

**T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE**

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN MALAYSIA

MASTER'S THESIS

Iffah Fadhilah BİNTİ AWANG MUHAİDİN

Department: Middle Eastern Studies

Thesis Adviser: Assoc. Prof. Ismail Numan TELCİ

JULY-2023

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THESIS APPROVAL

This work headed “.....”
which has been prepared by, is approved as a M.A
thesis by our jury in majority vote.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis fits the scientific standards of academic research and that the entire preparation of this thesis is my original work and free from the utilization of others' works unless there are similarities of direct quotes and scientific standards of references, which can never be changed. I also declare that this is the first time this thesis is presented as a master's thesis, and it has never been published as another thesis at this university or any other universities.

Iffah Fadhilah BINTI AWANG MUHAIDIN

5th July 2023



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Iffah Fadhilah BİNTİ AWANG MUHAİDİN

5th July 2023

ABSTRACT

SAU, Middle East Institute

Abstract of Master's Thesis

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This thesis investigates how Islamic Organizations in Malaysia have been impacted by the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology to achieve social and political agendas. In doing so, this paper makes a comparative analysis of three Islamic Organizations in Malaysia, which are PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia), IKRAM (Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia) and ISMA (Malaysian Muslim Solidarity). It is done by first scrutinizing the founding history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Then, the analysis will be done by including how these Islamic Organizations in Malaysia perform their ideology of <i>da'wa</i> (preaching) and <i>tarbiyyah</i> (education) that they have impacted from Muslim Brotherhood. The political action, political statements, and social activities to achieve the political and social agenda of these organizations are also analyzed. The methodology used in this study is a qualitative research methodology which is case study. Analysis of its portal and website and observation of the movement on the ground are done. Movement documents, literature, newspaper and book published by the organizations are also analyzed.	
Key Words: Malaysia, Islamic Organization, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood	

ÖZET

SAÜ, Ortadoğu Enstitüsü

Yüksek Lisans Tez Özeti

Tezin Başlığı: Malezyadaki Ihvan Müslimin

Tezin Yazarı: Iffah Fadhilah BİNTİ AWANG MUHAİDİN **Danışman:** Ismail Numan TELCİ

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Anabilimdalı: Ortadoğu Çalışmaları

Bu tez, Malezya'daki İslami Örgütlerin sosyal ve politik gündemlerini gerçekleştirmek için Müslüman Kardeşler'in ideolojisini nasıl etkilediklerini araştırıyor. Bunu yaparken, bu makale Malezya'daki üç İslami Kuruluşun, PAS (Malezya İslam Partisi), IKRAM (Pertubuhan IKRAM Malezya) ve ISMA'nın (Malezya Müslüman Dayanışma Derneği) karşılaştırmalı bir analizini yapmaktadır. Öncelikle Mısır'daki Müslüman Kardeşler'in kuruluş tarihi ve ideolojisi irdelenerek yapılmıştır. Daha sonra Malezya'daki bu İslami Örgütlerin Müslüman Kardeşler'den etkilendikleri tebliğ ve terbiyye ideolojilerini nasıl icra ettiklerine yer verilerek analiz yapılacaktır. Bu örgütlerin siyasi ve sosyal ajandalarına ulaşmak için siyasi eylemleri, siyasi beyanları ve sosyal faaliyetleri de analiz edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada kullanılan yöntem, durum çalışması olan nitel bir araştırma yöntemidir. Portalının ve web sitesinin analizi ve yerdeki hareketin gözlemlenmesi yapılır. Hareket belgeleri, edebiyat, örgütler tarafından basılan gazete ve kitaplar da incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Malezya, Müslüman Kardeşler, İslam örgütü, Mısır

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MB	: Muslim Brotherhood
US	: United States
UK	: United Kingdom
ISMA	: Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia
IKRAM	: Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia
ABIM	: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia
PAS	: Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
NGO	: Non Government Organization
UMNO	: United Malay National Organization
PKR	: Parti Keadilan Rakyat
PH	: Pakatan Harapan
BN	: Barisan Nasional
PR	: Pakatan Rakyat
DAP	: Democratic Action Party
AKP	: Justice and Development Party
PKS	: Parti Keadilan Sejahtera
ASU	: Arab Socialist Union
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
NDP	: National Democratic Party
RCC	: Revolutionary Command Council
ICERD	: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
AMANAH	: Parti Amanah Negara
IRC	: Islamic Representative Council
FJP	: The Freedom and Justice Party
MSA	: Muslim Student Association

INTRODUCTION

"What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe?" This is the phrase that had been said by Iqbal in the 1930 Muslim League convention held in Allahabad, Pakistan.¹ To such a great extent, should religion and politics mix? Can a mix of religion and politics become the supreme form of government and solve problems that happen in some countries? Nevertheless, the post-9/11 War on Terrorism and the Middle East crisis draw the world's attention to the blistering discourse of Political Islam among academicians, politicians, media, and policymakers. Recently, the study of political science and international relations has had high inquisitiveness on the rise of Islamic-oriented political parties, or some scholars would assume as Islamist. Political Islam seems more perceptible than any other religious politics and is consistently highlighted in the headlines of the media. For instance, the late Arab Spring eventually marked the rise of Islamic organizations, particularly in the politics of the democratic sphere in the Middle East. Speaking about Political Islam, Emad El-Din Shahin, and Esposito, in the *Oxfords Handbook of Islam and Politics*, states that there are two diametrically opposed orientations when it comes to manifested political Islam. First is the pro-democracy uprising of mainstream movements, and the second is the violence by fringe groups.² Both of these categories aim to rebuild the political, economic, social, and cultural basis of their societies.

There is some attempt to compare the role of Islam and Christianity in the political aspect, yet there is an abundance of differences between both. Shadi Hamid, in his book 'Islamic Exceptionalism,' states one of the differences in which he picks the Muslim Brotherhood as the example in order to distinguish; "Muslim Brotherhood does have a particular vision for society that puts Islam and Islamic law at the center of public life. The vast majority of Christians, in the west-including, committed conservatives cannot conceive of a comprehensive legal order anchored in religion."³ Muslim Brotherhood is appraised as one of the most influential, most organized, most popular, most active, and most

¹ Latif Ahmad Sherwani, Speeches, "Writings and Statements of Iqbal", *Iqbal Academy*, 2005, p.302.

² John Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, *Oxfords Handbook of Islam and Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.1.

³ Shadi Hamid, *Islamic Exceptionalism*, St Martin Press, 2016, p.1.2

important opposition movement.⁴ Its founder Hassan Al-Banna also the theoretician of the movement explains well the concept of Political Islam in the *Maj'muaat Rasail* (The Complete Works). The organization, founded in 1928, first were initiated as an Islamic social movement and consequently involved in politics in the 1930s. The erudition and tremendously impactful ideology manifested by Al-Banna and other prominent scholars in Muslim Brotherhood such as Syed Qutb have enticed Islamic organizations in the Middle East, West, Asia and almost every Muslim country which adopted its ideology or formal affiliate to Muslim Brotherhood.

The study of the Muslim Brotherhood also falls under the scope of Islamism and post-Islamism. The first generation or Islamism of Islamic political oriented parties were mostly the parties that born from the ship of post-colonial exasperation, longing for stability and hold to the implementation of Islamic state and Shariah.⁵ On the other hand, the new emergence term of Post-Islamism or the second generation is originates by Asef Bayat in 1990s. Post-Islamism is a theoretical framework developed and explained as a 'phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy and sources of legitimacy of Islamism are exhausted even among its once-ardent supporters'.⁶ Bayat also mentioned that Post Islamism 'is neither un-islamic or secular, rather it represent an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty'.⁷

Post-Islamism could be manifested through diverse forms of social customs, political concepts, and religious beliefs, such as urban reasoning that follows post-Islamist ideals, youth and student movements, feminist activities, or theological viewpoints.⁸ The second generation do not envision Islamic state and Shariah but 'viable electoral platforms and stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests – Islamic as well as secular'.⁹

⁴ John Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, p.12.

⁵ Jeffrey Martini, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Erin York, "The Muslim Brotherhood, Its Youth, and Implications for U.S. Engagement", **Rand Corporation**, 2012, p.29.

⁶ Asef Bayat, "What is Post Islamis?", **International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM Review)**, Vol 16, Autumn 2005, p.5.

⁷ Asef Bayat, p.8.

⁸ Asef Bayat, p.5.

⁹ Vali Nasr, "The Rise of Muslim Democracy", **Journal of Democracy**, 16, No 2, April 2005, p.13.

Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu' Ala Mawduddi represent the main proponent of Islamism and the first generation of the politically oriented Islamic parties that champion the establishment of Islamic state, order and Shariah law since they were longing for stability in the post-colonialism era.

On the other hand, Rashid Ghannouchi, the founder of En-Nahda, a political party that emerged from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia best described as one of the main proponents of post-Islamism which he declared himself as Muslim Democrats, embarking from Islamism to post-Islamism in 2013 which En-Nahda has put aside its Islamic principle and adhered to the liberal-democratic games and rules.¹⁰ There was also discourse by scholars that 'Islamism had failed, both intellectually and politically.'¹¹ Bayat then emphasizes that due to parochial conceptualization by critics, the rise of post-Islamism is not the downfall or end of Islamism.

According to Halim Rane, the second generation of Islamic-oriented political parties such as Turkey's AKP(Justice and Development Party) and Indonesia's PKS(Justice and Prosperity Party) are progressing politics based on a goal oriented and holistic *maqasid-oriented* approach in which putting their Islamic objective on 'democracy, good governance, economic prosperity, socio-economic justice, human rights and pluralism'.¹² He also underlined that the inadequacy of the traditional perspective in meeting the requirements, hopes, and anticipations of Muslim voters, coupled with the diminishing electoral achievements of Islamists, prompted a development of Islamic political ideology. This has resulted in the appearance of a subsequent generation of political parties with an Islamic leaning that promote a maqasid-oriented strategy.¹³ *Maqasid al-Shariah* is the higher objectives of *Shariah* that can be traced back in the administrative approach of second caliph Umar al-Khattab and developed by times as well as revised and expanded by Ibn Taymiyyah in 1328 and developed as a new philosophy of Islamic law by Ishaq al-Shatibi in 1388. Nowadays, the adoption of *the maqasid-oriented*

¹⁰ Francesco Cavatorta, Fabio Merone, "Post-Islamism, ideological and '*la tunisianite*' of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda", **Journal of Political Ideologies**, Vol 20, 2014, p.6.

¹¹ M. Browsers, "Rethinking Post-Islamism and the Study of Changes in Islamist Ideology", **Project of Middle East Political Science Briefings**, No 24, 2014, p.16-19.

¹² Halim Rane, "The Impact of Maqasid Al-Shari'ah on Islamist Political Thought", **Islam and Civilisational Renewal**, Vol, 2, No. 2, 2011, p.348.

¹³ Ibid, p.351.

approach is a platform to express the objective of Islam in response to contemporary circumstances. According to *the Maqasid Shariah* approach, five major qualities in human life, which are quality of life, religion, intellectuality, progeny and wealth, must be in line with any ruling or policy execution adopted by Muslims in order to achieve the highest objective of *Shariah*.¹⁴ Freedom, justice and equality were added in the benchmark of *Maqasid Shariah* by Ibn Ashur.¹⁵ Thus the second generations or post Islamism has used *Maqasid Shariah* as their reference to achieve their objective.

In 2019, Malaysia, under the Mahathir government, hosted a Kuala Lumpur Summit. High-level representatives from Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, and Iran attended the KL (Kuala Lumpur) Summit in December 2019. Among the dignitaries present were Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Mahathir urged cooperation from the international community, saying the Summit would be the first step in finding remedies for the problems plaguing the Islamic world. The displacement of Muslims globally, food security, national/cultural identity, and Islamophobia are some of the issues that are covered. The meeting also focused on commerce, internet governance, technology, and security.¹⁶ Mahathir was asked if the Summit is an alternative to OIC, and he responded, "OIC is a huge organization. The Summit will not replace the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). For us, having such a large organization at the conference is quite challenging. Due to this, we only started with five nations, but we do hope that eventually, the OIC's other members will join as well."¹⁷ When asked why Malaysia chose not to invite Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Syria, and Jordan, Abdel Rahim Abdel Wahed, an Egyptian specialist on Malaysian political issues, responded, "Search for the Turkish, Qatari, and Muslim Brotherhood influence."¹⁸

¹⁴ Ibn Ashur, *Treatise on Maqasid al-Sharia'ah*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, London, 2013.

¹⁵ Rached Ghannouchi, "al-Hurriyat al'Ammah fi al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah(Public Liberties in the Islamic State)", **Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Center**, 1993.

¹⁶NST, "KL Summit 2019 establishes stronger alliance among Muslim countries", <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/12/549788/kl-summit-2019-establishes-stronger-alliance-among-muslim-countries> (March 31, 2023)

¹⁷"Shadow of Muslim brotherhood hovers over Malaysia summit", *Arab Weekly*, 15 December 2019, <https://theArabweekly.com/shadow-muslim-brotherhood-hovers-over-malaysia-summit> (31 March 2023)

¹⁸ Ibid.

In 2014, Datuk Seri Dr. Mujahid Yusof Rawa, a former leader in PAS(Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), an Islamic political organization in Malaysia, said that the Muslim Brotherhood's "impact" in PAS is confined to adhering to the group's opinions regarding the place of Islam in society.¹⁹ He was also claimed that the movement was supported by other organizations in Malaysia, including IKRAM and ABIM(Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia), and that it posed no threat to Malaysian society.²⁰ Mujahid stressed that in accordance with the Muslim Brotherhood's philosophy, a caliphate would eventually be established after first establishing a strong Muslim community through the institution of the family, followed by society and the state. Mujahid added that it covers political power, authority and how to run a state. Mujahid says that PAS did not accept this ideology absolutely, though. PAS just localized it and adapted some parts of it.²¹

Malaysia is one of the countries that experience the phenomenon of the Muslim Brotherhood in the political and non-governmental organization. According to Liow, there is 'inherent bias' in the literature of Islamist movement studies whereby it is developed by analytical frameworks and historical development based on the Middle East and North Africa, for example, the 'Arab Spring' narrative. 'Arab Spring' later become the mining data for scholars on tracking and investigating Islamist mobilization. Liow stressed that scholars have less attention to Southeast Asia Islamism.²² Thus to fill this gap, this thesis is a study of how Islamic organizations in Malaysia adopt the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and methodology in order to achieve social and political agenda. This thesis first presents the historical narrative of the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its ideology. It will then analyze three organizations that adopt

¹⁹The Edge Market, "Muslim Brotherhood influence not a problem in Malaysia", <https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/%E2%80%98muslim-brotherhood-influence-not-problem-malaysia%E2%80%99> (March 31, 2023)

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Joseph Chinyong Liow, **Islam and Political Power in Indonesia and Malaysia: The Role of Tarbiyah and Dakwah in the Evolution of Islamism**, Cambridge University Press, 2022, p.1.

Muslim Brotherhood's ideology which are the political and Islamic social organizations. The organizations are the political organization PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and two NGOs, IKRAM (Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia) and ISMA (Malaysian Muslim Solidarity). The analysis will be done by including how these Islamic Organizations in Malaysia perform their ideology of *da'wa* (preaching) and *tarbiyyah* (education) that they have adopted from the Muslim Brotherhood. The political action, political statements, and social activities to achieve the political and social agenda of these organizations are also analyzed. The thesis will then make a comparative analysis of these three Islamic Organizations.

Research Methodology

The methodology that has been used in this study is a historical analysis and empirical research; the qualitative study is applied in the way of a holistic approach. Fieldwork consists of interviews with members and activists, analysis of its portal and website, as well as observation of the movement on the ground. Movement documents, literature, newspaper and books that had been published by the organizations is analyzed as well. To a large extent, this thesis methodology is a qualitative research methodology. This methodology is preferred because the qualitative approach aids in the exploration of individual unique perspectives through interview that lead to descriptive result.

Literature Review

From the start of the writing, this thesis, sources of information on the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood and finally, literature on recent and current events related to the Muslim Brotherhood, especially Muslim Brotherhood-related events in Malaysia, have been a focus of this research.

The ideology of Muslim Brotherhood in term of *Da'wa*, *Tarbiyyah* and politic is researched through primary resource which is in *Majmuah Rasail* (The Complete Works). In this book, Al-Banna explain the *Majmuah Rasail* is regarded as a seminal work that encapsulates Al-Banna's profound insights into Islamic activism, social reform, and the relationship between religion and state. It remains a significant reference for scholars, researchers, and individuals interested in understanding the intellectual and ideological

foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. In *Majmuah Rasail*, al-Banna addresses a wide range of topics relevant to Islamic ideology and activism. He discusses the role of Muslims in society, the importance of Islamic education, the need for social justice, and the establishment of an Islamic state. Al-Banna emphasizes the importance of adhering to Islamic principles and values in all aspects of life, including politics, economics, and social relationships. The book also delves into al-Banna's vision for the Muslim Brotherhood as a cohesive and disciplined organization working towards the betterment of society. He outlines the objectives, strategies, and methods for achieving the Brotherhood's goals, emphasizing the role of piety, activism, *da'wa* (Islamic outreach) and *tarbiyyah* (education) in promoting their message.

It is important to understand the theory of Islamism as it is related to Muslim Brotherhood. In the work of Esposito, John, and Emad El-Din Shahin entitled *Oxford's Handbook of Islam and Politics*, they examine the diverse range of Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah, and explore their ideological foundations, goals, and strategies. Esposito highlights the complex interplay between religion, politics, and socio-economic factors that shape Islamist movements. They have also explored the concept of post-Islamism. They argue that post-Islamism represents a shift in the political landscape of Muslim-majority countries, characterized by a move away from a singular focus on establishing an Islamic state through revolutionary means. Instead, post-Islamist movements seek to engage in democratic processes, promote social justice, and address contemporary issues within a framework that reconciles Islamic principles with modern realities.

Furthermore, the book "Political Islam in Malaysia: Islamism in a Secular State" by Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid offers insights into the Islamist movement in Malaysia, including the Muslim Brotherhood's influence. It explores the ideological underpinnings, strategies, and evolving nature of political Islam in Malaysia, shedding light on the dynamics between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. In "Foundations of Islamic Governance: A Southeast Asian Perspective," Maszlee Malik adopts a discursive and abstract approach that aims to develop a framework for "good governance" by employing a value-driven dynamic model based on the *Maqasid al-Shari'ah* (higher

objectives of Islamic law). This approach moves beyond the limitations of traditional and contemporary discussions on the topic, which often focus on proposing institutional models of governance derived from *fiqh*(juristic methods). Instead, Malik seeks to broaden the scope and offer a unique perspective by emphasizing the underlying values and principles of Islamic governance. Maszlee Malik is a prominent academic and politician in Malaysia who has written extensively on Islamist movements and issues related to Islam in Malaysia. As a former Minister of Education in Malaysia (2018-2020) and an associate professor of Islamic studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Maszlee Malik possesses in-depth knowledge and expertise in this field.

The presence and impact of the Muslim Brotherhood in Malaysia have been subjects of academic inquiry. This literature review synthesizes existing research to provide an overview of the organization's activities, ideologies, and impact in the country. Scholars have examined the historical context of the Muslim Brotherhood's establishment in Malaysia, its ideological framework, organizational structure, and activities. Moreover, the review delves into the influence and impact of the organization on religious and political discourse, as well as the controversies and criticisms surrounding it. There is one book named "Pengaruh Ikhwanul Muslimin terhadap Gerakan Islam di Malaysia"(Influence of Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic Movement in Malaysia) authored by, Dr. Riduan Mohamad Nor, provides a comprehensive and well-researched analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's influence on the Islamic movement in Malaysia particularly in Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party(PAS), an Islamic political organization in Malaysia. The author skillfully weaves together historical context, ideological exploration, organizational analysis, and examination of impact to present a holistic understanding of the subject matter. The book's strengths lie in its use of primary sources, rigorous research methodology, and balanced approach to addressing controversies and criticisms. By analyzing the organization's core beliefs, principles, and strategies, the book presents a nuanced understanding of how these ideologies have resonated within the local Islamic movement. A thesis authored by Abdul Malek, Zulkifly thesis examines the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia-ABIM), an Islamist youth movement that emerged in Malaysia

during the Islamic revivalist period of the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that ABIM drew guidance and inspiration from the doctrines of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in its early years. This influence occurred through direct contact, communication, and media channels. In addition to highlighting the ideological and spiritual impact of the Muslim Brotherhood on ABIM, the thesis explores how ABIM adopted organizational models from the Brotherhood. These models provided ABIM with the necessary tools and strategies to effectively propagate Islam throughout Malaysia, as evidenced by specific examples presented in the study. Another literature related to Muslim Brotherhood in Malaysia, entitled *Transmission of Islamic Reform (Islah) from Egypt to Malaysia: A Study of Hasan al-Banna's Legacy*, authored by, Ismail Bin Mamat, he examines Hasan al-Banna's ideas and teachings have had a profound impact on Islamic movements globally, and this review specifically examines their influence on Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) in Malaysia. These Islamic movements advocate for comprehensive reform encompassing the individual, family, society, and socio-political systems. By analyzing Hasan al-Banna's pivotal role in shaping these movements, this review aims to provide insights into the transmission and impact of his ideas in Malaysia.

One notable academic work is the book *"Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students"* by Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid. This book examines the rise of Islamic activism in Malaysia, including the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology on PAS. It explores the mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and strategies in the context of Malaysian student activism. Another significant academic contribution is the article *"Islam and Political Power In Indonesia and Malaysia: The Role of Tarbiah and Dakwah in the Evolution of Islamism"* by Joseph Chinyong Liow. This book provides two arguments. Firstly, to fully comprehend the popularity and attraction of Islamism in Indonesia and Malaysia, it is crucial to recognize the role of social movements in facilitating and empowering mobilization. Secondly, it is precisely the foundations in civil society mobilization that explain the persistent influence of Islamist politics, as evidenced by the ways in which Islamic social movements have shaped and reconfigured the political environment.

There are not a lot of academic literature related to Muslim Brotherhood and Malaysia. This paper is aims to contribute to contemplate the knowledge vacuum in Muslim Brotherhood assessment especially in Malaysia. It is also aims to filled the critical studies gap in literature of religious studies, political Islamic studies particularly in South East Asia, and other studies that related.



CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

1.1 History of Its Founding Year

Hassan Al-Banna grew up in a modest, conservative town in Ismailiya, Egypt, where he studied in a local religious elementary school at the age of twelve while helping his father as a combined trade and watch repairer.²³ Growing up in a modest rural society, he was shocked witnessing the lifestyle of gambling, materialism, alcohol, prostitution and promiscuity when he moved to Cairo in 1923.²⁴ He perceived this as intellectual and social liberation movement that washed out the Islamic values and norms in Egypt. He discerned that liberal organizations, atheists, and the mass media are spreading secularization ideas that will destroy the religious role in public life and the country. After graduating from Dar al Umum in 1927, he became an Arabic Language teacher in Ismailiya.²⁵ Since he had seen the socio-economic problem that faced the people of Egypt, he urged the people of Ismailiya by giving talks in cafes about his idea of reform according to comprehension of Islam.²⁶ Accordingly, Al-Banna established the MB in 1928 at the age of 22 with the vision of upholding the true Islam.²⁷ The early establishment of Brotherhood has no objective to form a political organization. Instead, it is an Islamic social organization that aims to call for an individual and collective Islamic revolution, emphasizing *da'wa* (preaching) and *tarbiyyah* (education) that elevate the spiritual aspect. MB is also well known as a welfare organization that offers cheap medical health services, schools and other social charities that have helped the majority under privileged people of Egypt up until now. The organization enlarged expeditiously from 5 branch offices in 1930 to 300 offices in 1932.²⁸

In the late 1930s, MB became involved in a political prospect without disregard for its spiritual aspect of *da'wa and tarbiyyah*.²⁹ Factors that made MB involved in politics are the mandate-power Britain influence,³⁰ which is the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of

²³ Richard Paul Mitchell, **The Society of Muslim Brotherhood**, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.1.

²⁴ Ibid p.3.

²⁵ Ibid p 6.

²⁶ Noha Melor, **Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Da'wa, Discourse, and Political Communication**, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2018, p.88.

²⁷ Ibid p.8.

²⁸ Ibid p.328.

²⁹ Ibid p.16.

³⁰ Barbara Zollner, **The Muslim Brotherhood, Routledge Handbook of Political Islam**, London, Routledge, 2012, p.52.

Allegiance, associate the country's domestic affair and the Palestine crisis. In 1946, the palace of Egypt called Al-Banna for a consultation on the appointment of a new prime minister. This event proves that Al-Banna accepted the constitutional life in Egypt but more to having a reform approach from the internal political system by introducing MB representatives in the parliament by-election.³¹ However the new prime minister Ahmad Maher had urged removing them by declaring the fraud of election result.³² The government aware and feel threatened by the expansion of MB power in socio-economic as well as in politics resulting on the prohibition of MB and arrested a large number of its members by the government. Furthermore, by the end of 1940, MB's paramilitary wing, the *Nizam al-Khass*(Special Apparatus), employed force against British authorities, leading to Hassan Al-Banna's assassination. Nonetheless, MB's prohibition only lasted for a short time as the government was preoccupied with World War Two.

1.1.1 Muslim Brotherhood in Nasser Era 1952-1970

After Free Officer's coup against the Egypt monarchy on July 23rd, 1952, President Naquib became president until 1954, when Nasser succeeded him after an internal leadership battle. The evolution of the relationship between Nasser and MB fluctuated, ranging from rapprochement to discrepancy and exasperation. Then to utter atrocities.³³ In the first phase between 1952-1954, MB supported the revolution to overthrow the monarch and unwanted British mandate as a declaration drafted by MB that called the revolution a "blessed movement" and remarks from Al-Banna as "the prelude for a new dawn."³⁴ There were meetings between Hassan Hudaybi, Al-Banna's successor, with President Naquib and Prime Minister Ali Mahir in the days following the revolution to request a constitutional reform to make it compatible with Islam.³⁵ Although there was rapprochement in this phase, subsequently, leaders minimized the connection with MB and the regime started to form an eloquent authority over political opponents through coercion.³⁶

³¹ Mohammed Zahid, **The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East**, I.B Tauris, 2012.

³² Ibid.

³³ Omar Ashour, "The De-Radicalisation of Jihadists", **London, New York: Routledge**, 2009, p.42.

³⁴ Richard Paul Mitchell, **The Society of Muslim Brotherhood**, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.105

³⁵ E. Avsar, "The Transformation of the Political Ideology and the Democracy Discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt", (**Master Thesis**), Middle East Technical University, p.33.

³⁶ Ibid.

The second phase was between 1954 to 1967, a devastating and cessation phase in which MB was banned and opposition was absent during the Nasser regime. Nasser's initial primacy was to centralize power as political pluralism is perceived as fragile and could lead to instability.³⁷ Thus, in 1953, all parties were banned except MB, which was under pressure to join the Free Officers' Freedom Committee' but Hassan Hudaybi had refused. The pressure on MB to join the Committee was due to popular social support, which was not within the state's control. Nasser believed it could cause a threat to stability.³⁸ On October 19th, 1954, Nasser signed a withdrawal agreement with Britain. The agreement allowed Britain to locate its army for at least six more years. This triggered Islamists such as MB to intensify opposition towards Nasser.

As a result, MB was banned and struggled with pervasive and brutal repression from the government as thousands of its members were inhumanity tortured, arrested and accused in court. Nasser had ordered MB to stop its recruitment and activities as he felt MB was politically hazardous to his power.³⁹ Nasser also accused MB of attempting an assassination on him when he delivered a speech in Alexandria, but MB repudiated the accusation. In his book 'Inside the Muslim Brotherhood,' Yousef Nada, a member of MB, claimed that it was an action planned by Nasser to strengthen its power. Instead, Hassan Hudaybi called for an uprising against the Nasser regime and intended to reinstate political freedom, but in 1954 Nasser prohibited the organization. It was under Nasser's tenure that Qutb has sentenced to death due to the accusation of the assassination of Nasser and Qutb's argument that the Nasser regime as the model of *jahiliyyah* and jihad towards the regime.

The third phase was between 1967-1970, in which Egypt was defeated in the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Nasser then used Islam as rhetoric to gain support as the defeat against Israel increased disappointment and dissatisfaction towards the regime after the socio-economic failure in the society in 1965. Nasser used 'Allah' term more in his speeches which appeared to be more Islamic and he even released hundreds of group members from jail.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Lia Brynjar, **The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942**, Garment Publishing, 1998.

⁴⁰ Derek Hopwood, **Egypt Politics and Society 1945-1990**, Routledge, 1991, p.97.

Thus, after Egypt was defeated in the war in 1967, Islamic groups popped up and tried to display themselves as an alternative for the regime as MB proclaimed three causes of the defeat in the war as (1) the regime's social, economic and political notion is against the principles of Shariah, (2) a sign from Allah's vengeance toward the regime's violation of Allah's law, (3) Allah's punishment to the regime as the regime's alliance with USSR, an atheist state so that the secular regime's interests prospered.⁴¹

1.1.2 Muslim Brotherhood in Sadat Era 1970-1981

When Anwar Sadat took power, his approach towards MB differed from Nasser's, as he perceived MB as a counterbalance to the leftists and Nasserists. In that sense, he allowed MB to resume its activity, such as reclaiming headquarters, recruitment meetings in mosques and university activities. He also constructed a policy to put MB in society. Sadat displayed himself as a 'Believer-President,' constantly appearing in mass media performing prayers in the mosque on Friday congregations and public holidays.⁴² The opportunity given paved the way for MB to allocate itself in the participation of parliament and to construct the party alliance. In October 1977, Umar Tilemsani, Hassan Hudaybi's successor of General Guide (*Mursyidul Am*), filed a court case to question the organization's prohibition by Nasser. He proclaimed that they were against any constitutional rights. However, the aspiration that Tilemsani might see in the Sadat era was impossible as the court case was unsettled.

Moreover, the transition from one party to a multi-party system is just a tactic from the government without any real independent decision-making powers.⁴³ Tilemsani then proposed MB participate in Sadat's Parliament. This change was done to protect MB from repression and government ban. However, Sadat realized this proposal could be a potent political opposition from MB. Instead, he gave another alternative for MB to participate in parliament via a coalition with any three existing political parties established after the demise of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1976. Tilemsani rejected the alternative as it would worsen the public image of MB as an Islamic actor to a coalition with a secular

⁴¹ Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred W. Wenner, "Modern Islamic Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt", **The Middle East Journal**, 1982, p.336-361.

⁴² John Esposito, **Islam and Politics**, Syracuse University Press, 1984, p.236-237

⁴³ Mohammed Zahid, "The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East", **I.B Tauris**, 2012.

party. MB keeps criticizing the government if the government does not give value to Islam and the Egyptian people. MB's most concern from the government is the *Infitah*, the Open Door Economic policy introduced by Sadat since this policy could be a threat to Egypt's economy as the policy appears as an open market to the West and could monopolize the local market.⁴⁴ MB also coerced the government to implement Shariah law in the state law even though Sadat has made Islam as the state religion in the constitution but for MB Sadat still fail to implement Shariah in the state law.⁴⁵ Consequently, Camp David accords spark fire between Sadat and MB. MB's repudiation of the Israel Camp David accord agreement ignited Sadat's indignation as Sadat commanded to arrest of many of MB's members and another Islamist group in 1981.

1.1.3 Muslim Brotherhood in Mubarak Era 1981-2011

During Hosni Mubarak's tenure, he handled political and economic instability in Egypt. *Infitah* policy had suffered the lower and middle-income populations. In his earlier years in power, Egypt counters larger debt from 30 billion to 48 billion dollars, making up 150 percent of Egypt's GDP then. In 1990, he introduced his Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program with agreement via International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank. Over time, his support lessened and Egypt became one of the world's poorest countries due to its economic crisis. Due to this, Egypt was qualified to apply for a soft loan from the International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank. For MB, the economic crisis is the best way to criticize and oppose the regime.

During the Mubarak era, six parliamentary elections were held: 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. In order to demise the electoral stranglehold of Mubarak's National Democratic Party(NDP), in 1984, New Wafd Party, a secular and liberal party, united with MB despite their contrasting ideology and dislike of history. The alliance is a tactical movement for both, as the electoral requirement must exceed the 8 percent threshold to enter the People's Assembly. Additionally, for MB, due to Nasser's verdict in 1954 and the constitution that forbids the establishment of a political party based on religion, it was still not allowed to enter the election independently. MB's decision to enter the election

⁴⁴ Tal Nachman, **Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan**, Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005.

⁴⁵ Shamsul Azhar Yahya, Mohammad Redzuan Othman, Abu Hanifah Haris, "Tahalluf Siyasi dalam Perjuangan Ikhwan Al-Muslimin di Mesir, 1970-1981", **Jurnal Hadhari Edisi Khas**, 2017, p.188.

aims to spread its message and reach the nation, as well as a recommendation from al-Banna to participate in politics to facilitate the aspiration of *Da'wa*. Drafting laws for non-covered issues under Islamic law is also one of the reasons for participating in the election.⁴⁶

The government hoped this alliance would be a counterbalance between the secularist and Islamist party in which the government expected there would be a "divide and rule" of the internal organization of both parties.⁴⁷ At the same time, the Mubarak regime gave some tolerance to MB during that time because it is one of Mubarak's effort to gain support from worsen relationship with US and Israel. Many MB political activists were released from prison in 1982 and 1983, reinforcing their Islamic reform undertakings. The 1984 election resulted in the alliance of MB and the New Wafd Party winning 58 seats out of 454, making up 15 percent of the total votes. However, the alliance did not last long. In the 1987 election, MB with the Labor Party(Al-Amal) and the Liberal Party(Al-Ahrar) form a new alliance under the name of "Islam Alliance." MB still needs to ally with these parties this time as MB still needs to form an independent party. MB is the spearhead in this alliance and they brought up the slogan "Islam is the Solution." The Labor Party have a similar goal to MB which is establishing an Islamic state, while the tiny Liberal Party, a right-winged party that opposed the government's economic issue and must enter the People's Assembly in alliance with other parties as it is impossible to enter alone.⁴⁸ MB disseminating booklet containing its electoral program in seven points. The first two points consist of reforming the system of democracy from a totalitarian regime to a democratic system based on multi-party⁴⁹ and followed by the implementation of *Shari'a* in the whole system, including the economy and not just in the judiciary system. Regarding citizenship, MB announced that the Copts and the followers of the Book are also fellow citizens of the country and have the same right and obligations as

⁴⁶ Duzgun Arslantas, "The Political Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP Tradition: Why Did Turkish Model Fail in Egypt?", (**Master Thesis**), Middle East Technical University, 2013, p.28.

⁴⁷ Serpil Acikalin, "Muslim Brotherhood's Relationship With Egyptian Government From 1952 to 2008: An Accomodational and Confrontational Relationship", (**Master Thesis**), Middle East Technical University, 2009, p.93.

⁴⁸ Tal Nachman, **Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan**, Sussex Academic Press, 2005 p.52.

⁴⁹ Ahmad Abdalla, **al - Intikhabat al - barlam aniyya fi misr: dars intikhabat 1987 (Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: The Lesson of the 1987 Elections)**, Cairo, Markaz al-Buhuth al-Arabiyya, 1990, p.306.

Muslims do.⁵⁰ The new alliance agreed to run under the list of Socialist Labor Party. As a result, the Socialist Labor Party won 60 seats by taking 17 percent of the votes, 38 of which went to the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵¹ Mubarak regime perceived the participation of MB as a policy of "carrot and stick" as MB had to submit to the political structure and to play the passive posture against the regime.⁵²

Hitherto of the 1990 election, the government formed a new law, Law 206, which is the ending of the party-list system and returning to an individual candidacy system.⁵³ The new law also added a new location in which the opposition positions not strong and manipulating of voting districts that give a privileged spot for NDP candidates. As a result, MB and opposition groups boycotted the 1990 election. Accordingly, MB develops its discourse in political participation by using the term "democracy," which explains the term as an Islamic version rather than the "Western Liberal Democracy" version. MB and opposition parties made 10 points of consensus implying the democratic base of Shari'a as below:

1. Commitment to the human rights and public liberties mentioned in Shari'a and international law.
2. An end to the state of emergency and martial law;
3. A lifting of restrictions on the formation of political parties;
4. The independent supervision of elections by the judiciary;
5. The adoption of the parliamentary system in which the executive power will be vested in the cabinet, which is selected from the party with the majority;
6. Guarantee the right of the People's Assembly to amend the budget; the Shura Council [i.e., the Upper House] powers of oversight and legislation;
7. Choice of the president through direct election from a list of several candidates, with a limit of two terms;

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.309.

⁵¹ Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher, **Boxing In the Brothers**, Middle East Research and Information Project, 2007, p.143.

⁵² Duzgun Arslantas, "The Political Analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP Tradition: Why Did Turkish Model Fail in Egypt?" **Master Thesis**, Middle East Technical University, 2013, p.31.

⁵³ Maye Kasem, **Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule**, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.

8. The compatibility of all legislation passed with *Shariah*, with emphasis on the rights of non-Muslims to follow their own religious law in case of contradiction;

[SEP]9. The independence of the judiciary;[SEP]

10. Freedom of the press and media from government control and equal opportunities for all political parties in the official media.⁵⁴

The 1990s also witnessed a generational crisis between the old member in their seventies and eighties and the younger middle-aged members in their late thirties and forties generation members of MB. The old members are conservative and loyal to the teaching of Al-Banna and Qutb. The younger and middle-aged generation joined the movement in their high school or university in the 1970s.⁵⁵ They were also split among their own generation. The first type of younger and middle-aged generation saw themselves as pioneers with a conservative interpretation of *Shariah*. *At the same time*, in the *Jahilliyah* discourse of Egypt, they perceived that Egyptians should obey the law of Allah instead of Western democracy even though, at the same time, they participated in the electoral process.⁵⁶ After finishing university, some affiliated with Islamic oriented jobs such as founded schools, Islamic clinics, charitable institution, and others were affiliated with politics and trade unions. This type of middle-aged generation is similar to the old member.

While the second type of young generation members of MB is those, who became members of parliament and are seen as communicating with multi institutions such as the government, business people with distinguishing views, secularist figures, non-muslim representatives and journalists, together with secularists in 1990 and 1994, they participated on even issued several joint petitions. They are also involved in conferences and activities abroad in the Middle East, the US and Europe.⁵⁷ To a great extent, all of these political experiences influence their notions and thoughts and enlighten them to be

⁵⁴ Chris Harnisch, Quinn Mecham, **Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood's Civil State**, Middle Eastern Studies, 2009, p.192.

⁵⁵ Serpil Acikalin, "Muslim Brotherhood's Relationship With Egyptian Governments From 1952 To 2008", **Master Thesis**, Middle East Technical University, 2009, p.112.

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Ibid, p.113.

more open toward others' thought and approaches and somehow changed their previous stands.⁵⁸

The strain between the generational gap worsens starting from the death of the fourth General Guide, Hamid Abu Nasr. Seventy-six years old Mustafa Mashour was announced by Mamoun al-Hudaybi as the successor of General Guide and turned up the younger generation against the method of nomination as they claimed that it opposed the law in which MBs had to choose the leader after the meeting was held.⁵⁹ Critiques towards the old members heightened and led the second type of younger generation mainly to resign from the movement and found Wasat Party. Abu al Ayla el Madi, Assam Sultan and Salah' Abd al Karim were among the second type of generation that founded the new Wasat Party. From the statements made by members of the Wasat party, it can be seen that they attempted to allocate themselves in a different way of politics from other Islamic movements. They also denounce the slogan 'Islam is the solution,' and state that righteous secular is better than an Islamic dictator.⁶⁰ They also emphasized the Copt's equality to Muslims and that Copts will have the same right as Muslims and should not pay *Jizya* (tax paid by non-muslim). This is in contrast to MB's stand on Copts, where in April 1997, Mustafa Mashour announced that Copts had to pay *Jizya*. Statements from Wasat party members, Abu al Ayla el Madi and his Copts counterparts, Rafiq Habib manifests that they are more developed, moderate and more open-minded than other Islamic movements:

"Wasat is a civil party like the CDU (Christian Democratic Union). Our culture is Islamic, while theirs is Christian."⁶¹

"Our thoughts are more developed, more moderate and more open minded, than those of the other Islamist groups. Most of us are young; we use modern

⁵⁸ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, **Mobilizing Islam**, Columbia University Press, 2002, p.206-220.

⁵⁹ Joshua A. Stacher, "Post - Islamist Rumbblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party", **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, p.415-432.

⁶⁰ Meir Hatina, **Identity Politics In The Middle East**, I.B Tauris, 2007, p160-161.

⁶¹ Karim El-Gawhary, "We are a Civil Party with an Islamic Identity" An Interview with Abu 'Ila Madi Abu 'Ila and Rafiq Habib, *Middle East Report*, Vol. 26, 1996, p.30.

language to express our thoughts and we are open to cooperation with the West. We have taken elements from many different perspectives."⁶²

Wasat Party applied for a license in four years, 1996, 1998, 2004 and 2009. However, all were rejected by the Party Formation Committee, which was made up of seven members from ministers and government-assigned members.⁶³ Wasat members were also detained and tried in the military judiciary in 1996.⁶⁴ Wasat were told by the judiciary that "the party's program was not sufficiently distinguishable from those of already existing political parties."⁶⁵ In 1997, 46 founding members of the Wasat Party exited the party and went back to MB due to they saw the domination of Rafiq Habib in Wasat Party's plan.⁶⁶

MB gained seventeen seats in the 2000 Parliamentary Election despite the 1990s repression and imprisonments. The tactic in the election was to choose less popular and younger MB members, position the candidates in the Delta region instead of Upper Egypt, and refrain from competing with NDP's leading districts. In 2002, the fifth General Guide, Mustafa Mashur, died and the 83-year-old Deputy Guide, Mamoun al-Hudaybi, succeeded as the sixth General Guide elected by the 100 members of the Consultative Council and Guidance Office in which the election is aligned with the MB's constitution. Not long into his term, al-Hudaybi died in 2004 and was succeeded by 76 years old Mahdi Akef. Two months after Mahdi Akef was in office, MB published "Reform Initiative." In this initiative, MB demands the "separation of powers, the unrestricted right to form political parties, and freedom of personal belief and opinion."⁶⁷ MB continuously upholds its religious point of reference and utilizes the famous slogan 'Islam is the solution'.

There was a Parliamentary elections program in 2005. Alongside the initiative, MB also promoted the implementation of *Shariah*, pluralism in the party, and the rights of the Egyptian people. MB denied that Islam is a theocratic system but Islam 'Civil State' in which the community determines its system within the framework of the fixed norms of

⁶² Ibid p.31.

⁶³ Tal, p.73.

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Esposito and Shahin, p.266

⁶⁶ Hopwood, p.97.

⁶⁷ Shadi Hamid, "Parting the Veil", **Democracy Journal**, 2007

Islamic law.⁶⁸ Mahdi Akif put a promise that if MB won, they would focus on the "freedom, human rights, democracy, education development, unemployment and university reform."⁶⁹ The 2005 parliamentary election is a total success for MB as it becomes the most prominent opposition bloc in parliament of 88 members. However, MB faced another phase of military strike after the victory, which effecting MB's movements.

Despite the strike, MB worked within the system and leaders to prove their seriousness with democracy. However, MB is criticized that its democracy as unclear. For example, MB's stand on the equal right for Copts as critiques said MB remains reluctant to endorse equal rights for the Copts.⁷⁰ In 2007, MB marked its milestone in which they launched the "Draft Party Platform," which caught the eyes of Egyptian and international media. The platform is about democracy and freedom, but the difference is that the platform included the thought of Egyptian women, Copts and Islamization. Yet the draft attracted more criticism when the draft seemed to contradict the 'Civil State' as the draft suggested laws to be suited to Islamic law and legislature needs to seek the advice from senior respected religious scholars from the Muslim community.⁷¹

While the draft is still disputed, MB released another program for the 2008 Municipal Election. The program highlighted Egyptian society's socio-economic, everyday problems like health, education, environment, facilities, agriculture and unemployment. Around 10,000 candidates affiliated with the MB were expected to participate. However, due to restrictions on preparing required documents, only 5,754 candidates were able to do so. Eventually, the number of MB candidates decreased to just 498 individuals who managed to complete the registration process. Habib noted that it was ironic that only 21 names of MB members were included in the final lists for the municipal elections. Prior few days to the election, 900 members were arrested. Aftermath, MB boycotted the election and stated it was a disregard for justice.⁷²

⁶⁸ Kristen Stilt, "Islam is the Solution': Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood", **Texas International Law Journal**, 2010, p.73-108.

⁶⁹ Muhammad el-Shreef, Akeef: "Freedom and Democracy are on the Top", *Ikhwanweb*, 19 November 2005, <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=5502> (March 29, 2023).

⁷⁰ Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway **Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, p.6.

⁷¹ Kristen Stilt, p.102.

⁷² Habib: Tuesday's Local Elections "A Farce", *Ikhwanweb*, April 7, 2008,

In March 2009, Mahdi Akef resigned, and Muhammad Badie succeeded him based on the Shura Council of MB as the new General Guide. The presidential election was planned to be held in 2011 where Mubarak was planning to pass his position to his son Gamal as he did not want MB to win big like 2005 election.⁷³ Mubarak was able to withdraw MB and other opposition parties from the parliament by the arrestment of MB's members and fraudster during the election.

1.1.4 Post Arab Spring and Muslim Brotherhood Political Ideology

Arab Spring in 2011 prompted the ouster of Hosni Mubarak after his regime for thirty years. Egyptians had been on the streets, notably Al-Tahrir Square, to call Mubarak for resignation due to his incapability to bring Egypt into political, economic and social prosperity and stability after all his years in corrupted power. After Mubarak was expelled, the Special Committee of the Armed Forces(SCAF) halted the parliament. It postponed the constitution to give way for parliamentary elections in which MB political party, Freedom and Justice (FJP), won nearly half the seats of the law-making lower house, followed by the Salafi al-Nour party that gained a quarter of the seats and the rest ten percent goes to the liberals, secular and independent politicians. Thus the Islamic-based party makes up 90 percent of the seats. Morsi's victory is slightly more than half of the votes in the presidential election.

