

To My Family



**GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION:
THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH CASE**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

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ABSTRACT

“GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION:
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This thesis analyses the transformation of the Ottoman-Turkish state under the influence of globalization in a historical context. It is an attempt for operationalization of the transformationist argument in the Globalization and state literature. The Ottoman-Turkish state had been in the process of transforming into initially modern national state then a modern nation state during the era of first and second globalizations. Now, in the face of third globalization, it is in the process of transforming into a liberal democratic state.

Keywords: Globalization, State, Transformation.

ÖZET

KÜRESELLEŞME VE DEVLET DÖNÜŞÜMÜ:

OSMANLI – TÜRK ÖRNEĞİ

Özgür Çiçek

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışma küreselleşmenin etkisi altında Osmanlı – Türk devletinin transformasyonunu tarihsel bir çerçevede incelemiştir. Küreselleşme ve devlet literatüründeki transformasyon argümanının operasyonelleştirilmesi için bir denemidir. Birinci ve ikinci küreselleşmelerin etkisi altında Osmanlı – Türk devleti önce modern ulusal devlete sonra modern ulus devlete dönüşmüştür. Günümüzde üçüncü küreselleşmenin etkisi altında liberal demokratik devlete dönüşme sürecindedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Küreselleşme, Devlet, Dönüşüm.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	 1
 CHAPTER 2: GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION	 8
2.1. Globalization.....	8
2.2. Political Globalization.....	9
2.3. Historical Forms of Globalization.....	11
 CHAPTER 3: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH STATE.....	 15
3.1. The Beginning of the Europeanization of the State Structure.....	15
3.2. The First Globalization and The Classical Eastern Question.....	17
3.3. Modern National State Building.....	21
3.3.1. The Institutionalization of the Modern National State, Initial Reforms.....	23
3.3.2. Two Alternative Regime Model in Europe, Constitutional Monarchy and Absolute Monarchy.....	25
3.3.3. The First Ottoman Constitution and the Ottoman Parliament.....	26
3.3.4. The Second Globalization and The New Facet of Eastern Question.....	30
3.3.5. Young Turk Movement and Constitutional Liberalism.....	31
3.4. Nationalism, Nation-State Building.....	35
3.4.1. The Establishment of the Republican Regime, the Single-Party Rule and State- Dominant Monoparty Authoritarianism.....	41

CHAPTER 4: FROM NATIONAL SECURITY STATE TO A LIBERAL

DEMOCRATIC STATE.....47

4.1. Democracy in the West and the Multi Party Period in Turkey.....50

4.2. The Third Globalization and Democracy in Turkey.....53

4.2.1 Democracy and Great Divide in Turkey: State Elites vs. Political Elites.....54

4.3. Military Coup, 1960 and the Emergence of National Security State.....55

4.4 The Cold War and The National Security State.....57

4.5 The Political Role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).....59

4.5.1. Constitutional & Legal Basis of the Guardianship of the TAF.....62

4.5.1.1. The Army Internal Service Code and Regulations.....63

4.5.1.2. The General Staff.....64

4.5.1.3. National Security Council.....66

4.5.1.4. The State Security Courts.....68

4.5.1.5. The Office of the President.....68

4.6. Political Globalization, Transformation to a Liberal Democratic State: The
Significance of the European Anchor in the Turkish Context.....69

4.6.1. The New Europe.....70

4.6.2. Application for Full Membership and the Strengthening of European
Anchor.....71

4.6.3. The Rejection of Membership Application and the European Concerns about
Civil-Military Relations in Turkey.....74

4.6.4. Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era, The Acceleration of the
Transformation.....77

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....84

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....88

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between globalization and state has been a widely studied subject in the social sciences. Coming from different disciplinary backgrounds, the mainstream of the literature theorizes comprehensively on the transformation, however, operationalization of the dynamics of transformation has been understudied. This thesis may provide a case of operationalization of the transformationalist school of this Globalization & State literature. The transformation of a developing state, Ottoman-Turkish state, under the influence of political globalization is analyzed.

Three perspectives- Hyperglobalists, Rejectionists and Transformationalists- have dominated the debates on the relationship between globalization and the state¹. While the Rejectionists² oppose globalization as a new phenomenon, Hyperglobalists³ and

¹ Aydınli, Ersel. 2002. "Securing the Transformation: Political Globalization vs. Anarchy in the Modernizing World." Paper presented at the Conference on "Globalization, Security and the Nation-state," in Ankara, Turkey, June 15, 16.

² Brown, Chris. 1995. "International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community." In Ken Booth and Steven Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today* Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 90-109. Krasner, Stephen. 1995 "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security* 20(3): 115-151. Krasner, Stephen. (1993) "Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood." In Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, eds., *States in a Changing World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thomson, Janice E. and Stephen Krasner. 1989. "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty." In Czempiel, Ernst-Otto and James Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*. Mass. Lexington: Lexington Books, 195-219. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. NY: Random House. Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson. 1996. *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Government*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hirst, Paul. 1997. "The Global Economy: Myths and Realities," *International Affairs* 73(3): 409-426. Weiss, Linda. 1998. *The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Armstrong, David. 1998. "Globalization and the Social State," *Review of International Studies* 24: 461-478. Zysman, John. 1996. "The Myth of the 'Global' Economy: Enduring National Foundations and Emerging Regional Realities," *New Political Economy* 1(1): 157-

Transformationalists⁴ argue that globalization is a central driving force in the new epoch and is the reason behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping individuals, societies, states and the world order. The Rejectionists, on the other hand, conceive globalization as the great myth of our times. While the direction of the globalization impact is fixed within the Hyperglobalists, the Transformationalists refrain from making absolute claims on the future course of globalization⁵. Hyperglobalists argue that globalization invites the demise of sovereign statehood and undermines a world order constructed upon the basis of Westphalian norms⁶. The core emphasis in the Transformationalists is that globalization is a powerful transformative force that introduces a “fundamental

184. Pauly, Louis W. and Simon Reich. 1997. “National structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalisation,” *International Organization* 51(1): 1-30.

³ Ohmae, Kenichi. 1995. *The End of the Nation State*. NY: Free Press. Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. *The Borderless World*. NY: HarperCollins. Perlmutter, Alvin H. 1991 “On the Rocky Road to the First Global Civilization,” *Human Relations* 44(1): 901-906. Gray, John. 1998. *False Dawn*. London: Granta Books. Falk, Richard. 1997. “State of Siege: Will Globalization Win Out?” *International Affairs* 73(1): 123-136. Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Camilleri, Joseph A. and Jim Falk. 1992. *The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*. Aldershot: Edward Algar. Wriston, Walter. 1992. *The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming our World*. NY: Scribner. Guehenno, Jean-Marie. 1995. *The End of the Nation State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

⁴ Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity* Cambridge: Polity Press. Rosenau, James. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics*. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Rosenau, James. 1997. *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organization* 47:139-174. Elkins, David J. 1995. *Beyond Sovereignty: Territory And Political Economy In The Twenty-First Century* Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Sassen, Saskai. 1996. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. NY: Columbia University Press. Cox, Robert W. and Timothy J. Sinclair. 1996. *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 296-313. Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner. 1996. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoogvelt, Ankie. 1997. *Globalization and the Postcolonial World*. London: Macmillan, 134-139. Held, David and Anthony G. McGrew. 2002. *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Held, David and Anthony G. McGrew. 2000. *Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Held, David and et al. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

⁵ Mann, Michael. 1997. “Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State,” *Review of International Political Economy* 4(3): 472-496.

⁶ Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2000. “Globalization, Regionalization and the Transformation of the Community.” Paper presented at the *Political Studies Association- UK 50th Annual Conference* in Ankara, April 10-13.

shake-out” for the subjects including states⁷. The Transformationalists’ main argument regarding the state is that globalization is reforming and reconstituting the state structure, political community and authority. In the past, the state was the sole authority in the state-centric world politics. Today, there are two images of world politics that are called state-centric and multi-centric⁸. In the latter, the authority becomes diffused and states seek to share the tasks of governance with a complex array of institutions, public and private, regional, transnational and global. How this transformation actually occurs at the domestic level is the question that is understudied in the literature. This thesis tries to be an answer to this question by exploring the transformation of the Ottoman- Turkish state. The Ottoman-Turkish state structure has been transforming since the late 18th century under the influence of three waves of globalization.

This study focuses on the political facet of globalization because it aims specifically to explore the interaction of globalization with the states’ political structure. Political globalization is related to world order and political organization in the modern world that is associated with the traditional state-centric relations and with the emergent multi-centric world. Political globalization has transformed the very foundations of the world order by reconstituting the state structure and reordering international political relations. There are historical forms of political globalization that pressure states or state elites⁹ for change. This pressure does not only come from other states. Agents of the emerging multi-centric world such as INGOs, IGOs, transnational actors and subgroups are important agents of political globalization. In fact, political

⁷ Giddens, Anthony. 1998. “Globalization: A Keynote Address.” Retrieved from www.telcor.gob.ni/BCS/societal-issues/08/giddens.htm on 06/07/2003.

⁸ Rosenau, James. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

⁹ The state elites are the agents who act in the name of the state to hold the autonomy and supremacy of the state in the polity. Heper, Metin. 1990. “The State and Debureaucratization: The Case of Turkey,” *International Social Science Journal*. 126: 606.

globalization is occurring in both of the two worlds of world politics- State-Centric World and Multi-Centric World.

A state in the developing world will be the focus of this study because the states in this realm seem to be the most in transformation. These are the states that are still in the process of state making and in which there exist great insecurities. In fact, state security has been the main subject matter of the Third World Security literature¹⁰ that focuses on the developing world. It is maintained in this literature that lack of societal consensus on basic principles of the polity and lack of legitimacy of the political institutions bring state security to the fore. The inclusion of the societal groups to the political system has been problematic in those developing states, because the modernizing role of the state and state elites, and modernization itself polarized society to an extent that a fragmented society structure emerged with political elites and rival social groups. The state establishment has been concentrated on power maximization in order to provide order in this structure. With the help of international events, such as Cold War, there is the emergence of a kind of state whose agenda is dominated by security.

It is argued here that political globalization has made a great impact on this security state fragmented society composition. Contemporary political globalization, which can be associated with liberalization and democratization, has contributed to the state security in the developing world by creating a societal consensus based on liberal democracy. While changing the security problematique in the developing states,

¹⁰ Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Job, Brian L. 1992. "National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World." In Brian L. Job, ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma* Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 11-35. Acharya, Amitav. 1995. "The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and the Security Studies," *YCISS Occasional Paper* 28. Acharya, Amitav. 1992. "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World." In Brian L. Job ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Hazar, Edward and Chung-In Moon. 1984. "Third World National Security: Towards a New Conceptual Framework," *International Interactions* 11(2): 103-135.

political globalization is pressurizing these security states to transform into liberal democratic states. The security of the state has long been dominating the political agenda in Turkey. The political regime in Turkey is based on secular democratic unitary republic and granted from above by a military distinct from society and remain above politics¹¹. This is in contrast with a regime forged through multiple confrontations, bargaining, and the professionalization of the military by civilian politicians seen in democratic states. Political Islam and ethnic politics has been a threat to the regime in Turkey because these currents emerged not only an alternative to other political parties but also to the secular-democratic order in Turkey¹². A consolidated democracy in Turkey could not have been emerged because of an indirect military presence in the polity. The military assumed a role of the guardian of the regime and this role of the military has been consolidated by various institutional arrangements.

Political globalization affects contemporary Turkish state via two mechanisms. First, the European Union membership bid is a strong drive for democratization and political liberalization¹³. Second, transnational democratic forces are shaping Islamic and Ethnic subgroups to a democrat identity¹⁴. A new social consensus on liberal democracy has emerged. This affects the Turkish state by easing the threats to the regime security. The form of current transformation, occurring in Turkey, is from a security state to a liberal democratic state. Previously, threats to the regime security

¹¹ Heper, Metin. 1992. "The Strong State and the State Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared," *Comparative Political Studies* 25: 169-194.

¹² Sayari, Sabri. 1996. "Turkey's Islamic Challenge," *Middle East Quarterly* 36: 39.

¹³ Dağı, İhsan D. 2001. "Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-1987," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37(1). Dağı, İhsan D. 1996. "Democratic Transition in Turkey: The Impact of European Diplomacy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32(2): 124-141.

¹⁴ Sarıbay, Ali Yasar. 1997. "Küreselleşme, Postmodern Uluslaşma ve İslam." In Fuat Keyman and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, eds., *Küreselleşme, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*. Ankara: Vadi, 14-33. Keyman, Fuat. 2000. *Türkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi*. İstanbul: Alfa.

created a security state structure that was dominated mainly by the Turkish Armed Forces. Political globalization is opening the way for a democratic state structure by alleviating threats to the regime security. Moreover, international actors are pressurizing the military to believe in the prudence of civilian actors to rule the state. So, a democratic state is emerging in Turkey in the form of an EU member. All of these mean that the Turkish state is undergoing a prominent transformation. Therefore, the Turkish case presents an excellent lab to observe the dynamics of transformation and conceptualize an operationalization of it.

Since the thesis is about historical waves of globalization and the transformation of the Ottoman-Turkish state, it gives special attention to literatures regarding the history of world order, European system, Turkish state tradition, modernization, democratization and civil-military relations. A qualitative analysis of the Ottoman-Turkish experience is done as a case study. Extensive literature survey has been conducted into the books, articles and published thesis and reports. Unpublished dissertations and reports have been made use of. Newspapers have also been made use of, while Internet sources have been searched through. This present thesis provides the basic literature and makes initial analysis that would hopefully help to further research.

In the second chapter a theoretical study of globalization is done with a specific focus on political globalization and historical forms of it. The three globalizations understanding explained in this chapter provide the time scale for the analysis of the transformation of the Ottoman-Turkish state. The remaining chapters are arranged in accordance with the three epochs of globalization. The transformation of the Ottoman ancient regime to a modern nation state under the impact of first and second globalizations is outlined in the third chapter with the aim of providing the historical

background for an understanding of the contemporary globalization and state transformation. The fourth chapter deals with the contemporary globalization and the emergence of a liberal democratic state in Turkey. The purpose of the last chapter is to summarize the thesis, outline the findings and suggest follow up research on the topic.



CHAPTER 2

GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

2.1 Globalization

Globalization as a term and idea has gained increasing prominence over the last 40 years, however it lacks precise definition. Nonetheless, the term globalization captures elements of real life that there is a broadening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of life, from the cultural to the legal, the financial to the environmental. It appears to be a global shift; that is, a world being shaped, by economic and technological forces, into a shared economic and political arena. There are various, often contradictory, interpretations of globalization such as, a new US Empire project¹⁵, another phase of Capitalism¹⁶, a kind of historical world system¹⁷, discourse of capitalist ideology¹⁸, economic

¹⁵ Widastomo, Iqbal. 2002. "Globalization: 21st-Century Imperialism," *Jakarta Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/1101empire.htm> on 15/01/2004. Hobsbawm, Eric. 2003. "After the Winning of the War, United States: Still Wider and Wider," *Le Monde Diplomatique*. Retrieved from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2003/06hobsbawm.htm> on 15/01/2004.

¹⁶ Robinson, William I. 2004. *A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World*. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

¹⁷ Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1998. *Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: The New Press.

¹⁸ Sklair, Leslie. 2000. *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Oxford: Blackwell.

internationalization¹⁹, seeing the world as a single place²⁰ and deterritorialization²¹. Here, globalization is understood as a multidimensional, dynamic process²² (or a set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power. “*Globalization refers to an historical process which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions and the exercise of power*”²³.

2.2 Political Globalization

Political globalization is an element of the huge multi dimensional issue, globalization. The main elements of this phenomenon include all the dimensions of politics, economy, social and culture. Economic Globalization is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders²⁴. Socio-Cultural Globalization is the transmission of cultural values globally and the emerging transformation of

¹⁹ Hirst, Paul Q. and Grahame Thompson. 1999. *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. Munck, Ronaldo. 2002. “Globalization and Democracy: A New ‘Great Transformation’?” Retrieved from www.gseu.org.uk/publish/pdfs/ann_ch1.pdf on 12/11/2004.

²⁰ Robertson, Roland. 1992. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London and Newbury Park, California: Sage.

²¹ Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press.

²² Held, David and et al. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 2000. *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*. New York: Routledge.

²³ Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2000. “Globalization, Regionalization and the Transformation of Political Community.” Paper for the Political studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference in London, April 10-13, 1.

²⁴ IMF Staff. 2000. “Globalization: Threat and Opportunity?” *The IMF Issue Brief* 00/01. Retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm> on 08/09/2003.

values and societal institutions such as the family and ethno-religious groups²⁵. This thesis refers primarily to globalization in its political form (such as how globalization transforms political systems and the model of government) because it aims specifically to explore the interaction of globalization with the states' political structure.

