

EPIC GAZE IN *PARADISE LOST*

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ABSTRACT

EPIC GAZE IN *PARADISE LOST*

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This study aims to investigate the workings of gaze in John Milton's *Paradise Lost* with regard to Helen Lovatt's book on epic gaze and the theoretical insights of three important writers on gaze: Sartre, Foucault and Lacan. The study focusses on four main characters of the epic: Satan, God, Adam and Eve. Lovatt's epic gaze proves to be an appropriate starting point for this study, while the other named theorists' ideas are employed more or less for different characters and for different scenes. Sartre's notion of the gaze concerns the ontological level rather than everyday experience and is used mostly for the analysis of the gazes of Satan, Adam and Eve. Foucault's view of the gaze, however, concerns power relations and therefore offers most insights into God's gaze in the poem. For the investigation of Satan and Eve's gazes in different phases, in contrast, the analysis employs mostly Lacan's ideas of the gaze, which are related to his developmental psychological model. All the findings show that Milton's epic uses gaze in differing and distinctive ways, producing cinematographic scenes.

Keywords: *Paradise Lost*, John Milton, theories of the gaze, epic gaze.

ÖZ

KAYIP CENNET ADLI ESERDE EPİK BAKIŞ

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Bu çalışma, Helen Lovatt'ın epik bakış üzerine yazmış olduğu kitaba ve Sartre, Foucault ve Lacan gibi üç önemli yazarın teorik kavramlarına ilişkin John Milton'un *Kayıp Cennet* adlı eserindeki bakış işleyişini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, şiirin dört ana karakterine odaklanmaktadır: Satan, God, Adam ve Eve. Lovatt'ın epik bakışı bu çalışma için uygun bir başlangıç noktası olmuştur ve diğer adlandırılmış kuramcıların fikirleri farklı karakterler ve sahneler için uygun olduğunda kullanılmıştır. Sartre'ın bakış kavramı günlük deneyimden çok varoluşçu bir düzeydedir ve çoğunlukla Satan, Adam ve Eve'in bakışlarının analizi için kullanılmıştır. Ancak Foucault'nun bakış görüşü güç ilişkileriyle ilgilidir ve bu nedenle God karakterinin şiirdeki bakışına ışık tutmaktadır. Bunun tersine, Satan ve Eve'in farklı aşamalarındaki bakışlarının incelenmesi için, analiz çoğunlukla Lacan'ın, gelişimsel psikolojik modeliyle ilgili bakış fikirlerini kullanmıştır. Tüm bulgular, Milton'un destanının sinematografik sahneler üreterek bakışı çeşitli şekillerde kullandığını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kayıp Cennet, John Milton, bakış teorileri, epic bakış.



To my family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>PL</i>	<i>Paradise Lost</i>
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
<i>DP</i>	<i>Discipline and Punishment</i>
<i>HS</i>	<i>History of Sexuality</i>



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“O hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold,
Into our room of bliss thus high advanced
Creatures of other mould, earth-born perhaps,
Not spirits, yet to heavenly spirits bright
Little inferior...”
(4.358-62)

Scholarship about John Milton’s epic, *Paradise Lost* (1667) is in itself a huge corpus. From almost the moment of its publication, the poem has inspired deep critical analysis of various aspects of both its form and its content. There have been many works which refer to visual aspects in the poem, one such work being McColgan’s essay “Light out of Darkness” (1991). Many unexplored areas remain, and current theoretical and critical discourses bring new perspectives to our understanding of the poem. One such discourse concerns theories of gaze. It is quite surprising that no one has brought modern theoretical perspectives into questioning the whole idea of gaze in this poem, since Milton’s epic uses lines of sight and ideas of viewing in distinctive ways, producing visual scenarios, especially since theories of gaze have become influential in different areas of the representational arts such as film studies, the visual arts, and literature.

Directly relevant to Milton's representation of gaze in *Paradise Lost* is Lovatt's work on what she calls the epic gaze. In her book on this subject she aims to explore how lines of sight (primarily the gazes of characters) create structures and define power relationships in ancient works. Unlike her work, this study will explore these lines of sight in Milton's *Paradise Lost* and with respect only to the gaze. For Lovatt, the gaze is a defining feature of epic poetry. She describes the significance of the concept of the gaze for the epic genre with the following words:

[e]pic is an omniscient and objective narrative, one that looks down on its characters, and turns them into objects of its gaze, although the characters themselves strive to stand out [...] The narrative of epic is structured by the gazes of those watching, not just the gods (and goddesses) on the mountains above, but also the women (and old men) on the walls at the edge (1).

The gaze is thus a fundamental concept of epic poetry, and the characters of epic are defined by the gazes of other characters, and the gazes of characters determine how other characters act or behave. This thesis proposes that using theories of gaze and ideas related to the concept of an epic gaze will improve our understanding of *Paradise Lost* and an overlooked aspect of its epic modality. For this reason, this thesis will present a study of epic gaze in *Paradise Lost* by analysing selected significant aspects of Milton's poem through the theoretical insights of three important writers on gaze: Sartre, Foucault and Lacan. It will reach the conclusion that the gaze reinforces the power relations within the poem, including those related to gender and to perceptions of identity.

In this chapter, the epic gaze, Sartrean, Foucauldian and Lacanian concepts and theories of gaze will be discussed, and the methodology of the thesis will be discussed.

1.1 Definitions: Gaze

To start with the definition of the word “gaze”: in earlier usage, it meant “to look vacantly or curiously about; also, to stare, open one's eyes (with astonishment)”, a sense that is still current; however in modern times and in the use of the theorists whose ideas are used in this thesis, it has taken the more specific meaning of “to look fixedly, intently, or deliberately at something” (*OED* “Gaze,” def. v. 1a). These definitions draw a parallel between the word’s usage in literary theory and its common usage. Yet, these definitions do not fully acknowledge the broad range of ways in which the word is used in philosophical, cultural and literary theory. Margaret Olin in a chapter about “gaze” in *Critical Terms for Art History* (2003) provides a useful background about the word. Olin describes the term as such: “gaze is a rather literary term for what could be called “looking” or “watching.” Its connotation of a long, ardent look may bring to mind the intensity in which knowledge and pleasure mingle when I behold a work of art” (319). For visual arts, the gaze or gazing might be associated with looking and at the same time deriving pleasure from a work of art. Yet, in other discourses, it may go beyond looking. With regard to this, Olin states that:

While most discourse about the gaze concerns pleasure and knowledge, however, it places both of these in the service of issues of power, manipulation, and desire. There is usually something negative about the gaze as used in art theory. It is rather the word “stare” in everyday usage (319).

Similarly, the feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey emphasizes how the word “gaze” might be associated with the issues of power and desire. In her seminal article “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975) Mulvey, using Freudian and Lacanian ideas, says that “gaze” is a defining feature of the cinema. She claims that the cinema offers

a number of possible pleasures, which one of them is scopophilia. Scopophilia is a term which appears in Sigmund Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), and it means "taking other people as objects and subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze." This particular pleasure is also visible in the cinema as maintained by Mulvey:

[T]he mass of mainstream film, and the conventions within which it has consciously evolved, portray a hermetically sealed world that unwinds magically, indifferent to the presence of the audience, producing for them a sense of separation and playing on their voyeuristic fantasy. Moreover, the extreme contrast between the darkness in the auditorium (which also isolates the spectators from one another) and the brilliance of the shifting patterns of light and shade on the screen helps to promote the illusion of voyeuristic separation. Although the film is really being shown, is there to be seen, conditions of screening and narrative conventions give the spectator an illusion of looking in on a private world (Mulvey, 9).

According to Mulvey, women in films are turned into objects of desire by male gazes in the cinema. The male gaze is not limited to the characters in the films as it might be extended to the gaze of male spectators. The male gaze bears the look whereas the female body is reduced to an image to be looked at. As Mulvey asserts:

In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female figure which is styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-look-at-ness. Women displayed as sexual object is the leit-motif of erotic spectacle (11).

As she maintains, the pleasure in question belongs to a male gazer whereas the passive role of an exhibitionist is taken by female gazed. Similarly, in the world outside the cinema, John Berger (in a book adapted from a television series *Ways of Seeing* (1972)) suggests that:

Men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations between men and women but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus she turns herself into an object- and most particularly an object of vision: a sight (47).

Berger's claim is especially significant in the way that it also shows how women even beyond the cinema screen turn themselves into an object; visual representations definitely construct women as objects for the construction of male subject, a conclusion arrived at by critics and theorists from the fields of art, film criticism, and theory. While other theorists have written about the gaze in other not necessarily gendered ways, it is important in this thesis to bear in mind the cinematographic qualities of several passages of *Paradise Lost*, which will be reconsidered from the point of view of the gaze.

The first theorist of the gaze is generally understood to be Jean- Paul Sartre, the first modern philosopher to focus on gaze as a very specific situation; his ideas will be discussed in a separate section below. Following that, the ideas of the French theorist and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who also wrote about the gaze, will be discussed. After Sartre, Lacan was the most important theorist dealing with the concept of the gaze. In addition, because the gaze is so evidently one of the discourses of power, Foucault has made very significant contributions to the study of the gaze within culture and literature, so the Foucauldian gaze will also be inspected in this thesis. When it comes to epic gaze, this is a new term coined by Helen Lovatt in her scholarly work on ancient epics, and it is to her work that this thesis will be a supplement, and an addition to general scholarship on the gaze.

1.2 The Epic Gaze

In her investigation of the theme of vision in Greek and Latin epic, Lovatt begins with the discussion of the gaze-related nature of epic: “Epic is an omniscient and objective narrative, one that looks down on its characters, and turn them into objects of its gaze, although the characters themselves strive to stand out” (1). Observing that the protagonists of epic are ‘action heroes’ who join battles, move from one place to another, and change the ‘world around them’, she argues that the purpose of epic glory requires these protagonists to be transfixed, becoming monuments and poetic artefacts (1). She further continues her explanation about the narrative structure of epic as follows: “The narrative of epic is structured by the gazes of those watching, not just the gods (and goddesses) on the mountains above, but also the women (and old men) on the walls at the edge” (1). After these explanations, she straightforwardly comes to discuss her ideas about the epic gaze with various examples from a group of ancient texts. For Lovatt, the owner of the gaze can be divine characters (gods) who can function on a number of levels: “as characters taking full part in the story; as allegorical representations of human emotions (anger, wisdom, love); as embodiments of the natural world; as cultic presences, worshipped by readers outside the poems” (30). She says that the divine gaze is characterized as clearer, more penetrative and effective than that of mortals, which makes it improbable for them to appropriate the divine gaze even when they are granted divine vision by the gods. Then, we are informed about the prophetic gaze, which is again not as effective as the divine gaze because the owners of the prophetic gaze lack the agency of divine viewers (124). It should be here noted that the prophetic gaze is more effective than the gaze of other mortals because she notes that the prophets come between gods and mortals (122).

Although Lovatt explores how Ariadne (in Catullus 64) becomes the object of the gaze, she demonstrates the significance of the female gaze for epic with the following words: “the presence of a female perspective, even if disempowered and on the margins, is an important part of the epic gaze” (224).

Subsequently, she asserts that epic gaze often focusses on looking at men: “women are not the central subject matter of epic: the epic gaze is fundamentally concerned with looking at men” (205). She explores how the body of the hero in epic is erotically objectified when he is exposed to the gazes of those gazing upon him. Yet, heroes are not only presented as an object to be looked at, but also they can show their strength with their assaultive gaze on which they act.

It is also worth pointing out that she provides approaches to theories of ‘the gaze’, referring to Sartre, Foucault and Lacan’s views of gaze.

In sum, as Lovatt maintains, epic uses lines of sight and ideas of viewing in distinctive ways, and this produces visual scenarios, in which all sorts of gazing (theatrical, cinematographic etc.) occur. The gaze is a significant aspect of epic genre, and it plays a major role in how the characters act and behave. Further, epic owes much of its fascination to the act of gazing, allowing us, the readers to act as the biggest gazers.

1.3 The Sartrean Gaze

First of all, I am going to outline some key ideas of Sartre’s with respect to consciousness and existence, and then I am going to separately add Sartre’s discussions of the fall and shame, which will be short sections because these are separate issues that will be referred to again, later in my analysis. Here the most

significant concepts are “being-for-itself”, “being-in-itself”, “being-for-others”, “shame”, “pure shame” and “fall” which Sartre mentions in his *Being and Nothingness*, and these are the Sartrean concepts which most closely refer to the issues of the gaze in *Paradise Lost*.

The significance of vision is explicit in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. In his major work *Being and Nothingness* (1943), a phenomenological enquiry into the nature of being, he demonstrates how looking (i.e. the gaze) ¹ plays an essential role in human experience, in particular for the relations between the subject and the object. We should here note that the Sartrean gaze exists at the ontological level rather than referring to everyday experience (yet for Lacan, who benefits from Sartre’s work, the gaze is concerned with the scopic field in psychoanalysis). To display the relations between the subject and the object within the scope of the gaze, Sartre introduces to us the existence of two kinds of being, which are ‘being-for-itself’ (the subject) and ‘being-in-itself’ (the object). ‘Being-for-itself’ is the nature of being of consciousness while ‘being-in-itself’ refers to the nature of being of non-conscious things. As also suggested by Storr, for Sartre, to be a subject is to be active rather than passive, which is the locus of existential phenomenology (64). Thus, we can equate ‘being-for-itself’ with subject-hood and activity whereas ‘being-in-itself’ with object-hood and passivity. The Subject’s activity is achieved through the act of looking at the Other with the Subject’s objectifying gaze, which is also confirmed by Storr:

Both the activity through which the subject posits itself as such in relation to others, and the term by which it extrapolates from the fact of its own consciousness to the apprehension of that of others, is explicitly set out as looking. Looking is the essential and original mode of the Sartrean

¹ In French as ‘le regard.’ In her translation of *Being and Nothingness*, Barnes uses the word ‘look.’ However, this thesis will use the word ‘gaze’ here, as it is ‘the concept of gaze’ which is explored, and which Sartre seems to be referring to in this passage.

subject's relation to other subjects; moreover, the construction of looking as an activity inscribes all such relations as power relations between active subject and passive object (64-65).

Thus, the gaze determines the power relations between the subject and the object in a way that it exalts the position of one, allowing him or her to assert his or her subjectivity, while it reduces the Other to the level of a passive object to be looked at. In other words, when one puts the other under his or her gaze, he or she takes on the role of an active subject and the Other becomes a passive object in the Subject's field of vision. At this point, neither of them can occupy the positions of object and subject at the same time. However, they can exchange their roles because for Sartre the gaze is a two-way process; as his own claim clearly confirms: "‘Being-seen-by-the-Other’ is the truth of ‘seeing-the-Other’" (257). (In the preceding sentences Sartre has shown how these two states imply the "permanent *possibility*" (my emphasis) of each other, which is easier to accept). This causes a conflict in the interaction between these two sides. In this conflict, achieving subjectivity means the negation of objectivity, which demonstrates the power of the Subject's gaze. Storr defines this particular conflict as a 'battle of looks' with the following words:

When I look at someone, I see him or her just as I see any object in the world, but my recognition of that someone as another human subject is, in Sartrean terms, based on my recognition that he or she may look at me and thereby make me into an object for himself or herself. Any meeting of subjects is therefore a battle of looks, a struggle by each subject to save its own subject-hood from obliteration by the other's look (65).

As in Sartre's account, the Other is "on principle the one who looks at me" (257), it is inevitable that I am rendered an object under the gaze of the Other. Also, as a response to the gaze of the Other, I can assert myself as an active subject so as to make him or

her an object of my gaze. This is the beginning of a conflict between me and the Other since both of us attempt to objectify each other. With regard to this particular issue, Martinot makes the following explanation:

If one apprehends the other as a subject through having been rendered an object for the other in the look, when one reciprocates, retrieving one's own subject hood by returning the look, one thereby renders the other an object for oneself in turn. And the ensuing oscillation of successive objectivizations signifies an unending conflict as the originary nature of this process of interaction. An uneasy balance of subjectivities can be achieved as a contingent mutuality; but it is an unstable structure, continually on the verge of breakdown. Each individual lives in peril of the other's re-objectivizing look; both stand ready with a pre-emptive look in order to preserve their own autonomy, subjectivity, and freedom - a kind of ontological Cold War (Martinot).

As mentioned above, the gaze is a determining factor in the Subject's relation to the Other. It enables one to assert his or her own subjectivity and freedom. Yet, achieving it by all means raises a conflict between two subjects. This conflict, in Sartre's account, is based on the ground of 'being-for-others:'

Everything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations... Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others (364).

As Sartre indicates, our relations with the Other are reciprocal and bilateral, and this is experienced by both sides. What takes place in our relation with the other also takes place in his or her relation with us. Conflict is the indication of being-for-others. He describes our being-for-others with the following words:

If we start with the first revelation of the Other as a *look*, we must recognize that we experience our inapprehensible being-for-others in the

form of a possession. I am possessed by the Other; the Other's look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculpts it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. The Other holds a secret - the secret of what I am. He makes me be and thereby he possesses me, and this possession is nothing other than the consciousness of possessing me. I in the recognition of my object-state have proof that he has this consciousness. By virtue of consciousness the Other is for me simultaneously the one who has stolen my being from me and the one who causes "there to be" a being which is my being (364).

As is obvious from Sartre's description, the Other's gaze strips us of our being and freedom and we are possessed by the Other. This is the indication of our being-for-others, in which our freedom or being is stolen by the Other's gaze. In this ontological structure, thus, so as to recover our being, we are compelled to assimilate the other's being and freedom. In the words of Sartre:

[. . .] if in one sense my being-as-object is an unbearable contingency and the pure "possession" of myself by another, still in another sense this being stands as the indication of what I should be obliged to recover and find in order to be the foundation of myself. But this is conceivable only if I assimilate the Other's freedom. Thus my project of recovering myself is fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other (364).

Furthermore, as hinted by the preceding explanations, in Sartre's view, our being-for-others is an alienating experience because we are reduced to an object and defined by the gaze of the Other when his or her gaze is directed at us. To illuminate the power dynamics inherent in the gaze, Sartre gives two examples. In the first example, I sit in a public park and look at another man who is not aware of being looked at. As long as the man at does not return the gaze, he remains an object in my field of vision.

[T]he Other is still an object for me. He belongs to my distances; the man is there, twenty paces from me, he is turning his back on me. As such he is again two yards, twenty inches from the lawn, six yards from the statue; hence the disintegration of my universe is contained within the limits of this same universe; we are not dealing here with a flight of the world

toward nothingness or outside itself. Rather it appears that the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it is perpetually flowing off through this hole. The universe, the flow and the drain hole are all once again recovered, reapprehended and fixed as an object. All this is there for me as a partial structure of the world, even though the total disintegration of the universe is involved (255-6).

In this example, 'the disintegration of universe' is the moment when the Other fixes his or her gaze upon me. As I apprehend the gaze of the Other, my subjectivity is annihilated. The annihilation of my subjectivity is an effect of apprehending the Other as an active subject and as another consciousness who can define me by his objectifying gaze, as Sartre says: "I grasp the Other's look at the very center of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities" (263). The gaze of the Other strips me of my being-for-itself. As explained by Spade, the gaze of the Other is a threat to the order and arrangement of my whole world. As an object of the Other's gaze I recognize the fact that I am seen, and thence my universe disintegrates. I become exposed to the Other's judgement, and feel vulnerable because I have no control over the fact that I am looked at. This is why the Other's gaze is alienating in my relation with the Other.

In Sartrean gaze, being seen while gazing upon an object, by another observer is a shameful experience for this gazing object, too. Sartre's second example is an apt description which manifests this particular experience which is felt by the person who recognizes the gaze directed upon himself or herself; this time I am subject who is looking through a keyhole, as Sartre describes:

Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known; I am my

acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification. I am a pure consciousness of things, and things, caught up in the circuit of my selfness, offer to me their potentialities as the proof of my non-thetic consciousness (of) my own possibilities. This means that behind that door a spectacle is presented as "to be seen," a conversation as "to be heard" (259).

In this first case, I (looking through the keyhole) am nothing and, as there is no gaze directed at me, I do not have a consciousness because I have no awareness of existing for an Other (I am not an object of an Other's gaze); I only become a "reflective consciousness" when I become aware of another person gazing at me (260). So, as soon as I become aware of the fact that someone is looking at me (for I hear footsteps as Sartre describes), there happens to be a radical change in the structure of my being:

All of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone 'is looking at me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure-modifications which I can apprehend and fix conceptually by means of the reflective cogito.

I experience myself as an 'object-for-the-Other.' Through the gaze of the Other, I get self-consciousness, but am reduced to an object. The change in the structure of my being, becoming an object engaged in doing something that is somehow illicit, brings forth the experience of shame, as Sartre notes: "Shame reveals to me that I am this being, not in the mode of "was" or of "having to be" but in-itself" (262). Sartre's following comment clearly demonstrates that shame is an effect of our being-seen-by-the Other when not wishing or ready to be seen:

I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other. By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is an object that I appear to the Other [...] Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me (222).

Pointing out that involuntary being-seen-by-the Other is a shameful experience for the object, Sartre introduces to us another term, “pure shame” which has an ontological significance.

Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being an object; that is, of recognizing myself in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other. Shame is the feeling of an original fall, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault but simply that I have “fallen” into the world in the midst of things and that I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am (288-9) ²

Again, ‘pure shame’ still arises due to the fact that I am an object for the Other, but this time without reference to the sense of being seen doing something that might make me feel guilty. I am inevitably rendered an object under the gaze of the Other. I recognize that I am dependent on the Other. To be what I am and feel my own being, I need the presence of the Other in my existence.

In addition to comments about shame and pure shame, Sartre also relates the experience of shame to the physical body, with direct reference to the story of Adam and Eve. In his words:

Modesty and in particular the fear of being surprised in a state of nakedness are only a symbolic specification of original shame; the body symbolizes here our defenseless state as objects. To put on clothes is to hide one’s object-state: it is to claim the right of seeing without being seen; that is, to be pure subject. That is why the Biblical symbol of the fall after the original sin is the fact that Adam and Eve ‘know that they are naked.’ The reaction to shame will consist exactly in apprehending as an object the one who apprehended my own object-state (289).

² Sartre’s concept of a fallen state in which you are aware of being in the midst of things bears many parallels to Lacan’s mirror stage and an entry of the subject into the Symbolic order, which objectifies him or her.

1.4 The Foucauldian Gaze

When considering the gaze from the point of Foucault, we will be concentrating on power dynamics, resistance and Panopticism. Unlike Sartre and Lacan's notions, Foucault's account of the gaze concerns the Panopticon model, in which power is exercised by someone with authority (through a surveying and controlling gaze). So, the most relevant aspect of the Foucauldian gaze is the surveillance system which allows an observer to gaze upon freely and exercise mastery over others from an invisible central point. Although Foucault uses the gaze to explain a disciplinary mechanism³ at the same time, not all aspects of this gaze are directly related to our analysis of *Paradise Lost*, and will not therefore be described in detail in this section. However, the panoptic aspect of the gaze with respect to power relations and dynamics, which is very important in understanding the epic gaze in *Paradise Lost*, will be referred to here.

1.4.1 Power Relations and Resistance

Foucault in his writings is very concerned with power relations between social structures, and institutions and the individual, which makes his analysis of power central to these relations. Power is generally understood to be something which is possessed, and exercised by those in power over a powerless group. According to Foucault, however, power should not be seen as a possession, but rather as something which is enacted in the form of a strategy. In his book *The History of Sexuality*, criticizing the common understanding of the term, he defines power as follows:

³ This is surveillance's self-disciplinary form for individuals due to being watched or observed; in particular, for prisoners which Foucault discusses in "Panopticism".

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation - of the law, in the various social hegemonies (92).

Foucault's view of power is evidently different from commonly held ideas (e.g. power as a possession) about power since his main focus is on the workings of power in the form of a chain or system; indeed, with regard to Foucault's notion of power, Mills points out that "power should be seen as a verb rather than a noun, something that does something, rather than something which is or which can be held onto", and makes the following comment:

Foucault tends to see power less as something which is possessed but rather as a strategy, something which someone does or performs in a particular context. Power needs to be seen as something which has to be constantly performed rather than being achieved. Indeed, he argues that power is a set of relations which are dispersed throughout society rather than being located within particular institutions such as the State or the government (35).

Further, according to Foucault's account of power:

Power is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere [...] power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (93).

In *The History of Sexuality*, with reference to networks of power relations, Foucault says that "[p]ower comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a

general matrix” (94). This introduces to us the existence of resistance in power relations, for which he asserts that “[w]here there is power, there is resistance” (95), and for this very reason, we understand that there is no binary opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations. As also explained by Downing, according to this view, power does not operate from the top down- either with a hierarchy or by oppression, but rather from below to up, through resistance (90). The strictly relational character of power relationships [operates in such a way that] their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network (HS, 95). With respect to Foucault’s this particular view, Gutting makes the following comment: “Power is not something possessed or wielded by powerful agents, because it is co-constituted by those who support and resist it. It is not a system of domination that imposes its rules upon all those it governs, because any such rule is always at issue in ongoing struggles” (112).

1.4.2 The Foucauldian Gaze and Panopticism

It is in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977) that Foucault discusses the concept of the gaze as a disciplinary and control mechanism by means of observation.⁴ In this work, he demonstrates how several measures were to be taken so as to control plagues at the end of seventeenth century (Downing, 81). Foucault describes these measures with the following words:

Inspection functions ceaselessly. The gaze is alert everywhere: ‘A considerable body of militia, commanded by good officers and men of

⁴ It should here be noted that before the publication of *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault had discussed power relations and gaze in his *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963); however, the surveillance system in this section is different from his medical gaze as described in the earlier book.

substance', guards at the gates, at the town hall and in every quarter to ensure the prompt obedience of the people [...] At each of the town gates there will be an observation post; at the end of each street sentinels (*DP*, 195-6).

Foucault then describes the control of lepers, who were treated as 'plague victims'. These people were excluded from society and treated as 'others', which caused a division, that of a binary distinction:

[A]ll the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode; that of binary division and branding (mad/sane; dangerous/harmless; normal/abnormal); and that of coercive assignment, of differential distribution (who he is; where he must be; how he is to be characterized; how he is to be recognized; how a constant surveillance is to be exercised over him in an individual way, etc.) (199).

Thus, we can understand that surveillance in the hands of authorities has operated in various ways. It functioned as a way to control the spread of diseases and was also used as a technique to 'otherise' (199) a group of people (as seen in the case of lepers). For Foucault, there is also disciplinary model of observation. This account of the gaze concerns Bentham's model of prison, which is designed in a circle with an observation tower in the center. This is a surveillance mechanism in which the inmates of this prison are observed from a central tower through a controlling gaze but they cannot see the observer or return the gaze. Foucault makes this clear with the following words:

Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication. The arrangement of his room, opposite the central tower, imposes on him an axial visibility; but the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility (200).

Foucault says that the Panopticon is ‘a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheral ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen’ (202). Downing draws our attention to the fact that surveillance allows these inmates to regulate their behaviour:

As the watcher cannot be seen or identified by the watched, the inmates develop an impersonal and anonymous relationship with power. Without being able to verify the presence of the watcher, they soon behave as if they are being watched, without knowing for certain whether or not this is the case. Thus, discipline becomes self-regulatory (82).

This allows us to understand that surveillance has a disciplinary mechanism for the individual observed, and this is achieved through the effects of the surveillance. Regarding the effect of this surveillance system on the convicts, Foucault says:

The major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action, that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that is architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers (201).

So, as also maintained by Downing, the power dynamics described by Foucault concern ‘internalisation’, ‘invisibility’, and ‘plurality’ (Downing, 84). Surveillance, thus becomes self regulatory.

1.5 The Lacanian Gaze

The Lacanian gaze fits in with the Sartrean gaze and with the gaze in the poem with respect to parallels between Sartre and *Paradise Lost* and Lacan’s concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, the Law of the Father, and the Mirror Phase. Also of course

involved in all of these is the concept of objectification. However, because Lacan's work is mostly interested in a developmental psychological model, his other concepts are not so directly related to our analysis of *Paradise Lost*, and will not therefore be described in detail here.

In this thesis, there are two main Lacanian ideas about the gaze that will be used in the analyses: objectification and the gaze, and the mirror phase as has been interpreted in the film studies.

1.5.1 The Lacanian Gaze and Objectification

Concerning the gaze and otherness, as also noted by Boothby, as far as the structure of the gaze is concerned, in the Sartrean gaze there is only a relation between the Subject and the Other, which makes it dual, the Lacanian gaze is triadic: including the subject (the one who sees), the visual object (the Other who is seen), and the gaze (a third locus) (170). As highlighted in the previous section, in the Sartrean gaze, there is a binary opposition between the two poles (the Subject and the Other), which causes a conflict between them; either I as an active subject make the Other an object of my gaze, or I am objectified under the gaze of the Other. In Lacan's view of the gaze, however, there is no such ontological structure between the Subject and the Object as Boothby says: "[...] there is nothing to prevent both positions from being occupied simultaneously (169). So as to clarify this point, Boothby gives the example of the cover girl face that functions in two ways at once: first she looks directly at the viewer with an intense and penetrative gaze, and second she appears to the viewer as a fascinating object of beauty.

It is in his seminar XI that Lacan further developed Merleau-Ponty's idea of a pre-existing gaze which is always directed at us from the outside. Drawing attention to the distinction between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty's notions of the gaze, Homer points out the following: "For Merleau-Ponty [the] gaze emanates from an all-seeing transcendental subject, but for Lacan no such subject exists. According to Lacan, we are not primarily conscious subjects viewing the world, but rather we are always-already 'beings that are looked at'" (125). For Lacan, there is a clear distinction between the eye and the gaze for which he says: "I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at from all sides" (72). That is, we are always subjected to an all-seeing gaze and, the gaze is always prior to the act of seeing. Žižek's following comment provides a summary of this given distinction: "[T]he eye viewing the object is on the side of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object. When I look at an object, the object is always already gazing at me, and from a point at which I cannot see it" (109). In a similar vein, McGowan notes that "Lacan [...] conceives of the gaze as something that the subject encounters in the object; [thus] it becomes an objective, rather than a subjective, gaze" (5).⁵ McGowan further says that "[A]s an object, the gaze acts to trigger our desire visually, and as such it is what Lacan calls an *objet petit a* or object-cause of desire" (5). Again, we see this specific term *objet petit a* in Lacan's seminar XI in which he defines it as the gaze: "*The objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze*" (105). McGowan explains this particular term as such:

This special term *objet petit a* indicates that this object is not a positive entity but a lacuna in the visual field. It is not the look of the subject at the object, but the gap within the subject's seemingly omnipotent look. This gap within our look marks the point at which our desire manifests itself in

⁵ At this point, Lacan seems to embody Sartre's notion of the gaze as this idea of the gaze also emanating from the object is also found in Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of "The Existence of Others" in *Being and Nothingness*.

what we see. What is irreducible to our visual field is the way that our desire distorts that field, and this distortion makes itself felt through the gaze as object (6).

From this explanation, we can understand that the gaze is not the look which is directed at the object by the subject but rather it is an object (a third locus in this sense) that the subject does not possess. This is further explained by McGowan in the following:

Though the gaze is an object, it is not just an ordinary object. There is, according to Lacan, a form of the objet petit a that corresponds to each of our drives. The gaze is the objet petit a of the scopophilic drive (the drive that motivates us to look), functioning in a way parallel to the breast in the oral drive, the feces in the anal drive, and the voice in what Lacan calls the “invocatory” drive. The objet petit a is in each case a lost object, an object that the subject separates itself from in order to constitute itself as a desiring subject. It is the loss of the object that inaugurates the process of desiring, and the subject desires on the basis of this loss. The subject is incomplete or lacking because it doesn’t have this object, though the object only exists insofar as it is missing. As such, it acts as a trigger for the subject’s desire, as the object-cause of this desire, not as the desired object. Though the subject may obtain some object of desire, the objet petit a lacks any substantial status and thus remains unobtainable (6).

As evident in McGowan’s description, the gaze in Lacan’s notion is the object-cause of desire, which the subject is not able to sustain, thence the subject is ‘incomplete’ and ‘lacking’. According to Lacan, the gaze by its nature is not something that the subject can grasp in the field of vision; rather it remains unreachable. This lack triggers the subject’s desire. McGowan suggests that the desiring subject attempts to find its lack in the field of the Other because its desire is the desire of the Other as put by Lacan himself. McGowan gives more details about this desiring subject and its experience with the gaze.

[T]he path of desire is infinite because the subject’s desire can never line up perfectly with what the Other offers the subject. In the visual field, for instance, the subject desires to see precisely what is not visible in the Other, and what results is that the subject continually seeks without ever finding. In the experience of desire, the gaze remains a motivating absence:

it triggers the movement of desire but remains an impossible object in the field of vision. Visually, desire concerns what we don't see, not what we see (69).

So, in Lacan's account, the gaze is a lost object that the subject does not have, which is clearly different from Sartre's understanding of the gaze. For Sartre, however, the gaze is at the ontological level and it only concerns the two poles. On the other hand, Lacan's view of the gaze concerns the scopic field in psychoanalysis.

1.5.2 The Mirror Stage and the Cinema

According to Lacan, the mirror phase occurs between the ages of six and 18 months. At these ages, the infant starts to recognize his/her own image in the mirror (any reflective surface), which is accompanied by pleasure. In the beginning, the child confuses its own image with reality; however, he/she later discerns that the image in the mirror is a reflection of himself/herself and, becomes aware of the fact that his/her body has a total form. Although his/her motor control is not fully developed, he/she feels a sense of mastery over his/her body. It is the mirror image that allows them to have a sense of wholeness, of which Homer claims to be "crucial" stage of identification (25). Further, during this phase, the child identifies with this mirror image, concluding that what he/she sees is an image of him/herself. In Sartre's account of the gaze, we come to understand that the gaze of the Other is an alienating experience for the Subject. In Lacan's mirror stage in which the gaze plays a major role (in the acquisition of the selfhood), we can understand that there is an alienation between the self and the image in the mirror, which paves the way for the emergence of the ego. In the words of Homer:

At the same time, however, the image is alienating in the sense that it becomes confused with the self. The image actually comes to take the place of the self. Therefore, the sense of a unified self is acquired at the price of this self being an-other, that is, our mirror image... For Lacan, the ego emerges at this moment of alienation and fascination with one's own image. The ego is both formed by and takes its form from the organizing and constituting properties of the image. The ego is the effect of images; it is, in short, an imaginary function... The ego is based on an illusory image of wholeness and mastery and it is the function of the ego to maintain this illusion of coherence and mastery. The function of the ego is, in other words, one of mis-recognition; of refusing to accept the truth of fragmentation and alienation (25).

It should be here noted that this alienation is different from Sartre's alienation because the subject is not alienated from itself as we see in Sartre. Concerning this, Homer underlines this by saying Lacan's use of the term alienation is different from that of his critics:

Through the mirror stage the infant imagines that it achieves mastery over its own body but in a place outside of itself. Alienation, in Lacan, is precisely this 'lack of being' through which the infant's realization (in both senses of the term: forming a distinct concept in the mind and becoming real) lies in an-other place. In this sense, the subject is not alienated from something or from itself but rather alienation is constitutive of the subject – the subject is alienated in its very being (26).

However, as critics have pointed out, this is not so much philosophical alienation (as in the Sartrean sense) as a psychological awareness of the distinctive fragmentation of the self.

The previous section has shown that there is a conflict between the Subject and the Other in Sartre's concept of the gaze. Likewise, in Lacan there is a conflict between the infant's fragmented sense of self and the imaginary autonomy, as Homer says:

From the moment the image of unity is posited in opposition to the experience of fragmentation, the subject is established as a rival to itself. A conflict is produced between the infant's fragmented sense of self and the imaginary autonomy out of which the ego is born. The same rivalry

established between the subject and him/herself is also established in future relations between the subject and others (26).

Lacan's psychoanalysis has been incorporated into the study of the cinema by film theorists in 1970s and continues to be discussed to this day (although he never theorized about film); his notion of the gaze had a huge impact on these theories about the cinema. In this thesis, it will be referred to whenever the main characters of the poem view a scene presented in a cinematographic fashion. According to early film theorists, since spectators (as active viewers) exercise a sense of mastery over what they see on the screen, they derive an imaginary pleasure from their filmic experience. This particular experience is likened by these theorists to the experience in Lacan's 'mirror stage,' as pointed out by Baudry: "the arrangement of the different elements—projector, darkened hall, screen—in addition to reproducing in a striking way the mise-en-scene of Plato's cave [...] reconstructs the situation necessary to the release of the "mirror stage" discovered by Lacan" (45). According to Lacan, the gaze in the mirror stage allows a child to achieve an illusory sense of completeness and mastery over his/her own body even though his/her motor control is not fully developed (1). So, as cinematic experience provides an imaginary pleasure, the spectator is considered by film theorists to be like the child looking in a reflective surface (which for Lacan includes the mother's face). Referring to Baudry's earlier idea about this cinematic experience, McGowan has criticized his "theoretical approach [that] conceives of the gaze [...] as a function of the imaginary, the key to the imaginary deception that takes place in the cinema", claiming that Lacan's gaze is more fundamentally concerned with the Real (3-4). Thus, for McGowan "[t]he real provides the key for understanding the radical role that the gaze plays within filmic experience. As a manifestation of the

real rather than of the imaginary, the gaze marks a disturbance in the functioning of ideology rather than its expression” (7).

1.6 Methodology

This thesis aims to investigate Milton’s epic with respect to four perspectives on gaze: Lovatt’s epic gaze, and the theories of Sartre, Foucault and Lacan. Milton uses the gaze of his characters in such a way that it endows individual scenes. In *Paradise Lost*, all the characters look at one another. It should be also noted that, as potentially in all literature, the narrator and the reader become a part of seeing or looking. Thus, our eyes are constantly directed to the actions of the characters. This thesis will analyse *Paradise Lost* by analysing selected significant aspects of Milton’s poem through the theoretical insights of three important writers on the gaze: Sartre, Foucault and Lacan. It should be noted that this thesis will focus on the gazes of four main characters: Satan, God, Adam and Eve, respectively.

The second chapter of the thesis will deal with Satan’s gaze through which he acts as a voyeur. As readers, we are continuously directed to the act of gazing through the eyes of Satan. The gaze is a major element in Satan’s characterization. However, it should be pointed out that Satan does not only gaze upon others, but also is gazed from all sides, which inevitably makes him concerned about his own physical deformation throughout the poem. Lacan’s ideas about the concept of the gaze prove to be useful in understanding Satan’s discomfort about his appearance.

The third chapter will focus on God’s gaze, which is the only absolute and omnipresent gaze in the poem. In *Paradise Lost*, Milton shows the powerful gaze of God as a constitutive aspect of his divine omnipotence. Unlike other characters in the poem,

God gazes upon other characters with a central and dominant gaze, which is suitable for Foucault's notion of the gaze.

The fourth chapter will focus on Adam and Eve's gaze. Adam's first gaze upon Eve and Paradise will be examined, then his gaze upon the future of mankind as shown to him by Michael. His gaze here illustrates the cinematographic aspect of the gaze. So the ideas of Lacanian film theory offer us a possible reading of Adam's gaze. Eve's gaze upon herself will be examined in accordance with Lacan's views of the Mirror Phase, which introduces the 'primary narcissism'. Eve's dream will be analysed, as well, since female dreams allows us to approach the female gaze in epics, according to Lovatt.

The concluding chapter will summarize the findings of each analytic chapter and give information about possible further research into *Paradise Lost* and other works by Milton with respect to theories of gaze. It will present the answers that this thesis has found to the questions implied by the applications of four concepts of the gaze to this great epic poem.

CHAPTER II

SATAN'S GAZE IN *PARADISE LOST*

This chapter looks at how Satan acts as a voyeur, because we are continuously directed to the act of gazing through the eyes of Satan. In fact, gazing is a prime element in the characterization of Satan in this poem; the very first reported action of any character in *Paradise Lost* is Satan's casting his tormented gaze upon hell – "round he throws his baleful eyes [. . .] At once as far as Angels kenn he views / The dismal Situation waste and wilde' (*PL* 1.56, 59-60), whereupon he 'discerns' (1.80) 'the companions of his fall' (1.76). His gaze upon the other fallen angels will be dealt with in the fourth section of this chapter, which starts with an analysis of Satan's gaze upon Adam and Eve together, before examining how Eve is turned into an object under his gaze, which is perhaps the most notable of his acts of gazing. Adam is also gazed upon but not independently, and this is studied before turning to the complex issue of his gaze upon the good angels, and finally this chapter analyses Satan's gaze on Sin and Death.

2.1 Satan's Gaze upon Adam and Eve Together

Satan first catches sight of Adam and Eve together in Book 4. He turns them both into objects by gazing at them, but the nature of his gaze and of its objectification is different for each. Satan sitting in the shape of a cormorant on the tree of life in Paradise, wonders at their perfect form and happy state, lamenting his own expulsion from heaven. The narrator describes this scene by drawing our attention to Satan's first gaze at the first man and woman.

