circulation of news stories, claims, and comments targeting the Turkish Armed Forces, an institution that is wholly focused on its mission, its duties prescribed by legislation and that is fuelled by the drive to fulfill its role of serving its state and Glorious Nation, has come to our attention.

We are sad to observe that these provocative claims and comments that exceed the boundaries of constructive criticism are attempts to harm the morale and motivation of the selfless and heroic members of the Turkish Armed Forces and tarnish their efforts to fulfill their duties in the best manner.

It is regrettable that certain authors, speakers and professional organizations are abusing the freedom of expression and freedom of the press to shamelessly ridicule both our Eternal Commander in Chief, Veteran Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and other military individuals who have made their mark in history, despite their military status, to harm the superiority-inferiority relations, the sense of discipline inside our Army (thought to be one of the most disciplined armies in the world) and to provoke the valuable

members of the Turkish Armed Forces through written and spoken statements.

The selfless and heroic members of the Turkish Armed Forces, from the most junior ranks to the most senior general/admiral, will continue to serve our country and the Glorious Nation, without giving into provocations, in a rock solid unity, and very closely committed to the basic characteristics of our Constitution and our parliamentary democratic system.

- The statement on May 4, 2012 is about the improvements made to the employment terms and conditions of NCOs, which is the first comprehensive statement regarding NCOs. With this statement, TAF can be seen as trying to communicate the message that “Yes, there are problems regarding NCOs, however, we are trying to address them.”

- It is interesting to note the polite tone and the emphasis on the rule of law in the 5 September 2012 statement concerning the Balyoz case.

The 10th High Criminal Court of İstanbul has ruled to convict 324 active duty and retired members of TAF in the trial publicly known as the Balyoz Case.

Taking into account the well-being of the Turkish Republic, the virtue of living under the rule of law and our responsibilities towards our Glorious Nation, we are closely watching the investigations and legal proceedings regarding the members of TAF, with patience, fortitude, cool and calm always avoiding actions that may give cause to misunderstandings.

We deeply share and feel the sadness experienced both by our comrades with whom we have served side by side for years and by their dear family members.

As TAF, we have believed and continue to believe that the trial in question will be resolved equitably, with a definite ruling, as the principles of the rule of law and fair trial necessitate.

Following the first statement on February 6, 2013, a second statement was released responding harshly to stories in nationalist newspapers, which claimed that “TAF (were) experiencing shortcomings in their chain of command due to the officers that have left as part of the trial process.”

- The December 27, 2013 statement contains the following excerpt regarding the trial of TAF members.

Recently, media organization have featured certain comments and texts concerning the Turkish Armed Forces within the context of a high profile investigation that has grabbed considerable public attention.

The Turkish Armed Forces fulfills the duties and responsibilities ascribed to them in the Constitution and Legislation with the spirit of serving the Turkish Nation in the highest manner outside any political opinion or organization.

In executing its tasks, the Turkish Armed Forces take the principles of constitutional state, the rule of law, and democratic society as its foundation.

In this context, TAF have paid extra care to act within the framework of respecting the law and the independence of the judiciary, and have first and foremost sought to protect the institutional identity and integrity of the Turkish Armed Forces during the investigation and legal proceedings concerning their acting and retired members.

The legal processes concerning the Turkish Armed Forces have been followed according to the duties and responsibilities arising from the relevant legislation and any activity or practice with dubious legal has been reported to the highest decision making bodies and most senior authorities of the state.

The Turkish Armed Forces do not want to be involved in political debates of any sort. However, they will continue to follow closely the developments in matters that concern their institutional identity and the legal standing of their members in accordance with the principles of the rule of law and equity.

- The statement on January 6, 2014 contains the excerpt below, and highlights respect for the rule of law in cases concerning the trial of TAF staff.

As our December 27, 2013 press release indicated, The Turkish Armed Forces have acted in a manner that is in accordance with the necessities of the rule of law, in response to the trial and investigation processes conducted on some of their members. They have refrained from making statements that could be characterized as attempting to influence the trial and have solely shared their views and thoughts with the relevant authorities, has presented suggestions, awaited results and as a result has not resorted to any legal means thus far.

However, as a result of our institutional and humane responsibilities, we have first released an informative press statement and, on the same day, filed an official criminal complaint about the recent expressions of a figure of political importance in the media.

The aim of this criminal complaint is to investigate the claims being made, to bring clarity, and to alleviate certain grievances in public conscience, reinstating the belief in justice and protecting the rights, dignity and honor of the members of the Turkish Armed Forces.

- The statement on February 13, 2014 contained information regarding an NCO seminar.
- The statement dated March 36, 2014 emphasized TAF's attempt to stay out of politics and has featured the excerpt below:

We are sadly witnessing recent attempts to use various incidents to draw the Turkish Armed Forces into political debates before the local elections.

As we have declared many times, the Turkish Armed Forces is the military of the State of the Republic of Turkey. They receive their support, morale and resources from the Noble Turkish Nation and its glorious history.

The Turkish Armed Forces are of the opinion that they ought to stay out of political debates for the well-being of our State, as well as the peace and security of our Glorious Nation.

The Turkish Armed Forces are determined to uphold their stance of rejecting antidemocratic procedures and practices, respecting human rights, believing in the rule of law and committed to the principle of "a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law" indicated in our Constitution.

The dear members of the Turkish Armed Forces are aware of their duties, acting in a sensible, calm manner that avoids all kinds of provocation and political debates, and are continuing to serve our Glorious Nation. They have lost nothing of their power and might.

Moreover, speculative news stories are being featured in certain media outlets about the shooting down of a Syrian aircraft that violated our airspace, despite warnings issued from the authorities in Turkish and Syrian Armed Forces.

- The statement issued on March 26, 2014 once again draws attention to TAF's respect for the rule of law.

The Turkish Armed Forces are determined in upholding their stance of rejecting antidemocratic procedures and practices, respecting human rights, believing in the rule of law and committed to the principle of "a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law" indicated in our Constitution.

A general analysis of the General Necdet Özel Period:

The initial stages of the Özel period, the 1.5 years between August 2011 and December 2012, are primarily about fighting terrorism. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe the polite tone and the emphasis on the rule of law in

statements concerning the trial process of TAF staff. It is possible to note a general softening of the tone in the statements during the Özel period. This period is marked by an informative approach, with statements that sound more polite compared to the elitist tone and self-righteous attitude adopted in earlier statements. Among all the statements analyzed in this study, 13 have emphasized the rule of law and 8 have been released in the Özel period.

Analyzing the word cloud of the statements in the Özel period, one can observe the words “Türk,” “Chief of Staff,” “air,” “Gendarmerie,” “amount,” and “Özel,” are among the most frequently occurring. Moreover, we see relatively a greater number and distribution of frequently occurring words in this period.

4.1.5.7. A general evaluation of the 283 statements released between 2003-2014

In every statement, it is possible to see elements of the character traits of the serving Chief of Staff at the time. For example, fierce criticisms during General Özkök’s period of **active hostility** lost their power in General Büyükanıt’s period of **direct confrontation**, yet the tone and content of the press releases in General Büyükanıt’s period were more aggressive when being compared with the following periods. The personalized communication approach in General Başbuğ’s **indirect confrontation** period clearly reflected in the tone and the choice of words of the statements released; the increasing emphasis on the rule of law in the period of General Özel’s **delicate harmony** directly corresponds with the character traits of the serving Chief of Staff. In this sense, it is possible to articulate that TAF’s communication strategy is far from being institutionalized and is under the control of the serving Chief at the time. This presents an obstacle against the development of an institutional stability in the construction of TAF’s communication strategy. In short, one can observe that

TAF's media and public relations strategy is still under a centrist attitude just as the "reserved domain" under the discretion of the Chief of Staff.

On the other hand, as the press releases have been presented consecutively from 2003 to 2014, a general pattern has emerged. One can characterize this pattern in four stages:

Stage 1: Denial of allegations appeared on the media with an elitist attitude and direct threats

Stage 2: Counter-offensive and indirect threats

Stage 3: Attempt to inform the public with a softer tone compared to early releases, emphasis on ethics and morality, publicly complaining of those working against TAF

Stage 4: Increasing emphasis on democracy and the rule of law, public complaining, a visible softening of tone, communicating sensitivities in a polite manner.

To summarize the general patterns in the statements, there has been:

- A shift in rhetoric from a harsher tone to a softer one,
- An increasing emphasis on democracy and the rule of law,
- A general attitude of being tired of the constant harassment and inquisitiveness of the media and a related desire to stay away from everyday politics,
- A shift from an attitude of demanding to bring authorities to account, to an attitude of informing the public,
- An increasing use of ethic and moral themes,
- A softer tone on statements regarding the Kurdish issue,
- A changing discourse on the fight against terror, and

- An increasing tendency to opt for visual material alongside written texts,

In the light of the findings presented above, it is likely to suggest that, between 2004 and 2014, TAF has adapted their strategic narratives and the way they presented these according to the changing socio-political context in Turkey. Namely, TAF incrementally changed the nature of its strategic discourse from hard in tone to soft in tone, and its communication strategy first from direct confrontation, to indirect confrontation, then to strained harmony and lastly to delicate harmony.



The following summarizes the findings of the qualitative content analysis of TSG's press releases.

Table 2: The Summary of the Content Analysis of TGS's Press Releases

Name of the Chief	Period	Number of Press Releases	Characteristics
Hilmi Özkök	2002-2006 Active Hostility	68	-Direct confrontation with the elected civilians in foreign policy preferences and the counter-terror strategic planning - Bickering with media and efforts to fiercely respond to any media coverage that TGS considered negative -Emphasis on secular characteristics of the state and the nationalist references -Stress on TAF's strength and deterrence with an elitist intonation -Harsh and reactionary tone any issue implying that TAF is not united -No reference to democracy and rule of law
Yaşar Büyükanıt	2006-2008 Direct Confrontation	91	-Direct confrontation with the government on foreign policy choices (particularly between 2006-2007) -Parallel to the increasing number of the PKK attacks like Dağlica, harsh tone towards critiques -Emphasis on deterrence, determination, and use of technology, first ever use of visual material in the press releases -Emphasis on moral principles to counter-attack allegations about TAF's preferences and behaviors -No reference to democracy and rule of law
İlker Başbuğ	2008-2010 Indirect Confrontation	28	- Started with terror events and ended with custodies and court proceedings -The personalization of TAF's communication strategy (The usage of questions, emotional phrases in the releases) -Attempts to use media outlets and NGOs to influence public opinion -Excessive elitist tone in the statements - No reference to democracy and rule of law
Işık Koşaner	2010-2011 Strained Harmony	13	-Attempts to explain legal proceedings TAF personal involved in. -No counter-attacks and defensive mood in the releases -The first emphasis on democracy and TAF's submission to the democratic norms
Necdet Özel	2011-2014 Delicate Harmony	83	-Attempts to explain the terror attacks -Polite and softening tone in the releases -More provision of information in the releases -The first emphasis on rule of law and the continuation of emphasis on democracy -No counter-attacks and self-righteous attitude adopted in earlier releases
Total		283	

4.1.6. Internationalization: The driver of TAF's transformation as a security organization

Another good example indicating TAF's efforts to change and, as a security actor, to adapt to the new situations in the last decade is its increasing internalization efforts. It is evident that, in the last decade, TAF had deliberate attempts to increase interactions with other modern militaries of the world and sought to assume more active roles at the international scenes. Colonel M. being at the end of his three-year mission period in the NATO explains this situation:

The TAF have started to attach more importance to their abroad mission posts from the beginning of 2000s, and, in this frame, they increased the number of personnel cadres for positions abroad. Thanks to that, the visibility of the Turkish Army in NATO missions and exercises such as the ISAF in Afghanistan, as well as Kosovo and Bosnia missions in the Balkans, has increased perceptibly. In addition, I observe that the Turkish military follows the transformation process of NATO and takes important lessons from NATO's experience to be used for its own structural transformation.⁵⁵

Major M. who is currently serving as an adviser to one of those NATO's top commanders in Brussels, agrees with the observation of Lt. Colonel M. According to M., who carries out a crucial consultancy mission at NATO headquarters, one of the fundamental reasons underlying the increase of the number of NATO positions of TAF and the enforcement of its relations with NATO, is to closely follow NATO's transformation process and to use it for its own transformation process.⁵⁶

Major M. continues as follows:

NATO is really vital for us, because it is the only international institution in which we are equal arbiters. We cannot determine the priorities of NATO, but we can block any issue we wish. This is the political part. To me, the military part seems more important. Since NATO is an alliance, it is not a

⁵⁵ From interview with Colonel M. conducted in İstanbul on May 31, 2015.

⁵⁶ From interview of Major M. via e-mail conducted on April 17-19 2015.

one-to-one fitting system for a country in terms of TTP (tactics, techniques, procedures) but there is much that can be transferred. Most basically, NATO has also an audit and evaluation system, but it does that in accordance with the manuals of force standards. We have lots of instruction documents. In this respect, there are things we are trying to copy from NATO units and military branches and paste to our own procedures within TAF. The job has also a balance section. What is that? In short, everything should not be NATO. We have geopolitical realities, obligations, and opportunities. Other alternatives should always be ready in our hand. The common production of 10 countries called Smart Defense is a good thing, but we must have capacity at the national level. We may not be using that immediately because of prioritizing economic considerations, but we have to have that capacity. At least, we have to have such a long-term plan.

Colonel F. emphasizes that the most important thing his commanders wanted him to do was to closely study how NATO actualized the transformation process as a security actor and continues as follows:

I am one of the people who believes that the experience with NATO will contribute a lot to TAF in the transformation issue. From this point of view, the methods NATO applies in the institutional transformation and the lessons learned will be very beneficial for the transformation of TAF as well.⁵⁷

It is possible to say that NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey (NRDC-T), TAF's corps allocated to NATO, undertakes the motor role for the transport of the institutional transformation experience of NATO to TAF. A general says:

One of the most important issues I had concentrated on during my post at this corps was to closely observe the institutional transformation of NATO as a security actor in line with the changing security environment and menaces, and to try to nationalize that experience. Within this scope, we have organized many courses, workshops, seminars and conferences. For example, in my opinion, the "Hybrid Warfare" concept NATO is trying to develop, in fact, fits the Turkey's security environment. Therefore, I think that NATO will contribute a lot to us and so it should be followed closely.⁵⁸

Captain Y., who is working in the unit related with the abroad mission at the TGS, states:

TGS has increased its positions abroad by 30% between the 2005 and 2015. There is a great increase in the young rank officers going to the 6-month long temporary missions at a lot of international settings primarily

⁵⁷ From interview of Colonel F. via telephone conducted in January 2015.

⁵⁸ From interview of the general conducted in İstanbul on May 21, 2015.

Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. NCOs abroad were also increased. TAF ensured this increase by both increasing NATO cadres allocated for TAF and also the military attaché and other international observatory mission positions. I think that TAF's increasing their visibility in the international environment is a conscious policy. Because TAF recognized the rapid change of the security environment both in Turkey and also in the world, and attempted to adapt to this change by trying to gain expertise through these missions.⁵⁹

4.1.6.1. TAF's graduate-level education abroad

TAF's process of becoming international is not limited to NATO posts. In the last decade, TAF has sent nearly 300 officers abroad for post-graduate level education to primarily the US and other western countries.

In comparison with the number in the years between 1990 and 2000, it becomes necessary to underline that the number in the period between 2010 and 2015 is nearly the 5 times above the number of the previous period. For example, TAF started sending successful lieutenants from the war academies to privileged western universities for joint PhD educations for the first time in 2010. At the moment, nearly 60 lieutenants are continuing their joint PhD educations in the US within the frame of this program. Major H., a PhD candidate in the US, indicates:

The number of TAF sent to the prestigious universities abroad for post-graduate education has started increasing since 2010. I consider the main reason for that as the need for qualified experts especially in the General Staff and the Force Command headquarters providing scholarly insights for decision making processes and for the effort to increase the quality of the military education.⁶⁰

A captain who received his master's education on operational research at US's Naval Postgraduate School (NPS/ Monterey/CA) and obtaining his PhD at the Bilkent University, asserts:

The TAF is aware of the need for academic personnel both for scholarly decision making support and also for the increase in the quality of education

⁵⁹ From interview of Captain Y. conducted in Ankara on December 13, 2014.

⁶⁰ From interview of Major H. via e-mail conducted on April 17, 2015.

at the military education institutions. Therefore, they attach importance to graduate-level education. But, the TAF is not yet at required level in terms of intellectual capital, particularly at the decision makers level. In my opinion this situation, in turn, is the greatest obstacle to TAF's transformation. Especially the number of qualified personnel who can be employed is a minute amount. Every qualified personnel is planning to leave TAF in a way, this or another.

Major M., who received a master's degree in the US on security studies agrees with Captain B, underlines the following points:

Even though TAF increases the number of personnel they send abroad for academic education, I still think that there are structural obstacles in front of their transformation towards an intellectual Army. Probably, the most primary obstacle of those is, in turn, the resistance of TAF generals regarding this issue. For generals, scientific support for the decisions they make is yet a new concept. Hence, the top-level decision makers in TAF are very reluctant to use the intellectual expertise which has started to accumulate in TAF at the post-graduate level. In this situation, the intellectual energy that TAF tries to develop with several altruisms flows out in streams like the water, a very small portion of that energy can be used for the benefit of the institution.⁶¹

General T. explains why TAF's generals, the one sitting at one of the most decision maker posts at the moment, are not holding with the scientific decision making support with the following words:

This reluctance is somehow related to institutional culture and the codes of the profession for being a general. Most of the generals and especially the ones in the land forces underestimate scientific decision making support before issuing an executive order, that is, a decision. In my opinion, this reluctance has two reasons: the first is that the generals consider referring to the scientific decision support as a weakness since they over-relate the administration of an order with their own personalities, and the other is their distant and, to some extent, undermining attitude to scientific support for decision making which stemmed from their occupational backgrounds.

4.2.The TAF as a Changing Social Institution

4.2.1.The empowerment of gender-friendly policies in TAF

One of the most obvious examples showing that TAF has changed over the last fifteen years as a social institution was the rise in the number of female personnel and the adoption of more gender-friendly policies by TAF on recent years.

⁶¹ From the interview conducted on June 12, 2015 in Ankara.

First, TAF made officer cadres available for females by accepting young girls into its war academies in 1992, and staff colleges in early 2000s, and the first female graduates have begun to work in all three forces of the military since 1996. According to TGS's data, as of November 2014, there are 1,350 female officers in the TAF that is 3.3% of the total number of officers.⁶² TGS's objective is to increase this ratio to 5% by 2017.⁶³ TAF, for instance, currently employs 96 female colonels, 140 female Lt.colonels and 360 majors. Besides, the military started to recruit female non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in 2012. Contractual recruitments of female NCOs largely began in the posts of the Gendarmerie Command;⁶⁴ then, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force commands have initiated these recruitments as well. The TGS wants to further increase the number of female NCOs that today stands at 843 (0.9%). The goal is also to increase this ratio to 5% by 2018, meaning the employment of an additional 4,000 female NCOs. To achieve this aim, the military has been trying to hold more female-friendly recruitment and personnel policies.

E.O., a female producer working in the media-communication department of the TGS for fifteen years, relates the newly emerged vigorous policies about female staff pursued by the military to rising initial recruitments and the change in their institutional culture.⁶⁵ E.O. continues:

I have been working at the General Staff for about 15 years. Especially for this decade, there is a considerable rise in the number of female personnel working at this highest of headquarters. Particularly in the areas in which female presence is actually crucial, the number of female personnel has almost become the same with male personnel.⁶⁶

⁶² From the interview of Captain Y. conducted in January 2015.

⁶³ From the interview of Captain Y. conducted in January 2015.

⁶⁴ For more information, please see <http://ilan.memurlar.net/ilan/27292> (accessed December 13, 2014).

⁶⁵ From the interview conducted in November 2014 in Ankara.

⁶⁶ From the interview conducted in November 2014 in Ankara.

In 2014, the documentary "Light of Hope" directed by her was selected for the Jury's Award at the 24th International Defense Film Festival in Rome (*Sabah*, "Savunma film festivalinden..."). The documentary was about Şenay Haydar, Turkey's first female Gendarmerie commander and senior NCO sergeant, against the backdrop of gender discrimination and violence against women in the small Anatolian town of Mesudiye/Ordu (Gürcan, 2014). She places particular emphasis on the fact that General Necdet Özel, the then-Chief of the TGS, demanded, that Şenay Haydar's story about the prevention of violence against women to be shot as a documentary. The idea was widely developed in the TGS.

Haydar worked meticulously with local officials and families. She has been credited for eradicating violence against women among the 40,000 residents of Mesudiye. During the interview, E.O. stressed that the high command has been much overwhelmed with Haydar's accomplishments in a small Anatolian town where traditional norms have prevailed.

NCO Şenay's success, as much as this is due to [her own accomplishments], is also the success of the commanders who have believed in her. Appointing a female NCO as a representative of law and order to a town with 40,000 residents is truly a revolution for the Turkish military (Gürcan, 2014e).

Over the last five years, there have been wide-ranging changes in the personnel policy of the TAF with the increased number of female officers and NCOs and, as was the case with Haydar, in assigning female personnel to active field positions instead of just to administrative positions at headquarters.

In the interview, Şenay Haydar says the following:

I always wanted to be a field commander who makes decisions, instead of working at a desk. I was encouraged by the Gendarmerie General

Command. When the results [of my employment] turned out to be positive, scores of female officers and NCOs followed in my footsteps.⁶⁷

The deputy commander of the Gendarmerie School in Beytepe/Ankara notes that, in October alone, 67 female NCOs have been assigned to Gendarmerie Command field posts after completing basic training; another 90 female NCOs and 30 officers will follow.⁶⁸ Captain Hülya Ercan, an teacher of the UH-60 Sikorsky helicopter at Ankara's Gendarmerie Aviation School, is the first female Gendarmerie pilot in Turkey. She states:

My husband is a captain. I raised my daughters Bensus and Beren without giving up my profession. I actually flew until the third month of my pregnancy with my younger daughter. There are both difficult and good sides of being a woman at TAF. But I carry out a duty as an operational helicopter pilot, and my commanders absolutely trust me, regardless of my sex. Previously, female officers were not assigned to operational duties like piloting. However, this common sense has recently changed, and now you can see female officers at any degree and any place of TAF.⁶⁹

Female colonels usually work at headquarters while majors are generally unit commanders. Staff Major B. is the commander of the biggest transport fleet of the Air Force Command in Ankara and is also the first female fleet commander. There is an apparent increase of Turkish female staff officers in vital posts of the headquarters in the TAF and NATO. For example, naval staff officer Major Y. is Turkey's current naval attaché in London. Within six years or seven, she may well become the first female admiral of the country. In an email, she states that she wants to return home after excelling in her current position, and she wants to command a frigate before becoming an admiral (Gürcan, 2014f).

⁶⁷ From the telephone interview conducted in December 5, 2014 in Ankara.

⁶⁸ From the interview conducted in November 30, 2014 in Ankara.

⁶⁹ From the interview conducted in November 28, 2014 in Ankara.

A colonel from the personnel department of the TGS has answered the question of what is behind the Turkish military's decision to increase the number of female officers and NCOs with the following remarks:

There are two practical reasons and one ideological one. The first practical reason is the relative reduction in the number of personnel called up for compulsory military service; as the Turkish military is moving toward becoming a professional entity, increasing the number of females in the Army makes up for this loss in manpower. The second practical reason is a need for female personnel because of a change in security issues the Turkish military is dealing with, notably, the shift from rural to urban areas of the PKK violence in the southeast of Turkey. In addition, there is a need for female personnel in international missions that the Turkish Armed Forces are undertaking in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, among others. To have ranking female officers provides significant advantages in communicating with the local population, especially with women, and carrying out civil-military cooperation projects effectively in the health care and education sectors. Thus, the Turkish Army is determined to establish more effective links with local populations in low-intensity conflict areas and peace support missions. The ideological reason for increasing the number of females in the Turkish military is that the latter has always been the leading cause of modernization and westernization of the Republic. The military sees itself as a pioneer in all transformation processes in society, and more females and an increase in the visibility of their presence in the Turkish military deliver crucial messages — especially to the rural population — on equality for women and a more active participation of women in society.⁷⁰

The Turkish military wants the public to be aware of the rise of female power in the military positions. Thus, it brings female staff to the fore in most of the public information activities. For instance, the special news series entitled *Female Power at TAF*, which was prepared by Ahu Özyurt, a news editor at CNNTürk, aired in the summer of 2014 attracted quite amount of attention.⁷¹ Besides, the episodes of this series were serialized as news at the *Hürriyet* newspaper (“Zor görevlerin kadınları”).

⁷⁰ From the interview conducted in November 29, 2014 in Ankara.

⁷¹ Please see the link to watch a chapter of the series: <http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/tskda-kadin-gucu342> (accessed July 16, 2015).

4.2.2. NCOs vs. the High Command

The case of NCOs' struggle for their rights and status within the military is another example of how some civil society actors, who gained the power to create public pressure and to set agenda by taking the support of the civil society and the media, can influence TAF's decision making mechanisms. As of May 2015, 96,228 NCOs serve in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie Command, in addition to around 100,000 retired NCOs. When taking the serving and retired NCOs and their families into account, the number of NCOs and their families are about 800,000 people (Gürcan, 2014e). In the military, NCOs are intermediary leaders who serve as a bridge between conscripts and officers. Technical and maintenance personnel and logistics experts are all NCOs. NCOs like to describe themselves as follows: "Take the NCOs out, and the battalion will starve, planes won't fly, ships won't sail, and tanks will break down."

The tension between the High Command and NCOs first became public in 2012 and centered on two main issues: first, the personal rights of serving NCOs, their status in TAF, and claims that NCOs are discriminated against and treated unfairly; and second, complaints of low pensions among retired NCOs. In 2012, the public and the media began to notice that NCOs were engaged in unconventional protest actions unheard of in the Turkish military. The Turkish Retired Non-Commissioned Officers Association (TEMAD) organized protests and became the voice of NCOs. What did NCOs want? As noted above, serving NCOs point to status problems and call for an end to unfair treatment. For example, they are unhappy that their rank is displayed on their arms and not on their shoulders like officers, and that there are variations in campaign ribbons and badges. Furthermore, NCOs are critical of a lack of living quarters, and of tougher and longer working conditions with lower

compensation when compared with officers. Retired NCOs have financial complaints. When in service, an NCO is paid 1,600 US \$ monthly and, when retired, receives a 900 monthly US \$ pension. NCOs state that they still must work after retirement and that they struggle to make ends meet, even after toiling in state service for 30 years.

NCOs represented by TEMAD within the civil society engaged in unusual forms of protests, including a two-week fast against discrimination and injustice within the military. One retired NCO, for instance, walked 600 kilometers (372 miles) to protest injustice. NCOs wore black on certain days of the month, demonstrated in front of the parliament, and appeared on TV shows and news hours. Nobody expected Turkish soldiers to resort to such actions, but their protests worked and attracted media and public attention.

How did TAF react to these unexpected protests? The command's response underwent three distinct phases. This case is suitable for three-phase pattern, which can be summarized as the strategy of silence, the strategy of denial and counter-accusation, and the strategy of engagement and rehabilitation.

4.2.2.1. The first phase: Strategy of Silence

Founded in 1984, TEMAD⁷² acted on the views of TAF and remained a low-profile non-governmental organization for years. However, TEMAD began to draw attention of both the media and the public by means of unusual reactions and acts against personal rights problems of retired and serving NCOs, against their statute in TAF, and discrimination and maltreatment against them in TAF. By May 2014, there were about 72,000 serving NCOs and around 100,000 retired ones as members of TEMAD. One can assert that, when considered together with their families, NCOs

⁷² For more information, please see the official website of TEMAD: www.temad.org

are of a well-organized community consisting of approximately 800,000 people. TAF first ignored these reactions and acts about rights of retired and serving NCOs and about their statute in TAF, which drew the attention of the public and the media. Perhaps, the most interesting one of these actions was an almost two-week death fast by Ahmet Keser, TEMAD Chairperson, and the executive board members with the purpose of a stand against discrimination and injustice against NCOs (*OdaTv*, “Ölüm orucuna başlayacaklar”). TAF did not deal with the executives of the TEMAD, which began to draw attention with both its actions and its statements, and silently watched the developments unfold. However, in addition to frequent news series about NCOs at written and visual press, continuous articles written by Umut Talu from *Habertürk*, Tunca Bengin from *Milliyet*, and Cüneyt Özdemir from the *Radikal*⁷³ raised awareness on the subject, and these made it a significant current issue of the agenda.

It is clearly observed that TAF preferred not to deal with and to ignore the discussions about the personal rights and statute of retired and serving NCOs and to keep still about claims and comments on themselves until 2012.

4.2.2.2.The second phase: denial and counter-accusation

The issue of retired and serving NCOs’ personal rights and statute at TAF became current and hot for the public agenda from 2012 onwards. The TAF felt obliged to do something on this issue because of the discussions and claims gradually arousing the attention of the public and the media. It primarily issued the written press statement about the issue which was accepted as a “memorandum” by TEMAD members:

It is regretfully watched that the members of the Association of the Retired Non-Commissioned Officers of Turkey has misinformed the public by making idle statements about our non-commissioned officers, which

⁷³ Please see for the archive of the news and journal articles published about NCO’s in TAF: <http://www.temad.org/basin.php?k=4> (accessed July 24, 2014).

constitute a highly significant force of the Turkish Armed Forces, at certain media organs, and that they have acted outside of the limits of the aim and the acting area of the association so as to provoke our serving staff.

The division of tasks in charge of the statute law is constructed with such statutes as officer, non-commissioned officer, civil servant, specialist gendarme, master sergeant, contractual private soldier, petty officer, and private. All the responsibilities and authorities are accordingly distributed. According to the required criteria, a demand on one of these statutes is a person's own preference. Similar structures are also available at official and private institutions and organizations. In this respect, it is against the nature of military and civil institutions and organizations to describe some rights and authorities given to personnel according to their incomparable statutes, duties and responsibilities as inequality or injustice.

In this statement, TAF emphasized that TEMAD attempted to destruct the hierarchical order, the chain of command and the discipline in TAF, and provoked serving NCOs to disobey their commanders; therefore, they vehemently condemned these activities, which could be defined as "treachery." They pointed out that being an NCO was one's personal choice as their staff knew the statutes since the very beginning. In short, one accepts the statute of an NCO at the starting point when that person voluntarily commences his/her occupation by knowing what an NCO means in TAF. Then, the problem is not the issue of statutes of NCOs at TAF, but the issue of damaging the discipline and the chain of command in TAF by the ones who have voluntarily preferred to be an NCO. This ontological approach of TAF that "there is not a problem of NCO rights and statutes, but the only problem is of breaking the hierarchy and the discipline in TAF by one's using his/her NCO status" continued for about 1.5 years between 2012 and 2013.

TAF kept emphasizing the same argument at the disavowals sent to newspaper columnists having written about NCO rights. For instance, in a disavowal sent to Tunca Bengin, it was underlined that there was not a problem of the personal rights of NCOs at TAF, but in the intentional commentaries of the malicious people informed the public and the media with some unrealistic claims so that they could

create the perception that there was a problem in TAF, and such news and commentaries aimed at TAF would not be beneficial to the state. In addition, some claims were reflected in the press that the General Staff barred the internet access to Umur Talu, who, as a *Habertürk* columnist, frequently wrote about problems experienced by NCOs and made them heard by recognizing them in the newspaper, in the domains open to TAF personnel (*Radikal*, “Askerden Umur Talu'ya sansür”).

While TAF’s communication strategy can be recapitulated as denial and counter-accusation, the struggle for NCOs’ personal rights whose lead was taken by TEMAD aroused a great deal of social media interest. On April 17, 2012, a Facebook group named “Bu Kadarına da Pes” (That’s Enough) reached 220,000 followers in a short period of time. Also, the “Astsubay” (NCO) hashtag on Twitter contained hundreds of thousands of messages.⁷⁴

In the meantime, retired NCOs from TEMAD held a number of meetings to draw attention to their problems, stating that they had not yet managed to attract enough public support for their cause. Retired NCOs issued strong complaints about their pensions, claiming that they were unfairly lower than those of the retired commissioned officers (*Today’s Zaman*, “Retired NCOs seek...”). Retired NCOs also supported their colleagues on active duty. Keser announced his association’s support of the protest, and said that it was a grassroots movement and that approximately 200,000 NCOs were organized through social media websites like Facebook and Twitter. Keser remarked that the NCOs were being subjected to unfair treatment and suffer from psychological and financial difficulties as a result (*Today’s Zaman*, “Active duty, retired NCOs...”).

⁷⁴ Please see: <https://twitter.com/hashtag/assubaylar?src=hash>

4.2.2.3. The third phase: strategy of engagement and rehabilitation

By the middle of 2013, TAF ended the second phase and got obliged to step back on this subject which gained a rising public awareness and had a great press visibility. Within this scope, they first contacted with the TEMAD. Its executive board members were invited to the General Staff to receive their opinions, and many structural reforms were made in TAF to enhance the personal rights and statutes of NCOs. The most important of these reforms was the foundation of the Office of the General Staff NCO and the Force NCO offices which started to perform in 2013.

This system which was actually founded in Air and Naval Forces in 2012 and was carried into effect in the most populated force, the Land Forces Command, about a year ago functions as such: NCOs are assigned as representatives of the Chief of the General Staff who work under the Force Commanders. For example, three non-commissioned officers in the Land Forces who are directly under the command of the Land Forces Commander regularly visit troops and have meetings with NCOs of these troops. These NCOs who listen to and learn their colleagues' problems and desires report these directly to the Land Forces Commander.