Nevertheless, numerous critics of the term "moderate" have been propagated by MB and FJP. Critics accused them of faking ideology, having a "hidden agenda," and feared that the political ideology could lead to growing authoritarianism.⁷⁴ FJP also had difficulty including liberal and secularist-dominated political opposition due to both having diverging aims for post-revolutionary Egypt. This also brings much more criticism as MB lacks "inclusion" of the political opposition. They were allies in the politics of *wasatiyya*(moderate) during the Mubarak regime, but MB took a step forward to fully

<https://ikhwanweb.com/habib%3a-tuesdays-local-electio/> (31 March, 2023).

⁷³ Kristen Chik, "Egypt election routs popular Muslim Brotherhood from parliament", *CS Monitor*, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1201/Egypt-election-routs-popular-Muslim-Brotherhood-from-parliament> (29 March 2023).

⁷⁴ Samuel Tadros, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution," **Current Trends in Islamist Ideology**, 2011, p.5-20.

make use of its electoral winning to achieve its vision for Egypt- which secular opposition dissatisfied at the time they also wanted to uphold their ideology in post-revolutionary of Egypt.⁷⁵ Yet the political opposition shows their undemocratic behavior when they refused the results of Morsi's election by saying it is a fraud and also boycotting the Constitution of 2012 made by MB.⁷⁶

The Constitution of 2012 is another milestone of MB's rule in power that replaced the Provisional Constitution of Egypt adopted in 2011 in the post-revolution. The constitution's referendum result in December was 63.8% for yes.⁷⁷ Drafted mainly by the Islamic inclined political actors; the constitution comprises an Islamic-oriented legal system. It is the entire constitution after the one in 1971, as against the provisional one voted in 2011. The constitution is in line with MB's political ideology, which clearly states that it is a champion of democracy that ensures people's contribution to decision-making and supports political pluralism. The constitution also initiated a more sturdy role for the religion of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in many aspects of Egyptian law. The constitution opposed that in 1971 which gives Christians and Jews the right to be ruled by their religious laws..⁷⁸ Moreover, Al-Azhar and its scholar are given a mandate as the country consult its scholar for Islamic law. The woman's acknowledgment in an idiosyncratic manner is also included in the 2012 constitution, which opposes the constitution of 1971 that mentions equality between men and women. The establishment of two mandates of four years for the presidential rule is the principle of democratic transition president is in the constitution of 2012 that prevented having a more extended power in a rule like Mubarak did for thirty years.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Maha Azam, "Egypt's Democratic Experiment: Challenges to a Positive Trajectory," *Insight Turkey*, 15(2), 2013, p.157-169.

⁷⁶ Tamer el-Ghobashy, "Misgivings Over Coup Spread in Egypt," *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 July 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324694904578597840302132514?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887324694904578597840302132514.html> (29 March 2023).

⁷⁷ Peter Beumont, "Mohamed Morsi signs Egypt's new constitution into law", *The Guardian*, 26 December 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/26/mohamed-morsi-egypt-constitution-law> (29 March 2023).

⁷⁸ Mariam Rizk, Osman el-Sharnoubi, "Constitution 2013 vs. 2012: A Comparison", *Ahram Online*, 12 December 2013, <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/88644/Egypt/0/Egypt-constitution--vs--A-comparison.aspx> (March 29, 2023).

⁷⁹ BBC News, "Egypt to hold December referendum on new constitution", December 1, 2012 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20568356> (29 March 2023).

Many laws were made throughout Morsi's power, and it is not fully religiously oriented. Many laws made and planned also focus on the economy and society, such as easing sectarian tensions,⁸⁰ addressing income tax for the poverty-stricken people, and launching "*Sokouk*" (Islamic financial bond) as a new financial mechanism.⁸¹ Even the Salafis suggested laws about the ban of ballet dancing or women's group were denied by MB. This shows that the MB does not entirely focus on religious matters during the presidential power.⁸²

During the Morsi presidential campaign, he always emphasized the MB's political ideology, the 'Civil State,' with an Islamic reference, including women and Copts. He implemented the "moderate" vision of Islamic law. MB is consistent with its political ideology of never nominating a "Caliph" or a cleric as the head of a country. Even though Al-Azhar is mandated to consult the laws through the constitution 2012, the Islamic scholars never sought any executive or political power.

MB faced challenges and limitations; the peak was when a military coup in July 2013 toppled them. One of the challenges is the antagonism labeled as "political Islam" or "Islamist" by their opponents, the liberal and secular groups. Their opponents have spread misinformation and anti-Islam discourse in mainstream and social media in order for them to gain more significant ground.⁸³ MB and secular groups were allies in the Mubarak regime. But the alliance is a tool in order to survive in the political order in which it made a "middle ground politics" between political entities of the opposition to confront the regime while setting aside ideological dissimilarity.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Ikhwanweb, "Egypt Upper House Approves Reconciliation Panel to Ease Sectarian Tensions," <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30937&ref=search.php> (March 29, 2023).

⁸¹ Ikhwan Web, "Egypt Parliament Unanimously Approves Sokouk (Bonds) Law," <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30899&ref=search.php> (March 29, 2023).

⁸² Griff Witte, "Egypt's Morsi gets poor reviews from Islamists after first year of presidency," *The Washington Post*, 18 June 2013, Available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-morsi-gets-poor-reviews-from-islamists-after-first-year-of-presidency/2013/06/17/03445ffa-d5c2-11e2-ab72-3f0d51ec1628_story.html (March 29, 2023).

⁸³ Maha Azam, "Egypt's Democratic Experiment: Challenges to a Positive Trajectory," *Insight Turkey*, 15(2), 2013, p.158-9.

⁸⁴ Michaelle L. Browsers, *Political Ideology in the Arab World*, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.48-76.

1.2 Muslim Brotherhood Fundamental Ideology

1.2.1 Hassan Al-Banna Ideology

The *fikrah*(ideology) constructed mainly by Hassan Al-Banna is the primary reference of MB's political outlook, statements, strategy and actions. The religious aspect of ideology also plays its role, as seen from *the da'wa and tarbiyyah* of MB. The prominent ideologue of MB is Hassan Al-Banna and followed by Syed Qutb since the ideology from both of them has always been the primary reference and was taken into consideration for the organization to perform their decision in the organization's affairs. Unlike Syed Qutb, that had published abundant publications, Hassan Al-Banna has had wrote letters and delivered speeches such as in the *muktamar* (general assembly) and some articles. These actions were then compiled in *Majmu'ah Rasa'il* (The Complete Works). In this book, Hassan Al-Banna states that there are three base foundations in the ideology of MB. First is 'the proper program of action'; This foundation can be found in Quran, Hadith and the precepts of Islam with a pure understanding which means far from any other ideology. Second, 'believing workers'; with this foundation, the members of MB understand their work in performing Islamic duty without any compromise. Third, 'trustworthy leadership': This character is compulsory in every leader in MB organization so that members will be obedient under its banner. Hassan Al-Banna also upholds three fundamental views of Islam. First, Islam is a comprehensive system that can be developed itself. Second, Quran and Hadith as the fundamental source. Third, Islam is relevant at any time and any place.⁸⁵

Al-Banna once explained the MB's aim and objectives, "I devoted myself to one aim: to guide people to Islam by words and deeds and that is why I founded the Brotherhood to exemplify Islam in its aims and means."⁸⁶ Thus, al-Banna promotes the idea that MB should acquire a comprehensive *manhaj* (methodology) to pursue the objective. He emphasized that *shumuliya al-manhaj al-Islami* (perfect Islamic methodology) encompasses all aspects of life, the political, social, economic and moral. Then MB's phenomenal slogan of 'Islam is the Solution' appeared from this comprehensive ideology

⁸⁵ Yacoob M.N, Biografi Hassan Al-Banna dan Sumbangannya terhadap Permukiman Akidah Umat Islam, *Jurnal Kias*, 8(1), 2013, p.119-136.

⁸⁶ Hasan Al-Banna. *Majmu'ah rasa'il*, Darul Salam, Cairo, 2003.

and methodology. Therefore, according to him, religion is not encompassed solely in individual life. However, a system that comprehends all aspects of life, politically, economically and socially-culture aspects and the ultimate aim of the movement was to Islamic State.

According to al-Anani, Al-Banna has brought a gradualist approach which is a hierarchical structure of '*Maratib Amal*' (mediating' steps) to achieve the organization's objective.⁸⁷ The structure consists of seven steps:

- (1) starting from reforming individuals that compromises the duties of every the Muslim as an individual;
- (2) from a Muslim individual merge into the Muslim family in other words an Islamic home;
- (3) from the Muslim family merge into the Muslim society which a guiding society that leads to integrity and Islamic principles;
- (4) from the Muslim society merge into the Muslim government that uphold the Islamic values in all aspect;
- (5) reforming the government into a truly Islamic government;
- (6) reuniting international Muslim state and government
- (7) Leading the Islamic call all around the globe.⁸⁸

In 1936, Al-Banna aimed to restore the caliphate system and coordinated the educational, economic and social policies to bolster relations among Muslim countries toward unifying the Islamic world. In 1938, Al-Banna stated that:

"The Ikhwan believes that the Caliphate symbolizes Muslim Unity and the link between the Muslim peoples. The Caliphate is a religious office to which all Muslims should give considerable thought and importance. The MB gives

⁸⁷ Khalil al-Anani, **Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity and Politics**, Oxford, 2016.

⁸⁸ Hasan al-Banna. **Majmu'ah rasa'il**, Darul Salam, Kaheerah, 2003.

top priority to the restoration of the Caliphate. At the same time, they believe that this requires considerable preparation and that various stages must precede the immediate step to restoring the Caliphate. [First of all] there must be complete educational, social, and economic cooperation between all the Muslim peoples. [These steps should then be] followed by treaties, meetings, and conferences between the Muslim countries."⁸⁹

As for the political ideology, Hassan Al-Banna has had stated clearly in the letter he wrote to King Farouk titled Towards the Light, what kind of government Egypt should have pertained and these are a few points that were proposed by Hassan Al-Banna that reflect his insight into Political Islam:

(...) (2) Amending the law conforming to all Islamic legislation branches.

(3) Reinforcing the armed forces, and increasing the number of youth groups, igniting in them the spirit of Islamic *Jihad*.

(5) Spreading the Islamic spirit throughout all government departments so that all its employees feel responsible for adhering to Islamic teachings.

(9) Weighing all governmental acts given Islamic rules and teachings, National holidays, receptions, official conferences, prisons and hospitals should all be compatible with the Islamic teachings; hours of work should be arranged such that they do not conflict with the Salah times. (...).⁹⁰

From these points, the political ideology of Hassan Al-Banna is divided into three sections, which are social reformation with the base of *Akidah*(faith), religion and state are not separated. *Sharia* Law is the legit law under the rule of Islam Al-Banna is seen to emphasize political authority as a strength to imply *Sharia* Law at community and state levels. Hence a remarkable slogan of '*al-din wa al-dawlah*'(religion and state) is the derivation from Al-Banna's political ideology and is used by MB in their pursuit of developing Egypt as a more Islamic political aspect.⁹¹ Al-Banna's vision is perceived as

⁸⁹ Christina Phelps Harris, **Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt**, Zephyr Books, 2007, p.163.

⁹⁰ Hasan Al-Banna. **Majmu'ah rasa'il**, Darul Salam, Kaherah, 2003.

⁹¹ Tahir A.J.M, **Hakikat Pemikiran Politik Hassan Al-Banna**, Pustaka, Iman, 2012.

progressive in a way that technology can be benefitted for Muslim in the twentieth century without feeling any compromising as Muslim commitment to Islamic values as well as Shariah law is the medium of interpretation and completely suited in the modern society entailment.⁹² As pointed by Louay Sa in 'The Islamic State: A Conceptual Framework,' the objective of the Islamic State is to enrich the quality of life in the community and allow the society to immerse in economic and political challenges within the framework of Shariah that make a state Islamic state.⁹³ It is believed that the implementation of Shariah law to meet the need of modern society is founded by Syed Jamaluddin Al-Afghani(1839-1897) in which this revolutionary ideology was continued by his next legacy, Sheik Muhammad' Abduh(1849-1905) and Syed Muhammad Rashid Ridha(1865-1935).⁹⁴ Abu A'la Mawdudi in the other hand developed Islamic state characterized by the implementation of Shariah in modern society on the respond toward British colonialism in India. This proves that Al-Banna was impacted by the ideology of the earlier reformist.

Nationalism according to Al-Banna, every Muslim should possess the responsibility for being a nationalist that is formed from the understanding of *akidah*(faith) and not limited to territorial and geographical borders.⁹⁵ He stated that Islam and nationalism are interdependent for the reason that Islam is inclusive that includes religion and state as showing patriotic spirit also compatible with Islamic teaching. If the definition of nationalism is that the recent generation is taking the previous generation as an example toward being a developed, respected and glorious race, the same as if the definition of *nationalism* is the glory of a father is the pride that a child follows his father model, according to Al-Banna it is a good intention and should be supported. The version of nationalism that he opposed is the one that propelled Islam and Arab culture at the same time and he argued that every race has its uniqueness and strength, but the strength possessed by a race is not a tool to belittle other races.⁹⁶

⁹² Cleveland, William L, **A History of the Modern Middle East**, Boulder: Westview Press, 2004, p.198.

⁹³ Louay M. Safi, "The Islamic State: A Conceptual Framework", **The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences**,1991, p.227.

⁹⁴ Ahmad N. Amir, "Muhammad Abduh's Contributions to Modernity", **Journal of Management Sciences & Education**, 2012, p.63-75.

⁹⁵ Hasan Al-Banna. **Majmu'ah rasa'il**, Darul Salam, Kaherah, 2003.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

As for MB religious ideology, *Tarbiyyah* (Education) is the core concept that shapes MB member's rationale, worldview, sense of belonging and action in position with MB's norms ⁹⁷ *Tarbiyyah* is a process of developing a man to hold responsibility in *da'wa* (preaching)⁹⁸ and a platform to change an individual for become a better Muslim.⁹⁹ All the members of MB are obliged to embrace *Tarbiyyah* sessions, whatever rank or level the member is. *Tarbiyyah*, according to Al-Banna, is the rope that holds unity among the members. He also stressed that every member should have 10 *Muwosafat Tarbiyyah*(*Tarbiyyah* Characters) which are, physically strong, an excellent morals, educated thoughts, correct beliefs, authentic worship, be self-sufficient, be able to control inner instinct, have good time management, be well organized and willing to serve and help others¹⁰⁰ in order to achieve to be an individual Muslim as in the first of seven mediating steps. There are seven methods of *Tarbiyyah*, which are *Usrah*(family), *Katiba*(battalion), *Rihla*(trip), *Mu'askar*(camping), *Dawra*(workshop), *Nadwa*(seminar) and *Mu'tamar*(congress).¹⁰¹

Usrah, in the concept of the MB is the building of a vital family institution for its members and resulting in the formation of a solid member's personality as a whole. It is also the basis for constructing an individual that includes a comprehensive education system by managing the main aspects of a person's mind, heart and body. In *usrah*, the first thing that every member should emphasize is building a bond of the heart. Building this bond of heart will produce the strength of *ukhuwah*(relationship) among members, which makes a member willing to sacrifice or help anything for the sake of his fellow Muslims. However, *usrah* is the primary basis for building an organization.¹⁰²

According to MB, *Katibah* is defined as a special program for the development of members of the organization. This program is to educate members to be disciplined in building a soul that can draw closer to Allah SWT, soften the heart and purify the soul,

⁹⁷ Khalil al-Anani, **Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity and Politics**, Oxford, 2016.

⁹⁸ Abdelhamid el-Ghazali, **The Way to the Revival of the Muslim Ummah: A Study of the Thinking of Imam Al-Banna**, Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation, 2001, p.130.

⁹⁹ Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud, **Wasa'il al-Tarbiyya 'ind al-Ikhwan al-muslimiyyn (Tarbiyya tools in the Muslim Brotherhood)**, Cairo, Dar al-Tawzi' wal' Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1997.

¹⁰⁰ Hasan Al-Banna. **Majmu'ah rasa'il**, Darul Salam, Kaherah, 2003.

¹⁰¹ Ali 'Abd al-Halim Mahmud, p.256.

¹⁰² Hasan Al-Banna. **Majmu'ah rasa'il**, Darul Salam, Kaherah, 2003, p.286.

as well as prepare oneself to worship Allah in performing *tahajud*(night) prayers while thinking about the power of Allah.¹⁰³

Hasan Al-Banna introduced *Rehlah* program as one of the *tarbiyyah* programs of MB. This *rehlah* program is as essential as the *Usrah* and *Katibah* programs. Only it is implemented in a more relaxed form, like going to the beach, museum, historical sites, cycling and mount climbing.¹⁰⁴

The word *Mukhayyam* comes from an Arabic word that means a place to hold activities that train basic life skills. According to Mahmud Abd Halim, the *Mukhayyam* program is implemented to train patience when facing difficult or easy situations. He said that the *Mukhayyam* program is a follow-up program after the *Rehlah* program because both involve the physical endurance of Brotherhood members. He also explained that in the *mukhayyam* program, three elements are applied to the experts, namely the elements of *tajmi'*(group), *tarbiyyah*(education) and *tadrib*(training) as a preparatory step to preach to the community.¹⁰⁵

Daurah is a program carried out periodically at a specific time. It is also defined as the gathering of a large number of members of a group in a specific place to listen to lectures, studies, research and training about something related to a spiritual theme that raises the spirit.¹⁰⁶

Mu'tamar is a forum attended by experts with good personalities, supporters, scientists and leaders of an organization to study and discuss a problem. The results of the discussion will be disseminated and given understanding to all present in the forum. While according to the Language Board Arabs in Egypt state that the meaning of *mu'tamar* is a forum to discuss or debate a question.¹⁰⁷ understanding to all who are present in the forum. While according to the Language Board. In implementing the

¹⁰³ Ali 'Abd al-Halim Mahmud, p.177.

¹⁰⁴ Hasan Al-Banna, p.288.

¹⁰⁵ Mahmud 'Abd al-Halim, **Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn – Ahdāth Ṣana'at al-Tārīkh Ru'yatun Min al-Dākhil**, Kaherah, Dār al-Da'wah, 2004, 1:185.

¹⁰⁶ Alī 'Abd al-Halīm Maḥmūd, p.312.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

mu'tamar program, the program director needs to ensure that the selection of the speaker or discussant is someone who is knowledgeable about the topic to be discussed and has experience. The program director also needs to determine the appropriateness of the *mu'tamar* title with the level of attendees who will attend the *mu'tamar*. In addition, the program director needs to find a bigger place to accommodate the large number of attendees to the *mu'tamar* program.¹⁰⁸

Nadwah means a meeting that brings together a number of experts in a field to study a theme or question scientifically. They will give their individual opinions based on valid arguments and evidence. The *Nadwah* program is carried out with fewer attendees than *Mu'tamar*. Usually, the *Nadwah* program involves several *Usrah* groups to discuss a topic or theme set by the *Nadwah* leader. Among the topics or themes discussed in the *Nadwah* program are religious issues, social issues, political issues, issues economics, questions about trends and understanding that exist in the present and questions of morals..¹⁰⁹

1.2.2 Syed Qutb Ideology

Syed Qutb is the most prominent leader in MB after Al-Banna. Born in 1906 in Asyut, Qutb grew up experiencing political endeavor and colonialism. Qutb, the book worm love to read poem and one of his favorite poem that he memorized is by Ali-al-Ghayati, 'My Nationality' about the occupation and independence of Egypt.¹¹⁰ Eventually, his interest and passion in literature and poetry led him to the exquisiteness of Quran.¹¹¹ In his youth, he is an active young student who stood up in students rallies and demonstration in support for 1919 revolution for freedom of Egypt.¹¹² He studied in Dar al-Ulum. He graduated with Licentiate in Arabic Language and Literature. He then worked with the Ministry of Education and were sent to the United States on educational objective. In the US, he had a duty to research the American educational system. However, he saw the mayhem of social problems and pro-Zionism in the US despite the US being a well-developed country. This then prompted his way of thinking. Qutb published numerous books and poems from his experience and his wisdom. Qutb participation in MB started

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid p.317.

¹¹⁰ Sayed Khatab, **Political Thought of Qutb Sayyid Khatab**, Routledge, 2006.

¹¹¹ Andrea Mura, **The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism**, Routledge, 2015, p.132.

¹¹² Sayyid Qutb, **Al-Islam wa al-Ra'smaliyyah**, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1993, p.5–6.

after the death of Al-Banna.

In the post-military coup against the pro-British monarch in 1952, Qutb took part in the early sessions of the Revolutionary Command Council(RCC) and served as MB's liaison with the junta leaders.¹¹³ He organized a conference in 1953 on the theme of Islam as an emancipating religion. Nasser and General Naguib admired him for his job. However, the admiration did not last long as the regime rejected the Brotherhood's demand to implement Shariah within society. In the same year, Hudaybi appointed him in the most prominent section in MB, which is *Qism Nashr Al-Da'wa*(The propagation of the Message Section).¹¹⁴ He was then arrested since he strongly criticized the regime's deal with the British to reintroduce their troops into the Canal Zone. Due to this criticism, and the accusation of MB's assassination attempt on Nasser, he was subjected to twenty years of hard labor. In his detention, he was tortured, resulting in a severe health condition. He was then sent to a hospital where he wrote most of his works. *Ma'alim fi Al-Tariq*(Signs along the Path/Milestone), *Fi Zilal Al-Quran*, *Hadha Al-Dim* and *Mustaqbal li Hadha Al-Din* are some of the books that he had written while he was in detention. He was released in 1964 and again arrested for his controversial book, *Milestones*. In 1965 he was sentenced to death due to the regime accused him of his statement in his book *Milestone* that blamed the regime as *jahiliyyah (ignorance)* and called for *Jihad*(effort) against the *jahiliyyah* regime as the regime did not abide by God's Shariah law, instead using their man-made law.¹¹⁵ Therefore, Qutb's life is a shift from the literature and poetry world to the socio-political analysis which is from the perspective of Islam.

The disillusionment of the Egyptians between 1945-1952 due to the government's failure to solve the country's hurdle then instigated several groups to demand a social reform in which justice was the assurance of the people of Egypt.¹¹⁶ Qutb wrote many books including criticizing the corrupt royal government, feudalism and capitalism. His books reflect the disillusionment of Egyptians' condition and the Quran is 'the last resort and the

¹¹³ John Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, **Oxfords Handbook of Islam and Politics**, Oxford University Press, 2013.

¹¹⁴ Adnan Musallam, **From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism**, Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing, 2005, p.150.