From this Assyrian garden, where the fiend
Saw undelighted all delight, all kind
Of living creatures new to sight and strange:
Two of far nobler shape erect and tall,
Godlike erect, with native honour clad
In naked majesty seemed lords of all,
And worthy seemed, for in their looks divine
The image of their glorious maker shone,
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure,
Severe but in true filial freedom placed; (*PL* 4.285-94)

At this moment, Satan is amazed at the majestic beauty of God's new creation, which comes from their divine creation. Here, his main interest is to have mastery over everything he surveys, and especially over these two creatures who 'seemed' to be 'lords of all', and to whom he considers himself unambiguously "foe" (*PL* 4 372), perhaps for that very reason, among others. Through his sight, he wishes to acquire more knowledge about them, and his gaze is destructive, as Schwartz stresses: "That mastering, destructive aim of his gaze is perhaps the clearest when Satan watches Paradise from a special position of concealment (89-90). Schwartz makes another interesting point related to Satan's gaze which is that, according to Freud's theory, the primacy of narcissism begins by directing our own gaze at ourselves, after which we direct it outward. From a Lacanian viewpoint, we can take this further and understand

that this first looking at yourself can be seen as the beginning of a very anxious process whereby you become aware of yourself as an other that can be gazed upon by someone else, and this recognition threatens your subjective position. We may consider what's happening to Satan in this respect because he does also look at other characters around him, and he is aware of the fact that in looking at them he is also looking at himself (in various ways) and that he is thus also the other. Therefore, this provides a gaze-related explanation as to why Satan, as a narcissistic character, needs to think of, or 'see', himself as superior over Adam and Eve. In the very beginning of the poem, after the famous 'baleful eyes' passage, Satan directed his gaze at Beelzebub, almost speculatively implying a worry about his own appearance. When he sits on the tree in Book 4, he beholds the new creations with 'grief', again turning his thoughts to himself as he remembers his own expulsion and his physical fall from grace, as he cries out:

Oh hell! what do mine eyes with grief behold,
Into our room of bliss thus high advanced
Creatures of other mould, earth-born perhaps,
Not spirits, yet to heavenly spirits bright
Little inferior; whom my thoughts pursue
With wonder, and could love, so lively shines
In them divine resemblance, and such grace
The hand that formed them on their shape that poured,
Ah gentle pair, ye little think how nigh
Your change approaches, when all these delights
Will vanish and deliver ye to woe,
More woe, the more your taste is now of joy; (*PL* 4.358-369)

His soliloquy reveals significant details about his acts of gazing and his inner state of mind. Although he acknowledges that, in other circumstances, he could love these creatures, he is full of hatred, and has a burning desire to change the nature of God's first created man and woman. Satan's internal discomfort also increases his desire to take revenge against God. He cannot bear the loveliness he sees before his eyes. By gazing at them, he remembers what he has lost-his perfect angelic form before his

expulsion. Therefore, it might be argued that Satan's looking at God's newest creations Adam and Eve also means looking at himself because he understands the relation between his earlier angelic beauty and his present fallen physical appearance by looking at them. As Satan turns Adam and Eve into objects through his gaze, it puts him in a position of power, which is increased by his hidden position as Schwartz has shown. However, as has been stated earlier, Satan himself is also the object of gaze in the poem. God, as an all-seeing character watches Satan throughout the poem (as do the readers). Smith has pursued this complicated of the gazed-upon classical hero in his reading of Virgil's *Aeneid*. He, regards Aeneas as Merlau- Ponty's voyant-visible and conveys the way that the hero is both powerful because "spectacular", and at the same time disempowered by being watched (qtd. in Lovatt, 10). Although whether or not Satan is the hero of the poem has long been debated, it is indubitable that Satan is transformed and disempowered as the object of God's gaze, and is thus evidently not a hero from that superordinately authorial perspective.

Notwithstanding being an object of Satan's gaze, Adam and Eve are presented as naked as the day they were created, and this is expressed in several passages: "Nor those mysterious parts were then concealed, / Then was not guilty shame, dishonest shame/ Of works, honour dishonourable (4.312-14) [...] "so passed they naked on, nor shunned the sight/ Of God, or angel, for they thought no ill" (4.319-20). For example, Eve appears naked to Raphael when he arrives in Paradise to inform them about their free state, and enemy near at hand, but "no veil/ She needed, virtue-proof, no thought infirm/Altered her cheek" (5.383-5). These innocent creatures are unashamed of their nakedness in their pre-fall Paradise. It is their lack of self-consciousness the fact that the angels who walk among them, the other creatures, and they themselves, are free to look upon each other without any sense of nakedness, or shame. The gaze has no harm

for them, and they are open to the gazes by each other for evil does not reside within them. Yet, after eating the fruit, they become aware of their nakedness, and feel a need to hide themselves from their creator's gaze, and this new awareness brings self-consciousness. Changing his shape, Satan gazes upon them attempting to cover themselves to hide 'their shame' from view, but he then flees in fear from the sight of his vanquisher, the Son.

He after Eve seduced, unminded slunk
Into the wood fast by, and changing shape
To observe the sequel, saw his guileful act
By Eve, though all unweeting, seconded
Upon her husband, saw their shame that sought
Vain covertures; but when he saw descend
The Son of God to judge them terrified,
He fled... (10.332-39).

2.2 Satan's Gaze upon Eve

So as to explore Satan's act of gazing with a deeper analysis, the following passages will focus on a closer examination of Satan's gaze on Eve, which will be analysed separately from his gaze on Adam, because Eve is more exposed to his controlling gaze, and his gaze upon her has greater repercussions than it does with other characters, for it ultimately leads to her temptation to eat the fruit from the forbidden tree. Here, one may argue that after seeing her, Eve becomes Satan's main target or victim, since he very quickly singles her out for ill-intentioned attention (and only she is thus chosen), he then appears in her dream, not Adam's, to entice her to eat the fruit. In Mulvey's version of gaze, Eve would presumably be chosen as the main target of Satan's gaze, for she argues that it is the female body reduced into an object to be looked at. Especially it could be argued that Milton's representation of Eve, as enchanted by her own reflection, presents her as the first, original case of a woman in

what became women's "traditional exhibitionist role" wherein they are "simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual [...] impact ..." (Mulvey, 11). Mulvey adds that their appearance is also of erotic impact, but this part of the comment will not be pursued here, since eroticism is not a part of the objectification of Eve through Satan's predatory gaze.

Satan gazes upon Eve separately in Book 9. After having compassed the earth, Satan returns as a mist into Paradise: "By night he fled, and at midnight returned/From compassing the earth, cautious of day... (9.58-9). Afterwards, Satan chooses a creature to possess, in order to continue his temptation of Eve, and he decides that the snake is the best fit for his purpose:

...his final sentence chose
Fit vessel, fittest imp of fraud, in whom
To enter, and his dark suggestions hide
From sharpest sight: for in the wily snake
Whatever sleights none would suspicious mark (9.88-92).

He recognizes that only the snake is clever, or 'subtle' enough to be accepted as an intelligent conveyor of an argument; "the serpent subtlest beast of all the field" (9.86). Any other creature arguing with Eve would be suspected of being possessed by a greater power. This is why only the snake is a "fit vessel" for Satan. In the following scene, Satan enters the snake and waits for Eve to steal her innocence and happiness with his 'false guile.' Satan feels that it will be particularly easy to deceive Eve if he finds her "separate": "he sought them both, but wished his hap might find/ Eve separate, he wished" (9.421-22) [...] "Eve separate he spies" (424). When he catches sight of Eve, he enjoys seeing her alone due to the fact that without Adam she is more vulnerable and being less intelligent than him as later he says "her husband, for I view

far round, not nigh/ Whose higher intellectual more I shun” (9.482-3) At the same time, Satan takes pleasure in gazing at Eve because she has a ‘heavenly angelic’ form.

Such pleasure took the serpent to behold
This flowery plat, the sweet recess of Eve
Thus early, thus alone; her heavenly form
Angelic, but more soft, and feminine,
Her graceful innocence, her every air
Of gesture... (9.455-460)

As a voyeur with a dark intent, Satan watches unseen, turning his object of sight, Eve, to an object. Here, we may recall what Schwartz observes: “The reason that, theoretically, the voyeur’s pleasure depends upon his hiding, upon his seeing without being seen, is that the very character of his aggression is to turn the object of his sight into just that, an object (94). Indeed, Satan as an aggressive voyeur puts himself in a position of power by watching hidden from view. Besides, as an active subject and gazer, he recognizes that Eve has an angelic beauty which is different from Adam’s. Eve is adorned with a feminized innocence and sweetness, which does not go unnoticed by Satan. In fact, even he surveys Eve through his destructive and voyeuristic gaze, he is momentarily ‘disarmed’ of his hostility:

That space the evil one abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remained
Stupidly good, of enmity disarmed,
Of guile, of hate, of envy, of revenge (9.463-66)

It could be considered that his gaze upon Eve’s beauty and innocence disarms him of his enmity precisely because he now does not possess all of his previous angelic beauty. His hate returns when he recalls that nothing in the garden of Eden is created for him. Since he is actively positioning himself as a gazer; actively looking at things as the object of his somehow more important subjectivity, this inevitably alienates him. The more he gazes, the more he becomes aware of what he has lost after he was cast

out of heaven, and recognizing the gulf between his subjective existence and the total separate existence of the other that he gazes upon gives him discomfort and pain. Therefore, Satan's discomfort and pain is an effect of his gaze and we can certainly say that his gaze determines how he has to feel, or even act.

...the more he sees
Of pleasure not for him ordained: then soon
Fierce hate he recollects, and all his thoughts
Of mischief, gratulating, thus excites (9.469-72).

Satan in the form of a snake moves closer to Eve and finally gains her attention. At this point, he is not a voyeur anymore but an active subject who has already turned Eve into an object. When he starts to speak to her, he continuously uses words related to the act of gazing: "...I approach thee thus, and gaze/ Insatiate, I thus single..." (9.535-6) and then just as he did in Eve's temptation dream he claims that all things gaze upon her: "Fairest resemblance of thy make fair/ Thee all things living gaze on, all things thine/By gift, and thy celestial beauty adore/With ravishment beheld, there best beheld (9.538-41). Here Satan aims to tempt Eve by employing sight-related language. That is, by using words such as "gaze" and "behold", Satan wishes to draw attention to the fact that Eve is a woman with feminine traits that (he implies) should be looked at, or in this case, be gazed upon by others. The words used by Satan certainly suggest that Eve is the victim of all gazes. Somewhat contradictorily, through shifting the topic to that of her sexual identity, he says that Eve is only seen by 'one man' (Adam): "one man except, / Who sees thee? (and what is one?) who shouldst be seen/ A goddess among gods" (9.545-47). With regard to this, Schwartz says that Satan's main goal is to encourage Eve to be an exhibit: "the serpent tries to trick Eve by inciting her supposed wish to be an exhibit" (85-6). According to Satan, Eve should be 'served, adored, and gazed upon' by numberless angels (9.547-8). He wants her to

see herself as the object of more admiring gazes because this is how he believes he will tempt her. Later on, Satan urges Eve to eat the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge.

Ye eat thereof, your eyes that seem so clear,
Yet are but dim, shall perfectly be then
Opened and cleared, and ye shall be as gods,
Knowing both good and evil as they know.
That ye should be as gods... (9 706-710).

Through his 'wily' and persuasive remarks, Satan finds access to Eve's heart, and she fixes her eyes on the fruit. Her hunger for the fruit intensifies with her gaze: "Fixed on the fruit she gazed, which to behold/ Might tempt alone..." (9.735-6). Concerning this scene, Schwartz makes an interesting point about Satan's gaze upon Eve. According to her, their roles change, and Satan shifts from an active voyeur to an active exhibitionist whereas Eve takes on the role of a passive voyeur. She is a passive voyeur because her gaze does not belong to her anymore.

"Look on me" (9.687) says phallus, late-voyeur-become-exhibitionist. She looks, and then, as in her dream, her gaze moves from serpent to the object of his sight...In the scene, Satan has literally caught her eye, and possessing it, he directs it where he chooses. Her point of view is now Satan's. Again, Satan has turned Eve-the-exhibit into Eve-the-voyeur; for once she fixes her/his gaze on that fruit, she must possess it, just as Satan possesses her (91).

Schwartz's viewpoint illustrates how Satan controls Eve through his controlling gaze. She becomes a victim of his predatory gaze, and finally is possessed by his gaze. In the earlier scenes, Satan possessed the snake, and now he also possesses Eve as the director of her gaze. The ability of Satan to possess certainly comes from the fact that he is able to turn his object of sight into an object. Besides, as maintained by Sartre, it is only because of the gaze of the Other that one gets a reflective consciousness, which is a key to Satan's success in tempting Eve. We can certainly understand that Eve has

a reflective consciousness at this moment of the scene since the unreflective consciousness does not apprehend the person directly or as its object; the person is presented to consciousness in so far as the person is an object for the other. Eve apprehends the snake (Satan), and herself as a beautiful object that can be gazed upon. She is also aware that she is turned into an object as Satan also informs her about his “insatiate” gaze (9.536), and her beauty which is gazed on “by all things living” (9.539). Again, with a Sartrean point of view, we could say that Eve only becomes aware of herself in this scene due to the gaze of Satan, just as she became aware of herself only through gazing at her own image in the lake in Book 4. That is, she is given physical self-consciousness by Satan’s gaze for she was all alone labouring in the garden before Satan appeared. Yet, it is only with Satan’s arrival that she is reduced to an object to be looked at. Now, in fact, unlike in the dream, having become a self-conscious object of Satan’s gaze, Eve eats the fruit.

2.3 Satan’s Gaze upon Adam

As discussed earlier, Satan first views Adam and Eve together when he sits on the tree of life as a cormorant. In this scene, the narrator explains Adam and Eve’s physical appearance, and as readers we also witness what Satan gazes upon. Although they are both of “far nobler shape erect and tall” (4.288), they are not equal as described: “Not equal, as their sex not equal seemed” (4.296). It should be noted that in addition to having differences, they also have hierarchical stages in relation to God. The following lines give further information about their difference: “For contemplation he and valour formed, / For softness she and sweet attractive grace, / He for God only, she for God in him” (4.297-99). In terms of physical strength, Adam is stronger than Eve as also expressed by Satan: “and strength, of courage haughty, and of limb heroic built”

(9.484-5). On the other hand, Eve recognizes the hierarchy with her “coy submission” (4.310). It could be considered that Eve is already created as an object within a hierarchy for she was not created at the same time as Adam. When Adam asks a companion in his own likeness, Eve is created from his rib (8.469). The fact that she was created out of Adam’s request is a hierarchal point. Then, it is worth asking whether there is any connection between this hierarchy and the fact that there is no scene in which Satan is directly showing his gaze upon Adam separately. The only scene that he spies Adam is when he is with Eve. Nevertheless, Adam’s strength and intellect does not go unnoticed by Satan especially when he desires to find Eve alone. In this chapter’s previous passages, it was shown that Satan fears Adam because he is intelligent. It is also worth asking whether Satan fears Adam because he is physically stronger than him: “[...] I shun, / And strength, of courage haughty, and of limb/ Heroic built, though of terrestrial mould (9.483-85). Although he also acknowledges that they are both “creatures of other mould, earth-born perhaps, / Not spirits (4.360-1), it is interesting that Satan does not spy on Adam separately. Is he afraid of being gazed upon by Adam? Or is it because he sees the image of God in Adam, which has to be avoided? Or rather, from a Sartrean point of view, does Satan fear a fierce conflict when the gaze returns back and Satan is rendered an object under Adam’s gaze? Yet, it should be also suggested that it would be difficult for Satan to prevent both positions (gazing and being gazed upon) from being occupied simultaneously, as Lacan could have maintained (see Introduction). Another point for Lacanian interpretation is that Satan seems to ignore the fact that he sees from one point, but in his existence he is looked at from all sides (by God). Throughout the poem, Satan continuously suffers from this dilemma. He considers himself to be almost a God, and most possibly the

only gazer because he does not remember being created. Just before the battle in heaven he had revealed this when arguing with Abdiel, he asks:

When this creation was? rememb'rst thou
Thy making, while the maker gave thee being?
We know no time when we were not as now;
Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised
By our own quickening power, when fatal course
Had circled his full orb, the birth mature
Of this our native heaven, ethereal sons (5.857-63).

Satan wishes to be the one who is able to gaze upon others. Interestingly, although he craves the attention of the other fallen angels at the beginning, which is a political side of his existence, he does not seem to accept the fact that he is under the gaze of God. Thus, he believes that he can hide himself from God's gaze. Also, he considers that they might be self-raised and even Gods. Later on, when he urges Eve to eat the fruit, he assumes that she too, would desire divinity and that it would therefore be an effective part of his temptation, telling her that "should be seen a goddess among gods" (9.546-7). He wishes her to believe that she also could be a goddess, although he knows that Adam and Eve are "spirits, yet to heavenly spirits bright little inferior (4.61-2).

2.4 Satan's Gaze upon His Followers and Good Angels

Turning to Satan as a self-conscious object of the gaze, it is noticeable that he uses his companions (other fallen angels) like mirrors, and it sheds light on Satan's anxiety which arises from the fact that he is also the other who is being looked at. At the very beginning of the poem, in book one, Satan is presented with his infernal angels in a place of utter darkness; nevertheless, they can see each other. They are all seen lying on a burning lake, thunderstruck and astonished: "There the companions of his fall,

o'erwhelmed/ With floods and whirlwinds of tempestuous fire" (1.76-77).⁶ It could be said that Satan's first looking at himself begins when he first gazes upon other fallen angels. Satan "weltering by his side" (1.78) gazes upon and recognizes Beelzebub to whom he speaks "with bold words" (82):

If thou beest he; but O how fallen! How changed
From him, who in the happy realms of light
Clothed with transcendent brightness didst outshine
Myriads though bright: if he whom mutual league,
United thoughts and counsels, equal hope
And hazard in the glorious enterprise,
Joined with me once, now misery hath joined
In equal ruin: into what pit thou seest
From what height fallen, so much the stronger proved (1.84-92).

Satan implies that Beelzebub has lost much of his angelic appearance, and as his later words indicate, he knows that this reflects his own physical appearance. By gazing at Beelzebub, he receives an image of himself, equally ruined, which is only identifiable through his gaze. That is, Beelzebub provides Satan's notion of his appearance. Therefore, from a Lacanian point of view, Beelzebub might be associated with the "mirror" in which Satan finds himself reflected. Satan is conscious of his fall from grace and thence he becomes presumably aware of his changed physical appearance through his gaze upon Beelzebub. A further Lacanian consideration could be that Satan's unconscious is revealed in his language, and this speech might thus reveal how he thinks about his own fallen appearance. It is also possible to see the effects of his gaze on his speech. In Lacanian terms, his repressed unconscious may be explicated by taking his gaze into consideration. Although he tries to repress his feeling or opinion about his changed appearance, his following words make it clear that he is actually aware of his outward appearance. While questioning whether he should feel remorse

⁶ Unlike the lake (4.459) in which Eve sees herself, this fiery lake presents no reflection.

for his revolt against God, almost unavoidably he continues to think about his appearance, and says that his former splendour has seen a change for the worse:

...do I repent or change,
Though changed in outward lustre; that fixed mind
And high disdain, from sense of injured merit,
That with the mightiest raised me to contend,
And to the fierce contention brought along
Innumerable force of spirits armed (1.96-101).

When he utters these words, Satan is addressing his fallen angels, and he knows that he is under the gaze of his infernal peers. He is an object of sight for them, and can be gazed upon by fixed stares from all sides whereas he can gaze upon them from one side, only and thus needs to move his sight from one object to another, casting his eyes (his baleful stare) around. As an ambitious leader, he has to convince them that he is bold and strong enough to war against the almighty God. Yet we should not ignore that Satan is worried by their observing him too closely, both in terms of the gaze and in terms of keeping his deepest thoughts hidden from his followers. This is why he does not seem to elaborate on his current appearance and condition. He directly raises the issue of waging war against their grand foe (God). This is the scene in which Satan's rage and desire to seek revenge against an almighty God intensifies. Starting from this moment, for Satan as a tragic protagonist, there will be no turning back:

Me miserable! which way shall I fly
Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?
Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell;
And in the lowest deep a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me opens wide (4.73-77).

Even though he perceives that God is matchless in direct conflict, as a self-promoted protagonist he asserts that he has to carry out his plan: "All good to me is lost;/ Evil be thou my good" (4.109-10). When he is in the presence of his fallen angels, he

displays words of courage. On the other hand, when he is in the prospect of Eden away from his followers, his hidden thoughts come to the surface, and are expressed in soliloquys, in the first of which he acknowledges that he will not be successful in a conventional war against God: "Till pride and worse ambition threw me down/ Warring in heaven against heaven's matchless king" (4.40-1). Satan, who is shown throughout the poem to be uncertain of his exact identity, needs to define himself in the eyes of the fallen angels. Furthermore, this is necessary to allow him to pursue his aspiration. For his own self-image and political ambitions, he has to be seen as a superior and fearless leader, and their gaze upon him plays a major role on his determination and behaviour. However, in his followers' presence, he informs us about their shame due to their downfall as expressed by these words: "That were an ignominy and shame beneath/ This downfall..." (1.115-6). As well as shame that comes from his downfall, Satan also suffers from the "shame of self" (Sartre, 261). That is, he feels a sense of shame due to the recognition of the condition that he is indeed an object at which the other fallen angels are gazing, and about which they are making judgements. In addition, his condition which is accompanied by shame results in alienation from his old self, and he has become in his own estimation a tragic character suffering from degradation. His sense of shame and degradation are especially apparent in his soliloquy in Book 4, in which Satan speaks of a particular shame among his companions, and each time sinking lower and lower.

O then at last relent: is there no place
Left for repentance, none for pardon left?
None left but by submission; and that word
Disdain forbids me, and my dread of shame
Among the spirits beneath, whom I seduced
With other promises and other vaunts
Than to submit, boasting I could subdue
The omnipotent. Ay me, they little know
How dearly I abide that boast so vain,

Under what torments inwardly I groan:
While they adore me on the throne of hell,
With diadem and sceptre high advanced
The lower still I fall, only supreme
In misery: such joy ambition finds (4.79-92).

