



Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Political Science and Public Administration

Political Science

**INTERSECTIONALITY, POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND GENDER:
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN FRANCE**

Bilge DURUTÜRK

Ph.D. Dissertation

Ankara, 2018

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
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
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
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
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
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ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Prof. Dr. Berrin KOYUNCU LORASDAĞI danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.



Bilge DURUTÜRK

Biricik Anneanneciğim Muzaffer GÜMÜŞ'e

TEŞEKKÜR

Hayatta her şey emek ister... Bu tezin her aşaması, babamın her zaman söylediği bu sözün ne kadar doğru olduğunu tekrar tekrar hatırlattı bana. Hayatta her şey emek ister...

Ben bu tezin asıl can alıcı noktası olan “literatüre katkı” kısmını şekillendirmek için Fransa’ya gitmişken BİRTANECİK ANNEANNEMİ kaybettim. Benim için çok ama çok değerli bir insan, yol gösterici ve öğretici olan anneannem, uzaklardan bizi izlemeye gittiği o gün de dahil olmak üzere sonraki sürecin tamamında yanımda oldu, bana uğur getirdi, işlerimin rastgitmesini ve önümdeki engellerin ortadan kalkmasını sağladı. Ben hep buna inandım. Ve anneannemi hep yanımda bana destek olurken hissettim. Bu sebeple bu tez, ilk önce anneannem için yazıldı; literatüre katkı ve siyaset bilimine bir küçük gelişme tanesi sağlaması sonrasında geldi...

Bana her zaman destek olan ve her halimle beni kabul eden ailem... Hep sevgi dolu 9 yaşındaki bir çocuğun neşesi ve umuduna sahip BİRİCİK ANNEM; her zaman doğru, dürüst ve sabırlı insan olmayı öğütleyen ne olursa olsun gerçeklerden vazgeçmemek gerektiğini bana aşıl原因 ve her zaman dimdik ayakta durup gerekiyorsa ağaçlar gibi ayakta ölecek kadar onurlu olmayı nasihat eden CANIM BABAM; bana tüm huysuzluklarım, atarlarım, nazımın geçebildiği her konuda yaptığım gönül koymalarım rağmen sınıksız sarılıp “ama biz ayrılamayız ki; kardeşiz” diyen ve tezimin her aşamasında hep ama hep yanımda olup yerin geldiğinde benim için kendi gerekliliklerini ikinci plana atmış MİNİK TAVŞANIM KARDEŞİM ve ailemizin en minik üyesi, tüm evin neşesi, her kucağıma aldığımda evin içinde her tarafta uçuş uçuş olan tüyleri ve sevgisini gösterdiği pespembe diliyle iyi ki var iyi ki minicik bir yavru olarak hayatımıza girdi dediğim OĞLUM FETA... Sizler olmasaydınız ben gün gelip yeter ya dedikten sonra bile devam etmeyi, her zorluğu atlatmamı sağlayan “Hadi Bilge, ha gayret!” dediğiniz anılarımı nasıl yaşar ve bugüne gelirdim bilmiyorum. Sizin bana verdiğiniz güç ile ben güç aldım; iyi ki varsınız ve hep yanımdasınız.

Aile kadar yakın insanlar vardır bir de. Onlar da aslında aileden sayılırlar. Size kardeş kadar yakındırlar. Gözünüze bakıp içinizden geçeni anırlar; hatta bazen sizin

kendinizle ilgili farkında olmadığınız şeyin farkındadırlar. İşte benim can dostum, KARDEŞİM AYŞEGÜL, bu tanıma en çok yakışan... Tez sürecimde ve aslında hayatımın en zorlu süreçlerinde hep benim yanımda bana bir yoldaş ve destek oldu. Ne zaman başım sıkışsa ya da ne zaman başıma güzel bir şey gelse ben onunla paylaştım. Belki de az sayıda o çok şanslı insandan biriyim...

Bir de bazı insanlar vardır; sizin yanınızdadır, hep aklınızda ve kalbinizin bir köşesinde. Bir şekilde yer etmişlerdir, bu uzun doktora sürecimde ben bir çok öyle insan biriktirdim. Hepsinin benim kalbimdeki yeri ayrı ayrı, hepsi çok değerli... Bana desteklerini bir gün olsun esirgemediler.

Tez sürecimde beni en çok ilerleten zamanlardan olan tez izleme komiteleri vasıtasıyla tanıdığım ve pek çok şey öğrendiğim Sayın Hocalarım, PROF. DR. SİMTEN COŞAR, DOÇ. DR. SAİME ÖZÇÜRÜMEZ VE DOÇ DR. FUNDA GENÇOĞLU ONBAŞI' ya sonsuz teşekkürlerimi sunuyorum.

Pek tabi bana bütün üniversite hayatım ve akademik kariyerim sürecinde destek olan ve bu desteğine hayatımın sonuna kadar layık olmak için canla başla çalışacağıma; hep kendisinden öğrendiğim ve bizzat kendi hayatında uyguladığını gözlemlediğim adaletli olma, iyi ve ahlaklı olma ilkelerini takip edeceğime söz verdiğim biricik yol göstericim PROF. DR. BERRİN KOYUNCU LORASDAĞI'na çok teşekkür ederim. İyi ki varsınız HOCAM.

Son olarak bana anneannemin bir hediyesi olduğunu düşündüğüm ve Fransa'da çalıştığım alanda oldukça tanınan bir akademisyen olan, bana hem burs almamda yardımcı olan hem de akademik olarak yol göstericilik yapan PROF. DR. ERIC FASSIN'a saygılarımı sunuyorum.

ABSTRACT

Durutürk, Bilge. *Intersectionality, Politics of Identity and Gender: Civil Society Organizations in France*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ankara, 2018.

The concept of intersectionality in feminist theory, which has been embraced especially in parallel by third-wave feminists, is strongly contested by many belonging to the second wave of feminism. Considering the different historical backgrounds and their present-day consequences in the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European traditions, in each country the meaning of intersectionality could consist of different elements besides the quintessential elements of the concept (race, class and gender). Also, even though those quintessential elements may be commonly used to conceptualize the term, their implicit meanings might differ. Intersectionality and its meaning in French context have been discussed by CSOs through extremely important debates over *laïcité* which have shaped the foundation of identity politics, as well as the example of Muslim migrant women. Debates in which CSOs advocating women's rights over the last 20 years have had a particularly active part have led to a need for an analysis of the concept of intersectionality in the light of French exceptionalism.

Thus, this thesis is to explore how the concept of intersectionality is articulated in the French context by CSOs in France with regard to specific incidents such as prohibition of headscarf in public schools, visibility of Muslim women in public sphere, young generations' challenges to integration policy. The argument of this thesis is that French context constitutes an exceptional case in terms of intersectionality due to the determining factors such as *laïcité*, racialization of Islam, integration policy, emancipation of Muslim veiled migrant women. Hence, the contribution of this thesis is to reveal how far the concept intersectionality can be stretched out in the exceptional case of France with regard to feminist movements in France and French republican values, integration policy and debates of *laïcité* through Muslim veiled migrant women.

Keywords

Intersectionality, France, Civil Society Organizations, Identity politics, Feminism and Women's Rights

ÖZET

Durutürk, Bilge. *Kesişimsellik, Kimlik Politikaları, Toplumsal Cinsiyet: Fransa’da Sivil Toplum Örgütleri*, Doktora Tezi, Ankara, 2018.

Kesişimsellik, feminist kuram içerisinde üçüncü dalga paralelinde ele alınan ikinci dalga tarafından da oldukça tartışılan bir kavramdır. Kavram, hem kadın, hem alt sınıftan hem de etnik ya da ırksal kimlik özellikleri sebebiyle bazı kadın gruplarının çoklu ayrımcılığa uğradığını belirtir. Bu paralelde kavramın üç temel ve vazgeçilmez değişkeni ırk, toplumsal cinsiyet ve sınıftır. Her biri kendi içerisinde alt boyutlar taşımakta ve her boyut farklı bir tartışma alanı oluşturmaktadır. Fransa örneğinde ise kavram kimlik politikası, laiklik ve feminist tartışmalar paralelinde özellikle STK’lar tarafından tartışılmaktadır. Son 20 yılda kadın hakları savunucusu sivil toplum örgütlerinin özellikle aktif olarak söz aldığı başörtülü Müslüman göçmen kadın olgusu üzerinden yapılan tartışmalar, bu çalışmanın temel çıkış noktası olmuştur.

Bu paralelde tezin temel amacı, intersectionality kavramının Fransa bağlamında STK’lar üzerinden nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığı ve bu kavramsallaştırmanın kavramı nasıl şekillendirdiğinin bir değerlendirmesini yapmaktır. Tezin temel argümanı ise Fransa’da kavramın istisnai bir yapı gösterdiği ve bu yapının özellikle 1980’lerden günümüze devam eden kimlik politikaları temelinde tartışılan laiklik, Müslüman kadın göçmenler, İslam ve entegrasyon politikaları ile ilintili olduğudur. Bu noktadan hareketle, tezin literatüre katkısı, intersectionality kavramının Fransa’da belli başlı faktörler (feminist hareketin Fransız değerleri ile ilişkisi; entegrasyon politikaları ve başörtülü Müslüman kadın göçmenler üzerinden yapılan laiklik tartışmalar) ile ilintisini ortaya koyarak Feminist teori içerisinde yeni ve tartışmalı olan bu kavramın nasıl anlamlandırıldığının değerlendirmesidir.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Kesişimsellik, Fransa, Sivil Toplum Örgütleri, Kimlik Politikası, Feminizm ve Kadın Hakları

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1976, the cover story of an issue of Harper's magazine proclaimed a 'Requiem for the Women's Movement' (Geng, 1976: 53, cited in (Hawkesworth, 2004: 963). The story's summary said that feminism had undergone a 'natural expiration', caused by a disappearance of the problems of women's experiences. The question is today whether feminism is dead or not. Freedman states that feminism is far from "diminishing or disappearing" since 1960; feminism has endured exceptional improvement and its establishment within political, social and cultural territories is still distinct, and she adds 'Contrary to the views of contemporary pundits, feminism has never been more widespread or politically influential than at this point in history' and it has 'moved from the margins of alternative culture to infiltrate mainstream politics' in many countries (Freedman, 2006: 85). Instead of becoming a corpse, in parallel to other profound third wave feminist debates, intersectionality has become one of the popular concepts of feminism today. In an article on "The Complexity of Intersectionality", Leslie McCall states that intersectionality is the most important theoretical contribution to Women's Studies (McCall, 2005:1771). It is not a unified body of theory but more a range of theoretical and conceptual tools, according to Helma Lutz, Vivar Herrera, Teresa Maria and Linda Supik (2013). Intersectional scholarship, especially in the US, has integrated the knowledge from Race and Ethnic Studies with aspects of Women's Studies. This knowledge has been refined through the civil and women's rights activism of the 1960s and 1970s (hooks, 1981; Pugh, 2002). And the themes and ideas of intersecting identities and structural social relations emerged during the early 1980s (Davis, 1982). As Nira Yuval Davis explains, instead of unidimensional identity politics, intersectionality has become a fragmented identity politics which means no longer for example, women or Blacks, but Black women. Before Kimberlé Crenshaw invented the term in 1989 to refer to marginalised and racialised women, Floya Anthias and Nira-Yuval Davis in their article "Contextualizing feminism: Gender, ethnic and class divisions" stated that intersectionality analysis relates to the distribution of power and

other resources in society (Anthias and Davis, 1983: 65). Philomena Essed linked intersectionality to what she calls gendered racism, claiming that racisms and genderisms are rooted in particular histories and formations of gender, race, ethnicity (Essed, 2001:1). Other conceptualizations of intersectionality have created in parallel and in exchange with the American concept, focusing, for illustration, the role of nationalism (Yuval-Davis 1997) in forming the “matrix of domination” (Collins 1990). Patricia Hill Collins describes the matrix of domination as a proper acknowledgement of the interlocking inequalities. The matrix of domination can come into play on several levels, three in particular: the level of personal biography; the group or community level of cultural context created by race, class and gender; and the systemic level of social institutions (Collins 1990: 227). The idea is to seek a way to overcome dimensions of inequality such as race, class and gender as they overlap and intersect with one another, as articulated by Deborah King in 1988. King called for a model of analysis permitting recognition of the multiple forms of jeopardy that different identities can put one in (King, 1988). When King refers to multiple forms of jeopardy, she is not only referring to several simultaneous forms of oppression, but to the multiplicative relationships between them as well (King, 1988: 47). Ivy Ken has described how oppression and multiples of oppression are produced and structured. Ken argues that sources of oppression begin with production, which depends on the particular social, historical, political, cultural and economic conditions of a society (Ken, 2007: 154). Besides the three quintessential dimensions, Hernandez and Rehman state that intersectionality theory has evolved over time to explicitly include other points of discrimination, such as sexuality, age, religion, disability and weight. Crenshaw then adds a distinction between political and structural intersectionality; the former referring to the responses of political institutions and the latter explaining the various ways in which intersectionality is experienced differently by those who face discrimination on the basis of more than one axis (Crenshaw, 1991).

The aim of the thesis is to explore how the concept of intersectionality is articulated in the French context by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) advocating women’s rights with regard to specific incidents such as prohibition of headscarf in public schools, visibility of veiled women in public sphere, emancipation of those women from their Muslim culture and communities. The French case is significant to study because it is a

considerably different case to the Anglo-Saxon version. Even though the concept has been imported, its definition is quite different than in the US, since in France the intersectional dimensions (gender, race, and class) are interpreted within particular differentiated parameters and debates such as *laïcité*¹, French Islam, and universal women's rights. According to Fassin, US feminism had to define itself in relation to the black movement, so it is the racial question that makes it possible to understand why French intersectionality is different, as it is found in the context of the controversies over the Islamic veil (or scarf) – and in particular on the occasion of the 2004 law on religious symbols at school (Fassin, 2015). One group of people continue to think that this is only religion and claim to speak exclusively of *laïcité*, but others, especially in the new generations, are starting to see it with the guise of republican universalism, as a form of racism (Fassin, 2015; Delphy, 2009).

As Elenore Lepinard states that the question of intersectionality is especially alarming in Europe. Undoubtedly, for the last 20 years, a particular nexus articulating migration, ethnicity, religion, and class has been shaping in numerous European countries that can shed new light on the concept and the politics of intersectionality. The role of religion in theorizing intersectionality in Europe is very crucial. Lepinard continues that the racialization of Muslim religious identities, which covers with the racialization of migrants and their (third and fourth era) children, has happened in portion through a series of public debates on Muslim and migrant women: veiling, arranged and forced marriages, and female genital mutilation have been examined in relation to the public sphere (Rosenberger and Sauer 2011), frequently with approach results detrimental to migrant/Muslim women's rights and concrete lives. Within the European context, there is a need to conceptualize intersectionality in relation to migration, nationalism, and Islam (El-Tayeb, 2011). For feminist politics and the women's movement in France, theorizing intersectionality is embedded within questions of *laïcité* and Muslim migrants (Lepinard, 2014: 125). For instance, the problem is that defending universal women's rights against veiling might also cause nationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia between non-Muslim or nonmigrant women and Muslim or migrant women. This double bind of feminist movements is the initial point of this thesis. On

¹ In this thesis the term *Laïcité* will be using instead of secularism. Since the starting point of this thesis is the case of France, it will be considered within its original context in France.

the one face of the coin, the debates about promoting the emancipation of all women, and on the other side the debates about the fueling of discrimination against Muslim women and their exclusion from the public sphere are both contradictory and problematic in terms of intersectionality theory (Lepinard, 2014). As Davis states, the discourse of legitimizing these conflicts supposedly uses an intersectional analysis about women, Muslim women, and women who need to be rescued by the “enlightened West” (Davis, 2009). That is another crucial pinpoint of this thesis.

Based on field research, the argument of this thesis is that the French context constitutes an exceptional case in terms of intersectionality because the main arguments, discussions, and discourses about identity politics in France are on *laïcité*, discrimination, oppression, the visibility of women, the public and private sphere, and the daily life/routines/habitus of French culture versus Muslim migrants’ culture. These issues are also related to the French feminist approach which began the sexual freedom of women and emancipation of women from religion in Europe in the 1960s and ‘70s. The perspective of French feminists about the role of women in monotheist religions (either Christianity, Islam or Judaism) is critical, and the impact of religion – especially of Islam – in identity politics in France also inspired the debates within feminist politics on intersectionality in the 2000s.

In 2004, Nacira Guénif-Souilamas extended her work on the “Beurettes” by elaborating with another sociologist, Eric Macé, a critical discourse about the “Arab boy”, the racialization of feminism in postcolonial France (Guénif-Souilamas, 2004). Christelle Hamel also published an article in 2003 which was part of her thesis in anthropology on the invention of rotating, “their supposed social exoticism contributes to the racialization of these French people that we refer once again to their origin in the name of equality between the sexes, playing not only on their image but also on their existence”. The intervention of Christine Delphy can be also considered in this quarrel, especially with an important article published in 2006 by the magazine *Nouvelles Questions Feministes*, declaring the point of convergence between the US study on intersectionality and the history of materialist feminism in France, a transatlantic exchange which is not foreign to its own trajectory. Many feminists were caught on the horns of a dilemma between anti-sexism and anti-racism, but she considers this ‘a false

dilemma': the sociologist is part of a logic of intersection. Indeed, "The assumption that anti-racism and anti-sexism contradict is only possible if we consider that those oppressed by racism are all men; otherwise, this hypothesis applies only if the women in the group are not subject to the racist regime" (Delphy, 2009). Moreover, "It does not only imply that the women of the racialized group, the women neighborhoods and suburbs are oppressed only by sexism; it is also implied that it is oppressed only by one sexism: that of 'Their' men" (Delphy, 2009). But Christine Delphy also reminds us that:

Patriarchy is not the only system which oppresses women in "neighborhoods and suburbs". They are also oppressed by racism. Oppressions do not add up to each other so mechanically and successively in time and space. There is no sign announcing: "Here you leave the patriarchal system to enter the racist system". The two (or more) systems of oppression coexist at the same time and in the same space for individuals. They combine. (Delphy, 2009)

In short, the French context in the mid-2000s provides fertile ground to explore the ways to account for what draws, in feminism, a fracture: the 'racial question' has an effect indeed, in France but also elsewhere in Europe and beyond, on 'sexual questions' – at the forefront of which we find the two figures, inseparably racialized and gendered, the 'Arab boy' and the 'Muslim girl', the rapist and the veiled. Such is the challenge of the French translation of intersectionality; this is the reality to which the irruption of the concept first refers (Fassin, 2015).

Regarding this literature in France in this thesis there are some cases which are thought of as parameters for carrying out a proper analysis. Those cases are categorized in terms of race, gender and class. Under race, the racialization of Islam is the first conceptual term. Under gender, it is the emancipation of all women, and lastly under class it is the integration problems of Muslim migrants. Hence, to give a general perspective of these cases, they are within the categorizations of race, gender, and class. Under the racialization of Islam, the debates of French Islam and its practice, the establishment of the Institution of the Arabic World (*L'institute du Monde Arab*, in 2000 the project of the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* – French Council for the Muslim Sect – (CFCM), debates about French Islam and integration, the French republic and its capability to accept Islam. Cases relating to the emancipation of all women include the debates about Muslim women's visibility in the public sphere (through the debates on

the veil), and cases beginning in 1989 and every year after that in which there were attempts to create clashes between the different sides. In terms of the integration problems of Muslim migrants, cases such as the riots of 2005 or vandalism in the banlieues as well as a lack of education and ‘incomplete citizenship’ in terms of French values are considered.

This dichotomy between the affirmation of intersectionality in practice and the refusal to make it significant to feminist politics uncovers the problem in which French women’s organizations discover themselves as they wish to be comprehensive and claim to practice sisterhood in spite of differences whereas at the same time denying to receive an intersectional approach that would recognize designs of segregation and inequality connected to religious identity and ethnicity in their official political platform (Lepinard, 2014). As Lepinard declares;

French feminist organizations do not ignore that banning veiling might place some women in difficult situations, but they believe that the remedy is worth the price to pay because by doing so, they are in fact helping a majority of women to become emancipated, and they are protecting hard-won universal women’s rights. Hence, the lack of intersectional reasoning enables them to discard the interests of a minority of Muslim women in the name of enhancing the interests of the majority of women. Such a focus on the interests of the majoritarian group represented by an organization, at the expense of the interests of sub/minority groups, is common in activism and not specific to French women’s rights organizations (Strolovitch 2007). However, in the French context, the prevalence of this “gender-first” approach is striking. Indeed, even organizations that identify as representing women from migrant backgrounds tend to adopt a similar positioning, some of them being at the forefront of the mobilization in favor of the 2010 ban (Lepinard, 2014).

Hence, in this thesis, to understand the concept of intersectionality in France, CSOs advocating women’s rights are focused on. Regarding Lepinard’s work, the dilemma of some feminist groups became a challenge for intersectional situations such as the case of veiled Muslim migrant women.

The expected contribution of this thesis to the literature on gender, identity politics, feminist theory is revealing how the term “intersectionality” articulated in France which is argued to constitute an exceptional case in terms of racialization of Islam, *laïcité*, integration policy, universalism and communitarianism/multiculturalism debates by feminist groups from different standpoints, socio-economical background. Also another important pinpoint to contribute is to reveal how in the case of France, intersectionality

is stretched out in terms of feminist fragmentations, the role of *laïcité* for identity politics in France and the tension between veiled Muslim migrant women and white feminists.

The second chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual framework concerning main parameters of identity politics, feminist discourse (such as emancipation, the private and public sphere, diversity, multiplicity, and the objectification of women). These parameters are discussed across a large spectrum via the crucial principles of second- and third-wave feminism. Those two are intertwined because several branches of the women's movement have been formed which would be classified both under the second and third waves at the same time. After explaining the intersections and main arguments of these two waves, intersectionality and its claims are described through scanning and summarizing the literature of feminist and identity politics in the so-called 'post-feminist' period. The ambiguous feature of the concept of 'intersectionality' gives the opportunity to analyze it from many different perspectives which all have pros and cons in the feminist literature. As a theoretical framework within this research, the concept has been magnified through identity politics based on multicultural tenets, and it has been asked whether intersectionality is the proper reflection of multiculturalism within feminism and Gender Studies. Concurrent issues of feminism and identity politics have also been clarified. Then finally, the intersectional situation of France through the perspective of the main trends within feminism and identity politics from the 2000s onwards has been excavated. The structure of the concept has been constructed via French exceptionalism/essentialism and the principles (the main pillars which are fraternity, equality, liberty, and – most crucially and vulnerably – "*laïcité*") of the solidarity and democracy of France (Scott, 1986; 2015). It has been explained why the perspective of the study has not only been built up on identity politics and its feminist contradictions, but also on CSOs advocating women's rights and their importance to the discourse. Hence, the intersection of feminism and issues in identity politics has been pointed out via the perspectives, action and reactions of CSOs advocating women's rights over specific cases which have occurred in relation to the main problematic of the emancipation, integration and submission of women (but not "ordinary" white French women: migrant Muslim-origin women) into French society. This theoretical and conceptual framework brings us to an awareness of how the

concept can stretch through the historical background and political culture of a country – France, in this study – and helps us to analyze the later discourse of in-depth interviews of CSOs for data analysis.

The third chapter introduces the methodological framework of the thesis. Cases designated through the intersection of identity politics, feminist and gender issues from the 2000s onwards in France are explained with their consequences. Then, to determine related CSOs, a database² has been used. After the categorization and elimination of various CSOs, 35 CSOs' data was used. In this chapter *autoethnography* was explained as a feminist methodology of data analysis. Autoethnography is a very rich and new technique to figure out tiny details during the interviews. Since the main principle of this technique is to get the interviewer to become an outsider and insider of the interview while doing discourse analysis of the data, those advantages of the autoethnography method were very helpful. "I" indicate privileged an important knowledge which brings an insider account and weaved power structures' analysis that an outsider cannot dismantle. That is why during the analysis process of the interviews, the background, culture, gender, social status and education affected the data evaluation. Thus here it was me as an outsider and insider of the interview who is a non-veiled woman, coming from a country where the majority of population is Muslim and which has a secular state system – even if secularism has its own definition. Incorporating the research as a person concedes supplying wealthy, all encompassing insights into people's views and activities, as well as the nature (that is, sights and sounds) of the area they possess, through the collection of detailed observations and interviews. Autoethnography also provided me the opportunity to follow the principles of standpoint feminism research techniques during the data analysis process.

The fourth chapter, discusses the research findings by carrying out a qualitative analysis of how CSOs in France perceives intersectionality on the bases of intersectional cases such as emancipation of veiled women from their Muslim community and culture, visibility of religious items in public sphere, integration of Muslim population in France in the 2000s onwards. The aim here is to conceptualize the relationship between

²<https://www.centre-hubertine-auclert.fr/associations> It will be explained why this database has been chosen.

different women groups' perception of identity politics in France. It will help us to interpret the position of the CSOs regarding intersectionality in France.

The fifth chapter summarizes how the concept of intersectionality can be understood by French CSOs advocating women's rights. It reveals the future prospects of how further studies might be like.



CHAPTER II

THE CRISIS WITHIN FEMINISM & THE ROOTS OF INTERSECTIONALITY

In order to understand recent issues in feminist theory, we need to take a quick flashback to the different waves of feminism. According to Julia Kristeva, the core principle of different periods of movement of women and feminism is in the sense of a Hegelian dialectic which is “the universal – the particular – the individual” (Kristeva, 1986: 32). In this context, first-wave feminism states that the abstract universal rights known as the rights of man should be extended to women. Second-wave feminism claims that women are different from men and that their particularities be respected. Third-wave feminism, a type of post-feminism, emphasizes the singularity of each individual against both the particular and the universal (Kristeva, 1986: 53). Kristeva’s individualism moves feminism beyond equality to a singularity. She states the project in the trilogy “Female Genius” as ‘a call to every woman’s singularity’ (Kristeva, 1986; Tong, 2013: 91).

Considering this refined summary of Kristeva, each wave of the feminist movement has represented its own particular power struggle. First-wave feminism argues that man and woman are equal and have the same universal rights; the second wave has certain breaking points from the first (Weedon, 1999; Kristeva, 1986; Delphy, 2000; Allwood and Wadia, 2013:26). This era was different to the era of the first wave’s concerns. Women’s particularity and difference from men needed to be underlined. The socio-economical situation and existence of woman was based on sexual freedom. The ‘emancipation of women’ and getting ‘their’ own freedom was a stony road to head off from. Thus, second-wave feminism brought the term gender onto the stage, which slowly became the main term within its arguments (Bryson, 1999:52; Bunjun, 2010:26). From another point of view, third-wave feminism has its own arguments emerging from cultural differentiations between particular women’s groups.

In this context, it is essential to emphasize that the second wave (in the West) has been about the rights of individual to political and religious freedom, choice and self

determination. Until the arrival of second-wave feminism, liberal expression consistently spoke of ‘man’³(Weedon, 1999:28; Harding, 2012a:56; Lutz, 2011). As bell hooks emphasized in detail, “feminism which is a liberation struggle, must exist apart from and as part of the larger struggle to eradicate domination in all its forms” (hooks, 1981). In this study, there is considered to be a need to understand that patriarchal domination shares an ideological basis with racism and other forms of group oppression (religion, class, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation... etc.), and that there is no hope of ending this oppression while these systems remain in one piece (Young, 2005). This acquired knowledge should repeatedly inform the direction of feminist theory (hooks, 1981:22). Additionally, the main purpose of this study goes in parallel with the explanation that the emergence of feminism is based on the roots of black feminism, which takes the refusal of racism and sexism as discreet and separate forms of oppression as the main principle (Benhabib, 1998:22; Benhabib, 2006:56; hooks, 1981; Collins, 2009).

Hence, in this theoretical chapter, the main principles of second and third waves are first going to be exposed and then it will be explained how the movement changed and what the main transition parameters are. The main pillars and concepts of the movement at various particular time periods are going to be explored.

