

**T.C
GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF RADIO, TELEVISION AND CINEMA**

**MEDIA, NATIONALISM AND VIOLENCE:
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF A NEWS
ABOUT “OTHERS”**

MASTER THESIS

Beyza KARAYEL YEŞİLBAŞ

Supervisor: Doç. Dr. Serhat GÜNEY

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TABLE CONTENT

	Page No.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	vi
RESUME.....	vii
ABSTRACT	xiv
 ÖZET.....	 xx
 INTRODUCTION.....	 1
 CHAPTER 1: NATIONALISM AND THEORIES OF NATIONALISM.....	 4
1- Nationalism.....	4
1.1 Definition of Nation	6
1.2 Birth of Nationalism.....	7
2- Theories of Nationalism.....	10
2.1 Primordialist Approaches.....	10
2.2 Modernist Approaches	13
2.2.1. Tom Nairn and “Uneven Development”	14
2.2.2 Hobsbawm and “invented tradition”	15
2.2.3. Gellner and “High Cultures”	16
2.2.4 Benedict Anderson and “Imagined Community”	19
2.3 Ethno-symbolist Approach and Anthony Smith	22
 3- The Media in Theories of Nationalism	 26

CHAPTER 2: MEDIA, IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE.....	31
2.1. A Brief History of The Media	31
2.2. Concept of the ideology	36
2.2.1 Ideology and Discourse.....	44
2.2.2. Ideology on the Media Studies.....	47
2.2.3. News Discourse.....	49
2.2.4. Nationalist Discourse and the Media	50
2.2.4.1 Reproduction of Nationalist Discourse on the Media	54
CHAPTER 3: VIOLENCE AND NATIONALISM ON THE MEDIA	58
3.1 Debates on Violence	58
3.2 Violence and Power Dynamics	59
3.3 Nationalism, Violence and Their Representation in Media	63
3.3.1 Media and Violence	64
3.3.2 Violence, Media and “Others”	65
3.4 Nationalism and Violence in The Turkish Media (Samples).....	70
CHAPTER 4: A CASE STUDY OF THE NEWS ABOUT WOMEN “VILLAGE GUARD” ON TEN MOST CLICKED NEWS WEBSITES	74
4. 1 The Selection of the Case Study and the Research Question.....	75
4.2 Methodology: Teun A. Van Dijk and Critical Discourse Analysis	76
4.3 Historical Background	81
4.3.1 The Construction of “National Identity” in Early Republic Period	81
4.3.2 The Changing Climate of Nationalism in Turkey and Kurds ...	87
4.3.3 Operation and History of The “Village Guard” System	94
4.4 Macro and Micro Analysis of the Case Study	99
4.4.1 Macro Structure: Themathic and Schematic Analysis	99
4.4.1.1 Thematic Structural Analysis.....	99
4.4.1.1.1 Headlines.....	100
4.4.1.1.2 Leads	102

4.4.1.1.3 Photographs.....	105
4.4.1.2 Schematic Analysis	105
4.4.1.2.1 Main Events and Consequences.....	106
4.4.1.2.2 Context and History	108
4.4.1.2.3 Verbal Reactions, Evaluations, Expectations	109
4.4.2 Micro Structure Analysis	110
4.4.2.1 “Good citizens” or “Agreeable Citizens”	110
4.4.2.2 “Motherhood” and “Womenhood”	111
4.4.2.3 Militarism and “Army-Nation”	114
4.4.2.4 “Homeland”: Geographical Definition of “Us”	115
CONCLUSIONS.....	118
APPENDIXES	123
Appendix 1	123
Appendix 2	141
REFERENCES	162
CIRRICULUM VITAE.....	172

ABBREVIATIONS

- AA** : Anadolu Agency
AKP : Justice and Development Party
APA : American Psychological Association
CDA : Critical Discourse Analysis
DP : Democratic Party
PKK : Kurdistan Worker's Party

RESUME

A partir du postulat que les médias traditionnels reproduisent le discours nationaliste et, là où le nationalisme incite le racisme, incitent à la violence envers « l'Autre », la thèse suivante, intitulée « Médias, Nationalisme et Violence : une analyse de discours critique sur les nouvelles concernant l'Altérité », porte sur la question de savoir si les sites Internet d'information reproduisent le même discours nationaliste.

Une nouvelle, qui a fait la Une de 9 sites d'information sur les 10 sites les plus visités, accessibles sur le portail de l'agence de presse nationale Agence Anadolu a été analysée en utilisant « l'Analyse critique de Discours » du chercheur Teun A. Van Dijk.

Avant de détailler l'analyse, le concept de nationalisme, le nationalisme comme discours et sa relation avec la violence furent théoriquement creusés.

S'il est courant de penser que, avec l'impact de la globalisation, les développements dans les champs politique, économique et culturel ont poussé à une modification du modèle de l'Etat-nation, il est évident que la localisation, née d'une réaction à la globalisation, préserve la notion de nationalisme dans l'agenda. Dans l'ère globale, là où le modèle d'Etat-nation est sur le déclin, l'identité nationale peut s'accroître en défense et pourrait même évoluer à un niveau agressif de racisme. La globalisation contient en elle-même ce type de dialectique. Donc, il est nécessaire de parler d'une nouvelle forme d'articulation du nationalisme et non pas de sa disparition. Il est possible de voir les indices de cette articulation non seulement dans le sens théorique, mais également dans le nouveau climat du nationalisme turc d'aujourd'hui. Dans cette articulation, que certains qualifient « le nouveau racisme », même s'il n'est pas question de racisme biologique ou de violence explicite, il est possible de parler d'une violence discursive ou symbolique. Les médias de communication de masse jouent un rôle important dans cette évolution.

Avant d'évoquer le discours nationaliste reproduit à travers les médias, il est judicieux d'étudier la création du nationalisme et les théories qui en traitent.

Pour définir ce qu'est le nationalisme, nous avons tout d'abord besoin de définir ce qu'est une nation. Ces notions sont assez contradictoires. Cependant aujourd'hui, en général, l'entité d'un territoire avec des frontières immuables, une langue commune, les symboles de la nation, les coutumes communes, les traditions, la culture écrite, les sentiments de croyance envers la nation et l'amour et le dévouement pour une patrie, ainsi que la définition d'une identité qui la distingue des autres nations ou sociétés, sont les principaux éléments qui constituent une nation.

La question de où et comment le nationalisme est né est discutable. Même si en général on attribut cette notion au « modernisme », il existe également des idéologies et des discours qui prônent que les communautés étaient divisées en des formes de nations/sociétés depuis la préhistoire. En fait, cela peut être considéré comme les deux faces du débat sur le nationalisme ; le premier étant l’assertion que les nations ont émergé après la modernité et qu’elles sont, comme formulé par Benedict Anderson, « des communautés imaginaires », tandis que le deuxième souligne que tous les hommes sont issus d’une nation et de son identité, tout comme ils sont issus d’une certaine famille ou d’un certain sexe. C’est d’ailleurs cette dualité qui est à la base de la différence entre le nationalisme territorial et le nationalisme ethnique. L’amour d’une nation qui considère que tous les citoyens qui vivent sur la même terre sont égaux et la notion d’un nationalisme qui nécessite une unité de sang/race sont les deux facettes de ces deux pôles. La différence se manifeste également dans les théories portant sur le nationalisme ; c’est-à-dire, l’approche primordialiste, traitant la notion de nation comme la continuité qui n’a pas changé depuis l’éternité, du commencement de l’Histoire jusqu’à nos jours, et l’approche moderniste selon laquelle les nations sont le produit de la modernisation et sont construites pas l’idéologie nationaliste.

Les théoriciens modernistes tels Gellner, Hobsbawm et Anderson, Nairnn Hechter, Breuilly, Brass et Hrochm, qui portent un regard convergent sur le sujet, traitent le nationalisme comme une notion qui appartient à la modernité, tout comme le capitalisme, la laïcité et l’état moderne bureaucratique. Parmi ces théoriciens, Benedict Anderson est celui qui implique le plus les médias et ce, de manière la plus efficace. Selon Anderson, la nation est « une communauté politique imaginaire » Pour le chercheur, le fait que les certitudes religieuses sont révolues et que les communautés religieuses ont failli à leur réputation au 18^e siècle—de même que la chute des royaumes dynastiques dès le 17^e siècle—sont preuves d’une mutation dans les systèmes politiques et culturels. « Le capitalisme d’imprimerie » a joué un rôle considérable dans la transition vers un état moderne. Le capitalisme d’imprimerie a remplacé les langages sacrés et a créé un sens commun du temps et de l’espace par le biais des journaux et de la fiction dans la formation d’un conscient national. Les journaux rendent possible une « cérémonie de masse » extraordinaire. Nous avons tendance à croire que des millions de gens qui nous sont inconnus font simultanément partie de cette cérémonie. C’est ainsi que l’imaginaire d’une grande communauté devient possible.

Le rôle des médias dans non seulement l’imaginaire d’une « nation », mais également dans sa reproduction discursive est incontestable. Les technologies Internet qui sont de plus en plus pointues sont à l’origine des modifications structurelles des médias. En tant que medium qui permet une participation massive, si Internet rend l’usager créateur de contenu, il a également le potentiel de produire un contre-discours alternatif au discours dominant. Cela étant dit, il ne faut pas oublier que le contenu de ce médium est indépendant de l’idéologie dominante, du pouvoir et des notions de discours d’une quiconque société.

Sur la notion de l’idéologie, il est clair que Marx nous a légué un champ riche en rhétorique. Pour lui, l’idéologie est une réalité déformée qui est définie par les relations matérielles dominantes. Idéologie est la version inverse de la réalité matérielle. Selon Marx, la classe dominante qui contrôle les outils de productions contrôle également les outils idéologiques. Les idées dominantes représentant les

intérêts objectifs de la classe dominante deviennent également les idées dominantes de la société. La notion d'idéologie de Marx se trouve dans le côté où l'état du sujet est considéré passif et inactif. Par contre, Gramsci, au lieu de souligner le pouvoir coercitif de l'état, ouvre la voie à de nouvelles recherches avec sa notion « d'hégémonie ». Celle-ci nous montre les attributs que nous fabriquons dans nos esprits et qui sont fondés sur le consentement. Louis Althusser explique un processus comparable en établissant le pouvoir de la classe dominante sur des mécanismes répressifs et des mécanismes idéologiques. Les médias sont « le mécanisme idéologique de l'état ».

La reproduction des idéologies et leur usage dans la vie quotidienne se fait à travers le discours. La plupart de nos discours sont l'expression de nos opinions qui prennent leur source dans nos idéologies. Selon Van Dijk, les médias de communication de masse sont ceux où les idéologies dominantes et les discours dominant sont le plus souvent reproduits.

Foucault souligne également le lien entre le discours, l'idéologie et le pouvoir. Le philosophe s'oppose à l'approche marxiste qui pose le pouvoir comme une extension des relations économiques et où le pouvoir étatique est le seul pouvoir. Il suggère plutôt que le langage/discours est un champ de bataille. Les discours ne sont pas tous soumis au pouvoir. De temps à autre, un point de résistance et un point de départ émanant d'une stratégie d'opposition sont possibles. Comme proposé par Van Dijk, l'idéologie ne légitime pas toujours le statu quo. Des anti-idéologies et le potentiel de produire des contre-discours existent toujours dans les sociétés.

Les nouvelles sont également une forme de discours. Elles contiennent l'idéologie dominante et sont presque la « reproduction » des mots qui ont été répétés maintes fois ou qui sont issus de textes similaires. Le discours nationaliste ne peut que se préserver dans le champ populaire et en étant reproduit dans la vie quotidienne. Il ne suffit donc pas qu'une communauté soit « imaginaire » ; les nations imaginaires doivent constamment se rappeler de leur propre existence. Dans ce sens, les médias sont un outil de préserver le nationalisme en reproduisant ce discours. Les médias jouent un rôle important dans la popularisation du nationalisme, répété sans cesse dans la routine quotidienne, et dont Michael Billig appelle le « nationalisme banal ».

L'aspect le plus important du discours nationaliste est dans sa capacité de faire vivre la différence entre le « nous » et « l'autre ». L'identité du « nous » nécessite d'utiliser ce qu'il n'est pas pour se définir. Nous ne pouvons définir ce qu'est le « nous » sans « l'autre ». Les produits médiatiques, en tant que « structures textuelles », sont également fondés sur la reconnaissance de la différence entre nous et les autres. C'est pour cela que le discours médiatique naturalise cette distinction sans avoir besoin d'utiliser les mots « nous » et « l'autre ». Dans une série de recherche sur l'analyse de discours qu'il a mené, Van Dijk (1988) conclut que les minorités, les réfugiés, les squatters, ainsi que les pays du Tiers Monde et leurs habitants sont représentés en contraste avec la représentation de groupes et nations puissants.

La violence se manifeste à chaque fois qu'il existe des minorités ou des groupes exclus de la définition du « nous » de l'identité nationale, elle-même basé sur une histoire, un objectif, une idée ou des symboles communs. Ceux qui sont

exclus de la définition du « nous » de l'identité nationale, notamment les groupes ethniques, les minorités, les réfugiés et les groupes de confession différente, sont définis comme « les autres » et sont déclarés comme ennemis. Cela crée un sentiment de violence envers eux dans la société qui les abrite. Les médias de communication de masse sont les outils les plus communs de la reproduction de cette définition.

Avec sa théorie de « bio-pouvoir », Foucault prône que la violence physique a disparue dans l'ère moderne et que le nouveau pouvoir est là pour prolonger la longévité, multiplier les opportunités et diminuer le mal causé par les dangers vitaux. Cependant, il poursuit en soulignant que cette situation ne veut pas dire que le racisme (impérativement accentué par le nationalisme) et la violence disparaîtront dans le présent. Le pouvoir positionne les groupes composant une population comme supérieur ou inférieur. Pendant que les genres inférieurs disparaissent, ceux qui sont considérés comme des individus anormaux vont également disparaître et la population sera saine, pure et de longue vie. C'est-à-dire, ce qui rend la vie plus saine et pure nécessite la mort de l'inférieur, donc de "l'autre."

La notion que Van Dijk appelle le « nouveau racisme » souligne directement cette forme "symbolique" et "discursive" de la violence. Le nouveau racisme, comme le vieux, retient sa violence affichée et est discursive. Les médias de communication de masse se servent de cette violence discursive et le rend « normal » et "naturel" dans la société.

Dans le contexte théorique que nous avons tenté de résumer ci-dessus, l'Analyse Critique de Discours d'une nouvelle qui a été diffusée simultanément sur 9 sites d'information constitue l'analyse de cas de ce mémoire. La méthode de Van Dijk fournit un cadre fonctionnel sur les sujets des médias, du discours et du racisme et convient tout à fait à notre recherche. La nouvelle concernant les « gardes féminines qui ont servi à Tunceli » fut diffusée par l'agence étatique Agence Anadolu et a été reproduite sur 9 des 10 sites d'information les plus visités. Dans cette recherche, nous tenterons de faire une micro et macro analyse de la manière dont cette nouvelle fut couverte à la Une de chaque site d'information dans la totalité des textes de nouvelles sur le même site.

La contribution que vise ce mémoire est de donner des pistes à la problématique suivante : La nouvelle génération de journalisme, fortement usagère d'Internet, est-elle plus libre, et surtout, s'oppose-t-elle au discours nationaliste et raciste qui légitime parfois la violence reproduite par les médias concernant tous ceux qui sont exclus de l'identité nationale en Turquie, notamment les Kurdes, les Arméniens, les Juifs, les Roms, les Alévis, les féministes et les groupe LGBT, en portant ou pas le potentiel de reproduire un contre-discours.

Avant de détailler les résultats de l'analyse, il semblerait judicieux de scruter la dimension contextuelle du sujet, tout autant que sa dimension textuelle, comme le suggère Van Dijk. Étant donné le cadre politique et historique des nouvelles qui font l'objet de ce mémoire, il est important de revisiter des sujets tels le processus de formation du nationalisme turc, des nationalismes qui ont évolué jusqu'à nos jours, l'identité nationale et le peuple Kurde.

L'émergence du nationalisme turc commence dès la modernisation de l'Empire ottoman au 19^e siècle et la construction de l'identité nationale turque fut « construite » pendant la première période de la République. L'Empire ottoman était constitué de différents groupes ethniques, sans pouvoir développer une quelconque appartenance nationale. Donc, l'objectif principal du « Projet de modernisation kémaliste » fut de permettre la transition d'une communauté où la religion était déterminante, à une société laïque où la nation serait prédominante. Ce projet rejetait les identités ethniques et la diversité, abandonnait l'identité Islamique/Ottomane, visait à créer une nation homogène composée de citoyens multinationaux, refusait ou assimilait la diversité et avait une essence formelle et monolithique. Alors que « l'autre » du nationalisme turc était au départ l'Islam et le passé ottoman, ces groupes ont connu une mutation au fil du temps. Les minorités non-musulmanes, les communistes et les progressistes sont devenus les groupes distincts de l'altérité dans cette atmosphère politique de mutation du nationalisme turc. La question kurde, qui s'aggrave dans les années 1990, a produit un discours nationaliste exclusiviste et chauvin. Depuis la fondation de la République, les Kurdes furent exposés tour à tour à des pratiques d'assimilation ou de discrimination. Presque toujours, la question kurde a été perçue comme un problème de sécurité nationale et les Kurdes furent représentés dans la société, ainsi que dans les médias avec la distinction de « bon Kurde/mauvais Kurde ».

Malgré son caractère variable selon la période, le nationalisme turc demeure essentiellement figé dans le cadre « d'une perception d'un danger interne » et « d'une anxiété perpétuelle ».

Le système de garde relaté dans les nouvelles, qui constitue notre étude de cas, est celui d'un système de « garde villageois temporaire ». Ce système constitue un mécanisme où les civils, armés par l'Etat dans les régions à forte densité de population kurde, sont utilisés comme éléments de la sécurité interne.

Dans macros et micros analyses, nous constatons que des textes et photos semblables sont utilisés sur les 9 sites, et des sens similaires sont utilisés. Ce qui fait du sujet « une nouvelle » n'est donc pas le système de garde, qui est déjà présent depuis longtemps ; mais c'est plutôt le fait que ce sont des « femmes » qui sont désignées comme gardes qui donne la valeur journalistique de ce sujet sur tous les sites d'information scrutés.

Dans tous les titres et textes de news, les thèmes comme « mère » et « femme » se font distinguer. Par exemple, la signification de la femme portant ses enfants dans ses bras dans la phrase « enfants dans les bras, Kalash(nikovs) sur les épaules ! », souligne le fait que ces femmes sont des « mères » ; ou encore, la phrase qui commence avec « Mme Turkan à la maison... » dénote une mère et femme au foyer. Dans les nouvelles, en même temps que son rôle de mère, une qualité héroïque est attribuée aux « femmes ». Elles deviennent des héroïnes à travers la glorification de la « maternité » et du devoir de « défendre sa patrie ».

Les femmes, en leur qualité de reproductrices « biologiques, culturelles et symboliques » des nations ont été incluses au discours nationaliste en tant que éleveuse d'enfant (des générations futures), ainsi que, en tant que « mères de la nation » de manière symbolique. Le discours nationaliste est étroitement lié aux

problèmes de genre et rappel qu'une analogie entre famille et nation est toujours déduite dans ce discours.

Dans toutes les nouvelles, les femmes sont présentées de manière étroitement liée à des mots qui ont une connotation militariste et qui sont en rapport avec les mots « armes », « montagne », « garde-forestier », « keleş » (kalash) ou encore « Kalashnikov », et apparaissent en uniforme militaire dans toutes les photos. Alors que ceux qui sont directement liés au militarisme sont les hommes, puisqu'il y a le service militaire obligatoire, on attribue aux femmes la maternité sacrée (surtout puisqu'elles sont mères de soldat) ou alors, exceptionnellement, elles ont la tâche de « belligérance ». Dans les nouvelles que nous traitons, il y a insinuation d'une situation « extraordinaire », qui nécessite la participation de « même » les femmes dans un combat. Alimentant le nationalisme turc, le « syndrome de perpétuité » et la perception de la « menace de l'intérieur » sont à la base de cette situation extraordinaire qui n'est jamais exprimé avec des mots. Les mots utilisés dans les nouvelles, tels le patriotisme, la bravoure et le devoir font partie intégrante du discours nationaliste et militariste. Ainsi, l'usage de la violence sera légitimé. Agir pour la nation rend légitime plusieurs discours, qui, normalement devront être considérés comme des actes criminels, et celui-ci réunit les caractéristiques les plus importants du discours nationaliste.

Dans les nouvelles, au lieu de faire un impact ethnique, la dualité de « l'ennemi » et de la « société civile » qui défend la « patrie » contre l'ennemi, est accentuée. Si l'image d'un « ennemi » portant une identité inconnue représente « l'altérité », le « nous » est défini comme les femmes qui soignent leurs foyers et défendent en même temps leurs villages contre « l'ennemi ». « L'ennemi/autre » n'est pas défini comme groupe, mais, au contraire, sur plusieurs sites, des mots tels « terreur » et « lutte contre le terrorisme » sont employés. Ainsi, la question kurde qui perdure dans le pays est présentée comme une question de « sécurité » du pays-même, plutôt qu'une question de droits des citoyens kurdes.

Une part de terrain devient la définition la plus concrète du « nous » avec des frontières géographiques fixes, ou encore, le mot « patrie » (ou « patriote ») surgit dans les nouvelles comme l'un des mots les plus caractéristiques du discours nationaliste. À l'opposé de la perception que les frontières deviennent de plus en plus incertaines grâce à la globalisation, la « patrie » demeure un « ensemble indivisible ».

Pour conclure, les sites d'information qui font l'objet de cette étude reproduisent, tout comme les médias traditionnels, un discours nationaliste. Bien au contraire, ils reproduisent l'idéologie dominante ainsi que le discours nationaliste officiel. Certains des sites d'information sur Internet, tel le site hurriyet.com.tr, milliyet.com.tr, haberturk.com et sabah.com.tr, sont des filiales de grandes sociétés privées qui sont propriétaires de plusieurs organes de médias. Même si leur appartenance structurelle ne peuvent pas être entièrement libre dans la production journalistique, les sites ensonhaber.com, haberler.com, gazetevatan.com.tr, haber7.com et internethaber.com, qui sont relativement plus libres, utilisent également les nouvelles de la même manière. Le discours portant l'idéologie dominante véhiculé par l'agence de presse étatique, l'Agence Anadolu, est reproduit dans chacun des sites tel quel. Sur les 10 sites d'information les plus visités, seul ntvmsnbc.com n'a pas fait passer la dite nouvelle. Ce cas est un choix éditorial

propre à cette nouvelle est ne change donc pas le résultat général.

Mots-Clés: Nationalisme, Nationalisme turc, Discours nationaliste, Médias, Violence, Infos en ligne, Analyse de discours critique, Altérité

ABSTRACT

The subject of this thesis, *Media, Nationalism and Violence: A Critical Discourse Analysis of a News About "Others"* is the question of whether or not Internet news sites produce the same nationalist discourse as the conventional media, following from the assumption that the conventional media produces the nationalist discourse once again and instigates violence against the "other" to the point of turning nationalism into racism.

A news that has been served by the state's news agency, Anadolu Agency and has appeared as a main page headline on 9 of the most clicked 10 news sites,¹ as well as the way this news has been covered, is analyzed with Teun A. Van Dijk's "Critical Discourse Analysis".

Before the analysis, the notion of nationalism, nationalism as a discourse and its relation with violence were theoretically studied.

Although it is believed that in this century, with the impact of globalization the developments in the political, economic and cultural fields have urged the nation-state model to undergo changes, it is undeniable that localization, which has risen as a reaction to globalization, has kept the notion of nationalism on the agenda. In the global era, while the nation-state model begins to fall into decline, national identity may rise as a defense and it could even shift towards an aggressive level of racism. Therefore, one must speak of a new articulation of nationalism and not of its disappearance. It is possible to see the signs of this articulation both in the theoretical sense and in today's changing climate of Turkish nationalism. In this articulation, which some calls "new racism", biological racism or explicit violence may not be mentioned and yet, one could speak of a discursive or symbolic violence. Mass communication mediums play a great role in this.

Before touching on the nationalist discourse, which is reproduced through media, one must study the formation of nationalism and theories of nationalism.

In order to define nationalism, we will firstly need a definition of nation. These notions are quite controversial. However, today broadly speaking, entity of land with set borders, common language, symbols belonging to a nation, common customs, traditions, written culture, feelings such as belief in the nation as well as love and dedication for it and definition of an identity which distinguishes it from other nations or societies, come across as elements that fundamentally constitute a nation.

The issue of where and how nationalism came about is disputable. Although according to the general view this notion belongs to "modernity", there are also ideologies and discourses claiming that communities were divided into certain nations/societies since prehistory. In fact, this could be regarded as two sides of the debates on nationalism. First of them is the assertion that nations emerged after

¹ **IAB** According to the data of January 2013 of the Turkey Internet Computation Research. <http://www.iabturkiye.org/>

modernity and that they are, as Benedict Anderson puts it, “imagined communities”, whereas the other is the thought that all humans were born to a nation and with its identity just like innately having a family or gender. The distinction of territorial and ethnicity based nationalism essentially arises from this duality. Love for a nation, which regards all citizens living on the same lands as equals, and the understanding of nationalism that requires a unity of blood/race, are considered to be the two poles of these two sides. This distinction manifests itself in the theories of nationalism as well; the primordialist approach, which treats the notion of nation as a continuity that hasn’t changed since an eternal time, from the beginning of history until today, and the modernist approach according to which nations are products of modernization and are constructed by the nationalist ideology.