Satan could submit himself to God by asking his repentance but this is an entirely impossible thing to do for him because he places how others see him more highly than how God sees him, and also he does not wish to lose his authority over his companions. Shame stops him from choosing God's mercy. As his words here also confirm, Satan has been falling spiritually lower and lower since he chose evil. Being supreme among infernal angels does not help him out of his moral predicament. Although he is treated as a supreme ruler among his infernal peers, in God's eye, he is just an outcast, and this is very painful for him. What is more painful is that by his reckoning he will not manage to win a victory against omnipotent God, which will presumably bring more shame among his companions. His following words reveal that his relationship with God is irreparable in his estimation, and submission would bring more degradation in his eyes and in the eyes of his followers.

But say I could repent and could obtain
By act of grace my former state; how soon unsay
What feigned submission swore: ease would recant
Vows made in pain, as violent and void.
For never can true reconciliation grow
Where wounds of deadly hate have pierced so deep:
Which would but lead me to a worse relapse,
And heavier fall... (4.93-101).

Satan also finds it difficult to accept the fact that he is diminished in appearance, something which will only increase as the biblical plot continues. In Book 4, filled with rage, he reacts strongly when Ithuriel and Zephon gaze upon, and fail to recognize him. Satan through being conscious of their gaze is made aware of his further diminution, in a way that is again explicable through Lacan's mirror concept.

Know ye not then said Satan filled with scorn,
Know ye not me? Ye knew me once no mate
For you, there sitting where ye durst not soar;
Not to know me argues yourselves unknown,
The lowest of your throng (4.827-831)

Satan is conscious of his diminution but he cannot stand this confirmation of the loss of his supreme angelic appearance in the eyes of other angels. This is especially painful for him when he is being observed by unfallen and therefore undiminished angels. Satan also draws attention to the fact that the unfallen angels were not as powerful or important as he used to be in heaven. Yet, Satan has lost his previous state and he is no longer highly respected by them. Zephon confirms this, emphasizing Satan's physical change.

Think not, revolted spirit, thy shape the same,
Or diminished brightness, to be known
As when thou stood'st in heaven upright and pure;
That glory then, when thou no more wast good,
Departed from thee, and thou resemblest now
Thy sin and place of doom obscure and foul (4.835-840).

This speech allows us to understand that Satan's appearance is deteriorating. However, Satan's physical appearance is not a stable thing. He is able to change it, as we see on four occasions. Intriguingly he does not attempt to regain his former splendour, perhaps because he knows – without directly acknowledging it for his own case – that it is not in his power to attain the 'divine resemblance' that has to be 'poured' from 'the hand that formed them', as he recognizes in Adam and Eve. Thus, having appeared like 'a stripling cherub' (3.636) and then a cormorant, in the next scenes he becomes a lion and a tiger (4.402-3), and later he continues his physical descent from flying, to stalking and 'watching' creatures, and then to a meanly 'squat' (4.800), crouching creature as he takes on the appearance of a toad (this is how the 'radiant' and 'dazzling'

angels (4.797-8) Ithuriel and Zephon find Satan, before returning him to his Satanic form as ‘the grisly King’ of Hell (4.821)). Therefore, Satan’s experience of diminution is a point worth discussing in relation to his exposure to continuous gaze. It could be argued that Satan’s transitions on earth from one animal to another could be also connected to his anxiety about being gazed upon. It is not only to avoid recognition that he takes on different shapes when he visits Paradise; it is also because he wishes to prevent the gaze of others. Interestingly, in Book 4, he aimed to disguise himself in the shape of a young angel, and he failed in this attempt even though at first he managed to escape the gaze of Uriel in Book 3. The narrator turns our attention to Satan’s gaze upon Uriel on the orb of the sun. He is able to see Uriel with no difficulty “for sight no obstacle found here, nor shade” (3.615).

...sharpened his visual ray
To objects distant far, whereby he soon
Saw within ken a glorious angel stand,
The same whom John saw also in the sun:
His back was turned, but not his brightness hid;
Of beaming sunny rays, a golden tiar
Circled his head, nor less his locks behind
Illustrious on his shoulders fledge with wings
Lay waving round; on some great charge employed
He seemed, or fixed in cogitation deep (3.620-29).

While throwing his baleful eyes, Satan sees the magisterially static Uriel who is the regent of that orb, and he considers that he would be easily turned into an object through his gaze. So as to operate as an active gazer, he transforms himself into a good angel.

...first he casts to change his proper shape,
Which else might work him danger or delay:
And now a stripling cherub he appears,
Not of the prime, yet such as in his face
Youth smiled celestial, and to every limb
Suitable grace diffused, so well he feigned;

Under a coronet his flowing hair
In curls on either cheek played, wings he wore
Of many a coloured plume sprinkled with gold (3.634-42).

The first reason why he changes himself into a good angel is that he does not wish to be recognized as Satan by Uriel. The second reason is that he intends to prevent Uriel's gaze owing to the fact that he is often confronted with his diminished appearance. Although Satan takes on the shape of a young angel, his appearance still lacks a God-given beauty, which Uriel, however, fails to perceive. The narrator emphasizes how Uriel gazes upon the heavens and earth in a controlling way: "... his eyes/That run through all the heavens, or down to the earth" (3.650-1). Nonetheless, Uriel is unable to recognize Satan, because he has never encountered deception before, and because angelic gazing, is weaker than God's divine gazing. Speaking to Uriel, Satan asks where he may find God's new creation, Adam and Eve to "behold with secret gaze and open admiration" (3.671-2). Uriel points out Paradise. Uriel's gaze is nevertheless all-surveying and all-considering ('fixed in cogitation deep'), and it does not take long for him to understand that the young angel is in fact Satan himself. Satan's own, apparently uncontrollable, furious gestures on Mt. Niphates cannot escape Uriel's gaze:

Yet not enough had practiced to deceive
Uriel once warned; whose eye pursued him down
The way he went, and on the Assyrian mount
Saw him disfigured, more than could befall
Spirit of happy sort: his gestures fierce
He marked, and mad demeanour, then alone,
As he supposed, all unobserved, unseen.
So on he fares, and to the border comes,
Of Eden, where delicious Paradise (4.124-132).

After having gazed steadily upon Satan's antics (he 'marked' them), Uriel discovers from the 'cherub's' frantic motions that it is in fact a fallen angel. Satan could have

escaped the gaze of Uriel but his deep malice and hate, his 'passions foul' (4.571) which were also visible in his marred physical appearance in hell, are unveiled through his very motions. Satan thought that, in the shape of a good angel, he would not be gazed upon and inspected; yet, he could not prevent himself from the notice of the steady and sun-like gaze of Uriel, which is more powerful than his. Later, Uriel warns Gabriel of a fallen angel's presence in Paradise:

Gabriel, to thee thy course by lot hath given
Charge and strict watch that to this happy place
No evil thing approach or enter in;
This day at height of noon came to my sphere
A spirit, zealous, as he seemed, to know
More of the almighty's works, and chiefly man
God's latest image: I described his way
Bent all on speed, and marked his airy gait;
But in the mount that lies from Eden north,
Where he first lighted, soon discerned his looks
Alien from heaven, with passions foul obscured:
Mine eye pursued him still, but under shade
Lost sight of him; one of the banished crew
I fear, hath ventured from the deep, to raise
New troubles; him thy care must be to find (4.561-575).

These lines prompt us to question whether there is a limit to the act of angelic gazing. That is, as it is the case in this part of the poem, Uriel's gaze was not entirely discerning at first, as he was unable to recognize Satan until 'warned' and until Satan reveals himself through antics; furthermore, he then loses sight of him. Lovatt devotes an entire chapter about the significance of prophetic gaze. She considers that the prophetic gaze is one of the fundamental ways of negotiating the relationships of power and authority. Although there are no prophet characters in the whole poem, we may consider angels such as Uriel and Gabriel in *Paradise Lost* as taking on prophetic roles, inasmuch as they are in a secondary position in relation to God within a hierarchy, and give warnings and information to mankind. Concerning prophetic gazing, Lovatt

observes: “A special relationship with the divine gives prophet figures authority and privileged knowledge of things far away, deep inside and to come, but they lack the agency of divine viewers” (124). In Milton’s representation, God is an all seeing divine authority whereas the good angels are his messengers with limited angelic gazing. Lovatt further says that prophets operate in various ways, to foretell the future, interpret the will (or anger) of the gods, and to warn and advise mostly using visual aids or operating as gazers (127). The good angels in the poem certainly fit into this category. For example, in the case of Raphael, in Book 5, God sends him to Paradise to relate how Satan has come to be a foe, and to warn Adam and Eve against Satan. In another scene, God sends Michael with a band of cherubim to Paradise, and up on a hill Michael sets before Adam a vision of what shall happen in the future (following Adam and Eve’s expulsion from Paradise). According to Lovatt, the gaze of prophets might be powerful or powerless. As they do not possess the agency of divine gazing, their gaze might be powerless in comparison to divine gazing. Likewise, in *Paradise Lost*, the angels are represented in a secondary or even tertiary position in relation to Christ, and Adam and Eve. The good angels share the same essence with the fallen ones, too; and as equals, the good angels do not have an authority over them. Most compelling example could be that in Book 6 God asks Christ to win a glory in the battle against Satan and his followers since the war cannot be won by angels such as Michael and Gabriel who are equals to Satan.

Effulgence of my glory, Son beloved,
Son in whose face invisible is beheld
Visibly, what deity I am,
And in whose hand what by decree I do,
Second omnipotence, two days are past,
Two days, as we compute the days of heaven,
Since Michael and his powers went forth to tame
These disobedient; sore hath been their fight,
As likeliest was, when two such foes met armed;

For to themselves I left them, and thou know'st,
Equal in their creation they were formed (6.680-90).

In God's speech, we may observe that Christ is the second most omnipotent being after the Father, and that almighty God has ordained victory for the Son. The fact that the war between God's angels and Satan is perpetual is a point worth discussing in the framework of act of gazing as God gazes upon the whole battle on his throne, awaiting his Son to end it on the third day. For the first two days, God as the source of authority shows no motion, he only gazes upon the war which is the centre of visual power. Another interesting point is that God draws our attention to the issue of being invisible; therefore, not being gazed at. Yet he points out that it is possible to see him by gazing upon Christ. Considering this, we may conclude that there is a hierarchal act of gazing in the whole poem. To get back to the main subject of this chapter, we have come to understand that Satan is conscious of his worsening outward appearance. As has been noted earlier, Zephon also confirmed Satan's changing and diminishing brightness. It is also noticeable that there is a binary opposition between Satan and Zephon's appearance. When Satan received a stern rebuke from Zephon, Satan gazed upon him, and felt sorrow at his loss of beauty, which is bountiful in Zephon.

So spake the cherub, and his grave rebuke
Severe in youthful beauty, added grace
Invincible: abashed the devil stood,
And felt how awful goodness is, and saw
Virtue in her shape how lovely, saw and pined
His loss; but chiefly to find here observed
His lustre visibly impaired... (6.844-50)

Again, using Zephon as a mirror, Satan plunges himself into despair due to his state. He is no longer an active subject who turns others into objects but a figure who turns himself to a passive object to be gazed upon with pity. He is deprived of any sign of

goodness and this is morally tragic for him forasmuch as that he defines virtue and goodness with physical beauty. Namely, he considers that physical beauty comes from virtue. This condition throughout the poem becomes an unbearable burden for Satan as earlier he identified himself with evil, therefore in his frame of mind rendering himself vulnerable to diminution in physical appearance. Hence, there is no doubt that Satan feels shame due to his appearance, and it is not surprising that he looks abashed in the presence of a lesser but an unfallen angel. Regarding this, it should be acknowledged that Satan's shame is both mental and physical. Satan's impaired appearance is noted by others, too. The narrator also informs us about it, for instance, and in addition to the gazes of Zephon, the narrator and the reader, Gabriel also gazes upon Satan from a distance, and recognizes him right away.

O friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet
Hasting this way, and now by glimpse discern
Ithuriel and Zephon through the shade,
And with them comes a third of regal port,
But faded splendour wan; who by his gait
And fierce demeanour seems the prince of hell,
Not likely to part hence without contest;
Stand firm, for in his look defiance lours (6.866-73).

Satan's diminished appearance and characteristic movement (gait) makes him vulnerable to the gazes of other characters, and he continues this act of diminution in physical appearance due to being exposed to acts of gazing from all sides. Not only through unfallen angels' demeaning act of gazing, but also in their speeches Satan is often confronted with his fallen appearance. There is almost no scene in which Satan's fallen and diminished appearance is not made explicit when other characters speak to him.

Satan's gaze upon his followers after returning to hell is also significant because it shows us how he and his followers are punished by God's unwavering gaze. He returns to Hell as victorious in his purpose to turn God's newest creation against their creator. He ascends his throne without being observed by his followers: "[...] from the door/ Of that Plutonian hall, invisible/ Ascended his high throne (10.443-5) so as to give his victory speech. For a moment, he is not seen by his followers. He surveys them through his gaze. Satan here in a way shows his followers how powerful his gaze is. He sits on his throne and looks at his followers until he appears in a cloud with his bright head, just like the Eternal Father, God appears from his secret cloud (*PL*,10.32). He seems to believe that he has reached God's position who is invisible to his followers.

[...] Down awhile
He sat, round about him saw unseen:
At last as from a cloud his fulgent head
And shape star-bright appeared, or brighter, clad
With what permissive glory [...]" (10.447-51).

After making his God-like entrance, Satan delivers his speech to his followers, and he says that he deceived the mankind in the form of a serpent. At the very moment he is expecting to hear his followers' applause, to his surprise, he hears nothing but hisses from his followers' tongues.

...expecting
Their universal shout and high applause
To fill his ear, when contrary he hears
On all sides, from innumerable tongues
A dismal universal hiss, the sound
Of public scorn; he wondered, but not long
Had leisure, wondering at himself now more;
His visage drawn he felt to sharp and spare,
His arms clung to his ribs, his legs entwining
Each other, till supplanted down he fell
A monstrous serpent on his belly prone,
Reluctant, but in vain, a greater power
Now ruled him, punished in the shape he sinned,

According to his doom: he would have spoke,
But hiss for hiss returned with forked tongue
To forked tongue, for now were all transformed
Alike, to serpents all as accessories
To his bold riot... (10.504-21)

God's controlling and supreme gaze upon Satan and his followers brings devastating retribution. They all transform into serpents, the form that Satan had used to tempt Eve. Instead of triumph, they experience more punishment and more degradation.

Sublime with expectation when to see
In triumph issuing forth their glorious chief;
They saw, but other sight instead, a crowd
Of ugly serpents; horror on them fell,
And horrid sympathy; for what they saw,
They felt themselves now changing; down their arms,
Down fell both spear and shield, down they as fast,
And the dire hiss renewed, and the dire form
Caught by contagion, like in punishment,
As in their crime. Thus was the applause they meant,
Turned to exploding hiss, triumph to shame
Cast on themselves from their own mouths (10.536-47).

In this scene, Satan's transformation is involuntary and witnessed. He loses his own appearance and becomes a serpent in the presence of his followers. Satan, as a narcissist, could scarcely be degraded further, for he is aware of his followers' gaze upon him as he turns into a serpent like them, losing his pre-eminence and his heroic physical attributes such as his great 'spear and shield' (10.542). There is no doubt that this is a dreadful punishment for a narcissist who cannot tolerate the idea that he might be seen as less than perfect. The fact that Satan's ultimate punishment is witnessed by all his followers shows us, as it shows him, how he has sunk lower and lower under God's gaze.

2.5 Satan's Gaze upon Sin and Death

Turning to Satan's gaze upon his daughter Sin and son Death, Satan first looks at them when he passes on his journey to the gates of hell guarded by Sin and Death. His son Death stops him from passing the gates. Death's appearance is described as such:

If shape it might be called that shape had none
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb,
Or substance might be called that shadow seemed,
For each seemed either; black it stood as night,
Fierce as ten Furies, terrible as hell,
And shook a dreadful dart; what seemed his head
The likeness of a kingly crown had on (2.666-73).

In Sartre's concept of gaze, this scene might be a good example of the conflict in which two gazes clash and one of them succeeds in seeing the other as an object. To disarm each other's power, both Satan and Death use their assaultive gazes: "...such a frown/ Each cast at the other" (2.713-14). With regard to this, Lovatt also observes that "the essence of the assaultive gaze is looking at someone with the intention of committing violence against them" (312). Both Satan and Death's gazes are used as a kind of literal weapon as their blazing eyes can also carry out the violence. Before any further conflict arises, Sin intervenes to stop them from fighting. She reveals herself and Death's identity. Yet, Satan after gazing upon them does not consider them to be his family as they possess an unseemly form and repugnant countenance.

What thing thou art, thus double-formed, and why
In this infernal vale first met thou call'st
Me father, and that phantasm call'st my son?
I know thee not, nor ever saw till now
Sight more detestable than him and thee (2.741-45).

Satan as a character who is still fond of his own appearance believes that Sin and Death cannot be his daughter and son. Again, Satan seems to face a very difficult dilemma:

is he in fact beautiful to behold, his bright countenance? or does he own a detestable outward appearance that others should refrain from looking at? Sin explains how she has come to life, emphasizing that she got her attractive grace from his image (as Christ his received from his father God).

Hast thou forgot me then, and do I seem
Now in thine eye so foul, once deemed so fair
In heaven, when at the assembly, and in sight
Of all the seraphim with thee combined
In bold conspiracy against heaven's king,
All on a sudden miserable pain
Surprised thee, dim thine eyes, and dizzy swum
In darkness, while thy head flames, thick and fast
Threw forth, till on the left side opening wide,
Likest to thee in shape and countenance bright,
Then shining heavenly fair, a goddess armed
Out of thy head I sprung (2.747-58).

It is no wonder that Sin has been appointed as a guardian of hell to gaze upon those who might try to escape. After hearing these words, Satan seems to recognize that they are his family, and the less aggressive manner of his speech that follows indicates that he accepts the new information: "She finished, and the subtle fiend his lore/ Soon learned, now milder, and [...] answered smooth" (2.815-6).

The following chapter will investigate God's divine gaze which is the most powerful among all the characters' gazes.

CHAPTER III

GOD'S GAZE IN *PARADISE LOST*

Identifying gods as active viewers, Lovatt says that gods in epics possess a distinctive way of seeing/looking which she defines as the “divine gaze.” According to her, the divine gaze has a structural significance for the epic genre. She further says that the divine gaze is characterised by verticality (the gods tend to be above the action, often on a mountain or hill), and often a distant, ‘bird’s-eye’ view, clarity and penetration (seeing through to the true nature of what is on display), agency and effectiveness. (78). Likewise, in *Paradise Lost*, Milton’s representation of God as an omniscient and omnipresent character who (as the narrator informs us) “beholds from his prospect high/ Wherein past, present, future he beholds” (3.78-9) demonstrates the authority and power of God’s divine gaze. Lovatt also highlights that “epic is a genre closely associated with the divine gaze, the genre which most clearly aspires to apotheosis: epic requires and desires authority” (77). In *Paradise Lost*, the powerful gaze of God is shown to be a constitutive aspect of his divine omnipotence. In addition to being part of his omnipotence, this divine gaze is definitely different from the gaze of any other character, for he can see and control them with a central and dominant gaze while remaining unseen. Importantly, the objects of his gaze are subject to a gaze that they cannot return.

From the first of these aspects, we can read God's gaze upon other characters in Foucauldian terms as a 'Panopticon', -meaning 'all-seeing', as did Armstrong in "Punishment, Surveillance, and Discipline in *Paradise Lost*." Suggesting that the 'surveillance' in the poem is as pervasive as in a modern panoptic setting, she further says that God's surveillance is possible to be associated with an 'optic glass,' a seventeenth century invention which enabled observers of the universe to view distant objects:

A hierarchy or network of surveillance controls life, invading, as the optic glass in nature, the private lives of individuals. Within *Paradise Lost* a similar network of watching exists with God at the apex watching Satan, the Angels, Adam and Eve, and by extension, all of mankind and all of history to the end of time" (100).

As readers, we encounter God acting as a gazer with his more powerful and penetrative gaze throughout the whole poem, in passages where, in Armstrong's term, God is presented as a 'surveillant' (101). Examples of such passages include the following: God can witness every incident "for what can scape the eye/ Of God all-seeing" (10.5-6); for Satan and his companions God is a "wakeful foe" (2.463) whose eye is capable of seeing "all things at one view" (2.190); God sees all time at once (3:78) with an "Eye" that is "unsleeping" and "Eternal" (5:647, 711). In addition to these passages, further examples can be given from the other parts of the poem: In Belial's assumption, God "from heaven's height sees and derides all their motions vain" (2.190-1); God "sits/ Shrined in his sanctuary of heaven secure" (6.671-2) and watches the "intestine war in heaven" (6.259); God gazes upon and "surveys his great work" (8.352) in the course of creation of the earth and mankind. He also gazes upon his newest creation Adam and Eve:

[...] the almighty Father from above,
From the pure empyrean where he sits
High throned above all height, bent down his eye
His own works and their works at once to view (3.56-9)

In another scene the unceasing gaze of God is implied with the sentence “them thus employed beheld with pity heaven’s high king (5.219-20) These passages and their ubiquity through the poem demonstrate that God’s powerful, panoptic gaze watches and sees everything at once.

