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OVERLAPPING INSTITUTIONS ON THE WAY
TO NON-HIERARCHY: EU-NATO RELATIONS
BETWEEN 1993-2016

A Master's Thesis

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To My Father and Mother



OVERLAPPING INSTITUTIONS ON THE WAY TO NON-
HIERARCHY: EU-NATO RELATIONS BETWEEN 1993-2016

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ABSTRACT

OVERLAPPING INSTITUTIONS ON THE WAY TO NON-HIERARCHY: EU-NATO RELATIONS BETWEEN 1993-2016

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This study aims to analyze the dynamics of cooperation and competition between the EU and NATO between 1993 and 2016. Specifically, this research evaluated the dynamics of cooperation and competition between the EU and NATO within the scope of functional overlapping and hierarchy, which are basic dimensions of the regime complex theory developed in the first ten years of the 21st century. The study shows that the EU and NATO jointly operate in the field of military crisis management policy. At the same time, the study argues that although there is a hierarchy in favour of NATO between the EU and NATO, this hierarchy has decreased over time. This thesis states that both cooperation and competition dynamics can be seen between the two organizations because the EU and NATO operate jointly in military crisis management policy area. However, based on the decreasing hierarchy between EU and NATO, this thesis argues that the relationship between the two organizations is on the way from cooperation to competition.

Keywords: Cooperation, Competition, Regime Complex Theory, Functional Overlapping, Hierarchy

ÖZET

KESİŞEN KURUMLAR HİYERARŞİDEN ARINMA YOLUNDA: 1993-2016 YILLARI ARASINDA AB-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ

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Bu çalışma 1993 ve 2016 yılları arasında AB ve NATO arasındaki iş birliği ve yarışma dinamiklerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. 21.yy'ın ilk 10 yılında geliştirilen rejim kompleks teorisinin temel boyutları olan işlevsel kesişme ve hiyerarşi kapsamında iki organizasyon arasındaki iş birliği ve yarışma dinamikleri değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışma AB ve NATO'nun ortak olarak askeri kriz yönetimi politika alanında faaliyet gösterdiğini göstermektedir. Aynı zamanda, çalışma da AB ve NATO arasında NATO'nun lehine hiyerarşi bulunmasına rağmen, bu hiyerarşinin zamanla azaldığını iddia edilmektedir. Tez de AB ve NATO'nun askeri kriz yönetimi politika alanında ortak olarak faaliyet göstermesine dayanılarak iki organizasyon arasında hem iş birliği hem de yarışma dinamiklerinin görülebileceği belirtilmiştir. Ancak çalışma iki organizasyon arasındaki hiyerarşinin azalan yönde hareket etmesine dayanarak iki organizasyon arasındaki ilişkinin iş birliğinden yarışmaya geçiş yolunda olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İş birliği, Yarışma, Rejim Kompleks Teorisi, İşlevsel kesişme, Hiyerarşi

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1Puzzle and Research Question

With the emergence of the EU's role in the context of security and defence policies, especially since the first years of the 21st century, it has been a matter of curiosity how their relations with NATO will be. This curiosity has led to increase in the discussions on the dynamics of this relationship in the literature and to see different approaches. Especially in the process, with every step that the EU takes in security and defense, these discussions in the literature, media and public sphere have further inflamed. In general, these discussions focused on the dynamics of cooperation and competition between the two organizations; while one side argues that the relationship between the two actors developed within the framework of cooperation, the other side states that the actors competed with each other in the field of security and defence. Indeed, since the relations between the EU and NATO contain a wide range of dynamics, the scholars can evaluate the EU-NATO relations with different dynamics and dimensions, and they can reach different conclusions about the nature of the relationship between the two organizations. Based on these discussions in the literature, in this study, my research question will be is the relationship between the EU and NATO is competition, cooperation or both between 1993 and 2016? Since 1993 is the year the EU was officially established and 2016 is the year that UK voted to leave the EU and Trump was elected as the USA president, these two years were chosen as the research years within the scope of this study.

1.2Argument

In the literature, most of the studies explain the EU-NATO relations both with cooperation and competition dynamics. Based on these arguments in the literature regarding EU-NATO relations, first, I answered this question with the hypothesis

that the relationship between two organizations involves both cooperation and competition dynamics. Afterwards, when I look at the studies in the literature, there are five theories that explain EU-NATO relations. These theories are principal agent theory, resource dependency theory, strategic partnership, practice approach or practice turn, and regime complex theory (Koops, 2017). Indeed, regime complex theory can explain the dimensions explained by other theories with its unique concepts. Furthermore, compared to other approaches, unlike the other theories, regime complex theory evaluates the relations between two organizations in terms of both cooperation and competition dynamics. Therefore, in this study, I apply the regime complex theory to answer my research question. More specifically, regime complex theory is developed to explain the systemic effects of the relationship that functionally overlapping institutions enter in a non-hierarchical way. That is to say, functional overlap and non-hierarchy are the basic dimensions of regime complex theory (Alter & Raustiala, 2018). Depending upon these basic dimensions, arguments concerning inter-organizational cooperation and competition are developed. In this context, arguments developed within the scope of regime complex theory generally contend that due to the functional overlap between the international institutions, both competition and cooperation dynamics can be seen in the relationship (Gehring & Faude, 2014; Faude & Parizek, 2020). However, depending on hierarchy level between the actors involved in the relationship, whether the relationship is more inclined to cooperation or competition may change. While high-level hierarchy between international institutions in regime complexes leads the relationship to tend to be more cooperative, low-level hierarchy between international institutions in regime complexes leads relationship between institutions to tend to be more competitive (Henning & Pratt, 2020). Based on these arguments in regime complex literature, I came up with three more specific narrowed sub-hypothesis besides the main hypothesis I posed above. These are:

H₁: If there is no functional overlap between institutions, there will be no competition, irrespective of the hierarchy relations between institutions, cooperation is still possible between international institutions.

H₂: If there is a functional overlap and a high-level hierarchy between international institutions, their relationship tends to be more cooperative.

H₃: If there is a functional overlap and low hierarchy level between international institutions, their relationship tends to be more competitive.

Indeed, within the framework of these hypotheses, to understand whether the relationship between EU and NATO is competition, cooperation or both of them between 1993 and 2016, I look at whether there is a functional overlap between EU and NATO or not and how the hierarchy relation between these two institutions is. Besides the functional overlap, most of the literature arguments regarding regime complexes contend that institutions should also have joint members to see the systemic impacts of regime complex, which are competition and cooperation (Haftel & Lenz, 2021). Based on these arguments, even though it is an explicit fact that the EU and NATO have joint members, I look at the joint members that the two organizations have in different periods in detail.

Firstly, looking at the documents and operations published and organized by the two organizations from the post-Cold War period to 2016, it can be said that the two organizations operate or functionally overlap in the field of military crisis management policy competency (Fahron-Hussey, 2018). In other words, there is a functional overlap between the two institutions and, so both cooperation and competition dynamics can be seen in the relationship. Therefore, we can eliminate first hypothesis. After realizing that these two institutions overlapping functionally, I look at the hierarchy between the two organizations to see if the relationship between the two organizations tends to be more cooperative or competitive. Although the concept of hierarchy is generally used within the scope of domestic policy dynamics, it is also used in the context of relations between actors operating in the international system. Although there are different approaches in the literature to explain the hierarchy relationship between the international actors, David Lake's (2009) approach to the hierarchy relationship between states is more framed and more straightforward than other arguments in the literature. Therefore, I adopt Lake's hierarchy approach to evaluate the hierarchy relation between the EU and NATO. Even though Lake employs his hierarchy concept to explain the hierarchy relation between states, I apply Lake's hierarchy concept to explain the hierarchy relation between the EU and NATO. Given that states and international organizations can be considered unitary actors in the international system, the hierarchy approach of Lake can be applied to relations between the EU and NATO.

Lake (2009) defines the concept of hierarchy as “the extent of authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled”, and concerning authority, he says that even though authority is also a type of power, this power differs from other types of power in terms of being legitimate (pp. 9-24). In other words, he states that authority is the power that has legitimacy. More specifically, in the relationship between two actors in the international system, the more powerful actor must also be legitimate to be an authority over the less powerful actor (Lake, 2009, p. 21). Furthermore, the literature’s discussions within the scope of power are generally divided into two as power as resources and power as outcome (Beckley, 2018). In addition, for legitimacy, Lake says that in the modern world, the source of legitimacy is the consent of less powerful actors to the right of more powerful actor or actors to make regulation upon themselves (p. 28-40). That is, in the relationship, if a more powerful actor is able to gain the consent of less powerful actor to make regulation upon itself, this actor can be authority upon the less powerful actor.

Further, in the international system, the consent of the less powerful actor to the authority of more powerful actor is determined by looking at the public opinion within the borders of this actor, the expressions used by a less powerful actor in the context of political communication or by looking at the behaviours he exhibits (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Overall, authority consists of power and legitimacy. While power is evaluated in terms of resources an actor has or outcomes it gets in the international system, consent of less powerful actor or actors can be assessed by looking at the public opinion, political communication and political behaviour of the less powerful actor or actors.

In this context, first, I compare the EU and the NATO in terms of their military and economic resources within the scope of power as resources. Since military power is the first line of defence and economic power is the foundation of military power, I compare the two organizations in terms of military and economic resources (Tellis, Bially, Layne, & McPherson, 2000, p. 47; Carr, 1946). Indeed, to get a comprehensive grasp of organizations’ military power, I look at the military spending of two organizations in the years I arranged based on enlargement periods of organizations. Further, to compare the economic power of these two organizations as did in military power, I look at the organizations’ GDPs in specified years. Since the GDP is one of the most fundamental metrics of economic power, I look at the

total GDPs of member states in the years arranged according to enlargement periods of organizations (Lepenies, 2016). Besides these, in most of the literature, the population of the actor in the international system is expressed as one of the sources that show both the military and economic power of the country (Treverton & Jones, 2005; Tellis et al., 2000). More specifically, since the population contributes to the size of armed forces and production, it is accepted as one of the military and economic power sources. Therefore, in the context of military and economic power, I also look at the institutions' populations in years arranged based on enlargement periods of these organizations. When I compare the two institutions according to their members' total military expenditures, total GDPs and total population in specified years, which I have separated according to their enlargement processes of these two institutions, NATO has a comparative advantage upon the EU in all of these three metrics. This shows that NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of power as resources.

Secondly, I evaluated the power relationship between the two organizations within the framework of power as the outcome, which is the other approach in the literature about the power relationship between actors. According to this approach, even though an actor in relations is less powerful in terms of the resources, this less powerful actor can diffuse or reduce the more powerful actor's power with the policies and strategies it follows in line with its preference or desired result (Beckley, 2018; Mack, 1975, pp. 175-200). Based on this approach, when I look at the EU's documents, the EU occasionally states its autonomy goal in the security and defense realm. Specifically, in the strategy document published in 2016, it explicitly expresses this autonomy goal within the framework of strategic autonomy (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). More specifically, with the idea of strategic autonomy, the EU shows its willingness to decrease its dependence on NATO and respond to internal and external threats with its capacity and capabilities. In this context, taking strategic autonomy as the desired end of the EU, the EU is reducing NATO's authority upon itself with each step it takes within the scope of strategic autonomy. In other words, the EU diffuses the power that NATO upon itself in the context of power as resources, with each step it takes within the scope of capacity and capability development within the scope of power as the outcome. That is to say, even though NATO is more powerful than the EU in the context of power

as resources, the EU has reduced/diffused the power that NATO has upon itself within the scope of power as the outcome.

For legitimacy, it refers to “the right to rule”, and this right stems from the consent in the international system as well. More specifically, in the relationship, the stronger actor has to obtain the less powerful actor’s consent to be the authority in the relationship (Lake, 2019). Based on this approach, to understand whether the EU has consent to NATO or not, I look at the EU’s consent in two ways. First of all, in the context of public opinion, I look at the survey results conducted in the three most powerful EU countries in terms of resources: the UK, France and Germany. In the survey, respondents are asked whether they support NATO or not, and more than half of the respondents answered yes to this question in these three countries (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). Based on this survey, it can be said that the EU has consented to NATO’s authority within the scope of public opinion. However, looking at public opinion is not the only way to conclude the consent of an actor. As stated, besides the public opinion, inferences can be made concerning the consent of less powerful actor or actors by looking at the expressions used and behaviours exhibited by the less powerful actor (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). In this context, since I look at the EU’s behaviours to show that EU diffuse/reduce the power of NATO in the context of power as the outcome, I don’t look again at behaviours of EU to make inference to EU’s consent to NATO’s authority. Therefore, besides the public opinion, I evaluate the EU’s consent to NATO’s authority within the scope of political communication. To understand how the EU’s consent to NATO’s authority changed over time in the context of political communication, I compare the content of joint declarations published by EU and NATO in 2002 and 2016 and EU’s security strategy documents published in 2003 and 2016. As a result of the comparison, I see that the EU accepts NATO’s authority upon itself much more in 2002 and 2003 compared to 2016. In other words, EU consents to NATO’s authority upon itself is less in 2016 than in 2002 and 2003. Based on this, it can be said that NATO’s legitimacy upon the EU has been decreasing.

Overall, NATO is more powerful than the EU in the context of power as resources. However, the EU diffuses/reduces this power in the context of power as outcomes. In addition, with respect to legitimacy, the EU consents to NATO’s authority in public opinion. However, it is seen that the EU’s consent to NATO’s authority is less in

2016 than in 2002-2003 in political communication. Considering that authority is consisted of power and legitimacy based on the Lake's definition, when we combine those who are in the same direction, results are as follows: NATO is more powerful than the EU in the context of power as resources and the EU has consented to NATO's power in the context of public opinion. Therefore, it can be said that NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion.

Furthermore, NATO's power upon the EU is decreasing in the context of power as the outcome and EU's consent to NATO's authority is decreasing in political communication. Therefore, it can be said that NATO's authority upon the EU is decreasing within the framework of power as the outcome and political communication. In brief, it can be said that even though NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion, NATO's authority upon the EU is decreasing within the framework of power as the outcome and political communication. By taking Lake's definition of hierarchy "the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled" (p. 9) and the authority framework that I expressed above into account, it can be said that although there is a hierarchy between NATO and EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy moves in a descending (decreasing) direction.

In sum, there is a functional overlap between the EU and NATO in the military crisis management policy competency. Moreover, concerning hierarchy, even though there is a hierarchy between NATO and the EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy is decreasing. Based on this conclusion, by taking the sub-hypotheses that I come up with in the context of arguments in the regime complex literature about competition and cooperation into account; as a result, I contend that relationship between EU and NATO is on the way of shifting from cooperation to competition.

1.3 Contribution and Importance

Studies that explain EU-NATO relations with the regime complex theory have generally focused on the functional overlap between these two institutions and the systemic impacts of this functional overlap. However, there are not many studies in the literature evaluating the relations between two organizations within the scope of the hierarchy concept, which is another essential dimension of regime complex

theory. Therefore, I make an original contribution to the literature by examining the relationship between two organizations within the framework of hierarchy.

Considering the studies in the literature evaluating the relations between two organizations within the framework of cooperation and competition dynamics, this study is also significant because it contributes to the discussions in this context in a theoretical sense.

1.4 Research Design and Methodology

In this study, I come to a conclusion about EU-NATO relations based on the functional overlap and hierarchy dimensions, which are the basic dimensions of regime complex theory. Therefore, in this study, my independent variables are functional overlap and hierarchy and, my dependent variable is the relationship between EU and NATO. In my research chapters, I look at the functional overlap and hierarchy relation between two institutions. Basically, in the overlap chapter, I categorize the documents based on their type like the founding treaties, revising treaties, strategy documents, factsheets, websites and then analyze each data to understand whether there is a functional overlap between two institutions in the process. In addition to that, I use the websites and secondary sources to explain to membership overlap between these two institutions. In the hierarchy chapter, I divided the research period between 1993 and 2016 into four years as 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, considering the enlargement process of two organizations, and then I apply World Bank (WB) Database to take data concerning countries' GDPs, military spending and populations in these specified years. I extracted the total GDP, total military expenditure, and total populations of the EU and NATO member states in the specified years from data I downloaded. Then, I compared the total GDP, the total military expenditure and the total population of the two organizations in the specified years based on this data to understand which organization is more powerful than in terms of power as resources.

Afterwards, in the context of public opinion, to make inference about the rate of public support for NATO in the EU, I benefit from the survey results conducted by the Pew Research Center about the support rate for NATO in UK, France and Germany (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). Indeed, I look at the survey results in these three countries because they are the three countries with the most GDP, the most military

spending and the most population in the EU. I look at the survey results in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2015 since the data for the years before 2010 could not be reached appropriately reached and the research ended in 2016. Also, data is not available for 2014. The survey is conducted with 1503 unweighted samples size in the countries stated, and the participants were asked whether they support NATO or not (Fagan & Poushter, 2020).

In the second section of hierarchy chapter, to show that the EU increases its power in the context of power as outcome and decreases the power of NATO upon itself, I use documents that the EU published and secondary sources about the EU's capacity and capability development moves. Furthermore, to make inference about how the EU's consent to NATO's authority has changed over time within the framework of political communication, I compare the content of joint declarations published by these two organizations in 2002 and 2016 and security strategy documents published by the EU in 2003 and 2016.

1.5 Overview of the Study and Chapters

In Chapter 2, I will first give definitional and historical information about the relations between international organizations and share the theories most frequently used in the literature when explaining the relations between the EU and NATO. Besides, I will also share the conceptual and theoretical arguments in the literature on the concept of the strategic partnership due to its frequent use in the literature as defining the EU-NATO relations. Afterwards, in the same section, I will show how the relations between the EU and NATO are examined in the literature and how the relationship between EU and NATO is conceptualized and theorized within the scope of these examined dimensions in the literature. In addition, I compared the theories explaining the EU and NATO relations in the literature under the title of theory selection.

In Chapter 3, I will share the arguments in the literature upon the regime complex theory, which I chose to explain relations between EU and NATO. In this chapter, I share information upon theory's background, the concepts that theory contain, the approaches within the theory, and the use of the theory in the literature. At the end of the chapter, I will share the information on the general research frame and proceed in the next two research chapters.

In Chapter 4, I examine the relations between the EU and NATO within the scope of the membership and functional overlapping dimensions in the context of overlapping, one of the most basic dimensions of the regime complex theory. In addition, I will share the data on the operations conducted by the two organizations in the form of a table under a separate title.

In Chapter 5, I examine the EU-NATO relations in the context of hierarchy. Since the concept of the hierarchy includes within itself concepts such as authority, power and legitimacy, I examine the relationship between the two organizations within the scope of these concepts in this section in a way stated inside the chapter.



CHAPTER 2: RIVAL THEORIES AND EU-NATO RELATIONS IN THE LITERATURE

The EU and NATO interact as two international organizations, and the relations between the two organizations are generally evaluated within the scope of inter-organizational relations (IORs) in the literature. In this context, in this section, first of all, background information about the concept of IORs will be shared. Then, brief information concerning IORs theories that are used to explain EU-NATO relations will be shared. Afterwards, in this section, basic literature will be shared about the strategic partnership, which is another conceptual and theoretical framework used to explain the EU-NATO relations in the literature. Later on, literature regarding EU-NATO relations will be touched upon. While looking at the literature on the relations between the EU and NATO, I focus on how the studies in the literature evaluate the relations between the two organizations and how they conceptualize and theorize the relations between the two organizations within the scope of these dimensions.

2.1 Inter-Organizational Relations (IORs)

2.1.1 History and Conceptual Development

Although the traces of the concept of inter-organizational relations (IORs) in the discipline of International Relations (IR) date back to 1919s, the foundation year of the League of Nations and its associate organizations, theoretical and empirical studies upon the concept of IORs in IR started in the Cold War period and increased after especially 2000s (Biermann and Koops, 2017). Indeed, the first systemic studies on the concept of IORs in the literature were carried out in the 1960s in management, economics and sociology disciplines. Then, these studies were adapted to IR and Political Science (PS) literature by the studies of Kenneth Hanf and Fritz Scharpf

(1978), Leon Gordenker and Paul Saunders (1978), Cox and Jacobson (1973), Karen A. Mingst (1987) and Christer Jönson (1986, 1987, 1993).

Concerning conceptualization of IORs, it is generally defined in almost all disciplines in its simplest form as the relationship between two or more organizations (Cropper, Huxham, Ebers, & Ring, 2009). Furthermore, Bierman (2011) defines the IORs as the interactions between two or more international organizations (IOs) in the same or close geographic space upon overlapping functional realms. He then says that interaction can be formal or informal, direct or indirect, dyad or triad, horizontal or vertical in any issue area (p.173). According to him, the concept of IORs encompasses the relationships that occur among (1) units of an international or national organization, (2) different governmental departments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in a country (3) different state and non-state actors (NSA) in transnational space (4) internationalist and locals within a country (p. 175). Moreover, the absence of authority that regulates the relationship among organizations and lack of hierarchy in IORs are features that are peculiar to IORs (Biermann & Koops, 2017).

Different concepts are used in the literature to refer to relationship between international organizations. Some of these concepts are inter-locking institutions, mutually reinforcing institutions, effective multilateralism, partnership, inter-agency relations, alliances or joint ventures, network or networks, regime complexes so on and so forth (Biermann & Koops, 2017). Moreover, studies within the scope of IORs in IR literature have been developed within the framework of cooperation and competition. Other terms upon IORs generally have been conceptualized within the framework of these two concepts.

2.1.2 Theories upon IORs and EU-NATO Relations

Even though there are many theories in the literature to explain and conceptualize IORs, the number of theories developed in the discipline of IR solely to explain and describe the IORs is very limited. Indeed, many theories that explain and describe the IORs in IR discipline have been developed in management, economics, administration, sociology, and then these theories have been adapted to IR (Biermann & Koops, 2017, pp. 2-3). In this case, it can be said that theories regarding IORs in IR have an interdisciplinary dimension. Moreover, while some of the theories upon

IORs in the literature are sociological institutionalism, regime complexes, resource dependence theory, principal agent theory, contingency theory, transaction cost theory, sociological neo-institutionalism, organizational ecology theory, network theory, organizational theory, bureaucratic politics approach, classical pragmatism, Luhmann's Systems Theory, nested institutions approach, the most of the theoretical arguments used to explain IORs in IR are generally gathered around sociological neo-institutionalism, resource dependence theory, regime complexes, networks based theories, principal agent theory and practice turn or practice approach theory (Franke, 2017). More specifically, in literature, there are five theories that explain the EU-NATO relations. While four of them are developed in the context of IORs, one of them is the general conceptual approach in IR literature. These theories, as stated above, are principal agent theory, resource dependency theory, practice approach or practice turn, regime complex theory and strategic partnership (Koops, 2017).

2.1.2.1 Principal-Agent (P-A) Theory

The basis of P-A is built upon Ross's work on agency in the economic realm, and studies within the scope of this theory in the literature are more common after the 1980s (Mitnick, 2006). Ross's work is developed based on the idea that the leading actor (principal) delegating authority to another actor (agent) to achieve specific goals. P-A theory began to be used in the context of IRs and IORs in 2006, when Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney (2006) adapted the framework of the theory to IORs. Indeed, it is possible to come across many studies in the literature examining the EU's negotiations within the framework of the P-A theory (Fahron-Hussey, 2018). The P-A theory is basically expressed as an actor's delegation of function, duty, and authority to another actor to achieve its goals. Hawkins et al. define delegation as "a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by the principle". In the context of the IR and IORs, states delegate functions, tasks, and authority to IOs in some cases to achieve their goals in the international system. Within the scope of P-A, the principal and agent enter into a relationship through a formal or informal contract. These contracts usually determine the limits of the authority delegated to the agents. Indeed, one of the most important reasons for states' delegation of authority and tasks to

international organizations is that these international organizations have the resources and knowledge to achieve the goals that states want to achieve. At the same time, states reduce the transaction costs to acquire some outcomes in the international system by delegating authority to international organizations. In sum, in the international system, states delegate authority to IOs to achieve their goals in the international system. This relationship is called as principal agent theory in the literature.

2.1.2.2 Resource Dependency Theory (RDT)

The first traces of RDT have been seen in sociology, social psychology, anthropology and management literature. It is argued in the literature that RDT is built upon the Social Exchange Theory (SET) developed by Levine and White in 1961, Emerson in 1962 and 1964 and Blau in 1964 (Biermann & Koops, 2017, p. 136). SET has been used to explain IORs since the 1970s, and then as explaining the IORs, it was conceptualized as a Resource Dependence Theory (RDT). Indeed, Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik conceptualize the RDT in their book *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*, and since then, RDT has been used more frequently as explaining IORs (Davis & Cobb, 2010). Mizruchi and Yoo (2005) say that “Pfeffer and Salancik’s resource dependence model is a macro-level version of social exchange theory, in which an organization’s power in an interorganizational relation is a function of the degree to which other organizations depend on it for valued resources” (p. 616). Furthermore, RDT as a theory that conceptualizes the organizations as open-systems is developed on the premise that organizations operate in an insecure environment with limited resources to achieve their goals and interact with other organizations to provide the tangible and intangible resources they need to achieve their goals (Biermann & Harsch, 2017). More specifically, the level of dependence of organization-X on organization-Y in terms of resources depends on the importance of these resources for the organization-X and the availability of alternative actors in the environment from which the organization-X can provide them (Cook, 1977, pp. 66-67). However, relations built upon unilateral dependence or imbalanced interdependence creates the risk of losing the autonomy of organizations (Biermann & Harsch, 2017, pp. 138-143). For this reason, organizations should develop their relations regarding resource

exchange with other organizations based on the symmetric relationship and balanced interdependence (Davis & Cobb, 2010, p. 24). Besides, RDT is often used empirically to explain the IORs established in security and economic development. For example, the relations between NATO and UN in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan can be evaluated within resource dependence theory. While NATO provides tangible hard security resources to UN in these regions, the UN provides intangible soft security resources such as providing legitimacy to NATO in these regions (Franke, 2017). In brief, an organization may need the resources of another organization to achieve its goals and might enter into relations with another organization to have access to these resources. Yet, organizations ought to be careful about protecting their autonomy as they get into relations with another organization based on resource exchange.

2.1.2.3 Practice Approach

Moreover, another theory used to explain the relations between IOs is practice theory. Indeed, the concept is developed within the framework of philosophy, anthropology and sociology, and later it began to be applied to explain the relations between IOs. Practice theory, which started to be developed in the last years of the 1990s, was brought into IR by Schatzki, Cetina and Savigny in 2001. The practice approach explains the relations between IOs by taking into account the interactions of organizations with each other in the field mostly without relying on a formal basis. In general, it is used to examine organizations' relations when official contacts between organizations are blocked (Graeger, 2016, 2017). Indeed, to conclude the relationship between the organizations within the scope of practice theory, interactions should generally be informal. At the same time, these informal contacts should be constant or sustainable. Indeed, by looking at these informal interactions, which are repeated on informal and daily basis, interpretations can be made about the nature of the relationship between organizations.

2.2 Strategic Partnership

The concept of strategic partnership as a term that passed into the discipline of IR from management and economics disciplines has started to be used in IR literature after the 1990s to describe the bilateral relations of the USA with other countries.

Afterwards, the use of the concept has gradually increased. It was used in the literature not only to define the USA's relations with other countries but also to define the relations between two actors. Despite the increasing use of the term in the literature, there is no agreed definition of strategic partnership. However, there are some issues that are common to most of the literature and form the basis of the concept of strategic partnership. Furthermore, although the discussion in the literature are mostly made on the concept of 'strategic partnership', there are terms used interchangeably with the concept of strategic partnership. These concepts are strategic alliance, strategic cooperation, close partnership, special relations/particular relations (Czechowska, 2013).

Moreover, Lessa (2010) defines the strategic partnership as "priority political and economic relations, reciprocally compensating, established on the basis of an accumulation of bilateral relations of a universal nature" in his study, which deals with Brazil's bilateral relations with other countries between 2003 and 2010 (p. 199). Moreover, Michalski and Zhongqi (2017) argue in their book addressing the China and EU relations within the framework of strategic partnership that strategic partnership is a special type of relationship established by actors based on bilateral relations to achieve their foreign policy goals. At the same time, they say that the parties in the relationship may be equal or unequal, friend or competitor, geographically close or distant and norms, interests, identity and nature of the relationship are constructed through the interaction process of actors. Furthermore, Kay (2000) says that the concept of strategic partnership gained popularity after the end of the cold war, as a result of bilateral talks where the US and Russia discussed how to manage European security. Contrary to Michalski and Zhongqi, Kay states that a relationship based on strategic partnership does not have constructivist features, but is established by considering power elements. However, Kay, Michalski and Zhongqi agree that strategic partnership is a tool that powerful states use to increase their political, economic and military influence in the international system. Especially, Kay emphasizes that due to the unclear nature of the concept, American policymakers have preferred to use it frequently to maintain its international hegemony. On the other hand, Kay also adds that states can also use strategic partnership within the framework of cooperation to balance the hegemonic power. Moreover, Holslag (2010), in his study evaluating the relations between the EU and

China within the framework of strategic partnership, states that there are some conditions to consider a relationship as a strategic partnership. According to him, for the relationship to be considered a strategic partnership, it is necessary for the parties to come together around economic, political and military interests and expectations for a long time, and it should not be possible to achieve globally determined goals without a strategic partnership. Furthermore, Grevi (2010) evaluates the bilateral relations of the EU with China, Russia, Japan, Canada, India, and the USA. Then he states that the strategic partnership is a kind of cooperation that actors established based on mutual interests and common goals in political, military and economic field. In another study, Wilkins (2008) analyses the relations between Russia and China within the framework of strategic partnership. Wilkins also says that strategic partnership has been adapted from management studies to the IR discipline. According to Wilkins, strategic partnership is a type of relationship that is organized around a general-purpose rather than a specific task, such as intimidating or fighting against a hostile state and “tend to be informal and entail low commitment cost...” (p. 361).

Although there are different approaches to the concept of strategic partnership in the literature, as seen above, there are common points on the term in most of the literature. A large part of the literature agrees that the concept started to be used extensively in the IR discipline in the post-cold war era. At the same time, the literature has a common view that the concept is not very clear and has different definitions in the literature. Concerning principles that strategic partnership should have, a large part of the literature particularly agrees that strategic partnership is established based on bilateral relations, a common goal, mutual interests, shared values, and long-term cooperation. In short, despite the different approaches to the concept of strategic partnership in the literature, there are the above-mentioned points that most of the literature agree on.

2.3 Dimensions, Concepts, and Theories in EU-NATO Relations

Unlike inter-state relations, IORs can be analyzed within the scope of more aspects and dimensions. In this context, studies reach a conclusion about the relationship within the scope of the dimension or dimensions in which they evaluate the IORs. Therefore, this section looks at the aspects within which EU and NATO relations are

analyzed and how the relationship between two organizations is conceptualized and theorized in the context of these aspects and dimensions. Looking at the aspects and dimensions within which the relations between the two organizations are evaluated and theories and conceptual approaches in the context of these dimensions will give clues about the dynamics of cooperation and competition between the two organizations. At the same time, looking at all these enable us to see the different dynamics in the relations between the two organizations.

First of all, studies that evaluate the relations between two organizations within the framework of cooperation dynamics draw attention in the literature. In this context, Kirchner (2012) argues that given the fact that NATO has previously been in the areas where the EU conduct operations and has gained experience, EU needs to cooperate with NATO and benefit from the NATO's experience in the regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (p. 38). In line with Kircher argument, Ghez and Larrabee (2009) analyze the relations between France and NATO within the framework of 2009 France's re-entry process into NATO's integrated military command structure (NIMCS). They argue that the EU has the post-operation stabilization and reconstruction capabilities that NATO does not have in crisis management operations; therefore, cooperation and division of labor between EU and NATO are necessary to conduct effective crisis management operations. In addition to that, they state that the re-entry of France into NIMCS again would reduce the possibility of competition and rivalry between the EU and NATO (p. 87).