These "Ombudsman" NCOs, or master sergeants, visit every single troops they are attached to and arrange meetings with all the non-commissioned officers. The aim is to reach all the NCOs in Turkey. In these meetings, not only NCOs' complaints are received, but also their proposals. It also becomes possible for serving NCOs to communicate with these master sergeants, who provide their personal contact information to their colleagues in troops, to share their momentary grievances. These "concerned" NCOs of the General Staff and the forces have begun to find solutions to the problems they delivered to their force commanders. However, the solutions are still very limited since the majority of NCOs' problems are ones like

personal rights which can be sorted out with government decrees. Otherwise, they have already sorted out some issues with the initiative of their commanders at some troops (Gürcanlı, 2013).

A master sergeant NCO makes points about this matter:

The struggle of the NCOs serving in TAF for the enhancement of their statutes in the institution and their personal rights is actually important in terms of proving that the institutional culture of TAF can be changed by civil society taking the support of the public and the media. Just as in any modern world military, subordinates' struggle for legal rights is a tough experience due to the hierarchy and discipline at TAF. Legal struggles by especially inferior ranks are not regarded well in a hierarchical institution like a military. However, the Office of the General Staff NCO that I am in charge of at the moment is a good example showing that TAF and their command echelon can stretch and that things which seem unusual and impossible at first view can be institutionalized in line with the requirements. My duty is to deliver general problems and solution suggestions of all the NCOs serving at TAF to the Chief of the General Staff and to relay notifications of the command echelon to NCO fellows without any intermediary. That is my duty, to be like a bridge. I have meeting arrangements with the Chief of the General Staff every week, and I regularly visit all the troops at TAF every month and listen to problems of NCO fellows.⁷⁵

In terms of displaying the progress of TAF about NCOs, journalist Balçiçek İlter's interview with General Yaşar Güler, the Deputy Chief of TGS, on December 12, 2013 presents significant information. To Balçiçek İlter's question about whether or not the NCOs were correct in their demands, General Güler answers, "I can say neither they are right, nor they are not..." For İlter, General Güler understands the troubles of the NCOs and acknowledges them to be right. Yet, his following words spoken during an interview in December 2013 with Balçiçek İlter are also noteworthy:

Can a statute of an employee bringing tea in an office be equal to the statute of a general manager? Everything has a hierarchy, a gradation. Well, if someone misconducts his position in that hierarchy, we already spare no effort to do our best about that person like conducting an investigation. All

⁷⁵ From the interview which was conducted in May 21 2014 in Ankara.

investigations are conducted with an utmost detail and precision. It is not as in the old times, everyone is able to demand justice.

According to İlder, General Güler seems sincere at his statements although he emphasizes hierarchy and rigid organizational discipline in his words.

While NCOs are waiting for the enhancement of their personal rights, they have also demanded the names and signs of their ranks. They complain that the names and signs of their ranks are not much different from the ones of privates performing their military service. In this respect, rank models which can be carried just like officers' shoulder marks instead of upper arms (*Habertürk*, "TSK'da rütbe devrimi").

Interestingly enough, the military organized and hosted the International Senior NCOs' Symposium 2014 in June of the same year in İstanbul and İzmir. For NCOs in TAF, organizing such an activity academically for the first time had an enormous importance. This symposium was considered to contribute a lot to increasing efficiency of NCOs around the world.⁷⁶ Like this international symposium, the NCOs Seminar was organized in the headquarters of the General Staff with the attendance of senior NCOs serving in the land, Navy, Air Forces, the Gendarmerie, and the coast guard in February 2014. In the seminar, the personnel specialized in their fields informed the attendees as given in the program below. The attendant personnel was provided a program by their related force so that they were accepted by their respective generals within the scope of this program. The seminar was regarded profoundly beneficial in terms of spreading the culture of joint-ness, providing occupational development, strengthening the communication among the forces and interactive consultation, and it was concluded with the closing remarks of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (*Hürriyet*, "TAK'dan astsubay semineri..."). The final report of the seminar was then presented to General Necdet Özel, the Chief of the General Staff (*İnternetHaber*, "Genelkurmay Karargahı'nda Bir İlk!").

⁷⁶ Please see the following link for the advertisement <http://www.hvkk.tsk.tr/EN/IcerikDetay.aspx?ID=171> (accessed July 28, 2014)

4.2.3. Civilian activists vs. the High Command on allegations about violations of soldiers' rights

Another case indicating that TAF is able to change their strategic preferences and attitudes in the face of civil society movements supported by the public and the media is the attitudinal change TAF has gone through in the matter of soldier suicides and violation of soldier rights since 2012.

First, it is noteworthy to acknowledge one significant item of the public agenda in the period of October-November-December 2011 (*Today's Zaman*, "Soldier tortured in same..."). To state briefly, Uğur Kantar, a soldier serving in the northern Cyprus, received imprisonment in a room as a result of a disciplinary punishment, and went into a coma due to maltreatment of soldiers in charge during his imprisonment.⁷⁷ After 80 days, he passed away at the military hospital in Ankara on October 12, 2011. This occasion brought the claims of maltreatment in the military before the media and the public.

EU 2013 Turkey Progress Report notes:

However, instances of ill treatment of conscripts have been continued to be reported and efforts are needed to address this issue. The Human Rights Inquiry Committee of the Parliament opened a monitoring dossier on ill-treatment during military service.⁷⁸

In the quarterly media analysis report for the period of October-November-December 2011 prepared by the Office of Public Information of the General Staff in January 2012, the issue of violation of soldier rights took place at the top of the list about issues affecting the media visibility of TAF most negatively. General Necdet

⁷⁷ Soldier Uğur Kantar had been sentenced to seven days in the "discipline dormitory" known as "disko" during his compulsory military service in Northern Cyprus. Uğur Kantar went into a coma due to the torture inflicted on him and he was hospitalized to the military hospital GATA in Ankara Province on 25 July 2011.

⁷⁸ European Union, Turkey 2013 Progress Report, October 16, 2013. Please see for the full report: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/tr_rapport_2013_en.pdf (accessed December 12, 2014).

Özel, Chief of the General Staff, instructed the subject to be dealt with in detail; therefore, a working group was gathered in coordination with the Personnel Division of the General Staff.

The author who joined the first coordinate meeting of this working group in January 2012 as the representative of the Public Information observed that the Personnel Directorate (J1) did not attach importance to the issue and reported this observation in written to the deputy Chief of the General Staff. Then, the J1 restarted its enhancement works with the command of the Chief of the General Staff.

In April 2012, the Soldier Rights Platform,⁷⁹ a civil society platform based in İstanbul, prepared a report entitled “Violation of Soldier Rights during Conscription” on the grounds of applications made on the website www.askerhaklari.com in a year between April 2011 and April 2012. According to this report, 432 applications were made at the website in a year; the most common issues are “suffering an affront” and “exposure to physical violence.” As also stated in the report, 32 soldiers committed suicide in the recent year.⁸⁰

On the continuation of the discussions about the violation of soldier rights and the soldier suicides as an agenda item, the working group was extended to include legal experts from the Judicial Advisory of the General Staff and specialist scholars from the Department of War Psychiatry of the GATA (Gülhane Military Medical Academy). Thus, a further inclusive transformation period had begun. In this regard, military discipline rooms known as “disko”⁸¹ in the public were removed, and all the offences, even committed during a conscription, were started to

⁷⁹ Please see for the official website of the platform: <http://www.askerhaklari.com> (accessed July 19, 2015).

⁸⁰ Please see: <http://www.askerhaklari.com/genel/bin-100-asker-ihthar-etti>

⁸¹ Disko is the abbreviation of Disciplinary Dorm (DISiplin KOğuşu) in Turkish.

be brought to justice and court (*Today's Zaman*, "Military to abolish..."). The service of Psychological Counseling and Guidance was enabled widespread, a psychological support system named "*Can Dost*"⁸² was established, and a complaint line through which any military personnel or their family could directly connect to the General Staff in order to convey their problems was activated (Bila, 2013).

In the meantime, Ayhan Aslan and Fırat Keser, two Turkish soldiers serving as military guards in northern Cyprus at the time of Kantar's death, were sentenced to life imprisonment on July 8 by the Kyrenia Military Court, a Turkish military court in Cyprus (*Hürriyet Daily News*, "Two Turkish Army..."). Such a severe penalty is a first, even for TAF (*Hürriyet Daily News*, "Rights violations in..."). However, several news stories and columns continued to be published throughout 2012 (Lale, 2012).

Between 2012-2014, the issues of the violation of soldier rights and soldier suicides preserved its status in the agenda of the public. On this issue, Major T. states the following:

In our quarterly analyses between the years 2012 and 2014, the category of the violation of soldier rights and the soldier suicides remained among top three in the rank of negative subjects about TAF available in the media. News and columns written in the period of October-November-December of 2012 especially constituted almost 60% of the negative visibility of TAF. It is obvious that the public image of TAF was extensively worn out in recent times due to this issue. We, as communication professionals, always explained the Personnel Division the importance of this issue since the late 2011. They were firstly reluctant to deal with it; however, General Necdet Özel, the Chief of the General Staff, and General Hulusi Akar, the Deputy Chief, extensively thought on this and commenced a variety of new projects for the solutions. I can easily say that the public and media pressures on this topic had a major part in enabling the issue first to be perceived as a problem area in TAF and then enforced TAF to feel requisite to take action for the solution.⁸³

⁸² "*Can Dost*" is a kind of buddy system in which the soldier with a problem is matched with another soldier who is expected to closely monitor his buddy's behaviors.

⁸³ From the interview conducted in Ankara on January 21, 2015.

4.2.4.High Command versus the headscarf: and the winner is the headscarf

The headscarf had long been a symbol of power struggle in Turkey between secular elites labeled as the “center” and a conservative segment labeled as the “periphery” (Göle, 1991). The recent easing of this struggle and the trend toward normalization is attributed mainly to the Turkish military, which still are the most noticeable representatives of the center and softened their firm stance against headscarves. In a decision dated March 20, 2015 by the High Military Court, TAF canceled their rigid practice of prohibiting first-degree relatives (spouse, children, and parents) of the military personnel from entering military buildings, living quarters, military clubs, and social facilities wearing headscarves.

The Higher Military Court's ruling concerns hundreds of thousands of female relatives of the military personnel. Infantry NCO Hakan Kayabaşı charged the Ministry of National Defense after refusing his application for a military ID card allowing his wife to enter military housing because she wore a headscarf in her photo on the application form. In its defense, the Ministry surprised everyone by maintaining the ban on headscarves and asking that case be dismissed. But the court found Kayabaşı's argument justified and the ban to be “against human rights and equality,” and ended the practice of denying ID cards to female relatives whose photographs contained headscarves.

Kayabaşı's lawyer, Mehmet Erkan Akkuş, emphasized the ruling will set a precedent, telling the daily *Hürriyet*, "With this ruling, from now on relatives of TAF personnel with headscarves will not have any problems entering military clubs, social facilities, and military premises. This important decision concerns about 1 million people." With this ruling, TAF has untangled itself from an issue that

seriously lowered its prestige with the public and what were seen as uncompromising and unfair practices that at times violated human rights and the law.

One should note that, in Turkey where all male citizens must serve 12 months in the armed forces, the military is an important component of social life. For years, the public criticized severely about the ban on conservative Turkish mothers attending their sons' important oath-taking ceremonies in the military bases. The mothers, wives, or sisters of tens of thousands of soldiers could not see their sons, husbands, or brothers being sworn in as a soldier because of the inflexible military rule posted at entrances of military areas: "No entry with headscarves.

The AKP has been adept at making political ammunition of the strict rule of TAF since the party was voted into power 2002. For example, in 2007, General Aslan Güner, the then-Deputy Chief of the General Staff, walked out of the protocol line-up while welcoming President Abdullah Gül at the airport to avoid shaking the hand of his wife Hayrünnisa Gül, who wore a headscarf. The incident made headlines. In 2010 Emine Erdoğan, the wife of then-Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, went to the GATA Hospital in Ankara to visit a patient and was denied entry because she wore a headscarf, which became another major scandal in the media.

In yet another striking example of the Turkish military's inflexible hardline attitude to the headscarf, all the officers at the 29th October Republic Day reception in 2010 walked out in protest when guests with headscarves arrived. It was later understood the mass walkout was an order from the high command that had been interpreted as "walk out when you see a headscarf."

The inconsistencies in the military's criteria for headwear at times led to humorous consequences. For example, in the attire rules for the entry of civilians to military premises, the rule that read "If a woman who comes to a military facility

agrees to knot her headscarf under her jaw, she will be allowed entry” became the subject of sarcastic jokes that TGS categorized traditional headscarves as not threatening to national security and conservative headscarves as threatening to national security. Also, this ban applied to Turkish citizens without exception but not to foreign military personnel and their relatives, which was seen as ridiculous.

What caused the Turkish military's ironclad attitude toward headscarves? In an interview, Zeki Sarıgil, an associate professor at Bilkent University, known for his studies on military-society issues, told: "The Turkish military is truly sensitive to uncompromising secularism of absolute separation of what is religious and what belongs to the state."⁸⁴ Sarıgil stated that the Turkish military always saw itself as the guardian of uncompromising secularism and couldn't have handled the headscarf issue otherwise. He added: "We can say that we are undergoing an important transformation in civilian-military relations and also in TAF's own organizational culture. One aspect of this change is the softening of TAF's approach to secularism and religious freedoms."

Of course, one should not deny the role of the gradual moderation over the headscarf issue in the country as a whole. Sarıgil notes:

The military as a part of this society feels the need to keep in step with the normalization in society. To preserve its legitimacy, an institution tries to be in harmony with its environment. Until now, academics like myself have focused on the changes in civilian-military relations. Certainly these changes have affected the internal dynamics, opinions, values and tendencies of the military. But there is not much academic study of this headaddress change in TAF, which still remains a black box.⁸⁵

Here another significant development in the easing of the military rules on appearances ought to be mentioned. In a decision by the high command dated March

⁸⁴ The interviews were conducted in Ankara with Zeki Sarıgil at Bilkent University on November 12, 2014.

⁸⁵ The interviews were conducted in Ankara with Zeki Sarıgil at Bilkent University on November 12, 2014.

30, 2015, bearded men can now enter military clubs and social facilities. In sum, it is likely to say that the military is undergoing changes parallel to the changes in society. One should note that, starting with the institutional changes after the softening of headscarf bans in public domains such as parliamentary (*Aljazeera*, “Turkish women MPs...”), university campuses (*Daily Sabah*, “Turkey lifts controversial...”), hospitals, schools (Akyol, 2013), and courts (*The Express Tribune*, “Headscarf-wearing judge...”), the headscarf issue no longer at the center of contentious politics (Cindioğlu, 2011). Then one would suggest that such a major change in civilian domain would help one contextualize the shifting attitude of the military towards headscarf better.

4.3. Officership as a changing profession

In this section, the general assessments in the interviews conducted about the changes in the profession of officership will first be given. Then, in turn, the characteristics of every rank, starting from general down to the lieutenant, will be shared based on the interviews conducted with TAF personnel of that rank.

In the interview, Colonel Z.,⁸⁶ who is a 1974 graduate of the Staff College starts his words by saying “At our times, officership was seen as chivalry,” and continues as follows:

The officer style had never changed between the years 1970 and 1990. The officers of this period were the very soldiers who were deeply faithful to the Turkish military, disciplined, sacrificed their selves and their families for the military, and performed every order in obedience without questioning. Disobedience to the order of the commander and questioning the order were deemed to be the greatest shame. It cannot be conceived otherwise in the Turkish military, everybody respected his superiors and esteemed for them. But after 90s, first of all, the education in the Staff College was spoiled. Of course, when the terrorism also began, the officers of the new period got away from the chivalry. The millennium lieutenants of the 2000s are, in turn, much more individualistic. They are questioning every order and they

⁸⁶ The interview was conducted in Akçay/Balıkesir Military Resort on August 2, 2014.

are chasing how they can escape [from orders], or how they can slack. The minds of those young officers do not work like ours.⁸⁷

When he was asked to say the three words he remembered when he heard the word “officer,” Z. said “motherland, honor, and duty.” When he was asked to elaborate on those concepts, he stated that he understood unitary and national state from the concept of “motherland,” and he perceived the fundamental concept of officership and being a soldier when honor was spoken of; and when duty was spoken of, he emphasized that TAF came even before his personal interests and his family in all his life.

A.,⁸⁸ a lieutenant of one year yet, emphasizes that he perceives officership as a profession. A., who is not a graduate of war academy and is called “contractor officer”, states that he is a graduate of the Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, İstanbul University. He prepared for the public teacher acceptance exams for almost 2 years called KPSS (Public Personnel Selection Examination), but could not succeed in the exam and steered for the officership as the last remedy. He emphasizes with sorrow that he is worried a little bit about his becoming an infantry lieutenant and he wants to move one of the branches of artillery or air defense classes since he is a graduate of department of mathematics; however, this is not possible.

A. continues his statement as follows:

In fact, I am not that much worried about my being an infantry lieutenant. I am aware that a tough professional life awaits me and I will be stationed in three or four years of periods. Bu I think the career opportunities offered by TAF are not offered by any other state institution. I started attending the English course even at this stage. My aim is to take my English to a good level and to go abroad for a course or a mission.

When he was asked to say three words he remembers when he hears the word “officer” his answer was “profession, career opportunities and commitment.” A.

⁸⁷ The interview was conducted in Akçay/Balıkesir Military Resort on August 2, 2014.

⁸⁸ The interview was conducted in Infantry School/Tuzla/İstanbul on November 5, 2014.

states that he preferred officership himself although he could work at other jobs and, therefore, he perceives it as a profession. Again, he emphasizes that the most important factor for his preference to be an officer was the career opportunities TAF offer, and he underlines that it is compulsory to serve with commitment in order to reach his goals.

As it can be seen in the examples above, the perceptions of officership of retired Colonel Z. who stepped into the life of being a soldier with his family's preferences at the age of 13 and infantry school graduate, lieutenant A. who could not find a job though he searched for other jobs for two years after graduation and therefore steered for officership are apparently different.

According to Major N.,⁸⁹ who has been a teacher at the Kuleli Military High School and the Land War Academy for 15 years, the perception about the profession of officership started to change after especially the 2000s. Until 20 years ago from now, although the quality of education was much better in the military schools compared to its civilian counterparts, the quality of education in the civilian schools developed rapidly beginning from the 2000s and overran the quality of education in the military schools. Major N. puts attention to the fact that parallel to the increasing diversity of education, development of the private sector, increase in the opportunities abroad, increase in the possibilities of scholarship and education support funding the education opportunities have rapidly been improving in the civilian life and states that the successful youngsters and their families are now going ahead for the education opportunities in the civilian life and if no result comes out of those they go for the officership which they perceive as a "guaranteed public profession."

⁸⁹ The interview was conducted in Ankara on November 14, 2014.

I think that the military education system fell behind the civilian between the years 2000 and 2014. Those 15 years slipped away from our hands. I remember, in the year 2000 a delegation from the Robert College in İstanbul visited the Kuleli Military High School to see the school's internal computer network system which they wondered a lot. Now we are very behind in education at the high school and undergraduate levels. Having such a situation, the successful children first try the opportunities in the civilian life and go ahead for the officership as the last remedy. Before 2000s, the Army Academy based in Ankara was accepting students up to the 30,000th in the University Entrance Exam, but as of 2014, the academy accepted up to 150,000th student, a fact showing the decreasing quality of the students in the war academies. Before 2000, there were youngsters among the ones taking the university entrance examination who gave up medical faculties, engineering faculties and law faculties of prestigious universities in Turkey although they were accepted to the War Academies, nowadays the students who are accepted to faculties of arts and sciences or faculties of education of average universities are coming to the War Academies. I know many students coming to the war academies although they were in the top 1000 rank between the years 1994 and 2000. But now, we are delighted if a student preferring the War Academies is in top 100,000.

A general ⁹⁰ also agrees with Major N.'s opinions. General says: "The most important thing distinguishing between us, the old officers, and the youngsters is the time management." He elaborates on this matter as follows:

We, old officers, are too busy with the daily tasks such an extent that we cannot find the opportunity to educate ourselves and learn new things. Tasks never end. Your own career and family are always in the second priority, that is, for 24 hours and 7 days you are busy with your job. Therefore, you never have time to update yourself. But young officers of this time are not the same. They are much more skilled than us in terms of time management. They can afford time especially from their jobs and can allocate time for themselves and their personal development. They put effort for that. I witness lots of young officers who have hobbies, a pursuit or who are interested in fields other than the officership. Frankly, I like this situation also.

According to Captain Y. working at the General Staff headquarters, especially at the process starting with the conduct of mission of the contracted officers within TAF, the increased diversity of the officer resources is the most important reason for the change of officer profile. Captain Y. continues as follows:

⁹⁰ The interview was conducted in İstanbul on March 30, 2015.

Among the officer corps, in terms of their origin, there were two types of officer in TAF a decade ago; that is, military high school/war academy graduates and civilian high school/war academy graduates. Currently, however, there are seven types of officers in terms of their origin in TAF; that is, military high school/war academy graduates, civilian high school/war academy graduates, civilian university graduates (contracted officers), foreign war academy graduates (the US, South Korea), officers with NCO background, officers with contracted specialist background. One should also note that the ratio of war academy graduates, the category which constitute the backbone of the officer corps, has drastically decreased from 90% to 60% within the last five years. It is worth mentioning that, from 2004 onwards, there has been a sharp rise in the ratios of contracted officers and NCO-background officers in the cadres. This heterogeneity in the origins inevitably comes up with varying attitudes and opinions when interpreting social realities, yet TAF have been trying hard to standardize young officers through military education and other means. To affirm this, let me tell that. Ten years ago, eight years were needed (four years for military high school and four years for military academy) to be appointed as a lieutenant and nearly 80% of all lieutenants were spending eight years in military schools. At the moment, however, for a civilian university graduate, it takes on 10 months to commence his service as a lieutenant in the Turkish military. And now, the level of eight-year military school graduates among the total population of the lieutenants in the Turkish military has dropped to 40%. The 60% comes from different origins.⁹¹

4.3.1. Generalship as a profession

As of May 2014, 343 generals were serving in TAF. The issues about the profession of generalship elicited from the statements of eight generals (four from the Army, one from the Gendarmerie, one from the Air Force, and one from the Navy) interviewed for this thesis are below.

In the Turkish military, on average, the position of brigadier generalship is between the ages of 48 and 52, major generalship is between 52 and 55, lt. generalship is between 55 and 59, four-star generalship is between 59 and 62, and force commandship is between 65 and 67. It is important to note that there is a difference of 18 years between brigadier general and a four-star general, even though both are generals. In this sense, one may talk about generational differences among

⁹¹ From interview with Captain Y. conducted in Ankara on May 23, 2015.

Turkish generals. Among those who are all graduates of the War Academy, 10% (about 35) have master's degrees and about 5% have doctorate degrees. As regarding the status of their parents,

- About 15-20%: are sons of primary school graduates (sons of low degree public servant, workers, and farmers),
- 50-60%: are sons of secondary school – high school graduates (low-degree public servants and tradesmen),
 - 10% are sons of bureaucrats, academicians, and great tradesmen,
 - 10%: are sons of soldiers (officers and sergeants).

General M. from Ankara emphasizes the following point about the histories of families of the generals:

I can say that only one-fifth of the families of the generals are from the urban, educated, and intellectual class. Most of the generals are poor fellow Anatolian children coming from villages. In this respect, generalship is a somehow a process of becoming elite.

A general defines generalship not as a “profession” but as “a lifestyle in which everything is exaggerated” and continues:

Learning is too weak after becoming a general. A general cannot admit his mistake even if he has made a mistake since if he does, his honor of being a commander, which is united with his personality, will be hurt and he cannot bear it. He tries not to have a critical attitude in his relations with his superiors. He does not want to be seen as opposing his commander when seen from outside. A general does not want a “rebellious inferior,” which would make him a permanent troublemaker, which he deems a source of problems. The characteristic of searching for mistakes is very dominant among generals, and he has become a general for that reason. Therefore, he is so unsympathetic to both his personnel and to his family. He is always thinks that everybody is wrong and he is right. He assumes and approves that it is the most essential part of his job to find and correct mistakes, which he always believes to exist.

Since being very hardworking is praised in his group, he has to be hardworking and seem to be busy all the time. Always being busy with something is the aim of life. Always being available when the commander calls, staying for extra work, going to his unit even on the weekends, the

message that “this herd belongs to me.” He is in the state of being busy with his unit as much as a shepherd cares about his herd. A general’s attachment to TAF is very strong, but the feeling that the unit he is ordering and commanding belongs to himself is stronger. He has no chance to educate himself and learn new things since he is very busy. He is busy with his job 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. He has never got time to educate and improve himself.

Nearly 80% of the wives of the generals are employed. Nearly 20% speak at least one foreign language (mostly English), but in the generalship foreign languages are forgotten in time (especially in the Army and Gendarmerie, as there is not a huge need for foreign languages for lots of positions). All of the generals interviewed expressed regret that they could not retain their foreign language skills that they had spent so much effort to acquire. However, in parallel to the increase in TAF’s missions abroad, the generals also stated in the interviews that foreign language has now become a very important criterion for appointments and promotions. Foreign language proficiency has become a compulsory preference due to more open international missions and more NATO positions. At least 60% of generals have been in a mission abroad for about 2 or 3 years (as an attaché or in a permanent mission), that is, in an international environment. In the interviews carried out, all interviewees emphasize that military status and prestige come into prominence in the generalship motivation and it is observed that none of them speaks of economic motivation.

General A., interviewed in Ankara, explains this situation as follows:

For a general, the single most important thing in life is his name and reputation in the institution. Generals know each other very closely without paying regard to force differences. In fact, think of a competition starting from the rank of major, which continues for more than 30 years. The professional careers of the generals are much more important than the other factors such as wife, children, and health. This gives a general both the feeling of being elected and the feeling of commitment. If you ask me who a general is, I would tell you “a committed and highly motivated person.” At the same time, this motivation creates an expectation for the next rank.

Owing to those, a general finds the energy in himself to strive for his job and his unit 24 hours a day and 7 days a week.

Generals working in the Army and the Gendarmerie have had internal security missions in counter-terrorism, whereas the duration of these missions are less in the Air Forces and does not exist in the Navy. Two generals interviewed in İstanbul, indicate that generals are more like doves, but others are more like hawks since they have not seen the region and do not know the public closely.

The generals, except one of them in the Air Force, perceive NATO positively and think that NATO increases TAF's power and effectiveness of war. A general from İstanbul, explains his opinions about NATO as follows:

NATO is the only place we come face-to-face with modern armies around the world. I consider NATO to be the most important anchor connecting us to the West and the western security system. In fact, I have observed that 90% of all generals perceive NATO positively. All of them have a deep understanding of what NATO adds to the Turkish military. Perhaps, 20% might oppose NATO for ideological reasons. But this stays only in the verbal realm, and he does not show his opposition in his behaviors.

General A. explains the effects of lawsuit processes such as *Balyoz* and *Ergenekon* on the profession of generalship:

TAF passed the democracy and sincerity test in the lawsuits involving soldiers. Almost 30% of the generals went to the prosecution office and testified in one way or another. Almost 20% were arrested, tens of them went to the prison. I think this process created much trauma and emotional breakdowns among generals. All the generals tasted the end of the impunity and what the law can do with a sour experience. Since then, the emphasis of law is the priority among generals. Especially in the political field, nobody takes the risk of stepping outside of legal bounds. Because now they know very well what will happen to them.

Moreover, in military lawsuits, we could not "play the victim" in any way; therefore, a great opportunity was lost. The best example is Başbuğ. He could not manage the process well. For this reason, we are still an elite mass disconnected from the public. Also, I think that these prosecution and lawsuit processes have caused a paranoia of "not talking to civilians" for some generals. In my opinion, this paranoia has been very harmful for TAF because it has disconnected some generals from the societal change and the civilian one.

A general continues:

Although in the 1980s, around 30% of generals were rightist and 70% were leftist. I think this process of prosecution and lawsuit increased the ratio of rightist generals. Now, the transition to the right is ongoing and, in my opinion, I can say that right and left are balanced.

Although nearly half of the generals in the TAF are still oversensitive about secularism, I can say with sincere comfort that they now think that secularism is not in danger, but it is hard for me to say that they think the same way for the nation-state and the indivisibility of the state. But, to concede all those, the TAF still needs a mental revolution. The most important factor for this revolution are a “qualified command rank” and effective leadership. On the other side, the acting staff and the technology are sufficient for that job. We were shaken by the fact that we were lagging behind. At this point, getting support from civilians is certainly needed.

Another general, who underlines that cohort spirit (*devre ruhu*) is still very important among the generals, continues by saying:

The cohort spirit is still an important means of peer pressure both in general promotions and also in appointments. At the same time, it is a very crucial self-control mechanism which forces a general to get on well with his friends.

Regarding the level of religiosity among the generals, S. emphasizes the following:

A general never externalizes his piety or cannot do that. Therefore, it is almost impossible to measure of a general’s level of religiosity. In my opinion, 55% to 60% of generals try to fast, even if they do not fast for the whole period [of Ramadan]. But let us underline that fasting is not a criterion for piety in TAF. Fasting is usually an act of tradition and habit. The percentage of the ones performing prayer, in my opinion, never goes above 5%.

According to General M., there is a great amount of support for the EU among generals and he articulates that this is to ensure the success of Turkey’s westernization/modernization as well as secularism.

General T. emphasizes the importance of secrecy for generals when he says the following:

Every general tries to be secretive, they never share their secrets, all kinds of secrets of them, even the ones related to their families and health, are state secrets. By that, watching out and never disclosing is targeted. For generals are persons working in an over-competitive environment.

4.3.2. Staff Officership as a Profession

In his book entitled *Shirt of Steel* (1996), Mehmet Ali Birand defines staff officers as “cream of the military” and then he starts praising both the education in the Staff College located in Levent, İstanbul and the quality of staff officers. In this section, Birand explains how officers are selected for the staff education with what kind of an exclusive attitude and with how hard a procedure of exam, the features of the education and the prestigious and brilliant careers of young staff officers who have graduated from War Academies in the Turkish military. After 20 years that have passed since the book was written, are Birand’s insights still relevant?

First of all, it is possible to define Staff Officership as a privileged type of officership formed within TAF to provide decision making consultancy for commanders. The Staff College is a military academy that offers post-graduate level (master’s and doctorate) education and teaching and which raises staff officers for the TAF. The War Academies founded in 1848 produced their first graduates in 1849 (Uyar and Erickson, 2009). They have resumed their education and teaching activities in their campus in Yeni Levent since 1975.⁹² In line with the amendments inserted into the Staff Colleges Act in 2003, graduate courses have been initiated at the Service War Colleges, and for the first time in 2007, graduates were awarded with the master’s degrees, in addition to a “Staff Officer Diploma.” In order to meet the requirements of technological world of today, the War Colleges command inaugurated the deeply-needed Atatürk War Gaming and Convention Center on 25 July 2003 to support academic education and training activities, to experiment the joint concepts in a simulated environment as well as exercise and seminar environments.

⁹² Please see for the War Academy legislation: <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5847&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch> = (accessed July 20, 2015.)

The Strategic Research Institute (SAREN) of the Staff College has been continuing its education and training activities since 2004 to provide postgraduate (master's and Ph.D) training, certificate programs, and to carry out academic studies. Apply to request friendly and allied countries to the War Colleges, which has a special place among its counterparts, constantly increase every year. More than 1,000 international officers from 41 countries have graduated from the War Colleges since 1995. Today, at the end of a process, which has been shaped by the historical developments and experiences, there are five educational institutions within the organization of the War Colleges command, which is a direct subordinate unit to the Turkish General Staff.⁹³

It is necessary to note that every year, only 50-60 officers are selected from the 2,000 land force applicants, and only 30-40 from the 600 to 800 applicants from the Navy and Air Force. They are chosen based on exam results. It is also necessary to emphasize that every year approximately 95% of the colonels becoming brigadier general are selected from staff officers. Therefore, being a staff officer is a prerequisite for becoming a general.

In the Turkish military, staff officers have a privileged position among officers. Staff officers, constituting roughly 4% of the officer population (around 1,500 of 39,000 officers), have been given priority both in the selection of international cadres and assignment to the rank of general. An officer is entitled to apply for the Staff College exam, which is administered every December, six times during his first lieutenancy and captaincy. The Staff College exam is a very tough one, including military culture, general knowledge (international relations, law, political history, popular agenda, international law, among others) and operational planning sessions.

⁹³ Please see for the official website of the War Academy: <http://www.harpak.edu.tr/pageContainer.aspx?PID=1> (accessed July 12,2015).

Officers are responsible for memorizing about 40 different books. Each year, approximately 1,200 officers from all services apply for the exam, and roughly 100 officers (8% of the total) pass it. After passing the exam, the “soon-to-be staff officers” pursue a two-year education at the master’s level in the Staff College in İstanbul. After graduation, the staff officer holds the master’s degree on security studies and are deployed to “staff only” cadres accordingly.

Staff officers are privileged in TAF as roughly 90% of the international cadres of TAF and 95% of the general cadres are reserved for them. It is also worth mentioning that international posts (*daimi görev kadrosu*) is the most desired position in TAF since it is a three-year deployment, and an officer could earn up to \$7,000 per month when working in this cadre. If an officer could save the half of this monthly payment, which is generally the case for the majority of officers, it means, then, a saving of \$120,000 after the three-year deployment. There are roughly 300 international cadres of TAF.

To be a staff officer in TAF is, thus, the first step to be deployed to an international cadre for three years (maybe another one for the second term) and to be a general. Simply, the desire and endeavor of a junior officer to be a staff officer, which means the first and most significant step for the contemplation of the military career in TAF, is a reliable indicator to assess the extent of idealism of the young officers. It is a fact there has been a drastic decline in applications for the Staff College exam. According to TAF’s official numbers, in 2012, one out of four officers (25%) applied for the exam, which means that three out of four did not even apply.