Contemporary political globalization is understood in this thesis as a consensus on the mutual ideas of economic liberalism and liberal democracy and the pressure this creates on states for further democratization that necessitates system-transformations in the political structure. Another reason for focusing on this aspect of globalization is that it is particularly liberalization impact of political globalization that leads to a transformation in the state structure²⁶. In point of fact, contemporary globalization is reconstituting or transforming the power, functions and authority of the nation-state²⁷. The transformation effect of contemporary political globalization has been operationalized in the Turkish case in the form of Turkey's application and accession to European Union (hereafter EU) and the European demands for further liberalization and democratization.

²⁵ Bestor, Theodore C. 2000. "Globalization at Work: How Shushi Went Global," *Foreign Policy* 121: 54-63.

²⁶ For a similar argument please look at Aydınli, Ersel. 2002. "Political Globalization versus Anarchy: An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case." Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 2.

²⁷ Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Stanford University Press. Elkins, David J. 1995. *Beyond Sovereignty- Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty First Century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and Global Order*. Cambridge: Stanford University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner. 1996, eds. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Goldblatt, David and et al. 1997. "Economic Globalization and the Nation-state: Shifting Balances of Power," *Alternatives*, 22 (3): 269-285. Jessop, Bob. 1997. "Capitalism and its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance," *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(3): 561-582. Mann, Michael. 1997. "Has Globalization ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-state?" *Review of International Political Economy*, 4 (3): 472-496. Rosenau, James. 1997. *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2.3 Historical Forms of Globalization

The particular form taken by globalization differs between historical areas. It is widely argued that there are three great epochs of globalization²⁸:

1. First Globalization, Early Modern (14th – 18th century)
2. Second Globalization, Modern (19th – 20th century)
3. Third Globalization, Contemporary (1945 on)

The first globalization was marked by the growing centralization of political power within Europe in the form of constitutional monarchies and absolutism. The sedimentation of political rule into state structures, the spread of European interstate order began in this era. Key features of the modern state system, so-called Westphalian model²⁹, became prevalent features of the global order:

1. The world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial states which recognize no superior authority.
2. The process of law-making, the settlement of disputes and law enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states.

²⁸ Held, David and et al. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Öymen, Onur. 2000. *Geleceği Yakalamak: Türkiye’de ve Dünyada Küreselleşme ve Devlet Reformu*. İstanbul: Remzi. Kazgan, Gülten. 2001. *Küreselleşme ve Uluslararası devlet: Yeni Ekonomik düzen: Ne Getiriyor? Ne Götürüyor? Nereye Gidiyor?* İstanbul: Bilgi. Oran, Baskın. 2001. *Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar*. Ankara: İmaj. Tellal, Onur. 2001. “Küreselleşme ve Ulus Devlet.” *Özgür Üniversite Forumu*, 4: 65-75.

²⁹ Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Polity, 78.

3. International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and peoples is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows state objectives to be met.
4. Responsibility for cross-border wrongful act is a 'private matter' concerning only those affected.
5. All states are regarded as equal before the law; legal rules do not take account of asymmetries of power.
6. Differences among states are often settled by force; the principle of effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection.
7. The minimization of impediments to state freedom is the 'collective priority'.

There was also the initial European imperialist expansion. The rapidly developing Imperial powers of Britain and other European states were the most powerful agents of globalization in this era. The Ottoman Empire, in the face of these developments in Europe, questioned its ancient regime and started to transform itself into a European style modern national state.

The second globalization was constituted by the consolidation of the modern state system in the form of nation state as a result of the spread of nationalism. The effect of nationalism to the Ottoman Empire was that subjects within the Empire looked for national identities. While subjects in the periphery tried for their ethnic identities, the Capital looked for an Islamic or Ottoman identity that would include all groups. The clash of this rival identities and corresponding political agendas created great insecurity for the Ottoman state. In the mean time, liberal democratic regimes formed

in Western Europe and USA that would have a substantive influence on the Ottoman elite who began pushing for transformation in the state structure. The turmoil in this era marked the end of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of nation-states from its ashes.

The third globalization includes the spread of liberal democracy to the globe. Since the end of Second World War the modern nation state has become the principal type of political rule across the globe and has eventually acquired a particular political form; liberal democracy. It is argued that four types of change characterize globalization in this particular perspective³⁰:

1. It involves a stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers, regions and continents.
2. It suggests the intensification, or the growing magnitude, of interconnectedness and flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture, etc.
3. The growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness can be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and processes, as the evolution of world-wide systems of transport and communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital, and people.
4. The growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions can be associated with their deepening impact such that the effects of distant events can be highly significant elsewhere and even the most local developments may come to have enormous global consequences. As Immanuel Kant says, we are all

³⁰ Held, David and et al. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

“unavoidably side by side³¹”. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs can become increasingly blurred.

By comparison with previous periods, globalization today combines a remarkable convergence of intense patterns of global interconnectedness, alongside their unprecedented institutionalization through new global and regional infrastructures of control and communication, including the UN, G7, IMF, WTO, EU, APEC, ASEAN and NAFTA summits and many other official and unofficial meetings. In the middle of the nineteenth century there were few interstate conferences or congresses per annum; today the number totals over four thousand annually³². National government is increasingly locked into an array of global, regional and multi-layered systems of governance - and can barely monitor it all, let alone stay in command. At the regional level the EU, in remarkably little time, has taken Europe from the disarray of the post Second World War era to a world in which sovereignty is pooled across a growing number of areas of common concern. In sum, driven by interrelated political, economic and technological changes, globalization is transforming societies and world order. Sandwiched between global forces and local demands, national governments oblige to reconsider their roles and functions. The next chapter would set the historical background of the current transformation in Turkey. The Ottoman-Turkish state responded the challenges created by the first and second globalization by first transforming into a modern national state and than to a nation state.

³¹ Held, David. 2001. “Violence, Law and Justice in a Global Age.” Retrieved from <http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/112held.htm> on 04/01/2004.

³² Held, David and et al. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 55.

CHAPTER 3

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN - TURKISH STATE

3.1 The Beginning of the Europeanization of the State Structure

The beginning of the Western impact on the Turkish politics in terms of state reform is generally taken as the beginning of the reign of Sultan III (1789-1807)³³. The ideas on the transformation in the Ottoman ancient regime dated back to 16th and 17th centuries when many Ottoman thinkers wrote memos to the Sultan that prescribe various types of reforms aiming to avoid the collapse of the Empire as suggested in the theory of Ibn-i Haldun. Hacı Halefi presented a good example of this theory in his *Düstur-ül Amel* in 1653:

“The social condition of man corresponds to his individual condition, and in most matters the one is parallel to the other....First of all, the natural life of man is reckoned in three stages, the years of growth, the years of stasis, and the years of decline. Though the times of these three stages are ordained in individuals, nevertheless these times vary according to the strength or weakness of individual constitutions... and these states also vary in different societies... when the reckoning from the migration of the Prophet (upon him the best of greetings) had reached the year 1063, and the lofty Empire of Osman had attained its 364th year, in accordance with God’s custom and the natural laws of civilization and human societies, signs of indisposition appeared in the complexion of this lofty Empire, and

³³ Shaw, Stanford J. 1971. *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Findley, Carter V. 1994. *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik Reform, Babiali, 1789-1922*. İstanbul: İz, 38-39.

*traces of discord in its nature and its powers...*³⁴,

The original features of Ottoman Turkish traditional society dated back to the times of Süleyman I (1520-1566) and in the period immediately before the political modernization of the 19th century, we find more or less degenerate forms of the original Ottoman institutions³⁵. The Ottoman ancient regime was based on a “tacit contract” of the Sultan with his subjects based on the religious ideal of the good³⁶. There had been an Islamicized version of a Platonic worldview in which the strength of the state has been assumed to be identical with the political morality of the rulers. In this deeply rooted understanding of the state, it had been thought that the “true order of religion”, that is, the true order of morality, is inseparably connected to the “true order of the world³⁷”. The absolute power of the Ottoman ruler found further support in the old Oriental maxim that a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice. This tacit contract was the basis of the legitimation formula of the Ottoman state that guarantees the loyalty of its subjects to the Sultan. The regime had been protected by a group social of elements, the army (Janissaries), civilian population of bazaar merchants (reaya) and men of religion (Ulema), which balanced the palace of the Sultan in the Ottoman political equilibrium. But, it was in the late 18 century that the transformation to a European

³⁴ Lewis, Bernard. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 21.

³⁵ İnalçık, Halil. 1995. *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*. Istanbul: ISIS, 123.

³⁶ Mardin, Şerif. 1988. “Freedom in the Ottoman Perspective.” In Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 29.

³⁷ Kedourie, Elie. 1992. *Politics in the Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-21.

style state was accepted as indispensable³⁸.

Sultan Selim III first initiated military reform in the face of defeats against Western powers by establishing military schools relying on French instruction³⁹. In fact, the turning point was loss of Hungary to Austria in 1783-99 and of Ukraine and the Crimea to the Russia in 1768-83, defeats involved far more precious than territory to Ottomans; they threatened the very basis of self-confidence. A similar attitude is well expressed in a famous poem by Ziya Pasha, "*I passed through the lands of the infidels, I saw cities and mansions; I wandered in the realm of Islam, I saw nothing but ruins*"⁴⁰. For the first time, Ottomans had occasion to question the structure of the state in comparison with the Western model⁴¹. It is not a coincidence that the Ottoman Empire emerged as the Eastern Question on the agenda of the European powers- Russia, Britain, France, and Austria-Hungary during this era.

3.2 The First Globalization and The Classical Eastern Question

As it was stated in the second chapter, the first globalization was marked by the spread of the European modern state system. The rapidly developing imperial powers of Britain and other European states were the most powerful agents of globalization

³⁸ Ortaylı, İlber. 2001. "Osmanlı'da 18. Yüzyıl Düşünce Dünyasına Dair Notlar." In Mehmet Ö. Alkan, ed. *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Mevritiyet'in Birikimi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 38-39.

³⁹ Shaw, Stanford. 1965. "The Origin of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-i Cedid Army of Sultan Selim III," *The Journal of Modern History* 37(3): 291-306. Allen, Henry Elisha. 1935. *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 4-27. Lewis, Bernard. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 39.

⁴⁰ Göçgün, Önder. 1987. *Ziya Paşa'nın Hayatı, Eserleri, Edebi Şahsiyeti ve Bütün Şiirleri*. Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı.

⁴¹ Rustow, Dankwart A. 1973. "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective." In Kemal Karpat, ed. *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*. Leiden: E.J: Brill, 95.

in this era. The relations between these European powers and the Ottoman Empire were conceptualized with the concept of the Eastern Question. Actually, the Eastern Question is the operationalization of the first globalization in the Ottoman domain.

For more than 150 years, from the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74 to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the Eastern Question, the question of what should become of the Ottoman Empire, played a significant, and even at times a dominant part in shaping the relations of Great Powers. The problem was how to dispose of the empire in such a manner that no one power would gain an advantage at the expense of the others and upset the political balance of Europe. This understanding of the Ottoman Empire as a passive pawn in the struggle for power between the Great Powers is conceptualized as the “*Sick Man of Europe*”⁴². Although the core of the question did not change, content transformed in time. In the 18th century it concerned mainly the conflicts generated by the expansion of Russia into the territories bordering the northern shores of the Black Sea. In the 19th century, following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), during which a French force occupied Egypt, it concerned the attempts of the subject peoples and their rulers to secure some degree of autonomy or independence, and the efforts of the Great Powers either to contain the mostly nationalistic tensions thereby generated or to exploit them to their own advantage⁴³.

The origin of the classical Eastern Question has been a debate in the literature. Although there is a suggestion that the origin of the question is related with the problems created by the first appearance of the Turks in Macedonia in the 14th

⁴² It was Tsar Nicholas I who said in 1853: “We have on our hands a very, very sick man.” Later, the term turned into a widely used concept in diplomacy and social sciences.

⁴³ Macfie, Alexander Lyon. 1996. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*. London and New York: Longman, 1.

century⁴⁴. The main debate is between those who argue that the beginning of the question was in the second half of the 18th century when the Russian and Austrian advanced against the Ottoman Empire⁴⁵ and those who argue that the 19th Century and the end of the Napoleonic Wars is the origin of the question⁴⁶. The mainstream view of the Eastern Question is adopted in this study that takes the late 18th century as the beginning.

The defeats of the Ottoman Empire against Russia and the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainarji, Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 altered the Balkan scene in three important ways:

- Russia gained access to the Black Sea coast, so that for the first time Russia physically impinged on the Turkish heartland, including the Balkans.
- Russian merchant ships got the right to enter the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Russian merchants got the right to trade in the Ottoman Empire, and Russia got the right to appoint consular agents inside Turkey.
- Russia became protector of the Orthodox Christians of Turkey, with special rights in Wallachia and Moldavia.

These clauses started a competition among the Great Powers for influence in Turkey because no power, especially British, was willing to permit Russia to dominate the vast Ottoman holdings. The competition was mainly between Russia and England

⁴⁴ Marriott, John Arthur Ran. 1969. *The Eastern Question: A Historical Study in European Diplomacy*. Oxford: Clarendon.

⁴⁵ Anderson, Matthew Smith. 1966. *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*. New York: St. Martin's. Ancel, Jacques. 1927. *Manuel historique de la question d'Orient, (1792-1926)*. Paris: Delagrave. Macfie, Alexander Lyon. 1996. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*. London and New York: Longman. Hozier, Henry Montague. 1878. *The Russo-Turkish War: Including an Account of the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Power and the History of the Eastern Question*. London: William Mackenzie.

⁴⁶ Mosely, Philip Edward. 1934. *Russian diplomacy and the opening of the Eastern question in 1838 and 1839*. New York: Russell & Russell. European Diplomacy and the Congress System, 1815-56: a brief survey. Retrieved from <http://www.thecorner.org/hists/europe/congress.htm> on 02/01/2004.

but it also includes France and Austria-Hungary whose policies made a pendulum between partition and status quo. Germany and Italy later joined this group.

The policies of Great Powers towards Ottoman Empire can be summarized as: British saw Russian expansion to the south and straits as a major challenge to her interests, ever since the French attack against Egypt in 1798. The guiding principle of the British policy with only few exceptions during the first Muhammed Ali Crisis and more generally under Salisbury in the years following the occupation of Egypt was therefore to deny Russia direct access to Straits and preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Before 1840 and after 1871, France had designs on the African territories, Egypt, of the Sultan. France therefore supported dependencies of the Ottoman Empire in these parts in their resistance to the Sultan. Except for temporary policies of supporting the status quo after 1833 and 1897, Russia pursued expansionist policies at Turkey's expense all throughout the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary joined Russia in the partition of Balkans but some times followed status quo policies and cooperated with other European powers to balance Russia expansion. These security threats forced Ottomans to reform the parts of the state that would help survive the challenge. Later, reforms spilled over other branches of the state and assumed a character of full-fledged state transformation to a modern state.

3.3 Modern National State⁴⁷ Building

Sultan Selim III set off the formation of a new army under his direct command that would both guarantee his position against the Janissaries and the local notables (Ayan), on the one hand, and against the modern Russian armies, on the other. But this created unrest within Janissaries and Ayans. The Janissaries perceived the new army as a threat to their existence and resisted harshly. Sultan Selim III also created a treasury for the new army by implementing new taxes that turned public opinion and the Ulema against him. Finally, in 1807 the Janissaries rose against the Sultan with the support of the Ulema and the populace of Istanbul. Sultan Selim III was dethroned and the reforms were abolished.

The rebels made Mustafa IV the Sultan and limited his power. In fact, "Mustafa's authority was not heeded outside the walls of his court⁴⁸." But the extraordinary rise of Janissary and Ulema power in the capital, abolishing the ancient regime, generated resistance in the Ayans that sees status quo as a guarantee to their position in the provinces. Soon the joint forces of the Ayan flocked into the capital, terrifying the Janissary and the court. Ayans restored the old ancient regime by making Mahmut II sultan and guaranteeing their position with a covenant (Sened-i İttifak). Sultan II. Mahmut eliminated one of the basic elements of the old regime, the Janissaries in 1826 with his new army. The military corps and the administrative officials, educated in the Westernized schools that were established by Sultan III. Selim, were

⁴⁷ National State is used here, as defined by Charles Tilly, in distinction from the nation state. Tilly defined national state as "relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organizations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, contiguous, and clearly bounded territories." Nation states, on the other hand, are those "whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity." Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 70.

⁴⁸ İnalcık, Halil. 1995. *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*. Istanbul: ISIS, 131.

the backbone of the new centralist absolute political structure. Ayans and bureaucrats replaced the Janissaries and the men of religion in the old political equilibrium for a while. The Doctors of Islamic law were unable to adjust to new concepts of society⁴⁹. The legal and educational reforms of Sultan Selim III became the graveyard of the high Ulema who supported them⁵⁰.

