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LEADERS' REACTIONS TO EXOGENOUS POLITICAL SHOCKS

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LEADERS' REACTIONS TO EXOGENOUS
POLITICAL SHOCKS: AN ANALYSIS OF
NECMETTİN ERBAKAN'S & RECEP TAYYİP
ERDOĞAN'S LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND STYLES

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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Ankara
February 2023

To My Dad, My Superman
To My Mom, My Angel
To Gökarp, My Only Love
To Mira Su, The Rest of My Life



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TRAITS AND STYLES

The Graduate School of Economics and Social
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ABSTRACT

LEADERS' REACTIONS TO EXOGENOUS POLITICAL SHOCKS: AN ANALYSIS OF NECMETTİN ERBAKAN'S & RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'S LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND STYLES

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Turkey has witnessed a leader-oriented history of politics. Considering the role of leadership characteristics as an explanatory variable, this thesis follows the leadership studies suggesting that personal traits and leadership styles play significant roles in shaping a leader's policy-making process. Presupposing that the leader matters to adequately comprehend Turkish politics, this thesis focuses on the leadership traits and styles of two significant figures: Necmettin Erbakan (the founding member and leader of several prominent Islamic political parties in Turkey from the 1960s to the 2010s, namely the National Order Party (MNP), the National Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP), mentor of the Virtue and Felicity Parties); and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (chairman of the Justice and Development Party, Prime Minister between 2003 and 2014, and President since August 2014). In analyzing the role of the leadership traits and styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan in their decision-making process, the overarching methodological approach combines the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) with an at-a-distance assessment technique and the case study. Using LTA, this thesis discusses whether and in what ways Erbakan's and Erdoğan's traits and leadership styles changed in response to the military threats both leaders faced and their parties' closure cases. Considering valuable and meaningful results delivered by LTA, this thesis empirically expands the literature on Turkish political leaders and contributes theoretically to leadership studies on the role of exogenous shocks in studying politics.

Key Words: Necmettin Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leadership trait analysis, leadership traits and styles, leader's response to external shocks

ÖZET

LİDERLERİN DIŞ SİYASİ ŞOKLARA TEPKİSİ: NECMETTİN ERBAKAN & RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'IN LİDERLİK ÖZELLİKLERİ VE TARZLARININ ANALİZİ

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Türkiye lider odaklı bir siyasi tarihe tanıklık etmiştir. Açıklayıcı bir değişken olarak liderlik özelliklerinin rolüne dikkate alan bu tez, kişisel özelliklerinin ve liderlik tarzlarının bir liderin politika oluşturma sürecini şekillendirmede önemli roller oynadığını öne süren liderlik çalışmalarını takip etmektedir. Türkiye siyasi tarihini yeterince anlamak için liderin önemli olduğunu varsayan bu tez, iki önemli figürün liderlik özelliklerine ve tarzlarına odaklanmaktadır: Necmettin Erbakan (1960'lardan 2010'lara kadar Türkiye'de birçok önde gelen İslami siyasi partinin kurucu üyesi ve lideri - Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP), Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP), Refah Partisi (RP)- ve Fazilet ve Saadet Partilerinin akıl hocası) ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2003-2014 yılları arasında Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Genel Başkanı ve Başbakan, Ağustos 2014'ten beri Cumhurbaşkanı). Kapsayıcı metodolojik yaklaşım, Erbakan ve Erdoğan'ın liderlik özelliklerinin ve tarzlarının karar verme süreçlerindeki rolünü analiz ederken, bir uzaktan değerlendirme tekniği olarak Liderlik Özellikleri Analizi (LTA) ile vaka çalışmasını birleştirir. Bu tez, LTA'yı kullanarak, Erbakan ve Erdoğan'ın özelliklerinin ve liderlik tarzlarının her iki liderin de karşı karşıya kaldığı askeri tehditler ve partilerinin kapatılma davaları karşısında değişip değişmediğini ve değişti ise ne şekillerde olduğunu tartışmaktadır. LTA'nın sunduğu değerli ve anlamlı sonuçları göz önünde bulunduran bu tez, Türk siyasi liderleri hakkındaki literatürü ampirik olarak genişletmekte ve siyaset çalışmasında dışsal şokların rolüne ilişkin liderlik çalışmalarına teorik olarak katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Necmettin Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, liderlik özelliği analizi, liderlik özellikleri ve stilleri, liderin dış şoklara tepkisi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
AP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
BACE	Belief in the Ability to Control Events
CC	Conceptual Complexity
CGP	The Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi)
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
D-8	D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8 Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatı)
DGM	The State Security Court (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi)
DIS	Distrust of Others
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi)
DTP	Democratic Turkey Party (Demokratik Türkiye Partisi)
DYP	The True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)
ECHR	The European Court of Human Rights (Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi)
EU	European Union (Avrupa Birliği)
FP	The Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)

IGB	In-Group Bias
İTÜ	İstanbul Technical University (İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi)
LTA	Leadership Trait Analysis
MCH	The Nationalist Front Governments (Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümetleri)
MGK	The National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)
MHP	The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MNP	The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)
MSP	The National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü)
OC	Operational Codes
OCA	Operational Code Analysis
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)
PP	Profiler Plus
PWR	The Need for Power
RP	Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
SC	Self-Confidence
SP	The Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
TASK	Task Focus
TBMM	The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TESK	Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu)
TM	Turkish Military

TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)
TRT	The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu)
TSK	The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)
TÜRK-İŞ	Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu)
YÖK	Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu)



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout Turkish political history, a large number of political parties have emerged and played different roles within different historical periods since the country's establishment. However, several political leaders such as Bülent Ecevit, Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan, Alparslan Türkeş, Turgut Özal, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have had long-lasting influence in the political arena, leaving permanent marks on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Turkish politics has traditionally been a world driven by its leaders (Heper and Sayarı 2002). Considering the strong leader-oriented political tradition in Turkey, leaders matter to adequately understand Turkish politics.

In the history of Turkish politics, Islam as a political force has assumed numerous forms, been adopted for diverse purposes, and followed various different political strategies. Until the establishment of the Justice and Development Party, the political history of Turkey witnessed an Islamist tradition called the 'National Outlook', sequentially represented by the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party, and the Virtue Party (Yeşilada, 2002; Mecham 2004). Following the ban of the Virtue Party by the Constitutional Court in 2001, some of its reformist members, including Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, together with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul established a new party, the AKP (Çınar, 2006). The AKP's victories in the elections (2002, 2007, 2011, June 2015, November 2015, and 2018) sparked extensive academic debates about the similarities and differences between the AKP and its Islamist predecessors on how their preferences and decisions reshaped Turkey's domestic and foreign policy orientations, ideological and discursive divergences on policy issues, and underlying historical and contextual factors resulted in such a transformation (Gunter and Yavuz 2007; Cizre 2008; Duran 2008; Gümüşcü and Sert 2009, Çavdar, 2006; Mecham, 2004; Özbudun, 2006; Öniş, 2006; Yıldırım et al., 2007; Dağı, 2005; Turam, 2007; Doğan, 2005; Yeşilada 2012).

While previous analyses about the transformation of political Islam tend to provide insights into the historical and situational factors transforming the previous Islamist parties into the AKP, this study focuses on two prominent leading political figures in this transformation with similar Islamist roots, compares them with respect to their leadership traits and styles, and their possible effects on their decision-making processes: Necmettin Erbakan (former chairman of the Welfare Party supporting ‘National Outlook’, an Islamist movement; Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister; and mentor and informal advisor of the Virtue and Felicity Parties); and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (chairman of the Justice and Development Party, Prime Minister from 2003-2014, and President since August 2014).

For this study, these leaders have been selected based on their leadership practices with a specific focus on the transformation of political Islam from the Welfare Party (RP) of Necmettin Erbakan to the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

1.1. Research Questions

The following questions form the focus of this study:

- i. Do Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan differ from each other in terms of their leadership traits?
- ii. What are the leadership styles of Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan?
- iii. What are the ways in which the leadership traits and styles of Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan differentiate in their reactions to significant political constraints in the cases of military intervention and party closure?

In profiling leaders’ responses to military threats, two similar cases were selected to analyze how each leader responds to this constraints based on the changing nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey: For Erbakan, February 28 and for Erdoğan, E-memorandum. Considering the legal constraints imposed on these leaders, this study concentrates on the closure case of the Welfare Party in 1998 and that of the Justice and Development Party in 2008.

1.2. Purpose and Methodology

This research makes the assumption that personal characteristics and leadership styles play critical roles in defining leaders' policy-making processes in order to fully comprehend the context and historical dynamics in Turkish politics. Assessing leadership traits and styles has long been an approach used by political scientists in studying political decision-making processes (Hermann 1984; 1987; Mastors 2000; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Taysi and Preston 2001; Kille and Scully 2003; Dyson 2006; Renshon 2009; Görener and Uçal 2011; Kesgin 2012; 2013; Özdamar 2017; Cuhadar et al 2017; Kesgin 2018; Cuhadar et al 2020; Balcı and Efe 2021). Turkish political scholars have recently drawn attention to how political party leaders differ from one another in terms of their leadership traits and styles, and how this affects how policies are made (Heper and Sayarı 2002; Demir 2007; Görener and Ucal 2011; Kesgin 2013; 2018; Özdamar 2017; Cuhadar et al. 2017; Cuhadar et al. 2020; Balcı and Efe 2021).

This thesis employs the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), as a well-organized technique that allows researchers to analyze leaders based on seven traits: (1) belief that one can influence or control events (BACE), (2) need for power (PWR), (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment) (CC), (4) self-confidence (SC), (5) task focus (tendency to focus on problem-solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities) (TASK), (6) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (IGB), and (7) an individual's general distrust or suspiciousness of others (DIS) (Hermann 2003). The combination of these allows researchers to establish a leadership style profile that describes how leaders respond to restrictions, are driven toward the world, and are receptive to knowledge. LTA entails a detailed content examination of leaders' language and makes the case that the frequency with which specific terms appear in leaders' speeches is significant.

Despite the debate in the literature on stability and change in personality, this study denies the claim regarding the static and stable character of traits across the life cycle (Caspi et al. 2005; Fraley and Roberts 2005; McCrae et al. 2000), but presumes the possibility of change on personal traits in time and/or as a result of exogenous dynamics (Bleidorn et al. 2018; Roberts et al. 2017; Balcı and Efe 2021). Accordingly,

this research is based on the hypothesis that 'the leader appears to be sensitive to conditions if his/her scores change as the contexts change' and examines whether the leadership traits scores of Erbakan and Erdoğan remain stable through two similar situational constraints in Turkish politics, February 28 and the E-memorandum; and closure cases of the Welfare Party and the AKP. The military interventions and party closures have significant roles in the history of Turkish politics, especially in the line of the country's democratization, political rights, and freedom.

1.3. Significance of the Study

This thesis tests the role of leadership as an explanatory variable and concentrates on the ways in which Erbakan and Erdoğan as political leaders of Islamist-rooted-parties differ in their world view, in general, and how they respond to constraints from military and civil bureaucracy, in particular.

The significance of this study is based on its results showing that LTA delivers meaningful and useful findings in examining the leadership traits, styles, and the leaders' responses to military and legal restrictions such as party closure cases. Rather than focusing on the structural or historical reasons that led to the discursive and behavioral differences between the parties, this study suggests a leadership approach focusing on the leaders' traits, styles, and reactions to selected exogenous political shocks to adequately understand Turkish politics. Furthermore, it offers a methodological framework for further studies about different Islamist intellectuals who have had an impact on the history of politics in Turkey. This study also contributes to the LTA literature with its concrete research results enlightening two exogenous shocks, military threats and party closures. In addition, the agent-centered trait analysis of this study and its valuable results provide a new perspective to expand our understanding of civil-military relations in Turkey; and even the military leaders' profiles can be conducted for further studies in analyzing its complex nature.

1.4. The Organization of the Dissertation

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the general framework of the research by introducing the problem area, the subject matters, the

research questions, the purpose, hypothesis, methodology, significance and contribution, and the organization of the dissertation.

The second chapter focuses on the role of leadership as an explanatory variable from sections 2.1 to 2.3. Section 2.1 defines leadership and focuses on the significance of leaders' personalities in politics. Section 2.2 draws the theoretical framework by focusing on three main approaches to leadership in general (psychobiography, cognitive approach and trait approach). Section 2.3 concentrates on Leadership in Turkey in three sub-sections. While section 2.3.1 focuses on historical background of the study, section 2.3.2 provides a scholarly background on the earlier research and highlights leadership literature in Turkish politics on Erbakan and Erdoğan. Section 2.3.3. draws a framework for assessing leadership and describes LTA.

The third chapter discusses the methodology of the research from sections 3.1 to 3.3. Section 3.1 highlights the overarching methodological perspective. Section 3.2 explains the at-a-distance technique including the data collection and LTA. Section 3.3 discusses the Case Studies.

The fourth chapter analyzes the leadership profile of Necmettin Erbakan from sections 4.1 to 4.3. Section 4.1 highlights Erbakan's political background. Section 4.2 analyzes his Leadership Profile. Section 4.3.1 focuses on Case 1, February 28; provides its historical background, analyzes his leadership profile within the case, and discusses the findings at the end. Section 4.3.2 concentrates on Case 2, the closure of the Welfare Party.

The fifth chapter analyzes the leadership profile of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from sections 5.1. to 5.3, focusing on his historical background, case 1 – E-memorandum; and case 2 -closure of the AKP.

The sixth chapter discusses the comparison of the leadership profiles of Erbakan and Erdoğan from sections 6.1 to 6.3. Section 6.1 evaluates leaders' traits and their combinations in general profiles and in the contexts of military threat and party closure cases. Section 6.2 evaluates the leadership styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan. Section 6.3 analyzes and discusses the overall results of leaders' responses to constraints.

The seventh chapter closes with the concluding remarks of the thesis.

CHAPTER II: THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AS AN EXPLANATORY VARIABLE

When analyzing politics, scholars have typically focused their research on the structural and personal causes of political actions and outcomes. However, it appears that in recent years, research on the importance of leadership in determining political consequences begun to take precedence. To theoretically interpret both the actual political climate in the global world and unstable international relations at the theoretical level, many scholars and theorists assert that the leadership styles and personal characteristics of leaders are strongly associated with their political behaviors and acts; and that political structures and events are shaped by leaders' peculiarities and personal strengths. This perspective largely ignores the influence of situational factors in providing insight into political contexts, and dismisses the idea that political actors' behaviors can easily be deduced from such situational determinants. Instead, it concentrates on the role of leadership as an explanatory variable for political outcomes by making the claim that politics is merely the projection of leaders' personalities.

Within this framework, about the core research question on whether the leadership traits and styles (of Erbakan and Erdoğan) differentiate two leaders from each other in decision-making processes when they face with major structural constraints such as military pressure and party closure cases, this chapter addresses the following points to comprehensively examine the issue: (i) the significance of the leaders' personalities in politics, (ii) the major approaches of personality and (ii) the theoretical approach.

2.1. The Significance of Leaders' Personalities in Politics

When it is considered that various political instances in which personal desires, demands, fears, or obsessions have visible impacts on shaping political outcomes, such as 'Hitler's pathological approach to Europe, Osama Bin Laden's hatred for the United States, or Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's enthusiasm to build a new nation', it seems only

reasonable to place political leaders' personalities as the main focus of a political investigation (Winter, 2003; Post *et. al*, 2005). In interpreting either international or domestic political contexts, these instances encourage experts to claim that political consequences created by leaders' styles and decisions can be attributed to their personalities and personal characteristics, and/or any situational factors.

Despite the simplistic counter-argument that political outcomes and events are the results of politicians' responses to situational assessments and acts within the available constraints and opportunities, at some point, one may feel the effects of many changes in leadership by saying "if this specific leader had lived, such-and-such would or would not have happened" (Greenstein, 1992:105). Several other similar questions in the political context may take the role of personalities taken as a significant determinant of political behavior.

Such attempts to focus on political leaders' personalities in interpreting politics are not negligible, what political leaders are like in terms of their worldviews, beliefs, and leadership styles can be expected to have visible effects on what they think and how they behave in the political arena. Specifically, leaders can differ concerning how they see the world, what they believe in, how they relate to those around them, how they receive information, etc. (Kaarbo, 1997). These differences among leaders may play an essential role in policy-making processes. For this reason, leaders matter when studying politics and the claim can be made that politics can only be adequately analyzed when leaders' characteristics are included.

In the literature, the attention that scholars draw to the significance of leaders' personalities in analyzing politics varies on the circumstances in which they think that a leader's personality become more influential on political outcomes. Greenstein, for instance, underscores the following four points with the claim that under such conditions a leader's personality may be especially important: "(i) when an actor occupies a strategic location, (ii) when a situation is ambiguous or unstable, (iii) when there are no clear precedents or routine role requirements, and (iv) when spontaneous or especially effortful behavior is required" (1992). From this angle, the impact of a leader's personality may positively depend upon the degree of environmental admission for restructuring. Thus, for Greenstein, some necessary and required conditions that may accelerate the role of a leader's characteristics exist, and if these

conditions make the political environment ready to change, then the personality of a leader attains more importance.

Hermann, on the other hand, highlights several other circumstances in which the personality of a leader tends to play an influential role in politics, such as “(i) when in proportion to the general interest of the head of state in foreign policy, (ii) when the means of assuming power are dramatic, (iii) when the head of the state is charismatic, (iv) when the head of state has great authority over foreign policy, (v) when the foreign policy organization of the nation is less developed and differentiated, (vi) when in crisis and (vii) when the external national situation is perceived to be ambiguous” (2003). Although Hermann does not fully neglect other determinants, his account concentrates more on the political actor’s interests, power, and distinctiveness.

In contrast to Greeinstein and Hermann, Byman and Pollack give priority to three other conditions in their analysis under which individual characteristics become more significant: “(i) when power is concentrated, (ii) when institutions are conflict, or (iii) during times of great change” (2001). In their assertion, these two scholars describe the context of a crisis and conclude that the way leaders act in a period of war or political crisis, the way they structure their administration office resulting in various institutions; and the way they utilize their power become much more significant in analyzing the role of leader personality in politics.

As noted by scholars in the literature, the psychological assessment of political leaders to analyze politics has historically developed both within the academic community and the US government (Post, 2005:3). Psychological assessment is used in profiling leadership at both the academic and governmental levels. These two historical strands have different goals and focus, and methodologies (Post, 2005:3-14).

The primary goal of scholars; is to expand knowledge about the psychology of leadership. To this purpose, they tend to concentrate on certain specific traits or trait constellations of each politician, and analyze leaders based on a few significant personal characteristics rather than their personality as a whole. Depending on the model they construct, scholars typically concentrate on different elements of a leader’s personality. For example, Winter in his work entitled ‘Things I’ve Learned about Personality from Studying Political Leaders at a Distance’, describes ‘traits, motives,

cognitions and cognitive constructions, and social context' as the four main fundamentals of personality (2005:572). Furthermore, Hermann focuses on different typologies of political personalities based on leaders' cognitive complexity and several traits, which she clarifies in her article 'Assessing Leadership Style: A Trait Analysis' (2003). In addition, Walker mainly explores the relationship between the motives and beliefs of leaders; and makes use of these foundations in constructing the typology of leaders' political belief systems (Walker, 2000). In analyzing leaders' trait manifestations, scholars employ quantitative methods and standardized measurement techniques and, construct a comparison group of several political figures utilizing what the academic community predicts to be the likely behaviors of political leaders under different circumstances (Post *et al*, 2005:3). Those are the leaders who share some common characteristics in different degrees and whose behaviors vary by their responses to the same input in the real political area (Post *et al*, 2005:3-4).

In profiling leaders' personalities, the goal of the US governmental experts in analyzing the leaders' psychology and assessments of the dimensions of political personality is –likely to be scholars– to predict the leaders' approaches to specific issues, -but they mostly utilize that- especially in high-level negotiations and during politico-military crises (Post *et al*, 2005:3). In addition, governmental officials generally employ qualitative case studies as a method rather than quantitative statistical models (Post *et al*, 2005:4). These officials use the psychobiography approach as the basis of their political personality assessments. While deriving their profiles, they less tend to ignore the cultural, historical, and socio-political context in which they are contained (Post *et al*, 2005:4). This is because they are aware of the fact that all such factors are influential on their personalities and, thus, their political behaviors and actions.

Although several political psychologists strongly claim that leaders' personalities shape political structures and actions, the utility of studying political leaders' personalities is typically criticized from six main angles, according to Greenstein (1992:105).

One of the major criticisms is that there is no value in studying personality in politics since the political actors' roles are randomly distributed, and thus their characteristics have no impact on politics (1992:105-108). Though this interpretation is partly true

and based on the fact that posts are sometimes more or less randomly assigned to the individuals, this may not be considered a solid ground to fully ignore the relation between politicians' personalities and their political acts and behaviors. It is primarily because the roles played by political actors often lead to significant political outcomes, and ignoring the influence of personal variables (starting with the action and concluding in the political consequences) may be considered a reductionist approach rather than a realistic one. Instead, as suggested by Greenstein with reference to George and George (1964), exploring the political consequences and understanding the consistency between role and personality may be seen as significant components of studying personality in politics (1992:108).

The second criticism defends the idea that it is more the political environment and situation rather than personal characteristics that determine leaders' actions (1992:106-111). This way of analyzing the issue rejects two significant points: the possibility of any negative reaction to what the environment dictates to the political actors, and the roles of actors shaping the environment itself. In relation to the research question of this study, adopting the structure-focused perspective to analyze any political outcome, dissimilar decision outcomes of the leaders for similar situations cannot be fully explained. In addition, such an approach may deny different interpretations of the given context by the leaders who may act in a different manner based on their different leadership styles and traits, and/or not being equally empowered by constraints. Even though specific cases in certain contexts may be seen as affirmative instances to that criticism, one may always find opposing examples in which a political leader acts contrary to the political situation and environment because of his/her personality. While this would occasionally be the case to achieve a better political outcome, this may also be political fault a leader's personality forces him to make. This then becomes an egg and chicken dilemma with an infinite regression. For this reason, this study uses the content analytic Leadership Trait Analysis framework to specify the characteristics of leaders and the way they relate to the political contexts.

Another major criticism questioning the utility of studying political leaders' personalities argues that the leader's personality and the context in which he operates can always interact with each other. Thus, it may be claimed that leaders' behaviors depend on both personality and environment (Lewin, 1935). This relationship between

personality and the context in which the leaders find themselves makes it difficult to ignore one part of this formula, and indeed does not isolate either such that just the leader or the environment determines the political behavior of leaders.

Some scholars, however, criticize the applicability of studying political leaders' personalities based on political scientists' inadequate conceptualization of personality. While analyzing the personality of a leader, different scholars emphasize particular components of a leader's psyche. While Winter, for instance, measures the leaders' three motives; achievement, affiliation, and power, Hermann focuses on leaders' traits in assessing their leadership styles (as self-confidence, conceptual complexity, and general distrust to the others) and the combination of those traits with motives. At first sight, the criticism that many theorists simply concentrate on a specific part of the leaders' psychodynamics and bring it to the core in analyzing the political acts of an individual appear to be.

While this reflects a methodological obstacle to adequately measuring personality, it once again brings the criticism that there is a blurred link between the psychology of a leader and his political decisions (1992:111-115). Indeed, some scholars advocate the idea that the leaders' psychodynamics, including their manifestations of emotional disturbances and ego defensiveness, have no or little impact on politics. However, claiming that a leader who, for instance, is more sensitive to environmental changes may give the same political reaction during moments of crisis. This way of analyzing politics clearly denies opening Pandora's Box in which personal factors that play important roles in political outcomes are hidden.

The fifth criticism undermining the utility of studying political leaders' personalities derives from the idea that scholars ignore politicians' social backgrounds, even though they are more significant than their psychological characteristics (Greenstein, 1992:114-116). This standpoint requires answering two fundamental questions: (i) whether it is possible to completely distinguish social characteristics from those of an individual's psyche, and (ii) even if so, whether it necessitates neglecting the leaders' psyche. Concerning the former point, social psychologists strongly claim that the social context in which the political actors were born, internalize their dynamics, and operate has a substantial role in creating their personal behaviors and acts. This is an inevitable result of the interactive nature of human beings' relationship with their

environment. This clearly underlines that the actions of political leaders are mediated by their social backgrounds at different levels. Those background characteristics have an effect on a leader's personality, and thus, can be considered relevant to the study of personality and politics. As social characteristics are also parts of leaders' personal makeups, it can be claimed that focusing on the different social backgrounds of leaders with regard to their ethnicity, class or etc. is strongly linked to the study of personality in politics and hardly denies the significance of studying leaders' psychology in analyzing politics (Greenstein, 1992:116).

The final criticism against studying personality in politics stresses the claim that there is 'no' or 'restricted' impact of personality on events; and advocates in the literature that individual effects on political outcomes can be neglected on that basis. The evolution of its counter-arguments may trace back to that of leadership theories in history. Until the nineteenth century, the debate among scholars was about how actors can shape events. In finding an answer, scholars primarily concentrated on leadership and questioned who could be considered a leader, what the necessary characteristics of leaders were, and whether leadership characteristics were innate or could be developed afterward. While analyzing political outcomes, scholars concentrated more on leaders than the political context or other variables. For instance, in *Republic to Plutarch's Lives*, one of the masterpieces of the history of philosophy, Plato's presumption that a leader has certain characteristics that are superior to those of ordinary citizens may be read from this point of view. Therefore, it can reasonably be claimed that for Plato, it is leaders that take the decisions, make the choices, and shape the political contexts. Though it is open to discussion, it can be argued that leaders have inevitable effects on political events, at least in the Platonic sense. Following this tradition, *the leadership trait school*, which became popular in the 1930s, strongly defended the idea that individuals become leaders based on their abilities, personalities, and physical appearances, and suggested that leaders' physical and mental capabilities and personal characteristics -not only gained at birth but also traits acquired all along- play influential roles in politics (Hershey and Blanchard, 1988).

During the 1940s, the trait school lost its popularity to the behavioral school, which assumed that a man adopting or developing certain styles and behaviors due to various factors, such as his experience and age, may become a leader. Scholars from this

school vary with regard to the leadership characteristics they focus on. For instance, while Tannebaum and Schmidt (1958) emphasized that a leader is superior to an ordinary person in formulating decisions and choosing options based on the usage of authority, Blake and Mouton (1978) were concerned with topics like people or relationships, such as ‘promoting friendship, help others at work, caring work conditions’, and like products for ‘the desire to achieve greater output, cost-effectiveness, and profit organizations.’ In the 1970s, situational and contingency theories appeared as a *reactionary school* that searched for a universally valid theory of leadership and gained popularity with the claim that leadership is situational and the time and conditions in which the leader finds himself are actually what makes him a leader (Friedler, 1967; House, 1971; Krech *et al.*, 1962). As explained, scholars throughout history have approached the capacity of political actors from different perspectives and attributed various roles to it in politics. However, this should not be seen as a constant, but as a variable in an attempt to explain its power in shaping events (Greenstein, 1992:117). It is mainly because political outcomes arise from the interaction between various factors, among which leadership is just one.

Personal determinants of political actions and outcomes, therefore, should be taken into account to fully analyze politics. The influence of leaders’ personalities cannot be excluded from such analysis. In politics, both situational and personal factors play interactive roles to different extents, and that is why political consequences occur not only as a result of different contingencies in the political environment but also as a result of personal forces stemming from the various characteristics of leaders.

Not all leaders react the same way to the same situational imperatives. Following such a presupposition, this study investigates the leadership characteristics of two agents (Erbakan and Erdoğan) and examines how they relate to their context. To this purpose, it focuses on the question of whether any possible differences exist in agency-structure interaction as reflected by the dissimilar decision outcomes in similar political environments and situations under the military pressure and closure cases of their political parties.

2.2. Approaches in Leadership Studies

To analyze the role of leaders' personalities in politics, three major approaches have been adopted so far: Psychobiography, the cognitive approach, and the trait approach. In this section, each approach is described in detail and the approach in this study is discussed and defined in the final part.

2.2.1. Psychobiography

Despite its several definitions, it is commonly accepted in the literature that psychobiography is an assessment technique of personality that helps to understand the role of the personal characteristics and inner motives behind people's behaviors and decisions (Schultz, 2005; Runyan, 1984:202,321; Tucker, 1977:606). As a discipline, it is utilized to reveal under what conditions any specific acts and/or decisions were made by people. Therefore, the main objective of psychobiography is to comprehend how personal determinants, rather than either the contextual or other dynamics such as biological or cultural, play a role in any specific cases. However, this does not necessarily imply that psychobiography concentrates on personality regardless of historical, political, or social factors. Accordingly, technically, its primary aim is to examine the myriad of reasons for people's behaviors to understand life-shaping cases that influence fundamental characteristics of personality and behaviors. Unlike comprehensive biographies reflecting an entire life course, psychobiography may involve only a specific part of a person's life. Concerning Freudian terminology, this facet is largely an '*unusual, abnormal or pathological one*' (1964). While biographies are descriptive and informative, psychobiographies are particularly explanatory and deal with 'internal reasons.' As a case study technique, it approaches people's lives to determine this causal link, utilizing which it provides information on who they are and how they act (Schultz, 2005). In explaining any single case in the lifespan of a person, psychobiographers search for any reference group rather than a single cause of behavior to fully describe how they are personally unique and what their behavioral patterns are (Schultz, 2005).

Several scholars contributed to the literature on the study of personality in political psychology, such as Sigmund Freud with his book *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood* (1910), Erik Erikson with *Young Man Luther* (1958), Harold

Lasswell with Pathology and Politics (1930), Alexander and Juliette George with Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (1964), Doris Godwin with Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (1976), James David Barber with his book titled The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (1977), Daniel Levinson's The Seasons of a Man's Life (1978) and Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz with Immortal Atatürk (Ölümsüz Atatürk) (2000).

Among many other works on psychobiography, Freud's analysis of Da Vinci's life centered on the artist and inventor's inner motivations and the driving forces behind his artistic skill. Freud's two major claims in psychobiography are that only the aggression and the sexual impulses can motivate people, and that childhood experiences might strongly influence people's later development and adult behaviors. From a Freudian perspective, political leaders' early experiences can be concentrated on as significant factors in their personality development and as the roots of their political decisions.

Based on the Freudian standpoint, Erik Erikson's fundamental approach is centered on eight stages (not five, as Freud believes) of individual development from birth to death. Erikson's stage of life span pursues the idea that each stage inevitably starts with an identity crisis and the choice is made either for or against growth. From this perspective, all cornerstones are the points that potentially help to grow; and either end by the resolution of the experienced identity crisis or maintain a stable line. In his work *Young Man Luther*, Erikson (1958) analyzes Luther's personality in his relationship with his father and reads his acts in the context of his insubordination with his father's rules and principles. Erikson explores the relationship between leaders' psychology and politics based on their childhood experiences and analyzes Luther based on his rebellion against the most important figure in his life, from a different but still deeply-rooted Freudian perspective.

Harold Lasswell suggests in "Pathology and Politics" that politicians tend to reflect their personal needs in their private lives onto the ones in their public life. In his work *Power and Personality* he defines power 'as a means of compensation against deprivation' (1948:39). In other words, Lasswell advocates the idea that leaders' political acts and behaviors often derive from the reflection of their personal requirements in the private realm, such as self-esteem, onto the public objects. As

Lasswell claims the replacement of private motives from family to objects in the public, George and George (1964) test this relationship between self-esteem, power, and compensation in their work entitled *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*. Their fundamental hypothesis is whether “power was for him (Wilson) a compensatory means restoring his low self-esteem damaged in childhood” due to his father and whether his desire for power was mitigated by a simultaneous need for approval, respect, and, especially, for feeling virtuous" (George & George, 1956: 320, 114). Though George and George distinguish Wilson the power seeker from Wilson the power holder, they claim that Wilson’s desire for office can be considered compensation for his unhealthy relationship with his father.

In her work *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (1976), Doris Godwin applies psychobiography and suggests that President Johnson’s relationship with his mother may have shaped his future interactions and communications with the people surrounding him in the political environment. Pursuing an apparent link between his childhood relations with his family in the private realm and the way he treated others in the political realm, she derives the conclusion from her research that Johnson sometimes experienced paranoid behaviors (based on his mother’s ambitions and expectations from her substitute), which is additionally confirmed by others close to him.

Whereas Godwin focuses on a president and deeply analyzes his psychobiography, James David Barber in his book titled *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (1977) focuses on how a leader will perform as president. The presupposition behind Barber’s analysis is that the personality of the leader plays a significant role in whether he becomes a successful president or not. In his analysis, Barber groups presidents based on a two-dimensional model: the active-passive and the positive-negative dimension. While the active-passive metrics refer to the amount of energy the president performs in his role, the positive-negative dimension refers to whether (and if so, to what extent) a president enjoys or dislikes what he gets out of his role in politics. In his book, Barber suggests the performance of a president is based on the combination of five main elements: the character of the leader, his worldview, his style, his performance in a power situation, and the climate of expectations surrounding him. In predicting the success or failure of a president, for

Barber, not only the personality; but also the mix of these listed factors needs to be considered when considering a successful leader in the.

Though several scholars follow the Freudian path and focus on the role of childhood in the decision-making process of leaders in politics, Levinson divides adulthood into six stages (early adult transition, entering the adult world, age 30 transition, settling down, mid-life transitions, entering middle adulthood) in his work entitled “The Seasons of a Man’s Life” (1978), and defines three major life transitions (young adult, the mid-life, and late adult transition) in the lifespan. While he claims that the social and physical environment of a person plays additional roles in shaping the life of a person, Levinson implicitly ignores any possibility in which the future of an individual is completely determined by his childhood.

In constructing the psychobiography of a leader, following Greenstein (1969), three steps might be defined to analyze the subject as exemplified by George and George’s work (1964) entitled *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* and William Runyan’s work entitled ‘Why did Van Gogh Cut Off His Ear? The Problem of Alternative Explanations in Psychobiography (1981): (i) Identifying the case, (ii) constructing an explanation, and (iii) digging into the early experiences to find the source of the adult behavioral pattern. In the first step, drawing the boundaries between the specific case to be explained and the whole life story of the subject appears to be essential to focus on the subject from macro and micro perspectives. While such an approach requires understanding the possible correlations between the wide ranges of behaviors, the case may sometimes be the possible post of the subject as ‘President to be’ in the future as David Barber’s focus of analysis in his book entitled *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. In the second stage, this identification of an explanation necessitates a detailed analysis to comprehend the case with the help of psychological terms such as motives, cognition, or traits. For Greenstein (1969), this is exactly when the non-operational behaviors turn into measurable and also understandable ones in the scientific scheme in the case of Erikson’s *Young Man Luther* (1958) concentrating on the development of his personality at several stages in his life-span, or of Levinson’s classification of adulthood into six stages (early adult transition, entering the adult world, age 30 transition, setting down, mid-life transitions, entering middle adulthood) and his

descriptions of three major life transitions (young adult, the mid-life and the late adult transition) in a lifespan in *The Seasons of a Man's Life* (1978). To justify these explanations at the third stage (Greenstein 1969), it is possible to dig into the early experiences of the subject to catch (if it exists) the origin of the behavioral pattern like how Doris Godwin approaches President Johnson's relations in the political environment in *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (1976), Lasswell sees power as a means of compensation in his work *Power and Personality* (1948), and George and George (1964) test the relation between Wilson's low self-esteem and his power in *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*

Though psychobiographies of significant political figures attract public attention, these studies are often criticized on two main grounds. The major criticism has to do with psychobiography's core tendency to explain the external public behaviors of leaders as the products of a moment they experienced in their childhoods or a different stage of their life.

Three deficiencies have underlined the negative evaluations of the psychobiography approach. First, it is accused of being an absurd reductionist method of analysis since it explains a political decision or moment only regarding the personal determinants of a leader. Second, comprehending the political environment with the help of the purely psychological variables of a leader is considered problematic in that it gives no sense of the world around a leader, and tends to disregard any political social, economic, or historical change in the context of the subject. Third, the causal relationship between the evidence and the result in the analysis of the adult behavior of the subject seems to be largely hypothetical. These criticisms focus on the problem of data, which includes access to data, a variety of interpretations, and confirmation bias (Houghton, 2014). Whether it is possible to 'get inside the head of the leader' to analyze them is an old question that requires putting all relevant data about the leader together. Though it is not always easy to have close access to political leaders, as Doris Godwin had with President Johnson, in writing a psychobiography, access to data and collecting the relevant information based on the focus of the research may be seen as a major problem. Even though psychobiography can sometimes provide a chance to access personal materials about the subject, such as diaries, speeches, letters, interviews, etc., this type of data is criticized for being open to a variety of interpretations. Choosing

from among several possible explanations creates the problem of ‘confirmation bias’ following Houghton’s terminology (2014) in psychobiographical works. These criticisms mean that psychobiographical works have been considered insufficient by some scholars (Barzun 1974; Stannard 1980).

2.2.2. Cognitive Approach to Leadership

Several scholars studying political leaders assert that focusing on the cognitions, specific beliefs, attitudes, and values should be the basis for analyzing personality and they search for the foundations of the political decisions of leaders (George, 1969; Holsti 1977; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998; Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977; Bonham 1993). The cognitive approach in analyzing personality defends the notion that individuals’ interpretations of all external worlds, including their relations with physical objects and other people, form a pattern, and this is how people make predictions when interacting with the world. As the core argument, cognitivism claims that these patterns are how individuals personally construct their own world, and thus, they are inevitable elements in understanding the personality of individuals.

Theoretically, the early works on the cognitive approach can be traced back to the social-learning perspectives of Albert Bandura, a theorist who advocates that environmental factors play influential roles in memory and emotions. His ‘bobo doll experiment’, in which a class of kindergarten children beats the bobo dolls during play shortly after Bandura showed them the video in which a student kicks and shouts at the bobo doll, can serve as an example of a cognitive learning process. In addition to Bandura’s work, Baron (1982) and Gardner’s (1953) work on consistent preferences of people in grouping heterogeneous objects, and Block and Petersen’s (1955) study about confidence in line discrimination judgments can also be marked as the early instances of this approach in the literature. Walter Mischel’s works (1968, 1973) describe the significance of both effect and cognition in cognitive analysis and Seymour Epstein’s cognitive-experiential self-theory (1990) explain the interaction of emotion-driven experimental and logic-driven rational systems in determining thoughts, behaviors, and objectives can also be counted among other important studies. Apart from these early works, George Kelly’s ‘*Personal Construct Psychology*’ (1955) might be considered the premier theory in the literature, claiming that individuals’ interpretations and predictions about the events that affect their lives differ from each

other based on the way they gather information from their environment, process it, and develop hypotheses to interpret these events; and as asserted by the ‘fundamental postulate ‘a person's process is psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events’ (1955:46).

In cognitive analyses of personality in the studies of political leaders, like Kelly’s internal constructs that help to perceive the world, several scholars focus on the Operational Codes (OC) of politicians representing the set of beliefs utilizing which they recognize the political environment within which they operate (Leites 1951; George 1969; Holsti 1977; Walker 1990). Though the concept of OC evolved over time, the term was first conceptualized by Merton at the beginning of 1940s to refer to the values, worldview, and response repertoire of the individuals working in an organization (Walker, 1990). Following him, Nathan Leites initially applied OC to politics in his classic two-volume work, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951), and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953) and focused on the shared responses of Politburo members, and identified them as a series of decision-making rules and axioms that constitute their worldview (Walker, 1990; Crichlow, 1998). In this way, he broadly reconducted OC concerning cognition, character, and culture.

Following Leites’s pioneering analysis in a review article, Alexander George in his work “The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making” (1969), refined both the theoretical and operational underpinnings of OC (Crichlow, 1998). Through focusing on its functionality, George (1969) differentiated the beliefs that influence the behavior of a given individual into two sets, philosophical and instrumental beliefs. The Operational Code Analysis (OCA) tradition investigates both the philosophical beliefs describing the leader’s recognition of the political universe in his mind and the instrumental beliefs depicting strategies and the best timing for accomplishing goals. The answers of the leaders to the following ten questions distilled by George are used in their operational code analysis (1969, 1979):

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code:

P-1: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4: How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

P-5: What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and historical development?

The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code:

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

While the philosophical set of beliefs represents 'external attributions that the leader makes about the political universe and other actors', the instrumental ones are 'internal attributions that the subject makes his/her own best approaches to political action' (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Since it distinguishes when the subject is talking about 'self' from when about 'the others', this is a significant detail for OCA.

Concentrating on the leaders' general worldviews and perceptions of the nature of the political universe, their relationship between the 'self' and 'others', and the necessary means of dealing with political problems, OCA is criticized in the literature from four perspectives (Houghton, 2014). As the major weakness of OCA, the problem of the source of the data is indicated (Houghton, 2014:112-113): First, the analysis appears

to depend too much on ‘spontaneous speeches’ and public materials of leaders. Though there are some OC studies utilizing different sources, they typically do not reflect the beliefs of the leaders and arrive at a reliable conclusion. In addition to the limited data, the selected data may sometimes be audience-specific. In other words, leaders may give those verbal speeches to certain domestic or international audiences in mind. Furthermore, there is always the danger of referring to pre-prepared speeches, which may either reflect the unnatural opinions of the leaders or those of his advisors. In addition, OCA does not explain more about the sources of beliefs.

2.2.3. Trait Approach to Leadership

As a major theoretical attempt focusing on what differentiates leaders’ personalities from that of their followers, the trait approach is scholarly based on the idea that leadership requires having some specific traits and capabilities forming personalities unique to each person. In analyzing the differences between leaders and ordinary individuals, this approach essentially identifies and concentrates on a set of major traits exhibited by leaders following an effective path in their decision-making processes.

Considering the conceptualization of ‘trait’ and its dimensions, the basic principles and main classifications of the trait approach vary in the literature. Although Gordon Allport, one of the first scholars referring to ‘traits’ in describing different personalities, states that distinguishing characteristics or qualities of leaders can be found that guide their behaviors, he perceives trait as ‘a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent forms of adaptive and expressive behavior’ (1961). According to Allport, traits, therefore, are just consistent and permanent ways to respond to various stimuli similarly coming from the environment; and they determine the behaviors based on their fundamental interaction with the surroundings, not vice versa (Schultz, 2005).

Parallel to Allport’s studies, Stogdill in his works *Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature* (1948) and *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research* (1974) defines leadership traits considering the person’s surroundings. Based on his two surveys representing a comprehensive overview of the trait approach, Stogdill classifies the set of traits peculiar to leaders and proposes the idea as the conclusion of the first survey is that an individual may not become a leader

only because he or she possesses those traits since they must fit into the situation in which the leader finds himself. According to Stogdill, leadership requires actively being in a relationship with the environment and others. Although his first research highlights the significance of situational factors, his second indicates that personality traits also play a role in the process of becoming a leader. Similar to Allport, Stogdill concludes that both situational and personal factors are effective in making a person a leader. Despite paying less attention to the influential role of situational factors on leadership in 'A Review of the Relationship Between Personality and Performance in Small Groups', Mann (1959) seemingly underlines a similar presupposition that personality traits may be utilized to distinguish leaders from others, he concluded that specific traits exist in which leaders are particularly strong, such as intelligence, dominance, extraversion, and the like.

Compared to other scholars, the trait theorist Raymond Cattell's list (1950, 1957, 1973) of main personality traits with 171 rare leadership characteristics proposes sixteen major traits as the adequate source to portray the personality of leaders. He differentiates his definition and understanding of traits from other theoretical and empirical works in the literature. In conceptualizing personality traits, Cattell refers to the mental elements or structures created to understand the personality of leaders in more detail. Despite the apparent disagreement between the scholars on the definition of traits, Cattell seemingly agrees with Allport that common traits characterizing all people might be found in addition to the individual traits that are unique to each person (Aiken, 1999).

In the late 1970s, British psychologist Hans Eysenck (1976) conducted further research on personality traits, based on which he developed a model identifying universal trait classifications. Although this theory follows the core idea that personality is composed of traits, which are theoretical constructions about the surrounding world, unlike various other scholars, Eysenck derives from his research that traits are genetic in origin, and thus innate by nature. In theorizing his trait approach, Eysenck, however, does not deny the environmental and situational factors but claims that they have a restricted influence on understanding personality (Schultz, 2005). In analyzing the personality in terms of traits, Eysenck specifies three main dimensions: introversion versus extraversion, neuroticism versus emotional stability, and psychoticism versus

superego functioning. He thinks that each of these types is found in people. Introversion focuses on inner experiences, while extraversion involves the relation to the external world. The score on these traits determines how close or open a person will be to the social world and in relation to others. The second dimension of Eysenck's trait theory questions whether a person is a pessimist or good-tempered. In the personality model of Eysenck, neuroticism measures the level of a person's inclination to be in a bad mood (fluctuate between moods), while the other end (stability) refers to remaining calm and emotionally stable. The third and last dimension in the trait theory of Eysenck refers to the person's tendency to become aggressive and hostile. A higher score on this trait implies a higher level of personal trouble for a person to face the real world peacefully.

Since the late 1980s, the trait approach has shifted its emphasis in the literature from determining the qualities to be a leader to the role of traits in becoming an effective leader. Regarding the significance of leadership traits, Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991), for instance, claim that effective leaders are typically high on six traits, namely drive, motivation, integrity, confidence, cognitive ability, and task knowledge. In defining these traits and explaining how they make leaders different from others, Kirkpatrick and Locke assert that these traits sometimes can be inherent and sometimes can be learned. During the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, scholars started to utilize various other concepts such as social intelligence or charismatic leadership in their investigations. Zaccaro (2002), for instance, refers to 'social intelligence' with the high capacity of leaders in their social awareness about themselves and their environments. Zaccaro, Kemp, and Bader (2004) add this attribute to their research as a new category of leadership trait. Charismatic leadership, identifying to be self-monitored, impressive in management, and having the social power to motivate both himself and others, have also been marked by several scholars as a new emphasis in leadership studies, such as Bass (1990), Zaccaro (2007), and Zaleznik (1977).