¹¹⁵ N. Sulaiman, *Pembinaan Peradaban Ummah Dalam Menghapi Cabaran: Perjuangan dan Pemikiran Sayyid Qutb*, (**Master Thesis**), University of Malaya, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Adnan Musallam, "Sayyid Qutb and Social Justice", 1945—1948, **Journal of Islamic Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1993, p.52-70.

ultimate proof of his idea'.¹¹⁷ Qutb also implies that what he hold and believed is the true endeavour of combating injustice in society.¹¹⁸

Numerous scholars regard Qutb as an Islamist fundamentalist and radical, mostly from his general ideology writing in *Tafsir fi zilal* and *Maalim Fi Tariq*(Milestone), particularly from the phrase *jihad*(effort) and *jahiliyyah*. According to Gabriele Maranci, Islamist fundamentalism term were related to the revolution of Iran, consequently to A'la Mawduddi, Banna, Qutb to the event of 9/11, thus making the fundamentalism terminology change to 'terrorism' since 9/11 tragedy.¹¹⁹ Scott Appleby is one of the example of scholars that indicates Islamist fundamentalism as one of the shape of Islamist extremism which a militant manifest themselves as the true believer and creating alternative away from secularism as well as protecting the destruction of Islamic identity.¹²⁰ Appleby identifies Qutb as one of the extremist Sunni as there is fundamentalist elements in Qutb's book *The Milestone* which Qutb legitimize the action of *Jihad* to fight adversaries of Islam.¹²¹ Shireen T. Hunter mentions that Qutb as the new label of fundamentalist or terrorist that expanded nowadays and Qutb ideology born from the response of the declination in Egyptian morality that effected from the western economic and political expansion in Middle East, particularly Egypt.¹²²

Qutb then blames Orientalists who relate him to Islam and violence. Qutb explained *that Jihad* is not always associated with war but there some times that Muslim Ummah can use the definition of Jihad as a war to fortify Islam and the state.¹²³ As he wrote in *Tafsir Fil Zilal Quran*, Jihad is also a form of liberating humankind from *ubudiyah*(submission) toward creation and *nafs*(self) but totally submission and worship toward God solely.¹²⁴ Qutb in *Milestone* discerns that *Jahiliyyah* regime at its very roots should be opposed as the regime is oppressing the society to live in the life which is demanded by God thus the

¹¹⁷ Nettler, R, "A Modern Islamic Confession of faith and Conception of Religion: Sayyid Qutb's Introduction to tafseer Fi Zilal al Quran", **British Journal of Middle Eastern Studie**, 21(1), 1994, p.102-110.

¹¹⁸ S. Qutb, **Social Justice in Islam**, Islamic Publications International, Oneonta, N.Y, 2000, p.51.

¹¹⁹ Beverley Milton-Edwards, **Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945**, Routledge, 2004, p.113.

¹²⁰ R. Scott Appleby, **The Ambivalence of the Sacred Religion**, Rowman and Little Field, 2000, p.86-87

¹²¹ Ibid p.92.

¹²² Shireen T. Hunter, "Introduction" in **Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity**, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2009, p.6.

¹²³ Dr. Badarussyamsi, MA, **Fundamentalisme Islam; Kritik atas Barat**, Lkis, Jogyakarta, 2015, p.103.

¹²⁴ Sayyid Qutb, **Tafsir fil zilal, Al-Anfal**, Kube Publisher, Leicestershire, 2015, p.139-145.

ultimate objective is to change Jahiliya system the practices of the society.¹²⁵ Qutb mentions the Jihad and *jahiliyyah* connection in Milestones from this following quote and also it is from this quote the radical militant group mistakenly perceived the term of Jihad as a holy war. However, Qutb never directly intend the use of violent cards:

"This movement uses the methods of preaching and persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs, and it uses physical power and Jihad to abolish the organizations and authorities of the Jahilliyah system, which prevents people from reforming their ideas and beliefs, but forces them to obey their erroneous ways and make them serve human lords instead of Almighty Lord. This movement does not confine itself to mere preaching to confront physical power, as it does not use compulsion for changing the ideas of people".¹²⁶

Indeed Al-Banna also makes remarks about Jihad in general and as accepted in Islam metaphorically in the "Holy War" epistle: "Oh Brothers! The nation that knows the craft of death and how to die in an honorable way, God has given it a life of happiness in this world and immortal pleasures in the afterlife. What is this false likeness that humiliates us if not the love of this world and hatred of death; prepare yourselves for a mighty act and long for death so that life can be given to you. Know there is no escape from death; it happens only once, and if you make sure it is in God's way, it will be your gain in this world and a reward in the afterlife."¹²⁷ Thus, Qutb suggests Jihad as a way to condemn *Jahiliyyah* and states no use force on bringing down *Jahiliyah*. In contrast, Al-Banna suggests *Jihad* as in metaphoric notion as it is.

Qutb's book, The Milestone is a source of inspiration for the Egyptian society that struggled to need change in society and thus, Qutb is a reformer with his ideology.¹²⁸ According to Qutb, there is no significant reason for Muslims to separate Islam from society like European and Communist do.¹²⁹ As for Qutb, the European separating

¹²⁵ Sayyid Qutb, **Milestones, Ma'alim fi'l-tareeq**, Maktabah Publisher Birmingham, England, 2006, p.35.

¹²⁶ Ibid, p.65.

¹²⁷ Barack E, **Islam is our Gospel and Jihad is our Way**, Hassan al Banna, File Epistles, Tel Aviv, 2012, p.260.

¹²⁸ Dr. Badarussiyamsi, MA, **Fundamentalisme Islam; Kritik atas Barat**, PT. LKiS Pelangi Aksara, 2015, p.129.

¹²⁹ S. Qutb, **Social Justice in Islam**, Oneonta, N., Islamic Publications International, 2000, p.17.

religion with society because of the historical background that European laws and system were not derived from religion, instead, it derived from Greek-rooted Pagan Roman law which is materialistic and unethical.¹³⁰ John Calvert affirmatively view Qutb ideology as the ideology emphasize on the enhancing morality of the nation to face the difference and competition with the west as stated in his book *al-Asalah al-Ijtimaiyah fi Islam* that do not follow the injustice value from the outsider.¹³¹ Same goes to Andrew F. March, as he sees Qutb as a utopian realize that based on the balance of theologist on how human value morality.¹³²

Qutb perspective on justice consists of three discrete principles: complete liberation of conscience, absolute equality of all human beings and solid mutual responsibility of mankind.¹³³ Complete liberation proposes that mankind is not confined to anyone except God. The second, which is absolute equality, proposes that mankind is perceived by God as equal despite ethnicity, race, possessions, gender and tribe. The third, which is a solid mutual responsibility, is the outcome of the first and second concepts where each person is responsible as per se, among individuals, among family members, among their nation and generation to further generation.¹³⁴ Qutb then clearly asserts that social justice can only be achieved when implementing authority of Islamic system.¹³⁵

Qutb asserted that an Islamic system of government is the answer to pursuing pure justice in society. He also asserted that the *musyawarah*(deliberation) concept should be implied in the system of political Islam so that society and individuals can take part and decide things and issues that related to politics.¹³⁶

1.3 Structure of Muslim Brotherhood

The internal hierarchy is MB's structure(*tanzim*) of the organization is publicly known

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 214–216.

¹³¹ John Calvert, “The World is an Undutiful Boy!': Sayyid Qutb's American Experience, Islam and Christian Muslim Relations”, **Islam and Cristian-Muslim Relation Journal**, 2010, p.91.

¹³² A.F. March, “Taking People as They Are: Islam as a 'Realistic Utopia’ in the Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb”, **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 104, No. 1, 2010, p.189-207.

¹³³ S. Qutb, **Social Justice in Islam**, Islamic Publications International, Oneonta, N.Y: 2000.

¹³⁴ Qutb, S. and Shepard, W. **Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism**. Leiden: E.J.Brill,1996, p.69.

¹³⁵ Ibrahim, A. I., & Engku Alwi, E. A. Z. “Pemikiran Politik Hassan Al-banna, Syed Qutb Dan Tuan Guru Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat : Satu Analisis”, **Asian People Journal**, 1(1), 2018, p.218.

¹³⁶ Qutb, S. **Jalan Pembebasan Rintisan Islam Menuju Perdamaian Dunia**, Yogyakarta, Salahuddin Press, 1985.

until 1954, when MB was banned, except for its special apparatus(*Tanzim Al-Khass*). Due to the tyrannical conditions of the country, MB's structure is yet to be unknown.¹³⁷ According to Amr Elchoubaki, MB's organizational structure is the reason MB has been sustained over years of oppressive conditions. In addition, the structure supports it by allocating resources, advocating its ideology and expanding social networks. It is due to the multi-tiered structure that enables to recruits members despite various sectors, ages and social circumstances in society.¹³⁸

The leading and foremost institutions of MB are the *Mekteb al-Irshad*(Guidance Office) and the *Majlis al-Shura*(Consultative Council), and the *Murshid al-Am* (General Guide) as the leader and chief of these leading institutions. The General Guide appears publicly to represent the movement and has the authority to suspend the members of the constituent body.¹³⁹ There is no limit of terms for the General Guide, but four years of *Hijri* calendar is limited for the terms of Guidance Office and the Consultative Council.¹⁴⁰

MB is a centralized movement seen from its decision-making process and the General Guide and the Office of General Guide conduct the organization and control its structure. The Office of General Guide and Consultative Council voted on a critical strategic decision like participating in elections, meeting with the government and protesting. However, in the end, the decision is in the hands of the General Guide and its office.¹⁴¹

However, there is a decentralization in the implementation process. It is to serve its broad aims and extensive network. For example, the local branches are running independently and according to the current conditions without referring to the leadership. Furthermore, decentralization allows young members to receive training and experience in organization management and advance their leadership skills. It can be seen from the July 2013

¹³⁷ Serpil Acikalin, Muslim Brotherhood's Relationship With Egyptian Government From 1952 to 2008: An Accomodational and Confrontational Relationship, **Master Thesis**, Middle East Technical University, 2009, p.32.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Daa Rashwan, **Jama'a Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin fi Masr** (Society of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), in **Al-Harakah Al-Islamiyah fi Al- Alam (Islamic Movements in the World)**, Al Ahram Center For Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2006, p.31.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Khalil al-Anani, **Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity and Politics**, Oxford, 2016, p.110.

coup¹⁴², although many of the senior leaders were arrested, the young members survived and continued their activities underground.

In the political segment, there are information and the parliamentary committee made up of MB's member in the Parliament. During the 1980s, MB's structure was decentralized, and the Guidance Office assumed the duty for the principal policies related to the government. It is to strengthen the competency to face the challenge of the autocratic leader.¹⁴³

1.4 Muslim Brotherhood in Global

The academic discourse surrounding the Muslim Brotherhood's global scope, specifically its operations in the Middle East and Europe, demonstrates a significantly higher degree of scholarly engagement in contrast to the relatively limited attention dedicated to the Muslim Brotherhood in Southeast Asia. Due to this thesis analyzes the narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Malaysia, it is worth to analyze the narrative of Muslim Brotherhood in other countries across the world.

The global spread of the Muslim Brotherhood can be attributed to various factors, including its ideology, organizational structure, and historical context. The Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, based on the principles of political Islam, has resonated with individuals and communities worldwide. Its message of Islamic revivalism, social justice, and resistance against perceived Western imperialism has attracted followers who seek a comprehensive Islamic framework to address political and societal challenges. Other factor is exile and diaspora. The Muslim Brotherhood faced persecution and repression in its country of origin, Egypt, under various regimes. As a result, its members sought refuge in different countries, establishing branches and networks in the Middle East, Europe, and beyond. These exiled members and their subsequent networks played a crucial role in spreading the organization's ideology and activities globally. Transnational networks and alliances is the other factor of how Muslim Brotherhood spread globally. The Muslim Brotherhood has actively established and nurtured transnational networks

¹⁴² Khalil al-Anani, **Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity and Politics**, Oxford, 2016, p.110.

¹⁴³ Hesham Awadi, **In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak 1982-2000**, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004, p.219.

and alliances with like-minded Islamist groups and individuals. These connections have allowed for the exchange of resources, expertise, and strategies, contributing to the spread of the Brotherhood's influence and activities beyond its original geographic focus.

In the UK, a review of the Muslim Brotherhood's origins, ideology, and record in and out of government was ordered by the Prime Minister of the UK in April 2014, as its activities in the UK and abroad, as well as its organization.¹⁴⁴ Two of the most experienced and senior civil servants in the United Kingdom carried out the review: John Jenkins and Charles Farr. Sir John Jenkins met with representatives of governments, political movements, religious leaders, academics, and other independent commentators during his trip to twelve nations.¹⁴⁵ While Charles Farr examined in detail the Muslim Brotherhood's development, ideology and activities in the UK. Sir John considered the period of time between 2011 and 2013 when the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood held power in Egypt through The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), noting the variety of viewpoints regarding the intricate interplay of events. He came to the conclusion that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had failed to demonstrate political moderation or a commitment to democratic values adequately, had failed to persuade Egyptians of its competence or good intentions, and had struggled to learn from its failure in Egypt what its failure meant for the organization's future. Overall, John Jenkins and Charles Farr concluded their review on Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood in the UK by saying that through grassroots activism, the Muslim Brotherhood has historically focused on transforming individuals and communities. Wherever possible, they have engaged politically. However, in order to achieve their institutional objectives, they have also used terror and violence on occasion and selectively.¹⁴⁶ Their public narrative emphasized engagement rather than violence, particularly in the West. However, there have been significant differences between Arabic and English Muslim Brotherhood communications.¹⁴⁷ Farr also noted that membership, fundraising, educational programs, and much else about the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK are kept a secret. However,

¹⁴⁴Muslim Brotherhood Review: Main Findings, Open Government License, 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/muslim-brotherhood-review-main-findings> (March 31, 2023).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

affiliates and associates of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK have, at times, had a significant impact on the largest Muslim student organization in the UK, national organizations that claim to represent Muslim communities and have sought and engaged in dialogue with the government, charities, and some mosques. Despite a decline in their domestic influence, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations maintain a disproportionately large influence UK.¹⁴⁸

Muslim Brotherhood has grown internationally. There was a section of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo that was in charge of "liaison with the Islamic world."¹⁴⁹ The mission of this section was to spread the Muslim Brotherhood's message abroad and coordinate activities with other Islamic groups wherever they were. An example of its international branch is Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. In his article "The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945-1956: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology," Joshua Teitelbaum questioned and answered, 'Is it possible that the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was established independently or under the direction of the Egyptian Brotherhood?' It turns out that the answer lies somewhere in the middle.¹⁵⁰ A doctoral dissertation by John Wessel, entitled *The Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt And Jordan: A History Of Modern Islamic Fundamentalism*, explains that Muslim Brotherhood's experiences in Egypt and Jordan are vastly different. Through cooperation and tolerance between the government and the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood, which provided both entities with legitimacy, stability was achieved, and peace was maintained in Jordan since the Jordan Muslim Brotherhood entered into a symbiotic relationship with the state.¹⁵¹ Jordan is a one-of-a-kind case study that shows how modern nation-states and Islamist organizations can work together and even participate in government institutions. This points to a promising possibility for the establishment of multiparty government systems and the acceptance of devoted opposition parties that include Islamist organizations from the wider Muslim world.¹⁵² In addition, the Islamists cooperated with the Jordanian government while the

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Joshua, Teitelbaum, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, 1945-1958: Founding, Social Origins, Ideology", **Middle East Journal**, 2011, 65(2): p.213-233.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ John Wessel, "The Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt And Jordan: A History Of Modern Islamic Fundamentalism", **Master Thesis**, The University of Utah, 2009.

¹⁵² Ibid.

Islamists opposed liberalizing policies like women's suffrage. The Jordan Muslim Brotherhood appears to have achieved a contented moderate balance of state loyalty, democratic practice, and Islamic principles in comparison to their counterparts in other Middle Eastern nations.¹⁵³ The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has occasionally spoken out against the actions of the government. However, rather than supporting action against the government, it has chosen to express itself through public discourse.

In Palestine's case, as the political and military arm of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood(PMB), the Islamic Resistance Movement(HAMAS) was established on December 14, 1987, during the First Intifada (1987–93). Imad Alsoos, in his article, What Explains The Resilience Of Muslim Brotherhood Movements? An Analysis Of Hamas' Organizing Strategies explains that Hamas's resilience and popularity in a highly volatile environment are explained by the organization's strength, which includes its centralized professional hierarchy, its learning system based on education and training, and the organized body of its local mobilization. Members of Hamas are trained, educated, and mobilized to hold functional positions within its internal hierarchy and branches. In turn, these qualified members are used to mobilize the general public in their respective communities. These findings strongly suggest that organizing is more important than religious or ideological identity, personal rule, or the clientelism of social services in separating Hamas from other secular or religious movements.¹⁵⁴ While some scholars analyze and acknowledge Hamas as a democratic and moderate organization, some concurred it as a radical movement. Hillel Frisch wrote Hamas: The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, noting that Hamas is a model for other Muslim Brotherhoods to follow in becoming more violent, militant and aggressive. This is due to the fact that the array of forces aligned against Hamas is formidable, and the movement's geographic center, Gaza, is vulnerable due to its reliance on supplies provided primarily by its adversaries.¹⁵⁵

Whilst in North America, Alyssa Aleppen states that Muslim Brotherhood has massive supporters from institutions and individuals avid Muslim Brotherhood never declare it

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Imad Alsoos, "What Explains The Resilience Of Muslim Brotherhood Movements? An Analysis Of Hamas' Organizing Strategies", *Mediterranean Politics Journal*, 2011, 26(2): p.213-233.

¹⁵⁵ Barry Rubin, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, see Hillel Frisch, *Hamas, The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.123.

has any branches or connections in North America. The Muslim Students Association (MSA), which was established in 1963 at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, was the first organized organization of the Muslim Brotherhood to establish itself in North America.¹⁵⁶ According to Aleppen, MSA and other organizations have reportedly received funding from the powerful Brotherhood theoretician Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Brotherhood Finance Chief Yusuf Nada. She accuse that Al-Qaradawi is also a foreign terrorist and a major shareholder in the Al Taqwa Bank. Despite the fact that the majority of Muslims in the world regard Yusuf al-Qardawi as an exceptionally prominent scholar, westerners accuse him as a terrorist primarily because of his adherence to Muslim Brotherhood and his stand on the Palestine issue. The fundamental strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America was initially formulated at the Lugano meeting of the MSA in 1977. The document titled "Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy" directed Muslim Brotherhood members to work towards establishing Islamic government worldwide by thinking, educating and acting accordingly.¹⁵⁷ The program advocated for engaging with non-Muslim communities locally while maintaining Islamic values and principles.

Academic research on the Muslim Brotherhood in North America includes the work of John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, who co-authored the book "Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think." The book includes a section on the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities in North America. Other scholars who have studied the Muslim Brotherhood in North America include Lorenzo Vidino, who has written extensively on the organization's activities in Europe and North America, and Shireen K. Burki, who has studied the Muslim Brotherhood's influence on American Muslim women.

In the case of Morocco, the relationship between the Moroccan government and the Muslim Brotherhood has become more complicated. The Brotherhood has tried to establish a political presence in Morocco by forming alliances with other political parties.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid , and Alyssa Lappen, **Muslim Brotherhood in North America**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.162.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

However, the Moroccan government has been cautious about allowing the Brotherhood to become too influential in the country's politics, and it has taken steps to restrict its activities.

The Muslim Brotherhood has no significant presence in China, Korea, or Japan. This is because these countries have relatively small Muslim populations, and the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and activities have not gained much traction in these regions. However, there may be some individual members or sympathizers of the Brotherhood in these countries, but it is not considered to be a significant organization in these areas.

For the case of Malaysia, after the independence of Malaysia, the May 13th, 1969 Tragedy, where Malaysia faced vulgar incidents between Malay and Chinese Malaysians caused by the unsatisfied Malay toward how Chinese opposition parties provocatively celebrated their victory after the general election.¹⁵⁸ This then led to riots and fighting on the street between both races. This tragedy marks the worst scenario had ever happened in Malaysia since its independence year in 1957. Consequently, the government made resolutions like the New Economic Plan (NEP) policy. It is believed that Malays were felt deprived and left behind compared to other races since the independence year, particularly in economic sectors. It is due to British order that the Chinese were allocated to the city and doing the business and mining sector while Malay were allocated to rural to do the agriculture sector, and Indians in the rubber estate industry.¹⁵⁹

Afterward, the New Economic Plan (NEP) policy, the government determined to send Malays students to study abroad, and most of the students were sent to the UK to strengthen the socio-economic situation that was impoverished than other races. In this period of the 1970s and post The 13th May Tragedy, students, especially from University Malaya, realized that religion then played a significant factor in the societal changes in

¹⁵⁸ Gayl D. Ness "May 13: Before and After, by Tunku Abdul Rahman; Malaysia: Death of a Democracy," **The Journal of Asian Studies**, 1972, 31 (3): 734–736.

¹⁵⁹ Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, "Colonial Policy and the Impact to the Politico-Economy Stability after Independence: The case of Indonesia under the Dutch and Malaysia under the British", **Review of History and Political Science**, 2014, Vol. 2, No. 3 & 4, p. 69-84.

Malaysia as the new Islamic discourse emerged and dispersed throughout society.¹⁶⁰ Malay students either local or abroad particularly began to focus and return towards Islam to tackle the issue. Consequently, the emergence of *da'wa* is one of the elements in the new Islamic discourse that was executed mainly by students and Muslim intellectuals.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, as the Malaysian who studied in the UK are coming from a conservative and traditional background, they were ascertained to preserve their religion as the response for the modern life of the western culture.¹⁶² Hence *da'wa* and *da'wa* organizations are the methods to propagate Islamic message and to understand faithful Islam within the Malaysian student abroad.¹⁶³ One of the most dominant *da'wa* organization was Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia that have been impacted by Egypt and Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood as well as Jamaat Islami leaders that were deported to UK.¹⁶⁴

In 1925, it was reported that there were 200 Netherland East Indies students studying in Al-Azhar which, include Malays students.¹⁶⁵ The reason students opted for Al-Azhar rather than studying in Mecca was the easy access to Egypt by steamship, the high price of rubber, Ibn Saud gain control over the Holy cities. Therefore, Al-Azhar way of the educational system was conveniently accepted to be taught in the *surau* (small mosque) or Mosques in Malaysia.¹⁶⁶ According to the fact, from 2006 to 2007, the Malaysian student in Egypt ranged between 4000 to 6000 students.¹⁶⁷ In 2015 Malaysian Student in Egypt has reached to 11,000 which makes the fourth largest Malaysian student community in the world after UK, Australia and Taiwan.¹⁶⁸ Even though there is no

¹⁶⁰ Zulkifly Abdul Malek, "From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur: The Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)", (**Master Thesis**), Georgetown University 2011.

¹⁶¹ Manan, S.H, **Gelombang Kebangkitan Dakwah Kampus**, JIMedia, 2009.

¹⁶² Shaikh, M.A., "Ethics of Decision Making in Islamic and Western Environments", **American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences**, 1998, p.115-128.

¹⁶³ Ibid p.45.

¹⁶⁴ Zulkifly Abdul Malek, "From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur: The Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)", **Master Thesis**, Georgetown University 2011.