The modernist theoreticians such as Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson, Nairn, Hechter, Breuilly, Brass and Hroch, who have a common approach to the matter, treat nationalism as a notion that belongs to modernity like capitalism, secularism and modern bureaucratic state. Amongst these theoreticians, Benedict Anderson is the thinker who includes media the most and in the most efficient way. According to Anderson, nation “*is an imagined political community*”. For him, the fact that religious certainties were overcome and religious communities lost reputation in the 18th century as well as dynastic realms starting to fall from the 17th century not only indicate to the political but also the changing cultural systems. “Print capitalism” has played a great role in the transition to the modern state. Print capitalism has taken the place of sacred languages and created a common sense of time and space by means of newspaper and novel to create a national conscious. Newspaper makes an extraordinary “mass ceremony” possible. We tend to believe that millions of people whom we don’t know simultaneously take part in a ceremony. This way, the imagination of a great community becomes possible.

It is unquestionable that media plays a big part in both in the imagination of a “nation” and in its discursive reproduction. The rapidly improving Internet technologies of today have caused media to undergo structural changes. Internet, as a medium that allows bigger participation, makes the user at the same time a content maker and has the potential to produce a counter discourse as an alternative to the dominant discourse. Despite of this, one mustn’t forget that the content in this medium is not independent of the dominant ideology, power and notions of discourse in a society.

Marx has undoubtedly left us a rich theoretical field of debate regarding the notion of ideology. For him, ideology is a distorted reality that is defined by the dominant material relations. Ideology is the inverted version of material reality. According to Marx, the dominant class that controls the tools of production also controls the ideological tools. The dominant ideas that represent the objective interests of the dominant class become the dominant ideas of the society as well. Marx’s notion of ideology is on the side where the state of the subject is regarded passive and inactive. Gramsci, on the other hand, rather than stressing the coercive power of the state, with his notion of “hegemony” has paved the way for analyses, which highlight its attributes that are constructed in our minds and are based on consent. Louis Althusser explains a similar process with the establishment of the power of the dominant class by means of repressive apparatuses and ideological apparatuses. Media is the “ideological apparatus of the state”.

The reproduction of ideologies and their use in everyday life is realized through discourse. Most of our discourses express our ideology-based opinions. According to Van Dijk, foremost among the mediums whereby dominant ideologies and dominant discourses are reproduced is the mass communication mediums.

Foucault also has underscored the link between discourse, ideology and power. The thinker disagrees with the view that power is an extension of economic relations and that the state power is the only power, as suggested by the Marxist theory. In his view, language/discourse is a field of struggle. Discourses do not constantly submit to power. At times, there could be a resisting point and a starting point for an opposing strategy. As Van Dijk points out, ideology may not always legitimize the status quo. Anti-ideologies and the potential of producing counter discourses always exist in societies.

News, as well, is a form of discourse. It contains within itself the dominant ideology and is almost the “reproduction” of words that have been countless repeated or of similar texts. The nationalist discourse could only maintain itself in the popular field and by being reproduced in the daily life. It is not sufficient that a community is “imagined”; the imagined nations should always remind themselves of their existence. In this sense, media is a tool to sustain nationalism by reproducing this discourse. Media plays an important role in the popularization of nationalism that is repeated countless in the daily routines which is what Michael Billig calls “banal nationalism”.

The most significant characteristic of the nationalist discourse is that it constantly keeps the distinction of “us” and “other” alive. The identity of “us” needs to use what it is not, in order define itself. We cannot define who “us” is or isn’t without the “other”. Media products, as “textual structures”, are also founded on recognizing the distinction of us and others. For this reason, the media discourse naturalizes this distinction without having the need to use the words “us” and “other”. In a series of discourse analysis studies that he has conducted, Van Dijk (1988) has reached the conclusion that minorities, refugees, squatters as well as the Third World countries and people are portrayed in contrast with the presentation of powerful groups and nations.

Violence makes itself present whenever there are minorities or groups excluded from national identity’s definition of “us”. Those who are excluded from national identity’s definition of “us”, which is based on a common history, goal, idea or symbols, such as ethnic groups, minorities, refugees and different religious groups are defined as the “others” and declared as enemies which creates a feeling of violence towards them within a society. Foremost among the mediums whereby this definition is recreated is mass communication mediums.

With his theory of “bio-power”, Foucault argues that physical violence has disappeared in the modern era and that the new power is established to expand the length of life, increase opportunities and to lessen harms caused by vital hazards. However, he states that this situation does not mean that racism (imperatively articulated with nationalism) and violence will disappear at the present time. Power, positions groups within a population as superior or inferior. As the inferior types disappear, those who are considered abnormal individuals will also disappear and the

population will be healthy, pure and long lasting. In other words, what will render life healthier and pure requires the death of the inferior, that is to say the “other”.

The notion that Van Dijk calls “new racism”, points right at this “symbolic” and “discursive” form of violence. New racism, unlike old racism, abstains from open violence and is discursive. Mass communication mediums use this this discursive violence and, make it “normal” and “natural” in the society.

Within the theoretical framework, which we tried to sum up above, the Critical Discourse Analysis of a news that was simultaneously featured on 9 news sites, will constitute the case study of this thesis. Van Dijk’s method, which provides a functional framework on the subjects of media, discourse and racism, is profoundly suitable for our study. The news about the “Female ‘guards’ who serve in Tunceli” was served by the state owned Anadolu Agency and has appeared on 9 of the most clicked 10 news sites. In this study, macro and micro analyses of the way this news was covered as the main page headline on each news site and the whole of the news text have been made.

Whether the new generation journalism, which uses the Internet technology, is relatively freer and is opposed to the nationalist, racist discourse that at times legitimizes violence reproduced by the media about those are excluded in the definition of national identity in Turkey such as Kurds, Armenians, Jews, gypsies, Alewis, feminist groups as well as LGBTTs and so on, carries or not the potential of producing a counter discourse is the most important question that this thesis aims to contribute to.

Before moving on to the results of the analysis, one must examine the contextual dimension of the matter as much as its textual dimension as Van Dijk suggests. When we look at the political and historical background of the news that we will deal with, issues such as the formation process of the Turkish nationalism, nationalisms which have evolved from the past until today, the national identity as well as the Kurdish people become prominent.

The emergence of the Turkish nationalism has begun with the modernization of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and the Turkish national identity has been “constructed” during the first period of the Republic. The Ottoman Empire had consisted of different ethnic groups and hasn’t been able to develop any sort of national belongingness. Therefore, the most important goal of the “Kemalist modernity project” has been to transition from a community whereby religion prevailed to a modern, secular society whereby the nation would prevail. This project ostracized ethnic identities and diversities, abandoned the Islamic/Ottoman identity, aimed to create a homogenous nation from multinational citizens, denied or assimilated diversities and had a formal and monolithic essence. While the “other” of the Turkish nationalism was initially Islam and the Ottoman past, these groups have been changing from time to time. Non-Muslim minorities, communists and leftists have been the most distinctive “other” groups in the changing political atmosphere of Turkish nationalism. The Kurdish issue that intensified in the 1990’s has lead to an exclusivist and chauvinistic nationalism discourse. Since the establishment of the Republic, Kurds have been exposed to at times assimilative, at other times discriminative practices. Almost all the while, the Kurdish issue has been perceived

as a matter of internal security and Kurds have been represented in the society as well as in media with the distinction of “good Kurds/bad Kurds”.

Despite its characteristics that change in every era, Turkish nationalism still remains broadly within the frame of “perception of inner threat” and “perpetuity anxiety”.

The guard system mentioned in the news, which constitutes our case study, is the “temporary village guard” system that is an implementation whereby the civilians are used as components of internal security by being armed in regions with high Kurdish population.

In the macro and micro analyses, we notice that similar texts and photographs have been used and similar meanings were coded on all 9 news sites. What makes this subject “a news” is not the guard system, which already has been running for a long time. The fact that those who were assigned as guards are “women” has made all these news sites consider the subject to have a news value.

In all the headlines and news texts, the themes of “mother” and “woman” stand out. For instance, the denotation of the woman carrying their children in their arms in the sentence “Kids in Arms, Kalash(nikovs) on Shoulders!” highlight the fact that these women are “mothers” or the phrase “Mrs. Türkan at home...” connotes a “mother” taking care of housework and children at home. In the news, beside the duty of motherhood, a heroic quality is attributed to “women”. They are heroised with the glorification of “motherhood” and their duty of “defending their homeland”.

Women, as the “*biological, cultural and symbolic*” reproducers of nations have been included in the nationalist discourse both as the raisers of children (future generations) and as the “mothers of nation” in a symbolic way. The nationalist discourse is closely connected to gender issues and an analogy between family and nation is always drawn within this discourse.

The women, in all of the news, have been presented in a close relation with words that have militarist connotation and linked to violence such as “weapon”, “mountain”, “ranger”, “keleş” (kalash) as well as “Kalashnikov” and they have appeared with military clothes and guns in all of the photographs. Those who are in close relation with the military are men due to the compulsory military service. Women are ascribed the sacred motherhood (especially being the mother of a soldier) or in exceptional cases, the duty of “belligerence”. In the news that we deal with, there is the implication of an “extraordinary” situation, which necessitates the participation of “even” women in a battle. Nurturing Turkish nationalism, the “perpetuity syndrome” and the perception of “inner threat” are the reasons for this extraordinary situation that are not put into words. Words used in the news such as patriotism, bravery and duty are affiliated with both the nationalist and militarist discourses. This way, the use of violence has been legitimized. Acting for the nation makes many things, which under normal circumstances could be considered as a crime, legitimate and this is one of the most significant characteristics of the nationalist discourse.

In the news, instead of making an ethnic emphasis, the duality of the “enemy” and the “civil society” that defends the “homeland” against it, has been

accentuated. While the image of an “enemy” with an unknown identity represents the “other”, “us” has been defined as women who both do their house duties and bravely defend their villages against the “enemy”. “The enemy/other” has not been defined as a group but instead, on several news sites words such as “terror” and “fight against terrorism” have been used. This way, the Kurdish issue that has been going on in the country has been presented as a matter of “security” within the country rather than a matter of the rights of the Kurdish citizens.

A piece of land, which is the most concrete form of the definition of “us” with set geographical borders, “homeland” (or “patriot”) appears in this news as one of the most distinctive words of the nationalist discourse. On the contrary to the perception that borders are becoming uncertain due to globalization, there stands “homeland” as an “indivisible whole”.

In conclusion, the news web sites that we examine in our case study produce the nationalist discourse just like the conventional media does. As a matter of fact, they reproduce the dominant ideology as well as the official nationalist discourse. Some of the Internet news sites like hurriyet.com.tr, milliyet.com.tr, haberturk.com and sabah.com.tr are a part of holding companies that own a large number of media organs. Although due to the ownership structure they are not entirely free in making news, ensonhaber.com, haberler.com, gazetevatan.com.tr, haber7.com and internethaber.com, which we would figure to be relatively freer, have also used the news in the same way. The discourse that was served by the state’s news agency, Anadolu Agency and carries the dominant ideology has been repeated exactly as it was. Out of the most clicked 10 news sites, only ntvmsnbc.com.tr has not featured the news. This case is an editorial choice specific to this news and does not change the general result.

Key Words: Nationalism, Turkish Nationalism, Nationalist Discourse, Media, Violence, Online news, Critical Discourse Analysis, otherization.

ÖZET

Medya, Milliyetçilik ve Şiddet: “Öteki” ile İlgili Bir Haberin Eleştirel Söylem Analizi (Media, Nationalism and Violence: A Critical Discourse Analysis of A News About “Others”) isimli tezimizin konusu, geleneksel medyanın milliyetçi söylemi yeniden ürettiği ve milliyetçiliğin ırkçılığa eklemlendiği noktada “öteki”ne karşı şiddeti körüklediği varsayımından hareketle, internet haber sitelerinin de aynı milliyetçi söylemi üretip üretmediğidir.

Devletin haber ajansı, Anadolu Ajansı tarafından servis edilen ve en çok tıklanan 10 haber sitesinden¹ 9’unda manşet olarak yayınlanan bir haber ve sitelerde yer alış biçimi Teun A. Van Dijk’ın, “Eleştirel Söylem Analizi” (Critical Discourse Analysis) kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir.

Analize geçmeden önce, milliyetçilik kavramı, söylem olarak milliyetçilik ve şiddetle olan ilişkisi kuramsal olarak incelenmiştir.

Yüzyılımızda, küreselleşmenin etkisi ile, siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel alanlardaki gelişmelerin ulus-devlet yapısını değişime zorladığı düşünülse de küreselleşmeye bir tepki olarak yükselen yerelleşmenin milliyetçilik olgusunu gündemde tuttuğu inkar edilemez. Küresel çağda; ulus-devlet yapısı inişe geçerken savunma olarak ulus-kimlik yükselebilir hatta ırkçılığın saldırgan bir boyutuna taşınabilir. Bu nedenle çağımızda milliyetçiliğin yokoluşundan değil yeni bir eklemlenmesinden söz etmek gereklidir. Hem teorik anlamda hem de Türk milliyetçiliğinin bugünkü değişen ikliminde bu eklemlenmenin izlerini görmek mümkündür. Kimilerinin “yeni ırkçılık” dediği bu eklemlenmede biyolojik bir ırkçılıktan ya da açık bir şiddetten söz edilmese de söylemsel ve simgesel şiddetten söz edilebilir. Burada kitle iletişim araçlarının rolü büyüktür.

Medya yoluyla yeniden üretilen milliyetçi söylemden bahsetmeden önce milliyetçiliğin oluşumuna ve milliyetçilik teorilerine bakmak gereklidir.

Milliyetçiliğin ne olduğunu tanımlamak için öncelikle millet/ulus tanımlamasına ihtiyaç duyarız. Bu kavramlar oldukça tartışmalıdır. Ancak günümüzde genel olarak; sınırları belli bir toprak bütünü, ortak bir dil, ulusa ait semboller, ortak adet, görenek, yazılı kültür, ulusa olan inanç, sevgi, bağlılık gibi duygular, diğer uluslardan ya da topluluklardan kendini ayıran bir kimlik tanımlaması temel olarak bir ulusu oluşturan unsurlar olarak karşımıza çıkmakta.

Milliyetçiliğin nerede ve nasıl ortaya çıktığı konusu tartışmalıdır. Genel kanı, bu kavramın “modernite”ye ait olduğu görüşü olsa da insan topluluklarının tarih öncesinden itibaren belli ulus/topluluklara bölündüğü ideoloji ve söylemleri de mevcuttur. Aslında bu, milliyetçilik konusundaki tüm tartışmaların iki eksenine sayılabilir. İlki, milletlerin modernite sonrası ortaya çıktığı ve Benedict Anderson’ın “hayal edilmiş topluluklar” (Imagined Community) olduğu düşüncesidir. Diğeri ise her insanın doğuştan aile ya da cinsiyet gibi bir ulus içinde ve o kimlikle doğduğu fikridir. Toprak temelli (territorial) ya da etnisite temelli milliyetçilik ayrımı da özde

¹ IAB iye İnternet Ölçümleme Araştırması, Ocak 2013 verilerine göre. <http://www.iabturkiye.org/>

bu ikilikten doğar. Aynı topraklarda yaşayan tüm vatandaşları eşit gören bir millet sevgisi ile kan/ırk birliği arayan bir milliyetçilik anlayışı bu iki eksenin iki zıt ucu gibi görülür. Bu ayrım, milliyetçilik teorilerinde de kendini gösterir; millet olgusunu tarihin en başından itibaren ezeli bir zamandan günümüze değişmez bir süreklilik halinde ele alan primordialist yaklaşım ve milletlerin modernleşmenin birer ürünü olduğunu, milliyetçi ideolojinin onları yaratmış/inşa (construct) etmiş olduğunu düşünen modernist yaklaşım...

Gellner, Hobsbawm, ve Anderson, Nairn, Hechter, Breuilly, Brass, Hroch gibi modernist kuramcılarının konuya dair ortak yaklaşımı, milliyetçiliğin kapitalizm, sekülerizm, endüstrileşme, modern bürokratik devlet gibi moderniteye ait bir kuram olarak ele almalarıdır. Bu kuramcılar içinde medyaya en çok ve etkili şekilde yer veren düşünür ise; Benedict Anderson'dır. Anderson'a göre; ulus "hayal edilmiş bir siyasal topluluktur" (*is an imagined political community*). Ona göre; 18. Yüzyılda dinsel kesinliklerin aşılması ve dinsel cemaatlerin (religious communities) itibar kaybetmesi ve 17. Yüzyıldan itibaren kutsal kraliyetlerin (dynastic realm) inişe geçmeye başlaması sadece siyasi değil değişen kültürel sistemlere de işaret eder. Modern devlete geçilirken; "kapitalist yayıncılık" (print capitalism) büyük rol oynar.. Matbaa kapitalizmi, kutsal dillerin yerine geçer ve gazete ve roman aracılığıyla ulusal bir bilinç oluşturmak üzere eş zaman ve mekan duygusu oluşturur. Gazete, olağanüstü bir "kitlese ayin"i (mass ceremony) mümkün kılar. Tanımadığımız milyonlarca kişi aynı ayini eşzamanlı olarak yerine getirdiğine inanırız. Böylece, büyük bir cemaat tasavvuru mümkün olur.

Hem "ulus"un tasavvur edilmesinde hem de söylemsel olarak yeniden üretilmesinde medyanın büyük rolü olduğu tartışmasızdır. Bugün hızla gelişen iletişim teknolojileri, medyayı da yapısal değişikliğe uğratmıştır. Daha fazla katılımı mümkün kılan bir mecra olarak internet, kullanıcıyı aynı zamanda içerik üretici haline getirmekte ve egemen söyleme alternatif karşıt-söylem üretme potansiyeli taşımaktadır. Buna rağmen, bu mecradaki içeriğin de toplumdaki egemen ideoloji, güç ve söylem kavramlarından bağımsız olmadığını unutmamak gerekir.

İdeoloji kavramı hakkında şüphesiz ki Marx bize zengin bir kuramsal tartışma alanı bırakmıştır. Marx'a göre ideoloji, egemen maddi ilişkilerin belirlediği çarpıtılmış bir gerçekliktir. İdeoloji, maddi gerçekliğin tersine dönmüş halidir. Marx'a göre, üretim araçlarını kontrol eden egemen sınıf, aynı zamanda ideolojik araçları da kontrol eder. Egemen sınıfın nesnel çıkarlarını temsil eden egemen düşünceler, toplumun da egemen düşünceleri haline gelir. . Marx'ın ideoloji kavramı öznenin konumunu pasif ve edilgen gören taraftadır. Gramsci ise, devletin zora dayalı iktidarını vurgulamak yerine, "hegemony" ("hegemony") kavramı ile zihinlerde kurulan ve rızaya (consent) dayanan niteliklerini öne çıkaran çözümlemelerin önünü açmıştır. Buna benzer bir süreci Louis Althusser, egemen sınıf iktidarının devletin baskı aygıtlarıyla (repressive apparatuses) kurulması ve ideolojik aygıtları (ideological apparatuses) ile kurulması olarak açıklar. Medya, "devletin ideolojik aygıtı"dır. (ideological apparatuses).

İdeolojilerin yeniden üretilmesi ve günlük hayattaki kullanımı ise söylem yoluyla gerçekleşir. Söylemlerimizin çoğu, ideolojik temelli görüşlerimizi ifade eder. Van Dijk'a göre; egemen ideolojilerin ve egemen söylemin yeniden üretildiği araçların başında kitle iletişim araçları gelir..

Foucault da söylem, ideoloji ve iktidar ilişkisi üzerinde çokça durmuştur. Düşünür, Marksist teorinin savunduğu, iktidarın ekonomik ilişkilerinin bir uzantısı olduğu ve devlet iktidarının yegane iktidar olduğu görüşüne katılmaz. Ona göre dil/söylem bir mücadele alanıdır. Söylemler durmaksızın iktidara boyun eğmez. Bazen de bir direniş noktası ve muhalif bir strateji için bir başlangıç noktası da olabilir. Van Dijk’ın da belirttiği gibi, ideoloji her zaman statükoyu meşrulaştırıcı olmayabilir. Anti-ideolojiler ve karşıt söylem üretme potansiyeli her zaman toplumda varlığını sürdürür.

Haber de bir çeşit söylemdir. İçinde egemen ideolojiyi barındırır ve defalarca tekrarlanmış sözcükler ve benzer metinlerin adeta “yeniden üretimidir.” Milliyetçi söylem, varlığını ancak popüler alanda ve günlük hayatta yeniden üretilerek sağlayabilir. Bir topluluğun “hayal edilmiş” olması yetmez, hayal edilen milletler, varlığını kendine sürekli hatırlatmalıdır. Bu anlamda medya, bu söylemi yeniden üreterek milliyetçiliğin sürdürülmesinin bir aracıdır. Michael Billig’in “banal milliyetçilik” (banal nationalism) adını verdiği günlük rutinler içinde sayısız kez tekrar edilen milliyetçiliğin popülerleşmesinde medya önemli bir rol alır.

Milliyetçi söylemin en önemli özelliği, “biz” ve “öteki” ayrımını sürekli canlı tutmasıdır. “Biz” kimliği, kendini tanımlamak için kendinden olmayanı kullanmak zorundadır. “Onlar” olmadan “biz” ne olduğumuzu ya da olmadığımızı tanımlayamayız. Medya ürünleri, birer “metinsel yapı” (textual structure) olarak aynı biz ve onlar ayrımının kabulü ile kurulur. Bu nedenle medya söylemi, biz ve öteki sözcüklerini kullanmaya ihtiyaç duymaksızın biz ve öteki ayrımını doğallaştırır. Van Dijk, (1988) medya haberleri üzerine yaptığı bir dizi söylem analizi çalışmasında, azınlıklar, göçmenler, kaçaklar ve üçüncü dünya ülkelerinden insanların (minorities, refugees, squatters, and Third World countries and peoples) güçlü gruplar ve ulusların sunumuna zıt bir şekilde portre edildikleri sonucuna varmıştır.

Ulus-kimliğin “biz”lik tanımı dışında tanımlanan her grup ya da azınlıkların olduğu yerde şiddet de varlığını gösterir. Ortak bir tarih, amaç, fikir ve simgeler üzerine yaratılan ulusal kimliğin “biz”lik tanımı dışında kalanlar; etnik gruplar, azınlıklar, mülteciler, farklı dini gruplar, “öteki” olarak tanımlanır ve düşman ilan edilerek toplumda onlara karşı bir şiddet duygusu yaratılır. Bu tanımlamanın yeniden üretildiği mecraların başında kitle iletişim araçları gelmektedir.

Foucault, “biyo-iktidar” (bio-power) kavramıyla modern çağda bedensel şiddetin ortadan kalktığını, yeni iktidarın; yaşam süresini uzatmak, imkanları arttırmak, yaşamsal tehlikelerden doğan zararları azaltmak üzerine kurulduğunu söyler. Ancak bu durumun, ırkçılık (milliyetçiliğe zorunlu olarak eklenilen) ve şiddetin günümüzde ortadan kalktığı anlamına gelmeyeceğini anlatır. İktidar, nüfus içerisindeki toplulukları aşağı ya da üstün olarak konumlandırır. Aşağı türler yok oldukça, anormal sayılan bireyler yok olacak, nüfus o kadar sağlıklı, katıksız ve uzun ömürlü olacaktır. Yani yaşamı daha sağlıklı ve saf kılmak, aşağı olanın yani “öteki”nin ölümünü gerekli kılar.

Van Dijk’ın yeni ırkçılık” (new racism) dediği kavram da böyle bir şiddet türüne işaret eder. Yeni ırkçılık, eski ırkçılıktan (old racism) farklı olarak açık şiddetten uzak durur ve söylemseldir. Kitle iletişim araçları bu söylem şiddeti kullanarak onu toplum içinde “normalleştirir” ve “doğallaştırırlar”.

Yukarıda özetlemeye çalıştığımız bu kavramsal çerçeve ışığında, 9 haber sitesinde eş zamanlı olarak yer alan bir haberin Eleştirel Söylem Analizi (Critical Discourse Analysis) tezimizin örneklemini oluşturmaktadır. Medya, söylem ve ırkçılık konularında oldukça kullanışlı bir çerçeve sunan Van Dijk’ın yöntemi, bizim çalışmamız için de son derece uygundur. “Tunceli’de görev yapan kadın köy korucuları” konulu haber, devletin sahip olduğu Anadolu Ajansı tarafından servis edilmiş ve en çok tıklanan10 haber sitesinden 9’unda kullanılmıştır. Çalışmamızda, bu haberin her bir haber sitesinde manşetten veriliş şekli ve haber metninin tamamı için makro ve mikro analiz yapılmıştır.

Türkiye’de, ulus-kimlik tanımlaması dışında kalan Kürtler, Ermeniler, Yahudiler, çingeneler, Aleviler, feminist gruplar, LBGT’ler vb. ile ilgili medya tarafından yeniden üretilen milliyetçi, ırkçı ve zaman zaman şiddeti meşrulaştıran söyleme karşı, internet teknolojisini kullanan, görece özgür, yeni nesil haberciliğin, karşıt söylem (counter discourse) oluşturma potansiyeli taşıyıp taşımadığı, bu tezin katkıda bulunmak istediği en önemli sorudur.