Thus, this theoretical summary will allow us to see how the feminist movement is evolving while maintaining its power struggle. Regarding second wave, the main principals of Marxist, Liberal feminisms are going to be mentioned through universality and public versus private relation. Then the transition from second to third will be summarized. After that third wave is going to be explained via standpoint, multiracial/multiethnic, women of color, postcolonial and global, black and white feminisms as a section named ‘patchwork of feminism’ because the main arguments of second and third waves are integrated to each other as a patchwork. One piece from (e.g. diversity) is related to another (e.g. universality). It is difficult to draw a linear line in history of feminist theory when there are numerous connections, disruptions and

³The French Revolution proclaimed “Liberty, Equality and *Fraternity*” while the American Declaration of Independence of 4th July 1776 insisted that “all *men* are equal that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are “*Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness*”(Weedon, 1999:13).

rediscoveries. Hence there might have some overlaps of the arguments in 2nd and 3rd waves. It is going to be continued on with intersection of multiculturalism and feminist theory.

2.1. DUALISM IN FEMINIST THEORY: 2ND and 3RD WAVES

First-wave feminism was a period during which feminists largely argued from a position completely attached to liberalism (Fraser, 2013; Mansbridge, 1999; Oliver and Walsh, 2005). The second wave of feminist thought is a feminism that is hyphenated, with a different theoretical structure but unified under the commitment to sameness, equality, universality and scientific understanding (Collins and Chepp, 2013; Fraser, 2013; Lloyd, 2005). Third-wave feminism begins by questioning these basic premises, yielding up instead ideas like difference, particularity, embodiment, multiplicity, contradictions, and identity. With a destabilization of the dualities inherent in the second wave, it has moved from culture/nature to public/private to man/woman (Evans and Williams, 2013; Tomlinson, 2013:79) The bases of this critical shift can be found in realizing the importance of the motto “the personal is political”, which questioned not only the public divide, but also the scientific distance mostly assumed between culture, mind and subject versus nature, matter or object (Rodriguez, Lytle and Vaughan, 2013:289).

Beginning with the first wave, dualisms (private/public and culture/nature) remained unchallenged. In many ways, the very first wave of feminists who fought for civil rights on behalf of white middle- and upper-class women took on the women’s role in the private sphere. Indeed, they used the ideal of ‘motherhood’ to further their claims that women were more bonded to the cultural and civil realm than men. It was exactly the private sphere in which women earned the right to contribute to the political sphere in the form of their votes (hooks, 1981:78; Collins, 2000:8; Davis, 2008).

Second-wave feminism continued to realize the dualities built-in in modern political theories but opened up space to which women gained access (Bowleg, 2008). Not only was the 'cultural realm' under attack, but now too the 'public realm' of work and politics was equally being challenged for its exclusion of women (Werbner, 2013). The goal, therefore, was particularly to get white middle-class women into the spheres of both the

political and cultural realm, so as to make them equal with men and no longer to leave them classified as marginalized, or 'the other', by their association with the natural or private spheres (Werbner, 2013). The means of this movement and therefore 'equality' would be varied according to different schools of hyphenated feminist thought (Bryson, 1999:67; Bunjun, 2010). The main objective of second-wave feminism was about 'reproduction'. Reproduction in terms of both childbearing and childrearing is central to the traditional political definitions of 'natural' and 'private' and therefore outside the boundaries of political theory (Tong, 2013; Lloyd, 2005). As feminists made inroads into both the theoretical and practical worlds of politics (the cultural and the public realm), it was recognized that the spheres being vacated by many women (the private and natural) were becoming difficult to sustain in their existing forms. As feminists encouraged women to leave the former spheres, the movement simultaneously created a need to reconstruct the latter. Challenging the fundamentals of dualisms, particularly liberal feminism under the second wave of feminism has argued that as certain groups of women move into the public/cultural spheres, at the same time men have moved into the private and natural spheres (Tong, 2013; Mohanty, 1997). This was partially successful. Instead of men filling the vacated spaces poor women of color were a better choice (Lorber, 2012; Gopaldas, 2013; Haslanger, 2013). Because second-wave feminism, in all its theoretical manifestations, claimed for itself a universality of both historical cause and the goals for the potential future, its adherents have believed that it could both accommodate and transcend individual differences, by uniting women in the goal of entering the cultural and public realm (Moi, 2001; Lloyd, 2005). This would only be achieved, however, if feminists brought down these barriers as a unified force (Scott, 2005; 2007; Costa, 2014). For this reason, second-wave feminism was associated with the 'universal' goals, that is to fight for 'all women's' interests.

The public and private divide acts as a distinguishing segregation allowing us to understand different dimensions of women's worlds. This is because of the strong links between women's experiences and their social location, which creates most of the differences of women groups. The construction of a public and private realm by political theory has thus been violated by feminists on both sides, by means of which women have been eliminated from political life whilst collectively being subjected to its authority (Dhamoon, 2013: 89). The response to this elimination can be put in a phrase

adopted as the women's movement motto, in the 1960s and '70s: "The personal is political." This call influenced the political agenda for the analysis of the private and public spheres and a greater understanding of how authority works in all conditions of both women's and men's lives. Its analysis varies by extremes in accordance with the views of different types of feminists under 2nd wavist category (Dhamoon, 2013:92). Liberal feminists have tended towards trying to add women into the public sphere, while the traditional family was protected in the private sphere (supplemented by state intervention in the form of childcare and elderly care; in other words, as women enter the public sphere, the public realm must take greater responsibility for their needs in the private sphere). Simultaneously, they have claimed that issues which have been seen commonly as 'private' must be subject of public laws: for example, domestic violence, sexual assault or child abuse. Generally, the socialist, liberal and radical feminist response to the private/public divide has been questioned by women of color and lesbian feminists, who both say that the "universal claims, both about the private and public sphere made by these feminist groups continue to exclude the reality of them" (Arneil, 1999: 75-76).

During this period, as many feminists have questioned the relevance of white middle-class liberal feminist conclusions regarding the nature of the public and private divide to other groups of women, there are specific questions also raised about the Marxist or socialist analysis of the productive/reproductive divide (Smith, 2010). Hence the dual system of Hartmann and Mitchell which analyse both production/reproduction in terms of patriarchy (gender relations) and capitalism (class relations) ignores any other explanatory factors. Race, in other words, or the reality of women who face obstacles other than class and gender is simply not addressed (Mitchell, 1995; Butler and Scott, 1992). As Angela Davis comments about the tendency of Marxist feminism:

To extract the greatest possible surplus from the labor of the slaves – the Black woman had to be released from the chains of the myth of femininity... In order to function as slave, the black woman had to be annulled as woman... The sheer force of things rendered her equal to her man (Davis, 2008).

Also hooks adds in her critique of liberal feminism that while African-American men and women were often equal in terms of the labor they did outside of the house, women

were still more responsible either within their own families or their master's households (hooks, 1981; Arneil, 1999: 71). The point here by Davis and hooks is that black women were dominated by their masters in the public sphere and their husbands in the private sphere (Davis, 2008). Therefore, the consequences of the production/reproduction theories of Marxist feminism have affected the division of the public and private sphere. Nancy Harstock uses the Marxist ideology to look into this idea further and argues for the development of a "feminist standpoint" based on the possession of women and leading to a form of knowledge superior to that available to either white or black men (Harstock, 1985:89; Bryson, 1999:22-23). Another approach/criticism of second-wave feminism was by Betty Friedan (1966), "white middle- and upper-class women were housewives not because sexism would have prevented them from being in the paid labor force but because they had willingly embraced the notion that was better to be a housewife than to be a worker" (Friedan, 1966). As has been mentioned before, women often worked in exploitative, low paying jobs, which was the case for many women from all areas (Allwood and Wadia, 2010).

When 'class' cracked open the second-wave feminist's claims to 'universality', the diversity of women's groups was born. In general, through second wave feminism the liberal, Marxist, socialist and radical feminist response to the public/private divide has been challenged by both women of color (Harstock, 1985) and lesbian feminists who argue that the "universal claims, about the public and private sphere made by these groups of feminists continue to exclude their reality" (Arneil, 1999: 75-76). According to Barbara Arneil (1999), 'public versus private' claims would not only give us the power relations between 'women' and 'men' through gender inequalities, but also the power relations within women (Lorde, 1984; Davis, 1981). "As wives, secretaries or assistants to white men, white women are physically integrated around centers of power" (Arneil, 1999:69) Also Audre Lorde makes the point that such closeness to power is an illusion, because "white women face being trapped into joining the oppressor sharing power" (Davis, 1981; Crenshaw; 1989; 1991; Lorde, 1984). "Women of color never had this possibility. It is sometimes extended to us not as an invitation to join power but being the other. Whereas for white women there are a wider range of choices." (Lorde, 1984).

The relationship between white men and white women is different in comparison to the relationships between white or black men and women of color (Davis, 2008). White women, as a result, experience a highly private, individualized sense of control. Hurtado and Henley argue that this intimate relationship to power is why second-wave feminists have developed a closeness to psychoanalytic theories (or individualistic psychological frameworks) to respond to social problems in a way that women of color have not (Hurtado, 2003; Hurtado and Sinha, 2008). Hurtado concludes: "As a result the "white women" movement is the only political movement to develop its own clinical approach – feminist therapy – to overcoming at the interpersonal level" (Hurtado, 2003). For women of color on the other hand, who do not have, demographically, the same intimate interaction with white men, goals and strategies differ. Feminists of color may resist the notion, for example, that psychoanalysis is the solution to their problem; such an approach would depoliticize and individualize their concerns (Young, 2005). Similarly, society treats these groups differently, Hurtado claims: "When white women rebel they are thrown in mental institutions, when black women rebel they get locked up: this difference is due to how far each group is from the centre of power." (Hurtado, 2003; Hurtado and Sinha, 2008; Arneil, 1999:70, Benhabib and Cornell, 1987).

Regarding the transition from second- to third-wave feminism, to understand the "evolution" of the feminist movement and the clustering of women groups' interests, it is crucial to consider the differentiated women groups and their dynamics in third-wave feminism. Hence, the answer of what third-wave feminism is varies: Synder contends that third wave woman's rights presents a strategic reaction to three major hypothetical challenges to second-wave women's liberation: the category of women debates about (started by women's activists of color) that smashed the thought of a shared women's encounter or character; the conclusion of terrific stories through the decay of Marxism and the rise of poststructuralism, deconstruction and postmodernism inside the foundation; and the sex wars that broken the bound together political stand of woman's rights on numerous vital women's activist issues (Synder, 2012; Bilge, 2008; Lloyd, 2013:128). In short, the third wave responds to the debates of the 1980s that hobbled feminist theory and practice. Synder names the third wave "feminism without women" (Synder, 2012; Lorde, 1984) because it answers to the "women category" debates of the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s that started with a criticism of the

contention of the second wave that women share something in common as women: a common set of experiences and a common gender identity (Synder, 2012).

It is suggested that the root of feminism lies in second wave feminism, where it was shaped by the political climate of the 1960s, '70s and '80s. The 'third wave' suggests the era of feminism rooted in and shaped by the political climate from the mid '80s to the new millennium (Kinser, 2004: 132). Whereas within the 1990s the express 'third wave' was regularly utilized by youthful journalists who articulated themselves a 'new generation' of women's activists (Findlen, 1995; Walker, 1995), numerous faultfinders have pointed out that, earlier to the development of distinction along generational lines, black and lesbian women's activists conveyed the dialect of contrast to declare their claim women's activist personalities and to lay claim to their interesting encounters, varying as they did from prevailing women's activist debates of the time (Dhamoon, 2013). Third wave woman's rights is entrenched in "the questions raised by women's activists of color and lesbian and strange scholars almost the nature of personality, the meaning of 'gender' and working through a few of the inconsistencies inspired by such questions" (Arneil, 1999:192). Orr follows the 'definitional moment' of third wave back to the terrain of 'race' within the early 1980s.

Third-wave feminisms have come to question the diversity and cultural differences of women groups during the period of second-wave feminism. As well as the categories, the dualisms integrated in political theory and the role of gender politics, race, class and religion are included in third-wave discourse (Evans and Williams, 2013; Delphy, 2000; Allwood and Wadia, 2013; Lepinard, 2014:7) At the same time, third-wave feminists have questioned the values attached to the cultural realm over the natural, the public over the private and the assumed duality of man/woman but also the duality of 'white women'/other women groups (Synder, 2012; Bastia, 2014) . The earliest roots of second-wave feminism can be found when feminists began to revel in their role as 'the other' or 'an outsider', rather than setting as their goal getting 'inside' either the public or the natural realm (Tong, 2013; Shields, 2008:39). The much-needed reaffirming of the categories of nature, sexuality and motherhood provided feminists with an opportunity to celebrate the differences between men and women. This was in spite of longstanding political thought to the contrary (Costa, 2014; Williams, 2014; Butler and Scott, 1992).

According to Arneil, third wave woman's rights was born as a 'new body of thought. It was unmistakable from second-wave feminism distinguished by convictions of personality, distinction, inconsistencies and embodiment' (Arneil, 1999:255). Third-wave woman's rights appears signs of shortcoming with past women's activist hypothesis challenging the dualisms related with the 'Western way of life' (Moi, 2001; Mohanty, 1992). Second-wave feminism viably challenged and shook the establishments of dualisms such as nature/culture and private/public, in which women were seen as a depreciated 'other' (Collins and Chepp, 2013:62). From the point of view of third-wave feminism, this approach is eventually restricted insofar as this technique holds a dualistic structure that's mapped onto the categories of man and lady, but with a political point to coordinated ladies into standard structures and social educate (Krook, 2011). Third-wave feminism is characterized, to begin with and first, by a deconstructive drive that looks for to challenge the development of these categories and to demand on beginning from the viewpoint of different contrasts instead of from a position that advocates equivalence (Tomlinson, 2013; Scott, 1996; Benhabib and Cornell, 1987). This can be a circumstance that begins by affirming contrast in two ways. To begin with of all, contrast is imperative to the degree that third-wave feminism looks for to transport the accentuation in feminist hypothesis absent from approaches which puts correspondence or equality within the center to a perspective in which the distinction of ladies from men or 'otherness' is associated. (Scott, 2005; 2007). It is in this sense that the starting for third-wave feminist discourse is the specificity of women's encounters. The moment perspective of contrast comes from the acknowledgment that beginning from the encounters of women includes working with the abundance of contrasts that make these encounters, which hence third-wave feminism 'embraces the differing qualities, as well as contrasts in aspects among 'women', at last straddling both 'one' additionally the 'other'' (Arneil, 1999:186).

Third-wave feminists properly deny the universalist claim that all women share a run of common information, but they don't arrange of the concept of 'experience' through and through (Springer, 2012). Women too see to their individual encounters to pick up information that how the world works, looking to develop profound accounts around how things ought to be. Actually, individual stories constitute one of the most hallmarks

of third-wave feminism and the development has not moved beyond this genre over time (Lorber, 2012).

Numerous third-wave stories endeavor to appear the gaps between the reality of women's lives and prevailing discourses. A few third-wave feminists, for instance, utilize their own knowledge developing up in multicultural or inter-racial families to embody how the politics of gender, race, and class play out in people's lives (Weiner-Mahcus, 2006). By involving female primary parts in conflicting or inventive ways, third-wave feminists unsettle essentialist stories almost passive women and dominant men and also shape new identities into the intersection of competing narratives. (Lutz, 2011).

Third-wave feminism has been understood as contradictory, sometimes responding to multiple different issues. Some academics claim that third-wave feminism's goal is to subvert and reclaim notions of femininity (Groeneveld, 2009; McRobbie, 2009). The third wave is mostly connected to intersectionality and women of color (Labaton and Lundy Martin, 2004), because according to this idea, the oppression of middle class, heterosexual, white voices has been analyzed (Henry, 2004). The influence of postcolonialism and poststructuralism has also affected the third wave (Hernandez and Rahman, 2002; Bobel, 2010; Hines, 2005; Dean, 2010; Budgeon, 2011). Third-wave criticism is directed at post-1970s and second-wave activists and a very specific generation, which is generation X (Zack, 2005; Redfern, and Aune, 2010; Baumgardner and Richards, 2000; Shugart, 2001). The reason that the third wave is not defined is that that respects its existence (Walker, 1995; Siegal, 2007; Finley and Reynolds and Stringer, 2010); hence, we need to avoid representing third-wave feminism as monolithic.

2.2. PATCHWORK OF FEMINISM

Standpoint feminism is based on the perspective of social locations. Its focus on standpoint, the view of the world where you are physically, emotionally, mentally, and socially – is a major theoretical contribution and springboard for action (Harding, 2005; 2012a; 2012b). Although women's voices were the original source of standpoint theory, the concept has been successfully used by women and men of diverse classes, racial and

ethnic groups, nations and cultures to make their values and accomplishments visible to the dominant society.

Additionally, as it has been explained above, women's viewpoints are privileged in order to counteract the dominance of men's perspectives. But since women's "social locations" differ depending on where they live, their education, job, economic status, marital and parental status, religion, racial and ethnic group and sexual orientation, their perspectives will differ (Lorber, 2012:197). As Donna Haraway says, all knowledge is partial, dependent on social location, and situated somewhere (Haraway, 1988:600). Therefore, knowledge produced from women's perspectives is not homogeneous, (nor is men's from their perspectives). In addition to individual social positions, racial categories, ethnicity, religion, social class, age and sexual orientation intersect with gender to produce varied life experiences and outlooks (Harding, 2012a; 2012b; Smith, 2012). Body capabilities are also an important experiential influence. There may be a common core to women's experiences – perhaps because they share similar bodies – but standpoint feminism cannot ignore the input from social statuses that are as important as gender (Bowleg, 2013).

Through standpoint feminism, we may call it another tendency under 3rd wave, women of color (black/white or the Other) challenged white feminists to recognise differences among women (Donovan, 1985; Donovan, 2012; Eisenstein, 1977). The theories of standpoint feminism and social location politics had been constructed, but there do not always make women prior. Multiracial/multiethnic feminism states that it is not acceptable to check just one social status instead of looking at race, gender, social class, and ethnic vulnerabilities. Either picking up one social status or adding them one after another is not acceptable (Lorber, 2012: 232; Donovan, 2012). Their interface is synergistic – together they construct social locations which are oppressive in order to understand the results of multiple systems of domination. In the work of Patricia Hill Collins, this is named the "matrix of domination" (Collins, 1989). The knowledge of women and men in different locations of society are the grounds for the worldviews and the politics of activists, and the social location of a woman and a man of same social class, ethnic, racial, and (even) religious status differs (Collins, 2009). If disadvantaged

women succeed in gaining equality with men of a disadvantaged group, they may still have not been very successful.

Hence, that is multiracial/multiethnic feminism, with its roots in the history of disadvantaged groups, argues that the major social statuses of a society produce a complex hierarchical stratification system. By teasing out multiple strands of oppression and exploitation, multiracial/multiethnic feminism shows that gender, racial categories and ethnicity are intertwined social structures (Roth, 2004). How people are gendered differs according to whether they are members of dominant or subordinate racial and ethnic groups. Social class is also an especially crucial dimension, given the wide differences between the poor and the rich throughout the world (Haslanger, 2013).

Multiracial/multiethnic feminism makes a politics that interweaves gender with the continuum of dominance and subordination inferred from other social statuses. It contends that feminist political activism can now not be based as it were on gender but must consider racial identifications, ethnicity and social class as well (Haslanger, 2013; Lutz, 2011). The battle for justice and acknowledgment incorporates men, but the viewpoints, politics and cultural commitments of women of different racial and ethnic groups take priority. Since other critical social statuses intersect gender as a social status, multiracial/multiethnic feminism challenges a entirely parallel gendered social arrange.

Multicultural feminisms highlighted women's differences which had previously been ignored (Crenshaw, 1989). Elizabeth Spelman suggested the causes for this jigsaw failure (Spelman, 1990) and stated that many feminist scholars, especially liberal feminists, went down the wrong way. In their aim to demonstrate that women are men's full equals, they focused women's similarity to each other as well as women's equivalence to men (Spelman, 1990). According to Spelman, oppressing people by ignoring their differences and emphasizing their similarities is possible. If one group is underlined as more human, more important than the other, the differences among them will be deeper than ever. On the other hand, to highlight women's solidarity does not mean the disappearance of hierarchy: class is the ultimate way to make women equal.

Through the energy of multiracial/multi ethnic feminism, global and postcolonial feminists highlight that “the oppression of women ignore one part of the world is often affected by what happens in another, and that no woman is free until the conditions of oppression of women are eliminated everywhere” (Young, 1997; 2005). More precisely, these academics focus on the world’s division of nations into alleged First World nations which are industrialized and market-based, found in the northern hemisphere and Third World Nations which are economically developing nations positioned in the southern hemisphere (Anzaldua, 1987). Global and postcolonial feminists mainly study how this state of affairs disempowers and shortchanges Third World women (Davis, 1992). According to Davis, First World feminists are largely concerned with gender issues related to sexuality and reproduction, however, Third World feminists underline that economic and political issues are lodged at the center of their worldview (Synder, 2012: 309). They emphasize that their oppression as Third World nations/peoples are mostly higher in priority than their oppression as women. For this reason, Third World women discard the tag feminist (Evans, 2015). As an alternative, they use other terms to define themselves, including Alice Walker’s term ‘womanist’ (Walker, 1995; Tong, 2013: 215). Walker explains “a womanist is like a Black feminist or woman of color dedicated to the survival, and unity of entire people” (Walker, 1995). Many First World feminists largely accept as justified Third World womanists’ criticisms of themselves. Considering many Third World womanists, many First World feminists think of feminism as a dynamic movement rather than as a static doctrine. They pursue to maintain feminism as the progression whereby women from all around the world confer their cohesions, and differences in an effort to secure the two long-term goals below:

- i) As a right freedom of choice, the control of their own lives within and outside of their home. The reason of control over lives and bodies is crucial to guarantee a sense of dignity.
- ii) The amputation of all dimensions of inequity, and oppression through national international, social and economical situations (Tong, 2013). The reason why the association of women in national liberation fights, in plans for national and local development, and comprehensive struggles for revolution (Werbnier, 2013). For global, and postcolonial feminists, the economical, and the political

are unified. In the privacy of one's home affects their lives in the larger social order (Hancock, 2013). Economical and political justice should be as important as sexual, and reproductive freedom (Hancock, 2013; Donovan, 2012). Emily Woo Yamaski claims that point: "I cannot be an Asian American on Monday, a woman on Tuesday, a lesbian on Wednesday, a worker/student on Thursday, and a political radical on Friday. I am all these things every day" (Tong, 2013).

Besides the variety of different oppression of women in their own lives; global, and postcolonial feminists emphasize the connections between the various kinds of oppression women experience throughout the world. Charlotte Bunch describes the connections between local, and global feminism in detail:

To make global feminist consciousness a powerful force in the world demands that we make the local global, and the global local. Such a movement is not based on international travel, and conferences, although these may be useful, but must be centered on a sense of connectedness among women active at the grass roots in various regions. For women in industrialized countries, this connectedness must be based in the authenticity of our struggles at home, in our need to learn from others, and in our efforts to understand the global implications of our actions, not in liberal guilt, condescending charity, or the false imposition of our models on others. Thus, for example, when we fight to have a birth control device banned in the United States because it is unsafe, we must simultaneously demand that it be destroyed rather than dumped on women in the Third World. The kind of consciousness that global, and postcolonial feminism demands clearly requires great sensitivity to, and awareness about the situations of women in nations other than one's own (Bunch, 2001).

Beside the interconnection between women, global, and postcolonial feminists do not aim to sweep women's differences under the rug (Lutz, 2011). On the contrary they assess that women cannot unite as equals until women accept and point out their differences (Ackerly and McDermott, 2011). According to Audre Lorde, a feminist in a room with different women groups from all around the world attempts to minimize the differences from them. Lorde says that is a threat to sisterhood, instead of focusing on the manyness of women: even the black women focus on women's oneness (Tong, 2013). Lorde emphasized that it is precisely this type of behavior that clarifies some feminists' incapability to forge that kind of unions to create a better world:

Advocating the mere tolerance of difference between women is the grossest reformism. It is a total denial of the creative function of difference in our lives. Difference must not be merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening. Only within that interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged, and equal, can the power to seek new ways of being in the world generate, as well as the courage, and sustenance to act where there are no charters (Lorde, 1984).

Lorde also explains that just because one woman has not suffered oppressions more harmful to body, mind, and spirit than the ones she has suffered, it does not mean that woman should ignore what the other has suffered. Nor does it mean she should keep her counsel for fear of offending others (Ackerly and McDermott, 2011). On the contrary, to refuse to reveal one's self to others is to adopt that others are not accomplished of coming to terms with one. It is to say, "Although I think I have what it takes to understand others, I doubt that they share this ability. To think in such a fashion is the height of arrogance in global, and postcolonial feminists' view" (Spivak, 1988).

Continuing on with black feminism and white feminism, Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, and Audre Lorde, who were American feminists, began to call the women of color and other minority women in the U. S. the victims of "multiple jeopardy" (Llyod, 2013). Focusing on African-American women, bell hooks stated that sexism, classism, and racism are not divisible in real life, as if in theory they are divisible (hooks, 1981). hooks mentioned that any oppression situation might not be discarded in favor of any other one. As Young describes, "oppression is a many-headed beast capable of regenerating any one of the heads temporarily severed from its bloated body" (Young, 2005). Frye continues "the whole body of the beast is the appropriate target for those who wish to end oppression's reign of terror" (Frye, 2005). hooks firstly refers to black women as needing to rebel the negative sexual stereotypes about black females that have arisen from white supremacy (hooks, 1981; 2005). She claimed that "white racists who viewed black women as sexually promiscuous animals caused large numbers of black women to react in one of two extreme ways. Some black women became overly modest prudes, obsessed with matters of bodily cleanliness, and purity. In contrast, other black women decided to capitalize on their supposed sexiness" and also hooks commented, "Who may have believed themselves to be always the losers in a world of sexist feminine competition based on beauty could see the realm of the sexual as the

place where they [could] triumph over white females” (hooks, 1981). She advises the black women to emancipate themselves from the white women’s shadows and continues by saying that black women and black men must stop internalizing the negative image of black men. hooks also stresses that otherwise black women won’t be liberated to respect themselves, that is, to be fulfilled of blackness (hooks, 1981).

In a style as direct as bell hooks’s style, Audre Lorde noted “as a 49 year old Black lesbian feminist socialist, mother of two, including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple, she claimed the term multiple jeopardy very well, because she mostly saw herself as a group member of defined as other, deviant, inferior, or just plain wrong” (Lorde, 1984; hooks, 1981). Lorde continues;

The way to overcome one’s marginalization, is not to pluck out some one aspect of [oneself], and present this as [a] meaningful whole, as if one can become a “first-class” member of society simply by fighting racism or sexism or classism or homophobia or ableism. Rather, the way to overcome one’s marginalization is to integrate all the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources of my living to flow back, and forth freely through all my different selves, without the restrictions of externally imposed definition. (Lorde, 1984).

Lorde told all women need to struggle against the oppressor, even the little one within themselves (Lorde, 1984). The priority was to build up a society where everyone was equal, and where differences did not mean inferiority but uniqueness (Lorde, 1984). Later, the ideas of Lorde, hooks, and Patricia Hill Collins suggested that in the U.S., black women’s oppression was consolidated along three interdependent layers: economical, ideological and political. First, the economic layer of black women’s oppression pushed black women to “ghettoization in service works” (Collins, 2000). Second, the political layer ignored black women’s rights, and would not view them as equal to all white men, nor many white women. Third, the ideological dimension imposed a “control system” on black women, helping to justify white men’s and white women’s power on them. Collins commented to hooks observations that “from the mammies, Jezebels, and breeder women of slavery to the smiling Aunt Jemimas on pancake mix boxes, ubiquitous Black prostitutes, and ever-present welfare mothers of contemporary popular culture, the nexus of negative stereotypical images applied to African-American women has been fundamental to Black women’s oppression”

(Collins, 1999)". Collins declares that ideological dimension is much more powerful and efficient maintaining black women's oppression than the other two dimensions. She underlined that the existence of these forms of oppression, which are gender, race, and class, need ideological justification (Collins and Chepp, 2013). For that cause, Collins calls black feminists and women to emancipate themselves by deconstructing white stereotypes, which was also the call of hooks as well (Collins, 2000; Tong, 214-216).

The "history of oppression" has had a close relationship to black feminism. Some acts have been reclaimed from history by black feminists (Harding, 2012b:50; Weedon, 1999:162-163). According to black feminists, activists crucial in these other histories are positive narratives of historical agency and self-definition of in the face of racist stereotypes and Eurocentric narratives of history (Harding, 2012a:47; 2012b; Weedon, 1999:162).