Similar to arguments made by Ghez and Larrabee, Cizel and Hlatky (2014) explain the EU-NATO relations in their articles analyzing the relations between France and NATO with the concept of "coexistence". They argue that NATO is still the main actor responsible for "transatlantic defence" and that the EU has completed NATO's capabilities with its competencies in the crisis management realm. They emphasize that the nature of EU-NATO relations is "complementary" rather than "competition" (p. 357). Moreover, in another study, Biscop (2018) emphasizes the different character of EU and NATO in operational domain. He then says that even though most of the studies in literature define the relationship between EU and NATO as "beauty contest", there can be "division of labor" between these two organizations in the fields of security and defense in terms of strategy, operation and capacity (p. 85). Furthermore, Demetriou (2016) assesses the relations between EU and NATO by

paying attention to divergent political perspectives of two organizations; civilian and military capabilities of two organizations; American perspectives upon NATO-EU relations; Russia's recent expansionist policies in Crimea and Ukraine; EU's quest for autonomy; and NATO's supremacy over CFSP. Even though Demetriou, in his article examining the relations between EU and NATO, could not fully conceptualize and theorize the EU and NATO relations, he applies the concept of "strategic partnership" to EU-NATO relations (pp. 3-11). Moreover, Schleich (2014) defines the relations between the EU and NATO in three different ways in three different periods. While she uses the phrase "interlocking institutions" to describe the EU-NATO relations during Phase 1 (1992-1998), she uses the subtitle of "rapprochement and coalition building" to express the EU-NATO relations during Phase 2 (1998-2003). She then states that EU-NATO relations started to be institutionalized with the Berlin Plus Agreement signed between these two organizations in 2003; therefore, she conceptualizes the EU-NATO relations for Phase 3 (post 2003 period) as "interlocking institutions" and "division of labor". Besides, she argues that even though the symbolic and rhetorical impacts of institutional representatives of EU and NATO on the development process of EU-NATO relations could not be underestimated, states are the main actors that affect and manage the relations between EU and NATO. In this context, she applies rational institutionalism and principal agent theory to explain the EU-NATO relations (pp. 182-200). Similar to arguments made by Schleich (2014), Fahren-Hussey (2018) also analyses the EU and NATO relations within the scope of principal agent theory in the context of military crisis management operations organized by NATO in Libya in 2011, in Cad/CAR by the EU in 2007, and separately in the Horn of Africa in 2008 by the two organizations.

Moreover, in the context of cooperation arguments, Schreer (2019) argues that the Trump administration's skeptic attitude towards transatlantic relations and Macron's remarks upon the need for a more autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) independent of NATO and USA could be considered threats to transatlantic relations. In this context, Schreer evaluates EU and NATO relations within the framework of Trump's presidency and states that despite Trump's threatening rhetoric on transatlantic relations, empirical findings show that EU-NATO relations will continue as "strong" as in the past (pp. 11-15). In short, although the studies

evaluating the relations between the EU and NATO within the framework of cooperation dynamics accept that there are situations that negatively affect the relations between the two organizations, they draw attention to the need for cooperation between the EU and NATO. They then state that the relations between the two organizations continue within the framework of cooperation.

In addition to studies explaining the EU-NATO relations within the scope of cooperation dynamics, there are also studies explaining the relations between the two organizations within the scope of both cooperation and competition dynamics. In this regard, Simon (2019) evaluates the EU-NATO relations in the context of great power competition. He lists situations that may pose challenge to EU-NATO relations as EU's confinement of its policies and capabilities in the field of security and defense within the boundaries of external crisis management operations ; lack of connection between EU's policies (The Capability Development Plan, The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and Permanent Structured Cooperation) in the field of defense industry and transatlantic relations; and emergence of Russia and China as revisionist powers. He uses the phrase "a mix of competition and cooperation" to refer to the nature of EU-NATO relations. In another study, Duke (2008) evaluates the EU-NATO relations by taking differentiating approaches of Berlin, Paris, London and Washington towards EU and NATO; limited sources of two organizations to operate and risk of competition upon resources; and negative impact of problematic relations between non-EU NATO member Turkey and Non-NATO EU member Southern Cyprus upon EU-NATO relations. He then adds that if these problems are solved, the relations between the two organizations can evolve from "irrelevance through competition" to "mutual relevance by cooperation" (p. 42).

Furthermore, Hofmann (2009) evaluates the EU and NATO relations in terms of the overlapping in membership, mandate and resources; the chessboard politics of member states; and competition and division of labour between these two organizations. He argues that the relationship between the EU and NATO cannot be classified either as cooperation nor competition and adds that both dynamics can be seen in the EU-NATO relationship. In this context, Hofmann has defined the relations between the EU and NATO as an "international regime complex" (pp. 45-52). Within the scope of regime complex theory, she argues that states that are members of only one of the international institutions may set conditions in line with

their own interests for the advancement of relations between the organizations in the relationship. She conceptualizes this situation as “hostage taking”. Further, within the context of EU-NATO relations, she states that Turkey as a member of the NATO but EU and Southern Cyprus as a member of EU but NATO prevent the progress of relations between EU and NATO. Due to bilateral problems between them, they stall the development of relations between the EU and NATO through using their veto power in their institutions. Secondly, she argues that some joint members of institutions make one institution, where they can achieve their interests more efficiently; see themselves closer and have more influence, stronger and more autonomous than the other organizations in the relationship. As a result of the efforts of some members of institutions to bring the organization or institution that they have more influence into the forefront, the institutions in relationship compete with each other over the scope of functions they have and the geographies they operate. Hofmann conceptualizes this situation as a “turf battle”. Indeed, in the case of EU and NATO relations, she argues that while France wants to expand the functions of CFSP and reduce its dependency to NATO, the USA wants to expand NATO’s function into civilian crisis-management operations, which are the fields of the EU activity. As a result of these efforts of members states, the EU and NATO may compete with each other over the functions, geography and resources.

In the literature, there are also arguments developed about situations that prevent the healthy progress of cooperation dynamics between the two organizations. In this context, Smith and Gebhard (2017) argue that political deadlock between non-EU NATO member Turkey and non-NATO EU member Southern Cyprus, called participation problem; Trump’s questioning attitude towards liberal common institutions; unpredictable nature of USA foreign policy with Trump presidency; and institutional, political, budgetary and capability related complications created by 2016 Brexit referendum have negative impacts on relations between EU and NATO. They conceptualize the impact of the problematic relationship between Turkey and Southern Cyprus upon EU-NATO relations as “participation problem” (p. 305). Indeed, the negative impact of the bilateral problems between Turkey and Southern Cyprus upon the cooperation dynamics between the EU and NATO is one of the most common arguments in the literature. In addition to that, Oglesby (2014) evaluates Germany’s role in post-Cold War NATO operations in the Balkans,

Afghanistan and Libya, Germany's approach to NATO and EU CSDP within the framework of domestic policy dynamics Germany. He contends that even though these two organizations are working in complementary way within the framework of "strategic partnership", "NATO-EU relations have been awkward since the end of Cold War" due to "lack of clearly defined common strategic vision" and lack of cooperation and coordination mechanism (p. 45). In this context, Duke and Ojenen (2006) say that, even though EU can be considered as an actor responsible for civil protection, conflict prevention and peace-building along with the other actors such as NATO, the OSCE or the UN, its role in the context of security and defense is not so clear. Moreover, in the context of these arguments, Salmon (2005) claims that during the first years of the twenty-first century, the EU failed to act cohesively and coherently in international fields and failed to act as a global actor.

In the literature, there are also studies stating that bilateral problems between Turkey and Southern Cyprus prevent the progress of EU and NATO relations on the official ground, so they apply the practice approach or practice approach theory to explain the EU and NATO relations. In this context, Gebral and Smith (2014) explain the relations between EU-NATO by looking at the simultaneous, separate anti-piracy operations of two organizations off Somalia costs and take informal arrangements and cooperation ways at sea between two organizations. They argue that the EU and NATO established a framework of "informal cooperation" off Somalia Coasts by "complementing" each other at sea (pp. 108-109). Moreover, Lavallee (2017) says that the historical problems between non-EU NATO member Turkey and non-NATO-EU member Southern Cyprus make formal NATO-EU coordination within the scope of Single European Sky (SES) policy-making processes difficult.

Therefore, relations between these two organization within the scope of SES have been maintained informally (pp. 427-428). She applies to practice theory approach to explain these informal practices. Similar to the argument made by Lavelle, Graeger (2016; 2017) also argues that problematic relations between Turkey and Southern Cyprus prevent the progress of relations between EU and NATO, and she conceptualizes this situation as "mutual blocking of cooperation". In addition, she says that different perceptions of different countries negatively affect the relations between EU and NATO, and she describes this situation as "conflicting national agendas". She then adds that due to these reasons, relationship between the EU and

NATO could not go beyond the 2002 Berlin Plus Arrangements, declarations, statements and speeches. For that reason, she looks at informal interactions between two organizations' diplomats, soldiers and civil bureaucrats and applies to practice theory to explain the relations between EU and NATO. As can be seen, some studies in the literature explain the relations between two organizations by looking at the practical contacts between two organizations.

Considering the obstacles to the healthy progress of relations between the two organizations, it is also possible to come across arguments in the literature in the context of the EU's steps within the scope of autonomy. In this regard, Bailes (2008) says that even though some states like Finland and Sweden do not take kindly to militarization of the EU to conduct operations far from Europe, the EU as a whole is not a kind of organization that carries out its security activities under the wings of NATO. Therefore, although it is not the competitor of NATO directly, it has gradually been free from NATO, especially in its internal security issues (pp. 115-130). Similar to argument made by Bailes, Howorth (2018) evaluates the relations between EU and NATO around the concept of "strategic autonomy" and take the US and EU perspectives towards "strategic autonomy of EU" into account as analyzing the IORs between EU and NATO (pp. 523-534). Furthermore, Fiott (2017) examines the relationship between EU and NATO within the framework defense-industrial cooperation by looking at four different types of interactions the EU and NATO get involved in (Cognitive Interaction, Interaction through Commitment, Behavioral Interaction, and Impact-Level Interaction). As a result of examination, he states that the EU and NATO affect each other directly or indirectly in the defense industry realm; therefore, the relationship between these two organizations can be conceptualized as "interdependence". In line with this argument, Biermann (2008) states that in the post-Cold War period, the EU, WEU, NATO and OSCE entered into relations within the scope of networks to ensure the security of the Euro Atlantic region. At the same time, he states that the network relationship established between European security institutions includes asymmetry between the actors. He then explains the EU's dependence on NATO in terms of military resources in the high intensity of Petersberg operations with the resource dependence theory. Then, he stated that as the EU increases its capability and capacity, it decreases this dependency level. Moreover, in the context of autonomy and dependency arguments,

Kempin and Mawdsley (2012) assess the EU's strategic leadership and autonomy capacity through the EUPOL Operation conducted in Afghanistan in 2007. They say that the EUPOL Afghanistan Operation was a failed test for the EU as European states show more engagement and confidence for operations performed by NATO and US in the region. Therefore, they argue that CSDP cannot be considered independent of the US and NATO and "represents a continuation of US strategic hegemony" (pp. 55-70).

In the literature, besides the arguments explaining the relations between two organizations with cooperation dynamics, there are also arguments explaining the relationship between two organizations with the competition dynamics. In some studies, although the relations between the EU and NATO are not directly evaluated within the framework of competition dynamics, it is implied that the relations between two organizations are moving towards competition by expressing that relations between two organizations are weakening. In the context of competition arguments, Himmrich and Raynova (2017) evaluate the relations between EU and NATO within the framework of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration published in July 2016 and in terms of exercise and capacity building. They use the phrase "latent institutional competition" to express the current relations between two organizations (p. 3). Furthermore, Tardy and Lindstrom (2019) have gathered the issues that would challenge the healthy functioning of EU-NATO relations under five points: lack of formal, conceptualized and systemic division of labour between these two organizations and, as a result of this, absence of clear strategic direction; diverging preferences and interests of states; unresolved bilateral dispute between Turkey and Southern Cyprus; protectionist structure of latest EU initiatives in defence industry such as "fencing off non-EU companies from the European market and putting restrictions on third states participation" through PESCO (p. 10). Based on these, they say that EU and NATO "are indeed essential partners; yet this, to date, still reflects an ambition rather than reality" (p. 11-14). In line with the Tardy and Lindstrom's (2019) arguments, Smith (2011) analyses the EU and NATO relations by taking the bilateral formal and informal interactions between two organizations at multiple levels. Due to absence of a systematic agreement and framework that could come over the existing problems and regulates the relations between two

organizations beyond the 2002-Berlin Plus Agreement, he conceptualizes the relationship between EU and NATO as “institutional fatigue” (p. 243).

Furthermore, there are also studies evaluating the relations between the EU and the USA within the scope of transatlantic relations. In this regard, Riddervold and Newsome (2018) evaluate the EU-USA relations by comparing eight different articles’ arguments and empirical findings. They list the problems between the EU and NATO as “low levels of spending by EU member nations on defense” and critical approach of US for it; Trump’s questioning and sceptic approach to transatlantic relations, common institutions and norms; fragmented structure of Europe with the 2016 Brexit and success of nationalist and euro-sceptic parties in the 2017 Germany, Austrian and Czech elections; and EU’s attempts to increase its autonomy in foreign and security policies independent of NATO and US. Based on the arguments and empirical findings of these articles, they then describe the EU-US relations as “weakening” (pp. 511-517). In line with this argument, Newsome (2018) also evaluates the relations between the EU and the USA in the current Syrian migrant crisis and compared European responses to the 2015 Syrian migrant crisis with the EU responses to the Kosovo refugee crisis in 1999. He argues that Europe responded to the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis more effectively than the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis under the leadership of the USA. Newsome then says that due to the internal fragmentation of EU states about Syrian refugee policies and America’s distanced approach to transatlantic relations, the EU could not react to the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis as effective as the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis. Concerning transatlantic relations, he conceptualizes the EU-US relations within the context of responses to the refugee crisis as “weakening” and define the EU-US relations upon Syrian refugee crisis as “unravelling relations” (p. 589).

2.4 States’ Visions in Europe and EU-NATO Relations

One of the most critical factors affecting the cooperation and competition dynamics in EU and NATO relations is the differing state visions and preferences. For this reason, to better understand the dynamics of cooperation and competition between EU and NATO, it is beneficial to look at the arguments about the state visions that affect the relations between two organizations. Indeed, states within the EU are divided into two sides as Europeanist and Atlanticist according to their approach to

relations with NATO in the literature. More specifically, while Atlanticist states are afraid of undermining the presence of NATO in EU by forming independent security and defense policy from NATO, Europeanist states try to encourage the independent European security and defense policies alternative to NATO as a way of balancing the USA international influence. Moreover, EU and NATO have 22 common members before 2016. These 22 countries can be divided into categories as the states that want to have independent European security policy from NATO during this term and as the states that want to be a subsidiary of NATO in its security operations. In addition to common members, non-common members, especially Turkey as a non-EU member of NATO and Southern Cyprus as a non-NATO member of EU, impact the relationship between these two organizations as stated above. Indeed, given that France has the largest military budget and spending among the countries in EU that would like to have independent European security policy and UK has the largest military spending and expenditure both among the countries that would like to operate under the wing of NATO in the EU, France can be considered as the representative of the Europeanist vision in Europe and UK as the Atlanticist vision in Europe between the 1993 and 2016.

Furthermore, there is also a group of states known as neutral states in the literature. Neutrality in defence policies in an organization or institution is the rejection of any specific prejudged security and defence policy by a supranational body. From this point of view, some EU states neither want to be bound by any mutual defence commitment nor being a party to any project to develop a European army. In other words, these neutral states in the EU such as Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Austria, are opposed to the concept of collective or territorial security. Instead they would prefer the notion of soft security, prevention and crisis management within the EU since they think that supranational security policies can contradict with their national security policies or constitutional requirements. In this context, this section also looks at studies in the literature that evaluate the relations between two organizations from the perspective of neutral states. Since studies evaluating the relations between the EU and NATO within the scope of the relations between non-EU NATO member Turkey; and non-NATO EU member Southern Cyprus are shared above, these studies will not be shared again.

2.4.1 France and EU-NATO Relations

Cizel and Hlatky (2014) examine the Franco-NATO relations since the re-entry of France into NATO's integrated military command structure (NIMCS) in 2009 by paying attention to the historical process of EU-NATO relations in the post-cold war era; France's re-entry process into NIMCS in 2009; French and NATO perspectives on integration; French achievements during the integration process; and France's role in NATO operations. While they describe France's relations with the Atlantic wing as "exceptionalism" for the pre-integration period of France into NIMCS, with France integration in NIMCS, relations between the two wings have entered the "normalization" process. They argue that given the intensification of interoperability between two sides in the fields of economy, politics, military, and technology during the "normalization" process, Franco-Atlantic relations are evolving towards a "special relationship" (pp. 353-362). Within the scope of this argument, Vaisse and Sebag (2009), in their article evaluating the relations between France and NATO within the framework of the historical process since the 1960s, state that the lukewarm policies towards NATO pursued by Nicholas Sarkozy do not contradict France's past NATO policies since the policies pursued during the Sarkozy presidency are the result of a number of steps taken in the past since 1995 rather than sudden political moves (pp. 148-149). Similar to arguments Cizel and Hlatky, Ghez and Larrabee (2009) also discuss France and NATO relations by taking into accounts: the process of reintegration of France into NIMCS and France's expectations from this process; different European states' perspectives about the integration of France into NMCS; different domestic actors' approaches such as military, other political parties and foreign ministry regarding this integration action; and US approach and reaction to France integration step. They then argue that basically, seven factors caused France to be included in NIMCS again. These are; failure of Europe in managing and stabilizing the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in the last decade of the twentieth century and so understanding the importance of the USA in ensuring European Security; disengagement and shifting strategic attention of the USA from Europe to other regions like the Asia Pacific and France's worries about this; the inability of France to fully influence the military decisions and structure of alliance due to being outside of NIMCS before integration; suspicion by European states towards France because of the France appearance outside of NATO

and since possibility of lack of support to develop autonomous European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); enlargement of NATO and EU towards Eastern Europe and US-oriented foreign policies of Eastern European countries; to gain the support of UK to develop more autonomous ESDP; to receive the support of US to develop more autonomous ESDP. Furthermore, they say that France has supported NATO's operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan and has been in contact with NATO at different levels since the 1990s, which enable France to join NIMCS gradually. They define the gradual re-inclusion process of France in NIMCS as "creeping integration" (pp.77-89; Pesme, 2010, pp. 49-50; Rieker, 2013, pp. 337-378). In addition to these, Bickerton (2010) examines France's re-entry into NIMCS in 2009 in the context of UK-France relations and the UK's reaction to this decision. He argues that the UK failed to show a systematic, concerted and coherent reaction to France's decision to return to NIMCS. He then says that this situation "emphasized the ad hoc nature of contemporary British defense policy, its lack of strategic reflection and the prominence of many unanswered questions vis-à-vis British defense policy more generally" (p. 113). In sum, he emphasizes the lack of strategic vision of British defence policy with respect to NATO and EU related issues (p. 113). Similar to argument Bickerton, Fortmann, Haglund and Hlatky (2010) evaluate the return of France to NIMCS within the framework of France's bilateral relations with USA, UK, and Germany; possible complications that step might cause such as burden sharing and agreement on nuclear deterrence; and the NATO and France approaches to return by taking several articles into account. For bilateral relations with Germany, they argue that France and Germany agree to keep NATO's working domain as collective defence. At the same time, they contend that France is more inclined to use military methods to respond to crises than Germany. Regarding the UK, they state that France's return to NIMCS did not receive a systematic response from the UK as expected, but this step would strengthen bilateral relations with the UK. Regarding the impact of France's return to NIMCS on bilateral relations with the USA, they say that although this step strengthens bilateral relations, time is needed to understand the direction where bilateral relations are going. At the same, they conceptualize the Franco-US bilateral relations as "suboptimal strategic cooperation". Furthermore, they argue that the return of France to NIMCS would create complications within the alliance on issues such as how the command structure will be shaped within the alliance and which paths will be followed

regarding nuclear policies. Furthermore, regarding France perception, the integration move was perceived as a “geostrategic necessity” by Sarkozy and its consultants; and Sarkozy defined the relations between NATO and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a “complementary toolbox”. In general, they state that literature sees France’s return to NIMCS as an expected situation by looking at the relations between the two actors in the last 20 years (pp. 1-10). In line with the arguments above, Pesme (2010), in his article analyzing France’s re-entry to NIMCS from the mostly France perspective, states that both NATO and the EU play an important role in the French defence policies and that, contrary to the past, the two organizations can reinforce each other mutually. At the same time, he looks at the words of American and French political elites after the French’s move. He says that with France’s return to NIMCS in 2009, Franco-US relations greatly improved, and Europe took an important step from being a “traditional ally” to becoming a “necessary partner” (pp. 45-60). In addition, after France decides to join NIMCS in 2009, Rieker (2013) examines the level of integration of France into NATO by taking four dimensions into account: “functional (degree of interdependence), social (degree of contact), political-institutional (degree of common capacities and resources) and cultural integration (degree of common values and goals)” (p. 377). As a result of his study based on empirical evidence, he contends that while France is highly integrated into NATO functionally, socially and politically, there is less empirical evidence on cultural integration. At the same time, he also states that France has red lines on integration into NATO, and he lists these red lines as keeping France’s nuclear weapons under French control; deployment of French soldiers in the operations under French control; and non-command of French troops by NATO during peacetime (pp. 377-391).

2.4.2 UK and EU-NATO Relations

In the literature in the context of the UK within the scope of EU-NATO relations, Marianne and Peters (2020) examine how the UK, as a big and old member of NATO and EU, has affected the EU-NATO relations upon security and defence in the pre-Brexit era and how the Brexit process would change this situation by taking into account: conceptual and theoretical approaches to the role of the UK in relations between NATO and EU; domestic and foreign policy dynamics of the UK and the

EU; the impact of UK-US special relationship on EU-NATO relations; UK's political and operational capabilities; EU's decision making and policy-making dynamics; institutional and operational dynamics of UK's role in EU-NATO relations; UK's bilateral relations with mostly France and USA, partly Germany; Brexit process and possible scenarios in post-Brexit UK-EU and EU-NATO relations. Concerning conceptual approaches for UK's role in EU-NATO relations, they say that literature covers several concepts: "communication channel, coordination hub, linking-pin actor, the advocate of interorganizational relationship, broker, interorganizational hegemon, networked foreign policy actor" and they conceptualize the role of UK in EU-NATO relations as "transnational bridge" (pp. 2-5). Indeed, they state that UK served as a bridge between the EU and NATO during the membership of both organizations and enable to formalize and institutionalize the relations between these two organizations. Furthermore, they contend that while the UK has preferred to act in line with NATO and America's policies on defence and deterrence issues, it has preferred to consider EU policies in diplomacy, trade and foreign policy. In other words, they argue that the USA exerted its policy preferences on the EU through the UK. In addition to Marianne and Peters, Martill and Sus (2018; 2019) analyse post-Brexit UK-EU relations under three main sections as 1) "United Kingdom's commitment to European Security after Brexit; 2) nature of post Brexit developments within the union ;3) and, European Union's willingness to afford the UK a substantial role after withdrawal". Under these sections, they focus specifically on 1) a) the viability of the 'global Britain' alternative, b) the UK's interest in participating in EU-led initiatives, c) feasibility of close cooperation; 2) a) danger of fragmentation, b) recent advances in the EU's security and defense, c) changing balance of power and the renewed Franco-German axis ; 3) a) Existing coincide of interests b)the effect of new instruments in the EU's security and defence, c) the divergence of opinions among the member states and the politics of granting the UK a substantial role after Brexit. Furthermore, Martill and Sus have developed arguments for UK-EU relations by examining the post-Brexit UK-EU relations. First, they state that the UK's commitment to EU security will not decrease in the post-Brexit period. They will compensate for their broken ties with the EU due to Brexit through ties they will establish with EU countries bilaterally on security and defence. Second, they claim that the Brexit process would facilitate integration and cooperation in security and defence policies within the EU by keeping the Atlantic

supporter UK out of the union. Third, they argue that the EU will not give the UK a strong role or say in the security and policy making processes after Brexit due to their aim to deepen the integration and cooperation in security and defense policy realm and danger of moral hazard associated with privileged position of London than other non-EU countries such as Ukraine and Norway. Similar to the observation above, Sweeney and Winn (2020) examine the relations between UK and EU by focusing on: the impact of the Brexit Referendum on EU security and defence cooperation as a threat to EU strategic autonomy; the importance of post-Brexit referendum initiatives (Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Fund (EDF), European Intervention Initiative (EI2)) on EU security and defence cooperation; Franco and German attitudes towards post-Brexit security and defence initiatives; conceptual and theoretical framing of European Defence Cooperation (EDC); Challenges posed by Brexit and global threats to the EU strategic autonomy; differences in strategic cultures of EU member states; events that trigger the initiatives upon EU security and defence cooperation; post-Brexit EU-NATO relations. They shaped their arguments around three conclusions. First, the Brexit process has led EU countries outside the UK to take steps towards greater integration and cooperation in security and defence. Second, even though these steps have been embodied through PESCO, EDF and EI2, due to their lack of coherent and clear-cut blueprints, it is unclear where exactly the EU wants to go with these steps. Third, the completion of the Brexit process without an agreement on security and defence between the EU and the UK may create an atmosphere of distrust between the EU and the UK, which might cause collateral damage to both EU and the UK in terms of security and defence. Furthermore, Oliver and Williams (2016) say that despite the military, economic, social and political ties between the UK and the USA, the USA would begin to question the UK's great power role in the global arena with the Brexit process. In other words, UK's departure from the EU would deprive the UK of the economic power of the EU in the global arena, and UK would have to deal with global threats such as refugee crisis, immigration, terrorism etc., alone. At the same time, France would remain the only permanent EU member state in United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As a result, these factors would lead the USA to question the great power role of UK in the world politics. In addition to these arguments, Risso (2015) evaluates the UK's position in NATO within the scope of Russia's expansionist policies in Ukraine and around the Baltic Sea and the UK's

declining defence spending. She argues that although NATO's two percent defence spending requirement does not show the "military capability, deployability and sustainability levels" of the countries, it is an important indicator of prestige and political will. She then says that considering UK's declining defence spending, UK may revise its defence spending in the coming years in line with NATO's requirements by looking at the discourses of the political elites in the UK in that direction. In addition, she also argues that there are different approaches available within the alliance regarding the policies against Russia's expansionist policies around Ukraine and the Baltic Sea. She says that while Germany and Italy want to solve the alliance's problems with Russia through diplomatic ways, UK and USA propose to increase the military presence on the Russian borders of the alliance (pp. 30-31).

2.4.3 Neutral States and EU and NATO Relations

Thirdly, as stated above, there is a group of countries called neutral in the EU. In the context of neutral states and EU-NATO relations, Devine (2011) examines the attitudes of Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland, which are named "neutrals" because of their distanced approach to defense organizations and balance of power competition among great powers during the Cold War. She observes behaviours of these countries through the concept of "neutrality" from the post war period to the period after the 2009 Lisbon Agreement within the framework of the views of political elites and the constituency in these countries (p. 353). Particularly, she states the principles covered by the concept of neutrality as "Noninvolvement in war/other countries' wars; Self-defence only; primacy of the UN/UN peacekeeping only; Anti-militarism; Impartiality/Anti-big power politics/independent decisions amid 'big power' pressure; Non-aggression/Peace promotion; and non-membership of a military alliance" (p. 353). Afterwards, she argues that political elites and public in these four countries approached the foreign policy-making from the perspective of "neutrality" and did not involve the great power competition and become a member of defence organizations in post-war period and during the Cold War. However, political elites started to soften the concept of neutrality in line with EU's defence pillar (WEU) in the last decade of 20th century. Devine states that, after the 2000s, despite the public opposition, political elites have emphasized the concept of

“solidarity” and started to show implicit support for the steps taken by the EU in the field of defence. She explains the change in political elite perception regarding the neutral foreign policy understanding in these four countries with the elite socialization with EU’s integration process in defence realm. With the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU adopted the mutual defence clause. Given that these countries are the member of EU, their “neutral” foreign policy understanding adopted especially during the post-war period change in reverse in the post-Lisbon period despite the public support for “neutral” foreign policy (p. 353).

Besides Devine, Cottey (2018), in the introduction chapter of the *European Neutrals and NATO* book, has also drawn the framework of relations between neutral European states and NATO by taking into account the: brief historical development of “neutral” foreign policy understanding; the concepts used by states to express their neutral foreign policy understanding; debates in literature upon neutrality and policies pursued by neutral European states within the scope of neutrality. He argues that although some European states occasionally adopt a foreign policy understanding upon the principle of neutrality, European states that have established their foreign policy understanding upon “long-established and fairly clear-cut policies of neutrality” are Sweden, Ireland, Austria, Finland and Switzerland. He then states that while Sweden and Switzerland adopted the foreign policy understanding based on neutrality at the beginning of the 19th century, Ireland at the beginning of WW2 and Austria and Finland during the Cold War period. However, with the end of the Cold War, these neutral states developed new foreign policy approaches within the dynamics of the new geostrategic environment. Within their new foreign policy understandings, these states have been included in NATO’s Peace for Partnership program (PfP). He contends that these states maintain their relationships with NATO within the scope of this program.

There are also discussions in the literature about relations between neutral states and NATO, saying that bilateral relations of neutral European states with NATO have improved. Regarding, Sweden, while it was secretly maintaining its relations with NATO during the Cold War period, it did so openly in the post-cold war period and maximize the bilateral relations with NATO. Indeed, Sweden-NATO relations developed within the framework of cooperation based on partnership in the post-Cold War era and relations established based on the concept of neutrality during the

Cold War period have begun to be established under the concept of solidarity in the post-Cold War period. However, given Sweden's domestic policy dynamics and longstanding neutral state identity, NATO membership seems unlikely in the near future. Besides, although Sweden counts on the partnership relation with NATO for its defence, it needs to invest more politically and financially in the defence field (Petersson, 2018, pp. 90-91). Secondly, for Finland, it, as one of the states that adopted the neutral foreign policy in the Cold War Period, developed its relations with NATO within the framework of military non-alignment in the Post-Cold War period. In general, Finland's relations with NATO are affected by domestic policy dynamics, bilateral relations with Russia and the USA, and foreign policy followed by Sweden as a neighboring country. Although Finland has very close ties with NATO, no recent membership application or status (Forsberg, 2018, p. 122). Thirdly, as one of the neutral states of Cold War Era, Austria developed its relations with NATO in the post-Cold War period by adopting the "engaged military" approach within the concept of "non-membership in military alliance". In other words, while adhering to the principle of "neutrality", it supported the "crisis management", "conflict prevention", and "peace operations" organized by NATO within the scope of protecting universal values. Fourthly, with respect to Ireland, Ireland's neutral foreign policy understanding at the beginning of the WW2 has become a part of state identity in the following years. UK and USA proposed NATO membership to Ireland in 1949; but, Ireland rejected this offer because of its neutral foreign policy understanding. Besides, due to domestic dynamics and its neutral foreign policy understanding, Ireland participated in PfP in 1999, where NATO organized its bilateral relations with other actors, and became the latest European neutral state in PfP. As a result of prolonged internal party discussions, it participated in this PfP program to not be excluded from the European security architecture and contribute to peace operations organized by NATO. Although Ireland has started to establish relations with NATO through PfP and peace operations at the beginning of 21st century, it has maintained its relations with NATO at a low level due to its anti-militaristic foreign policy understanding, adherence to normative values in foreign policy, domestic policy dynamics and making neutrality a part of state identity (Cottey, 2018). Fifthly, Switzerland, which has been the country that has adopted the neutral foreign policy understanding for the longest and most clearly, has taken a distant attitude towards international organizations such as NATO and European

Community (EC) during the Cold War period. In the Post-Cold War period, it developed its relations in the international arena in the context of security within the phrase or concept of “security through cooperation”. Within the scope of this concept, it participated in NATO’s PfP in 1996 and supported NATO’s crisis management operations in the Balkans. Indeed, Switzerland has acted with an understanding of foreign policy based on creating a basis for cooperation between Russia and NATO against current global threats like terrorism, climate change etc. and would like to play a “broker” role among the states or actors that have competed in the history by assuming a global role. However, after NATO signaled in the direction of collective defence principle due to of Russia’s activities in Ukraine in 2014, Switzerland has opened NATO relations and PfP discussion within itself. With a little drop in tension in North of Europe, in 2016, the Security White Paper of the Federal Council stated that PfP participation facilitated the cooperation of Switzerland with NATO and other NATO partner states in the collective security domain. Further, Switzerland has often expressed that it has no goal of NATO membership (Nünlist, 2018). In sum, neutral European states (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland) built their foreign policy understanding upon the principle of neutrality during the Cold War. They started to develop their relations with NATO within the scope of PfP in the post-cold war period. However, the approaches of neutral European states to the principle of neutrality have also started to differ in the changing geo-strategic environment and in the face of increasing global threats. In this context, differences were also observed in the level of their relationship with NATO and EU CSDP. While Sweden and Finland have carried out their relations with NATO at the highest level, Austria, Ireland, and Finland took a more distant and cautious attitude towards NATO (Cottey, 2018, pp. 14-15).