Sultan Mahmud II, under the pressures of first globalization, launched an extensive program of autocratic reform after the elimination of Janissaries parallel to Peter the Great in Russia⁵¹. The reformation of the army necessitated a new education, administrative and taxation system. An entire new school system was instituted to prepare the future officers, administrators and tax collectors of the emerging national state. The School of Military Sciences established in 1834 following the Medical School and the Imperial Music School.⁵² Military conscription required a tightening of administration in provinces and the cost of the new army had to be borne by systemic taxation. So, the Europeanization of the state structure began from the military and continued with the other branches of the state such as public administration and finance.

Ayans remained as a threat to the emerging national state but in two decades of tenacious struggle, Sultan Mahmud II subdued Ayans and all the provinces except Greece and Egypt. The Greeks revolted in 1821 and started ten-years independence war. Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt had created a great problem for the Ottoman state with his modernized administration and army. New bureaucratic elite nurtured

⁴⁹ Mardin, Şerif 1988. "Freedom in the Ottoman Perspective." In Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 34.

⁵⁰ Heyd, Uriel. 1961. "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II." In Uriel Heyd, eds. *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*. Jerusalem: Scripta Hierosolymitana, 63-96. Cited in Gerber, Haim. 2000. "Ottoman Civil Society." In Kemal Karpat eds. *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. Leiden: Brill, 134.

⁵¹ Karpat, Kemal. 1967. *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi*. İstanbul: İstanbul, 14.

⁵² Seyh, Mahmud Cevad İbn-us. 1922. *Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Tarihce-i Teskilati ve İcraati*. İstanbul: Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti.

first Russian than a complete five power European assistance to pacify the rule of Muhammet Ali Pasha. The power wrested from Ayans was relocated in the hands of the new bureaucracy. This empowerment of the central government was strengthened by changes in the structure and organization of the central government staff. Governmental Ministries and High Councils were established. The new bureaucracy, trained at first in the embassies at Paris, London, and Vienna and the translation chamber at the Sublime Porte- the office of the Grand Vezir, and later in higher schools, academies in Istanbul and other cities of the Empire, would be the forerunners of the reform process. The successes of Muhammed Ali Pasha in Egypt in creating an efficient administration and powerful army with European style reforms set a good example to the new bureaucratic elite. This new bureaucratic elite served as the most important medium for the internalization of the ideas of first globalization and institutionalization of the European style modern state.

3.3.1 The Institutionalization of the Modern National State, Initial Reforms

After the dead of Sultan Mahmud II, his 16 years of son Abdulmecit came to throne. With Sultan Abdulmecit, a prototype of new bureaucracy, Mustafa Reşit Pasha assumed the leadership of the reform process. Reşit Pasha group was able to grasp leadership with their success in nurturing European assistance during Ottoman-Egypt crisis. The Tanzimat rescript, *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif* of 1839 was created by Reşit Pasha's group, and was the first step for the institutionalization of a national state in the Ottoman Empire with new systems of administration and education⁵³. The document outlines the new administrative philosophy of the emerging national state

⁵³ Luke, Sir Harry. 1955. *The Old Turkey and the New*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 47-50.

that is in line with the norms of first globalization. The bureaucrats safeguarded their position in the system by referring to principles on the safety of lives and properties; the prevention of arbitrary punishment. While modernizing bureaucracy had been getting power day by day, their status in the system was still not guaranteed. An example of this insecure position of bureaucracy in the political system occurred when Reşit Pasha group's teacher and patron Pertev Pasha lost his life in 1837⁵⁴.

Reşit Pasha group was very well acknowledged the importance of European influence in both protecting the state (as it was the case in Ottoman-Egypt crisis) and the bureaucratic elites. The political rights that European model demanded were seen as a guarantee by new bureaucrats for their power⁵⁵. Tanzimat document also proposed the establishment of government councils consisting of the military political bureaucracy and the religious elite. In practice it is more like a technocratic government found in the absolutist states of the continental Europe than parliamentary system of Britain. European model also demanded minority rights. This was satisfied in the Tanzimat document by emphasizing equal rights to minorities. Under the influence of the success of absolutist monarchies in Europe, the Tanzimat ministers, Reşit, Ali and Fuad Pashas championed the sultan's absolute power as the most effective force for enlightened reform.

The European influence to the Ottoman reform process increased after the Crimean War. In return for their assistance against the Russians, the British and French asked for further reforms in the Ottoman state that had more emphasis on liberalization. Western Europeans outlined their demands clearly in the Paris Peace Treaty and the

⁵⁴ Findley, Carter V. 1994. *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokratik Reform, Babıali, 1789-1922*. İstanbul: İz, 116.

⁵⁵ Çavdar, Tevfik. 1995. *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*. Ankara: İmge, 20.

Ottomans responded cooperatively by issuing Reform Rescript, Islahat Fermanı of 1856.

3.3.2 Two Alternative Regime Model in Europe, Constitutional Monarchy (Hükümet-i Meşruta) and Absolute Monarchy (Hükümet-i Mutlaka)

When the Ottomans began to imitate European governments in the 18th century, there was neither a common constitutional pattern nor an ideal model to which states might seek to conform. However, some generalizations are still possible⁵⁶. On continental Europe, the monarchy slowly developed into more absolutist forms. States that had been only loosely centralized, such as Austria and Russia, became powerfully centralized states, while states such as Prussia and France further tightened the centralized control of the monarch. This centralized, absolutist power of the monarch was used to effect profound reforms in the military, structure of justice, government and economic life. Catherine the Great of Russia was an unashamed apologist for the absolute monarchy: *“There is no better form of government than autocracy for it combines the strength of law with the executive dispatch of a single authority”*⁵⁷. Sultan Selim III sent a special envoy, Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi, to make inquiries in Europe. He went to Vienna in 1791 and gathered information on Austrian government, society, political thought and the military system⁵⁸.

⁵⁶ Simpson, William and Martin Jones. 2000. *Europe, 1783-1914*. London and New York: Routledge, 11.

⁵⁷ Sims, Brendan. 1995. “The Eastern Empires from the Ancien Regime to the Challenge of the French Wars, 1780-1806.” In Pamela M. Pilbeam, eds., *Themes in Modern European History*. London: Routledge, 67.

⁵⁸ Lewis, Bernard. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 57.

Britain, on the other hand, had adopted important aspects of constitutional monarchy. Contrary to the absolutist movement in the East, a British House of Commons voted in 1780 that “*the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished*”⁵⁹. Constitutional monarchy, as sketched by thinkers from the Enlightenment onward, is a philosophy of governance, granting the governed a set of inalienable personal freedoms, in addition to ensuring the rule of law and the separation of powers.

*“It is a ... doctrine of private individual and institutional rights, a judiciary dedicated to the enforcement of those rights, a system of representation designed to mute the excesses of popular passions, a constitutional framework that impedes the hasty translation of public impulses into sweeping changes of fundamental law, and, above all, a private sphere diverse and capacious enough to mount a stern defense against public encroachment”*⁶⁰.

Rival groups emerged in the Ottoman ruling elite emulated different aspects of these two alternative types of government according to their interests. While the palace of the Sultan and Tanzimat Pashas tried to establish an absolutist monarchy, rival liberal bureaucrats and constituent Pashas mostly fought for a constitutional monarchy with a parliament that might limit the power of the palace of the Sultan and his fellow Pashas. The first Ottoman constitution emerged under such political circumstances.

3.3.3 The First Ottoman Constitution and the Ottoman Parliament

When Ali Pasha, the last first generation Tanzimat Pasha, died in 1871, there were two candidates for power in the Empire. First, there were Sultan Abdülaziz and

⁵⁹ Simpson, William and Martin Jones. 2000. *Europe, 1783-1914*. London and New York: Routledge, 11.

⁶⁰ Galston, William A. 1991. *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 53.

Mahmut Nedim Pasha who wanted to take power back to the Sultan and his close associates by abolishing Tanzimat reforms and emerging bureaucracy. The Tanzimat Pashas kept Mahmut Nedim Pasha out of important offices deliberately. He allied with the Sultan who is also critical of the rule of Tanzimat Pashas. Second, there was Mustafa Reşit Pasha, Midhat Pasha, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha who were critical of absolutist Tanzimat Pashas and wanted to further Tanzimat reforms in a more liberal fashion. During the rule of Tanzimat Pashas, Mustafa Reşit Pasha was kept out of the center and served as ambassador in Paris. There he learned about Louis Philippe's Liberal regime⁶¹ and he was personally acquainted with liberal circles in France. When he returned to Istanbul, he then sought to convince the government to send young people to Europe for education. Mustafa Reşit Pasha had a special interest on students because students at the military staff colleges, and particularly the medical cadets, had already become the center of secret political organizations against the authoritarian rule of Tanzimat Pashas. Many young coming from families having bureaucratic background went to France and there they learned about liberal ideas and other political transformations. These students became important public figures promoting constitutional liberal ideology; they tried to spread new concepts such as liberty, freedom, and nation in the Empire via new mediums such as newspapers, theater. Şinasi Efendi, Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi were the forerunners of this group. Later they assumed the name of New Ottomans' Society, Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti that is specifically aiming a change in the Ottoman State Structure towards a constitutional liberalism downgrading the Sultan⁶².

⁶¹ Aydın, Ersel. 2002. "Political Globalization versus Anarchy: An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case." Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 61.

⁶² For the origins and ideas of the New Ottomans see, Mardin, Şerif. 1962. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

What may have started from above when Sultan Selim III initiated his reform in the 1790s, by 1875 had assumed a very distinct new face of constitutionalism and soon became a weapon in the hands of various echelons of the bureaucracy against the top, that is the sultan⁶³. The fundamentals of the program of this society were summarized in a public letter written to Sultan Abdülaziz by Mustafa Fazıl Pasha. The letter, later called '*The Letter From Paris*,' stated that⁶⁴:

- At the basis of all development and progress lies freedom.
- Freedom of conscience facilitates public accountability and avoids misconducts of public servants.
- Reforms cannot be realized in the society that has no freedom.
- The lack of freedom provokes Europeans to intervene in Ottoman domestic affairs.
- Freedom does not impede on the autonomy of the Sultan or the faith or traditions of the society.
- Religion is related to spiritual side of the individual, religious rules do not determine laws of one country.
- A constitutional regime is the legitimate state structure for all countries.
- The essentials of justice are universal.
- Against tyranny and autocracy, the only solution is to establish a accountable government.

⁶³. Davison, Roderick H 1963. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Cited in Haim Gerber. 2000. "Ottoman Civil Society." In Kemal Karpat. eds. *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. Leiden: Brill, 134.

⁶⁴ Çavdar, Tevfik 1995. *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*. Ankara: İmge, 27-28.

The early 1870s brought about the right conditions for the implementation of such a program. State declared bankruptcy as a result of several bad harvests and skyrocketing military expenditures. The harsh suppression of rebellions in Balkans led to protests of European powers. So the Ottoman state was in the middle of a crisis. Under these conditions, the criticisms to the absolutist policies of the Mahmut Pasha united liberal bureaucrats (senior and mid level officials and Pashas), military Pashas and the Ulema on 30 May 1876 when they made the first coup in the Ottoman-Turkish history under the leadership of Midhat Pasha. Sultan Abdülaziz and Mahmut Pasha lost their power and Murad V was designed as the Sultan.

But the coalition of liberal bureaucrats, military Pashas and the Ulema did not last long. Military Pashas and the Ulema leaders had reservations about a constitution. There emerged a great debate on a possible Ottoman constitution. Sultan Murad V could not stand all these debates and have gone completely out of his mind⁶⁵. Later Sultan Abdülhamit who would open the way for the first constitution replaced him. A kind of constitutional monarchy was established in the Ottoman Empire by the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution, Kanun-i Esasi of 1876. However, liberalism has various ideas in it that can be detrimental to the political system that the liberal perpetuators of the coup wanted to establish. While political rights, on the one hand, lead to the establishment of the parliamentary monarchy, minority rights and liberal ideas of self-determination, on the other hand, lead to the escalation of nationalist uprisings in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

⁶⁵ Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 7.

3.3.4 The Second Globalization and The New Facet of Eastern Question

With the Crimean War Western Europe became more and more aware of the Eastern Question and its implications.⁶⁶ Industrial Revolution and emerging competition for raw materials and markets created an additional interest to the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the consolidation of the modern state system, the high edge of the Imperialist rivalry and the rise of nationalism are the main characteristics of the second globalization as stated in the second chapter. The Ottoman Empire launched state transformation, in order to be a modern European state, as a response to the challenges of the first globalization. Now, in the era of the second globalization, the state was facing the rising challenges of imperialism and nationalism.

The Ottoman Empire had a dual economy in the nineteenth century consisting of a large subsistence sector and a small colonial-style commercial sector linked to European markets and controlled by foreign interests. The empire's first railroads, for example, were built by foreign investors to bring the cash crops of Anatolia's coastal valleys--tobacco, grapes, and other fruit--to Smyrna, İzmir for processing and export. A European alliance was formed after the Ottoman-Egypt crisis that was committed to defending the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire but the rival economic interests of the Great Powers, each of which hoped to profit from Ottoman disintegration, soon caused the abandonment of this principle.

The nationalistic uprisings in Bosnia Herzegovina and Bulgaria opened the Pandora's box. The Ottoman Empire tried to respond the nationalistic cause there by establishing constitutional monarchy in 1876 but the constitution was anything but

⁶⁶ Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 3.

satisfactory to them. The Russians were to first to intervene under the pretext of events in Balkans. The Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) ended with a devastating defeat of the Ottoman armies. The San Stefano Treaty signed after the war was so favorable to Russia that Britain and Austria-Hungary went to verge of war to compel a revision⁶⁷. The harsh measures taken by Ottoman authorities against nationalistic movements in Balkans turned European public opinion against the Ottoman Empire. The traditional British policy of keeping the integrity of the empire began to change during this era. When liberal Gladstone, who is zealously supporting national self-determination, replaced the conservative Disraeli government, British policy totally turned against Ottoman unity. Gladstone ordered a naval demonstration on Ottoman Albania shores in order to support the independence of Serbia-Karadag on September 1880. Moreover, Austria-Hungary embarked on an active expansionist policy to compete with Russia and as compensation for the loss of influence in Germany. The Congress of Berlin curbed the Russian advances against the Ottoman Empire but the partition process of the Empire began on June 1878. The partition policies of Great European powers against Ottoman Empire tilted Ottoman governing elite towards German influence⁶⁸.

3.3.5 Young Turk Movement and Constitutional Liberalism

As uprisings emerged in Balkans and Eastern provinces, the liberal bureaucrats lost their power and the palace of the Sultan gained dominance in the political system. The forerunners of the constitutional liberals Midhat Pasha, Namık Kemal and some

⁶⁷ Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 8.

⁶⁸ Ortaylı, İlber. 1983. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfusu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 36.

military Pashas including Süleyman Pasha were sent to exile. The constitution liberal movement was put an end by the closure of the Ottoman parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan on February 1878. The end of the constitutional era was severely criticized by Britain and France. Russia also took a hostile stance by inciting the ethnic groups in Balkans. On the contrary, German Kaiser Wilhelm acted cooperatively. Germany did not have an interest in ethnic groups in the Balkans and she has an authoritarian type of government. So, the authoritarian policies of Sultan Abdülhamit were welcomed. Moreover, Germany wanted to utilize Islamist policies of the Sultan in order to gain an advantage against her rivals in the Imperialist rivalry.

One of the forerunners of the Yeni Osmanlılar, Ali Suavi tried to establish constitutional order again by making a coup and replacing Abdülhamit with Murat V but he could not be successful and killed by the police.⁶⁹ Sultan Abdulhamit concentrated power in his hands and followed an absolutist policy similar to that of Tanzimat Pashas. Sultan Abdülhamit's policies were in no way a deviation from modernization efforts. The demands of the European Ambassadors were satisfied, modern schools and academies were supported, telegraph and railway webs were established⁷⁰. There was a particular German impact during this era via delegations that help reform in the army, education and public administration. The German officers had a great prestige among Ottoman officers and bureaucrats as the victor of Franco-German War. Moreover, German influence brought admiration to authoritarianism and militarism among the officials. With the construction of the Baghdad railway, German influence reached its highest stage⁷¹.

⁶⁹ Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2003. *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*. İstanbul: İletişim, 31.

⁷⁰ Mardin, Şerif. 2001. "Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi" In Mehmet Ö. Alkan, eds. *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 51.

⁷¹ Ortaylı, İlber. 1983. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfusu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 52-64.

