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THE ROLE OF BEING A MINORITY IN THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN IN CIVIC
AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: MIGRANTS FROM TURKEY IN THE UK

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MIGRANTS FROM TURKEY IN THE UK

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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Meryem Ay Kesgin

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By Meryem Ay Kesgin

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ABSTRACT

**THE ROLE OF BEING A MINORITY IN THE COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN IN THE
CIVIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION:
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This study examines the civic and political integration of migrants from Turkey in the United Kingdom (UK), comparing the members of the majority group in the country-of-origin (Turkish and Sunni) with the ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Alevi) minority group members. It is argued that minority groups have more adaptability skills and in-group consciousness developed through uneven interaction with a majority group, and their collective experiences in their country-of-origin migrate with them to the country-of-residence. Therefore, they better adapt to the

civic and political life in the country-of-residence compared to migrants who were members of the majority group in the country-of-origin. This novel argument is tested through a new civic and political integration model using individual-level survey data and complemented by in-depth interviews with the migrant organization representative for a better understanding of the mechanism of the civic and political integration process.

The empirical findings provide mixed results: It confirms that (ethnic) minorities are more actively involved in politics than the majority. However, there is no difference between migrants with majority and minority backgrounds in terms of civic participation. Furthermore, migrants differ in their perceptions of belongingness to the country-of-residence's politics. While (ethnic) minorities feel belonged to the political system in the UK more than the majority, (ethnic) minorities believe that minorities are represented in the system. Religious minority status is also significant in the sense of representation; compared to the majority, more religious minorities feel that their community is represented in the system. The qualitative data suggests that the majority had a natural integration process through time, whereas, among the minority, the group consciousness that was already developed in the country-of-origin enabled collective learning and action, and higher adaptability allowed them to access different resources and networks, which eventually facilitate minorities to have higher civic and political integration than the migrants with a majority-origin.

Keywords: migrant integration, civic, political, minority, majority

ÖZET

KÖKEN ÜLKEDE AZINLIK OLMANIN MESKEN ÜLKEDE SİVİL VE SİYASİ ENTEGRASYONA ETKİSİ: BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK'TAKİ TÜRKİYE KÖKENLİ GÖÇMENLER

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Bu çalışma Birleşik Krallık'taki Türkiye kökenli göçmenler üzerinden çoğunluk (Türk ve Sünni) ile etnik (Kürt) ve dini (Alevi) azınlık kimliklerinin sivil ve siyasi entegrasyon sürecine etkisini incelemektedir. Çalışmada, azınlıkların çoğunluk ile asimetrik bir ilişkilerinin olduğu, bu sebeple de edindikleri tecrübeler ile kendilerinin hem grup bilincinin hem de uyum yeteneğinin geliştiği, bir başka ülkeye göçmen olarak gittiklerinde de bu bilinç ve uyum yeteneğinin mesken ülkedeki sivil ve siyasi entegrasyon süreçlerinde kolaylaştırıcı etkisi olduğu öne sürülmektedir. İlk defa bu çalışmada dile getirilen bu önerme yeni bir sivil ve siyasi entegrasyon modeli

kullanılarak bireysel düzeyde anket verisi ile test edilmiş, sivil ve siyaset entegrasyon sürecindeki mekanizmayı daha detaylı yorumlayabilmek için de göçmen dernek temsilcileri ile yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler de tartışmada tamamlayıcı rol oynamıştır.

Araştırmada karma bulgular öne çıkmaktadır: Anket sonuçları (etnik) azınlıkların siyasete daha aktif olarak katıldıklarını göstermekle birlikte, sivil katılım açısından azınlık ile çoğunluk arasında bir fark bulunmamaktadır. Ayrıca, azınlık ve çoğunluk kökenli göçmenlerin mesken ülkenin siyasetine aidiyet konusundaki algılarında farklılıklar bulunmaktadır: Azınlık mensubu göçmenler çoğunluk mensuplarına kıyasla Birleşik Krallık'taki siyasi sisteme daha ait hissederken çoğunluk Birleşik Krallık'taki tüm azınlık grupların yeteri ölçüde temsil edildiğini düşünmektedir. Temsiliyet konusunda dini azınlık olmak da belirleyici bir özelliktir; Çoğunluğa kıyasla azınlık mensupları kendi gruplarının sistemde temsil edildiği kanaatindedir. Nitel araştırma bulguları da çoğunluk kökenli göçmenlerin daha doğal bir entegrasyon süreci geçirdiklerini, azınlıklar arasında ise grup bilincinin toplu halde öğrenme ve hareket etmeyi kolaylaştırdığını, uyum yeteneğinin ise farklı kaynak ve bağlantılara erişim sağladığını, nihayetinde de azınlıkların çoğunluğa kıyasla sivil ve siyasi hayata daha fazla entegre olduklarını göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: göçmen entegrasyonu, sivil, siyasi, azınlık, çoğunluk

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In a world where more than 3.5 percent of the people are living in countries other than their birthplaces (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021), integration into the country-of-residence is a necessity for migrants to habituate to their new environment and live a decent life and for the country-of-residence to absorb tangible sizes of people into the society by maintaining social harmony.

Successful integration of migrants creates opportunities for the countries-of-residence. As migrants have their own unique experiences, their involvement in the issues within the country-of-residence has the potential of contributing to advancing the systems and structures in the country through new perspectives they bring. Studies already show that migrants contribute to the receiving countries' labor economy, intellectual landscape, and fine arts (Banting & Kymlicka, 2007; Hirshman, 2007; Mählick, 2013; OECD/ILO, 2018). Failed, insufficient, or incompatible policies often result in the alienation of the migrant-origin population within the country (Kymlicka, 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). The more and better migrant integration is understood, the easier it is managed, and the more capacities and resources are utilized more effectively.

Due to the potential it has of attracting policymakers and its convenience to study, most of the studies in the literature approach integration as a policy objective, measure the expected outcomes of the state intervention, and evaluate the success of these policies (Banting & Kymlicka, 2007; c et al., 2001; Desidero & Weinar, 2014; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Gabrielli, 2015; Oliver, 2016; Pasetti, 2015). These studies indicate that integration policies—ranging between assimilation and multiculturalism, the two being on two ends – by the state in the country-of-residence play significant roles in migrant adaptation to the country-of-residence (Goksel, 2018). The perspective that views integration as a two-way process between the migrants themselves and the state/society in the country-of-residence also benefits from the findings of the abovementioned studies where the state of the country-of-residence is an integration actor.

The literature that focuses on migrants as integration actors is more common in the American context. However, in that context migrants are viewed as the only actors (Child, 1943; Hsiao & Wittig, 2008; Lee, 2009; Sonntag, 2019). Furthermore, the large diaspora literature is concentrated on the distinctiveness of these communities rather than them becoming members of society (Brubaker, 2005; Bruneau, 2010; Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991). Newly emerging studies that examine migrants as integration actors with the approach that views integration as a two-way process have found that there are characteristics of migrants – often socio-demographic factors – that also determine their integration process (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014; OECD/European Union, 2019; Riley, Griffin, & Morey, 2010). Understanding migrant individuals' characteristics that influence their integration process in more detail is needed not only to fill the gap in the literature but also to help policymakers rightly determine the areas of intervention and build effective policies.

Some of the studies that aimed to fill this gap found that migrants from different countries have different integration levels that are affected by the state policies in the country-of-origin. If state-level factors from the country-of-origin – such as single citizenship policies, the presence of institutions for citizens abroad, policies promoting or discouraging moving abroad, etc. – influence the integration processes in the country-of-residence (Clewett, 2015), the social structure in a country-of-origin is also likely to influence the integration of migrants in the country-of-residence as well. Thus, a new definition of integration as a “three-way approach” where the country-of-origin is included as a third actor has also been introduced (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016; Oliver, 2016; Pasetti, 2015).

This study argues that migrants with a minority background in their country-of-origin arrive in their new country with a set of memory and experiences they develop through their everyday lives, which might accelerate their integration process. Ethnicity and religious identity are minority identities that are salient in power relations. The members of these minority groups are disadvantaged in terms of equal access to resources, and often compelled to accommodate themselves in a majority dominated environment. These uneven relations enforce minority individuals to adapt themselves and the accumulated adaptation experiences pave way for higher adaptability in the country they migrate to in comparison to migrants with majority backgrounds. Furthermore, the experiences ethnic and religious minority members have through interaction with the majority gives rise to the development of consciousness of their group identity. This then leads them to preserve their identity while adapting to their new environment and country-of-residence at the same time. Given that there is a power imbalance that minority individuals experience in different dimensions within the state and society in the country-of-origin, it is

possible to observe higher levels of integration among them when compared to the majority individuals, particularly in civic and political dimensions in the country-of-residence.

Among multiple dimensions scholars developed that approach integration from social, cultural, and structural aspects, integration in civic and political dimension is particularly important in order to include migrants in the decision-making processes in democracies. As integration is broadly understood as migrants becoming “part of receiving societies and nations” (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014), participating in the civic and political environment transforms migrants from being ‘guests’ in a host country to responsibility-sharing ‘housemates’. Migrant involvement in democratic activities might blend the host and migrant communities and increase cohesion between them. This could be done with the gathering of shared opinions and creating a mutual identity over the same concerns between the host community and migrants, whereby the emphasis on the distinction between the two societies might fade away.

Furthermore, civic and political integration facilitates migrant integration into other areas such as economic or social integration, by paving the way for improvement in these said areas. Involvement in the civic and political environment also allows migrants to convey the issues they experience in these areas to the authorities in order to seek solutions to specific obstacles they face particularly in integrating into the country. Given that migrants settle in their new countries for life and their descendants are born and raised in the same country as natives, the civic-political involvement of migrants becomes essential to prevent the marginalization of these generations from the society they grow up in.

1.1 Research Argument

This study introduces a novel argument that claims: people with a minority status in their country-of-origin leads them to develop adaptability skills to an environment dominated by the majority. These skills are transferred to the country-of-residence once they migrate and facilitate their adaptation when encountering a new environment that is dominated by another majority – which is the native society. Moreover, as minorities successfully preserve their identity while adapting to the majority in their country-of-origin, they already have a higher group consciousness than the majority when they arrived in the country-of-residence. Higher group consciousness that is built upon the experiences they shared collectively causes stronger community bonds among the minority group members compared to the majority, and this creates solidarity and collectivity in the country-of-residence which facilitates their integration processes. As minority status is a product of power relations that often leaves them in disadvantaged positions, especially in nation-states (Davis, Livermore, & Lim, 2011; Killian, 1996), minority migrants are likely to have higher civic and political integration in the country-of-residence compared to majority migrants, to secure their access to resources, demand and protect their rights both as individuals and as a collective group.

The research question here asks whether the minority status from the country-of-origin has an impact on civic and political integration. To measure such causality, this argument has to be tested through individual-level data. In the literature, migrant-related studies with individual-level analysis mostly examine the attitudes of the host societies towards migrants and the approval of immigration policies. These studies particularly increased after the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis in Europe and the 2018 Latin American Caravan crisis in America (Card, Dustmann, & Preston, 2015;

Facchini et al., 2008; FitzGerald & Arar, 2018; Kleemans & Klugman, 2009; Laciak & Frelak, 2018; McCarthy, 2018). The few studies that adopt individual-level data collected from migrants are mostly from the United States as there are sizable and hyphenated identities as a result of the migration waves in the late 20th century (Berry et al., 2006; Gimpel, Tam Cho, & Wu, 2007; Martinez, 2005; Morawska, 2003; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006) or combine the data from migrants of all backgrounds in their cross-national analysis across Europe due to small numbers of migrant participants in surveys (Belhadj Kouider, Koglin, & Petermann, 2014; Bijl & Verweij, 2012; Pessin & Arpino, 2018). Studies are even more limited when the subject is narrowed down to empirical studies on the political involvement of migrants and their descendants (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014; Just & Anderson, 2012; Koopmans, et al., 2005; Maxwell, 2010; Scuzzarello, 2015). As a consequence, given the scarcity of available data due to difficulty to access, little is known about the characteristics among migrants that have an impact on their civic and political involvement in the countries-of-residence. In this respect, this study aims to understand the causality of migrant characteristics that are inherited from the country-of-origin on their integration through empirical research with individual-level data and aims to contribute to the emerging literature on integration as a three-way approach.

Furthermore, the way in which minority status facilitates integration is also a question that requires an answer and the causal mechanism behind is an interest in this study. Spencer and Charsley consider “family and social networks” as one of the effectors of migrant integration in a country-of-residence (Spencer & Charsley, 2016). Social networks allow the sharing of experiences between fellow migrants. They accelerate the migrant integration process as these experiences provide

guidance on know-how, solving obstacles as well as assisting with accessing resources. Here, it is also argued that high group consciousness facilitates having a stronger social network among minority migrants that results in rich and frequent information transmission among the members, which is also important for collective action. Moreover, the adaptability skills they acquire might also facilitate the expansion of these networks with the host society through finding a common ground between them. This will increase the chances of their acceptance, which is integral for integration.

In their study, Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx (2016) conceptualize migrant actors on three analytical levels: They consider states as migrant integration actors on the macro level shaping integration through policies, whereas migrant individuals are actors on a micro-level. In addition, they suggest meso-level analysis for organizations and collectives as they play a bridging role between the host state and migrants, which contributes to the integration process. It is argued in this study that organizations unite migrants (sometimes with the host society as well) and allow a knowledge and experience-sharing network for better adaptation and that they play a role in developing coping mechanisms by reducing stress surrounding the notion of being a foreigner. Organizations also carry an important role as entities for collective action to raise issues to the attention of decision-makers on the state level.

Leading from studies conducted by Spencer and Charsley and Garcés-Mascreñas and Penninx, in order to understand the mechanism of the civic and political integration process and the impact of the minority status from the country-of-origin, it is important to examine migrant integration processes not only on an individual level but also at a collective level as well. Given that organizations are mediators between the state in the country-of-residence and the migrant individuals, studying

the role of organizations in civic and political integration might be further explanatory to the integration mechanism.

In light of previous studies that have found mixed results regarding the impact of organizations on integration (Portes, Escobar, & Arana, 2008; Sardinha, 2009; Tillie, 2004), the second argument in this study is that minority-origin migrant organizations more effectively contribute to the civic and political integration process of migrants with minority backgrounds compared to the impact that majority-origin organizations have on those with majority backgrounds from the same country-of-origin. Testing this argument through a meso-level is expected to contribute to integration literature, as the issue of minority status from the country-of-origin is yet to be studied among migrant communities.

1.2 Research Design

To test the arguments in this study, a mixed-methods research model of quantitative and qualitative analyses will be employed. Mixed method research is well-suited in complex, mutable, and interdisciplinary research, which allows for the capturing of new phenomena, and is also frequently used in studies that focus on migrants due the interdisciplinary and intricate nature of the issue at stake (Bergman, 2018; & Plano Clark, 2011; Fauser, 2017).

As the purpose is to determine a causal relationship, the question of whether having a minority status from the country-of-origin has an impact on the civic and political integration processes in the new country-of-residence will be tested through individual-level quantitative data. Whereas a qualitative study, which is more suitable for exploratory purposes, will be conducted to seek answers to the question of whether minority organizations have a more facilitating role than the majority

organizations in the civic and integration processes of the respected communities at a meso-level. Civic-political integration will be approached as a process that migrants go through when they settle in a country-of-residence.

Per the study case of this research, Turkey-origin migrants in the UK will be examined. The UK is home to various migrant-origin communities and currently has around 9.3 million foreign-born people, which make up around 14 percent of its population (“Migrants in the UK: An Overview,” 2020). The UK is a country that scores relatively high on integration indexes (Solano & Huddleston, 2020; Wallace, Tolley, & Vonk, 2021). It creates an environment for migrants to progress in their integration processes without facing structural obstacles that purposely restrict migrants. Furthermore, policies such as providing funds for projects and civil society activities might positively contribute to the number and variety of the activities of migrants, which in turn, is used as data in this study to compare organizations with minority and majority backgrounds.

Minorities are already a hard-to-reach population for research purposes (Shaghghi, Bhopal, & Sheikh, 2011), and it is even more difficult to find them in a migrant group to collect representative data to conduct causal research. Among the Turkey-origin migrants in the UK, minority migrants are sizable enough for comparative research to be conducted to test the impact that minority status has on civic and political integration. Ethnicity and religious identities as two salient minority identities in the literature are used in this study: The Kurdish ethnic and Alevi religious minority migrants from Turkey are compared with the Turkish ethnic majority and Sunni religious majority, respectively.

1.2.1 Quantitative Research

The quantitative research in this study attempts to have a closer look at migrants on an individual level to determine the impact of having an ethnic or religious minority status from the country-of-origin on civic and political integration in the country-of-residence. The data used in this study comes from a survey that was collected by a private company between 7 April and 31 May 2017, from 398 migrants from Turkey – which is representative of the Turkey-origin migrants in the Greater London Area, which makes up 97 percent of the entire Turkey-origin population in the UK (“2011 Census Data Catalogue,” 2011).

The literature on political participation includes studies that focus on migrants’ civic and political behavior. However, the indicators used in these studies are mostly limited to behavioral measurements, and few cognitive perception indicators such as political ideologies are used as explanatory variables (Tam Cho, Gimpel, & Dyck, 2006; Patterson, 2019). In this study, arguing that integration is beyond political participation, a new empirically assessable civic and political integration model is introduced with the inclusion of psychological aspects of integration. The model is composed of three main indicators: political knowledge, participation, and belongingness. While the political knowledge component focuses on the cognitive/psychological aspects such as interest and knowledge of the political environment in the country-of-residence, the belongingness component aims to assess the emotional/psychological aspect with the use of variables that measure how much migrants feel like they are “part of the society” – an important aspect of integration – from a political perspective. Furthermore, the model also differentiates civic and political participation. In addition to voting, political participation is driven by political motives which Dalton calls “campaign activity”, whereas this may not be

the case for civic participation, where the latter is composed of activities that Dalton categorizes as “direct contact” and “communal activity” (Dalton, 2013).

By using the newly formed civic integration model as the dependent variable in this micro-level analysis, ordinal logistic regression analyses are going to be implemented to determine the role of ethnic and religious minority status on civic and political integration while controlling the characteristics of migrants that are found to be predictors of civic and political integration in the literature.

1.2.2 Qualitative Research

Suggesting a new argument about predicting what the role of minority status from the country-of-origin has on the civic and political integration in the country-of-residence, which is tested in the quantitative research section, this study also aims to understand the causal mechanisms behind the differences and similarities between minority and majority groups in their civic and political integration processes. Focusing on migrant organizations as collective actors on the meso-level, this chapter aims to address the question “to what extent do migrant organizations facilitate the civic and political integration of migrants through their activities?” and does so by comparing organizations with minority and majority backgrounds from the country-of-origin.

Semi-structured in-depth interviews with representatives of the Turkey-origin migrant organizations, who are considered elite informants, given that they have a higher social position than the average members of the community, provide additional insights and perspectives that are not captured through the semi-structured questions (Stephens, 2007). Aside from activities and events they organize for the migrant communities that would directly or indirectly contribute to the civic and

political integration of migrants, information regarding the contexts and conditions, structural changes in the country, and additional explanatory details provided by the informants enrich the conversations and are used in the analyses.

While the initial plan was to conduct a field study in the UK and visit the organizations in person, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and restrictions on travel at the time of the study, the interviews were conducted online or as phone interviews. 19 organizations participated in the study and 7 additional interviews were conducted with academics and experts on the Turkey-origin communities residing in the UK.

In order to compare the migrant organizations based on their majority and minority status, a new typology of migrant organizations has been designed. Based on the previous research and the interviews conducted, the type of organizations included service organizations that provide services for the migrants to facilitate their adaptation to the country-of-residence, such as offering legal advice, providing guidance to access social services, and arranging activities to raise awareness of the rights and obligations for migrants, which directly influence the civic and political integration of migrants in the UK. Faith-based organizations are formed to meet the religious needs of the migrants and are centered on places of worship; these are the mosque associations for Sunni migrants and the Cemevi and Alevi cultural centers for Alevi migrants. Ethnic-based organizations are organizations where community members of the same ethnocultural group come together for activities ranging from having symbolic cultural celebrations to advocacy to preserve ethnocultural identity. Lastly, hometown organizations gather migrants who are from the same geo-cultural backgrounds and have a closer kinship network. The contribution of these type of

organizations to the civic and political integration of minority and majority migrants is analyzed in the qualitative study.

1.3 Structure of the Study

The structure of this study proceeds as follows: The subsequent chapter is composed of two sections where the former explains the theoretical framework and the latter provides background information about the case study. The section on theory starts with providing an overview of migrant integration debates with critics on empirically framing integration, followed by a section where the components of the civic and integration model suggested in this study are developed. The second half of the theoretical section starts with the role of the country-of-origin in civic and political integration as a third actor and later focuses on the minority identity development in the country-of-origin. The last part of the theoretical section discusses migrant individuals and organizations as integration actors in the country-of-residence.

The background section of Chapter 2 explains the selected case in this study for a better understanding of the context. This section starts with a brief history of the migration and integration experiences in the UK, followed by background information on Turkey-origin migrants, their migration flows and the current status of their integration processes. The section ends with a summary of the status of minorities in Turkey, as adaptability skills and group consciousness is developed in the country-of-origin before migration.

Chapter 3 examines the role of minority status in civic and political integration through quantitative research. The chapter starts with the theoretical perspectives on empirical assessments of integration and introduces a new civic and political integration model that is to be used in the analysis as the dependent variable. Migrant

characteristics that determine the civic and political integration process are also discussed. The details of the research questions, data, and variables are provided in the research design section. The chapter ends with the findings and a discussion that is built on the findings of the analyses.

Chapter 4 focuses on qualitative research in this study that examines the facilitating role of migrant organizations in the civic and political integration of migrants, comparing those from minority and majority backgrounds. The chapter starts with the theoretical perspectives on the organizations and their functions, the debates on the relationship between migrant organizations and integration, the connection between minority identity, collective consciousness, and organizations, and later introduces the typology of organizations used in this study. Following a section about the Turkey-origin migrant organizations in the UK, the details of the research design are provided. In the findings section, the themes that have emerged are elaborated, and the chapter is finalized with a discussion about the comparison of the collective dynamics of minority and majority communities in light of the findings.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The 20th century witnessed technological developments such as advancement in transportation means and the affordability of migration, as well as political developments, which resulted in increase in the mobility of people. In 2020, the number of foreign-born people in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was around 136 million. Around 66 million people are foreign-born in the European Union (EU) countries, which make up 15 percent of the population (OECD, 2021). When the second generation of migrants that were born in the countries-of-residence are included, there is a substantial migrant-origin population in migrant-receiving countries. Whether migrants arrive for permanent settlement or temporary reasons like education, their integration into the country-of-residence emerge as an issue both for the state and the society in the country-of-residence. Migrants (and their descendants) directly or indirectly impact the mechanisms in the country-of-residence, such as the economy, health, and education systems as well as social order. A healthy integration of migrants is beneficial for both the country-of-residence (state and society) and for migrants, mutually. Effectively managing migrant integration is particularly important for the migrant-receiving democratic states, as immigration is a continuing phenomenon.

Even though there is a tendency to approach all immigrants in a country-of-residence as a whole – which gives some information about the migrant population in the country - migrants have different backgrounds and experiences brought from their countries-of-origin, and thus are not homogenous in terms of their integration pace at different integration dimensions. For instance, the Indian immigrants in the UK have better labor integration whereas the Chinese have better school enrolment in comparison to one another and with reference to the natives (Unterreiner, 2015). It is argued in this study that migrants from the same country might differ from each other due to their backgrounds. While recognizing that migrant individuals have their unique characteristics that contribute to their integration processes wherever they come from, it is suggested here that migrants who have a minority background in their country-of-origin integrate into the civic and political environment in the country-of-residence more than the migrants of the majority group in the same country. This is a result of the adaptability skills they develop in the countries they come from while preserving their minority group identity at the same time through the collective consciousness they already gain by being exposed to the majority group in their home country.

As migrant integration itself is an amorphous concept, the following section starts with an overview of migrant integration, which includes theoretical criticisms, followed by the introduction of a new empirically assessable approach for civic and political integration – which is the integration dimension that is focused on in this study. The third section switches the focus to the role that the country-of-origin has on migrant integration in a country-of-residence as a third actor, which is a recently emerged literature that created the ground for the novel argument introduced in this

research – the impact of minority status on integration. This is discussed in the last section of the theoretical framework.

2.1.1 An Overview of Migrant Integration

Historically, migrant integration was perceived as the ‘assimilation’ of migrants into the receiving society, where they integrate solely through their own efforts and achievements by imitating certain segments of the host society (Child, 1943; Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Gordon, 1964; Morawska, 2003). In recent decades, the migrant-receiving state and society have been recognized as actors that have a direct influence on the integration process of migrants, and the concept of migrant integration as a ‘two-way process’ emerged (Castles et al., 2001; Council of the EU, 2004; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). After the agreement on the basic principles of migrant integration in 2004 by the Council of the European Union, the OECD and European Union developed migrant integration indicators based on existing data that is comparable across countries such as migrant access to the labor market, housing, education, health, as well as social cohesion and the status of youth with immigrant parents (Council of the European Union, 2004; OECD/European Union, 2019). Partly due to their instrumentality for politicians, this resulted in many studies that focused on the effectiveness of integration policies of migrant-receiving countries (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Gamlen, 2014; Hellgren, 2015; Huddleston et al., 2013; Joppke & Morawaska, 2003; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2009). Even in these studies, migrants have been at the center as the subjects of integration, and their performance under certain interventions have been evaluated.

However, despite the growing interest in the issue, policymakers and scholars do not have a ‘single, generally accepted definition, theory, or model’ due to the complexity and interdisciplinary nature that consists of areas such as political science,

economics, sociology, history, anthropology, psychology, geography, urban studies, marketing, and demography (Atasu-Topcuoglu, 2019; Banting & Kymlicka, 2007; Berry et al., 2006; Castles et al., 2001; Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; IOM, 2021, Kurtulus, Yildirim & Yasin, 2012). For a simple understanding, Budyta-Budzyńska (2011) differentiates ‘integration’ from ‘adaptation’ by defining adaptation as the acquirement of “a minimum of capabilities enabling survival” in biological and economical aspects, which does not necessarily require close contact with the host community. Integration, however, is inclusive of adaptation but also requires the establishment of a relationship with the host society and taking an integral part in various aspects of the life the society lives. While integration scholars argue on various dimensions to frame components of integration as discussed below, in the broader sense, they at least agree that integration means “migrants’ becoming members of the society” (Entzinger, 2000; Heckmann & Schnapper, 2003; Koopmans, 2005; Laxroix, 2013; Mugge & van der Haar, 2016; Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016; Gsir, 2014).

Scholars have categorized integration dimensions based on the purpose of their studies and the unit of analysis such as migrant individuals, society, or state policies. Entzinger (2000) conceptualizes three integration factors, market, state, and nation, in order to discuss the economic, legal-political, and social aspects of migrant integration. Laxroix (2013) focuses on the social and structural integration at the community level, whereas Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011) combined religious and cultural aspects to create a cultural-religious dimension and merged the social and economic aspects under the socioeconomic dimension when comparing policies. The EU Zaragoza Indicators categorize migrant integration indicators as employment, education, social inclusion, active citizenship, and welcoming society (Huddleston,

et al., 2013). Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas (2016) introduce cognitive-behavioral and aesthetics dimensions to integration discussions. Heckmann and Schnapper (2003) suggest an identity dimension in addition to cultural, social, and structural dimensions where they also differentiate legal/political integration from structural dimensions. Even though the scholars recognize and examine similar aspects, due to having different contexts and focuses, they attempt to introduce various typologies, which are yet to be broadly accepted.

The difficulty of framing integration is particularly prominent in empirical studies where some form of scaling is a necessity to determine where each migrant falls: How well or less integrated they are. It is a challenge to identify an adequate number of indicators as some might score well in one and not in the other. Moreover, it is imperiling to develop a measurement criteria attributed to a (desired) host society and expect migrants to meet these criteria to complete their integration. Indeed, this creates convenience for quantification. However, it has the widely criticized classical assimilationist echo that assumes the host society as an idealized homogenous entity (Modood, 2011; Portes & Manning, 2008; Schinkel, 2010; Wimmer & Schiller, 2003). While there are differences among members of the host society, it is paradoxical to expect migrants to be shaped in a certain way to become the unrealistically perfect and desirable ‘member of society.’

Secondly, the host society is not static; nations continuously transform through various developments and experiences, which can be seen in generational differences. Nagel (2009) points out that interacting with migrants also results in the evolvement of the host society. With the contribution of globalization and transnationalism, people already have access to other cultures, their products, and practices, like Indian curry becoming a component of British cuisine – which

contributes around 5 million pounds to the national economy annually (Mukherjee, 2017). Furthermore, the exchange between cultures is not a new phenomenon; the caravansaries on the Silk Road and mercantile ports in multiple locations were the centers for trading spices, fabrics, porcelain, and various other goods, centuries before the term globalization even emerged. Exposure to these novel goods and practices – as well as thoughts and ideas – have been shaping the habits of local societies.

As cultural materials are more distinctive – which is well summarized by Alibhai-Brown's (2000) 3S model (Sari, Samosa, Steel drums) – it is tempting to measure migrant integration through the visibility of such materials. While for assimilationists these materials represent the aspects that need integration, on the opposite end the 3S could be praised as the symbols of diversity by the host society's openness to this visibility. Yet, simplifying the issue to the acceptance of migrant appearance and their food is problematic. The cultural interaction would promote social cohesion between the host and migrant society and might even contribute to increasing the sense of belongingness to the adopted country among migrants for further motivation to become part of it. However, as Kymlicka (2012) argues, this drifts the attention away from serious issues in concern, such as economic and political inequalities for migrant groups.

Material visibility is not excluded from integration. In fact, it is often discussed under cultural integration, acculturation, and religious retention (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Mesoudi, 2018). Given that migrant integration is a two-way process between migrants and the host state/society, material visibility is an issue for civic-political integration as well. As visual differences stand out more than the invisible and result in the development of opinions and assumptions when

encountered (Carling, Erdal, & Ezzati, 2014), it is not unusual to see the host state and society be selective about the certain visibility of migrants. Furthermore, visible materials easily become symbols for manipulation and propaganda in politics and consequently affect the level of acceptance of migrants by the host society – which is an important aspect of integration. However, from the perspective of migrants as integration actors, it fits better with Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas (2016)’s differentiation between the ‘cognitive/behavioral’ and ‘aesthetics’ aspects of migrant integration and corresponds with Kymlicka’s criticism on overemphasizing material visibility. Penninx & Garcés-Mascreñas claim that the cognitive and behavioral adaptation of migrants is actualized as “they learn how things are done, by whom and so on”, yet the absorption of the ‘aesthetic aspects’ in the host society requires a longer time, often generations. The taste of food, music, fashion, and other cultural materials inevitably transform particularly among the generations born in the country-of-residence, where they also develop a new and hybrid form of two cultures.