As can be seen, within the scope of EU and NATO relations in the literature, EU states are generally grouped as Europeanist, Atlanticist and Neutrals. While France stands for the Europeanist states in the EU, the UK for the pre-Brexit period stands for the Atlanticist. Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland are expressed as neutral states.

2.5 Evaluation upon Literature and Theory Selection

As can be seen above, in the literature, EU and NATO relations are expressed and conceptualized within the framework of different concepts. Some of these concepts are cooperation, partnership, complementarity, interlocking institutions, division of labour coexistence, interdependence, strategic alliance, intricate interdependence, mutually reinforcing institutions, mutually reinforcing institutions, strategic alliance, intricate interdependence, strategic hegemony, strengthening relations, mix of cooperation and competition, competition, beauty contest, Euro-Vision Defense Contest, latent institutional competition, institutional fatigue, unravelling relations, weakening relations. As seen, in these concepts, the relations between the two organizations are generally examined within the framework of cooperation and competition dynamics. Indeed, in the literature, cooperation and competition dynamics between EU and NATO are generally explained with the five theories: principle agent theory, resource dependence theory, strategic partnership, practice approach theory, and regime complex theory.

In the context of this study, I choose the regime complex theory to explain the EU and NATO relations. Indeed, despite the many dynamics involved in the relationship between the two organizations, the practice approach theory, principle agent theory and resource dependence theory analyze the relationship between two organizations based on focusing only on one dimension of the relationship. However, examining the relations between two actors by focusing only on one dimension through the member states' visions, informal interactions in the field and resources misses many dimensions and dynamics in the relations between the two organizations.

Considering the attribute that a good theory should have a large explanatory power and the fact that these two theories only explain the limited dynamics in the relations between the two organizations shows that the explanatory power of these theories is limited within the scope of EU and NATO relations (Evera, 1997, p. 17).

Furthermore, for strategic partnership between these organizations, in the official documents published by the two organizations and in some studies in the literature, the relationship between the two organizations has been expressed as the strategic partnership (Cornish, 2006, p. 6). However, since the strategic partnership is not clearly framed in the theoretical sense and that the EU and NATO relations contain

many different dimensions, strategic partnership is not chosen to explain the EU-NATO relations. At the same time, the cooperation dynamics of EU-NATO relations that strategic partnership theory can explain can be explained with the regime complex theory. Moreover, regime complex theory can explain the EU and NATO relations in terms of cooperation and competition instead of focusing on just one of them like other theories expressed above. Therefore, in this study, regime complex theory is applied to explain EU-NATO relations. In sum, EU and NATO relations contain multiple dimensions. Given that just above stated theories limited explanatory power to explain these multiple dimensions and regime complex theory can evaluate the dimensions that other theories analyze in the EU-NATO relations with its unique concepts, in this study, regime complex theory is chosen to explain the EU and NATO relations. Besides, regime complex theory can explain the cooperation and competition dynamics in EU-NATO relations unlike the other theories.

Moreover, as seen in the literature above, the relations between the two organizations have been analyzed within the framework of different aspects such as resources, differing member states visions upon EU-NATO relations, capabilities and capacities, overlapping in functions and members, functions of these two organizations, autonomy, dependence and operations etc. Given that the overlapping in function and low-level hierarchy are the main dimensions of regime complex theory, there is not so much study in the literature that evaluates the EU-NATO relations within the framework of hierarchy. In this study, I evaluate the EU-NATO relations within the framework of the hierarchy dimension as well as the functional overlap. By analyzing the relations between two institutions in the context of hierarchy, I will contribute to the literature.

CHAPTER 3: REGIME COMPLEXES: BACKGROUND, CONCEPTS, APPROACHES, ELEMENTS, EXAMPLES, GENERAL FRAME AND SUM OF RESEARCH

In this section, the brief background about institutions, regimes and regime complexes, theoretical and conceptual approaches concerning regime complexes, the basic concepts used in regime complex discussions in the literature, existing debates in the literature about regime complexes and different perspectives in these discussions, policy domains that regime complex theory is applied to explain, general theoretical frame and sum of research based on international regime complexity within the context of this research will be shared.

3.1 Background: Institutions and Regimes

With the increase in international organizations (IOs) and international arrangements in the post-war period, theoretical and empirical studies on global governance increased rapidly in the second half of the 20th century. However, with the changing dynamics of the international system like increase of non-state actors, IOs, and cooperative arrangements among actors in the 1970s, existing concepts and theoretical approaches such as international cooperation, alliance, partnership, international organization, authority, etc. have been insufficient to explain the policy dynamics in the international system. To overcome the inadequacy of existing concepts and theories in explaining the dynamics of international politics, the concepts of international institutions and international regimes were developed in the 1970s. With the development of international regime and international institution concepts, scholars have tried to show how international institutions and regimes facilitate cooperation between states by forming focal points in the international system (Drezner, 2009, p. 65). Accordingly, Keohane and Martin (1995) state that “in complex situations involving many states, international institutions can step in to

provide ‘constructed focal points’ that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent” (p. 45).

More specifically, international institutions facilitate cooperation in the international system and ensure a rule-based system by reducing the transaction costs, promoting issue-linkage, facilitating enforcement, providing information and creating focal points (Keohane & Martin, 1995, p. 42; Duffield, 2007, p. 5). When we take a closer look at the concepts of international institutions and regimes, I appreciate Duffield’s study upon institutions, *What Are International Institutions*, due to his broad perspective about the subject. He (2007) synthesized the existing studies in the literature on international institutions and then conceptualized international institutions (p. 5).

Duffield (2007) defines international institution as “relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states and as well as non-state entities), and their activities” (pp. 2-3). He then states that concepts used to express institutions in the literature can be grouped in four different ways as “formal organizations, practices, rules and norms” (pp. 2-3). He then evaluates these four concepts regarding institutions under four separate sub-headings.

Firstly, regarding international organizations, he states that the concept of international institutions was used in the same way as international organizations in the 1950s and 1960s in the literature. However, he then says that with the innovation of concepts like regime and the use of the concept of institution interchangeably with the concept of regime, the use of international institution in the same way as international organization decreases. He also says that despite the decrease, it continues to be used in this sense as well in the literature (p. 3). Secondly, about practices, although he does not give a systematic definition of practices, he uses practices with the same or similar meanings as behaviours. Thirdly, regarding rules, he emphasizes their rationalist nature, being a set of formal and informal arrangements and their wide usage in the literature (pp. 4-5). Fourthly, for norms, he says it is a constructivist sociological concept and is generally defined by constructivists as “socially shared expectations, understandings or standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (p. 6). In addition to these, he

states that agreements, organizations, regimes and conventions are different types of international institutions.

Further, about the concept of the international regime as one of the frequently used concepts and theory in the IR literature after the 1980s, Krasner's definition of regime, "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectation converge in a given issue-area", has been one of the most used regime definitions in the literature (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). Later, Krasner uses the following expressions to clarify his concepts in defining the concept of regime. "Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice" (p. 2). Moreover, Oran Young (1986) has also defined the concept of the institution as "practices composed of recognized roles coupled with set of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of those roles" and states that organizations differ from the regime in terms of having an office, personnel, equipment and budget. He then says that while IMF and World Bank are international organizations, Breetton Wood system is an international institution or regime (p. 108).

Regarding regimes, Young (1980) argues that "regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiabale activities (or meaningful sets of activities). As such, they are recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge" (p. 332). Afterwards, he gathers the primary component of the regimes under three main subtitles as 1) substantive component (rights and rules), 2) the procedural component, and 3) implementation (enforcement mechanism for compliance). Young's approach to these concepts is briefly as follows Firstly, while Young defines the concept of right as "anything to which an actor (individual or otherwise) is entitled by virtue of occupying a recognized role," he describes the concept of rule as "well-defined guides to action or standards setting forth actions that members of some specified subject group are expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances" (pp. 333-334). He then lists the properties that should be in a rule as "a) an indication of the relevant subject group, b) a behavioral prescription, and c) a specification of the circumstances under which the rule is operative" (p. 335). Secondly, regarding the procedural component, Young

states that “a procedural component encompasses recognized arrangements for resolving situations requiring social or collective choices” (p. 336). Thirdly, concerning implementation, he argues that “rights are not always respected and rules are often violated, and therefore a compliance mechanism is needed as third component of regime” (p. 338). At the same time, he argues that international regimes could contain formal and informal components and says that “formalization is clearly not a necessary condition for the effective operation of international regimes” (p. 343). Young then adds that “maintenance of convergent expectations among actors” is essential for continuity of regimes (p. 355).

3.2 Regime Complexes: Concepts, Approaches, Elements and Examples

In the first decade of the 21st century, there has been a significant increase in the number of international organizations, agreements and international institutions operating in the international system. More specifically, today, “there are more than 2,400 intergovernmental organizations, 37,000 organizations engaged in international politics, and hundreds of thousands of international agreements” (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 330; Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 13). With the increase in the number of international institutions, specific components of these institutions, such as their members, functions and mandate, began to intersect or overlap, and for this reason, examining these institutions separately made it difficult to fully understand the impact these entities had on the international system (Gehring & Faude, 2014, 472). In other words, with the excessive increase in the number of international institutions in the international system in the first years of the 21th century, many institutions operating in the same policy area have emerged. With this emergence, existing theories and concepts have been inadequate to explain how these overlapping policy areas have an impact on the international system, how rules are made and adapted in these overlapping policy areas, and the policy dynamics of between overlapping institutions and states. This gap in the literature has been filled with the “regime complexity theory” in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century by bringing systematic and theoretical explanations upon the policy dynamics of overlapping policy areas.

Kal Raustiala and David Victor, as the first authors to use the concept of *regime complex* in the literature, defines the concept of regime complex as “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area” (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 1). That is, these two authors state that the three fundamental properties that should be present in the relationship founded based on “regime complex” are “1) composition by a number of elemental institutions, 2) horizontal structure among these institutions, and 3) common issue area” (Gehring & Faude, 2013, 119; Faude & Gehring, 2017).

Furthermore, Alter and Raustiala (2018) explain the concept of *international regime complexity* by considering conceptual concerns ; policy dynamics within the regime complex ; the state of hierarchy between institutions that are in a relationship within international regime complexity ; interactions between institutions within the framework of competition and division of labor; regime complex’s effects on the international system ; the advantages and disadvantages of the regime complex in explaining the international policy dynamics ; and the strategic behaviors/actions that the states can follow in the regime complex. Firstly, they define the concept of international regime complexity as “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions that include more than one international agreement or authority” in accordance with the definition of Raustiala and Victor (p. 333). Secondly, they argue that a change in one of the institutions that interact with others within the framework of the regime complex also affects other institutions (p. 333; Alter & Meunier, 2009, p. 20). Thirdly, Alter and Raustiala state that the concept of hierarchy expresses the relationship of authority between actors and that being an authority in an issue or policy area means having a right to make regulations on this policy/issue area or upon other subordinate actors as a formal and legitimate power in a field. They then say that the “absence of hierarchy among institutions and rules is the key political feature of an international regime complexity” (p. 332). Later, they argue that lack of hierarchy means that it is not clear which rules, norms, or decision-making procedures will be applied/prevail in the face of problems and questions (p. 332). Fourthly, they contend that inter-institutional competition may take place to become the regulatory authority on the overlapping policy area due to the absence of hierarchy between functionally overlapping institutions. Furthermore, while this competition between institutions may cause conflict or turf battles between

institutions, it may also lead to the division of labour between institutions by adapting with each other during their interaction. Fifthly, they argue that regime complexes provide space for countries operating under their roof to pursue policies within the framework of strategic behaviour/action in line with their interests. In other words, states can follow different strategic policies to maximize their interests within the international regime complexity. Indeed, they divided these strategic behaviours that states can follow into three categories as forum shopping, regime shifting and contested multilateralism.

With respect to these strategies that states can follow in regime complex, forum shopping means “the strategic use by actors of alternative arenas to stall or advance negotiations” (Murphy & Kellow, 2016, p. 39). As another scholars, Alter and Meunier (2006) also define forum shopping as “actors selecting ‘the international venues based on where they are best able to promote specific policy preferences” (p. 16). Further, while Gehring and Faude (2014) define actors who are members of more than one institution operating in a policy area as multiple members, they define actors who are members of only one institution in a policy area as single members. They then say that while multiple members can pursue a forum shopping strategy, single members are deprived of this opportunity. Although the single members cannot use the forum shopping strategy since they do not operate in the overlapping policy area, they are affected by the preferences of multiple members who use this method (p. 486; Faude & Gehring, 2017). Regarding regime shifting, Alter and Raustiala (2018) define regime shifting as “the attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard-setting activities from one venue to another” (p. 341). In line with the definition of Alter and Raustiala, Rabitz (2018) states that “regime shifting refers to states moving an alternative parallel regime, possibly relocating the most relevant politics for a given issue-area from one regime to another” (p. 303; Helfer, 2009, pp. 39-44). As for contested multilateralism, Alter and Raustiala (2018) employ the definition of contested multilateralism made by Morse and Keohane to explain the concept of contested multilateralism.

Morse and Keohane (2014) define the contested multilateralism as “combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institution to pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions” (p. 341). More specifically,

Morse and Keohane argue that in cases where states and non-state actors operating in the international system are not satisfied with the rules and practices of the existing multilateral institution due to the change in their preferences or failure of existing institution to fulfill their request and cannot change these rules and practices through internal means, they can cooperate within the scope of the coalition as dissatisfied states to challenge the status quo multilateral institution (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, 341 ; Gehring & Faude, 2013, p. 127). That is to say, Morse and Keohane state that for a situation to be defined as contested multilateralism, it must meet three criteria : 1) the existence of a multilateral institution in a well-framed policy/issue area with a mission and, rules and practices ; 2) Dissatisfaction of coalition actors with the existing status quo multilateral institution and challenging the status quo multilateral institution by using the rules and practices of another pre-existing institution or creating new rules and practices; 3) Clash between the rules and practices of the challenging institution and rules practices of status quo multilateral institution or substantial revision of the status quo multilateral institution's rules and practices (p. 388). They then say that dissatisfied actors can realize the policies or strategies within the scope of contested multilateralism in two different ways as regime shifting and competitive regime creation (p. 392).

Regarding regime shifting, Morse and Keohane argue that regime shifting occurs when some dissatisfied actors operating within an institution adopt the mandate and rules of another alternative institution operating in the same policy or subject area, and then challenge the rules and practices of multilateral institution they were previously in through the platform they attend later (p. 393). For competitive regime creation, they contend that competitive regime creation takes place as a result of the fact that the actors were not happy in the multilateral institution they were in, and could not find an alternative platform where they could come together again in the same policy field in line with similar tasks. These unhappy actors would prefer to create a new multilateral institution by creating new rules and practices, and through this new multilateral institution, they challenge the rules and practices of the multilateral institution therein before (p. 398). In addition to these, Morse and Keohane argue in their abstract that the international institutions that could be created to contest the status quo multilateral institution could "range from traditional agreements or inter-governmental organizations to informal networks, some which

include non-state actors” (p. 385). Indeed, with this statement, Morse and Keohane indirectly state that traditional agreements, inter-governmental organizations and informal networks are multilateral institutions as well. Another section uses expressions that mean that international legal conventions, formal organizations, and organizations encompassing civil society organizations are also be considered multilateral institutions (p. 407).

Turning to contested multilateralism, in line with Morse and Keohane arguments, Faude and Parizek (2020) argue that the underlying idea of contested multilateralism is the strategic and instrumental use of an international institution against another international institution by a group of states that are unhappy with the governance arrangements of latter. They conceptualize the contested multilateralism as “a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining” (Abstract, para. 1). They emphasize that while contested multilateralism affects inter-institutional cooperation in an overlapping policy area negatively in the short term, this situation may reverse under certain conditions in the long term. A closer look at Faude and Parizek’s arguments built on contested multilateralism will provide us with the opportunity to understand the strategies pursued by actors better and see how the bargaining and adaptation process between institutions take place. Firstly, they state that all member states of an international focal institution cannot derive the same level of gains from a policy area, which leads to dissatisfaction of less earning members with the existing institution’s governance arrangements. Secondly, they say that the actors with less earnings in an institution want the current system to be revised toward equal gain; however, this is not taken into account by the actors who earn more. Indeed, they say that actors who earn more underestimate the less earning actors’ resolve as less earning actors do not convey their resolve (message). Thirdly, as a result, the institutional adjustment bargaining process between actors (defender of status quo institution) who benefit more and actors (challenge the status quo institution) who benefit less fail. In this case, there are normally two policies that dissatisfied actors can follow within the framework of the “cooperation under anarchy” logic. While the first of these policies is to leave the current status quo institution and continue its policies unilaterally, the second is to remain within the status quo institution and proceed to contribute to the institution’s activities as seeking opportunities from within the institution to challenge the regulatory

arrangements of it. Indeed, with the increase in number of international institutions and institutional density, institutions start to work very closely with each other and actors who are members of the institutions have started to pursue cross-institutional strategies. This situation has caused the logic of “cooperation under anarchy” to be replaced by the “logic of cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international system (CTIS).” (Faude & Parizek, 2020, para. 7).

CTIS has opened up another avenue for actors to follow in addition to strategies they can follow in the “cooperation under anarchy” system, which is “contested multilateralism”. (Faude & Parizek, 2020). Fourthly, Faude and Parizek divide the policies that dissatisfied actors can follow within the scope of contested multilateralism into two strategies as “regime shifting” and “competitive regime creation”, and they approach these concepts from the same perspective as Morse and Keohane. They then state that due to the contested multilateral strategies that dissatisfied actors follow, strategic inconsistency (rivaling rules) between institutions emerges. Regarding strategic inconsistency, Raustiala and Victor (2004) conceptualize it as “explicit efforts to create conflicts in order to force change in another regime” and, Alter and Meunier (2009) say that strategic inconsistency is “contradictory rules are created in a parallel regime with the intention of undermining a rule in another agreement” (p. 17). At the same time, Rabitz (2018), with reference to Raustiala-Victor and Alter-Meunier, describes the strategic inconsistency as “attempting to undermine a regime by deliberately creating contradictory rules elsewhere”, and he argues that “strategic inconsistency does not aim at redistributing regulatory authority from one institution to another, but rather seeks to contest a given institution’s authority for isolated issues or larger issue-area” (pp. 301-303). In brief, due to the actors’ dissatisfaction with the rules of the institution, they are in and they follow contested-multilateral strategies (regime-shifting and competitive regime creation), another set of rules that contradict the rules of the existing institution emerge. At the same time, dissatisfied actors who challenge the existing institution with contested multilateral policies continue to keep their membership in the pre-existing institution. As a result, institutions with joint members and contradictory rules emerge, which is expressed as strategic inconsistency in the literature.

Further, dissatisfied challenging actors who follow contested multilateral policies use the strategic inconsistency situation that arises as a result of contested multilateral policies to make changes in the pre-existing institution in the direction they want. However, Faude and Parizek (2020) argue that contested multilateral policies will adversely affect the cooperation between actors who both defend the pre-existing institution and challenge the existing institution. Precisely, Faude and Parizek classify the stages leading to contested multilateralism as follows: 1) First of all, dissatisfied members voice aloud that they are not satisfied with the rules and regulations of the current institution; 2) Afterwards, dissatisfied members begin not to comply with the regulations made by the focal institution, which further reduces the level of cooperation gains. However, the dissatisfied actors are not ready to stand up to the existing institution with radical policies; 3) In the third stage, actors may prefer to resort to contested multilateral policies. As a result of contested multilateral policies, relations between dissatisfied actors and defenders of the focal institution will suffer, which means loss of gains from cooperation on focal institution both for actors who earn less (dissatisfied actors) and actors who earn more (defender actors).

Indeed, while contested multilateral policies undermine the cooperation between the two sides (dissatisfied and defenders) on the focal institution and negatively affect the gains of the actors from cooperation on the institution in the short term, positive effects may be seen in the long term. Regarding the positive impacts of contested multilateralism, firstly, dissatisfied actors will show their resolution messages and how serious their intentions are to the defender actors, and defender actors will act with this information after that. In other words, contested multilateralism solve the information asymmetry problem between dissatisfied and defender actors and bargaining on the previous institution's adjustment between actors may proceed more efficiently. Secondly, dissatisfied actors will have a more powerful position in institutional bargaining arrangements, and defender actors will not be able to unilaterally dominate the bargaining process (Faude & Parizek, 2020). In short, contested multilateral policies lead to a loss of gains on both sides, leading both sides to re-initiate the bargaining process based on cooperation on the focal institution, and actors who are not satisfied with this bargaining process will sit stronger than before. However, while defender actors may want cooperative arrangements similar to focal institution's regulations, dissatisfied actors will want to establish a cooperation

mechanism similar to the arrangements of the institution they have started to operate in later or newly created, which lead the actors to find themselves in the “Battle of Sexes” (Faude & Parizek, 2020).

This “Battle of Sexes” between the two sides will be resolved with the gradual adaptation of institutions to each other (Faude & Parizek, 2020). More specifically, “gradual adaptation implies that the governance activities of the overlapping institutions are adapted to each other” (Gehring & Faude, 2014, p. 479). The problem between the defender and the dissatisfied actors will gradually be solved by making concessions on both sides, and each level will be one step closer to the solution. The two sides will come together around the new regulations and redesign the rules of the institutions they are in within the framework they have agreed upon. They will take mutual steps to eliminate the strategic inconsistency. At the end of this process, a relationship will emerge within the complementarity framework between actors (Gehring & Faude, 2014). This relationship established within the framework of complementarity will occur in two ways within itself. In the former, the two institutions (pre-exist and later founded or used) will set the management functions to work together and co-govern the overlapping policy area. In the latter, the parties will mutually define their jurisdiction over the overlapping area and share governance functions among themselves. In this case, the overlap in the field of policy area will be eliminated, and the parties will act within the limits they have determined mutually (Gehring & Faude, 2014). In brief, dissatisfied actors within an institution have the option of pursuing contested multilateral policies/strategies. If they choose this option, they will either start to operate within another institution operating in a similar policy (regime shifting) or create another institution (competitive regime creation) operating in a similar policy area.

Further, as a result of contested multilateral policies, the institution’s rules they used or created later will conflict with the first institution and strategic inconsistency would be made. However, due to the loss of both sides from this situation, the parties will start to bargain on the pre-existing institution again. Then, the parties might come together within the framework of cooperation on the existing institution as expressed above. That is to say, even though contested multilateralism negatively affects the relationship between the parties in the short term, they have the potential to positively affect the relationship between parties in the long term.

Faude and Gehring (2017) also approach the concept of regime complex from a similar perspective to Alter and Raustiala and expressed the four essential features of regime complexes as overlapping, non-hierarchy between institutions, strategic behaviour of states in line with their interests and governance function on an issue area. Indeed, Faude and Gehring (2017) argue that “a regime complex as an entity has its own existence” and conceptualize the concept of regime complex as a “system of continuously interacting international institutions with overlapping membership and issue areas” (p. 188). Moreover, they (2017) also argue that functionally overlapping institutions in a policy area can compete against each other to become a regulatory authority on the governance of overlapping policy area, to receive the support of constituents and to get a greater share of resources (190; Gehring & Faude, 2013). Indeed, inter-institutional competition is further exacerbated by the differing goals of the institution. They (2017) then argue that that the competition between the institutions under the roof of regime complex will spontaneously turn into cooperation or division of labor as the institutions adapt to each other during their interactions unless some of the member countries of these institutions do not block or prevent the adaptation and solution process in line with their interests. However, at the same time, they (2017) contend that there is a possibility that the institutions cannot adapt to each other and the conflict will continue for a long time (p. 191; Gehring & Faude, 2013, pp. 124-126).

Indeed, Faude and Gehring (2017) argue that the division of labour between institutions operating in the overlapping policy area will spontaneously occur in three different ways. First, an institution operating in an overlapping policy area may drop its governance functions on overlapping policy area and focus on governance functions in other areas (stratificatory differentiation).

Second, governance functions or activities in the overlapping policy area are shared by institutions operating in the overlapping policy area in a way that each institution jurisdiction is different (sectoral differentiation). Third, the overlapping policy area is co-governed by institutions operating in this overlapping policy area inclusively (functional differentiation) (p. 191). Furthermore, they say that while the division of labour between institutions operating in overlapping policy area can generally occur spontaneously as a result of the interactions of the actors with each other as expressed above, it can also be designed by the institutions that are parties to the

overlapping policy area. That is to say, the regime complexes may ensure the order between the institutions operating in overlapping policy area by enabling the development of the institutional relationships in an organized manner (Gehring & Faude, 2013, p. 120). However, it achieves this by not having an official collective decision-making mechanism as in the institutions it hosts, but with the order that generally emerges spontaneously due to the gradual interaction of the institutions in contains (Gehring & Faude, 2013, p. 121). With respect to maintenance or endurance of division of labour between international institutions, they say that as long as there is no significant change in the balance of power between the institutions and their actors and the preferences of the multiple members, the inter-institutional division of labour will last (Gehring & Faude, 2014, p. 493).

Further, they (2017) classified the policies pursued by states between institutions operating in overlapping policy areas as forum shopping, regime shifting and competitive regime creation, and they approach these concepts from the same or similar perspective as the explanations given above about these concepts (p. 177). Yet, they state that there is no agreed approach in the literature as to whether these cross-institutional strategies followed by states facilitate or complicate the cooperation between international institutions (Gehring & Faude, 2017, p. 187). Regarding the relationship between the division of labour between institutions and cross-institutional strategies, they (2014) say that adaptation of institutions with each other and having distinct regulatory functions in the overlapping policy area eliminate the opportunity for forum-shopping for multiple members (p. 479).

In addition to these, Gehring and Faude (2013) divide the regime complexes into two categories as regime complexes composed of *operational institutions* and regime complexes composed of regulatory institutions (p. 124). Even though they (2013) do not explain this distinction in a fully-fledged systematic way, they provide brief information about the characteristics of the two types. Firstly, they say that operational institutions generally influence world politics with their executive activities rather than regulation they make and show military institutions conducting humanitarian intervention operations and banks' lending money to countries in times of crisis as operational institutions. It is talked above that today, many international institutions are operating in a policy area in the international system, and this causes institutional density and competition among institutions to be the regulatory authority

on policy areas that overlap. Gehring and Faude (2013) say that operational institutions specialize more on competency for these overlapping policy areas to go to the fore in this competition and gain comparative advantage over other actors. In short, Gehring and Faude (2013) state that operational institutions operate more in executive actions and focus much more on a particular competence to be preferred by actors to achieve specific policies and objectives. With respect to regulatory institutions, Gehring and Faude (2013) state that regulatory agencies support cooperation projects with their rules and prohibitions and cite the World Trade Organization (WTO) and environmental regimes as examples of regulatory regimes. Indeed, due to the fact that regulatory institutions operating in the same policy area make contradictory regulations regarding the governance of overlapping policy area, conflicts between institutions arise as to which rules prevail in overlapping area. In this inter-institutional conflict, while one group of actors would want the regulations of one institution to be applied in the overlapping policy area, another group would wish to the regulations of the other institutions to be valid in the overlapping policy area. The third group of actors can act as a mediator to find a middle ground between these two conflicting groups (Gehring and Faude, 2013, p. 125). However, suppose there is an unequal distribution of power among the actors involved in the conflict. In that case, the regulations of the actor who is strong in overlapping policy area over time will begin to prevail. Suppose the distribution of power between actors is more or less equal, and the mediating actors between the conflicting actors are effective enough. In that case, the conflict between actors will gradually give way to the division of labor between actors and gradual adaptation of institutions to each other (Gehring & Faude, 2013, p. 125). More specifically, they (2014) assert that in the latter case, it is more likely that overlapping policy area will be jointly governed rather than clear-cut sharing and separating the governance functions of institutions in the overlapping policy area (p. 481). Further, Gehring and Faude (2013) then state that in case that the division of labor occurs both in the regime complexes consisting of operational institutions and in the regime complexes consisting of regulatory institutions. In these cases, the competition dynamics between the actors will not completely disappear, but the cooperation between the actors will be positively affected by this synergy (p. 126).

With regard to intermediary actors, not only are there arguments in the literature that states make the cooperation between international institutions difficult by following cross-institutional strategies and contested multilateral policies on overlapping policy areas but also there are arguments that actors/states can facilitate the cooperation between international institutions operating in the same policy area and having conflicts regarding the regulations in overlapping policy area. Indeed, the actions of actors to resolve the conflict between institutions and improve cooperation between institutions find their place in the discussions that revolve around the concepts of interplay management, orchestration, policy coherence and inter-institutional order in the literature (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011; Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl, 2015; Faude & Gehring, 2017, p. 187). Furthermore, in some cases, the conflict between institutions operating in an overlapping policy area is resolved by formal cooperation agreements between institutions or by adding provisions to existing legal documents called saving clause, which draw the boundaries between institutions and determine the order of priority “in the application of conflicting laws” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004). However, how the saving clause resolves the dilemma between conflicting international institutions is not very clear in literature (Raustiala & Victor, 2004). In brief, besides the debates in the literature that actors prevent inter-institutional cooperation by following cross-institutional strategies and contested multilateral policies, there are arguments in literature that stalemate between international institutions operating in overlapping policy areas may be resolved and the actors of the institutions ensure international cooperation between institutions.

In addition, another group of actors affecting the relations between international institutions in literature are actors who are members of one of the international institutions operating in overlapping issue area but are not members of the other or others (single members). Indeed, these actors prevent the development of relations between international institutions by using unanimous decision-making mechanisms of their institutions in line with their interests (Hofmann, 2018, p. 887; Hofmann, 2009, pp. 46-47; Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 391). In other words, actors who are members of one of the institutions operating in overlapping issue area but other or others can veto the development of formal relations with the other institution or institutions in accordance with their interests and internal policy dynamics in the assembly of its institution which made decisions unanimously. In particular,

Hofmann has conceptualized this situation as “hostage-taking” (Hofmann, 2018, p. 887; Hofmann, 2009). In addition to the concept of hostage-taking, turf battle is one of the frequently used concepts in the regime complex literature as discussing the competition between institutions for the expansion of governance functions on an overlapping issue area. Although the concept of “turf battle” is not fully conceptualized in the regime complex literature, it is generally used in literature to mean the width of the jurisdiction of institutions in an issue area (Gehring & Faude, 2013, pp. 119-120; Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 333; Hofmann, 2009, p. 47).

In addition, Alter and Meunier’s symposium paper named *The Politics of International Regime Complexity* explains the main points and consequences of regime complexity and systematically addresses the points that most of the literature takes a cursory glance. This paper argues that “international regime complexity refers to the presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered” (Alter & Meunier, 2009, p.13). They (2009) then say that while parallel regimes imply situations where there is no overlap between institutions, nested regimes refer to intertwined circles and whose centres are one. Besides these, they argue that overlapping regimes refer to situations that “multiple institutions have authority over an issue, but agreements are not mutually exclusive or subsidiary to another” (p. 15). Indeed, Alter and Meunier argue that international regime complexes influence the actors’ policies and strategies and interactions with each other through five pathways as discussed below.