The constitutional liberals who faced severe Abdülhamit pressure fled abroad and established secret opposition organizations such as Ahmed Rıza Bey's in France and Mehmed Murad Bey's in Geneva that would be called as Young Turk movement. While Mehmed Murad Bey's group supported great power, especially British, intervention into the Ottoman Empire for a regime change⁷², Ahmed Rıza Bey's group rejected this idea⁷³. Meanwhile, academy students, educated in modern, European-style colleges and academies of the Empire in Istanbul, became increasingly restless under the apparent absolutism of the Abdulhamit rule they served.⁷⁴ These students were particularly influenced by the writings of the Yeni Osmanlılar who had been suppressed by Sultan Abdülhamit. They established the Ottoman Union, İttihad-ı Osmanli secret underground organization in 1889. Later organizations in Europe and İttihad-ı Osmanlı merged under the name of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti⁷⁵. The Committee tried an unsuccessful coup in August 1896 and continued its activities in Europe, concentrated in Paris and Geneva. In May 1897, the headquarters of the Committee was transferred from Istanbul to Geneva.⁷⁶ The Committee lost strength for a while when Mehmed Murad Bey came into terms with the Sultan Abdülhamit and stop his opposition activities. Ahmed Rıza's group remained alone in their heading the opposition against the Sultan. They gathered under the title of Society of Progress and Union, Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti.

⁷² Murad, Mehmed. 1895. *Yıldız Saray-ı Hümayunu ve Bab-ı Ali Yahud Şarkın Derd-i Ashısı*. Mısır el-Kahire, 94. Cited in Şükrü Hanioglu. 1998. "Jön Türkler ve Osmanlı'da İç-Dış Politika Bağlantısı." Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 467.

⁷³ Ahmed Rıza. "İcmal-i Ahval." *Meşveret*, September 8, 1896. Cited in Şükrü Hanioglu. 1998, "Jön Türkler ve Osmanlı'da İç-Dış Politika Bağlantısı." Faruk Sönmezoğlu. *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 467.

⁷⁴ Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2000. "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics 1908-1938." In Kemal Karpat, eds. *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. Leiden: Brill, 151.

⁷⁵ Petrosyan, Yurih Asatovic. 1974. *Sovyet Gözüyle Jöntürkler*. İstanbul: Bilgi, 174-176. Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1974. *Jöntürkler ve 1908 İhtilali*. İstanbul: Sander, 30-33.

⁷⁶ Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 40.

In 1900, some members of the royal family, Damat Mahmut Pasha (the Sultan's brother-in-law) and his two sons, the Princes Sabahattin and Lütfullah joined the opposition movement⁷⁷. Ismail Kemal Bey, who had occupied a number of high positions in the Empire, followed Damat Mahmut Pasha. During the first year of the new century, the Young Turk movement appeared to have taken on a fresh momentum and to have won back some of the ground lost in the failed coup of 1897⁷⁸. In 1902, people opposing the Sultan Abdülhamit gathered in an opposition organizations congress, in Paris on the 2nd of February upon a call of Prince Sabahaddin and Lütfullah. The common features of these organizations can be summarized as:

- They were a collection of various groups of the Empire including Turks, Arabs, Circassians, Kurds, Albanians, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews.
- They had 'Ottoman' national identity in mind and asserted a 'common fatherland.' Both their actions and discussions revolved around a central problem- How can this Ottoman state be saved?
- They were critical of Abdülhamit rule and wanted the transformation of the regime to a constitutional liberal one.
- They appreciated the British and French scientific and political philosophy.

Prince Sabahattin was elected as the president of the gathering. Although there emerged a resolution accepted by the majority in the congress, the only tangible result of the congress for the Young Turk movement was the division of the movement into two. First, there is Prince Sabahattin's the League for Private

⁷⁷ Kutay, Cemal. 1964. *Prince Sabahattin Bey, Sultan II. Abdülhamit, Ittihad ve Terakki*. İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 80-83.

⁷⁸ Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 62.

Initiative and Decentralization, Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti, with its newspaper 'Şürayı Ümmet'. They supported private entrepreneurship, decentralization in the form of an Ottoman Confederation and if necessary foreign intervention. They were critical of the Armenian policy of the Ottoman government. Second, Ahmed Rıza's the Committee of Progress and Union, Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti and 'Meşveret' newspaper, which championed state controlled economy, a centralized government on the French model with a new Sultan. Ahmed Rıza's group rejected foreign intervention, actually; they represented a kind of Turkish nationalism.⁷⁹ The Young Turk split began to crystallize from the Congress onwards as one between Turkish nationalism and Ottoman liberalism.

3.4 Nationalism⁸⁰, Nation-State Building

While Young Turk movement in exile was torn with differences of opinion, young military officers and junior bureaucrats, educated in modern colleges and academies of the Empire, became increasingly restless under the apparent impotence of the Abdülhamit rule they served, in the face of double nationalist and imperialist challenge of the second globalization era. Since they could not be active in the Capital, dissatisfied comrades in Balkans and Syria started to form secret organizations. The Fatherland, Vatan organization was established in Damascus, including Mustafa Kemal, later to become the founder of the Turkish nation-state, as

⁷⁹ Aydın, Suavi. 2001. "İki İttihat-Terakki: İki Ayrı Zihniyet, İki Ayrı Siyaset." In Mehmet Ö. Alkan, eds. *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 116-128. Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 65-93.

⁸⁰ Nationalism has been defined by Ernest Gellner as "primarily a principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1.

a member.⁸¹ Meanwhile, military officials and junior bureaucrats coming from units in Macedonia, Anatolia and Syria established Ottoman Society of Liberty, Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti in Salonika. Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti has members such as Talat Bey, Colonel Cemal Bey and Fethi Bey. The Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti expanded with great rapidity and inevitably encountered the Vatan group. Two societies merged under the name of Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti on 1906.

In the meantime, Young Turk organization in exile gathered the second congress and were able to united under the name of Ottoman Progress and Union Society, Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihad Cemiyeti in 1907. Ahmed Rıza's group, who remained as minority, persuaded to sacrifice their principles in the interest of unity and subscribed to a program advocating a change of government in the Ottoman Empire by violence if necessary.

The unification of all Young Turk organization within and outside the empire came in September 1907 when they united under the name of the Committee of Union and Progress, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti. The setup of this second organization was vastly different from the first. The differences can be summarized as:

- They were mostly military officials.
- Many of them assigned to Turkish nationalism as a defense to other nationalistic movements within the Empire.
- They were under influence of German political philosophy, especially militarist, pragmatist state understanding.
- They proposed authoritarian solutions to save the state.

⁸¹ Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. 1957. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 95.

So, the opposition was ready to overthrow the Sultan. The Sultan did not remained uninformed of the developments in Macedonia and sent spies to investigate the situation there. Invitations were sent to young officers and junior bureaucrats to visit İstanbul to accept promotions. Those members of the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti preferred to reject the invitation. The final stage of the revolution was approaching. The Third Army Corps came out and declared for the constitution. On July 24, 1908 Sultan Abdülhamid was forced to announce that the constitution of 1876 was now in effect once more. Sultan Abdülhamit was not displaced immediately because the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti was not such strong in the Capital yet. After 1908 Revolution Ottoman Parliament, Meclis-i Mebusan re-established and the Young Turk opposition in exile returned back to the capitol of the Empire. The divisions within Young Turk movement reemerged in the parliament in the form of clashing groups. The Prince Sabahaddin fraction was the most important group and supported by the representatives of minorities who had a double-agenda. While some minority representatives cooperated with the supporters of liberalism and decentralization in order to get foreign intervention, some other who were the participants on national independence movements tried to save time for their arrangements against the Ottoman state. Moreover, religious groups, whom the Sultan Abdülhamit had supported in order to facilitate order through Islamic faith, raised their voices outside the parliament against the Constitutional order and the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti. There were also loss of territory and prestige in Balkans and North Africa. Austria annexed Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared her independence, Crete announced her union with Greece, Italy attacked Ottoman Tripolitania in September 1911, and combined Balkan States' forces attacked in October 1912. Such developments pushed Ottoman governments more under the influence of Germany.

İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti tried to response both these criticisms inside and the challenges outside, by immediately turning into a political party on 12 April 1909. Then on 23 April, party ordered the Army of Deliverance, Hareket Ordusu to occupy the capital and establish a Unionist government. First, Sultan Abdülhamit was deposed and replaced by Sultan Mehmet Reşat. Second, it put Unionist nominees into key positions in the government and bureaucracy. Third, the new 'Law of Associations' and 'Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition' published. Fourth, cooperation with Germany was increased. By the end of 1909, Unionists established an authoritarian militaristic one-party rule.

"The spread of nationalism among the subject peoples of the empire, and the final contamination, by the nationalist virus, of even the Turkish masters of it, ended forever the 'Ottomanist' dream of the free, equal, and peaceful association of peoples in a common loyalty to the dynastic sovereign of a multi-national, multi-denominational empire⁸²."

Germany assisted the Unionist government in every realm from economics to military. It went to the levels that even the ideology of the Unionist government was governed by Germans. Germany appointed an Orientalist Professor, Ernst Jaecks as the theorician of the government's formal ideology, Turkish nationalism, Pantürkism⁸³.

Unionists followed repressive and centralist policies to save the state that are continuously criticized by both Ottoman Liberals, gathered under a new party, the Liberal Union, Hürriyet ve İtilaf on 1911 and the representatives of the Christian subjects of the Empire. The losses in the Balkan Wars and the flow of Turkish Muslim refugees into the Empire created demand for more repressive policies. Three military officers responded to this rising nationalist ideas by making a coup in 1913.

⁸² Lewis, Bernard. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 218.

⁸³ Ortaylı, İlber. 1983. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfusu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 136.

1913⁸⁴. From then until 1918 the state was governed by a virtual military dictatorship, dominated by three men- Enver, Talat, and Cemal Paşas who were members of the second Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti in Salonica. Under these three men the mechanism of state power was wound tighter and tighter. The opposition groups and parties were broken up, their leaders exiled or silenced. The army was established as the dominant element in the political scene in close alliance with the İttihat ve Terakki.⁸⁵ The specialist on violence became the most powerful group in the Ottoman society; that can be conceptualized as a “garrison state,”⁸⁶ “...almost uninterrupted hostilities (with Italy, 1911-1912; in the Balkans, 1912-1913; and in the First World War) brought the Ottoman Empire closer being a garrison state than it had perhaps been at any time since its infancy⁸⁷.” The German influence also reached to its zenith. German Ambassador Wangenheim, as a typical representative of German militarism, involved in every policy of the Ottoman government⁸⁸. In fact, parallel to the situation in the Ottoman Empire, the role of military in German political system was increasing. Their rule ended only with the defeat of Ottoman Empire in the First World War in 1918.

The Mondros Truce of September 1918 symbolized the defeat in the First World War and put an end to the İttihad ve Terakki rule. It was also the final destination of the Eastern Question. The partition of the remaining Ottoman territories in Anatolia and Middle East began. The invasion of the Turkish core of the Empire by foreign forces

⁸⁴ For different versions of the events during the coup please look at: Danişmend, İsmail Hami. 1945. *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, Volume 4*. İstanbul: Türkiye.

⁸⁵ Rustow, Dankwart A.. 1959. “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,” *World Politics*, 11(4): 517.

⁸⁶ Lasswell, Harold D. 1941. “The Garrison State” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 46(4): 455-468.

⁸⁷ Rustow, Dankwart A. 1959. “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,” *World Politics*, 11(4): 518.

⁸⁸ Weber, Frank G. 1970. *Eagles on Crescent*. London: Cornell University Press, 18-21. Cited in İlber Ortaylı .1983. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfusu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 137.

created a popular front within the Empire that first triggered local Turkish nationalist awakening. Turkish nationalism had been a part of Young Turk movement but Ottomanism prevented its development. Ittihat ve Terakki aspired to follow Turkish nationalistic policies but could not be successful. Turkish nationalism became fully constituted in the Turkish War of Independence.

With the beginning of Allied occupations and Greek and Armenian cooperation with them, Turkish nationalist independence groups first emerged locally all around the Turkey⁸⁹. These organizations united under the title of Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti through congresses attended by delegates from all over the country. The 1919 elections and the gathering of the Ottoman Meclis-i Mebusan also amalgamated different groups aspiring the end of partition. In January 1920 the Meclis-i Mebusan approved a list of principles, known as the National Pact, which united different groups claiming various solution to the current situation. However, the operationalization of the National Pact was not an easy process. First of all, sultan, who was living under occupation in İstanbul, did not approve a struggle by emerging nationalistic forces. Government in İstanbul denounced the Mustafa Kemal group as the leader of the nationalist act. Second, differences of opinion between groups who wanted to save the country continued in the congresses and parliamentary meetings. Young Turk fragmentation between liberal and authoritarian continued. While those assigned to a more authoritarian, militaristic strategy gathered under Müdafaa-i Hukuk group, opposition created minor groups. Third, the erosion of central government in İstanbul created unleashed local powers that did not want to come under the rule of a new centralized government. Lastly the Allied forces alarmed by the nationalist

⁸⁹ Öz, Esat. 1991. *Türkiye 'de Tek Parti Yönetimi ve Siyasal Katılım 1923-1945*. Ankara: Gündoğan, 72.

developments and suppressed the Meclis-i Mebusan and nationalist sympathizers in İstanbul.

With the dissolution of the Meclis-i Mebusan by Sultan on 11 April 1920 and the deportation of some nationalist sympathizers to Malta, the headquarters of the nationalist resistance moved to a city inside the Anatolia, Ankara. On 23 April a body of delegates from various nationalistic independence organizations in Turkey met in Ankara under the name of the Grand National Assembly. The divided nationalistic groups who were already militarily engaged against the Greeks, the Armenians and the French united. The Grand National Assembly not only fought against the occupation forces but also against the so-called 'Army of the Caliphate' of the İstanbul government. But the signing of the treaty of Sevres created a massive revulsion of nationalistic feeling in Turkey against the regime that accepted it. The Grand National Assembly was able to form a nationalist front with a regular army under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

3.4.1 The Establishment of the Republican Regime, the Single-Party Rule and State-Dominant Monoparty Authoritarianism

As the Independence War was well advanced military officials and the Turkish Army began to emerge as the leader of the Turkish nationalism and the nation-state building under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Although there emerged differences on the nature of the regime within the Grand National Assembly Mustafa Kemal's Müdafaa-i Hukuk group assumed the leadership in the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Mustafa Kemal's ideas turned into a political party when the

Müdafaa-i Hukuk group gathered under the Republican People's Party (hereafter CHP). The military bureaucratic elite who gathered around the CHP undertook revolutionary changes such as the proclamation of the Republic, abolition of the Sultanate and retention of a separate Caliphate.

Naturally, there aroused resistance and opposition to the Mustafa Kemal's leadership and CHP's vision of government. The opposition emerged fully constituted during the debates on the 1924 Constitution. The debates were especially on the articles regarding the President of the Republic. The opposition did not want to give a lot of power to the President, Mustafa Kemal. The opposition gathered under the Progressive Republican Party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası on October 17, 1924. This first phase of the multi-party period short lived. As the İttihat and Terakki Party suppressed the opposition by authoritarian measures, CHP utilized authoritarian methods to silence opposition. The Law for the Maintenance of Order, Takrir-i Sükun and the war-time type tribunals, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, which were introduced by the government after the outbreak of a Kurdish Religious rebellion, Şeh Said Ayaklanması in South East Turkey against the new regime, were used by the İsmet İnönü government to forbid and abolish any opposition organizations in the country. The closure of the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası was started a period that opposition organizations were constantly eliminated. Emerging opposition parties the Free Republican Party, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, the Popular Republican Party, Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası and the minute Workers' and Peasants' Party, Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi were dissolved by the government through strong opposition or direct order.

CHP took severe measures to limit the opposition, having in mind the Ottoman reform experience and the İttihat and Terakki period. Mustafa Kemal acted as the

charismatic leader and CHP acted as the strong political institution in the formation of the modern Turkish nation state. After the death of Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü and CHP gave a more authoritarian character to the regime. As Bernard Lewis argues, *“in the hands of lesser men than himself, his authoritarian and paternalist mode of government degenerated into something nearer to dictatorship as the word is commonly understood”*⁹⁰. Feroz Ahmad argued that he established *“a virtual police state”*⁹¹ in Turkey and was *“almost guilty of establishing the cult of personality”*⁹². Henri Barkey argues that during the İnönü era *“politics was relegated to the confines of the single party, which gave bureaucratic-military elite-dominated state a sacred status”*⁹³. Metin Heper have a milder interpretation of the İsmet İnönü and suggests that Atatürk and İnönü complemented each other.

*“At the end of the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire was in shambles and the country faced the prospect of further and serious dismemberment, Atatürk took the initiative and started the Turkish War of Independence. Also, following Turkey’s full independence, Atatürk played a critical part in replacing the essentially Islamic Ottoman Empire with the secular Republic of Turkey and in launching the basic reforms aimed at westernization. In the accomplishment of above tasks, Atatürk received great help from İnönü, although it must be said that if it had not been for Atatürk, these programs would probably not have been initiated either by İnönü or others. On the other hand, if it had not been for İnönü, it is questionable whether what was accomplishment by Atatürk would have been preserved, both during the single-party years and multi-party years”*⁹⁴...