This chapter will start with the analysis of God’s unwavering gaze upon Satan, then it will continue with God’s gaze and the process of creation, and finally it will investigate his gaze upon his newest creations, Adam and Eve.

3.1 God’s Gaze upon Satan and His Followers

God is a Foucauldian ‘surveillant’, exercising his panoptic power over Satan and his followers in hell. These are the only explicit prisoners in the poem and hell and its inmates are therefore the most literally appropriate objects for a Foucauldian reading of gaze in the poem. Taking into consideration the effects of the Panopticon’s surveillance system on the prisoners, we could say that Satan and fallen angels are also ‘caught up in a power situation of which they are the bearers’ (Foucault 201), because God’s powerful surveillance system disempowers them even when God does not need to exercise it. This is confirmed in Belial’s assumption, mentioned above, that God “sees and derides all their motions vain” (2.190-1). This assumed gaze deters the fallen angels from further direct conflict with God. As also observed by Armstrong, although there are limitations and failures in Satan’s ‘surveillance’ (e.g. over hell) God is the absolute ‘surveillant’ and thus the absolute gazer. With regard to this, she says:

The total nature of God's vision extends to the secret plans of Satan, both in Heaven when he makes gunpowder and in Hell when he plans to take his revenge on God through his creation and mankind. God, therefore, is the ultimate panoptacist; he is able to see not only physically but psychically (101).

From a vantage point, God operates in the poem just as an observer in the Panopticon's tower; nothing escapes from his eye. Within this context, the heaven's high towers that are mentioned in several parts of the poem might be considered as metaphorical, if not physical representations of a network of God's 'surveillance.' Even though God does not need any of these towers to be able to observe Satan and his fiendish peers, they play a major role as symbols of God's absolute authority and surveillance system. In Books 1 and 2, we are notified of the presence of these structures, described as:

[...] many a towered structure high,
Where sceptred angels held their residence,
And sat as princes, whom the supreme king
Exalted to such power, gave to rule,
Each in his hierarchy, the orders bright (1.733-7).

We understand that like a monarch, God gives the towers in heaven to his higher (sceptred) angels to enable them to survey and thence rule the other angelic orders. After the fall of the rebel angels, these towers may not only be used as seats of power within heaven, but also as look-out towers from which to send out guards, and to survey, the areas beyond heaven's borders. The very idea of this deters Satan and his followers from considering re-entering heaven, as seen in Belial's comment that

[...] the towers of heaven are filled
With armed watch, that render all access
Impregnable; oft on the bordering deep
Encamp their legions, or with obscure wing
Scout far and wide into the realm of night (2.129-33).

Satan and his followers are aware that it is probably impossible to enter heaven by force due to the fact that God's surveillance system is thorough and strict. This is explicitly discussed in their council in Book 2, where they debate whether another battle should be hazarded for the recovery of heaven, and are finally dissuaded from the idea because of somehow knowing that heaven is highly protected by God's observer angels. When Beelzebub asks whom they shall send in search of the new world, which they hope might be less strictly guarded, his speech again refers to the gaze of angel observers and protectors, that extend beyond the borders of heaven:

[...] ere he arrive
The happy isle; what strength, what art can then
Suffice, or what evasion bear him safe
Through the strict sentries and stations thick
Of angels watching round? (2.409-13).

As a hellish counterpart of the heaven's towers, in Book 1, one of the fallen angels Mulciber who had "built in heaven high towers" (1.750) builds another high structure for Satan and his peers in hell. This enormous structure, called 'Pandemonium' (coined by Milton from Greek, meaning 'all the devils') is considered as the 'capital' of these fallen angels (1.756). Thus, we could observe that Satan's Pandemonium which is the perversion of God's towers in heaven symbolizes his pride and denotes his attempt to equal or even best God. Concerning this, Low says that "the construction of hell's capital corresponds with Satan's drive to be first and highest" (175). If he believes that he can build single, capital tower higher and more central than those occupied by heaven's scepter'd angels, it is not surprising that he should also underestimate the panoptic powers of God, considering, as it would seem from the speeches in Books 1 and 2, that God alone does not have a controlling panoptic power, but that he has a devolved network of surveillance. To illustrate, when he disguises himself in the shape

of a young angel in Paradise, he considers that he is alone and not seen: “alone/ As he supposed, all unobserved, unseen” (4.129-30). Yet, ironically, acting as the God of hell, just as God appoints good angels to guard heaven, he asks his followers to keep uninterrupted watch against a ‘wakeful foe’ while he is seeking the destruction of mankind. The poem knows better: when Satan starts his journey for the newly created world to find Adam and Eve, God ‘beholds him from his prospect high’.

[...] he then surveyed
Hell and the gulf between, and Satan there
Coasting the wall of heaven on this side night
In the dun air sublime, and ready now
To stoop with wearied wings, and willing feet
On the bare outside of this world, that seemed
Firm land embosomed without firmament,
Uncertain which, in ocean or in air (3.69-76).

Even though Satan is on the dark side of the newly created world, God is able to see him at once. God also shows his Son how Satan directs his flight towards Adam and Eve’s world. God directly gazes upon Satan and his companions when he punishes them after Satan’s return to Pandaemonium. He shows them to his saints from his “transcendent seat”:

See with what heat these dogs of hell advance
To waste and havoc yonder world, which I
So fair and good created, and had still
Kept in that state, had not the folly of man
Let in these wasteful furies, who impute
Folly to me, so doth the prince of hell
And his adherents, that with so much ease
I suffer them to enter and possess
A place so heavenly, and conniving seem
To gratify my scornful enemies,
That laugh, as if transported with some fit
Of passion, I to them had quitted all,
At random yielded up to their misrule;
And know not that I called and drew them thither (10.616-29).

Although there are no more scenes in which God directly gazes upon Satan and his peers, we come to understand that it is impossible for Satan to avoid his panoptic gaze. God could read Satan's most secret plans easily, and God's surveillance system is shown in the poem to be absolute.

3.2 God's Gaze and the Newly Created World

There is an interesting contrast between the gazes of Satan and God in *Paradise Lost*. Satan possesses an evil and destructive gaze, but God's gaze is beneficent, which makes it possible to draw a clear contrast between their gazes. Where God's gaze is benevolent, inevitable and defining, Satan's gaze is malevolent, atrocious and manipulative; we may remember how Satan, early in the poem, 'threw his baleful eyes' around hell. In contrast, without God's gaze, there would be no creation because although God's 'great idea' (7.557) is first uttered, it is only affirmed by God's gaze. In Book 7, as narrated by Raphael, God actively gazes upon the whole creation, which is fundamental to his creation as he confirms and affirms that all is good. His gaze (unlike that imputed to his sentinel angels by the fallen angels, as shown above) is always creative and affirming in this respect.

As several critics have also noted, Milton modelled his account of creation on the first chapter of Genesis closely following its story of creation in terms of the order of the events and repetitions of certain lines. Concerning this, Ittzés says: "Raphael faithfully follows the opening chapter of Genesis, keeping much of its formulaic structure but amplifying the biblical text. The sequence of events is identical in both accounts, as in their temporal arrangement into six days followed by a Sabbath" (232). In Milton's poem, the line "and God saw [...], that it was good" is repeated over and over as in the

Genesis account of creation (*PL*, 7: 249, 309, 337, 352/353, 395, 549, 556). We wonder whether Milton repeated this Biblical line so as to draw attention to the fact that God's gaze is central to creation, unwavering, and thence impossible to avoid. With regard to this repetition in the Bible, Humphreys observes that use of such repetitions has a function.

The cosmos [...] shaped by God is as ordered in the mode of telling as it is in what we are told about his speaking, dividing, separating, making, naming, seeing, and judging. Form informs content. Just as the created cosmos will serve as a finely structured setting to support human life, and as a stage for the story of God's relationship with these humans, so a range of repetitions provides a structured framework for its telling (25).

We may use these ideas about the Biblical narrative of the creation to understand God's supreme rule over his creation in Milton's poem. Humphreys suggests that repetitions are used as a rhetorical frame, which is obviously echoed in the creation passage of *Paradise Lost*. Besides its poetic function, this repetition allows us to understand that God as the author and authority of the whole of creation gazes upon the whole event actively; and what is being created is seen as good in his own judgement. Concerning this, Humphreys further says:

Creation comes directly from his utterance and actions, as expressions of his will. As a further indication of his commanding authority we repeatedly meet the suggestion that the elements of creation are "good" and the whole "very good," for this is presented as God's judgment. In this respect the perspective of this prelude to the Genesis narrative is God's. His is the only perspective we have to this point. It is "good" because God looks at it, judges it, and says it is "good" (26).

Likewise, Milton's God is also the only perspective in the act of creation because he is the only character who actively gazes upon, and judges whether all is good. When Raphael narrates the account of whole creation to Adam, he emphasizes the difficulty of understanding and recounting God's work: "This also thy request to recount

almighty works/ What words or tongue of seraph can suffice, / Or heart of man suffice to comprehend?" (7.111-3), which implies that angels and mankind cannot judge God's work (as 'good' or otherwise) because God is the only perspective and maker of the whole creation, the theology indicated by the words of Genesis is that he creates the very concepts by which judgements can be made, and if he saw that something was good then that makes it good, by definition.

In Raphael's narration, while God is speaking to his Son, he says that he will create another world and mankind: "in a moment will create/ Another world, out of one man a race/ Of men innumerable, there to dwell" (7.154-56). Raphael notes that God's acts are swift and mankind cannot comprehend this without being told, and that act of telling can only indicate the immediacy of his acts in a watered-down version, because 'earthly notion[s]' cannot grasp such speed: "Immediate are the acts of God, more swift/ Than time or motion, but to human ears/ Cannot without process of speech be told/ So told as earthly notion can receive" (7.176-79). The whole creation takes six days, in such earthly terms, although we have just been informed that these days are nothing like the 'days' that earthlings count. On the first day, God as the commanding authority declares the creation of light because the earth is "matter unformed and void"; and "darkness profound/ Covered the abyss" before the creation (7.233-4). When God creates light, first he gives utterance to it: "Let there be light, said God, and forthwith light / Ethereal, first of things, quintessence pure / Sprung from the deep" (7.243-5), and then he gazes upon and affirms it: "the light was good" (7.249). This creation of light paraphrases Genesis (1: 4-8). Then God creates seas and land, and again judges with his affirming gaze: "The dry land, earth, and the great receptacle / Of congregated waters he called seas: / And saw that it was good" (7.307-309), which again follows the account of Genesis (1:10 ff). God goes on, in subsequent days, to

create plants with “their branches hung with copious fruits; or gemmed / their blossoms” (7.325-6), and the Sun, Moon and stars, and then reptiles, fish and birds, and on each occasion he observes his work and sees that “it was good” (7.337, 7.352-3, 7/395). On the sixth day God creates mankind in his own image and at the end of that day, he “views and beholds all was entirely good” (7.549). After the creation of the earth and mankind, as Raphael narrates, God gazes upon his whole creation:

Yet not till the creator from his work
Desisting, though unwearied, up returned
Up to the heaven of heavens high abode,
Thence to behold this new created world
The addition of his empire, how it showed
In prospect from his throne, how good how fair,
Answering his great idea (7.551-57).

It is notable that Milton incorporates the biblical account of creation into his epic with the given lines. God’s gaze in the poem is central to the creation and without his gaze, it is implied, there would be no creation.

3.3 God’s Gaze upon Adam and Eve

The power of God is greatly increased in *Paradise Lost*, as in the classic epics, by his divine perspective from on high. Nørgaard talks about how to analyse ‘real photos and graphics’ inserted in novels, taking “gaze, perspective, distance and modality” into account. In a slightly different context, we could consider the scenes of God’s gazing in *Paradise Lost* as the images presented by the poem to the minds of readers. Concerning “perspective,” Nørgaard says that:

Vertical perspective refers to the vertical positioning of the viewer in relation to the represented participants, who are seen either from above, from below or at eye level. Where eye level signals some sense of equality, the perspectives from above and below typically involve a sense of power,

since these perspectives invite the viewer to respectively look down on or up to the represented participants – literally as well as figuratively (170).

For example, in Book 4, God sits on his ‘high throne’ (3.58) and ‘bends down his eye’ upon Adam and Eve in their ‘happy garden’ (3.66) before turning his gaze to Satan flying towards newly created earth.

Now had the almighty Father from above,
From the pure empyrean where he sits
High throned above all height, bent down his eye,
His own works and their works at once to view:
About him all the sanctities of heaven
Stood thick as stars, and from his sight received
Beatitude past utterance (3.56-62).

We could certainly understand that God in this scene views his creatures from a vantage point, which suggests his absolute power. Within this hierarchical system, God’s gaze is central to his authority over other characters for he is the only character whose gaze is absolute. Later, in Book 5, when Adam and Eve are praying, God gazes upon them with pity because he knows that Satan is plotting their fall from the ‘state of bliss’: “Them thus employed beheld/ With pity heaven’s high king” (219-20). God with his pitying gaze is a mediating spectator in this scene. When Eve is later tempted by Satan and disobeys God by eating the fruit, interestingly, for a moment, she reckons that God may not have seen or witnessed her eating.

And I perhaps am secret; heaven is high
High and remote to see from thence distinct
Each thing on earth; and other care perhaps
May have diverted from continual watch
Our great forbidding, safe with all his spies
About him (9.811-16).

Readers know that God sees Eve eating the fruit because nothing “can escape the eye of all-seeing God,” as mentioned in this chapter’s introduction. When Adam partakes

of the fruit with Eve, he realises their mistake. They both feel shame for the first time because they become aware of their naked state. As discussed in Chapter 2, in their pre-fall, they were unashamed of their nakedness, and open to the gazes of God, angels and each other. They were innocent and did not have any self-consciousness: they were naked and did not “shun the sight of God, or angel, for they thought no ill” (4.319-20). However, after eating the fruit, their own gazes are changed, and they become aware of their nudity in a different way. We understand this from Adam’s speech.

[...] since our eyes
Opened we find indeed, and find we know
Both good and evil, good lost, and evil got,
Bad fruit of knowledge, if this be to know,
Which leaves us naked thus, of honour void,
Of innocence, of faith, of purity,
Our wonted ornaments now soiled and stained,
And in our faces evident the signs
Of foul concupiscence; whence evil store;
Even shame, the last of evils; of the first
Be sure then (9.1070-80).

Then, Adam asks how he will “behold the face of God or angel” (9.1080-1). To conceal their nakedness and hide their shame from God, Adam’s own gaze ‘creates’ a shameful map of the previously beautiful human body, as he says:

[...] cover me ye pines,
Ye cedars, with innumerable boughs
Hide me, where I may never see them more.
But let us now, as in bad plight, devise
What best may for the present serve to hide
The parts of each from other, that seem most
To shame obnoxious, and unseemliest seen,
Some tree whose broad smooth leaves together sewed,
And girded on our loins, may cover round
Those middle parts, that this newcomer, shame,
There sit not, and reproach us as unclean (9.1088-98).

We could read Adam and Eve's shame in the light of Sartre's account of shame in his analysis of "the look" (252). Adam and Eve feel shame because they recognize that they have transgressed against God. Undoubtedly they have been seen by him, and eventually, in their understanding, they are put in a position of object about which the possessor of the panoptic gaze (God) makes judgments. Even when Eve tasted the fruit alone, we could remember how she was first concerned whether God had seen her eating the fruit. They are worried about God's judgement, and gaze. We could consider this kind of shame as a moral emotion because it arises due to the fact that they have transgressed God's Law. Yet, and more importantly for the fallen humans in *Paradise Lost*, for Sartre, shame has an ontological significance, too, which he describes as "pure shame". In this type of shame, both Adam and Eve recognizes the fact that they are the Other in God's gaze. That is, Sartre's characterization of this particular shame reveals our being-for-others as an object in our very existence. So, Adam and Eve are dependent on God for they are rendered an object under his gaze. Thus, this ultimately brings shame.

CHAPTER IV

ADAM AND EVE'S GAZE IN *PARADISE LOST*

Adam is told about the war in heaven, he is not shown it. The future of his descendants (mankind), however, is shown to him in Book 11, and he actively gazes upon it like a spectator in the cinema. Thus, his gaze in this particular scene is very cinematographic. In the analysis of his gaze here, the ideas of Lacanian film theory will be referred to where relevant.

This chapter will also discuss Eve's gaze upon herself in the lake in Book 4, which allows her to gain her identity because it is evidently a stage which recalls Lacan's 'primary narcissism'. As pointed out by Zimmerman, it is during this moment that Eve experiences a degree of selfhood even though at first she does not recognize that the image in the lake is a reflection of herself. It is also worthy of mention that Eve's gaze upon Adam reveals her object-state, because as she herself acknowledges, she is subjected to Adam.

The following section will first explore Adam's gaze upon Paradise before the creation of his companion Eve, and following that his gaze upon her; these are the scenes of his dreams. Even though Lovatt notes that the dreamers and interpreters in epics are often female characters, she gives the dream of Agamemnon as an example of the epic

dream. Likewise, Adam's dreams are also a part of Milton's epic. So, we can understand that both male and female characters in epics can dream of present or future events. However, it should be pointed out that Adam's dreams are God-given whereas it is Satan who gives a dream to Eve.

Then, it will focus on Book 11 in which Adam's gaze reveals the cinematographic aspect of the gaze. The third section will deal with Eve's gaze upon herself while the final section will refer to her dream and gaze.

4.1 Adam's Gaze upon Paradise and Eve

While relating to Raphael what he remembers since his own creation in Book 8, Adam informs us about his dream in the garden of Eden.⁷ Before he starts dreaming, first he finds himself lying on a 'flower herb' (*PL*, 8.254) in Paradise. Turning his wondering eyes as a new-born, he gazes at the 'ample sky' (8.258) above him without knowing who he is or how he has come there. 'By quick instinctive motion', he raises himself from ground to be able to see further, and surveys

Hill, dale, and shady woods, and sunny plains,
And liquid lapse of murmuring streams; by these,
Creatures that lived, and moved, and walked, or flew,
Birds on the branches warbling; all things smiled,
With fragrance and with joy my heart o'verflowed (8.262-66).

Among his other senses, it is first his gaze that allows him to enjoy what he sees. After carefully examining his surroundings, he begins to examine his own body too: "My

⁷ At Adam's request, Raphael has related how Satan has become a fallen angel, and then the creation of the world. This time, Adam relates what he remembers from his own creation and interestingly, Raphael notes that he 'was absent that day' (8.229) when God created Adam. As discussed in Chapter 2, we can certainly confirm that angels lack the agency of divine gazing, that of God's omniscient gaze.

self I then perused, and limb by limb/ Surveyed [...]" (8.267-68). We can understand that he is developing an innocent physical self-consciousness at this moment. Although he is not aware of where or who he is, all of a sudden, he begins to speak and name everything he sees around him. Turning his gaze on to the sun, like Satan did in Book 4 in his soliloquy⁸, he directs his speech to it: "Thou sun [...], fair light, /And thou enlightened earth, so fresh and gay" (8.273). Afterwards, he turns his gaze upon hills, dales, rivers and creatures, and implores them to say what has brought him there. He is instinctively aware of the fact that someone higher and greater has put him in this garden (God created him 'self-knowing' (7.510)) as indicated by the following lines clearly: "[n]ot of myself; by some great maker then, /In goodness and in power pre-eminent" (8.278). With regard to this, we can certainly say that there is a strong contrast between newly created Adam and Satan. As discussed in Chapter 2, Satan denied his having been created by God in his quarrel with Abdiel. Adam, on the other hand, accepts that he is created by someone higher than him. As to his creation, no answer is returned, and so he sits pensively, lost in thought. It is at this moment when he starts dreaming. God comes to him in his dream and instructs him:

[...] Thy mansion wants thee, Adam, rise
First man, of men innumerable ordained
First father, called by thee I come thy guide
To the garden of bliss, thy seat prepared (8.296-99).

Afterwards, still in his dream, God takes him by the arm and carries him 'over fields and waters' (8.301) and then leads him up a woody mountain on whose top he is able to gaze upon the pleasant earth: "A circuit wide, enclosed, with goodliest trees/ Planted, with walks, and bowers, that what I saw of earth before scarce pleasant

⁸ It should be noted that unlike Adam, Satan gazed upon the sun in a hostile fashion.

seemed” (8.304-6). There he observes the trees ‘loaden with fairest fruit that hung to the eye’ (8.307) and they whet his appetite: ‘stirred in me sudden appetite/ To pluck and eat’ (8.308-9). During this moment, God gives Adam a chance to survey Paradise from a vantage point, just as he surveyed everything during the creation. It seems that only through a panoptic gaze Adam will be able to understand that everything is created for him, and thence belongs to him. Unlike God, he is a passive gazer while gazing upon Paradise, and only once and here is he given a panoptic gaze. He wakes up from his dream and discovers that what he has seen in his dream is set before his eyes ‘all real’. At this moment, God appears to him ‘up hither, from among the trees’ (8.313). No sooner does he see God, than ‘with awe’ he falls at his feet to ‘rejoice’ him; however, God raises him from ground again and talks to him as follows:

Whom thou sought'st I am
[...] Author of all this thou seest
Above, or round about thee or beneath.
This Paradise I give thee, count it thine
To till and keep [...] (8.316-20).

