

TURMOIL IN THE CRIMEAN KHANATE (1623-1628)

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TURMOIL IN THE CRIMEAN KHANATE: (1623-1628)

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ABSTRACT

TURMOIL IN THE CRIMEAN KHANATE: (1623-1628)

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The objective of this study is to analyze the socio-political causes and effects of the turmoil in the Crimean Khanate (1623-1628) depending mainly on the Crimean Tatar, Ottoman, Polish, Russian, Romanian, and Persian sources. The *Karaçi* system, inherited from the Golden Horde, that forced the Khans to share the power with the *Karaçi* leaders was the major obstacle for the stability of the Khan. The Ottomans were depending on the cooperation of the *Karaçi* leaders and their superior fire arms in order to keep the Khans under control. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers who realized this fact put the *Karaçi* leaders under strict control and made an alliance with the Zaporozhian Cossacks who were effectively using fire arms and defeated the Ottomans. Consequently, they have managed to remain in the power for five more years, contrary to the Ottoman's plan to replace them with Canıbek Giray Khan and Devlet Giray Sultan.

Keywords: Crimean Khanate, *Karaçi*, Ottoman Empire, Mehmed Giray III Khan, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan.

ÖZET

KIRIM HANLIĞI'NDA KARGAŞA: (1623-1628)

Türk, Ahmet

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr Özer Ergenç

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Bu çalışma Kırım Hanlığı dahilinde 1623-1628 yılları arasında zuhur eden kargaşanın sosyopolitik nedenlerini ve sonuçlarını öncelikle Kırım Tatar, Osmanlı, Leh, Rus, Romen ve İran kaynaklarının karşılaştırılmasına dayanarak analiz etmektedir Han'ı iktidarı Karaçi Beyleri ile işbirliğine icbar eden, Altınorda'dan tevarüs eden Karaçi sistemi mütemadiyen siyasi istikrarsızlığa yol açıyordu. Osmanlı Devletinin Hanlık üzerindeki kontrolü hem Karaçi Beylerinin işbirliğine hem de üstün ateş güçlerine dayanıyordu. Bu gerçeğin farkına varan III .Mehmed Giray Han ve Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan kardeşler, hem.Karaçi Beylerini gözetim altına alarak, hem de ateşli silahları çok etkili kullanan Zaporozh Kazakları ile ittifak kurarak Osmanlıları mağlup ettiler. Sonuç olarak, Osmanlıların onları Canıbek Giray Han ve Devlet Giray Sultan ile değiştirme planlarına rağmen beş yıl daha iktidarda kalmayı başardılar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kırım Hanlığı, Karaçi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, III Mehmed Giray Han, Kalagay Şahin Giray Sultan.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGAD Archivum Glowne Akt Dawnych (Main Archives of Early Acts Warsaw)

BOA Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Archive of the Prime Ministry Istanbul)

ITUAK İzvestiya Tavricheskoy Uchenoy Arkhivnoy Komissii (News of the Taurian Archival Commission Simferopol)

RAGAD Rossiskij Gosudarstvennyj Arxiv Drevnix Aktov (Russian State Archive of Early Acts, Moscow)

RNB Rossijskaia Natsional'naia Biblioteka (Russian National Library St Petersburg)

TSMA Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi (Archive of the Topkapı Palace Museum, Istanbul)

ZOOID Zapiski Odesskogo Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnostei (Transactions of the History and Antiquity Society in Odessa)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives of the Study

The Crimean Khanate (1441-1783) was named after the Crimean peninsula that was located at the center of the Eastern European steppes and the Black Sea. The peninsula had been the home of several civilizations throughout history. It was an important stop and refuge for the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes (*Deşt-i Kıpçak*). The Crimean Tatars mainly descended from the Turco-Mongol clans that settled in and around the peninsula after the arrival of the Chinggisid armies to the region at the end of the thirteenth century. The founder of the Khanate, Hacı Giray Khan, came from the Jochid dynasty (*Cuci*), who ruled over the European part of the Chinggisid Empire, the Golden Horde (1241-1502). The *Karaçi Beys* (non-Chinggisid aristocracy), who held the real power in the Golden Horde, invited Hacı Giray to the peninsula to rule over them. In fact, Hacı Giray came from a lesser branch of the Jochids who had never been Khan of the Golden Horde. Under normal conditions, it was not possible for him to become Khan. However, the *Karaçis* were looking for a low-profile candidate who would not challenge their status, and Hacı Giray Khan seemed to be the perfect candidate. It appears that the emergence of the Crimean Khanate was the result of the Giray's direct relationship

with Cengiz Han (Chingis or Genghis Khan) and the initiative of the *Karaçis*. It is also possible to see that the *Karaçi* leaders enjoyed great freedom of action and even shared the power with the Khans. Therefore, my first objective would be to understand the effects of their privileged status on the political life of the Khanate and their methods to preserve the status-quo.

The strategic location of the Crimean peninsula, located at the junction of the continental trade roads, made it very attractive for the regional powers. The Ottomans, that became a great power after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, were not an exception and were waiting for the appropriate moment. Quite interestingly, the leading *Karaçi*, the *Şirin Bey* Eminek Mirza, who was in revolt against Mengli Giray Khan, also invited the Ottomans to the conquest of the peninsula (1475). Mehmed II and Mengli Giray Khan had different views about the future of the region. The Ottomans considered it a buffer zone with its northern neighbors while it was the patrimony of the Girays. The Ottomans had to change the Khan three times between the years 1475-1478 before the normalization of relations. During this process, the *Baş Karaçi*, Eminek Mirza, was the main supporter of the Ottomans in the Khanate. The cooperation of the *Karaçis* with the Ottomans against the power of the Khans also continued throughout the Ottoman suzerainty in Crimea. Therefore, my second objective would be to understand the effects of the Ottoman-*Karaçi* cooperation on the Crimean Khanate.

The Crimean Khans were aware that they were the descendants of Jochi Khan and heir to the throne of *Ulu Orda* and *Ulu Yurt* (Great

Horde) and emphasized this during their correspondences with the other rulers. The Ottomans believed that they would not be able to control a powerful Khan and replaced them with the manageable ones. The *Karaçis Beys*, who were also against the existence of a powerful Khan, were the fundamental ally of the Ottomans. The Crimean Khans soon realized that the final outcome of the increasing Ottoman influence in the Khanate would result in their extinction and tried to take precautions against it. Therefore, my third objective would be to understand the methods of the Crimean Khans to counter the negative effects of the Ottoman-*Karaçi* block's intervention in the internal politics of the Khanate.

The Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers also greatly experienced the negative effects of the Ottoman-*Karaçi* block in their personal lives. However, they did not follow the example of their predecessors; they neither simply submitted to the will of the Sultan nor retreated to the steppe but tried to organize an anti-Ottoman alliance with the regional powers to resist Ottoman intervention. Therefore, my fourth objective would be to understand the logic behind the plan of the anti-Ottoman alliance and the reasons for its failure.

1.2 Sources and Literature Review

1.2.1 The Sources of the history of the Crimean Khanate

For several reasons, our inventory of the archival sources is very limited in comparison with the rich history of the Crimean Khanate, which was one of the most important powers of Eastern Europe. First of

all, the Khanate was not centralized and did not have a developed bureaucracy, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy. Second, as a result of the military invasions and natural disasters, most of the existing materials were destroyed. Finally, the remaining documents were confiscated and transferred to St Petersburg by the Russians, who annexed the Khanate in 1783. The original letters (*bitik*), edicts (*yarlıks*) of the Khans, Kalgays and Nureddins and the correspondence of other high officials exist in the Russian archives RAGAD, (*Rossiskij Gosudarstvennyj Arxiv Drevnix Aktov*) the Polish archive AGAD (*Archivum Głowne Akt Dawnych*) also have examples of the original Crimean Tatar diplomatic documents. It is also known that Crimean Tatar documents exist in the archives of European states, such as Sweden, Denmark, Austria. Since the Crimean Khanate was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire (1475-1774), the BOA (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*) and the TMSA (Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi) have the examples of the Crimean Tatar documents.

The collection of the *Kadı Sicilleri* court registers maybe are our most valuable sources about the history of the Crimean Khanate. The collection contains 122 *defters*.¹ 121 of the *defters* are in the RNB (*Rossijskaia Natsional'naia Biblioteka*) in St. Petersburg, while one is in Yalta and 400 separate pages in St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, the *Kadı Sicilleri* pertaining to the scope of this research are not known for the moment.

¹ For more information on *Kadı Sicilleri* see: (ed.) Fehmi Yılmaz, *Kırım Hanlığı Kadı Sicilleri Kataloğu*, Ankara, 2021.

Therefore, the letters and edicts of the Ottoman Sultans and the reports (telhis) of the Ottoman bureaucrats become very important. Unfortunately, again *Mühimme Defterleri* (Books of the important matters) within which the important matters discussed in the *Divan* pertaining to the period of this research did not exist. The only existing one contains the period 1626-1628 but has very few information about the situation in Crimea. On the other hand, the reports of Muscovite and Polish envoys provide us lots of information. The testimonies of the travellers, merchants, missionaries and prisoners of war also provide us with lots details about the socio-political situation in the Khanate.

1.2.2 Different approaches to the history of the Crimean Khanate

The fundamental problem of the studies about the history of the Crimean Khanate is the neglect or even the denial of its separate identity mostly because of the political considerations. The Ottoman historiography tended to consider the Khanate as an Ottoman province and the Khan as its governor. Therefore, every initiative of the Khans contrary to the will of the Porte was reflected as the “ingratitude” of the “treacherous” Tatars. On the other hand, Russian and Polish historiography preferred to represent Crimean Tatars as the barbarous slave hunters employed by the Ottoman Sultan. It should be admitted that it was mainly the Russian and later the Soviet historians who introduced us the fundamental sources of the history of the Crimean Khanate, like the *Kadı Sicilleri*. However, the rich archival material remained closed to the researchers until the end of the Soviet system. As a result of the availability of the Russian and Polish archives, the

researchers had the opportunity to cross check the sources and to make new synthesizes and to have an objective approach towards the Crimean Khanate. Unfortunately, the scientific researches on the history of the Crimean Khanate were also negatively influenced from Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014. The Crimean Tatar heritage in the peninsula is under the threat of extinction again.



CHAPTER II

Historical Background

2.1 The Origins of the Crimean Khanate

The Crimean Khanate (1441-1783) was one of the successor states of the Golden Horde (1241-1502) which was a successor of the Chinggisid Empire (1206-1368).² The Khanates of Kazan (1438-1552)³, Astrakhan (Hacı Tarhan 1466-1556),⁴ and Sibir (1464-1598)⁵ Khanates founded on the territory of the Golden Horde.⁶ It is also possible to include the Kasimov Khanate (1445-1681)⁷ in the list despite the fact that it was founded as a vassal-buffer client state by Muscovy. Each of

² For the Chinggisid Empire see: Rene Grousset, *Bozkır İmparatorluğu Attila-Cengiz Han-Timur*, İstanbul, 1993.

³ For the Kazan Khanate see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, "Kazan Hanlığı", *AÜ. DTCF Dergisi*, C. 12, Nu: 3-4, Ankara, 1954, pp. 227-246 and Reşid Rahmeti Arat, "Kazan", *İA C. VI*, Eskişehir, 2001, pp. 505-522 and Anvar Aksanov, "Kazanskoe Khantsvo", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskie Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 146-150.

⁴ For the Astrakhan Khanate see: I.V. Zaitsev, *Astrakhanskoe Khanstvo*, Moskva, 2006 and Reşid Rahmeti Arat, "Astrahan", *İA C. I.*, Eskişehir, 2001, pp. 880-882 and Akdes Nimet Kurat, *IV-XVIII. Yüzyıllarda ...*, pp. 274-280 and Serkan Acar, "Astrahan Hanlığı", *Doğu Avrupa Türk Tarihi*, (ed.) Osman Karatay, Serkan Acar, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 767-780.

⁵ For Sibir see: Ilya V. Zaitsev, "The Khanate of Sibir", *The Turks V.II*, (ed. Hasan Celal Güzel et alias.), Ankara, 2014, pp. 860-866 Serkan Acar, "Sibir Hanlığı", *Doğu Avrupa Türk Tarihi*, (ed.) Osman Karatay, Serkan Acar, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 781-798 and Aleksandr Nesterov, "Tyumenskoe i Sibirskoe Khantsvo v XV veke", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskie Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 162-176 and Aleksei Matveev and Sergei Tataurov, "Sibirskoe Khantsvo v Kontse XVI-nachale XVII vv.", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskie Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 215-222.

⁶ For the Golden Horde and its disintegration see: A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çöküşü*, Ankara, 1992 and M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi Ordı*, Saransk, 1960.

⁷ For Kasimov Khanate see: V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' Tsariyakh' i Tsarevichakh'*, 4 Vols., St. Petersburg, 1863 and Ilya V. Zaitsev, "The Khanate of Astrakhan", *The Turks V.II*, (ed. Hasan Celal Güzel et alias.), Ankara, 2014, pp. 848-853. Serkan Acar, "Kasim Hanlığı", *Doğu Avrupa Türk Tarihi*, (ed.) Osman Karatay, Serkan Acar, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 725-766 and Bulat Rahimzanov, "Kasimovskoe Khantsvo", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskie Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 150-156.

the Khanates claimed to be the legitimate descendant of the Chinggisid dynasty, and the Golden Horde.⁸ The Chinggisid legacy was extremely important for the peoples of Eurasian steppes because only a direct descendant of the Genghis Khan (Cengiz Han d. 1227) had the right to become Khan.⁹ Even the great military and political leaders such as Tamerlane (Timur 1336-1405)¹⁰ or Nogay (d. 1299)¹¹ could not use that title and they assumed the title of *Emir* (Commander, governor or prince) and theoretically acted on behalf of a puppet Khan from the Chinggisid dynasty.¹²

Therefore, the most distinctive feature of the Crimean Khanate was its direct relationship to the Chinggisid tradition. The Giray family which was the founder of the Khanate had also based its legitimacy on its direct link to the Cengiz Khan.¹³ Although the direct descendance from

⁸ For the disintegration of the Chinggisid Empire and the formation of Golden Horde see: Gabdrakhman Khafizov, *Raspad Mongol'skoi Imperii I Obrazovanie Ulusa Djuchi*, Kazan, 2000

⁹ The right of the of a Prince to rule was depending on his hereditary relation to Genghis Khan or altan uruğ and had to right to govern the land and people as a patrimony. For more see: B. V. Vladimirtsov, *Moğolların İçtimai Teşkilatı Moğol Gşçebe Feodalizmi*, Ankara, 1987, pp. 150-151.

¹⁰ For more on Emir Timur see. Mustafa Kafalı, "Timur", *İA. C. XII/1*, Eskişehir, 2001, pp. 336-346. He used the title of Küregen (Son in law) in the meaning of the helper to the Genghisids.

¹¹ For Emir Nogay see: Berthold Spuller, *Zolotaya Orda Mongoly....*, pp. 91-104 and E. P. Mys'kov, *Politicheskaya Istoriya Zolotoi Ordy (1236-1313)*, Volgograd, 2003 pp. 112-140 and N. I. Veselovskii, "Khan iz Temnikov Zolotoi Ordy Nogai i Ego Vremya", *Zapisiski Rosisskoi Akademii Nauk*, VIII° Serie, St. Petersburg (Petrograd), 1922, pp. 1-58 and Çolak, Selim, *Emir Nogay ve Deşt-i Kıpçak'ta Hakimiyet Mücadelesi*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Istanbul, 2021.

¹² For Emir see: S. M. Stern, "Amir", *El² V. I*, Leiden, 1986, pp. 438-440.

¹³ For the genealogy of Giray family see: appendix in Halil İnalçık. *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, İstanbul, 2017 and appendix in M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi Ordy* and N. N. Kosyakin, *Krymskoe Khanstvo Monety Gireev*, Simferopol, 2013, p. 38. According to the tradition Hacı Giray's link to the Genghis Khan was as follows Hacı Giray son of Giyaseddin son of Taş Timur (Baş Timur) son of İçkili Hasan (Canhasan? in Safargaliev) son of Cığay or Cinse (Derviş? in Safargaliev) son of Tülek Timur son of Künçek or Kşnçe son of Sarıça son of Şreng or Oran Timur son of Tokay Timur son of Cuci son of Cengiz Han. Also see: (ed.) Hive Hanı Ebu'l-Gazi Bahadır Han, *Türk Şeceresi Türk 'ün Soy Ağacı*, İstanbul, 2009, p.

Chingis Khan was a pre-condition for legitimacy, it was not enough to rule securely, because according to Turco-Mongol steppe tradition which was epitomized in the code of Cengiz Khan; the Yasa, every single member of the ruling family had the right to rule and to claim his share in the country, and the one that the Gök Tengri gave *kut* (fortune) would eventually get the power.¹⁴ The *Tengride kut bulmak* (to have the benediction of the God) principle was the Achille's heel of the all Turco-Mongol states, because it periodically created disturbances within the states, that finally leads to their break up. The Crimean Khanate was not an exception to this phenomenon but managed to survive, thanks to several domestic and regional factors. First of all it originated from the Crimean peninsula which was a well protected safe heaven in the vast plains of the Eastern European Steppes (Kipchak Steppe, Deşt-i Kıpçak).¹⁵ Crimea had been a refuge from the insecurity of the steppes for many peoples, stretching from Sycthians, Kievan Rus', Khazars, Kumans etc., throughout history.¹⁶

2.2The Girays in the Crimea

The Chinggisid Princes¹⁷ who were fighting for the throne of the Golden Horde or who were trying to establish a power base for themselves, considered Crimea a perfect place for that purpose. Hacı Giray I Khan

158. For a recent study on genealogy of the all descendants of the Genghis Khan see: Olovintsov, A. g., Tabuldin G. Zh., *Chingizidy Dinastii i Epokhi*, Astana, 2010.

¹⁴ For the concepts of Kut and Altan Uruğ see: İsenbike Togan, "Chinggis Khan and the Mongols" *The Turks*, V. II,... Hasan Celal Güzel et alias), Ankara, 2014, pp. 779-780 and

¹⁵ For Crimea and Deşt-i Kıpçak see:

¹⁶ For the history of pre-Golden Horde Crimea see: Kırım

¹⁷ For the genealogy of the Genghisid dynasty in Golden Horde see: appendix in M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi Ordı*,

(1441-1456 and 1456-1466), the founder of the Khanate, was one of them. The struggle of the Giray family for control of the Crimean peninsula had already started during the time of Hacı Giray's grandfather, Taş Timur, who temporarily managed to succeed against his nephew, Uluğ Muhammed (Khan of Golden Horde 1419-1424 and 1427-1436 and founder of Kazan Khanate 1437-1445).¹⁸ It is clear that he ruled for a short period in 797 AH./ 1394-1395 AD. in Crimea and minted coins in his name, which was the proof of sovereignty in the Turkic-Muslim tradition.¹⁹ However, it is not possible to determine the extent of his authority, because there were not only other members of the Chingisid dynasty, but at the same time there were different political entities on the peninsula.²⁰ It appears that the struggle continued this time between Uluğ Muhammed and the two sons of Taş Timur, Devletberdi and Giyaseddin, who were also competing for the control of Crimea. In his letter to Vytautas the Great²¹ (Vitovt Rus., Witold Wielki Pol. Vitold Great Duke of Lithuania (1392-1430), dated 2 March 1426, Devletberdi states that he entered Crimea as Khan and expresses his

¹⁸ Halil Inalcik, "Kirim Hanlığı", *DİA*, C. XXV. Ankara, 2002, p. 420.

¹⁹ For the examples of coins minted in the name of Taş Timur in Crimea dated 797 AH./1394-1395 AD. and more information on him see: Saval'ev, P., *Monety Dzhuchdov', Dzhagataidov', Dzhelairidov' i Drugii Obraschchavshiyasya v' Zolotoi Ord' v' Epokhu Toktamysa*, V. 1, St. Petersburg, 1857, pp. 312-315. The first coin does not bear date but it is written that it was minted in Crimea the second one bears both date and place and the last one bears the names of both Taş Timur and Toktamış (Khan of Golden Horde 1379-1397) that might be interpreted that Taş Timur was ruling in Crimea under the authority of Toktamış the Khan of Golden Horde. For more information on Toktamış Khan see: For the symbols of sovereignty in Turco-Muslim tradition see:

²⁰ For the history of Crimea in the Middle Ages see: A. I Yakobson, *Srednevekovyi Krym Ocherki Istorii I Istorii Material'noi Kul'tury*, Moscow, 1964, pp. 114-150. For the different peoples that were settled in Crimea see: (ed.) I. N. Khrapunov and A. G. Gertsen, *Ot Kimmeriitsev do Krymchakov Narody Kryma s Drevneishikh Vremen do Kontsa XVII v*, Simferopol, 2007.

²¹ For more on Vytautas the Great see: Mickunaite, Giedre, *Making a Great Ruler, Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania*, New York, 2006.

desire to establish good relations with him.²² The Mamluk historian Badra'ldin al-'Ayni²³ (Bedreddin el-Ayni 1361-1451), who was both a jurist and a scribe in his *'lkd al Djuman (İkdü'l-Cüman)*, confirms that Devletberdi was controlling Crimea at that time. He writes that a letter from the ruler of Crimea named Devletberdi to the Mamluk court in C.A. 830/March 1427, and he notes that actually there existed three different candidates who were claiming supremacy in the Dashti Kipchak: Uluğ Muhammed in *Taht İli* Saray, Devletberdi in Crimea, and Borak²⁴ (Barak) in the lands adjacent to the Timurid state.²⁵ Al-Áyni also adds that an emissary from Uluğ Muhammed with presents and two letters, one in Arabic and the other one in Uygur, which could not be understood by anybody, came to Egypt (16-B-832 AH./21-IV-1429AD.).²⁶ However, Borak seems to have played a far more important role at that time. According to Timurid historian, 'Abd a'l-razzak al-Samarkandi²⁷ (Abdü'l-rezzak el-Semerkandi 1413-1482), Borak invaded the lands of Uluğ Muhammed in 826/1422-1423 and ruled in the Dashti Kipchak until his death in 1428 or 1429. Borak Khan had an indirect but crucial effect on the foundation of the Crimean Khanate, because Devletberdi moved to Crimea with his Horde after his

²² A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü* pp. 232-233.

²³ For more on Bedreddin el-'Ayni see: W. Marçais, "Al-'Ayni", *El²* V. I, Leiden, 1986, pp. 790-791

²⁴ The third contender Borak was the grand son of Urus Khan (Khan of Golden Horde 1374-1376) and Khan of the Uzbeks (Şzbek). For more information on Borak see: V. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik' Materialov' Otnosyaschikhsya k' Istorii Zolotoi Ordı*, V II, 1941, St Petersburg, pp. 195-198 and A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, pp.207-209.

²⁵ V. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik' Materialov' Otnosyaschikhsya k' Istorii Zolotoi Ordı*, V I, 1941, St Petersburg, pp. 533-534.

²⁶ *Ibid.* p.534.

²⁷ W. Barthold, and M. Shafi, "Abd al-Razzak Kamal al-Din b. Djalal al-Din Ishak al-Samarkandi", *El²* V.I, Leiden, 1986, pp. 90-91.

defeat by Borak.²⁸ Devletberdi disappears from the historical scene after we see the coin that was minted in his name in Astrakhan in 831/1427-1428.²⁹ After the elimination of Devletberdi and Borak, Uluğ Muhammed seems to control everything. In his letter to Murad II (1421-1444 and 1446-1451), he talks about his military successes and conquests. Al-'Ayni also writes that Uluğ Muhammed was the Khan of Deşt-i Kıpçak in the year 847 AH./1443-1444 AD.³⁰

The ensuing events show that the contending princes of the Golden Horde understood very well not only the strategic but also the economic importance of Crimea, which was crucial to international trade.³¹ The richest and civilized parts of the Golden Horde, Crimea and Kazan, were about to break away from the nomadic lands of the Khanate³². However, Uluğ Muhammed Khan and Seyid Ahmed (three times Khan 1435-1465, 1465-1481 and 1481 of the Golden Horde) Khan were still able to prevent separatist tendencies until the second half of the 15th century.³³

Devletberdi and his brother Giyaseddin could not succeed in establishing an independent Khanate in Crimea. It was up to Giyaseddin's son, Hacı Giray, to realize it. The oldest available coin in

²⁸ A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, p. 208. For more information on Borak see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivindeki Altınordu Kırım ve Türkistan Hanlarına Ait Yarlık ve Bitikler*, İstanbul, 1940

²⁹ Kh. M. Fren *Monety Khanov' Ulusa Dzhuchieva ili Zolotoi Ordı*, St. Petersburg, 1832, p.35.

³⁰ V. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik' Materialov' Otnosyaschchikhsya k' Istorii Zolotoi Ordı*, V I, 1941, St Petersburg, p. 534.

³¹ For the importance of Crimea in international trade see:

³² A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, pp. 210-211.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 213.

Hacı Giray I's name is dated 845 AH./1441-1442 AD³⁴, but It is possible to see that he was an active military and political actor in regional politics since 1430's. Hacı Giray's control over the western part of the Golden Horde is related to the decision of Uluğ Muhamed Khan to give up his claim to the throne of Golden Horde, which also meant withdrawing his claim on Crimea and establishing his rule in Kazan after his last defeat by Küçük Muhammed Khan (Kiçi Muhammed 1427-1445).³⁵ Küçük Muhammed Khan who controlled, the *Taht İli* claimed to be the Khan of the Golden Horde and made an attempt to control Crimea but he was driven out by Hacı Giray.³⁶ The defeat of Küçük Muhammed Khan has also a symbolic significance, because it represented the break away of Crimea from the other parts of the Golden Horde.

2.3 The Political Situation of the Crimean Peninsula Prior to the Foundation of the Khanate:

2.3.1 The Theodoro Principality

The political situation in Crimea was very complex when he entered the political arena. Several small conflicting power centers were existing side by side within the 26.140 km² peninsula that was separated from the mainland by a 20 km long isthmus, Orkapı (Borysthenes, Perekop).

³⁴ N. N. Kosyakin, *Krymskoe Khanstvo Monety...*, p. 47. The coin is minted in the city of Kırım (Solhat, Solkhat or Sary Krym).

³⁵ Yücel Öztürk, "Kırım Hanlığı", *Doğu Avrupa Türk Tarihi*, (ed.) Osman Karatay, Serkan Acar, Istanbul, 2013, pp. 630. Yücel Öztürk also argues that Kazan was the second option for Uluğ Muhammed. He first tried to control Crimea, but he decided to march on Kazan after his failure. For more on Küçük Muhammed Khan that was often missed up with Uluğ Muhammed see: M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi ...*, pp. 237-238.

³⁶ M. G. Safargaliev, *ibid.* p. 238.

The most important of them were the Goths, the Trebizond, and the colonies of the Italian city states. The Goths³⁷ came to Crimea around the third century AD and established the principality of Theodoro.³⁸ The principality was centered in Mangup (Mankop, Mankup, Theodoro or in a larger context Crimean Gothia). The principality was under the Byzantine (330-1453) suzerainty, after large intervals of Khazar (Hazar), Kievan Rus', and Kuman dominations.³⁹ After the Latin invasion of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade (1202-1204) and the formation of the Latin Empire (1204-1261), which divided Byzantina into three separate states; Nicea, Morea, and Trebizonde, it fell under the domination of the Empire of Trebizond⁴⁰ (1204-1461). The domination of Trebizond continued until the second coming of the Chinggisids in 1238.⁴¹ The Chinggisids did not establish a direct rule on the principality and satisfied simply by the payment of a tribute to their governor residing in Solkhat.⁴² Although, the Empire of Trebizond lost the control of Theodoro to the lords Golden Horde, the principality is continued to be ruled by the princes related to the principality of Trebizond.⁴³

³⁷ For the history of Goths in Crimea see: A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea*, Massachusetts, 1936.

³⁸ For the principality of Theodoro see: *ibid.* pp. 70-266.

³⁹ For the Byzantine rule on Goths see: *ibid.* 70 159.

⁴⁰ For the Empire of Trebizond in Crimea see: *ibid.* pp. 160-170.

⁴¹ The Mongols first came to Crimea in 1223 but their invasion was brief.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 164. For the Mongol administration of Crimea see: Mark Kramarovskii, "Krym v Sisteme Administrativnogo Ustroistva", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotoya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 436-448.

⁴³ For the discussion on the origins of the rulers of Theodoro in the 15th century see: A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...*, pp. 194-203.

2.3.2 The Italian Colonies

The colonies of Italian city states were the third political force that was active in the Crimean peninsula in the beginning of Hacı Giray's political career. It was the Genoese that had first come to the peninsula around 1266.⁴⁴ They have founded Caffa (Kefe, Kaffa, Feodosia) upon the territory bought from a prince of Golden Horde and extended their sphere of influence benefiting from the internal problems of the Golden Horde.⁴⁵ Eventually, Caffa that was located at the end of the great trade roads from the east become the most important city of the region and it also becomes a bishopric in 1318.⁴⁶ It was initially agreed that Caffa would be an open city and it would absolutely not be fortified but the Genoese did temporarily remain faithful to the agreement and fortified it at the first occasion despite all the

⁴⁴ See: W. Heyd Tezcan, Mehmet, "Türk Moğol Hakimiyeti Döneminde Karadeniz'de Ticaret", *TİD*, V. XXIV, Nu: 1, İstanbul, 2009, pp. 151-194.

⁴⁵ For the foundation of Caffa see: W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*, V. II, Leipzig, 1886, pp. F. Elie, de la Primaudaye, *Histoire du Commerce de la Mer Noire et des Colonies Génoises de la Crimée*, Paris, 1848 pp. 75-76. and Sainte-Marie Mévil, *Caffa et les Colonies Génoises*, Paris, 1856, pp. 7-8. Mévil argues that the governor that sold or gave to the Genoese could have been Uran Timur (Oran Timur son of Emir Nogay?) since Khan of Golden Horde Mengü Timur (1266-1280) gave the rule of Caffa and Crimea to him that was also his nephew. However, according to the *Şecere-i Türki* Uran Timur was the son of Tokay Timur son of Cuci (Tukay, Tugay) in (ed.) Hıve Hanı Ebu'l-Gazi Bahadır Han, *Türk Şeceresi Türk'ün ...*, p. 152. W. Heyd suggests that the Genoese have first contacted with the "Tatar" governor (presumably Uran Timur) to build a colony and then were directed to the Mengü Timur Khan that seems to be the highest authority to give the permission to form a colony in W. Heyd, *ibid.* p. 163. For Genoese administration system of Caffa see: Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese Colony in Crimea and the Eastern Question (1453-1475)", *Western Europe, Eastern Europe and World Development, 13th-18th Centuries*, Leiden, 2010, pp. 103-106 and for the trade of Caffa see: Marian Malowist, *ibid.* pp. 104-110 and Emel Kılıç, "Ortaçağ'da Kefe Jeopolitik ve Jeostratejik Açısından Bir Değerlendirme", *Jeostratejik ve Jeopolitik Açısından Karadeniz* (ed. Mehmet Okur vd.), Ankara, 2018, pp. 77-119.

⁴⁶ W. Heyd, *ibid.* , pp. 172-173. The bishopric's authority all the territory of Golden Horde from Saray in the east to the Varna in the West.

protestations of the Khan.⁴⁷ The Genoese appeased the Khans by arguing that the fortifications of Caffa were actually against the Venetians not to the Golden Horde.⁴⁸

2.3.3 The Golden Horde and the Black Sea Trade

It should be remembered that the tolerance of the Khans towards the Genoese was primarily related to their foreign policies. The Golden Horde was at that time in a competition with the Ilkhanids (1256-1335) for the control of Caucasia and established an alliance with the Mamluks (1250-1517) and Seljuks of Anatolia (1077-1308) contrary to the Ilkhanid-Byzantine alliance including Papacy.⁴⁹ The policy of the Golden Horde was the uninterrupted continuation of their relationship from the sea with their ally Mamluks in the south that was easier than the land road of Anatolia. For that purpose, they have organized a series of campaigns in order to prevent Byzantine to block the navigation in the straits.⁵⁰ However, the anti-Byzantine politics of the Golden Horde did not restrain to cooperate with Genoese and to give

⁴⁷ F. Elie, de la Primaudaie, *ibid.* pp. 76-77. In fact, it was a policy of Genoese to build walls around their colonies in times of crises like the one in Pera in 1302 in Ostrogorsky, Georges, *Histoire De L'Etat Byzantin*, Paris, 1956, p. 513. Actually, they were not wrong to try to strengthen their defence because their colonies were under constant threat of being attacked and pillaged by their rivals.

⁴⁸ Sainte-Marie Mévil, *Caffa et les ...*, p. 78. The Genoese argumentation was not completely groundless because Venice has attacked and destroyed their colonies several times. For previous attacks on Genoese colonies by the Venetians forces including Galata in Constantinople (1296). Consequently, Genoese have fortified Galata upon the approval of the Byzantines see: W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*, V. I, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 444-447 and 454-455.

⁴⁹ For Ilkhanid-Byzantine vs. Golden Horde Mamluk-Seljukid alliances see: Georges Bratianu, *La Mer Noire*, pp. 213-218 and Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War 1260-1281*, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 78-105 and İlyas Kamalov, *Moğolların Kafkasya Politikası*, İstanbul, 2003 and Abdülkadir Yuvalı, "XIII. Yüzyılda Önasya'daki Siyasi Bloklaşma", *Türk Kültürü*, Yıl XXIII, Sayı 262, Ankara, 1985, pp. 111-120.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pp.215-216.

them trade posts and concessions despite their alliance with Mikhail Paleologos (Emperor of Nicea 1259-1261 and Emperor of Byzantine 1261-1282) after 1261. According to the treaty of Nymphaeum (13 March 1261) that was signed before the restitution of Constantinople by the Byzantine Empire in which Mikhail promises to give the monopoly of trade in the Black Sea to the Genoese ships at the exchange of military and naval assistance.⁵¹

The treaty was a great setback for the Venetians that lost all their superior status in the Black Sea to their arch enemies Genoese. The Venetians would of course not give their claim up in the region and they followed their rivals and established a small colony in Solkhat after 1265 when Mikhail himself denounced Genoese monopoly on the Black Sea trade ⁵² The Venetian offensive reached its climax in 1296 when they have managed to capture Caffa from the Genoese but could not hold it for along time and the city was returned to Genoese control in 1299.⁵³ The Venetians that realized that they would not hold on to Crimea decided to focus on Tana (Tanais, Azak) in the other side of the Azak Sea that they have already settled, after 1204 but the Khans recognized their colony only after 1332 by Özbek Khan (Uzbek 1312-1341).⁵⁴

⁵¹ For the Treaty of Nymphaeum see: W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. I., pp. 427-431.

⁵² W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. II, p. 168.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 169.

⁵⁴ For the foundation of Venetian colony in Tana see: *ibid.*, pp. 180-183.

2.3.4 The fall of the Golden Horde and the rise of Italian city states

The political situation of the peninsula was as follows when Hacı Giray has started his political career; first there was a massive concentration of Tatar population in and around the Crimean peninsula as a result of the great turmoil in the Golden Horde, second there was the principality of Theodoro and the colonies of Genoese and Venetians. While, the Venetians were located in the periphery of the peninsula, the Genoese were extending their domination over Theodoro and other parts of the Crimea thanks to crisis of the Golden Horde. Apart from Caffa, Balaklava (Cembalo), Lusce (Aluşta, Kusta), Grand and Petit Lambat (Lambetie), Parthenite (Pertence), Gurzuf (Gorzovium), Nikita (Sykita, Sicita), Yalta, Orianda, Miskor (Muzacori), Alupka (Lupico), Kikineis (Chichineo), Foros (Fori) and though temporarily Solkhat were the new Genoese colonies.⁵⁵ It appears that the lords of the Golden Horde have gradually lost their tributary power over Theodoro and have conveyed their rights to the Genoese. The treaties of 1380-1381 and 1387 that were signed between the Genoese and the representatives of the Golden Horde legalized the situation in the peninsula. According to the treaty a)-the territory called Soldaia (Sudak) was ceded to Genoese b)-Gothia comprising the territory between Cembalo and Soldaia (the places that were written above) was to be given to Genoese with all of his Christian subjects.⁵⁶ The Khan would have a representative in Caffa in order to arrange the business relations between his subjects. However, it should be admitted that despite all of their diplomatic

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 209-210 and in A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...*, pp. 180-181.

⁵⁶ A. A. Vasiliev, *ibid.* pp.177-182.

success the authority of the Genoese was nominal and it did not meant very much outside the walls of Caffa.⁵⁷ Therefore, they have always tried to establish peaceful relations with the princes of the Golden Horde and immediately satisfied their demands especially in the early stages that they feel themselves vulnerable to their attacks without the protection of the strong walls. The princes of Golden Horde were still far more powerful than the Genoese except that they did not have naval power and their armies consisted of light cavalry were not suitable to pass the solid fortifications of Caffa as in the case of Canibek Khan's unsuccessful siege that lasted for three years 1344-1347.⁵⁸

It was also not logical to think that Theodoro completely become depended of Genoese, least the princes of Theodoro were against that idea. –The princes of Theodoro were under the pressure of both the Genoese that hold the control of maritime Gothia (Sudak and Cembalo) and the princes of the Golden Horde that consider Theodoro their own territory. Even, the Prince Stephen of Theodoro was reluctantly forced to emigrate or flight to Muscovy where he died as monk Simon with one of his sons, when he realized the impossibility to rule Theodoro under these conditions (1391-1393 or 1403).⁵⁹ He was replaced after a long internal strife by his second son Alexei (1403? 1444-1447?) that did not join to his father and remained in Crimea. The exact date of his coming to power is not certain but he appears as an

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 182.

⁵⁸ Kırımlı Abdullahoğlu Hasan "Ceneviz Menbalarına göre XV inci asır Kırım Hanlığı I", *Azerbeycan Yurt Bilgisi Yıl 1., no. 10, Tıpkıbasım*, Ankara, 2008, p. 333.

⁵⁹ A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...* p. 199. For more information on Prince Stephen see: *ibid.* 199-202.

important figure of Crimean politics that worth to be exchanged embassies and given presents for the Genoese (1411).⁶⁰

2.4 Hacı Giray Khan's entrance to the Crimean Politics

It is noticed that Alexei's relations with the Genoese reversed twenty years later. Alexei either upon the encouragement or by his own initiative began to pursue an anti-Genoese policy. It was apparent that both Hacı Giray and Alexei have understood that it was impossible to exist in Crimea without having an outlet to the Black Sea. Therefore, Hacı Giray convinced Alexei that he will support him military if he attacks the Genoese port of Cembalo.⁶¹ Hacı Girey's plan was to use the local connections of Alexei to get hold of Cembalo and Mangup.⁶² However, the Crimean Tatar cavalry could not penetrate in the city a peace that left the city to the Genoese was made.⁶³

Another factor that was believed to be influential on Hacı Giray's hold on to Crimea was his close relationship with the Great Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuania becomes an important actor in East European politics after the Union of Kreva⁶⁴ (Krewo in Pol. 1385). The Lithuanians began to interfere with Golden Horde politics as a result of their expansion to the east although they were still paying tribute to Emir

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 201.

⁶¹ Kırımlı Abdullahoğlu Hasan "Ceneviz Menbalarına ... p. 336. For the contrary argument of A. A. Vasiliev that the attack was in fact Alexei's plan because he has previously attacked and temporarily controlled Cembalo in 1422-23 without the involvement of Hacı Giray that was not a prevailing figure in Crimea see: A. A. Vasiliev, *ibid.* p. 202.

⁶² Kırımlı Abdullahoğlu Hasan *ibid.* p. 337.

⁶³ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan i Ego Politika", *ITUAK*, V. L , Simferopol, 1913, pp. 116-119.

⁶⁴ For more information on Krewo Union of 1385 see: Saulius Suziedelis, *Historical Dictionary of Lithuania*, London, 1997.

Mamay⁶⁵ (d. 1382) de facto ruler of the Horde after 1362 for Podolia.⁶⁶ The rival princes and military commanders of the Golden Horde that were engaged in a devastating competition for ascending to throne have desperately needed any kind of support including that of Lithuania. As a result, the Dukes of Lithuania began to support rival princes in order to prevent the strengthening of the Golden Horde and to keep the threat away from their borders like Toktamış Khan (1379-1397) and his sons.⁶⁷ Several followers of Toktamış that decided to settle in Lithuania and to enter in the service of Vytautas formed the backbone of the group that was called Lipka Tatars (today Lithuanian, Belorussian and Polish Tatars according to their settlements).⁶⁸ However, the role of Vytautas as a king maker should not be exaggerated. It was true that the sons of Toktamış Khan (Celaeddin 1412, Kerimberdi 1412-1414-1417, Kepek (Kebek) 1414-1415 and Cabbarberdi 1417) and Uluğ Muhammed that were supported by him managed to become Khan but their rule was short lived and their sphere of influences were limited.⁶⁹

Hacı Giray's father Giyaseddin was one of the supporters of Toktamış that followed him to Lithuania most probably perished during one of the campaigns against Edige Mirza and Timur Kutluk Khan (1395-1400).⁷⁰

⁶⁵ For more information on Emir Mamay see: A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, pp. 119-158 and M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi ...*, pp. 116-136

⁶⁶ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, p. 7.

⁶⁷ For more on Toktamış Khan see: Berthold Spuller, *Zolotaya Orda Mongoly v Rossii 1223-1502 gg.*, Kazan, 2016, pp. 148-163.

⁶⁸ For Lipka Tatars see: It is argued that there were more than 40.000 Tatars soldiers in Lithuania upon the death Vytautas in M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi ...*, p. 234.

⁶⁹ For the struggle between the sons of Toktamış and other princes see: A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, pp. 204-219 and Berthold Spuller, *Zolotaya Orda Mongoly....*, pp.168-183

⁷⁰ Litvin, Mikhailon, *O Nravakh Tatar, Litovtsev i Moskvityan*, Moskva, 1994, p. 46. However, Crimean Tatar chronicles states that he was born within the Kerey clan

It is also known that he made several attempts to control Crimea. The first one was around 1427-28 after the disappearance of his uncle Devletberdi from the political arena when he lost the struggle against Uluğ Muhammed and Borak.⁷¹ However, Hacı Girey's control was to be very short and he had to wait another thirteen years. It was Uluğ Muhammed that was supported by Vytautas that became the ruler of Crimea and the whole Golden Horde until 1437.⁷²

2.5 The Status of the Karaçi Beys

Who were than that enabled Hacı Giray to obtain Crimean throne If it was not Vytautas. The answer lays in the internal structure and in the events that occurred in the process of Golden Horde's disintegration. The four leading clans of the Golden Horde; *Karaçi* (non-Chinggisid aristocracy) were holding the real power in the country, it was impossible to remain in the throne without their consent.⁷³ The unity of the state was preserved by the relationship between the Khan and the Karaçis that was usually established via marriages.⁷⁴ In general, the struggle within for power was between the factions heading their own lineages (dynastic or tribal). It was usually one person's place in the genealogical tree was determining his status as the head of dynasty or

where his father was brought up and named him after. For more on the patronym Giray see below.

⁷¹ See: note 782 and Gulevich, V. P., "Krym i "Imperatory Solkhata" v 1400-1430 gg.: Khronologiya Proveniia i Status Pravitel", *Zolotoordynskoe Obozrenie*, No: 4/6, Kazan, 2014, p.179-180.

⁷² See the letter of Uluğ Muhammed Khan to the Ottoman Sultan Murat II dated 831 A.H./1428 A.D. in Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, pp. 6-36.

⁷³ For more on Karaçis and their role in the government see: chapter

⁷⁴ Uli Schamiloglu, "The Golden Horde", *The Turks V.II*, (ed. Hasan Celal Güzel et alias.), Ankara, 2014, p. 832.

clan.⁷⁵ However, the Black Death (1347-1351) and the continuous struggle of the candidate for the Khanship caused to the extermination of several members of the royal factions harmed the balance of the society.⁷⁶ Each of the four clans began to support their own candidates for the throne to the end instead of reaching a compromise that caused to a continuous chaos within the Golden Horde.

The clans have also begun to move around after their candidates or tried to find a more secure place and Crimea was one of the ideal ones.⁷⁷ Tekine (Tegine) Mirza the leader of Şirin clan was one of them.⁷⁸ He was one of the supporters of Devletberdi against Uluğ Muhammed Khan.⁷⁹ After the defeat of Devletberdi it appears that he switched allegiance to Küçük Muhammed Khan and supported him.⁸⁰ However, neither Uluğ Muhammed who lost his major supporter Vytautas and the leading clans nor Kiçi Muhammed who was busy in the east could get hold of Crimea. It was Hacı Giray that was able to get the support of both Karaçi clans and Polish-Lithuanians become the

⁷⁵ Although, the principle of collateral succession was accepted that the sons of the first generation descending from Genghis Khan might rule in descending order based upon age, the system changed after the Golden Horde when tribal elites began to select Khans without adhering to the prior principle. Uli Schamiloglu, "The Impact of the Black Death on the Golden Horde: Politics, Economy, Society, Civilization", *Golden Horde Review*, V. 5, No: 12, Kazan, 2017, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁶ Uli Schamiloglu, "The Golden Horde", p. 840. For Black Death and its effect on Golden Horde see: Uli Schamiloglu, "The Impact of the Black Death ...", pp. 325-343.

⁷⁷ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi Ahbari Müluki't-Tatar*, (*İnceleme-Tenkit*), (ed.) Yavuz Söylemez Ankara, 2020, p. 93.

⁷⁸ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza in *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar* states that several Tatar clans has settled in and around Crimea in the first quarter of 15th century especially as a reaction to the policies of Edige Mirza in Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar* ..., pp. 92-93

⁷⁹ A. Yu. Yakubovski argues that he has supported Devlet-Berdi together with the relatives of Edige Mirza in A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, p. 209 and M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi* ..., p. 237.

⁸⁰ V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod Verkhovenstvom Otomanskoi Porty Do Nachala XVII Veka*, Moskva, 1995, p. 178-180 and M. G. Safargaliev, *ibid.*, p. 237.

ruler of Crimea in 1441. According to Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, Hacı Giray was an ardent enemy of Seyyid Ahmed (Khan 1445-1459) that held the control of Crimea after the death of Uluğ Muhammed in 1437 and tried to liquidate the line of Taş Timur.⁸¹ Hacı Giray who learned about the plot saved his life in the last minute while his cousins Giyaseddin and Ali Bek had perished.⁸² Hacı Giray that *went Kazak* tried to gather anti-Seyyid Ahmed tribes around him. His alliance with Tekine Mirza, the most prestigious emir of the time marks the beginning of his rise to the power.⁸³ According to the Polish-Lithuanian sources Hacı Giray was a protégé of first Vytautas and then Wladyslaw II (1434-1444) and Casimir IV (Kazimierz IV King of Poland 1447-1492 and Grand Duke of Lithuania 1440-1492) He had even served as a lieutenant in Lida (Lyda) for them.⁸⁴

2.6 The Invitation of Hacı Giray to the Crimea by the Karaçi Beys

Hacı Giray came to the throne with the invitation of Karaçi beys; Şirin, Barın, Argın and Kıpçak that called him back from the court of Casimir to Crimea.⁸⁵ The beys were against the policies of Kiçi Muhammed Khan that aimed to alter their privileged status in Crimea.⁸⁶ He was allowed to meet with the delegation in Kiev that convinced him to return.

⁸¹ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, pp. 92-94.

⁸² *Ibid.* p. 94.

⁸³ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 97. Seyyid Mehmed Rıza argues that Tekine became the most prominent head of clan after the death of Kongrat (Kungrat) Haydar Mirza that was a supporter of Seyyid Ahmed. V.D. Smirnov argues that it was Tekine Mirza that made Hacı Giray the Khan of Crimea in V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 187.

⁸⁴ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, p. 12.

⁸⁵ M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi ...*, p. 261.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 237.

Meanwhile, Duke Casimir that decided to make him Tsar of Perekop assigned Marshall Radziwill to accompany him till the Crimean capital Solkhat.⁸⁷ The Karaçi Beys were expecting that he restore their previous status and Duke Casimir was expecting that he challenge the power of Seyyid Ahmed Khan that was causing many troubles for Lithuania. It seems that the plan worked because Seyyid Ahmed Khan was ousted from the political arena within ten years.⁸⁸ The retreat of Seyyid Ahmed Khan from Crimea to the steppes had a very significant meaning for the Girays. Hacı Giray did not only become the ruler of Crimea, but he also driven out the other Chingisid families from the peninsula except the brief invasion of Ahmed Khan (Khan of the Great Horde son of Kiçi Muhammed Khan) in 1476.⁸⁹ Therefore, the right to govern Crimea remained prerogative of the Giray family that was a very important factor for the domestic stability of the Khanate. Contrary to the brotherly Khanates of Kazan, Hacıtarhan and Sibir where different branches of the Jochid family were continuously struggling for power, it was almost impossible to achieve political stability.⁹⁰ The Giray family could realize the succession relatively easier than their brethren.

⁸⁷ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov Tom I Krymskoe Khany XV-XVI Stoletii i Borba za Nasledstvo Velikoi Ordı*, Kyiv, 2010 p. 25.

⁸⁸ For the end of Seyyid Ahmed Khan's political career see: A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Altınordu ve Çşküşü*, pp. 213-214.

⁸⁹ Ahmed Khan is mistaken by Seyyid Ahmed Khan because he has taken the ulus of Seyyid Ahmed Khan. For more on Ahmed Khan see: Iskander Izmailov, "Agoniya Imperii", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotoya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 727-728.

⁹⁰ For more information on the domestic politics in Kazan, Astrakhan and Sibir Khanates see notes 757, 758 and 760. The Kasım Khanate that was established as a vassal state of Muscovy from the beginnig had a different history.

2.7 Hacı Giray Khan's relations with Genoese Colonies

Hacı Giray was from the beginning aware of the fact he would sooner or later confront Genoese who control all the coasts and ports of the peninsula for the regional supremacy. It was already stated that the Crimean Tatar cavalry was not suitable to conduct siege warfare and he had neither navy nor artillery to bring down the walls of Genoese colonies, especially those of Caffa. The previous alliance with Alexei of Theodoro that was not successful did not change the status-quo. The Genoese also quickly realized that it was impossible for them to stay in Crimea without establishing peaceful relations with Hacı Giray Khan. Besides, Hacı Giray Khan managed to establish a parallel trade network (especially in terms of slaves) that of their network and insisted on conducting this trade without using Italian ports and ships.⁹¹ According to the plan they have tried to respond positively to every demand of Hacı Giray Khan for himself or his family whether it was humiliating or not.⁹²

2.8 The conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans and Its regional effects

Although, he demonstrated his power to the Genoese colonies, Hacı Giray Khan could not realize his desire to bring them under his direct rule without the existence of a navy and artillery. The conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed II (Mehmed the Conqueror 1444-1446

⁹¹ Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese", p. 108 and Ahmet Mutu, "Hacı Giray I", *DİA*, C. XIV, İstanbul, 1996, p. 474.

⁹² W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. II, p. 382.

1451-1481) in 29 May 1453 has radically changed the balance of power and gave Hacı Giray Khan the opportunity to achieve his objective. Mehmed II's capture of Istanbul and the following conquests were not coincidental and product of a major scheme; the revival of the previous regional empires that Istanbul was placed in the center upon the Turko-Muslim traditions.⁹³ In order to achieve his plans he first of all eliminated all the dynasties that were related to the Byzantine throne. The offsprings of the Byzantine Empire were immediately destroyed. Trebizond (1461)⁹⁴ and Morea (1460)⁹⁵ were taken and all members of their royal families were liquidated.⁹⁶ The second principle of Mehmed II was to bring all of the trade under his control that means to not allow the existence of any foreign trade colonies within his borders.⁹⁷ Black Sea had a special importance in this project because it was the link between Anadolu (Anatolia) and Deşt-i Kıpçak that functioned as a joint economic unit while Istanbul is placed in the center. The fertile pasture lands of the Deşt-i Kıpçak could easily solve the nutrition problem of Istanbul that was completely depended outside for provisions. Finally it should be noted that almost all of the Italian trade colonies that were taken by Mehmed II were located on the ancient trade centers.⁹⁸ Therefore, there was a historical continuity between the previous

⁹³ For Mehmed II's plans see: Halil İnalçık, "Mehmed II", *İA*, C. VII., Eskişehir, 2001, pp. 520-529

⁹⁴ For the Empire of Trebizond see: Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, *Trabzon İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, Ankara, 2011.

⁹⁵ For the Despotate of Morea see: Machiel Kiel, John Alexandr, "Mora", *DİA*, C. XXX., İstanbul, 2005, pp. 281-282. .

⁹⁶ For the policies of Mehmed II to form an empire centered around Istanbul see Halil İnalçık, "Mehmed II", *İA*, C. VII., Eskişehir, 2001, pp. 514-520.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 515.

⁹⁸ For more information on the history the Black Sea trade see: Georges Bratianu, *La Mer Noire*,

political powers and the Ottoman Empire. For Mehmed II the control of the Black Sea trade was related to its domestic economy rather than the international trade because the importance of Black Sea ports had already vanished after the collapse of the Pax-Mongolica and the emergence of alternative trade routes.⁹⁹

Contrary to the ideas of Mehmed II the Crimean ports were a link that combined the Khanate to the outside world and the international trade. The cooperation between the Ottoman Sultans and Crimean Khans was already conflicting from the beginning. The Ottoman plan was not more than to replace Genoese authority in the region by stationing and controlling strategic locations, since they were aware it was well beyond their military and technological power (like any other political power of the time) to incorporate the vast and dangerous Deşt-i Kıpçak in their system. It was better that the Deşt-i Kıpçak remained as a no man's land between Ottomans and the north.

On the contrary, for Hacı Giray it was a question of hereditary right and political legitimacy. The Giray dynasty based their claim on the Crimea, as well as Golden Horde, to their membership of the Chingisid royal family. Since Crimea was part of the Golden Horde, it was the patrimony of Hacı Giray. Although, the Genoese extended their authority at the expense of the Tatars, they were not able to become completely independent of their rule.¹⁰⁰ First, a *Tudun* (Capitano della

⁹⁹ Halil İnalcık (ed.), *An Economic Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 271-325.

¹⁰⁰ However, W. Heyd argues that the existence of Khan's officials in Caffa does not mean the colony's dependence on the Khans and their jurisdiction was vaguely

campagna) appointed by the Khan was ever present in Caffa in order to represent the interests of the Khan and his subjects.¹⁰¹ Second, there was another official of the Khan that was charged with the collection of customs duties for the Khan.¹⁰² Hacı Giray Khan in his *yarlık* that was given to a certain Hekim Yahya from Ankara in (26-S.-857 AH/8-III-1453 AD) listed Caffa within his domains.¹⁰³ Above all, there was a considerable Tatar settlement in the city and although the office language was Italian the vernacular was Tatar language.¹⁰⁴ The problem of the sovereignty over Caffa and the litoral of Crimea between the Crimean Khanate and Ottoman Empire existed prior to the establishment of their relationship.

2.9 The first siege of Caffa in 1454 by the joint Ottoman-Crimean Tatar forces

The different interpretations about the future status did not prevent the two states to cooperate for the elimination of Italian colonies in the region. The Ottoman conquest of Istanbul has already determined the fate of the Italian colonies in the Black Sea. Contrary to their expectations, Mehmed II returned Pera to the Genoese only after demolishing its walls and making certain that its resurrection would not

symbolic despite the existence of 3 % duty collected for the Khan in W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce ...*, V. II, p. 371.

¹⁰¹ The Tudun who was responsible from the Tatar quarter and subjects and representing the interests of the Khan was usually elected by the common decision of city council and four judges called "Uffisio della campagna" and the Khan or his representative in *ibid.* p. 400. It is interesting to note that any Tatar that resided with his family in Caffa or in its suburbs for more than year becomes a Genoese subject and exist from the jurisdiction of the Khan. *ibid* ..., V. II, p. 371.

¹⁰² *ibid.* p. 371 W. Heyd states that the amount of the duty was generally 3%.

¹⁰³ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, p. 72 "... Kırkyer'de ve Kırım'da ve Kefe'de ve Kerç'de ve Taman'da ve Kaba'da ve Kıpçak'da ..."

¹⁰⁴ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan...", pp. 99-139.

be tolerated. It was evident that the Genoese would not be able to continue the trade as before via Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, but the alternative journey by land was very long and costly. The appearance of the Ottoman navy before Caffa one year after the conquest of Istanbul should not be a big surprise for the Genoese. The colony proposed to entrust the administration to the Bank of St. George (Banca di S. Giorgio est. 1407) which controlled a huge amount of capital.¹⁰⁵ Upon the approval of the doge Pietro di Campofregoso (1450-1458) all the administration of Caffa and all other colonies in the Black Sea was offered to the Bank.¹⁰⁶ It was thought that the Bank could finance the defence of the colonies and could enter in to negotiations and influence the Ottomans. The Bank tried to send reinforcements to Caffa but two vessels loaded with 200 soldiers and ammunitions were intercepted by the Ottomans in Istanbul and their crew was imprisoned.¹⁰⁷ Thereafter, the plans to pacify Ottomans thaving failed he Bank turned its attention to Hacı Giray Khan and tried to bring him on their side by presenting valuable gifts to him.¹⁰⁸

The Ottoman fleet first sieged Moncastro that it met with a stiff resistance and was forced to lift the siege and then went to the shores of Caucauses and invaded Sebastopolis (Diskourias, Sukhumi).¹⁰⁹ Finally, it appeared in front of Caffa on June 1454. Just after the arrival of Ottoman fleet which consisted of 50-60 galleys commanded by

¹⁰⁵ W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce ...*, V. II, p. 385.

¹⁰⁶ For more on Bank of St. George see: *ibid.* p. 384.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 385-386.

¹⁰⁸ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan I ...", p. 122.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 383.

Demirkaya, a Crimean Tatar army of 6000-7000 cavaliers appeared outside the walls of Caffa.¹¹⁰ Although, the siege seems to be well organized according to the punctual arrival of the armies, the first joint Ottoman-Crimean Tatar operation was not successful and failed to capture the city. The Genoese reports shows that there was a great panic in the city and it was believed that Mehmed II agreed to help Hacı Giray Khan to take all Genoese colonies of Crimea.¹¹¹ The city would be the eternal patrimony of the Khan and all the adults of all genders would be the slaves of the Sultan.¹¹² However, we don't know whether it was just a preliminary expedition or it was beyond the capacity of the joint forces to take Caffa. In fact, the Ottomans did not insist on the siege and accepted the peace proposal of the Genoese. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars could not reach an agreement over the possession of Caffa and Demirkaya that understood that the control of the city would pass to Hacı Giray Khan he suddenly decided to return Istanbul.¹¹³ The fact that the Ottomans have returned twenty years later with a greater army shows that they were acting according to a conscious plan. According to the Genoese reports Demirkaya organized a meeting with Hacı Giray where he proposed the Khan to begin the talks for peace. After the meeting, Hacı Giray moved away from the city with his army and the Ottomans started the peace

¹¹⁰ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan ...", p. 123. For the description of the campaign according to the Genoese reports see: *ibid.*, pp. 127-132.

¹¹¹ *ibid.* p. 126..

¹¹² M. Volkov, "Chetyre Goda Goroda Kafy (1453, 1454, 1455 i 1456), *ZOOİD*, V. LIII, Odessa, 1872, p 114..

¹¹³ Halil İnalcık also argues that the immediate return of the Ottoman fleet was related with the possession of Caffa in Halil İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı Himayesi Altına Girmesi Meselesi", *III. Türk Tarih Kongresi Ankara 15 20 Kasım 1943 Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*, Ankara, 1948, pp. 480-481.

talks with the Genoese.¹¹⁴ Demirkaya's requests were very modest; some sugar and sea biscuits that were very urgent for the fleet according to the report.¹¹⁵ Thus, either the Ottoman campaign was ill organized or there appeared a problem between the allies to lift the siege immediately.¹¹⁶ Hacı Giray asked the payment of 600 soms (equivalent of 19000 Italian lirets or 1200 golds) that the colony offered to pay 450 soms.¹¹⁷ The next year Ottomans and Genoese has signed a peace treaty that Genoa has accepted to pay 3000 gold ducats per year as tribute to the Ottomans.¹¹⁸

2.10 The Genoese project to replace Hacı Giray Khan with his son Haydar and his second reign (1456-1466)

Initially, Genoese tried to take Hacı Giray Khan to their side or at least neutralize him during the prospective Ottoman invasion. According to the Genoese documents, the administration of Caffa and Ulubey (Olobei)¹¹⁹ (1447-1458?) the Prince of Theodoro that were united against the Ottoman threat gave a present of 31000 aspers (258, 33 piastres or akçes) to Hacı Giray Khan in 1455 in order take him to their sides.¹²⁰ The Genoese efforts were not limited to establish good relations with Hacı Giray Khan. It appears that they managed to overthrow Hacı Giray Khan temporarily and replace him with his son Haydar in 1456. The Genoese documents of 12 November 1456

¹¹⁴ M. Volkov, "Chetyre Goda ... p. 129.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 129.

¹¹⁶ It is also possible that the Genoese bribed one of the parties but the report would probably not be silent and talked about their diplomatic success.

¹¹⁷ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan ... p. 130.

¹¹⁸ W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce ...*, V. II, p. 391.

¹¹⁹ A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...* pp. 221-235.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 223

declare that the new Crimean Khan had to be respected and well treated.¹²¹ It seems that Haydar Khan came to the throne as a result of the cooperation of Crimean tribal aristocracy and Genoese.¹²² Haydar Khan was not successful and quickly lost the support of the population after a few months rule he fled to Lithuania with his family that he lived in exile until his death.¹²³ Hacı Giray Khan that resumed the power after a short interval seems to have good relations with the Genoese of Caffa because he was rarely mentioned in Genoese documents.¹²⁴

Hacı Giray Khan was not only the Khan of Crimea and was claiming to be the Khan of the *Taht İli*¹²⁵ or *Ulu Ulus* (Great Horde).¹²⁶ Thus he was competing with other claimants of the throne of the Golden Horde, although his priority was to consolidate his power in Crimea. Upon the request of Kazimierz IV, he attacked Seyyid Ahmed Khan who was invading Podolia from the rear and defeated him.¹²⁷ The defeat was not only the beginning of the end to the political career of Seyyid Ahmed Khan who was imprisoned by Kazimierz IV until his death in Kovensk

¹²¹ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan ... p. 135.

¹²² W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. II, p. 398. W. Heyd points the Genoese factor on the rise of Haydar Halil İnalıcık, "Hadjji Giray" *El*², V.III, Leiden, 1991, pp. 44. Halil İnalıcık suggests a joint operation of Genoese and Crimean tribal chiefs and L.P. Kolli, *ibid.* p. 135. Also see in Ahmed Süha Arslangiray, *Kırım Hanlığı Menşei-Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna Bağlanması*, İstanbul, 1959 p. 50.

¹²³ For more information Haydar Khan see: Ilya Zaitsev, "Krymskoe Khantsvo", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotaya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, p. 252 n. 1.

¹²⁴ W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. II, p. 398-399.

¹²⁵ For the concept of Taht ili see: Halil İnalıcık, "Power Relationships Between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as reflected in the Titulature", *The Middle East and the Balkans Under the Ottoman Empire*, Bloomington, 1993, p. 372.

¹²⁶ For the meaning of Ulu Ulus see: İskander İzmailov, "Ulus Dzhuchi i Zolotaya Orda: Ofitsial'noe Nazvanie Strany I Istoricheskaya Traditsiya", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotaya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 16-19.

¹²⁷ Berthold Spuller, *Zolotaya Orda Mongoly*..., p. 199 and M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi Ordı*, p. 262.

Podolia, but also the elimination of a potential rival for the Crimean throne for Hacı Giray.¹²⁸ Once, he consolidated his power base in Crimea Hacı Giray started on the one hand to attract and settle Turco-Mongol tribes around Crimea and tried to claim the heritage of the Golden Horde at least in the western part of the *Deşt-i Kıpçak* without infringing his alliance with Kazmierz IV.¹²⁹ In his Yarlík given to the Lithuanians dated 867 AH/1461 AD, he confirms the granting of several towns and places to them by Toktamış Khan to Vytautas and by him to Sigismund (Grand Duke of Lithuania 1432-1440) earlier.¹³⁰ However, his struggle with the other pretending descendants continued until his death in 1466.

In order to explain the political and military influence of Hacı Giray, the visit of Papal delegation should be emphasized. Pope Pius II¹³¹ (1464-1471) who was trying to organize a crusade against Mehmed II under the leadership of Frederick III (Holy Roman Emperor 1453-1493 German King 1440-1493) sent a delegation headed by the Patriarch of Antioch Louis of Bologna to Hacı Giray in order to invite him to join anti-Ottoman coalition in 10 September 1465.¹³² Hacı Giray replied that he would act in accordance with his ally Kazimierz IV. H. Howorth argues that his response was very clear because Kazimierz that was in war with Teutonic Knights and Muscovy would not dare to create troubles

¹²⁸ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, p. 13.

¹²⁹ Berthold Spuller, *Zolotaya Orda Mongoly....*, pp. 201-202 and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *ibid.* pp. 13-16.

¹³⁰ For the Yarlík of Hacı Giray Khan see: Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *ibid.* pp. 531-533.

¹³¹ For more information on the project see: Trandafir G. Djuvara, *Türk İmparatorluğunun Paylaşılması Hakkında Yüz Proje*, İstanbul, 2017i pp. 51-54.

¹³² Henry H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols From the 9th Century to the 10th Century Part II The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, London, 1880, p. 451.

with the Ottomans.¹³³ On the eve of the visit of the Papal delegation Hacı Giray had another decisive victory against Ahmed (in some sources Mahmud, the future Khan of Hacıtarhan son of Kiçi Muhammed) that was marching on Moscow upon the request of Ivan III.¹³⁴ Hacı Giray's campaign in the name of Muscovy had also a symbolic meaning since it represented the beginning of Crimean-Muscovite coalition against Polish-Great Horde block.

2.11 The succession crisis after the death of Hacı Giray Khan (1466) and the role of the Karaçis and the Genoese of Caffa in the accession of Mengli Giray Khan

When Hacı Giray died in 1466 he had eight children: Öz Timur, Yamgurçi, Kildiş, Kutluğ Zeman, Devletyar,¹³⁵ Haydar¹³⁶, Nurdevlet and Mengli Giray.¹³⁷ Nurdevlet (Khan of Crimea 1466-1467, 1467-1469 and 1475-1476 and Khan of Kasım 1486-1490) who was the eldest son of Hacı Giray¹³⁸ sat on the throne upon the death of his father but could not hold it for a long time, because he could not subdue his brothers who were trying to get the throne for themselves. Consequently, he was

¹³³ *Ibid.* p. 451.

¹³⁴ M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi ...*, pp. 264-265 Berthold Spuller, *Zolotaya Orda Mongoly....*, p. 203. B. Spuller argues that the battle was against Seyyid Ahmed, M. G. Safargaliev argues that it was one of the sons of Kiçi Muhammed that were fighting for the post of their fathers depending on Muscovite chronicles. For the discussion of the identity of the Khan of the Great Horde that Hacı Giray defeated see: M. G. Safargaliev, *ibid.* pp. 264-265.

¹³⁵ Devletyar the eldest son is dead when Hacı Giray was alive in L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy Po Genuzeskim' i Drugim' Sovremennym' Istochnikam'", *ITUAK*, V. LIV, Simferopol, 1918, p. 130.

¹³⁶ Haydar that has revolted his father Hacı Giray in 1456.

¹³⁷ Henry H Howorth, *History of the ... Part II The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, *Ibid.* p. 451.