It is accepted in the literature that the Turkish Republic is an inheritance, in the form a nation-state, of the Ottoman reform process that was undertaken by modernizing

⁹⁰ Lewis, Bernard. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press, 304-305.

⁹¹ Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London, New York: Routledge, 104.

⁹² Ahmad, Feroz. 1977. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-75*. London: Hurst, 45.

⁹³ Barkey, Henri J. 2000. “The Struggles of a “Strong” State,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 93.

⁹⁴ Heper, Metin. 1998. *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman*. Leiden: Brill, 9-10.

military-bureaucratic elite during the last centuries of the empire⁹⁵. The source of this particular social group was the educational reform of the 17th century and modern military schools and academies⁹⁶. The graduates of such schools had a positivist approach to social affairs; this approach was emphasized as a means to top-down restructure society for the preservation of the state.⁹⁷ In fact, they conceive the state an abstract entity, divorced from society, as well as individual. Military-bureaucratic elite has molded the countries national political culture and the republic inherited the authoritarian, top-down approach to politics. The adoption of a series of rapid reforms by the military-bureaucratic elite was nothing less than a “*Revolution from Above*”⁹⁸. The Turkish military is a kind of institutionalized expression of this heritage of Ottoman-Turkish top-down modernization⁹⁹. Various scholars have interpreted this authoritarian structure with concepts such as strong state, police state, military state.

Metin Heper is the premier of those who argue for the strong state tradition as the underlying characteristics of the continuing Ottoman-Turkish political experience. The defining feature of this strong state is the existence of some ‘state interests’ divorced from the society and individual and protection of these interests by an

⁹⁵ Lerner, Daniel and Richard D. Robinson. 1960. “Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force” *World Politics*, 13(1): 19-44; İnalcık, Halil. 1995. *From Empire to Republic: Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History*. Istanbul: ISIS, 144-145; Hale, William. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London and New York: Routledge; Jung, Dietrich. 1999. “Turkey at the Crossroads.” Two papers presented at the international workshop on *Middle East Globalization and Development* in Alborg, 5-6 November 1998, and at the author’s symposium on *Persian Gulf Security* in Copenhagen 10-11 March 1999. Retrieved from <http://www.copri.dk/publications/WP/WP%201999/16-1999.doc> on 05/06/2003.

⁹⁶ Shaw, Stanford J. 1976. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I, Empire of the Gazis. The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 240-277.

⁹⁷ Karaosmanoğlu Ali L. 1993 “Officers: Westernization and Democracy.” In Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer *Turkey and the West*. London, NY: I.B. Tauris, 24.

⁹⁸ Trimberger, Ellen Kay. 1977. *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Egypt, Peru, Turkey, and Japan*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Cited in Henri J. Barkey. 2000. “The Struggles of a “Strong” State,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1): 89.

⁹⁹ Dankwart Rustow. 1964. “The Military: Turkey.” In Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow eds. *Political Modernization in Turkey and Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 388.

autonomous social group called state elite¹⁰⁰. The defining feature of the state is formulated in political terms with the autonomy of the state elite from other agents in the populace. Heper argues that state tradition in Turkey is different from the continental European experience in this regard:

*"[T]he difference between Turkey and many new countries lies in the presence of a strong state in the former, and the state's weakness... in the latter... As a means of political integration, the Turkish state has filled the void created by increased praetorianism... For many Turks, this particular role has reinforced the legitimacy of the state... But Turkey has also differed radically from the continental European countries...: in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, the state did not develop alongside the politically influential social groups, but evolved by making these social groups politically impotent. Even at the pinnacle of their powers, the French and Prussian absolutist kings had to grapple with the demands and pressures of their parlements and Stände respectively. The Ottoman Sultans, on the other hand, faced no aristocracy that could impinge upon the affairs of the centre."*¹⁰¹

Jeremy Salt conceptualizes the structure of the Turkish state as a military state where the autonomy of the state elite is demonstrated by the 'supra' status of the military.¹⁰²

Amos Perlmutter identifies the Turkish state as a modern praetorian state in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system¹⁰³.

Ahmet Insel and İlhan Üzgel join Perlmutter by arguing that the state structure in Turkey is a one of Praetorian state¹⁰⁴.

"The political processes of this state favor the development of the military as the core group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative,

¹⁰⁰ Heper, Metin 1988. "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience." In Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin eds. *State, Democracy and the Military in the 1980s*. Berlin, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1-2.

¹⁰¹ Heper, Metin. 1992. "The 'Strong State' and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective." In S. N. Eisenstadt, ed. *Democracy and Modernity*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 144-145.

¹⁰² Salt, Jeremy. 1999. "Turkey's Military "Democracy," *Current History* 98: 72-78.

¹⁰³ Perlmutter, Amos. 1978. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army." In Norman W. Provizer, eds. *Analyzing the Third World*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 300-322.

¹⁰⁴ Insel, Ahmet. 2002. "TSK'nın Konumunu Değerlendirmek" *Birikim* (160/161), 18-27; Üzgel, İlhan. 2003. "The Paradox of Modernization and Securitisation: The Turkish Military vs. The European Union." Retrieved from http://selene.uab.es/_cs_iuee/catala/obs/dossier_turquia/tk_analisis/eutr_09_2003uzgel.pdf on 02/03/2004.

and managerial leadership) is chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army frequently intervenes in the government. In a praetorian state, therefore, the military plays a dominant role in political structures and institutions¹⁰⁵.”

It is argued in this chapter that despite their differences in terminology, all interpretations point out a bureaucratic-authoritarian state that is ruled by a guardian regime at the core of which lies the Armed Forces¹⁰⁶. In fact, in the Turkish case, before facing the pressures of third globalization for state transformation, Turkey has already built up an authoritarian-bureaucratic regime that had long been facing domestic and international pressures for change. The purpose of the next chapter is to analyze the transformation of the Turkish state in the face of third globalization.

¹⁰⁵ Perlmutter, Amos. 1978. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army." In Norman W. Provizer, eds. *Analyzing the Third World*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 301.

¹⁰⁶ For similar arguments: Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model" *Comparative Politics*, 2(3): 337-363;

CHAPTER 4

FROM NATIONAL SECURITY STATE TO A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATE

The establishment of the Turkish Republic was a sufficient reply to the challenge of the second wave of globalization that necessitated the foundation of modern nation state. However, the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's insistence on democracy as a pretext to declare war against Germany in 1917 gave a clue to predict what challenges are going to come next. In the years immediately after the First World War, a promising era of democracy seemed to be starting¹⁰⁷. The autocratic regimes in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman Empire were all overthrown and replaced by republics. The seven newly created states in Europe all adopted the republican form of government. Democracy seemed triumphant in the post war world. Yet within two decades, many democratic countries in Europe were taken over by some kind of dictatorship¹⁰⁸. Russia became a Communist state; Italy and Germany became Fascist states. Only Britain and France in Europe remained staunchly democratic. Actually, international order created after the First World War

¹⁰⁷ Todd, Alan. 2001. *Democracies and Dictatorships: Europe and the World 1919-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 13.

¹⁰⁸ Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. ed. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

brought nationalist and militarist cadres to the fore in Europe¹⁰⁹. The triumph of democracy had to wait until the end of Second World War.

After the First World War, there was little political stability in Europe. In Eastern Europe, the new states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland were always threatened by the rapid increase in the national strength of Communist Russia. In Central Europe, the Germans always desired a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. They would give full support to a government that advocated a strong hawkish foreign policy. In Southern Europe, the Italians also had antipathy towards the Versailles Settlement because the Allied failed to realize the territorial ambitions of Italy as were promised in the Treaty of London of 1915. There were only two states in Europe that hoped to preserve the Versailles Settlement. They were Britain and France. As both Britain and France were seriously weakened by the war, it is uncertain that they would be ready to make a costly war against any aggressors who were determined to revise the Versailles Settlement. Moreover, the First World War left devastating economic problems on all the European countries. The long-term result of these economic problems was that in order to solve their economic problems, most of the European nations tried to become economically self-sufficient and to keep out the products of other countries by building high tariff walls. Economic nationalism was a bad sign for the peace of Europe. In sum, the harshness of the peace treaties created nationalist upheavals and aggressive policies in Germany, Italy and Japan. The Allied remained too passive and the League of Nations failed to secure peace¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁹ Kitchen, Martin. 1993. *Europe Between the Wars: A Political History*. London and New York: Longman.

¹¹⁰ Carr, Edward Hallett. 1983. *International Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919-1939*. London: Macmillan.

The Second World War started with the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1st September 1939. Germany and Italy quickly occupied most of continental Europe. Britain and Soviet Union stood against the axis powers of Germany, Italy and Japan. Military efforts were accompanied by a series of important international meetings on the political objectives of the war. The first of these took place in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. They issued a joint declaration on the purposes of the war that is called the Atlantic Charter¹¹¹. Just as Wilson's Fourteen Points delineated politics of the First World War, so the Atlantic Charter provided the criteria for the Second. President Roosevelt, who had been a member of the Wilson administration, argued for the possibility of a world governed by democratic processes, with an international organization serving as an arbiter of disputes and protector of the peace.

With the eventual American entry into the war, Britain gained vital reinforcements in men and supplies. The German and Japanese supply lines were at full stretch, and eventually a string of victories forced the enemy to retreat. Victory at El Alamein led eventually to the Germans being driven from North Africa, and the invasion of Italy. Soviets, on the other hand, launched a counter-offensive at Stalingrad where the most important battle in the eastern front took place. Leaders of the United States, Soviet Union and Britain, so called Big Three, met in Tahrán, discussed on the final assault on the Axis. The planned invasion of France by the allies took place in June 1944. Big Three gathered again in the Yalta Conference and this time discussed on the post-war structure.

The surrender of German forces symbolized the victory in Europe. The Charter of the United Nations, international organization, designed by the Big Three for post-

¹¹¹ For the full text please browse:
http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/constitutions/un/e_atlantic_charter.htm

war order, signed in San Francisco. Within three months Second World War was totally over with the surrender of Japan. During the Second World War, under the leadership of İsmet İnönü, Turkey tried to stay at an equal distance to Germany, Soviet Union and Britain. Turkey signed peace, cooperation and non-aggression treaties with both the allied and axis powers to have recognition of its neutrality from both sides; Deringil conceptualized this policy as “active neutrality”¹¹².

The United Nations officially born in October 1945 and the Big Three started to establish a new world order. They launched policies that would furnish friendly regimes in the respective states and regions under their control. The victory of Second World War was in large part understood as a victory over authoritarian single-party regimes. While Britain and the U.S. supported democratization in Western Europe and Japan, Soviet Union backed establishment of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. American and British occupation policies in especially West Germany and Japan made a major contribution to the global spread of democracy. In fact, Western European experience in democratic regime building would provide the example and tools to initiate similar processes in other countries. Towards the end of the Second World War, Turkey began to feel double pressures of democratic West and the Socialist East.

4.1 Democracy in the West and the Multi Party Period in Turkey

After the World War II, Western countries appeared to be increasingly concerned with the promotion of democracy and Ankara, ruled by a single-party authoritarian

¹¹² Deringil, Selim 1988. *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An Active Neutrality*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

system since the initiation of the Republic, began to consider transformation of the regime toward a multiparty system¹¹³. The reasons for the Turkish transition to multiparty system are one of the hotly debated issues of the Turkish politics. While some accounts stress on the domestic changes and İsmet İnönü's firm personal commitment to democratization¹¹⁴, others emphasize the external pressures such as the growing Soviet threat and the democratic wave in the Western countries¹¹⁵. İsmet İnönü's answer to Rustow on foreign policy considerations influencing his decision to announce democracy shows that he hoped to nurture the support of the victorious Western democracies through democratization against Soviets. İnönü said "*all that slander that has been spread about me, as if I had been swimming with the stream.*" "*And suppose I had been swimming with the stream; that, too, is a virtue*"¹¹⁶. However, these words also symbolize that there is an appreciation in the Turkish politicians side of a wave of democracy.

Another indication of the Turkish officials comprehension of democracy as an essential requirement of joining the West was Telegrams of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifying that "*a Turkey with a single-party regime and a dictatorship-like structure, which had narrowed individual rights and freedoms even further during the war years, had to be transformed into a liberal political*

¹¹³ Rustow, Dankwart. 1979. "Turkey's Travails" *Foreign Affairs* 58: 87.

¹¹⁴ Heper, Metin. 1998. *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman*. Leiden: Brill; Özbudun, Ergun. eds. 1988. *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*. Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association; Karpas, Kemal. 1959. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Karpas, Kemal. 1967. *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi: Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller*. İstanbul: İstanbul;

¹¹⁵ Ekinci, Necdet. 1997. *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Sonra Türkiye'de Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Dış Etkiler*. İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm; Çavdar, Tevfik. 1995. *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi, 1839-1950*. Ankara: İmge; Ünaş, Oğuz. 1994. *Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Doğuşu: Tek Parti Yönetiminden Çok Partili Rejime Geçiş Süreci*. İstanbul: Milliyet; Dodd, Clement. 1990. *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*. (2nd Edition) London: Eothen Press; Vali, Ferenc. 1971. *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Rustow, Dankwart. 1973.

"Modernization of Turkey." In Kemal Karpas (eds.) *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*. Leiden: Brill, 93-120; Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.

¹¹⁶ Rustow, Dankwart. 1979. "Turkey's Travails" *Foreign Affairs* 58: 87.

*regime*¹¹⁷.” In fact, the dividends of the implementation of the multi party politics quickly realized. The U.S. supported Turkish cause in the straits by organizing a visit of the U.S. battle ship Mississippi to Istanbul. Moreover, the Truman government through foreign aid supported the implementation of the multi party politics in Turkey. Truman declared that the U.S. aid was given to Turkey in order to help the establishment and development of democracy in Turkey¹¹⁸.

The introduction of multi-party politics symbolize an end to the Single-Party years when the state was governed by a closed military-bureaucratic elite whose roots goes back to the Union and Progress party. Democrat Party, established in 1946, gathered all oppositional movements including those of the heritage of the Ottoman elites- liberals, local notables- and new social groups created and motivated by the modern economic forces such as, entrepreneurial. Professional and social background research shows that:

“[I]n the political alignments of the late 1940s and 1950s, the CHP, which combined governmental officials, some large landowners, and a substantial portion of the more backward peasantry, was opposed by the Democrat Party backed by the commercial middle class, the urban poor, and the more modern sections of the rural population”¹¹⁹.

The inclusion of social groups to the political arena was a very significant break in the Ottoman-Turkish political history. A major characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish politics since the inception of modern state building had been that political arena was limited to the members of the elite and intra-elite conflict. While it was the Sultan, the bureaucracy and pashas during the Ottoman period, CHP and the military-

¹¹⁷ Kunalalp, Zeki. 1982. *İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Dış Siyaseti: Dışişleri Bakanlığının 11 Telgrafi*. İstanbul: İstanbul, 89. Cited in Aydınli, Ersel. 2002. “Political Globalization versus Anarchy: An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 105.

¹¹⁸ McGhee, George. 1990. *The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East*. London: Macmillan, 23-24.

¹¹⁹ Özbudun, Ergun. 1976. *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 47.

bureaucratic elites monopolized the authority during the first decades of the republic. It was led by the two charismatic leaders Atatürk and İnönü, and supported enthusiastically by the secularized, progressivist urban intelligentsia made up of university and literary circles, teachers, lawyers, petty officials and so on. Social groups could hardly have been active in politics, national aristocracy simply did not exist, and the urban commercial class and the landed notables had neither the political organization nor the power to challenge the CHP and military-bureaucratic elite. In this context, the character of Single-Party rule is best defined as “*authoritarian politics in an incorporated society*”¹²⁰.

4.2 The Third Globalization and Democracy in Turkey

With the third globalization, nation states began to acquire a particular political form, liberal democratic state. The multi party system and the incorporation of society into the political system widely symbolized Turkish states’ shift to a democratic state. In the period 1946-1959, elite competition spilled over into society, and mobilized new social groups. “*The theater of conflict among the elite became the society itself, rather than the palace, the bureaus of the civil servants, or the back rooms of the single party*”¹²¹.” Democrat Party defended liberal economic policies against the statist policies of the CHP. The basis of the support to these policies was that they were seen as a possible way to weaken state elite. The program and ideology of the Democrat Party included various ideas and issues but “...*the foremost or the most*

¹²⁰ Sunay, İlkay and Sabri Sayari. 1986. “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects.” In O,Donnell et al. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 171.