Considering various definitions and descriptions of leadership based on different traits, the trait approach to personality is strongly criticized from five main perspectives. The first common criticism in the literature is based on its failure to determine an exact and definitive list of traits. Though a numbers of scholars have their lists (Cattell 1950; 1957; 1973; Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991; Digman 1996; Zaccaro *et. al*; 2004; Ashton

and Lee, 2005; Deyoung, 2006), it has seemingly evolved and changed by further research. This has led the scholars to question if the lists of leadership traits are mostly subjective (Funder 1994; McCrae 2001). The third critique is based on the notion that the trait approach largely disregards situational dynamics. Stogdill (1948) claims that one trait that made a person a leader may not help him to maintain his leadership in time, and therefore leadership may be considered contextual. Another major criticism is that the trait approach to personality does not deal with identifying the reasons and ways of the origin from which individual differences emerge and develop (Pervin, 1994).

2.3. Leadership in Turkey

To understand the framework and scope of the research, this chapter has three main highlights. The first section focuses on historical background of the study. The second section 2 provides leadership literature in Turkish politics on Erbakan and Erdoğan. Section 3 draws the framework for assessing leadership and examines the LTA in detail. Concentrating on LTA, its subchapter explains how leaders' reactions to constraints, openness to information or motivation by problem or relationship are studied.

2.3.1. Historical Background

In Turkish history, Islam, as a political force has assumed a variety of shapes, been instrumentalized for diverse purposes, and employed numerous political tactics to survive.

The origins of its tumultuous relationship with the state may be traced back to Ottoman Empire when the state-dominated religion and progressively regulated the political arena without reference to any religious regulation of the Shari'a (Altunışık, 2005:47). The Ottoman Empire's first secular endeavors focused on regulating both the institutions of state and religion independently. However, during the pre-republican period, when the Turkish fight for independence began, Islam was considered as a force that created a shared identity of the masses (Mardin, 2006). Soon after, Islam

was effectively politicized as a means to unite the many groups of society that fought together in the Turkish War of Independence.

With the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Atatürk and his supporters were resolved to build a secular democratic state and society; Islam, as a political weapon in state affairs, consequently lost its role on the ground. It was then revealed its intrinsic status in the state-controlled territory through several secular reforms, which favorably contributed to the country's modernization process. The abolition of the caliphate, the closing of religious institutions, vocational training schools for the pious, and Qur'an courses, and the adoption of new civil, commerce, and criminal legislation were all key components of the country's secularization process in the early Republican years. The founding elite's reforms were clearly designed to replace Ottoman civilization's emblems with Western ones, and so strove to secularize not just the state, but also society itself (Toprak, 2005:169-170). During the single-party period between 1923 and 1946, the Kemalists attempted to enforce these changes on society from the top down, which led to various Islamist uprisings, including the Menemen episode in 1930. All such Islamist attacks against the secular institutions of the state and society were put down, and the perpetrators were murdered or imprisoned by the Turkish military. The increased pressure of the secularization process on society at this early stage of the Republic diminished the importance of religion in individual awareness (Tunçay, 1999).

Beginning with the multi-party period in 1946, the state's scrutiny of religion slowed. Turkey had entered a new age as a result of shifting governmental views regarding Islam and religious organizations. The ruling Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) modified its rigid interpretation of secularism out of concern for losing votes in a competitive parliamentary system and revised its policies in this respect (Ahmad, 1994). Until the end of the 1940s, the party implemented a number of new rules, including the establishment of vocational training schools of theology and Qur'an courses, that reflected its more moderate approach to Islamic values and traditions (Karpat, 1967). During this time, however, several new political parties with strong Islamic overtones were formed and disbanded. Considering its tagline, "when [we] take the Qur'an into our hands, the sun of wellbeing and pleasure shall rise." "Believers unite and build their own regime," 'The Islamic Democratic Party' (İslam

Demokrat Partisi—IDP) might be considered one of Turkey's earliest Islamist political parties (Yeşilada, 2002:63). The IDP's social base was largely composed of Büyük Doğu authors (Karabatak, 1994:12). As Turkey's first post-war Islamic party, it continued its founders' anti-Jewish sentiments, with the principal purpose of purifying the Islamic moral underpinnings of any Jewish overtones (Vermaat, 2010). The IDP's political career was short; six months after its formation, it was barred from politics by a court judgement rule a political party may not have a religious name, emblem, or connotation as that violated the Republic's ideals (Tunaya, 1995). According to Toprak (2005:171), the Nation Party (Millet Partisi - MP) was the only party that was allowed to participate in the elections, as other Islamist parties were divided by a lack of support from their electoral base. Although the Nation Party did not run in the 1948 elections, it received over 3% of the vote in the 1950 elections. The party was shut down in 1954 on the grounds of breaching the tenet of secularism. Following the demise of the Nation Party, the Republican Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi - CMP) was founded by several of its former founders who were active in politics improved its political position until it united with the Turkish Peasants' Party in 1958. These two founded a new party named the Republican Peasants' National Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi - CKMP), which went on to become an influential party in Turkish politics and formed part of the coalition government in 1965 (Sherwood, 1967:62). Despite many Islamist parties arriving and disappearing with little or no impact, the Turkish political landscape experienced various political parties with the ambition of attracting the attention of Islamist voters based on their policies, party programs, and statements.

During the 1950s the center-right Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti - DP) led by Adnan Menderes were influential in the rebirth of Islamist philosophy. Shortly after defeating the CHP, the DP attempted to relegitimize Islam and traditional values, as well as reintegrate Islam into public life (Mardin, 1973:185). It restored several Kemalist prohibitions on Islamic rituals for this aim and garnered support from Islamist voters (Yeşilada, 2002:63). For example, the DP reopened Qur'an classes and changed the call to prayer from Turkish back to Arabic. As a result, Menderes' views were regarded as hazardous and hostile to the Kemalist state by Turkish military forces, which assumed control in 1960 (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008:36).

Following the 1960 military intervention, the attraction of political Islam grew in the Turkish political reformation process (Dağı, 1995:24). Both the coup and the formation of the liberal 1961 Constitution increased liberties and created new avenues for religious expression (Tank, 2005:7). Beginning in the 1960s, the number of religious groups and communities rose substantially, with the majority of them banding together in networks or clubs to address modernizing issues (Ergil, 2000:54). Menderes' DP was superseded in the early 1960s by the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi—AP), led by Süleyman Demirel (Jenkins, 2003:48). This party represented Turkey's so-called "democratic Islamists" (Yeşilada, 2002:64). To win the support of rural conservatives, the AP erected mosques and established theological vocational training institutions (Jenkins, 2003:48). The Nurcu movement backed this new political party as its adherents felt Demirel was the person whose birth was prophesied by the organization's founder, Said-i Nursi (Yeşilada, 2002:64).

Political Islam reemerged in the early 1970s with Necmettin Erbakan, one of Turkey's most influential Islamist figures. He founded the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi- MNP) with the support of Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku (a major figure in the Naḥqshbandi order) (Yeşilada, 2002:64). It was the first autonomous political manifestation in a string of Islamist parties in Turkey's political history, led by him. Its members were largely from the Naḥqshbandi and, at first, Nurcu orders (Jenkins, 2003:48). The MNP overtly linked to (and hence used) religion for political objectives, defending a new socio-political and economic system founded on Islamic values (Dağı, 2005:24). As a result, its political existence was very short-lived. Following a military intervention in 1971, the Constitutional Court decided to shut it down for breaching the norms of secularism enshrined in the Constitution (Preamble and sections 2, 19, 57) and the Law of Political Parties (Law no. 648, Articles 92,93,94) (Tank, 2005:7).

Following the military intervention in 1971 and the closure of the MNP by the Constitutional Court, Erbakan relocated to Switzerland. He returned to Turkey immediately after the court dismissed his case, and the first thing he did was establish a new party, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP) to take the place of the MNP (Yeşilada, 2002:65).

The MSP created the 'National Outlook' (Milli Görüş) ideological movement, which combined Islam with Turkish nationalism. The 'National Outlook Movement' (Milli Görüş Hareketi - MGH) sought a return to Turkey's traditional Islamic paradigm away from the Kemalist Western model (Toprak, 2005:182). Parallel to it, MSP's political existence began with a striking motto, "A Great Turkey Once Again" ("Yeniden Büyük Türkiye"), and a forceful argument that the only way to overcome Turkey's issues was to revert to traditional Islamic teaching and "the Muslim way of life" (Toprak, 2005:181-182). According to the MGH founded by MSP, Kemalist ideology had wrecked the traditional (Islamic) character of the state and society by recreating Turkish society's values at the social level and replacing all governmental institutions with Western ones. The MGH saw the Western world as the source of all problems and maladies in society, and wanted to correct this historical error that had rendered Turkish society's socio-economical and political structures unhealthy (Dağı, 2005: 24). Surprisingly, the MGH's rejection of the Westernization process did not include the use of Western technology. Instead, the MGH stressed the use of Western technical advancements as tools for removing Western power's influence and hegemony from the nation (Dağı, 2005:25). The MSP members hoped to establish a "Greater Turkey" as a new civilization, and intended to do so by strengthening relations with Muslim nations (Atacan, 2005:188). According to the MGH, Turkey belonged to the Muslim world because of its shared beliefs, institutions, and political actions. At the heart of their ideological commitment, MSP members advocated uniting all Muslim forces and nations in social, economic, and political terms and ruling the globe (Toprak, 2005:182). In pursuit of this goal, MSP supporters argued for the establishment of a Muslim Single Market, with the Islamic dinar as its common currency, as well as the formation of a Muslim Defense Alliance (ibid). The MSP also advocated for religious instruction centered on "modesty, morality, and virtue," as well as a ban on population control to foster population increase (Atacan, 2005:188). The MSP had an important role in the evolution of political Islam in Turkey, and its founders became influential leaders in subsequent Islamist parties that were successful in reformulating the Islamist political movement.

In reality, the MSP's decisions in 1973 foreshadowed the MSP's future impact on Turkish political Islam. Despite the turbulent political atmosphere of the 1970s, Erbakan's campaign in Turkey seemed to be successful, as the party won 11.8 percent

of the vote and finished third in the 1973 election with 11 seats in parliament (Jenkins, 2003:48). Behind the MSP's success were clearly supporters from various segments of society, such as provincial merchants, small businessman (known as the *esnaf*) from Central Anatolia, recent urban immigrants from the countryside, and two leading informally organized religious groups, *Nahqshbandis* and *Nurcus* (Mecham, 2004:355; Narl, 1997:39). Despite being a minor party, the proportion of votes cast for the MSP in 1973 demonstrated that it had a strong electoral base. With these votes, the MSP joined the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* - CHP) led by Bülent Ecevit in 1974 to form a coalition (Yeşilada, 2002:65; Atacan, 2005:187). However, not all MSP supporters agreed to be a member of such a coalition administration. *Nurcus* in the party expressly condemned the CHP's participation in government since this party and its members, in their opinion, represented communists. Despite the resistance of the *Nurcu* group, extreme right-Islamists in the MSP, notably Erbakan and his close friends, chose to form a coalition with the other parties (Yeşilada, 2002:65-67). Erbakan and his staff led the MSP in such a manner that the *Nurcu* MPs in the party were unhappy and eventually left the alliance (Yeşilada, 2002:65). According to Atacan in her article titled 'Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroads: AKP-SP,' it was not the only, but was the primary source of conflict among *Nurcus* and others in the party, which led them to believe that there were other ways to serve Islam than to be under the umbrella of specific party leadership (2005:190). Unsurprisingly, the MSP's coalition stance altered *Nurcu*'s impression of the party. The *Nurcus* came to see the party as one controlled by the *Nahqshbandi* faction, their strong partisanship, materialism, and dishonesty, as the second cause of conflict, as described by Atacan (2005:190). According to this viewpoint, the Islamic backgrounds of the members (the majority of whom were from *Nahqshbandi* groups) were given enormous priority in the party structure, causing schisms within the MSP.

Even when the MSP became a coalition partner of the CHP, the remaining unresigned *Nurcu* MPs in the party were uneasy since they were hesitant to politically behave in the same way as the seemingly communist-supporting CHP. Within this environment, the government's promised broad amnesty for political prisoners became another cause of contention among *Nurcu* members and others in the MSP (Atacan, 2005:190-191). Though this amnesty would benefit religious and conservative convicts and therefore

received support from many MSP supporters, twenty Nurcu MPs voted against it in order to keep leftist political prisoners behind bars. According to the constitutional court's judgment, the amnesty law's scope included leftist and other political prisoners (ibid). This, however, led to accusations that the party's leaders were on the communists' side of CHP (ibid). In contrast to Nurcus' opponents, joining this coalition government offered the MSP three major benefits, through which MSP supporters primarily engaged in the future of their movement. First, during this partnership period, the MSP was successful in organizing the Raiders (Akınlar), the young section of Erbakan's National Outlook Movement (Yeşilada, 2002:67). Toprak in her paper titled "Politicization of Islam in a Secular State", identifies the Raiders as a "youth organization with its headquarters in Ankara and over 600 branches around Turkey" (1984:128). Youths were intensely political at the time, she continues, and the Raiders were created simply as an alternative to comparable groups on the Left and Right (ibid). This broad network of Islamist activists formed their political grass-roots organizations in the years that followed. Furthermore, being in a coalition government allowed the party to install its supporters in critical posts in the bureaucracy, particularly in ministries controlled by the MSP (Narlı, 1999:39). It was a political ploy by the party to get bureaucratic backing if it were necessary for the future. Furthermore, the MSP promised that the academic level of theological vocational training institutions would be equivalent to secondary school. The importance of this adjustment in the education system was that it allowed theological school graduates to enter universities. This led in an increase in the number of theology school graduates joining Islamist political groups in the years that followed. From this vantage point, this may be seen as a sound approach for assembling a formidable opponent group. While the MSP reaped the benefits of being part of a coalition government from 1973 to 1977, its electoral triumph did not continue long. The internal schism between the Nahqshbandi and Nurcu religious groupings in the Party reduced the party's support by 8.6% in the 1977 elections.

The Nurcus group's backing shifted the MSP's focus to the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) led by Süleyman Demirel and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP) led by Alparslan Türkeş (Yeşilada, 2002:66). Despite this apparent drop in votes, the MSP was able to participate as a junior member in the

Nationalist Front coalition governments led by Süleyman Demirel in 1975 and 1977, and Bülent Ecevit in 1978. (Jenkins, 2003:49; Atacan, 2005:187).

Being a member of all of these administrations established the MSP as an important player in Turkey's political history. Its political existence, like that of all other political parties, came to an end when the armed forces commanded by General Kenan Evren assumed power in a military coup in 1980. The motivation for this involvement was founded on the opinions of military leaders that previous governments involved in the Turkish political scene had failed to tackle Turkey's socioeconomic and political challenges, instead widening the divide between various elements of society (Narlı, 1997:39). As a result, all parties were closed and suspended from the political arena.

The 1980s began with the shutdown of political parties and Erbakan's ten-year ban from political activity. Until they returned to the political arena, political Islam was not represented in parliament by a distinct party. In the years afterwards, Islamists sought numerous tactics to re-enter the political sphere (Yeşilada, 2002:67). The first thing that drew their notice was their support for the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP) led by Turgut Özal (ibid). This party was founded on neither Islamist nor traditional ideals (Öniş, 1997:757). However, there was no possibility for Islamists to be represented in parliament as a distinct party in the early 1980s. Özal was well aware of this situation and tried to unite two opposing political forces, the religious and the bureaucratic secular conservatives (Öniş, 1997:757). Özal's tactic was initially successful, and many former MSP members joined ANAP. His dreams, however, did not last long. On July 1983, Erbakan returned to politics with the formation of a new party, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi- RP), in lieu of the MSP; and with Erbakan's return to politics, the ANAP lost the majority of its Islamist supporters. Until 1987, when legal reforms overturned Erbakan's prohibition, the RP was led by Ali Turkmen (Narlı, 1999:39). It is often argued in the literature that the RP distinguished itself from major parties in the Turkish political system by explicitly outlining its principles, aims, and uniformed functions based on moral ideals. Öniş, in his article titled 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective' (1997:755), cites this as one of the RP's achievements under Erbakan's leadership during a period when there was no clear divergence between the center-right and social democrat parties. This argument is supported by Meham's (2004:342)

ideas, according to which, unlike other parties, the RP (in accordance with the political ideology of the MGH) clearly focused on the importance of religious freedom, the perceived exploitation of Turkey by the West, ethnic tolerance, social justice, and the creation of an Islamic economy. In terms of its ideological framework, the RP, in other words, espoused comparable core views on the ground to those of its forefathers, the MNP and MSP. Fundamentally, it combined nationalism with Islamist transnationalism in its foreign policy (niş, 1997:757). Expectedly, Islamic allusions were at the heart of their political agenda. The RP members vehemently maintained the premise that Turkey's Muslim population must be allowed to exercise their religion freely, and they often emphasized the importance of moral values and moral growth. As observed by Öniş, the RP was opposed to the conventional conception of secularism adopted by major center-right and leftist parties in Turkish politics and regarded it as a highly militant and authoritarian manner of restricting the individual rights of religious people (1997:757). Secularism, according to RP members, should result in religious freedom, which they argued was not the case in Turkey. The RP's idea of secularism, as emphasized by niş (1997), was also one of its differentiating traits from other political organizations. While the main focus for the RP was on the right to freely exercise one's religion, the focus for social democrats in these years was on social and civil human rights, and that of center-right parties was on private ownership and business activities (Öniş, 1997:754). The RP also symbolized the identical antagonism its succeeding parties expressed against the West and the effects of the country's Westernization process (Öniş, 1997:753). The RP members believed that the West was imposing its principles on Turkey by new imperialist methods and that the other established parties in Turkey were only mimicking the West (ibid). Within the ambit of these declarations, the RP argued that they were the sole group attempting to safeguard Turkey's historical and cultural legacy from the Ottoman period (ibid). According to RP members, Turkey's must sever off its links with the Western world or risk losing its cultural and social identity.

Parallel to such anti-Western stances, the RP, like the MNP and MSP, favored a deeper relationship with the rest of the Islamist world rather than with the West. While the RP purposefully prioritized Islamic unity and collaboration, it followed the previous Islamist parties' ideal and positioned Turkey at the helm of the Islamic world (Öniş, 1997:754). Unlike its forefather, the RP focused on strengthening relations with the

Middle East, newly emergent post-Soviet Central Asian nations, and Southeast Asia's increasingly industrializing countries (Öniş, 1997:754). The reason being that the people of these nations were largely Muslim, and they played vital roles in the newly restructured Muslim world (ibid). This set the RP apart not just from past Islamist parties, but also from the mainstream political parties in Turkey's political arena. As Dağı (2005:25) points out in his article 'Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization,' one can easily see a shift in the RP's political agenda, emphasizing social issues rather than religious themes. This, however, cannot be understood as a significant ideological shift in party politics after the MGH. Instead, the RP deliberately addressed the social issues or obstacles that individuals from various socioeconomic groups experienced. Explicitly, the RP members planned to reach a greater number of prospective voters in this manner. Jenkins (2003:49) emphasizes that the RP formed numerous distinct sorts of groups and sections inside the party, such as those focusing on youth or women. The RP, in fact, attempted to broaden its social base by operating at the society level via these groups. As Jenkins notes, the party founded religious foundations and young groups for youth, for example (2003:49). The RP's major target audience was the young, and these religious and youth foundations worked to tackle their social and occasionally financial difficulties. In order to achieve these goals, they organized social events and offered scholarships and free housing to young people in need. Potential female voters were another target category targeted by party groups, in addition to youth. The RP created a women's section in order to capture prospective female votes. In this context, they were primarily designed to reach those living in impoverished rural regions. Women from the party conducted house visits to convey the RP's beliefs and aims, and they occasionally attended family weddings (Jenkins, 2003:49). Furthermore, the party did not disregard the old, the impoverished, or persons with disabilities, as well as their societal concerns. The RP mostly operated in tenement neighborhoods, visiting these individuals in their houses on a regular basis, assisting the impoverished in finding employment, distributing free food, and providing health care and other social services (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008:43, Yavuz, 1997:76-78).

Not only what the RP organizations did for its target audience but also how they reached those individuals clearly separated the party organization from the rest in the Turkish political arena. According to Mecham (2004:343), the RP had a unique party

structure that linked the party with its prospective constituency. A tesbih model is an organizational framework that connects all party volunteers to one another and to the party's (real or future) voters (Yavuz, 1997:77). Using Mecham's model, existing street representatives at the grass roots level were in close touch with the communities, attending events and providing social assistance to those in need (2004:343). They were scrutinized by neighborhood groups, which reported back to district committees. The provincial organizing committees included these committees. Other political parties seem to have lacked these necessary levels of connections with their voter base that the RP had (Öniş, 1997:755; Mecham, 2004:343). The RP's economic plan was also highly innovative in substance, which distinguished the party not only from its forefathers, but also from other parties in Turkish politics at the time. niş characterizes the 'just order' model as a hybrid of two economic models: Western free market capitalism and the former Eastern Block's state-controlled socialism. Contrary to predictions based on its Islamist foundations, Yavuz emphasized in his article titled 'Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey' (1997:73-74) that the main goals of just order were social equality and the defense of the state and its property. Because this paradigm assumed that only a strong state could provide social and economic security to its population. According to niş (1997:754), the RP focused its emphasis on two key players in achieving such goals: private efforts as the primary engine of economic development, and the state as the primary supplier of basic infrastructure and distributional aid.

As Yavuz (1997:73-74) notes, this economic model signified several things for people, including justice, a secure social and economic environment, the preservation of state property, the elimination of corruption, the unity of the State, collaboration between state and country, and the end of Western influence. Yavuz (1997:74) concluded that the 'just order' proposed by the RP as a better economic model was accepted as a means of coping with Turkish socio-economic difficulties, rather than a model imposing an Islamic political system. This is not to say that the just order did not have Islamic characteristics. On the contrary, as maintained by Öniş (1997:754), its origins were founded on the concept of "morally justified cross-class compromise." In other words, the model's two main components, equitable income distribution and the moral need to improve one's material situation, were metaphysically linked (Yavuz, 1997:74). Using Yavuz's language, Islam appears as a communication system and philosophical

foundation for justice, rather than a religion (ibid). Based on these features, the RP constituted a watershed moment in Turkish political Islam between 1987 and 1998. Although it received around seven percent of the vote in the 1987 elections, it climbed by nearly ten percent in the 1989 municipal elections. The RP's electoral base grew in the years that followed, and the party obtained the largest proportion of votes (16.88%) of any Islamist party in Turkey's political history in the 1991 elections. In order to form a government, the RP joined forces with the MHP and the Democratic Reformist Party (Islahatç Demokrasi Partisi - IDP). This was followed by the RP's electoral victory in the 1994 local elections, in which it garnered 19 percent of the vote and took control of 28 municipalities, including Ankara and Istanbul. In the years thereafter, Erbakan and his allies consistently increased the party's vote share. In the 1995 elections, the RP won 21.6 percent of the vote and established a coalition government with the True Path Party (Doru Yol Partisi - DYP), the successor of Demirel's Justice Party, and Erbakan was appointed Prime Minister. In the 1996 municipal elections the RP received around 35% of the votes cast. Since its inception in 1923, an Islamist party led by an Islamist Prime Minister has governed Turkey since 1995, causing consternation among both the secularist and military elites. Scholars have analyzed numerous variables to understand the reasons for the rebirth of Islamism as a political force in Turkey in the 1990s.

Using Yeşilada's phrase, this was the joyful finish of the "gradual process of crafting a success narrative" (1992:67). This, however, was not to last long. On February 28, 1997, the military forces staged a post-modern coup, claiming that the administration had a clear Islamist objective. Despite the party's success and its voter share, this resulted in the downfall of Erbakan's coalition government. In 1998, the RP was likewise barred from active politics for breaching the tenets of secularism. This restriction was removed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2003. By then, however, Turkey's Islamist political movement had broken into two separate parties, the Felicity Party and the Justice and Development Party, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Soon after the RP's demise, close allies of Erbakan maintained their desire to politicize via a party structure, forming the Virtue Party in 1998. (Fazilet Partisi - FP). Recai Kutan took over as chairman in Erbakan's absence. Though it was the successor to the

RP, the FP, in the words of Öniş, had a more moderate political face in (Öniş 2006:8). The FP's distinguishing qualities may be divided into three categories: its party leaders' remarks indicating their Islamist viewpoint, its economic programs, and its orientation to the West. Concerning the first point, Islamists attempted to tone down their marginal voice, which seems to have resulted in the dissolution of earlier Islamist parties from the same heritage as the MGH. In other words, the FP learned from the MNP, MSP, and RP, and developed a new strategy to achieve religious liberties within the framework of the secular system. Meham in his paper 'From the Ashes of Virtue: A Promise of Light, the Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey' supports the view that the FP was extremely cautious in attempting to promote the impression that it was not the same party as the RP, but a new political party organization with democratic goals (2004:345). In assessing such a political maneuver by the FP, Dağı alluded to Kutan's argument that the FP would not employ old terms from the National Outlook heritage such as "just order" or "national perspective" since they were often misunderstood and misused (2005:28). Not just Dağı, but also Öniş, in 'Globalization and Party Transformation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective' (2006:9), referred to this as the FP's priority shift. The authors define such a change in terms of two aspects of the FP's political agenda: its attitude toward "religious and moral values" and "democratization." In assessing the first point, niş indicates that, although the FP emphasized moral norms and principles, it made no specific reference to Islam or Islamic values (2006:9). However, for Öniş, this did not imply that the FP had neglected religious liberty (ibid). Rather, the party stressed religious freedom in the framework of individual rights and democracy. Within its larger goal, Öniş emphasizes that, in comparison to its Islamist forefathers, the FP placed considerably more emphasis on democracy, particularly on human rights, and alluded to religious freedom within this framework (2006:9). Dağı adopts a similar viewpoint in his work, and adds that Kutan seems to have concentrated on two concerns in this framework: Turkey's existing democratic deficits and Turkey's prospects for democratization (2005:28). Within this paradigm, Dağı argues that Kutan was fiercely opposed to the military seizing political power via interventions and proposed reorganizing the National Security Council in accordance with Western democratic values (2005:28). Although this was first seen as an internal contradiction of the FP's political theory, as underlined by Dağı, the FP advocated for liberal democracy in order to minimize the military's influence in the political scene, and therefore limit the chance of reclosing

by the armed forces (ibid). Dağı claims that the National Outlook Movement's plan for political survival within the same organization without being closed or outlawed includes not just a demand for democracy and human rights, but also a plea for the rule of law (2005:27-28).

This brings up other important qualities of the party that set it apart from past Islamist parties. According to the literature, unlike its forefathers, the FP no longer represented anti-Westernism and distrust of the West. Instead, it accepted the aforementioned Western ideas and took a hostile stance against the Western powers. Furthermore, as Dağı noted, the FP advocated solid links with European nations and America, despite its Islamist origins in the MGH. With this new image, the FP seems to be more pro-European and pro-American (2005:28). In addition, the FP's economic policy approach set it apart from its predecessors. The FP was much more market-friendly than previous Islamist parties. Unlike the RP, the FP included some allusions to the state's distributional role, as well as increased emphasis on competition and the necessity to rely on market forces and privatization (Öniş, 2006:8-9). However, none of these defining features of the FP indicated that the party had lost its Islamic credentials, which were inherent in its founding. In June 2001, the Constitutional Court declared the party unlawful for breaching the tenets of secularism. The FP's prohibition exposed the internal discussion among the Party's founders, the majority of whom were active members of the RP, and culminated in a split in the party organization between two factions, the "traditionalists" (Gelenekselciler) and the "reformists" (Yenilikçiler). The initial challenge of the young elites in the party such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Gül, erupted over the leadership problem during the first Grand Congress of the FP in May 2000 (Yeşilada, 2002:58). Abdullah Gül, the head of the Reformist faction, challenged Kutan for the leadership of the FP; nonetheless, the traditionalists' dominance resulted in the continuance of Erbakan's influence over the party (Dağı, 2005:30). Meham saw this as a victory for the young reformists who gave an unequivocal statement that they treated Erbakan's dominance by voting 521 to Gül versus 633 to Kutan (2004:349). Following the dissolution of the FP, these two distinct political factions split into two distinct party organizations. While the traditionalists launched the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi - SP) in July 2001, the reformist wing of the FP established the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) in August 2001, with which political Islam displayed a new

perspective in Turkey. Starting its political career in 2001, the SP pushed its Islamist origins forward. According to Mecham (2004:349), both its name, which means "the state of joyful contentment arising from self-realisation," and the day on which the party's registration was filed (Friday, the Islamic holy day), were selected in line with its religious foundations. From this perspective, the SP was a re-establishment of the RP, as an application of an ancient formula to re-establish the same party under a new name in order to re-enter Turkish politics. Between 2001 to May 2003, the party was created and administered using Recai Kutan's older leadership paradigm. When Erbakan's suspension was removed in 2003, he returned to politics and assumed leadership until 2004. Recai Kutan led the SP from 2004 to 2008 due to health issues and a home confinement sentence for lost billion litigation, and Numan Kurtulmuş led it from 2008 to 2010. Beginning in October 2010, Erbakan resumed leadership until his death in February 2011. Initially, the SP pursued a similar ideological agenda to its successors, the RP. According to Mecham, the party primarily advocated moral principles in Turkish society and protected human rights, particularly religious freedom (2004:351). Since its founding, the SP's discourse has been largely identical to that of the RP. Its leader advocated the relevance of joining the European Union and maintaining ties with the United States. However, the party's rhetoric and agenda have gradually changed and transformed into a more anti-Western and (to borrow Mecham's terminology) anti-government line, particularly in light of various external factors such as the SP's opposition to structural adjustment reforms affirmed by Turkey's Economy Minister, Kemal Dervis, or its desire to differentiate itself from the AKP (2004:351). It is difficult to deny that the AKP was seen as a significant danger to the SP's political existence, given that their theological and political foundations were almost identical, and they came from the same Islamist lineage (Mecham, 2004:351-352). The SP's electoral failures in the federal election in 2002 and the local election in 2004 were both accepted by its members. The SP earned just 2.5 percent of all votes in the 2002 general elections, and so lost its opportunity to achieve representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly since it fell short of the 10% barrier. Though there was no significant shift and the SP was defeated in the 2004 municipal elections with 4.1 percent of the vote, this was still insufficient for the party to attain representational power in the parliament. The AKP's dominance was substantially reinforced in the 2002 elections, with 34% of the vote and over two-thirds of the parliament seats. The AKP further increased its votes in the 2007 elections with 47% of the vote and 341

seats, and in the 2011 elections with 49.85% and 326 MPs. The fact that the AKP won three consecutive general elections, in 2002, 2007, and 2011, sparked widespread debates about their 'real' agenda in Turkish politics. Compared to its Islamist antecedents, the AKP's tastes and choices molding Turkey's internal policy orientations appear different. Scholars from numerous disciplines have written extensively on the subject; most analyses focused on the extent to which there is an ideological and discursive gap between the AKP and its forefathers on domestic policy issues, as well as the historical and contextual reasons for it (Çavdar, 2006; Mecham, 2004; Özbudun, 2006; Öniş, 2006; Yıldırım et al., 2007; Dağı, 2005; Turam, 2007; Doğan, 2005). In 'Globalization and Party Transformation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective,' Öniş (2006) points to the distinctions in the AKP's political aims, including 'democratization' and 'religion and moral values,' from those of its forefathers. While the AKP emphasizes the importance of ongoing changes in the realms of civil and human rights, as Öniş points out (2006:8-9), the RP makes no mention of them, instead focusing on religious freedom. Furthermore, he emphasizes how the AKP's party platform takes the secular order as its main reference point and prioritizes democracy, including religious freedom, while the RP largely appealed to Islamic principles and references (ibid). In the economic world, Öniş notes another distinctive feature of the party: the AKP's focus on liberal economy and direct foreign investment; and that the party promotes privatization and advocates a market-friendly economic model, in opposition to the RP and the FP (ibid). In addition, Öniş maintains the view that the AKP's political strategy is firmly associated with the ideals of decentralization and the policymaking ability of local government, as opposed to the RP's program which contains very limited reference to local authorities (2006:9). Dağı (2005) focused on the development of the MGH from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, which would later lead to the establishment of the AKP with a democratic orientation and political objective. Dağı emphasizes that the AKP's newly adopted ideology of democratic conservatism, as well as its party platform (a democracy and development agenda), paralleled its aims. Dağı contends that, given its founders' pro-Islamic backgrounds and idea of conservatism, the AKP is best characterized as a post-Islamist organization that maintains social relations with Islam while renouncing it as a political agenda (2005:30). Dağı also states that the AKP's stance on EU membership and globalization distinguishes it from prior Islamist positions that were typically anti-Western (2005:30-31). Mecham, in 'From the Ashes of Virtue to the Promise of Light:

The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey,' (2004), has analyzed the historical reasons for such transformation and concluded that the AKP has gone further than the RP and FP in terms of ideological moderation and institutional change. Various researchers in the literature support this view by arguing that the AKP has learnt from the failures of its forefathers, such as the RP (Çavdar, 2006; Öniş, 2006:24). However, whether this experience can be replicated by any of the Islamist-rooted political parties in other Muslim nations, and if Turkey can serve as a model for other countries in this regard, is a matter of debate among academics.

Upon this socio-political and historical background, it is important to highlight three significant dimensions regarding Turkish polity with a special focus on the role of Islam and the military.

The first dimension points out the era in **Turkish political history when the military served as a guardian**, as well as the perceptions and dynamics of that time (Narlı 2000; Heper 2005). The major position of the armed forces in society, which extends into the civil sphere, can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire when the elites were separated into three groups at the top, the sultan, the ulema, and the military (Narlı, 2000). Given the interdependence of these three, the military's duty evolved to protector of secularism and the six principles of Kemalism with the foundation of the Republic (Narlı, 2000). Although Islam was employed as a force connecting people with a similar identity during the War of Independence (Mardin, 2006), Islam has long been regarded as a high priority on the list of the military as a possible threat that must be addressed and taken into action throughout the first eighty years of the Republic's history. Turkey's military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 are examples of Turkish armed forces acting on that perspective (Narlı 2000; Heper 2005). Each military involvement altered the nature of the interaction between Islam and the military, necessitating a reorganization of the players' roles, using Dekmejian's (1982) terminology of who dominates, influences, and/or has partnerships with the other (Narlı 2000).

The 1960 coup marked the return of the military to power as a result of the military's assessment of Islam's emergence as a danger to the Kemalist system, during which the military originally enjoyed broad acceptance and approbation for their actions (Harris 1965: 176). As a consequence of the military's attempts to expand civil liberties

following the coup, the 1961 Constitution became more liberal from the military's perspective by introducing checks and balances, and subsequent civilian government elections were aimed at returning civilian authority (Harris 2011: 205). As civilian rights have increased, political Islam in this period has been portrayed in several different ways in the political and social arenas (Tank, 2005). The emergence of various religious factions and religious communities, as well as the establishment of new mosques and vocational training institutions as part of political support mechanisms, particularly in rural regions, resulted in domestic chaos and the 1971 military ultimatum (Ergil 2000; Jenkins 2003; Harris 2011).

Although there was no full military takeover in 1971, Turkey moved to a "military control/civilian partnership" situation with this intervention (Dekmejian, 1982). In the period up to the 1980s, the military approached the actions of civilian governments very critically and observed whether the necessary conditions for additive and economic stability were formed or not. Social movements and economic instability created chaos in Turkey and in 1980 the country experienced a full military takeover (Narlı, 2000). This period witnessed Erbakan's ten-year ban from the politics and reentering of the Islamists into the political sphere through various political tactics and maneuvers (Yeşilada 2002). The 1990s in Turkey marked a period when Islamists gained strength, providing the military with an opportunity to justify and even expand its dominant role in Turkey's internal affairs; and the military's power is best demonstrated by its 1997 unseating of Turkey's first-ever Islamist government, led by Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party, which resulted in the February 28 process. (Narlı, 2000).

The second dimension, with a special emphasis on the role of Islam and the military, indicates **a paradigm shift** starting with the AKP's in-power era regarding the military's reposition and transformation from its traditional role of maintaining Kemalism and protecting the state's unity from dangers, into a more professional role (Heper 2011, Bardakçı 2013).

Based on its Islamic ancestors, the electoral first victories of the AKP led to the reemergence of long-lasting public discussions of its 'hidden agenda' for the establishment of the Shari'a in Turkey (Gunter and Yavuz 2007; Cizre 2008; Duran 2008; Gümüşcü and Sert 2009). On the one hand, the AKP's political power as a result

of its electoral wins and political actions in response to EU reforms, on the other hand, the military's questioning of their role in intervening in politics with the sense of responsibility for dealing with internal as well as external threats to the country resulted in and strengthened the military's professionalism, particularly from 2002 onwards (Heper 2011, Bardakçı 2013). The paradigm shift clearly demonstrates a new era with the separation of civil and military institutions and the civil sphere's power over the military to avoid domestic military intervention (Heper, 2011).

The third dimension to understanding the changing nature of civil-military is based on the Ergenekon investigation, with the judicial accusation that absolutist circles had either planned or attempted attacks to persuade people that the country was facing an Islamist-based reaction or even a potential counter-republican revolutionary movement (Aydınlı, 2011). Ergenekon, as a major milestone in Turkish civil-military relations, has provided an opportunity for the AKP to establish itself as an actor and define its disputed character, as well as generate new prospects for the reorganization of the civil-military balance (Cizre and Walker, 2010). The Ergenekon investigation has justified reducing its position in the Turkish political system, as well as any support structures that serve the military, and delegitimizing the military's political involvement (Bardakçı 2013). As a result of these grounds, the post-Ergenekon phase is a market of the paradigm shift in civil-military relationships during the AKP era (Bardakçı, 2013). The failed coup attempt Turkey experienced in 2016 also contributed to the fluctuating civil-military relations and this shift by showing that the interventionist tradition is still alive (Esen and Gümüşcü, 2017).

2.3.2. Leadership in Turkish Politics: Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

In analyzing the different forms, goals, and strategies of political Islam in the history of Turkey scholars of Turkish politics have predominantly focused on structural and historical factors that led to discursive and behavioral differences between the parties with Islamist roots (Çavdar, 2006; Dağı, 2005; Doğan, 2005; Mecham, 2004; Özbudun, 2006; Öniş, 2006; Yıldırım *et al.*, 2007; Turam, 2007). Considering Turkey's leaders-oriented political history, the role of leadership as an explanatory

variable has attracted much interest. To fully comprehend the transformation of Turkish politics from Erbakan to Erdoğan's AKP, scholars of Turkish politics have paid particular attention to the effects of the personal characteristics and styles of the political party leaders and analyzed their potential effects on policies (Heper and Sayarı 2002; Görener and Uçal 2011; Kesgin 2012; 2013; Özdamar 2017; Cuhadar et al 2017; Kesgin 2018; Cuhadar et al 2020; Balcı and Efe 2021).

In terms of Turkish political leaders' personalities, "Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey" by Heper and Sayarı (2002), is one among the first that focuses on leaders' personalities and how these personalities have affected Turkish political history. In evaluating the personalities and leadership styles of significant political actors of Turkey's political history, in chapter thirteen (Heper and Sayarı, 2002) Heper provides interesting insights into Erbakan's leadership and leadership style. Heper initially portrays Erbakan as a politician who aggressively introduced Islam into modern Turkish politics, with the big question being raised as to whether it was political Islam or an endeavor to improve religious morals in Turkey. In terms of his personality, Heper describes Erbakan as a leader who craved attention and pursued eye-catching initiatives, the majority of which were never finished. However, Erbakan's mentality, according to Heper, demonstrated pragmatism in politics as a leader who acted based on his interests rather than changing environmental situations. Heper makes the case that it is his interest, not differing political situations, that has pushed him to engage within the political climate. If there are crises, Heper argues that Erbakan did not assume blame for their inception. However, he emphasizes Erbakan's determination as a leader that he always has the last word.

As Heper and Sayarı (2002), Ali Faik Demir's "Leaders in Turkish Foreign Policy - Continuity and Change Discourse and Action" (2007) is also among the first studies focusing on leadership and foreign policy and indicate Erbakan as one of the main political figures influencing over the history of Turkish politics. Demir's book covers Erbakan's life, ideology, and individual engagement in decision-making as an important actor in Turkish political history, beginning with political players in the 1950s and continuing with the Özal period. Erbakan has been analyzed as one of Faik's six primary characters within the context of the core debate of who the leader is in decision-making process.

Görener and Uçal's 'The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy' (2011) is another notable work covering the personalities of Turkish political leaders. While describing Erdoğan as "arguably the most controversial character in modern Turkish political history," Görener and Uçal delve into his ideology and leadership style, assessing their influence on his government's policy processes and outcomes. The LTA approach is used to create Erdoğan's leadership profile, which compares him to the leaders of two norming groups, one from around the world and another from the Middle East. According to Görener and Uçal's study, Erdoğan ranks high in BACE and DIS, is middling in PWR and SC, and low in CC, IGB, and TASK when compared to global leaders. In comparison to 83 Middle Eastern leaders, he is found to be the same leader except for his SC ratings, which are lower than the Middle Eastern average.

Bariş Kesgin's 'Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers' (2013) is another notable study that focuses on the personal traits and styles of political party leaders. Kesgin utilized the LTA approach in his research, focusing on the specific leadership traits and styles of Demirel, Çiller, Yılmaz, Ecevit, Erbakan, Gül and Erdoğan and focused on the leadership traits of Turkey's prime ministers in the post-cold war era as the independent variables of interest. As data (different than that of this study) spontaneous foreign policy remarks of Turkish prime ministers have been utilized. Concentrating on Erbakan, his paper identifies this leader as the sole Islamist one who differs considerably from Turkey's other post-Cold War prime ministers. Erbakan, is shown to be a leader who challenges constraints, is open to information (depending on the situation), and is relationship-focused, with an emphasis on removing possible dangers and difficulties. From this vantage point, Kesgin (2013) portrays Erbakan as a leader who sees the world as focused on rivals and aims to expand their influence. He also emphasizes that leaders like Erbakan are required to take risks because they believe it is a moral obligation to confront their opponents (2013).

Kesgin characterizes Erdoğan (like Erbakan) as a leader who confronts the limitation(2013). Erdoğan, is either a problem-solving or relationship-focused leader, depending on the circumstances. According to Kesgin's study (2013), Erdoğan may also be described as a leader who sees the world as not hostile and instead the AKP

leader concentrates on taking advantage of opportunities and potential relationships in the political arena. Kesgin argues that Erdoğan might justifiably be called an actively independent leader.

Arpacı's thesis titled 'Islamism in terms of its Effects on Turkish Political Life and Necmettin Erbakan' (2012), which was subsequently published as a book is another notable related study in the literature. Arpacı (2012) provides an in depth and comprehensive study on Necmettin Erbakan in which Erbakan was evaluated in four eras in light of his political discourses: the Period of Political Formation, the Period of Influencing Politics, and the Period of Influence from Politics. Arpacı notes how Erbakan entered Turkish politics as an independent parliamentary candidate in 1969, had a 42-year political career, that the four political parties he founded were closed at least once, and that despite this, he died while the leader of the fifth party. Simultaneously, Arpacı points to how Erbakan spent most of his political life outlawed as a result of the collapse of the political organizations he formed. One of Erbakan's most significant influences on Turkish political life as a leader was to make the National Outlook ideology acceptable in the political arena. Arpacı characterizes the National Outlook ideology as a framework that runs according to Islamic principles and, in his own words, is founded on the right, or, to put it another way, on the principles that Allah brought with Islam. One of the most notable points raised in Arpacı's work in this context is that she emphasized the need to characterize Necmettin Erbakan as a leader who employed Islamic political means rather than being a political Islamist leader.

Özdamar's (2017) work titled 'Leadership Analysis at a "Great Distance": Using the Operational Code Construct to Analyze Islamist Leaders' is another noteworthy study with important findings. Necmettin Erbakan of Turkey, Imam Khomeini of Iran, Moammer Qaddafi of Libya, Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, and Khalid Meshal of Gaza are among the Islamist leaders studied by Özdamar (2017). He employs the operational code technique in evaluating these leaders' belief systems concerning foreign policy, and he addresses the "boundedness" of operational code analysis in the examination of non-Western individual leaders and political groups. Özdamar emphasizes that his examination of Erdoğan yields findings that are both compatible with and contradict traditional perceptions of Islamists. In his

analysis, Özdamar identifies Erdoğan as a leader who recognizes that the world of politics is violent and that he has only moderate control over historical developments; and as a political leader, he seeks common interests through flexible strategies. Erdoğan, according to Özdamar's findings, is a leader with a generally favorable strategic orientation but less historical influence over events.

Cuhadar et al.'s (2017) paper titled 'Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions' is a significant study in the literature on how leaders respond to external constraints based on their personalities and leadership styles. Their research compares the personalities of Özal, Demirel, and Gül, focusing on their leadership characteristics as prime minister and president. Using LTA, it calls into question the assumed deciding effect of their shifting roles. Unlike the other studies, this one tested two hypotheses: that various leaders would be more vulnerable to changing roles based on their personality traits, and that different traits are more likely to shift with new roles. It concludes that leaders' traits are relatively resistant to changes across roles, but task orientation may be the most likely characteristic to change as leaders adjust to new job demands and expectations.

'Turkish leaders and their foreign policy decisionmaking style: a comparative and multi-method perspective' by Cuhadar et al. (2020) is another study that by Cuhadar et al. that examines the influence of Turkish leaders' styles and personalities. It analyzes six Turkish presidents (Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, and Turgut Özal) and 18 foreign policy situations using both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. This study focuses on whether (and to what extent) these leaders differ from one another based on their leadership traits and styles, how their leadership styles influence their decision-making process on foreign policy, and how they react to both domestic and international constraints in foreign policy cases. The results of this study suggest that they cannot be homogeneously classified in terms of personality characteristics, that they usually have various effects, and that they have discernible variations in making foreign policy decisions. Their research reveals that Erbakan, with his low BACE, SC, and CC scores, high PWR, IGB, and DIS scores, is a leader who uses 'behind the scenes' strategies to challenge restrictions, is closed to information, and is relationship-oriented. The findings on Erdoğan, on the other hand, suggest that Erdoğan with high

BACE, low PWR, IGB, and DIS scores is a leader who is likely to utilize his position directly and act in line with the conviction that he will accomplish his objectives, is open to knowledge (depending on the context), and is problem-oriented.