After informing Adam that he is the ‘author’ of everything created, God warns Adam against eating from the forbidden tree.

As God has shown Paradise to Adam from above, he seems to be concerned with the idea that Adam should be conscious of his power over all the creatures in Paradise. According to Nørgaard, as also mentioned in Chapter 3, the perspective from above is often connected with power since this perspective allows a viewer to look down on a participant. Thus, God in this scene draws attention to Adam’s superiority over other creatures, and says that he is the possessor of all things in Paradise, including animals.

Even though all the animals except the fish (God has not summoned it out of water due to its nature) pay fealty to Adam as he names them one by one, and even though he acknowledges that he is provided with everything ‘with hands so liberal’ (8.362) he expresses his desire for a companion in his own likeness because for him there is no happiness in solitude: “In solitude/ What happiness, who can enjoy alone, / Or all enjoying, what contentment find?” (8.364-66). Adam observes that the animals are not his equal for he has been made God’s “substitute, / And these inferior far beneath me set?” (8.381-82). He wants to have a rational companion because ‘the brute cannot be human consort’ (8.391). Following their discourse, God announces that he will give Adam a companion: “Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, / Thy wish exactly to thy heart’s desire (8.450-51). In order to create Eve, God puts Adam to sleep in which he dreams of the creation of Eve, gazing upon the vision of that creation that his dreams present him with. It should be here pointed out that Milton incorporated the biblical sleep in Genesis into his own epic, just as he modelled his account of creation on the first chapter of Genesis. But he added the idea that Adam has a dream or vision of what happened while he sleeps. Adam’s sleep is told in Genesis with the following lines: “The Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall on Adam, and he slept; and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh in its place/ Then the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, He made into a woman, and He brought her to the man” (Gen., 2.21-22). In Milton’s poem, Adam actively gazes upon the creation of Eve in his dream. He relates this scene to Raphael with the following words:

[God] opened my left side, and took
From thence a rib, with cordial spirits warm,
And life-blood streaming fresh; wide was the wound,
But suddenly with flesh filled up and healed:
The rib he formed and fashioned with his hands (8.465-69).

The first woman, Eve, is presented as an object of beauty, which connotes her to-be-looked-at-ness. Adam is fascinated by her fair beauty:

Manlike, but different sex, so lovely fair,
That what seemed fair in all the world, seemed now
Mean, or in her summed up, in her contained
And in her looks, which from that time infused
Sweetness into my heart, unfelt before,
And into all things from her air inspired
The spirit of love and amorous delight (8.471-77).

For a moment, in his dream Eve disappears and Adam thinks that he has lost her. However, he wakes to find 'all real' as in his first dream. Eve approaches him and Adam, still in gaze, enjoys Eve's beauty and his gaze increases his love for her.

Such as I saw her in my dream, adorned
With what all earth or heaven could bestow
To make her amiable: on she came,
Led by her heavenly maker, though unseen,
And guided by his voice, nor uninformed
Of nuptial sanctity and marriage rites:
Grace was in all her steps, heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love (8.482-89).

This depicted scene resembles a scene from a Christian marriage ceremony⁹ in which the father gives the daughter as a bride to the husband. It is not unexpected, therefore, that we have a visual connection here with 'nuptial sanctity' and 'marriage rites', while being a direct reference to God giving Eve to the first man. These lines also prompt us to say that Eve is presented as an object to be looked at by Adam. Even though she is created from his rib as his 'other self', she completes Adam's delight in things to gaze at. In Mulvey's view of the gaze, in this scene Adam would most probably be assigned

⁹ Here there is a strong parallel between this scene and Edmund Spenser's "Epithalamion" (1595). In this poem Spenser celebrates his own marriage to his bride Elizabeth Boyle who is gazed upon by the attendants. Likewise, Eve's beauty is also gazed at. It seems that Milton knew this poem and was influenced by it.

an active role as the possessor of the 'male gaze' whereas Eve would be considered to be the passive recipient of the male gaze. On the contrary, Eve is not presented as a sexual object with an erotic impact. Adam overwhelmingly gazes upon her because she is so gracious and dignified. According to him, Eve is "bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh, myself" (8.495) and they are "one flesh, one heart, one soul" (499). Therefore, she is not made an erotic object and an other through his gaze in Mulvey's version of the gaze. Moreover, in his discourse with Raphael, Adam states that he is superior to and unmoved by all other pleasures except that of gazing upon Eve's beauty: "[...] in all enjoyments else/ Superior and unmoved, here only weak/ Against the charm of beauty's powerful glance" (8.531-33). Besides, Adam ignores wisdom and reason when he beholds Eve because she seems 'so absolute' and 'complete' (8.547-48), which implies that Adam is incomplete without her. Until the moment of eating the forbidden fruit, we can say that Adam's gaze is not malevolent at all; there is nothing threatening about his gaze. The nature of his gaze, however, is different when he partakes of the fruit as they now both know 'good and evil', where before they only knew good, and this change is first described in terms of gaze. They are overcome with 'carnal desire inflaming, he on Eve/ Began to cast lascivious eyes, she him/ As wantonly repaid; in lust they burn' (9.1013-15). Adam's desire intensifies as he keeps gazing upon her 'lasciviously', and Eve appears to him as an erotic object of desire; to fulfil this desire, tellingly, the sight of her beauty 'inflames' his physical senses, giving readers an allusion to the flames of hell. In the quotation given below, we see that Adam invites her a way that it draws on or echoes the tradition of carpe diem poems, in which the speaker urges his beloved to make the most of time, and explore earthly pleasures. Here, especially the first line alludes to the popular carpe diem poems and songs of the late sixteenth and earlier seventeenth century, as does

the end rhyme (so rare in *Paradise Lost*) of the first and third lines, and the almost end rhyme of the second and 6th lines (fare/fairer) which incidentally draws attention to the fact that Eve's fairness is now something consumable, like 'fare'.

But come, so well refreshed, now let us play,
As meet is, after such delicious fare;
For never did thy beauty since the day
I saw thee first and wedded thee, adorned,
With all perfections, so inflame my sense
With ardour to enjoy thee, fairer now
Than ever, bounty of this virtuous tree (9.1027-33).

There is a strong contrast between his former gaze and his gaze in this particular scene. As this act of gazing gives them pleasure, they both desire each other. Mulvey's article mainly focusses on the male gaze which objectifies the woman's body through a controlling and curious gaze. It should be pointed out, however, that like Adam, Eve is also overwhelmed sensuous and gaze-related desire that alludes to hell's flames, because her 'eye dart[s] contagious fire' (8.1036). As discussed in the previous chapters, in their pre-fall, there was no sense of shame between them due to their nakedness. After their fall, however, as they look upon their nakedness, they are filled with shame, which leads them to conceal their nakedness from each other's gaze. This concealing of their bodies from each other is grieved by Milton's poetic voice: "[...] O how unlike/ To that first naked glory" (8.1114-15).

4.2 Adam's Gaze upon the Future of Mankind

In Book 11, the future of mankind is shown to Adam by Michael in a cinematographic fashion. In this part of the poem, history of the mankind is not narrated to Adam. Thus, it is worth asking why God instead of sending Raphael to relate the future of mankind, sends Michael to reveal it to Adam in the form of visions. Another interesting point to

ponder over is why Adam in this book is allowed to gaze from a vantage point, in the same way as in Book 8, for both of these particular acts of gazing occur on the top of a mountain and a hill. Also we wonder whether Adam's gaze in these two scenes is meant to show him what they have lost after their fall. When Adam first found himself lying in Paradise following his creation, God led him up to a mountain on whose top he gazed upon Paradise. This scene was his arrival into the realm of Paradise. It was the first day of his creation and life therein. God appeared to him and showed everything created for him from a panoptic point of view. Adam concluded that everything was an object of his gaze because God was mainly concerned with Adam's gazing upon everything. After their fall, however, God declares that they must no longer reside in Paradise, and sends Michael along with a group of cherubim to expel them from their abode. We can also call attention to why God does not appear to Adam in this book, and appoints Michael instead. Is this because Adam is unable to stand in the presence of God due to shame? This is clearly confirmed by Adam who suffered agonies of guilt over his fall, and wanted to: "[...] hide me from the face/ Of God, whom to behold was then my height/ Of happiness (10.723-25). Before leading them out of Paradise, Michael first leads Adam to a high hill and it is from there that he reveals to him the future of his descendants from the Fall to the Flood. This hill is described as "the highest of Paradise, from whose top/ The hemisphere of earth in clearest ken/ Stretched out to the amplest reach of prospect lay" (11.378-80). Before Michael asks Adam to behold the first vision, he improves Adam's eyesight because his gaze is evidently not as powerful as that of God and the angels:

[Michael] purged with euphrasy and rue
The visual nerve, for he had much to see;
And from the well of life three drops instilled.
So deep the power of these ingredients pierced,
Even to the inmost seat of mental sight,

That Adam now enforced to close his eyes,
Sunk down and all his spirits became entranced (11.414-20)

Adam first gazes upon the biblical scene in which Cain murders his brother Abel due to envy. At the sight of this first act of killing, Adam is utterly 'dismayed' and cries out to Michael. Curiously enough, even the Archangel Michael is moved by this scene as noted by the speaker of the poem. Michael informs Adam that Cain and Abel are his sons, and Abel will be rewarded while Cain will be punished for what he has done to his own brother. Witnessing the first form of death, Adam reacts and asks Michael:

But have I now seen death? Is this the way
I must return to native dust? O sight
Of terror, foul and ugly to behold,
Horrid to think, how horrible to feel!

Michael says that Adam has only seen one form of death, and adds that there are other forms of death, too: "By fire, flood, famine, by intemperance more/ In meats and drinks, which on earth shall bring/ Diseases dire (11.472-74). The second vision depicts a lazar-house in which many people caught with various diseases are helpless in the face of death. According to the speaker, it is a "sight so deform [that, he exclaims] what heart of rock could long/ Dry-eyed behold?" (11.494-95). At this sight, Adam sheds tears. He expresses his sorrow with the following words, almost expostulating with God:

O miserable mankind, to what fall
Degraded, to what wretched state reserved!
Better end here unborn. Why is life given
To be thus wrested from us? Rather why
Obtruded on us thus? who if we knew
What we receive, would either not accept
Life offered, or soon beg to lay it down,
Glad to be so dismissed in peace (11.500-7).

Adam fails to understand how mankind created in the image of God can suffer from those ‘ghastly’ diseases. Michael asserts that it does not have anything to do with God’s image, and the sin of Eve is the main cause of all this suffering (11.519). The third vision of the future that Michael shows Adam returns stories told in Genesis, and it depicts the story of Cain’s descendants. Adam at first enjoys this scene as he has no insight into what he gazes upon. Further, he says that he is hopeful about the future of mankind because in the words of Adam, this third vision does not depict “hate and death or pain much worse” (11.601) like the preceding visions. Shortly after, Michael points out that Adam should not be deceived by what he has seen because “those tents [Adam] saw’st so pleasant, were the tents/ Of wickedness” (11.607-8). He explains the whole scene to Adam in detail, showing how men and women suffer lack of righteousness. Adam from a male perspective and easily returning to his earlier blaming of Eve for his own troubles, sees women as the main source of man’s suffering, for which he says:

O pity and shame, that they who to live well
Entered so fair, should turn aside to tread
Paths indirect, or in the mid-way faint!
But still I see the tenor of man’s woe
Holds on the same, from woman to begin (11.629-33)

In response to this, Michael declares that man is responsible for his own woe because “From man’s effeminate slackness it begins, / [...] who should better hold his place/ By wisdom and superior gifts received” (11.634-36). In this vision, the male descendants of Cain lose their righteousness due to their lust for women since, just as Adam had done after the fall, they gaze upon them with lascivious eyes as described with the following lines:

A bevy of fair women, richly gay
In gems and wanton dress; to the harp they sung
Soft amorous ditties, and in dance came on:
The men though grave, eyed them, and let their eyes
Rove without rein, till in the amorous net
Fast caught, they liked, and each his liking chose (11.582-87).

These lines clearly demonstrate how women bodies are turned into objects through the gazes of Adam's male offspring, and the poem draws parallels between their gazes and Adam's gaze upon Eve after partaking of the fruit. With regard to this, Waddington argues out that Milton's purpose was to portray Adam's infatuation with Eve to be similar to that of Satan for Sin (13), which reminds us of that earlier story of lascivious attraction between sexes (even though Lucifer, like the other angels, would not have had a fixed sexual nature (*PL* 6.350-53). In the fourth vision, Adam gazes upon a scene of warfare in which 'cities of men' are destroyed and the inhabitants slaughtered mercilessly. Among all men, only one (Enoch) is rescued from being killed by God. He would be killed "had not a cloud descending snatched him thence/ Unseen amid the throng (11.670-71). Adam again weeps and laments, comparing this 'massacre' with the atrocity of Cain:

[...] O what are these,
Death's ministers, not men, who thus deal death
Inhumanly to men, and multiply
Ten thousandfold the sin of him who slew
His brother; for of whom such massacre
Make they but of their brethren, men of men? (11.675-80).

In the last vision, Adam is shown the Flood. He gazes upon the annihilation of his offspring as: "Down rushed the rain/ Impetuous, and continued till the earth/ No more was seen" (11.743-45). Adam is emotionally devastated by what he sees and this seems to move the Miltonic voice to describe his own vision of Adam's grief, and exclaim:

How didst thou grieve then, Adam, to behold
The end of all thy offspring, end so sad,
Depopulation; thee another flood,
Of tears and sorrow a flood thee also drowned,
And sunk thee as thy sons; till gently reared
By the angel, on thy feet thou stood'st at last,
Though comfortless, as when a father mourns
His children, all in view destroyed at once;
And scarce to the angel uttered'st thus thy plaint (11.754-62).

Adam is saddened by the future of his descendants and he wishes that he had never seen it.

O visions ill foreseen! better had I
Lived ignorant of future, so had borne
My part of evil only, each day's lot
Enough to bear; those now, that were dispensed
The burden of many ages, on me light
At once, by my foreknowledge gaining birth
Abortive, to torment me ere their being,
With thought that they must be. Let no man seek
Henceforth to be foretold what shall befall
Him or his children [...] (11.763-72)

So, we can say that the more Adam gazes upon the future of his descendants the more he feels sorrow. In Chapter 2, Satan's pain and sorrow were discussed in relation to his gaze. As he gazed upon his followers, then the good angels, Paradise and Adam and Eve, even the sun, he understood what he had lost by being cast out of heaven. He was tormented by what he gazed at because there was no turning back to his previous happy state. Likewise, Adam's gaze gives him discomfort and pain. His gaze upon the future of his children leads him to understand (as quoted by Satan) "from what state [he] fell". However, in this last vision, Adam is comforted by being shown God again sparing one good man (Noah), this time with his family, and the promise of hope for the future of mankind. Adam expresses his joy with these words:

O thou who future things canst represent
As present, heavenly instructor, I revive
At this last sight, assured that man shall live
With all the creatures, and their seed preserve.
Far less I now lament for one whole world
Of wicked sons destroyed, than I rejoice
For one man found so perfect and so just,
That God vouchsafes to raise another world
From him, and all his anger to forget (11.870-78).

This last vision gives hope for the future of mankind not only to Adam but also to the Miltonic voice and to the reader of the poem because as readers, we have also actively gazed upon all these visions, and shared Adam's sorrow.

4.3 Eve's Gaze upon Herself

Zimmerman has drawn attention to how Eve has been examined through the male lens from the moment of the poem's publication. According to her, these male perspectives, while analysing Eve as a character, have seen femininity "as vain and seductive, as well as infantile and dependent" (247). Although she confirms that this is evident in the poem, in particular "through the eyes of the divine voice, Adam, Satan, and the narrator", she asserts that "Eve is much more complex a figure" than this. Even though she shares Gilbert's view of Milton as "the first of the masculinists [whose intention] "most notably [is to] tell to women [...] the story of woman's secondness, her otherness, and how that otherness leads inexorably to her demonic anger, her sin, her fall" (Gilbert, 370), she argues that Milton's poem is also mainly concerned with Eve's search for her identity. Within this context, acknowledging it as an instinctive dilemma, Zimmerman emphasizes how Eve through her actions "strives to secure a sense of self [while] desir[ing] to be both separate from and united with [Adam] without losing [herself] in either isolation or fusion" (247). She further suggests that

Eve's first view of her reflection in the lake reveals "a very positive psychological basis for her identity" although it is generally considered "to be an ominous foreshadowing of her vanity" (248). Thus, Eve's primary gaze upon herself suggests that she experienced Lacan's 'primary narcissism' because during that moment she came closer to understanding a sense of wholeness. To discuss her gaze upon herself here, the following lines report Eve's first moment of life after her creation, as she recounts it to Adam in Book 4:

That day I oft remember, when from sleep
I first awaked, and found myself reposed
Under a shade of flowers, much wondering where
And what I was, whence thither brought, and how.
Not distant far from thence a murmuring sound
Of waters issued from a cave and spread
Into a liquid plain, then stood unmoved
Pure as the expanse of heaven; I thither went
With unexperienced thought, and laid me down
On the green bank, to look into the clear
Smooth lake, that to me seemed another sky.
As I bent down to look, just opposite,
A shape within the watery gleam appeared
Bending to look on me, I started back,
It started back, but pleased I soon returned,
Pleased it returned as soon with answering looks
Of sympathy and love; (4,449-65)

This scene shares a similarity with the scene in which Adam first found himself created in Paradise. Like Adam, Eve fails to understand who she is and how and by whom she has been brought there. Eve also turns her gaze upon her surroundings; unlike Adam, however, she does not name everything around her. Concerning this, Zimmerman maintains that:

Whereas Adam perceives an objective reality instantly, Eve is at first fused with an environment which is neither subjective nor objective, but rather both. Nevertheless, it is in this initial fusion with the world and mirroring of the image's "sympathy and love" that Eve seems to experience a degree of selfhood (249).

Even though Eve does not discern that the image in the lake is a reflection of herself, she starts to develop a physical self-consciousness as also stated by Zimmerman: “This mirroring experience [...] is the essential source of Eve’s sense of who she is” (249). We can understand that Eve’s gaze upon herself is certainly the kind of gaze that can be explained by Lacan’s concept of the gaze because this mirroring experience plays a major role in the acquisition of Eve’s selfhood. Like the infant, first Eve confuses the image with her own self, and then we see that she is fascinated with the image on the reflective surface. This alienation and fascination with her own image paves the way for the emergence of her ego. However, it should be pointed out that Eve as a subject is not alienated from something or from herself. That is, this alienation is significant for the emergence of the ego (see *The Lacanian Gaze*). At this moment, the divine voice warns and instructs her as she fixes her gaze upon her own reflection, and interestingly, having been commanded by the divine voice, Eve describes her narcissistic gaze as a “vain desire” (4.466). The divine voice talks to Eve with the following lines, almost condemning her gaze upon herself as if it is something to be avoided and suggesting a preferable object for her eyes:

[...] What thou seest,
What there thou seest fair creature is thyself,
With thee it came and goes: but follow me,
And I bring thee where no shadow stays
Thy coming, and thy soft embraces, he
Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy
Inseparably thine, to him shalt bear
Multitudes like thyself, and thence be called
Mother of human race: (4.467-75).

Just as the divine voice had instructed Adam about who he is, so is Eve also instructed. When led by the divine guide to Adam whom “she shall enjoy” but to whom she is

secondary as his image (just as her reflection in the pool is secondary to herself), she obeys:

[...] what could I do,
But follow straight, invisibly thus led?
Till I espied thee, fair indeed and tall,
Under a platan, yet methought less fair,
Less winning soft, less amiably mild,
Than that smooth watery image;

Eve is allowed to gaze upon Adam from a distance, not from a vantage point. She is already created as an object; and thus she is given to Adam. Eve does not find Adam as appealing as the “smooth watery image” in the lake. With respect to this, Zimmerman says: “Eve wants to return to an “image,” a more positive affirmation of her primary identity. In an effort to retain her sense of self, Eve almost instinctively rejects Adam” (250). In spite of her wish, Adam asks her to stay as he has ‘lent’ her his own rib for her creation and therefore, he argues, she is a part of him.

[...] back I turned,
Thou following cried'st aloud, Return fair Eve,
Whom fly'st thou? Whom thou fly'st, of him thou art,
His flesh, his bone; to give thee being I lent
Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart
Substantial life, to have thee by my side
Henceforth an individual solace dear;
Part of my soul I seek thee, and thee claim
My other half (4.480-88).