The cognitive-behavioral aspect of migrant integration mentioned by Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas (2016), clears out the aesthetics aspects as well as the dependency of migrants on others who act on their behalf. It focuses on the cognitive adaptation of migrants through learning and understanding how the structures and systems function in the country-of-residence, adjust their behaviors accordingly, and operate in practice as actual members of society. With knowledge on the mechanisms and procedures in the systems within the country-of-residence, migrants develop cognition and become equipped to behave like natives; making decisions and taking action. Even in countries where migrants are granted limited rights compared to the natives, learning these limitations would be considered as

(cognitive) integration, which also increases the potential of migrants to initiate political advocacy to demand equal rights as an aspect of civic-political integration as well.

From an empirical perspective, the knowledge and behaviors of migrants reflecting “how things are done and not” in the country-of-residence can be compared with the knowledge and behavior of the natives. This not only helps to determine the degree of integration the migrants have, but also provides a more calibrated scale for reference by recognizing the heterogeneity within the society. For example, child vaccination rates among migrants can be considered as an integration issue only if it is lower than the vaccination rate of the host society, or whether migrant crime rates are higher than the native’s crime rates. Otherwise, these issues need to be treated as national issues rather than migrant integration. Furthermore, focusing on behaviors allows policy makers to take more effective actions for migrant integration when needed. The Migration Policy Institute’s Integration Futures Working Group report published in October 2018 concludes with suggestions such as linguistically simplifying the application procedures to any bureaucratic papers or using digital systems to automatically register migrants to the voting system after naturalization, which are behavioral interventions through policies that would ease the cognitional/behavioral adaptation of migrants for their integration processes.

In this study, it is argued that behavioral resemblance between the migrant communities and the native society draws the scope of migrant integration. Unlike utopic homogeneity, there is diversity within the host society in terms of opinions, attitudes, and lifestyles, and transformation is unavoidable for both the host society and migrants through time. Instead of forming an idealized society to demand migrants to ‘fit in,’ it is claimed that focusing on the behavioral resemblance of the

migrant and native communities would provide a more realistic picture regarding migrant integration and allows policymakers to be involved with policies when needed. Instead of idealism, considering migrants as a ‘group in society’ along with other disadvantaged or marginalized groups is a more fitting approach (Rudiger & Spencer, 2003) to monitor and quantify their behavioral resemblance to the rest of society in terms of access and utilization of resources, such as schooling or employment rates. From a policy perspective, the European Union already monitors certain indicators such as the unemployment rate of migrants and encourages the member states to implement policies to eliminate the gap on a national level (OECD/European Union, 2019).

2.1.2 The Civic and Political Integration of Migrants

There is a variety of categorizations of integration that are designed around social, cultural, economic, political, religious, civic, legal, cognitive, behavioral, and identity aspects as the core elements with different emphasis on the dimensions introduced by scholars studying integration (Entzinger, 2000; Heckmann & Schnapper, 2003; Koopmans, 2005; Laxroix, 2013; Penninx & Garcés-Mascreñas, 2016). These dimensions are not isolated from one another. However, the focus of this study is narrowed down to the civic and political integration of migrants, which consists of the direct and indirect involvement of migrants in the decision-making process in the country-of-residence through political and civic participation. As it has a utilization role in actualizing the integration in other dimensions such as the improvement in structure and a better understanding of the host culture, studying civic-political integration has a multiplier effect on migrant integration. Furthermore, integration is understood as a “dynamic, two-way process” between the migrants and the country-of-residence, where the country-of-residence has two components - state

and society. Focusing on the civic and political integration of migrants allows to capture their relationship with both host actors and to draw a complete picture.

The interconnectedness among migrant integration dimensions is an obstacle to empirical research. Within this concern, Spencer and Charsley (2016) have developed a heuristic conceptual model. While they adopted Heckmann and Schnapper's (2003) social, cultural, and identity dimensions where the relationship between the host society and migrants is more salient, the novelty in the model entangles the relationship between the migrants and the host state. Separating the 'civic-political dimension' from the 'structural dimension', they differentiate the involvement in the democratic process through political and community participation of migrants, from "participating in the systems" such as labor and housing markets, and access to services and rights, where the state draws the frame and accessibility through laws and policies (Spencer & Charsley, 2016). Such categorization was beneficial for this study to focus on the civic-political integration process of migrants that can be empirically studied on different levels of analysis. While the integration policies can be discussed under the political "structure", this study focuses on the migrants themselves – both as individuals and communities – from the civic-political dimension.

Civic political integration is often used interchangeably with political participation as it refers to involvement in the decision-making process through political and civic activities and is measured by the same indicators (Huddleston & Dag Tjaden, 2012; Koopmans et al., 2005; Mugge, 2010). However, as it will be explained later in detail, this study approaches the civic-political dimension more comprehensively and views it as a composition of a cognitive phenomenon about 'knowing how things are' as well as emotional and behavioral aspects for migrants. The literature on

migrant political participation focuses on the behavioral aspects as migrants exercise their rights to vocalize their needs, demands, and opinions through civic and political activities to inform or persuade the political bodies in the countries-of-residence for solutions. As it dominates the literature, it is worth elaborating on the political participation in the following section.

In democracies, the political participation of society in decision-making processes is an indispensable component. Furthermore, through people's involvement and the introduction of new technologies, the functions and forms of political participation continue to expand. It hardly needs to be said that the most common form of political participation is electoral participation. In its modern understanding, political participation also includes signing petitions, contacting political representatives, financial contributions to political causes, and many other advocacy activities (Verba & Nie, 1972; Parry, Moyser, & Day, 1992; van Deth, 2001; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006; Gimpel, Tam Cho, & Wu, 2007; Logan, Darrah, & Oh, 2012). Some include illegal forms of activities such as violent attacks, occupying buildings, or making rebellious graffiti as ways of political expression, since these acts still have some impact on the agendas of decision-makers (Heger, 2015; Waldner & Dobratz, 2013). In this study, the political participation of migrants will be outlined by the legal activities as their integration into the country-of-residence is the primary discussion.

In the migrant context, civic-political integration discussions diverge from political participation regarding electoral behaviors; while this is the major form of political participation, as migrants are not always citizens in their country-of-residence, only a portion of them are eligible for such political participation. Even though there are some exceptions for migrants to participate in the local elections in certain

conditions, such as being an EU citizen, citizenship is a prerequisite to participate in the national elections in most countries (European Union, n.d.). Expectedly, the literature on electoral behavior includes studies that focus on the voting patterns of migrants who acquired the citizenship of the country-of-residence (Bueker, 2006; Tam Cho et al., 2006; Gimpel et al., 2007). Yet, as Just and Anderson (2011) argue, these studies often exclude the non-citizen migrants, whose political behavior is undoubtedly insightful for their integration. In their cross-national empirical study, they find a significant role of citizenship in political participation among migrants. These studies indicate that there is indeed a need for inclusion of non-citizen migrants in the migrant political participation studies. From migrant integration perspective, examining non-citizen migrants would allow researchers to capture the earlier stages of migrant integration process and to determine their integration patterns as well. Additionally, more studies can focus on the non-electoral political and civic participation of migrants –where citizenship is not necessary – to capture the behaviors of migrants during the early stages of their integration processes as well. The literature on civic and political integration of migrants can also be enriched by more interdisciplinary approaches as migrant integration dimensions are interconnected.

Spencer and Charsley's distinction (2016) allows us to distinguish the roles of migrants and the state as actors regarding citizenship: Granting citizenship or permissions to participate in politics to non-citizens is related more to the structural dimension of integration, while the civic and political integration of migrants (in addition to the electoral participation of those who acquired citizenship) has a reactionary nature to promote possible changes and improvements – for instance, on citizenship or residency laws and regulations as well as acquiring adequate

knowledge about the systems in order to take appropriate actions. The structural dimension of migrant integration focuses on participation in the systems structured through state policies. Policies can be assimilationist, multiculturalist, or somewhere between and aim to contribute to the adaptation of migrants to the given structure (Entzinger, 2006; Modood, 2011; Rudiger & Spencer, 2003). As integration policies are state interventions, they draw the legal framework for migrant rights, duties, and exemptions and therefore have a direct impact on them. The abovementioned electoral rights of migrants obtained through naturalization are an example of the direct impact of policies on migrants. Granting citizenship is an issue in integration policy studies that is debated from two perspectives; arguments compiled around integration as a policy that aims for an integrated society consider naturalization as the end point of migrant integration (Oliver, 2016; Penninx & Garcés-Mascreñas, 2016). By granting citizenship to migrants who fulfill a set of requirements, such as a certain length of duration in the country or passing some language and cultural knowledge tests, the migrants and natives become indifferent in terms of rights and responsibilities they have, and that their integration is assumed to be ‘completed.’ For others, citizenship is perceived as a primary tool for migrants before integration as their argument on integration policies concentrate on providing migrants equal opportunities or the need for affirmative action (Banting & Kymlicka, 2007; Barry, 2002; Collins, 2003; Joppke, 2007). The policy approach adopted by the state to grant citizenship to migrants determines when they can become eligible for electoral participation and some other political practices.

Despite the domination of electoral participation in the literature on migrants, it should be emphasized that civic and political integration is beyond electoral participation. Non-electoral political participation includes the advocacy and

lobbying activities carried out by migrants (citizens and noncitizens), expressing their demands through democratic means such as protests, petitions, claims on legal platforms, forming organizations and involvement in civil society, learning about and complying with regulations (for example, eligibility for citizenship) and are all considered as indicators of civic and political integration. Such actions may not be necessarily needed or preferred among migrant groups for various reasons. However, having the cognitive aspect, such as knowing where to go for registration, to whom to contact in case they need, knowing their rights and obligations are also components of the civic-political integration.

2.1.3 The Role of the Country-of-Origin on Civic-Political Integration as a Third Actor

The main argument in this study is that migrants have different backgrounds, experiences, and perceptions, and this affects their civic and political integration process. It is argued that migrants do not arrive in their countries of residence as ‘blank pages’; they carry their previous lives in their country-of-origin over to the new country they reside in. Studies comparing different migrant communities in the same country-of-residence reflect that each community has a different pace to integrate into the economy, society and culture, legal or educational systems, and more (Huddleston et al., 2009; Unterreiner, 2015; Van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004). The differences are often ascribed to the conditions in countries-of-origin. For instance, the number of naturalized migrants from countries permitting dual citizenship is higher in numbers compared to the migrants from countries with restricted citizenship policies, and the migrants from former colonies of the country-of-residence are much better at language skills.

Following the emergence of studies that have found differences among the migrants of different countries, some scholars began to discuss integration as a three-way process by considering the country-of-origin as a third actor (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016; Oliver, 2016; Unterreiner & Weinar, 2017), emphasizing the role of state policies of the country-of-origin on migrants, such as viewing citizens living abroad as a source of economic or social remittance and lobbying in the host countries or sometimes as traitors. State-level structural features in a country-of-origin have concordance or discordance with the integration processes in the country-of-residence: While the fact that the government in the Philippines provides training and orientation courses for its citizens who go to work abroad, and Turkey's blue card system that encourages naturalization as a remedy for its citizens residing in countries that do not allow dual citizenship are considered as country-of-origin policies that promote integration, having an institutional connection with diasporas only at a symbolic level in Russia and Iran encourages return rather than integration, or for instance, Morocco and Turkey sending religious leaders to their diasporas sometimes leads to dissonance in the country-of-residence (Clewett, 2015; "Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)," n.d.).


Aside from the increase of studies focusing on the role of the state of the country-of-origin over their citizens abroad (Brown, Quayson, & Daswani, 2013; Gamlen, 2014; Glick-Schiller, 2005; Ulusoy, 2016), the role of the societal structure in the country-of-origin on the migrant integration process has not yet received the attention it deserves. Although this study benefits from the three-way integration arguments, rather than viewing the state in the country-of-residence as the only actor, it brings the social dynamics in the country-of-origin as well.

There are indeed some studies that focus on the same country-of-origin, yet they are only a few and overwhelmingly focus on ‘the reason for migration’ – such as voluntary or forced displacement – as involuntary migration requires a recovery period of shock before starting to adapt to the new country (Bermudez, 2017; Lypiatska, 2018; Strang & Ager, 2010; United Nations Development Programme, 2015). These studies often have the purpose to guide humanitarian operations to help refugees or other displaced people overcome their trauma. Furthermore, the scholarly works that adopt this categorization of voluntary or forced migration are motivated by the legal status of migrants in the country-of-residence, thus holding the perspective of the state in the country-of-residence rather than the reflections of the relations in the country-of-origin. While the accumulated research focusing on the country-of-origin of migrants has been informative for studies like this one, this study here aims to explore the diversity among the migrants of the same country-of-origin rooted in the same country-of-residence and its potential impact on their civic-political integration.

2.1.4 Minority Identity in the Country-of-Origin

This study is interested in migrant communities in a country-of-residence who were already a minority group within their country-of-origin. It is argued here that the minority groups have different experiences in their homelands compared to the majority group, and this affects their integration process in the country-of-residence. Particularly, the adaptation experiences of minorities with the majority in their countries-of-origin equip them better to adapt to the society in the country-of-residence relatively easier and therefore become involved in politics in the country-of-residence, which would result in higher political-civic integration compared to their fellow migrants who are members of the majority group.

Figure 1 Visualization of minority and majority groups in country-of-origin and country-of-residence



In a sociological context, minorities are defined as “relatively powerless, self-conscious groups whose members were subject to discrimination” (Killian, 1996). Even though there are views that consider women, disabled, or other groups that are subject to discrimination as minority categories, the term has a political connotation due to the power balances and mainly refers to the ethnic, racial, and religious groups within nation-states that are different from the dominant group.

In the literature, migrant groups are also defined as a common minority group, particularly with the increasing number of second and third generations (Banting & Kymlicka, 2007; Maxwell, 2012). Yet, the term “minority” will be used in this study to refer to the minority status in the country-of-origin, and the term “majority” will be used for the dominant group. When referring to the relationship in the country-of-residence, “minority” “majority” and “host society/natives” will be used to identify the three communities.

2.1.4.1 *Formation of Minority Identities*

As claimed by social identity theory, people make social categorizations based on a common characteristic or social experience to differentiate the in-group and out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In that sense, as minorities are the “different ones” from the mainstream majority in the nation-states, they develop higher consciousness of their differences, group distinctions, and belongingness in comparison to the majority group through their daily experiences. Furthermore, while maintaining their minority identities, they have experience in adapting themselves to the conditions formed by and in favor of the majority group in order to survive. When they migrate, they are already fortified with these cognitional exercises on developing their group identity and adaptability which is to transfer to the migrant-host society comparison.

Minority group members have a learning experience of their differences that is transferred through generations with the concerns over preservation of their minority identities. As primary socialization theory suggests, while the family (including nonrelative caregivers) is the primary source for children to develop their social behaviors (Nurco & Lerner, 1999; Oetting, Donnermeyer, & Deffenbacher, 1998), the closer bonds among minority members compared to majority group members leads to more frequent and cohesive interaction with in-group members that shape the lives of individuals as an ‘extended family’. While minorities obtain their group identity in their primary circle, they experience secondary socialization with majority group members as the larger community through daily interaction and exposure to influential factors such as school, and peer groups. Secondary socialization shapes the behaviors of individuals in a social environment that is already institutionalized and has formal structures and codes that determine acceptable norms and behaviors

(Crisogen, 2015). In an environment where the norms of the majority dominate, minority members exercise behavioral adjustments for survival in these surroundings, therefore develop adaptability skills. Exposure to some of the majority's norms reminds minorities of their distinct identities and triggers their group consciousness. Thus, rather than assimilating to the majority, minorities use adaptability skills to fit in the setting they enter. As secondary socialization is a continuous learning process, the minority members continuously adjust themselves and advance their adaptability skills.

Aside from individual experiences, minorities also shape their group identity with exposure to the majority. According to social identity theory, which is a collective identity theory, group members have active roles in shaping the social category they belong to and to the extent that they prefer. Therefore, group identities are approached as indeterministic in this theory (Brewer, 2001). Expectedly, minorities are exposed to the characteristics of the majority more often than vice versa due to the population ratio and are thus able to observe the group differences (and similarities) more frequently than the majority. Frequent exposure to the majority characteristics contributes to the minorities in two ways: first, it allows the minority group to transfer the best practices they observed from the majority as tools to strengthen their inner group identity. While acculturation, the unavoidable exchange between two groups, is a threat to deterministic identity theories, in social identity theory, group identities are permeable and such imports by the group members even have the potential to invigorate the group identity.

Secondly, exposure to the majority characteristics in a territorial context creates complex identities for the minorities; along with their belonging to the minority group, they also possess broader identities that categorize them with the majority

group. Considering the fact that native minorities in a home country have been in the same geography for generations, the shared commonalities and similar experiences with the majority group through history increases the complexity of the identities of minorities. For instance, even the Jewish communities – whom the diaspora concept was built upon and who are cautious not to assimilate – have internalized some of the features of the countries they have lived in for centuries; the difference between the Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews reflect their German and Spanish history respectively, that cannot be entangled from who they are today (Zimmels, 1976).

Taking the fact that the Jews were migrants in those countries that makes them outsiders and their identity went through a transformation, it is plausible for minorities who are natives of a country to advance their identities with experiences and characteristics shared with the majority. Given that people with complex identities have more ability to adapt (Ziemes & Abs, 2017), minority group members have a high capacity to integrate into a country-of-residence when they migrate with their complex identities. The minority migrants already know what ‘being a minority’ is and therefore what to expect, through living with a dominant group while preserving their minority identities to avoid extinction.

In line with social identity theory, in his famous essay, ‘Politics of Recognition,’ Charles Taylor (1992) claims that identities are shaped through recognition and misrecognition in a dialogical interaction; the misrecognized individual or groups suffer from damage and distortion (Taylor, 1994). The recognition of minorities by the state plays a significant role in their identity-making, their relationship with the state, as well as the majority group members. State policies towards minorities, the rights, and exemptions they are granted as well as the limitations, determine their status in a country. As nation-states are established with nationalistic motivations to

have the direct rule of the majority under national sovereignty, the policies are structured not only in favor of the national majority, they are designed to intensify the homogeneity of the national identity (Tilly, 1975). However, such policies become dysfunctional when minorities are discriminated against and exposed to prejudice (Glazer, 1993). While minorities are provided with citizenship and given the same rights as the majority with the claim of indifference between groups, the state misrecognition – or even non-recognition – of the minorities put them in a position of conflict between their national and minority identities.

In his essay, Taylor also states that in modern times social hierarchies have collapsed, and honor (noble inequality) has been replaced with the dignity of individuals, therefore the recognition of identities is actualized through efforts. Considering that the power dynamics are often asymmetrical between minorities and the majority in nation-states (Seyranian, Atuel, & Crano, 2008), the minorities are more aware of their disadvantaged position through their experiences in a setting that does not provide equal power to its members (despite the equal rights in some cases). Therefore, there are additional efforts required for their recognition; elimination of discrimination they are subject to as a result of policies or social exclusion by the members of the majority (Sökefeld, 2006). These efforts can include violence in some cases, independence claims might be voiced, and sometimes achieved, as seen in the emergence of Kosovo and South Sudan, through the efforts made by these groups on an international level (Rohan, 2018).

Through their awareness of the range of motion they have in an environment set by others, the closer in-group bond among the minorities facilitates their mobilization as a group. While minorities often have challenges in nation-states and score lower in educational achievement through racial or language barriers (Assari et. al, 2021;

Schmid, 2001), and have a gap in socioeconomic statuses due to systematic inequality, they tend to remain in the same social status and have higher in-group reliance than the majority. Even though they may not have an individual capacity for social mobilization, political claim-making, and advocacy to overcome disadvantages and maximize their power share, the closer bonds among minority group members accelerate their collective action as they might have more trust in the few notable members who have leadership skills within their community.

2.1.4.2 *Minority Identities: Ethnicity and Religion*

In nation-states, minorities are often the ethnic or religious groups that are different from the mainstream population, which the state has been built and shaped upon (Rex, 1996). According to the American Sociological Association, both race and ethnicity are products of social stratifications; race is defined as the socially significant physical difference of a group, whereas ethnic group members share a unique set of culture, traditions, and practices, have a common history, ancestral heritage, common geographical roots, language, and – for some cases – religion (ASA, 2018; Hamer et al., 2018). Even though they are both commonly viewed as socially constructed collective identities, race is built on visible features where alteration is impossible for an individual, such as skin color. Thus, racial identity is developed by an individual's interpretation of the messages of others regarding their race more than the members' affiliation with the group. (Carter, 1998; Chávez & Guido-DiBrito, 2002; Helms, 1995). While ethnicity also consists of characteristics that are very difficult to change, such as language, or even impossible especially when combined with racial characteristics, ethnic identity is associated with relatively more self-identification and in-group affiliation (Birnir, 2007; Posner, 2005). Phinney (1993) has a gradual three-stage model for developing ethnic

identity, where the passive ethnic identity rouses up through a long exploration and experimentation process after encountering a situation that can be overt racism or gradual discrimination, and at the last stage the individual solves the identity conflict and accepts the membership of the ethnic identity. Ethnic identity development is an individual cognitive¹ process that is primarily driven by the interaction with others; the outsiders treatment of the individual as well as learning about the experiences of the other members of the same group. Ethnic identity is a strong identity that has both collective and individual consciousness components. While the majorities also have ethnic identities that transformed into the national identity in nation-states, the ethnic identity of the minorities is more salient as it is a product of the identity conflict they go through as individuals and as a group.

Religious identity is also developed through a cognitive journey. It is constructed on faith and beliefs that are intertwined with practices and behaviors, and composed of both individual and community aspects (Bell, 2010). Even though religious identity development differs from ethnic identity development due to the presence of religious doctrines that are followed, from a group perspective, these religious teachings form a shared culture among group members, which is inherited over generations. Even more, some ethnic and religious identities might be tangled as in the case of the Jewish communities or the Greek Orthodox minority community in Turkey. Compared to racial or ethnic identity, religious identity can be changed through conversion or renouncement by individuals themselves, yet, this is quite unlikely in most cases. Another distinction of religious identity is the diversity within; under the same umbrella religion, there are different denominations, sects,

¹ A cognitive process is the basic mental process regarding sensation, attention and perception and is composed of complex operations such as memory, learning, problem solving, reasoning, which can be conducted consciously or unconsciously.

and communities such as Catholicism, Mormonism, Methodist and Baptist churches under Christianity, and the Sunni and Shia sects in Islam. Depending on the context, members of these faiths are sometimes treated as a whole, and in other cases, fractions gain importance. In the minority context, some religious groups might be officially recognized as minorities, especially when the ethnic and religious identity is entangled, or they become a minority simply due to their ratio in the overall population. State policies on religious regulations such as the recognition of an official religion, and the exercise of assertive or passive secularism determines the status of religious minorities at a structural level. On a societal level, interpersonal interactions and historical experiences might shape the attitudes towards a certain religious group as in the case of Christians distancing themselves from Mormons in the US (PEW, 2012).

2.1.5 Minorities as Migrants in the Country-of-Residence

2.1.5.1 Migrants as Individual Integration Actors

The challenge of moving to a new place to start a new life strengthens the bonds among fellow migrants regardless of their backgrounds due to the convenience of creating a network with people who share the same language and culture and who have transnational bonds with the country-of-origin (Fitzgerald, 2008). This bond is likely to be stronger among minorities as the in-group identity is already built in the country-of-origin and remains high when they migrate to another country. Since minorities have a higher group consciousness than the majority, they might have better solidarity among themselves and higher motivation to assist each other to settle in.

Furthermore, compared to majority group members who experience being a minority for the first time, minority groups already have experience with a majority group in

which they were able to develop adaptability skills. In their new setting, this adaptability skill allows them to have a faster grasp of their surroundings and find room for themselves within the new society easier than the majority group. Even though they would be considered as a new minority in the new country they reside in, they have the mindset of being a minority transferred through generations and are prepared to synchronize their behaviors with a majority.

The group consciousness and adaptability skills that are inherited from the country-of-origin also facilitate the civic and political integration process for minority individuals. As minorities are disadvantaged in power-sharing (Davis et al., 2011; Seyranian et al., 2008) in their country-of-origins, when they migrate, they are aware of the potential areas they might be disadvantaged in the country-of-residence. Therefore, they might be more cautious to not be discriminated within the systems. This would motivate them to be more demanding of their rights to extend the power they have in civic and political platforms. Also, due to their previous experiences of struggling to access resources, they may be aware of the means and tools to invest in for the most useful outcomes. Through their awareness of the range of motion they have in an environment set by others, and with frequent additional efforts to exercise their rights and resource sharing, minorities also have knowledge and practice in finding alternative ways to overcome disadvantages and maximize their power share, which they can use in the country-of-residence as well. This is also an aspect of the adaptability skill they have and can be facilitated through civic and political involvement to reach their demands and expectations – not only for minorities or the migrant political agenda but also related to national issues, as they also directly or indirectly affect their lives.

Even though there is a rich literature on ethnic and religious minorities and many studies approaching migrant groups as ethnic and religious minorities of the country-of-residence (Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2013; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006), the studies that focus on the ethnicity of migrants as a 'minority status' from country-of-residence is limited with some ethnographic studies (Barrier & Dusenbery, 1989; Dhanda, 2013; Metcalf & Rolfe, 2010) and rarely discussed in quantitative studies (Guveli et al., 2017; Spierings, 2014). Fewer studies focus on migrants who are religious minorities in their homelands (Jacobsen & Raj, 2008; Kayyali, 2018), and are mostly descriptive and often conducted using qualitative research methods. Even though these studies provide readers with an understanding of these particular communities, studying these groups is important to understand the processes and challenges they go through in country-of-residences as migrants that may or may not be the same as others. The receiving countries are inclined to treat the migrants from the same country as a whole based on their citizenship. As Juon (2019) suggested, the interest of the largest minority group often overrides the interests of the smaller minorities, and the receiving countries may fail to address the needs of these communities by assuming their needs are the same as the majority from the same country. Comparative studies allow researchers to differentiate migrants belonging to different sub-groups of the same country. Also, as integration is a process, the state intervenes with policies, it helps policymakers to recognize and identify these groups in the larger picture and address the issues accordingly and more effectively. Examining in what ways Christian Pakistanis, ethnic Bosnians from Serbia, and Palestinian Israeli citizens differ from the Muslim Pakistani, Serbian, and Jewish Israeli majority groups that come from these countries prevents over-assumptions about these communities, and

evidence-based policies relieve the burden on them to correct the assumptions and create healthier communication with the receiving country (both as state and society) and the migrant group. Studying these groups in a quantitative approach that uses inferential statistics is important for determining the causality and drawing conclusions to guide decisions. This study aims to enrich literature on migrant integration by comparing minority and majority migrants from the same country.

2.1.5.2 The Role of Collectiveness and Migrant Organizations on Migrant Integration

Aside from the individually inherited skills, minorities are expected to have more collective behavior as well. Minorities have a stronger sense of belonging to their groups compared to the majority, and therefore a more intense collectivity is anticipated among the minority group members in the organizational form.

The migrant collectives, communities, or organizations provide social support and resources to the experienced migrants who have gone through similar processes, creating social capital in the country-of-residence for the migrants. These local communities assist with economic networking and entrepreneurship, helping with family unification and ‘chain migration’ processes, and reduce the level of stress on migrants as it helps if they have social bonds with people alike (Ager & Strang, 2008; Baldwin-Edwards, 2005; Faist, 2010b). While this support can be economic or social in most cases, it also plays a facilitating role for the migrant minorities to know about their rights, obligations as well as procedures in the country-of-residence as part of their integration. Along with improving their knowledge, organizations would also guide their members for collective action, especially for individuals who would be hesitant to do so individually. In that sense, organizations might have some facilitating and encouraging roles in the civic-political integration of individuals.

Due to the fact that group bonds are stronger among minority members, they might become involved in activities conducted by organizations more willingly, embrace the organization agenda, and benefit from the closer network, therefore, improving their civic-political integration process.

The collectives and organizations by the host society also contribute to the integration of migrants by assisting them by offering tools that are beneficial for their integration, such as courses on language or cultural orientations, and organizing social events. The trade unions and churches were influential actors in the adaptation of the guest workers in Germany after the 1960s until the government intervened with policies in 2002 (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016). Creating a social network with the country-of-residence organizations would play an acceleratory role in the civic and political integration of migrants, as they can benefit from the know-hows provided by the organizations related to the systems in the country-of-residence. Furthermore, such organizations might introduce migrants to other organizations or political figures that expand to a network for migrants so that they can increase their involvement in political causes. The cooperation of migrant organizations with organizations formed by the host communities on different causes would assist the political integration of migrants. Such partnerships would help to expand the collective size and influence of migrant groups on the political agenda, which would be particularly more favorable for minority groups with group consciousness and previous experiences regarding the functionality of collective action. Thus, as they also have adaptability skills to find ways to be accepted by these organizations, it is possible to see that the minority organizations would have more interaction with the native organizations in order to be involved in political discussions in the country-of-residence.

Organizational relations may not be limited to civil society in the country-of-residence; the expansion of technologies has allowed the digitalization of networks as well. The use of communication tools and media consumption from a universal perspective such as social media, fades the national borders for migrants to worldwide interactions in real-time (Faist, 2010a; Özkul, 2012). The fast transfer of information allows migrants to develop connections with people and organizations that are dispersed around the world. ‘Migrant transnationalism’ has emerged after the adoption of an individual level of analysis in transnational studies examining the ties and activities of migrants with their home countries as individuals and as communities (Bauböck, 2003; Glick-Schiller, Basch, & Blanc, 1995; Kokot, Tololyan, & Alfonso, 2004; Schuerkens, 2005). However, beyond the countries-of-origin, there are already umbrella organizations and federations formed for better information exchange between the same migrant groups in different countries such as Non-Resident Indians Online or Association for Americans Resident Overseas (“Association for Americans Resident Overseas,” n.d.; “Non-Resident Indians Online,” 1997). These organizations assist their members with adjustments to their countries-of-residence through the migration experience of the same community across the world, along with their activities promoting the preservation of their identities. Migrant transnational activities are not a zero-sum game between affiliation with the country-of-origin (or identity) and integration in the countries-of-residence, but rather these two connections augment each other (Faist, 2010a). Considering that minority groups have more diasporic characteristics such as having historic, ancestral, and cultural distinctiveness, their bonds with fellow minority members across the world are possibly stronger than the majority, and this allows

more transnational connections between minority organizations to exchange experience and best practices to replicate in their country-of-residence.

