

T.C.
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INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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**REFLECTIONS ON INTERVENTIONISM IN LIBYA: AN EMPIRIC ANALYSIS
OF VENEZUELAN VOTING PATTERNS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

Ana Paula ANDRADE SERRANO

2501191650

DISSERTATION SUPERVISOR:

Assist. Prof. Aylin Ece ÇIÇEK

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ABSTRACT

REFLECTIONS ON INTERVENTIONISM IN LIBYA: AN EMPIRIC ANALYSIS OF VENEZUELAN VOTING PATTERNS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Ana Paula ANDRADE SERRANO

The foundation of the United Nations Organization started a new era for international relations (Amici & Cepiku, 2020) creating new dynamics of interaction among the States based on the foundational principles of this organization (United Nations, 1945). Among these principles, for the purpose of this research, it is important to point out the non-intervention principle, which as Vincent (1971) explained, prescribed a standard of behavior that requires respect for the principle of state sovereignty which recognition is fundamental to the coexisting among the States. This principle has been a subject of constant debate, particularly in those issues related to humanitarian action after 2001 with the emergence of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which aims to provide protection for the affected population that their states are unwilling or unable to protect (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). The main scenario for this debate has been the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which can be considered the most important body of the UN system bearing in mind the binding nature of its decisions (United Nations Security Council, n.d.). In that sense, the situation in Libya has been extensively discussed within this body representing an accurate example of the Pluralism/Solidarism debate within the normative structure of the English School (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). During the 2015-2016 period, the Bolivarian Republic of

Venezuela participated as a non-permanent member of the UNSC playing a prominent role in the discussion process related to the situation in Libya, manifested in its voting pattern (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). In this regard, this research aims to answer the following questions: what is the position of Venezuela in the discussion of the situation in Libya within the Security Council according to its voting patterns? Furthermore, which specific elements are more likely to influence its foreign policy? According to the results obtained, the voting strategies of States within international organizations are based on the principles of their international policy and are more likely to be influenced by the bilateral relationships held with the actors involved in the discussion.

Keywords: Non-interventionism, United Nations Security Council, voting pattern, bilateral relationship, legal framework

ÖZ

LİBYA’DA MÜDAHALECİLİK ÜZERİNE YANSIMALAR: GÜVENLİK KONSEYİ’NDE VENEZUELAN OYLAMA ŞEKİLLERİNİN AMPİRİK BİR ANALİZİ

Ana Paula ANDRADE SERRANO

Birleşmiş Milletler Örgütü'nün kuruluşu, uluslararası ilişkiler için yeni bir dönem başlatmıştır (Amici & Cepiku, 2020), bu örgütün temel ilkelerine dayalı olarak Devletler arasında yeni etkileşim dinamikleri yaratmıştır (United Nations, 1945). Bu ilkeler arasında, bu araştırmanın amacı açısından, Vincent'in (1971) açıkladığı gibi, devlet egemenliği ilkesine saygı gösterilmesini gerektiren bir davranış standardı öngören, müdahale etmeme ilkesine, dikkat çekmek önemlidir. Devletler arasında bir arada yaşama amacıyla, etkilenen nüfus için devletlerinin isteksiz olduğu veya yapamadığı koruma sağlamayı amaçlayan Koruma Sorumluluğu (R2P) kavramının ortaya çıkmasıyla birlikte 2001'den sonra özellikle insani yardımla ilgili konularda sürekli bir tartışma konusu olmuştur. Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi (BMGK) bu tartışmanın ana senaryosu olan korumak (Uluslararası Müdahale ve Devlet Egemenliği Komisyonu, 2001) ve kararlarının bağlayıcılığı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda BM sisteminin en önemli organı olmuştur. (Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi, t.d.). Bu anlamda, İngiliz Okulu'nun normatif yapısı içindeki Çoğulculuk/Dayanışma tartışmasının doğru bir örneğini temsil eden bu kurumda Libya'daki durum kapsamlı bir şekilde tartışılmıştır (Bellamy ve Williams, 2011). 2015-2016 döneminde, Bolivarcı Venezuela Cumhuriyeti, BMGK'nın daimi olmayan üyesi olarak katıldı ve Libya'daki duruma ilişkin tartışma sürecinde oylamaya katılarak önemli bir rol oynadığını gösterdi (Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu, 2017) . Bu bağlamda, bu araştırma

şu sorulara yanıt vermeyi amaçlamaktadır: Güvenlik Konseyi'nde Libya'daki durumun tartışılmasında Venezuela'nın oylama kalıplarına göre konumu nedir? Ayrıca, hangi belirli unsurların dış politikasını etkilemesi daha olasıdır? Elde edilen sonuçlara göre, Devletlerin uluslararası kuruluşlardaki oylama stratejileri, uluslararası politika ilkelerine dayanmaktadır ve tartışmaya dahil olan aktörlerle yürütülen ikili ilişkilerden etkilenme olasılığı daha yüksektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Müdahalesizlik, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi, oy verme şekli, ikili ilişki, yasal çerçeve

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To Juvenal, Paula and Margarita

Para Juvenal, Paula y Margarita

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	: African Union
ES	: English School
GCC	: Gulf Cooperation Council
IOs	: International Organizations
IGOs	: Intergovernmental Organizations
INGOs	: International Non-governmental Organizations
LAS	: League of Arab States
OIC	: Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPEC	: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
R2P	: Responsibility to Protect
UN	: United Nations
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
UNSMIL	: United Nations Support Mission in Libya
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US	: United States of America

INTRODUCTION

In 1945, the foundation of the United Nations Organization started a new era for international relations (Amici & Cepiku, 2020). The establishment of permanent forums for the discussion of international issues, especially those related to peace and security with implications for the international society, also created new dynamics of interaction among the States based on the foundational principles of this organization, namely sovereign equality of States, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, the refrainment from the threat or use of force and non-interventionism in matters of domestic jurisdiction (United Nations, 1945). Among these principles, for the purpose of this research, it is important to point out the non-intervention principle, which as Vincent (1971) explained, prescribed a standard of behavior that requires respect for the principle of state sovereignty which recognition is fundamental to the coexisting among the States.

Among international society, this principle has been a subject of constant debate, particularly in those issues related to humanitarian action after 2001 with the emergence of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that has as its main purpose to provide protection for the population affected by serious harm, civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse, which their states are unwilling or unable to protect (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). In that sense, the normative structure of the English School approaches this issue through the Pluralism-Solidarism debate, tackling the order/justice perspective, and how interstate society relate to people with human rights as the central element (Buzan, 2014).

The main scenario for this debate has been the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which is one of the 6 main structures established by the United Nations Charter. This multilateral body has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security following the main purpose of the Organization. It can be considered the most important body of the UN system since it has the function of determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It also has the power to call upon the parties to a

dispute to settle it by peaceful means, generate recommendations, impose sanctions or even authorize the use of force to preserve or restore international peace and security. Furthermore, it is fundamental to point out that Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, all members of the United Nations agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Security Council (United Nations Security Council, n.d.).

In that sense, one issue extensively discussed within the UNSC since 2011 is the situation in Libya, which also represent an accurate example of the debate between the pluralist approach supporting the non-interventionism principle, and the solidarist view based on the R2P for promoting the humanitarian armed intervention (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

During the 2015-2016 period, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela participated as a non-permanent member of the UNSC playing a prominent role in the discussion process related to the situation in Libya, manifested in its voting pattern (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). Taking into consideration the mentioned above, this research aims to answer the following questions: what is the position of Venezuela in the discussion of the situation in Libya within the Security Council according to its voting patterns? Furthermore, which are the specific elements that are more likely to influence its foreign policy?

As preliminary answers, the present research has the hypothesis that the voting strategies of States within international organizations are based on the principles of their international policy and are more likely to be influenced by the bilateral relationships held with the actors involved in the discussion. Based on that, there are two variables, being ‘the voting strategies of states within international organizations’ the dependent variable; and ‘the principles of the state’s international policy’ and ‘the bilateral relationships held with the actors involved in the discussion’ the independent variables.

With that purpose, this dissertation starts with a general overview of the background in Chapter I, composed of the definition of international organizations, developing an inside evaluation of the United Nations Organization tackling its ideological background, its antecedents, and foundation, and its principles and organs. Furthermore, related to the UNSC is described its role in international peace and security, conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations, and its political and peacebuilding missions. Subsequently, this

study proceeds to describe the participation of Venezuela within the United Nations, observing its Foreign Policy during the First World War (1914-1918) and the Second World War (1939-1945), its role in the constitution of the organization and its participation as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Moreover, it tackles the definition of intervention and non-intervention in international relations for a better understanding of this concept as a foundational principle of the United Nations, introducing the origin and guidelines of the R2P as a legal instrument of international law. To finish this chapter, it is presented the discussion of Libya's situation within the UNSC, describing the starting of the political crisis, the actions taken by the different bodies of the organization, the position of the regional organizations, and the Resolutions approved.

Chapter II refers to the theoretical framework where is described the English School, and the debate Pluralism-Solidarism within the normative structure, which represents the most suitable paradigm to develop this dissertation. Likewise, Chapter III presents the methodological aspects, namely the main research questions, hypothesis and variables, and the methodology implemented based on a qualitative method alongside a quantitative evaluation of the resolutions adopted during the 2015-2016 period of the UNSC that tackle the situation in Libya, to evaluate the Venezuela voting pattern, executing a case study method taking the discussion of the situation in Libya as a single case.

By last, Chapter IV exposes the analysis and results. With that objective, it is developed the evaluation of the bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Libya, tackling the establishment of the diplomatic relations, the foreign policy to the Middle East region from 1999 with the start of Hugo Chávez administration, the State Visits, and the bilateral agreement subscribed between Venezuela and Libya during the 1999-2011 period. Regarding the analysis of the Venezuelan legal framework, are considered the Constitution as the foundational law alongside 'El Plan de la Patria' [The Homeland Plan] and the most relevant legal document that contains the guideline principles for the design of the foreign policy, highlighting the articles focused on the defense of the national sovereignty.

In consequence, the present study is built around the objective of evaluating the position of Venezuela in the discussion of the situation in Libya within the Security Council according to its voting patterns during its non-permanent membership of the UNSC throughout the

2015-2016 period, to identify the specific elements that are more likely to influence its foreign policy. First of all, taking into account the binding nature of the decisions emanating from the UNSC, the position adopted by the states during their two years the non-permanent membership, will reflect their alignments and interests to be pursued in other international organisms (United Nations, 2017); and secondly, because in the recent years this State has been an object of discussion within the international community under arguments based on the absence of legitimacy and the lack of compliance with international law and democratic principles, intending to create the scenario for the legitimization of the adoption of interventionist measures within international organizations. For that reason, the Non-interventionism has consolidated as a key principle of the Venezuelan foreign policy, defining the position to be adopted in the discussions related to this topic.

CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND

- **International Organizations**

The modern history of International Organizations (IOs) properly begins with the nineteenth-century public international unions resulting from the economic and geopolitical requirements of various sorts, that is to say, technical or purportedly non-political and non-controversial initiatives to address specific problems (Weiss, 2015). These small steps in international cooperation would result in bigger ones, what Mitrany (1948) defined as ‘peace by pieces’. While some analysts considered that such cooperation would make war impossible, a less extremist position was argued that these practices would certainly build confidence and interdependence that would create more feasible conditions for the approach to international peace and security issues (Weiss, 2015).

In this sense, as Amici & Cepiku (2020) state “the term ‘international organizations’ (IOs) refers to a wide variety of formal structures with both common elements as well as specific peculiarities, which call for clarification” (p. 7). In addition, Dijkzeul and Beigbeder (2003) quoted by Amici & Cepiku (2020) claim that in a general approach the term ‘international organizations’ is used to include multinational corporations, bilateral organizations, multilateral organizations, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (p. 7). That is to say, this term is implemented “as a generic term for all forms of non-state actors working at the transnational or global levels” (Brechin & Ness, 2003, p. 17).

In this sense, as Amici & Cepiku (2020) point out, the IOs can be classified according to diverse criteria, being the most relevant, the distinction between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) according to the nature of their composition. The first attempt to distinguish the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) was implicitly defined in Resolution 288 (X) of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on 27th February 1950. This document stated, “any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these arrangements”.

Furthermore, additional conditions include that IGOs must be constituted mainly of sovereign states, although they can also incorporate other international actors; and the establishment of a permanent Secretariat performing specific tasks.

In outline, as Karns et al. (2015) sum up, “IGOs are organizations that include at least three states as members, that have activities in several states, and that are created through a formal intergovernmental agreement such as a treaty, charter, or statute. They also have headquarters, executive heads, bureaucracies, and budgets” (p. 17).

Besides, Karns et al. (2015) define non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as “private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a common purpose” (p. 15). Most commonly, these organizations are constituted to advocate causes such as human rights, peace, or environmental protection.

IOs also can be classified considering the geographical range and purpose. Taking into account the location of its members, it can be global involving states of several regions; regional when its members belong to a specific region, normally the same continent; and sub-regional composed of limited states within a particular region. Regarding the purpose, one IOs can be multi-purpose when it approaches several topics within the international system; and single-purpose in the case of those IOs focused on specific fields, for instance, migration, trade, education, among others (Amici & Cepiku, 2020).

The most emblematic global and multi-purpose IGO is the United Nations. “A universal intergovernmental organization dealing with peace and security as well as economic cooperation would necessarily be at the centre of the new international (and European) order after the second worldwide conflagration within a half-century” (Weiss, 2015, p. 1223). “As a consequence, it can be considered IGOs as a subset of IOs connected to the United Nations system and other actors engaged in global governance and related interstate activities” (Brechtin & Ness, 2003, p. 17).

a. United Nations

• Ideological Background

As Weiss (2015) states “The geopolitical necessity offered fertile ground to plant with creative thoughts about how best to foster peace and prosperity after the Second World War” (The United Nations: before, during and after 1945, p. 1221). The foundation of the United Nations in 1945 is the consolidation of the ideal of an international community focused on the promotion of peace as the key condition for the preservation of security. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant first conceived this idea in 1795 with the notion of perpetual peace based on what is now comprehended as the rule of law. “He advocated that nations establish a peaceful world community, not through a global government, but with each country becoming a free State respectful of its citizens and foreign visitors, thus promoting a peaceful society worldwide” (United Nations, 2018, p. 10). With this idea, Kant settled the philosophical and political thinking for the development of international law and future institutions.

• Antecedents: First International Peace Conference and The League of Nations

Peace has been a constant goal of international relations. More than a century ago, the first International Peace Conference was held in The Hague in 1899 to elaborate multilateral instruments for settling crises peacefully, preventing wars, and codifying rules of warfare. This event had, as a result, the adoption of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and established the Permanent Court of Arbitration which starts its operations in 1902 (United Nations, 2017).

Subsequently, the most emblematic antecedent of the United Nations, the League of Nations, was set up in 1919 following the end of the First World War. It was established with 44 signatures of the Covenant of the League of Nations to keep world peace by promoting disarmament, preventing war through collective security, settling disputes mechanisms between countries such as negotiation and diplomacy, and improving global welfare. Nevertheless, the lack of military force or any other method to enforce its decisions over tackled disputes represented its main weakness. Likewise, not all countries were members of this organization failing in taking action when necessary. For instance,

The United States was never a member, despite president Wilson's involvement in the League's creation (United Nations, 2018).

In summary, the League of Nations was able to resolve some disputes and impede certain local wars. However, it was ineffective in preventing powerful nations from involving in belligerent actions. Moreover, the League was powerless to prevent the escalated events that led to the Second World War. Though it did not succeed, this organization represents the first attempt at the dream of a universal organization (United Nations, 2018).

- **Foundation of the United Nations**

As a successor of the League of Nations and due to the necessity of a mechanism focused on guaranteeing long-lasting peace and preventing future wars, allied world leaders who collaborated to end the Second World War developed several negotiations that end up with the foundation of the United Nations in 1945 (United Nations, 2018).

On 12 June 1941, delegates of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa; the exiled governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia; and General de Gaulle, leader of the Free French, met in London and signed the **Declaration of St. James' Palace** that promote cooperation as the most effective method to guarantee durable peace¹ (United Nations, 2018).

Subsequently, on 14 August 1941, United States president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a joint declaration known as the **Atlantic Charter**. It is composed of eight main points that outlined a vision for post-war settlement including no territorial gains for the involved parties, territorial adjustments following the wishes of the peoples concerned, the introduction of the principle of self-determination, the reduction of trade barriers, the promotion of global economic cooperation for the accomplishment of social welfare, the commitment of focusing efforts that aim to achieve a world free of want and fear and the freedom of the seas, and the most relevant outcome of this negotiation, the agreement on disarmament of aggressor nation and post-war common disarmament. Even when leaders never signed this document, its content was well known

¹ The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security; It is our intention to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end (The Declaration of St. James' Palace, 1941).

by the international community and represents an important precedent to the settlement of the principles of international relations contained in the following documents (United Nations, 2018).

It is fundamental to emphasize that this document mentions that both victor and vanquished states will have market access on equal terms. This statement represented a direct refusal to weaken the defeated nations' economies through sanctions, founded on the belief that these kinds of measures imposed on Germany after the First World War were part of the causes of the Second World War. On 24 September 1941, during a meeting of the Inter-Allied Council in London the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and delegates of General de Gaulle unanimously adopted the common principles of policy settled by the Atlantic Charter (United Nations, 2018).

In January 1942, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, The Soviet Union, and China signed the **Declaration by United Nations** that pledged the signatory governments to the maximum war effort and compromised them against settling a separate peace. Representatives of 33 other states added their signatures (United Nations, 2018). As Weiss (2015) exposes

The Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations committed the Allies to multilateralism not only to fight fascism in the short term, but also over the longer term to maintain international peace and security and to foster postwar economic growth and social stability. The commitment was evident not only on the battlefronts but also in a commitment to intergovernmental organizations and wide coordination of national policies among the 44 allied states (p. 1223).

Later, on 30 October 1943, Vyaches Molotov, Anthony Eden, and Cordell Hull, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States respectively, together with Foo Ping Shen, the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, signed the **Moscow Declaration**, which pledged further joint action in dealing with the enemies' surrender, recognizing the necessity of establishing an international organization in order to maintain international peace and security² (United Nations, 2018).

² Paragraph 4 recognizes the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to

Following the four-power Declaration that presented the concrete necessity of a new international organization, in December of 1943 Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, meeting at Teheran, the capital of Iran, declared that they had worked out concerted strategies for final victory (United Nations, 2018).

To carry out paragraph 4 of the Moscow Declaration, the representatives of China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States laid down the principles and the structure of the world organization-to-be in 1944 during the **Dumbarton Oaks Conference** in Washington D.C. This proposal was submitted to all the United Nations governments and its people for their study and discussion (United Nations, 2018).

Regarding its structure, the organization to be known as the United Nations will be constituted by four principal bodies: a General Assembly composed of all the members, alongside a Security Council of eleven members where five of these were to be permanent and the other six were to be chosen from the other members by the General Assembly to hold participation for two years. The third body was an International Court of Justice, and the fourth a permanent Secretariat. By last, it was contemplated an Economic and Social Council, working under the authority of the General Assembly (United Nations, 2018).

The essence of the plan was that the Security Council would be responsible for preventing future armed conflicts and the General Assembly would be in charge of the study, discussion, and making recommendations to promote international cooperation and adjust situations likely to impair welfare. For instance, problems of cooperation in maintaining peace, security, and disarmament but without tackling any matter being considered by the Security Council (United Nations, 2018).

Comments and constructive criticisms came from numerous governments, such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Union of South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Relevant consideration was given to the differences between this proposal and the Covenant of the League of Nations, being the most important feature the admission

membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security (Moscow Declaration, 1943).

of putting armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council in its task of preventing war and suppressing acts of aggression (United Nations, 2018).

One important aspect of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals had yet to be discussed: the voting procedure in the Security Council. This debate was held at the **Yalta Conference** in February 1945, where Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin announced that this question had been resolved, and it summoned the San Francisco Conference as the final step for the consolidation of the United Nations Organization project (United Nations, 2018).

The **San Francisco Conference** was celebrated from April to June 1945, starting even before the end of the war in Europe, with the participation of 50 nations representing over 80% of the world's population, aiming to produce a document acceptable to all countries that would guide the work of the organization in charge of preserving peace and international security. The resulting Charter containing the guiding principles of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945 by the present 50 countries and on 15 October 1945 by Poland, considered the 51 original member States. As result, the United Nations came into being on 24 October 1945 (United Nations, 2018). This event was evidence of the commitment to multilateralism and robust intergovernmental organizations, which were viewed as structural necessities of the postwar context (Weiss, 2015).

- **The Charter of the United Nations: principles and organs**

“The United Nations is an international organization constituted by independent states that has the common interest of gathering efforts around world peace and social progress. Nowadays, the UN membership is 193 countries” (United Nations, 2018). This organization has as a constitutive instrument the Charter of the United Nations, which sets out the rights and obligations of the member states, codifies the basic principles of international relations, and establishes its principal organs and procedures (United Nations, 2017).

The Charter is composed of a Preamble and 111 articles divided into 19 chapters. The Preamble expresses the shared ideals and common aims, such as the consolidation of international peace, the protection of human rights, conditions of justice, and social

progress. Chapter 1 exposes the purposes and principles³; Chapter 2 establishes the criteria for the membership; Chapter 3 presents the 6 principal organs; Chapters 4 to 15 define the functions and powers of each organ; Chapters 16 and 17 relate the United Nations to existing international law; and Chapters 18 and 19 define the amendment and ratification of this legal instrument (United Nations, 2017).

Regarding the structure, the Charter establishes six principal organs: the General Assembly (UNGA), the Security Council (UNSC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. All these organs are based at United Nations Headquarters in New York, except for the International Court of Justice that is settled at The Hague in the Netherlands. The United Nations system, however, is much larger, encompassing 15 specialized agencies, multiple funds, and programmes, as well as other entities responsible in specific fields (United Nations, 2017; United Nations, 2018).