This 're-theorizing difference' has brought new questions. For women of color, the social marking of difference is part of everyday life (Phoenix, 2004; Lorde, 1984; hooks, 1981; Crenshaw, 1991). It can take many forms, from the negative stereotyping of everyday racial abuse to a romantic, often primitivist, celebration of black and Asian female difference which reaffirms deep-rooted racist stereotypes (Benhabib and Cornell, 1987; Bastia, 2014). Yet, in both cases racism defines, contains and controls (Phoenix, 2004; Lorde, 1984; hooks, 1981; Crenshaw, 1991). One of the key issues for black feminism has been the assertion of the right to redefine the meanings of difference. This has meant contesting long-established assumptions and stereotypes and asserting new meanings (Tomlinson, 2013). In the face of mainstream white scholarship which has consistently defined black women as different – often in racist ways – and excluded them (Fanon, 1986), a key focus of black feminism has been to identify and challenge the negative images of black women's difference that have persisted since slavery (Weedon; 1999: 166). Another has been to reconceive this difference, locating it in historically separate experience which has produced different positive cultural traditions following the process of black feminism that Foucault emphasizes as "reverse discourse" (Foucault, 1980). In black feminism's strongest forms, Afrocentrism works as reverse discourse. It reverses the meanings and values commonly found in

Eurocentric history, refixes the meaning of blackness and offers apparently authentic forms of subjectivity (Foucault, 1980).

Additionally, Patricia Hill Collins takes a more differentiated approach to Afrocentrism, advocating a meshing of theory and lived experience which can acknowledge and respect differences without fixing them outside history or contemporary social relations:

Individual African-American women have long displayed various types of consciousness regarding our shared angle of vision. By aggregating and articulating these individual expressions of consciousness, a collective, focused group consciousness becomes possible. Black women's ability to forge these individual, unarticulated, yet potentially powerful expressions of everyday consciousness into an articulated, self defined, collective standpoint is the key to Black Women's survival... For black women the struggle involves embracing a consciousness that is simultaneously Afrocentric and feminist (Collins, 2000:26).

To clarify white feminism appropriately, we might clarify what 'whiteness' implies and to what extent it would be alluded to as 'white feminism'. Hence, other than the concepts of race and racialization, whiteness as a concept sits at an intersection between historical privilege and identity, something that incorporates a modern dynamic but which is not universally shared in (or can be removed to) how numerous white people encounter their identities (Phoenix, 2004; Nash, 2014; Wolff, 2016). That's to say that "whiteness as a location of privilege is not absolute but rather cross-cut by a extend of other axes of relative advantage and subordination; these do not delete or render insignificant race privilege, but rather arch or alter it." (Frankenberg, 2001:76; Meer, 2014:152). In addition, in considering approximately whiteness there is regularly a tension between its study from contexts marked by historical segregation and somewhere else where whiteness has either "(i) functioned as a banal repository of white majority conceptions of the given identity of societies or (ii) ordered social relations in colonial states occupied overseas" (Hage, 1998; Hewitt, 2005).

The last few years have finally seen 'whiteness' emerge as a theoretical and political problem, ripe for analysis, deconstruction and transformation. The emergence of whiteness as a largely invisible norm has a long history which is also the history of the development of modernity the scientific search for knowledge and the colonial projects of subduing, Christianizing and "civilizing" other cultures (Spivak, 1988; Wolff, 2016).

The establishment of the authority of whiteness as the signifier of civilization and the advancement served to divert consideration from the economic and political interests which spurred colonial extension.

The major emancipatory discourses which created within the Western world within the wake of Enlightenment – liberal humanism, Marxism and feminism – were, at the same time, universalist in their aspirations and Eurocentric in their presumptions and practices (Lutz, 2011). They assumed that white Western societies and social orders were the foremost progressed whereas at the same time absorbing racist generalizations of individuals who were not white (Terry, 2015:56). They further failed to recognize the significance of structural racism to their projects (Fanon, 1985; Lutz, 2011:87; Terry, 2015). As Fannon remarks that skin color and phenotype are among the most important signifiers of difference in contemporary Western societies (Fanon, 1986). In racialized thinking these physical characteristics of individual bodies serve as the guarantee for racial classification. Race is often assumed to be natural, yet race, as we think of it today, is very much of a product of modernity (Weedon, 1999:164; Fanon, 1986; Amin 2002; Keith, 2005). It continues even today with different forms of discrimination. These racist stereotypes have meant that women and men of color continue to face ingrained, centuries-old prejudices that construct their ‘otherness’ in negative and exotic ways – apparently the core idea of orientalism was based on this exoticization of the ‘East’ which is here in the manner of women/men of color (Ackerly and McDermott, 2011).

Racist ideas and imagery take two main forms. There are those that define difference purely negative and those that, in fixing the nature of ‘Others’, celebrate their difference from a white Western norm (Smith, 2010; Saidman, 1995; Wolff, 2016). This latter celebration most often takes the form of “primitivism”. In “primitivist”⁴ discourses, the white world’s ‘Others’ are seen as closer to nature, more authentic and less contaminated by modern industrial society (Donovan, 1985). Like many discourses on women, primitivism variously sees non-Western, non-white ‘Others’ as more spiritual, more intuitive, more physical, more sensual and more sexual. The obverse of this is that

⁴This term will be using frequently during the analysis chapter. In order to identify the rituals and duties of Islamic culture as an imposition on Muslim women, they were often declared ‘archaic’ by ‘white feminist’ organizations.

they are defined as less rational and less sophisticated than their white Western counterparts (Weedon: 1999:153).

This manner placed white people at the top of its scales of racial difference, seeing them as the most advanced of the different races. In mainstream discourses of race are silent about the status of whiteness as a socially and historically changing construct and its role in the perpetuation of racist assumptions. One consequences of this failure to recognize the racialized nature of whiteness is that race and racism come to be seen as the problem and responsibility of people of color. The issue has been voiced powerfully by Audre Lorde;

Whenever the need for some pretense of communication arises, those who profit from oppression call upon us to share our knowledge with them. In other words, it is the responsibility of the oppressed to teach the oppressor their mistakes. I am responsible for educating teachers who dismiss my children's culture in school. Black and Third World people are expected to educate white people as to our humanity. (Lorde, 1984:114-115).

View from a white perspective, the invisibility of whiteness as a racialized category in the Western world often makes it difficult for those white people who benefit from racism to realize their part in maintaining the status quo. This has been the case with the women's movement. As second-wave feminism developed, the emphasis placed on patriarchy, shared oppression and sisterhood tended to render questions of race invisible (Bastia, 2014; Bilge, 2008). It took vocal protests by black women and other women of color to begin to open eyes of white women to their complacency where race was concerned (Ackerly and McDermott, 2011).

There have tended to be some common responses by white feminists to the question of racism:

- i) A liberal refusal to see racialized difference. This finds expression in assurances such as: "I am not prejudiced. Color does not matter to me. We are all the same" Implicit in this response is the assumption that racism is an individual rather than a structural phenomenon that pervades all social institutions and practices;
- ii) A response to racism among white women with a disabling sense of guilt which often leads to inaction. In order to move beyond guilt, white women need to address their own privilege. They need to recognize their role in perpetuating racist social relations, either actively or passively via the failure to take racism seriously and challenge its effects;

iii) Another response is to recognize racism as a problem that affects women of color but to see it as a “black” problem rather than one that should be fundamental to the lives of white women. This is often justified by statements such as “Of course I abhor racism but I have no right to speak for women of color”. Missing in this analysis is the recognition that racism is grounded in a binary relation of difference in which whiteness is the dominant term. Racism functions by privileging whiteness. To fail to question this privilege is to leave intact the binary oppositions on which racist discourse is founded. The idea that racism is a “black” problem marks a position from which women fail to see that the meanings of whiteness, too, are not naturally given but rather discursively produced within hierarchical power relations;

iv) the fourth response to racism which remains much less widespread is the conscious recognition of racism as a structuring force in both the material practices shaping societies and the production of individual subjectivities, whether white or of color (Weedon, 1999).

From this position racism is understood to have both individual and structural dimensions which are often invisible from the privileged position of whiteness and as such require conscious problematization by white women. The history of white women’s failure to confront racism is a long one. In her history of black women and feminism, bell hooks points out: “how white women have often been complicit in black women’s dual oppression by racism and sexism” (hooks, 1981).

As Audre Lorde contends that racism the conviction within the inherent prevalence of one race over all others and in this manner the right to dominance sexism, the conviction within the inherent prevalence of one sex over the other and subsequently the right to dominance (Lorde, 1984: 115) and proceeds with Barbara Smiths, the reason racism could be a feminist issue is effectively clarified by the inherent definition of feminism. Feminism is the political theory and practice of liberating all women: women of color, working-class women, poor women, physically challenged women, lesbians, and old women as well as white economically privileged heterosexual women. Anything less than this can be not feminism, but simply female self-aggrandisement (Smiths, 1983b:61).

Lorde includes that by and huge within the women’s movement nowadays, white women center upon their persecution as women and disregard differences of race, sexual orientation, class and age. There is a pretense to a homogeneity of involvement covered by the word ‘sisterhood’ that does not in fact exist (Lorde, 1984:116).

Subsequently, gender is rarely the only noteworthy naturally grounded signifier of social and cultural distinction. In racist societies, where whiteness is hegemonic, skin color and phenotype are inevitable markers of difference (Strolovitch, 2007). In any case much a person might need to elude racial categorizations and be seen just as a person, s/he finds her/himself kept by white societies' implicit and explicit definition of whiteness or racial otherness. These definitions are not simply the property of prejudiced people, they are basically inhering within the discourses and institutional practices of the societies concerned (McCall, 2005; Dill and Kohlman: 2012: 157-58; Lorde, 1984: 67)

Racism not only classifies certain groups of women as “different” on the basis of phenotype and skin color, but also as inferior. Skin color and phenotype matter because racist discourse and practices make their protagonists self-define as ‘better’ (Strolovitch, 2007). White supremacist practice has systematically defined people of color as different in a negative way. Black feminism is a response both to these racist definitions of blackness and to the devaluating of women of color on the basis of their difference. Black feminism is thus a challenge to exclusion from a predominantly white women's movement and the refusal of white feminists to acknowledge the centrality of racism and recognize how it creates material differences in black women's lives (Williams, 2014; 189).

2.3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT INTERSECTIONALITY: THE START OF A NEW ERA?

Firstly, to apprehend the main arguments of intersectionality and its relation with gender and feminism, it needs to be explained by the origins of the intersectional approach and the core parameters of standpoint feminism, which are the grassroots of intersectionality. As has already been explained in this chapter, standpoint feminism claims that women's experience and knowledge need to become the center of the feminist movement. As Patricia Collins Hill focuses out, experiences are not just individual, but moreover common to the individuals of a group that offers a sense of identity. When a group's experiences outline the production of knowledge and set political agendas, that group has the capacity to utilize its power (Collins, 2000). Most

racial and ethnic groups in a heterogeneous society do not have such control; their experiential life-world views do not become part of the mainstream. Standpoint feminism needs to incorporate all of these perspectives into its production of knowledge. In order to include diverse perspectives in science, she suggests using intersectional analyses: This approach means;

Choosing a concrete topic that is already the subject of investigation and trying to find the combined effects of race, class, gender, sexuality and nation, where before only one or two interpretive categories were used (Collins, 2000: 278).

Considering the starting point of standpoint feminism, the concept of ‘intersectionality’ has been rooted in black/women of color movements. Over the past two decades, the term intersectionality, as a theoretical approach and a critical feminist research, has also been used by many scholars of gender (Davis, 2008; McCall, 2005:177; Hancock, 2007). As early as the beginning of 1980s, those scholars discussed the ideas of identities that intersected, and structural social relations (Davis, 1982; McCall, 2005; Lloyd, 2013:126; Bilge, 2013). Intersectionality symbolizes the overlapping and multiple stages of oppression that affect an individual's life (Crenshaw, 1989; 1991). As a term, it works by exploring themes mostly related to identity politics and can be understood through the narratives of those of other identities (Yuval-Davis, 2006). In the feminist movement, Crenshaw was the one to give this name to situations of multiple oppression, but the use of the approach has been growing day by day (Lutz et al., 2011:3).

According to Yuval Davis, there are different approaches to the framework of intersectionality. Essed, Crenshaw and Harding especially focus on the particular positions of women of color, while others (such as Brah, Maynard, Anthias and Yuval Davis) have constructed their discourse in more general terms, applicable to any grouping of people, advantaged as well as disadvantaged. This expands the area of intersectionality into a major analytical tool that challenges hegemonic approaches to the study of stratification as well as reified forms of identity politics (Crenshaw, 1991).

Also another pushing force or descent of the concept ‘intersectionality’ as explained earlier in this chapter is ‘black and women of color movements’. As bell hooks argues “perhaps the most important principle in black feminism is the refusal to see racism and

sexism as discreet and separate forms of oppression” (hooks, 1981; Frye, 2005; Young, 2005). Black feminists insist on seeing the two as interrelated (hooks, 1981; Weedon, 1999:161). Also, women of color have opened the way to moving beyond binaries towards intersectionality in the meanwhile. Anzaldua declares that:

Racist definitions of difference remain trapped within sets of binary oppositions in which one term is privileged over the other: white over black, First World over Third World. The oppositions also presuppose that a person is either one thing or the other. In recent writing, influenced by postmodern thinking, attempts have been made to deconstruct race and develop new ideas of hybridity as alternatives to the binary oppositions which structure racist ideas of difference (Moraga and Anzaldua, 1983:175).

Additionally, she mentions her own history, experience and place, to state that ‘new mestizas’, women who are ethnically and racially mixed, are in a situation to challenge and go beyond the binaries that structure heterosexism, ethnocentrism, racism, and sexism (Crenshaw, 1989; 1991).

Regarding the changes of the direction of the feminist movement, today the very fact that there are feminism and black feminism is an indictment of a body of thought that treats the particular standpoint of particular group of women as universal and marginalizes the experience of women of color as an optional extra in much the same way that male ideologies have marginalized all women (Bryson, 1999:32).

In spite of the fact that hooks, Lorde and Collins happened to be African-American/black feminists, their thoughts about the multiple sources of oppression of women of color were voiced with equal strength by Latin American/Hispanic feminists (Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherrie Moraga, Ofelia Shutte, Maria Lugones), Asian-American feminists (Elaine Kim, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Ronald Takaki) and Native American feminists (Anne Waters, Bonita Lawrence, Donna Hightower Langston). At first, these so-called women of color looked for their freedom in their color – within the truth that their skin color was not white. But afterward, they started to wonder whether the term “women of color” was truly a term of freedom or whether it was, at root, a camouflaged term of oppression. (Lewis and Process, 2003; Body, Scott and Smith, 182; Anzaldua 1987; Mohanty, 2003)

1980s identity politics focuses on the oppression of a specific group of women: black, Hispanic, Native American, lesbian and many others – in the case of the US (Weedon, 1999:168). One important feature of identity politics is the sense of solidarity and positive identity that it offers to marginalized groups, forming a basis from which to develop strategies for contesting specific forms of oppression (Haslenger, 2013). The essential of the idea is that the nature of identity politics has tendency to define identity (or multiple identities) in particular fixed ways which ultimately work to exclude many of others. In a strong criticism of identity politics in the black feminist context, Heidi Safia Mirza suggests that:

Identity politics, a political ideology that consumed the 1980s, was based on the premise that the more marginal the group the more complete the knowledge. In a literal appropriation of standpoint theory, the claim to authenticity through oppressive subjecthood produced a simplistic hierarchy of oppression. The outcome was the cliché-ridden discourse which embodied the holy trinity of “race, class and gender” (Appiah and Gates, 1995), within which black women, being the victims of “triple oppression” were keepers of the holy grail.

The solution within this conceptualization of oppression was to change personal behaviour rather than wider structures. In a time when what should be done was replaced by who we are (Bourne 1987:1), the freedom to have was replaced by the freedom to be (Melucci 1989: 177). Identity politics offered no radical way forward in the critical project of revealing how we come to be located in the racialized and sexualized space where we reside (Mirza, 1997b:9).

Up until this part of the chapter, changes in the feminist movement have occurred in parallel to identity politics in the new world order. Coming together on the basis of specific oppressions, for example as black lesbians, was crucial in terms of contesting the marginality and invisibility of particular groups of women, voicing their presence and needs, and analysing the power relations structuring the oppressions to which they were subject. bell hooks, for example, although critical of the restrictive impulse of identity politics, suggests, writing of African-American women, that:

The contemporary African-American resistance struggle must be rooted in a process of decolonization that continually opposes re-inscribing notions of “authentic” black identity. This critique should not be made synonymous with a dismissal of the struggle of oppressed and exploited peoples to make ourselves subjects. Nor should it deny that in certain circumstances this experience affords us a privileged critical location from which to speak, this is not a reinscription of modernist master narratives of authority which privilege some voices by denying voice to others. Part of our struggle for radical black subjectivity is the quest to find

ways to construct self and identity that are oppositional and liberatory (hooks, 1981:29).

At this point it is considered that any group of women would be the subject of criticism of white supremacy, meaning that the group of women oppressing/excluding another group of women might not be called “white” in ethnic or racial terms, but that their actions would be explained as oppressive and white supremacist. Mirza claims that “there is a long way to go in transforming racist societies, first the self-improvement without othering ‘the other’ as much as it is possible” (Mirza, 1997b). Collins explained that those feminist debates remain a useful tool for deconstructing the bases of existing hierarchies and enabling one to theorize and imagine how difference, identity and subjectivity might be realized otherwise in non-oppressive forms. Saying that the consciousness of women of color; As Moraga and Anzaldua explains: “We are the colored in a white feminist movement. We are the feminists among the people of our culture. We are the lesbians among the straight. We do this bridging by naming ourselves and by telling our stories in our own words” (Moraga and Anzaldua, 1983:23)⁵.

Here the most important point (and also a good way to understand intersectional thinking) has come from Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua in the introduction of “This Bridge Called My Back” (1983), where they described how “What began as a reaction to the racism of white feminists soon became a positive affirmation of the commitment of women of color to our won feminism” (1983: xxiii-xxiv). This concept of one’s own feminism recognizes the specificity of different groups of women and the particular forms of power and oppression with which they are confronted. Central here is understanding of place, history, language and culture – that is question of ethnic belonging – as well as the broader power structures of class, gender, and race (Bowleg, 2013: 67; Appiah and Gates, 1995; Weedon, 1999:168; Mori, 2001:247).

⁵In this study the reason why the methodology named ‘autoethnography’, which helps us to carry out an efficient analysis and comprehend the actions or reactions of feminist movements or groups of women today, has been used here.

2.4. IDENTITY POLITICS OF FEMINISM or MULTICULTURAL TENETS OF FEMINISM

The alleged clash between feminism and multiculturalism stems from an impaired liberal dichotomy: equality versus difference. One may hold this line of argument if one defines feminism as promoting gender equality and multiculturalism as the promoting recognition of cultural differences. In this light, while the first is understood as equality politics, the second is seen as a politics of recognition, void of any social justice aspirations. This dissociation has been criticized by proponents of differentiated citizenship, for whom the conditions of equal citizenship include both recognition and redistribution and for whom there is nothing antithetical between the recognition of difference and the pursuit of equality. As Phillips puts it, 'we cannot hope to achieve equality by ignoring differences, for all attempts to pretend difference away – not noticing whether someone is male or female, not noticing whether she is white or black – will end up reinforcing the dominance of already dominant groups' (1997: 143). When justice and equality issues are erased from the horizons of multiculturalism, reducing it to its components in terms of identity, difference and diversity, the injustice of denying minorities the right to a meaningful social existence, which includes the recognition of their culture and the creation of the conditions of a cultural life, disappears.

The current focus on women's status among minorities and the denunciation of these minorities' 'much worse' patriarchy must be met with scepticism. What is needed is not a withdrawal from multiculturalism but a new conception of differentiated citizenship cognizant not only of intragroup and intergroup inequalities, but also of the complex ways in which they are connected to one another. It is only then that we may avoid enhancing intergroup inequalities and injustices for the sake of combating intragroup injustices.

As it has been explained before, the evolution of the feminist movement declared diversity is something inevitable. The universalist manner of second-wave feminism, especially from white women towards other groups of women (firstly black women but then other women of color) is applicable to identity politics as well. Regarding the issue of culture, identity, and difference, which have appeared on the feminist academic and political agenda, and the relationship between feminism and identity politics, there are two main discourses to follow. The first is "*liberal*" and the second is "*critical*" (Prins

and Saharso, 2013: 31). The main debates of identity politics and the debates and issues of feminist theory consist of various contradictory intersectional points.

Susan Moller Okin (1999) says that she doubts whether any politics of multiculturalism, even that of Kymlicka's (1995) liberal kind, can really guarantee the rights of women while simultaneously granting a particular minority group rights to uphold its own culture or religion. She continues by saying that many minority cultures are patriarchal, often more so than the surrounding majority culture. This being so, group rights might function as a license for minorities to oppress their women (and other vulnerable group members) (Okin 1999, 16-17).⁶

According to theorists of multiculturalism, engagement with feminist beliefs and minority group rights would be compatible. At this point, it is apparent that multiculturalism can be a liberal or critical discourse. The nuances among theorists are based on the "universality" of liberal values, which are questioned by some critical approaches. Here, firstly it will be efficient to assert what parameters of the liberal and critical discourses of multiculturalism are. Considering issues of feminist theory, the perspective of these two discourses will be described through intersectionality as a concept of feminism related to the contradictions of identity politics.

Here i) the tension between universalism and relativism and ii) the concept of the subject and individual autonomy will be questioned in order to realize the contradictions through intersectionality (Delphy, 2007).

The first refers to the dilemma that feminists want to speak out against gender injustices, whether in our own or in another culture, yet feel hesitant to judge the lives of women in other cultural traditions. This anxiety derives from the fear of repeating the colonial and racist gesture of imposing Western values as if they were universal values. The second issue originates in the fact that the criteria that determine a person's autonomy are contested. If some women defend their right to live by conditions that in the eye of others merely endorse their subordinate position, it may be questioned by the

⁶From a feminist perspective, Okin argues, multiculturalism is not part of the solution but part of the problem. Similar concerns were articulated in Europe by Wikan (2002), Hirsi Ali (2006), Amara (2003) and Kelek (2005), and in Canada by Manji (2005)

other group(s) of women whether their choice should be rejected because they thereby show a lack of autonomy, or their position suggests that dominant notions of the subject and autonomy are in need of revision.

According to Okin's concern, to avoid misuse Kymlicka made a distinction between external protections and internal restrictions (Okin, 153). Minority group rituals need to be governed by liberal principles for the sake of individual rights in the minority group (Okin, 153). Hence, minority rights aim to protect the minority group against the society at large, but they should not restrict the basic liberties of its own members. However, Bhikhu Parekh (1999), another multiculturalist, responds by questioning what makes the liberal values so essential and fundamental for all minority groups. She remarks that there is not only one undisputed set of liberal values and that liberalism is not necessarily the best view of life. Moreover, Parekh asks what if the women concerned do not share the view that they are oppressed. Against the idea that these women would all suffer from false consciousness, he states "We should avoid the mistaken conclusion that those who do not share our beliefs about their well-being are all misguided victims of indoctrination" (Parekh 1999: 73). Kukathas defends cultural diversity but agrees on the contradiction between feminism and multiculturalism (Kukathas, 2003) insofar as some groups do not accord women equal dignity, neglect women's interests and seek (multicultural) accommodation of their traditions. But in his perspective, in cases where the interests of women conflict with the claims of culture, the latter should prevail (Kukathas 2001). Unlike Kymlicka, Kukathas believes that freedom of conscience and freedom of associations are not grounded in the values of individual autonomy. Hence, a minority group needs to survive through its own strengths and group dynamics rather than either the support of cultural group rights or the state intervening in cases of oppression of internal minorities (Kukathas, 2001; 2003). He remarks;

This does not end up in "a formula for creating a lot of private hells" (Barry 2001, 143), because those who wish "to go it alone" (Kukathas, 2003, 140) can preserve their culture only if they succeed in making it attractive enough for people to remain members of that community.

However, Kukathas underlines that it is of crucial importance that group members have a right to exit, so that we can be sure that those who stay do so voluntarily. He realizes that this will not form a foolproof guarantee that no woman will be coerced into

leading lives they do not want to lead. Daughters may be socialized into compliance and therefore acquiescence (Kukathas 2001, 96).

Among feminists there were also many who shared the multiculturalists' objections to Okin's (1999) perspective. Okin assumes, according to Bonnie Honig (1999, 38), that Western liberal regimes are simply and plainly 'less patriarchal' than other regimes, rather than differently so, perhaps worse in some respects and better in others. She illustrates her point with examples of women-friendly practices in non-Western cultures and sexist practices in American culture. According to Azizah Y. Al-Hibri (1999, 41), "Western patriarchal feminism" wrongly treats and sees minority women as oppressed and dependent, as well as limited within their community. She claims that on the contrary, non-Western women have no need to be rescued by Western women. Moreover, "people of faith are entitled to their religious beliefs whether secular feminist approve of these beliefs or not."

We do not intend to further reconstruct the debate, but it undoubtedly points to real problems we encounter when we want to address minority practices that are harmful to women. Okin (1999) is correct in drawing attention to these practices and it is relevant to ask how public agencies can intervene against cultural practices that are harmful to women. Yet if we continue along the line of argument of Parekh (1999) and Honig (1999), we easily end up at a relativistic position: all cultures have their good and bad sides and therefore we cannot say which is better. Likewise, we think Kukathas (2001) rightly signaled that if women are disempowered by their socialization into compliance, then they cannot be empowered by treating their preferences as inauthentic. And even if they may not all be "misguided victims of indoctrination" (Parekh, 1999, 73), it is a little too simplistic to assume, as Al-Hibri (1999) does, that they are capable enough to decide for themselves. Here the question is how we should understand the autonomy and moral agency of women under cultural conditions that entail severe constraints (Baum 1997, 243).

There is now a large and growing body of feminist writing exploring how liberal democracies should deal with minority practices, now also referred to as traditional harmful practices (THPs), which infringe on the rights of individuals, that is, women.

Thus, how we should deal with the ‘universalism versus relativism’ issue and the problem of autonomy are arguments in both liberal and critical discourse.

Liberal discourse holds that individuals have not only civil, political and social rights, but also the right to speak their own language and live according to their own culture and religion (Okin, 159). For this reason, minority groups are entitled to equal respect for their cultural identity and they need group rights to protect their cultural identity. As awareness has grown that minority cultures may include practices that are harmful to women, feminists have worried that group rights might be granted at the expense of minority women⁷ (Prins and Saharso, 2013: 31; Squires and Siim, 2013).

On the other side, the discourse of critical multiculturalism began as an interrogation of the social and political drawbacks of liberal multiculturalism. It was inspired by the black feminist and poststructuralist perspectives on politics and power that challenge the individualistic bias of liberalism. People’s behaviour and ways of thinking should be interpreted not as the outcome of autonomous and rational deliberation, but as predominantly determined by their position within a society stratified along lines of class, gender, racial and age differences. These scholars insisted that members of minority groups did not so much need more (individual or collective) rights as a transformation of society as whole.

If we discuss the principles of liberal multiculturalism and feminist points of view under minority group rights; it is better to categorize these approaches to figuring out the issue (Prins and Saharso, 2013).

According to principal driven approach, the concept of personal autonomy is the central principle that should be respected (Friedman, 2003). Marilyn Friedman claims that “the values of minority groups would be “nonliberal” which is also an ambiguous concept. According to Friedman “Western” feminists are concerned about avoiding paternalism. While “emancipating” all women from their paternalistic oppression, they might ignore women’s free will and consent. Thus, Friedman solves this problem by making a distinction between a content-neutral conception of autonomy and a substantive conception of autonomy (Friedman, 2003). The substantive autonomy of a choice

⁷For instance, polygamy or condoning forced marriage.

depends on the content of what is chosen, requiring that this content be consistent with the value of autonomy. The content-neutral autonomy of a choice depends only on the question of whether the choice is made under conditions of autonomy. A choice to live a life of total servility would not, following a substantive account of autonomy, qualify as an autonomous choice, because a servile life is not consistent with the value of autonomy. However, according to the content-neutral account, it would be accepted that choice were made autonomously.

The advantage of this distinction is that it may be assumed that a traditional practice like female genital mutilation is such a bad thing that no woman would ever voluntarily choose it. The severity of the result and the substance of the choice decide for us whether a choice is intentional (Okin, 2005: 79). This contains the risk in spite of the fact that, of a cultural predisposition that leads us to accept that in case individuals assent to a practice that is exceptionally alien to us they are not truly competent of autonomy. Friedman's (2003) refinement helps to maintain a strategic distance from this cultural trap. One critique of Friedman's approach, however, is that it is not clear what should happen to those whose choices do not meet the standards of procedural autonomy.