2.2 The Context of the Study Case: Turkey-Origin Migrants in the UK

To examine the migrant integration of a specific group of migrants in a specific country, it is necessary to discuss the background information regarding both the country-of-residence and the migrant group. The section below provides information regarding the UK's experiences with migrants and its stand on integration policies that draw the borders for migrant integration. It is followed by a section that includes the characteristics and the current integration process of migrants from Turkey in the UK. For a better understanding of the minority and majority status differences among migrants from Turkey, a brief background regarding minority-majority relations in the country-of-origin is also included.

2.2.1 Migrant Integration in the UK

Integration policies in a migrant-receiving country determine the ground for the integration processes of migrants. For instance, easier naturalization policies lead to higher naturalization and access to equal rights in the country-of-resident with natives, or migrant employment rates are in line with natives where countries allocate a larger share for them (Huddleston et al., 2013). Therefore, to be able to rightly examine and interpret the study case here, it is important to understand the context and conditions in the country-of-residence that are related to migrants and integration. The following section starts with the historical evolvement of the migration policies in the UK, which in the early 20th century was composed of 72 currently existing countries as part of colonization (O'Neill, 2022), and any migration from those lands in a way was considered as domestic travel. The UK still


does not have migrant integration policies at the central government level except for refugees, as issues regarding migrant communities in the country are discussed as a part of race relations and minority relations debates.

2.2.1.1 A Brief History of Migration and Integration in the UK

The section introduced in the 1851 UK Census regarding the 100,000 foreign-born population (0.5% of the total population) reflects that the migrant population is not a new phenomenon for the UK (“A summary history of immigration to Britain,” 2014; “Census 1851,” n.d.). Even though there had been a stable increase in the number of foreigners in the following decades, the Second World War is considered a milestone for migration management, as it was also related to the increased mobility of people in need to reconstruct the economies of the war-torn countries, including the UK.

Following World War II, the UK’s imperial power over its territories deteriorated. The death toll for the empire at the end of the war was 450,000, of whom around 200,000 were from the military and 70,000 civilian casualties were from the mainland (“The Deaths in the First and Second World Wars,” n.d.). Restoring the economy became a challenge with the absence of people involved in the production systems. Furthermore, British migration to Australia began in 1947 with an agreement between the two countries; over a million Britons settled in Australia until 1981 (National Archives, 2003; Pullen, 2014). Since the country was short of labor power in the late 1940s, the UK had an “open door” policy for migrants from the UK territories to meet the labor demand in the mainland.

Figure 2 Foreign-born population in England and Wales between 1851-2011²



When the British Nationality Act was issued in 1948, it defined its citizenship in two groups; “United Kingdom and Colonies” and the “Commonwealth,” and provided the same rights to abode and work in the country as well as to hold a UK passport and have suffrage rights (British Nationality Act, 1948). Between the 1931 and 1951 censuses, the foreign-born population in the country increased from 2.7 percent to 4.3 percent (“A summary history of immigration to Britain,” 2014). The migration flows started with the arrival of the Empire Windrush that carried migrants from the Caribbeans, which is also referred to as the West Indies after Colombus’ misidentification of the American continent with India (Phillips, 2011). South Asians were the other large post-colonial migrant group that came to the country (Ballard, 1994; Goulbourne, 1998). After the nationalist movements in newly independent countries like Kenya and Uganda in the 1960s, the Asian population in those countries as well as some Africans started to move to the mainland with their UK passports and the given commonwealth citizenship rights (Shankardass, 2001).

² The figure is retrieved from Migration Watch UK website: [MW48 : A summary history of immigration to Britain | Migration Watch UK](#)

From an integration policy perspective, the UK government as a core integration actor had liberal policies by granting direct citizenship to the first immigrants of the country. The liberal aspect of immigration policies gradually decreased as additional preconditions were introduced for the arrivals from post-colonial and Commonwealth countries. This occurred through Immigration Acts introduced over the years that limited the rights granted to migrants who previously arrived (“Commonwealth Immigration control and legislation,” n.d.; Small & Solomos, 2006; Steinberg, 2000). In the more recent decades, it continued through increasing the securitization of migration and restricting border policies due to refugee flows that started in the 1990s with the dissolution of the SSCR, the Bosnian War, the Iranian Revolution, as well as people escaping from conflicts in their countries such as the Ugandans, Ghanaians, Tamils from South Asia and Kurds from the Middle East (Steinberg, 2000; “the Refugee Council,” n.d.; Vollmer, 2019). This is also the time that migrants from Turkey started to arrive in the country as ‘asylum seekers’; the UK introduced a visa requirement for Turkey on 23 June 1989 and this did not affect the migration flow but rather changed the immigration status. People who left Turkey after the 1980 military coup started to apply for asylum in the UK during this period as they could no longer travel to the UK without a visa (Sirkeci, 2017). The regulations became more restricted in the 2000s with an increase of national security risk discourse after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and then the 7/7 London Bombings in 2005 (Messina, 2022; Umansky, 2016; Vasta, 2007; Vollmer, 2019).

During the earlier flows of migration, since the government were effective in removing barriers faced by migrants in terms of access to resources, the UK did not need a ‘migrant integration’ discourse. Rather, the issue was part of the race relations in the country and this shaped the focus of policies as well. Starting from the race

riots in Notting Hill in 1958 where the Afro-Caribbean migrants and white working-class clashed, and the first Immigration Act introduced in 1962 to address labor integration by restricting entries of commonwealth citizens without securing a job in the UK (“Commonwealth Immigration control and legislation,” n.d.; National Archives, 2003; Steinberg, 2000). Before the flows of migration from colonies and commonwealth countries, the non-whites could be found in coastal towns like Liverpool, or as students or diplomats in London. With the increasing number of non-whites in the country, the 1960s witnessed further race riots, such as Middlesbrough (Banton, 1955; Panayi, 1991; Small & Solomos, 2006). The escalated tensions obliged the government to develop policies that limited migration further by introducing the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1968, followed by the Race Relations Act in the same year.

The Race Relation Act of 1968 can be interpreted as the first broad ‘integration policy’ regarding migrants in the UK, whereas the immigration act further limited the definition of ‘Commonwealth citizen’ and made immigration more inconvenient (“Commonwealth Immigration control and legislation,” n.d.; Steinberg, 2000).

Compared to other countries that had been receiving migrants from ex-colonies, such as France or guest workers like Germany during the same period (Bleich, 2001; Garcés-Masareñas & Penninx, 2016), the UK approached its immigrant population as non-temporary and started addressing the issue by recognizing racial differences. The Race Relations Act made it illegal to discriminate against people “on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins” on the provision of goods, facilities, and services from hotels to banking services, employment, housing, accommodation, business and advertisement (“Race Relations Act 1968,” 1968). Furthermore, the act included the establishment of the Community Relations Commission to establish and

assist “harmonious community relations” and coordinate the measures adopted, which also played an advisory role for the local institutions and their scope of work included providing conferences and courses on ‘training in connection with community relations’. The use of the word “community” rather than “migrants” also indicates the level of inclusion of the migrant groups by de-emphasizing the foreigner aspect regarding these communities. The Race Relations Act was updated and broadened in 1976 by banning racial discrimination in sectors like education, police force, employment as well as applicants, and trade union memberships.

Education is particularly emphasized; it included vocational training along with other educational institutions, and from admission as pupils to becoming service providers (“Race Relations Act 1976,” 1976). The expansion of the act to various sectors and stages in the mechanism depicts two important points: First, despite providing equal opportunities from a legal perspective, discrimination against minorities has been a reality, and secondly, these efforts are a good example of ‘structural integration’ where the state facilitates integration through policies it implemented (Spencer & Charsley, 2016).

Another change in the act is the emergence of the former Race Relations Board and Community Relations Commission under the Commission for Racial Equality as a non-departmental public body to independently address the discrimination (Peppard, 1987; “Race Relations Act 1976,” 1976). The commission is established as a ‘quango’ (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization) that distances integration issues from being manipulated by political power relations, and as a result, from frequent changes (Harrison & Boyd, 2006). Yet, despite the efforts to prevent discrimination through policies, riots by the Afro-Caribbean minorities in 1981 starting from Bristol and spreading to 35 different locations across the country,


mainly driven by race-based socio-economic struggles reflect the weaknesses in implementation (Ball, 2012; Peach, 1986).

Given the increasing number of migrant flows in the 1990s, the Asylum and Immigration Acts focused on the rights and responsibilities of migrants, limiting access to the labor market and services to prevent misuse of asylum statuses and discourage illegal stay, while at the same time introducing the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) to guide asylum seekers on housing and social assistance (“Asylum and Immigration Act 1996,” 1996; “The National Asylum Support Service (NASS),” n.d.; “UK immigration acts through the ages,” 2013). After 2002, “Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Acts” introduced a further screening of migrants through English and citizenship exams for those residing in the country as well as introducing a 5-tier visa system to profile prospective migrants, which has been criticized for having assimilationist connotations (Bassel, Monforte, & Khan, 2018; Modood, 2011; Vasta, 2007). Furthermore, these acts included penalties like imprisonment to discourage nationals who would harbor illegal employment and housing for illegal migrants. Regarding the social cohesion in the country, reports such as the Macpherson Report that investigated police brutality against black people and the Ritchie Report on racial and ethnic discrimination of Asians, and other Race Relation acts included a frame to outlaw discrimination and promote racial equality (Hussain & Bagguley, 2019; Macpherson, 1999; “Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000,” 2000). Amidst the shift of attention from race to faith communities in the country particularly to Muslims, since the terrorists claimed Islam as their motivation for their attacks (Grillo, 2010), the White Paper published in 2001 “Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain” aimed to improve government policies towards minorities at home (Secure Borders, Safe

Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, 2002). Later, the Equality Act 2010 widened the fight against discrimination and provided equal opportunities for groups beyond race; it included religion or belief, age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civic partnership, sex, and sexual orientation (Equality Act 2010, 2010). However, despite the efforts on structural equality, racial discrimination remains an important issue in the UK, and inquiries are made by the House of Lords and the House of Commons for investigations (Black People, Racism and Human Rights, 2020).



Figure 3 A Chronology of Policies Related to Migration and Integration in the UK



2.2.1.2 *The UK in the Integration Policy Indexes*

The UK does not have a national integration policy framework that is used across the country, and each department in the government is responsible for specific areas, for example, education. While the Home Office regulates settlement and citizenship policies, the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government leads community cohesion-related issues. The UK government considers integration to take place at local levels and gives more authority to the local governments and encourages the private and voluntary sectors to be involved in the integration processes (Broadhead, 2020; Department of Communities and Local Government, 2012). The UK government approaches integration issues through assessments by independent commissions to recommend policies and sometimes to investigate certain cohesion incidents in order to better understand the root causes (Hunter & Boswell, 2015; Ndofor-Tah et al., 2019). The policy recommendations from research conducted by these independent groups such as the indicators of integration framework have suggestive roles for authorities and due to their scholarly input, they are commonly referred to in academia such as Ager and Strang's well-known "Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework" article in 2008 which is a subsequent work of their Home Office report on integration in 2004 (Ager & Strang, 2008; Ager & Strang, 2004).

Despite the absence of official guidelines designated to integration, the policy practices in the country are analyzed by integration policy studies that allow cross-country comparative studies. According to the Multiculturalism Policy Index that is initiated by Bantling and Kymlicka, the UK scores 6 out of 8 as of 2020. Given that in the 1980s and 1990s scores were 2.5 and 5, respectively, migration flows from diverse backgrounds in the recent decades and the efforts of the old migrants that

formed communities in the UK might have contributed to the developments on the policy side as well. The index assesses diverse criteria including the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculums, the inclusion of ethnic representation and sensitivity in the media, dress code exemptions, dual citizenship, funding for ethnic organizations or activities, the presence of bilingual education or instructions in mother languages, and affirmative actions for disadvantaged migrants. The UK is placed towards the multiculturalist end rather than assimilationist when scaled, and the missing 2 points on the score are due to the absence of “constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism” and the insufficient emphasis on multiculturalism or anti-racism in the curriculums (Wallace et al., 2021). The Migrant Integration Policy Index is led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and Migration Policy Group (MPG) and examines 8 policy areas (labor market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination). The UK scores 56 out of 100 in this index. Even though it is placed at a middle level, this score is higher than the average of other EU countries. Perhaps due to focusing on race relations and equality, the UK scores 94 on the antidiscrimination dimension. It scores the least in the family reunion (29) and education (40) dimensions, while having 45 points in the political participation aspect, stating that while commonwealth migrants have the right to vote, there were not sufficient efforts to consult and organize minority groups to address their needs. Access to nationality is another aspect that scores high at 61 points. This is due to the obligation of migrants to stay in the country for at least 5 years in order to be able to apply for permanent residency for naturalization. Restrictive requirements such as language and

citizenship tests leave the UK as a country that has “temporary integration” as it leaves immigrants in uncertain positions (Solano & Huddleston, 2020).

Overall, as a home for diverse populations ranging from the imperial colonies to European migrants, the UK has more multiculturalist policies than assimilationist ones even though it does not secure these policies. These policies, such as antidiscriminatory regulations, create more equal opportunities for migrants and minorities to progress in their integration processes at all integration dimensions. Unlike countries that follow assimilationist policies that restrict migrants to take a collaborative part in their integration processes, this multiculturalist perspective in the UK creates an environment for migrants to express themselves and make requests for their integration and allow them to access resources that contribute to their integration journey. This is particularly important for civic and political integration as certain policies such as the right to organize are interrelated with the civic and political behaviors of migrants.

2.2.1.3 Migrant and Minority Profiles in the UK

According to the Annual Population data from 2020-2021, 86 percent of the UK population is white and 14 percent are from ethnic minority groups. Those who are “White- Irish”, “White – Gypsy or Irish traveler” and “White – other” are also classified as ethnic minorities in the UK. Among the minorities, “Asian/ Asian British” make up the largest group (6.9%), followed by “Black/Caribbean/African/ Black British” (3.4%). While “Mixed/ Multiple ethnic groups” compose 2.1 percent of the UK population, and 1.6 of the remaining population is composed of people from all other ethnic categories (Uberoi & Tunnicliffe, 2021). Migrants from Turkey are also considered in this category.

Among the foreign-born population, India-born UK residents are the largest group (896,000) followed by those born in Poland (682,000), Pakistan (456,000), the Republic of Ireland (412,000), and Germany (347,000) (Office of National Statistics, 2021). However, perhaps due to the recency of their migration, Polish nationals did not naturalize at high numbers yet, and therefore, make up the largest group with a nationality other than the UK (696,000). The following largest groups of non-UK nationalities in the country are Indians (370,000), Irish (370,000), Italian (342,000), and Romania (342,000) reflecting the diversity among the non-native population in the country.

The UK also has some degree of diversity in faith as well. According to the 2011 Census, 59 percent of the population is Christian (of which 8 percent is Catholic). Composing 25 percent of the population, people who do not follow any religion make up the second largest group. Islam is the third largest religion in the country (4.5%), followed by Hinduism (1.5%) and Sikhism (0.8%), which reflects the largest migrant population from Southeast Asia. Jewish (0.5%) and Buddhist (0.4%) populations are sizable enough for population monitoring, and other religions make up 0.4 percent of the population (Office of National Statistics, 2020; Faith Survey, 2022). Given that one-third of Muslims and one-fifth of Hindu, Sikh, and Jewish faiths are under the age of 16 and the youth who do not have any religion constitutes 23 percent, compared to 16 percent of Christians under the age of 16, religious diversity in the country seems to be one of the focus points for the evolvement of the population in the following decades. Even though some would consider these as “migrant religions”, data from 2016 depicts that 50 percent of the foreign-born population are Christians, 19 percent Muslim, and 18 percent of migrants have no religion (Apostolova & Hawkins, 2017). These figures challenge the assumptions of

traditional migrant communities; migrant profiles are changing, for instance, migrants from Europe and from Christian backgrounds are the more recent migrants and those who arrived in the past decades from Asia and countries like Turkey are becoming old migrants. The native-born generations of these old migrants have emerged, which allows for researchers to observe their integration process.

In their cross-country comparative study, Alba and Foner (2015) found that the UK has the least gap between the population (14%) and electoral percentage (12%) among immigrant-origin groups. Furthermore, electoral participation is high at 69 percent among ethnic minorities in the UK, even though this turnout is 10 percent lower than the white electorate (Sanders et al, 2014). While there is no difference between minorities and whites in terms of interest in politics (39% to 51% respectively), minorities (25%) tend to participate in nonelectoral activities less than white people (40%) and tend to have less knowledge on politics. This can be interpreted as an ongoing and continuing integration process where even the first UK-born generation rely on their own resources to increase their knowledge on UK politics as they do not inherit any political views or knowledge from their parents when compared to their native fellows.

The continuation of the integration process is also reflected in the figures of minority representation that started at the local level with local councils. In the London borough, where 40 percent of the population is nonwhite, local representatives who do not come from a white background constitute 15.6 percent of the representatives. Representation on a national level is lower, only 4.2 percent of the national legislatures are minorities (Alba & Foner, 2015). While there is room for progress, integration in other dimensions such as economic, educational, and housing aspects are interlinked with the progress in the civic and political dimensions. According to

Garbaye (2002), the emergence of the middle class among minorities played a key role in the UK having relatively higher political descriptive representation at local governments compared to the migrants in France.

2.2.2 Turkey-origin Migrants in the UK

2.2.2.1 The Migration Flows from Turkey to Europe

Turkish emigration waves can be classified into five categories; emigration of the non-Muslim communities from the late Ottoman era to the 1960s, labor migration to Europe and Australia between the 1960s and mid-1970s, political migration in the 1980s and 1990s to Europe, temporary labor migration to the Middle East, North Africa and post-Soviet countries from 1980s onwards, and the sporadic migration of professionals and students to Europe, the US, Canada, and Australia (Aksel, 2014). Currently, around 6.7 million Turkish citizens live abroad, and 5.7 million of them reside in Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Being called guest workers, the stay of labor migrants was intended to be temporary for both the Turkish state and the host countries in Europe. However, through renewals of the agreements and family reunification they extended their stays, and eventually many of the Turkish migrants have settled permanently in the countries they moved to (Icduygu & Aksel, 2013). The second important migration flow from Turkey to Europe mostly included those who were affected by the political tension in the 1970s and sought political asylum after the military coup in 1980, of whom the majority was the ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Alevi) minorities within Turkey (Kirisci, 2003). In recent decades, associated with the increase in human mobility, there is an increase in emigrations from Turkey for education and professional opportunities. For instance, according to UNESCO, each year 49 thousand Turkish citizens seek academic education abroad, and the figure increases to around 100 thousand when students

studying language courses abroad are also included (Karaboga, 2021). Even though students are considered temporary migrants, who eventually return to Turkey, it is not surprising that some others settle in the receiving countries upon finding opportunities. Furthermore, there are around 3 million Turkish citizens who moved back to Turkey, yet are still affiliated with the countries-of-residence as they retired from those countries, receive pensions, and some of them have dual citizenship (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).

2.2.2.2 *Migrants from Turkey in the UK*

Migrants from Turkey to the UK started arriving in the second half of the 20th century as part of the labor migration flow in the post-WWI era (Akgündüz, 2008). However, unlike other countries that hold labor agreements with Turkey, migrants who moved to the UK arrived rather individually as the 1957 Council of Europe Agreement on Movement of Persons allowed Turkish citizens to travel in Europe without visa requirements until 1989 (Groenendijk & Guild, 2010; Peers, 2009). Similar to those who migrated to other European countries, the initial intention of the labor migrants was to stay in the UK temporarily, send remittances to Turkey, and eventually return to their country of origin. However, the majority of them stayed permanently, and through family unification, the number of migrants who came from Turkey without economic reasons expanded. Along with labor migrants, following the 1980 military coup, the UK became a destination for those who fled Turkey as the UK did not require a visa at the time, and for those who applied for asylum (Baser, 2011; Sirkeci et al., 2016). The UK also received a significant number of migrants from Turkey for education purposes. A significant number of them stayed after graduation, along with the professional migrants who benefited from opportunities like the Ankara Agreement, which allowed Turkish citizens to migrate

to the UK as freelance entrepreneurs and which granted them permanent residency before it was terminated with the Brexit (Kucukcan & Gungor, 2009; Sirkeci et al., 2016). In recent years, other migrants include middle-class professionals whose motivation to migrate is human security, that is to avert from socioeconomic uncertainty and distance themselves from the socio-political environment in Turkey (Bilecen, 2022). The migrants from Turkey, however, are not the first group of the “Turkish-speaking community” in the UK. The arrival of Turkish Cypriots to the UK dates back to the earlier decades of the 1900s as a wave of post-colonial migration, which was a result of the Cypriots escaping from the conflict on the island in the 1970s (Bertrand, 2004). Currently, the size of the “Turkish-speaking population” that includes migrant Turks from Turkey, Kurds from Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriots and their descendants is estimated to be between 180,000 and 250,000, when multiple resources are compared (Sirkeci et al., 2016).

2.2.2.3 The Integration Process of Migrants from Turkey in the UK

Compared to migrants from former colonies of the British Empire, migrants from Turkey are considered a new migrant community. Given that the majority (around 76 percent) of them are first-generation foreign-born migrants, they are going through an integration process as a community. In this section, the current situation of the Turkey-origin migrants from an integration perspective will be discussed through the available figures of integration dimensions. Most of the studies that focus on integration policies approach migrants as a whole or focus on the larger migrant communities such as those from Poland, India, and Pakistan (Heath et al., 2013; Kordasiewicz & Sadura, 2017).

One of the most common and quantifiable integration indicators are the labor market outcomes (OECD/European Union, 2019). Demireva’s (2011) study that uses the

British Quarterly Labour Force Survey data indicates that migrants from Turkey are yet to integrate into the UK's labor market. A significant number of Turkey-origin migrant men (24%) are neither in education nor labor compared to 15 percent of the UK's White men and 13 percent of the older migrant communities. The figures are higher for women; 63 percent of Turkey-origin women are outside of education and the labor market. Among the ones in the labor force, the unemployment rates of Turkey-origin men (10%) are more than twice of the men in the native society (4%). The figures are 5 percent and 3 percent, respectively.

The quality of immigrant jobs is another labor integration indicator (OECD/European Union, 2019) and Demireva examines the occupations of migrants in her study. The findings show that more than half of the Turkey-origin migrant men (53%) work in unskilled work and only 10 percent hold some managerial level positions. However, 25 percent of the Turkey-origin migrants are self-employed – this figure is higher than the average self-employment rate (17%) among the locals (Demireva, 2011). Such figures confirm the ethnic-business patterns in the food sector with kebab shops, restaurants, cafes, takeaways, and off-licenses among the Turkey-origin migrants, after the disappearance of the textile industry (Bilecen, 2016). Dedeoglu's study (2014) estimates that the kebab sector alone contributes about 2.2 billion sterling to the UK's economy.

One shortcoming of such business ownership is the unpaid family workers: While family businesses increase the physical involvement of women in a household in the labor force, it often leaves these family members unregistered in the labor system (Dedeoglu, 2014). Aside from the family members, people who benefit from social services find informal jobs in these businesses, get paid less than minimum wage yet compensate with social benefits (Sirkeci et al., 2016). Even though such informality

seems to create a win-win situation, it undermines labor integration and creates an environment open to exploitation in the long run.


Bilecen (2016) argues that the advent of ethnic businesses in the Turkish-speaking community is due to the absence of or limited language skills and lower education attainment – which are among the 11 principles of migrant integration declared by the Council of the European Union (2004). The absence of or limited English proficiency inevitably enclaves the Turkey-origin community and results in less and weak interaction with the host society. Paradoxically, it also creates interdependency among various groups such as Sunnis and Alevis, Turks and Kurds, which eliminates the borders between them in their daily lives.

The report by Strand et al. (2010) highlights that the lower-than-average educational achievement and aspirations among children of Turkey-origin migrants are also linked to lower educational background and language barriers among the migrant parents, which prevents them from engaging in the school performance of their children. However, it should also be noted that the also highlights that school success is increasing among Turkey-origin youth.

The language issue creates barriers to direct access to services as well. Similar to other migrant groups, children accompany their parents for doctor appointments as translation services are limited. Friends, relatives, and other social support networks including community associations are often the main source of information about public services. Even though poor language command creates barriers to integration, these networks are found to be useful in order for migrants to be informed about services and positively contributes to their ability to access these services (Korkmaz Yaylagul, Yazici, & Leeson, 2015).

From a civic and political integration perspective, Turkey-origin migrants indicated significant progress in the last two decades. According to the UK official statistics, the number of Turkey-origin migrants who were granted UK citizenship increased over time; between 2000 and 2017, on average 4.5 thousand Turkey-origin migrants have been granted UK citizenship (Office, 2018). As indicated in the figure below, the number of people who reported their nationality as Turkish remains lower despite the increase in the number of those who were born in Turkey. The gap between the two reflects the number of migrants who have acquired UK citizenship. The number of citizenship grants decreases after 2010, in line with the decrease in the number of citizenship applications. As the UK requires 5 years of residency and one year of permanent residency in order to be eligible for citizenship application, the increase in naturalization after 1997 is possibly an outcome of the migration flow after the 1980s and 1990s.

Figure 4 Naturalization Trends of the Migrants from Turkey between 1990 - 2021



Despite the absence of comprehensive data to measure the trends of the political and civic behaviors among the migrants from Turkey, the increasing presence of Turkey-origin councillors in London boroughs where the Turkey-origin migrants are

concentrated – such as Hackney, Haringey, Enfield, and Islington – is an example of progress in integration (Aydin, 2021). This also gives signs of interest in politics and electoral participation among the Turkey-origin migrants.

Additionally, the Turkish-speaking community has formed over 50 civic organizations, particularly after the intensified number of migrants after the 1980s. Although these organizations were established by a few influential people in the community, they were the pioneers of Turkish-speaking civic society in the UK, which also contributed to the Turkish-speaking society. The purpose of these organizations was to create a network of people who are from the same culture and language to exchange information and experiences as well as to meet their needs from settlement to religious practices (Çoştu, 2018; Uysal, 2016).

2.2.2.4 A Background on Minorities in Turkey

After the Ottoman Empire that had a multiethnic and multireligious structure, the Republic of Turkey was founded as a nation-state in 1923. However, it was rather a “state-nation” where the state aimed to create a new and modern nation through top-down modernization (Heper, 2007). As Casanova summarizes, these monolithic policies shaped Turkey in a way that it was found ‘too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevis and too Turkish for the Kurds’ (Casanova, 2001); and ‘too Muslim for non-Muslim minorities’ (Keyman, 2010). Despite being a home to diverse cultures, many cliques in the society that do not fit in the desired citizen profile faced sanctions and were left on the periphery.

Among 84.7 million people in Turkey, after Turks, Kurds make up the second largest ethnic group. The official statistics in Turkey do not collect data on ethnicity. However, surveys estimate the Kurdish population to be around 16 percent, whereas

those who identify themselves as ethnically Turkish make up 76 percent of the population (KONDA, 2019). Being present in the territories of Iran, Iraq, and Syria along with Turkey for over a thousand years, the Kurds in Turkey are more concentrated in the Eastern/Southeastern regions of the country (Mahmod, 2016; Oktem, 2008; Wahlbeck, 1998). They had some political autonomy in the form of emirates before the establishment of nation-states, and still, today, carry the distinct language and the tribal structure, and (Sunni) religious institutions (yet informally) remained their importance in the modern as distinctive minority characteristics (Van Bruinessen, 1992).

Alevism in Turkey also has historical roots - even the time it started to become institutionalized dates back to the 1300s as a Sufi order (Yildirim, 2017). According to traditional Alevism, it is a denomination of Islam, yet, with different practices such as fasting in the month of Muharram rather than Ramadan and performing cem rather than five daily prayers in mainstream Islam (Cem, 2005; Yildirim, 2018).

There are some differences in the belief systems that place the Alevi faith in a heterodox position as well, which causes doubt among the followers of mainstream Islam and leads to distancing themselves from Alevis (Karolewski, 2008). In recent decades, through urbanization and secularization within the Alevi community, there have been more complicated challenges to continue with traditional practices, and some reformist voices started to demand changes that separate Alevism from Islam as a different faith and redefine it as a philosophy, a culture, a path, and a lifestyle due to its syncretic nature (Aydin & Taskin, 2014; Dressler, 2008; Yaman, 2010). Alevism is not exclusive to any ethnicity, and followers of the Alevi faith consist of both Turkish and Kurdish ethnicities. Historically, the Alevi villages are located in eastern and central Anatolia (Kenanoğlu, 2019).

After the Republic of Turkey was established, in reference to the Lausanne Treaty in 1924, Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities in Turkey were granted official minority status. The context of national identity back then comprised religion as a significant component, therefore, the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey were subjects of the legal recognition process of minorities (Seven, 2007). The article on religion in the constitution in 1924 stated ‘the religion of the state was Islam, the official language was Turkish and its capital was Ankara’ before the article on religion was amended in 1928 to be a secular state (Yılmaz, 2012). Yet still, given that the society predominantly follows Sunni Islam, inevitably, the State had taken the Sunni understanding of Islam into account and the Presidency of Religious Affairs was established in 1924 as a state institute to regulate ‘the religious matters of the State rather than the society’ (Koca, 2014). While assertive policies, such as the closure of all other Sunni religious institutions like tekke and zaviyes, and the change of the call for prayer to Turkish were also oppressive on the Sunni population as part of the new nation-making, Alevis were neither granted legal status nor recognized by the religious institutions (Avşar & Emre Kaya, 2017; Koca, 2014). In the same period, despite being the mother tongue of many citizens, the Kurdish language was not recognized officially, and the Kurds were not provided with minority rights. In the Republican period, these ethnic and religious identities were suppressed under the overarching Turkish national identity (Yeğen, 2004).

In his empirical study, Juon (2019) found that the struggle to share power among minorities often results in ‘minority policies’ in favor of the largest minority group, which overrides the demands of the smaller minorities. Although the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey also had a power struggle, the unrecognition of the Alevi and Kurdish communities caused a deprivation of their rights in the following decades

and pushed them to the periphery. According to Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu (2014), in addition to the assimilationist state policies, these minority groups were exposed to prejudice and negative treatment by the dominant majority group. Consequently, these policies and treatments left these communities mostly excluded from the economic, social, and political spheres (Tezcür & Gürses, 2017; Van Bruinessen, 1996). When these communities reacted to these policies with insurgencies, they were quelled (Tezcür & Gürses, 2017). Due to the political and social conditions, many people internally migrated to Western cities in Turkey, where they also experienced ‘exclusionary recognition’ of the majority and faced discrimination (Saracoglu, 2010).