- **Role of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) over International Peace and Security**

The Charter of the United Nations as an international legal instrument compels member states to solve their disputes by peaceful means that do not threaten international peace, security, and justice. They are to abstain from the threat or use of force against any state and should bring any dispute before the Security Council (United Nations, 2017).

³ Article 1. The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. Maintain international peace and security; 2. Develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 3. Cooperate in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms; and 4. Be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (United Nations, 1945).

Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: 1. It is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members; 2. All Members shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed; 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means; 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; 5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action; 6. The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles; 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State (...); but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (United Nations, 1945).

Being the UNSC the organ responsible for maintaining peace and security, its decisions have mandatory force and the States are obliged to accept and carry out its resolutions. When a dispute is brought to its attention, the UNSC urges the parties to solve it through peaceful means. Under this scenario, the Council may generate recommendations for a peaceful settlement, such as appointing special representatives, requesting good offices from the Secretary-General, undertaking an investigation, or executing mediation practices. On the other hand, when a dispute leads to fighting, the Council takes rapid action to end the belligerent situation as quickly as possible. Besides that, the Council has the possibility of deploying military peacekeeping forces to the area of conflict⁴ (United Nations, 2017). It is fundamental to highlight that the actions that involved armed efforts are implemented as a last resort when peaceful means have been exhausted, and after the recognition of the situation as a threat to the peace or as an act of aggression. Furthermore, the UNSC has the faculty to establish international tribunals to prosecute the actors involved in violation of human rights and serious breaches of international humanitarian law (United Nations, 2017).

- **Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping operations**

The prevention of conflict is the main priority of the United Nations mission. Preventive diplomacy is the principal keystone of the organization to forestall conflict or avoid confrontation escalating, through mediation, conciliation, or negotiation practices. Early warning is a fundamental element of prevention and worldwide monitoring enables the UNSC and the Secretary-General to execute preventing measures. Skilled envoys and special representatives of the Secretary-General are involved in mediation and preventive diplomacy in several locations. Likewise, the Secretary-General may bring before the UNSC any matter that represents a threat to international peace and security. These operations are frequently undertaken in cooperation with regional organizations. The UN Department of Political Affairs is the main support structure, planning the tasks of peace envoys, providing conflict analysis, and overseeing the field-based political missions that

⁴ Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is empowered to take measures to enforce its decisions. It can impose embargoes and sanctions, or authorize the use of force for ensure that mandates are fulfilled. In some cases, the Council has authorized the use of military force by a coalition of member states or by a regional organization or arrangement (United Nations, 2017, p. 58)

represent the central platforms for preventive diplomacy. Alongside, the UNITAR Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention Programme are in charge of delivering innovative training in negotiation and mediation enhancing the effectiveness of UN efforts in these purposes (United Nations, 2017).

In the same sense, peacekeeping operations are an essential instrument employed by the international community to guarantee peace and security. These operations “are deployed with the authorization of the Security Council and the consent of the host government and/or the main parties of the conflict” (United Nations, 2017, p. 60). In its conception, Peacekeeping was a primarily military protocol of observing ceasefires and the dissolution of forces after inter-state wars. Nowadays, it has evolved into a complex model with many features such as military, police, and civilians working collectively to settle the foundations of sustainable peace. The military forces and civilian staff of peacekeeping operations are provided voluntarily and they are supported with financing resources from member States (United Nations, 2017).

Recently, the UNSC has implemented the practice of authorizing the deployment of peacekeeping operations allowing them to perform tasks that required the use of force, under the enforcement provisions contemplated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

“Originally, UN peacekeeping could only use their weapons in self-defense, but the more ‘robust’ mandates under Chapter VII enable them to use force in the exercise of their mandates, for example, their mandate to protect civilians” (United Nations, 2017, p. 60).

The tasks executed by peacekeepers over the years have included: maintaining ceasefires and dissolution of armed forces, protecting humanitarian operations, implementing comprehensive peace settlements, leading transitions to stable governments based on democratic practices and good governance, and protecting civilians (United Nations, 2017).

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is relative to “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. Under its provision, the UNSC can take enforcement measures to maintain or restore international peace and security as is stated in Article 39⁵. These measures range from sanctions to military action. Sanctions encompass

⁵ Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in

an extensive variety of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force. As is established in Article 41 of the Charter⁶ (United Nations, 2017).

The taken actions have had several different forms ranging from economic and trade embargoes to particular commodities bands and arms embargoes, alongside measures targeting specific individuals and entities through travel bands and asset freezes. Sanctions have been applied as part of a strategy encompassing peacekeeping and peacebuilding to achieve peaceful transitions, dissuade non-constitutional changes of government, counter-terrorism, safeguard human rights and promote non-proliferation. Concerns about the unfavorable impact of economic sanctions on the most vulnerable sectors of the civilian population have motivated improvements in the design and implementation of sanctions. Nowadays it has been focused on designating individuals and specific commodities (United Nations, 2017).

On the other hand, in the scenario of the failure of the non-armed action, stronger action may be authorized as it is contemplated in Article 42 of the Charter⁷. The UNSC has authorized coalitions of member States for implementing ‘all necessary measures’, involving military action to deal with determined conflicts such as the restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq (1991); the establishment of a secure context for humanitarian operations in Somalia (1992); the restitution of the democratically elected government in Haiti (1994), the safeguard of humanitarian operations in Albania (1997), the restoration of peace and security in East Timor (1999 and 2006); and the civilians' protection in Libya (2011). “These actions, although authorized by the Security Council, were entirely under the control of the participating States. They were not UN

accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to preserve or reinstate international peace and security (United Nations, 1945).

⁶ Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations (United Nations, 1945).

⁷ Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945).

peacekeeping operations, which are established by the Council and directed by the Secretary-General” (United Nations, 2017, p. 64).

- **Political and Peacebuilding missions**

Under the United Nations conception, peacebuilding includes diverse measures focused on reducing the risk of violent conflict and laying the basis for sustainable peace and development. While the nature of peacebuilding depends on the changing circumstances in each situation, efforts generally include strengthening safety, security, justice, and public administration; assisting dialogue and reconciliation, providing basic services; and stimulating the economy (United Nations, 2017).

There are three types of political and peacebuilding missions: field-based; special envoys; and sanctions panels and monitoring groups of the UNSC. These operations involve the participation of the General Assembly, Security Council, and Economic and Social Council, alongside several specialized agencies and international financial institutions. The United Nations has deployed peacebuilding operations in Liberia (1997), Central African Republic (1999), Angola (2002), Afghanistan (2002), Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2007), Sierra Leone (2008), Libya (2011), among others (United Nations, 2017).

- b. Venezuela in the United Nations**

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a founding member of the United Nations, signing the UN Charter on 26 June 1945 and ratifying it on 15 November 1945. During its membership, Venezuela has been part of the Security Council five (05) times being the most recent during the 2015-2016 period, a member of the Economic and Social Council 9 times being the last time during the 2017-2019 period, and a member of the Human Rights Council twice currently participating in the 2020-2022 period (United Nations, 2022).

- **Foreign Policy during the First World War (1914-1918)**

From the beginning of the war, most of the Latin American countries assumed a neutral position. The entry of the United States into the war, contrary to the expected, did not substantially modify this position. Already by 1914, the United States had achieved an important influence in Latin America in general and in Venezuela in particular. By then, Venezuela was beginning to participate decisively in the economic and political scope of

the United States, therefore, when this country entered the war in 1917, it was believed that Venezuela would follow the same decision. However, even though the Venezuelan Head of State did not hide his sympathies for the Kaiser and tried to build a system of government inspired by the German model, Venezuela declared itself neutral (Villegas, 1993).

At the time of the outbreak of the war, Juan Vicente Gómez had only been in power for six years and his government program had as its central aspect the consolidation of peace both internally and internationally. The neutrality policy responded in principle to that program closely linked to the achievement of internal peace and it is reflected in the message addressed to Congress by the President making reference to the European conflict and its impact over the populations⁸ (Villegas, 1993).

However, other factors influenced the adoption of this position. Mainly, all the governments, belligerent or not, believed that the war would be of short duration. It is also important to highlight the country's oil potential, which made it a strategically key actor. On the other hand, there was significant German influence and interests in Venezuela since the main import and export houses were of German origin, along with significant investments in the railways and financial sectors. Assuming an openly pro-German position meant alienating the markets of England, France, and the United States, countries that together with Germany constituted the country's main international markets and partners in the oil field whose investments were large and with growth prospects. Neutrality allowed the government to increase its exports and increase State resources, taking advantage of the food and oil supply needs of the countries directly involved in the war (Villegas, 1993).

⁸ En los últimos días de julio y los primeros de agosto del último año, estalló y propagó hasta adquirir enormes proporciones que hoy reviste el conflicto europeo, lanzándose a la guerra bajo sus respectivas banderas, millones de hombres. Especialísimo cuidado ha tenido el gobierno venezolano en guardar la más estricta neutralidad, cumpliendo así sus deberes en la comunidad internacional y patentizando con su proceder, los íntimos sentimientos de nuestro pueblo que en este duelo entre naciones amigas, no se inclina a ninguna más que a las otras sino que con todas comparte el dolor para sus hijos muertos valerosamente en los campos de batalla [In the last days of July and the first days of August of last year, it exploded and spread until it acquired the enormous proportions that the European conflict has today, launching into war under their respective flags, millions of men. The Venezuelan government has taken special care to maintain the strictest neutrality, thus fulfilling its duties in the international community and demonstrating with its actions the intimate feelings of our people that, in this duel between friendly nations, do not lean toward anyone other than the others but with all of them it shares the pain for their sons who died bravely on the battlefields] (Presidency of the Republic, 1971 quoted by Villegas, 1993).

Despite its neutrality policy, Venezuela was part of the invited countries to become a member of the League of Nations whose foundation was contemplated in the Treaty of Versailles coming into place on 10 January 1920. In that sense, Venezuela has been considered an original member of this organization resulting from the initiative promoted by France, England, and the United States, representing a break in the neutral position and an alignment with the Allied Powers (Edwards, 1929).

- **Foreign Policy during the Second World War (1939-1945)**

The participation of Venezuela in the establishment of the United Nations Organization takes place under the mandate of president Isaias Medina Angarita (1941-1945) whose foreign policy was determined by bilateral relations with transnational oil companies with extensive operations in Venezuelan territory with the growing oil industry, highlighting the relationship with the United States of America who saw Venezuela as a fundamental ally as an oil supplier in the face of the increased demand for energy resources due to the deployment of World War II. Before this scenario, Medina's foreign policy assumed a collaborating position in favor of the continental defense promoted by the United States. A confidential note on the subject of national defense, dated 18 June 1941, signed by Foreign Minister Caracciolo Parra Pérez, evidenced this regional alignment as of foreign policy in times of war⁹ (Marcano, 2020).

In that sense, one can perceive that the Venezuelan position was immediately prudent and that any international position would be defined by a regional bloc policy and guided by the fulfillment of the regional commitments (ACMRE, 1941c quoted in Marcano, 2020). In that sense, this position is also evident in the declarations of Medina condemning the invasion of Japan to Pearl Harbor in December 1941¹⁰ (Marcano, 2020).

⁹ La primera providencia sería reforzar con la colaboración norteamericana nuestro servicio de informaciones, sobre todo en materia de política militar y naval, conforme se previó en las conversaciones citadas [The first step would be to reinforce our information service with North American collaboration, especially in matters of military and naval policy, as foreseen in the aforementioned conversations] (ACMRE, 1941a quoted in Marcano, 2020, p. 41).

¹⁰ La serie de graves sucesos internacionales que se vienen sucediendo con pavorosa extensión e intensidad acaba de culminar con la agresión llevada a efecto contra los Estados Unidos de América por el Imperio del Japón; agresi- ón que Venezuela condena en nombre de postulados que han sido siempre suyos, en virtud de pactos solemnes que la hacen solidaria de todas y cada una de las naciones del continente, y que la llevan a colocarse con viva sinceridad, al lado de los Estados Unidos [The series of serious international events that have been taking place with frightening extension and intensity has just culminated with the aggression

These declarations and the subsequent rupture of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers represent an explicit alignment with the United States' foreign policy. This scenario accentuates the latent threat of possible attacks on the Venezuelan coasts and ships in charge of transporting oil to the United States, which occurred with the sinking of the Steamship Monagas, generating the celebration of the Colombia-Venezuela-United States tripartite mutual defense pact to prevent further incursions by German submarines into Caribbean waters (Marcano, 2020).

On the other hand, with the intensification of the war with the Pacific campaigns, oil resources were necessary to supply the marines, generating shortages that increased proportionally with the hostilities. Indeed, part of the problem of shortages arose as a consequence of the so-called "black lists" carried out by US and British commercial agents on Venezuelan trading houses that maintained relations with foreign businesses linked to the Axis powers. Precisely these pressures would generate accommodations and rearrangements in political and economic positions (Marcano, 2020).

Despite these diplomatic-commercial frictions, Venezuela remained aligned to the aspirations of the allies in the World War. This was ratified by Minister Parra Pérez on 13 February 1943 through a communication to the Ambassador of the United States of America Frank Corrigan that states the adhesion of Venezuela to the principles contained in the Atlantic Charter¹¹ (Marcano, 2020).

In this way, the principles of the Atlantic Charter would define not only Venezuela's foreign policy in times of World War, but would also become the main framework for the peaceful coexistence of States in the future. The bilateral relationship between Venezuela

carried out against the United States of America by the Empire of Japan; aggression that Venezuela condemns in the name of postulates that have always been its own, by virtue of solemn pacts that make it supportive of each and every one of the nations of the continent, and that lead it to place itself with great sincerity, next to from United States]. (Miraflores Archive, 1941b quoted by Marcano, 2020).

¹¹ Señor Embajador: (...) En la Reunión Consultiva de Río de Janeiro, el Gobierno de Venezuela manifestó su completo acuerdo con los mencionados principios cuando, en unión de los gobiernos de Estados Unidos de América, de Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba y México, presentó proyecto de resolución en el cual las naciones americanas daban su plena adhesión y apoyo a la Carta referida. C. Parra Pérez [Mr. Ambassador: (...) At the Consultative Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, the Government of Venezuela expressed its complete agreement with the aforementioned principles when, together with the governments of the United States of America, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba and Mexico, presented a draft resolution in which the American nations gave their full adherence and support to the aforementioned Charter. C. Parra Pérez] (MRE. Memoria, 1943, p. 15–16, quoted by Marcano, 2020).

and the United States would reach its higher level in February 1944, with the meeting between president Medina and US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It was the first time that a Venezuelan President in office had visited the United States. Followed by the visit to Venezuela by Nelson Rockefeller, Undersecretary of State of the United States of America in November 1944, accompanied by a group of experts looking for guaranteeing the North American vital space in Venezuela (Marcano, 2020).

- **Venezuela in the constitution of the United Nations Organization**

Venezuela was aware of the allied intentions to establish an international organization that would overcome the weaknesses of the League of Nations, generating serious observations at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on 18 November 1944. In this sense, the problems of war and peace are discussed by Venezuela in the Inter-American Conference on this subject at the beginning of 1945 under the tutelage of the Department of State (MRE, 1945 quoted by Marcano, 2020).

In the context of the constitution of the United Nations Organization and the San Francisco Conference, Ambassador Diógenes Escalante sent to Foreign Minister Parra Pérez his comments regarding the final text, very similar to the opinions of North American Republican senators (ACMRE, 1945 quoted by Marcano, 2020), an aspect that evidenced the alignment of the Venezuelan and US diplomacy. The delegation before the San Francisco was composed of the Foreign Minister Parra Pérez, Dr. Gustavo Herrera, Minister of Development, and Dr. Alfredo Machado Hernández, director of the Central Bank of Venezuela (ACMRE, 1945b quoted by Marcano, 2020).

During the second half of the XX century, Venezuela established democracy, freedom, and respect for Human Rights as the main focus of action both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. After the overthrow of the government of Marcos Pérez Jimenez in 1958, the initiatives were aimed at strengthening democracy in the world and around the defense of the principle of non-interventionism (Romero, 2009).

- **Venezuela as a non-permanent member of the Security Council**

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has been a non-permanent member of the UNSC for five opportunities during the 1962 – 1963, 1977 – 1978, 1986 – 1987, 1992 – 1993, and 2015 – 2016 periods (United Nations, 2022).

In 1962, Venezuela assumes for the first time the position of non-permanent member of the Security Council for the period 1962-1963, and having been elected the Venezuelan Ambassador as President of the General Assembly, the Venezuelan representatives before the Council took the floor in numerous opportunities expressing the national position on various issues on the international scene such as the cases of Cuba and the Missile Crisis, Palestine, India, and Pakistan with the Kashmir conflict, and in 1963 regarding the denunciations made by countries such as Senegal and Haiti about the territories under Administration Portuguese in the context of the decolonization proliferation, the condemnation of the Apartheid policy in South Africa, as well as the admissions of Algeria, Jamaica, Uganda, Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya, and Kuwait as members of the organization. During this period, it can be noticed that Venezuela's courses of action both in the UN and in other integration mechanisms focused on defending non-interventionism in the internal affairs of other nations (Romero, 2009).

In 1977, Venezuela was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the second time for the period 1977-1978. During this occasion, the Venezuelan representative, Simon Alberto Consalvi, consolidated its participation in that body and in 1977 intervened on several occasions on various issues such as Botswana's complaint against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Middle East, Cyprus, rights of the Palestinian people, the admissions of Djibouti and Vietnam as members of the UN, among others. In 1978, Ambassador Ruben Carpio Castillo's efforts aimed at increasing the role and participation of Venezuela in the UN consistent with a foreign policy focused on the pursuit of solidarity and international cooperation (Romero, 2009).

In 1986, Venezuela occupied a seat for the third time as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 1986-1987 period, and the representative Andres Aguilar used this forum to present the Venezuelan position to the international community regarding current international issues such as the war between Iran and Iraq, the denunciation of Angola

against South Africa, the situation in Namibia and the Central American conflict, regarding the intervention of the United States in Nicaragua through military and paramilitary activities, rejecting the US action and defending once again the principle of non-interventionism (Romero, 2009).

In 1992, Venezuela is elected for the fourth time as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 1992-1993 period. In this opportunity, it maintained the line of defense and promotion of democracy in Latin America and the world in general. Also, the promotion of South-South coordination and cooperation was emphasized to explore the possibilities of increasing trade and other forms of exchange between non-industrialized countries. Likewise, the role played by Venezuela and OPEC in the Persian Gulf crisis was defended, and the State committed itself to the struggle for the independence of Namibia and against the Apartheid regime in South Africa (Romero, 2009).

Among other outstanding participation before this forum, Venezuela supported the need to achieve a state of justice and common well-being in the Latin American region as an indispensable step for the achievement of truly peaceful coexistence and a real hemispheric integration, including the thesis on international social justice and the international common welfare to its foreign policy in the multilateral sphere. In addition, during the 80' decade Venezuela maintained active participation in the Security Council in specific cases of global significance such as the situation in Afghanistan, the war in the Malvinas in which it widely promoted the principle of non-interventionism, the dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua, Namibia and Grenada, among others. Also, it is worth mentioning the position of Venezuela regarding the democratization of this body where Venezuela was a promoter of the reform of the UN structures with the incorporation of new members and the democratization in the decision-making process within this body (Romero, 2009).

- **Other priorities of Venezuela before the UN: The boundaries situation between Venezuela and Guyana, South-South Cooperation, Law of the Sea, foreign debt, and anti-corruption measures**

In 1962, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marcos Falcon Briceño, presented the topic "Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the Territory of British Guyana" in the program of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. With this action, Venezuela

raises for the first time the border issue before the international community, a fact that began the negotiations between Venezuela and the United Kingdom that later concluded with the signing of the Geneva Agreement of 1966 (Romero, 2009).

Since then, the border issues between Venezuela and other countries will be a priority matter in foreign policy before international organizations, giving priority to the problem of Guyana Essequiba and the maintenance of its claim around the Essequibo in the Decolonization Committee of the UN. In this way, although in 1965 Venezuela voted in favor of the admission of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana as a member of the United Nations, in 1966 the Venezuelan representative, Pedro Zuloaga, in a paper entitled "Admission of Guyana as a member of the UN" hereby formally record that this decision did not imply a reduction on the claims of Venezuelan rights over the territory under dispute¹² (Romero, 2009).

On other matters, the UN represented an opportunity for Venezuela to achieve greater rapprochement with developing countries. In this sense, in terms of international cooperation, its participation in the I and II United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was of great significance, as well as the alignment to the Group of 77 (G-77) in 1965 and its participation as an observer in the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Zambia in 1970. For Venezuela, the South-South cooperation was essential to increase negotiating strength and promote ties with other developing countries in defense of common interests (Romero, 2009).

Likewise, Venezuela, along with other developing countries, also defended the establishment through the Conference on the Law of the Sea, of the right of developing nations to have a fair share in the control and enjoyment of the marine and underwater resources as a principle of international law. Another important topic in the 80' decade was the economic situation of developing countries focused on foreign debt as a priority issue of

¹² ...ni su apoyo (el de Venezuela) a la solicitud de ingreso de Guyana a las Naciones Unidas, ni el ingreso mismo, pueden implicar renuncia ni disminución de los derechos de soberanía de Venezuela sobre el territorio situado a la margen izquierda del río Esequibo, ni reconocimiento en forma alguna al llamado Laudo Arbitral de París de 1899 sobre la frontera entre Venezuela y la Guyana Británica [...neither its (Venezuela's) support for Guyana's application for admission to the United Nations, nor admission itself, can imply a waiver or diminution of Venezuela's sovereign rights over the territory located on the left bank of the river Essequibo, nor recognition in any way to the so-called Paris Arbitration Award of 1899 on the border between Venezuela and British Guyana] (MRE, 1966, p.78 quoted by Romero, 2009).

hemispheric and global security. Later in the 90s, the attention was focused on the promotion of the responsibility to undertake a common strategy to combat corruption, raising the necessity to sign a global convention against corruption (Romero, 2009). With the new century also came a foreign policy focused on the promotion of a multicenter system, prioritizing regional integration and closer relationships with the oil producer countries, denouncing imperialistic practices, and promoting the defense of the non-interventionism principle (López, 2020).

c. Non-interventionism Principle in United Nations

• Definition of Intervention in International Relations

Intervention in international relations, as Vincent (1971) states is a concept implemented to refers to an event that could be as relevant as the starting of a violent conflict one State with another State, or as seemingly less significant as an adverse remark made by a Statesman about the affairs of a another State. In that sense, it is considered a diverse phenomenon and a concept that involves a significant range of actions that generates a broad debate regarding the activities that can properly be considered intervention.