Another noteworthy study is 'Exogenous Dynamics and Leadership Traits: A Study of Change in the Personality Traits of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's by Balcı and Efe (2021). Balcı and Efe examine the impact of three critical events on Erdoğan's leadership traits: an e-memorandum from the military (TE1), the Gezi Park demonstrations (TE2), and the military coup in July 2016. (TE3). It employs the LTA method, however, two approaches are used to separate the influence of traumatic experiences from other external dynamics such as role shift and experience: The formation of two-year groups before and after each of the three incidents, as well as the split of Erdoğan's tenure in office into five groups of years. In comparison to the norming group of global leaders, this research reveals that TE3 modifies two separate characteristics (DIS and IGB) on a statistically significant scale, but that TE1 and TE2 had no effect on trait scores.

Furthermore, Kesgin's 'Dueling Personalities and Leadership Styles: Gül: Erdoğan's and the Parliament in Turkey's Policymaking During the 2003 Iraq War.' (2022) employs a combination of LTA and case studies and contends that a leader-oriented study provides detailed insight into comprehending foreign policymaking processes and outcomes. Erdoğan, according to Kesgin, is a leader with high BACE, PWR, SC, and TASK but low CC, IGB, and DIS. In addition, Kesgin identifies Erdoğan's as a challenger leader that is receptive to new information and has a problem-solving mindset. Considering his leadership style, he is 'actively independent,' focusing on retaining his own mobility and independence in an environment that is considered to constantly strive to restrict both.

Each of these studies surely provide insights into the critical relevance of leadership as an explanatory variable in understanding the leader-oriented history of Turkish politics. The competency of these studies is open to discussion on the basis of the different theories they are depended on and the different presumptions they test. However, each of these studies may be read as either a grounding point or a forerunner to further study fields investigating various other facets of the personalities and leadership styles in various scenarios in Turkish politics.

This study, which differs from earlier research, examines how leadership functions as an explanatory variable and focuses on how two political leaders of Islamist-rooted parties, Erbakan and Erdoğan, differ from each other in terms of how they perceive the world, what they believe in, how they relate to those around them, how they obtain information, and how they react to restrictions from the military and civil bureaucracy. Despite the fact that both leaders have been examined in several LTA-based research and that the same events have been examined, this study still adds value due to: (i) its scope focusing on the role of leaders' personal determinants in Turkish politics, (ii) its ability to compare these two leaders' responses to two similar constraints from the military and legal side for the party closure cases and contribution to the LTA literature with its consistent findings illuminating two exogenous shocks, military and legal limitations for party closures, (iii) a methodological foundation and new angle it provides for further research on both various Islamist intellectuals who have influenced Turkish political history, changing nature of civil-military relations and the military elites who have participated in the country's political scene.

2.3.3 Framework for Assessing Leadership: Leadership Trait Analysis

This thesis concentrates on the trait approach to personality in analyzing the leadership traits and styles of Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The research approach avoids focusing on the comprehensive biographies that highlight the leaders' whole political life to rather focus on possible changes in their leadership traits and styles through two select cases, military threats and party closures.

Based on the trait approach, the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is a new tradition and technique for assessing political leaders. An analysis of political leaders in LTA is based on the idea that the leader's personality correlates with his or her political behaviors, and the approach explicitly presupposes that what determines who the leader is influencing how he or she behaves in the political environment. From this perspective, the LTA tradition suggests a link between leaders' individual differences shaping their leadership styles and their attitudes in the world of politics.

Within the framework of this study, the overarching approach essentially combines the leadership trait analysis (LTA) with case studies to fully understand whether situational determinants affect the leaders' decision process and therefore, whether (and if so, to what extent) situational factors relate to the leaders' personalities. In the empirical analysis sections, the LTA concentrates on three main questions around which the leadership styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan are built, following the account of Margaret Hermann (1983, 1984, 1987a, 2003:5): (i) How Erbakan and Erdoğan react to the political constraints in their environment, (ii) how open they are to incoming information from their environment, and (iii) what motivates them to act. As Hermann points out (2003:5), the answers to these questions highlight whether these political leaders will generally be sensitive to the context, to what degree these leaders feel the need to control what happens, and by what these leaders are driven.

To examine Erbakan's and Erdoğan's responsiveness to the constraints, the research will mainly question whether (and if so, to what degree) these two leaders believe that they can control or influence the political environment in which they find themselves. In an attempt to answer this question, this study focuses on whether Erbakan and Erdoğan tend to either challenge or respect restraints in the political world. This study discusses whether these leaders see these constraints as difficulties they can overcome, or as obstacles that are difficult to remove. Even if the former is the case for either of these leaders or both, as several numbers of research including that of Hermann (1984) and Tetlock (1991) indicate, this means that the leader/s is/are interested in dealing with the problems and able to find the solution to newly emerging situations. If the leader/s realizes the constraints as obstacles, and prefers to respect and adapt to the situations, then this shows the leader to be less sensitive, less empathetic to his environment, and thus, less able to respond to situational dynamics and demands.

Furthermore, to examine how Erbakan and Erdoğan process information, this study mainly asks which types of information these two leaders wanted to have in their decision-making. In defining their differences, one category includes the types of leaders who typically focus on supportive arguments to their approaches to the situations in contrast to others, representing the type of leaders who need expert opinion or advice in making their decisions (Hermann, 2003:183). The first group of leaders looks for supportive evidence to their standpoints and directs their goal to

persuading others to support their position (Hermann, 2003:183). In contrast, the latter group prefers to delve into the political situations to see who is doing what and to what degree (Hermann, 2003:183). Thus, while the first type consists of leaders who are less open to incoming information from the environment, the latter catalogs mostly the opposite ones who try to realize the whole picture before making their decision.

In questioning what motivates Erbakan and Erdoğan to act, the research (following Hermann's methodology) suggests concentrating on two traits, task focus or relationship focus (2003:184). As defined by Hermann, while the former focus of what the leaders are driven by represents 'a specific problem, cause, ideology, or a set of interests', the latter focus indicates a leader's desire for feedback from people surrounding them, such as 'acceptance, approval, power, support, status, acclaim' (Hermann, 2003:184). Following this explanation, this study will also categorize Erbakan and Erdoğan based on the sources of their motivations. To make categorize the leaders, the primary question will be whether they are the internally driven type of leaders (by, for instance, an idea, a solution to a problem, or a cause) or whether they are motivated by the desired relationship with someone of importance for the leaders. The study will question whether Erbakan and Erdoğan are motivated by the same focus, or whether it is their focus that differentiates them.

To assess the leadership styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan, seven personality traits in the LTA are used: (1) belief that one can influence or control what happens (BACE), (2) the need for power and influence (PWR), (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment) (CC), (4) self-confidence (SC), (5) task focus (tendency to focus on problem-solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities) (TASK), (6) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (IGB), and (7) an individual's general distrust or suspiciousness of others (DIS) (Hermann, 2003). These are selected since previous research suggests the sufficiency of their combination to assess in what ways the leaders react to the political constraints in their environment, whether the leaders are open to incoming information from their environment, and by what the leaders are driven to action (Bass, 1981; Kaarbo and Hermann, 1998; Hermann, 1983, 1984, 1987a, 2003; Walker, 1983; Winter *et al.* 1991; Ziller *et al.* 1977).

The following section presents the connection between these seven traits and the three questions informing leadership style (Hermann, 2003: 184-203):

2.3.3.1. Responsiveness to Constraints: Respecting or Challenging?

Assessment of two traits of the degrees to which leaders believe that they can influence or control what happens, and for which they need power and influence provide information on whether Erbakan and Erdoğan will challenge or respect the constraints they perceive in the environment they live.

The belief in one's own ability to control events, BACE, represents a world-view in which the leader believes he can control and manage what occurs in the world of politics (2003:188-189). If both Erbakan and Erdoğan have a strong belief that they can control the political situations, then it is likely that they wish to be involved in the policy-making process. Leaders with high scores in this trait enjoy controlling and persistently monitor their political decisions in the real world. These leaders, therefore, do not generally stop at the first step in decision-making but generally desire to be active in the following processes. Leaders with high scores in belief that they can influence political events are more likely to both initiate and improve the policy they made, even if it is required. However, these leaders are less likely to welcome the idea of making a deal with others when they draw a conclusion from some specific data concerning an issue. Conversely, leaders with low scores in their belief about their own ability to control events are those who are in favor of taking a step back, waiting to act after someone takes the first initiative and responsibility to see its results and to give them the potential risks. These leaders prefer to minimize the risk to achieve success when making decisions in the political context. This approach provides this type of leader with a chance to blame someone other than themselves if something does not go well. Hence, the leaders with low scores on this trait would take responsibility and control over the situations only when success is almost certain to follow their action.

The need for power and influence, PWR, shows the leader's desire to affect, change, or modify situations. With this trait, the study investigates to what degree Erbakan and Erdoğan desire to exert influence over other people or groups. Leaders whose scores are high on this trait are usually those who wish to be seen as winners. To be in such

a position, this type of leader manipulates the environment and people and then shows how they handle the situation. In doing so, these leaders determine their strategy and follow it to achieve their goals. The most significant point underlying these leaders' attitudes is their desire for success and validation. When the leader is highly in need for power and influence, he puts himself at the core of the world and recognizes the others around him as the sine-qua-non components of the political game, but just as the tools to realize his main objectives. This is what makes these leaders the unreal hero, instead of vice versa. This instrumentalist point of view requires these leaders to always test the boundaries and restrictions for action to ascertain whether their decisions are likely to bring success. Expectedly, taking action sometimes necessitates some degree of bargaining or negotiating. Leaders low on the trait need for power and influence, are usually ready to share the influence over the situation and the people with other factors or actors. This means that these leaders do not concern themselves about the positive validation and the trust and confidence that comes with it. Leaders with low scores on this trait ignore their interests but prioritize those of the group. This is because they believe that what is good for the group is good for everyone, including themselves. For this reason, they may be labeled leaders who trust in the power of collective consciousness, rather than that of individual roles or assets. From this point of view, these leaders support the group spirit and manage people based on some determined norms that define the basic boundaries of people's behaviors in the group. Thus, they intend to build a trustworthy relationship among the members of the group and prefer to share the responsibility in political decision-making.

Leaders whose scores are high on both traits (belief in one's own ability to control events & need for power and influence) may be considered those who typically know how to achieve what they want, and thus, challenge the constraints. They always force possible limits to realize the maximum. For this reason, these leaders are skilled in influencing the political environment both directly and indirectly, in defining their goals and in achieving them.

Conversely, those who score low on two traits respect the constraints and prefer to function within the environmental dynamics to achieve their goals (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Winter & Stewart 1977). These leaders focus on building harmonious relations with

those around them based on consensus and compromise. From their point of view, this is the purpose and expectations of political leadership.

Between these two extreme groups, there exist moderate leaders who with aspects of both traits. Their behavior is generally shaped by the nature of the situation, which results in diverse reactions to the constraints. That is, the moderates may either challenge or respect the constraints depending on the context. What determine their decision-making may be their other traits and/or contextual factors.

Furthermore, a leader may be high on one trait, but low on the other. To illustrate, if leaders are high in the belief that they can control events, BACE, but low in the need for power, PWR, this means these leaders challenge constraints in a too direct manner. This type of leader is presumably less able to work behind the people with a hidden agenda or goal. Rather, they are too open and predictable in using their power and reacting to others and/or situations. Compared to the leaders high in both traits, they can be labeled as less successful.

Table 1. Leader's Reaction to Constraints

Need for power	Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events	
	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>
<i>Low</i>	Respect constraints; work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important.	Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence.
<i>High</i>	Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion—behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where they can pull strings but are less accountable for result.	Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

Source: Hermann (2003), p.188.

Leaders whose scores are low on BACE, but high on PWR also tend to challenge the constraints, not overtly, but indirectly. This manner of challenging behind the scenes makes these leaders feel more comfortable, but less accountable for results.

2.3.3.2. Open or Close to Information?

The literature suggests that leaders in general differentiate from each other not only in terms of their political reactions to the constraints, but also their degree of openness to contextual information. While some leaders selectively use information, others are open to information directing their responses. To assess whether Erbakan and/or Erdoğan are open to contextual input (input from the other people and/or the political environment itself) in their decision-making process, this study focuses on the interrelation of two traits, namely self-confidence, SC and conceptual complexity, CC.

SC shows how important Erbakan and Erdoğan consider themselves, and their abilities to handle the situations and people in the world of politics. From one point of view, the significance of this trait lies in the fact that the leader's perception of self is generally what is at the core of how he sees the world outside himself, including people, objects and situations. This is because the way the leader positions him compared to others can be indicated as his reference point in evaluating the political environment. From another point of view, the leader's self-confidence can also be determined by how the others evaluate the actions of the leader himself. That is, the interpretations of outsiders, especially regarding the leaders' consistency level in behaviors, can also be seen as an effective component of his self-confidence.

Leaders who are high in SC are less needful for input from others they work with. Hence, before politically acting, these leaders do not necessarily need to consider what the people around them think or feel about the political environment or a specific context they experience. Rather, they are happy to be themselves, they always make their own assessments, and they do not seek the approval of others or disagreement with him. The leaders' way of thinking and behaving are highly consistent in their thought system. This point is of great significance from their personal perspectives and they are usually obsessed with this.

Leaders who are low in their self-confidence score have a general tendency to seek out other's opinions and feelings while they evaluate a political situation. Before they make a decision, they usually request the opinions of others concerning the situation. Since these leaders determine how they will act in accordance with the approval they

receive from others, they tend to be inconsistent in their behaviors. Thus, such leaders also have a tendency to see themselves as representatives of a group, ideology, or class.

Conceptual complexity, CC, refers a leader's willingness to perceive, define, and discuss issues in his/her political environment (ideas, people, tools, objects and places) from different viewpoints. Conceptually simple leaders are those who live with the categories in their minds. For them, everything (for instance, every policy and object) can be classified under a certain group such easily definable terms or categories. This means that they are less capable or willing to recognize or acknowledge ambiguity in the world of politics. In contrast, conceptually complex leaders can recognize the complexities and ambiguities in a political situation or a specific position. This is because leaders high in conceptual complexity are generally able to perceive scenarios from different perspectives and to describe them from various angles. Leaders who score high on CC, thus, rely on contextual information more than leaders who score relatively low on this trait. These leaders tend to receive a wide range of incoming information from the environment and analyze a great number of such stimuli before they make a decision. When they are faced with a situation where they need to decide what to do, they usually first ask for others' opinions and consider those opinions and the advice given. Therefore, they need more time to act and be more flexible in their actions than other leaders. However, leaders scoring low on CC are less flexible, but always ready to act within their basic categorization system. They automatically classify incoming contextual information into the categories they have in their minds. Data without any categories cannot exist. The stimuli these leaders receive from the environment is filtered by their interpretation process and then finally transformed into the determined categories.

Table 2. Rules for Determining Openness to Information

Scores on Conceptual Complexity and Self-Confidence	Openness to Contextual Information
Conceptual Complexity > Self-Confidence	Open
Conceptual Complexity < Self-Confidence	Closed
Both High	Open
Both Low	Closed

Source: Hermann (2003), p.185.

As shown in Table 2, Leaders whose conceptual complexity scores are higher than their self-confidence scores are generally sensitive to the environment around them. They are typically concerned about the others. They care about what others think, what they are interested in, and what their major needs and demands are in the wider political context. These types of leaders are open enough to the stimuli incoming from the environment. They can be labeled as the most responsive type of leaders within the other three sub-groups. Contextual information, for them, is what they need to in order to understand the current conditions. They like to be involved in the political conditions as much as possible in order to make the most effective decisions. Therefore, these leaders cope with problems and situations case-by-case. They believe that each case should be separately evaluated on the basis of the contextual situations, which are unique and vary depending on different variables. Based on their strategy of dealing with the situational difficulties, they can be considered to be more pragmatic in this sense.

Leaders with higher self-confidence scores than their conceptual complexity scores tend to be closed to any input from the environment. They are ideologues that advocate specific principles and act based on determined goals. They are less sensitive to others' opinions and feelings. For these types of leaders, if a problems or situation occurs in the world of politics, it should have some specific contextual causes. These leaders are insensitive to situational cues. Instead of being responsive to the contextual information, they like to present themselves as knowledgeable about the correct response within the specific context and how to act. Therefore, they usually try to persuade others about how appropriate their worldviews and course of action are. In doing so, they do not use any coercive maneuvers; instead, they work hard to convince people that their ideas and behaviors are the right ones. These types of leaders like to control the decision-making process and maintain its hierarchical structure.

When leaders' scores appear to be high on both traits, they are likely to be more open and strategic. These leaders ascertain the political context to realize what will work and make decisions and act accordingly. That is, they first focus on the conditions of the situation at any point in time to determine the most feasible and effective course of action. Their high self-confidence tends to make them patient in that they do not need to see immediate resolutions to their decisions. They can be categorized as

opportunistic individuals in this sense. When their goals within the context can be established, their choices and aims regarding specific political positions are more apparent.

Leaders who score low on both traits are most likely to be closed to reflecting the ideas of those around them. This type of leaders mostly desires to be in a position that makes them appear as winners, and they tend to be labeled as narcissist.

2.3.3.3 Motivated by Problem or Relationship?

Political leaders have various motivations and reasons for maintaining their power. Following Hermann's account (2003), the present study suggests narrowing these into two general foci: Task focus, TASK and relational focus.

Task focus might be any particular cause, idea political ideology, or determined set of interests. The literature suggests that the ideas, principles, and norms leaders advocate can push them to act in this way. On the other hand, relational focus can be considered as a leader's desire to receive feedback from others and the political environment in general in order to realize the impact and, acceptance of, or suggestions on their behaviors in the world of politics. When leaders look for a certain type of relationship by which they are pulled to act can be said to show that their behaviors are generally driven by a relational focus.

To assess Erbakan's and Erdoğan's two types of motivations in this study, three traits, namely, task focus, TASK, in-group bias, IGB, and general distrust of others, DIS, have been used to understand whether tasks or relations motivate these two leaders. While the task and relationship focus help assessing the reasons why the leaders sought office, the latter two traits (in-group bias and distrust of others) illustrate whether (and if so, how strongly) the leaders identify with their groups.

Assessing 'task focus' allows for an understanding of what the leaders' motivations are for seeking office. In defining this trait, two major functions of a leader in a group can be highlighted: getting the task done (solving problems the group faces) and maintaining group spirit and morale (building relationships within a group) (Hermann, 2003:197). In fact, it does not differentiate the leaders' absolute function within this

context since these two functions coexist together. There is, however, always an upper hand indicating an emphasis on either the former or the latter function.

If the leader concentrates on the problems his group faces and copes with them with the ideal to move the group forward towards its goals, then it means he places more emphasis on task completion, and his score is relatively high on this trait. This type of leader always forces the group to cope with a contextual problem. The reason behind this is that these leaders tend to perceive the world of politics as a whole consisting of two major components: problems and groups as their solver. From these leaders' viewpoint, people can be considered as instruments more than anything else. In addition, leaders with high scores on this trait are focused on progress in the process towards the solution of problems. For them, the focus of attention is always accomplishment of the determined task. They always look for ways to solve the group's problems with the ultimate goal being the benefit of the group. Leaders scoring high on this trait look for people around them who have the same interests in coping with the problems and who can do their best to solve them.

On the other hand, if leaders, insist on establishing, keeping, and maintaining dynamic relationships with loyalty between the members of the group, then dealing with the political problems the leader's group faces with as the other function) of leadership would be the extreme. Leaders who have prioritize high group maintenance maintaining high group membership spirit typically have lower scores on this trait. Unlike leaders with high scores on this trait, low-scoring leaders are concerned about the ideas, desires, needs and interests of others. The people in their group are at the core of this type of leader's mindset. This does not mean that these leaders consciously ignore the need to achieve their group's aims; however, leaders low in task focus may behave in such a manner that even the goal of the group is for the benefit of its members, not vice versa. That is, these leaders believe that when the needs, desires, and wishes of the group members are not satisfied, this goal or end becomes something less meaningful. In addition to what the group members need, want and think, this type of leader have sufficient freedom by wish to express their thoughts and feelings. This concern stems from their attempt to make all people a part of the political situation they live in. Thus, these leaders can be considered as team members rather than individuals focused.

As shown in Table 3, the literature also suggests that there are moderate leaders who fall in between these two extremes, and focus on either the problem or relationship building depending on context of specific situations (Hermann, 2003:198). In assessing their motivation for seeking office, contextual situations determine how they may behave and what they do. Therefore, these leaders do not exhibit a fixed tendency in reacting to political situations and people. They interpret the conditions determined by the political environment and behave in accordance with their interpretation of the world of politics at the time they experience it.

In addition, an assessment of the other two traits -in-group bias and general distrust of others- provides information about a leader's level of identification with the group. Furthermore, it illustrates whether the leader's behaviors are driven either by the opportunity to shape developing relationships with the world of politics in general, or by the threats and problems he recognizes in the political environment he and his group live in.

Table 3. Rules for Assessing Motivation for Seeking Office

Score on Task Focus	Motivation for Seeking Office
High	Problem
Moderate	Context-specific
Low	Relationship

Source: Hermann (2003), p.198.

On the other hand, such differentiation in the leaders' behavior indicates that the political ecosystems the developments of which leaders contribute to may be unlike one another. It all depends on the answer to the question of how leaders perceive the world of politics they live in. Leaders' scores on these traits shed light on this point. Leaders whose priority is 'protection' of their group tend to detect threats first in the world of politics. This may be reasonable for these leaders since their final aim is to provide a secure environment to the other individuals around them. Conversely, leaders who do not focus on this issue to such a degree recognize the possibility of perceiving the world as a place where profitable and beneficial environments may exist for everyone. For these leaders, who perceive the place they live in as such an opportunistic environment, the political world is more peaceful and provides the chance for cooperative relations.

In-group bias is an ethnocentric world-view in which a leader perceives their own group at the center of the world and politics. The similarities of the group members are what exactly unite people and create a sense of belonging. The common point around which all the members gather in a group may be a political ideology or certain values. People sharing similar political standpoints generally have more in common than one may think. However, this is not always the case. Often, social or ethnic backgrounds can unify individuals and create a collective consciousness from people's individualities.

Whatever common point forms the groups, political leaders with high scores on in-group bias tend to recognize these groups as separate entities. These types of leaders are emotionally attached to their in-group and attach great importance to its maintenance, status, and in-group culture. That is, while making any decision about the political environment, their concern is always for the good of the group since what is good for the group will be good for the individuals it is composed of. Leaders with high scores in this trait are likely to become the group itself. That is, the leader loses his individuality and is inclined to think and feel everything the group faces as he experiences it. From this point of view, such leaders are those who recognize the world of politics based on the distinction of "us and them". For such leaders, only friends and enemies exist. Such a simple categorization forces them to see only the good characteristics their groups have, but never those that need to be improved. These leaders usually deny whatever is weak or bad about their groups. From the perspective of leaders scoring high on in-group bias, there are always external threats that cause all the problems that people in the group have to deal with. These leaders generally make use of such determined enemies in mobilizing group support. When the leader's score on this trait becomes higher on this trait, he views the political world as a zero-sum game, in which the group can only win or lose.

Distrust of others is a trait that represents a general tendency to have doubts about others' motives and actions. It is a feeling of suspicion as to how people behave in the political environment and as to the motives by which their behavior is driven.

Leaders with high scores on this trait generally have intensive doubts, worries, and misgivings about other people or groups. They feel anxious about what others are doing and perceive all incoming actions from others as potentially harmful and

dangerous, especially those coming from potential leadership competitors or those against their ideological standpoint. To prevent any possible damage to their actions, these leaders prefer to do things on their own. From this point of view, such leaders are usually concerned with the loyalty of their group members. They do not allow others within their group attain sufficient power to threaten their position and authority. Therefore, circulation among among the group leadership always exists to prevent other members of the group's elite from accumulating sufficient power. These leaders tend to work for short periods with select advisors or experts. For these leaders, there are only winners and losers in the world of politics. Their constant desire to win makes them suspicious about the motivations of the others and they are generally very sensitive to any sort of criticism since they perceive it as a possible starting point for a challenge against their leadership. Conversely, leaders who have lower scores on this trait are less suspicious about others' thoughts or behaviors. Though this does not mean that these leaders do not have such doubts about the people around them, the extent to which they have such feelings can be indicated as relatively less. The degree of this trait expectedly depends on what the leaders experience in the political environment, which type of difficulties they deal with throughout their political life, and what type of people they work with in their office.

The correlation of the two traits trait IGB and trait DIS with one another provides information on whether the leader is motivated either by the threats or problems he recognizes in the political environment he lives in, or by harmonious relationships in the world of politics. As highlighted in Table 4 below, the focus of attention of leaders whose scores are high on both traits is removing dangers from the political environment. For these leaders, it is the enemies and their dangerous intentions in spreading their ideology and extending their power that is at the center of international politics. The world of politics for this type of leader, therefore, is a place full of conflicts and continuous power struggle. Leaders with high scores on both traits generally concentrate on eliminating potential threats and problems in the world of politics. Therefore, they believe they should always be ready to confront such adversaries and to prevent potential dangers.

Unlike leaders scoring high on both in-group bias and distrust of others, the main focus of leaders scoring low on these traits is on building relationships between the groups

and capitalizing on the possible opportunities within this context. These leaders do not tend to recognize the world as either a threatening or peaceful place. This does not mean that they do not see problems and threats in the environment. Though they perceive them, these leaders do not consider them as the sine-qua-non parts of the political world. From their point of view, the problems and threats leaders and their groups face are mostly context dependent and peculiar and limited to a specific period. Therefore, rather than focusing on such contextual factors, this type of leader is interested in building possible cooperation and constant cooperative relations with others. For them, this approach to the world of politics is more advantageous, both in the national, but especially in the international arena.

In contrast, leaders with high in-group bias and low distrust of others concentrate on threats and deal with problems as the former type of leaders. Unlike the previous type, these leaders believe that the political context sometimes offers specific opportunities. For these leaders, the political system is like a zero-sum game, in which there are just the winners and the losers. That is, these leaders perceive the system as one in which they can either win or lose. The specific set of norms determines the rules of the game through which the actors play their roles within the political environment.

In addition to these three types of leaders emerging from the correlation of the two traits in-group-bias and distrust of others there are also leaders with low in-group bias and high distrust of others, who focus on building relationship and taking advantage of opportunities. For these leaders, the world is full of conflicts and they should constantly pursue the interests of their own groups or countries. Since this is a valid generalization for all leaders throughout the world, these types of leaders are aware that they should always be ready for any challenge coming from the international arena. However, this does not mean that these leaders do not build any relations between other countries. On the contrary, these leaders are usually willing to establish close relationships with the others in the world of politics, especially to screen the developments in the environment.

Once the scores of the leaders on each trait have been determined and compared to those of other Turkish and world leaders presented in the sample sets, there have been sufficient data to evaluate how leaders react to constraints, process information, and are motivated to deal with the political environment. Based on the above-explained

relations between the specific traits, three dimensional combinations of traits suggest a particular leadership style for each leader on which they are likely to exhibit (Hermann, 2003:185).

As explained in Table 5, if a leader challenges constraints, is closed to information and problem focus, then this leader is considered as '**expansionistic**' and their focus is on expanding the control of the leader, the government and the state. If a leader shows a similar response to the constraints and is at a zero level of openness to information, but focuses on relationships, this type of leader is classified as '**evangelistic**' who prefers to convince others to accept the mission and vision, and being of his group.

Whereas a leader that challenges constraints, but is open to information and focuses on the problems, this leader classified as '**actively independent**' and gives attention to preserving personal and governmental independence in the political world. If this type of leader has a relationship focus rather than a problem, then they are a 'directive' and prefer to keeping one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others.

If a leader does not challenge, but respect the constraints, while he is closed to information and problem-focused, this type of leader is considered as '**incremental**' in developing the security and economy of the state rather than dipping back into any obstacle. If the same leader respects the constraints, is closed to information and has a relationship focus, then they are classified as an '**influential**' leader type who deals with creating cooperative relationships and concentrates on building such working relations with other actors. A leader that respects constraints, but is open to information and is problem focused can be considered '**opportunistic**' since this type is good at analyzing a situation and its dynamics, and accomplish specific desires allowed by the given context. If this leader focuses on relationships rather than problems, then they may be considered as 'collegial' since this leader's main focus is on harmonizing the differences, developing consensus on them to gain prestige and status through which they empower the other and share accountability.

The methodology section, explains how the research combines LTA with the case studies in detail.

Table 4. Motivation Toward World

In-group Bias	Distrust of others	High
Low	Low World is not a threatening place; conflicts are perceived as context-specific and are reacted to on a case-by-case basis; leaders recognize that their country, like many others, has to deal with certain constraints that limit what one can do and call for flexibility of response; moreover, there are certain international arenas where cooperation with others is both possible and feasible. <i>(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships)</i>	World is perceived as conflict prone, but because other countries are viewed as having constraints on what they can do, some flexibility in response is possible; leaders, however, must vigilantly monitor developments in the international arena and prudently prepare to contain an adversary's actions while still pursuing their countries' interests. <i>(Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant)</i>
High	While the international system is essentially a zero-sum game, leaders view that it is bounded by a specified set of international norms; even so, adversaries are perceived as inherently threatening and confrontation is viewed to be ongoing as leaders work to limit the threat and enhance their countries' capabilities and relative status. <i>(Focus is on dealing with threats and solving problems even though some situations may appear to offer opportunities)</i>	International politics is centered around a set of adversaries that are viewed as "evil" and intent on spreading their ideology or extending their power at the expense of others; leaders perceive that they have a moral imperative to confront these adversaries; as a result, they are likely to take risks and to engage in highly aggressive and assertive behavior. <i>(Focus is on eliminating potential threats and problems)</i>

Source: Hermann (2003), p.200.

Table 5. Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints, Openness to Information and Motivation

Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation <i>Problem Focus</i>	<i>Relationship Focus</i>
		Expansionistic	Evangelistic
<i>Challenges constraints</i>	<i>Closed to information</i>	(Focus of attention is on expanding leader's, government's, and state's span of control)	(Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
		Actively Independent	Directive
<i>Challenges constraints</i>	<i>Open to information</i>	(Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world)	(Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others)
		Incremental	Influential
<i>Respects constraints</i>	<i>Closed to information</i>	(Focus of attention is on improving state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles)	(Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others)
		Opportunistic	Collegial
<i>Respects constraints</i>	<i>Open to information</i>	(Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what important constituencies will allow)	(Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus—on gaining prestige and status through empowering leathers and sharing accountability)

Source: Hermann (2003), p.185.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1. The Overarching Methodological Approach

In analyzing roles played by the leadership traits and styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan in their decision-making processes, the methodological approach combines leadership trait analysis (LTA) as an at-a-distance technique with case studies. This helps to comprehend if and how situational elements influence the leaders' decision process and to what extent these dynamics affect the leaders' personalities.

Therefore, two methodological approaches have been used in this research. The first stage's at-a-distance technique is a content analysis of the leaders' interviews and spontaneous speeches using LTA. This represents the quantitative part of the research. The second stage is the case study. The major political cases selected for each leader allow for an in-depth understanding of the crucial role these cases had on the leaders' personalities and behaviors. For this reason, the research at this stage examines how the leadership traits of Erbakan and Erdoğan reveal themselves within the selected cases, tests the quantitative data at the first stage, and deeply focuses on the reflection of their leadership traits in making their decisions. In analyzing the cases, the qualitative data has been investigated through written sources, such as databases, national and international interviews, the works of journalists, scholarly articles, books, and reviews.

The empirical chapters for each leader include short biographical sections followed by an evaluation of their leadership profiles in general. An evaluation of their leadership profile requires answering whether the leader (i) respects or challenges constraints in the political environment, (ii) is open or closed to contextual information, and (iii) is motivated by problems or relationships. Quantitative data derived from the analysis of

their leadership profiles, in general, has been tested within the cases in the following sections. For each case, the historical background has been narrated and empirical results have been contextualized. Then, both leaders' profiles have been evaluated within the context of the cases in the following sections.

3.2. At-a-Distance Technique

This thesis mainly utilizes an 'at-a-distance' assessment technique, developed to examine leaders without having direct access through analyzing their statements. The aim of this technique is to learn more about leaders who are not readily available for psychological tests or interviews, with the assumption that their personalities can be reliably and systematically studied by focusing on the content analysis of what they have previously stated in the media and other information channels. In measuring the personalities of leaders (including prominent motives, cognition, and traits within the theoretical framework of LTA) at-a-distance, their orientation towards seven traits and leadership styles have been inferred from their words utilizing their statements.

The primary data set of this thesis is the spontaneous verbal materials of the two leaders. In assessing the cognition, personality traits of the leaders, and leadership styles, the interviews given to the media and the spontaneous statements they made are used as the units of analysis. The speeches these leaders made in determining places and times, on the other hand, are consciously ignored within the scope of this research; since this type of verbal materials is open to criticisms that they are generally written by the advisors, political experts, or staff members rather than the leaders themselves, and therefore not appropriate to assess what that leader is really like (Hermann, 2003:179). Although even a leader's interviews require some previous preparation with advisors, such as considering potential questions and possible answers to them, interviews may still be considered at times when the leader is in a less controlled environment (Hermann, 2003:179). In comparison to when a leader is giving a prepared written speech, during interviews a leader has a better chance to express his own thoughts and ideas on a given topic. This research, therefore, presupposes that leaders are more likely to provide unprepared individual responses when they are interviewed.

The following sections specify which data is collected and how it is analyzed.

3.2.1. Data Collection and Analysis

The leaders' speeches are gathered predominantly through three databases namely the World News Connection, Factiva, and LexisNexis Academic which are accessible through the Bilkent University library. The former database allows access to a number of responses leaders have given to the domestic press as it also includes translations of non-English newspapers. Factiva, features Reuters News in English and Turkish, Turkish Daily News, Dünya (Turkish language), and Anadolu Agency (Turkey). LexisNexis Academic contributes to the data by providing access to Agence France Press. In addition to these databases, several interviews found online were also added to the list.

A total of 128 of Erbakan's and Erdoğan's interviews and statements in the domestic and international press will be analyzed. The assessment of Erbakan is derived from his 81 responses to the press between August 1974 and December 2010, while that of Erdoğan is from his 47 statements between July 2000 and September 2011. These periods for each leader have been chosen on purpose depending on, the comprehensiveness of the cases this study examines, the validity of sources, and having an adequate period to assess their impacts afterward.

The analysis of the leaders uses a total of 72,196 words presented in Appendix 1 and 2 selected randomly from the aforementioned databases that help to reach domestic and international archives of Anadolu Agency, Al-Awsat, Al-Safir online, Anatolia, BTA, Cumhuriyet, Der Spiegel, FRG, Hürriyet, Hürriyet Daily News, Irib Tv, Irna News Agency, Kanal 7, Mena, Milliyet, Milliyet Online, Panaroma, Reuters, Sabah, Sabah Online, Show Tv, Spiegel, Tercüman, Time, TRT TV, Today's Zaman, Turkish Daily News.

The leadership profile of Erbakan is derived from an at-a-distance assessment of 40,226 words and that of Erdoğan of 31,970 words. (See Appendix 1 for more detailed information on the data). While the shortest texts both in the leadership profiles of Erbakan is 100 and that of Erdoğan is 120 words, the longest one in Erbakan's profile is 4034 and in Erdoğan's profile is 2000 words.

They are the spontaneous type of material rather than the topic or audience-specific written speeches. The data focus on a variety of topics, such as relations with other countries, general elections in Turkey, the Kurdish issue, and the role of the army, etc.

Interviews with each leader were conducted in various places. The dataset consists of what the leaders said in various cities in Turkey, including Ankara, İstanbul, Konya, İzmir, Urfa, and Diyarbakır, as well as cities abroad including Athens, Baku, Cairo, Chicago, France, Rome, Sofia, Washington, New York.

Fundamentally, the methodology is based on the coding of selected speeches and interviews within the LTA framework for content analysis. In defining the leaders' characteristics and styles, their scores on each trait play a role. In profiling the leaders in general, these scores create forecasts regarding the leaders' personalities and through this their political attitudes in the decision-making processes.

To code the speeches, this thesis used a specialized computer program called *Profiler Plus*, PP, developed to create an LTA Analysis (Schafer and Walker 2006a, Hermann 2005). This software systematically works data and accurately concludes the results.

Following the data collection, each speech is created as a text (.txt) file and made ready to analyze in PP in analyzing his general scores on each trait, the leaders' scores in the context of military threat and closure case of their parties, including the pre- and post-cases periods. While the speeches are long, utilizing this program reduces the analysis time and makes it possible to work on all data within this study. Since the program works in English, the data used in this research is in English on purpose.

In obtaining the quantitative data through LTA, a careful content analysis of the discourse in the data set representing the leaders' own words in various contexts at different times is conducted following Hermann's account concentrating on the calculation of seven personality traits to fully describe the type of leader. Each trait of both leaders is scored via *Profiler Plus*, which provides an accurate calculation to understand how he behaves when he is faced with political obstacles, how he acts when he is likely to show in the political environment, and how he interacts with others in his environment. Scores on each trait represent the calculation of what percentage of time a leader used certain verbs or phrases that are indicative of a certain leadership

characteristic while responding to the interviewers' questions. The idea underlying this technique is that uttering specific words reflects the personality of the leader.

After scoring each characteristic of a leader, the scores were put compared with two main reference groups. As indicated in Table 6 below with scores on traits, while one group consists of 284 leaders from around the world (Hermann 2003), this research focuses on the scores of the other norming group of 6 leaders from Turkey (Cuhadar *et al.* 2020), in deciding on the profile and tendencies of both Erbakan and Erdoğan. This allows for a focus on understanding each leader's behavior in the context of Turkey.

Once the leaders have been profiled and their scores compared their scores with one another, the data set is divided into pre and post-periods of the selected cases for each leader related to the military threats and closure case of their parties. To do this, the speeches and interviews of the leaders are once again analyzed through Profiler Plus. After obtaining new quantitative data, the differences between the pre and post-case scores are evaluated for both leaders. In the discussion section, the quantitative data of each leader (general profile, scores on pre and post-case 1, scores on pre and post-case 2) are discussed in comparison to that of both leaders to determine their similarities and differences. The next section will summarize how the data and coding process is analyzed.

3.2.2. Analyzing the Data: Using LTA to Construct Leaders' Profiles

In using the LTA technique, 128 interviews and statements of Erbakan and Erdoğan in total were coded, and the overall scores of each leader over the seven traits were calculated.

In analyzing each trait, the focus is on the percentage of times the leaders uses certain verbs and phrases in their speeches, with the idea that the more frequently they use certain verbs and phrases the more prominent such content is to them (Hermann, 2003). In other words, scores on each trait represent the calculation of what percentage of time Erbakan used certain verbs or phrases that are indicative of a certain leadership characteristic while responding to the interviewers' questions. The idea underlying this technique is that uttering specific words reflects the personality of the leader.

While coding for ‘belief in control over events’, for instance, the attention was directed to action verbs. Following Hermann’s account (2003), this study supposes that a leader does not subordinate tasks but takes full responsibility for planning or commencing an action to challenge the constraints when a leader believes that he has control over events. The actions either proposed or taken by the leader or the group he identifies with was the focal point in determining the leader’s score on this trait. Calculations were based on the percentage of times either the leader himself or a set of people close to the leader are obliged to the people for initiating and working an action out.

In coding the ‘need for power’, the score was also calculated based on the frequency of the verbs signifying any attempt of a leader to establish, maintain or restore his power. While scoring this trait, as Hermann points out (2003:190), it is questioned whether the leader becomes involved in accusing and/or being accused by someone, threatening and/or being threatened by someone (or in such an action), in giving advice or assistance to someone, in providing the regulations for the behaviors outside himself, in endless negotiation with someone, in taking an advantage of fame with an action, or be interested in his or her name and position.

In determining the score for self-confidence, attention was directed towards the pronouns ‘my’, ‘myself’, ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘mine.’ This shows to what degree the leaders emphasize themselves with different intentions in their speeches. In addition, calculating this trait questions how significant the leaders perceive themselves in comparison to what is going on in the political context. Different dimensions of this trait, therefore, are investigated. Among these, it is questioned whether the leader displays himself at the core of a political situation or activity. In other words, whether the leader references himself as a sine-qua-non component of the political environment the only one capable of confronting or managing a problem. In addition, calculations of this score examined whether may be seen as somewhat authoritarian for instance through statements like “if it were up to me...”, or whether he admits that he received positive input from other people and groups (Hermann, 2003).

In coding for conceptual complexity, the attention is on two groups of specific words: those indicating that the leader perceives various dimensions of the political environment, and others suggesting that the leader recognizes only a few categories through which he classifies everything concerning the world of politics. In this

framework, while words like ‘approximately’ or ‘possibility’ was suggestive of the high conceptual complexity of the former group, others like ‘absolutely’, ‘without a doubt’, ‘irreversible’, or ‘certainly’ brought about low scores in the calculations.

Likewise, the previous trait, in scoring for task focus, the concentration is on two sets of words: (i) words implying that the leader focuses on a task or dealing with an instrumental activity, and (ii) words reflecting how others feel, need, and want. In this framework, while ‘accomplishment’, ‘achievement’, ‘plan’, or ‘recommendation’ would be task-oriented words, words like ‘appreciation’, ‘collaboration’, ‘disappointment’, or ‘suffering’ suggest group-maintenance words.

The score for in-group bias, in addition, is determined by calculating the percentage of words referring to the particular leader’s own group. Focusing on this point requires determining whether (and if so, how often) the leaders use modifiers for being favorable, suggesting strength, or indicating the need to maintain group honor and identity. While the former category includes words like ‘peace-loving’, ‘prosperous’, ‘progressive’, and ‘successful’, modifiers suggesting strength consist of ‘powerful’, ‘capable’, ‘boundless’, and ‘advances.’ For the latter group, the focus is on phrases such as ‘need to defend firmly our borders’, ‘must maintain our own interpretation’, and ‘decide our own policies’ (Hermann, 2003).

In coding for distrust of others, the unit of analysis are the noun and noun phrases directing attention to persons other than the leader or his group. The literature suggests that two conditions should be present to code any such noun or noun phrases as exhibiting distrust. Those words or phrases concern whether the leader doubts, has misgivings, or is vigilant about anyone or anything and whether he is concerned or anxious about the actions of other people or groups and perceives them as being dangerous.

After coding and calculating the two leaders’ scores on each trait, this research used the data to compare these leaders for two sample groups of Hermann, involving 6 Turkish leaders and 284 world leaders.

**Table 6. Potential Comparison Groups
for Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan**

Personality Trait	Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
Belief Can Control Events	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Need for Power	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06
Self Confidence	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.074	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10
Task Focus	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07
In-group Bias	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Distrust of Others	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06

Source: For Turkish leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003)

This method decides whether the particular leader scored high or low on a specific trait. Table 1 below represents the mean on each particular trait for the sample groups as well as the scores below and above the average scores (Hermann, 2003:204). If the score of a leader on a specific trait exceeds the mean listed below, then the leader scored high on the trait, and vice versa. In addition, a leader can also be considered moderate in a trait, if his score falls around the mean for the comparison group.

3.3. The Case Study

In analyzing the leadership profiles of Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this research, at the first stage focuses on the results of the at-a-distance analysis and each leader's general leadership profile has been derived. In the second stage, two similar cases have been selected both to test the quantitative data derived from the content analysis and to strengthen its validation. In this way, this thesis combines the quantitative with the qualitative data allowing for a detailed analysis of the research questions regarding how the leaders' leadership traits have manifested themselves in the decision-making processes.

Both leaders have been analyzed based on two cases that affected their political careers, namely military threats and closure cases of their political party. The leaders' profiles were derived using the at-a-distance technique and their profiles pre and post-period of the selected cases have been compared.

Table 7: Selected Cases for Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Leader	Necmettin Erbakan	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Case		
Military Threat	February 28	E-memorandum
Closure Case	The Closure Case of the Welfare Party in 1998	The Closure Case of the Justice and Development Party in 2008

As indicated in Table 7 above, four cases have been examined. In analyzing the military threat, for Erbakan, February 28 and for Erdoğan the E-memorandum process has been selected. The other case selected for both leaders concerns the closure cases of their parties, for Erbakan the closure case of the RP in 1998, and for Erdoğan that of the AKP in 2008.

Considering the case study of the research, the literature review has been completed to understand the scholars' perspectives. In addition to academic articles and books, for each case, domestic and international press' news, newspaper articles, interviews, and press releases have been screened to uncover any relevant information necessary to analyze leaders' profiles. Furthermore, the archives of newspapers, the anecdotes of journalists, the leaders' personal opinions on any detail of the case, printed materials produced by other parties, and foreign press' news have been utilized.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYZING THE LEADERSHIP PROFILE

OF NECMETTİN ERBAKAN

4.1. Political Background of Necmettin Erbakan

Erbakan is widely considered the most prominent figure in the history of political Islam in Turkey. His life and political profile are closely connected with the Gümüşhane Chapel of the Nahqshbandis order and its background.

Erbakan, the son of a judge from the notable clan of Kozanoğlu in Adana, attended Istanbul High School and graduated from the Department of Mechanical Engineering, İstanbul Technical University (İTÜ). He graduated first in his class, and then pursued his doctoral studies at Aachen Technical University in Germany. Starting from his early academic career that lasted twenty-one years, he distinguished himself with both his academic success and the large circle of friends surrounding him and called him ‘hodja’ when among his prayer group and classmates (Özdalga, 2002). Such a title accounted for and explained his main characteristics; it was connected with his initial affiliation with the Nahqshbandis that defended the spiritual order of Sufism under the discipline of Sheikh Hasib Yardımcı Ibn-i Ali al-Serezi, his first spiritual mentor. After the sheik’s death in 1949, Erbakan followed Sheikh Abdulaziz Bekkine between the years 1949 and 1952, and then Mehmed Zahid Kotku until 1980 (Özdalga, 2002).

Erbakan’s remarkable academic success in engineering and the nature of his relations with others provided him with an important opportunity to become the co-founder and general manager of ‘Gümüş Motor’, the first motor factory in Turkey (İmişiker, 2002; Demirhan, 1994). Rather than a break, this can be considered a new direction in his academic studies, for which he received his professorship in 1965.