¹²¹ Sunay, İlkay and Sabri Sayari. 1986. “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects.” In O,Donnell et al. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 168.

raised issue was the cultural reaction or resentment to authoritarian modernization efforts or revolutions¹²².” However, even these ideas and policies of populist appeal and the existence of a wide clientelist network that was fed by distributive policies were able to overcome the low institutional penetration of society that it had inherited from the past. “*The network of patron-client relations, the appeal to religious sentiments, and populism were, in fact, attempts by the Democrat Party to overcome its institutional shortcomings by rewarding regional cliques, kinship ties, religious demands, and personal influence networks*¹²³.”

4.2.1 Democracy and Great Divide in Turkey: State Elites vs. Political Elites

Throughout the 1950s, the CHP remained in opposition. Support for the party came largely from the military-bureaucracy establishment, the traditional local notables of eastern Turkey and the intelligentsia. The opposition of the CHP was limited to the tactics of provoking the administrative and juridical bureaucracy and the intelligentsia to determination against the Democrat Party. In this context, there emerged the potential for emergence of a state vs. political elite divide. Until the launching of multi-party politics, there had been no separation within the state structure in terms of power sharing between the state bureaucracy and the single party elite; the state and the party were virtually the same entity¹²⁴. Democrat Party policies to control government influence by providing a check on the CHP and its

¹²² Mert, Nuray. 2001. “Türkiye’de Merkez Sağ Siyaset: Merkez Sağ Politikaların Oluşumu.” In Stefanos Yerasimos et al. *Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*. İstanbul: İletişim, 46.

¹²³ Sunay, İlkey and Sabri Sayari. 1986. “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects.” In O’Donnell et al. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 173. (165-186)

¹²⁴ Aydınli, Ersel. 2002. “Political Globalization versus Anarchy: An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 109.

constituent military-bureaucracy and intelligentsia marked the beginning of an era in which power diffusion was to be forced by competition between the state elite (military-bureaucracy) and the political elite.

4.3 Military Coup, 1960 and the Emergence of National Security State

The Democrat Party's attempts to limit the power of CHP and military-bureaucratic elite, naturally, created objections. Secret organizations re-emerged within the army after 40 years when the roots of the Union and Progress Party first emerged as secret political organizations. *"One author, whose father was an influential member in some of these organizations, counted at least seven different ones, and two allied groupings among them¹²⁵."* These organizations held various views and ideologies but the common denominator was that the Turkish state was not ready for this type of democratic experience which would shift domestic power balances and, therefore, allow a threatening potential to form. Eventually, on May 27, 1960, a group of officers who had been meeting in secret organizations conducted the first coup in the history of the Turkish Republic.

The perpetrators of the 1960 coup faced similar problems with those of the 1908 coup, secret organizational structure does not provide a solid basis to govern country lacking hierarchical ranks and discipline. One of the perpetrators, Orhan Erkanlı, later confessed that *"we had done the 27 May Coup but we did not know what to do in the 28th May¹²⁶."* Although, the single-party bureaucracy and intelligentsia supported the 1960 Coup, military could not avoid divisions. Two alternative

¹²⁵ Aydın, Ersel. 2002. "Political Globalization versus Anarchy: An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case." Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 119.

¹²⁶ Toker, Metin. 1966. *İsmet Paşayla 10 Yıl*. Ankara: Akis, 17. Cited in Hale, William. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London and New York: Routledge, 113.

organizations, National Unity Committee, Milli Birlik Komitesi and Armed Forces Union, Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği emerged within the Turkish Armed Forces. Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği, which was an “umbrella organization” gathering to control the potentially uncontrollable elements and formations within the army, acquired the first hand¹²⁷. Under the leadership of the Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği, a coalition of generals, CHP and intelligentsia emerged. The three leaders of the Democrat Party, including the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were hanged. The 1961 constitution was adopted and elections were held. The results of the first general elections were generally disappointing for the coalition elite, as majority of votes went to Justice Party, which was following the former Democrat Party’s vision of government. Radical voices within the army, which had been suppressed by the coalition generals, began to reemerge in Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği. Radical groups gathered around Talat Aydemir tried two failed coups. Several of the failed coup leaders were sentenced to death and long jail terms. Talat Aydemir was hanged in July of 1964¹²⁸.

The execution of the leaders of the emerging political elite and the leader of radicals in the military-bureaucracy set the new power configuration in Turkey composed of state vs. political elites. Turkey’s second attempt at democratic rule began with this new balance of power and institutionalization imposed from above, this time with the institutions that were established during the military interregnum between 1960 – 61. In the face of the popular support mobilized by the leadership of the Democrat Party, military-bureaucracy and the authors of the constitution were on the defensive against centralization of power and concentration of function in the hands of political elites. As a consequence, power was dispersed, institutions carefully differentiated,

¹²⁷ Ahmad, Feroz. 1992. *Demokrasi sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980*. İstanbul: Hil, 179.

¹²⁸ Aydınli, Ersel. 2002. “Political Globalization versus Anarchy: An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach Through the Turkish Case.” Unpublished PhD Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, Montreal, 141.

and bureaucratic checks and controls were established against the power of the parties. However, despite the checks and controls placed on the power of the parties after 1961, the infiltration of the political system, bureaucracy, intelligentsia and society at large by parties steadily increased. Moreover, the policies of the Western powers in the Third World through and the Cyprus and Palestine policy of the U.S. especially created uprisings and polarization in Turkey. The anti Americanism led to radicalism of the left and right wing parties. While left wing, traditionally represented by the CHP, shifted to Socialist Left; the right wing, represented by Democrat and Justice party tradition, weakened and political Islam gained power.

The following fragmentation and the intensive ideological polarization brought with it two military interventions in 1971 and 1980. In these interventions not only the power of political parties curbed but the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia were also excluded out of the core of the regime. During these years, a national security state emerged at the core of which lies the guardian Turkish Armed Forces.

4.4 The Cold War and The National Security State

The 1960 Coup and following institutionalization of an authoritarian national security state attracted little attention in the world politics. The emerging Cold War rivalry dominated the agenda of the international politics and the rise of interest to the internal regimes of the states halted with in the face of geopolitical interests. The promotion of democratic regimes remained as an important part of the Western

policy but when it collides with the geopolitical interests, it was underestimated¹²⁹. The Soviet threat and geopolitical considerations guaranteed a seat to authoritarian bureaucratic Turkey in the democratic Western Alliance through membership in institutions such as OECD in 1948, Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952.¹³⁰ A discourse of national security, emerged during the Cold War period, helped the consolidation of the existing authoritarian bureaucratic state in Turkey in the form of a national security state¹³¹ at the core of which lies the Turkish Armed Forces (hereafter TAF). Such a state structure was strongly supported by the U.S. because while anti American groups were kept under control, Turkey did not move to any kind of regime that would alienate Turkey from its Western orbit¹³². The core of the Western alliance, the U.S. and the core of the Turkish politics, TAF agreed on the political equilibrium in Turkey that is necessarily not communist and anti-Western. The institutionalization of this political equilibrium was done by the TAF through military interventions and by execution of those who deviated from this equilibrium. The list of such political executions includes the leaders of the Democrat Party, the leaders of the failed coups and the leaders of the socialist left groups in Turkey. In fact, all crises in the Turkish-American relations happened when multi party politics were active and relations were extraordinarily smooth during the military rule periods¹³³. The U.S. supported military interventions to secure stability in the short term. Military rulers were immediately pressurized by the U.S. to return to civilian rule in the middle term because prolongation of the military

¹²⁹ Gözen, Ramazan. 2001. "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri ve Türk Demokrasisi: 'Realist' Bağlam." In Dağı, İhsan Duran et.al. *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik*. Ankara: Liberte, 77.

¹³⁰ Barchard, David. 1985. *Turkey and the West*. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1;

¹³¹ İba, Şaban. 1998. *Milli Güvenlik Devleti*. İstanbul: Çivi yazıları.

¹³² Pipes, Daniel and Adam Garfinkle. ed. 1991. *Friendly Tyrants: an American Dilemma*. London: Macmillan.

¹³³ Henze, Paul B. 1993. *Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2.

rule may take Turkey out of the Western orbit that may mean instability in the long term.

4.5 The Political Role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)

TAF has a presence in Turkish politics since the establishment of the republic that can be traced back to its roots in the Ottoman-Turkic History. According to Feroz Ahmad:

“The emphasis on the army’s role in Turkish history and politics, from Ottoman times to the present, suggests a continuity which seems plausible. It assumes that the army was an institution that never changed its world view, that it stood above society and acted independently of it”¹³⁴.

There are several typologies and models on Civil-Military relations in the literature. William Hale presents, on the basis of the work of Eric Nordlinger, Morris Janowitz, Christopher Clapham and George Philip, three models of military regimes, which are relevant to the Turkish case¹³⁵:

1. The moderator or veto regimes where the state still is directed by civilian politicians, but the armed forces exercise veto power, without taking over power itself. The military can restrict or direct the decisions by the civilian governments in many ways. Generally the moderator regimes are conservative, and may carry out

¹³⁴ Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London, NY: Routledge, 3.

¹³⁵ Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 10-18; Janowitz, Morris. 1977. *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*. Chicago, Londra: University of Chicago Press, 79-80; Clapham, Christopher and George Philip. 1985. *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*. London: Croom Helm, 8-10. Cited in Hale, William. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London and New York: Routledge, 308-310.

'displacement coups', where another one more acceptable to the military replaces the civilian government.

2. The guardian regimes where the military exercise a higher degree of penetration and control. A fundamental characteristic of the guardian regime is that the military take over direct political power without intending to exercise it indefinitely, and they proclaim their duty is to 'sort out the mess' the civilian politicians created, and return the power to the civilians after having created conditions which will not lead to a new need for a military intervention. Hale underlines that the guardian regimes, like all military regimes, are authoritarian and limit civil rights,

3. The ruler regimes which exercise a far greater political control, and for a far longer period, than the previous three models. The military leaders of a ruler regime aim to effect long-term changes in the distribution of political power by overthrowing existing political institutions.

There is a wide consensus in the literature that TAF provide a good example to the guardian regime model¹³⁶. According to Ümit Cizre, TAF's political role has shifted between each of Robin Luckham¹³⁷'s four sub-types of military guardianship¹³⁸. The first of the sub-types is 'Direct Guardianship' where the military views itself as the unique custodian of national values, the second, 'Alternating Guardianship' where the dynamics are the same but the military alternates in and out of power, and thirdly

¹³⁶ Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 1987. *Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative Study*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing, 71.

¹³⁷ Luckham, Robin A. 1971. "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition* 6(1), 5-35. In Cizre, Umit. 2002. "Concept and Policy of National Security and the Civilians: The Case of Turkey." Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on "Civilians in National Security Policy" held in Geneva 2-4 November 2002. Retrieved from www.dcaf.ch/news/Civilian%20Expert_Gev_041102/Cizre.pdf on 11/12/2003.

¹³⁸ Cizre, Umit. 2002. "Concept and Policy of National Security and the Civilians: The Case of Turkey." Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on "Civilians in National Security Policy" held in Geneva 2-4 November 2002. Retrieved from www.dcaf.ch/news/Civilian%20Expert_Gev_041102/Cizre.pdf on 11/12/2003.

the 'Catalytic Guardianship' whereby the military in question may not wish to rule itself but installs governments favorable to itself. The last category is 'Covert Guardianship'; the military may submerge and yet retain the capacity for direct action by supporting over the long run a political order that supports national security. Actually, TAF develops a self image as the guardian of the founding principles of the state and the mandate of the TAF's influence over Turkish politics has been determined by various legal arrangements and de facto powers that are conceptualized mainly by two concepts: 'guardianship concept' and the 'national security concept'.

This guardianship of the TAF has been institutionalized through legal mechanisms since the inception of the republic. However, the introduction of the National Security Council in the 1961 Constitution symbolized a turning point, the beginning of the consolidation of a national security state. The rationale of the national security emphasizes both external and internal/regime security. The core state elite, military bureaucracy categorized all kinds of opposition to their authority as a threat to national security. This opposition groups include political elites and social groups that criticize the regime and the authoritarian modernization. As a result, the political elites and social groups were kept under close scrutiny. In this context, an analysis of the legal basis of the guardianship role of the TAF is important because it is in this domain we can find concrete criteria for evaluating the national security state and the impact of third globalization on it.

4.5.1 Constitutional & Legal Basis of the Guardianship of the TAF

The constitutional role of the Armed Forces had been a hot debate during the establishment of the Republic. As a principle, it is determined that active members of the Armed Forces should be out of the legislative and executive part of the government. The first action towards this end was on 3 March 1924, when the caliphate abolished, the Chief of General Staff was deprived of his seat in the cabinet and made directly responsible to the president. The point was underlined by Article 23 of the Constitution of April 1924, which stated, "*No person may be a deputy and hold office under the Government at the same time.*" Moreover, Article 40 vested supreme command of the armed forces in the Grand National Assembly, "represented by the president of the republic."¹³⁹ Finally, Article 148 of the Military Penal Code, 22/05/1930, reinforced the interference of armed officers to the politics. However, the 'guardianship concept' had emerged during that years. In 1931, for example, Atatürk declared:

*"... [T]he Turkish nation... has always looked to the military... as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals... When speaking of the army I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are true owners of this country... The Turkish nation considers its army to be the guardian of its ideals."*¹⁴⁰ Moreover, in another occasion Atatürk said, "*Our Republic respects only the will of the people and the guidance of the military.*"¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Hale, William. 1994. *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London and New York: Routledge, 72.

¹⁴⁰ Rustow, Dankwart. 1959. "The Army and The Founding of the Turkish Republic" *World Politics* 11, 549-550. Cited in Heper, Metin. 1985. *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Northgate: Eothen Press, 53

¹⁴¹ Harris, George S. 1965. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics." *Middle East Journal* 19(1): 54-66.

4.5.1.1 The Army Internal Service Code and Regulations

The idea of Turkish Armed Forces as the guardian of the state was adopted into law in 10/06/1935 through the Army Internal Service Code, Article 34. The law specified, "*The duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution*". Later, this would be repeated in the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code of 04/01/1961, Article 35¹⁴². This concept of the 'guardianship of the state' politicized¹⁴³ and invoked in later military interventions as "*armed forces have invoked the powers granted to them by the Services Code to protect and look after the Turkish Republic*."¹⁴⁴ During the 1960-1998 period the military gradually assumed an active role as the guarantor of regime stability in Turkey¹⁴⁵. In the most of Third World countries, militaries combine external defense with an internal security function¹⁴⁶. Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Code embodies the notion of internal enemies and legitimizes military's intervention into politics. In addition, Article 85 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations stipulates that the "*Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as the external threats, if necessary by force*."¹⁴⁷ Moreover, section the defense white

¹⁴² Heper, Metin. 2001. "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 1(3), 14.

¹⁴³ Jacoby, Tim. 2002. "The Internal dynamics of Turkish Militarism." Retrieved from <http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2002/jacoby.pdf> on 02/20/2004, p. 19.

¹⁴⁴ Birand, Mehmet Ali. 1987. *The Generals' Coup in Turkey*. London: Pergamon, 187

¹⁴⁵ Karpat, Kemal. 1988. "Military Interventions: Army Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980." In Heper, Metin and Ahmet Evin, eds. *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 28.

¹⁴⁶ Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 191.

¹⁴⁷ Heper, Metin. 2001. "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 1(3), 14.

paper specifies the duty of armed forces to protect the Turkish Republic against internal and external enemies¹⁴⁸. These articles function as a legal-constitutional channel for military to exert power on the three branches of government; executive, legislative and justice.

4.5.1.2 The General Staff

The place of the General Staff in the official hierarchy has interpreted as a symbol of prestige and influence of Armed Forces in the political community. During the war of independence the Chief of Staff held a seat in the 11-member government by Law¹⁴⁹, No: 3 on 02/05/1920. After the war of independence, the Chief of Staff was deprived of his seat in the cabinet and made directly responsible to the president by the Law¹⁵⁰, No: 429 on 03/03/1924. This position of the Chief of Staff was reinforced by the Article 40 of the Constitution of 1924. The İnönü government through Law, No: 4580 on 05/06/1944, terminated the independent status of the General Staff. The Chief of Staff was placed under the Ministry of Defense and made responsible to the Prime Minister. Finally, in 30/05/1949, the General Staff was relegated to its most subordinate position in the history of the Republic, transformed into an undersecretariat of the Ministry of Defense through Law¹⁵¹ No: 5398.

The military intervention of 27 May 1960 ended this subordination of the General Staff. The Constitution of 1961, Article 110 restored the position of the General Staff

¹⁴⁸ Ministry of National Defense (2000) *The Defense White Paper*. Retrieved from <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyazKitap.htm#WHITE%20PAPER> on 08/09/2003.

¹⁴⁹ Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi ve İcra Vekillerinin Sureti İntihabına Dair Kanun

¹⁵⁰ Şer'iye ve Evkaf Ve Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekaletlerinin İlgasına Dair Kanun.