¹³⁸ According to Seyyid Mehmed Rıza Nur Devlet was not the son of Hacı Giray. He was the son of Seyyid Ahmed Khan in Seyyid Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 108. However, the numismatic evidence shows that he was Hacı Giray's son see: N. N. Kosyakin, *Krymskoe Khanstvo Monety...*, p. 50.

forced to flee to Poland in 1478 when he finally lost the throne to his brother Mengli Giray (1467-1474, 1475-1476 and, 1478-1514)¹³⁹ Nurdevlet Khan entered to the service of Muscovy in 1479 with his brother Haydar that they have acted together in the struggle for the throne and he become Khan of Kasimov in 1486. After several years of service for Muscovy, he died in 1503 and his body was transferred to Crimea and buried in the mausoleum of his father Hacı Girey Khan in Salacık, contrary to the practice for the other Khans of Kasimov.¹⁴⁰ It appears that Nurdevlet Khan like his father pursued the policy of cooperation with Polish-Lithuania. Immediately, after his accession to the throne, he sent an embassy to Kazimierz IV that declare his intention to continue the existing close relations with him (spring 1467).¹⁴¹ It appears that Kazimierz IV supported him at this juncture. However, his second initiative deviated from the policies of his father; he sent a delegation to Ahmed Khan¹⁴² (d.1481) of the Great Horde requesting a *yarlık* that confirmed his rule in Crimea.¹⁴³ Nurdevlet Khan, obviously, sent the delegation to Ahmed Khan in order to fortify his legitimacy in the eyes of the *Kırım Ulusu* (Crimean Ulus) but it turned to be his greatest mistake because in the final analysis the clans that

¹³⁹ V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' Tsariyakh' i Tsarevichakh'*, Vol I.St. Petersburg, 1863, pp. 93-94.

¹⁴⁰ N. N. Kosyakin, *Krymskoe Khanstvo Monety...*, p. 49. For more information on Nur Devlet Khan see: V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V. I., pp. 91-96.

¹⁴¹ For the copy of the *yarlık* of Nur Devlet to Kazimierz IV in Latin dated 17 September 1467 see: Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, pp. 534-535.

¹⁴² For more information on Ahmed Han see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, pp. 54-59. However, Akdes Nimet Kurat misleadingly identifies Ahmed Khan with both his son Seyyid Ahmet that later reigned in Crimea for a while and Seyyid Ahmed son of Toktamış (1432-1459) the last Khan of the Golden Horde. For more information on the identity of Ahmed Khan see: Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁴³ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom I, p. 48.

constitute the Crimean Ulus were in the peninsula because of their desire to be out of the internecine troubles of the Great Horde.

Contrarywise, his brother Mengli Giray was representing the ideals of the Crimean Ulus that were primarily willing to concentrate on their new *yurt*. Therefore, he was supported by the Karaçi Beys. It appears that while Mengli Giray has controlled the inside of the peninsula, whereas Nurdevlet was established outside in the steppe.¹⁴⁴ Mengli Giray was not the youngest son of Hacı Giray Khan that is, the one unlike to succeed to the throne. Therefore, the support of the Karaçi clans was extremely important in his take over of the Crimean throne. However, the death of his most important supporter the head of Şirins Tegene Mirza gave Nurdevlet the opportunity to defeat his brother and forced him to take refuge in Caffa.¹⁴⁵

2.12 Mengli Giray I Khan's relationships with Genoese of Caffa and the Ottomans prior to the Ottoman conquest of the Crimea (1467-1475)

The relationship between Mengli Giray and Genosese seems to be stronger than expected. According to the Genoese chronicles, he spent

¹⁴⁴ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı Tabiiliğine Girişi ve Ahidname Meselesi", *Seçme Eserleri –XI Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, İstanbul, 2017, pp. 59-60. Seyyid Mehmed Rıza also states that while Mengli Giray Khan was active inside the peninsula Nurdevlet Khan was controlling the steppe. He also states that another brother of Mengli Giray; Keldibay (Giraybay? Kıldış or Kıldıbay) has also ruled in Crimea for a short time after 1469 in Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar ...*, p. 108-109. Seyyid Mehmed's narrative is most probably coming from the same sources of the chronicle Debar' Sefataim' (of David Lekhno (d. 1735) A., Ya., Garkavi, "Otryvki iz Istoricheskogo Sochineniya Davida Lekhno", *Otchet Imperatorskoi Publichnoi Biblioteki za 1882 god*, St. Petersburg, 1884, pp. 2-3. For more information on David Lekhno see: A., Ya., Garkavi, *ibid.* p. 1. According to this narrative the Khans of Crimea prior the Giray dynasty were Urus, Toktamış, Celaledin, Cafer, Keremberdi, Kiyik?, Kadirberdi, Nur Devlet, Haydar, Geldiş.

¹⁴⁵ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar ...*, p. 100.

quite a long time in Caffa as a prisoner of war made him the primary candidate for the throne in the eyes of Genoese.¹⁴⁶ Thanks to the support of Mamak¹⁴⁷ (Mamay) son of Tegenene Mirza and the Genoese Mengli Giray managed to defeat his brother Nurdevlet and to take the control of the Khanate in 1468.¹⁴⁸ According to Genoese sources, they have provided several services for Mengli Giray including providing mercenaries for him that was extremely important for his victory against his brother.¹⁴⁹ As an act of gratitude, the new Khan rendered a visit to Caffa and signed a treaty of eternal peace and mutual friendship.¹⁵⁰ He also renewed the treaty of 1381 and reduced the tribute paid by the colony. The ensuing events have created such an optimistic spirit in the colony that it was believed that in case of an Ottoman attack Mengli Giray Khan would support them rather than the Ottomans.¹⁵¹ Indeed, Mengli Giray politely protested in a letter dated 25.9.1469 to Mehmed II the damages done by the Ottoman fleet under the command of Yakup

¹⁴⁶ L.P. Kolli, "Khadzhi-Girey Khan ...", p. 136-138 and L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy" ..., *ITUAK*, V. LIV, p. 131. L. P. Kolli quotes that Mengli Giray had a modern European education like a prince that his father would be proud of during his stay in Caffa. If we believe in Genoese documents Mengli Giray was nothing more than a joint project of Mamak and Genosese. According to a Crimean Tatar chronicle introduced by A. Negri in Zooid Mengli Giray has spent quite a long time in Mangup that was a Genoese possession at that time when he was defeated by Nurdevlet and he was later transferred to Caffa in A. Negri, "Izvillechenie iz' Turetskoi Rukopisi Obschestva, Soderzhaschei Istoriyu Krymskikh' Hanov", *ZOOID*, T. I., Odessa, 1844, pp. 379-392.

¹⁴⁷ According to the Genoese sources Mamay as the tudun (governor or prefect) of Caffa and holder of the vast lands was the strongest man in Crimea. Nurdevlet was recognizing his authority on the lands between Cembalo (Balaklava) and Otuztepe in L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy" ..., *ITUAK*, V. LIV, p. 131.

¹⁴⁸ Ahmed Süha Üstüngeray, *Kırım Hanlığı Menşei-Kuruluşu* ..., p. 51. For the coin minted in the name of Mengli Giray in 873 AH/1468 AD see: N. N. Kosyakin, *Krymskoe Khanstvo Monety*..., p. 54.

¹⁴⁹ W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. II, p. 399. Halil İnalçık states that the mercenaries were in fact the Tatar residents of Caffa on the ground that the city's garrison did not suffice to defend it and the city which was continuously searching ways to overcome this problem could not provide Mengli Giray with his army in Halil İnalçık, *Seçme Eserleri –XI* ..., p. 60. For the Tatar population in Caffa see note: 870 and for the weakness of the defence of Caffa see notes: 884 and 885.

¹⁵⁰ L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy" ..., *ITUAK*, V. LIV, p. 132.

¹⁵¹ W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce* ..., V. II, p. 399.

Bey to the Crimean cities by stating that the damage that was done to Caffa would be considered as if it was done to him.¹⁵² Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the Genoese Mengli Giray's interest in Caffa depended on the fact that he considered it his patrimony. However, V.D. Smirnov argues that the Genoese support to Mengli Giray was in fact marginal and he was essentially depending to the support Tatar clans settled around Caffa and to the Tatar population that were settled in the outskirts of the city.¹⁵³

The rapprochement between Mengli Giray and the Genoese happened at a juncture when the Genoese learned that the Ottomans were about to return their aggressive policy against the Genoese colonies in the Black Sea.¹⁵⁴ They threatened the Genoese to increase the duties and to disrupt their trade. Finally, it was learned that the Ottomans were preparing a large fleet to send to the Black Sea. Both Mengli Giray Khan and his five brothers acting together with Nurdevlet did not miss the opportunity and entered into secret negotiations with the Ottomans in order to obtain their support.¹⁵⁵ Nurdevlet was not only planning to attack Cembalo upon the request of Mehmet II, but sent an army in front of Caffa at the same time. One of the Genoese officials Jacobo Grimaldi wrote a letter to Nurdevlet Khan that settled in Zichia (Northern Abkhazia) after the latter lost power where he offered his assistance to

¹⁵² Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, p. 85-86.

¹⁵³ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, pp. 212-213.

¹⁵⁴ For instance, the Ottomans demanded the immediate dispatch of 6000 ducats to Istanbul that was previously paid partially throughout the year in L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy" ..., *ITUAK*, V. LIV, p. 133.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 133.

him in his struggle for the throne.¹⁵⁶ The letter was intercepted by Mengli Giray Khan and it was submitted to the consul of Caffa that supported Mengli Giray Khan and condemned Grimaldi to death penalty for high treason.¹⁵⁷ According to the Genoese documents, Nurdevlet Khan prepared to attack on Solkhat with the help of Grimaldi's forces but he was stopped by the Genoese forces in Kerch (1470). Consequently, he was imprisoned together with all of his brothers in one of Caffa's towers (1471).¹⁵⁸

The relations between Mengli Giray Khan and Genoese have further developed after the isolation of Nurdevlet and they have even formed an alliance that included the principality of Theodoro against external powers (i.e the Ottomans).¹⁵⁹ However, the alliance was in fact very fragile, under the circumstances of an ever increasing Ottoman threat¹⁶⁰ and the brothers of Mengli Giray Khan that were continuously intriguing in order to obtain their freedom and to the throne.¹⁶¹ Nurdevlet had also his allies and supporters inside Caffa that were about to take the action. For an obscure reason, they managed to transfer Nurdevlet and his brothers from the tower to house custody in the city enabling them to contact with their supporters easily.¹⁶² Mengli Giray who felt the incoming danger organized an unsuccessful plot to assassinate

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 133-134.

¹⁵⁷ The punishment was later reduced to the exile upon the request of Mengli Giray, *ibid.* p. 134.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 134-135.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 136. For the correspondance between the Consul of Caffa and Mengli Giray see: *ibid.* pp. 136-137.

¹⁶⁰ In 1470, the Ottomans increased the tribute of Caffa to 8000 from 3000 ducats and it was finally agreed on 4000 ducats in W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce ...*, V. II, p. 399.

¹⁶¹ L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy" ..., *ITUAK*, V. LIV, p. 138.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* p. 144.

Nurdevlet and his other brothers. Nurdevlet who was informed of the plan managed to survive.¹⁶³ Finally, the Genoese decided to take Nurdevlet together with his four brothers to take in Soldaia (Sudak) and put under surveillance in the towers of St. Elias and St. Nicholas for their own safety.¹⁶⁴ It appears that the plot was far more important than a power struggle between two Tatar princes but also was an indication of the level of the corruption of the administration of the colony.

2.13 The place of the Şirin Bey and the Tudun of Caffa Eminek Mirza in the Crimean politics

Mamak, the tudun of Caffa, was replaced by his brother Eminek upon the death of the former in 1473. The nature of the relationship between the city administration and Eminek was extremely important for Caffa because he was controlling the provisioning of the city and the relationship of the colony with other Tatar Mirzas. However, there was a great discrepancy between the approaches of Eminek Mirza and Mengli Giray Khan towards the Genoese. While, the former wanted to return to the policy of Hacı Giray that stresses the subordination of Genoese to the Crimean Khans, the latter was looking forward to a rather more equal relationship and cooperation.¹⁶⁵ The interventionist policies of Eminek Mirza caused the reaction of the colony's administration and damaged the peaceful relationship between two entities. According to the letter of the head consul Antonio Cabella on 14.10.1474, writes that

¹⁶³ For Mengli Giray Khan's plot against Nurdevlet Khan see: *ibid.* pp. 144-146.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 146.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 160. "Padenie Kaffy Po Genuzeskim' i Drugim' Sovremennym' Istochnikam' Poslednie Mesyatsy Genuzeskoi Kaffy", *ITUAK*, V. LV, Simferopol, 1918, pp. 145-174

Eminek Mirza was acting like the proprietor (ruler) of Caffa and did not listen any advices. He had even insouciantly asked from Mengli Gray Khan the marriage of his mother.¹⁶⁶ It was a great scandal to dare to ask the hand of the widow of a deceased Khan by one of his subjects. Khan who thought that he might have lost his position to Eminek refused the proposal. However, Eminek Mirza insisted on the request and asked from the city consul to be intermediary between him and the Khan stating that otherwise he would prevent the provisioning of the city. When the city council declined to perform, his request he actually blocked the entrance of the provisions to the city by June 1474.¹⁶⁷ The things were becoming more complicated and difficult for Caffa and Mengli Giray. Khan Caffa was in a desperate position because of the complete Ottoman blockade that constrained the colony to rely on inland neighbors in order to survive.¹⁶⁸ The Genoese were ensuring the friendship of Mengli Giray Khan thanks to his brothers including the rival Khan Nurdevlet that were put under custody first in Caffa and later in Soldaia.

2.14 The Ottomans decide to return (1475)

Genoa's relationships with the Ottoman Empire were going quite well. The city was trying to benefit from the deterioration of Venice's relations with the Ottomans after 1463 and it was aiming to replace its

¹⁶⁶ L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy Po Genuzeskim' i Drugim' Sovremennym' Istochnikam'Poslednie Mesyatsy Genuzeskoi Kaffy", *ITUAK*, V. VV, Simferopol, 1918, pp. 149-150.

¹⁶⁷ Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese", p. 127.

¹⁶⁸ The caravans coming from Moscow, Lviv and Hacitarhan were the life-lines of the city for more and besides both of the caravans should pass on Crimean Khanate territory to arrive Caffa on the subject of the Caffa's trade with the North see L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy Po ...", V. LIV, pp. 168-169.

arch-rival in the Levantine trade.¹⁶⁹ After the Ottoman conquest of Negropont (Negroponte, Euboea, Eğriboz) in 12 July 1470, It was believed that the Ottoman invasion of Italy was imminent and the Black Sea colonies were safe for the moment. The Venetians tried to balance the Ottoman aggression by making an alliance with the Akkoyunlu Uzun Hasan (1452-1478)¹⁷⁰ and forcing them to fight simultaneously on two fronts.¹⁷¹ For that reason they even tried to contact with Ahmed Khan of the Great Horde and his nephew Canibek who would later control Crimea for a while.¹⁷² However, Mehmed II managed to overcome one of the most important crisis of his reign by defeating Uzun Hasan at Otlukbeli in 11.8.1473.

Quite surprisingly, a six month armistice was signed between the Ottomans and Venetians in the spring of 1475 while they were still at war in Albania. Since, the political situation was radically changing in the Northern Black Sea region, Mehmed II realized that it was more convenient to turn his attention over there. The Hospodar of Moldavia Stephen the Great (Ștefan cel Mare 1457-1504)¹⁷³ who was willing to break up with the Ottomans stopped to pay tribute.¹⁷⁴ Mehmed II

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 117-121. For the Ottoman-Venetian relations between 1453-1475 see: Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II", *İA*, C. VII., Eskişehir, 2001, pp. 520-529 and Marian Malowist, *ibid.* pp. 116-121.

¹⁷⁰ For more information on Uzun Hasan see: Faruk Sümer, "Uzun Hasan", *DİA*, C. XLII, İstanbul, 2012, pp. 261-264. For more information on Akkoyunlu state (1340-1514) see: Faruk Sümer, "Akkoyunlular", *DİA*, C.II, İstanbul, 1989, pp. 270-274.

¹⁷¹ Mehmed II like almost all of the Ottoman Sultans applied the principal of refraining from fighting on two fronts at the same time.

¹⁷² For more information on Venetians plans to bring Great Horde to their side see: note 1008 below.

¹⁷³ For more information on Stephen cel Mare see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Boğdan", *DİA*, C. VI., İstanbul, 1992, p. 269. Stephen was married with a princess of Theodoro.

¹⁷⁴ The Ottomans were fighting against the Papacy, Venice and Naples at the sea and Hungarians and Albanians in the land. For more information see: Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II" ...

realized that in order to put an end to the threat of Stephen the Great who was trying to extend his authority in the region, the incorporation of the peninsula to the Ottoman system was necessary.¹⁷⁵

2.15 Crimean Tatar raid on Moldavia upon the request of the Ottomans

The Ottoman-Crimean Tatar relations evolved over Moldavian problem even before the Ottoman conquest of Crimea. The pro-Ottoman Wallachian Hospodar Radu III (cel Frumose, Fair or Beautiful 1462-1474) that could not resist the aggressive policies of the Moldovian Hospodar Stephen cel Mare who had invaded Wallachia, asked the help of Mehmed II (1470).¹⁷⁶ Consequently, upon the request of the Ottomans Crimean Tatar forces attacked and pillaged Moldavian territory including the capital Suceava. However, they were ambushed and heavily defeated by Stephen the Great in Lipint on Dnieper while they were returning and many of them including one son of Mengli Giray were taken prisoner (20.8.1470).¹⁷⁷ The Hanzade saved his life thanks to the mediation of his father Mengli Giray Khan while the other captives were severely punished. The Crimean Tatars renewed their attacks on Moldavia in the following year.

¹⁷⁵ Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese", pp. 120-121.

¹⁷⁶ I. Zaitsev, *Mezhdru Moskovoi i Stambulom Dzhuchidskie Gosudartsva, Moskva i Osmanskaya Imperiya (nach. XV – per. pol. XVI vv.) Ocherki*, Moscow, 2004, p. 87.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* p. 87 and Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *Romen Kaynak ve Eserlerinde Türk Tarihi I Kronikler*, Ankara, 1993, p. 6. "Letopisetul Tarii Moldovei" (The Chronicle of Moldovian Country) that was quoted by Mehmet Ali Ekrem does not refer to the invitation of the Tatars by Mehmed II and considers it as a campaign for booty.

2.16 The origins of Crimean-Muscovite alliance

Meanwhile, Mengli Giray Khan who had already established his rule in Crimea turned towards Casimir IV that he has sent a delegation to him notifying his accession to the throne.¹⁷⁸ As a result of a series of diplomatic exchanges, a formal treaty of peace and mutual friendship was signed in 1472.¹⁷⁹ However, the balance of power in the steppe was about to change once again while Muscovy's increasing power began to threaten Poland and Golden Horde. Therefore, the friendship of Great Horde turned to be more important for Casimir IV than that of Mengli Giray Khan. The result was the inevitable rapprochement between Mengli Giray Khan and Ivan III of Muscovy.¹⁸⁰ Therefore, it appeared two rival blocks Poland and Great Horde vs. Muscovy and Crimean Khanate that would shape the future of Deşt-i Kıpçak. The early Crimean Khans thought that Muscovy might be useful for the realization of their claim on the heritage of the Golden Horde. At that stage, Mengli Giray Khan was still trying to continue the cooperation with Poland he could not prevent the invasion of Polish Ruthenia by Crimean Tatar Mirzas that was provoked by Eminek.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate* ..., p. 18.

¹⁷⁹ For the copy of the confirmation text sent by Kazimierz IV to Mengli Giray Khan latin dated 27 July 1472 see: document no: 3 in *ibid.* pp. 536-538.

¹⁸⁰ Halil İnalcık argues that the Crimean-Muscovite alliance that were both technically rebellious was already established during the reign of Hacı Giray in Halil İnalcık, *Seçme Eserleri –XI* ..., p. 498 note 91.

¹⁸¹ According to Genoese sources the raid was commanded by one Mengli Giray's brother in L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy Po Genuzeskim' ... *ITUAK*, V. LV, p. 166.

2.17 Eminek Mirza's dismissal from the post of *tudun* and his revolt

The domestic politics was not going well both for Caffa and Mengli Giray Khan. In fact, it was the events that took place after the death of Mamak in 1473 provided the perfect opportunity for Mehmed II to conquer Crimea. It was already mentioned that the policies of *Tudun* Eminek Mirza were causing great disturbances for both Mengli Giray and Council of Caffa. Moreover, the wife of the late *tudun* Mamak was intriguing in order to replace his son Saydak (Sartak, Seytak, Seytah, Şeytan?, or Seyyid-Aka) with Eminek Mirza on the ground that legally his son Saydak should have become *tudun* instead of his uncle Eminek.¹⁸² Her efforts were semi-successful she managed to overthrow Eminek Mirza but Mengli Giray Khan appointed Kara Mirza (Karay Mirza or Kara Musa) contrary to the wishes of the City Council that was bribed by Mamak's widow appointed.¹⁸³ Kara Mirza was cooperating with his son in law Haydar and tried to make him Crimean Khan.¹⁸⁴ Mengli Giray, Kara Mirza and Haydar cooperated against Eminek and

¹⁸² *Ibid.* p. 155. Here the widow of Mamak argues that the succession should be vertical (from father to son) but the steppe tradition requires that it should be horizontal to the eldest brother (next kin).

¹⁸³ According to Genoese sources Kara Mirza was the younger brother of Eminek Mirza *ibid.* p. 173. V.D. Smirnov argues that the Council of Caffa that was suspicious about the pro-Ottoman stance of Eminek Mirza actually asked the help of Khan of the Great Horde and forced Eminek to invite Mehmed II to conquer Caffa in V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, pp. 219-220.

¹⁸⁴ There is a discrepancy about the identity of Haydar. According to M. Malowist he was a high dignitary Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese", p. 128. Howorth says that Haydar was the son of Hacı Giray and therefore a brother of Mengli Giray and Nur Devlet and Kara Mirza was his protégé. Moreover, Mamak declared him his successor in his will in Henry H. Howorth, *History of the ... Part II, The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, p. 452 V. D. Smirnov raises the question that if Haydar was Mengli Giray's brother he would not have nominated Kara Mirza Tudun of Caffa since he was allied with Haydar; his potential rival for the throne in V. D. Smirnov, *ibid.* 219.

forced him to go to the exile but they were also completely against the prefecture of Saydak.¹⁸⁵ According to a different version of the events Saydak who was disappointed by the decision of the Khan, turned his face to the Great Horde¹⁸⁶ and asked for their help to institute him on the post. The City Council fearing from the invasion of the Great Horde, began to put pressure on Mengli Giray Khan to replace Eminek Mirza with Saydak and informed Mengli Giray Khan that his brothers who were under custody in Solkhat would be released unless he appointed Saydak. As Mengli Giray Khan unwillingly declined under the threat of a civil war, Saydak became the *tudun* of Caffa on the last days of 1474.¹⁸⁷ It soon appeared that the decision to replace Saydak with Eminek Mirza was a great mistake. According to the Genoese's own reports, Saydak was not only anti-Genoese but was extremely unpopular among the Tatars.¹⁸⁸ According to the Genoese administration the reason behind Eminek's deposition was his pro-Ottoman stance¹⁸⁹ but it seems that his aggressive foreign policy ventures that frequently endanger the peace with the neighbors and his haughty manners were also related with the deposition.

According to the Genoese sources Eminek that fled from Caffa with his 25 men and went into hiding in an unknown destination most probably

¹⁸⁵ Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese", p. 128.

¹⁸⁶ The essential part of the Golden Horde that dwelled in Deşt-i Kipçak after it's break up. Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire*, Lanham, 2003, p. 157. For the formation of Great Horde see: M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi ...*, pp. 232-273 and Vadim Trepavlov, "Bol'shaya Orda", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskie Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 180-196.

¹⁸⁷ Howorth, Henry H., *History of the ... Part II The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, p. 452.

¹⁸⁸ L.P. Kolli, "Padenie Kaffy Po Genuzeskim' ... ITUAK, V. LV, p. 156.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 157.

in Abkhazia.¹⁹⁰ After the end of his clandestinity, in February 1475 Eminek Mirza started a rebellion against Mengli Giray together with the support of large numbers of Tatar notables. Now on the course of the political alliances has radically changed. While Mengli Giray was together with Saydak, Eminek Mirza sided with Kara Mirza and Haydar whom he was planning to make Khan instead of Mengli Giray.¹⁹¹ Mengli Giray who has retreated realized that he could not stand against Eminek's forces in Kırkyer (Çufutkale), took shelter in Caffa with his men. It was most likely that Mehmed II that was closely following the political situation in Crimea since 1453 and waiting the appropriate moment did not need the invitation of Eminek Mirza to take action. He was already preparing for a decisive strike in Moldavia and the Crimean Tatars were to be playing a crucial role in the realization of his plans to subdue Caffa that was an ideal base to expand his authority to the north of the Black Sea.¹⁹² It appears that the administration of Caffa has made a fatal mistake by supporting Saydak and fearing from the invasion of the Great Horde instead of the plans of Eminek Mirza and the Ottoman invasion.

2.18 The Ottoman conquest of the peninsula

Since Moldavia was the only potential regional power at the moment to cause trouble for his plans, Mehmed II decided that it was the right time

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 162. According to L. P. Kolli he could not go neither to the Great Horde that was already in turmoil nor to Moldavia that he caused great damages nor to Muscovy that he recently organized a raid. Therefore, under these circumstances requesting the help of Mehmed II was an political obligation for Eminek, rather than a choice.

¹⁹¹ R. Khautala, V.P. Gulevich, "Pismo Toskansкого Anonima o Vzyatii Kafy v 1475 Godu iz Kodeksa Q 116 SUP Ambrozianskoi Biblioteki" *Zolotoordynskie Obozrenie*, No: 4/6, Kazan, 2018, p. 833-835.

¹⁹² Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese", pp. 128-129.

to take action when a Moldavian garrison arrived in Theodoro.¹⁹³ Encouraged by his victory over the Ottomans in Vaslui (10 January 1475)¹⁹⁴ Stephen the Great was now threatening Caffa and asking their support against the Crimean Khanate and Theodoro. However, the city which considered the support of two neighbours more important under the constant threat Ottoman invasion, refused him.¹⁹⁵ Having turned down by Caffa, Stephen made another maneuver: he sent Alexander; brother of Maria and Isaac and his brother in law (1475?) to overthrow Theodoro with an Italian vessel in early 1475.¹⁹⁶ Alexander's expedition was very successful since he managed to defeat and replace the pro-Ottoman Isaac within three days.¹⁹⁷ However, Alexander's rule would not last very long because Mehmed II realized that he should immediately take action before Stephen the Great extends his power in the peninsula entrusted, the Grand Vizier Gedik Ahmed Pasha¹⁹⁸ (d. 1482) to the conquest of Crimea.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 129. According to A. A. Vasiliev the contingent were consisted of the men that were send to Stephen by Matthias Corvinus (King of Hungary 1458-1490). Later, Stephen transferred them to Theodoro in *ibid.* p. 261.

¹⁹⁴ For more information on Stephan the Great's defeat of Ottoman army see: Serban Papacostea, *Stephan the Great Prince of Moldavia 1457-1504*, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 47-48.

¹⁹⁵ A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...*, pp. 242.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 244. For more information on Alexander of Theodoro see: *ibid.* pp. 244-245.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 244-245.

¹⁹⁸ For more information on Gedik Ahmed Paşa see: Hedda Reindl Kiel, "Gedik Ahmed Paşa", *DİA*, C. XIII., İstanbul, 1996, pp. 543-544 and Gökçen Güner Gökçöz, *Gedik Ahmed Paşa'nın Hayatı ve Eserleri (Ö. 1482)*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Afyonkarahisar, 2019.

For the role of Gedik Ahmed Paşa in the conquest of Crimea see: Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II", p.. 530.

¹⁹⁹ For Stephan the Great's plans to extend his power to Crimea see: Serban Papacostea, *Stephan the Great ...*, pp. 49-51.

The Ottoman navy arrived in Caffa in 31 May 1475 and the siege started on June 2.²⁰⁰ The resistance was very weak, though the city was aware of the incoming attack and had enough time prepare itself. Mengli Giray was deserted by the Tatar population that was in Eminek's side. The non-Muslim local population was also in favor of the capitulation. The city surrendered to the Ottomans on June 6 after a mere resistance of four days.²⁰¹ All other colonies in the eastward extending to Anapa were abruptly taken by the Ottomans except Mangup that fell after five months of siege thanks to its topographical location on high mountains. The fall of Mangup in the end of December 1475 that seemed to be impregnable had strong repercussions in Europe.²⁰²

2.19 Ottoman's decision on the future of the Crimean Khanate

From now on the future of the Crimea and the Crimean Khanate was depending on the decision of the Ottoman state. It was possible that they put an end to Crimean Khanate and incorporate in their administrative system or they might have allowed it to continue its existence under their control. It was already stated that the Ottomans considered Crimea as a stronghold for their control of the Black Sea basin and their extension towards Eastern Europe. Therefore, they have decided that it would be better to content with the control of

²⁰⁰ W. Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce ...*, V. II, p. 402.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.* p. 402.

²⁰² A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...*, p. 249. For more information on the fall of Mangup see: *ibid.* pp. 249-266.

Yalıboyu (littoral) of the peninsula and to allow the Khans to continue their rule in the mainland. Besides, Crimean Tatar cavalry could have been a very useful ally in their future military operations. Once it was decided to allow the Crimean Khanate to continue, it would be better to make the most suitable (i.e., loyal) candidate the new Crimean Khan.

Mengli Giray and Nurdevlet who had already been in contact with the Ottomans were the most probable candidates. Previously, Mengli Giray Khan who was supported by the Karaçi clans and especially by Eminek Mirza would have the greater advantage. However, the rupture of his ties with Eminek Mirza that pushed him towards the Genoese might have declined his credibility in the eyes of the Ottoman state. However, the problem of where Mengli Giray was captured by the Ottomans is not solved yet. The Ottoman narrative tradition argues that he was captured in Caffa. J. Hammer-Purgstall and Seyyid Mehmed Rıza do not mention the exact place of Mengli Giray's captivity.²⁰³ V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov quoting from the Ottoman historian Cenabi²⁰⁴ (d.1590) states that he was captured in Mangup together with other Christian Princes and was sent to Istanbul together with them.²⁰⁵ The Ottoman narratives also argues that Mengli Giray was sent to Istanbul with other Christian captives as a result of mistake by the Ottoman officials who did not

²⁰³ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 101 and J. V. Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l' Empire Ottoman*, V III., Paris, 1836, p.200.

²⁰⁴ For more information on Cenabi and his works see: Mehmet Canatar, "Cenabi Mustafa Efendi", *İA C. VI*, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 352-353. For the Russian translation of Mengli Giray's captivity and liberation see: V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V. I., pp. 100-103 and F. Lashkov, "Sbornik Dokumentov' po Istorii Krymsko-tatarskago Zemlevladieniya", *İtuak*, V. XXIII, p. 125.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p.101.

recognize him.²⁰⁶ The basic foundation of above mentioned claim is a letter of Mengli Giray to Mehmed II in 5/15.6. 1475 In which he congratulate the Sultan for the conquest of Caffa and thanks for his liberation from the prison.²⁰⁷ On the contrary, Halil İnalcık suggests that the Ottoman chroniclers that were not aware about the second Khanship of Mengli Giray between the years 1475-1476 have misinterpreted the events and attributed the events of 1478 to 1475. Therefore, the letter of Mengli Giray that was written in 1475 shows that Mengli Giray was libareted from the prison and made Khan by the Ottomans after the conquest of Crimea.²⁰⁸ It was also not possible that he was send to Istanbul together with other prisoners by Ottoman officials that were unaware of his real identity.²⁰⁹ A fragment quoted by A. A Vasiliev from a contemporary source *Geschihte von der Türkei* by Jörg of Nuremberg²¹⁰ (1456-1482) might help us to solve the puzzle. Jörg of Nuremberg states that when they invaded Soldaia the Ottomans found three sons of Khan of the Tatars in captivity and they have made the eldest one the Khan of the Tatars after their liberation.²¹¹ Therefore, the argument of Halil İnalcık on Mengli Giray could be true. He might have been found in the prison by the Ottomans together with his brothers most probably in Soldaia and might have been made the Khan

²⁰⁶ Halil İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", p. 64.

²⁰⁷ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi* ..., pp. 88-89. Depending on this letter Akdes Nimet Kurat argues that the claim about the imprisonment and the transfer of Mengli Giray to Istanbul by the Ottoman authorities was not true in *ibid.* p. 87.

²⁰⁸ *ibid.* p. 89.

²⁰⁹ Halil İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", p. 64-65.

²¹⁰ For more on Jörg von Nuremberg and his work see: Günter Prinzing, "Zu Jörg von Nürnberg, dem Geschützgiesser Mehmeds II., und seiner Schrift "Geschicht von der Turekey", *Sultan Mehmed II. Eroberer Konstantinopels-Patron der Künste*, (ed.) Neslihan Asutay-Effenberger and Ulrich Rehm, Köln, 2009, pp. 59-75

²¹¹ A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in ...* *ibid.* p. 247 note: 3.

of Crimea for the second time in 1475.²¹² On the other hand, it is possible that the liberated *hanzades* could have been Nurdevlet and his brothers who were interned in Soldaia after their failed plot against Mengli Giray in 1471. It is also possible that Mengli Giray might have taken to Mangup after the fall of Caffa where he was liberated by Gedik Ahmed Pasha as mentioned above.²¹³ Finally, both of them might have been imprisoned at the same time in Soldaia. According to the Russian Chronicle *Voskresenskie Letopis*²¹⁴ in the summer of 6983 (1475) the Turks has taken Caffa and seated the senior son of Hacı Giray Khan, Mengli Giray who accepted to pay a tribute to them to the Crimean throne and his brothers escaped and went to Moscow.²¹⁵ In the final analysis, despite the fact that the identities of the Crimean *hanzades* liberated by the Ottomans are not certain, Mengli Giray became the Khan of Crimea after the Ottoman conquest of Crimea.

2.20 The second reign of Mengli Giray I Khan

The second reign of Mengli Giray was very short and did not last more than one year but it seems to be very important for the future of the Khanate and Eastern Europe. Mehmed II that ensured the loyalty of Crimea once again directed towards Moldavia in order to complete the security of the Black Sea bassin. First of all, Ottoman army under the

²¹² Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II", *İA*, C. VII., Eskişehir, 2001, p. 530.

²¹³ R. Khautala, V.P. Gulevich, "Pismo Toskanskogo Anonima ... p. 838.

²¹⁴ For more information on *Voskresenskie Letopis* see: (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh' Letopisei Izdannoe Po Vysochaishemy Povelenyu Arkheograficheskoyu Kommissieyu Tom VII. VII Letopisi Po Voskresenskomu Spisku*, St Petersburg, 1856, pp. V-X.

²¹⁵ (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh' Letopisei Izdannoe Po Vysochaishemy Povelenyu Arkheograficheskoyu Kommissieyu Tom VIII, VII . Prodolzhenie Letopisi Po Voskresenskomu Spisku*, St Petersburg, 1859, p. 181.

command of the Sultan entered Moldavian territory from İsakça (Isaccea) in the south while Eminek Mirza's forces attacked from the east.²¹⁶ The simultaneous, invasion of Mengli Giray Khan of the territory of the Taht İli turned the campaign in to a regional crisis. Polish-Lithuanian King Casimir IV also the overlord of Stephen cel Mare was threatened by Mengli Giray Khan not to intervene to the Moldavian affairs remained neutral and satisfied only by sending a protestation to the Ottomans for the invasion. Mengli Giray's ally Ivan III also changed his attitude towards the Great Horde and took an aggressive stance. It appears that Mengli Giray Khan was acting like an ally of the Ottomans and following his own foreign policy rather than their vassal .

2.21 Ahmed Khan's invasion of the Khanate

The Crimean Tatar forces under the command of Eminek Mirza have joined to the Ottoman campaign and ravaged Moldavian country side, but they have disorderly hurried back to Crimea upon the news of the invasion of the peninsula by Ahmed Khan of the Great Horde. In his letter to Mehmed II, Eminek Mirza says that when he learned about the invasion he has immediately returned to Crimea and pushed Canıbek back from the capital Kırkyer.²¹⁷

The absence of the Crimean Tatar forces costed very expensive to Mehmed II that could defeat Stephen the Great's forces with a great difficulty and the failure of Crimean army was attributed to Ahmed

²¹⁶ For more information on Mehmed II's Kara Boğdan campaign in 1476 see: Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II ...", pp. 530-531.

²¹⁷ See document no: VII dated Evahir-I CA. 881 A.H./10-20 September 1476 AD. in Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, pp. 102-105. Vadim Trepavlov, "Bol'shaya Orda", ... T. III, p. 191.

Khan's invasion of the peninsula. However, Seyyid Rıza draws another picture of the event. He argues that it was not Ahmed Khan but Mengli Giray that first attacked to the Great Horde.²¹⁸ According to the words of Seyyid Rıza, it seems that Mengli Giray Khan overestimated the Ottoman attitude towards him. Since, he thought that he could use it for his own purposes he decided to take the initiative and to solve the problem of the Jochide supremacy in Deşt-i Kıpçak by invading the *Taht İli* with a preemptive strike. The fact that Mengli Giray Khan solely depended to the Crimean Tatar forces was a great mistake for Seyyid Rıza.²¹⁹ Mengli Giray Khan's army that was intercepted by Ahmed Khan was heavily defeated. Seyyid Rıza relates the defeat to two different factors. To the prior warning of Murtaza Sultan (son of Ahmed Khan and brother of Seyyid Ahmed of the Great Horde)²²⁰ to Ahmed Khan about the plans of Mengli Giray Khan and the reluctance of Şirins to perform their duty.²²¹ However, it is known that the bulk of Şirin forces joined to the Moldavian campaign of Mehmed II

In the final analysis it is certain that the Crimean Tatar army suffered a great defeat by the forces of Ahmed Khan. Seyyid Rıza states that Mengli Giray Khan who was wounded could barely save his life by taking refuge to the castle of Kirkyer which was located steep on rocks.²²² Following the victory, Ahmed Khan immediately invaded the

²¹⁸ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 102.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 110.

²²⁰ For the genealogies of Ahmed and Seyyid Ahmed Khans of the Golden Horde that were contemporaries see: appendix in M. G. Safargaliev *Raspad Zolotoi Ordı* and V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V. I., pp. 112-123.

²²¹ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 103.

²²² *Ibid.* p. 112.

peninsula that he considered part of his patrimony, but the conquest would be incomplete without Caffa. Ahmed Khan sent an ambassador to the Ottoman governor Kasım Pasha and asked for the surrender of the city. Kasım Pasha who set up a plan and convinced the ambassador that Mehmed II became very angry upon learning the invasion of the patrimony of one of his vassals and he was sending an army to remedy the situation.²²³ Consequently, Ahmed Khan realized that he could not cope with the Ottoman power agreed on peace but he entrusted the rule of Crimea to his nephew Canıbek as a sign of his claim on the peninsula.²²⁴

2.22 The second reign of Nur Devlet Khan (1476) and Eminek Mirza's intervention in favor of Mengli Giray

Mengli Giray Khan who was defeated and humiliated could no longer remain in neither in throne nor in the Crimea, was forced to flee to Istanbul.²²⁵ It appears that Mengli Giray Khan has completely lost the support of Crimean aristocracy that did not want to interfere with the affairs of *Taht İli* and did not approve his aggressive policy towards the Great Horde.²²⁶ Under these circumstances he was forced to take refuge to the Ottomans. However, the Sultan this time preferred Nurdevlet that was supported by the clan leaders. Mengli Giray Khan

²²³ *Ibid.* p. 116. Seyyid Rıza mistakenly writes that the Ottoman Sultan was Bayezid II (1481-1512) instead of Mehmed II.

²²⁴ Halil İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", p. 69.

²²⁵ (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh' Letopisei* ..., p. 183. However, from the letter of Eminek Mirza to Mehmed II dated Evassı-ı Receb 883/8/17 October 1478 it is possible to understand that the deposition of Mengli Giray was not only related with his defeat to Ahmed Khan but it was fact closely related with the domestic situation in the Khanate. In fact the strife in Khanate was one of the major causes of the defeat.

²²⁶ The actionse of the Şirîn clan that was from the beginning against the campaign was shown among the causes of the defeat by Seyyid Rıza.

and his son Mehmed Giray Sultan were put under surveillance in Istanbul as an alternative to Nurdevlet.²²⁷ He was replaced by his brother Nurdevlet in 1476.²²⁸ Canıbek Khan from the Horde²²⁹ of the Great Horde ruled in Crimea for a short period between the years 1476-1477. During this period, there existed the de facto rule of two rival Khans in the peninsula. In his letter dated 5/15 September 1477 Ivan III to Canıbek Khan states that he confirms the establishment of the friendly relations between two countries as in the days of the previous Khan Mengli Giray.²³⁰ However, Canıbek could not control Crimea for a long time and was forced to leave the throne and took shelter in the court of Ivan III that previously invited him to Muscovy in case of emergency (Autumn 1477).²³¹ Nurdevlet too could not succeed to restore the order in Crimea mainly because of his rivalry with his brothers and his animosity with Eminek Mirza.

According to H. Howorth the Ottomans who were mainly aiming to use Crimea as a base for their operations in Eastern Europe considered Nurdevlet who was settled outside the peninsula to be a better option as the Crimean Khan.²³² Thus, Nurdevlet replaced his brother Mengli Giray as Crimean Khan despite the opposition of Eminek Mirza in 1476.

²²⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", p. 74.

²²⁸ For the debate on the second Khanate of Nur Devlet see: Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", p. 69-72.

²²⁹ For more information on Canıbek Khan of Crimea see: V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V. I., pp. 123-124.

²³⁰ (ed.) *Sbornik' Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obschestva T. 41*, St. Petersburg, 1884, pp. 13-14.

²³¹ V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V., pp. 123-124.

²³² Henry H. Howorth, *History of the ... Part II The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I.*, p. 455. Contrary to H. Howorth M. Malowist argues that Haydar instead of his brother was made Khan in Marian Malowist, "Kaffa, the Genoese ...", p. 130.

However, it soon appeared that Nurdevlet could not stabilize his rule and restore the order in the country. He had quarrels with his brother Haydar, and most importantly he did not have the approval of the aristocracy and the ordinary people.²³³ In his letter to Mehmed II dated 15/24.5.1477. Nurdevlet Khan says that he has more enemies than friends around him and the Sultan should not listen to his enemies instead of him who was his abiding servant.²³⁴ Nurdevlet Khan's representative was also present in the Ottoman embassy to the Poland (March 1478).²³⁵ He could not restore the order and have the consent of the population contrary to all of his diplomatic manoeuvres. There was an overgrowing opposition to him. Eminek Mirza, the leader of the opposition was also intriguing against him in the Porte. In his letter to Mehmed II dated 8-17 October 1478 explain the delicacy of the situation and the necessity of the of Nurdevlet Khan's replacement with Mengli Giray Khan.²³⁶ First of all like Nurdevlet he complained about the groundless rumors about himself in the palace.²³⁷ Second, he talks about the risk of the invasion because Ahmed Khan who increased his military power wants to march on Crimea. Therefore, it was possible that some of the Crimean Tatar clans would switch side and enter in Timur Bek's or Ahmed Khan's service and attack Crimea.²³⁸ Third, he complained about the relentless struggle between Nurdevlet Khan and

²³³ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, p. 21.

²³⁴ Fevzi Kurdoğlu, "İlk Kırım Hanlarının Mektupları", *Belleten*, C.1, S.3-4, Ankara, 1937, Levha XI.

²³⁵ V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V. I., pp. 124-125..

²³⁶ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, pp. 109-113.

²³⁷ *ibid.* p. 111.

²³⁸ *ibid.* p. 111.

Haydar that causes great damages to the country.²³⁹ Fourth, he ensured the Sultan that the population is psychologically ready and willing to accept Mengli Giray as the Khan if the former would send the latter back and he guaranteed that the previous problems would not be repeated.²⁴⁰ Fifth, he warned the Sultan about the emergency of the situation and Crimea would have been invaded, if Mengli Giray was not immediately send.²⁴¹ Finally, he requested from the Sultan that he should advise Mengli Giray on the necessity of consulting Eminek Mirza on every important matter before sending him to the Crimea.²⁴² At the end of the letter he even denoted that the Crimean Beys would had already been eliminated Nurdevlet Khan, but instead out of respect to the Sultan, they were waiting for his decision.²⁴³

2.23 The third reign of Mengli Giray Khan (1478-1514)

Mengli Giray Khan arrived in a relatively safer country than his previous rule. The threat of an invasion from the Great Horde was over. The letter of Ahmed Khan to Mehmed II dated 2.6.1477 shows that the Ottoman Great Horde relationships have entered in to a new stage and Ahmed Khan has accepted Mehmed II's supremacy.²⁴⁴ It is also possible to see that the attempts to include the Great Horde in an anti-Ottoman alliance failed.²⁴⁵ However, he arrived to a chaotic and

²³⁹ *ibid.* p. 111 and 113.

²⁴⁰ *ibid.* p. 111 and 113..

²⁴¹ *ibid.* p. 111 and 113.

²⁴² *ibid.* p. 113.

²⁴³ *ibid.* p. 113.

²⁴⁴ For the transliteration of the letter see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi* ..., pp. 48-53.

²⁴⁵ For the formation of the anti-Ottoman alliance see: Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II", *İA*, C. VII, pp. 522-523 and Liviu Pilat and Ovidiu Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat and*

devastated country, since the arrival of the Ottoman fleet three years ago. In his letter to Mehmed II dated 4/13.7.1478, Mengli Giray Khan stated that he has come to Crimea with Kasım Pasha, the Beylerbeyi of Kefe at that time, upon the order the order of the Sultan.²⁴⁶ Thanks to the forces provided by Mehmed II, he was able to defeat his elder brother and become Khan again.²⁴⁷ Mengli Giray admitted that he found the country devastated when he arrived.²⁴⁸ However, according to his letter dated 9/19.9.1479, he stated that thanks to the help of the Sultan, the situation was changed and the order is restored.²⁴⁹ Therefore, It took more than one year for Mengli Giray to bring Crimea under his rule. Nurdevlet and Haydar who had been defeated and given their claim up on Crimean throne, first took refuge in Poland-Lithuania but later moved to Moscow in the fall 1479 where they entered into the service of Ivan III.²⁵⁰ Nurdevlet later became the Khan of Kasım which he ruled until his death in 1491.²⁵¹

2.24 The trilateral consensus about the administration of the Khanate

As a result of the consensus of Crimean tribal aristocracy on his name and the approval of Mehmed II and the support of Ottoman army, Mengli Giray became for the third and last time Khan of Crimea after

Crusading on the Eastern Border of Christendom During the 15th Century, Leiden, 2018.

²⁴⁶ Fevzi Kurdoğlu, "İlk Kırım Hanlarının ...", Levha XII. For his dispatch to Crimea see: undated letter from Mengli Giray to Mehmed II in *ibdi*. Levha XIII.

²⁴⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", pp. 74-75.

²⁴⁸ Fevzi Kurdoğlu, "İlk Kırım Hanlarının ...", Levha XII.

²⁴⁹ *ibid*. Levha XIV.

²⁵⁰ V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Izsledovanie o Kasimovskikh' ...*, V. I., p. 128.

²⁵¹ For more information on Nur Devlet and Haydar's lives after 1479 see: *ibid*. pp. 128-148.

1478. I suggest that is better to consider the beginning of the Ottoman-Crimean partnership with the third reign of Mengli Giray in the sense that the political actors began to understand each other and succeeded to reach an equilibrium. It should also be kept in mind that the equilibrium was extremely fragile because it was the result of compelling factors. A genuine copy of a written agreement between the Ottoman Sultan and Crimean Khans is still not available, but it is sure that a tacit understanding existed among the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Khans and Crimean Beys.²⁵²

During the years of chaos in Crimea the Ottomans understood the inevitability of the Crimean Tatars for the success of their East European politics.²⁵³ Besides, the Crimean Tatars not only did help the Ottomans in battle field but has also provided valuable information for the Ottoman diplomacy. Meanwhile, they have also realized that it is not possible to control the Khanate simply by appointing a trusted Khan. The approval of the prominent clan leaders (*Karaçi Beys*) was essential because of their excessive power. During the chaotic environment of the last years of the Golden Horde, the beys who already had an important role in the political life of the steppes increased their power extremely especially when the masses began to move towards the relatively secure areas like the Crimean peninsula. For instance, in Crimea the head of Şirin clan Eminek Mirza played the same role and convinced the Ottomans to make the necessary replacements. The

²⁵² For the discussion on the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate see: Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...,"

²⁵³ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...," p. 67.

Ottomans did not oppose to this *de facto* situation as they considered it to be a usefull tool to be used against the unruly Khans.

Mengli Giray Khan also understood that he should establish a delicate balance of power in order to survive in the region. The consent of the Karaçi Beys was fundamental in order to remain in the power and the support of the Ottomans is indispensable in order to restore the order in the Khanate and to be safe from the pressure of the Khans of the Great Horde who had political claims on Crimea.²⁵⁴ Although, it seems that Mehmed II and Ahmed Khan have established a peaceful relationship, this was not the case for the Crimean Khans. The bases of the Polish-Great Horde versus Crimean-Muscovite axis that would shape the future of Eastern Europe were laid during this period. Ahmed Khan had based his claim of sovereignty on the Crimean throne to the *yarlık* that he had previously granted to Nurdevlet. In spite of, his uneasiness about the Ottoman expansion to the northern shores of the Black Sea, it is constated that Ahmed Khan changed the tone of his address to Mehmed II that demonstrated the Ottoman superiority.²⁵⁵ However, he insisted on sidelining Mengli Giray Khan and tried to bypass and ignore the Crimean Khans in his relations with the Sublime Porte. Since he believed that, as the ruler of *Taht İli*, he was the genuine and legitimate representative of the Jochid tradition, he considered Crimean Khans to be subservient to him.²⁵⁶ Therefore, Mengli Giray Khan once again

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 67.

²⁵⁵ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi ...*, pp. 56-57.

²⁵⁶ Halil İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ...", p. 67.

realized that he would not be safe in Crimea without reckoning with his Chingisid heritage.

The third reign of Mengli Giray was a result of a trilateral consensus. The order was finally restored in the Khanate which began to reassert its power in the region. The political circumstances forced Ottomans and Crimean Tatars to form an uneasy alliance that could prove to be very successful when they respected each others priorities, but unfortunately that could never overcome its primordial defects.

2.25 The first succession crisis: Chinggisid tradition (*Töre*) versus Ottoman intervention

2.25.1 The reign of Mehmed Giray II (1577-1584)

The fragile Ottoman-Crimean Tatar relationship came through several major crises throughout its history but the incident of Mehmed Giray III (twice Khan of Crimea 1610 and 1621-1627) and his *Kalgay* and brother Şahin Giray is one of the most peculiar ones. In fact the story goes back to the deposition of their grandfathers Mehmed Giray II²⁵⁷ Khan (1577-1588) in 1588 by the Ottomans during the Ottoman-Safavid war (1578-1590). Mehmed Giray II Khan who was his fathers *Kalgay* (heir apperant) replaced his father Devlet Giray I Khan (1551-1577)²⁵⁸ after his death. His designation was also according to the Chinggisid tradition.(*Töre*) confirmed by the Karaçi Beys. It was already stated that

²⁵⁷ For more information on Mehmed Semin Giray II (Fat) see: Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom I, pp. 299-311.

²⁵⁸ For more information Devlet Giray I Khan see: Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* ... T.I, pp. 249-297 and Halil İnalçık, *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi* ..., pp. 133-134.

according to the Turco-Mongol steppe tradition the succession was not vertical (primogeniture) but horizontal (seniority) goes to next kin or the eldest member of the family but not to the children of the deceased chief of the clan. Alexandre Benningsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay argue that the principal of vertical succession was a feature of sedentary societies while the horizontal succession principle was a feature of nomadic societies.²⁵⁹ The Crimean Khans starting from Mengli Giray Khan tried to by pass the principle of seniority (*ekberiyet*) by appointing their favorite son *Kalgay*.²⁶⁰ Quite, interestingly, the Karaçi Beys that claimed to be representing the tradition did not oppose this innovation and adopted it.²⁶¹ In fact, it was the Ottomans that applied the principle of vertical succession that followed the principle of horizontal succession in Crimea.²⁶² The Ottomans were of course pursuing their own benefits rather than observing the Chingisid tradition. The system of nominating a *kalgay* was not very successful and did not solve the problem of succession.²⁶³

When he came to the throne Mehmed Giray II Khan made his eldest brother Adil Giray his *Kalgay* in perfect conformity with the tradition. However, he was not as successful as his father as a Khan. His *Kalgay*

²⁵⁹ Alexandre Benningsen, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "La Moscovie, L'Empire Ottoman et la Crise Successorale de 1577-1588 Dans le Khanat de Crimée La Tradition Nomade Contre le Modele des Monarchies Sédentaires", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, V. XIV, No. 4, Paris, 1973, pp. 454-457.

²⁶⁰ For the *Kalgay* see: Halil İnalçık, "Kalgay", *DİA*, C.XXIV, İstanbul, 2001. p. 259 and Carl Max Kortepeter, "Kalgay", *EI²* V. IV, Leiden, 1997. pp. 499-500.

²⁶¹ Alexandre Benningsen, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "La Moscovie, L'Empire Ottoman ...p. 456.

²⁶² *Ibid.* p. 456. Mehmed Giray I Khan (1514-1523) is replaced by his brother Saadet Giray I Khan (1524-1532) rather than his *kalgay* and son Gazi Giray. Sultan Sahib Giray Khan (1532-1551) was replaced by his nephew Devlet Giray I Khan (1551-1577) rather than his *kalgay* and son Emin Giray Sultan.

²⁶³ For more information on the issue see: *ibid.* pp. 456-457.

was plotting against him. Adil Giray even during the life of his father was showing independentist tendencies. He constructed a city out of the Orkapı on the Kalmius. He wanted to form an alternative power base in his new settlement Bolusaray by depending on Nogays that dwell around. Bolusaray quickly becomes the center of opposition to the policies of Mehmed Giray II Khan.²⁶⁴ His other brothers were also working against him. His son Murad Giray Sultan was refusing to obey him too. Nogays of the Great and Little Horde were disobeying his order. Finally, Murad Giray Sultan and Nogays of the Little Horde neglected his orders and attacked on Muscovy instead of Poland.²⁶⁵ Moreover, disregarding all of his failures in domestic politics he was insisting on following the independentist policies of his father. It appears that the Chinggisiid traition which gives a great amount of liberty to the members of the dynasty was at the sametime one of the major causes of the crises in the Khanate.

2.25.2 The formation of the post of *Nureddin* as a remedy to the succession problem

The Ottomans that were desperately needed the participation of the Crimean Tatar forces for the continuation of the prolonged and costly Safavid campaign most of the time disregarded Mehmed Giray II Khan's haughty manners. Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) first invited Mehmed Giray II Khan to join to the Otoman forces in the Persian front in 1578 but the Khan confined himself to sent his brothers; the Kalgay

²⁶⁴ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 33.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 33.

Adil Giray²⁶⁶ (d. 1579), Gazi Giray Sultan and his son Saadet Giray Sultan with an army. Adil Giray Sultan and Gazi Giray Sultan were taken prisoner during the combat and only Saadet Giray Sultan managed to escape.²⁶⁷ When the news on the death of Adil Giray Sultan arrived to Crimea, Mehmed Giray II Khan tried to make use of the situation and to nominate his favorite son Saadet Giray Sultan *Kalgay*. Two of his younger brothers Alp Giray Sultan and Selamet Giray Sultan fled from Crimea to go to Istanbul in order to claim their rights (Spring 1581).²⁶⁸ On the road they were intercepted by the Cossacks in Ukraine and were delivered to the Polish authorities. They were set free upon the pressure of the Ottomans.²⁶⁹ The Khan even offered 70,000 ducats in cash and 400 kaftans to the Cossacks for the delivery of the fugitive Hanzades to him.²⁷⁰ Finally, Mehmed Giray II Khan was forced to nominate his senior brother Alp Giray *Kalgay*. However, he comes out with a solution and nominated Saadet Giray *Nureddin* (second heir to the throne) and obtained a *berat* (diplome) that officially confirms from the Porte.²⁷¹ The result was the emergence of a new source of confrontation among the members of the Giray family.

²⁶⁶ For more information on Adil Giray Sultan see: Alper Başer, Gülay Karadağ Çınar, "Kırım'dan İran'a Bir Cengizli Hanzadesi: Adil Giray Sultan", *Alevilik Araştırmaları Dergisi*, V.4, Ankara, 2012, pp. 149-164.

²⁶⁷ Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, (971-1003/1563-1595) I (ed. Mehmet İpşirli) Ankara, 1999, pp.121-122 and Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, İstanbul, 1281-1283/1864-1867, p. 53.

²⁶⁸ A.V. Vinogradov, "Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia v Pervie Gody Pravleniya Khana Gazi-Gireya II (1588-1591 gg.) v Kontekste Konsolidatsii Krymskogo Khantsva po Zavershenii Dinasticheskogo Krizisa Gireev", *Crednevekovye Tyurko-Tatarskie Gosudartsva*, V. 4, Kazan, 2010, p. 17.

²⁶⁹ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate* ..., p. 104.

²⁷⁰ S.A. Le'pyavko, "Kozats'ki Pokhody na Tatar u 1570-1580-kh Rokakh", *Pivdenna Ukraina*, Vyp. 5, Zaporizhia, 1999, pp. 194-195.

²⁷¹ Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan* (ed. O. Cudi), İstanbul, 1327/1909, pp. 54-55.

2.25.3 The causes of Mehmed Giray II Khan's deposition (1584)

However, the problem did not remain a domestic issue of the Crimean Khanate but quickly evolved to a regional problem. Murad III invited Mehmed Giray II Khan to the front once again in 1582 but he declined to comply and made excuses. Such as the late season, his worries about his defected sons and brothers and the threat of Cossacks that were waiting to attack on Crimea as soon as he leaves the peninsula.²⁷²

The English reports show that the Khan was deposed because of his failure to join Persian campaign despite the fact that the Sultan carried out all of his demands including the hand over of the fugitives.²⁷³ Consequently, the Ottoman Sultan who had enough of the Khan's unruly manners decided to punish him and ordered Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha²⁷⁴ (d. 1585) to stop by Crimea on his return to Istanbul and replace him with his brother Islam Giray Sultan²⁷⁵

It seems that apart from personal characteristics, two factors were lying behind the crisis: the attitude of the Ottoman administration towards the Crimean Khans and their insistence on using Crimean forces for their own purposes. The Crimean Khans believed that since they were the descendent of Chinggis Khan they should have a special treatment. They had to be treated like sovereign monarchs not as a simple *kuls*

²⁷² Johannns Leunclavius, *Türk Milletinin Tarihi*, V. I., (ed. Türkis Noyan), İstanbul, 2019, pp. 281-282.

²⁷³ See. document no: 513 from Harborne to Welshington dated 28 March 1583 in (ed.) *Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth*, V. XVIII, (ed.) Sophie Crawford Lomas, London, 1914.

²⁷⁴ For more information on Özdemirpoğlu Osman Paşa see: Çiçek, Kemal, "Osman Paşa Özdemiroğlu", *İA C. XXXIII*, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 471-473.

²⁷⁵ Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, I, p. 143.

(servants) of the Sultan. The attitude of the Ottoman authorities caused to reaction of Crimean Tatars that created several crises.²⁷⁶ It has already been stated that the Cossacks were regularly raiding and causing great damage in Crimea. The absence inside the Crimea of the Crimean forces that were joining the long and distant Ottoman campaigns was creating an enormous reaction in the Khanate. Therefore, the Khans were trying to avoid going in distant campaigns. If they had no other option than going to the campaign, they have always tried to secure their back by making peace agreements with Poland and Muscovy. However, the existence of agreements did not have a great significance for the Cossacks who were always ready to attack on Crimean and Ottoman possessions. Especially, the long intervals when the army was out of Crimea were providing better opportunities for them. It appears that the Cossacks organized more than forty raids on Crimea including the Ottoman forts of Akkerman and Özü between 1570 and 1590.²⁷⁷ The Cossacks attacked on Bender and Crimean settlements when the Khan was about to leave for the campaign in early summer 1583.²⁷⁸

When Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha arrived in Kefe, he stayed away from the Khan who invited him to a meeting in Solhat in which he probably planned to kill him.²⁷⁹ Meanwhile the involuntary Kalgay Alp

²⁷⁶ Halil İnalçık, "II. Gazi Giray (Bora) 1588-1596), *Kırım Hanlığı'nın Tarihi Üzerine* p. 196. Peçevi ?

²⁷⁷ S.A. Le'pyavko, "Kozats'ki Pokhody Na ...", p. 198. S.A. Le'pyavko estimates that during the raids the Cossacks obtained thousands of slaves, more than 100,000 cattles and sheeps, 18,000 horses and more than 360,000 gold money.

²⁷⁸ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 86.

²⁷⁹ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 135. Seyyid Rıza argues that Mehmed Giray II wanted to kill Paşa during the banquet the other sources including

Giray Sultan clandestinely left the camp of Mehmed Giray II Khan and went to Kefe near Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha.²⁸⁰ The rumor that Alp Giray Sultan became Khan in place of Mehmed Giray Khan spreaded all over Crimea, however, Islam Giray II Khan (1584-1588) was coming from Istanbul with the *berat* of Khanship. According to Seyyid Rıza, it was a successful trick of Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha in order to divide the Crimean Tatar forces.²⁸¹ However, it appears that the investiture of Alp Giray was a *de facto* decision of Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha. It was absurd and unacceptable to the Crimean Tatar tradition and did not workout.²⁸² On the contrary, Ottoman forces could not stand against the Crimean army and were trapped in Kefe.²⁸³ When he realized that he is been deposed by a simple *kul* of the Sultan, Mehmed Giray II Khan became furious. He says that he is a ruler who possesses the insignia of the sovereignty and no one can depose him.²⁸⁴ Consequently, he besieged Kefe for forty days until the arrival of Islam Giray Khan with the Ottoman fleet. When the ship of the new Khan embarked on the port Crimean Beys including his son in law Ali Bey of Şirin began to switch their allegiances to him.²⁸⁵

the excerpt *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar* published by A. Kazimirski and A. Jaubert does not refer to the plot see in: A. Kazimirski, A. Jaubert, "Précis de l'Histoire des Khans de Crimée ...", *Nouveau Journal Asiatique*, T. XII, Paris, 1883, pp. 377-378.

²⁸⁰ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *ibid.* p. 135. and A. Kazimirski, A. Jaubert, *ibid.* p. 378.

²⁸¹ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *ibid.* p. 135..

²⁸² A. Kazimirski, A. Jaubert, "Précis de l'Histoire ...", p. 378. Halil İnalcık argues that the appointment of Alp Giray was a decision of the Porte rather than the *de facto* decision of Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa in Halil İnalcık, "İslam Giray II", *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi* ..., p. 189.

²⁸³ Document no: 599 dated 15 May 1584 in (ed.) *Calendar of State Papers Foreign*:..., p.

²⁸⁴ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, pp.90-91.

²⁸⁵ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi* ... p. 135. and A. Kazimirski, A. Jaubert, "Précis de l'Histoire ...", p. 378.

2.25.4 Mehmed Giray II Khan's death and Kalgay Alp Giray

Sultan

Mehmed Giray II quickly realized that he could not resist to the Ottoman army and decided to flee to the steppe near the Nogays in Volga via Ferahkerman. However, he was captured and executed with one of his son by Kalgay Alp Giray that was ordered to follow and kill him by the Ottomans in Kalancık.²⁸⁶ Most of the Ottoman chroniclers accuse Mehmed Giray of revolting against the Sultan. Nevertheless, Selaniki Mustafa Efendi (d. 1600)²⁸⁷ considered the problem was the result of an earlier discussion between the late Khan and Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha.²⁸⁸ Only, the French Ambassador to Istanbul (1579-1585) Jacques de Germigny, accused Mehmed Giray II Khan of having secret relations with the Safavids against the Ottomans.²⁸⁹

2.26 The reign of Islam Giray II (1584-1588), and the increasing influence of the Ottomans in the Khanate

The greatest mistake of Mehmed Giray II Khan was to think that the nature of the relationship between the Khanate and the Ottoman State

²⁸⁶ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *ibid.* p. 135 and document no: 707 dated 29 June 1584 in (ed.) *Calendares of State Papers Foreign:...*, p. ? The letter states that three sons of the late Khan were killed one on the road together with him but the other two were killed by the new Khan despite the Ottoman insistence on their handover. According V.D. Smirnov it was Safa Giray who was executed with his father in V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 330. Halil İnalçık states that Safa was alive and he has been together with his brother Saadet Giray in Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlı Rus rekabetinin Kökeni ve Don-Volga Kanalı Girişimi (1569)", *Kırım Hanlığı'nın Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, İstanbul, 2017, pp. 135-185. Hakan Kırımlı states that Safa Giray remained in Caucasia and until his return to the Khanate during the reign of Gazi Giray II Khan in 1588 Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, İstanbul, 2022, p. 94.

²⁸⁷ Mehmet İpşirli, "Selaniki Mustafa Efendi", *DİA C.XXXVI*, İstanbul, 2009, pp. 357-359.

²⁸⁸ Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selaniki*, I, p. 144.

²⁸⁹ E. Charriere. *Negociations de la France Dans le Levant*, T. IV, Paris, 1855, p. 276.

was the same and a shrewd Khan could resist to the Ottoman power as in the days of his father. The Ottomans since the time of Süleyman I (1520-1566) starting from Saadet Giray I Khan (1524-1532) were accustomed to keep one brother of the Khan as a *rehin* (hostage) in Istanbul in order to guarantee the obedience of the Khans.²⁹⁰ Islam Giray II Khan (1584-1588)²⁹¹ was one of two hostages who was made Khan from Istanbul (the other one was Bahadır Giray (1637-1642)²⁹² He has been in Istanbul under the control of the Ottomans for more than thirty years since the time of his father Devlet Giray I Khan and moved to Konya; the center of the sufi Mevlevi order, when he lost all hopes to become a Khan after the reign of Murad III who did not favor him.²⁹³ The decision of the Sultan was of course not coincidental. Apart being brought up and lived as an Ottoman since his childhood, Islam Giray II Khan as the oldest living brother of Mehmed Giray II Khan was the legal heir to the seat according to the Chingisid *Töre*.

2.27 The reaction of Mehmed Giray II Khan's sons, and the revolt of Sa'adet Giray (the rival) Khan and Murad Giray Sultan

However, two of Mehmed Giray II's sons were still alive; Sa'adet Giray Sultan and Murad Giray Sultan and they were still inspiring to follow their father's independentist policies. Saadet Giray Sultan went near the Great Nogay tribes that were dwelling along the Volga in order to find

²⁹⁰ Halil İnalçık, "Giray", *Kırım Hanlığı'nın Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, İstanbul, 2017, p. 32. For more information on Bahadır Giray see: Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., pp. 229-267.

²⁹¹ For more information on İslam Giray II see: Halil İnalçık, "İslam Giray II", *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi ...*, pp. 189-191 and Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom I, pp. 319-335.

²⁹² Halil İnalçık, *ibid.* p. 32.

²⁹³ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 136.

supporters. The Nogays whose allegiance to any other authority as well as to the Crimean Khanate had been ambiguous, were representing the centrifugal powers in the Khanate and were ready to take part in any military movement that would likely to return rich booty for them. Moreover, Saadet Giray Sultan was married with the daughter of Great Nogay Bey Urus b. İsmail (d. 1590)²⁹⁴ therefore, he sought the support of his relatives.²⁹⁵

Saadet Giray Sultan who declared himself Khan returned to the peninsula in the summer of 1584 accompanied with a large army (more than 15,000 Nogay²⁹⁶, 100-200 Kumuks²⁹⁷ and 230 Don Cossacks)²⁹⁸ A. A. Novosel'skii states that apart from two Divey (Great Nogay) Mirzas; Esen Bey (Eseni, Eseney) and Arslanay Bey (Arsanay), two important clan leaders from Crimea were also present in the invading army, Hacı Mirza of Şirin and Süleş Mirza, the Or Beyi.²⁹⁹ The fact that Saadet Giray Khan managed to attract some of the Crimean clans in his side, explains his rapid victory. It is also important to note the support to the sons of Mehmed Giray II Khan of the Şirin clan which was the most important ally of the Ottomans in the Khanate.³⁰⁰ It was most probably a reaction to the imposing policies of the Porte on the Crimean population. Saadet Giray "Khan" reached Bahçesaray, the capital of the

²⁹⁴ For more information on Urus see: V.V. Trepavlov, *Istoriya Nogaiskoi Orda*, pp.319-385.