Even before entering politics, Necmettin Erbakan was always an activist with roles in several organizations, such as the Mechanical Engineers' Association, Industry, Maritime Trade, and Trade Exchange. Among these, Erbakan was elected to the presidency of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges in Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği- TOBB) in 1969, his first semi-political position, despite he and his associates being accused of voting irregularities. The right-wing circles, including the nationalists, conservatives, and Islamists, united under the same umbrella to support him during that time. His main objective was to solve the conflict between Anatolian capital owners and industrialists in İstanbul; however, he was quickly expelled from his highly influential position after the government rejected the results of the elections. While it was commonly accepted that it happened because of his criticisms of the government's economic policies by defending the Islamists Erbakan focused on the pressure exerted by the best-known industrialists and businessmen as the main reason¹

Considering Erbakan's spiritual roots and sense of the universe, it is commonly accepted that Sheikh Kotku's mentorship motivated him to enter politics and this mentorship played an influential role in his first steps in the political sphere (Demirhan, 1994:111; Yeşilada, 2002:64; Yavuz, 1997:66; Özdalga, 2002; İmişiker, 2002). Receiving the blessing of Sheikh Kotku, following his expatriation from TOBB, Erbakan first tried to join the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi –AP) with the help of his supporters. Süleyman Demirel, however, vetoed his submission of candidacy and removed him from the party. In searching for other alternatives to become part of the political arena, Erbakan established the Independents' Movement (*Bağımsızlar Hareketi*), upon which he was elected an independent MP in the same year for the city of Konya.

In the short term, Erbakan and his close friends within the AP agreed that the party was estranged from Islamist values and decided to establish a new party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi – MNP) to serve political Islam in Turkey (Yeşilada,

¹ Regarding this issue, in his interview with Milliyet Newspaper, Erbakan states that "...19 million \$ of the 20 million investment quota provided to the TOBB was distributed to İstanbul and İzmir. Just 1 million \$ was distributed to Anatolia...As a result, the Anatolian capital was won (in this election)... However, ... the TOBB was under the control of the comprador-mason minority... Those who do not desire the development of Anatolian capital... But, to have all the headgears in their hands..." (Yalçın; 1994:33-34)

2002:63-64)². Erbakan's close circle³ came together with the objective of the "Islamization of the cultural and political life of Turkey" (Yavuz, 1997). Considering its founding figures, the Islamist MNP consisted of not only people from the Nahqshbandis religious circle but also from the Nurcu order. What united these people was their Islamic and conservative tendency, prioritizing the three main conceptions that Islamic values could save nations from degeneration and help them progress, that Turkey had to cooperate with the Islamic countries, rather than with the countries of the Western world, and that industrialization should be seen as the way to fight with the Western power; and its importance could not be denied (Yeşilada, 2002:65). The political lifespan of Erbakan's MN was, however, very short. In May 1971, the party was closed down by the Constitutional Court since the party's fundamental objective was perceived to be the establishment of a state based on the Shari'a rules of Islam. Erbakan and his followers were tagged as threats to Turkey.

Following the MNP's closure, Erbakan established the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP) in October 1972⁴. Considering its program and religious-oriented values, the MNP protected the core of the MSP (Demirhan, 1994:24). In 1974, the party unexpectedly received 11.8 percent of the votes in the elections and took part in a coalition government formed by the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi–CHP) under Bülent Ecevit. In forming a coalition government with CHP, Erbakan was granted the position of deputy prime minister. Erbakan, however, was harshly criticized for being willing to enter into a coalition government as Nurcu party members and many rightist groups accused him of forming a government with the representatives of the communist power, despite its several consequences. A major consequence of entering into this coalition government was a deep split among the party members of different Islamist backgrounds, while Erbakan also found himself losing support from his far-right supporters. The coalition between the CHP and the MSP finally dissolved in 1974. Instead, the Nationalist Front Governments (Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümetleri-MCH), both of which included the MSP, were formed between

² It was Eşref Edip, who gave the party its name and its emblem of a hand pointing to the heavens in an Islamic manner (Okutucu, 1996:29). Although the MNP was first under the leadership of Süleyman Arif Emre, Erbakan took over the post from him in February, 1970 (Yeşilada, 2002:65)

³ This circle consisted of several key Islamist figures in the political history of Turkey, including Hasan Aksay, Mustafa Yazgan, Arslan Topçubaşı, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, and İsmail Hakkı Yılanoglu.

⁴ Owing to his case in the court, the new party (as that of MNP) was again under the leadership of Süleyman Arif Emre at the beginning. Soon after the 1973 national elections, Erbakan took his position.

the years of 1975 and 1977. Whilst the AP, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi–MHP), the MSP, and the Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi–CGP) took part in the first MCH, the second did not only include the CGP. Although all were shortlived, Erbakan paid a price again for his decision to be a part in a coalition government with the resignations of Nurcu members from the party and the withdrawals of both his Nurcu and far-right supporters. This led to decrease in the party's popularity in the elections of 1977. In comparison to the previous election, the MSP's votes decreased by 3 % and the number of its deputies were reduced by half to 24 seats. Until the end of 1979, replacing CHP upon Ecevit's resignation, Demirel came to power with a minority government. Erbakan supported Demirel's government in the vote of confidence, disregarding several years of bitterness and a big surprise for members of both parties.

The MSP, like other parties, was closed down following the military coup of 1980. After a short detention period, Erbakan and his close associates in the party were arrested and accused of transforming the MSP into an illegal community and acting against secularism (Örmeci, 2010). After nearly 9 months in prison Erbakan was released, but due to the Constitution of 1982, he was banned from politics for ten years. This ban was lifted soon after the national referendum of 1987 led by Turgut Özal (Demirhan, 1994:32).

Despite a bad start to the post-1980 period, Erbakan established a new party called The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) in 1983, a successor to the MSP. The RP was excluded from the 1983 elections, but this new party of the Islamist movement distinguished itself from its predecessors by reshaping its acts, statements, and organizational structure (Özdalga, 2002:132).

The post-1980 period was a new era for Erbakan. In 1980, the leading figure of the Nahqshbandis group, Kotku, passed away and Mahmut Esad Coşan became the new Sheikh. Erbakan's relation with this new figure was unsurprisingly different. His ties with the İskenderpaşa Seminary weakened and he no longer continued to follow his Sheikh's advice (İmişiker, 2002:21). Instead, Erbakan directed his attention to other potential voters from the different segments of society. Erbakan's campaign throughout Turkey, in which his new policies were announced, worked and for the first time in the political history of Turkey, an Islamist party received this percentage

in the general elections of 1991. Among the Islamist groups, Erbakan regained his popularity. His success was rivaled in the local elections of 1994 when both the Ankara and Istanbul municipalities were won by the RP. Erbakan saw even greater success in the 1995 general elections when his RP party became Turkey's largest party with 158 seats in parliament. Following these elections, he became the Prime Minister, leading a coalition government with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi – DYP) headed by Tansu Çiller. Erbakan's success story between 1991 and 1997 was interrupted by the resignation of the party in June 1997 from the government by military force as the consequence of the post-military coup of 1997, followed by the establishment of a new party, called the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) after the Constitutional Court closed down the RP because the party was against the principle of secularism.

To borrow the terminology of Özdalga, it was an “open secret” that Erbakan continued to be involved in the party politics of the FP headed by Recai Kutan; this despite the fact that he was banned from politics for five years, together with other leading figures of the RP (2002). The closure of the RP historically led to a division within the Islamist groups into two parties that differed concerning the ideas they advocated and the political strategy on which they built their party structure, namely, the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*-SP) of the *conservatives*, and the Justice and Development Party of the *innovators* (*Yenilikçiler*). Whilst the old allies of Erbakan became members of SP, innovators, including Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan got involved in AKP. Erbakan replaced Kutan and became the leader of SP on May 2003, when The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) lifted his ban. However, due to health problems and the political ban, he left this position on January 2004, until he retook this responsibility on October 2010 and maintained his duties as a leader until his passing away in February 2011.

4.2. Necmettin Erbakan's Leadership Profile

In analyzing the leadership profile of Erbakan, a careful content analysis of the discourse in the data set representing Erbakan's own words in various contexts at different times was conducted following Hermann's account, concentrating on the

calculation of seven personality traits to fully describe the type of leader. To understand how Erbakan reacted when he faced political obstacles, how he acted when he was likely to show in the political environment, and how he interacted with others in his environment, Table 8 below reports the average trait scores for Erbakan across eighty-one speeches and interview responses. Scores on each trait show the percentage of time (from zero to one hundred) Erbakan used certain verbs or phrases, indicative of certain leadership characteristics. Table 1 puts Erbakan's scores into perspective in comparison with two main reference groups. The first comparison group was developed by Hermann and consists of 284 leaders from around the world; the second group was developed by Cuhadar et al. (2020) for six Turkish leaders studied with the LTA method. In scoring the traits as high or low, it is considered whether they are either one standard deviation below or above the average of each particular trait and moderate if they are similar to those for the norming groups of leaders.

Necmettin Erbakan appears to be different from the other leaders on five of the seven traits, 'the need for power' (PWR), 'conceptual complexity' (CC), 'self-confidence' (SC), 'task focus' (TASK), and 'in-group bias' (IGB). 'The other traits (BACE and DIS) appear to be average and similar to those of the 284 other world leaders and 6 Turkish ones. In the following sub-sections, these scores will be interpreted to fully describe the personality of Necmettin Erbakan.

Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)

Necmettin Erbakan's scores on BACE show that he is moderate in comparison to two norming groups from both around the world and Turkey. This underlines that this trait does not distinguish him from the leaders in his country or those around the world. Such an average score suggests that as a moderate leader on this trait, Erbakan is likely to be a leader who can control the political outcomes either through respecting the political constraints or by challenging the structural parameters depending on what was contextually required from his perspective. These leaders with moderate scores on BACE, like Erbakan, are typically ready to shape the political universe within the legal limitations and to build consensus and harmony with others to achieve their goals. If it appears necessary to maintain their political authority and fulfill their ends, leaders like Erbakan who score moderately on this trait might, however, step beyond the limitations. Depending on how these leaders evaluate the situation and how closely

they recognize political success, they may either prefer to be involved in the decision-making process or stop to monitor its consequences in the real world. In other words, such leaders might take the initiative if they feel risk they take will potentially lead them to success on the surface, or opt to act after someone makes the first move and takes the potential risks. In the former case, moderate leaders such as Erbakan are mostly in favor of utilizing certain techniques to test their ideas and actions before they take responsibility in the policy-making process. These leaders, therefore, might challenge or respect the political context and dynamics in which they find themselves based on how they interpret their particular context. In this sense, the specific case becomes important when predicting Erbakan's behavior.

The Need for Power (PWR)

Erbakan's scores on PWR indicate that he is moderate in comparison to 284 other leaders from around the world, while he has a high score on PWR when compared with other Turkish leaders. Considering Erbakan in the context of Turkey, leaders with high PWR scores like him mostly desire to touch, change, or influence other people or political events. Leaders with average scores on this trait typically prefer to take the risk of running their ideas or strongly by their opinions. Leaders with high scores on PWR, like Erbakan, desire to be seen as winners and wish to receive any positive compliments and credit to themselves alone. Depending on the context, these leaders have little regard for the people or groups surrounding them in the political universe. Leaders with high scores on PWR are good at analyzing situations and determining the right political strategies to achieve their political goals. In analyzing the elements influencing the political environment, they only trust their potential and reason, and never give priority to the significance of others' influence and power in shaping the political environment. For leaders like Erbakan, only the individual spirit can play a role in drawing the boundaries in the political sphere.

Conceptual Complexity (CC)

As a leadership trait, 'Conceptual Complexity', CC, is the degree of differentiation that a leader indicates in perceiving, describing, or analyzing a specific issue or people in the political environment from various angles. Erbakan's scores on CC appear low in comparison to those leaders from the norming group including the 6 politicians from

Turkey and 284 international leaders. Leaders with low scores on CC interpret different political situations, positions, or actors based on the fixed categories in their minds, rather than focusing on wider and more flexible perspectives to understand what happened and why. Since these types of leaders do not seek to determine all the possible angles from which a political context might be evaluated, defined, or studied, they typically disregard any ambiguity in the political sphere. Leaders with low CC scores are inclined to perceive anything in the political environment including ideas, people, tools, objects, and places in 'black and white' terms. Therefore, they do not tend to receive a wide range of incoming information from the political environment or examine a large set of data before making a decision. On the contrary, the decision-making process for these leaders, works within their limited categorization scheme, through which they split the contextual data into fixed groups in order to make a decision. The decision-making mechanism of such leaders operates with restricted stimuli, time, and categories.

Self-Confidence (SC)

The scores of Necmettin Erbakan on 'Self-Confidence', SC, fall within the average of 284 international leaders, and below that of 6 leaders from Turkey. Erbakan's low scores on SC in the context of Turkey indicate that he allocates less importance to his self-perception and image concerning his ability to control the political environment, including the people, objects, and other concepts related to the world of politics. Leaders with low self-confidence scores like Erbakan might place others' interpretations at the core of their perception in defining, evaluating, and analyzing the political world. While these leaders are always very open open to receive any external output and stimuli to understand others' opinions, feelings and wishes. For such leaders, listening to the advice of those close to them is always necessary when deciding how to act in a specific situation. Leaders like Erbakan, therefore, are in a constant inclination to search for any incoming information and always need to obtain such data to handle a political situation they experience for a certain time.

In other words, leaders with low scores on SC evaluate the situations in which they find themselves and make decisions with the advice of those close to them. This tendency makes leaders with low scores in SC inconsistent actors in the world of politics. Leaders with low scores in this trait are never happy to be themselves with

Table 8. Necmettin Erbakan's Personality Traits in Comparison to Two Reference Groups

LTA Characteristics	Necmettin Erbakan's scores	Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	0.34 Moderate – Moderate	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05
The Need for Power (PWR)	0.28 High – Moderate	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.52 Low – Low	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06
Self-Confidence (SC)	0.30 Low – Moderate	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10
Task Focus (TASK)	0.52 Low	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07
In-group Bias (IGB)	0.13 Moderate – Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Distrust of Others (DIS)	0.14 High - Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06

Source: For Turkish leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003)

** If a score falls into at least one standard deviation lower/higher than the mean of the reference group, then it is evaluated as 'low/'high'

their rational inner feelings and thoughts and always care about the perspectives of others in dealing with specific political situations.

Task Orientation (TASK)

Though he appears to be moderate when compared with the norming group consisting of 284 world leaders, his scores in TASK appear to be low based on the average trait scores of the 6 Turkish leaders. When compared with his Turkish colleagues, Erbakan's low score in TASK indicates that he perceived politics as a world of opportunities full of cooperative relations with others. From such perspectives, leaders with low scores like Erbakan typically give priority to building sustainable relations with loyalty among group members and maintaining a high group spirit in order to accomplish a high morale group living in peace until their determined political ending. For this reason, have a strong desire to know and understand what group members feel, think, are interested in, and desire than other leaders with high scores on TASK because, for leaders with low scores on TASK, the people surrounding them are considered the sine-quo-non components of the political universe and therefore the main parts of politics.

This underlines that Erbakan was a responsive leader, not to the problems, but to the difficulties that might move his group back to their political aim, and to the group members' political ideas, desires, and acts. Leaders with low scores in this trait do not see their primary function as dealing with any particular problems their group faces. They politically insist on maintaining their groups spirit and recognize the group and its members as what constitutes the political world itself.

In-Group Bias (IGB)

Considering that 'In-Group Bias', IGB, represents a world-view in which a leader puts their own group at the center and perceives all other things with reference to its core position, the score of Necmettin Erbakan on this trait compared to the Turkish leaders shows that he recognized the political world as either conflictual or cooperative based on the contextual factors influencing the political situation at different periods. Leaders with such scores on IGB like Erbakan are more inclined to categorize people into groups depending on situational requirements and care about the maintenance of their

own group as separate much more than anything. Leaders like Erbakan tend to see the world through the dichotomy of ‘we and the others’, despite situational factors that let them build cooperative relationships with others. These leaders might be inclined to fix external threats or enemies trying as potential dangers to undermine their authority and destroy the status quo depending on the environment they found themselves. From this point of view, for these leaders’ politics can often be defined as a zero-sum-game in which their own group either wins or loses. On the other hand, leaders such as Erbakan might also recognize the weakness of their groups with respect to situational factors.

Distrust of Others (DIS)

Leaders whose score on ‘Distrust of Others’, DIS, fall into the higher interval than that of the Turkish leaders like Necmettin Erbakan perceive the world of politics as potentially dangerous depending on the situational and temporal factors that are influencing the environment that they inhabit. Leaders with high scores on DIS are inclined to doubt and worry about the actions and inner motives of others in a reasonable manner, which makes these leaders ready to act against any domestic or external threat that appears to undermine their authority. Such leaders are typically under stress or in constant anxiety. These leaders with a high score on DIS have been in need to protect themselves against any harm by enemies to their authority and to make them open to receiving any useful information from their friends. This perspective provides these leaders with the opportunity to make the most effective choice about the people and external stimuli obtained from them. Leaders like Erbakan are sensitive not only to people, but also to the specific subject matters in the politics they work. They require constant loyalty from their group and quickly react to any perceived criticism.

Following the interpretations of Necmettin Erbakan’s leadership traits, this research additionally links these seven characteristics to three major questions in profiling him.

4.2.1. Respecting or Challenging Constraints in the Political Environment?

In analyzing Necmettin Erbakan’s responsiveness to situational constraints, this thesis concentrates on the way the leader reacts to these restraints, either by challenging or

respecting the political environment he finds himself. To evaluate whether Erbakan is an adaptable leader towards the needs of certain political circumstances or as one opposed to responding to what is required under certain political circumstances during specific time periods, this thesis take his scores on beliefs in one's own ability to control events and need for power (BACE and PWR).

As explained in the Methodology Chapter, leaders who score high on both traits (BACE and PWR) are typically considered leaders that tend to take charge of the political situation and force the limits to accomplish their goals. Conversely, those with low scores on both traits recognize they need to work within the legal limitations and situational constraints in politics; and typically seek consensus-based relationships based on the interests of the constituents.

When leaders with moderate scores on BACE are unable to recognize any inappropriate parameters that structure certain political periods, they unsurprisingly prefer to respect the situational factors by which the political environment is shaped and build working relationships with others in order to achieve whatever they politically desire as a goal for that specific period. However, in times when moderate leaders on BACE such as Erbakan find any unwanted restrictions, particularly in the leadership roles, they typically tend to challenge them. Their reactions against the limitations they perceive as unfounded generally do not require them to take the initiative. Rather than find themselves in a risky position, leaders like Erbakan allow other people take the first step so as to have them shoulder the responsibility. They are not the type of leader to react to any constraints without testing the results of their potential actions parallel to their ideas in a specific situation.

Necmettin Erbakan's moderate scores in BACE and high scores in PWR in comparison to the norming group of Turkish leaders, however, indicate that he is most likely challenged by the limitations he faced in certain political circumstances. Whether Erbakan confronts the constraints in a direct manner or behind the scenes is largely determined by the nature of the political contexts he found himself. In other words, the political situation Erbakan experiences at a specific time and political dynamics inclines him to influence the environment and have control either in a direct or indirect manner. Hence, for Erbakan, contextual elements play an important role in determining how they challenge politics. This suggests that such leaders' attitudes

towards different political cases are generally shaped by contextual dynamics unique to certain situations. Leaders like Erbakan prefer to be sure about the possible consequences of their actions or decisions before they make them. In providing sufficient information to know what will work, Erbakan-type leaders like to test the limits before taking an action toward their goals.

4.2.2. Open or Closed to Contextual Information?

As suggested in the literature, political leaders are distinguished from each other based on their degree of openness to any incoming information received from the environment in which they live. While some leaders are in a constant need and desire to receive all the relevant information from both the people surrounding them and from other constituents of the political world within a specific time in order to make a decision on a certain issue, others are extremely closed to any external input. Between these two extremes, leaders who selectively utilize the information coming from external sources can also be found. To understand whether (and if so, to what degree) Necmettin Erbakan was open to contextual information from the people and environment itself in his decision-making process, the connection between the two leadership traits self-confidence (SC) and conceptual complexity (CC) needs to be analyzed.

Erbakan's low score on SC indicates that he prefers external input from others and the political environment, and likes to assess the political situations he finds themselves in, within its own limitations and parameters with the help of the external stimuli they receive from outside.

In comparison to both two reference groups of the research, Erbakan's low CC level indicates that he is less likely to be a leader from the reference groups with regard to the degree he describes, understands, and analyzes a specific political issue by taking different factors and influential elements into consideration from different points of view. Unlike the reference groups of the world and Turkish leaders, leaders with low scores on this trait tend to filter events and reasons in the political universe from a black-and-white perspective. The major underlying reason is the fixed categories in their minds through which all aspects of the political environment (including the role of its actions, the means, and ends, the instruments, strategies, political objects, etc.)

make sense for them. This means that for leaders with low CC scores there may be little ambiguity in the world of politics. Contextual information coming from the political environment has great significance for such leaders with low CC levels. They make their decisions by filtering and categorizing these data while determining how to act.

Compared to the 284 world leaders' and 6 Turkish leaders' averages in SC and CC, Necmettin Erbakan might be considered a leader with low scores in both SC and CC. This presents a leader profile that is less responsive to the ideas, feelings, desires, demands, and needs of others and one that is less capable of seeing political situations from different perspectives. Leaders like Erbakan tend to be closed to any contextual information coming from the environment; rather, they suggest that they know what, why, and how they do it and do not need to change it. Therefore, they mostly need to convince others of the appropriateness of their perspectives and actions. When faced with any political problems or difficulties, they typically claim that it is not due to their actions, but due to the situational factors that played a role in shaping them. These leaders act towards determined political ends, and to reach these political goals, they employ some principles and strategies.

4.2.3. Motivated by Problem or Relationship?

In questioning the motives of political leaders, Hermann's account is followed to answer the specific question of whether leaders are driven by either task or relational focus. In the framework of this study, while the former type refers to any particular problem, ideology, effect, or concern, the latter indicates the leaders' need and desire to receive input from those in their political environment. To analyze what motivates political leaders, this thesis concentrates on three leadership traits: Task focus (TASK), in-group bias (IGB), and general distrust of others (DIS). The TASK presents the former type of focus, and a combination of the IGB and DIS presents the latter type.

Necmettin Erbakan's scores on TASK fall one standard deviation lower than the means of the norming groups. Leaders like Erbakan who have low scores on TASK versus interpersonal focus are most likely to view politics as a world in which they can build cooperative relations. Rather than giving priority to dealing with the problem they encounter, these leaders tend to keep the group spirit higher as their determined

political end. Therefore, leaders like Erbakan are always said to receive as many external stimuli the others and the environment as to ensure that all their group members live in peace and happiness. Thus, the ideas, feelings, desires, and demands of the people surrounding the leader are of great significance to leaders like Erbakan. Creating better conditions for their groups requires loyalty for leaders with low scores on TASK. These leaders' major concern, therefore, is centered on keeping the group spirit and morale high as a fundamental part of the political universe. Erbakan's low score on TASK represents his sensitivity to his group members' opinions, actions, demands, and desires.

In addition, leaders with moderate scores in 'in-group-bias' (IGB) like Necmettin Erbakan are likely either to place their groups in the center and perceive the world with reference to their group position or to build good relationship with other parties depending on the situational factors. The main concern for such leaders might be the maintenance of their groups. Leaders with moderate scores on IGB are not inclined to see the world and people in 'black and white' terms and not expectedly more likely to categorize people around them either as friends or enemies. Rather, they are able to confront the weaknesses or wrongs of their own groups. From these leaders' perspectives, their emotional attachment does not imprison them to their groups, and leaders with moderate scores as Erbakan can easily position themselves separately from their groups and put their own individuality to the front, if it is required with regard to the situational elements in the political environment.

Furthermore, leaders with high scores in 'distrust of others', DIS, with reference to the Turkish norming groups of the research see politics as a world full of dangers based on the role the contextual factors play in shaping a specific situation in a certain time period in the political history of Turkey. Leaders with a high level of 'distrust of others' question fear the actions, behaviors, and feelings of other politicians. This enables them to be ready for any potential attack that might come from domestic or international forces. Leaders like Erbakan, therefore, cannot act within the political sphere without being suspicious about the behaviors, motives, or ideas of others. These leaders are always ready to confront any danger that threatens to undermine their political power and makes them skeptical of those that they work alongside.

The correlation of these two leadership traits, IGB and DIS, illustrates that Necmettin Erbakan was motivated by external threats and problems in the political environment. The focus of Erbakan's scores on both traits can be considered as dealing with and eliminating real or perceived threats and problems depending on the context-specific variables and elements influencing the environment for specific time periods in the history of politics. Leaders like Erbakan are more likely to recognize politics as a world of war in which people struggle with both threats and problems. For such leaders, building conflictual relationships with others is necessary to remain politically powerful. The eyes of these leaders including Erbakan are relatively more vulnerable to any potential threats to their authority and political position. Therefore, they are motivated by problem-oriented drives depending upon several situational factors influencing the political environment they are confronted with.

4.3. Analyzing Necmettin Erbakan's Leadership Profile in Context

In analyzing the leaders' profile, in most cases, the specific context is crucial. For an in-depth understanding of the possible influential role of the context on the personalities and behaviors of political leaders, this section focuses on the different contexts for Erbakan and tests the quantitative data derived from the empirical analysis in a case study. In profiling Erbakan in context, both the quantitative and qualitative data have been focused on ascertaining adequate answers to the research questions of this study.

In this study, Necmettin Erbakan's leadership profile is analyzed within two different contexts: the post-modern coup in 1997, February 28 (case 1), and the closure case of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court in 1998 (case 2). These two cases have been selected to determine how Erbakan responded to various situational constraints. The question of whether Erbakan challenges or respects contextual changes are analyzed through a systematic examination of his scores in both cases. Based on the hypothesis that 'the leader appears to be responsive to the situations, if his/her scores change as the contexts change', this study concentrates on whether or not Erbakan's leadership traits scores remain stable across two major situational changes experienced in Turkish politics in 1997 and 1998. Considering the leader-oriented political history of Turkey,

it appears meaningful to study politics from an agent-centered perspective, to question a leader's probable political behavior in certain contexts, and to examine whether contextual factors influence leaders as individual actors.

While measuring the seven leadership traits of Erbakan, his scores across the pre and post periods of Case1 and Case2 were focused on and compared with regard to the scores between the general profile and its application in the cases, for different periods within the same case, and in different cases. While forming his profile, Erbakan is assessed over seven leadership traits and whether these remain stable during before and after periods for both case 1 and 2. The reference for such analysis is the general leadership profile of Necmettin Erbakan, as explained in detail in the previous chapter. The essential question in this section is whether such a general profile is applicable in these two circumstances or not. The following sections highlight and assess differences on certain traits of Erbakan in detail and describe its implications in the determined context of this study.

4.3.1. Case Study 1: February 28

4.3.1.1. Historical Background

The post-modern coup in 1997, February 28 refers to the decisions issued by the Turkish military at a National Security Council meeting regarding secularism and political Islam in Turkey to the government, resulting in the resignation of Erbakan and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - RP), and ending the coalition government. It is scholarly accepted in the literature that what Turkey experienced on February 28 is a process that began earlier but has had a lasting impact on Turkish politics (Ozbudun and Hale, 2009; Dagı, 2005; Jenkins, 2003; Tanıyıcı, 2003).⁵

⁵ The leaders from the political and military scenes of Turkey have repeatedly re-confirmed such a thesis in their speeches and interviews. Bülent Ecevit, for instance, has inevitably certified that the process was still realized when he declared in summer 2000 that 'they work in accordance with the National Security Council Decision on February 28 in justifying the legislative decree that necessitates the firing of those 'operating destructively or divisively, intending to modify, to eliminate, or to engage in activities contrary to any of the characteristics of the Republic.'⁵ Tansu Çiller, a few years later at the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission meeting, defined February 28 as "a process spreading over a period, the starting date of which was not exactly February, 28 and maybe even lasted until after the AKP won the elections in 2002". Undoubtedly, the declaration by Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the Turkish Military Chief of Staff, that "February 28 is a process [that] will last a thousand years, if necessary" has been the most memorable one among all similar ones.

Looking back to the early years of RP's success, March 1994 witnessed the RP's largest share of the vote in the local elections, through which the party took the control of several of the largest cities in Turkey, including Istanbul and Ankara. This increasing trend of RP continued into the general elections of December 25, 1995, in which it became the largest party in the Turkish Parliament with 21.38 % of the votes and 158 seats in the Assembly. It was followed by the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi - ANAP) with 19.65 % and 132 seats, DYP with 19.18 % and 135 seats, and the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi - DSP) with 14.64 % and 76 seats. The two most prominent parties in the history of Turkey, CHP and MHP received only 10.70 % and 8.18 % of the total votes, respectively, with MHP staying under the threshold.

With its two major victories at the election box in 1994 and 1995, the RP marked a significant break in Turkish history based on its major success in comparison with that of its predecessors. As the final representative of an uninterrupted Islamist tradition of the 'national outlook' following the National Order Party and National Salvation Party, this success of the RP with its Islamist roots brought about deep discussions in the political arena about the revival of the Islamist outlook and values.

The year 1996 witnessed surprises at the political level. Following Erbakan's appointment as Prime Minister on June 28 in 1996, the dismissal of around six hundred religious officers was on the agenda of the Supreme Military Council meeting in July of that year. When the first Military Council was convened under the Presidency of Erbakan in August, 13 officers were expelled from the army on the grounds of fundamentalism. While the tension between the military elites and Erbakan was increasing, Erbakan was busy establishing closer ties between Turkey and other Muslim majority countries.

In October 1996, Erbakan embarked on a series of visits to Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria. Kaddafi's criticism of Turkey in a press conference in which both the Libyan and Turkish leaders were in attendance inevitably attracted the attention of and was criticized by the Turkish press and opposition.⁶ Though Erbakan responded to

⁶ "It is normal that Kurds are detached in Libya, Iraq, Iran and everywhere. Nobody can reach anything by waging war against the nations which want to obtain freedom. Turkey tried it. Arabs also went to

Kaddafi's criticism, stating that, 'Turkey's current laws and our Constitution do not make any racial discriminations; therefore, there is no racism and gender discrimination in Turkey. However, there is an issue, terrorism', and such explanations did not recover from being subjected to criticism. Such comments and closer ties with Muslim countries only heightened the tension for the RP and Erbakan in Turkey.

Moreover, within Turkey, a new opposition began in the streets. September 1996 witnessed, for instance, the protests of dozens of Aczmendîs with beards, robes, and staffs in their hands shouting "we want the Shari'a" in Ankara's Kocatepe Mosque. While 113 Aczmendîs were arrested at the end of the day, their demonstrations were on the front page of all the major newspapers. In the international arena, Erbakan established new economic ties and cooperation among major Muslim countries. During a Conference on "Cooperation for Development", on October 1996, Erbakan took the first steps towards the establishment of a coalition among 8 Muslim countries, called the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8 Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatı), represented by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. Until the D-8 official announcement by the Summit of Heads of State in Istanbul in 1997 (Istanbul Declaration), a series of preparatory meetings took place, in which the objectives, organs, and areas of cooperation of the D-8 were clearly defined. The objectives of D-8 was identified as to "improve developing countries' positions in the world economy, diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making at the international level, and provide better standards of living".

In November 1996, another scandal occurred in a traffic accident outside the town of 'Susurluk' in Turkey's West that revealed connections among the mafia, politicians, and State officers. Three of the four passengers died: "Huseyin Kocadag, a former captain in the Special Operations Unit, a government anti-terrorist unit; Abdullah Çatlı, an escapee from a Swiss prison searched by Interpol; and his girlfriend". Sedat Bucak, a True Path Party Member of Parliament for the city of Urfa, survived. The local police, moreover, publicly announced that various weapons and other equipment

war in the region like the Kurds and ensured their future. Kurdistan should be established. This nation must take place under the sun of the Middle East, too. Turkey's future is not in tormenting the Kurds, in NATO, and bases of America, but in its nobility and history." Retrieved 21 December 2016 from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=latK5GE3C5w>

of the Interior Ministry were found in the car. Further investigations revealed that Çatlı's two diplomatic passports were signed by the Interior Minister of the DYP. Çatlı refused to provide a detailed explanation for national security reasons but resigned from his post in the following days. Doubts and concerns regarding the accuracy of the report prepared by the National Intelligence Agency about the Susurluk affair resulted in Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's having the President of Prime Ministry Inspection Board, Kutlu Savaş, begin a new Susurluk report and in the establishment of the Susurluk Research Commission in the Turkish General National Assembly.

While the close relations between the government actors and mafia became apparent, 'the movement of being in the dark without light' started as a civil society initiative under the slogan 'a-minute-darkness for constant brightness' and extended to several cities and regions of Turkey. Though the people demonstrated their reactions against such relations, the comments of Erbakan and some of his party members focused on the absurdity of this initiative. The words of the Minister of Justice, Şevket Kazan, "these people (who turn off their lights to take part in the protests) are playing 'candle went out' (referring to an Alevi tradition)" were intensely criticized and resulted in his being accused of being a provocateur at the societal level. (Milliyet, 13 February 1997). The critical statements of the RP members were not limited to one case. In the following weeks, in November 1996, another RP member in his speech at the Provincial Court Meeting of the party stated that "don't think I'm secular because I look fancy. I've attended a ceremony today due to official duties. Maybe the prime minister, ministers, and lawmakers have some obligations. However, you do not have any obligation. As a Welfare Political Party sided if I stay alone on earth, this outrage must be changed. This outdated layout which regards people as slaves must be changed definitely. O Muslims! Beware of your ambition, resentment, and hatred, and do not skimp on this belief. It is our binding duty" (Hürriyet, 10 October 1997).

At the end of 1996, the Chief of Staff stated in one of his speeches that "confusion over the concept of secularism is being created. The purpose is to drag the country into the darkness of the Middle Ages by changing the secular democratic order. This is not acceptable." (Author's Translation) (Milliyet, 25 December 1996). His declarations received public attention discontent among the Armed Forces became apparent.

What occurred in 1996 did not only precipitate discussions concerning relations between the mafia and the State but also highlighted relations with women in religious cults. Towards the end of the year, the Aczmendîs' leader, Müslüm Gündüz, was found hiding naked with a young woman, Fadime Şahin. Müslüm Gündüz claimed that she was his third wife in accordance with the religious rules of marriage. (Milliyet, 30 December 1996). This and similar relations in 'religious cults' became front page news, and were used as a tool to enlighten these relations within religious orders. The media saw it as a means by which to highlight the corruption within the religious lifestyles sects and another way of informing the public about the threat of religious fundamentalism.

In terms of the legislature and parliamentary work, 1997 began in a different way. In the early days of January, the "Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center Regulation" came into force upon publication in the Official Gazette (Government Gazette, 9 January 1997). This was criticized by Erbakan and the party members because when compared to enacted regulations, the right to speak and the degree of General Staff and the National Security Council were increased in crisis management, which indirectly created the impression that Erbakan could have the right to speak alone in crisis management. Due to the Regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers Decision dated September 30, 1996, the basis of the established Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center has two fundamental considerations: (i) to be designed as "the top-level decision and coordination organ which would serve temporarily, established according to the size and type of crisis", and (ii) According to the first article of Regulation, to direct preparation and activities to finalize the crisis process according to national interests and to ensure the crisis is finalized with minimum damage by coordination, cooperation, speed and efficiency between the General Staff, relevant Ministry, institution and organizations.⁷ The concern of the party members in the DYP in response to the party increased. A group of DYP members who resigned formed a new party called the 'Democratic Turkey Party' (Demokratik Türkiye Partisi-DTP) in January 1997. The reactions from different segments to Erbakan's government continued to be voiced in the streets. In Ankara, the "Protect Turkey! Struggle for

⁷ For more information, retrieved 22 December 2006 from <http://eprints.sdu.edu.tr/828/1/TS00888.pdf>

democratization" march and meeting were organized by the Confederation of Turk-İş with the participation of over eighty-thousand people.

The year 1997 brought many developments and political decisions for Erbakan and the RP members. Following a series of events surrounding the Aczmendi cult that reached the media, the volume of news regarding cults and fundamentalism in Turkey increased during the first weeks of 1997 in the written and visual media. Disregarding the media, Erbakan invited 51 religious and congregational leaders to breakfast in the Prime Minister's Residence in January. One newspaper responded to this meeting by stating, "this meal was found wrong as it is held during a time when the particular sects of Islam and secularism perspectives were questioned by military and judicial circles" (Sabah, 11 January 1997). In the following days, Erbakan prepared a draft law that defined the 'Authorized Human Rights Undersecretaries' which could control the public and private sector and the military without the need for permission from any organ. That drafted law set forth 469 inspectors' staff with title of "Democracy Inspectors", who were authorized with broad powers to investigate and impeachment of proceedings as "fully authorized" regarding the "notice and claims" about the human rights violations besides the right of 'ex-official auditing the prisons. As a first step, it was returned by the State Minister Fehim Adak; however, it was forwarded to the Presidency of the Assembly in the following weeks (Milliyet, 15 January 1997).

In early 1997, the military forces were responsive to the threat of fundamentalism continuously processed in the media, and held a meeting in Gölcük in which the subject was discussed for 3 days. The high court also signed several decisions in the first month of 1997. For example, the Council of State rejected a decree of the Council of Ministers which set forth the reorganization of the working hours of civil servants during Ramadan since it violated the grounds of the secularism principle of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor issued a warning to the RP that it was behaving contrary to the law of political parties. The chief prosecutor of the period, Vural Savaş argued that "Erbakan was carrying the country to war" (Haber 7, 27 February 2013) All these political developments aside, undoubtedly one of the most important developments of the year was the demand of the Secretary General of National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu - MGK) General İlhan Kılıç, National Intelligence Agency Undersecretary Sönmez Köksal, and Chief of Staff

İsmail Hakkı Karadayı to visit Süleyman Demirel to negotiate political developments on the agenda, especially fundamentalism. In the first month of the year, the relationship between the armed forces and the higher judicial organs, regarding the legislature was decreasing, in the same period when Ankara province Sincan Mayor from the RP Bekir Yıldız organized a special Jerusalem night to protest Israel raised the tension even more. In his speech at night, he defended the 'headscarf' and pilgrimage, and claimed that the headscarf is a 'banner of honor' for Muslims. In addition to this speech of Bekir, the Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Reza Baghari who was attending that night as a guest stated that "they declared the United States and Israel as their enemy and they called for sharia", which led to major criticism. CHP leader Deniz Baykal argued that Baghari had no right to interfere in Turkey's domestic politics and emphasized "I call the Minister of Foreign Affairs to duty. an Immediate response should be articulated and Turkey must demonstrate its attitude". His party organized an event attended by around two thousand people to protest the speeches made during the night organized by the Municipality of Sincan. In this context, CHP Secretary General Adnan Keskin stated that the "mentality in Sincan is reversing the secular and democratic processes" and accused Erbakan and the Refah Party.

These developments were followed by an investigation launched by the State Security Court (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi-DGM). the Mayor of Sincan, Yıldız, was detained by anti-terror teams in Ankara DGM, where he came to give his defense; in his defense, he said that as Ankara Metropolitan Mayor Melih Gökçek told in the county council meeting had said 'you will not have asphalt anymore', he expressed that he had invited Iranian Ambassador that night "to develop relationships in order to supply asphalt from Iran."⁸ However, he was dismissed within a short time from his work as the sharia propaganda was performed at the night.⁹ The Iranian Ambassador Bagheri, who was criticized after his speech in the Jerusalem night event, was invited by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Deputy Ambassador Ali Tuygan to his office and rebuked Bagheri's call for Sharia in Turkey. He was later withdrawn by Iran.¹⁰

⁸ Retrieved December 22, 2016 from

http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/CoRms_x2F_ihINUM6vM2TtsU5g_x3D__x3D_

⁹ Retrieved December 21, 2016 from

http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/LQM3OtpVwA7uoZIAN2n3vg_x3D__x3D_

¹⁰ Retrieved December 18, 2016 from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=214302>

Before the organization of the Jerusalem night by a municipality of the Welfare Party and before all the developments around the incident, Prime Minister Erbakan thought that “both the Army and Demirel are content with their government.” A meeting to discuss the political regulations of the country, mainly the military fundamentalism, was held after the Jerusalem night event. Turkish journalist, Murat Yetkin states the following in relation to the February 28 process: “Around the afternoon I received a phone call from a politician that stayed out of the Assembly and had good relations with the army. He told me that the army was up to a movement and there could be an action towards Sincan. After a few phone calls with military sources, we decided to send a few camera crews to Sincan without knowing what was seriously about to happen.”

The attack by the Prime Minister’s voluntary guard, Recep Gülmez, on InterStar reporter Işın Gürel, who was watching the dismantling of a tent in Sincan, was a hot discussion on the social media agenda. Though it was heard the noises of tanks of the Etimesgut Armor School and Training Division Command on the next day, it was stated that a Team of Tank Complex with around 20 tanks, 15 carriers, a military jeep, and rheas was performing a motorized march towards the Raider Base within the training order that they received and that they would return after their “maneuver military exercise” (Sabah, 5 February 1997; Milliyet, 5 February 1997). After this show of strength of the Turkish Armed Forces, Chief of Staff Second Deputy General Çevik Bir stated “we have done a balance setting to democracy”, and his words received support from CHP, DYP, ANAP and MHP (Milliyet, 20 February 1997:17).

Parallel with Turkish Armed Forces' (TSK) reactions, the dialogues between President Süleyman Demirel and Erbakan were not as pleasant as Erbakan had stated. The frequency of their meetings decreased considerably, which was covered in the media with headings like “It seems that Erbakan and Demirel are angry with each other” (Milliyet, 10 February 1997:15). Moreover, Demirel emphasized that there was “uneasiness” and he was setting his clear attitude in relation to the topics he thought required it. For example, in his Ramadan speech, he criticized the RP without mentioning any names, as follows: “My neutral position towards political parties should not be misunderstood. I support the secular republic. There is no coercion in

Islam. Those who are trying to make religion politics are sinning” (Milliyet, 9 February 1997:1).

There were statements of the President in meetings with journalists, such as “Democracy is a fair game. The game has rules... No commission is trying to change secularism and modernity will have a long life” were printed in the newspapers (Milliyet, 24 February 1997: 16). During this period, Demirel chose to warn Erbakan both implicitly and explicitly. A letter that he personally wrote to Erbakan to underline that, “the tendencies of radical Islamic ideas should be banned from leaking to the government offices. Schools, local governments, universities, judiciary, and Armed Forces should be protected”, was published in the newspaper (Sabah, 1 March 2006). This letter was considered important even starting from that day for those who examine the era. This written warning can be viewed as an example of the incredibly strained communication between Erbakan and Demirel.

The presidents of the Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) and Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen (TESK) united their voices on February 1997 and stated that “drug-related gangs are trying to seize the Government and illegal organizations based on the exploitation of people's religious feelings” were increasing the depression upon which they headed to the Mansion. They visited the First Commander of Army General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu and the Istanbul State Security Court (Milliyet, 27 February 1997).

During the same period, in the political arena, the DSP and the CHP were proposing no-confidence motions to the Assembly against the secular democratic regime threats. The Turkish National Assembly rejected the motions; however, Vice President and Foreign Affairs Minister Tansu Çiller stated in delivering her speech during her party’s group meeting at the Assembly that “the assurance of secularity, the republic... is the people. The State is secure, and it is the assurance of religion and consciousness freedom.” This was enough to suppress the uneasiness within the party. One day before the National Security Council meeting, President Demirel invited two top representatives of the legislative process, the President of Assembly Mustafa Kalemli and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, discuss the agenda. It was stated in the media that Erbakan, who remained upbeat after the meeting, told his staff officers “We need

to reduce the tension; avoid speeches that will cause tensions” (Author’s Translation) (Milliyet, 27 February 1997: 16).

In the National Security Council monthly meeting conducted on February 28, 1997, under the presidency of the President and the participation of the Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior Affairs, the Joint Chiefs, General Commander of the Gendarmerie, and the National Security Council General Secretary, reactionary movements and declarations that threatened the regime and the public’s fear for them were discussed. It was agreed that the assessments had four basic conclusions: (i) The groups that aim to found a Sharia State in Turkey within the Islamic Republic rules pose a threat as the Constitution states ‘a multifaceted threat toward our democratic, secular, and social law state; (ii) Religionist groups that oppose the republic and regime are trying to weaken the democratic, secular, and social law state by the difference between secular and anti-secular; (iii) Secularity is not only a regime in Turkey but is also the assurance of peace of democracy and society, and is a lifestyle; (iv) The State cannot give up social law state and justice principles that constitute the identity of the state, and the laws cannot be ignored. Leaving the actions of reactionaries non-followed does not comply with the principle of the superiority of law.”¹¹

In light of these assessments, two basic points were determined: (i) 18 precaution subjects decided for the purpose of “intervention in the groups that aim to found a Sharia State in Turkey within the Islamic Republic rules” should be implemented in short, medium, and long terms and the Council of Ministries should be informed about it; (ii) In accordance with 2945 issued by the MGK and the MGK General Secretary Legislation, the MGK General Secretary should determine the decisions of the Council of Ministries as to those subjects whether they will be implemented or not, or to what extent and inform the Prime Minister, President, and the MGK.¹²

The MGK decisions determined on February 28 were neither the beginning nor the end of the process, but it was a historical moment caused by the political and economic dynamics and developments of that era. After a 5-day resistance, Erbakan was forced

¹¹ Retrieved December 21, 2016 from <http://t24.com.tr/media/editorials/files/406.pdf>

¹² *ibid*

to sign these decisions. For the implementation of the decisions of February 28, which is a cornerstone in Turkish political history, a related committee was established.

4.3.1.2 Contextualizing Erbakan's Leadership Profile

A comparison of Necmettin Erbakan's scores during interviews held until February, 28 in 1997, with those occurring afterwards constitutes the first case through which Erbakan's profile is contextualized. The comparison with pre and post cases indicates that three of Erbakan's leadership traits out of seven changed across this case. ; these traits being a belief in the ability to control events (BACE), the need for power (PWR), and self-confidence (SC). Despite the differences between the pre and post-case scores of Erbakan on conceptual complexity (CC), task focus (TASK), and distrust of other (DIS), the change in Erbakan's scores for these traits do not fall into one standard deviation higher or lower than the means of the norming group of Turkish leaders. The significance tests approve this point. For the other traits—BACE (from 0.38 at pre-case to 0.29 at post-case with a standard deviation 0.03), PWR (from 0.29 to 0.27 with a standard deviation 0.02) and SC (from 0.34 to 0.26 with a standard deviation 0.06), the change in scores represent at least one standard deviation, and statistically significant differences in comparison implying that the situational factors and elements might influence the leaders' actions and attitudes towards the case. Based on the changing scores of these three traits, the general leadership profile of Necmettin Erbakan described in the previous section seems to be hardly applicable to him under the conditions of the first case. Table 9 shows Erbakan's scores on each trait in general, for the period until (pre-case period) and after 28 February 1997 (post-case period). The general scores on each trait underline how Necmettin Erbakan was likely to act politically as a leader under normal conditions. Erbakan's scores indicated for the pre- and the post-case periods describe the output when such general data is put into the context that provides it with a perspective.