Staff Major D. says the following about the system of staff officership:

First of all, let us note that the staff officership exam carried out in December, which takes four days, is a very hard exam. In order to prepare

for the exam, you have to remember 40 military source books⁹⁴ and about 10 general culture books which we call “the white series”⁹⁵ down to their points and commas, if it is so to say. In this respect, the exam tests fully the memorization skills of the officers, not their judgment and criticism skills. In addition, in the “Military planning at the brigade level” part of the exam, they have to solve military operation problems related with their force. For example, the problems about the land forces are built on attack operation at the level of brigade. In this problem exam also, the analytical judgment skills are needed in a limited amount. The more needed thing is mastery on previously asked questions, that is the archive. I can say that this exam is even harder than the TUS (Expertise in Medicine Exam). At least 1 year of studying with a daily average of 6 hours is necessary. Despite this much of studying, the possibility of not succeeding for two years is above 60%. In this situation, you already select the hardworking ones who reveal their will to be a staff officer.⁹⁶

Indeed, it is possible to say that the staff officers are an elitist mass in TAF having very high motivation compared to the other officers called “class officers.” Most of the young officers in TAF who are not staff officers gain prestige after becoming staff officers and begin to gain privilege. According to Major D.;

In fact, privileged attitudes of the ones around and primarily the attitudes of generals to the staff officers cause staff officers to feel privileged and despised by others. Otherwise, there is no special education or attitude advice for the staff officer either at the Staff College or at other military units and institutions. Staff officer are always among the top 1,000 people in TAF and therefore embraces TAF. Staff officership is, in my opinion, a status created in TAF upon being the first step in moving towards being a general. I think that the staff officership is built on closely watching the attitudes, conduct, and behavior of prospective generals and their families (wives and children) and not to promote the wrong people. A staff officer cannot behave like an ordinary officer. If someone arises and says “treat me like an ordinary officer, give me that many tasks, I do not want generalship, whatever the rights of the ordinary officer, I only want that,” the system lynches him. Because he is harming the staff officership system. Simply, he is the bad example of his breed. His different behavior cannot be accepted. Whilst an ordinary officer showing the same performance is appreciated, the staff officer stating and applying that is punished, perhaps dismissed from

⁹⁴ Those source books are constituted of basic instructions of all of the force commands and the common instructions that all force personnel must know, which are called ‘Common Instructions.’

⁹⁵ In the category of general culture called the ‘white series,’ there are undergraduate level books in fields such as political history, history of reforms, public administration.

⁹⁶ From the interview conducted in Ankara in December 18, 2014.

the job. But if he does not state that and just behave like a class officer, he goes on to benefit lots of privileges.⁹⁷

It is interesting that all the eight staff officers interviewed in the study stated that professional knowledge and war fighting are not effective for the promotion of the staff officers. The comment of a staff officer is interesting, “I can argue that civilian experts on military matters may know soldiery better than some generals.”

A staff officer at the rank of major continues his interview:

The greatest difference between staff officer and an ordinary officer is his unquestioned obedience and ability to work hard. That is why, important posts are allocated to the staff officers. The staff officers, therefore, do the jobs important for the commanders. Issues like audit program, speech notes, gathering together the preparations before the meetings, tracking the schedule of the commander are cut out just for staff officers.⁹⁸

Another staff officer attracts attention to the following point:

The most important task of a staff officer is to learn English after being accepted to the academy. English score is much more important than your overall academic score at the Staff College. Because NATO's posts abroad are appointed through the language score. Therefore, in the Staff College, the smart staff officer candidates study English more than their academic courses and they get the payoff eminently.⁹⁹

One of the wives of the staff officers interviewed also emphasizes the staff officership is not a profession, but a lifestyle including the wife and the children, by stating:

The transformation of staff officership into lifestyle starts during education in the Staff College. This college is an education setting which covers the wives also as much as the officers being educated. Wives learn how to entertain guests, how to eat and drink, how and what activities to be participated in, and how to select dresses through social activities, such as kermises and meeting days. The aim of this process is preparing the wives to be good general wives. You are held responsible from your market-shopping to service for the guests and to the relationship of wives of high rank and low rank officers in the hierarchy; in short, you are held

⁹⁷ From the interview conducted in Ankara in December 18, 2014.

⁹⁸ From the interview conducted in Ankara in May 2015.

⁹⁹ From the interview conducted in Ankara in May 2015.

responsible for everything. Everybody knows everybody very well, and nothing remains as a secret in this environment.¹⁰⁰

Staff Major M., in turn, states the following points:

In my opinion, staff officership should not be abolished. Staff officership education should remain, it should extend and more people should be given this education, the generalship issue should not be perceived as being specific to staff officership; but, on the other hand, the system should invest in the personnel (I am not saying definitely staff officers) from which it will benefit most, without hurting the others. Thinking the opposite of that means not accepting the truth. I do not know how we will establish the difference between equality and justice. Equality means that everybody has equal rights and opportunities, but justice is getting the payoff as much as you invest. The German system is continuing in us and in the Germans. You become a staff officer, it means you are; otherwise, your chance of generalship decreases very much. The French system is also very sharp. They even invest more. Before going to the academy, they have their men conduct internships in a joint base (SHAPE, ISAF, peace mission in Mali, KFOR, etc.). Americans were also going to the academy with 50% rate. Now, they increased that to a hundred percent with distance education. My opinion about the staff officership was also rigid before I came here, but I can say that it has softened after I have seen the examples here. The point we need to learn from them is to benefit their skills without having other personnel lose their motivation, or having them loose in a little amount, and trying to unlock the payoff of those skills with material and emotional compensations. I am saying “trying to” because the social culture is different. Experts criticize sergeants, sergeants criticize officers, fighting class criticizes support class, class officers criticize staff officers, staff officers who have not become general criticize ones who have become generals usually, and ones who have become generals do not appreciate the others.

That exists in our nature, but extra precautions are necessary. A retired general in the US wrote a book saying that the 60% of the jobs done by the generals are the ones which can be done better by a civilian. We need to concentrate on the motivation of the personnel by taking those into account, by opening other tracks and putting other targets and by making the audit and assessment system a more reliable one. I cannot speak comfortably because I am also in this job (I am leaving staff officership aside), but I spent 6 years in the US, 3 which was with an American general, the state sent me...now, at what point should the needs of the organization and the wishes of the personnel unite?

General T., in turn, says about the staff officership system thus:

To be accepted to the staff officership, to be a graduate of the staff school, to become a general after staff officership is not a job that every brave

¹⁰⁰ From the interview conducted in Ankara in June 2015.

fellow can do. Both success in the staff officership exam and the staff officership itself requires discipline and patience. Most importantly, it requires dedication. While you are preparing for the staff exam, you will also do your job in the mountains, in the sharp hills, in the posts and in the base. In the evening when you go home, you will steal time from your children, your sleep, your entertainment, your rest, your off-days, your wife, and your friends, and you will read books and study, be it night or day. You will lean on the maps and you will adapt yourself to the scenarios superior than the ones of best scenarists, you will carry out wars on the paper, you will win the wars or lose. You will prepare for the staff exam for months; after an exam lasting four days, you will be successful when you get the point enough for reaching the quota. If you cannot achieve this, and you still want to be a staff officer, you will start working over. Assume that you are accepted to the staff officership. You are not done merely succeeding in the exam. The state educates this officer of success to be a staff officer as a gentleman with a stone of patience, a cube of secrets, and holding as much information as a library. It has its officer graduated after handling him and raising a perfect man of state. Our war academies are good examples and one of the best in the world. You are not done also after graduating from war academies. You have to be ready to conduct missions everywhere in Turkey and throughout the world. When you become a staff officer, you enter into the brain and become one of the nerve endings of the Turkish Army which resembles a living organism.

You work without losing heart, without getting tired, saying no matter if it is day or night and with great commitments also of your wife and of your children, and you serve for your state and your nation and conduct your mission. You start the competition for generalship with tens of your classmates and other class members via targeting the best, the most excellent and having the latest information. The weird thing is that there is no general rule saying every staff officer shall be a general. If there are a hundred classmates deserving staff officership, only ten or fifteen of them reach to the generalship. The staff officers who cannot be generals go on doing their jobs with their heart and soul until the last moment before their retirement. The staff officers have very high level of commitment. It is not a job everybody can do and stay patient.¹⁰¹

Major T., who is a class officer, in turn, says the following about the staff officership system:

Staff officers are the officer group whose basic claim is to become a general. If possible, they want to work in places where their records will not be spoiled, they will not be scratched out, a place where they make their gateway to abroad for permanent missions and a place where they can form a robust network; the most dangerous position for them is to work in troops where there are plenty of soldiers and therefore plenty of problems; the most ideal is to work in the bases or the institutes. Their greatest target is to fill in

¹⁰¹ From the interview conducted in İstanbul on May 21, 2015.

their pockets even though in little amount, and to have career in the abroad missions without being engaged with the soldiers and therefore the problems and without being scratched out until the end of colonelship. When they become generals and admirals, the situation is a meal fit for a king. Generalship is already a separate world. Of course, the conditions have changed a little bit today, it has become inevitable to think of settling a new civilian life and making alternative plans after the lawsuits experienced. As much as possible, they feel they need to conduct their troop commandership missions, which is often 2 years, by postponing the problems instead of solving them or taking measures for the side from which damage will come to them. At the very end, there is an abroad mission or base mission awaiting them after that commandership mission, they should be careful not to destroy their admiralship dreams in the long run. When you consider the professional life of 20 or 25 years of a successful staff officer, the duration of commandership is at most 7 or 8 years while that of the plain officer of the same rank is 15 or 16 years. Of course, all those are generalizations, and reflections present dominant mentality; no matter what happens, there are ones who try to do their jobs in the best way and try to deserve the attribute of commandership.¹⁰²

Captain E. who graduated from the war academy with a high ranking, carried out his masters in the US and is a successful class officer who worked in the tight mission locations, emphasizes that did not take the staff officership exam in any of his 6 chances, did not prepare for the staff officership exam, and has no aim like being a staff officer and continues:

The staff officership system in its present state is losing power and desirability like ice melting in the sun. Now, the dreams or ideals of lots of young officers are not having staff officership or generalship. Now, I see that the officer puts the concepts of academic career, foreign language, hobbies, and family before the staff officership. This is something the system cannot appreciate. If examined, it can be seen that the number taking the staff officership exam decreases every year. Because the successful class officers like me do not want to allocate two years of their life in preparation for that hard exam and two years for enduring the tough education process and spend their following years of their career as staff officers. Staff officership is like a Catholic wedding. Once you get it, you transform and can no longer stand in front of the flowing water. But, I see that the class of “successful non-staff officers” has been rising since the successful class officers do not prefer staff officership.¹⁰³

¹⁰² From interview conducted in Ankara on June 20, 2015.

¹⁰³ From an interview conducted in Ankara on December 14, 2014.

It is known that TAF who has recognized that staff officership is losing its appeal have been making efforts to increase the desirability of staff officership since 2009 (2009, “TSK’da Kurmay Subay...”). Within the scope of the revision of the system, it is planned to abolish the War Academy acceptance exam, which is infamous for its toughness to encourage successful officers, such as Captain E., who do not want to take the exam. In the new system, the officers between the ranks of first lieutenant and first captain and those with good records will be invited to the academy. The invited officers will be subjected to education for one year. The successful ones will be staff officers and will partly open the gate to the generalship for the following process of their professional life. With this change, the system will both ensure prospective generals to be selected from among more officers and will create “equal opportunity” among the officers. The new regulation which will put “invitation” according to successful records instead of an exam is still being discussed at General Staff headquarters.

Lt. Colonel M. says:

Staff officership; I think not delivering enough for the needs of the contemporary Turkish military. Very complex and complicated operations, joint-ness are very significant today. Although there is a structure in which you have to communicate and cooperate with everybody, we stand separate from those. We need to rise up parallel to today’s conditions. The selection and exam system is problematic. Evaluation and assessment requires command plus base experience. With the memorizing mentality, the ones making their asses uneasy become staff officers. Staff officership is a great problem hindering specialization in decision making. There is no balance between troop and base missions. It is needed to delegate decision making processes. Let me note that, in the 3rd corps, the papers for taking the foreign personnel to the airport are signed by the Head of the Staff. The gun charge and discharge stations at the security gates are handled by the Head of Staff of Land Forces Command. Centralization in decision processes is very bad, but this does not fit any more. So, I think there is an urgent need for a significant study about decision-making processes. The presentations of the projects proposed to the decision-makers should be listened by the owner of that project. Directly the owner of the project should talk to the

decision-maker, not the general. The one who knows the issue best will present it to the decision-maker.¹⁰⁴

4.3.3. Colonelship as a profession

According to the data from the TGS's Personnel Directorate (J1), there is a total of about 6,000 colonels in TAF (nearly 15% of the total number of officers), around 80% are from the Army. It is necessary to note that the percentage of colonels in the US military is about 3%. In short, the number of colonels in TAF is nearly five times of that of the US military.

According to Colonel M., it is possible to separate the colonels in TAF into three basic groups: Staff colonels, successful and still idealist non-staff colonels willing to work, and colonels not doing anything out of taking their salaries and waiting for their retirements to kick in. M. continues by saying the following:

The staff colonel group constituting 4% of all the colonels is the group with very high motivation since they are on the way of being generals. But this high level of motivation causes great stress on themselves and the people working with them. Because a staff colonel on the path to generalship should not take excessive risks and should not offend the eyes of the commanders. Therefore, staff colonels are excessively careful and status-oriented. Working with them is always difficult. The colonels who are not working and waiting for retirement, I think, constitute 70% of the colonels. Since those colonels (especially the land soldiers who conducted mission in counter-terrorism regions for several years) think that they have gotten very tired at their previous missions, they perceive colonelship as a recumbence and retirement process. In my opinion, this group of colonels is a great burden for TAF and is one of the biggest obstacles for institutional transformation. The "working and idealist" group of colonels, which I consider myself to be in it, in turn, constitutes 25% of the complete group of colonels. A portion of those colonels continue to work even though they are emotionally hurt to some degree because they think they could not get the payoff for their sedulity and commitment from TAF. Another portion of colonels tries to do their jobs better to deserve the salary they get.

4.3.4. Lt. Colonelship as a profession

Lt. Colonelship is an intermediate rank of three years between a major and a colonel in the promotion system of TAF. The most crucial task of lieutenant colonels is

¹⁰⁴ From an interview conducted in İstanbul on April 17, 2015.

battalion commandership. Besides that, lieutenant colonels conduct tasks as project officers at the TGS's and Force commands' directories, and plan officers at the brigade and corps-level headquarters. Lt. Colonel M. states about the lieutenant colonelship as such:

I perceive lieutenant colonelship as a crucial rank where differentiation between the operational and tactical levels starts. This rank, which corresponds generally to the ages of 40-43, should force an officer to decide whether he will resume troop commandership or take place in the base missions. In my opinion, the battalion and fleet commands carried out by lieutenant colonels in TAF are the most crucial operational offices. The lieutenant colonels are responsible for guiding and administering battalions, smallest self-sustaining regiments as well, in which they contribute to the individual development of their subordinates by communicating each one of them. But I do not consider the promotion policy and the system of promotion to high ranks to be corrected. The duration of waiting and promoting everybody to high ranks are not good and leads to under-motivation. In my opinion, not everybody should be lieutenant colonel. Besides, I think the waiting duration of three years at the lieutenant colonelship is very short. Lt. colonelship should be a rank in which the decision makers to take over important missions in TAF are tested.¹⁰⁵

Lt. Col. M. emphasizes that there is quota to entering the Staff College but after graduation everybody is staff officer, and for him, that kills specialization.

Stressing on the need for TAF's increased involvement to the civilian life, Lt. Col.

M. continues:

As a social institution, we came from the center of it, but we somehow could not get into it. We are not in the social life. The employee lodging systems should be abolished at the places having no security threats. The personnel should be immersed in society. The public does not know he attends Friday prayers. We need to dig to the center of the public and get in there. Let us have a martyr-oriented approach in the ceremonies. Each of us should connect people with emotional connections. We need to foster the social connections via the emotional connections. Physical spreading is compulsory.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ From a telephone interview conducted with Lt.Col. M. in June 1, 2015.

¹⁰⁶ From a telephone interview conducted with Lt.Col. M. in June 1, 2015.

4.3.5. Majorship as a profession

Majorship is a rank of a five-years waiting period covering the ages of 35-40. Battalion commanders, battalion-level planning officers in the brigades and corps, base squadron commanders, fleet, and project officers at the headquarters of TGS's and force commands are majors. Majors are crucial officers providing contact between operational battalions at the tactical level and brigades and corps at the operational level. Major O., who has been working in the Special Forces Commandership since his second lieutenantship, says the following:

Since I have spent all my professional life in the special forces, I cannot clearly reflect on what majorship is in the force commands, but we came together with the majors in the land, Navy, and Air Forces for occasions like missions, exercises, trainings, and drills, and I had the chance to observe them closely. For the land forces, the majorship is coded more like a bridge between operating units of team and platoon; and other units such as squadron and brigade. In the Navy and Air Force, nonetheless, majorship is coming to the front with its ship and fleet commandership features. In my opinion, majorship is a hard but pleasing rank having both features of operating and decision making. That is, it is possible for you to go sporting with the young officers if you like, or if you like you it is possible do operation and education planning with the superior officers at the base. Majors have also got an important mission of ensuring a balance between younger officers and NCOs, and older generals and colonels to boost the morale of the Army. Majorship is also a critical career rank in which you look for the answer of the question of whether you will resume your career as a decision making commander or a base officer. But, in my opinion, the fact that this rank covers a long duration of six years diminishes the dynamism and the power of this rank.¹⁰⁷

4.3.6. Captainship as a profession

Captainship is a six-years waiting period, usually covering ages 30-35.

Captain T. suggests that:

Captainship is the most loved rank within the military because it is the first for an officer to feel like the company commander, fully and independently in charge of around 80-120 soldiers. Companies are the first independent military units, and generally captains are company commanders. This is also a mediator rank between younger personnel such as conscripts, NCOs,

¹⁰⁷ From an interview conducted in Ankara in April 20, 2015.

lieutenants, and senior level officers. It is also the most critical rank for an officer to make big decisions for both his career in the military and his personal life. The great majority of officers marry in this rank, and they decide about career path. Most critical decisions about studying the entrance examination of the Staff College, developing language skills for three-year long abroad mission cadres, pursuing academic career or trying to have happy family life. Please also note that this is the very first rank that an officer's political and personal being gets matured, and his understanding about the socio-economic and political issues gets settled. When I first joined the Army as a cadet in 1996, for instance, our captain told us that it was forbidden by the law for the members of the armed forces to participate in any kind of political activity. He also added any violation of this rule would result with a discharge from the armed forces. Over the course of my nineteen-year service in the armed forces, I witnessed and realized that members of TAF were an important part of the Turkish politics, usually in a capacity to make important political decisions, let alone being discharged from participating in it. There is an irony in this issue, which has strongly struck me until this day. The irony is that, while members of TAF have always been strongly inclined to take part in Turkish politics, they (including me) have had almost no courses of some sort about political science during their academic endeavors either in the Turkish Military Academy or in the Staff College. While I was attending classes at the United States Naval Postgraduate School to get my master's degree in "Defense Decision Making and Planning," I better recognized my lack of understanding of political theory and politics as a member of TAF along with my desire to research about it in order to get a better grip of political decision making processes with a special focus on CMR. At the same time, I thought it would be beneficial for TAF, for academia and for my own career to get a PhD in political science because a soldier's research in political science, especially in CMR, would provide a different and new perspective. That is why I applied for a PhD program in a political science department and seek to have an academic career on this field.

4.3.7.Lieutenantship as a professions

Lieutenantship, the first ranks of profession of officership is a process of nine years covering the ages of 21-30 (three years of lieutenantship, six years of first lieutenantship).

Lt.T. S. who is at the Infantry School of the Land Force Command , and who is yet at the first year of his profession, starts his words as follows:

Lieutenantship is the first officership rank in TAF. When you are at the beginning of the profession, you have a lot to learn. I still see second lieutenant-ship as an education process. But the lieutenant resources are getting diverted primarily being the one such as the contracted officers coming from civilian universities, the increasing number of the ones passing

to officership from non-commissioned officership. In my opinion, this is a good thing. Different perspectives and problem solving skills thereby enter into TAF. Second lieutenants care more about the material means and career opportunities compared to the high rank officers. For a second lieutenant, improving himself also means contributing to the system. Therefore, many of my friends are searching for master's degree opportunities even now, they are trying to learn foreign languages and trying to improve their hobbies in sports and arts. In this respect, I think officership is seen as a normal profession rather than a lifestyle by a lot of second lieutenants. Of course, being a soldier is a profession requiring commitment and discipline, but all those things are not obstacles for you to have your own life. Investment in yourself also means investment in the system. But, of course, it is not possible for our high ranking commanders to understand that; they still want us to be the same officer of the Cold War years. But those days are left behind, they have now a new generation at hand which questions, does not immediately obey, wishes to understand and to be encouraged and expects to have role models.¹⁰⁸

4.4.Discussion

The power-distributive perspective explaining gradual institutional change put forward by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) provides a framework to explain the above-presented changes of TAF: as a security actor, as a social institution, and officership as a profession. The first finding of this institutional analysis is that TAF does not have yet a comprehensive transformation process consciously designed and controlled by the High Command that covers all three domains. That is, in the domain of TAF as a security organization, for instance, the High Command (particularly Chief and deputy Chief of the TGS)¹⁰⁹ meets one as the prime change agent of the top-down transformation. Change in this domain is implemented under the full control of the military elites and mainly shaped by the change in the international security environment. That is why, it looks like an elite-driven process that seeks to adapt TAF to the contemporary global security environment by

¹⁰⁸ The interview was conducted in İstanbul on April 17, 2015.

¹⁰⁹ By saying high command of TAF, it is meant the personnel at the rank of General/Admiral including the Chief of the General Staff, the 2nd Chief of the General Staff, Force Commanders and Army commanders. As of August 2015, there are 12 full generals in TAF.

“emulating” the ways of thinking and doing things of the other modern security actors in the globe, particularly NATO. In contrast to this, in the domain of TAF as a social institution, change arises primarily as first commencing from the bottom and developing generally by confrontational interactions between the military elites and junior-level personnel or emerging with the inclusion of the outside actors in civil society. Change then goes to the top and, by dictating its own reality to the military elites, evolves into a process that the High Command cannot keep under its full control and manage accordingly. In this sense, it is likely to assert that, in this domain, change is to some extent an arbitrary process partly controlled by the High Command and partly driven by random dynamics such as the existence or absence of public awareness and media support to the issue at hand. One should note that, in this domain, the High Command, after first ignoring and then counterattacking the change demanding insiders or outside actors, cannot find another option but to submissively accept the existence of the problem and attempt to adapt its institutional order to fulfill change demands. In the domain of officership as a profession, however, one may talk about an “agentless change” process as no actor can fully control the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps. The differentiation among three domains in terms of change types, change agents, change pathways, and change modes therefore, creates a power-distributional effect of change in TAF, which according to this research, yields to gradual institutional change within TAF.

In the domain of the change of TAF as a security organization, it is likely to state that, especially more evident since 2011, the High Command’s “reformist sentiment,” which first emerged at the TGS’s headquarters and then expanded to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy headquarters, creates a “non-compliant sentiment” to the detriment of traditional status-quo-focused sentiment. It is exactly

this increasing non-compliant sentiment expanding within the TGS's and force commands' headquarters due to the reformist mood of the High Command that should be taken into account when analyzing the very initiation of TAF's change as a security organization. That is why one should focus on the compliance behavior of subordinate ranks to the High Command. Compliance is built into the definition of the institution under consideration. In other words, what institutions do is to stabilize expectations (by providing information about the probable behavior of others among other methods), and thus enforcement is endogenous in the sense that the expected costs and extent of non-compliance are factored into the strategic behavior of the actors in a particular institutional equilibrium. If, instead, one breaks with a view of institutions as self-reinforcing (through whichever mechanism) and put distributional issues at front and center, compliance emerges as a variable, which is critically important to the analysis of both stability and change. The need to enforce institutions carries its own dynamic of potential change, and emanates not just from the politically-contested nature of institutional rules, but also importantly, from a degree of openness in the interpretation and implementation of these rules. Even when institutions are formally codified, their guiding expectations often remain ambiguous and are always subject to interpretation, debate, and contestation. It is not just that unambiguous rules are enforced to greater and lesser degrees. Rather, struggles over the meaning, application, and enforcement of institutional rules are inextricably intertwined with the resource allocations they entail. The above-presented analysis clearly indicates that this is exactly the case for TAF. The changing socio-political context in Turkey and the changing global security environment, nevertheless, have degraded the power of compliance as the principal

institutional driver, and, thus, the prime constant for TAF to such an extent that compliance has gradually turned out to be a variable for TAF in the last decade.

First, particularly from 2011 onwards after the critical juncture of the resignation of the then-Chief Gen. Işık Koşaner along with three force commanders, the new High Command has come to conclude that compliance has become inherently complicated for TAF by the fact that rules can never be precise enough to cover the complexities of all possible real-world situations. It is worth mentioning that new developments affecting the Turkey's socio-political context such as the empowerment of the civilian elites, single party rule for over a decade and emerging public reaction to the military's intervene in politics have emerged in the last decade. In the same vein, the changes in the global security environment such as increasing complexity and uncertainty in the global system, emergence of hybrid threats, the changing characteristics of global terrorist networks, military's more involvement in the international peace missions and support missions after man-made or natural disasters forces the High Command to transform the TAF and adapt to the new context. Simply, changing socio-political context in Turkey and change in the global security environment confound pre-existing rules, existing institutions may be changed to better accommodate the new reality. These changes can involve rule creation, or they may simply entail creative extensions of existing rules to the new reality. Here, it is seen that the High Command has entered into so much a reformist mood to promote the non-compliant sentiment in TAF to better grasp the new reality imposed by the changing socio-political context in Turkey and changing global security environment to the detriment of compliance, once the determining institution within TAF. Simply, the first emergence of the "new reality" and then the High Command's realization of the need for an acceptance of this new reality with a

reformist mood have drastically eroded compliancy, which was adopted as a overarching sentiment in TAF, and have turned compliance into a variable in a gradual fashion. Then, “non-compliant sentiment” has emerged as the prime driver that has started to define the very essence of institutions within TAF.

In addition to erosion of compliance from a constant into a variable, other dynamics forcing the High Command to change things is the increasing ambiguity within TAF. It is possible to assert that especially the investigations and trials such as the *Sledgehammer*, *Ergenekon*, and *Izmir Spy Case* with which serving officers were involved created an ambiguity about the promotions and appointments of the senior level commanders in TAF because many detained and arrested senior-level officers had to leave their posts by resigning or were relieved by the High Command. This has deeply degraded the traditional institutional mechanisms set for determining the promotion and appointment of the senior level officers.

In short; while the non-compliant sentiment emerged because of the High Command’s reformist mood first in the TGS, and then expanded to the force commands headquarters caused the pre-existing determining institution of compliance to turn into a weakened institution. The increased institutional ambiguity caused by the legal processes like *Sledgehammer* and *Ergenekon* revealed the necessity of the transformation of TAF.

How then have these two mega trends within TAF as a security organization influenced the officer corps? It is likely to suggest that these two mega trends have forced each officer to choose one institutional identity in terms of his/her attitude towards institutional change. Unsurprisingly, the portfolio of the identity includes four types of change actor (insurrectionary, symbiont, subversive, opportunist) proposed by Mahoney and Thelen.

Coming to the domains of TAF as a social institution and officership as a profession, the analysis shows that, in contrast to the domain of TAF as a security organization, the High Command is the prime change agent. One may even suggest that there is no solely dominating change agent in these domains. It is the friction between the High Command and the mass-level actors (NCOs or NGOs within the civil society) about change in these domains appears as the prime trigger of change. What can be said about the nature, characteristics, and evolution of this friction between military elites and mass-level actors in these domains? Firstly, it is worth mentioning that, by pumping a great amount of uncertainty into TAF's institutional setting, this friction has increased the level of ambiguity within the organization. The increasing ambiguity leads to a non-compliant sentiment and thus mass-level insurrectionary behaviors. The analysis reveals that the military elites have a patterned response to those insurrectionary behaviors. The first stage is the strategy of ignorance implying the High Command's inaction and silence as it thinks that response would give credit to those insurrectionary behaviors. The second is the strategy of denial and counter-offense through which the High Command seeks to gain control of the narrative supremacy so as to delegitimize those rival narratives in the eyes of the public. The last one is the strategy of submission and rehabilitation in which the High Command passively accepts its defeat and seeks for venues to engage with the rival actors for rehabilitation and restoration.

Then one may conclude that, in an organization like TAF, change occurs through distributional effects of institutions which trigger distrust to the pre-existing norms and divisions among institutional elite-level powerholders. Or, through elite-mass frictions, change can occur if institutions disadvantage subordinate groups to the point that they organize and come to identify with one another, thereby

increasing their power and capacity to break prevailing institutional arrangements. These two mechanisms correspond to the themes of “divided elites” in the TAF as a security organization domain and “united subordinate groups vs. military elites” at TAF as a social institution level that are emphasized in explanations of change.

Shortly, within TAF, it is evident that what animates change is the power-distributional implications of institutions. However, the place that one expects incremental change to emerge is precisely in the “gaps” or “gray zones” between the rule and its interpretation (division among elites) or the rule and its enforcement (division between elites and subordinate groups). This is an analytic space that other conceptions of institutions (as behaviors in equilibrium, or as scripts) essentially rule out by definition; but, as a practical matter, this is exactly the space in which contests over – and at the same time within – institutions take place.

The table below summarizes the points presented above.

Table 3. The Summary of the TAF's Change as an Institution

	Cases Examined	Characteristics of Change	Mode of Change	Driver of Change	Actor of Change
Turkish Military as a Security Organization	1.Stages of Change a. 2011-2012: Damage assessment and institutional transformation discussions. b. 2012-2013:Adoption of reformist approach and institutionalization of transformation in the TGS c. 2013-2014: Spread of transformation to the Force commands d. 2014-2015: Consolidation of the transformation Cases examined: 2. Change in press and public relations 3.Internationalization efforts (NATO and post-grad level education)	- An elite-driven process top-down fashion - No arbitrary processes - No pressure from the below	LAYERING	Technology + Internationalization	Subversive elites and symbionts+ opportunist lower senior ranks (brigadiers etc.)
Turkish Military as a Social Institution	Cases examined: - Empowerment of 'Woman Force' in TAF - NCO's struggle for their rights and status in TAF - Violations of Soldier Rights - The Headscarf Ban	- Bottom-up and junior-driven processes - The pressure from the bottom as key determiner of the outcomes - Provides room for arbitrariness	"Drift" and "conversion" as the modes of change leading to "passive layering" of the rules/norms by the elites	Organizat. Culture	"Insurrectionaries" at the junior level and "subversive elites" to appease them The impact of media scrutiny and public pressure
Officership as a Profession	Examination of all ranks within the TAF	- Bottom-up and junior-driven processes - The pressure from the bottom as key determiner of the outcomes	"Conversion" as the mode of change. No written institution -Fully attitudinal	Technology + Organizational culture + Politics	Generals: some symbionts (some parasitical some mutual) Some: subversive Some: opportunist Colonels: great majority symbionts, some opportunist Lt. Col: subversive Major: subversive Cpt+Lit:Insurrectionaries

What can one say about the characteristic of change? What are the modes and drivers of change in each domain? Exactly who are the agents behind such changes in each domain? Why do they carry out behaviors that lead to transformation?

As can be seen on the table above presenting a brief summary of this chapter, the change in the Turkish military as a security organization domain is an elite-driven process in a top-down fashion, and provides no room for arbitrariness. Another important characteristic in this domain is the appearance of “layering,” a change more aiming incremental transformation of the existing institutional order, as the primary mode of change. In this domain, change actors are “subversive elites” (the High Command and senior level generals), and “sybionts,” and “opportunists” among the strategic intermediate-level decision-makers (major generals and brigadier generals).

In the domain of the Turkish military as a security actor, there is an effort to re-interpret the existing ways of thinking and doing things without ignoring the existing the institutional order. It is evident that starting with foundation of working groups to conduct damage assessment in August 2011, the High Command’s reformist mood created a non-compliance sentiment within the TGS. It is this non-compliance sentiment that let to the emergence of “subversive” officers in addition to the existing sybionts and opportunists. The working groups formed an evaluation of the last 10 years of TAF, determined what wrong practices existed in which fields, and presented their findings and analysis to the High Command together with their proposals. In the light of those proposals, the institutionalization process commenced in the fundamental fields such as force structuring and re-organization, public and press relations, personnel and personnel benefits, military education and international missions. In the following periods, likewise, the institutionalization in the TGS

expanded slowly among the lower level units starting with the Force Command headquarters.

From those efforts, it is clear that TAF entered into an attempt at transformation, which seeks to accommodate their traditional ways of thinking and doing things with changes in the global security environment and socio-political change in Turkey. Therefore, it is likely to suggest that “layering” the mood defined as “the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones,” is generally appreciated. Because, in this mode neither change of all the old rules nor ignoring all those is on the agenda. But there exists the establishment of new rules and institutions besides the mass of old rules. A good example of this is the rise of the public and press relations branch to the level of department and then changing its existing structure and organization seven times in the four-year period between 2011 and 2015. Again, upgrading the TGS Command Center to the level of department due to its importance, revising its relations with J-directories and other connected ones, re-defining its duties, authorizations and responsibilities without canceling the old rules. The TAF also integrated the efforts of sending officers abroad and attempted to increase the quality of graduate level military education with both the military education system and also the institutionalization of support services for the decision-makers at the crucial posts.