Firstly, Alter and Meunier argue that the scholars studying international cooperation focus too much on formal negotiation processes and rules as explaining international cooperation and interactions between actors. Yet, they often ignore the implementation phase of these rules (pp. 15-16). However, actors reinterpret the formal international agreements and regulations they made in the international environment within different policy dynamics during the implementation phase (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Indeed, the international regime complexity obscures the difference between the actors’ legal obligations based on agreements and implementation by creating an ambiguity for overlapping space upon legal arrangements on an issue, referred to as “fragmentation” in international law. More specifically, overlapping policy areas give the actors opportunity to choose legal regulations in line with their interests and hide the differences between

implementation of agreements and legal obligations arising from the legal agreements (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Secondly, they state that regime shifting and strategic inconsistency situations are cross-institutional political strategies that states can follow, and they conceptualize these cross-institutional political strategies as “chessboard politics” (pp. 16-17). Thirdly, they say that complexes would create ambiguity in overlapping policy areas, which make it difficult to understand cause and effects in international politics and that actors develop new policies in line with their interests in this ambiguity. Notably, to clarify these ambiguities, lawyers, experts, NGOs would be assigned more roles by actors (pp. 17-18). Fourthly, they argue that due to the formation of overlapping policy areas in the international system, representatives of institutions interact face to face and form small groups, which facilitate the cooperation between institutions by gathering them around common expectations, goals and norms. However, these small groups carry risks such as being insufficient to understand the policy dynamics outside the overlapping area and the formation of intra-group rivalry between actors (pp. 18-19). Fifthly, they state that, like other studies in the literature, international regime complexes can lead to competition between institutions. This may have both positive effects like spreading risk and gaining experience and negative effects like coordination failures for institutions. They then argue, as discussed in most of the studies in literature, that change in one institution may trigger the change in another institution. Besides these, they add that while international regime complexes make it difficult to find out who is responsible for the problems and failures in the overlapping policy areas of the complexes, they increase actors’ loyalty to the rules due to reputation concerns (pp. 19-20). In brief, Alter and Meunier systematically frame the main discussions on regime complexes and impacts of regime complexes on the international system in the literature around five points as discussed above.

Henning and Pratt (2020) built their theory developing arguments on the concept of hierarchy and differentiation, which are two crucial dimensions of the arguments made on the regime complex in the literature. Put more precisely, Henning and Pratt divide the concept of “order” into two dimensions as “hierarchical relations of authority” and “institutional differentiation”, and both explain the characteristics of these two concepts and their impacts on international cooperation (p. 2). In their unpublished paper, they first define the concept of regime complex and explain the

concepts of hierarchy and differentiation, and then how these two concepts affect international cooperation. They define the concept of regime complex as “a set of international institutions that operate in a common issue area and the (formal and informal) mechanism that coordinate them” (p 3). Further, they approach the concept of the institution from a broader perspective than other studies and claim that institutions may be formal or less formal unilateral, plurilateral, regional and global arrangements (pp. 3-4). Regarding the coordination structure of regime complex, they (2020) say that “mechanism of coordination includes both deliberate inter-institutional collaboration and recurring patterns of behavior that emerge from repeated interaction in a dense institutional environment” (pp. 3-4). More specifically and importantly, unlike most of the literature, they state that there may be a hierarchical authority relationship between institutions in the relations established within the framework of the regime complex (pp. 3-4).

Regarding the explanation of relations of authority, Henning and Pratt say that the relations of authority refer to “the degree to which institutions explicitly or implicitly” acknowledge the right of other institutions to make arrangements on the dynamics of cooperation (p. 9). In the context of regime complexity, they express that the variance of authority between institutions can range from the complete absence of hierarchy to a relationship where there is absolute hierarchy (p. 9). With respect to the impact of level of hierarchy upon international cooperation, they state that while the hierarchy level between institutions is inversely proportional to rule conflict between institutions, it is directly proportional to clearance of obligations and rates of compliance (p. 16). More specifically, as the hierarchy between institutions increases, the chances for actors to apply to forum shopping and probability for rule conflict decreases due to clearance of obligations (p. 16). In sum, in a regime complexes with a high level of hierarchy between institutions, while conflict between rules is less common, institutions’ and actors’ loyalty to formal obligations is more common due to reputational concerns.

Concerning differentiation, they describe differentiation as “the extent to which institutions in a regime complex vary in the functions they perform” (p. 10). More specifically, the level of differentiation between institutions in regime complexes ranges from completely differentiated institutions in function and rules to undifferentiated institutions that perform the same function and adopt rules upon the

same issue area. Regarding the impact of differentiation upon international cooperation, Henning and Pratt (2020) argue that as the level of differentiation decreases, level of substitutability of institutions for each other increases. This situation leads to increase in the probability of competition between institutions for the support of multiple members and governance functions on undifferentiated space (pp. 16-17). Further, while the level of differentiation is adversely proportional to rule conflict, it is directly proportional to the state's compliance with the institution's rules (Henning and Pratt, 2020, pp. 16-17). Besides, as the level of differentiation decreases, the probability that states apply for regime shifting and forum shopping as cross-institutional strategies increases due to the expansion of common issue area (Henning and Pratt, 2020, pp. 16-17).

Table 1 Expected Outcomes of Hierarchy and Differentiation

		Authority Relations	
		Hierarchical	Non-hierarchical
Institutional Differentiation	Differentiated	Low rule conflict and forum shopping; intermediate collaboration; strong compliance; dissatisfaction leads to stagnation.	Intermediate rule conflict and forum shopping; low collaboration; intermediate compliance; dissatisfaction leads to regime creation
	Undifferentiated	Intermediate rule conflict and forum shopping; high collaboration; intermediate compliance; dissatisfaction leads to regime shifting	High rule conflict and forum shopping; occasional collaboration; weak compliance; dissatisfaction leads to regime shifting or creation

The table above shows four different situations in the regime complexes in terms of hierarchy and differentiation: Hierarchical-Differentiated, Hierarchical-Undifferentiated, Non-Hierarchical-Differentiated and Non-Hierarchical-Undifferentiated. In the first situation, Hierarchical-Differentiated, the relationship between institutions is based entirely on hierarchy, and the institutions are focused on the areas of their expertise. The rules are clear, and there is a very low level of rule conflict, which lead to strong compliance. Besides, there is little room for forum

shopping due to the strong hierarchical relationship between institutions and low level of rule conflict (Henning & Pratt, 2020, p. 17). In the second situation, Hierarchical-Undifferentiated, rule conflict and forum shopping are more common than in the first case since the actors operate in the same subject area. Besides, given a hierarchical relationship between institutions, there are not many opportunities for inter-institutional competition. Further, states can attempt a regime shifting strategy in that institutions operate in the same policy area. Intermediate level of rule conflict gives institutions and actors some flexibility in compliance with the rules (Henning & Pratt, 2020, pp. 17-18).

In the third situation, Nonhierarchical-Differentiated, rule conflict and forum shopping are not seen much since they operate in different fields. Considering the non-hierarchical and differentiated situations, a low level of institutional collaboration would occur. Due to the absence of hierarchy, institutions and actors may sometimes break the rules. In addition, since institutions operate in different issue areas so cannot follow regime shifting strategy so often, they may resort to competitive regime creation strategy (Henning & Pratt, 2020, p. 18). In the fourth situation, Non-Hierarchical-Undifferentiated, considering that institutions operate in the same issue area in the absence of hierarchy, there will be a high level of competition between institutions for actor's supports, resources, and governance arrangements. Actors may exploit this competitive environment between institutions and frequently resort to forum shopping. Since there is no hierarchy between institutions and institutions operate in the same issue area, the conflict between rules will be at a high level, and compliance level will be very low. If the actors are not happy with their institutions, they can easily apply regime shifting and competitive regime creation (Henning & Pratt, 2020, p. 18).

Moreover, as one of the effects of regime complexes in the international system, Drezner (2009) argues that regime complexes would bring big powers to an advantageous position over small powers. Indeed, great powers use their technical sources like competent lawyers and experts, NGOs to ensure that complicated situations upon rules formed by regime complexity are interpreted in their favour (p. 66). Besides, thanks to the flexibility provided by the regime complexity, the great powers can effectively manage the reputational risks resulting from different interpretations of the rules (Drezner, 2009, p. 67). Alter, and Raustiala (2018) also

supported Drezner's (2009) arguments and say that regime shifting and contested multilateral policies require large amounts of resources to be followed as strategy, which puts great powers in an advantageous position as well (p. 28). In addition, there are also arguments in the literature that regime complexes favour less powerful actors. For example, Alter and Meunier (2009) argue that the international regime complexes enable technical experts and lawyers who advise governments and companies to come to the fore (p. 16). Indeed, although there are discussions in literature that regime complexes put less powerful actors in advantageous positions, many studies say that regime complexes put powerful actors in an advantageous position as Drezner and, Alter and Raustiala say.

Concerning its application in the literature, a wide range of topics such as climate change, refugee management, energy management, patent management, genetic resources, international financial regulations, maritime piracy, human trafficking and human rights are examined and analyzed within the framework of regime complex theory (Keohane & Victor, 2011; Betts, 2010; Colgan, Keohane, & Graaf, 2012; Helfer, 2009; Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Henning & Pratt, 2020; Struett, Nance, & Amrstrong, 2013; Gomez-Mera, 2015; Hafner-Burton, 2009). For example, Helfer (2009) examines and analyses the intellectual property system within the framework of regime complex theory and emphasizes regime shifting and impacts of regime complexity on both domestic and international politics. More specifically, in this case, considering the developing countries' resistance to raise the standards about intellectual property protection rights in WIPO and pressure on USA put by its intellectual property industry to raise the standards, developed countries (USA and European states) have moved the platform for negotiations of intellectual property rights from World Intellectual Property Organizations (WIPO) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) through Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement in 1994 (Helfer, 2009 ; Morse and Keohane, 2014, pp. 393-394). Many studies in literature has shown this as an example of regime shifting (Helfer, 2009; Morse and Keohane, 2014, pp. 393-394). Afterwards, the TRIPS set the minimum standards for the member countries of the WTO for intellectual property rights and made the WTO the primary dispute resolution mechanism on this issue. Regarding the WIPO, after this date, it has struggled to survive for a long time and

has recently begun to regain its dominance on this issue again (Morse & Keohane, 2014, p. 394).

Further, Henning and Pratt (2020) argue that international financial regulations are made by more than twenty institutions worldwide and that these financial institutions interact with global multilateral organizations like OECD and regional organizations like the EU (pp. 20-21). Indeed, they firstly say that monetary governance authorities functionally act within the division of labour and display differentiation to a great extent. In other words, they contend that financial institutions divide labour among themselves, and they specialize in their fields of competence, which prevents the conflict between rules. Secondly, for authority relations, they state that there are authority institutions in the international finance sector like Bank for International Settlements and Financial Stability Board (FSB) created by Group Twenty in 2009. Based on these, they characterize the order of international financial regulation as hierarchical-differentiated within the theoretical framework they build as shown above. In this regard, they say that the rule conflict between regulations of international financial institutions and competition between international financial institutions will be seen at very low levels, which give countries little chance to pursue forum shopping.

3.3 General Frame and Sum of Research

Information on the scope of the theoretical framework and concepts to be used in this study is provided below. The case study in this piece will be evaluated within the framework of the following concepts and frame. Indeed, research frameworks will be more detailed in the sections below.

This research aims to understand whether the relation between EU and NATO is competition, cooperation or both of them. In line with this research aim, regime complex theory is applied to reach a conclusion. Even though regime complex theory contains different dynamics and dimensions in itself, it basically consists of functional overlap and hierarchy (Alter & Raustiala, 2018; Gehring & Faude, 2013; Faude & Gehring, 2017). More specifically, regime complex theory contends that functionally overlapping institutions in a non-hierarchic way impact the international system (Gehring & Faude, 2013). Based on the arguments stated above, it is seen that

one of the impacts of the regime complexes upon the international institutions is the dynamics of the relationship between the institutions that enter the relations in the context of regime complexes. More specifically, based on the functional overlap and hierarchy level between international institutions that enter into relations, cooperation and competition dynamics change (Gehring & Faude, 2013). Indeed, first and in general, based on the argument in literature, I state that both competition and cooperation dynamics can be seen in the EU and NATO relationship. However, in the context of the basic dimensions of regime complex theory, which are functional overlap and hierarchy, I came up with the three more specifics narrowed sub-hypothesis in addition to the main hypothesis I stated. These are:

H₁: If there is no functional overlap between institutions, there will be no competition, irrespective of the hierarchy relations between institutions, cooperation is still possible between international institutions.

H₂: If there is a functional overlap and a high-level hierarchy between international institutions, their relationship tends to be more cooperative.

H₃: If there is a functional overlap and low hierarchy level between international institutions, their relationship tends to be more competitive.

Based on these hypotheses, to understand the competition and cooperation dynamics between EU and NATO, I look at the functional overlap and hierarchy dimensions in EU and NATO relations. Besides that, in the literature, it is also stated that institutions should have joint members to see the impacts and dynamics of the relationship entered into within the scope of the regime complex (Haftel & Lenz, 2021). Considering these arguments, besides the functional overlap and hierarchy dimensions, I will also look at the membership relations between these two institutions.

In the overlap section, to understand whether there is an overlap or not, I look at documents the EU, and NATO published and operations two organizations conducted. Moreover, although it is obvious that the two organizations have joint members, I examine in detail the joint members of the two organizations according to their enlargement processes. As a result, I argue that the EU and NATO functionally overlap in military crisis management policy competency. In terms of the membership, I show that the EU and NATO had joint members between 1993

and 2016, when they were relations, and currently the number of joint members of the two organizations is 21.

Furthermore, in the hierarchy section, I apply the hierarchy approach of Lake to evaluate EU-NATO relations in the context of hierarchy. Lake (2009) defines the hierarchy as “the extent of authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled” and says that authority is also a type of power but, it differs from the other types of power in that it is legitimate (pp. 9-24). Based on this mentality, to understand the authority relations between the EU and NATO then hierarchy relations, I evaluate the EU-NATO relations in the context of power and legitimacy.

The concept of power is evaluated in terms of resources and outcomes in the IR literature (Beckley, 2018). More specifically, it is argued in the literature that, in the context of power as resources, the more an actor has resources, the more powerful this actor is (Beckley, 2018; Treverton & Jones, 2005; Tellis et al., 2000). Besides that, in the context of power as the outcome, the power of an actor is evaluated according to his ability to achieve results in line with his preferences and desires in the international system (Beckley, 2018; Treverton & Jones, 2005; Tellis et al., 2000)

In the context of legitimacy, Lake (2009) states that the source of legitimacy in the modern world stems from consent (p. 24). More specifically, for the more powerful actor to have authority over the less powerful actors, these less powerful actors must consent to the stronger actor’s power/authority upon them. Further, in the literature, it has been stated that inferences about consent in the international system can be made by looking at public opinion, political communication and political behaviour (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019).

Based on Lake’s approach, to understand whether the hierarchy level between EU and NATO is low or high, I look at the authority relations between them. Given that authority consists of power and legitimacy and power can be generally evaluated in terms of resources and outcomes, I evaluate the EU and NATO relations within the framework of power as resources and power as outcomes. Besides the power relations between the EU and NATO, since another element of authority is legitimacy, I look at the legitimacy relationship between the EU and NATO. Since I look at behaviours that the EU exhibits in the context of power as outcome, I don’t

look at the EU's behaviors again and make inferences about the consent of EU to NATO's authority in public opinion and political communication.

As shown in more detail below, in terms of power as resources, NATO is more powerful than the EU. However, the EU has diffused/reduced the power that NATO has upon itself in the context of power as outcomes. In other words, NATO's power upon the EU is decreasing in the context of power as outcome. Furthermore, with respect to legitimacy, as I shown below, the EU consents to NATO's authority in public opinion. However, EU's consent to NATO's authority is less in 2016 than in 2002 and 2003 in the context of political communication. In other words, NATO's legitimacy upon the EU is less in 2016 than in 2002 and 2003 in the context of political communication.

When the frameworks that move in the same direction in terms of power and legitimacy are combined, the result is as follows: NATO is more powerful than the EU in the context of power as resources and EU consents to NATO's power in the context of public opinion. However, NATO's power upon the EU is decreasing in the context of power as the outcome, and NATO's legitimacy upon the EU is decreasing in political communication. Given that authority is consisted of power and legitimacy, it can be said that while NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion, NATO's authority upon the EU is decreasing within the framework of power as outcomes and political communication. To put it more succinctly, even though NATO has authority upon the EU, this authority that NATO has upon the EU is decreasing. Considering the Lake's (2009, p. 9) definition of hierarchy, "the extent of authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled", it can be said that even though there is the hierarchy between NATO and the EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy relation is decreasing.

As a result, as the data shows below, it can be said that there is a functional overlap between EU and NATO, which is a military crisis management policy area. Besides that, as the data shows below, it can be said that even though there is a hierarchy between NATO and EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy relation is decreasing. That is, there is a functional overlap between EU and NATO, and even though there is hierarchy between NATO and EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy is decreasing. From this point of view, by considering the hypothesis that I came up with based on

the arguments in the regime complex literature, it can be said that the relationship between the EU and NATO is on the way of shifting from cooperation to competition.

Concerning basic concepts used in this research, the concept of the international institution will be used within the framework of Duffield's definition of institution: "relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states and as well as non-state entities), and their activities" (Duffield, 2007, p. 2). Within the scope of this definition, as used in the most of the literature, the concept of the institution will be used to mean the same as "formal organizations, practices, rules and norms" (Duffield, 2007, p. 3). In this study, as Oran Young (1986) states, regimes will also be accepted as an institution, and the concept of the regime will be used within the framework of Krasner's definition of the regime, "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectation converge in a given issue-area" (Krasner, 1983, p. 2).

Furthermore, with respect to complexity in the international system or complex systems, the definition of Alter and Meunier (2009), "a system with a large number of elements, building blocks or agents capable of interacting with each other and with their environment" will be taken into consideration" (p. 14). With the combination of concepts of regime and complexity / complex systems through Koestler's method/notion of bisociation, the theoretical framework of regime complexity has been used to explain the relationship between international institutions that contain different dynamics and their impacts upon the international system (Koestler, 1964; Dubitzky, Kötter, Schmidt, & Berthold, 2012, pp. 11-12). Based on these, the concept of regime complex is used in this study as the framework of international inter-institutional relationships. Two or more international institutions in the absence of absolute hierarchy relations come together upon a partially overlapping competency/policy-issue area.

In the next section, the functional overlap between EU and NATO in the military crisis management policy competency will be shown based on the data extracted from primary and secondary sources. In addition to that, joint members of the two

organizations will be examined within the scope of the periods separated according to the enlargement process of the two organizations.

In another section, the hierarchy relation between EU and NATO will be explained based on the arguments I stated above. Indeed, based on the data extracted from World Bank's database, primary sources and secondary sources, I will show that even though there is a hierarchy between NATO and the EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy is decreasing.



CHAPTER 4: FUNCTIONAL AND MEMBERSHIP OVERLAPPING BETWEEN EU AND NATO

To understand the competition and cooperation dynamics in EU-NATO relations, first of all, it is necessary to understand whether these two institutions overlap functionally and if they do, on which policy competency they overlap. Indeed, for a relationship to be defined as a regime complex, these two organizations must functionally overlap (Rabitz, 2018; Gehring & Faude, 2013; Alter & Raustiala; 2017; Haftel & Lenz, 2021). In this regard, the functional overlap between EU and NATO in military crisis management policy competency is explained in this section. In addition to functional overlap, in the literature, it has been stated that to observe the systemic effects of the relationship entered into within the scope of the regime complex, the institutions should also have joint members (Haftel & Lenz, 2021; Gehring & Faude, 2013). In this context, in this section, before moving on to the functional overlap between the two institutions, overlap in membership between two institutions is examined in years determined based on the enlargement process of these two institutions.


4.1 Overlapping in Membership between EU and NATO in the Different Periods of the Relationship

As stated above, to observe the systemic impacts of the relationship based on the regime complex, these institutions have to have joint members. Moreover, cornering EU and NATO, currently, while the EU has 27-member states, NATO has 30-member states, and 21-member states are members of both organizations. In other words, two organizations currently have common 21-member states. However, considering the enlargement processes of the two institutions, the two institutions have had different numbers of joint members in different periods in the relationship. In this context, in this part, to observe the change in joint members in the process, the

number of members and joint members of two institutions are examined in the four different years: 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015. Indeed, years are configured based on enlargement periods of the two organizations to see the impact of the enlargement processes of both organizations upon the number of joint members. Besides these years, even though 2021 are outside the scope of this research, the number of members and joint members of EU and NATO in 2021 are also examined to see how the overlapping in membership of both organizations has evolved from the beginning of relations (EU-NATO) to now. As a result of the examination, it is seen that the number of joint members of two organizations in all the periods we examine is above 55%.


Furthermore, it is seen that the most considerable increase in the number of members of two organizations and joint members of two organizations is observed between 2000 and 2005. Despite the significant increase in the number of joint members, due to accession of Southern Cyprus to EU in 2004, which has bilateral problems with NATO member Turkey, relations between EU and NATO have not been able to function properly on the official ground after this date. This situation shows that even if the rate of overlap in the membership ratios of organizations increases, the bilateral problems between the members who are not joint can negatively affect the relations between the two organizations and forestall the development of relations facilitated by the increase in overlap in the membership.

Table 2 The EU and NATO Overlapping in Membership in 1993



The EU was officially established in 1993 with the identity of the European Union. With its establishment, it started to operate in a wide range policy area from security policies to environmental policies. Indeed, it was established by 12 states that are members of the European Economic Community. At the time when the EU was established, 11 of the 12 states that were members of the EU were also NATO members (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d.; *Member Countries*, 2020). Moreover, regarding NATO, NATO also had 16 members in 1993 and 11 of these 16 members, as stated, are joint members (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d.; *Member Countries*, 2020). In short, when the Cold War was over, and new policy dynamics in international politics emerge in international politics, at least %68 of the members of the two organizations were joint members. The above table and information regarding the membership of both organizations in the period when the Cold War ended shows that even though European states established their organization, their organization has not yet shown a significant differentiation from NATO in terms of membership.

Table 3 The EU and NATO Overlapping in Membership in 2000




Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. With the accession of these countries to the EU, the number of EU members has increased to 15 (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d). Furthermore, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999 (*Member Countries*, 2020). With the accession of these countries to the EU, the number of NATO members has increased to 19. Even though two organizations increased the number of their members, the number of joint members remained the same.

Further, due to an increase in the number of their non-joint members, the percentage of joint members decreased. In addition to these, in the post-Cold War period, NATO has started to establish bilateral relations with non-NATO countries in different regions to ensure stability and ensure peace and security outside of NATO territory within the framework of cooperation, partnership and dialogue. In this context, NATO has maintained its bilateral relations with non-NATO states in the Euro-Atlantic region with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program initiated at the Brussel Summit in 1994 within political and military cooperation, partnership and dialogue (*Partnership for Peace Program*, 2020). Finland and Sweden joined PfP in 1994. Austria joined PfP in 1995 and Ireland in 1999 (*Partnership for Peace Program*,

2020). In sum, NATO and the EU increased the number of their members between 1993 and 2000. Also, NATO has created a mechanism to regulate bilateral relations with non-member states in the Euro-Atlantic region and created an opportunity for itself to refer to it if needed.


Table 4 The EU and NATO Overlapping in Membership in 2005



Between 2000 and 2005, while the EU increased the number of members from 15 to 25 through the Eastern Enlargement Round in 2004, NATO increased the number of members from 19 to 26 as a result of the enlargement process in 2004 (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d.; *Member Countries*, 2020). As a result of the accession of Balkan states to the membership in both organizations, the number of joint members increased from 11 to 19. The percentage of joint members also increased from 57% to 73%. It was noteworthy that in 2004, both organizations accepted countries for membership that were under Soviet influence during the Cold War period. In addition, another important development in terms of membership during this period was the acceptance of Southern Cyprus to EU membership. Considering the bilateral problems between Turkey and Southern Cyprus upon the status of Island and Turkey's NATO membership but EU, bilateral problems between the two countries prevented the two organizations from working together on the legal ground (Acikmese & Triantaphyllou, 2012, p. 555). After the accession of Southern Cyprus

to the EU, one of the most common arguments in the literature has been on the negative impact of the bilateral problems between Southern Cyprus and Turkey upon the EU and NATO relations. Besides, another issue that is worth mentioning is the accession of Malta to the EU. Although Malta joined the PfP program in 1995, it then suspended its participation due to neutrality concerns (*Relations with Malta*, 2021). In brief, although the number of joint members between two organizations increased significantly in 2005, as said above, the acceptance of the Southern Cyprus to EU membership in this period would be one of the biggest obstacles to the progress of relations between two organizations on the official ground in the future.


Table 5 The EU and NATO Overlapping in Membership in 2010



Between 2005 and 2010, while NATO entered the enlargement process in 2009 and increased the number of members from 26 to 28, the European Union entered an enlargement process in 2007, increasing the number of members from 25 to 27 (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d.; *Member Countries*, 2020). As a result of these enlargement processes, the number of joint members of two organizations increased from 19 to 21. In addition, Malta reactivated its participation in the PfP in 2008, which is suspended in 1996 (*Relations with Malta*, 2021). With Malta’s reactivation of the PfP program, Southern Cyprus remained the only one among the EU members in terms of not having a framework regulating bilateral relations with NATO. In sum,


although the number of joint members increased during this period, there was no development in the direction of the bilateral relations between Southern Cyprus and NATO.

Table 6 The EU and NATO Overlapping in Membership in 2015



While NATO did not enter an enlargement process between 2010 and 2015, the number of EU members increased from 27 to 28 as a result of its enlargement in 2013 (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d.; *Member Countries*, 2020). The number of joint members of the two organizations also increased from 21 to 22, which means to increase in the percentage of common members from 74% to 78%. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, the number of members of the two organizations reached the same level for the first time in history in this period. In sum, during this period, the increase in the number of joint members continued.

Table 7 The EU and NATO Overlapping in Membership in 2021



While NATO increased its number of members from 28 to 30 by the enlargement rounds it experienced in 2017 and 2020, the number of EU members decreased from 28 to 27 as a result of Britain's exit from the EU on 31 January 2020 (*40 Years of EU Enlargement*, n.d.; *Member Countries*, 2020). Indeed, The UK decided to leave the EU with a referendum held in June 2016 and officially left the EU in January 2020. As a result of the departure of the UK from the EU, the number of joint members decreased from 22 to 21 (Oliver & Williams, 2016, p. 547). Britain's departure from EU membership is important since a member decides to leave the union for the first time in the history of the EU. It is also important because Britain was the country that served as a bridge between NATO and the EU. I think that the effects of Britain's withdrawal from EU membership on EU-NATO relations may get along better after a while.

Table 8 EU Enlargement Rounds

EU Enlargement Rounds			
Number	Enlargement Round	Member states acceding	Accession Year
1	Northern Enlargement	Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom (UK)	1973
2	Mediterranean Enlargement	Greece	1981
		Portugal, Spain	1986
3	EFTA Enlargement	Austria, Finland, Sweden	1995
4	Eastern Enlargement	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia	2004
		Bulgaria, Romania	2007
5	Balkan Enlargement	Croatia	2013

Table 9 NATO Enlargement Steps

NATO Enlargement Steps		
Number	Member States Acceding	Accession Year
1	Turkey, Greece	1952
2	Germany	1955
3	Spain	1982
4	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland	1999
5	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	2004
6	Albania, Croatia	2009
7	Montenegro	2017
8	North Macedonia	2020




Figure 1 Number of EU, NATO and Joint Members in the Process

After establishing the EU in 1993, one of the crucial dynamics affecting its relations with NATO has been the membership structures of two organizations. As can be seen above, the number of joint members between two organizations has always been more than half of the number of members of the two organizations from 1993 until today. Moreover, the biggest increase in the number of members and joint members of organizations occurred as a result of the enlargement process experienced by the two organizations in 2004. In fact, despite the significant increase in the number of joint members as a result of accession processes of two organizations in 2004, the accession of Southern Cyprus to the EU, which has bilateral problems with NATO member Turkey upon the future of island, has negatively affected EU-NATO relations. Furthermore, another striking point in the light of the graph data given above is that the two organizations reached the same number of members in 2013 for the first time in history. This situation continued until 2017 when NATO accepted North Macedonia as a member state. In addition to these, comparing the number of members in 1993, when two organizations started to enter into relations under the umbrella of EU-NATO relations in the post-Cold War period, and today will show us the change in the number of members and the number of joint members. The increase or decrease in the number of joint members can also give us a clue about the bond

between two organizations and the overlap level (membership) between the two organizations. In this context, while the EU had 12 members in 1993 when it was founded, this number reached 27 in 2021. While NATO had 16 members in 1993, this number increased to 30 in 2021. Indeed, while the EU has expanded by 125% in terms of membership in the past 28 years, NATO has expanded by 87.5% in terms of membership. Regarding the joint members, while the number of joint members of two organizations was 11 in 1993, this number increased to 21 in 2021. In the intervening 28 years, the number of joint members of the two organizations has increased by 91%. In sum, the EU and NATO have had joint members in every period since 1993, the year they started to enter into relations, and the number of these joint members has increased in the process.

4.2 Functional Overlapping between EU and NATO in Military Crisis Management

To see the systemic effects of the relationship entered into within the regime complex, the international institutions that enter into the relationship must functionally overlap. In fact, for the relationship to be regime complex and for observing the systemic effects of the regime complex, such as competition and cooperation, at least one of the functions of these international institutions must be the same (Alter & Raustiala, 2018, p. 333). In the context of EU and NATO relations, to observe both competition and cooperation dynamics between institutions, these institutions must functionally overlap. In this regard, as shown below, EU and NATO functionally overlap in military crisis management policy competency. Therefore, before moving to data that show the functional overlap between EU and NATO, sharing the basic arguments about crisis and crisis management enables us to understand the policy competency better that EU and NATO functionally overlap.

4.2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management

The concept of crisis has an interdisciplinary use and has been developed in the context of the concept of conflict in the literature (Brecher, 1996, p. 128). Concerning conflict, Brecher (1996) says that “conflicts are characterized by two or more parties engaged in mutually hostile actions and using coercion to injure or

control their opponents” (p. 128). He then adds that the concept of international conflict is used to express the disputes between the actors of the international system, which can be states, non-state actors, religious, economic and social groups. Indeed, the concept of international conflict covers a wide range of behaviours, from verbal and physical threats to full-fledged wars that occur in the international system (Brecher, Potter, & Durocher 2008, p. 6).

Houben (2005) states that today’s crisis is multi-dimensional and contain economic, social, political, ecological, and environmental dimensions together and adds that the concept of crisis has been approached from two broad perspectives, constructivist and realist, in the literature. He then contends that while constructivist approaches the concept of crisis with the understanding that “a crisis is a crisis only when it is conceived as a crisis”, realist understandings approach the crisis in an objective, normative and absolute framework (p. 9). Afterwards, he argues that the concept of crisis has following the five characteristics: “multi-dimensional in their manifestation, indirect and direct in their consequences, geographically diffuse, asymmetrical, uncertain and unpredictable in their developments” (pp. 19-20). Moreover, Coombs (as cited in Zamoum & Gorpe, 2017) makes the following statement regarding the concept of crisis:

crisis is defined as a significant threat of operations that can have negative consequences if not handled properly. In crisis management, the treat is the potential damage a crisis can inflict on an organization, its stakeholders, and an industry. A crisis can create three related threats: (1) public safety, (2) financial loss, (3) reputation loss (“No Page Numbers,” para 19)

Moreover, Brecher, Potter and Durocher (2008) evaluate the concept of crisis as one of the concepts developed within the framework of the concept of conflict under two different headings: international crisis and foreign policy crisis. First of all, he says that international crises are initiated by an act, change, or movement that occurs in the international system or domestic politics of state and threaten other actors operating in the international system. They then say that the actor or actors operating in the international system, who perceived this change, behaviour, or movement as a threat to their basic values, react against the threat situation by another adversary reaction who risks turning into violence. Then the relationship between the actors

may turn into hostile interaction with the risk of violence. Brecher, Potter and Durocher then argue that the international crisis refers to situations where these hostile interactions with the risk of violence between actors pose a threat to the functioning of the international system. In other words, Brecher, Potter and Durocher say that for a situation to be expressed as an international crisis, firstly, there must be a threat situation against an actor or actors of the international system or functioning of the international system. Secondly, actors of the international system under threat should respond to this threatening situation. Thirdly, due to the response, hostile interactions between actors occur, which is called international crisis (p. 9).