To evaluate the scores in Table-2, the differences between Erbakan's score on the aforementioned three traits -BACE, PWR, and SC- until and after the case periods as well as their implications are explained in detail below.

On the ‘belief one can control events’ (BACE) trait, the difference in Erbakan’s score during the pre and the post-case periods of February 28 indicates that his personal sense of control over events in the political sphere changed significantly in different contexts. While his score on this trait increases to 0.38 before February 28, it decreases significantly to 0.29 afterward. Focusing on the time that the case had happened, the difference between Erbakan’s pre and post- case period scores on BACE reflect an explicit change with more than one and a half standard deviations for both reference groups of leaders from Turkey and around the world. For the pre-case period, Erbakan’s scores appear to be higher by almost three standard deviations than the means of the first reference group, and nearly twice as high as that of the second. This indicates that Erbakan was more involved in the policy-making process in the pre-February28 period since he had stronger beliefs to take control over the political events. His desire to actively take part in decision-making was much more than he would have later. Furthermore, he was more in favor of taking responsibility and risk to seize the initiative on a specific issue if he thought the political conditions in which he found himself required him to act. He, moreover, may be considered a leader who was more likely to take control, but less likely to share success close to their political actions in certain contexts at specific times. During the post-case period, Erbakan’s scores on BACE, however, exhibit a sharp decrease from 0.38 to 0.29. This is because he became more respectful of contextual parameters since, to some extent; he his ability to influence political events was shaken. That is, based on his changing self-perception, Erbakan transformed into a leader who perceived himself as less effective and less capable of shaping Turkish politics under certain circumstances. Moreover, he became more inclined to take less risk by loading the risk of any decisions onto the shoulders of others, who might take the blame if things went wrong. Instead of taking quick decisions, Erbakan appeared to be less active in taking steps unless he was sure of its political success.

Another leadership trait of Necmettin Erbakan, the score of which changed over time, is “The Need for Power’, PWR”. While Erbakan’s pre-February28 scores on this trait are seemingly high with reference to other Turkish leaders, his post-case score remains in the average interval of that of this norming group. The general score of Erbakan on PWR, 0.28, slightly increases to 0.29 during the pre-case period, but decreases to the same extent to 0.27 during the post-case period. This indicates that while Erbakan had

a relatively strong desire to change or influence political situations, others surrounding him and the political environment itself before February 28, and his sensitivity and responsiveness level had more or less decreased. This underlines that, as expected, Erbakan changed as a leader with regard to his desire to influence the people and political environment before and after confronting the February 28 process. That is, confrontation with such a military restraint made him less likely to take responsibility or the risk of running his political opinions. His decreasing scores compared to his pre-case scores on PWR demonstrate that he became more likely to share the responsibility of any political actions for certain time periods rather than be willing to take all the credit. This also reveals the changing self-perception of Erbakan in the pre and post-case periods. While his higher score on PWR during the pre-case period mirrors his higher tendency to position himself closer to the core of the political world, his lower score in the post-February28 term shows that he gives more weight to that of his group than himself and utilized the power of a collective spirit rather than that of the individual. In both the pre and the post-case periods, Erbakan's scores on PWR remain within the average interval compared to that of both reference groups including the 284 international leaders and 6 Turkish leaders. This reflects how self-recognition and political attitudes towards certain cases occurring in specific time periods might differ from one another depending upon the situational elements unique to the time that the leaders experience them.

Another leadership trait score that statistically changed more than at least one standard deviation across time within this context is 'Self-Confidence', SC. Whilst Erbakan's general score is 0.30, representing the low interval of the group of Turkish leaders, this increases by 0.04 points to 0.34 in the pre-case period (more than half the standard deviation) and decreases by the same amount (0.04) to 0.26 in the post-case period. This reflects a difference of 0.08 points between Necmettin Erbakan's scores during the pre- and the post- case periods, which represent more than one standard deviation (0.07) for the former norming group and more than half a standard deviation for the latter one. This shows that Necmettin Erbakan's perception of himself and his ability to handle situations changed over time within different contexts.

Compared to his post-February28 scores, Erbakan's pre-case scores on this trait suggest that he was inclined to care less about having as many external stimuli as

possible before February 28. He was, in other words, relatively less concerned in what others thought or felt. Instead, he was more likely to be content with his own personal assessment and behave in accordance with his own reasoning and principles to accomplish political ends. Therefore, his actions seemed to be more consistent with his own way of thinking and his political standpoint.

Erbakan's SC score significantly decreased after February, 28 in 1997. This is because he became less satisfied with who he was and he began to require more information coming from the environment to make the most appropriate political decision depending on the contextual factors of that time. Focusing on the self-other orientation of Erbakan, his main focus had changed from himself to others' feelings, ideas, demands, and wishes and he became more open to situational data.

4.3.1.3. Discussion of Erbakan's Response to the February 28

A comparison of Erbakan's scores during the pre-February 28 period with those of the post-period suggests that he had changed his style since he (and his party) witnessed this case. This is largely confirmed by the changing scores in BACE, PWR, and SC in the empirical analysis. The questions of 'how' and 'to what extent' are discussed separately for each trait below.

For the pre-February 28 period, Erbakan preferred to be active in decision-making processes, particularly during the successful years of the elections of 1994 and 1995 and his term of office as prime minister between 1996 and 1997. His desire to strengthen the dialog and ties with other Muslim countries and his visits to those countries -despite criticisms from the General Staff and the media- can be interpreted as exemplifying this preference. As a major actor in the political decision-making process the pre-case period, Erbakan's belief in having control over political events and decision-making plays an important role in his behavior. For example, despite Muammar Gaddafi's criticisms towards Turkey and the Turkish media-related criticism against Erbakan following Gaddafi's comments, Erbakan maintained his desire to strengthen economic and social relations with Muslim majority countries. This can be seen as proof of his consistency in both his political ideas and attitude

Table 9. Necmettin Erbakan's Personality Traits in the Context 1 – February 28

LTA Characteristics	Erbakan's scores (General)	Erbakan's Scores During		Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World (N=284)	Leaders
		Pre-Case 1	Post-Case 1			
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	0.34 Moderate – Moderate	0.38 High	0.29 Low	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05	
The Need for Power (PWR)	0.28 High – Moderate	0.29 High	0.27 Moderate	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05	
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.52 Low – Low	0.51 Low	0.53 Low	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06	
Self-Confidence (SC)	0.30 Low – Moderate	0.34 Low	0.26 Low	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10	
Task Focus (TASK)	0.52 Low – Low	0.53 Low	0.50 Low	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07	
In-group Bias (IGB)	0.13 Moderate – Moderate	0.13 Moderate	0.12 Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05	
Distrust of Others (DIS)	0.14 High – Moderate	0.14 High	0.14 High	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06	

Source: For Turkish leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003)

before the February 28 period. During that period, Erbakan's decisive leadership profile draws attention. Despite the serious domestic hindrances he faced, his wish to strengthen economic and social relations with Muslim countries rather than the West, as well as initiating the first steps towards the founding of the D-8 coalition -the organization for economic collaboration between the Muslim states, in which he had always believed- can be regarded as examples for this profile. These examples suggest that during the period prior to February 28, Erbakan was more in favor of taking responsibility and risks to move first on a specific issue if he thought the political conditions in which he found himself required him to act that way. Similarly, during his in-office period as prime minister, he hosted a breaking during Ramadan for the leaders of the religious cults and orders despite all the critiques against him in the media and the apparent tension between him and the Turkish Armed Forces, which he denied by describing their relationship as harmonious. He took these steps despite recognizing the risks of the possible outcomes and by taking responsibility, during a period in which the perspectives of the religious orders towards Islam and secularism were being questioned at the political, judicial, and martial levels.

For the post-February 28 period, his profile indicates that Erbakan's belief in his ability to influence political events was severely shaken. He, therefore, became more respectful to contextual parameters and focused on minimizing the risks he needed to take for any decision-making. Following the decisions of the National Security Council, Erbakan shared his promise with the Party in the group meeting that he would not sign any article that may be a cause of concern. However, he could not manifest the same determination by presenting his power to refrain from signing the decisions. This may be due to his lack of belief in his own ability to control events as it was known that he received feedback during his meeting with the general secretary of the MGK, that there was no chance of softening or changing the decisions. In addition, it was a known fact that Erbakan had met with the other leaders to find another solution; however, he was unable to find the support he was looking for. The head of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), Mustafa Kalemli, explicitly expressed in his speeches in the February 28 Sub-Commission that Erbakan wished the decisions could be discussed in the Parliament but that this chance was politically blocked by him. Within this framework, it is important to underline three main points. First, Erbakan

preferred to realize his decisions after receiving the opinions of the other leaders and from as many members of parliament as possible in order to share political responsibility and avoid making a quick and potentially fatal decision. Furthermore, it can be highlighted that he sought to take the risk of signing the February 28 decisions in a consortium, in order to thwart the opposition within his party and external threats. In this way, he tried to mitigate the risk of incurring full responsibility and so become the only person to take the fall for a disastrous decision. For this reason, Erbakan always felt the need to emphasize that “they took the MGK decisions altogether” in his speeches (Milliyet, 3 March 1997). The necessity of accentuating the harmony and the presence of consensus can be interpreted as a reflection of Erbakan’s struggle to exhibit an image of ‘there is no problem’ to his base within the party and to potential enemies outside the party. This, correspondingly, can be seen as an example of Erbakan’s respect for contextual parameters. Furthermore, Erbakan became sure that the decisions would be implemented irrespective of his behavior, at the end of the day. Therefore, his perception of himself had become ‘less effective in and less capable of shaping the political world.’

Within the framework of this study, Erbakan’s resignation on June 18 in 1997 during the post-February 28 period can be interpreted as transforming from an active figure in decision-making processes in politics to a passive one based on his self-perception within the political conjuncture of that period. The ninth President Süleyman Demirel at the February 28 Sub-Commission meeting mentions Erbakan’s resignation from the office “everything is normal. Erbakan told me that ‘there is a tension. It doesn’t look as if it will disappear; I am resigning.’ The True Path Party (DYP) Parliamentarian of that period, Hasan Ekinci, describes the day in the same sub-commission as ‘the media was also stating that ‘it was decided for Erbakan’s government to go and for a new one without the Welfare Party to be established Ekinci quotes Erbakan as having told him, ‘I will resign to realize this exchange -this conversion- on June 18.’ It might be concluded from both of these examples that Erbakan did not have any faith in himself to change his status and saw himself as a leader who failed to embody sufficient strength to change the contextual parameters and political outcomes. Needless to say, in that respect, Erbakan did not want to be exposed to the risks of staying in office as he lacked the necessary power to affect the events.

Another trait that changed significantly after the February 28 period is “the need for power – PWR.” His higher scores during the pre-February 28 period can be interpreted as indicators of Erbakan’s stronger desire in that period to influence and control others. This interpretation can be taken as an easily verifiable output of the analysis, considering his rising popularity in the 1994 and 1997 periods and the public attention he received. His rising percentage of votes, both in the local and general elections until the day he took office, is an indicator of Erbakan’s success in his desire to affect others, and in the pre-case period, it helped to reinforce this sentiment. Although Erbakan’s scores in the pre-case period are moderate compared to the 284 world leaders, they can be regarded as high when compared with the 6 Turkish leaders. Although this indicates that Erbakan adopted a more middle-of-the-road attitude compared to the world leaders, with respect to which strategy worked best to achieve his goals, it can be said that it indicates a result-driven, Machiavellian attitude and that it constructs a profile of a leader who can work behind closed doors, when compared with the Turkish leaders.

The order and the content of his talks with the DYP and ANAP demonstrate that Erbakan used his negotiation skills until the last possible minute, during his duty to establish the government, in order to understand whether it was possible to build a robust coalition government after the RP had become the largest party in the Turkish Parliament with 21.38 % of the votes and 158 seats in the Assembly, in parallel to the analysis of his rising PWR score during the pre-case period. In this regard, it can be readily noted that Erbakan perceived himself as the winner of the establishment of the government process, as he became the prime minister for the first time in history. On the other hand, the question that comes to mind is first: Why did Erbakan not celebrate his victory? This can be interpreted as an action that he intentionally did not perform, in sync with the advice coming from the external environment, as he saw this high authority post, where he would be in charge and thus be a part of the political decision-making process for the first time, as an instrument to reach his goals and he did not want to lose it. During the 28 February Sub-Commission meeting, Yalın Erez, an MP who shared his opinion with Erbakan, stated “I have requested it from Erbakan: ‘Tonight, you are rightfully becoming the Prime Minister. (This is an) expectation of many years. Members of your party will attempt to celebrate. Turkey’s current situation is not ready for this. Don’t let this happen.’ Those who are in politics know

that the RP organization did not conduct the slightest celebration because it was a sensitive period.” Erbakan seemingly respected this and did not push ahead.

Another example that confirms the higher PWR score during the pre-February28 period is his efforts during his time as prime minister to strengthen ties with the other Muslim countries in harmony with his main goals, by disregarding the criticism aimed at him by businessmen in Istanbul, the general staff, and the media. While doing this, Erbakan, as a political maneuver, rarely consulted with Çiller and simultaneously did not interfere with her trips to Western states and her representation of Turkey in the West. In other words, as a part of his own political strategy, he did not hinder his coalition partner in taking steps towards her own goals. He can be seen as trying to demonstrate that he was acting in harmony with the RP’s ideology and that he would behave in accordance with that ideology under any circumstances during his post as prime minister.

It might be underlined that during the post-February28 period, Erbakan’s responsiveness and speed level more or less decreased compared to that in the pre-February28 term. Although he did not object to the Decisions during the National Security Council meeting held in February, 28 in 1997, his mission to start the consultation tour with the MGK General Secretary and with the leaders of the other parties (despite its other dimensions) might even be indicated as an instance for that. As emphasized, signing those decisions might be perceived, at the core, as Erbakan becoming more willing to share the responsibility of any political decisions and actions. During the RP group meeting, his stress on the statement “they are selected by the people” emphasizes that the ideas and facilities of the RP, the party selected by the majority, and therefore Erbakan himself as its representative, were confirmed by the people. That is, Erbakan, in a way, highlighted that they acted as a party and took their power from the votes of the people through his similar words that he repeated during the post-case period. Thus, Erbakan gave priority to group identity and utilized the power of a collective spirit rather than his own individualistic power. Several examples from the post-case period showcase whether Erbakan attaches importance to the collective spirit of the group or individual desires, for instance, Erbakan’s approach to the 8-year-compulsory education issue before the MGK meeting held on April 26, in 1997. In that period, while Çiller and the leading figures of the DYP announced the

necessity of its implementation to the public, Erbakan avoided taking the decision by him on whether they should accept DYP's proposal on that issue and whether the Party should remain a coalition partner, and therefore, the Presidency Council held an extraordinary meeting. While the decision was that the party might politically act in the way that Erbakan would like to, it might be inferred that by denying his own position as the Prime Minister and his political power in that post, he prioritizes his Party's ideological standpoint.

The empirical result regarding Erbakan's self-confidence level is partly supported by his political attitudes and actions that can be observed within the February 28 case. Based on these results, three significant points need to be underlined. While Erbakan's score on SC at pre-February 28 increased (to 0.34) with reference to the norming group of Turkish leaders, it significantly decreases (to 0.26) during the post-case period. Compared to the pre and post-case contexts, Erbakan's perception of himself and his ability to handle the situations seemingly changed over time.

For his relatively higher scores on SC in pre-February 28 period, several examples in which Erbakan shows high-self confidence in his political actions can be found. For instance, he did not avoid focusing on Muslim countries, particularly when generating his foreign policy orientation. Despite intense criticisms leveled against him, he did not cancel visits, but even added new destinations toward his policy. Likewise, his steps towards the establishment of the D-8 also reflect his self-confidence and determination in his own abilities. In addition, empirical findings show that Erbakan typically cared less about having as much external information as possible during the pre-February 28 period. However, that seems to contradict his dependency on some close staff. He reproduced his personal assessments and reshaped his political actions based on the information he received from these trustworthy figures. In addition, he had, to some extent, interdependent with his coalition partner, Tansu Çiller. Though Erbakan was less interested in the what and how of her actions, especially with regard to foreign policy issues, and though they avoided maintaining a coalition policy on each issue, some specific subject matters required joint decisions.

Erbakan's leadership in the post-February 28 period reconfirm his decreasing SC level. Following the National Security Council meeting on February 28, Erbakan portrayed a leader for whom signing the MGK decisions required being in harmony both within

the party and with others. At that point, he can be seen as a leader who was unable to decide by himself give his signature to the MGK decision, who was in need of the support of others, and who had already met with the General Secretary of MGK and other leaders in this regard. Considering the situational factors and contextual dynamics influencing the time, especially during the period up to the warning of the Party, one can hardly recognize a leader in his attitudes during the post-case period as he did consider what has happened on the political scene and was almost ready to ignore the external voices from the environment. However, Erbakan did not refrain from claiming that ‘the fascist secularism period has ended in Turkey’ both during his group meeting and his interviews with the press (Milliyet, 12 March 1997). According to Erbakan, ‘it is ignorance to put secularism as opposed to religion.’ This and other similar statements about secularism (despite the military and judicial power that did not approve of some of his political maneuvers), might indicate that he still had a high degree of self-confidence. In addition, his pilgrimage to Mecca and his inability to reschedule his visit according to the agenda of the Secularism Summit organized by Çiller can be considered as another example. Following the closure of the RP and Erbakan’s 5-year ban from politics, his attachment to the new party, FP, and politics demonstrate his passion for the political world and its dynamics. This is perhaps an example that does not support the SC’s empirical results. The apparent transformation, however, of Erbakan’s self-other orientation from a self-centered perspective to the point he cared more about others in the post-February period.

4.3.2. The Case Study 2: The Closure Case of the Welfare Party

4.3.2.1 Historical Background

The closure of the Welfare Party, RP, started when the Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor Vural Savaş brought about the lawsuit on May, 21, 1997 with the main accusation that ‘the party’s actions are against the principle of a secular republic that cannot be even offered to change according to the Constitution’¹³ (Milliyet, 22 May 1997). Considering the political history of Turkey, the closure case of the RP is a

¹³ Retrieved December 12, 2012 from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/05/22/siyaset/rpye.html>

consequence of a period that began earlier and had a lasting influence into the following decade.

Since the start of the year Erbakan's relations with the military were further strained. Although Erbakan clearly stated right after the MGK decisions on February 28 that "We made these judgments in the MGK meeting together; We are in compliance with the Turkish Military. We are in full consensus with the MGK" (Milliyet, 3 March 1997:14), his following declaration that "the MGK decisions are not orders. The Government does not take them as orders" was responded to by the MGK Chief Secretary's written statements underlying that "efforts to present the TM as if it is part of politics is upsetting; ... and as a legal platform, generals express their opinions and suggestions freely as members of the MGK" (Milliyet, 9 March 1997:17).

In his party's group meeting in the same week, further public attention was brought about through Erbakan's comments on religion and secularism that "The era of fascist secularism is over. As it's necessary to separate the public and treat them kind for the struggle against the PKK, and for the struggle against fundamentalism, it's necessary to treat kind those who believe. To put secularism against religion is ignorance" (Milliyet, 12 March 1997:18).

Following the National Security Council decisions, public discussions began concerning the '8-years-education' and 'Religious Vocational High Schools' (Imam Hatips). The Ministry of Education took an unexpected decision, which was one of the issues RP was most sensitive about. In accordance with the decisions taken by the MGK and approved by the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Education stated that "in order to start 8-year-compulsory education for the next school year, they have started intensive work and hence secondary schools of religious and vocational high schools will be closed, and they will even not accept new students for the next school year (Sabah, 22 March 1997). In addition, it stated that "it is prohibited to go to Koran courses before finishing secondary school" (Sabah, 22 March 1997). Thus, it was planned to completely shut down the secondary classes of religious and vocational high schools in the following three or four years.

During this period, the tension between the RP and the military significantly rose as a result of a poem written by RP Deputy Chairman Yasin Hatipoğlu and directed at Navy

Commander Güven Erkaya and Deputy Chief of Staff General Cevik Bir. When the Chief of Staff launched an investigation and filed a criminal complaint to the Ankara Public Prosecutor's Office,¹⁴ General Staff Bir's explanation that the "the first target is fundamentalism" underlined that the TSK's struggle with every anti-secular thought was top priority. Fundamentalism was also still on the agenda of the MGK chaired by President Suleyman Demirel. In a statement issued immediately after the meeting, it was decided to warn the government to take any action towards implementing the law and state sovereignty against reactionary activities against an outdated regime against the Republic of Turkey. The (Refahyol) government was again warned by the MGK to act rationally and work effectively (Milliyet, 27 April 1997:1). Prime Minister Erbakan did not resist the eight years of education in the MGK meeting and this was interpreted as softening tactics and sparked debate (Milliyet, 27 April 1997:14).

In April 1997, the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court was following two separate investigations which were started about Prime Minister Erbakan and the RP and how they allegedly hindered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. The first of these investigations concerning a statement of Prime Minister Erbakan was published in a newspaper three years prior in Egypt in which he allegedly said "If we come to power, secularism will be abolished, we will bring shariah to Turkey"; the other concerned the Islamic Call Society located in Central Libya having granted five hundred thousand dollars to the RP.

In the beginning of May, when Prime Minister Erbakan came to the Merzifon Jet Base ceremony, some of the officers did not stand up, and as the Prime Minister was not applauded by high-ranking officers and their families, it was commented on as "alarming" (Sabah, 3 May 1997).

Subsequently, on May 21, 1997 the Supreme Court Chief Prosecutor Vural Savaş lodged an appeal to the Constitutional Court for the closure of the RP. Following that, the legal term for the RP to give the pre-defense expired on June 21, 1997. However,

¹⁴ In that poem, the lines "each group has an agile pasha, without soul, searching for formalists, looking for monists to exclude society" were asserted to be referring directly to General Çevik Bir and a part from the poem saying "fools unaware of suffering, consider the PKK more dangerous than Muslims" was asserted to refer to Admiral Erkaya's words "fundamentalism is more dangerous than the PKK" which were published in newspapers.

an additional 30 days period was granted for their pre-defense by the court following a request and they submitted their pre-defense on August 4, 1997.

Following a meeting of MGK and parallel to these developments, an organization called the 'Western Working Group' was created to "strictly control the reactionary activities" within the scope of the 'National Military Strategic Concept' where "fundamentalism became the number one domestic threat" (Milliyet, 13 June 1997:1).

On the basis of the period's political juncture and dynamics, Necmettin Erbakan resigned on June 18, 1997. After Erbakan's resignation, the President appointed ANAP leader Mesut Yilmaz to form the 55th government and with the votes of independents, the ANAP, DSP, and DTP coalition would be established and the tripartite coalition received the support of the CHP to establish a new government.

In July, the government began the task by taking a vote of confidence, and warmer political-military relations had somewhat reduced the high tension. The new government enacted the 'uninterrupted eight years of education' as one of its first acts. 8-year compulsory education protests erupted Ankara (Hürriyet, 30 July 1997; Hürriyet 31 July 1997) and later other regions of Turkey towards the end of July (Hürriyet, 28 July 1997)

While June and July witnessed these events, the RP submitted its pre-defense regarding the closure case to the Constitutional Court on August 4, 1997. Chief Prosecutor Savaş transferred his defense on the merits within 2 days. The one-month period for RP's defense on the merits expired on September 4; it was however, extended by 30 days at the request of the party. The RP submitted its last defense on October 6.

On August 17, 1997, the 8-year compulsory education law was passed by the Parliament. However, this did not end the protests. The Imam Hatip Platform of Solidarity continued its protests in different places (Hürriyet, 18 August 1997).

The Chief Prosecutor completed his verbal description regarding the closure of the RP on November 11, 1997. On the same day, Erbakan requested an additional 15 days from the Constitutional Court to make his oral defense. The Court accepted Erbakan's request and received his oral defense (Sabah, 15 November 1997), which Erbakan

began on 18th November and completed on 20th November 1997 (Hürriyet, 10 December 1997). Erbakan's three-day defense in the Constitutional Court was written into the minutes amounting to 161 pages (Sabah, 30 November 1997).

In addition, the headscarf became a new field of politics and social consciousness. Different voices were rising and about a debate surrounding the place of the "headscarf" in public places became louder. On November 23, it moved to another dimension with the fact that the Supreme Court found justified the decision of the judge who had discarded from the court a lawyer who had come to the court with a "headscarf" and had not taken it off against all the warnings (Milliyet, 23 November 1997:6) The High Court explained the behavior of the lawyer by stating "she wants to maintain this negative behavior against modern dress by falling back upon the concept of the fundamental rights and freedoms with her own logic." The "headscarf" issue and the conclusion of the judgment that no lawyer wearing a headscarf was allowed to join any lawsuit of the Supreme Court were thought to be related to 'fundamentalism', which was seen as the primary threat by the Supreme Military Council (Milliyet, 23 November 1997:6)

By the end of 1997, the motion of the Virtue Party (FP), which had been designed by the staff of the RP as a new party, was submitted to the Ministry. In the FP, which was said to be the backup party against the possibility of the closure of RP, most of the 34 founders were members of the Lawyers Society.

The closure case of the RP that had been ongoing for the last eight months came to an end with the decision of the Constitution Court on January 16, 1998. In a press conference Ahmet Necdet Sezer stated "the RP was closed because of its anti-laic actions and the decision was made by the majority of the votes (2 negative votes – the members Haşım Kılıç and Said Adalı – to 9 positive votes.)"¹⁵ Two more decisions in the voting were added: (i) the dismissal of 6 deputies including Erbakan who was also enjoined from politics for five years¹⁶, and (ii) the confiscation of the properties of the party and not returning the treasury grants which were taken in cautionary judgment.

¹⁵ Retrieved December 22, 2016 from <http://www.vahdet.info.tr/isdunya/dosya4/1040.html>

¹⁶ Apart from Erbakan, the other 5 people on trial were Şevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Şevki Yılmaz, and İbrahim Halil Çelik.

The decision of the Supreme Court to close the Welfare Party came into force after the announcement in the official gazette dated February 22, 1998.¹⁷

This was the first time in the history of the Turkish Great National Assembly that independent members reached such a high number. In the wake of the closure, representatives who became independent by the closure of the RP continued to pass to the newly founded Virtue Party.

4.3.2.2. Contextualizing Erbakan's Leadership Profile

In contextualizing Erbakan's profile within the RP's closure case on January 16, 1998, the scores on more than 70 percent of the traits (five out of seven) do not remain the same across time and indicate change at least by one standard deviation. This shows that Erbakan appears to be responsive to such a structural change. In this section, the significant changes in certain traits will be empirically presented and the influence of the situational elements on the leader and the actions he is most likely to take under specific circumstances will be interpreted.

Table 10 below presents Erbakan's scores, including the general score indicating his regular profile and the scores in the pre-case and the post-case time periods. In comparing Erbakan's scores on the seven traits both before and after the closure of the RP, only 'the need for power' (PWR) and 'task focus' (TASK) seem to remain stable with no significant changes. The changes in the scores of the other five traits -BACE, CC, SC, IGB, DIS- provide insights into how Erbakan likely was to change his behaviors.

The leadership profile described for Erbakan in the previous section might still remain applicable under the situational circumstances for this case, since four traits -BACE, SC, TASK and DIS- still fall into the same interval with that of the general score of Erbakan on these traits with reference to the norming groups of international leaders

¹⁷ For the gazette itself, you can find <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/23266.pdf>

and the 6 from Turkey. Erbakan's scores on PWR, CC, and IGB change the level either upwards or downwards in which they are categorized in general.

The significant differences between Erbakan's pre- and post-case scores of five traits, BACE, CC, SC, IGB and DIS are evaluated below in detail.

On BACE, Erbakan's score in the pre-case period, 0.36 decreases to 0.31 in the post-closure case period. Although this appears to be a small change at first, the difference between his score before and after the closure of the RP reflects one standard deviation of the norming groups of 284 world leaders and more than one standard deviation from that of Turkish leaders. This highlights how Erbakan is most likely to respond to such a situational change. The described difference in his score on BACE across time reflects that his recognition of challenging the constraints and taking charge of the situation in which, he found himself rises during the period before the RP was closed in 1998; and that his tendency to work within the restrictions in the environment increased during the post-period following the closure of the RP. Considering the standard deviation of the reference groups (which equals almost two for that of Turkish leaders and to one for 284 world leaders), such a decline in Erbakan's BACE score represents the loss of his perception of his personal ability to control events in the political environment.

Considering Erbakan's scores on BACE during the pre and the post-case periods, the explicit difference shown in Table-3 suggests that Erbakan seems to be more responsive and challenging toward the situational changes during the pre-case period. He appears to be more likely to influence and control events and the political environment. That showcases him as a leader who is more likely to seize the initiative and risk his political choices rather than waiting to see how the situation will shape based on contextual factors. Before the closure of the RP, Erbakan was less inclined to build consensus and working relationships with others for the sake of his group. Erbakan's scores in the pre-case period indicate that while he decides what to do based on contextual factors, he seems to be most likely to challenge the environment and others in order to accomplish his political goals.

Two-standard-deviation decrease (than that of Turkish leaders) on Erbakans's post-closure case BACE score indicates that he became more moderate in his belief in his

ability to control events in time; and therefore, less likely to take the first initiative and responsibility for certain political issues and can take a position in different roles in the decision-making process, depending on the situation experienced in the world of politics.

Another leadership trait of Erbakan that indicates a statistically significant difference in the context of RP's closure case is 'Conceptual Complexity', CC. As shown in Table-3, Erbakan's score on this trait is around 0.51 during the pre-case period, while this increases to 0.55 in the post-case period. Erbakan's score in the pre-case period remains more than one standard deviation lower than the mean of the norming groups, including the 284 world leaders and 6 Turkish leaders. Considering his scores on this trait during the post-case period, 0.04 points increase the one in the pre-case period raised his level from low to moderate on CC. Such a discrepancy between Erbakan's score before and after the closure of RP makes sense and shows that he became more likely to respond to such a situational change and receive the information from the environment after RP was closed to be more able to act in accordance with the situational factors that shape certain contexts for specific time periods.

Furthermore, Erbakan's scores on 'Self-Confidence', SC, presented in Table 10 suggest that Erbakan's perception of himself and his capability to handle problems changed significantly over time. While his pre-case score on this trait is 0.34, this decreases to 0.25 in the post-case times. This, on the one hand, indicates that Erbakan represents the profile of a leader profile that is more likely to be satisfied with whatever he thinks and feels about the situation he finds himself in during the pre-case period. On the other hand, after the RP was closed, his lower scores on SC shows Erbakan's tendency changed and he became a leader more open to receiving external data from the environment to better judge the consequences of his actions. Such changes in SC score during pre and post periods imply that Erbakan is a leader that is more inclined to act based on the contextual dynamics shaping the new requirements of the time.

In-group bias (IGB) is another trait of Erbakan that changed over time in the context of the RP's closure case. Emphasizing Erbakan's score on IGB during and after the closure case of the RP, the research addressed the question of to what extent Erbakan places his own group in the center of the political world under such contextual conditions. As indicated in Table 10, while Erbakan's pre-case score on this trait is

0.14, this decreases to 0.11 during the post-case periods. The discrepancy between his scores refers to 'three' standard deviations of the Turkish group of leaders. Focusing on the pre-case period, Erbakan's pre-case scores on IGB show his tendency to focus on solving problems in the political environment within which he acts. Therefore, his recognition of politics before the closure case of RP is most likely to be the conflictual world full of threats and enemies. This changed during the post-case period; which shows that Erbakan in that later period was more inclined to have a relationship-focused rather than a problem-one, and perceive both the positive and negative sides of his group. On the other hand, the post-case period reflects that Erbakan's decreasing scores on IGB do not remain at the high-level anymore, but decreased to moderate with reference to the norming group of Turkish leaders. This empirically refers to Erbakan's decreasing attachment with his group and its diminishing centralization in his perception, by means of which he became more likely to see everything in the political sphere in terms of ours or not, corresponding to 'we and the others' dichotomy. Such a major change in Erbakan's IGB scores for two different time periods in context, therefore, implies that his perception of politics changed towards a more relationship-oriented approach.

The last trait representing major differences across time is 'Distrust of Others', DIS. Considering his general score on this trait, Erbakan appears to be high, in comparison to the mean group of the leaders from Turkey, but moderate compared to the world leaders. His scores slightly change in both the pre and the post-case periods. Erbakan's score on DIS decreases to 0.12 before the RP was closed and increases to 0.17 during the period following the RP's closure.

Concentrating on the pre-case period, the change from 0.14 to 0.12 indicates Erbakan's diminishing level of doubt about his opinions, behaviors, and inner motivations. This might be seen in connection with his increasing tendency to recognize politics as more a peaceful environment with cooperative relations. The post-case period, however, reflects a major increase in his scores on DIS, which marks his increasing fear of loss of power in a world of dangers and threats. His perception changes from building a relationship towards problem-solving.

4.3.2.3 Discussion of Erbakan's Response to the Closure Case of the Welfare Party

Erbakan's scores based on his interviews and speeches held during the pre and post-periods of the closure of RP indicate major changes. Within the context of the research, this shows that the leader responds to situational differences. In other words, the contextual factors influence the leader and his probable actions in a case. The results of the empirical analysis of Erbakan's profile in the context of RP's closure case confirm this as reflected in the changes in his BACE, CC, SC, IGB, and DIS scores.

Based on the empirical analysis of Erbakan's scores on BACE, he transformed from a leader who believed in his ability to control events into one lacking such confidence. The leader seen through the analysis is one who takes more risks in the pre-case period, while he seems to desire less responsibility in the post-term. Additionally, this leader has a lower tendency to work on maintaining good professional relationships and act in a consensus with others in the pre-case period. Especially during the post-closure period, this leader portrait of Erbakan empirically appeared to be of one who is more open to building working relations over time. Based on other outputs of the research, Erbakan draws a more challenging leader image with regard to his BACE score in the pre-closure period than in the post-period.

These results mostly confirm how Erbakan is likely to act in the political world within this context. Considering the pre-case period, he insisted on asking the opinions of all parties and if it had been possible for that time, that of the Parliamentarians regarding the February 28 decisions of the National Security Council. Taking the initiative and all possible risks, he met with the General Secretary of the Council to ask whether it was possible to make them soften, with the other political parties leaders and all other interrelated agents and sides. Though this might be interpreted as compatible with the results, it should not be ignored that Erbakan made the decision not to sign the Decisions. That is, he could not take the responsibility and risk if he had politically acted in that way. As another example, his resignation may also indicate that the results derived from the empirical analysis do not correspond to Erbakan's political attitudes within this case. Despite the fact that the empirical dimension of this study pictures Erbakan as someone who has some belief in his ability to control the political

Table 10. Necmettin Erbakan's Personality Traits in the Context 2 – The Closure Case of the Welfare Party

LTA Characteristics	Necmettin Erbakan's scores (General)	Erbakan's Scores During		Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
		Pre-Case 2	Post-Case 2		
Beliefs in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	0.34 Moderate - Moderate	0.36 Moderate - Moderate	0.31 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05
The Need for Power (PWR)	0.28 High - Moderate	0.28 High - Moderate	0.27 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.52 Low - Low	0.51 Low - Low	0.55 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06
Self-Confidence (SC)	0.30 Low - Moderate	0.34 Low - Moderate	0.25 Low - Low	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10
Task Focus (TASK)	0.52 Low - Low	0.51 Low - Low	0.52 Low - Low	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07
In-group Bias (IGB)	0.13 Moderate - Moderate	0.14 High - Moderate	0.11 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Distrust of Others (DIS)	0.14 High - Moderate	0.12 Moderate - Moderate	0.17 High – Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06

Source: For Turkish Leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003).

environment during the pre-case period, his resignation following the opening of the closure case of RP may be interpreted as a sign that he was without hope at that point.

Considering the post-case period, as Erbakan was banned from politics, he took less risks. Especially in the post-closure period, Erbakan's inclination towards creating a harmonious relationship as a leader, both within his group and with others, increased. In spite of the increasing tension between the reformist and traditionalist wing in the FP, he visited Erdoğan, one of the major figures among the young reformists, and declared that the mentioned conflict between them and/ or within the party was nothing but an illusion. Erbakan's respect for the political restraints may be read as an outcome of his ban; and therefore, that of his and his own Party's future at some point. However, this respect may still be considered a part of his method of accomplishing his political goals.

The empirical results of Erbakan's CC scores partly support his political preferences and actions within that case for three main reasons. First, the outputs for CC underline that Erbakan tended to recognize, describe, and analyze the political world from a limited perspective during the pre-case period. That reflects the fact that to comprehend events in the political environment and their reasons, Erbakan preferred to receive limited external information. Concentrating on the period when Erbakan decided to sign the mentioned Decisions of the National Security Council, his wish to receive as much information as possible was significant to understand whether there may have been an exit strategy for him and his party not to sign this document. It is widely known that Erbakan always felt the need to listen to his close staff and Parliamentarians to make decisions on certain issues throughout his political career. Focusing on the terms short-before and after the closure of RP, he was typically open to hearing the opinions of Gül and/or Kazan. Several instances in which Erbakan did not listen to ideas of others can be pointed out in the pre-case period. For instance, during his resignation period, Erbakan took fewer people's ideas into consideration. While Hasan Ekin describes the situation in the 28 February Sub-Commission meetings at that time, he notes that although he described the political atmosphere, Erbakan did resign anyway. On the other hand, in parallel to the empirical results, Erbakan became more open to listening to the ideas and opinions of others when making political decisions. Following the closure of the RP and his ban from politics, he started

to meet as many people as possible and organize as many events as possible to maintain his political power and authority. That is, he needed to receive as much information from the environment as possible to survive and keep updated.

The results for Erbakan's self-confidence, SC, in the pre-case period show that he was more confident than he was during the post-closure period of the RP. These results appear to confirm how he politically acted within that context. In the pre-case period, Erbakan was leader who was struggling with political crises, such as the signature process of the Council Decisions and the two main investigations conducted by the Supreme Court of Appeals Prosecutor's Office. However, he was a leader who continued to follow his Party's ideological roots. In spite of increasing tension between the parties, Erbakan, for instance, in his group's meeting, declared that "fascist secularism ended in time. It is just ignorance to put secularism against religion. Secularism is not the hatred of religion. It is a foreign word" (Milliyet, 12 March 1997:18). While both the military and judicial organs were discussing the compatibility of Islam with secularism on different platforms, Erbakan's speeches not only lecture to his own group, but everybody, including clues as to his self-perception and confidence level. At the time when Çiller organized the Secularism Summit during his period in office, Erbakan was preparing to go on a pilgrimage for the twenty-sixth time together with his parliamentarians. This also constitutes another example that he was more or less satisfied with what he thought and cared less about the opinions of others. The empirical outputs in the SC level of Erbakan for the post-case period clearly imply that Erbakan became a leaderless satisfied with himself, but more open to any external stimuli from the political environment in order to comprehend situational factors that constantly shape and reproduce the political context. This can be confirmed by Erbakan's increasing expectations from his group and other parties and people surrounding him to assist him in returning to the political sphere. His political standpoint and actions in the post-case period can be read from that angle. As an alternative solution to help him, his party first tried to change the relevant article of the Political Parties' Law during discussions at the Constitutional Commission of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This, however, was rejected by other parliamentarians. As a follow-up attempt, the Party prepared an amnesty report to allow him to return to politics as an actor. Erbakan was seemingly in touch with lawyers within the party to find a way to cancel his 5-year ban from politics. His

independent candidacy was also suggested by them; was tried by himself, but canceled by the High Election Board based on the Constitutional Court Decisions. Erbakan was open to information from not only his close circle but also was in contact with the DYP to address the problem. From this perspective, the empirical output of his SC trait seems to be validated within that context.

The analyses of Erbakan's scores on IGB confirm his political actions and attitudes in both the pre and post-case periods of the closure case of RP. For the pre-case period, the research results indicate that Erbakan put his group at the center of the political world depending on the contextual circumstances. The establishment of the D-8 decision case underlines how Erbakan perceived the political world in terms of a 'we and the others' dichotomy. Despite the tension and possible interventions, closer ties with the Muslim world at that time on the presumption that it had been ignored for years appeared to offer an opportunity for Erbakan. In addition, the results of empirical research suggest that Erbakan's group attachment decreased during the post-case period, leading to a more individualistic standpoint. From this angle, it can be hardly denied that Erbakan's fear to lose his authority and power with his closer circle increased following the closure of RP and his ban. Despite his expectations, this received public attention. This was not Erbakan's main problem in the post-case period; rather, it was a new dichotomy within the Party between 'the young reformists and old traditionalists'. Any instances indicating that Erbakan tried to solve this problem through various political maneuvers can be highlighted as instances that confirm the results.

The results show that Erbakan's scores on DIS do not differentiate him from other leaders from around the world and Turkey. The empirical output shows that his level of distrust for others increased in the pre-case period, whereas he concentrated more on building relationships with others in the post-closure term of the RP. The results for the pre-case period can be confirmed with several examples. Considering the contextual elements, Erbakan may be expected to perceive the political world as not only full of dangers and threats but that of opportunities to build new relations. Since it was a time when the written and the visual media were constantly criticizing his acts and speeches, it can be inferred that he utilized all political instruments to deal with them. Furthermore, civic initiatives (including TOBB, TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, TESK) had

united their forces and published joint statements against any religious-oriented organizations and ideology. Erbakan had to deal with tensions and issues with both the military and judicial powers of Turkey. More significant than the other situational factors influencing his perception, Erbakan resigned from his position as Prime Minister during the pre-case period. This could also be read as another element tending him to focus on not only the problems but also the relations. During the post-case period, the empirical research results highlight that Erbakan's approach became more problem-oriented. Erbakan's transformation observed in the changing scores on DIS shows that he became more sensitive and more likely to trust the people surrounding him. For the post-case period, claiming the opposite might be hard when considering how the closure of RP and his ban affected him during these times. Rather than Erbakan relying more on himself, he began to the opinions of others about how he could return to active politics. Both his staff and Parliamentarians within the old and new party establishments started to search for alternatives created by the leaders of the other parties. Çiller's positive approach within that context and her coalition with him behind closed doors allowed for new possibilities for him to re-enter the world of politics.

In explaining Erbakan's scores within the context of RP's closure, he appears to be a sensitive leader based on his changing scores on DIS. Although he is more or less likely not to trust people based on his high scores on DIS, this may change depending on the contextual factors influencing the environment.

CHAPTER V

ANALYZING THE LEADERSHIP PROFILE OF

RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN

5.1. Political Background of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first appeared on the political scene of Turkey as the leader of AKP, a newly established party with Islamist roots and a moderate face, scholars, political experts and journalists began questioning his political background and the Islamist principles he advocated in order to better understand and interpret the Islamist movement in Turkey. Whilst some argue that he is not as Islamist as he was previously, others claim that he projects a less Islamist image for fear of being checked and balanced by the secular system.

Erdoğan's ideological standpoint and the roots of his political career and personality were influenced by two major elements: his education and his informal network with Islamists.

Erdoğan was born into a conservative family in Kasımpaşa. He attended Imam Hatip School for the pious with the encouragement of his primary school teacher in Kasımpaşa, who realized his deep knowledge about and special interest in Islamic practices. Erdoğan, as also noted by Heper and Toktas, in their article entitled 'Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan' (2003) had been a devout Muslim since his early years, even before he attended Imam Hatip School.

However, it is important not to dismiss the influence of the years at Imam Hatip in the formation of Erdoğan's personality and political background. His own words underlined in Muhammed Pamuk's book titled 'Yasaklı Umut: Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan' emphasize the significance of this period in his life (2001:21): "My Imam Hatip period is everything I have. I gained the destination and network of my life there. The Imam Hatip School taught me patriotism, love of people, service for the country, worship of God, environmental consciousness, socialization, awareness of solidarity, and the pleasure of wishing for others what I want for myself."

In his high school years, Erdoğan was very active in school and engaged in different activities, including poetry and football. As also noted by Çakır and Çalmuk in their book 'Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Bir Dönüşüm Öyküsü' (2001:21), Erdoğan was awarded first prize in a poetry reading competition organized by the Tercüman newspaper in 1973; and in 1974 he received first prize in an essay writing contest organized by Ahmet Kabaklı. Following his graduation, Erdoğan enrolled at Marmara University and received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the Department of Economics and Trade.

Starting with his education years, Erdoğan attended the Iskenderpaşa Seminary (dergah) of the Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku, like Erbakan, and internalized the culture of this group. This also played a significant role in his personal and political formation. For Naqshbandis, politics is a significant and effective way of preserving the rights of Muslims and expanding their religious freedom, and Sheikh Kotku was a crucial figure in the formation of the first Islamist-oriented political party, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) (İmişiker, 2002).

Erdoğan first became involved in politics towards the end 1960s at the age of fifteen, as a member of the National Outlook Association (Milli Görüş Teşkilatı), which was (by borrowing the terminology of Heper & Toktaş, 2003) a think-tank of the Islamic political movement' represented by MNP and MSP. He also led the National Union of Turkish Students' (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) Secondary School Branch during his high school years (İmişiker, 2002:39). In 1973, Erdoğan became a member of the MSP. In the following years, he also headed the youth division of the MSP's Beyoğlu District in Istanbul, and then the Istanbul Youth Division of the MSP between 1976-1977.

In his book 'Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Kimdir?', Hakan Türk quotes Erdoğan's in which Erdoğan comments upon his rise through the ranks of the RP (2003:22): "In Istanbul,

I first became the head of the RP Beyoglu District Branch; and afterward of the RP Istanbul Provincial Party Organization. Concurrent with my latter position, I was a member of the RP central executive committee and the board of directors. In this process, I became a parliamentary candidate in the elections of 1986 and a mayoralty one in 1989.”