²⁹⁵ Carl Max Korteper, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 89.

²⁹⁶ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 34.

²⁹⁷ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ..*, pp. 137-138.

²⁹⁸ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 330.

²⁹⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 32-33.

³⁰⁰ A.V. Vinogradov, "Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ...", p. 17. A.V. Vinogradov lists the main supporters of Saadet Giray as Arsanay Mirza Diveyev, Kutlu Giray Mirza head of Şirin clan, Koşum Mirza from Süleşev family of Yaşlavski clan, Paşa Mirza of Kulyukov family and the clan of Perekop.

Khanate, without much difficulty and defeated Islam Giray II Khan's army.³⁰¹ When Saadet Giray "Khan" attacked Bahçesaray İslam Giray II Khan was in the city together with his brothers, more than four thousand Beys and Mirzas and six hundreds Janissaries majority of whom were killed during the combat.³⁰² It is evident that Saadet Giray Khan was informed about the situation in the capital and made a surprise attack. İslam Giray II Khan, having understood that he could not stand against the attacks, fled during the night first to Balıklava and than went to Kefe by the sea. Saadet Giray "Khan" who *de facto* become Crimean Khan could preserve the post only for two or three months until the return of İslam Giray II Khan with 4000 Janissaries, supported by their allies Yahşısaat Mirza (d. 1589-1590) (the leader of Gazi Ulus or the Little Nogays) and Circassians of Jane tribe. Saadet Giray "Khan" whose forces could not resist to the heavy fire of the Ottoman artillery was heavily defeated in the battle of İndol, where Esen Bey and many other Nogay Mirzas perished, and once again retreated to the steppe. Sa'adet Giray "Khan" would once more try marching on Crimea, but this time Kalgay Alp Giray anticipated his movement took necessary precautions to prevent him from invading the peninsula.³⁰³ Sa'adet Giray "Khan" after the failure of his second attempt went to Caucasia where he tried to take part in the emerging anti-Ottoman coalition consisted of Muscovy, Persia and Georgia at the echange of

³⁰¹ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi .*, pp. 136-137.

³⁰² See: note 100 in Appendix p. 35 in N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossiiskago*, T. X, St. Petersburg, 1824.

³⁰³ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi .*, p. 137.

recognition of his status by the Tsar.³⁰⁴ He found refuge in Daghestan that was not an ally of the Ottomans at that time and worked against them. According to the reports of Muscovite envoys Shah Muhammed Hüdabende (1578-1587) have proposed Sa'adet Giray Khan to cede Derbent to him at the exchange of Great Nogays military assistance against the Ottomans but he refused the proposal on the ground that he could not take such an action without the approval of Fyodor I (Feodor I 1584-1598).³⁰⁵

2.28 Early Muscovite plans to invade Crimea (1587)

In 1587, Moscow planned to invade Crimea together with the forces of fugitive Hanzades and Circassians and make Sa'adet Giray Khan.³⁰⁶ The Muscovite envoy to the Crimea (1586-1588) Ivan Sudakov reported that Crimean Tatars were against Islam Giray Khan and preferred Sa'adet Giray as their Khan.³⁰⁷ In his report he further stated that when Sa'adet Giray Khan appeared before Orkapı in late March 1587 Kalgay Alp Giray immediately fled to the Muscovite territory but most of the Tatars remained neutral and did not support one of them because they are trying to predict which one was likely to win.³⁰⁸ After the failure of

³⁰⁴ E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza i Ikh Svyazi s Rossiei Vtoraya Polovina XVI-30-e Gody XVII Veka*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 263 and 273-274.

³⁰⁵ Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "La Moscovie, L'Empire Ottoman ...p. 463.

³⁰⁶ Actually, Muscovy has from the beginning wanted to seat one of the three fugitive Hanzades to the throne and particularly Sa'adet Giray "Khan" until his death. E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza ...*, p. 263.

³⁰⁷ F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago Poslannika v' Krym' Ivana Sudakova v' 1587-1588 godu." S Predisloviem F.F. Lashkova, *ITUAK*, V. XIV, 1891, Simferopol, pp. 52-53.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.* 62.

the plans to invade Crimea, Sa'adet Giray "Khan" preferred to live among the Great Nogays until his death (December 1587).³⁰⁹

Safa Giray Sultan after the failure of Saadet Giray's second attempt to invade Crimea went also to the Caucasus and was in Kabarda.³¹⁰ Moscow wanted most probably to use him in its plans against Crimea. Since Safa Giray Sultan's *Atalik*³¹¹ was from the Circassian Jane tribe, his presence was extremely important for the support of Circassians to their cause.³¹² However, Safa Giray Sultan was not willing to play an active role and watched the course of events. Finally, he returned to the Crimea when his uncle; the new Khan Gazi Giray II invited him in 1588.³¹³ However, the third fugitive Murad Giray Sultan declined to return.

- **2.28.1 Murad Giray Sultan's cooperation with Muscovy**

It appears that Muscovy tried to benefit from the internal problems in the Khanate and pursue an active policy towards it. The third fugitive Hanzade Murad Giray Sultan's relationship with Muscovy is very illustrative on this subject. It was partly related with the personality of Murad Giray Sultan that was more ambitious and adventurous of the fugitives. It was also a natural phenomenon of the East European Steppes of the time that any prince who lost his patrimony goes abroad and he enters to the service of a foreign ruler irrespective of their

³⁰⁹ F. LaShkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago ...", p. 67.

³¹⁰ Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "La Moscovie, L'Empire Ottoman ...", p. 464.

³¹¹ For more information on Atalik see: Carl Max Kortepeter, "Atalik (Atabeg)", *El²*, V. II, Leiden, 1991. pp. 731-732.

³¹² E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza ...*, p. 262.

³¹³ *ibid.* p. 268.

religious or ethnic affiliation and then he searches the ways to reconquer their hereditary lands. In Russian it was called *Izgoi* that meant someone who changed his or her status in a negative way or became *declass  *. Dmytro Vyshnevetsky who did not hesitate to serve consecutively for Poles, Ottomans, and Muscovites or Simeon Belskii who served for the Ottomans, Crimeans, and Poles, and Toktam  ş Khan³¹⁴ who took refuge at the court of Emir Timur and served him in order to regain his possessions are the typical examples of this phenomenon. It should also be remembered that the brothers of Mengli Giray I Khan; Nurdevlet Khan and Haydar Khan, have gone to Muscovy when they lost the struggle in Crimea. Their indifference towards the religious faith of their protectors shows that the urge for power is more important than anything for the members of the royal families of the time.³¹⁵ Murad Giray Sultan was not an exception to this phenomenon and tried to use every opportunity to become the ruler of Crimea. Contrary, to his brothers, he directly went of to Moscow when he fled from Crimea upon the death of his father. Then, he was sent to Astrakhan accompanied with a Muscovite army in 1586. It was planned that Murad Giray would to attack Crimea from Astrakhan and if he is successful he would become Khan while Saadet Giray Khan and Safa Giray Sultan would rule over Nogays.³¹⁶

³¹⁴ For more information on Toktam  ş Khan and his relationship with Timur see: A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Alt  nordu ve         *, pp. 131-203 and Forbes Manz, Beatrice, *Timurlenk, Bozk  rların Son G         Fatihi*, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 97-100

³¹⁵ Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemer  cier-Quelquejay, "La Moscovie, L'Empire Ottoman ...p. 459.

³¹⁶ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 35.

The incident of Murad Giray Sultan should be considered different from that of his brothers, it very significantly displays the Muscovite inspirations on the region. It was already stated that Murad Giray Sultan directly went to Moscow contrary to his brothers who went to the Great Nogays. On 21 June/1 July, 1586, in the name of his brothers Saadet Giray Khan and Safa Giray Sultan as Nureddin and he as a Kalgay take an oath and give *şart* (oath) that from now on they would be in the full service of the Tsar.³¹⁷ He was welcomed in Moscow and was sent to Astrakhan in the company of two voevodes (October 1586).³¹⁸ In Astrakhan, he was received in such a splendor that he started to believe that he would really become the Khan of Astrakhan while his brother would become the Crimean Khan.³¹⁹ The Muscovite plan according to the Voevode of Astrakhan F.M. Lobanov-Rostovskii was to convince him and the Turkic-Muslim peoples of the region that only the friendship of the Tsar could emancipate them from the Ottoman yoke.³²⁰ On the contrary, he was under strict surveillance and could even not go to the Mosque without the presence of Muscovite guards. Meanwhile, Muscovite envoy Ivan Sudakov was threatening Islam Giray Khan that Saadet Giray “Khan”, Hanzade Murad Giray Sultan, Nogay Mirzas, Circassians and others were looking forward to him for his dethronement unless he signed a peace treaty.³²¹ He also added that

³¹⁷ Belyakov, A., “Doroga Tsarevicha Murag Gireya v Astrakhan”, *İzvestiya Saratovskaya Universiteta Novaya Seriya T. 13, Seriya Istorija Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia* V. 1, Saratov, 2013, p. 93.

³¹⁸ N. M. Karamzin, *Istorija Gosudarstva Rossiiskago*, T. X, St. Petersburg, 1824, p. 55.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 55..

³²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 55-56.

³²¹ *Ibid.* p. 57.

the main objective of supporting Murad Giray Sulatn was not against Crimea but against their common enemy Poland.³²² In fact, Moscow had already informed Bahçesaray that it would not use the fugitive Hanzades against them under three conditions a- if the Khan did not attack on Muscovy, b- if the Khan convinced the Sultan to not to attack on Muscovy and c- if he informed Moscow about the Ottoman plans.³²³ At the same time, Boris Blagov; the envoy was talking about the peaceful character of Muscovy and the friendship between the previous Sultans and Tsars.³²⁴ The Ottoman ambassador İbrahim who has gone to Moscow with B. Blagov asked from the Tsar that the fugitive Hanzades should be given to the Sultan and the prevention of Don Cossacks from attacking Ottoman possessions to reach to an agreement.³²⁵ Tsar replied that most of the Cossacks that were attacking the Ottomans in the Don area were “Lithuanian” Cossacks that are the subjects of the Polish King and the fugitive Hanzades were his servants and they would be punished but would by no means be delivered to the Ottomans.³²⁶ Meanwhile, Muscovite envoy to the Shah Abbas I (1571-1629), G.B. Vasilchikov was saying that the Tsar wanted

³²² F. Lashkov, “Stateinii Spisok’ Moskovskago ...”, pp. 53-56.

³²³ S.M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii s Drevneishikh* V. VII.p. 608.

³²⁴ N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossiiskago*, T. X., p. 59-60. On the subject of the Muscovite fortress on Terek B. Blagov states that the fortress had been build on the time of the late Tsar upon the request of Circassians, but deserted after the proposal of the Sultan Selim II. However it had been taken by the Volga Cossack bandits without the approval of the Tsar. On his attitude towards the Muslims he replied that the Tsar had lots of Muslim subjects who were freely practisng their religion and has always been friendly towards the Muslim neighbors. Therefore it was not possible that he was preventing any Muslim to perform their religious duties.

³²⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 60-61.

³²⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 61-62.

to make Murad Giray Crimean Khan.³²⁷ It appeared that the Moscow was planning to use Murad Giray Sultan as an asset against the Khanate.

Ivan Sudakov was told by all of the Crimean authorities that they are ready to fight with them against Poland once the appropriate gifts (tribute) were given and the problem of Murad Giray Sultan was solved. According to the story of a certain Tatar Useyn (Hüseyn) who had fled from Murad Giray came to the court of Şirin Mirzas Ali and Murad in March 1587, Murad Giray Sultan was mobilizing a large army to invade Crimea with the help of Muscovy.³²⁸ Muscovy and Crimea was trying to attract Nogays to their side. While, Murad Giray Sultan was trying to convince Great Nogays to fight for Muscovy in Poland, Islam Giray was sending an advisory council to urge them to leave the cause of Murad Giray Sultan.³²⁹ Murad Giray Sultan sent also a delegation to Little Nogays and called them to enter in Muscovy's service. On 9/19.3.1587 Ivan Sudakov learned that Islam Giray II Khan allowed Kalgay Alp Giray Sultan to attack on Muscovy since the appropriate gifts did not come and Murad Giray Sultan was not punished yet³³⁰ Ivan Sudakov responded that neither Tsar nor the Hanzades had any intention against the Khan and all of the military preparations were against Poland.³³¹

On the 28 September/8 October Ivan Sudakov met with Islam Giray II Khan in Gözleve. The Khan said to him that although he wanted to have

³²⁷ Veselovskii, N.I., *Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh' i Torgovykh' Snoshenii Moskovskoi Rusi c' Persei T.I Tsartsvovanie Fedora Ioannovicha*, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 53.

³²⁸ F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago ... p. 56.

³²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 58.

³³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 59.

³³¹ *Ibid.* p. 60.

peaceful relations with him, Tsar was still helping to the fugitive Hanzades. He had provided Murad Giray Sultan with 30,000 soldiers and war materials. He had responded to the Crimean complaints that his support to Murad Giray Sultan had nothing to do with Crimea instead, he was against Poland and the Hanzade would soon go to the Polish front. The Khan said that he demanded from the Tsar that he found and delivered Murad Giray Sultan to him and proved his friendship.

2.29 The Ottoman Caucasian politics under the shadow of Safavid-Muscovite rapprochement

The confrontation between the Ottomans and the Safavids had already developed into a regional crisis long before the arrival of the Hanzades to the Caucasia. Two contending powers that could not change the equilibrium by themselves were looking for new means to change it for their benefit. The Ottomans that were weary of the long and costly wars in a hostile environment were heavily dependent on Crimean forces. However, the expansionist policies of Muscovy that can concentrate on the region after the end of the Livonian war (1558-1583) had began to pose a major threat for the Ottoman plans. Muscovy's aim was to recover Golden Horde's territory under its own rule.³³²

After the conquest of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) they were at the gates of the Caucasus. They were one step behind Demirkapı (Temürkapı, Derbent); key to the Transcaucasia and Crimea. The

³³² In a letter to Urus Mirza dated 1586 Sa'adet Giray Khan tells that *Beliy Tsar* (WhiteTsar, Muscovite Tsar) has provided Murad Giray Sultan a huge army and lots of money. In E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza* ..., p. 264. For the title of *Beliy Tsar* and its connotations see: Trepavlov, V.V., *Beliy Tsar*, Moscow, 2007.

Cossacks (those of Don and Terek) and the Nogay tribes that they have managed to take under influence were their main allies. The Ottomans who stayed away from the region after the failure of the Astrakhan campaign and Don-Volga canal project in 1569³³³ soon realized the importance of the region for the success of the Persain wars when Crimean Tatar forces under the command of Kalgay Adil Giray Sultan went to the help of Ottomans via Demirkapı in 1579. However, the existence of Muscovite fortresses and stations was threatening the security of the road. It appeared that they had rebuilt the fort Terek contrary to their promises. In his letter to Mehmed Giray II Khan, Ivan IV says that the fort was build in order to prevent the unruly Circassians to disturb his brother, the Khan.³³⁴ Moreover, Safavids and Muscovites were cooperating in order to push Ottomans back from the region. The Ottoman and Crimean forces that were using the road including the Serdar Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha himself in 1583 were constantly harassed by the Cossacks.³³⁵ Muscovy has of course denied any connection with the incidents, on the ground that the Cossacks were unruly people that were out of Tsars authority. However, when there was a diplomatic contact between Muscovy and the Otomans, the Cossacks were warned about the necessity to stay out of the trouble and to not to make actions that would risk the success of the diplomatic

³³³ For the Astrakhan campaign and Don-Volga canal Project see: Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Rus Rekabetinin ... pp. 135-185 and Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve İdil Boyu*, Ankara, 1966.

³³⁴ E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza ...*, pp. 259-260.

³³⁵ For the examples of such incidents see: *Ibid.* pp.. 261-262.

mission.³³⁶ The Ottomans who were intensively engaged in the war in Persia, did not want further trouble and adjourned the solution of the problem. Finally, they have decided to put an end to problem in the autumn of 1587.

Semen, an Armenian from Kefe that Ivan Sudakov met in the beginning of October, told Sudakov that lots of Ottoman soldiers under the command of Piyale Pasha has arrived to Kefe which are saying that they were send to take Astrakhan. According to Semen, there were also rumours that the Porte and Urus Mirza who was willing to switch his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan had agreed and all peoples of the Deşt-i Kıpçak that were against Muscovite rule were united.³³⁷ Ivan Sudakov notes that the news that the Sultan charged with the conquest of Astrakhan is confirmed by the Crimean officials (19/29 October).³³⁸ On the 13/23 November Ivan Sudakov states that the representative of Urus Mirza; Allahkul Emildeş swore allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul in the name of the whole Nogay Horde and Islam Giray II Khan send Nureddin Mübarek Giray Sultan to meet with Yahşisaat Mirza and Little Nogays.³³⁹

Meanwhile, the sudden death of İslam Giray II Khan on his way to launch a punitive expedition to Moscow changed the course of the events. Islam Giray Khan II was replaced by Gazi Giray II Khan (1588-1596, 1596-1608) who called the fugitive Hanzades to return in

³³⁶ For example see the letter of Tsar Fedor to the Don Atamans dated 31 August/10 September 1584 document no: 52 in which he warns the Don Cossacks to not to cause trouble while the Muscovite delegation was on the road to Istanbul in (ed.) *Sobranie Gosudarstvennykh' Gramot' ... V. II*, pp. 86-87.

³³⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 66-67.

³³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 67.

³³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 67.

Crimea.³⁴⁰ Safa Giray Sultan who immediately accepted the offer returned to Crimea.³⁴¹ On 25 December 1587/4 January 1588, Ivan Sudakov noted that an Ardobazarets (Ordu Pazarıcı) Tatar Akmehmet who spent the whole summer in Astrakhan said that Saadet Giray “Khan” was dead and Murad Giray Sultan who returned to the city and was passionately waiting the decision of Moscow. Murad Giray Sultan whose release was several times requested by Gazi Giray II Khan was dead in dismay under suspicious conditions with his sons in Astrakhan (1590).³⁴² According to the New Chronicle (*Noviy Letopis*) he is death from carious tooth while waiting to be transferred to Crimea.³⁴³ A.A. Novosels’kiy argues that he was poisoned by the Muscovites who were afraid that his existence might harm their relationship with Crimea.³⁴⁴

2.30 The first reign of Gazi Giray II, the years of stability and military cooperation between the Ottomans and the Khanate (1588-1596)

2.30.1 Gazi Giray II Khan tries to compromise with the dissidents

On 6/16 April 1588, Ivan Sudakov writes that a certain Tatar Asanbay told that he had heard from the gunner Süleyman from the Khan’s army that Islam Giray II Khan was dead and Kalgay Alp Giray after receiving the homage of the notables had sent Şirin Mirza Osman with a letter to

³⁴⁰ E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza ...*, p. 268. According to the Ottoman sources fugitives Hanzades applied to the Porte ask for amnesty and permission to return Crimea that was actually granted in Halil İnalçık, *ibid.* p. 171 and document no: VII in appendix.

³⁴¹ E. N. Kusheva, *ibid.* p. 268.

³⁴² A.A. Novosels’kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 37.

³⁴³ (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh’ Letopisei ...*, Tom XIV, V. I, p. 39.

³⁴⁴ A.A. Novosels’kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 37.

the Porte about the situation where he requested his entronement.³⁴⁵

Most importantly, Asanbay adds that everyone in Crimea desires that Gazi Giray to be Khan. It seems that the sudden death and the replacement of unpopular Islam Giray II Khan with Gazi Giray II Khan who was supported both by the Crimean Tatars and Ottomans changed the balance of power.³⁴⁶ It was also a major blow for the Muscovite plans to control Crimea through Murad Giray Sultan.

On 12/22 April, Ivan Sudakov stated that he learned from a certain Sipaga (Sipahi) Mustafa that the Sultan was sending Gazi Giray with Ferhad Pasha to Crimea and most importantly that there would not be a campaign on Astrakhan because the Ottomans had decided to launch an offensive against the Safavids in the east and a naval expedition against the Germans (Spain) in the White Sea (Mediterranean).³⁴⁷

On 16/26 April he learned that Gazi Giray II Khan is coming to Balıqlava in the company of 300 janissaries and the Crimean envoys that were sent to Istanbul by the late Khan and Kalgay Alp Giray Sultan. Gazi Giray II Khan first went to Gözleve that has a minting house and minted money in his name.³⁴⁸ The Porte has also ordered Fetih Giray Sultan³⁴⁹

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 68. For a letter of the Great Hetman Jan Zamoyski (1542-1605) to Christoph Radziwill (1549-1616) dated 22 April 1588 about the situation of the Crimean Khanate after the death of Islam Giray II see: document no: 152 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitoare La Istoria Romanilor 1510-1600*, V. I, Bucarest, 1893. pp. 294-295 and E. Charriere. *Negociations de la France ...*, T. IV, pp. 662-663.

³⁴⁶ A.V. Vinogradov finds the sudden death of Islam Giray II Khan suspicious especially the arrival of Gazi Giray II to Crimea only six days after the death of Islam Giray in A.V. Vinogradov, "Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ...", p. 19.

³⁴⁷ F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago ...", pp. 68-69.

³⁴⁸ For the coins minted in the name of Gazi Giray II Khan see: O. Retovskii, "Monety Gazi Gereya Khana II, ben' Devlet'", *ITUAK*, V. XIII, 1889, Simferopol, pp. 90-98 and N. Kosyakin, *Krymskoe Khanstvo Monety...*, p. 92-95 Carl Max Kortepeter argues that he has first established his court in Gözleve because of the internal resistance in Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 117 note 21. However, there is a

to maech immediately on Alp Giray Sultan and kill him. Gazi II Khan dispatched Derviş Mirza to Orkapı to convince Selamet Giray Sultan³⁵⁰ to return Crimea.³⁵¹

On 18/28 April he states that Gazi Giray II Khan arrived to Bahçesaray and married with the mother of Safa Giray Sultan; Hantotay Biyim³⁵² (the widow of Mehmed Giray II Khan) in order to facilitate his return. Mahmut Agha was also charged with the duty of advising Nogay Mirzas to come to Crimea.³⁵³ It appears that Gazi Giray II Khan did not only establish good relations with the Ottoman administration but was also influential in Crimean politics. Nureddin Mubarek Giray who was sent to Istanbul by the Khan realized the exalted status of Gazi Giray Sultan in the Porte and the support of Crimean refugees (the supporters of Sa'adet Giray "Khan") switched allegiance to him.³⁵⁴ His relations with Crimea and the fugitive Hanzades did never stop. He had already developed a positive reputation as an alternative to the fugitive Hanzades thanks to the Ottoman support when he came to the throne.³⁵⁵ However, Muscovy underestimated his political power and did not consider him as a viable alternative to the fugitive Hanzades for the

very short time interval between his arrival to Balaklava and entrance to Bahçesaray see: F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago ...", p. 69.

³⁴⁹ For more on Fetih Giray Sultan see: Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan* ... pp. 69-71.

³⁵⁰ For more on Selamet Giray Sultan see: *ibid.* pp. 72-73 and Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., pp. 82-83.

³⁵¹ F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovsk ago ... p. 69.

³⁵² For more information on Hantotay Biyim see: A.M. Nekrasov, "Zhenschiny Doma Gireev v XV-XVI Vekakh", *Izbrannie Trudy*, Nalchik, 2015, pp. 247-248.

³⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 69. Hantotay Biyim was under custody since 1584 in Çufutkale with some other members of the fugitive Hanzades.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 19. Mubarek Giray S was actually send to Istanbul in order to remove him from Istanbul but he succesfully reversed this plan and succeeded to stay in Istanbul until the "death" of Islam Giray.II Khan.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 19.

Crimean throne.³⁵⁶ Meanwhile, Gazi Giray II patiently consolidated the power in the Khanate. He replaced Kalgay Alp Giray Sultan with Selamet Giray Sultan and Nureddin Mubarek Giray Sultan with Fetih Giray Sultan and forced the former ones to flee from Crimea. Alp Giray Sultan went to Istanbul and Mubarek Giray Sultan to Kerch.³⁵⁷

On 23 April/3 May, Ivan Sudakov makes his first contact with the representatives of the new Khan; Derviş Mirza, Sefer Atalık, Zentemir Aga and the Atalık of the Khan Molla Kan Atalık who asked him for an extra payment (zapros) to buy horses for the army.³⁵⁸ Next day, he learns that several Nogay Mirzas including the son of Urus Mirza came to the Khan and declared that they are waiting for his orders. The Ottoman *Çavuş* (messengers) that went to the Nogay Horde with Allahkul Emildeş for the ceremony of allegiance and investiture was also returned with them.³⁵⁹ On 24 May/3 June Safa Giray Sultan returned to Bahçesaray with some of the Nogay dignitaries who were the supporters of Islam Giray II Khan. Ivan Sudakov notes that he is expecting that a great quarrel is likely to begin in the Khanate.³⁶⁰ On 27 May/6 June, Ivan Sudakov once again met with Derviş Mirza who told him that Gazi Giray II Khan desire to have peaceful relations with Muscovy contrary to his predecessor who did not keep his promise.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p.19.

³⁵⁷ F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago ... p. 71.ultan

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70. Also see note: 1219 above.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 70.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 75.

2.30.2 The failure of the compromise, Gazi Giray II Khan establish his network

On 1/10 June 1588, he reported that the as a result of the quarrels Kalgay Selamet Giray Sultan had fled to Istanbul with Ali Mirza and Osman Mirza of the Şirins from Kefe and the Khan had replaced him with Fetih Giray Sultan while Safa Giray Sultan had become Nureddin.³⁶¹ On the 4/14 June he learns from Süleş Mirza Mehmed that the Khan asked from the Porte to handover Alp Giray Sultan and Selamet Giray Sultan who fled from Crimea without his permission. In fact, they had escaped not from their adversaries who want to revenge them.³⁶² As Ivan Sudakov pointed out the return of Safa Giray Sultan changed the balance of power in the peninsula. The sons of Gazi Giray II Khan were too young to take an initiative and Kalgay Fetih Giray Sultan seemed to be passive. Therefore, Nureddin Safa Giray Sultan became prominent among the Giray Sultans.³⁶³

On 5/15 June, he met with Mollakay Atalık who told him about the thoughts of the Khan on the political situation in Crimea and Crimean-Muscovite relations. According to Mollakay Atalık, the Khan who suffered much during his captivity in Persia was a very peaceful man. He was very content about the return of Safa Giray Sultan and others that fled during the time of Islam Giray II Khan and now Selamet Giray

³⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 77.

³⁶² *Ibid.* p. 77.

³⁶³ A.V. Vinogradov, "Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ...", p. 23. Three of the six sons of Saadet Giray Khan that were taken in custody in Çufutkale; Devlet Giray Sultan, Baht Giray Sultan and Selamet Giray Sultan who were released with Han Tukay in the summer but did not play any political or military initiative and disappeared, Kumuk Giray Sultan lived as an hostage in Moscow and Muhammed Giray Sultan returned in Crimea after 1590 and the fate of Bibadşah Giray Sultan is not known *ibid.* p. 23 and Belyakov, A.V., *Chinghisidy v Rossii XV-XVII vekov Prosopograficheskoe Issledovanie*, Ryazan, 2011, p. 59.

Sultan has fled, not from the Khan but because of his theft. The Khan also believed that lots of innocent people were dead and their goods were stolen during the rule of Islam Giray II Khan and they now wanted justice to be done. Meanwhile, the Ottomans who had been preparing for the war on Astrakhan, had sent ammunition to Kefe and had asked the help of the Khan, but he had refused their proposal because of his desire to have peace with Muscovy.³⁶⁴

As the last entry on his diary on 10/20 June 1588 Ivan Sudakov met again with Mollakay Atalık who had proposed a new list of the persons to be paid *tış* (zapros, gifts) shows that the transformation of power was completed in the Khanate and while the staff of Islam Giray II Khan left the peninsula and was replaced by the men of Gazi Giray II Khan and Safa Giray Sultan.³⁶⁵ Some members of Islam Giray II Khan's party were Selamet Giray Sultan, Alp Giray Sultan, Mubarek Giray Sultan, Şirin Bey Ali, Murad Süleş and they were supported by Cigalazade Sinan Pasha³⁶⁶ (1544-1606) who was the main opponent of Gazi Giray II Khan in Istanbul.³⁶⁷ Gazi Giray II Khan's main supporters were Mollakay Ali Atalık and Külük Bey Derviş that have been in Istanbul with him. Gazi Giray II Khan had to make a coalition with the sons of Mehmed Giray II Khan because he did not have enough power in Crimea that was ruled by the supporters of Islam Giray II Khan since

³⁶⁴ F. Lashkov, "Stateinii Spisok' Moskovskago ... p. 79.

³⁶⁵ A.V. Vinogradov, "Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ..., p. 24.

³⁶⁶ For more information on Cigalazade Sinan Paşa see: Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, "Cigalazade Sinan Paşa", *DİA C. VII.*, İstanbul, 1993. pp. 525-526.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 23. According to Muscovite archival documents anti-Gazi Giray II Khan made several attempts to replace him with Alp Giray Sultan in early 1590's. They have finally managed to descend him and replace with Fetih Giray Sultan in 1596. For more information on Gazi Giray II Khan's dethronement see: Ahmet Türk, *The Crimean Khanate Under The Reign of Gazi Giray II*, (Unpublished Master Thesis) Ankara, 2000

1584. The supporters of Safa Giray Sultan were Şirin Bek Kutlu Giray Arsanay Divey, Süleş and Zarpan Mirzas of the Yaşlav clan (OrKapı). Here, it is seen that like the members of Giray family who supported different political factions, the members of the prominent clan families were also supporting different political factions.

It is not wrong to claim that the Muscovite control of Murad Giray Sultan until his death in late 1591 had important effects on the political life of Eastern Europe. Muscovy used him very effectively to put pressure on Crimea.

2.30.3 Murad Giray Sultan as a foreign policy instrument of Muscovy

There were three determining factors for the future of the Crimean-Muscovite relationship. A)- Timely and appropriately payment of tribute “gifts”, B)- the return of Murad Giray Sultan, C)- the pattern of the regional alliances which two states would ally against the third one.

There had been five Crimean diplomatic missions to Moscow and four Muscovite missions to Bahçesaray between the years 1588-1591.³⁶⁸

Moscow’s response was that the presence of Murad Giray is extremely important for the security of the Muscovite state in Caucasia and it could only be debated after the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.³⁶⁹

Muscovy was playing on time and trying to exploit the opportunities that arised as a result of the changing political balance of the region. The

³⁶⁸ A.V. Vinogradov, “Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ...”, p. 25. The Crimean missions are as follows Abdüsselam Molla in August 1588, Kazan Agha in December 1588, Alaş Batır in October 1589, Allahberdi Mirza in June 1590 and İsa Bek in Janhuary 1591. The mission of Abdullah Bey Kıpçak’s mission was not completed because of his death on the road in the summer of 1589. Muscovite missions are as follows: Ivan Mishulin in November 1588, Pyotr Zinoviev in April 1589, Ivan Gryaznov in November 1589 and Ivan Bibikov in October 1590.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 28.

Muscovite expansion in Caucasus would inevitably cause to the Muscovite-Crimean and Ottoman rivalry and the prolonged Ottoman-Safavid war was about the finish. Under these circumstances, Moscow wanted to benefit from Polish-Crimean and Polish-Ottoman conflict as much as possible until it consolidates its territorial and political gains in the region. Muscovite diplomacy was calculating that the Ottomans could not react to their advance in Caucasus, since they were fearing that Muscovy could ally with Safavids against them.³⁷⁰ At the same time, Muscovite envoys were informing the Polish administration that the Tsar as a true Christian rejected the offers of both the Ottoman Sultan and the Crimean Khan to form a triple alliance against Poland (7/17.11.1589).³⁷¹ The Muscovite envoy; I. Gryaznom who was dispatched to Crimea in 22 November/2 December was instructed to pass of the issue of Murad Giray Sultan and to concentrate on Polish campaign.³⁷² Muscovy was able to direct the imminent Ottoman-Crimean campaign on Astrakhan to Poland and to get rid off unfriendly Nogay tribes that passed to the Crimean part of Volga.³⁷³ Actually, Crimean Tatar forces were on the Polish territory in the early month but they were defeated by the Polish forces.³⁷⁴ Muscovy made a miscalculation and did not see the coming of Ottoman-Safavid peace (Istanbul peace treaty 21 March 1590) despite the covert warnings of

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.* p. 32.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 32-33.

³⁷² *Ibid.* pp. 31-32.

³⁷³ *Ibid.* pp. 33-34.

³⁷⁴ The letter of Hetman Jan Zamoyski to Christoph Radziwill dated 25 January 1590 document no: 156 in in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitoare La ...*, V.I., pp. 306-308. Jan Zamoyski also informs K. Radziwill about the peace agreement between the Ottoman and Safavids.

Safavis envoys to adapt their relations with Crimea to the new situation.³⁷⁵ Actually, Shah Abbas I has even requested the mediation of Gazi Giray II Khan for the conclusion of the peace with the Ottomans, but Sultan Murad III disregarded.³⁷⁶ According to the report of Muscovite envoy to Crimea Ivan Bibikov, there was a strange mood in the Khanate and there are rumours about the replacement of the Khan with Alp Giray Sultan. As a result of the intricacies of his fugitive relatives at the Porte it was discussed that Alp Giray Sultan should replace Gazi Giray II Khan and Mubarek Giray Sultan should become Kalgay.³⁷⁷

2.30.4 The sudden death of Murad Giray Sultan and CrimeanTatar invasion of Muscovy (1591)

While the tension between Muscovy and Crimea was continuously rising. On 21/31 March 1591, Tsar Fedor published a verdict on the precautions to be taken against the invasion of the Crimean Khan.³⁷⁸ It appeared that the Crimean offensive was inevitable. The sudden death of Murad Giray in early 1591 changed the course of events but did not stop the invasion of the Muscovite territory by the Crimeans (July 1591).³⁷⁹ Since there was not any diplomatic contact between two countries, Crimean side considered the death of Murad Giray Sultan a challenge of their authority. Gazi Giray II Khan sent Yamgurçi Atalık

³⁷⁵ *ibid.* p. 34. For more on Istanbul peace treaty see: Kırzioğlu, Fahrettin, *Osmanlılar'ın Kafkas-Ellerini Fethi (1451-1590)*, Ankara, 1993, pp. 375-382

³⁷⁶ G. Sagredo, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottomane*, (tr. M. Laurent), V. IV.. Paris, 1724, p. 247.

³⁷⁷ *ibid.* p. 38.

³⁷⁸ *ibid.* p. 40.

³⁷⁹ For the raid of Gazi Giray II on Moscovy on June 1591 see: S.M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii s Drevneishikh Vremen*, T. VII, St. Petersburg, 1896, pp. 611-613.

who had been with Murad Giray Sultan in Astrakhan and who had been the tutor of Kumuk Giray Sultan to investigate the incident.³⁸⁰ Prior to the investigation, it was believed that Murad Giray Sultan was killed upon the order of Moscow with Kumuk Giray Sultan and Muscovy was accused of poisoning Saadet Giray Khan previously.³⁸¹ On the contrary, Yamgurçi Atalık argued that the information on the poisoning came from a few *Yurt* Tatars and had been accepted true because of the lack of communication between the countries.³⁸² Muscovy blamed Crimea on the death of Murad Giray Sultan. According to the *Letopis*; “*Povest’ o Chestnem’ Zhitii Tsarya i Velikogo Knyazya Feodora Ivanovicha Vseya Rossii*”, Murad Giray Sultan was poisoned by his Crimean visitors.³⁸³ However, Gazi Giray II’s decision to attack on Muscovy should not be only related to the international factors. Gazi Giray’s position in the Khanate and his relationship with the Porte were also influential. Gazi Giray II managed to consolidate his power in the Khanate in 1591. According to the reports of I. Bibikov most of the pro-Islam Giray II Khan Mirzas who fled from Crimea had returned to the peninsula including the head of Şirin clan Osman Mirza in the beginning of 1591.³⁸⁴ The *şart* given by Kan Mirza (son of Yahşısaat Mirza) together with his brothers had restored Crimean authority on the Gazi Ulus.³⁸⁵ The Khan

³⁸⁰ A.V. Vinogradov, “Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ... p. 40.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 40.

³⁸² *Ibid.* p. 40.

³⁸³ (ed.) *Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh’ Letopisei ...*, Tom XIV, pp. 39-40.

³⁸⁴ A.V. Vinogradov, “Russko-Krymskie Otnoshenia ... p. 44.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 44.

had also made contacts with Diveys in order to bring Great Nogays again in the Crimean orbit.³⁸⁶

The major threat for Gazi Giray II Khan was the intricacies of the Giray refugees in Istanbul. A successful campaign on Muscovy like his father did twenty years ago might have put an end to the intricacies and ameliorate his position vis-à-vis the Ottoman Sultan. However, the campaign was not successful. The Khan managed to reach to the gates of Moscow like his father did, but he was defeated by the forces of Boris Godunov mainly because of the superior firearms of the Muscovite army.³⁸⁷

According to Russian historian Nikolay Karamzin, Gazi Giray II who was aware of his declining status in the Porte after the failure of his Muscovite campaign wrote to the Tsar that he was intended to leave the Crimean peninsula and to completely break up from the Ottoman Empire and to settle in the Koshkin passage on Dnieper and to enter to the service of the Tsar against the Ottomans and Poles if he helps him to build a new fort to stop the Cossacks encroachments in the region (Gazikerman).³⁸⁸ It is not possible to determine whether the Khan was sincere or not on this proposal but it was certain that the Giray refugees were working harder for his deposition after his defeat in Moscow. It was almost certain that the Ottomans would have deposed him after the failed Muscovite campaign, had they have not needed the Crimean forces in the war against Habsburgs. Mübarek Giray Sultan who had

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 44.

³⁸⁷ For the description of the unsuccessful campaign of Gazi Giray II to Moscow in 1591 see. N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossiiskago*, T. X., pp. 144-157 and S.M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii s Drevneishikh* V. VII.pp. 611-614.

³⁸⁸ N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya Gosudarstva Rossiiskago*, T. X., p. 171.

fled to Caucasus and unsuccessfully lobbied for a while to replace Gazi Giray II Khan after the failure of this attempt, made a new proposition to the Porte in which he offered to reconquer the lands that were taken by Muscovy in the Northern Caucasia for the Sultan.³⁸⁹ The Ottomans appreciated the project but Mübarek Giray Sultan suddenly died on the autumn of 1592 while the preparations to send him military forces were under way.³⁹⁰

2.30.5 The renewal of the peace with Muscovy (April 1594)

The Muscovite delegation witnessed a major crisis between the Khan and the Kalgay when they arrived in Crimea for the ratification of the peace treaty in 1694. The Crimean dignitaries including the Kalgay Feth Giray Sultan were not satisfied with the distribution of the *tış*. The Khan was receiving one quarter of the estimated 40,000 rubles that seemed very high for the others that were getting far more less than they were expecting. Kalgay Feth Giray Sultan even had a quarrel with his brother the Khan. He argued that the Khan obtained very much booty from the Muscovite campaign, but he did not give his share. Therefore, he would be staying in Crimea and raiding Muscovy, while the Khan would be going to the Hungarian front.³⁹¹ Under these circumstances, the Khan hesitated to ratify the peace and asked that the Tsar should annually dispatch 10,000 more rubles for the Kalgay, but the Vizier of the Khan, Ahmed Agha, convinced him to accept the agreement by saying that unless he accepted the proposal, the Tsar would agree with Polish King

³⁸⁹ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, note 68 in p. 120. Kusheva Kabardins.

³⁹⁰ Kумыков, Т. К.Н., Кусева, Е. Н., *Kabardino-Russkie Otnosheniya v XVI-XVIII Vekov*, V.I., Moscow, 1957, pp. 68-69.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 618.

and no one would receive anything.³⁹² Gazi Giray II Khan had to turn his attention to the Ottoman requests and the Crimean-Muscovite peace was renewed (14/24 April 1594).³⁹³

2.31 The principles of Gazi Giray II Khan's steppe politics

When the internal and steppe politics of Gazi Giray II Khan until the death of Murad Giray Sultan is analyzed, it is possible to say that it was quite successful. He first of all understood that the power of the fugitive Hanzades of Mehmed Giray II Khan was depending on their kinship to the Great Nogays; Sa'adet Giray Khan was married to the daughter of Urus Khan, head of Great Nogays that helped and sheltered the fugitive Hanzades whenever it was necessary. Therefore, his invitation of the fugitive Hanzades and Great Nogay Mirzas did not only strengthen his position in the Khanate, but also attracted the Mirzas that were disrupted by the Muscovite expansion towards their traditional pasture lands along Volga basin. Several Great Nogay tribes moved westwards to the Don basin and asked from the Ottoman Sultan permission to settle around Bolısaray along the Kalmius because they were still suspicious of the attitude of Crimean Khans towards them.³⁹⁴ The movement of large numbers of Great Nogays provoked another major historical problem; the Little Nogays who were forming part of the Crimean Khanate were against to share their their pasture lands and water with their traditional enemies Great Nogays whom they held responsible for the Muscovite expansion in the region.³⁹⁵ A bloody

³⁹² *Ibid.* p. 618.

³⁹³ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 41-42.

³⁹⁴ V.V. Trepavlov, *Istoriya Nogaiskoi Orda*, p. 358.

³⁹⁵ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p.103.

struggle happened between the two Nogay Hordes immediately after the accession of Gazi Giray II Khan to the throne, it eliminated any chance of bringing the bulk of the Great Nogay Horde to the Ottoman-Crimean orbit.

2.32 The principles of the Ottoman steppe policies in the beginning of the seventeenth century

Unfortunately, the Ottoman vision of the problem was short sighted. They did not realize the threat that Muscovite expansion was posing until it was too late. It was partly related to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was looking to the steppes from a distance and always considered it to be of secondary importance. The Crimean Khans whom the Ottomans entrusted their steppe politics had their own agenda that most of the time conflicted with that of the Ottomans. The Crimea Khans not only wanted to preserve their prerogatives, but also approached suspiciously to the Ottoman undertakings in the region. They always believed that once the Ottoman authority expanded to the north of the Black Sea basin their existence would become unnecessary and Crimea would be ruled by a *kul* of the Sultan.³⁹⁶

I believe that the Ottoman-Muscovite relationship was most of the time differed from the Crimean Khanate-Muscovites relations. Crimean Khans insisted on conducting of the Ottoman-Muscovite diplomatic relations via Bahçesaray, while Moscow always tried to by-pass Bahçesaray and to conduct its separate diplomacy with Istanbul from the beginning of Ottoman-Muscovite diplomatic relations in 1492.

³⁹⁶ Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Rus Rekabetinin ... p. 171.

Besides, Muscovy was aware of the might of the Ottoman Empire and refrained from entering direct confrontations with them until the end of the 17th century. Instead, as the heir of the Byzantine diplomatic tradition, they used the ambiguous language of diplomacy and followed a policy of appeasement based on passing over and false promises that would never meant to be kept. However, the success of Muscovite diplomacy should not be attributed to the high standards of the Muscovite diplomats. The Ottoman administration was aware that Muscovites were making empty promises, but they were not in a position to take action against them. Especially, the failure of the 1569 campaign was a major blow to the supporters of the policy including the Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmet Pasha (1565-1579) who believed the Ottoman Empire should focus on the north in order to subdue Persia.³⁹⁷ According to the plan, Ottoman Empire would control the Caucasus and reach the Caspian Sea which would not only enable them to put pressure on Safavids from the sea, but also to make contact with the Sunnite Khanates of Turkestan and to force the Safavids to a two frontal war. It demonstrated that without the cooperation of the Crimean Khanate and above all the existence of a meticulously prepared plan, the failure of the project was certain.

The Ottoman interest in the region was also closely related with the politics of the religion. The Ottoman Sultan, as the presumed *Halife*

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 164. I think that Sokullu Mehmed Paşa understood that the Ottoman Empire reached its natural boundaries in the East and West and tried to shift the focus of the Empire to the North and found new areas of expansion but he failed.

(Caliph)³⁹⁸ of the Muslims and the ruler of the *Haremeyn-i Şerifeyn* (two holy cities of Islam; Mecca and Medina) after 1517, had the responsibility to keep open the roads of Hajj (pilgrimage) to all Muslims.³⁹⁹ The Sunnite Muslims of Turkestan were using the Astrakhan road and they already have difficulties to perform pilgrimage because the problems caused by the Shiite Safavids of Persia. This road was also blocked after the Muscovite expansion in the region. The Ottoman Sultan could not ignore the complaints of Turkestani Khans about the difficulties encountered by the pilgrims.⁴⁰⁰ The security of the Astrakhan road was also related to the regional economy; the fall of Astrakhan had severed the traditional trade between Deşt-i Kıpçak and Turkestan and had forced the Turkestan Khans to apply Moscow for the continuation of the trade that would in the end bring them under Muscovy's sphere of influence as in the case of Nogays.⁴⁰¹ The Ottomans would obviously not watch Muscovy to control this lucrative trade.⁴⁰² The Ottoman Sultan as a result the role that the title of Caliph of the Muslims entrusted him could not stay out of the steppe politics for religious, economic and political reasons.

Another important factor that influenced the Ottoman-Muscovite relations from the beginning was the trade of the luxury goods between

³⁹⁸ For the presumed handover of Hilafet to the Ottomans in 1517 see Azmi Özcan, "Hilafet Osmanlı Dönemi", *DİA* C.XVII, İstanbul, 1998. pp. 546-553.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 546.

⁴⁰⁰ Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Rus Rekabetinin ... p. 152. Ottoman Admiral Seydi Ali Reis (d. 1562) during his return from India to İstanbul was forced to return from Saraycık (Sarayçuk) because of the Muscovite invasion (1557) in pp. 98-99 in Seydi Ali Reis, *Hindelerinden İstanbulla ...* p. 31.

⁴⁰¹ M.V. Fehner, *Torgovlya Russkogo Gosudartsva ...*, p.57. M. Fehner also states that the Nogay Horde was the biggest market of the Muscovite textile. The Khans had to apply to the Tsars because of the state monopoly on certain goods, for more details see: note 1202 below.

⁴⁰² Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlı Rus Rekabetinin ... p. 153.

two countries. The Ottomans were importing furs, walrus tusks, leather and game birds from Muscovy and were exporting silk clothes and oriental goods in exchange.⁴⁰³ Especially, the furs were very popular among the Ottoman elite to the extent that the period of 1640-1648 the reign of Sultan Ibrahim I was called *Samur Devri* (Sable Period) the most exalted of the furs especially the black ones.⁴⁰⁴ Walrus tusk was also a very popular item that was used as an alternative to ivory in the making of durable goods either as an ornament in chests or boxes or as handle for blades.⁴⁰⁵ The *Tiş* (Diş Tiş, Tıyış) registries where recorded the amounts and names of the persons about the tribute that Muscovite State had to pay to the Crimean Khanate was recorded was also named after walrus tusk.⁴⁰⁶

As a result of its rise as a power, Muscovy began to dominate the regional trade. On the one hand, it became the main supplier of European products such as woolen clothes and began to search with

⁴⁰³ Other goods that were imported by the Ottomans were wax, dye, slaves and certain metals. The other goods of Ottoman exports were finished leather goods, swords, wax, aromas for the church ceremonies, gems and sugar cane. For more information on the trade between Muscovy and Ottomans see: M.V. Fehner, *Torgovlya Russkogo Gosudartsva ...*, and Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "Les Marchands de la Cour Ottomane et le Commerce des Fourrures Moscovites dans la seconde moitié du XVI^e Siècle", *CMRS*, V.XI, No.3, Paris, 1970. pp. 363-390 and Halil İnalcık, *An Economic Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 271-291.

⁴⁰⁴ For the *Samur devri* see: Ahmet Refik Altınay, *Samur Devri (1640-1648)*, İstanbul, 2010 esp. pp. 37-43. The kinds of the imported furs are: Sable, Martens, Fox of various colors, Squirrel.

⁴⁰⁵ For the significance and administration of the walrus tusk trade see: Serkan Acar, "Moskof Çarlarının Kırım Hanlarına Ödediği Bir Haraç Türü: Tış-Tıyış (Mors Dişi)", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, XV/60, Ankara, 2018, pp. 34-45. M.V. Fehner states that the walrus tusk trade was not under the state monopoly in M.V. Fehner, *Torgovlya Russkogo Gosudartsva ...*, p. 63.

⁴⁰⁶ For the etymology of "Tış" see: Serkan Acar, *ibid.* and N.A. Samoilovich, "Kırım Tatarlarında "Tıyış (Tış)" ve Diğer Terimler" (çev. Serkan Acar), *DEÜ Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* V. XXVI, no.1, İzmir, 2011. pp. 277-278 and N.I. Veselovskii, "O Turetsko-Tatarskom' Slovo' Tysh ("Zub") v' Diplomaticeskikh' Dokumentakh", *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosvещения*, Novaya Seriya No: LVI, Petrograd (St. Petersburg), 1915, pp. 329-331

the help of English alternatives in the north to the traditional trade roads.⁴⁰⁷ On the other hand, they became the main supplier of furs and walrus tusks after the annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates and the expansion towards inland Siberia.⁴⁰⁸ The Muscovite administration which realized the importance of those items, monopolized their trade like their counterparts in Istanbul.⁴⁰⁹ The fur as the most important and valuable export of the Muscovite State required a special emphasis.⁴¹⁰ It was customary for the Muscovite State to “prohibit” or “reserve” (*zapovedni*) the trade of certain “strategic” products and to make their import subject to the “imperial commerce” (*tsarskaya trgovlya*) that could only be imported by the merchants of the “treasury” (*kazna*).⁴¹¹ The furs that were collected by the state were brought to the capital and stored.⁴¹² In Moscow they were either sold or exchanged with other goods or were sent to the export centers, the remaining parts were used for other purposes such as diplomatic or personal gifts or the consumption of the palace. The state was selling the furs through its three agencies; the Sable Treasury (*Sobolinaya Kazna*), the Treasury Court (*Kazennii Prikaz* or *Dvor*) and Treasury

⁴⁰⁷ Halil İnalçık, “Struggle for East-European Empire: 1400-1700 The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire”, *Seçme Eserleri –XI Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, İstanbul, 2017, p. 436..

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 426.

⁴⁰⁹ For the significance and administration of Muscovite fur trade see: Raymond H. Fisher, *The Russian Fur Trade 1550-1700*, Los Angeles, 1943. For the monopoly of Ottoman Treasury (Hazine-i Hassa) on the fur trade see: Alexandre Bennigsen, Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “Les Marchands de la ...”, p. 367.

⁴¹⁰ M.V. Fehner, *Torgovlya Russkogo Gosudartsva ...*, pp. 58-59. Almost all trade items sent to Istanbul with Ambassador Ivan Morozov in 1523 consisted of different kinds of furs.

⁴¹¹ For more information on the prohibited goods see: *ibid.* p. 51. The other prohibited products are leather, all kinds of war materials.

⁴¹² For the organization of Muscovite fur trade see: Raymond H. Fisher, *The Russian Fur ...*, pp. 123-145.

Merchants (*Kazennii Kupets*). While the first two were only selling the furs in Moscow, the last ones were travelling around in other markets. According to M.V. Fehner the Muscovite-Ottoman trade in the sixteenth century was “diplomatic” and could only be conducted through the diplomas granted by the rulers of both sides.⁴¹³ Only the merchants of the eastern countries that have the official permission of their own governments had the right to trade in Moscow and could enter to the capital together with the diplomatic delegations.⁴¹⁴ Therefore, whether he was an Ottoman or Muscovite subject every merchant had to have the certified permission of both sovereign in order to conduct a legal trade appears that Muscovy has efficiently used the demand of Ottoman market for the furs both in trade and diplomacy.

As it was stated above, the Muscovite State did not only use commodities but also the fugitive Hanzades for its political aims; to claim and to use the heritage of the Golden Horde to increase its power in Eastern Europe. Since, Muscovy was not yet strong enough to disregard other regional powers and was refraining from directly confronting the Ottoman Empire. On the other side, it was confident on making daring plans such as annexing Crimean Khanate despite the Ottoman presence thanks to the modern fire arms and its political and economic control on the regional manpower after the annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates and entrance of Ulu Nogay Horde and some Caucasian ethnic groups under its control. However, though it had been limited, the Ottoman intervention demonstrated that the

⁴¹³ M.V. Fehner, *Torgovlya Russkogo Gosudartsva ...*, pp. 99 and 108-109.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 46-47. Another advantage for the merchants to travel with the diplomatic delegations was that they were exempt from the duties.

Muscovite imperial projects were still immature. Although, the Ottoman plan to control the Caucasus was not completely successful, at least they managed to stop Muscovite expansion in the south for one more century until Muscovy joined to the Holy League (1684) in 1686.

The Ottomans also benefited from the existence of the fugitive Hanzades in order to strengthen their position in the Khanate. Islam Giray II Khan was aware that he owed his status to the Porte. Finally, the Crimean Tatar raids on Moldavia which was under the Ottoman suzerainty created the reaction of the Sultan and he asked the immediate compensation of the damages. Therefore, he realized that he had to show his faithfulness to the Porte in order to stay in power and introduced the practice of mentioning the name of the Ottoman Sultan in the *Hutbe* (sermon during the Friday prayers) that was considered to be the proof of the increasing Ottoman influence in the political life of the Khanate.⁴¹⁵ It should also be noticed that the “sufi” Khan Islam Giray II Khan was not a completely mystic man since he did not refrain to make necessary concessions to stay in the throne.

2.33 Mehmed Giray III Khan and Saadet Giray Sultan’s entrance to the political arena (1601)

The emergence of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan shows that the Crimean Khanate was also influenced from the socio-political crisis that prevailed in Europe after the second half of the sixteenth century. They were the sons of fugitive Hanzade and rival Khan Saadet Giray. They have first appeared in the Crimean politics in

⁴¹⁵ Halil İnalçık, “II. İslam Giray (1584-1588)”, *Seçme Eserleri –XI Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, İstanbul, 2017, p. 191. Essebüsseyyar p.

the failed attempt of their brother Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan to overthrow Gazi Giray II Khan in 1601. Gazi Giray II Khan was on the zenith of his power and prestige as result of his military successes on the Hungarian front on his return to the peninsula in the autumn 1599. He managed to reorganize and to centralize the administration of the Khanate in the line with Ottoman Empire.⁴¹⁶ His reforms were receiving the reaction of the Crimean Tatar aristocracy who thought that their privileged status would be removed. The Şirins who had lost their leading position among the Karaçi Beys to their arch rival Mansurs because of their role in the affair of Kalgay Fetih Giray Sultan were the most ardent opponent of the reforms.⁴¹⁷ Nureddin Devlet Giray Sultan who had political ambitions of becoming the Khan, organized a plot with Şirin Bey Kutlu Giray to assassinate Gazi Giray II Khan. They planned to kill the Khan during the traditional banquet organized for the feast of sacrifice (*Kurban Bayramı* 12 June 1601)... However, Gazi Giray II Khan who learned about the plan executed Nureddin Devlet Giray Sultan and Kutlu Giray Mirza. We do not know whether Mehmed Giray Sultan and Şahin Giray Sultan have taken part in the plot but they have fled from Crimea upon the death of their brother.⁴¹⁸ Mehmed Giray went

⁴¹⁶ For the reforms of Gazi Giray II see: Ahmet Türk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, pp. 103-106.

⁴¹⁷ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom I, p. 366.

⁴¹⁸ See the letter of the Voevode of Tersk Andrei Suminkov to the Tsar Boris Godunov dated Octobre 1601 in Belokurov, Sergei, *Snosheniya Rossii s' Kavkazom' Materialy Izvlechennye iz' Moskovskago Glavnago Arkhiva Ministerstva Innostrannykh' Del', V.I., 1578-1613*, Moscow, 1889, p. 352. According to the letter The fugitive Hanzades were sent back to Crimea by the Sultan, but since they were not allowed to enter the Crimean Khanate territories they stayed in Kefe and informed the Porte about the situation. The Khan who was aware that the Sultan wants to send an army to the peninsula wrote a letter to the Little Nogays in which he proposed an alliance against the Ottomans. However, they refused the proposal.

to İstanbul while Şahin Giray went to Circassia.⁴¹⁹ After several weeks Kalgay Selamet Giray followed their example and fled to İstanbul through Akkerman (September 1601).⁴²⁰ Gazi Giray II Khan considered the flight of the Kalgay as a proof of his involvement in the conspiracy and requested his delivery from the Porte. The Sultan who refused the proposal, informed the Khan that the fugitive Hanzade would be send to a remote land where he could not intrigue against him.⁴²¹

2.34 Gazi Giray II Khan receives a *ferman* from Mehmed III which declared his son Toktamış Giray as the next Khan

Gazi Giray II Khan took the advantage of the incident and succeeded in convincing Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603) to grant him the permission to nominate one of his sons his heir.⁴²² In turn, the Khan started to be more observant about the demands of the Porte and he became keen on joining the Ottoman campaigns in order to not to give a pretext to his rivals in İstanbul to overthrow him. However, everything was changed after the death of Gazi Giray II Khan (Ş. 1016/21 November 19 December 1607).

2.35 The reasons of Ahmed I's refusal to recognize the *ferman* of his father

Ahmed I (1603-1617) who replaced his father did not recognize the election of Toktamış Giray (1607-1608) as Khan of the Crimea by four

⁴¹⁹ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov Tom II Krymskoe Khany XV-XVI Stoletii i Borba za Nasledstvo Velikoi Ordyy*, Kyiv, 2009 p. 27 and Dariusz Korupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie 1595-1623*, Warsaw, 2004p. 99. However, Carl Max Kortepeter argues that Mehmed Giray went to Caucasia and Şahin Giray went to Anatolia where he joined to the Celalis in Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 176.

⁴²⁰ Dariusz Skorupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie ...*, pp. 103-104.

⁴²¹ *ibid.* p. 367.

⁴²² Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 167.

Karaçi leaders; Şirin, Barin, Sicivut and Mansurs on the ground that Mehmed III was already dead and his promise to the late Khan was not valid anymore. In fact, Ahmed I was initially sympathetic towards Gazi Giray II Khan and put the fugitive Hanzades in custody in Yedikule.⁴²³ From the account of Hasanbeyzade Ahmet Pasha⁴²⁴ (d. 1046 A.H./1636-1637 A.D.), it is possible to understand that Toktamış Giray Khan fall victim to the intricacies of the Ottoman court.⁴²⁵ According to Naima the Hocaşades and Kaptan-ı Derya (Chief Admiral) Hafız Ahmed Pasha⁴²⁶ reacted to the approval of the Khanate of Toktamış Giray and instead worked for that of Selamet Giray Sultan who was the favorite of the Kaptan-ı Derya.⁴²⁷ V.D. Smirnov even claims that the Hocaşade family plotted against Toktamış Khan in order to avenge what they thought the inappropriate behavior of Gazi Giray II Khan to their father Hoca Sadettin⁴²⁸ (d. 1599)⁴²⁹ V.D. Smirnov refers to the response of Gazi Giray II to Hoca Sadeddin Efendi's letter which invited him to the Hungarian front. In the poem Gazi Giray II Khan satirically explained to the *Şeyhülislam* the reasons of his absence from the front.⁴³⁰ However,

⁴²³ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., p. 26.

⁴²⁴ For more information on Hasanbeyzade Ahmed Paşa see: Nezihi Aykut, "Hasanbeyzade Ahmed Paşa", *DİA*, C.XVI., İstanbul, 1997, pp. 363-364

⁴²⁵, *Hasan Bey-Zade Tarihi*, V. 3, (ed.) Şevki Nezihi Aykut, Ankara, 2004, pp. 855-856.

⁴²⁶ For more information on Hafız Ahmed Paşa see: Köprülü, Orhan F., "Hafız Ahmed Paşa", *DİA*, C.XV, İstanbul, 1997. pp. 84-85.

⁴²⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. p. 341.

⁴²⁸ For more information on Hoca Sadeddin and his family see: Şerafettin Turan, "Hoca Sadeddin Efendi", *DİA* C. VII., İstanbul, 1998. pp. 196-198 and for his son Hocaşade Mehmed who became Şeyhülislam after the dismissal of Sunullah Efendi see: İpşirli, Mehmet, "Mehmed Efendi Hocaşade", *DİA* C.XXVIII, Ankara, 2003, pp. 452-453. Despite the fact that his "scientific" and political authority is accepted Hoca Sadeddin was often criticized because of his nepotism and considered one of the chief responsible of the deterioration of the Ottoman state apparatus.

⁴²⁹ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 348.

⁴³⁰ For the letter of Hoca Sadeddin and the response of Gazi Giray II Khan see: , Seyyid Muhammed Rıza *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, pp. 158-166.

I think that the fundamental motive of the Hocaşades was to remove Sunullah Efendi who was supporting the Khanship of Toktamiş Giray from the post of Şeyhülislam and to bring their candidate to the Crimean throne rather than to avenge their father. Gazi Giray II Khan managed to bring up Toktamiş Giray as his heir after obtaining the *ferman* of Mehmed III. Toktamiş was in the command of the Crimean army in the Hungarian front in the absence of his father in 1604 while he was only fifteen years old.⁴³¹ Finally, İskender Bey Münşi argues that the Ottomans did not approve the election of Toktamiş Giray Khan and other sons of Gazi Giray II Khan because of his friendly relationship with the Safavids.⁴³² However, another son of Gazi Giray II Khan, İnayet Giray (1635-1637)⁴³³ became the Crimean Khan.

2.36 The career of fugitive Giray Sultans as Celalis after their flight from Crimea (1601-1607)

The political career of Selamet Giray Khan (1608-1610) who became the Crimean Khan while he was in prison is also quite interesting and coincides with those of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan. Selamet Giray Khan who was in his fifties and was in prison for more than four and half years when he was taken to the Topkapı Palace had little hope to be the Crimean Khan as the only surviving brother of Gazi Giray II Khan. In fact, he was the legitimate heir to the throne according

⁴³¹ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., p. 24. Oleksa Gaivoronskii states that Toktamiş Giray was only nineteen years old when he became Khan. For the military activities of Toktamiş Giray in the Hungarian front see: ü 282-283.

⁴³² Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah 'Abbas the Great (Tarik-e 'Ālamārā-ye 'Abbāsī*, V. II, (Translated by Roger M. Savory), Boulder, 1930, p. 975. For more information on İskender Bey see: *Ibid.* p. xxiv-xxvii.

⁴³³ For more information on İnayet Giray see: Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., pp. 197-227.

to the Chinggisid *töre* as the eldest brother of the late Khan. It was already stated that Selamet Giray Khan had escaped from Crimea shortly after Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan. While Şahin Giray Sultan went to the Caucasus, Selamet Giray Khan and Mehmet Giray III Khan went to Istanbul. Selamet Giray Khan who became the most viable alternative to Gazi Giray II Khan could not replace him, because not only Gazi Giray II Khan knew the Ottoman politics very well and had supporters in the Porte, but he had also satisfied the demand of the Ottomans who extremely needed the participation of the Crimean forces in the western front by personally going to the front in 1602.⁴³⁴ Therefore, Selamet Giray Khan was exiled to Anatolia to ensure the cooperation of Gazi Giray II Khan where he joined to the forces of Karayazıcı (d. 1602) and later to his brother Deli Hasan after Karayazıcı's death. Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan were active in Eastern Anatolia and posed a great threat to the Ottoman rule, since they have managed to form an alliance of different Celali groups and demonstrated the extent of Celali power when they were acting as a unified group.⁴³⁵

According to the report of Venetian Consul Vincenzo Dandolo in Syria dated 27 February 1602, it appears that the relationship between Karayazıcı and the fugitive Hanzades was very good. He even claimed that prior to his death in 1602, Karayazıcı might have planned to build a navy in Samsun in order to pass to the northern coast of the Black Sea

⁴³⁴ *Hasan Bey-Zade Tarihi*, V. 3, pp. 674-675.

⁴³⁵ See note 9 above. For more information on Karayazıcı see: Mücteba İlgürel, "Karayazıcı Abdülhalim", *DİA*, C. XXIV., İstanbul, 2001, pp. 482-483. For more information on Karayazıcı movement see: William Griswold, *Anadolu'da Büyük İsyan ...*, pp. 19-46.

in order to unite with the Crimean Tatars with whom he established good relations.⁴³⁶ In reality, the cooperation of Celali leader and the fugitives was symbiotic. While the Celalis were enhancing their military power and fame thanks to the inclusion of Crimean Tatar forces, Selamet Giray could have used the Celali forces in his quest for the Crimean throne.⁴³⁷ Richard Knolles states that the Celali army that besieged Bursa in 1603 was commanded by one of the brothers of the Crimean Khan.⁴³⁸ As it was stated above the preemptive maneuver of Gazi Giray II Khan who knew very well the intricacies of the Ottoman court soon proved to be beneficial. The fugitive Giray Sultans are pardoned (Evahir Za. 1011 A.H./ 1-10 May 1603) upon the request of Deli Hasan just after his own amnesty (Early Za. 1011 A.H./April 1603 A.D.).⁴³⁹ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi⁴⁴⁰ (d. 1649) who spent the winter of 1603 with Gazi Giray II Khan in the Hungarian front states that the Khan was extremely worried about the position of Selamet Giray Khan and feared that he could replace him with a fait accompli.⁴⁴¹ Gazi Giray II Khan was finally freed from the threat of an Ottoman intervention of the Crimean affairs after the death of Mehmed III who was replaced by infant Ahmed I in 1603. However, acting very cautiously he dispatched his son Kalgay Toktamış Giray to the Hungarian front to satisfy the demands of the Porte while he was remaining in Crimea until the end of the Ottoman-Habsburg war in 1606. From now on, Ottomans needed

⁴³⁶ Berchet, Guglielmo, *Relazioni dei Consoli Venetti nella Siria*, Torino, 1866, p. 115.

⁴³⁷ William Griswold, *Anadolu'da Büyük İsyan ...*, p. 33.

⁴³⁸ Robert Knolles, *The Turkish History*, V.II. London, 1687, p. 811.

⁴³⁹ *Hasan Bey-Zade Tarihi*, V. 3, pp. 759-760.

⁴⁴⁰ For more information on Peçevi İbrahim see: Erika Hancz, "Peçuylu İbrahim", *DİA*, C. XXXIV., İstanbul, 2007, pp. 216-218.

⁴⁴¹ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, pp. 250-251.

the Crimean Tatar forces in the east after the beginning of Ottoman-Safavid war that lasted until Nasuh Pasha or II Istanbul treaty (1612)⁴⁴² However, Gazi Giray II Khan has already passed away in 1608.

2.37 Crimean reaction to the changing balance of power

2.37.1 The cautious foreign policy of Gazi Giray II Khan

During his sejour in Crimea, Gazi Giray II Khan realized that the ventures of the Crimean Tatar forces in the Ottoman wars put the security of the Khanate in to a delicate situation. It was through that the Ottomans were providing extra income for the Khan and the Crimean Tatar army, but the balance of power in the steppes was gradually changing. Muscovy and Don Cossacks were expanding at the expense of the Khanate in the Caucasus by constructing new fortresses (*ostrogs*). The traditional allies of the Khanate Circassians and Kumuks were under the pressure of Cossack encroachments; and even the Kabardians and Kumuks⁴⁴³ were forced to accept Muscovite suzerainty. The Little Nogay Horde was confined to the vicinity of Azak which was under the threat of the Don Cossacks that have already surrounded it in 1593.⁴⁴⁴ The Little Nogay leader Han Mirza bin Yahşisaat described the situation as such that they were left alone by the Great Nogays and living like a mouse in the hole under the constant Don Cossack threat.⁴⁴⁵ Since the expected Ottoman intervention did not realize, Gazi Giray II Khan decided to alter the situation in the region. He constructed

⁴⁴² For more information on Ottoman-Safavid war 1603-1612 see: Kılıç, Remzi, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Antlaşmaları, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 145-169.

⁴⁴³ For more information on Kumuks see: Rıza Kurtuluş, "Kumuk", *DİA*, C. XxVI, Ankara, 2002, pp. 272-273.