Furthermore, International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project researchers Wilkenfeld and Brecher (2003) state that three basic features of crisis are “1) a threat to basic values; 2) a finite time for response and; 3) high probability of involvement in military hostilities” (“No Page Numbers,”). Further, Brecher, Potter and Durocher evaluate the concepts of the military security crisis, international military security crisis within the scope of inter-state crisis concept and state that the main three indicators of international military security crisis are “value threat, action demonstrating resolve, and overt hostility” (p. 8). Brecher, Potter and Durocher then show the events as an example of military security crisis, and some of these examples are: threatening statements and military mobilization moves of major European powers in 1914, the decision of the SSCB to cut off land transport to West Berlin following the decision of the Western powers to unite their occupation zones, the USA quarantine the roads on the Caribbean as a result of the Soviets deploying missiles in Cuba in 1962, the threat of SSCB to intervene unilaterally in the Yom Kippur War and as a result of this USA alarm of its air forces in different regions, North Korean admission of continuation on its nuclear weapons program, which is halted by signing an agreement with the US in 1993 and the US worrying reactions to this admission. With respect to foreign policy crisis, they say that the foreign policy crisis stands for the beginning phase of international crisis and add that “higher than normal threat to one or more basic values, finite time for response, and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities” are the main features of foreign policy crises (p. 9). They then contend that when the actor who perceives the threat responds, hostile interactions would begin between the actors, leading to an international crisis. They then argue that the military security crisis that occurs in the international arena takes place between the states operating in the international

system. The crisis that occurs in the domestic policy would remain as a domestic policy crisis unless they threaten any of the actors operating in the international system. However, they argue that if a change, event or act in domestic policy poses a threat for an actor or actors operating in the international system, requires an urgent response and have a risk of turning into military conflict in the international arena in the future, this domestic event can turn into an international crisis. That is to say, if an event occurring in domestic politics fits the triangle of threat, urgent response, and risk of military violence created within the framework of the concept of crisis, this incident taking place in domestic politics can gain an international dimension. As an example of this situation, Brecher, Potter, and Durocher show how the crises in Yugoslavia's domestic politics between 1991 and 2001 gained an international character. In line with the Brecher, Potter and Durocher argument, Stern (2003) argues that the boundaries between domestic and international politics are eroded as a result of globalization, regional integration, and internationalization processes. Therefore, events that took place in domestic and international politics became more likely to affect each other (p. 189). In other words, as a result of globalization, regional integration movements and internationalization steps, domestic policy crises are more prone to gain an international dimension. With respect to phases of crisis, in the literature, it is seen that crises are generally examined in 3 or 4 periods: the pre-crisis period, the crisis period and post-crisis period or pre-crisis period (onset phase), crisis period (escalation phase), end-crisis period (de-escalation phase), and post-crisis period (impact phase) (Zamoum & Gorpe, 2017; Brecher, 2017, p. 16).

Studies conducted within the scope of foreign policy and international crisis in IR generally focus on military and security-based threats. Crisis related to military and security affairs refers to threats involving the possibility / risk of turning into violence against the core values of actors operating in the international system. Since economic threats generally do not carry the risk of turning into conflict and do not require urgent intervention, which are characteristics of crises in the field of international relations expressed above, situations that involve only economic threats are generally not considered within the scope of operations organized within the scope of crisis management. In addition to economic threats, there are different approaches in the literature regarding threats related to environmental and health conditions. Although situations such as natural disasters and epidemics are described

as crises by some studies in the literature or by some institutions, they are somewhat outside the framework of the definition of crisis made within the scope of IR. It would be better to characterize environmental, biological and health related situations as disasters rather than crises.

In brief, although there are different approaches to the concept of crisis and crisis management in the literature, many studies have agreed that crises create threats to the actors in the international system and the functioning of the international system that requires urgent intervention or reaction. In addition to these, features such as multidimensionality of crises, creating an environment of uncertainty, carrying the risk of turning into a military conflict, and having a geographically wide area of influence come to the fore in the IR literature upon crisis. Based on the studies in the literature, in this study, situations requiring urgent reactions that pose a threat to the functioning of the international system and international actors will be the main features that indicate the concept of international crisis. And also, as stated in the literature, multi-dimensionality, dispute that has the probability of turning into military violence, the environment of uncertainty will be regarded as the other characteristics of the crisis. In this context, within the scope of this study, I will define the concept of international crisis as threats that require urgent intervention or reaction against the fundamental values of the actors of the international system and that contain features such as multi-dimensionality in nature, the environment of uncertainty, and the risk of turning into violence.

Furthermore, activities organized as a response to the crisis are generally evaluated around crisis management. Within the concept of crisis management, a wide range of activities such as responding to crisis, ensuring the containment of the crisis, contributing to the strengthening of peace and stability in the long term, preventing crisis turning into conflict, etc., are expressed. Indeed, it is not possible to find an agreed definition of crisis management in the literature, and studies in the literature draw their frames within the scope of the concept of crisis management from their point of view. Although the concept of crisis management has been expressed within the framework of different concepts in different periods of history, the foundation of crisis management in this modern sense was laid by the development of concepts such as issue management during the Cold War. Issue and crisis are mutually related concepts. The crisis results from an issue that cannot be agreed upon; issue to deal

with stems from a crisis. The concept of issue management is used for the first time by Howard Chase (as cited in Jacques, 2009). He defines the concept as “the capacity to understand mobilize, coordinate, and direct all strategic and policy making functions, and all public affairs/public relations skills, toward achievement of one objective: meaningful participation in creation of public policy that affects personal and institutional destiny” (pp. 25-29; Zamoum & Gorpe, 2017). Moreover, in the post-Cold War period, the concept of issue management was narrowed down more and, the concept of crisis management began to be used more frequently within a particular framework. As stated above, in the discipline of IR in general, the concept of crisis management is used to express the reactions and responses of countries and IOs, as actors of the international system, to threats having a risk of turning into violence that both occur outside of their territories and require urgent intervention.

Furthermore, Houben (2005) states that the concept of crisis management is generally used together with the concept of military (as military crisis management). He defines the concept of crisis management as “coordinated (and institutionalized efforts) aimed at and intended to redress a situation conceived as intolerable and unjust, and in which use of force cannot be excluded” (p. 10). Houben then states that he would use the concept of crisis management to refer to peacekeeping operations organized within the framework of chapter 6 of the UN Charter and peace enforcement operations organized within the framework of chapter 7 of the UN Charter and non-article 5 NATO operations. He also says that since the normal decision-making procedures are not applied to the relief operations organized after natural disasters and diseases, he does not consider these operations within the concept of crisis management. Similar to arguments made by Houben (2005), Mitroff and Anagnos (2000) argue that the activities carried out within the scope of crisis management are conducted against threats caused by man. Since threats such as natural disasters and diseases are not caused by human hand, they cannot be evaluated within the scope of crisis management. They then add that activities against threats caused by emerging natural disasters and diseases can be evaluated within the scope of emergency management, risk management, and disaster management concepts. As mentioned above, crisis management operations generally focus on reducing the negative impact caused by the crisis. As stated above, the concept is used to denote various activities and other concepts. Although the actor

draws the boundaries of the concept of crisis management uses it, the concept generally is used to refer to concepts of humanitarian intervention, peace building operations, peace keeping operations, post conflict management operations, peace operations, peace support operations, external operations, crisis response operations and operations short of war.

Furthermore, NATO (2013) defines the concept of crisis management as “the coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result” in its document named APP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (p. 2-C-18). In addition to NATO’s definition of crisis management, in IATE (Interactive Terminology for Europe), the terminology database of the EU, the definition of the concept of crisis management is stated as “process of planning and implementing measures aimed at preventing, reducing, responding and recovering from crisis” (2018). As can be seen from the crisis management definitions made by the two organizations as well, in crisis management operations, actors come together within a certain coordination process to eliminate the crisis, mitigate the impact of crisis, and prevent the crisis from turning into conflict. In other words, both organizations emphasize that crisis management is a proactive process that will cover the crisis from the beginning to end and even the post-crisis period. It has also been emphasized that the purpose of crisis management is to prevent the country or organization from drowning in the crisis, to minimize the impact of the crisis during the crisis and in the post-crisis period. Further, it is important to say again that crisis management operations are organized outside the boundaries of the operating actor in the international system.

Besides these, crisis management operations, in general, are divided into military and civilian operations, according to the presence or absence of military elements. While the operations in which the military participated are evaluated within the framework of the military crisis management concept, the operations in which there are no soldiers but in which police officers, lawyers, judges and other experts with knowledge in a specific field participate within the framework of crisis management concept are called civilian crisis management operations (Fahron-Hussey, 2018, p.239). Put it differently, while crisis management operations in which soldiers do not participate are called civilian crisis management operations, crisis management operations in which soldiers attend are called military crisis management operations.

In line with this distinction, within the scope of this study as well, while the crisis management operations in which the soldiers participate are named as military crisis management operations, the operations in which the soldiers do not participate, instead of which the police, lawyers, judges and experts participate will be called civilian crisis management operations. Moreover, in this study, the concept of crisis management will be evaluated in the context of operations organized by the EU and NATO against threats requiring urgent intervention other than disasters and diseases that occur outside their territories and have the risk of turning into violence. Further, as stated above, these operations, which are organized within the scope of crisis management, are a proactive process that covers the period from the beginning of the crisis to post-crisis period. Crisis management operations organized with the missions to prevent threats from turning into conflict, to prevent threats from occurring, to reduce the intensity of threats and to eliminate threats. Furthermore, since threats within the scope of disasters, environment, epidemic diseases do not have the risk of turning into violence and are not within the scope of human-made threats, the situations created by these threats will not be evaluated within the framework of concept of crisis in this study. The operations organized by the two organizations within this scope (disaster and disease) will not be included in the operations organized within the framework of crisis management concept.

4.2.2 EU and NATO Overlapping in Military Crisis Management

NATO started to operate in the field of defence in 1949. Throughout the Cold War period, it operated with the function of providing the defence and security of the Euro-Atlantic region. Indeed, despite the establishment of an organization called the Western European Union (WEU) by the European states in the early years of the Cold War era, which includes mutual defence commitments and functionally overlap with NATO, it remained idle throughout the Cold War period due to reasons such as the fact that all members of the organization are NATO members and NATO is more advanced in terms of capacity and capability. In addition to that, throughout the Cold War, although the European states attempted to establish their security and defence mechanism under the leadership of France with the Pleven Plan and the Fouchet Plan, these attempts failed due to the sovereignty concerns of countries (Acikmese & Dizdaroğlu, 2013).

In the post-cold war period, after the official establishment of the EU with the Maastricht Agreement in 1993, the EU started to develop policies within the scope of foreign and security policies. With the development of policies of EU within the scope of foreign and security policies, discussions and the probability that EU could operate in the same policy area as NATO increases. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, NATO tried to identify new security risks and threats in the face of new security environment. In this context, both organizations have generally expressed the security threats that emerged with the end of the Cold War within the following concepts: ethnic conflicts, regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime, economic distress, the proliferation of mass destruction and terrorism. Both organizations took steps to determine their functions within the scope of these threats in the Post-Cold War period. Indeed, since NATO was operating around the principle of collective defense during the Cold War period, instead of establishing a structure from the bottom, it gradually expanded the scope of its collective defense function within the scope of changing threat perception. However, EU member states had to build security and defence policy from scratch in the Maastricht Agreement they signed on 7 February 1992. As stated, although the WEU was established under the leadership of the UK and France in the last years of the first half of the 20th century, the WEU remained dysfunctional in the Cold War period. EU member states, however, tried to turn this step (establishment of WEU) taken during the Cold War into an opportunity and stated in the Maastricht Treaty that the WEU could be requested for the execution of the EU's decisions regarding the defence (*Maastricht Treaty*, 1992).

Moreover, NATO gave the signals about the functions it would adopt in the post-Cold War period in the Strategic Concept document published in 1991. This document expressed that, in addition to its defense and deterrence functions, NATO would adopt the consultancy and crisis management functions in the face of new security threats and risks. At the same time, it (1991) also states that alliance could enter into cooperation and dialogue with other non-member actors within the Broad Approach to Security framework in the face of new multidimensional threats.

Furthermore, NATO (1999) expressed the functions it adopted in the new security environment after the Cold War in a more transparent and framed way in the Strategic Concept it published in 1999. In this context, in this document, NATO has designated its functions as security, defence and deterrence, crisis management,

consultation and partnership. Considering that NATO was established against the Soviet threat during the Cold War and laid its foundation in this context, NATO laid its second foundation just after the Cold War with the changing threat perception. It took steps to strengthen this foundation in the last decade of the 20th century.

Moreover, concerning the EU, it (1992) states in the Maastricht Treaty that it would develop its security policies within the scope of Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP). Indeed, very general expressions were used in the agreement regarding the security and defence. It was stated that the issues related to the security of the union would be evaluated within the framework of the CFSP, and it was stated that the union could also operate in the field of defense in the future (*Maastricht Treaty*, 1992). The fact that the union did not use explicit expressions in the context of CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty has raised questions about whether the policies developed in this context would be developed under the umbrella of EU independent of NATO or under the roof NATO. Indeed, until the early stages of the 21st century, the discussions within the scope of CFSP progressed in this direction. Since the Maastricht Treaty did not use clear statements about the functions of the union in the context of CFSP, it is not possible to say that EU and NATO overlap in any policy area within the scope of CFSP by looking at the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, it can be said that when the Maastricht Agreement was signed, the EU and NATO were not yet operating in the same policy area in the context of CFSP on paper (*Maastricht Treaty*, 1992).

Moreover, WEU, which was stated as the defence pillar of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty, adopted new functions in the context of crisis management at the WEU Council of Ministers in June 1992. The tasks known as the Petersberg Tasks includes humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (*Petersberg Declaration*, 1992). These functions, known as Petersberg Functions, were included in EU Agreement with the Amsterdam Treaty signed on October 2, 1997, and entered into force on May 1, 1999. With the incorporation of Petersberg Tasks into the EU Treaty, the EU turned an organization operating in the field of crisis management policy area on paper within the scope of CFSP (*Treaty of Amsterdam*, 1997). With the Amsterdam Treaty, specific policy areas/functions were included in the CFSP for the first time. In another saying, with the incorporation of Petersberg Tasks into the EU Treaty, the

EU and NATO have begun to overlap in the crisis management policy on paper for the first time in history. At the Cologne Summit, Helsinki Summit, Santa Maria Da Feira Summit, Nice Summit, it was stated that the union should take steps within the scope of capability and capacity development within the scope of both military and civil crisis management. With these statements, union's activity in the field of crisis management policy became more evident (*Cologne European Council, 1999; Helsinki European Council, 1999; Santa Maria Da Feira European Council, 2000; Nice European Council, 2000*). That is to say, the two organizations began to overlap on paper in the last years of the 20th century.

Concerning operations conducted between the 1990 and 2000, while NATO gets started 14 of the 30 military crisis management operations between 1990-2000, the EU did not carry out any operations during these years. These 14 military crisis management operations show that NATO has become functional in military crisis management both on paper and in practice just after the post-Cold War. At the same time, the fact that the EU has not organized any operations within the scope of crisis management between 1990-2000, which is added to its functions in the last years of the 20th century, shows that the EU has not yet been fully operational in this policy area during this period. For this reason, it can be said that the two organizations gave signals of overlapping in function on paper in crisis management in the last years of the 20th century. Still, they could not fully overlap due to the fact that the EU is not yet operational in this sense.

After it became more evident that the two organizations functionally overlap in crisis management on paper, the two organizations published a joint declaration on ESDP in 2002 and the strategic partnership established by the two organizations within the scope of crisis management was emphasized in this declaration. In this declaration, there are statements that the two organizations jointly operate in the field of crisis management, and the emphasis on strategic partnership in the field of crisis management also proves that the two organizations operate in the field of crisis management (*EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 2002*).

Furthermore, to express its vision in a systematic and framed way within the scope of security and defence policies in the light of the arrangements, the EU published the European Security Strategy in 2003 and emphasized the role of union in both

military and civilian crisis management by stating that the “first line of defense will be abroad” in the document (*European Security Strategy*, 2003). In the European Security Strategy published in 2003 and at the summits held in the last years of the 20th century, it has been stated that the EU should improve itself in terms of both civil and military capabilities within the scope of crisis management. It was stated that the EU would operate within the scope of both military and civilian crisis management. Briefly, the fact that the documents published by the EU state that the union would operate in both military and civilian dimensions of crisis management and shows that union operates in both military and civilian context within the scope of crisis management on paper, at least in this term. Furthermore, as detailed above, the EU and NATO put into practice several arrangements called Berlin Plus Arrangements on March 17, 2003, within the scope of establishing an institutional link between the two organizations and making use of NATO’s planning capabilities and command opportunities in the crisis management operations conducted by the EU.¹

Indeed, these arrangements, taking into account that both organizations operate in crisis management policy, support the argument that the two organizations operate jointly in crisis management policy competency (Acıkmese & Dizdaroğlu, 2013, p. 50). In addition, the fact that these regulations are mainly on the side of the military dimension of the crisis management policy area may show that the two organizations

¹These regulations contain articles on the EU’s use of NATO’s resources and capabilities and the participation of non-EU NATO members in EU-organized operations. With these arrangements, while non-EU NATO members gained the right to participate in EU operations, where NATO facilities and capabilities were used, they can attend in operations where NATO facilities and capabilities were not used with the unanimous decision of the Council. As part of these arrangements, the EU gained access to NATO’s planning capabilities at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In this context, NATO would support the EU within the scope of military and strategic plans for the operation before the operation begins, and continue to support within the framework of planning after the operation begins. In addition, the EU would be able to request to benefit from NATO’s command capabilities within the framework of the Berlin Plus arrangements. Indeed, it is worth noting that while NATO’s planning capabilities will be automatically assigned to the EU under the Berlin Plus Arrangements, its command and other capabilities will be evaluated case by case. In other words, the conditions under which the EU will use NATO’s capabilities would be determined within the framework of a separate agreement for each operation. In addition, within the scope of the deal, some arrangements were made regarding intelligence sharing and the development of military capabilities between two organizations. At the same time, it has been stated that the arrangements made under the Berlin Plus Arrangements are valid for states that either is NATO members or have a bilateral agreement with NATO within the scope of Peace for Partnership Program (PFP). Indeed, Berlin Plus regulations are a good indicator that both organizations are operating in military crisis management policy area and overlap in this policy area since cooperation is generally established upon the typical characteristics of two actors. Cooperation within the military crisis management policy area scope shows that both organizations operate in this policy area.

operate jointly in the military side of the crisis management. However, due to the problems called the strategy of “hostage -taking” in regime complex literature between the non-EU NATO member Turkey and the non-NATO EU member Southern Cyprus, the EU has been able to conduct only two operations in the context of Berlin Plus Arrangements, one in Macedonia-Operation Concordia and one in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hofmann, 2009, p.46). This shows that even though the two international organizations, as unitary actors, make some arrangements within the scope of cooperation between them on paper, states that are members of only one of the organizations in cooperation, which are specified as “single members”, can prevent the on-paper arrangements between the organizations from being implemented in practice. In brief, that is to say, in the first five years of the 21st century, it has become more evident that the two organizations functionally overlap in the field of crisis management policy area on paper within the scope of security and defense policies. As seen above, official documents regarding security and defense published in this term state that the strategic partnership between the two organizations will be established in the field of crisis management policy area, where two organizations operate jointly. Further, when it is looked at the joint declaration issued by the two organizations and the Berlin Plus Arrangements in this period, they drop hints that the two organizations overlap primarily in the military dimension of the crisis management policy area on paper.

Turning to NATO’s function on paper, in the light of development in the first 5 years of the 21st century, like the terrorist attacks of September 9/11, the enlargement round that NATO entered in 2004, and the steps taken jointly with the EU in the field of security and defense, need for NATO to make arrangements for the capability and priority areas for the next 10-15 years emerge. In line with this requirement, the document named Comprehensive Political Guidance was approved by NATO Head of States and governments on 29 November 2006. In the document, threats arising from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are emphasized. Information is given on the steps to be taken by NATO in terms of capability development and its priority areas. Indeed, the fact that emphasis on the capability development of alliance on the military side of crisis management and the expression in the document “while NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes...” shows that alliance focused on the military side of crisis

management during this term (*Comprehensive Political Guidance*, 2006).

Furthermore, at NATO's Strasbourg / Kehl Summit on 4 April 2009, it was stated that in the context of new threats and risks, the Secretary General was appointed to prepare a new Strategic Concept until the next summit of the alliance. In this context, the most up-to-date strategic concept of alliance under "Active Engagement, Modern Defense" was adopted at NATO's Lisbon Summit held on November 19-20, 2010. In this strategic concept, it is stated that core functions of the alliance are collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security, and it is added that the union would also provide consultancy to its members within the scope of territorial integrity, political independence and security based on the Article 4 of Washington Treaty. Indeed, it is possible to find cues in the document stating that the alliance would take steps within the scope of the civilian side of crisis management in the context of capability development as well as the military side of the crisis management function (*Active Engagement, Modern Defense*, 2010). In this document, which is the most up to date strategic concept of the alliance, it is seen that the functions of the alliance are expressed more clearly and systematically.

Regarding the developments in the EU side, after the EU's efforts within the scope of the Constitutional Treaty were unsuccessful due to the rejection of it in the referendums held in the Netherland and France, the EU made its new arrangements in the context of security and defence through Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, with the Lisbon Treaty, two important arrangements were made in the functional context within the scope of CFSP. Firstly, functions of the union in the context of crisis management were expanded by adding joint disarmament operations, conflict prevention, post-conflict stabilization tasks to the EU Treaty. Secondly, the mutual assistance clause, which evokes the collective defence principle of NATO, and the solidarity clause were added to the agreement of the Union (*Lisbon Treaty*, 2010). Indeed, even if the mutual assistance clause is added to the union's agreement, the union did not conduct operations within the scope of this article. With the addition of the mutual assistance clause, as stated above, WEU ceased its existence in 2011, which shows that the EU, with its EU identity, has made progress, at least on paper, in the scope of development of defence policy (Bailes & Whiting, 2011). In other words, giving that EU states in its founding treaty , Maastricht Treaty in 1993, that the implementation of the Union's decisions that would have an impact in the field of defense would be

requested from the WEU, and termination of WEU in 2011 after the incorporation of mutual assistance clause in EU treaty through Lisbon Agreement, it can be said that it has incorporated the functions of a WEU into its structure by including a mutual assistance clause in the EU agreement (*Lisbon Treaty*, 2010). Indeed, with the Lisbon Agreement, the EU's addition of mutual assistance clause to its functions, at least on paper, is one of the most critical steps taken within the scope of security and defence policies. Although it cannot be said today that the union is operating in the field of defence within the scope of this article, since it has not conducted an operation under this article, this does not mean that it will not make this article functional in the future. Moreover, with the addition of this article to the EU agreement, rule ambiguity emerged. For example, when "multiple members" of organizations are attacked from outside, the question arose whether the attack will be answered within the scope of the collective defence principle of NATO or in the context of the mutual assistance clause of the EU. This situation is conceptualized as "fragmentation" in the regime complex literature.

For operations conducted by two organizations in this period, the EU has operationalized the arrangements it has made on paper within the scope of crisis management by starting both civil and military crisis management operations in 2003, and it has shown that the EU is functional on both civil and military sides of crisis management. As stated, the EU has not yet conducted operations under the mutual assistance clause that it added to its functions with the Lisbon Agreement. This shows that the EU has not become functional concerning collective defence. Regarding NATO, 12 of 30 operations organized by NATO within the scope of military crisis management concept started between 2000 and 2010 and 7 of them were completed between these years. Considering that the number of operations initiated by NATO between 1990 and 2000 was 14, the number of military crisis management operations undertaken by NATO in the first decade of the 21st century decreased compared to the previous ten years. This may indicate that NATO's threat perception is less than in the previous ten years. NATO launched operations within the scope of collective defence both in this period and between 1990 and 2000.

Furthermore, NATO did not undergo a notable revision in terms of essential functions of the alliance between 2010 and 2016. More specifically, declarations published after the 2012 Chicago Summit, 2014 Wales Summit and 2016 Warsaw

Summits reiterate that basic functions of the alliance are collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (*Chicago Summit Declaration*, 2012; *Wales Summit Declaration*, 2014; *Warsaw Summit Declaration*, 2016). In addition, in the declarations issued after these three summits, which took place after the publications of the Strategic Concept in 2010, it has been stated that the current crises should be combated with political, military and civilian means within the scope of the comprehensive approach. In line with this need, also in the declarations published after these summits, it has been stated that in addition to the alliance's effort to develop military capabilities, efforts have also been made in the context of "appropriate but modest" civilian capability development. Further, in the declaration published after the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO states that Russia's seizure of Crimea was illegal and illegitimate. In this context, it has adopted the NATO Readiness Action Plan, which consists of assurance and adaptation measures. While military activities have been increased in response to Russia's activities on the eastern borders of the alliance within the scope of "assurances measures", steps were taken to improve the capabilities and capacity of NATO forces and command structure within the scope of "adaptation measures".

Then, when it is examined the documents of NATO mentioned above from 2005 to 2016, it can be seen that the alliance's most up to date strategy document, published in 2010, defines the functions of the alliance more clearly and around systematic concepts. Indeed, it is drawn attention that while the documents published before Strategic Concept 2010 emphasize the importance of capability development at the military side of the crisis management, the summit declarations published after the Strategic Concept 2010 state the importance of taking steps within the scope of "appropriate but modest" civilian capability development as well as the military side of crisis management. This may show that alliance interest for the military crisis management policy area has gradually started to be seen on the civilian side of crisis management. In this context, considering the works carried out within the scope of capacity and capability development within the civilian side of crisis management, it will not be wrong to say that the alliance will actively operate on the civilian side of crisis management in the coming years but not yet.

Moreover, the EU published its second strategy document within the scope of security and defence policies in the context of events occurring on a global and

regional scale on 28 June 2016, after 2003. As stated, in the document, the necessity for the EU to have the capacity and capabilities to respond alone to internal and external threats, when necessary, is expressed within the scope of strategic autonomy. Although the document emphasizes the strategic autonomy of the union, attention is drawn to the importance of relations with other international actors, especially with NATO in ensuring the security and defense of the transatlantic region. More specifically, in the document, it is stated that the EU has a global role in crisis management in both military and civilian side, and it is stated that within the scope of crisis management, it can undertake tasks in the context of prevention, resolution, and stabilization before, during and after the crisis. As can be seen, in the second security document published by the EU in 2016, it is clearly stated that the union has both military and civilian roles in the context of crisis management within the scope of security and defence policies. In addition, the necessity of taking action within the framework of the mutual assistance and solidarity clause included in the agreement of the union with the Lisbon Agreement was clearly expressed. It is stated that the arrangements made on paper within the scope of defence should also find a response in practice. In fact, with this statement, the EU admitted that although it makes regulations on paper within the scope of defence, it has not been able to put it into practice until 2016, the year the strategic concept was published (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016).

While NATO initiated two military crisis management operations between 2010 and 2016, the EU started five military crisis management operations in this term. In addition to that, NATO launched five operations within the scope of defence and deterrence. Further, until 2016, while the EU did not conduct any defence and deterrence operations, NATO did not conduct any civil crisis management operations. This shows that while the EU has not become functional in defence and deterrence, NATO has not gained functionality in the field of civilian crisis management. The results are as follows If we look at the total number of operations organized by the two organizations:




Figure 2 Types and Numbers of EU and NATO Operations

NATO did not conduct any operations during the Cold War Era. Moreover, with respect to operations it organized after the Cold War, it can be seen that it carried out operations within the scope of the defence and deterrence and the military side of the crisis management. As can be seen in the chart, according to data collected, while NATO has conducted 15 operations within the scope of defence and deterrence, it conducted 30 operations within the framework of military crisis management. NATO has not conducted any civilian crisis management operations yet based on the data on this study. Furthermore, with respect to operations carried out by the EU within the scope of security and defence in numbers, it is seen that while the EU has carried out operations on both the military and civilian sides of the crisis management, the EU has not conducted any operations within the scope of defence and deterrence. More specifically, while the EU conducted 15 military crisis management operations, it conducted 22 civilian crisis management operations.

Indeed, the most striking point in the graph is that both NATO and the EU organize operations within the scope of military crisis management operations. Notably, while NATO conducted 30 operations within the scope of military crisis management operations, the EU organized 15 operations within military crisis management.

Moreover, while NATO states on paper that it has functions on both defense-deterrence and crisis management, in practice, it carried out operations within the

scope of defense deterrence and on the military side of crisis management.

Therefore, considering NATO's documents and operations, it would not be wrong to say that NATO is currently functional in the field of defense-deterrence and military crisis management policy area.

Regarding the EU, on paper, the EU has said that it has been operating within the scope of the crisis management policy area since the last years of the 20th century and within the scope of defence in the context of mutual assistance and solidarity clause since 2009 Lisbon Agreement. However, when it is looked at the operations it organizes in practice, it is seen that the EU has carried out both military and civilian crisis management operations but has not yet conducted any operations within the scope of defence and deterrence. Therefore, considering EU's documents and operations, it can be said that the EU is functional on both the military and civilian sides of crisis management.

Considering that NATO is functional in the field of defense, deterrence and military crisis management policy area and EU is functional on both the military and civilian side of crisis management policy area, it can be said that the EU and NATO are functionally overlapping in the field of military crisis management.

Furthermore, when we group the total dates of operation of these two organizations and the operations in the field of military crisis management policy, in which they operate jointly, by the date of initiation of the operation, the results will be as follows:




Figure 3 Number of Operations Initiated by EU and NATO by Date

Considering that NATO did not conduct operations during the Cold War, looking at the graph, it is seen that NATO became operationally active right after the end of the Cold War, as stated above. Furthermore, considering that NATO did not conduct any operations within the scope of civilian crisis management, it can be seen from the graph that NATO organized its first operation within the scope of defence and deterrence. Moreover, it is seen that NATO organized its first operation within the scope of military crisis management in 1992 and became operationally active in this field. Besides, it can be said that NATO initiated most of the operations between the period-immediately after the Cold War and the first years of the 21st century within the scope of military crisis management.

For the EU, as it is seen in the graph, the EU did not carry out any operations until 2003, and in 2003 it launched a total of 4 operations, 2 of which were military crisis management operations. Indeed, with the initiation of the first operations by the EU in 2003, both the EU and NATO have started to operate in practice in military crisis management. In another saying, the EU and NATO, which overlap in military crisis management policy on paper, have also begun to overlap in practice within the scope of military crisis management in 2003.