¹⁵¹ Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Kanunu.

as directly responsible to the Prime Minister rather than the Minister of Defense. Later, on 14 February 1966, the Constitutional Court abolished the articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Law No: 5398 that put the Chief of Staff into a subordinate position by arguing that these articles are in conflict with the constitution Article 110. Finally, the Law¹⁵² No: 1324 on duties and competences of the General Staff, 31/07/1970, reinforced this position of the General Staff as working in collaboration with the Ministry of Defense and responsible to the Prime Ministry. In fact, two separate laws passed in 1970 specified the duties of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense. The General Staff obtained autonomy in determining defense policy, the military budget¹⁵³, future weapons systems, production & procurement of arms¹⁵⁴, intelligence gathering, internal security, and all promotions. The Ministry of Defense carried out tasks according to the principles, priorities and major programs as determined by the General Staff. As a result of this wide range of roles of the General Staff, the emergence of career civil servants specializing in military affairs was hindered. In many democratic countries similar functions to the General Staff such as military budget are entirely in the hands of a civilian technical cadres¹⁵⁵. The 1982 Constitution did not change the status of the Chief of Staff but reinforced its prestige by Article 117 that declared the Chief of Staff as commander in chief during wartime.

¹⁵² Genelkurmay Başkanının Görev ve Yetkilerine Ait Kanun.

¹⁵³ With the amendments to the Constitution of 1960 in early 1970s, military budget kept out of the scrutiny of The Turkish Court of Accounts, Article 127. See, Özbudun, Ergun. 2003. *Çağdaş Türk Politikası: Demokratik Pekişmenin Önünde Engeller*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 102.

¹⁵⁴ Production and procurement essentially comply with the priority list prepared by the General Staff and are considered to be in the militaries own domain. The Turkish Arms Industry is supported by a fund set up by the Armed Forces and managed by a civilian undersecretary in the Ministry of Defense.

¹⁵⁵ Cizre, Ümit. 1997. "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy" *Comparative Politics* 29(2): 159.

4.5.1.3 National Security Council

National Security Council (hereafter NSC), consisting of the President, the main cabinet ministers, the Chief of Staff, and the serving force commanders, was established by the Constitution of 1961, Article 111 to advise the government on defense and security. It is argued that NSC was introduced as an embodiment of the bureaucracy's primacy over the popularly elected parliament¹⁵⁶. With the amendments in early 1970s, the power of military members and the primary functions of the NSC were extended¹⁵⁷. Under the Constitution of 1982, Article 118 enhanced the position of NSC, "*The NSC shall submit to the council of ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of national security policy of the State.*" It is stated that the recommendations of the NSC would be given priority consideration by the council of ministers. Moreover, the number and weight of senior commanders participating in the NSC also increased at the expense of civilian members. Under the 1982 constitution, Article 118, the position of the NSC was enhanced: the recommendations of the NSC would be given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers. The number and weight of the senior commanders participating in the NSC also increased at the expense of civilian members. Finally, NSC and the NSC Secretariat established by Law¹⁵⁸ No: 2945 on 09/11/1983, served as the primary legal platform where military could participate in the civilian authorities' decision-making process. NSC turned out to be the most decisive leg of a

¹⁵⁶ Cizre, Ümit. 1997. "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy" *Comparative Politics* 29(2): 157.

¹⁵⁷ Özbudun, Ergun. 2003. *Çağdaş Türk Politikası: Demokratik Pekişmenin Önünde Engeller*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 99.

¹⁵⁸ Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği Kanunu.

dual system of executive decision making, the other leg being the council of ministers.¹⁵⁹ NSC has been a legal-constitutional channel for military to exert power on the executive branch of government.

NSC influenced the politics also through the National Security Policy Documents (hereafter NSPD) that is clarifying the 'national security concept'. NSPDs are prepared by the Secretariat and turn into government policy after being accepted by the NSC without any input from Parliament either at the debating or ratification stages. These documents have influenced the functioning of the executive body innegligibly. The codification of laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, maintenance of public order, political activities and public debate and military jurisdiction over civilians has been all drafted in line with the NSPDs. The Decrees with the Force of Law No: 174 and 176 enforced in 1983 stated that Ministries would function in line with the 'national security policy'.¹⁶⁰ There were also other legal arrangements that facilitate a seat to the officers from National Security Council General Secretariat or the General Staff in the governing board of various state executive institutions such as the Radio and Television Supreme Council¹⁶¹ or the Council on Higher Education¹⁶².

¹⁵⁹ For this entire paragraph see Cizre, Ümit. 1997. "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy" *Comparative Politics* 29(2), 157-158.

¹⁶⁰ Özcan, Gencer. 2002. "Türk Dış Politikasında Oluşum süreci ve Askeri Yapı." In Rubin, Barry and Kemal Kirişçi (eds.) *Günümüzde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 76.

¹⁶¹ Article 6 of the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts No. 3984 of 20 April 1994.

¹⁶² Constitution of 1982, Article 131 and Article 6 of the Law on Higher Education System No. 2547 of 4 November 1981.

4.5.1.4 The State Security Courts

The State Security Courts were established in 1973 with a law amending the Constitution of 1961 in 1971. The State Security Courts were established in order to curb political violence. In the State Security Courts, the Army officers presided over civilian trials. Its role is defined in the Constitution of 1982 Article 143 as to deal with the offenses against the indivisible integrity of State with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the Constitution, and offenses directly involving the internal and external security of the State. Later, on 16/06/1983, the Act on the Establishment and Procedures of the State Security Courts clarified the Court's role. The status of the military judges called the independence and impartiality of the Court into question by international agents such as The European Court of Human Rights, Amnesty International. Military Judges were interpreted as a legal-constitutional channel for military to exert power on the judicial branch of government.

4.5.1.5 The Office of the President

During the 1960-1989 period, a succession of presidents with military backgrounds reinforced the privileged position of the military in the polity. The former general presidents were interpreted as a balance between the civilian government and the TAF. Actually, the Presidents tried to play a consensual role between the government and the TAF in times of crises and acted as a channel of communication. Under the Constitution of 1982, the office of the President became the locus of the state with

extended powers. The third civilian president of the Republic, Süleyman Demirel's active role in the 28 February 1997 process of military intervention supported the argument that coming from civilian or military backgrounds, the prominent role of the President is the management of the political equilibrium of the status quo.

4.6 Political Globalization, Transformation to a Liberal Democratic State: The Significance of the European Anchor in the Turkish Context

Cold War rivalry and Turkey's role as a NATO ally created an international structure that facilitated the emergence of a national security state in Turkey despite of the democratic wave of the third globalization. However, the support of the international politics to this structure began to diminish by the 1980s with the heading of Cold War to an end and emergence of democratic transitions in Southern Europe via the European Community. Moreover, Neo-liberal economic policies turned into a norm for the developing economies and the etatism¹⁶³ of the authoritarian-bureaucratic Turkish state could no longer continue under the pressure of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. The so-called 24th January regulations and the post-coup Özal government initiated economic liberalism in Turkey in accordance with the Neo-Liberal doctrine. The policies of Özal government triggered long suppressed social groups into politics again. These internal developments set the stage for the rise of international influence in Turkish politics. Actually, even an

¹⁶³ At its 1931 congress, CHP adopted etatism as its official economic strategy. According to this program, individual enterprise was to retain a fundamental role in the economy, but active government intervention was necessary to boost the nation's welfare and the state's prosperity. In practice, etatism entailed the promotion of industrialization by means of five-year plans and the creation of public enterprises. Comprehensive protective tariffs also were introduced during the 1930s, establishing a pattern of import-substitution industrialization that would continue for many years. For theory and policies of etatism see, Barlas, Dilek. 1998. *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: economic and foreign policy strategies in an uncertain world, 1929-1939*. Leiden : Brill.

external anchor constitutes a powerful driving force for change, the primary impetus for change, nonetheless, needs to originate from domestic actors¹⁶⁴. Özal government and growing social groups who would later be called as pro-Europe coalition were the domestic actors alongside with the state elite.

After the 1980 Coup, Council of Europe emerged as an important international institution influencing the process of democratization in Turkey¹⁶⁵. This role of the Council of Europe was inherited to European Community (contemporary European Union) in 14 April 1987 when Turkish government formally applied to join the EC as a Full member. This move led to a considerable increase in European influence on the process of democratization in Turkey¹⁶⁶. *“Potential EU membership creates both conditions and incentives, constituting a powerful engine of democratization and transformation in candidate countries in the process”*¹⁶⁷. Multi-party politics and economic liberalization were initiated well before under the influence of external pressures, however an external anchor per se failed to provide an appropriate mix of conditions and incentives to induce a major transformation in Turkey’s domestic politics, especially in the authoritarian-bureaucratic state.

4.6.1 The New Europe

The EU possesses an institutionalized framework, which readily transmits the kind of

¹⁶⁴ For similar arguments please look at: Whitehead, Laurance. ed. 1996 *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁶⁵ Dağı, İhsan Duran. 1996. “Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy” *Middle Eastern Studies*. 32(2). Retrieved from www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dagi.htm on 20/12/2003.

¹⁶⁶ Uğur, Mehmet. 2000. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye bir Dayanak / İnandırıcılık İkilemi* İstanbul: Everest, 279.

¹⁶⁷ Öniş, Ziya. 2002. “Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era.” Paper presented in Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) at Washington D.C., USA, November 23, 26.

influences and pressures that affect the course of democratization. With the Southern European enlargement during the course of the 1980s, EC played an important role in the process of democratic consolidation of Spain, Greece and Portugal. In fact, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, 'the New Europe' has placed even more emphasis on the quality of democratization and human rights as part of her emerging identity¹⁶⁸. There are mainly two reasons for that. First, the European Economic Community has transformed to European Community, which highlights the political characteristics of the entity. In this political entity, the greatest consideration had been given to democracy and human rights. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union led European countries to have been less concerned about strategic and military cooperation. Consequently, democracy and human rights became an important dimension of foreign relations of European Community¹⁶⁹. So, Turkey was confronted with a changed international structure and Europe that necessitates a high standard in the quality of democracy and the achievement of civil and human rights that is the high tide of the third globalization.

4.6.2 Application for Full Membership and the Strengthening of European Anchor

Following the 1980 military coup, while bilateral relations were not alarming for Turkey, the relations with the European Community and the Council of Europe developed along a more problematic line raising questions about Turkey's place in a

¹⁶⁸ Cordell, Karl. eds. 1999. *Ethnicity and Democratization in the New Europe*. London: Routledge; Grugel, Jean. 1999. *Democracy without Borders, Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies*. London: Routledge; Whitehead, Laurance. 1996. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁶⁹ Dağı, İhsan Duran. 1997. "İnsan Hakları ve Demokratikleşme: Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkilerinde Siyasal Boyut." In Atila Eralp, ed. *Türkiye ve Avrupa*. Ankara: İmge, 120.

democratic Europe. After the military coup the issues of democracy and human rights in Turkey became a major item on Turkey's economic as well as political relations with EC. The Commission issued a statement on the day of the military coup took indicating that 'it is following with grave concern the course of events in Turkey'. The statement also expressed the Commission's 'hope' that human rights would be respected and that democratic institutions would be quickly restored¹⁷⁰. The European Parliament had a debate on the situation in Turkey one week after the coup and adopted a resolution that expressed its concern about political and civil rights and the physical safety of detainees. As Turkey was not moving towards the restoration of democracy as quickly as it had promised, The EC took harsh measures such as suspending economic aid program. The EC Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee also ceased to meet following the military coup in 1980¹⁷¹. The Council of Europe also reacted critically to the military coup in Turkey¹⁷². Some parliamentarians, particularly socialists, were pressing for the suspension of Turkey's membership on the grounds that the Council did so when the Colonels' coup took place in Greece in 1967. The Assembly mobilized its organs to follow the developments in Turkey closely and exert pressure on the military regime. As far as the Council of Europe's attitude is concerned there were two prevailing approaches within the Council; one that was basically promoted by Socialists, Communists and the Greeks pressed for the punishment of the military regime for suspension of democracy and suppression of political activists by expelling Turkey from the

¹⁷⁰ Bulletin of the European Communities, 9 (1980), p.52. In Dağı, İhsan Duran. 1996. "Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy" *Middle Eastern Studies*. 32(2). Retrieved from www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dagi.htm on 20/12/2003.

¹⁷¹ EP Resolutions of 8 July 1982, OJ (1982) C 238/56, para. 11 and 14 September 1988, OJ (1988) C 262/126. In Bieber, Roland. 1990. "Democratic Control of European Foreign Policy" *European Journal of International Law* 1(1), 150.

¹⁷² Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. 1994. "The Limits to International Influence for Democratization." In Heper, Metin and Ahmet Evrim, eds. *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder: Westview, 129.

Council¹⁷³. There was another approach that advocated a policy of keeping Turkey within the Council of Europe on the ground that this would make easier the return of Turkey to parliamentary democracy and respect for human rights¹⁷⁴. At the end the prevailing view was that the Council should neither be too soft about the suspension of democracy and violation of human rights nor press too hard for the expulsion of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey's membership issue was kept on the agenda throughout the period and membership in the Parliamentary Assembly was suspended¹⁷⁵.

The period 1980-83 witnessed an intense international debate about the future of democracy and human rights in post-coup Turkey. The military regime came under fierce attack from European quarters, particularly the Council of Europe, the European Community, the European Parliament, trade unions, other human rights organizations and individual countries. After the establishment of civilian political order, Özal government attempted to restore relations with the European Community as soon as possible. A number of significant steps were taken by the government to normalize relations and Turkish parliamentarians resumed their seats in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as early as April 1984. The Özal government moved for EC membership by an official application on 14 April 1987¹⁷⁶. Thus, Turkey became more vulnerable to the European pressures in the realm of democracy and human rights, moving more into the EC's sphere of influence¹⁷⁷. Ali Karaosmanoğlu says "*This move led to a considerable increase in*

¹⁷³ Official Report of Debates, 33rd Session, 13 May 1981.

¹⁷⁴ Dağı, İhsan Duran. 1996. "Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy" *Middle Eastern Studies*. 32(2). Retrieved from www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dagi.htm on 20/12/2003.

¹⁷⁵ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. 1994. "The Limits to International Influence for Democratization." In Heper, Metin and Ahmet Evin, eds. *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder: Westview, 129.

¹⁷⁶ Baç, Meltem Müftüler. 2001. *Türkiye ve AB: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası İlişkiler*. İstanbul: Alfa, 39.

¹⁷⁷ Uğur, Mehmet. 2000. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye: Bir dayanak/inanırıcılık ikilemi*. İstanbul: Everest; Dağı, İhsan Duran. 2000. *İnsan Hakları, Küresel Siyaset ve Türkiye*. İstanbul: Boyut.

*European influence on the process of democratization in Turkey*¹⁷⁸. Similarly, Udo Steinbach thinks “*the most significant event in Turkey’s international affairs after the return to democracy was its application for full membership in the European Community in April 1987*”¹⁷⁹.

4.6.3 The Rejection of Membership Application and the European Concerns about Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

The European Community on economic and political grounds rejected Turkey’s membership application. Turkey’s continuing democratic deficits and weak human rights record were the political justifications for the rejection¹⁸⁰. The wave of democracy in Europe that skyrocketed after the end of the Cold War did not affect Turkey initially. On the contrary, the political role of the military increased in the 1990s. The continuing low intensity war against the terrorist organization, PKK and the struggle against Islamic Fundamentalism within the country were the major reasons for the unique situation in Turkey. Turkish state was not able to join democratic transitions. As a result, the focus of Turkish policy makers shifted towards the reactivation of the Customs Union that had been the principal objective of the Ankara agreement¹⁸¹. The Customs Union agreement came into effect at the end of the 1995. The impact of the EC in the form of the Customs Union and related

¹⁷⁸ Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. 1994. “The Limits to International Influence for Democratization.” In Heper, Metin and Ahmet Evin, eds. *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder: Westview, 129.

¹⁷⁹ Steinbach, Udo. 1994 “The European Community, the United States, the Middle East, and Turkey.” In Heper, Metin and Ahmet Evin, eds. *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder: Westview, 109.

¹⁸⁰ Commission of the European Communities (1989) “Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community.” Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/sec89_2290f_en.pdf on 12/12/2003.

¹⁸¹ Balkır, Canan. 1998. “The Customs Union and Beyond.” In Libby Rittenberg, ed. *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?* Westport: Praeger, 51-79.

conditionality began to increase in the direction of democratization in Turkey.

As reforms in the economic arena reached to a certain stage, the European Commission specifically marks out certain institutional areas of civil military relations as requiring reform. In the Agenda 2000 document that was adopted on July 1997, the Commission gave the following assessment on Turkey:

"Recent developments in the administration and the education system, while intended to strengthen secularism, nonetheless underline the particular role of the military in Turkish society... There are ambiguities in the Turkish legal system with regard to civilian political control of the military"¹⁸².