It is seen that the prime actors of in the domain of the Turkish military as a security organization are “subversive elites.” Subversives are actors who seek to displace an institution, but in pursuing this goal, they do not themselves break the rules of the institution. They instead effectively disguise the extent of their preference for institutional change by following institutional expectations and working within the system. From this point of view, it is possible to say that

primarily the Chief of TAF General Necdet Özel in 2011-2015 and also General Hulusi Akar (first Deputy Chief in 2011-2013 and then Land Force Commander in 2013-2015, and the current Chief since August 2015) played the role of subversive elites and succeeded in forming a strong reformist sentiment within TAF in the period of August 2011-August 2015.

With layering, institutional change grows out of the attachment of new institutions alongside existing ones, as the case mostly happened within the TGS headquarters. While powerful veto players can protect the old institutions, they cannot necessarily prevent the addition of new elements.

The other actors of the transformation in this domain are especially the strategic intermediate level decision makers at the levels of lieutenant generals, major generals, and brigadier generals. They can be defined as “symbionts” and “opportunists,” the sum of all which forms the status-quo block. Among this group of “transformation resisters,” the category of “parasitic symbionts” constitutes the majority because parasitic symbionts wish to retain the formal institutional status quo, and strong veto players help to secure this outcome. Besides parasitic symbionts, another group forming the status-quo block, is, in turn, opportunists. Opportunists are actors who have ambiguous preferences about institutional continuity. They do not actively seek to preserve institutions. However, because opposing the institutional status quo is costly, they do not try to change the rules. Opportunists, instead, exploit whatever possibilities exist within the prevailing system to achieve their ends. The decision to be made by the opportunists who constitute the large portion of the intermediate level decision makers about whether they will present a reformist or pro-status quo standing is very important in the transformation of TAF as a security organization.

Again, the re-organization and new force structuring is an important field of change coming to the front in the domain of TAF as a security organization. In this domain also, the fundamental drives of the change appear to be technology and internationalization. TAF tries to gain the intellectual capacity to procure, utilize, and manage the new capability packages of technology, while trying to increase its international visibility to catch up with the change in the modern world armies in the global security environment. From this point of view, it is possible to say that TAF perceives technology-focused change and internationalization as the two driving forces for both material and mental transformation.

In contrast to the previous domain of TAF as a security organization, the process in the domain of the Turkish military as a social institution is not an elite-driven and deterministic (or pre-planned) process carried out in a top-down fashion. The change in this domain is mostly a mass-driven process in an arbitrary and confrontational fashion. There is a great power gap creating room for arbitrary processes and interactions in this domain primarily because military elites are not fully aware and capable to manage this domain. Because of this power gap, the actors at the mass level who can be classified generally as “insurrectionary” (both serving and retired personnel and the families of those) can impose their demands of change to the military elites as an organized voice if they can get united, and get the support of the public and the press. In the face of such an imposition, the elites give the following responses as a pattern respectively as it was seen in the case of NCOs personal rights and violations to soldiers’ rights:

- Firstly, imposing that the demands are not legitimate and attempts to degrade the credibility of demands with counter-attacks,
- Appreciating the existence of the problem, dialogue attempts,

- Attempts to resolve the problem, building trust with trival actors, institutional and legal arrangements.

In this domain, generally “drift” appears as the change mood, and sometimes “conversion.” Since legal regulations are done very late and deficiently in this domain, two methods come forward, either staying non-reactive while the present rules remain the same (drift) or interpreting and practicing the present rules differently (conversion). The best example of drift is the softening of the headscarf and beard ban within TAF in the latest period although the official written regulations/institutions have not been amended. As is not to be forgotten, the then-Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Aslan Güner, left the protocol in 2007 to avoid shaking hands with then-First Lady Gül, placing it high on the agenda was (Kavakçı, 2010: 5). Although there have been no changes in the formal institutional texts of TAF such as Military Housing/Lodging Entrance Regulation since 2007, it is seen that there has been a great softening about the headscarf and beard ban.

Again the campaign regarding the personal rights and legal status of NCOs was pursued at the conversion mood at the very beginning. Even though they do not like to do very much in the face of pressure, the High Command went for the changes in the formal textual institutions for developing rights and privileges of NCOs and for promoting their institutional status with a method that can be defined as “passive layering.”

The actors of change in the domain of TAF as a social institution are seen to be the insurrectionaries at the junior level and the subversive elites attempting to soothe them. The demands for change in this domain appear firstly at the mass level generally in an arbitrary way with the attempts of insurrectionaries. Then, it attracts the attention of the public and the media, and captures public attention to such an

extent that High Command cannot resist this pressure. Demands that had captured the public attention and were promoted by news and commentaries on the media in a prolonged fashion forced military elites to change their preferences. Many changes being experienced in the social domain create arbitrary and non-compliant confrontations, friction between the High Command and mass-level actors, despite the fact that military elites seek to withstand each confrontation. At the end, however, they accept the defeat tacitly and try to adapt the institutional structure to the new reality dictated by the mass-level actors supported by the media and the public. In this domain, the fundamental drivers of change are media power and public pressure. Simply, bottom-up demands which can capture media attention and public support in a prolonged fashion can lead to changes in the strategic culture of TAF.

In the domain of officership as a profession , the change is completely arbitrary and in a bottom-up fashion. The types and characteristics of change actor of very rank are explained respectively below.

Generals

In the light of the interviews with four serving generals, it is likely to suggest that the great majority of generals are opportunists. About a quarter of them are symbionts and about one-fifth of them are subversives. As the “guardians of the existing system,”¹¹⁰ none of the generals are insurrectionaries. The perceptions and opinions of the generals constituting the High Command about other generals are very important for the promotions and appointments of class of generals within TAF. Therefore, generals usually shape their positions in the system according to perceptions and opinions of the High Command. In this respect, in the period from

¹¹⁰ From the interview with Gen. L. conducted in İstanbul on October 12, 2015.

2011 to 2015, the reformist mood of the Chief of the General Staff Gen. Necdet Özel and Deputy Chief Gen. Hulusi Akar deactivated the traditionally dominant “pro-status quo” sentiment in TAF and played role in the domination of the non-compliant sentiment. The investigations and trials such as *Balyoz*, *Ergenekon* and *İzmir Spying Case* have struck TAF as a shockwave shaking the traditional ways of thinking and doing things and increased the organizational ambiguity in the organization. This situation has drastically increased the ambiguity in the promotion and appointment processes named “tradition” (*teamül*), formed in decades by the generals who were not sure of their futures and who could be arrested any time because of any investigation process. It is possible to say that the non-compliant sentiment’s commencing to become the dominant one and a high-level organizational ambiguity among the generals caused the formation of a subversive group for the first time in this group who are not satisfied with the old and seeking to create a new institutional order, albeit a tacit manner.

This characteristic of generals, who are mostly opportunist in fact, makes them each a master player about understanding the dominant sentiment within TAF and taking position accordingly. A general suggests that “For every general, the first dynamic shaping his decisions primarily is his own military career and his next promotion.”¹¹¹ The most important determiner shaping this dynamic is, in turn, the perceptions and opinions of the High Command about them. For this reason, it is impossible for the generals to be insurrectionary. Therefore, every general must, before all, be an opportunist carefully analyzing the status quo challenges in the institution and the ambient political context. Most of the generals have to reflect this opportunism to the decisions they make and to their behaviors. A proportion of the

¹¹¹ From the interview with Gen. X who asked not to be named conducted in Ankara on September 12, 2015.

generals are parasitic symbionts believing that they deserve their positions due to their past services and therefore having the opinion that the system “owes” them. These generals think that the system has to provide them some privileges and prestige due to services they carried out in the past. For the endurance of the present prestige and privileges, they all develop a pro-status quo sentiment. For this reason, it is possible to say that great majority of the generals, except the subversives reaching to 20%, are opportunists and parasite symbionts having a pro-status quo and compliant sentiment. However, appointment of the newly forming subversive generals to crucial missions by the High Command and that the High Command tries to keep them close have become an encouragement pushing the generals who have an opportunistic latent sentiment towards being subversive. The best example about that issue is the institutionalization of the decision support departments which were founded in the TGS headquarters and which outstretched to the force commands later on.

Colonels

For 97% of the officers, colonelship is the last of the professional life. It is seen that the colonels who came to the end of their professional life and started to plan the retirement life (this portion is more significant among the land forces) have sacrificed lots of things both from themselves and from their families during the weary profession of officership, and therefore, they want to be comfortable in the rank they “deserve” as the return of the price they paid at the past ranks. Therefore, a great majority of the colonels in TAF are of the parasitic symbionts type. The group coming after the parasitic symbionts among the colonels is the opportunists., but the subversives. It is possible to state that lots of officers at this rank have a pro-status quo focused sentiment since they are parasitic symbionts. The officers in this rank

who do not want to take risk and responsibility and also do not want to work too much, perceive reform as new risks, new responsibilities and as an effort to get themselves out of the system as quickly as possible. For this reason, trying to refuse the reform efforts actively and passive resistance by slowing down the jobs is a widespread situation at this rank.

Lt. Colonels and Majors:

The great majority of the officers at the ranks of Major and Lt. Colonel, which cover the ages of 35 to 45, are subversive, some of them are opportunist as a small portion seem to be mutual symbionts. The Lt. Colonels and Majors are the group that can overtake important role in the institutional transformation of TAF in each of the three domains.

Captains and Lieutenants

The great majority of the Captains and the Lieutenants constitute the most crowded group in TAF have the image of insurrectionaries. They are definitely in discomfort with the status-quo and want to change something.

The main drivers of change in this dimension are the changes in technology, political context, and strategic culture.

As a result, the change in TAF which is fed by the dynamics independent of one another is in the domains of

- A security organization,
- A social institution,
- Officership as a profession is in fact creating a “power-distributional” effect within the subject of change.

The different change processes shaped by these change modes, actors, and drivers are separated from one another are forming a healthy gradual change climate,

although the elites are not fully aware of that. It is often seen especially in the domains of the Turkish military as a social institution and the officership as a changing profession that institutional change often occurs precisely when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways.




CHAPTER V

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Historically, the TAF's military service has always been a mixed system with a minority of core professionals and a majority of non-professionals. Today, the TAF is composed of three force commands; the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, as well as the Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard, yet these last two fulfill their missions under the auspice of the Interior Ministry. As of April 2014,¹¹² the distribution of the TAF's active military personnel (total **623,818** personnel excluding the civilian employees) is shown in the chart below.

Figure 5: The Distribution of the TAF's Active Military Personnel as of April 2014



¹¹² Please note that there has been no drastic change in the numbers and ratios of the services and ranks within the TAF since April 2014.

In the Turkish military, despite the fact that officer corps constitutes only 6% of the total serving personnel, it is the dominating military elite group, similar to other modern militaries of the world. The attitudes, opinions, strategic calculations, and behaviors of the officer corps determine the outcomes within the TAF. The table presented below provides the distribution of the TAF's officer corps, the universe of this research's survey, in terms of ranks and force commands.



Table 4: The service and rank distribution of officer corps in the TAF as of April 2014¹¹³

Service	Lt/ First Lt.	Captain	Major	Lt.Colonel	Colonel	General	TOTAL
Army	7,672 (19.2%)	3,561 (8.9%)	3,535 (8.8%)	2,119 (5.3%)	3,936 (9.8%)	196 0.49%	21,019 (52.7%)
Navy	1,631 (4.1%)	1,327 (3.3%)	1,126 (2.8%)	528 (1.3%)	725 (1.8%)	48 (0.12%)	5,385 (13.5%)
Air Force	2,723 (6.83%)	1,466 (3.67%)	1,153 (2.89%)	630 (1.58%)	713 (1.78%)	67 (0.16%)	6,752 (16.94%)
Gendar -merie	2,528 (6.3%)	1,393 (3.4%)	965 (2.42%)	494 (1.23%)	497 (1.24%)	31 (0.07%)	5,908 (14.8%)
Coast Guard	348	313	58	29	32	1	781 (1.9%)
TOTAL	14,902 (35.36%)	8,060 (20.22%)	6,837 (17.15%)	3,800 (9.53%)	5,903 (14.81%)	343 (0.86%)	39,845 (100%)

As seen in the table, the distribution of the population of the officers serving in the TAF is a clear-cut one (39,845, around 40,000). If we set the confidence level as 95% and confidence interval at $\pm 2.5\%$, our random, representative sample should include around 1,500 officers.¹¹⁴ One should also note that our population (i.e. active duty officers in the TAF) comprises two major strata: rank and service. For a better representation of the population, this study follows stratified random sampling procedure, in which we consider the strata as separate sub-populations and draw a

¹¹³ This table was cross-tabulated by data provided by the Personnel Command (J2) of the Turkish General Staff.

¹¹⁴ Please see Table 2 presented below.

separate random sample from each stratum before combining the results. Stratification is the process of dividing members of the population into homogenous sub-populations before sampling. The principal objective of stratification is to reduce sampling errors, thus making the sample more representative of the population. The strata should be mutually exclusive: every element in the population must be assigned to only one stratum. The strata should also be collectively exhaustive, meaning that no population element can be excluded. The primary advantage of the stratified random sampling is to provide opportunity to study the stratum variations for each stratum.

Table 5: The distribution of the survey sample in terms of service and rank

Service	Lt/ First Lt.	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General	TOTAL
Army	427	197	52	7	202	7	892 (63.6%)
Air Force	126	42	42	12	22	0	244 (17.4%)
Navy	65	21	28	18	28	0	160 (11.4%)
Gend.	33	17	21	15	18	1	105 (7.4%)
TOTAL	651 (46%)	277 (19.7%)	143 (10.2%)	52 (3%)	270 (19.2%)	8	1,401 (100%)

5.1. Conducting the survey

At the initial phase, three options were taken into consideration as the survey method. The first option was the conduct of the survey by utilizing “formal

channels” and within the close control of TAF’s chain of command. This option would mean that the survey would be delivered as the annex of an executive order which would be issued by the Turkish General Staff (TGS) directly to the selected respondents via the TAF’s formal informing channels. This executive order may simply force the selected respondents to complete survey sheets and then send these sheets back to the TGS. However, one should note that it is highly likely to have “biased survey data” while applying this option due to a general pattern in the TAF’s organizational culture, which may be defined as the overreaction of those sub-commanders to any survey directly sent by the TGS to personnel under their command. Simply, in this method, there is a risk that sub-commanders would intervene or influence survey results, which would then yield biased survey data and insights.

The second option would be contacting a civilian survey firm to conduct the survey, which is perhaps the most reliable option among three. This issue was raised at the initial phase of the research and discussed with the commanders at the highest echelons of the TGS. Unfortunately, the top brass in the general staff kindly declined this proposal both due to the issue of confidentiality on this sensitive research project and, this time, their concerns on the reliability of survey results which, in this case, would be collected by civilian employees of the survey firm.

The third option was to conduct the survey with the help of a group of Point of Contacts (POCs), who can create a network of officers to fill out the questionnaires. The third option is the best among these three options as it endows a “trusted” interaction between the POC, or the surveyor, and the participating officers, a group of 30 officers from different services and ranks. This includes a three-star general and a brigadier general, four colonels from each services, 11 officers from the Army,

4 officers from the Navy, 4 officers from the Air Force, and 5 officers from the Gendarmerie Command were chosen as POCs. Each POC was given a list of between 40-45 officers, which only had the required specifications of service type and rank level. One should note that, as they were not given any names, they were asked to pick randomly an officer fitting for the requirements of the list from within their network of acquainted officers. That is, the POCs were not restricted to any other rule other than the required specifications, meaning that they were free to choose any officer as a respondent as long as he fit the requirement in terms of rank and service. As one may give credit, in this first-ever survey applied to officers included some questions about their political views and their attitudes towards “hot” issues such as religion, democracy, and the Kurdish question. This means that a certain amount of trust must exist between the POC and respondent to feel comfortable when filling the survey form.

The surveys were conducted between June 15, 2015 and October 15, 2015 (a span of four months). At first glance, one may suggest that a four-month long period might be a long duration for a survey. However, one should note that the answers of these questions are highly unlikely be varied within a four-month period.

5.1.1. Content of the survey

The survey to be applied to the participants includes three parts.¹¹⁵ To gather the baseline information, the first part contains demographic information. This first part, for instance, included questions on respondent’s service and rank, the economic and educational status of their parents, the number of service years spent in missions/trainings abroad, the number of languages known by the respondent, and the number of years spent fighting against the PKK. The main purpose of the

¹¹⁵ Please see the Turkish survey in the Appendix section.

demographic characteristics of the respondents is to identify associations between these characteristics and attitudes. Would there be, for instance, any statistically significant relationship between the years spent in missions/trainings abroad and the attitudes of the officers regarding democratic and civilian control? Would the number of years spent fighting against the PKK be directly related to the level of satisfaction about the military service? Or would the educational and financial status of officers' parents have an impact on their decision to be an officer? Would being a graduate from the war academy or civilian universities impact the conceptualization of a "professional soldier"? Would the ability to speak a foreign language or the level of education make the respondent more open to change and liable for the democratic and civilian control?

The first section of survey's second part includes closed-end questions designed to measure the attitudes of the respondents attitudes issues related to security defense, particularly the mission and the role of TAF, military reform within the Turkish military, and their ideas about NATO. The second section of the second part contains questions seeking to measure the political stance, religiosity level of the officers and their levels of satisfaction in economic terms.

The third part of the survey includes 36 "yes/no" dichotomous questions. The first 8 questions of this part were designed to measure the attitudes of the respondents towards the headscarf issue and confirm or falsify their previous answers about religiosity and the Kurdish question for more reliability. The questions between 9-14 were designed to measure the level of trust/satisfaction towards institutions such as the EU, Turkish parliament, media, police, and democracy in Turkey. The questions between 15 and 25 were designed to measure ideas about the TAF as a security organization to address issues such as conscription,

professionalism, conscientious objection, as well as the service of women and homosexual in the military. The last questions between 26-36 were designed to get a picture about the status of the Turkish General Staff, the independency of military judicial system, the acceptance of orders violating legal codes, Turkish foreign policymaking, Atatürkism, and internet usage.

It is also worth mentioning that the POCs were informed that it is not obligatory for the respondents to answer each and every question, meaning that they may leave any questions they do not want to answer blank. This “feel-free to leave blank” approach serves the purpose of comforting the respondents. One, however, should note that, in scholarly terms, these unanswered questions is telling of the “closed” domains in which TAF officers are highly discouraged to comment on.

At this point, one might be led to ask the following: can this survey presenting a snapshot of the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps as of May-September 2015 be reliable enough to provide scholarly inferences on the changing attitudinal trends of Turkish officer corps? The military service experience over years would, for instance, change officers, so that the colonels, who were the lieutenants of the late-1980s, started same as the current lieutenants but changed over time due to the transformative military mechanisms, such as military education and the military’s particular lifestyle. One may then assert that current differences between lieutenants and colonels do not mean change in the distribution of opinions across ranks. This may be the same distribution of opinion as in late-1980s if one had applied this design then. This is a grounded reservation that would point to a validity problem in the design, particularly when emphasizing generational differences. The first thing that is worth mentioning is the fact that this validity problem is rooted from the absence of previous research on the attitudes of the Turkish officer corps. This

absence of longitudinal data makes it impossible to compare and confirm/confront the findings of this study with another research to generate trend analyses. To overcome this validity problem, this study relies on the triangulation and multi-method approach explained in previous chapters.

5.2. The Analysis of the Survey Findings

In the following, a brief analysis will be presented about each question taking place in the questionnaire. Then, a general discussion of this chapter will be provided. In the analysis, the Gendarmerie Command, which is affiliated with the Interior Ministry in terms of its duties, authorities and, responsibilities, will be included in some relevant questions, but not all.

Distribution of the sample with respect to force commands (services)

Force Command

	#	%
Army	892	63.7
Air Force	244	17.4
Navy	160	11.4
Gendarmerie	105	7.5
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Distribution of the sample with respect to ranks

Rank

	#	%
Lieutenant/first Lt.	651	46.5
Captain	277	19.8
Major	143	10.2
Lt. Colonel	52	3.7
Colonel	270	19.3
General/Admiral	8	.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Q4. What is the highest level of education you have completed or are currently enrolled in?

	#	%
War academy/University Graduates	990	70.7
Master's (Including the continuing ones)	335	23.9
PhD (Including the continuing ones)	72	5.1
No response	4	.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As seen, the level of education of the officer corps is much higher compared with that of Turkey in general.¹¹⁶ While 100% of the officer population is a university graduate, according to data from TUIK as of 2014, the ratio of the whole population of university graduates is 11% in Turkey; while 23.9% of the officers have a master's diploma or are continuing their education, this is 1% in Turkey; while 5.1% of the officer population have had their PhD degree or continuing their PhD education, this is 0.22% in Turkey.

No significant difference between the force commands was found with respect to the education levels.

¹¹⁶ For more information on this comparison, please refer to TUIK's 2014 educational year: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/basinOdasi/haberler/2015_34_20150609.pdf (accessed December 2, 2015).

The following shows education levels broken down with respect to ranks:

Table 6: Education Level of the Respondents with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
War Academy/University	528	172	67	34	182	983
Master's (Including the continuing ones)	114	91	53	13	64	335
Doctorate (Including the continuing ones)	6	13	23	5	24	71
TOTAL	648	276	143	52	270	1,389

As a significant difference, majors in the TAF have the highest level of education in the TAF. Thirty-seven percent of majors hold master's degrees, and 16% of all majors are PhD graduates or continuing their doctorate studies. In the light of this result, it is possible to say that the rank of major between the ages of 35-42 is the group that would potentially provide the greatest contribution to the TAF's institutional change in intellectual terms. Besides, it is possible to say that the level of education tends to increase as the rank decreases down until the rank of captain.

Q5. What type of school did you graduate from?

	#	%
War academy	1,099	78.4
Civilian university	296	21.1
Other (non-commissioned officers or specialized sergeants)	5	.4
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Table 7: School Distribution with respect to ranks


	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Civilian University	195	60	7	1	33	296
War Academy	456	216	134	48	237	1,091
TOTAL	651	276	141	49	270	1,387

There is an increase in a civil university background among junior ranks, particularly lieutenants and first lieutenants. As of 2014, 30% of the lieutenants/ First lieutenants serving in the TAF are those civil university graduate contracted officers. Due to the insufficient number of lieutenants from war academies to fill the TAF's cadres, the lack of cadres is being compensated with contracted officers with civilian university background. The recruitment of young civilian university graduates as contracted officers is a source of supply that the TAF has been deliberately concentrating on since 2006. In this respect, the Army has the leading role as the positions of platoon/team commandship, especially for counter-terrorism, are filled with contracted officers. According to the regulation,¹¹⁷ the contracted officers sign a 3-year contract at the beginning of their service, and this contract can be renewed 3 times, serving 9 years in total. After the 9-year period, if TAF offers and the contracted officer accepts, he gains the right to take the transfer to regular service examination. The ones who can pass the examination, which has a written test,

¹¹⁷ Please see for the official regulation of contracted officers (Turkish): <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.11974&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=> (accessed September 14, 2015)

interview, and physical proficiency phases can continue their services as regular officers up to the rank of colonel.

Figure 6: Number of contracted officers in the TAF¹¹⁸



As seen in the table, there was no contracted officers in the TAF as of 2005. Gradually, there were around 3,784 contracted officers in the TAF as of 2015, a population constituting around 11% of the officer corps.

The following highlights the ratio of contracted officers in each force command:

Table 8: Number and ratio of contracted officers in the TAF

Army	2108 (11.6%)
Navy	181 (3.4%)
Air Force	572 (9.3%)
Gendarmerie	929 (16.7%)

¹¹⁸ The numbers are taken from the TGS's Personnel Command (J1).

As one may notice, while the Army has the highest population of contracted officers in the officer corps, the Gendarmerie Command and the Air Force have a relatively high population when compared to the population in the Navy, the force command which has only been contracting officers for 4 years.

One should also note that, in terms of the distribution of the contracted officers among ranks, the Lieutenant/First Lieutenant category has the highest number of contracted officers with around 30% of the whole population.

The interview findings suggest that there is a friction between the junior officers (lieutenants/first lieutenants, captains, and majors) who have graduated from the war academy and contracted officers. War academy graduates do not perceive the contracted officers as “genuine officers” and they isolate them¹¹⁹ by calling them “pouch (*poşet*)” a derogatory term meaning that they are empty beings not fully deserving officership. Despite the fact that the practice of contracting officers has been ongoing for 10 years, this discontent is still visible among ranks of lieutenants/first lieutenants and captains, although not as much as it was in the first years.

S., a contracted lieutenant in the Army, says the following in the interview:

It is true that we are exposed to discrimination from officers who have a war academy background. They essentially do not see us as real officers or stress that we are temporal. This stress on being temporal, in turn, weakens our attachment to the institution.¹²⁰

War Academy graduate Captain I. says, in turn,

The contracted officership has been practiced in the Navy for almost 5 years, but it is still not possible to say it runs smoothly. We have difficulty

¹¹⁹ From interview with Captain A. who worked as a company commander of the student officer battalion of Army Infantry School based in Tuzla/Istanbul on January 16, 2014.

¹²⁰ From interview conducted with S. in Istanbul on January 21, 2015.

in seeing the contracted ones as officers. They also do not want to be like us.¹²¹

Again, an important finding observed in interviews and the questionnaire is that both the quality of education and the level of foreign language contracted officers are much lower than the officers graduating from the war academy. The difference in education between war academy graduates and contracted officers coming from low-quality universities and not faring well in knowledge of foreign languages standing weak about foreign language knowledge, is the most important factor feeding the discrimination. For example, while 90% of the officers who graduate from the war academy know at least one foreign language (mostly English), the proportion of contracted officers knowing at least one foreign language is about 50%.

Q6. What is your hometown? (Please fill the space below with which ever city you feel is your hometown)

It is seen that the officers disperse proportionally in general without concentrating on a specific city or region geographically. This is an important point as it shows that no system of segregation exists in the TAF in terms of geographic dispersion and an “Army-nation” unison, a narrative which TAF has always been emphasizing, is ensured from the geographic point-of-view.

When the difference between the force commands is considered, a slight accumulation to the ones in the Aegean and Marmara regions attracts attention within the Navy and the Air Force. The Army, however, has got officers distributed evenly from everywhere. Especially for the Air Force, Eskişehir, İstanbul, and Bursa; and for the Navy, İstanbul, Kocaeli, İzmir, and Bursa are the leading hometowns of

¹²¹ From interview conducted with I. in Ankara on November 12, 2014.

officers. The existence of units/bases at those provinces can be stated as the main reason. There was no significant difference in answers for this question between ranks.

Table 9: Geographic distribution of respondents

Hometown					
	#	%		#	%
Istanbul	104	7.4	Diyarbakır	12	.9
Eskişehir	61	4.4	Mardin	12	.9
Ankara	52	3.7	Muğla	12	.9
Bursa	51	3.6	Muş	12	.9
Izmir	51	3.6	Sivas	12	.9
Kocaeli	43	3.1	Aksaray	12	.9
Rize	36	2.6	Karabük	12	.9
Edirne	31	2.2	Artvin	11	.8
Adana	30	2.1	Kastamonu	11	.8
Konya	29	2.1	Hatay	10	.7
Kayseri	28	2.0	Kahramanmaraş	10	.7
Bilecik	27	1.9	Sinop	10	.7
Kars	26	1.9	Bayburt	10	.7
Kütahya	25	1.8	Karaman	10	.7
Kırşehir	24	1.7	Düzce	10	.7
Ordu	24	1.7	Burdur	9	.6
Manisa	23	1.6	Gümüşhane	9	.6
Afyon	22	1.6	Tokat	9	.6
İçel	22	1.6	Şanlıurfa	9	.6
Denizli	21	1.5	Uşak	9	.6
Amasya	20	1.4	Isparta	8	.6
Erzurum	20	1.4	Nevşehir	8	.6
Samsun	20	1.4	Van	8	.6
Aydın	19	1.4	Yozgat	8	.6
Malatya	19	1.4	Bingöl	7	.5
Adıyaman	18	1.3	Elazığ	7	.5
Ağrı	17	1.2	Siirt	7	.5
Trabzon	17	1.2	Şırnak	7	.5
Antalya	16	1.1	Ardahan	7	.5
Tekirdağ	16	1.1	Iğdır	7	.5
Bolu	15	1.1	Kilis	7	.5
Gaziantep	15	1.1	Osmaniye	7	.5
Giresun	15	1.1	Kırklareli	6	.4
Sakarya	14	1.0	Niğde	6	.4
Yalova	14	1.0	Tunceli	6	.4

Balıkesir	13	.9	Kırıkkale	6	.4
Çorum	13	.9	Bartın	6	.4
Erzincan	13	.9	Hakkari	5	.4
Bitlis	12	.9	Zonguldak	5	.4
Çanakkale	12	.9	Batman	2	.1
Diyarbakır	11	.9			
TOPLAM				1,401	100.0

Q7. What is your father's level of education? In other words, what was that highest degree your father obtained?

	#	%
Literate	42	3.0
Primary school	302	21.6
Elementary school	366	26.1
High school	425	30.3
University	242	17.3
Master's	21	1.5
Doctorate	2	.1
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

According to the results of this question, 29.18% of officers in the Army have fathers whose highest level of education was primary school. This percentage is 5% in the Navy and 12% in the air force. The ratio of university and above is, in turn, 15.71% in the Army, 28.12% in the Navy, and 28.12% in the Air Force. While the highest level of education among officers' fathers was in the Navy, followed by the Air Force and the Army, respectively. On average, the father of an Army officer has an elementary school education, the father of an air force officer has a high school education, and the father of a Navy officer has a high school or university education. This shows, in turn, that the parents of the officers in the Navy and the Air Force are from a higher education and income group compared to the Army. Averagely, while

parents of officers in the Navy and air force are mostly from high- and middle-class income level, the parents of the Army officers are mostly in the low- to middle-income level.

The following table shows the level of education among officers' fathers with respect to ranks:

Table 10: The level of education among officers' fathers with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Literate / Primary school	110	47	28	11	145	341
Elementary school	170	74	39	16	66	365
High school	194	109	53	18	48	422
University / Post graduate	177	47	23	6	11	264
TOTAL	651	277	143	51	270	1,392

As can be seen, the level of education among fathers increase as rank decreases. While the ratio of university graduate fathers is 27% for lieutenants/first lieutenants, this ratio is about 4% for colonels.

Q8. Which income bracket does your monthly household income fall under? In other words, how many Turkish Liras does your household receive per month on average, from all sources of income? (All sources of income including money from your spouse's wage as well as any money you may be receiving from rent, etc.)

	#	%
2500-4000 TL	537	38.3
4000-5000 TL	315	22.5
5000-6000 TL	220	15.7
6000-7000 TL	177	12.6

7000-8000 TL	127	9.1
8000 TL - above	25	1.8
TOTAL	1277	100.0

The interview findings indicate that the “financial situation” is one of the important criteria determining the relation of an officer with the TAF. It is possible to say that there is an important difference between the officers whose wives are working and officers whose wives are not working in terms of the institutional attachment towards the TAF and the importance given to the occupational career. Since the officers whose wives are working are more independent of TAF in financial terms, it is seen that they perceive officership as an “occupation” instead of a lifestyle. M.G., who resigned from the TAF, in January 2015, says:

In order to be able to carry on my academic studies, I chose to resign willingly since I completed 10 years of compulsory service. The most important thing fostered me in taking this decision was that my wife is an teacher working in public sector. If her public service and stable income were not in place, I would not have made this decision so easily.¹²²

Y., a successful Staff Major whose wife does not work, says:

My wife is a university graduate, but she is a housewife. We have two children. She had studied for the Public Staff Selection Examination (KPSS), the exam for recruitment of public servants for 3 years, but could not get the required score, then she gave up. We are trying to survive with my single salary in the metropolis of Ankara. If I did not live in a flat within military housing but out in a civilian rental house, I would have substantial financial problems. In fact, we are having financial problems now. Sometimes my parents and my wife’s parents provide financial aid to us. My single aim is to concentrate more on my military career and to be selected to the 3-year long post abroad by increasing my foreign language score. For us, the staff officers, when you get a score that is not very high but about 80, it is possible to go to an abroad post in which you can make a saving of 2500 US \$ per month. In this situation, you can return from that post as having saved enough money for a house and a good car. Since my wife does not work, going to a permanent post abroad is vitally important for me in financially to guarantee my children’s future.¹²³

¹²² From interview conducted with I. in Ankara on October 22, 2015.

¹²³ The interview was conducted on March 21, 2014 in Ankara.

Q9. Do you know any languages aside from Turkish? (including those you only have a beginner's or basic knowledge of)

	#	%
I do not know a foreign language	269	19.2
One language	973	69.5
Two languages	152	10.8
Three languages	7	.5
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

According to the results of this survey question, 68% of the Army and Air Force personnel, as well as 88% of the Navy know at least one foreign language. The reason for the decrease foreign language knowledge in the Army and Air Force can be attributed to the higher number of contracted officers in than in the Navy.

The following chart shows the knowledge of foreign languages with respect to ranks:

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
I do not know	153	49	5	4	58	269
Only one	440	188	114	36	189	967
Only two	57	37	23	11	23	151
TOPLAM	650	274	142	51	270	1387

As rank decreases, the rate of knowing one foreign language or more increases. Knowledge of a foreign language is most prevalent amongst majors at 95%, of whom know at least one foreign language. Of the captains, 82% of the captains knows at least one foreign language.

The ostensible low rate of foreign language acquisition in the lieutenants/first lieutenants can be explained by the number of contracted officers, which is much more than that of the other ranks.