⁴⁴⁴ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 41

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 41.

a fortress (1597-1608) on the upper Kuban in order to check Muscovite and Cossack activities and help Khanate's Circassian and other allies whenever it is necessary. Moreover, he reaffirmed the allegiance of Kabardians and Kumuks to the Khanate.⁴⁴⁶ Crimean Tatar forces joined the successful siege of Şamhals of the Muscovite fort near Tarki (1603).⁴⁴⁷

Gazi Giray II Khan apart from reasserting Crimean claims in Caucasia pursued a reconciliatory policy towards Muscovy. After the enthronement of Boris Godunov, he send a delegation to the Tsar declaring his desire to settle the problems with Muscovy including raids of Bucak Horde (Akkerman) and Don Cossack raids on neighboring territories (1598-1600).⁴⁴⁸ Tsar Boris Godunov accepted to dispatch 14,000 rubles to Crimea with Knyaz Grigorii Volkonskii (June 1602). Although, Gazi Giray II Khan was satisfied with the delivery, he still complained about the construction of new forts in the steppe by Muscovy. Knyaz Grigorii Volkonskii replied that the forts were not built against Crimean Tatars but to restrain the Don Cossacks and was for the security of the diplomatic missions.⁴⁴⁹ The Khan preferred to extend the peace with Muscovy in 1603 and accepted the tribute of the Tsar considering the threat of the Ottoman intervention in Crimean affairs. However, he did not miss the opportunity to obtain tribute or "gifts"

⁴⁴⁶ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 230.

⁴⁴⁷ Alkadari Hasan Efendi, *Asari Dagestan (Istoricheskie Svedeniya o Dagestane, Mahachkala, 1929, p. 43. For more information on Şamhal see: Davut Dursun, "Lezgiler", DİA, C. XXII., Ankara, 2003, p. 170 and Ufuk Tavkul, "Kumuk Türkleri Tarihleri, Sosyal Yapıları ve Dilleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme" Emelimiz Kırım Dergisi, 13/50, İstanbul, 2005, 29-39.*

⁴⁴⁸ N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya Gosudarstva ...*, V. XI., p. 28. N.M. Karamzin states that Crimean forces advanced up to the Kursk region in *ibid.* p. 11 note 36.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 29.

(*pominki* in Russian, *upominki* in Polish) from both Muscovy and Poland but he eventually did not help Poland to crush Muscovy. Instead, he send an embassy to Boris Godunov informing that Sigismund III was ready to finance him to attack on Muscovy and forced the hard pressed Tsar to send appropriate gifts to him in 1605.⁴⁵⁰ The relationship between Gazi Giray II and False Dmitrii I, who was the man of the Poles, was quite peaceful. False Dmitrii I who was willing to organize or join to a crusade against the Ottomans had a peaceful approach to the Khan and even asked him for help to become Tsar.⁴⁵¹ He sent the regular tributes to Crimea to express his desire to be friendly with the Khan in January 1606.⁴⁵² Gazi Giray II Khan finally secured his northwestern flank after the conclusion of Ottoman-Polish agreement of 1607.⁴⁵³

The relationship of Gazi Giray II Khan in the last years of his reign with Persia where his political career has started during his captivity (1580-1585) was also quite interesting. He considered Safavids as a reliable equilibrant against the increasing Ottoman pressure. According to the words of Esinev (Esinyev?) from Mansur tribe, the Little Nogay Horde refused the proposal of the Khan to join forces against a probable Ottoman invasion of Crimea. Therefore the Khan decided to go Terek or

⁴⁵⁰ See the letters of Tsar Boris Godunov to the King Sigismund III dated September 1605 and the instructions to the envoys dated June 1606 in Sergei Belokurov, "Pamyatniki Diplomaticeskikh' Snoshenii Moskovskago Gosudartsva c' Polsko-Litovskim' Gosudartsvom' Tom' IV 1598-1608 gg." *SIRIO*, T. 137, St. Petersburg, 1912, pp. 179 and 249-250.

⁴⁵¹ See pages 73-74 above.

⁴⁵² N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya Gosudarstva ...*, V. XI., pp. 254-255.

⁴⁵³ For the copy of Ahdname send by Ahmed I to Sigismund III dated 20-RA-1016 AH./15-VII-1607 see document no:30 in Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic ...*, pp. 330-344.

Astrakhan in Muscovite territory or to the Safavids.⁴⁵⁴ Shah Abbas I who was willing to recover earlier territorial losses declared war on the Ottomans in 1603 and made a quick progress against the Ottomans that were still at war with the Habsburgs.⁴⁵⁵ Since the neutrality of Crimea was very important for the Shah, he made everything possible to keep the Khan out of the campaign relying on their former acquaintance going back to the captivity of Gazi Giray II Khan in Persia. According to the Safavid historian İskander Bey Münşi (Eskander Beg Monshi), Gazi Geray II Khan wrote a letter to Shah Abbas I to show his willingness to establish friendly relations in 1590, which he sent with Hafız Karakaş Tebrizi who was with him during his flight from captivity.⁴⁵⁶ In his letter Khan declared his gratitude to the Safavids for his well treatment during his captivity and asked his guardian Bayramkulu Bey in Alamut to be sent to him. Shah expressed his friendship to him and his regrets that he could not establish necessary relationship with him after his liberation because of his preoccupation with the Ottoman affairs.⁴⁵⁷ Shah Abbas I, who was determined to ensure the neutrality of the Khan, sent Bayramkulu who was despised as a merchant with valuable gifts and invited him to ask whatever gift he wants from him without hesitation. Shah Abbas I dispatched the items requested by the Khan with Ebu'l-Kasım Evoğlu and the diplomatic relations was maintained. In the winter of 1606, Shah Abbas I received

⁴⁵⁴ See Document No: 21: the report of Muscovite envoys to Georgia I. A. Paschokin and I. Leont'ev (1601-1603) in Sergei Belokurov, *Snosheniya Rossii s' ...* pp. 252-253.

⁴⁵⁵ For more information on Şah Abbas and his policies see: Sümer, Faruk, "Abbas I", *DİA*, C.I, İstanbul, 1988, pp. 17-19.

⁴⁵⁶ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 974.

⁴⁵⁷ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 974.

the news that an Ottoman army accompanied by a Crimean Tatar contingent will very soon arrive in Dağıstan (Daghestan).⁴⁵⁸ Consequently, when the Shah was in the midst of the Şirvan campaign, Khan sent another friendly letter and informed him that he will not join to the campaign against Persia (1607-1608).⁴⁵⁹ Gazi Giray II Khan kept his promise and did not join the Ottoman army which was under the command of his arch enemy Cigalazade Sinan Pasha; however, he could not refuse Sultan's order to send army against the Celalis which included dissident members of the Giray family and joined the campaign.⁴⁶⁰

2.37.2 The renewal of the Crimean Tatar claims on the region

The reign of Gazi Giray II coincides with one of the most important turning points of the Deşt-i Kipçak and Crimean Khanate. Not only he did manage to come out of the turbulences of the time, but also managed to express the grandeur of the Khanate. Above all, he appears to be a great political and military strategist who can adjust himself according to the new conditions and make use of the new opportunities. He established a delicate balance between the Ottoman military demands and the foreign policy priorities of the Khanate. His success is mainly based on his first-hand experience of the Ottoman politics and establishing confidential relations with the Ottoman ruling elite during his sejour in the Ottoman Empire (1585-1588) The Ottoman experience has taught him two important lessons. He managed to reform the administration of the Khanate in the line of the Ottoman

⁴⁵⁸ Alkadari Hasan Efendi, *Asari Dagestan* ..., pp. 46-47.

⁴⁵⁹ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah* ..., V. II p. 975.

⁴⁶⁰ Halil İnalçık, "II. Gazi Giray (Bora) ...", p. 196.

example in order to strengthen the position of the Khan, vis-avis the local aristocracy, because the memories of his brief deposition in 1596 thought him that solely satisfying the Ottoman military requests would not suffice to remain in the throne. The Ottoman military campaigns in Hungary were financially beneficial for the Khan and the army; because the Ottoman were distributing handsome subsidies for the presence of Crimean Tatars in the frontline; and there were several occasions for the plunder that meant extra income for the army.

Gazi Giray II Khan went one step further and realized that the Khanate should have also rewarded him with territorial gains. He requested the appointment of a Giray Sultan to the Hospodarship of Moldavia but was refused by the Porte who suspected that he might have late interfere with Moldavian affairs (1596).⁴⁶¹ Three years later he asked for the governorship of Silistre⁴⁶² (Silistria) that was conferred by his close friend Serdar of the Hungarian front Satırcı Mehmed Pasha (d. 1599). However, Satırcı Mehmet's decision that was subject to the Sultan's approval was not only refused but caused his immediate execution.⁴⁶³ Paradoxically, the lands that Gazi Giray II Khan wanted to extend his authority over were not only historically belonging to the Golden Horde but also were partially settled by his subjects.⁴⁶⁴

In the final analysis, Khan's participation to the Ottoman campaigns in the Hungarian front was not totally in vain. He could at least manage to

⁴⁶¹ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, p. 174.

⁴⁶² For more information on Ottoman Silistre see: Machiel Kiel, "Silistre", *DİA*, C.XXXVII, İstanbul, 2009, pp 202-205.

⁴⁶³ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 161.

⁴⁶⁴ F. Romanci, *La Terza Parte del Tesoro Politico*, Torino, 1605, pp. 462-463 and Alper Başer, *Bucak Tatarları ...*, pp. 11-75.

get a ferman from Mehmet III which entrusted the Crimean throne to his children.⁴⁶⁵ The ferman could put an end to the devastating effects of succession crises and interregnums in the Khanate. However, the ferman was declared null and void when Toktamış Giray was made Khan according to this principle. As a result of the transition of power in the Porte and the rise of a rival group to the power, Gazi Giray II Khan, who began to feel intimidated, retreated to Crimea and took a defensive position in case of an imminent Ottoman action against him. As an expert of regional politics, the Khan started to make manoeuvres to strengthen his position. Shah Abbas I who was pursuing an active anti-Ottoman policy was ready to make his best to gain Gazi Giray II Khan over his side. Although he declared that he would not join any campaign against Persia as a sign of their friendship, he did not place Crimea in the orbit Shah Abbas I either. Moreover, he disrupted the Safavid-Muscovite alliance in Northern Caucasia and extended the authority of the Khanate up to the shores of Caspian Sea. As a result of Gazi Giray Khan's policies, Muscovy's expansion in the Caucasus was delayed for another century. It is possible to argue that Gazi Giray Khan's reign was closely related with the political conjuncture which worked in his favor. The Ottomans would have easily replaced him with a more obedient member of the Giray family without the pressure of several domestic and external problems. He would have been less successful, if Muscovy was not experiencing the disastrous effects of the Time of Troubles and the existence of several problems that prevented the Polish-Lithuanian

⁴⁶⁵ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 167.

Commonwealth to take action. Gazi Giray II's legacy was not just related to his survival in the hostile environment of the late sixteen and early seventeen century but to his capacity to earn the respect of Crimean people who praised him as exemplary perfect ruler. His reputation went beyond the borders of the Khanate and made him an influential political figure of the Eastern European politics. He was highly respected with regional powers that did not treat him as a mere Ottoman vassal but as an Ottoman ally. Moreover, they have tried to detach him from the Ottoman alliance and bring to their side as in the cases of Shah Abbas I and Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II (H.R.E. 1576-1612, King of Hungary and Croatia as Rudolf I 1572-1608, King of Bohemia 1575-1608/1611 and Archduke of Austria 1576-1608).⁴⁶⁶ One of the most distinctive features of Gazi Giray II's reign was that he was the last Khan who was able to continue the claim of the Giray House on the heritage of the Golden Horde. While the Khanate was entering the Ottoman orbit and was forced to take a defensive position in the steppes, Giray allegations on the territory of *Tahtili* in the east and the territory of the Golden Horde in the west disappeared from the political priorities of the Khanate after the death of Gazi Giray II Khan.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁶ See: page 289 above and J. V. Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l' Empire ...*, VIII, pp. 78-79. Hammer writes that Khan's representative Ahmed Agha requested 40000 golds and the right to join to the election of Transylvanian Hospodar for the realization of the alliance.

⁴⁶⁷ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom I, p. 376

2.38 The reign of Selamet Giray Khan (1608-1610) and the beginning of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan's political career

The decision of Selamet Giray to appoint Mehmed Giray Sultan Kalgay and Şahin Giray Sultan Nureddin caused the renewal of internecine struggle between the grandsons of Devlet Giray I Khan. Mehmet Giray III Khan was willing to settle with the sons of Gazi Giray II Khan whom he had held responsible for the execution of his brother Nureddin Devlet Giray in 1601. Toktamış Giray Khan and Sefer Giray Sultan brothers decided to seek the help from the Porte for the reasons behind the refusal of their thronment, but they were intercepted on the road by Mehmed Giray III Khan on the Aksu river and they were executed on the spot.⁴⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Khanship of Selamet Giray Khan who arrived to Bahçesaray with the ferman of the Sultan is recognized by the aristocracy without any resistance. Soon after Kalgay Mehmed Giray and Nureddin Şahin Giray brothers joined the new Khan in the capital Bahçesaray. Şahin Giray Sultan was returning to the peninsula after seven years of clandestinity in the Caucasus near his uncle Şakay Mübarek Giray Sultan contrary to his brother who went to the Ottoman Empire. Şahin Giray Sultan returned to Crimea together with the sons of Şakay Mübarek Giray Sultan (Canıbek Giray Sultan and Devlet Giray Sultan) and their mother Dürrbike (Durbike?).⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁸ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, pp. 167-168.

⁴⁶⁹ Dürrbike was the daughter of Kanuko (Qanoqwe) from Beslen (Beslenay) tribe. She was married to Şakay Mübarek Giray and the mother of Canıbek and Devlet Giray brothers. After the death of Mübarek Giray she married with Fetih Giray in Crimea. After the execution of Fetih Giray she returned Northern Caucasia near Besleneys. She returned to Crimea with his sons and Şahin Giray when Selamet

Selamet Giray Khan's decision to appoint Mehmed Giray Kalgay and Şahin Giray Nureddin and to marry with Dürrbike Biyim would have crucial impacts on the future of the Khanate. His marriage with Dürrbike who was already an old woman (Canıbek Giray Khan was more than forty years old at that time) shows that it was a political marriage. Safavid chronicler İskender Bey Münşi argues that the Khanate of Canıbek Giray Khan became legitimate as a result of his mother's marriage with Selamet Giray Khan.⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, Selamet Giray Khan's marriage did not only bring his stepson to the throne but also his relatives Beslenays to his side. Canıbek Giray Khan made his journey to the Crimean throne who would otherwise most probably end his life as a fugitive Giray Sultan in the Caucasus.

2.38 The cousins struggle for the power under the shadow of Selamet Giray Khan

When Canıbek Giray Khan became the Crimean Khan, Mehmed Giray III Khan would regretfully say that it was them (Mehmed and Şahin Giray brothers) who have found Canıbek Giray and Devlet Giray Sultans wandering in the Caucasus and brought to Crimea. However, they have conspired against him with Selamet Giray Khan and hindered his Khanate.⁴⁷¹ Selamet Giray Khan quite soon proved to be right not to

Giray became Khan and she married with him. For more information on Dürrbike see: V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 350 and E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza ...*, p. 151. For Beslenay clan and Kanuko family see: Jaimoukha, Amjad, *The Circassians A Handbook*, Richmond, 2001, p. 53 and Bizhev, A. Kh., "Beslenei v Istoricheskoy i Etnokul'turnom Kontekste Adygskogo Etnosa", *Arkeologiya i Etnologiya Severnogo Kavkaza*, No:4, Nalchik, 2005, pp. 136-143.

⁴⁷⁰ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 1095.

⁴⁷¹ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak an Hitta-i Kırım veya Tevarih-i Tatar Hanan-ı Kadim ve Ahval-i Deşt-i Kıpçak*, (ed. M. Akif Erdoğan and Selçuk Uysal), İzmir, 20212, pp. 34-35. For more information on Abdullah ibn Rıdvan see: *ibid.* pp. 1-4.

trust Mehmed Khan III and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers and ally with Canibek Giray Sultan and Devlet Giray Sultan brothers. Canibek Giray Suştan informed the Khan about the plans to overthrow him. Mehmed Giray Sultan and Şahin Giray Sultan once again escaped from Crimea and went to Circassia.⁴⁷² Consequently, Canibek Giray became Kalgay and Devlet Giray Nureddin of Selamet Giray Khan (1609). Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers continued their activities to overthrow Selamet Giray Khan from Caucasia.⁴⁷³ Selamet Giray Khan under the threat of an invasion applied to the Porte for the help. Despite the existence of several internal and external problems within the Empire, the Ottoman administration envisaged the criticality of the situation in the Khanate and sent an important diplomat Rıdvan Pasha to settle the situation.⁴⁷⁴ Rıdvan Pasha was appointed the *Vali* (Governor) of Kefe and the *Ser-Asker* (Commander in Chief) of Crimea because of the critical political situation of the Khanate. Rıdvan Pasha managed to mediate between the parties, and it was agreed on Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan's return to Crimea and reassuming their previous posts. However, the sudden death of Selamet Giray Khan abruptly reversed the course of events.⁴⁷⁵ Selamet Giray Khan's short reign was not just about his struggle against the dissidents in the Khanate. It appears that one of the fundamental reasons for his appointment to the throne is that he accepted to join the

⁴⁷² Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* ... p. 29 and note 1417 above.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁴⁷⁴ *ibid.* p. 29. Rıdvan Pasha was also father of Abdullah bin Rıdvan author of the chronicle.

⁴⁷⁵ *ibid.* p. 30.

Ottoman military campaigns.⁴⁷⁶ İskender Münşi claims that Selamet Giray Khan gave up the idea of personally joining to the Ottoman campaign as a result of the advice of the elders who said that war against the Safavids (Kızılbaş) had never brought happy result for the Giray dynasty as in the case of Mehmed Giray II Khan and Adil Giray Sultan and Gazi Ğıray II Khan brothers.⁴⁷⁷ A Crimean Tatar army joined Kuyucu Murad Paşa's (d. 1611) campaign against the Celalis.⁴⁷⁸ After the end of the campaign Crimean army did not return and was assigned to Ahıska region and fought together with the Ottoman army. They were trapped by the Safavids in Kartlia and were almost completely annihilated.⁴⁷⁹

Selamet Giray Khan pursued an active policy in the north. Crimean Tatars went to the Muscovite territory and fought with them. Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii was previously against the Crimean Tatar presence on Muscovite territory and refused their offer in 1607 but was forced to ask for their help under the increasing threat of invasion from several directions.⁴⁸⁰ S. Zvyagin and D. Vitovt were sent to Crimea to convince the Khan to send military help. The mission was successful and the arriving Crimean Tatar army is stationed in Ryazan and fought together

⁴⁷⁶ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 975. İskender Münşi further states that Selamet Giray did not personally join to the Persian campaign as a result of the advice of the elders who said that war with Persian did never bring happy result as in the case of Mehmed Giray II and Adil Giray and Gazi Ğıray brothers.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 975-976. For more information on the term Kızılbaş and its different historical usages see: İlyas Üzüm, "Kızılbaş", *DİA*, C.XXV., Ankara, 2002, pp. 546-557.

⁴⁷⁸ For more information on Kuyucu Murad Paşa see: Ömer İşbilir, "Kuyucu Murad Paşa", *DİA*, C. XXVI., Ankara, 2002, pp. 507-508.

⁴⁷⁹ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 983.

⁴⁸⁰ For the situation in Muscovy in 1607-1608 see: page 118 above.

with Muscovite forces (Summer 1608).⁴⁸¹ A larger Crimean Tatar army was in Muscovite territory in the following year under the command of Kalgay Canibek Giray. Vasilii Shuiskii, who desperately needed the Crimean forces, even ordered the local officials to disregard their violent acts. Crimean army arrived in the shores of Oka in July and was directed to the capital to join the Muscovite army upon the request of the Tsar.⁴⁸² According to the official reports, Crimean Tatars were active in the region in the late summer and autumn of 1609 but they have raided the countryside instead of fighting against False Dmitrii II.⁴⁸³ On the contrary, Crimean Tatar officials later complained that despite the fact that Tsar Vasilii did not keep his promise and sent very few gifts to the Kalgay Canibek Giray who did a lot for him.⁴⁸⁴

In the spring 1610, Tsar Vasilii Shuiskii informed İřterek Mirza of the Great Nogay Horde that Selamet Giray Khan who wanted to show his friendship to him would send a large army to fight with him against the Polish invasion.⁴⁸⁵ İřterek Mirza confirmed him and stated to the Muscovite envoy P. Vrasskii that they have already joined the Polish campaign upon the invitation of Selamet Giray Khan in the previous

⁴⁸¹ (ed.) S. O Shmidt, *Opis' Arkhiva Posol'skogo Prikaza 1626 goda*, V I. Moscow, 1977, pp. 277- 278 and N. S. Zakharyna, "Russko-Krymskie Otnosheniya v Gody Pravleniya Vasiliya Shuiskogo 81607-1610 gg.)" *Sotsial'no- Ekonomicheskaya i Politicheskaya Istoriya Yugo-Vostochnoi Evropy do Serediny XIX. V.* (ed. V.D. Korolyuk), Kishinev, 1980, p. 133.

⁴⁸² N. S. Zakharyna, "Russko-Krymskie Otnosheniya ... p. 135. N.S Zakharyna also notes that Tsar dispatched G. K. Volkonskii to the Crimeans with the "gifts".

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 135.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. 135.

⁴⁸⁵ See document No: 99 dated 20730 March 1610 in (ed.) A. M.Gnevushev, *Smutnoe Vremya Moskovskago Gosudartsva 1604-1613 Vy.. II Akty Vremeni Pravleniya Tsarya Vasiliya Shuiskogo 1609 g. 19 Maya-17 Iyulya 1610 g.*, Moscow, 1918, pp.225-226.

year.⁴⁸⁶ A Crimean Tatar army under the command of Bahadır Giray Sultan has entered Muscovite territory during the summer of 1610 in order to fight against Poles at the exchange of 30,000 rubles and undertaking of sending 20,000 rubles of gifts every year to Crimea.⁴⁸⁷ However, the participants of the campaign stated that the existence of the Crimean Tatars did not help Tsar to achieve his objective because of their wayward actions.⁴⁸⁸ A.A., Novosel'skiy further claims that the presence of the Crimean Tatar allies of the Tsar was not different from the slave raids of the previous years and was one of the main reasons behind Tsar Shuiskii's deposition.⁴⁸⁹ The Crimean Tatars, on the contrary, were talking about the ingratitude of the Muscovites. The Nureddin of Great Nogay Horde Şayterek Mirza bin Tinahmed complained to the Muscovite envoy P. Vrasskii about the betrayal of the people of Ryazan who massacred Nogay soldiers that previously helped them to liberate several cities from the invasion.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁶ See document dated 4/14 June-14/24 August 1611 in (ed.) S.K. Bogoyavlenskii, and I. S. Ryabinin, *Smutnoe Vremya Moskovskogo Gosudartsva 1604-1613 Vy.. III Akty Vremeni Mezhdutsartsviya 17 Iyulya 1610 g.-1613 g.*, Moscow, 1915, p. 20

⁴⁸⁷ N. S. Zakharyna, "Russko-Krymskie Otnosheniya ... pp. 137-138.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 138.

⁴⁸⁹ A.A., Novosel'skiy, *Borba Moskovskogo Gosudatrstva ... p.72.*

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 73.

CHAPTER III

THE TURMOIL

3.1 The death of Selamet Giray Khan and the rush of the cousins for the throne and the initial success of Mehmed Giray II Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan (1610)

Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers were on their way to Bahçesaray to reassume their previous posts according to their agreement with the Porte when they learned about the death of Selamet Giray Khan. The other claimant to the throne, Canıbek Giray Khan could not resist them and escaped from the capital while Mehmed Giray III became Khan and Şahin Giray Kalgay without difficulty by a fait accompli (1610).⁴⁹¹ However, they were not able to capture the fugitives Canıbek Giray Khan and Devlet Giray Sultan who took refuge near Rıdvan Paşa in Kefe. Mehmed Giray III Khan besieged Kefe when he learned that the fugitives were in the city and requested from Rıdvan Paşa their immediate hand over. Rıdvan Paşa replied that first the fugitives were now under the protection of the Sultan and that no one could deliver them to him; and secondly he is not the legitimate Khan because his status is not yet confirmed by the diplome of the Sultan,⁴⁹² The response of Mehmed Giray Khan was extremely confident and unapologetic. He not only refuted the Ottoman claims of jurisdiction on

⁴⁹¹ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* ... p. 30.

⁴⁹² *ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

Deşt-i Kıpçak, which was his inherited patrimony, but also claimed that he is militarily superior to the Ottomans.⁴⁹³

3.2 Ottoman intervention on behalf of Canıbek Giray Khan and the flight of the brothers

According to Rıdvan Paşazade's account, the Porte realized the damages that Mehmed Giray III's Khanate could pose to the Ottoman interests and decided to replace him.⁴⁹⁴ The initial inclination of the Porte was towards Devlet Giray Sultan but it was later decided to institute Canıbek Giray Khan, because of his seniority.⁴⁹⁵ According to the Ottoman version of the events, when it became obvious that the de facto Khan Mehmed Giray III would harm the interests of the empire and pursue independent policies, it was decided to replace him with Canıbek Giray Khan who was likely to be more useful for the Porte.⁴⁹⁶ Since it was evident that Mehmed Giray III Khan would not abandon the throne without combat, it was necessary to send Canıbek Giray Khan to Bahçeşaray with the company of the Ottoman forces.⁴⁹⁷ In Rıdvan Paşazade's version of the events, thanks to the good fortune of Canıbek and Devlet Giray brothers, Mehmed Giray III Khan's berat of Khanate, which was already prepared, could not be sent because of the weather conditions in the Black Sea; and with a new berat Canıbek Giray became the Crimean Khan.⁴⁹⁸ The berats and regalia of the new

⁴⁹³ *ibid.* p. 31.

⁴⁹⁴ *ibid.* p. 31.

⁴⁹⁵ *ibid.* p. 31.

⁴⁹⁶ *ibid.* pp. 33-34.

⁴⁹⁷ *ibid.* p. 34.

⁴⁹⁸ *ibid.* p. 34.

Khan dispatched to Kefe with a contingent of ten galleys despite all the protests and intimidations by Mehmed Giray III Khan (1610). While, Canıbek Giray Khan was planning to flee from Kefe to save his life and Rıdvan Paşa was trying to convince him to stay till the Ottoman fleet arrived to the city.⁴⁹⁹ Upon the arrival of the Ottomans, Mehmed Giray III Khan relieved the siege and retreated to Bahçesaray in order to organize the resistance while Rıdvan Paşa was mobilizing his forces to march on Bahçesaray.⁵⁰⁰ Two armies faced each other near the river Indal (Indol in Rus.).⁵⁰¹ In the Ottoman army there were only ninety seven Crimean Tatars who were in fact the servants of Paşa; and the majority of the Crimean Tatars including the aristocracy, mirzas, Nogays and Circassians were on the side of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan.⁵⁰² The Ottoman chronicler relates the Ottoman victory, despite the numerical superiority of the adversary, to the surprise effect created by the cannons that was masterfully hindered from Mehmed Giray III Khan's army by Rıdvan Paşa.⁵⁰³ Consequently, while Mehmed Giray III Khan fled to Moscovy and Şahin Giray Sultan to Persia the Crimean army decided to swear allegiance to Canıbek Giray Khan.⁵⁰⁴ Rıdvan Paşa accompanied Canıbek Giray Khan during his journey to Bahçesaray and assisted his coronation as Khan of the

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 35.

⁵⁰⁰ *ibid.* p. 35.

⁵⁰¹ *ibid.* p. 36.

⁵⁰² *ibid.* p. 35-36.

⁵⁰³ *ibid.* p. 37.

⁵⁰⁴ *ibid.* p. 38.

Crimea.⁵⁰⁵ He appointed his brother Devlet Giray Sultan Kalgay and Azamet Giray Sultan Nureddin.⁵⁰⁶

3.3 The first reign of Canıbek Giray Khan (1610-1623)

It appears that Canıbek Giray Khan was neither the Ottomans' nor the Crimean Tatars' first choice for the throne. Under the constant threat of invasion of Mehmed Giray III Khan, he had nothing but to rely on Ottoman support to remain in the power. It is even possible that Rıdvan Paşa, de facto, ruled the Khanate during the early days of his reign. Besides from the threat of invasion, he had to satisfy the military demands of the Porte for the Persian campaign of Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha contrary to the resistance of the local population.⁵⁰⁷ Mehmed Giray III Khan who could not obtain the necessary support in Muscovy returned towards Istanbul to seek the pardon of Ahmed I through the mediation of the Grand Vizier Nasuh Pasha (d. 1614)⁵⁰⁸ *Es-sebü'ü'seyyar* without reference to the journey to Muscovy continues the life of Mehmed Giray III Khan with his settlement in Gelibolu (Gallipoli)⁵⁰⁹. According to Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, Nasuh Paşa improvised a meeting between the Sultan and Mehmed Giray III Khan; however, as a result of an unfortunate misunderstanding everything was reversed and the plan completely failed.⁵¹⁰ V. Smirnov argues that Mehmed Giray III Khan presented several valuable slaves including

⁵⁰⁵ *ibid.* p.38.

⁵⁰⁶ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-sebü'ü's-seyyar* ... p. 169.

⁵⁰⁷ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* p. 38.

⁵⁰⁸ *ibid.* p. 39. For more information on Nasuh Paşa see: Ömer İşbilir, "Nasuh Paşa" *DİA*, C. XXXII., İstanbul, 2008, pp. 426-428.

⁵⁰⁹ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-sebü'ü's-seyyar* ... p. 170.

⁵¹⁰ *ibid.* p. 172.

beautiful concubines to Nasuh Paşa for the meeting.⁵¹¹ Ottoman chronicler Naima states that the meeting occurred according to the custom in Rodosçuk (Tekirdağ, Rodosto) without reference to the unfortunate incident (1613).⁵¹² As result of the intricacy of his enemies that used this incident against him, Mehmed Giray III Khan was sent to Yedikule prison and Nasuh Paşa was executed for a plot against Ahmed I that would replace him with Mehmed Giray III Khan.⁵¹³ Contrary to Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, Rıdvan Paşazade argues that there was not a misunderstanding but just the ingratitude of Mehmed Giray III Khan towards the Ottoman Sultan who had generously pardoned him.⁵¹⁴ Another Ottoman chronicler, Mehmed Safi (d.1616)⁵¹⁵, who was the İmam of Sultan Ahmed I and adversary of Nasuh Paşa⁵¹⁶ confirms Naima's story.⁵¹⁷ Finally, Katip Çelebi writes the story from the mouth of Mehmed Giray III Khan who claims that he was innocent and fell victim to the intricacies of Canıbek Giray Khan with the Ottoman palace factions.⁵¹⁸ If we closely analyse the relationship of Mehmed Giray III Khan and the Ottoman Porte, it appears that there were two different meetings between Ahmed I and the Khan. The first one occurred around March 1613 when Mehmed Giray III Khan left Bucak upon the

⁵¹¹ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 352.

⁵¹² Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. p.397.

⁵¹³ *ibid.* p. 172. The fundamental reason behind the execution of Nasuh Paşa is not certain but the Ottoman chronicles agree that it's immediate cause was the Cossacks sack of Sinop in 1614.

⁵¹⁴ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* p. 39.

⁵¹⁵ For more information on Mehmet Safi see: Bekir Kütükoğlu, "Safi Mehmed Efendi", *DİA*, C.XXXV., Istanbul, 2008, pp. 472-473.

⁵¹⁶ For the animosity between Nasuh Paşa and Mehmed Safi see: Ömer İşbilir, "Nasuh Paşa" ...

⁵¹⁷ Mustafa Safi, *Mustafa Safi'nin Zübdetü't-Tevarih'i*, 2 Cilt, (ed. İbrahim Hakki Çuhadar), Ankara, 2003, pp. 199-200.

⁵¹⁸ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.II., p. 60.

pressure of Canıbek Giray Khan and was pardoned by the Sultan and allowed to settle in the capital. The second one occurred at the end of the year during the second journey of the Sultan to Edirne that caused to the imprisonment of Mehmed Giray III Khan to Yedikule.⁵¹⁹ The fragment in the *Tarih-i Naima* about the events after the defeat of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers by Canıbek Giray Khan near Akkerman also supports my argument.⁵²⁰

3.4 Töre versus Sultan's choice, the reasons of Mehmed Giray III Khan's opposition to the Khanate of Canbek Giray Khan

When the first years of Canıbek Giray Khan's first khanship is considered it appears a quite paradoxical situation. While Mehmed Giray III Khan who had the support of the Crimean Tatar aristocracy and military elite⁵²¹ was desperately seeking the support of the contending Ottoman palace factions, whereas Canıbek Giray Khan who did not have a support base in Crimea was in power thanks to the Ottoman support. Mehmed Giray III Khan did never give up the idea of being Crimean Khan. It was already stated that Rıdvan Paşazade accuses Mehmed Giray III Khan of ingratitude and he was confined to Yedikule prison for that reason. He continued his political activities and escaped from the custody. However,,he was caught and brought back, he was finally exiled to Rhodes (Rodos) after 26/02/1618.⁵²² It is also

⁵¹⁹ For the second journey of Ahmed I to Edirne see: *ibid.* p. 353.

⁵²⁰ See note :1398 below.ür Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... pp. 357-358.

⁵²¹ Mustafa Safi, *Mustafa Safi'nin Zübdetü...* C. II, p. 199.

⁵²² *Topçular Katibi 'Abdülkadir (Kadri) Efendi Tarihi (Metin ve Tahlil)*, C. 2, (ed.) Ziya Yılmaz, Ankara, 2003, p. 691 and Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* p. 39. For more information on Topçular Katibi Abdülkadir Efendi see: Ziya Yılmaz, "Abdülkadir Efendi, Topçular Katibi", *DİA*, C. I., İstanbul, 1988, pp. 233-234.

important to note that Mehmed Giray Khan's escape from Yedikule coincides with the day that Osman II seated on the throne and the political situation in the capital was not stable because of the interregnum (26-02-1618).⁵²³

The initial objection of Mehmed Giray III Khan to the Khanate was based on the alleged tradition (*tore*). He claimed that Canıbek Giray Khan could not become Crimean Khan because his father was not a Khan, he was only a Sultan (son of a khan), while he himself was the son of a Khan (*hanzade*). It was true that Canıbek Giray Khan's father Şakay Mübarek Giray Sultan was not a Khan and was only the Nureddin of Islam Giray II Khan⁵²⁴ but the father of Mehmed Giray III Khan Sa'adet Giray was a rival Khan who was not recognized Khan by the Ottomans. Ottomans has already violated this practice and made Devlet Giray I Khan (1551-1577) whose father Mübarek Giray Sultan was not a khan. The Golden Horde (Jochid) tradition essentially envisaged a horizontal transfer of power from the older brother to the younger brother, but the Crimean Khans were inclined to the vertical Ottoman system (from father to son).⁵²⁵ Therefore, the enthronement of Canıbek Giray Khan was, in theory, against both Crimean Tatar succession traditions because neither his father nor his brothers had been Khans.

⁵²³ Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan*, p. 81.

⁵²⁴ Dariusz Skorupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie ...*, p. 163.

⁵²⁵ See:

3.5 Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan in Bucak (1612)

Canıbek Giray Khan's first reign (1610-1623) coincided with one of the most turbulent era of not only of the Ottoman Empire but also of the Crimean Khanate. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were on the height of their activity and were constantly attacking the shores of the Black Sea including Crimean peninsula while the Bucak Horde under the leadership of Mansuroğlu Kantemir Mirza was regularly raiding the Ukrainian part of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers first settled in Bucak (Bessarabia) region. They have taken part in the highly profitable venture with Kantemir Mirza in which they were driving out livestock and slaves from the Polish territory and selling them in the Akkerman market. Canıbek Giray Khan, who was extremely uncomfortable about the activities of the two Hanzades, routed them out of Akkerman region upon the permission of the Sultan. After the defeat, the two brothers broke up; Mehmed Giray III Khan decided to search his fate in the Porte upon the invitation of Grand Vizier Nasuh Pasha while Şahin Giray stayed in the region and continued his activities (1612).⁵²⁶ Şahin Giray Sultan this time cooperated with Vasyl Bosy, border guard of Bratislav (Bratslav ukr., Braclaw pol.).⁵²⁷ Ahmed I, who was informed about the activities of Şahin Giray Sultan from Canıbek Giray Khan, immediately asked his extradition from the Polish King Sigismund III in 1614. Canıbek Giray Khan who did not wait the result of the Sultan's initiative went to the region by himself and routed Vasyl Bosy out and defeated

⁵²⁶ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, pp. 351-352.

⁵²⁷ For more information on Vasyl Bosy see: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII., pp. 200-201.

the small army of Şahin Giray Sultan who first fled to Dobruca and then to Shah Abbas I of Persia.⁵²⁸ Canıbek Giray Khan who received Muscovite delegation on the 30th of May informed them that he is ready to fight against the Poles since the trouble of Şahin Giray Sultan was over for the moment.⁵²⁹ Polish Crown Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski was also against the activities of Şahin Giray Sultan and Vasyl Bosy within the Polish borders which hampered the relationship with Ottomans and Crimeans for the benefit of Muscovy.⁵³⁰ The problem was solved after the campaign of Canıbek Giray Khan; after which Şahin Giray Sultan fled to Persia over Circassia. However, Şahin Giray Sultan's shadow continued to effect Crimean-Polish relations and the political image of Canıbek Giray Khan in the Khanate. According to the testimony of Muscovite diplomats Lodzhenskii and P.Danilov, who arrived in Crimea when Canıbek Giray Khan was on the campaign against Şahin Giray Sultan, stated that except for his courtiers, the Crimean Tatars did not want to fight against Şahin Giray Sultan.⁵³¹

3.6 The Lucky Khan, the rise of Canbek Giray II Khan after 1615)

The image of Canıbek Giray Khan changed positively when he conducted one of the most successful Crimean Tatar raids on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1615. In the previous year, he had confined himself to deal with the problem of Şahin Giray Sultan, and did not join the Ottoman campaign on Poland most probably because of the

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 272-273.

⁵²⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 83.

⁵³⁰ Dariusz Skorupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie ...*, pp 179-180 and (ed.) August Bielowski, *Pisma Stanisława Zolkiewskiego Kanclerza Koronnego i Hetmana z jego poiersiem*, Lwov, 1861, pp. 422-424.

⁵³¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 85.

handsome tribute delivered to him by Sigismund III.⁵³² Since the Ottoman army was busy in the eastern front against the Safavids, after the renewal of the atrocities that would continue until 1618, it was the Crimean Tatars' duty to conduct the war against Poland. A large Crimean Tatar army including the Ottoman contingents under the command of the Khan invaded Right Bank Ukraine where they have pillaged the countryside up to Lwow⁵³³ According to the reports of Muscovite diplomats, Crimean Tatars gathered enormous amount of captives including their families. Since it was understood that it was not technically possible to transfer them to Crimea some of them were massacred on the passage of the river Dnieper. Every soldier, on the average, had five or six slaves or more, whereas the *savga* (tithe) of the Khan was more than 1200 persons. In response of his success during this campaign Canibek Giray was named the Lucky Khan.⁵³⁴

3.7 Rendezvous of the rival cousins in the Persian front (1618)

After his victorious return to the peninsula, Canibek Giray Khan warned Sigismund III that the Crimean army would continue punishing Poles unless the damage done by the Zaporozhian Cossacks to the Crimean and Ottoman territories was stopped.⁵³⁵ However, his threat did not bring any result and the Zaporozhian naval raids continued. They burned Kefe, Samsun, Trabzon and even the ports of Istanbul in the Black Sea (1615-1616).⁵³⁶ The Ottoman-Crimean plans to put an end to

⁵³² *Ibid.* p. 86.

⁵³³ See: document no: 115 dated 1615 in (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii Ukrainy-Rusy* T. VIII., Lvov, 1908, pp. 162-163

⁵³⁴ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 86-87.

⁵³⁵ Dariusz Skorupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie ...*, p. 183.

⁵³⁶ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII., pp.276-277.

the Cossack problem had to be postponed because of the Persian campaign. Canıbek Giray Khan who was called to join the Ottoman army went to the front while Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan remained in the defence of the Khanate (April-May 1618).⁵³⁷ The Crimean army sailed to the Anatolian side from Kefe. They landed in Samsun Canıbek Giray Khan, and successfully raided Nahcivan region.⁵³⁸ Fortune was not always with Canıbek Giray Khan; Crimean Tatar army was ambushed and heavily defeated by the Safavids in the battle of Serav near Erdebil (1618). According to Peçevi, the defeat was the outcome of self-confidence extended to the Ottoman command as a result of the easy initial victories and the disinformation by some officials.⁵³⁹ The path of two rival cousins crossed once again in Persia, but this time the luck was with Şahin Giray Sultan. Safavids have unsuccessfully tried to gain over Crimean Tatars to their side, but they were able to establish friendly relations and neutralize them.⁵⁴⁰

3.8 Şahin Giray Sultan in the court of Shah Abbas I (1614-1623)

Şahin Giray Sultan's sejour was the apogee of the Safavid-Crimean Tatar relations when it was possible to talk about the realization of an anti-Ottoman alliance of two countries. The relationship between Şahin Giray Sultan and Shah Abbas I goes back to the days when Selamet Giray was the Crimean Khan. İskender Bey Münşi writes that Şahin Giray Sultan arrived at the camp of the Shah near Gori where he was

⁵³⁷ *Topçular Katibi 'Abdülkadir ... C. 2, p. 674.*

⁵³⁸ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, p. 364.

⁵³⁹ *ibid* pp. 364-366..

⁵⁴⁰ For more information on the evolution of Safavid Crimean Khanate relations see: Leila Mohebbi,, "Safevi Devleti'nin Kırım Tatarları ile Münasebetleri Farsça Kaynaklara Göre", (tr. Umut Kırca), *Türk Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, V.5, No: 1, Ordu, 2020, pp. 302-318.

welcomed and offered a place in his retinue (after October 1614).⁵⁴¹ Later, he was given a residence in Şirvan and got the full moral and material support of the Shah.⁵⁴² Şahin Giray Sultan's devotion to him was so deep that he even sealed his letter to the Shah with the signet ring that bore the inscription "Şahin Giray the slave of Shah Abbas" when he became Kalgay, despite all the efforts by Ottomans to bring him to their side (1623-1624).⁵⁴³ The Safavid chronicler also claims that Cihangir Giray Sultan, another brother of Canıbek Giray Khan, also took refuge in Persia with Şahin Giray Sultan and had a prominent position in the court of Shah. Shah Abbas I had mainly two reasons to support Şahin Giray Sultan. First one was to keep Şahin Giray Sultan as an asset against Canıbek Giray Khan; and therefore to prevent him joining Ottoman campaigns on Persia. Second one was to support Şahin Giray Sultan's candidate for Khanate who would likely to pursue a pro-Safavid policy.⁵⁴⁴ The Italian traveller Pietro Della Valle⁵⁴⁵ (1586-1652), who has been in Persia between the years 1617-1623 and worked to form an anti-Ottoman alliance, writes about the high prestige of Şahin Giray Sultan in the Safavid court. During the banquet, Şahin Giray Sultan was sitting next to the Shah. The rest of the Sunnite rulers and notables of the same sect were placed behind him.⁵⁴⁶ Shah Abbas I was sitting between Imamkulu Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan.

⁵⁴¹ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II, p. 1095.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.* p. 1237.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 1237.

⁵⁴⁴ Leila Mohebbi, "Safevi Devleti'nin Kırım ...", p.312.

⁵⁴⁵ For more information on Pietro Della Valle see: Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, "Della Valle Pietro", *DİA C. IX.*, İstanbul, 1994, pp. 144-145.

⁵⁴⁶ Pietro Della Valle, *Voyages de Pietro Della Valle, Gentile Homme Romain, Dans La Turquie, L'Egypte, La Palestine, La Perse, Les Indes Orientales, & autres lieux.*

3.9 Ottomans accuses Canıbek Giray Khan for the defeat at Serav

According to İskender Bey Münşi, it was Canıbek Giray Khan who convinced Grand Vizier Halil Paşa to attack Safavids. The Khan argued that the Crimean Tatar army was in the Eastern Anatolia for several years because of the Persian war and causing troubles in the region. Therefore, it was necessary to put an end to this disturbing situation with an all about offensive.⁵⁴⁷ It appears that the existence of Şahin Giray Sultan in the Safavid side created a sense of confusion within the Crimean Tatar ranks. According to Pietro Della Valle, it was a Crimean Tatar deserter who informed the Safavids about the situation of the divided Ottoman forces that helped them to prepare an ambush.⁵⁴⁸ İskender Bey Münşi argues that Şahin Giray Sultan, who was in the vanguard of the Safavid army, bravely fought against his cousin, but Canıbek Giray Khan who was warned by his senior officers about the delicacy of the situation did not directly join the battle and fled immediately having realized that the Ottoman lines were broken which caused the defeat.⁵⁴⁹ According to *Gülbün-ü Hanan* Şahin Giray Sultan who informed the Safavids about all the Crimean Tatar tactics was the real reason for the defeat.⁵⁵⁰ The Safavids treated the Crimean Tatar

Nouvelle Edition, Revuë, corrigée et augmentée, Tome 4, Rouen, 1745, p. 84. According to the Safavid court etiquette the right side of the Shah that was considered to be more honorable was reserved for the Shiites and the left to the infidels including the Sunnites. He further states that it was only the Sunnite Turks (Ottomans) were considered to be infidels, though Tatars who were also Sunnite were not. He also claims that the Tatars were placed in the left because the left side was more honorable in their tradition. In Pietro Valle, *ibid.* pp. 82-83.

⁵⁴⁷ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II, p. 1153.

⁵⁴⁸ Pietro Della Valle, *Voyages de Pietro Della Valle ...*, T. 4, pp. 178-186.

⁵⁴⁹ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II, p. 1154.

⁵⁵⁰ Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan*, p. 76.

captives quite well and pardoned their lives whereas the Ottoman captives were executed on the spot.⁵⁵¹ Later, the captives were given to the custody of İsfendiyar Bey who was in charge of handing them over to Şahin Giray Sultan.⁵⁵² The Ottoman Serdar Halil Pasha who was trying to reopen the peace talks put the blame on Canıbek Giray Khan for the battle in order to absolve himself.⁵⁵³

According to the testimony of Pietro Della Valle, Shah Abbas I summoned Şahin Giray Sultan to Erdebil and instructed him that he wanted him to go Crimea via Demirkapı in order to takeover the throne instead of Canıbek Giray Khan who was out of the peninsula with the army in 1619.⁵⁵⁴ Shah Abbas I's second motive to send Şahin Giray Sultan was to get rid of his guest who costed very much for the treasury without any return.⁵⁵⁵ Moreover, there were rumors that Canıbek Giray Khan was persuaded by Grand Vizier Halil Paşa to go to Istanbul to be present during the succession crisis and to lobby for his own candidate Mustafa I. (1617-1618 and 1622-1623).⁵⁵⁶ According to Muscovite reports, only one fifth of the ten thousand soldiers were able to return to Crimea together with Canıbek Giray Khan.⁵⁵⁷ İskender Bey Münşi relates the fall from favour and the deposition of Canıbek Giray Khan for his negative role in the Serav defeat but the ensuing events drew a rather different picture. Canıbek Giray Khan was heavily engaged in

⁵⁵¹ Pietro Della Valle, *Voyages de Pietro Della Valle ...*, T. 4, pp. 198-199. However, İskender Bey Münşi argues that most of the Crimean Tatar notables that were imprisoned were executed see: Eskander Beg Monshi, *ibid*, p. 1154.

⁵⁵² Pietro Della Valle, *ibid*. pp. 207-208.

⁵⁵³ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II, p. 1155.

⁵⁵⁴ Pietro Della Valle, *Voyages de Pietro Della Valle ...*, T. 4, p. 211.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid*. p.212.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid*. p. 211 and 307.

⁵⁵⁷ RGADA f. 123 op.1. nos.53.

Ottoman domestic politics and took part in the palace intricacies like his cousin Mehmed Giray III Khan. Therefore, his depositions should have been closely related with the involvement of Canibek Giray Khan in the competition of the Ottoman palace factions. Canibek Giray Khan was replaced by Mehmed Giray III Khan immediately after the appointment of Mere Hüseyin Pasha as Grand Vizierate and the removal of Kayserili Halil Pasha who is known to be very close to Canibek Giray Khan from the days of his Chief Admiralty (*Kaptan-ı Derya*).

Canibek Giray Khan did not personally join the Ottoman Polish campaign in 1620 and sent Kalgay Devlet Giray because it was feared that Şahin Giray Sultan who was stationed in Northern Caucasia and supported by Shah Abbas I, Nogays and Circassians were waiting for the right moment to attack the peninsula.⁵⁵⁸ Next year, Canibek Giray Khan inevitably mobilized a large army upon the order of Osman II who thought he would have an easy victory over Poland. However, Canibek Giray Khan was still suspicious about the actions of Şahin Giray Sultan. He asked the Voevode of Terek to stop being friendly and giving shelter to his enemy.⁵⁵⁹ In the Northern Caucasus Şahin Giray Sultan was trying to gather forces from among the Great and Little Nogays, Circassians and Terek Cossacks.

According to the Muscovite reports, the failure of Osman II's plans could have been a turning point for Canibek Giray Khan, if the Sultan was not deposed and massacred by the Janissaries in their return to the capital. Muscovite envoys in the Porte reported that the Sultan became very

⁵⁵⁸ See document no: 136, the letter of Stanislaw Zolkiewski to King Sigismund III dated 15-XI-1619 in (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii* T. VIII pp. 203.

⁵⁵⁹ RGADA f.1 123 op.1 nos.106

angry with the Khan whom he accused of causing the death of many soldiers because of his unmasculine spirit as in the case of Persian war and that he spared his life for the sake of his brother Kalgay Devlet Giray.⁵⁶⁰ However, the testimony of the Muscovite envoys looks like to be exaggerated, because according to the subtle agreement between the Ottomans and the Girays, let alone the Khans, the members of the Giray family were not executed by the Ottomans.⁵⁶¹

3.10 Kantemir Mirza and the emergence of the Bucak problem

The Hotin campaign had a very significant result for the future of the Crimean Khanate and Canıbek Giray Khan. Kantemir Mirza, the leader of Mansuroğulları (Mangıt) branch of the Great Horde who had been settled in the Bucak region (Bessarabia), broke up with the Crimean Khanate and entered in the Ottoman suzerainty. The Turko-Tatar presence in the region which is located on the migration road of steppe nomads towards west goes back in the history. Huns, Avars, Pechenegs and Kipchaks (Cumans in Greek, Polovtsy in Rus.) were among the Turkic peoples that settled in the region before the arrival of the Jochid Ulus.⁵⁶² The region came under the rule of the Golden Horde after 1241. After 1242, the region was controlled by Emir Nogay who de facto ruled the Golden Horde until his death in 1300. The political

⁵⁶⁰ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 100.

⁵⁶¹ For more information on the execution of the Girays by the Ottomans see: Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp. 179-182.

⁵⁶² For more information on Huns see: For Avars see: Nadir Devlet, "Avarlar", *DİA*, C. IV., İstanbul, 1991, pp. 110-111. For Pechenegs see: Faruk Sümer, "Peçenekler", *DİA*, C. XXXIV, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 213-214., Hüseyin Namık Orhun, *Peçenekler*, İstanbul 1933, Kurat, Akdes Nimet, *Peçenek Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1937. For the Cumans see: Mualla Uydu Yücel, "Kıpçaklar", *DİA*, C. XXV., İstanbul, 2002, pp. 420-421, Akdes Nimet Kurat, *XV-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavim ve Devletleri*, Ankara, 1972, pp. 71-97, Istvan Vasary, *Cumans and Tatars Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans 1186-1365*, Cambridge, 2005, and in general Peter B Golden, *Türk Halkları Tarihine Giriş*, Ankara, 2002.

domination of the steppe people gradually disappeared as a result of the decline of the Golden Horde but the Turko-Tatar population continued to exist in the region. As a result of the migration of small groups to the region after the Ottoman conquest in 1538, the Tatar-Nogay settlement around Akkerman started again.⁵⁶³ Lithuanian chronicler Mihalon Litvin⁵⁶⁴ (1460?-1560?) states that Belhorodenses (Akkerman) and Dobrisenses (Dobrudja, Dobrudzha, Dobrogea) Hordes that were hostile to Crimean Khans were dwelling in Moldavia (1538-1539).⁵⁶⁵ The Nogays were considered as a buffer between Crimea and Zaporozhian Cossacks who continuously intensified their incursions to the Crimean lands by taking advantage of the absence of Crimean Tatar army during the long Ottoman campaigns. Crimean Khan Devlet Giray I settled 30,000 Nogay families to Bucak after the Astrakhan campaign in 1569.⁵⁶⁶

The Tatar-Nogay settlement intensified especially during the Long War (1593-1606). Polish Crown Hetman Zolkiewski wrote that a large amount of Nogay population came to the Bucak region because of the famine that struck Crimea in 1606 and gave the name of Kantemir Mirza and Batur Mirza as the leaders of the raiding parties.⁵⁶⁷ The radical change in the regional demography caused several problems and the Porte requested from the Crimean Khanate that the newcomers

⁵⁶³ For the Tatar-Nogay settlement in Bucak after Ottoman conquest see: Alper Başer, *Bucak Tatarları* ..., pp. 68-75.

⁵⁶⁴ For more information on Mihalon Litvin see: Mikhailon Litvin, *O Nravakh Tatar, Litovtsev i Moskvityan*, Moskva, 1994,

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 44.

⁵⁶⁶ Johann Erich Thunmann, *Krymskoe Khanstvo*, (ed. G.I. Grzhibovskii), Simferopol, 1991, p. 59..

⁵⁶⁷ See letter no: 2 dated 4-02-1606 in August Bielowski, *Pisma Stanisława Zolkiewskiego* ..., pp. 388-391.

be returned to their residences of origin. The Crimean attempts to send them back failed on several occasions and they continued to remain in the region.⁵⁶⁸ According to the foreign reports, there were around 15,000 Tatar-Nogays dwelling along the shores of Dniestr in Bessarabia.⁵⁶⁹ Bucak was referred as *Tartaria*, *Terra Tartaroum* or Tatar Steppe (Plain) by the European sources throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵⁷⁰

In his report about the beginning and progress of the Muscovite war, Crown Hetman Zolkiewski states that Kantemir Mirza joined the campaign of Serpukhov with a large army consisted of fifteen thousand men.⁵⁷¹ It appears that Kantemir Mirza was able to attract members of other Tatar-Nogay groups of the region to his orbit and thus became a considerable actor of the regional politics by 1610. Several factors contributed to the rise of Kantemir Mirza from a local tribal leader to the most trusted man of the Porte to replace the Crimean Khans. Kantemir Mirza was more suitable to play the role of buffer between them and their northern neighbors contrary to the ambitious Crimean Khans who did not give their imperial claims up. Most of his prestige in the eyes of the Ottomans was coming from his full support in their struggle for Moldavia against Poland. Access to the Black Sea was always important for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which wanted to dominate the trade between Danube and Dniestr.⁵⁷²

⁵⁶⁸ Alper Başer, *Bucak Tatarları* ..., pp. 79-81.

⁵⁶⁹ Nicolae Iorga, *Studii Istorice Asupra Chilie și Cetate Albe*, Bucharest, 1900, p. 221.

⁵⁷⁰ Gemil, Tahsin, "Peste Unmileniu de Existență a Populației Turco-Tatare Peteritoriul Romaniei", *Mostenirea Istorica a Tatarilor*. Vol. I. Bucharest, 2010, p. 21.

⁵⁷¹ August Bielowski, *Pisma Stanisława Zolkiewskiego* ..., pp. 63-64.

⁵⁷² Daniel Stone, *The Polish-Lithuanian* ... p. 32.

3.11 The Moldovian problem

The control of Moldavian Principality that was situated at the mouth of Danubian Delta was of paramount importance. However, the establishment of the Ottoman rule in the region between the years 1475-1538 failed the Polish plans.⁵⁷³ After the death of the Hospodar of Moldovia Ieremia Movila (1595- May 1600 and September 1600-1606), the Poles considered that the political conjuncture is convenient to reassert their claim on the principality but the Ottomans were ready to confront them as a result of the Zitvatorok Treaty⁵⁷⁴ (Zsitvatorok) which put an end to the Long War between the Ottomans and Habsburgs. However, they could not foresee the coming of Nasuh Pasha treaty (20.11.1612) which ended the Ottoman-Safavid War that enabled Ottoman to focus on the Moldovan problem. The Ottomans, on the one hand, located troops to the region and on the other hand, allowed Tatars to raid Polish territory at will.⁵⁷⁵ The Poles managed to unseat the brother of Ieremia Movila⁵⁷⁶ and former Hospodar of Wallachia (1600-June 1601 and October 1601-1602) Simeon Movila (Simion Movila 1606-1607) who seemed to be the Ottoman candidate; and the brief rule of Simeon's son Mihail Movila (twice in late 1607) who unsuccessfully tried to replace him after his death. Simeon, who was an opportunistic man, approached Ahmed I and sent valuable gifts to him

⁵⁷³ For the establishment of Ottoman rule in the Black Sea basin see: Ahmet Türk, "Ottoman Empire and the Security of the Black Sea (1354-1700)", *Marea; Lo cal Memoriei și al Desfașurării Geostrategice*, (ed. Florin Anghelescu et al.), Targoviște, 2014, pp. 84-101.

⁵⁷⁴ For more information on Zitvatorok Treaty (1606) see: Sandor Papp, "Zitvatorok Antlaşması", *DIA*, C. XLIV, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 472-474.

⁵⁷⁵ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 81-82.

⁵⁷⁶ For more information on Ieremia Movila and the Movila family see: Brezianu, Andrei and Spanu, Vlad, *The A to Z of Moldova*, Plymouth, 2007, p. 306.

for the confirmation of his Hospodarship.⁵⁷⁷ A cruel internecine struggle started between the cousins; Ieremia's sons were supported by the Poles while those of Simeon were supported by the Ottomans and the Crimean Khanate.⁵⁷⁸

The older son of Ieremia Constantine Movila (October 1607 and December 1607-1611) manage to become Hospodar with the help of his brother-in-law Stefan Potocki (1568-1631 Voivode of Bratslav) to oust Simeon who died soon after; most probably poisoned by the Poles.⁵⁷⁹ Constantin who was a practical man like his uncle Simeon and obtained the pardon of the Porte thanks to the 50,000 ducats which he distributed in the Ottoman palace despite all the efforts of the Boyars that were trying to replace him with Gavril Movila (Gabriel Moliva), another son of Simeon relying his close relationship with the Poles.⁵⁸⁰ Constantin continued to rule until 1611 when he was replaced by Stephan II Tomşa (twice Hospodar of Moldavia 1661-1615 and 1621-1623). Constantin Movila soon after took refuge in Poland and came back with an army under the command of his brother-in-law to reclaim his throne. Stefan Potocki was in fact sent by Sigismund III to help Constantin Movila. Constantin's army included his brother Alexander (Alexandru Movila 1601-1620) and their Boyar supporters and the Polish forces that were mostly consisted of Zaporozhian Cossacks. The

⁵⁷⁷ See Document no: 283 dated 04-08-1607 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria Romanilor 1600-1650*, V. IV, Partea 2, Bucarest, 1894. p. 290. Among the gifts were four sable furs, brocade garments, two hundreds studs, six hundred horses.

⁵⁷⁸ A.D. Xenopol, *Histoire Des Roumaines de la Dacie Trajane Depuis Les Origines Jusqu'a l'Union Des Principautés en 1859 I (513 av. J-C.-1633)*, Paris, 1896, p. 412.

⁵⁷⁹ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII., p. 256.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 412-413.

invading army did not succeed and was heavily defeated by the forces of Stefan Tomşa reinforced by the Ottomans, Crimean and Bucak Tatars.⁵⁸¹ During the campaign Stefan Potocki did not only lost his whole army but was also taken captive together with Alexander Movilla by the Ottomans after the defeat at Cornul Lui Sas (09/07/1612).⁵⁸² Constantin Movila drowned in Dniestr while he was trying to flee from Tatars.⁵⁸³ It is generally accepted that Kantemir Mirza, who encircled the enemy forces and prevented their movement, was the architect of the victory.⁵⁸⁴ According to the report of Venetian Bailo Cristoforo Valier (1611-1614), Constantin Movila was defeated because of the timely manoeuvres of the Tatars that controlled the left wing of Stefan Tomşa's army.⁵⁸⁵

The political shortsightedness of Polish authorities had unexpected results in the history of Eastern Europe. Poland failed to bring its candidate members of the Movila family to the throne, was forced to give up its claims on the principality and recognize Stefan Tomşa's hospodarate.⁵⁸⁶ Moldovian chronicler Miron Costin (1633-1691) refers to the defeat at the battle of Cornul Lui Sas as the fading of the Movila family.⁵⁸⁷ Sigismund III's decision to intervene in Moldavian affairs without finding a solution to the Muscovite problem caused the failure of

⁵⁸¹ Tömasz Swiecki, *Opis Starozitnej Polski*, T.2, Cracow, 1861, p. 190.

⁵⁸² See Documents no: 354 and 355 dated 12-8-1607 and 25-08-1607 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria ...*, V. IV, Partea 2, pp. 336-338.

⁵⁸³ Tömasz Swiecki, *Opis Starozitnej ...*, T.2, p. 190.

⁵⁸⁴ K.W. Woycicki, *Pamiętniki do Panowania Zygmunta III, Władysława IV i Jana Kazimierza*, 2 T., Warsaw, 1846, p. 37.

⁵⁸⁵ See Document no: 354 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria ...*, V. IV, Partea 2, pp. 336-337.

⁵⁸⁶ August Bielowski, *Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego ...*, pp. 456-457.

⁵⁸⁷ Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *Romen Kaynak ve ...* p. 28. For more information on Miron Costin see: *ibid.* pp. 23-25.

both projects.⁵⁸⁸ Ottoman Empire and Muscovy became closer as a result of growing tension between the Ottomans and Poles. The political conjuncture helped the Romanov family resume power in Muscovy and opened the way of its transformation first to a regional, and consequently to a world power.

3.12 The rise of Kantemir Mirza's influence for the Ottomans at the expense of the Crimean Khans

The might and prestige of Kantemir Mirza, who, upon the consent of the Porte, organized military raids on Polish territory, continued to rise steadily and he became the most reliable asset of the Ottomans. In 1618, while an Ottoman-Polish war was becoming inevitable, it was Kantemir Mirza who first attacked on Poland with a large force.⁵⁸⁹ According to the report of Muscovite messenger, Sultan's edict of the mobilization was welcomed by the population and in addition to the regular forces, many Crimean Tatars were volunteered to prepare for the campaign and the peninsula was almost deserted.⁵⁹⁰ A significant part of the manpower had been exhausted during the Persian campaign. Canıbek Giray Khan, who unsuccessfully tried to prevent volunteers to join the army, stayed in the peninsula in order to counter an imminent attack of Şahin Giray Sultan who was known to be in the Northern Caucasus.

⁵⁸⁸ See document no: 12 dated 22-March/1April 1612 the letter of Sigismund III to the members of Rada about the situation in Wallachia in (ed.) *Smutnoe Vremya Moskovskogo Gosudartsva 1604-1613*, Vp. 3., Moscow, 1915, pp.139-140.

⁵⁸⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 99.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 101.

Kantemir Mirza's role during the battle of Cecora is one of the best determinants of his status in the eyes of the Ottomans.⁵⁹¹ Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin states that the Ottoman forces were stationed from left to the right of Kantemir Mirza's forces, Ottoman army, Hungarian and Moldavian forces, while the Crimean Tatar forces under command of Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan, were kept in the reserve.⁵⁹² However, Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan did not accept to play a secondary role as reserve and threatened İskender Pasha to turn back, if they are not allowed to attack enemy in the first place.⁵⁹³ It appears that it was degrading for the Crimean Tatars to be the auxiliaries of the Bucak Tatars and give up the opportunity to plunder the enemy camp first. The rivalry between Kalgay and Kantemir Mirza came to surface once again upon the Polish proposal to pay 100,000 florins in exchange for their safe passage to the Polish side. Kantemir Mirza and Çerkes Hüseyin Pasha were to be given hostage to the Poles until they crossed to the other side of the Dniestr; however, this plan could not be realized because of the strong opposition of Kantemir Mirza.⁵⁹⁴ On the occasion of the Hotin campaign, Ottoman chronicler Naima relates the problem to the personal competition between the Khan and the Mirza rather than to the political factors.⁵⁹⁵

Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan were also present in the Bucak region during the rise of Kantemir Mirza and Bucak Horde as a regional power around 1613. Bucak, which was situated remote from

⁵⁹¹ For more information on Cecora Battle (1620) see: page 7 above.

⁵⁹² Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *Romen Kaynak ve ...* p. 31.

⁵⁹³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... pp. 454-455.

⁵⁹⁴ *ibid.* pp. 455-456.

⁵⁹⁵ *ibid.* p. 469.

Crimea, was not only relatively safe for the fugitive brothers but had also a considerable Tatar population to attract to their side. Moreover, Kantemir Mirza was the son of Eseney who has supported and died for their father Sa'adet Giray Khan during the latter's struggle for the Crimean throne against Islam Giray II Khan in 1584. The geographical proximity of Bucak to Istanbul was another factor that attracted the two brothers to the area who still believed that they could convince the Ottoman administration to change their decision and return to the throne.⁵⁹⁶ It has already been stated that according to the Ottoman chronicler Katip Çelebi, Mehmed Giray III Khan visited the camp of Ahmed I near Edirne in March 1613.⁵⁹⁷ Ottoman chronicler Naima states that Canıbek Giray Khan who was anxious about the activities of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers in the Bucak area first requested from the Porte to stop their incursions on the ground that the enormous amount of wealth and power began to influence his immediate surrounding who were willing to join to the Sultans. Canıbek Giray Khan was forced to handle the situation by himself because of the Porte's unresponsiveness and launched a campaign on the Sultans.⁵⁹⁸ Naima's fragment does not exist in Katip Çelebi's *Fezleke* that was the basic source for him; it must have come from another source. It provides crucial information about the life of fugitive Sultans after their escape from Crimea in 1610 and up until their defeat by Canıbek Giray in 1614.

⁵⁹⁶ See Documents no: 342 dated 13-12-1611 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria ...*, V. IV, Partea 2, p. 330.

⁵⁹⁷ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.I., p. 351

⁵⁹⁸ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... pp. 357-358.

3.13 The significance of Bucak for the Crimean Khanate

The insistence of Crimean Khanate over the Bucak region had several historical antecedents. First of all, Bucak region was part of Golden Horde and the Crimean Khans were claimed to be the heirs.⁵⁹⁹ Since the time of Gazi Giray II Khan, who tried to bring Moldavia under his rule, the Crimean Khans were also claiming to have jurisdiction on the region.⁶⁰⁰ The Crimean Khans and particularly Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Dultan who dwelled and participated in the slave raids in the region understood its strategic location; i.e., being the achille's heel of Poland. Kantemir Mirza's wealth and influence was closely related to his control of the strategic position of Bucak. Bucak region had direct access to the Commonwealth's prosperous and populated lands over Moldavia, unlike to the Crimean Tatars who had to make a dangerous journey through the Zaporozhian Cossack territory and near the newly build fortresses before arriving in the richer parts of the Commonwealth. The Crimean Khans did not want to let the accumulation of this wealth and prestige taken away by a Mangıt of the Diveyoğlu branch of Mangıt clan of the Grand Nogay Horde whom they considered to be their subjects. The Bucak problem for the Giray dynasty was the division of Crimean Yurt (*Kırım Yurtu*) and breaking up of Mangıt clan from their rule. They have naturally made several attempts to prevent and force them to return to Crimea but it seemed that they were not able to achieve this goal since the Tatar-Nogay

⁵⁹⁹ For the history of Turco-Tatar settlements in Bucak see: Tasin Cemil "Budjaskie i Dobrudzhinskie Tatary", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskoe Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 282-288.