Concurrently with rapid urbanization in the 1970s, Turkey witnessed an intense political mobilization with the proliferation of various ideological groups; leftist movements, labor unions, as well as far-right groups amid the Cold War. Access to university education allowed some Kurdish and Alevi groups to develop political awareness and they were also involved in a power struggle in this environment by mostly aligning with leftist groups (Alis, 2009; Aydin & Taskin, 2014). Through the years, tension between the leftist and rightist groups escalated to public unrest, and arrests and incarcerations took place across the country. There was the closure of Kurdish organizations, rejection of using the Kurdish language in courts, and deadly attacks on Alevis, such as the Maras massacre (Akkaya, 2013; Poyraz, 2005). After the 1980 coup, the socio-political environment became intolerable in Turkey with military oppression on one hand and the Kurdish Workers’ Party’s (PKK) terrorist attacks on the other, many Kurds and Alevis started to migrate to Europe seeking asylum with reference to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Massicard, 2013; Sirkeci et al., 2016). Migration waves continued in the

1990s as the decades-long armed conflicts between the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish state escalated, which also put many apolitical and unarmed Kurds in the crossfire (Gunter, 1990; Wahlbeck, 1999).



CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF MINORITY STATUS IN CIVIC-POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANT INDIVIDUALS: AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction

Migrant individuals are the oldest key actors of migrant integration; from assimilationist perspectives that put all the burden on the shoulders of the migrant individual to achieve blending into their new environment, to the theories that distribute the burden among additional actors – varying from individuals and institutions in the country-of-residence and country-of-origin to supranational entities, migrants themselves remain at the heart of integration discussions both as the subjects and actors (Garcés-Mascreñas & Penninx, 2016; Gordon, 1964; Hellgren, 2015; Modood, 2011).

Regardless of the reason of their migration, after moving to a new environment they are not rooted, migrants try to replant their lives there. Integration is the process they go through not only to ensure their survival but also to replenish and become a part of this new habitat. Recognizing that the external factors such as the policies, attitudes, and conditions in the country-of-residence significantly determine the integration process (Berry et al., 2006; Geddes, 2003; Rudiger & Spencer, 2003), this chapter focuses on migrants themselves as individuals and attempts to determine the characteristics that play a predictive role in their civic-political integration

through a micro-level analysis. Particularly, the impact that being a minority or majority in the country-of-origin has on the civic-political integration in the country-of-residence will be tested. The core argument in this dissertation claims that migrants who have a minority status in their country-of-origin develop adaptability to a dominating majority without losing their identities due to their higher group consciousness that can be transferred to the country-of-residence. Thus, it is expected to observe higher scores on civic-political integration indicators among the minorities compared to majorities.

Examining migrants on an individual level allows us to understand the effectiveness of policy interventions and through causal relationships in cross-national studies, as well as to capture the differences across migrant groups in a given country (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Gabrielli, 2015; Pasetti, 2015). Understanding such differences contributes to the utilization of resources efficiently through the customization of the needs of different migrant groups with certain characteristics. Furthermore, individual-level data enables the exploration of integration patterns because the process in different integration dimensions influence each other. For instance, people who are economically integrated also have higher integration in the political sphere (Schur, 2003).

While individual-level data is informative to understand the integration processes, it is also equally important to frame how to measure integration in a quantitative study. There are efforts to untangle integration dimensions to enable empirical research on the theoretical end (Spencer & Charsley, 2016), yet it is more challenging to determine the indicators and create models that reflect what integration is and how well migrants perform on their integration processes. While this is relatively easier for aspects such as market integration, where the expected outcomes are more

tangible such as employment rates, average work hours, distribution of professions, the ratio of managerial positions they occupy, etc., dimensions such as civic and political integration remain more abstract and comprises many assumptions. As will be discussed in the theoretical perspectives section below in more detail, this chapter suggests a new frame to measure civic and political integration in a quantitative method by using individual-level data that is collected from migrants themselves as the primary source.

Using individual-level survey data and a new empirically testable definition of civic and political integration of migrants, this chapter aims to test the main argument in this dissertation. Through using ordinal logistic regression models, the role of ethnic and religious minority status in the country-of-origin on the civic and political integration in the country-of-residence has been examined by comparing Turkey-origin migrants in the UK as the minority (Kurdish/Alevi) and majority (Turkish/Sunni) group members.

In an age that has higher human mobility and immigration compared to earlier centuries thanks to the technological developments in transportation, migrant integration will remain an unageing subject. Therefore, examining the mechanisms of migrant integration processes contributes to better migration and integration management, effective facilitation of integration processes in areas that require intervention, and prevents the escalation of potential social tension between the migrant and local communities.

3.2 Theoretical Perspectives

As mentioned in the previous chapters, scholars do not have an agreed definition of integration and they are inclined to define their integration categories. In this study, the concept of ‘civic-political integration’ is preferred, as it equally adds emphasis on both the civic and political aspects of integration where the main actor is migrants themselves (Spencer & Charsley, 2016).

In order to measure the civic and political integration of migrants on an individual level in an empirical way, this study suggests a new frame to define and develop indicators for civic and political integration by strengthening interdisciplinary communication in the integration literature. The argument here has a holistic notion beyond the *political participation* of migrants – which is the focus of the political science literature on migrants. The interdisciplinary nature of migration and integration studies requires close interaction between disciplines in order to have an (almost) complete picture. The approach here combines civic and political participation with the psychological aspects of integration.

Aside from civic-political participation, the first aspect that is suggested to be included in the integration process assessments is the ‘cognitive aspect’, which is called ‘political knowledge’ by Barrett and Brunton-Smith (2014), referring to the knowledge and interest in civic and political integration. Throughout the text, the term ‘political knowledge’ is exclusively used for ‘knowledge and interest in politics in the country-of-residence’. Secondly, given that integration is (at least) a two-way process between migrants and the country-of-residence (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013) and understood as migrants’ becoming part of society’ (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014), here, it is argued that the perception of migrants about how much they see themselves as ‘a part of society’ should be a core component of the integration

process. Therefore, the second aspect that should be included is the emotional aspect – which is termed as ‘belongingness’ to the civic and political environment in the country-of-residence.

In addition to the interdisciplinary approach, the measurability of these aspects is another challenge that this study attempts to overcome. The model introduced here also enables a quantifiable evaluation while focusing on the migrants themselves as the integration actors. The section below discusses the new civic and political integration model suggested here and explains the newly introduced aspects and indicators to be used for an empirical assessment. Due to its novelty, this study also acknowledges that the model has to be tested more and that there is still more room for improvement.

3.2.1 A New Civic and Political Integration Model

Migrant political integration literature is dominated by electoral and political participation studies using migrants as cases (Chui, Curtis, & Lambert, 1991; Lien, 1994; Martinello, 2006; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006; Just & Anderson, 2012; Scuzzarello, 2015) due to two reasons. First, compared to migrant integration, political participation literature dates back to the 20th century when Rousseau defined participation as involvement in the decision-making process and as a tool to protect individual interests, and to sustain a check and balance mechanism for the government (Qvortrup, 2003). Participation has evolved through time by the recognition of the reactionary role of people, which became even more complex with the inclusion of interactivity in digital media in the 2000s (Riley et al., 2010; Sartori, 1962). Thus, there is standalone literature examining political participation and democratic involvement. Secondly, migrants are minority groups in a country-of-residence and because they are smaller in size, it is not easy to obtain data.

Therefore, the limited comparative quantitative data is often retrieved from large cross-national studies and is used in aggregated forms that combine data from all countries available in these datasets and categorizes participants as ‘migrants and non-migrants’ (Doomernik, J., Kraler, A., & Recihel, D., 2010; Just & Anderson, 2012; Tyrber, 2020). Since these datasets are composed of questions covering many aspects of life, inevitably, the items for politics related questions are limited with some electoral and other participation forms, basic political interest, attitude, and questions on party affiliation (Bijl & Verweij, 2012; Belhadj Kouider, Koglin, & Petermann, 2014; European Social Survey, 2020). Nevertheless, political participation is a significant component of migrant civic-political integration, and political participation literature played a significant role during the study design.

3.2.1.1 Components of the Integration Model

Participation

As electoral participation is the most common political participation behavior across democracies, it is extensively used as an indicator when measuring political participation. While the studies focusing on elections has specific literature covering a wide range of issues from electoral volatility to the acceptance of ideologies to examine the behavior of the electorate (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Geers & Strömbäck, 2019; Patterson, 2019; Verba & Nie, 1972), electoral participation of the minorities from migrant backgrounds has also become a rising interest for scholars (Davis et al., 2011; Gimpel et al., 2007; Jackson, 2003; Logan, Darrah, & Oh, 2012). These studies can be criticized for only focusing on the naturalized migrants and leaving the many migrants who do not have voting rights, except in some cases where the non-citizen migrants become “denizens” who are allowed to participate in the local elections (Nye, 2007). Yet, they significantly contribute to the literature as

concerns over migrant integration are on the rise as the proportion of migrants and their descendants increase in Europe (OECD/European Union, 2019). Electoral participation is included in this study as an indicator of political participation.

The scope of political participation has expanded beyond voting through decades, with any action that contributes to political processes in a country, including any democratic practices, activities on digital platforms, and sometimes even criminal behaviors that have political consequences (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014; Riley et al., 2010; Van Deth, 2014). From an empirical perspective, the measurable unconventional political behaviors included political party or civic organization membership, contacting politicians, wearing signs of political parties, signing petitions, donating to political parties, contacting media, lobbying, and many other activities that directly or indirectly have an impact on the policies and policymakers (Adamson, 2006; Gimpel et al., 2007; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004; Just & Anderson, 2012; Martinez, 2005).

Even though these activities are necessary democratic practices, there is an assumption about the presence of a strive for such participation. Dalton (2013) offers a taxonomy of modes of activities and their characteristics such as the type of influence these activities have, whether there is conflict involved or not, the level of effort required, and cooperation with others. Among the conflict categories, he highlights the partisan conflict and the conflictual nature of protests, which inspired this study to approach the issue from an advocacy or striving perspective to group civic and political activities. Indeed, involvement in some activities like donating to a political party is different than signing a petition; the former has an ideological or policy agenda that the individual feels affiliated with and provides active support, whereas the latter can be complaints or requests, for instance, a complaint about

some broken streetlights. Thus, in this study, these activities are grouped into two categories: (1) civic and (2) political. While civic participation is mostly motivated by concerns in daily life and voluntary initiations, political participation has the purpose of influencing governance, public policy implementation, and the selection of policymakers (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014; Verba et. al., 1995).

Differentiating between political and civic participation is more suitable here to measure migrant civic-political integration from a quantitative analytical perspective.

Political knowledge

Other than participation, there is a second component of civic and political integration suggested here as 'political knowledge'. Highlighting the cognitional aspect related to politics, Barrett and Brunton-Smith (2014) also conceptualized it as engagement where they draw the lines around being interested in politics, paying attention to the political agenda, having knowledge, holding opinions and attitudes regarding the political and civic issues in the country. From an integration perspective that goes beyond political participation, taking any civic and political action requires obtaining enough knowledge regarding the subject, the structure of the competent authorities for decision-making, the political system in the country, the governmental and judicial structure, political parties and their views, and political rights and limitations of migrants, and so on to proceed with a judgment before developing an opinion and make decisions. While this is also true for natives in the host society, they are exposed to the political atmosphere in these countries at an early age and through a natural process, compared to migrants who have to put conscious efforts to understand the structure and reach similar levels of civic-political knowledge the natives have. This is also true for their descendants; they often do not inherit political knowledge from their migrant parents regarding the

politics in the country-of-residence like natives, and they also have to go through a knowledge acquisition process to set their political views, attitudes and practices based on how they are perceived and treated by society and political actors, access to similar resources and opportunities, and other relevant factors. Therefore, the political knowledge component is an indicator of the integration process of migrant groups about their knowledge and interest in the civic and political developments in the country they live in.

Belongingness

Aside from the political participation literature and the cognitional aspect, psychology scholars also approach migrant integration from the aspects of attachment to, affiliation, and identification with the host country and its society (Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2016; Scuzzarello, 2015; Yuval-Davis, 2006). It is considered to be the emotional component of the integration of migrants (Spencer & Charsley, 2016), which combines their feelings towards the country-of-residence as well as their reactions to the attitudes they receive from both the state and society. While there are some popular opinions in host societies that demand loyalty from migrants to consider them integrated and even expect migrants to cut their affiliation with their origin countries, some other views consider learning and abiding by the rules of the country-of-residence would be satisfactory. How migrants perceive these attitudes and whether they feel accepted by society is a matter of integration. Thus, it is believed here that a belongingness component plays a complementary role that reflects integration as a two-way process between the country-of-residence (as state and society) and migrants. Belongingness can be particularly important for the generations born and raised with their native fellows in the country-of-residence. While migrants have some bonds with their country-of-origin, this bond is weaker

among the second generation, as they do not have the background of and interaction with the origin country like their parents who grew up there. Belongingness to the country-of-residence would prevent them from isolation, which refers to the alienation from affiliations with both the country-of-origin and residence (Berry et al., 2006). Belongingness also helps migrants and their descendants to have ownership of the issues in the country-of-residence and encourages them to determine the areas that have the potential for improvement for a more bounded society.

While Spencer & Charsley consider belongingness (which they term as identity) as a separate dimension, this study argues that it should be a component of each integration dimension as migrants might feel a sense of belonging to one dimension (e.g. labor market integration of guest workers) and feel isolated from another (e.g. social integration). Thus, assessing belongingness to the civic and political environment in a country-of-residence might contribute particularly to understanding the civic and political integration of migrants and their descendants from an emotional perspective.

In summary, migrant integration is an interdisciplinary subject. Therefore, for a holistic understanding, accumulated knowledge from multiple relevant disciplines needs to be taken into consideration for each integration dimension. In this study, which focuses on civic-political integration, the developed model combines political science literature with psychology (cognitive and emotional) and is composed of three indicators: (1) political knowledge, (3) participation, and (3) belongingness. Briefly, while ‘participation’ is playing the game (by its rules), ‘political knowledge’ is knowing what the game is and what the rules are, and ‘belongingness’ is being a

team member in the game. The quantification of these components and the variables to be used will be explained in the research design section below in detail.

3.2.2 Factors Influencing the Civic and Political Integration of Migrants

Comparative studies that focus on political participation often examine the demographic attributes, as these are the general information collected in large cross-national datasets. Gender is the most commonly used characteristic in these studies. Traditionally, men have been found significantly more involved in political activities and have more interest in politics compared to women, which is considered interrelated to the higher educational attainment of men compared to women and the higher labor involvement among men (Schlozman, Burns, & Verba, 2006; Vrablikova, 2010). The gender difference is also observed in migrant political participation as well (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014; Itzigsohn & Saucedo, 2005). Aside from gender, age is another factor that influences political participation. Older people are more involved in politics than youth, and this is also the case among migrants (Jennings, 1996; Riley et al., 2010; Youth Political Participation, 2017). For migrants, the generation they are from in the country-of-residence is another factor that affects political behaviors; the first generation of migrants are less likely to attend politics in the country-of-residence compared to the later generations born in the country. The time a migrant spent in the country-of-residence is also another factor that allows for comparison among migrants from the same generation. The length of stay in a country-of-residence is found positively associated with integration, as migrants who have been exposed to and who are familiar with the practices in the country-of-residence increases overtime (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Lopez & Marcelo, 2008; Maxwell, 2010; Stepick, Stepick, & Labissiere, 2008).

Education influences political involvement of both natives and migrants (Helliwell & Putnam, 2007; Just & Anderson, 2012; Kam & Palmer, 2008) and it is associated with the social mobility of minority groups (Shiner & Modood, 2002). The more educated the people are, the more they show interest and participate in politics. Education is also examined under the socio-economic status of people as these two are correlated with social capital (Emler & Frazer, 1999; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004; ZOOM, 2017). Specific education on the rights and duties of people in a society and civic education curriculums at schools are found to significantly predict civic and political involvement among people (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014).

Employment is also found to be positively associated with civic and political involvement. Studies link the labor force and gender together when examining participation; as labor participation increases, women participate in politics significantly more (Schlozman et al., 2006; Schur, 2003). The people involved in the labor force have more opportunities to interact with others and gain knowledge on civic and political issues at the local and national levels, as well as to participate in unions, and practice civic demand through collective action. However, the employment status of migrants has inconsistent results on political participation among them (Chui, Curtis, & Lambert, 1991; Just & Anderson, 2012), which is also perceived as a preventative factor from civic activities because of long working hours (Bilecen, 2016).

Studies show that family plays a role in people's involvement in civic and political life, through social learning (Barrett & Brunton-Smith, 2014). For migrants, labor migrants in particular, having a family residing in the country-of-residence or back in their origin country plays a role in the decision they make as to whether their migration will be a temporary endeavor or whether it will become indefinite

(ZOOM, 2017). Migrants whose spouses are with them feel more attached to the country-of-residence in comparison to the singles whose movements are more independent.

Religion and religiosity are other interests of political participation studies. Higher religious attendance is found to have an impact on higher electoral participation (Kurek & Falkowski, 2022). Among immigrants, attendance to the religious practices is higher in countries with multiculturalist integration policies compared to the countries that implement assimilationist policies (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011) and youth that have different religious beliefs have different levels of acculturation in the country-of-residence (Berry et al., 2006). Religiosity is also found to be associated with a migrant's country-of-origin, the religiosity of natives in the country-of-residence, as well as the date of migration (Van Tubergen, 2006, Van Tubergen 2011; Van Tubergen & Sindradóttir, 2011).

Proficiency in the language of the host country is seen as a tool for non-native speakers to directly access information similar to natives and to express themselves. Studies indicate that migrants who are more fluent in the language of the host society have higher levels of political and civic involvement (Berger, Galonska, & Koopmans, 2004; Bohl & Schader, 2010; Castles et al., 2014; Jacobs & Tillie, 2004; Togeby, 2004).

Migrant integration processes differ by their origin countries; migrants coming from post-colonial countries that have prior knowledge on the language and culture go through different integration processes (Bosma, 2012; Rutter, 2015), whereas migrants from different countries integrate better in different dimensions, such as Ecuadorians in Spain have higher integration in education and labor markets in Spain

compared to Moroccans (Gabrielli, 2015), Chinese have higher education attainment while Indians are better integrated in labor in the UK (Unterreiner, 2015), Iranians have higher educational scores compared to Turkish citizens in Sweden, whereas naturalization is higher among Turkish citizens as Turkey promotes dual citizenship but is formally forbidden in Iran (Pasetti, 2015). Other studies that focus on the impact of the country-of-origin examine the urban-rural backgrounds of migrants as well as the reason for migration in order to investigate their integration into the country-of-residence (Ager & Strang, 2008; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011; Mugge, 2010; Stephen, 2012).

Previous comparative studies depict that individual characteristics play an influential role in migrant integration and civic and political behaviors. Understanding these differences allow researchers and policymakers to determine the fragile groups and areas that might need policy investment to boost their integration and to not leave them behind other migrants. Along with individual characteristics, some country-of-origin related characteristics also affect the integration process of migrants that deserves attention as a third actor in integration. Thus, the minority and majority status of migrants in their country-of-origin as a personal characteristic in the country-of-origin might also have an impact on the integration process of migrants.

3.2.3 Ethnicity and Religious Identity on Civic and Political Integration of Migrants

This study focuses on the role of ethnic and religious minority status on the migrants' civic and political integration in the country-of-origin. "Race and ethnicity" are commonly examined in political participation studies – particularly in the American context, and they are often interlinked with minority studies (Lien, 1994; Sears & Savalei, 2006; Shingles, 1981; Wong, Lien, & Conway, 2005). Other

studies that focus on the political participation of migrant groups and their descendants compare migrants by their country-of-origin, and the findings display mixed results with each civic political behavior (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Gallego, 2007; Heath et al., 2013; Martiniello, 2006; O'Neill, 2006; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006; Stepick et al., 2008). Studies that use the country-of-origin as a comparative measure among the migrants in a country-of-residence have also found significant differences in other migrant integration dimensions, such as economic integration, schooling, and obtaining dual citizenship (Gabrielli, 2015; Huddleston & Dag Tjaden, 2012; Pasetti, 2015; Unterreiner, 2015). As migrants from different countries differ from each other primarily because they have unique experiences in their country-of-origins, the subgroups in a country with unlike experiences might also differ from those who come from the same country.

Religious minorities are another interest for quantitative and qualitative researchers (Barrier & Dusenbery, 1989; Connor & Tucker, 2011; Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011). Integration studies often approach religious minorities from the perspective of the culture and values of the country-of-residence, and bias and prejudices of society against them make it more difficult for them to integrate (Berry et al., 2006; Statham et al., 2005).

However, as migrants in general are hard to reach populations due to obstacles related to their “inclusion, identification, access, motivation and trust” (Tyldum, 2021), the diversity within them are often understudied in quantitative research. Presence of quantitative studies is particularly important for migrant integration as it is a process; comparative studies, especially causal analyses, lead to appropriate integration policies and practices which would make such processes smoother, prevents marginalization among migrants and decreases prejudices of the host

society towards migrants, to maintain social cohesion in the country. Furthermore, having a comprehensive knowledge about the inner dynamics of the migrant communities in a country indirectly contributes to the foreign affairs with the country-of-origins these migrants emigrated from.

3.3 Research Design

3.3.1 Research Aim and Questions

This chapter examines migrant individuals as the micro-level actors of migrant integration through the migrant community from Turkey that settled in the UK. The research question asks whether having a minority status in the country-of-origin has a facilitating role in the civic and political integration of these individuals in the country-of-residence when they migrate. The aim is to understand whether migrants with an ethnic or religious minority identity in their country-of-origin differ from migrants who are of the ethnic or religious majority from the same country-of-origin in terms of their civic and political integration into the country-of-residence. And if they do, what aspects from which differ from each other will be explored.

3.3.1.1 Research Hypotheses

The impact of the minority status from the country-of-origin on civic-political integration in the country-of-residence among migrants from Turkey living in the UK will be tested with the following hypotheses for each indicator:

Political Knowledge

1. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK have a higher political knowledge – they are more interested in UK politics and have higher levels of knowledge about their representatives – than the majority (Turk/Sunni)

Participation

2. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK *participate in elections* more than the majority (Turk/Sunni)
3. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK *participate in non-electoral political activities* more than the majority (Turk/Sunni)
4. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK *participate in civic participatory activities* more than the majority (Turk/Sunni)

Belongingness

5. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK *have a higher sense of belonging to the UK political system* than the majority (Turk/Sunni)
6. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK *feel represented in the UK political system* more than the majority (Turk/Sunni)
7. The minority (Kurd/Alevi) in the UK *feel that minorities are represented in the UK political system* more than the majority (Turk/Sunni)

3.3.2 Data and Methodology

This study analyzes the political integration of people who migrated from Turkey to the UK or were born to migrant parents from Turkey. Despite the disagreements about the size of the Turkish population in the UK, the UK Office of National Statistics have information about the languages spoken at home, ethnicity, and country of birth at the county level. When these indicators are cross-checked, it is found that there are 106,750 migrants from Turkey and their descendants; 71,301 of them are Turkish, 19,880 Kurdish, and 15,569 are Cypriot Turks (UK Census, 2011). These numbers confirm the work of Sirkeci et al; “Little Turkey in Great Britain” with some slight updates in the census calculations after their publication (Sirkeci et al., 2016). The initial survey sample is determined as 600 with a +/-4 confidence interval at 95 percent confidence level, yet due to the difficulty of access to the population, the sample was finalized with 506 participants with a confidence interval of +/-4,36. To have a comparable sample from each Turkey-origin community

mentioned above, the ratios were determined as 47 percent for Turks, 32 percent for Kurds, and 21 percent for Turkish Cypriots. Cypriots are excluded due to the purpose of this study, and the total sample size is set as 398,000 with 236,000 Turkish and 162,000 Kurdish migrants from Turkey in the UK.

The data was collected between 7 April and 31 May 2017, by a private company with face-to-face surveys by 7 interviewers for an independent project. To avoid any potential resentment between the two ethnic groups that could have impacted the data quality, the survey was designed in a way that is applicable to any minority group resident in the UK and terms such as ‘your home country’ are used instead of Turkey. The interviewers were trained on the survey content as well as with interviewing techniques and were provided with detailed written guidelines to ensure the quality of the data.

3.3.3 Measuring Civic-Political Integration: The Dependent Variables

The indicators of political integration have been determined based on the literature that focuses on multiple aspects of integration, and three main indicators have been set: Political knowledge, participation, and belongingness. Following Barret and Brunton-Smith’s view, there was a distinction made between political knowledge (they call it engagement) and participation, where political knowledge included the level of interest, knowledge, and motivation, and political participation refers to involvement in activities. Therefore, the third indicator here will be belongingness, specifically in this study, to the political system.

Political Knowledge

For the political knowledge indicator, the data includes three components; (1) interest in UK politics and knowledge about their representatives both at the local

and national level; namely (2) local Councillor and (3) the Member of Parliament.

The political interest question uses a 5-point Likert scale where 1 refers to “not at all interested” and 5 is for “very interested”. The knowledge questions are designed as 4-point scale questions where the lowest score is 1 for those who do not know their representatives at all, and 4 means knowing them “to a great extent.” The political knowledge indicator will be measured by creating a factor to be used in the logistic regression model.

Participation

In the literature, civic and political participations are often discussed under the same category as they are practices of democracy. This study attempts to differentiate them as two components based on the purposes and motivations behind (OSCE, 2017; Spencer & Charsley, 2016; Waters & Gerstein Pineau, 2015). Such distinction allows a comprehensive approach for migrant civic participation in activities which may not necessarily be driven politically, yet, would still contribute to the policymaking process and creating solutions while the political participation is more about ‘campaign activities’ that has a political stand (Dalton, 2013). In this study, it is found worthy to approach these two components, political and civic participation, separately.

Political participation

As the studies focusing on political participation examine participation as electoral and non-electoral (Barnes et al., 1978; Graaff, 2017; Linssen et al., 2018; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006), this approach is also employed in this study. In the literature, the most common political participation activity is electoral participation across democracies, and quite a few people are involved in non-

electoral activities (Wike & Castillo, 2018). While this is one reason for this study to focus on citizens only, it is expected to see less non-electoral participation compared to electoral participation.

A. Electoral participation

The data used in this study is collected from naturalized citizens or those born as UK citizens to parents who emigrated from Turkey. The electoral participation question asks “Have you voted in the 2015 UK elections?”, where the local and general elections were held on the same day (May 7th, 2015). The variable had the response options of “yes” “no” and “not eligible by the time of the election.” The participants who were ineligible to vote during the elections were excluded from the analysis after confirming that neither ethnicity nor religious status significantly differ from each other among the ineligible. Therefore, the variable became a binary variable with the responses “(0) no” and “(1) yes.”

B. Non-electoral participation

Voting takes place in 4-5 years of periods. However, non-electoral political activities allow the continuation of democratic mechanisms during the non-electoral season as well. To examine the non-electoral political behaviors, the participants were asked about their behaviors in British politics;

- (1) whether they are a political party member,
- (2) donated to a political party in the UK,
- (3) attended a political rally,
- (4) displayed signs such as stickers or posters, and

(5) if they have attempted to convince someone to vote for a specific party or person.

The binary responses to these questions (yes=1, no=0) have been transformed to an index with a 5-point scale, where 5 indicates participation in all the listed activities, and 0 means no participation at all.

Civic participation

Civic participation in this study is defined as the involvement in actions to solve community-related issues the migrants and their descendants face. The question in the survey asks, “To solve a community related problem, have you ever...” and has the 9 behaviors to be used in the civic participation index in the analysis;

(1) signing a petition,

(2) attending a protest or rally,

(3) contacting local councillors,

(4) contacting a Member of Parliament,

(5) contacting lobby organizations (such as unions, and business associations)

(6) contacting the media,

(7) cooperating with civic organizations in the UK,

(8) boycotting certain people, parties, events, or products, and

(9) participating in social media campaigns.

Similar to the political participation index, the practice of each behavior was asked in a binary format of “(1) yes” and “(0) no”. Therefore, the civic participation index is created as a 9-point scale index focusing on the civic aspect of migrants’ civic-

political integration, where 0 indicates no civic participatory action at all and 9 refers to participation in all 9 civic activities asked in the questionnaire.

Belongingness

Belongingness in migrant integration is often defined as social belonging, acceptance, and identification with the host community. However, as argued above, given that different integration dimensions are actualized at different paces by migrants, belongingness to the country-of-residence within each of the integration dimensions might differ among migrants from particular aspects. Therefore, here, the belongingness components specifically focus on how the political system makes the participants feel about (1) their inclusion, (2) their representation, and (3) their opinions about minority representation in the UK's political system.

A. Feeling included in the political system

During the surveys, the respondents were given a list of statements and asked how much they agree or disagree with each one of them. The statement “[the political system in the UK] makes me feel like I belong here” is used as one of the indicators in this study to measure the belongingness aspect of civic political integration. The scale in the questionnaire was a 5-point Likert scale where 1 referred to “strongly disagree” with the abovementioned statement, and 5 referred to “strongly agree” with it. However, this scale is contracted to 3-points due to the skewness of the responses causing analytical obstacles. Therefore, the belongingness variable has been treated as a categorical variable with the categories of “(1) not feeling included,” “(2) neither feeling included nor not included” and “(3) feeling included.”

B. Feeling represented

The respondents were asked whether they feel represented in the political system in the UK through their agreement level with the statement “It [the UK political system] makes me feel politically represented”, and the responses were categorized similarly to the “feeling included in the political system” variable above. The three categories where the two lowest responses were grouped under “(1) do not feel represented.” While the “(2) neither agree, nor disagree with the statement” remained ungrouped, and the highest two responses were grouped under “(3) feel represented”.

C. Feeling that minorities represented

The last item in the belongingness analysis is the perception of whether migrants feel that the UK political system represents minorities. The statement in the questionnaire is “minorities are represented sufficiently [in the UK political system]” and the previously 5-point scale responses were grouped in 3-point scales: “(1) not feeling represented”, “(2) neither” and “(3) feeling represented”

These three components, political knowledge, participation, and belongingness, have been considered the three indicators of the civic-political integration of migrants, and each indicator will be tested for multiple hypotheses.