Eve notes that Adam seized her hand and thus she yielded to stay. His first touch allows her to see “How beauty is excelled by manly grace/ And wisdom, which alone is truly fair” (4.490-91). We can conclude from this scene that Eve is not drawn to Adam by act of gazing but by touch, which is an interesting detail. This perhaps indicates that Eve is a more tactile, physical creature than Adam who can be so affected by

immaterial things like gaze, dreams, visions and the words of angels. Further, this might be the reason why Adam sees her so ‘absolute’ and ‘complete’.

So we can understand that Eve’s primary gaze upon herself is the indication of her search for her own identity, and plays a major role in how she will be searching for own identity in the other parts of the poem. As maintained by Zimmerman, starting from her creation Eve, through her actions, wishes to secure a sense of self while desiring to be both separate from and united with Adam. This is certainly confirmed by the scene in which she suggests dividing the days labour, and again when she later contemplates whether to share the fruit with Adam:

[...] Shall I to him make known
As yet my change, and give him to partake
Full happiness with me, or rather not,
But keep the odds of knowledge in my power
Without copartner? so to add what wants
In female sex, the more to draw his love,
And render me more equal, and perhaps,
A thing not undesirable, sometime
Superior; for inferior who is free? (9.817-25).

So, Eve’s soliloquy here makes it clear that she is already aware of her secondary position in Paradise, and she wishes to be independent of Adam in order to gain at least equality, or even superiority. Eve’s primary gaze upon herself had given her the beginnings of a sense of wholeness and thence an urge to sense mastery over her own body. That is why she wished to return to the image in the lake, and again why she preferred to work separately from Adam. Therefore, it is not surprising that afterwards, Satan taunts her for being seen only by Adam, with the words “Who sees thee? (and what is one?)” (9.546), she eats the fruit.

4.4 Eve's Dream and Gaze

In a chapter entitled 'The Female Gaze', Lovatt considers that dreams of female characters engage with the future. She points out that: "while most interpreters of omens are male, dreamers and their interpreters are often female. Dreams offer one way of approaching the female gaze in epic" (205-6). According to her, dreams in ancient literature have prophetic elements and function as a channel of communication between gods and men. In a modern sense, however, referring to the ideas of some critics, she observes that dreams are often connected with film, as a metaphor for the subconscious (206). Interestingly, in a footnote, she also provides Jung's characterization of dreams as 'theatrical'. Further, she comments upon the particular idea that dreamers, regardless of their sex, are often passive in the face of a future inflicted upon them (214). Similar to Lacan's notion of the gaze, she says that dreams are disturbances in the field of epic vision (209). Taking into account all these ideas, of particular interest in this section is how Eve's infernal dream in Book 4 (in which there is a theatrical gazing) presents her subconscious and foreshadows how she will be tempted by Satan in their future encounter in Book 9. In this respect, her dream is certainly prophetic; yet it should be noted that this particular dream is not given to Eve by God, but by Satan "Assaying by his devilish art to reach/ The organs of her fancy, and with them forge/ Illusions as he list, phantasms and dreams" (*PL*, 4.801-3). According to Lovatt, the dreams of female characters are one of the defining features of the epic genre. So we conclude that dreamers and their interpreters in epics are often female. Twentieth century critics read Eve's infernally instilled dream in the light of Freud's notion of dreams, claiming that it manifests her subconscious, and thence she had already fallen long before eating the fruit (Diekhoff, 5). This dream foreshadows

what will happen in her future encounter with Satan, and it is very significant due to the fact that it seems almost to represent what Eve wishes to do.

In the shape of a toad, Satan, “close at the ear of Eve assay[ed] by his devilish art to reach the organs of her fancy” (4.800-2) in a dream. As Eve recounts this dream to Adam, readers learn that Satan had attempted to make her unsatisfied with her (very new) life by objectifying her, showing her to herself with words as a beautiful woman with a visual impact. In his speech, often employing gaze-related language such as ‘to gaze’, ‘to behold’, and ‘to see’, Satan speaks to Eve in the following way:

... heaven wakes with all his eyes,
Whom to behold but thee, nature’s desire,
In whose sight all things joy, with ravishment
Attracted by thy beauty still to gaze. (5.44-7)

Satan’s words suggest that Eve and her beauty is the object of a gaze from ‘all things’, including Satan’s. Like ‘desire’, in this passage the word ‘ravishment’ is very ambiguous as it implies ‘pleasure’ for the gazers, but also violation of the gazers and, in this syntactically ambiguous sentence, also perhaps of the object. In her dream as elsewhere, then, Eve is presented as a passive recipient of ‘gaze’, and here Satan claims ‘all things’ so view her. The words used by Satan for Eve connote her ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’, as expressed by Mulvey (11). In the dream, Satan in the form of an angel, is seen gazing on the tree as she continues relating it to Adam.

And as I wondering looked, beside it stood
One shaped and winged like one of those from heaven
By us oft seen; his dew locks distilled
Ambrosia; on that tree he also gazed (5.54-7)

It should be emphasised that Satan is in the process of gazing upon Eve within this dream, and while doing so, he exerts power over Eve through his gaze, putting himself

in a position of power. Eve, on the other hand, beholds rather than gazes, she looks in order to understand her surroundings because she is not aware where she is led. Satan continues speaking to Eve in the dream.

Taste this, and be henceforth among the gods
Thyself a goddess, not to earth confined,
But sometimes in the air, as we, sometimes
Ascend to heaven, by merit thine, and see
What life the gods live there, and such live thou (5.77-81).

While trying to entice Eve to eat the fruit, Satan uses words related to sight. After the passage given above, he declares that Eve will be like a god, beholding the world from ‘prospect high’. After eating the fruit, she flies with him up to the clouds: “Forthwith up to the clouds/ With him I flew, and underneath beheld/ The earth outstretched immense, a prospect wide/ And various (5.86-8). Satan reveals the world from up above, from a god’s perspective. Eve ‘wonders at her flight and change to this high exaltation’ (5.89-90) now that she comes to understand that the act of looking from above is an indication of a higher rank or more powerful position, which is also implied by Satan’s reference to the heavenly abode of the gods. We may argue that Eve’s dream seems to present her subconscious state of mind. Furthermore, Eve is objectified through Satan’s gaze in this scene, but she is also reduced to the role of a spectator. She gazes upon Satan when he plucks the fruit, and tastes it. It should be pointed out that in this dream, Eve is shown – and then narrates to Adam and to the readers - a distorted vision of the future, thus relating her dream to the dreams of other female characters in the epics analysed by Lovatt.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to analyse the workings of the gaze in Milton's *Paradise Lost* with respect to Lovatt's epic gaze and focusing on four main characters, that is Satan, God, Adam and Eve, through the theoretical insights of three important writers on the gaze: Sartre, Foucault and Lacan.

The first analytic chapter of this thesis, which is chapter two, found that Satan gazed upon Adam and Eve together, and then separately upon Eve, and that these gazes are presented very differently in the poem. His gaze upon Eve separately is found to be the most notable of these acts of gazing, being a more controlling and destructive gaze. Curiously enough, Satan does not gaze upon Adam independently and with regard to this, some possible reasons are presented: As he sees the image of God in Adam, he seems to avoid gazing upon him independently. Or rather, from a Sartrean point of view, Satan probably fears a fierce conflict when the gaze returns and Satan is rendered an object under Adam's gaze. Satan's gaze upon other fallen angels and good angels are investigated, too. Satan as a self-conscious object of the gaze, uses his companions (other fallen angels) like mirrors, and it illuminates Satan's anxiety which arises from the fact that he is also the other who is being looked at. Lastly, Satan's gaze upon his

children Sin and Death is inspected and these passages reveal his attempted rejection of the physical changes that his own sins have created.

The next analytic chapter discusses God's gaze from Foucault's view of the gaze, which demonstrates the panoptic power of God's gaze. Throughout the whole poem, God acts with his more powerful and penetrative gaze, and his absolute surveillance deters Satan and his followers from a direct conflict with him. Unlike Satan, God's gaze, on which the whole creation is based, is seen to be benevolent and defining. After all, it is his gaze during creation which confirms and affirms that all is good. As the sole authority and the possessor of the divine gaze in the poem, nothing escapes his gaze.

The fourth chapter, which is the last analytic chapter found that God gives Adam a chance to survey Paradise from a vantage point, just as he surveyed everything during the creation. Adam is only given a panoptic gaze in this scene, which nevertheless reflects a small illustration of Adam's inherited divine properties. Then, Adam also gazes upon Eve for the first time in his dream vision when she is created out of his rib at his request. Eve is presented as an object to be looked at by Adam. However, she is not made an erotic object and an other through his gaze. Adam's gaze upon the future of mankind illustrates the cinematographic aspect of the gaze, which is suitable for the ideas of Lacanian film theory. Also, this thesis found that Lacan's view of the Mirror Phase offers us a possible reading of Eve's gaze upon herself since this stage introduces to us Eve's primary narcissism. Lastly, Eve's dream proves to be useful in approaching the female gaze in epics, as suggested by Lovatt in her book.

As a result of these findings, the thesis concludes that Lovat's epic gaze was an appropriate starting point for the discussion of how Milton uses the gaze in this poem

but did not cover all the different ways in which it was used. While all of the three theorists whose ideas about the gaze were studied contributed to our understanding of Milton's use of the gaze, not all of them were appropriate for all of the different uses of the gaze in the poem. Lacan was found to be more fruitful in approach to Satan and Eve; whereas Sartre was found to be more fruitful when looking at these characters but also when examining Adam's character; and Foucault was particularly useful when looking at God's divine gaze. So the gaze in this poem reinforces the power relations in the story, including those related to gender and to perceptions of identity. Also, the characterization in more general terms benefits greatly from Milton's differential uses of and representations of the gaze.

As for the limitations of this study and suggestions for further research, time and space, focus on selected characters, other characters, specifically good and fallen angels could be fruitfully investigated with respect to the gaze in further work.

Using three theorized approaches to the gaze under the more general concept of Lovatt's epic gaze helped us to understand the functions of the gaze in this poem but did not allow the research to pursue any of these individual theories completely. Future work could pick up on the position of the gaze in *Paradise Lost* with respect to other Sartrean, Lacanian or Foucauldian concepts.

The connections between philosophical and theological ideas and the theories of the gaze have been studied could be further researched, most notably connections between Rousseau's earlier concept of "Amour-propre" and how it relates to shame and gaze, Sartrean ideas of gaze and authenticity in relation to sin, Lacan's ideas of especially the symbolic and semiotic registers again with relation to the theological implications of his Law-of-the-Father, and Foucauldian Panoptic gaze with respect to whole

discipline and punishment theory as it can be applied to the power structures in *Paradise Lost*.

Given the fact that light is the first thing that God creates and Milton asks for light in *Paradise Lost*, any act of or reference to sight and the gaze will have a heightened thematic as well as epic importance in this as in Milton's other poems. That Milton makes direct references to his own blindness in certain well-known parts of *Paradise Lost* indicates that, so the gaze of the blind poet himself could be investigated with respect to a power struggle between himself as the author of the poem and his characters, including God, in further study.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET¹⁰

JOHN MILTON'IN KAYIP CENNET ADLI ESERİNDE EPİK BAKIŞ

Bu alıřma John Milton'ın epik řiiri Kayıp Cennet'i incelerken, Helen Lovatt'ın epik bakışını, Sartre, Foucault ve Lacan gibi önemli kuramcıların bakış kavramlarını kullanmaktadır. Milton'ın řiiri, yayınlandığından bu yana bir ok açıdan incelenmiş; ancak teorik olarak bakış konseptini kullanan bir alıřma bulunamamıştır. Bakış konsepti film alıřmaları, grsel sanatlar ve edebiyat gibi eřitli alanlarda n plana ıkılmış bir kavram haline gelmiştir. Lovatt eserinde epik řiir iin bakış konseptinin ok önemli bir unsur olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Milton'ın řiirinde btn karakterler birbirini izler ve karakterlerin bakışları diğerkarakterler zerinde önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu açıdan, yukarıda bahsedilmiş olan önemli kuramcıların bakış konseptine olan yaklaşımları eseri anlamamız iin farklı bakış açıları sunmaktadır.

Szlk, bakış kelimesinin eski zamanlardaki kullanımını, “merakla veya boř boř bakmak; řaşırmış bir řekilde birisinin gzlerini dikmesi” řeklinde ifade etmektedir.

¹⁰ Bu alıřmanın Trke zetinde, Milton'ın řiirindeki karakterlerin isimleri, edebi karakter olmaları nedeniyle evrilmemiřtir.

Yine, sözlük kelimenin günümüzdeki kullanımı için “bir şeye kasten gözlerini dikerek bakmak” tanımını vermektedir. Her ne kadar bu tanımlar kelimenin edebi kuramlarla olan ilişkisini anlamamız konusunda yardımcı olsa da, kelimenin felsefi, kültürel ve edebi kuramlarla olan bağınyı yeterince açıklamamaktadır. Margaret Olin, *Sanat Tarihi için Önemli Terimler* (2003) isimli kitabında kelimenin manipölasyon, güç ve arzu gibi kavramlarla ilişkili olduğunu ve daha çok olumsuz bir anlam içerdiğini savunmuştur. Aynı şekilde, feminist film kuramcı Laura Mulvey *Görsel Zevk ve Anlatı Sineması* isimli makalesinde, kelimenin güç ve arzu ile yakından ilişkili olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Mulvey, Freud ve Lacan gibi kuramcılarının fikirlerinden faydalanarak, bakış kelimesinin sinemayı tanımlayan bir kavram olduğunu belirtir. Mulvey’e göre, sinema izleyiciye görsel bir haz (skopofili) imkanı sunar çünkü izleyici karanlık bir ortamda diğer insanlardan ayrı olarak, ekranda gördüğü bedenleri bakışlarıyla nesnelleştirir ve bu deneyimden zevk duyar. Buna ek olarak, Mulvey’in makalesinde asıl savunduğu düşünce, sinemada kadın bedeninin nasıl erkek izleyici tarafından arzu nesnesine dönüştürüldüğüdür. Sinemada kadınlar cinsel bir nesne olarak izlenilmesi ve bedenlerinin erkeklerin bakışlarına maruz kalması öne çıkan düşünceleri arasındadır. Yani, ona göre, bu durumda, bakış erkeklere aktif bir rol sunarken; kadınları pasif hale getirerek, izlenen nesne konumuna düşürmektedir.

Jean-Paul Sartre, varoluşçu felsefenin önemli bir eseri olan *Varlık ve Hiçlik* isimli kitabında, bakış kavramını ele alır ve ona göre bu söz konusu kavram insan hayatında, özellikle de özne ve nesne ilişkilerinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Sartre’a göre bakış günlük deneyimden ziyade varoluşçu bir seviyededir. Sartre’ın yaklaşımında, bakış özne ile nesne arasındaki iktidar ilişkisini belirler. Bakış bir kişinin konumunu yüceltirken, onun öznelliğini ortaya koymasına imkan sunar. Öte yandan, Öteki bakılacak pasif bir nesne konumuna düşer. Diğer bir deyişle, biri diğerini bakışı altına

aldığında, aktif bir özne rolünü üstlenir ve Öteki, Öznenin görüş alanında pasif bir nesne haline gelir. Bu aşamada, ikisi de aynı anda hem nesne hem de özne konumlarında bulunamaz ancak rollerini değiştirebilirler çünkü Sartre için bakış iki yönlü bir süreçtir. Sartre söz konusu bu iki yönlü süreci ifade etmek için, “başkası tarafından görülmek başkasını görmek” der. Ancak bakış iki taraf arasındaki etkileşimde bir çatışmaya neden olur. Bu çatışmada, kişi öznelliğe ulaşmak için bakışıyla Ötekini nesnelleştirerek, etkisiz hale getirmeyi amaçlar. Dolayısıyla bakış, Sartre’a göre, Öznenin Öteki ile ilişkisinde belirleyici bir rol oynar çünkü kişi kendi öznelliğini ve özgürlüğünü ancak üstün gelen bakışıyla elde edebilir. Aynı şekilde, Ötekinin bakışı da bizi varlığımızdan ve özgürlüğümüzden koparır ve sonunda Öteki tarafından ele geçiriliriz. Sartre, bu varoluşçu yapıda, varlığımızı yeniden kazanmak için, ötekinin varlığını ve özgürlüğünü özümsemeye mecbur kaldığımızı belirtir. Bunun yanı sıra, Sartre Öteki tarafından görünüyor olmamızı yabancılaştırıcı bir deneyim olarak nitelendirir çünkü Ötekinin bakışı bizi bir nesneye indirger ve bakışını bize yönelttiğinde Ötekinin bakışıyla tanımlanırız. Aynı zamanda, Sartre, Öteki tarafından görülmenin nesne için utanç verici bir deneyim olduğunu belirtir. Bu durumu “saf utanç” olarak tanımlar. Nitelendirdiği bu utanca, Ötekinin gözünde nesne olup ona bağımlı kalmanın neden olduğunu söyler.

Foucault ise, Sartre’dan farklı olarak (çünkü Sartre bakışı varoluşçu bir bağlamda inceler), kavramı ele alırken, bakışın güçle yakından ilişkisine dikkat çeker. Foucault, bakışın bu türünde, gücün otorite sahibi biri tarafından kullanıldığı Panopticon modelini ele alır. Bakışın ön planda olduğu bu modelde, bir gözlemci görünmez bir merkezi noktadan özgürce bakarak başkaları üzerinde hakimiyet kurar. Foucault, *Disiplin ve Cezalandırma: Hapishanenin Doğuşu* isimli kitabında (1977) bakış kavramını bir disiplin ve kontrol mekanizması olarak nitelendirir. Tarihten örnekler

vererek, bakışın bir denetleme mekanizması olarak nasıl güç sahibi otoritelerce kullanıldığını anlatır. Aslında Foucault'ın söz konusu bu kontrol ve denetleme mekanizması Bentham'ın hapisane modelinden gelmektedir. Bu hapisane modelinde mahkumlar denetleyen bir bakışla merkezi bir kuleden gözlemlenir, ancak gözlemciyi göremez. Bu durumun mahkumların davranışlarını kontrol ettiği ve nihayetinde onları disiplin haline getirdiği öne sürülmektedir. Sonuç olarak, bu Panoptik bakış, mahkum veya gözlenen kişi üzerinde gücün otomatik olarak işleyişini sağlar. Yani, panoptik bakış bu sistemin başında olan kişiden bağımsız bir güç ilişkisi yaratır. Kısacası, denetlenen kişiler birisinin onları sürekli izlediğini düşünür ve bu da disiplin yaratır.

Lacan'ın bakış konseptine yaklaşımı Foucault ve Sartre'ın yaklaşımlarından farklıdır çünkü Lacan bakışı psikolojik bir bağlamda ele almaktadır. Yukarıda belirtildiği üzere, Sartre'a göre iki kutup (Özne ve Öteki) arasında bir çatışmaya neden olan ikili bir karşıtlık vardır; diğer bir ifadeyle, ya ben aktif bir özne olarak Ötekini bakışımın nesnesi yapıyorum ya da Öteki'nin bakışları altında nesneleştiriliyorum. Ancak, Lacan'ın bakış kavramında, Özne ve Nesne arasında böyle bir ontolojik yapı yoktur. Lacan bakış kavramını geliştirmek üzere Merleau-Ponty'nin fikirlerini kullanmıştır. Merleau-Ponty, bize her zaman dışarıdan yönlendirilen önceden var olan bir bakış olduğunu söyler. Lacan görme organı olan göz ve bakış arasındaki farklılığa dikkat çeker. Yani her zaman her şeyi gören bir bakışa maruz kalırız ve bakış her zaman görme eyleminden önce gelir. Dahası, Lacan'a göre, doğası gereği bakış, öznenin görüş alanında kavrayabileceği bir şey değildir; daha ziyade ulaşamaz kalır. Bu sebeple, bu eksikliğin, öznenin arzusunu tetiklediğini belirtir. Lacan'ın bakış kavramında, ayna evresi de önemlidir. Ayna evresi 6 ile 18 ay arasında gerçekleşir. Bu yaşlarda bebek aynada (herhangi bir yansıtıcı yüzey) görüntüsünü tanımaya başlar ve

kendi görüntüsünden zevk alır. Başlangıçta çocuk kendi görüntüsünü gerçeklikle karıştırır; ancak daha sonra aynadaki görüntünün kendisinin bir yansıması olduğunu anlar ve vücudunun bütünsel bir forma sahip olduğunu farkına varır. Motor kontrolü tam olarak gelişmemiş olmasına rağmen, vücudu üzerinde bir hakimiyet duygusu hisseder. Bütünlük duygusuna sahip olmalarını sağlayan ayna görüntüsüdür, ki bu ancak bebeğin bakışıyla mümkündür. İşte bu evrede çocuk bu ayna görüntüsü ile özdeşleşir ve gördüğü şeyin kendisinin bir görüntüsü olduğu sonucuna varır. Bu yüzden bakış ayna evresinde oldukça önemlidir.