The accurate analysis of intervention within international relations must be composed of the subject that executes the action, the object which suffers the intervention, the activity of intervention itself, and the types and purpose of the action. About the subject, it can be some entity of group such as a State or group of States, a revolutionary group within a State, a group enjoying the tacit support of its government, and in the modern world, regional and universal international organizations have taken their place as potential subjects of intervention. The object of intervention refers to the target at which the intervention is aimed. It can be distinguished into two broad destinations: domestic affairs which seek to penetrate and meddle in the domestic arrangement of a State, and external affairs which address its foreign relations bilaterally and multilateral. Likewise, the target of intervention can be approached by the concept presented by Wright (1960) quoted by Vincent (1971) understanding matters of purely domestic concerns

geographically as matters taking place within the territory of a State,
personally as matters concerning individuals within the jurisdiction of a
State, functionally as matters which could be dealt with conveniently and
efficiently by States individually, or politically as matters which could be

dealt with by States individually without affecting the interests of others (p. 4)

In this sense, it might be considered that intervention occurs whenever any of these aspects is made the object of intrusion by a foreign actor. In this sense, “a subject intervenes and the object suffers the intervention; the activity of intervention itself is the ‘doing-word’ of the relationship” (Vincent, 1971, p. 5). More generally, intervention is considered an interference in whichever affairs so as to affect its sequence or outcome encompassing the scenario in which intervention takes place on behalf of one party within a dispute, as well as the action of coming between the parties. Subsequently, many scholars define intervention more properly as a synonym of “dictatorial interference” for referring to the imposition of the will of one actor on that of the State, the attempt to force or coerce the sovereign will of another State (Vincent, 1971).

In the context of international politics, the words ‘interference’, ‘dictatorial’, and ‘coercive’ are fundamental for understanding the intervention phenomenon. “Interference might be defined as action taken to affect the actions of others, dictatorial interference as action taken to prescribe the actions of others” (Vincent, 1971, p. 6). The fundamental distinction between affecting some action and prescribing its course resides in the notion of coercion that introduces the idea of force. According to the Oxford English Dictionary quoted by Vincent (1971), to coerce is to “constrain or restrain by application of superior force or by authority resting on force; to constrain to compliance or obedience by forcible means” (p. 6). In that sense, one can conclude that “intervention will be understood as coercive interference and the use or threat of force will be taken as a guide to the incidence of intervention” (Vincent, 1971, p. 7).

Some writers have denoted intervention as a type of action that is to be distinguished from war; they have placed it in a range between war or the forceful crossing of international frontiers and mere diplomatic pressure. Intervention is a type of action, and there are also types of intervention such as military intervention, which takes place when troops are deployed to keep the order or to support an insurrection in a foreign State, or when military support is given to a government with internal position is insecure or that is in conflict with a neighboring country; economic intervention occurs when threads are related to the manipulation using the aid given to small countries by foreign States, or when

economically developed States limit the contracting capacity of under-developed primary-producing States; and political intervention takes place when hostile propaganda is circulated abroad, when moral support is provided to a revolutionary movement within another State, or when recognition is denied to a newly established government (Vincent, 1971).

Regarding the last aspect, the purpose of intervention refers to the objective towards which it is directed, the goal which it is designed to achieve. More generally, the most common purposes are related to the maintenance of the balance of power, the interests of humanity, and ideological solidarity (Vincent, 1971).

- **Definition of Non-Intervention in International Relations**

Intervention having been defined; non-intervention can be understood as the circumstance in which intervention does not occur. In international relations, it is considered that a State follows a policy of non-intervention when it decides not to intervene in a situation where intervention is a conceivable policy path. From the legal perspective, non-intervention is conceived as a principle, a rule with which States are obliged to comply with their relations with each other. Thus, a rule is an imperative which stipulates a specific form of action or delimitates the appropriate form of conduct for a defined class of people or institutions. It prescribes a standard of behavior and makes compliance with such behavior the norm for the class in which it involves (Vincent, 1971).

The rule of non-intervention can be understood as derivative from and require respect for the principle of State sovereignty which recognition is fundamental to the coexisting. If a State has a right to sovereignty, this suggests that other States must respect that right by, among other things, abstaining from intervention in its domestic affairs. The principle of non-intervention recognizes the right of States to sovereignty as prevailing in international society and makes explicit the indispensable respect for it in abstention from intervention. In that sense, one can understand that “the function of the principle of non-intervention in international relations might be said then, to be one of protecting the principle of State sovereignty” (Vincent, 1971, p. 14).

As Vincent (1971) states quoting Falk (n.d.) non-interventionism is considered a “doctrinal mechanism to express the outer limits of permissible influence that one State may properly

exert upon another” (p. 15). It can be understood as the frontier between diplomatic pressure, being this tolerable, and the pressure and several degrees of coercion that are not acceptable. This principle might act as the border between the domain of international law and that of national law (Vincent, 1971).

- **Non-Intervention as foundation Principle of the United Nations**

Within international organizations, in particular the United Nations, non-interventionism is conceived as a mixture of a rule which had to be considered in the framing of foreign policy, a political slogan that was founded to advance the purposes of foreign policy, and a statement of the desired pattern of behavior in international relations (Vincent, 1971).

The principles of the organization, stated in Article 2 of the UN Charter, in the paragraph 7 explicitly arise the non-intervention principle¹³. This paragraph is considered the main legal source of the mentioned principle within the legal framework of the organization constituting the guardian of the domestic jurisdiction against the competence of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it applies to relations between the United Nations and its members, not to relations between the members themselves. Its final objective is to preserve the sovereignty of the States against the establishment of a supra-state actor (Vincent, 1971).

Even when the principle of non-intervention between States is not explicit in the Charter, it is implicit in the statement of Principles. For instance, Article 2(1) bases the Organization on the "principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members"; Article 2(3) demands the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and Article 2(4) commands all members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”, that is to say, territorial integrity and political independence were safeguarded by forbidding the use of force against them. It is aligned to delimitate the function of the United Nations as an organization that deals fundamentally with the governments of member-States, and through international relations, instead of one that is expected to penetrate the domestic affairs and the social economy of member-States. However, it is important to highlight that territorial integrity and political

¹³ Article 2.7: Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (United Nations, 1945).

independence can be weakened by actions not directly containing the threat or use of force (Vincent, 1971).

- **Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations**

As a result of the discussion developed within the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, also known as the Legal Committee, regarding the extension and implementation of the principles contemplated in the UN Charter, in 1970 was adopted the “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. Related to the non-intervention principle, in the preambulatory clauses the declaration recognizes the obligation of not intervene in the affairs of other State as precondition for the guarantee of international peace¹⁴. Likewise, operative clauses contemplate detailed guidelines for the implementation of the non-intervention principle and also establish the practices considered a violation of it¹⁵ (United Nations General Assembly, 1970).

Thus, the present Declaration made extensive the principle not only to the relationship between the Organization and its member-States but also to the relationship among the States, considering the intervention of one State or group of States over another a violation of international law. Furthermore, this paragraph also specifies the elements of a State that can be considered an object of intervention and consequently a violation of international law. Additionally, it explicitly recognizes the principle as part of the international legal order, defining the practices that could be considered a violation of the principle of non-

¹⁴ the strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security (United Nations General Assembly, 1970).

¹⁵ “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law (United Nations General Assembly, 1970).

intervention, including not also armed activities but also the use of economic-political coercive measures¹⁶ (United Nations General Assembly, 1970).

This document offered conclusions to the main debates around the implementation of the non-intervention principle, the forms of its violation, and the elements object of it. This conception is further stated in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty of 2001 adopted in 2005 by the General Assembly of the United Nations¹⁷. However, major discussion arises related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, values whose protection is contemplated in the Purposes of the organization, which would require an interference into traditionally domestic affairs.

- **Responsibility to Protect (R2P)**

Under international law, the main responsibility to protect civilians during armed conflicts lies with belligerents, State or non-State actors. International humanitarian law contemplates minimum protection and protocols applicable to the most vulnerable groups (United Nations, 2004). Thus, intending to provide protection for the population affected by serious harm, civil wars, insurgencies, State repression and State collapse, which their States are unwilling or unable to protect, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty celebrated in 2001, introduce the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’. The adoption by the UNGA in 2005 of the report resulted from the named commission has introduced this doctrine as an element of the international legal framework (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

The UN Charter is not clear when it comes to saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. Furthermore, the arguments for the establishment of the R2P are founded on the idea that “the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect

¹⁶ No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State (United Nations General Assembly, 1970).

¹⁷ Intervention is understood as any action taken against a State or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. By far the most controversial form of such intervention is military, and a great part of our report necessarily focuses on that. But we are also very much concerned with alternatives to military action, including all forms of preventive measures, and coercive intervention measures – sanctions and criminal prosecutions – falling short of military intervention (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing” (United Nations, 2004). Furthermore, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) contemplates that State sovereignty implies responsibility, including the responsibility to protect, thus “the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect” (p. XI).

Regarding its foundations, according to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), the R2P lies in the duties related to the exercise of state sovereignty, the UNSC responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security, the international legal instruments related to the protection of human rights and the practices of international actors in this matter¹⁸. Likewise, the introduction of this new legal doctrine contemplates the establishment of precautionary principles such as right intention, last resort, Proportional means, and reasonable prospects¹⁹ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

Another important element to be mentioned is that R2P contemplates the United Nations Security Council as the most appropriate body to approve military intervention for human protection purposes and its authorization should in all cases be formally requested before any military intervention action is deployed (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

d. Discussion of Libya's situation within the Security Council

As Bellamy & Williams (2011) expose, the international response to specific crises, namely the situation in Libya, evidences a new approach in practice to human protection. The UNSC has long authorized the implementation of ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians,

¹⁸ A. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; B. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; D. the developing practice of States, regional organizations, and the Security Council itself (p. XI).

¹⁹ A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, (...) must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned; B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored (...); C. Proportional means: The scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective; D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. XII).

in cases such as Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, Resolution 1973, approved on 17 March 2011, on the situation in Libya represented the first time this body “had authorized the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state” (p. 825).

- **Starting of Libya's political crisis**

The origins of Libya's crisis, then the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, lie in the political commotions related to the ‘Arab Spring’ movement that spread from Tunisia to Egypt and beyond at the beginning of 2011. After initial protests in January, it quickly evolved into a civil war between forces supporters of Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi and opposite groups seeking to downfall his government that established the Interim Transitional National Council also known as the Interim Council (United Nations, 2017). In the beginning, the rebels enjoyed increasing success, concreting solid control over some major cities that represent significant territories of the country. In response, in early March, Gaddafi's forces retook the control over much of the country, threatening to eradicate the rebellion's epicenter in the eastern part of the country. In this matter, Gaddafi declarations had a significant impact on the international society stating that ‘officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches’ and ‘any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed’ (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

- **United Nations response to Libya's situation: High Commissioner for Human Rights and Secretary-General**

In this sense, UN officials approach the problem as one of human protection, highlighting the imminent threat to the population in Libya. In February UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights made callings to the government authorities to the stop implementation of violent practices against rebel forces that can be considered crimes against humanity, insisting on the compliance of the 2005 commitment to R2P. These demands were reiterated by the Secretary-General ratifying the situation as a human protection problem involving also the UN Human Rights Council that established a commission to investigate the situation urging the UN General Assembly to suspend Libya from the Council, effective on 1 March (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

Likewise, it is fundamental to mention the role played by the regional organizations as ‘gatekeeping’ facilitating the establishment of the conditions for the adoption of enforcement measures by the UNSC. In this case, the League of Arab States (LAS) which is traditionally founded on the principle of non-interference, suspended Libya as a participant until the suppression of the violent measures (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Furthermore, on 23 February 2011, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué that condemned “the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protestors, in violation of human rights and International Humanitarian Law”, and recognized that “the aspirations of the people of Libya for democracy, political reform, justice and socio-economic development are legitimate” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2011).

- **UNSC Resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011**

Thus, the efforts made by the UN Secretariat alongside the initiatives taken by regional organizations set the scenario for the introduction of the Libya situation in the Security Council agenda. During the discussions, the UK and France assumed a tough position while the US adopted a more reticent position, especially regarding the possibility of adopting military options (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Later, on 26 February 2011, the Council unanimously passed Resolution 1970 that condemned “the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity” (p. 1); moreover, welcomed the earlier actions of the LAS, the AU and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); and strongly recalls “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population”²⁰ (p. 2).

²⁰ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41: 1. Demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population; 2. Urges the Libyan authorities to: (a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors; (...) (c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; (...) 4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; (...) 9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (...) of arms and related materiel of all types; (...) 15. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution; (...) 17. Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in annex II of this resolution; (...) 26. Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to facilitate and support the return of

Even when the adoption of this resolution was considered uncontroversial, several member States exposed they are not willing to endorse more coercive measures. For instance, the Russian government publicly stated that political means represent the most suitable methods for the solution to the Libya situation. This position was widely shared by States like China, India, and Brazil. Before this scenario, Gaddafi's regime wrote to the UNSC expressing the condemnation of Libya as premature and requesting the suspension of Resolution 1970 until the confirmation of the allegations against Libya (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

At the time of analyzing the discussion of the situation of Libya within the UNSC after Resolution 1970, it is fundamental to consider the elements that contribute to overcoming the differences among member States for the adoption of enforcement measures, despite the abstention of five member States. The first factor was the Libyan intransigence and the deterioration of the situation inside the country, with the imminent defeat of rebel groups and the worries that Gaddafi's forces would execute a massacre against this population. On the diplomatic field, the Gaddafi government refused the demands established in Resolution 1970 and did not allow humanitarian aid convoys into the belligerent territories. Secondly, the UK and France increased their calls for stronger international action, introducing a draft resolution on a no-fly zone leading to the negotiations on Resolution 1973. Even when this proposal was opposed by Germany and cautiously evaluated by the United States, on 10 March, NATO announced its decision of moving additional vessels into the region to assist humanitarian efforts and to closely monitor the situation, considering also the enforcement of an arms embargo and no-fly zone (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

- **Position of Regional Organizations: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), League of Arab States (LAS), and African Union (AU)**

Until this point, and despite the Anglo-French activism, the authorization of military action from the UNSC appeared unlikely due to the Russian, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and German opposition. Nevertheless, a third element is considered a political game-changer, namely the position taken by relevant regional organizations, serving once again as

humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

‘gatekeepers’ accelerating the conditions for international actions. For instance, this is the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that on 7 March requested to the UNSC to ‘take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya’, and condemned ‘crimes committed against civilians, the use of heavy arms and the recruitment of mercenaries’ by the Libyan regime. Likewise, the OIC echoed the GCC position calling for a no-fly zone over Libya, but explicitly excluding foreign military operations in Libyan territory (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

In the same order, the Council of the LAS in an extraordinary session at the Ministerial level decides to request to the UNSC to take the necessary measures in order to respond to the deteriorating situation in Libya, including the establishment of a no-fly zone and to cooperate with the Transitional National Council alleviating the loss of the legitimacy of the Libyan authorities²¹ (Council of the League of Arab States, 2011).

On the other hand, the position assumed by the AU’s Peace and Security Council was more precautionary and less supportive of the Transitional National Council than the LAS. Through a Communique the Council exposes its concerns about the national situation, especially regarding the humanitarian situation. Nevertheless, it also condemned the use of force from both involved sides²² and also “reaffirms its strong commitment to the respect of the unity and territorial integrity of Libya, as well as its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form” (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2011, p. 1).

²¹ 1. To call on the Security Council to bear its responsibilities towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring States; 2. To cooperate and communicate with the Transitional National Council of Libya and to provide the Libyan people with urgent and continuing support as well as the necessary protection from the serious violations and grave crimes committed by the Libyan authorities, which have consequently lost their legitimacy (Council of the League of Arab States, 2011, p. 1).

²² 3. Expresses AU’s deep concern at the prevailing situation in Libya, which poses a serious threat to peace and security in that country and in the region as a whole, as well as to the safety and dignity of Libyans and of the migrant workers (...) Council is equally deeply concerned with the resulting humanitarian situation; (...) 5. Reiterates AU’s strong and unequivocal condemnation of the indiscriminate use of force and lethal weapons, whoever it comes from, resulting in the loss of life, both civilian and military, and the transformation of pacific demonstrations into an armed rebellion (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2011, p. 1).

- **United States policy regarding Libya's situation within Security Council**

The most immediate effect of the LAS activism was on US policy led by Obama administration that adopted a cautious position before the scenario of military action in Libya considering military demands, probable casualties, financial implications, lack of a well-defined exit strategy, and concerns about involving in conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world. However, the LAS efforts consolidate the interventionist tendency within US government (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

After the decision of supporting stronger measures against Libya, the US deployed significant diplomatic efforts focused on persuading UNSC members to support the proposed resolution, a factor predominantly relevant to the position of Russia and South Africa. These diplomatic labors led to the debate within the UNSC regarding the authorization of the use of force for the establishment of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians. However, China and Russia, as permanent members; and India, Brazil, and Germany, as non-permanent members, were skeptical of the need to use military force and the motivation of the States promoters of these measures. Their objections were based on the non-interference and the non-use of force principles and the belief that “the use of military force might exacerbate an already bad situation and that the decision to impose a no-fly zone could quickly lead to more military commitments and might prolong the conflict” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 843).

Furthermore, these States considered that this resolution contemplates measures beyond the LAS request and unlocked the possibility of more large-scale armed intervention, arising procedural and pragmatic questions that were not answered in the negotiations such as “How would the no-fly zone be enforced? What assets would be used? What would the coalition’s rules of engagement be? And what would the political end-game entail?” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 843). Despite these concerns, these members that maintain an unconvinced position about the use of force abstained during the voting procedure because they alleged that they could not legitimize inaction in the scenario of mass atrocities events (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

- **UNSC Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011**

The Resolution 1973, voted on 17 March 2011, was approved with ten votes in favor and five abstentions, namely Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia. This Resolution recognizes the failure of the compliance of Resolution 1970 (2011) by the government of Libya, and reiterates that the national situation still represents a threat to international peace and security²³ (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

Regarding the operatives' clauses, paragraph 1 and 2 call for the establishment of a cease-fire, and strong efforts to set a solution of the crisis attending the claims of Libyan population²⁴. Regarding the protection of civilians, which represents the main argument for intervening in the situation, paragraph 4 authorizes the deployment of all required measures, including armed measures, with the objective of protect civilians under threat by government forces, only explicitly excluding foreign occupation in the national territory, with the condition of immediate notification to Secretary-General and the UNSC in function of the already granted authorization²⁵ (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

Furthermore, regarding the establishment of the no-fly zone, paragraph 6 and 7 set a ban on all flights in the national airspace, with the exception of those with humanitarian purposes²⁶. These represent the new elements introduced by Resolution 1973 as a complement to Resolution 1970. Nevertheless, these measures generated a polemic discussion about its interpretation. On 19 March, two days later, NATO and its key allies, including Qatar and Jordan in the region, interpreted the Resolution as the basis for a broad

²³ The preoperative clauses stated “the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with Resolution 1970 (2011)” (United Nations Security Council, 2011, p. 1) and reiterates that “the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security” (p. 2).

²⁴ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians; 2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people (United Nations Security Council, 2011)

²⁵ 4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General (...) to take all necessary measures, (...) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (...) excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

²⁶ 6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians; 7. Decides further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

range of military actions and launched an airstrike campaign that included the suppression of Libya's air forces and aviation capacities, as well as the implementation of armed measures against Libya's fielded forces under the argument that Libya's army represents a threat to civilians. On the other hand, LAS Secretary General insinuated that NATO's approach does not agree with the main objective of the establishment of a no-fly zone and stated that the final goal is to protect civilians, not bomb other civilians (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

Other positions are worthy of attention. For instance, Russia pointed out that NATO bombing had caused significant civilian casualties going beyond the mandate contemplated by resolution 1973, implementing unacceptable disproportionate use of force. For its part, China requested an immediate ceasefire and disagreed with any subjective interpretation of the Resolutions. Likewise, South Africa, which was a precautionary supporter of Resolution 1973, joined the critics, stating that the decision to refer the situation in Libya to the ICC contemplated in Resolution 1970 should also be extended to any actions committed in the supposed implementation of Resolution 1973 (Bellamy & Williams, 2011). Meanwhile, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Libya supported mediation efforts for the establishment of a ceasefire. After months of severe belligerent context, in October opposition groups conquered the city of Sirte, and Gaddafi was executed. On 23 October, the National Transitional Council took control of the government (United Nations, 2017).

In summary, the consensus around the implementation of force against Libya was facilitated by several particular elements, highlighting a solid regional consensus alongside the poor international standing of Gaddafi's regime, as well as the intelligibility of the threat and limited timeframe for effective measures. Moreover, the UNSC's response in this regard displayed the 'new' politics of protection that present four principal characteristics. First, the international community is nowadays explicitly focused on civilian protection, promoted mainly by the Secretariat. Second, the UNSC is openly more willing to authorize the implementation of armed forces for human protection purposes. Third, it evident the fundamental relationship between the UNSC and relevant regional organizations. Fourth, both activist and more precautionary States have agreed to approach crises through the UNSC

and related regional organizations. Nevertheless, this new politics of protection raises some challenges, namely, NATO has been extensively criticized for an exaggeratedly expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973, resulting in civilian casualties. Second, inquiries have been raised regarding the liaison between human protection and other political objectives, namely regime change. Critics focused on the argument that while protection is a legitimate interest it must not become a method to promote regime change (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

- **The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)**

Subsequent to the armed conflict in Libya in 2011, the United Nations founded a political mission to assist the transitional authorities of the country within the post-conflict processes. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), is mainly carried out by the UNSC with the objective of “supporting an inclusive Libyan political process and security and economic dialogue through mediation and good offices, including supporting the implementation of the Libyan ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020 and the political road map of 15 November 2020” (United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, 2022).