3.3.4 Measuring Civic-Political Integration: The Control Variables

Previous studies have found age, gender, education, proficiency in the language of the country-of-residence, generation, employment status, marital status, and religiosity as significant predictors for migrants, which reflect that migrant integration is influenced by certain individual characteristics as well. Thus, these variables are included as control variables in this study. Age is calculated by using the birth year and the date of the survey and treated as a continuous variable. Gender

has been coded as a binary variable where 1 is “male” and 2 is “female”. Education question initially had 7 different levels that reflect both the education levels in Turkey and the UK. Yet, due to the small size of the participants, education levels are grouped as 3 categories based on the distribution in the dataset. The categories include, “(1) middle school and below”, “(2) high school” and “(3) higher education.” The language proficiency was designed as a 5-point scale where 1 referred to ‘very poor’ and 5 referred to ‘very good.’ However, the responses for “very poor,” “poor” and “neither good, nor poor” were quite few, therefore, they were grouped together as ‘(1) below good’. In the newly grouped 3-point scale the other categories were “(2) good” and “(3) very good”. Generation variable is generated from the question that asks the country respondents were born, and migrants are coded as 0 and the generation born in the UK is coded as 1. Employment question in the survey was another question with wide range of answers including different occupations. Yet, the data size was not enough to benefit from such variety, and in line with the literature, the variable is coded as “(0) unemployed” and “(1) employed.” Similarly, marital status also had answer options such as divorced. but due to the small number of responses (only 3 people), they were grouped under “(0) single” as their marital status and married people are categorized as 1 in the newly created binary variable. Religiosity question designed as a self-reporting question where the participants evaluated their religiosity in a 5-point scale ranging from “(1) not at all religious” to “(5) very religious.” The distribution within the responses were sufficient to include the variable in the data without further grouping.

3.3.5 Limitations

As minorities are hard to reach populations and increase the cost of conducting surveys, (Shaghghi et al., 2011) the study was limited to the Greater London Metropolitan Area. Given that an overwhelming size of the Turkey-origin population resides in Greater London (97%), the survey was limited to covering this specific region rather than the entire country. Secondly, the data is limited to people who obtained UK citizenship through birth or naturalization.

This study recognizes and appreciates the criticisms that many migrants do not have citizenship of their country-of-residence to become eligible to participate in elections in most places, which results with exclusion of an important number of migrants from the studies on migrants' political behavior (Just & Anderson, 2012). However, another limitation is absence of large datasets from the migrants for a comparison of citizens and non-citizens in terms of their political behaviors. Therefore, in this study, focusing only on those who have citizenship is found appropriate to examine electoral and non-electoral participation to compare migrants with minority and majority backgrounds from the same country-of-origin. Non-political participation is generally lower than electoral participation for both migrant and native communities (Bishop & Davis, 2002; Heath et al., 2013), and thus, more survey studies with larger sample sizes may reach a sufficient number of non-citizen migrants to examine their civic and non-electoral political participation, which then helps to understand the behaviors of migrants who are in earlier stages of their integration processes. Larger sample sizes would also allow a better understanding of other influential factors such as employment in different sectors, educational levels, and year spent in the country.

Lastly, because naturalization is considerably easier in the UK compared to many other countries (Wallace et al., 2021), this study may have a higher coverage of migrants from Turkey residing in the UK, though, non-citizens are not included. While the sample in this survey serves the purpose of the study, the exclusion of non-citizens is an important limitation.

3.4 Findings

The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 below for dependent, independent, and control variables. Among the dependent variables, the political knowledge indicator is composed of interest in politics and knowledge of local and national representatives. Thus, using these three variables, factor analysis was conducted to compose a 'political knowledge variable (Cronbach's Alpha=0.854). The descriptive findings indicate that the participant has a below-moderate level of political knowledge in politics in the UK. Regarding participation, migrants from Turkey tend to participate in elections. However, they are involved in fewer non-electoral political and civic activities. In terms of belongingness, most of the participants feel that they belong to the political system in the UK, while the figure is slightly lower, but at mid-level, when they were asked if they feel represented in the system. Many believe that minorities are not sufficiently represented in the UK's political system.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent</i>					
Political Knowledge	386	0.00	1.00	-1.3	2.1
Voting (0: no, 1: yes)	395	0.77	0.42	0	1
Index of political participation	385	1.03	1.48	0	5
Index of civic participation	361	2.72	2.67	0	9
Belonging to the UK political system	385	2.45	0.72	1	3
Feeling represented in the UK political system	360	2.01	0.80	1	3
Believe minorities are represented in the UK political system	348	1.77	0.81	1	3
<i>Independent</i>					
Ethnic minority status (0: Turkish, 1: Kurdish)	398	0.41	0.49	0	1
Religious minority status (0: Sunni, 1: Alevi)	377	0.35	0.48	0	1
<i>Control</i>					
Age	398	39.37	12.12	18	71
Gender (0: male, 1: female)	398	0.46	0.50	0	1
Education	398	2.17	0.79	1	3
Language skills	397	2.46	0.73	1	3
Generation (0: migrant, 1=UK born)	398	0.22	0.41	0	1
Employment (0: unemployed, 1: employed)	393	0.72	0.45	0	1
Marital Status (0: single, 1: married)	395	0.66	0.47	0	1
Religiosity	366	3.25	0.98	1	5

Political Knowledge

Using the created political knowledge factor, a multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test the hypothesis of higher political knowledge among the minority group members compared to the majority group members. The results summarized in Table 2 suggest that being a minority-member does not predict higher political knowledge than being a majority member, either for ethnic or religious aspects. However, in line with previous studies, age, gender, education, and language proficiency are determinants for the political knowledge of migrants. Every added year to a migrant's age, every level of education (low, middle, high) and language

proficiency (poor, average, good) significantly increases political knowledge. Also, men are more likely to have higher political knowledge compared to women.

Table 2 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis on Political Knowledge

Predictors	B	SE	β
(Constant)	-2.645 (0.001)	0.430	
Ethnic minority status	0.115 (0.239)	0.097	0.057
Religious minority status	-0.414 (0.181)	0.309	-0.199
(Religiosity)* (Religious minority status)	0.064 (0.506)	0.097	0.094
Age	0.026*** (0.001)	0.005	0.314
Gender (women)	-0.361*** (0.001)	0.098	-0.182
Education	0.450*** (0.001)	0.074	0.363
Language	0.375*** (0.001)	0.088	0.268
Generation	-0.006 (0.963)	0.122	-0.002
Employment	0.192 (0.101)	0.117	0.088
Marital Status (married)	0.054 (0.619)	0.168	0.026
Religiosity	-0.082 (0.210)	0.065	-0.080
R²	0.380		
F	18.7***		
ΔR^2	0.359		
Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$, [†] $P < 0.1$.			

Participation

For the participation indicator, the impact of ethnic and religious minority status on (1) voting, (2) non-electoral political participation, and (3) civic participation is examined. For electoral participation, two different models with and without minority status were compared. For non-electoral political participation and civic participation, ordinary logistic regressions were employed. The findings indicate

some interesting results; while there is no difference between minorities and majorities in electoral participation and civic participation, minorities tend to participate in political activities more than the majority group members. The findings for each analysis are explained in detail below.

Electoral participation

The voting variable was tested by employing binary logistic regression. The first model did not include any of the minority status variables (Table 3). When ethnic and religious minority status was introduced in the second model, the change was not found to be statistically significant. Two significant determinants for electoral participation were age and education; the older the people get or the higher education degree they have, the more they participate in elections.

Table 3 Binary Logistic Regression Analysis on Electoral Participation

	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Wald	B	SE	Wald
(Constant)	-3.412	1.204	8.033	-3.614	1.433	6.356
Ethnic minority status				.137	.314	.189
Religious minority status				.126	1.001	.016
(Religiosity)* (religious minority status)				-.099	.310	.102
Age	.053**	.017	9.876	.054**	.017	9.522
Gender (women)	-.682*	.327	4.342	-.644	.332	3.757
Education	.806** *	.239	11.37 9	.802** *	.247	10.565
Language	.309	.274	1.279	.298	.275	1.177
Generation	.286	.407	.495	.329	.412	.638
Employment	.146	.362	.163	.182	.370	.242
Marital Status (married)	.127	.355	.128	.145	.360	.161
Religiosity	.128	.148	.748	.172	.221	.612
R²	.165			.165		
Model χ^2	39.421			39.366		
N	351			348		

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$, † $P < 0.1$.

Non-electoral political participation

The explanatory role of minority status on non-electoral political and civic participation indices were examined through ordinal logistic regression analyses and are comparatively presented in Table 4. Regarding non-electoral political participation, the analysis indicates that being an ethnic minority member of a country-of-origin increases participation in non-electoral political activities in the country-of-residence. In this study, it is found that ethnic minority-member (Kurdish) migrants are twice as more likely to participate in various political activities than the majority-member (Turkish) migrants. While the religious minority status (being Alevi) does not have a statistically significant impact on political participation, religiosity has a reverse effect. The people who consider themselves religious are 26% less likely to participate in political activities compared to those who do not identify themselves as religious.

Table 4 Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of Non-electoral Participation


Predictors	Political Participation				Civic Participation			
	B	OR	95% CI		B	OR	95% CI	
Ethnic minority status	0.714** (.266)	2.043	1.319	3.16 2	0.282 (0.235)	1.326	0.901	1.950
Religious minority status	-0.671 (0.775)	0.511	0.143	1.83 1	-0.553 (0.717)	0.575	0.177	1.871
(Religiosity)* (Religious minority status)	0.048 (0.260)	1.049	0.684	1.61 0	0.171 (0.228)	1.186	0.814	1.727
Age	0.049*** (0.014)	1.050	1.027	1.07 5	0.031* (0.012)	1.032	1.011	1.053
Gender (women)	-0.448† (0.251)	1.565	1.035	2.36 6	-0.671** (0.231)	1.957	1.339	2.859
Education	0.821*** (0.206)	2.272	1.620	3.18 7	0.927*** (0.187)	2.527	1.859	3.435
Language	0.966*** (0.272)	2.627	1.678	4.11 3	0.765*** (0.217)	2.148	1.504	3.068
Generation	0.155 (0.315)	1.167	0.696	1.95 8	0.311 (0.295)	1.365	0.840	2.217
Employment	0.042 (0.312)	1.043	0.624	1.74 2	0.285 (0.275)	1.330	0.846	2.090
Marital Status (married)	-0.371 (0.279)	0.690	0.436	1.09 2	-0.060 (0.251)	0.942	0.623	1.422
Religiosity	-0.320* (0.161)	0.726	0.557	0.94 6	-0.076 (0.182)	0.927	0.727	1.183
Log-likelihood	-379.10				-611.84			
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	790.20				1263.68			
N	348				326			

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Confirming previous studies, age, gender, education, and language proficiency are found as determinants of political participation at different degrees of statistical significance. In parallel to the political knowledge indicator, each added year in age increases political participation by 5 percent. While the impact of the gender variable is marginally significant, the findings suggest that men are 1.6 times more likely to participate in non-electoral political actions. Expectedly, education and language proficiency are also found as significant indicators of political participation. For each educational level increase (low, medium, high), the possibility of being involved in political activities increases by 2.3 times, and the increase in political participation is 2.6 times more likely for each language proficiency level increase.

Aside from the regression analysis findings, for a better understanding of the substantive impact of the ethnic minority status on political participation, the predicted probabilities are depicted in Figure 5 below. The probability of not participating in political activities at all is 71 percent among the Turks and 53 percent among the Kurds, which indicates an 18 percent difference between the two groups. The gap widens with the increase in the number of activity types; 20 percent of the Kurds are involved in two different forms of political activities in comparison to 13 percent of the Turks. The difference in probability of participating in a variety of political activities almost doubles between the Turks and Kurds: 6 percent to 11 percent respectively for three different types of political activities and 3 percent to 7 percent for four different types of political activities. Even though this finding suggests that most of the migrants from Turkey do not participate in political activities, the probability of participation in such activities is much higher among the Kurds compared to Turks.

Figure 5 The effect of ethnic minority status on non-electoral political participation



Civic Participation

Even though minority status predicts some impact on political participation, interestingly, having a minority status among migrants does not predict higher civic participation. That is, majority and minority migrants from Turkey are not meaningfully different from one another when it comes to their involvement in civic activities. While the ethnic minority group members participate in more diverse political practices, their civic involvement is similar to the majority group members. Expectedly, among the control variables, higher education and language proficiency are the strongest predictors of civic participation among migrants. For each education level, the likelihood of participating in various civic activities increases by 2.5 times. The increase in English language proficiency levels also increases civic participation among migrants by 2.2 times. Participation in civic activities increases

by 3 percent per additional year to a migrant's (or descendant's) age. Lastly, men tend to participate in civic activities twice as much as women do.

Belongingness

The participants' perceptions of their belongingness to the UK political system were examined by employing ordinal logistic regression models for each of the three variables: 'Feeling included in the UK's political system,' 'feeling represented in the political system' and 'feeling that minorities are represented in the system' where the responses were treated as 3-point scales explained above. The analyses displays mixed findings, which are elaborated in detail for each variable.

Belonging to the Political System

The results indicate that the ethnic minority group members (Kurds) are 1.9 times more likely to feel a sense of belonging to the UK's political system in comparison to the ethnic majority (Turks) at a .05 significance level. Interestingly, the religious minority status has a reverse impact; compared to the majority (Sunnis), minority group members (Alevi) are less likely to feel a sense of belonging to the political system in the UK. However, when the religious minority status is introduced in an interaction variable with the religiosity variable, the impact reverses again: Religious Alevi are more likely to feel a sense of belonging to the UK's political system than the rest, even though the finding is marginally significant.

Among the control variables, language proficiency and age are found to be predictors of belongingness to the political system. For each additional English proficiency level, migrants are twice as likely to feel a sense of belonging to the political system in the country. For each year in age, the likelihood of belonging to the political system increases by 3 percent.

Feeling Represented in the Political System

Regarding the feeling of being represented in the political system, having a minority or majority background does not play an explanatory role. Even though the coefficients for both the ethnic and religious minority status variables indicate less feeling of representation in UK politics among the minority groups, the findings are not found to be statistically significant. Interestingly, however, when the explanatory role of the religious minority status (being Alevi) was tested in the presence of the religiosity variable through the interaction variable, the impact was in a positive direction and statistically significant. Being a religious Alevi tends to increase the sense of being represented in the UK's political system.

Feeling that Minorities are Represented in the Political System

In terms of the perceptions about minority representation in the UK political system, ethnic minority status is a significant predictor at the .05 level, yet, has a reverse impact. The ethnic minority group members (Kurdish) are 54 percent less likely to believe that the minorities are represented sufficiently in the political system compared to those with a majority background (Turkish). To put it differently, although the ethnic minority group members feel like they are a part of the UK's political system compared to the majority group members, they do not feel that minorities are represented adequately in the political system.

Table 5 Ordinal Logistic Regression Analysis of Belongingness to the UK Political System

Predictors	Feel belonged				Feel represented				Feel minorities represented			
	B	OR	95% CI		B	OR	95% CI		B	OR	95% CI	
Ethnic minority status	0.634* (0.255)	1.886	1.239	2.871	-0.228 (0.236)	0.796	0.540	1.173	-0.616* (0.247)	0.540	0.360	0.811
Religious minority status	-1.767* (0.886)	0.171	0.040	0.733	-1.125 (0.764)	0.325	0.093	1.141	0.552 (0.789)	1.736	0.474	6.360
(Religiosity)* (Religious minority status)	0.493† (0.266)	1.637	1.057	2.536	0.553* (0.242)	1.738	1.167	2.588	-0.087 (0.244)	1.091	0.730	1.631
Age	0.033** (0.013)	1.034	1.012	1.056	-0.006 (0.012)	0.994	0.974	1.015	-0.006 (0.013)	0.994	0.974	1.015
Gender (women)	-0.078 (0.259)	1.081	0.707	1.654	-0.246 (0.234)	1.279	0.871	1.879	-0.213 (0.244)	1.237	0.828	1.848
Education	0.154 (0.193)	1.167	0.849	1.604	0.289 (0.289)	1.335	0.989	1.802	0.035 (0.189)	1.036	0.759	1.415
Language	0.689** (0.221)	1.991	1.385	2.861	0.032 (0.032)	1.032	0.724	1.472	-0.024 (0.219)	0.977	0.681	1.400
Generation	0.578† (0.336)	1.782	1.026	3.096	0.342 (0.296)	1.408	0.865	2.291	0.253 (0.298)	1.288	0.788	2.103
Employment	-0.213 (0.302)	0.808	0.491	1.329	0.286 (0.282)	1.331	0.837	2.116	0.187 (0.301)	1.206	0.735	1.978
Marital Status (married)	-0.169 (0.281)	0.845	0.532	1.342	0.412 (0.412)	1.510	0.976	2.338	-0.241 (0.276)	0.786	0.499	1.238
Religiosity	-0.563 (0.186)	0.569	0.420	0.773	-0.501 (0.165)	0.606	0.462	0.794	-0.040 (0.166)	0.961	0.731	1.264
Log-likelihood	-302.01				-337.85				-315.62			
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	630.02				701.71				657.24			
N	346				324				312			

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$, † $P < 0.1$.

3.5 Discussion

Migrant individuals and their descendants are one of the key actors for migrant integration in a country-of-residence. From a micro-level approach where migrant individuals are the focus, this chapter first suggests a civic-political integration definition that can be tested empirically by using three indicators –political knowledge, participation, and belongingness. Secondly, based on this definition and through using original survey data, it examined the explanatory role of ethnic and religious minority status in a country-of-origin on the civic and political integration in a country-of-residence, when people migrate.

The analyses findings here indicated mixed results; while there was no difference between the majority (Turkish/Sunni) and the minority (Kurdish/Alevi) migrants in terms of their political knowledge, voting, or civic participation in the UK, migrants with an (ethnic) minority background are found to be more politically active compared to their fellow migrants from a majority background. Regardless of their motivation for involvement – be it for their power struggle in their country-of-origin politics or the national and local civic political issues in the country-of-residence – minorities tend to participate in a broader range of political activities. The belongingness indicator provides a more complex picture as ethnic minorities feel included yet do not see the minorities represented enough, whereas religious minorities do not feel a sense of belonging to the system unless they are observant of their faiths, which then, also feel represented in the UK political system.

One important claim of social identity theory is that in-groups are formed by the active participation of their members, and their reactions and responses when exposed to the behaviors and attitudes of the outgroup and other external influential factors (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To put it differently, group identities are

customized. This presence of customized identities explains why the minority status has predictability for some of the indicators and not for others. Furthermore, this phenomenon also suggests an explication of why the impacts of ethnic and religious identities vary across the dependent variables used in this study.

Higher political participation among (ethnic) minority groups might reflect their higher collective consciousness and belief in direct involvement in the political sphere compared to the majority. Minorities are more likely to be political party members, carry signs of political parties, donate, attend a political rally, and attempt to convince people to vote for a political party. Dalton (2013) describes these activities as ‘campaign activities’, which are often derived from partisan conflict, and require high motivation, collective work, and knowledge. Participation in such activities reflect the power relation experiences of minorities have that they gained through their struggle for existence in economic, social, and political spheres in their country-of-origin. The experiences under the dominance of a majority group matured them through developing adaptability to the circumstances without losing the minority identity that they eventually carried over to the UK. The demand for power and expansion of rights as double-minority status – an ethnic minority in the country-of-origin and migrant minority in the country-of-residence – are actualized through personally becoming involved in the politics and the policymaking process. The experiences on adaptability in the country-of-origin might also have utilized their understanding of the political system in the UK and might have permitted them to merge into the system more easily. Consequently, their sense of belonging to the political system is higher than the majority group members among the Turkey-origin migrants.

Conversely, the minority disagree that ‘minorities in the UK’ are represented sufficiently as opposed to the migrants with majority backgrounds. This might be a result of reciprocity; as they become involved in politics, they might notice the areas that they and other minorities fall behind the native British citizens. Noting that all the participants in the survey are equal citizens with the natives, their perception of ‘minorities are not being adequately represented in the political system’ might be a result of defining themselves with Kurdish ethnicity as a salient minority identity that should be preserved. They might be inclined to demand more collective group representation than the expansion of the opportunities for ‘minorities (Black and Minority Ethnic –BME) of the UK’ as individuals to actualize their rights and practice democracy. Maxwell argues that there are trade-offs between integration dimensions; the more socially integrated the migrants, the less they have co-ethnic mobilization and therefore have less collective political participation (and less economic outcomes), whereas ethnic community groups support and watch out for each other (Maxwell, 2010). While this might be a suitable argument for migrants with majority backgrounds from the country-of-origin, as it is argued through this study, migrants with minority backgrounds from their country-of-origin have adaptability skills. Thus, the ethnic minority identity is not ‘dissolved’ in the social dimension among the Kurdish migrants from Turkey. Rather, they have adapted to society. While their high group consciousness might lead them to approach minority representation issues from a collective mobilization perspective, through their adaptability skills, they can even seek support from society to advocate for collective group rights.

Conversely, the majority group members (Turkish) feel that “the minorities in the UK” are represented. This might be due to their lack of experience as a minority and

not having group consciousness as individuals to mobilize collectively, as compared to the minority group members that have already internalized being a minority and developed skills to have immunity against the dominance of the majority. In addition, the presence of Cypriot Turks before migrants from Turkey arrived also had an introductory role in the country with the Turkish language and culture. Thus, through developing familiarity within society for Turkishness, it is likely that Cypriots provided a level of comfort for Turkish (majority) migrants from Turkey, which might have prevented them from political endeavors as opposed to minority (Kurdish) migrants.

When the role of the religious minority status is examined, majority group members (Sunni) feel a higher sense of belonging to the UK political system than the minority group members (Alevi). This might be explained by the presence of Islam as a faith in the UK long before the arrival of migrants from Turkey. The interaction with Muslims dates back to the 16th century through Moors, North Africans, Indians, and Ottoman Turk traders, and during the colonial period, the British Empire ruled half of the world's Muslim population in the 1920s (BBC, 2016; Brown & Louis, 1999; Matar, 1997). The first Muslim migrants arrived in the UK about 300 years ago from India to work as sailors for the East India Company (Iqbal, 2016). Aside from having experiences from the commonwealth countries where different religions are practiced, the UK has been responsive to the needs of religious practices of other religions thanks to its church-state model that permits the Church of England to be influential on state policies through having 26 Bishops in the House of Lords who are known as Lords Spiritual ("Lords Spiritual," 2022; Soper & Fetzer, 2009). Soper and Fetzer (2009) argue that the close connection between the state and church is taken as a model to accommodate other religious minorities such as the Anglican,

Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, and Jewish groups through providing state funds for their schools and social services. They point out that Muslims also followed the established church model for their political mobilization and advocacy efforts, and state funds were provided for Islamic schools for the first time in 1998. The involvement of Muslims in policymaking continued in the following years. They established All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPG) on various subjects such as Islamophobia in the past decades, and recently, have groups on Islamic Finance and Muslim Women.

Alevis, however, lacked such an inheritance in the country-of-residence when they arrived. Therefore, they had no option but to build a new minority identity in the UK from scratch as a collective group (Jenkins & Cetin, 2018). Alevis formed an independent All-Party Parliamentary Group in 2015 to advocate for their community needs, and their efforts resulted in the recognition of Alevism as a separate faith. Having such status permitted their organizations to be tax-exempt and eligible for state funds as well.

The novelty of Alevism in the UK compared to the long-present Sunni Islam explains the statistically significant findings of “feeling represented” and of “belonging to the political system”, particularly among the religious Alevis when the religious minority status variable is introduced together with the religiosity variable. The more religious Alevis do not only feel a sense of belonging but are also feel represented. Before migrating to the UK, they had experienced the consequences of not being recognized as a religious community in legal settings in Turkey. Therefore, it is possible that the recognition of the Alevi community center and cemevis as a faith organization and exemptions from certain taxes and being able to receive other benefits and funds make them feel like they belong to the UK’s political system.

Furthermore, it is not a coincidence that the first-ever Turkey-origin member of parliament, Feryal Demirci-Clark, who was elected in December 2019, is a first-generation Alevi-Kurd. The successful strive of the minority (Kurdish and Alevi) groups for existence in the political sphere in the UK is a product of their high group consciousness that led to acting collectively. The salient group consciousness is a significant characteristic among minorities; it was gained through the cumulative experience of group members and was able to clinch the minority community for solidarity that led to such achievement. Along with group consciousness, adaptability skills also played a role. While the minority groups preserved their group identity, at the same time, minorities have better adaptability to the society in the UK to a level that they were embraced and supported (including some of the majority migrants from Turkey as well). After all, Demirci-Clark received the votes of the non-Kurdish and non-Alevi electorate as well.

An interesting finding in the study is the civic participation of both the majority and minority groups. Even though one-third of the respondents, regardless of ethnic and religious backgrounds – Kurdish (31%), Turkish (32%), Alevi (32%), Sunni (31%) – have not reported any civic involvement, two out of three migrants from Turkey indicated they sought civic solutions for the problems they faced as a community. This reflects that both communities can express themselves on various platforms though democratic means. The achievement of the solutions and the satisfaction with the outcomes are the subject of another study. However, the level of civic involvement reflects that the migrants and their descendants take responsibility to overcome problems in the society they live in. According to the National Council of Voluntary Organizations, civic participation – combined with some civic and political activities – was around 34 percent in the UK (Hornung, Egan, & Jochum,

2017). Noting that most of the participants are foreign-born who obtained UK citizenship, the higher figures of civic participation among them might be associated with the settlement process of this relatively new migrant community as a whole and as individuals.

Aside from the comparison by minority status, the control variables also provide valuable information, which is coherent with previous studies; overall, age, education, language ability, and gender, predict migrant civic-political integration. Even though the dataset used here was not very large for additional breakdowns and offers a limited number of control variables, the impact of these variables was found to be significant on the integration indicators in line with the literature. Such findings are important for the validity aspects of this study given that it introduces a novel factor, ‘minority status at the country-of-origin as a potential determinant facilitating migrant integration in a country-of-residence.’

Aside from validity, the generalizability of the findings might be another concern that could be raised, given that migrants from Turkey in the UK make up a small minority group in the UK. However, when rates of political participation of Turkey-origin migrants are compared with figures from other minority group in the UK, similar average scores were found on the indicators that are available in the survey used for this study (Community Life Survey, 2018; Sanders et al., 2014). Such confirmative findings from comparisons with other migrant and ethnic minority groups contribute to the ground for the argument built in this dissertation: “being a minority in a country-of-origin facilitates the civic-political integration in the country-of-residence”.

The study here shows that having a minority status in their country-of-origin has some predicting role for the non-electoral political participation of migrants in their country-of-residence. They (the religious minority) feel a moderate level of sense of belonging to the political system and feel represented, though they believe that minorities are not represented in the political system enough, perhaps with some diasporic inclination. For future research, examining the content of the political agenda of these minority migrants would provide further insights into ethnic-politicism, along with general local and national politics in the country-of-residence. While the argument here is promising to better understand the dynamics among the migrant minorities in the country-of-residence, it needs to be tested in different contexts with various migrant groups as well as with additional control variables.

3.6 Appendix: Survey Questionnaire

Demographic Information

Q.1. Are you a British citizen, or not?

1. Yes
2. No (END THE SURVEY)
3. N/A (END THE SURVEY)

Q.2 In what year did you obtain your British citizenship?

(Please tell the year you were naturalized or the year you were born if you were born in the UK).....

Q.3. Other than your British citizenship, what is your country/countries of citizenship?.....

Q.4. In what country were you born?

.....

Q.5. In what year were you born?

.....

Q.6. What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Other
4. N/A

Q.7. What is the highest education degree you have obtained?

1. No formal education
2. Primary school (YR 1-6)
3. Secondary school (YR 7-9)
4. High school (YR 10-13)
5. University

- 6. Master's/ Doctorate
- 7. *Higher National Certif.*
- 8. N/A

Q.8. Which of the following statements describes you best?

- 1. Not in labor
- 2. Self-employed
- 3. Unskilled worker
- 4. Skilled worker
- 5. State employee
- 6. Academic
- 7. Other.....
- 8. N/A

Q.9. How would you describe your marital status?

- 1. Single, never married
- 2. Married
- 3. Divorced
- 4. Widowed
- 5. Other.....
- 6. N/A

Q.10. How would you describe your ethnicity?

- 1. Caribbean
- 2. Black
- 3. Indian
- 4. Pakistani
- 5. Bangladeshi
- 6. Chinese
- 7. Arab
- 8. Russian
- 9. Turkish
- 10. Kurdish
- 11. Iranian/Persian
- 12. Gypsy
- 13. Irish
- 14. French
- 15. German
- 16. Other.....
- 17. N/A

Q.11. Which religion or belief do you associate yourself with, if any?
(IF ANSWERED, ask Q.11.A)

Q.11.A. Which denomination do you associate yourself with, if any?

0. No religious affiliation (SKIP TO Q.13)

- 1. Christianity
 - 11. Catholic
 - 12. Orthodox
 - 13. Anglican
 - 14. Protestant
 - 15. Other.....
- 2. Islam
 - 21. Sunni
 - 22. Shia
 - 24. Ahmadiyyah
 - 25. Alevi
 - 26. Other.....

3. Buddhism
 31. Theravada
 32. Zen
 33. Mahayana
 34. Tantric
 35. Other.....
4. Hinduism
 41. Vaishnavism
 42. Shaivism
 43. Shaktism
 44. Smartism
 45. Other.....
5. Sikhism
 51. Ramajyas
 52. Udasi
 53. Nanakpanthi
 54. Namdharis
 55. Other.....
6. Judaism
 61. Orthodox
 62. Hasidism
 63. Reform
 64. Kabbalah
 65. Other.....
7. Other religious belief.....
 71. Denomination
8. N/A (SKIP TO Q.13)

Q.12. How religious would you consider yourself?

1. Not at all religious
2. Not religious
3. Neither religious nor nonreligious
4. Religious
5. Very religious
6. N/A

Q.13. How good, would you say, is your ...

- A. English
1. Very poor
 2. Poor
 3. Neither good nor poor
 4. Good
 5. Very good
 6. I do not know
 7. N/A

B. Mother language

1. Very poor
2. Poor
3. Neither good nor poor
4. Good
5. Very good
6. I do not know
7. N/A

Political Knowledge

Q.14. How much interested are you in British politics?

1. Not at all interested
2. Slightly interested
3. Moderately interested
4. Interested
5. Very interested
6. I don't know
7. N/A

Q.15. How much, do you think, you know about your representative MP?

1. Not at all
2. Very little
3. To some extend

4. To a great extend
5. I don't know
6. N/A

Q.16. How much, do you think, you know about your local councillor?

1. Not at all
2. Very little
3. To some extend
4. To a great extend
5. I don't know
6. N/A

Civic and Political Participation

Q.17. Have you voted in the 2015 UK elections?