Analizin sonuçlarına geçmeden önce, Van Dijk’ın da belirttiği gibi, metinsel boyut kadar konunun bağlamsal boyutuna da bakmak gereklidir. Ele alacağımız haberle ilgili siyasi ve tarihsel arka plana baktığımızda, Türk milliyetçiliğinin inşa edilme süreci, tarihten bugüne değişen milliyetçilikler, ulus kimlik ve Kürtler gibi konular ön plana çıkmaktadır.

Türk milliyetçiliği’nin ortaya çıkışı, 19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı modernleşmesiyle başlamış ve Türk ulus-kimliği Cumhuriyet’in ilk döneminde “inşa” edilmiştir. Osmanlı imparatorluğu farklı etnik topluluklardan oluşmuş ve herhengi bir ulus aidiyeti geliştirmemiştir. Bu nedenle “Kemalist modernite projesi”nin en önemli amacı, dinin egemen olduğu bir cemaatten ulusun egemen olduğu modern, seküler bir topluma geçmektir. Bu proje, etnik kimlikleri dışlayan, Müslüman/Osmanlı kimliğini terkeden, çok milletli bir tebaadan türdeş bir ulus yaratma amacıyla olan, farklılıkları inkar veya asimile eden resmi ve monolitik bir yapıdadır. Türk milliyetçiliğinin, “öteki”si başta İslam ve Osmanlı geçmişi. iken bu gruplar dönem dönem değişmektedir. Gayrimüslim azınlıklar, komünistler, solcular... Türk milliyetçiliğinin değişen siyasi atmosferinde öne çıkan “öteki” gruplar olmuşlardır. Özellikle 1990’lı yıllarda şiddetlenen Kürt sorunu, dışlayıcı, şovenist bir milliyetçilik söylemini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Cumhuriyet’in kuruluşundan itibaren Kürtler, bazen asimilasyonist bazen de ayrımcı pratiklere maruz kalmışlardır. Kürt meselesi, hemen her dönem, bir iç güvenlik meselesi olarak algılanmış ve Kürtler, toplumda ve medyada “iyi Kürt-kötü Kürt” ayrımıyla temsil edilmişlerdir.

Türk Milliyetçiliği, her dönem değişen özelliklerine rağmen, genel olarak “iç tehdit algısı” ve beka kaygısı” çerçevesinde varlığını sürdürür.

Örnekleminiz olan haberde bahsi geçen koruculuk sistemi ise, Kürtler’in yoğun olarak yaşadığı bölgelerde, sivillerin silahlandırılarak iç güvenlik unsuru olarak kullanılması uygulaması olan “geçici köy koruculuğu” sistemidir.

Makro ve mikro olarak analiz ettiğimizde, 9 haber sitesinde de benzer metin ve fotoğrafların kullanıldığını ve aynı anlamı kodladıklarını görürüz. Konuyu “haber” yapan şey, zaten uzun zamandır süren koruculuk uygulaması değildir.

Korucu olarak görevlendirilenlerin “kadın” olması, ele aldığımız tüm haber siteleri için bu konunun haber değeri taşıdığı fikrini uyandırmıştır.

Tüm başlıklarda ve haber metinlerinde “anne” ve “kadın” teması mevcuttur. Örneğin; “Kucakta çocuk, sırtta keleş!” cümlesinde kucakta çocuklarını taşıyan kadın ifadesi ile bu kadınların “anne” olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Ya da “evde Türkan Hanım...” denilerek evde ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı ile ilgilenen “anne” çağrışımı yapılmaktadır. Haberlerde, “kadın”a, annelik görevinin yanısıra birer kahramanlık özelliği de atfedilmiştir. “Annelik” ile “vatanı koruma” görevleri yüceltilerek kadınlar kahramanlaştırılmıştır.

Milletleri “biyolojik, kültürel ve sembolik “ olarak yeni üretenler olarak kadınlar, hem çocuk (gelecek nesilleri) yetiştirenler olarak hem de sembolik olarak milliyetçi söyleme “ulusun anaları” (mothers of nation) olarak dahil olmuşlardır. Milliyetçi söylem, cinsiyet ilişkileriyle yakından ilgilidir bu söylemde aile ile ulus arasında sürekli bir analogi kurulur.

Kadınlar, tüm haberlerde militarist çağrışımı olan ve şiddetle ilişkili “silah”, “dağ”, “komando”, “keleş”, (kalash) “kalaşnikof” gibi sözcükleri ile yakın ilişki içinde sunulmuş, tüm fotoğraflarda askeri kıyafetler ve silahla yer almışlardır. Askerlikle sıkı ilişki içinde bulunanlar, zorunlu askerlik uygulaması nedeniyle, aslen erkeklerdir. Kadınlara, ya kutsal anne (özellikle asker annesi) ya da istisnai durumlarda “savaşçılık” görevi yakıştırılır. Ele aldığımız haberde, kadınların “bile” savaşa katılmasını gerektiren “olağanüstü” bir halin varlığı sezdirilmiştir. Türk milliyetçiliğini besleyen “beka kaygısı” ve “iç tehdit” algısı bu olağanüstü halin dilendirilmeyen nedenidir. Haberde kullanılan vatanseverlik, cesaret, görev gibi kelimeler hem milliyetçi hem de militarist söylemle yakın ilişki içindedir. Böylece şiddet kullanımı meşrulaştırılmaktadır. Millet adına hareket etmek normal koşullar altında suç sayılabilecek birçok şeyi yapma meşruiyeti sağlar ve bu da milliyetçi söylemin en önemli özelliklerinden biridir.

Haberde herhangi bir etnisiteye vurgu yapmak yerine, “düşman” ve ona karşı “vatan” toprağını koruyan “sivil halk” ikiliği vurgulanmıştır. Haberde, kimliği belli olmayan bir “düşman” imgesi, “öteki”ni temsil ederken, “biz”, hem ev içi görevlerini yerine getiren hem de köylerini “düşmana” karşı cesurca savunan kadınlar olarak tanımlanmıştır.” Düşman/öteki” bir grup olarak tanımlanmamış, onun yerine birkaç haber sitesinde “terör”, “terörle mücadele” ifadeleri kullanılmıştır. Böylece ülkede yaşana Kürt sorunu, Kürt vatandaşların hak temelli sorunları olarak anlaşılacak yerine ülke içinde bir “güvenlik” problem olarak yansıtılmıştır.

“Biz” tanımının en somut haliyle vücut bulduğu coğrafi olarak sınırlı çizilmiş bir toprak parçası; “vatan” (homeland) (ya da “vatansever”) milliyetçi söylemin en belirgin sözcüklerinden biri olarak haberimizde yer almaktadır. Küreselleşme ile sınırların belirsizleştiğine dair algısının karşısında, “bölünmez bir bütün” olarak “vatan” dikilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, örneğimizde ele aldığımız haber sitelerinin, geleneksel medyadan farksız olarak, milliyetçi söylemi kullandıkları görülmüştür. Hatta egemen ideolojiyi ve resmi milliyetçi söylemi yeniden üretmektedirler. İnternet haber sitelerinden hurriyet.com.tr, milliyet.com.tr, haberturk.com, sabah.com.tr, bünyesinde birçok medya organını bulunduran holdinglerin içinde yer aldığından,

sahiplik yapısı nedeniyle haber yapmada tamamen özgür sayılmasalar da, bu anlamda görece özgür olduğunu düşündüğümüz ensonhaber.com, haberler.com, gazetevatan.com.tr, haber7.com, internethaber.com'da da haber aynı şekilde kullanılmıştır. Devletin haber ajansı Anadolu Ajansı'nın servis ettiği ve egemen ideolojiyi taşıyan söylem, haber sitelerinde aynen tekrarlanmıştır. En çok tıklanan 10 haber sitesinden sadece ntvmsnbc.com.tr haberi kullanmamıştır. Bu durum, bu habere özel editoryal bir seçim olup, genel sonucu değiştirmemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Türk milliyetçiliği, Milliyetçi söylem, Medya, Şiddet, internet haber siteleri, eleştirel söylem analizi, ötekileştirme.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this thesis titled “Media, Nationalism and Violence: A Critical Discourse Analysis of a News About ‘Others’” is to understand whether the nationalist discourse, which divides the world into two as “us” and the “other” and instigates violence against the “other”, is reproduced or not on the Internet news sites.

The hypothesis of our study is that the nationalist discourse, which from time to time articulates with racism and generates a discursive violence, is currently being reproduced in the mainstream media. Our research question is whether Internet news sites, which in this century have undergone a transformation with the possibilities of the improving Internet technology and are still doing journalism unlike the social media networks in today’s media that promises more freedom, have the potential of producing counter discourses.

10 most clicked news sites have been examined and it has been noted that a news, which was served by the state’s news agency called Anadolu Agency, has been featured on 9 of these sites (hurriyet.com.tr, milliyet.com.tr, ensonhaber.com, haberturk.com, haberler.com, sabah.com.tr, gazetevatan.com.tr, haber7.com, internethaber.com) concurrently as a main page headline without any significant changes in the news text that was served. The news text and the way it has appeared on the sites have been analysed with Teun A. Van Dijk’s method called “Critical Discourse Analysis”.

Since it has not allowed the execution of a multi-layered analysis, the fact that the news was published without major changes on the aforementioned 9 news sites could be considered as a constraint of the research. Yet, as this provides an answer to a question raised by this study, at the same time it constitutes a substantial point.

In the first chapter of the thesis, the notion of “nationalism” has been discussed and the close link between nationalism, modernism, capitalism, globalization and, needless to say, mass communication mediums has been touched upon. Answers to questions of “what nationalism is” and “how it has emerged” have been briefly sought and the theories of nationalism (primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolic theories) have been studied. The theoretician who includes media the most and in the most effective way among all the modernist approaches, Benedict Anderson’s theory that regards nations as “imagined communities” has been laid emphasis on.

In the same chapter, lastly the place of media in the theories of nationalism and the way it is tackled has been reviewed. The dialectic between mass communications’ unitive role in the formation of nations as well as their major role in globalization and the consequent characteristic of weakening the nation-state on the other side has been highlighted.

In the second chapter of the study –as in the following chapters a discourse analysis of the case study will have been made– the correlation between media, ideology and discourse has been urged upon. Initially the notion of “media” and its historical evolution after which what we will refer to by “media” in this thesis has been expressed. It has been attempted to define the notion of ideology and the notion has been scrutinized in the light of the rich theoretical heritage of Karl Marx who uses ideology with its negative connotation.

Thereafter, the relation between ideology and discourse has been studied. The issues of ideology being generated through discourse and mass communication mediums being the primary tools with which the dominant ideologies/dominant discourses are reproduced have been dealt with. Predominantly Van Dijk’s views on ideology and discourse have been covered. In addition, Foucault’s conceptions of power and discourse have been touched upon. The place of ideology and discourse in the contemporary media studies has been discussed.

The characteristics of the news discourse and the nationalist discourse in media have also been covered in this chapter. Followed by this, the reproduction of

the nationalist discourse in media has been tackled. Nationalism that penetrates us everyday in the utmost natural and ordinary way and is repeated in the daily routine, which Billig calls “banal nationalism”, has been addressed in this context.

Furthermore, the issue of “otherization” in news discourse has been scrutinized in this chapter and the findings about the representation of social groups in media of Van Dijk’s series of discourse analyses on the media news have been mentioned. Dijk’s thoughts on the presentation of “us” and “other” in media have been conveyed.

The third chapter of our study begins with violence and the debates on violence. Hannah Arendt’s take on the connection between violence and power, Marx’s view on violence and the relations of capitalist production as well as Foucault’s notion of bio-power, which he claims to extinguish physical violence, are notions that we have studied.

In this chapter, examples from the Turkish media on nationalism and violence have been provided.

The forth and last chapter features the case study. In this study, the matter of whether or not the most clicked Internet news sites have the potential of producing a language apart from the widespread nationalist discourse, which we see in the mainstream media instigating violence and has been propounded on many studies conducted up until today.

Within the framework of Van Dijk’s Critical Discourse Analysis, the main page coverage (the headline, the photograph as well as the lead if available, or the spot featured in the coverage) of the same news on 9 different Internet news sites have been analyzed. Prior to this analysis, information on the historical background of the subject has also been provided in this chapter.

CHAPTER 1: NATIONALISM AND THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

1- Nationalism

One can say that “nationalism” is essentially phenomena of the modernism accordingly the most common belief. In spite of this, the ideology and the discourses based on the idea that humankind has been divided into nations innately since the pre historic period still exist. This secession actually shows us the two main axes of the notion of nationalism. The first axis is the one according to which human beings are born with a nationality/nation like a family or gender whereas according to the second one, societies/nations are entirely “imagined communities” as stated by Anderson. Since it is related to the subject, we could briefly mention an example scrutinized in many studies about nationalism; in our 10th Year Anthem, the phrase “we have existed before the history, we will exist after the history” denotes nationalism that refers to this kind of ethnic basis. This nationalist discourse which makes itself evident in social institutions like schools, families, households and media, needs to be analysed in order for its roots to be understood. Although it is too soon, we need to stress that our aim in this study is to show whether or not nationalism is reproduced as a discourse in the media products.

Actually, we know that studies of nationalism cannot be confined to a just single perspective. Philosophers, anthropologists, political scientists’, international relation experts, sociologist, economists and many others have been interesting the

field of nationalism. Nationalism is accepted that it is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world. The notion of nationalism have been discussing intensively since last half century.

Although this is said that nationalism is declined by globalization still we have been discussing the erecting of nationalism and racism opposed to idea of globalization.

Hall indicates that erosion of nation-state, nation-economies and national cultural identities is very complex and contradictory. There are some dangers when they are ascending and declining. It is debated point whether they are more dangerous in existing of them or lacking of them. (Hall, 1991 p: 171)

Hall say that *“The important point here is when nation states begin to declining the era of globalization, they regress to a very defensive and highly dangerous form of national identity that is driven by a very aggressive form of racism.”* (Hall, 1991, p: 178)

Actually, nationalism tightly ties notion of modernism, post-industrialism, capitalism, globalization, secularism and mass communications. Even root of nationalism is based on wherever – modern or pre-modern- we can not negate to relation between nationalism and modernism and other concepts related to modernism in global era.

Philosopher or thinker of nationalism will have been mentioned briefly in the upcoming page however debates on nationalism has wide scale. For this reasons nationalist discourse and relation between mass media and nationalist discourse and violence will be focused on this study.

1.1 Definition of Nation

Although “nationalism” is a notion with a recent history, one needs to define what the word “nation” means first in order to describe it.

‘Nation’, a Latin origin word, is defined as *“reunion d’hommes habitant un meme pays”*, *“people who live in the same country”* according to the *etymological dictionary*. (Lebrun&Toisoul, 1937, p: 568) Based on the word *“naitre”* which means, “to be born”, the word connotes the idea of defining the place of birth and origin. (ibid, p: 56)

Regarding the history of the word “nation”, Guido Zernatt comes across the word “nation” in Latin, in his work that was published half a century ago. This word was used in order to describe people who are alike by birth. However, instead of describing themselves with this word, the Romans used this term in the opposite way, meaning “a community of outsiders”. Even more, referring to the immigrants, this term was also used for the student communities, which were also considered to be outsiders. In fact, the professors and the students who came from nearby geographies were put in the same neighbourhoods and these communities were called “nation”. These students would participate in the university debates with their teachers and represent a certain view. So, the word nation had started to be used not only to denote those who have the same origins or strangers but also people who had a common goal or consensus. Although it is unknown as to when the words “nation” and “public” became synonyms and the word “nation” has started being used widely, it is possible to say that the word “nation” is used extensively since the 18th century whereas that the word “nationalism” is a notion with a much more recent history. (Özkırımlı, 2010, p: 13-14) “Initially, the word nation used to determine the differences within a whole whereas it has gained an absolute, political meaning in 1789.” (Fritz, 1988 p: 179 cited in Akkaya 2004, p: 20) This notion has, without a doubt, played an important role in the generation of a modern nation-state after the French Revolution. Therefore, the nationalist ideology became a notion that would be discussed in relation to modernization. Different perspectives on the definition of the notion of “nation”, which has undergone a semantic change within the flow of history, reveals the different fractions of the nationalist ideology.

If the concept of nation predated the ideology of nationalism, we have to regard even a few pre-modern nations before nationalist ideologies in the late 18th century and we need a definition of the concept of the nation which is independent of the ideology of nationalism. In this point there is the greatest problem in the study of nationalism. Some definitions of the nations is stressed “objective factors such as language, religion and customs, territory and institutions. On contrary, those that emphasize merely “subjective” factors, such as perceptions, sentiments, attitudes. (Smith, 2004, p: 11)

Evidently, it is not easy to define the notion of “nation”. The question of whether societies come together with objective or subjective criteria as Smith points out entirely changes the meaning of “nation”. Even more, it becomes a factor that defines the severance of the nationalist theories. For instance, Joseph Stalin who believe “objective factors” say that: “A nation is an historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (Stalin, 1973 p: 61 cited in Smith 2004, p: 11)” On contrary, Benedict Anderson, in influential book on nationalism along with many scholar, is *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, say that “In anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” (Anderson, 2006, p: 5) This definition is clear sample for subjective perspective of the concept. (Smith, 2004, p: 11)

1.2 Birth of Nationalism

In correspondence to the difficulty in defining the notions of nation and nationalism, it is not possible to set forth universally accepted information about the emergence of nationalism.

We have briefly touched upon the debate regarding when nations came into being in the history. The question of when “nationalism” emerged seems to be more complicated. This is because one expects the notion of “nationalism” to include a political assertion in it, unlike the notion of “nation” (especially unlike the pre-modernity definitions of the notion). Anthony D. Smith suggests five significant points while defining of nationalism:

- (1) “a process of formation, or growth, of nations;
 - (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation
 - (3) a language and symbolism of the nation;
 - (4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation
 - (5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular”
- (Smith, 2004 p: 6)

As it can be seen, Smith suggests that the nationalism carries a doctrine or ideology besides a sentiment or soul of a nation or like this.

In similar way Gellner define it that, *“Nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state- a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation- should not separate the power-holders from rest.”* (Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p:1)

C. Shafer lists ten ideas as basic to the concept of nationalism. They are;

- “1. The idea of a more or less defined territory (owned or desired).*
- 2. Common language.*
- 3. Customs, manners and literature.*
- 4. Some common dominant social and economic institutions.*
- 5. A sovereign government (passionately desired if absent)*
- 6. Belief in common history and a common ethnic origin.*
- 7. Love for the fellow national.*
- 8. Devotion to the nation.*
- 9. Pride in its achievements and sorrow in its tragedies.*
- 10. Indifference towards other groups, perceived as a threat to the nation and belief in a great future for the nation.”* (1955, p: 7-8)

The reason for difficulties to define concept of the nationalism, it is hard to be known when nationalism emerge firstly in the history. Barrington conceded that *“there may be as many definitions of nationalism as there are nationalism scholars”* (2006, p:8-9 cited in Alexander Maxwell, 2010, p: 2)

The answers to when and how “nationalism” first emerged vary from one researcher to another. Nationalism, according to Greenfeld and Hastings came about in England, according to Alter in France and according to Breuilly and Kedourie in Germany. The common point of all these researches is the opinion that nationalism first emerged in Europe. Anderson, nevertheless, claims that Latin America is the

birthplace of nationalism where the independence acts took place. (Özkırmı, 2008 p: 193)

Besides “*there are no great theoretical text outlining and defending nationalism; No Marx, no Mill, no Machiavelli*,” (Özkırmı 2012, p:11 cited in Beiner, 1999 p: 2) there are some difficulties to define this concept. Although lots of scholars did write on nationalism they have not treated the question in a systematic way as the focus subject of their working in eighteen and nineteenth centuries. In 20th century, most recent text on nationalism rediscover in academic studies.

“It was the 1920’s when “nationalism” began being treated as an academic subject and examined through a more objective perspective. Although the upshots of this period didn’t really question the naturalness of nations and nationalism, they still have left a not to be underestimated heritage, compared to the past, in the process of understanding nationalism. After the 2nd World War, the “new” nationalism movements which arose with the disengagement of the colonialist empires, became the sign of the most intense and efficient period in the corporate sense”. (Özkırmı, 2008 s:30) As Özkırmı mention, the existing of nation and nationalism inherently is like a key open the door of big debate about nationalism. Are belongings like gender and family the elements that make nations, nations and if not, what is it that holds them together and makes them “a nation”? Is a nation created with culturally founded constituents or is it created politically? As we will be covering further on, we could say that the debates about the modern nationalism are fundamentally shaped around these two questions.

Recently, as a word, “nationalism” may have been used to refer for discourse of patriotic or political discourse of right-wing or the ideology based on a nationalist political parties, the process of national state-construction, popular discourse on media product and several other certain historical events.

2- Theories of Nationalism

In general, theories of nationalism is classify in two approaches as primordialist and modernist. Umut Özkırmı says there was one more approach for nationalism called ethno-symbolism is counted primordialist despite it is so different

to primordialist. He offers ethnosymbolism as a third approach for nationalism and assumes Anthony D. Smith led to this approach. (Özkırımlı, 2010, p: 143-144)

Primordialists treat the phenomenon of nation as continuity, which has been unchanging since the very beginning of its history until today. Modernists, on the other hand, believe the notions of nation and nationalism to begin with modernity and reason them with developments such as the generation of nation-states, the Industrial Revolution, the French Revolution, the German Idealism, the discovery of printing, the emergence of media tools and the institutionalisation of education. Ethnosymbolists recognize the significance of ethnic core that comes from the past in building a nation whilst they stress the impact of modernity on nation and nationalism.

2.1 Primordialist Approaches

Primordialism is not discussed as a linear category in many of theoretical approaches. Özkırımlı offers that four categories are 'nationalist', 'sociobiological', 'culturalist' and 'perennialist'. The common denominator of these four approaches is their belief in the naturalness and antiquity of nations. (Özkırımlı, 2010, p: 49-50)

The earliest use of primordialism dates back to Edward Shils. In "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties", his major contribution to debates on nationalism, Shils wrote that family attachment stems from 'significant relational' qualities, which can merely be described as primordial. It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood. (1957, p:142)

The extreme version of primordialism grounds that every one has an ethnic identity "as we have speech, sight or smell" (Smith, 2000, p: 31) Smith offers one more version of nationalism called 'organic version'. In the early 19th century this version was detailed by German Romanticism which may be found among the followers of Rousseau in France. In this version, each nation has specific origin and roots, authentic character, common mission, history and destiny. Humanity based on naturalistic connection. There is no distinction between 'nations and *ethnies*'. (Smith, 2000, p: 32)

A version of primordialism is socio-biological theory. For this view point, due to every *ethnies* and nations is a kind of 'kin group', they are 'natural'. Also they are selected by genetic evolution. Individual reproductive success is maximized 'nepotism' (2000, p:32)

Van den Berghe claims that 'kin selection' is a powerful bond of sociality. "... *ethnic groups, races and nations are super-families of (distant) relatives, real or putative, who tend to intermarry, and who are knit together by vertical ties of descent reinforced by horizontal ties of marriage*" (Özkırımlı, 2010 p: 54 cited in Berghe, 2011 p: 274)

According to Berghe, human sociality based on three distinct factors: kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion. For individual, a reproductive capacity is maximized by kin selection method. The kin selection method is in the human nature. Human beings want to sustain their genes by reproducing. They possess the drive for carrying on their generations with their relatives with whom they share their genes. What is implied by kin selection is that human beings are nepotistic. (Taştan, 2010, p: 204)

Selection of kin is directly related to the genetic relatedness, the benefits that are to be gained, and the cost that will incur. "*Simply put, an altruistic transaction can be expected if, and only if, the cost-benefit ratio of the transaction is smaller than the coefficient of genetic relatedness between the two actors*" (G. Smith, 1983 p.365 cited in Berghe, p:19-20) Although such calculations would seem to require conscious rational choice by individuals, in Berghe's view, such choice is neither always fully conscious nor rational for humans and animals. (ibid. p: 365)

According to the socio-biological approach, it is not a pre-requisite for people to have the tendency of kin selection consciously. Besides this, selection of kin may not always be the condition for selecting the biologically and culturally similar one. Meanwhile, the chance of coercion or reciprocity makes it possible to speculate about how closely human beings are connected. One could reciprocate for self-interest in order to increase the success of production. Reciprocity may be between

congenerics, just as it could also expand to the public. Different groups who could benefit from the process could reciprocate. Coercion refers to the situations whereby there is an imbalance of power between the ethnic groups or where one side is more dominant. (Taştan, 2010, p: 206)

Van Der Berghe suggests that even though ethnic groups emerge or vanish, collaborate or break up, all this construction-deconstruction is firmly tied to reality of 'the socially perceived biological descent'. (Berghe 2001, p: 274, Özkırmı, 2010, p: 55)

As mentioned above, according to the primordialist approach, the relations that are believed to be innate could be genetic as Pierre van den Berghe claims or 'cultural' as Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz argue. For Geertz, assumed 'givens' of immediate contiguity and kin connection basis of primordial attachments. Beyond these, as culture is unavoidably related to this matters, the attachments is 'the givenness' that stems from being into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. (Geertz, 1973, p: 259) Cultural primordialism brings out belief in ethnical connections. What ties individuals to a society is the 'belief' that factors like religion, language and common past are primal and that they have existed before anything else. (Özkırmı, 2008, p: 94)

Perennialism refers to the historical antiquity of the nation. Modernity of nationalism is accepted as a political movement and ideology by perennialists. However for them nation is updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities or collective cultural identities in all eras of human history. Neither nations nor ethnic groups are 'givens' in nature instead are strictly historical and social. (Smith, 1998, p: 159)

Holding a perennialist point of view, the theologian Adrian Hastings would summarize it by saying that "modern nations can only grow out of certain ethnicities". Every ethnicity did not become a nation, but many have done so. (Özkırmı, 2008, p: 59)

2.2 Modernist Approaches

Unlike the primordialists who argue that nations are natural, given, unchanging and that they have existed since past times, which are not the beginning of the nations that live today; according to the modernist approaches nations are products of the modernization. Nations did not exist before nationalisms. It is the nationalist approach that has constructed them. Massimo d'Azeglio, played a major role in the establishment of Italy, said after Italy had been politically unified: 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians' (Hobsbawm, Kertzer, 1992, p: 4)

According to Smith, “Historians may differ over the exact moment of nationalism’s birth, but social scientists are clear: Nationalism is a modern movement and ideology...” (Smith, 1998, p: 1) So, in terms of modernist approaches, there was not any thinking or movement about nations or nationalism in the pre-modern era.