⁶⁰⁰ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, p. 174.

population in Bucak continued to grow rather than decline.⁶⁰¹ All efforts of Canıbek Giray Khan and Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan could neither prevent the break away from Crimea nor the rise of Kantemir Mirza as an independent power. He demonstrated to the Ottoman administration that he could be a very convenient substitute for the Crimean Khans who did not want to give up their imperial claims and frequently follow their own political agenda. During the years when the bulk of the Crimean Tatar army was on the Eastern front upon the pressure of the Ottomans, Kantemir Mirza benefited from the fragile Ottoman-Polish relations and became the unquestionable leader of the Bucak Horde. He could even stand against Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan who was known to be very popular within the Ottoman circles on the hostage incident during the Cecora battle.

3.14 Kantemir Mirza's entrance to the Ottoman system as a result of his successes during the Hotin campaign (1621)

Kantemir Mirza's military successes during the Hotin campaign did not only upgrade his status in the eyes of the Ottomans, but also raised him into the Ottoman administrative system. The report of Venetian Bailo Almorò Nani (1614-1620) stated that Tatar forces started their incursions as early as March 1621 and the Poles began to destroy the bridges on the Dniestr, which connected Polish lands to Moldavia, in order to prevent Tatar raids.⁶⁰² It is important to note that the Zaporozhian Cossacks were also conducting preemptive strikes in the

⁶⁰¹ For the attempts to drive Nogays out of Bucak see: Alper Başer, *Bucak Tatarları* ..., pp. 79-81.

⁶⁰² See Documents no: 422 dated 19-03-1621 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria* ..., V. IV, Partea 2, p. 391.

Ottoman territory.⁶⁰³ Arguably, Kantemir Mirza's most significant military action during the campaign was his successfully cutting the Polish supply routes in Kamanets (Kamaniçe, Kami'anets-Podilskyi in Ukr. Kamieniec Podolski in Pol.). According to the Kamenets chronicle about the 1620-1621 campaigns written in Armeno-Kipchak, Kantemir Mirza camped on the road of Kamenets.⁶⁰⁴ He captured victuals that were dispatched for Prince Wladyslaw (1595-1648) and two carriages of gunpowder which he later sent to Osman II. as a present. His blockage was so efficient that the besieged Polish soldiers were forced to eat the dead horses to survive.⁶⁰⁵ Apart from the blockage, Kantemir Mirza organized successful raids around Zamosc and Lublin and obtained a large amount of booty. However, his forces were trapped on their way back to the outskirts of Kamenets and lost most of their trophy.⁶⁰⁶ Kantemir Mirza also took part in the combats of the Hotin War. The forces of Kantemir Mirza and Çerkes Hüseyin Pasha pursued and destroyed several hundreds of soldiers that were trying to flee from the Polish camp.⁶⁰⁷

Kantemir Mirza was, together with Zaporozhian Cossacks, the only winner of the Hotin campaign.⁶⁰⁸ In fact, he was rewarded before the end of campaign as a result of his successes when he was appointed

⁶⁰³ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... p. 461.

⁶⁰⁴ E. Schütz, *An Armeno-Kipchak Chronicle on The Polish-Turkish Wars In 1620-1621*, Budapest, 1968, pp. 53-55.

⁶⁰⁵ (ed.) Yaşar Yücel *Osmanlı Devlet Düzenine Ait Metinler VI. II. Osman Adına Yazılmış Zafer-Name*, Ankara, 1983, pp. 152-153.

⁶⁰⁶ E. Schütz, *An Armeno-Kipchak Chronicle* ..., p. 55.

⁶⁰⁷ (ed.) Yaşar Yücel *Osmanlı Devlet Düzenine* ... pp. 163-164.

⁶⁰⁸ For the gains of Zaporozhian Cossacks as a result of the Hotin campaign see: page 50 above.

the governor of Özü (08.09.1621).⁶⁰⁹ Ottoman chronicler Naima relates the elevation of Kantemir Mirza to the rank of Pasha in appreciation of his bravery during the Hotin campaign of Osman II.⁶¹⁰ One of the fundamental reasons of the Ottoman support for Kantemir Mirza was the Cossack raids to the Ottoman over the Bucak region. The appointment caused the reaction of Polish administration who envisaged the threat that Kantemir Mirza could pose with the backing of the Ottoman power. The Polish ambassador to the Porte for the ratification of the treaty which ended the war, Krzysztof Zborovski (1580-1627) states in his report that during their meeting Grand Vizier Gürcü Mehmed Pasha⁶¹¹ (d. 1626 Grand Vizier 21.09.1622 05.02.1623) said that when he wanted to talk about the Tatar raids to the Polish territory, had been told that he should not complain about Kantemir Mirza and Stephan Tomşa since they were like the Grand Vizier's sons.⁶¹² Krzysztof Zborovski insisted that as an ambassador he had to transmit him what he was instructed to say. He added that according to the agreement, the Sultan should protect the Polish borders from attacks coming from Moldavia or any other place. In the end Grand Vizier admitted that Kantemir Mirza was a devil but rejected any allegations on Stephan Tomşa. The ambassador replied that if Hospodar wanted to preserve the peace, he should neither cooperate

⁶⁰⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.I., p. 411.

⁶¹⁰ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... p. 472.

⁶¹¹ For more information on Gürcü Mehmed Paşa see: Mahmut Ak, "Mehmed Paşa, Gürcü", *DİA*, C.XXVIII, Ankara, 2003, pp. 509-510.

⁶¹² (ed.) Kh.M. İbragimbeyli, N.S. Rashba, "Donesenie o Posolstve Knyaza K. Zbarazhskogo v Turtsiyu v 1622-1623 Godakh", *Osmanskaya Imperiya v Pervoi Chetverti XVII Veka Sbornik Dokumentov i Materialov*, Moscow, 1984, p. 110.

with nor harbor the enemies of Poland.⁶¹³ At the end of the meeting, the Grand Vizier stated that, for the moment, he would by no means deprive Kantemir Mirza and Stefan Tomşa from their posts for any reason.⁶¹⁴ It appears that the raids of the Bucak Horde to the Polish borders and Zaporozhian Cossacks to the Ottoman territory were blocking the ratification of the agreement.⁶¹⁵ Grand Vizier confessed that Kantemir Mirza and Stephan Tomşa would inevitably breach the peace before the order was established in the border. Thus if they want peace, they should at first control their own voevodes in Kamenets and Wroclaw.⁶¹⁶ Krzysztof Zborovski states that he protested the new attack of Kantemir Mirza who convinced Gürcü Mehmed Pasha that the Poles were making preparations to remove him from the post and the Grand Vizier, who was very suspicious, allowed him to attack on Podolia and Pokuttia (in Ukr. Pokuttya, in Pol. Pokucie).⁶¹⁷ Krzysztof Zborovski stated that he managed to convince the new Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha⁶¹⁸ (d. 1624 twice Grand Vizier 1306-1622 08.08.1622 and 05.02.1623 30.08.1623) about the intrigues of Kantemir Mirza to write a letter to Kantemir Mirza to remain within the Ottoman borders, so long as he did not want to be executed immediately.⁶¹⁹ Kantemir Mirza attacked again to Pokuttia with 7000 Tatars and 2000 Moldavian

⁶¹³ *Ibid.* p. 111.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 112.

⁶¹⁵ For the Zaporozhian Cossack activities in 1622 see: Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, pp. 30-33.

⁶¹⁶ (ed.) Kh.M. İbragimbeyli, N.S. Rashba, "Donesenie o Posolstve Knyaza ...", pp. 112-113 and for the Ottoman version of the events see: Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.II., p. 32.

⁶¹⁷ (ed.) Kh.M. İbragimbeyli, N.S. Rashba, *Ibid.* p. 121.

⁶¹⁸ For more information on Mere Hüseyin Paşa see: Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, "Hüseyin Paşa, Mere", *DİA C XIX.*, İstanbul, 1999, pp.8-9.

⁶¹⁹ (ed.) Kh.M. İbragimbeyli, N.S. Rashba, "Donesenie o Posolstve Knyaza ...", p. 129.

between February-June 1623 and brought considerable numbers of slaves.⁶²⁰ He was even lobbying for the removal of Wallachian Voevode Radu Mihnea (Four times Hospodar of Wallachia 1601-1602, 1611, 1611-1616 and 1620-1623 twice Hospodar of Moldavia 1616-1619, 1623-1626) whom he considered to be pro-Polish and supporting his ally Stephan Tomşa.⁶²¹ Krzysztof Zborovski's mission seems to be successful after the ratification of the *Ahidname* (treaty) given by Mustafa I to Sigismund III in 12.2.02.1623 which stipulated that both the Tatars and the Cossacks were forbidden to violate the borders.⁶²² However, the deposition of Mustafa I because of his mental problems (10.09.1623) and the rule of Murad IV required the ratification of a new *ahidname* by the new Sultan. Since the *ahidname* that was brought by Krzysztof Zborovski was criticized of being unsatisfactory, an Armenian interpreter Krzysztof Serebkowicz sent to the Porte where he received a new *ahidname* which was almost identical with that of his predecessor (10.10.1623).⁶²³ Kantemir Mirza who became the most valuable asset of the Ottomans in the region managed to survive all the pressure from Poland but the attitude of the Gürcü Mehmed and Mere Hüseyin Pashas showed that he could easily be dispensed as a new comer. It should also be admitted that his positive image within the Ottoman ruling elite is depended on the distribution of the wealth which he had accumulated during the raids on Polish territory.

⁶²⁰ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black*,. p. 44.

⁶²¹ Nicolea Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, C. III, İstanbul, 2005, p. 318.

⁶²² For the text of Mustafa I ahidname to Sigismund III see: Document no: 37 in Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic ...*, pp. 388-401.

⁶²³ For the text of the ahidname of Murad IV to Sigismund III see: Document no: 38 in *ibid.* pp. 404-418.

3.15 Canıbek Giray Khan falls from grace

Canıbek Giray Khan contrary to Kantemir Mirza was the greatest loser of the Hotin campaign. His status was declining in the eyes of the Ottoman administration since the Serav defeat during the Persian campaign. Even, his personal participation at the head of the Crimean Tatar army to the campaign did not reverse the situation. The first problem arised when Canıbek Giray Khan's request to be allowed to raid enemy territory was refused in the beginning of the campaign.⁶²⁴ The privilege had already been granted to Kantemir Mirza who had conducted it very successfully. In fact, Canıbek Giray Khan would prefer to not to join the campaign because of the threat of an invasion of Şahin Giray Sultan who was waiting for the right moment in the Northern Caucasus. According to the Muscovite reports the Crimean envoy İnalçık brought the letter of Canıbek Giray Khan to Volynskii, the Voevode of Terek, which forbade him to shelter his enemy Şahin Giray Sultan.⁶²⁵ Therefore, his fundemantal objective was to keep the integrity of his forces and to bring it back to the peninsula safely. However, Osman II did not only refuse his proposal but also stationed the Crimean army within the range of Polish artillery.⁶²⁶ Moreover, his vassal Kantemir Mirza was granted the Governorship of Özü that controlled the western coasts of Black Sea from Dnieper to Bulgaria. The Crimean Tatars were granted the permission to raid, in the final

⁶²⁴ L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, *Wojna Chocimska 1621 Roku*, Cracow, 1979, p. 193. Ottoman chronicler Katip Çelebi writes that Canıbek Giray Khan was given permission to raid Polish territory but it was in the end during the Ramazan festivities (01-L-1030 AH./19-08-1621 AD.) before the beginning of the siege in 15.L.1030 AH./02-09-1621 AD in Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.I., p. 397.

⁶²⁵ RGADA f. 123 op.1 nos.106

⁶²⁶ (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii* T. VIII p.233.

phases of the war, but Canıbek Giray Khan who was afraid of a possible plot towards him, refrained from sending the army. However, bulk of the army that did not want to miss the benefits of a raid challenged the decision of the Khan and attacked to the enemy territory under the command Nureddin Azamet Giray Sultan.

Nureddin Sultan's decision to make a raid contrary to the will of the Khan resulted with the surfacing of the problems between the two and resulted in his defection to the Ottoman camp.⁶²⁷ The English ambassador to the Porte Sir Thomas Roe states that the relations between the Khan and the Sultan have deteriorated as a result of the rumors that the former was conducting clandestine negotiations with Poland contrary to the will of the Sultan and the new favourite of the Sultan was Kantemir Mirza who had made a very profitable incursion to the Polish territory.⁶²⁸ It was only a matter of time for Osman II not only to depose but also to punish the Crimean Khan. The ambitious Sultan did not declare off the appointment of Kantemir Mirza to the governorate despite all the efforts of the Khan. After the end of the Hotin campaign the deposition of the Khan was so imminent that even the Poles who had started the peace talks with the Ottomans have requested the punishment of Canıbek Giray Khan who could attack on Poland after the conclusion of the peace. According to the memoirs of Jakub Sobieski (1590-1646) who was present in the peace talks, the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha⁶²⁹ (1621-1622) refused the Polish

⁶²⁷ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 100 n. 11.

⁶²⁸ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, pp. 11-12.

⁶²⁹ For more information on Dilaver Paşa see: Nezihi Aykut, "Dilaver Paşa", *DİA*, C.IX., İstanbul, 1994, p. 297.

proposition, but declared that the Sultan was the Khan's master and he would be removed from the throne if he continued to act independently and attack on Poland (4.10.1621).⁶³⁰ The words of the Grand Vizier must have more detrimental effects on Canıbek Giray Khan from the words of Sultan Osman II. It was not only the personal prestige of the Khan that was declining in the eyes of the Ottoman, but also the overall status of the Crimean Khanate was deteriorating. İskender Pasha's reply to the complaints of the Polish representatives about the problems they encountered during the payments of tributes and their proposal that they had better to make the payment in Istanbul rather than Bahçeşaray was very significant (15.11.1619).⁶³¹ It appears that the Ottoman establishment who believed that they had found a more viable alternative to the Crimean Khans in the person of the Kantemir Mirza have changed their attitude towards the Khan and began to treat him as an Ottoman official.

In spite of Osman II could not punish Canıbek Giray Khan, instead the Sultan himself was dethroned and murdered by his own soldiers who were suspicious of his plans about them (20.5.1622). It is possible to argue that it was not reasonable for the Sultan who was struggling for his own life to deal with the Khan. However, the course of the events demonstrates that the changes in the Crimean throne depended on the relations of the contenders with the different Ottoman palace factions. The wrath of the Sultan could have been moderated, but failing to

⁶³⁰ Zegota Pauli, *Pamiętniki o Wyprawie Chocimskiej r. 1621*, Cracow, 1853, pp. 168-172.

⁶³¹ See document no: 136, the letter of Stanisław Żółkiewski to King Sigismund III in (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii* T. VIII pp. 203-207.

satisfy the demands of the Ottoman establishment had consequences for any Crimean Khan. It seems that Canıbek Giray Khan's hesitant approach during the Hotin campaign did not only turn the Ottoman administration against him, but also decreased his popularity in Crimea. The victories of Kantemir Mirza against the Poles must inevitably have speeded up Canıbek Giray Khan's deposition. According to the reports of the Muscovite diplomats N. Likharev and V. Makhov, Kantemir Mirza's wife who was in Crimea, took refuge to Kefe under Ottoman control immediately after Kantemir's appointment to the governorate. The Sultan also asked the release of the family and the belongings of Kanteöir Mirza and Mangits detained by the Khan.⁶³²

Meanwhile, Mehmed Giray III Khan was waiting in the island of Rhodes, the place of confinement for the members of the Giray dynasty who fell from grace.⁶³³ Mehmed Giray III Khan was lobbying for the appointment of his chief protector, Mere Hüseyin Pasha, to the post of Grand Vizier who could then make him Crimean Khan again.⁶³⁴ Contrary to the Crimean Tatar chronicler Seyyid Rıza's argument that the deposition of Canıbek Giray Khan was unsubstantiated; and there were serious reasons for it.⁶³⁵ He had antagonized the Ottoman administration but also the Crimean Tatar army by refusing Osman II's offer to raid enemy territory in the final phase of the Hotin campaign. It was highly plausible that, as the anti-Ottoman feelings in the Khanate became obvious that

⁶³² A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 101.

⁶³³ For Rhodes as a place of exile for the members of Giray dynasty see: Ilya V. Zaitsev, "Krymskiye Khany v Ssylke na Rodose", *Vostochnaya Kolleksiya Leto 2009*, N. 2 (37), Moscow, 2009, pp. 96-101.

⁶³⁴ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 172.

⁶³⁵ *ibid.* p. 171.

the Porte did not only preferred but also de facto detached the Bucak Tatars from the Crimean Khanate. Canıbek Giray Khan's public image as the lucky Khan declined and switched to the side of Mehmet Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers who were representing the party in the Khanate which favored independence.⁶³⁶ It is also important to note that the epidemic and famine which struck the Khanate after 1621 also contributed to the unpopularity of Canıbek Giray Khan.⁶³⁷ According to the chronicle of Kefeli Haçatur (Khachatur of Caffa), due to the inflation Canıbek Giray Khan devaluated the currency; and the price of wheat exceeded 600 akças. Canıbek Giray Khan could not eliminate Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers who were waiting the appropriate moment to remove him from the throne.

3.16 The deposition of Canıbek Giray Khan and the second reign of Mehmed Giray III (1623)

According to the words of Mehmed Giray III Khan, Mere Hüseyin Pasha previously promised him that he would do everything to make him Crimean Khan again, if he could become Grand Vizier once again at their meeting in Rhodes in the summer of 1620 when Mere Hüseyin Pasha was on his way to Egypt. Mere Hüseyin Pasha kept his promise immediately after he became Grand Vizier in 5.2.1623. Mehmed Giray III became the Crimean Khan while Canıbek Giray was deposed. Canıbek Giray Khan, who was aware of the danger of possibility of being deposed, immediately sent his most trusted Bek Ağa to the Porte

⁶³⁶ Dariusz Skorupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie ...*, p. 251.

⁶³⁷ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik Von Kaffa Aus Der Ersten Halfte Des 17. Jahrhunderts", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, Vol. XXIX (2), Budapest, 1975, pp 142-143.

with valuable gifts but his ally Gürcü Mehmed Pasha was also deposed and the new Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha had already called Mehmed Giray III Khan from Rhodes (April 1623).⁶³⁸ In the capital, Mehmed Giray III Khan was taken by the Grand Vizier to the audience of the Sultan Mustafa I who presented him the regalia of the Khanate. However, it was not easy for the Ottomans to send the new Khan to Crimea because of the bitter memories of the past as in the cases of Mehmed Giray II, Sa'adet Giray II. Even the new Khan had already resisted to the possibility of his deposition.

According to the reports of Muscovite envoys Kondyrev and Barmasov, on their way to Moscow their ship was intercepted by the new Khan in the Bosphorus who forced them to give sable furs to him (18.4.1623).⁶³⁹ The Governor of Azak who was travelling with them had fled from the ship; the envoys who informed the Grand Vizier about the incident was replied by Grand Vizier that Mehmed Giray III Khan was joking. Actually, Canıbek Giray Khan, who was highly unpopular in the Khanate, did not resist and left the peninsula in 21.5.1623 when Mehmed Giray III Khan was seated to the throne in 16.6.1623.⁶⁴⁰ According to the reports of Muscovite envoys Usov and Ugodskii (Ugotskii) who were in Bahçesaray during the transition of the power, the arrival of the new Khan was celebrated with splendid festivities.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁸ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 100.

⁶³⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *ibid.* p. 107.

⁶⁴⁰ Dariusz Skorupa, *Stosunki Polsko-Tatarskie ...*, p. 251.

⁶⁴¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 108-109.

Canıbek Giray after being given the Sancak of Çirmen for his expenses was exiled to Rhodes by the Porte (March 1624).⁶⁴²

3.17 Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan's personalities

The Khanship of Mehmed Giray III, besides the support of Mere Hüseyin Pasha, should also be attributed to his past close relationship with Kantemir Mirza when both of them were conducting profitable raids on Polish lands from Bucak region. It was expected that their compatibility would bring order to the northern border of the empire. On the other hand, even his main supporter Mere Hüseyin Paşa was not sure about the extent of his loyalty to the Porte. Therefore, it was decided to send him to Crimea accompanied by someone who was both loyal to the Ottomans and could balance the tendencies of independence of the new Khan.⁶⁴³ Devlet Giray Sultan from the disputed Çoban⁶⁴⁴ branch of the Giray family who was brought up in the Porte was nominated Kalgay and sent with him. However, after the arrival of Şahin Giray Sultan to Bahçeşaray with a large contingent of Safavid soldiers, he resumed the post of Kalgay while Çoban Devlet Giray was relegated to the rank of Nureddin.⁶⁴⁵ H. Howorth claims that Şahin Giray Sultan, who had no children, adopted him and named him Ahmed Giray.⁶⁴⁶ On the other hand, it seems that Mehmed Giray III Khan was compelled to appoint Çoban Devlet Giray Nureddin because

⁶⁴² Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.I., p. 35.

⁶⁴³ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* ... p. 40.

⁶⁴⁴ For more information on Çoban Girays see: Hakan Kırımlı, "Kırım Hanlığı Tarihinde "Çoban Geraylar" Meselesi", *Belleten* C. 84, S. 249, Ankara, 2020, pp. 243-260 and Halil İnalçık, "Giray", *DİA*, C. XIV, Ankara, 1996. pp. 77.

⁶⁴⁵ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* ... p. 40.

⁶⁴⁶ Henry H. Howorth, *History of the ... Part II, The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, p. 541.

all other eligible members of the Giray family had fled from Crimea when they learned that Mehmed Giray III became the Khan of Crimea. Mehmed Giray III Khan had to support the large retinue which returned to the peninsula with him and were immediately asking for having their share from the welfare of the Khanate after spending several years in the exile. According to the words of *Amyat İbrahim Süleş*, Mehmed Giray III Khan was an authoritarian ruler who was treating the Mirzas and Beys as his servants, but was not cruel like his brother Şahin Giray Sultan and had a great affection towards his family and entourage. However, Canıbek Giray Khan who always respected the ideas of those who were around him..⁶⁴⁷

3.18 Kantemir Mirza's dismissal as a result of the Polish pressure on the Porte

It was evident that Mehmed Giray III Khan, contrary to the expectations of the Ottoman administration, did not follow administration's instructions, instead pursued his own agenda. Mehmed Giray Khan's first action was to attack on Kantemir Mirza upon the order of the Ottomans. Mere Hüseyin Pasha ordered him to stop Kantemir Mirza's incursion damages to the Polish territories whose removal from the governorship was a prerequisite for the Poles to sign the peace treaty.⁶⁴⁸ However, the dismissal of Mere Hüseyin Pasha and the appointment of

⁶⁴⁷ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 109.

⁶⁴⁸ ⁶⁴⁸ See document no: CCCIX, the letter of French ambassador to the Porte Comte de Cesy Philippe de Harlay (1620-1631) dated 13-VI-1623 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitoare La Istoria Romanilor Suplement I V. I 1518-1780*, Bucarest, 1886, p. 210 and Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p.165.

Kemankeş Ali Pasha⁶⁴⁹ (30.8.1623–3.4.1624) changed the direction of Ottoman policy towards Kantemir Mirza. However, the new Khan had already taken action against Kantemir Mirza. According to the Polish sources, it was the proposal of Polish envoy Krzysztof Serebkowicz to send Cossack contingents to help them against Kantemir Mirza that convinced the Porte to remove him from the region.⁶⁵⁰ Sir Thomas Roe explains that the Ottomans were alarmed by the possibility of a Cossack intervention and dismissed not only Kantemir Mirza but also his main ally Stephan Tomşa Hospodar of Moldavia who was an ardent enemy of the Poles (9.8.1623).⁶⁵¹ However, the decision of replacing Stephan Tomşa with Radu Mihnea shows that Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha was trying to establish his own administrative network by appointing his associates to the key positions in addition to his determination to conclude the protracted peace talks with Poland. His successor Kemankeş Ali Pasha was initially inclined to forgive and restore Kantemir Mirza to his previous post (3.10.1623).⁶⁵² Krzysztof Serebkowicz attributes the change of the decision to the bribes distributed by Kantemir Mirza to the Ottoman officials.⁶⁵³ Alper Başer believes that Kantemir Mirza's reappointment was due to the fear that he could start a revolt, rather than the distributed bribes, and it was planned by the Porte to hold him up until the arrival of Mehmed Giray III

⁶⁴⁹ For more information on Kemankeş Ali Paşa see: Münir M. Aktepe, "Kemankeş Ali Paşa", *DİA*, C.XXV, Ankara, 2002, p. 248.

⁶⁵⁰ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 55.

⁶⁵¹ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, pp. 169-170 and see: The letter of De Cesy dated 17-IX-1623 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitoare La ... Suplement I V. I*, p. 223.

⁶⁵² Thomas Roe, *ibid.* p. 181 and see: The letter of De Cesy dated 15-X-1623 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *ibid.* p. 226.

⁶⁵³ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 57.

Khan to Bucak.⁶⁵⁴ However, Victor Ostapchuk states that when Mehmed Giray III Khan informed the Porte that he captured Kantemir Mirza he was secretly ordered that Kantemir Mirza was reinstituted to his former position and should be escorted back to Silistre.⁶⁵⁵ Immediately after learning the secret correspondences, Krzysztof Serebkowicz strongly protested and requested the reversal of the appointment.⁶⁵⁶ Initially, Kemankeş Ali Pasha refused the proposal on the ground that it was the will of Sultan Murad IV. According to the report of French Ambassador De Cesy, after the sack of Sinop by the Cossacks, the Sultan decided to restore Kantemir Mirza to his previous post, which confirms the words of the Grand Vizier.⁶⁵⁷ However, the news about the deployment of Polish troops on the front forced the Ottomans to change their mind and it was decided in the divan to dismiss Kantemir Mirza and to appoint a new governor to Özi.⁶⁵⁸ Therefore, Ottomans who were already at war with Safavids (1623-1639) could not take the risk of a new war with Poland and accepted the removal of Kantemir Mirza.

3.19 Mehmed Giray III Khan's first resettlement of Kantemir Mirza and its negative effects on the regional politics (1623)

Although it was made by the order of the Porte, it was quite natural for Mehmed Giray III Khan who wanted to assert the supremacy of the

⁶⁵⁴ Alper Başer, *Bucak Tatarları ...*, p. 100.

⁶⁵⁵ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 57.

⁶⁵⁶ See: The letter of De Cesy dated 03-IX-1623 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *ibid.* pp. 218-219.

⁶⁵⁷ See: The letter of De Cesy dated 15-X-1623 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *ibid.* p. 226.

⁶⁵⁸ See the report of Venetian Bailo Giorgio Guistinian (1620-1627) document no: CCCCL dated 23-XVII-1623 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria ...*, V. IV, Partea 2, p. 403.

Khanate in the region to make his first move against Kantemir Mirza. Mehmed Giray III Khan during their meeting in the end of June 1623 apologized to the Muscovite envoys Ya. Dashkov and V. Volkov for his delay coming to the meeting because he was making preparations to go against Kantemir Mirza upon the order of the Sultan.⁶⁵⁹ It appears that Mehmed Giray III Khan considered the order as a great opportunity since he sent contingents to the passages on the Dniestr and recruited men from the small parties turning from the foray.⁶⁶⁰ Initially, the Khan tried to solve the problem by peaceful means depending on their previous cooperation but the meetings did not bring any result. Mehmed Giray III Khan chased the Bucak Horde through the late summer and early autumn and returned to Crimea in late September or early October after deporting them to Sütsu (Molochna Rus., Molochnaya Ukr.) in the steppes north of Azak.⁶⁶¹

After the resettlement of the Bucak, the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars fulfilled their share of the obligations of the peace but the Polish side did not. The Zaporozhian Cossacks who took advantage of the Mehmed Giray III Khan's campaign on Bucak sacked Crimea and the Ottoman part of the Black Sea littoral.⁶⁶² According to Krzysztof Zbaravski, the Ottomans considered the raids a result of Tatar raids and did not blame Poland for them.⁶⁶³ The Cossacks who attacked were not

⁶⁵⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 110.

⁶⁶⁰ (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii* T. VIII p. 280.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 110 and E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p. 143.

⁶⁶² For the Cossacks attack on Samsun see: note 1610 above. For the attack on Or Kapı see: E. Schütz, *ibid.* p. 143 and in general see: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII., p. 399.

⁶⁶³ See: the letter of Krzysztof Zbaravski to Sigismund III (ed.) V. Antonovich, *Sbornik Letopisei Otnosyashchikhsya k Istorii Yuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusi*, Kiev, 1888, p. 253.

the Zaporozhian but the Don Cossacks was another argument of the Polish envoy.⁶⁶⁴ In fact, the raid was more than a reaction to Tatar incursion. The Poles had to take Cossacks under control in order to validate the peace with the Ottomans and made several financial, administrative and religious promises to obtain their loyalty but dragged their feet to legitimize them in the *Sejm*.⁶⁶⁵ As a result, several bands of Zaporozhian Cossacks who could not organize raids for themselves because of their agreement with Poland started to join Don Cossack raids or organized joint raids with them.⁶⁶⁶ Eventually, Zaporozhian Cossacks had been ready to propose Don Cossacks to fight together against Ottoman Turks and Tatars under the banner of the Polish King during the Ukrainian Hetmanate of Yakiv Borodavka (Neroda 1620-1621).⁶⁶⁷

3.20 The return of Şahin Giray Sultan to Crimea accompanied with Safavid soldiers and its effects (1624)

Besides the changes in the regional politics, the biggest challenge for Mehmed Giray III Khan came after the arrival of his brother Şahin Giray Sultan accompanied with two thousand Safavid soldiers in Crimea (09/19.5.1624) and was welcomed by the population who believed that he would bring peace to the peninsula.⁶⁶⁸ Şahin Giray's close relationship with Shah Abbas I has already been mentioned. According to the Safavid chronicler Iskender Bey Münşi, Şahin Giray Sultan had

⁶⁶⁴ (ed.) Kh.M. İbragimbeyli, N.S. Rashba, "Donesenie o Posolstve Knyaza ..., p. 145.

⁶⁶⁵ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. pp.384-399.

⁶⁶⁶ V. Sukhorukov, *Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli Voiska Donskago*, V. I., Novocherkassk, 1869, p. 153, 162.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 158-159.

⁶⁶⁸ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p. 144.

the full support of Shah Abbas I and refused all Ottoman efforts to bring him to their sides. Moreover, he bore a signet ring that bore the inscription: “Şahin Giray the slave of Shah Abbas.”⁶⁶⁹ Shah Abbas I, like he did to several other Crimean Sultans, sheltered and supported Şahin Giray Sultan and tried to detach him from the Ottomans. His intent was to keep the Ottomans busy with as much problems as possible in order to prevent them concentrating on the Safavid front. He also believed that if his protégé Şahin Giray Sultan becomes the Crimean Khan, he would pursue a pro-Safavid policy.

The grand arrival of Şahin Giray Sultan should have reminded the Ottomans the gravity of the mistake that they made by bringing Mehmed Giray III Khan to the Crimean throne. According to the Muscovite reports Safavid soldiers that arrived with Şahin Giray remained loyal to him to the end as his personal guards according to the plan of Shah Abbas I who aimed to keep the Kalgay under his control through them.⁶⁷⁰ Sir Thomas Roe’s report, dated 3.4.1624, stated that while Şahin Giray was on his way to Crimea, Ottomans were optimistic about the services that the new Kalgay could render to them. Instead, they were afraid that Safavids would liquidate him on the road because he knew very well their weak points.⁶⁷¹ It was generally accepted that there was not a considerable problem between the Porte and Mehmed Giray III Khan prior to the arrival of Şahin Giray Sultan and the problem was Kalgay’s Safavid connections and Shiite

⁶⁶⁹ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 1238.

⁶⁷⁰ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 111. According to the report of Voevode of Putivl Şahin Giray returned from Persia with only 70 persons in P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii Vozsoedineniya Rusi*, V. I. Moscow, 1877, p. 159.

⁶⁷¹ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 131.

inclinations.⁶⁷² The theory of Şahin Giray's Safavid connections and Shiite inclinations are based upon the allegations of the Ottoman sources. Rıdvan Paşazade attributes Şahin Giray Sultan's deposition to Safavid connections and Shiite inclinations.⁶⁷³ Katip Çelebi and Naima condemn the pro-Safavid and Shiite inclinations of Şahin Giray Sultan and the independence movements and disobedience to the Ottoman orders of Mehmed Giray III Khan and accuse the brothers of continuous persecution of their political rivals.⁶⁷⁴ Quite interestingly, Katip Çelebi even claims that they were planning forced migration of the Crimean Tatars to the Safavid lands.⁶⁷⁵ The Crimean chronicler Seyyid Mehmed Rıza states that besides the relationship between Shah Abbas I and Şahin Giray Sultan, the brothers were accused of revolt in the Divan (Imperial Council) by their opponents who supported Canıbek Giray Khan.⁶⁷⁶ The former Khan benefited very much from the rumor that Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers were planning to overthrow and replace Ottoman dynasty by taking advantage of the disorder within the empire.⁶⁷⁷ In this passage Naima talks about a combined plan to migrate to Persia with the desire to replace the Ottoman dynasty. It seems that both allegations were fabricated and circulated by Canıbek Giray Khan and his supporters. It looks like the rumor about overthrowing the Ottoman dynasty is

⁶⁷² Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 62.

⁶⁷³ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak ...* p. 40,

⁶⁷⁴ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.II., p. 56 and Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... pp. 558-559.

⁶⁷⁵ Katip Çelebi, *ibid.* p. 56.

⁶⁷⁶ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar ...*, p. 173

⁶⁷⁷ *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. ... p. 560.

fabricated for the Porte while rumor about the forced migration is produced for the Crimean Tatar aristocracy.⁶⁷⁸

3.21 The reasons for Mehmed Giray III Khan's deposition

According to the Ottoman sources Mehmed Giray III Khan was deposed as a result of several accusations. First, he was accused of disobedience to the orders of the Porte; second one was the pro-Safavid and Shiite incinations of his brother Şahin Giray Sultan; and finally it was their cruel treatment of the Crimean aristocracy and perpetual persecution of their political opponents.⁶⁷⁹ The Safavid connection of Şahin Giray Sultan seems to be the most important factor that was definitely true when the Ottoman interests were taken into consideration. However, there seems to be a quite different picture when the problem is looked at from the Crimean Tatar point of view. The Ottoman-Safavid war started again in 1623 and the revolt of Abaza Mehmed Pasha (d. 1634) was still continuing.⁶⁸⁰ Moreover, the new Sultan Murad IV was only 12 years old child under the tutelage of his mother and statesmen. Grand Vizier Çerkes Mehmed Ali Pasha (3.4.1624 28.1.1625) was under the pressure of the difficult conditions and ordered the Khan to send 10,000 well trained and equipped

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p. 560.

⁶⁷⁹ There are documents that confirm the above mentioned arguments in Feridun Bey's *Münşeâtü's-selatin* Feridun Bey but they are not dated and it is not certain when and by whom they were added to the compilation in *Münşeâtü's-selatin* C.II, İstanbul, 1264-1265/1868-1869, p. 145. For more information on Feridun Bey see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Feridun Ahmed Bey", *DİA* C.XII, İstanbul, 1995. pp. 396-397 and for *Münşeâtü's-selatin* see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Münşeâtü's-Selatin", *DİA* C.XXXII, İstanbul, 2006, pp. 20-22.

⁶⁸⁰ For more information on the revolt of Abaza Mehmed Paşa see: Özer Küpeli, "Osmanlı Safevi Münasebetleri (1612-1639)", Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, İzmir, 2009, pp. 90-92 and 106-112.

soldiers to the Persian front via Samsun.⁶⁸¹ According to the report of Thomas Roe, Mehmed Giray III Khan did not comply with the order for the reason that the peninsula was under the threat of an imminent Cossack invasion but could not convince the Ottomans who related the incident with the arrival of Şahin Giray Sultan (15.5.1624).⁶⁸² However, on one of his previous report Thomas Roe states that the Safavid campaign of the Grand Vizier was postponed because of the Cossacks who sacked Kefe and other cities of Crimea and posed a great threat on the Black Sea (1/11.5.1624).⁶⁸³ Thus, the threat of a Cossack invasion of Crimea was genuine and Mehmed Giray III Khan, most likely, refused to join the Ottoman campaign before the arrival of Şahin Giray Sultan to Bahçesaray (9/19.5.1624). The Ottomans had already decided to depose them and reinstalled Canıbek Giray Khan to the throne.⁶⁸⁴ Therefore, other factors besides the close relationship between Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers and the Safavids should have been taken into consideration for their deposition.

3.22 The efforts of CanıbekGiray Khan to take the throne back

It was indispensable for any claimant of the Crimean throne to have strong ties of the Porte. It was already seen that the clique of Mere Hüseyin Pasha was essential for Mehmed Giray III's khanship since his deposition and neutralization undermined his protégé's prestige in the Porte. From that point on, the deposed Canıbek Giray Khan could work against Mehmed Giray III Khan who lost his principal supporters. Since

⁶⁸¹ The undated letter of Murad IV to the Mehmed Giray Khan in Feridun Bey, *Münşeatü's-selatin* C.II, İstanbul, 1264-1265/1868-1869, pp. 148-150.

⁶⁸² Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., pp. 141-142.

⁶⁸³ *ibid.* p. 236.

⁶⁸⁴ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo* ..., p. 111.

he departed from Bahçesaray with a large retinue and the Crimean treasury, he could easily use these resources to take the throne back. Mehmed Giray III accused Kapı Ağası Mustafa Ağa of taking 200 000 kuruş from Canıbek Giray to replace him immediately after the coronation of Murad IV (10.9.1623). The attitude of the brothers towards the Crimean population could be another reason for the deposition. While Şahin Giray Sultan was always portrayed as a violent man and cruel to his opponents, Mehmed Giray III Khan was seen as an authoritarian ruler who treated the aristocracy like his servants. According to the chronicle of Kefeli Haçatur, the return of Şahin Giray Sultan from Persia after almost fourteen years was welcomed by the local population who believed that he would bring prosperity to the Khanate. The image of the Kalgay was mainly originating from the days when he was fighting against the Ottomans and Crimean Tatars in the Safavid army (1618) He set free the ordinary soldiers, while he killed the members of the aristocracy on the spot.⁶⁸⁵ On the contrary, there was a great sense of animosity between the Kalgay and the Mirzas and Beys.

According to the report of a Tatar on the Muscovite service K. Baybirin, when Canıbek Giray Khan landed in Kefe, Crimean mirzas and beys send a message to him offering their services⁶⁸⁶ He also reported that Crimean population requested from Murad IV to depose Mehmed Giray III Khan and restore again Canıbek Giray to the Khanate for the reason that he disregarded state affairs and treated the population cruelly.

⁶⁸⁵ Eskander Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ...*, V. II p. 1154 and Pietro Della Valle, *Voyages de Pietro Della Valle ...*, T. 4, p. 199.

⁶⁸⁶ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 112.

Another reason was the pillage of Eskikırım by Don Cossacks, incidences like that had never happened under Canıbek Giray Khan.⁶⁸⁷ Rıdvan Paşazade states that the Crimean notables, who were uneasy about the relations of Şahin Giray Sultan with Shah Abbas I and the threat of a Safavid intervention, asked the Porte for the replacement of the Khan.⁶⁸⁸

3.23 The deposition of Mehmed Giray III Khan and the second Khanate of Canıbek Giray Khan (1624)

It was already stated that the Porte had already decided to replace Mehmed Giray III Khan. Canıbek Giray Khan was brought to Istanbul and became the Crimean Khan for the second time and was sent to Crimea.⁶⁸⁹ It appears that a palace faction, most probably headed by Kapu Ağası Mustafa, manipulated the deposition process and Canıbek Giray Khan landed in Kefe together with Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan and Nureddin Azamet Giray Sultan accompanied by janissaries (21.5.1624). Thomas Roe states that İbrahim Pasha accompanied him with thirteen galleys to protect them from the Cossack fleet.⁶⁹⁰ Muscovite reports talks about twelve galleys.⁶⁹¹ Katip Çelebi states that Canıbek Giray Khan was sent with four galleys while the rest of the fleet remained in Varna. When they arrived at Kefe they found Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan waiting outside of the walls with the Crimean army, and decided to request help from Istanbul. Thomas Roe notes that ten more galleys were secretly sent as reinforcement

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 112.

⁶⁸⁸ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* ... p. 41.

⁶⁸⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.II., pp. 56-57.

⁶⁹⁰ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., p. 236.

⁶⁹¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo* ..., p. 111.

because of the criticality of the situation.⁶⁹² It appears that the Ottomans underestimated the political power of the deposed brothers. They thought that the cooperation of the Crimean aristocracy and the superior fire power of the artillery would suffice to neutralize them as had been the case of many previous claimants who had tried to resist to the will of the Porte. However, Mehmed Giray III Khan and Şahin Giray Sultan brothers were determined to resist the deposition.

The Crimean aristocrats, who were traditionally accustomed to manipulate the state affairs, were completely uncomfortable for the authoritarian methods of the Khan and the Kalgay; and were ready to cooperate with the Ottomans.⁶⁹³ The brothers who were aware that the aristocracy was the main Ottoman ally in the Khanate took precautions against their betrayal. According to the report of K. Baybirin, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan divided the Crimean people in two as fathers and sons; and assigned the fathers to Mehmed Giray III Khan while he placed the sons under his command and declared, that fathers would be punished for the faults of their sons and vice versa in order to guarantee their loyalty.⁶⁹⁴ The letter of Kalgay Şahin Giray to Sigismund III dated 19.8.1624, demonstrates the preparations that they made before the arrival of Canıbak Giray II Khan to Kefe.⁶⁹⁵ He stated that only 12 days after his arrival in Bahçesaray, Ottomans sent Canıbek

⁶⁹² Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 241.

⁶⁹³ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 112.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p.112.

⁶⁹⁵ Seweryn Golebiowski, "Şahin Giraj i Kozacy", *Biblioteka Warszawska*, T. XLVI-2, Warsaw, 1852, pp. 17-18 and Alexander Baran, "Şahin Girai of the Crimea and the Zaporozhian Cossacks", *Jubilee Collection of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences*, Winnipeg: Uvan, 1976, pp. 15-33.

Giray Khan at Kefe with 40 galleys and 10,000 janissaries.⁶⁹⁶ It appears that Kalgay Şahin Giray started to think about forming an anti-Ottoman alliance when he had been in exile in Persia. He was the one who advised Shah Abbas I to use Zaporozhian Cossacks to fight against the Ottomans in 1618.⁶⁹⁷ According to the reports Francesco Dotallevi the Papal Nuncio to Poland,, Shah Abbas I requested 10-12,000 Cossacks from Sigismund III to fight against Ottomans.⁶⁹⁸ Sigismund III, who feared from the retaliation of the Porte, refused Shah's proposal.⁶⁹⁹ On his way to Crimea as Kalgay, Şahin Giray Sultan visited Circassian and Nogay tribes, mainly Gazi Ulus, and assured their loyalty.⁷⁰⁰ Finally, he turned to Zaporozhian Cossacks and asked their military cooperation. Zaporozhian Cossacks had the fire arms and artillery that was the fundamental weakness of Crimean Tatar forces vis-a-vis the Ottomans. Therefore, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan tried to solve this problem with the help of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁷⁰¹ However, the Zaporozhian were suspicious about his intentions; thus Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan had forced to make some gestures to convince them. He freed several Cossack prisoners and promised them part of the booty, if they fought on his side.⁷⁰² As a result, 300 Cossacks joined Şahin Giray Sultan's

⁶⁹⁶ Seweryn Golebiowski, "Şahin Giraj I ... pp. 17-18.

⁶⁹⁷ Alexander Baran, Shakh Abbas Velykyi i Zaporozhitsi", *Ukrains'kyj Istoryk*, No: 1-2, New York, 1977, pp. 51-52 and (ed.) Athanasius G. Weylkyj, *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantes (1550-1850)*, Vol. III. 1609-1620, Rome, 1959, pp. 156-161.

⁶⁹⁸ Athanasius G. Weylkyj, *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum ...*, p. 158.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 161.

⁷⁰⁰ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, pp. 356-357

⁷⁰¹ See the letter of Şahin Giray to Sigismund III dated 05-ZA-1033/19-VIII-1624 in Alexander Baran, "Shahin Girai of ...", p. 30.

⁷⁰² See the letter of Zaporozhian Cossack leader John Lubiewicz to Sigismund III dated 02-IX-1624 in *ibid.* pp. 32-33.

forces.⁷⁰³ According to the Ottoman sources, there were around 800 armed Cossacks fighting for Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan during the siege of Kefe.⁷⁰⁴

3.24 The de facto alliance between the Crimean Khanate and Zaporozhian Cossacks (1624)

The Cossack presence in the Black Sea and the necessity to reinforce Crimean campaign compelled the Porte to change their routine and dispatched navy there at the expense of the Mediterranean security. Kapudan Recep Pasha was ordered to sail to Kefe.⁷⁰⁵ However, the navy was not ready because of the internal problems of the empire; and the rowers and the levends who were coming from Anatolia had not arrived yet; so its departure was postponed.⁷⁰⁶ Meanwhile, Bayram Pasha was ordered to go to Özü to protect the region from a possible Crimean Tatar, Cossack or Polish attack.⁷⁰⁷ According to the reports of French Ambassador De Cesy, Cossacks, who descended to the mouth of Dnieper with 80 boats, entered Crimea and besieged Kefe both from the land and sea which caused a greater shock in the capital; more than that of the expected Safavid invasion (12.5.1624).⁷⁰⁸ English Ambassador Thomas Roe describes how untimely the decision to depose Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁷⁰⁴ V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, p. 357.

⁷⁰⁵ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.II., p. 57.

⁷⁰⁶ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 242.

⁷⁰⁷ The report of French Ambassador De Cesy dated 26-V-1624 in A. Turgenov, *Akty Istoricheskoe, Otnosyashchieskie k Rossii, Izvlechennye iz Inostrannykh' Arkhivov' i Bibliotek'*, T. II, St. Petersburg, 1891, p. 426.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 426.

was, as if further aggravated the problems of the Porte.⁷⁰⁹ They desperately sent orders to the governors of the sancaks along the Danube and to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia to help with all of their forces to the besieged Ottoman forces in Kefe.⁷¹⁰

During the standstill between the landing and the arrival of the Ottoman auxiliary forces, Mehmed Giray III Khan tried to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. While Kalgay Şahin Giray and the Nureddin Çoban Devlet Giray continued the siege, he retreated to Karasubazar (in Rus. Belogorsk, in Ukr. Bilohirsk) with his retinue. According to the Muscovite reports, he sent one of his sons with 300 Lithuanian slaves to Murad IV and requested the revision of his decision, but the Sultan insisted on his previous decision and sent reinforcements to Canıbek Giray Khan with 16 galleys (June 1624).⁷¹¹ Thomas Roe reports that the Porte who realized its mistake decided to reinstall Mehmed Giray III Khan, but since Canıbek Giray Khan had already landed before the notification of the new decision, the Ottoman forces had to protect him and turned the crisis into a matter of honour for the Sultan.⁷¹² According to O. Gaivoronskii, Mehmed Giray III Khan's intention to retreat to Karasubazar was to block the main road to Bahçesaray; while Kalgay Şahin Giray stayed in Kefe to control the other one.⁷¹³ Kalgay Şahin Giray who remained in the vicinity of Kefe continued to clash with Canıbek Giray Khan's forces.

⁷⁰⁹ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., p. 243.

⁷¹⁰ *ibid.* p. 247.

⁷¹¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo* ..., p. 112.

⁷¹² Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., pp. 247-248.

⁷¹³ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., p. 94.

The formation of a de facto alliance with Zaporozhian Cossacks was a great success for Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray brothers; however, at the same time they allowed Kantemir Mirza to exit from Crimea and return to Bucak and eventually to the Ottoman side around the first half of 1624. Kantemir Mirza once again became the primary asset of the Ottomans against Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's political ambitions in the region. From Thomas Roe's letter dated 26.6.1624, it is plausible to understand that Kantemir Mirza was sent to deter Stanisław Koniecpolski's forces that were stationed near the border.⁷¹⁴ In his letter to the Voevode of Kiev dated 11.5.1624, Stanisław Koniecpolski (d. 1646) stated that Kantemir Mirza was in Bucak with a large army and planning to attack on Poland to avenge the death of one of his sons.⁷¹⁵ It appears that Kantemir Mirza came to Bucak during the early days of spring 1624. One of Kantemir Mirza's sons was raiding Polish territory since February and was defeated by the forces of Stanisław Koniecpolski (06-II-1624).⁷¹⁶ Eventually, he invaded the Polish territory and pillaged it up to Lviv in the north (5.6.1624). Five days later, he wrote a letter to Sigismund III in which he reminded him that he promised to restrain Cossack raids in Hotin and declared that he would attack on Poland together with Ottoman forces even without the approval of the Porte.⁷¹⁷ However, Kantemir Mirza's army was ambushed by Stanisław Koniecpolski's

⁷¹⁴ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 255.

⁷¹⁵ Stanisław Przylecki, *Pamiętniki Koniecpolskich*, Lwow, 1842, p. 251-252.

⁷¹⁶ Tadeusz Korzon, *Dzieje Wojen i Wojskowosci w Polsce*, V. I, Cracow, 1923, p. 219. It is possible that the son that Kantemir Mirza wants to revenge his death was perished in this combat.

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 252.

forces during their return; and he lost two third of his forces (24.7.1624).⁷¹⁸

3.25 Ottomans decide to reinstitute Mehmed Giray III to the Khanate after the defeat near Karasubazar (1624)

When, finally Recep Pasha set sail for Crimea, Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan had already forced Canıbek Giray Khan to the galleys in Kefe.⁷¹⁹ First, Recep Pasha tried to use the spiritual power of the clergy to convince the Crimean Tatars to oppose the rebel brothers and submit to the authority of the Sultan. Later, he turned to the brothers and offered them the governorships of Mora (Morea) and Hersek (Herzegovina) in exchange of the Crimean throne. In his reply, Kalgay Şahin Giray not only refused the offer but complained that they were deposed as a result of the groundless claims spreaded by corrupt officials only few days after Mehmed Giray III Khan's return to Crimea following several years in exile.⁷²⁰ Mehmed Giray III Khan also demonstrated the extent of their supporters among the Tatars by listing the names of several Nogay leaders who were willing to join them. Finally, he firmly declared that they had the support of the population and would resist the deposition.⁷²¹ In his response, Recep Pasha after stating his awareness of the superiority of Kalgay Şahin Giray's forces, he replied that he was assigned to carry out the decision of the Imperial Divan to enthrone Canıbek Giray Khan and the result would be decided according to the will of Allah by referring to the verse 249 of the

⁷¹⁸ Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna w Latach 1624-1629*, Lodz, 1948, p. 22 n.24 and Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 265.

⁷¹⁹ Thomas Roe, *ibid.* p. 265

⁷²⁰ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke ...*, C.II., p. 57.

⁷²¹ *ibid.* pp. 57-58.

Baqarah verse,⁷²² which implied that many small nations defeated greater nations with the help of the mighty God.⁷²³

The tension between the parties increased while the clashes continued; and Nureddin Çoban Devlet Giray was killed during one of the combats.⁷²⁴ It soon appeared that the Ottoman forces were not enough to confront the forces of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray brothers and their allies. Moreover, the brothers not only had the military supremacy by taking the Nogay cavalry and Zaporozhian Cossacks armed with fire guns, but also the psychological supremacy in the battlefield. Finally, it was also evident that the Ottoman forces had severe logistic problems. Initially, Canıbek Giray Khan had believed that the Crimean Beys and Mirzas would join to his side, if they could make some progress but during the third day of the march they were besieged by Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray's forces near Karasubazar and the mood of the Ottoman headquarter turned against him. In the war council where Canıbek Giray Khan was accused for his miscalculations; and it was decided to withdraw the decision to depose Mehmed Giray III Khan and send regalia to him again because of the delicacy of the situation. Canıbek Giray Khan and Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan who were afraid of the wrath of their cousins fled to Kefe with their retinue immediately after the dispatch of the letter that reinstituted them.

⁷²² the English translation, interpretation of the verse: "How often a small group overcame a mighty host by Allah's leave" in (ed.) Al-Hilali, Muhammad Taqi-ud-din, *Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur'an in English Language*, İstanbul, 1404 AH, p. 57.

⁷²³ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.II., p. 58.

⁷²⁴ *ibid.* pp. 58-59.

The news about the withdrawal of Canıbek Giray Khan created a great panic in the Ottoman lines and the army began to follow him towards Kefe.⁷²⁵ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's forces perceived the disintegration of the enemy lines and did not only massacre the soldiers but also plundered the ammunitions and even the treasury of the expedition. The Ottoman army lost several prominent commanders including Hasan Pasha and İbrahim Pasha during its retreat. Those who managed to arrive to Kefe did not stay in the city and embarked on the galleys. Kalgay Şahin Giray who arrived in the city next day announced a three day cease fire during which the residents of the city could board on the ships which in turn led to the accumulation of large crowds in the port while the city was filled with Tatars and Cossacks. The existence of three day cease fire to quell the city was most probably due to Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's desire to resettle it with his supporters and bring Kefe under the Crimean rule.

Under these conditions, Ottomans had no option but restore Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray to their former status.⁷²⁶ A *Çorbacı* (middle rank janissary officer)⁷²⁷ was sent to Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray brothers to discuss the peace conditions. The messenger asked them whether they would accept the Ottoman conditions which were to liberate the captives, send back the captured gun, and evacuate Kefe so that they could preserve their status; or

⁷²⁵ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.II., pp. 59-60.

⁷²⁶ *ibid.* pp. 60-61.

⁷²⁷ For more information on *Çorbacı* see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Çorbacı", *DİA* C.VIII, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 369-370.

face an allout campaign of the empire.⁷²⁸ The Ottoman proposal was accepted by the brothers according to the consultation of the notables. However, the Nogays, who wanted to avenge the killing of Çoban Devlet Giray Sultan, attacked again and massacred Ottoman soldiers.⁷²⁹

The reports of Muscovite diplomats Yakov Dashkov and Vasilii Volkov describe the same story with slight differences.⁷³⁰ Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan attacked the convoy of Canıbek Giray Khan which was accompanied by 6,000 Ottoman soldiers and pushed them back to the sea where they were drowned.. As a result of their total victory, Nureddin Azamet Giray Sultan, five Giray Sultans together with their families, Bek Ağa, the right hand man of Canıbek Giray Khan, together with several nirzas and Ottoman pashas surrendered to the brothers while Canıbek Giray Khan and the Serdar fled to Varna via sea. Kefe where there was no heavy artillery could not resist and surrendered. Kalgay Şahin Giray started to eliminate his enemies and appointed a Crimean Tatar Pasha as a governor. French Ambassador Philippe De Cesy reports that the Ottoman forces tried to flee at night after the fierce battle outside Kefe but were intercepted by the Tatars who were awaiting them on the road. In addition to 26 heavy artilleries, 500 wagons were lost and the standart of the Sultan more than 3000 Ottoman soldiers including two viziers, Ibrahim Pasha and Hasan Pasha perished in the battle while Recep Pasha was heavily

⁷²⁸ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., p. 283.

⁷²⁹ Henry H. Howorth, *History of the ... Part II, The So-called Tatars of Russia and Central Asia Division I*, p. 542.

⁷³⁰ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo* ..., pp. 112-113

wounded.⁷³¹ According to the reports of Thomas Roe dated 7.8 and 21.8.1624, the Crimean Tatars were in open rebellion against the Ottomans and was able to break up from them.⁷³² Thomas Roe reports that Crimean Tatars did not only attack Moldavia and force Voevode Radu Mihnea to flee but also did not return the Ottoman cannons captured in Kefe 21-IX-1624.⁷³³

Kefeli Haçatur complained that after the arrival of Canibek Giray Khan, the city was besieged and its infrastructure was destroyed which resulted in food and water shortages.⁷³⁴ He also cursed the Godless Canibek Giray Khan together with Ottomans and applauded his escape and welcomed the entrance of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan who brought peace and order to the city (15.9.1624) He also notes that the Nogays and Cossacks who entered the city before the Kalgay robbed the population and pillaged the commercial districts.

3.26 The third reign of Mehmed Giray III (1624-1628)

3.26.1 The anti-Ottoman foreign policy of Kalgay Şahin Giray

Two brother's victory was very fragile; it was obvious that the Porte reaffirmed their status under extraordinary conditions and would try to take the revenge as soon as possible. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's connections with Shah Abbas I and two brothers reluctance's to join the Ottoman Persian campaigns was another major problem. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who was aware of the dangers, pursued an aggressive foreign policy contrary to Mehmed Giray III Khan who above all tried to

⁷³¹ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 273 and the report of Philippe De Cesy dated 01-IX-1624 in A. Turgenev, *Akty Istoricheskije, Otnosyashchieskie ...*, T.II, p. 427.

⁷³² Thomas Roe, *ibid*, p. 268 and. p.273.

⁷³³ *Ibid*. p. 292.

⁷³⁴ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... pp. 144-145.

reconcile with the Porte. The energetic Kalgay who did not know his limits offered both Zaporozhian Cossacks and Poland to form an alliance against the Ottomans. In his letter to Sigismund III, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan informed him that some 300 Cossacks came to their aid against the Ottomans who wanted to remove them from the throne and reminded him the days when there were no deadly wars between the two countries and blaming the Porte for the existence of the internecine struggle and he wanted to restore old friendship between them. As an act of good will, he proposed that the territory between Don and Bucak, except the lands between Dniestr and Azov Sea which belonged to the Crimean Khanate, should be a part of Poland. In exchange, he requested the military aid of Poland and the permission for military cooperation with Zaporozhian Cossacks, if the King could not send his forces. After the elimination of the Ottomans, he would turn against Muscovy and take back from them the lands of their ancestors, Kazan and Hacitarhan Khanates and abandon the rest of the Muscovite lands to Poland. He stated that he asked for the Cossacks because they were the best match for Janissaries; and he also requested the dispatch of ammunitions which they could no more obtain from the Ottomans. The Zaporozhian Cossack commander J. Lubiewicz in his letter to Sigismund III dated 2.9.1624, confirmed that as an act of goodwill Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan sent 300 Christian (Cossack) captives to Zaporozhian Host with his internuncio Mirza and the rest of the captives to the Cossack city called Vrochiste.⁷³⁵ In the last letter,

⁷³⁵ See: document no: 2 in Alexander Baran, "Shahin Girai of ..., pp. 31-32.

Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan proposed a tripartite alliance between Crimea, Poland and Persia against the Ottomans.⁷³⁶ Şahin Giray Sultan also knew that the existence of pro-Ottoman Kantemir Mirza was the fundamental obstacle between Crimea and Poland. Therefore his first proposal was to cooperate against Kantemir Mirza who was also the fundamental target of Poland. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's primary objective was to subjugate all of the centrifugal forces inside the Khanate. Kantemir Mirza, who had the full support of the Porte again, was the most important one.

3.26.2 The first formal alliance between the Crimean Khanate and Zaporozhian Host (1625)

Şahin Giray Sultan was disappointed by the diversion of Poles, who did not want to attract the hostility of the Porte, signed an alliance treaty with the Zaporozhian Cossacks in Karayteben,⁷³⁷ which was a market place at the juncture of Dnieper and

Yılkı Su (Kins'ki Vody) rivers (24.12.1624/3.1.1625).⁷³⁸ According to the report of the Zaporozhian Cossack envoys, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan personally came to Zaporozhia and concluded a peace treaty with them.⁷³⁹ According to the Muscovite sources, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan had already sent supplies including 1000 cattles, 300 cows, wine and wheat to the Zaporozhians at the end of 1624.⁷⁴⁰ The agreement

⁷³⁶ See. Document no: 3 in *ibid.* pp. 34-35.

⁷³⁷ For more information on Karayteben see: Bartosz Paprocki, *Herby Rycerstwa Polskiego*, (ed. K. Turowski) Cracow, 1858, p. 159.

⁷³⁸ See: the letter of Kievan Metropolit Iov Boretskii dated 12-I-1625/19-I-1635 in Severin Golubev, *Kievskii Mitropolit' Petr' Mogila i Ego Spodvizhniki*, T.I. Kiev, 1883, pp. 273-275.

⁷³⁹ See: the letter of Voevode of Putivl to Moscow in P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. pp. 157-161.

⁷⁴⁰ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 114.

stipulated that the Crimean Tatars and Zaporozhian Cossacks would not make war among themselves, and Zaporozhians would help them against the Ottomans.⁷⁴¹ Three days after the Christmas, Zaporozhian Cossacks joined Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to fight against Kantemir Mirza according to the requirements of the treaty.⁷⁴²

The de facto alliance between Kalgay Şahin Giray and Zaporozhian Cossacks against the Porte had already started before the signing of the formal treaty in 1624. After becoming Crimean Khan for the first time, Mehmed Giray III Khan managed to construct fortresses on the lower Dnieper to block Cossack exit roots to the Black Sea upon the order of the Porte. Ottoman decision to replace him changed the balance of power and resulted with a rapprochement between the deposed Khan and the Cossacks against the Ottomans. The Cossack raid of Kefe was considered to be their first venture in the name of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan (12.5.1624).⁷⁴³

The most important result of the Cossack presence in the Black Sea which caused a great panic in Istanbul was to divide the Ottoman forces and prevent them to dispatch much needed reinforcements to Crimea. According to the words of Thomas Roe, the empire had to prepare three different armies at the same time: the first one against Persia, the second one against Poland, and the last one for Crimea, meanwhile the security of the capital was neglected. The capital was almost defenceless when a Cossack fleet of 70-80 chaikas appeared in

⁷⁴¹ For the text of the treaty see: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. pp. 404-405.

⁷⁴² P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. p. 159.

⁷⁴³ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. p. 401.

Bosphorus and burned down Büyükdere, Yeniköy and İstinye (Steniea) for nine hours without resistance (09.6.1624).⁷⁴⁴ Upon the order of the Sultan, Ottomans gathered a navy with every vessel that was available in order to stop the Cossack fleet. However, the rambling navy could not dare to stand against them because of the risk that the capital would be completely vulnerable to Cossack incursions in case of a defeat.⁷⁴⁵

Two weeks later the Cossacks returned to the Bosphorus with a larger navy (150 chaikas). According to the writing of Kiev Orthodox Metropolitan Boretsky (1620-1631), the Ottoman fleet of 25 galleys came across to the Cossack fleet at the mouth of Dnieper. The Ottomans could not manage to stop the Cossack fleet which appeared in the vicinity of Istanbul and this time they burned down Rumeli Kavağı. They threatened to attack arsenal (*tophane*) and but returned with a large booty after the arrival of two galleys and twenty boats.⁷⁴⁶ The Cossacks even essayed to organize a third raid, which was not usual, but they were forced to return from Özü because of the unfavorable winds (16/26.8.1624).⁷⁴⁷

It is evident that Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan benefited very much from their alliance with the Zaporozhian Cossacks during their struggle against the Ottomans, but it is not possible to say the same for their allies. For the Crimean side the alliance was against the Porte but the Cossacks were hoping that it could be used against

⁷⁴⁴ M. Grushevskii, *Istoriya Ukrainskogo Kozachestva*, V. II, Kiev, 1914, p. 251 and see: notes 139 and 141 above.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 251.

⁷⁴⁶ See: document no: 55 dated 24731-VIII-1624 in (ed.) *Arkheograficheskii Sbornik Dokumentov Otnosyashchikhsya K Istorii Severozapadnoi Rusi*, No: 7, Vilnius, 1870, pp. 81-83.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 82.

Poland.⁷⁴⁸ According to the documents preserved in the Kievan Metropolitinate, the Zaporozhian Cossacks asked the *Sejm* about the solution of the religious dichotomy, the liquidation of the Uniate of Church and the re-legitimization of the Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian territories of the Commonwealth.⁷⁴⁹ Contrary to their expectation, the Crimean Tatar help did not come when they rebelled against Poland (19/29.10.1625). The most significant part of the alliance was that it was a political agreement signed between two political entities which did not consider Cossacks as subordinates.⁷⁵⁰

3.27. The Şehzade Yahya affair (1625-1626)

Kalgay Şahin Giray Sutan was eager to join every promising political venture especially when it was against his arch enemy; the Ottomans, like his new allies the Cossacks. Meanwhile, a strange person arrived in the Zaporozhian Sich; Şehzade Yahya (Alexander Akhia, Count Alexander of Montenegro 1585-1649), was a pretender claiming to be the son of Mehmed III.⁷⁵¹ The Ottoman version of False Dmitrii was presumably smuggled away by his Crypto-Christian mother Safiye Sultan⁷⁵² (Baffo d. 1619) to Greece after the death of his father and raised as an Orthodox Christian. He travelled across European courts and tried to find financial and military support to become the Ottoman

^{748 748} Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate ...*, p. 134.

⁷⁴⁹ See: document no 2 dated 01/11-I-1625 in Yurii Mytsyk, "Kilka Dokumentiv do Istorii Kozats'ko-Tatarskoho Soyuzu 1625 Roku ta Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy v Ukraini", *Rukopisna ta Knyzhkova Spadschyna Ukrainy*, Vyp. 4, Kyiv, 1998, pp. 139-146.

⁷⁵⁰ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 90.

⁷⁵¹ For more information on Şehzade Yahya see: Vittorio Catualdi, *Sultan Jahja Dell Imperial Casa Ottomana*, Trieste, 1889, Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk A pattern of Alliances 1350-1700*, New York, 1976, pp. 219-236 and for his activities in the steppes see: P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. pp. 142-286.

⁷⁵² For more information on Safiye Sultan see: Akyıldız, Ali, "Safiye Sultan", *DİA*, C.XXXV, İstanbul, 2008, pp.472-473.

Sultan. Finally, his path coincided with the *Lisovchyky Cossacks* who invited him to come with them to Zaporozhia, since only the Zaporozhian Cossacks who share the same belief could help him (1623).⁷⁵³ The Metropolitan of Kiev Iov Boretsky was informed by a Muscovite magnate about the arrival of a baptized son of the Ottoman Sultan Murat III, Alexander Akhia to Kiev (21/31.10.1624).⁷⁵⁴ According to the story of the magnate, he had already been accepted as their leader by the Balkan Christians who were dreaming of being independent from the Ottomans, and he also had the support of the many European courts. Now he was going to Zaporozhian Sich to convince them to join the fight against the Ottomans. The Poles who preferred to make peace with the Ottomans disregarded Yahya.⁷⁵⁵ However, his representatives who had the sanction and the recommendation of Metropolitan Boretsky were welcomed in Moscow.⁷⁵⁶ Mikhail I presented him valuable gifts but declared that he could not provide military assistance, because he was working with the Zaporozhian Cossacks who were the subjects of Sigismund III.⁷⁵⁷ Moreover, the Tsar did not even issue an official document (*gramota*) for Yahya fearing that it could be apprehended by the Ottomans who were currently at peace with Muscovy.⁷⁵⁸ Unlike the Catholic Poland, it was not easy for Muscovy to turn its back to the Orthodox Balkan peoples, The possible effects of Yahya's political activities within the

⁷⁵³ P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. p. 213

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 148.

⁷⁵⁵ See: the report of Priest Filip to Metropolit Iov Boretsky about the situation in Ukraine in *Ibid.* pp. 226-231. .

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 149-150.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 150.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 173.

Muscovite territory without causing the reaction of the Ottomans and Crimean Khanate were discussed in the Boyar Duma.⁷⁵⁹ Finally, it was decided to transfer him secretly from Putivl on the Polish border to Mtsenk and then to Moscow without attracting the attention of the Poles who could deliver him to the Ottomans.⁷⁶⁰

It was evident that the Cossacks were more than ready to support any centrifugal force that welcomed him.⁷⁶¹ In his report to Moscow about the situation in Ukraine and Yahya, the Voevode of Putivl talks about the determination of Zaporozhian Cossacks to fight with Yahya against the Ottomans (1625).⁷⁶² In the *Sich* Yahya learned that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sulran wanted to make peace with the Zaporozhian Cossacks and fight against the Ottomans. He wrote to Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan about his identity and his desire to fight “to take back his throne” and invited him to join his campaign; but the Kalgay declined this offer and he sent an invitation to Yahya instead.⁷⁶³ Finally, the two parties came across at the opposite banks of the Dnieper but the meeting did not happen because neither Cossacks nor Crimean Tatars allowed their leader to visit other camp. Later, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan wrote a secret letter to Yahya promising that he would help him to fight against Ottomans. According to Yahya’s explanation, he did not go to the meeting with Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, because Kalgay’s real intention was to capture him and sell to the Ottomans for a high

⁷⁵⁹ See: document 8 about the opinion of the Boyar Duma on how to behave about Yahya dated 16/26-XII-1624 in *ibid.* pp. 185-187.