The foreign language score is the most important criteria for an officer to be selected to temporary (up to 6 months) or permanent (from 6 months to 3 years) posts abroad, in which an officer can receive abroad post payment (around US\$ 2,400 for 6-month-long temporary posts and around US\$ 5,000 for 2 or 3-year long permanent posts). Therefore, a great majority of officers consider learning foreign languages as the primary condition for financial gain in the TAF with a pragmatist approach. First Lieutenant E. explains the significance of foreign language skills among officers with following words:

We say in the TAF “eating bread” to imply financial gains. If you want to eat bread, you eat it only through your foreign language skills. Because, the greatest dream of an officer or non-commissioned officer is a 2- or 3-year permanent post abroad from which he can return with \$150,000 in his pocket. For that reason, only with your foreign language skill, you can differentiate from your peers in the TAF, and you can have substantial economic gain.¹²⁴

Major G., who can speak five foreign languages, emphasizes the following about the importance foreign language knowledge among officers:

Now, knowing only English is not enough in the TAF. Many officers are going for a second and even a third language. My interest in learning foreign languages stems from military high school. I receive award payments for all the languages I learned. Four years of my 17-year career was abroad. For an officer, foreign language proficiency means a ticket for going abroad. Therefore, officers who don't know English in which the competition is tough, behave more pragmatic and tend towards the increasingly fashionable languages such as Arabic, Farsi, Chinese, Hebrew, and Russian. While for average test score for English, which is composed of the average of public servants' foreign language exam score

¹²⁴ The interview was conducted on September 15, 2015 in Ankara.

and the listening test score conducted within the TAF, you should take is 95, this average falls down to 70 for those other languages.¹²⁵

Indeed, the tendency of young officers towards learning less competitive languages such as Arabic, Russian, Hebrew, and Chinese reveal their pragmatist sides. Their tendency towards learning the languages in which the competition is relatively soft such as German, French, Arabic, Russian, Hebrew, Chinese instead of English which requires a General Language Exam average score of 90 to 100 show the strategic preferences of officers who are focusing on posts and financial expectations.

Army Major İ., who had been abroad as an assistant military attaché for 3 years in a central Asian country with a Russian language score of 87, says:

In fact, I know English but since the scores are very high in English, it was very difficult for me to go abroad with a score of English. I was deployed to a 6-months long temporary post in Turkmenistan. I started learning Russian in this post. I knew very well that I could eat bread from Russian. I studied this language for 4 years and, at the end, I was chosen for this 3-years long post of assistant military attaché. It took four years of mine to reach this goal. I am not a staff officer. I do not have career expectations in the military but thanks to my Russian, I went to Turkmenistan. With the money I saved in that post, I could buy a good house in the Eryaman province of Ankara and a good car. My wife is also working. Now, I am relaxed in economic terms.¹²⁶

Q.10. Were you acquainted with officers from your family or your friends before you joined the military?

	#	%
Yes	491	35.0
No	910	65.0
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

¹²⁵ The interview was conducted on August 22, 2015 in Ankara.

¹²⁶ The interview was conducted on May 2, 2015 in Ankara.

The answer to this question of the amount of officers who were not acquainted with other officers before joining the military (65%) reveals that the profession of officership does not have an aristocratic characteristic coming from the family and the near sphere lineages. This likely suggests that the great majority of officers are not coming from elite officer families, and are rather experiencing their “elitization process” within the TAF.

The following table shows the preceding question with regard to different ranks:

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	189	131	57	22	89	488
No	462	146	86	30	181	905
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1393

In all ranks, the percentage of not having had any officer acquaintances amongst family or friends exceeds 50%. This finding shows that, in the officer corps, there is no favoritism granted to relatives and no patronage on the basis of family relations.

Q11. Who was the primary influence in your decision to become an officer?

	#	%
Personal choice	705	50.3
Family's influence	651	46.5
Other people close to me, besides my family	44	3.1
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As seen, the decision to become an officer in the military is the result of the freewill of the person or as a decision made within the family.

The following chart illuminates the distribution among different ranks:

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Personal choice	410	149	66	24	52	701
Family's influence	235	118	66	24	206	649
TOTAL	645	267	132	48	258	1,350

As an important finding, as the rank decreases, the voluntary choice of an individual becomes the most significant factor in the decision to be an officer. While, for instance, the decision to be an officer is the person's own choice for 64% of the lieutenants/first lieutenants, while this number is 20% for colonels.

The findings indicate that the influence of personal choice on the decision to be an officer is increasing. Junior-level officers (lieutenants, captains, and majors) officers tend to choose officership with a more deliberate preference, while senior-level officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels) became officers with a preference shaped by the influence of their family. It is possible to say that the increase of determination of the freewill of the individual and the decrease of the family's influence in the decision to become an officer is an important finding emphasizing increased professionalism among the officer corps.

Q12. What was your main reason in becoming an officer?

Table 11: The main reason in becoming an officer

	#	%
Social status (Serving in an institution such as the TAF)	732	52.2
Financial expectations (a secure job)	417	29.8
A training offered by the TAF, opportunity to serve abroad and similar professional career opportunities	223	15.9
The high level of education at the TAF compared to its civilian counterparts	28	2.0
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As seen from the table, social status (serving in an prestigious institution such as the TAF) mostly accounts for the reason to officers decided to join the military a 52% in the Army, 49% in the Air Force, and 61% in the Navy. This means that the Navy is the most idea force among all three.

Answers from this survey question reveal that financial expectations were the most important reason to join for 33% in the Army, 29% in the Air Force, and 17% in the Navy. Following this, it is possible to say that the officers serving in the Army are the ones attaching the greatest importance to financial expectations.

The reason for the ostensible higher rate of financial expectations in the Army and the air force is the increased number of contracted officers compared with the Navy. For a specific force, it is observed that as the ratio of contracted officers increase, the option of financial expectations (secure job) becomes more weighted.

The following tables elucidates the main reasons officers decided to join broken down by rank:

Table 12: The main reason in becoming an officer with respect to ranks

	Lt. / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Financial expectations (secure job)	243 (38%)	74 (27%)	27 (20%)	16 (30%)	56 (21%)	416
Social status (Serving in an institution such as the TAF)	269 (42%)	144 (52%)	92 (66%)	29 (56%)	191 (72%)	725
A training offered by the TAF, opportunity to serve abroad and similar professional career opportunities	123 (20%)	57 (21%)	19 (14%)	6 (14%)	18 (7%)	223
TOTAL	635	275	138	51	265	1364

The table above is important in that it shows variety among ranks. While social status is the determining factor in becoming an officer at the senior-level, as the rank decreases, the determining power of the social status decreases and the scale slips towards the alternatives of financial expectations and career at the junior level. This finding shows that the officership is transforming from institutional, that is a lifestyle attaching significance to system of values to a “profession” in which financial expectations and progress in career gain importance.

Table 13: The split between seniors and juniors with respect to reasons for becoming an officer

	Social Status	Financial Expectations	Career
Junior-Level officers (Lit., 1 st Lit, Captains + Majors)	48%	33%	19%
Senior-level officers (Lt. Colonels, Colonels, Generals)	70%	22%	8%

Again, when we separate the sample in a dichotomic way as juniors and seniors, the difference in this question becomes even more visible. While social status is the primary reason to be an officer for the great majority of the senior officers (70%), for the junior officers, this ratio decreases more than one third and goes down to 48%. There is an increase in the financial expectations alternative and for the career alternative, in turn, the difference in between is almost doublefold.

Q13. What is the total amount of time you have served in areas actively partaking in counterterrorism operations as of now (towns in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, commonly referred to as “*Sark Görevi*”)?

	#	%
I haven't	552	39.4
1-2 between years	229	16.3
2-3 between years	249	17.8
3-4 between years	127	9.1
4-5 between years	105	7.5
5-6 between years	77	5.5
6 or more	62	4.4
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

According to the results of this survey question, 70% of the Army, 42% of the Air Force, and none of the Navy officers has been to southeast Turkey at least once to perform counterterror tasks.

A colonel in the TAF spends 5 years on average in combating terrorism. Among majors, this average falls down to 3 years and to 1 year among lieutenants/first lieutenants. Combating terrorism has deeply affected the organizational culture of the Army. During the interviews, it was interesting to note that, among the 47 officers who served in southeastern Turkey, roughly half of them stated that only strict implementation of security-centric incapacitating strategies through military means cannot solve the PKK-initiated violence, and more comprehensively, population-centric approaches should be mobilized by policymakers.

Q14. How successful do you think the TAF has been thus far in combating terrorism?

	#	%
Not successful	351	25.1
A little successful	565	40.3
Very successful	485	34.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In regards to the military's efforts to combat terrorism, 32% in the Army, 12% in the Air Force, 15% in the Navy, and 10% in the Gendarmerie think that the TAF has not been successful in counterterrorism. This may lead one to ask the question as to why this number is so high in the Army. The answer is that the Army is the one who carries the heaviest burden of counterterror operations in southeast Turkey. Amongst officers in the Navy, who never takes an active role in combatting terrorism, 43% think that the military has been very successful in combatting

terrorism. The percentage is 27% in the Army. From this point, it is possible to say that having served and conducted counterterror operations in southeast Turkey and incidents experienced negatively influences the assessment of success against terrorism among the officers.

The survey results of how successful the military has been at combatting terrorist broken down by rank.

Table 14: Perceptions on the TAF's success in combatting terrorism with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Not successful	130 (20%)	104 (38)	34 (24%)	5	78 (29%)	351
A little successful	240 (37%)	122 (44%)	57 (40%)	19	125 (46%)	563
Very successful	281 (43%)	51 (18%)	52 (26%)	28	67 (25%)	479
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1393

The ones who think that the TAF has not been successful in combating terrorism are the captains, who have the highest rank in the field. One should note that captains are the intermediate decision makers in counterterrorism operations. As an interesting finding in the questionnaire, the tendency to find the TAF unsuccessful in combating terrorism increases as the duration of mission conduct in the counterterror region increases. The reason for that is the difference between officers with field experiences in the southeast of Turkey and those who have not served but have listened to stories account for this phenomena, which is counterintuitive.

Q15. As of today, how long have you served outside of Turkey? (including military deployment, education, and seminars)

Table 15: The distribution of the service for international posts among respondents

	#	%
Never served outside Turkey	754	53.8
0-6 months	342	24.4
6 months - 1 year	165	11.8
1-2 years	76	5.4
2-3 years	42	3.0
3 years and more	18	1.3
No response	4	.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The percentage of officers who have never been posted abroad is 54% in the Army, 52% in the Air Force, and 52% in the Navy, meaning that one in two officer in all three forces had been abroad for at least 6 months. The effects of the increase in the international posts and the “becoming international” efforts on institutional transformation were emphasized in the previous chapter. In interviews conducted, it was stressed continuously by all the officers that the TAF has increased its international post in the last decade and that the High Command has been placing special emphasis on internationalization.

Q16. What is the total number of years you have spent abroad for educational purposes (military or academic)?

	#	%
Never received education abroad	1,059	75.6
0-6 months	238	17.0
6 months - 1 year	54	3.9

1-2 years	33	2.4
2-3 years	8	.6
3 years and more	1	.1
No response	8	.6
TOTAL	1,277	100.0

In terms of being abroad for educational purposes, 21% of the Army, 30% of the Air Force, and 36% of Navy officers have been abroad for at least 6 months for education/training. It is evident that the best force about education/training abroad is the Navy, followed by the Air Force and the Army.

Q17. Where have you served abroad? (If you've served in more than one place, please circle all the relevant options)

The country in which the TAF has the greatest amount of abroad personnel due to NATO posts, as well as training and educational purposes is the US While the proportion of being in the U.S. for educational or post purposes is 13% in the Army, it is 19% in the Navy and 17% in the Air Force. Afghanistan ranks second as having the most amount of military personnel being deployed for educational purposes with European countries coming in third at 4%.

Q18. Generally, how satisfied are you with being an officer as an profession?

	#	%
Not at all	318	22.7
A little	754	53.8
Very	328	23.4
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

When asked about how satisfied they were with being an officer as a profession, 26% in the Army responded that they were not satisfied, followed by the

Air Force (21%), the Navy (15%), and the Gendarmarie (11%). In the light of those numbers, it would appear that the Army is the unhappiest force.

The following chart reveals that satisfaction level of being an officer by breaking it down by rank:

Table 16: The distribution of satisfaction with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Not at all	148 (23%)	72 (26%)	30 (21%)	12	56 (20%)	318
A little	368 (56%)	164 (59%)	85 (59%)	24	113 (42%)	754
Very	135 (21%)	41 (15%)	28 (20%)	16	100 (38%)	320
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	269	1392

Table 17: Satisfaction Among the Seniors and Juniors

	Very	A little	Not at all
Senior level Officers (Lt.Colonels,Colonels,Generals)	37%	42%	21%
Junior Level officers (Lit.,First Lit,Captains+Majors)	19%	58%	23%

As seen in the table above, the dissatisfaction about the profession among the officers increases as the rank decreases. There is a clear shift from “very satisfied” to “a little satisfied” and “not satisfied at all,” particularly among junior-level officers.

The interviews suggest that for a great majority of junior-level officers, the level of satisfaction is not directly related to financial issues or difficult assignments in remote bases. Instead, it is directly related to the commander with whom they have

served. An officer, on the one hand, who served in a remote base in the border line during a rough period, could define this as the most satisfying service in his whole career and thanks to the “commander” with whom he served. Another officer, on the other hand, who served in a “preferable” base in the metropolitan city of Istanbul, could define this deployment as the “grimmest” period in his career, blaming it on the commander’s attitude towards his subordinates. It is then not hyperbole to assert that there is a direct association between an officer’s satisfaction level in a particular deployment and his perception of the commander in charge of the unit in which the officer serves.

Q19. What has been the most satisfying aspect of your time in the TAF till now? (please choose only one)

	#	%
Social status and job satisfaction	581	41.5
Economic resources	452	32.3
Career opportunities	367	26.2
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The percentage of “social status and job satisfaction” is 43% in the Army, 43% in the Air Force, 22% in the Navy and 53% in the Gendarmerie. The ratio of the “career opportunities” making an officer happy is, 35% in the Air Force, 46% in the Navy, 31% in the Army, and 21% in the Gendarmerie.

Table 18: Satisfaction with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Social status and job satisfaction	199 (30%)	103	70	21	180	573

Financial gains	209 (32%)	70	34	18	36	367
Career opportunities	243 (38%)	103	39	13	54	452
TOTAL	651	276	143	52	270	1,392

As seen in the tables, as the rank decreases, there appears a shift from the option of “social status and job satisfaction” to that of “financial gains” and “career opportunities.” This finding supports consistently the finding of 12th question regarding motivations as a determining factor in the decision to become an officer. Furthermore, the findings of this table confirm the findings of the previous one. While morale and social status play a determining role in the satisfaction levels of senior-level officers, the majors do not associate their satisfaction level with morale and social status as much, instead concentrate more on career opportunities and material factors. lieutenants, on the other hand, are the most economy-oriented category in the survey. One may then suggest that while social status has been on the decline as the determining factor of the level of satisfaction, material opportunities have been on a relative increase.

Q20. What have you always most prioritized during your period of service in the TAF?

	#	%
TAF (my institution)	675	48.2
Myself	371	26.5
My Family	354	25.3
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

When this question is considered in terms of forces, 55% of the Navy, 50% of the Army and 40% of the Air Force stated that TAF is above all. For showing the

trend of becoming individualistic, 29% of the Army, 27% of the Air Force and 16% of the Navy said 'myself is above all'. For this question also, the effect of the contracted officers in the Army and the Air Force is observed.

Table 19: Prioritization with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Myself	263 (40%)	74 (27%)	18 (13%)	7 (13%)	9 (3%)	371
My family	166 (26%)	89 (32%)	45 (31%)	21 (40%)	33 (12%)	354
TAF (my institution)	221 (34%)	114 (41%)	80 (56%)	24 (47%)	228 (85%)	667
TOTAL	650	277	143	52	270	1392

With respect to ranks, the rising effect of individualism as the rank decreases is seen clearly from the increase in the rate of the option of 'myself.' For example, the rate of the option of 'myself' among the colonels rises to 13%, among the Lt. Colonels, 13%, among the Majors, 27%, among the Captains and 40% among the lieutenants / first lieutenants. As seen in the table, there is an obvious difference in the opinion of officers towards officership. While the great majority of senior-level officers regard officership as a way of life that not only surrounds the officer himself but also has direct impact on his family's life, great majority of junior-level officers do reject this conceptualization of officership, and conceive officership merely as a profession which should not shape the whole life of the officer and his family.

Q21. How important is the “spirit of cohort” (*devre ruhu*) for an officer?

The “spirit of cohort” (*devre ruhu*) has never been studied until now in the TAF scholarly literature, despite the fact that it is an important informal institution directly influencing the behaviors and strategic preferences of the officers. The *devre*

ruhu can be defined as an officer's gratuitous trust in collaborating with his cohorts, who are closely monitoring and protecting him. Especially, each officer collaborates with them first when he has been newly appointed is an important rule in the TAF. Mates within a cohort generally know each other very well and they think they should firstly support each other in every circumstance and situation, and at all cost. This informal institution allows for both swift communication between cohort mates and a pressure mechanism that affects the behaviors and strategic preferences of officers. For an officer well known and appreciated, the cohort spirit has an effect for promotion, whereas negative cohort spirit can cause obstacles to an officer's career.

However, especially in war academies, the practice that the same cohorts studying in a single battalion or fleet was abolished starting from 2000. This meant that there were going to be students from each of the 4 classes (that is, from 4 different cohorts) in every student battalion/fleet. This new regulation called "mixed battalion" has weakened the effect of spirit of cohort to a great extent. Now, cohort mates do not know each other very well as they do not study together as boarding students for 4 years. The following table shows to what extent officers value the cohort spirit:

	#	%
Not at all	473	33.8
A little	442	31.5
Very	486	34.7
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The following table shows the importance each officer places on the cohort spirit, broken down by rank.

Table 20: Importance attached to the “Cohort Spirit” with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Not at all	373 (57%)	85	13	1	1 (0.3%)	473
A little	201 (31%)	140	58	12	31 (11%)	442
Very	77 (21%)	52	72	39	238 (88%)	478
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1393

As it can also be understood from the table, while 88% of the colonels consider the spirit of cohort to be very important, this ratio falls down to 19% for captains, and to 12% for lieutenants/first lieutenants. This research suggests that as ranks decrease, so does the effect of the “spirit of cohort” on the behaviors and strategic preferences of an officer.

Q22. Do you think that the respect and reputation accorded to officership as a profession is decreasing in Turkey?

	#	%
Yes	1,077	76.9
No	318	22.7
No response	6	.5
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

With regards to the perception of the military, 83% of the Army responded “yes” when asked if the respect and reputation accorded to officership as a profession has been decreasing in Turkey, followed by the Air Force (76%), Gendarmerie (76%), and the Navy (50%).

Table 21: Perception about the decrease on TAF's reputation with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	488 (76%)	233 (84%)	105 (73%)	34 (65%)	211 (78%)	1,071
No	157 (24%)	44 (16%)	38 (27%)	18 (35%)	59 (22%)	316
TOTAL	645	277	143	52	270	1,387

It is an interesting finding that a great majority of all ranks answered “yes” without much differentiation by rank.

Q23. If you currently have or plan to have children, would you want them to be an officer in the TAF?

The following question on whether or not an officer would want his children to be an offer in the TAF aimed to measure institutional attachment:

	#	%
Yes	528	37.7
No	873	62.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In response to this survey question, 66% of the Army answered that they would not want their children to be an office in the TAF, followed by 65% of the Air Force and 53% of the Navy. In the light of those answers, it is interesting to note that the Army had the greatest number of respondent about not wanting to have children entering the military.

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	196 (30%)	91 (33%)	61 (43%)	22 (42%)	152 (56%)	522
No	455 (70%)	186 (67%)	82 (57%)	30 (58%)	118 (44%)	871
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1,393

This question again emphasized that as rank decreases, the less likely the officer would like his offspring to become an officer. Answers given to this question also go hand-in-hand with the findings from questions about “who is above” and their degree of satisfaction.

These results clearly show the extent to which “officership” has become an unpopular profession among junior officers. This finding may also be asserted as another indicator of the officer corps’ declining commitment to the TAF as the source of high status within society.

Q24. What do you think the TAF’s “primary task” ought to be?

	#	%
Protecting the Republic of Turkey solely from external threats	740	52.8
Protecting the Republic of Turkey from both internal and external threats	661	47.2
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Table 22: Perception of TAF's primary task with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Protecting the Republic of Turkey from solely external threats	450 (69%)	159 (57%)	54 (38%)	15 (29%)	59 (22%)	737 (53%)
Protecting the Republic of Turkey from both internal and external threats	201 (31%)	118 (43%)	89 (62%)	37 (71%)	211 (78%)	656 (47%)
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1,393

This question which aims to measure the opinions about the TAF's primary task. While no significant difference exist between the forces, there are significant differences between ranks. For example, as ranks decrease, the opinion that the task of the TAF is to protect Turkey from solely external threats tends to increase. For colonels, this percentage is 21.8%, whereas it is 89.1% for lieutenants/first lieutenants.

Q25. Do you think the TAF needs serious structural reforms to meet future threats and prepare for possible conflicts?

	#	%
Yes	1240	88.5
No	138	9.9
No response	23	1.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The Army responded affirmatively about the restructuring of the military with 92%, followed by the Air Force (88%), and the Navy (80%). In total, 88% answered "yes," which is an important finding showing that the officers need a structural reform and are mentally ready for something like that.

Table 23: Perception about TAF's need for reforms with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	589 (94%)	255 (92%)	130 (90%)	40 (77%)	221 (82%)	1235 (90%)
No	40 (6%)	22 (8%)	13 (10%)	12 (23%)	48 (18%)	135 (10%)
TOTAL	629	277	143	52	269	1,370

The overwhelming amount of affirmative answers in all ranks is indicative that the great majority of officers who participated in the questionnaire agree that the TAF needs serious structural reforms for transformation.

Q26. How optimistic are you about the TAF's power and deterrent capabilities in the global security environment?

	#	%
Not at all	397	28.3
A little	667	47.6
Very	336	24.0
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Regarding TAF's current capabilities on the international stage, 30% of the Army is not optimistic about the current deterrent capabilities of the TAB in the global security environment, followed by the Navy (33%), the Air Force (25%), and the Gendarmerie (15%).

Table 24: The level of Optimism about TAF's Deterrent Capabilities with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Not at all	150 (23%)	90 (32%)	46 (32%)	10 (20%)	100 (37%)	396
A little	323 (50%)	137	66	34	107	667
Very	178 (27%)	50	31	8	62	329
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	269	1,392

The average of “not at all” optimistic among all ranks is around 30%.

When both the interviews and the questionnaire results are considered, it is possible to say that there is a positive correlation between the durations of posts abroad and the negative opinion regarding international deterrent capabilities of the TAF. That is to say, as officers increase their understanding of the capabilities of other armies around the world while being posted abroad, their level of optimism about the TAF's ability at international deterrent declines.

**Q27. Which are the most important factors for a “deterrent and strong Army”?
(please choose only one)**

	#	%
Qualified personnel	609	43.5
Technology	490	35.0
Qualified commanders	226	16.1
Military morale and cultural values	74	5.3
No response	2	.2
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

It is interesting to note that the officers who participated the questionnaire, emphasized “qualified commanders” for a deterrent and powerful Army.

Table 25: Perception about the most Important factor for a Strong TAF’s with respect to ranks

	Qualified Personnel	Technology	Qualified Commanders	Military moral and cultural factors
Army	10%	29%	56%	5%
Air Force	18%	60%	15%	7%
Navy	48%	36%	12%	4%
Gendarmerie	13%	25%	53%	9%

As seen from the table, the varieties among the forces give clear insights about the cultures of each force command. In the answers given, while the emphasis of qualified personnel predominates, in the Navy, the emphasis of technology gains importance with 60% and in the Air Force, and in the Army, the emphasis of qualified commanders gains importance with 56%.

Q28. How do you think Turkey’s membership to NATO contributed to TAF’s institutional structure (organizational structure, work, institutional culture, etc.)?

	#	%
Positively	992	70.8
Negatively	362	25.8
No response	47	3.4
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The ones saying yes are 74% in the Army, 74% in the Air Force, 68% in the Navy. The answers show that the perception about NATO is so “positive” that it reaches to a rate of 70%.

Table 26: Perception of NATO with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Positively	472 (75%)	196 (75%)	108 (76%)	39 (75%)	169 (62%)	984
Negatively	151	64	34	13	100	362
TOTAL	623	260	142	52	269	1346

In light of the table above, it is possible to say that the level of positive perception about the NATO is the same for all ranks, except for colonels with a 62% positive perception.

Q29. How do you think Turkey’s NATO membership contributed to TAF’s effectiveness in battle?

	#	%
Positively	990	70.7
Negatively	366	26.1
No response	45	3.2
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Finding of this question supports the previous question.

Q30 Should Turkey cooperate more with international security organization other than NATO such as Shangai Cooperation Organization?

	#	%
Yes	1189	84.9
No	204	14.6
No response	8	.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The ones saying “yes” are at a level of 89% in the Army, 94% in the Air Force, 62% in the Navy, and 71% in the Gendarmerie. On the total, the answer 'yes' appearing to have an overwhelming majority of 84% can be said to have occurred as a result of the interest of the officers about abroad posts and the fact that the internationalization efforts offers opportunities for both their occupational careers and in financial means.

In the interviews conducted also, it was seen that the close interest of the officers to internationalization is directly related to their financial expectations and career opportunities.

Q31. Is the recent wave of civilianization in civil-military relations in Turkey, positively affecting the TAF’s military power and efficacy?

	#	%
Yes	574	41.0
No	708	50.5
No response	119	8.5
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The ratio of “yes” is 47% in the Army, 44% in the Air Force, 28% in the Navy and 45% in the Gendarmerie. The trauma and rage experienced by the Navy personnel because of the court cases and prosecution processes experienced by some Navy officers in the last couple of years are seen clearly from the results of this table.

Table 27: Perception about positive affect of civilianization in the CMR with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	328 (58%)	116 (44%)	54 (40%)	15 (30%)	60 (22%)	573
No	233 (42%)	145 (56%)	83 (60%)	36 (70%)	206 (78%)	703
TOTAL	561	261	137	51	266	1276

As it can also be seen from the table, as the rank decreases, the opinion of the officers that the civilianization positively affects TAF's power and efficacy tends to increase.

This table shows the “deep-seated mistrust” to the political system among senior officers when it comes to the civil-military relations. It is also noticeable that while the senior officers were inclined to answer this question in a negative way, the majors and specifically lieutenants were inclined to answer this question with “Yes.”

Q32. How nationalist would you say you are?

	#	%
Not at all	51	3.6
A little	641	45.8
Very	607	43.3
No response	102	7.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

With regards to nationalist sentiment, 42% of the Army, 44% of the Air Force and 46% of the Navy defined themselves as “Very nationalist.”

The fact that an average of 7% from all the forces left this question empty is an important finding from the point of view that it shows that stating opinion about this subject which is considered to be a “political questions” still keeps its character to be a taboo in the TAF.

Table 28: Level of nationalism with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General/ Admiral	TOTAL
Not at all	31 (5%)	4 (1%)	3 (2%)	2 (3%)	11 (4%)	0	51
A little	286 (44%)	139 (50%)	56 (39%)	18 (35%)	140 (52%)	2	641
Very	253 (40%)	117 (42%)	81 (56%)	32 (63%)	119 (44%)	5	607
No response	81 (11%)	1 (7%)	3 (3%)	0	0	1	102
TOTAL	650	277	143	52	270	8	1,401

There is no significant difference between ranks as regarding the level of nationalism.

Q33. There has existed a long tradition of left-right-center politics in Turkey. Where in this spectrum would you locate your political views?

	#	%
Centrist	510	36.4
Center left	287	20.5
Center right	282	20.1
Right	43	3.1
Left	37	2.6
None	19	1.4
No response	223	15.9
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As it is also seen from the table, for this question with which an effort was made to measure the political position, 'Center' is the mostly preferred answer with 36.4%. The fact that 15.9% of the participants avoided answering this question is important since it shows that talking and expressing opinion about politics is still a taboo in the TAF.

Table 29: Political stance with respect to force commands

	Left	Center Left	Center	Center Right	Right	Blank
Army	3%	18%	34%	24%	3%	18%
Air Force	1%	20%	26%	16%	-	37%
Navy	-	35%	43%	4%	-	18%
Gendar merie	1%	2%	30%	20%	15%	32%

As it is seen from the table, the Army has the most 'right-conservative' opinion whereas the closest force to the left is the Navy Command. The Air Force, though, arises with its characteristic to be the one which is most unwilling to answer this question. In addition, from this table it appears clearly that Gendarmerie General Command personnel are graduates of Army War Academy and are very close to the Army officers.

Table 30: Political stance with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General / Admiral	TOT AL
Left	143 (22%)	37 (13%)	12 (8%)	2 (4%)	29 (11%)	0	223
Centre Left	7 (1%)	3 (1%)	1 (0.6%)	1 (2%)	25 (9%)	0	37
Centre	76 (12%)	62 (22%)	38 (27%)	14 (27%)	97 (36%)	0	287
Centre right	232 (36%)	106 (38%)	64 (45%)	24 (46%)	83 (31%)	1	510
Right	165 (25%)	65 (23%)	19 (13%)	7 (13%)	26 (10%)	0	282
None	23 (3%)	3 (1%)	5 (3%)	3 (6%)	6 (2%)	3	43
No response	5	1	4 (2%)	1	4 (1%)	4	19
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	8	1,401

In this table, the political view shifts from center to right as the rank decreases.

Table 31: Political stance within the Seniors and Juniors

	Juniors	Seniors	TOTAL
Left	11	26	37
Centre left	176 (26%)	111 (34%)	287
Centre	402 (38%)	108(33%)	510
Centre right	249 (23%)	33 (10%)	282
Right	31	12	43
None	10	9	19
No response	192	31	223
TOTAL	1071	330	1,401

In this table, the difference between the junior officers and senior ones appears clearly. Especially there is no answer of 'Center right' in the seniors, 23% of the juniors have chosen this alternative. Again, it is an important point that the overwhelming majority of the ones giving no response are juniors since it shows that young officers are more timid about expressing their political preferences.

As the table shows, while there is homogeneity in the political stance of seniors (mostly nationalist left and social democrat), the political views of majors and lieutenants are more heterogeneous. It is appealing to note that the political views of lieutenants, particularly, are the most varied. It is also significant to note that, during the interviews while the seniors had rock-solid stance in terms of their political ideas, the majors, captains and lieutenants are politically confused when defining their political stances.

Q34. Which institution first and foremost represents the “national will” in Turkey?

	#	%
Parliament	1239	88.4
Government	75	5.4
Presidency	48	3.4
Constitutional Court	16	1.1
No response	23	1.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As seen from the table, an overwhelming majority of 88% has perceived the parliament as the representative of the national will. This result shows that the parliament which the officers attach special emphasis in an overwhelming majority has critical importance about the democratic and civilian control of the officers.

Given the high level of credibility of the parliamentary among the officers, it is also likely to suggest that the commissions of the parliament should be the mechanisms managing the civilian side of the Turkish CMR.

Q35. Do you think that the principle of “secularism” is currently under threat in Turkey?

	#	%
Yes	554	39.5
No	688	49.1
No response	159	11.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In the general distribution, the fact that only half of the officers still think secularism is under threat is an important finding showing that TAF does not any more perceive political Islam as an internal threat. The secularism sensitivity of the TAF has visibly fallen.

Table 32: Perception about whether secularism under threat with respect to force commands

	Yes	No	Blank
Army	32%	56%	12%
Air Force	40%	46%	14%
Navy	69%	22%	9%

It is seen that there are significant differences between the forces at the point of sensitivity about secularism. For example, 56% of the Army thinks that secularism is not under threat any more, for the Navy, this ratio is 22%. According to the Navy,

secularism is still under threat. This opinion variety is important in the sense that it shows the differentiation in the organizational cultures of the forces.

Table 33: Perception about whether secularism under threat with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	167 (31%)	106 (43%)	73 (54%)	38 (75%)	166 (64%)	550
No	374 (69%)	139 (57%)	63 (46%)	13 (25%)	95 (36%)	684
TOTAL	541	245	136	51	261	1234

In this question, it is understood differences exist between ranks. As also seen in the table, sensitivity regarding secularism decreases along with rank. While 64% of colonels still think that secularism is under threat, only 31% of lieutenants/first lieutenants think that secularism is under threat.

Q36. Do you think that the principle of the “unitary state” is currently under threat in Turkey?

	#	%
Yes	1162	82.9
No	201	14.3
No response	38	2.7
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As is also seen in the general distribution table, an overwhelming majority as much as 82.9% of the officers think that the unity of the state is under threat. Starting from the fact that the percentage of officers thinking that secularism is under threat, it is seen that the officers’ threat perception about the unity of the state is much higher than the one about secularism.

Table 34: Perception about whether “unity of state” under threat with respect to force commands

	Yes	No
Army	87%	13%
Air Force	82%	18%
Navy	86%	14%

While it is seen that there is no significant difference between the forces regarding the sensitivity about “unity of the state,” a difference can be spoken of in the distribution among ranks. The rate of answers of “yes” to the question of “Is the unity of the state under threat” is 82% for lieutenants/first lieutenants, 82% for captains, 88% for majors, 75% for Lt. colonels and 98% for colonels. From those ratios, colonel appears to be the rank having the highest sensitivity.

Q.37. Do you fast during the month of Ramadan?

	#	%
I partially do	430	30.7
I don’t fast	338	24.1
I try to fast during the whole period of the Ramadan	308	22.0
I don’t fast (due to health reasons/not in my faith)	139	9.9
No response	186	13.3
TOTAL	1,277	100.0

This question aims to measure the piety/conservativeness level of officers by asking about fasting habits. The ones who “partly fasting” constitute the largest portion. The

fact that 13.3% of the officers refused to answer this question related with piety shows that the question is still taboo in the TAF.

Table 35: Fasting with respect to force commands

	I don't Fast	I don't fast (Health)	I partially Fast.	I fast during whole Ramadan	Blank
Army	23%	9%	29%	26%	13%
Air Force	27%	14%	32%	12%	16%
Navy	14%	30%	30%	5%	21%

There is no significant difference between the forces with regards to the fasting question. The answers to this question align with question 33 regarding political preferences, 26% of the Army personnel officers state that they fast during whole the Ramadan. Again as a characteristic supporting question 33, only 5% of the Navy personnel fast during the entire month.