Furthermore, regarding human rights, UNSMIL is responsible for conducting monitoring and reports, supporting Libyan authorities’ efforts to secure uncontrolled arms, providing necessary services for the provision of humanitarian support, and coordinating international assistance. Its mandate was most recently renewed on 30 September 2021 through resolution 2599 until 31 January 2022 (United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, 2022).

In this sense, Libya situation still subject of discussion within international organizations, including several organs of the United Nations system. Furthermore, this topic has represented an algid point that have generated clear alignments that range from the States with clear tendency for the legal arguments and the States that support the humanitarian approach.

CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical discussions regarding the role of international organizations as actors in the international system are full of diverging ideas on the subject. This chapter focuses on the theoretical foundation of this study by observing approaches to international organizations through different paradigms of the international relations discipline.

As Çiçek (2020) quoting Hollis and Smith (1990) exposes, studying international relations theory as a whole, it is essential to introduce a cautious note: “no specific camp is able to capture the full extent of realities and nuances of global governance or international politics” (p. 6). Nevertheless, there are specific approaches that allow tackling the study of international relations as actors of international systems, especially as a source of international law. For this study, has been chosen the pluralism-solidarism debate within the English School as the theoretical perspective to analyze the different positions assumed around the non-intervention principle as part of the international legal framework, especially within international organizations.

- **The English School**

In the first theoretical framework, the English School conceive international society as anarchic considering that while humans within States are under the rule of a common government, independent States in their reciprocal relations are not, and this School focuses on the reflections regarding the implications of the absence of a common government. In this sense, the main consequence of this anarchy is the lack of existence of any kind of society that encompasses all the States; and in the scenario of its establishment is only possible with the subordination to a common authority (Bull, 1966).

One of the main support arguments of this doctrine is the called domestic analogy, founded on the experience of individuals within national society, in which exists their necessity to develop themselves under a common power with the objective of living in peace, claiming that States require to implement the same practice. That is to say, it is needed the

reproduction of domestic institutions on a global scale to eradicate the context of anarchy. The view of anarchy as incompatible with society among States has been particularly relevant since World War I (Bull, 1966).

According to Buzan (2014), English School thinking is developed around the foundational ‘three traditions’ of IR theory: realism, rationalism, and revolutionism, and their discourses are inspired by Hobbes, Machiavelli, Grotius, and Kant's statements, generating a triad of key concepts, namely international system, international society, and world society.


Within the English School, International System based on the Hobbes/Machiavelli/realism thinking is related to power politics amongst sovereign States and sets the conception of international anarchy as the key characteristic of IR theory. This approach is broadly concordant with the founding precepts of realism and neorealism and therefore clearly developed and understood separate from the English School (Buzan, 2014).

In the case of the conception of International Society, also known as States-system, interstate society, or society of States, based on the Grotius/rationalism thinking, is associated with institutionalization of shared interest amongst States and establishes the foundation and conservation of common rules and organizations at the fundamental element of IR theory. The essential notion of international society is reasonably simple: human beings inhabit within societies they mutually shape and are shaped by, in that sense, States also develop within an international society they shape and are shaped by (Buzan, 2014).

World society, based on Kant/revolutionism conception, considers individuals, non-state organizations, and the worldwide population as a complete and the center of global societal characteristics and places preeminence of the State system at the focus of IR theory (Buzan, 2014).

Taking into account these three main concepts, the traditional English School outline is summarized in figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The classical ‘three traditions’ model of English School theory



Source: (Buzan, 2014, p. 14)

As reflected in figure 2.1, these three key concepts compose an interlinked image of the IR universe. Even when each section is conceptually and methodologically different, they blur into each other at the borderlines. According to the English School assessment, all three elements are in constant coexistence and interaction, generating the main question: how strong they are in relation to each other? The answer to that question opens up an extensive range of scenarios: from solid realist ones where States compete ruthlessly for power, based on a system dominant conception; to more well-ordered ones in which States aspire to different degrees of coexistence, cooperation, and convergence, representing a society dominant model; to ones where States are no longer the prevailing unit, corresponding with the world society dominant perspective (Buzan, 2014). In summary, the English School contributes to IR theory as an attempt to balance power, interests, and principles of justice and responsibility within international society (Bain, 2021).

- **Normative Structure of the English School: Pluralism and Solidarism debate**

Within the English School thinking, the distinction between system and society has played a fundamental role, especially with the recurrent straddle of their frontiers by multiple authors; with world society playing more at the sidelines. However, international society is the most distinctive concept related to the nature of the English School, for that reason, much of its literature is focused on this over the other two parts of the triad. In this sense, it is fundamental to introduce the notions of Pluralism and Solidarism within international society. These terms are particularly associated with the discussions related to order and justice, human rights, and non-intervention and were coined by Hedley Bull in 1966. They have remained the central concepts in the normative structure of the English School which is the key feature that distinguishes the English School from realism or constructivism (Buzan, 2014).

On one hand, Pluralism embodies the communitarian approach regarding a State-centric method of association where sovereignty and nonintervention work to maintain political and cultural diversity. In this sense, this view is orientated essentially in the maintenance of interstate order. As a mandate, pluralists, highlighting Bull, will support that, though a profoundly unfair system cannot be long-lasting, the order is the *sine qua non* condition for justice (Buzan, 2014).

On the other hand, Solidarism refers to the tendency either to surpass the States-system with some other means of association or to evolve it beyond a sense of coexistence to one of collaboration on common projects. In practice, within this School, it has been related mostly to liberal cosmopolitan approaches and discussions about justice. Solidarists traditionally stress that order without justice is objectionable and eventually unsustainable (Buzan, 2014).

The pluralism-solidarism debate is talking about how interstate society should relate to world society, that is to say, how States should relate to people. The central matter has been human rights and the arising tension between the claim to sovereignty by States, on the one hand, and the idea that universal human rights must be perverse, on the other. The order/justice, States/people debate can be observed in terms of the States' rights versus the people's rights; or it also can be seen in terms of the nature of interstate society considering

the extent and type of shared norms, rules, practices and institutions within these societies. In the second view, there is no contradiction between the States and people's rights if States deploy the right of sovereignty and also the responsibility to acknowledge and implementation of human rights (Buzan, 2014). In that sense, it is about diminishing the tension between the necessities and priorities of states and the essentials and constraints of humankind (Bain, 2021).

To this debate is fundamental the discussion regarding international law as the basis of international society, considering whether it should be based on positive law or founded on natural law. Order/justice reflected in pluralism/solidarism perspectives have yin/yang characteristics, that is to say, they have complementary features to each other. Pluralism is related to positive law, situational ethics, and practical associations with coexistence as the main purpose; while Solidarism is related to natural law, cosmopolitan ethics, and purposive associations focused on collective goals. Both views State preferences regarding how situations within international relations should be addressed: both are practice-guiding models (Buzan, 2014).

At first glance, it seems Pluralism and Solidarism might be associated with realism and liberalism, but it is not the case. They do not embody zero-sum positions. The English School is about defining an operational balance between power and interest, and justice and responsibility; that is to say, finding the most effective meet-up of the ideal and the real. In practice, related to human rights, humanitarian intervention has been the main empirical issue tackled by this debate (Buzan, 2014).

- **Pluralism**

As mentioned above, Pluralism is focused on international order, with a State-centric vision and restricted to norms of coexistence. Pluralism conceives States as the dominant actor of international society and the sense of State sovereignty gives political preeminence to positive international law and non-intervention. The final objective of international society is establishing a framework for well-ordered coexistence and management of shared problems that involve the 'existence' as part of coexistence such as arms control and environmental issues (Buzan, 2014).

This is evidenced in the in the conception of sovereignty as the foundational element of international society and international law as the chief empirical expression of international society. In that sense, being sovereignty the basis of international society, international law represents the rules by which this occurred (Wilson, 2021).

In this framework, Pluralism has in common with realism the perspective that States are distinct, but it is not compatible with the supposition of an everlasting crisis of survival and the predominance of conflict. Contrasting with realism, it moderates the view that notwithstanding their differences, States are able to construct orderly relations with peace as the final goal. “Whereas the basic principle of realism is survival, that of pluralism is coexistence” (Buzan, 2014, p. 90).

In this sense, Pluralism is not a denial of collective interests, but it recognizes the struggle of harmonizing action in the face of disparities in power and ideals. It can be considered that pluralists give political prevalence to States over people. “They are more sovereigntist and nationalist than internationalist” (Buzan, 2014, p. 90).

Conceiving sovereignty and non-interventionism as the founding principles of inter-state relations, the solidarist promotion of cosmopolitan human rights is perceived as a threat to the safeguarding of international society, under the argument that if human rights are granted independent of the State, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are essentially questioned in an ultimate approach. Thus, it is restricted to the settlement of agreements related to mutual recognition of sovereignty, guidelines for diplomacy, and promotion of the principle of non-intervention (Buzan, 2014).

- **Solidarism**

Solidarism embodies the progressive and liberal division of the English School. It represents the justice approach to the question of intervention related to human rights, giving major significance to the emergency of world society, perceiving the State as the representation of its population more than as a sovereign actor. Their vision contemplates the argument that order cannot function in the absence of some notion of justice in which interstate society takes into consideration the necessities, claims, and rights of its population. Moreover, this wing of the English School contemplates the existence of common moral norms, rules, and institutions focused on well-designed cooperation related

to restrictions on the implementation of armed measures and suitable principles of civilization regarding the relationship between States and their population; and a more extensive and more interventionist comprehension of international order (Buzan, 2014).

The Solidarist vision is mainly concerned with the establishment of consensual principles applicable to international and world society. In that sense, moral concerns exceed State boundaries. That is the main argument behind the coercive approach of Solidarism that considers the exercise of power to comply with those principles and beliefs that expect to be universal but in practice, they are not universally implemented. This approach embodied the center of debates about the conception of human rights and also it has its presence in the economic sector with the promotion of the principle of free trade. In other words, solidarism claims and arguments are essentially focused on the reform of the international legal order instead of exceeding the State system (Buzan, 2014).

Exists an essential categorization composed of a) the State-centric Solidarism that refers to the shared norms and institutions that imply cooperation broader than the notion of coexistence, and b) the cosmopolitan Solidarism founded on the existence of universal rights inherent to people. Both are solid forms of the practice of internationalism based on different ontologies: States and people respectively. Ontologically, State-centric Solidarism is closer to Pluralism considering that both are centered on States. However, politically and morally, State-centric Solidarism is more related to cosmopolitan Solidarism due to its willingness to evolve the aim of coexistence into the pursuit of cooperation and convergence amongst States. Some analysts suggest that State-centric Solidarism is the midmost point between the great society of humankind and the society of States. Another line of reasoning sustains that the two types of Solidarism are much more alike to each other than Pluralism. In this regard, the great society of humankind plays a relevant role as a moral referent, nonetheless, it cannot enforce and preserve universal rights. In practice, exclusively States, or subordinate institutions mostly under the management of States, have that capacity, even though States are the primary violators and challengers of cosmopolitan principles (Buzan, 2014).

Regarding the impact of human rights on sovereignty, and specifically on nonintervention, if the concept of sovereignty is understood from its juridical interpretation being

conditioned to diplomatic recognition, it can be assumed that sovereignty is essentially conditional. Thus, the embracement of human rights from a State-centric Solidarism approach can legitimate the erosion of the right of nonintervention, generating the discussion over failed States and humanitarian intervention. In this context, human rights is a growing and intensely argued international institution, an object of diverse opinions within international society, especially regarding the legitimacy of intervention with humanitarian purposes (Buzan, 2014).

For instance, the strengthening of the solidarist approach can be perceived in the ideas of Bain (2021) that exposes how the increasing human interconnectedness alongside the ties of the global civil society has undermined the pluralism approach effectiveness. Cases as the ecological crisis and emerging security threats have evidenced the incapability of pluralist doctrine of coexistence to solve current global problems. As result, the United Nations system has projected a renewed solidarist consciousness in the discussion of crisis such as the Libya and Syria situations.

CHAPTER III: MAIN QUESTION AND PROBLEM

The Security Council (UNSC) is one of the 6 main structures established by the United Nations Charter. This multilateral body has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security following the main purpose of the Organization. As established in Article 23 of the UN Charter, fifteen (15) Members compose the UNSC: five (05) permanent members, namely the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America; and ten (10) non-permanent members elected for a two-year term²⁷. Regarding its voting procedures, as established in Article 27 of the UN Charter, each member State has one vote, procedural matters require the affirmative vote of nine members for their approval, and all other matters required the favorable vote of 9 members including the five (05) permanent members²⁸ (United Nations, 1945).

The composition of this body is a reflection of the balance of power of the international system at the moment of its foundation at the end of the Second World War, besides two reforms that resulted in the enlargement of the seats for the non-permanent members but any reform attempt has produce changes in the number, designation or competencies of the permanent members even when in repeated occasions has been concluded that the UNSC

²⁷ Article 23: 1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution; 2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate reelection (United Nations, 1945).

²⁸ Article 27: 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote; 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members; 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting (United Nations, 1945).

composition no longer reflects the reality of the international system (United Nations Security Council, n.d.).

The UNSC has the function of determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. Furthermore, it has the power to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and generate recommendations of adjustment or terms of a settlement. In further cases, the UNSC can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to preserve or restore international peace and security. Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, all members of the United Nations agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Security Council²⁹. While other organs make recommendations, only the UNSC has the power to make decisions that member States are then obligated to comply with, that is to say, that the decisions of the UNSC are binding. Taking into consideration the mentioned above could be pointed out that the UNSC is in charge of discussing the most relevant and controversial issues of the international system, where the adopted positions reflect clear alignments of the foreign policy interests of the member States, especially before the discussion of measure that implies armed actions to reestablish international peace (United Nations Security Council, n.d.).

One example of a controversial discussion held within the UNSC is the situation in Libya, in which as Dunne and Gifkins (2011) state, the international reaction has been remarkably quick and decisive. The early response to Libya in 2011 promoted by the UNSC was founded on the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) norm, processing the situation as an ongoing political controversy that requires armed humanitarian intervention. The subsequent discussion in this forum was regarding the dimensions of the Security Council's implementation of the R2P. In this sense, the debate encompasses the contrast between the non-interventionism principle and the humanitarian intervention doctrine framed within the pluralism-solidarism debate of the English School of International Relations (Dunne & Gifkins, 2011).

On one hand, as Shen (2001) raises, the principle of non-intervention, was introduced into the 1973 French Constitution in Art 119 which stated that France would neither intervene in the public affairs of other States nor allow other nations to intervene in its public affairs,

²⁹ Article 25: The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter (United Nations, 1945).

and it eventually became accepted by other major powers as a customary rule of international law. Later this principle is embodied in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations restricting the interference in matters considered as domestic jurisdiction of the States³⁰ (United Nations, 1945). Based on this Article, “the only exception to the non-intervention principle under the Charter is for the implementation of measures taken under Chapter VII for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security (Shen, 2001)”.

On the other hand, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention offers a seemingly principled exception for departing from the non-intervention principle. However, the doctrine has never become an established principle of international law, even as a generally recognized exception to the established principle of non-intervention, and generally, the debate around it resides in its legal or moral weight (Shen, 2001).

a. Research Question

During the 2015-2016 periods, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela participated as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, as its fifth experience within this international body. Among the topics addressed by the organization during these years, in the discussion of general issues relating to the situation in Libya, Venezuela played a prominent role in the negotiation process which is manifested in its voting pattern (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). This study aims to answer the following questions: **what is the position of Venezuela in the discussion of the situation in Libya within the Security Council according to its voting patterns? Furthermore, which are the specific elements that are more likely to influence its foreign policy?**

Since the ending of the Second World War, the international organizations have become the quintessential platforms for the interactions among the States and other international actors to tackle and cooperate on topics subject of global governance, and the United Nations due to its universal composition and competency is considered the most representative example of global governance. And taking into account the binding nature of the decisions emanating from the UNSC, the position adopted by the States during their two years the non-

³⁰ Article 2(7): Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (United Nations, 1945).

permanent membership, will reflect their alignments and interests to be pursued in other international organisms (United Nations, 2017).

As far as Venezuela is concerned, in the recent years, this State has been an object of discussion within the international community under arguments based on the absence of legitimacy and the lack of compliance with international law and democratic principles, intending to create the scenario for the legitimization of the adoption of interventionist measures within international organizations, more specifically the UNSC considering its binding nature. For that reason, the Non-interventionism has consolidated as a key principle of the Venezuelan foreign policy, defining the position to be adopted in the discussions related to this topic. In consequence, the present study has as its objective evaluates **the position of Venezuela in the discussion of the situation in Libya within the Security Council according to its voting patterns** during its non-permanent membership of the UNSC throughout the 2015-2016 period, to identify the specific elements that are more likely to influence its foreign policy.

b. Hypothesis and Variables

As preliminary answers, the present research has the hypothesis that the voting strategies of States within international organizations are based on the principles of their international policy and are more likely to be influenced by the bilateral relationships held with the actors involved in the discussion. Based on that, there are two variables, being ‘the voting strategies of States within international organizations’ the dependent variable; and ‘the principles of the State’s international policy’ and ‘the bilateral relationships held with the actors involved in the discussion’ the independent variables.

The objective of the analysis is the result of the evaluation of the UNSC voting pattern of Venezuela as a non-permanent member among the discussed topics during the 2015-2016 period, conducted through the systematization of the information provided by the data collection stage. By scrutinizing the Venezuelan voting patterns it is possible to appreciate the concordances and discordances with the different voting blocks, discriminating among those resolutions where its vote is aligned with the majority voting pattern about topics such as the renewal of measures on arms, transport, finance and travel against the Central African Republic, the extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,

the renewal of measures on arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the situation in Yemen, the extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, the UN Mission in Liberia, the renewal of sanctions against Côte d'Ivoire, among others; the resolutions which vote was aligned with the opposition block headed by Russia, abstaining to vote on topics such as the extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan, the extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, the situation in Burundi, the arms embargo on Somalia, among others; and distinguishing the resolutions where Venezuela had a voting pattern nonaligned with any block, which is the case of the resolutions related to the Libya situation, in particular those concerning migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, where Venezuela was the only State abstaining in the voting procedure.

The dependent variable 'the voting strategies of States within international organizations' is understood as the tendency of alignment of a State during the discussion and voting procedure as the explicit expression of a specific position regarding a particular topic. In this study, this variable is built from the number of resolutions discussed within the UNSC in the 2015-2016 period where Venezuela voted alone different from the voting tendency without alignment to any block of States. This is calculated through a nominal counting of the voting procedures of each resolution during the given period as the fundamental indicator since it explicitly demonstrates the official position adopted before the international decision-making process related to a determinate issue object of discussion within the international community, obtaining the data resources from the information provided by the United Nations official voting records available online.

Likewise, the independent variable 'the principles of the State's international policy' refers to the international legal principles that delineate the foreign policy and the execution of its diplomacy bilaterally and multilaterally. To the objective of this research, it is planned to measure the relevance of the non-intervention principle in the formulation and execution of the Venezuelan foreign policy. Understanding the defense of the national sovereignty as the principal objective of the non-intervention principle, the main indicator will be obtained from the evaluation of the Venezuela Constitution and the 'Plan de la Patria' [The Homeland Plan] as the national documents that contain the guidelines of foreign policy,

studying the number of Articles formulated in concordance with the defense of sovereignty and the non-intervention on national affairs, implementing nominal and proportional results.

In the same sense, the second independent variable named ‘the bilateral relationships held with the actors involved in the discussion’ refers to the bilateral relationship between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the State of Libya, being the last actor subject of discussion within the international organizations, specifically the UNSC. This variable will be measured through two indicators, namely the accounting of the numbers of the State Visits between Venezuela and Libya during the governments of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (1999-2013) and Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) respectively, that is to say, the State Visits during the period between 1999 and 2011; and the second indicator, the number of bilateral signed agreements during the same period as the most tangible result of the bilateral relation between States. In this case, also data resources will be obtained from the official records of the Ministry of People’s Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

c. Methodology

Regarding the methodological aspect, this research is expected to be developed under a qualitative method, that in political science and international relations are usually focused on puzzling within-case transformations or variations in events and institutions across a limited number of cases. Qualitative research proceeds to unpack the historical, social, and political processes that cause these effects (González-Ocantos, 2020). In addition, is expected to conduct a quantitative evaluation of the resolutions adopted during the 2015-2016 period of the UNSC that tackle the situation in Libya, to evaluate the Venezuela voting pattern.

Besides, this project is planned to implement the case study method, which is defined as an instance of a class of events, the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical event to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other episodes. It can be understood as an attempt to understand and interpret a spatially and temporally bounded set of events. This investigation will focus on one single case, orientated to explore the

plausibility of a theory or tracing the causal mechanism at play in a particular context (Ruffa, 2020).



CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Bearing in mind the statements of Buzan (2014) in his evaluation of the normative perspective of the English School, one can perceive that this doctrine tackles the discussion of issues related to political instability, social conflicts, and violation of human rights as a threat to international peace and security³¹. In this framework, States and other international actors tend to adopt a position whether pluralist or solidaristic.