Hence, the alternative approach to solving a situation like this one is democratic deliberation that should define whether a practice is to be tolerated. The basic idea is that, after all others have spoken, this public deliberation will generate a compromise that all parties are willing to accept. Considering the toleration of oppressive practices, it is very important that those whose lives are most directly touched by it and in particular the most vulnerable to it, young women, are consulted. Their experiences, their views on their culture, and their views on possible interventions carried out on their behalf by the state in the group's internal affairs must be considered. According to Monique Deveaux (2005), the democratic approach requires that the voices of those engaged in a practice need to be listened to and thus it will hopefully prevent their autonomy from going unrecognized.⁸ However, the critics of the democratic approach

⁸Deveaux presents the case of the South African Customary Marriage Act to illustrate her views. There are two kinds of oppression present in this case. First, apartheid had oppressed the South African peoples and their customary laws. Second, the patriarchy of most of the customary laws oppressed women (Deveaux, 2005).

have argued that this would force minority women to choose between their culture and their rights. Shachar claims that oppressed minority women who recognize the paternalistic oppression and the dynamics of their own community might create their own optimal outcomes. Moreover, Shachar (2001) expects that with the two parties holding discussions with each other, minority women may be in a better position to renegotiate oppressive group traditions. Thus, she aims both to respect minority women's culturally defined interests (e. g., to remain in their cultural community) and to create more space for them to increase their autonomy (Shachar 2001).

The most radical deconstruction of culture yet, combined with a plea for multicultural policies, has been developed by Anne Phillips (2007). Her critique of much of multicultural theory and its feminist critics alike is that in the debate about tensions between gender equality and cultural diversity, both have reified non-Western minority cultures as distinct and robust 'things' that determine the beliefs and behavior of their members. This ignores the agency of non-Western people as if they were incapable of autonomy, for example, to choose for themselves how they want to shape their (cultural) identity. Non-Westerners are thus their (monolithic unchanging) culture, as either victims or perpetrators, while Westerners are influenced only by (plural, fluid and changing) cultural environments. Phillips's (2010) approach is based on 'respect for culturally diverse individuals', not 'recognition of things called cultures'.

Not only the liberal discourse of multiculturalism, but also the critical discourse of multiculturalism have met with feminist critics. Feminists have claimed that liberal thinkers have not sufficiently thought through the critical implications of the 'multi' in multiculturalism. Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner (1994, 108), for instance, defined critical multiculturalism as a project of organizing a critical culture primarily against capitalism, class exploitation and consumer passivity.

Critical multiculturalists develop ideas about the role and strategy of oppositional movements in improving the lives of citizens. For them, politics is about the struggles for hegemony between the (ethnic and religious) majority and different minorities. They discuss ways marginalized groups may achieve empowerment, challenge dominant ideas and create counter-hegemonic practices. The aim of critical multiculturalism is to break through the (supposedly) homogenizing tendency of the hegemonic way of

thinking and make room for the history and heritage of minority groups. Political power is located not so much in the official political sphere of government and governmental institutions as in the organization of everyday life as a discursive political realm (Fraser 1989, 26). Rather than explore, as liberal multiculturalists do, the possibilities and limits for the equal recognition of other cultures, critical multiculturalists question whether and to what extent forms of (liberal) multiculturalism may actually worsen rather than improve the lives of individuals, situated as they are at the intersection of axes of social inequality such as gender, race, class, ethnicity and sexuality.

According to standpoint and intersectional approaches, a line of feminist thought that made a significant contribution to the critical discourse on multiculturalism was developed by women of color and third-world women who take issue with the (Western) women's movement for its inherent racism and classism (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981; Sandoval, 1982; Mohanty, Russo and Torres 1991). Mainstream feminism, it is argued, has long mistaken the concerns of white women for those of women in general, thereby ignoring race, ethnicity and class as axes of inequality. Some talk about a 'double jeopardy' (Beale 1970) or even a 'triple jeopardy' (Collins 1991), as women of color suffer not only from sexism but also from racism and poverty. To empower such marginalized women, sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (1986) has developed the contours of what she calls a black feminist standpoint. Many, however, find that such additive approaches are inadequate. In societies stratified by numerous axes of difference and equality, the lives of men and women are structured by multiple and interlocking systems of gender, race, class, and sexuality and hence are far more complex. To grasp this complexity, black legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) coined the concept of 'intersectionality'. According to Crenshaw, women's identities are always lived in the modalities of other categories of identity, such that gender is always lived in the modalities of ethnicity and class, nationality in the modalities of gender and race, or class in the modalities of gender and nationality. The intersectional approach thus takes into account differences not only between but also within groups of women (Crenshaw, 1991: 1242). However, by representing the social reality of intersecting axes of identity as 'converging' systems of oppression (Crenshaw 1991, 1245), within these early conceptions of intersectionality women are still seen as passive bearers of the meanings of categories imposed upon them by a sexist, racist,

patriarchal, or homophobic system. As such, they tend to fall back to the additive account they wished to leave behind. As in standpoint theory, the only conceivable strategy of resistance is to self-consciously reappropriate one's identity as, for instance, a black woman or a working-class lesbian.

Besides the standpoint and intersectional perspectives, some feminists find that identity politics is an unfortunate road to take, as it is based on reified identity categories, collapses categories of personal and collective identity, takes political differences between women as mere 'reflections of different stages of raised consciousness,' and mistakenly believes that the basis for political action is a reality to be discovered and subsequently changed (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, 191). These feminist scholars adopt alternative conceptions of power and politics as developed within the post-Marxist theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2002). In their plea for radical democracy, Laclau and Mouffe adopt Antonio Gramsci's notion of power as hegemony, that is, the power of a bloc of parties that have entered into a temporary alliance. Hegemonic formations are the contingent and provisional outcome of political struggle; they always have to reckon with the existence of marginalized but potentially subversive counterhegemonic discourses. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are always constructed in and through hegemonic discursive practices. Identity categories therefore not only limit women's freedom of movement and choice but also provide narrative and enabling resources for resisting these categorizations. So critical multiculturalists question and deconstruct the detrimental effects of what Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (1994, 17) call "transnational scattered hegemonies" and also look for sites where new configurations of the (female feminist) subject are created and transformative forms of politics are practiced.

Moreover, one of the central aims of critical multiculturalists is to radically interrogate the modernist and humanist notions of subjectivity and identity upon which the liberal discourse of multiculturalism is built. The ensuing challenge is to develop "analytical frames capable of addressing multiple, intersecting, axes of differentiation" (Brah 1996, 210). Such analytical frames need to be radically antiessentialist and should include marginalized discourses, forms of subjectivity and ways of thinking while simultaneously avoiding their assimilation within the hegemonic discourse (Stam and

Shohat; 1994). Therefore, there is discourse of polycentric multiculturalism as a project that consistently ‘thinks and imagines from the margins’ and grants epistemic advantage to those who are equipped with a ‘double consciousness’ (Stam and Shohat, 1994:300). The subject is to be seen as ‘a site of multiple voicings’ not originating from one unitary and self-transparent subject but constituted by ‘a discourse that traverses consciousness’ (Alarcon 1990, cited in Brail and Phoenix 2004, 78).⁹

An interesting middle ground between the discourses of liberal and critical multiculturalism is explored by Seyla Benhabib (2002). On one hand, Benhabib agrees with critical multiculturalists in their rejection of the mosaic version of multiculturalism, that is, “the view that human groups and cultures are clearly delineated and identifiable entities that coexist while maintaining firm boundaries” (Benhabib, 2002: 8). Instead, cultures should be seen as radically hybrid and polyvocal rather than coherent and pure wholes (Benhabib, 2002: 25). On the other hand, with liberal multiculturalists Benhabib is adamant that feminists should take the dimension of normative deliberation seriously (Benhabib, 2002: 7). Her critical account of cultural diversity is therefore based on two pillars: a narrative conception of identity; and an interactive account of universalism.

According to the narrative model of identity, to become a self is to insert oneself into already existing webs of narratives. “We cannot freely choose the webs of signification that we are caught in, yet we have the capacity to weave out of those narratives, a life story that makes sense for us” (Benhabib 1999, 344). This account of identity thus leaves room for the multiplicity and fragmentation of individual subjects but simultaneously acknowledges the need for a core self. It leaves room for some form of autonomy, understood not as the feature of a dislocated and isolated subject but as the

⁹ One example is Gloria Anzaldua’s exploration of the figure of the new mestiza who as “a product of crossbreeding” (Anzaldua 1987, 81) provides “hybrid progeny, a mutable, more malleable species with a rich gene pool” (77). Rather than celebrating diversity as something smooth and easy, the mestiza experience is one of living racial, cultural and linguistic diversity “in the flesh.” To cope with her body and soul being the site of a constant “clash of cultures” (81), the mestiza develops a considerable tolerance for ambiguity and ambivalence (79). Other examples of such alternatives to the modernist notion of the autonomous and rational subject are Trinh’s (1989) inappropriate/d other, Sandoval’s (1991) oppositional consciousness and Haraway’s (1991) cyborg.

ability of people to sometimes critically distance themselves from their lives and actions."

To take a critical distance, Benhabib claims, involves the capacity to take a universalistic attitude of hypothetical questioning (Benhabib, 1999:354). This universalistic attitude requires us to follow a procedure whereby we truly interact with others. For this purpose, we should adopt the viewpoint not only of the generalized but also of the concrete other. For example, we should put ourselves in the position of others insofar as they are like us, such as beings with the same basic needs, equal rights and duties; however, we also should take account of their position insofar as they are truly other than us, such as beings with a different history, faith, and culture (Benhabib 1992). Benhabib's theory thus brings together the conception of politics as embraced by liberal thinkers as a sphere of reasonable deliberation about the legitimate use of state power to enhance the lives of citizens and the critical view that perceives of politics as the struggle to give voice to marginalized groups. In her view, policies regarding cultural, ethnic and religious minorities should be based on the normative guidelines that emerge when we follow the truly democratic procedures of interactive universalism.

Through these new configurations, critical feminist multiculturalists attempt to indicate how diversity and difference destabilize our notion of the (female feminist) subject. However, this radical decentering of the subject raises the question as to the origins of critique and resistance.

If "there is no doer behind the deed," as Judith Butler (1990, 142) approvingly quotes Friedrich Nietzsche's dismantling of the illusions of autonomy and rationality, how can we then conceive of creative resistance or innovative action? Where does real change come from if the subject is no longer an autonomous source of speech and action but is simply a node in a discursive field of (counter) hegemonic forces? The difficulty to address such questions becomes particularly acute when the position of women within (fundamentalist) Islam appears on the agenda of Western feminism (Butler, 1990: 142).

In an ethnographic study of a Muslim women's mosque movement in Cairo in the 1990s, Saba Mahmood (2005) shows how these pious women wholeheartedly subject themselves to the demands of Islam. Admittedly, they do not meet the liberal feminist criteria of autonomy, but according to Mahmood they nevertheless are active agents.

Building on Butler's (1990) notion of the performativity of gender, Mahmood argues that their agency consists in their deliberate engagement in practices of self-cultivation through the performance of 'repeated bodily acts' by which they train their 'memory, desire and intellect to behave according to established standards of conduct' (Mahmood; 2005:214). The problem with this analysis is that it meets the feminist demand to respect the choice of women who self-consciously opt for a non-liberal lifestyle but that it leaves precious little room for questioning the misogynist assumptions underlying these established standards of conduct.

In the wake of the Salman Rushdie affair of 1989, British sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis (1992:285) observed that as 'carriers' of religious norms and values, Muslim women especially are expected to contribute not only to the biological but also to the cultural reproduction of their collectivity. As a consequence, they are the object of strong social control within their community. British policies of multiculturalism were at least partly responsible for the significant growth of fundamentalist movements in the United Kingdom that imposed uniformity on their members (Yuval-Davis, 1992:283). From the perspective of critical multiculturalism, Yuval-Davis's critique was problematic, as it could feed into already existing racist and xenophobic sentiments toward Muslims in the United Kingdom and seems disrespectful of the autonomy of this religious minority group. Yet, against the grain, in the early 1990s there emerged an organization in London, Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF), that did question the role of women within Islamic fundamentalism without relapsing into a position of cultural imperialism. According to Yuval-Davis, WAF succeeded in finding an effective voice amid the minefield of politically correct standpoints during the Rushdie affair, because the movement practiced a form of transversal politics. Transversal politics, a term adopted from Italian feminists who worked with members of conflicting national groups (Yuval-Davis 1994), consists of the formation of coalitions of individuals from various backgrounds who organize on the basis of a common stance regarding a specific issue. This common stance is based on dialogues in which each participant brings in her own experiences and identity (i. e., rooting) while simultaneously attempting to put herself in a situation of exchange with other members of the coalition (i. e., shifting) without either decentering herself or homogenizing the other (Yuval-Davis 1999, 123). "All feminist (and other democratic) politics can thus be seen as a form of coalition politics

whose boundaries are set not in terms of ‘who’ we are but in terms of what we want to achieve”(Yuval-Davis, 1997:26). This poststructuralist interpretation of intersectionality neither is based on the (liberal) assumption of the feminist subject as autonomous and rational nor lapses into a relativistic position that renders each reference to hegemonic norms and values suspect.

WAF did not present itself as anti-traditional or antireligious but forged a critical third position, aptly expressed in the slogan, “Our tradition – resistance, not submission!” (Yuval-Davis 1999, 114). In this respect, WAF shows a remarkable similarity with the strategy set out by the French feminist movement, “Ni putes, Ni soumises (*NPNS*) (Neither whores, nor submissive) (Amara 2003) a couple of years later.¹⁰ Here too was a coalition of religious and secular women, who together challenged both the image upheld by fundamentalist Muslims of independent women as whores and the Islamophobic assumption that all Muslim women are oppressed.

As if we consider the combination of two theoretical backgrounds in this perspective, these could also be merged in the case of France.

¹⁰NPNS will be explained in the French context in this thesis.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. THE AIM, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS

In the social sciences literature, the focus of gender studies on social inequalities has resulted in huge progress throughout cultural winds of change: female identity building was replaced by the mainstream feminist analysis of the 1970s and 1980s referring to women as bound by capitalism and patriarchy (Butler, 1990). After that, poststructuralism and subjectivism by the 1990s had focused instead on gender analysis, including (McCann and Kim, 2003) feminist studies, masculinity studies (Adams and Savran, 2002) and queer theory (Jagose, 1997; Corber and Valocchi, 2003). Again since the 1990s, the political discourse on gender mainstreaming and cultural diversity have been embraced as part of a culturalising gender theory.

The roots of the concept “intersectionality” has been accepted as black feminism, which related black women’s experiences to patriarchy, capitalism, and culture (Crenshaw, 1989; Hill Collins, 1989). The seeds of black feminism were first planted in American soil. In the history of migration and identity politics in the US, the feminist movement began to be shaped through the cultural differences of black women/women of color. These women’s situation has been merged into the issue of “race”. According to bell hooks, the claims of the supremacy of white women in the second wave of feminism was an obstacle to black women distinguishing or emancipating themselves through this feminism (hooks, 1981). Black feminism took as their subject of analysis inequalities through social and racial divisions (Davis, 2008; Hurtado, 2003) between different women groups.

Intersectionality, during the theoretical and empirical studies in 1990s, was often researched as triple-oppression model or the “Big Three” master categories on the basis of class, race and gender (Davis, 1983; Segura 1993). Anthias and Yuval-Davis advanced the criticism that multiple oppressions were not ordered hierarchically (Anthias and Yuval-Davis; 1983). Among black feminists in the US and gender scholars

in Europe the main criticism has been that the oppression categories had been layered in isolation (Yuval Davis, 2006; Davis, 2008). According to the black feminist Crenshaw, if we count the Big Three separately, the dimensions of discrimination might not be understood properly (Crenshaw, 1989). Thus, as a pioneer, Kimberlé Crenshaw (a black female judge) identified and invented the concept “intersectionality” which consisted of race, class, gender and other identity dimensions, in the 2000s (Crenshaw, 1989).

Considering the globalization and simplicity of mobility, since 1980's the identity politics has been inevitably a crucial concept to analyze social dynamics of many societies. Diversity, recognition of differences, and the inclusion of the “other” are some of the main ideological apparatuses of the new world era. However, identity politics has been changing all around the world from the 2000s onwards. Identity categories and dimensions do not only vary by culture, class, race, and gender, but also religion as well. As a result of these dimensions, identity politics has mostly been embedded in feminist issues. Patriarchal rituals within cultures in society and restrictions stemming from religion, especially on women, would be given as concrete state of affairs. Therefore, it could be said that feminism had to reconsider the dynamics of different societies and tended to critique itself in order to adapt to this new era and transitions in society. For this reason, this tendency manifested itself in terms of new concepts such as ‘intersectionality’. The content of its dimensions varies, such as gender-race-class combinations or gender-race-class plus other identity dimensions (such as religion, sexual orientation, and ethnic origin).

This thesis aims at exploring how far intersectionality as a concept of the feminist movement can stretch in the French context. The main purpose is to understand the concept of “intersectionality” in the case of France. Considering the different historical backgrounds and their present-day consequences in the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European traditions, in each country the meaning of intersectionality could consist of different elements besides the quintessential elements of the concept (race, class and gender). Also, even though those quintessential elements may be commonly used conceptualize the term, their implicit meanings might differ. As Bürkner remarks, this has been called cultural essentialism based on cultural diversity and the historical background of the case (Bürkner, 2012). Hence, “Feminist movements in France” have

their own historical background and principles (of the republic) and “*raison d’être*” (reason of being) for conceptualizing ‘intersectionality’. Starting with separate perspectives of two regions of the world (the Anglo-Saxon sphere of influence and Continental Europe as two different cases), Fassin says that US feminism had to define itself in relation to the black movement, while French feminism had to define itself in relation to Marxism (Fassin, 2015). The US case definitely speaks of class, just as the European version is more related to the racial dimension of it (Fassin, 2015). In particular, during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy (2005-2012), French migration policy was changed via legal regulations (Özer, 2016: 20-21). Those changes, via identity politics and the pioneering role of France in feminist debates, have led to a differing conception of ‘intersectionality’ (*‘intersectionnalité’*). Besides the three main dimensions of intersectionality, in France, it is assumed that intersectionality has its own manner, which is very much related to religion (Delphy, 2000). As a *laïcité* French Republic, the interconnection of religion and state has a different history than in the Anglo-Saxon cases. Considering the critiques of the French Republic and its principles in particular, in the context of the relationship between feminism and multiculturalism in terms of identity politics in the 2000s, it is a racial question that makes it possible to understand why, in France, intersectionality has been seen in the context of the controversies over the Islamic veil (or veil) – in particular on the occasion of the 2004 law on religious symbols at school, and in similar cases. There are a number of gender scholars who continue to think that this is only religion and depict religion exclusively in the language of secularism, but others, especially in the new generations, are starting to see it, under the guise of republican universalism, as a form of racism (Fassin, 2015).

In the French literature, intersectionality in gender studies has a different and more controversial perspective in France than in U.S. through challenging its main principles of the republic and *laïcité*. Social movements occurring in France (such as May ’68 and the Sexual Revolution in the second wave of feminism) established the social and political culture of the exceptional and the essential, which have in turn been calcified into a universalist attitude. A universalist attitude is an attempt to become a ‘rescuer’ or ‘emancipator’ of the Other through the values of modernity. That is why “post-colonialist” or

“post-orientalist” discourse has very critical of the term.¹¹ French essentialism was revealed in terms of its universalist attitude towards gender equality as well (Delphy, 2000). In this context the main question of this thesis: considering the content of French essentialism, what has intersectionality become as another form of French exceptionalism?

This thesis also aims to address the relationship between the term intersectionality and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) advocating women’s rights in France¹². As the literature of feminist theory states, CSOs, especially those which advocate women’s rights, are crucial pillars for providing and maintaining the equality of “differentiated” groups – being women as the major group – which are either discriminated against or excluded by other social or interest groups/the state or else privileged by the state/social or interest groups. In each society there are check and balance mechanisms. As a Hegelian dialectic, which is “State (Universal) - Civil Society (Particular) - Woman (Individual)”, CSOs are crucial pillars for protecting the rights of individuals in society. Regardless of the political culture and history in France, its civil society is one of the most efficient social mechanisms for discussing the sanctions of the state, regulations, and laws, and to deliberate tensions and power struggles between different interest groups. However, each CSO has its own primary target group, even if their aims might be the solidarity of all women. This situation generates distinctions among CSOs advocating women's rights. In this context, CSOs advocating women’s rights in France are analyzed by asking questions about specific incidents related to race, gender, class, and identity issues which help us conceive of how *intersectionality* is being understood.

Here is the research assumption within the scope of 3 main dimensions and related concepts in France;

¹¹ This will be explained in the theoretical chapter in detail.

¹² Generally, in France, instead of the expression Civil Society Organizations advocating women’s rights, they are commonly known as feminist associations. While searching for CSOs advocating women’s rights for the purposes of this fieldwork, most CSOs were found under the name of feminist associations. Even if this is the French situation, it has been decided to address CSO advocating women’s rights in this thesis, as this term has been seen as a more comprehensive illustration of the situation considering CSOs that are not called themselves specifically “feminist” in the first place. Therefore, identifying those “advocating women’s rights” is more comprehensive and “CSO” in place of “association” defines a large spectrum of civil society.

(1) The Racial Dimension (being European and French);

In France intersectionality cannot be conceptualized without taking into account the impact of religion. Therefore, the racialization of minority groups' religion generally across Europe, but particularly in France, is meant to be the racialization of "Islam" as the concrete other. In terms of this assumption, it has been analyzed how CSOs advocating women's rights exclude/include or neutralize religion as a dimension of identity in the conceptualization of "intersectionality" in France.

According to Goldberg, Europe has the attitude of race blindness in the sense of color blindness in the US; even remarking on race or racism has had a pejorative meaning since World War II (Goldberg, 2006). The refusal to countenance any race-based discourse would sharpen the edges of post-World War II migration. In France the Maghrebians (Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians) and Turks are groups of "minorities" from different historical and cultural backgrounds. The origin countries of these minority groups are known as "Muslim countries" in historical terms. Hence, it could be said that the only visible commonality between them was their religion. At this point, the move in Europe's dominant concern and resentment from the figure of "the black" to that of "the Muslim" consolidates the essential point that race is not simply a matter of false understandings about skin color or biology. Nor is the race-based approach basically at odds existentially or analytically with religion (Goldberg, 2006). However, Goldberg adds that quite the contrary, race has more to do with the complete set of dispositions, views, and predilections concerning culture, or even more exactly concerning culture tied to color, of "blood" to behavior, and of being to body (Goldberg, 2006). Racism is linked to these identifications, ruined institutions institutionally even as the categories representing race – phenotypical or biological, cultural or religious – are left mute (Goldberg, 2006: 349). There is a sight, then exemplified most strenuously in Europe, in which race prevents public political debates because the public/political sphere excises any explicit racial mention, save at the fringes. This attitude (the denial of racist assessments) makes race an unseen borderline demarcating both who officially belongs or does not belong and what can or cannot be told about it. This borderline is marked not at the level of personal affairs, of sexual and social intercourse or the exaltation of avant aesthetic expression, but in formal relations

of power and crevices of political divides, of institutional access and also complete membership in the polity, of standards of education and citizenship requirements (Goldberg, 2004: 349). Goldberg says that insistent assimilation in the name of *laïcité* and particularist universalism and stridently republican anti-communism in France would show how Europe can be racist without being racist at all. Goldberg calls it the “regional racial of Europeanization” in which Europe remains regarded by the bulk of Europeans as the place of and for Europeans historically conceived (Goldberg, 2004: 352). Also historically this Europeanization of Europe presumes Europeans to be Christian and white. Therefore, it follows any person of colour or non-Christian (at least genealogically) in Europe hypothetical is not of Europe, not European, does not properly or absolutely ever belong (Goldberg, 352). Considering the arguments of “*racial Europeanization*” for the post-World War II as a binary situation, the “racialization of religion” would inevitably occur.

(2) The Gender Dimension (being French and women);

Religion-blindness by second-wave feminists sometimes accepts religious rituals and habits as a patriarchal oppression (Islamic Patriarchy). It has been said that on behalf of emancipating all women from religious patriarchy, a question for second-wave feminists in France would be whether ignoring other women’s differences is valid under the circumstances of intersectionality or not.

Since the social movement in 1968 began a change in the role of women and a greater questioning of social inequalities between men and women in the modern world, the second wave has defended the social and economical equality of women in any society, because any dependence has been considered domination, and so any religion has been seen as a tool of men’s oppression to deepen the inequality between men and women. During the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, second-wave feminism’s argument asserted that it was Catholicism which sought to oppress women via beliefs and rituals such as an opposition to abortion.¹³ At that time and today as well, according to feminists and

¹³As the most known “warrior” feminist in the second wave, Simone de Beauvoir had the biggest impact on the right to abortion and men and women’s equality in the 1960s. However, in this study, as it explains the second wave and also to recent periods of feminism, would not be directly related to Beauvoir and her contributions to the movement.

activists originating from the second wave, *laïcité* was the salvager or shield that protected women from the domination of religion (Lepinard, 2014). The emancipation of women from religion has been justified by *laïcité* and the founding principles of the republic (Lepinard, 2014).

Based on the otherization of Islam, the domination of “Muslim” men over “Muslim” women has been discussed as a problem of gender inequalities in France. Today it seems to be Islam as the concrete other (or the enemy) of gender equality. Henceforth, *laïcité* and the principles of the republic became a shield for women’s emancipation in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s, and second wave feminists have taken the idea of “rescuing” Muslim Women for granted, just as they see European women as having been rescued by *laïcité*. Just as “*raison d’être*” (reason for being) feminists, particularly the generation of ‘68, has never been declared itself as ‘the guardian angel’ of women’s rights, but acted as an emancipator of all women from any religious rituals. In the mission of abolishing religious (Islamic) patriarchy, *laïcité*, democracy and republican universalism have been declared as the instruments of the feminist movement in France (Scott, 2007; Lepinard, 2014).

Consequently, following the post-World War II wave of migration, feminists in France presumed that the majority of women of migrant origin were oppressed and suffered due to Islamic obligations and domination by ‘fundamentalists¹⁴’. The reason why the fundamentals of women’s rights tended to be structured along the lines of a universalist attitude which was in favor of ‘all women’ but some women differently to others. It might be said that the contradiction between feminism and religion via patriarchal oppression can forge a religion blindness.

(3) The Class Dimension (being French women citizens in the public sphere);

According to the contemporary debate on identity politics in France, the isolation of communities of migrant origin has led to enormous social inequalities among the citizens of France. That’s why the integration of new generations through education is essential in order to avoid the decomposition of society. Also, it is important to unite

¹⁴ During the interviews “*les intégrists*” is the concept that is translated as Islamists and at some points Islamic fundamentalists.

the society under French values. These are either seen as a reason for polarization and problems in social cohesion, or else the unification of society in France. In terms of this assumption, some have questioned how the concept of intersectionality is understood in parallel with the integration process, multiculturalism, and communitarianism.

French integration policy has been based on the principle of “*jus soli*”. Considering post-World War II migration, after the first generation of migrants, the second, third or fourth generation of migrants born in France have been naturalized automatically. The basis of citizenship is the equality of all people in French society. As is well known, equality as well as fraternity and liberty, constitute the main stated principles of the republic. Therefore, becoming a French citizen is needed in order to internalize the French republic’s values. This perspective comes from “French exceptionalism” (Scott, 2007). Its claim is that the consciousness of belonging to French identity can be formed by three essential principles. Besides these three main pillars of the French republic, another two pillars are laïcité and democracy. Hence, on behalf of “equal” citizens of French republic, the integration policy of France is to build up new generations via the republic’s values (laïcité, equality, fraternity, and liberty). At this point, considering the main principles of identity politics all around the world, multiculturalism or communitarianism are quite contradictory in France due to its conceptualization of citizenship, because diversity in society has a pejorative meaning in France. Even if the “famous” quotation of De Gaulle¹⁵ provides insight about French society’s common (general) perspective on different cultures, rituals and traditions. These differences are tolerated as long as they are “local” to France which means, according to Goldberg, only white Europeans (Goldberg, 2015). That is why this perspective does not mean accepting the clusters or parallel lives of different ethnic/religious or cultural communities coming from post-World War II migrants like those in cases in the US. It is not “racism or discrimination” towards those people, because France’s integration policy has been declared as “inclusive” and respectful towards diversity as long as the main French values are adopted by newcomers. Public schooling has always been the first and most crucial institution which is considered the first step of social construction

¹⁵“How can anyone govern a nation that has two hundred and forty-six different kinds of cheese?”

by the French republic. The integration of post-World War II migrants through primary education is the key.