¹⁶⁵ Othman, Muhammad Redzuan, "Call of the Azhar: The Malay Students Sojourn in Cairo Before World War II", **Jurnal Sejarah**, 1994no. 3, p.97-110.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Data Pelajar Malaysia di Luar Negara (MSD) 2002_2007
[file:///Users/iffahfadhilah/Downloads/Data%20Pelajar%20Malaysia%20di%20Luar%20Negara%20\(MSD\)%202002_2007%20\(3\).pdf](file:///Users/iffahfadhilah/Downloads/Data%20Pelajar%20Malaysia%20di%20Luar%20Negara%20(MSD)%202002_2007%20(3).pdf) (March 29, 2023)

¹⁶⁸ Statistik Pendidikan Negara: Kementerian Pendidikan Tinggi (Malaysia National Education Statistics: Ministry of Higher Education),

record of the numbers of student in 1970s, it is believed to reached thousands.¹⁶⁹ Some of the prominent figures amongst that Malaysian student impacted by their ideology are Muhammad Abduh, Jamaludin Al-Afghani, Rashid Rida and Hassan Al-Banna.

Nasser gave a free headquarters for Malaysian in Egypt in 1959. The year after the embassy of Malaysia in Egypt was established, it is reported that Malaysia Association in Egypt existed long back in 1930.¹⁷⁰ Malaysia and Egypt signed several agreements regarding the educational field and scholarship exchanges were formed as thousands of Malaysian students studied in Al-Azhar University. Al-Azhar teachers were dispatched to Malaysia consistently as a mission of Al-Azhar teaching in Malaysia to the extent that the deputy Sheikh of Al-Azhar visited Malaysia in 1991.¹⁷¹ Malaysia also opened a Center for Malaysian Studies at Cairo University with an objective of a platform for Egyptian researches and Malaysian community in Egypt to access and equipped with the relevant information on the development and situation of Malaysia in all dimensions.¹⁷² Up until nowadays, many of state government in Malaysia sponsored many Muslim students in Malaysia under Zakat Center of every state to pursue Islamic studies or medical course in Egypt.

There were plenty of MB members flying throughout the world after MB was banned in 1954. Malaysia is one of the countries the member migrated to. One of the members is Sheikh Taqiyyuddin, Secretary of MB's branch in Cairo, who advocates their ideology in the Northern part of Malaya and it was reported that one of his students is Jaiz Anwar, the former PAS Youth Leader.¹⁷³ Other than that, Dr. Nabil al-Tawil, is the one who contributed to the spreading of MB's ideology of the *Tajdid*(renewal) and *Islah*(reform) to the student in University Malaya as he was once working there.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affair Egypt, Relations Between Egypt and Malaysia, January 7, 2014, <https://web.archive.org/web/20140107162706/http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/EgyptianForeignPolicy/EgyptianAsianRelation/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=b1b5d194-8528-4e39-874e-b7f786820055> (29 March 2023).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Yon Machmudi, **Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)**, Canberra, ANU E Press, 2008, p.138.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid p.139.

The perspective of the Malaysian government towards the MB was seen as positive. The previous government of Malaysia under the tenure of Najib Razak, Najib openly criticized the coup and congratulated Morsi's victory in 2012. He welcomed democracy during the transformation period of Egypt. He looked forward to working together with Morsi towards bolstering the relationship between both countries.¹⁷⁵ Notwithstanding, in February 2011, Malaysian Muslims that consist of Malaysian Muslim groups and organizations condemned Najib's regarding his speech in Istanbul to have demanded Qardawi and MB to "Reject violence and extremism." Statement by Najib, perceived by Muslim groups as the former Prime Minister, judged the MB and Qardawi as a champion of extremism and violence. Najib then repudiated and clarified to the Muslim groups by stating:

"I have never said that the MB is a terrorist group. I said they could participate in the elections on the condition that they reject violence or extremist ideology as the general impression is such (MB as a terrorist group), and it is not my opinion".¹⁷⁶

Hence this particular incident can prove the significance of MB in the Malaysian community in Malaysia. Anwar Ibrahim's daughter, Nurul Izzah Anwar, a member of the Parliament in 2018 and the member of Parti Keadilan Rakyat(PKR) or National Justice Party, appeared in a press interview in the Parliament of Malaysia along with four exiled MB MPs from Egypt. She mentioned that there are a lot of exiled Egyptian MPs seeking refuge in Malaysia, contributing many benefits in the economy and education sector since they are teaching and as for her, this contribution makes Malaysia richer.¹⁷⁷ She added that she aspires Malaysia to have greater collaboration with Egypt in term of democracy as well as she reminded Malaysian about the coup that Malaysian should adequately address notion about human rights and democracy. She then invited one of the exiled MPs to deliver a speech. In his speech, he praised Malaysia's democracy as he mentioned that

¹⁷⁵ The Star, "Najib congratulates Egypt's president-elect Morsi", <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2012/06/26/najib-congratulates-egypts-presidentelect-morsi/> (29 March, 2023).

¹⁷⁶ Zulkifly Abdul Malek , p.64.

¹⁷⁷ New Malaysia Times, "Exiled Muslim Brotherhood MPs Making Malaysia Richer Thinks Nurul Izzah Anwar", <https://newmalaysiatimes.com/2018/07/26/exiled-muslim-brotherhood-mps-making-malaysia-richer-thinks-nurul-izzah-anwar/> (29 March, 2023)

the freedom of Anwar Ibrahim resembles the freedom that the democratically elected Morsi should have. He then describes the situation in Egypt nowadays there is no political freedom except for those who support the military regime, and there was a fake general election in order to ensure As-Sisi win in the election.¹⁷⁸

On the other hand, MB sees Malaysia as a model to refer to in the post-Mubarak era in the Egyptian agenda. Other than Malaysia, Turkey was also seen as a model. Prof Ahmed Suleiman, one of the leaders of MB, stated that "Combining the two experiences is the best alternative for Egypt after the uprising. Thus, in each experience, there are many similarities with the current situation in Egypt". The Egyptian citizen perceived Malaysian models as a successful example, particularly in their economic prosperity and multi-ethnics solidity.¹⁷⁹ There was a developmental conference on 18 May 2013 in Egypt that invited Dr. Mahathir to share the Malaysian experience. In the press conference, Dr. Mahathir stressed that Malaysia's multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversity has proven that these factors are not barriers to betterment. He also added that, for opposition forces, there should be a fine line between freedom and turmoil, which means turmoil would hinder economic growth and hinder future development. For Mahathir, securing economic growth is very important as it can protect investment and appointing an economy that create new opportunities for labors is also very crucial.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Rezeg Ali, Turkish and Malaysian Experiences: Lessons for Egypt, (**Master Thesis**), Eastern Mediterranean University, 2013

¹⁸⁰ Basil El-Dabh, "Muslim Brotherhood hosts former Malaysian PM", *Daily News Egypt*, 19 May 2013, <https://cdn1.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/19/muslim-brotherhood-hosts-former-malaysian-pm/> (29 March 2023)

CHAPTER 2: PAS: MALAYSIA ISLAMIC POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

2.1 PAS Background

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, formerly known as Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party(PAS), is an Islamic political organization and was established in 1951 at a meeting of Malay scholars and representatives of Islamic associations in Butterworth, Penang.¹⁸¹ The meeting eventually a meeting of the third *Ulama* Congress which has been sponsored by UMNO. UMNO is a political party that has governed Malaysia for a total of 61 years, from the country's independence in 1957 until its defeat in the 2018 general election, it emphasis on Malay nationalism and its role as the main representative of the Malay-Muslim community. UMNO sponsored the *Ulama* Congress so that they can have support and voters from conservative Malay Muslim.¹⁸² The establishment aimed for independence from British colonial and establishing *Daulah Islamiyyah*(Islamic State) along with the implementation of Islamic laws.¹⁸³ In the General Election 2022, PAS won the most seat amongst all parties whereby PAS candidates won 49 of it is alliance's 73 seats. It shows that PAS popularity is increasing.

PAS was initially a religious segment in UMNO, as seen in PAS's first president is UMNO's head of the Religious Affairs Bureau, Ahmad Fuad Hassan. In the era of PAS under Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy's (1956-1969) leadership, he brought up leftist ideology and transnationalism in a way that was not an absolute Marxist-Lennist but the leftist term somehow used to explain the endeavor towards independence from British and pan-Malayan nationalist vision-'*Melayu Raya*'.¹⁸⁴ Thus this transnationalism ideology is inclined to MB ideologies.¹⁸⁵ Consequently in Asri Muda(1969-1982) leadership, he

¹⁸¹ Riduan Mohd Nor, **Pengaruh Pemikiran Ikhwanul Muslimin Terhadap Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)**, Penerbit Ahnaf, Kuala Lumpur, 2004.

¹⁸² Wan Saiful Wan Jan, The Splintering of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), **International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia**, Vol. 9 No. 4, 2018.

¹⁸³ Abu Bakar Bin Abdullah, "Analysis on the Ruling Principles of Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) in Administration and Development of the State of Terengganu within the Period of 1999-2004", **International Journal of Business and Social Science**, Vol. 2 No. 7, April 2011.

¹⁸⁴ Farish A. Noor, "Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS (1951 - 2003)", **Sociological Research Institute**, Kuala Lumpur, 2014.

¹⁸⁵ Abdul Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi "Transnational Islam in Malaysia", in Mandaville, P., et al, eds, *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics*, **National Bureau of Asian Research**, Seattle, 2004, p,141–165.

brought PAS in 1974 to the coalition of Barisan National (BN), or National Front Coalition, the coalition led by UMNO that ruled Malaysia from independence until it is lost in the 14th General Election in 2018 after 61 years of ruling. There were scandals and dissatisfaction with Asri's Malay-nationalist-centred agenda as PAS members accused him had departed from the party Islamic State's main agenda.¹⁸⁶ Thereby, at the same time it was believed that Asri Malay centric ideology clashed with the MB ideology that PAS espoused.¹⁸⁷ Dissatisfaction with Asri Muda's approach led to PAS's exit from the BN coalition in 1978, and Asri was expelled at the PAS General Assembly in 1982. After Asri ousted from PAS, a new generation of leaders and reformists took over PAS, such as Yusof Rawa, Fadhil Noor, Abdul Hadi Awang, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat and Nakhaie Ahmad; most of them had studied in Cairo, India or Saudi Arabia and exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.¹⁸⁸ With the new leadership in line, they reformed the party by reoriented its internal order in order to bring back to the track which is true Islam in a method of *Kepimpinan Ulama* (religious scholars leadership). Since then, the highest policy-making body in the party has been the party's Council of Religious Scholars (*Dewan Ulama*).

Yusof Rawa is Asri's successor. Since the new leadership took over, PAS nationalist ideology brought by Asri Muda has changed to a more internationalist brand of Islam: global Islamism. These Ulama-led PAS has resuscitated the notion of transnational Islam in which the PAS agenda have always brought up international issue due to their Middle Eastern-oriented studies background and MB ideology.¹⁸⁹ PAS members translated the work of Syed Qutb and Mawdudi into Malay language and English. Thus this makes a significant spread of the Islamic state concept. They possess excellent efficiency in the Arabic language and thus can translate all MB's ideology books like Qutb's *Milestone* and *Fi Zilal Quran* by that, translated by Salahuddin Abdullah, PAS State Secretary for

¹⁸⁶ Farish Noor, p.77

¹⁸⁷ Mariam Binti Abdul Majid, I.M.B. Muhammad Kamil, "Critical Analysis of Muslim Intellectual Developments in Malaysia Post-independence (1960- 1990) to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", **Jurnal Pengajian Islam**, 2017, p.88-110.

¹⁸⁸ D. M. Muller, "An internationalist national Islamic struggle? Narratives of 'brothers abroad' in the discursive practices of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)", **Southeast Asia Research**, 2010, p.757-791.

¹⁸⁹ Abdul Hamid, p.151.

Yusuf Rawa had received indirect education through reading written by the leaders of MB and published magazine that contained the translation of *Tafsir Fi Zilal Quran* by Qutb.¹⁹¹ Fauzi Zakaria then believes that Yusuf Rawa and Dr. Zulkifli are the first Malays who receive direct contact from MB and Dr. Zulkifli were present in Hassan Al-Banna weekly religious lectures entitles *Hadith al-Thulatha* that then continue by Qutb after Al-Banna demise.¹⁹²

PAS sent ten students to further their studies in Baghdad to receive guidance from the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood. These students eventually become the leaders of PAS.¹⁹³ Since the 1960s, PAS leaders have utilized MB books such as "Rules and Regulations" by Hassan Al-Banna.¹⁹⁴ Iran Revolution is also an inspiration to PAS which is proven by the knowledge of conventional ideology, Ulama can reign a government and can establish an Islamic State in the modern times.¹⁹⁵ The establishment of the *Majlis Syura Ulama*(Islamic Shura Council) and the post of *Mursyidul Am* marked that *ulama* group is totally on the power to reign the party.

In 1989, Fadzil Noor took over Yusuf Rawa's role as President. Since Fadzil's tenure, there has been an influx of a new generation of pragmatic professionals to the party, where this new generation introduced an inclusive approach which is an inclusive and progressive approach. PAS is seen as a dynamics political organization where ideology has evolved from time to time. PAS possesses members impacted by various ideologies such as conservative, moderate, and liberal, but nowadays, PAS leadership is dominated by the conservative *Ulama* that is inclined to nationalism, different from when the reformist ideology of global Islamic transnationalism. In contrast, the progressive group

¹⁹⁰ Mohamad Fauzi Zakaria, **Pengaruh Pemikiran Sayyid Qutb Islam di Malaysia**. Kuala Lumpur: Jundi Resources, 2007, p.135

¹⁹¹ Mohamad Nor, Riduan. **Sejarah & Perkembangan Gerakan Islam Abad Moden**. Kuala Lumpur: Jundi Resources, 2009.

¹⁹² Mohamad Fauzi Zakaria, p.126.

¹⁹³ Zulkifly Abdul Malek, p.28

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Chandra Muzaffar, **Kebangkitan Semula Islam di Malaysia**, Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti Sdn Bhd, 1988.

within PAS was called 'Erdoginist'.¹⁹⁶ The progressive and pragmatic leaders left the party during PAS General Assembly in 2015 and formed a splinter party called Party Amanah Negara (AMANAHA, National Trust Party).

Abdul Hadi Awang, the next President after Fadzil Nor, remarks on three Muslim responses toward Western democracy, which fall into three categories. First is the Muslim who quickly embraced Western democracy due to secularist thought. Second is the Muslim who quickly rejected because of the un-Islamic notion, which is deviated and considered as those who implement Western democracy are committing sins. Third is the one associated with the Islamic movements such as MB in Egypt, PMIP in Malaysia, and Islamic parties in Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia in Egypt, which go along critically with Western democracy in its principle but at the same time reject any frailty.¹⁹⁷

2.2 Da'wa and Tarbiyyah

Yusuf Rawa has proclaimed how PAS combined da'wa and politics as their duty and utilized the political platforms to execute da'wa and vice versa:

“Our political activities should relate to the fundamental role of Islamic da'wa and the manhaj(method) of da'wa. We must streamline our political activities to raise the people's sympathy and support towards the Islamic objectives we are struggling for. Our movement is a unique movement that possesses its characteristic. We are not merely a political party or just a da'wa movement. Our movement is compact: we are active in politics and da'wa. We are using politics for the achievement of da'wa, and we are performing da'wa to strengthen politic.”¹⁹⁸

According to Nizam *Tarbiyyah* PAS, PAS received and focused on the *Tarbiyyah* aspect of MB, Masyumi of Indonesian and Jamaat Islami, Pakistan and executed it by its

¹⁹⁶ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Towards a Post-Islamists Secular Democracy in the Muslim World”, *Paper for Contemporary of Politics Research Workshop*, 2011, p.14.

¹⁹⁷ Abdul Hadi Awang, *Islam: Fikrah, Harakah & Daulah*,. Shah Alam: Dewan Pustaka Fajar. 2005, p101-103.

¹⁹⁸ Badlisham Mohd Nasir, “Da'wah in PAS: A Study of the Pronouncement of the Party Leaders” in *Jurnal Fikrah*, Vol. 2,1999.

model.¹⁹⁹ Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, an Islamic youth association that previously led by Anwar Ibrahim, had helped in advocating Muslim Brotherhood ideology in the youth wing when PAS joined BN coalition. ABIM has translated Muslim Brotherhoods leaders writing, and their official magazine, *al-Risalah*, contains many of MB leader's writing.²⁰⁰

The strong ideology of MB in *Da'wa* and *Tarbiyyah* within students can be seen from its Leadership training Bureau at PAS Central level where Hadi Awang as the chairman of the Bureau. There was a Seminar organized in 1982 to systemize the syllabus and methodology of *Tarbiyyah* in PAS.²⁰¹ During the Seminar, the PAS *Tarbiyah* and Leadership Training Bureau committee periodically introduced the contents and syllabus of *tarbiyah*. This *tarbiyah* is organized into three stages: the stage of *ta'rif* (identification), the stage of *takwin* (formation), and the stage of *tanfīz* (implementation). The syllabus covers several topics, including the Holy Quran, *hadith*, *fiqh*, *usul fiqh*, *tawhid*, *tasawwuf*, Arabic and *Jawi* language, and studying the history and *sirah* of the Prophet (peace be upon him). PAS *tarbiyyah* also focuses on contemporary issues of Islam and general knowledge of Islam. PAS uses different *tarbiyah* programs, such as *Usrah*, *Tamrin*, *Mukhayyam*, *Liqā' al-fikri*, and *Ijtima'*.

PAS *tarbiyyah* involves studying various books that address contemporary Islamic issues, such as "What Effects With the Fall of the Islamic World," "Islamika Economi," "*Maza ya'ni intimai li al-Islam?*," "*al-Mustaqbal li Haza al-Dīn*," and "Misunderstanding of Islam." The general knowledge of Islam is acquired by studying books like "*al-'adalah al-ijtima'iyyah*" by Sayyid Qutb, "Islam and Legislation" by 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awdah, "*al-Nuzum al-Islamiyah*" by Subhi Salleh, and 'Economics in Islam.' *Fiqh Da'wah* is learned through books like *Usul al-Da'wah*, *Fiqh al-Da'wah*, *Fiqh 'Amal jama'i*, *Min ahl al-Khuṭwati ila al-Amam*, *Kaifa Nad'u al-Nas*, *Fi Afaq al-Ta'lim and al-Usul al-'Isyrīn*. Additionally, attacks on Islam and Muslims are studied through books like "Battle

¹⁹⁹ **Nizam Tarbiyah PAS**, Kuala Lumpur: Lajnah Tarbiyah dan Perkaderan PAS Pusat, 2015, p.12.

²⁰⁰ Zulkifly Abdul Malek, **From Cairo to Kuala Lumpur: The Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM)**, Dessertation, Georgetown University 2011.

²⁰¹ Mohamad Nor, Riduan. **Sejarah & Perkembangan Gerakan Islam Abad Moden**. Kuala Lumpur: Jundi Resources, 2009.

Between Islam and the Western Thought, ‘*Rasa’il*’ by Mawdudi, and ‘*Ghazwah al-Fikri*.’²⁰²

According to Idris Ahmad's explanation of the *usrah* guide, it encompasses several elements such as pillars, objectives, rules, etiquette, program, means, methods of handling, *naqib* (facilitator), and its own history. This *tarbiyyah* system aims to cultivate individuals with good character and proactive members who can effectively carry out the movement's initiatives.²⁰³ In PAS, *usrah* is often organized through neighborhood-based study groups that meet regularly to discuss religious and social issues. These study groups are led by trained facilitators who provide guidance on Islamic teachings and encourage members to live according to Islamic principles. By strengthening family and community ties, *usrah* aims to foster a sense of unity and belonging among Muslims. Besides *usrah*, there are other activities under *tarbiyyah*. There are such as:²⁰⁴

- i. *Katibah or qiyamullail*(night prayers ctivities)
- ii. *Rihlah Tarbawiyah* (Visits)
- iii. *Tamrin Tarbawi* (Program Cadre)
- iv. *Mukhayyam Tarbawi* (Camping or Jamboree)
- v. *Iftar Jama’i* (The congregation Iftar)
- vi. *Liqat al-Fikri* (The Gathering of Thought)
- vii. *Ijtima 'Tarbawi* (Monthly gathering)
- viii. *Nadwah Tadrībiyyah*(Seminar or Convention)
- ix). *Mu'tamar* (General assembly)

Mu'tamar refers to a large gathering of individuals who come together to discuss and plan

²⁰² Ismail Mamat, “Transmission Of Islamic Reform (Islah) From Egypt To Malaysia: A Study Of Hasan Al-banna’s Legacy”, **International Journal of Business, Economics and Law**, Vol. 10, Issue 5, 2016.

²⁰³ **Nizam Tarbiyah PAS**, Lajnah Tarbiyah dan Perkaderan PAS Pusat, Kuala Lumpur, 2015.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

for the future. In PAS, *mu'tamar* is often held as a party congress, where members come together to elect new leaders, set policy priorities, and discuss the party's direction. Through this process, members are encouraged to participate in the political process and take an active role in shaping the future of their community.

According to interview in 2023 with Ahmad Shauqi Johara, a PAS member, he said that he goes through *tarbiyyah* module and using the books of *tarbiyah*. The book are *Manhaj Tarbiyah* (*Tarbiyyah Methodology*), this book compiles the *usrah* syllabus that needs to be followed by all PAS members at every level and consists of 6 volumes based on the phases of Taarif, Takwin, and Tanfiz. Next book is the “Nizam Tarbiyah PAS”, it is a guidebook for the implementation of PAS *tarbiyyah* such as *usrah*, *tamrin*, and other *tarbiyyah* programs. Another book is, “Manhaj Daurah Tadribiyah”, a collection of worksheets for building PAS member. Last book is “*Fiqh Al-Harakah*” From the Prophetic Biography discusses the prophet's biography from the perspective of being a da'wah body and an Islamic movement.²⁰⁵

2.3 Political strategy and evolution

It was believed that the decision of PAS to join the 1974 coalition of Barisan National (BN), or National Front Coalition was intended to enhance the Malay economic, the propagation of *da'wa*, and the implementation of Malay-oriented education policy.²⁰⁶ It was also a lesson learned from MB in the tenure of Jamal Nasser who banned MB due to being too powerful and threaten his regime. Thus, PAS supported *Tahalluf Siyasi* (political partnership) with National Front Coalition so that PAS would not face the same fate as MB was banned.²⁰⁷ *Tahalluf Siyasi* is the term champion by PAS in which the ultimate objective of the partnership is said to achieve the same aims and not contravene to the Islamic *Shariah* at the same time.²⁰⁸ As noted by Muhammad Fuzi Omar, *Tahaluf* means a method of several political parties that differ in ideology, unifying either Muslim or non-muslim that does not emphasize Islamic struggles. However, it is a

²⁰⁵ Ahmad Shauqi Johara, Pas Member, Interview, April 8, 2023.

²⁰⁶ Alias Mohamed, **PAS Platform Development and Change 1951-1986**, Gateway Publishing House, 1994, p.121.

²⁰⁷ Ibid p.142.