Although theorists especially like Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson, as well as Nairn, Hechter, Breuilly, Brass and Hroch tackle the notion of nationalism from different perspectives like economic, socio-cultural or political, (Özkırmı, 2010, p: 72-113) the common denominator of all these scholars is a belief in the modernity of nations and nationalism. Modernist approaches claim that nation and nationalism are the products of modern processes like capitalism, secularism, urbanization, industrialization and modern bureaucratic state. (ibid. P: 72)

Based on the modernist point of view on nationalism, these notions undoubtedly include profound debates and various approaches with economic, sociological and cultural roots, within the whole field of social sciences.

2.2.1. Tom Nairn and “Uneven Development”

Tom Nairn who is considered to be a Neo-Marxist amongst the ones who adopt the modernist approach and who looks at the topic from an economic perspective, begins his influential work, “The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism” as follows: “*the theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historic failure*”. (Nairn 1981, p: 329 cited in Özkırmı, 2010, p: 74)

Due to understanding to Nairn we shall remember *Communist Manifesto* that say thanks to advance of capitalism, all barriers of nationalism and religion are swepted away. So proletariat has no nationality: “*National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish faster. And, The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got.*” (Marx, Engels 2008 p: 61)

Tom Nairn say that we should not seek the stem of nationalism in internal dynamics of the societies but in general process of historical development and ‘world history’ as a whole. As Nairn claims, nationalism is defined by certain features of the political economy that has been dominating the world over the time span starting from the French and Industrial Revolutions until today. (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.74-75 cited in Nairn, 1981 p:332) According to Nairn, nationalism is a response to the ‘uneven development’ of the modern world. Capitalism, industrialism or modernization –whatever you say- has not diffused itself throughout the world ‘evenly’. Contrary, they have always involved the domination and exploitation of some regions by others. Nationalism has been the response of the suffering regions, ranging from the reactions of fragmented European nationalities. (Orride, 1981, p: 3) ‘Uneven development’ has led to the subordination of the underdeveloped peripheral countries to the industrialized core countries. The elites of the underdeveloped countries have taken matters into their own hands in order to meet their public’s expectations of development and so, nationalism has become the driving force of this process. (Nairn, 1981, p:325, cited in Selçuk, 2011, p: 3858) For Nairn, this territorial conflict which is created capitalism is more intense and significant than the antagonism between classes. (Orride, 1981, p:3)

2.2.2 Hobsbawm and “invented tradition”

According to Hobsbawm, nation and nationalism are products of ‘social engineering’. (Hobsbawm, 2007, p: 10)

For Gellner, the ‘national question’, as the old Marxist called it, is situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation. Nations exist not only as function of a particular kind of territorial state but also in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development. Hobsbawm provides an example in this respect; the spoken or written standard, national languages couldn’t have progressed without the discovery of printing and the massification of literacy and education. (ibid, 2007, p: 10)

For this reason they are dual phenomena constructed essentially from below, but they can not be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people. (ibid, p: 10)

Hobsbawm explains the notion of ‘invented tradition’ as follows; *“Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.”* (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2010, p:1)

Hobsbawm makes a distinction between tailoring the existing traditions according to the new conditions and consciously inventing ‘new’ traditions to fulfil the needs that change. The examples of the first are features that are considered to be ‘traditional’ in all societies whereas the second situation is seen in the ‘modern’ societies at periods when fast, social changes occur. As a reaction to the sudden fragmentation and disintegration caused especially by industrialization, the idea of ‘national community’ was constituted with the aim of securing the social integrity and obtaining an order as well as unity.

‘This explains the importance of the idea of ‘national community which can secure cohesion in the face of fragmentation and disintegration caused by rapid industrialization’. (Özkırmı, 2008, p: 94 cited in Hobsbawm and Ranger, Chapter 7)

Hobsbawm defers to Gellner: ‘Nations as a natural, God-given, way of classifying men, as an inherent... political destiny, are a myth,; nationalism, which sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: That is a reality’ (Gellner 1983, p: 48 -49) In short, ‘*nationalism do not make states and nationalism but the other way round*’. (Hobsbawm, 2007, p: 10)

2.2.3. Gellner and “High Cultures”

While the other approaches that treat nationalism as a notion related to modernity focus on subjects like class and economical conflicts, modern state, mass politics, media and the imagination of a nation; Gellner focuses on the transition to an industrial society as well as its cultural and political results from a sociological perspective. John Breuilly claim that “*Gellner’s work still represent the single most important attempt to provide a theory of nationalism as a whole*” in his introduction to the second edition of *Nation and Nationalism*. (Breuilly liii cited in Gellner, 2006)

Gellner defines the nationalism in the beginning of the “*Nation and Nationalism*”: “*Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind*” (Gellner, 2006, p: 1)

Gellner works with Weber’s definition of the state as that agency within society that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. He stresses that states merely exist where there is division of labour, and the state “*is that institution or set of institution specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else they may also be concerned with).*” (Gellner, 2006 p: 4) For Gellner, the question of nationalism doesn’t exist in stateless societies. The state is a prior to nationalism although the state has emerged without the help of the nation. (2006, p:6) At this point, Gellner gives a definite and effective answer to the question that constitutes the main axis of the debates on nationalism and that is of whether or not the nations have

existed before modernity. Nationalism existed before nations and is the pre-requisite of modern nation-states. In other words, the idea of nationalism has created nations.

Gellner's theory is known as the most influential work in theories of nationalism and it can be understood within context of sociological tradition whose origins based on Durkheim and Weber. The major unit of this tradition is a distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. (Özkırımlı, 2010, p: 98-99) In this context, Gellner historically examines the society as gather-hunter, agrarian society and industrial society.

In the agro-literate polity, ruling class which is small minority of the society certainly is separate from the rest of public. These societies consist of some subdivided layers, for instance, warriors, priests, clerics, administrators, burghers, peasants. The most important point, between the ruling stratum as a whole, and for the various sub-strata, there is great cultural differentiation rather than on homogeneity. In this social level, almost no one tries to construct cultural homogeneity. On one side, there was the elite class that consisted of the aristocrats, soldiers, bureaucrats and clerics who would use culture to differentiate themselves from the other classes, whereas on the other side, there were the peasants. Small peasant lives inward-turned life and doesn't interest political issues, tied to locality by economic need. 'The state is interested in extracting taxes, maintaining the peace, and not much else, and has no interest in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities.' (ibid: 9-11) At this stage, culture was of use to separate casts from one another. In other words, there was no social or political need for culture to be spread to large masses in the agricultural societies. There was also no need for a common culture to be born, which would bring them closer with a bond of "nation".

In this stage, large territories controlled by a concentration of force and society can be divided into local self governing communities, and large empires. Such empires did not need their elites and peasant masses to share a common culture. Political form based on a central dominant authority co-exist with semi-autonomous local units. Local units or communities depend for their functioning on a good

measure face-to-face contact, speaking their local accent and having their customs. (Ibid, p: 13-14)

In brief, Gellner say that if the nationalism had been invented in the agrarian society its possibility of the general acceptance would have been slender. (ibid, p:11)

According to Gellner, it was a different case in the industrialized societies. At this stage, there was a need for nations and nationalism, unlike the agricultural societies. The relationship between culture, politics and society had entirely changed in the industrialized societies. In the pre-modern era, the social statuses of individuals were predetermined from birth and couldn't easily change whereas in modern societies the shifts within the classes had increased. Culture had ceased being the determining factor of the social strata and had become open for everyone. The culture 'does not so much underline structure: rather it replaces it' (Gellner, *Thought and Change* 1964, p: 155 cited in Özkırımlı 1999, p: 153) In the modern era, "high culture" was dominant over the whole society and was the foundation of the society's structure. '*Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture.*' (Gellner, 2007 p: 35)

Gellner underlines the importance of the circulation of culture and thus, "communication" by scrutinizing division of labour and economical transformations in the industrial societies. For Gellner, the modern economy needs substitutable and thus mobile people on a large scale. Its members must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another. In this society, all people have to be specialised but to move between specialisations. They must have generic training which give them a chance to follow their new activity or occupation. So it is required that all have a common education, a similar culture. Also they must consistently communicate with a large number of other individuals. '*They must also be able to communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-does-not-concern type message.*' The large and standardized educational system guarantees this social achievement. (ibid. p: 34) Merely the state can sustain the educational infrastructure which is too large and costly for any organization also is strong enough to control this significant function. (ibid, p: 36) Gellner speaks of an education system that is standardized for everyone and is taken on by the government, as well as a cultural

environment in which everyone can breathe, speak and produce. He names the shared culture, “high culture”. However he says that “...it must now be a great and high (literate, training-sustained) culture, and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture or tradition.” (ibid, p: 36-37) Gellner suggests that in order to create a congeneric society, a government invents “nationalism”. He states that this close relationship between the government and culture in the industrial societies has an inevitable relation with nationalism. “High cultures”, the products of the modern era, were fed by the government and were the protected ‘garden’ cultures, unlike the ‘wild’ culture in the agricultural societies, which was ‘per se’ and which couldn’t be fed and ruled. (ibid, p: 48) *State and culture must now be linked whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, loose... Now it is unavoidable due to we live in an age of nationalism.*” (ibid, p:37)

2.2.4. Benedict Anderson and “Imagined Community”

Broken new ground in literature with his theses regarding the roots of nationalism and the writer of one of the most referred to books in the field, “Imagined Communities”, Benedict Anderson matters to our study as well. This is because he is a thinker who includes media in his theories the most and in the most effective way amongst all the modernist approaches.

Anderson states that the era of nationalism does not seem to be over and even more, that “nation-ness” is a universal and legitimate value of the political world of our times. (Anderson, 2006, p: 3) Anderson completely agrees with Eric Hobsbawm who says that *‘Marxist movements and states have tended to become national not only in form but in substance, i.e., nationalist. There is nothing to suggest that this trend will not continue.’* (Hobsbawm, 1977, p:13)

Anderson carries the Marxist historian, Tom Nairn’s aforementioned statement, *“The theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s great historical failure.”* much further. He claims that nationalism is an ‘anomaly’ for Marxism and that therefore it is ignored rather than confronted. In the meantime, he states in his work, “Imagined Community” that he attempts to provide a more satisfying explanation of this anomaly. (ibid, p: 3)

He also puts forward his renowned definition of nationalism that gives its name to his work: Nation “*is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.*” (ibid, p: 6)

Anderson also touches upon Gellner’s theory with which he claims that nationalism invented nations. He argues that what Gellner means by the word ‘invention’ is not ‘imagining’ or ‘creation’, but instead ‘fabrication’ or ‘falsity’. Anderson asserts that by claiming that nations are artificial, Gellner actually implies that inartificial, ‘real’ societies do exist. (ibid, p: 6) Gellner suggests, “*I fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.*”(ibid, p: 6) Anderson also adds that these communities could only be differentiated in terms of the ways they are imagined, not by the extent of their reality / falsity.

As it will be revealed in the following chapter where the relationship between media and violence will be scrutinized, Anderson makes a connection between the erosion of religious certainties and the emergence of nationalism in the 18th century. Yet, his main assertion is as follows: Nationalism has to be understood not in relation to self-consciously held political ideologies, but the large cultural systems that preceded it. (ibid, p: 12)

Anderson treats these cultural systems initially as ‘religious community’ and ‘dynastic realm’. Afterwards, he adds a third notion that creates a social change: “*apprehensions of time*”.

Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and even Confucianism contained ‘conceptions of immense communities’ which were imagined by the mediation of a sacred language and a text. The qualities of these classic communities of which the essence was constituted of these sacred languages were considerably different to the ‘imaginary communities’ of the modern nations. (ibid, p: 12-13) Religious communities and their sacred languages (Anderson refers to Latin greatly, as an example) began to lose their monopoly especially after the explorations of the non-European world. In Anderson’s words, these explorations; “*widened the cultural and geographic horizon and hence also men’s conception of possible forms of humans*

life” (ibid, 1991, p: 16). The second reason for this fall was that the sacred language itself lost its reputation. (ibid, p: 18)

The main reason for the sacred language and thus, religious communities to lose their reputation in the 16th century was “print capitalism”. Latin falling out of favour and the increase in the number of books in public languages shattered the sacred communities. In Anderson’s words: *“In a word, the fall of Latin exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities integrated by old sacred languages were gradually fragmented, pluralized and territorialized.”* The notion of “print capitalism” by Anderson who, amongst the theoreticians of nationalism, gives the most importance to media in the emergence of nationalism, will be scrutinized much more extensively in the section called “Media in Nationalist Theories”.

The second cultural system, which Anderson says has undergone changes, is the “dynastic realm”. The automatic legitimacy, possessed by the sacred kingdoms in the 17th century, started to fall in Western Europe. (p: 21) Anderson, at this point, studies the structural transformation of nations in the modern and pre-modern eras. The kingdom organizes everything around a high centre and gets its legitimacy from sacredness. Based on the modern conception, the sovereignty of the state functions in all centimetres within the borders determined by laws, in an extensive, unswerving and implicit way. In the pre-modern period, the borders were penetrable, indefinite and the kings would obtain their power from a heterogeneous and entwined population. (ibid, p: 20-21)

According to Anderson, besides the aforementioned decline of ‘religion’ and ‘descent’, it was the fundamental change in the way of perceiving the world that was significantly effective in the emergence of nation as imagination. (ibid, p: 22) In order to reveal how the perception of time has changed in the modern era, Anderson examines the notion of time in the religious communities. In the religious communities, time is understood as the “concept of time where there is a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present”. It is totally unfamiliar to the Medieval Christian mentality to perceive past and present as an infinite chain of cause and effect whereby they are separated from one another with sharp borderlines.

What replaced this understanding of simultaneity has been the “homogenous, empty time”, an expression that Anderson has borrowed from Benjamin. (ibid, p: 38- 39) The simultaneity aforementioned is a simultaneity with ‘temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar’. (ibid, p: 38-39)

Anderson argues that the best way for us to realize the importance of the transformation in relation to time for the birth of a nation is to examine the structures of ‘novels’ and ‘newspapers’. (ibid, p: 25) Anderson attributes great importance to ‘print capitalism’ in the reconstruction of the cultural systems which he claims to have undergone changes. Amongst the other theoreticians of nationalism who are considered to hold modernist approaches, it is Anderson who refers to media the most. Anderson’s thoughts on the relation between media and nationalism will be covered much more extensively in the section called “Media in Theories of Nationalism”.

2.3 Ethno-symbolist Approach and Anthony Smith

The term ‘ethno-symbolist’ is used to describe theories that focus on the ethnic background and culture. The ethno-symbolists who stand against primordialism and who find the modernist perspective deficient, try to combine these two approaches and reach a different theory on nationalism. Out of the theoreticians who could be called ethno-symbolists, Anthony D. Smith is the theoretician who upholds this term and is the most important representative. (Özkırımlı, 2008, p: 209-210)

We have mentioned the five significant points of Smith’s definition of nationalism. Smith, defines nationalism based on these points. According to Smith, *“A nation can therefore be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and a common legal rights and duties for all members.”* (Smith, 1993, p: 14) As can be seen in his definition and as he also states, national identity is complex and abstract; it cannot be reduced to a single dimension. Nations and nationalism cannot be searched in only one dimension or only in the modern era. Its roots lie in the past. For Smith, *“... if we want to grasp the power and understand the shape of*

modern nations and nationalism, we must trace the origins and formation of nations, as well as their possible future course, over long periods of time (la longue durée), and not tie their existence and formation to a particular period of history or to the processes of modernization.” (Smith, 2005, p: 23)

According to Smith, most of today's nations are actually the continuation of a certain ethnic community. Ethnic communities are not just primordial entities. Ethnic communities are formed in two ways: ‘coalescence’ and ‘division’. They are formed either by units joining together or by the assimilation of one unit into another with the expansion of tribes. However, there could be divisions caused by the differences of opinion in religion or politics. (ibid, p: 23-24)

Smith provides three reasons for why these ethnic cultures are so permanent: ‘religious reform’, ‘cultural borrowing’ ‘popular participation’ and ‘myths of ethnic election’. The failure of religious reforms pushes the public that is in need of a change, to achieve this with other elements. Consequently, this leads to the renewal of the ethnic community. Similarly, what the writer means by ‘cultural borrowing’ is their renewal through their interchanges with different ethnic cultures. The participation of masses of public in the political life, namely ‘public participation’, also saves most of the ethnic communities from melting away. Lastly, according to Smith, those communities that cannot produce ‘myths of ethnic election’ also have no choice but to be assimilated by other ethnic communities. (Smith, 1991, p: 35 – 36)

During this process, the structures, which Smith names ‘ethnic cores’ occur. Smith counts three reasons that justify the search for the roots of the modern nations in these ethnic connections. The first reason is that historically the first nations were built around these ethnic communities. Secondly, this model of progress matches the ‘demotic’ societies, a type of public of the pre-modern era which though rarely, we still come across in the world. In the words of Smith, ‘the ethnic model was sociologically fertile’. The third and the last reason is that even the nations that do not possess any ethnic antecedents, feel obliged to create a history by fabricating myths and symbols with the cultural material they have got in hand. (ibid, p: 40)

As it could be understood from the aforementioned, the etno-symbolist approach is almost like a synthesis of the primordialist and the modernist approaches. Smith disagrees with the idea that nations and nationalisms are entirely 'inventions', nor he doesn't think that they are 'imaginary' like Anderson does. He thinks that the ethnic communities, which he elaborately explains in "The Ethnic Origins of Nations" and "National Identity" and defines while using the French word "*ethnie*", are the origins of many nations. Nevertheless, the important point is that at the stage when the cultural material deriving from the ethnic core is insufficient, nations create a history in which the real and the invention merge together by producing "myths" and "symbols".

Smith presents two types of ethnic community that have different impacts on the process of the formation of nations: the first one is 'lateral' and 'extensive', the second one 'vertical' and 'intensive'. Lateral communities rarely diffuse deep in the social scale but they extend in ambiguous borders. Generally, lateral *ethnie* composed of aristocrats, clerics along with some of the wealthier urban merchants. (Smith, 2008, p:76) In the lateral or the aristocratic type *ethnie*, culture is stratified and the expansion of the elite culture to the other stratum is very weak. On the other hand, horizontal *ethnies*, as the name implies, are limited to the upper classes of the societies while they are in an aristocratic solidarity with the upper classes of the neighbouring horizontal *ethnies* and could expand to a geographically large area. Therefore, as we have stated before, its borders are undefined and flexible. On the contrary, 'vertical *ethnies* were more compact and demotic. Unlike lateral *ethnie*, in vertical *ethnies* culture was diffused to other strata of the population as well. Culture used to gather different classes around common traditions. Therefore, the ethnic connection was much more intense and exclusive. The differences between the communities were sharp and it was very hard to be included in the group. (Smith, 1991, p: 53)

The transformation processes of these two different ethnic communities in becoming nations have been different as well. Smith calls the model based on the horizontal *ethnies*, 'bureaucratic incorporation'. The Western European states with ethnic cores that are constituted of horizontal *ethnies* such as England, France, Sweden and Spain are the ones that have completed this transformation most

successfully. In these countries, the horizontal *ethnies* managed to incorporate the middle and the lower classes. It was a series of developments that Smith calls ‘administrative revolution’ have enabled this. These developments were changes in the administrative structure, like the attainment of rights of citizenship by more people, the transition to a structure whereby all places could have a connection with the centre and tax collection. In addition to these administrative changes, the significant changes in the economy like the switch to a market economy and the expansion of capitalism were also the complements to this revolution. Besides the administrative and economic changes, Smith sees the changes in the cultural arena as the important agents of this process as well. After listing developments like the reform movement and education that is independent of religion, Smith draws attention to the consequent developments in the popular modes of communication like the explosion of the variety of books and newspapers. (ibid, p: 59-60)

In vertical *ethnies*, which is the secondary model of nation, the bureaucratic state played a small role during the process which Smith calls ‘vernacular mobilization’. In societies like this, religion used to be a way of living. Myths, holy books and the importance of the clerics were the main constituents. Religion and ethnic identity were tightly interdependent. This religious culture used to make it difficult to build a nation based on the rights and duties in relation to citizenship. On the road to building a nation under such circumstances, the biggest role was of the intellectuals once again. (ibid, p: 63 – 64)

3- The Media in Theories of Nationalism

Amongst the theories of nationalism, the debate that focuses on the role of “communication”, which has the trait of uniting a certain society, is a debate that has a potential in the field of media. We have already reviewed above a part of the literature in the field of nationalism. Although there are thinkers who refer to the role of media in the emergence of nations and nationalism, we could not say that they have developed a holistic mass communication theory.

While the conceptualization of nation-states in communication studies is deficient, the mass communication tools in the literature of nationalism are usually not theorized. (Schlesinger, 1994, p: 265)

With the inclusiveness of social communication, belonging to a society creates a different community of communication than a bordering/spatial community, as Mackenzie would put it. (Mackenzie, 1978, p: 165) This is the most important way to secure the bond of nation-identity, which is crucial in the dissemination of nationalism. Although this thought seems to be functioning, it holds an incredible dialect within it. Playing a unitive role in the formation of nations, mass communication undermines the nation-state at the same time with its characteristic of being “transnational” or global which is acquired by the new communication technologies. What would happen if the new communication technology melts cultures within it and turn the world into “a global village”, as often expressed in the subject matter of cultural imperialism? A single, big nation and a single, big common language... What I want to put forward is not a very futuristic point of view. What needs to be underlined is that the theories of nationalism and the communication theories are interrelated but in the meantime that it is essential to emphasize the dialect that lies in the intransigence of the communication theories in explaining the state of being a nation. As stated before, “language” already is one of the key elements tackled in the effective theories of nationalism. Anderson claims that the print capitalism in Europe standardized vernaculars, that the print languages have integrated all spaces of lingual exchanges and that they have replaced the sacred, universal languages. He also adds that ‘print capitalism’ addresses an imaginary national community by creating a simultaneous sense of time and space in order to form a national conscious with the mediation of newspapers and novels. In any case, the communication theorist McLuhan tells us that the fundamental notions of civilizations with writing, in other words of the ‘Gutenberg Galaxy’, are ‘individualism, centralism and nationalism’. (dip notunuyaz!) Yet, Anderson does not add to his theory the communication technologies that have gone through big changes after Gutenberg. Anderson attributes great importance to ‘newspaper’ and novel as they have a simultaneous way of addressing the ‘imaginary community’.