Although Erdoğan put forward his candidacy for the Beyoglu mayoralty in the local elections of 1989, he lost the elections. In the 1994 local elections, however, he was renominated by the RP as a candidate major of Istanbul Metropolitan and this time won the election. While it was a defeat for the secularist elites, the Islamist front considered the winning of this mayoralty a real victory (İmişiker, 2002:40). Though Erdoğan’s political acts in his term as mayor were largely criticized by secularist circles, most of his projects managed to win recognition. The year 1998 may mark be seen as a turning point in his political career due to two events: In February 1997, the Turkish democracy experienced (with Heper’s terminology, 2002:217) a ‘semi-breakdown’ as the result of a post-military coup, which resulted in the Constitutional Court’s ruling for the closure of the RP and a five-year ban from politics of its leading figures, including Erbakan and Istanbul’s mayor, Erdoğan. This was followed by the RP members’ application to the old formula to turn back into politics, which is to establish a new party, the FP in 1998. In December 1997, Erdoğan once again found himself in trouble because of the lines of a poem he read in a speech in Siirt: “The mosques are our barracks, the minarets our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the believers our soldiers” (Author’s Translation).

Based on these lines, he was accused of violating Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, was removed from active politics, and received a prison sentence of four and a half months.

After the RP was closed down, he became a member of the FP. Until he was imprisoned in 1999, Erdoğan maintained his function as the mayor of Istanbul under the newly established FP. Before he was sentenced to prison, he was required to resign from the party in October 1998. In his last speech quoted in ‘Yasaklı Umut: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ (2001:126), he announced: “I would like to spend the four months here working on the projects that will prepare Turkey for the 2000s on which we have already focused. These projects are the name of a vision that aims to bring our country,

our nation to the standards of the 2000s with regard to the economy, health, education, science, local government, sports, human rights, technology, defense, and international relations. Therefore, I would like to send a message here to our children and youth from primary school to university: Turkey of the 2000s will be your bright and beautiful Turkey. But for that, we all need to work very hard. You also must work hard at school.”

As Fatih Bayhan noted in his book ‘Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Liderlik Şifreleri’ (2007:43), Erdoğan’s days in prison were days during which the foundations of a new era in politics and the beginning of the ideological change and transformation were laid. In prison, Erdoğan started to work on the plans as he had stated; however, the post-military coup in 1997 exposed tensions among the members of the FP, as those of the SP, a newly established party. In her article ‘Subversion and Subjugation in the Public Sphere: Secularism and the Islamic Headscarf’, Çınar argues that the intervention of 1997 had already initiated the first sparks of the division within the SP; and afterward a new episode in the history of political Islam in Turkey began with the establishment of two parties following the closure of the FP in 2000 for violating the principle of secularism: The SP formed by older-generation traditionalists, and the AKP by the younger-generation reformists organized around Erdoğan, whose wife became the first first-lady to wear an Islamic headscarf (2008).

When the AKP was founded in August 2001, Erdoğan was elected its leader and much attention was focused on whether he had changed and had actually become a conservative democrat as he claimed, or whether he still represented the same Islamist tradition of the National Outlook. During this time, Erdoğan repeatedly declared that he had learned from past experiences as a virtuous act (Heper & Toktaş, 2003). Concerning this point, Hakan Türk in ‘Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Kimdir’ (2003:32) quotes Erdoğan who declared: “We (as the AKP) currently pursue a different brand and are dedicated to creating it. What is it? We call it ‘conservative democracy. As an identity, it is our brand. Within such an identity, we will move forward to the future.”

Soon after its establishment, Erdoğan’s AKP won the elections of 2002 and received nearly two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. With this landslide victory AKP was able to form a single-party government. In his book titled ‘Türk Siyasetinde Bir Kasımpaşalı: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ Bilal Çetin (2003: 133,137) claims that the

overwhelming victory of the AKP in November 2002 that led AKP to form a single-party government for the seventh times since the establishment of the Republic resulted in the end of one chapter of Turkish politics and the start of a new chapter.

Despite his party's landslide victory, Erdoğan did not become prime minister as he was banned from active politics because of the poem he had read in his speech in Siirt. Instead, Abdullah Gül, the deputy leader, became prime minister. Due to the cancellation of the general election results from Siirt based on voting irregularities, Erdoğan was listed as a candidate for its rescheduled elections in 2003, when his ban was lifted due to a legal change. Shortly after he was elected, Erdoğan replaced Gül and assumed the position of prime minister.

In terms of his electoral success, the AKP of Erdoğan continuously increased its percentage of votes up until the elections of 2011. The AKP's votes rose from 34,42 percent with 363 seats in the elections of 2002, to almost 46,58 percent with 341 seats in the elections of 2007, and then to 49.83 percent in 2011 with 327 seats, and. Erdoğan stands down as a Party leader upon his election as the twelfth President of Turkey in August 2014. Since 2015, the AKP percentage of votes began to decrease with 40,87 percent with 258 seats. In the elections of 2018, however, it increased its percentage slightly to 42,56 percent with 295 seats.

5.2. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Leadership Profile

In profiling Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Table 11 below presents his scores on seven leadership traits in comparison to two reference groups of 6 Turkish leaders and 284 world leaders. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's scores deviate by approximately 42 % (by three traits out of seven) from the sample of Turkish leaders and 14 % (by just one trait) from 284 world leaders. Erdoğan's three traits scores that differ from the means of the others and falls the standard deviation below the group are 'belief the in ability to control events (BACE), 'self-confidence' (SC), and 'in-group bias' (IGB). His scores for all the other traits (PWR, CC, TASK, and DIS) appear to be close to the group average. Based on the different means of the trait in the reference group including 284 leaders from the globe, Erdoğan is only on IGB. The following sub-

sections will describe Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's personality in terms of his scores on each trait.

Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)

Compared to Turkish leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's high score on BACE indicates that he does not resemble other leaders with regards to his high belief in the ability to control events. Considering that this trait represents a world-view in which the leader believes that they can handle and manage whatever may occur in the world of politics (Hermann, 2003:188-189), such a score suggests that leaders such as Erdoğan generally believe that they can challenge the constraints and exert control over other people, political situations and the environment, rather than respecting the contextual parameters. For this reason, such leaders generally recognize themselves as influential, effective, and capable of shaping the outcomes in politics, since they prefer not to respect any restraints that may curb their authority or prevent them from achieving their political goals. Leaders who score high in this typically take quick and proactive action, especially in resolving challenging political problems. In initiating activities and policies, such leaders prefer to be involved in the policy-making process to take control and persist in monitoring its implementation in the real world, if they do believe in success. These leaders are less likely to delegate aspects of the tasks; rather, they actively take part in all stages of the decision-making process.

The Need for Power (PWR)

Erdoğan's score on the need for power indicates that he is moderate on this trait in comparison to the 284 international leaders and 6 Turkish leaders. Considering that PWR indicates 'the desire of the leader for powering on or influencing other people or situations, Erdoğan's score suggests that he intends to affect, influence or impact other people and situations only as much as other leaders tend to do (Hermann, 2003). Leaders with moderate scores on PWR are typically more likely to be reactive. They are more comfortable sharing the responsibility with others, especially when faced with challenging issues that have potential risks of failure.

Table 11. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Personality Traits in Comparison to Two Reference Groups

LTA Characteristics		Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's scores	Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
Beliefs in Ability to Control Events (BACE)		0.38 High – Moderate	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05
The Need for Power (PWR)		0.25 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity (CC)		0.58 Moderate – Moderate	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06
Self-Confidence (SC)		0.30 Low - Moderate	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10
Task (TASK)	Focus	0.68 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07
In-group (IGB)	Bias	0.08 Low - Low	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Distrust (DIS)	of Others	0.11 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06

Source: For Turkish leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003)

** If a score falls into at least one standard deviation lower/higher than the mean of the reference group, then it is evaluated as 'low'/'high'

Considering the potential constructive effects of contextual factors, they prefer to deal with less risky points to achieve success. In handling problems or difficulties in the political environment, moderate leaders in PWR like Erdoğan often care about receiving all the adulation for their success, whilst occasionally giving others their due in any successful enterprise. In doing so, leaders like Erdoğan determine their strategy and follow it to achieve whatever they want to have or to do for either themselves or their groups. Such leaders care both about their interests and those of their group. Individual and collective goods are related to each other and mutually bound for them. They largely believe that whatever will be good for the group will be good for themselves and vice versa. In building the collective consciousness of the group, leaders like Erdoğan, do not ignore the significance of individuals' roles in the group. Despite the plurality, managing people and achieving consensus among the group members is perceived as a significant political skill by such leaders. Those with moderate scores on PWR put both themselves as a leader and the others without whom they cannot be in this position at the core of their reasoning as two linked components to realize the main goals.

Conceptual Complexity (CC)

Leaders with moderate scores on conceptual complexity (CC), in analyzing or discussing several factors in politics such as ideas, actions, peoples, places, tools, etc., resemble other leaders from around the world and from Turkey. Such leaders can see and examine the world of politics from various angles in relation to certain specific issues, though they can be considered closed to receiving a wide range of incoming information from the environment about other particular issues. Therefore, these leaders often analyze various stimuli before they make a decision. Moderate leaders on CC spend time on others' ideas about the political situation in some cases, but if necessary, they can make quick decisions and act quickly. This, however, may not always be the case. Depending on the subject and situational dynamics, leaders with moderate scores in this trait can be less flexible, but they are also ready to act in terms of the categorization system in their mind. These conceptually moderate leaders are occasionally attached to the contextual obstacles and elements in the decision-making process and have various different ways of reasoning in describing the political situation or a specific position. Expectedly, leaders with moderate scores on CC may

not tolerate ambiguity and categorize policies and political objects, while leaders like Erdoğan sometimes cannot simply classify the contextual information. While such leaders filter, reinterpret, and transform the stimuli they receive from the environment into fixed categories, they sometimes do not refer to any fixed group in comprehending and evaluating it. This enables leaders like Erdoğan to recognize the political environment in terms of either a set of stereotypes and classifications, or unstructured stimuli in gray areas that may only be reasonably interpreted in a specific context (Hermann, 2003).

Self-Confidence (SC)

Erdoğan's scores on Self-Confidence (SC) is low in comparison to the 6 other Turkish leaders and average compared to the 284 world leaders. In the context of Turkey, this shows that Erdoğan may be a leader is concerned about his ability to deal with people and objects in the political environment. In building self-confidence, two factors typically play a role: the self-perception of the leaders and the outsiders' interpretations about the leader himself. Considering Erdoğan's low SC score, he can be seen as a leader is more concerned with the latter one. In evaluating other political actors, objects, or situations, such leaders often ask for assistance from others, while they often close themselves off to any incoming information from the environment. Thus, in making their assessments, these leaders frequently look for others' approval or objections. Since these leaders are not satisfied with their inner reasoning, they require additional external input to know how to act towards any given political situation. Such leaders make their own decisions and act based on the final output they derive from what they know. Leaders like Erdoğan lack confidence and require validation and advice from others concerning the political environment or a specific situation they are confronted with.

Task Orientation (TASK)

The task focus of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicates which function he focuses on more as a leader; solving a particular problem his group faces or preserving and maintaining relationships through acceptance, approval, and support within the group. This trait asks for the upper hand in these two distinct functions of leadership. Considering his moderate scores on TASK, Erdoğan can be described as a leader who is sensitive both

to the problems, causes, or ideologies that prevent his group from moving forward to a determined ideal political end. Leaders scoring moderately on TASK like Erdoğan feel the need to provide solutions on the one hand, and maintain high group spirit on the other. Depending on the situation, their focus of attention might be either the options to deal with the problem and the necessary instruments or the dynamic relationships in the group with loyalty among its members. This type of leader places both the ways to find solutions to a problem their groups deal with and various means to accomplish the such goals in the center of their mindset from time to time. This prior focus might be replaced with their group members' ideas, desires, needs, and interests based on the situation. While leaders like Erdoğan, recognize the political world as a particular problem, they prioritize full comprehension of what others have, desires and needs, and satisfaction of these in the meantime. The ultimate goal for such leaders varies depending on the environment and its political requirements. Though they may occasionally perceive their group members as playing an instrumental role in finding any solution to a particular problem, they may also insist that their group members are the political world itself rather than its parts. In both cases, these leaders concentrate on their different functions for the sake of the group.

In-Group Bias (IGB)

As a leadership trait, in-group bias is the extent to which a leader recognizes their own group at the core of the political environment and centralizes it while perceiving the rest of the political world. As IGB implies such a world-view, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's low scores on this trait compared to other leaders from the international scene and Turkey, show that he perceives the world of politics to be more cooperative than conflictual. Such leaders are less inclined to categorize people in their environment, but, still recognize their own group as an entity and are concerned about its goals and interests. In identifying people, leaders like Erdoğan do not simply see 'friends and enemies'. A low score on this trait enables such leaders to be aware of agents within the political environment other than those that belong to their group. For these leaders, there are no fixed external threats or enemies trying to undermine their authority, but they may always face domestic opposition from the others. In this case, leaders like Erdoğan typically employ (borrowing the terminology of Hermann) 'positive diplomatic gestures' as a political strategy to deal with such situations (2003: 202).

They prefer to influence the political values and ideologies of people and to attract new members to their groups. For these leaders politics cannot be defined as a zero-sum game in which their group either win or lose; rather, it is an environment that allows different people to interact and collaborate. It also helps such leaders recognize shortcomings in their group characteristics that can be rectified. Rather than neglecting the problems of the group, they consider them whenever they arise. This inclination typically makes them the first person to recognize shortcomings or issues in their group.

Distrust of Others (DIS)

As 'distrust of others' represents a leader's general inclination to doubt, mistrust, or chariness about the motives and actions of others, Erdoğan's moderate scores on this trait provide a clue about his perception of politics as an environment full of both threats and opportunities. Leaders with moderate scores on DIS, like Erdoğan, are suspicious about the political behaviors and motives of other actors or groups in the political world, which enables them to prepare themselves for any sudden attack from the opposition. However, they are not as incredulous as those who recognize any person or external stimulus, including those coming from their group, as potential risks against their authority since they believe in the trustworthiness of the group. This expectedly influences their attitudes towards the political world. Leaders with moderate scores on DIS exert control over others' behaviors and the environment to a usual extent. It is not because they suspect others of being potential challengers for their posts, but because they, like all leaders, feel the need to protect themselves and their groups from any potential threats. Leaders with moderate scores on this trait often prefer not to consider the opinions and ideas of their advisors before they make a decision. In putting it into perspective, such leaders sometimes refer to it as a political maneuver to minimize the risk of any challenges to their authority. , Leaders with moderate DIS scores demands unconditional loyalty from their group members and only trust a close select group of people. Apart from this core group of trusted members, the people surrounding leaders like Erdoğan may constantly change because these leaders are distrustful of others and are concerned of potential competitors within the group. These leaders are sensitive to any criticism but do not tend to identify people as those belonging to 'us' and 'the others'. Although leaders like Erdoğan see the

world of politics in simple ‘black and white terms in some cases, various situational factors and past experiences do not allow them to deliberately reject in the idea of a more complex political environment.

The discussion of Erdoğan’s score on each trait is followed by an account of the connection between these seven traits based on three main questions profiling Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in detail.

5.2.1. Respecting or Challenging Constraints in the Political Environment?

In evaluating how Erdoğan responds to political constraints, it is important to evaluate how important it is for him to control and influence what happens in the environment. Erdoğan’s scores on belief in one’s ability to control events and the need for power and influence (BACE and PWR), therefore, provide enough information to determine whether he can be considered a leader who respects or challenges restraints in the world of politics.

Leaders with high scores on both traits (BACE and PWR) are typically those who know how to get what they want; and thus, challenge any constraints. These leaders always force the possible limits to realize the maximum. From this perspective, leaders are highly talented in influencing their surroundings both directly and indirectly, in defining whatever they want, and in achieving their goals. Conversely, leaders whose scores are low on these two traits respect the constraints and choose to function within the environmental dynamics to achieve their goals (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Winter & Stewart 1977). These leaders emphasize building balanced relations with those around them based on consensus and compromise. This is what, from their point of view, a political leader is required to do.

In comparison to the norming group of Turkish leaders, Erdoğan’s scores indicate that he is high on BACE, while moderate on PWR. Such average scores suggest that Erdoğan generally challenges the constraints, sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully. The political acts’ of such leaders, like Erdoğan, are typically shaped by the nature of the situation and result in his different reactions to the use of power. Thus, contextual factors play a significant role in their ability and strategies to manipulate the voting population. Leaders like Erdoğan typically not respect the

constraints in the political environment and they always challenge specific cases, especially those that limit their role as leader and decision-maker. Erdoğan-type-leaders are less willing to give the decision-making responsibility to others. Instead, these leaders are more likely to take the initiative rather than be reactive since they believe in their potential influence over events, people, and the environment.

5.2.2. Open or Closed to Contextual Information?

The literature suggests that leaders differ from each other in their degree of openness to contextual information. While some rarely apply for information from other people or the political environment itself, some leaders from around the globe are open to receiving any incoming data from others and, if required, refer to these data in their decision-making. To measure whether (and if so, to what degree) Erdoğan is open to situational input in his decision-making process, the scores on self-confidence (SC) and conceptual complexity (CC) are taken into consideration in LTA.

In questioning the leader's reference point in analyzing the political environment, actors, or objects, leaders' scores on SC help to understand how leaders recognize the political world around them. This necessitates an evaluation of a leader's recognition of himself, and his ability to handle situations, objects, and people in the political scene.

From this perspective, Erdoğan's low score on SC indicates that he is a leader who cares about his public image. These leaders care about receiving input from others. They look for others' approval or objections on various issues depending on the political context in which they are experienced. They make their own final decision after interpreting the data they gather from other actors or the political context by themselves. Hence, the manner in which leaders like Erdoğan will politically act on a specific issue is difficult to predict which may make them appear to be an inconsistent leader.

Erdoğan's scores on CC are close to the means of both norming groups of the study. This means that Erdoğan politically acts depending on a given situation. While he takes others' ideas and voices into consideration in describing, understanding, and analyzing the political world, he politically acts based on determined mental categories when

some specific issues are concerned. In accordance with the case, conceptually moderate leaders like Erdoğan, therefore, act without any delay and wait for political outputs before making a decision.

Based on his moderate scores on both SC and CC, Erdoğan can be considered open to information. This is because these leaders tend to be sensitive to their environments in some instances. These leaders need to hear what others feel and think whenever any political challenge against their authority and power occurs. That is, they become more immune to external stimuli and inputs from others' ideas, perceptions, and moods about them and the situation if their position and political future are in danger. Therefore, receiving such information is crucial for them in deciding how to act in such a situation. Leaders like Erdoğan are therefore primarily concerned about others' voices, needs, wishes, and demands only in specific contexts. They are leaders who often emphasize realizing their determined goal and tend to focus on situational factors or cues. Under such circumstances, these leaders typically persuade others about their thoughts, and how appropriate their actions within a specific political case to their general worldview, and course of action.

5.2.3. Motivated by Problem or Relationship?

In analyzing the motivation of political leaders, several drives can be found. Following Hermann's account, this research concentrates on two general categories in an attempt to understand leaders' drives, namely, task and external focus (2003). A task focus might be any particular cause, an idea, or political ideology, or a determined set of interests. The literature suggests that it is the ideas, principles, and norms that the leaders advocate that push them to act in a certain way. Relational focus indicates the leaders' preference and need to receive feedback from other people and the political environment. Such a tendency implies these leaders' desire to comprehend the effects, reactions, or recommendations concerning their political actions. To analyze the roots of a leader's motivations, three leadership traits, namely, task focus (TASK), in-group bias (IGB), and general distrust of others (DIS) are used. While the task and relationship focus assist in measuring the reasons why leaders seek office, the latter two traits (in-group bias and distrust of others) highlight whether (and if so, to what degree) the leader identifies with his group and with "other" groups.

Leaders like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who have moderate scores on TASK tend to focus on solving contextual problems depending on the context when their group faces it, or in establishing a dynamic relationship if that seems more appropriate. In assessing their motivation for seeking office, situations determine such leaders' attitudes and actions. Hence, they analyze the political situation and prefer to act in the most suitable way depending on the context. In deciding how to act in the political environment, they direct their attention either to accomplishing their main goal or to maintaining their relationships. In the former case, they tend to understand the problem their groups face and search for any ways to solve these problems for the sake of the group. In such times, leaders like Erdoğan recognize the world through two simple components, the problem and the people who help solve it. Then, they search for the people around them with the same interests and capacity to deal with the problem. In the latter case, where they insist on establishing and keeping loyal relationships among the group members, such leaders give priority to group maintenance and maintaining a high group spirit among members. Thus, leaders like Erdoğan who have moderate scores do not have a fixed tendency in reacting to political situations and/or people. Their reaction and motivation will change from one context to another. Even in both cases, such leaders act immediately after they evaluate the requirements of the situation. In other words, no upper hand exists for this type of leader's political behaviors. They interpret the conditions determined by the political environment and behave by their reading of the political conjuncture at the time they experience it.

In addition, leaders with low scores on IGB like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are less likely to recognize their groups at the center of the world of politics and are attached to their groups in an emotional sense. However, as Hermann points out, these leaders may still be considered as patriots interested in the maintenance of their groups' status and in-group culture toward their goals (2003:202). Though such leaders function based on some categories in the political world, they also have some complexity when perceiving the environment and other people's feelings, desires, and needs. However, such leaders still some enemies exist apart from their friends, and this moves them to cope with external threats, which results in certain problems the group members may have to confront.

In addition, leaders with moderate scores on distrust toward others – DIS suspect others at an average level, which makes them providentially ready to face any constraints from the environment without transforming into skeptics who search for enemies and opposition everywhere. Such people are typically not anxious about all incoming information from others as potential dangers, since they believe in loyalty, especially within the group. While they are aware of potential dangers and challenges to their authority and position, especially around them, they do typically do not check all possible threats skeptically. Instead, they tend to work with several trustworthy advisors and experts for specific periods and suspect their motives and actions at a reasonable level. From their perspective, there may be categorically fixed and conditionally changeable people they work within their offices.

The combination of these two traits (IGB and DIS) provides information as to whether Erdoğan is motivated either by the threats he recognizes in the political environment he lives in or by harmonious relationships in the world of politics. The focus of leaders like Erdoğan with low scores on IGB, but moderate scores on DIS is typically to take advantage of opportunities and relationships. Rather than strictly focusing on threats and problems, such leaders tend to act in a more relationship-oriented manner. While they may perceive politics as a threatening place, they may also perceive it as conflict-prone depending on contextual factors. At the core of their ideological standpoint, these leaders are aware of possible conflicts in different contexts, but ready to cooperate with other people, leaders, or countries if they think it is reasonable and feasible for both sides. Therefore, leaders like Erdoğan are typically prepared to struggle with any rival actions from adversaries, but also to work in collaboration with others, especially in the international arena while pursuing their countries' interests.

In the next section, I will analyze how and to what extent these traits played a role and how Erdoğan responded to two critical challenges in his political career as prime minister.

5.3. Analyzing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Leadership Profile in Context

This research evaluates the leadership profile Erdoğan in two different contexts, namely, the e-memorandum issued by the Turkish military in April 2007 and the constitutional court case introduced that demanded the closure of the AKP in 2008. These two cases have been selected to analyze how Erdoğan responded to the situational constraints based on the changing nature of the civil-military relations in Turkey. That is, it examines whether Erdoğan challenged or respected the constraints imposed by the established, which was a milestone in the political history of the country. Considering the leading figures in shaping Turkish politics analyzing the issue from an agent-centered is reasonably justified.

Erdoğan's scores on the seven leadership traits across the pre- and post-periods of the cases are assessed and compared with each other. To analyze and evaluate his profile, the stability of Erdoğan's traits in his leadership profile is determined based on his interview responses before and after the two cases. The fundamental question is whether the leadership profile of Erdoğan described in the previous chapter explains how we behaved in these circumstances. Stability in traits indicates the predictability of Erdoğan's relevant political behaviors and attitudes. His remaining scores highlight how Erdoğan is likely to act politically. The changing scores, on the other hand, imply that Erdoğan is responsive to the situation to a certain extent and thus, less predictable. In the following sections, the statistical differences in traits are discussed in detail and their implications in each specific context discussed.

5.3.1. Case Study 1: The E-memorandum

5.3.1.1. Historical Background

In power since 2002, the AKP government with its market-oriented policy and its Islamist ideological roots has initiated profound change in Turkey in the political, economic, and social realms (Toledano, 2011). Considering its roots, how this transformation would return to the relationship between the AKP and Turkish armed forces was a subject of great interest. Following the electoral success of AKP in 2002, the change in the dialogue between the Party and Turkish Armed Forces, as a key component of the transformation Turkey was undergoing, was examined by Turkish

politicians, political historians, academicians, journalists, and researchers in an attempt to understand and interpret Turkish politics.

Focusing on the relationship between the AKP and the military forces and on the historical evolution of that relationship in different conjunctures during the period starting with the 2002 elections, undoubtedly affected the next presidential election. The due expiration of the 10th president of the Republic Sezer's term of office, and the possibility of a person from the "National Outlook" tradition as the current Prime Minister to ascend to Presidency created social tension and unrest within the military.

On April 12 in 2007, the Chief of General Staff Büyükanıt held a press conference to announce to the public that "the TSK is closely related to (the presidential election) since the president will also be the chief commander of the TSK" with defining the new Presidents as one "...who adheres to the unitary form of the social and democratic state- which also found its place in our law, the core values that the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish Nation and Republic hold" (NtvMsnbc, 12 April 1997:18).¹⁸ Following this announcement, several mass demonstrations called "Republic Meetings" with the motto as 'Protect your Republic' were held in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa, Çanakkale with the participation of thousands and contributions of many non-governmental organizations. Sezer, whose term of office was about to expire, commented on the presidential election that "Turkey has been under threat for a long time. It can be said that the Regime threat emerged more than 4.5 years ago and I will approve the president you (the public) approve" (Hürriyet, 19 April 2007) (Author's Translation)..

Erdoğan, who was authorized to run in the election, announced the candidacy of Abdullah Gül at the AKP group conference on April 24, 2007. The national press stated that the nomination of Gül, the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, as the presidential candidate was well received by European Union (EU) circles in Ankara.

The first round of voting in the presidential elections took place on April 27, 2007, in the Parliament. While there were 361 votes in total, Gül took 357 of the votes.

¹⁸ Retrieved December 17, 2016 from <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405466.asp>

Immediately after the voting, CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for the cancellation of the elections as they believed that internal regulations had been violated (Hürriyet, 28 April 2007).¹⁹

On the same day, in the middle of the night, a public statement by the General Staff of the Turkish military was issued regarding the Turkish presidential elections. This statement would later be called the e-memorandum, which was published on the official website of the TSK: "...In recent days, the outstanding problem in the Presidential elections has been the discussion of secularism. This situation is observed with concern by the Turkish Armed Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is not neutral in these discussions and is the absolute defender of secularism. Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces are against the ongoing discussions and negative comments and will reveal its attitudes and behaviors clearly and transparently when necessary. No one should ever have any doubt about this. Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of the Great Leader Atatürk "How happy is he who says I am a Turk" is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he stay. The Turkish Armed Forces still maintains its firm determination to fully carry out its clear duties assigned to it with laws to protect these qualifications, and its commitment and faith in this determination are absolute" (BBC News, 28 April 2007).

The government evaluated this explanation of the General Staff in the conference that Erdoğan held with ministers and subsequently the government spokesman and the Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek, stated that such explanations of the General Staff to the media are perceived as an attitude against the government and it is the strangest thing to be thought in a democratic society (Hürriyet, 28 April 2007b). After his

¹⁹ Onder Sav summarized the details of his party's application as follows: "Article 121 of the internal regulation of the parliament refers to Article 102 of the Constitution. The president of the assembly performed an interesting action. He said that 'there was an adequate majority.' The president violated the internal regulations by saying that 184 people were sufficient and violated it again for other internal regulations. He had his personal decision voted for by the council. We presented all these to the constitutional court. He violated the Constitution by taking these incorrect actions. By this application, we wanted a motion to be granted to hold the execution until the second election on May 2. The fact that such an application wasn't made in previous presidential election doesn't show that this action is right. If such an application was not made then, this was a mistake of the people living in that period. The president of the assembly (Bülent Arınç) did not seek for 184 votes in today's election as he did not seek for 367 votes. Arınç opened the meeting and this situation is a violation of the internal regulations too. He wasn't contented with those. He also made another violation of the internal regulations. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey voted his personal thought and he made a final decision about this case. In this way, the Parliament acted against the constitution." Retrieved from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6414928&tarih=2007-04-27>

explanation, Minister Çiçek confirmed that Erdoğan and Büyükanıt had a positive exchange on the issue.

During these days, the Constitutional Court accepted the CHP's application for the election of the 11th president. The vice president of the constitutional court stated in his public statement that "the decision related to the voting in the 96th session of Grand National Assembly of Turkey on April 27, 2007, about the quorum for meetings that must be met in a voting for the president is perceived as an amendment of the bylaw and this case is decided as against the constitution.' The thing that we have canceled is the first round voting and it is related to the cancellation of the parliament's act...After that, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey knows whether it will move on or not."²⁰

Over this decision, Erdoğan stated that the rising case would be presented to the judgment of the nation as soon as possible by the AKP. He stated that the AKP would apply to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for a decision call an early election for the essential decision of the nation.

The AKP published a constitutional amendment package in parallel with early election activities as part of the efforts of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Memurlar, 16 June 2007). This package was accepted with 376 votes and several changes such as "the term of office for the presidency was reduced to 5 years", "one person can only be chosen twice as a president (for 5+5 years)", "the general elections will be held once every four years", "in all actions, including voting, TBMM will gather with at one-third of the total number of members", "the Grand National Assembly of Turkey will make decisions with the absolute majority, unless the constitution bears any other provision", as well as "the quorum for a decision cannot be less than a quarter plus one (138) of the number of members' (Sabah, 10 May 2007). This package, however, went through several stages before coming into force as President Sezer vetoed the constitutional package and returned it to TBMM for reevaluation.²¹ The package was accepted once again in the TBMM (Hürriyet, 29 July 2003). and the President took the package to a referendum (NtvMsnbc, 16 October) which resulted in 69.123 % accepting votes (Sabah, 21 October 2007a).

²⁰ Retrieved December 17, 2016 from <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com:80/news/406859.asp>

²¹ Retrieved December 18, 2016 from <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/409099.asp>

Shortly before these processes, in the early election of July 22, 2007, the AKP retained power with 46.6% of the votes and 341 deputies (Sabah, 21 October 2007b). In pursuit of forming the government, Abdullah Gül took 341 votes in the first round of Presidential elections on August 20. Since 267 votes were required for the second round and he failed to achieve the required number, the third round with 339 votes made him the 11th President of the Republic of Turkey.²²

It took the public attention that the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders did not attend the oath-taking ceremony at the Parliament -which ordinarily they would attend every year- because of the Supreme Military Council meeting (Hürriyet, 5 August 2007). This was widely interpreted as an indication that the relations between these two forces gained a new dimension. They also did not attend the swearing ceremony of Gul at the end of August and this strengthened such claims (Hürriyet, 28 August 2007).

5.3.1.2 Contextualizing Erdoğan's Leadership Profile

When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's scores during interviews held until the e-memorandum held on April 27, 2007, as the first case for Erdoğan presented in this research, are compared with the post-period scores, three out of the seven leadership traits are found not to be stable. These are task focus (TASK), in-group bias (IGB), and distrust of others (DIS).

Table 12 summarizes Erdoğan's scores on each trait in general, before and after April, 27 of 2007, when the e-memorandum was publicized. Scores on pre- and post-periods represent whether and if so how results change according to the changing context.

In the three traits, there's almost no change at all in the before and after periods. These are; BACE, PWR, and CC. In SC, there's a slight increase but this is within one standard deviation range.

In the three other traits, there is a more noticeable change which is either an increase or decrease with two standard deviations. Task motivation declined two standard deviations in the aftermath of the military intervention compared to before the e-

²² Retrieved December 18, 2016 from <http://ntvmsnbc.com:80/news/418499.asp>

memorandum (from 0,72 to 0,61). Erdoğan's in-group bias (from 0,07 to 0,09) and distrust towards others (from 0,10 to 0,12) increased by two standard deviations after the military's intervention as well as his in-group bias.

As a leadership trait, TASK, which shows the upper hand of two main functions performed by a leader in a group -problem-solving or building relationships, significantly differs over time. In Erdoğan's general profile, his score on this trait is 0,68 and falls into the average of the two reference groups. This score, however, for the period until the e-memorandum seems to be 0.72. On the other hand, this score after the country experienced the e-memorandum.

The process decreases to 0,61, close to the lower value of the interval for the means of two reference groups. The difference between Erdoğan's scores in pre- and post-memorandum periods is more than two standard deviations from the norming group of Turkish leaders. Such discrepancy between these two scores implies that although Erdoğan can be called a leader with a high task focus before April 27, 2007, it becomes moderate in post-memorandum period when he spent much of his energy solving the problem or maintaining group spirit and morale based on the situation he experiences. Focusing on the pre-memorandum period, Erdoğan's scores on TASK appear high when compared to other leaders. This implies that, in Hermann's terms, he was a task master' who emphasized moving his group forward toward the completion of a given solution of a problem (2003: 197). It can be interpreted as perceiving the world of politics as an environment full of struggles and problems after the e-memorandum was released by the military. Erdoğan tended to perceive politics in terms of two components, the problem and the group members as necessary instruments to deal with. In this interpretation, during the post-memorandum, he was no longer interested in pleasing everybody, but focused on the decisions that would make his his group happy.

After the memorandum, Erdoğan became more focused on maintaining group spirit rather than solving problems. In other words, such a difference in Erdoğan's score on TASK indicates that he gained the ability to adopt his prior focus based on the contextual requirements. This made him flexible in concentrating on the task, or fully comprehending what others have desire and need, and satisfying them. Whilst his scores on TASK in the context of the post-case period indicate that situational factors

Table 12. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Personality Traits in the Context 1 – E-memorandum

LTA Characteristics	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's scores (General)	Erdoğan's Scores During		Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
		Pre-Case 1	Post-Case 1		
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	0.38 High – Moderate	0.38 High – Moderate	0.38 High – Moderate	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05
The Need for Power (PWR)	0.25 Moderate - Moderate	0.25 Moderate Moderate	0.26 Moderate Moderate	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.58 Moderate Moderate	0.58 Moderate Moderate	0.57 Moderate Moderate	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06
Self-Confidence (SC)	0.30 Low – Moderate	0.28 Low – Moderate	0.33 Low - Moderate	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10
Task Focus (TASK)	0.68 Moderate Moderate	0.72 High - High	0.61 Moderate Moderate Moderate	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07
In-group Bias (IGB)	0.08 Low - Low	0.07 Low - Low	0.09 Low - Low	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Distrust of Others (DIS)	0.11 Moderate Moderate	0.10 Low - Moderate	0.12 Moderate Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06

Source: For Turkish leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003)

and dynamics determine how he acts politically, this influences how he perceives the political world. Though Erdoğan perceives politics as a particular problem at some point in time, he can also view it as a mass of relationships when that seems more appropriate to the context.

Another trait where significant differences can be observed across time within this context is in-group bias (IGB), a worldview in which a leader puts his group at the center of his perception of politics. Erdoğan's IGB score falls two standard deviations after the e-memorandum. His score on IGB before the electronic memorandum was sent is 0,07, where the standard deviation is 0,01. This score increases to 0,09 in the post-case period. Although both scores remain low compared to the world leaders' average Hermann's scheme, Erdoğan's increasing in-group bias is noteworthy.

This rise in scores implies a slight strengthening of his emotional attachment to his own group and an increasing tendency to put his group at the center. Erdoğan shows a higher inclination to perceive others as threats and enemies and to recognize the political system as a zero-sum game in which they might either win or lose. This makes him see politics as more conflictual than in the pre-e-memorandum period.

The difference between his scores in the pre- and post-terms of the e-memorandum reflects his changing perception of the world of politics from a more cooperative to a more conflictual one. This implies that compared to before, after the e-memorandum Erdoğan became a leader more inclined to realize threats in the political environment. Still, Erdoğan's score falls into both periods showing that he recognizes the world of politics to be more cooperative than threatening, although he conceives that he and his group may experience several context-specific conflicts, namely with the military.

The final trait that showed statistically important changes across time is distrust of others (DIS). Whilst Erdoğan's general score on this trait is 0,11 and puts him into the moderate category compared to that of the two norming groups consisting of 284 leaders from around the world and 6 from Turkey. The differences in Erdoğan's scores before and after the e-memorandum imply that his general tendency to have doubts about the motives and actions of others rose in time.

Before the military's intervention, it can be said that Erdoğan tended to recognize the conflicts he experienced as context-specific rather than general problems threatening his authority and position in politics. He was more likely to build working relationships, which could turn into opportunities to cope with the situation itself. Erdoğan's inclination to do so implies a change in a negative direction after the e-memorandum.

Erdoğan's distrust towards others rose following the military's electronic memorandum. Still, this increase did not put him into a high category when compared to other world leaders, but he became more distrustful when compared with the pre-memorandum period.

This rise in distrust indicates an increasing tendency to be more cautious about the actions and motives of others. It also implies a tendency to see politics more in terms of threats. Thus, Erdoğan appears more weary of the risks and dangers concerning information from others and external sources. This inevitably affected his behavior in the political environment and transformed him into a more vigilant leader who attaches more importance to trustworthiness and loyalty in the group.

Comparing Erdoğan's scores over the two periods, after the e-memorandum he became more likely to respond to a situation through increased suspicion of others, and others' motives and actions. His tendency to recognize any external stimuli as a potential danger rose as a natural consequence when contextual factors are taken into consideration. This difference and increase in scores reveal that Erdoğan had become a leader who in time adopted a more adversarial attitude toward situations and people that opposed his authority. In this specific context, these were people in the military that opposed his authority as an elected politician.

5.3.1.3 Discussion of Erdoğan's Response to E-memorandum

Erdoğan's scores during his interviews and speeches held before the e-memorandum period and those in the aftermath indicate that he appears to respond to situational differences and that he changes his actions in the political scene under the influence of contextual factors. The empirical results presented in the previous section are mostly

confirmed about his changing scores on TASK, IGB, and DIS. The reasons are explained in detail with specific examples below.

Erdoğan's one trait that changes in a significant way within the context is his decreasing task orientation. Erdoğan's general score on TASK categorizes him as a leader who might concentrate on dealing with problems or building relations to keep the group consciousness and morale high based on situational factors. Before the e-memorandum, Erdoğan appears to have a higher task orientation compared to after the e-memorandum. This implies that he perceives the political universe based on problems to be resolved. The empirical outputs show that Erdoğan as a leader is likely to focus on tasks; since he recognizes the politics about the struggles and conflicts he and his group deal with. First, the e-memorandum process represents one consequence of a long-lasting struggle between military and civil powers to become the upper hand throughout the history of Turkey. On the one hand, there is the military with its guardian role of protecting Kemalist principles and secularism. This supports the previous break that began with Turgut Özal and challenges the historical continuum once again. Another issue is that the Presidential residence is generally considered a symbol of secularism by the military (Warhola and Bezci, 2010); and a potential President with a wife wearing a headscarf was regarded as a danger to secularism by both the military and the Kemalists. So, Erdoğan by nominating Abdullah Gül without seeking consensus in different segments of society on this point angered high-level figures in the military (Görener and Uçal, 2011: 371). These three factors resulted in a context with which Erdoğan had to deal; and he reasonably recognized this situation as a particular problem since it was the first time in Turkish politics that the party in power had challenged the Turkish Armed Forces' apparent warning to intervene in politics. Right after Erdoğan and his group resolved the e-memorandum process, his task focus declined as the crisis meant that he focused more on fixing and maintaining relations.

In addition, the change in Erdoğan's pre- and post-case scores of on TASK can be confirmed by several other examples within the case. Before the e-memorandum, it can reasonably be claimed that Erdoğan as a leader tended to act as a task-master. During the Supreme Military Council meeting, for instance, he repeatedly added annotations to the decisions regarding the expulsion of the soldiers due to their

fundamentalist activities. He sustained this following the first step taken by Gül in the initial meeting. Thus, he can be considered leader who moves his group to solve a problem and insists on dealing with it until that problem is solved. The Council of Higher Education's (YÖK) Draft law might be marked as another task, though not a major one, for Erdoğan to concentrate on. Though he announced that he was ready to finalize the draft in a harmony with other parties' views, including that of the universities, Erdoğan's determination after a short while to pass it in Parliament illustrates that he recognized it as a problem that he solved within a certain scope and time.

During the post-memorandum, Erdoğan's score indicates a significant decrease compared to his scores for the pre-ememorandum term. An analysis of this case shows that Erdoğan became more focused on building relations than struggling with several difficulties. He spent more time trying to fix relations with the military afterward. For instance, Erdoğan's affirmative wording in the criminal complaint on Büyükanıt by the Chief Prosecutor can be evaluated as showing that he cared about building relationships with others despite the tension. However, this may be fallacious by itself and requires further research into their relations and opinions on the issue. Furthermore, Erdoğan's desire to call for an early election to justify his own and the party's power on people by people may show how much he listens to others. The reason behind this demand could be his wish to heighten his and his party's morale. This instance, from another perspective, can be read in a way that Erdoğan recognizes the e-memorandum as a major problem he faced throughout his political career and finds a solution to deal with it.

Another trait that indicates how Erdoğan empirically differentiates from himself within the context of the e-memorandum is his IGB. To explain the apparent rise in IGB scores requires underlining that Erdoğan's general profile with low scores on this trait makes him a leader who is less likely to place his group into the center of the political world. In the period before the release of the e-memorandum by the military, Erdoğan seemingly forced Gül's candidacy. In this case, it was he who concentrated more on his group and chose one of them to nominate. This expectedly resulted in various challenges and opposition from different segments of society. The Republic Protests, in which thousands of people gathered together in public places to show that

they supported the Republican system in Turkey, placed Erdoğan in a challenging position. The Turkish Armed Forces' electronic memorandum also challenged his authority to some degree.

An indication of Erdoğan's lower IGB bias before the e-memorandum and Republic protests was his willingness to finalize several laws compatible with others' views, such as the draft law of YÖK. Focusing on how Erdoğan behaves in the following process, however, may disprove such an inference. Erdoğan's underlined declarations on the headscarf issue and his political attitudes towards this subject (such as attending the official Receptions of May 19 without spouses with a headscarf) during the pre-memorandum period can also be used to suggest that Erdoğan sought to build relations with those who did not belong to his group.

In analyzing the increase following the post-case period, Erdoğan appears to be a leader with more favor towards his group because of whom he faced serious threats against his authority, and this necessarily strengthened his emotional attachment to his group. The post-case term indicates an apparent increase in Erdoğan's IGB scores, which highlights that he became much more attached to his group, unite his group, and focused on keeping morale high in his group. Erdoğan's call for early elections to reassure himself of his power based on the percentage of the votes he and his party would get can be illustrated as a political strategy to regain group spirit and unity. Considering the Presidential elections of 2007 and how Erdoğan struggled with both the opposition and other reactionary groups and communities who were against a president with Islamist roots, these rising IGB scores can be considered as an affirmative instance expected from his group. His call for the Presidency of Abdullah Gül, despite the protests against such a possibility, his focus on his group, and their chance to allow one from their group to become the President of Turkey confirms these empirical results.

The last trait that exhibits a significant increase over time is distrust towards others. Though the underlined changes appear to be minor, the discrepancy between Erdoğan's score during pre and post-case periods makes sense in the analysis of his leadership profile. The results show a small decrease in Erdoğan's DIS score, which reflects that he became more likely to build working relations during the pre-case period.

Assessing the change in Erdoğan's scores on DIS in this context implies that Erdoğan adapted himself to the situation motivated by the problem itself and that he better prepared himself against any sudden attack by other actors. His following statements about his group's relationship with the military in an interview with public broadcast station The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), confirm this: "We are in a much more positive process now in terms of military-government relations. At least, I can observe that the military is now more positive in launching internal probes when needed. I have to be open about it." In the same interview, Erdoğan expresses his political maneuver to minimize the risk of any challenges to their authority with the following words: "We have no such problem (of confidence). In the past, there were no weekly meetings with the chief of General Staff. We have started this process" (Turkish Daily News, 8 November 2009)

The e-memorandum process, therefore, can be considered a part of his learning process in which he experienced a situation where he needed to protect both himself and his group from controversy. His increasing distrust scores show that to achieve his goal, which was the presidency of Abdullah Gül, he became a leader who adapted his behavior to the requirements of the context and focused on building relationships as a strategy. This resulted in a decline in his task orientation.

After the memorandum, Erdoğan concentrated more on maintaining group spirit rather than focusing on the problems and being in constant need to deal with and solve them. Considering Erdoğan's willingness to build relations with others is illustrated in his attitude towards the rectors of the university who were against the draft law of YÖK. However, since Erdoğan's positive approach did not last long, this may not be underlined as an appropriate instance to justify that point.

During the post-memorandum, however, Erdoğan's score on DIS significantly increases, marking that his perception of the political environment became more threat-based. Focusing on the closure case of the AKP with the possibility of his ban from politics shortly after the e-memorandum process, such recognition of politics by Erdoğan can be justified. This rise in his DIS score, in addition, highlights that he became more attached to his group and placed it at the core of his understanding. For Erdoğan, the 'We and the others' dichotomy became stronger after this period. For instance, Erdoğan's call for early elections might also be interpreted as his way to

understand who is from his group and who is not and how much support he has from his constituency for his action. It might be concluded that Erdoğan with this vision is more prepared for any sudden attack, such as the closure case of the party, and is more closed, but ready to fight to survive by acting within the political universe.

5.3.2. Case Study 2: The Closure Case of the Justice and Development Party

5.3.2.1. Historical Background

The closure case of the AKP started on March 14, 1998, when the chief prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya handed an indictment to the Constitutional Court stating that AKP had become ‘the center of performances against secularism’. The indictment stated that the party should be closed and seventy-one people, including Erdoğan and Gül, should be banned from politics for five years.