²⁰⁸ Mohd Syakir Mohd Rosdi, “Pemikiran Tahaluf Siyasi Parti Islam SeMalaysia PAS dan Implikasinya Terhadap Pembangunan Negara”, **Sains Humanika**, 8(2), 2016.

treaty in order to face the same adversary as it does not go against the principles of Islam.²⁰⁹ Yusuf al-Qardhawi also pointed out that in *Tahalluf Siyasi*, there is no restriction to unify with non-muslim rulers that are willing to execute Islamic Shariah in order to minimalized tyranny and oppression in any way to help the tyrannized and oppressed people.²¹⁰ The coalition with National Front Coalition does not last long as PAS member dissatisfied with Asri leadership and blame his deviating ethnic nationalism ideology in 1978. In the post-Asri leadership, Hadi Awang, the *ulama*-dominant leader in 1981, announced, 'We oppose BN not because it has been in power so long. We oppose it because it preserves the colonial constitution, infidel, and the pre-Islamic(*jahiliyyah*) rule.'²¹¹ In the 1990s, PAS had done three coalitions with Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah(APU), Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat Malaysia(Gerak) and Barisan Alternatif(BA).

In the middle of Ulama's dominant PAS leadership, there was a new generation of professional and pragmatic leaders that influenced the party to drop the polemic of an Islamic state and engage with non-muslim voters to join the opposition coalition, People's Front Coalition. It was said that the new generation and pragmatic leaders are creating a wave called '*mengintelekkkan kan ulama dan mengulamakan intelek*' (intellectualized the *ulama*, and ulamasized intellect) that were started in the 41st *Muktamar*(general assembly) in 1995. As stated by Wan Jan, 'the progressives(pragmatic leaders) played a pivotal role in solidifying the ulama's grip on the party'.²¹² These leaders are trying to pave away PAS from *Hudud* law, a penal laws of Islam. It shows that these leaders are transforming PAS so that it would compromise with the modern times and give rise and hope to PAS to win in the next election and prove that PAS is not inclusive to the rural and religious people only.²¹³

²⁰⁹ Muhamad Fuzi Omar, "Strategies and Tactics of Mobilisation: Opposition Political Parties in Malaysia, 1982-2003", (**Phd Thesis**), Kulliyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Science, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2007.

²¹⁰ Yusuf al-Qaradhwai, **Fiqh Daulah Menurut Perspektif Islam**, Maktabah al-Qaradhwai, Bangi 2002.

²¹¹ Malaysia Kini, Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, 'Menilai Amanat Hadi Dengan Adil', <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/218028> (23, March 2023)

²¹² Wan Saiful Wan Jan, "The Splintering of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)", **International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) Malaysia**, Vol. 9 No. 4: October 2018, p.11.

²¹³ Mohd Izani Mohd Zain, **Islam dan Demokrasi**, Penerbit University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 2007.

It was in 1999 PAS was shown the willingness to immerse itself in a new trend following the 1998 ousting of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim from UMNO. According to Wan Jan, there were around 20 members of the PAS central committee flew to the United Kingdom and went to the Islamic Foundation in Markfield to take part in the meeting with well-known invited scholars such as Yusof al-Qardhawi, Rached Ghannouchi, Khurshid Ahmad and Kamal Alhelbawy. Two main agendas of the meeting were the *tahalluf siyasi* with the Chinese-majority-secular DAP party and the discourse of Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar's wife, to become the Leader of the Parliamentary opposition and coalition.²¹⁴ Initially, Abdul Hadi Awang and conservative central committee member were rejecting both agenda however after the invited scholars assert that the agenda was Islamically-justified and necessary.²¹⁵ Once the majority supported the agenda and majority decision were reached, the conservative leaders were also agreed with the decision made or as said by Wan Jan' The conservatives were willing to give way to the new ideas, or they may simply realize that they did not have the strength to resist the changing national tide'.²¹⁶

Consequently, in 1999, PAS then collaborated in the alliance of Pakatan Rakyat(PR) or People's Front Coalition, which consisted of the liberal, secular and Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party(DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat(PKR) or National Justice Party. Apart from developing PAS's Islamic-based economic development, the ultimate aim of the coalition was more to an opposition pact against the National Front Coalition(BN) of the Federal government at that time.²¹⁷ PAS also agreed to put on halt the slogan of an Islamic state in its manifesto in the coalition.

In 2006, Anwar Ibrahim as the PKR advisor, promoted the *maqasid*-oriented approach, an approach that has a discrepancy with PAS literal approach. Anwar Ibrahim's tendency to not promote the implementation of Shariah law or the Islamic state like what has been

²¹⁴ Wan Saiful Wan Jan, p.13.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ M. Salleh, M. Syakir, Bin Mohd Rosdi, "Islamic Political Economy: A Special Reference to the Use of Tahaluf Siyasi in the State of Kelantan, Malaysia." **American International Journal of Contemporary Research**, 2014, p.126.

done by the first generation of Islamist and Islamic organization but instead endorsed *Maqasid Shariah* approach as he stated:

Maqasid al-Shariah (higher objectives of the Shariah) sanctify the preservation of religion, life, intellect, family, and wealth, objectives that bear striking resemblance to Lockean ideals that would be expounded centuries later. Many scholars have further explained that laws which contravene the maqasid must be revised or amended to bring them into line with the higher objectives and to ensure that they contribute to the safety and development of the individual and society(...).²¹⁸

The new generation leadership in PAS, the Deputy President at that time, Nasharuddin Mat Isa, supported the approach apart from the vision of establishing an Islamic state by the implementation of *Shariah* law. Furthermore, in 2008, the progressive leader coaxed the party to adopt a slogan for the Malaysia general election manifesto that year entitled 'Honest, Fair and Clean Government: Toward *Negara Berkebajikan* (Nation of Care and Opportunity). The coax succeeded as Abdullah Hadi Awang declared *Negara Berkebajikan* as their topmost agenda. For the progressive leaders, it is such an achievement to introduce the slogan and lessens the call of *Hudud* law and the PAS slogan of Islamic state.²¹⁹

PAS in the People Front coalition did not last long which is until 2015.²²⁰ This is largely due to the *Hudud* law implementation issue that Hadi Awang, the Ulama leaders in PAS, brought up. There were arguments between PAS and the other coalition members regarding the implementation of the *Hudud* law, as other members of the coalition were strongly against it. Additionally, the *ulama* and professional leaders argue about the suitability and timing of *Hudud* implementation. This is then the turning point from the progressive leaders to founding the Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH, National Trust Party).²²¹

²¹⁸ Anwar Ibrahim, Universal Values and Muslim Democracy, *Journal of Democracy*, 2006.

²¹⁹ Wan Saiful Wan Jan, p.14.

²²⁰ Halim Rane, p.344.

²²¹ Ahmad Fauzi, *The Governance of Religious Diversity in Malaysia: Islam in a Secular State or Secularism in an Islamic State?: The Problem of Religious Diversity: European Challenges, Asian Approaches*, Edinburgh University Press, 2017, p.170–176.

In 2010, *Tahalluf Siyasi* of PAS in the People Front coalition was isolated relatively since other parties won a lot more seats. Since PAS is not dominant in the coalition, PAS has to compromise on religious issues like *Kalimah Allah* (Allah's name), confiscation of the Bible and the apostasy case in Selangor state. PAS also agree with the the *Ketuanan Rakyat* (supremacy of people) in the People Front coalition Orange Book in 2013, in which political democracy is the main principle and liberty, equality and human right as the main endeavor of the supremacy of people.²²² This endeavor was to execute and prove the existence of the COMANGO, a coalition of liberal dominated-NGOs and LGBT rights in which the members of the NGOs are the pro and supporters of the People Front coalition.²²³

As Hadi was against UMNO because of his accusation of the secular ideology of the party, PAS was also in the coalition of the secular party, which is DAP and PKR in the People Front Coalition. Therefore, the PAS *Tahalluf Siyasi* in People Front Coalition does have a bad perception from the conservative Malays Muslim electorate. It was then proven from the 13th General Election in 2013 PAS lost two seats in Kelantan and seven seats in Kedah which is the Malay Muslim majority area.

PAS and UMNO were seen as competing with each other as they are the two leading Malay-Muslim political parties. The argument of Malaysia as an Islamic state is argued by both since both interpret it differently. UMNO displays itself as a promoter of a moderate and modernist Islam and distinguishes itself from traditional conservative Islam brought by PAS Whereas PAS leader Yusuf Rawa discerns UMNO Islamization policy would not be successful as the leader of UMNO is a secularist nationalist. As he believed that nationalism is a backward notion.²²⁴ UMNO already announced Malaysia as an Islamic State by Tun Dr. Mahathir back in 2001:

“UMNO wishes to state loudly that Malaysia is an Islamic country. This is based on the opinion of the ulamaks who had clarified what constituted as

²²² Muhammad Faiz Mukmin Abdul Mutalib, and Wan Fariza Alyati Wan Zakaria, “Pasca-Islamisme dalam PAS: Analisis terhadap kesan tahalluf siyasi”, *International Journal of Islamic Thought (IJIT)*, 8, 2015, p.57.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Kamarudin Jaffar, *Pilihanaya 1999 dan Masa Depan Politik Malaysia*. Kuala Lumpur: Ikdas Sdn Bhd, 2000.

Islamic country. If Malaysia is not an Islamic country because it does not implement the hudud, then there are no Islamic countries in the world.²²⁵

One has argued that Dr. Mahathir's declaration of Malaysia as an Islamic state is to show Muslim and Malays voters that UMNO is a shield and protector of Islam, gain the vote, and attract PAS supporters. UMNO perceived that Muslim leaders must dominate Malaysia's political power.²²⁶

PAS was founded in 1951; PAS has experienced numerous changes in its stance, strategy and approach. PAS is seen to change its approach according to the conditions and circumstances. The pragmatic leaders are the biggest influencer in decision-making to the conservative and Ulama leader and PAS.

However, as the conservative leaders were committed to their Islamic state vision, the pragmatic leaders formed a new splinter party against the Islamism standard vision and manifested their post-Islamism attitude. Overall, now, PAS defines the concept of the Islamic State in the form of a Malay conservative outlook as there were founded and born from UMNO's segment in 1951. As in 2022, PAS has its stance to uphold Malay nationalism again and not having any *tahalluf siyasi* with the liberal friendly parties like PKR and DAP. In the General Election 2022, PAS won the most seat amongst all parties whereby PAS candidates won 49 of its alliance's 73 seats. It shows that PAS is the most popular parties amongst all parties in Malaysia.

²²⁵Greg Lopez, Thinking of Malaysia as an Islamic state, *Malay Mail*, 1 June 2017, <https://www.malaymail.com/news/opinion/2017/06/01/thinking-of-malaysia-as-an-islamic-state-part-3/1389425> (26 March 2023)

²²⁶ The reference is to the UMNO - led government's official's document, **Malaysia Adalah Sebuah Negara Islam**, and PAS's party document, **Dokumen Negara Islam**.

CHAPTER 3: IKRAM AND ISMA: MALAYSIA NGOS THAT IMPACTED BY MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IDELOGY

3.1 IKRAM

3.1.1 IKRAM Background

The organization of Malaysia IKRAM (IKRAM) was established in 2009.²²⁷ It originated from the Islamic Representative Council (IRC) that was founded in 1975 in the era of Islamic Revivalism by a Muslim Malaysian student in the UK and a Muslim Brotherhood-oriented Malaysian student in Egypt.²²⁸ IRC receive the influence of MB in term of ideology, identity, organizational structure and regimentation activities. Thus it can be seen upon the return of members to Malaysia, they transpired in the *da'wa* movement that was aimed to establish of Islamic State and Caliphate inspired by the MB but according to Malaysian cauldron.²²⁹ IRC then evolved and became Pertubuhan Jamaah Islah Malaysia(JIM) after rethinking position, roles and contribution towards society.²³⁰ JIM's leadership and other like-minded Islamic organization desired to be more inclusive, towards a good governance vision and reform of Islamic agenda. Thus the JIM tenure since 1990 had changed to IKRAM. It has branched across Malaysia with an overseas branch in UK-EIRE, Egypt and Australia. IKRAM's vision is based on the 12 Basic Features of the '*Negara Rahmah*'(Nation of Mercy) based on Islam. Among them are Competent and Integrity National Leadership, Effective Checks and Balances Based Governance System, and Fair Law.²³¹ IKRAM states its aim is to propagate the Islamic message through *da'wa*, *tarbiyyah*, and charity, which cares for society's needs that in line with Islamic teachings and way of life by Quran and Sunnah as the main reference.²³²

²²⁷ IKRAM, "Siapa Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia?", <https://ikram.org.my/kenali-kami/#visimisi> (March, 31, 2023)

²²⁸ Maszlee Malik, "Religion, civil society and good governance: Pertubuhan Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM)'s experience," *International Journal of Islamic Thought*, 2012, 8: p.5-19.

²²⁹ Ibid

²³⁰ Siti Hafisah Manan, *Gelombang kebangkitan dakwah kampus*. Kuala Lumpur: JIMedia, 2009

²³¹ IKRAM, "Malaysia Negara Rahmah", <https://ikram.org.my/malaysia-negara-rahmah/> (March, 31, 2023).

²³² Ibid.

They also willing to cooperate and having relationships with any organization that can develop and gives benefit to Muslim Ummah without bias in any race or religion.²³³

In 2017, the General Secretary of IKRAM was present at the Muslim Brotherhood's 90th celebration in Istanbul, Turkey. This proves that IKRAM has a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.²³⁴ In 2020, IKRAM declared its disappointment at the statement of the Supreme Council of Ulama of Saudi Arabia - *Haiat Kibar al-Ulama al-Suudiyah* which declared MB as terrorists and deviant from the true teachings of Islam.²³⁵ This declaration is a shared declaration with various Islamic Organizations in Malaysia. In the declaration, it is stated that it is surprising that the Supreme Council of Ulama of Saudi Arabia is opposed by the majority of Muslim scholars around the world and only gets the praise and support of the Jewish regime that colonizes the beloved land of Palestine. A total of 18 ulama unions around the world united to release a statement condemning this action, even asking that their statement be reviewed for its truth and propriety. The standard language of statements is also not the same as the standard language of religious *fatwas*, which are filled with arguments, facts and '*tabayyun*'(to investigate) of reality.²³⁶ The Vice President of IKRAM says that MB is an organization that pioneered a wave of universal Islamic awareness including bringing free and independent thinking while the Islamic world was still in the grip of western colonialism at the beginning of the 20th century.²³⁷

3.1.2 Da'wa and Tarbiyyah

IKRAM's Da'wa and *Tarbiyyah* committee published their own monthly brochure called 'Tarbiatuna'. In the brochure, they updating their progress on Da'wa and *Tarbiyyah*. Discourses such as is 'Is our *Usrah* effective?', '*Usrah* as the basic method on our Da'wa's structure' and '*Usrah* and Youth' are the examples of discussion in the magazine written by the key leaders of IKRAM.²³⁸ In the brochure they also updating their activities of the

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, "SUA IKRAM hadir Sambutan 90 Tahun Ikhwan Muslimin", <https://ikram.org.my/sua-ikram-hadir-sambutan-90-tahun-ikhwan-muslimin/> (March, 31, 2023).

²³⁵ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, "Kesederhanaan dan Pendekatan Damai Ikhwanul Muslimin", <https://ikram.org.my/kesederhanaan-dan-pendekatan-damai-ikhwanul-muslimin/> (March, 31, 2023).

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, "Ikhwanul Muslimin pertubuhan sederhana, bukan Pengganas", <https://ikram.org.my/ikhwanul-muslimin-pertubuhan-sederhana-bukan-pengganas/> (March, 31, 2023).

²³⁸ Tarbiatuna, https://www.ikram.org.my/pdf/tarbiatuna/tarbiatuna_03.pdf (March, 31, 2023).

Da'wa and *Tarbiyyah* such as *Usrah*(Circle Discussion), *Katibah*(Night Prayes), *Rehlah*(Picnic)*Mukhayyam*(Spiritual Camp), *Daurah*, and *Nadwah*(conventions) throughout Malaysia.

Belia Harmoni(Harmony Youth) is IKRAM's university wing. The ideology of MB have been impacted in this student's organization can be seen from its *Tarbiyyah*'s objective, which is the 10 *Muwasofat Tarbiyyah* that Hassan Al-Banna coins.²³⁹ For Aliyah, in addition to building and shaping personality, *usrah* is also implemented to build Islamic thinking as implemented by MB.²⁴⁰ In the *usrah* there is a process of transferring ideas from a *naqibah* to his *mutarabbi* through discussions about the interpretation of the Qur'an, hadiths, sirah and books of ideas. Aliyah added that the process of transfer of *fikrah*(ideology) is fundamental in our education because every *mutarabbi*(trainer, the one who delivers ideology) we build now is a future *murabbi*(the one who receives the ideology) to others in the future. So we need to instill in them the correct and true understanding of this *fikrah* (ideology) so that they can also convey the ideology to others later. Regarding the implementation of *usrah* at UKM, Nur Zakiah Najihah said that *usrah* is led by a *naqibah*(leader). In the *usrah* there will be a discussion about the syllabus or module among *usrah* experts on Tafsir Al-Azhar written by Hamka, Majmū'ah Rasā'il written by Hassan Al-Banna, Fiqh Sīrah written by Muhammad Al-Ghazali, a former member of MB and other modules according to the current situation and needs.²⁴¹ Belia Harmoni has complied to all seven methods of *Tarbiyyah*, which are *Usrah*(family), *Katiba*(battalion), *Rihla*(trip), *Mu'askar*(camping), *Dawra*(workshop), *Nadwa*(seminar), and *Mu'tamar*(congress). It could be said that each *tarbiyyah*(educational) program implemented by Belia Harmoni has a clear objective for the development of students and has an organized and flexible form of program implementation.²⁴² *Tarbiyyah* is not only done among the university members but also within all its member regardless ages.²⁴³

²³⁹ Fadhilatul Ehsan Fakhru Adabi, "Student Development Through Tarbiyah Programme by Belia Harmoni in Selangor", **Jurnal Usuluddin**, 2020, 48(2) p.95-132.

²⁴⁰ Ibid p.103.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Writer's Observation.

IKRAM defines *Da'wa* as delivering and spreading Islamic pamphlets to all levels of society using various media and methodologies, giving advice and expressing Islamic views as a basis in all social affairs.²⁴⁴ *Da'wa* also develop educational, health, welfare, science and technology and economic institutions.²⁴⁵

IKRAM is also very active in giving *Da'wa* to non-muslim in Malaysia through its Hidayah Center. IKRAM in Pahang, one of the states in peninsular Malaysia, used 4 types of methods of *Da'wa* to non-Muslims which are:²⁴⁶

a)Method from talk and forum

IKRAM target professionals and give talk and forum to this class of people. The issues of the talk about Palestine and Syria and other issues related to the Muslim Ummah.

b)Method from Seminar

Seminar is an activity created to present a scientific work from an expert to the participants. By conducting this seminar, IKRAM has made it mandatory for its professional member to participate in an organized seminar.

c)Method *Da'wa Bil Hal*

Da'wa Bil Hal means preach from example and deeds. In other words, it means the sound and quality personality that individuals are doing through their activities of helping the community.

d)Street *Da'wa*

Hidayah Centre uses this method to do *da'wa*, especially to non-Muslims and Muslims on the street. This method aims to expose the technic and practical *da'wa* to non-muslim by IKRAM's members. The members are trained before they execute the *da'wa* on the street, and they will follow up with the targeted preached person.

²⁴⁴ Safina Ismail, "Gerakan Dakwah Di Malaysia: Peranan Dan Cabaran", Penerbit Jabatan Dakwah Dan Usuluddin, 2012, p.70.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ahmad Effat Mokhtar, Ibrahim Hashim, Misnan Jemali, Abdul Munir Ismail, "Da'wah to the Professional Group in Pahang," **Jurnal Perspektif**, Special Issue 1, 2017.

In an interview with Ruqayya Azhari, a member of IKRAM, she said that they use books by Syed Qutb, Tafsir Fi Zilal, books by Fathi Yakan Hadis 40 by Imam Nawawi.²⁴⁷

3.1.3 IKRAM and Rashid Gannouchi and Good Governance

Ghannouchi's paradigm ideology from 'Political Islam' to 'Democrat Muslim' has been seen as a harmonious synthesis between Islamic discourse and Western democracy. However, some criticized it as a strategy or tactic of new Political Islam that was negatively perceived so that it would be more accepted. It was the Arab Spring as the touchstone of Ghannouchism by IKRAM members was developed since the ability of Ennahda to keep the revolution and the country. Since then, IKRAM has developed ties with Ghannouchi to adopt a more solid Maqasid-based approach.²⁴⁸ The endeavor of both Ghannouchi and IKRAM was seen in 2015 when Ghannouchi was invited to give his keynote speech in the assembly of IKRAM core members along with Maqasid event through Skype.²⁴⁹ Ghannouchi claims that western democracy is the Islamic version of the Islam's *Shura* (mutual consensus), which were existed back in Prophet Muhammad era.²⁵⁰ Ghannouchi then believes that a true Muslim upholds democracy thus explicitly makes Muslim as democrats.²⁵¹ Ghannouchi's idea *Muwatanah*(citizenship) is for all citizens regards of different race and religion in Muslim countries and serving Tunisian based on that Tunisia is for all and not for Muslim is opening the eyes of IKRAM members. Ghannouchi asserts that a boundary between Muslims and Non-Muslim is irrelevant today. The same goes for political plurality should be implemented towards a modern Muslim state due to political pluralism can prevent exclusive power and catastrophe in Muslim countries.²⁵² Having all of these Ghannouchisms, IKRAM perceive Ghannouchi ideas as a suitable model for Malaysia as Malaysia has difference races, religions and a democratic country thus they are pleased to announce IKRAM members as democrats

²⁴⁷ Ruqayya Azhari, IKRAM's member, Interview, April 8, 2023.

²⁴⁸ Maszlee Malik, *From political Islam to democrat Muslim: A case study of Rashid Ghannouchi's influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP*, IIUM Press, 2017.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Rached Al-Ghannouchi, *Al-Dimuqratiyah wa huquq al-Insan al-Islam*, Doha: Aljazeera Centre For Studies, 2012.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

Muslim.²⁵³ Ghannouchi's 'Democrats Muslim' and the party defined itself as 'democratic political party with an Islamic frame of reference and a national platform' has been perceived by IKRAM as an inclusive approach and effective way in countering the radical ideologues of Islam. Ghannouchism has inspired IKRAM to establish '*Negara Rahmah*' (Nation of Mercy) in Malaysia, which is a concept of 'its initial typical Islamism position to a more multi-racial, multi-religious society which embodied a friendlier version of Islamism.'²⁵⁴ *Negara Rahmah* (Nation of Mercy) is also based on Maqasid-approach in which processes of *islah*(reform) and *taghyir*(change) are the main motivation of the concept.²⁵⁵ IKRAM in their website also underlined the methodology of *taghyir*(change) according to the Secretary General of the International Organisation of MB, Dr. Ibrahim Munir Mustafa. Dr. Ibrahim, in his public lecture that 200 IKRAM members attended, emphasized three *tsawabit*(resolution) in the *taghyir*(change) methodology of MB, which are correcting the *akidah*(faith) of the Muslim Ummah, and *amal mujtama'i* (devoting oneself to Allah and practicing with society). Dr. Ibrahim also asserts that MB aspire to correct the *akidah*(faith) to be more *wasatiyyah*(moderate) between two factions which are the extremist and those who are too easygoing in upholding Islam.²⁵⁶

IKRAM President, Mohd Parid Sheikh Ahmad, aspires that there are 12 principles of '*Negara Rahmah*' (Nation of Mercy);

- 1) A competent and integrated leadership in government;
- 2) An effective government that based on check and balance;
- 3) Good governance
- 4) Fair laws;
- 5) Educated, civilize and affectionate people
- 6) A strong family institution;
- 7) A harmonious relationship between ethnics and religions;

²⁵³ Malik, Maszlee, **Tatakelola Kerajaan yang Baik (Good Governance): Gerakan Islam dan Rashid Al-Ghannouchi**, Petaling Jaya: ILHAM Books & Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 2016.