For instance, since 2011 the situation in Libya based on a political crisis has been a subject of discussion within several international organizations pointing out the United Nations Security Council with a humanitarian intervention approach that as Bellamy & Williams (2011) sustained, reflected the introduction of human protection as a matter of international security³². In this discussion, Venezuela has adopted a pluralist approach, manifested through its voting pattern as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in the 2015-2016 period, which is evidenced during the voting process of the S/RES/2240 (2015) on migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya where Venezuela was the only abstention without alignment with the block of States (United Nations, 2015); and the S/RES/2312 (2016) on renewal for 12 months of the authorizations as set out in paras. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) concerning migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, where Venezuela repeated the same voting pattern (United Nations, 2016).

In this regard, this research aims to prove that the position adopted by the States in the discussion of international issues, displayed by their voting strategies within international organizations, is influenced by the bilateral relationship sustained with the actors under discussion alongside the guideline principles of their foreign policy, among the elements that have an impact in the position adopted by the States, subject that also have been

³¹ “The key issue has been human rights and the seeming tension between the States’ claim to sovereignty” (Buzan, 2014, p. 83).

³² “The international responses to recent crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya reveal a great deal about the UN Security Council’s approach to human protection” (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

tackled by Vincent (1969) approaching the voting convergences and attitude patterns at the United Nations. In this case, is evaluated the influence of the bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Libya and the principles of foreign policy contained in the Venezuelan legal framework over its voting pattern in the discussion of Libya's situation within the United Nations Security Council.

a. Venezuela-Libya Relationship

- **Establishment of bilateral relations between Venezuela and Libya**

Since the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, Venezuela has established diplomatic and economic relations with several countries in the Middle East region, based on a common interest: the production of oil. However, the strengthening of these relations can be studied from the distinction of two main stages: the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century (Boersner, 2021).

The first stage responds to the foreign policy established between 1958 and 1998, which emphasized solidarity and cooperation with developing countries; the principle of non-intervention; and the defense and promotion of democracy among nations. These principles will characterize Venezuelan foreign policy conditioned by the internal situation, the elements contained in the National Constitution of 1961, and the international dynamics of the Cold War and post-Cold War. During this stage, the Middle East was a significant region for Venezuela due to its international oil policy and its objective of promoting the strengthening of developing countries (Boersner, 2021). Regarding the African region, until 1998, Venezuela had signed diplomatic relations with 32 countries of this continent but its most dynamic relations were carried out with the African OPEC countries, namely Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria (Bolívar, 2013). Within this stage and in the framework of the strengthening of bilateral relations with OPEC member States, on 18 June 1965 Venezuela and Libya established diplomatic relations (VTV, 2021).

The second stage begins in 1999 under the government of Hugo Chávez, where bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Middle Eastern countries held a significant place for Venezuela for several reasons, namely the shared ideologies base on an anti-American speech, counteracting neoliberalism and capitalism through aligned positions in multilateral instances; attempts to overcome underdevelopment; the aim to strengthen relations with

groups of developing countries through South-South exchange; and the objective of establishing relations of solidarity between peoples (Boersner, 2021).

- **Venezuelan Foreign Policy to the Middle East region from 1999**

From 1999, the foreign policy of Venezuela will progressively start a transition towards a new model promoted by the presidency of Hugo Chavez that will materialize after 2004 with his victory during the recall referendum. On the one hand, relations between the United States and Venezuela will become more contentious. On the other hand, Venezuela's relations with other developing nations will become more dynamic and stronger both in Latin America and with nations in more distant geographical regions. In that sense, the most important elements that define Hugo Chávez's policy towards the Middle East region were (1) the guidelines of Arab socialism and the non-aligned movement; (2) the defense of the Palestinian cause; (3) oil interests; and (4) anti-imperialism ideology (Boersner, 2021).

Among some of the variables to take into consideration when evaluating the relationship between the government of Hugo Chávez and a large part of the countries of the Arab world, we find the promotion of the ideologies of the leaders that predominated in the Middle East regional scene based on the assumption of socialism, but also the commitment to leave behind the option of reformism to commit to the social revolution. Chávez will revitalize the historical relationship between the Arab world and Latin America, founded with the establishment of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (MNOAL) (Boersner, 2021).

These interests are manifested in the “Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social” [the Economic and Social Development Plan] for the 2000-2007 period. where objective 5.3.2 aims to strengthen the relations between the Latin American, African and Asian countries through the improvement of the political cooperation mechanisms³³ (Chávez, 2001, p. 157).

³³ El fortalecimiento de las relaciones entre los países latinoamericanos, africanos y asiáticos será posible en la medida en que los organismos de consulta y concertación, tales como el Grupo de los 15, el Grupo de los 77, el Movimiento de Países No Alineados y el Grupo de Río perfeccionen sus mecanismos de actuación. Venezuela dará un decidido apoyo para que esto sea posible [The strengthening of relations between the Latin American, African and Asian countries will be possible to the extent that the organizations for consultation, such as the Group of 15, the Group of 77, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group Rio refine

Regarding its relationship with the Middle East region, it is necessary to mention that in 2002, Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency of the Group of 77 and he expressed his solidarity with countries such as Iraq and Iran before multilateral bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Commission; and rejected sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program (Boersner, 2021).

Regarding the defense of the Palestinian cause, it can be understood as an element of foreign policy that Venezuela openly uses for counteracting the relationship with the United States and drawing closer allies in the Middle East. Likewise, the strengthening of its oil foreign policy generated significant political capital for the Venezuelan government at the international level. In that sense, in order to catapult Venezuela into a country-energy power with global influence based on its oil reserves, the OPEC constituted a key point for the government's international geopolitics, stressing the purposes of reinforcing ties with member States, increasing commercial and technological cooperation with the Middle East region. With that objective, in 2000 Chávez undertook a presidential tour visiting at least 9 OPEC countries. This official tour generated as result, among others, the consolidation of common positions in international organizations with countries like Iran and Libya as the most relevant ones (Boersner, 2021).

By last, the relationship with the Middle East region was largely focused on the criticism and rejection of the neoliberal globalization model, the capitalist system, the unipolar international structure, and the role played by the United States in the international system. This aspect will be fundamental for understanding the approaches of some heads of State such as Muammar Gaddafi from Libya (Boersner, 2021).

- **State Visits between Venezuela and Libya during the 1999-2011 period**

High-level visits are a diplomatic instrument of foreign policy through which governments stimulate cooperation with strategic States, that is to say, this practice is considered a significant signal of quality bilateral relations between States. Since host countries are not able to receive an unlimited quantity of visits, they must strategically prioritize certain countries over others. This decision discloses relevant information about foreign policy

their mechanisms of action. Venezuela will give determined support to make this possible (Chávez, 2001, p. 157)

priorities together with diplomatic strategies as a whole. Meetings that include Heads of State also project to the international community the quality of the relations between the involved countries, and also, they play a relevant role in determining the alignments, deterrence, regime survival, trade patterns, and harmonization in the position adopted before international organizations (Koliev & Lundgren, 2021).

In concordance with the priorities of the Venezuelan foreign policy, during the 1999-2011 period, the governments of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias (1999-2013) and Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) have performed six (06) bilateral State Visits of which the Venezuelan Head of State visited Libya in five (05) opportunities and the Libyan head of State visited Venezuela in one (01) occasion (Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2022).

Table 4.1 State Visits between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011

Year	Official Visit	Results
2000	Hugo Chávez to Libya	Subscription of the Agreement for the Establishment of a Mixed Commission between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
2004	Hugo Chávez to Libya	Hugo Chávez received the Gaddafi International Award for Human Rights and the title of 'Honoris causa' by the Academy of Jamahiriya Thought
2006	Hugo Chávez to Libya	Subscription of the General Agreement for Cooperation between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
2009	Hugo Chávez to Libya	Participation of Hugo Chávez in the African Union Summit and the Commemoration ceremony for Muammar Gaddafi's 40 years in power
2009	Muammar Gaddafi to Venezuela	Joint Declaration between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Muammar Gaddafi received the Liberator Order and a replica of the sword of Simón Bolívar. The III South America-Africa Summit will be held in the Great Socialist Popular Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in September 2011

2010

Hugo Chávez to Libya

Subscription of:

The Modifying Protocol to the General Cooperation Agreement

The Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between the Pedro Gual Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela and the Academy of Diplomatic Studies of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya

The Agreement between the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Foundation of Venezuela and the School of Higher Studies of Tripoli of Libya on Scholarships for Study and Exchange of Knowledge

The Agreement for the Creation of the Fund for the Financing of Joint Investment and Trade Incentive Projects Venezuela - Libya

The Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Binational Work Commission for Economic-Productive Complementation in Basic Industries and Mining, Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Trade

The Energy Cooperation Agreement

The Letter of Intent on Agriculture

The Memorandum of Understanding between New South Television (TELESUR) and the General Radio and Television Corporation of Libya

The Agreement on Maritime Transport and Ports

The Air Services Agreement

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

- **States Visits of the Venezuelan President to Libya**

On 06 August 2000, the Venezuelan president at the time, Hugo Chávez, started a historic tour that included State Visits to ten (10) OPEC countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, and Algeria. This tour had the objective to invite their leaders to the second summit of the Organization to be celebrated in Caracas from 27 to 30 of September; and to expose the guidelines that Chavez's government proposed to achieve a genuine development of their oil industry and a stabilization of the prices in the international market (AFP, 2000).

In the framework of this tour, on 13 August 2000, Chavez arrived in Libya and sustained a bilateral meeting with Gaddafi where the Libyan leader was invited to the OPEC summit to be celebrated the following September in Caracas, alongside the expression of solidarity from the Venezuelan President referring to the actions taken against Libyan government by the United States of America and the United Nations (Folha de Sao Paulo, 2000).

Furthermore, this meeting resulted in the subscription of bilateral legal instruments, pointing out the Agreement for the Establishment of a Mixed Commission between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2022).

On 24 November 2004, Hugo Chávez performed his second State Visit to Libya during the tour to Spain, Libya, Qatar, Russia, Iran, and France (Bolívar, 2013). In the frame of this visit the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, received the Gaddafi International Award for Human Rights in recognition of the efforts to build a more humane and fairer world, as well as the award of the title of doctor 'Honoris causa' by the Academy of Jamahiriya Thought, which was granted for the first time and is given in recognition to the people's struggle and the confirmation of social justice and democracy (EUROPA PRESS EFE, 2004).

In the frame of his participation in the African Union Summit in Gambia, on 17 May 2006, Hugo Chávez arrived for the fourth time in Libya where he was welcomed by the Libyan President (Bolívar, 2013). This visit occurred after the announcement of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the government of The United States and Gaddafi's administration, alongside the removal of Libya from the list of States that sponsor terrorism. On the other hand, Washington imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela, declaring that it does not cooperate in the fight against terrorism. The bilateral conversations tackled the cooperation in the oil sector, especially the reinforcement of the role of the OPEC in the international market with a defense of the price strategy before the upcoming OPEC meeting in Caracas the following June. Likewise, as Chavéz declared, the bilateral cooperation had the intention to expand to other areas such as the gas industry, the

petrochemical sector³⁴, and social programs based on the national incomes resulting from the oil trade. In this manner, Venezuela will consolidate as the open up for the cooperation of Libya with the Latin American region (EuroPress, 2006). As a result of this high-level meeting, both leaders subscribed to the General Agreement for Cooperation between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2022).

On 1st September 2009, Hugo Chávez started in Libya a tour that also include visits to Algeria, Syria, Iran, Belarus, and Russia to promote the economic diversification of Venezuela and overcome the oil mono production; and demonstrate the prestige achieved by the foreign policy of Chávez administrations (EUROPA PRESS, 2009). During this visit to Libya, the Venezuelan President participated in the African Union Summit and the Commemoration ceremony for Muammar Gaddafi's 40 years in power, demonstrating the political support between both governments. This tour also was performed to extend the invitation to the II South America-Africa Summit (ASA) to be held in Venezuela the following September³⁵ (Chávez, 2009).

³⁴ Hugo Chávez declarations: “Estamos trabajando el tema de la industrialización, comercialización del gas... nos interesa mucho la experiencia de Libia y también de Argelia porque tenemos un gran proyecto gasífero en Venezuela que esta comenzando; primero para el consumo de nuestro propio pueblo, el pueblo venezolano progresivamente irá consumiendo más gas y disminuyendo el consumo de petróleo, y además estamos proyectando el gasoducto del sur rumbo a Brasil, rumbo a Argentina. De todo eso he venido a informar a los líderes árabes, al líder y hermano Moamar Gadafi [We are working on the issue of industrialization, gas marketing... We are very interested in the experience of Libya and also of Algeria because we have a large gas project in Venezuela that is starting; first for the consumption of our own people, the Venezuelan people will progressively consume more gas and reduce oil consumption, and we are also projecting the gas pipeline from the south to Brazil, to Argentina. I have come to inform the Arab leaders of all this, the leader and brother Moammar Gaddafi]” (EuroPress, 2006).

³⁵ Hugo Chávez declarations: “Están dando ustedes un ejemplo (...) África debe ser de los africanos y de las africanas. África unida será África libre, será África grande (...) Por ese camino andamos los países de América Latina, los países del Caribe (...) hemos acordado celebrar en Caracas el próximo día 26 de septiembre, la Cumbre de la Unión Africana con la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas. (...) Yo aprovecho esta maravillosa oportunidad para ratificar la invitación, a todos y a cada de los jefes de Gobierno de los países de la Unión Africana, para que hagamos un esfuerzo y estemos en Venezuela ese día 26 de septiembre, 26 y 27 de septiembre. (...) de la misma forma invitaremos a otros países del Caribe, porque cómo se entiende la unión de Suramérica sin el Caribe, cómo se entiende la estirpe africana de nosotros los suramericanos sin el Caribe, el Caribe es como el más sólido puente histórico, geográfico, cultural, entre la América Latina y el África [You are giving an example (...) Africa should belong to African men and women. United Africa will be a free Africa, it will be a great Africa (...) We, the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean countries are walking along this path (...) we have agreed to hold in Caracas on September 26 the Summit of the Union Africa with the Union of South American Nations. (...) I take advantage of this wonderful opportunity to ratify the invitation, to each and every one of the heads of government of the countries of the African Union,

The last visit of Chávez to Libya was on 23 October 2010 as part of his tour that also included Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Iran, Syria, and Portugal. In this opportunity, the meeting with Gaddafi had the objective of strengthening bilateral relations, analyzing issues related to the South-South integration and the organization of the III South America-Africa Summit to be held in Libya the following year. Moreover, Ministers from Venezuela and their counterparts from Libya opened workshops to promote new technical cooperation agreements on energy, scientific-technical, agricultural and commercial issues (Juventud Rebelde, 2010).

As result of this State Visit, both governments subscribed several legal instruments, namely the Modifying Protocol to the General Cooperation Agreement (currently not into force); the Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between the Pedro Gual Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela and the Academy of Diplomatic Studies of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya; the Agreement between the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Foundation of Venezuela and the School of Higher Studies of Tripoli of Libya on Scholarships for Study and Exchange of Knowledge; the Agreement for the Creation of the Fund for the Financing of Joint Investment and Trade Incentive Projects Venezuela - Libya (currently not into force); the Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Binational Work Commission for Economic-Productive Complementation in Basic Industries and Mining, Manufacturing, Agriculture and Trade; the Energy Cooperation Agreement (currently not into force); the Letter of Intent on Agriculture (currently not into force); The Memorandum of Understanding between New South Television (TELESUR) and the General Radio and Television Corporation of Libya; the Agreement on Maritime Transport and Ports (currently not into force); and the Air Services Agreement (currently not into force) (Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2022).

so that we make an effort and be in Venezuela on September 26, 26 and 27 of September. (...) in the same way we will invite other Caribbean countries, because how is the union of South America understood without the Caribbean, how is the African lineage of us South Americans understood without the Caribbean, the Caribbean is like the most solid bridge historical, geographical, cultural, between Latin America and Africa] (Chávez, 2009).

These multiple State Visits of the Venezuelan President to the Libyan territory, are a clear sign of the relevance given by Venezuela to the bilateral relationships with this State. Likewise, Libya was included in the presidential tours for the Asian and African, and Middle East regions, especially those performed to strengthen the position of Venezuela in the international oil industry alongside the reinforcement of the OPEC as an international actor. As Bolívar (2013) exposed, with the Chávez administration, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East recovered preponderance in the design of Venezuelan foreign policy, especially with OPEC members. In this regard, it is important to point out the personalization of this bilateral relationship considering the explicit ideological compatibility of Chávez and Gaddafi, reflected in the several reciprocated distinctions during the 2004 and 2009 as well as the participation of Chávez in the Commemoration ceremony for Muammar Gaddafi's 40 years in power.

- **States Visits of the Libyan President to Venezuela**

Between 22 and 27 September, 2009 was held in Venezuela the II South America-Africa Summit (ASA) with the participation of representatives from 61 countries of the 63 that compose the South America-Africa integration bloc. This summit was attended by the Libyan president, Muammar Gaddafi representing the first and only State Visit of the Libyan President to Venezuela and Latin America (Reuters, 2009). Gaddafi proposed Libya as the location for the 2011 Summit, referred to the need to establish air connectivity between the two regions, addressed in depth the issue of United Nations reform, suggested the transfer of Security Council's power to the General Assembly, and declared his support to the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat for ASA, and proposed the foundation of South Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAS) based on the necessity to fill the gap existing in the South Atlantic (Bolívar, 2013).


During the event, both socialist leaders subscribed to a Joint Declaration where they committed to promote an international summit to redefine the concept of "terrorism" in the frame of their recurrent calls to fight the US imperialism³⁶ and to encourage a reform of the

³⁶ In a joint statement, both leaders "manifestaron su rechazo al intento de vincular la legítima lucha de los pueblos por la libertad y la autodeterminación, renovaron su llamado a celebrar una conferencia internacional con el fin de definir y determinar el concepto de terrorismo [expressed their rejection of the attempt to link the legitimate struggle of the peoples for freedom and self-determination, renewed their call to hold an international conference in order to define and determine the concept of terrorism]" (Reuters, 2009).

UN system in order to prevent the hegemony of the Security Council (Reuters, 2009). Furthermore, Chávez conferred to Gaddafi the Liberator Order, which is the highest decoration granted by the Venezuelan State, and gave a replica of the sword of Simón Bolívar, the hero of Venezuelan independence in the 19th century³⁷ (Reuters, 2009). It is important to highlight that in this summit was agreed that the III South America-Africa Summit will be held in the Great Socialist Popular Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in September 2011 (Bolívar, 2013).

Although Gaddafi performed only one State Visit to Venezuela, this contemplated significant political relevance since represent the first and only visit of the Libyan leader to the Latin American region, consolidating Venezuela, as Bolívar (2013) stated, as its opening for the cooperation with the region.

Figure 4.2 Figure 1 State Visits between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011



Source: data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

³⁷ Hugo Chávez declarations: "Ésta es la espada que libertó a América hace 200 años (...) esta espada está viva y hoy anda por América Latina a nombre de nuestro pueblo, de la revolución bolivariana, la entrego a ti, soldado revolucionario, líder del pueblo libio, líder de los pueblos del Africa [This is the sword that liberated America 200 years ago (...) this sword is alive and today it walks through Latin America in the name of our people, of the Bolivarian revolution, I give it to you, revolutionary soldier, leader of the Libyan people, leader of the peoples of Africa]" (Reuters, 2009).

Understanding the State Visit as the highest-level diplomatic event, the six (06) visits performed during the 1999-2011 period, by the president of Venezuela, Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, who visit five (05) times the Arabic State; and the president of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, who visit in one (01) opportunity the Latin American country, alongside the mutual given recognitions and public distinctions, are a clear sign of the elevation of the bilateral relationships in contrast with the previous Venezuelan governments. The Chávez administration, based on the concordance of national interest such as the defense of oil policies of the producer countries, alongside the convergence in the political ideology, positioned Libya as a strategic ally of the Venezuelan government, especially in the African region. this is demonstrated by the statements of Afif Tajaldini, the Venezuelan ambassador in Libya, who argues that Venezuela and Libya have diplomatic relations that fully coincide³⁸ (Bolívar, 2013).

- **Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011**

In concordance with the foreign policy strategy developed by the government of Chávez in Venezuela, in the period composed of almost 12 years between the starting of Chavez's government and the end of Gaddafi's government, twenty-two (22) international legal instruments were subscribed between the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Of said agreements, seven (07) have not come into force.

Table 4.2 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Political area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism between the General People's Committee for Foreign Contact and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Venezuela	Politics	21/07/1999

³⁸ Afif Tajaldini declarations: “Uno de los logros es haber elevado el nivel de las relaciones diplomáticas, las cuales son muy estrechas entre los dos Presidentes. Venezuela y Libia tienen una relación en la que coinciden plenamente. Libia en el África y en todos los escenarios es un aliado verdadero para Venezuela y para América Latina y nosotros también apoyamos a Libia [One of the achievements is having raised the level of diplomatic relations, which are very close between the two Presidents. Venezuela and Libya have a relationship in which they fully coincide. Libya in Africa and in all scenarios is a true ally for Venezuela and for Latin America and we also support Libya]” (Bolívar, 2013).

Agreement for the Establishment of a Mixed Commission between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	13/08/2000
Minutes of the First Meeting of the Consultation Mechanism between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	07/04/2004
General Agreement for Cooperation between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	18/05/2006
Final Act of the First Meeting of the Mixed Commission between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist Arab People's Libyan Jamahiriya	Politics	09/10/2008
Agreement on the Abolition of Visas in Diplomatic, Special, and Service Passports between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	09/10/2008
Joint Declaration between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	28/09/2009
Minutes of Visit for the Follow-up of the Commitment from the People's Power Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	27/10/2009
Modifying Protocol to the General Cooperation Agreement between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**	Politics	23/10/2010
Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between the Pedro Gual Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Academy of Diplomatic Studies of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation in the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Politics	23/10/2010

* Subscription date / **This treaty is not in force

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

The bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Libya has been developed mainly in political cooperation based on the shared ideology founded on the rejection of the neoliberal globalization model and the capitalist system promoted by the United States and its allies. To promote an alternative to the unipolar international structure, these two States have celebrated ten (10) bilateral agreements. The Memorandum of Understanding for the

Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism subscribed on 07 July 1999 has as its objective to carry out regular consultations to follow all aspects of their bilateral relations and exchange points of view on world issues, interaction in the international field, and matters of mutual interest, constituting the most significant bilateral document representing the foundation of a path to deepen cooperation in several aspects. This intention was ratified also with the subscription of the General Agreement for Cooperation on 18 May 2006, and the Joint Declaration on 28 September 2009. Moreover, to adapt the cooperation to the changing conditions, on 23 October 2010 was subscribed the Modifying Protocol to the General Cooperation Agreement, nevertheless, this Protocol has not entered in force (MPPRE, 2022).