Every French citizen has right to go to public school for the benefit of belonging to the republic, but the banning of religious signs in school removed the right to have a primary or secondary education for Muslim girls wearing the veil. As a result, either Muslim girls wearing the veil are excluded from society and need to stay at home or go to (private) religious schools, which is another form of isolation from society. Thus, the impact of this situation is the exclusion and isolation of some migrant groups (especially the girls) in their communities in the suburbs (*banlieue*). What that means is that each side of the situation “blames” the other for being the reason why Muslim girls/women are excluded from society and remain in their communities.

Regarding those assumptions, my interview questions are designed according to related incidents determined through the intersectional and contradictory identity politics and issues from 2000s France. Due to the complexity of the term ‘intersectionality’, the formulation of questions was based on those incidents. Considering there would be very particular and different perspectives and approaches towards gender inequalities, the incidents are determined through those contradictions in French society. At the same time, the incidents have been researched in relation to the profile of CSOs in France. These two conditions are aimed at allowing for a proper and clear analysis via the main arguments and assumptions of the study.

3.2. DATA COLLECTION

3.2.1. Key Concepts, The incidents, and Interview Questions

The main contradictory discussions of identity politics and feminism were collected from the reviewed newspapers’ websites and analyzed as visual media. That research data is combined with court sentences, (high) commission/committee orders, restrictions, regulations, and municipal sentences through intersectional and contradictory incidents. While designing the questions for these in-depth interviews, those incidents are taken as being at the centre of the issues to understand how the term intersectionality is conceptualized in France. Here are the intersectional incidents and concepts that have been studied and taken into account;

The first group of cases and questions concerns the origins of Islamic-origin immigrants.

i) Debates about French Islam and its practice, the establishment of the Institution of the Arabic World (*l'institute du Monde Arab*), in 2000 as a project of the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* - French Council of the Muslim Sect (CFCM). Those part of the questions are based on concepts that are related to understanding how the racialization of Islam could affect society in France. The main arguments are over whether Islam is compatible with French values.

Here are the related questions with those concepts and incidents:

- 1- What is your viewpoint on the statement 'Islamophobia is a new form of racism'?
- 2- What do you think about 'French Islam'? Could it be implemented?
- 3- The French Republican Pact rests upon the values of liberty, equality and fraternity, which constitute the French Republic's motto (Art. 2 of the 1958 French Constitution). Do you think that secularism (*laïcité*) is the fourth value of the French Republic? If yes, how?

The second group of cases and questions concern the visibility of Muslim women in the public sphere (through the debates on the veil) and related questions. Regarding the main arguments of these cases, the fundamental problems between Muslim migrant origin women and their veils have formed the main contradictory debate of intersectionality. Because the aforementioned group causing the contradictions in French society are Muslim migrant-origin women. One of the fundamental contradictions of patriarchy in the case of Muslim migrants in France is Muslim women's freedom of conscience. Thus, through these cases the questions below have been formulated:

- ii) A discussion of the meaning of *laïcité* today, because there are different groups who claim that the *laïcité* today is not the same as in 1905; it has different formulation of the term such as the definition by Baubérot¹⁶ and incidents related to the division of the public and private sphere have been discussed and asked under this category. Also,

¹⁶ According to Baubérot, *laïcité* is the freedom imposed on religions and not the repression of religions. Neutrality and separation are tools. The goal is freedom of conscience. The purpose of secularism is non-discrimination on the grounds of religion (Baubérot, 2000;2015).

public sphere debates had two main discussions: the situation at primary and secondary (public) schools and state universities.

iii) Prohibitions of “ostentatiously religious signs” at public schools. Even if it is remarked on that the regulation (law) was necessary and obligatory for all signs from all religions and the law has been described as the restriction of all religious signs at public schools, affairs were mostly focused on the situation of Muslim girls or their mothers. The related article was made law by the Stasi Commission on March 15 2004; Article L. 141-5-1¹⁷ of the education code, which stipulates that ‘In the public schools and high schools, wearing pieces of clothing through which pupils ostentatiously demonstrate their belonging to a religion is forbidden. Prior rules remind that implementing this shall follow after discussing with the pupil. Other than this, the law does not only concern “ostentatious” demonstrations related to the Muslim religion, since other ostentatious demonstrations of other religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, etc. are also forbidden.’¹⁸ However, after the passing of this law there have been incidents not only concerning the Muslim girls wearing veils at public school but also incidents where mothers wearing veils have been excluded from field trips.¹⁹ There were demonstrations

¹⁷On March 15, 2004, the French government passed a law that prohibited the wearing of “conspicuous signs” of religious affiliation in public schools. Article 1 is the key arrangement: In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing which prominently show students’ religious affiliations is disallowed. Disciplinary strategies to execute this rule will be preceded by a dialog with the student (Scott, 2007:2).

¹⁸<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000177.pdf>

¹⁹Extract from a question to the Senate in 2007: “Mothers wearing headscarves are thus at times excluded from extracurricular activities or parent-teacher meetings and forbidden to enter school premises. However, the minister of national education has reminded us that the law does not apply to adults who are not part of the educational community, such as students’ parents and the school chaplain. The prime minister has confirmed this. The argument according to which parents who accompany school classes can have the status of an occasional employee does not hold. Jurisprudence is clear: this type of assimilation serves only to allow the accompanying parent to receive compensation from the State in the event of an accident. It should not in any case lead to the screening of students’ parents from participating in this kind of events. In a ruling released on the 15th of March 2007, the HALDE (*Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité*, the French Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission) states: “The mothers of eight students have been excluded from participating in any school activity and/or supervising school trips owing to wearing headscarves. The Commission reminds us that neither the principle of secularism [*laïcité*], neither that of neutrality in public service are *a priori* opposed to headscarf-wearing mothers collaborating in public education services by taking part on school activities or field trips. Refusing to let these mothers participate as volunteers might represent a case of religious discrimination. The Commission recommends that school councils revise their regulations and/or their interpretation in this sense [in the sense that it matches the Commission's ruling] and the minister of national

organized against the exclusion of mothers from these school trips. Additionally, The Act of the October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealing of the face in public spaces states that ‘no one shall, in any public space, wear clothing designed to conceal the face’. For the purpose of application of the 1st article, the 2nd article states that ‘the public sphere shall be composed of the public highway and premises open to public or used for the provision of a public service’. ²⁰ Regarding the 2004 law forbidding ostentatious religious demonstrations at school, the Charter of Secularism at school (*Charte de la laïcité à l’École*) of Sept. 9th 2013 was added, despite the 2004 law. Furthermore, the Baby Loup nursery school issue has been turned into a debate, this time around about secularism in the private sphere. Baby Loup falling under the category of private sphere as a private enterprise. At that time and afterwards, Elisabeth Badinter has warned against the risk of an increase in religious claims in the early childhood sector and urges the left-wing to react and defend secularism [*laïcité*]. ²¹ Besides the kindergarden “Baby Loup” as a recent debate in the media, H&M has a collection especially for Muslim women²² and hires saleswomen that wear veils. On February 27, 2016, *Le Monde* defined public space in these terms: ‘the street, public transportation, but also private spaces such as stores, companies, movie theatres, concert halls, and performance rooms’.

The aim of asking some critical questions about those contradictory incidents has been to take the CSOs’ positions and see how they react. The question has taken place in the form of asking the place of religious signs and how the prohibitions of religious signs can be defined as a protection of French values and the principles of the republic at public schools.

education to take action in order to secure that the principle of non-discrimination based on religious grounds is enforced equally in all territory”.

²⁰<http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/2010-613-dc/decision-n-2010-613-dc-du-07-octobre-2010.49711.html>

²¹<http://www.elle.fr/Societe/Interviews/Elisabeth-Badinter-Il-faut-d-urgence-une-loi-sur-le-voile-pour-la-petite-enfance-2408590>

²²The collection was not labelled as for “Muslim Women” but it has been interpreted as “pudique” in French which might mean “prudish” or “reserved” or “modest”. <http://nextliberation.fr/mode/2015/09/30/mariah-idrissi-premier-mannequin-voilee-dans-une-pub-hm-1394047>, http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2015/12/30/mode-musulmane-evangelique-juive-mode-dieu-2015_n_8859998.html

After asking whether in public school for primary education, the prohibition of religious signs is “necessary” or not, it has been asked whether, if the case was a state university, how they consider forbidding the veil at universities as part of the public sphere. Regarding their reactions, they were asked about their opinion of ‘hijab day’ at Sciences Po Paris.²³ For background information recent incidents related to the freedom to wear a veil at universities have been recalled. At the beginning of the school year in 2014, various incidents related to veils were publicized in the media, such as the one at the Sorbonne where a student was called aside by her professor because she was wearing a veil and one at Sciences Po in Aix-en-Provence. In each incident, professors picked on students because of their veils, regardless of any objective considerations. Everyone in France knows that wearing veils on university campuses is not prohibited. However, the ‘chador’ is forbidden. The students that wear veils thus consider these incidents as Islamophobic incidents. For those opposed to veils, some just want to warn these women that their garment may be a setback in their professional careers. Others with stronger opinions consider that although not forbidden, the veil is nonetheless an affront to their view of secularism and the values of France. Such was the case in the *IEP* (Political Studies Institute) in Aix-en-Provence.²⁴ Then as a recent discourse, the ministry of education has also discussed the question of foreign students likely to wear a scarf as saying; ‘May I remind you that our universities are actually hosting many foreign students? Are we supposed to forbid them from entering the university because there is a specific way of dressing in their culture? I am referring to the principle of freedom in education, because we are dealing with young adults.’²⁵ Since a popular catchphrase is ‘The university must be open to the world’²⁶

²³http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/04/20/le-hijab-day-organise-a-sciences-po-pour-sensibiliser-sur-le-voile-divise_4905430_3224.html

²⁴http://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/jean-paul-brighelli/iep-d-aix-en-provence-voiles-et-deboires-08-10-2014-1870313_1886.php, <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20141002.OBS0989/sciences-po-aix-un-prof-accuse-une-eleve-voilee-d-etre-un-cheval-de-troie-de-l-islamisme.html>, <http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/aix-en-provence-une-etudiante-voilee-apostrophee-par-un-prof-a-sciences-po-02-10-2014-4182915.php>

²⁵<http://etudiant.lefigaro.fr/les-news/actu/detail/article/manuel-valls-veut-interdire-le-voile-a-l-universite-19965/>

²⁶ This is also what the Stasi commission states in their report regarding secularism at university: ‘The university case, although it integrally belongs to the sphere public education service, is completely different to the school case. Adults study there. The university must be open to the world. So there is no question of impeding students from being able to and expressing their religious, political, or philosophical beliefs. These manifestations however shall

Here are the questions related to cases i and ii above:

4- “Forbidding visible Islamic symbols in public sphere as an ostentatious religious sign in elementary school” would mean a major challenge (particularly) for some young girls. What is your stance on this? Do you consider that it would bring about the exclusion of these girls from society and a removal of their right to an education?

5- The Act of the October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealing of the face in public space states that ‘no one shall, in any public space, wear clothing designed to conceal the face’. What was your position on this topic at the time? How do you define ‘public space’ (in relation to debates of “the veil”)? Where does it start and end?

6- What do you think of [women] wearing any type of veil (Islamic or fundamentalist) at university? What is your opinion on this matter?

7- How do you consider freedom of conscience in relation to the debates on the wearing of the veil? Do you think Muslim women wearing veils are expressing their choice instead of men’s oppression?

iv) The day of dressing “without a veil” every June 10 as another theme is part the universalistic attitude of (white) Feminism in France and has been claimed as discrimination towards other groups of women. Thus, I have questioned CSOs about their points of view about the relationship between the second wave of feminism and (any) religion. The crucial debates in France is whether a universalist attitude would be a “shield” against religious extremism, which is the universalist feminist’s claim oppressing Muslim migrant women in France, or whether it would become another type of oppression.

Hence, here are the questions linked to cases (iii) above;

8- What do you think of the second wave of feminism and its struggle with religion, particularly Islam considering identity politics from the 2000s onwards?

not lead to the infringement of the organizational rules of the university as an institution. It is unacceptable that teachers are refused on the basis of their sex or their supposed religion, or that the teaching is impeded as a principle. The commission sees desirable that the higher education establishments understand the rule in question in this way.’

9- Taking these debates into account, do you think that the ban on religious symbols excludes/discriminates women that wear it? Does it appear to emancipate women from religious oppression and “integrate” them into “French culture” and “French society”?

The third group of cases and questions concern issues related to social cohesion, social inequalities and the issues of the integration of immigrants and priorities in education zones in the banlieues.

v) Incidents such as riots in 2005 or vandalism in the banlieues are said to be due to a lack of education or uncompleted integration into citizenship with French values, or else problems with integration, migration, socio-economic issues, and the situation of community segregation in France. Within the main debates and concepts of multiculturalism and communitarianism in a French context is the problem of integration.

Here are the related questions with the incidents and concepts (v) above;

10- What is the connection between republican universalism (if you think it exists) and “immigrant integration” in France? Do you think that integration politics are problematic in France in general? How do you define “French national identity”? If we consider the expression of identity politics since the beginning of the 21st century would you say French national identity is changing?

11-What is your perspective on the ‘multiculturalism’ practiced in the UK and the United States? Could it exist in France? Do you think that the principle of “the indivisibility of the republic” goes against the idea of multiculturalism?

As a last question/case to analyze the CSOs point of view about the term “intersectionality” in relation to multiple forms of discrimination;

12- Have you ever heard of the word/concept of “intersectionality”? It is a concept explaining multiple forms of discrimination, what is your position on it?

3.2.2. The Universe and the Sample Groups of the Research

Specific French newspapers from both left-wing and right-wing point of view has been scanned from 1989 to the present day. These newspapers were *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *l’observatoire*, *Liberation*, *le Parisien*, and *L’equipe*. The reason why I have tried to

choose papers from both the left and the right is to propose that the perspectives of both sides might be different at some points and at others might be quite surprisingly similar. The leftwing media in France has a very skeptical point of view about “self-determination”. Sometimes this might lead to the justification of discrimination, especially in the case of Muslim Migrants. Besides the newspapers, daily, weekly and monthly political issue-based journals are another resource used in the study. *Nouvelles Questions Feministes*, *L'OBS*, *Marianne*, *MediaPart*, *Courrier Internationale*, and *le Point* are the relatively more objective political journals selected here.

Finding the archival material about the incidents and documentation about those incidents was not very difficult. Since incidents similar to Bataclan attacks or Charlie Hebdo attacks happened, French media and philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have been eager to describe recent events, and resources about recent incidents were easily found.

While deciding on the cases, it was realized that some of the CSOs were more active than the others and that those were generally more media-friendly as well. The protests or demonstrations of some CSOs would give them the opportunity to include them within the scope of this research. Also using the same method and reaching related CSOs by carrying out internet research, a large number of CSOs were reached. While looking for the cases and the CSOs there was a database that contained most of the (media) resources. After checking the objectivity and accountability of the database, the CSOs and their features were confirmed on that website. Hence, [https://www. centre-hubertine-auclert. fr/associations](https://www.centre-hubertine-auclert.fr/associations)²⁷ was the essential database. Founded by the regional council of Paris Region, The Hubertine Auclert Center is a resource center dedicated to the promotion of gender equality. The main goals of the organization are as follows: Promoting equality between women and men, making people aware of the necessity to fight against discrimination based on sex and gender, producing expertise in these fields, and studying and increasing awareness about gender-based violence through their Regional Observatory on violence against women. The organization was composed of non-profit organizations, elected representatives and trade unions, and aimed at backing its members by helping them setting up their projects, fighting against gender

²⁷For the further information: [https://www. centre-hubertine-auclert. fr/le-centre](https://www.centre-hubertine-auclert.fr/le-centre).

discrimination in education, and providing information and resources regarding gender equality through the center's website.

The reason why this database has been chosen to select the CSOs is to be able to summarize all the CSOs very detailed and properly. The contribution of this database is to facilitate access to CSOs carrying out joint activities and activities within the framework of similar principles. The database includes the main objectives, focus groups, visions and missions of CSOs, as well as their target groups. As a result of the research on the database made with different keywords relating to issues and case studies, a large proportion of the CSOs on gender issues in France were constituted as the universe of the field work. These groups were crosschecked by checking the activities and aims of the CSOs from the media and from their own websites.

The concepts searched for in the database were minority groups rights, inclusive groups, anti-discrimination, feminist or vulnerable groups, anti-racism, women's rights, protecting French values, race, sexual orientation, gender, class, social integration, inequalities, republican values, laïcité, universalism, multiple discrimination, gender inequalities.

To carry out the fieldwork, 90 CSOs were determined as the universe of the field.²⁸ Those were the associations who were mostly concerned with the migration problems (either pro- or anti-integration), but who also advocated for Women's Rights. As was explained above, the CSOs were selected by their websites, and their actions and reactions with regard to discrimination against women. The initial point of multiple discrimination and then the concept of intersectionality is being a woman in any society. Hence, women are the major oppressed group within multiple discrimination. To make a proper analysis of the concept of "intersectionality", it is important to understand the multiple discrimination situations, via the reaction of CSOs who put advocating Women's Rights first.

At the beginning of fieldwork my sample group was 58 CSOs which had accepted my interview demand. Not all those CSOs replied to my email or phone calls. I have also benefited from a snowball sampling method to reach the target group. This was one

²⁸ The origins and the changing the mission of CSOs are not the focus of this thesis. This thesis only concerns about the CSOs that are currently functional in the French context.

efficient way of using methods for this research. Representativeness and reliability generally are among common criticisms of qualitative methods. The issues of representativeness and reliability rotate around the address of designing and creating a sample of individuals, places, or activities appropriate for study. Snowball sampling is the regular way of creating a sample. Members are inquired to appoint potential sources and the request is made at each subsequent interview until the required number is reached. The snowballing of a sample proceeds all through the period within the field. The snowballing of a sample continues throughout the period in the field. After the interview with *Regards des Femmes*, the research reached the main sample group of the study, as Michele Vianes introduced a network of very close network of feminist CSOs advocating women's "universal" rights. Despite this, there are problems in generating a sample from one network of people with particular characteristics, because participants can nominate a set of interconnected people. Researchers have to be on their guard against producing a restricted sample and find ways of generating as wide a sample of participants as possible (Devine; 205).

In my field work, snowball sampling gave me the opportunity to reach a network of associations which was the necessary source of data. The reason for this is that getting an appointment from some CSOs would have been hard if there was no "acquaintance" or a familiar/trustful contact to guarantee of your study's reliability. Hence, considering the main concerns and interest groups of those 58 associations, 35 in-depth interviews (CSOs) were used from the field research. These organizations, which have been identified as the sample, were asked the questions about the specified cases to find out;

- what kind of activities they carry out,
- whether that they have or not taken any action,
- what their positions are about some of the concepts and phenomena (such as the principles of the French republic, *laïcité*, French values, and freedom of conscience) that are being experienced in France today,
- what they think about the transition of feminist theory and the concept of intersectionality,

My analysis, based on the replies given in the interviews, reveals how the concept of intersectionality in France is understood in the framework of feminist theory and identity politics by CSOs advocating women's rights.

I requested in-depth interviews with the founding members, executive committee members and/or president/co-presidents of the CSOs via email or phone. Via the email, the main aim of this study was explained by brief information about which university and under whose supervision it was and a request for an appointment for an in-depth interview. In cases where it the target group could not be reached, either the most active members who were dealing with both the internal functions and project management or the most active volunteers were reached and interviewed.

Hence verbal or signed affirmations were received with the ethical approval of the study before the interview started. Each in-depth interview lasted 120-180 minutes. The language of the interviews was French,²⁹ the data research before the interview and the interview questions were prepared in French and were then translated into English for this thesis.

Considering the main “*raison d’être*” of CSOs -they either advocate or provide services- here, the selected CSOs were engaged with groups whose interests were overlapping. This ensured accounting for the diversity of opinion of different CSOs.

Here is the list of the universe (90) and sample (58) of the field research based on my categorization into 5 groups. In each group at the end there are clusters of CSOs who did not respond any email or phone calls, so they were in the universe but they were not in the sample group. In the tables, the sample consists the ones written with their engagements into each groups. As mentioned before, after the interviews were made with 58 CSOs, 35 interviews were selected to use for the analysis. The selection of the interviews was related to main arguments (assumptions) of this thesis.

- (1) The first group consists of CSOs (see Table 1) whose common categories were secular, anti- discriminative and anti-racist on the database and their websites.

²⁹ This is why transcriptions of the interviews were not attached to the thesis Annex.

Table 1 - The List of CSOs in the first group within the Scope of the Research

1.	Ligue de droit international des femmes,	Secular, international women's rights, women emancipation
2.	CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes	Secular, gender equality, international women's rights
3.	Regards de Femme	Secular, violence against women, integration
4.	Les Chiennes de Garde	Secular, against prostitution, against male oppression
5.	Initiative Feministe -EUROMED	Secular, international women's rights, equality between men and women
6.	COMEPROD	Secular, equality between men and women
7.	Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers	Secular, against male oppression, anti-discrimination
8.	Libres Mariannes	Secular, French integration, anti-discrimination, emancipation of women, equality between men and women
9.	Reseau Feministe Rupture	Secular, Anti-discrimination, French values, 2nd wave feminist values, women's rights
10.	Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme	Secular, Against radical Islamists, gender equality
11.	AMEL	Secular, Integration, social cohesion, social inequalities, international women's rights
12.	Femmes Solidaire	Secular, Integration, social cohesion, social inequalities, international women's rights
13.	CFCV	Secular, Violence against women, sexual violence, male oppression, against cultural relativity
14.	Women in War	Secular, Violence against women, integration, gender equalities
15.	FEMAID	Secular, Violence against women, integration, gender equalities
16.	RAVAD Reseau d'assistance aux victims d'agressions et de discrimination	Equalities between men and women, anti-discrimination
17.	Reussir Legalité	Secular, Social cohesion, international women's rights
18.	CNDF Collectif National pour les Droits des Femmes	Secular, gender equality, women's emancipation
19.	Osez le feminism	Women's emancipation, universalist, equality
20.	LICRA	Human rights, social cohesion, equality
21.	MRAP	Anti-discrimination, social inequalities, anti-racism
22.	MPCT Mouvement Pour La Paix et Contre le Terrorisme	Anti-terrorist, secular

Table 1 - Continued

23.	Ligue des Droits de l'Homme	Universalist, human rights
24.	SOS Racisme	Anti-discrimination, anti-racism
25.	Eller	Secular, Integration, Turkish-origin migrants, disadvantaged groups, inequalities between men and women, against male oppression
26.	Elele	Secular, Integration, Turkish-origin migrants, disadvantaged groups, inequalities between men and women, against male oppression
27.	Place aux Femmes	Secular, equality between men and women, against male domination
28.	Egalé- Egalite Laïcité Europe	Secular, women and men equalities, against male domination
29.	L'Association Femme et Libre	
30.	L'association Ateliers du Feminisme Populaire	
31.	Association des Femmes Euro-Mediterranéeenne contre les Intégrisme (AFEMCI)	
32.	La Cimade	
33.	L'Association Nationale des Etudes Feministes	
34.	Femmes Responsables	
35.	L'Association Ville et Banlieu	
36.	Alliance des Femmes pour la Democratie	
37.	Une Femme Un Toi	
38.	APGL	
39.	Egalité, C'est pas Sourcière	
40.	Agir pour la Laïcité et Valeurs Republicaines	
41.	Conseil des ex-Musulmanes de France	
42.	Association Amities Laïc et Republicaines	
43.	La Mission Laïc Française	
44.	Collectif Le Printemps Republicain	

(2) The second group consists of the CSOs (see Table 2) whose main feature was integration of migrants

Table 2 - The List of CSOs in the second group within the Scope of the Research

1.	RAJFIRE	Magrebian women's integration in France, anti-discrimination, social cohesion, international women's rights
2.	APEL- egalité	Magrebian women's integration in France, anti-discrimination, social cohesion, international women's rights
3.	Femme de la Terre	Migrant women's rights, social cohesion, integration
4.	Libres Terres des Femmes	Migrant women's rights, integration
5.	Fils de France	Migrants' rights, cultural tolerance

Table 2 - Continued

6.	Ataturquie
7.	COJEP
8.	ADRIC
9.	ASFAD

(3) The third group consists of the CSOs (see Table 3) whose main common features were social inequalities between men and women in the suburbs, multiple discrimination, issues with violence against women.

Table 3 - The List of CSOs in the third group within the Scope of the Research

1.	Wmasi	Black feminist movement, non-mixing, gender equalities, multiple forms of discrimination
2.	Les Effrontées	Intersectionality, multiple forms of discrimination,
3.	Les Dorines	Integration, social inequalities, secular, against male domination, universalist, international women's rights
4.	Voix de Femmes	Against forced marriage, against (sexual) violence against women,
5.	Brigade Des Meres	Integration, social inequalities, anti discrimination, violence against women
6.	Federation National GAMS	Against female genital mutilation, against cultural relativism, secular, tolerant of differences, equality between men and women
7.	NPNS Ni putes Ni soumises	Migrant women's rights, integration problems, secular.
8.	ACORT	Turkish migrants' integration problems
9.	Voix D'elles Rebelles	Social inequalities, anti- discrimination
10.	Les Femmes Migrantes Debout	

(4) The fourth group consists of the CSOs (see Table 4) who categorize themselves as being respectful to intersectionality, diversity, sexual orientation, multiple forms of discrimination, and anti-racism

Table 4 - The List of CSOs in the fourth group within the Scope of the Research

1.	La Barbe	Gender equality, against male domination, sexual orientation
2.	Feminité	Intersectionality, gender equality, multiple discrimination
3.	Pour Elle Revienne	Equality between men and women, intersectionality
4.	Les Indivisibles	Anti-discrimination, multiple discrimination

Table 4 - Continued

5.	Coordination Lesbienne en France	Secular, radical feminist, gender equality, international women's rights, the rights of lesbians, anti-discrimination
6.	Association Fieres	Multiple discrimination, gender equality, sexual orientation
7.	Islam Inclusif	Freedom of belief, anti-discrimination, religious tolerance
8.	Centre LGBT	Sexual orientation, gender equality, tolerance, anti-discrimination
9.	Homosexuel Musulmans HM2K	Sexual orientation, freedom of belief, religious tolerance, gender equality, Islamic culture
10.	Association Contact	Sexual orientation, anti-discrimination
11.	SOS Homophobie	Gender equalities, against homophobia, sexual orientation
12.	Shams	
13.	FLAG!	
14.	L'Autre Cercle	
15.	Le Collectif Education contre Lgbtphobie	
16.	Le Regardes de l'Autre	

(5) The fifth group consists of the CSOs (see Table 5) who have been categorized as being respectful to freedom of conscience, diversity, freedom of religion, and multiple discrimination.

Table 5 - The List of CSOs in the fifth group within the Scope of the Research

1.	Ligue Française Des Femmes Musulmanes	Protecting Muslim women's rights, moderate, anti-discrimination
2.	Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée	Protecting Muslim women's rights, moderate, anti-discrimination, reform inside Islam
3.	Indegenes de la Republique	Maghrebien migrant rights, anti-discrimination
4.	Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France	Muslim migrant's rights, anti-discrimination, against Islamophobia
5.	UAM-93 Union des Association Musulmanes	Tolerance of religion (Islam)
6.	Feminist Pour L'égalité	
7.	Maman Pour Egales	
8.	Des Françaises Voilées	
9.	CRI France Coordination contre le Racism et Islamophobie	
10.	La Foundation Pour l'Islam de France	
11.	L'Avenir pour Tous	

3.2.3. Data Collection and Analysis

The field research of this thesis is based on the qualitative method that includes a range of techniques including in-depth interviews (Harvey, 197). In-depth interviews permit people to talk openly and offer their own interpretation of events. It is their perspective which is crucial (Harvey, 1990). In-depth interviews permit people to explain their own story in language with which they themselves identify. This allows for discourse analysis. Also, qualitative methods draw significant attention to contextual arguments (in this study's case it is intersectionality) that place an interviewee's behaviors and attitudes in the context of their biography and the broader social settings (Devine, 195). Hence, this sort of interview is suitable when looking for to understand people's motives and interpretations. In-depth interviews endeavor to reveal a more profound level of data in order to capture meaning, prepare and setting, where clarification includes portraying and understanding individuals as cognizant and social human beings (Landman, 21; Fielding 1993: 157). Following the data collection stage of this thesis, the qualitative method and in-depth interviews were the main tools of analysis.