Furthermore, the graph shows that the EU started most of its operations between 2003 and 2010. Regarding NATO, we see that it started more operations in the pre-2010 period. Indeed, discussions upon the relationship between the EU and NATO in the context of cooperation and competition have increased in the literature since 2003 when two organizations started to operate in the same policy area in practice. In this context, when it is looked at the operations organized by these two organizations at the same time intervals and in the same region, the result is as follows:

Table 10 Operations Conducted by the EU and NATO t the Same Time Intervals and in the Same Region

Location	Organization	Operation	Nature	Tasks	Duration
Kosovo	NATO	Operation Joint Guardian /KFOR	Military CM	SASE	06/1999-
	EU	EULEX Kosovo	Civilian CM	Rule of Law/Monitoring+ Advisory	12/2008-
Afghanistan	NATO	ISAF Afghanistan	Military CM	SASE	08/2003-12/2014
	NATO	NTM-A	Military CM	Training/Advisory	11/2009-09/2014
	NATO	NATO Resolute Support Mission	Military CM	Training/Advisory	01/01/2015-
	EU	EUPOL Afghanistan	Civilian CM	Police SSR/Advisory	06/2007-12/2016
Iraq	NATO	NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)	Military CM	Training/Advisory	08/2004-12/2011
	NATO	NATO Mission Iraq (NMI)	Military CM	Training/Advisory	7/2018-
	EU	EUJUST LEX-Iraq	Civilian CM	Rule of Law/Consultancy+Training	06/2005-12/2013
	EU	EAUM Iraq	Civilian CM	SSR/Consultancy+ Advisory	10/2017-
Horn of Africa	NATO	Operation Allied Provider	Military CM	Counter-Piracy	10/2008-12/2008
	NATO	Operation Allied Protector	Military CM	Counter-Piracy	03/2009-08/2009
	NATO	Operation Ocean Shield	Military CM	Counter-Piracy	08/2009-12/2016
	EU	EUNAVFOR Atalanta	Military CM	Counter-Piracy	12/2008-
Mediterranean Sea	NATO	Operation Active Endeavour	Defence and Deterrence	Counterterrorism/Naval patrolling	10/2001-10/2016
	NATO	Operation Sea Guardian	Defence and Deterrence	Counterterrorism/Naval patrolling	02/2016-
	EU	EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia	Military CM	Against Illegal Migration	06/2015-03/2020
	EU	EUNAVFOR Med Irini	Military CM	Arms Embargo Enforcement	31/03/2020-
Somalia	NATO	NATO Support to AMISOM	Military CM	Airlift Support	06/2007-
	EU	EUTM Somalia	Military CM	SSR/Training/Advisory/Mentoring	04/2010-
	EU	EUCAP Somalia	Civilian CM	Capacity Building/Advisory	06/2012-

2

² Data is gathered on EU operations from websites and from factsheets and council decisions found on these websites. With respect to NATO's operations, data is also collected on NATO's operations from NATO's website and factsheets. "Operations and Missions : Past and Present," NATO, April 22, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm ; "Military and Civilian Missions and Operations," European Union External Action Service (EEAS), March 05, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en ; see also Hussey, "Military Crisis Management Operations by NATO and the EU," 39-70.

With respect to the table, it is seen that the two organizations carried out operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa in intersecting periods. Indeed, while the nature of the operations carried out by two organizations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mediterranean, are different, the nature of their operations, especially in the Horn of Africa is the same. More specifically, while NATO has conducted military crisis management operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the EU conducted civilian crisis management operations in these countries. This situation may show that the two organizations in these countries may be operating within the scope of complementarity. Further, when it is looked at the tasks that these organizations take on in especially in Afghanistan and Kosovo, while NATO acts with the mission of providing a safe and secure environment in these countries, the EU is much more focused on the capacity and capability development of the internal security elements of these countries. This situation may indicate that these two organizations act within the framework of complementarity in these two countries since one provides the state with a secure environment to develop its functions, the other one contributes to the developments of these functions through advising, training and monitoring.

However, when it is looked at the operations conducted by the two organizations in the Horn of Africa, it is seen that they conduct simultaneous operations with the same function and different mandates. This has led to the emergence of both cooperation and competition discussions about the relationship between the two organizations in this region. Indeed, while the scholars who evaluated the relations between the two organizations in this region within the framework of the competition questioned why the two organizations carried out operations with different command or mandate in the same region at the same time, the scholars who evaluated the relations between the two organizations in this region within the framework of cooperation claimed that the two organizations cooperated informally within the scope of information and intelligence sharing (Gebhard & Smith, 2014, p. 107). In sum, the fact that two organizations operate in the same or different functions in the same region in the intersecting periods has caused both competition and cooperation dynamics to emerge in the relations between the two organizations. Indeed, this data supports my general hypothesis that both cooperation and competition dynamics can be seen in the EU and NATO relationship.

In short, as can be seen above, when it is looked at the documents published and operations organized by the EU and NATO, it is seen that the two institutions started to operate jointly in the field of military crisis management policy competency both on paper and in practice in 2003 for the first time. Afterwards, although the EU added mutual assistance clause to the EU Agreement through Lisbon Treaty, it has not yet organized an operation within the scope of this clause. Therefore, it is not yet possible to say that the EU operates within the scope of defence and deterrence. In the same way, NATO signalled that it had taken steps in capacity development within the scope of modest but appropriate civilian crisis management in its 2010 Strategic Concept and subsequent summit decisions. However, NATO has not become fully functional within the scope of civilian crisis management. For this reason, it is too early to say that NATO is operating within the scope of civilian crisis management. Therefore, it can be said that the EU and NATO functionally overlap in military crisis management policy competency between 1993 and 2016.

As a result, it is seen that the two organizations functionally overlap. Considering my sub-hypothesis, I eliminate my first sub-hypothesis since there is a functional overlap between institutions and both competition and cooperation dynamics in the EU-NATO relationship can be seen. In order to understand whether the relationship between them tends to be more cooperative or more competitive, in the next section, I will look at the hierarchy level between EU and NATO.

4.2.3 Data on Operations

Below, NATO's operations within the scope of defence and deterrence and military crisis management and EU operations within military and civil crisis management are tabulated. Indeed, each operation organized by the EU has its website.³ These web pages contain information, factsheets and council decisions about these operations. I gathered data on EU operations from these websites and factsheets and council decisions found. With respect to NATO's operations, I also collected data on NATO's operations from NATO's website and factsheets.⁴ The data on the

³ "Military and Civilian missions and operations," European Union External Action Service (EEAS), March 03, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.

⁴ "Operations and Missions : Past and Present," NATO, April 22, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm ; "NATO's Operations," SHAPE NATO, <https://shape.nato.int/resources/21/NATO%20Operations,%201949-Present.pdf>.

operations organized by the EU is more easily accessible than the data on the operations organized by NATO. At the same time, I used secondary sources to collect data on the operations of the two organizations (Fahron-Hussey, 2018). When I group the data from the specified sources base on organization and type of operation, the results are as follows:

Table 11 NATO's Defence and Deterrence Operations

NATO's Defence and Deterrence Operations			
Name	Location	Type	Duration
Operation Anchor Guard	Turkey	Air System Deployment	03.1991-08.1990
Operation Ace Guard	Turkey	Air System Deployment	01.1991-03.1991
Operation Agile Genie	Meditarranean Sea	Air System Deployment	05.1992-05.1992
Operation Eagle Assist	USA	Air System Deployment	10.2001-05.2002
Operation Active Endeavour	Mediterranean Sea .	Maritime surveillance and patrolling	10.2001-10.2016
Operation Display Deterrence	Turkey	Air System Deployment	02.2003-04.2003
Baltic Air Policing	Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania	Air Policing	2004-
Air policing over the Western Balkans	Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro	Air Policing	2004-
Iceland Air Policing	Iceland	Air Policing	2008-
Operation Active Fence	Turkey	Air System Deployment/Missile System	01.2013-
Enhanced Air Policing	NATO Region	Air Policing Capability Develop.	2014-
Operation Sea Guardian	Mediterranean Sea .	Maritime security	02/2016-
Operation in Aegean Sea	Aegean Sea	Preventing illegal migration	3.2016-
Support for fight against ISIL	Turkey	Air System Deployment	11.2016-
Air Policing over Benelux	Belgium, Netherland, Luxembourg	Air Policing	2017-

Table 12 NATO's Military Crisis Management Operations

NATO's Military Crisis Management Operations			
Name	Location	Type	Duration
Operation Maritime Monitor	Adriatic Sea/FRY	Embargo Monitoring and Reporting	07/1992-11/1992
Operation Sky Monitor	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Surveillance and Monitoring/NFZ	10/1992-04/1993
Operation Maritime Guard	Adriatic Sea/FRY	Embargo Enforcement	11/1992-06/1993
Operation Deny Flight	Bosnia and Herzegovina	NFZ Enforcement	04/1993-12/1995
Operation Sharp Guard	Adriatic Sea/FRY	Embargo Enforcement and Monitoring	06/1993-10/1996
Operations Deadeye and Deliberate Force	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Air Campaign	08/1995-09/1995
Operation Joint Endeavour / IFOR	Bosnia and Herzegovina	SASE	12/1995-12/1996
Operation Joint Guard / SFOR	Bosnia and Herzegovina	SASE	12/1996-06/1998
Operation Eagle Eye	Kosovo	Aerial Monitoring	10/1998-03/1999
Operation Joint Forge	Bosnia and Herzegovina	SASE	10/1998-12/2004
Operation Joint Guarantor	Kosovo	Evacuation	12/1998-03/1999
Operation Allied Force	Kosovo	Air Campaign	03/1999-06/1999
Operation Allied Harbour	Kosovo	Humanitarian Assistance	04/1999-09/1999
Operation Joint Guardian / KFOR	Kosovo	SASE	06/1999-
Operation Essential Harvest	FYROM	Disarmament	08/2001-09/2001
Operation Amber Fox	FYROM	Protection of Observers	09/2001-12/2002
Operation Allied Harmony	FYROM	SASE and Advisory	12/2002-03/2003
ISAF in Afghanistan	Afghanistan	SASE	08/2003-12/2014
NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)	Iraq	Training/Advisory	08/2004-12/2011
NATO Operation Distinguished Games	Greece	Secure Public Event	08/2004-09/2004
NATO Support to AMIS	Sudan (Darfur)	Airlift Support	06/2005-12/2007
NATO Support for Latvia	Latvia	Secure Public Event	11/2006.
NATO Support to AMISOM	Somalia	Airlift Support	06/2007-
Operation Allied Provider	Horn of Africa	Counter-Piracy	10/2008-12/2008
Operation Allied Protector	Horn of Africa	Counter-Piracy	03/2009-08/2009
Operation Ocean Shield	Horn of Africa	Counter-Piracy	08/2009-12/2016
NTM-A	Afghanistan	Training/Advisory	11/2009-09/2014
Operation Unified Protector	Libya	Embargo+NFZ+Air and Naval Campaign	03/2011-10/2011
NATO Resolute Support Mission	Afghanistan	Training/Advisory	01/01/2015-
NATO Mission Iraq (NMI)	Iraq	Training/Advisory	7/2018-

Table 13 EU's Civilian Crisis Management Operations

EU's Civilian Crisis Management Operations			
Name	Location	Type	Duration
EUPM / BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Police SSR/Training+Advisory+Equipme	01.2003-06.2012
EUPOL Proxima/FYROM	FYROM	Police/Monitoring+Mentoring+Ad visory	12/2003-12/2005
EUJUST THEMIS Georgia	Georgia	Rule of Law/Mentoring+Advisory	07/2004-07/2005
EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC)	DRC	Police SSR/Training	04/2005-06/2007
EUJUST LEX-Iraq	Iraq	Rule of Law/Consultancy+Training	06/2005-12/2013
EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine	Moldovo-Ukraine	Border Management	11/2005-
Aceh Monitoring Mission-AMM	Indonesia	Monitoring	09/2005-12/2006
EUBAM Rafah	Palestine	Border Management	11/2005-
EUPAT FYROM	FYROM	Police/Monitor+Mentor+Advisory	12/2005-06/2006
EUPOL COPPS	Palestine	Police SSR and Rule of Law/Advisory	01/2006-
EUPOL RD Congo	DRC	Police SSR/Advisory	06/2007-12/2014
EUPOL Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Police SSR/Advisory	06/2007-12/2016
EUMM Georgia	Georgia	Rule of Law/Monitoring	09/2008-
EULEX Kosovo	Kosovo	Rule of Law/Monitoring+Advisory	12/2008-
EUAVSEC Sudan	Sudan	Airport Security/Advisory	06/2012-1/2014
EUCAP Somalia	Somalia	Capacity Building/Advisory	06/2012-
EUCAP Sahel Niger	Niger	Capacity Building/Advisory+Training+Ment	07/2012-
EUBAM Libya	Libya	Border Assistance/Advisory+Training+Me	05/2013-08/2017
EUAM Ukraine	Ukraine	Rule of Law/Advisory	12/2014-
EUCAP Sahel Mali	Mali	Capacity Development/Advisory+Training	01/2015-01/2021
EAUM Iraq	Iraq	SSR/Consultancy+Advisory	10/2017-
EUAM RCA	CAR	SSR /Advisory+Monitoring	12/2019-

Table 14 EU's Military Crisis Management Operations

EU's Military Crisis Management Operations			
Name	Location	Type	Duration
Concordia/FYROM	FYROM	SASE	03/2003-12/2003
Operation Artemis DRC	DRC	SASE	06/2003-09/2003
EUFOR Althea	Bosnia and Herzegovina	SASE	12/2004-
EUSEC RD Congo	DRC	SSR/Advisory	06/2005-06/2006
EUFOR RD Congo	DRC	SASE	07/2006-11/2006
EUFOR Tcad/RCA	Chad and CAR	SASE	01/2008-03/2009
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau	SSR/Advisory+Training+Equipment	06/2008-10/2010
EUNAVFOR Atalanta	Horn of Africa	Counter Piracy	12/2008-
EUTM Mali	Mali	SSR/Training/Advisory	02/2013-
EUTM Somalia	Somalia	SSR/Training/Advisory/Mentoring	04/2010-
EUFOR RCA	CAR	SASE	02/2014-03/2015
EUMAM RCA	CAR	SSR/Advisory	03/2015-07/2016
EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia	Meditarranean Sea	Against Illegal Migration	06/2015-03/2020
EUTM RCA	CAR	SSR/Advisory/Training	07/2016-
EUNAVFOR Med Irini	Meditarranean Sea	Arms Embargo Enforcement	31/03/2020-

CHAPTER 5: HIERARCHY BETWEEN EU AND NATO

In the previous section, I showed that EU and NATO functionally overlap in the military crisis management policy competency. This means that both competition and cooperation dynamics can be seen in the EU and NATO relationship. However, based on my sub-hypothesis, to understand whether the relationship is more inclined to competition or cooperation, it is necessary to understand how the hierarchy relationship between the two organizations is. In this context, in this section, firstly, basic arguments about the concept of hierarchy and authority and the relation between these two concepts will be shared. Then concepts of hierarchy and authority will be defined as used in this research. Secondly, within the scope of definitions of authority and hierarchy made in the first part, the NATO's authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion will be explained based on the empirical data taken from the database of the World Bank (WB) and survey results conducted by Pew Research Center. In the third part, how the NATO's authority upon the EU decreases between 1993-2016 within the framework of power as the outcome and political communication will be explained by showing the steps that the EU takes in the context of capacity and capability development in the process. As a result, I will contend that although NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion, the EU has gradually reduced/diffused this authority over time through its policies in the field of security and defence. Considering a directly proportional relationship between hierarchy and authority based on Lake's argument (2009), the hierarchy between EU and NATO is decreasing and, on the way, to becoming a non-hierarchy.

5.1 Hierarchy and Authority

In this section, firstly and briefly, hierarchy debates in the literature will be discussed, and secondly, concept of hierarchy and authority will be explained

together based on the arguments that David Lake (2009) made in his book of *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Concerning the concept of hierarchy, the word hierarchy is a Greek word and is formed by the combination of the words hieros (sacred) and arche (rule) (Donnelly, 2006, p. 141). The concept of hierarchy has also been used in the literature similarly as to rank, grade and status (Barner, 2015, p. 9). Richard Ned Lebow (2008) defines the hierarchy as a “rank order of statuses” in this context (p. 65). Indeed, the word hierarchy is generally understood within domestic policy dynamics and is defined as a set of regulations that reflect the authority relations between actors. However, within the scope of international politics, the concept of hierarchy can be defined by considering different dimensions.

In this context, the most prominent debates in the IR literature within the scope of the hierarchy have developed their arguments based on the unequal power relations among the actors in the international system. These approaches generally evaluate the relations between the actors according to their economic and military capabilities and define the hierarchy relations within the framework of distribution of capabilities. In the literature, the most prominent arguments in this context are gathered around hegemonic stability theory, power transition theory, dependence theory and critical theories that be based upon Marxist Theory. To briefly mention these approaches, while hegemonic stability theory claims that a dominant actor who is more advanced than other actors in the international system in terms of economic and military capabilities would provide stability in the system (ex .*Pax Britannica and Pax Americana*), the power transition theory developed by Organski (1968) asserts that the actors in the international system are classified based on their power levels as great powers, middle powers, small powers, dependencies and the dominant power at the top of the hierarchy ensures stability in the international system by enabling actors to behave within the scope of their power limits. Besides, while dependency theory claims that different levels of economic development between actors develop a hierarchical relationship between actors, the critical theories developed based on Marxist arguments contend that economic, political and social inequalities in the international system create a hierarchical relation between actors. Ian Clark (1989) defines the concept of hierarchy as follows by synthesizing the studies made in this context in the literature:

a social arrangement characterized by stratification in which, like the angels, there are orders of power and glory and society is classified in successively subordinate grades. This hierarchy is commonly assigned in terms of politico-strategic power, yielding the traditional groupings of great powers, medium powers, and small powers. It may equally be described in economic terms, yielding the stratification into first, third and fourth worlds. Outside a statist perspective, it may be analyzed in terms of centres or cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries (p. 2).

In addition to the arguments that evaluate hierarchy in terms of material power elements, there are also discussions in the literature that evaluate the concept of hierarchy in terms of respect, dignity, and value that an actor gets from other actors in society. Further, there are also discussions in the literature claiming that hierarchy is also formed by actors' discourses (Barner, 2015, p. 12). For example, Grovogui (1996) says that discourses built upon enlightenment debates in the 17th and 18th centuries highlight the European domination upon non-Europeans.

Apart from these arguments, David Lake (2009) states that "hierarchy is defined by the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled. The greater the number of possible actions by the ruled that the ruler can legitimately regulate, the more hierarchical is the relationship" (p. 9). In other words, Lake states that there is a directly proportional relationship between authority and hierarchy. The higher the level of authority of an actor over another, the higher the level of hierarchy between actors. As the level of hierarchy among actors increases, the position of the dominant actor to regulate, give orders, and control subordinate actors' actions also increase, which leads to a decrease in the level of anarchy among actors. Regarding the authority, Lake states that "authority is simply one form of power and what distinguishes authority from other forms of power is not the result—subordinate actor's compliance--- but the mechanism through which power is exercised" (p. 21). As shown above, authority arguments within the scope of international politics are generally made only by considering the material power elements of the actors operating in the international arena, such as military and economic power. These arguments say that actors who are strong in terms of material capabilities (resources) can establish authority over subordinate actors, and thanks to this authority, powerful actors can command the subordinate actors to carry out specific actions. In case subordinate actors do not comply with the orders and demands of the powerful actors, the strong actors can coerce subordinate actors by using their power materials to comply them with commands.

However, unlike most of the debates within the scope of authority in the literature, Lake says that to speak of a certain level of authority, there should be the legitimacy of the actor claiming authority in addition to material powers (p. 22). In other words, for the actor who has the power elements to be an authority upon the subordinate actors, it must also have the right to rule. He then contends that even though the right to rule originated from the charisma of individual leaders (charismatic authority), traditions (traditional authority) and religious doctrines (religious authority) throughout history, in the modern world, the right to rule originates from either law or social contract. He names the authorities that take the right to rule from the law as the *formal legal authority* and says that in these formal legal authorities, ruling actors derive their right to rule not from their capabilities or abilities but from the office they hold (p. 24). In other words, the law gives actors holding an office the right rule. However, he then says that for certain legal rules to be enforced fully, there should be a duly constituted legal authority that gives these actors the right to rule based on law. While, in domestic politics, the state machine as an authority gives some actors the right to rule within the scope of law, there is no authority in the international system that can implement international law and give the actors the right to rule, as all states/actors are equal before the law. Therefore, in the international system, the authority relations between actors cannot be explained within the framework of formal legal authority. In brief, due to equality of all states before international law and the absence of a duly constituted legal authority over the states in the international system, the relations between actors in the international system within the framework of authority cannot be explained effectively within the scope of formal legal formal authority. Furthermore, he says that another source of the right to rule in the modern system is a social contract and evaluates the authority relations between states/actors in the international politics within this scope (p. 28).

Lake says that a legal framework is not a requirement for the engagement of actors within the scope of authority. He then asserts that actors can engage in a relationship within a scope of authority in a dynamic and evolving way through a social contract. On the occasion of this social contract, the dominant actor would provide the order in which subordinate actor or actors can develop their activities like trade or infrastructure. In turn, the subordinate actor or actors accept the right of the dominant actor to rule to a certain extent. In other words, the dominant actor would gain

legitimacy by obtaining the consent of the subordinate actor to rule herself (p. 29). Indeed, while in domestic politics, powerful actors who act without the consent of subordinate actors to get what they want by using their powers are called authoritarian or tyrants, in international politics, dominant actors using the coercive power upon the subordinate actors to get what they want are called imperialist powers (Lake, 2009, p. 23). Based on these arguments, Lake conceptualized the concept of authority as a “contract between ruler and ruled, continuously renegotiated, based on the provision of a political order produced by the ruler in exchange for compliance by the ruled with the commands and extractions necessary for that order” and called this type of authority originating from social contract relational authority (p. 44). In summary, Lake says that power and legitimacy are two characteristic features that an actor who is an authority between actors in international politics should have. Power without legitimacy in the international system is called an imperial power, not authority.

He argues that hierarchy refers to the dominant actor's level of authority in the policy areas in which the actors are operating. In other words, the more the dominant actor has the right to rule in the policy area in which the subordinate actor is operating, the more the ruling actor has a hierarchy over the subordinate actor (p. 45). By accepting the hierarchy and authority relations between states in international politics, Lake opposes the claim that all states operating in international politics are fully sovereign. He claims that the sovereignty of the weak actor, that is, the right to rule (authority) in a policy area, can be shared with other actors operating in international politics (pp. 46-51). Speaking of sovereignty, it would be useful to clarify the concept a little more. The principle of sovereignty was founded by the peace of Westphalia (1648), including the Münster and Osnabrück agreements, based on basic three principles : (1) “ultimate or final authority over the people and territory of a given realm ; (2) exclusion of external actors from possessing or exercising authority over the people and territory of sovereign ; (3) indivisibility of sovereignty” (Lake, 2009, pp. 46-51) More specifically, Lake objects directly to article third of the principle of Westphalian sovereignty by saying actors in international politics can share their right to govern (authority) in a particular area. Then, the more an actor shares an authority in many policy areas with another actor or, the higher the hierarchy level between actors. In sum, Lake asserts that the more the dominant actor has the right to

rule the areas of politics that the subordinate actors manage, the stronger the hierarchy between the dominant actor and subordinate actor will be. Suppose there is no authority relationship between actors engaging in relationship or operating in international system. In that case, it can be said that these actors have Westphalian sovereignty and the character of relations between actors in the relationship or international system is described by anarchy. However, if the dominant actor has the right to direct all the actions of the subordinate actor and the subordinate actor who is led has no autonomous action capacity in the political sphere, this relationship is described as a pure hierarchy (p. 52). Indeed, pure hierarchy form is rare in the international system, and the hierarchy level among actors ranges from weak to strong.

5.2 Authority and Hierarchy Between EU and NATO

As stated above, Lake defines the concept of hierarchy as the level of authority among actors. He says that the concept of authority consists of the combination of power and legitimacy. For a power to be expressed as an authority in a relationship in the international system, this power must be legitimate. Although it is possible to diversify the approaches to the concept of power in literature, basically, the arguments within the scope of power are grouped under two headings: power as resources and power as outcomes (Beckley, 2018, p. 11).

Within the scope of the power as resources approach, the power of an actor in the international system is determined according to its resources. In other words, the more resources an actor has in the international system, the more powerful this actor is (Treverton & Jones, 2005). The other approach, power as the outcome, evaluates the power of the actors within the scope of reaching the desired result. In other words, the power of the actors operating in the international system is determined by looking at how much they have obtained their preferences in the international system (Tellis et al., 2000).

Concerning legitimacy, as stated above, Lake (2009) says that actors enter into relationship through the self-enforcing contract in the international system. If the more powerful actor gains the consent of the less powerful in this relationship to rule herself/himself, the more powerful actor establishes authority upon the less powerful actor (pp. 29-33). Moreover, Tallberg and Zürn (2009) also conceptualize the

concept of legitimacy as “beliefs within a given constituency or other relevant audience that a political institution’s exercise of authority is appropriate” (“C. Legitimacy and Legitimation,” para. 1). In other words, by looking at the definitions of both Lake, Tallberg and Zürn in the context of legitimacy, it can be said that legitimacy is a right-the right to rule of powerful actor- and it is obtained in the modern world by gaining the consent of the actor who is less powerful and ruled. Tallberg and Zürn then state that the consent of the less powerful actors can be determined by looking at the public opinion, political communication and political behaviours of actors. They then say that while making inferences about the consent of the actors operating in the international system by looking at the public opinion, inferences are made by surveying within the scope of the individual level of analysis. At the same time, they say that in addition to the individual level of analysis, actors operating in the international system can be considered as a unitary actor, and inferences can be made regarding their consent within the scope of state or organizational level of analysis. In cases where actors are accepted as unitary actors, actors’ consents can be inferred by looking at the documents published by these actors within the scope of political communication. Besides these, they say that by observing the actors operating in the international system within the framework of political behaviour, it can be inferred about the actors’ consent with respect to authority relations with other actors.

Briefly, as Lake stated, the concept of authority refers to the power that has legitimacy. The concept of power in the discipline of international relations is analyzed by looking at the resources of the actors and based on the outcomes/results obtained by the actors in the international system. Concerning legitimacy, it is analyzed by looking at the consent of actors with regard to the authority of other actors. Moreover, the consents of the actors are determined by looking at the public opinion, by examining the political communication they undertake and the behaviours they exhibit. As methods, survey, field experiment, content analysis and case study can be employed as examining the consent of actors within the framework of public opinion, political communication and political behaviour.

In this section, first, the power relationship between the two organizations based on power as resources approach is examined and then is showed that NATO has been more powerful than the EU in terms of resources in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015

which I separated according to the enlargement process of two organizations. Afterwards, it is stated that the EU supports NATO in the context of public opinion based on the survey conducted between 2010 and 2015 in the UK, France and Germany, the three countries with the highest GDP, military expenditure and population in the EU within the years of research. Based on the results of this survey, it is stated that the EU consents to NATO's authority. In other words, it has been stated that NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of resources and based on the public opinion survey data EU consents to NATO's authority. Considering that consent is the primary source of legitimacy in the modern world, it would not be wrong to say that NATO is legitimate power upon the EU within the context of power as resources and public opinion survey. That is, firstly, based on the power as resources and public opinion survey, I will show that NATO has authority upon the EU.

However, in the second part, it has been argued that with each step taken by the EU within the scope of the power as outcome approach, EU diffuses/reduces NATO's authority or power upon itself by getting one step closer to the strategic autonomy goal stated in the strategy document published in 2016 within the scope of security and defence policies. In addition, by comparing the EU's strategy documents published in 2003 and 2016 and joint declarations issued by two organizations in 2002 and 2016 within the scope of security and defence policies in terms of political communication, it has been said that the EU's consent to NATO's authority in 2016 compared to 2003 and 2002 has decreased. In short, when we look at the authority relationship between the two organizations within the framework of power as the outcome and political communication, we can argue that this authority relationship moves in a decreasing direction.

In summary, in this section, I will first state that NATO has the authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion. And then secondly, I will argue that the authority relationship between NATO and the EU moves in a decreasing direction within the framework of power as the outcome and political communication. Based on this argument and considering Lake's argument (2009) that hierarchy refers to the extent of authority between actors who engage in with each other through social contract in the international system, we can say that although there is a certain level of hierarchy between NATO and the EU in favour of

NATO, the EU is gradually reducing hierarchy level between itself and NATO with the steps it takes in the context of capability and capacity development. Therefore, this hierarchy relationship is decreasing and, on the way, to become non-hierarchy.

5.2.1 Authority Between EU and NATO in the context of Power as Resources and Public Opinion

It is expressed above that that David Lake's concept of authority consists of a combination of the concepts of power and legitimacy. First, NATO and EU are compared in the context of resources. Then the consent of EU to NATO's authority is examined in the context of public opinion based on data collected through the survey in UK, France and Germany between 2010 and 2015.

Moreover, in the context of power as resources, many studies in the literature evaluate the power of states by looking at the level of military expenditures, GDPs, size of armed forces, populations, natural resources they have, investments made within the scope of research and development (Treverton & Jones, 2005). Further, in most of the studies in the literature analyzing the powers of the countries within the scope of power as resources approach, the powers of countries have been evaluated according to countries' military and economic powers. More specifically, since military power is the first line of defence in the anarchic international system and economic power is one of the main foundations of military power and other power types, military and economic power elements are taken as a basis when comparing the powers of countries within the scope of power as resources approach (Tellis et al., 2000, p. 47; Carr, 1946). Within the scope of this study, based on this approach in the literature, the EU and NATO will be compared in terms of military and economic resources within the scope of power as resources approach.

Furthermore, to operationalize economic power, various indicators, different indexes, and methods have been applied in the literature. However, there is no agreement about which indicator better reflects economic power. In other words, discussions within the scope of validity in the context of indicators reflecting economic power continue in the literature. Within the scope of this research, GDP, which is defined as "value of the total domestic economic output of a particular country's economy over a specific period" is chosen as the economic power indicator (Lepenies, 2016, p. 1). Lepenies (2016) used the following statements about GDP:

Gross Domestic Product is the most powerful statistical figure in human history...GDP is simply the measure of a country's economic output, the value of all goods and services produced in specific period, expressed a number... The global economy and global politics are largely defined by GDP... Not only is GDP still considered the most important indicator for analyzing an economy's economic performance and welfare development but also international benchmark too, GDP is more important than ever (pp. 1-156).

In line with LePenies' statements, the USA Department of Commerce also states that GDP is "one of the great inventions of the 20th century" (Landefeld, 2000, pp. 6-9). Considering that GDP is one of the most used metrics when analyzing and comparing the economic performance of countries and actors of the international system, within the scope of this study too, the GDPs of the countries are taken as a basis an indicator of economic power. Within the scope of this study, as stated above, four different years, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 are determined based on the enlargement rounds of the EU and NATO, and GDPs of EU and NATO member states are downloaded from the website of the World Bank in dollars in these years.⁵ Then, total the GDPs of the EU's members and NATO's members for the specified years were calculated by summing the GDPs of the EU and NATO members in the specified years.

Concerning the operationalization of military power of a country, it is possible to come across different indicators of military power too and discussions within this scope in the literature. In the literature, as an indicator of military power, the number of soldiers of the countries, the military expenditures of the countries and the military equipment of the countries such as tanks have been taken into account in different studies. Indeed, military expenditures of a country also show the spendings made within the scope of security and defence, and it sheds light on the country's capacity within the scope of security and defence in a comprehensive manner, taking into account not only one dimension but also expenditures made in different fields within the scope of security and defence (Treverton & Jones, 2005). At the same time, the more an actor attaches importance to a product or service, the more he invests it and the more it increases her capacity and capabilities in this area. Based on these mentalities, within the scope of this study, it will be taken into account the

⁵ "GDP (current US\$)," World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.

expenditures of these countries within the scope of military forces and activities in the years specified as the military power indicators of the countries. In this study, the countries' military expenditures for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, which are determined according to the enlargement periods of the EU and NATO, were obtained from the World Bank's database as well.⁶ The WB also states on its website, where military expenditure data is available that the license of these data belongs to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In this context, when it is looked at what expenditures SIPRI takes into account within the scope of military expenditures on its website when calculating military expenditure of a country, it can be seen that it includes personnel expenditures, operations expenditures, maintenance expenditures, procurement expenditures, research and development expenditures, construction expenditures and military aid to other countries. More detailed information about the method of how SIPRI calculates military expenditures can be reached at the website at the footnote.⁷ Briefly, I downloaded the military expenditure data calculated by SIPRI for the countries in 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 from the World Bank site. Then, using this data I downloaded, I calculated the total military expenditures of the EU and NATO member countries by summing the military expenditures of the EU and NATO member countries in the specified years.