In the indictment, following the introduction about the party closure action, there were some parts relating to secularity and the AKP, Erdoğan’s actions, Arınç’s actions, Gül’s activities, Çelik and other people’s actions from the party, the actions of AKP, the assessment of those actions, conclusion, and demands.²³ Several headings and examples about Erdoğan presented by Chief Prosecutor were started with the historical background of his political career, as “elected from the Welfare Party as the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Governor for five years; sentenced to prison for 10 months as a result of his speech in Siirt, which caused people to relate to grudge and hostility being a part of religious discrimination; banned from being a member of a political party as a result of that action by Political Party Law Number 2820 article 11, he became the founder member of AKP and soon he was chosen to be the president of the Party” (Hürriyet, 19 March 2008). In addition to those claims about Erdoğan in the indictment, there were several others, ten of which were about the Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdullah Gül in terms of “his actions and speeches against the secular country.” For instance, Gül’s speech on the 55th Anniversary of the Acceptance of the

²³ Retrieved December 16, 2012 from <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/439362.asp>

UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights were exemplified, in which he mentioned that “we insist on freedom of religion and expression; everyone must be able to live as they believe. Everyone should be safe, far away from fear and anxiety. They should be able to express what they think and live what they believe. Freedom of expression and elimination of torture and terrorism is our aim. The legislative arrangements on this will continue in a determined manner.” It also included Gül’s following explanations of other ‘headscarf’ issues in one of his interviews in the newspaper Akşam: “Just think that I have been fighting so much about freedom of thought and expression, and it is demanded from me not to fight for my own wife’s rights as the closest to me. How could it be possible? As the AKP, we view the ‘turban issue’ on the basis of freedom of thought and expression, and deal with it within this aspect. About these turban discussions, I am one of those who is in a very difficult position. This became clearer in the Leyla Şahin case in the Human Rights Court. I need to support the perspective of the government and current laws, so, I am stuck between my conscience and government works. However, when people see the turban on the basis of freedom of thought and expression, people like me will no longer be stuck in between their conscience and state affairs. I believe in that.” (Author’s Translation).

Furthermore, the indictment included eighteen allegations about local governments. No doubt that in all those proofs, some words of Erdoğan held a significant place. For example, on May 2003, what Erdoğan stated during an interview with the Newspaper in Malaysia, New Straits Times was underlined: “As a modern Islamic country, Turkey can be the example of the harmony of civilizations.” In addition, the important parts of his explanations at Esenboğa Airport in December 2005 in response to the question whether it was a misunderstanding or if he had said “The main factor that connects ethnic factors in Turkey is religion”: “There are around 30 ethnic factors in Turkey. You always write about it too. Religion is cement in Turkey where 99% of the population is Muslim”. On the headscarf issue, his words based on his experiences in response to two Turkish girls in Ukraine who asked for the equivalency problem for the universities took place in the indictment: “I know this topic very well. When my child succeeded to enter Bosphorus University, her grade was decreased just because she graduated from a Religious Vocational High School, and she could not enter that university. My daughters could not have their education in Turkey just because they were wearing a ‘turban’. We are the victims of this issue as a family. We are against

this kind of discrimination. However, your request for a solution must be realized with the participation of all political parties, not just with our own step. I do not want to deal with this situation on our own, because then tension occurs. I do not want to cause tension in the country.”

Following the submission of the indictment, it was sent to the members on March 18. A reporter concluded the pre-investigation report on the folder on March 29, and could not find any drawback in it. On March 31, 2008, members of the Constitutional Court discussed the indictment and report. They decided to accept it in consensus, excluding the part related to the case of Abdullah Gül. The Presidency post which Gül stood for and how it might cause problems with regard to the legal procedure were discussed at length and that part was accepted by a majority of votes. The members of the Constitutional Court supported such a decision that presidents could be judged on their activities belonging to the period before they become president.

When they received the indictment, the AKP prepared a pre-defense. However, it should be underlined that during this crisis time the AKP decided on a strategy for how to deal with the situation. In this period, with Erdoğan’s coordination, the relations with other actors of politics, the direction of public perception, and coordination of the court period were planned to be dealt with. On May 1, 2008, with a folder of 98 defenses and 35 attachments, it was stated that the case is not one of law but of politics. The other part of the defense examined the freedom of political parties and their borders in democracies. In the following parts, it was explained that the case was devoid of a legislative base and its content was wrong, fictional, and warped.

Following the submission of the AKP’s pre-defense, Prosecutor Yalçinkaya stated his opinion about the case to the Constitutional Court. The AKP did not utilize the determined time of legal term and submitted their exact defense to the court on June 17, 2008. In this defense, the chief prosecutor’s opinions on secularity were criticized by the Party and it was underlined that the claims were not proven. In addition, they stated that they were not against secularity and declared why they should not be closed according to the European Court of Human Rights. The allegations were said to be of no truth and in the defense responses to claims about Erdoğan were attached.

On July 30, 2008, in the press conference of the result of the Constitutional Court closure case, President Haşim Kılıç stated that it was decided not to close the AKP;

however, it was decided to cut half of the AKP's treasury grants due to the party being the center of anti-secular performances. The permanent closure of the Party, therefore, was rejected, and the cutting of the treasury grant was decided on by consensus without Kılıç's vote.

5.3.2.2 Contextualizing Erdoğan's Leadership Profile

When Erdoğan's general profile is put into the context of the AKP's closure case in 2008, the scores on more than 57 % of the traits (four out of seven) did not remain the same across time. This implies that Erdoğan is responsive to such a context change. In this section of the study, a discussion of the influence of the contextual factors on Erdoğan and his most likely actions under such circumstances will be presented concerning the statistically significant changes in his trait scores.

Table 13 summarizes Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's scores, those in his general profile, those during the interviews held until the closure case ended, and those after this process. A comparison of Erdoğan's scores in both the pre and post-case periods reveals that only three traits are stable, self-confidence (SC), need-for-power (PWR), and conceptual complexity (CC). The other four traits, however, show differences across time. These traits are beliefs in his ability to control events (BACE), task focus (TASK), in-group bias (IGB), and distrust of others (DIS). The stable traits represent the characteristics of Erdoğan that are responsive to situational changes, while the changing scores on the other four traits imply that Erdoğan adapted to the situation he experienced at the time and modified these traits in his behaviors and attitudes since the closure case of his party ended on July 30, 2008.

The following section presents a detailed evaluation and discussion of the differences between Erdoğan's score on the aforementioned four traits during the pre-and post-case periods based on Table 13.

Table 13. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Personality Traits in the Context 2 – The Closure Case of the Justice and Development Party

LTA Characteristics	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's scores (General)	Erdoğan's Scores During Pre-Case 2	Post-Case 2	Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	0.38 High - Moderate	0.39 High - Moderate	0.37 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.34 Standard Deviation: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 Standard Deviation: 0.05
The Need for Power (PWR)	0.25 Moderate - Moderate	0.25 Moderate - Moderate	0.26 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.25 Standard Deviation: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.58 Moderate - Moderate	0.58 Moderate - Moderate	0.57 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 Standard Deviation: 0.06
Self-Confidence (SC)	0.30 Low - Moderate	0.28 Low - Moderate	0.34 Low - Moderate	Mean: 0.42 Standard Deviation: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 Standard Deviation: 0.10
Task Focus (TASK)	0.68 Moderate - Moderate	0.72 High - High	0.60 Moderate - Moderate	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 Standard Deviation: 0.07
In-group Bias (IGB)	0.08 Low - Low	0.07 Low - Low	0.10 Low - Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 Standard Deviation: 0.05
Distrust of Others (DIS)	0.11 Moderate - Moderate	0.12 Moderate - Moderate	0.10 Low - Moderate	Mean: 0.12 Standard Deviation: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 Standard Deviation: 0.06

Source: For Turkish leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003)

** If a score falls into at least one standard deviation lower/higher than the mean of the reference group, then it is evaluated as 'low'/'high'.

The difference in Erdoğan's scores on BACE during the closure case of AKP and after it ended suggests that Erdoğan was more likely to influence what happens in the world of politics in the pre-case period. That marks him as a leader who is less likely to delegate tasks, but more likely to take charge and responsibility of political activities. This allows him to wait and see how the situation changes and evaluate the dynamics. Until then, he was less inclined to make a deal with the others or to compromise for the sake of what is good for his group. It implies that in the pre-case period when Erdoğan decided what to do depending on the situation, he challenged others and the environment itself and insisted on achieving his goal.

Though Erdoğan's score on BACE increased to 0,39 (compared to its score in his general profile), it significantly decreased to 0,37 after July 30, 2008. This decrease shows that Erdoğan became more moderate in his belief in his ability to control events in time. This illustrates Erdoğan as a leader who may act based on contextual requirements. From this point of view, Erdoğan seems more likely to react to the situation in the post-case period, although he still was a leader who liked to take responsibility for anything. This decrease in his BACE scores makes him more curious about the context-specific dynamics and the hidden motivations lying behind the apparent scene. This, furthermore, enabled him to either take the initiative or compromise if required under the circumstances he experiences. Based on the situational parameters, he can take the position at the top or any other stage of the decision-making process.

One other trait that differed significantly in context is TASK. Although Erdoğan's score on TASK in his general profile is 0,68 and falls into the moderate scale based on the means of the two norming groups. It significantly increases (by around one standard deviation of the reference group of Turkish leaders) to 0,72, which makes him a leader high on this trait with reference to both norming groups. Conversely, his score decreases (by more than two standard deviations of the Turkish leader group and one standard deviation of the 284 world leaders) down to 0,60, which brings him to the average line with the other leaders in both reference groups. Interpreting the

discrepancy between these scores in different contexts requires an understanding of the contextual dynamics.

During the period in which the closure case of Erdoğan's party was in process, his high scores on TASK show that his only focus was to deal with the context-specific problem. Despite being moderate on this trait in general, in that case, and under its extraordinary conditions, Erdoğan, acted as a leader with an emphasis on problems and threats. This also entailed his perception of the political world being a challenging environment consisting of only problems and the means to overcome them. Until the circumstances were normalized, his scores suggest that he ignored making all people happy and that he was less interested in what others thought and how they feel. These were how he responded to what was happening at that time.

From the conclusion of the closure case of the AKP Erdoğan's score on TASK decreases to the average interval of the leaders in both reference groups. This may be interpreted as a sign of a normalization period for Erdoğan. Following the resolution of the problems, Erdoğan returned to his moderate scores on this trait because the situation might allow him to adopt his prior manner.

In-group bias (IGB) is another of Erdoğan's traits that changed in the pre-and post-case periods in this context. Focusing on Erdoğan's score on IGB during and after the second closure case of the AKP, the extent to which he centralizes his group under such situational circumstances is analyzed. Although his score in general on this trait makes Erdoğan a leader with a low IGB (0,08), it seems to be 0,07 before the case ended. This pre-case score of Erdoğan on IGB increases to around 0,10 in the post-case period which makes him a moderate leader in this trait since. The significant differences in Erdoğan's score over time show how he is most likely to act under the conditions of this case.

Though small, the decrease of his scores from 0,08 to 0,07 in the pre-case period implies his tendency to focus more on the relationships and opportunities that can be seized in the changing situational factors at that time. However, based on such discrepancy, Erdoğan cannot be said to be a leader who denied his groups' weaknesses

during the pre-case period. Rather, this decrease suggests that he was open enough to confront the good and bad aspects of his group. His low scores in this trait underline that his tendency to recognize the political world by fundamental categories decreased, while his will to classify all people around him as ‘from us or not’ rose in the period he and his group experienced the AKP’s closure case.

Following the end of this case, his scores on IGB apparently increase to almost 0,10 and move him closer to the average score of the leaders from the two norming groups of the study. It shows his increasing attachment to his group from one perspective, and from another, a potential inclination to recognize other people as potential external enemies based on situational factors. The differences in his score on this trait in two different periods and, thus, contexts (pre- and post-case periods) reveal a real change in his recognition of politics as a cooperative place rather than just an environment full of dangers depending on the situation.

The last trait that indicates significant differences in scores across time in this context is distrust of others (DIS). In general, Erdoğan appears to be a moderate leader in general based on his average score (0,11) compared with those of the two norming groups of this study.. This score, however, differs in the pre-case and post-case periods. While his general distrust toward other groups and people increased to 0,12 before the closure case of the AKP ended, it slightly decreases to 0,10 following its end.

During the pre-case period, the small increase in DIS to 0,12 marks Erdoğan’s rising tendency to doubt what others do and what motivation they have under time related conditions. From one perspective, it also shows his suspicions about people as potential challengers or competitors for his position. This suggests that Erdoğan became more sensitive to any criticisms during that period. All these factors made him recognize the world of politics as a place with threats and dangers.

The minor decrease in Erdoğan’s scores on DIS in the post-case period shows that he began to perceive the problems as context-specific, instead of being part of the threatening world of politics. His scores on this trait at that time suggest that he is most likely to focus on opportunities and building relationships after the case ended in July

2008. This shows that the end of this case made Erdoğan less prone to suspecting others, but more likely to understand their motives and opinions.

5.3.2.3 Discussion of Erdoğan's Response to the Closure Case of the Justice and Development Party

A comparison of Erdoğan's scores based on his interviews and speeches held during the pre-case period with those occurring in the post-period suggests that Erdoğan had partly changed his style since he (and his party) witnessed this case. His changing scores on BACE, TASK, IGB, and DIS largely confirm that and the differences in each trait are exemplified in detail below.

Erdoğan's higher BACE scores during the pre-case period than the post-one can be seen as a signal of his stronger desire and demand to influence and control the environment. In evaluating the increase in Erdoğan's BACE scores during the period before the constitutional court announced its verdict, it should be highlighted that the only way for Erdoğan to maintain his position and remain an actor in the world of politics appeared to be to challenge any action by the court to ban the AKP for its violation of secularist principles based on the headscarf amendments (articles 10 and 42) of the Constitution. Considering this fact, the increase in his score on this trait shows his decreasing tendency to respect the constraints and to work within the accepted parameters to achieve his goals, and thus, explicitly indicates how he was most likely to respond to such threats against him on the political scene. Considering that period, Erdoğan seemingly preferred to stay calm and keep focused on his job during the trial. Following the court's verdict not to close the AKP but to cut the state funding to the party by half, many defended that the court managed to find a middle ground in which satisfied the secularists and AKP members (Göl, 2009). In this context, Erdoğan's scores on BACE decrease depending on two interrelated factors, the disappearance of such a major problem and the new context with fewer threats against his position taking shape after the end of the case. The decrease in his score at that time can be accounted for by his building new relationships with the other actors on the political scene and by his increasing tendency to work with others.

Considering the differences in Erdoğan's TASK score in these two different periods, Erbakan's increasing level of focus on problems during the pre-case period implies that he only focused on the problem he faced in this process. His decreasing score on TASK at the post-case times however, underlies his increasing tendency to either concentrate on tasks or relationships depending on the political situation he finds himself in. These two outputs of the analysis can be taken as easily verifiable ones. Focusing on the closure case of the AKP, the potential risk was to ban him from politics and close his party. While considering the requirements of closing a political party based on Turkish law, the AKP's fate was in the hands of two-thirds of the eleven members of the Constitutional Court (Jenkins, 2008:9). Following the final decision of the Court that warned and fined the AKP around \$20 million, Erdoğan's scores are normalized compared to that of his profile.

In evaluating the decrease of Erdoğan's IGB scores before the closure case ended, it can be highlighted that, especially during this period, he frequently referred to this case as one against 'the will of the people' (Aliriza, 2008). This can, however, be perceived as a rhetorical strategy he employed to emphasize his group's power. It can also be read as his way of showing that he works for all people rather than those around him and in his party. Both might be considered instances suggesting that Erdoğan was seemingly less inclined to see the world in terms of 'us and them', especially until his ban from politics and the closure case of his party came onto the agenda. Considering the statistically significant increase in Erdoğan's IGB score in time within this context, it should also be pointed out that the rise in scores on this trait brings him to a moderate position after the end of the closure case of AKP. This certifies any instances that Erdoğan who is less likely to centralize his group in his political actions and decisions in the pre-case period has learned from what he experienced, and transformed into a leader who focuses more on his group following the end of the case. Putting into perspective the AKP's second closure case, the differences in Erdoğan's DIS demonstrate that although he is less likely to trust people and any incoming information from them or the environment during the case period, this general feeling of doubt and suspicion decreases in the period after the case was finalized. Several instances might confirm that. Focusing on the period in which

Erdoğan faced the possible closure of the AKP he led and a possible ban from politics for five years together with seventy other members of his group, the rise in scores on DIS can be interpreted as a natural outcome of the contextual factors. Parallel to such reasoning, the decrease in Erdoğan's scores on DIS over time can be evaluated as a part of his normalization process, which ends up with his returning to the score in his general profile.



CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION: COMPARISON OF THE LEADERSHIP PROFILES OF NECMETTİN ERBAKAN & RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN

This dissertation examined how two leaders having similar Islamist backgrounds and ideologies differed in their responses to similar political constraints imposed on them with military interventions and party closures. Furthermore, the dissertation argues that the different responses by Erbakan and Erdoğan can be understood better if we comparatively examine their leadership traits. The two leaders are considerably different in leadership traits and thus their responses are expected to be very different as well when compared. Finally, the dissertation argues that LTA has proven to be a useful method to study the relations between the Turkish military and Islamist elites, especially between 1990 and 2010 in a systematic and comparative manner. This chapter will compare the profiles of the two leaders and how they may have affected their divergent responses to similar crises. Moreover, the chapter also compares the degree of change in the two leaders before and after the crises to see how stable or consistent they have been in their responses across contexts.

6.1. Comparing Leadership Traits of Erbakan and Erdoğan

In comparing the leadership profiles of Erbakan and Erdoğan, Table 14 summarizes the LTA results for both leaders again also indicating the degree of change before and after each case. First of all, when their general profiles are compared, the two leaders show differences in six of the seven leadership traits: BACE, PWR, CC, TASK, IGB and DIS. Second, they have different responses to similar military threats and different

leadership traits with a statistically significant discrepancy in their scores before and after the crises. Those are BACE, PWR, and SC for Erbakan; and TASK, IGB, and DIS for Erdoğan. Third, both leaders have diverse reactions to the similar party closure constraints and the scores of five traits for Erbakan and four for Erdoğan do not remain constant over this political constraint. These traits are BACE, CC, SC, IGB, and DIS for Erbakan; and BACE, TASK, IGB, and DIS for Erdoğan.

While Erbakan's general scores in **BACE** show him to be moderate, Erdoğan's BACE score is high, one standard deviation above, and the highest among all Turkish leaders. Furthermore, while Erbakan's BACE score fluctuates across cases and contexts, Erdoğan's BACE is consistently high and very stable. Thus, BACE is one of the key scores that distinguish Erdoğan from Erbakan. Erdoğan's high score on this trait shows him to be a leader who is more likely to believe that he can influence the political world through his political actions and decisions and makes him actively involved in the decision-making process. Unlike Erdoğan, Erbakan's less consistent and lower score on this trait indicates that he is less likely to recognize himself as influential and capable of shaping political outcomes and that he may prefer to pause to see how the situation is likely to play out. Considering how this affects their behaviors during the respective crises, Erdoğan will almost certainly challenge the constraints. On the contrary, Erbakan may prefer to work within the contextual parameters and compromise or seek consensus with others if and when necessary. Erbakan's score might also lead him to challenge constraints, if the situational dynamics of the crisis period necessitate. Erdoğan is less likely to delegate any steps of the decision-making process, while Erbakan may not be that involved personally.

Before and after February 28, the difference in Erbakan's scores shown in Table 14 indicates that his personal sense of control over what occurs in the political world altered. While his BACE score climbs more than his general profile before the case, it lowers likewise after February 28. Erbakan's pre-case scores suggest that he was more active in policy-making and he had greater convictions about gaining control of political conditions. Right before February 28, Erbakan experienced successful years in his professional career at the elections of 1994 and 1995 and his following term of

office as prime minister between 1996 and 1997. His eagerness to actively participate in decision-making was considerably based on his accelerating power in the decision-making process in politics. Furthermore, his BACE scores indicate him as being more inclined to accept responsibility and risk in order to take charge on a given topic if he believed that the political circumstances forced him to do so. Despite criticism from the Chief of Staff and the media, his frequent travels to other Muslim countries to strengthen dialogue and relations can be given an appropriate example. Erbakan's decreasing BACE scores over the post-February 28 period allude to the fact that he became more sensitive to contextual constraints after losing faith in his capacity to influence political events. Erbakan turned into a leader who regarded himself as less effective and capable of altering the world of politics. Moreover, Erbakan was more unwilling to take risks or make tough decisions. Such a decrease in his BACE scores clearly reflects Erbakan's position as a leading figure who lost political power during the February 28 era and was unable to secure the support he sought during the post-case period. Given Erbakan's success in the 1990s, as evidenced in the elections, and his experiences following February 28, the shift in his BACE scores Erbakan within the military case seems to be reasonable.

Throughout the pre-and post-case **e-Memorandum**, Erdoğan's BACE scores show no change. This demonstrates his ability to operate within contextual limits, as well as to cooperate with others in order to reach an agreement.

Before and after the crisis of **party closures**, the difference between Erbakan's BACE scores is almost two standard deviations. This means that Erbakan is more likely to affect and control events and the environment during the pre-party closure phase. In contrast to the 'wait and watch' strategy, Erbakan is more inclined to take initiative and risks in his political activities, and more willing to confront the situational variables forming the political conjuncture to accomplish his political aims. Erbakan's BACE scores during post-closure period indicate that he became more moderate in his belief in ability to control events in time; thus, less likely to have responsibility for certain political issues and can take a position in different decision-making roles, depending on the situation experienced in the world of politics. These findings

corroborate Erbakan's behavior in the political realm in this scenario. Given the time constraint, he insisted on seeking the views of all stakeholders, including, if feasible, parliamentarians, on the crucial February 28th National Security Council decisions. Taking the initiative and accepting the potential risks, he spoke with the General Secretary of the Council and requested more information, as well as the leaders of the other political parties and all other relevant political stakeholders. In the post-case era, when Erbakan was banned from politics, he took fewer risks or initiatives. During this time, Erbakan's desire for peaceful interaction within his group and with others increased, particularly in the post-closure era. Despite the growing tensions inside the FP between the reformist and conservative wings, he paid a visit to Erdoğan, a significant figure among the young reformists, and stated that the aforementioned conflict between them and within the party was an illusion.

Erdoğan's BACE score, like Erbakan's, increased during pre-party closure period. Although this increase may be statistically insignificant, the evident fall in his post-case BACE scores cannot be ignored since it sees him transform into a moderate leader with an average score among Turkish leaders. Erdoğan's higher BACE scores during the pre-case period can be seen as an indication of his growing expectation and need to affect and control his surroundings. This rise occurs prior to the announcement of the constitutional court's decision. Therefore, it can be claimed that the only way for Erdoğan to maintain his position and remain a political actor was to challenge any action by the court to ban the AKP for its violation of secularist principles. Erdoğan's high scores on this trait reflect his diminishing willingness to respect constraints and to work within the existing boundaries to achieve his aims. However, his moderate scores during the post-case period can be considered the outcome of two political factors: the absence of significant political obstacles and a new environment in which fewer challenges can emerge to pose potential risks. The decline in his score at the time may be attributed to his developing new ties with other players on the political scene, as well as his greater willingness to collaborate with them.

Comparing the two leaders on **PWR**, Erdoğan scored moderately consistently across the cases, while Erbakan's score fluctuates between moderate and high across the

cases. The two leaders are motivated by power, but compared to others this is not the main motivation. It's hard to say that this would be a trait that would distinguish the two leaders and how they responded differently to the crises.

While Erbakan's pre-February 28 score on PWR seems to be high, his post-case score drops to the average interval. This suggests that Erbakan had a reasonable tendency to affect or influence political events, individuals around him, and the political climate itself prior to February 28; and that this sensitivity and reactivity had declined. Erbakan's behaviors throughout the crisis are explained and confirmed by before and after case scores. Before the crises, Erbakan can be portrayed as a political leader who enjoyed increasing popularity and public attention. When the RP become the largest party in the Turkish parliament by strong poll results in both local and national elections, this expectedly enhanced his relationships both inside his group and with other players. On one hand, he improved his relationships with other parties and party leaders as the coalition partner at the national level. Similarly, in order to achieve his political goals, Erbakan internationally attempted to enhance relationships with other Muslim countries as a result of his desire to influence and control events, others around him, and the political climate, as consistent with the leader's PWR scores. In the aftermath of the February 28th intervention, confronting the military's restrictions made Erbakan less willing to accept responsibility or run the danger of expressing his political beliefs. The decline in his post-February 28 PWR scores indicates that he felt the need to work with others in decision-making processes and he lacked the confidence to make tough decisions alone. This explains why Erbakan went on a consultation tour with the Secretary General of the National Security Council and other party leaders during the post-February 28th period, hoping to find a way out for himself and his party by seeking the support of external actors. This reflects Erbakan's evolving self-perception in the pre-and post-case periods. While his higher PWR score during the pre-case period reflects his strong inclination to place himself closer to the core of the political world, his lower score in the post-February 28th term demonstrates that he prioritizes not only others but also his group over himself and used the power of collectivity rather than the individual spirit. This explains his emphasis, during his group meetings in the post-February 28th period that "they are chosen" "as the party"

and clearly asserting that "those chosen by the majority is their party" and that "the party has its own ideas as a group."

Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's PWR scores show little change in the e-Memorandum periods, remaining stable within the average all along. This suggests that leaders with moderate PWR, like Erdoğan, would respond in accordance with the circumstances, positioning themselves either in the center of politics or as a victim of the situation depending on the contextual elements.

One of the most critical combined traits to understand their respective responses to the crises is the combination of **BACE and PWR**. Erbakan in general is inclined to challenge constraints in particular situations. The political environment in which Erbakan finds himself largely influences whether he challenges the constraints directly or indirectly. In other words, Erbakan is more likely to seek a direct or indirect impact on the environment depending on the political scene and the dynamics of politics. Thus, for Erbakan, the context is crucial in how he approaches confrontation. In comparison, Erdoğan's scores indicate that he is high on BACE and moderate on PWR. These results suggest that Erdoğan primarily pushes the limits and challenges constraints. Such leaders are less inclined to delegate decision-making responsibilities. As these leaders are confident in their ability to affect events, people, and the environment, they are more inclined to take strong and forceful initiative. Similarly, Erdogan can be indicated as a leader who challenges the conditions that take precedence when confronted with a crisis; nonetheless, Erdoğan places a high emphasis on the requirements of the circumstances.

Within **the military cases**, Erbakan becomes a leader who may "challenge constraints", based on his combined trait of BACE and PWR, before the February 28th intervention. Such a tendency changed in the aftermath of the February 28th intervention, and he became more respectful of limitations or questioned them indirectly. Given the political atmosphere before the February 28th intervention, Erbakan was in the midst of his most powerful period in political history, and it was the appropriate time to actively pursue his political objectives. For a leader of Erbakan's strength, the pre-February 28 era was when the conditions were most

favorable to challenging the limits. Regardless of how much criticism he received for his attempts to build the D-8 and improve connections with other Muslim countries, Erbakan knew what he wanted and took action in that direction. Erbakan's behaviors in the pre-crisis period demonstrate this. Regardless of the extent of criticisms, Erbakan participated in a series of preparatory meetings in which D-8's objectives, organs, and areas of cooperation were clearly defined, until its official announcement in 1997. Erbakan's advocacy for the development of Muslim countries and his conviction in the strength of business relations built through collaboration with them was an example where he challenged the constraints. On the other hand, Erbakan's combined trait scores in the post-case period positioned him as a leader who may challenge, depending on the context. After February 28, Erbakan lost his popularity and political authority he had and entered a new phase in which he could push the limits of his political activity within the stated limitations and parameters. However, the circumstances did not allow him to challenge and he ultimately backed down.

Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan is more consistent in this combined trait of BACE and PWR; and his challenging reaction remains constant throughout the cases. As is his typical propensity, both before and after the e-memorandum, he is a leader who pushes the limits, sometimes too directly, but often skillful in both direct and indirect influence understanding what he wants and taking the necessary measures to achieve his aims.

It is noteworthy that Erbakan's reaction to the constraints he has experienced resulted from the Prime Ministry to his ban from the political arena, while the party closure threat did not end up with the similar scenario for Erdoğan and he did not lose, instead gained power. Although the outcomes differ, it is significant to highlight that the leaders' responsiveness to the threat of party closure is identical.

Considering **CC**, while Erdoğan is moderate in CC across cases, Erbakan's score is either one standard deviation below the average or moderate. Erbakan's low score suggests that he is less likely to view the political world from a variety of perspectives in order to understand why and how an event may have transpired. Instead, he is more inclined to view reality via the lenses of his preconceived conceptual categories. By contrast, Erdoğan's moderate scores show that he may interpret the political

circumstances, instruments, actors, and instances in a broader and more varied way than Erbakan. Leaders like Erdoğan can act quickly and decisively under pressure, as he consistently does, but they may also take their time to consider, analyze, and comprehend diverse outside stimuli and information. Considering this scores' impact on handling of crises, the ability to either act quickly or take time depending on the situational requirements makes Erdoğan more flexible and pragmatic and maybe a step forward than the other leaders during the crises periods. Considering their CC scores, Erbakan's desire to hear different political perspectives and his capacity to assess this data are restricted; whereas Erdoğan's moderate results on the CC indicate that he may be more inclined to access information from his surroundings. Leaders with low CC scores, like Erbakan, have a tendency to have preconceived notions regarding subjects, individuals, and circumstances, whereas the decision-making process of leaders like Erdoğan is likely to be more adaptable to the changing circumstances and outside information. Expectedly, Erdoğan's adaptability puts him in an advantageous position, particularly during crisis moments.

Although CC scores do not show any statistically significant change in the context of military threats, this case is different at least for Erbakan (not for Erdoğan) within the context of party closures. When the leaders faced legal and bureaucratic threats, Erbakan's CC scores fluctuated, while Erdoğan remained stable.

The difference between Erbakan's pre-and post-party closure scores on CC is almost one standard deviation different as can be seen in Table 14. Erbakan's low CC scores in general remain low throughout the party closure timeframe. This describes Erbakan as a leader who perceives and analyzes the political world with limited external information. On the other hand, during the post- party closure period, his CC scores climb to a moderate level. Given what Erbakan and his party have gone through in the aftermath of their party's demise, the difference in his CC scores explains the leader's interactions with his close circle and all other actors to define, comprehend, and analyze this particular political threat better in taking many considerations and influential components into account from different point of views. These interactions may have increased his CC. This also shows that Erbakan has become a leader in the

post party closure case who views political events and motivations from different angles, rather than a black-and-white perspective. To reduce the uncertainty as much as he can in the political realm, Erbakan searched for contextual knowledge from the political environment for decision-making. Erbakan frequently had meetings with other party leaders, other major players, and within his group to get more information from them, and sought a solution together with them unlike how he behaved before in some instances such as the D8 case

SC is not one of the leadership traits that differentiate Erbakan from Erdoğan. When we look at the combination of **CC and SC**, Erbakan exhibits a leader profile closed to contextual knowledge. This suggests that he is less capable of viewing political problems from a variety of perspectives and is less receptive to the thoughts, feelings, desires, demands, and requirements of others. Leaders like Erbakan have a propensity to dismiss contextual information from the outside world, arguing that they already know what, why, and how to do things and are unwilling to make changes to them. As a result, they primarily need to persuade others that their viewpoints and behavior are suitable. They frequently assert that any political issues or challenges are the result of contextual elements rather than a result of their poor judgement or decision-making. Political action by leaders like Erbakan is motivated by clear political purposes, and in order to get there, they follow certain rules and apply certain tactics. Erdoğan's SC scores are one standard deviation lower than the Turkish average, but higher than the average of world leaders. From this perspective, Erdoğan's low SC shows that he is a leader who is concerned with maintaining a positive reputation. Depending on the political context in which they are encountered, individuals search for other people's endorsement or opposition to a variety of subjects. Leaders of this type analyze the information they have obtained concerning an issue before they make a final judgment. Since it is difficult to predict how Erdoğan will approach a particular subject, he may be viewed as having an inconsistent leadership style. In contrast to SC, Erdoğan's scores on CC are comparable to the means of both norming groups, compared to Erbakan. This implies that Erdoğan adapts his political behavior to the circumstances. In other words, these types of leaders consider the opinions and ideas of others when they describe, comprehend, and analyze the political reality. Furthermore, when

particular topics are involved, they politically behave according to predetermined mental categories. Therefore, moderate leaders on CC like Erdoğan take action right away and hold off on making decisions until they have seen some political results. Based on contextual considerations and his moderate scores on SC and CC, Erdoğan can be classified as either open or closed to the information depending on the issue and the context at the time. It should be noted that, in time Erdoğan's SC score increased significantly though (Cuhadar et al 2017) which made Erdoğan closed to information in time. However, during the time examined he was more open to information compared to Erbakan. Leaders with moderate scores in these combined traits tend to be sensitive to their surroundings and are more willing to perceive what other people would like to say when the political context permits them to do so. If their position or political future is in jeopardy; however, they can quickly change, closing themselves off to any external advice or opinions from others' views, perceptions, and feelings about them and the issue. The challenges Erdoğan faced after 2013 changed him to be a closed leader (Cuhadar et al 2017). Leaders like Erdoğan are likely to listen to other people's opinions, wants, desires, and expectations, but only in particular circumstances and for a limited period of time. They are leaders who alternate between emphasizing the accomplishment of a predetermined objective and concentrating on external circumstances or indications. In these situations, these types of leaders primarily work to persuade others of the success of their ideas and the relevance of their actions within a particular political scenario.

Considering two leaders' combined trait scores (**CC and SC**) **within the context of military threat**, Erbakan appears to be a leader who has always been closed to information in this context, though his degree of openness seems to be greater before February 28. Given the political climate in pre-February 28, it is plausible to conclude that Erbakan was more open to contextual information before the February 28th intervention. It is primarily because this highlights a period in which Erbakan has met with both members of his group and other actors outside the group in order to hear all parties' thoughts and acquire their ideas regarding the process. Every opinion that comes in the pre-February 28 phase has a different importance for Erbakan since it can lead him and his party to a feasible solution. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's degree of

openness to contextual information stays unchanged throughout the case since his CC and SC scores do not alter by a statistically significant margin.

Concentrating on **the context of party closures**, Erbakan again appears to be a leader who is more likely to be closed to contextual knowledge, based on his overall profiles' low CC and SC scores. However, his propensity shifted as a result of his increasing CC score in post-party closure. Despite the fact that Erbakan's general profile indicates him as a leader closed to information in pre-party closure period, he becomes receptive to information following party closure threat. Considering the effects of party closure threat that Erbakan experienced, it is evident how critical it would be for the leader to establish any new relations, to gain any new knowledge, or any new perspective from which he can look to overcome its negative consequences. This shift describes how Erbakan behaved in order to regain his political presence, whether inside his own group or outside, to have legal advice, opinions and/or proposals of different parties.

Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's openness to contextual information remains constant throughout party closure case since his CC and SC scores do not vary by a statistically significant margin.

Considering the leaders' **TASK** scores, Erdoğan is moderate while Erbakan's scores fall below the average. Low-scoring leaders like Erbakan emphasize relationships and see maintaining the morale of their group as their primary responsibility. Leaders like Erdoğan with a moderate score on this trait focus on dealing with a specific issue their group has and the tools needed to address it, or preserve relationships within the group, depending on what is essential within the political environment they find themselves in. Erbakan is a leader who is more likely to solely be concerned with fostering long-term relationships with others and preserving a positive sense of community. For Erdoğan, the political universe refers to a problem with its solution, whereas for Erbakan it simply refers to a peaceful world. A leader with a low score in this trait, like Erbakan, would constantly want to know the mood and interests of the people in their group, whereas a leader with a higher score, like Erdoğan, places more emphasis on how the people in their group feel and what they need in order to achieve their predetermined goals. Given the effects of these leaders' scores during crisis periods,

the major question may be whether the root of the problem is based on internal/group ties or relationships with others. Depending on the nature of the constraint, these scores of leaders may place them either in an advantageous or unfavourable situation or in disadvantageous positions in handling of crises, which is explained in detail below.

Concentrating on **the military threat context**, Erbakan seems to be more consistent than Erdoğan with regard to his unchanged **TASK** scores both before and after the cases, with no statistically significant variations. Unlike him, the scores of Erdoğan, as represented by Table 14, for all TASK, IGB, and DIS show statistically significant change over time during the pre and/or post-**e-memorandum**.

Erdoğan's TASK score declines to a moderate level in the post-e-memorandum context, while Erbakan's TASK score remains average all along. Once again, compared to Erdoğan, Erbakan portrays a leader that is more stable and consistent across different cases and times. Erdoğan's changing scores suggest that while he appears to be a leader with high task focus prior to April 27th, 2007, this shifts to moderate after the e-memorandum period, when he primarily spends his energy either solving the problem or maintaining group spirit and morale based on the situation he encounters. The e-memorandum process might be seen as the result of a long-running struggle between military and civil authorities to get the upper hand in Turkish politics. This pre-case scores of Erdoğan portrays him as a leader insisting on solving a problem until it was handled; and explains his behaviors such as not stepping back to nominate Abdullah Gül, as a president candidate with a wife wearing a headscarf or constantly appended notes to the decisions about the expulsion of soldiers from the military based on their fundamentalist practices during the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (Görener and Ucal 2011; Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 14). Erdoğan's scores in this trait become moderate after the military published the e-memorandum; and he increasingly focused on keeping everyone happy while still remaining willing to make choices for the welfare of his group. His focus shifted towards relationships rather than accomplishing tasks. Erdoğan's meeting with Chief of Staff Yasar Büyükanıt in May 2007, right after the crisis, and his following regular meetings with the military can be noted as key examples of proof (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 15). In affecting

the handling of crises, the difference between Erdoğan's high scores in the pre-case contexts and moderate ones in the post-case settings makes him more inclined to accept contextual needs and behave politically in accordance with situational circumstances and dynamics. This makes him adaptable in terms of focusing on the work at hand, as well as grasping what the others have, want, and need and gratifying them.

Within the party closures context, the lack of a statistically significant margin on Erbakan's TASK score remain the same. However, the significant disparity between his pre- and post-party closure TASK scores stand out once again. There were so many challenges Erdogan had to deal with from the beginning; and resolving the 'headscarf issue' was one of the key tasks Erdoğan and AKP parliamentarians wanted to deal with because most AKP members and their families suffered several barriers in their lives (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 14). In dealing with this problem in the crises, AKP members altered their behaviors and did not attend the official receptions of May, 19 with their wives wearing headscarf (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 15). The decrease in his TASK score during the post-case periods reflects his increasing predisposition to focus on relationships depending on the political environment he finds himself in.

IGB is another trait that differentiates Erbakan and Erdoğan significantly from each other. Considering their general profiles, Erbakan scores moderately on IGB, whereas Erdoğan's scores are one standard deviation lower. The difference between Erbakan and Erdoğan's IGB scores shows that these two leaders have different inclinations concerning how they place their groupings in regard to how they perceive the political landscape. Erbakan may be more likely to perceive politics as either conflictual or cooperative depending on the contextual elements impacting the political environment at different times. Being moderate on this trait might provide the leader an edge during crises since these scores allow the leader to behave according to the requirements of the situational factors. On the other hand, leaders with low IGB scores, like Erdoğan, are less likely to label others as "friends or enemies." Even though these leaders still see their own group as a separate entity and are concerned about its upkeep, objectives,

and interests, they are also constantly aware of others in the political environment who are not of their group, and even though they are not friends, these outsiders may not necessarily be enemies. As with Erdoğan, leaders with low IGB scores constantly consider categories other than “friends or enemies”. Additionally, leaders like Erdoğan (as opposed to those like Erbakan) have a tendency to develop strong relationships with others outside their own groups, which can aid them in recruiting new members to their groups and bolstering any areas of weakness that might exist. According to the nature and source of the crisis, especially if it stems from relations with outsiders, the ability to challenge the constraints of leaders like Erdoğan with a low score in this trait might be higher.

Compared to Erbakan, Erdoğan once again appears to be less consistent with regard to IGB scores with significant differences over time in the context of military constraints. Although Erdoğan's low scores persist in general, pre and post-case periods, there are two standard deviation changes in his IGB scores before and after the e-memorandum period, as well as his rising scores when the case happens. The shift in his scores reflects his deteriorating emotional bonds with his group and growing proclivity to hear other people's thoughts, opinions, and behaviors. As an example, Erdoğan's eagerness for making various laws and hearing others, rather than simply conservative AKP members, is an indication of his lower IGB prior to the e-memorandum (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:15). The new law of the Higher Education Council was drafted by the AKP in 2004 that eliminates the scoring barrier of the vocational school graduates with the religious curriculum at the university entrance examinations; and it was shared with a diverse variety of stakeholders including civil society groups, universities, and other institutions to receive their comments (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). Unlike the pre-case, Erdoğan's post-ememorandum scores in IGB demonstrates his increasing concentration on his own group, and his call for early elections to gain reapproval from the people can be attributed to his political tactic to re-establish group spirit and unity (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). Considering his post-case scores, the 2007 presidential elections and his struggle against the reactionary parties opposed to an Islamist president are foreseen (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16).

Looking at Erbakan's IGB scores before and after the RP closure case, Table 14 shows major differences between his pre- and post-party closure case scores. This means that Erbakan's perception of politics prior to the resolution of the RP case is likely to be conflictual, fraught with threats and opponents. The development of the D-8 decision as a means of legitimizing Erbakan's Muslim supporters during that era may have represented how Erbakan regarded the political world in terms of a us and them dichotomy. His propensity reduces throughout the post-case time, indicating that Erbakan became a leader more inclined to have a relationship-focused approach rather than a problem-focused one; in addition, he was more inclined to recognize both the good and bad aspects of his group. Furthermore, it reflects Erbakan's waning loyalty to his organization as well as its reducing centralization in his view.

Erdoğan was less inclined to perceive the world in terms of 'us and them' compared to Erbakan. . He became more receptive to hearing from others after the closure case of the AKP. However, Erdoğan's IGB score grew over time following the conclusion of the AKP closure case. This validates any instances in which Erdoğan who, before to the case, was less inclined to focus his political actions and choices through his group, had now learned from his experience and become a leader who focused more on his group (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). Erdoğan's reference to the closure case as one against "the will of his people" (Alırıza, 2008) might also be interpreted as his attempt to demonstrate the power of his group (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16).

Another trait that differ the leaders from each other is **DIS**. Considering their leadership profiles, Erbakan's scores on DIS are moderate Erdoğan's scores are average for both norming groups of Turkish leaders and the international leaders, while again Erdoğan's DIS increased significantly after 2013 (Cuhadar et al 2017). Leaders that scored moderately on DIS, like Erdoğan, understand that there are many possibilities and threats in the political realm. These leaders are always ready for any opposition attacks against themselves in addition to being wary of the political attitudes and aspirations of others. As these leaders live as if they are constantly waiting for moments of crisis, they are also ready to act as the time and conditions require in the

crises. As a result, these scores form the basis either for challenging or respecting constraints when necessary. Leaders with high scores on DIS, like Erbakan, are more prone to exclusively see threats and risks in the political environment. Unlike leaders with moderate scores, leaders like Erbakan experience more stress and anxiety about potential threats to their authority and power. In times of crisis, these leaders' emotional stress and anxiety level might make them weaker than they should be. Compared to these leaders, the ones with moderate DIS scores have little faith in others and do not permit anyone to challenge them as potential rivals. These leaders do not distinguish between those who belong to "us" and "the others," according to their moderate DIS scores. Despite the fact that leaders with moderate DIS scores, like Erdoğan, occasionally view politics in "black and white" terms, situational considerations and prior experiences do not allow them to completely discount that politics is complex and dynamic. It is reasonable to assert that these perspectives of such leaders with moderate DIS scores help them to foresee various hazards in times of crisis, making them stronger against risks and threats.

In the e-memorandum context, **DIS** is another trait that showed statistically significant changes over time in Erdoğan's profile. While Erdoğan's overall score on this trait places him in the moderate group, the discrepancies in Erdoğan's scores before and after the e-memorandum indicate his evolving inclination to question the motivations and actions of people in the setting. Prior to the military intervention, Erdoğan was claimed to have seen difficulties as context-specific rather than universal challenges affecting his power and position in politics. He was more likely to form connections and attempt to resolve problems through collaboration. The increase compared to his pre and post-ememorandum DIS scores suggests a growing predisposition to mistrust others and be sceptical about the actions and motivations of others. It also denotes a tendency to see politics in terms of dangers. As a result, Erdoğan became more conscious of the hazards and dangers in the information he received from individuals and external sources in the post-ememorandum. This influenced his political conduct, transforming him into a more watchful leader that places higher value on honesty and loyalty within his group. By the e-memorandum process, Erdoğan found himself in a political climate where he needed to safeguard both himself and his organization from

political dangers and threats (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). During the post-e-memorandum, he evolved into a leader who tailored his behaviors to the demands of the situation and prioritized developing relationship as a strategy (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). As an example, while he hold regular meetings with military as part of his political strategy, he also mentioned in his interview with TDN on 8 November, 2009 with a cautious approach indicating that he must do it (stating, "I have to be open about it") that "we are in a much more positive process now in terms of military-government relations. At least, I can observe that the military is now more positive in launching internal probes when needed. I have to be open about it" (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:17).

In the party closure context, DIS also represents significant variations over time for both leaders. Focusing on both leaders' general scores on this trait, the difference between the leaders' pre- and post-party closure periods DIS scores stands out. While Erbakan scores declined by almost 2-standard-deviation than his general score during the pre-party closure period, examining the difference between the pre- and post-party closure case reveals around 5 standard deviations on DIS. Erbakan's pre-case period DIS scores points out his decreasing level of uncertainty and lack of confidence about his beliefs, behaviors, and inner motives. It is a reflection of his growing predisposition to see politics as a more peaceful and less conflict-driven environment that can allow for cooperative relationships. Considering the fact that Erbakan experienced his most powerful years in his professional political career, right before the closure case, accelerating since 1994 and then to be top in 1996 as being Prime Minister for the first time in the history. This surely explains his decreasing DIS scores an recognition of the political world in peace, rather than the one he has to constantly deal with the problems. The post-case period, on the other hand, represents his growing anxiety about losing authority in a political world filled with dangers and challenges. His post-party closure scores demonstrate that he became more sensitive to trust the people around him, given how the closure of RP and his suspension affected his political standing at the time. During post-party closure period, Erbakan began to solicit feedback from others, which assisted him in making a return to active politics. Not only did he begin to look for alternatives generated by the leaders of the other parties'

staff and parliamentarians inside the old and new party institutions, he also began to look for alternatives made by his own staff and parliamentarians within the old and new party establishments.