⁷⁶⁰ See: the transfer of Yaha to Mnetsk in January 1625 in *ibid.* pp. 187-193

⁷⁶¹ For Cossacks attitude towards the pretenders see: pages 71-72 above.

⁷⁶² See: the letter of Voevode of Putivl to Moscow in P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. pp. 157-161.

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.* pp. 214-215.

ransom.⁷⁶⁴ Examining the Muscovite sources, it is also possible to deduce that the alleged meeting between Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan and Yahya did not happen let alone it was successful and the Crimean-Zaporozhian alliance had nothing to do with Yahya.

However, Yahya's biographer Vittorio Catualdi states that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan demonstrated great respect for Yahya and promised to serve him with all his power.⁷⁶⁵ In 10.5.1625, a joint Zaporozhian-Don Cossack force including Yahya descended Black Sea, and after pillaging Chilia, Ismail and Constanta at the mouth of Danube, directed towards Anatolia. While the Cossacks were willing to attack directly at the Bosphorus, Yahya convinced them to attack Trabzon. Vittorio Catualdi argues that his objective was to distract the Ottomans attention from the Balkans where he was expecting to incite revolts against the Ottoman rule with the support of the Duc of Tuscany.⁷⁶⁶ The Ottoman chroniclers and European diplomats who were in Istanbul during 1625 confirmed the Cossack raids without referring to Yahya. Unfortunately, the information within the Muscovite sources does not coincide with the biography of Vittorio Catualdi. According to Yahya's statement in Muscovite sources, Zaporozhian Host declared that 18,000 Zaporozhian and 300 Don Cossacks were ready to fight for him for six *efimki*⁷⁶⁷ (silver coin) per mounted man and four *efimki* per foot man a month plus a bonus of 30 000 Polish zloties (20/30.1.1625). In addition, 8000 town Cossacks were also willing to join him at the exchange of

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 215.

⁷⁶⁵ Vittorio Catualdi, *Sultan Jahja Dell ...*, p. 134.

⁷⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 135.

⁷⁶⁷ For more information on efimki see: E.V. Pukhov, *Moneta <Efimok s Priznakom>*, St. Petersburg, 2020.

60,000 ducats. The project did not come into effect because Yahya could not pay them on time. According to Yahya, the project failed because 60,000 ducats promised by the Duke of Tuscany Ferdinando II de Medici (1621-1670) did not arrive.⁷⁶⁸ He further stated that the Cossacks did not listen to him and sailed back to the Host in the spring and lingered long time there. In fact, the Cossacks were very active in the Black Sea throughout 1625; and there were several campaigns between the spring and autumn but there is not any considerable and accurate information about them. On April, a group of Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks entered the Black Sea from Don but trapped by the storm; and only 30 boats could return to their host base.⁷⁶⁹ According to the Muscovite sources, a joint Don-Zaporozhian Cossack fleet sailed towards Anatolian coasts and besieged Trabzon for four weeks. When a quarrel about the priority to enter the fortress turned to astrife between them and several Cossacks were killed including one of the best Don Cossack Atamans, the siege failed.⁷⁷⁰ A different source states that on May 1625, 400 Don and Zaporozhian Cossacks under the command of Zaporozhian Cossack A. Shafran attacked and captured Trabzon.⁷⁷¹ According to the testimony of Yahya, during the campaign, 300 Don Cosacks joined him in Zaporozhia with their ataman; and he went to campaign accompanied with 100 Zaporozhian and 60 Don Cossack boats.⁷⁷² On this occasion, Zaporozhian and Don

⁷⁶⁸ P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. pp. 215-216.

⁷⁶⁹ V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky Ukrain's'koho Kozatstva z Donom u XVI-seredyni XVII st.*, Kyiv-Zapaorizhzhya, 1998, p. 164.

⁷⁷⁰ V. Sukhorukov, *Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli ...* V.I., pp. 187-188.

⁷⁷¹ V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky Ukrain's'koho Kozatstva ...*, p. 164.

⁷⁷² P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. p. 225.

Cossacks sailed separately from their bases and met at Trabzon.⁷⁷³

According to the dispatch of French ambassador De Cesy, Zaporozhian Cossacks who appeared before Istanbul caused a great panic but they have turned eastward to Trabzon and pillaged more than 250 settlements on their journeyi but failed to capture the citadel (5.6.1625).⁷⁷⁴

The Cossack fleet managed to capture the city except the citadel where the Ottomans took refuge. Yahya who realized that they could not hold it longer turned the direction of the fleet towards Kefe upon the advices of four Greek merchants who promised to show him the weak parts of the fortress.⁷⁷⁵ During the siege of Kefe Yahya was wounded at his right leg, but he managed to enter city and burned it down.⁷⁷⁶ After Kefe, Yahya turned his direction again to Anatolia and besieged Sinop and caused heavy damage. The succesfull campaign of the Cossack fleet caused a great chaos in Istanbul and even the chainblock which closed the entrance of Golden Horn reemerged since the Ottoman conquest in 1453.⁷⁷⁷ However, contrary to the intention of Yahya to sail directly towards Istanbul, the Cossacks insisted first to secure the spoils and returned to the Host. The Cossacks were mobilized again and reappeared in Bosphorus during the first week of the August 1625.⁷⁷⁸ The capital laid defenceless in front of the Cossack fleet and the Viziers were suggesting to the Sultan to abandon the capital and pass to

⁷⁷³ V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky Ukrains'koho Kozatstva ...*, p. 164.

⁷⁷⁴ A. Turgenev, *Akty Istoritcheskie, Otnosyashchieskie ...*, T.II, pp. 429-430.

⁷⁷⁵ Vittorio Catualdi, *Sultan Jahja Dell ...*, p. 136.

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 136-137.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.* p. 141.

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid.* p.139.

Anatolian side which was safer. However, Murad IV refused this idea and remained in the city.⁷⁷⁹ At the end, the Ottoman navy managed to stop Cossack fleet thanks to the favorable wind and superior fire power.⁷⁸⁰ The Cossacks retreated to the mouth of Dnieper to return again. Yahya purchased ammunition and 300 guns to use against the Ottomans (25-VIII-1625). However, upon the pressure of the Porte, the Poles ordered the Zaporozhian Cossacks to put an end to the campaign. Under these circumstances, the Zaporozhians decided to stop the campaign, but they invited Yahya to come the *Sich* with them and promised him that they would return to Istanbul together as soon as possible.⁷⁸¹

S. Koniecpolski immediately attacked the Cossack lands with 30,000 soldiers in order to expel Yahya, the number one enemy of the Ottomans.⁷⁸² Zaporozhian Host declared their support for Yahya and incited a revolt against Poland who persecuted people of Orthodox faith and were ready to make him King of Little Russia (Ukraine) by the Metropolit of Kiev, and punish Poland with the support of Muscovy or Crimean Khanate and move towards Istanbul afterwards.⁷⁸³ Yahya did not accept the proposal on the ground that he did not want to fight with another Christian state; and openly stated that he just wanted to fight against the Ottomans.⁷⁸⁴ Although the Zaporozhians did not like his answer, they thought that it was more convenient to use his prestige

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 140.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 141-142.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.* p. 143.

⁷⁸² *Ibid.* p. 145.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.* pp. 145-146.

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p. 146.

and provided him with 120 horsemen for his journey to the Don Cossack Host.⁷⁸⁵ Meanwhile, Yahya refused their proposal to become their king on the ground that it would unite Poles, Crimean Tatars and Ottomans which would mean the devastation of their Host and suggested them to enter under the protection of the Orthodox Muscovite Tsar.⁷⁸⁶ Muscovite sources remain silent about Yahya's Black Sea campaign other than referring to his plan to incite a rebellion in the Balkans with the help of Cossacks.⁷⁸⁷ Yahya's steppe adventure had several setbacks from the beginning and did not produce an outcome. For the Poles, he was an Orthodox Christian who could cause the break up of Orthodox subjects of the Commonwealth. His presence and activities was also hampering the fragile peace with the Ottoman Empire. For the Muscovites, he had the potential of becoming an alternative power center which could stimulate the centrifugal elements of the society. He could also provoke the wrath of the Ottomans as in the case of Poland. However, Muscovy, recovering from the devastation of the Times of Troubles, did not miss the opportunity and proposed for the first time the Ruthenian people and church came under the suzerainty of Muscovite Tsar.⁷⁸⁸ It appears that Yahya was not able to convince the Crimean Tatars to support him. It was only the Cossacks that were more than ready to tag behind every adventurer who supported Yahya. Paradoxically, in the case of Cossacks, it was Yahya who did not trust them and turned back their proposal to be their ruler.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 146.

⁷⁸⁶ P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. p. 216.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 279.

⁷⁸⁸ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. pp. 409-410.

He realized that he did not have the slightest chance to succeed in the steppes and turned back to the Balkans declaring that his only objective was to become the Ottoman Sultan.

There is also a scarcity of information about the relationship between Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan and Yahya except the argument of Yahya that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's real objective was to hand him over to the Ottomans. Kiev Metropolitan Petro Mohila (1596-1647) in his letter dated 12.1.1625 stated that when he returned from the unsuccessful meeting with Yahya, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was accompanied by a claimant to the Moldavian throne, Bogdan son of Ieremia Movila whom he wanted to enthrone.⁷⁸⁹ According to the report of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's envoy to Poland, Bogdan convinced Şahin Giray Sultan that there was a hidden treasure in the Suceava Monastery where his father was buried. The Kalgay who presented him a silver garment promised to make him Moldovan Hospodar, if he brought the treasure to him but Bogdan disappeared during his journey to Suceava.⁷⁹⁰ According to the report of Venetian Bailo Giorgio Guistinian (1620-1627), an uncertain pretender for the Moldavian throne secretly escaped to Crimea.⁷⁹¹ Therefore, it was possible that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan tried to take Yahya under control and to use against the Ottomans.

While Yahya was on his way to Astrakhan, he was invited to Moscow by Tsar Mikhail I who wanted to benefit from his prestige. Yahya having conveyed his gratitude for the hospitable invitation of the Tsar, he told

⁷⁸⁹ S. Golubev "Kievskii Mitropolit' Petr' Mogila i Ego Spodvizhniki", V. I, Kiev, 1883, p. 275.

⁷⁹⁰ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 104.

⁷⁹¹ See document no: 457 dated 07-XII-1624 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria Romanilor Suplement II V. II, 1601-1640*, Bucarest, 1895, p. 406

to the Muscovite delegation that he was not looking for a permanent refuge, just a temporary shelter.⁷⁹² Yahya did not want to go to the court of Mikhail I because he was afraid that he could be taken as a hostage. Therefore, Yahya replied that he did not have any political ambition in Muscovy and he just wanted to die for the Orthodox fate.⁷⁹³ The Muscovite delegation was satisfied with his answers when they understood that he wanted to go directly to Germany without interfering neither Polish nor Ottoman affairs and offered to escort him till Arkhangelsk where he was presented a valuable fur equal to 12,000 ducats.⁷⁹⁴ Thus, the Northern adventure of Yahya ended without success in the spring of 1626.

3.28 Ottoman reaction to the Crimean Tatar-Zaporozhian alliance

The Ottomans, upon learning about the military cooperation between Crimean Tatars and Cossacks, changed the directions of its steppe policy. First, they unsuccessfully tried to ensure the loyalty of the Crimean Khanate.⁷⁹⁵ When they faced with the Cossack incursions and the rumors about the joint Crimean-Cossack campaign on Ottoman lands, they began to put pressure on Poland and threatened it with war, because they believed that the Zaporozhian Cossack attacks on the Ottoman lands were made for the sake of Mehmet Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers.⁷⁹⁶ They also called the Crimean Khan to punish anti-Ottoman actions of the Poles and Cossacks. A *Çavuş* (Messenger) brought sword, kaftan and the ferman, which called

⁷⁹² Vittorio Catualdi, *Sultan Jahja Dell* ...pp. 146-147.

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 147.

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 147-148.

⁷⁹⁵ V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky Ukraïns'koho Kozatstva* ..., p. 165-166.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 166.

the Khan to the campaign on Poland, arrived at Bahçesaray (August 1625).⁷⁹⁷ Finally, they organized two fleets to counter Cossacks; one was placed near Trabzon under the command of İlyas Pasha who had initially been assigned to the Persian front, and the other one at the mouth of Dnieper. In the letter of the Governor of Özi Diak Mehmed Paşa to S. Koniecpolski, the second Trabzon campaign of the Cossack fleet was described as a complete failure because they were defeated by the Ottoman fleet several times.⁷⁹⁸ According to the Muscovite reports, the governor of Özü, Şakşaki Mehmet Pasha was ordered to march on Poland together with the Crimean forces.⁷⁹⁹

Consequently, the Polish state which was not ready to enter to a military conflict with the Porte immediately dispatched S. Poczanowski to the *Sich* with orders to stop any anti-Ottoman actions. However, he met with a stiff resistance of the part of the Cossacks.⁸⁰⁰ Meanwhile, the Don Cossacks learned that the Azak Horde (Gazi Ulus), taking advantage of their absence, entered their territory and burned down five settlements that were empty.⁸⁰¹ It is not certain that the attack of the Azak Horde was stimulated by the Ottomans or not. As a response, the Don Cossacks, who remained in the Host, attacked at Azak. Probably, in the early days of summer, the joint Cossack fleet reappeared before Trabzon upon the request of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan and stormed the forts of Trabzon, Sinop and Samsun but ousted by the forces of

⁷⁹⁷ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 116.

⁷⁹⁸ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. p. 419 note: 185.

⁷⁹⁹ V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky Ukrain's'koho Kozatstva ...*, p. 166.

⁸⁰⁰ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. p. 417.

⁸⁰¹ V. Sukhorukov, *Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli ...* V.I., pp. 188-189.

Ilyas Pasha and headed back towards Crimea.⁸⁰² 500 Don and 800 Zaporozhian Cossacks perished during the skirmishes. In Crimea, they burned down several villages around Gözleve and drove off horses from Orkapı with the Astrakhan Tatars and returned to their Hosts.⁸⁰³ The attack was extremely disturbing for Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan and it was considered to be the end of the alliance between Crimea and the *Sich* by the Muscovite sources.⁸⁰⁴ Musketeers under the command of Nureddin Sultan were sent to Orkapı to prevent Zaporozhian incursions. However, the alliance between the Kalgay Sultan and Zaporozhian Cossacks proved to be more successful and did not disintegrate. The Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were allowed to use Gözleve for logistics, disregarded the “betrayal” of the Kalgay Sultan.⁸⁰⁵ In his letter to the King Sigismund III dated 22.9/2.10.1625 the Castellan of Cracow Jerzy Zbaraski (1573-1631) states that it was highly probable that a Polish punitive expedition to the Zaporozhian lands could provoke the reaction of the Crimean Tatars.⁸⁰⁶ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan’s envoy to Poland stated that the Kalgay did not listen the order of Mehmed Giray III Khan who asked him to deliver the Cossacks to the Ottomans. He charged his personal surgeon-barber for the treatment of the wounded Cossacks.⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰² *Ibid.* pp.189-190.

⁸⁰³ *Ibid.* pp.190-191.

⁸⁰⁴ V. Brekhunenko, *Stosunky Ukrains’koho Kozatstva ...*, p. 168.

⁸⁰⁵ A. Turgenev, *Akty Istoricheskie, Otnosyashchieskie ...*, T.II, p. 430.

⁸⁰⁶ August Sokolowski, *Listy Ksiecica Jerzego Zbaraskiego Kasztelana Krakowskiego z Lat 1621-1631*, Cracow, 1878, p. 97.

⁸⁰⁷ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 111.

3.29 The battle of Karaharman (1625)

The rumors about the existence of a Cossack fleet and the likelihood of a Crimean-Zaporozhian alliance already alarmed the Porte for the security of the capital. However, the clash between the Janissaries and Cebecis⁸⁰⁸ left the fleet almost defenseless against the Cossack attacks and delayed its departure.⁸⁰⁹ When the Ottoman fleet arrived at Kılburun, it was learned that the Cossacks departed towards Trabzon but the council of war decided to remain in the area because it was believed that the Cossacks would most probably return back.⁸¹⁰ According to the report of the English Ambassador T. Roe, Kapudan Recep Pasha sent a fleet of 180 frigates under the command of Şakşaki İbrahim Pasha to guard the mouth of Dnieper. Şakşaki İbrahim Pasha who saw that everything was quiet, landed on the shore for the celebration of the feast of *Ramazan* (07.7.1625) but he was ambushed by the Cossacks and lost several men and ships.⁸¹¹ Recep Pasha hurried to Özü upon learning the incident and came across with the Cossack fleet consisted of 350 boats which were directed towards Istanbul near Karaharman (Vadu) and managed to defeat them thanks to the starting of favorable wind. Moreover, J. Zbaravski states that Cossacks captured part of the Ottoman artillery and attacked to Özü but were repulsed and lost around two thousand men.⁸¹² Despite the fact it was mainly coincidental and the Ottoman fleet was on the verge of the

⁸⁰⁸ For more information on Cebeci see: Yasemin Kılıçarslan, "Cebeci", *DİA*, C.VII., İstanbul, 1993. pp. 182-183.

⁸⁰⁹ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.II., p. 72.

⁸¹⁰ *ibid.* pp. 72-74.

⁸¹¹ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., pp. 426-427.

⁸¹² August Sokolowski, *Listy Księcia Jerzego* ... p. 96.

total destruction before the start of the north wind. This enabled the Ottoman galleys to use artillery against the Cossack boats which hooked on Ottoman ships, and the Karaharman battle (5.10.1625) was considered to be the greatest Ottoman naval victory over Cossacks. Katip Çelebi states that 172 boats and 781 Cossacks were taken while the others perished. However, the European sources provide a lesser figure which may indicate that Ottoman chronicles exaggerated the Cossack losses. Thomas Roe admits that 30 boats sunk while 600-700 men were captured while French Ambassador states that 200-300 men perished from either parties.⁸¹³ The fact that the Cossacks continued their naval activities throughout 1625 shows that the Ottoman victory had limited effects over their naval capacity. Most probably, the Ottomans defeated one of the several Cossack fleets that were sailing around the Black Sea while the others remained safe in their harbour. J. Zbaraski writes that Cossacks attacked the fortress of Kili on their return, despite the fact that they were defeated by the Ottoman fleet and lost several boats.⁸¹⁴ According to the Muscovite sources, every Cossack warrior who was returning from Trabzon accused Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan of betraying them and causing the death of several Cossack fighters. They claimed that he had secretly informed the Ottomans about their actions because the Ottomans were already waiting for them in Trabzon when they arrived.⁸¹⁵ If we believe the letter of Diak Mehmed Pasha to S. Koniecpolski which has been mentioned

⁸¹³ The report of Philippe De Cesy dated 05-X-1625 in A. Turgenev, *Akty Istoricheskie, Otnosyashchieskie ...*, T.II, p. 430. .

⁸¹⁴ August Sokolowski, *Listy Księcia Jerzego ...* p. 97.

⁸¹⁵ V.N. Korolev, *Bosforskaya Voina*, Rostov Na Donu, 2002, p. 380.

above, the fact that the Cossack fleet came across to the Ottoman fleet supported their arguments, but it was highly possible that they used Kalgay Şahin Giray's alleged betrayal as a pretext for their failure.

3.30 Kantemir Mirza was again resettled by the Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan

The reports of English Ambassador Thomas Roe support the idea that the greatest fear of the Ottoman administration was the possibility of a joint Crimean Tatar Cossack campaign on Istanbul.⁸¹⁶ However, the political pressure of the Porte on Poland and Kantemir Mirza's commitment to the Ottomans prevented it to happen. It was obvious that the exit of Kantemir Mirza from their control created a serious threat for Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan. Therefore, his return to the Crimean orbit was extremely important. In his letter to Sigismund III, written at the end of 1624, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan stated that he was about to go to Bucak with his army to subdue and bring Kantemir Mirza and his horde back to Crimea.⁸¹⁷ According to the report of Venetian Bailo Giorgio Guistinian, the concentration of Crimean Tatar forces in Akkerman caused a great concern in the Ottoman administration which could not foresee their real objective.⁸¹⁸ They settled when it was understood that the invasion was against Kantemir Mirza but this time the suspicion of a secret agreement between Crimean Tatars and Poles emerged. Ottoman chronicler Naima states that Kantemir Mirza successfully repulsed Kalgay Şahin

⁸¹⁶ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 315.

⁸¹⁷ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 100.

⁸¹⁸ See document no: 458 dated 05-I-1625 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La ... Suplement II V. II*, pp. 406-407.

Giray Sultan's expedition who barely saved his life.⁸¹⁹ B. Baranowski questions the credibility of Naima's story on the ground that such a major incident should have been mentioned in the Polish sources, but it did not exist. On the contrary, according to Şahin Giray Sultan's envoy, Kantemir Mirza and his brother Selman Şah Mirza were now wandering around Orkapı which meant that they obeyed Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan.⁸²⁰ A. A. Novoselskiy, depending on Muscovite reports, states that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was the winner without referring to any encounter with Kantemir Mirza. Kalgay Şahin Giray, Sultan who managed to capture Akkerman, withdrew when he heard about the arrival of the Ottoman forces.⁸²¹ Since several sources agree on the resettlement of Mansuroğulları around Orkapı, it was highly probable that Kantemir Mirza decided to submit without resistance to the will of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan. In his letter J. Zbaravski wrote that Kantemir Mirza, who constantly harassed Polish subjects, had been driven out of Bucak and taken to Crimea according to the order of the Sultan.⁸²² According to the Muscovite sources, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan had deported the Hordes of Kantemir Mirza and his brother Gulim Divey to Crimea where Kantemir stayed until the beginning of 1627.⁸²³ Finally, Katip Çelebi states that Kantemir Mirza was deported to Crimea by Mehmed Giray III Khan upon the order of the Sultan because of his military activities which continuously increased the tension on the Polish

⁸¹⁹ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-I ...*, C.II, p. 566.

⁸²⁰ Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna ...* p. 38.

⁸²¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 114.

⁸²² August Sokolowski, *Listy Księcia Jerzego ...* p. 97.

⁸²³ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 114.

border.⁸²⁴ It has already been stated that one of the primary objectives of Poland was to remove Kantemir Mirza from the region. It seems that the Porte accepted to give up Kantemir Mirza with the exchange of the prevention of Cossacks raids by Poland. Kantemir Mirza most probably realized that it was the Ottomans who requested his deportation and did not resist; and obeyed to the will of the Porte. In view of these pieces of information, it is difficult to accept that the relationship between Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan with Kantemir Mirza was hostile.

According to the testimony of a Crimean Tatar captive to the Poles, the deportation was two staged.⁸²⁵ First, all Kantemir's belongings and wives went to Crimea with some of Mangıt Mirzas. Second, Kantemir and 4000 Nogays remained with Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan until his return to the peninsula. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's envoy to Poland also stated that Kantemir Mirza was wandering outside Orkapı and was frequently visiting the Kalgay; and the two had a very good relationship with each other.⁸²⁶ Consequently, Katip Çelebi writes that Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan complained about the prohibition of their raids while the Cossacks freely wandered around the Black Sea; and they were entitled to the same amount of tribute paid in the time of Süleyman I to the Crimean Khans as a concession.⁸²⁷ It appears that the problem between the two brothers and Kantemir Mirza was related to the control of the Bucak region which provided easy

⁸²⁴ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.II, p. 93.

⁸²⁵ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black* ..., p. 102.

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 102-103.

⁸²⁷ Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke* ..., C.II, p. 93.

access to the rich lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was also known that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan wanted to form an anti-Ottoman alliance. He did not want to alienate Sigismund III, who was already suspicious about the feasibility of the alliance which could provoke the wrath of the Ottomans, and tried to convince Poles that he was working for their benefit. According to the letter of Zaporozhian, Cossacks, who were in the army of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, the Kalgay was in Bucak to drive out every Nogays that were working against Poland in Crimea.⁸²⁸ The two brothers who were aware of the suspicions of the Ottomans of their operations in the Balkans tried to convince them that the sole objective of their invasion of Bucak was to carry out Sultan's order.⁸²⁹ However, according to the enquiry of Thomas Roe, they were not able to convince the Ottoman administration and considered their message as a test for the possible Ottoman reaction and commitment. The reports of Venetian Bailo Giorgio Guistinian confirms that the Crimean Tatar invasion of Wallachia and Moldavia caused a great concern in the Ottoman capital and could only be pacified after the promise of the Crimean Tatars to pull back to the north of Danube.⁸³⁰ It appears that the solution of the Bucak problem did not only affect the Ottoman-Crimean relations but also the Crimean-Polish relations. Parallel to the stabilization of the Ottoman-Crimean relations, the Crimean approach to Poland also gradually changed. While the emphasis on anti-Ottoman solidarity was fading

⁸²⁸ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 103.

⁸²⁹ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, pp. 362-363.

⁸³⁰ See documents no: 453 and dated 454 ed 15-X-1625 and 24-X-1625 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La ... Suplement II V. II* p. 404.

away, the emphasis on Crimean supremacy began to be more explicit. Mehmed Giray III Khan requested the delivery of previous *upomniki* (gifts, tribute) and the prevention of Zaporozhian Cossacks entering Black Sea.⁸³¹ However, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was still talking about the alliance with the Cossacks and requested that they should have been allowed to join his campaign. He was also requesting the payment of the *upomniki* with the statement that his preference would be gunpowder and lead.⁸³²

3.31 The differences between the Khan and the Kalgay's policies towards the Ottomans

1625 was a relatively quiet year within which the relationship among the Ottomans, the Crimean Tatars and the Kantemir Mirza did not turn into a military conflict. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan had their different approaches towards the Ottoman Empire. While Mehmed Giray III Khan believed that it was imperative to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the Porte in order to preserve the Crimean throne, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan believed that they would never be safe on the throne because the Ottomans would never trust them and forget their revolt. According to the report of the Muscovite envoy Kirill Baybirin, as the difference between the brothers came to surface on September 1624 during the Ottoman request for them to return to Kefe. While Mehmed Giray III Khan was ready to accept the return, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan protested and stated that he did not want to serve

⁸³¹ Bohdan Baranowski, *Polska a Tatarszczyzna ...* pp. 38-39..

⁸³² Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 107.

the Sultan forever.⁸³³ It was true that the Ottomans were waiting for the appropriate moment to punish the rebel brothers. A Crimean Tatar captive in Poland stated that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan hurried to Crimea after the end of Bucak campaign in 1625 because of his fear of an Ottoman plot.⁸³⁴ The English Ambassador Thomas Roe writes that the Ottomans sent a galleon to Kefe to gather information about the situation in the peninsula, but it returned empty-handed because of the Governor's warned not to come to shore. Soon the rumors about the plans of the Crimean Tatars and the Cossacks to invade Kefe arrived in the capital.⁸³⁵ Meanwhile, the Muscovite envoy Kirill Baybirin relates that when the Ottoman forces arrived in Crimea in the spring of 1625, Mehmed Giray III Khan visited them and declared his loyalty to the Sultan. While Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan escaped to the steppe with his Safavid guards and called Little Nogays to help, the Ottomans, confined to Kefe to strengthen their position, departed without military engagement.⁸³⁶ On July 1625, the Ottoman state ordered the Crimean Khan to attack on Poland if he wanted to preserve his throne; but if he chose to fight against them together with the Zaporozhians and Poles, the Ottoman army was ready to fight against them.⁸³⁷ It was obvious that the Ottomans who were suspicious about the secret relations of Crimea with Zaporozhians Cossacks and Poland wanted to break up such an alliance. In the eyes of the Ottomans, the Poles and Zaporozhians were identical and the latter were acting according to the

⁸³³ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 115.

⁸³⁴ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p. 107.

⁸³⁵ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 410.

⁸³⁶ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 115-116.

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 116.

directives of the former. Mehmed Giray III Khan replied that he was ready to declare war on Poland if the invitation to the campaign was made in the proper traditional way. When the Porte send a Çavuş with the regalia, the Crimean war council decided to launch a campaign on Poland withas the began to freeze.⁸³⁸ Field Hetman S. Koniecpolski's main concern was that the Crimean Tatars would come to the rescue of their allies the Zaporozhian Cossacks in case of their revolt, as the latter did in the previous year in Crimea. However, Koniecpolski' did not dare to attack, moved around the Polish border, and he was confined to control the main attack roads of the Tatars throughout the summer of 1625.⁸³⁹ He also informed Kalgay Şahin Gıray Sultan that *upominki* of the two previous years were ready to be delivered; and, he convinced the Kalgay to return to Crimea whose departure left the Cossacks alone. As a result, Polish forces engaged with the Zaporozhian Cossacks near Kurukiv Lake (Kurukove) in Poltava (19/29.10.1625) and forced them to sign a treaty with unfavorable terms (5.11.1625).⁸⁴⁰ Besides several rights and privileges, the Cossacks pledged that they would neither make arrangements with nor attack any foreign state. Hetman Mykhailo Doroshenko⁸⁴¹ (1626-1628) took an oath to not lead the Cossacks against the Ottomans by sea or land without the consent

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 116.

⁸³⁹ (ed.) Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnej Polsce z rekopismów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych, oraz z listami oryginalnemi królów znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym. T. 6, Lwow, 1833, p.143.

⁸⁴⁰ For more information on Kurukove War and Treaty see: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V.VII. pp. 425-439.

⁸⁴¹ For more information on Mykhailo Doroshenko see: P.T Firov, *Getmany Ukrainского Kazachestvo Biograficheskie Spravki*, Sevastopol, 2005, p. 15.

of the Kingdom.⁸⁴² The Muscovite envoys reported that, almost simultaneously, depending on their military alliance, the Zaporozhian Cossacks applied to the Crimean Khan and requested his help against the Poles, who were continuously devastating their lands.⁸⁴³

3.32 Crimean Tatar raids on Poland upon the request of the Ottomans

Quite paradoxically, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who were one of the fundamental causes of the problems between Ottomans and Poles, joined the punitive expedition of the Crimean Tatars against Poland, which was instigated by the Ottomans. English ambassador Thomas Roe confirms that the Crimean Tatars and the Zaporozhian Cossacks cooperated during this campaign (21.2.1626).⁸⁴⁴ Polish *Sejm*'s plan to pacify the Crimean Tatars with the dispatch of a 60,000 ducats *upominki* did not work this time.⁸⁴⁵ Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin relates the campaign to the reluctance of Poland to send the yearly *upominki*.⁸⁴⁶ According to the reports of Muscovite envoys D. Skuratov and N. Postinkov a Crimean Tatar army under the command of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Nureddin Azamet Giray Sultan launched a campaign on Poland.⁸⁴⁷ The army consisted of 60,000 Crimean Tatar, Nogay and Ottoman forces reinforced with 20,000 Bucak Tatars. They raided all over the Ukrainian parts of the Commonwealth

⁸⁴² Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...*, V. VII. pp. 437-438.

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 116 and for the devastation of Cossack settlements see: P.A. Kulish, *Materialy dlya Istorii ...*, V. I. p. 229.

⁸⁴⁴ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 486.

⁸⁴⁵ Ambrozy Grabowski, *Ojczyście Spominki w Pismach do Dziejow Dawnej Polski*, V. I, Cracow, 1845, p. 223.

⁸⁴⁶ Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *Romen Kaynak ve ...* p. 45.

⁸⁴⁷ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 117.

12/22.12.1625. The army was able to return to Crimea only in the spring of 1626 with the loss of more than 10,000 men and 40,000 horses but and with more than 50,000 captives. Venetian Bailo Giorgio Guistinian reports that the Crimean Tatar army, drown in the melted ice and attacked by the Poles that were waiting on the other side of the river, lost 25,000 men and most of their booty. To save his life Mehmed Giray III Khan fled to Moldavia with his entourage.⁸⁴⁸ Venetian Bailo in Istanbul also states that the Khan received 5,000 ducats from the Sultan and 20,000 ducats from the Voivode of Wallachia, Alexandru Coconul (1623-1627) who wanted to replace his father Radu Mihnea as the Moldavian Voivode and he returned to Crimea with a great treasure.⁸⁴⁹ The English Ambassador Thomas Roe also states that the Voivode Radu was dead and replaced with a prince, contrary to the traditions of the country, but the Crimean Khan had a legitimate prince in his court that he wanted to make Hospodar by every means.⁸⁵⁰ Venetian Bailo also refers to the increasing activities of the Crimean Tatars on the border and the rumors about their intention to bring a pro-Crimean candidate to the Moldavian throne.⁸⁵¹ Contrary to his brother, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan who remained in Crimea, was waiting for the sailing of the Cossack fleet to the Black Sea. It appears that at least the unregistered and dispossessed Cossacks (around 4000) were opposed to the clauses of the Kurukove treaty, which forbid any alliance with

⁸⁴⁸ See: document no: 467 dated 05-IV-1626 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La ... Suplement II V. II*, p. 414.

⁸⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 414.

⁸⁵⁰ Thomas Roe, *The negotiations ...*, p. 486.

⁸⁵¹ See: document no: 468 dated 10-IV-1626 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La ... Suplement II V. II*, p. 414.

foreign powers, and to attacking Ottoman possessions. They continued to support Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan under the leadership of their *Hetman Olifer* (Holub, Golub d. 1628).⁸⁵²

The Ottomans asked for the renewal of the campaign on Poland in the spring of 1626 again, but this time Mehmed Giray III Khan did not go to the campaign and sent Kantemir Mirza. According to the Muscovite reports there was major strife between the Khan and the Kalgay, and none of them dared to leave the peninsula.⁸⁵³ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who did not participate in the campaign, accused the Porte for the campaign and even dispatched a copy of the ferman that allegedly ordered it against the Poles.⁸⁵⁴ The Ottoman response was that the Sultan by no means ordered Crimean Tatars to attack Poland, and that it was the Khan himself decided to launch a campaign, because he did not regularly receive *upominki* for the last two years.⁸⁵⁵ The Polish administration did not believe the Ottoman explanations and considered it to be one of their traditional maneuvers to receive more tribute.⁸⁵⁶ Quite interestingly, French Ambassador De Cesy put the blame on the Crimean Tatar for the attack as a result of the efforts of the Habsburg and Spanish Empires in order to keep Ottoman busy in the Black Sea

⁸⁵² B.N. Florya, "Zaporozhskoe Kazachestvo i Krym Pered Vosstaniem B. Khmel'nitskogo" *Issledovaniya Po Istorii Ukrainy i Belorusii*, T. 1, Minsk, 1995, p. 53. For more information on Olifer Holub see: P.T. Firov., *Getmany Ukrainskogo Kazachestvo ...* p. 13. .

⁸⁵³ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 117.

⁸⁵⁴ Stanislaw Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy Lwow*, 1842, p. 5 and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of UKRAINE-RUS' Volume Eight: The Cossack Age 1626-1650*, Toronto, 2002, p. 19.

⁸⁵⁵ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...* V. VIII. pp. 19-20.

⁸⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 20.

and out of Mediterranean Sea.⁸⁵⁷ According to the report of Voevode of Belgorod M. Kozlovskii, which depended on the testimony of Crimean Tatar captives, Nureddin Azamet Giray Sultan, with the participation of one of the sons of Kantemir Mirza and the Şirin Mirza Bahadır, organized another raid, targeting the Kiev region between August-October 1626. However, they were ambushed near Akkerman by the Registered Cossacks of M. Doroshenko, who massacred several thousand Nogay cavaliers.⁸⁵⁸

3.33 The decreasing popularity of the brothers as a result of their domestic policies

As was already stated there was no agreement on the Polish affairs between the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan. While Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan wanted to preserve the alliance with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, contrary to the existence of Kurukove agreement, Mehmed Giray III Khan did not want the Crimean-Zaporozhian alliance turned into a Crimean-Polish alliance.⁸⁵⁹ The problems between the two brothers were not confined to international affairs, but also included domestic affairs. Mehmed Giray III Khan's silence about the violent practices of Kalgay Şahin Giray was the major cause of their declining popularity. According to the Muscovite diplomatic reports, the administrative power of the brothers was continuously declining because of their political differences while the controversy within the aristocratic factions was increasing and the

⁸⁵⁷ See the report of Philippe De Cesy dated 03-V-1626 in A. Turgenev, *Akty Istoritcheskije, Otnosyashchieskie ...*, T.II, p. 431..

⁸⁵⁸ See document no: 186 written in 1626 in N. A., Popov, *Akty Moskovskogo Gosudartstva ...* T. I, pp. 202-203.

⁸⁵⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 118.

discontent of the ordinary people was very high.⁸⁶⁰ The Khan, who did not trust the aristocracy since the 1624 affairs, threatened them with the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Little Nogays, whom he had settled inside the peninsula.⁸⁶¹ Even the amiyat (friend, agent) of Muscovy, İbrahim Süleş, confessed them that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan wanted to kill him.⁸⁶² The mirzas and beys were secretly working against the brothers and were willing to bring back Canıbek Giray Khan to the throne. At the end of 1625 Muscovite interpreter F. Myasoedov was reporting that neither the officials nor the ordinary people loved the Khan and Kalgay, that the silence of the Khan against the violent punishments of the Kalgay aggravated the situation, and that everyone desired the return of Canıbek Giray Khan.⁸⁶³ According to the statement of a Crimean Tatar captive of the Voevode of Belgorod, neither the aristocracy nor the ordinary people were in favor of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray's rule.⁸⁶⁴

3.34 The flight of Kantemir Mirza from Crimea and his quest for the Ottoman support

The events which resulted in the end of the rule of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray started with Mehmed Giray III Khan's decision to launch a punitive expedition on the Besleney tribe (winter 1627), which stopped the tribute payment to the Khan. Selmanşah (Salmaş) Mirza, the nephew of Kantemir Mirza, killed the Circassian

⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 118.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.* p.118.

⁸⁶² *Ibid.* p. 118.

⁸⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 118.

⁸⁶⁴ See the statements of the Crimean Tatar captives in document no: 193 written in 1627 in N. A., Popov, *Akty Moskovskogo Gosudartsva ...* T. I, pp. 209-212.

Bey, who was the son-in-law of the Khan, because of a blood feud and then fled immediately.⁸⁶⁵ O. Gaivoronskii states that the Circassian Bey was Gazi Bey and that Selmanşah Mirza accused him of killing his father Temreş several years ago.⁸⁶⁶ Mehmed Giray III Khan, who realized that Selmanşah Mirza would not dare commit such an act by himself, ordered Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who was in Crimea, to immediately round up Kantemir Mirza, who was in Crimea. However, Kantemir Mirza managed to escape from Orkapı and fled to Akkerman with his entourage including Arslanayoğlu and Eseneyoğlu Mirzas.⁸⁶⁷ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan forcibly shaved the hairs of the fugitive Mirzas and cut the tails of the woman and dispatched to the camp of the fugitives and declared that those who remained in Crimea would be severely punished if they did not immediately return to the peninsula.⁸⁶⁸ While some of the clans including the Eseneys, submitted to the will of the Kalgay and returned to Crimea to save the lives of their families, others, like the Arslanay clan, preferred to stay with Kantemir Mirza. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who captured the members of the clans which could not escape, confiscated all their belongings and severely punished them.⁸⁶⁹ The tragic death of the captive Mangit women, who were tortured and burned alive in 1627, made a deep impact on the collective memory of the Crimean people.⁸⁷⁰

⁸⁶⁵ See: *ibid.* p. 211.

⁸⁶⁶ Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy ...* p. 5.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁸⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 6

⁸⁷⁰ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. p. 565 and the Muscovite reports in A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 119.

The Venetian Bailo Giorgio Guistinian states that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan went to Circassia with Kantemir Mirza and 30,000 Tatars to secure Demirkapı, the passage to Persia, but was defeated and blamed Kantemir for the loss.⁸⁷¹ It is possible to consider the defeat in Circassia as the turning point in the relationship between Kalgay Şahin Giray and Kantemir Mirza. Ottoman chronicler Mevkufati Mehmed Efendi (d. 1655), who seems to have personally known and interviewed Kantemir Mirza, describes the course of the events from the eyes of the Ottomans and Kantemir Mirza in his book *Tarih-i Mevkufati*.⁸⁷² According to Mevkufati Mehmed, the Ottoman state could not solve the problem of the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray brothers because of the Safavid invasion of Baghdad (1623) and the revolt of Abaza Mehmed Pasha (1622).⁸⁷³ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan attributed it to the weakness of the Ottomans and began to dream about building his own empire. Later, he revealed his plans to Kantemir Mirza, who was an experienced soldier. Kantemir Mirza replied to him that the Ottomans were one of the greatest empires in world history and that none of the other powers dared to challenge them and he advised him to give up such ideas. Therefore, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's hatred of Kantemir Mirza started after this conversation, but he behaved

⁸⁷¹ See: document no: 469 dated 19-IV-1626 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La ... Suplement II V. II*, p. 415.

⁸⁷² For more information on Mevkufati Mehmed Efendi and *Tarih-i Mevkufati* see: Başer, Alper, "Kırım Hanlığı Tarihini Konu Alan Müstakil Eserler ve Yeni Bir Kaynak, *Tarih-i Mevkufati*", *Turkish Studies International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic*, Volume 6/1 Winter 2011, p. 724-740.

⁸⁷³ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi*, İstanbul Üniversitesi, Nadir Eserler Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar, No..1751. p. 2a.

otherwise and thanked him for his wise advice.⁸⁷⁴ Soon, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan started to make plans to kill Kantemir Mirza because of his fear that he would expose his ambitious plans to the Ottomans.⁸⁷⁵ The Kalgay sent 2000 Crimean Tatars and 500 Circassian to Kantemir Mirza's house but the Mirza managed to escape to the steppe after three hours of skirmish and eluded the trackers.⁸⁷⁶ Mevkufati's explanation of Kantemir Mirza's flight from Crimea corresponds to the words of Kefeli Haçatur who stated that one night Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's men attacked Kantemir Mirza's house, who saved himself by escaping to Akkerman, while his wives, family members and possessions fell into the hands of the Kalgay (April 1627).⁸⁷⁷ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who could not capture Kantemir Mirza, got his revenge by burning alive his family members and punish his supporters.⁸⁷⁸ Later, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan applied to the Porte, asking them to disregard accusations about him by Mirza, and requesting the extradition of his subject Kantemir Mirza because of his improper behaviours, arguing that someone who betrayed his legal master would definitely betray the Sultan.⁸⁷⁹ In his response, Sultan Murad IV stated that Kantemir Mirza was a high ranking and faithful servant of the empire and his deportation was out of question.⁸⁸⁰ Consequently, Kantemir Mirza went secretly to Istanbul and complained to the Porte about Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's anti-Ottoman activities

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 3a-3b.

⁸⁷⁵ *ibid.* p. 4a.

⁸⁷⁶ *ibid.* p. 5a.

⁸⁷⁷ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p. 145.

⁸⁷⁸ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... p. 5b.

⁸⁷⁹ *ibid.* pp. 5b-6a.

⁸⁸⁰ *ibid.* pp. 6b- 7a.

and requested the permission to punish and depose Mehmed Giray III and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sulran.⁸⁸¹ The English Ambassador Thomas Roe also reports that Kantemir Mirza secretly came to the capital and declared his discontent about the Khan and the Kalgay (October 1627).⁸⁸² According to the Ottoman documents, Kantemir Mirza was on the way to Istanbul in August 1627.⁸⁸³ Kantemir Mirza, who was appointed Sancakbeyi (Commander) of Tırhala went to the Bucak region, instead of his post, under the pretext of searching for the remnants of his family.⁸⁸⁴

3.35 The defeat of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan by Kantemir Mirza supported by the Ottomans near Babadağ (early 1628)

Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who learned about the arrival of Kantimur Mirza in Özü decided to eliminate him and gathered a large army, contrary to the warnings of Crimean Tatar notables that the attack on Kantemir Mirza (Ottomans) might cause the devastation of the Khanate and reminded him of the tragic fate of his father, Sa'adet Giray Khan, who revolted against the Ottomans.⁸⁸⁵ It is also possible that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan might have thought that he had been cheated on by the Ottomans because he had believed that the Ottomans would send Kantemir Mirza to the Persian front and free him from the threat of Mansuroğulları.⁸⁸⁶ O. Gaivoronskii claims Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan

⁸⁸¹ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 108.

⁸⁸² Thomas Roe, *The negotiations* ..., p. 688.

⁸⁸³ See document no: 13 dated 26-ZA-1036/08-VIII-1627 in (ed.) Aktaş, Necati vd., 83 *Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (1036-1037/1626-1628) <Özet-Transkripsiyon-İndeks ve Tıpkıbasım>*, Ankara, 2001, p. 10.

⁸⁸⁴ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... p. 7b.

⁸⁸⁵ *ibid.* pp. 7b-8b.

⁸⁸⁶ Stanislaw Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy* ... p. 6

contributed to the construction of a fortress on the Crimean side of Dnieper opposite the Togan Geçidi, for that reason but, S. Przylecki states that the fortress was built on a different place near Islamkirman (Aslankirman) and its main purpose was to survey the Ottoman movements.⁸⁸⁷ The fortress was later destroyed by the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁸⁸⁸ When Kantemir Mirza heard that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was coming towards him, he crossed to the other side of the Danube and positioned himself in the village Toprak near Babadağ. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who positioned himself on the other side, first demanded that the local population hand over Kantemir Mirza to him and attacked them when the locals refused. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was heavily defeated by the forces of Kantemir Mirza who was supported by the Ottoman forces, and was even wounded by Yılandıç Mirza, the youngest son of Kantemir Mirza, during his retreat.⁸⁸⁹ Kefeli Haçatur in his chronicle reports that Kalgay Şahin Giray attacked Kantemir Mirza in Bucak with a large army but was defeated and lost several prominent companions and barely managed to escape to Bahçesaray.⁸⁹⁰ According to the letter of Zaporozhian Cossacks to the King Sigismund III dated 28.7.1628, Şahin Giray Sultan, who was defeated by Kantemir Mirza, applied them for help against his arch enemy, according to their previous agreement; and they decided to join

⁸⁸⁷ Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., p. 116 and Stanislaw Przylecki, *ibid.* p. 6.

⁸⁸⁸ Stanislaw Przylecki, *ibid.* pp. 26-27.

⁸⁸⁹ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... pp. 8b-11b.

⁸⁹⁰ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p. 146.

him with 4000 Cossacks without consulting the Polish authorities because of the emergency nature of the situation.⁸⁹¹

3.36 Kantemir Mirza's invasion of Crimea and Canıbek Giray Khan appointed Crimean Khan again (summer-1628)

According to the report of Muscovite Ambassadors to the Crimean Khanate; S.I. Tarbeev' and I. Basov (1626-1628) who were received by Mehmed Giray III Khan in 6/16.11.1628 the political atmosphere was already tense in the peninsula.⁸⁹² The Khan sent a messenger to S.I. Tarbeev' and suggested that he immediately go to Çufutkale (Kırkyer) to escape from the forces of Kantemir Mirza that were approaching the capital (30.4/7.5.1628).⁸⁹³ Kantemir Mirza did not stop and pursued Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan with 15,000 Nogay cavalry up to Bahçesaray to the camp of Mehmed Giray III Khan and besieged the camp for three weeks.⁸⁹⁴ Brothers Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan did not trust the Crimean population and were proven right when the Crimean Tatars switched their allegiances to the Ottomans upon Kantemir Mirza's arrival to Bahçesaray and requested the appointment of a new Khan.⁸⁹⁵ The Porte, that was more than ready to get rid of the brothers, replaced Mehmed Giray III Khan with Canıbek Giray Khan who returned from exile in Rhodes (4.6.1628).⁸⁹⁶ In fact, during the previous years Canıbek Giray Khan had been lobbying to return to the

⁸⁹¹ Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy ...* pp. 26-28..

⁸⁹² L.M. Savelov, "Iz' Istorii Snoshennii Moskvy s'Krymom' Pri Tsare Mikhail' Fedorovich Posol'tsvo S.I. Tarbeeva v Krym' 1626-1628 gg.", ITUAK, V. XXXIX, Simferopol, 1906, p. 17.

⁸⁹³ *Ibid.* p. 69.

⁸⁹⁴ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi, *Tarih-i Mevkûfati ...* pp. 11b-12a.

⁸⁹⁵ *ibid.* pp.12a-12b.

⁸⁹⁶ *ibid.* p. 12b.

Khanate during the previous years and assured the Porte that once he became the Khan again he would fight with them to the end against the Safavids unlike Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan who were dragging their feet to join the campaigns.⁸⁹⁷

3.37 Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan call to the Zaporozhian Cossacks for military aid

Under these circumstances Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan applied to their old allies; the Zaporozhian Cossacks and asked their military help and proposed giving the fortresses of Kefe, Gözleve and Balıklava, 50000 gold ducats, 1000 concubines, and even the Polish throne to them. As a result, 8000 Cossacks managed to join the forces of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan in Bahçesaray despite the fact their tabor was intercepted by Kantemir Mirza near Almasaray and lost 300 men, including their Hetman.⁸⁹⁸ When the Nogay cavalry began to plunder the countryside after the initial success, Kantemir Mirza was forced to lift the siege of Bahçesaray and retreat to Kefe. Consequently, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan managed to get out of the capital with 4000 men and attacked the Ottoman forces under the command of Ebubekir Bey near Karasu.⁸⁹⁹ According to the testimony of Kefeli Haçatur, Kantemir Mirza pursued the Kalgay up to the gates of Bahçesaray where he laid siege for a long time. The Nogays devastated the countryside and all the livestock, which caused famine in the capital, but miraculously 12,000 Cossacks came to the rescue, thanks to the

⁸⁹⁷ Victor Ostapchuk, *The Ottoman Black ...*, p 151.

⁸⁹⁸ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati ...* pp. 12b-13b.

⁸⁹⁹ *ibid.* p. 13b.

messenger secretly dispatched by Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan.⁹⁰⁰ Emilio D'Ascoli states that Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan appealed to the Cossacks immediately after the defeat in Babadağ when he realized that Kantemir Mirza was supported by the Ottomans and it would not be easy to defeat him without the support of Cossack fire power.⁹⁰¹

3.38 The arrival of the Zaporozhian Cossacks changes the balance of power at the expense of Kantemir Mirza

Muscovite Ambassador S.İ. Tarbeev' states that the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan who were besieged in Eskiuyurt was saved with the arrival 6000 Zaporozhian Cossacks. Taking six days to reach Bahcesaray from Orkapi the Zaporozhian Cossacks moved in *wagenburg* formation because of the surprise attacks of Kantemir Mirza's forces.⁹⁰² The Cossacks received five gold coins each, which came from the tribute that Tarbeev' brought from Moscow.⁹⁰³ Kantemir Mirza, who was defeated by the arrival of Cossacks, escaped to Kefe, while the Nureddin Azamet Giray Sultan, who came to Crimea with him, fled back to Akkirman, while the Cossacks lost their Hetman Mykhailo Doroshenko.⁹⁰⁴

3.39 The siege of Kefe and the psychological warfare

The arrival of 10 000 Cossacks and 30,000 Crimean Tatars cavalry changed the balance of power in favour of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan,

⁹⁰⁰ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p 146.

⁹⁰¹ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 109. The Polish historian Stanislaw Przylecki (1805-1869) states that Şahin Giray sent Kanswir Sultan (Hanşir?) and Orazly (Orazlı or Urazlı?) Mirza to the Cossacks in Stanislaw Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy* ... p. 7.

⁹⁰² Stanislaw Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy* ... p. 27.

⁹⁰³ *Ibid.* p. 27.

⁹⁰⁴ L.M. Savelov, "Iz' Istorii Snoshennii Moskvyy s'Krymom' ... p. 70.

who, getting the upper hand besieged Kefe.⁹⁰⁵ However, Rıdvan Paşazade states that the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan hired the Cossacks when they realized that the Crimean Tatars would not support them anymore and levied a new tax to finance the Cossacks which was very disturbing to the population of the Khanate.⁹⁰⁶ Kefeli Haçatur states that the arrival of the Cossacks changed the balance of power at the expense of Kantemirr Mirza, who was forced to flee Kefe with his entire Horde and possessions, and the city became crowded when they arrived and the local population flocked to the citadel (*Toprakkale*); the city was prepared for the siege while the rumors circulated everywhere.⁹⁰⁷ Arriving with a great army the Khan and the Kalgay launched an attack and targeted the city with artillery fire. When the siege reached its first month, the scarcity of food and provisions started, and the black market emerged while everyone suffered from the hunger.⁹⁰⁸ The Imperial Divan issued an order to the governor of Akkirman about the necessity of transporting cereal to Kefe for the provisioning of the soldiers which were on their way to the city due to the scarcity of the food (23.6.1628).⁹⁰⁹

According to the story of Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi, during the siege besides the military one, a psychological and ideological warfare also continued. Addressing the residents of Kefe, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan stated that his reason for besieging Kefe was the sheltering of his main

⁹⁰⁵ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... pp. 13b-14a.

⁹⁰⁶ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak* ... pp. 41-42.

⁹⁰⁷ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p. 146.

⁹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* p. 147.

⁹⁰⁹ See document no: 98 dated 20-L-1037 in *83 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* ... p. 68 and 63.

enemy, Kantemir Mirza, in the fortress; and he would by no means do any harm to them if they voluntarily handed him over.⁹¹⁰ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan captured one of Kantemir's sons, and tortured him to death just outside of the city walls in front of the eyes of his father.⁹¹¹ Kantemir Mirza, who realized that the public opinion was changing against him, invited the notables and opinion leaders of the city and stated that he was fighting against Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who was not only a *mürted*⁹¹² (apostate), but also a *bağy*⁹¹³ (rebel) to the *Halife* the Ottoman Sultan and the servitor of the Holy Places (Mecca and Medina).⁹¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Porte dispatched robes and regalia to the Crimean Tatar notables and aristocracy that were likely to support the new Khan Canıbek Giray Khan together with Kapıcı-Başı Ahmed Ağa.⁹¹⁵ The pro-Mehmed and Şahin Giray *ulema*, who considered Kantemir Mirza's invasion of the Khanate as an act of violence contrary to the will of the Ottoman Sultan, declared that, in reality, Kantemir Mirza was a *bağy* and that to fight against him was the responsibility of all Muslims. The presents of the Porte removed the suspicions about the legitimacy of the Kantemir's invasion.⁹¹⁶ It appears that the siege was thorough and caused famine in the city. The urgent arrival of the Ottoman forces was the only hope of the defendants but the arrival of

⁹¹⁰ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... pp. 14a-14b.

⁹¹¹ Stanislaw Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy* ... p. 8.

⁹¹² For more information on Mürted see: İrfan İnçe, "Ridd", *DİA* C.XXXV, İstanbul, 2008, pp. 91-93.

⁹¹³ For more information on Bağy see. Ali Şafak, "Bağy", *DİA* C. IV., İstanbul, 1991, pp. 451-452.

⁹¹⁴ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... pp. 14b-15a.

⁹¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 15a.

⁹¹⁶ *ibid.* p. 15a.

the Ottoman fleet was delayed because of the storm.⁹¹⁷ The Ottoman naval commander Hasan Pasha had great difficulty convincing the sailors, who were reluctant to fight, to hurry to go to the rescue of the city.⁹¹⁸

3.40 The arrival of the Ottoman fleet and the flight of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan

According to the reports of Emilio D'Ascoli the Khan, the Kalgay and the Cossacks had different views of the invasion of Kefe. Mehmed Giray III Khan was completely against the invasion of the city which belonged to the Sultan, while the Cossacks were willing to plunder the city, and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was inclined towards the Cossacks.⁹¹⁹ As a precaution, Kalgay divided his forces into three: the first one under the command of the Khan, the second under his own command and the third under the command of Mustafa Ağa and he placed the first two next to the city, while the last one was on the seaside.⁹²⁰ Everyone was expecting that a fierce battle would take place when Canıbek Giray Khan arrived to the city on the night of June 28, but it soon appeared that Mehmed Ağa, who agreed with the new Khan, switched his allegiance to him with his followers and was appointed Vizier.⁹²¹ When the fleet has finally arrived to the shores of Crimea, Kapudan Hasan Pasha sent private letters to the leading supporters of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray brothers. In the letters he stated that the Ottomans mobilized a very large army under the command of Kenan

⁹¹⁷ *ibid.* pp. 15a-15b.

⁹¹⁸ *ibid.* 15b-16a.

⁹¹⁹ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 111.

⁹²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 111.

⁹²¹ *Ibid.* p. 111.

Pasha and a fleet of 60 galleons under the command of Recep Pasha, which were on their way to the peninsula; by guaranteeing their safety, he requested their submissions to the will of the Sultan, instead of fighting for the sake of rebel brothers.⁹²² As a result of these efforts some of them switched their allegiances to the new Khan, Canıbek Giray Khan, and the Cossacks, who realized that it was almost impossible to resist the Ottoman forces were highly demoralized.⁹²³ According to Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, even, Mehmed Ağa the Tüfekçi-Başı (Chief Musketeer) of Mehmed Giray III. Khan was one of the defectors.⁹²⁴ According to the reports of Venetian Bailo Sebastiano Venier (1626-1629), the Ottomans were preparing a large army in order to depose Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan.⁹²⁵ The Kalgay gave a large amount of money and presents to the Cossacks who saved him and together they besieged Kantemir Mirza in Kefe; Canıbek Giray Khan and Devlet Giray Sultan landed on Kefe with a large army as the new Khan and Kalgay (21.6/1.7.1628).⁹²⁶ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who understood that he could not stand against the superior Ottoman forces fled with the Cossacks without warning his brother. Mehmed Giray Khan also managed to escape with his closest men to the Tat ili mountain of the Yayla mountains.⁹²⁷ However, Emilio D'Ascoli argues that it was Mehmed Giray who fled first and Şahin

⁹²² *ibid* .p. 16a.

⁹²³ *ibid* .p. 16b.

⁹²⁴ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar* ..., p. 178.

⁹²⁵ See the report of the Venetian Bailo Sebastiano Venier document no. 479 dated 24-VI-1628 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La ... Suplement II V. II*, p. 421.

⁹²⁶ L.M. Savelov, "Iz' Istorii Snoshennii Moskvy s'Krymom' ... p. 71.

⁹²⁷ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... p. 16b.

Giray, who realized the desperateness of the situation, fled towards Islamkermen together with the Cossacks.⁹²⁸ According to the information S.I. Tarbeev' obtained from the Don Cossacks fighting for Kalgay Şahin Giray while the Crimean Tatars began to abandon the two brothers and the aristocrats were going to the side of the new Khan, Mehmed Giray III Khan fled to the mountains with his close men and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan tried to flee to the Zaporozhian Host with the Cossacks.⁹²⁹ Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan and Kantemir Mirza went after Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to the steppe and Canıbek Giray Khan entered Bahçesaray in 29.6/6.7.1628.⁹³⁰ Kantemir Mirza and Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan, who pursued Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan up to the river Eryat, killed many Cossacks who were trying to retreat to the steppe with the Kalgay.⁹³¹

3.41 The third reign of Canıbek Giray Khan (1628-1635) and the reaction of Kantemir Mirza

Consequently, the new Khan Canıbek Giray was seated on the Crimean throne without any resistance (August 1628).⁹³² According to Kefeli Haçatur, Canıbek Giray Khan and Devlet Giray Sultan arrived with 43 galleons, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who could not resist, fled towards the steppe with the Cossacks, and Canıbek Giray Khan triumphantly was seated again on the throne in 12.8.1628.⁹³³ Quite paradoxically, S. Przylecki states that Kantemir Mirza was from the

⁹²⁸ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 112.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 71

⁹³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 71.

⁹³¹ Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ... p. 16b.

⁹³² Mevkûfati Mehmed Efendi.; *Tarih-i Mevkûfati* ...p. 16b.

⁹³³ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... p. 147.

beginning against the Khanate of Canıbek Giray Khan who was one of his arch enemies and wanted to make one of the sons of Gazi Giray II Khan who was under his protection.⁹³⁴ According to Muscovite Ambassador S.I. Tarbeev', while most of the Crimean notables owed allegiance to Canıbek Giray Khan, Kantemir Mirza did not come for five days and he did so only after the Khan warned him about his awareness that the Mirza was behaving like a co-Khan and wanted to kill Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, but the Ottomans did not send him to follow his own agenda.⁹³⁵ Kantemir Mirza remained silent to the accusations from the new Khan and finally sworn allegiance to him. According to the report of an Ottoman Çavuş to Murad IV, the Crimean Tatars welcomed Canıbek Giray Khan and quickly switched their allegiance to him and forced Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to flee. Mehmed Giray III Khan who could not find any place to shelter was forced to go near his brother the Kalgay. However, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan who lost the confidence of the infidels was also in a critical position.⁹³⁶

The Ottoman orders sent to the Crimean people explained the reasons and process of the transition of the power from the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers to the Canıbek Giray Khan and Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan brothers. According to two orders written to the Kadis (Judges) of Kefe, Sudak and Taman and to the Nogay beys and mirzas subject to the Crimean Khanate dated 30-VI-

⁹³⁴ Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukraińne Sprawy* ... pp. 7-8. We don't know the existence of any sons of Gazi Giray II in the entourage of Kantemir Mirza but Azamet Giray bin Selamet Giray was with him during the invasion of the peninsula see: page 392 above.

⁹³⁵ L.M. Savelov, "Iz' Istorii Snoshennii Moskvy s'Krymom' ... p. 72.

⁹³⁶ TSMA E. 0809/52.,1

1628, orders that the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan were deposed because of their opposition to the Sultan, to the cannonic law and their violent actions against the Crimean people and that they were replaced by Canıbek Giray Khan and Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan, who were sent to the peninsula with the royal navy.⁹³⁷ Since the deposed brothers did not comply with the order and resisted the Ottoman forces, the Nogay beys and mirzas were invited to owe allegiance to the new Khan and to fight against the “rebel” brothers. The next day, the deposed Khan and Kalga were ordered to submit to the will of the Sultan, like their predecessors, and to return to Istanbul with the royal navy but the orders were not sent because of their resistance (1.7.1628).⁹³⁸ The order that was sent to İbrahim Pasha the Governor of Özü dated 5.7.1628 to not demobilize the troops demonstrates that the situation was still critical in Khanate despite the escape of the deposed Khan and Kalgay from the peninsula.⁹³⁹ According to the report of the Ottoman Çavuş, the situation in the Khanate was still critical and the reinforcements should be sent immediately.⁹⁴⁰

3.42 Kantemir Mirza’s domination of the Khanate and the reaction of the population

During the critical period Canıbek Giray Khan was seated on the throne but his authority was confined to Bahçesaray, because of the pressure of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who was conducting guerilla war against him. Kantemir Mirza and Mangıts seemed to be controlling the

⁹³⁷ See documents no: 101 and 102 dated 27-L-1037 in *Numaralı Mühimme Defteri ...* pp. 70-71.

⁹³⁸ See documents no: 103 and 104 dated 28-L-1037 in *ibid.* pp. 71-73.

⁹³⁹ See document no: 105 dated 3-Za.1037 in *ibid.* pp. 73-74.

⁹⁴⁰ TSMA E. 0809/52. ,3

peninsula.⁹⁴¹ Many villages were deserted as a result of the famine and plague.⁹⁴² It appears that the Mangıt clan, whose properties had been plundered by the followers of the deposed Khan and Kalgay, got their revenge when they got the upperhand.⁹⁴³ According to the Muscovite reports, the Crimean population was completely against the Nogays, who were acting as the owner of the peninsula and confiscating their properties. Thus they would have welcomed the return of the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan.⁹⁴⁴ According to his letter to Sigismund III dated 22.7/1.8.1628, Canibek Giray Khan stated that Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan fled, and, while the former had disappeared, the latter was with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Therefore, he demanded either the isolation or the handover of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to him or the Ottomans if he wanted to preserve the peace. He also emphasized that he should by no means allow the Zaporozhian Cossacks to enter the Black Sea and violate the peace.⁹⁴⁵

3.43 Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray's attempts to resist to the deposition together with the Zaporozhian Cossacks and Nogays

Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who sought refuge in the Zaporozhian *Sich*, desperately needed reinforcements and was forced to apply to the

⁹⁴¹ Abdülgaffar, Kırımı, *Umdetü't-Tevarih*, (ed. Necip Asım), İstanbul, 1334-1918, pp. 119.

⁹⁴² L.M. Savelov, "Iz' Istorii Snoshennii Moskvy s'Krymom' ... p. 72 and A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 132.

⁹⁴³ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 182.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 134.

⁹⁴⁵ See: document no: 10 in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga ...*, p. 28.

Polish King Sigismund III for help and declared that he wanted to enter his protection to avenge his enemies; and he also made generous offers to the Cossacks.⁹⁴⁶ Both, the Polish border guards, the Cossacks and Kalgay Şahin Giray sent their separate delegations and requested the permission to attack Crimea with Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan. According to the letter of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to the King Sigismund III, everyday people from Crimea were joining Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's camp on the Dnieper; and if he allowed the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the forces of Stephan Chmielecki, the Crown Guardian (*Strazhnyk Koronnyi*), they would put an end to the Crimean problem for the Kingdom, while Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan promised that the King would never have to worry about his southern border again once he returned to the power in Crimea.⁹⁴⁷ The Zaporozhian Cossacks were also confident about themselves in spite of their defeat in the previous year. Although defeated, they were claiming that they learned how to fight in the peninsula and they would easily defeat their adversaries now.⁹⁴⁸ Besides, the Crimean Tatars were not afraid of the Cossacks but of the Nogays, who were taking revenge on them, and they were ready to cooperate with the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁹⁴⁹ However, the Polish Court, which was in the middle of a war with Sweden⁹⁵⁰ (1626-1629), was not willing to provoke Ottoman anger by attacking the Crimean Khanate, but they were also aware of the importance of the

⁹⁴⁶ Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukraińskie Sprawy ...* pp. 42-45 and 51-52.

⁹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 28 and pp. 51-52.

⁹⁴⁸ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 134.

⁹⁴⁹ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 94.

⁹⁵⁰ For more information on Polish-Swedish wars see: Robert I. Frost, *The Northern Wars 1558-1721*, Essex, 2000, pp. 104-114.

possibility of neutralizing the Crimean Khanate by supporting the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan. Under these circumstances, they decided to support the brothers anonymously. According to the writings of Jerzy Zbaravski, the Crimean affairs had to be conducted by the Zaporozhian Cossacks for the benefit of the Kingdom.⁹⁵¹ First of all, larger groups of Cossacks would be out fighting in Crimea, instead of causing trouble in Ukraine. Second, Ottoman and Crimean Tatar forces would fight each other, instead of dealing with Poland. Third, if he succeeded, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan would never trust the Ottomans, who were his enemies to the end, and be friendly to Poland. Finally, if they were defeated, many Zaporozhian Cossacks would be eliminated, which was also beneficial to Poland. It was extremely important that the Polish aid was made through intermediaries without the direct involvement of the Polish government, over the free unregistered Cossacks. Evidently, the Crimean crisis evolved from a regional problem to a continental problem, while Spain and Austria were trying to keep them busy in the region, whereas England and France were trying to free the hands of the Ottomans to be effective in Europe and Mediterranean.⁹⁵²

3.43.1 Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's first attempt to invade Crimea (end of 1628)

After Mehmed Giray III Khan met with Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan outside Orkapı and went to Zaporozhian *Sich*, the brothers decided to

⁹⁵¹ Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukraińskie Sprawy ...* pp.37-40.

⁹⁵² A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 121.

return Crimea after gathering all of their forces.⁹⁵³ According to the reports of the Don Cossacks to Moscow, after fleeing from Crimea, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan first went to Azak and hid among the Azak Horde, who were in fact Ottoman subjects, but betrayed them by sheltering the fugitive Kalgay and accompanied him to the *Sich*.⁹⁵⁴ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan sent Mehmed Giray III Khan, who was also welcomed by the Azak Horde, to the Little Nogay Horde to invite them to assist him against Canıbek Giray Khan (November 1628). The first attempt to reconquer Crimea occurred at the end of November after the Cossacks resumed their sea campaigns while they were waiting for the arrival of their newly raised wages from Poland.⁹⁵⁵ It appears that in fact they were bargaining with the desperate Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers to extract more financial and political concessions. According to the latest news from Ukraine, 6000 Cossacks, and 8000 Tatars, including 30 notable mirzas agreed on marching on Crimea. It was agreed that every Cossack participating in the campaign would receive ten ducats and that the Nogay territory would be given to them.⁹⁵⁶ Several thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks reinforced by Little Nogay cavaliers appeared in Orkapı, but when they encountered the superior forces of the Crimean Tatar army, they retreated back. Despite all the efforts of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to encourage them to make surprise attacks to the enemy, the Cossacks, who lacked a strong leadership's insistence on looking for the booty

⁹⁵³ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 112.