Moreover, in 1998 Commission reported:

"[S]everal factors prevent these authorities from functioning in the same way as they do in the Member States of the EU. The National Security Council demonstrates the major role played by the army in political life. The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act without the government's knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive military operations. The judicial system includes emergency courts (the state security courts) that are not compatible with a democratic system and run counter to the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights... The lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for concern. This is reflected by the major role played by the army in political life through the National Security Council. A civil, non-military solution must be found to the situation in south-eastern Turkey, particularly since many of the violations of civil and political rights observed in the country are connected in one way or another with this issue. The Commission acknowledges the Turkish government's commitment to combat human rights violations in the country but this has not so far had any significant effect in practice. The process of democratic reform on which Turkey embarked in 1995 must continue."¹⁸³

The stance of the EU against the role of the military in Turkish political life became apparent in the 1999 regular report: *"Through the National Security Council, the*

¹⁸² Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession (1998). Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf on 10/12/2003.

¹⁸³ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession (1998). Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf on 10/12/2003.

*Military continues to have an important influence in many areas of political life. The National Security Council continues to play a major role in political life.*¹⁸⁴” The 2000 regular report also mentioned that:

*“Civilian control over the military still needs to be improved (see also section below on the National Security Council). Contrary to EU, NATO and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister. It is also noted that the Council of Higher Education, which controls the activities of the institutions of higher education, as well as the Higher Education Supervisory Board, include one member selected by the Chief of General Staff*¹⁸⁵. ”

Lastly, perhaps “the clearest expression of the Commission’s view¹⁸⁶” on the civil-military issue came in the 2001 regular report: *“The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control of the military, remain to be effectively addressed*¹⁸⁷. ” Nevertheless, in the absence of visible prospect for full membership, the EU (former EC) anchor proved to be a weak anchor in terms of inducing core reforms in the Turkish political structure¹⁸⁸. The institutional basis of the national security state kept untouched. There existed an anchor/credibility dilemma inherent in Turkey-EU relations¹⁸⁹. Turkish authorities interpreted the weak EU anchor as evidence of weak commitment on the part of the EU. Similarly, the EU interpreted failure to undertake reforms in sufficient depth as a sign of weak commitment on the Turkish part.

¹⁸⁴ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (1999). Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf on 10/12/2003.

¹⁸⁵ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (2000). Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/tu_en.pdf on 10/12/2003.

¹⁸⁶ Cizre, Ümit. 2004. “Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and European Union Enlargement Zone.” *European Journal of Political Research*, 43: 109.

¹⁸⁷ Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession (2001). Retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf on 10/12/2003.

¹⁸⁸ Öniş, Ziya. 2003. “Domestic Politics, Transnational Influences and the Impetus for Reform: The Diverse Paths of Poland and Turkey on the Road to EU Membership.” Retrieved from <http://home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/publications.htm>.

¹⁸⁹ Uğur, Mehmet. 2000. *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye: Bir dayanak/inanırıcılık ikilemi*. İstanbul: Everest.

4.6.4 Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era, The Acceleration of the Transformation

The decisive turning point in Turkish – EU relations came in late 1999 after the major excuse of the Turkish military to dominate the political system, the war against terrorism, came nearly to an end with the capture of the leader of PKK. In the Helsinki summit of December 1999, the agenda was whether Turkey has the ability to transform its own state and domestic institutions in line with European norms. The European leaders with the support of the U.S. government agreed to give Turkey a chance for accession and Turkey, for the first time, was offered a candidate state status. The 2000 Accession Partnership document of the European Commission clarified the dual transformation demanded from the Turkish state in both economic and political spheres in line with the so-called Copenhagen Criteria:

"Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union."¹⁹⁰

The Accession period refers to the most of the basis of the supra role of the TAF in the political system that are mentioned above: National Security Council, State Security Courts, State of Emergency and Anti-Terrorism regulations¹⁹¹. The transformation in these areas was not expected to be without resistance but a series unexpected domestic developments helped the launching of the transformation. The economic crises of the November 2000 and February 2001, biggest in the history of

¹⁹⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/copenhagen.htm>

¹⁹¹ Accession Partnership Document. Retrieved from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adac/Accession.partnership.pdf> on 11/12/2003.

the republic, created a strong public support for the transformation of the existing state structure.

Turkey pledged to transform its state structure in accordance with the European norms in the National Program of March 2001. National Program includes all the economic and political criteria covered in the Accession Partnership. The political criteria are especially important for our topic because they include the role of the TAF in the political system. Turkish state has achieved more or less the liberalization of the economic system but the authoritarian-bureaucratic and security minded political structure resisted change and a liberal democratic regime could not be achieved. National Program includes the creation of such a regime.

The implementation of the National Program began in November 2001 with the changes in the State Security Courts Law. It was followed by three so-called Adjustment Packages including changes in laws related to various issues such as the freedom of expression, political activity and capital punishment. The abolition of the capital punishment had created the first important resistance against the transformation. A campaign against the abolition of the capital punishment began including one of the coalition member, MHP that assumed the leadership of the anti-EU coalition. On the other hand, civil society organizations organized a public campaign called 'Movement for Europe 2002' to support transformation. Another coalition party, Anavatan, supports these pro-European groups.

This turbulent launching of the transformation was stabilized by two important developments. First, a liberal-democrat general, Hilmi Özkök was nominated as the Chief of the Staff in the summer of 2002. Özkök on different occasions states that

TAF prefers to solve problems in a democratic fashion and is in favor of the EU¹⁹². Şener identified an Özkök doctrine meaning a stress on “political solutions to political problems¹⁹³.” Özkök was well exposed the ideas of the “democratic control of the armed forces” as conceived of by NATO when he was working in the NATO headquarters. Since the end of the Cold War, democratic and civilian control of the military has turned a common priority of NATO and it embraces a clear constitutional division of authority between civil and military sectors, parliamentary control of the defense budget and governmental discretion over the professional, institutional and political activities of the military¹⁹⁴.

Second, the Justice and Development Party (Hereafter AKP) who openly supported a pro-EU stance in its election campaign won a landslide victory in November 3rd general elections¹⁹⁵. The AKP found social support especially from the medium and small-scale industrialists whose numbers and economic activities have been growing throughout the society. It also established alliances with the poor and disadvantaged groups, mobilized civil society organizations voicing the religious segments of society in terms of recognition. The AKP, in spite of its strong Islamist roots, looked like a European social democrat party of the Global Third Way type in terms of its commitment to EU-related reforms and the goal of establishing a genuinely pluralistic and multi-cultural society. The Global Third Way is defined as an alternative mode of societal and economic modernization that attempts to establish a

¹⁹² For the statements published in Turkish press browse: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/04/13/>; <http://www.sabah.com.tr/yaz41-10-128-20040414.html>; <http://www.zaman.com.tr/2003/05/28/yazarlar/eyupcan.htm>

¹⁹³ Şener, Hasan Engin. 2003. “Unending Tension in Turkey?” Retrieved from <http://www.thesprout.net/010/graft/graft10.htm> on 05/12/2003.

¹⁹⁴ Cizre, Ümit. 2004. “Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and European Union Enlargement Zone.” *European Journal of Political Research*, 43:107-125.

¹⁹⁵ Keyman, Fuat and Ziya Öniş. 2003. “Turkey’s Delayed Encounter with Global Third Way Politics: The AKP and the Possibility of Democratization.” Early draft of the paper subsequently published under the title of “Turkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges,” *Journal of Democracy* 14(2), 95-107. Retrieved from <http://home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/summer2003/w.PDF> on 10/10/2003.

linkage between state, economy and social justice, in order to cope with the serious challenges that globalization has been generating on national economies¹⁹⁶. Moreover, on the part of AKP, there is an understanding that the EU could provide certain protection for Islamists in Turkey and enable them to be vocal in their identity claims¹⁹⁷.

The December 2002 Copenhagen Summit of the EU meant a new phase in Turkish – EU relations. During the Summit, the AKP tried to commit the EU that it is not an Islamic party but a center-right party supporting very strongly Turkey's accession to the EU. Although successful in this respect, the AKP did not get a determined negotiation date in 2003. In the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 the borders of the new enlarged Europe were discussed. The issue was not only the ability of Turkey to transform its own state and domestic institutions in line with the European norms as it had been the case in the Helsinki Summit but the future direction of the EU project. Turkey received a conditional date for the start of the accession negotiations, meaning that if Turkey achieves a successful realization of the dual transformation of its state, then the negotiations will start after December 2004 without delay.

In the post-Copenhagen period, major steps were taken in the transformation of the state. The AKP government passed five major political reforms packages in 2003 and one in May 2004. these were enacted in January 2003 (the fourth package), in February 2003 (the fifth), in July 2003 (the sixth), in August 2003 (the seventh), in December 2003 (the eighth), and May 2004 (the ninth).

¹⁹⁶ For an outline of Global Third Way Politics see; Giddens, Anthony. 2001. *The Global Third Way Debate*. Cambridge: Polity; Beck, Ulrich. 1997. *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order*. Cambridge: Polity. Hutton, Will and Anthony Giddens, ed. *On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism*. London: Vintage.

¹⁹⁷ Keyman, Fuat and Ziya Öniş. 2003. "Helsinki, Copenhagen and Beyond: Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish State." Retrieved from <http://home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/publications.htm#Journal> on 02/01/2004.

The sixth and seventh package represents a major turning point in the transformation process because for the first time the political elite found itself in a position to tackle the thorny question of civil-military relations. The balance that was struck by the military through three coups between political and state elites came revised during this period. The reforms in 2003 significantly curbed the legal basis of the role of the military in politics. The executive powers and areas of responsibility of the National Security Council, the main institutional organ of the military dominance on politics, were limited. Actually, the seventh package eliminates the structural means with which the Turkish military has influenced the political system in the past. New reform measures include¹⁹⁸: Firstly, limiting the executive powers and areas of responsibility of the National Security Council. Previously, the Council was headed by the military and had sole responsibility for drafting Turkey's national security and foreign policy doctrines and passing them to the government for implementation. Now, the National Security Council is to become an advisory board. Secondly, increasing the civilian presence on the National Security Council. The post of National Security Council secretary-general, hitherto filled by an army general, can now be held by a civilian, to be appointed by the president from a list of candidates selected by the prime minister. Thirdly, subjecting the National Security Council to executive authority. Previously, the National Security Council met monthly and communicated policy to the cabinet, thereby setting the political tempo for Ankara. Now, the National Security Council is to convene only every other month and report to the deputy prime minister. In addition to reform packages, the Parliament approved a bill in December 2003, attempting to remove policies of secrecy governing the National Security Council's staff, by-laws and regulations, allowing

¹⁹⁸ Çağaptay, Soner. 2003. "European Union Reforms Diminish the Role of the Turkish Military: Ankara Knocking on Brussels' Door." Retrieved from http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/policy_2003/2003_781.html on 02/01/2004.

decisions on these matters to be published in the government's Official Gazette. Moreover, the sixth reform package also abolished the Article 8 of Anti-Terrorism Law, and terminated its current proceedings, for which Turkey has been widely criticized by the Council of Europe and other international bodies.

Finally, on May 7, 2004 the 1980 constitution was amended for the 9th time. The economic autonomy of TAF was curbed. The military expenditures, which were not publicly audited in the past, were brought under the inspection of the Court of Accounts. The State Security Courts, which had been established following the 1980 military coup, were abolished. Representatives of TAF from boards that oversee broadcasting and education were removed. Finally, these amendments brought final touches to the Constitution to completely abolish capital punishment. The main reason why the seventh package passed through the Turkish parliament easily, with the public offering strong support and the military voicing only a few quiet reservations, was that democratization had become a political avalanche in the country, driven by many powerful catalysts, including the prospect of EU accession. There is wide consensus among Turkish public opinion that political liberalization toward EU membership can only be good. Hence, those who are unhappy with the reforms nevertheless find it difficult to resist liberalization, since they do not want to be in the highly unpopular position of being responsible for blocking EU accession.

The AKP government backed by a strong pro-EU coalition and major international actors engaged in a major transformation of the national security state towards a liberal democratic state. Major changes happened in the legal basis of the national security state that was outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The Cyprus negotiations that took place under the auspices of the UN on February 2004 served as a test case for the emerging civil-military balance in Turkish political system.

Turkish government's opting for a change in the traditional Cyprus policy of the national security state confirmed the argument that Turkish state is in the process of transformation to a liberal democratic state.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Globalization is neither a novel nor a linear phenomenon. An historical analysis would reveal that there are different trajectories of globalization in different domains. For the Ottoman-Turkish political community, globalization emerged as an imported set of ideas and institutions. The domestic political equilibrium effected the implementation of these ideas and institutions. Such an analysis considering the globalization and domestic politics can be done by a study of the operationalization of the state transformation in the Ottoman-Turkish context, which is the main purpose of this thesis.

The first globalization that is marked by the spread of European state system had different patterns in different domains. Those states that produced first globalization as the creators of the European state system launched expansionist policies. Other political communities left outside of this producers group tried to catch up with the forerunners by concentrating on internal affairs and reform. Ottoman Empire was one of those states that were the consumers of first globalization and launched an extensive reform program to be a European style modern state. This initial stage of globalization could be interpreted as the 'widening phase' because the relationship between the producers and consumers created an environment where European state system eliminates other forms of political community and set the modern state as the standard. The great powers were the primary agents of the first globalization.

The most concrete impact of the first globalization for the Ottoman Empire was the security treat created by the great powers, which is conceptualized by the 'Eastern Question.' Ottoman Sultans launched staunch reform programs that started from military and spilled over other branches of the state. In time this reform program created new power centers within the Empire who advocated reform for the enlarging their position and power in the system, namely military-bureaucracy. Bureaucrats' role is especially important in the Ottoman context to understand the particular character taken by the reforms. In fact, when we analyze the series of transformation in the Ottoman context, it becomes evident that what may have started from above when Sultan Selim III initiated his reform in the 1790s, by late 19th century had assumed a very distinct new face of constitutionalism and soon became a weapon in the hands of various echelons of the military-bureaucracy against the top, that is the sultan. The power rivalry between the Sultan and the military-bureaucracy had determined the main contours of the Ottoman polity and the impact of the globalization on the Ottoman state was shaped by this rivalry.

The second globalization was constituted by the consolidation of the modern state system in the form of nation state as a result of the spread of nationalism. The Imperialist rivalry and colonial relations made the nation state the dominant form of the modern state. The Ottoman Empire could not catch up with this development and divided into a number of nation states. The military-bureaucracy played an important leadership role in the establishment of the Turkish nation state. Their dominance in the political structure gave way to an authoritarian-bureaucratic state. However, external pressures against the authoritarian single party regime emerged. In the years after the World Wars, the deepening stage of the globalization started. In the first and second globalization, the issue was only the macro form of the state and the widening

of the state system as the only form of political community. But with the consolidation and institutionalization of the state system, there comes the deepening face of the globalization into the shell of states. A particular type of domestic regime, liberal democracy emerged as a global norm and states are forced to take this particular form.

The European integration process has institutionalized the pressures for liberal democracy on Turkish national security state. Turkey has transformed into a liberal democratic state in important ways and the process is still continuing. Despite its shortages in implementation, the reform process undertaken by the last two governments is one of the most remarkable transformational achievements in Turkish political history. Institutional and legal changes of the last three years herald a fundamental transformation in the political life of the country.

Whether this transformation has a strong internal impetus and would move beyond rhetoric is still indefinite. Although there has been substantive change in the legal basis of the national security state in Turkey at the core of which lays the Turkish Armed Forces, the new political equilibrium in Turkey is still vague. Those who are holding the powers at stake are on defensive and waiting for a possible break in the EU integration process. In this sense, December 2004 summit of the EU, at which Turkey is expected to be given a negotiation date, is critical for the contemporary process of transformation of the Turkish state. EU facilitates the most important external anchor of the transformation process; a failure in the part of the EU to keep its role would unleash anti-EU groups in Turkey that would put the transformation under the threat of reversal. As the Ottoman experience showed institutional changes do not guarantee substantive transformation. Although constitutional developments were achieved during the last decades of 19th century, a constitutional liberal state

could not be established without necessary external environment.

The lack of individual level of analysis limits the explanatory power of the operationalization of the state transformation. But it is because the main actors of the transformation process that are the key policy makers are not very open to public, especially for academic research. Some interview with retired officials might be possible but further research could be done by basing on media interviews. So, follow up research on this issue might include an empirical study of perceptions of main actors about the transformation. Such an individual level analysis might reveal a great deal of information on whether institutional transformation consolidated in the minds of the policy makers. At the theoretical level a framework that includes dynamics of both globalization and fragmentation might reveal a lot about the course of transformation and possibilities of reversals.

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