1. Yes
2. No
3. I was not eligible back then (under 18, or not naturalized, etc)
4. I don't remember
5. N/A

Q.18. To solve a community-related problem, have you ever...				
	Yes	No	Do not remember	N/A
1. Signed a petition	1	2	3	4
2. Participate in a social media campaign (political posts, TT campaigns)	1	2	3	4
3. Contacted your local councillors	1	2	3	4
4. Contacted members of Parliament	1	2	3	4
5. Contacted lobby organizations (unions, business organizations, etc)	1	2	3	4
6. Contacted media	1	2	3	4
7. Attended a protest or a rally	1	2	3	4
8. Boycotted people, parties, events, or products	1	2	3	4
9. Cooperated with civic organizations in the UK	1	2	3	4

Q.19. Regarding BRITISH politics, have you ever...				
	Yes	No	Do not remember	N/A
1. Displayed a poster, pennon, or sticker of a British political party	1	2	3	4
2. Attended a rally of a British political party	1	2	3	4
3. Donated money to a British political party	1	2	3	4
4. Attempted to convince someone to vote for a specific party or person	1	2	3	4
5. Became a member of a British political party	1	2	3	4

Belongingness

Q.20. When you think about the political system in the UK, how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?							
	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Do not know/ not interested	N/A
1. It makes me feel like I belong here.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. It makes me feel politically represented	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Minorities are represented sufficiently.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF MAJORITY AND MINORITY MIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS IN MIGRANT CIVIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: A MESO LEVEL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

In recent decades, discussions on migrant integration have been broadened among policymakers and led them to determine integration actors on various levels. Along with the two traditional actors – migrant individuals and state actors in the country-of-residence – the host community, state actors in the country-of-origin, local governments, international organizations as well as local organizations are now considered to be integration actors (McAuliffe & Ruhs, 2018; Unterreiner & Weinart, 2017; Van Ewijk & Nijenhuis, 2016). Furthermore, the European Commission encourages member states to implement strategies to increase the political participation of migrants by not only setting expectations from the host community organizations to facilitate migrant participation but also suggests the involvement of migrant organizations to represent their interests in the democratic processes and involve them in implementing the integration measures, stating that such involvement increases the value of integration strategies (EC, 2005). From a conceptual perspective, Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas define organizations as meso-level integration actors that play a mediatory role between the micro-level

(individuals) and macro-level actors (Penninx & Garcés-Mascreñas, 2016). In a collective sense, migrant organizations create a corporate voice of migrants to facilitate communication with other entities such as state actors (both in the country of origin and destination) as well. On the individual level, they also have direct communication with migrant individuals to respond to their needs and facilitate their integration as individuals. Studying the dynamics within the migrant organizations allows to understand how they contribute to the integration process of the migrants. In this study, examining the migrant organizations is particularly important to compare majority and minority backgrounded organizations from group consciousness perspective while examining their contributory or obstructing role on their integration into their country-of-residence.

Taking part in any form of civil society is considered to be one of the modes of democratic participation for involvement in the decision-making process (Dalton, 2013). Putnam (2000) argues that the decrease in political interest and participation is linked with the decrease in participation in clubs, associations, or other community organizations, stating that such forms of collectivity allow people to obtain norms and skills for democratic involvement. Confirming this, Lundasen (2014) finds a significant correlation between individual involvement in local civil society organizations and local political participation. However, when it comes to migrant civil society, there are mixed findings in the literature. Fennema and Tillie (1999) found a positive correlation between the degree of involvement in ethnic organizations and the degree of political participation among migrant communities in the Netherlands. However, as quoted in Just (2017), even though Strömblad & Adman (2010) found a positive effect of membership in a voluntary organization on the political activities of migrants in Sweden, they state that ethnic organization


membership does not have an impact on political activities even though it increases civic skills. From a qualitative perspective, this current study examines the organizations and suggests some evidence for the positive contribution of migrant organizations as meso-level actors on migrant individuals' civic and political integration in the UK.

This chapter argues that such contribution of organizations to the civic and political integration of migrants is more salient among the minority migrant organizations. Firstly because, the minority groups have higher adaptability skills inherited from their country-of-origin to position themselves in the civic and political environment in the country-of-residence better than the majority organizations. As a result, minority organizations are expected to hold more civic and political events on various issues where they increase the civic-political information repertoire of migrants. Secondly, having a higher in-group consciousness bonds minority group members in organizations better than the majority group members, and this results in solidarity as a group, facilitating collective action more effectively than the majority group. The higher group consciousness among the minority group members allows minority organizations to be more effective on the community to involve the members in their activities and agendas. Consequently, the minority group members achieve better integration outcomes.

In this study, the organizations are set as the unit of analysis to understand the causal mechanism behind the civic and political knowledge and behaviors of migrants in a country-of-residence and how migrant organizations as meso-level actors play a role in this process. While recognizing that organizations are formed by migrants themselves and such formations are also considered as civic integration, they are often established by a few – who become executive board members. On the flip side,

however, they serve and mobilize the greater community. Thus, this study treats migrant organizations as an exogenous determinant of immigrant integration in the country-of-residence (Figure 1). Through in-depth interviews with organization representatives, migrant organizations of majority and minority backgrounds from the same country-of-origin will be compared on their role in the civic and political integration of migrants. The study case of this chapter is the Turkey-origin majority (Turkish and/or Sunni) and the minority (Kurdish and/or Alevi) organizations in the

Figure 6 Interaction between organizations and migrant individuals



4.2 Theoretical Perspectives

4.2.1 Organizations: Both Agency and Structure

Organizations are collective entities formed by individuals to actualize a particular purpose (Argyris, 1967; Barnard, 1958; Scott, 1998). While they can be informal and formed spontaneously, formal organizations have rather structured designs and processes. As this study focuses on the civic and political integration of migrants, the migrant organizations that are focused on in this chapter are limited to the formal migrant organizations (also known as migrant associations or trusts in the UK or *dernek* and *vakif* in Turkish) that are legally recognized in the UK.

Organizations differ from institutions; while institutions are the ‘rules of the game’, which are norms, procedures, routines, conventions, and technologies that provide a structure for social, economic, and other interactions and can be established and/or changed by individuals as actors, organizations as ‘group of individuals’ are also considered as actors and have an influence on institutions. However, organizations also provide structures for individuals and therefore they are mutually constructive (Giddens, 1984; March & Olsen, 1989; North, 1990). On one hand, similar to institutions, organizations are also formed by individuals and even the founding purpose of the organizations can be changed overtime (or even abolished) by its members. On the other hand, (formal) organizations also partially ‘coordinate’ behaviors of individuals through the structures they have, the activities they offer, and the agendas they introduce (Galiani & Sened, 2014; Weber, Henderson, & Parsons, 1947). Furthermore, some scholars even argue that organizations can evolve into institutions if they become able to set rules and norms for individuals and ‘shape’ their behaviors (Scott, 1998). Given that (formal) organizations have the capacity to shape individual behavior, it is worth examining how migrant organizations contribute to the lives of migrants in a country-of-residence.

4.2.2 Arguments on Functions of Organizations

The roles and functions of civil society organizations in an individual’s life are discussed around Durkheim’s structuralist-functionalist approach. Briefly, the scope of these debates include arguments around interpersonal relations, collectivity and voluntariness, interdependence, the sense of place, artificial wills and specialized purposes, commonality of bonds of sentiments, organic and mechanical solidarity, common values, morals and rationale, common goods, liberties, as well as their role as a counter-hegemony, and as checks and balances mechanisms (Gramsci, 1971;

Moren-Alegret, 2017; Moya, 2005; Parsons, 1960; Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1994; Sardinha, 2009; Sergiovanni, 1994). Thus, while providing unity among individuals, organizations also have a mediatory role between individuals, society, and state actors.

The debates on the roles and functions of migrant organizations particularly emphasize interdependence and solidarity. Sardinha (2009) refers to the four main functions of migrant organizations developed by Rex in 1973: (1) “overcoming social isolation”, (2) “helping individuals to solve personal and material problems” (3) “combining to defend the group’s interests in conflict and bargaining with the wider society” and (4) “maintaining and developing shared patterns of meaning”. He mentions that the first two are related to the individuals themselves (cultural identity and their daily-life issues), whereas the latter two are related to group interests and access to resources as a collective body. Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter (2005) also mention that Rex later added: “maintaining links with the homeland” as another aim of migrant organizations, they can facilitate both individual and collective level connections.

Migrant organizations provide an opportunity environment for migrants. Activities conducted by these organizations allow migrants to expand their awareness regarding their surroundings, expand their social (and economic) networks, and contribute to their wellbeing and quality of life. Individuals might show interest in an organization only to meet the above-mentioned social needs. However, it is argued here that through their individual-level interactions in the organization and exposure to the organization’s structure, its agenda, and its priorities that the individual initially might have not thought of, the individual becomes aware of the issues around them and eventually develops an ‘information repertoire’ which shapes their

ideas, opinions, and behaviors. Furthermore, if the organization has a collective group interest or a certain political agenda, the individuals can accumulate political knowledge and even choose to take part in political activities serving the collective purpose of the organization as well.

Organizations also have to utilize roles for migrants who already have some political interest or concerns. Bauböck (1996) argues that organizations create ‘shelters’ for people who would not become politically active as individuals. Despite having citizenship, many migrants would hesitate to be outspoken politically even if they have issues that need to be solved. Particularly for migrants who have gaps in their knowledge regarding the civic and political structure in the country-of-residence to act on, organizations empower these individuals by filling those knowledge gaps through the cumulative knowledge the organization has and equips individuals with skills to take part in political debates even on their own.

4.2.3 Migrant Organizations and Integration

There have been mixed arguments regarding migrant organizations and their role in migrant integration. In the earlier decades, migrant organizations were criticized for their solidarity function, claiming that these organizations provide safe havens for migrants to gather with their fellow migrants from the same country-of-origin or broader geographical region (e.g. Southeast Asia, Latin America, etc.). It is argued that migrant organizations limit migrant social networks, prevent their interaction with the native community to address issues, and delay their language learning and integration processes. Furthermore, some scholars claim that through creating a closed network within the association, building their own schools and media outlets are considered as ‘parallel institutions,’ resulting in social and cultural segregation (Breton, 1964; Reitz, 1980). The counterarguments, however, point out that migrant

organizations offer social capital for their members and also economic networking that positively impacts their integration processes (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005; Jardim & da Silva, 2019; Moren-Alegret, 2017; Schoeneberg, 1985). Indeed, the cumulative knowledge in these organizations developed through the experiences of fellow migrants of the same country-of-origin can be transferred to the migrant individuals in the native language for easier and better comprehension. Such practical guidance saves migrants' efforts in learning through trial and error and helps with speeding up the integration process. In his quantitative study, Schoeneberg (1985) finds that migrants who participate in ethnic associations indicated higher interaction with German society.

Layton-Henry (1990) further discusses that even the organizations that aim to segregate themselves from the host society that creates the abovementioned 'parallel institutions', in a way should be considered as a sign of integration as they can do so through advocacy for the preservation of their culture through using the means offered in the country-of-residence and comply with the legal requirements. For instance, their schools need to be recognized by the education system in the country so that the students can pursue further education. To be recognized by the Ministry of Education, these schools are required to meet the standards of education in the country and receive an official affiliation. Such knowledge about the systems in the country-of-residence attained by organizations is transferrable to the migrant individuals. Even though these 'parallel institutions' built by organizations make the social-cultural aspect of migrant integration questionable, they can be considered products of civic and political integration. While the participation of migrants in the collective action in organizations enables the establishment of such schools, the

migrants also individually become equipped with knowledge on such procedural works.

In recent decades, with the rise of technology and mobility, migrants and their organizations became ‘transnational’ and the connection with their homelands rejuvenated; migrant organizations received official recognition by the institutions in the country-of-origin, increased remittances for developmental purposes, and due to the flow of real-time information they became involved in public issues back home. These developments raise concerns for some policymakers in countries-of-residence on the integration of migrants as their energy and efforts are directed to their homelands. On the contrary, many scholars argue that having bonds with both the country-of-origin and country-of-residence is more complementary rather than contradictory; the better-integrated migrants are found to have more capacity to contribute to the development efforts in their country-of-origin, as they have better knowledge of and access to resources in the country-of-residence (Faist, 2010a; Fitzgerald, 2008; Moren-Alegret, 2017; Somerville, Durana, & Terrazas, 2008). Moreover, Somerville, Durana, and Terrazas (2008) found that even the transnational activities of migrants’ associations promote their integration into the host community. Somerville and his colleagues mention governmental institutions in the country-of-residence that approach the migrant associations as their allies when the state decides to contribute to the developments in the country-of-origin, giving the example of the Canadian International Developments’ Agency’s (CIDA) collaborative work with the Association of Canadian-Haitian Organization for Development (ROCAHD), a federation to fund small-scale developments in Haiti.

4.2.4 Minority Identities, Organizations, and Collective Group Consciousness

This study argues that minority migrant organizations differ from majority migrant organizations in the civic and political integration of migrants. In political participation discussions of minority groups, whether it is ethnic minorities or migrant communities, group identity is an integral part of the literature (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 2004; Birnir, 2007; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2006).

Minority groups have more collective group consciousness than majority groups through their experiences in power relations (with society and the state) in their country-of-origin, they transfer their group consciousness from the country-of-origin to the country-of-residence. Thus, minority organizations can utilize such group consciousness to attract community members to participate in the organization's activities, regardless of their content (political or non-political). By creating interaction opportunities for their members (even without a political agenda), organizations enable more exchange of information among migrants to develop civic and political participatory skills at the individual level (e.g. having an individual request to the municipality for garbage collection, as they have already learned how to contact the municipality to rent a venue for an event the organization arranged).

Secondly, through a unity discourse, these minority organizations have the potential to mobilize minority community members. Olson (1971) argues that the smaller groups better organize for collective action because the individuals have to take more responsibility, unlike the "free-riders" among the larger groups that the members can get by without putting much effort for the collective actions. Smaller groups internalize the issues and concerns, and better involve in seeking for collective good. Furthermore, the interests are not as diverse in the smaller groups compared to larger

groups, which prevents them from diverting from the main group interests. Given that minorities in a country are smaller in size compared to majority, they are more conscious about their group identity, and more motivated to contribute to the group's interest for any collective action. The collective action of smaller groups also reveal itself in 'solidarity politics' around their minority identity. Rooting from experienced prejudice and discrimination as a group among African Americans, Dawson's (1994) Linked Fate argument on political participation suggests that minority group members believe that "their self-interests are linked to the interests of the race" and they have their political preferences in favor of the group interest. This continues, or perhaps gets even stronger, when these group members migrate to another country and become "double-minorities". The bond between the minority group members is strengthened with the dependency on each other in a new country, and they trust and accept guidance from the organizations of their own group. Having group identity in the center and advocating for group interest, minority organizations have a higher potential to persuade their members to perform certain behaviors (that they would not do so individually) in the civic and political scope - even promote their involvement in minority politics. Such influence on the targeted community might be easier for the minority organizations in comparison to majority organizations, as the group consciousness creates stronger affiliation among the members to act more willingly.

Additionally, higher group consciousness can also enhance networking, and facilitate collaboration between different minority organizations more easily compared to majority organizations for information exchange. As suggested by Social Network Theory, these organizational-level connections can allow frequent information

transmission through social networking, influence people, and even ‘enable attitudinal or behavioral change’ (Liu et al., 2017).

From a minority group perspective, Harris-Perry mentions the importance of the African American networks of all-Black civil rights organizations, social clubs, churches, and trade unions that worked collectively during the civil rights movement (Rogers & Kim, 2021). For the minority migrant groups, on top of the power relations experiences transferred from the country-of-origin, minority groups find themselves in another power relation to access resources in the country-of-residence as a new minority group where formal organizations often represent the group as a collective body and ability to make connections. Tilly (2004) explains that the ‘connection’ between a variety of minority organizations generates a greater social capital for migrant individuals and for migrant groups to participate in politics. As it allows additional resources, the connection among the same migrant organizations would enhance their impact on the minority groups. Given the group consciousness that strengthens collective identity, it is more possible to establish such a network among minority organizations to serve the community.

Lastly, minorities have better adaptability skills to their environment (as they have experience with different majority groups in their country-of-origin and country-of-residence). This is also applicable to the organizational level as well. These organizations might be more alert about the opportunities to expand their presence in the power dynamics in the country and can make investments in the areas they would benefit the most. This includes direct networking with other organizations that share similar interests or indirectly arranging events to receive the highest attention and support from the host society to maximize their share in power relations.

Compared to majority organizations, the collective consciousness and adaptability skills of minority organizations provide a potential for minority organizations to gather and mobilize minority group members where they can have a direct influence on their civic and political participation. Furthermore, such skills also help minority organizations to expand their relations and power as collective bodies, which indirectly creates more opportunities for the minority to be involved in civic and political practices. Conversely, the majority of migrants do not have a collective identity experience from their country-of-origin to transfer to their country-of-residence and have strong solidarity practices. Examining the Turkish migrant organizations in Canada, Özçürümez (2009) states that Turkish organizations focus more on cultural objectives rather than political objectives while listing group heterogeneity from Turkey (socioeconomic status, attitudes towards religion, etc.) and only reacting in times of resentment as the two underlying factors. In other words, the absence of collective group consciousness among the majority of migrants prevents building an agreed group interest, and also prevents organizing and having advocacy for sustainable group politics, as it is not demanded by the community. Moreover, it results in looser connections with other majority organizations or native organizations, which reduces their social capital. Consequently, the majority of organizations do not offer much to their members' civic and political integration.

It is argued here that higher group consciousness leads to higher group solidarity among minority community and enables organizations' activities to be welcomed, accepted and even demanded by the community members. Having organizational activities eventually shape the community's civic and political behaviors directly through the organizations' civic-political agenda or indirectly through the

environment that enables communication among the members who share the same identity.

4.2.5 A New Typology of Migrant Organizations for Empirical Studies

Migrant organizations are often considered ‘ethnic organizations’ or more commonly known as “hometown associations – HTAs” (despite referring to home countries) in the civil society context of a country-of-residence (Orozco & Welle, 2005; Rabadan, Rivera-Salgado, & Rodriguez, 2011). There are some studies that look closer at the differences among migrant organizations in terms of their roles, functions, and purposes. Portes et al. categorize migrant organizations as ‘transnational’ and ‘ethnic’ organizations (2008) from a practices perspective where the former refers to the associations that have ties with the homeland and the latter is for the Hispanic identity in the US, as they constitute a long-established Latin/Central American migrant community.

In Europe, the European Commission groups migrant organizations by their leadership, such as refugee-led, migrant-led, migrant-women-led, second-generation/youth, and other migration-related diversity organizations as well as grouping them based on their composition such as having single or multi-ethnic/religious groups, or migrant-led organizations with many non-migrants (European Commission, 2021). Focusing on the transnational ties of the Turkey-origin organizations in Germany and the integration pressure they receive from the state, Amelina and Faist (2008) categorize these organizations as religious, political, and business organizations. Sardinha’s (2009) study of the organization of migrants from various countries living in Portugal offers a more comprehensive list of the migrant organization types such as cultural, religious, sports/leisure, student, business/professional, development, youth associations, or prisoner solidarity, which

can be used as a reference for large-scale studies to categorize migrant organizations. However, while being an inspiration, his list was not suitable in the context of this study, as his conceptualization is more towards creating a categorization that can be used across all migrant communities in a country. Such diverse categorizations reflect that they all have different purposes for their approaches.

As this study aims to compare the majority-minority status of migrants – that is shaped by ethnicity and religion in the context of Turkey – a new categorization is introduced here based on functional similarities of organizations to determine the aspects majority and minority organizations differ from each other. Such categorization helps to understand the background of such organizations and the mandate they take on within the community. Thus, from an empirical perspective, it allows matching organization types that correspond both to the majority and minority community and increases exogeneity for better comparability between minority and majority organizations.

The organizations are categorized based on their primary role, functions, and purposes based on the interviews conducted for this study. The four categories include (1) Service organizations, (2) Faith-based organizations, (3) Ethnic-based organizations, and (4) hometown organizations. Service organizations refer to the organizations that aim to facilitate the adaptation process of migrants and their access to services, provide legal advice, raise awareness about their rights and obligations, and advocate for the improvement of the lives of the community members. Along with organizations that are formed for the purpose to help Turkey-origin migrants to settle and be part of society in the UK, the professional and business networks can be categorized in the service organizations from the aspect that these organizations function as a network to share policy updates, regulations,

sectoral updates (innovations, materials, etc.) and changes that affect their professional lives.

Faith-based organizations are organizations that aim to respond to the religious needs of Turkey-origin migrants. These include mosque associations for the Sunni migrants, and the Cemevi and Alevi cultural centers for Alevi migrants. It is common to see community associations built around mosques or Cemevis, especially in non-metropolitan areas. Despite having some ethno-cultural aspect, if they are temple-oriented, they are considered in this category as well.

Ethnic-based organizations gather people from the same ethno-cultural group. The organizations that have the names “Turkish” or “Kurdish” are categorized as ethnic-based organizations. The central focus of ethnic-based organizations here can vary from having an ethno-political identity to the preservation of ethno-cultural identity, or simply being from a shared culture and language, such as being from Turkey. This category also includes organizations that originate from Turkey as branches of organizations existing in the country. This is because they have an ethnonational aspect unless they are particularly established as faith-based or service organizations, which are then categorized accordingly.

Hometown organizations are the organizations that have more homogeneity in terms of their geo-cultural background, such as being from the same province, district, or village. Kinship bonds play the main role in these organizations as some members are already relatives of each other. While their purpose is to also have a continuation of their sub-culture and keep connected with their hometown, unlike ethnic-based organizations, these organizations create a closer network where its members have high and frequent interaction.

4.3 Turkey-Origin Migrant Organizations in the UK

When the registered charities are filtered for ‘Turkish’ and ‘Kurdish’ organizations, there are 96 and 84 organizations are found respectively (Gov.uk, 2021a). However, this also include the Cypriot Turks, as well as the Kurds from Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Similarly, although searching the word ‘Alevi’ would give the accurate number (19), as that is a unique name to differentiate from others, searching for ‘Sunni’ ‘mosque’, or ‘Muslim’ was not enough to filter for the targeted population. Moreover, this approach misses the hometown organizations that do not include any ethnic or religious name but only the name of hometowns, and even sometimes only the name of villages. It is also difficult to find the provinces in which these villages are located.

In his article “Turkish Social and Cultural Organizations in London”, Uysal (2016) looks at the umbrella organizations and their members for a categorization. Aside from the Cypriot organizations, He mentions the Federation of Turkish Associations in the UK, which is open for Cypriot and Azerbaijani associations, but most of their members are Turkish organizations. Founded in 2002, the federation gathers organizations with different stands in Turkey like the “İngiltere Türk Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Religious Foundation UK)”, which is the religious foundation associated with the Presidency of Religious Affairs, and the “İngiltere Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Ataturk Society UK)”, the organization that carries the secular Ataturkist ideology. Among others, Pekunluler Association is a hometown association from Gumushane, Turkey, the Turkish Republican Women's Association of London reflects the Republican People's Party (CHP)'s ideology, and the UK Turkish Islamic Cultural Centre Trust is founded by a Sufi group following the late Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan. The federation website has direct links to information

from the Turkish Embassy and Consulates and shows signs of close relations with the diplomats – some of the family members of diplomats are active in these organizations as well. Although though the federation website (<https://ftauk.org/>) is not inactive as there are COVID-19 updates and commemoration messages on Turkish National Holidays, given the diversity walks of life and absence of active collaboration, it cannot be considered a unified body.

Table 6 Organizations under the Federation of Turkish Associations in the UK³

No	Name of Organization	No	Name of Organization
1	Anatolian Friendship Association	11	Turkish Religious Foundation UK
2	Anatolian Cultural Centre	12	The Union of Turkish Teachers in the UK
3	Azerbaijan House Culture and Friendship Centre	13	Association of Turkish People in the UK
4	Association of Turkish Women in Great Britain	14	Cyprus Turkish Association
5	Hos Seda Art and Culture Centre	15	Turkish Republican Women's Association of London
6	Third Age Challenge Project	16	Pekunluler Association UK
7	Ataturk Society UK	17	Turkish Forum UK
8	Association of Western Thrace Turks UK	18	Turkish Elders Club
9	Mustafa Kemal Association UK	19	Turkish Youth Union UK
10	UK Turkish Islamic Cultural Centre Trust	20	International Turkish Women Association

Another umbrella organization is the Demokratik Güç Birliği Platformu - Britanya (Unity of Democratic Organizations Britain), which has 16 member organizations. The platform has a Facebook page (<https://www.facebook.com/dgbbritanya/>) rather than a website that does not give a formal description. However, they were established in September 2013, which is a few months after the DGB-Germany was founded and they have the same statement on their mission, reflecting their international bonds (“Almanya Demokratik Güç Birliği Platformu kuruldu,” 2013; “Britanya Demokratik Güç Birliği Platformu Kuruluşunu İlan Etti,” 2013):

³ The table is retrieved from Uysal (2016) which was in Turkish, and the original English names were taken from the federation’s website.

“Unity of Democratic Organizations has undertaken an important mission on Turkey’s democratization, recognition of the national democratic rights of the Kurdish nation, to contribute to granting rights to the Alevi faith in the first place, the Ezidis, Christian and all the other faiths, ethnic and cultural dynamics, and to have our nations live together in peace, and on the basis of freedom and equality.”


The member organizations of DGB include the Britain Alevi Federation (BAF), which also has 20 different ‘cemevi and/or cultural center’ members across the UK. While the BAF unites the Kurdish Alevis, Nurhanlilar is an independent organization of Turkish Alevis. Organizations like Day-Mer and GIK-Der define themselves as leftist or socialist organizations and use the term “Turkish and Kurdish” when referring to the community they serve, even though they are overwhelmingly Kurdish. Organizations like Kirkisraklilar and Tilkililer are hometown associations. On one hand, Fed-Bir is the Kurdish organization that is a part of the PKK-associated KON-KURD, which was renamed as KCD-E after 2014 (D’Angelo, 2008; Posch, 2016) and holds pro-PKK protests in the UK (Marshall, 2008). PKK has been on the proscribed terrorist organization list in the UK since March 2001 (Gov.uk, 2021b). KOMKAR, on the other hand, built its mission on Kurdish nationalism and protection of migrant workers’ rights. It was involved in the ‘Kurdish Opening’ initiated by the AK Party government, and was in long-lasting disputes with the PKK to the extent that its branches and member across Europe were targeted by PKK in the past (Baser, 2015).

Table 7 Organizations under the Unity of Democratic Organizations Britain (DGB)

No	Name of Organization	No	Name of Organization
1	Fed-Bir (Kurdish Federation in Britain)	8	Tilkililer Solidarity Association
2	British Alevi Federation	9	Kirkisraklilar Community Centre
3	GIK-DER (Migrant Workers Culture Centre)	10	Dersimliler Association
4	Yuz Cicek Acsin (100 Flower Blossom) Culture Centre	11	Kocgilililer Association
5	Tohum Culture Centre	12	Kom-Kar London (Germany-based Federation of Kurdish Associations)
6	El-Com (Elbistan Community)	13	Paz-Der (Pazarciklilar Social and Cultural Solidarity Association)
7	Day-Mer (Turkish Kurdish Community Centre)	14	Nurhaklilar Culture House

Along with Day-Mer, Kurdish Federation UK (FED-BIR), and Kurdish Advice Centre (KOMKAR), D'Angelo (2008) mentions Halkevi and the Kurdish Community Centre (formerly Kurdish Workers Association) as the two other Turkey-origin Kurdish organizations. Halkevi (People's House) had the highest capacity with its large staff and budget (D'Angelo, 2008). It was established in 1984 as another 'Turkish and Kurdish' organization where over 75 percent of the members are Kurdish and is a member of the FED-BIR, along with the Kurdish Community Center, Croydon Community Centre, Brighton Kurdish Community Centre, Roj Women Committee, and Ozgur Roni Youth Assembly ("Britanya Kürt Dernekleri Federasyonu yeni yönetimini seçti," 2013). The other organizations in D'Angelo's study are specialized organizations such as Kurdish Housing Association where the boards have some Turkey-origin Kurds, but these organizations are not included here as they do not fit the context of this chapter. Originally from D'Angelo's network analysis study, Figure 1 below indicates how the Kurdish organizations have strong links with each other and their comparative capacity.

Figure 7 Kurdish Organizations Network in the UK (D'Angelo, 2008)



According to Uysal's categorization (2016), 36 organizations are not under an umbrella organization. Yet, some of those organizations can be sub-grouped under professional/occupational networks, or sports organizations, which are specialized. Some others such as the CHP Union UK, the Union of Turks in Europe, and Turkish Ulkucu Federations, and perhaps Milli Görüş, are transnational organizations as they are the branches of political groups from Turkey. Some organizations have umbrella organizations such as the Axis Education Trust, Koza Educational Association, and Dialogue society, which are affiliated with the Gulen Movement.

Among others, the Union of International Democrats in the UK stands out as an organization with a focus on politics as it is a branch of the broader UID (founded in Germany in 2004 as the Union of European Turkish Democrats and changed its name in 2018) and has branches in 17 countries. The organization aims 'to contribute to the political, social and cultural progress among the Turks and related communities living abroad, and to increase their activities in the countries they reside' and 'to strengthen their bonds with the country of residence while assisting their integration process' (UID, 2021). The UK branch was founded in 2011.

Table 8 Organizations that are not under an Umbrella Organization

No	Name of Organization	No	Name of Organization
1	Union of Turkish Sports Clubs in Europe - UK Branch	19	Koza Educational Association
2	Union of Turks in Europe	20	Marathon Science School
3	Union of International Democrats (formerly Union of European Turkish Democrats)	21	Merton / South London Turks
4	Axis Educational Trust	22	Metropolitan Turkish Police Association
5	Business Network	23	MUSIAD (Self-contained Manufacturers and Businessmen Association) UK
6	CHP (Republican People's Party) Union UK	24	Networks of Students
7	Committee of British Turks	25	Professional Networks
8	Dialogue Society	26	Reading Turkish Community Centre
9	Galatasaray UK	27	Reborn
10	Iraq Turkmen Fronts UK	28	Southampton Turkish Community
11	Milli Gorus (National Outlook) Islam Community (ICMG UK)	29	Assyrian Turabdin Focus Group
12	Associaition of British and Turkish Academics	30	Textile Employers' Association
13	Fenerbahceliler Association UK	31	Turkuas-UK
14	Women's Platform UK (WPUK)	32	Turkish British Academics and Professionals Association
15	UK Kazakh Association	33	Turkish Businessmen Association
16	Turkish Women Philanthropic Association of England	34	Turkish British Lawyers Association
17	Turkish Ulkucu Federation (LIKA) UK	35	Turk Yar (Turkish Student Welfare Charity)
18	Turkish Health Workers' Association UK	36	Yunus Emre Cultural Centre

Çoştı (2018) focuses on the religious organizations in the UK established by migrants from Turkey and Cyprus. The oldest Turkish Sunni organization was a Sufi dargah established by the Cypriot Muslim scholar Sheikh Nazim el-Haqqani in 1972, and the first few religious organizations were also initiated by Cyprus Turks. “The UK Turkish Islamic Association” was established in 1979 by the founders of Aziziye Mosque, which was opened in 1984. With the increasing population, the number of mosques and affiliated associations increased both in London such as Edmonton Merit Association (Fazilet Mosque) and across Great Britain such as Leicester

Hamidiye Mosque and Turkish Community Centre. Said Nursi Cami in London was established by the Sunni Kurds in 2011.