²⁵⁴ Maszlee Malik, **From political Islam to democrat Muslim: A case study of Rashid Ghannouchi's influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP**, IIUM Press, 2017, p.37.

²⁵⁵ Ibid p.36.

²⁵⁶ Ikhwan Muslimin Tekankan Tiga Tsawabit Dalam Manhaj Taghyir, <https://ikram.org.my/ikhwan-muslimin-tekanan-tiga-tsawabit-dalam-manhaj-taghyir/> (March, 31, 2023)

- 8) Sustainable economy;
- 9) A just in property contribution;
- 10) sustainable development
- 11) Welfare, health and safety of the people are preserved,
- 12) Leading national security and harmony.

The concept also faces critics as there are doubts about its real agenda. *Rahmah's* term is questioned as it seems that term is lenient and loose, which can lead to allowed ideology against *Shariah*, and the doubts strengthen as IKRAM amicable engagement with controversial liberals and secular organizations like *NEGARA-KU*²⁵⁷. IKRAM then argues that the engagements are a potential platform to execute *da'wa* as the controversial liberal and secular organizations are eager to empower people's will and strategically and systematically put efforts for changes.²⁵⁸

3.1.4 IKRAM and Maqasid Shariah

IKRAM was supporting PAS in the PAS era of having the *tahalluf siyasi* with the PR coalition; IKRAM members were former PAS member too, but since PAS decision to exit from the coalition and embracing Islamism again by upholding the Islamic state and sharia law, IKRAM has turned its support its members took control in AMANAH that embrace the same epistemology of democrat Muslim and Maqasid Shariah.²⁵⁹ AMANAH and IKRAM like-mindedness can be seen from an event organized by pro-AMANAH NGO called Nadhwah Ulama Nahdhah Jadidah(NUNJI) on 15 August 2015 in which both leaders were presented in NUNJI first seminar about the concept *Fiqh al-Muwatanah*(equal citizenship for both Muslim and non-Muslims that was introduced by Ghannouchi. During the seminar, IKRAM and AMANAH, along with other pro-AMANAH NGOs, agreed that *Maqasid Shariah* is the concept of an ideal towards a more adaptable political Islamic discourse, especially in the multi-racial and multi-religion

²⁵⁷ Abdul Muhaimin Hamzah, "Malaysia Menuju Negara Rahmah, Kelab IKRAM Jordan" https://www.academia.edu/24585940/Malaysia_Menuju_Negara_Rahmah_Sebuah_Pernyataan_Identiti_IKRAM (March, 31, 2023).

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Maszlee Malik, "Rethinking the Role of Islam in Malaysian Politics: A Case Study of Parti Amanah Negara," *ICR Journal*, 8(4), 2017, p.459.

condition of Malaysia.²⁶⁰ In 2015 NUNJI event, IKRAM's president, Dr. Mohd Parid Sheik Ahmad also has presented his speech of *Fiqh al-Muwatanah*: A sharing in Buiding Up Nation as he delivered *fiqh* regarding issues that related to the citizen in a country and the relationship with the country based of the Islamic perspective and *shariah*. According to him, based on *Fiqh al-Muwatanah*, every citizen in a country have the same rights whether they are Muslim or Non-Muslim, and there is no such thing as a second or third-class citizen; even the Jews in Prophet Muhammad's era were considered as the citizens and part of the Ummah by the Prophet.²⁶¹ Second NUNJI, which was held in 2017, was also attended by the formerly IKRAM vice-President and now the vice President of AMANAH, Hasanuddin Mohd Yunus regards Maqasid Shariah as a way out and solution to the numbness of Ummah and the enthusiasm of thinking and knowledge would be formed from the culture of understanding Maqasid Shariah that was set up in AMANAH.²⁶²

On 25 October 2015, IKRAM organized the Convention of Maqasid Shariah with the theme of 'Building Up a Virtuous Malaysia Based on Maqasid Shariah.' According to the director of the convention, Hj Shahrul Aman Mohd Saari, understanding Maqasid Shariah can prevent misleading from the real objective towards the endeavor of having a *Negara Rahmah* (nation of virtues) and ensuring that the foundation of anything to be enforced should refer to Maqasid Shariah which prioritizes six elements as a purpose which are religion, life; intellect, dignity, property and environment life.²⁶³ It was reported that the convention would present Rashid Ghannouchi, but instead, Ghannouchi gave a video

²⁶⁰ Harun, A. Shukur, Himpunan ulama Progresif Serlah Keterbukaan Politik Islam, *Malaysian Insider*, 18 August 2015, <https://blog.limkitsiang.com/2015/08/18/himpunan-ulama-progresif-serlah-keterbukaan-politik-islam/> (31 March 2023).

²⁶¹ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, "Dr Parid bentang Fiqh Kewarganegaraan dalam NUNJI '15," <https://ikram.org.my/dr-parid-bentang-fiqh-kewarganegaraan-dalam-nunji-15/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁶² Hasanuddin Yunus, "NUNJI 2017," <https://www.facebook.com/ustazhasanuddin/photos/a.531629590292981/1080839802038621/?type=3&theater> (31 March 2023).

²⁶³ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, "Fahami ilmu Maqasid Syariah, bangunkan Malaysia Negara Rahmah", 23 October 2015, <https://ikram.org.my/fahami-ilmu-maqasid-syariah-bangunkan-malaysia-negara-rahmah/> (March, 31, 2023).

speech during the convention. Secretary General of the International Organisation of MB, Dr. Ibrahim Munir Mustafa, also attended the convention and delivered his speech.²⁶⁴

In 2019 Dr. Parid stated that Ikram believes that the principle of *rahmatan lil alamin* and *maqasid syariah* should be accepted by all parties regardless of political views in order to achieve the status of a prominent and advanced Islamic country that is in line with the times. The Islamic world has high hopes for Malaysia to become a modern Islamic model country that excels and prioritizes the overall welfare of the people.

Based on this *rahmatan lil alamin* approach, IKRAM proposes 12 characteristics of a merciful state that of their vision. This is to create an advanced, progressive, balanced, and blessed country that is accompanied by forgiveness from Allah SWT.

The characteristics are:

- 1) Competent and integral state leadership
- 2) An effective system of governance based on checks and balances
- 3) Good governance
- 4) Fair laws
- 5) Knowledgeable, ethical, and compassionate society
- 6) Strong family institutions
- 7) Harmonious ethnic and religious relations
- 8) Sustainable economy
- 9) Equitable distribution of wealth
- 10) Sustainable development
- 11) Welfare, health, and safety of the people are preserved
- 12) Leading efforts for global security and prosperity

Anwar Ibrahim, the PH coalition (previously known as PR coalition) advisor and unofficial leader advocating the Maqasid-approach in 2006. Due to their liked mindedness on Maqasid-approach, IKRAM then has shown an amicable relationship with

²⁶⁴ Maszlee Malik, **From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A case study of Rashid Ghannouchi's influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP**, IIUM Press, 2017.

him as IKRAM leaders have visited him several times, discussing and exchanging opinions regarding Islamic world and recent issues since he was freed from jail..²⁶⁵

3.1.5 Stand on Liberalism and Secularism

Ennahda has become a semi-secular political party with Islamic identity from the episode of calling for a separation between *da'wa* activities from political activities so that their inclusive approach would be achieved.²⁶⁶ So thus, IKRAM are seen to have a similar identity to Ennahda on the stand of secularism as they are having amicable relations with non-muslim, liberal and secular society organizations not like other mainstream Islamic NGO. Organizations like BERSIH and NEGARA-KU. NEGARA-KU is a movement of 68 NGO coalitions, including IKRAM, and mostly joined by Malaysian Chinese, liberal and secular organizations such as Seksualiti Merdeka, the LGBT(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) champion-NGO, SUARAM the demolishing Malay-privilege NGO, Sister in Islam a liberal feminist-based NGO who are banned by Department of Islamic Department Malaysia(JAKIM). NEGARA-KU's aim is to reclaim Malaysia on extremism and racism, while BERSIH is a rally that aims for a clean and well-integrated election in Malaysia. Zaid Kamaruddin, the Secretary-general of IKRAM, is one of the founders and chairperson of NEGARAKU justifies that multi-ethnic, multi-faith and multi-cultural in Malaysia is under threat, thus NEGARA-KU is a call to reclaim the nation and going back to the root of the nation which is the *Rukun Negara*, federal constitution and Malaysia agreement.²⁶⁷ IKRAM president, Dr Mohd Parid Sheikh Ahmad has also release its words refering to NEGARA-KU:

"The mobilisation and manipulation of race, ethnicity and religion have resulted in increasing intolerance, bigotry and extremism. There is also an emerging sub-culture of political violence. These are symptomatic of dangerous under-currents in our society."²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, "JKP IKRAM ziarah Anwar Ibrahim", <https://ikram.org.my/jkp-ikram-ziarah-anwar-ibrahim/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁶⁶ Maszlee Malik, *From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A case study of Rashid Ghannouchi's influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP*, IIUM Press, 2017.

²⁶⁷ Zaid Kamaruddin, "Why the Negara-Ku movement is a must, now", *Malaysia Kini*, <https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/268931> (31 March 2023).

²⁶⁸ IKRAM, "Negara-Ku: IKRAM Komited Perjuangkan Negara Yang Harmoni, Adil Dan Penuh Rahmah, 2014", <https://ikram.org.my/negara-ku-ikram-komited-perjuangkan-negara-yang-harmoni-adil-dan-penuh-rahmah/> (March, 31, 2023).

BERSIH and NEGARA-KU are chaired by Ambiga Sreenivasan, a former chief of the Malaysian Bar Council and human rights activist and the president of the National Human Rights Society(HAKAM) who is the champion of equal rights, including LGBT, freedom of religion justifying apostasy in Islam, demolishing the banned of Shiah ideology and equal rights in every race in Malaysia.

Democratic Action Party(DAP), the secular-Chinese-majority party, one of the PR coalition parties (then known as PH coalition), is attracted to Maqasid-approach brought by Anwar Ibrahim in PKR, AMANAH and IKRAM. DAP sees the application of *Hudud* law as meaningless due to the higher objective of Maqasid Shariah is not fulfilled. Lim Kit Siang, DAP advisor and long-time party supremo, describe secular as a pluralism and neutral approach towards all religion in Malaysia and not anti-Islam or atheist ideology or the typical, contrasting with the idea that PAS and UMNO brought that ISLAM be given priority position over other religions.²⁶⁹ DAP believes good governance, democracy, liberalism and human rights is in line with Islam thus DAP has like-mindedness approach as PKR, AMANAH and IKRAM.

²⁶⁹ Ibid

3.2 ISMA

3.2.1 ISMA Background

Established in 1997, Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA: Malaysian Muslim Solidarity) is an Islamic NGO that states its aim to preach the true Islam to society as well as executed programs such as human resource development, statehood, social charity, women's activism, youth, family, society and economic empowerment.²⁷⁰ It has 35 registered branches all over Malaysia with 11 overseas branches with includes Egypt, United Kingdom, New Zealand, United States, Japan, South Korea, Ireland, India, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.²⁷¹ It was reported in ISMA portal website in 2013 that its member is 10,000 people and its followers are 20,000.²⁷²

ISMA claimed itself as the forefront in upholding Malay Nationalism and Muslim rights and interests as enshrined in Malaysia's constitution in Article 3 and Article 153.²⁷³

Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.²⁷⁴ (Article 3)

It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article.²⁷⁵ (Article 153)

In their introduction book, ISMA emphasized they are upholding the right and interests of Malay Nationalism on the basis and principle of Islam in moderation and not based on obsession or ignorance. They discerned Malay Nationalism as a platform for an Islamic state and civilization the same time, rejecting *assobiyah*(racism) that cause division between Ummah.²⁷⁶ ISMA is against politics and government that possess direct or

²⁷⁰ ISMA, "Kenali ISMA", <https://isma.org.my/tentang-isma/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² ISMAWEB, "PRU13 ISMA Alternatif Kepada PAS Dan UMNO", <https://www.ismaweb.net/2013/02/17/pru13-isma-alternatif-kepada-pas-dan-umno/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁷³ Kenali ISMA, <https://isma.org.my/tentang-isma/> (March, 31, 2023)

²⁷⁴ **Malaysia's Constitution.**

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ ISMA, Kenali ISMA, <https://isma.org.my/tentang-isma/> (March, 31, 2023).

indirect foreign intervention in international capitalism that can cause hurdle to race and religion in Malaysia.²⁷⁷

3.2.2 Da'wa and *Tarbiyyah*

Amir(Leader) of ISMA and the former Women Leader of ISMA, Abdullah Zaik and Norsaleha Salleh, have written a journal titled The Empowerment of Dakwah in Malaysia through the involvement of Islamic NGOs: a case study of Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA), they explained that in Islamic da'wa, there are two approaches which are the *da'ie* (preacher) able to deliver the *da'wa* to the *mad'u* (people who got preached) which are *da'wa bil lisan* (through speech) and *da'wa bil hal* (through behaviour) are consist of seven methods of *Tarbiyyah* wick are *Usrah* sytem(family), *Katiba*(night prayers activities), *Rihlah*(physical training), *Mu'aska*(external camp), *Dawra*(Internal Camp), *Nadwa*(seminar), and *Mu'tamar* (congress).²⁷⁸ For the *da'wa bil hal*, (approach of behaviour), *qudwah hasanah*(best example) is considered as an effective method as it is an approach of 'walk the talk' and considered as the strength of ISMA activist and members.²⁷⁹

According to Norsaleha, ISMA uses the concept of *da'wa* and *tarbiyyah* of MB *da'wa* and *tarbiyyah* ideology of MB in order to achieve its objective as an Islamic movement that propagates the true Islam to Muslim and non-muslim in Malaysia.²⁸⁰ Even though ISMA have been impacted by the *da'wa* and *tarbiyyah* ideology of MB, ISMA declared that they are not affiliated and a subsidiary group of MB. Instead, utilizing the *tarbiyyah* methodology has been proven to change a personality to be *soleh*(pious) and having a vision in life.²⁸¹

ISMA organization structure has Amir as the highest position in the organization, followed by the President. Amir has the same connotation as Mursyidul Am(General

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Norsaleha Mohd Salleh, Abdullah Zaik Abd Rahman. " The Empowerment of Dakwah in Malaysia through the involvement of Islamic NGOs: a case study of Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA)," **Jurnal ILIM**, 2011.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

Guide) in MB.²⁸² In its Central Committee, there are also the Cluster of *Da'wa*, and *Tarbiyyah* exists.²⁸³

In an interview with Hassanah Nordin, an ISMA full-time officer, she mentioned the names of books that were used for the members during *Usrah*. The books are:

1) *Tafsir*: Fi Zilalil Quran by Syed Qutb

2) *Sirah*:

i) Raheq Makhtum by Safiur Rahman Mubarakpuri

ii) Fiqh Sirah-Munir Ghadhban

iii) Fiqh Sirah - Said Ramadhan Al-Buti

3) *Hadis*

i) 40 Hadis Nawawi

ii) Knowledges and Hikmahs- by Ibnu Rejab

4) *Tauhid*

i) Kitab Tauhid by Abdul Majid Aziz Az-Zindani

5) *Haraki*

i) Silsilah Fiqh dakwah by Mustafa Masyhur

ii) *Silsilah ihya' Fiqh dakwah (Al-muntalaq, Al-Masar)* by Abu Ammar

iii) Books by Fathi Yakan

iv) *Afat 'Ala Toriq* - Syed Muhammad Nuh

6) *Akhlak*- Akhlakul Muslim by Imam Al-Ghazali.²⁸⁴

²⁸² ISMAWEB, "ISMA umum Abdullah Zaik Sebagai Amir, Aminuddin Presiden", <https://www.ismaweb.net/2018/09/16/isma-umum-abdullah-zaik-sebagai-amir-aminuddin-presiden/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁸³ ISMA, Kenali ISMA, <https://isma.org.my/tentang-isma/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁸⁴ Full time ISMA's Officer, Interview Marc 20, 2023 .

It can be seen that most of the books are written by the members of MB like Syed Qutb, Fathi Yakan, Abu Ammar, and Mustafa Masyhur.

3.2.3 ISMA participation in 13th, 14th and 15th General Election

ISMA participated in Malaysia's 13th general election in 2013 using the tickets of the Islamic Congregation Front of Malaysia (Barisan Jemaah Islamiah SeMalaysia [BERJASA]). ISMA's priority is sending seven candidates to parliamentary and two state seats which these seats were contested by non-Malay candidates from mainstream parties. ISMA claimed that the main reason for the participation in the 13th general election was to regain Malay ascendancy in the areas of Malay dominance had lessened. According to Abdullah Zaik, ISMA's main reason and objective of participation which are spreading its message to Malaysian society and "Change the mindset and action of members to become more aggressive," were achieved despite the losses in all the seats contested.²⁸⁵ Ahmad Fauzi states that it could be described that ISMA participation as a separate electoral entity in the 13th general election is the mirror of the MB's experience in the Middle East. MB activist Kamal Helbawi, when interviewed by ISMA in 2011 regarding his support toward democratic politics, could be a source of encouragement for ISMA.²⁸⁶

Abdullah Zaik stated that ISMA was keen to do detailed research before deciding to take part in the contest, which included research on the political parties, non-partisan, the future of youth electorate that might not tend to support any parties but following the current issues and trends.²⁸⁷ He added that the "Unmatured politic experience towards developing political system ala Islam has invited destruction to Islam thus ISMA give the alternative political party that serves different approach in politics which emphasize the role of Malay race and Islam as religion".²⁸⁸ Aminuddin Yahya, formerly the chief of the ISMA political bureau and now president of ISMA, states that the participation of ISMA in the 13th general election is based on the situation of Malay Muslims that is facing a huge fracture amongst them; therefore a third person is needed to unify UMNO and PAS

²⁸⁵ Abdul Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi and Che Mohd Razali, Che Hamdan, **Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia: The Cases of ISMA, IRF and HTM**, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2016.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ PRU13 ISMA Alternatif Kepada PAS Dan UMNO, February 2, 2012, <https://www.ismaweb.net/2013/02/17/pru13-isma-alternatif-kepada-pas-dan-umno/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

in order to coalesce the fracture. During 13th general election PAS *tahalluf siyasi* with DAP according to Abdullah Zaik is *haram*(forbidden) since DAP is strongly against the implementation of *Hudud* and *Qisas* in the state of Kelantan and he added that the requirement of *tahalluf siyasi* is the non-muslim party is the one who accepted Islamic agenda not the other way around.²⁸⁹ Norsaleha Salleh, the former Woman Chief of ISMA wrote an article in ISMA portal website about '*Tahalluf Siyasi's Hukum and Rules*,' she stated that according to Muhammad Ahmad Rasyid', one of MB *da'wa* ideologue, The *hukum*(rule) of asking for help from a non-Muslim is *harus*(permissible) only, not compulsory(must), it is best for leaders to stay away from asking non-Muslims for help.²⁹⁰ Aznan Hassan, the member of ISMA *Ulama* Council also point out his opinion that it is such a disappointment for a Muslim who votes non-Muslim who are against Islam which maybe those who permit the election of those non-muslim thinks that even *ulama* such as Sheikh Dr Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, Sheikh Dr Abdul Karim Zaydan, Prof Dr Salam Madkur, Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Hamas etc however in reality *ulama* and this organization has underlined the prerequisite that the non-muslim candidate must obey to the implementation of Islamic law.²⁹¹

In 2018, members of BERJASA sent one candidate to a by-election in the coalition of Gagasan Sejahtera with PAS and a few parties, and they lost. However, the Gagasan Sejahtera coalition did not last long as there was no news about it, and PAS shifted to another coalition. In the 15th general election in 2022, 13 candidates of ISMA members using the BERJASA party's ticket are competing under the Gerakan Tanah Air (GTA) coalition led by Mahathir Mohammad. All of GTA's 158 competing seats, including 13 sets from BERJASA, are lost. BERJASA's trend is competing in the Malays majority area. The vision of BERJASA and ISMA is similar in terms of their 2040 vision. The increasingly bitter challenge of *da'wa* requires an Islamic organization to have a systematic, innovative direction and, at the same time, still be guided by guidance. On that basis, the Islamic movement, Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA) introduced the idea

²⁸⁹ Astro Awani, "Haram PAS kerjasama dengan DAP, kata ISMA", <http://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/haram-pas-kerjasama-dengan-dap-kata-isma-34784> (31 March, 2023).

²⁹⁰ Slogan MSIB, "Tahalluf Siyasi: Hukum & Syarat Menurut Muhamad Ahmad Rasyid (Bhg. 2)" <https://sloganmsib.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/tahaluf-siyasi-hukum-syarat-menurut-muhamad-ahmad-rasyid-bhg-2-ismaweb/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁹¹ Abdul Hamid, Ahmad Fauzi and Che Mohd Razali, Che Hamdan, p.57.

of the Islamic New Order 2121 (OBI2121) and *Malaysia Unggul*(Malaysia Superior) 2040 (MU2040) as a new element of its Islamiyah movement.²⁹² Amir of ISMA said that ‘*Malaysia Unggul 2040* (MU2040)’ is the first phase aimed at developing Malaysia into a superior country that has world-class national power and will be the site of the Islamic New Order civilization”²⁹³ He said that the two ideas have 12 characteristics or principles that cover the *Rabbani* (God-oriented); *istisyrat* *mustaqbal*(future-oriented); *syumul*(perfect); *tajdid* civilization(redefine civilization); realistic and global.²⁹⁴ He said, the idea was developed based on facts and research that made it ideal and not just empty wishful thinking.²⁹⁵ In the meantime, BERJASA's vision of 2040 is *Impian Nasional*(National Dream) 2040. It is a document that describes the characteristics of a superior and dignified Malaysia that will be used as a guide in formulating all the party's actions in the future.²⁹⁶

3.2.4 Nationalism: "Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign"

ISMA's slogan before Malaysia's 12th general election in 2008 was *Membina Generasi Harapan* (Building Aspired Generation). However, after many issues regarding political tenets and relationships with non-muslim were brought up after the general election, ISMA began to change their slogan to '*Melayu Sepakat Islam Berdaulat*' (Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign) and '*Membina Umat Beragenda*' (Building an Ummah with Agenda). The '*Melayu Sepakat Islam Berdaulat*' (Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign) was formulated to call the Malay to consent toward a vision that Islam can be sovereign in Malaysia as all Malays a Muslims. In the book 30 Questions about '*Melayu Sepakat Islam Berdaulat*' (Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign), Abdullah Zaik asserts that the slogan is launched for the "Malay to return to Islam by strengthening Malay personality towards Islamic identity, becoming unified *ummah* that possesses *risalah*(prophethood) and *ummah* that have agenda and can go out from the situation that they are facing now.”²⁹⁷

²⁹² Azrul Hakimie, Orde Baru Islam 2121, Malaysia Unggul 2040 Susuk Baharu Harakah Islamiyah ISMA, ISMAWEB, <https://ismaweb.net/2021/03/13/orde-baru-islam-2121-malaysia-unggul-2040-susuk-baharu-harakah-islamiyah1-isma/> (March, 31, 2023).