During data analysis, this thesis used the autoethnography method, which is a process involving the interviewer as a participant in the analysis and a discourse analysis method based on certain assumptions about the standpoint feminism with respect to different female standpoints. According to Vicky Randall, during feminist epistemology debates, their call for a feminist methodology entails methodological eclecticism, including borrowing methods from outside the discipline and above all gender awareness (Landman, 118). Therefore, combining more than one method would create an eclectic feminist methodology and make the analysis richer.

In feminist theory, autoethnography has been an increasing interest of scholars such as Reinharz (1992) and Patai (1991), in their approaches to biographical history. Many feminists highlight women's need to relate their own narratives about women's collective and unique experiences' understanding, the experiences which are key to their lives, and their personal practices (Ostriker, 1983). Moreover, Maynard and Afshar (2000) say that feminist analysts empower the sharing of cross-disciplinary methods in their research: Feminists have profited from approaches emphasizing experience, narrative, (auto)biography, oral history and life, along with qualitative techniques. All

of these are among the in-depth strategies of social research, underlining the extraordinary importance of listening to, recording and understanding women's own portrayals additionally accounts of their experiences. Hence, it would be efficient to clarify the feminist methodology of autoethnography for data analysis and how the in-depth interviews were analyzed. Autoethnography is the consider of social interactions, behaviors and discernments that happen inside groups, teams, organizations and communities in feminist methodology. According to Foucault, taking the self as something to write about, a theme or object (subject) of composing movement is one of the foremost antiquated Western conventions (Foucault, 1997b, p. 233; Fine 1995). The central aim of autoethnography is to supply wealthy, all encompassing insights into people's views and activities, as well as the nature (that is, sights and sounds) of the area they possess, through the collection of detailed observations and interviews.

Vone'che states that point of a person interpreting his/her past has been affected how that person understands and analyzes the interview (Vone'che, 2001: 226; Trahar, 2009). Heewon Chang declared that autoethnography emphasizes cultural analysis and interpretation of the researcher's behaviors, thoughts and experiences in relation to others in society (Chang, 2007:1). Autoethnography shows the interconnectivity of others and also the self. Chang (2008) claims that "I" indicate privileged an important knowledge which brings an insider account and weaved power structures' analysis that an outsider cannot dismantle. This generates autoethnography in a kind and a knowing way for the unknown and barely-spoken-of. According to Chang, it is related to culture, with an individual culture being an individual version of group culture, which individuals construct in relationship with others.

In this study, the autoethnography technique is employed to make the analysis of the interviews by myself, I designated the particular terms under the first analysis table. In addition, I also used some of the specific occasions that I conducted with the interviewees to formulate the expressions of the second analysis table.

My categorization of the CSOs followed the same method in data analysis. That was me and my personal experiences from the interviews. For instance, during the interviews with the first group of CSOs, a representative of Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers scolded me because in her opinion the interview questions were

oriented, guided, and subjective. She believed they were in favor of Islamist discourse. She said “Your questions are like the other (post-colonialist) intellectuals’ discourse. But you know what, if one day Turkey becomes like Iran, her CSOs would be helping all the women in my country to fight against Islamists in order to rescue or save them as guardians of universal women’s rights.” Her perceptions helped me to categorize the attitude of CSOs as seeing themselves as emancipators or guardians of “universal women’s rights”.

Another event is that before the interview the president of Ligue des Droits Internationales des Femmes called me and asked about my situation, which at first I explained through my education and visa status in France. However, she also asked whether I wore the veil or not. Hence, that was another specific data point for me to make my discourse analysis more detailed. I chose to benefit from the autoethnography technique because I used my origin to understand and make a better analysis. Even before the interviews, when I was requesting appointments, my country of origin helped me. Because for some, I was coming from a country where the majority of the population is Muslim and for others Turkey has a secular system.

Besides autoethnography, discourse analysis would provide the best opportunity for data analysis. In this thesis while making the discourse analysis of the data which has been collected, standpoint feminism was the main parameter. It is aimed to reach a conclusion about how the basic parameters of the intersectionality concept were understood in the case of France and how intersectionality was conceptualized by discourse analysis through CSOs’ replies to the related questions. In addition to the tables, I have added examples of the discourse of some selected interviewees.

3.3. DATA ANALYSIS

Just like the condescending attitude that white women adopted towards black women and the other nonwhite women as described by bell hooks, one can observe the tension between white women and Muslim migrant women in France. Through their universalistic attitude, they remind the other that the women’s movement was theirs – as long as they let the others participate, the other groups might remain in the movement. As hooks said, white women did not see black women as equals, neither did they treat

them as equals (hooks, 141). If there were a movement or necessary changes, white women believed they could solve them, despite other groups' needs and experiences. Hence, just as bell hooks claimed about problems of black and nonwhite women, Muslim migrant "feminist" women and others have found that if they dared to criticize the (feminist) movement or assume responsibility for reshaping feminist ideas and introducing new ideas, their voices were tuned out, silenced and dismissed.

As a contribution to conceptualizing the term intersectionality in France, "universalism" and the universalistic attitude of women's groups need to first come under the magnifying glass. Then other women groups also need to be analyzed. That is why through these questions, the data obtained has been explained and categorized by the main terms, with issues of intersectionality and the discourse of each CSO about the terms remarked upon. This categorization would give us the opportunity to understand how they see the main debates by the sides they take. Additionally, under the second analysis but merged into the first one via the experience of the interviews and using the methodology of autoethnography, intersectional sentences are formulated and explain what the CSOs have declared implicitly. So, under the three quintessential dimensions, religion (Islam) is a crucial debate. Hence, a categorization has been developed to explain how intersectionality is stretched and understood by CSOs in France.

The first table indicates what CSOs said when I asked what they thought about intersectionality and whether they agreed with the concept or not. When they said yes, no or maybe (not), it means they accepted, rejected or abstained from commenting on the term. During the interviews, each term was explained as defined by this thesis via related case studies. Through these explanations, the CSOs proclaimed their points of view and why they rejected, accepted or abstained from commenting. If there is a blank, that means they said nothing and they were not concerned with the term and its consequences.

After categorizing the interviews under the first table, the second table was also created by myself via the literature of intersectional issues and autoethnographic analysis of the interviews. The second table consists of intersectional expressions and intersectional terms from the first table. The categorization of the second is same as the first. Yes, no, and maybe (not) are the replies from each CSO; when there is blank, that means they

had no comment or any other attempt to say something about the issue. The numbers near the CSOs refer to which category the CSO is in. Additionally, in each table the CSOs are categorized by their discourse about the main intersectional issues and how they explained their perspectives. Each category (there are 5 categories) is explained at the end of the analysis.



CHAPTER IV

INTERSECTIONALITY IN THE FRENCH CONTEXT

4.1. INTERSECTIONAL ISSUES IN FRANCE

Racism was the echo of the contradiction over the veil; however, “secularism” was its outspoken justification. The prohibition of ostensible religious signs means implicitly the division of religion and state instead of the defence of *laïcité* within the French Republic. The veil interventions were made in public schools which are the melting pots in which French citizens are formed (Scott, 2007). Scott explains that the National Assembly report (Secularism and Schools) began, “*laïcité* designates the laos, the people considered as an indivisible whole. Though respect for the right to a private individual conscience is essential, the neutrality of the state needs to be inevitable for national unity. The aim of the prohibition law was a prohibition but with a “*raison d’etat*” purpose. In spite of assertions towards this aim, the veil contradiction has provoked a discussion on *laïcité*, the limits of religious toleration and the main principles of republic. Proponents of a law to forbid veils say that it might just enforce long-established boundaries between the public and the private, the political and the religious (Scott, 2007).

The French case must be understood in terms of its specific historical background. Secularism is one of those parameters. In France, the separation of church and political power was attempted to secure individuals to the republic (Scott, 2007). The reason for the state protection of individuals was the alleged undivided loyalty of citizens to the nation which meant relegating religious communities to the private sphere. In France, the state ensures people from religion; in America, religions are ensured from the state and the state from religion. But in both cases, the landscape of legislative issues is implied to be free of religious impact; it is considered fundamental to republican democracy that religion may be a private affair (Scott, 2007).

The distinction between private and public derives from historic relationships to Christianity. Today, on behalf of democracy, religious communities and their members

demand to live and be recognized in terms of their beliefs, and this definition of secularism might be an obstacle to their rights as citizens. According to Scott, secularism might be defined a veil for the political domination of others, which is a form of ethnocentrism or crypto-Christianity, a fruit of the history of the European nation-state. Hence, the related term universalism has justified itself with the term secularism, but actually it conforms to those of the dominant group. Political theorist William Connolly says that “Democratic governance readily degenerates into the organization of unity through the demoralization of otherness. ” (Connolly, 1999). This captures the contradiction over the veil in France. The law has underlined the inevitable difference (the otherness) of those whose religious identity was completed by wearing the veil, and the assumption that they are not emancipated by their choice to dress like that (Scott, 2007).

In France, the exclusion of religion from the public sphere became an ideological tool and a reason to exclude the Muslim population of France. Scott declared those French supporters of the law apostles of secularism. In France this type of secularism was not just different, but very particularly French (Scott, 2007). It belongs to a universal manner but at the same time a unique history and national character (“*une singularité française*”). It further rests on the idea that the secular and the sacred can be separated inside the lives of people. Unlike other secular democracies, composed Bernard Stasi within the presentation to his commission’s report, “France has raised *laïcité* to the level of a establishing esteem. ” (Stasi, 2003). Scott explains very clearly the reason why *laïcité* is so significant and a pillar of the French Republic. According to the values of the French republic, the school could be a sacred space; *laïcité* was un méta-idéal humain; and precluding the headscarf was fundamental to prevent a overthrow of the school by the street. The experience was stated in abstract terms, between the republic and religion, modernity and convention, reason and superstition; in concrete terms, it was seen as being between modern France and Islam. The issue, the critics proceeded,

was not religion in common but Islam, and not just Islam but immigrants. Within the conclusion, they announced, the defense of *laïcité* was but another veil for racism.³⁰

The republican model of *laïcité* has been denominated the definition of French secularism. In fact, as Jean Baubérot (the solitary disagreeing part of the Stasi commission and a history specialist of *laïcité*) has pointed out, the thought of *laïcité* has had a long history in France, and a few of its definitions are exceptionally much at odds with the definition offered within the heat of the veil inconsistency (Baubérot, 2000; 2015). There is at least one other model of *laïcité*, a democratic model, that Baubérot places squarely within a French context. According to Baubérot, the *laïcité* of the year 2000 should ensure that the citizens are not deprived of public debates on essential questions relating to medical ethics, information, education, etc. In this vision the school is in fact a support of democracy, in which differences are accommodated and arranged, set up practices are basically rementioned, and debate ought to prosper in the absence of dogmatic assertions of permanent truth. In that sense, it is an arrangement for citizenship, for participation in the work of a nation conceptualized as a heterogeneous substance, in which the differences of its constituents are caught on to be an asset, not a deficiency (Bilge, 2008). Baubérot concludes by proposing that verifiably the two models of secularism have long been in pressure in France, that the democratic model has already been connected to Christians and Jews which it would be the republican model is connected to Islam. It is the democratic model, he accepts, that constitutes an opportunity for a future in which socio-cultural and socio-religious clashes have been moderately ached and contribute to the development of the future (Baubérot, 2015). For Baubérot it is not religion but the republican model that, by taking the religious and the secular to be absolute opposites, postures the foremost unsafe obstacle to democracy (Bilge, 2008).

Regarding the Republican Model, Jacques Chirac's aim was national unity while creating the Stasi commission in July 2003. "France is a *laïque* republic," he wrote in his charge to Bernard Stasi. Since the law of 1905 separating church and state, *laïcité* has established deep roots in the institutions of France. Indeed, that law had become a

³⁰ Historically, *laïcité* in schools dated to the Third Republic's ferry laws (1881–82, 1886), which made primary education compulsory for boys and girls and which effectively banished from the classroom religion as a subject and priests and nuns as teachers.

key perspective of national cohesion, a way of ensuring that social differences would not fracture the solidarity of the nation. But this way of accomplishing solidarity included disregarding the presence of the differences altogether. “The Republic is composed of citizens,” Chirac went on, “it must not be segmented into groups. As early as 1989, the future of the nation was connected by numerous commentators to what happened in schools” (Chirac,2003). Thus, the law was claimed by a especially defensive nationalism, one which rested on conviction in the unchanging truth of a certain national identity (Bilge, 2008; Scott,2007) Sirma Bilge explains why the forming of Muslim girls as individuals via schools was important. The answer was universalism. Universalism drifted opposition between political and social; the abstract and the concrete. During the French Revolution, everyone was an individual except for women, slaves and wage earners whose lack of autonomy made them unable to represent themselves. Any group belonging needs to be discarded if he or she is an individual. There were some, however, who might never be disassociated from the group to which they belonged, who could hence never become individuals. This was the case for women, whose sex was thought to create them unable of abstraction (comparing to men, they may not be segregated from their bodies). As a concrete result, they did not get the right to vote until 1945. For distinctive reasons, Muslims are presently in a similar position. Clearly, they do qualify for formal citizenship, but their having a place to a religious community that does not perceive of people as able to classify their convictions in terms of public or private makes them not slanted to abstraction, thus unable of integration (Bilge,2008).

Via this universalism, since the 1980s and the 200th anniversary of the revolution in 1989, there has been a prominence on unity and indivisibility of the nation. This distinction has derived from muddling the long and complicated history of various group struggles for rights in France. Although abstraction is the principle of universalism, in practice it is sameness, achieved through cultural assimilation, that guarantees national unity (Bilge, 2008).

Being autonomous individuals is not enough, French values needed to learned eternally in order to be taken seriously. For this reason, current requests for social and legal recognition by different groups – women, gay people, and immigrants – have been met

with impugning: they are communalist, they grant need to group participation, they present ‘unnatural’ differences that will rend the social texture and debilitate the body of the nation. The excuse (within the title of solidarity) of ensuring the nation from the requests of a few of its citizens has been utilized to block action on sake of groups underserved by the generous arrangements of the French welfare state (Bilge, 2008).

4.1.1. Public Schools: Fortresses of Laïcité

The members of the Stasi Commission who favoured the prohibition of the veil made a very particular and similar claim. Its claim was that the students who had come to school were individuals, and as rational agents, they had must leave communal identities at home. Essentially, Jules Ferry’s vision of the school as a melting pot of citizenship had changed to the sphere of a transition from the private to the public sphere, and from community to nation; today the school became a prototype of a nation, the place where French citizens were raised. Hence, for the *raison d’être* of state and nation, universalism meant conformity to the same rules. Those who were not already ‘French,’ or who in advance fell outside the purview of the universal, were the reason why commonality was of the essence for belonging in the educational community (Scott, 2007; Delphy, 2011).

A former minister of education, François Bayrou, has stated that “The school is designed to integrate; therefore it must exclude.” (quoted in Bilge 2008). That was a different version of saying that Muslims might never be French. On the other side, those who believed that Muslims could be integrated into society by going to school without any prohibition of religious signs were those who thought the school must necessarily reflect the diversity of society. The school gave an opportunity for the negotiation of differences and created communality via a shared knowledge of education (Scott, 2007). Scott claims the circumstance as there would be regard for differences, accomplished through an idea of neutrality, in expansion to the plausibility for children to become autonomous subjects in an ideal classroom. Considering that autonomy implies eluding the pressures of religion and family, it moreover implies understanding the choices others have encouraged you to make. Underlying numerous of the articulations

opposing the law were the same commitments that appeared to drive the law's defenders: to instruction as a modernizing process and to *laïcité* as a way of containing the power of religious truth claims (Bilge, 2008). There were, though, vital differences. For one, pundits of the law contended that assimilation was the wrong model for national solidarity; there might be toleration and coexistence of differences without homogenization. In fact, if *laïcité* were caught on as a platform for the negotiation of distinction rather than as its eradication, national solidarity based on shared values might still be the result. The question was how to have a 'dynamic process of integration' that was not 'a policy of assimilation.' According to Scott, public school is the most excellent place to stage the 'encounter of cultures and values' that might create a new universalism. In this vision, the school was the preparing ground for *laïcité*, a preparation for participation in adult politics, a place in which the merits of thoughts would be weighed without respect for their provenance (Scott, 2007).

The discussion about the meaning of secularism between the opponents and supporters of the prohibition of the veil in schools changed over time. If the opponents of the law had their position reflected in many newspapers, journals, and books, its public impact compared to those in favor who represented a wide audience was silence. While the debate continued, and "*la foulard* (the headscarf)" became synonymous with "*le voile* (the veil)", most people became either pro- or anti-veil. Those people who agreed that Muslim girls should not be away from school just because of their practice of religion were tagged pro-veil (in some cases 'Islamists').³¹ Though the law was stated so as to be universal, outlawing all conspicuous religious signs, there were no debates about Sikhs wearing turbans or Jewish boys wearing skullcaps. Scott asks "Why was school attire so important? And why direct a law primarily at underage Muslim girls?", and replied that the laws of Jules Ferry placed children as the breaking point of the nation where French values were constructed and broken, because the children of a nation are the population for reproducing and cultivating citizenship (Scott, 2007). The situation of Muslim girls, who are controlled by their brothers, fathers and imams. It was reminded

³¹ For example, an appeal by some activists titled 'Yes to *Laïcité*, No to Laws of Exclusion' appeared in *Libération* on May of 20th 2003, with a new title: 'Yes to the Headscarf in Secular Schools' which was not approved by the authors. After that, many of these intellectuals resigned from the feminist journal *Pro-Choix* after being called supporters of fundamentalism by its editor. They were now tagged as partisans of the veil. (Scott, 2007)

the old relations between women and religion. As Delphy construed this situation, “Therefore, Muslim girls wearing the veil represented vulnerable little women needed to be protected and emancipated because they carried the virus which was religion into the school” (Delphy, 2011).

4.1.2. “Just a Class Issue”

Hence, as Scott and Dubet underline, society is not the same society as it was when the Ferry laws were enacted. Racism and the division in society by class issues have become quite reactionary in the 21st century. In society, schools are the prototypical institutions for building up a nation, so those microcosmos of a society challenging secularism through religion are seen as a threat to the republic. (Dubet, 2006). By 1970, a large number of students coming from the lower-classes into secondary school, witnessed changes in the education system. Considering the law from this perspective, the ban on the veil was also a displacement of concern, an approach to avoid facing up to economic and social dilemmas about what was happening at French schools.

Dubet states that for middle- and upper-class parents familiar with the education system, the primary concern is to place their child in a good school. Working-class parents had not that much interest to the system, and insufficient social capital, and therefore their children often went to less successful schools, while children of families in the “immigrant” suburbs were limited to what the neighborhoods had (Dubet, 2006). The social problems of those suburbs could not be stopped at the school gate. As the proportion of immigrant participation in schools increased, the opportunities for all students of those schools decreased (Bilge, 2008). Going to a school in the immigrant suburbs was not always a guarantee of a good job; in contrast it was toxic, sometimes making it even more difficult to benefit from opportunities. As was seen during the riots in the fall of 2005, students coming from immigrant suburbs complained about the negative impacts of their schools (Dubet, 2006). According to Dubet, and Scott, it might be said that schools were not set up in terms of integration but a way of stabilizing and immobilized social hierarchies which already existed. In poorer districts, there was a huge social distance between teachers and students. On the other side, there was many similarities in the social milieus attending the same primary schools, collèges, and lycées. Etienne Balibar declares how the issue of experience has translated into a belief

in the power of education to shape people's minds and thus their lives. In the suburbs, there were disciplinarians in the sense of rule enforcers instead of mind trainers. Balibar says that is why, even though most did not see religious difficulties as an educational priority, in France the main unions of secondary school teachers supported the ban on the veil, and their political constituency was very powerful. They supported the law because "they saw no other remedy for their impotence except the symbolic affirmation [of their authority] by the power of the state for which they worked." (Balibar, 2005)

Regarding Scott's point of view, "Laïcité,- was not the end but the instrument of this corporate reflex" (Scott, 2007). Many teachers interpreted the veil as symbolic of the problems of integration, and came to believe that drawing a line between the veil and school would help to solve the problems in the education system. Therefore, the decision to prohibit the veil moved the problem outside of the education system itself. Situations of conflict at school were considered to be the result of the impact of foreignness, with immigrants clashing with the republic. In their opinion, if foreign influences diminished at school, then everything would improve. Bilge calls that as a delusional fix that addressed social problems as coming from foreign enemies (Bilge, 2008).

Timothy Smith argues that outside pressure had always been blamed in France. It is one approach of French elites to refuse to see internal problems such as grossly unequal employment, high unemployment rates, and pay rates for women, youth, and immigrants as compared to previous generations, the need for a pension, and health care system that cares for elders and the disabled, and poverty among public sector employees (Bilge, 2008). This does not mean that there are no 'Islamist' terrorists on French soil, but it also does not mean that each Muslim has the potential to become a radical Islamist. Bilge underlines what Emmanuel Terray says: that instead of concrete social policy, as a phantasmatic enemy, the veil controversy has become a form of political hysteria which became loaded with actual social anxieties. Problems to do with the status of immigrants and the practices of racism that kept them on the margins of French society were redefined as problems of Islamism, an external threat with links to Saudi Arabia and Iran. The solution has been framed as a militant form of secularism.

This has been conceived as the true French national identity. The negotiation of identity is not the subject at all.

The scapegoat of social division in France has been the refusal of Muslims to integrate. According to this theory, the 'foreignness' of Muslim culture is incompatible with membership of the French nation. The remedy for this discrimination was denial that differences existed at all, thus reversing the mistake of 'communalism' – a concept supposedly alien to France. The elevation of *laïcité* to an immutable and unquestioned truth of French republicanism was the symptom of a set of difficult problems: how to integrate a large population of marginalized 'immigrants' and, broadly, how to understand difference in political and social terms. The French reply to this has been explained below.

4.1.3. Intersectional Case: Veiled Muslim Migrant Women

There were three controversies at moments when the girls could wear Islamic veil at public schools: 1989, 1994, and 2003. Chronologically, there is no evidence that there was an increase in demonstrations against the law by Muslim girls, who generally had good grades and no criminal records. Their only refusal was to take off their veils. Then, they became the symbols of the problematization of Islam. On March 15, 2004 the French National Assembly adopted a law banning students from wearing 'conspicuous religious symbols' in public primary and secondary schools; the law came into effect on September 2, 2004. Prohibiting all ostensible religious objects such as the veil, the kippa and large crosses, the law permits the wearing of discreet objects such as small crosses, Stars of David, Fatima's hand, or miniature korans. Although there is no explicit mention of any particular religion, the law is considered to have targeted the Muslim veil, which has caused much controversy in France since the late 1980s (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995: 11). Dounia Bouzar (2004) rightly reminds us that the prohibition targets only students; veiled cleaning women working in public spaces, including schools, have never been considered an issue or a threat to the French principle of *laïcité*. Concurring to Benhabib, this philosophical principle is not completely interpreted by the separation between state and church or secularization: at best, it can be caught on as the public and manifest neutrality of the state toward all sorts of religious practices, institutionalized through watchful evacuation of sectarian

religious images, signs, symbols and items of clothing from official public spheres' (Benhabib, 2002: 95-96). Hence, it took a handful of veiled teenagers to challenge the principles governing the French public sphere and to generate a decade-long controversy over the legitimacy of the veil in public schools in a country with a Muslim population estimated at between 3.7 and 5.5 million, the largest in Europe.

The banning of the Muslim veil from French public schools implies the closure of a process of signification in which the dominant framing had the last say. The ban illustrates that the veil has been defined as an unequivocal signifier of women's submission to men and as such incompatible with the principles of the republic. It was perceived to transgress specifically two tenets of French republicanism: equality (in this case gender equality) and the principle of *laïcité* (Blank 1999). Numerous empirical studies show the fluidity and semiotic plurality of the veil as a social practice (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995, Venel 1999, Dwyer 1999, Bouzar and Kada 2003, Tersigni 2005), which also includes an aesthetic dimension (Moors 2004, Sandikci and Ger, 2005) and much empirical evidence suggests its use as an enabling rather than disabling garment in particular contexts (El Guindi 1999, Hoodfar 2003, Mahmood 2005) and its political reappropriation in order to contest the social exclusion and anti-Muslim racism, in particular by second and third generations of "*émigré*" youth (Keaton 2006; Afshar, Aitken and Franks 2005) - which make wearing the veil, in these specific cases, a process similar to the reversal of the stigma, conveyed in political mottos such as 'Black Is Beautiful,' or 'Gay Is Good,' Nevertheless, in French political and media discourses the Muslim veil has been cast without any ambiguity as the sign of Muslim women's submission to Muslim men. Thus, accommodating the veil became morally objectionable, since it came to signify endorsing this submission. The following quotations from feminists and mainstream politicians are intended to illustrate the representational consensus reigning with regard to the Muslim veil.

For French feminist Elisabeth Badinter, allowing women to wear headscarves in state schools meant that French democracy and the republic display religious tolerance, but in doing so they gave up on gender equality (Badinter, 2006). Opposing the veil from the beginning of the controversy, Badinter equates the veil with 'sex oppression' and asserts that wearing the veil cannot involve a choice since it signifies renouncing one's own

personal autonomy. Revealingly, her understanding of personal autonomy and agency does not refer to the ability to make one's own choices in one's best interests, but includes a value judgment of the content of these choices. This 'content-dependent' understanding of agency is a humanistic one, reminiscent of the Millian premise (1874) that one cannot freely submit to slavery, nor prefer a slothful life to one of Socratic questioning (Mookherjee 2005: 3), which has been challenged successfully both by poststructuralist and anti-racist feminism. For Badinter, indeed in the event that Muslim girls might show up to select this practice autonomously, this does not imply that they are autonomous. This can be since the substance of their cultural norms – specifically, the Muslim values of female limitation, unobtrusiveness and seclusion – are restricted to individual autonomy. What is striking about this account is its exclusive focus on one aspect of intragroup power relations (gender), which totally ignores intergroup (majority/minority) power relations based on (gendered) ethnicity, culture and religion. Indeed, the subtext of such a definition of agency, involving the choice of liberal values, perpetuates the power relations within which the agency is always already embedded.

After the prohibition, there were different reactions to the veiling ban by schools. Sirma Bilge summarized how those in favor of the law reacted the issue: for example, Fadela Amara, the president of NPNS, declared that the veil was the first and foremost instrument of oppression. Another organization, Les Chiennes de Garde, argued that the veil was solely a symbol of politics and religion. In their perspective, the veil was a way of demonizing women's bodies and sexuality, which camouflaged women and put them in chains. This pro-law lobby mixed Islamic culture, rituals, Shari'a law, forced marriage, the veil, and honour killing in order to describe the veil as oppressive to women. For instance, Safia Lebdi of the NPNS condemned anti-law groups for spreading anti-white and anti-French racism. Former Prime Minister Alain Juppé announced that *laïcité* must be defended – the next step, he said, might be separate train compartments for men and women, or reserve beaches for one sex. Paradoxically, being against a law expelling veiled students from public schools came to signify being against the integration of Muslims in French society. Bernard Stasi declared that those who were against the law were against the integration of Muslims. According to the pro-law lobby, the veil is a symbol of women's subordination which defines a collective representation of women (Bilge, 2008).

The French veil controversy conveys a collective representation of the veil as a symbol of women's subordination. Central to the making of the veil into a symbol of women's submission was the cognitive and perceptual distortion, conceptualized by Adrienne Rich (1979) as 'white solipsism,' that is, a burrow vision coming about from the propensity of Euro-American mainstream feminists to disregard the particularities of their (white, middle-class, hetero, able bodied) standpoint and to universalize their experience with their claim to represent and speak for all women (Bilge, 2008). This type of distortion is manifest in liberal feminist writings, for instance, in Okin's assertion that "the situation of poor women in poor countries is not qualitatively different from that of most women in rich countries but, rather, similar but worse" (Okin, 1994: 11). This reasoning is motivated by keeping the subject of feminist struggle, women, unified and the premise of common oppression unchallenged. Okin's claim that "one can argue that sexism is an identifiable form of oppression, many of whose effects are felt by women regardless of race or class, without at all subscribing to the view that race and class oppression are insignificant likewise needs to be unpacked, since the regardless of race or class discourse is tenable only for women whose lives are relatively privileged in terms of racial and class hierarchies."