Likewise, the Agreement for the Establishment of a Mixed Commission subscribed on 13 August 2000 had the intention of creating the forum for the development of economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and social cooperation ties. With the Minutes of the First Meeting of the Consultation Mechanism subscribed on 07 April 2004, and the Final Act of the First Meeting of the Mixed Commission subscribed on 09 October 2008 the Parties confirmed their commitment and interest in development, eradication of poverty, and social inequality, and they reiterated the desire to deepen the bonds of cooperation in the political, economic and commercial fields (MPPRE, 2022).

In the diplomatic field in the framework of their political relations, on 09 October 2008, the parties subscribed an Agreement on the Abolition of Visas in Diplomatic, Special, and Service Passports to provide more suitable conditions to government officials; and on 23 October 2010, they subscribed a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between the Pedro Gual Diplomatic Academy of Venezuela and the Academy of Diplomatic Studies of Libya to promote deeper cooperation and exchange in the formation of the diplomatic staff of both States (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.3 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Culture area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Cultural, Scientific, and Educational Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Culture, Science, and Education	28/09/2000

Cultural Cooperation Program between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the Period 2009-2011	Culture	09/10/2008
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* Subscription date

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

In the cultural field, the parties subscribed a Cultural, Scientific, and Educational Cooperation Agreement on 28 September 2000 to also develop stronger cooperation in technical matters. Specifically, on 09 October 2008, they have subscribed to a Cultural Cooperation Program to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries and their peoples, promote a climate of understanding and mutual knowledge, through cultural relations, and convinced that cultural cooperation is a viable instrument to deepen mutual understanding (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.4 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Education area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Cultural, Scientific, and Educational Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Culture, Science, and Education	28/09/2000
Agreement between the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya on Higher Education**	Education	09/10/2008
Agreement between the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Foundation of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the School of Higher Studies of Tripoli of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on Scholarships for Study and Exchange of Knowledge	Education	23/10/2010

* Subscription date / **This treaty is not in force

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

Related to the education sector, Venezuela and Libya have subscribed to three (03) agreements, namely the Cultural, Scientific and Educational Cooperation Agreement on 28 September 2000; the Agreement between the Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho Foundation of Venezuela and the School of Higher Studies of Tripoli on Scholarships for Study and Exchange of Knowledge subscribed on 23 October 2022 intending to establish cooperation in terms of scholarships, through the exchange and training of human talent in various areas of knowledge; and the Agreement on Higher Education subscribed on 09 October 2008. The last one has not entered into force (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.5 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Economy and Trade area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of People's Power for Light Industries and Commerce of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Libyan National Center for Standardization and Metrology of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to Promote Cooperation Tea Technique in the Areas of Quality, Standardization, Metrology, Accreditation, and Conformity Assessment	Economy and Trade	09/10/2008
Agreement for the Creation of the Fund for the Financing of Joint Investment and Trade Incentive Projects Venezuela - Libya between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**	Economy and Trade	23/10/2010
Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Binational Work Commission for Economic-Productive Complementation in Basic Industries and Mining, Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Trade between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Economy and Trade	23/10/2010

* Subscription date / **This treaty is not in force

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

The economy and trade sector also has received significant attention with the subscription of three (03) tackling technical and specific areas of cooperation. On 09 October 2008 was subscribed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of People's Power for Light Industries and Commerce of Venezuela and the Libyan National Center for Standardization and Metrology of Libya, to Promote Cooperation Tea Technique in the Areas of Quality, Standardization, Metrology, Accreditation, and Conformity Assessment. On 23 October 2010, it was subscribed to the Memorandum of Understanding for the Creation of a Binational Work Commission for Economic-Productive Complementation in Basic Industries and Mining, Manufacturing, Agriculture, and Trade. By last, on the same date more related to financing cooperation, they subscribed to an Agreement for the Creation of the Fund for the Financing of Joint Investment and Trade Incentive Projects Venezuela – Libya. The last one has not entered into force (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.6 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Oil and Energy area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Energy Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**	Oil and Energy	22/10/2010

* Subscription date / **This treaty is not in force

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

As mentioned before, the dynamization of the bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Libya developed as part of the strategy of the Venezuelan government focused on strengthening its relationship with the OPEC countries. In that sense, cooperation in the oil and energy sector played a key role in the bilateral relationship between these two countries. As a result of that dynamization, on 22 October 2010 was subscribed to an Energy Cooperation Agreement looking forward to encouraging and promoting cooperation in the energy sector, including oil, gas, electricity, and petrochemicals, based on principles of equality (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.7 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Agriculture area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Letter of Intent between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on Agriculture**	Agriculture	23/10/2010

* Subscription date / **This treaty is not in force

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

For agricultural cooperation, these States subscribed on 23 October 2010 to a Letter of Intent on Agriculture where the Parties decided to create a Technical Commission, which will be made up of two (2) representatives of the Parties. This international legal instrument has not entered into force (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.8 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Communication area

Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Memorandum of Understanding between New South Television (TELESUR) and the General Radio and Television Corporation of the Great Socialist People's	Communication	23/10/2010

* Subscription date

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

Regarding the communication sector, Venezuela and Libya on 23 October 2010 subscribed to a Memorandum of Understanding between New South Television (TELESUR) and the General Radio and Television Corporation of Libya with the purpose of allowing the access and use of the news material by both parties to strengthen alternatives to the traditional media corporations focused on delegitimated governments with leftist ideology (MPPRE, 2022).

Table 4.9 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011 in the Transportation area


Name of Treaty	Area	Date*
Agreement on Maritime Transport and Ports between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela**	Transportation	23/10/2010
Air Services Agreement between the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela**	Transportation	23/10/2010

* Subscription date / **This treaty is not in force

Source: Data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022).

For complementing the agreements subscribed in the economy and trade sector, some instruments in the transportation area have been subscribed, namely the Agreement on Maritime Transport and Ports on 23 October 2010 to create and develop means of cooperation in order to work for the removal of obstacles and the granting of facilities that contribute to the development and promotion of commercial maritime transport operations between the two countries; and Air Services Agreements on the same date to establish air services between and beyond their respective territories. Nevertheless, these legal instruments have not entered into force (MPPRE, 2022).

Figure 4.3 Bilateral Agreements between Venezuela and Libya between 1999-2011



Source: data obtained from the File of the Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2022)

Through Figure 4.3, it can be evaluated the distribution by areas of the legal instruments subscribed by the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. This bilateral relationship has generated twenty-two (22) bilateral agreements distributed in eight (08) different areas. In the political areas have been subscribed ten (10) legal instruments which compose forty-four percent (44%) of the total of which one (01) is not in force. In general, these agreements established a mechanism of consultation, mixed commissions, and favorable conditions for the diplomatic officers. Following, in the economy and trade sector was subscribed three (03) agreements that represent thirteen percent (13%) of the total of which one (01) is not in force, promoting more technical cooperation involving several industries.

Likewise, in the education sector were subscribed to three (03) agreements that represent thirteen percent (13%) of the total of which one (01) is not in force, focused on promoting an increase in knowledge exchange. Alongside, in the cultural sector were subscribed two (02) agreements that compose nine percent (9%) of the total, aiming to strengthen the people ties. The transportation sector also composes two (02) agreements that represent

nine (9%) of the total, focused on maritime and air cooperation to establish the conditions for the increase of trade exchange. Nevertheless, these agreements are not in force.

By last, agreements in the oil and energy, agriculture, and communication sector have been subscribed, representing four percent (4%) of the total each, also aiming to increase the cooperation in more technical areas. In this case, the subscribed legal instruments in oil and energy and agriculture cooperation are not in force.

In conclusion, taking into consideration the mentioned above, understanding the bilateral dynamic of Venezuela and Libya in terms of States Visits and bilateral legal instruments subscribed, one can perceive that the bilateral relationship held with the actors involved in the discussion is likely to influence the voting strategies of States within international organizations.

b. Constitution

Regarding the national legal framework, the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 1999 is the supreme law of the State composed of a Preamble, three hundred fifty (350) articles, divided into nine (09) Titles, thirty-three (33) Chapters, Repealing, Transitory and Final Provisions (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

The Preamble exposes that the main objective of the adoption of a new constitution is to refund the Republic with a new sense of social justice, reinforcing the principles of independence and rule of law, centered on the promotion of regional integration based on the self-determination and non-interventionism international principles. In this way, this document set the form of government as federal and decentralized; freedom, independence, peace, solidarity, the common good, and territorial integrity as the principles, and the peaceful cooperation, the consolidation of the Latin American integration, the defense of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples, the guarantee of human rights, and the democratization of international society as the priorities of the Venezuelan foreign policy³⁹ (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

³⁹ Preamble: refundar la República para establecer una sociedad democrática, participativa y protagónica, multiétnica y pluricultural en un Estado de justicia, federal y descentralizado, que consolide los valores de la libertad, la independencia, la paz, la solidaridad, el bien común, la integridad territorial, la convivencia y el imperio de la ley para esta y las futuras generaciones; asegure el derecho a la vida, al trabajo, a la cultura, a la educación, a la justicia social y a la igualdad sin discriminación ni subordinación alguna; promueva la

Likewise, Article 1 establishes the conception of the State as free and independent, being the main national priority the defense and preservation of those conditions. For that reason, these elements will be constantly present in the formulation of the other paragraphs of the national constitution and other legal instruments. For certain countries, mainly those with colonial backgrounds, the promotion of independence, self-determination, and non-intervention have been fundamental principles for the formulation of their foreign policy; this is the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela⁴⁰ (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

- **Guideline principles of the Venezuelan Foreign Policy**

The Venezuelan Constitution in its Title IV, Chapter I, the Fifth Section contains 4 Articles that delimitate the most relevant aspect of the conduction of the decisions in the international field (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

Table 4.10 Articles of the CRBV referring to the Foreign Affairs

Articles	Content
152	Independence, equality among States, self-determination, and non-intervention as principles of foreign affairs.
153	Priority to Latin American and Caribbean integration.
154	Prior control by the National Assembly for the ratification of

cooperación pacífica entre las naciones e impulse y consolide la integración latinoamericana de acuerdo con el principio de no intervención y autodeterminación de los pueblos, la garantía universal e indivisible de los derechos humanos, la democratización de la sociedad internacional, el desarme nuclear, el equilibrio ecológico y los bienes jurídicos ambientales como patrimonio común e irrenunciable de la humanidad [Refund the Republic to establish a democratic, participatory and leading, multiethnic and multicultural society in a State of justice, federal and decentralized, which consolidates the values of freedom, independence, peace, solidarity, the common good, territorial integrity, coexistence and the rule of law for this and future generations; ensure the right to life, work, culture, education, social justice and equality without discrimination or subordination of any kind; promote peaceful cooperation among nations and promote and consolidate Latin American integration in accordance with the principle of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples, the universal and indivisible guarantee of human rights, the democratization of international society, nuclear disarmament, ecological balance and environmental legal assets as common and inalienable heritage of humanity] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

⁴⁰ Article 1: La República Bolivariana de Venezuela es irrevocablemente libre e independiente y fundamenta su patrimonio moral y sus valores de libertad, igualdad, justicia y paz internacional en la doctrina de Simón Bolívar, el Libertador; Son derechos irrenunciables de la Nación la independencia, la libertad, la soberanía, la inmunidad, la integridad territorial y la autodeterminación nacional [The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is irrevocably free and independent and bases its moral heritage and its values of freedom, equality, justice and international peace on the doctrine of Simón Bolívar, the Liberator; Independence, freedom, sovereignty, immunity, territorial integrity and national self-determination are inalienable rights of the Nation] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999)

	international agreements.
155	Commitment to the methods of peaceful settlement of disputes.

Source: Data obtained from the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 1999

Article 152 ratifies independence, self-determination, and non-intervention as fundamental principles of Venezuela's actions in the international arena. Representing the main guidelines for the formulation of the foreign policy. Likewise, this Article, among those explicitly related to the foreign policy, contains the guideline principles for the design of international priorities, and the subsequent Articles define the methodology for the subscription and ratification of the international agreements⁴¹ (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

Article 153 favors the regional integration with Latin America and the Caribbean as Venezuela's main area of political interaction, prioritizing the subscription of international agreements related to cooperation for the development of better conditions for the population⁴². Likewise, Article 154 refers to the steps to follow as a mechanism of control among the different organs of the State involving the Legislative branch⁴³. By last, Article

⁴¹ Article 152: Las relaciones internacionales de la República responden a los fines del Estado en función del ejercicio de la soberanía y de los intereses del pueblo; ellas se rigen por los principios de independencia, igualdad entre los Estados, libre determinación y no intervención en sus asuntos internos, solución pacífica de los conflictos internacionales, cooperación, respeto de los derechos humanos y solidaridad entre los pueblos en la lucha por su emancipación y el bienestar de la humanidad. La República mantendrá la más firme y decidida defensa de estos principios y de la práctica democrática en todos los organismos e instituciones internacionales. [The international relations of the Republic respond to the purposes of the State based on the exercise of sovereignty and the interests of the people; They are governed by the principles of independence, equality among States, self-determination and non-intervention in their internal affairs, peaceful resolution of international conflicts, cooperation, respect for human rights and solidarity among peoples in the struggle for their emancipation and the welfare of humanity. The Republic will maintain the strongest and most determined defense of these principles and of democratic practice in all international organizations and institutions] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

⁴² Article 153: La integración latinoamericana y caribeña, en aras de avanzar hacia la creación de una comunidad de naciones (...) podrá suscribir tratados internacionales que conjuguen y coordinen esfuerzos para promover el desarrollo común de nuestras naciones, y que garanticen el bienestar de los pueblos [Latin American and Caribbean integration, in order to move towards the creation of a community of nations (...) may sign international treaties that combine and coordinate efforts to promote the common development of our nations, and that guarantee the well-being of the peoples] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

⁴³ Article 154: los tratados celebrados por la República deben ser aprobados por la Asamblea Nacional antes de su ratificación por el Presidente o Presidenta de la República [The treaties concluded by the Republic must be approved by the National Assembly before their ratification by the President of the Republic] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

155 ratifies the commitment of the nation to the methods of peaceful settlement of disputes⁴⁴ (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

- **Defense of the national Sovereignty in other aspects of the national legal framework**

Concerning the other Articles of the primary national legal instrument, the defense of the independence and sovereignty is recurrently present as the objective of the different levels of the public power⁴⁵ and as a duty of the civilians and the several national authorities (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

Table 4.11 Articles of the CRBV referring to the Defense of the National Sovereignty

Articles	Content
5	Sovereignty resides non-transferable in the people.
11	Venezuela exercises sovereignty over the continental, insular, air, and maritime territory and its resources.
70	Means for the exercise of popular sovereignty.
73	International treaties, conventions, or agreements that could compromise national sovereignty may be submitted to a referendum.
110	Recognition of science and technology as fundamental instruments for national security and sovereignty.
126	Indigenous peoples must safeguard their integrity and national sovereignty.
130	Venezuelans must honor and defend the homeland, safeguard, and protect the sovereignty, nationality, territorial integrity, and self-determination.
156.30	The management of border policy and territorial maintenance and sovereignty in those spaces is the responsibility of the National Public Power.

⁴⁴ Article 155: en los tratados, convenios y acuerdos internacionales que la República celebre, se insertará una cláusula por la cual las partes se obliguen a resolver por las vías pacíficas reconocidas en el derecho internacional [in the international treaties, conventions and agreements that the Republic celebrates, a clause will be inserted by which the parties are obliged to resolve by peaceful means recognized in international law] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

⁴⁵ Article 136: El Poder Público se distribuye entre el Poder Municipal, el Poder Estatal y el Poder Nacional. El Poder Público Nacional se divide en Legislativo, Ejecutivo, Judicial, Ciudadano y Electoral [The Public Power is distributed between the Municipal Power, the Statal Power and the National Power. The National Public Power is divided into Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral] (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

159	The State Public Power is obliged to maintain independence, sovereignty, and national integrity.
232	The President is obliged to seek the guarantee of the rights and freedoms of Venezuelans, as well as the independence, integrity, sovereignty of the territory, and defense of the Republic.
299	The socioeconomic regime of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela aims to strengthen the country's economic sovereignty
303	For reasons of economic and political sovereignty and national strategy, the State will keep all the shares of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA)
323	The National Defense Council is the highest consultation body for the planning and advice of the Public Power in matters related to the comprehensive defense of the Nation, its sovereignty, and the integrity of its geographical space.
328	The National Armed Forces constitute an essentially professional institution, without political militancy, organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Nation.

Source: Data obtained from the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of 1999.

After a broad evaluation of the Venezuelan constitution, it can be observed the recurrent presence of the independence and national sovereignty as a priority in the formulation of the national policy and its consolidation as the principles that guide the design the foreign policy from the most important legal document to the subsequent instruments, being present in 19 Articles from 350, representing around 5.4% (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, 1999).

c. Design of Foreign Policy

• El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan]

“El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan], officially entitled “Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social” [the Economic and Social Development Plan], is a compile of government initiatives and Venezuelan laws originally presented by Hugo Chávez and later by Nicolás Maduro as Head of State, which have a validity of 6 years.

This National Plan is composed of historical objectives, national, strategic, general, and specific objectives. The 5 historical objectives are focused on 1) the defense of the national independence; 2) the building of the Bolivarian socialism of the 21st century; 3) the consolidation of Venezuela as emerging great power in Latin America and the Caribbean;

4) the development of new international geopolitics, with the multicentric and multipolar system; and 5) the preservation of life on the planet and the salvation of the human species (Maduro, 2013).

The first objective is named as

Defender, expandir y consolidar el bien más preciado Que hemos reconquistado después de 200 años: la Independencia Nacional [Defend, expand and consolidate the most precious asset That we have reconquered after 200 years: National Independence] related to “la consolidación de nuestra Independencia, se refiere al conjunto de objetivos nacionales y estratégicos en los órdenes político , económico, social y cultural, principalmente, cuyo alcance nos permitirá sentar la s bases de la irreversibilidad de la soberanía nacional [the consolidation of our Independence, refers to the set of national and strategic objectives in the political, economic, social and cultural orders, mainly, whose scope will allow us to lay the foundations of the irreversibility of national sovereignty] (Maduro, 2013, p. 11).

In this sense, this objective refers to the sovereignty over the natural resources, the oil reservoirs in particular; the sovereign management of national income; food sovereignty; technological and scientific sovereignty; and the strengthening of the National Armed Forces for the comprehensive defense of the nation, giving a holistic understanding of the diverse aspects of the concept of sovereignty.

Table 4.12 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Political Sovereignty

Objectives	Content	Field
1.1.1.2	Guarantees of the electoral processes' conditions for the recognition of popular sovereignty	Political sovereignty
2.3	Achieve full sovereignty, as a guarantee of the irreversibility of the Bolivarian project	Political sovereignty
2.3.1.6	Formation of Communal Federations and Confederations for the strengthening and defense of national sovereignty.	Political sovereignty / Strengthening the defense of the nation
5.1.1.1	Guarantee the sovereignty and leading participation of organized People's Power for decision-making	Political sovereignty

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

The policies focused on political sovereignty made references to the exercise of popular sovereignty through electoral processes and the participation in the decision-making procedures through the consolidation of the administrative figures promoted by the Bolivarian project characteristic of this government period such as Communal Federations (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.13 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Communicational Sovereignty

Objectives	Content	Field
1.1.5	Promotion of democratization and communicational sovereignty	Communicational sovereignty

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

Communicational sovereignty refers to the right of the population to be truthfully informed and promptly, as well as to the free exercise of information and communication.