In the last decade, there has been an increase in the number of hometown associations among both the Turkish and Kurdish communities, and even a federation of village and hometown associations were established in 2018 by the Kurdish migrants (Ucar, 2018). In late 2020, another umbrella organization called British Turkish Association that holds “more than 20 local Turkish community organizations” was established. It defines its goal as working towards “the adaptation and integration of the Turkish people into British society” and promoting dialogue with other communities in the UK (https://www.facebook.com/British-Turkish-Association-112636123938172/about/?ref=page_internal).

4.4 Research Design

4.4.1 Research Aim and Questions

In this chapter, migrant organizations as the meso actors in migrant integration will be examined through the migrant community from Turkey settled in the UK. As mentioned above, the research question asks to what extent migrant organizations arrange the kind of activities that facilitate migrant civic and political integration.

The main research question, however, is whether there are differences between migrant organizations with minority and majority backgrounds from the country-of-origin at the meso-level. That is, how different or similar they are, and how the mechanism works in terms of the impact of their activities on the civic and political integration of the migrant communities they serve.

This work hypothesizes that;

1. Among the Turkey-origin migrants in the UK, the minority organizations (Kurdish and/or Alevi) can contribute to the civic and political integration of the minority community members more than the majority organizations' (Turkish and/or Sunni) influence on the majority community members in the UK.
2. The impact of the minority organizations on civic political participation is higher compared to the majority organizations because the management and members of organizations have higher adaptability skills to the civic and political environment and the higher group consciousness among the minority community makes them more responsive to the organizations' agendas.

The research objective is to explore the underlying factors of the differences if there are any.

The survey findings in the previous chapter indicate that the minority members of the migrant community from Turkey show higher involvement in various political behaviors than the majority members. However, the majority and minorities do not differ from each other in terms of civic participation. The study will also explore if the majority and minority organizations have played a role in such differences.

4.4.2 Data and Methodology

In order to understand the role of migrant organizations in the civic-political integration of migrants, the key informant interview technique, a qualitative research methodology, has been used in this study. Key informant interviews are beneficial to explore issues in-depth, flexible to discovering insights that are not anticipated in the

planning of the study, and allows the interviewer to pursue relevant issues with further elaboration (Kumar, 1989). The participants are expected to have adequate knowledge regarding the organization and be authorized to share that information. Thus, the target group is determined as the representatives of migrant organizations. The leaders of the organizations and executive board members not only represent the organization and its members but are also entitled to guide and direct their organizations to specific agendas and activities. From that aspect, these participants have a direct influence on the organization and the migrant community, and are therefore considered as “elite informants”. Elite informants are defined in relation to their social position with the average person in a community, or sometimes with the interviewer, and require more effort and adjustments to arrange interviews (Stephens, 2007).

In this study, organizations that were founded by migrants from Turkey and that reflect their ethnic or religious identities, which are suitable for the definition of migrant organizations, have been listed initially by benefiting from the abovementioned previous academic studies – such as Uysal’s, and D’Angelo’s and Costu’s. Additionally, Eskioglu’s book “Londra’daki Bizim’kiler” (*Ours in London*), which was designed with a journalistic approach, helped with finding some other Turkey-origin organizations. Furthermore, migrant online newspapers in the UK, migrant Facebook groups, and personal connections helped with listing 81 organizations.

Each organization that had an email address was emailed with a brief description of the study and a consent letter. Organizations that do not have email addresses were reached through their Facebook pages, and others were communicated through

snowballing.⁴ While there were no replies to the interview requests, some organizations sent rejection emails. There were a few organizations that accepted interviews, yet they were not able to arrange the time.

In total, there were 19 organizations that participated in the study. In addition, there were 7 academics and experts in the Turkey-origin community who were interviewed. Among all, 5 organizations were minority-origin, and 14 of them can be identified as of majority origin. The disproportioned distribution has been balanced through the contributions of academics and experts along with the interviews with the umbrella organizations. The interviewed organizations included service, faith-based, ethnic-based, and hometown organizations, and had a large spectrum that reflects the social and political cliques in Turkey, from Kemalist to Sufi organizations. 13 organizations were based in London and 6 of them were located in different parts of the UK.

The interviews were conducted between November 2020 and June 2021. All the interviews were conducted from distance, except for one face-to-face interview that was conducted in Turkey due to the participant's preference during their visit. While the academics preferred online platforms, only two organization representatives used such platforms. As suggested by Harvey (2011) and Holt (2010), phone interviews were the most convenient and preferred by 19 participants. The interviews were conducted through WhatsApp, which is the most frequent telephone application they used, as it allows free calls internationally that would be costly through phone operators. Moreover, phone interviews were quite efficient to reach the 'elites', as they have limited time for interviews. Some participants were on the road while they

⁴ Sincere thanks to my Kurdish and Alevi friends, colleagues, and scholars who referred me to others to refer me to the organization representatives in the UK.

were interviewed and some were in the organization or at work and had to pause for some time to complete some tasks, respond to visitors, and continued the interviews after. On average, an interview took approximately 1 and a half hours where the shortest was 45 minutes and the longest was 2 hours and 10 minutes.

The responses to interviews were mostly written down as notes. While all participants allowed recordings of the interviews, some recordings were of poor quality due to the use of multiple devices as WhatsApp does not allow recording applications to be active when in use. After each interview, the responses and additional information were summarized in a compiled Excel file to be analyzed by myself and a fellow researcher for intercoder reliability. The data is categorized as direct or indirect political activities arranged by the organizations based on the information provided. For instance, 'Education' was a salient theme as most organizations mention that "children of the Turkish speaking community have the second lowest performance at schools" and the organizations offer complementary courses for them to improve their school performance and pass the GCSE⁵ exams to graduate from secondary schools and continue to university education. While these courses are categorized as non-political activities, the organizations' efforts to have Turkish recognized as a language subject in the GCSE exams are categorized as a direct political activity, as it included petitions and visits to the local authorities. As the nature of 'elite interviews', participants were inclined to tell stories that were important to them by departing from the questions asked. In some of these stories some civic and political contexts that affect the migrant integration are detected. For instance, the budget cuts for migrant integration in government institutions and the decentralization of integration responsibilities to local councils, which evolved to

⁵ General Certificate for Secondary Education.

fund-providers rather than being direct actors. Since some input gained in one interview is also discussed in the following interviews, the perspectives on the previous interviews were missed. For instance, to avoid any potential conflict, the questions did not include the perception of the “other community” in the context of majority and minority communities. While some raised this issue on their own and provided comparative insights, other attitudes towards the other group are partially captured and some did not mention it at all. Thus, it is difficult to quantify responses, and rather the emerging themes were discussed in the following section through civic and political lenses.

Even though the interview participants were informed about data confidentiality, the participants particularly requested their personal information and identifying information regarding their organizations to be kept unanimous due to their concerns of unintentionally violating the laws and restrictions of the Charity Commission in the UK, as well as unnecessarily taking a part in the political debates in Turkey that would be time-consuming to correct any misunderstanding.

Aside from the interviews, for triangulation purposes, the social media pages of organizations were frequently visited. While the COVID-19 pandemic prevented in-person visits to the organizations in the UK, during lockdown, the organizations carried on their activities online and posted records on their social media pages. This created an opportunity for me to have (*quasi*) participatory observation. Aside from flyers, pictures, and videos from the events organized in the past, social media platforms had rich content on significant events that were observed during the pandemic, such as the religious holidays for Sunnis and Alevis, as well as national Turkish holidays and the Days of Remembrance for the Kurdish groups. The web

TV established by one of the minority organizations during the pandemic was also visited frequently.

4.4.2.1 Positionality and building trust

A lower response rate is a problem with elite informants and given that the target population of this study is not large, building trust became particularly important. Zirh (2017) mentions that even after conducting research within the Alevi community in London for 2 years as a non-Alevi, his non-Aleviness created skepticism among some community members. In one of the interviews I conducted, one academic stated that the coup attempt in 2016 in Turkey caused a high mistrust among Turkey-origin migrants towards people they do not know. which became a particular challenge for research studies. Therefore, they kindly referred me to their networks.

Given that as the researcher, I am a Sunni Muslim Turkish woman, to avoid the potential of positionality⁶, I consulted with my Kurdish and Alevi friends as well as interviewed academics specialized in these communities during the preparation and interpretation of the findings. Furthermore, having been raised in Kurdish towns and being a migrant in the West for long years myself, having personally experienced state-level discrimination for my religious practices helped me to personally build an empathetical understanding of the minority community.

Initially, an academic participant recommended me to hire interviewers to conduct my interviews as I would ‘have a zero chance’ to reach the minority organizations due to ‘what I have on my head’ - referring to my visible hijab. Hiring others would

⁶ Positionality refers to the effect of the position taken by a researcher due to their own status in the social and political context (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014).

not work in this study as elite interviews are a form of exploratory research. Even though there would be semi-structured questions, information provided by the elites brings the researcher's attention to points that have not been thought of, and elite interviews have the flexibility for further discussions on those points to build perspectives (Stephens, 2007).

Therefore, I focused on building trust, which is essential not only to convince people for participation but also for the quality of data collected. Considering the possibility of organization representatives searching me online, to prevent any presumptions that would lead to the rejection of participation, I removed all items revealing my Turkish-Muslim identity except from my academic and professional background information that remained publicly accessible. To avoid mysteriousness by complete disappearance, however, I changed my social media profile pictures to natural images, such as a picture my child drew and a photo of my cat, which even helped as an ice breaker before conducting some of the interviews.

Focusing on trust building was worthy. I only had my camera on in one interview I had with a representative from an organization, where my identity was visible. Yet still, we discussed openly, and the representative followed up with me with additional information to contribute to my study. In other interviews, I responded honestly to their questions such as my location and background or the reason I picked my dissertation topic, which helped building rapport and at the end of the interviews, I was generously invited by them to visit them in the UK.

Most of my connections with organizations were made through referrals of friends who were minority group members and academics respected by these communities, which also helped with building trust with minority organizations. However, the

refusal of some minority organizations to participate in the study reflects their overall orientation and patterns of interaction with outsiders, as well as possible prejudice against my ethnic and religious background, as my name has a religious connotation. Interestingly, as I was referred to majority organizations without the need for a neutral appearance, it was an additional advantage to create trust with the majority organizations, where they also complained about the weaknesses of their organizations and the community. Only for one majority organization representative that was of the Kemalist background, I had to neutralize my identity to create an unbiased environment that would allow them to express themselves.

4.4.2.2 Limitations

Aside of the positionality that I attempted to overcome, being a researcher from outside of the community limited access to some of the minority organizations that were more closed within the organizations despite that my friends, who were members of these organizations, acted as guarantors for me. Other nonresponsive organizations to my interview requests might be also due to absence of reference contacts that would have convinced them for participation in this study. Future studies that focus on communities can be strengthened by having multiple researchers of different profiles to be welcomed by the examined communities. Additionally, despite the advantages it brought, Covid-19 pandemic definitely affected the research design and response patterns of organizations as well. I was not able to physically present due to travel restrictions, and this affected the research modality. On one hand, Covid-19 pandemic helped me to introduce myself in a more neutral profile through phone and online interviews without exposing my visible identity. On the other hand, it was a disadvantage that prevented in-person conversation that I would have convinced the organization representatives for

participation or understand the reasons of rejection, and also observe their gestures and the environmental setting. Covid-19 also affected organizations' managements that took higher responsibilities during the pandemic such as arranging funeral processes for those lost their lives to Covid-19 and transfers of bodies to Turkey for burial. They were also busy assisting the community and the larger society That are financially affected by the pandemic. These unexpected and ineluctable tasks while struggling with pandemic in their personal lives overwhelmed many organization representatives that some had to reschedule their appointments and others might have not been able to respond because of their busy agenda.

4.5 Findings

Migrant Organizations: Actors of Integration or Social Isolation?

In terms of the activities of Turkey-origin migrant organizations, both the minority and majority organizations share the commonality to respond to the needs of the Turkey-origin community. The youth, their education, and their future are often the core agenda items of organizations. As they are raised in between two cultures at their home and outside, they feel different from their schoolmates⁷. To assist their identity-building processes, organizations create social activities from arts to music, dance, and sports courses for children. Such activities allow children to meet others like them, tackle their loneliness, and embrace both their migrant and British identities without an identity conflict.

Other courses offered for the children aim to transfer the folklore, culture, and teachings of their faith. The organization representatives do not see these activities as

⁷ For more information on identity building among migrant youth see: Berry, J.W. & Phinney, Jean & Sam, David & Vedder, Paul. (2010). Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 55 (3), 303 - 332 (2006).

contradicting British values and in fact, emphasize the multiculturalist values of the UK. One organization representative stated, “my spouse is British, and I want my children to attend these courses to learn that their other parent is not from nowhere, and also has a rich culture as well”. Sports is another means for the youth. Many organizations have football teams and clubs that compete in Turkish and Kurdish Leagues where the youth have a “transnational social space where their identities are represented and contested” (Unutulmaz, 2016). Given that the UK is the homeland of football, one interviewer stated that it gives the youth a skill that is valued among the natives to blend in with them more easily.

The educational underachievement of the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups in the UK has been an issue and is often seen as a failure of the education system on policies to integrate these children into the system. The Turkish-speaking children are not different than others minority groups (Lytra, 2013). One interviewee stated that the parents (in the migrant community) have low educational degrees, and they do not know how to help their children, especially in a language they lack proficiency for formal education. Therefore, the organizations invest in complementary courses given by tutors with educational backgrounds. While on the one hand, they fill the parental gap, on the other, they fill an institutional gap in the UK on migrant children’s school achievement. One interesting finding was that for education, while the participants are predominantly in-group members, there were no restricted boundaries for minority-majority differences; locational convenience plays a more important role to attend those courses regularly than the identity the organization represents. Based on the needs and demands, organizations offer education for adults for socialization purposes like arts, music, and sports, but also English language courses that directly contribute to their integration. Furthermore,

organizations arrange seminars on a variety of topics that would increase migrants' knowledge of different subjects as well as provide guidance for them. For instance, inability to have upward social mobility in labor market (related to educational underachievement combined with language unproficiency), alienation, and identity crisis led to increase in suicide rates among the Kurdish Alevi male youth in the past few years (Cetin, 2017). Therefore, the minority organizations try to address such issues by offering seminars by psychologists on psychological wellbeing for both the youth and for parents.

As the data collection period was amid the COVID-19 pandemic, both the minority and majority organizations were putting efforts to prevent the community from the negative financial impacts of the pandemic by arranging food banks and food drives, where they reached beyond their own community and served the affected British and other minority (BME) communities. Organizations also played an important role in updating the community on the COVID-19 regulations as they changed frequently, summarized the relevant sections, such as the restrictions and procedures to travel internationally or business regulations for restaurants, and provided the Turkish translations of the released documents. Charity work is a common ground for both organizations, both the majority and minority backgrounded organizations organized fundraising campaigns for children with SMA diseases. Even though they were for the same children, each organization run its own campaign.

The social, educational, and cultural activities offered by migrant organizations indirectly contribute to the integration of migrant communities. Rather than social isolation, participants in Turkey-origin migrant organizations provide a social environment with people alike where they celebrate their multicultural identities. Moreover, these organizations contribute to individual integration by enhancing their

capacities by providing the education and training they offer. The charity work they contribute through members' donations as well as voluntary work on arranging the boxes, running deliveries, etc. also reflects that they promote interaction with the native society as opposed to the criticisms of migrant organizations as miniature homelands.

The Contribution of Migrant Organizations on the Civic and Political Integration of Individuals

In this dissertation, the participation components of civic-political integration are differentiated by the driving source. While civic activities may not be necessarily driven by political ambitions, activities that directly target the political agendas of the decision-makers are considered to be political activities. This applies to activities conducted by the organizations as well. For instance, contacting representatives to invite them to a holiday party is considered a civic activity, while contacting them to request action against the drug gangs in the neighborhood is considered a political one.

The direct contribution of organizations in civic and political integration refers to the activities that are arranged purposely to increase the capacity and involvement of the migrant community in civic and political life in the UK. This contribution can be in a passive form of providing information that boosts the 'political knowledge' component of civic-political integration through shaping the opinion and attitudes, or it can take the form of active participation that shapes the behaviors of individuals. Activities such as hosting speakers or providing legal and civic advice to individuals are passive direct contributions, whereas providing petitions to sign, and arranging protests or rallies are active contributions where the individuals take action. Indirect

contributions are the activities that did not have integration purposes, but create opportunities for the civic and political integration of individuals.

A distinction found between the majority and minority organizations is that majority organizations are inclined to have more passive direct contributions, while the minority organizations have both passive and active direct contributions, with higher frequency and in an organized way. When they were asked about what type of activities they did to contribute to the civic and political integration of their communities, some majority organization representatives mentioned that they hosted speakers who talked about issues such as changes in the country after Brexit, Education, the NHS, government system in the UK, and political stances of mainstream media channels in the UK. The social media posts also have some flyers regarding speakers talking about the issues related to UK-Turkey relations or Turkish diplomacy. A few of the representatives mentioned that they offer legal and civic guidance, but that it is rarely needed. One organization representative stated that, in their organization, every day, they assign one person to stay in the organization's office, yet, "people rarely come as they live here for a long time and already learned where to find the information they need... They know when they need a lawyer, or they can find information on the websites of the government. Once the language is not a barrier, everything is accessible. Even for the elderly people who still do not know much English... They have native English speaker children or relatives raised here, know the things... They (elderly non-English speakers) go to these native speaker family members to ask for help rather than the organizations." However, almost all organizations mentioned their promotion of registration for the UK elections and some provided assistance on how to register.

When it comes to direct active contribution, the majority of organizations mentioned petition signing, and reaching out to the representatives and the media as some of the activities they arranged with their members. The issues that contacted them for included the demand in investigations for xenophobic and Islamophobic incidents, the drug gangs in the neighborhoods, recognition of Turkish as a GSCE language subject, and mandatory sex education in kindergartens. A few protest organizations that were done in the past were about the Cyprus and Armenian issues, and some organization members gathered to prepare factsheets on the subject and delivered these documents to members of parliament. These two topics are the only political issues that Turkish (here would be the majority) migrants around the world involve in as collective mobilization and only in times of controversy, which mirror the weak and discontinuous political participation among the majority communities (Ozcurumez, 2009). In recent years, Turkey's stance on the Syrian crisis emerged as a third transnational political issue related to the country-of-origin that some of the majority organizations took political action on.

Hosting speakers is common among minority organizations to inform their members. During the pandemic, one of the minority organizations founded a web TV to continue these events from a distance. A wide range of topics can be found when examining the events with guest speakers: some of them are about local issues like the police, crime, the Sentencing and Courts Bill, NHS funding cuts, and cuts in school dinners. Issues related to Turkey such as the Istanbul Agreement, authoritarianism in Turkey, the commemoration of the Maraş and Sivas incidents were also discussed and other global topics included the Black Lives Matter movement and the Palestinian resistance. Protests and rallies are also common activities of minority organizations; aside from protests on the abovementioned

subjects, these organizations are involved in local environmental rallies, such as protests against the expansion of the incinerator in Edmonton, and high-speed train construction.

Minority organizations are still significant actors in legal and civic advice and some organizations have full-time paid staff to provide free consultancy for the migrant community. They are also active in organizing the community to actualize their agenda as well. It is common for minority organizations to collect signatures from the community for petitions on various issues. Furthermore, during the last census that took place during the data collection, there have been a large campaign initiated by the Alevi organizations and shared by minority hometown organizations that encourages Alevis to enter the word 'Alevi' for the faith section of the census form, to be recognized as a sizeable faith-based minority community in the UK. The collective actions in the past have succeeded; thanks to the efforts of these organizations, Alevi cultural centers/cemevis are already granted a faith-based charity status by the Charity Commission. Another significant direct contribution of the minority organizations on migrants civic and political integration was during the elections. Aside from encouragement for registration to vote, some organization representatives proudly mentioned the support from the organization for the candidates from their communities. The bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000) of the minority organizations creates successful results to actualize the group interests and expand their presence in the civic and political arena such as having higher number of political representatives and gaining recognition as charity.

Organizations also provide some indirect contribution to the civic and political integration of migrant individuals by creating an environment for individuals to have the opportunity to access information and resources. For instance, one minority

organization representative stated that the people who migrated from their villages without a political background are exposed to political debates among others only when they come to socialize at the organization. Another interviewee said, “when the youth go to the football club, they see those printed materials, Leftist magazines on the tables, and they just browse over when waiting for their friends.” Gaining knowledge through meeting with members of other organizations during the protests or other events also helps them to learn more about the political environment and thus increases participation (Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 2010).

While it is not detached from the organization’s political stance, the indirect contribution organizations have is actualized in a more natural process. This indirect contribution is not highlighted among a majority of organizations from the civic and political aspect, but more about social information exchange through social gatherings like breakfast events. Both majority and minority organizations hold those breakfast events as a tool to keep connected with members in casual ways.

The Strength of Organizational Affiliation as a Condition for the Contribution of Organizations

One of the underlying themes for the difference between the majority and minority backgrounded organizations is the extent of organizational affiliation and the meaning attributed to the organizations. Minority organizations are more embraced by the minority community, whereas the majority community have looser affiliations. One minority organization representative told a metaphorical anecdote from one elderly minority community member saying “oğlum, geldiğimizde yol bilmiyorduk” (*son, we did not know the way when we first arrived*) when he had to walk from a textile factory that he worked into his home, as he literally did not know

how to use public transport, ‘nor the way to sort things out’ in the country. Another minority organization representative stated that “forget about being politically active, the people who arrived as asylum-seekers in the 1980s and 1990s are the village-men who did not even go outside of their towns before.” For the minorities, these organizations were their only resource providers; from a network for accommodation and employment, to legal advice on the lawsuit process for their asylum, especially for those who arrived in the 1980s and 1990s. Even though the dependency on organizations faded away over time, the affiliation with those organizations remained high due to the strong group belonging with high in-group consciousness among minority members. In general, minority groups have higher in-group consciousness, and therefore, have more unity when compared to the places where they make the majority; Arthur et al. (2011) find that Catholics in the US – a minority group – indicated more homogenous attitudes towards social and political issues, whereas there are a variety of opinions among the Catholics in Poland, where they make the majority. In the country-of-origin, minority groups already have a closer in-group consciousness, which is strengthened as they also become a migrant minority in the country-of-residence. Experiencing traumas in the country-of-origin and facing the challenges of being a minority in the destination results in higher solidarity in power relations among the minority compared to the majority. Having a collective group identity allows for minority communities to absorb the political agendas of organizations that shape their civic and political thoughts as well as behaviors for collective action. The active involvement of the second-generation educated youth in these minority organizations also reflects the belief of a linked fate among them, as being a minority is the salient identity that remains at the center when they participate in civic and political activities.

On the flipside, while the majority organizations also provide social and economic networks and offer services, these organizations do not play central role in the lives of the majority community. Many majority organization representatives mentioned the lack of motivation among majority-origin migrants to participate in civic activities. Unlike a bottom-up demand from the community, most of the majority organizations have a top-down approach in order to increase group awareness within the society and to have ‘integration without assimilation’.

Among the majority organizations, one of the reasons there is a lack of participation in the organizations is because migrants still hold the perception of staying in the UK only ‘temporarily’. It was stated by representatives that the majority community still have intentions to return to Turkey and many majority community members are recently realizing that the UK is a home for their children. The sense of temporariness prevents them from investing in civic and political life as a group. Yet, confirmed by both minority and majority organizations, the minority community abandoned ‘the sense of temporariness’ when the political conflict in Turkey escalated in the 1990s and they realized that they have to settle in the UK. Through their adaptability skills, the minority community managed to establish their lives in British society. Given that they followed political tension in Turkey closely (as they have extended family and friends and also for their potential return) along with their efforts in the UK to access resources, and demands of recognition, a minority organization representative highlighted that “the (minority) community made a 50-year progress in politics in the UK just in the first 5 -10 years of their arrival”.

Another reason for the lack of interest in the majority community is that they experienced a ‘natural integration process’ due to the gains of different migrant

groups before their arrival. Indeed, the presence of Turkish Cypriots enabled networking for both the minority and majority communities for social and economic needs. Moreover, the heated Cyprus issue enabled Turkey-origin migrants to acquire knowledge of the civic and political environment in their native languages⁸ by following the activities of Cypriots. While having a shared ethnicity allied the majority community (and organizations) with the Cypriots demanding sovereignty on the island, leftist ideologies brought the minority community (and organizations) together with the leftist Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Eskioglu, 2019). The majority of organizations also had the advantage of inheriting the experiences of other Muslim migrant communities. The rights they gained, such as the establishment of mosques and access to halal food, allowed the majority organizations to a smoother integration into the already-existing Muslim minority where they expanded their knowledge of the civic and political context in the country. Turkey-origin mosques were established only to overcome the language barrier in front of learning one's faith with the increase in population size. The majority of interviewees stated that the participants of religious sermons are of mixed racial and ethnic backgrounds, and now the sermons are given both in Turkish and English in most places. Minority communities, however, lack such inherited rights. As a minority organization representative stated, "when we first arrived, we had to use the mosques for our funerals. When we understood that we cannot return to Turkey soon due to the political circumstances, we started to build our cemevis." Instead of being treated as a sub-group of Islam that has different challenges, the minority community

⁸ Even though Kurds have Kurdish as their minority language, they use Turkish more fluently due to societal exposure and state policies in Turkey.

advocates for Alevism to gain recognition as a faith-minority in the UK, which in the long-run would make the community eligible for certain rights and exemptions.

Inter-organizational Collaboration

Earlier studies depict that a higher “degree of ethnic civic community” in a minority group results in higher political participation of the group members (Fennema & Tillie, 2001). The degree is defined by the number of organizations, their activities, and the ‘density of organizational network’ (Tillie, 2004). The interaction among organizations creates a greater social capital for communities and allows access to different resources. In this study, minority organizations stand out with their close collaboration among themselves. Based on the typology suggested, there is a task allocation observed among the minority organizations:⁹ While service organizations are more UK-politics oriented, faith-based organizations lead politics among the minority through advocacy for the recognition of Alevism as an independent faith, and ethnic-based organizations conduct transnational political activities through lobbying for Kurdish independence in the Middle East. Interestingly, while minority hometown organizations were initially established to meet the non-political needs and even created a dispute among other organizations, they play a key role to keep the minority community involved in collective civic and political participation. One representative stated that “where do you go when you have a problem? To your family. The hometown organizations are our family here.” The hometown organizations are approachable to the community members that would not raise their concerns or incidents they experienced to the larger organizations otherwise. The closer collaboration with hometown organizations and others such as service

⁹ The categorization of activities was inspired by Koopmans (2005).

organizations, allows collective action at a broader level against the raised issues such as drug gangs threatening children from the community. In turn, the closer bond found in the hometown organizations convinces members more easily to participate in events and campaigns organized by other fellow organizations. The presence of umbrella organizations within the minority organizations reflects the close network and the specialized social capital.

Networking among the majority organizations is rather weak. Heterogeneity within the majority-origin organizations is considered to be an obstacle in front of political mobilization. Different political cliques from Turkey such as secularists, Kemalists, conservatives, nationalists, Sufis, and non-Sufis prevent unity for the majority organizations to benefit from the social capital of each other. Organizations from the same cliques attempt to unite under an umbrella organization to exchange information and have collective action that were mentioned during interviews. However, I have not come across one yet.

Table 9 Summary of Minority and Majority Organization Characteristics based on the Organization Types

Organization types	Service	Faith-based	Ethnic-based	Hometown
Minority	• Provide legal and civic services • Focus on the political issues in the country-of-residence • Close relationship with the national labor unions • Focus on both the individual and state actors • High collective participation	• More diasporic characteristics • Advocacy for minority politics • Focus on both the individual and state actors • High collective participation	• Transnational politics • Focus on state actors • High lobbying • Closed groups • High collective participation	• Cultural networking • Social and economic networking • Higher collective identity consciousness • Less political • Focus on individuals • Bridge individuals and federations
Majority	• Provide legal and civic services • Focus on the political developments in the country-of-residence and country-of-origin • Focus on both state actors and individuals • Some collective participation	• Natural integration • provides an overarching identity • Purposely nonpolitical • Focus on the individuals • Rare collective participation (civic)	• Cultural networking • Focus on individuals more than the state actors • Mostly non-political • Have heterogeneity • Moderate collective participation (civic)	• Cultural networking • Social and economic networking • Non-political • Focus on individuals • Rare collective participation (civic)

Both majority and minority organizations benefit from social networks with other non-group organizations. Among the majority of organizations, ethnic-based organizations have sister organizations from other ethnic minorities, with whom they collaborate on cultural events. Service organizations have some collaborative events with other migrant communities and have some sociopolitical exchanges. Faith-based organizations stand out differently from other majority organizations; even though they have the largest network with other Muslim organizations as well as with other faith-based groups like the Jewish and Christian groups, they collectively work against Antisemitism and Islamophobia, and cooperate with the local authorities from a civic aspect and intentionally abstain from politics in the organizations. One organization representative stated, “we want to keep it as a religious place rather than a place for political debates. We do have board members who are also councillors in the local government and we always encourage our members to participate in elections, demand their democratic rights... But, for example, there was a white British Muslim political candidate who wanted to give a speech in our organization. Even though some of us voted for him in the elections, we did not accept his request. If we did, then comes the question: ‘what would we do if UKIP¹⁰ wants to give a talk as well?’ we do not want to be involved in political fights...” Another representative pointed out that the Sunni Kurdish members of their organizations call the HDP¹¹ “*bizim çocuklar (our children/our guys)*” and vote for them, and other members vote for conservative and nationalist parties. These faith-based organizations do not want to create resentment among their members due to Turkey-related politics either.