Table 14 shows the fluctuation of Erdoğan's DIS scores throughout pre- and post-party closure periods. Despite Erdoğan's moderate DIS scores on his overall profile, this increases by one standard deviation during the pre-case but lowers during the post-party closure. This suggests that during the pre-case phase, the AKP's closing case background made him less trustworthy of others and any incoming information from them or the environment. For example, Erdoğan's request for early elections and multiple referendums till 2017 can be indicated as a technique for him to figure out who is in his group and who isn't, as well as how much support he has from his area (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:17). However, such a pervasive sense of doubt and mistrust fades when the case is resolved. Focusing on the period during which Erdoğan faced the likely closure of the AKP and a possible ban from politics, the rise in DIS scores explains his behavior in this crisis' the contextual conditions. Similarly, the decrease in Erdoğan's DIS scores over time can be viewed as part of his normalization process, which results in him reverting to the scores in his overall profile.

In assessing if the leader is motivated by problem or relationship based on evaluating the scores in **TASK, IGB and DIS**, the motivations of Erdoğan and Erbakan appear to be distinct based on their scores in the former trait. Erbakan is more inclined to see politics as a place where they can forge amicable relationships. He typically prioritizes maintaining a strong group spirit as their stated political goal rather than prioritizing attempting to resolve any issue they encounter. In contrast to Erbakan, Erdoğan's is a leader who prefers to concentrate on either creating a dynamic connection if it appears more appropriate or handling contextual difficulties depending on the scenario when their group meets them. Situations impact these leaders' attitudes and behaviors while evaluating their reasons for running for power. As a result, they evaluate the political situation and choose to behave appropriately given the circumstances. They focus on either achieving their main objective or preserving their relationships when determining how to behave in a political setting. In the first scenario, they typically

recognize the situation that their groups are dealing with and look for every opportunity to find a solution for the benefit of the group. Leaders like Erdoğan only see the problem and the individuals who contribute to its solution. Then, they look for others who share their interests and have necessary skills to resolve the situation. Such leaders prioritize maintaining the group's members sense of community strong above goal fulfillment in the latter scenario, where they concentrate on forging and maintaining loyal ties among the group members. As a result, leaders with a moderate score do not have a predetermined way of responding to political circumstances and/or individuals.

The combination of IGB and DIS shows that Erbakan identified the world of politics based on the external dangers and difficulties in the political environment in which he worked, while Erdoğan focus on seizing the advantage of opportunities that arise and establishing positive connections. Erbakan's scores on both traits indicates him as a leader who deal with and remove real or possible risks and difficulties based on context-specific variables and aspects impacting the environment for distinct periods in political history. Erdoğan's combined score, on the other hand, points him out he might be driven by the risks he perceives in the political environment in which he lives, or by the harmonious connections in the political world. As a leader he might consider politics as dangerous at times, depending on the situation and be prepared to fight antagonists, but are also willing to collaborate with others (particularly in the international arena, while pursuing their nations' objectives).

Considering the context of military threat, Erbakan's classifications of **TASK**, **IGB** and **DIS** in his general profiles did not alter. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's scores showed statistically significant variations before and after e-memorandum. This means that while Erbakan's motivation stays constant, Erdoğan's seems to be less consistent and be context-responsive.

Considering Erdoğan's **TASK** scores, his overall profile shows that he is a moderate leader, yet his TASK scores fluctuate to a higher level in pre-e-memorandum and to a moderate level in post- e-memorandum. This implies that, although Erdoğan, based on his overall leadership profile, is more likely to be a problem-focused leader depending

on the context, he becomes only a problem-focused leader during the pre- e-memorandum phase. His such scores in pre-case, for instance, explains his beviors not to step back for Abdullah Gül's nomination to the Presidency and dealing with the reactions from the opposition on this issue (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 14). On the other hand, his scores remain the same as his general profile during the post-case 1 period. Erdoğan's meeting with the Chief of Staff and starting with meeting with the military regularly since then can be pointed out a major instance for it (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 15).

While Erdoğan's IGB scores decreases during pre-e-memorandum, it increases during post-case. This reveals that, although Erdoğan is more likely to regard politics as a more dangerous area during the pre-case time, his perspective shifts to be more relationship-focused in the post-case phase. Though Erdoğan's moderate DIS scores in his general profiles drop compared to other Turkish leaders before e-memorandum and then rebound. When looking at Erdoğan's motivation toward the world, his overall profile suggests that he views politics as a world of connections and that a leader's attention should taking advantage of these connections. However, during the pre-case era, Erdoğan begins to focus more on the difficulties and perceives politics as a menacing realm rather than a calm one. The drafted law of the Higher Education Council that eliminates the scoring barrier of the vocational school graduates with the religious curriculum at the university entrance examinations and distributed to various stakeholders for their inputs exemplifies this (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). Based on his shifting scores, his propensity to concentrate on both the issues and relationships returned throughout the post-case phase. During that period, Erdoğan's concentration on both the presidential elections and struggling with the military about it can be indicated as one of its proof (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16).

In the party closure context, Erbakan's TASK score classifications did not affect his overall score before or after party closure case. His low TASK scores show him to be a leader who prioritizes building and maintaining relationships. Erdoğan's TASK scores, in contrast to Erbakan's, indicate a distinct pattern. Despite the fact that his overall TASK score suggests that he may have a problem or relationship focus

depending on the circumstances, he transforms into a problem-focused leader during the pre- party closure period and then into a similar two-sided tendency during the post- party closure period. His such scores clearly explains similar transformation of Erdoğan's struggling relationship with the military during pre- party closure case period into an harmonious one, even though it is a part of his strategy as a 'must-to-do' it (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Çuhadar, 2022: 15).

In terms of the combination of IGB and DIS, Erbakan's IGB scores are at the average level in both the general and pre-case eras, but fall during the post-case period. This scores explains that Erbakan become more relationship-focus to survive within the context and therefore being more open to listen to others, to know the others interests and points of views, to develop cooperative relations that might help him and his group.

Erdoğan's IGB scores, however, are low when compared to the two norming groups, not only in his overall profile but also during both the pre- and post- party closure periods. Erdoğan's IGB score falls during pre- party closure case, but rises during post-case. This reveals that, whereas Erdoğan is more likely to see politics as a dangerous environment during the pre-case phase, his perspective transforms to a more 'issue or relationship-focused depending on the circumstance' during the post-case phase. This confirms any of his behaviors showing that he learned to become a leader who focused more on his group after the party closure case. (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). Erdoğan's referral to the closure case as one against "his people's will" (Alırıza, 2008) might alternatively be seen as an attempt by Erdoğan to display the power of his group. (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16).

In examining the leaders DIS scores, it is clear that both leaders' scores on this trait shifted throughout party closure case. Erbakan's overall DIS score is higher than the average of Turkish leaders but lower than that of international leaders. Erbakan's high scores fall during the pre- party closure period. Considering Erbakan's accelerating popularity and political power, especially between 1994 and 1996, this scores in this trait explains his cooperative behaviors during pre-case times. This disparity between pre and post- party closure periods suggests that, while Erbakan is more willing to

connect with others than the other members of his group during the pre-case term, he becomes a leader who was more inclined to focus on the risks rather than the possibilities that may arise from relationships. The results of the party closure case verify Erdoğan's propensity and change from his moderate DIS scores in pre-closure to the lower scores during the post-closure period.

Looking at the the leaders 'motivation toward the world,' Erbakan's combined trait - IGB and DIS- scores reveal that his general relationship-focused profile marks him as a leader who may focus on 'taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant' or 'eliminating potential threats and problems.' His combined scores also identify him as a leader that may focus 'on taking advantage of chances and creating connections', as clearly indicated as examples above. This fluctuation returns to as its usual trend during the post-party closure period. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's correlation of IGB and DIS scores shows that during the pre-party closure, he may focus on 'taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships' or focus on 'eliminating potential threats and problems.' However, in party closure case, his scores show him to be a leader who may only focus on building relationships.

Table 14. Necmettin Erbakan's Personality Traits in "February 28" and "The Closure Case of the Welfare Party" & Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Personality Traits in the "E-memorandum" and "The Closure Case of the Justice and Development Party"

LTA Characteristics	Erbakan's scores (General)	Erbakan's Scores During				Erdoğan's scores (General)	Erdoğan's Scores During				Turkish Leaders (N=6)	World Leaders (N=284)
		Pre-Feb 28	Post-Feb 28	Pre-Party Closure	Post-Party Closure		Pre-e-memorandum	Post-e-memorandum	Pre-Party Closure	Post-Party Closure		
Beliefs in Ability to Control Events (BACE)	0.34 M - M	0.38 H	0.29 L	0.36 M - M	0.31 M - M	0.38 H - M	0.38 H - M	0.38 H - M	0.39 H - M	0.37 M - M	Mean: 0.34 SD: 0.03	Mean: 0.35 SD: 0.05
The Need for Power (PWR)	0.28 H - M	0.29 H	0.27 M	0.28 H - M	0.27 M - M	0.25 M - M	0.25 M - M	0.26 M - M	0.25 M - M	0.26 M - M	Mean: 0.25 SD: 0.02	Mean: 0.26 SD: 0.05
Conceptual Complexity (CC)	0.52 L - L	0.51 L	0.53 L	0.51 L - L	0.55 M - M	0.58 M - M	0.58 M - M	0.57 M - M	0.58 M - M	0.57 M - M	Mean: 0.59 SD: 0.04	Mean: 0.59 SD: 0.06
Self-Confidence (SC)	0.30 L - M	0.34 L	0.26 L	0.34 L - M	0.25 L - L	0.30 L - M	0.28 L - M	0.33 L - M	0.28 L - M	0.34 L - M	Mean: 0.42 SD: 0.07	Mean: 0.36 SD: 0.10
Task Focus (TASK)	0.52 L - L	0.53 L	0.50 L	0.51 L - L	0.52 L - L	0.68 M - M	0.72 H - H	0.61 M - M	0.72 H - H	0.60 M - M	Mean: 0.63 SD: 0.05	Mean: 0.63 SD: 0.07
In-group Bias (IGB)	0.13 M - M	0.13 M	0.12 M	0.14 H - M	0.11 M - M	0.08 L - L	0.07 L - L	0.09 L - L	0.07 L - L	0.10 L - M	Mean: 0.12 SD: 0.01	Mean: 0.15 SD: 0.05
Distrust of Others (DIS)	0.14 H - M	0.14 H	0.14 H	0.12 M - M	0.17 H - M	0.11 M - M	0.10 L - M	0.12 M - M	0.12 M - M	0.10 L - M	Mean: 0.12 SD: 0.01	Mean: 0.13 SD: 0.06

Abbreviations: "L" indicates low, "M" indicates moderate and "H" indicates high scores. "Standart Deviation" is abbreviated as "SD"

Source: For Turkish Leaders, Cuhadar et al. (2020); and for World Leaders, Hermann (2003).

6.2. Comparing Leadership Styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan

Considering **Erbakan's and Erdoğan's leadership styles** based on their general scores on seven traits and the relations between their combinations, it is clear that these leaders having similar Islamist backgrounds acted differently to both similar military and bureaucratic threats they experienced in their political careers. The results of this study show that these two leaders are very different in their political approach and this is one of the main reasons lying behind their different reactions to similar cases.

In analyzing these leaders' styles, Table 15 shows if these leaders (i) respect and challenge constraints in the political environment, (ii) are open or closed to contextual information, (iii) are motivated by problem or relationship; and therefore (iv) their leadership styles.

Considering their general profiles, Erbakan can be considered a leader who challenges the constraints, is closed to information, and relationship-focused, compared to other Turkish leaders. This leadership style is called 'evangelistic. According to Hermann (2003: 185), these types of leaders' emphasis is on convincing others to participate in one's purpose, and on rallying people behind one's message. Erdoğan, on the other hand, has a distinct leadership style, which is 'directive' leader, who pushes the limits, is open to information depending on the context and advice, and is primarily concerned with relationships. This type of leadership style's primary emphasis is on the leader himself and the government's prestige and approval. Evangelistic style makes Erbakan a more ideological leader with more stability and consistency across cases, whereas in directive or active-independent styles Erdoğan oscillates more and is a leader less ideological and more likely to change from one context to another compared to Erbakan. This makes Erbakan's actions more consistent and predictable, it makes Erdoğan less stable and predictable.

Within **the military cases**, Erbakan's and Erdoğan's leadership varied from one another. Erbakan's acted as a leader who questioned his limits, was rather closed to knowledge, and was more focused on building and maintaining relationships. He didn't change his actions or politics due to the military threat he experienced; but

remained constant and the same in the aftermath as expected from an 'evangelistic leader. He quit the government but continued as the leader of the new Islamist party pursuing the same line of politics. But, he did not change his politics to remain in power. In contrast to Erbakan, Erdoğan's leadership style changed in response to the challenges from the military. His style shifted to 'actively independent,' referring to Hermann's (2003: 185) observation that 'the focus of attention is maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to constantly try to limit both). Erdoğan negotiated and compromised when appropriate and strategically waited for the right timing to push his agenda. Unlike Erbakan, he did not quit but looked for the right timing to act in line with his goals in a more pragmatic manner. His focus of attention has been on maintaining one's own and the government's position and approval by others. He chose to compromise when needed to stay in power and enhance his and his party's position. Appointing Abdullah Gül to the presidency rather than himself, as a person who was more acceptable was an example of such a compromise and flexibility showing his pragmatism. However, he sought for the right timing to push for his own leadership, unlike Erbakan.

Within the party closure cases, being evangelistic, Erbakan's leadership style has been consistent before the party closure case, implying (in Hermann's words) that his "focus of attention is on convincing others to join in his purpose, in mobilizing people behind his message." In line with the LTA results, Erbakan was more likely to take the lead and risks necessary to achieve his political goals. For instance, he insisted on strengthening the relationship with other Muslim countries and took part in the establishment of D-8, despite all criticisms. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan has always been open to information within the case and he always utilizes this as an advantageous political tactic in taking actions to accomplish his goals. Sharing drafted legislation for Higher Education Council in 2004, which eliminates the scoring barrier of vocational school graduates with religious curricula for the university admissions, with almost all stakeholders to receive inputs their was an example of this (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16). Erdoğan's leadership style is likely to fluctuate and change before and after the party-closure case. As a challenger, Erdoğan has a more flexible nature of leadership style and changes his political acts based on the contextual requirements

he faced to maintain his own and group's power, such as call for early election to regain approval from the people or postpone it (Ulutürk-Cinbiş and Cuhadar, 2022:16).

Examining the differences in the leadership styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan in general and how this affects the cases, it attracts the attention that Erbakan's responsiveness to constraints changes in both post-constraints periods and his challenger status might become either challenger or respecer regardless of the type and nature of a threat (either military or legal) depending on the conditional requirements. It is not the case for Erdoğan. Erdoğan's challenger profile in general has not changed in facing constraints from the military side. This might surely had a direct impact on civil-military relations throughout his political lifetime, and contribute to the transformation of the military's role from being guardian of the country into a more civilized one after the post-e-memorandum period. The results, on the contrary, indicate a different response of Erdoğan to legal threat, party closure. It is reasonable and possible to claim that two points might be influential, that the time he was in jail and that his own Islamist predecessor vanished from the political arena by the help of similar political technique. When the two leaders' openness to information is contrasted, Erdoğan's openness to information did not change in the face of military and legal threats, point to a significant distinction as a leader.

Focusing on Erbakan's motivation toward the world, his motivation by connection remains constant in the face of both dangers. Erdoğan, on the other hand, appears to be driven by both the problem and the relationship with motivation toward the word, but in both pre-cases periods, he moved away from focusing on relationships and rather became simply problem-focused. However, in post-cases, he reverted to his regular form and concentrated on both problems and relationships. It might reasonable to claim that Erdoğan's adaptability skill has put him in an advantageous position in both cases.

6.3. Overall Discussion of Leaders' Responses to Constraints

The differences of the leadership traits and styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan surely have impact on how these leaders handle of military and party closure crises they experience throughout their political career. The results point to three issues indicating how Erbakan as a leader handled both military and party closure threats. First, Erbakan's changing status in responsiveness to constraints regardless of the threat. While he is a leader who is ready to challenge to the constraints, Erbakan become a context-dependent leader who might either respect or challenge the constraints depending on the situational needs and necessities, in both post-cases. Second, Erbakan's shifting level of openness to information, from closed to open following the party closure crises. In handling this crisis, Erbakan became seemingly more open himself to the inputs from the others, taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant. Third, Erbakan's stability in being motivated by relationships.

In a better understanding about how Erdoğan handled the crises, two changes he experienced as a leader stand out. First one is Erdoğan's changing status from being challenger to context-dependent one in the aftermath of the party closure period. This reasonably put him in a more advantageous position to handle the situation in a better way, rather than losing. The second one is Erdoğan's changing motivation toward the world in time. Erdoğan became a leader less motivated by task and more by the relationships with his declining TASK score.

The general leadership profile of Erbakan share common points with that of Heper in their book with Sayarı (2002) titled 'Political Leaders and Democracy.' Heper describes Erbakan as a pragmatic leader who undertakes a political action based on his interests rather than the requirement of the political conjuncture. Looked at from this viewpoint, he appears ready to challenge constraints depending on his interest. In addition, Heper underlines that he has always the last word. For this reason, Erbakan as a leader does not appear to be open to hearing others' thoughts, and ideas, but instead have always the last word.

Kesgin's Erbakan profile, in his work 'Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers' (2013) portrays Erbakan, like this study, as a leader that challenges constraints and is motivated by relationships. Erbakan's openness to information, however, is scored differently; Kesgin's findings show Erbakan to be a leader who may be open to information depending on the situation, while this study finds him closed to information. This may be due to the cases examined. While Kesgin focused on his foreign policy cases, this study dealt with his responses vis a vis the military and legal bureaucracy.

This study's scores of Erbakan's leadership style are similar to those of Cuhadar et al (2020) in their work 'Turkish leaders and their foreign policy decision-making style: a comparative and multi-method perspective'. While Cuhadar et al (2020) scored BACE and IGB differently; like this study, they show Erbakan to be a leader that challenges constraints and is closed to information with higher relationship-focused motivation. Erbakan's 'evangelistic' leadership style is also supported by Cuhadar et al (2020)'s work.

Considering Erdoğan's leadership profile, the empirical findings of Cuhadar et al. (2020) show differences from those of this study. Although both studies' results point to Erdoğan as a challenger of constraints, the results on his openness toward information differ, with Cuhadar et al.'s study (2020), utilizing the data between 2002 and 2017, finding Erdoğan becoming far more closed to information in time. In that sense, since this study examined his traits until 2011, it does not capture the overall change in his leadership style especially as it happened after 2013 and 2016. In addition, this study highlights that based on his TASK, IGB and DIS scores, Erdoğan might focus on either solving problems or building relationships depending on the needs of the context. Unlike these findings, Cuhadar et al. (2020) Erdoğan categorize as a problem-focused leader even though his TASK score declines in time. With their different scoring of Erdoğan's traits, Cuhadar et al.'s work (2020) determines his leadership styles as either 'actively independent' or 'directive' similar to this dissertation. Cuhadar et al.'s study (2020) examines Erdoğan across time between 2002 and 2017, this study focuses only on two events limited time before his major

change.

This study's evaluation of Erdoğan's leadership profile, on the other hand, shows both similarities and differences with that of Görener and Uçal (2011). Görener and Uçal's comparison is based on a norming group of 214 world leaders. As another norming group of this study, Erdoğan's scores appear to be low on IGB, but moderate on all other traits compared to that of the 284 world leaders. While Erdoğan's PWR, SC and IGB scores fall into the same category as that of Görener and Uçal's study, the score of the other four traits -BACE, CC, DIS, TASK- show differences.

Kesgin (2013) evaluates Erdoğan's leadership style in a comparison with a norming group of world leaders and indicates scores of two combined traits -openness to information and motivation toward the world as context-dependent. For this reason, his research defines his leadership style as either expansionistic, evangelistic, actively independent or directive. Focusing on the empirical results of this study analyzing the data of Turkey's prime ministers in the post-cold war era, Erdoğan's moderate scores on all traits than his low score on IGB compared to that of 284 world leaders define him as either 'evangelistic', 'directive' (as underlined by Kesgin) or 'influential' or 'collegial' (the latter two are different based on his relationship-focus nature indicating in this study).

During pre-and post- military threats, Erbakan's post-case score on reaction to constraints change him from a challenger to a context-dependent leader who may respect or question the situational elements of the political environment. For this reason, Erbakan's 'evangelistic' leadership style in general may be 'influential' if his focus of attention on persuading others to join in one's mission to on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's TASK, IGB, and DIS scores have shown statistically significant change across cases. Erdoğan's motivation toward the world changed, and he becomes a less problem-focused leader with an 'actively independent' leadership style. Based on his evangelistic leadership style, Erbakan portrays a more ideological and stable leader across different contexts. In contrast Erbakan, Erdoğan is more likely to change across cases.

As a result, this study highlights Erbakan's actions and politics more consistent and predictable based on his evangelistic leadership style. In contrast to Erbakan, Erdoğan is more likely to change from one case to another depending on the situational factors. As a result, Erbakan portrays a leader who is more stable and predictable, while Erdoğan's behaviors is less consistent and less foreseeable.

The results of this study demonstrate that LTA produces useful and relevant findings in studying the leaders' traits, leadership styles and their responses to the military and party closure restrictions. It takes a leadership approach to read Turkish politics concentrating on the psychological dynamics of leadership rather than the traditional analysis to Turkish political history from the Islamist parties to the AKP. Moreover, this study offers a new analysis concentrating on the personalities of the leaders for further studies of different Islamist intellectuals effecting the politics in the history of Turkish politics. Furthermore, the thesis study contributes to the LTA literature by offering solid research results on exogenous shocks, as military threats and legal constraints for the party closures. This study, in addition, provides useful and meaningful outcomes in studying complex civil-military relations concentrating on the role of personalities in the leaders' decision-making processes. Even further studies might be conducted in studying behavior of military leaders in the history of Turkish politics.

Table 15. Leadership Styles of Erbakan and Erdoğan – General, In Contexts of Military Threats and Party Closuresⁱ

		Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation Toward the World	Leadership Style
ERBAKAN	General	Challenger ⁱⁱ	Closed ⁱⁱⁱ	Relationship ^{iv} Takes advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant ^v	Evangelistic (focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
	Case 1	Pre-Case 1 Challenger ^{vi}	Closed ^{vii}	Relationship ^{viii} Takes advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant ^{ix}	Evangelistic (focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
		Post-Case 1 Context-dependent (challenger or respector) ^x	Closed ^{xi}	Relationship ^{xii} Takes advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant ^{xiii}	Evangelistic (focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message) OR Influential (focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own)
	Case 2	Pre-Case 2 Challenger ^{xiv}	Closed ^{xv}	Relationship ^{xvi} Focus is on eliminating potential threats and solving problems even though some situations may appear to offer opportunities ^{xvii}	Evangelistic (focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
		Post-Case 2 Context-dependent (challenger or respector) ^{xviii}	Open ^{xix}	Relationship ^{xx} Takes advantage of opportunities and building relationships while remaining vigilant ^{xxi}	Directive (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation) OR Collegial (focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus—on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)

ERDOĞAN	General		Challenger ^{xxii}	Open ^{xxiii}	Both Problem & Relationship Depending on Context ^{xxiv} Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships (while remaining vigilant) ^{xxv}	Actively independent (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both) OR Directive (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
	Case 1	Pre-Case 1	Challenger ^{xxvi}	Open ^{xxvii}	Problem ^{xxviii} Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships ^{xxix}	Actively independent (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)
		Post-Case 1	Challenger ^{xxx}	Open ^{xxxi}	Both Problem & Relationship Depending on Context ^{xxxii} Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships (while remaining vigilant) ^{xxxiii}	Actively independent (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both) OR Directive (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
	Case 2	Pre-Case 2	Challenger ^{xxxiv}	Open ^{xxxv}	Problem ^{xxxvi} Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships (while remaining vigilant) ^{xxxvii}	Actively independent (focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)
		Post-Case 2	Context-dependent (challenger or respector) ^{xxxviii}	Open ^{xxxix}	Both Problem & Relationship Depending on Context ^{xl} Focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and building relationships ^{xli}	Actively independent OR Directive OR Opportunistic OR Collegial

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In Turkey, politics have traditionally been centered on a few significant individuals (Heper & Sayarı, 2002). Several political figures have remained in the political arena for a long time and individually contribute to the formation of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Consequently, Turkish politics can be effectively evaluated if the political leaders have been analyzed based on the country's leader-driven political tradition.

Throughout the history of Turkish politics, Islam has taken on different forms, pursued various goals, and adopted several strategies to survive. Adopting the personality approach, to fully comprehend Turkish politics, this thesis is focused on two significant political leaders in Turkish political history with similar Islamist backgrounds: Necmettin Erbakan; and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

To adequately understand the conjuncture and historical dynamics in Turkish politics, this research assumes that personal traits and leadership styles play fundamental roles in determining leaders' policy-making processes. Political scientists have a long history of researching political decisions through evaluating leaders and leadership traits (Hermann 1984; 1987; Mastors 2000; Schafer and Crichlow 2000; Taysi and Preston 2001; Kille and Scully 2003; Dyson 2006; Renshon 2009; Görener and Uçal 2011; Kesgin 2012; 2013; Özdamar 2017; Cuhadar et al 2017; Kesgin 2018; Cuhadar et al 2020; Balcı and Efe 2021). Furthermore, the influence of Turkish leaders' personalities and leadership styles has received scholarly attention. (Heper and Sayarı 2002; Görener and Uçal 2011; Kesgin 2012; 2013; Özdamar 2017; Cuhadar et al 2017; Kesgin 2018; Cuhadar et al 2020; Balcı and Efe 2021).

In recognizing the pioneering studies in the literature, this thesis provides a theory-driven trait analysis of Erbakan and Erdoğan by focusing on how these leaders respond

to two similar structural constraint threats in their political careers; the military and their party closure cases.

The role of leadership as an explanatory variable, as discussed in Chapter 2 from different angles, provides an insight to fully grasp the political conjuncture and deeply focus on Turkish politics from agent-centered perspectives. Though there are different approaches by which to study leadership such as the psychobiography, cognitive, or trait approach, this study uses the trait approach to analyze the profiles of Erbakan and Erdoğan within the contexts of the military threats and legal constraints both leaders faced, which allowed for wider consideration and analysis of Turkish politics.

To profile the political leaders, this thesis utilized LTA as a well-established at-a-distance method with high validity and reliability to analyze how Erbakan and Erdoğan's leadership traits changed in response to these two exogenous challenges during their tenures.

The stability or change of the leaders' reactions before and after the constraints is used to determine the reliability of the leaders' traits in analyzing their profiles. While trait stability implies the predictability of leaders' political actions and attitudes and reflects how the leaders are likely to act politically, their shifting scores across the cases indicate whether they are less predictable and sensitive to the circumstances to some extent (Hermann, 2002).

Overview of the Findings

In profiling Erbakan and Erdoğan by LTA, this study determined these two leaders' general profiles that differ from each other, with reference to the Turkish norming group, based on their six leadership traits, out of seven: BACE, PWR, CC, TASK, IGB, DIS. Based on his general profile scores, Erbakan is shown, in Table 15, to be a leader who (i) challenges constraints, (ii) is closed to information, (iii) is relationship-focused with an 'evangelistic' leadership style (representing the primary focus on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message). The findings of the study show Erdoğan, on the other hand, to be a leader who (i)

challenges constraints, (ii) is open to information, (iii) is a either relationship or problem-focused leader depending on the situational constraints he has faced. In the case of being motivated by the problem focus, then Erdoğan's leadership style can be considered as 'actively independent' with the emphasis on retaining his own and the government's flexibility and independence in a world that is considered to be always attempting to limit both. If motivated by relationships, then his style becomes 'directive' with the emphasis on preserving his own and the government's standing and acceptability to others by engaging in acts in the international arena that promote the state's reputation.

This study shows that Erbakan is more stable and consistent across the cases, while Erdoğan's traits and styles fluctuate and are more likely to change from one context to another. The evangelistic leadership style of Erbakan makes him more stable, ideological and foreseeable; whereas Erdoğan's political acts are context-dependent and therefore less consistent and predictable.

Considering the leaders' responses to the case of a military threat, as discussed in chapters IV and VI, three traits of the two leaders changed over this crisis; but both leaders react to the military constraints from different angles and not even one of these three traits of Erbakan and Erdoğan is common.

Focusing on Erbakan, while his pre-February 28 scores do not indicate any change to his general profile, his post-case score shows changes in his responsiveness to constraints and therefore his leadership style. Despite being a challenger, the LTA findings show that he became a context-dependent leader that may either respect or challenge the situational factors in the environment he finds himself in and politically act to win. Therefore, if he challenges the situational constraints, then his leadership style might be considered an 'evangelistic' one. However, if he respects constraints, then an 'influential' style focuses on developing cooperative ties with other governments and nations in order to play a leadership role; by cooperating with others, one may gain more than oneself. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan's pre-cases scores, as shown in Table 15, have indicated a change in his motivation toward the world and therefore his leadership style. Though Erdoğan appears to be a leader who may be

either problem or relationship-focused based on the situational requirement, he is shown to be problem-focused based on his changing TASK and DIS scores and therefore as a leader with an 'actively independent' leadership style.

Based on their responses to the closure of their political parties, Erbakan and Erdoğan differentiate from each other as evaluated in Chapter VI. Considering the stability-change discussion, Erdoğan appears to be less stable compared to Erbakan.

Erbakan's pre-case scores indicate that while his relationship focus remains, he become a leader with a focus on eliminating potential threats and solving problems even though some situations may appear to offer opportunities. During the post-party closure period, Erbakan's changing scores on BACE and PWR indicate that he becomes a leader who may respect or challenge constraints depending on contextual factors. This marks him as a leader with either a directive leadership style or a collegial one with an emphasis on resolving conflicts and reaching a consensus on achieving respect and status by empowering others and sharing accountability. Regarding Erdoğan's response to the legal constraints for the closure of the AKP, Erdoğan's pre-party closure scores suggested that (unlike Erbakan), Erdoğan's focus tends to be problem-oriented rather than contextually dependent. Though Erdoğan prefers to focus on seizing chances and building relationships, he uses these opportunities and relationships to solve challenges they face during pre-party closure period. During post-party closure, Erdoğan seems likely to challenge the constraints based on the dynamics of the context and motivated by either problem or relations. Both Erbakan and Erdoğan respond to contextual challenges in similar ways based on their leadership traits during post-party closure.

Strenghts and Limitations

By conducting an extensive and theory-driven trait analysis of two Islamist political leaders in Turkish history, one of the major strengths of this thesis is that it goes beyond anecdotal accounts of the transformation of previous Islamist parties into the AKP and contributes to Turkish political literature. Furthermore, its empirical analysis was conducted using a considerable amount of spontaneous materials of leaders, despite

Hermann's 5000-word limit. In addition, its meaningful LTA results on the selected exogenous political shocks expand the previous research on Turkish politics and contribute to the LTA literature.

Considering the limitations of this study, first, the results of this study are not creating a reference group but are restricted to the analysis of the influence of two similar exogenous shocks on two leaders with similar Islamist backgrounds. Moreover, by referring to Renshon's terminology of temporal stability (2008), the results of this study provide inadequate information about the long-term consequences of these two exogenous shocks resulting in the change of leaders' traits and styles. It is mainly because such a study about long-term results requires longitudinal data collection over a longer time span. In addition, this study opens any criticisms about the impact of the other influencing factors in assessing to the role of exogenous shocks, such as these two leaders' changing roles during pre and post-cases.

Suggestions for Future Research

Focusing on the role of leadership traits, styles, and the leaders' responses to the military and legal restrictions in Turkish politics, this study with its helpful and pertinent results derived by LTA contributes to future research in many ways. First, it serves the LTA literature in general, with its empirical findings that provide ground for further studies about the impact of other political exogenous shocks on leadership traits. Second, this study highlights a useful method for Turkish politics in particular, with its meaningful outcomes that open a door for further investigations into different Islamist intellectuals' roles in history. Third, it offers a new angle for gender discussions in Turkish politics, with its focus on two research subjects and male-dominant leadership traits results as a reflection of the country's patriarchal political culture. Fourth, this study provides a new perspective, with its agent-centered focus that indicates the military leaders as the further studies' subjects to adequately evaluate the complex nature of civil-military relations in Turkey.

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APPENDIX 1. Data Set for Necmettin Erbakan

Date	Source	Subject	Word Number	Place
30.08.1974	FRG TV	International Politics	210	N/A
27.10.1975	Anatolia	International Politics	133	Ankara
16.09.1976	Tercüman	International Politics	449	N/A
24.07.1977	Milliyet	International Politics	245	Ankara
1.08.1979	Cumhuriyet	International Politics	489	Ankara
2.08.1979	Cumhuriyet	International Politics	515	Ankara
24.04.1989	Cumhuriyet	Domestic Politics	4034	N/A
15.12.1989	Milliyet	International & Domestic Politics	2771	N/A
8.10.1991	TRT TV	International Politics	282	Ankara
17.11.1991	Panorama	Domestic Politics	1160	N/A
31.01.1994	Show TV	Domestic Politics	2167	Ankara
26.12.1995	Show TV	Domestic Politics	1941	Ankara
31.12.1995	Milliyet	Domestic Politics	1337	Ankara
18.01.1996	TRT TV	Domestic Politics	1707	Ankara
22.02.1996	Hurriyet	Domestic Politics	1394	Ankara
16.06.1996	Der Spiegel	International & Domestic Politics	1172	Ankara
29.07.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	105	Ankara
10.08.1996(a)	IRIB TV	International Politics	241	Tehran
10.08.1996(b)	IRIB TV	International Politics	291	Tehran

12.08.1996	IRIB TV	International Politics	388	Tehran
17.08.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	107	Ankara
21.08.1996	TRT TV	International & Domestic Politics	1905	Ankara
22.08.1996	TDN	International Politics	301	Ankara
29.08.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	102	Ankara
3.09.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	217	Ankara
11.09.1996	TRT TV	International & Domestic Politics	293	Ankara
20.09.1996	TDN	International & Domestic Politics	405	Ankara
23.09.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	130	Ankara
26.09.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	112	Ankara
28.09.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	266	Ankara
30.09.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	167	Ankara
02.10.1996(a)	TRT TV	International Politics	267	Ankara
02.10.1996(b)	MENA	International Politics	122	Cairo
5.10.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	288	Ankara
7.10.1996	TRT	International Politics	321	Ankara
8.10.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	280	Ankara
9.10.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	128	Ankara
23.10.1996(a)	TRT TV	International Politics	117	Ankara
23.10.1996(b)	TDN	International Politics	234	Istanbul
9.11.1996	TRT TV	International Politics	170	Ankara

16.12.1996	IRNA News Agency	International Politics	116	Tehran
5.01.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	170	Ankara
8.01.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	120	Ankara
21.01.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	113	Ankara
6.02.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	122	Ankara
6.04.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	100	Ankara
8.04.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	166	Ankara
24.04.1997	TRT TV	Domestic Politics	371	Ankara
5.05.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	130	Ankara
14.06.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	139	Ankara
17.06.1997	TRT TV	International & Domestic Politics	194	Ankara
27.06.1997	TRT TV	International Politics	119	Ankara
19.01.1998	Kanal7	Domestic Politics	872	Ankara
20.01.1998	Kanal7	Domestic Politics	297	Istanbul
27.01.1998	Kanal7	Domestic Politics	662	Istanbul
12.02.1998	TDN	Domestic Politics	260	Ankara
7.08.1998	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	107	Balikesir
8.08.1998	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	119	Balikesir
15.08.1998	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	251	Balikesir
3.09.1999	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	108	Balikesir
6.01.2000	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	267	Konya

7.01.2000	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	324	Antalya
18.03.2000	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	417	Istanbul
10.07.2000	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	853	Ankara
21.07.2000	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	197	Balikesir
30.11.2000	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	153	Ankara
14.09.2001	Anatolia	International Politics	167	Istanbul
21.09.2001	Anatolia	International Politics	239	Istanbul
12.12.2001	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	151	Istanbul
19.07.2002	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	231	Balikesir
2.09.2002	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	212	Ankara
8.09.2002	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	144	Ankara
20.04.2003	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	168	Konya
28.05.2003	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	436	Ankara
15.06.2003	Anatolia	International Politics	328	Istanbul
2.08.2003	Anatolia	International & Domestic Politics	388	Ankara
6.09.2003	Anatolia	International & Domestic Politics	248	Ankara
16.11.2003	Anatolia	Domestic Politics	187	Istanbul
23.03.2004	Today's Zaman	International & Domestic Politics	157	N/A
17.11.2007	Al-Awsat	International & Domestic Politics	3087	N/A
6.12.2010	Today's Zaman	International & Domestic Politics	373	Ankara

APPENDIX 2. Data Set for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Date	Source	Subject	Word Number	Place
12.07.2000	Sabah	Domestic Politics	854	NA
23.01.2001	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	356	NA
27.08.2001	Hürriyet	Domestic Politics	1601	İstanbul
28.08.2001(a)	Hürriyet	Domestic Politics	2000	NA
4.11.2002	Milliyet	Domestic Politics	663	Ankara
13.04.2003	Sabah	International Politics	971	NA
3.11.2003	Sabah	Domestic Politics	577	NA
15.03.2004	Hürriyet	Domestic Politics	935	Urfa & Diyarbakır
22.03.2004	Hürriyet	Domestic Politics	284	İzmir
2.06.2004	Sabah	Domestic Politics	257	Ankara
3.06.2004	Milliyet	International Politics	1347	Ankara
22.07.2004	Sabah	International Politics	556	NA
3.09.2004	Sabah	International Politics	1482	NA
25.09.2004	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	228	Ankara
29.10.2004	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	340	Baku
4.04.2005	Hürriyet	Domestic & International Politics	1550	Ankara
6.04.2005	Hürriyet	Domestic Politics	503	NA
7.07.2005	Hürriyet	Domestic & International Politics	1659	Chicago
8.07.2005	Sabah	Domestic Politics	238	Idaho

1.05.2005	TDN	International Politics	630	NA
8.06.2005	Milliyet	International Politics	976	İstanbul
1.09.2005	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	187	Rome
5.09.2005	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	172	Rome
8.11.2005	Milliyet	International Politics	611	Cologne
27.10.2006	TDN	International Politics	200	Ankara
24.11.2006	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	193	NA
20.12.2006	Reuters	International Politics	194	Washington
22.12.2006	TDN	International Politics	217	Washington
4.04.2007	Milliyet Online	Domestic Politics	1121	NA
16.04.2007	Hürriyet	Domestic Politics	789	İstanbul
29.05.2007	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	157	NA
22.08.2007	TDN	Domestic Politics	307	Ankara
6.04.2009	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	135	New York
7.07.2009	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	138	Rome
8.11.2009	Hurriyet Daily News	International Politics	161	İstanbul
7.12.2009	Sabah online	International Politics	745	Washington
29.03.2010	Spiegel	International Politics	1261	NA
19.04.2010	Sabah online	International Politics	1923	İstanbul
15.05.2010	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	278	Athens
28.06.2010	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	505	Toronto

29.06.2010	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	120	Washington
10.09.2010	Anadolu Agency	Domestic Politics	306	New York
9.10.2010	BTA Radiotelevizionen Monitor Online	International Politics	1238	Sofia
19.10.2010	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	228	Athens
27.11.2010	Al-Safir Online	International Politics	1.410	Ankara
13.05.2011	Anadolu Agency	International Politics	207	Washington
26.09.2011	Time	International Politics	1160	New York

APPENDIX 3. E-MEMORANDUM

The statement published on TSK's official website regarding the Turkish presidential elections On April 27, 1997 is as follows:

“It has been observed that there is a part of society that is in an ongoing struggle to undermine the basic values of the Turkish Republic, secularism being at the forefront, and those activities have increased recently. The following ongoing activities have been submitted to the relevant authorities under suitable conditions: the desire to redefine basic values, and a wide range of activities, which extend as far as to arrange alternative celebrations of our national holiday, which is a symbol of our nation's coherence, the independence of our state, and our nation's unity. Those that attempt to carry out these activities shamelessly exploit the sacred religious emotions of our people, in the form of an open challenge to the government in the guise of religion, in an attempt to conceal their actual purpose. By bringing activities that draw attention to women and children, these actions resemble those that attempt to destroy the unity and integrity of our country. In this context in Ankara, a Koran reading contest was scheduled on the same day as the April 23 National Sovereignty and Children's Day celebrations, but the contest was cancelled due to sensitive media and public pressure. On April 22, 2007, a choir was formed in Şanlıurfa with the participation of groups from the districts of Mardin, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır, where young girls were forced to sing religious refrains at a time when they should have been in bed, and clad in old-fashioned costumes inappropriate for their age. Additionally, the attempts to remove pictures of Atatürk and the Turkish flag in the middle of the night revealed the true intent and purpose of the organization of such activities.

Furthermore, all school principals in the district of Altındağ in Ankara were ordered to participate in the “Holy Birth Celebration”; and at an event organized by the District Mufti of Denizli with the cooperation of a political party, elementary students sang religious refrains with their heads covered; in spite of having four mosques in the town of Nikfer, in the county of Tavas in Denizli, Atatürk Elementary School women were forced to listen to presentations about preaching and religion, and similar news has been heard. The National Ministry of Education has determined the events that will be celebrated in schools. However, it has been established that such celebrations were realized upon instructions that were not regulated in directives. Also, it has been

observed that although the General Staff had informed the authorized institutions, no preventive measure was taken. The fact that an important part of activities in question were realized with the authorization and within the knowledge of civilian authorities which are supposed to intervene in and prevent such events makes the matter even graver. Further examples can be presented. Those that are anti-Republican, with no other purpose than to erode the basic characteristics of the state with this retrogressive approach, have expanded the scope of their activities over the past few days, encouraged by the developments and discourse of the last few days. The developments in our region reveal many examples which could be the result of playing with religion and abusing beliefs for a political rhetoric and purpose from which lessons should be drawn. It is possible to observe in our country as well as in other countries that a political rhetoric or ideology which is tried to be built on a sacred belief suppresses the belief and turns out to be something else. It can be argued that the event which occurred in Malatya is a stunning example of this. There is no doubt that the only condition for the State of the Republic of Turkey to live in peace and stability as a modern democracy is to protect the essential characteristics of the State defined in our Constitution. As a matter of fact, such behaviors and implementations are totally in contradiction with the principle “Being committed to the regime of the Republic not in words but in deeds and reflecting this with acts” stated by the General Chief of Staff in a press conference held on the 12th of April, 2007 and they do violate the basic qualifications and provisions of the Constitution. In recent days, the outstanding problem in the Presidential elections has been the discussion of secularism. This situation is observed with concern by the Turkish Armed Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is not neutral in these discussions and is the absolute defender of secularism. Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely against the ongoing discussions and negative comments and would reveal its attitudes and behaviors clearly and transparently when necessary. No one should ever have any doubt about it. Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of the Great Leader Atatürk “How happy is he who says I am a Turk” is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he stay. The Turkish Armed Forces still maintains its firm determination to fully carry out its clear duties assigned to it with laws in order to protect these qualifications, and its commitment and faith in this determination are absolute”. Announced with respect to the public.”

ⁱ These leaders' styles have been indicated with reference to the norming group of Turkish leaders

ⁱⁱ Moderate BACE and high PWR score, therefore either (i) Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion--behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where can pull strings but are less accountable for result; or (ii) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

ⁱⁱⁱ Low CC and low SC

^{iv} Low TASK

^v Relationship-focused despite moderate IGB

^{vi} High BACE and high PWR, therefore 'Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens'

^{vii} Low CC and low SC

^{viii} Low TASK

^{ix} Relationship-focused despite moderate IGB

^x Low BACE and moderate PWR, therefore either (i) Respect constraints; work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important, or (ii) Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion--behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where can pull strings but are less accountable for result

^{xi} Low CC and low SC

^{xii} Low TASK

^{xiii} Relationship-focused despite moderate IGB

^{xiv} moderate BACE and high PWR score, therefore either (i) Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion--behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where can pull strings but are less accountable for result; or (ii) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xv} Low CC and low SC

^{xvi} Low TASK

^{xvii} Relationship-focused despite moderate DIS

^{xviii} Both moderate BACE and PWR, therefore either (i) Respect constraints; work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important, or (ii) Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion--behind the scenes; good at being "power behind the throne" where can pull strings but are less accountable for result, or (iii) Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because

too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence; or (iv) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xix} Moderate CC and low SC

^{xx} Low TASK

^{xxi} Relationship-focused despite moderate IGB

^{xxii} High BACE and moderate PWR score either (i) Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence; or (ii) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xxiii} Moderate CC and low SC

^{xxiv} Moderate TASK

^{xxv} Context-specific focused despite

^{xxvi} High BACE and moderate PWR score either (i) Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence; or (ii) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xxvii} Moderate CC and low SC

^{xxviii} High TASK

^{xxix} Both low IGB and DIS

^{xxx} High BACE and moderate PWR score either (i) Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence; or (ii) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xxxi} Moderate CC and low SC

^{xxxii} Moderate TASK

^{xxxiii} Moderate DIS and low IGB

^{xxxiv} High BACE and moderate PWR score either (i) Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence; or (ii) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xxxv} Moderate SC and low CC

^{xxxvi} High TASK

^{xxxvii} Moderate DIS and low IGB

^{xxxviii} Both moderate BACE and PWR, therefore either (i) Respect constraints; work within such parameters toward goals; compromise and consensus building important, or (ii) Challenge constraints but more comfortable doing so in an indirect fashion--behind the scenes; good at being “power behind the throne” where can pull strings but are less accountable for result, or (iii) Challenge constraints but less successful in doing so because too direct and open in use of power; less able to read how to manipulate people and setting behind the scenes to have desired influence; or (iv) Challenge constraints; are skillful in both direct and indirect influence; know what they want and take charge to see it happens.

^{xxxix} Moderate CC and low SC

^{xl} Moderate TASK

^{xli} Low IGB and low DIS