The liability of multiculturalism for women's discourse is grounded on a particular subject – the immigrant woman victim of her culture – and as such it constructs women's subordination to men as integral to non-Western cultures (Volpp 2005: 40-1). Even if the universalist claims of Western feminism to speak for all women and present their interests, experiences and standpoints have successfully been challenged since the late 1970s, what has emerged from this challenge – that is, taking into account women's differences – has often ended up boxing Other women into what Mohanty calls tightly packaged discrete cultural units (1988). Hence, cultural reductionism and essentialism embedded in gender/culture antagonism interpret almost every significant aspect of the lives of minority women – and men – as determined by their culture. Such determinism relies on both an essentialist view of culture, seen as immutable and a historical sets of values, beliefs and practices, often coupled with the idea of the superiority of the Western civilization and a construction of minorities as devoid of any social agency. Hence, the interrelated processes of cultural reductionism, essentialism and negative stereotyping, along with the denial of minority agency constitute the building blocks of

the dominant discourse on minority women's victimization by their culture, which is itself part and parcel of the current delegitimization of multicultural citizenship as a viable component of the project of achieving equality and social justice.

4.2. CATEGORIZED INTERSECTIONAL DIMENSIONS IN FRANCE

How race, class and gender can be conceptualized by CSOs can be shown via three diagrams to understand the categories, the case study and which category its results relate to. The table was designed based on the discourse of the CSOs and their replies to the questions about intersectionality. That is why dimensions of intersectionality were the initial point of the table. The categorizations refers to how CSOs have explained and conceptualized intersectionality; how it leads to an attitude which excludes Muslim populations, especially Muslim migrant women; and lastly how the consequences of each exclusion manner are provided.

Tablo 6 - Categories of Intersectional Dimensions in France

Dimensions of Intersectionality	Conceptualized term: religion (Islam)	Exclusion manner	The consequences
Race	As otherization of Muslim culture	Racialization of Islam	French Islam Islamophobia
Gender	As male domination	Emancipation of Muslim migrant Women	Universalist attitude (universal women's rights). Visibility of Muslim women in the public sphere
Class	Religion (migrant suburbs)	Integration of Muslim migrants	Multiculturalism and communitarianism Values of French citizenship

In France, there are ways of characterizing religious difference under each of the three quintessential dimensions of intersectionality (race, class, and gender). For each dimension, religion refers to the enlarged meaning of an issue. Therefore, race refers to religion as the otherization of Muslim culture; gender refers religion as the male domination of Islam on Muslim women; class refers to religion as a migrant suburban conservative lifestyle.

Additionally, religion is used as a conceptualized term to build an exclusive attitude into each dimension (race, class, and gender). The racialization of Islam attitude excludes Muslims through the otherization of Muslim culture for race; the emancipation of Muslim women excludes Muslims through talking about male domination for gender; and the integration of Muslim migrants excludes Muslims by considering them merely a migrant suburban conservative lifestyle for class.

Thirdly, as the consequence of the exclusive attitudes of each dimension to religious difference, the racialization of Islam leads to the discussion of Islamophobia and French Islam; the emancipation of Muslim migrant Women leads to the discussion of universalist attitudes (via universal women's rights) and the visibility of Muslim women in the public sphere; and the integration of Muslim migrants leads to the discussion of multiculturalism, communitarianism and the values of French citizenship.

According to Lepinard, the problem of the second wave of feminists in Europe is their distance from any religion (Lepinard, 2014). In the 2000s, with discussions of multiple discrimination issues, religion has become a particular feature of debate, especially in the case of France. Second wave feminists' religion-blindness became an attitude that ignored any religious conviction in the same way as race-blindness (Goldberg, 2014). But intersectionality emphasizes that the exclusion of a particular group identity represents a sort of discrimination. Taking into account *laïcité* which is a very authentic value of French republic, they say that the exclusion of religion from any public service is needed for the protection of democracy and French values. For that reason, for the good of the republic, religion needs to be off the table, according to many second-wave feminists.

While interviewing some CSOs, the very particular discourse was “Laïcité permits each person/individual to become emancipated (se emanciper) from their group belonging.” which is a crucial matter of modernity in Europe and the first principle of becoming a French citizen. That is why primary and secondary school are seen as the first stage of subjectification of reason as an individual. Also, some CSOs which emphasized that they were *laïc* (secular) and stated “Laïcité is the protector of French democracy and French values” or “Laïcité is the shield of democracy” which comes from a citation of Caroline Fourest’s book called “*Le Génie de la Laïcité*”. A well-known radical secular writer, Caroline Fourest writes that “Laïcité is not a gladiator’s sword, but a shield”. This is related to the gender dimension, White women attempt to use it to rescue Muslim-origin migrant women from male domination. Even if asked the question about freedom of conscience or freedom of religion, the common reply of a particular group of feminists is “Islamic culture is patriarchal”, “There is no sexual freedom for Muslim women”, or “The headscarf is a tool for the Islamic patriarchy to oppress Muslim women.” The mentality behind this perspective is that if a person is autonomous then that means there is no need to belong to any community. Since European modernity has the attitude of manifesting Islam as a religious community against European individuals separated from Christianity by laïcité, the Muslim population needs to be rescued by laïcité to similarly become emancipated and autonomous individuals. These particular groups of CSOs advocating women’s rights have aimed to save Muslim migrant women from Islamist patriarchy. The motivation behind its universalist attitude derives from the otherization of Muslim culture, those who have declared that “we are aware of the differentiations in Muslim community and not all of the Muslims are Islamist and terrorist, but in the case of women’s rights, Islam is a source of oppression.” Hence, this discourse leads to an exclusive attitude which is the racialization of Islam and its consequence is the modification of Islam as French Islam or an enlarged version of Euro-Islam³²

³² For the further information, Madood, Tariq . (2013) “*Multiculturalism*”. Polity Press: UK

4.3. CONCEPTUALIZED CSOs' DISCOURSES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF INTERSECTIONAL ISSUES

This part will be quoted by the interview, their discourses and their self-definition through the intersectional arguments above. Also, what they have explicitly and implicitly stated will be explained through their own discourse. On the first table it indicates what CSOs say when I asked what they think about intersectionality and if they agree with the concept or not. That is why, when they say yes, no or maybe (not), it means they accept, reject or abstain from commenting on the term. During the interviews each term was explained as defined in this thesis via the related cases. Through those explanations, CSOs proclaimed their point of view and why they reject, accept or abstain from commenting. If there is a blank, that means they said nothing and they are not interested in the term and its consequences.

Then after the fieldwork, and the interviews being categorized under the first table, the second table was created by myself via the literature of intersectional issues and an autoethnographic analysis of the interviews. The second table consists the intersectional expressions and intersectional terms of the first table. The categorization of the second is same as the first. Yes, no, and maybe (not) are the replies for each CSO; when there is blank, that means they had no comment or any attempt to say something about the issue. The numbers near the CSOs refer to which category the CSO is in.

Here is each term from the first table and its matched expression from the second table explained with the discourses of selected CSOs:

The first expression that is formulated from the questions and cases is: **the politicization of Islam** which is related to the expression **political Islam is the threat of Islamists** from the second table. When the CSOs representative means is that the headscarf and Islam are tools for the radical Islamists (they call them “fundamentalists”), when they say yes to the politicization of Islam this means the headscarf is NOT a piece of cloth, it is something symbolic and political. Laure Caille from *Libres Mariannes* told: “I agree with Elisabeth Badinter. There is a ideological contradiction. If it is just a piece of tissue, why that is essential to live their religion. It is political Islam who creates this.” (8 November 2017, Paris) *Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le*

Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d' Aubervilliers, Libres Mariannes, Réseau Feministe Rupture, Collectif de Femmes Contre Intégrisme, AMEL, Femmes Solidaire all declared in their own terms that:

The headscarf is an instrument of Salafists who wants to oppress Muslim women. In France we can not allow this kind of male domination even if they say 'our culture, our rituals'. Firstly, due to male domination over Muslim migrant women, secondly veiling has become an object to politicize Islam in France and divide French society. (2017, Paris)

On the other side, the same group said: "Yes, the politicization of Islam is a threat, but there are some groups who are responsible for these terrorist actions, we can not blame all of them". *Collectif de Femmes Contre Intégrisme* declared: "We have no problem with a woman wearing headscarf on the street, we are against the integrists who use religion as a weapon." (9 December 2017, Paris). The politicization of Islam and its consequences were carried out by Islamists, they said: "our fight is not against Islam or any religion; we are against the mentality which abuse Islam as a tool for politicization in the territories of France". After that reply I asked again if it were the Islamists who are blamed, what was the situation of Muslim women in their own community; the discourse of the "politicization group" replied: "It is subjectification of women's bodies as an instrument of Islamists in French society "(2017, Paris).

Their discourse refers to the second expression which is the **subjectification of women's bodies**. And it refers to **veiled women becoming an instrument for the Islamists to manipulate French society**. This means that women's bodies are being used as a tool by men and not emancipated. For instance, *Chiennes des Garde* says: "she is used as a subject to express some other meanings. Prostitution is another type of subjectification. The women body becomes a meta" (6 November 2017, Paris).

Monique Dental from *Réseau Feministe Rupture* added:

It is like how it needs to work for prostitution; the client needs to be refrained to change the mechanism of prostitution, not the prostitute. Those are the Islamists need to be punished for that systematic, not the Muslim migrant women. On the other hand, France is abolitionist which means if there is a commodification of women body; it is against women's emancipation. (25 December 2017, Paris)

Additionally, when it was asked if a Muslim woman might want to wear a headscarf by her own choice, the answer to my question by especially the *laïc CSOs (Ligue de Droit International des Femmes, CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des*

Femmes, Regards de Femme, Initiative Feministe-EUROMED, COMEPROD, Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d' Aubervilliers, Libres Mariannes, Réseau Feministe Rupture, Collectif de Femmes Contre Intégrisme, AMEL, Femmes Solidaire, CFCV, Reussire l'Egalité, les Dorines, and Voix d'Elle Rebelle), is:

That kind of manner is not something to be chosen, it is not possible, even if those Muslim women affirm that wearing a headscarf is their choice and under their consent; it is not, because consent seems like capitalist consumption, there are different variables to orient it. Consent is easy to be guided. (Paris 2017).

However, Lea Delmas, the president of *Féminicité*, declared:

What those white feminists do is racism, it feeds discrimination, I am not Muslim and I do not know whether veiling is obligatory or not in Islam but I do believe if they wear a headscarf, we can not exclude them from the our society just as long as it is their identity. For our organization we do respect religion or any other dimension as an identity issue. (16 December 2017, Paris).

The president of *La Barbe* states:

Just because of a division over the headscarf and Muslim migrant girls among CSOs advocating women's rights, our organization has no comment and no action on this issue. (27 November 2017, Paris).

As a reply of those racism arguments, Monique Dental from *Réseau Feministe Rupture* claims: "It is not racism, it is definitely sexism because it is inferiorization of women." (25 December 2017, Paris).

The issue of the subjectification of Muslim girls by Islamists is also discussed as **an exclusion or emancipation of Muslim girls and freedom of conscience (consent)**. Both positions are related to the prohibition of the headscarf and the expression is **the prohibition of the veil means the emancipation of Muslim women**. Lea Delmas (president of *Féminicité*), said: "This is not only racism from other women, but also racism by the state. We can live with our differences together. There is no need any prohibition as a law by the state" (16 December 2017, Paris). According to the *Ligue Française Des Femmes Musulmanes and Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée*: "Prohibition has excluded us from French society and schools" and the president of *Ligue Française Des Femmes Musulmanes* has declared: "Wearing the headscarf is our choice, there is

no patriarchal oppression on us in Islamic rituals. We all are emancipated and free to choose, the only thing that prevents/excludes us is the prohibition law” (11 November 2017, Lille) but on the other side some CSOs (*Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, *AMEL*, *Femmes Solidaire*, *CFCV*, *Reussire l'Egalité*, *Les Dorines*, and *Voix d'Elle Rebelle*) and feminists say:

It is the opposite of exclusion, this “prohibition” is to force those families to send their daughters to school without a veil or any headscarf, so this prohibition gives an opportunity to girls whose families are conservative. Also, even if it says prohibition, it is an attempt to improve the individuality of Muslim girls by themselves. (2017, Paris)

From Les Dorines Serenade Chafik claimed: “The veil is not emancipator, it is the tyrannie of Islam. It is the project (emancipation) against the project (conservatisation)” (5 December 2017). Michele Vianes from *Regards de Femme* announced: “The veil causes any women or men to lose the dignity of their body, yet we can accept the prohibition. We are the one who suggested the prohibition at the first place.” (18 December 2017, Paris). Laura Caille from *Libres Mariannes* added: “We can not give permission at primary school. It starts with “headscarf and ends up with chador or full veil.” (8 November 2017, Paris). The president of *Reseau Feministe Rupture* underlined: “ Our aim is to build the new generations. And schools are the place where the young generations would be transformed by French values, that is why one of the the main pillar, which is laïcité, needs to be seeded and cultivated.” (25 December 2017, Paris) Freedom of conscience is also related to the same logic as mentioned above. Those Muslim-origin women argue that is by their choice, no-one forces them to wear the veil. However the same group in favor of prohibition (*Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, *AMEL*, *Femmes Solidaire*, and *CFCV*) claim: “conscience

and consent might be very relative and manipulative”. As mentioned before, in the example of capitalism, consumption and manipulating consent; they said:

“For veiled women, the oppression of their community, neighborhood or peer groups might affect their choice. However, the principles of becoming a French citizen need to have the liberty of being individual; and only basic education gives that, even if it is a prohibition, it provides neutrality and equality.”(2017, Paris)

Parallel to the emancipation issue, the expression is **Universal Women’s Rights** and the related sentence is **universalism is essential for women’s rights**. It derives from the universalist attitude of French exceptionalism. There are universal claims and the emancipation of women is one of them, especially for CSOs who say yes to those two, meaning that all women need to be detached from any religion. This is particularly a claim from the second wave’s perspective (Lepinard, 2014). The reason why it is universal is because no cultural relativist attitudes are considered. However, as has been explained before, the third wave has identified itself with diversity of religion, race, class, and gender. Ignoring them means ignoring the discrimination that comes with those identities. So, the universalist attitude does not diminish the differences or does not find a common ground, it hides the differences. But when I asked the group who define themselves as universalist how they define universalist women rights and their universalist attitude. They (*Ligue de Droit International des Femmes, CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes, Regards de Femme, Initiative Feministe-EUROMED, COMEPROD, Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d’Aubervilliers, Libres Mariannes, Réseau Feministe Rupture, Collectif de Femmes Contre Intégrisme, AMEL, Femmes Solidaire, and CFCV*) proclaimed :

Universalist women’s rights are for all women, all around the world. It does not matter about any cultural relativism – female genital mutilation or forced marriage, sexual violence or any violence against women can not be accepted in any country or in France. The universalist attitude contains all women all around the world, it is de facto preventing women from male domination. (2017, Paris)

For instance, Laure Caille from *Libres Mariannes* said: “I have no problem with the identity of Islam, but the way it implements is problematic because it is sexist and it is

against universal women's rights." (8 November 2017, Paris) *Reseau Feminist Rupture* states: "as universalist women's rights, the principles of second wave feminism need to emancipate from male oppression; any area of domination is unacceptable. As second wavists, it is our fight." (25 December 2017, Paris). The emancipation issue is related to the universalist women's rights, according to Lepinard on behalf of second wave feminism's principles such as detachment from any religion (Lepinard, 2014) the situation of Muslim migrant women activates the universalist attitude of those organization. Besides those, there are some, for instance, *Federation National GAMS* and *CVCF* (The Collective of Violence Against Women) who underline that "culture is a powerful element of any society; we try to understand it. But of course it does not mean accepting female genital mutilation or other THPs (traditional harmful practices)." (26 December 2017, Paris)

Laïcité is the fourth expression and its attached sentence is "**laïcité means protecting women against Islam**". It is very essential because it is the most important pillar of French values. When it is asked what the essential values of French republic are, the answer is mostly liberty, equality, fraternity, laïcité, and democracy. Monique Dental from *Reseau Feminist Rupture* pointed out : "Religions are against democracy and laïcité because democracy and laïcité are important for the women's rights." (25 Deecember 2017, Paris) The role of laïcité is seen as follows, "As a value of the French republic, laïcité protects French citizens from the oppression of religion; because laïcité builds a route to emancipating from religion," as *Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, *AMEL*, *Femmes Solidaire*, *Reussire l'Egalité*, *Eller*, *Elele*, *Les Dorines*, *Egalé-Egalite Laïcite Europe*, *Pour Elle Revienne* said. How laïcité can protect those Muslim girls against Islam starts with primary and secondary schools. The president of *Regards de Femmes* Michele Vianes explained:

Since public schools are part of the process to becoming a French citizen which means educating girls and boys to be autonomous individuals, they need to be detached from any community identities, and so from religions. Therefore, laïcité irrevocably needs to be there to create a neutral area, even by forbidding something. Laïcité is to permit each individual emancipating from his/her group's belonging. (18 December 2017, Paris).

Hence, when *laïcité* was considered, for some organizations (*Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, *AMEL*, *Femmes Solidaire*, *Reussire l'Egalité*, *Eller*, *Elele*, *Egalé-Egalite Laïcité Europe*, and *Pour Elle Revienne*) stated:

It is an irrevocable condition for the public service, in other words, ostensible religious signs need to be prohibited at primary and secondary school to build up solid French citizenship. Even if it is a prohibition, it is a need to protect French culture and society as always. (2017, Paris)

As seen, the role of *laïcité* for the French republic and citizenship is seen as a guardian angel for Muslim girls by those *laïc* CSOs. However, the president of *Ligue Française des Femmes Musulmanes* stated: “*Laïc* women groups see *laïcité* like a religion. They do not question it, just obey what it says.” (11 November 2017, Lille).

Islamophobia is the fifth expression which has a pejorative meaning for the secular CSOs. It is related to the expression from the second table which is “**Islamophobia does not exist**” Those CSOs claim: “There is no fear of Islam because it is not something threatening.” (2017, Paris) Laure Caille from *Libres Mariannes* said: “Islamophobia is something imaginary/ inventory”. (8 November 2017, Paris) On the other side, the other group says: “Just like xenophobia, islamophobia is a fact” (2017, Paris). *Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, *AMEL*, *Femmes Solidaire*, *CFCV*, *Reussire l'Egalité*, *Place aux Femmes*, *Eller*, *Elele*, *Les Dorines*, *Egalé-Egalite Laïcité Europe*, and *Pour Elle Revienne* state: “Islamophobia is the invention of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran which was to blame non-Muslim communities to create an enemy of Islam” (2017, Paris). They did not accept any *phobia* and gave the same example, such as that after the attacks of Charlie Hebdo or Bataclan, they did not blame all the Muslim population, but solely terrorists. When it is asked what the parameters for understanding who is a terrorist were, the reply came: “those ones who

did not accept French values and did not integrate into French society”. Even if they do not say or point out anything to blame the Muslim migrants in France but say: “they do not accept French values”, this expression takes in a very large spectrum, because a Muslim woman who wants to wear her veil to go to school is against one of the French values, which is *laïcité*. This topic is also related to integration and multiple forms of discrimination. On the other side of this Islamophobia issue, *Ligue Française Des Femmes Musulmanes and Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée* stated: “Islamophobia exists in France. It is a kind of xenophobia but through Islam” (2017, Paris). This attitude was very defensive and seeing itself as the other. Both sides othered the other by their discourse. In addition to these two sides, there were moderates who said “it might not be as extreme as xenophobia but there is a sense of fear in the air and it affects both sides”. *La Barbe, Voix de Rebelle, and Voix des Femmes* described the Islamophobia issue in this bilateral case.

French Islam is another one which was very popular after the presidency of Sarkozy, especially Tariq Ramadan and his speeches are the main topic of arguments. Some CSOs agree with the combination of French values and Islam but some say that is not compatible. **French Islam is Islamist** is the expression from the second table. *Ligue de Droit International des Femmes, CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes, Regards de Femme, Initiative Feministe-EUROMED, COMEPROD, Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d’Aubervilliers, Libres Mariannes, Réseau Feministe Rupture, Collectif de Femmes Contre Intégrisme, AMEL, and Femmes Solidaire* said : “Islam is not compatible with the republic and French Islam is something of an oxymoron.” Laure Caille from *Libres Mariannes* said: “French Islam excludes Muslim people”. (8 November 2017, Paris) But on the other side, *Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée* points out: “French Islam is already implemented in France, the adoption of Islam in French society has shown itself through the practices of Islamic rituals.” (12 November 2017, Paris). Hanane Karimi, spokesperson of *Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée* (The Women in the Mosque) described their organization’s aim as providing the feminist movement within Islam in France. The president of *Les Dorines*, Serenade Chafik, said:

“French Islam is a way to hide the aims of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. Under the name of French Islam, it is the Islam of Salafist groups whose branches have reached France. The only way to protect those Muslim

girls is to describe them one by one, using the same weapons as those groups. Even if it is one by one, it is at least something". (5 December 2017, Paris).

Madame Chafik was dedicated to educating those Muslim girls in the *20th arrondissement* in Paris. She defends *laïcité* as necessary and the protector of Muslim girls, but she has a different attitude accompanying this. She criticized:

Some of the organizations advocating women rights are so closed to understanding this very fragile issue. Their methods might be attitudes of exclusion. The aim should be inclusion of those girls, not to lose them or push them into the hands of Islamists. (5 December 2017, Paris)

Multiculturalism and communitarianism whose expression is that **multiculturalism and communitarianism means isolation** are very sensitive topics in France; as with **intersectionality**, these “imported” concepts from US are mostly seen as “suspicious” by CSOs. Either they are comfortable with these ideas or they are against them. Those who argue that multiculturalism and communitarianism cannot be acceptable say that “the idea of communitarianism is an attempt to divide the united French society. Also, they are opposed to the idea of integration”. They claim: “multiculturalism creates separated cultures in the same society or communitarianism has tendency to built up communities and deconstruct the united French state.” They do not accept the idea of intersectionality which defines multiple jeopardy and multiple discrimination. This group includes *Ligue de Droit International des Femmes*, *CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes*, *Regards de Femme*, *Initiative Feministe-EUROMED*, *COMEPROD*, *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d’Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, *AMEL*, and *Femmes Solidaire*. Those who are against the intersectional analysis do not accept there is racial discrimination in France. As an example of race blindness, that group does not see (accept) any racial differences. That is why the racial dimension of intersectionality has disappeared for them. *Regards de Femmes*, *Libres Mariannes*, and *Ligue de Droits International de Femme* claim:

There is no racial discrimination in France because there is no racial differentiation. So, there is no racial dimension of intersectionality; gender equality is what we fight for, referring to the emancipation of Muslim

women, and lastly there is the class discrimination which would disappear after Muslim migrants' families are integrated into French society. (2017, Paris)

Becoming a citizen of France for Muslim migrants is related to issues of **integration** and **multiple discrimination** through French values. For the migrant origin generations, integration is quite important for the construction of a comprehensive French Society. The expression in the second table is “**French citizenship integrates French values among Muslim migrants**”. Public schools and public service are the most crucial institutions for teaching new generations the particular pillars of French society. That is why at public schools, any religious symbols are prohibited because laïcité is one of the most important French values and carrying religious symbols might be a bad influence on new generations. As mentioned before, the religion-blind often take that approach. On the other side, some are against and if French values are inclusive, they need to accept anyone with their differences. However there are some who say that is not compatible with the idea of integration. *Féminicité* is an organization which is aware of intersectionality as their founding principle. Lea Delmas, its president, explains:

Today what is happening between women's groups is a parameter of multiple discrimination. There is a white feminist group who defends French republican values and laïcité with a racist attitude and this manner causes discrimination which comes from women, white-French and upper-class; so it becomes a multiple form. (16 December 2017, Paris).

Men and women (gender) equalities which refers to the idea that “**the equality of men and women is very crucial.**” Regarding the second wave, besides social and economic equality, men and women need to be provided with equal opportunity. Hence, “if the veil is an obstacle for the Muslim girls to go to school which is a right to an education for both boys and girls, that means there need to be a regulation to “protect” those girls and make them equal to Muslim boys and the other boys and girls.” On the other side there are some that say “the prohibition is the reason for veiled Muslims not going to school and having the equal opportunity to get a job and education. And this situation causes the other social inequalities either between women and men or among women”. Madame Vianes, the president of *Regards de Femmes*, affirmed:

“Gender equality is our must. In Islam the role of women in the society is undermined by male oppression, that is why our organization has criticized it. It cannot create exclusion, on the contrary it creates equality and balance between women and men.” (26 December 2017, Paris).

When I asked “there are some new generation feminists who support a diversity of women groups, what do you think about them?”, she added “They are not aware of what we have been through in the ‘60s and ‘70s; they do not know our, their feminist history.” (26 December 2017, Paris). Laure Caille from *Libres Mariannes* said:

The new generations who support intersectionality and freedom of religion are coming from rich *quartier* (suburbs), they donot know Aubervillier and its people’s situation. The law protects poors; without the law rich becomes stronger. (8 November 2017, Paris)

The volunteer at *Coordination Lesbienne* said: “The principles of second wave feminism matters which are basically first of all the sexual revolution and the equality of women and men” (17 November 2017, Paris). Another expression is “**Islam is the patriarchal oppression of all veiled Muslim women,**” *Voix d’Elles Rebelle* states:

It is an economic issue of the suburbs where Muslim girls need to get married earlier. Before they get married, they were coming to our organization and they were unveiled, but economic difficulties forced them to get married and after that they had to be veiled on the orders of their husbands and his family. (12 December 2017, Paris).

Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d’Aubervilliers underlined the particular problems of Aubervilliers where the migrant population is extremely large. She explained:

Islamists use the economic difficulties of young generations and their integration problems with the wealthy population of France. These difficulties would be economic, social or mostly cultural. (6 November 2017, Paris).

Madame Benmissi and Madame Ould Kaci added:

The seeds of hate and grudges are planted by Islamists against French people and well-integrated Muslim migrants through fueling the economical cleavage between rich and poor. There are Islamists who we need to fight against in the suburbs. (6 November 2017, Paris).

This discourse brought us to the expression which is **Banlieues are Muslim communities, and localization prevents their integration into French society**. Some part of this expression is true. In France most of the Muslim population live in the suburbs of big cities (especially in Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Lille), In Paris, there are some “*arrondissements*” populated by the Magrebian population, Turks or Africans, so the first group of CSOs generalized them as communities of Muslim population even if those migrants had made small neighborhoods of many different origins. *Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d’Aubervilliers*, *Libres Mariannes*, *Reseau Feministe Rupture*, *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme*, and *Femmes Solidaire* all stated:

As communitarism, those Muslim communities resist integration, their culture of Islam is separating them from French society and it makes the integration of Muslims impossible. (2017, Paris)

On the other side there is the *Brigade des Meres*, which is an organization that works for mothers whose children have left to join the Islamic State in Syria from the suburb. Nadia Remadna, the president of the *Brigade des Meres*, declared: “we need to find a middle way between the suburbs and rich neighborhoods, the migrant families do not even know what the *Quartier Saint Michéle* looks like.” (6 November 2017, Paris).

This attitude is also the result of Islam being seen as a holistic culture or doctrine of rituals. This reductionist attitude can be matched with the expression **they all belong to the same Muslim culture**. As mentioned before, even if they keep an epistemic distance between terrorists and the Muslim population in France, they see Turkish, Magrebian and African Muslim populations as all being part of the same Muslim culture. Seeing Islam as a culture is also a problematic within this issue. This generalization puts all migrants coming from Muslim countries into the same basket in which the archaic Muslim culture is held. Some do not know or realise the differences between each migrant group and their attitudes towards the women in their group. For example, it would be understandable from some generalized expressions by the volunteer for *Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme* (The Collective of Women Against Fundamentalists), who said: “Muslim rituals and some cultural behaviors are archaic in France.” (9 December 2017, Paris).