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Berjasa, “6 Teras Impian Nasional BERJASA 2040”, <https://berjasa.org.my/6-teras-impian-nasional-berjasa-2040/> (31 March 2023).

²⁹⁷ 30 soal jawab MSIB, ISMA Publication, 2012.

Another question raised from the books of 30 questions of '*Melayu Sepakat Islam Berdaulat*' (Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign) is why ISMA has a slogan that seems to have a concept of upholding Malay supremacy which people saw as irrelevant in the context of multiracial context of Malaysia. Abdullah Zaik, in reply to this question, supremacy is '*siyadah*' in, which is having a right to lead, decide and plan for the future that is not belittling other races or seeing Malay as the noblest race. Thus there is no such as oppression in that term.'²⁹⁸ The slogan is also seen as an indirect message for the party of UMNO and PAS to consent as both of the party is two largest Muslim and Malays-based parties and have a lack of consensus between both parties on Malay and Islam issues, Norsaleha Saleh justifies the '*Melayu Sepakat Islam Berdaulat*' (Malay Consensus, Islam Sovereign) is referred from Hassan Al-Banna thought on integral nationalism in Al-Banna's treatise *Majmua'ah Rasail* (The Complete Works).²⁹⁹

On 8th December 2018, Aminuddin Yahya, ISMA's president and also president of Gerakan Pembela Ummah(UMMAH-300 coalition of NGO) has had organized the anti-International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination(ICERD) tranquil rally that was attended by almost 300,000 thousand people and were supported by UMNO and PAS as both presidents of the parties were present at the rally.³⁰⁰ ICERD is the United Nation(UN) Convention that incriminates discrimination on social and race that calls upon countries to pursue a policy regarding discrimination issues. The rally was held through the PH coalition; Malaysia's government made a U-turn and decided not to sign and ratify the ICERD despite the fact that the signing is in their manifestation promise, contrary to 55 out of 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Countries(OIC) have signed the ICERD. Malaysian seventh prime minister, Dr. Mahathir, the announcement that Malaysia would not ratify ICERD reflects his stance of never being fond of obey to international conventions that might go against the current situation in Malaysia's domestic policy, which he saw Malaysia as not mature enough to commit to this kind of international Convention and mirror his stance

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Interview Norsaleha.

³⁰⁰ Syalikha Sazili, "Jumlah Peserta Bukan Kayu Pengukur", *Harian Metro*, <https://www.hmetro.com.my/mutakhir/2018/12/401877/jumlah-peserta-bukan-kayu-pengukur> (31 March 2023).

on his previous tenure from 1981 to 2003 that he strongly against ICERD. Thus it can be seen that Mahathir's stance and PH's perspective towards ICERD are opposite.³⁰¹ Both UMNO and PAS, as well as ISMA and UMMAH, assert that ICERD is threatening Islam in Malaysia and challenging Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution that giving privilege to Malay and Indigenous people of Malaysia in many aspects such as education and economy as Malay was left behind than other races, especially Chinese.

ISMA also organized five monthly campaign called *Kempen Malaysia Negara Islam*(Malaysia as Islamic State Campaign) started on 26 December 2018 in the post-anti-ICERD rally.³⁰²The campaign, as claimed by ISMA vice president Fauzi Asmuni aims to strengthen Malaysia's position as an Islamic state and will be massively mobilized at a national level throughout the country which the campaign would include lectures in mosques, art performances, dialogue sessions with significant academicians and various professionals background and many more.³⁰³ Hashtags #malaysianegaraislam (Malaysia an Islamic state) on Twitter is also widely used by ISMA members to advocate the campaign and spread the message.³⁰⁴ He also declared that, at the end of the campaign in May 2019, the accumulation of petition of one million signatures of Muslim throughout the country in supporting Malaysia as Islamic state along with the memorandum of public wish statement would be sent to the *Agong*(King) of Malaysia.³⁰⁵ ISMA has always organized events and programs that related to enhancing the nationalism spirit with Islamic touch for Malays. A program related to this is *Malam Inspirasi Pejuang*(Night Inspiration of Warrior) in September 2017, an event that aims to bolster the concept of Malaysia as an Islamic state that, from the view of history, culture, language and constitution in which, highlights the endeavour story of significant figures who struggle to construct Islamic identity, raising patriotism towards being faithful through upholding Malay language and *Jawi* script. The theme of *Bahasa Melayu Teras Tamadun*

³⁰¹ James, Chin, "Anti Icerd White Shirts Rally Race Religion Politics", *Channel News Asia*, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/malaysia-anti-icerd-white-shirts-rally-race-religion-politics-11023236> (31 March 2023).

³⁰² Indahnya Islam, "Kempen lima bulan Malaysia Negara Islam bermula hari ini", <https://www.indahnyaislam.my/kempen-lima-bulan-malaysia-negara-islam-bermula-hari-ini/> (March, 31, 2023).

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Author's experience.

³⁰⁵ Kempen lima bulan Malaysia Negara Islam bermula hari ini, <https://www.indahnyaislam.my/kempen-lima-bulan-malaysia-negara-islam-bermula-hari-ini/> (March, 31, 2023).

Bangsa (Malay Language as the core of nation civilization).³⁰⁶ Malay Islamic arts performances were presented as well as poems, rhymes and literature were read that night. Other than that, the Pertiwi Convention with themes of 'Facing the Islamic *Da'wa* Challenge in the New Era Malaysia' is a convention that gives a critical discussion to the Muslim community of Malaysia on the challenge or threat of foreign ideology, particularly liberalism.³⁰⁷ Four topics were presented at which are Tracing the History of Liberalism in Malaysia; Liberal Islam Network Indonesia: Lesson for Malaysia; State concept: Between Islam and Liberalism and Orientalist Studies in the New Malaysia Mindset. The panelist was made up of famous figures like Federal Territory Mufti, Dr. Zulkifly Muda and the widely known Malaysia's law and constitution expert, Prof Madya Dr. Shamrahayu Abd Aziz, as well as the think tank ISMA *Ulama* council member Mohd Hazizi Abd Rahman and chaired by Military Corps of Religion Malaysia Lieutenant, Colonel Haji Nazri Musman. Seven resolutions of the Convention were delivered to the Council of Rulers and to the new government.³⁰⁸

Amir of ISMA, Abdullah Zaik, in a conference titled 'Liberalism and faiths: Do they go hand-in-hand?' stated that liberalism could go hand in hand with Islam if and only if liberalism is willing to follow and obey Islamic principles, but if liberalism tries to define or reform Islam, so it is not accepted in Islam.³⁰⁹ In his speech he said, *"The West has coined the term moderate to recruit victims. They give the perception that Islam (which comes from the Quran and Sunnah) is backward, racist, bigoted and so on. Modern and advanced Islam is Islam that is aligned with liberal discipline. Many of us who want to be seen as moderate by the West are walking into that trap."*³¹⁰ He also shows a strict and stern figure in his statement on Hudud Law that non-Muslims are not entitled to challenge

³⁰⁶ ISMA Kuala Terengganu, "Malam Pejuang Tonjol Empat Tokoh Pejuang Bahasa Melayu Sebagai Model Contoh", <http://www.ismakualaterengganu.com/2017/09/malam-pejuang-tonjol-empat-tokoh.html> (March, 31, 2023).

³⁰⁷ ISMAWEB, "Konvensyen Pertiwi 2018 Kupas Bahaya Ancaman Liberalisme", <https://www.ismaweb.net/2018/11/24/1konvensyen-pertiwi-2018-kupas-bahaya-ancaman-liberalisme/> (March, 31, 2023).

³⁰⁸ Resolusi Pertiwi Kepada Kerajaan Majlis Raja-raja, November 24, 2018, <https://www.ismaweb.net/2018/11/24/serah-resolusi-pertiwi-kepada-kerajaan-majlis-raja-raja/> (March, 31, 2023).

³⁰⁹ Ideas Liberalism Conference - Liberalism and Faiths: Do They Go Hand-in-hand?, IDEAS Liberalism Conference, September 19, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FXAAih_QHAW (March, 31, 2023).

³¹⁰ Abdullah Zaik Abdul Rahman, "Menebus Kedaulatan Menjulung Peradaban - Ucapan Dasar Amir ISMA", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-3gMQKNt6k> (March, 31, 2023).

the authority of Muslims to practice Islam as the ultimate way of life within the boundaries of the nation.³¹¹

In 2018, a peaceful rally against the government on ratifying the International Convention on all form of Racial discrimination which were attended by 1.5 million Malaysian 2018; he mentioned on that day that foreign liberal democratic agenda disregard the noteworthiness of religions, particularly Islam and race as well as indigenous people, that can lead to problems in Malaysia.³¹² Vice Chairman of ISMA Religious Scholar council, Dr. Ahmad Sanusi Azmi said that liberal and secular ideology is obviously contrary to Islamic principle as Islam is the ultimate and incomparable guide to lead all aspect of human's life from small matters to governments and statehood. He quoted Dr. Yusof al-Qardawi's definition of secularism, which is, 'Indeed Secularism was born in a place which is not from Muslim place, framed for non-muslim and not for Muslim. in a condition for a non-muslim's condition, to solve a problem that does not happen to Muslim'.³¹³ He also stated that even Malaysian Government's Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) regards secularism a part of liberalism which assesses as misleading thought and ideology.³¹⁴ President of ISMA's youth wing, National Islamic Youth (PEMBINA), Azam Asri had remarked that liberal and secular's supporters have actively slacken of Malaysian identity which is according to him, Malaysia is an Islamic state base identity.³¹⁵

Abdullah Zaik, the Amir of ISMA, is a board member of the Kuala Lumpur Summit, founded in 2014 and chaired by Dr. Mahathir Mohamed. This summit is held almost every year. This is one of the examples of Muktamar. The first and second Kuala Lumpur Summits were held in Malaysia in 2014 and 2015 with the theme of 'Civil State-An

³¹¹ Malay Mail, "Shut up about hudud, ISMA warns non-Muslims", <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2014/04/04/shut-up-about-hudud-isma-warns-non-muslims/647013> (March, 31, 2023).

³¹² TV Pertiwi, "Laporan Khas Himpunan Bantah ICERD (English Subtitles)" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ejmmap3Iy8> (March, 31, 2023).

³¹³ Ahmad Sanusi Azmi, "Islam tidak memerlukan pemikiran liberal-sekular" <https://muis.org.my/2018/12/islam-tidak-memerlukan-pemikiran-liberal-sekular/> (31 March 2023)

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ ISMAWEB, "Pendukung Liberal Sekular Giat Gelapkan Identiti Negara", <https://www.ismaweb.net/2018/12/28/pendukung-liberal-sekular-giat-gelapkan-identiti-negara/> (March, 31, 2023).

Islamic Perspective' and 'The Role of Freedom and Democracy in Achieving Stability and Security.' The third and fourth were held in Khartoum, Sudan, in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2016 and 2018 with the theme of 'Good Governance and its Impact on the Achievement of the Advancement of Civilization and Democratic Transition Principles and Mechanisms.' The mission of the summit is 'to establish a permanent platform of dialogue on intellectual and civilization issues related to the reality of Muslim Ummah and its future options through a contemporary and comprehensive analysis, hence guiding the path for the activists to uphold the Islamic values, the renaissance, and the sovereignty of this Ummah'.³¹⁶ In 2019 KL Summit, Mahathir once again become prime minister and the summit becomes organized together with the government.³¹⁷ He gave example for Malaysia's experience of democracy, in which he points out that, democracy would not bring harmony and social justice if there is socio economic imbalance such as the 13 May 1969 rift of races tragedy in Malaysia and whether liberalism or Marxism version of democracy would sacrifice the interest of Malay and Islam in Malaysia. He stated that the World order would not accept absolute Islam as part of the world system order. As for 2022, KL Summit has its theme of 'Civilisational Reforms & Revivalist Endeavors In The Muslim Ummah: Foundations, Realities and Futures,' Kuala Lumpur Summit is seen focusing more on politics in Muslim countries by the theme and discussion that were brought. The board director of KL Summit is Abdullah Zaik, and he is the only one from Malaysian; this can be proved that KL Summit is one of ISMA's initiatives.

³¹⁶ KL Forum, "KL Summit's Mission", <http://kl-forum.org/?fbclid=IwAR2GzYPMp7rZb7aGWScTWmMolLwOtXCoT5kftEp2r9kmTSM0G2TdhuIq5Q#3rd> (March, 31, 2023).

³¹⁷ Malaysia Kini, "Kl Summit 2019 Not Funded By Gov't, Says Summit's Sec-gen", <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/504474> (31 March 2023).

CONCLUSION

While numerous entities sympathize, supporting and have been impacting by the Muslim Brotherhood's, others are concerned and dismayed by its growing power. Most of those who are against the Muslim Brotherhood disagree about its credibility to performing democracy or regard it as a threat to regional power. For example, due to the Muslim Brotherhood's political activism against the Wahhabi ideology and its principles of complete obedience to political leadership, Saudi Arabia framed the organization as a threat to its sovereignty.³¹⁸ Response from IKRAM toward Saudi behavior is, in 2020, IKRAM declared its disappointment at the statement of the Supreme Council of Ulama of Saudi Arabia - *Haiat Kibar al-Ulama al-Suudiyah* which declared MB as terrorists and deviant from the true teachings of Islam.³¹⁹

While ISMA stand towards Saudi can be seen through this statement, "The unity and solidarity among Muslims are undermined, while normalizing relations with Jews is reinforced," stated Prof Dr Zainur Rashid Zainuddin, the Vice President of the Islamic movement Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA), as he commented on the current situation in Saudi Arabia. This remark was made in response to Saudi Arabia's dismissal of 100 imams and preachers for failing to adhere to the government's directive to condemn the Muslim Brotherhood movement.³²⁰ The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Da'wah, and Guidance had issued instructions to all imams and preachers to criticize the Muslim Brotherhood. ISMA in its portal says that the Arab government sees the anti-monarchical ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the legitimacy of their government, most of which gained power as a result of colonialism after the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The portal added that, Saudi Arabia is believed to be cold towards the Muslim Brotherhood because this movement is fighting to restore the Islamic Sharia and cleanse the Islamic world of elements of colonialism starting from the Muslim individual, up to

³¹⁸ Mustafa Menshaway, "Sovereignty Alignment Process: Strategies of Regime Survival in Egypt, Libya and Syria," **Third World Quarterly**, 2021.

³¹⁹ Hafizuddin Abdul Mukti, Kesederhanaan dan Pendekatan Damai Ikhwanul Muslimin, <https://ikram.org.my/kesederhanaan-dan-pendekatan-damai-ikhwanul-muslimin/> (March, 31, 2023).

³²⁰ Ainul Illia, "Saudi Arabia is treacherous! Fired 100 priests, preachers The government urges the Muslim Brotherhood to be condemned, claiming it is the cause of division." <https://ismaweb.net/2020/12/19/arab-saudi-khianat-pecat-100-imam-khatib/> (March, 31, 2023).

the government.³²¹

PAS in the other hand in 2023, welcomed the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and described it as an initial step towards the unification of the Ummah and the Islamic world, said its president Abdul Hadi Awang. In fact, he said, the restoration of relations between the two countries can also strengthen the struggle to liberate the land of Palestine. "It is a very good action in an effort to bring back the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran which has been affected by the interference and deception of interested parties who take advantage of it for their own profit. "The restoration of this relationship is also expected to play an important role in stabilizing the geopolitical temperature in West Asia, especially the resolution of conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Libya, as well as being able to further strengthen the struggle to liberate the land of Palestine," he said in a media statement today.³²² Hence, these three organization will support or not supporting Saudi according to its behavior towards Muslim Brotherhood and the benefit of Ummah.

IKRAM is a moderate and progressive Islamic organization that promotes a more inclusive and pluralistic approach to Islam. It emphasizes education, social welfare, and community development and has been involved in various social and political issues in Malaysia.

ISMA is a more conservative Islamic organization that advocates for stricter implementation of Islamic law and values in Malaysia. It focuses on Islam and Malay rights issues and has been criticized for promoting divisive and intolerant views.

PAS, IKRAM and ISMA are well-known *da'wa* movements that adopt the Muslim Brotherhood ideology of *Da'wa* and *Tarbiyyah* in social sphere in Malaysia. However, all have different approaches to analyzing current political issues in Malaysia, especially concerning interactions with non-Muslims.

The two NGOs groups' priorities and approaches have always been different. However, both share the commitment to propagate Islam and campaign for adopting Islamic values

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Malaysia Kini, "PAS: Pemulihan hubungan Arab Saudi - Iran langkah awal penyatuan ummah," <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/658407>

into public policies. Due to Malaysia's fragile ethnic composition, ethnoreligious demands for more Islamic involvement in governance have always been met with opposition from Muslims of varying orientations and non-Muslim minorities.³²³ However, the positive aspect that is seen as complementing each other between ISMA and IKRAM is the firm nature that exists in the preaching approach of these two NGO bodies that can reveal a balance in firmness in holding a principle that exists in Islam.

PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) is a political party without formal affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. PAS shares some ideological and strategic similarities with the Brotherhood, such as its emphasis on Islamic governance, social justice, and grassroots mobilization. It is important to note that the Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Islamic movement with many branches, affiliates, and offshoots worldwide. Its influence and impact on other Islamic organizations can vary widely. In the case of Malaysia, while there may be some connections and similarities between the Muslim Brotherhood and IKRAM, ISMA, and PAS, it is also possible for these organizations to have their own unique identities, priorities, and agendas that are shaped by local factors and contexts. While PAS stand consists of both ISMA and IKRAM's stand but it is a shifting flow. PAS was open to having *Tahalluf Siyasi* (political partnership with non-muslim that are supporting secularism during the case) in 2014, like IKRAM, but then shifted their perspective to be more nationalist Islamists like ISMA.

By prioritizing the objectives of *Maqasid*, the second generation of Islamists has redefined not only Islamic democracy and political Islam but also the future of Islam in the socio-political context. This generation distinguishes itself from the first generation in terms of both their more comprehensive political platforms and their approach to Islam. Rather than emphasizing the implementation of Shariah law or the creation of an Islamic state, these Islamic-oriented political parties prioritize objectives such as democracy, economic prosperity, good governance, human rights, and pluralism as Islamic goals. In the context of this thesis, IKRAM has the second-generation characteristic, and ISMA has the trait of a first-generation Islamist but still upholds *Maqasid Syariah*. In comparison, PAS is agile and pragmatic in its strategy. PAS once adhered to the style of the first Islamist generation, then changed to the second generation, and currently goes

³²³ Ahmad Fauzi, p.364

back to the first generation. In the 21st century, more centrist Muslim political parties have incorporated Islamic values into their political program or Islamized specific public policies, marking the difference between an "Islamist" who seeks to make religion the ideology of the community and state and a "Muslim" who maintains their religiosity in their private life.

Stressing more on the differences in term of political environment, Egypt has experienced periods of open political contestation and repression, with the Muslim Brotherhood facing cycles of crackdowns and periods of participation in electoral politics. In Malaysia, the political environment has been characterized by dominant ruling coalitions, with the Muslim Brotherhood-impacted party, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), participating in a multi-party system. The approach to governance differs between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and PAS in Malaysia. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has traditionally aimed to attain political power and establish an Islamic state through its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party. In contrast, PAS in Malaysia adopts a gradual and pragmatic approach, prioritizing the implementation of Islamic principles within a democratic framework.

In addition to the aforementioned points, it is worth noting that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's agenda has focused on broader national issues, including resistance to authoritarian rule, social justice, and political reform. PAS in Malaysia has emphasized Islamization efforts at the state level, seeking to implement Islamic laws and promote Islamic values within the multi-religious and multicultural Malaysian society. It's important to note that these differences are not exhaustive, and both the Egyptian and PAS have evolved over time. Additionally, individual members and factions within each organization may have varying approaches and perspectives.

Looking into economic differences that faced by Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and these organizations in Malaysia, Egypt has a diverse economy with sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, services, and tourism. It faces challenges of high unemployment, income inequality, and limited economic opportunities for its growing population. Malaysia, on the other hand, has a more developed and diversified economy, with a strong manufacturing sector, significant natural resources, and a well-established services

sector. According to World Bank, Egypt unemployment rate in 2010 while Arab Spring happens is 8.8 percent while Malaysia is 3.4%. Malaysia does have quite low of unemployment rate that time but Egypt is significantly high. This is proven as the unemployment rate in a strong economy stays between 3% and 5%. Thus the rising of Muslim Brotherhood during Arab Spring is the sign that Egypt wants a trusted government to reform the economy. While in Malaysia, these organization, PAS, ISMA and IKRAM also concerned about the economy of Malaysia but does not necessarily in need of urgent reforming like Egypt.

When it comes to economic policies, Egypt has gone through phases of economic reform and liberalization, but it has also faced economic instability and extreme poverty. In its economic platforms, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has emphasized social justice, income redistribution, and aiding marginalized communities. In Malaysia, the government has implemented various economic policies, including affirmative action programs that prioritize the socio-economic advancement of ethnic Malays, which may have impacted the economic perspectives of these three organizations. As ISMA and PAS seems to support this policy absolutely while IKRAM seems to be sympathizes non-Malays who want to develop this policy so that it is equal to all races.

Regarding international relations and trade, Egypt has a long history of contributing significantly to regional and global affairs in terms of international relations and trade, luring in foreign capital and business. Its economic linkages have been shaped by its geopolitical position and close ties to major world powers. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region is one where Malaysia, on the other hand, has actively pursued an economic foreign policy. Global trade networks have benefited its export-driven economy.

Economic circumstances and inequalities have the potential to influence political dynamics and shape the attractiveness of various ideologies. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has gained support from segments of the population facing economic difficulties, thanks to its focus on social welfare programs and pursuit of economic justice. In Malaysia, the Muslim Brotherhood's stance on economic matters has been influenced by the socio-economic policies of the ruling government and the presence of other political parties.

In general, PAS, IKRAM, and ISMA have employed the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, particularly in the domains of *Da'wa* (Islamic outreach) and *Tarbiyyah* (education), with the aim of realizing their respective societal objectives. These objectives primarily revolve around fostering a Muslim community that upholds moral integrity and adheres to Islamic principles. Nevertheless, notable variations emerge in their political stances due to divergent interpretations and perspectives.



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