¹⁰ A rightist nationalist political party in the UK.

¹¹ A Kurdish ethnic political party in Turkey.

Among the minority organizations, service organizations collaborate with the labor unions in the UK. Both subscribing to Leftist ideology, these organizations are frequently allies at protests. Additionally, the close connection they have facilitates the transfer of political information to the minority organization members in different venues, as in the case of having union members as speakers at art festivals hosted by service organizations. Such interaction with the labor unions also reflects the adaptability skills of the minority community to different issues and settings in broader society. While minority organizations provide a larger social capital with allying with labor unions for the minority community to expand their political knowledge and build opinions and attitudes, strong group consciousness within the community leads them to become involved as a group in the causes defended by labor unions.

Both the majority organizations and minority organizations have the bridging social capital that is presented through their collaboration with other organizations; the advocacy and collaborative work against racial and religious discrimination by the majority organizations and minority organizations attending and organizing events to defend the rights of workers are examples of these groups efforts to create benefits for various groups and individuals other than their own. Unlike Putnam (2000), Leonard (2004) argues that both bonding and bridging social capital can be present within the same group or community for different purposes and in different contexts. The case of the minority organizations also reflects that; on the one hand, they blend into the civic and political environment in the country. They are able to support the causes that are relevant for the larger society through working with other organizations as a result of their adaptability skills. On the other hand, the higher group consciousness allows organizations to facilitate communities' bonding social

capital to actualize their diasporic agendas to expand their presence and power in the country as well as their transnational political activism.

4.6 Discussion

Examining the Turkey-origin migrant organizations in the UK, this study compared the contributions minority and majority organizations have on the civic and political integration of their relevant migrant communities. The evidence presented in this study shows that migrant organizations create opportunities for their communities to improve their knowledge on the civic and political context of the country-of-residence, as well as providing opportunities to participate in civic and political action. Minority organizations offer more diverse and frequent activities compared to majority organizations. This is a result of the fact that the minority community has a closer affiliation with their organizations, as they are the only (or main) resource providers for the minority community. Group consciousness among the minority community facilitates maintaining such affiliation in two ways - while it provides belongingness to meet their needs, it allows the minority community to embrace the agendas offered by the organizations, which shapes their perceptions and behaviors. Through specialization in different political agendas and collaboration between the organizations, as well as through partnership with the politically active labor unions through adaptability skills, minority organizations offer their communities more opportunities for civic and political participation. Given that minority community members heavily required legal advice during their asylum process that enhanced their political knowledge thanks to the support from their organizations, and the fact that the minority community have to establish their faith institutions on their own,

the minority community in a way was enforced by the organizations to be involved in civic and political activities.

On the other hand, majority-background organizations have looser affiliations with the organizations; rather than a solid demand from the community to meet the needs (except for the need for faith-based organizations to teach religion in the native language during the early arrivals) the organizations rather introduce top-down mobilization efforts to promote 'integration without assimilation.' As collective group consciousness is not strong among the majority community due to heterogeneity with in-group cliques, it is not surprising to see collective action except for time-to-time advocacy regarding the transnational political issues that interest Turkey. From the ethnic perspective, the perception of staying in the UK only temporarily is another reason for not engaging in collective action, whereas despite civic participation, collective political action is intentionally avoided in faith-based organizations. However, through inheriting the experiences of migrants who arrived in the country before them, through informative programs offered by the organizations, and the collaboration with other local organizations, the majority community has adequate knowledge and skills to be involved in civic and political activities when they need it.

The majority community is satisfied with the conditions they live in and do not have political demands for change. A faith-based organization representative stated that their members feel heard and represented by their representatives, who are neither migrants nor Muslim. However, for the minority, while they are proud of having their community member representatives, they have an agenda with diasporic demands as they are inclined to preserve their minority-origin identity, as they did in

the country-of-origin for generations. As there is a match with their objectives, the Leftist groups are an entry channel for them to position themselves in the country's political sphere to root and grow with their ability to adapt.

4.7 Appendix: In-depth Interview Questionnaire

Questionnaire for the Turkey-origin Migrant Association Representatives in the UK

Introduction

1. Can you please describe the main purpose of your organization and your area of activity?
2. Can you please tell me the number of members you have, and the people who benefit from your activities?
3. Do you have a membership fee? How do you cover the expenses of the organization?
4. Can you please tell me where you see migrants from Turkey in terms of politics and civic society in the UK?
5. In your opinion, what does the UK's Turkish community expect from politics in the UK?

Political Participation

1. What kind of political activities are you involved in? (probe: petition campaigns, organizing conferences, and meetings, protests, reaching out to the representatives or media, etc).
2. On what issues do you take these actions? (particularly regarding the UK's agenda)
3. How would you describe your relationship with the local authorities as an organization? What kind of positive or negative reactions do you receive (probe: getting permission for activities, renting venues, etc.) What do you think is the reason behind this?
4. What type of activities do you have as an organization that raises your members' awareness regarding political and civic participation, or do you provide them with a network they access when needed?

Civic Society

1. As an organization, where did you obtain the information regarding the procedures to establish an organization? How did the process evolve?
2. Do you interact with other civic organizations based in the UK? Do you have activities or events collaboratively organized with them? (probe: other local organizations, migrant associations, etc).

3. On what issues do you collaboratively work with other civic organizations? (probe: climate change, women's rights, anti-migration movements, etc).
4. What type of activities do you have that assist your members' adaptation to the UK? (probe: taxation system, labor market, learning language, address registration, traffic registration, etc).

General View on the Community's Integration

1. In your opinion, to what extent have migrants from Turkey adapted to the political life in the UK? If not enough, what could be the reasons behind this?
2. In your opinion, to what extent have migrants from Turkey adapted to civic-societal life in the UK? If not enough, what could be the reasons behind this?

Questionnaire for the Academics and Experts on the Turkey-origin Community in the UK

Overview

1. As a person studying Turkish migrants in the UK, how would you describe this migrant community?
2. Can you please tell me where you see migrants from Turkey in terms of politics and civic society in the UK?
3. In your opinion, what does the UK's Turkish community expects from politics in the UK?
4. In your opinion, to what extent have migrants from Turkey adapted to the political life in the UK? If not enough, what could be the reasons behind this?
5. In your opinion, to what extent have migrants from Turkey adapted to civic and societal life in the UK? If not enough, what could be the reasons behind this?

Regarding Migrant Associations

1. Some migration studies argue that migrant organizations create safe havens for migrants and they isolate them from the local society and weaken integration. Others say that migrant organizations provide networks for migrants to benefit from the experiences of other migrants and therefore ease the adaptation process. Where do you see the Turkish migrant organizations in the UK?
2. Some studies on the Turkish community in the UK state that the deep-seated migrant organizations (Halkevi etc.) are not as popular as in the past. On the other hand, there is an increase in the size of hometown migrant associations in the UK in the last decade. How do you interpret that? Does it mean disentanglement among the migrant groups, or is it a reflection of reaching an integration level of forming civic organizations independently?
3. Among the different groups coming from Turkey, who were the pioneers of organizations, and who did they learn from? How important are the opportunities given by the UK government? What is the role of Turkey, or other international federations of (Alevi, Kurds, religious groups, etc)?
4. Some studies say that most of the migrants from Turkey take part in ethnic businesses, that is, they own their small shops (such as doner/fast food) and work for long hours, which are interpreted as barriers in front of integration into

society culturally, socially, or politically. On the other hand, we see Turkish coffee houses/teashops in the UK where they hang out. Is this not a contradiction? What prevents them from engaging in civic society? What is your opinion on that as a person who knows the Turkish society there?

Regarding the Second Generation

1. What is your opinion on the second generation? The language barrier is seen as an obstacle for the first generation to participate in civic or political life. Assuming that this is not an issue for the second generation, how would you describe the youth?
2. The second generation, particularly children of the political asylees can inherit their parents' activism, while some others attempt to prevent their children from political involvement out of fear. What is the case among Turkish migrants?

Regarding Turkey-origin Political Representatives

1. Recently, there are some political representatives of Turkey origin. How do you evaluate this development? What is your opinion on their political stands?

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The integration of migrants and their descendants into the countries they migrated to is essential to maintain social cohesion and prevent extremist ideologies among both the host and migrant societies. Particularly, integration in civic and political life in receiving countries prevents marginalization by bringing conflicting opinions to a democratic platform to be discussed in a civic manner, which allows for migrants and their descendants to share responsibility with the native society for the decisions that are made. Furthermore, civic and political integration facilitates integration in other dimensions, such as economic, social, and structural, as it creates an opportunity to express the needs and concerns over the barriers in the integration processes in these aspects and grabs the attention of policymakers for progress. Civic and political platforms also contribute to the interaction between the members of host societies and migrants by gathering them around the causes they might be mutually interested in, which would create a common ground for both societies where rather than their differences, their similarities stand out. In the end, these commonalities increase the acceptance of migrants, therefore, allowing them to be accepted as a part of society.

Focusing on the civic and political integration of migrants, this study examines the impact having a minority identity from the country-of-origin has on the integration process in the country-of-residence. It is argued here that, due to uneven interaction with majority group members in a country-of-origin, minority group members develop adaptability to an environment dominated by a majority, while building group consciousness at the same time, which helps them to preserve their identity. When they migrate to a new country, they carry this adaptability skill over to their new environment that is dominated by another majority – the host society. As minority group members are already experienced with exposure to a majority, they adapt faster to their surroundings, and eventually they have higher integration than migrants who are members of the majority group in the country-of-origin. Furthermore, group consciousness – which would have been thought to be paradoxical with adaptation at first – actually helps them to be aware of themselves and their surroundings. Even more so, from a power relations perspective, group consciousness helps with closer bonds and solidarity among the members. This results with higher social capital to learn from the experiences and knowledge of others in order to find ways to access resources as well as to have collective action. Eventually, this allows migrants with a minority background to adapt in the country-of-residence more easily, and results with higher integration compared to migrants with a majority background. While this argument applies to all integration dimensions, this study particularly examines civic and political integration for the abovementioned reasons, and it is suitable for empirical research to test both individual and collective aspects.

The study here is designed as a mixed-method, where the individual (micro-level) differences between the minority and majority on their civic and political integration

in the country-of-residence were assessed through quantitative research with first-hand survey data. Arguing that minorities have better adaptability skills, the impact of having a minority status is empirically tested in the quantitative section.

To better understand the mechanism behind the differences and similarities found between the migrants with minority and majority backgrounds from the same country-of-origin at the individual level, the collective aspect of civic and political integration gained attention. Given that migrant organizations are considered meso-level actors in migrant integration processes, and civic and political integration has some collective aspects, a qualitative study has been conducted with the migrant organization representatives through semi-structured elite interviews. This section both tested the adaptability skills and – as it has a collective nature – the group consciousness of the minority groups through comparing the minority and majority organizations. The meso-level analysis helped to understand how the migrant organizations contribute to the civic and political integration of migrants through their activities and events, collaborations of minority organizations with local civic and political bodies with the adaptability skills, and how group consciousness facilitated the successful impact of the minority organizations on the community's integration process.

Interpretation of the Empirical Findings

The micro-level survey data displayed some mixed results and the meso-level analysis provided further clarification on these findings. The quantitative section of this research has not found a significant difference between the majority and the minority groups in terms of their political knowledge, electoral participation, and civic participation. The qualitative study confirmed that migrants with a majority

background have a longer and more natural integration process of developing interest and knowledge of politics as well as involvement in civic participation, mainly due to having a settled Turkish Cypriot community with who they share a common ethnic background. As Turkish Cypriots are considered commonwealth migrants, they were already granted UK citizenship, which enabled them to participate in elections, and access the civic and political environment more easily. Advocacy efforts on a collective level on the Cyprus issue strengthened bonds between the two communities where the Turkey-origin Turkish migrants were exposed to the UK political structure, and accessing the information in their native language through Cypriot Turks was an additional advantage (Bertrand, 2004; Eskioglu, 2019). The presence of Turkish diplomats and their families (since 1793 during the Ottoman Empire) is another factor that facilitated the community's access to knowledge of the civic environment. Associations initiated – or at least participated – by diplomat family members smoothed the exchange of knowledge and the performance of civic practices through arranging activities in the past. Even though the service organizations of the majority offer support for the community on their access to services (e.g. legal consultancy), the Turkish (majority) community tends to find their own sources with the increase in their language fluency or benefit from their personal/family networks rather than migrant organizations. This is because they have looser collective group consciousness compared to migrants with a minority (Kurdish) background.

Furthermore, in terms of religion, the presence of other Muslims before the Sunni majority from Turkey arrived in the UK contributed to their civic and political integration in the country. Aside from the exposure to Muslim traders in history, the Muslim population from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh who settled in the UK after

WWII were able to form civic organizations, and established mosques (Samad, 2013). The fact that the earliest mosque in the UK was established in 1889 by Abdullah William Henry Quilliam – who was a native Brit who converted to Islam – also reflects that presence of Muslims in the UK was not solely a ‘migrant’ minority issue (Saleem, 2018). Furthermore, the diverse backgrounds of Muslim migrants, their descendants, and native converts were blended under umbrella organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, where rich informational exchange is performed on both individual and organizational levels among the Muslim communities in the UK.

The Sunni Muslim migrants from Turkey benefited from the experiences of these Muslim organizations in various aspects of their integration processes. As confirmed by the qualitative data, the newly emerging Turkish/Sunni community was able to replicate the successful practices of the formerly established Muslim community and organizations for their activities (as well as benefiting from other faith community organizations such as Jewish and Catholics), such as arranging community iftars or solving community-related issues on the civic end of their integration.

Moreover, the earlier Muslims in the country put efforts to institutionalize Islam as a religion in the UK, benefitting from the model of church-state relations in the country (Soper & Fetzer, 2009). Sunni Muslims (the majority) from Turkey arrived in an environment where Muslims were officially recognized as a faith group with established institutions and gained rights such as funding for Islamic schools, wearing a headscarf in public venues, or the certification of halal food through the advocacy of the older Muslim groups and organizations. This explains why the Sunni majority among Turkey-origin migrants feel a higher sense of belonging to the

UK political system more than their fellow migrants who are of the Alevi religious minority in Turkey.

However, the survey findings also reflect that more religious Alevis feel a higher sense of belonging to the system when the combined effect of religiosity and religious minority status is examined. Moreover, this group also feels represented in the UK's system. Data obtained from the interviews support the notion that Alevi (religious minority) individuals who were not recognized as a minority group in Turkey were in a way invisible, and that they have been able to organize in a short period of time in order to collectively demand recognition in the UK. Group consciousness among these religious minority members unified them with stronger bonds for their survival and rooting in the UK in a diasporic sense. Through their adaptability skills and minority experiences brought from Turkey, rather than becoming a smaller minority within 'the Muslim minority' as a denomination¹², they successfully advocated for recognition as an independent faith that would give them more independence. The cemevis and Alevi cultural centers already granted rights as faith organizations and can benefit from public funds (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2020). As the Alevi minority in Turkey lacks such opportunities, it is not surprising for the religious Alevis to feel a higher sense of belonging and feel represented in the UK political system.

Similarly, quantitative research shows that the ethnic minority (Kurdish) feel a higher sense of belonging to the UK system more than the ethnic majority, though they think that minorities are not adequately represented in the political system. The

¹² The reformist approaches within the Alevis in those years reshaped the Alevi identity among those living abroad as well as those who migrated to urban areas in Turkey, distancing themselves from the Islamic connotation in the faith.

ethnic minority is also found to have significantly more diverse political activities than the majority. Having more political participation in the country allows these minorities to feel like they belong to the political system. The qualitative research provides insights into how this minority community is efficaciously involved in the political environment through their adaptability skills. The minority community explicitly participates in politics in the Labour Party. They are not only electorates due to their favorable policies towards migrants – which are also widely supported by the majority as well – but are also actively involved in their campaigns, and have party memberships, or contribute financially. The interview data indicates that the founders of the minority organizations are aligned with the leftist ideology and therefore in close collaboration with labor unions and other leftist organizations. The Leftist ideology also brought minority members together with Leftist Cypriots, from whom they were also able to obtain knowledge regarding the UK's political structure along with other integration dimensions.

The information obtained from representatives from minority organizations reveals that the minority community is composed of people who were ordinary villagers and who were not politically active in Turkey, and that when they migrated, the migrant organizations became their primary resource provider from employment to housing. High group consciousness among them easily improved their affiliation with the organizations where they improved their knowledge of politics and leftist ideology, but also made them responsive to the collective activities conducted by these organizations in collaboration with the unions or other organizations. During these interactions, they were able to be accepted in these networks due to their high adaptability skills.

When both minority and majority migrant organizations are compared, group consciousness stands out in the organizations of the minority community where their behaviors are shaped by the organizations, as they are credible in the eyes of the community due to the stronger bonds they have through being members of the same minority group. The adaptability of minorities is also visible among the minority background organizations, particularly in their share of different roles and responsibilities in the community. While service organizations provide guidance and consultancy for the minority community and also educate and mobilize them on the civic and political issues in the UK, faith-based organizations involve in diasporic activities to be legally and socially recognized as a minority with distinct features, to preserve their identity, and continue to practice their beliefs in a multicultural context. The content of the political involvement of service and faith-based minority organizations are considered “purely national claims” in Koopmans and his colleagues’ (2005) categorization of the political activities of migrants, reflecting that these activities and efforts are to become a part of the country-of-residence. Ethnic-based organizations also aim to preserve their identity. However, they have the role of leading political advocacy related to the conditions in their country-of-origin. In this sense, they are run by ethno-politically mobilized elite members of the Kurdish community, who on one hand promote Kurdish identity through de-Turkification among Kurdish migrants, and on the other, facilitate political opportunities in the UK. They access these opportunities through their adaptability to advocate for their Kurdish political agenda in the country-of-origin (Demir, 2017), which is defined as “homeland-directed transnational politics” by Koopmans et. al. As the last type of organizations, hometown organizations have the role of keeping the connection among the community members in the form of an extended family

where the problems of the community members are shared confidently and delivered to the relevant bodies, such as the service organization to be addressed. Even though hometown organizations are criticized by some scholars for delaying language acquirement for creating a close network of migrants, it is found in this study that the minority hometown organizations consolidate group consciousness and allow for the rapid mobilization of the community in general on the issues led by the other abovementioned type of organizations.

Group consciousness among majority group members is looser than among the members of the minority group. This is reflected among the organizations as well. While there are some direct events and activities that they organize specifically for the majority community to increase their civic and political awareness, service organizations mostly contribute to the improvement in overall conditions in the UK that the community also benefits from, such as advocating on issues like racial discrimination and Islamophobia. Faith-based majority organizations aim to meet the religious and faith-related needs of the community. They purposely keep a distance from political activities in order not to be the subject of political disputes. However, they take part in civic activities with other faith organizations and collaborate with the local authorities against anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hatred. Unlike minority organizations, ethnic-based organizations of the majority aim to gather the community to celebrate culture, gather for holidays, offer Turkish language courses, and arrange charity work. Hometown organizations also function as hubs to share a network of those who have a common local culture and are not involved in political activities.

Methodological Implications

As migrant integration is a relatively new area in literature and is studied by multiple disciplinary approaches including political science, sociology, economics, history, anthropology, psychology, geography, urban studies, marketing, and demography, empirically measuring integration is a challenge. Scholars untangle integration as multiple dimensions based on their study purpose and perspectives and develop indicators to measure these dimensions. The civic and political integration dimension is often an interest for scholars who study the political participation of migrants. Yet, this study argues that studying only participation indicators is not sufficient enough to understand integration as a process. Given that migrant integration is not only adapting to a country-of-residence but ‘being a part of it,’ and the pace of integration is not the same in all dimensions, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting a new civic and political integration model that includes psychological aspects. This new model is composed of three main indicators; (1) political knowledge, (2) participation, and (3) sense of belonging, which refers to the cognitive, behavioral, and emotional components, respectively. By introducing the emotional aspect that is specific to the civic and political dimension, it is attempted to clear out the impact of other integration dimensions in a quantitatively measurable study. Another introduction in this study is the differentiation between civic and political participation from a measurability perspective. Political participation is defined as an indicator that is composed of politically driven behaviors, whereas civic participation does not necessarily have a political motivation behind it. This categorization captures the behaviors of people who practice their civic rights and choose not to take a political stand on their actions, and behaviors of those who

affiliate themselves with some political bodies or ideas along with their civic practices.

This study also contributes to the literature on migrant organizations by offering a typology based on their purpose and content. The typology of (1) Service organizations, (2) faith-based organizations, (3) ethnic-based organizations, and (4) hometown organizations, allows for the examination of social connection among organizations and also allows for a comparison to be made on the backgrounds of the migrant communities they serve. This categorization is particularly useful for smaller migrant groups in order to provide a structured grouping. However, it can be expanded into a more detailed grouping, such as student organizations or professional/sectorial organizations, for larger migrant communities.

Theoretical Implications

The foremost contribution of this study is the new argument it suggests about the role of being a minority in the country-of-origin on the civic and political integration in the country-of-residence. Integration has been known as a two-way process between the migrant individuals and the country-of-residence, yet, empirical studies in recent years point out the impact policies from country-of-origins have on the integration processes of migrants in the country-of-residence. Benefiting from these findings, it is considered that the social structure in a country also influences the pace of integration of its citizens in the countries they settle in. Thus, it is argued that minorities in a country-of-origin develop group consciousness and adaptability skills through the uneven interaction with a majority, and transfer these features to the country-of-residence. This contributes to their integration in the new country where

they are exposed to a new majority (native society) while preserving their distinct identity.

The data used in this study provides some evidence for this novel theory. Given that other influential factors, such as age, gender, education, and language fluency are also found as significant predictors of civic and political integration, these findings conclude that the argument in this study is promising. However, due to its novelty, the conditions under which this argument can be true needs further investigation and elaboration. The section below discusses the scope of conditions for this argument by focusing on the case used in this study.

Scope of Conditions

The argument that minorities of a country who migrated to another have higher rates of integration in the civic and political environment when compared to the majority from the same country is studied through the case of Turkey-origin migrants in the UK. This is done by comparing ethnic and religious minorities, namely the Kurdish and Alevis, with the majorities, namely the Turkish and Sunni. While the case of Turkey-origin migrants in the UK provides a sizeable population to examine minority and majority impact on integration, this argument needs to be tested for different minority and majority populations who have different relationship patterns in their country-of-origin.

As discussed earlier, the involvement of “homeland-directed transnational politics” by minorities from Turkey might reflect their experiences of the political tension in their country-of-origin that was corrosive on these minorities, and which became a push factor for them to migrate to other countries. Whether the higher civic-political integration of Turkey-origin minorities compared to the majority group is an

exceptional case due to the possible resentment and indignation these minorities have towards Turkey, or whether the theory can be applied in different settings with different homeland experiences should be further examined.

Regarding the case of Turkey-origin migrants, one might argue that the Kurdish diaspora literature finds Kurds living abroad as a political diaspora. This claim does not conflict with the argument in this study. Here, it is argued that the civic and political integration process Kurds go through as minorities with minority background from the country-of-origin paves the way for them to be known in the political arena. In other words, the transnational activities of the Kurdish population are the outputs of their adaptability and group consciousness, which they carried over to the country-of-residence. While their focus on preserving their group identity through group consciousness has helped them to have solidarity and build a ‘diaspora’, their adaptability skills allowed them to understand the systems in the country-of-residence. This has permitted them to fit in the civic and political environment in the UK better than Turks, and to practice the activities they are involved in. From a power relations perspective, before their involvement in “homeland-directed transnational politics,” their adaptability skills mostly contributed to their efforts to seek access to political power where they can gain the most. The fact that Kurdish-origin individuals hold important positions within the UK Labour Party and the fact that they have a higher number of local councillors could also be perceived as a product of the adaptability skills the Kurdish diaspora has. This is also visible on a supra-national level; the remarkable efforts to advocate for the Kurdish cause in the European Union reflect the adaptability of Kurdish minorities who were able to find room for themselves in the contexts where they can build their arguments. For instance, evolving from their separate state advocacy to

advocacy of human rights discussions ahead of Turkey's EU membership process alone can be considered a successful example of this skill of adaptability (Sagnic, 2016).

Within the diaspora, some argue that the Kurdish and Alevi identities are indispensable as most of these migrants sought asylum after the 1980 coup due to both of their ethnic and religious identities (Keles, 2014; Cetin, 2017), and some others also consider Alevi identity as an ethno-religious identity due to its endogamic nature (Jenkins, Aydin & Cetin, 2018). Even though Kurdish-Aleviness is a salient identity likely because of having 'double minority status' in their country-of-origin, the survey conducted in this study has included quite some Alevi Turks and Sunni Kurds in the UK through random sampling (who were categorized based on their minority identities for the analysis), which indicates that there are various combinations of identities, but the overlapped (double minority and double majority identities) are more highlighted. Further studies on these groups can be approached from Crenshaw's intersectionality perspective that focuses on male dominance on women within the people of color – who are a disadvantaged group already (1991).

Policy Implications

In the past decades, the UK has indicated progress with policies like "Equality Act 2010" – which aggregated various anti-discrimination acts under one single act – prohibits discrimination against characteristics like race and religion (most common features of migrants as well) in any aspects from accessing to education to renting a house. Furthermore, the UK approach the issues related to migrants in the country as an internal issue and does not have affirmative policies or actions for any certain migrant communities. Yet still, in 2018, 16 percent of migrants and 30 percent of

UK-born population with foreign-born parents reported they experienced discrimination “because of their colour/race, nationality, religion, language or ethnicity,” (Migrant Observatory, 2020) which indicates the need for further policies towards migrants. Finding differences between the migrants with minority and majority backgrounds in terms of their civic and political integration, this study suggests that the policies towards migrants can be better customized based on the needs of each migrant community. Through the adaptability skills, migrants with minority backgrounds are able to involve in politics and take part in local governments more than the migrants with majority backgrounds from the same country. The in-depth interviews conducted in this research confirm that such representativeness allows minorities to be more informed about the opportunities provided by the local governments as in the case of additional fundings and exceptions for the businesses affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. While the minority organization representatives appreciated having councillors and local government workers to be notified about the state funds in advance so the community can benefit from, majority organization representatives complained about not receiving timely information about those funds and losing eligibility. In the context of the UK, given that the local governments are the responsible entities regarding migrant integration, it can be recommended for the local authorities to promote higher engagement with the majority organizations for their involvement. For any migrant receiving country, monitoring the differences among the migrants brought from the same country-of-origin would contribute to better integration policies that directly address the needs of the communities.

Current Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

As this study introduces a new theory, it requires to be tested for other contexts in order to compare the integration process of minority and majority groups from the same country-of-origin living in the same country-of-residence. For instance, Hungarians from Slovakia and Hungarians from Hungary, Turks from Bulgaria and Turks from Turkey, Hindus in Sri Lanka and Hindus in India can be compared to further test if the theory fits in these contexts as well.

The current study focuses on a single country-of-residence, which limits comparison of different integration policy settings. This theory should be tested to understand if minorities would still be able to transfer their adaptability skills and preserve their group consciousness in countries that follow more assimilationist policies that would prevent both the majority and minority migrants from maintaining their identity. Conversely, it can be hypothesized that the more a multiculturalist a country is the easier it would be for the minority to integrate better than the majority, with greater freedom such settings offer to migrants to express themselves and celebrate their identities. Having a single country-of-origin is another limitation in this study. In a three-way integration approach, the studies argue that conditions in a country-of-origin influence the integration process of migrants in the country-of-residence, both positively and negatively (Clewett, 2015; Garcés-Mascreñas & Penninx, 2016). Therefore, different countries-of-origin needs to be compared based on the presence or absence of certain conditions they have. The authoritarian versus democratic regimes in the countries-of-origin, the size of minority group as well as presence or absence of a variety of minority groups, how fragmented or unified the majority in a country-of-origin (especially in terms of politics) can play roles on the integration of

its citizens once they migrated to other countries. Furthermore extra territorial operations can contribute to integration processes as well. For instance, the state institutes for the citizens abroad such as the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities that would provide funds and guidance to the migrants abroad might facilitate integration for the advantage of the majority migrants, as the systems in a country-of-origin are generally designed in favor of the majority. For the minorities, the higher group consciousness creates stronger bonds with other fellow minority migrants in different countries, that allowed emergence of supranational organizations such as European Alevi Confederation that has over 250 member organizations across Europe that share their experiences with others (Eke, 2014). The contribution of these entities on migrants civic and political integration is also worth examining in further studies.

Due to the novelty of the argument in this study, it is also recommended to invest in more research to examine what the impact of having a minority status in the country-of-origin has on other integration dimensions in the country-of-residence. There is room in the literature that focuses on other dimensions as well, and developing measurable indicators for these dimensions would provide a more comprehensive understanding of migrant integration. From an empirical perspective, the civic and political integration model suggested here might be further tested for the suitability of variables used to compose the designed indicators and can be enriched with additional variables for a comprehensive approach to civic political integration. Aside from this, the list of control variables can be expanded with other significant predictors.

The quantitative research in this study focused on the migrants who have obtained citizenship in the UK, which is a limitation. Larger datasets from migrants with sizable non-citizens in the country-of-residence can be beneficial to compare nonelectoral behaviors, which are often not high. The data size also limited the variety within the variables such as employment; larger data sets would allow to examine not only the employment status, but also the impact of the occupation of migrants on their civic and political integration. The richer datasets also would include other variables such as length of stay in the country to measure integration, but also the time spent in the country-of-origin would provide insights about the adaptability skill development process. When such information is combined with the generation variable and other indicators measuring transnational activities would allow comparison between the first-hand experiences and observations in the country-of-origin and how these experiences are transferred to the generations born and raised in the country-of-residence through stories. Such studies would contribute to three-way integration research with inclusion of how the country-of-residence is perceived by both the majority and minority migrants and the transnational networks they engage in when they develop the image of their country-of-origin in their minds.

For the qualitative part, minority-origin researchers might find better access to minority-origin organizations, particularly ethnic-based organizations that have closed networks. Other migrant organizations such as student associations and business networks can be categorized as different types of organizations with a sufficient number of interviews for a more detailed understanding. Interviews with other organizations as well as government representatives regarding the

organizations and community migrated from Turkey would provide a more complete picture for migrant integration of this specific migrant group.

Lastly, it is worth reminding the reader that integration studies are interdisciplinary, and this study approaches the issue from political science, sociological and psychological perspectives. The study here can be enriched with the inclusion of other disciplines, such as geography, which can compare the density of same country-of-origin migrants in certain neighborhoods compared to more dispersed areas, particularly for the electoral behaviors from a constituency perspective.



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