Regarding those expressions and cases in France, the concept of intersectionality is essential to understand what it consists of, because this essentialism is embedded into

the inner dynamics of French society, history and culture. At the intersectional point of the term intersectionality is basically *laïcité*. Related to *laïcité*, the principles of second wave feminism has a very strong voice, especially in the CSOs who are advocating women's rights, where this is very controversial issue as mentioned before (Lepinard, 2014). French exceptionalism claims *laïcité* is a principal pillar of the French Republic. The analyses of this field work shows that the consciousness of belonging to a nation is one problematic peculiar to second wave feminists; the issue of public schools is not the main reason; rather, it is the taking on of the task of nation-building and the integration of migrants. Through their historical claims, second-wave feminism takes Islam as an issue relating to terrorist attacks; they do not blame Muslims overtly, but they declare Islamists their enemy. Additionally, according to second-wave feminists, universities are not that much cause for controversy because the law on the prohibition of the veil is intended for struggling for integration and fully entering into the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. The seeds of becoming a good French citizen should be planted at primary and secondary school, which is why public schools are seen as fortresses of *laïcité*. These feminists also organize an event that is called "a day without headscarves" which is quite a defensive and hostile action to demonstrate their position. Third wave and post-feminist groups have criticised this action, but second-wave feminists have argued that is not an action but a reaction against a "hijab day" started by veiled women.

On these two tables, the explanation of the expressions and the terms are shown under which CSOs affirm, reject or abstain from commenting about them. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the terms and expressions are related to each other. So are those of the second table. Consequently, regarding the aim of this thesis, the CSOs who replied to my questions by reflecting their perspective on intersectionality have been categorized into five groups³³:

- (1) The first groups consists of *laïc* white feminist universalist groups of CSOs who agree with the veil prohibition for the sake of emancipating Muslim women

³³ As mentioned at the methodology chapter, The origins and the changing the mission of CSOs are not the focus of this thesis. This thesis only concerns about the CSOs that are currently functional in the French context. Hence this explanation needs to be taken into consideration while evaluating the categorizations here as well.

because Muslim girls are under the effect of Islamists which represent male domination/patriarchy. This group do not think there is Islamophobia in France. They say that intersectionality, multiculturalism and communitarianism are the ways to divide united France. Additionally, this first group called the *white feminists* consists of members who emphasize the values of second wave feminism and the diminishing role of religion (it was Christianity before and Islam now). These are the reasons why they pursue a complete exclusionary attitude towards the headscarf in public service.

These CSOs are; *Ligue de Droit International des Femmes, CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes, Regards de Femme, Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d' Aubervilliers, Initiative Feministe-EUROMED, COMEPROD, Egalé-Egalite Laïcité Europe, Reussir l'Egalité, Libres Mariannes, Reseau Feministe Rupture, Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme, AMEL, Femmes Solidaire, CFCV, Women in War, FEMAID, Elele, Eller, Les Chiennes de Garde, Coordination Lesbienne France, Eller, APEL-Egalité*

- (2) The second group consists of those who are close to the first laïc group but have no effective action or discourse over the issue. They abstained from most of the questions. But when they replied, they adopted a universalist attitude even if they were CSOs advocating over the problems of migrant women.

These CSOs are; *Libres Terres des Femmes, Femme de la Terre, RAJFIRE, Place aux Femmes*

- (3) The third group consists of those who are engaged in the field where Muslim migrant women are struggling. This group is more moderate and try to understand both sides of the issues. Also, it is eager to find a compromise among the women groups through “universal” claims of feminism and “French Values”.

The CSOs are *Voix d'Elle Rebel, Federation National GAMS, Voix des Femmes, Brigades des Meres, Les Dorines*

- (4) The fourth group is a group consisting of members who are attempting to understand diversity and eager to change the feminist perspective through

intersectionality. This group consists of **new generation civil society organizations**. That is why the understanding of changes in identity politics and feminist movement are important to be aware of.

The CSOs are *La Barbe, Feminicité, Pour Elle Revienne*

- (5) The fifth group is a group consisting of members who believe that immigrants' claims to diversity should be fully acknowledged. Muslim migrant women, in their view, do not need an emancipator to save them from any community or oppressive Islam.

The CSOs are *Ligue des Femmes Françaises Musulmanes, Les Femmes dans la Mosquee*.

It has been seen here that the group engaged directly in the field (categorized as group 3) through helping the girls from the suburbs, are more tolerant than the other group (group 1). They say that when they are in the field, they see the issues and problems of class and how economic problems might affect those girls' choices. As explained above, the CSOs *Les Dorines, Voix d'Elle Rebel, and Voix des Femmes* say: "there might not be just one reason to have a religion. It is the French state, their own communities and their culture, economic conditions... etc."

Table 7 - Conceptualized CSOs Discourses

	Politicization of Islam	Subjectification of Women's Bodies	Universal Women's Rights	Laïcité (as French Value)	Islamophobia	French Islam	Multiculturalism and Communitarianism	Exclusion or Emancipation of Muslim Girls	Integration	Intersectionality	Equality between Men and Women (Gender Equality)	Multiple Forms of Discrimination
<i>Ligue de Droit International des Femmes (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>Regards de Femme (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>Les Chiennes de Garde (1)</i>		Yes *										
<i>Initiative Feministe-EUROMED (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Very Important	Yes	Important	No

Table 7 - Continued

	Politicization of Islam	Subjectification of Women's Bodies	Universal Women's Rights	Laïcité (as French Value)	Islamophobia	French Islam	Multiculturalism and Communitarianism	Exclusion or Emancipation of Muslim Girls	Integration	Intersectionality	Equality between Men and Women (Gender Equality)	Multiple Forms of Discrimination
<i>COMEPROD (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>Coordination Lesbienne France (1)</i>	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	No		-	No	-	Yes	Definitely	Yes
<i>Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers (1)</i>	Yes		Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>Libres Mariannes (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>Reseau Feministe Rupture (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No

Table 7 - Continued

	Politicization of Islam	Subjectification of Women's Bodies	Universal Women's Rights	Laïcité (as French Value)	Islamophobia	French Islam	Multiculturalism and Communitarianism	Exclusion or Emancipation of Muslim Girls	Integration	Intersectionality	Equality between Men and Women (Gender Equality)	Multiple Forms of Discrimination
<i>Collectif de Femmes Contre Intégrisme (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>AMEL (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>Femmes Solidaire (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>CFCV (1)</i>		Yes	Yes But		No		Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	Yes
<i>Federation National GAMS (3)</i>		Yes	Yes But		At Some Point	Might Be	Might Be	Maybe	Important	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 7 - Continued

	Politicization of Islam	Subjectification of Women's Bodies	Universal Women's Rights	Laïcité (as French Value)	Islamophobia	French Islam	Multiculturalism and Communitarianism	Exclusion or Emancipation of Muslim Girls	Integration	Intersectionality	Equality between Men and Women (Gender Equality)	Multiple Forms of Discrimination
<i>Women in War (1)</i>	Yes		Yes	Yes	No	Might Be	Might Be	Maybe	Important But	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>FEMAID (1)</i>	Yes		Yes	Yes	No	Might Be	Might Be	Maybe	Important But	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Brigade Des Meres (3)</i>	Might Be		Yes But	Yes But	Yes	Yes	Might Be	Yes	Important But	Yes	Yes But	Yes
<i>Voix d'Elles Rebelles (3)</i>	Might Be	Yes	Yes But	Yes But	Might Be	Might Be	Might Be	Yes	Yes But	Yes	Yes But	Yes
<i>Reussire l'Egalité (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>RAJFIRE (2)</i>				Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes		No
<i>APEL-Egalité (1)</i>						Yes	No	No	Yes			

Table 7 - Continued

	Politicization of Islam	Subjectification of Women's Bodies	Universal Women's Rights	Laïcité (as French Value)	Islamophobia	French Islam	Multiculturalism and Communitarianism	Exclusion or Emancipation of Muslim Girls	Integration	Intersectionality	Equality between Men and Women (Gender Equality)	Multiple Forms of Discrimination
<i>Femme de la Terre (2)</i>						Yes	No	No	Yes			
<i>Place aux Femmes (2)</i>	Yes		Yes			Yes	No	No	Yes		Yes	
<i>Libres Terres des Femmes (2)</i>					No	No	No	No	Yes		Yes	
<i>Voix de Femmes(3)</i>	Might Not	Might Be	Yes But	Yes But	No	No	Yes But	No But	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Eller(1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Against	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<i>Elele (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Against	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<i>Les Dorines(3)</i>	Might Not	Might Be	Yes But	Yes	No	No	Against	No	Yes	Yes But	Yes	Yes But
<i>Egalé-Egalite Laïcité Europe (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Not Possible	Against	No	Important	Yes	Important	No
<i>La Barbe (4)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes But	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 7 - Continued

	Politicization of Islam	Subjectification of Women's Bodies	Universal Women's Rights	Laïcité (as French Value)	Islamophobia	French Islam	Multiculturalism and Communitarianism	Exclusion or Emancipation of Muslim Girls	Integration	Intersectionality	Equality between Men and Women (Gender Equality)	Multiple Forms of Discrimination
<i>Féminité (4)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes	Might Be	Yes	Yes	Yes But	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Pour Elle Revienne (4)</i>	No	No	Yes	Yes But	No But		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Important	Yes
<i>Ligue Française Des Femmes Musulmanes (5)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Important	Yes
<i>Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée (5)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Important	Yes

Table 8 - Categorized CSOs' Discourses within the scope of race, class and gender

	RACE Racialization of Religion				GENDER Emancipation of All Women						CLASS Integration Problems		
	Political Islam is the threat of Islamists	Reductionist attitude: They all belong to same Muslim culture	French Islam is Islamist	Islamophobia does not exist	Universalism is essential for women's rights	Islam patriarchally oppresses Muslim migrant women	Laïcité protects women against Islam	Veiled women became an instrument for the Islamists to manipulate French society	Prohibition of the veil means emasculation of Muslim women	Equality of men and women is crucial	French citizenship integrates French values among Muslim migrants	Multiculturalism/communitarianism are isolating	Banlieues are Muslim communities
<i>Ligue de Droit International des Femmes (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>CLEF Coordination Française du Lobby Européen des Femmes (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Regards de Femme(1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Le Collectif Femmes Sans Voile d'Aubervilliers (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Initiative Feministe-EUROMED(1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>COMEPROD (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Egalé-Egalite Laïcité Europe (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Reussir l'Egalité (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Libres Mariannes (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Reseau Feministe Rupture (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Collectif de Femmes Contre Integrisme(1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>AMEL (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Femmes Solidaire (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 8 - Continued

	RACE Racialization of Religion				GENDER Emancipation of All Women						CLASS Integration Problems		
	Political Islam is the threat of Islamists	Reductionist attitude: They all belong to same Muslim culture	French Islam is Islamist	Islamophobia does not exist	Universalism is essential for women's rights	Islam patriarchally oppresses Muslim migrant women	Laïcité protects women against Islam	Veiled women became an instrument for the Islamists to manipulate French society	Prohibition of the veil means emasculation of Muslim women	Equality of men and women is crucial	French citizenship integrates French values among Muslim migrants	Multiculturalism/communitarianism are isolating	Banlieues are Muslim communities
<i>Place aux Femmes (2)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>CFCV (1)</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Women in War (1)</i>	Yes	No	No	No	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>FEMAID (1)</i>	Yes	No	No	No	Yes		Yes		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Elele (1)</i>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Les Chiennes de Garde (1)</i>					Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes			
<i>Coordination Lesbienne France (1)</i>					Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes			
<i>Eller (1)</i>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<i>APEL-Egalité (1)</i>				yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes			
<i>Femme de la Terre (2)</i>			No	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
<i>RAJFIRE (2)</i>			No	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
<i>Libres Terres des Femmes (2)</i>	No	No	No	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
<i>Voix de Femmes (3)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes		Yes		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
<i>Les Dorines (3)</i>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes but	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Federation National GAMS (3)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes		Yes		No but	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Brigade des Meres (3)</i>	Yes	No	No	No	Yes		Yes		No but	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 8 - Continued

	RACE Racialization of Religion				GENDER Emancipation of All Women						CLASS Integration Problems		
	Political Islam is the threat of Islamists	Reductionist attitude: They all belong to same Muslim culture	French Islam is Islamist	Islamophobia does not exist	Universalism is essential for women's rights	Islam patriarchally oppresses Muslim migrant women	Laïcité protects women against Islam	Veiled women became an instrument for the Islamists to manipulate French society	Prohibition of the veil means emascipation of Muslim women	Equality of men and women is crucial	French citizenship integrates French values among Muslim migrants	Multiculturalism/communitarianism are isolating	Banlieues are Muslim communities
<i>Voix d'Elles Rebelles (3)</i>				Yes	Yes		Yes		No but	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>La Barbe (4)</i>					No		No		No	Yes			
<i>Féminité (4)</i>	No	No	No	No	No		No		No	Yes	No	No	No
<i>Pour Elle Revienne (4)</i>	No	No	No	No	Yes		Yes		No	Yes	Yes		
<i>Ligue Française Des Femmes Musulmanes (5)</i>	No	No	No	No	No		No		No	Yes	No	No	No
<i>Les Femmes Dans la Mosquée (5)</i>	No	No	No	No	No		No		No	Yes	No	No	No

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Over 30 years, gender equality has been institutionalized at the center of the global political agenda through the development of gender quotas and women's political agency through a series of state policies (Squires, 2007:1). The clearest expression of this adoption of gender equality is 'gender mainstreaming'. This is an approach that aims to institutionalize equality by embedding gender-sensitive norms into activities, roles, public policy, and political processes. Today the second wave of feminism and its particular term "gender mainstreaming" has been questioned by a new generation of feminism, made up of third-wave feminism and post feminist approaches. The third wave offers us a chance to rethink the connection between feminism and women's experience. Bacchi and Eveline (2005: 497), for instance, challenged what being mainstream defines as the magnification of the value of gender equality, which has been established as mainstream by the significant social impact of second wave feminism. Besides, third wave feminism bonds with moderate, 'post-feminist' claims that by encouraging a 'victim identity', feminism disempowers women and that women should refuse feminism in favor of embracing power by individual means. The third-wave feminists emerged at the stage where feminists had already become a voice of public dialogue, even if that voice represented a mainstream which reproduces the sexist and conservative status quo (Kinser, 2004: 135). Third-wave feminism occurs in tension with both post-feminism and second wave feminism, and it tends to handle this tension by struggling with the influence of both. Kavka explains that post-feminism shows that the time when feminists could say "we" is over (Kavka, 2001; x). That 'we' is credited in retrospect as an imagined issue whose very recognition highlights the transition into post-feminism due to the complications brought to the category of women by the recognition of women's differences and diversity along lines of ethnicity, race, class, and sexuality. Ethnocentric tendencies and white solipsism represented in many forms of second wave thought have been disputed, with prominence given to the study of interlocking, multiple, and direct oppressions, which initially challenge the assumption that a shared feminist policy could be founded upon the *claim of a common female*

oppression (Collins, 2000; hooks, 1981). This criticism not only showed a demonstrated a reformulation of the subject of feminism, however; it also drew attention to the ways in which feminism had attempted to perpetuate social inequality, in spite of its initial aim of addressing social injustices. With the switch from second-wave feminism to post-feminism came the idea of a more structured and more comprehensive feminism (Zack, 2005), and the concept of post-feminism basically refers to how feminist issues intersect with a number of approaches in terms of race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class (Braithwaite, 2002: 341). This post-feminist heterogeneity is connected to structured debates of feminism with cross-generational dynamics (Looser and Kaplan, 1997; Henry, 2004; Budgeon, 2001). Regarding the different generations, post-feminism declares that it is between the second wave and the rest. This point offered by the generational paradigm is the idea that younger women can advance a feminism which is connected with the second wave but is unattached to the identities of the younger women on their own terms. Post-feminism and third-wave feminism are mutually embedded. Third-wave feminists are understood in terms of generational differences as well. Additionally, for the younger generations of third-wave feminists, post-feminism presents the benefit of a more self-defined politics. It claims women's lives are individually-oriented through multiple social differences, as some concerns are shared with both the second wave feminists and new generations (Looser, 1997: 34). Hence, third wave feminism has responded to how feminism has manifested itself at specific times and places with different conceptual frameworks and practices (Shelby, 2015).

Today in feminist theory the difference between second wave and the rest arises on intersectionality. Each wave accepts the oppression or more than one oppression in the society. But intersectionality defends that multiple oppressions can not be ordered hierarchically (Anthias and Yuval-Davis; 1983). Especially among black feminists in the US and gender scholars in Europe the main criticism has been that the oppression categories had been layered in isolation (Yuval Davis, 2006; Davis, 2008). According to the black feminist Crenshaw, if we count the Big Three (race, class and gender) separately, the dimensions of discrimination might not be understood properly (Crenshaw, 1989).

Obviously the concept is quite different in France than the US version. The second wave of feminist principles are not paralleled with the favour of *laïcité* and its consequences on discrimination, emancipation and the oppression of religion. However, after the 2000s, the wave turns towards the “post”-feminist claims of new generations who might be counted in the third wave of feminism and are more tolerant of different groups of women’s perspective than second-wave feminists.

Based on the perspective of CSOs advocating women’s rights in France, we need to ask how far the concept can stretch by asking about the *problématique* in the case of Muslim migrant-origin women in France, because the issue of intersectionality is a new slogan to represent multiple forms of discrimination, and results in the question of whether the solidarity of sisterhood has been buried by intersectionality or if the revival of women’s solidarity is emerging through intersectionality. Some activists and academics are quite skeptical about the term. They claim the idea of intersectional situations in feminism would diminish the solidarity of “sisterhood”.

Hence, the aim of this thesis is to find out how the CSOs advocating women’s rights in France understand the concept. Though it is a complex and complicated concept. It can be employed as a useful “tool” to explicate the intersectional issues of race, gender and class in the specific French context. The French case constitutes French exceptionalism because it reveals us the unique contradiction between *laïcité*, integration policy and Muslim veiled migrant women in France. Additionally French exceptionalism reveals us how far intersectionality can be stretched out within the scope of feminist fragmentations, the role of *laïcité* France and tension between White feminists and muslim veiled migrant women.

To figure out the exceptional case of France, regarding the factors that frames the concept of intersectionality (such as *laïcité*, integration policy, racialization of Islam) reveals us an intersectional issue which is the situation of “muslim veiled migrant women”. The case of these women is related to gender, race, and class. As was explained in the analysis chapter, the racialization of religion, the domination of Muslim men over Muslim women, and Muslim communities’ problems with integration are intersected under the issue of veiled Muslim migrant women. Each group of CSOs has their own arguments and explanations of those women’s cases.

Regarding the contradiction between feminist groups (2nd- 3rd and the rest) about the concept of intersectionality, as an exceptional case of the concept in France has also controversial points in the area. Thus, there are women groups who discuss the term from different angles. Each group's argument is quite closely related to their experiences. Women's experiences, therefore, do change their points of view. Even in the second and the third wave of feminisms, there are nuances that are changed by the personal experiences of the women groups.

First of all, the first and very significant output of this thesis that there is a **generational gap** between third-wave and second-wave feminists through the understanding of the concept. Here, the main output of this thesis explicate within the scope of intersectional issue in France which is Muslim veiled migrant women's situation. The parameters are discussed across a large spectrum via the crucial principles of second- and third-wave feminism. Those two are intertwined because several branches of the women's movement have been formed which would be classified both under the second and third waves at the same time. But still there is a remarkable pinpoints that are quite differentiated.

Second wave feminists argue that the universal principles of women's rights needs to be protected and privileged. So some differentiated points of women experiences and needs can be ignored and hidden under the rug. Because the "sacred" women's rights such as emancipation of all women from male domination is not something to abolish or abandon.

For the second-wave feminists (who were categorized as first and second groups in data analysis), there needs to be a common ground which means universal rights to unite around. However, regarding the experiences of the new generations (who were categorized as fourth, and fifth groups in data analysis) the unity of diversities and patchwork designs are more acceptable than solid marble.

Regarding the french values, integration policy of migration, we might see the universalist attitude of second wave feminist because they argues that French values needs to be internalized by immigrants, this is the only way to include them to the society. Those women groups claim that due to the integration policy they defend in

France, those migrant women can be emancipated and become French. On the other side third wave feminists proclaim that the integration policy of France is discriminative and racist. They defend what the French state try to make as inclusion is called state racism.

Additionally, there is a contradiction between second and the third wave feminists in terms of feminist principles because “older” – which generally means second wave feminists – generations “accuse” young generations –which are third wave feminists- of ignorance of feminist history.”Older generations” defend how hard they obtained social and economic equality of women and men in 1960’s and 70’s.

This polarization between feminist groups in France now reveal a new polarization on intersectionality. As seen through data analysis of the different CSOs’ answers, the new generations are quite open to new terms such as intersectionality, and they accepted multiple discrimination as an important issue to solve.

Also, considering the data analysis, there are also some moderate sides (which is the third group in data analysis) but their activities are either close to the first group of CSOs or silent or trying to find a middle point between the groups. Hence we might count them as second wavist.

Secondly, as another output of the thesis that explained gap and the contradictions causes and also shapes CSOs positions depends on their tendancy of waves within the scope of race, gender, class. Considering the intersectional issue is the veiled Muslim migrant woman, here is the distribution of CSOs positions within scope of each dimensions.

i) Generational gap through gender dimension;

This is closely related to the subjectification of women’s bodies as well. That is why if intersectionality makes a problem of the headscarf ban, sexual independence is brought onto the table by second wave feminists, sexual independence is also another important pinpoint for second wave feminists which is related to subjectification of women.

And the headscarf does not represent religious freedom for them. It is the restriction of women’s bodies and it is not acceptable under the French flag. This point of view was

based on the discourses of group 1 and 2 who were defined themselves as laic, White feminist and universalist.

On the other side, some CSOs (categorized as group 4 and 5) think that is a choice and if there is freedom of choice it needs to be respected by everyone. As if religious choices are not seen as autonomous, this is not the problem of the person who made the choice but it is the problem whose force to change the other's choice.

The first and the second group claims that the Islamic patriarchy force muslim women to be veiled because it is a manner of male oppression. It is not acceptable or tolerable. All women need to be emancipated. As a contrary the fifth group consisting of members who believe that immigrants' claims to diversity should be fully acknowledged says that there is no need to emancipator or rescuer. The fourth group also defends that in this new era, we can not move forward with nationalist and universalist "western/eurocentric" attitude. France needs to be multicultural and it needs multicultural integration policy instead of this assimilationist policies. If we respect freedom of religion, we also need to be respectful to the choices of Muslim women.

ii) Generational gap through racial dimension;

Intersectionality has complex issues, in this thesis, it is admitted that in the case of France because of the background of feminist movements, it is more complicated than in the United States. When we consider that the analysis of the CSOs and how they explain race, class and gender relations through the issue of Islam, we also need to consider laïcité and its consequences in France. So, it goes back to the racism and discrimination. That is why the concept "intersectionality" has a different interpretation in France. It could be expressed as *French exceptionalism*. It is clear that intersectionality has its own French exceptions.

As Evans (2013) explains, different experiences have affected the perspectives of women's groups such as the white solipsism in terms of *laïcité* or democracy.

The first and the fourth group of CSOs argued that prohibition laws or state action is either necessary to protect the French society or to help migrants integrate or in ending state racism and discrimination.

Second wave Feminists agree with the prohibition and those kind of implications because they do defend the unity of French republican values and if there needs to be a restriction to continue the republic, it is acceptable. The perpetuity of French values is more important than the inclusion of migrants or the multicultural tenets. Because they believe that French values are more inclusive than all other multicultural or communitarianist policies. They also question new pattern of being diverse. In France the differentiated identity dimension is religion and second wave is quite skeptical about religion as an identity. Islam is seen as a tool for Islamists to treat France and its republican values.

The new generations are more eager to evaluate the diversity of society; even the differentiated identity dimension is religion. They have no problem with religious individual or atheist individuals. They are quite tolerant to those kind of diversities. Islam might be dangerous but as a scale of personal experiences they include Muslim women to their society and daily life.

There are some women groups who are kind of in the middle of two opposite sides and they know the French values and their importance for the second wavists and also understand the manner of this wavist and their claims of changing world and values. Hence their way of figure out a milieu between those two is to go to local areas or suburbs and try to understand the main reason of the conflicts. But this sort of attitude shows that the universalism and the tendency of second wave are their actual point of view. They just need to find more realistic reason to change the choices of Muslim women. They did not deny this manner.

iii) Generational gap through class dimension;

That “moderate” group of women focus on the economical issues of those Muslim women’s choices. They do believe that the exclusion of Muslim girls from public school and also the exclusion of Muslim women from French society with white solipsism.

As for the fifth group, they claimed that there was very profound discrimination against Muslim girls and women in France; some of the arguments they emphasized were the prohibition of headscarf at elementary and secondary school and discrimination against women during the employment process. The prohibition affects the life of those Muslim girls to integrate the society. If there is an oppression it is not only male oppression but the oppression of white feminists. They accuse the other groups of women of being racist and white feminists.

Consequently, considering the issues of solidarity and also fragmentation in feminist politics, it might be said that the case of France is burning out due to the debate. Intersectionality is a very trendy concept all around the world, but in each case it needs to be taken very seriously. It could be said that as a main stated principle, *laïcité* fuels debates about racism, gender discrimination, and class issues through different approaches. Academicians, intellectuals and philosophers all discussing the particular details of intersectionality from their own points of view. However, in the end, there is no common ground for negotiation or compromise. According to this thesis, there needs to be a common ground among feminists, and that needs to be based on solidarity between different groups rather than division over identities.

As an unveiled woman coming from a Muslim but secular country, I have seen both sides of the story in both my country and in France. The CSOs in France have fragmented into many pieces and each piece has criticized at least one other. However, for women's solidarity both the polarized sides and those in the middle ground need to sit at the same table and negotiate over the problems of different women's groups. The polarization or otherization of one another will not lead to any proper resolution.

To conclude, this thesis is limited because it just focuses on the French case and CSOs in France. For further studies, I suggest comparative studies of different country cases to reveal the concept in a larger spectrum. Additionally, In this thesis there were CSOs which advocate women's rights but for the further studies, my suggestion will be enlarging the scale of CSOs from women issues to sexual orientation might be efficient to make a larger analysis. Lastly, for the future prospects, the arguments and the analysis of this thesis might be inspiring for the other countries where similar problems have been occurred.

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ANNEX-1

Interview Questions

1. “Forbidding visible Islamic symbols in public sphere as an ostentatious religious sign in elementary school” would mean a major challenge (particularly) for some young girls. What is your stance on this? Do you consider that it would bring about the exclusion of these girls from society and a removal of their right to an education?
2. The Act of the October 11, 2010 prohibiting the concealing of the face in public space states that ‘no one shall, in any public space, wear clothing designed to conceal the face’. What was your position on this topic at the time? How do you define ‘public space’ (in relation to debates of “the veil”)? Where does it start and end?
3. Taking these debates into account, do you think that the ban on religious symbols excludes/discriminates women that wear it? Does it appear to emancipate women from religious oppression and “integrate” them into “French culture” and “French society”?
4. What do you think of [women] wearing any type of veil (Islamic or fundamentalist) at university? What is your opinion on this matter?
5. How do you consider freedom of conscience in relation to the debates on the wearing of the veil? Do you think Muslim women wearing veils are expressing their choice instead of men’s oppression?
6. What do you think of the second wave of feminism and its struggle with religion, particularly Islam considering identity politics from the 2000s onwards?
7. The French Republican Pact rests upon the values of liberty, equality and fraternity, which constitute the French Republic’s motto (Art. 2 of the 1958 French Constitution). Do you think that secularism (laïcité) is the fourth value of the French Republic? If yes, how?
8. What is the connection between republican universalism (if you think it exists) and “immigrant integration” in France? Do you think that integration politics are problematic in France in general? How do you define “French national

identity”? If we consider the expression of identity politics since the beginning of the 21st century would you say French national identity is changing?

9. What is your perspective on the ‘multiculturalism’ practiced in the UK and the United States? Could it exist in France? Do you think that the principle of “the indivisibility of the republic” goes against the idea of multiculturalism?
10. What is your viewpoint on the statement ‘Islamophobia is a new form of racism’?
11. What do you think about ‘French Islam’? Could it be implemented?
12. Have you ever heard of the word/concept of “intersectionality”? It is a concept explaining multiple forms of discrimination, what is your position on it?





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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Ph.D. DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT

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
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Tarih: 13/07/2018

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