Anderson provides examples of novels especially in the section where he exhibits how the way people perceive the world has changed. Afterwards, he observes the formation of an identical imagination of a society in the ‘empty and homogenous time’, as a notion that constitutes the backbone of his book. Then, he states; *“An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000-odd fellow Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.”*(Anderson, p: 26)

Anderson stresses the fact that newspapers are ineradicably ‘fictitious’ and adds; *“... if we were to look at a sample front page of, say, The New York Times, we might find there stories about Soviet dissidents, famine in Mali, a gruesome murder, a coup in Iraq, the discovery of a rare fossil in Zimbabwe, and a speech by Mitterand. Why are these events so juxtaposed? What connects them to each other? Not sheer caprice. Yet obviously most of them happen independently, without the actors being aware of each other or of what the others are up to. The arbitrariness of their inclusion and juxtaposition (a later edition will substitute a baseball triumph for Mitterand) shows that the linkage between them is imagined.”* (p: 32- 33)

Anderson expresses that this imaginary linkage derives from two resources. The first one of these is merely ‘acalendrical coincidence’ whereas the second one is the relationship between the newspaper as a form of book and the market. Anderson defines newspaper as ‘a form of book with a fugacious popularity’ sold in giant scales. Sayfa 34-34 türkçede 47-48 özetle

On the other hand, as we have extensively covered earlier, Gellner states that the formation of nation-states, the industrialization and division of labour that comes with it, necessitates centralization. The effects of the industrial production forms have changed the modes of social organization in the agricultural societies and so, a standardized language and a central education system in this language has become a necessity. (Gellner, 2007 p: 34 - 36) According to Gellner, “the political unit” and “culture” have been involved in a cordial relationship during this process. The state creates a culture of nation with the homogenization effect of central, national education systems. The modern human being is no longer dependant on a king or

land, but on a “culture”. (Gellner, 2007 p: 35) It is rather surprising that as someone who gives so much importance to language and culture, Gellner incorporates media so little into his theory. Gellner makes a clear reference to media in an excerpt of his work titled “*Nation and Nationalism*”:

“The media do not transmit an idea which happens to have been fed into them. It matters precious little what has been fed into them: it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted. The most important and persistent message is generated by the medium itself, by the role which such media have acquired in modern life. “...All this crystal clear, and follows from pervasiveness and crucial role of mass communication in this kind of society. What is actually said matters little.” (Gellner, 2006, p: 121-122)

Gellner, at this point, almost adapts McLuhan’s line, “medium is the message” to his theory of nationalism. Irrespective of what is said, the language and the manner used in media make people come together as if they are members of a community. Anderson thinks along the same lines with Gellner about this point. Media’s unifying characteristic in imagining a nation as ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson gives the examples of newspaper and book) is just as Gellner’s explanation that of media by its nature has the capacity to form a culture of nation. However, this homogenous “language and manner” means that media contents are “national”, so much so to address a homogenous culture. But are media contents always “national”? This is a topic that is frequently brought up in the debates about cultural imperialism. We could not say that the content produced by TV series that are either imported or adapted from foreign series as well as news, contest and entertainment shows or the world news pouring in from the international news agencies, create such a homogenous culture. Today’s media culture has a much more complicated economic-political structure than generating a national culture, as well as ways of producing/consuming news.

Anderson includes media in his theory much more than Gellner and others do. However, stringing together radio, TV, Internet and all these communication technologies in a holistic way, the structural change that 'media' has undergone is not one of the matters Anderson deals with.

In this day and age, the processes of producing media contents and the interaction of the spectators/readers are much more complicated procedures than how they are handled in the theories of nationalism. According to the known theories of nationalism, media is usually addressed in terms of its impacts on either generating a nation or holding it together. Yet, nation isn't a process that is completed. Although its borders are set—even so these borders have become open to question with globalization, it seems impossible to give definitions for a singular identity or culture within these borders. It is difficult to speak of a single, homogenous culture as Gellner defines it. Even more, one should not forget about the presence of certain different cultures that resist the legitimate discourse or the marginal movements. For the citizens of a nation that is "invented", "imagined" or "is constructed on ethnic foundations" by a nation-state, "national identity" needs to be in a constant re-construction process. As the theoreticians of nationalism who hold a modernist approach assert, nations and nationalism may have been invented and yet, to invent "discourses" about nations and nationalism is a completely different matter. The discourses produced by the politicians, opinion leaders, capital owners, newspaper bosses or editors and now, the discourses produced by the citizens or spectators/readers with the new communication technologies, all become apparent in the media. The re-construction process of nationalism amongst these complex relationships calls for a much more complicated analysis. Certain approaches that are considered to be the new approaches in the theories of nationalism are actually concerned with this re-construction process. There are also other approaches different than the modernist approaches, which we could describe to be postmodernist, that carry out interdisciplinary studies in the fields of social gender, discourse of hatred and racism by looking into the areas where the nationalist discourse is reproduced in the daily life. Nevertheless, the fluid dynamics of the new media shaped by the developing communication technologies create an endless, untouched space for the analysis of the nationalist discourse.

CHAPTER 2: MEDIA, IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE

Media is positioned as a structure that produces or carries ideology and most often ideologies generate the construction of meaning in the practices of discourses in media. In this respect, ideology and power are significant notions for the production of “nationalist discourse” of media.

The way postmodern approaches address nationalism, as a notion that arises nowadays, is through the discourse produced in daily life. Once established, nationalism does not remain given or stable, but is constantly reproduced. It is presented in a rhetoric that we are exposed to in our daily lives without being aware of it. Media plays a specific role in producing this language. Since its appearance on the scene of history, media has been a tool which the dominant classes of the society wanted to have control over.

2.1 A Brief History of the Media

Media is the plural of ‘medium’, which stands for mean. However, media is undoubtedly a complex system which bears meanings beyond this dictionary definition. It is impossible to think of it independent from the history of social changes. One must consider it to be in a principal relation to the modernization period of societies.

Communication has existed since humanity did. Communication that was realized through signs or sounds, and then verbally through language, subsequently became “mediated” (communication through a technical means apart from language, text or signs), which made it acquire another dimension. Taking into account that this tool changes in all eras with the improving technology, we may say that it plays an effective role in determining the quality of communication and, even in the historical and social changes of the societies that communicate.

We could speak of three types of communication that have changed with these means in the course of social history: ‘face-to-face interaction’, ‘mediated interaction’ and ‘quasi-mediated interaction’. “ *‘Face-to-face interaction’ can be contrasted with ‘mediated interaction’ by which we mean forms of interaction such as letter-writing, telephone conversation and so on.*” (Agrawal, 2007, p: 34)

‘Mediated Interaction’ is realized by using a technical means which provides a flow of information between an individual or individuals at different time and/or places. In Mediated Interaction, individuals are separated from their spatial and temporal context. This form of communication is different than the one that is face-to-face and momentary. In Mediated Interaction, it is difficult to define a shared place or time for the parties, like the necessity of introducing ourselves at the beginning of a telephone conversation or putting the date at the top of a letter. Even more, co-presence that exists in face-to-face interaction is not there in Mediated Interaction (for instance, gestures, facial expression...). Agrawal, uses term of ‘mediated-quasi interaction’ to refer to the kinds of social relations establish by the media of mass communication. While ‘face-to-face interaction’ or ‘mediated interaction’ denotes a reciprocal communication, the third type of communication, which is provided with the mass communication mediums, is actually a one-way information flow. (Agrawal, p: 35) Although they have attempts to get diverse feedback or to include the mass communication spectator/reader in the production of information, the communication occurring via mediums is ‘monological’ and addresses an indefinite range of potential recipients. In this third type of communication, the notions of time-space become much more complex. As Anderson states, people who do not know each other at all and share the same piece of land in an empty time are ‘imagined’ as a community.

At this point we need to state that; ‘the developments in the field of communications have been, from the very beginning, related to the developments in the social field. The proliferation of culture fostered with the increase in the literacy rate, the increase in the technical possibilities and the social progress that enabled all this, have also defined communication. However, the developing communication systems have also contributed to the aforementioned social/cultural changes’ (Alemdar, 1981, p: 3)

The first of the modern communication systems was ‘printing’. The printing system that Gutenberg has developed in 1450 spread all across Europe after the second half of the 15th century. Surely, we shall also add that prior to this there have been stages like the transition from symbols to text, as well as the discovery of materials like stone, papyrus which was followed by paper.

“Text was mandatory for making calculations, keeping records and for power to be passed on from generation to generation. The rulers gathering the public around squares which they called agora and addressing them in order to control the ruled ones in the city-states of antiquity, the Roman emperors being the initiators of improving the transportation facilities and forming an orderly communication system in order to protect the rapidly expanding lands of the Empire and to keep the Empire under control as well as them providing a flow of information to the public with wall papers such as Acta Publica and Acta Diurna could be seen as the concrete examples of the endeavours of setting up a system for controlling purposes.” (Güngör, 2011, p: 283, cited in Kaya, 1985, p:32)

Mass communication that began in the ancient times accelerated with the invention of printing. Around mid-18th century, the systems of mass communication came into being with concurrent factors, which we have touched upon such as the formation of the modern nation-state, the emergence of bourgeoisie as a class, industrialization and the progression of the capitalist social structure.

“Public” or “public opinion” became important after processes like the Renaissance and the reform movements followed by the French Revolution and with the downfall of empires as well as the formation of nation-states, the public started to have a say in the governance which increased their need to acquire knowledge and receive news. So, the mediums of the mass communication that came about and developed with the use of printing, such as book and newspaper, became essential.

The revolutionary process in France itself generated information that expanded to a national level and thus, a market for printed publication. Thus, at the final stage, it made an industrial revolution in this field possible. The new definition of a nation that was founded on a culture, on a language as well as on literature,

which were considered to be national above all, formed the essence of the integration of the markets beyond the French borders. Consequently, everyone, at least theoretically, became obliged to participate in a political and cultural construction. (Barbier, Lavenir, 2001, p: 74)

The distribution of the printed products at certain prices constitutes a part of the modern, representational democracies and also makes the rights and duties of the citizen who has become a voter, gain content: acquiring information. (ibid., 135)

After the discovery of printing as well as the proliferation of books and newspapers, almost all the mass communication technologies became possible with researches related to military operations and the technology developed by the war industry after which they became civilianized and disseminated.

The radio broadcast, which can transmit sound waves over a distance of kilometres, “came out more or less at the same time, in 1921-22 in all the industrialized countries.” (ibid, 226)

One needs to remember that the most known example of the “power effect studies” period in communication was about the fear and impact that a radio show evoked in people. In 1938, whilst an adaptation of an Orson Wells novel, ‘Star Wars’ was being broadcast, the speaker had interfered by making an announcement, saying that the Martians have attacked earth. This has overwhelmed all Americans with fear and panic and –according to a study carried out by Cantril and his friends later on– and at least six million people were in shock, some have even left their houses and their cities. (Cantril, Gaudet, Herzog, 1966 cited in Güngör, 2011, p.76)

Transmitting sound waves wirelessly over kilometres, “*radio broadcast creates an area of use which will yield to television later on whilst bringing new perspectives in the history of media: the whole family listening to it at home in the evening.*” (Barbier, Lavenir, 2001, p: 226) Television, which came out as a form of entertainment whereby families would gather around in the evenings in the 1950’s, “*had tendency to replace radio and compete with it until the beginning of the 1980’s.*” (Barbier, Lavenir, 2001, p: 257)

The renowned communication theorist Marshall McLuhan argues that the discovery of printing and the electronic mass communication that has evolved afterwards will change the world in a different way and that this way will lead to the generation of a new typology of human beings. According to him, the discrepancy that has occurred between this new world of “oral culture” and the former “literate” - world will become stable and the Earth will become “a global village”. (Mc Luhan, 2001 p: 47-48)

For some, the Internet technology, which has become widespread in the 90’s and has caused fundamental changes in our everyday life, was almost like the epiphany of the “global village” prophecy. We observe that the liberal approach, which considers the Internet as a powerful tool of democracy that will solve many problems of the modern societies with its means for information exchange, is dominant in many studies. In spite of this, today there are also critical approaches claiming that on the contrary, the Internet regenerates the social problems and makes things inextricable. Whichever approach is adopted, the fact that communication technologies have significant effects on the transformation of the social dynamics in reference to the possibilities borne by the Internet technologies is amongst the preconditions of many studies. It is a non-debatable fact that we have reached a brand new course that changes all of the dynamics of journalism with the arrival of the Web 2.0 technology, which makes the user a content maker as well. Although this study does not claim to be entirely about social media or new media, we reckon it is inevitable that any study on today’s media –we will be studying an example from Internet journalism– will tackle this structural change in the media. This is because a TV show, news on the Internet, a piece of information that is shared in the social networks or an article on a blog has become too interactive to be dealt with on its own.

Nevertheless, one must also add that none of the contents in this new medium, to which we attribute so much freedom, is independent from the notions of ideology, power and discourse in the society.

2.2 The Concept of Ideology

Unfortunately, similar to the notions of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, the notion of ideology is also one, over which a consensus isn’t reached. It has been the subject matter of profound debates in the fields of politics and philosophy. Having significance for all social sciences, this notion often comes up in media studies as well. The notion of ideology can be used to imply different meanings in our daily lives. When we say that individuals or institutions entail “an ideology” or that they approach things ideologically, we imply the meaning that that individual or institution look at reality in a limited, deficient or one dimensional way rather than looking at it from all perspectives. In this respect what we mean by ideology is almost a “world view” or a “paradigm”.

“The term ‘ideology’ was first used by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy in 1796 to describe his project of a new science which would be concerned with the systematic analysis of ideas and sensations, of their generation combination and consequences.” (Thompson, 1996, p: 29)

The tradition of the Enlightenment thinkers comprised a convenient background for Tracy. Interested in the systemisation of a new science, Tracy called this “ideology” in order to denote “science of ideas”. According to him, the object of this science was the origin of thoughts and scientific advancement may be possible only by getting rid of false thoughts; as a science, ideology could form a new basis for public education in order to overcome religions and metaphysical prejudices. (Larrain, 1979, p: 27-28).

For Tracy, the French Revolution used to provide a great opportunity for disseminating “the science of thought” which was assumed to correct the false thoughts of people. When he came into power, Napoléon Bonaparte gave this opportunity to ideologists who were called “scientists of ideas”. He assigned the duty of developing an education system that was based on the principles of the Enlightenment philosophy to the institution called “Institut de France” where ideologists were involved. Destutt de Tracy was renowned for being “the head of the ideologists”. After a while, however, Napoléon went against the ideologists whom he

had regarded as his close friends in the past. The reason for this clash was that Napoléon, with the aim of enhancing the regime of the emperor, abolished the ban on education imposed on the religious institutions that had been enforced during the period of revolution. When his decision got reaction from the ideologists, Napoléon insulted them by calling them “ideologists”. For Napoléon, ideologists were unrealistic people who ignored political practices. Napoléon had become the first person to use the notion of ideology with a negative connotation, which was being used with a positive meaning until then and to which great meanings were attached in terms of the evolution of humanity. In the eyes of Napoléon, ideologists were people who were useless metaphysicians disconnected from real life and oblivious of politics. (Larrain, 1979, p: 27-28; Eagleton, 1996: 103-105)

Karl Marx also used this negative denomination that Napoléon ascribed to ideology much later, for very different reasons.

“Men are producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active man, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process” (Marx, 1970, p: 68)

“*Camera obscura*”, the metaphor for an image that appears upside down in a camera, refers to the distinction that Marx would like to make between true consciousness and false consciousness. This association of being upside down was actually interpreted as “*false consciousness*”. This means that one’s standing in the physical life process is inaccurately formed in their mind.

Indeed, Marx himself never used the phrase ‘false consciousness’. (Eagleton, 1991 p: 89) In *The German Ideology*, Marx does not actually speak of “*illusion*”, but of the “*reflection*” of the material-objective reality and its echoes. (Marx, 1970, p: 69) Ideology is the inverted version of the material reality. According to him, “*life is*

not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life" (Marx, 1970, p: 69) Thus, he offers us a strictly materialist point of view which claims that ideology is merely "reflexes" and "echoes" in relation to one's real life practices.

We may say that within Marx's renowned distinction of base-superstructure, "ideology" is rather included in the social consciousness, namely "superstructure".

The Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* lays out the famous Marxist formulation:

"In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production that correspond to definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social and political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." (Marx, Engels, 1962, p: 362 cited in Eagleton, 1991 p: 80)

Eagleton states that Marx treats ideology as a social consciousness and that for this reason, ideology could be included in "superstructure" mentioned in the excerpt even though he finds this controversial. (ibid, 1991, p:81)

In Marx and Engel's work titled *The German Ideology*, "ideology" is also closely related to Marx's theory of "alienation" and "the logic of inversion".

Marx says that in certain social conditions, human powers, products and processes become uncontrollable of human subjects and it seems like autonomous existence. Such phenomena which are estranged in this way from their agents, then come to exert an imperious power over them. Thus mankind submit to what are in fact of their own activity as if they are an alien force. The concept of alienation is closely linked to that of 'reification'.

If social phenomena cease to be recognizable as the outcome of human projects, they are perceived as material things, and thus to accept their existence as inevitable. (Eagleton, 1991, p:70)

If human power and institutions could go through the aforementioned process, then so could consciousness. (ibid, p: 70) Social praxis is actually the product of the subject's actions and yet, it becomes a material reality and turns into a practice that creates a compulsory distortion within the consciousness of the subject. This "inversion" within the social praxis itself forms the basis of the "inversion" in the consciousness. Thus, ideology becomes a part of the theory of alienation.

In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels make a correlation between the production and spread of ideas, and the inter-class relations. *"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas."* (Marx, Engels, 1970, p: 92)

According to Marx, the dominant class that controls the means of production also controls the ideological means. The dominant ideas that represent the objective interests of the dominant class become the dominant ideas of the society as well.

"The motif of inversion" which appears and is often discussed in Marx's early-period thoughts on ideology, changes in his work of the following periods. *"Ideology, is now less a matter of reality becoming inverted in the mind, than of the mind reflecting a real inversion. In fact it is no longer primarily a question of consciousness at all, but is anchored in the day-to-day economic operations of the capitalist system."* (Eagleton, 1991, p: 85) In other words, under the conditions of capitalism, ideology no longer refers to our minds presenting us a distorted version of reality but to the consciousness that reflects upon us the distortion that already exists in the outer world. According to Eagleton, ideology in Marx's thoughts of his

mature period is a function of the capitalist economy rather than being a matter of discourses, beliefs and “superstructural” institutions. (ibid, p: 85) “... *whereas in The German Ideology was a matter of not seeing things as they really were, it is a question in Capital of reality itself being duplicitous and deceitful.*” (ibid, p: 87)

The theoretical heritage, which Marx has left to us with respect to ideology, is the basis of considerably productive and prolific debates. For Marx, the consciousness of the subjects is formed by their material praxis in society. However, these are thoughts that are at the same time independent of the individuals’ will, objective and obligatory. Although the notion of social praxis that indicates to subjective experiences is crucial for the Marxist thought, subjects are faced with a distorted reality determined by the dominant material relationships. In this situation, Marx’s notion of ideology is on the side where the state of the subject is considered to be passive and inactive. Nevertheless, new theories that mark the actions of the subjects in the social praxis at the time when ideology is generated and reproduced, form an important basis for debates on “ideology”.

The Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci is one of the initiators of the studies that focus on the subject. The importance of Gramsci’s theoretical contribution lies in the fact that rather than stressing the forcible power of the capitalist state, it draws attention to the modes of power that will gradually make this force invisible and even unnecessary. Such a power is possible by dint of ideology and becomes concretized with the notion of “hegemony”. Unlike the definitions that put emphasis on the institutional qualities of the central state, which is based on force and where the state power imposes on the subjects externally, Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony” paves the way for analyses that highlight its attributes that are constructed in the minds during the ideological processes and are based on consent. (Üşür, 1997, p: 28)

In “*Southern Question*”, where Gramsci brings up the notion of hegemony for the first time, he uses hegemony to solely denote political leadership within the context of proletarians getting the approval of the large masses of villagers and leading them during their fight against capitalism and the bourgeois government whilst adhering to the Leninist understanding of the notion. It was fundamentally in *Prison Notebooks* where Gramsci used the notion in a way that would connote moral

and intellectual leadership besides political leadership. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992: 85-86).

Ideology has a significant difference from the notion of “hegemony”. Ideology could be forcibly imposed. Hegemony is a much broader notion than ideology; it includes ideology but it is not reducible to it. (Eagleton, 1991, p: 112) Hegemony best understood as the organization of consent which are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion. For Gramsci, the ruling bloc operates not only in the political sphere but also throughout the whole of society. (Barret, p: 238, ed. Zizek, 1994)

In counterpart to the arena of power of the state that is based on force and political dominance, civic society is the arena of hegemony based on approval. (Üşür, P: 28-29) According to Gramsci, the field where hegemony is applied is basically the field of civic society whereby social classes fight for domination/power. Gramsci objects to economic reductionism and thus, according to the thinker, class does not correspond to an organization based merely on economic interests; the cultural and ideological aspects are as important as the economic aspects in sustaining the dominance of a certain class.

According to Gramsci, television, newspaper, army, school and church produce “ideology” as hegemonic instruments that tie individuals to the dominant power with consent rather than by force. (Eagleton, 1991, p: 113-114)

Louis Althusser mentions a process that is similar to this mechanism in his book titled *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. Althusser draws a distinction between the establishment of the dominant class power with the state’s repressive apparatuses and ideological apparatuses.

While institutions like the government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts and the prisons work based on coercion and violence; the educational institutions, religion, family, the political institutions, the syndicates and media exist by being dependent on ideological approval. Althusser, lists and exemplifies the ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) as follows:

“...the religious ISA (the system of the different churches), the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘schools’), the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties), the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc.)...” (Althusser, 1994, p: 33-34)

Nevertheless, Althusser indicates that though slightly, the ideological apparatuses could also resort to pressure and coercion at times. Even the ideological apparatuses of the state involve “violence” and “repression” secretly or symbolically, in many cases. Similarly, the repressive apparatuses could also use some ideological approval mechanisms (Even a repressive apparatus that imposes sanctions like the courts may resort to a universal law discourse and produce an ideology.). The distinction here is that the repressive apparatus gives priority to repression and ideology is a secondary function. On the other hand, in ISAs ideology totally gains priority. They may resort to repression at the last stage slightly or even symbolically. (Althusser, 1994, p: 35)

Althusser recognizes institutions that may be considered to be in the private field such as the church, the parties, the syndicates, family, some schools and media, as “state apparatuses”. Althusser attempts to resolve this case by stating that the basis of the distinction between private and public is already the state itself, in other words the “bourgeois law”.

“The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its ‘authority’. The domain of the State escapes it because the latter is ‘above the law’: the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private.” (ibid, 1994, p: 34)

This way, Althusser puts forward the relative autonomy of the economic, political and ideological levels in relation to one another. He theorizes this social system holistically with the ideological apparatuses counted by this ideological level, within the framework of its reproduction function. All the ISAs reproduce the

production relations – in other words, the relations of the capitalist exploitation. (ibid, 1994, p: 43) In his theory, Althusser counts ‘media’ too as an ISA separate from the political or religious apparatuses. For him media, in a capitalist social formation, produces ‘nationalist’ messages.

“The communications apparatus by cramming every ‘citizen’ with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, etc, by means of the press, the radio and television.” (ibid, 1994, p: 43)

Ideology, in Althusser’s theory, comes up in the mechanism of “hail” and “interpellation”. According to Althusser, *“... all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject.”* (Althusser, 1994, p: 63)

This process is that of the ideological subject formation. Ideology hails and interpellates subjects; Turkish, Muslim, student, soldier, woman, young, mother and so on. Subjects, through the practices within these rituals, become aware of their own subject positions through acts such as hailing, interpellating, worshipping, voting and defending one’s country. (Üşür, 1997, p: 45)

Althusser, uses the French word “sujet” to denote “subject”. Here, he draws attention to the conscious duality of meanings. The meaning of “sujet” is not only “subject”, but also “dependent” and “subordinate”. This conjugated verb connotes “to subordinate”.¹ The reason for this conscious decision lies in the essence of Althusser’s theory. For him, ideology is external to the individuals and is objective and, is not produced by the subject; on the contrary, it produces the subject. In most of the cases, it is experienced unconsciously and by making subjects adopt the dominant values, it makes them compatible with the system. So, the subject here is in an inactive and passive position.

“...the contradiction between defining the repressive and the ideological apparatuses as superstructure institutions and, schools and family institutions, which

¹ It is cited from the translation notes of Yusuf Alp and Mahmut Özışık, from the Turkish translation of Louis Althusser’s book titled Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. (Page: 72)

are considered to be one of these apparatuses, being directly related to the production process as institutions associated with the reproduction of labour power” (Üşür, 1997, p:45) and similarly, the contradiction between media, as a superstructure, being an institution that reproduces the dominant ideology and, the reader/spectator playing an active role in the reproduction of information with the developing communication technologies, establishes the debatable aspect of Althusser’s theory.

The relationship between the class belongingness of the subjects in the base-structure and their designation in the superstructure on an ideological and political level remains as an unanswered question in Althusser’s theory. Ernest Laclau provides an answer to this question. According to him, not all ideological and political elements have class belongingness. (Laclau, 1985, p: 172-173)

In Laclau’s views, the class related characteristic of an ideological discourse comes up in the notion of “articulation”. For instance, “nationalism” does not have a class connotation. If it were an absolute must that nationalism is treated with a class connotation, the only way to do so would be articulating it by adding ideological elements to it. Simply because it is dominant, the ideology of the dominant class does not only, as Althusser would put it, “interpellate” all members of this class but also the members of the oppressed class. (İbid, 173-175)

2.2.1 Ideology and Discourse

Ideology and discourse are notions that are quite related to one another. The reproduction and the expression of ideologies in everyday life are actualized through discourse. To put it broadly, discourse is the way language is used. However, it cannot be reduced to language. Discourse exists in all reciprocal communication.

Most of our discourses, especially when we speak as a member of a group, represent our views that are based on ideology. We learn our first ideological ideas in our lives by listening to members of close groups such as our family and close circle or by reading. We, then form these ideas from the masses of speech and text presented to us. Foremost among these are daily conversations and mass communication mediums. (Van Dijk, *“Ideology and Discourse: A multidisciplinary introduction,”* cited in Söylem ve İdeoloji., ed. Çoban ve Özarslan, 2003, p: 18)

As Van Dijk states (2003, p: 47), the most effective ideological institutions of the modern societies are schools and mass communication mediums.