Table 36: Fasting with respect to force ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General / Admiral	TOTAL
I don't fast	124 (19%)	57 (21%)	41 (29%)	12 (23%)	103 (38%)	1	338
I don't fast (due to health reasons/not in my faith)	41 (6%)	33 (12%)	14 (10%)	4 (8%)	47 (17%)	0	139
I partially do	185 (28%)	95 (34%)	44 (31%)	27 (52%)	79 (29%)	0	430
I try to fast during the whole period of the Ramadan.	184, (28%)	58 (21%)	31 (22%)	7 (13%)	23 (9%)	5	308
No response	117 (18%)	34 (12%)	13 (10%)	2	18 (7%)	2	186
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	8	1,401

There is significant difference between ranks also, and the answers of this question also support the results of the question 33. In addition, the tendency of not responding to the question about fasting increases as rank decreases. The number of officers not fasting increases as rank increases.

Table 37: Fasting among seniors and juniors

	Junior	Senior	TOTAL
I don't fast	222 (21%)	116 (35%)	338
I don't fast (due to health reasons/not in my faith)	88	51	139
I partially do	324	106	430
I try to fast during the whole period of the Ramadan.	273 (25%)	35 (11%)	308
No response	164	22	186
TOTAL	1071	330	1,401

As it is seen in this table which aims to analyze ranks in a dichotomic fashion, while the ratio of 25% of junior-level officers try to fast through the whole period of Ramadan, only 11% of senior-level officers are doing the same. 21% of junior-level officers do not fast, while 35% of senior-level officers do not partake in fasting. These findings also consistently support the findings of question 33 which shows that being conservative increases among the officers as the rank decreases.

Q38. Generally, how satisfied are you with your personal economic situation?

	#	%
Not satisfied at all	829	59.2
A little satisfied	527	37.6
Very satisfied	36	2.6
No response	9	.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The forces not satisfied at all with their personal economic situation are 66% in the Army, 45% in the Air Force, and 37% in the Navy. It is possible to say that Air Force and Navy personnel receive higher salaries than their counterparts in the Army due to the high mission compensations is the fundamental reason of the high dissatisfaction about economic status in the Army.

Q39. How has your economic situation changed as an officer over the past few years?

	#	%
Worse	1,153	82.3
Same	236	16.8
Better	10	.7
No response	2	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

An overwhelming majority of 82.3% of the officers think that their economic situation has gotten worse in the past few years.

In the remaining part of the questionnaire, the analysis of dichotomic “yes/no” questions designed for both cross-checking and expanding the questions asked in the previous section will be presented.

1. Matters of religion and state ought to be separate

	#	%
Yes	1,398	99.8
No	2	.1
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The “yes” answer received the question is almost 100%. This ratio shows that overwhelming majority of the officers have high awareness of secularism.

2. Women serving as judges, prosecutors, teachers, and police should be allowed to wear their headscarves during public service.

	#	%
Yes	181	12.9
No	1,104	78.8
No response	106	8.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In the general distribution, the rate of the ones opposing the woman in public service to cover their heads is 78%. Most of the ones in the affirmative are contracted lieutenants/ first lieutenants in the Army.

3. Female students in primary and secondary education should be allowed to cover their heads in class during lessons.

	#	%
Yes	110	7.9
No	1,177	84.0
No response	114	8.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The officers are against female students in primary and secondary schools covering their heads with percentage of 84%.

4. I believe in the afterlife.

	#	%
Yes	874	62.4
No	334	23.8
No response	193	13.8
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

This question tries to measure the level of piety directly, with 64% of officers believing in the afterlife. The proportion of 13.8% who did not answer the question is meaningful since it shows that expressing opinions about piety is still taboo in the TAF.

Table 38: Believing in the afterlife with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	423 (80%)	199 (82%)	90 (70%)	31 (61%)	126 (51%)	869
No	110 (20%)	42 (18%)	37 (30%)	20 (39%)	124 (49%)	333
TOTAL	533	241	127	51	250	1,202

In the distribution with respect to ranks, belief in the afterlife decreases as rank increases. The answers to this question further supports the findings related with the political preferences in question 33 and related with the fasting in question 37. An overwhelming majority (80%) of the lieutenants/ first lieutenants believe in the afterlife, with 51% for colonels.

5. When science and religion contradict each other, I seek guidance from science.

	#	%
Yes	1,294	92.4
No	93	6.6
No response	14	1.0
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

An overwhelming majority of 92.4% of the officers stated that they prefer science in a situation of contradiction between religion and science, which also supports the second question of this section related to religion and the state.

6. I don't approve of income from interest. (e.g. receiving returns from money in a bank account)

	#	%
Yes	263	18.8
No	1,036	73.9
No response	102	7.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

This question attempted to gauge how religious matters affect financial matters among officers, with 73.9% thinking that it does not go against religion to obtain money from interest.

7. Kurds should be granted the right to be able to use their mother tongue as the language of instruction in education.

	#	%
Yes	100	7.1
No	1,221	87.2

No response	80	5.7
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

Measuring the sensitivity to the Kurdish question, 87.2% of officers opposed the right for Kurds to be able to use Kurdish as the language of instruction in primary school. It is possible to say that an overwhelming majority of the officers still consider the rights surrounding the use of the Kurdish language from political point of view but not from cultural rights point of view.

8. I support Turkey's EU membership process.

	#	%
Yes	925	67.6
No	438	31.4
No response	30	2.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

This question aimed at measuring the willingness about EU membership, and a majority of 66.6% of the officers support the membership process.

Also in the interviews conducted, it was observed that majority of the officers still attach importance to EU membership process and westernization and perceive them as the preliminary requirement of democracy and modernization in Turkey.

Table showing support for EU membership with respect to the ranks as follows:

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	458 (86%)	190 (79%)	106 (83%)	34 (66%)	126 (51%)	925 (68%)
No	167 (14%)	83 (19%)	37 (17%)	18 (34%)	133 (49%)	438 (32%)

TOTAL	625	273	143	52	270	1,363
-------	-----	-----	-----	----	-----	-------

9. I trust the parliament.

	#	%
Yes	271	19.3
No	1,104	78.8
No response	26	1.9
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The purpose of this question was to gauge the military's trust of parliament, with 78.8% of the officers responded "yes." When this result is compared with the results of question 34 in which 84.4% of the officers perceive the parliament to be the representative of the "national will," it is possible to say that there is a perceptual gap among officers between credibility of the parliament and trust of that institution.

10. I trust the police (law enforcement agency).

	#	%
Yes	157	11.2
No	1,239	88.4
No response	5	.4
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As the question attempted to gauge the trust of the police as an institution, 88.4% of the officers answered "no." It is considered that the mistreatment by the police to TAF personnel, particularly during the last decade in the case and prosecution

processes in which the on duty and retired officers were involved could explain this perception.

11. I trust the media.

	#	%
Yes	99	7.1
No	1,302	92.9
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In trying to measure the military's trust of the media, only 7.1% of those questioned trust the media. This low ratio is again considered to be caused by the negative perception and biased attitude of the media.

12. No matter what the circumstances, Turkey should have a democracy.

	#	%
Yes	1,301	92.9
No	96	6.9
No response	4	.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In the general distribution, an overwhelming majority of the officers such as 92.9%, think Turkey's governing style must be a democracy.

Table 39: Level of internalization of democracy with respect ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General / Admiral	TOTAL
Yes	617	276	136	51	214	7	1,301

	(95%)	(99%)	(95%)	(98%)	(79%)		
No	30	1	7	1	56	1	96
No response	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	8	1,401

When the distribution with respect to ranks, the belief that Turkey must be governed by democracy increases as rank decreases.

13. I am satisfied with the level of democracy and the functioning of democracy in Turkey.

	#	%
Yes	344	24.6
No	993	70.9
No response	64	4.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In responding to the question which aimed at measuring the level of satisfaction among the officers about the present state of Turkish democracy, 70.9% of the officers are not satisfied with the present level and functioning of democracy in Turkey. When this finding is considered together with the finding from the previous question, the majority of the officers (95%) think democracy is the only political system, yet 71% are not satisfied with the current level of democracy in Turkey.

Starting from this result, it is possible to say that there is a strong perception in the minds of the officers that there is a democracy deficit in Turkey.

14. Turkey is a military-nation.

#	%
1,313	93.7
88	6.3
1,401	100.0

This question tries to measure the prevalence of the opinion of Turkey being a “military nation” among the officers, 93.7% of which responded affirmatively.

15. When necessary, the military should seize control and govern the country.

	#	%
Yes	83	5.9
No	1,309	93.4
No response	9	.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In response to this question, which aims to measure the level of the belief in democracy among officers and to cross-check question 12, 93.4% of the officers said “no.” This finding shows that answers with question 12 are consistent

Table 40: Inclination to the military rule with respect to ranks

	Lt./First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General / Admiral	TOTAL
Yes	15	7	10	3	48	0	83
No	630 (97%)	270 (97%)	133 (93%)	49 (94%)	219 (81%)	8 (%100)	1,309
No response	6	0	0	0	3	0	9
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	8	1,401

When distribution with respect to ranks is considered, it is seen that the tendency to say “no” to this question increases as the rank decreases. Especially, while 81% of

the colonels answered “no,” this percentage rises to 97% for lieutenants/first lieutenants and captains.

16. Military administrations can be much more effective and successful than civilian ones

	#	%
Yes	152	10.8
No	1,236	88.2
No response	13	.9
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The findings of this question which is included in the questionnaire to cross-check the 12th and 15th questions, the findings are in consistent with those of the two questions with 88.2% of officers answering “no” to the idea that military administrations can be much more effective and successful than civilian ones.

17. The military’s influence in civil politics and government has decreased in Turkey over the past 10 to 15-year period.

	#	%
Yes	1,135	81.0
No	219	15.6
No response	47	3.4
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In response to this question, which aims to measure the general opinion among the officers about civilianization during the last 10 years regarding the military’s influence on politics, 81% of officers answered “yes.”

Table 41: Perception about whether the military’s influence decreased in the last decade with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt.	Colonel	TOTAL
--	------------	---------	-------	-----	---------	-------

	/First lieutenant			Colonel		
Yes	534 (87.8%)	237 (86%)	122 (85.3%)	42 (80%)	194 (71.8%)	1129
No	74	36	21	10	76	217
TOTAL	608	273	143	52	270	1346

When the distribution with respect to ranks is considered, the tendency to give the answer 'yes' increases as the rank decreases. Especially, while the rate of junior level officers giving the answer 'Yes' to this question is 75.9%, the senior level officers' rate of giving the answer 'Yes' to this question is 75.9%.

18. The total number of soldiers in the TAF should be decreased.

	#	%
Yes	1145	81.7
No	252	18.0
No response	4	.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

A majority of 81% of the officers responded “yes” to this question, which aims to measure the opinion about the decreasing the number of soldiers in the TAF.

19. Compulsory military service should be abolished.

	#	%
Yes	930	66.4
No	464	33.1
No response	7	.5
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question aiming to measure the opinion about the compulsory military service, 66.4% of the officers answered affirmatively, most of which are junior-level officers.

20. Even if compulsory military service continues, the length of service period should be further shortened.

	#	%
Yes	1,186	84.7
No	214	15.3
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

When asked about shortening the length of time for compulsory military services, 84.7% of officers said “yes” to shortening the duration of compulsory military service.

21. Imagine that you have sufficient economic wealth and means and your son wants to complete his military service through a payment/fee. Would you approve?

	%
Yes	62.5
No	36.9
No response	1.6
TOTAL	100.0

In response to this question, which aims at measuring an important element of the value system of the TAF such as compulsory military service and the level of

pragmatist attitude of the officers towards this element, 62.8% of officers approved that his son could complete his military service through payment (*bedelli askerlik*).

Table 42: Perception about military payment through payment with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	511 (80%)	171 (62%)	80 (56%)	27 (52%)	85 (32%)	874
No	132	106	63	25	185	511
TOTAL	643	277	143	52	270	1,385

Considering the distribution with respect to ranks, it is seen that the tendency to answer “yes” increases as rank decreases. In accordance with this finding, it is possible to say that there is a shift from an idealist attitude to pragmatist attitude regarding a concept that has great value for the TAF such as compulsory military service.

22. TAF should be an Army constituted of only the professional soldiers (that is, volunteer soldiers like paid public servants) like in the USA.

	#	%
Yes	965	68.9
No	434	31.0
No response	2	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question aiming to measure the opinion about the professional Army,
68.9% of officers answered “yes.”

Table 43: Perception about “professional military” with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	547 (84%)	181 (65%)	101 (71%)	34 (65%)	98 (37%)	961
No	103	96	42	18	171	430
TOTAL	650	277	143	52	269	1,391

In the distribution with respect to ranks, it is seen that the tendency to appreciate professional soldiers increases as rank decreases. This question also supports the finding related with the shift from idealist officership to career and economy oriented officership.

23. There should be a legal right to refuse military service based on belief, moral views, or personal choice (conscientious objection).

	#	%
Yes	162	11.6
No	1,234	88.1
No response	5	.4
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

An overwhelming percentage of officers (88.1%) think negatively about conscientious objection.

24. The number of female officers and sergeants serving in the TAF should be increased.

	#	%
Yes	920	65.7
No	481	34.3
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

A great portion of the officers (65.7%) consider increasing the number of female personnel in the TAF positively.

Table 44: Perception about woman empowerment within the military with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	470 (72%)	194 (70%)	92 (64%)	25 (48%)	135 (50%)	916
No	181	83	51	27	135	477
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1,393

When distribution with respect to ranks is considered, it is seen that the opinion that the number of female officers and sergeants serving in the TAF should be increased tends to increase as the rank decreases. Looking at this result, it is possible to say that the officers are having more gender friendly opinions as the rank decreases.

When it comes to gender approval in the TAF, as seen in the table, there is a direct negative association between the seniority of an officer and his approval of women serving in the military, which means that the approval of women serving in the military has gradually been increasing among junior level officers. One should also note that, since 1996, women have been actively serving in all services of the

Turkish military even in the combat branches as war pilots in war fleets of the Turkish Air Force and helicopter pilots in Army aviation units in the Turkish Army. This fact also implies that the major and lieutenant categories have been more acquainted to work with women officers in the units. Another important notice on this issue would be that women have also started to serve as non-commissioned officers in the Turkish military for two years, a fact that will eventually increase woman's contribution to service-related jobs in the Turkish Military.

In contrast to the officers' gradually and positively changing attitudes on the gender issue, the officers are in a rock-solid unanimity when it comes to approval of homosexuals serving in the military. As seen in the table, it is extremely unlikely to assert that the officer corps has been looking for a paradigmatic change on this issue. Nearly all respondents (except for 1 lieutenant) were extremely conservative on the serving of homosexuals in the TAF.

25. If they want to, gays should be allowed to complete their compulsory service in the TAF.

	#	%
Yes	50	3.6
No	1,349	96.3
No response	2	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

As it is seen in the general distribution, 96.3% of the officers said "no" to allow homosexuals to service in the TAF. Thirty-five of the ones saying "yes" to the question were lieutenants/first lieutenants, while 15 were captains. Therefore, although in a very little amount, it is possible to say that the tough attitude in this matter softens as the rank decreases.

26. Atatürkism is the main source of intellectual inspiration for the TAF

	#	%
Yes	1164	83.1
No	237	16.9
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

An overwhelming majority of 83.1% of the officers think that Atatürkism is still the main source of intellectual inspiration for the TAF.

27. An officer in Turkey is always superior to a civilian counterpart of the same education level.

	#	%
Yes	440	31.4
No	961	68.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question aiming to the measure the elitist view of the officers about the society, a great majority (68.8%) of officers think that the officers' level of education is not higher than that of the civilians.

Table 45: Perception about “elitist view” within the military with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	124 (19%)	79 (28%)	49 (34%)	31 (59%)	152 (56%)	435
No	527	198	94	21	118	958
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	1393

In the distribution with respect to ranks, the rate of answering “no” increases as rank decreases. From this result, it is possible to say that the level of elitist view of society

decreases as rank decreases. In the question, it is an important finding that the colonels answered “yes” at a rate of 56% but lieutenants/first lieutenants answered “yes” only at a rate of 19%.

28. The General Staff should operate under the Ministry of National Defense

	#	%
Yes	441	31.5
No	918	65.5
No response	42	3.0
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question aiming to measure the opinion of the officers about operation of the TGS under the Ministry of Defense, although 65.5% of the officers said “no,” this ratio falls drastically for junior-level officers. Furthermore, 42% of the lieutenants/first lieutenants, 18% of the colonels say “yes” to operation of TGS under the Ministry of Defense.

29. The military judicial system should be abolished to end the distinction between civil and military courts.

	#	%
Yes	544	38.8
No	820	58.5
No response	37	2.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In the general distribution about this subject which is widely debated in the public opinion and is an important item on the agenda of the Turkish CMR, 58.5% of officers answered “no” to this question.

30. I would not carry out an order that I think is against the law, legislation or constitution.

	#	%
Yes	1,273	90.9
No	127	9.1
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question aiming to measure how much the superiority of law is internalized by the officer corps especially in the last 10 years, after the court case processes in which TAF personnel were judged as suspects, it was desired to learn whether the officers would prefer the “executive order” or the “law” in cases where there exists conflict between the two, in a disciplined and tough organization like the TAF. The executive order is regulated strictly via formal legal arrangements within the strategic culture of the TAF and “absolute obedience” of executive orders without questioning is one of the important norms in the institutional culture. In the 13th article of the TAF Internal Services Law and Regulation 127, which is the most fundamental text regulating the attitudes and behavior and also the mutual relations of the TAF personnel it is emphasized that “discipline” is the basis of being a soldier. The definition of discipline is given as follows “it is an absolute obedience to the laws, rules and superiors and conformity to the rights of superiors and subordinates.”

The notion of absolute obedience to superiors has become an extremely internalized norm within the TAF. In Article 8 of the same law, order is defined as “the oral, written or other type of expression of a demand or prohibition related with the service.” Interestingly, in the regulation prepared with the assumption that no

¹²⁷ Please see for the full text of the law (Turkish) : <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.4.211.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2015.)

order cannot already contradict with the law, there is no regulation about what to do if an order contradicts with an article of a law. Again, in the regulation, for the matter of order although it is stated that it will be related with the service, it is not clearly stated when and under which circumstances the order will not be realized. The norm that order is not questioned but that it is first done and then if a problem arises the situation is submitted to the superior is an important norm that has been practiced in the TAF.

Table 46: Perception about whether rule of law is superior when contradicting with orders with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant / First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	General / Admiral	TOTAL
Yes	618 (95%)	264 (95%)	126 (88%)	48 (92%)	210 (77%)	7	1273
No	33	12	17	4	60	1	127
No response	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	651	277	143	52	270	8	1,401

In this question aiming to understand the level of opinion about whether an order should be practiced or not when it contradicts the law, the opinion that the order should not be practiced when it is believed that it contradicts the constitution and the law increases as the rank decreases. In this paradoxical situation which can be defined as the “law-order contradiction,” as 77% of the colonels stated that the order would not be realized, this ratio rises up to 95% for captains and lieutenants/first lieutenants.

These high rates are important since they show that superiority of the law and conformity to the legal arrangements even if they contradict with the orders given started to appear as anew norm in the TAF.

31. When there is a conflict of opinion between civilian, political decisionmakers and the military, with regard to security/ defense issues the civilian, political decisionmakers should have the final say.

	#	%
Yes	1,092	77.9
No	271	19.3
No response	38	2.7
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

The response to this question, which aimed to measure the opinion about whose decision will be more seriously taken into account when there is a disagreement about security/defense issues, an overwhelming majority (77.9%) of the officers think that the final word should be said by the civilians. This is also important in showing the change in the officers about being subjected to civilian control and attaching importance to the decisions of the elected civilians.

32. The Chief of Staff should freely discuss his views with the public at large, including political issues.

	#	%
Yes	739	52.7
No	628	44.8
No response	34	2.4
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

More than half (52.7%) of the answers of “yes” seen in the general distribution can be perceived as a contradiction to the principle of democratic and civilian control principle of the military at first glance. But in the interviews

conducted, it was observed that ever officer is confused about how and with which means the technical information about defense/security and the opinions of the TAF should be shared with the public. The declarations of the chief of staff appear as the most privileged method in their minds since there is no idea in the TAF with which mechanisms the information sharing will be carried out about the military/security matters and political issues about which the public should be informed.

33. Besides western countries, Turkey should also initiate and pursue closer foreign policy ties with countries from Asia (Russia, Central Asia, etc.), Africa, and the Far East (China, India, etc.)

	#	%
Yes	1228	87.7
No	164	11.7
No response	9	.6
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question, which shows the willingness about the issue of internationalism, reveals an important trend in the TAF, with 87.7% of the officers leaning towards the extension in the foreign politics other than the NATO.

34. I think recent Turkish foreign policy has been successful.

	#	%
Yes	293	20.9
No	1070	76.4
No response	38	2.7
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

A ratio of 76.4% of the officers do not agree that foreign policy has been successful.

35. Ataturk's Thought System ought to remain the founding block of military education.

	#	%
Yes	1255	89.6
No	144	10.3
No response	2	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

A ratio of 89.6% of the officers still attach importance to Atatürkism and want it to remain as the fundamental component of the military education system.

36. I frequently use the internet and social media to follow the news.

	#	%
Yes	1131	80.7
No	269	19.2
No response	1	.1
TOTAL	1,401	100.0

In this question aiming to measure the level of access to different news resources of the officers, 80.7% of the officers use the internet for having information and following the news.

Table 47: Prevalence of the usage of Internet among the respondents with respect to ranks

	Lieutenant /First lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lt. Colonel	Colonel	TOTAL
Yes	611 (94%)	231 (83.3%)	105 (73.4%)	39 (75%)	141 (52.2%)	1,127
No	39	46	38	13	129	265
TOTAL	650	277	143	52	270	1,392

It is observed that there is a significant difference between ranks about the use of the internet for gathering information and following the news. The use of the internet extends as rank decreases. For example, while the percentage internet usage

for information gathering and following the news is 52.2% among the colonels, this number rises to 94% among the lieutenants/ first lieutenants.

5.3. Discussion

In light of the finding from the questionnaire, it is possible to define an average profile of an officer in the TAF as follows:

He is a person who comes from a family of low-medium income and his father has the average education of a high school graduate, and he geographically comes from any province of Turkey, He is not likely to have officers in the family or among his close relatives. He has a salary in the range of 3,500 TL to 4,000 TL and while he attaches importance to secularism, the unity of the state is more important. He never trusts the media or the police, but does trust the parliament a little bit, as it is an important platform in CMR. On average, he has spent four years combating terrorism and (with 50% probability) has spent 6 months of his career abroad. Furthermore, he considers being an officer an occupation now, even though he had considered it a lifestyle in the past. He now attaches importance to career opportunities in his occupation and financial means, whereas before he was an elite attaching importance to his social status in the society. He argues that the TAF should definitely transform and restructure itself, thinking that the respect and trust to the TAF has diminished in society during the last few years. In this way, he is respectful to democracy and the elected civilians, but aware of the “exceptional” significance of the institution for which he is working and the professional of officership. Following this, he expects respect to himself and his institution from civilians and is aware of the supremacy of law. This means that he cares more about serving within the boundaries of the law than obeying blindly to the orders of superiors. As he already knows at least one foreign language (mostly English), he is further trying to learn foreign languages,

mostly for career opportunities and as a way to get a better-paying job within the TAF by being posted in another country. His political view slipped from center to center right, meaning that he is getting more conservative with time. The sometimes fasts, believes in the afterlife, is nationalist, is not satisfied with his economic status. He has hawkish views about the Kurdish question and his focus has slipped from institutional attachment to occupational career and to financial success. He is further of the mindset that the duration of compulsory military service should be diminished with conscientious objection in the military. He has a definite negative attitude about having homosexuals serving but a positive attitude toward women serving in the military. He does not consider Turkey's foreign policy successful and still attaches importance to Atatürkism. Using the internet often, he is curious about technology and relatively open to new possibilities.

In light of the findings of the survey, it is likely to divide the officer corps into two categories: juniors (lieutenants, captains, majors) and seniors (lieutenant colonels, colonels, generals). This split indicates that there is a generational conflict within the TAF. The factor causing the difference of opinions between the junior-level officers group and the senior-level officers group is, in fact, the change in the social-political context in Turkey and the change in the global security environment. In the light of the findings, it is possible to list trends causing this split between juniors and seniors.

From idealism to pragmatism

The findings of the survey reveal that, particularly among the juniors, there seems to be a moral/practical dichotomy, whereas a great majority of seniors tend to opt for idealist discourse. That is; established norms and principles within the Turkish military, such as absolute obedience to the orders of superior commanders,

selfless service for the nation, prioritization of the military rather than the self, and practical self-interests such as a personal career and financial expectations seemed to be exclusive in most cases. Junior-level respondents, for instance, in contrast to those senior ones mostly embracing the idealist track, seem to be in a dilemma of pursuing rational practical self-interests to be able improve their lives on a material basis or career opportunities, as well as adopting the moral principles dictated by the institution. That is why, for instance, while senior-level officials noticeably dislike post-graduate education and learning foreign languages on the ground that it distracts moral commitment to the military, junior-level officials are inclined to evaluate their academic career and foreign language skills both to promote their military career and as a potential job opportunity in civilian life. During the interviews, for instance, the seniors tend to define speaking a foreign language as a crucial part of being an elite within society and a qualification for being an elite officer. Among junior-level officers, however, it is clearly noticeable that the respondents have dual motivation to learn a new language, which are to participate in temporary (6-month long) or permanent (2-3 year) posts abroad to take part in multinational operations and to apply for international cadres; namely, both to honor his officership with an idealistic stance as well as to contribute to his personal career and financial expectations.

One should note that, as the rank decreases, the ratio of the option of social status as the primary reason to be an officer decreases. The increase of the ratios of the options of career expectations and financial gains as the rank decreases shows one that idealist expectations and behaviors are being set aside as rank decreases. Simply, as rank decreases, pragmatist preferences and behaviors concentrating on career and financial gain are gain prevalence among the officers.

Other indicators that show the transition from idealism to pragmatism is the decreasing significance of staff officership among junior officers and the changing attitudes of the staff officers. Staff officers are privileged in the TAF as roughly 90% of the international cadres of the TAF and 95% of the general cadres are reserved for them. To be a staff officer in the TAF is thus the first step to be deployed in an international post for three years (maybe another one year for the second term) and to be a general. Simply, the desire and endeavor of a junior officer to be a staff officer, which means the first and most significant step for the contemplation of the military career in the TAF, is a reliable indicator to assess the extent of idealism of the young officers. It is a fact that applications for the Staff College Entrance Exam, a test administered every December, have shown a drastic decline. According to the TAF's official numbers of the TAF, in 2012, one out of four officers (25%) applied for the exam, which means that three out of four did not even apply. During the interviews, junior-level respondents state that it is a remarkably tough choice to be a staff officer as any officer desiring to be a staff officer should spend two years for the preparation for the exam, two years in the staff college, and then more than 12 years in the "staff-only cadres." This career path is defined by a majority of junior-level as a process of full sacrifice and absolute militarization of everything surrounding their life. The great majority of majors and captains who were interviewed emphasized that they did not apply even once for the Staff College Entrance Exam. After assessing the pros and cons of being a staff officer, they concluded that they did not want to bear the burden of staff officership even though it comes with a lucrative opportunity package to promote their military career. More importantly, all staff officers interviewed emphasized that "material benefits" played a more important role than the career opportunities in their decision of being a staff officer.

Another indicator showing the transition from idealism to pragmatism is the declining importance of generalship among the junior officers, and that they are more seeking short-term material benefits, instead of long-term objectives, such as being a general 20 years down the road. During the interviews, lieutenant colonels and colonels revered generalship as their utmost objective in their career, which was not the case for the junior ones.

For example, 80% of the lieutenants/first lieutenants answered “yes” to the question: “Imagine that you have sufficient economic wealth and means and your son wants to complete his military service through a payment/fee. Would you approve?” However, this percentage was 32% for the colonels. According to this finding, there is a shift from an idealist to pragmatist attitude regarding the importance placed on compulsory military service. Therefore, there is an increase in the tendency to regard shortened military service by payment positively as rank decreases.

From Homogeneity to Heterogeneity

In terms of their origin, there were two types of officer in the TAF a decade ago; that is, the military high school/war academy graduates and the civilian high school/war academy graduates. Currently, however, there are seven types of officers in terms of their origin in the TAF; that is, the military high school/war academy graduates, the civilian high school/war academy graduates, the civilian university graduates (contracted officers), the foreign war academy graduates (the US, South Korea), the officers with the NCO background, and the officers with the contracted specialist background. One should also note that the ratio of war academy graduates, the category which constitute the backbone of the officer corps, has drastically decreased from 90% to 60% within the last five years. It is worth mentioning that

half of the respondents in the lieutenant category were the contracted officers from civilian universities, which implies that the trend towards more heterogeneity has accelerated at the junior levels. This heterogeneity in the origins inevitably comes up with varying attitudes and opinions when interpreting social realities, yet the TAF has been trying hard to standardize young officers through military education and other means.

Another example showing the process of becoming heterogeneous in the TAF is the differentiation of the officers in the land, air and Navy forces about the TAF's reform process. Some of the factors considered are where a reform process should start, the rates of becoming conservative, expectations from the occupation of officership. According to the results of the questionnaire which was put forward for the first time in the Turkish CMR literature, the organizational cultures of the forces in the TAF are not the same but show differences. For example, according to the findings of the questionnaire, the Army is allowing institutional reforms such as the need for qualified commanders in decision making mechanisms, the Navy highlights the qualified serving personnel, and the Air Force highlights technology. In addition, the sensitivity about secularism in the Army is relatively low compared to the Air Force and it is very low compared to the Navy.

Another finding that shows the process of heterogenization in the TAF is the differentiation between junior-level officers and senior-level officers regarding their opinions about the compulsory military service system, payment-based military service, and the change to professionalism. For example, while 84% of lieutenants/first lieutenants are arguing for the transformation to a professional Army, this percentage is 37% for colonels.

These findings urge one to suggest that the heterogenization in the TAF is not only in the material domain, but also in the cognitive domain. The differentiation of opinion between the officers shows itself clearly especially in the questions about women participating in the military, compulsory military service, professional military service, and the payment-based military service.

From center to center-right in the political portfolio

A shift from center to center-right is observed in the political preferences of officer corps. It is possible to say that the fact that juniors are more conservative than seniors and the fact that the Army, constituting 65% of the TAF, has appeared to be the most conservative institution have influenced this shift.

From secularism to unity of state

Since perceptions of interior threats, the defending of secularism tends to decrease as the rank decreases and that it goes about 50% while the sensitivity of the unity of state runs high (83%) among all ranks and in all forces, it is possible to say that the main interior security threat in the officer corps is shifting from secularism, as it is defined traditionally, to the unity of state.

From collectivism to individualism

TAF officers are going from a collective point-of-view to an individualistic point-of-view as rank decreases. According to the findings of the questionnaire, as the rank decreases, the primary status of the TAF and the occupation in the officer's life tends to decrease and the tendency of the officer to put himself among the privileges of life increases.

On the other side, it is seen that the influence of guidance of the family and close acquaintances for the preference of occupation of officership decreases in time and opposite to that, the persons' own preferences will increase as the rank decreases. In addition, social status as a reason to become an officer in the military is on the decline as the reason to be an officer, while advancing personal careers and financial means serves as a greater motivation to become an officer.

The most important example showing the transformation from collectivism to individualism is, in turn, the determining effect of the “spirit of cohort” on strategic preferences and behaviors of the officers is in a trend of decrease as the rank decreases.

During the interviews, an informal institution was raised that has a significant impact on the opinions, attitudes and even behaviors of the officer corps in the Turkish military, the “cohort spirit” (*devre ruhu*), which is defined as one of the cores of being an officer by the majority of the respondents. This informal institution that, in fact, attracts considerable scholarly attention yet has never been studied academically, is considered as one of the great enablers of officers to standardize behaviors and as a group to act efficiently, effectively, and in a timely manner.

This informal institution that strengthens the “brothers-in arms” mood of classmates, may, therefore, be regarded as the first and foremost antecedent condition of a successful coup attempt among officer corps. The numbers in the table clearly show the gradual declining importance of the common spirit among same-year graduates. Put differently, this finding confirms the trend from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from collective mode of thinking and acting to individualistic mode of thinking and acting.

From elitist to an egalitarian view of civil society

According to the results of the questionnaire, the elitist view is decreasing among officers as the rank decreases, and the egalitarian view which considers the society and the officer corps to be more equal is, in turn, increasing .

From absolute obedience of orders to respecting the superiority of laws

It is observed that the superiority of laws and obedience to legal regulations, even if they conflict with the orders given, is appearing as a new norm in the TAF after the processes of lawsuits, although “absolute obedience to orders in every situation and circumstance” is the most important norm in the TAF. The tendency is now for officers to follow legal regulations when contradicting orders are given by the superiors.

It is possible to list those constants which do not create significant differences despite the different forces and ranks as follows:

- High level of positive perception about NATO,
- The opinion that the TAF should immediately go under a process of transformation,
- Technology-centric focus,
- The expectation that religious affairs and state affairs are not to be mixed with each other,
- The expectation that Turkey should be governed with democracy under every circumstance,
- The trust put into science when the religion and science contradict each other,
- The opinion that the Turks are a military nation,

- The opinion that the influence of the soldier on civilian politics has decreased in the last ten years,
- Emphasis on Atatürkism,
- The hawkish standing on any issue regarding the Kurdish question,
- The importance attached to internationalization,
- The worsening economic situation in the last few years,
- A high level of mistrust of the media and the police,
- The opinion that society's respect of the officer as a profession has decreased,
- The negative attitude towards conscientious objection and service of homosexuals in the Army

In the light of the findings above, there are also constant fields among the TAF officers in which no significant differentiation is observed besides the trend which cause significant differences with respect to both the forces and ranks. From this point of view, it is possible to say that the change in the perceptions and the opinions of the officer corps are gradual and incremental. In terms of ranks, while the split between junior level-officers and senior-level officers especially evokes interest; as regarding the separation between the forces, the officers in the Army are behind the ones in the Navy and the Air Force in terms of some affairs such as financial and educational status, duration of abroad posts, educational, and foreign language status.