Lovatt ise, yukarıda bahsedilmiş olan, Sartre, Foucault ve Lacan gibi önemli kuramcılarının da bakış konseptine olan yaklaşımlarına eserinde yer verir ve bakışın epik şiirin önemli bir parçası olduğunu vurgular. Epik şiirin karakterlerine tepeden bakan ve onları birer görsel nesnelere dönüştüren, her şeyi bilen bir nesnel anlatı olduğunu söyler. Epik şiirde, sadece yukarıdaki dağlardaki tanrıların (ve tanrıçaların) değil, aynı zamanda kenardaki duvarlardaki kadınların (ve yaşlıların) bakışlarının da epik şiirin bir parçası olduğunu belirtir. Bununla beraber, her bir karakterin kendine özgü ve diğerlerinden farklı bir bakışa sahip olduğunu ifade eder. Örneğin, ilahi karakterler (tanrılar) bakışlarını diğer karakterler üzerinde kullanabilir. Lovatt, ilahi bakışı, ölümlü karakterlerin bakışından daha net, nüfuz edici ve etkili olarak nitelendirir. Daha sonra, Lovatt kahin bakışını ele alır. Kahin bakışı, ilahi bakışlara oranla daha az etkiye sahiptir. Ancak, kahin bakışı diğer ölümlülerin bakışlarından daha etkilidir çünkü kahin bakışı, ilahi ve ölümlülerin bakışları arasında ikincil konumdadır. Lovatt, kadın karakterlerinin bakışının her ne kadar güçsüz bırakılmış olsa da epik şiirin önemli bir parçası olduğunu ileri sürer. Buna ek olarak, epik şiirde, genellikle erkek karakterlere bakmaya odaklanıldığını ve bu epik kahramanların bedenlerinin erotik olarak nasıl nesnelleştirildiğini aktarır. Yine de kahramanlar sadece bakılması gereken

bir nesne olarak sunulmaz, aynı zamanda saldırgan bakışlarıyla güçlerini de gösterebilirler. Özetle, Lovatt'ın ifade ettiği gibi, bakış epik şiirin en temel özelliğidir ve karakterler sahip oldukları bakışları kullanarak eylemlerini gerçekleştirirler, ki bu okuyucuya görsel bir senaryo sunar.

Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, Satan karakterinin bakışı ele alınmıştır. Şiir boyunca, Satan adeta bir röntgenci gibi davranır. Aslında röntgencilik, Satan'ın tanımlanmasında temel bir unsurdur. Ne var ki, Satan'ın şiirdeki ilk eylemi, nefret dolu bakışlarını cehenneme çevirmesiyle başlar. Satan ilk olarak 4. Kitapta Adam ve Eve'i bir arada görür. Her ikisini de bakışıyla nesneleştirir ancak her ikisine bakışında farklılık vardır. Cennet'teki Hayat Ağacının üzerinde kurbağa kılığına girmiş bir şekilde oturarak, onların mükemmel ve mutlu halini görmesi, ona eziyet verir. Cennetten kovulduğu ve artık cehennemin bir parçası olduğu için yakınıdır. Şiirin anlatıcı bu sahneye dikkatimizi Satan'ın ilk erkek ve kadına ilk bakışına çekmek için anlatır. Onları dikizlerken, onlarla ilgili daha fazla şey öğrenmeyi arzular. Schwarz'ın da belirttiği üzere, bu sahnede Satan'ın bakışı yıkıcıdır. Schwartz, Satan'ın bakışıyla ilgili bir başka ilginç noktaya dikkat çeker. Freud'un teorisine göre, narsisizmin (özseverlik) önce kendi bakışımızı kendimize yöneltmekle başlar ve sonrasında bakışımızı başkalarına yönlendiririz. Lacancı bir bakış açısıyla, bir kişinin kendisine bakmasının, o kişinin dışında bir başkası tarafından bakılabilecek olduğu anlamı çıkmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu durum kişinin öznel konumunu tehdit altına aldığı için endişeli bir sürecin başlangıcı olarak görebilir. Bu bağlamda Satan da etrafındaki diğer karakterlere bakar ve onlara bakarken aynı zamanda kendisine de baktığının (çeşitli şekillerde) ve bu nedenle de başkalarının gözünde Öteki olduğunun farkındadır. Bu yaklaşım, Satan'ın narsisist bir karakter olarak neden kendisini Adam ve Eve'den üstün gördüğüne dair bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Satan, gözlerinin önünde gördüğü Adam

ve Eve'nin güzelliğe tahammül edemez. Onlara bakmak, cennetten kovulmadan önceki eski güzelliğini hatırlar ona. Bu nedenle, Satan'ın God'ın yaratmış olduğu Adam ve Eve'e bakması bir ayna görevi görür ve aslında Satan bir bakıma kendisine dolaylı yoldan bakmış olur. Yani aslında, onlara bakışı kendi görünüşünün ne kadar da çirkin ve deforme olduğunu anlamasını sağlar. Satan'ın şiirdeki cehenneme ilk bakışının ardından, kendisi gibi cennetten kovulmuş Beelzebub'a bakar ve onun cennetteki güzelliğini kaybederek ne kadar biçimsiz ve çirkin bir hale geldiğini söyler. Yine, bu sahne aslında Satan'ın dış görünüşüyle ne kadar ilgili ve aynı şekilde Beelzebub'ı bir ayna gibi kullanarak aslında Beelzebub için kullandığı kelimelerin kendisi için de geçerli olduğunun farkında olduğunu gösterir. Satan kendisini ne kadar güçlü görürse görsün, aslında kendisi de Ötekidir çünkü yalnız çevresindeki kovulmuş meleklerce değil aynı zamanda her şeyi gören God tarafından da şiir boyunca Satan'ın izlendiğini anlarız. Satan'ın şiirin kahramanı olup olmadığı uzun zamandır tartışılıyor olsa da, God'ın her şeyi gören bir karakter olarak Satan'ı da bakışı altında tutması ve güçsüz bırakması Satan'ın aslında şiirin ana kahramanı olamayacağına bir işarettir.

Eve, Satan'ın kontrol edici bakışlarına, diğer karakterlerden daha fazla maruz kalır ve Satan'ın Eve'e bakışının diğer karakterlere göre daha büyük yansımaları vardır çünkü nihayetinde Eve'in yasak ağaçtan meyveyi yemesine yol açar. Satan, Eve'in tek başına daha korumasız olduğunu düşünür ve şiirin 9. Kitabında Eve'i tek başına yakalar ve izler. Nitekim, saldırgan bir röntgenci olarak Satan, gizli gizli izlediği için kendisini güçlü bir konuma sokar. Ayrıca aktif bir özne ve izleyici olarak Eve'in Adam'inkinden farklı bir meleksi güzelliğe sahip olduğunun farkındadır. Eve'in kadınsı bir masumiyet ve tatlılıkla donatıldığı Satan'ın gözünden kaçmaz. Aslında, yıkıcı ve röntgenci bakışıyla Eve'i baştan aşağı incelese bile, bir an için düşmanlığını unuttur. Eve'in güzelliğine ve masumiyetine bakışının ona düşmanlığını unutturduğu düşünülebilir,

ünkü bu esnada Satan nceki meleksi gzellięe sahip deęildir. Yani, Eve’e bakması aslında kendisinin de bir zamanlar gzel bir grnme sahip olduęunu anlamasını saęlar. Ancak, ok gemeden bulunduęu cennette hibir şeyin kendisi iin yaratılmadıęını hatırlar ve tekrar nefrete kapılır. Ne kadar ok bakarsa, cennetten kovulduktan sonra ne kaybettięinin o kadar farkına varır ve znel varoluđu ile baktıęı tekinin tamamen ayrı varoluđu arasındaki uurumun farkına varması ona rahatsızlık ve acı verir. Bu nedenle, Satan’ın rahatsızlıęı ve znts, bakıřlarının bir sonucudur ve onun bakıřlarının ne řekilde hissetmesi ve hatta nasıl hareket etmesi gerektięini belirledięini syleyebiliriz.

Satan kendisi gibi kovulmuř melekleri ayna gibi kullanır ve Satan’ın kendisinin de bakılan teki olması, ona huzursuzluk ve endiře verir. Yukarıda da belirtildięi zere, Satan, ilk olarak cehennemde Beelzebub’ı grr, ve onun meleksi grnřnn oęunu kaybettięine dikkat eker. Aslında Beelzebub’daki deęiřimi grmesi kendisinin de deęiřmiř olduęunu anladıęını gsterir. Beelzebub’ın harap olmuř haline bakar ve kendisinin de onunla aynı konumda olduęunu farkederek. Bu nedenle, Lacan bakıř aısıyla, Beelzebub Satan’ın kendini yansıttıęı "ayna" ile iliřkilendirilebilir. Satan, ltuftan dřřnn farkındadır ve bu nedenle, Beelzebub’a bakıřıyla, muhtemelen deęiřen fiziksel grnmnn farkına varır. Lacan’ın da bakıřın grme eyleminden her zaman daha nce geldięini belirttięi gibi, Satan kendisine eřlik eden dięer kovulmuř melekler iin bir tekidir ve farklı aılardan řiir boyunca izlenir, oysa kendisi onlara yalnızca bir taraftan bakabilir. řiirin bir ok blmnde Satan’ın grnřnn ktye gittięini anlamamızı saęlayan olaylar vardır. Ancak Satan’ın fiziksel grnm sabit bir şey deęildir. Birok kez grnmn deęiřtirir. İlgintir, eski ihtiřamını geri kazanmaya alıřmaz, belki de gzellięini elde etme gcnn kendisinde olmadıęını bildięi iin. Bylece, Uriel’i kandırmak iin kısa bir srelięine

genç bir melek ve sonra bir kurbağa gibi görünür. Sonraki sahnelerde bir aslan ve bir kaplana dönüşür. Bu nedenle, Satan'ın fiziksel görünümünün kötüye gitmesi, sürekli bakışlara maruz kalmasıyla bağlantılı olarak tartışmaya değer bir noktadır. Satan'ın yeryüzünde bir hayvandan diğerine geçişinin, kötüye giden fiziksel görünümünü saklı tutma kaygısıyla da bağlantılı olabileceği düşünülebilir. Bu durumda sürekli kılık değiştirmesinin nedeni, sadece başkalarının onu tanımasını engellemek değil aynı zamanda onların bakışlarını engellemek istemesidir.

Bu çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde, God karakterinin Panoptik bakışı ele alınır. God, cehennemde Satan ve kovulmuş diğer melekler üzerinde panoptik gücünü kullanan bir Foucault'cu "gözetmen" olarak düşünülebilir. Her ne kadar God'ın gücünü doğrudan kullanmaya ihtiyacı olmasa da, onun güçlü denetleme sistemi Satan ve diğerlerini güçsüzleştirir. God şiirde Panopticon'un kulesindeki bir gözlemci gibidir çünkü onun gözünden hiçbir şey kaçmaz. God'ın şiirde ne kadar herşeye hakim ve güçlü olduğu anlatıcı ve melekler tarafından dile getirilir Bu bağlamda, şiirin birkaç bölümünde bahsedilen yüksek kuleler, God'ın gözetim ağının fiziksel temsili değilse de metaforik temsili olarak düşünülebilir. Dolayısıyla, aslında God, Satan ve diğerlerini görmek üzere bu kulelerin hiçbirine ihtiyacı duymaz. Ancak God'ın çeşitli yerlere koymuş olduğu bu yüksek kuleler Satan'ı ve diğer melekleri bazı amaçlarından alıkoymaktadır.

Kayıp Cennet'te Satan ve God'ın bakışları arasında ilginç bir zıtlık vardır. Satan kötü ve yıkıcı bir bakışa sahiptir, ancak God'ın bakışı yapıcıdır. God'ın bakışı iyiliksever, kaçınılmaz ve tanımlayıcıyken, Satan'ın bakışı kötü niyetli, gaddar ve manipülatiftir; şiirin başlarında Satan'ın cehenneme nasıl kötü kötü baktığını hatırlayabiliriz. Aksine, God'ın bakışı olmadan yaratılış olmazdı. Dolayısıyla şiirde, yaratılış için God'ın bakışı esastır.

Daha önce belirtildiği gibi, God'ın bakışı şiirdeki en güçlü bakıştır ve hiçbir şey asla gözünden kaçmaz. Bu nedenle, God'ın Adam ve Eve'in yasak meyveyi yediklerinde gördüğünü biliriz. Adam ve Eve yasak meyveyi yediklerinde her ikisi de çıplak hallerinin farkına vardıkları için ilk kez utanç duyarlar. Daha önce çıplaklıklarından dolayı herhangi bir utanç duymuyorlardı ve God'ın, meleklerin ve birbirlerinin bakışlarına açıktılar. Dahası, masumdular ve herhangi bir öz bilinçleri yoktu. Ancak meyveyi yedikten sonra bakışları değişir ve çıplaklıklarının farklı bir şekilde farkına varırlar.

Son bölümde, Adam ve Eve'in bakışı ele alınmıştır. Adam'e cennetteki savaş anlatılır, gösterilmez. Ancak onun soyundan gelenlerin (insanlığın) geleceği ona Kitap 11'de gösterilir ve sinemadaki bir seyirci gibi aktif olarak insanlığın geleceğine bakar. Bu nedenle, Adam'ın bu özel sahnede bakışı oldukça sinematografiktir. Daha önceki kitaplarda, God Adam'a önemli konularda bilgilendirmek için Raphael'i gönderir. Ancak bu kitapta, Michael'i gönderir ve ondan Adam'a insanlığın geleceğini göstermesini ister. Adam'a insanlığın geleceği adeta bir film gibi sunulur. God, Adam'a kendisine karşı gelerek yasak meyveyi yedikleri için işlemiş oldukları bu suçtan gelecekte insanlığın ne gibi felaketlerle karşılaşacağını göstermek istemektedir. Sebebi ne olursa olsun, Adam görmüş olduğu insanlığın geleceğinden oldukça üzülür ve görmüş olduğu bir takım olaylar karşısında bir kaç kez göz yaşlarına hakim olamaz. Sonuç olarak, Adam'ın bu kitaptaki bakışı oldukça sinematografiktir ve Lacancı film teorisi bakışını incelememiz konusunda bizlere yardımcı olmaktadır.

Bu bölüm ayrıca, Lacan'ın "birincil narsisizmini" ile yakından ilişkili olan, 4. Kitapta Eve'in göldeki kendi yansımasını da inceler. Zimmerman'ın belirttiği gibi, Eve göldeki kendi yansımasını ilk bakışta fark etmez ancak bu yansıma onun bir nebze kendi

benliğini keşfetmesine yardımcı olur. Daha önemlisi, bu deneyim sayesinde Eve kendi kimliğini elde etmeye başlamış olur. Yine, Zimmerman Eve'in göldeki kendi yansımasına gözlerini dikmesinin Evi'in kimliği için çok olumlu bir psikolojik temel olduğunu vurgular. Eve göldeki görüntünün kendisinin bir yansıması olduğunu fark etmese de, Zimmerman'ın da belirttiği gibi fiziksel bir öz-bilinç geliştirmeye başlar. Bu deneyimin, Eve'in kim olduğunu anlaması için temel olduğunu söyler. Eve'in kendine bakışının kesinlikle Lacan'ın bakış kavramıyla açıklanabilecek türden bir bakış olduğunu söyleyebiliriz çünkü bu ayna deneyimi Eve'in benliğinin kazanılmasında büyük bir rol oynar. Tıpkı, ayna evresindeki bir bebek gibi, önce Eve yansımayı kendi benliğiyle karıştırır ve sonra yansıtıcı yüzeydeki görüntüden büyülenir. Kendi görüntüsüne olan bu yabancılaşma ve hayranlık, egosunun ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırlar. Bununla birlikte, Eve'in bir özne olarak bir şeye ya da kendine yabancılaşmadığı belirtilmelidir. Yani, bu yabancılaşma, Lacan'ın da belirttiği üzere egonun ortaya çıkışı için önemlidir. Eve, kendi yansımasına büyük bir beğeni ile bakarken, ilahi bir ses, onu kendisine bakarak oyalanmamasına dair uyarır çünkü Eve'i Adam beklemektedir. İlginç bir şekilde, ilahi ses tarafından emredilen Eve, narsisist bakışını "boş bir arzu" olarak tanımlar. Adam'ın yanına geldiğinde, onu gölde gördüğü yansıma (kendisi) kadar güzel ve çekici bulmaz. Akli hala göldeki yansımadadır ve neredeyse geri dönmek üzere Adam'dan uzaklaşmak ister. Ancak bu noktada Adam onu elinde yakalar ve aslında kendi bedeninden yaratıldığını, kendisinin bir parçası olduğunu söyler. Eve, Adam'ın elin tutmasının onun Adam ile kalmasına neden olduğunu söyler. Bu noktada, Eve'in Adam'a bakışıyla değil de fiziksel bir dokunmayla bağlı olduğunu anlamamızı sağlar çünkü Adam, Eve'in aksine bu sahnede daha çok bakışıyla hareket etmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, Milton'ın epik şiir Kayıp Cennet'deki bakış kavramının işleyişini Lovatt'ın epik bakış kavramı açısından incelemeye ve dört ana karakteri, yani Satan, God, Adam ve Eve'i, bakışla ilgili üç önemli yazarın (Sartre, Foucault ve Lacan) teorik anlayışlarından faydalananarak incelemeye çalışmıştır.

Bu tezin ikinci bölüm olan ilk analitik bölümü, Satan'ın Adam ve Eve'e birlikte ve sonra ayrı ayrı Eve'e baktığını ve bu bakışların şiirde çok farklı sunulduğunu ortaya çıkardı. Eve'e ayrı ayrı bakışının, bu bakma eylemlerinin en dikkate değer olduğu, daha kontrolcü ve yıkıcı bir bakış olduğu bulunmuştur. İlginçtir ki Satan, Adam'a bağımsız olarak bakmaz ve bununla ilgili olarak bazı olası nedenler sunulmuştur. Örneğin, Adam'ın güzelliğinin God karakterinin güzelliğinin bir yansıması olduğu dikkate alındığında, Satan bu sebeple Adam'a bakışını yöneltmek istememiş olabilir. Yine Satan'ın kendisinin de belirttiği gibi, Adam fiziksel olarak güçlüdür. Dahası, ona göre Eve Adam yokken daha savunmasızdır. Satan'ın cennetten kovulmuş diğer meleklerle ve iyi meleklerle bakışıyla onları aynalar gibi kullanmasına imkan sağlar ve Satan'ın da kendisine bakılan öteki olmasından kaynaklanan kaygısını ortaya çıkarır. Son olarak Satan'ın çocukları Sin ve Ölüm'e bakışı da incelenmiş ve bu bölümler, kendi günahlarının yarattığı fiziksel değişiklikleri reddetme girişimini gösterir.

Bir sonraki analitik bölüm, God'ın bakışının panoptik gücünü gösteren Foucault'un bakış kavramını kullanarak, bakışını ele alır. Tüm şiir boyunca, God daha güçlü ve derin bakışlarıyla hareket eder ve mutlak gözetimi, Satan'ı ve takipçilerini onunla doğrudan bir çatışmadan caydırır. Satan'ın aksine, tüm yaratılışın dayandığı God'ın bakışı olumlu ve tanımlayıcı olarak görülür. Sonuçta, her şeyin iyi olduğunu doğrulayan ve onaylayan, yaratılış sırasındaki bakışlarıdır. Şiirde tek otorite ve ilahi bakışın sahibi olarak, hiçbir şey onun bakışından kaçmamaktadır.

Son analitik bölüm olan dördüncü bölüm, God'ın Adam'a, tıpkı yaratılış sırasında her şeyi bakışıyla incelediği gibi, Cennet'i inceleme için panoptik bir bakış imkanı sunduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu sahnede Adam'a yalnızca bir kez panoptik bir bakış verilir. Sonra Adam, isteği üzerine yaratılan Eve'i rüyasında ilk kez görür. Eve, Adam tarafından bakılması gereken bir nesne olarak sunulur. Ancak, Eve Adam'ın bakışıyla erotik bir nesne ve öteki yapılmaz. Adam'ın insanlığın geleceğine bakışı, Lacancı film teorisinin fikirlerine uygun olan bakışın sinematografik yönünü gösterir. Ayrıca, bu tez, Lacan'ın ayna aşaması bize Eve'in kendisine bakışını incelemek için yardımcı olur çünkü bu aşama Eve'in birincil narsisizmidir. Son olarak, Lovatt kitabında kadın karakterlerin rüyasının epik şiirin kadın bakışlarına yaklaşımda yararlı olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Eve'in rüyasındaki bakışı da incelenmiştir.

Bu bulguların bir sonucu olarak bu çalışma , Lovat'ın epik bakış kavramının Milton'ın bu şiirde bakışı nasıl kullandığının incelenmesi için uygun bir başlangıç noktası olduğu, ancak kullanıldığı tüm farklı yolları kapsamadığı sonucuna varıyor. Bakışlarla ilgili fikirleri incelenen üç kuramcının tümü, Milton'ın bakışları kullanmasını anlamamıza katkıda bulunurken, bunların hepsi şiirdeki farklı bakışların tümü için uygun değildi. Lacan'ın Satan ve Eve'e yaklaşımda daha verimli olduğu görüldü. Sartre'ın Satan, Adam ve Eve karakterlerine bakarken daha verimli olduğu görülürken, Foucault özellikle God'ın ilahi bakışını incelerken yararlı olmuştur.

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