In addition, in many studies within the scope of power as resources approach, the country's population is also stated as one of the power elements of the country. While a country's population contributes to the country's military power in terms of the number of soldiers, it also contributes to the country's economic power by increasing production and knowledge (Beckley, 2018, p. 9; Raimzhanova, 2015). Therefore, as comparing the power of the two organizations within the framework of power as resource approach, the population is employed as well, as an indicator of both military and economic power within the scope of this study. Then, as did for GDP and military expenditures, the data on the population of the countries is downloaded from the WB database for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, which

⁶ "Military Expenditure (current USD)," World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD>.

⁷ "Monitoring Military Expenditure," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), January 11, 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2017/monitoring-military-expenditure> ; see also "Sources and methods," SIPRI, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods>.

are determined according to EU and NATO expansion periods.⁸ Afterwards, the total populations of the member states of organizations are calculated by summing the populations of the organization's member states in determined years.

Finally, to calculate the share of military expenditures in GDP as a percentage, I divided the military expenditure of the member states by the GDP in the specified years and multiplied by one hundred. As a result, I found the percentage share of military expenditures in GDP. In a nutshell, I calculated the total GDP, total military expenditure, total population and percentage of military spending in GDP of EU and NATO members for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, which I separated according to the enlargement process of EU and NATO.

After calculating the metrics of the two organizations in the specified years, two organizations are compared within the framework of these metrics in the specified years. As can be seen in the chart below, NATO has a clear comparative advantage over the EU in all four metrics as a result of comparison. In other words, within the scope of the power as resources approach in this study, we can say that NATO is more powerful than the EU.

However, according to David Lake's concept of relational authority, it must also be legitimate for this power to be considered an authority. It is stated above that Lake refers to legitimacy in the international system as the "right to rule" (p. 24). In other words, for a power to be an authority in the international system, that power must also have the right to rule. Indeed, Lake states that this right can be obtained in today's world in the international system by the subordinate actor's consent to the dominant actor's power. In another saying, Lake states that the source of legitimacy is the consent of less powerful actors in the international system (pp. 29-30).

Moreover, Tallberg and Zürn state that one of the methods of measuring the consent of the less powerful actor with respect to the authority of more powerful actor in a relationship in international system is to look at the public opinion of the less powerful actor through the survey. In this section, the inference regarding the EU's consent to NATO's authority upon itself is made based on the survey results conducted in the UK, France and Germany in the context of support to NATO

⁸ "Population, total," World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>.

between 2010 and 2015 except 2014.⁹ Due to the fact that the survey is only organized in certain countries, the results of the survey in the UK, France and Germany, which have the highest GDP, military expenditure and population within the EU borders, are examined.

The Pew Research Center measured the rate of support for NATO (NATO favorability) through the survey in the countries mentioned in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015. The years between 2010 and 2015 are chosen because the data before 2010 could not be adequately reached, and the research ended in 2016. The survey was conducted with 1503 unweighted samples size in the countries stated, and the participants were asked whether they supported NATO or not.

When it is looked at the data and survey results comparing the metrics of two organizations in the context of power as resources and public opinion, the results are as follows:




Figure 4 Total GDP's of EU Members and NATO Members (Billion \$)

First of all, when comparing the total GDP of NATO and EU member countries in the context of the specified years, the following table is seen. While the total GDP of

⁹ "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States," Pew Research Center, February 9, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/>.

NATO member countries was around 19 trillion 521 billion dollars in 2000, the total GDP of EU member countries was around 8 trillion 476 billion dollars in 2000. Furthermore, while the total GDP of NATO member countries was around 28 trillion 288 billion dollars in 2005, the total GDP of EU member countries in 2005 was around 14 trillion 271 billion dollars. Moreover, while the total GDP of NATO member countries was around 33 trillion 462 billion dollars in 2010, the total GDP of EU member countries in 2010 was around 16 trillion 959 billion dollars. Furthermore, while the total GDP of NATO member countries was around 36 trillion 90 billion dollars in 2015, the total GDP of EU member countries in 2015 was around 16 trillion 474 billion dollars. In other words, as can be seen from the graph, the total GDP of NATO members in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 is more than the total GDP of EU member states. These indicators show that in these years, NATO is stronger than the EU, specifically in terms of GDP and generally in terms of economic power.




Figure 5 Total Military Expenditures of EU and NATO Member States (Billion \$)

Secondly, when we compare the total military expenditures of NATO and EU member states in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, respectively, the table will be as follows. While the total military expenditures of NATO members in 2000 were

around 485 billion 509 million dollars, the total military expenditures of EU members in 2000 were around 148 billion 156 million dollars. Furthermore, while the total military expenditures of NATO members in 2005 were around 788 billion 154 million dollars, the total military expenditures of EU members in 2005 were around 235 billion 135 million dollars. Moreover, while the total military spending of NATO members in 2010 was around 1 trillion 42 billion dollars, the total military spending of EU member states in 2010 was around 273 billion 855 million dollars. Moreover, while the total military expenditure of NATO members in 2015 was around 892 billion 2 million dollars, the total military expenditure of EU members in 2015 was around 231 billion 447 million dollars. That is to say; as a result, total military expenditures of NATO members in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 are more than the total military expenditures of EU members.

Indeed, within the scope of this study, it has been stated above that the inference about the military power of the organizations would be made by looking at the military expenditures of the organizations. In this context, since the military expenditures of NATO member states are higher than the total military expenditures of EU member states in the mentioned years, within the scope of this research, we can state that NATO is militarily more powerful than the EU. At the same time, when we look at the percentage share of the total military expenditures of the members of the two organizations in the total GDP, the result is as follows. While the percentage of military expenditure of NATO members in GDPs in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 were 2.49, 2.79, 3.11 and 2.47 respectively, the percentages of military expenditures of EU members in GDP in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 were 1.75, 1.65, 1.61 and 1.40 respectively. When the percent share of NATO's military spending in GDP is compared with the percent share of the EU's military spending in GDP in the context of the specified years, NATO has an advantage over the EU in terms of this indicator as well. This indicator also supports the claim that NATO is militarily stronger than the EU when we compare NATO and EU, taking into account the percentage share of military spending in GDP within the scope of this study.




Figure 6 Total Populations of EU and NATO Member States

Thirdly, I stated above that a country's population is considered one of the indicators of power in many studies in literature, since it also contributes to the economic and military power. In this context, when we compare NATO and the EU in terms of the total population of their members in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, the result is as follows. While the total populations of NATO member countries for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 are 792,160,049, - 864,161,949, - 898,880,477, - 922,698,172 respectively, the total populations of the EU member countries for the years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 are 378,439,937, - 462,694,353, - 500,003,350, and 509,659,978 respectively. In other words, as can be seen from the graph, the total population of NATO countries in these years is higher than the total population of EU countries. Considering that population is one of the indicators of both military and economic power in the international system within the scope of this study and that NATO has a comparative advantage over the EU when we compare the populations of the two organizations in the specified years, it can be stated that NATO is more powerful than EU in this context as well.




Figure 7 The EU and NATO Experience in Security Realm

In addition, former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan has a saying: “Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family” (“Statements and Messages,” 1997, Press Release SG/SM/6268, para. 1). With this statement, Annan emphasizes that knowledge is one of the sources of power, and education is one of the methods to gain knowledge and thus power. However, besides acquiring knowledge through education, knowledge can also be obtained by actively performing a job and operating in a field. In other words, in addition to education, knowledge can also be obtained by gaining experience in a field (Tellis et al., 2000, p. 6). More specifically, the concept of experience is defined as “(the process of getting) knowledge or skill from doing, seeing, feeling things” in the Cambridge Dictionary (“Experience,” n.d.). In other words, an actor can gain power through knowledge and abilities by being involved in a job or activity. Moreover, when the concept of experience is accepted as a process of getting as expressed in the Cambridge Dictionary within the scope of this study, one of the ways to measure the process and time is to look at how much time an actor spends in a job or activity. Furthermore, besides the time, one of the ways of measurement of an actor experience on activity is to calculate how many times he/she performs the action in the specified activity. In this context, when the EU and NATO are compared in terms of experience within the scope of security and defence policies, the result is as follows. NATO was established in 1949 and has

been operating in security and defence since that date. The EU, on the other hand, was officially established in 1993 with the identity of the EU and has started to develop its policies within the scope of security policies since this date and its policies within the scope of defence since the beginning of 2000s. In other words, when the experience of two organizations is compared over the years they have been operating within the scope of security and defence policies, we can say that NATO is more experienced than the EU. In addition, if we measure the experience in terms of how many times an actor performs the action, it will be necessary to look at the number of operations that these organizations organize, which are practical reflections of their security and defence policies.

Indeed, when the EU and NATO are compared in terms of the number of operations they organize as the practical reflections of their security and defence policies, NATO has conducted 45 operations and the EU a total of 37 operations. In addition, when we compare the number of operations by the two organizations within the scope of military crisis management, in which the EU and NATO operate jointly, NATO has organized a total of 30 operations, and the EU has organized 15 operations.

In short, within the scope of security and defence policies, NATO has operated for more years than the EU, and within the scope of operations, which are practical reflections of security and defence policies and, NATO has conducted more operations than the EU. Based on these indicators, we can say that NATO is more experienced than the EU. As stated above, when we consider experience as one of the ways to obtain knowledge and knowledge as one of the sources of power, we can say that NATO is more powerful than the EU in this context.

As stated above, within the scope of power as resources approach, when two organizations are compared in terms of military and economic power by taking into account their members' total GDP, total military expenditure and total population in 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, respectively, which are determined according to the enlargement periods, it is seen that NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of resources. In addition, given that knowledge is considered as one of the sources of power, and experience is one of the ways of acquiring knowledge, and NATO is

more experienced than the EU in security and defense policies, it can be said that NATO is more powerful than the EU in this context as well.

However, as stated above, this power must also be legitimate to be expressed as the authority within the scope of Lake's relational authority concept. Indeed, as stated above, in the modern world, the legitimacy of the dominant actor in the international system is determined by the consent of the less powerful actor to the authority of the more powerful actor. In this section, the inference regarding the EU's consent to NATO authority is made based on the survey results conducted by the Pew Research Center in the UK, France and Germany within the scope of support rate for NATO in these countries. As stated above, these three countries have the highest GDP, military expenditure and population among EU members in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, when the survey results are taken into account. The results of the survey conducted in these countries in the years by Pew Research Center are shown in the table below. When the average of the results is taken based on the year of the surveys conducted in the context of measuring the support given to NATO in these countries in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015, the percentages of support are 61.7, 64.3, 64.7, 58.7, 59.7 respectively. When the average of these numbers is taken, the support rate is determined as 61.8% as the average of these four years. The fact that this support is 61.8% on average in the mentioned years, that is, more than fifty percent, shows that the EU has consented to NATO's authority in public opinion within the context of this study. Indeed, this result, which is in the scope of public opinion, legitimizes NATO's power upon the EU within the scope of power as resources approach and turns it into authority.

NATO Favorability Over Time / % who have a favorable opinion of NATO						
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	Average
France	68	70	67	58	64	65.4
UK	60	63	62	59	60	60.8
Germany	57	60	65	59	55	59.2
Average	61.7	64.3	64.7	58.7	59.7	61.8

Figure 8 NATO Favorability Over Time in France, UK, Germany

As a result, it has been shown that NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of power as resources in the context of metrics and methods stated above within the scope of this study. In addition, in the context of the method stated above, it is seen that the EU consents to the authority of NATO within the scope of public opinion. That is, NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of resources. The EU consents to NATO's authority in the context of public opinion. Given Lake's approach that authority consists of both power and legitimacy, it can be said that NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion.

5.2.2 Authority Between EU and NATO in the context of Power as Outcomes and Political Communication

Although NATO has authority upon the EU within the scope of the power as resources approach, it has been stated in the literature that it would be insufficient to examine the concept of authority only by looking at resources. More specifically, the actors with less resources can come to the fore in competition among the more powerful actors in terms of resources with the policies and strategies they follow (Beckley, 2018, p. 12; Mack, 1975, pp. 175-200). In other words, in the international system, the less powerful actor in terms of the resources can reduce/diffuse the power of the actor who has more resources, with each step he takes within the scope of its preferences and desires. In the literature, this approach is evaluated within the framework of power as outcomes. These steps can be in the form of capacity and capability development, publishing documents and speaking a word. According to this approach, each step taken by the actor in line with her/his goal is considered a separate case. It is evaluated how the result of this step affects the relationship of the actor with other actors within the scope of power. Indeed, the common point of the arguments developed within the framework of power as outcome approach in the literature is that, in the international system, as the actors get closer to their goals and desires, their power increases even they are less resources than other actors in the system (Treverton & Jones, 2005; Tellis et al., 2000).

In this section, in this context, first, it is argued that EU has reduced the level of power NATO has established upon itself with every step it takes and every policy it follows in line with its strategic autonomy goal it has expressed in its 2016 security

strategy document (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). In other words, the EU has diffused/reduced the power that NATO has built on itself within the scope of power as outcome approach. Actually, in line with this argument, the former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd used the following statements in the mid-1990s about the EU's step by step construction of its foreign and security policies: "CFSP is not a glass palace, which descends whole and perfect from heaven as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. It can only be built brick by brick on the basis of shared national interests" (Hauser & Kernic, 2006, p. 14). In this context, first, the EU's steps in the context of capacity and capability development within the scope of strategic autonomy goal will be shared in this section.

With respect to legitimacy, it is stated above that legitimacy refers to the right to rule. This right stems from the consent of less powerful actors in the relationship in the modern world (Lake, 2009). It has been stated above that the consent of a less powerful actor can be determined within the scope of public opinion, political communication and political behaviour. In the above section, where the power of the two organizations is evaluated in terms of resources, the consent of the EU to NATO's authority has been evaluated within the scope of public opinion. However, in addition to public opinion, inferences about the consent of less powerful actors can be made by looking at the expressions used and behaviours exhibited by the less powerful actor (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). In this regard, since I look at the EU's behaviours to show that EU diffuse/reduce the power of NATO in the context of power as outcomes, I don't look again at behaviours of EU to make inference to EU's consent to NATO's authority. Therefore, besides the public opinion, I evaluate the EU's consent to NATO's authority within the scope of political communication in this section. In the context of political communication, inferences about the consent of less powerful actor can be made by looking at the documents' narratives, discourses and language published by less powerful actor. In this regard, by comparing the content of security strategy documents published by EU in 2003 and 2016 and content of joint declarations published by two organizations in 2002 and 2016, it will be shown that EU's consent is less to NATO's authority upon itself in 2016 than in 2002 and 2003.

In sum, in this section, first, it will be shown that the EU has diffused/reduced the authority/power of NATO upon itself in the context of power as outcomes. Second, it

will be shown that the EU's consent to NATO's authority is less in 2016 than in 2002 and 2003 in the context of political communication. In other words, it will be shown that NATO's legitimacy upon the EU is decreasing in the context of political communication. Based on these, at the end of this section, it will be said that NATO's authority upon the EU is decreasing within the framework of power as the outcome and political communication.

When it is looked at the EU's steps and arguments within the scope of strategic autonomy in the context of power as outcome, these steps and arguments as follows.

After the end of the Cold War, the member states of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gathered in Paris between 19-21 November to ensure peace and unity in post-Cold War Europe and signed the document called Paris Charter. The following statements were used under the title of A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity: "The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended... Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past...Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades" (*Charter of Paris for A New Europe*, 1990, p.3). CSCE members, which served as a forum for political negotiations between the two blocks during the Cold War, signalled that the separation between Eastern and Western Europe ended and the European continent was freed from all the influences it had during the Cold War period. Indeed, considering that the security and defence of the Europe during the Cold War period provided by a structure in which NATO was at the centre, the phrase "Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past" signalled that Europe would take steps separately from NATO in the field of security and defence policies.

The EU was established with the Maastricht Agreement, which was signed in February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. Indeed, the union was basically established in a three-pillar structure around economic targets. The CFSP formed one pillar of these three pillared structures. As stated above, within the scope of CFSP, the purpose of the union is stated as the protection of the unity and integrity of the union in the context of common interests and values. At the same time, it was stated that this step taken within the scope of security policies would enable the development of common defence policies in the future. In the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU) was determined as the union's defence arm

(*Maastricht Treaty*, 1992). Indeed, the creation of a CFSP under the umbrella of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty and the statement that this step may lead to common defence policies in the future show that the EU has long-term goals in the context of security and defence structure and this step is only the first step of these long-term goals.

With respect to US approaches to new steps in Europe within the scope of security and defence, the US was worried that these new steps that would be taken within the scope of security and defence could damage NATO's holistic structure and create duality. The USA's both supporter and worried attitude towards steps taken to strengthen Europe's security structure is expressed in the literature as "yes but policy" (Sloan, 2016, p. 171). In this context, USA supported the formation of new European security architecture under the umbrella of NATO within the framework of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) instead of European states going to an independent entity from NATO (Sloan, 2016, pp. 161-173). In this direction, US ambassador to NATO, William Taft, stated in his speeches in February and March in 1991, that the EU could take steps within the scope of security and defence policies in the form of reviving the WEU within the NATO, that it should not duplicate NATO's capabilities, and that it should not discriminate against non-European Community member countries (Hatjiadonui, n.d.). Agreeing with William Taft, US defence minister, Dick Cheney, also states that the US would support the EU's steps in defense, security and foreign policy. Yet, he emphasized that NATO should remain as the main organization for the decisions taken within the scope of European security and defence (Hatjiadonui, n.d.). As can be seen, the USA expressed its concerns about the steps to be taken by the EU within the scope of security and defence policies, in the context of damaging NATO's role within the scope of European security, even before taking these steps. In this case, these statements show that steps taken by European states at that time may create an alternative security and defense mechanism to NATO, which was responsible for the security and defense of Europe at that time and reduce NATO's role and power in this area.

At the same time, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, two groups in the European Union as Atlanticists led by UK and Europeanist led by France, emerged. While the Atlanticist defended that NATO should play a fundamental role in EU security and defence, the European wing expressed the importance of the EU in

security and defence policies independent of NATO (Acıkmese & Dizdaroğlu, 2013, p. 67). In this direction, Kelleher (1995) used the following statements: “The Maastricht Treaty of December 1992 marked the striking of a relatively fragile security bargain among the Europeanist and the Atlanticists; in the short-term recognizing NATO’s primacy but clearly defining the path for future independent Europeanist evolution” (p. 58). With this statement, Kelleher states that the EU will build a separate security mechanism from NATO in the future.

At NATO’s Brussel Summit in 1994, it was stated that NATO supported the steps taken by the EU within the scope of security and defence policies, but the necessity of taking these steps in a way that strengthens the ESDI under the umbrella of the alliance was emphasized in the summit declaration. In addition, at the 1994 Brussel NATO Summit, it was decided to establish Joint Task Force (JTF) as part of NATO’s military command structure, which could be used by WEU as well. In addition, at the summit, it was expressed that NATO and EU should have separable but not separate military capabilities (*Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, 1994). Even though the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is established under the NATO command structure, the fact that it can also be used by the WEU, which is stated as the defence pillar of EU in the Maastricht Agreement, can be interpreted as one of the developments in the direction of the EU’s capacity and capability development. Furthermore, the emphasis put by NATO 1994 Brussel Summit upon the development of European Security and Defense policies under the NATO umbrella shows us that NATO saw the potential that EU may be taking its leading role in the future in the security of Europe.

Furthermore, at the Berlin Summit in 1996, NATO emphasized that the EU should develop its security and defence policies under the ESDI. It then stated that the WEU, the defence arm of the EU, could use the capabilities and assets of the alliance in the operations, subject to the consent of the North Atlantic Council (*Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin*, 1996). Briefly, with NATO’s Brussel Summit held in 1994, the foundations of the ESDI concept were laid, and this concept was further elaborated at the 1996 NATO Berlin Summit. Indeed, the ESDI is a concept used by NATO, and it refers both to the European Union’s development of security and defence policies under NATO and to the operations organized by the WEU within the scope of Petersberg Missions and using NATO

facilities and capabilities (Sloan, 2016, pp. 161-162). Indeed, at the Brussel and Berlin Summits, the ties between EU and NATO and the necessity of the EU to develop security and defence policies under the umbrella of NATO were emphasized. The development of new concepts within the framework of European security and defence, and arrangements on joint use of NATO assets and capabilities by WEU and NATO and the frequent emphasis on the bond between EU and NATO show that the EU increased its power within the scope of power as outcome. Notably, the initiatives of the EU in the field of security and defence have started to yield results and this shows that the EU increased its power within the scope of power as outcome. New concepts and regulations have begun to emerge in this context.

Furthermore, despite the decisions taken at the Berlin and Brussel Summits, the EU failed to respond to the crises in the Balkans in the last decade of the 20th century. The crises in the region were generally tried to be solved by NATO under the leadership of USA. However, even though the EU could not respond to these crises within the scope of the new regulations, the new developments and regulations paved the way for the further steps to be taken by the EU within the scope of security and defense policies.

Moreover, members of the EU signed the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 to update and strengthened the Maastricht Agreement. Improvements were also made within the scope of CFSP with the Amsterdam Agreement. As detailed above, Petersberg Tasks adopted by the WEU within the scope of crisis management in 1992 were included in the EU agreement with the Amsterdam Treaty. In addition, the High Representative (HR) position was created for Common Foreign and Security Policies with this agreement (*Amsterdam Treaty*, 1997). Particularly, with the Amsterdam Treaty, the policy areas in which the EU will operate within the scope of foreign and security policies were specified for the first time. The EU became an organization operating in the field of crisis management on paper. In short, as stated, the CFSP created by the Maastricht Agreement were made more systematic and institutionalized by the Amsterdam Agreement. The Amsterdam Treaty also took the EU one step higher within the scope of power as outcome approach

Moreover, one of the most significant steps in building the European security and defence architecture occurred when British Prime Minister Tony Blair changed his attitude towards the autonomous European defence structure. The UK and France came together at the Saint-Malo Summit on 4 December 1998. They issued a statement envisioning the EU to have an autonomous military action capacity that could respond to the international crises. This declaration emphasized that the EU should have an autonomous military capacity and the foundation of common security and defense policies was laid (*Franco-British St. Malo Declaration*, 1998). In many studies in the literature, the Saint Malo Summit has been stated as the breaking point in the construction of the European CSDP.

When we approach the process within the scope of power as outcome approach, since its establishment in 1993, the EU has gone one step further with each step it has taken within the scope of common foreign and security policies and has come one step closer to its strategic autonomy goal. In this context, Saint-Malo can also be considered a great result of the steps taken since 1993 within the scope of security and defence. Indeed, each step became the reason for another step taken after it, and within the scope of power as outcome, the power ladder was advanced to the upper steps. As stated, the EU's decision to create a structure with its autonomous action capacity in the face of international threats emerged as a result of steps taken by the EU within the scope of security and defence policies. As I stated, the EU's signalling with Saint-Malo that it will also operate in the field of defence was interpreted as an increase in power. The possibility of creating an alternative structure to NATO in the future in the context of European security was met with concern by some NATO members.

The USA, one of the strongest countries in NATO both militarily and economically, responded to this step within the framework of its "yes but policy". A few days after the Saint-Malo Declaration, US Secretary of State Albright stated at NATO's ministerial meeting held in Brussel in 1998 that the US supports the ESDI. Yet he said that the EU should pay attention to the issues expressed as three-D in literature. In this context, Albright used the following statements:

...what happened there was very important. There is a reason for the Europeans to find an identity in their own defense, but this is a thing that cannot be duplication

or discrimination. It is a manner by which the Europeans can share in the work of NATO. It is something that can not hurt NATO because this is the most important alliance. But we think it is very important that the Europeans work in this manner because this is most important alliance. But we think it is very important that the Europeans work in this manner because it is something that helps us in burden sharing (Albright, 1998).

As stated by Albright, these reactions are named three D in the literature. This three D concept has been used in literature to express NATO's concerns with respect to the EU's steps taken within the scope of autonomy from NATO in the context of security and defense policies. When we take a closer look at these concepts in 3D, which is the abbreviation of the concepts of discrimination, duplication and decoupling. These concepts are used or expressed as follows within the scope of EU-NATO relations. Firstly, duplication refers to duality in the security and defence of the European region by the EU's replication of NATO assets, capabilities and procedures within the scope of security and defence. Secondly, discrimination is a concept used to express the EU's concerns over the EU's exclusionary policies against non-EU-NATO member states like Turkey. Thirdly, decoupling, on the other hand, is used to express concerns that Europe should establish an independent security defence mechanism separate from NATO (Acıkmese & Dizdaroğlu, 2013, p. 5). In short, Saint-Malo is important because it is the first step that EU took to build autonomous defense policies and that the UK has given the green light to this step. Saint-Malo came into being as a result of the steps taken at the beginning of the 20th century and increased EU's power within the scope of power as outcome.

As stated before, although the EU has taken steps on paper and with rhetoric within the scope of security and defence policies, the US-led response to the crises that took place in the Balkans right next to Europe shows that the EU has areas of improvement within the scope of putting these regulations into practice.

Furthermore, the EU has taken steps in line with these development areas at the Cologne, Helsinki, Santa Maria de Feira and Nice Summits. At the Cologne Summit, planning studies were carried out for the establishment of the EU's autonomous action capacity within the scope of Petersberg Tasks. At the Helsinki Summit, steps were taken within the scope of concretizing the autonomous action capacity planned at the Cologne Summit under the title of Helsinki Headline Goals (*Cologne European Council Conclusions of Presidency, 1999; Helsinki European Council*

Presidency Conclusions, 1999). Specifically, within the scope of capability and capacity development under the title of Helsinki Headline Goal, it was decided to form a European Rapid Reaction Force with a capacity of 60,000 soldiers that could be deployed within six days and maintain its presence in the region for at least one year. In addition to that, the necessity of taking steps towards institutionalization of the union was expressed in the framework of crisis management at the Helsinki Summit (*Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 1999). The Capabilities Commitment Conference was held in 2000 to ensure the allocation of forces specified in the Helsinki Headline Goals. Besides these, in the 29th article of the final declaration of Helsinki Summit, it was stated that the establishment of a European Army was not aimed, taking into account transatlantic relations and reactions that the USA would give (*Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 1999).

Furthermore, in line with the necessity of much more institutionalization within the scope of CFSP, at the Nice Summit, it was decided to create new units under the concepts of Political Security Committee (PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (*European Council-Nice Conclusions of the Presidency*, 2000). In the light of these developments, it would not be wrong to state that the discussions that started with Saint-Malo in 1998 within the scope of having the capacity for autonomous action resulted in institutionalization moves in the early 2000s. In other words, the process that started with Saint-Malo in 1998 continued with the Cologne, Helsinki and Nice Summits, and the EU has increased its power in the context of power as outcome by going one step further in the context of institutionalization. With these steps, the EU has increased its power within the scope of power as outcome approach in the context of institutionalization and has given the signals that it would conduct operations within the scope of security and defence policies as practical reflections of security and defence policies.

Moreover, in 2002, the EU and the NATO issued a joint declaration within the scope of ESDP. It was stated that two organizations established strategic partnership within the scope of crisis management (*EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, 2002).

Considering that NATO often emphasized in the last decade of the 20th century that the EU would develop security and defence policies under the roof of NATO, this

declaration shows us that NATO accepted the development of security and defence policies of the EU under the roof of the EU rather than NATO. This also shows that the EU increases its power within the scope of power as outcome.

Furthermore, based on the decisions taken by NATO at the 1996 Berlin Summit on March 17, 2003, two organizations have implemented some arrangements under the name of Berlin Plus Arrangements, which stipulates that the EU would benefit from NATO's planning and command capabilities in crisis management operations it conducts. These regulations encouraged the EU to conduct operations within the scope of crisis management. The EU carried out its first operation in Macedonia between March 2003 and December 2003 within the framework of Berlin Plus Arrangements. However, within the scope of the Berlin Plus Arrangements, the two organizations could organize only two operations due to problems between the non-EU NATO member Turkey and non-NATO EU member Southern Cyprus. The EU started its second and last operation in Bosnia on December 2, 2004, within the scope of the Berlin Plus Arrangements, using NATO facilities and capabilities, and operation is continuing (Acıkmese & Dizdaroğlu, 2013, p. 50). In addition to these operations, the EU organized its first operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo between June 2003 and September 2003 without using NATO's facilities and capabilities. More specifically, the EU has organized 15 military crisis management operations so far, and 13 of these 15 operations have been organized using its means and capabilities.

Considering these data on operations, we see that the steps taken by the EU, especially after 1998, bear fruit. As can be seen, the EU first carried out an operation using NATO's assets and capabilities and then carried out an operation using the operational capabilities of its members. We can compare the EU as a toddler in operational terms during this period. The EU started to crawl in the last 5 years of the 20th century within the scope of security and defense policies and took its first step in the context of operations with the support of NATO through Operation Concordia in 2003. Later, it started to walk on its own with the operations it conducted without using NATO's assets and capabilities. Indeed, at the end of the process that started with Saint-Malo in 1998, the EU turned into an organization that could organize operations within the scope of security and defence policies in 2003. This case shows that the regulations made on paper and the discourses expressed have been turned

into action by the EU. The ability of the EU to put the regulations into practice shows that it has increased its power within the scope of power as outcome.

In the first 5 years of 2000s, the EU accelerated its steps in the context of autonomy within the scope of security and defense policies. At the Praline Summit, also known as the Chocolate Summit, held by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in Tervuren on 29 April 2003, the idea of the EU having its operational headquarters was discussed and, a joint declaration was published in this context. However, the UK prevented implementing these decisions on the grounds that the decisions taken at this summit would copy NATO's assets and capabilities and lead to duplication (Acıkmese & Dizdaroğlu, 2013, p. 66). Even if decisions taken at this summit are not implemented, it can be cited as an example of the efforts of some states in the EU to gain autonomy from NATO. Later, in 2005, it was decided to establish an EU unit in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under the name of EU Cell at SHAPE to enable the EU to benefit more effectively from NATO assets and capabilities. The mission of this unit was determined as supporting the preparation process of the operations in which NATO assets and capabilities are used within the scope of Berlin Plus Arrangements (Varwick & Koops, 2009, p. 108). Apart from this, in the Le Touquet Summit held by UK and France, it was observed that the European Rapid Reaction Force aim which was set under the name of Helsinki Headline Goals 2003 may not be able to operationalized until 2003. For this reason, it was decided to establish a sustainable troop consisted of 1500 soldiers. Later, in the document named Helsinki Headline Goal 2010, which was accepted at the Brussel Summit of the European Council on 17-18 June, it was stated that the goal of establishing the EU Rapid Reaction Force was not achieved, which was planned to be established until 2003 at the Helsinki Summit. In this context, it was stated that the EU should establish a new unit within the framework of the EU Battlegroup concept until 2007 (*Headline Goal 2010*, 2004). More specifically, it is aimed that this unit, which is planned to be established under the EU Battlegroup concept, consists of 1500 soldiers, is ready to operate within 15 days and continues the operation with its means for 30 days. In addition, in the document titled Headline Goal 2010 adopted at the 2004 Brussel Summit, it was decided to establish the European Defense Agency (EDA) to meet the EU's needs within the scope of military technology and to establish cooperation in the field of defence industry among EU member states

(*Headline Goal 2010*, 2004). In line with this plan, the EDA was established on 12 July 2004 to contribute to the more flexible and effective development of European military sources, to develop European defense capacity and capabilities, to support research and development activities in the field of defense technology, and to establish the European Defense technology market (*The Birth of An Agency*, n.d.).