However, one mustn't forget that Van Dijk does not deal with ideology in a negative, misleading sense and in a way that legitimizes the status quo like it is in the notion of "false consciousness" that exists in the Marxist doctrine, which we have explained earlier. He speaks of "anti-ideologies" such as anti-racism or feminism. These anti-ideologies have also created their own ideologies. According to him, ideologies are not necessarily negative or dominant. Yet, this belief of his does not retain him from criticizing negative or dominant ideologies and to make a critical discourse analyses. (ibid, p: 16-17)

The precedents of these mediums whereby the dominant ideologies and the dominant discourse are reproduced are the mass communication mediums. This is because ideologies are not a form of "behaviour" or "action"; they are obtained through discourse. According to Van Dijk (2003), today schools and communication mediums undertake the role that the church had once played.

Discourse contributes to the reproduction of the relations, practices, subjects and objects that constitute the social world. Ideology is a structural notion that is learnt during the process of socialization, which was mentioned before. Discourse is also formed by these structures. In the meantime, it enables these structures to be reproduced. In this respect, there is a bilateral interaction between discourse and ideology.

In daily life, elements like image, syntax, intonation, issues, pre-assumptions, metaphors and reasoning could be counted as the main elements that constitute discourse. Adopting this to the news discourse, we could list elements like the page layout of the paper, the space that the news take and the font type as well as the colour of the typography for newspapers and, for televisions; the imagery, the order of news, the text, the intonation and the emphasis of the words and sentences used. In fact, the ideology of news presentation is not limited to these.

The collection of news, care for the resources, the interaction with other journalists and people who have a role in the news, both professional and other social ideologies of the journalists also determine essentially who will be researched and observed as well as priming and framing. (ibid, p: 47)

A name that first comes to mind regarding the subject of discourse is Foucault. The thinker, who makes use of Marxism and the notions of ideology, draws certain distinctions between discourse and ideology.

According to Foucault, the entirety of knowledge is determined by the combination of social, institutional and discursive pressure. A part of this knowledge defies the dominant discourses whereas another part of it is in co-operation with them. (Mills, 1999, cited in Söylem ve İdeoloji..., ed. Çoban ve Özarslan, 2003, p: 117)

Foucault dwells upon the relationship of discourse and ideology with the notions of power. The thinker disengages from the view of the Marxist theory, which claims that the power is an extension of the economic relations. Instead of believing that the economic base-structure determines what needs to be thought and said at certain times and that the state power is the only power, Foucault considers language as a field of struggle in relation to the notion of discourse. (Mills, 1999, p: 119)

As we have stated earlier, Marxists like Louis Althusser try to formulate a state power model that represents the state everywhere in the society and elevate the state as the source of power relations.

For Foucault, however, power is not owned by a group, cannot be easily kept under control and is in circulation within the society. It is a form of relation and action, which has been agreed on by people in every interaction and has never been stabilized. (Mills, 1999, p: 122)

Therefore, as Foucault explains with his notion of power, language/discourse is a field of struggle in the formation of the subject, which is in a hierarchy of relationships. Let us consider this within the context of news discourse that we have

exemplified above. Apart from the dominant news discourse produced by the journalists through their professional and other social ideologies, minorities, immigrants and feminist groups that can exist especially in the Internet medium take part in this discursive field of struggle as well. There is certainly a lingual field of struggle that could be based on the dominant discourse produced by the state that possesses the economic and the political power or the “ideological apparatuses of the state”.

Discourses do not submit to the power permanently. Discourse could be a tool or an impact of the power. Nevertheless, they could at the same time be an obstacle, a difficulty, a point of resistance or a starting point for an opposing strategy also. (Foucault, 1998, p: 100-101)

2.2.2 Ideology on the Media Studies

In addition to characterizing ideology as a notion that is vast and difficult to set boundaries for, we had also mentioned its superstructural place in classical Marxism in the chapter titled “The Concept of Ideology”. As ideology’s place is set to be in the “superstructure”, searching for ideology in the “media” that also is positioned in this structure, is immensely crucial for critical theories.

It is evident that one of the most distinctive characteristics of understandings of ideology which are adopted in media studies, is their relation with the Marxist tradition, both epistemologically and methodologically. Without a doubt, this is due to the fact that ideology debates in social sciences are mainly carried out through Marxism. (Çam, 2006, p: 10) However, one must not interpret this, as there aren’t any approaches to “ideology” in the mainstream studies. On the contrary, these types of studies explicitly hold a liberal ideology. Yet, the distinction is that mainstream media studies do not problematize ideology itself as a notion and understanding. Nonetheless, it would not be possible to say the studies that are separated from the mainstream studies do create homogeneity between them. (Çam, 2006, p: 11)

Approaches ranging from the Frankfurt School critical theory to the structuralist media studies or from the political economy approach of classical

Marxism to Cultural Studies, have been focusing on the correlation between ideology and media. When a distinction is made based on the problematics of the critical studies, roughly two lines become clear:

- 1) The line that focuses on the formation, construction and consumption of the media meanings
- 2) The line that focuses on the economical organizations and the relations of ownership of the media industries

In other words, approaches that concentrate on the superstructure (on culture, ideology and discourse) and approaches that concentrate on the base-structure (on material relations)... (Çiler Dursun, 2001, p: 21 cited in Alemdar, Erdoğan, 1990)

While in the Classical Marxist doctrine, the thesis that classes which possess economical power or ownership of the means of productions, will dominate the ideologies of the society is put forward, Neo-Marxists who stand close to the Frankfurt School have put emphasis on the determining quality of the “culture industry”. On the other hand, the theoreticians who are involved in the English Cultural Studies of which Stuart Hall leads the way, criticize the views of the Frankfurt School by arguing that the culture industry and the popular culture could be means of freedom and they have carried out studies with this thinking.

Nevertheless, despite of how it is dealt with, the “reality” that media creates with language or the discourse it produces have always been treated in their relation to power and its ideologies. This power could both be forced upon the subject by an external structure and produced amongst the subjects within the base-structure. The common point agreed upon by all these points of views is that reality is constructed with language and that power dynamics are produced within a discourse. It is also the fact that ideology, which approves the existence of the power, is reconstructed with discourse. The result of this is the role that communication and especially mass communication mediums play throughout this process. As Habermas indicates, ideology is a way of communication that is systematically distorted by the power – a form of discourse that has become the instrument of the tyranny and serves the purpose of legitimizing the organized power dynamics. (Eagleton, 1991, p: 183)

2.2.3 News Discourse

The language and the visual material used by the media have been chosen specifically, put together and constituted by the media professionals. Therefore, they are initially shaped by the points of views of the actors who edit it (reporter, editor, redactor, screenwriter, director and so on) and most importantly, they are formed in a way that suits the conditions of the political economy of the market which is comprised within the capitalist production relations.

We have already indicated that in this study, by the notion of media we mean the mass communication mediums like radio, television, newspaper, cinema and Internet. When talking about the media discourse, one could undoubtedly think of a TV entertainment show, a TV series, a cinema film, a newspaper article or radio theatre. In any case, we refer to all of this with the term “media” that we use. However, since it claims to include “truth” and “reality” in it, “news” which is a product of journalism, is distinctively significant for our study. Although media news are “constructed”, most of the times they could convince the spectator/reader that they are not. They declare each and every time in their discourses the assertion that they reflect the world and the truth as it is. Nevertheless, news texts are written in a context and are mostly positioned in an “intertextual” place. They are almost the “re-productions” of words that have been repeated many times before and of similar texts.

News are the representation of the world within language. Language, on the other hand, is a semiological code and imposes values. It is possible to express the same happening or concept with a different language and discourse. The main determining factor of discourse is the one’s ideology, life style, ideological structure of the message medium as well as the characteristics of the target audience. That is why, unlike common belief, the newspaper news are not the immediate reflections of the facts of the world we live in; but instead beliefs, values, theories, suggestions and ideologies. This is due to the fact that the language used in the news is not an unbiased mean which conveys to the target audience the meanings attached to it without adding anything from itself; it is a mean which rather constructs. (Fowler, 1991, p:1)

News use a language that is of the political elite's dominant system of meanings. The words used in the news reflect the dominant concepts and values. For instance, phrases like regulations, law, national interest, extreme powers, moderates, silent majority, morality and hauling down the education standards are all ideological hints. (Matheson, 2005, p: 24)

2.2.4 Nationalist Discourse and Media

As media –apart from a few exceptional cases– does not create a counter-power different to that of the dominant ideology or the ideology of the elite, we must understand the dominant power dynamics in order to make sense of the media discourse. The statements about the capitalist system of today changing in structure, which most of the thinkers dwell on, is the point that we need to understand firstly. As we have emphasized in this study, developments in the field of communication are in relation to the developments in the social field. Social advancements also determine communication. Nevertheless, without a doubt the developing communication systems contribute to the social/cultural changes in question as well. Many writers come up with different conceptions in order to describe the further stage of capitalism or the progressed stage of the industrialized society such as Daniel Bell's *"Post-industrial Society"*, Manuel Castells' *"Network Society"* and Baudrillard's *"Consumption Society"*. In addition, broader terms for describing today's society such as *"postmodern society"*, *"information society"* and *"knowledge society"* which put an emphasis on the close relationship between the structural transformation of capitalism and communication technologies are used often. One must examine this structural transformation in order to understand the nationalism rising in the era of globalization as well as the evolution of communication technologies.

At the end of the 20th century, the discourse that says that nation-state and nationalism have also come to an end with "globalization", a term that has started to be used frequently, is being often repeated. The theoreticians of nationalism who hold the modernist approach that we have tackled earlier on, have regarded nationalism as a necessity for the formation of a nation-state and the continuation of the existence of capitalism. Nation-state is the primary condition for the expansion of

the market, which capitalism's production of goods necessitates, and for the creation of a homogenous production-consumption environment.

Nationalism has succeeded in creating this homogenous society by removing classes with a definition such as "a unified community that lives on the same lands". Therefore, "*the modern and national citizenship has a parallel history with the progress of Western capitalism.*". (Sarıbay, 1992, p.92)

Nevertheless, as a result of the structural transformation that capitalism has undergone, nation-states are becoming increasingly more dependent on economic and social constitutions that exceed their borders. Having tried to expand their commerce and investment activities by making use of new possibilities that technology provides, companies have caused to put aside all old-fashioned nationalist politics that obstructed the international transactions of capital and goods. The "global capital" threatens the presence of nation-states.

"The economic globalization, which we could define as "the globalization of the capital", weakens the nation-states by creating a "boundless global market". Similarly, "cultural globalization" too has brought up the terms "alternative modernities" and "cultural identity". These cultural re-definitions problematize the notion of national development by causing local reactions." (Özbudun and Keyman, 2003, p.303)

According to Jameson, this new phase of capitalism has caused changes in the human psychology as well. With its impact increasing extraordinarily, the visual media has begun to determine substantially the processes of perception, learning and knowing of an average human being. With media, which is being controlled by a transnational capital, a new ideological understanding that exceeds the variables of time and space has started to dominate the world. Postmodernism has come up as a cultural framework for all these occurrences. (Jameson, 1990 cited in Şaylan, 2002, p.39)

Rejecting pluralism, diversity and homogeneity, postmodernism almost prepares the conceptual basis of globalization related discourses. Postmodern movements, which stress multiculturalism and shifting, permeable identities by

opposing to the dominance of a singular nation-identity, stand contrary to the nation-identity. According to Stuart Hall, national identities are not unitive as they were in the past. Identity is rebuilt and reinvented under the conditions of the changing postmodern society. (Hall, 1998, p.63-69)

In this case, it would seem reasonable to make assumptions at first glance that nationalism will vanish as the dependence on the state is decreasing in the age of globalization.

Based on the theses of theoreticians that stress globalization; just like “*print capitalism*” creating nations as Anderson mentions, “*electronic capitalism*” will give birth to transnational formations today as well and the same communicational processes that have initiated the national constructions will lead to the annihilation of state-nation in the future. (Dieckhoff ve Jaffrelot, 2010b, p.337)

Although all the predictions that we have summarized until now indicate that nation-state and nationalism will vanish, a lot of intellectuals today observe that nationalism is rising.

Nationalism, as a product of modernity, is a reality/fiction that continues and has influence on after modernity even for those who regard ‘postmodernism’ as an entirely disconnected phase to modernity. Therefore, it would be appropriate to speak of a new articulation rather than the disappearance of nationalism. (Bora, 1995, p: 13)

As Laclau sets forth with the notion of “articulation”, “nationalism” has been reshaped or has undergone a transformation by being articulated with a lot of ideologies, which could be considered to be different or even contrary to one another. Today, the rise of the movements of nationalism with the political-economic structural transformation and the process of globalization is being debated whereas they were believed to fade away.

At this point, Kurubaş points out to the “*contradictory dual character*” of nationalism. While on one hand, nationalism has a *unitive* function as the ideology of

an established nation-state; on the other hand, it also has a *divisive* function as the ideology of ethnic groups that want to build a nation-state. (Kurubaş, 2008, p.24) Today, a lot of societies witness the awakening of religious and ethnical sub-identities with the impact of the postmodernist movements introducing pluralism and diversity as an important value. The phenomena that will arise as a reaction to such a rise of the sub-identities shall be increasing nationalisms, hatred of foreigners and racism.

For these reasons, the nationalist discourse has the tendency to position itself as “us” and the “other”. In the era of globalization in which the bonds of nation-identity are relatively weakening, promising a democratic, free space –with Habermas’ saying, a “public space”– for the user, –where the viewer/reader is the “prosumer” (producer and consumer) as Christian Fuchs defines– (Fuchs, 2009, p: 83) where the content can be produced by the consumers by the Internet technology, the “new media” contains the nationalist and racist discourse which belongs to sub-identities and rises again as a reaction in parallel to the social transformation mentioned above.

The organizational and the ownership structure of media whereby this discourse is reproduced, plays an important role.

Mass media organizations and their corporate owners control both the financial and the technological production conditions of discourse. They partially manage the contents by doing selective investments, budget control, hiring (and firing) and sometimes, by their direct editorial influence or directives. As a private institution, media is financially dependent on advertising. The owners of big companies and the news actors who most of the times are institutional and are the providers of regular information for the media withhold this indirect control. (Van Dijk, 2008, p: 32)

According to Van Dijk, control cannot be simply described as “discourse” as a social practice. Control is having the ‘knowledge, opinions, attitudes and ideologies’ of the controlled ones under control as well as other personal and social representations. “In general, mind control is indirect, an intended but only possible or

probable consequence of discourse.” In other words, getting discourse under control is getting minds under control. Since humans’ actions are controlled by their minds, getting their minds and thus, their knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values, is also indirectly getting their “actions” under control. These actions may be discursive. So, the strong discourse affects the other related discourses. (ibid, p: 9)

Van Dijk names the producers of the dominant, strong discourses as the “symbolic elites”. Symbolic elites are journalists, writers, artists, directors, academics and other groups that exercise power on the basis ‘symbolic capital’. “They may set the agendas of public discussion, influence topical relevance, manage the amount and type of information especially who is being publicly portrayed and in what way. They are the manufacturers of public knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, morals and ideologies. Hence their symbolic power is also a form of ideological power.” Along with the political, economic and military elites, the symbolic elites are also governed by the state or private companies. Therefore, it is difficult to speak of the liberty of their discourses. The ideology of the elites cannot be independent from those who pay or somehow support them. Only very small groups can form a counter-power. (ibid, p: 32-33)

2.2.4.1 Reproduction of Nationalist Discourse and the Media

In this century, the economic-political-social transformation mentioned above which is supported by the communication technologies gave a new dimension to the studies on nationalism as well. The new movements that make their way into almost every field of social sciences changed the extent of the debates about nationalism since the end of 1980’s. The first of these changes was the criticism of one of the most prominent of classical nationalism studies; the male dominant and Western-centred perspectives that ignored the social divisions as well as power relations and forgot about the everyday life. The other was the interdisciplinary attribute of nationalism studies becoming significant. (Özkırımlı, 2008, p: 238-239)

The classical movements of nationalism have made macro statements and were not quite interested with the quotidian. Most of the times, nationalism has been

defined as a political ideology which sustains the structure of the nation-state, power to rule masses, a mean of the elites for obtaining a homogenous culture by imposing “high culture” on masses as well as a “discovered, created and imagined” thought, doctrine which unites societies with a new cultural system around a perception of time and space, as a consequence of many social changes.

“... they tend to focus too much on the state and the position of the elites as if society naturally follows what they have been taught. This is a very harsh and simplifying criticism when the differences in the approaches of the scholars are considered, yet their motivation to seek structures and beginnings leads to a black hole in terms of how nationalism survives and changes through the interaction between different actors both above and below.” (Türkoğlu, 2008, p:5)

The sustainability of nationalism depends on its reproduction everyday. Nationalism is not constant, unchangeable and given. It is not enough to imagine society; those nations that are imagined must constantly remind themselves of their existence. This could only be possible through the presence of nationalist discourse in the popular grounds. In this sense, media, in fact the “new media” which has been renamed as a result of the incredible momentum in the communication technologies and holds the potential to ensure the interaction we have mentioned amongst the masses, plays an important role in sustaining nationalism with the reproduction of this discourse.

According to Özkırımlı, there are three characteristics of the nationalist discourse:

- Nation comes before anything else. National interests are above all the other values and interests.
- Acting on behalf of a nation legitimizes a great deal of things, which, under normal circumstances, could be regarded as crime.
- It divides the world into two; it defines “us” according to the “others” and keeps this distinction alive, as it is unable to be sure of itself. (Özkırımlı, 2008, p: 285-286)

The re-establishment and the reproduction of the nationalist discourse take place within the routines of the everyday life. The English social psychologist Michael Billig draws attention to precisely this point with his notion of “banal nationalism”: ‘The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building.’ (Billig, 2006, p: 8)

Billig stands against describing nationalism as a concept that emerges only during the “crisis” periods in the Western nation-states. During this crises, for instance it is not that nationalism spreads out like an infection in the state of war, and after the crisis, once the fever goes down, the flags are shelved. Nor it does not emerge on national holidays and suddenly disappear afterwards. National identity is repeated countlessly within the daily routine. This process gets into us in an immensely natural and ordinary way. Billig calls this notion “banal nationalism”. As quoted above, the biggest indication of banal nationalism is not the flags that fly over the streets on national holidays; but is the “unwaved” flags hung at public buildings where everyone needs to visit for some reason, which do not attract anyone’s attention. (ibid, p: 8)

Without being noticed, our national identity is reminded to us through the use of language. *“To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood.”* (ibid, p: 8) Therefore a lot of the studies on nationalism and national identity need a discourse analysis.

Media, in our postmodern world where nationalism remains crucial as the dominant ideology, reconstructs nationalism through discourse. As Laclau puts forward with his notion of “articulation”, “nationalism” takes part in the media by being articulated with a variety of discourses based on today’s changing conditions.

Hobsbawm, who draws attention to mass media’s potential of standardizing, homogenizing and transforming popular ideologies, argues that mass media is influential in turning national symbols into a part of each individual’s life. (Hobsbawm, 1993, p: 142)

Whilst newspapers and readers determine the newsworthiness, they make references to “stereotypes”, framings, paradigms and schemes. Stereotypes are mental divisions. Events and individuals are places into these divisions and thus, certain events and people are made easier to understand: mother, patriot, businessman, neighbour, hooligan, foreigner and so on. (Fowler 1991, p: 17)

Politicians are familiar figures in the electronic era and their faces constantly appear on newspapers and television screens. Political discourse is significant in the daily reproduction of nations. While they address the nation, politicians claim that they speak on behalf of the nation by using the “we” rhetoric. (Billig, op.cit., p: 96-97)

Media, on the other hand, reconstructs and represents this discourse of the politicians. Billig gives examples from media for the notion, which he calls “homeland making deixis”. In expressions like “the Prime Minister” or “one of the nation’s most wanted men” used in the English media, the prime minister stands for the British Prime Minister and the nation for Britain. On the weather broadcast too, the map of Britain would be on the screen but it would never be labelled with its name, “Britain”. It is assumed that everyone will remember the national borders from the shape of the map. (ibid, p: 114-117) Although the language that media establishes here does not openly say “we”, it still is a language that refers to a nation.

Regarding the line that divides homeland and other nations, Billig expresses that; “*we are habitually at home in a textual structure, which uses the homeland’s national boundaries, dividing the world into ‘homeland’ and ‘foreign’*”. (ibid, p: 119).

All media products are “textual structures” and these structures are built on the pre-supposition of “us” and “not from us”. For this reason, the media discourse naturalizes the distinction between us and the others, without needing to use the words “us” and “other”.

CHAPTER 3: VIOLENCE AND NATIONALISM ON THE MEDIA

3.1 Debates on Violence

Looking at the root of the term “violence”, we see that it has derived from “violentia” in Latin. Violentia means rigidity, or brutal personality, power. The verb violare, carries the meaning of behaving in a violent way, not appreciating, going against the rules. These words are related to “vis”. Vis, on the other hand means strength, power, authority, use of physical strength, and at the same time the core or the essence of something. (Micaud, p:5) In the Turkish dictionary, just as in English, the connotation of using brute force is emphasized (TDK). An extensive definition by Yves Micaud suggests that violence is “in the interaction of one or more persons, behavior of one or several of the parties in a way that would harm the physical integrity or conventional (ethical, moral, spiritual) integrity or property or symbolic and cultural values directly or indirectly, collectively or dispersedly, regardless of the extent” (Micaud 1991, p: 11).

In daily use, the word violence has a negative attribution. A person who characterizes an act as an act of “violence”, uses this word to express the fallacy of the act which they witnessed as the audience. The acts we define as violence are not legitimate for us. If the act were deemed to be rightful, a definition other than “violence” would be used for the act. The kind of violence one or a country uses in order to defend itself is referred to as self defense or violence that state’s security officers use as “use of force”. As can be seen from this, the usage of the word may change depending on the ideology of one or groups and could make a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence. Furthermore, both individual and social violence can be easily justified and legitimized.

It is another aspect of the discussion whether apart from being solely aimed at causing physical pain, psychological violence is still considered violence or not although it doesn't include an attack on physical integrity. Galtung, who is an important figure in the debates centered around violence, argues that violence can be both physical and psychological and talks about the notion of "structural violence". According to him, for instance in a society that possesses the necessary knowledge and equipment that would hinder tuberculosis related deaths, if there still are people who die due to this specific disease, then that is "structural violence". This is a form of situational violence that doesn't have a perpetrator or an evident subject individual or group. (Galtung, 1969, p: 168)

In the recent discussions, the term violence has been expanded to include first of all physical violence as well as psychological violence, and secondly from the scope of individual acts to social structures.

How can violence, an act with all these negative attributions, still exist among individuals and in social spheres? Eric Fromm, who says aggression in humans is a form of defense just like in animals and it serves the biological life, adds: "... man differs from the animal by the fact that he is a killer; he is the only primate that kills and tortures members of his own species without any reason, either biological or economic, and who feels satisfaction in doing so." (Fromm, 1974, p: 4-5)

3.2 Violence and Power Dynamics

Whether violence is a consequence of human nature is a field of research for psychology, psychiatry and neurology sciences. However, violence certainly is not solely an issue for these fields. Along with reasons for conflict, human beings also have a desire to coexist peacefully. In that case, violence is also a social and political issue. The existence of "the state" is justified as a solution for the limitation of use of violence. Hobbes believes that without a state, people would be in a constant war and this situation would not end without a general power, which keeps people in a state of fear. (Hobbes, p: 94)

In this context, it needs to be pointed out that the close relationship between violence and political power is an issue to dwell upon by many thinkers. Weber's definition of state as a political unity which is the monopoly of "legitimate violence" is a common concept in political sciences. Although in this concept, considering the historical conditions, the unity of violence and power is inevitable, there are other points of view that don't embrace this approach. Hannah Arendt, suggests there is a distinction between power and violence. She even asserts that they are complete opposites. According to Arendt, violence cannot coexist with power, it can destroy power when it weakens, and yet, it cannot create a new power as long as it remains as "violence".

"Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance. This implies that it is not correct to think of the opposite of violence as nonviolence; to speak of nonviolent power is actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it." (Arendt, 1963, p: 56)

According to Arendt, a government that is based on means of violence has never come into existence. Even a totalitarian governor whose mean of supremacy is torture, needs a grassroots to support him. (ibid. p: 56) In other words, violence cannot be an element on its own that sustains power. Violence is only a mean. However, power has a goal in itself. Violence can be justified in order to reach a goal but can nevertheless be legitimized like power.

Arendt and Marx are on common grounds on violence being a tool for the dominators to guarantee their dominance and being born from a social involvement. According to Marx, violence is a result of a form of modern tyranny that is grounded on capitalism. On the other hand, since violence is a tool, it can also be used to ensure revolutionary change. (Geisen, 2009, p:45) Arendt, who states that no revolution will solve social issues and that all attempts aiming to mobilize political tools with this objective will result in terror, diverges from the Marxist thought with this assertion. (Arendt, op.cit., p: 108)

Power in Marxism, is a tool in the hands of capitalist governments to maintain ongoing production affairs and to pursue bourgeoisie dominance. Foucault criticizes the ways in Marxism deals with power in lines of “violence”, “ownership” and “sovereignty”. Even though Foucault agrees with the impact of regeneration of production affairs in changes in power relations, he disagrees with Marxism on this being the determining factor. Foucault, instead, describes new power relations that have penetrated the public in a more efficient manner than “sovereign power”. (Altunok, p: 65-66)

Foucault names these new power mechanisms “bio-power”. At the end of 18th century, punishment has stopped being the ruler’s demonstration of violence the way it was in monarchical regime. Before, the ruler used to conduct the right to live by activating the right to kill or not. The right on “life and death” was the right to kill or to let one live. (Foucault, 1978, p: 138)

The right to end one’s life with power with physical torment in the public eye, as a punishment for a damage to the ruler’s power has been altered since the 18th century with new forms of power that dominates the western world.