⁹⁵⁴ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 135.

⁹⁵⁵ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...* V. VIII. p. 39.

⁹⁵⁶ See document no:209 dated 8/15-XII-1628 in ed.) *Zherela do Istorii ...* T. VIII pp. 339-340.

rather than military objectives, showed that their primary objective was to plunder, rather entering into direct confrontation with the Crimean forces and helping the fugitive brothers.⁹⁵⁷ Contrary to the insistence of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to enter Crimea directly, the Zaporozhian Cossacks preferred to drive out the horses grazing outside Orkapı, that belonged to Kantemir Mirza, and led to the immediate arrival of Canıbek Giray Khan and Kantemir Mirza to defend Orkapı. According to the letters of S. Chmielecki, while the cavalry went with Mehmed Giray III Khan to the meeting point Islamkerman (8 km. north of Orkapı), the infantry and artillery arrived by water with Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan (8.11.1628).⁹⁵⁸ The Crimean Tatars, who were at the side of Canıbek Giray Khan, were stating that they were not afraid of the Zaporozhian Cossacks anymore because they felt stronger with the presence of the Nogays.⁹⁵⁹ It appears that the Crimean Tatars were divided between the supporters of the Canıbek Giray Khan and Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan brothers and the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers. According to the Muscovite reports, there were lots of Crimean Tatars who fled to Akkirman to the Ottoman lands for their safety.⁹⁶⁰ The above mentioned anonymous account states that an envoy from the Great Nogays came to the deposed brothers and reported that their leader and also the son of their sisters, wanted to join

⁹⁵⁷ For an anonymous account of the November 1628 campaign of Şahin Giray and Zaporozhian Cossacks in Polish see: Golebiowski, Seweryn, "Şahin Giraj i Kozacy", *Biblioteka Warszawska*, T. XLVI-2, Warsaw, 1852, pp. 11-13 and for the English translation see: Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...* V. VIII. pp. 40-43.

⁹⁵⁸ Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy ...* p. 66.

⁹⁵⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 136.

⁹⁶⁰ *ibid.* p. 136.

them to help them recover their realm.⁹⁶¹ In his letter written from the Zaporozhian Host to S. Chmielecki, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan states that his brother Mehmed Giray III Khan went to the Great Nogay Horde to obtain their support (20/27.11.1628).⁹⁶²

3.43.2 The second attempt of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray brothers to invade the peninsula (1629)

It seems that the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan realized that it was hardly possible for them to succeed just depending on the Cossack force and tried to obtain the support of the Nogays, Circassians and Don Cossacks. However, it also appears that they had already lost the initiative to the Zaporozhians. According to his letter to Sigismund III dated 29.11/6.12.1628, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's objective was again to launch the campaign as soon as possible, immediately after the melting of ice, in order to prevent the coming of aid from the Ottomans; the Crimean Tatar Nogay relations were still problematic.⁹⁶³ While the Polish interest in the Şahin Giray Sultan affair was decreasing, because of the uncertainties it contained, the number of Cossacks who were looking for fortune was increasing. However, the Poles could not completely give up the issue, because of the deteriorating relations with the Ottomans. The Muscovite translator Vasili Gryzlov reports that the second attempt to invade the peninsula was made on April 1629, according to the plan of the Zaporozhian Cossacks.⁹⁶⁴ V. Gryzlov conveys that twenty five to forty thousand

⁹⁶¹ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...* V. VIII. p. 42.

⁹⁶² Stanisław Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy ...* p. 68.

⁹⁶³ *Ibid.* pp. 69-71.

⁹⁶⁴ (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii ...* T. VIII pp. 339-340.

Zaporozhian Cossacks and two thousand Little Nogays gathered outside of Orkapı where Kalgay Devlet Giray and Kantemir Mirza were waiting for them since early spring. When Canıbek Giray Khan joined the Crimean forces in 20.4.1629, the peninsula was open to the raids from the sea. First, two thousand Don Cossacks burned down Karasu, then, five to seven hundred Zaporozhian Cossacks came from the sea and invaded and plundered the heavily fortified fortress of Mangup where the Crimean Khans and Crimean Tatar notables hid their possessions (10/17.5.1629).⁹⁶⁵ The raid was mainly organized to detach the main Crimean Tatar army under the command of Canıbek Giray Khan from Orkapı. When the news about the activities of the Cossacks all over the Black Sea coasts reached the Porte, the fleet was ordered to protect the mouth of the Dnieper, and the army took necessary actions to support Canıbek Giray Khan by the Sultan (6/7.1629).⁹⁶⁶ Canıbek Giray Khan did not fall for the trap and did not leave Orkapı, and he prevented the forces of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to enter the peninsula. The Poles, who saw the decisiveness of the Ottomans, ordered the Zaporozhian Cossacks to stop their naval activities. The Host obeyed the order and did not allow the Cossacks, who wanted to set a naval campaign; even the leaders of three thousand Cossacks, who wanted to launch a sea campaign, were immediately put to death. However, they decided to continue their campaign with Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan in Crimea without failing to obtain new concessions from

⁹⁶⁵ V. Sukhorukov, *Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli ...* V.I., pp. 206, 213-215 and A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 121.

⁹⁶⁶ Stanislaw Przylecki, *Ukrainne Sprawy ...*, pp. 71-75.

them. According to a Polish report, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan reaffirmed his oath to fight with the Zaporozhians to the bitter end. Mehmed Giray III Khan and the Little Nogay öirzas loyal to him took the same oath before the *Rada* (Council) (8/18.5.1629).⁹⁶⁷ According to the report of the Vice-Starosta of Bela Tserkva (Biala Cerkiew Pol, Belaya Tserkva Rus.) dated 10/17.6.1629 the two armies met three miles north of Orkapi in 19/29.5.1629.⁹⁶⁸ There were around twenty three thousand Cossacks but they were not coordinated. For instance, they elected two different hetmans; Taras and Cherniata. The Cossacks were divided into ten regiments, while Kalgay Şahin Giray's forces, including the best Cossack warriors, were hidden for the ambush. The Crimean Tatars, who repulsed the attack, pushed the Cossacks back to their camp, but stopped when the Cossack infantry began to fire at the expense of killing their own men. The Crimean Tatars retreated back from their previous positions and the Cossacks regrouped and spent the night in the deserted Crimean Tatar camp. The Crimean Tatar forces divided into three, while the Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan was placed at the center. Kantemir Mirza encircled the Cossacks with heavy artillery support, broke their ranks, and forced them to retreat back to the Dnieper for four days.

3.44 The defeat and death of Mehmed Giray III Khan (1629)

The Cossacks who turned back to take a cannon they left during the retreat, violently killed Mehmed Giray III Khan.⁹⁶⁹ According to the writing of Emilio D'Ascoli, Mehmed Giray III Khan, who was in a

⁹⁶⁷ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of ...* V. VIII. p. 47.

⁹⁶⁸ (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii ...* T. VIII pp. 341-342.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* p. 342.

desperate mood, mistakenly took that Kantemir Mirza's men for the Bucak Tatars who were supposed to come to his aid and tried to convince the Cossacks to allow them to approach. However, when it was understood that they were in fact Kantemir's men, Mehmed Giray III Khan, who was disappointed, beheaded the Hetman who attacked him, consequently he was lynched by the Cossacks.⁹⁷⁰ Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan fled to the steppe with a few Nogays. The Zaporozhian Cossacks freed the remaining followers of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan and declared that the murder of the Khan was a mistake, and they were ready to cooperate with Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan if he returned to them. According to the report of the translator V. Gryzlov, the Cossacks killed Mehmed Giray Khan because they thought that he contacted Canıbek Giray Khan and offered to surrender in return for his personal security.⁹⁷¹ When he returned to the camp, the Cossacks accused him of treachery. Mehmed Giray III Khan got angry and beheaded the Hetman, and the Cossacks, who lost their temper, cut him into pieces. The Muscovite ambassadors S.I. Tarbeev' and I. Basov relates that the Zaporozhian Cossacks did not trust the Nogays among them when they wanted to dismount and march with them; a quarrel aroused among them and Mehmed Giray III Khan was killed during then.⁹⁷² The Zaporozhian Cossacks also related their defeat to the lack of potable water and argued that most of their casualties were because of the want of water.⁹⁷³ The Muscovite translator V. Gryzlov relates that

⁹⁷⁰ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... pp. 112-113.

⁹⁷¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, pp. 136-137.

⁹⁷² *Ibid.* p. 137.

⁹⁷³ (ed.) *Zherela do Istorii ...* T. VIII p. 342.

Kantemir Mirza not only cut the connections of the Cossacks with the Dnieper but also captured their water carriers and caused the lack of water among them.⁹⁷⁴ Kalgay Şahin Giray, Sultan who was wounded during the combat against Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan and Kantemir Mirza, fled to Gazi Horde over Don with his 30 close men. According to the Muscovite sources, the Zaporozhian Cossacks lost more than 8000 men; the Little Nogays lost nearly all of their men; and the Crimean Tatars lost 50 Mirzas and 6000 men.⁹⁷⁵ Ottoman and Crimean chroniclers relate the defeat of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to the decision of their followers to switch allegiance to the Canıbek Giray Khan and to the Ottoman Sultan and believe that the cause of the death of Mehmed Giray III was unidentified. Rıdvan Paşazade states that Canıbek Giray Khan declared amnesty for the followers of the brothers who owed allegiance to him and Mehmed Giray III Khan was found dead in the mountains.⁹⁷⁶ Ottoman chronicler Naima describes the whole process as a premeditated plan of the Porte.⁹⁷⁷ The deposed brothers fled from the peninsula after the initial defeat and returned with a large army consisting of Cossacks who were secretly encouraged and supported by the Poles and their Tatar supporters.⁹⁷⁸ Naima also claims that the Crimean army had great difficulties to encounter the effective fire power of the Cossack infantry and decided to launch an all out attack.⁹⁷⁹ He further states that the

⁹⁷⁴ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 137.

⁹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p.137.

⁹⁷⁶ Abdullah ibn Rıdvan, *Tevarih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak ...* p. 42.

⁹⁷⁷ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. pp. 625-626.

⁹⁷⁸ *ibid.* p. 626.

⁹⁷⁹ *ibid.* p. 626.

turning point of the decisive battle was the decision of the Tatars, who were in the army of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to change their allegiance to the side of Canıbek Giray Khan.⁹⁸⁰ Naima argues, contrary to the Muscovite and Polish sources, that both Mehmed Giray III Khan and the Cossack Hetman were dead on the battle field together with several other Cossacks, while Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan fled with his closest men. Canıbek Giray Khan, who found the body of Mehmed Giray III Khan on the battlefield, and he displayed the head of Hetman in Kefe as a sign of the victory.⁹⁸¹ In his letter to the Muscovite Tsar Mikhail I dated 01/10.8.1629 Canıbek Giray Khan also states that it was thanks to the Nogays, who turned to his side, that the victory was possible.⁹⁸² Crimean chronicler Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, after repeating the Ottoman-Crimean tradition about the war, he states that Canıbek Giray Khan returned to Crimea with the body of Mehmed Giray III Khan and buried him near the tomb of his father, Sa'adet Giray II Khan in the mausoleum of of his grandfather Mehmed Giray II Khan (24/31.5.1629).⁹⁸³ According to the letter of Canıbek Giray Khan to Mikhail I dated 1/10.8.1629., Mehmed Giray III Khan had died previously.⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁸⁰ *ibid.* p. 627.

⁹⁸¹ *ibid.* p. 627.

⁹⁸² See document no: 13 dated 10/20-Za.-1038/01/10-VIII-1629 in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga ...*, pp. 40-44.

⁹⁸³ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar ...*, pp. 178-179.

⁹⁸⁴ See document no: 13 in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga ...*, p. 41.

3.45 Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's desperate attempts to become Crimean Khan and the end of the turmoil

The death of Mehmed Giray III Khan was one of the critical turning points in the history of Crimean Khanate. However, Şahin Giray Sultan was still alive and continued to pose a threat to Canıbek Giray Khan. After their defeat and the death of his brother, Şahin Giray Sultan, had nothing to do but to escape to the east, and take refuge in the Little Nogay Horde. However, the road was very dangerous. The Don Cossacks reported to Moscow that they came across the escaping Şahin Giray Sultan, and although they had killed many of his men, he managed to slip away.⁹⁸⁵ Şahin Giray Sultan reached Kuban but could not stay there because Canıbek Giray Khan had already sent his son, Akça Mübarek Giray Sultan, to punish the Gazi Horde, who had sided with Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan during the turmoil.⁹⁸⁶ Akça Mübarek Giray Sultan confiscated the best horses of the Little Nogays who submitted without resistance, except the ulus of Azamet Mirza, who refused to submit and then marched on the Circassians and submitted to them (September 1629). It appears that Canıbek Giray Khan was determined to prevent Şahin Giray Sultan from becoming a threat to him again. Punitive expeditions were organized against the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks and Poland during the same year although the outcome was not very satisfactory.⁹⁸⁷ Once he felt secure in the Caucasus Şahin Giray Sultan tried to contact his supporters in the Khanate. He tried to convince

⁹⁸⁵ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 137 note 134.

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 137.

⁹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 137-138.

Kalgay Azamet Giray Sultan and his brother and Nureddin Safa Giray Sultan, but Canıbek Giray Khan, who learned of the plot, ordered their executions along with their families. The brothers of the Kalgay, who were warned by a Mirza, managed to escape but the infant children of Safa Giray were killed.⁹⁸⁸ Kefeli Haçatur states that the Kalgay Azamet Giray was dead as result of an accident happened during the festivities of the *Kurban (iyd adha, sacrifice)* in 1633.⁹⁸⁹ Under the pressure, Şahin Giray Sultan escaped to Dağıstan and tried to contact Terek (Tersk) Cossacks. However, Canıbek Giray Khan was closely following the situation and he requested Tsar Mikhail I prevent such an alliance and send his men after him.⁹⁹⁰ Finally, Şahin Giray Sultan once more took refuge in Persia, where he was welcomed, despite the fact that his protector Abbas I was already dead and replaced by his grandson, Shah Safi (Sam Mirza 1629-1642), who offered him the governorship of a province.⁹⁹¹ In the summer of 1630, Şahin Giray Sultan sent identical letters to the Voevodes of Terek, Astrakhan and to the Prince of the Circassians in Terek Sholokh⁹⁹² (Şoloh Sunjaley) which stated that he would organize a campaign on Circassia and Crimea and requested their cooperation.⁹⁹³ He requested the dispatch of 1000 Cossacks and 300 soldiers from Astrakhan in addition to the 40,000 Persian soldiers that were promised by the Shah, depending on the cooperation and

⁹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 195.

⁹⁸⁹ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... pp. 153-154.

⁹⁹⁰ See: document no: 15 dated 01/10-N.-1039/14/24-IV-1629 in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Tarafılgara* ..., pp. 51-62.

⁹⁹¹ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 113.

⁹⁹² For more information on Şoloh family see: Altunok, Yusuf Altan, *Kabartay 'ın Osmanlı Devleti ve Rusya ile Bağlılık İlişkileri (1475-1774)*, (Unpublished Master Thesis), Ankara, 2021, p. 67.

⁹⁹³ E. N. Kusheva, *Narody Severnogo Kavkaza* ..., p. 313.

friendship between Persia and Muscovy.⁹⁹⁴ According to the Muscovite reports, Şahin Giray Sultan was building forts in the region to control the strategic mountain passes and to observe the movements of the Crimean army on the road to Persia to join to the Ottoman-Safavid war.⁹⁹⁵ Muscovy, who did not trust Şahin Giray Sultan and feared that he would destroy their relationship with the Ottomans, refused to send reinforcements and even requested his killing, if it was possible. Since Shah Safi failed to keep his promise and did not send the 40,000 men, the plan failed, and Şahin Giray Sultan, who abandoned the region, went to Istanbul via Azak (1633).⁹⁹⁶ Emilio d'Ascoli states that Şahin Giray Sultan, who killed and robbed one of the Safavid governors, fled to the Besleney clan of the Adıges near his relative Circassian Prince Aleguka Şogenuko (Shogenukov) and tried to contact the Giray Sultans in Crimea and to plot against Canıbek Giray Khan eventually led to the massacre of the Giray Sultans.⁹⁹⁷ Crimean chronicler Seyyid Rıza writes that, after the death of Mehmed Giray III Khan, Şahin Giray Sultan took refuge in Persia. Since he felt that he was not welcome as before, he passed to the mountains of the Northern Caucasus and tried to gather an army to return to Crimea. Finally, when he realized the futility of his efforts, he decided to submit to the will of the Ottoman Sultan and went to Istanbul (1633-1634).⁹⁹⁸ According to the reports of the Terek Voevodes, it appears that Şahin Giray Sultan lost his allies

⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 313.

⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 313.

⁹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 314.

⁹⁹⁷ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 113 and A.A. Novosels'kiy, *ibid.* p. 195.

⁹⁹⁸ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'û's-seyyar fi ...*, pp. 179-180.

one by one. Azak did not allow him to enter in the city; the Nogays stated that they did not want him anymore and requested his departure; and finally his Besleney relatives requested the same from him.⁹⁹⁹ Consequently, Şahin Giray Sultan got on a ship from Azak and sailed to Istanbul to defect to the Ottomans who were working very hard to take him under their control (August 1633).¹⁰⁰⁰ By bringing him to Istanbul, the Porte not only took him out of the Persian orbit, but also had the opportunity to use him to tame the unruly khans. According to the report of Voeovode of Tsaritsyn Nikifor Meshcherskii, Murad IV called Şahin Giray Sultan to come to Istanbul together with 40 concubines and good wine (1633).¹⁰⁰¹ Emilio d'Ascoli states that Şahin Giray Sultan came to Istanbul under the protection of Janissaries, who had developed sympathy for him, and was welcomed by Murad IV, who hosted him for a long period before sending him to Rhodes with two galleys.¹⁰⁰² Quite interestingly Kefeli Haçatur states that two envoys of Şahin Giray Sultan who carried a treasure (*hazine*) with them were caught in the port. A mirza and a resident of Kefe arrived to Kefe from Azak on a ship were recognized by the Sipahis (1633).¹⁰⁰³ However, they managed to leave the city thanks to the help of the Janissaries who protected them. Since it was difficult to survive in the capital, Şahin Giray Sultan carried out the request of the Sultan and brought many valuable presents for the Sultan, including Circassian slaves of both genders and wine that he brought as a recompensation for his former wrong-doings; and said he

⁹⁹⁹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 195.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid.* p. 195.

¹⁰⁰¹ V. Sukhorukov, *Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli ...* V.I., p. 230.

¹⁰⁰² A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 113.

¹⁰⁰³ E. Schütz, "Eine Armenische Chronik ... pp. 153-154.

would never be with Christians and Shiites again.¹⁰⁰⁴ The aforementioned agents of Şahin Giray Sultan were in fact carrying the “presents” of Şahin Giray Sultan to the capital which mostly consisted of the money taken from the Safavid governor who was killed by Şahin Giray Sultan. The Janissaries managed to free them by force, and they left the city with the treasury. When he set sail to Rhodes, Şahin Giray Sultan believed that he would very soon return to Crimea as a Khan.¹⁰⁰⁵ Ottoman chronicler Naima states that Şahin Giray Sultan sought refuge under the protection of Murad IV when he realized that he did not have any other option and was exiled to Rhodes upon the mercy of the Sultan.¹⁰⁰⁶ According to the report of Muscovite envoy Ya. Dashkov, Şahin Giray Sultan was the first candidate of Murad IV when he wanted to replace Canıbek Giray Khan, but as a result of Muscovite complaints and only the insistences of *Kaymakam* Bayram Pasha he changed his decision (winter 1633).¹⁰⁰⁷ Quite strangely, Canıbek Giray Khan was deposed and became the neighbor of Şahin Giray Sultan in Rhodes. According to the report of horseman from Astrakhan T. Zhelyabuzhskii, when Canıbek Giray Khan, who was in Kuban, learned that a new Khan, İnayet Giray Khan¹⁰⁰⁸ (1635-1637), was appointed, and he was summoned to Istanbul, he immediately went to Kefe and departed to Istanbul with his family (18/25.4.1635).¹⁰⁰⁹ It was obvious that neither the rebellious Şahin Giray Sultan nor the conformist Canıbek Giray

¹⁰⁰⁴ A.L., Bert'e-Delagard “Opisanie Chernago Morya ... p. 113.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p. 113.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. p. 787.

¹⁰⁰⁷ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 179.

¹⁰⁰⁸ For more information on İnayet Giray see: Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom II., pp. 197-227.

¹⁰⁰⁹ V. Sukhorukov, *Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli ...* V.I., p. 252-253.

Khan could satisfy the demands of the Porte and were quick to be renounced. Seyyid Rıza states that Canıbek Giray Khan was deposed because of his lack of determination to conduct warfare.¹⁰¹⁰ Süleş Ali Bey who spoke in the name of the Khan and Kalgay during a meeting with the Muscovite delegation accused Canıbek Giray Khan of being a hedonist who knew nothing about the state affairs.¹⁰¹¹ According to the Crimean chronicler Seyyid Rıza, contrary to the days they had violently competed for the Khanate, during their exile the cousins they made long discussions about the political affairs; the arguments of Şahin Giray Sultan especially made quite an impression on Canıbek Giray Khan.¹⁰¹² Şahin Giray Sultan survived Canıbek Giray Khan who passed away on 10.11.1636. However, Şahin Giray Sultan was a man of politics and he continued his manoeuvres to return to Crimea. According to the letter of Voevode of Cracow Stanislaw Koniecpolski to Sigismund IV, there were widespread rumors about the return of Şahin Giray Sultan from exile.¹⁰¹³ Finally, Şahin Giray Sultan was executed upon the order of the new Sultan, İbrahim I (1640-1648), because of the rumors about his activities (8.9.1640). Both, the Ottoman chronicler Naima and the Crimean chronicler Seyyid Rıza state that Şahin Giray Sultan was not guilty and fell victim to the rumors spread by an astrologer about his appointment to the Khanate and he was executed upon the request of

¹⁰¹⁰ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 181.

¹⁰¹¹ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p.250.

¹⁰¹² Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, pp. 181-182.

¹⁰¹³ See document no: 242 dated 05/12-VII-1636 in Ambrozy Grabowski, *Władysława IV, Króla Polskiego Listy i Inne Pisma Urzędowe*, Cracow, 1845, pp. 198-200.

Bahadır Giray Khan (1637-1641).¹⁰¹⁴ The Ottoman chronicler Vecihi¹⁰¹⁵ (d. 1661) to whom Naima gives credit claims that Şahin Giray Sultan was executed because he was considered to be dangerous for the safety of the state by an astrologer.¹⁰¹⁶ A.A. Novosels'kiy argues that Şahin Giray Sultan's execution was related to his involvement in a political intrigue in the capital.¹⁰¹⁷ Therefore, one of the most turbulent period of the Crimean history came to an end tragically.



¹⁰¹⁴ Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, C.II. p. 46 and Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 182.

¹⁰¹⁵ For more information on Vecihi Mehmed Efendi see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Vecihi Hasan Efendi", *DİA* C.XLII, İstanbul, 2012, pp. 586-587.

¹⁰¹⁶ Buğra Atsız, *Das Osmanische Reich Um Die Mitte Des 17. Jahrhundertts Nach Den Chroniken Des Vecihi (1637-1660) Und Des Mehmed Halifa (1633-1660)*, München, 1977, p. 14. for german and pp. 19b-20a in Ottoman Turkish.

¹⁰¹⁷ A.A. Novosels'kiy, *Borba Moskovskogo ...*, p. 197 note 67.

CHAPTER IV

The Structure of the Crimean Khanate:

4.1 Chinggisid Heritage

The Crimean Khanate was one of the successor states of the Golden Horde; like the Kazan, Hacitarhan and Kasım, although the latter was founded as a vassal-buffer state by Muscovy) Khanates. The legitimacy of the Khanate and the ruling Giray family came from their relationship with Genghis Khan. Genghis Khan had already divided his empire as *uluses*¹⁰¹⁸ between his sons from the oldest to the youngest: Jochi or Batu, since Jochi was dead before his father in 1227, Çağatay¹⁰¹⁹ (Chagatai Ca'adai 1183-1241) in Western Turkestan, Ögedey¹⁰²⁰ (Ögedei 1186-1241) as the Great Khan in western Mongolia and Tuluy¹⁰²¹ (Tolui 1193-1232) *Ötçigin*¹⁰²² (Otcigin Fire Guardian) as the youngest in Eastern Mongolia. However, the system did not work very well and the empire gave birth to four Khanates within two generations: the Golden Horde or Cuci Ulusu (Jochid Ulus), Çağatai Khanate¹⁰²³ or Chagatai Ulus (Çağatay Hanlığı 1227-1370), İlkanate¹⁰²⁴ (İlhanlılar 1256-1353) and the Kubilay Khanate¹⁰²⁵ (Yuan Dynasty 1271-1368)

¹⁰¹⁸ For more information on Ulus see: Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of ...* p. 279.

¹⁰¹⁹ For more information on Chagatai Khan see: *ibid.* p. 129.

¹⁰²⁰ For more information on Ögedei Khan see: *ibid.* p. 204.

¹⁰²¹ For more information on Tolui Khan see: *ibid.* p. 271.

¹⁰²² For more information on Otcigin see: *ibid.* p. 208.

¹⁰²³ For more information Chagatai Khanate see: Abdülkadir Yuvalı, "Çağatay Hanlığı", *DİA*, C. VIII., İstanbul, 1993, pp. 177-178.

¹⁰²⁴ For more information on İlkanate see: Abdülkadir Yuvalı, "İlhanlılar", *DİA*, C. XXII., İstanbul, 2000, pp. 102-105.

¹⁰²⁵ For more information on Yuan Dynasty see: Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of ...* p. 290.

under the nominal rule of Kubilay Khan¹⁰²⁶ (d. 1294) as Great Khan and continued to interact. All of them belonged to the *Altan Uruq* (Altan Uruk, Golden Lineage); *Börçigin* (Borjigin), and therefore had the divine right to rule over the world and enjoy the benefits of the empire as a co-owner.¹⁰²⁷

In the Golden Horde it was imperative to be the descendant of one of Jochi's four sons, Batu, Orda İçen (Orda İçken), Shibān¹⁰²⁸ (Şeyban, Şiban d. 1266), and Tokay Timur (Toqa, Tukay) from his legitimate wives to become a Khan. Berke¹⁰²⁹ (d. 1266), another legitimate son of Jochi, was dead without heir. It was only the lines of Batu (*Ak Orda*, White Horde)¹⁰³⁰ and Orda (*Gök Orda*, *Kök Orda*, Blue Horde)¹⁰³¹ who ruled in the Golden Horde, except Berke. *Ak Orda* was placed in the right wing (*ön kol*) on the west of Volga and *Kök Orda* was placed in the left wing (*sol kol*) on the east. The *Ulus* of Şiban was placed in middle along the Volga but under the control of *Ak Orda* and the *Ulus* of Tokay Timur was placed within the *Kök Orda*.¹⁰³² According to the Turko-

¹⁰²⁶ For more information on Kubilay Khan see: Roxann Prazniak, Osman Gazi Özgüdenli, "Kubilay Kağan", *DİA* C. Ek-2, Ankara, 2019, pp. 88-89.

¹⁰²⁷ For more information on Altan Uruq see: Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of ...* p. 105.

¹⁰²⁸ For more information on Shaiban and his Ulus see: Vladimir Kostyukov, "Ulus Shibana", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotoya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 240-244.

¹⁰²⁹ For more information on Berke Khan see: Enver Konukçu, "Berke Han", *DİA*, C. V, İstanbul, 1992. pp. 506-507.

¹⁰³⁰ For more information on Ak Orda see: "Sistema Kryl'ev i Administrativnoe Ustroitsvo Problema Ak-Ordy i Kok-Ordy", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Tatarskoe Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2014, pp. 188-190 and Iskander İzmailov, "Ak-Orda", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotoya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 190-194.

¹⁰³¹ For more information on Kök Orda see: Aleksandr Kadyrbayev, "Kok-Orda", "Ak-Orda", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom III Ulus Dzhuchi (Zolotoya Orda). XIII-Seredina XV v.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 236-240.

¹⁰³² V. Tizengauzen, *Sbornik' Materialov' Otnosyaschikhysya ...* V II, 1941, St Petersburg, pp. 40-41.

Mongol steppe tradition the armies were located towards the south and the right wing that was superior was located in the west.¹⁰³³ The descendants of Tokay Timur joined the struggle for power only after the decline of the Golden Horde during the second half of the 14th century when the line of Batu had ended and the descendants of Orda and Şiban proved to be unsuccessful.¹⁰³⁴ Toktamış Khan¹⁰³⁵ (Toqta d. 1405) proved to be a mighty ruler succeeded to restore the order in the Horde. However, Hacı Giray Khan, the founder of the Giray dynasty, came from a different line of the Tokay Timurids who had never ruled in the Golden Horde, but their connections supported their claim for the Khanship.¹⁰³⁶

4.2 The emergence of the Crimean Ulus

The strategic importance of the Crimean peninsula increased as a safe heaven for the Chingisid and other pretenders for the throne during the interregnum of the Golden Horde that lasted from 1360 to the final break up of the state in 1502 with brief periods of stability. It is possible to distinguish between two different groups of pretenders who settled on the peninsula. The first group considered Crimea as a temporary base for their claim for the *Taht İli*, such as Toktamış and Uluğ Muhammed Khans and Emirs, like Mamay and Edige.¹⁰³⁷ The second group tried to establish their control in the vicinity of the peninsula and did not have a

¹⁰³³ Bahaeddin Ögel, *Türklerde Devlet Anlayışı*, Ankara, 1982, p. 26.

¹⁰³⁴ Favereau, Marie, *The Horde How the Mongols Changed the World*, Cambridge, 2021, p. 21.

¹⁰³⁵ For more information on Toqtamış Khan see: Kemaloğlu, İlyas, "Toktamış Han", *DİA*, C.XLI., İstanbul, 2012. pp. 231-232.

¹⁰³⁶ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve ...*, İstanbul, 2022, p. 33.

¹⁰³⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ... p. 53 and note 33 pp. 494-45.

Horde-wise claim like Bekpolad and Taş Timur.¹⁰³⁸ It seems that the arrival of Tegene Mirza, the Bey of the powerful Şirin clan, as the governor to Solhat changed the fate of the Girays. Most of the clans nomadizing the core areas of the *Taht İli* retreated to the margins of the Horde, either with the pretenders or to escape from the chronic civil war.¹⁰³⁹ Crimea and the Deşt-i Kıpçak were one of the best refuges.¹⁰⁴⁰ The support of Şirins and the other clans Barın, Argın, Kıpçak, and the existence of several different pretenders were extremely important for the formation of a separate Crimean identity within the region as a result of the decline of the central authority of the Golden Horde.¹⁰⁴¹ Although, the *Kırım Uluğu* was under the rule of Tokay Timur and his descendants from the early days of the Golden Horde, what emerged during the ensuing period was a self-sustaining political socio-economic entity different from that of the Golden Horde.¹⁰⁴²

4.3 The legacy of the Golden Horde

The existence of a separate Crimean Ulus does not exactly mean that the Crimean Khans gave up their claim on the heritage of the Golden Horde. The titles of *Uluğ Ordanın Uluğ Hanı* (The Khan of the Great Horde) was the official title of the Khans of the Golden Horde and was later used by the Crimean Khans who considered themselves as their legitimate heirs.¹⁰⁴³ However, their claim on the heritage of the Golden

¹⁰³⁸ Mark Kramarovskii, "Dzhuchidy i Krym: XIII-XV vv.", *Materialy Po Arkheologii, İstorii i Etnografii Tavrii*, Vypusk X, Simferopol, 2003, pp. 520-521.

¹⁰³⁹ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı ... p. 53.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar* ..., p. 93.

¹⁰⁴¹ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 31 and Mark Kramarovskii, "Krym v Sisteme ... p. 446.

¹⁰⁴² Hakan Kırımlı, *ibid.* p. 28.

¹⁰⁴³ İskander İzmailov, "Ulus Dzhuchi i Zolotaya Orda ... p. 16.

Horde was above all theoretical. The Crimean Khanate was never powerful enough to control the entire geography of the Golden Horde. Even when Mengli Giray I Khan invaded *Taht İli* (the core area of the Golden Horde) in 1502, he did not try to establish his own rule there and retreated to Crimea.¹⁰⁴⁴ It is also important to note that the opposition of the influential clan leaders who had escaped from the perils of the *Taht İli* and the Ottomans, were willing to keep Crimean Khanate as a buffer state in the north. In fact, it was the clans of the *Taht İli* who came to the west, rather than the Crimean Khans, who usually refrained from going to the east.¹⁰⁴⁵ Most importantly, none of the neighboring states opposed to the claims of the Crimean Khans even though they were frequently more powerful than the Khans. The Crimean Khans always considered the area and the population of Muscovite and part of the Lithuanian states as their patrimony, depending on the fact that they were once under the rule of the Golden Horde. Even though they had gradually lost their significance and became symbolic, the tribute and the taxes that were requested from the aforementioned states were inherited from the Golden Horde. The *tiş*¹⁰⁴⁶ (tysh, tıyış, valrus ivory), *dokuz hazine*¹⁰⁴⁷ (nine treasuries), *koltka*¹⁰⁴⁸ (zapros, overcharge) were given to the Golden Horde. The Crimean Khans were also confirming the possession of the lands that

¹⁰⁴⁴ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 46.

¹⁰⁴⁶ For more information on *Tiş* (Walrus Ivory) and other tributes and taxes paid to Golden Horde and Crimean Khanate see: S.F. Faizov, "Pominki-'tysh' v Kontekste Vzaimootnoshenii Rusi-Rossii s Zolotoi Ordoi I Krymskim Iurtom. K Voprosu Tipologii Sviazei", *Otechestvennye Arkhivy*, No. 3, Moscow, 1994, pp. 49-55.

¹⁰⁴⁷ A.L. Khoroshkevich, *Rus' i Krym Ot Soyuza k Protivostoyaniyu*, Moscow, 2001, pp. 245-246.

¹⁰⁴⁸ For the examples of *Yarlıks* that refers to *Zapros* see: (ed.) L.V. Cherepnin, *Pamyatniki Russkogo Prava*, T.III, Moscow, 1955, pp. 465-470.

they had never controlled to the Muscovite and Lithuanian rulers, whom they considered their vassals on the grounds that they were granted by their ancestors, the Khans of the Golden Horde. Towns and areas such as Chernihiv, Novhorod-Siverskii (Novgorod-Severskii, Smolensk including Pskov, Novgorod Velikii (Great Novgorod) and Ryazan, were among the places “donated” by the Crimean Khans to their counterparts.¹⁰⁴⁹ It was obvious that the grants were above all political, since they consisted of the lands under the Muscovite rule and were not very credible because they were alternatively given to both Poland and Muscovy.¹⁰⁵⁰ According to the Crimean Khans, Muscovite and Polish-Lithuanian rulers could have authority on those lands, which the Khans inherited from their ancestors, only after official donation (*yarlık*) of the Khans, which was one of the preconditions for the peaceful relations, like the regular dispatch of the annual gifts and tributes until the end of the seventeenth century.¹⁰⁵¹

4.4 The three pillars of the Khanate, the Khan, the Kalgay and the Nureddin

Theoretically, the authority of the Crimean Khan was absolute and limitless but in practice there were several constraints on it. According

¹⁰⁴⁹ Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate* ..., p. 496. For the example donated former lands of Golden Horde by the Crimean Khans see: document no: 1 dated AH. 867/AD.1461 (1462-1463?) written by Hacı Giray Khan to Grand Duke Casimir pp. 531-533, document no: 4 dated AH. 878/AD. 1474 (1473-1474?) written by Mengli Giray I to Grand Duke Casimir pp. 541-544, document no: 19 dated 09-Za.-926/21-X-1520 written by Mehmed Giray I to Sigismund I (1506-1548) pp. 646-651, document no: 27 the donation *yarlık* (*ahdname*) of Sahib Giray I Khan (1532-1551) dated AH.N.L.-941/AD.IV-1535 PP. 706-711 and document no: 32 donation *yarlık* of Devlet Giray I to Sigismund II dated AH.Ca.-C.959/AD.V-1552 pp. 746-752.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p.496.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Ibid.* p.496.

to the steppe tradition epitomized in the Yasa¹⁰⁵² (Code) and Töre (Laws and Customs) of the Chingis Khan, the state was patrimonial and belonged to every member of the ruling family (*Altan Uruq*). Moreover, the succession was lateral (next to kin by seniority), which means that the Khan should be replaced by the senior member of the uruq after his death.¹⁰⁵³ Under these circumstances, the Crimean Khans, who wanted to exclude the other branches of the family and to make khanship exclusive to their line, had found a solution by creating the of post Kalgay (first heir to the throne).¹⁰⁵⁴ According to the tradition, the post Kalgay came from Mengli Giray Khan who said that his son Mehmed Giray Sultan stay (Kalgay, Qalğay) in his place while he was on the campaign.¹⁰⁵⁵ It was obvious that the story was made up. Most probably, Mengli Giray Khan wanted to point out his successor and maybe prevent Ottoman intervention in the determination of future Khans.¹⁰⁵⁶ It seems that the title Kalgay was peculiar to the Crimean Khanate and was imitated by Crimean aristocracy. Canıbek Giray Khan, in his letter to Muscovite Tsar Mikhail I dated early 14/24.12.1624 complains about his failure to dispatch the tributes of Kalgay of the Şirin Bey, Nart Mirza and Kalgay and Nurededdin of the Mangıt Bey.¹⁰⁵⁷ Baron

¹⁰⁵² For more information on Yasa see: Fethi Gedikli, "Yasa", *DİA*, C. XLIII, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 336-340 and Curt Alinge, *Moğol Kanunları*, Ankara, 1967.

¹⁰⁵³ Fedorov-Davydov, G. A., *Obschestvennyi Stroi Zolotoi Ordy*, Moscow, 1973, p. 168.

¹⁰⁵⁴ For more information on Kalgay see: Halil İnalcık, "Kalgay", *DİA*, C. XXIV, İstanbul, 2001, p. 259 and Carl Max Kortepeter, "Kalgay", *El*² V. IV, Leiden, 1997. pp. 499-500 and Hakan Kırımlı, *Giraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp. 52-54.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan*, p. 25.

¹⁰⁵⁶ For the discussion on the origins and evolution of the post of Kalgay see: V. D., Smirnov, *Krymskoe Khantsvo Pod ...*, pp. 271-278 and Hakan Kırımlı, *Giraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp. 52-54.

¹⁰⁵⁷ See: document no: 21 in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarına ...*, pp. 89-97.

de Tott¹⁰⁵⁸ (1733-1793), who was in Crimea between the years 1767-1770, also states that the Şirin Bey had a kalgay and a nureddin, while the former was always the most senior one of the family.¹⁰⁵⁹ The Kalgay was the head of a miniature Khanate with the same institutions in his palace at Akmesçit (Simferepol). He assumed the role of the Khan when the latter was out of Crimea under the supervision of the Khan. He was acting as the de facto Khan during the interregnum period between the deposition of the previous Khan and the arrival of the new Khan.¹⁰⁶⁰ He had his own divan, administration, and *Ulus*. He had jurisdiction including the execution of the death penalty in his domain.¹⁰⁶¹

The third position of the Giray hierarchy was Nureddin¹⁰⁶². It was also introduced to find a solution for bypassing the steppe tradition which gave the right of succession to the senior member of the clan. Mehmed Giray II Khan, he wanted to nominate his son Sa'adet Giray Sultan as Kalgay, but could not, because of the Chingisid tradition. Thus, he designated him as the second heir to the throne, Nureddin. From then on, Crimean Khans, while nominating their brothers Kalgay, according to *Töre*, were nominating their favorites relatives, usually their sons, Nureddin, to point out their own candidates. According to the *töre*, Mehmed Giray II Khan named the post after the *Atalık* of Sa'adet Giray

¹⁰⁵⁸ For more information on Baron de Tott see: David, Geza, "Baron de Tott François", *DİA*, C. V., İstanbul, 1992, pp. 83-84.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Baron De Tott, *Memoirs of Baron De Tott*, V. 1 Part II, New York, 1973, pp. 118-119.

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 124.

¹⁰⁶¹ Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyan Fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman*, (ed. Sevim İlgürel), Ankara, 1998, p. 170.

¹⁰⁶² For more information on Nureddin see: Halil İnalcık, "Kırım Hanlığı", *DİA* C.XXV, Ankara, 2002. pp. 450-458 and Hakan Kırımlı, *Giraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp. 54-56.

Sultan, Nureddin Mirza.¹⁰⁶³ However, the term Nureddin must have been related to the Nogay Horde formed by Edige Mirza and came from his son Nureddin. The leader of the Nogay Horde (Mangıt Ulusu), who was settled on the right bank (west) of the Yayık, was called Nureddin, while the leader of the left bank (east) was called Kekovat (Keykubat).¹⁰⁶⁴ According to Hakan Kırımlı, since several tribes of the Nogay Horde that were in the process of disintegration moved to the west of Volga, Mehmed Giray II Khan, who wanted to bring them under his control, used the term Nureddin with the approval of the Ottomans.¹⁰⁶⁵ The Nureddin had his own administration and Ulus in the smaller form of the Khans and Kalgays. He also had his own palace and had the same judicial rights in his domain.¹⁰⁶⁶

4.5 The Giray Sultans

Contrary to the Ottoman Empire, where the members of the dynasty who were not lucky enough to become Sultan, were quickly excluded from the royal line, the Crimea Khans, who relate themselves to the Chingis Khan, were subject to the *Töre*. Besides, while the pre-Chingis Turkic Khans were addressing to the Turkish Budun in Orkhun scripts,¹⁰⁶⁷ whereas Chingis Khan was addressing to the members of his family (*Altan Uruq*) and his elite commanders (*Noyans*).¹⁰⁶⁸ The Crimean Khans, who claimed to be the members of the *Al-i Cengiz*

¹⁰⁶³ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 134.

¹⁰⁶⁴ V.V. Trepavlov, *Istoriya Nogaïskoi Orda*, p. 196.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 55.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyan Fi ...* p.170.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Hüseyin Namık Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, Ankara, 1994 and Talat Tekin, *Orhon Yazıtları*, İstanbul, 1998.

¹⁰⁶⁸ B.Y. Vladimirtsov, *Chingis Khan*, Moscow, 1922, p. 78, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, *Türk Tarihi ve Hukuk*, Ankara, 2014, p. 371. For more information on Noyan see: Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of ...* p. 203.

(Chinggisid House), followed the same principles and used the title of Sultan to the name of the male members of the family. However, there were two important pre-conditions for the upward mobility: the seniority (*ekberriyet*)¹⁰⁶⁹ and to be a Khanzade.¹⁰⁷⁰ The elder members of the family had more advantage and were superior to the younger members of the family. The only exception was to be a Khanzade. The sons of Kalgay and Nureddin were also superior to the ordinary members of the family, but even being a grandson of a Khan was not enough. The exceptions to the principle were accepted neither by the population nor by the other members of the Giray family, especially the existing Khanzades.¹⁰⁷¹ It should be remembered that one of the complaints of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was the khansip of Canıbek Giray, who was not a Khanzade, but just a grandson of the Khan.¹⁰⁷² However, there is an exception to every rule and there were several different factors for the determination of the new Khan. First of all, any member of the ruling family had a right to claim the throne according to the concept of the *Kut* (happiness, luck fortune). Any Khanzade who arrived on time to the *Kurultay* (Diet, General Assembly) and convinced the tribal leaders and other members of the *Kurultay* about the necessity of his Khanate by any means could become a Khan without opposition, even when the late Khan named his heir.¹⁰⁷³ The

¹⁰⁶⁹ For the discussion of the principle of seniority and primogeniture in the Turkic states see: Halil, İnalçık, "Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti Usûlü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisi ile İlgisi", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi (AÜSBFD)*, C. XIV, no: 1, Ankara, pp. 69-94.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 57.

¹⁰⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 57

¹⁰⁷² See notes 1142 and 1469 above.

¹⁰⁷³ Halil, İnalçık, "Osmanlılarda Saltanat Veraseti p. 72.

second solution was related to Islam. It is critical to note that none of the successful military commanders who de facto controlled the state, like Mamay, Edige and Timur, dared to assume the title Khan, and were forced to appoint a Chingisid puppet Khan, in whose name they were acting. Emir Edige prepared genealogies which related him to Ebu Bekir and Emir Timur to the prophet Muhammed to legitimize their claim.¹⁰⁷⁴ For the Crimean Khanate which remained faithful to the Chingisid tradition to the end, the approval of the *Karaçi Beys* was extremely important, and they quite often refused the Khan sent by the Porte or vice a versa, which meant armed conflict.¹⁰⁷⁵ Contrary to the Ottoman practice of fratricide, the Crimean Khans did not apply it, except for those who revolted against the Khan or committed a serious crime.¹⁰⁷⁶ It should also be remembered that the Khans often tried to eliminate other contenders whom they considered as a potential threat to their rule without investigating the genuineness of the threat, as in the case of Selamet Giray Khan's execution of Toktamış Giray Khan, together with the entire line of Gazi Giray II Khan, under the pretext of killing his brother Devlet Giray Sultan (1608).¹⁰⁷⁷ The only way for the ambitious Giray princes, who had political aspirations and those who felt their life in danger, was to escape from Crimea. The traditional method was to retreat to the steppe (*Kazak Çıkmak*)¹⁰⁷⁸ and to seek the support of the discontents, in order to return to the Khanate, as in the case of Mehmed

¹⁰⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p. 77.

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Ibid.* p. 81.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Ibid.* p. 91.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan* ... p. 73.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Halil İnalçık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate Under Sahib Giray I" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V. III-IV, Cambridge, 1979-1980, p. 452.

Giray I and II Khans. The fugitive Giray Sultan's chance to survive and to return to Crimea was higher with the existence of a dependable power base in the steppe, such as the tribe of *Atalık*, mother or wife, as in the case of the Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan. Some other members of the Giray family were taking refuge in Muscovy and Poland, in order to survive or to have their support to get the power in the Khanate as in the case of Murad Giray Sultan, who in vain cooperated with Muscovy. It was hardly possible to believe that the Girays, who were sheltered in Muscovy and Poland, could be successful except in the cases of Hacı Giray Khan, the founder of the Khanate and the last Khan Şahin Giray III (1777-1782, 1783)¹⁰⁷⁹, who managed to become Khan during the last years of the Khanate. The other Giray Sultans were either assimilated into the Muscovite (Russian) system or simply disappeared in the pages of history. At this point, it should be remembered that the Kasım Khanate was founded as a puppet-buffer state by Muscovy in order to attract the fugitive Giray Sultans. Quite paradoxically, it was the Ottomans who themselves frequently practiced and even legalized the fratricide¹⁰⁸⁰, saved the life of many members of the Giray dynasty. Several members of the family, who decided to reside in the Ottoman Empire, were assigned estates for their subsistence in Rumelia.¹⁰⁸¹ Those members of the family, who

¹⁰⁷⁹ For more information on Şahin Giray III Khan see: F. Lashkov, *Şahin Girei Poslednii Krymskii Khan (Istoricheskii Oчерk)*, Kiev, 1886 and A. Fisher, "Şahin Giray, The Reformer Khan and the Russian Annexation of Crimea", *Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks; Crimea and Crimean Turks*, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 91-121.

¹⁰⁸⁰ For more information on fratricide in the Ottoman Empire see: Mehmet Akman, *Osmanlı Devletinde Kardeş Katli*, İstanbul, 1997.

¹⁰⁸¹ For more information on the settlement of the members of the Giray family in the Ottoman lands see: Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp.60-62.

theoretically had the chance to become Khan one day, established strong relations with the Ottoman elite while they were waiting their turn without entering any military adventure. The members of the Giray family who were considered to be dangerous for the political stability of the Khanate were either settled or exiled to the insulated parts of the empire, like Rhodes and other islands on the Aegean Sea.¹⁰⁸²

4.6 The status of the *Karaçi Beys* in the administration of the Khanate

Evliya Çelebi in his *Seyahatname* (Book of Travels) gives a detailed description of Mehmed Giray IV Khan's *görünüŝ* (divan) in 1664-1665 in Bahçesaray and provides us with valuable information about the political and administrative structure of the Khanate.¹⁰⁸³ The Kalgay and Nureddin who were seated to the right and left of the Khan were second and third in the hierarchy. The *Karaçi Beys* (the leaders of the four constituent tribes) were as important as the Giray dynasty for the political and social integrity of the Khanate. Even though the hierarchy of the tribes varied according to the political atmosphere, the principle of the four *Karaçis* (Şirin, Barın, Argın, Kıpçak, Sicivut or Mangıt) played a key role in the functioning of the state apparatus. According to Uli Schamiloglu, the tetrarchy of the ruling tribes was always more important than their names.¹⁰⁸⁴ F. Lashkov states that there were seven influential clans in the Crimean Khanate. Şirins, Mansurs, Barins,

¹⁰⁸² For more information on the settlement of Girays in Rhodes see: Ilya Zaitsev, "Krymskiye Khany v Ssylke na Rodose", *Vostochnaya Kolleksiya Leto 2009*, N. 2 (37), Moscow, 2009, pp. 96-101.

¹⁰⁸³ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII, p. 228.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Uli Schamiloglu, *Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis), New York, 1986, p. 45.

Sicivuts and Argins constituted the first line, while Kıpçaks and Yaşlavs were in the second line.¹⁰⁸⁵ According to the Turko-Mongolian tradition, the Khan should be approved by a special ceremony by the four *Karaçi Beys* in the *Kurultay*.¹⁰⁸⁶ They were the natural members of the Imperial divan, whose approval was necessary for the decisions of the Khan to be effective from the days of the Golden Horde and was inherited by the successor Khanates.¹⁰⁸⁷ The *Başkaraçi* (Head Karaçi was also the chief commander of the Crimean army which was the real force behind their power.¹⁰⁸⁸ It was impossible to survive even for the most charismatic and ambitious Khans without the support of an army.¹⁰⁸⁹ The *Başkaraçi Şirin Bey* was positioned on the right flank of the army which was more prestigious, while the Mangit Beys were on the left. The prestige of the Şirin clan dated back to the Golden Horde when the Şirin Bey became *Uluğ Bek* (Great Bey) and began to cooperate with other *Karaçi Beys*.¹⁰⁹⁰ It should be remembered that it was the Şirin Bey Tegene who played a fundamental role during the formation of the Crimean Khanate. The second privilege of the *Karaçi Beys* was the making of foreign policy, and they had the freedom to correspond with foreign rulers.¹⁰⁹¹

¹⁰⁸⁵ F. Lashkov, "Arkhivnye Dannye o Beilikakh v Krymskom Khanstve", (soch.) F. F. Lashkova, Odessa, 1889, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 167 and for an earlier testimony of the ceremony see: Johannes Schiltberger, *The Bondage and Travels of Johannes Schiltberger, A Native of Bavaria, In Europe, Asia and Africa, 1396-1427*, (ed.) P. Bruun, London, 1889, p. 48.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 38 and 45.

¹⁰⁸⁸ V. Trepavlov, "Sistema Krylev i Administrativnoe Ustroictvo Problema Ak-Ordy i Kok-Ordy", *Istoriya Tatar s Drevneishikh Vremen v Semi Tomax Tom IV Tatarskie Gosudartsva XV-XVIII vv.*, Kazan, 2009, pp. 189.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 68.

¹⁰⁹⁰ V.P. Gulevich, "Severnoe Prichernomor'e v 1400-1442 gg. I Voznikovenie Krymskoe Khanstvo", *Zolotoordynskoe Obozrenie*, No: 1, Kazan, 2013, p. 121.

¹⁰⁹¹ Abdülgaḫḫar, Kırımlı, *Umdetü't-Tevarih ...* p. 194.

They were also receiving *tiş* from Muscovy.¹⁰⁹² It was natural that the ambitious Khans wanted to free themselves from those restraints, but the feudal character of the steppe tied their hands. The property and lands of the Beys were hereditary according to the senior successors and was out of the Khan's jurisdiction and therefore could not be confiscated.¹⁰⁹³ Moreover, the Ottomans, who realized the influence of the *Karaçi Beys*, were frequently using them to intimidate unruly Khans and to bring them back in line. The Crimean Khans, who tried to establish their own authority, tried to find different solutions to limit the power of the *Karaçi Beys*. First, they have tried to balance their power by inviting or bringing other clans to the Khanate, like the Mangits, and supported secondary clans.¹⁰⁹⁴ However, it should be kept in mind that the *Karaçi Beys* were not always acting in unison and there was fierce competition among them. According to Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, Sahib Giray I Khan (1532-1551) was inclined towards the Sicivut clan, contrary to the existing *Karaçis* of the time.¹⁰⁹⁵ He also states that during their revolt against the Ottomans while Mangits supported the Ottomans and Canıbek Giray Khan, Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray were supported by Şirins¹⁰⁹⁶

¹⁰⁹² See: document no: 35 dated L.1047 A.H./II-III-1638 A.D. in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga ...*, p. 167. and document no: 40 dated Z.1047IV-V/1638 A.D. in V.V.Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga ...*, p. 208.

¹⁰⁹³ F. Lashkov, "Arkhivnye Dannye o Beilikakh ...pp. 13-14.

¹⁰⁹⁴ For the incorporation of the Mangits in the Crimean system see: Alper Başer, "Kırım Hanlığı Tarihinde Mangıt Kabilesi", *Doğu Avrupa Türk Mirasının Son Kalesi Kırım*, (ed.) Yücel Öztürk, İstanbul, 2015, pp. 77-81.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 123.

¹⁰⁹⁶ *ibid.* 177.

4.7 The attempts to reform the army and the administration of the Khanate and the emergence of *Yumuş Mirzas* (Service Mirzas)

Sahib Giray Khan and Gazi Giray II Khans, who had opportunity to observe the Ottoman court tried, unsuccessfully to reorganize it according to the Ottoman example and to establish a standing army. According to a letter preserved in the archive of Topkapı palace, the chief *Karaçi* complained to Süleyman I about Sahib Giray Khan, who did not take into consideration their advices about violating the *töre* and accommodating criminals as musketeers around him.¹⁰⁹⁷ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza states that Gazi Giray II Khan levied a special tax to finance a musketeer force.¹⁰⁹⁸ Finally, they introduced the *Yumuş Mirza* (Service Mirza) or *İçki Beyleri* (Beys attached to the Khan) system. It was obvious that the Service Mirzas who owed their status to the Khan were far more loyal to the Khan than the hereditary clan leaders. In theory, the service mirza's lands were not hereditary and were given temporarily, in return for their services, but they gradually became hereditary, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the service mirzas were very well organized and acted as a group, contrary to the disorganized *Karaçi Beys*, especially the *Şirins*.¹⁰⁹⁹ It should also

¹⁰⁹⁷ (ed.) Alexander Bennigsen, *Le Khanat De Crimée Dans Les Archives du Musée du Palais du Topkapı*, Paris, 1978, p. 122. For more information Sahib Giray's reforms see: Halil İnalçık, "The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate Under Sahib Giray I" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V. III-IV, Cambridge, 1979-1980. pp. 458-466.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, p. 142.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Beatrice Forbes Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean Khanate 1466-1532", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V. II, no. 3. Cambridge, 1978. p. 306

be noted that the Khans strengthened their ties with the *Karaçi Beys* through marriages.¹¹⁰⁰

4.8 The other members of the *Divan*

According to Charles de Peyssonel¹¹⁰¹ (French Consul in Crimea 1754-1758), besides from Kalgay, Nureddin, *Kapu Ağası* and Şirin Beyi as the *Baş Karaçi*; Bucak, Kuban, Yedisan *Ser-askerleri* (Commanders in Chief) if they are in Crimea, Or Beyi, *Müftü*, *Kazi-asker* (Military judge), *Hazinedar* (Treasurer), *Defterdar* (Keeper of the register), *Aktacı* Bey (Head of the Stables), *Kilerci Başı* (Head of the Larder), *Kuşçu Başı* (Falconier), *Divan Efendisi*, *Kazi-asker Naibi* (Deputy of the Kazasker), *Bahçesaray Kadısı* were the members of the divan and *Kapucı Başı*, and *Kullar Kahyası* (Steward of the Servants) were also present for the ceremonial purposes.¹¹⁰² It is possible to find almost the identical list of the government officials entitled to receive a share of *tış* in the register of the *Tış Defters*, which includes the recipients of annual tribute from Muscovy.¹¹⁰³ It was also possible to convene a smaller divan, consisting of Kalgay, Nureddin, *Ser-askers*, *Ulu Ağa*, *Kazi-asker* and *Karaçi Beyleri* in case of emergency.¹¹⁰⁴ Evliya Çelebi states that Or Beyi was the most important military office of the Khanate, after the Kalgay and

¹¹⁰⁰ For the marriages between the Girays and the Karaçis and their political significance see: Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp. 79-82.

¹¹⁰¹ For more information on Claude-Charles de Peyssonel see: I.V. Sapozhnikov, E.V. Poleschchikova, "Sharl de Peisonal, i Ego Vklad v Izuchenie Antichnoi i Serednivekovoi Geografii Severo-Zapadnogo Prichernomor'ya", *Stratum Plus*, No: 4, 2005-2009, Kishinev, 2009, pp. 465-466.

¹¹⁰² Claude-Charles de Peyssonel, *Traité sur la Commerce de la Mer Noire*, Vol II., Paris, 1787, pp. 261-264.

¹¹⁰³ For more information on *Tış* and *Tış Defterleri* see: Serkan Acar, "Moskof Çarlarının Kırım Hanlarına Ödediği Bir Haraç Türü: *Tış-Tiyış* (Mors Dişi)", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, XV/60, Ankara, 2018, pp. 34-45 and the examples of *Tış Defters* see: V.V. Veliaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına Ve Ol Taraflarga ...*,

¹¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p. 23.

Nureddin, because of the strategic importance of the Orkapı¹¹⁰⁵, the fortress on the isthmus which separates Crimea from the mainland, for the defence of the peninsula.¹¹⁰⁶ The testimonies of the French diplomats Baron de Tott and Charles de Peyssonel confirm Evliya Çelebi; however, they say that the post was usually given to the Şirin Mirzas who were married to the daughters of the Khan.¹¹⁰⁷ The Nogays of the Bucak, Yedisian¹¹⁰⁸ and Kuban¹¹⁰⁹ Hordes were commanded by the members of the Giray family called *Ser-asker Sultans*.

4.9 The *Ulema*

Evliya Çelebi states that the Ulema (Muslim Clerics and Jurists) played an important role in the imperial divan because of their high prestige as pious men and their religious knowledge.¹¹¹⁰ C. Peyssonel and Baron de Tott also talk about the high status of the Ulema, but he also states that, because of the feudal character of the government, their authority was more limited than their Ottoman counterparts.¹¹¹¹ They were hearing and monitoring judicial cases brought to the divan in terms of their conformity to the religious laws. They were also controlling the decisions of the divan to the şariat and submitting to the Khan for ratification.¹¹¹² It was natural to think that the Crimean Tatar ulema was

¹¹⁰⁵ For more information on Or Kapı see: Johann Erich Thounmann, *Description de la Crimée*, Strasbourg, 1786, pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁰⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII, p. 229.

¹¹⁰⁷ Baron De Tott, *Memoirs of Baron De Tott*, V. 1 Part II, p. 125 and Claude-Charles de Peyssonel, *Traité sur la Commerce ... Vol II.*, Paris, 1787, pp. 256-257.

¹¹⁰⁸ For more information on Yedisian Horde see: .V. Trepavlov, *Istoriya Nogaiskoi Orda*, pp. 434-443.

¹¹⁰⁹ For more information on Kuban Horde see: Johann Erich Thounmann, *Description de la Crimée ...* pp. 91-95.

¹¹¹⁰ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII, p. 228.

¹¹¹¹ Claude-Charles de Peyssonel, *Traité sur la Commerce ... Vol.II* pp. 260-261 and Baron De Tott, *Memoirs of Baron De Tott*, V. 1 Part II, p.127.

¹¹¹² Abdülgaffar, Kırımı, *Umdetü't-Tevarih ...* p. 194

under the influence of the Ottoman traditions and institutions because of their affiliation to the Ottoman Sultan, who was at the same time the Emirü'l-Müminin (Caliph). However, they were the descendents of a rich Islamic tradition and institutions.¹¹¹³ Therefore, to be educated in the medreses (religious high schools) of the Ottoman state was not indispensable for a successful career. Natalia Krolikowska shows that most of the members of the Crimean Tatar higher ulema came from religious, noble, or influential Crimean Tatar families and were educated in the medreses in the khanate during the 18th century.¹¹¹⁴

4.10 The *Kapıkulus*

The beys and mirzas of all backgrounds, either hereditary or service, had to share the power with the *Kapıkulus* (servants of the Khan) on every aspect of life. The *Kapıkulus* represent the mixture of Chingissid and Ottoman administrative organizations. The system was mainly inherited from the Golden Horde and was influenced by the Ottomans.¹¹¹⁵ They came from various social backgrounds, although most of them were probably slave origin, their origin stretching from ruling families, noble clients, ulema families, Muslim and Non-Muslim subjects of the Khan.¹¹¹⁶ The basic difference between the Ottoman and Crimean administrative system was that it was out of the question for a member of *Altan Urug* to delegate his power to a slave. Contrary to the

¹¹¹³ For more information on the Islam in the Crimean Khanate see: Ahmet Türk, "Kırım Hanlığı'nda İslamiyet", *Doğu Avrupa Türk Mirasının Son Kalesi Kırım*, (ed.) Yücel Öztürk, İstanbul, 2015, pp. 123-154.

¹¹¹⁴ Natalia Krolikowska, *Law and Division of Power in the Crimean Khanate. A Study on the Reign of Murad Giray (1678-1683)*, (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis), Warsaw, 2010, pp. 108-114.

¹¹¹⁵ Maryna Kravets, "From Nomads Tent to Garden Palace Evolution of a Chingissid Household in the Crimea", *History and Society in Central and Inner Asia*, (ed. Michael Gevers et. alias), Toronto, 2005, pp. 48-49..

¹¹¹⁶ Natalia Krolikowska, *Law and Division of Power ...* p. 79.

Ottoman practice, the slaves were never allowed to assume higher positions.¹¹¹⁷ Evliya Çelebi demonstrates that the *Han Ağası* (*Ulu Ağā*, Vizier of the Khan), despite the fact that he was not of slave origin, by principle was not allowed to sit in the divan and was standing on his feet, and the *Kapı Kethüdası* (Commander of the Gate Keepers) was not present in the divan.¹¹¹⁸ For example Sefer Gazi Ağā (1644-1646, 1647-1664), who was the Vizier of the Khan during the visit of Evliya Çelebi, belonged to a middle class noble family.¹¹¹⁹ According to Charles de Peyssonel Kudalak, Avlan, Kemal, El, Uziç (?), Kaya and Sobla were the most prominent Kapıkulu families.¹¹²⁰ Evliya Çelebi adds that the Khan's *Kapı Halkı* came from a variety of different ethnic backgrounds and especially from the peoples of Caucasia.¹¹²¹

4.11 The Court Servants

The second group of the servants was the Khan's court servants, who organized the everyday life of the Khan which included *Aktacı Baş*, *Atalık* (tutor of the Khan), *Çadırıcı Baş* (Chief Tent Keeper), *Çaşnigir Baş* (Chief Taster), *Kapıcı Baş*, *Kilerci Baş* (Chief Larder), *Hazinedar*, *Silahdar* (Sword Bearer) and Eunuchs, Pages and other servants.¹¹²² According to E. V. Syroekovskii those persons and institutions were introduced to the Crimean administration by Sa'adet Giray I Khan¹¹²³ when he returned to Crimea from the Porte as the new Khan (1523).

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 84.

¹¹¹⁸ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII, p. 228.

¹¹¹⁹ For more information on Sefer Gazi Ağā and the social backgrounds of several other servants of the Khans see: Natalia Krolikowska, *Law and Division of Power ...* pp. 79-83.

¹¹²⁰ Claude-Charles de Peyssonel, *Traité sur la Commerce ...* Vol.II p. 276.

¹¹²¹ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII, p. 229.

¹¹²² Natalia Krolikowska, *Law and Division of Power ...* p. 85.

¹¹²³ For more information Sa'adet Giray I Khan see: Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli Dvukh Materikov* Tom I, pp. 167-201.

¹¹²⁴ In theory, they did not have any political power by the definition of their jobs, but they could influence the Khans decisions by providing him with selective information. ¹¹²⁵ It was also possible that they could manipulate Khan's decision, because it was most probable that they could establish an intimate relation with him and to have his full confidence.

4.12 The army

4.12.1 Tribal forces

The composition of the Crimean Tatar army also reflected the mixed character of the Khanate, combining its Chingissid heritage and the practice of their Ottoman overlords. The bulk of the army consisted of tribal forces. According to Evliya Çelebi, the Crimean Khans had the potential to recruit between one hundred twenty-thousand six thousand soldiers, but only forty to eighty thousand of them were ready to join the army immediately.¹¹²⁶ While, Martin Broniewski states that the Crimean Tatar army consisted of twenty thousand men, including the auxiliaries, Guillaume de Beauplan states that the Crimean army consisted of eighty thousand men.¹¹²⁷ The Şirins were able to recruit twenty thousand cavaliers and had 300 genuine Mirzas at their disposal.¹¹²⁸ Sicivut and Dayir Beys together had twenty thousand men, and fought

¹¹²⁴ V.E Syroechkovskii, "Mukhammed-Gerai i Ego Vassaly", *Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta im. M. V. Lomonosova*, vol. 2, Moscow, 1940, p. 60

¹¹²⁵ Natalia Krolikowska, *Law and Division of Power ...* p.. 85.

¹¹²⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII, p. 229.

¹¹²⁷ Martin Bronevskiy, *Kırım*, p. 56. Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine*, New York, 1959, p. 459

¹¹²⁸ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII p. 229.

in the right flank of the army with Kalgay Sultan.¹¹²⁹ Mansur (Mangit) Beys had twenty thousand men, and they fought in the left flank of the army under the command of the Nuraddin Sultan, together with other Nogay clans and Or Beyi.¹¹³⁰ Kaysuni Mehmedzade Nidai (Remmal Hoca d. 1567?)¹¹³¹ in his history *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han*, despite the fact that the weight of the clans changed, gives almost identical names and numbers when the Crimean Tatar army came out of Orkapı and began the Muscovite campaign (1541).¹¹³² Baron de Tott states that the Khan commanded one hundred thousand soldiers in person, while the army of Kalgay consisted of sixty thousand men, the Nureddin commanded forty thousand men, and the armies of Yedisan and Bucak *Seraskers* were in the army of the Khan Kırım Giray Khan¹¹³³ (1758-1764, 1768-1769) during the Ottoman-Russian War (1768-1774).¹¹³⁴

4.12.2 *Kapıkulus*

The second part of the army consisted of specialized professionals who were the *Kapıkulus*, who were either financed by the Khan or paid by the Ottoman Sultans. The Ottoman forces which were acting like the personal guard of the Khan were permanently stationed in the Khanate, while there were other forces temporarily sent for specific purposes. According to Remmal Hoca, Sahib Giray Khan was accompanied by a

¹¹²⁹ *ibid.* p. 229.

¹¹³⁰ *ibid.* p. 229.

¹¹³¹ For more information on Nidai see: Fatma Meliha Şen, "Nidai ve Kırım Tarihi Hakkında Yeni Bir Eseri: Nusret-İ Gaza-yı Sahib Giray Han, Hikayet-i Boğdan", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, C.23-Güz 2013, İstanbul, 2013, pp. 148-150.

¹¹³² Kaysunizade Nidai Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib Giray Han*, (ed. Özalp Gökbilgin) Ankara, 1973, p. 61.

¹¹³³ For more information on Kırım Giray Khan see: Halim Giray, *Gülbün-i Hanan ...* pp. 180-182.