Moreover, the unit, which was planned to be established under the EU Battlegroup Concept in the document named *Headline Goal 2010*, became operational at full capacity as of January 1, 2007 (Varwick, Koops, 2009, p. 108). Indeed, the operational activation of the EDA and the EU Battlegroup, which are stated as targets in the document called *Headline Goal 2010*, and the initiatives taken by the EU states in the first five years of the 20th century show that EU's power has gradually increased within the scope of power as outcome approach. In other words, the EU has increased its capacity and capabilities as a result of the steps it takes within the scope of capacity and capability development. This shows that it has increased its power within the framework of power as outcome.

Varwick and Koops say that with these steps taken by the EU towards more integration in the security and defence realm, the foreign policy interests, identities and security cultures of the member states began to be formed at the European level. They defined this process as Europeanization. They state that within the scope of Europeanization, EU member states have gradually gotten rid of their NATO identity and started to operate under the EU identity in the context of security and defence policies and adjust their preferences according to the EU identity. They also express the process of European members leaving their NATO identities as de-natoization and autonomization (p. 109). In other words, they state that it is a process for European states that, they diffuse the influence of NATO upon themselves with every step they take within the scope of security and defence. Furthermore, as can be seen, EU countries have taken many steps in the context of capacity and capability development in the first seven years of the 21st century. While these steps have contributed to the EU's self-sufficiency, it has also reduced NATO's influence upon the EU. In another saying, with every step taken in the first 7 years of the 21st century, the EU has achieved the targets it has set in the documents before. That is, it has achieved results. The fact that it achieves results in line with its goals also shows that it has increased its power within the framework of power as outcome.

Indeed, one of the most comprehensive arrangements within the scope of EU security and defence policies has been made with the Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. Specifically, with the Lisbon treaty, important steps were taken on a functional and institutional basis. Firstly, the name of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was changed to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which signifies closer cooperation among member states. Secondly, the functions of the union within the scope of crisis management have been expanded. At the same time, the mutual assistance clause, which evokes NATO's collective defence principle, has been added to the functions of the union. Further, the duties of the high representative are defined more systematically, and External Action Service (EAS) was established to support the duties of the high representative within the scope of foreign policy (*Lisbon Treaty*, 2010). With the arrangements made within the scope of security and defence policies within the Lisbon Agreement, signals were given that the union would operate more systematically and wider policy areas in the future. Although the EU has not organized any operations under the mutual assistance clause yet, the inclusion of this article with the revision made in the founding agreement is an important step in the field of defence. Considering the statement in the Maastricht Agreement of 1993 that the EU would become an organization operating in the area of defence over time, the EU has realized its target stated in the Maastricht Treaty by making arrangements within the scope of defence, at least on paper. In other words, EU reached the result it stated in the Maastricht Agreement, even if only on paper. This shows us that the EU has increased its power within the scope of power as outcome approach with the Lisbon Treaty.

Furthermore, in the light of regional and global developments, especially after 2010, the EU published a strategy document under the name of "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe" on 28 June 2016 within the framework of security and defence policies (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). In the document, the necessity of the EU to have the capacity and capability to respond alone to internal and external threats, when necessary, is expressed around the concept of strategic autonomy. Furthermore, in the strategy document, the necessity of putting into action the mutual assistance clause and solidarity clause, which is also included in the Lisbon Treaty is expressed as follows: "The EU Global Strategy

starts at home. To preserve and develop what we achieved so far, a step change is essential. We must translate our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity into action” (*Shared Vision, Common Action : A Stronger Europe*, 2016). In addition, the document emphasized the necessity of developing the technological and industrial capabilities of the union within the scope of autonomous action capabilities. The fact that the union emphasizes the concept of strategic autonomy in this document and that the union can act within the scope of mutual assistance and solidarity clause shows that the EU has now reached the capacity to combat internal and external threats in terms of both security and defence (*Shared Vision, Common Action : A Stronger Europe*, 2016). These expressions and the vision drawn by the EU in the global strategy document published in 2016 can be considered the result of its steps since its establishment in 1993.

In this context, within the scope of power as outcome approach, the power of actors in the international system is evaluated according to whether they can achieve the desired result in the international system or not. The union stated in the Maastricht Agreement, which is its founding agreement in 1993 that the union operates in the field of security and aims to become an organization that operates in defence over time. As it developed its capacities and capabilities in line with its targets over time, it puts the target at a higher point and tried to take steps towards autonomy as much as possible within the scope of security and defence policies. Considering that the power of an actor is evaluated in the context of the targets set and the choices made within the scope of power as outcome approach, the EU first determined its targets with the documents it published between 1993 and 2016, and then took steps in line with these targets and preferences and reached the result. In this context, it has achieved the goals it has set within the scope of capacity and capability development in line with its preferences in the international system and thus has increased its power within the scope of power as outcome.

As seen above, within the framework of power as outcome, the EU’s goals and preferences within the scope of security and defence policies were to have an autonomous action capacity. In the strategy document it published in 2016, he expressed this clearly and stated that it is now time for union to act in the context of defence. Indeed, while the EU has achieved its goals in line with autonomous action capacity with each of these actions and speeches and concepts, it has also increased

its power within the framework of power as outcome, since its goals are within the scope of autonomy. While the EU took steps within the scope of capacity and capability development within the scope of autonomy, it also increased its power. While increasing its power within the scope of power as outcome in line with autonomy, it decreased the power and influence that NATO held within the scope of power as resources.

In short, in this part of the study, I argue that with the steps taken by the EU within the scope of power as outcome, the EU increased its power and autonomy and reduced the authority and power NATO established upon itself within the scope of power as resources approach. Indeed, the power of an actor within the scope of power as outcome approach is evaluated according to whether this actor can achieve its goals and preferences in the international system or not. The global strategy document published by the EU in 2016, has clearly stated that EU's goal within the framework of the concept of strategic autonomy is to have the capacity and capability to respond to international threats alone when necessary. Even before publishing this strategy document, it occasionally stated that it has goals and preferences within the scope of having an autonomous action capacity, and it sometimes acted in this direction as well. As stated above, the EU has increased its capability and capacity with every step since its establishment in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty and has come one step closer to strategic autonomy or autonomous action capacity aim.

Within the scope of power as outcome, the power of actors is evaluated according to their ability to achieve results in line with their goals and preferences in the international system. EU has been one step closer to its autonomous action capacity goal after every step in the context of capability and capacity development it takes within the scope of security and defense policies. As it closer to the result – strategic autonomy- it took its power one level higher at every step within the framework of power as outcome approach. In other words, as its autonomy increased, it also increased its power within the framework of power as outcome and decreased the influence and power that NATO established on itself as an incumbent organization within the scope of power resources in this field.

5.2.2.1 Decreasing Legitimacy of NATO upon the EU

As stated before, Lake (2009) said that, actors enter into relations within the scope of relational authority through social contract in the international system. Lake later states that the concept of relational authority consists of two elements, power and legitimacy (p. 35). In the first part, the power is defined in terms of “power as resources” and the legitimacy is operationalized by looking at the public opinion. Then, it is argued that NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion. Later, in this section, firstly, the power relationship between the two organizations is evaluated within the framework of power as outcome. It is discussed that NATO’s power upon the EU was decreasing within the framework of power as outcome. However, for us to say that NATO’s authority upon the EU has decreased, NATO’s legitimacy upon the EU should also move in a decreasing direction. Indeed, it is stated above that Lake defines legitimacy as the “right to rule” and that right in the modern world stems from the consent of the less powerful actor about the authority of more powerful actor upon itself (p. 24).

In this context, in this section, the consent of the EU to NATO’s authority has been examined in the context of political communication, accepting the EU and NATO as a unitary actor. Firstly, the joint declarations issued by the two organizations in 2002 and 2016 are compared in the context of political communication, and it is inferred how the EU’s consent to NATO’s authority moves in the context of these two documents. Then, the security strategy documents published by the EU in 2003 and 2016 are compared within the scope of the EU’s consent to NATO’s authority.

First, when the joint declarations issued by the two organizations are compared, some of the statements in the joint declaration published in 2003, which show that the EU accepts NATO’s authority, are not come across in the joint declarations published in 2016 (*EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, 2002; *Joint Declaration*, 2016). It is pointed out that according to the joint declarations issued by the two organizations in 2002 and 2016, the EU’s consent to NATO’s authority was less in 2016 than in 2002. Secondly, when the strategy documents published by the EU within the scope of security and defense policies is compared, while strategy document published in 2003 emphasizes the cooperation with other actors against

threats within the scope of effective multilateralism, the strategy document published in 2016 emphasizes the importance of having autonomous capacity and capability that respond to threats alone when necessary within the framework of strategic autonomy (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, 2003 ; *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). Considering that NATO is one of the actors that has the closest relationship with the EU within the scope of Europe's security and defence, it can be expressed in the context of the previous sentence that EU's consent to NATO's authority was less in 2016 than in 2003 according to strategy documents that EU published. In short, it can be argued that the EU's consent to NATO's authority decreased in 2016 compared to 2002-2003, both in the context of declarations jointly published by the two organizations and in the context of strategy documents published by the EU. The fact that the EU's consent to NATO's authority was less in 2016 than in 2002-2003 indicates that NATO's legitimacy upon the EU has decreased.

First of all, when the joint declarations published by the two organizations in 2002 and 2016 are compared in the context of political communication within the scope of the EU's consent to NATO, while we come across statements showing that EU accept the NATO's leading role or authority in the joint declaration they published in 2002, we do not encounter these expressions in the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2016. More specifically, when we look at the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2002, we encounter the following statement that we can deduce that the EU accepts NATO's authority:

...Welcome the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union's disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged ("EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP," 2002).

In these words, with the phrase "where NATO as a whole is not engaged," the right to choose to conduct the first operation in the region was left to NATO, and it was stated that if NATO did not operate in this region, the EU could carry out an operation. In other words, the EU has consented to NATO's first choice right to

conduct an operation in a region. Based on this statement, it can be stated that the EU consents to NATO's leading role and authority, especially in the field of crisis management policy area. Furthermore, another expression in the declaration from which it can be deduced that the EU consents to NATO's authority is "...Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management..." (*EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP*, 2002). In this statement, it is stated that while NATO operates as a stronger and more important organization in the field, the EU can contribute to this power by increasing its power. In other words, it means that NATO is a stronger organization and that the EU can contribute to this power as an organization developing its power. Indeed, the EU recognized that NATO is a more powerful organization than itself by signing this declaration, and in a sense, it consented to the authority of NATO. In short, by looking at these statements in the joint declaration issued by the two organizations in 2002, it can be deduced that the EU has consented to the NATO's authority.

When it is looked at the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2016, it can be seen that these expressions are not used. Indeed, these expressions were not used, and the declaration did not include any expression that can made inferences that NATO is a more powerful organization than the EU. Besides, there is no expression in the joint declaration published in 2016 like "where NATO as whole is not engaged" (*Joint Declaration*, 2016). In short, in the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2016, no statement was made to deduce that NATO is stronger than the EU and that the EU consents to NATO's authority. On the contrary, the following expressions have been used expressing that a new era has been entered in the relations between the two organizations and that we can deduce that the positions of the two organizations are the same with respect to each other:

We believe that the time has come to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership...In the light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step up our efforts : we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition ; because our security is interconnected ; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond (*Joint Declaration*, 2016).

As can be seen, it has been emphasized that a new era has started in the relations between the two organizations. Furthermore, by looking at the expression “a stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing”, it can be deduced that the two organizations are in equal status to each other. Because it has been stated that with the stronger of both organizations, they will mutually contribute to each other’s strength. In short, in the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2016, no statement was made that the EU consented to NATO’s authority and influence. On the contrary, it was stated that the relations between the two organizations entered a new era and it was stated that the stronger the two organizations, the stronger the other.

In brief, in the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2002, there are statements that the EU consents to the authority and influence of NATO. However, the joint declaration published by the two organizations in 2016 does not contain any statements that the EU consents to the authority and influence of NATO. As a result, considering that legitimacy stems from consent, this situation shows us that NATO’s legitimacy upon the EU has decreased in the context of the joint declarations published jointly by the two organizations in 2002 and 2016 within the scope of political communication.

Secondly, when we compare the strategy documents published by the two organizations within the scope of security and defense policies in 2003 and 2016 in the context of EU’s consent to NATO’s authority in terms of political communication, it is seen that while in the strategy document published in 2003, EU emphasizes the importance of responding to threats together with other actors within the scope of effective multilateralism, in the strategy document it published in 2016 it emphasizes the necessity of responding to threats on its own when necessary within the framework of concept of strategic autonomy (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, 2003 ; *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). As stated in the strategy document published by the EU in 2003, the importance of responding to threats together with other organizations, especially with NATO and USA, was emphasized within the framework of the concept of “effective multilateralism.” Indeed, in the document published in 2003, the importance of

acting together in the face of the problems and the role of the USA after the Cold War is stated using the following expressions:

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, 2003, p. 3).

As can be seen, the importance of cooperation in the international system was emphasized with the phrase "no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own". Afterwards, union's objectives are expressed under the main heading of strategic objectives, under three subheadings: "Addressing the Threats, Building Security in our Neighbourhood and An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism" (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, 2003). Further, under the heading of an International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism, the following statements are used regarding the relations with NATO: "One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship" (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, 2003, p. 11). Furthermore, in the last part of the document, under the main heading of Policy Implications for Europe, the following statements were made in the strategy document published in 2003:

There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnership with key actors. The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, 2003, p. 15).

In particular, the importance of transatlantic relations was emphasized with the expressions "the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be formidable force for good in the

world". It was stated that no other relation could replace these relations with this "irreplaceable" expression. Although it was stated in the document that the EU should be more active, more capable and more coherent within the scope of combating threats, no expression was used for the EU to fight these threats alone. On the contrary, in the document, the importance of the EU to fight threats together with other international actors, especially with NATO, was expressed and emphasized in the context of effective multilateralism. More specifically, considering the role played by NATO in European security and defense from its establishment to the beginning of the 21st century, the EU's emphasis on relations with other international actors and transatlantic relations within the scope of effective multilateralism in the strategy document published in 2003, in a sense, shows that the EU wanted to act together with NATO within the scope of security and defense in this term. Indeed, it would not be wrong to deduce that the reason for the EU to act together with NATO is due to NATO's leading role in this field by looking at the word "One of the core elements of international system is the transatlantic relationship...NATO is an important expression of this relationship" (*A Secure Europe in A Better World*, p. 11). Based on the strategy document published in 2003, we can conclude that the EU accepts the NATO's role in this area. That is to say, it is deduced from strategy documents published by the EU in 2003 that the EU accepted NATO's leading role in the security and defence realm. At the same time, no statement of the EU against NATO's authority was found in the document.

In the strategy document published in 2016, it is stated that the union should have the capability and capacity to respond to threats alone to establish security and peace within and outside its borders when necessary. Although the importance of relations with NATO is stated occasionally in the context of transnational partnership and multilateralism under the title of A Closer Atlantic in the document published in 2016, the importance of the union's ability to fight threats alone, when necessary, is emphasized by using the concept of strategic autonomy, which was not used in previous documents (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). Considering that NATO is one of the organizations with which the EU has closer relations in the field of security and defence, with the expression of strategic autonomy, it can be understood that it signals that it accepts NATO's authority less than previous years. In other words, EU signals that it can act alone when necessary

within the scope of security and defense policies within the framework of the strategic autonomy concept. This shows that the EU's consent of NATO to its authority is at lower levels compared to previous periods. In addition, the necessity of transforming the principles of mutual assistance and solidarity clause, which was included in the agreement of the union with the Lisbon Agreement, into action is emphasized in the document within the framework of "from vision to action" phrase (*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, 2016). Indeed, NATO is the main organization within the scope of collective defense for Transatlantic region and it frequently emphasizes this. The statement in the document published in 2016 that the EU can take action under the mutual assistance and solidarity clause strengthens the claim that the EU recognizes NATO's authority to a lesser extent. Further, as the Union's autonomy within the scope of security and defense policies increases, its authority to set rules in this field will also increase and NATO's authority in this field will decrease compared to past.

Indeed, the following statements in the document reflect the EU's perspective on NATO throughout the document: "The EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defense efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO" (*Shared Vision, Common Action*, 2016, p. 20). As it is seen, while it emphasizes throughout the document that the union should have the capacity to act alone within the framework of the concept of strategic autonomy, it also states that it would contribute to NATO with these steps to be taken within the scope of capacity and capability development. As a result, when the security strategy documents published by the EU in 2003 and 2016 are compared, it is seen that while there are statements in the strategy document published by the EU in 2003 that it accepts the authority of NATO, the strategy document published in 2016 expressed the need for EU to have autonomous capability and capacity to respond international threat when necessary. In other words, it can be said that while EU consented to NATO's authority in the security and defense realm in its 2003 strategy document, this consent has decreased in the strategy document it published in 2016 due to its emphasis on strategic autonomy for the EU in the context of the capacity for autonomous action.

In summary, in this section, I have drawn my conclusion on EU's consent to NATO's authority by comparing the joint declarations issued by two organizations in 2002 and 2016 and strategy documents issued by EU in 2003 and 2016 within the framework of political communication. When it is looked at the joint declarations published by the two organizations, it is seen that while it can be come across the expressions that show the EU's consent to NATO's authority in the joint declaration issued in 2002, it cannot be found such expressions that show the EU's consent to NATO's authority in the joint declaration issued by two organizations in 2016. This shows that the EU's consent to NATO's authority was less in 2016 than in 2002. Furthermore, when it is looked at the strategy documents published by the EU in 2003 and 2016, in the strategy document published in 2003, the EU's response to threats in cooperation with other international organizations, especially with NATO, was expressed within the scope of effective multilateralism. Although it was stated that the EU was more active, more capable and more coherent, no statement was made with respect to separate or autonomous action capacity of EU within the scope of security and defence in the strategy document published in 2003.

Given that NATO is the main organization in ensuring the security and defence of Europe, the absence of an expression in this context means, in a sense, to accept NATO's authority in the security and defence realm. Therefore, by looking at the strategy document published in 2003, it can be said that the EU consents to NATO's authority. However, in the strategy document published in 2016, the EU expresses its willingness to respond to threats alone when necessary. In that context, the document emphasizes the capability and capacity development. At the same time, it is stated in the document that the EU should translate the mutual assistance and solidarity clause into action. Given that NATO is the main organization for years that ensures the security and defense of Europe, EU would like to express its decreasing consent to NATO's authority in this realm in the strategy document published in 2016 by using the strategic autonomy concept. From this point of view, when the EU's strategy documents in 2003 and 2016 are compared, it is seen that the EU's consent to NATO's authority has decreased.

As a result, when it is looked at the documents published jointly by the two organizations in 2002 and 2016 and the strategy documents published by the EU within the scope of security and defence policies, it is seen that the EU's consent to

NATO's authority has decreased. Given that Lake expresses the concept of legitimacy as "right to rule" and says that this right results from the consent of less power actor with respect to the authority of more powerful actor in the international system and EU's consent to NATO's authority less in 2016 compared to 2002-2003, we can say that NATO has less legitimacy in 2016 compared to 2002-2003. In this context, we can say that NATO's legitimacy upon the EU is decreasing within political communication when we take these actors as unitary actors.

In sum, within the scope of power as outcome, the EU is reducing the power of NATO upon itself with every step it takes within the framework of strategic autonomy. More specifically, given that the actors are more powerful as they can achieve results in the international system according to power as outcome and the EU's goal is strategic autonomy in the 2016 strategy document, EU increases its power within the scope of power as outcome with each step taken in line with the EU's strategic autonomy goal. At the same time, this power increase reduces the power that NATO has upon the EU within the scope of power as resources.

However, to say that NATO's authority has also decreased based on the decrease in its power over the EU, NATO's legitimacy over the EU should also decrease. In this section, I examined the legitimacy relations between NATO and the EU within the framework of political communication by comparing the joint declarations published by the two organizations in 2002 and 2016 and strategy documents by the EU in 2003 and 2016 in the context of EU's consent to NATO. As stated above, when these documents are compared within the scope of political communication, it is seen that the EU's consent to NATO's authority was less in 2016 than in 2002-2003, and thus its legitimacy is decreasing. Considering that Lake's statement that the concept of authority consists of the concepts of power and legitimacy, and both NATO's power within the scope of power as outcome and NATO's legitimacy upon the EU within the scope of political communication have decreased, we can say that NATO's authority upon EU has been decreasing within the framework of power as outcome and political communication.

5.3 Conclusion upon Hierarchy Between EU and NATO

As stated above, Lake (2009) defines the hierarchy as "the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled" and, he said that authority is a type of power

that has legitimacy (pp. 9-24). Based on these, when the power and legitimacy relations between EU and NATO is examined, it is seen that NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of power as resources and, the EU consents to NATO's authority in the context of public opinion. Therefore, it can be said that NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion. However, as explained above, the EU reduces/diffuses the power that NATO has upon the EU in the context of power as outcome, and the EU's consent to NATO's authority is less in 2016 compared to 2002 and 2003 in political communication. Based on that, it can be said NATO's authority upon the EU is decreasing within the framework of power as outcome and political communication.

Overall, even though NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion, NATO's authority is decreasing within the framework of power as outcome and political communication. Given Lake's hierarchy definition as "the extent of the authority exercised by the ruler over the ruled" it can be said that even though there is hierarchy between NATO and EU in favor of EU, this hierarchy is decreasing.

In the previous section, it is stated that the EU and NATO overlap in the field of military crisis management policy competency. In this section, it is seen that although there is a hierarchy between the EU and NATO in favour of NATO, NATO's hierarchy upon the EU is decreasing. Given my sub hypothesis, since there is overlap, both competition and cooperation dynamics can be seen in the relationship. However, since the hierarchy relationship is decreasing, it can be said that the relationship between the EU and NATO is on the way of shifting from cooperation to competition.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War, the EU was established and started to operate within the scope of security policies and gave signals that it would also operate in the field of defence. Considering that NATO provides European security and defense for a long time especially during the Cold War, it has been a matter of curiosity how the relations between NATO and the EU will be developed. Based on this curiosity, in the literature, discussions upon the relations between EU and NATO have been shaped in the context of both cooperation and competition. In this context, in this research, I answer whether the relationship between EU and NATO is cooperation, competition or both of them. At first, based on the literature, I came up with the general hypothesis that EU-NATO relations contain both competition and cooperation dynamics. Indeed, in the literature, five theoretical approaches explain the relations between EU and NATO. These theories are principle agent theory (P-A), resource dependency theory (RDT), strategic partnership, practice approach or practice turn, and regime complex theory (Koops, 2017). In this study, to understand whether the relationship between EU and NATO is cooperation, competition or both of them, I applied the regime complex theory due to its conceptual richness and explaining power of competition and cooperation dynamics. Specifically, as stated above, regime complex theory is developed to explain the systemic impacts of functionally overlapping institutions in a non-hierarchical way (Alter & Raustiala, 2018). In other words, regime complex theory explains the competition and cooperation dynamics between international institutions based on its basic dimensions, which are functional overlap and hierarchy. In this context, arguments in the regime complex theory state that to observe both competition and cooperation dynamics in the relationship between international institutions, institutions should functionally overlap, and have joint members (Haftel & Lenz, 2021). However, whether the relationship is more inclined to cooperation or competition varies

depending on the hierarchy level between the organizations. Arguments in the regime complex literature say that in the cases that actors functionally overlap and hierarchy level between actors is high, relationship between international institutions tend to be more cooperative. Indeed, since there is a high-level hierarchy between the institutions, less powerful actors comply with the regulations and orders of the more powerful actor.

However, in the cases that institutions functionally overlap and hierarchy level low between institutions, the relationship between institutions tend to be more competitive. Since the hierarchy level between institutions is low, there is no regulatory authority upon the overlapping policy competency. Institutions compete with each other to come to the fore in the overlapping policy area (Henning & Pratt, 2020). Based on these approaches, I first look at whether there is a functional overlap between the EU and the NATO. Indeed, in the first years of its establishment, the EU has not yet defined its security and defence functions specifically. For this reason, it cannot be said that the EU functionally overlapped with NATO when it was first founded. In 1997, with the Amsterdam Agreement, it added some functions within the scope of crisis management, called Petersberg Tasks, to its founding agreement (*Treaty of Amsterdam*, 1997). With the addition of these tasks to its founding agreement, the EU specifically defined its functions within the scope of foreign and security policies for the first time in history. Even though the EU added these functions into its founding treaty with the Amsterdam Treaty, it did not conduct any operations until 2003. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the EU could not gain functionality within the framework of these tasks until 2003.

The EU initiated 4 operations in 2003, 2 of which were military crisis management operations and 2 of which were civilian crisis management operations, and gained full functionality within the scope of crisis management in 2003. With respect to NATO, during the Cold War period, NATO operated with the functions of defence and deterrence. However, with the changing threat perception in the post-Cold War period, he stated in his strategy document published in 1991 that he would be operational within the scope of crisis management (*The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991).

Moreover, it gained functionality in military crisis management and defence by conducting operations just after the Cold War. The EU and NATO started to functionally overlap in 2003 in the military crisis management policy competency both on paper and in practice. Even though NATO has made some arrangements on paper within the scope of the civilian side of crisis management and the EU has made some arrangements within the scope of defense and deterrence, both organizations' arrangements within the scope of the specified functions remained on paper and did not gain functionality in practice. Therefore, it would not be true to say that these two organizations gained functionality in these specified areas between 1993 and 2016. Based on all these, it would not be wrong to say that these two organizations functionally overlap in military crisis management policy competency. Since institutions functionally overlap, both competition and cooperation dynamics can be seen in the relationship.

Furthermore, as stated, the hierarchy level between the two organizations determines whether the relationship between the EU and NATO tends to be more cooperative or competitive (Henning & Pratt, 2020). Therefore, after observing a functional overlap between EU and NATO in military crisis management policy competency, I look at the hierarchy relation between these two institutions. In this study, I adopted the hierarchy approach of David Lake. He says that hierarchy refers to the authority level among states in the international system, and authority is the type of power that has legitimacy in the relationship (Lake, 2009). I applied Lake's hierarchy and authority definition to explain the hierarchy relation between EU and NATO. To observe the power relations between these two actors, first of all, I look at the resources of the two actors. As explained in detailed above, in terms of resources, NATO is more powerful than the EU. Afterwards, I look at the power relations between the EU and NATO in the context of power as outcome. Within the scope of power as outcome, the EU diffuse/reduce the power that NATO upon itself. Once observing power relations between two institutions, I observe the legitimacy relations between two institutions, which is another basic dimension of the concept of authority. Lake defines legitimacy as "right to rule" and says that this right comes from consent (p. 24). Indeed, in terms of consent, the literature says that inferences can be made about the consent of less powerful actor to the authority of more powerful actor by looking at the public opinion of less powerful actor, the expressions made, and behaviours

exhibited by the less powerful actor in the relationship (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). In this context, first, I look at the public opinion of the EU through the survey conducted in the most powerful EU countries in terms of resources by Pew Research Center (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). Based on the result of this survey, I made the inference that the EU consents to NATO's authority within the scope of public opinion. Afterwards, I compare the content of joint declarations published by two organizations in 2002 and 2016 and the content of security strategy documents published by the EU in 2003 and 2016 within political communication. Since I look at behaviours that the EU exhibits in the context of power as outcome, it would be better to analyze the EU's consent to NATO's authority within the framework of political communication. In the comparison, while there are statements that show the EU's consent to NATO's authority in the documents published in 2002 and 2003, these statements are less common in the documents published in 2016. This shows that the EU consented to NATO's authority less in 2016 than in 2002 and 2003 in political communication. In other words, NATO's legitimacy upon the EU is decreasing within the scope of political communication.

Based on these, regarding the power, it is seen that while NATO is more powerful than the EU in terms of resources, the EU is reducing this power with each step it takes within the framework of power as outcome. Moreover, with respect to legitimacy, while the EU consents to NATO's authority in the context of public opinion, the EU's consent is decreasing to NATO's authority in the context of political communication. Given that Lake states that authority is a type of power that has legitimacy in the relationship in the international system, when I combine the power and legitimacy frameworks that in the same direction to ensure coherence, the authority relationship between two actors is as follows: NATO is more powerful than the EU within the framework of power as resources and EU consent to NATO's authority in the context of public opinion. Therefore, it can be said that NATO has authority upon the EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion. However, the EU diffuses/reduces the authority that NATO has upon itself within the scope of power as outcome, and the EU's consent to NATO's authority in the context of political communication is decreasing. Based on that, it can be said that NATO's authority is decreasing upon the EU within the framework of power as outcome and political communication. In brief, while NATO has authority upon the

EU within the framework of power as resources and public opinion, the EU reduces NATO's authority within the framework of power as outcome and political communication. In this context, considering Lake's approach that hierarchy is the extent of authority and there is a proportional relation between authority and hierarchy, it can be said that even though there is a hierarchical relation between NATO and EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy relations between these two institutions is decreasing.

That is to say, there is a functional overlap between the EU and NATO, and even though there is a hierarchy between NATO and the EU in favour of NATO, this hierarchy is decreasing through the process. From this point of view, considering the sub-hypothesis that I came up with above, it can be said that both cooperation and competition dynamics can be seen in the relationship. However, due to the fact that the hierarchy relationship between two institutions is decreasing, it can be said that the relationship between the EU and NATO is on the way of shifting from cooperation to competition.

6.1 Limitations

In this research, in the chapter where EU-NATO relations are examined in the context of the concept of hierarchy, the EU's consent to NATO's authority is examined in the context of public opinion within the framework of power as resources and public opinion. In this part, consent of the EU to NATO's authority is inferred in the context of public opinion based on the survey's results carried out by the Pew Research Center (Fagan & Poushter, 2020). In fact, the Pew Research Center conducted this survey to see NATO's support rate among NATO member states. Since the survey is conducted in NATO countries, results for non-NATO EU members are not available in the survey. Therefore, in this study, inference about the EU's consent to NATO in the context of public opinion is made by only looking at the survey results in the countries that are both members of the EU and NATO. Due to the fact that data is not available for countries that are not NATO members but EU members, public opinion in these countries is not taken into account as making inference about the EU's consent to NATO's authority. Since available data is limited, to make the inference, first of all, I classify the NATO member countries in terms of geography and then look at the three countries with the highest GDP,

military expenditure and population in the European continent in the years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Since the three countries that meet these criteria are the UK, France and Germany, the results of the surveys held in these countries in the years when the data on the survey results were available were taken into account within the scope of this study. More specifically, in the context of public opinion, including the survey results showing support for NATO in countries such as Southern Cyprus, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Malta, which are non-NATO EU member countries, could have further increased the validity of the data in the context of better reflection of the EU's consent to NATO's authority. However, since I do not have any data on the support rates for NATO in non-NATO EU members, I could not include data about the support for NATO in these countries. Even though this situation can be considered a limitation, this does not mean that inferences cannot be made from this data in the context of public opinion in the EU. The data I have inferred about public support to NATO includes countries with the highest GDP, highest military spending and highest population in the EU, namely most powerful countries in the EU in terms of resources. Considering the arguments in the literature that the EU was also dominated by these three most powerful countries during the pre-Brexit period, looking at the public opinion in these three countries provides me with insight to infer the EU's consent to NATO within the scope of public opinion.

6.2 Future Research

Although there are arguments in the EU-NATO relations literature regarding the direction of the relations of the institutions operating in the regime complex like cooperation or competition, there are not many arguments about how the relations will progress after taking this direction. Especially, in the regime complex literature, in the arguments where relations between these two institutions are evaluated in the context of cooperation, it is emphasized that there should be a mechanism among institutions that functions as coordination machinery of overlapping policy/issue area of institutions, especially in cases that the overlapping policy area is co-governed (Gehring & Faude, 2014; Faude & Parizek, 2020). In other words, regime complex literature has stated that there should be a coordination mechanism between the institutions operating in the regime complex, especially in the cases where relations progress as co-governance of an overlapping policy area. In this context, as one of

the recommendations for future studies, researchers can conduct research on whether functional overlap between EU and NATO leads to the emergence of co-governance in this overlapping policy competency and if yes, how this overlapping policy competency is co-governed by these two institutions.



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