To the contrary of the former forms of power that were determined by the ruler’s right to kill or grant, this new form of power is favorable, productive and aimed at supporting living. (Canpolat, 2005, p: 102)

“One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death. (Foucault, op.cit, p: 138)

In this modern society; institutions such as family, school, prison and asylum serve as institutions that normalize and fit individuals into society. Bio-power, by eliminating physical violence, gives the new power the right to control the biological existence of the individual and renders that individual productive and compatible in the capitalist system. After all, according to Foucault, bio-power is an indispensable component of capitalism. This is because capitalism requires that body is converted into labor power, it takes a part in production force and that the population is kept under control with respect to economic processes. (ibid, p: 140-141)

“The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life. During the classical .. period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines - universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the Subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of "bio-power." (ibid., p: 139-140)

According to Foucault, power has developed in two ways. One of these regards the body as a “machine”. It aims to discipline the body, increase its capabilities, and coalesce with effective economic control systems. This is the “anatomo-politics” of the human body. The second is centered around the “body” that is the base for biological processes. Birth, mortality rates, health levels, length of life and all conditions that could affect these are deemed important. For all these, a series of interventions and controls are conducted. This is the biopolitics of the population. Therefore, according to Foucault there are two aspects of the goal of power: human body and the biopolitics of the population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population make up the two poles of life. (ibid., p: 139) Thus, the modern power doesn’t use its authority explicitly to kill or for violence like in the monarchal order.

As it can be understood from the aforementioned, new power is built on extending length of life, increase opportunities and lessen the harms caused by vital hazards. Yet, this doesn’t necessarily mean that modern power is purified from violence. On the opposite, Foucault believes the birth of bio-power is what introduced racism into state mechanism. Biological racism, in this kind of power, legitimates death.

One must digress at this point to mention the relation between the notions of racism and nationalism. Foucault interprets bio-politics in relation to racism rather than its relation to “nationalism”. The reason for this is the redundancy of academic

texts that are commonly recognized on nationalism during the time period Foucault was making these analyses. Also, the fact that he was dealing with Nazism directed Foucault to use the notion of racism. Nevertheless, throughout history racism and nationalism have been two intertwined notions. The relation between the two is an issue of historical articulation. Even though it expresses an extremism compared to nationalism, racism it is always necessary for nationalism to come into existence. (Mermertaş, 2012, p: 160-161)

Foucault discusses the introduction of bio-power in the 19th century and its relation to racism through the increasing strategic significance of sexuality. Sexuality exists at the point where body and population intercept. It is assumed that an individual who is inclined to sexual exorbitance will cause depraved heritage and this depravity will transcend generations. (Foucault, cited in Mermertaş, op. cit., p: 162)

This condition leads to the perception that population or race should be protected. By segmenting the biological fields, power positions groups within a population as inferior or superior. As the inferior types disappear, those who are considered abnormal individuals will also disappear and the population will be healthier, pure and long lasting. “In other words, what will render life healthier and pure is the death of the other, the death of the inferior race.”(Canpolat, op.cit. p: 105)

As Foucault presents with the notion of bio-power, although modern power seems to have excluded death and killing, it is possible to say violence has continued to exist and has even escalated up until our century by changing its form. Nationalism, on the other hand, is deemed as the biggest argument that is used in pointing out to the “other” or the “enemy” to whom social violence can be directed nowadays.

3.3 Nationalism, Violence and Their Representation on The Media

It is impossible not to bring up violence if there exist minorities or groups defined outside of the national identity that is created by the nation-state. As mentioned before, it could be said that declaring those who are outside the national identity’s definition of “us” created based on a common history, goal, idea and

symbols, the enemy aggravates violence. The foremost among the mediums whereby this definition is reproduced is mass media.

3.3.1 Media and Violence

There have been countless studies conducted for years in the fields of sociology, psychology or communications on the effects of “violence” portrayed in mass media on individuals or societies. Whether there is a correlation between violence, as it exists in real life, and the ways in which it is being portrayed in media has been the primary question of these studies.

There are two general approaches to the effects of violence in media: “social learning approaches” and “the catharsis model”. Social learning approaches argue that individuals will imitate anything they see. For instance, a child learns how to tie his/her shoelaces by observing an adult and modeling their behavior. Similarly, those individuals who watch violent media could develop many more and stronger violence scenarios in real life compared to those who don’t consume this type of media. The catharsis model, however, suggests the opposite view. To the contrary, those who consume media violence exhibit less aggressive behavior. This is because one has to somehow express or release aggression that biologically exists in human nature. Media violence “may provide an outlet or release for aggressive drives”. Amongst these two models, “social learning approaches” is the model that has been largely recognized in the last years. (Ferguson, 2010, p: 42-43)

Paik and Comstock (1994) have scrutinized numerous studies conducted on the effects of violence portrayed in television in 30 years and have found a strong correlation between children being exposed to violence portrayed in media and their display of anti-social behavior. On the other hand, it has been determined that this is also influential in adulthood not only in childhood. (p: 516-546)

American Psychiatric Association (APA) states in an article on the subject as follows:

“The debate is over. Over the last three decades, the one overriding finding in

research on the mass media is that exposure to media portrayals of violence increases aggressive behavior in children.” (APA, 2013)

Furthermore, violence in media does not only stimulate aggressive behavior. Excessive imagery of violence renders people insusceptible to violence. Croft and Courrier have gotten similar results in their research they had conducted in 1973. In addition to this, individuals who are exposed to intense media violence develop the perception that world is a considerably dangerous place. Studies conducted by Gerbner and his colleagues demonstrate that immediate environment not being thought as safe, the exaggeration of crime rates and the possibility of being a victim as well as fear of crime are concerns. (Kalin, 1997, cited in Özer, 2007, p: 163)

In media, it is usually the “other” that is being associated with crime and violence. In this way, fear of those who are different is spread. In a nation-state that aims to create a homogenous society, all kinds of differences are in fact perceived as a threat to the nation-state. This threat turn into violence towards the “other”. Violence directed at the “other” manifests itself initially in the discursive field.

Media plays an active role in emphasizing prejudice towards the “other” and discursive violence. (Çoban, 2008, p: 4) Expressing the discursive violence of the dominant group in the society, media makes social practices based on violence appear legitimate and ordinary. (ibid., p: 1)

3.3.2 Violence, Media and “Others”

The nationalist discourse, in our minds, divides the world into two and is continuously reproduced in order to keep this division alive. Within the wholeness required by being a member of the same nation, we need to define them in order to define ourselves.

According to Julia Kristeva, “we come to the only modern, acceptable, and clear definition of foreignness: the foreigner is the one who does not belong to the state in which we are, the one who does not have the same nationality”. (Kristeva, 1991, p: 96)

In his Social Identity Theory where he sets forth the components of the group psychology, the British social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1981) provides the following example for a group defining itself: “a nation will only exist if body of people feel themselves to be a nation”. (p: 229) In Tajfel’s view, groups can be groups only if they define themselves to be a group. This tendency categorizes the world. The Social Identity Theory points out to this social distinction, which requires a group identity and its categorization. A table is a table because it is not a chair. Being a member of an ingroup categorically requires a disparity from an outgroup. Imagining our community could be possible by imagining its difference from “them”. One needs a social positive identity and seeks for that. “It can be assumed that an individual will tend to remain a member of a group and seek membership of new groups if these groups have some contribution to make to the positive aspects of his social identity”. (ibid, p: 256)

Billig states that nations produce “flattering stereotypes” of themselves, and despised stereotypes of those other nations. The honorary stereotypes are characteristics of the ingroup whereas the ones that are not honorary are of the other group. This way, the positive self-identity needed for the continuation of the group is sustained. (Billig, op.cit, p: 66)

The “we” that is defined around a common fate, a common history and language is a unique identity. Our character and idiosyncrasy is passed on from generation to generation like a genetic heritage. A sense of “our” uniqueness and integrity is conveyed. (ibid, p: 71)

In order to define itself, this identity has to use what it isn’t. As Tajfel (1981) also states, there can be no ‘us’ without a ‘them’ and describing who we are, indicates who ‘we’ are not.

By detaching “us” from “them”, stereotypes carry on our assertion of the “unique of identity”. Usually, in this definition, the ingroup considers itself normal, standard and unmarked in reference to the deviant. For instance, “If they, the French are stereotyped as ‘emotional’, it is with implicit reference to ‘our’ presumed, non-emotional standards. Or conversely another group might be stereotyped as ‘cold’, whereas ‘we’ will be neither ‘cold’ (too cold) nor ‘emotional’ (too emotional).” (Biilg, op.cit., p: 81)

Teun A. Van Dijk’s series of discourse analytical case studies of news contain some significant indications regarding the presentation of social groups in the media. Minorities, refugees, squatters, and Third World countries and people are portrayed in contrast to the way powerful groups and nations are presented. Van Dijk summarizes the results of his case studies as follows:

“these and other groups a) tend to have less access to the dominant mass media b) are used less as credible and routine sources c) are described stereotypically if not negatively, primarily as a ‘problem’, if not as a burden or even as a threat to our valued resources d) are assumed to be “deficient” or “backward” in many ways, as compared to our norms, goals, expertise, or culture, and therefore, e) need our (altruistic) help, understanding, or support, assuming they adapt to our social and political norms and ideology.” (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 56)

The western media discourse often presents the Third World nations in an ethnocentric and stereotypical way. Van Dijk puts forth a standard list of the ethnic news that are opted most often:

- immigration and reception of newcomer;
- socioeconomic issues, (un)employment;
- cultural differences;
- crime, violence, drugs and deviance
- ethnic relations, discrimination (ibid, p: 112)

As we see in this stereotypical list, the weak groups in the social structure are portrayed in a negative way in the media. Although not explicitly, Van Dijk reveals in the studies he has conducted, how this discourse is built with the use of active-passive sentences. The composition in both the headline and the background of the

news is prone to positive self-presentation and negative other presentation. A “resentment” or “diserimination” that exists within the practices of the members of the dominant group is never punctuated. Instead, “resentment” or “diserimination” is made abstract by being presented as a phenomenon. (ibid, p: 113)

“Their” negative actions are highlighted with topicalization, first page coverage, headlining and rhetorical emphasize. Nonetheless, “our” negative actions are not emphasized and negative self-presentation is avoided by means of mitigation, euphemism as well as denial. (Van Dijk, 2000, p: 38-39)

As the main news sources of the media are politicians, official authorities, state institutions or company directors, newspapers usually use the “white elite source text”. In this case, there is no room for alternative voices. “Because of a lack of alternative information sources about ethnic relations, the effects of such daily reporting of the models and attitudes of many white readers are predictable: widespread prejudice and xenophobia.” (op.cit , p: 75)

It is not a coincidence that in this century xenophobia is increasing a result of the groups, which we call “us”, considering those who are not one of them to be a threat to themselves as well as the fear and anger they feel towards the “other”. What strengthen the defensive feelings towards these supposed threats is advanced capitalism and the extremely rapid developments in the mass communication technologies which sets off globalization. International migrations and cities that become cosmopolitan may undoubtedly be the main argument of the sociological studies that search for the reasons of the increase of these identity conflicts. Yet, another important reason that could be mentioned along this is the rapid developments in the mass communication mediums, which enhance the feeling that the “other” is very near to us and which bring the world closer together.

The expressions in the daily life that contain anger, prejudice and hostility towards a certain group or people have become established in our language by being inherited socially either through state politics or popular products. Although it is hard to directly say that it is the media means that produce these expressions, we see that they are often repeated in the media contents and thus, naturalized.

News provoke the prejudice and hate crimes in the society by including the discursive and ideological elements based on the definition of “us” of the dominant ideology and by using negative and sarcastic statements, swear words, insult as well as humiliation. “Media, which reproduces nationalism and racism, directs hatred towards the “others” especially during the times of crisis and conflict; it creates an atmosphere of “insanity” and “lynch”. As a natural result of this, this atmosphere is internalized legitimately and inheritably.” (İnceoğlu, 2012, p: 13)

Such a discourse, which instigates the anger towards the others and therefore hate crimes, has been named “hate speech” and in 1997 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has defined this notion as follows: “the term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.” (Ann Weber, 2009, p: 3)

Although hate speech is considered as a crime in many EU countries, it is regarded to be a concept that conflicts with freedom of speech in the U.S.A.. However, hate speech has a quality that is more than a tough criticism. This controversial relation between freedom of speech and hate speech goes on. Beside this, Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe underline the fact that propagating hate speech through media will be more harmful. In media, which feeds the prejudices against the “other” groups, everything that appears normal, rational and logical as well as the unsaid, rather than what is said, make the diagnosis of hate speech much more difficult. (İnceoğlu 2012, p: 153-154)

Discourse normalised and naturalised by media is the primary source of violence. Violence discourse towards the minorities that is developed by mass media, normalises the racist discourse articulated with nationalism. In this way, violence committed against the “other” is legitimatised by the society. “Media, which reproduces nationalism and racism, directs hate towards the others especially in the times of crisis and conflict, and creates an atmosphere of “insanity” and “lynch”. As

a natural consequence, this atmosphere is internalized as being legitimate and natural.” (İnceoğlu, 2012, p:13)

The notion Van Dijk calls “new racism”, points right at this “symbolic” and “discursive” form of violence. According to new racism, minorities are not biologically inferior, but, different. Minorities, despite having “deficiencies” in many ways and “pathologies” that need to be fixed, have distinct cultures. New racism, unlike old racism, abstains from explicit violence and is discursive. These discourses are deemed so normal, so natural, and so commonsensical by all mass media in everyday conversation and create ethnic hegemony which is a form of legitimate ideology and stands recognized by the dominant majority. (Van Dijk, 2000, p: 34-35)

This ethnic hegemony created in discourses, exposes minorities to discursive violence which is the source of behavioral violence. Media with this discursive violence “leads individuals to develop a tendency to legitimize the use of violence on others as well as being subject to violence by others” (Oskay, 1996, p: 195)

3.4 Nationalism and Violence in The Turkish Media (Samples)

To begin with, it has to be said that; media “naturalizes” the separation of the world as “us” and “others”, in Billig’s words, in an extremely “banal” way. It invariably separates the world into two as “homeland” and “foreign”. (Billig, op.cit. p: 119). Media in Turkey, does not constitute an exception on this matter and draws upon similar arguments.

In their study, Özkırımlı and Yumul, (2000) revealed that the Turkish media relies on national news quantitatively much more than on international news. Looking at 38 newspapers in an average day 82% of the news they examined were “domestic” news, whereas only 18% were international news. 72% of the newspapers that were included in the research separated news as “foreign” and “domestic”. For international news, titles such as “the World”, “the World Tour”, “Foreign News” were used, while there were no such titles as “Home News” and so on, used for domestic news. Unless indicated otherwise, all news are “domestic news”. And yet this situation is deemed “natural” by readers. (p: 791)

Roughly one third of the newspapers included in the study were using a Turkish flag, a map of Turkey or a slogan in their logos that would connote “homeland” or “national identity”. Some of these are as follows: “Turkey for the Turks” (Hürriyet), “The newspaper of those who love their country” (Akşam), “The best newspaper of Turkey” (Sabah), “The best newspaper of new Turkey” (Günaydın) etc. (ibid., p: 789)

In Turkey, especially in the cases of national matches, contests like Eurovision, international political crises, (Kardak Crisis-1996, the “one minute” crisis that occurred in the World Economic Forum in Davos-2009, Süleyman Şah Tomb Crisis-2014) or in situations of intense competition in the international arena, all media in unison reproduces the nationalist discourse and its legitimacy.

The nationalist discourse in media that reproduces national identity needs to define the “other” in order to define “us”. Turkish nationalism, as have been stated before, creates a different “other” every term largely by means of media. It is again media that portrays the “other” as a threat and keeps the fear of the “other” as well as discursive violence alive.

Minorities, Kurds, LGBTTs, Jews, gypsies, women and so on, are groups that have been marginalized.

Minorities are targeted primarily with nationalist cliches. Hürriyet: “Armenians slaughtered Jews and Muslims”, “Armenians are covering their barbarity with the myth of massacre”, Akşam: “Armenian delegate’s complex about Turkey”, “Diaspora’s first lie”, “Armenian in pursuit of games”, Sabah: “‘Massacre’ insolence of NY Times”, “TIME also gave in to the Armenian lobby”, “Objection to Armenian Diaspora buying Petkim”, “Armenian protest outside our consulate”, Milli Gazete: “After Armenians, now Assyrians...”, “Armenian massacre claims are acts of aid and abet terror”, Yeni Şafak: “If there is one Armenian there is no massacre”.

The language of the news titles is one that assumes itself completely purified from all negativities, aims to correct and even snub all the “others” except for itself. (Çoban, 2007,p:150)

Looking simply at the titles of certain sample news and articles in Hate Speech Periodical Report (2012) by Hrant Dink Foundation, reveals the discursive violence directed at the other: “Flame that burned Ottoman Empire is lit by a homo lighter” (Yeni Akit-Bekir Yalçınkaya- 08.10.2012), “Terror will not end with words, we want actions!” (Anayurt-06.09.2012), “Impious, faithless and dishonorable bastards” (Güneş-Mehmet Memiş Hoca-14.09.2012), “Armenian operations of the missionaries” (Aydınlık-Mehmet Perinçek-21.09.2012) (Hrant Dink Foundation, Nefret Söylemi Raporu/Hate Speech Report, 2012)

Yeğen, on the other hand, suggests that the discursive violence towards Kurds has not decreased even after the low density war that ended in the late 1990’s and exemplifies as such: In May 2003, after a Kurd named Abdurrahman Mustafa won the Kerkük election as the governor, Star newspaper published the caption “Kerkürt” which means donkey-Kurd. (op. cit. p: 75)

A more recent example (October 23, 2011) is the sentence Duygu Canbaş, the newscaster in Habertürk television channel has made after the Van Earthquake ; “Although this tragic news comes from Van, the east of Turkey, it upset us all”. Television presenter Müge Anlı has also used the same nationalist and marginalizing language in her statement about the same incident; “You first throw stones, hunt soldiers like birds, and then ask for help. One must know his place” (Atv-October 24, 2011).

As it can be remembered that columnist Yılmaz Özdil’s (Hürriyet-January 6, 2012) article in which he drew the analogy of “mules” for 35 people who had lived off smuggling and were killed (mistaken for terrorists) in Uludere, Şırnak, by F-16 aircrafts that belonged to the Turkish Armed Forces, which is known as the Roboski Massacre, has nearly become the symbol of hate speech in recent years.

Unfortunately, it is also hard to say that apart from mainstream media, social media in Turkey has a different configuration.

According to Irak and Yazıcıoğlu (2012)'s findings from their studies on social media (what they call "new media") in which they analyzed approximately 150 thousand messages for six months, "it can be easily said that communities that spring up with the possibilities of social media spread hate speech rather than showing agency". (p:131)

However, it should be indicated that "new media" could provide a relative free platform for minorities, opponents and disparate groups that aim to form an alternative to the dominant discourse.

CHAPTER 4: A CASE STUDY OF THE NEWS ABOUT WOMEN “VILLAGE GUARDS” ON TEN MOST CLICKED NEWS WEBSITES

In our study, we will be making a critical discourse analysis about a news that has been published on a number of news sites on the Internet. The reason for the choice of Internet news is to grasp better the way news appear on the new generation media with the development of communication technologies. As the newspapers news, Internet news is comprised of a text and has a headline, a spot and a caption. It could also include sound, photographs or images as radio or television news. Unlike the other media tools, its place and its position on the page could change instantaneously. It could receive comments/likes from the reader/viewer. Therefore, it provides the opportunity of getting instant feedback. The news professionals such as an editor or a reporter could be guided. The reader/viewer may shape the content of the same news or the news to follow. Furthermore, it has the potential to reach significantly more people than the other media channels. It could also differ from newspaper, magazine, radio and television in terms of ownership. Being the owner of an Internet site is simpler and less costly than owning a television channel or a newspaper. As it is much easier to measure the ratings of readership/viewership (how many clicks it gets), it is considered to be a lot more efficient in reaching target audiences by the advertisers. As it is based on the principle of getting more advertisements and therefore more clicks, it may be assumed that it can be shaped by the reader/viewer in a much easier and direct way. As a result, it reflects the tendencies of the masses much more accurately. Surely there are other features of Internet journalism that justify our skeptic approach to these assumptions. We won't be discussing these features in length, as they constitute another subject of study. However at this point we must underline that it is most certain that all the advantages that Internet is presumed to provide with must be reconsidered for access to Internet technologies and thus to information is much more difficult or impossible for the lower socio-economic segment of the world population.

4.1 The Selection of the Case Study and the Research Question

In this study the question of whether or not Internet news sites have the potential of creating a language beside the widespread nationalist discourse, which we see in the mainstream media encouraging violence and has been put forth in many studies conducted up to this date, will be discussed. The chance of the Internet technology creating, in Foucault's words, a "counter-discourse" about those who are excluded in the definition of nation-state takes part in the widespread nationalist discourse since the foundation of the Republic, such as Kurds, Armenians, Jews, gypsies, Alewis, feminist groups, LGBTTs and so on, undoubtedly excites everyone carrying out academic studies in this field.

With the aim of contributing to these studies, we have herein tried to make a critical discourse analysis of the news on "The female guards who serve in Tunceli" which was served by Anadolu Agency and has appeared on 9 of the most clicked 10 Internet site.

The reason why we have chosen this news is the fact that the subject of the news is women and they have a close relationship with violence since they are "village guards", also that this news is about that the Kurds are regarded as the "other" of Turkish Nation-identity (even if no ethnic identities are mentioned explicitly in the news)

Without a doubt, our study seems to be limited to make a generalization about the whole of the Internet medium. While it provides us with a vast field of information, Internet also creates a slippery surface that is difficult to work on. Due to its nature, the information on the Internet is changeful and fast speed. They contain hundreds of unaccredited data, news and comment. For instance, it is not quite possible to do a retrospective research and technically have access to all the requested data on Twitter, which is still one of the most popular social media network. Yet, there are studies carried out by means of instantaneously recording the agenda that keeps changing instantaneously by more than one researcher and

extending the research over a long period of time. The nationalist discourse in social media networks, news sites, blogs and many other mediums has become so popular/mundane that there will be hundreds of examples that won't be a part of the data which will be included in the field of research. For this reason, we have made a choice of a case study in the light of the information that we have so far acquired through observation and research. We have tried to make a critical discourse analysis by focusing on a single news story, which was selected with the judgment sampling technique. The crucial point here is that this news has appeared on 9 of the most clicked news sites and that the ways it deals with the elements of nationalism and violence are worth scrutinizing.

Served by the state's news agency, Anadolu Agency, this news is notable in terms of reflecting the dominant ideology, the elements of nationalism as well as its stance towards women and ethnic differences.

4.2 Methodology: Teun A. Van Dijk and Critical Discourse Analysis

In this study, the news on the "Female 'guards' who serve in Tunceli", which was served by Anadolu Agency (AA) on April 1, 2013 and has appeared more or less simultaneously on 9 of the most clicked¹ 10 Internet sites, has been analyzed based on Teun A. Van Dijk's method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

Van Dijk who approaches news as a discourse and accordingly builds a framework of analysis, has tried to reveal the link between discourse and ideology by drawing attention to the context in addition to the text. A guide for many researches of media-discourse-racism, The CDA method appears to be a method that is appropriate for our study as well.

In the 2nd chapter of our study, we had covered Van Dijk's studies and conclusions in the context of otherization, and had referred to the link between discourse and ideology as well as its reproduction by means of mass communication mediums.

¹ IAB According to the data of January 2013 of the Turkey Internet Computation Research.
<http://www.iabturkiye.org/>

In this chapter we will touch upon the factors of the CDA method that we use.

CDA essentially is a discourse analysis method, which operates within a social and political context on the subjects of hegemony and inequality (social power abuse, dominance, inequality) and social power, which is reproduced and preserved through speech or text. (Van Dijk, 2001, p: 352)

According to Van Dijk, the main goal of the discourse analysis is to reveal the systematic descriptions of units of language use, which we could call “discourse”.

Discourse is two dimensional for it has a textual and a contextual dimension. *“Textual dimensions account for the structures of discourse at various levels of description. Contextual dimensions relate these structural descriptions to various properties of the context, such as cognitive processes and representations or sociocultural factors.”* (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 24-25)

In order to understand Van Dijk’s discourse analysis, one must study his definition of ideology and the correlation he makes between “ideology” and “discourse”. According to Van Dijk, ideology is a basic framework for organizing the social cognitions shared by the members of group. Ideology basically functions as the interface between the cognitive representations and processes underlying discourse and action. (Van Dijk, 1995, p: 17-18)

“In other words ideologies are localized between the societal structures and the structures of the minds of social members. They allow social actors to translate their social properties (identity, goal, position, etc.) into the knowledge and beliefs that make up concrete models of their everyday life experiences, that is, the mental representations of their actions and discourse. Indirectly (viz., through attitudes and knowledge) therefore, ideologies control how people plan and understand their social practices and hence also the structures of text and talk.” (Dijk, 1995, p: 21).