Furthermore, it is also related to the strategical use of the public and private media as instruments for the formation of Bolivarian values (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.14 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Sovereignty over Natural Resources

Objectives	Content	Field
1.2	Consolidate sovereignty over oil resources and other natural resources.	Sovereignty over natural resources
1.2.12	Guarantee the ownership and use in a sovereign manner of the country's natural resources	Sovereignty over natural resources
1.2.12.2	Technological sovereignty for the sovereign use of natural resources	Technological sovereignty / Sovereignty over natural resources
3.1.8	Develop the industrial complex related to the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry to strengthen the economic sovereignty	Sovereignty over natural resources / Technological and scientific sovereignty / Productive sovereignty
3.1.9	Strengthening of the technological sovereignty of the hydrocarbon sector	Sovereignty over natural resources / Technological and scientific sovereignty
3.2.1.5	Sovereign exploitation both in the extraction and in the processing of non-metallic minerals	Sovereignty over natural resources / Productive sovereignty

3.2.2.1	Configuration of a productive spatial specialization scheme, based on the advantages of location and the rational and efficient use of available resources with criteria of independence and sovereignty	Sovereignty over natural resources / Productive sovereignty
3.4.1.8	Sustainable development of the Mining Arc, with the sovereign and hegemonic control of the State in the productive chain of the sector	Sovereignty over natural resources / Productive sovereignty
5.2	Protection of the permanent sovereignty of the State over natural resources	Sovereignty over natural resources
5.2.1.7	sovereign control over knowledge, extraction, distribution, commercialization, and uses of strategic minerals	Sovereignty over natural resources
5.2.3.1	Cooperation with bordering countries on issues of environmental management and ecological zones of common interest following the principles of international law, and respecting national sovereignty.	Sovereignty over natural resources
5.2.3.2	Defense of the territorial rights and sovereignty of the Venezuelan State in negotiations related to the administration of marine, submarine, and oceanic spaces	Sovereignty over natural resources

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

Sovereignty over the natural resources is one of the most highlighted aspects of the conception of sovereignty of the Venezuelan State since this is a traditional oil producer country with the world's major proved oil reserves, this country has been an object of several attempts of intervention from diverse world potencies over its national oil industry. For that reason, the policies are directed to protect the exercise of sovereignty over the possession and exploitation of the national resources, being also extends to the metallic and non-metallic resources. This aspect is also related to the promotion of the technological development of the oil industry for the broad consolidation of national production (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.15 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Technological Sovereignty

Objectives	Content	Field
1.2.12.2	Technological sovereignty for the sovereign use of natural resources	Technological sovereignty / Sovereignty over the natural resources

1.5.1	Technological sovereignty to guarantee economic sovereignty	Technological and scientific sovereignty
1.5.1.1	Scientific and technological development with effective transfer of knowledge for technological sovereignty	Technological and scientific sovereignty
1.5.2.7	Scientific-technical and humanistic capacity to guarantee security and sovereignty in the production of material inputs	Technological and scientific sovereignty
1.5.4.1	The peaceful use of space technology guarantees the country the sovereign management of its telecommunications	Technological and scientific sovereignty
3.1.8	Develop the industrial complex related to the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry to strengthen the economic sovereignty	Sovereignty over the natural resources / Technological and scientific sovereignty / Productive sovereignty
3.1.9	Strengthening of the technological sovereignty of the hydrocarbon sector	Sovereignty over the natural resources / Technological and scientific sovereignty
3.2.1.7	Promotion of technological appropriation in the production of containers and packaging, both for food sovereignty and the industry in general.	Productive sovereignty / Food sovereignty / Technological and scientific sovereignty
3.3.1.3	Development of the technologies of our military industry, to ensure autonomy and sovereignty in the air, naval, and land space	Technological and scientific sovereignty / Strengthening the defense of the nation
4.4.2.6	Eliminate the technological participation of the imperial powers in strategic sectors for national sovereignty	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy / Technological and scientific sovereignty
5.1.6	Generation of clean energy, increasing its participation in the national energy matrix, and promoting technological sovereignty	Technological and scientific sovereignty

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

Per the sovereignty over the natural resources, technological sovereignty is a key element of the conception of sovereignty to prevent the interventionism, involving aspects such as transfer of knowledge, space technology, the development of an industrial complex for the

hydrocarbon sector including the production of cleaner energy, and innovation in the food production and the military industry (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.16 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to the Sovereign Management of National Income

Objectives	Content	Field
1.3	The sovereign management of national income	Sovereign management of national income
1.3.9	Reach international tax efficiency standards, safeguarding national sovereignty	Sovereign management of national income
3.4.7	Strengthening of control mechanisms that allow the State to effectively exercise its sovereignty in the exchange of goods in border areas	Sovereign management of national income

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

The sovereign management of national income is significantly related to the trade area referring to the implementation of the international tax efficiency standards and the exercise of national sovereignty in the exchange process, especially in border areas in order to generate better conditions for national income generation (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.17 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Food Sovereignty

Objectives	Content	Field
1.4.1.7	Food sovereignty through the improvement of transport infrastructure	Food sovereignty
1.4.3	Promotion of public policies for the scope of food sovereignty	Food sovereignty
1.4.3.2	Diagnosis of the food requirements and production capacities	Food sovereignty
2.2.11	Ensure healthy eating and adequate nutrition following the constitutional mandates on health, sovereignty, and food security	Food sovereignty
3.2.1.7	Promotion of technological appropriation in the production of containers and packaging, both for food sovereignty and the industry in general.	Productive sovereignty / Food sovereignty / Technological and scientific sovereignty

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

The exercise of food sovereignty is related to the consolidation of the national production to reduce the dependency on imports to supply the national market. This process involves the

improvement of transport infrastructure, production capacities, and technological innovation to increase the manufacturing sector (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.18 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Strengthening the Defense of the Nation

Objectives	Content	Field
1.6	Strengthening of the national defensive power to protect the Independence and national sovereignty	Strengthening the defense of the nation
1.6.1.3	Creation, restructuring, re-equipment, and relocation of military units,	Strengthening the defense of the nation
1.6.1.6	Strengthening the education in principles and values of Independence, Sovereignty, and Homeland	Strengthening the defense of the nation
2.2.1.4	Strengthening of values that protect identity, build sovereignty and defend the Homeland	Strengthening the defense of the nation
2.3.1.6	Formation of Communal Federations and Confederations for the strengthening and defense of national sovereignty.	Political sovereignty / Strengthening the defense of the nation
3.3.1.3	Development of the technologies of our military industry, to ensure autonomy and sovereignty in the air, naval, and land space	Technological and scientific sovereignty / Strengthening the defense of the nation
3.3.3.1	Education of the members of the National Armed Forces under the fundamental premise of the Bolivarian ideals of integration, sovereignty, independence	Strengthening the defense of the nation

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

The safeguard and protection of the national sovereignty against interventionist threats are strongly related to the armed defense capacities of a State. In that sense, it is a national priority of every State to strengthen the national defensive power. In the case of Venezuela, policies are focused on restructuring the military units, strengthening national identity values, and developing autonomous technology (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.19 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Productive Sovereignty

Objectives	Content	Field
3.1.8	Develop the industrial complex related to the oil, gas, and petrochemical industry to	Sovereignty over the natural resources /

	strengthen the economic sovereignty	Technological and scientific sovereignty / Productive sovereignty
3.2.1	Advance towards productive sovereignty and independence based on our comparative advantages	Productive sovereignty
3.2.1.5	Sovereign exploitation both in the extraction and in the processing of non-metallic minerals	Sovereignty over the natural resources / Productive sovereignty
3.2.1.7	Promotion of technological appropriation in the production of containers and packaging, both for food sovereignty and the industry in general.	Productive sovereignty / Food sovereignty / Technological and scientific sovereignty
3.2.2.1	Configuration of a productive spatial specialization scheme, based on the advantages of location and the rational and efficient use of available resources with criteria of independence and sovereignty	Sovereignty over the natural resources / Productive sovereignty
3.2.2.2	Generate a productive support structure that tends to build economies of scale in a new organizational culture within a framework of national sovereignty	Productive sovereignty
3.2.4.1	Design of an efficient and sovereign financial architecture	Productive sovereignty
3.2.5.1	Strengthen the iron-steel production chain to stabilize the economy of scale in procurement and sovereign marketing	Productive sovereignty
3.2.5.9	Development of the automotive sector, achieving increasing levels of sovereignty	Productive sovereignty
3.4.1.8	Sustainable development of the Mining Arc, with the sovereign and hegemonic control of the State in the productive chain of the sector	Sovereignty over the natural resources / Productive sovereignty
5.1.3	Generation of socio-productive alternatives and new social cooperation schemes under the principles of complementarity, cooperation, sovereignty, and solidarity	Productive sovereignty

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

The productive sovereignty involves a broad number of elements above, such as the building of a capable industry for the production and use of national resources, the promotion of technological development for the increase of national production capacities,

the settling of conditions for major food production and also most autonomous military equipment, all of them in function of most efficient use of the national income (Maduro, 2013).

Table 4.20 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to Sovereignty as Principle of Foreign Policy

Objectives	Content	Field
4.1.1.1	Strengthen ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC as regional integration mechanisms around the principles of sovereignty, cooperation, complementation, and solidarity	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy
4.1.4.1	Active participation in the Councils of UNASUR in the framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the peoples	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy
4.3.4	transformation of the Human Rights system based on respect, the sovereign equality of States, and the principle of non-intervention	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy
4.4.1.1	Denounce international treaties that limit national sovereignty against the interests of neo-colonial powers	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy
4.4.2.6	Eliminate the technological participation of the imperial powers in strategic sectors for national sovereignty	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy / Technological and scientific sovereignty
5.2.4.1	Follow up of the United Nations Security Council agenda to avoid interventionism in environmental and human issues, and their treatment as issues of international citizen security, which threatens the sovereignty of peoples	Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy

Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

Related to the foreign affairs aspect, the national plan stated as priority the promotion of regional integration through the Venezuela participation of mechanisms of political regional integration such as the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América - Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (ALBA-TCP) [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - Trade Treaty of the Peoples], the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR) [Union of South American Nations], and the Comunidad de Estados

Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC) [Community of Latin American and Caribbean States]. Those mechanisms of regional integration have a key purpose to promote cooperation among its member States with a non-interventionist approach and based on the principles of independence, sovereignty, cooperation, complementation, and solidarity.

Regarding the non-interventionism principle as a cross-cutting guideline for both national and foreign policy is explicitly contemplated in the objective 4.3.4 which states

Continuar impulsando la transformación del sistema de Derechos Humanos sobre la base del respeto, su democratización, la igualdad soberana de los Estados y el principio de la no injerencia [Continue promoting the transformation of the Human Rights system based on respect, its democratization, the sovereign equality of States and the principle of non-interventionism] (Maduro, 2013, p. 105).

This objective referred to the international Human Rights system as a mechanism of interventionism of regional organizations and imperialistic States, for that reason it is aimed to promote the transformation and democratization of the mentioned system to promote practices based on the respect, sovereignty equality of States and non-interventionist measures and recommendations to prevent future scenarios such as the situation in Libya object of intervention based on the protection of the human rights on the population in the context of the national political crisis.

Furthermore, and more specifically related to this subject, the objective 5.2.4.1 states

Mantener vigilancia del desarrollo de la agenda del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas para evitar la injerencia en los temas ambientales y humanos, y su tratamiento como temas de seguridad ciudadana internacional, lo cual atenta contra la soberanía de los pueblos [Maintain surveillance of the development of the agenda of the United Nations Security Council to avoid interventionism in environmental and human issues, and their treatment as issues of international citizen security, which threatens the sovereignty of peoples] (Maduro, 2013, p. 112).

Thus, this objective tackles the non-interventionism through the discussion of human rights and environmental topics within international organizations, in particular in the Security Council where these topics have been understood under security approaches for promoting interventionist measures that threaten directly the State sovereignty in diverse aspects.

Taking as an example the situation in Libya, the interventionist measures were taken to protect human rights, which triggered the change of government and subsequently a deeper


political crisis that generated long-lasting implications for the development of the State and the wellbeing of the population.

Likewise, objective 4.4.1.1 is also related to the mentioned below in a more general and implicit approach. It refers to the participation of Venezuela within an integration mechanism traditionally under the influence of imperialistic States. This objective exposes the intention of Venezuela of

Denunciar los tratados multilaterales, así como también los tratados y acuerdos bilaterales que limiten la soberanía nacional frente a los intereses de las potencias neocoloniales, tales como los tratados de promoción y protección de inversiones [Denounce multilateral treaties, as well as bilateral treaties and agreements that limit national sovereignty against the interests of neocolonial powers, such as investment promotion and protection treaties] (Maduro, 2013, p. 105)

On this matter, Venezuela stated its intention to no longer participate in agreements that threaten national sovereignty, especially in the trade aspect which has been the most common practice in its foreign relations.

Figure 4.4 Objectives of the Plan de la Patria referring to National Sovereignty by area



Source: Data obtained from the El Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] (2013-2019).

From the chart above, it can be seen that sovereignty over natural resources is the most mentioned aspect of the conception of sovereignty of the Venezuelan State with twelve (12) objectives focused on this field that represent the twenty percent (20%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty. This is in order to prevent future interventionist attempts over the oil national industry taking into account the condition of Venezuela as a traditional oil producer country with the world's major proved oil reserves, that is to say, the major exercise of sovereignty is conceived in the autonomous administration of its natural resources, pointing out the oil reservoirs (Maduro, 2013).

Technological sovereignty and productive sovereignty are the followings with eleven (11) objectives embodying the eighteen percent (18%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty. These two aspects are closely related since both aim to consolidate the exercise of sovereignty from a technological development that allows independence in the production of several industries including hydrocarbons, food, and military equipment. Strengthening the defense of the nation is tackled in seven (07) objectives that represent the twelve percent (12%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty, considering the military capacity the fundamental condition of sovereignty safeguard. Sovereignty as a principle of foreign policy is contained in six (06) objectives that represent the ten percent (10%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty, in concordance with the foreign policy contained in the Constitution of the State. Food sovereignty, contained in five (05) objectives that represent the eight percent (8%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty, is also related to the independence of the means of production.

Political sovereignty is contemplated in four (04) objectives embodying the seven percent (7%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty, related to the guarantee of people's sovereignty in the electoral processes. Sovereign management of the national income is included in three (03) objectives that represent the five percent (5%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty, referring to the generation of better conditions for the increase of the national income. By last, communicational sovereignty is contained in one (01) objective representing the two percent (2%) of the objectives referring to National Sovereignty to promote the free exercise of information and communication.

After evaluating Venezuela's legal framework, taking into consideration the Constitution as the supreme law that defines the government, the national priorities and the principle that guideline its actions at the national and international level; and the Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] as the document that states the priorities of the Maduro administration as a continuation of the government plan set by Hugo Chávez, where also is contemplate the principles basis of the further actions to pursuit in the international area, it is possible to perceive that the principle of non-interventionism is present in both legal instruments and have been a traditional and priority characteristic of the design of the Venezuelan Foreign policy. Furthermore, a significant number of articles are designed with the final objective of preserving and defending national sovereignty which is defined through a multifield conception tackling the technological development, management of the national income, the strengthening of the armed forces, the food sustainability, communication autonomy, and the most relevant for the oil producer country, the autonomy over its oil national industry. In that order, one can remark that the principles of their international policy are likely to influence the voting strategies of States within international organizations, perceiving the impact of the non-interventionism principle and defense of national sovereignty contained in the Venezuelan legal framework as guidelines for the design of the international policy, over the position assumed by Venezuela as a non-permanent member in the discussion of Libya situation within the United Nations Security Council.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

The United Nations represent the most relevant international organization engaged with global governance (Brechtin & Ness, 2003), with a particular focus on the promotion of international peace as the key condition for the preservation of security (Weiss, 2015). In this regard, the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility over the international peace and security, having the capability of urging the parties to solve their disputes through peaceful means, generating recommendations, appointing special representatives, requesting good offices from the Secretary-General, undertaking an investigation, executing mediation practices, or deploying military peacekeeping forces to the area of conflict through its decision with mandatory force. It is fundamental to highlight that the actions that involved armed efforts are implemented as a last resort when peaceful means have been exhausted, and after the recognition of the situation as a threat to the peace or as an act of aggression (United Nations, 2017).

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a founding member of the United Nations, signing the UN Charter on 26 June 1945 and ratifying it on 15 November 1945. During its membership, Venezuela has been part of the Security Council five (05) times being the most recent during the 2015-2016 period. As UNSC member expressed its position regarding various issues on the international scene such as the cases of Cuba and the Missile Crisis, the condemnation of the Apartheid policy in South Africa, the war between Iran and Iraq, the intervention of the United States in Nicaragua, the promotion of South-South cooperation, the war in the Malvinas, among others. During its participation in this body, it can be noticed that Venezuela's courses of action both in the UN and in other integration mechanisms focused on defending non-interventionism in the internal affairs of other nations (Romero, 2009). Especially, with the new century also came a foreign policy focused on the promotion of a multicenter system, prioritizing regional integration and closer relationships with the oil producer countries, denouncing imperialistic practices, and promoting the defense of the non-interventionism principle (López, 2020).

Related to the principle of non-interventionism as Vincent (1971) states quoting Falk (n.d.) non-interventionism is considered a “doctrinal mechanism to express the outer limits of permissible influence that one State may properly exert upon another” (p. 15). It can be understood as the frontier between diplomatic pressure, being this tolerable, and the pressure and several degrees of coercion that are not acceptable. This principle might act as the border between the domain of international law and that of national law. Likewise, within the United Nations, it is considered a statement of the desired pattern of behavior in international relations (Vincent, 1971). This principle is contemplated expressly in the form of non-intervention of the organization in the domestic matters of one member State, and implicitly in the form of non-intervention between States in several articles of the Charter and subsequent legal instruments such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States following the Charter of the United Nations (Vincent, 1971).

On the other hand, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty celebrated in 2001, introduce the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ to protect the population affected by serious harm, civil wars, insurgencies, State repression, and State collapse, which their States are unwilling or unable to protect (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). In this regard, the UN Charter is not clear when it comes to saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. Furthermore, the arguments for the establishment of the R2P are founded on the idea that “the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing” (United Nations, 2004).

As Bellamy & Williams (2011) expose, the international response to specific crises, namely the situation in Libya, evidences a new approach in practice to human protection. The UNSC has long authorized the implementation of ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians, in cases such as Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, Resolution 1973, approved on 17 March 2011, on the situation in Libya represented the first time this body “had authorized the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning State” (p. 825). UN officials approach the problem as one of human protection, highlighting the imminent

threat to the population in Libya insisting on the compliance of the 2005 commitment to R2P. Likewise, it is fundamental to mention the role played by the regional organizations as 'gatekeeping' facilitating the establishment of the conditions for the adoption of enforcement measures by the UNSC (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

In summary, the consensus around the implementation of force against Libya was facilitated by several particular elements, highlighting a solid regional consensus alongside the poor international standing of Gaddafi's regime, as well as the intelligibility of the threat and limited timeframe for effective measures. Moreover, the UNSC's response in this regard displayed the 'new' politics of protection that present four principal characteristics. First, the international community is nowadays explicitly focused on civilian protection, promoted mainly by the Secretariat. Second, the UNSC is openly more willing to authorize the implementation of armed forces for human protection purposes. Third, it evident the fundamental relationship between the UNSC and relevant regional organizations. Fourth, both activist and more precautionous States have agreed to approach crises through the UNSC and related regional organizations. Nevertheless, this new politics of protection raises some challenges, namely, NATO has been extensively criticized for an exaggeratedly expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973, resulting in civilian casualties. Second, inquiries have been raised regarding the liaison between human protection and other political objectives, namely regime change. Critics focused on the argument that while protection is a legitimate interest it must not become a method to promote regime change (Bellamy & Williams, 2011).

After the armed conflict in Libya in 2011, the United Nations founded the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as a political mission to assist the transitional authorities of the country within the post-conflict processes. Its mandate was most recently renewed on 30 September 2021 through resolution 2599 until 31 January 2022. In this sense, Libya's situation is still subject to discussion within international organizations, including several organs of the United Nations system. Furthermore, this topic has represented an algid point that has generated clear alignments that range from the States with a clear tendency for the legal arguments and the States that support the humanitarian approach (United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, 2022).

The normative structure of the English School represents the most suitable paradigm to evaluate the order/justice contrast within international society. Pluralism and Solidarism do not embody zero-sum positions. The English School is about defining an operational balance between power and interest, and justice and responsibility; that is to say, finding the most effective meet-up of the ideal and the real. In practice, related to human rights, humanitarian intervention has been the main empirical issue tackled by this debate (Buzan, 2014).

Regarding the impact of human rights on sovereignty, and specifically on nonintervention, if the concept of sovereignty is understood from its juridical interpretation being conditioned to diplomatic recognition, it can be assumed that sovereignty is essentially conditional. Thus, the embracement of human rights from a State-centric Solidarism approach can legitimate the erosion of the right of nonintervention, generating the discussion over failed States and humanitarian intervention. In this context, human rights is a growing and intensely argued international institution, an object of diverse opinions within international society, especially regarding the legitimacy of intervention with humanitarian purposes (Buzan, 2014).

Bearing in mind the statements of Buzan (2014) in his evaluation of the normative perspective of the English School, one can perceive that this doctrine tackles the discussion of issues related to political instability, social conflicts, and violation of human rights as a threat to international peace and security. In this framework, States and other international actors tend to adopt a position whether pluralist or solidaristic. For instance, in the discussion of the situation in Libya, Venezuela has adopted a pluralist approach, manifested through its voting pattern as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in the 2015-2016 period, which is evidenced during the voting process of the S/RES/2240 (2015) on migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya where Venezuela was the only abstention without alignment with the block of States (United Nations, 2015); and the S/RES/2312 (2016) on renewal for 12 months of the authorizations as set out in paras. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) concerning migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, where Venezuela repeated the same voting pattern (United Nations, 2016).

To prove that the position adopted by the States in the discussion of international issues, displayed by their voting strategies within international organizations, is influenced by the bilateral relationship sustained with the actors under discussion alongside the guideline principles of their foreign policy, among the elements that have an impact in the position adopted by the States, was evaluated the influence of the bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Libya and the principles of foreign policy contained in the Venezuelan legal framework over its voting pattern in the discussion of Libya situation within the United Nations Security Council.

Venezuela and Libya established diplomatic relations on 18 June 1965 within the framework of the strengthening of bilateral relations of Venezuela with OPEC members (VTV, 2021). From 1999, the foreign policy of Venezuela will progressively start a transition towards a new model promoted by the presidency of Hugo Chavez. Venezuela's relations with other developing nations will become more dynamic and stronger both in Latin America and with nations in more distant geographical regions. In that sense, the most important elements that define Hugo Chávez's policy towards the Middle East region were (1) the guidelines of Arab socialism and the non-aligned movement; (2) the defense of the Palestinian cause; (3) oil interests; and (4) anti-imperialism ideology alongside with the affinity of leaders that promote the assumption of the socialism and commitment to the social revolution (Boersner, 2021).

In concordance with the priorities of the Venezuelan foreign policy, during the 1999-2011 period, the governments of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (1999-2013) and Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011) have performed six (06) bilateral State Visits of which the Venezuelan Head of State visited Libya in five (05) opportunities and the Libyan Head of State visited Venezuela in one (01) occasion (Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2022).