¹¹³⁴ Baron De Tott, *Memoirs of Baron De Tott*, V. 1 Part II, p.151.

force of six hundred janissaries (*tüfenkçi*) and one thousand equipped soldiers against his enemies when he was sent to Crimea as the new Khan in 1532.¹¹³⁵ The Ottoman forces joined the parade of the army at Orkapı. At the beginning of the Muscovite campaign there were janissaries, one thousand musketeers, sixty cannons with their carts and the armorers.¹¹³⁶ Martin Broniewski states that the whole Crimean Tatar army consisted of cavalry, except the janissary musketeers, who were either paid by the Khan or subsidized by the Ottoman Sultan.¹¹³⁷ The Kapıkulus from aristocrats of diverse Caucasian ethnic groups, Circassians, Georgians, Abkhazians, Adigeys, Kumuks, etc., served the Khans.¹¹³⁸ According to the report of Muscovite envoy Elizar Rzhevskii, Kalgay Mehmed Giray Sultan punished Süleş Mirza Kaşay, who wrote a letter of complaint about the growing influence of the Circassian Kapıkulus in the Khanate (1575-1576).¹¹³⁹

4.13 The military equipment and the finance of the army

The Crimean Tatar army might have been large but it was by no means adequately equipped. Martin Broniewski states that there were many people in Crimea who did not have any weapons or a horse. Many of them were going into debt or renting horses to pay after their return in order to cover the expenses of the military equipment, and others were going on horseback without any weapon.¹¹⁴⁰ Halil İnalcık provides an

¹¹³⁵ Kaysunizade Nidai Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib Giray...*, p. 21.

¹¹³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 61.

¹¹³⁷ Martin Bronevskiy, *Kırım*, p. 56.

¹¹³⁸ A.A. Sheikhumarov, *Armiya Krymskogo Khanstva ...* p. 34.

¹¹³⁹ S.H. Khotko, "Portivostoyanie Voennno-Politicheskikh koalitsii v Cherkesii: i Osnovoe Soobschenii Elizar Rzhevskogo (1578)", *Klio*, No.7, (151), St. Petersburg, 2019, p. 80.

¹¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 52 and 57.

example of such a transaction which came before the court.¹¹⁴¹ For that reason, the Ottomans were sending subsidies to the Crimean Khan under the name of *Çizme Baha* (Price of the Boot), *Tirkeş Baha* (Price of the Bow) equal to forty thousand gold coins and *Sekban Akçesi* (Musketeer Money) for the preparations of the army as well as further subsidies called *Teşrif-i Kudüm* (Arrival) when they joined the imperial army.¹¹⁴² Evliya Çelebi, who joined to the siege of Azak, states that twelve thousand gold *Çizme Baha* was sent from Istanbul to Bahadır Giray Khan.¹¹⁴³

It appears that the fundamental problem of the Crimean Khans was finding the necessary funds to equip the army for the military campaigns. The slave trade played an important role for the welfare of ordinary Crimean Tatar which was subject to the effects of environmental factors like famine, drought or epidemics, which was one of the major obstacles. However, the pressure of the clans that did not want to lose their monopoly on the recruitment of the army seems to be of paramount importance.

4.14 The Seymens

*Seymens*¹¹⁴⁴ were the second group which was employed by the Khans during the campaigns; they were from the Crimean Tatar

¹¹⁴¹ Halil İnalçık, "Kırım Hanlığı Kadı Sicilleri Bulundu", *Belleten*, C.LX ,No: 227'den ayrı basım , Ankara, 1996, p. 180.

¹¹⁴² Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyan Fi ...*p. 172 and Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Nusretname İnceleme-Metin* (1106-1133 71693-1721), (ed.) Mehmet Topal, Ankara, 2018, p. 225.

¹¹⁴³ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, C.II., İstanbul, 1999, p.. 69.

¹¹⁴⁴ For more information on Seymens see. A.A. Sheikhumarov, *Armiya Krymskogo Khanstva: Organizatsiya i Taktika (XV-XVIII vv.)*, Kazan, 2019, pp. 46-56..

background and had also served as the personal guard of the Khan.¹¹⁴⁵ However, Evliya Çelebi claims that all of the five hundred *Sekbans* stationed in Orkapı were all Greeks (*Rums*), on the grounds that the Crimean Tatars did not know how to use muskets.¹¹⁴⁶ C. de Peyssonel states that the Musketeers employed from the so- called *Çelebi* villages formed one single group and joined the army with their own banner under the command of *Silahdar*.¹¹⁴⁷ A. A. Sheikhumeroov argues that several villages named after *Seymens* were their residences and they had their quarter in Bahçesaray.¹¹⁴⁸ However, the fragile economy of the Khanate in general did not allow the mobilization of more than three hundred *Seymens*.¹¹⁴⁹ Thus, it is quite reasonable to believe that *Seymens* who were using firearms might have been a viable alternative to the traditional cavalry, like the Ottoman *Sekbans* and the Polish Cossacks in the age of the military revolution. However, the tribal aristocracy strongly resisted their incorporation into the system and succeeded in preserving their dominant position in the military. It should also be noted that most of the *Seymens* were reserves and, like their counterparts, were employed during the campaigns which forced them to find alternative ways to continue their daily lives.¹¹⁵⁰ Therefore, the recognition of their status and being incorporated into the military apparatus of the Khanate was their main objective. A. A. Sheikhumeroov divides *Seymens* into three, according to their places of employment.

¹¹⁴⁵ A. De La Motraye, *Travels*, Vo. 2, ., London, 1773, p. 24.

¹¹⁴⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, C.VII p. 196.

¹¹⁴⁷ Claude-Charles de Peyssonel , *Traité sur la Commerce ...* Vol.II pp. 285-286.

¹¹⁴⁸ A.A. Sheikhumeroov, *Armiya Krymskogo Khanstva ...* p. 56

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 48.

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 47-48.

The first group was the *Seymens* of the capital, who were protecting the Khan and the capital and performing ceremonial duties. The second group was the *Seymens* of the garrisons, who were guarding the forts that where they were permanently residing. The third group was the Police *Seymens*, who accompanied the officials and foreign delegations in the countryside.¹¹⁵¹ The salaried Ottoman troops also served as the personal guard of the Khans, but mostly during the campaigns and under extraordinary conditions. It is believed that they would remain loyal to the Khans under every condition, since they did not have any connection with the local power centers.¹¹⁵² However, it appears that the Khans preferred to entrust their security to the *Seymens* of the Circassian and Georgian origin who were their subjects, rather than the Ottomans.¹¹⁵³

4.15 The impact of the Ottoman forces

The existence of the Ottoman forces in Crimea changed the balance of power in favor of the Khans. They were not only able to easily subjugate the internal opposition to their authority, thanks to the existence of the Ottoman firearms at their disposal, but also got the upper hand over their rivals in the region, especially the nomadic and semi-nomadic Nogays and Circassians.¹¹⁵⁴ Remmal Hoca describes how the Nogays and Circassians, who could not resist, dispersed and fled under the fire power of the Crimean army during the Circasian and

¹¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* pp. 51-52.

¹¹⁵² Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, p. 186.

¹¹⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 185.

¹¹⁵⁴ Halil İnalçık, *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi ...*, p. 98.

Nogay campaigns of Sahib Giray (1543-1544).¹¹⁵⁵ The Ottomans never allowed the Crimean Khans to have their own heavy artillery and preserved their monopoly on it up to the end of the Khanate. First of all, the Ottomans who were using artillery since the end of the fourteenth century and owed most of their success vis-à-vis their eastern neighbors were very well aware of their importance on the battle field.¹¹⁵⁶ Therefore, they were able to prevent the Khans from establishing their own weapon industry in the long run and to keep them dependent to the Ottoman aid, like the Poles did to the Ukrainian Cossacks, and the Muscovites to the Don Cossacks. For example, the Mehmed and Şahin Giray brothers' rapprochement with the Zaporozhian Host and Poland was closely related to their desperate need for arms and ammunition. The second problem was purely political. The Crimean Khans were claiming that Kefe which, was previously part of the Golden Horde, de jure belonged to them, while the Ottoman were claiming that the fortress and the territory within the artillery range belonged to them. Thus, the Ottomans feared that the Khans could easily besiege the most important military and commercial outpost of the Ottomans in the northern part of the Black Sea if they had the support of heavy artillery.¹¹⁵⁷

4.16 The traditional Crimean Tatar military tactics

On the other hand, the traditional Crimean Tatar forces were not sympathetic but rather against the existence of heavy artillery and

¹¹⁵⁵ Kaysunizade Nidai Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib Giray...*, p. 77, and *ibid.* p. 112.

¹¹⁵⁶ For more information on the subject see: Halil İnalçık "The socio-political effects ... pp. 202-211.

¹¹⁵⁷ Halil İnalçık, *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi ...*, p. 25.

infantry within the army.¹¹⁵⁸ The Crimean Tatar cavalry was one of the fastest armies of the time and their military tactics were based upon ambushes, pretended escapes and surprise attacks on the enemy. Sigismund Herberstein states that the Tatars were expert at fake escapes.¹¹⁵⁹ Martin Broniewski states that the Crimean Tatars were very well-organized and were able to make very quick manoeuvres thanks to their prespecified signals.¹¹⁶⁰ According to the Crimean Tatar military understanding, the presence of the infantry and artillery was decreasing their manoeuvrability. However, the infusion of firearms and the military revolution gradually made their traditional tactics obsolete. Besides, the Crimean Tatar cavalry was forced to give up hand to hand combat with pike and sable due to the use of muskets and bayonette by the enemy infantry, which proved to have catastrophic effects.¹¹⁶¹ Unless they could ambush the enemy, which was very difficult in the open field, the Crimean Tatars army was left with limited alternatives. In order to protect themselves from the surprise attacks, their adversaries like Poles and Cossacks were moving into the steppe, either in the form of *Guliai Gorod* (Wandering City) for the Muscovites or *Wagenburg* (Wagon Fort or *Tabor*).¹¹⁶² According to the testimony of the English ambassador to Muscovy Giles Fletcher (1588-1589), the *Guliai Gorod* was a moving castle aimed to protect the army from the surprise Tatar

¹¹⁵⁸ For the history of the fire arms in the Crimean khanate see: A.A. Sheikhumarov, *Armija Krymskogo Khanstva ...* pp. 170-184.

¹¹⁵⁹ Sigismund von Herberstein, *La Moscovie Du XVI^e* ... p. 177.

¹¹⁶⁰ Martin Bronevskiy, *Kırım*, p. 57.

¹¹⁶¹ A.A. Sheikhumarov, *Armija Krymskogo Khanstva ...* p. 161.

¹¹⁶² For more information on *Guliai Gorod* and *Wagenburg* tactics and their use in the steppe see: Brian Davies, "Guliai-Gorod, Wagenburg, and Tabor Tactics in 16th-17th Century Muscovy and Eastern Europe", *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800*, (ed. Brian Davies), Leiden, 2012, pp. 93-108.

attacks.¹¹⁶³ G. de Beauplan also admits that *Tabors* were formed against the Tatar attacks.¹¹⁶⁴ The Crimean Tatar cavalry, who could not approach the enemy, would try to harass the enemy with a massive shower of arrows behind the range of the firearms and to provoke them to attack.¹¹⁶⁵

In fact, the Crimean Tatars were familiar with the *Wagenburg* warfare. It was the modernized version of the Turko-Mongol *Küren*¹¹⁶⁶ (Circular Camp) but reinforced by firearms. Franciscan Missionary William of Rubruck (1220-1295), who had visited the courts of Sartak¹¹⁶⁷ (d. 1256), Batu and Möngke¹¹⁶⁸ (1251-1259) Khans, states that the Khan was living at the center of a village town which consisted of tents placed according to the owners proximity to the Khan.¹¹⁶⁹ Sahib Giray I Khan successfully applied the *Tabur Cengi* (Tabur Warfare) that he most probably adopted from the Ottomans in his campaigns, thanks to the existence of Ottoman firearms who accompanied him. According to Remmal Hoca, Sahib Giray I Khan positioned the army in the form of *Küren* when they were camping in the open field and successfully repulsed a Circassian attack in the night.¹¹⁷⁰ As a result, it should be emphasized that the proponents of the traditional Crimean Tatar

¹¹⁶³ : (ed.) L.E. Berry and R.O. Crummey, *Rude and Barbarous* ..., pp. 185-186.

¹¹⁶⁴ See note: 101 above.

¹¹⁶⁵ Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, *A Description of Ukraine* ..., p. 462.

¹¹⁶⁶ For more information on *Küren* see: B. V. Vladimirtsov, *Moğolların İçtimai Teşkilatı* ... pp. 61-62.

¹¹⁶⁷ For more information on Sartak Khan see: Rene Grousset, *Bozkır İmparatorluğu* ... pp. 395-396.

¹¹⁶⁸ For more information on Möngke Khan see: Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of* ... p. 195.

¹¹⁶⁹ (ed.) Christopher Dawson, *The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, New York, 1955, p. 126.

¹¹⁷⁰ Kaysunizade Nidai Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib Giray*..., pp. 91-92.

warfare were not against the use of firearms that proved their effectiveness in the battle. They were rather against the use of it by the infantry as they thought it slowed down the army. However, contrary to the stereotypes, Crimean Tatars adapted themselves to the use of firearms on horseback earlier than was expected and learned to fight under enemy fire.¹¹⁷¹

4.17 The increasing role of the Crimean Tatar army in the Ottoman campaigns

The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate was closely related to the role of the Crimean Tatar army in the Ottoman campaigns. The Crimean Tatars were first invited to the Ottoman military campaign by Bayezid II's Moldavian campaign in 1484. The fundamental effect of the campaign was to connect the Ottoman Balkans with Crimea and the isolation of Moldavia from the Black Sea as a result of the conquest of Kili and Akkerman by the Ottomans.¹¹⁷² The Crimean Tatars once again joined the Ottoman campaign after more than fifty years in 1538.¹¹⁷³ Süleyman I invited Sahib Giray I Khan, who became the Crimean Khan with the direct intervention of the Porte to the Moldavian campaign. After this date, the Ottomans began to frequently invite the Crimean army to the campaigns as a result of their increasing influence on the Khanate.¹¹⁷⁴

¹¹⁷¹ For the diffusion of fire arms in the Crimean army see: A.A. Sheikhumarov, *Armiya Krymskogo Khanstva* ... pp. 181-185.

¹¹⁷² For more information on the 1484 Moldavian campaign see: Şerafettin Turan, "Bayezid II", *DİA* C. V., İstanbul, 1992. p. 235 and Abdülkadir Özcan, "Boğdan" *DİA*, C. VI, p. 269 and Aurel Decei, "Boğdan" *IA*, C.II, p. 699.

¹¹⁷³ For more information on the 1538 Moldavian campaign see: Abdülkadir Özcan, *ibid.* p. 269 and Aurel Decei, *ibid.* p. 700.

¹¹⁷⁴ Halil İnalcık, *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi* ..., p. 30.

Quite paradoxically, the Ottoman dependence on the presence of the Crimean forces on the front was increasingly parallel to the unwillingness of the Crimean Tatars to join the campaigns. The Khanate, who had lost the competition over the political heritage of the Golden Horde in Kazan and Hacıtarhan, was now in a defensive stance against slow but decisive Muscovite advance towards the south. Muscovy had plans to invade Crimea as early as the second half of the sixteenth century.¹¹⁷⁵ Despite the fact that Muscovite-Russians could not be successful until 1736¹¹⁷⁶, Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks had made several incursions into the peninsula and inflicted great damages on the population.¹¹⁷⁷ The prolonged Ottoman campaigns which left the peninsula defenseless during the absence of the army was the fundamental cause of the Crimean Tatar reaction to the Ottoman domination of the Khanate.

The successful manoeuvre of Kalgay Fetih Giray Sultan, which brought the victory to the Ottomans in Haçova (Mezőkeresztes), radically changed the role of the Crimean Tatar army in the forthcoming campaigns. The Crimean Tatar cavalry had to assume the role of *Pișdar* or *Çarhacı*¹¹⁷⁸ (Pioneer, Vanguard) of the main army, instead of

¹¹⁷⁵ M.N. Berezhev, *Plan Zavoievaniya Kryma, Sostavlennyi v Tsartsvoovanie Gosudar Alekseya Mikailovicha Uchenym Slavyaninom Yuriem Krizhanichem*, St. Petersburg, 1891.

¹¹⁷⁶ For more information on Ottoman-Russian War 1735-1739 and the first Russian invasion of Crimea see: Alan Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of The Crimea 1772-1783*, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 23-25.

¹¹⁷⁷ For a general analysis on the effects of the Cossack raids on Crimean population and economy see: Alan Fisher, "The Ottoman Crimea in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: Some Problems and Preliminary Considerations", *Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks; Crimea and Crimean Turks*, İstanbul, 1998, pp.67-77.

¹¹⁷⁸ For more information on Çarhacı see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Çarhacı", *DİA* C.VIII, İstanbul, 1993, pp. 229-230.

the *Akıncıs*¹¹⁷⁹ (Raiders), who were recently extinguished in Wallachia. The Khans were not able to ask for concessions from the Porte as a reward for their contribution to the Ottoman victories, because of the changing balance of power at their expense. Previously, Mengli Giray I Khan was given the possessions of some settlements on Dniestr in 1484,¹¹⁸⁰ Sahib Giray I Khan claimed the right to Gözleve,¹¹⁸¹ while Gazi Giray II Khan claimed rights on Boğdan, Eflak and Silistre.¹¹⁸² Under the new conditions, Crimean Tatar cavalry was not only subject to Ottoman control, at the same time it became the scapegoat for the Ottoman defeats as in the case of Canıbek Giray Khan during the Persian campaign in 1618.

Evliya Çelebi, who had been in several campaigns with the Ottoman and Crimean Tatar armies, touches upon the divergences and the factors which increased the tension between them. During the failed siege of Varad¹¹⁸³ (1657-1658), the Crimean Tatar cavalry was quite successful because they were charged to penetrate and to raid the countryside, which conformed to their combat tactics.¹¹⁸⁴ When it became obvious that conquest would not be possible and a large army was coming to the aid of the besieged, the Crimean Tatars were requested to cut off the roads and to inform the main army about the movements of the enemy; and it was confirmed that they were allowed

¹¹⁷⁹ For more information on Akıncıs see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Akıncı", *DİA* C.II, İstanbul, 1989, pp. 249-250.

¹¹⁸⁰ Halil İnalcık, *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi ...*, p. 33.

¹¹⁸¹ Kaysunizade Nidai Remmal Hoca, *Tarih-i Sahib Giray...*, p. 45.

¹¹⁸² See note 1410 above and Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 142 and 160.

¹¹⁸³ For more information on Varad see: Maxim, Mihai, "Varad", *DİA*, C. XLII, İstanbul, 2012, pp. 513-515.

¹¹⁸⁴ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, C.V., İstanbul, 2001, p. 215.

to raid the countryside.¹¹⁸⁵ Evliya Çelebi, who joined, the expedition, describes how effective the Crimean-Ottoman cooperation could be when the Crimean Tatar cavalry forced the enemy to quit their tabor and annihilated them, together with the Ottoman musketeers.¹¹⁸⁶ However, the problems began to appear when the Ottoman Serdar accused Crimean Tatars of enslaving the Ottoman subjects of the Varad province and requested that they hand over the captives to his steward.¹¹⁸⁷ The Crimean Tatar *Serasker* replied that they were a bunch of unpaid soldiers, depending on the spoils of the holy war to survive, and absolutely denied that they had plundered the Sultan's domains.¹¹⁸⁸ The Ottoman soldiers who saw the return of the Crimean Tatars with their booty argued that the Crimeans were taking the lion's share without taking any risk, while they were fighting on the front lines and that they had forcibly seized their captives and booty.¹¹⁸⁹ The Crimean Tatars, who were in the open field, could not resist the armed Janissaries who were in the trenches.¹¹⁹⁰ Crimean Tatar Serdar Yalı Ağası Şah Polad Ağa, who protested the incident, rejected wearing the robe presented by the Ottoman Serdar Ali Paşa in the name of the Ottoman Sultan.¹¹⁹¹ The *Yeniçeri Ağası* replied that they had previously proposed to the Crimean Tatars to share the trophy, but they not only refused but also attacked them.¹¹⁹² The Crimean Tatars rejected that

¹¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 216.

¹¹⁸⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, C.VI., İstanbul, 2001, p "0.

¹¹⁸⁷ *ibid.* p. 19.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 19-20.

¹¹⁸⁹ *ibid.* p. 40.

¹¹⁹⁰ *ibid.* p. 40.

¹¹⁹¹ *ibid.* p. 40

¹¹⁹² *ibid.* p. 41.

they had accepted sharing the booty and that the janissaires attack on them was unlawful and punishable.¹¹⁹³ Ottoman Serdar's intimidation of the janissaries to get back the forcibly taken property failed, and the booty was divided between the janissaires and Crimean Tatars whose loss was subsidized by the Serdar himself.¹¹⁹⁴ The Crimean Tatars were allowed make a raid to recover their losses.¹¹⁹⁵

4.18 The effects of the military revolution

It appears that the problems occurred between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars were closely related to the effects of the military revolution.¹¹⁹⁶ The implementation of the new construction techniques made the medieval siege tactics obsolete. The high walls were replaced by the star shaped and vertical network of lower fortifications.¹¹⁹⁷ The gunmen prevailed over archers and pikemen, together with the increasing accuracy and the shorter reloading time of the hand guns.¹¹⁹⁸ The volley fire extended the depth of the battle field.¹¹⁹⁹ The number of the contingents decreased, while the size of the armies increased drastically.¹²⁰⁰ The harmonization and the discipline of the soldiers, which required discipline and training, became extremely important. Therefore, the presence of the Crimean Tatar army in the campaigns was indispensable for the Ottomans, who needed more men in the

¹¹⁹³ *ibid.* p. 41.

¹¹⁹⁴ *ibid.* p. 41.

¹¹⁹⁵ *ibid.* p. 41.

¹¹⁹⁶ For more information on military revolution and its effects see: Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution Military Innovation and The Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, New York, 1996 and (ed.) Rogers, Clifford J. et al., *The Military Revolution Debate Readings on the on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, New York, 1995.

¹¹⁹⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *ibid.* p. 8.

¹¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 18.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 19-20.

¹²⁰⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 21-22.

battlefield, but they were still attached to the traditional steppe warfare, which was by no means suitable to the requirements of the new warfare methods. The fate of the campaigns was not determined in the battle fields any more, but during the long sieges.¹²⁰¹ Between Mohaç (Mohacs 1526) and the Second Siege of Vienna (1683), there were only two major field battles, Haçova (1596) and Saint Gotthard Battle (Szentgotthard 1664). In fact, the Ottomans had to increase the number and the quality of their guns and gunmen, rather than to deploy light cavalry on the front lines.¹²⁰² In his report to the Sultan Mehmed III, Grand Vizier Yemişçi Hasan Pasha¹²⁰³ (d. 1603) was complaining about the difficulties of fighting with the Habsburg infantry since they carried handguns with the light cavalry both in the open field and in the siege warfare (1602).¹²⁰⁴ Essentially, the weight of the light cavalry (akıncıs), who had the lion's share of the booty, had steadily declined at the expense of the timariots and salaried *Kapıkulu* infantry and cavalry throughout the fifteenth century.¹²⁰⁵ The Ottomans, who were known for their pragmatism, never hesitated to transfer and to use new military technology and tactics.¹²⁰⁶ The supreme fire power of the Ottoman heavy artillery was one of the factors of the military revolution.¹²⁰⁷

¹²⁰¹ *Ibid.* p. 16.

¹²⁰² Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire*, New York, 2005, p. 26.

¹²⁰³ For more information on Yemişçi Hasan Paşa see: Orhan F. Köprülü, "Hasan Paşa, Yemişçi", *DİA*, C.XVI, İstanbul, 1997. pp. 342-343

¹²⁰⁴ "Her kağı tarafdan mukaddem asker ile hareket olunursa aḥun başı ilerüye varur ve mel'unların askerleri esker piyade ve tūfeng-endaz olmaḡla asakir-i islāmın ekseri atlu olup piyadesi az olduḡundan gayri tūfenge mü'tad üstadları nasir olmaḡla hin-i mukabalede ve kal'a muhasarasında azim ızdırab çekilür." see: document no: 81 Cengiz Orhonlu, *Telhisler (1597-1607)*, İstanbul, 1970, pp. 71-72.

¹²⁰⁵ Rhoads Murphy, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700*, London, 1999, pp. 35-36.

¹²⁰⁶ Gabor Agoston, *Guns for the Sultan ...* p. 192.

¹²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p. 194.

However, the overall quality of the weaponry and the armaments was dubious..¹²⁰⁸ The lack of the organization, which required the regular training and the discipline, was one of the fundamental problems of the Ottoman army in the age of the military revolution.

4.19 Ottoman impact on the Khanate and relationship between the Ottoman Kuls and Crimean Khans

Another cause of the problem was the Crimean Tatar resistance to the increasing hegemony of the Ottoman culture and institutions in the Khanate on every aspect of life. It appears that the more the Khanate became dependent on the Ottoman support and the Ottoman institutions and practices that penetrated into the Crimean Tatar political life, the more collision occurred between them. Ottoman historian Peçevi, who spent a long time with Gazi Giray II Khan, summarizes the changes in the attitude of the Ottoman high officials towards the Crimean Khans, and their reaction to this situation with three different anecdotes. First, he states that the attitude of Koca Sinan Paşa¹²⁰⁹ (d. 1596) to Gazi Giray II Khan was unacceptable by the Ottoman diplomatic traditions and by the high status of the Crimean Khans. Therefore, it was considered to be inappropriate by the experienced statesmen.¹²¹⁰ The cold approach of Gazi Giray II Khan towards Koca Sinan Pasha was also attributed to his reaction to the inappropriate manner of the Grand Vizier.¹²¹¹ After the banquet, the Khan was presented valuable gifts, which could also be given to any servant of the Sultan except the

¹²⁰⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 203-204..

¹²⁰⁹ For more information on Koca Sinan Paşa see: Mehmet İpşirli, "Koca Sinan Paşa", *DİA* C.XXVI, Ankara, 2002, pp. 137-139.

¹²¹⁰ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, p. 150.

¹²¹¹ *ibid.* pp. 150-151.

traditional *teşrifü'l-kudüm* (welcome present) in the name of the Sultan.¹²¹² Secondly, Peçevi talks about the respect of Sultan Süleyman I (1520-1566) to Sahib Giray Khan during the Moldavian campaign of 1538.¹²¹³ He also states that Grad Vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha¹²¹⁴ (d. 1601) respected Gazi Giray II Khan and treated him courteously.¹²¹⁵ Finally, he mentions the inferior position of Canıbek Giray II Khan in his relations with Kaptan-ı Derya Hasan Pasha, who considers him one of his own protégé thirty years later.¹²¹⁶ Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi also repeats the same stories in his work on the Ottoman laws and traditions.¹²¹⁷

The tendency of the certain Ottoman bureaucrats to treat the Crimean Khans like simple servants of the Sultan should not be generalized. It was not easy to eliminate the tradition regarding this issue. The Porte's attitude towards Crimea varied over time with the political conjuncture, the personality of the Khan, and his relationship with the Sultan and the administration. Ottoman Sultans, like Selim I¹²¹⁸ (1512-1520) and Süleyman I¹²¹⁹ who had been in Crimea at the beginning of their political career, were familiar with the Crimean Tatar culture. They had showed great respect to the Crimean Khans, and they had established political connections with them during their rise to the power. Selim I

¹²¹² *ibid.* p. 151.

¹²¹³ *ibid.* p. 151.

¹²¹⁴ For more information on Damad İbrahim Paşa see: Nezihi Aykut, "Damad İbrahim Paşa", *DİA*, C.VIII., İstanbul, 1993, Pp. 440-441

¹²¹⁵ Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*, C.II, pp. 151-152.

¹²¹⁶ *ibid.* p. 152.

¹²¹⁷ Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyan Fi ...*, pp. 169-170.

¹²¹⁸ For more information on Selim I see: Feridun Emecen, "Selim I", *DİA*, C. XXXVI., Ankara, 2009, pp. 407-414.

¹²¹⁹ For more information on Süleyman I see: Feridun Emecen, "Süleyman I", *DİA*, C. XXXVIII, İstanbul, 2010, pp. 62-74.

took refuge in Crimea, where his son, Süleyman, was the governor of Kefe (1509-1512), when he disobeyed his father and started some conflicts with his brothers and his father for the throne in 1509.

Theoretically, the Khans were able to neutralize the destabilizing power of the constituent clans in the Khanate, with the support from the Ottomans with the condition that they did not violate the Porte's interests in the region. This, at the same time, meant the renouncement of the Chingissid heritage; and in a sense the *raison d'être* of the dynasty. The most destructive effect of the increasing Ottoman influence was the frequent and unnecessary replacements of the Khans with the intervention from Istanbul as a result of the lobbying made by the members of the Giray family at the Ottoman court the palace. Since the approval of the Porte turned to be more important for the candidates and their supporters, they gave priority for the Ottoman support rather than the interest of the Khanate in order to preserve their power. However, it was not easy to replace a popular Khan in the throne or vice a versa; and the Ottomans frequently consulted with the local power groups and searched their approval and also tried to use the spiritual power of the ulema to legitimize their decisions.

As a result of their high prestige, there were instances that the Crimean Khans played a decisive role in the future of the Ottoman state to the extent that they were considered as alternate to the Ottoman dynasty. The European diplomats and visitors to the Ottoman Empire argued that the Girays were the first heir to the throne if the Ottoman dynasty

ceased to exist, but provided no material proof for this argument.¹²²⁰

Halil İnalçık argues that it was mainly the Crimean Tatar forces that kept the empire together, which prevented the invasion of the Balkans and reversed the effects of the crushing defeat at Vienna (1683-1699).¹²²¹

Kaplan Giray I¹²²² Khan (1707-1708, 1715-1716 and 1730-1736) played one of the leading roles in eliminating the rebel leaders of the Patrona Rebellion (1730) despite the fact that he had been made Khan upon rebels' requests.¹²²³

4.20 The financial aspect

It should be stated that because of the strategic location of the peninsula, the Khanate was indispensable for the Ottomans, with or without the existence of the Girays or the Crimean Khanate. For that reason, the Crimean Khans did never pay any tribute to the Ottomans, on the contrary they were regularly subsidized by the Ottomans.¹²²⁴

However, It should be noted that they regularly sent valuable presents to the Porte.¹²²⁵ Martin Bronevski states that the Khans were regularly

¹²²⁰ For a discussion on the genuinity of the claims about the Girays candidature on the ottoman throne see: Hakan Kırımlı, *Geraylar ve Osmanlılar*, pp. 198-203.

¹²²¹ For the importance of the Crimean Tatar support for the Ottomans and the Crimean Ottoman relations between 1683-1699 see: Halil İnalçık, "Viyana Bozgunu Yıllarında (1683-1699) Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve kırım Hanlığı", *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, pp. 219-341.

¹²²² For more information on Kaplan Giray I see: Halil İnalçık, "I. Kaplan Giray (1680-1738)", *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi Üzerine Araştırmalar 1441-1700*, pp. 349-354.

¹²²³ For more information on Patrona Rebellion and the role of Kaplan Giray I see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Patrona İsyanı", *DİA C.XXXIV*, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 189-192.

¹²²⁴ For the Ottoman subsidizes to the Crimean Khans see. Alain Fisher, "Les rapports entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Crimée: L'aspect Financier", *Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks; Crimea and Crimean Turks*, İstanbul, 1998, pp. 19-34 and Alain Fisher, "Crimean Separatism in the Ottoman Empire", *ibid.* pp. 79-92.

¹²²⁵ For the examples of presents requested by Mehmet Giray I from Vasili III (1505-1533) to Ottoman Sultan Selim I see document no: 20 dated 15/22-VI-1517/25-X/1-XI-1517 in (ed.) G. Karpov and G.F. Shtendman, *Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snoshenii Moskovskogo Gosudartsva s Krymom i Nagayami i c Turtsieyu*, T. II, 1508-1521 gg." *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obschestva*, T95, St. Petersburg, 1895, p.384.

sending slaves, furs, salt and oil to the Sultans.¹²²⁶ According to Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, the Khan, the Kalgay and Nureddin were given *salyanes* (annual allowance) from the revenues of Kefe custom.¹²²⁷ Salyanes were usually given to the governors of the distant provinces and maritime districts, which were located in the margins of the empire, in return for their military services.¹²²⁸ The Khans were also given *hass*¹²²⁹ (has) as personal revenues, like other Ottoman high officials, but their *hasses* were recorded in the *defters* (books) along the side of the members of Ottoman dynasty, right after that of the Valide Sultans.¹²³⁰ Moldavia, Wallachia,¹²³¹ Muscovy and Poland were tributaries of the Crimean Khanate. Besides, the Ottoman Sultans approved this right and reminded them to fulfil their obligations vis-a-vis the Khanate and to pay their tributes on time.¹²³² It is important to note that all the aforementioned states had been part of Golden Horde; and the Crimean Khanate had political and territorial claims over them. The Nogay Horde and Circassian tribes were also paying tribute to the

¹²²⁶ Martin Bronevskiy, *Kırım*, p. 49.

¹²²⁷ Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyan Fi* , p. 171.

¹²²⁸ For more information on salyane (saliyane) see: Gustav Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs and Efendis*, İstanbul, 1997, p. 131 and A. H. Groot, "Saliyane", *El²* , V.VIII, Leiden, 1995, p. 994.

¹²²⁹ For more information on Hass see: Cengiz Orhonlu, Nejat Göyünç, "Has", *DİA*, C. XVI., İstanbul, 1997, pp. 268-270.

¹²³⁰ Alain Fisher, "Crimean Separatism in ... p. 83.

¹²³¹ For more information on Crimean Khans demands of tribute from Moldova and Wallachia see: Sergeant Osman, "Did the Crimean Khans Collect Tribute (Harac or Hazine) from Moldova and Wallachia?", *Studia et Documenta Turcologica*, No: 2, Cluj, 2014, pp. 111-123. Sergeant Osman claims that there was not any material proof that Moldova and Wallachia regularly paid tribute to the Crimean Khanate but instead they have delivered "regular traditional fixed gifts". However, it should be remembered that the content of the delivery was more important than its label in the steppe tradition as long as the ceremonial procedures and the necessary respect to the rulers were observed.

¹²³² Halil İnalcık, "Power Relationships Between ... p. 394.

Crimean Khanate.¹²³³ The tribute was paid in cash, furs, luxury clothes, local products, like honey and slaves in the case of Circassian tribes.¹²³⁴

4.21 The diplomatic relations with other states

The Crimean Khans preserved the right to establish diplomatic relations and to sign treaties and agreements with foreign rulers till the end of the Ottoman rule in 1772, which was officially recognized by the Ottomans in 1774. More importantly, their counterparts did not raise any issue with this, and considered it legitimate to conduct diplomatic relations with the Khanate. In general, the Ottomans did not interfere with the foreign policy undertakings, including the military campaigns of the Crimean Khans in Muscovy, Polish-Lithuania and Northern Caucasia, as long as they did not violate interests of the Porte.¹²³⁵ Polish diplomat Martin Bronevskiy states that the Khans were asked to join the campaigns through invitations by the Sultans; and they could declare war on Muscovy with its own initiative, but this permission did not include Poland.¹²³⁶

The Crimean Khans not only followed their own political agenda, but they also played an important role in the formulation of the Ottoman steppe politics. It was required that Muscovite ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire should first report to Bahçesaray before going to

¹²³³ Martin Bronevskiy, *Kırım*, p.48, A.L., Bert'e-Delagard "Opisanie Chernago Morya ... pp. 115-117 and the memoirs of the mercenary John Smith (1580-1631) who has been a slave in Crimea (1603-1604) (ed.) V.M. Kalashnikov, *Britanskii Bzglyad Ha Krym (Khroniki, Memuary, Dnevniky XVII- Pervoi Chetverti XIX Stoletiya). Monografiya*, Dnepropetrovsk, 2013, p. 25.

¹²³⁴ Halil İnalçık, "Power Relationships Between ... p. 394.

¹²³⁵ Roman Pochakaev, "Pravovye Aspekty Otnoshenii Krymskogo Khantsva i Osmanskoi Imperii Glazami Evropeiskikh Sovremennikov Ch. 1: Analiz Istochnikov XVI-XVII vv.", *Krymskoe Istoricheskoe Obozrenie*, No: 2, Kazan, 2019, p. 76.

¹²³⁶ Martin Bronevskiy, *Kırım*, p.49.

Istanbul until 1681.¹²³⁷ Moreover, the Ottomans, who considered Crimean Tatars as experts of the steppe politics, not only consulted but also allowed them to participate in the negotiations with their northern neighbors. According to the testimony of Polish diplomat Reinhold Heidenstein (1553-1620), Ottoman Sultan Murad III (1574-1595), upon their insistence, accepted the participation of Crimean Tatar emissaries in the peace talks with Poland together with the Ottoman delegation in 1578 in spite of the opposition by the Polish side.¹²³⁸ The Crimean Khans had also taken initiative and acted as intermediaries for the Ottomans vis-avis other states and vice et versa. In 1597, Gazi Giray II Khan contacted the ambassadors of Rudolph II and told them his intention to act as intermediary between the Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan.¹²³⁹ The ambassadors, who seemed to be quite influenced by the proposal, sent one of the Khan's envoys to the Emperor. Actually, Alexander Paleologus¹²⁴⁰, the personal envoy of the Khan, negotiated with the Habsburgs on the conditions of a separate peace including the possibility of breaking up from the Ottomans and joining the Christian league (August-1598).¹²⁴¹ However, it appeared that Gazi Giray II's real intention was to arrange a temporary peace with the Habsburgs upon

¹²³⁷ Halil Inalcik, "Kirim Hanlığı" ... p. 457.?

¹²³⁸ Reingold Geidenshtein, *Zapiski o Moskovskom Voine (1578-1582)*, St. Petersburg, 1889, p. 32.

¹²³⁹ Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 164.

¹²⁴⁰ For more information on Alexander Paleologus see: *ibid.* p. 175 and 185.

¹²⁴¹ For the negotiations between the Crimean envoy Alexander Paleologus and the Habsburgs see: document no: 342 dated 19-X-1598 in Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente Privitore La Istoria Romanilor 1576-1600*, V. III/II, Bucarest, 1888. pp. 297-298.

the request of the Ottomans, who wanted to concentrate on the Celali rebellions which turned out to be a serious problem.¹²⁴²

The Crimean Khans' diplomacy was not only confined to the relationship with their immediate neighbors; they also had regular diplomatic exchanges with other foreign rulers in the west and east, including Sweden¹²⁴³, Denmark¹²⁴⁴, Austria, Prussia,¹²⁴⁵ Akkoyunlus, Memluks¹²⁴⁶ and Safavids.



¹²⁴² See: document no: 345 dated 23-X-1598 in *ibid.* pp. 299-300 and Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During ...*, p. 166.

¹²⁴³ For the diplomatic relations between the Crimean Khanate and Sweden see: İsmail Asanoglu Kerim, "Kırım Hanlığının Mektubatı", *Voprosy Krymskotatarskoy Filologii, Istorii i Kul'turi*, No: 4, Simferopol, 2017, pp. 143-158.

¹²⁴⁴ For the diplomatic relations between the Crimean Khanate and Denmark see: Josef Matuz, *Krimitatarische Urkunden Im Reichsarchiv Zu Kopenhagen Mit historisch-diplomatischen Und Sprachlichen Untersuchungen*, Freiburg, 1976, pp. 145-149.

¹²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 150-152

¹²⁴⁶ For the letter of Mengli Giray I to Ivan III dated 25-IV/2-V-1491 in which he demands presents to send to Akkoyunlu Yakup Sultan (1478-1490) and Memluk Sultan Kayıtbay (1468-1496) see: G. Karpov and G.F. Shtendman, *Pamyatniki Diplomaticheskikh Snoshenii ...*, pp. 106-107.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION:

The effects of the global crisis of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century were also visible in Eastern Europe. As a result, the climatic, socio-economic and political factors changed the balance of power in the steppes forever. The traditional supremacy of the nomadic peoples was challenged by the Cossacks. It is possible to identify several factors behind their successes, apart from the sine qua non of surviving in the steppe: internalization of the nomadic way of life. Firstly, the widespread and more effective use of the firearms because of the military revolution, enabled them to counterbalance and to overcome their nomadic adversaries. Secondly, the chronic political and socio-economic crises at the turn of the century provided them with an infinite flow of the new recruits and gave way to the emergence of organized Cossack communities, like the Zaporozhian and the Don Cossack Hosts.

The regional powers, who realized their potential, tried to bring the Cossacks under their control, and to use them for their own benefits. However, it was not easy to satisfy the demands of the Cossacks who developed a sense of common identity, and requested the legitimization of their status, like their Ottoman counterparts, Sekbans and Saricas. However, Sekbans and Saricas failed to establish a community like the Cossacks. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's attitude towards the Cossacks was not very different from that of the Ottomans. They both

tried to keep the newcomers out of the political system and denied official status. They were conscripted temporarily and then demobilized once the hostilities came to an end. However, the fragile structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state forced them to frequently make concessions and to allow Registered Cossacks join the system, but the tendency to limit their numbers, whenever it was possible, persisted.

Muscovite control on the Cossacks was stronger because of the geographical factors. Contrary to the Zaporozhian (Ukrainian) Cossacks, who were able to have relationship with different powers at the same time, the Don (Russian) Cossacks were living in the areas surrounded by Turkic-Muslim population. It was almost impossible to survive for them without the Muscovite support in this completely hostile environment. The depending on the outside powers for the ammunition and military equipment was the most important obstacle for their independence. Every Cossack group needed regular monetary and military support of the regional powers.

The Cossacks, like their nomadic counterparts, were organizing seasonal raids for the booty which were heavily damaging the neighboring lands. The success of the raids towards the Muslim lands not only increased their popularity throughout the Eastern Europe but also provided them the role of the protector of the Christian faith against the infidels even though they were also attacking to the lands of their fellow Christians. The Ottoman and Crimean Tatar reaction was directed towards Polish-Lithuanian and Muscovite states, that they had accused them for provoking the Cossack raids. It was true that both

countries wanted to use the Cossacks against their enemies, however, it was not always possible to control the Cossacks either. Historical evidence show that the Cossacks were pragmatic enough to switch their loyalty , if it was better for them better economically and politically. Meanwhile, several Cossack companies served as mercenaries through out the region.

The Cossacks, like their Ottoman counterparts, were more than ready to support every political figure that was likely to help them to enter to the state apparatus and to improve their social status. The Time of Troubles created the most suitable socio-political environment for the development of Cossacks, who could increase their power and influence, while a multitude of different political factions were trying to obtain the support of any potential ally. It took several years at the expense of many lives to put an end to the socio-political crisis, which brought Muscovy on the brink of extermination.

The Romanov dynasty, when it came to power in 1613, was aware of the fact that they had to modernize the administration and the military in order to maintain their safety in the region. It was possible to overcome the supremacy of nomadic cavalry by using new firearms, but the traditional Muscovite military elite, like their Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman and Crimean Tatar counterparts, was dragging their feet to replace the old techniques with the new ones. The Cossacks, who were already familiar with the system, were not reliable. As a result, they had tried to employ mercenaries, but the result was not very satisfactory because of the clashes between the Muscovites and the mercenaries,

and they eventually gave up. Finally, they were forced to reorganize the army and the defence of the steppe border by their own initiative, but they had to wait for more than a century to be successful.

First, they had to find a solution for the logistics problem. It was not possible to support the military forces, which were stationed deep in the steppe, from the center of the country. Thus, they had undertaken a project that was rather difficult, but was already successfully applied by the Stroganov family during the conquest of Sibir Khanate.¹²⁴⁷ They had pushed forward to the southern frontier of the steppe, systematically constructed new defence lines (Belgorod Line), while encouraged people to settle behind and around the fort. The more the settlements moved to the south, the more the central regions turned to be safer. Meanwhile, the Cossacks, who played a fundamental role in defending the border, were either integrated into the Muscovite system or forced to move further south to the uninhabited lands in order to escape from the central authority.

The Muscovite-Russian expansion in the steppe differed from that of Polish-Lithuanian and Ottoman-Crimean Tatar ones with the fact that it was conducted under the strict control of the Kremlin. The Polish-Lithuanian expansion was conducted by the magnates rather than by the central authority. The magnates allowed their serfs to flee from their original lands and claimed the ownership of their new lands based on the feudal laws. The Ottomans and the Crimean Khans for a long

¹²⁴⁷ For the Muscovite-Russian conquest of Siberia see: W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Conquest of a Continent Siberia and the Russians*, New York, 1994, pp. 33-47 and for more information on the Stroganov family and the debate about their role in the conquest of Siberia see: Zafer Sever, "Sibirya'da Ruslar: Rus İşgalinin Katalizörü Olarak Stroganov Ailesi", *MUTAD*, VIII (1), Istanbul, 2021, pp. 91-109.

period of time considered the steppe as a buffer zone with their northern neighbors and left its control to the nomadic tribes. The Ottoman attitude changed after the Venetians blockade of the Dardanelles, which prevented Egyptian grain to be delivered to Istanbul between the years 1648-1649, 1650, 1656-1657.¹²⁴⁸ This was during the Ottoman-Venetian War, which resulted in the Ottoman conquest of Crete (1645-1669).¹²⁴⁹ The Ottomans, who seemed to reach its natural limits in its eastern and western fronts, decided to concentrate on its northern border and to extend its authority to the steppe.¹²⁵⁰ In addition, they had realized that neither their northern neighbors nor their Crimean allies were in a position to solve the Cossack problem, which turned out to be a permanent threat for the security of the whole Black Sea region, including the capital, Istanbul. Consequently, the Ottomans conquered Podolia in 1672 and established the province of Kamanıçe (Kamianets-Podil'skyi, Kam'yanets-Podil'skyi in Ukr., Kamieniec Podolski in Pol.), which not only brought part of Ukraine under their rule, but also intensified their control over Crimean Khanate and the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia.¹²⁵¹ However, the decision of the Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (d. 1683), to march on Vienna in 1683 reversed

¹²⁴⁸ İsmail Hakkı Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, C.III, pp. 406-424.

¹²⁴⁹ Sanin, G.A., "Hekotorye Problemy İstorii Krymskogo Khanstva v XVII. V." *Materialy Po Arkheoolgii, İstorii i Etnografii Tavrii*, Vypusk III, Simferopol, 1993, p. 223.

¹²⁵⁰ Metin Kunt, "17. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzey Politikası Üzerine Bir Yorum", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi Beşeri Bilimler-Humanities*, Vol. IV-V, İstanbul, 1977, pp. 111-116.

¹²⁵¹ For more information on the Ottoman campaign of Podolia and Eyalet of Kamanıçe see. Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, "Ottoman Podillja: The Eyalet of Kam'janec' 1672-1699", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* V.XVI, no. 1-2, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 87-101.

everything, and caused the Ottomans to end the plans to control Ukraine after losing Kamanıçe to the Poles in 1699.¹²⁵²

The Crimean Tatar reaction to the establishment of direct Ottoman rule in the steppe was inevitable as in the case of Ottoman Astrakhan campaign (1569-1570), during which the lack of cooperation among their units was one of the fundamental causes of the Ottoman failure. It was not difficult to realize that once the Ottomans managed to establish their own administration in the region, they were expected to try to absorb the Khanate, which they had considered to be unnecessary or even dangerous for their authority.¹²⁵³ Therefore, the popularity of Murad Giray Khan (1678-1683), the champion of Crimean Tatar separatism, should have been closely related to the Ottoman expansion in Ukraine.¹²⁵⁴ Murad Giray Khan's decision to appoint a *Törebaşı* (Head of Traditional Law) to apply Chingisid Law, next to the Islamic Law, *Şeriat (Sharia)*, was a direct challenge to the authority of the Caliph Ottoman Sultan.¹²⁵⁵ However, he was forced to reverse his decision, because of the reaction of both the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans.

In reality, the Ottoman-Crimean Tatar relationship was extremely complex, and varied according to the conjuncture. From the Ottoman point of view, the control of the Crimean peninsula and the whole Black

¹²⁵² For more information on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Vienna Campaign (1683) see: Abdülkadir Özcan, "Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa", *DİA* C.XXVIII, Ankara, 2004, pp. 245-249.

¹²⁵³ For the establishment of Ottoman control in the conquered lands see: Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica* V. III, Paris, 1954. pp. 103-129.

¹²⁵⁴ For more information on Murad Giray and his policies see: Halil İnalcık, "Murad Giray Han (Ocak 1678-Eylül 1683), "Tatarlık" Siyaseti ve Viyana Bozgunundan Sonra Azlı", *Kırım Hanlığı Tarihi ...*, pp. 235-237 and Natalia Krolikowska, *Law and Division of Power ...* pp. 60-73.

¹²⁵⁵ Seyyid Muhammed Rıza, *Es-seb'ü's-seyyar fi ...*, pp. 249-250.

Sea basin was indispensable for the security and the welfare of the empire that was envisioned by Mehmed II after the conquest of Constantinople (1453).¹²⁵⁶ First, Istanbul, the heart of the empire, should have been militarily impregnable, and therefore, none of the regional powers had to be allowed to enter to the Black Sea, and it had to be transformed to full Ottoman control, as if being an Ottoman lake. Consequently, it would have been possible to find a solution to the problem of the city's subsistence because of the continuous outflow of the products of the fertile Black Sea region to the city. Ottomans had also realized that the proximity of the region to the Eastern European markets would have brought easy access to the luxury goods of the north, such as furs which were highly demanded by the ruling elite.¹²⁵⁷ The Ottomans, who managed to subdue the regional powers, expanded their authority all over the region, except the eastern shores, after the second Moldovian campaign of Süleyman I (1538). The Ottoman control of the region in the north was not very strict; they confined themselves just to prevent the Polish-Lithuanians (Jagiellons 1386-1569) to have access to the Black Sea, and to control the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. They had preserved the status-quo, and allowed the local dynasties to continue once they established garrisons in the strategic fortresses, which were at the same time former trade colonies since the ancient times.

¹²⁵⁶ For more information on the subject see : Ahmet Türk, "Ottoman Empire and the security of the Black Sea ...

¹²⁵⁷ Berindei, Mihnea, "Contribution A L'étude du Commerce Ottoman Des Fourrures Moscovites La route moldavo-polonaise 1453-1700", *CMRS*, V. XII., No. 4, Paris, 1971, pp. 393-409.

Therefore, from the Ottoman point of view it was required that the Crimean Khanate create a buffer zone and prevent regional powers to penetrate to the Black Sea. Since the relationship between the Khanate and Poland-Lithuania had already deteriorated, because of the latter's alliance with the Great Horde against the Crimean-Muscovite axis, the Ottoman-Crimean Tatar cooperation against the Poland-Lithuania worked quite well. However, the Crimean khans, who considered themselves as the descendant of the Chinggis Khan, the legitimate heir of the Golden Horde, had their own political agenda and ambitions which usually contradicted with the Ottoman plans. The Crimean khans initially agreed to abandon their sovereignty over the Sancak of Kefe¹²⁵⁸, which comprised the southern shores of the peninsula to the Ottomans, but they had continued to make territorial and administrative claims over the principality that they had considered to be part of their legitimate patrimony. Similar problems occurred over the territory of the Danubian principalities where the Crimean khans wanted to extend their authority even though they had agreed that the Ottomans built forts in the mouth of Dnieper.

It was unacceptable for the Crimean khans, who placed their Chinggisid origins above all, to give up their claims over the heritage of the Golden Horde. However, this soon proved to be very difficult to be realized. First, it appeared that none of the contenders, including the Crimean Khans, had the military power to recover it. In addition, the heads of the *Karaçi* clans, who had taken refuge in Crimea to escape from the

¹²⁵⁸ For more information on the Kefe under Ottoman rule see: Yücel Öztürk, *Osmanlı Hakimiyetinde Kefe 1475-1600*, Ankara, 2000.

chaotic environment of the *Taht Ili* and the Porte, were against such adventures. It is quite interesting that both Mengli Giray Khan and Nur Devlet Khan consecutively lost their throne because of their unsuccessful moves against the Great Horde in 1476 and 1478. The situation in the Khanate stabilized only after 1478, when Mengli Giray Khan, *Karaçi* Beys and the Ottomans reached to an understanding and created a delicate equilibrium; after which the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars were able to work harmoniously.

According to the tacit agreement, the Crimean Khans enjoyed a great degree of liberty to implement their own politics in the steppe, unless they did not challenge the authority of the Sultan, in exchange for joining the Ottoman campaigns, whenever it was required. The agreement seemed to be beneficial for both parties and worked quite well for a while. The Crimean Khans were able to supply their forces, which were not salaried and were dependent on the spoils at the campaigns, while the Ottomans were able to employ the famous Crimean Tatar cavalry. The fragile entente did not last very long, because of several compelling factors, and fell apart at the end of the sixteenth century. The military campaigns turned out to be more difficult and lasted longer for the Ottoman state, which reached its natural borders and faced with stronger enemies. The military revolution and the effective use of the firearms had more negative effects on the Crimean Tatar army, because neither its composition, nor its tactics were suitable to conduct a prolonged static warfare. The weary and long campaigns, which were not likely to bring the desired amount of

booty, continued to lose their attractiveness for the Crimean Tatars, while the Ottomans started to rely more on the Crimean Tatar cavalry after they realized that the *Tımarlı Sipahis* are no longer effective. A further negative effect of the distant campaigns was the increasing number of the devastating raids of the Cossacks, who benefited from the absence of the effective armed forces. As a reaction, the re-emerged Crimean Tatar separatists began to question the viability of participating in the Ottoman campaigns, while the Khanate was under the threat of invasion.

The Crimean Tatar separatism or the desire to be independent continued to exist in various degrees throughout the Ottoman rule of the Khanate, and it was the fundamental cause of the distrust between the Sultans and the Khans. The Ottomans quickly realized that the political significance of the legitimacy of the Crimean Khans, the descendants of the Cengiz Khan, for the control of the Deşt-i.Kıpçak. It can't be coincidental that the Ottomans, who followed the policy of liquidating all the members of the rival dynasties, allowed Girays to continue. Because of the similar reasons, they were also aware that they should always be constrained and kept under their grips. It was already stated that the Ottomans occupied and located their own forces in the strategic locations that they had taken under their direct rule. They had also found supporters; and formed alliances with the local power centers. For example, *Karaci Beys* had a considerable amount of military forces under their command, which had the capability to easily paralyze the army and prevent the Khans from taking action. It is also important to

note that the Ulema, who had the moral authority over the population, was usually inclined towards the Ottoman Sultan, who was at the same time was the *Halife* (Caliph) of the Muslim world. The Ottomans used a third mechanism to make sure that their control over the Crimean Khans continued, that is, they did not allow them to possess heavy artillery. Thanks to this prohibition, they not only prevented the Khans to threaten the Ottoman possessions in the region, but also made them dependent on the Ottoman support during their own campaigns. However, the most significant effect of the ban was in the internal politics of the Khanate. The Crimean Khans, who were deprived of the firearms technology, could not extent their authority over the *Karaçi Beys* and establish a centralized administration. All the attempts to replace the traditional structure and the tactics of the army were strongly resisted by the *Karaçi Beys* and made obsolete by their allies, the Ottomans.

The persistence of a Khan's rule was above all depended on his ability to satisfy the demands of the Ottoman-*Karaçi* block. Every Khan who violated this principle lost his throne, especially when the Porte was suspicious about his independent actions. Equally, the Girays too had their suspicions about the Ottoman plans on the steppe. They considered that the Deşt-i Kıpçak was their patrimony; and were, by no means, willing to let the Ottomans to penetrate in the area. Besides, they feared that the Ottomans would annex the Khanate; and replace them with a *kul* of the Sultan once they extended their rule deep in the region. One of the fundemantal causes of the failure of the Astrakhan

campaign was the unwillingness of Devlet Giray I (1551-1577) to cooperate with the Ottomans.

The changing balance of power during the crisis of the early seventeenth century forced the regional powers to search for new alternatives. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan brothers realized that following a pro-Ottoman policy was not enough for the continuation and the stability of their rule. The Ottomans did not refrain from deposing Gazi Giray II Khan twice, and Canıbek Giray Khan three times, even though they did their best to satisfy the Ottoman requests. Sa'adet Giray I Khan and Gazi Giray II Khan's reforms to monopolize the power and to keep it under their control, following the Ottoman example, did not continue after their reign.. The ambitious brothers, through their personal experiences and the fate of their father's rival Khan Sa'adet Giray and grandfather Mehmet Giray II Khan, were also aware that it was not possible to be successful against the Ottoman-*Karaçi* block simply by depending on the friendly forces of the steppe. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who was a very pragmatic person, and who was even called opportunistic, desperately tried to find alternative allies against the Ottomans when he came to the power for the second time (1623). His brother Mehmet Giray III Khan was more realistic, and never gave up the possibility of compromising with the Ottomans. The increasing power of Kantemir Mirza, who was allowed into the Ottoman administration apparatus and the Bucak Horde, was the fundamental cause of the tension between the Porte and Hansaray. The Crimean Khans were not satisfied with the rise of the Mangit

Kantemir Mirza whom they considered to be their subjects. Besides, they had historical claims over the Bucak region.

The primary target of Poland was to remove Kantemir Mirza from Bucak, who was organizing devastating raids to the Polish territory over there. The Ottomans, who were on the brink of the war with the Safavids, finally submitted to the Polish demands and sent orders to Mehmet Giray III Khan, the Voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia to drive Kantemir and his Horde out of Bucak (June 1623). Mehmet Giray III Khan, who invaded Bucak, defeated and imprisoned him (autumn 1623) before Kantemir Mirza managed to reverse the decision, thanks to his relations in Istanbul (September 1623). The Bucak Horde was exiled to the north of Azov Sea, and Kantemir was taken under the personal control of the Khan.

It seemed that the problems between the Khanate and the Ottomans were over after the removal of Kantemir Mirza. However, the ensuing events showed that the Ottomans made a fatal mistake by allowing Mehmet Giray III Khan to take Kantemir Mirza and Bucak Horde under control. The Ottoman-Crimean relations deteriorated as soon as new Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan arrived in Bahçesaray, accompanied by a group of Safavid cavalry (9-V-1624). Canıbek Giray Khan arrived in Kefe as the new Khan (24.5.1624). Several factors seemed to be influential on the deposition of Mehmet Giray III Khan. It appeared that he did not comply with all the requests of the Porte, and pursued an independent policy. Ottomans were suspicious about Kalgay Şahin Giray's connection with their arch enemy, Shah Abbas I, and his alleged

Shiite inclinations. The brothers applied violent punishments on their opponents, like Kantemir Mirza, who was, most of the time, was the main allies of the Ottomans.

The Giray brothers did not bow to the Porte's decision and revolted. They defeated the Ottoman forces which arrived to seat Canibek Giray Khan to the throne. The Ottomans were forced to accept the continuation of Mehmet Giray III's khanship (August 1624). The absence of Kantemir Mirza showed that it was not easy for the Ottomans to control the Crimean Tatars without the support or cooperation of the local forces. It seemed that Mehmet Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan obtained the support of the other *Karaçi* leaders, who were uncomfortable about the growing influence of the Mangit clan in the Khanate under the Ottoman protection by taking Kantemir Mirza under his control.

Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan envisaged that controlling only the local forces was not enough, and the formation of a greater coalition was necessary to overcome the Ottomans. Under the guidance of his chief protector, Shah Abbas I, he began to contact the regional powers to form an anti-Ottoman alliance. Quite interestingly, he did not approach the Muscovites, who were the traditional ally of the Safavids against the Ottomans in the region, since he was aware of the expansionist plans of Moscovy in the region from his personal experience. It should also be remembered that Muscovy was pursuing a reconciliatory policy towards the Khanate, and was very punctual about the payment of the tribute. Under these circumstances, Poland looked like to be the best option,

but the raids of Kantemir Mirza and the Bucak Horde emerged once again as the major obstacle against the realization of this alliance. Kantemir Mirza, who managed to escape from the custody and returned to Bucak, started to raid Polish territory. Meanwhile, he approached the Ottomans, who were alarmed upon the news about the possibility of an agreement between Crimea and Poland. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who convinced the Ottomans that his only intent was to take Kantemir Mirza under control, who was acting against the agreement with Poland. Once he ensured their neutrality, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan invaded Bucak and deported them to the north of Orkapı, while he kept Kantemir Mirza in his custody.

It seemed that one of the objectives of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan to drive Kantemir Mirza out of Bucak was to obtain the support of Poland. However, Poland, which refrained from the wrath of the Ottomans, dragged out. Consequently, Kalgay Şahin Giray, who realized that he could not convince the Poles to make an operational alliance, turned his attention towards their subjects, the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars had previously cooperated in the campaigns and were familiar with each others' military tactics as in the case of the defeat of Canıbek Giray Khan in 1624. However, the ambitious Kalgay, contrary to his predecessors, wanted to make the cooperation permanent. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were known to be expert on two military arts: The naval raids and the use of muskets which were not developed by the Crimean Tatars. He encouraged the Zaporozhian Cossacks to

intensify their operations in the Black Sea, and to attack the Ottoman possessions in the region. Kalgay Sultan allowed them to use the Crimean Tatar settlements on the shore for sheltering and logistics purposes (after spring 1625). Therefore, he had successfully kept them busy and prevented their intervention in the Crimean affairs.

Apart from the Ottoman pressure, Polish Kingdom had its own reasons to be suspicious about the Crimean Tatar-Zaporozhian rapprochement, that could have caused the exit of the Cossacks from their orbit. Thus, they decided to intervene in the summer of 1625. Prior to the beginning of the operation, they had made a crucial diplomatic move by declaring that the undelivered tribute of the last two years was ready to be dispatched. The move was obviously aimed to prevent Kalgay Şahin Giray to support the Zaporozhian Cossacks and was successful since the Kalgay, who was on the Polish border, returned to Crimea. The Cossacks, being deprived of the support of Crimean Tatars, were defeated and was forced to accept the Polish terms in the treaty of Kurukiv, which included stopping naval activities in the Black Sea In 1626. But the compromise was temporary, and did not last long as in the case of Ottoman confinement of Kantemir Mirza. However, neither the Kalgay nor the Zaporozhian Cossacks had the luxury to abandon the alliance and continued to cooperate.

The Ottomans, by taking advantage of the restrictions imposed on the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the departure of the main Polish forces to the Baltics against Sweden, decided to build a new fortress and strengthen its defence against the Cossacks (1627). The Crimean

Khan and the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia were also called to join the campaign. According to the Ottoman historiography, the campaign was a manipulation of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray., who were reluctant to join the distant Persian campaign. It was obvious that the Ottomans, who had suffered from the Cossack raids for a long time, had more than enough motivation to organize such a campaign while there was a pause in the Persian front. The Ottomans were planning to build a series of fortresses which would control the main Cossack exit road to the Black Sea and one of the fundamental Crimean Tatar passages to the Ruthenian lands of the Commonwealth. Therefore, it appears that, by manipulating the Ottoman campaign, the Khan and the Kalgay made a great mistake and forced the Ottomans to turn their attention to the north while trying to abstain from going to the eastern front. The fort that was built by Kalgay Şahin Giray was located at a place different from the one requested by the Ottomans and aimed to control the Ottomans' movements rather than the Cossacks'

Since the Ottoman Özü campaign was the beginning of the end for Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, Kantemir Mirza's escape from Crimea and return to Bucak was proof that they were losing control of the Khanate. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan entered Ottoman territory after the fugitives. Kantemir Mirza, who was supported by the Ottoman forces, managed to defeat Kalgay who barely escaped to near Silistria (early 1628). Kantemir Mirza, accompanied by the Crimean Tatars that were against the violent rule of the brothers and the Ottoman *Sekbans*, pursued the Kalgay to the outskirts of the capital

Bahçesaray. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan was stalemated and called the Zaporozhian Cossack for help, making them generous offers. The arrival of the Cossacks once again changed the balance of power in favor of the Kalgay. Kantemir Mirza could not stop the march of the Cossack *Tabor* to the capital. Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan managed to break up Kantemir Mirza's blockade, thanks to the arrival of the Zaporozhian Cossack infantry. Kantemir Mirza retreated to Kefe and was besieged there by the Kalgay, who came after him. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan failed to capture the city before the arrival of the Ottoman fleet (31.6.1628); most probably as a result of the reluctance of Mehmed Giray III Khan, who still hoped that the Sultan could change his decision, in his favor.

The first order issued by the Ottomans upon their arrival to Kefe put an end to the optimism of Mehmed Giray III Khan. According to the edict, Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan were deposed because of their actions against the will of the Sultan and *shari'a*; and it was the duty of every Muslim to rise up against them. Consequently, Crimean Tatar aristocracy, who realized the determination of the Ottomans, began to switch their allegiance to Canıbek Giray Khan as per the will of the Sultan. The brothers were forced to lift the siege and to retreat. Mehmed Giray III Khan went to the mountains, while Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan returned to the *Sich* with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. It appears that one of the fundamental causes of Mehmed Giray III Khan's and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's military successes against the Ottomans was closely related to the support of the *Karaçi*

leaders, who reacted to the growing influence of the *Mangit* (Nogay) clan, whom they considered to have a lesser status in the Khanate.

Both Canibek Giray Khan and the Porte were aware that the two brothers would not easily accept defeat and they would continue to resist. For that reason, the new Kalgay Devlet Giray Sultan and Kantemir Mirza were ordered to pursue and kill them, while the Ottoman forces in the region were ordered to remain in their posts in case of a surprise attack. Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan planned the invasion of the peninsula with the support of the Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks and Little Nogays (fall 1628). However, all of their attempts were prevented by the forces of Canibek Giray Khan and Kantemir Mirza.

Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan did not give up the fight, despite the decreasing possibility of sustaining an anti-Ottoman coalition because of the increasing military and political setbacks. Even the violent death of Mehmed Giray III Khan at the hands of Zaporozhian Cossacks did not prevent him from cooperating with them. He accepted their explanation that the death of Mehmed Giray III Khan was an accident. However, the plan of the anti-Ottoman coalition had already lost its momentum and the enthusiasm of the participating parties, especially after the death of Shah Abbas I (1629). After his various failed attempts, Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, realizing that it was not possible to come to power without the approval of the Ottomans, submitted to the will of the Murad IV and decided to try his luck in Istanbul (1633-1634). It appears that he never gave up the idea of returning to Crimea as a Khan one

day. Towards that end, he even did not refrain from getting involved in the Ottoman palace intrigues that was the cause of his execution in 1640.

The fate of Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan's main rival, Canıbek Giray Khan, who was the representative of the pro-Ottoman party, was not very different. He was also deposed and settled in Rhodes after 1635. Canıbek Giray Khan had believed that the support of the Porte was essential to remain in power; thus, he tried to satisfy its demands as much as possible. His close relationship with the Ottoman bureaucracy made his rule very fragile and vulnerable to the political changes within the Empire. Moreover, he was considered a puppet of the Ottomans by the Crimean Tatars. The formation of an independent Bucak Horde under the leadership of Kantemir Mirza was not acceptable to the Crimean Khanate for historical and political reasons. First, they considered the Bucak region part of their patrimony. Second, they believed that the entire Bucak Horde was their subjects.

Meanwhile, the Ottomans realized it could be more feasible to use Kantemir Mirza for their regional operations as an alternative to the Crimean Tatar forces. For that reason, they made him a Pasha and included him in the Ottoman administration, an action without precedent. The entire Crimean Tatar administration reacted to this decision, as they considered him to be their subject. However, they were not able to convince the Porte to change their decision. It was a major blow to the prestige of Canıbek Giray Khan, who lost the support of the Karaçi clans. The Ottomans quickly realized that it was not easy

to keep Kantemir Mirza under control, as he continuously raided Polish territory and infringed upon the peace. Therefore, they turned towards the Crimean Khanate for help for Kantemir Mirza's removal from the region.

The support of the Karaçi leaders was very important for the initial successes of Mehmed Giray III Khan and Kalgay Şahin Giray Sultan, who were able to take Kantemir Mirza under control and exile the Bucak Horde to Azak. However, Kantemir Mirza managed to escape and return to Bucak again and played one of the major roles during the deposition of Mehmed Giray III Khan and the third Khanate of Canıbek Giray. Quite paradoxically, Kantemir Mirza, an ardent enemy of Canıbek Giray Khan, was one of the applicants to the Ottomans as a replacement of the Khans. Unfortunately, Canıbek Giray Khan lost the initiative to Kantemir Mirza, who de facto ruled the Khanate and terrorized his enemies. It appears that the Crimean Khanate could not overcome its structural defects and continued to be open to the manipulations from abroad. .

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