Again, while no significant difference exists between the Navy and the Air Force regarding the level of conservativeness, belief in the afterlife, fasting, perception of secularism; it is interesting that significant differences between the Army and each of those two forces are observed. In light of the questionnaire's

findings, it is possible to say that the Army member officers constituting nearly 60% of the TAF are more conservative and devout than their counterparts in the Navy and the Air Force.

Again, while 39.5% of the officers think that secularism is under threat, an overwhelming majority of 82.9% thinks that the unity of the state is under threat. When those two rates are compared, it is possible to say that the primary threat perception for the TAF has transformed from secularism to the unity of the state. An overwhelming majority of 82.7% are against giving freedom to Kurdish language, giving the impression that a “Kurdo-fobia” exists in the officer corps.

The fact that 15% of junior-level officers did not respond to questions about political preferences in religious affairs shows that there exists an unwillingness to express opinions on these subjects.

In light of the questionnaire’s findings, while the officers who are members of the Army emphasize the “qualified command rank” for TAF’s institutional transformation, it is interesting that Navy officers highlight the “qualified performing rank” and the Air Force officers, in turn, underline “technology.” It is possible to say that each force has different strategic points of view for regarding transformation.

The finding that 88.4% of the officers think that the national will is represented in the parliament but only 19.3% of them trust the parliament is a meaningful finding since it shows the gap between expectation and trust.

Also, the findings that only 7.1% of the officers trust the media and 11.2% trust the police, in turn, are important findings in showing the trust gap in these two institutions in the officer corps.

In the questions, the high level of belief in democracy among the officer corps, especially the fact that 92.9% emphasize that Turkey should be governed with democracy under every situation and circumstance, but only 24.6% are satisfied with the level of democracy in Turkey is important in terms of showing the expectation of democracy and the dissatisfaction with the present situation.

Again, 93.4% of the officers said “no” to the sentence “when necessary, the military should seize control and govern the country.” Again, 88.2% of the officers disagreed with the statement that “military administrations can be much more effective and successful than civilian ones.”

These findings are promising in terms of showing the high tendency of the officers to be subjected to the control of the elected civilians. Again, 81% of the officers think that the effect of soldiers on the civilian politics has decreased during the last ten years.

While 72% of the lieutenants/first lieutenants consider the service of female officers/sergeants positively, this ratio is only 50% for colonels. The positive opinion about the service of female officers/sergeants in the TAF is observed to be in a trend of increase as rank decreases. It is also interesting that there appears a “negative” opinion of 96.3%, being close to almost 100%, about the service of homosexuals in the TAF.

What are the important findings of the survey that can be assessed with respect to Turkish CMR? First of all, the findings the survey confirm all of three hypotheses of the research. Primarily, it is seen that, as the rank decreases, there is shift in the officer corps from the type of idealist officer attaching importance to value system to the type of career-oriented officer focusing mostly on career opportunities and financial gains. The emphasis on secularism and the elitist views

tend to decrease again as the rank decreases, but the emphasis on democracy increases. It is also worth mentioning that, as the rank decreases, the rigidity of ideological stance weakens among the officers and diversification in the political preferences increases. The findings reflect a snapshot of the opinions of Turkish officer corps as of summer 2015. It is possible to say that the officer corps has become less ideological as the rank decreases and more diversification emerges. Lastly, according to the findings of this survey, there are significant cultural differences between the force commands especially in terms of political preferences and transformation. According to this picture, in contrast to the assumption that the TAF is a homogeneous and monolithic entity, there are significant differences of points-of-view and organizational cultures between the force commands primarily about the issues concerning political stances, the extent of conservative ideas, and how the transformation will take place. The trends in the officer corps can be summarized as from idealism to pragmatism, from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from center to center-right in the political spectrum, from secularism to the unity of the state as the prime internal threat perception, from collectivism to individualism, from elitist to egalitarian view of civil society, from absolute obedience of orders to respecting the superiority of law. All these differences seemed to have caused a change in TAF's organizational culture.

The findings of this survey also reveal that there exists a split between the juniors (lieutenants, captains, and majors) and the seniors (lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals) to such an extent that the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps' can be analyzed separately under these two categories. In this snapshot, how deep does this cultural split that seems to exist between juniors and seniors affect the organizational culture of the TAF? For example, would it be possible to say that

when juniors become seniors, that is after 10-15 years, their attitudes and opinions will be just like the seniors of the present time? In fact, in one of the findings of the survey, it has already been seen that the officers have a demographic background resembling Turkey in general in terms of criteria of both the geographic distribution and the social and economic status of the parents. But it is seen that an “elitization” process ongoing among TAF officers. It is observed that the high quality education and importance attached to the foreign languages in the military schools are the important dynamics shaping the elitization process in the TAF. In fact, one of the reasons underlying the friction between officers having graduated from war academy and the contracted officers coming from civilian universities of relatively low quality education and not knowing foreign language is that war academy graduates consider themselves to be more qualified officers. In short, the reason for this friction is seen to be elitization. In this case, is it possible to anticipate that a present junior's attitudes and opinions will resemble the ones of a present senior after years owing to the elitization process giving the TAF the ability to transform an officer. In scholarly terms, as this is a first snapshot of its kind in the literature, the ones seeking to confirm or falsify this assumption do not have a data to compare and contrast the findings of this survey with the existing one. If there were existing data, we could at least compare that data with this data at present and we could provide scholarly insights about the extent, nature, and evolution of the “elitization effect” of the TAF. However, this research takes this as a valid point and invites for quantitative data-based researchers seeking to snapshot the attitudes and opinions of officer corps’ for comparing the findings of this survey.

In short, in the light of the survey findings, it is seen that the trends of heterogenization, diversification, softening of political rigidity, strengthening of the

emphasis on the unity of the state, caring more about supremacy of laws than orders are observed to increase as rank decreases.

So, how do these trends affect Turkish CMR? It is possible at the end of the day to say that these trends affect the organizational culture of the TAF in the light of changing attitudes and opinions of the officer corps. If we also assume that there is a direct association between TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR, it is possible to say that this association is a reciprocal causation between TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR. The reason for causation to be defined as reciprocal is that the temporal sequence between TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR is not clearly defined and that those two variables are affecting each other reciprocally and continuously.

Another criticism here is that how determining the TAF's organizational culture and especially the attitudes and opinions in which the juniors and seniors are observed to diversify in High Command's strategic preferences and decisions seeming to shape the Turkish CMR. That is, how determining are the juniors' attitude and opinions in the strategic decisions of the High Command? This is an important question. As it was also seen in the previous chapter, the High Command recognizes that there is a trend of change at the moment in the TAF as a social institution and officership as a profession domains but cannot define that and more importantly can not quantify and measure that trend. But here, there is a high level of awareness of the High Command that there is a change. The fundamental motivation forcing the High Command to transform is already the change within the socio-political context in Turkey besides the change in global security environment. In this respect, TAF's organizational culture is a fundamental dynamic affecting the strategic preferences and decisions of the High Command.

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this general discussion chapter, first the findings of the previous empirical chapters are briefly summarized and then merged to provide a comprehensive discussion. Subsequently, the conceptual diagrams presenting configurations explaining change for each domain are provided. In the last section of this chapter, the overall conceptual diagram including all change domains, agents, modes and pathways and endeavoring to explain overall transformation within the Turkish military is presented.

Soldiers live and operate separately from the rest of the society. To be successful in the battle space, soldiers must learn to give their loyalty to their comrades-in-arms and put personal considerations aside for the good of the service and the nation they are serving. In doing so, they may nurture *esprit de corps*, a higher sense of responsibility both to uphold the morale of the military as a whole and to cultivate a *sui generis* organizational culture. The soldier's sense of isolation from society should, however, be mitigated with proper means, such as an increased inclusion of civilians into the military, the promotion of civilian housing and family

programs. Nonetheless, the continuous intervention of society into every military-related issue may compromise the military's morale and operational effectiveness (Fick, 2006). As clearly emphasized in the chapter about theoretical discussions, this dilemma of establishing a mutual balance between two seemingly competing trends has been salient since the emergence of Huntingtonian and Janowitzian formulations. That is, on the one hand, the necessity to provide a space for the military to nurture its organizational culture, its "way of thinking and doing things" for more professionalization; on the other hand, the necessity to prevent the military's isolation from the rest of society as to not let it become a threat to society and democracy. How would it be possible to address this dilemma? As emphasized in the literature review, the first ideal option would be through the militarization of the military by providing an autonomous space to nurture its "do-it yourself" values and norms. Or the second ideal option would be through the civilianization of the military, which implies military's embrace of society's values and norms. But what about the working of "militarization" emphasizing the technical transformation and the "civilianization" emphasizing social change mutually, two processes which at first glance seem to work to the detriment of one another?

The findings of this study show that this is exactly the case for the TAF. That is, as a security organization the TAF has been experiencing a technical transformation, and as a social institution, it is simultaneously in a civilianization process. Furthermore, in the domain of officership as a profession, the findings suggest that, as of May-September 2015, as the ranks decrease, there are five trends influencing the professional culture of the officer corps: the increasing heterogenization and diversification of the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps, the change from a collectivist mentality to an individualistic one, change from an

elitist to an egalitarian view of society, change from “absolute obedience to the orders” to “respect for the superiority of the law,” and, lastly, the change from value-centric officership to focusing on financial goals and careers (i.e. a shift from idealism to careerism). For the first time in the literature, the findings of this study indicate that there are differences between the organizational cultures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, particularly in the domain of TAF as a security organization and on socio-political issues.

Especially in the domain of TAF as a security organization, there is a transformation and internationalization process taking place driven by the elite run by the High Command (the level led by the Chief of the General Staff and including all four-star generals/admirals in the TAF), as well as by technology. In Chapter 4, this research evidently explains why, through which mechanisms, and how the High Command has been first trying to institutionalize the reformist sentiment as a foundational dynamic influencing the TGS organizational culture and then disseminating this new sentiment to the force commands and lower echelons since 2011. Non-compliant thinking and behavior, which is the first outcome of reformist sentiment and the primary factor in degrading old ways of thinking and doing things, first starts in the TGS and is then transferred to the force commands. This tacit acceptance (and to a certain extent appreciation) of the non-compliant thinking and behavior by the High Command in discovering new cognitive templates and models for execution to adapt to the changing international security environment and socio-political context in Turkey has caused the emergence of “subversive” officers at the senior level (particularly at the colonel, brigadier, and two-star general levels) and “insurgents” at the junior level. It is likely to suggest that TAF’s security culture has been deeply influenced by this transformation that is still ongoing in this domain.


In the domain of TAF as a social institution, there exists a transformation influencing TAF's social culture. This process of change is partly controlled by the High Command and driven by the interactions confrontational in nature between the High Command and the junior-level personnel, and between the High Command and third-party actors, such as non-governmental organization like TEMAD and the media. Three cases that are presented in Chapter 4 that emphasize interactions within the TAF are the existing tension between the NCOs and the High Command about the status and rights of NCOs within the system, the allegations about the soldiers' rights violations, as well as women's status in the TAF. These cases show that if insurgent juniors can get enough media attention and public awareness, then they can impose their will over the High Command, and then can cause changes in the existing institutional order. Furthermore, the submissiveness of the High Command when confronted with outside actors such as politicians, journalists, and NGOs is clearly elucidated in Chapter 4 through the analyses in the change of tones, content, and thematic structures of the TGS's press releases. In light of the findings of the qualitative content analysis of the TGS's press releases, one may easily suggest that the TAF has first submissively softened and then obediently democratized its official discourse to adapt to the changing socio-political context in Turkey in the last decade. As Chapter 5 lucidly highlights, as ranking decreases, the trends of heterogenization, diversification, civilianization, less ideological, and more pragmatic orientations influence the professional culture of officer corps.

Simply put, while the change in the global security environment appears to be the prime driver behind TAF's transformation in security culture, the fundamental factor influencing the social and professional culture of TAF is the changing socioeconomic and political context in Turkey. The findings of this study elucidate

that while the transformation shaping the TAF's security culture seems to be a consciously-designed and planned process by the High Command in top-down fashion, the fundamental dynamic influencing TAF's social culture is the confrontational, and to some extent, frictional interaction between the High Command and juniors, and between the High Command and outsiders. The transformation shaping the professional culture among the officer corps would, in turn, be defined as a more coincidental and arbitrary process of change when compared with other domains. One should also note that, at first glance, the "militarization of the military" trend shaping the TAF's security culture and the "civilianization of the military" trend influencing both TAF's social culture and officers' professional culture may be seen as conflicting change processes leading the TAF in opposite directions. However, just to the contrary, in light of the findings of this research, changes in three different domains are reinforcing, mutually bolstering one another. It is the power distributional effect that emerges as the first outcome of this type of transformation comprising three different change dynamics in three different domains that semi-independently affect one another. The power distributional effect within the TAF's existing institutional order leads to a "healthy" environment yielding to a more gradual institutional change within the TAF.

6.1. Transformation of the TAF's security culture

Figure 7: Transformation of TAF as a Security Organization



As seen in the figure above, the main change actor in the domain of TAF as a security organization is the High Command. Following the trends of change in the global security environment, the High Command has been trying to adopt TAF to the new security environment by aiming to change TAF's security culture. The reason for this is not to stay behind in the global competition by developing itself continuously and taking into account the changes in the other security actors (particularly adversaries). This attempt refers to "mimetic isomorphism," which implies the tendency of an organization to imitate another organization's structure as a response to the challenge of uncertainty due to the belief that the structure of the latter organization is beneficial. Mimetic isomorphism occurs "when organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates extreme level of uncertainty" (Paul and Powell, 1991: 65). When organizations are faced with uncertainty, they may model themselves after other organizations, which provide solutions for the problems that are faced by the borrowing organization. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell hypothesize that the more uncertain the relationship between means and ends, or the more ambiguous the goals, "the greater the extent to which an organization will copy practices from an

organization it perceives as successful” (2002: 77). As one may remember from Chapter 3, Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff suggest that there are three pathways whereby military change occurs, which are “emulation,” “adaptation,” and “innovation” (2002: 6). For them, emulation involves importing new tools and ways of war through the imitation of other military organizations. In this sense, emulation is a mimetic isomorphic process. As a security actor, the TAF is trying to learn from other security actors as to not fall behind, especially not to stay behind its adversaries, in the competition in global security environment. This study suggests that the TAF has seemed to grasp emulation as the prime pathway of change in the domain of TAF as a security organization. That is why the High Command seeks to closely follow the transformation processes, particularly NATO, and is expending a lot of effort in copying and adapting NATO’s way of thinking and doing things. It is possible to say that NATO’s popularity in the TAF and the high levels of positive perception about it stems from the common opinion that NATO is the primary model for emulation by the TAF. It is NATO that introduces new cognitive templates and new models of execution to the TAF. As a result of the TAF’s efforts in copying other security actors, two change drivers arise that directly affect its organizational culture: technology and internationalization. For further emulation, the TAF is expending a great deal of effort in procuring cutting-edge technology and using that technology. Again, according to the findings of this research, the TAF is trying to familiarize itself with other security actors in the global security environment at the maximum level with the internationalization, which is the driver that implies getting acquainted with the way in which other modern militaries think and do things. While the driver of internationalization provides the High Command with the means and know-how to become familiar with TAF’s competition, it is also allowing

individuals to satisfy their career and financial goals. Therefore, internalization is a win-win driver both at the organizational and individual level.

What about adaptation and innovation, the two other pathways of change proposed by Farrell and Terriff? For them, adaptation involves fine tuning existing military ways and means to newly emerging societal and cultural factors. One may then understand this pathway as the TAF's efforts as a social institution to adapt to Turkey's changing socio-political and economic context. Analyses in this research suggest that the domain of TAF as a social institution can be described as adaptation, the pathway of change at the domestic level. One should note that adaptation can, and often does, lead to innovation when multiple adjustments over time lead to the evolution of new ways and means. This study contends that the TAF has to improve a lot in terms of innovation, which involves developing ways and means genuinely designed by the TAF both as a security organization and a social institution. Despite the fact that all modern militaries of the world have been experiencing hard times in finding innovative solutions to meet highly complex challenges (Hill, 2015), it is likely to suggest that the TAF has not been fully aware of the existence of innovation as a pathway for change. Like any modern military of the world, the TAF thrives on consistent, standard approaches to resolving familiar problems. This explains why the TAF depends on the standardization of tools, training, methods, and organization. Innovation subverts this standardization and consistency in the exploration of a new approach (the introduction of variance into the system), as well as (if the innovation is successful enough) in the eventual replacement of the existing cognitive templates throughout the TAF. To make innovation popular in an organization requires organizational change, which may require cultural change, emphasizing the delegation of the decision making authority, which is something the TAF stills lacks.

The reformist sentiment, however, which the High Command, the main change agent in the domain of TAF as a security organization, created in the TSG and then let it spread to the force commands, caused the questioning of old ways of thinking and doing things at higher echelons. As a result of this sentiment, compliance began to transform from a constant to a variable within the TGS and force commands. Furthermore, due to the reformist sentiment of the High Command appreciating non-compliant behavior, it is seen that the senior elites with non-compliant thinking and behavior are being appointed to critical posts close to the High Command in the TGS and force commands. One should note that, in the TAF, those work in critical posts close to the High Command in the TGS and force headquarters are advantageous for the promotion as four-star generals know them by name and are acquainted with their specialties and performance. Again, as seen in the interview results, one may suggest that legal processes such as *Ergenekon* and *Sledgehammer* increased the extent of institutional uncertainty experienced in appointments and promotions of the senior-level officers, particularly generals/admirals. This increasing uncertainty and non-compliant behavior became prevalent among the senior-level cadres can be stated as causes of the emergence of four different types of change agents within the officer corps. As explained by Mahoney and Thelen, these four types are “subversive,” “symbiont,” “opportunist,” and “insurrectionary.” For example, the appreciation of non-compliant thinking and behavior by the High Command led to the emergence of the subversive elites whose overall objective is a gradual institutional change within the TAF without fully abandoning the existing institutional order. Although the percentage of this group corresponds to around 20%¹²⁸ of the ones of their counterparts, the fact that the High Command generally

¹²⁸ This percentage was used by a general during the interview which was conducted in Ankara on December 2015.

prefers subversive elites for critical posts at headquarters during the more recent period means that subversive elites having high chance of promotion. The appreciation of subversive military leaders for the critical posts places the “subversive officership” in front of senior-level officers as a popular and preferred identity. Here it is, those subversive elites and the new reformist and non-compliant habitat they created in the headquarters is the third component affecting TAF's organizational culture, after technology and internationalization. The interviews indicate that this habitat started to change TAF's traditional organizational culture. However, one of the most important points revealed by the interviews and the survey is that the TAF does not have enough qualified support for decision making, among the ones managing TAF's security culture transformation. It is possible to define this as the TAF's “deficiency in intellectual capital.” It is seen that the TAF cannot benefit sufficiently from the human capital composed of the majors between 36 and 42, who are the best group in terms of academic sufficiency, international experience, as well as foreign language proficiency. There is a hierarchy-based perception that knowledge increases the higher the ranking due to the military's strict hierarchy and intra-organization discipline at TAF's higher command echelons including absolute obedience to orders without questioning them. This perception still exists, despite the fact that it has been gradually decreasing. Due to the dominating opinion that the higher rank knows more and “if the commanders order like that, there is something he knows” mentality prevalent among officers, the intellectual energy of those subversives, especially that of majors, cannot be fully utilized for the organizational transformation of the TAF. This deficiency in translating the intellectual dynamism of juniors, particularly the majors, into the intellectual capital needed for institutional transformation comes as the greatest

obstacle for TAF becoming an “intellectual Army.” Even though the High Command is trying to benefit maximally from the majors and captains in the decision making departments, it is seen that this effort has not yet reached an effective level and institutionalization in this domain is extremely weak.

Regarding the type of change, the dominant kind of change or transformation in TAF’s security culture has been layering. Due to this approach, which can be summarized as the integration of the newly emerged cognitive and behavioral templates to the existing institutional order without devastating it, the change comes in a gradual and incremental mode. However, due to the fact that the duration of the critical posts within the TGS and force commands are generally two years at the level of generals, there is difficulty in ensuring institutionalization regarding structural transformation. This is mainly caused by the myopic outlook of those military leaders during their fast rotation periods. These short terms in office means that the officers are focused on daily routines and the short-term tactical picture. They are not able to concentrate on the strategic picture or foresee the future and adapt accordingly.

The groups that have taken a critical stance of the transformation of TAF’s security culture are majority of colonels, some brigadier generals, and major generals who can be defined generally as *symbionts*. Aside from those, again the opportunist colonels, brigadier generals, major generals, and three-star generals are the actors coming to the stage within the anti-transformation coalition. The fact that the great majority of colonels in the Army are *symbionts* and the fact that there is an abnormal excess number of those colonels at the top immediately appear as an obstacle to change. On the other hand, the status-quo oriented mood of the opportunist generals puts the compliance behavior in front of us as the fundamental strategic behavior

style, and this behavior creates a risk-averse sentiment in the TAF. Due to this sentiment, the headquarter in the TAF headed by a general focusing only on the daily routines, does not take risk and does not have interest in addressing the structural problems as those problems would mean risk packages.

One of the important findings of this study is that the symbiont and opportunist seniors attach importance to daily routines more than necessary as a risk-averse style of behavior. This goes a long way in explaining why the TAF cannot direct its intellectual energy to the structural problems requiring new designs and new ways and means of the management of risks. While symbionts are complain about the heavy workload of routine jobs during the working hours and emphasizing that they are working very hard, opportunists are, in turn, trying to manage the intensiveness of those routine jobs in line with their personal agenda. From this point of view, even though they are complaining a lot, the intensiveness of the daily routine jobs is just what the symbionts and the opportunists are seeking for. Symbionts and opportunists in the TAF state that they cannot allocate their time to structural problems, as they are continuously concentrating on daily routines. However, focusing on daily routines seems to be just the thing that they prefer.


There is an overwhelming percentage of common opinion within the officer corps that TAF is in need of reform as a security actor. However, each force has different priorities as to what should be reformed in each service. For example, the Air Force thinks priority should be given to technology, the Navy to educating “qualified practitioner personnel,” and the Army to educating “qualified command ranks.” In terms of the points emphasized, while Air Force is placing emphasis on a techno-scientific change, the Navy highlights a practitioner-focused discourse, and the Army

underlines a commander-focused discourse. From this point-of-view, it seems that the Army is having a problems regarding qualified decision makers.

Again, as it is put forward for the first time by this study, differences in organizational cultures of the force commands appears to be one of the foremost problems for the TAF's organizational transformation. For example, there is still no complete agreement within the TAF about "joint-ness," which is continuously emphasized as one of the most important issues of the TAF's 2033 vision. It is observed that different force commands understand quite different things by the notion of joint-ness. What is meant by joint-ness? At what level and in what size should this joint-ness be? Which abilities should the TAF have while ensuring operative joint-ness? Even if enough resources are obtained for reaching those abilities, how and by what means will this vision be conveyed to political decision makers? No clear answers have yet been given to those questions within the TAF. As it is also seen in the example of joint-ness, not paying attention to the differentiating organizational culture of each force within the TAF's transformation can cause structural friction in the TAF in a near future. In the light of the debate about key concepts such as joint-ness, military transformation, military innovation, and adaptation within the TAF, this study contends that each service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie) has its "unique" cultural framework that promotes diversity and heterogeneity within the TAF.

6.2 The transformation of the TAF's social culture

Figure 8. Transformation of TAF as a social institution



In contrast to change in TAF's security culture, the process of change in TAF's social culture appears as a dual-track construction. This means that change is not solely a pre-planned process driven by military leadership and carried out in a top-down fashion. Change in this domain mostly comes with confrontational interaction between the High Command and insurrectionary junior-level officers and NCOs within the system, as well as outsider actors such as politicians, journalists, and NGOs in Turkey's socio-political context. It is worth mentioning that change in this domain is partly controlled by the High Command, and to some extent, it occurs as non-deterministic sub-processes. Thus, this domain entails and provides room for arbitrariness and randomness. This, in fact, implies that the power-distributional effect is a dynamic shaping TAF's social culture. The friction between the High Command and agentless change driven by insurrectionary juniors within the system and outsiders makes the High Command incapable of managing this domain. Due to this friction, the insurrectionary juniors can impose their demands and will of change onto military leaders as an organized voice if they first become united, and then enlist the support of the public and media, emphasizing the effect of outside actors.

In the face of such an imposition, elites give the following responses as a pattern respectively as it was seen in the cases of NCOs status problems and rights, violation of soldiers' rights, gender equality, and the headscarf issue examined in this research.

- 1st stage: Counter-attacks imposing that the demands are not legitimate and attempts to degrade the credibility of demand holders.
- 2nd stage: Acceptance of the existence of problem and seeking venues to attempt dialogue.
- 3rd stage: Changing the existing institutional order to adapt to the new situation including trust building with the rival actors, institutional and legal arrangements.


In this domain, generally “drift” appears as the change mode, and sometimes “conversion.” As legal regulations are done late and deficiently in this domain, two methods come forward, either staying non-reactive while the existing order of rules remain the same (drift) or interpreting and practicing existing order of rules differently (conversion). The best example of drift is the softening of the headscarf and beard ban within the TAF in the latest period, although the official written regulations/institutions have not been amended. It is worth remembering that then-Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Aslan Güner had left the protocol in 2007 to avoid shaking then-First Lady Gül's hand. This incident had put the topic high on the agenda (Kavakçı, 2010: 5). Although there have been no changes in the formal institutional texts of the TAF such as the Military Housing/Lodging Entrance Regulation since 2007, there has been a great softening about headscarf and beard. The campaign regarding the personal rights and legal status of NCOs was pursued at the conversion mode at the very beginning. Even though the High Command does not tend to do much in the face of pressure, the High Command changes formal texts for developing the rights and privileges of NCOs and to promote their institutional

status with a method that can be defined as passive layering, implying the passivity of the change agent.

The actors of change in the domain of the TAF as a social institution are seen to be the insurrectionaries at the junior level and the subversive military leaders trying to soothe them. The demands for change in this domain appear firstly at the junior level generally in an arbitrary way with attempts of insurrectionaries. Then, it attracts the attention of the public and the media, and captures public attention to such an extent that High Command cannot resist to this pressure. Later, those demands, if captured the public attention with the involvement of the outside actors like the TEMAD's involvement in the NCOs' struggle for their rights, and if promoted by news and commentaries on the media in a prolonged fashion force, may force the military elites to change their strategic preferences. Many changes being experienced in the social domain create arbitrary and non-compliant confrontations or frictions between the High Command and the junior-level actors despite the fact that military leaders seek to withstand each confrontation. At the end, however, they accept the defeat tacitly and try to adapt the institutional structure to the new reality dictated by the juniors and outsider actors. In this domain, the fundamental drivers of change are media power and public pressure. Simply, bottom-up demands that can capture media attention and public support in a prolonged fashion can lead to changes in the TAF's social culture, changes of which directly influencing the TAF's organizational culture, and thus Turkish CMR.

6.3.Transformation of the officer corps' professional culture

Figure 9. Transformation of officership as a profession



To start with, one should note that the High Command is not fully aware of the existence of this domain yet; meaning that change in the professional culture of officer corps is out of the High Command's control. In contrast to the change of TAF's security culture, which is under the full control of the High Command, and change of TAF's social culture, which is partly controlled by the High Command, the professional culture of the Turkish officer corps is driven by agentless change. The profile of the officer corps has been gradually changing as a result of the change in the source of the officers. Especially, the continuously increasing percentage of contracted officers is the first driver of change influencing their profile. For example, the Army (11.6%) and Air Force (9.3%) has a higher number of contracted officers compared with the Navy (3.4%), who has a relatively low percentage of contracted officers. Although the policy of contracted officers has been operative since 2006, the tension between War Academy graduates and contracted officers is still visible. When contracted officers are compared with War Academy graduates, it is evident that contracted officers have relatively low-quality undergraduate education levels, are deficient in foreign language proficiency, more focused on financial expectations, and they tend to have more conservative tendencies.

Again, the findings of this study indicate that TAF has been becoming a less ideological military. The results of the questionnaire show that the ideological rigidity of an officer weakens as ranking decreases. The indicators that According to the results of the survey conducted as part of this study, diversification in political views increases as rank decreases, while the perception that secularism is under threat as rank decreases. These findings imply the loosening of traditional ideological principles in TAF. The only statistically significant difference with respect to ranking and force command is the perception regarding “the unity of the state,” which is something that the officer corps continues to take a tough stance on. The officers’ rigid stance on the Kurdish language and their perception of the right to use Kurdish in schools as an “unacceptable political demand” confirms the officer corps’ hawkish stance on the Kurdish question in Turkey.


Another significant finding is a dichotomous split between the seniors (generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels) and juniors (lieutenants, captains and majors) in terms their stance about the military, political issues, and understanding of officership. The seniors, for instance, seem more value-oriented, more inclined to sit on the center-left side of the political spectrum, more conservative on social issues such as women’s involvement in the military, care more about secularism, more skeptical about academic careers and financial opportunities provided by the system as they think that these two degrade the honor of officership, more orthodox on anything new, stick to the normative framework imposed by the cohort spirit, are more skeptical on NATO, and are more inclined to think of officership as a way of life.

The critical question at hand is the following: Are these findings, which reflects insights from a snapshot of officer corps as of May-September 2015 and emphasizes

change within the universe of the Turkish officer corps as of the summer 2015 in terms of generational (ranks) and cross-sectional (force commands) difference, enough to assert that there is a change within the officer corps? To answer this question, what we need is a trend analysis of officer corps' professional culture that requires a comparison of this research's findings with a new snapshot reflecting insights from the universe of officer corps in the future. This point stresses the need for subsequent research aiming to measure change within the Turkish officer corps with the same survey questions in the future. Then, for instance, can we learn more about what the officers at the rank of lieutenant think and what they think at the rank of major. With this comparison of the same group of officers in two different time periods and at two different ranks, then, for the first time in the literature, can we get scholarly insights about whats, whys, and hows of change within the Turkish military. It is also worth mentioning that the findings of this research indicate that there is a elitization process within the TAF. With this comparison, one can get scholarly insights about this process as well. It is also worth mentioning that measuring changes in attitudes and opinions of the same group of officers at two or more different ranks may provide scholarly insights on how these two change drivers; that is, how the elitization process within the TAF and the changing socio-political context in Turkey interact with one another when shaping the attitude and opinion of an Turkish officer.

It is possible to summarize the points explained above with the chart below.

Figure 10. Transformation of TAF's organizational culture



The change in the TAF, which was first affected by the change in the global security environment, is occurring in three main domains. The change in the domain of TAF as a security organization shaping the TAF's security culture is a deterministic process as it is under the full control of High Command. The fundamental determinant shaping change in the TAF's social culture is, however, the friction between High Command and the agentless change. In the domain of officership as a profession, in turn, change shaping the professional culture of the officer corps is a process running in a completely agentless fashion. In the domain of TAF as a security organization, the change mode is generally layering and, sometimes, passive layering. In the domains of TAF as a social institution and officership as a profession, though, generally drift and conversion appears as being the modes of change. Again, subversive elites exhibiting non-compliant behavior in each of these three domains and also subversive and insurrectionary juniors appear as important change actors. The change processes flowing out from all three domains are ultimately flowing towards the TAF's organizational culture pool through two change pathways: emulation driving the change in TAF's security culture and

adaptation driving TAF's social culture. Lastly, at the end of the day, these incremental changes in the TAF's security and social culture as well as the professional culture of the officers directly affect TAF's organizational culture. The changing organizational culture of the TAF is, in turn, affecting CMR. Turkish CMR is also affected by change in social-political context in Turkey. Simply put, as is seen from the chart above, one should note that there is a bilateral relationship between the TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR. This bilateral relationship, in fact, creates a reciprocal causality between the two. TAF's organizational culture is under the direct influence of TAF's security culture, social culture, and the professional culture of the officer corps. The changing Turkish CMR is, in turn, returning back to the very beginning of the causal mechanism explained above with a feedback mechanism and directly affects the TAF. Owing to that, the change takes place in a cyclic fashion, a reciprocal causality appears between the change in the TAF's organizational culture and Turkish CMR. It is evident that some amount of insidership enabling one to carry out social research from within and social research of familiar is needed to observe this reciprocal causality between TAF's organizational culture shaped by non-military changes in the Turkish CMR and Turkish CMR shaped by changes from within the TAF's organizational culture. That is why this research sought to emphasize that Turkish CMR should best be studied through a holistic approach that provides scholarly insights both from the civilian and military side of the CMR to go beyond existing dichotomous explanations conceptualizing CMR as a zero-sum power politics between soldiers and elected politicians. The binary and power-based approaches, however scholarly, not only overlook the highly interactive and transformative character of CMR but also disregard the reciprocal causality between the TAF's organizational culture and

CMR. As this research obviously elucidates, Turkish CMR is a bi-directional relational concept, meaning that the changes both in the civilian and military sides of the relationship may have the capacity to influence the nature, characteristics, and evolution of CMR.



CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

To begin with, the findings of this research falsifies of some taken-for-granted assumptions in the literature, such as TAF is a “fixed” organization immune

to change of that it is a homogenous entity with a rigid institutional order. In light of the findings, this research offers that one should provide room for the possibility that the drivers and characteristics of TAF's organizational culture may change over time, and that different - even sometimes conflicting - point of views, approaches, and ways of doing things may emerge within the Turkish military. In the in-depth interviews, the author observed that the military leaders at the moment, yet they cannot clearly conceptualize and define, feel the power-distributional effect of gradual institutional change within the TAF, and thus are inclined to concentrate more on TAF's organizational transformation. In the quest for this transformation, the military leaders know what to change and why to change, but do not have a methodological expertise to answer to the question of "how to change?" This increasingly inward-looking approach has been strengthened with the increased ambiguity in the system yielding to a need for transformation is, for instance, another reason explaining how Turkish CMR has survived through domestic and foreign policy-related crises in the last decade. Then, one may contend that not solely those five exogenous approaches seeking to explain the civilianization of the Turkish CMR in the decade, but also the endogenous factors addressed in this research, such as increased uncertainty within the system and change in the TAF's security culture, social culture, and the professional culture of the officer corps would explain the recent civilianization in CMR. One may then suggest that the High Command's dilemma about how to first confront and then manage uncertainty and change affecting TAF constitutes as the first and foremost endogenous factor preventing the military from intervening the politics as, for the High Command, more involvement in civilian politics means more uncertainty and increased pressure for change in the military. This prospect leads to a disinclination for the intervention to politics,

allowing for more room for civilianization in Turkish CMR. As explained in the literature review chapter, all exogenous (or non-military) explanatory approaches such as EU effect, the empowerment of the elected civilians, political stability, and changing socio-political context may be necessary explanations for civilianization. The High Command's dilemma on how to cope with existing uncertainty and change, as well as how to manage change in organizational culture may be proposed as an endogenous factor that has made the High Command retreat from the hostile civilian territory and withdrawal to the military terrains.

Another interesting finding of the research is that the officer corps, particularly juniors, are not at odds with political Islam, and do not see it as a threat to secular character of the state. The overwhelming majority of officers, however, perceive that the primary threat is the unity of the state. One may suggest that the ongoing clashes between Turkey and the PKK may be the cause of this increased sensitivity to the unity of the state, instead of the principle of secularism. One may then conclude that, in the coming years, the unity of the state, not the principle of secularism, will be the primary sensitivity that may potentially force the TAF to influence politics either directly or indirectly. The handling of the Kurdish question by elected civilians seems thus an exceptionally significant dynamic shaping the future of Turkish CMR.

The findings of the survey also reveal that a split exists within the officer corps between juniors (lieutenants, captains, and majors) and seniors (lieutenant colonels, colonels, and generals) to such an extent that the opinions and attitudes of the officer corps' can be analyzed separately under these two categories.

In conclusion, the main issue for future research is not a simple maximization of civilian power over armed forces. The real problem is "how to build a democratic

model of CMR and maintain a strong and effective military that poses no threat to the civilian rule” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011). Or with Peter Feaver’s famous paradox: “How does a society reconcile building a military strong enough to do anything democracy ask, but ensuring it remains compliant enough to do *only* what they ask?”

To answer this question, the Turkish CMR needs more holistic bodies of research reflecting empirical insights both from the civilian and military side of the story. This study has claimed to be one of those. It also offers four venues to enrich the scholarly path it sought to open.

The first venue is the comparison of its findings with future snapshots of the Turkish officer corps to be taken with a representative sample in order to generate a trend analysis addressing change within the Turkish officer corps.

The second is applying the same methodology and survey to the other group of people within the TAF, such as NCOs and contracted sergeants. With this attempt, we can get scholarly insights about different groups of people belonging to two or more different social classes, and then compare the findings to understand whether the same inputs driving change within the TAF influence social classes differently or not. More importantly, if differences exist, then we can concentrate on “whys” of the differences.

The third is to apply the same survey of this thesis to the representative of Turkish society to acquire, for the first time in the literature, the civilian-military gaps in Turkey. Policymakers and military elites aiming to develop new models for Turkish CMR should note that we cannot manage a process if we have not first quantified the literature on the Turkish CMR, measured changes both in the civilian and military domain, and lastly, compared different snapshots to generate trend analyses.

The last venue the applying the same methodology of this study to examine other militaries of the world. By borrowing of the methodology this study offers, the change within the Turkish military can be compared with the other modern militaries. With this comparison, one can get scholarly insights about the similarities and differences between different militaries and then generate some insights about “whats,” “whys,” and “hows” about those differences and similarities.

What can be said about the future implications of this research? As this research indicates, change within the TAF has been taking place in three domains, and the agents, types, modes, drivers and pathways of change in each domain are not the same with the others. While, for instance, the High Command is the prime change agent influencing the TAF’s security culture, its influence is getting weaker in the domains of the TAF as a social institution and officership as a profession. This differentiation among these three domains in terms of the change agent’s type, change mode, drivers, and pathways leads to a management challenge for the military elites. The question at hand in this challenge is the following: how, through which mechanisms, and to what extent should military elites preserve this differentiation which yields to gradual institutional change as an “organic” process and how not to let each domain disruptively affect the others? This challenge is in fact implies to a synchronization, or to better formulate, an orchestration, problem. First, quantification and then measurement of all three domains for a better orchestration emerges as a must for the TAF. Then the TAF should foster a hybrid setting in which both military and civilian expertise can be fused to one another so as to analyze and interpret the findings derived from each domain. This stage has the challenge of civil-military integration, a complicated process hard to achieve but is needed to project hybrid intellectual capital for a comprehensive and holistic military

transformation. The nurture of a hybrid intellectual capital so as to manage each and every domain and construct structures, processes and relationships to achieve needed orchestration seems to emerge as another challenge to cope with for the TAF, an institution which has a inherently existing distrust and underestimation anything coming from the civilian world. The question of how to garnet this intellectual capital seems to be a highly relevant question for the High Command, as this research shows, because the TAF has major setbacks on the management of its post-graduate education system. The fact that the intellectual energy of those majors and captains having their post-graduate education cannot be translated into intellectual capital for the management of the transformation appears to be another challenge for the High Command.

This research also shows that, within the TAF, subversives constituting a minority among the seniors, emerge as the prime change agent and the pro-status quo symbionts have a declining standing within the system. The non-compliant sentiment promoted by the High Command in the higher headquarters and increased uncertainty in the system are two drivers that force opportunists to gradually become subversives. One should, however, note that this transformation climate mainly initiated by the then Chief Gen. Necdet Özel in 2012 and preserved by the current Chief Gen. Hulusi Akar has not been fully institutionalized yet. Still low levels of institutionalization of transformation within the TAF and still existence of the pro-*staus quo* agents, structures, and processes that may easily undo the achievements.

In conclusion, this research, which has aimed to open the blackbox of the Turkish military, emphasizes that not only exogenous factors but also endogenous factors from within the military should be taken into consideration when analyzing the change in the Turkish civil-military relations. Thanks to its analytical premise

(conceptual model) that built based on the eclectic theoretical grounding benefiting both from institutional and culturalist approaches, this research has sought an approach from multiple angles (e.g., the TAF as a security organization, as a social institution and officership/profession) as well as from multiple levels (e.g., institutional, individual) and their interaction with the use of original and primary data (interviews and surveys). By revealing the High Command's attempts to transform the TAF's security culture, this research elucidates dynamics influencing change in the TAF's social culture and examining differentiation within the officer corps, has provided a snapshot of the Turkish military as of 2014-2015. This snapshot with an insider perspective from within the TAF is surely not immune to substance-related and methodological weaknesses. One should, however, give credit that, despite all these weaknesses, with this contribution, the literature is having an empirical piece on the Turkish military relying on primary data sources that may have a potential to elevate the scholarly debates about the Turkish CMR to a more quantitative level. The author wants to emphasize that it is this elevation the literature has been in need, as has a more lively academic environment for more robust scholarly debates.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Interviews

The interviews with 82 serving officers from all ranks and force commands.

Survey

The survey sheets of 1401 serving officers from all ranks and force commands.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Adamsky, Dima. 2010. *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*. Stanford Security Studies.

Akay, Hale. 2009. "Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri: Kurumsal ve Askeri Boyut," In Ali Bayramoğlu, Ahmet İnsel, ed., *Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008 Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.

Akay, Hale. 2009. "Türkiye'de Güvenlik Sektörü: Sorular, Sorunlar, Çözümler (Turkish)," TESEV Report, 22.

Aknur, Müge. 2012. "The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," In Müge Aknur, ed., *Democratic Consolidation in Turkey*, Boca Raton: Universal-Publishers, 234.

Akyol, Mustafa. January 3, 2015. "Turkey considers new peace process with PKK," *Al-Monitor*.

Aydınlı, Ersel. 2009. "A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 63(4): 581-596.

_____. 2011. "Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish Inner State," *Turkish Studies* 12:2.

_____. 2012. "Civil-Military Relations Transformed," *Journal of Democracy* 23(1): 100-108.

Aydınlı, Ersel, Nihat Ali Özcan and Doğan Akyaz. 2006. "The Turkish Military's March Towards Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (1): 77-90.

Balcı, Bayram. April 3, 2014. "Turkey: Local Elections Gave Huge Victory to Erdogan," *Foreign Policy Journal*.

Beeson, Mark. 2008. "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines: Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?" *Armed Forces & Society* 34: 474-490.

Bilgin, Pınar. 2008 "The Securityness of Secularism? The Case of Turkey" *Security Dialogue* 39(6): 593-614.

Birand, Mehmet Ali. 1991. *Shirts of Steel*. London: IB Tauris.

Burk, James. 2002. "Theories of democratic civil-military relations," *Armed Forces Society* 29 (1): 7–29.

Canan-Sokullu, Ebru. 2013. *Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century*. London: Lexington Books. 293.

Capoccia, Giovanni and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." *World Politics* 59: 341–369.

Carreiras, Helena, and Celso Castro. 2014. *Qualitative Methods in Military Studies*. London: Routledge Press, 18-24.

Center for European Security Studies. November 2005. *Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence*.

Center for Strategic and International Studies Report. *American Military Culture in the 21st Century*. Washington DC: The CSIS Press. xviii.

Cindoğlu, Dilek. 2011. "Headscarf Ban and Discrimination: Professional Headscarved Women in the Labor Market," TESEV Report.

Cizre, Ümit. 2008. "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?" In Ümit Cizre, ed., *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. London: Routledge, 132-171

_____. 2011. "Disentangling the Threads of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Promises and Perils," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 22(2).

_____. 2003. "Demythologizing the National Security Concept: the Case of Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 57(2): 216-217.

Cook, Steven. 2007. *Ruling But not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Cooker, Christopher. 2007. *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror*. New York: Routledge Press. p. 12.

Creswell, John W., and Vicki Plano Clark. 2010. *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. SAGE Publication. 58-64.

Demirel, Tanel. 2003. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Two Patterns of Civilian Behavior Towards the Military," *Turkish Studies*. 4(3): 1-25

_____. 2003. "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980," *Armed Forces and Society* 29(2): 253-80.

_____. 2005. "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective," *Armed Forces and Society* 31(2): 245-71.

Denzin, Norman. 1970. *The Research Act in Sociology*. Chicago: Aldine.

Desch, Michael. 1999. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

DiMaggio, Paul D and Walter W. Powell, 1991. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 65.

During, Simon. 1993. *The Cultural Studies: Reader*. London and New York: Routledge. 1998.

Farrell, Theo and Terry Terriff. 2002. *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishing.

Feaver, Peter D. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23(2).

_____. D. and Erika Seeler. 2009. "Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies," in S.C. Nielsen and D.M. Snider, ed., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

_____. 1999. "Civil-Military Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 211.

_____. 2003. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight And Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fick, Nathaniel C. 2006. *One Bullet Way: The Making of A Marine Officer*. New York: Mariner Books.

Finer, Samuel E. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics*. New York: Praeger. 62.

Gidengil, Elisabeth and Ekrem Karakoç. 2014. "Which matters more in the electoral success of Islamist (successor) parties – religion or performance? The Turkish case," *Party Politics*.

Goldman, Emily O. 2002. "Western Military Models in Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan" In Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*. London: Lynne Reinner Publishing 74.

Göle, Nilüfer. 1997 "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites," *Middle East Journal* 51 (1): 56-88.

_____. 2013. "Gezi-Anatomy of a Public Square Movement," *Insight Turkey* 15(8).

Gray, Colin S. 1999. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 131.

Gürçan, Metin. 2012. "Strategic Communication and Its Applicability in the Security Sector," *The Journal of Security Strategies*. Turkish War Academy 15: 99-139.

_____. 2013. "Drone Warfare and Contemporary Strategy Making: Does the tail wag the dog?" *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 6(1-3): 2013.

_____. October 6, 2014e. "Turkish military unhappy with parliament's lack of guidance" *Al Monitor*.

_____. November 3, 2014a. "Splitting Gendarmerie from Turkish military: Reform or Bad Timing?" *Al Monitor*.

_____. November 5, 2014b. "Military presence increases in the Eastern Mediterranean" *Al Monitor*.

_____. November 24, 2014c. "Turkish government, military at odds over Gulenists," *Al Monitor*.

_____. December 10, 2014d. "\$8,700 will let young Turks 'buy out' their military service," *Al Monitor*.

_____. December 12, 2014e. "Turkish NCO fight for their rights." *Al-Monitor*.

_____. December 1, 2014f. "Turkey's women expand role in the military." *Al-Monitor*.

_____. March 9, 2015. "Turkish military wages war on Social Media." *Al-Monitor*.

_____. March 20, 2015. "Turkish hawks want to settle past injustices," *Al-Monitor*.

Gürcanlı, Zeynep. March 30, 2013. "TSK'da astsubay devrimi," *Hürriyet*.

Güney, Aylin, and Petek Karatekelioğlu. 2005. "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Armed Forces and Society* 31(3): 439-62.

_____. 2002. "The Military, Politics and Post-Cold War Dilemmas in Turkey," in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds., *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy*. London and New York: Zed Books, 162-75.

Güngör, Uğur. 2007. *The Analysis of Turkey's Approach to Peace Operations*, PhD Dissertation. Bilkent University, Department of International Relations.

Gürsoy, Yaprak. 2011. "The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military," *South European Society and Politics* 16(2): 293-308.

_____. 2012. "The Final Curtain for the Turkish Armed Forces? Civil-Military Relations in View of the 2011 General Elections," *Turkish Studies* 13(2): 191-211

_____. 2012. "The changing role of the military in Turkish politics: democratization through coup plots?" *Democratization* 19(4): 735-760.

_____. 2014. "Turkish Public Attitudes Toward The Military and Ergenekon Case: Consequences For The Consolidation Of Democracy," European Institute, Working Paper No: 5.

Hale, William. *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London, Routledge, 1994).

_____. and Ergun Özbudun. 2010. *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP*. New York: Routledge, 91.

_____. 2011. "The Turkish Republic and its military, 1923 – 1960." *Turkish Studies* 12: 2011

Harris, George S. 1965. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I," *The Middle East Journal* 19(1): 59.

_____. 1988. "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision Makers?" In Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, ed., *Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 177–200.

Heper, Metin and Aylin Güney. 2000. "The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience," *Armed Forces & Society* 26: 635-657.

_____. 2005. "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 6: 215-231.

_____. 2011. "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?" *Turkish Studies* 12(2): 241-252.

Andrew Hill. 2015. "Military Innovation and Military Culture." *Parameters*.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of the Civil Military Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *Third Wave of Democracy: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman University of Oklahoma Press.

Idiz, Semih. October 31, 2014a. "Turkey's military is angered by Ankara's Peshmerga move." *Al-Monitor*.

_____. November 11, 2014b. "No chance Turkey will be kicked out of NATO," *Al-Monitor*.

Jakob, Alexander. 2001. "On the Triangulation of Quantitative and Qualitative Data in Typological Social Research: Reflections on a Typology of Conceptualizing 'Uncertainty' in the Context of Employment Biographies," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 2(1).

Janowitz, Morris. 1971. *The Professional Soldier*. New York: Free Press.

Jenkins, Gareth. 2001. *Context and Circumstances: Turkish Military and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 15.

_____. 2001. "Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics," *The Adelphi Papers* 41(337): 21-35.

_____. 2007. "Continuity and Change. Prospects for civil-military relations in Turkey," *International Affairs* 83(2): 339–355.

_____. 2008. "Court postpones Semdinli Hearing once again" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5(109).

Jenkins, Gareth. 2008. "Poll suggests military still the most trusted institution in Turkey," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5(25).

Jenkins, Gareth. June 25, 2014. "The Balyoz Retrial and the Changing Politics of Turkish Justice," *The Turkey Analyst*. Please see: <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/331-the-balyoz-retrial-and-the-changing-politics-of-turkish-justice.html> (accessed February 20, 2015).

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2011. "Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010," *South European Society and Politics* 17(1): 1-22.

Karakaş, Eser. November 8, 2012. "State Protocol and Politics," *Today's Zaman*.

Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. 2011. "Armed Forces And Democracy," Bilgesam Publications.

_____. 2011. "Transformation of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations Culture and International Environment," *Turkish Studies* 12:2.

_____. "Turkish Security Culture: Evolutionary or Carved in Stone?" *Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession*. PME Volten, ed. Groningen: Center for European Security Studies.

Katznelson, Ira. 2003. "Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative Historical Social Science." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ed. 270–301. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives in National Security," Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press 4.

Kavakçı, Merve. 2010. *Islam Headscarf Politics in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave 5.

Kemal, Lale. December 26, 2012. "Grave violation of soldier rights," *Today's Zaman*.

Keyman, Fuat. January 15, 2015. "Post-vesayet, Sivillesme, Demokratiklesme (Turkish)," *Radikal*.

_____. 2014. "The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization," *Insight Turkey* 16(2): 19-31.

_____. and Ziya Öniş. 2007. *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformation*. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. 9-34.

Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2012. "The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism," *Insight Turkey* 14(2):37-57.

Lagendijk, Joost. 2010. "The Times are Really Changing in Turkey: Security Matters," Newsletter from the Centre of European Security Studies, 12.

Letsch, Constanze. July 30, 2011. "Turkey military chiefs resign over Sledgehammer 'coup plot' arrests," *The Guardian*.

Lichbach, Mark Irving and Alan S.Zuckerman. 2009. *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 4

Linz, J.J. and Alfred C. Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Lion-Perlin, David. 2011. "Turkish Civil-Military Relations: A Latin American Comparison" *Turkish Studies*, Vol.12., Issue:2

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mansoor, Peter. 2011. "The Softer Side of War: Exploring the Influence of Culture on Military Doctrine." *Foreign Affairs*.

Mardin, Şerif. 1972. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," *Daedalus* 102(1).

McCargo, Duncan and Zarakol, Ayse “Turkey and Thailand: Unlikely Twins” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 23/3 2012.

Michaud-Emin, Linda. 2007. “The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the 7th Harmonization Package and its Ramifications for the Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 8(1): 36.

Moskos, Charles. 1977. “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization.” *Armed Forces & Society* 4:41-50.

_____. 1988. *Soldiers and Sociology*. US military Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1988.

_____. John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal eds., *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. Also, Charles Moskos, “Military Systems in Twenty-First Century and New Trends,” presented at Turkish Military Academy, June 2, 2003.

Narlı, Nilüfer. 2005. “Aligning Civil-Military Relations In Turkey: Transparency Building in Defense Sector And the EU Reforms,” *Transforming National Armed Forces in South East Europe - from the Social to the Military Challenge*, 9th Workshop of the PfP Consortium Study Group „Regional Stability in South East Europe“ LtCol Mag. Ernst M. Felberbauer, Mag. Predrag Jureković, Prof. Plamen Pantev (eds)

_____. 2009. “Changes in the Turkish Security Culture and in the Civil-Military Relations,” *Western Balkans Security Observer* 14: 56–83.

_____. 2011. “Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations,” *Turkish Studies*. 12(2): 215–225.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall 22.

Oruçoğlu, Berivan. January 6, 2015. “Why Turkey’s Mother of All Corruption Scandals Refuses to Go Away,” *Foreign Policy*.

Pelt, Mogens. 2014. *Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey: The Menderes Era and its Demise*. I.B. Tauris.

Pope, Hugh, and Nicole Pope. 2000. *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey*. Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 322.

Posen, Barry R. 1984. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Rhodes, Edward. 1999. "Constructing Power: Cultural Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s." In Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes, eds., *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rosen, Stephen Peter. 1994. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca :Cornell University Press.

Sarigil, Zeki. 2007. "Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military," *Mediterranean Politics*, 12(1): 39-57.

_____. 2011. "Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy," *Turkish Studies* 12(2): 265-278.

_____. 2014. "The Turkish military: Principal or Agent?" *Armed Forces & Society* 40(1): 168-190.

Şatana, Nil. 2008. "Transformation of the Turkish military and the path to democracy," *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (3): 357-388.

_____. Şatana, Nil S. 2011 Civil-Military Relations in Europe, the Middle East and Turkey, *Turkish Studies*, 12:2, 279-292,

Siebold, Guy L. 2001. "Core Issues and Theory in Military Sociology", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 29: 140-159.

Şimsek, Ayhan. 2014. "Turkey's top general offers new vision of military, democracy and secularism," *Southeast European Times*.

Tank, Pınar. 2001. "Turkey as a 'Special Case' for the EU: Will the Generals Retreat from Politics?" *Security Dialogue* 32 (2):217-30.

Taştekin, Fehim. January 26, 2015. "War on Gulenists undermines Turkish diplomacy" *al-Monitor*.

Toktas, Şule. "The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey"

http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_26_Sule_Toktas_Umit_Kurt.pdf
(accessed 10/12/2009).

_____. and Ümit Kurt. 2010. "The Turkish Military's Autonomy, AKP Rule and the EU Reform Process in the 2000s: An Assessment of the Turkish Version of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF)." *Turkish Studies* 11(3): 387-403.

Uyar, Mesut and Edward Erickson. 2009. *A Military History of the Ottomans*. Oxford: Praeger Publishing 151-153.

Varoğlu Abdulkadir. 2005. "Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces," *Armed Forces & Society* 31(4).

Varoğlu, Abdulkadir, Joseph Soeters, Erhan Tanercan and Ünsal Sıgri. 2004. "Turkish-Dutch Encounters during Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 11(2): 354-68.

Varoğlu, Abdulkadir, Joseph Soeters, Erhan Tanercan and Unsal Sigri, "Turkish-Dutch Encounters during Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 11:2 (2004): 354-68.

von Clausewitz, Carl. 1984. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 9.

Watson, BCS. 1999. "The Western Ethical Tradition and the Morality of the Warrior." *Armed Forces & Society* 26(1): 55-72.

Winslow, Donna. 1999. *Military Culture: An Annotated Bibliography*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa.

Wright, George. April 22, 2004 "Greek Cypriot leaders reject Annan plan," *The Guardian*.

Yalçinkaya, Haldun. 2012. "The Nongovernmental Organizations–Military Security Collaboration Mechanism: Afghanistan NGO Safety Office," *Armed Forces & Society* 39(3): 489-510.

Yıldız, Nurcan. 2007. *Tanklar ve Sözcükler* (Tanks and Words). Ankara: Alfa Publishing.



APPENDIX A

SURVEY

Hi;

This survey study is being carried out for the purposes of Major Metin GURCAN's (Mobile number: 0 507 767 01 41, E-mail: metin.gurcan@bilkent.edu.tr) PhD dissertation on "Civil-Military Relations" at Bilkent University, Department of Political Science. Our principal aim in carrying out this survey is to contribute to a better understanding of civil-military relations in Turkey, through undertaking a statistical analysis of the answers provided to it by both active duty officers serving

in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the answers of ordinary civilians to a similar survey.

Your identity is irrelevant for our purposes in this study. In other words we absolutely do not need information regarding your identity, telephone and regiment numbers or any other personal details. The main aim of the survey is not mapping out what people individually think but rather to grasp the general inclinations and thoughts of the TAF's officer staff. **Given this purpose, we are operating with a sample population of around 1500 randomly chosen officers.** The findings from this study will not be shared with the general public and will instead be used strictly for academic and scientific purposes. In other words, please be assured that you can be absolutely candid in your answers.

We thank you in advance for sparing **10-15 minutes** of your precious time to contribute to this scientific and academic study by answering the questions in a serious manner that frankly reflects your thoughts and feelings.

Q1. Please indicate <u>the force you are serving under</u> within the military? (Please circle the option that applies to you.) 1. Army 2. Air Force 3. Navy 4. Gendarmerie 5. Coast Guard
Q2. Your age:
Q3. Your <u>current rank</u>? 1. 2nd Lt./1st Lt 2. Captain 3. Major 4.Lt. Colonel 5. Colonel 6.General/Admiral
Q4. <u>Level of education</u>, in other words the highest level of education you have completed or are currently enrolled in? 1. Military Academy/University 2. Master's (Including those currently enrolled) 3. Doctorate (Including those currently enrolled)
Q5. The school you have graduated from (your <u>background</u>)? 1. Civilian university 2. War Academy 3) Other (noncommissioned officers or specialised seargent)
Q6. What is your <u>hometown</u>? (Please fill the space below with which ever city you feel is your hometown)
Q7. <u>Your father's level of education</u>, in other words the latest degree he has obtained? 1. Literate 2. Primary School 3. Middle School 4. High School 5. University 6. Master's 7. Doctorate
Q8. Which income bracket does your <u>monthly household income</u> fall under? In other words how many Turkish Liras does your household receive per month on average, from all sources of income? (All sources of income including money from your spouse's wage as well as any money you may be receiving from rent etc.)

1. (2500-4000 TL) 2. (4000-5000 TL) 3. (5000-6000 TL) 4. (6000-7000 TL) 5. (7000-8000 TL) 6. (8000 TL plus)
Q9. Any <u>languages</u> you know besides Turkish? (including those you only have a beginner's or basic fluency) 1. I don't 2. Just one 3. Just two 4. Three 5. Four 6. More than four
Q10. Did you have any officer acquaintances among your family or friends from before? 1. Yes 2. No
Q11. <u>Who</u> was the primary influence in your decision to become an officer? 1. Personal choice 2. Family's influence 3. Other people close to me, besides my family
Q12. What was your <u>main reason in becoming an officer</u>? 1. <u>Financial expectations</u> (a secure job) 2. <u>Social Status</u> (Serving in an institution such as the TAF) 3. A training offered by the TAF, opportunity to serve abroad and similar <u>professional career</u> opportunities 4. The <u>high level of education</u> at the TAF compared to its civilian counterparts
Q13. What is the total amount of time you have served in areas actively partaking in counterterrorism operations as of now (Towns in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, commonly referred to as "Sark Gorevi")? 1. 0 (I haven't) 2. (1-2 between years) 3. (2-3 between years) 4. (3-4 between years) 5. (4-5 between years) 6. (5-6 between years) 7. (6 years and more)
Q14. How successful do you think the TAF has been thus far in combatting terrorism? 1. Not successful 2. A Little Successful 3. Very Successful
Q15. As of today, how long have you served outside of Turkey? (including military deployment, education and seminars) 1. 0 (Never served outside Turkey) 2. (0- 6 months) 3. (6 months -1 year) 4. (1-2 years) 5. (2-3 years) 6. (3 years and more)
Q16. What is the total number of years you have spent abroad <u>for educational purposes</u> (military or academic) ? 1. 0 (Never recieved education abroad) 2. (0- 6 months) 3. (6 months -1 year) 4. (1-2 years) 5. (2-3 years) 6. (3 years and more)
Q17. Where have you served abroad? (If you've served in more than one place, please circle all the relevant options) 1. Never served abroad 2. USA 3. Europe 4. Afghanistan 5. Kosovo 6. Bosnia- Herzegovina 7. Iraq 8. Azerbaijan 9. Somali 10. Central Asia 11. Middle East 12. Africa 13. Asia 14. Far East

Q18. Generally how <u>satisfied</u> are you with being an officer as an occupation? 1) Not at all 2. A little 3 Very
Q19. What has been <u>the most satisfying aspect</u> of your time in the TAF till now? (please choose only one) 1. Social status and job satisfaction 2. Economic resources 3. Career opportunities
Q20. What have you <u>always most prioritised</u> during the period of your service in the TAF? 1. Myself 2. My Family 3. TAF (my institution)
Q21. How important is “<u>Spirit of cohort</u>” (spirit of camaraderie among people recruited in the same cycle) for an officer? 1) Not at all 2. A little 3 Very
Q22. Do you think that <u>the respect and reputation accorded to soldiership as an occupation</u> is decreasing in Turkey? 1) Yes 2) No
Q23. If you currently have or plan to have <u>children</u>, would you want them to be an officer in the TAF? 1) Yes 2) No
Q24. What do you think the TAF’s “<u>primary function</u>” ought to be? 1. Protecting the Republic of Turkey from <u>solely external threats</u>, 2. Protecting the Republic of Turkey from <u>both internal and external threats</u>,
Q25. Do you think the TAF needs serious <u>structural reforms</u> to meet future threats and prepare for possible conflict situations? 1) Yes 2) No
Q26. How <u>optimistic</u> are you on the TAF’s power and deterrent capabilities in the global security environment? 1) Not at all 2. A little 3 Very
Q27. Which of the options below is most important for a “deterrent and strong Army”? (please choose only one) 1. Qualified executing staff 2. Technology 3. Qualified command echelon 4. Military morale and cultural values
Q28. How do you think Turkey’s membership to NATO contributed to <u>TAF’s institutional structure</u> (organisational structure, work and institutional culture etc.) ? 1. Positively 2. Negatively
Q29. How do you think Turkey’s membership to NATO contributed to <u>TAF’s battle effectiveness?</u> 1. Positively 2. Negatively
Q30. Should Turkey cooperate more with international security organization other than NATO such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

1. Yes 2.No
Q31. Is the recent wave of civilianization in civil-military relations in Turkey, positively affecting the TAF's military power and efficacy? 1) Yes 2) No
Q32. How <u>nationalist</u> would you say you are? 1. Not at all 2. A little 3. Very
Q33. There has existed a long tradition of left-right-centre politics in Turkey. Where in this spectrum would you locate your <u>political views?</u> 1. Left 2. Centre-Left 3. Centrist 4. Centre-right 5. Right 6. None
Q34. Which institution <u>first and foremost</u> represents the " <u>national will</u> " in Turkey? 1.Presidency 2. Parliament 3. Government 4. Constitutional Court
Q35. Do you think that the principle of " <u>secularism</u> " is currently under threat in Turkey? 1) Yes 2) No
Q36. Do you think that the principle of " <u>unitary state</u> " is currently under threat in Turkey? 1) Yes 2) No
Q.37. Do you <u>fast</u> on the month of ramadan? 1. I don't fast 2. I don't fast (due to health reasons/not in my faith) 3. I partially do 4. I try to fast during the whole period of the ramadan.
Q38. Generally, how satisfied are you with your personal economic situation? 1. Not satisfied at all 2. A little satisfied 3. Very satisfied
Q39. How has your <u>economic situation</u> changed as an officer over the past few years? 1. Worse 2. Same 3. Better
Q40. In this section you will encounter a series of statements. If you agree with the statements below please indicate the option "YES" and if not the option "NO" Please mark the appropriate option with X YES NO
1. Matters of religion and state ought to be separate
Women serving as judges, prosecutors, teachers, police <u>should be allowed to wear their headscarves</u> during public service.

3.	Female students in primary and secondary education should be allowed to <u>cover their heads in class during lessons</u>
4.	I believe in the <u>afterlife</u> .
5.	When <u>science and religion</u> contradict, I seek guidance from science.
6.	I don't approve of income from interest and receiving returns from money in a bank account.
7.	Kurds' right to <u>mother tongue medium education</u> should be granted.
8.	I support Turkey's EU membership process
9.	I trust to the <u>Parliamentary</u>
10.	I trust the <u>police</u> (law enforcement agency)
11.	I trust <u>the media</u> .
12.	No matter what the circumstances, Turkey should be governed with democracy.
13.	I am <u>satisfied</u> with the level of democracy and the functioning of democracy in Turkey.
14.	Turks are a <u>military-nation</u> .
15.	When necessary, the military should seize control and govern the country
16.	Military administrations can be much more <u>effective and successful</u> than civilian ones.
17.	The military's influence in over civil politics and government has <u>decreased</u>
18.	in Turkey over the past 10-15 year period.
18.	The total number of soldiers in the TAF should be <u>decreased</u> .
19.	<u>Compulsory military service</u> should be abolished.
20.	Even if compulsory military service continues, the length of service period should be <u>further shortened</u> .
21.	Imagine that you have sufficient economic wealth and means and your son wants to complete his military service through a payment/fee. Would you approve?
22.	TAF should be a military constituted of only the professional soldiers (that is, volunteer soldiers like paid public servants) like in the USA.
23.	There should be a legal right to refuse military service based on belief, moral views or personal choice (conscientious objection).
24.	The number of <u>female officers and sergeants</u> serving in the TAF

	should be increased.
25.	If they want to, gays should be allowed to complete their compulsory service in the TAF.
26.	<u>Atatürkism</u> is the main source of intellectual inspiration for the TAF
27.	An officer in Turkey is always <u>superior to a civilian counterpart</u> of the same education level.
28.	General Staff should operate under the <u>Ministry of National Defence</u>
29.	<u>Military Justice system should be abolished</u> to end the distinction between civil and military courts.
30.	I would not carry out an order that I think is against the law, legislation or constitution.
31.	When there is a conflict of opinion between civilian, political decision makers and the military, with regard to security/defense issues the civilian, political decision should have the final say.
32.	The Chief of Staff should freely discuss his views with the public at large including on political issues.
33.	Besides Western countries, Turkey should also initiate and pursue closer foreign policy ties with countries from Asia (Russia, Central Asia etc.) Africa and the Far East (China, India etc.)
34.	I think Turkish foreign policy has been successful.
35.	Ataturkist worldview ought to remain the founding block of military education.
36.	I frequently use internet and social media to follow the news.