These multiple State Visits of the Venezuelan President to the Libyan territory, are a clear sign of the relevance given by Venezuela to the bilateral relationships with this State. Likewise, Libya was included in the presidential tours for the Asian and African, and Middle East regions, especially those performed to strengthen the position of Venezuela in the international oil industry alongside the reinforcement of the OPEC as an international

actor. In this regard, it is important to point out the personalization of this bilateral relationship considering the explicit ideological compatibility of Chávez and Gaddafi, reflected in the several reciprocated distinctions during the 2004 and 2009 as well as the participation of Chávez in the Commemoration ceremony for Muammar Gaddafi's 40 years in power. Although Gaddafi performed only one State Visit to Venezuela, this contemplated significant political relevance since represent the first and only visit of the Libyan leader to the Latin American region, consolidating Venezuela, as Bolívar (2013) stated, as its opening for the cooperation with the region. Understanding the State Visit as the highest-level diplomatic event, the six (06) visits performed during the 1999-2011 period, are a clear sign of the elevation of the bilateral relationships in contrast with the previous Venezuelan governments (Bolívar, 2013).

Likewise, in the period composed of almost 12 years between the starting of Chavez's government and the end of Gaddafi's government, twenty-two (22) international legal instruments were subscribed between the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the government of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya distributed in eight (08) different areas. Of said agreements, seven (07) have not come into force. The bilateral relationship between Venezuela and Libya has been developed mainly in political cooperation based on the shared ideology founded on the rejection of the neoliberal globalization model and the capitalist system promoted by the United States. In order to promote an alternative to the unipolar international structure, these two States have celebrated ten (10) bilateral agreements which compose forty-four percent (44%) of the total. In conclusion, taking the first independent variable, understanding the bilateral dynamic of Venezuela and Libya in terms of States Visits and bilateral legal instruments subscribed, one can perceive that the bilateral relationship held with the actors involved in the discussion is likely to influence the voting strategies of States within international organizations (Ministry of People's Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (MPPRE), 2022).

Regarding the second independent variable related to the principles contained in the national legal framework after evaluating the Venezuela legal framework, taking into consideration the Constitution as the supreme law that defines the government, the national priorities, and the principle that guideline its actions in the national and international level;

and the Plan de la Patria [The Homeland Plan] as the document that states the priorities of the Maduro administration as a continuation of the government plan set by Hugo Chávez, where also is contemplated the principles basis of the further actions to chase in the international area, it is possible to perceive that the principle of non-interventionism is present in both legal instruments and have been a traditional and priority characteristic of the design of the Venezuelan Foreign policy. Furthermore, a significant number of articles are designed with the final objective of preserving and defending national sovereignty which is defined through a multifield conception tackling the technological development, management of the national income, the strengthening of the armed forces, the food sustainability, communication autonomy, and the most relevant for the oil producer country, the autonomy over its oil national industry. In that order, one can remark that the principles of their international policy are likely to influence the voting strategies of States within international organizations, perceiving the impact of the non-interventionism principle and defense of national sovereignty contained in the Venezuelan legal framework as guidelines for the design of the international policy, over the position assumed by Venezuela as a non-permanent member in the discussion of Libya situation within the United Nations Security Council.

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APPENDIX A

**VOTING RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS DURING THE 2015-2016 PERIOD**



Resolution	Date	Topic	Summary	Voting Procedure (Y/N/A)	Venezuela vote	Notes
S/RES/2196 (2015)	22.Jan.15	Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2196 (2015) [on renewal of measures on arms, transport, finance and travel against the Central African Republic and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) until 29 Feb. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2197 (2015)	29.Jan.15	Cyprus	Security Council resolution 2197 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 July 2015]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2198 (2015)	29.Jan.15	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Security Council resolution 2198 (2015) [on renewal of measures on arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo imposed by Security Council resolution 1807 (2008) and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) until 1 Aug. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2199 (2015)	12.Feb.15	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Security Council resolution 2199 (2015) [on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts by Al-Qaida and associated groups]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2200 (2015)	12.Feb.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2200 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) on the Sudan until 12 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2201 (2015)	15.Feb.15	Middle East (Yemen)	Security Council resolution 2201 (2015) [on the situation in Yemen]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2202 (2015)	17.Feb.15	Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation (Ukraine)	Security Council resolution 2202 (2015) [on implementation of the "Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements"]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2203 (2015)	18.Feb.15	Guinea-Bissau	Security Council resolution 2203 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) until 29 Feb. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2204 (2015)	24.Feb.15	Middle East (Yemen)	Security Council resolution 2204 (2015) [on renewal of sanctions against Yemen imposed by Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) and extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 25 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2205 (2015)	26.Feb.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2205 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 July 2015]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2206 (2015)	3.Mar.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) [on the situation in South Sudan]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2207 (2015)	4.Mar.15	Non- proliferation/Demo cratic People's Republic of Korea	Security Council resolution 2207 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 5 Apr. 2016]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2208 (2015)	5.Mar.15	Libya	Security Council resolution 2208 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 31 Mar. 2015]	15/0/0	Y	8. Possibility of impose measures under Chapter 7 in further use of Chemical Weapons
S/RES/2209 (2015)	6.Mar.15	Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2209 (2015) [on use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic]	14/0/1	A	
S/RES/2210 (2015)	16.Mar.15	Afghanistan	Security Council resolution 2210 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 17 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2211 (2015)	26.Mar.15	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Security Council resolution 2211 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2212 (2015)	26.Mar.15	Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2212 (2015) [on increase of military, police and correction personnel for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2213 (2015)	27.Mar.15	Libya	Security Council resolution 2213 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 Sept. 2015]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2214 (2015)	27.Mar.15	Libya	Security Council resolution 2214 (2015) [on threats to peace and security caused by terrorist acts by Al-Qaida and associated groups operating in Libya]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2215 (2015)	2.Apr.15	Liberia	Security Council resolution 2215 (2015) [on drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2216 (2015)	14.Apr.15	Middle East (Yemen)	Security Council resolution 2216 (2015) [on cessation of violence in Yemen and the reinforcement of sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 2104 (2014)]	15/0/1	Y	Abstention Russia
S/RES/2217 (2015)	28.Apr.15	Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2217 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 30 Apr. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2218 (2015)	28.Apr.15	Western Sahara	Security Council resolution 2218 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 Apr. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2219 (2015)	28.Apr.15	Côte d'Ivoire	Security Council resolution 2219 (2015) [on modification and renewal of sanctions against Côte d'Ivoire until 30 Apr. 2016 and on extension of the mandate of the UN Group of Experts until 30 May 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2220 (2015)	22.May.15	Small arms	Security Council resolution 2220 (2015) [on small arms]	9/0/6	A	Abstentions: Angola, Chad, China, Nigeria, Russia and Venezuela
S/RES/2221 (2015)	26.May.15	Somalia	Security Council resolution 2221 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) until 7 Aug. 2015]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2222 (2015)	27.May.15	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Security Council resolution 2222 (2015) [on protection of journalists and associated media personnel in armed conflict]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2223 (2015)	28.May.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2223 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 30 Nov. 2015]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2224 (2015)	9.Jun.15	Non-proliferation	Security Council resolution 2224 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010) concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran until 9 July 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2225 (2015)	18.Jun.15	Children and armed conflict	Security Council resolution 2225 (2015) [on children and armed conflict]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2226 (2015)	25.Jun.15	Côte d'Ivoire	Security Council resolution 2226 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 30 June 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2227 (2015)	29.Jun.15	Mali	Security Council resolution 2227 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2228 (2015)	29.Jun.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2228 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2229 (2015)	29.Jun.15	The situation in the Middle East (UNDOF)	Security Council resolution 2229 (2015) [on renewal of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 31 Dec. 2015]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2230 (2015)	14.Jul.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2230 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 Dec. 2015]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2231 (2015)	20.Jul.15	Non-proliferation	Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) [on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2232 (2015)	28.Jul.15	Somalia	Security Council resolution 2232 (2015) [on deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 30 May 2016 and extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) until 30 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2233 (2015)	29.Jul.15	Iraq	Security Council resolution 2233 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 July 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2234 (2015)	29.Jul.15	Cyprus	Security Council resolution 2234 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 Jan. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2235 (2015)	7.Aug.15	Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2235 (2015) [on establishment of an OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2236 (2015)	21.Aug.15	Middle East (UNIFIL)	Security Council resolution 2236 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until 31 Aug. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2237 (2015)	2.Sep.15	Liberia	Security Council resolution 2237 (2015) [on renewal of measures on arms and travel imposed by Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) and on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2238 (2015)	10.Sep.15	Libya	Security Council resolution 2238 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2239 (2015)	17.Sep.15	Liberia	Security Council resolution 2239 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 Sept. 2016]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2240 (2015)	9.Oct.15	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) [on migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya]	14/0/1	A	Abstention Venezuela
S/RES/2241 (2015)	9.Oct.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2241 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 Dec. 2015]	13/0/2	A	Abstention Russia and Venezuela
S/RES/2242 (2015)	13.Oct.15	Women and peace and security	Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) [on women and peace and security]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2243 (2015)	14.Oct.15	Haiti	Security Council resolution 2243 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 Oct. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2244 (2015)	23.Oct.15	Somalia	Security Council resolution 2244 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 Dec. 2016]	14/0/1	A	Abstention Venezuela
S/RES/2245 (2015)	9.Nov.15	Somalia	Security Council resolution 2245 (2015) [on expansion of the mission of the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA) and the change of its name to UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOSS)]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2246 (2015)	10.Nov.15	Somalia	Security Council resolution 2246 (2015) [on piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2247 (2015)	10.Nov.15	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Security Council resolution 2247 (2015) [on renewal of the authorization of the European Union-led Multinational Stabilization Force (EUFOR ALTHEA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a further period of 12 months]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2248 (2015)	12.Nov.15	Burundi	Security Council resolution 2248 (2015) [on the situation in Burundi]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2249 (2015)	20.Nov.15	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Security Council resolution 2249 (2015) [on terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as Da'esh]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2250 (2015)	9.Dec.15	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security Council resolution 2250 (2015) [on youth, peace and security]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2251 (2015)	15.Dec.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2251 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 May 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2252 (2015)	15.Dec.15	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2252 (2015) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) until 31 July 2016]	13/0/2	A Abstention Russia and Venezuela
S/RES/2253 (2015)	17.Dec.15	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) [on renaming of Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee as "1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee" and the Al-Qaida Sanctions List as "ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List" and on extension of the mandate the Office of the Ombudsperson for a period of 24 months from the date of expiration of its current mandate in Dec. 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2254 (2015)	18.Dec.15	Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) [on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2255 (2015)	21.Dec.15	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Security Council resolution 2255 (2015) [on sanctions concerning individuals and entities and other groups and undertakings associated with the Taliban and the threat international terrorism poses to Afghanistan]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2256 (2015)	22.Dec.15	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Security Council resolution 2256 (2015) [on extension of the terms of office of permanent and ad litem judges and of the Prosecutor at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of a permanent judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)]	14/0/1	Y	Abstention Russia
S/RES/2257 (2015)	22.Dec.15	Middle East (UNDOF)	Security Council resolution 2257 (2015) [on renewal of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 June 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2258 (2015)	22.Dec.15	Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2258 (2015) [on humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and renewal for a period of 12 months of two decisions of Security Council resolution 2165 (2014)]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2259 (2015)	23.Dec.15	Libya	Security Council resolution 2259 (2015) [on the situation in Libya]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2260 (2016)	20.Jan.16	Côte d'Ivoire	Security Council resolution 2260 (2016) [on reduction of the military component of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) by 31 Mar. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2261 (2016)	25.Jan.16	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council	Security Council resolution 2261 (2016) [on establishment of a political mission in Colombia tasked with monitoring, verifying ceasefire and cessation of hostilities between Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) for a period of 12 months]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2262 (2016)	27.Jan.16	The situation in the Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2262 (2016) [on renewal of measures on arms, transport, finance and travel against the Central African Republic and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 2127 (2013) until 28 Feb. 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2263 (2016)	28.Jan.16	The situation in Cyprus	Security Council resolution 2263 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 July 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2264 (2016)	9.Feb.16	The situation in the Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2264 (2016) [on number of military, police and correction personnel for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2265 (2016)	10.Feb.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2265 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) on the Sudan until 12 Mar. 2017]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2266 (2016)	24.Feb.16	The situation in the Middle East (Yemen)	Security Council resolution 2266 (2016) [on renewal of sanctions against Yemen imposed by Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) and extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 27 Mar. 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2267 (2016)	26.Feb.16	Guinea-Bissau	Security Council resolution 2267 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) until 28 Feb. 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2268 (2016)	26.Feb.16	The situation in the Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2268 (2016) [on cessation of hostilities in the Syrian Arab Republic]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2269 (2016)	29.Feb.16	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Security Council resolution 2269 (2016) [on appointment of the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals with effect from 1 Mar. 2016 until 30 June 2018]	11/0/4	Y Abstentions: Angola, Egypt, Russia and Senegal
S/RES/2270 (2016)	2.Mar.16	Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) [on condemning the nuclear test of 6 Jan. 2016 and strengthening sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2271 (2016)	2.Mar.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2271 (2016) [on renewal of sanctions until 15 Apr. 2016 and extension of the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015) on South Sudan until 15 May 2016]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2272 (2016)	11.Mar.16	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) [on sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeepers and personnel]	14/0/1	Y	Abstention Egypt
S/RES/2273 (2016)	15.Mar.16	The situation in Libya	Security Council resolution 2273 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 June 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2274 (2016)	15.Mar.16	The situation in Afghanistan	Security Council resolution 2274 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) until 17 Mar. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2275 (2016)	24.Mar.16	The situation in Somalia	Security Council resolution 2275 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) until 31 Mar. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2276 (2016)	24.Mar.16	Non- proliferation/Demo cratic People's Republic of Korea	Security Council resolution 2276 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 24 Apr. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2277 (2016)	30.Mar.16	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Security Council resolution 2277 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2278 (2016)	31.Mar.16	The situation in Libya	Security Council resolution 2278 (2016) [on extension of the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by Security Council resolution 2146 (2014) and on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts concerning Libya until 31 July 2017]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2279 (2016)	1.Apr.16	The situation in Burundi	Security Council resolution 2279 (2016) [on the situation in Burundi]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2280 (2016)	7.Apr.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2280 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015) until 1 July 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2281 (2016)	26.Apr.16	The situation in the Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2281 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 31 July 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2282 (2016)	27.Apr.16	Post-conflict peacebuilding	Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) [on post-conflict peacebuilding]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2283 (2016)	27.Apr.16	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire	Security Council resolution 2283 (2016) [on lifting of sanctions measures against Côte d'Ivoire]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2284 (2016)	27.Apr.16	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire	Security Council resolution 2284 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) until 30 June 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2285 (2016)	29.Apr.16	The situation concerning Western Sahara	Security Council resolution 2285 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 Apr. 2017]	10.02.2003	N
S/RES/2286 (2016)	3.May.16	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Security Council resolution 2286 (2016) [on protection of the wounded and sick, medical personnel and humanitarian personnel in armed conflict]	15/0/0	Y

Negative:
Uruguay and
Venezuela.
Abstentions:
Angola, New
Zeland, Russia.

S/RES/2287 (2016)	12.May.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2287 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 Nov. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2288 (2016)	25.May.16	The situation in Liberia	Security Council resolution 2288 (2016) [on termination of measures on arms imposed by Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) and on dissolution of the Committee and the Panel of Experts on Liberia]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2289 (2016)	27.May.16	The situation in Somalia	Security Council resolution 2289 (2016) [on authorization to the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 8 July 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2290 (2016)	31.May.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2290 (2016) [on renewal of sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and the extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2291 (2016)	13.Jun.16	The situation in Libya	Security Council resolution 2291 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 Dec. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2292 (2016)	14.Jun.16	The situation in Libya	Security Council resolution 2292 (2016) [on inspection of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2293 (2016)	23.Jun.16	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Security Council resolution 2293 (2016) [on renewal of measures on arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo imposed by Security Council resolution 1807 (2008) and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) until 1 Aug. 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2294 (2016)	29.Jun.16	The situation in the Middle East (UNDOF)	Security Council resolution 2294 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 31 Dec. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2295 (2016)	29.Jun.16	The situation in Mali	Security Council resolution 2295 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2296 (2016)	29.Jun.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2296 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2297 (2016)	7.Jul.16	The situation in Somalia	Security Council resolution 2297 (2016) [on authorization to the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 31 May 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2298 (2016)	22.Jul.16	The situation in Libya	Security Council resolution 2298 (2016) [on destruction of Libya's chemical weapons]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2299 (2016)	25.Jul.16	The situation concerning Iraq	Security Council resolution 2299 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 July 2017]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2300 (2016)	26.Jul.16	The situation in Cyprus	Security Council resolution 2300 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 Jan. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2301 (2016)	26.Jul.16	The situation in the Central African Republic	Security Council resolution 2301 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 Nov. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2302 (2016)	29.Jul.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2302 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 12 Aug. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2303 (2016)	29.Jul.16	The situation in Burundi	Security Council resolution 2303 (2016) [on the situation in Burundi]	11/0/4	A	Abstentions: Angola, China, Egypt and Venezuela
S/RES/2304 (2016)	12.Aug.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2304 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 Dec. 2016]	11/0/4	A	Abstentions: Angola, China, Egypt and Venezuela
S/RES/2305 (2016)	30.Aug.16	The situation in the Middle East (UNIFIL)	Security Council resolution 2305 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until 31 Aug. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2306 (2016)	6.Sep.16	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)	Security Council resolution 2306 (2016) [on amending the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by adding Article 13 quinquies, on appointment of ad hoc judge for the Appeals Chamber]	15/0/0	Y	

S/RES/2307 (2016)	13.Sep.16	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Security Council resolution 2307 (2016) [on size, operational aspects and mandate of the UN Mission in Colombia]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2308 (2016)	14.Sep.16	The situation in Liberia	Security Council resolution 2308 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 31 Dec. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2309 (2016)	22.Sep.16	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts: Aviation security	Security Council resolution 2309 (2016) [on terrorist threats to civil aviation]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2310 (2016)	23.Sep.16	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security Council resolution 2310 (2016) [on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament]	14/0/1	Y Abstention Egypt
S/RES/2311 (2016)	6.Oct.16	Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	Security Council resolution 2311 (2016) [on recommendation that António Guterres be appointed Secretary-General of the UN for a term of office from 1 Jan. 2017 to 31 Dec. 2021]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2312 (2016)	6.Oct.16	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security Council resolution 2312 (2016) [on renewal for 12 months of the authorizations as set out in paras. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) concerning migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya]	14/0/1	A	Abstention Venezuela
S/RES/2313 (2016)	13.Oct.16	The question concerning Haiti	Security Council resolution 2313 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 Apr. 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2314 (2016)	31.Oct.16	The situation in the Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2314 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic until 18 Nov. 2016]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2315 (2016)	8.Nov.16	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Security Council resolution 2315 (2016) [on renewal of the authorization of the European Union-led Multinational Stabilization Force (EUFOR ALTHEA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a further period of 12 months]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2316 (2016)	9.Nov.16	The situation in Somalia	Security Council resolution 2316 (2015) [on piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2317 (2016)	10.Nov.16	The situation in Somalia	Security Council resolution 2317 (2016) [on renewal of the provisions of para. 2 of Security Council resolution 2142 (2014) until 15 Nov. 2017 concerning the arms embargo on Somalia and on extension of the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea until 15 Dec. 2017]	10/0/5	A	Abstentions: Angola, China, Egypt, Russia and Venezuela

S/RES/2318 (2016)	15.Nov.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2318 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 May 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2319 (2016)	17.Nov.16	The situation in the Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2319 (2016) [on renewal of the mandate of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic for one additional year]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2320 (2016)	18.Nov.16	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Security Council resolution 2320 (2016) [on enhancing the relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2321 (2016)	30.Nov.16	Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) [on strengthening sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and condemning the nuclear test of 9 Sept. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2322 (2016)	12.Dec.16	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Security Council resolution 2322 (2016) [on international judicial cooperation in countering terrorism]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2323 (2016)	13.Dec.16	The situation in Libya	Security Council resolution 2323 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 Sept. 2017]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2324 (2016)	14.Dec.16	Tribute to the outgoing Secretary-General	Security Council resolution 2324 (2016) [on Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2325 (2016)	15.Dec.16	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Security Council resolution 2325 (2016) [on non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2326 (2016)	15.Dec.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2326 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 16 Dec. 2016]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2327 (2016)	16.Dec.16	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Security Council resolution 2327 (2016) [on increase of force levels of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and extension of the mandate until 15 Dec. 2017]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2328 (2016)	19.Dec.16	The situation in the Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2328 (2016) [on humanitarian evacuations in Aleppo, Syrian Arab Republic]	15/0/0	Y
S/RES/2329 (2016)	19.Dec.16	International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991	Security Council resolution 2329 (2016) [on extension of the terms of office of permanent judges, Prosecutor and President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)]	15/0/0	Y

S/RES/2330 (2016)	19.Dec.16	The situation in the Middle East (UNDOF)	Security Council resolution 2330 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 June 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2331 (2016)	20.Dec.16	Maintenance of international peace and security	Security Council resolution 2331 (2016) [on trafficking in persons in armed conflicts]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2332 (2016)	21.Dec.16	The situation in the Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2332 (2016) [on humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and renewal of authorization of relief delivery and monitoring mechanism until 18 Jan. 2018]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2333 (2016)	23.Dec.16	The situation in Liberia	Security Council resolution 2333 (2016) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 Mar. 2018]	12/0/3	Y	Abstentions France, Russia and United Kingdom
S/RES/2334 (2016)	23.Dec.16	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) [on cessation of Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem]	14/0/1	Y	Abstention United States
S/RES/2335 (2016)	30.Dec.16	The situation concerning Iraq	Security Council resolution 2335 (2016) [on retention of funds in the escrow accounts authorized pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) until 30 June 2017]	15/0/0	Y	
S/RES/2336 (2016)	31.Dec.16	The situation in the Middle East (Syria)	Security Council resolution 2336 (2016) [on establishment of a ceasefire in the Syrian Arab Republic]	15/0/0	Y	
Source: data obtained from the United Nations Digital Library.						