In Dijk’s opinion, there lies a great deal of meanings, opinions and ideologies

under a news text. We need to analyze the cognitive, social, political and cultural contexts in order to bring out these meanings. Text does not hold a meaning; it is the language users, to be more precise, the mental processes of the language users that define meaning. Therefore, while analyzing a news discourse, one must unfold the cognitive representations and strategies of journalists during news production as well as of readers while reading and recalling. Dijk, refers to the notion of “model”, in order to understand the relationship between cognitive representations and discourse. (Van Dijk, 1991, p: 116-117)

Van Dijk regards knowledge represented in the mind as a mental structure, which we need for making sense out of text and he calls this a “model”. Models control how people move and talk, but they are also like templates that communicate how the others perceive the social practices.

“Models are mental representations of events and actions, or situations people engage in or which they read about and also represents the beliefs (knowledge and opinions) people have about their everyday lives and defines what we usually call people’s experiences. The set of these models are unique and personal and controlled by the biographical experiences of social actors. On the other hand they are also socially controlled, that is influenced by the general social cognitions members share with other members of their group.” (Dijk, 1995, p: 19)

As much as our experiences in daily life, what we obtain from mass communication mediums also contribute to the formation of models as mental structures.

For Dijk, ideologies may affect the content and the structure of mental models that we build for certain situations. We may have certain mental models depending on the ideology that we hold. In other words, models may be ideologically prejudiced. (Yet, this bond is not always valid. People may not be so adhered to their ideologies. Personal experiences, different information or ideologies may affect their discourses and behavior.) (Van Dijk, 2003, ed. Çoban, Özarslan, p: 34-36)

Models, in other words the representations in our minds, are articulated with the duality of “us” and “the others”.

In Van Dijk’s discourse analysis method, a macrostructural and a microstructural analysis of the news text are conducted. The macrostructural analysis is divided into two categories: thematic and schematic analyses. In thematic analysis, the topic, the headline, the sub-headline, the spot and the lead are scrutinized whereas in the schematic analysis the macro-organization is examined. This organization is broadly as follows: the headline and the lead (in the summary), the main events and consequences (in the episode), the context and history (in the background category), the verbal reactions and the conclusions (in the comments category). (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 53-57)

While in news text the information that appears to be the most significant is situated in the most noticeable place, the less significant ones come afterwards hierarchically. In the frame of hierarchical order, the headline is the first category that presents the most important information to the reader. The lead and the headline are both like a summary of the whole news text and they express the main topic of the whole news. (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 53)

The story section that comes after the summary category has two sub categories of which one is situation and the other is comments. In the situational category, the main events and its consequences as well as the background are featured. Consequences category is a category that routinely appears in the news discourse. The gravity of the consequences of the events only defines the news value of the events. At times, the consequences may be more important than the main event. In those cases, the headlines in the Consequences category may hierarchically be situated at higher positions in the news text. In fact, they could even appear in the headline. (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 53-57)

The background information includes the “context” and “history” sections. (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 53) Dijk draws a distinction between context and history sections. History section cannot be about the recent developments and events, as in

the past week or days. It has a much more historical dimension to it. Context consists of other actual news events or situation and not a general structural situation. (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 54)

We had stated that apart from the situational section of the story, there is also the comments section in the news schema. Verbal reaction and conclusion categories are the sub categories of the comments in story. In the verbal reaction category, the statements of those who are either the subject of the news or are significant to it are directly or indirectly quoted. The conclusion section consists of the “evaluation” and the “expectation” sections; *“evaluations features evaluative opinions about the actual news events and the expectations formulates possible political or other consequences of the actual events and situation”*. (Dijk, 1988, p: 56)

In Van Dijk’s discourse analysis model, another level subject to the analysis is the microstructure. In micro analysis, the lexical choice of the reporter, the news syntax, the local coherence and the rhetoric of the news are analysed. Syntactic analysis is made by examining the sentences to see whether they are simple or complex and whether they are in active or passive voice. With the inspection of the lexical choice, the main ideas and ideologies about the social actors in the news are put forth; whereas in the analysis called local coherence the functional, conditional and referential relations between the consecutive sentences in the news text are revealed. (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 59-65).

The rhetoric of the news is another factor of micro analysis. In this analysis, the numerical data and the quotations in the news are studied. (Van Dijk negative self-presentation, p: 86-87)

Macro and micro analyses are substantially functional while analyzing the news text. Most of the times, they appear to complement one another.

“In everyday interaction and experience the macro and microlevel (and intermediary “mesolevels”) form one unified whole. For instance, a racist speech in parliament is a discourse at the microlevel of social interaction in the specific situation of a debate, but at the same time may enact or be a constituent part of

legislation or the reproduction of racism at the macrolevel.” (Van Dijk, 2001, p: 354)

4.3 The Historical Background

We had already treated nationalism as a “discourse” that is reproduced in the society rather than a concept that is indigenous, per se and “given” in our study. This discourse is never a constant and sole discourse. Like all nationalisms, Turkish nationalism is consisted of nationalist discourses that can go through changes under different social circumstances and that can at times, have contradictory features, which are interrelated. That is why we need to briefly touch upon the emergence of nationalism and national identity in Turkey as well as their transformation before we begin our analysis.

4.3.1 The Construction of the “National Identity” in Early Republic Period

As Turkish nationalism was formed as the official ideology during the first period of the Republic, in other words during the single party period, “official nationalism” or “Kemalist nationalism” carry importance for they are the roots of Turkish nationalism.

Kemalist official nationalism is the ‘root-language’ of Turkish nationalism. There is a “symbiotic relationship” to a considerable extent between Turkish nationalism and Kemalism. (Bora, 2008, p: 16) *“Furthermore, “nationalism” is one of the three prominent principles of the ‘six arrows’ of Kemalism; in fact it is the primary one”* (Bora, 1994, p: 16).

For all these reasons, scrutinizing the era whereby the Turkish national identity was formed is essential.

In the vast literature that could be found in this field, the emergence of Turkish nationalism is treated in correlation with the Ottoman modernization in the 19th century. The awakening of nationalism or national identity in the world has influenced the different ethnic groups living under the Ottoman Empire and in

response to their attempts of separating from the Empire and gaining independence, reflexive ideologies aiming to prevent the Ottoman Empire from falling apart have emerged which led to “Ottomanism” and “Islamism”. Eventually, these two ideologies have been abandoned and during the establishment of Turkish Republic nation-state, “Turkism” has been opted.

It is not possible to speak of a “national” or “Turkish” identity in the Ottoman Empire, which had consisted of groups with different religious and ethnic characteristics.

Until the 19th century, the public has developed feelings of allegiance and belongingness to only Islam and the dynasty in the Ottoman Empire. There has not been an allegiance to the state. However, the allegiance of the non-Muslim *ethnies* to the dynasty has begun to cease as a result of the center-periphery tension in the Ottoman Empire, which has risen during the modernization process. This phase has led to them defining them selves as Serb, Greek, Roman, Bulgarian etc. and at the end, these societies have gained their dependence. Turkish nationalism, on the other hand, has come into being following the non-Muslim ethnies’ nationalisms. The principle factors, which have been influential throughout this process, may be listed as follows: the dispersion of the system of *Nation*, the weakening of the “ummah” ideal with the rise of the Arabic nationalism within the Empire, the rise of nationalism among the Turkish speaking communities in Russia and the arrival of important ideologists in the Ottoman Empire such as Yusuf Akçura who later became the first thinker to formulate Turkism, the advancement in the Turcology studies in Europe in the 19th century and the students, who have been sent to European countries for education, returning having learnt the idea of nationalism... (Gökalp, op.cit., p: 70-71)

During this phase, a new group of Muslim Intellectuals who have been educated abroad and speak a language has come into the picture. This group of Intellectuals called “Young Ottomans” defended the idea of liberty and the especially, the synthesis of Islam and the West. (Mardin, 2006, p: 73)

This new movement that has emerged in the Ottoman State has continued with the “Young Turks”. The Young Turks had taken over the ideational heritage of the Young Ottomans but the idea of Turkism was much more distinctive with the Young Turks. This group has played an important role rather in the development of linguistics and cultural nationalism. (Mardin, 2006, p: 65-66)

The main issue for the Young Turks and for the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), which is considered to be their continuation, was to save the Empire that they thought would fall apart and disappear. The Young Turks have come into prominence with their idea of “liberty” against Abdul Hamid II’s despotic rule. Yet, their main goal was to establish a constitutional system. (Mardin, 2006, p: 65-66)

In other words, the Young Turks had the aim of ensuring the Ottoman state’s perpetuity. So, they didn’t hold the idea of Turkish nationalism in order to diminish the Ottoman Empire. Although the Young Turks have employed the movement of Ottomanism, later on during the phase that began with territorial loss (especially after the Balkan Wars), they have started to adopt the movements of Islamism and Turkism. In short, the fact that the idea of Ottomanism could not be applied to practice along with the other developments in the Ottoman Empire has urged the Young Turks to advocate Turkism. (Ergün, 2010, p: 37)

Following the Armistice of Mudros (the first international document that determined the borders of Turkey which was founded after the subversion of the Ottoman Empire), the heritage of Turkism was passed on from the Committee of Union and Progress to the movement of National Struggle in Anatolia. The goal of transforming a public that until then has been exposed to a negative representation and practices, into a nation that is proud with its “Turkish” identity, has comprised the essence of the heritage, which the Kemalist nationalism that had limited itself to the Anatolian geography, has took over from the Young Turks. (Gökalp, 2004, p: 66)

Most often, it is considered to be analytically more viable to examine the formation process of the official Turkish nationalism and the new Turkish national identity during the Kemalist regime in three consecutive periods that are between the

years of 1919-1938. The first of these periods is the years of Turkish Movement of National Struggle for Independence (1919-1923). The years between 1924-1929 constitutes the second period, whereas the years between 1929-1938 was the third period.

During the years of Turkish Movement of National Struggle for Independence (1919-1923), which constitute the first period, the most significant reference of the Turkish national identity has been “being Muslim”. Islam has played a big role in this thinking. The official political discourse has put ethnic pluralism at its center. During the second period which is between 1924-1929, a radical disengagement has occurred followed by the definition of national identity in reference to religion. The discourse that supported ethnic pluralism has been abandoned. The Turkish national identity has been put on a secular and Republican basis. In the third and last periods of the establishment (between 1929-1938), national identity has been redefined in line with “ethnicity” and there has been a shift towards a discourse based on race and kindred. (Yıldız, 2001)

Although in the first period of the Turkish Movement of National Struggle for Independence, Islamism has been presented as a uniting element considering the multicultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, after the proclamation of the Republic, which was during the second period, religious references have been strictly withdrawn.

The most significant goal of the Kemalist modernization project was replacing belongingness to ummah with national belongingness. In other words, a transition from a community whereby religion prevails to a modern and secular society whereby the nation prevails had been planned. In this regard, nation-state is “the bearer of the modernization project and its ‘dominant subject’”. (Keyman, 1997, p: 88)

According to Yıldız, although it is claimed that the discourse, which was ascendant during the last of these three periods, has maintained itself since the foundation of the Republic, it was in the 1930’s that it became “the indicator of Turkishness in the public discourse”. (Yıldız, 2007, p: 124-126) During the 1930’s,

an ethnic and secular kind of Turkish nationalism had prevailed. The new regime has regarded the religion of Islam as an obstacle in the way of Westernization and has rejected it. So, Turkish nationalism has replaced it. Through the emphasis on the Turks' "*magnificent history*" pre-Islam, the Turkish History Thesis has tried to bring their Pre-Islamic Central Asian roots into the forefront. (Ergün, 2010, p: 55)

Nationalism's characteristic of being invented and imagined in the modern society, as claimed by the modernist nationalism theories and was mentioned in the first chapter, applies to the formation of the Turkish nation as it is for the formation of all nations.

A new history was "invented" for the Turkish nation and an ethnic narrative of history was constructed which traced to a mythical ancient history in Central Asia and lived down the history of Ottoman. The Turkish History Thesis (1932), which claimed that the Turkish race has contributed to the formation of many civilizations throughout the World history, has been accepted. "*The Turkish History Thesis had an effect on the formation of the Turkish national identity in two ways: by ensuring that the pre-Islamic history was taken pride in and by making it possible to deny the (617 year old) Ottoman history, which involved the Islamic/traditional identity*". (Yeğen, 1999, p: 191-195)

The political elite has used many means in order to create a homogenous society during the process of forming a nation. Exchange of populations, forced emigration, politics of settlement and politics of education are the main ones of these means. (Yalçın, 2007, p: 34)

"As a legitimizing ideology of the new Republic, Turkish nationalism was invented under circumstances marked by a historical background whereby big changes in the population composition were taking place. In this ethnic nationalism, the notion of Turkishness was developed to make the rest of the population seem homogenous and served the purpose of concealing all kinds of diversities within the population." (Keyder, 2003, p: 114)

Reforms in “language”, which undoubtedly is a key constituent of the national identity, have been made in the construction of the Turkish identity. Implementations in this field included the adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928) and later, having the call to prayers in Turkish (1932).

The Sun Language Theory that took things further with the assertion that Turkish is one of the first languages in the world history was also developed in the 1930’s.

With the Language Theory, the Turkish language was suggested to be the main origin of the world languages. According to the History Thesis, Turks were the ancestors of the Aryan race, which is claimed to be the founder of the civilization. In order to prove these theories, a cranium study was conducted on 70.000 people in Anatolia. It was argued that the founders of Sumer, Hittite, Roman and Egyptian civilizations were Turks who had migrated from Central Asia. (Yalçın, 2007, p: 75)

It is certain that the context of these initiatives were based on kindred or race. In fact, starting from the 1924 Constitution up until today the legal definition of the Turkish national identity did not have a racial basis. According to Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, “The people of Turkey are called Turkish by virtue of citizenship irrespective of religious and racial differences.”. In the legal terms, an identity founded on the basis of citizenship is in question. Yet, despite of the legal aspect in many administrations a kindred/race-based understanding can be seen.

In many of the official and diplomatic documentation after 1924, it was the indications of Turkishness excluding citizenship, which were highlighted and uttered. While some Turkish citizens were defined as ‘Turk’ or ‘Pure Turk’, others were called “Turks of Kanun-i Esasi” (Turks of Ottoman Basic Law)¹ or were even ignored. (Yıldız, 2001, p: 139-141)

¹ Kanun-i Esasi: First Ottoman Constitution – 1876. For full text in English see: <http://genckaya.bilkent.edu.tr/documents1.html>. As some legal rights were granted to the minorities with this law, this term was used to signify the discrimination between those who were later considered to be a Turk and the pure Turks.

As Bora puts it, *“since its establishment, the official nationalism of Turkey, ‘Atatürk nationalism’, has been going through the crisis of not being able to settle the tension between a ‘French style’ understanding of nationalism that is based on the tie between citizenship and territory, and ethnicist initiatives (‘German style’ nationalism)”*. (Bora, 1995, p: 101)

Nationalism in Turkey alternates between these two tensions; *“... the official comment is in line with the nationalism based on citizenship; however in foreign disputes, in ‘national causes’ and even more, in popular cultural platforms such as international sports competitions for instance, an ethnicist, ‘essentialist’ and aggressive language of nationalism easily finds its way in.”* (ibid., p: 101-102)

In summary, as a discourse that produces the imagined entity called the “Turkish nation”, the Kemalist modernity project is a massive project that ostracizes ethnic identities and diversities, rewrites history, completely abandons the Islamic/Ottoman identity and aims to create a homogenous nation from multinational citizens. The national identity constructed by this project is a formal and monolithic identity that denies or assimilates diversities.

In this case, the fundamental “other” of the Turkish nationalism is Islam or the Ottoman past. The non-Muslim minorities of this past are also treated as the “other”.

4.3.2 The Changing Climate of Nationalism in Turkey and Kurds

We have already tackled the construction process of the Turkish national identity and how it was formed in parallel with the efforts of modernization, which started at the final period of the Ottoman Empire, and later with the foundation of the Republic. The national identity as the official ideology, which was constructed at the first period of the Republic, that is to say during the single party era, surely was not a fixed and unchanging identity. Since the foundation of the Republic until today, the economic, political and social changes have caused the definition of national identity to have articulations of different attributions and to have some attributions more prominent at times or diminish.

The period whereby the Turkish national identity was formed, the single party era with CHP ended and the transition to multi-party system took place in the political arena, is a time during which the mainstream Turkish nationalism underwent a number of changes. The era of 1950's and 1960's is *"a time during which the official nationalism was 'consolidated', nationalism didn't stand out as a self-contained political name and was being fermented."* (Bora, 2008, p: 7)

The DP government has created a political understanding that derived from economic liberalism, religious sensitivities and nationalism. (Mert, 2007, p: 135)

It could be said that instead of the understanding, which regarded the traditional Islamic and Ottoman identity as the "other" during the construction of the national identity, in this new era the definition of an ethnic and secular Turkish nation has made itself present by being articulated with the Islamic identity.

Furthermore, *"this phase witnessed anti-communism gaining the position of high principle which influenced nationalism."* (Bora, op.cit., p: 7) During this period, "communism", which was considered to be anti-religious, was also attributed to the "marginalized" groups. After all, the discursive strategy of the (populist) nationalism in Turkey *"was to link the social, political and ethnic minority 'statuses' and by doing so, to present the snob townsmen, communists, leftists and non-Muslim minorities as degenerate and strange components that are at enmity with the national essence"*. (ibid., p: 913)

Characterized by the September 12, 1980 coup d'état and the following neo-liberal new rightist government, the 1980's were the years whereby the idea that the Republican regime's ideal of "reaching the level of contemporary civilizations" was close, became more distinct. Dynamics such as the capitalization and modernization process that transformed the social and cultural structure of the country, capital accumulation of the new rightists politics and the expansion of consumerism made a relatively more positive nationalist understanding become possible. In this era during which the perception of a synthesis of Turkish-Islam-West became widespread and there was an effort to adopt values unique to the West, a "positive" language of

nationalism that did not quite put an emphasis on “threats” and “enemies” has evolved. (Gökalp, op. cit., p: 83-85)

In the 1990’s, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism has risen. One of the two important reasons for this is because with the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Turkic Republics declared their independence, which provoked Turkey’s mission of being the leader as well as the imperialist/Turanian projects. The second reason is the emergence of PKK and the beginning of a war that caused the death of millions of people in the 1990’s. (ibid., p: 84-85) As a result, in this period the “others” of the Turkish nationalism has become the Kurds. The Kurdish issue has led to the re-emergence of the “perpetuity syndrome” within the society, which had existed since the period of the National Struggle for Independence. Having to deal with non-Muslim communities and imperial states that wanted the country to fall apart and dissolve, has led to a social paranoia such as the thought that “the country is about to be lost”. (Akçam, 2002, p: 60-61) This paranoia manifested itself as “perpetuity anxiety” and “inner threat” in Turkish nationalism since then up until today. The belief that the “enemies at home and abroad” “covet” Turkey’s existence has perpetuated the “perception of threat”. (Akçam, 1992, Bora, 1995, p: 74)

One must state at this point that Turkish nationalism may not follow the chronology that we have briefly touched upon earlier while producing different discourses that vary according to the social circumstances. Although all these nationalism discourses often have common characteristics, at times they may be used interchangeably or may exist simultaneously in an intertwined fashion.

Bora categorizes the types of nationalism under five headings: Atatürk Nationalism (official nationalism), Kemalist Nationalism, Liberal Nationalism, Radical (ülkücü) Nationalism and Islamic Nationalism. (Bora, 1994, p: 9-24)

Özkırımlı, on the other hand, summarizes the map of nationalism reflecting the 90’s as follows: (2013a)

“The official nationalism or Atatürk nationalism, which focuses on ‘the foundation of the national state and the mission of perpetuity’, is at the heart of

Turkish nationalism. It constantly relies on the army with a constant perception of threat and the consequent state of vigilance, and considers it as a protector-guardian, whereas Kemalist nationalism is a version of official nationalism with 'a leftist sauce'. This understanding of which the origins trace to Kemalism of the 1960's standing for anti-imperialism and independence, put secularism on the forefront in the 1990's. The importance attached to secularism explains why "nation" is chosen over the concept of "millet", which has a religious aspect. Liberal nationalism feeds itself from the modernist-Western side of official nationalism. It defines the national identity with the desire of reaching the level of Western civilization. The emphasis on economic accomplishments, at times, turns into market fetishism and class racism. Turkist nationalism, which has differed from the official nationalism for it treated the Turkish world as a country, has revived in the 1990's with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Having strived to discard the racist elements on an ideological level and replaced them with history and culture, the Turkist movement has come close to the political arena and has increased the voting rates. The perception of the Islamic nationalism though, is founded on Turkey's leadership role in the Islamic world. The attitude in national causes and the traditional anti-Westernism most often turned into discrimination and xenophobia. In Bora's view, the point where this nationalism meets with the official nationalism is development-progression."

According to Belge (2001), being Turkish and Muslim were identities that were prominent and lauded in the 90's. Within the frame of ovals such as "We are the greatest" and "The Greatest is Turkey", a nationalist boast has become the dominant discourse of the 90's.

In 2000's, nationalism took an important place in the dominant political atmosphere. Although, the ideals of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which was founded by the reformists who have separated from the Erbakan-National Vision movement which we may say, as Bora puts it, represents the Islamic nationalism in the political arena, contradict with the official (Kemalist) nationalism, it would be wrong to argue that AKP is not nationalist. (Bora, 1994, p: 9-24) (In any case, the debates about whether today's government, which had set off with a nationalist discourse like "one country, one flag, one nation, one state", uses

expressions such as “one religion” and “one language” in regards to the Kurdish issue may be considered as an indication of the contradictions between their nationalist course and their democratic approach in solving the Kurdish issue.)

In public opinion, “a new movement”, which was known as “nationalitarism” (ulusalcılık) and included many types of nationalism, used to come forward especially with a secular emphasis and the assertion that the values of the official Kemalist nationalism were to be preserved. Its major “enemy” was the AKP government, which was feared to overturn the Republican regime that Atatürk had founded. With the assertion borrowed from the official nationalism, it relied on the idea that “the army” was the savior of the nation. For this reason, the conflict between the army and AKP marked the 2000’s.

“This disparity became even more distinct with the 2007 elections. Nationalitarism would use the symbols of the official nationalism and popularize them. The Turkish flag and Atatürk portraits would turn into clothing items or accessories at the Republic rallies, whereas products that carried nationalism to popular culture such as Atatürk statuettes or the book titled “Those Crazy Turks” would sell out. The most important factor that brought nationalitarism and official nationalism together was their common enemy figures. The enemy figures of the new synthesis were the European Union, Islam, Kurds and the “liberal intellectuals” who supported them.”. (ibid.)

As we have stated above, it is difficult to argue that AKP is not nationalist despite of the “nationalitarism” movement that is positioned in opposition to AKP. Özkırımlı defines the understanding of nationalism that took shape during the 13-year rule of AKP as “neo-liberal conservative nationalism”. He states that even though in AKP Nationalism some figures change places, the state uses the same repertoire of discourses: “the image of Turkey surrounded by enemies”, “traitors amongst us who are the pawns of foreign forces” (EU, “liberal intellectuals”, “leftists” and so on)... “CHP and the putschists instead of Islam...” . (Özkırımlı, 2013b)

As can be seen from the broad picture with which we have attempted to briefly portray Turkish nationalism with its historical process, it is difficult to speak

of a fixed and singular nationalism with set boundaries. This understanding of nationalism, which hovers between a citizenship-based or territorial understanding of nationalism and nationalism that has ethnicist attributes, is actually one that determines the progress of the Kurdish issue.

The Kurdish issue was regarded by the Turkish nationalism as sometimes a resistance to the Republic of Turkey as a modern nation-state, sometimes as a matter of security caused by a group of citizens who were provoked by the “foreigners” and at other times, as a matter of economical reasons and development of the region. (Yeğen, 2012, p: 90)

Earlier on, we have dealt with the formation process of the national identity and its transformation throughout three periods. The phases of the formation process of the Turkish national identity progresses in parallel with how Kurds are perceived within this national identity. As a result of the non-Muslim communities’ separation from the dynasty followed by their declaration of independence, the emphasis on Islam, as an element uniting the society that emerged during the era of the National Struggle for Independence, has led the Kurds, which was a Muslim society, to stand by Turks during this struggle. During this era, Kurds *“whose ethnic rights were decided to be respected, were regarded as a part of the Muslim tribes”*. (Yeğen, 2012, p: 50) Furthermore, *“Between the years of 1919 and 1923 Mustafa Kemal had promised the Kurds ‘sovereignty’ a few times (for instance, in the Amasya Protocols in October 1919, explicitly in the İzmit Press Conference in January 1923 and tacitly in the 1921 Constitution).”*. (Hür, Radikal Newspaper, 15.09.2013) ¹

During the second period of the formation of the Turkish national identity, which was between 1924 and 1929, the discourse that encouraged ethnic pluralism was abandoned which changed the way Kurds were perceived. *“This perception that portrayed Kurds in the political society as a tribe with recognizable rights peculiar to them, changed in 1924... Kurds were no longer Kurds as legal and political subjects. Legally, they had become “Turks”.*” (Yeğen, 2012, p: 52-53) With this

¹ For detailed information about the subject see: Faik Reşit Unat, “Amasya Protokolleri, Tarih Vesikaları” (Amasya Protocols, History Records), New Series 1st Edition, 3 (18), 1961, p: 359-365 and “Mustafa Kemal Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları” (Mustafa Kemal Eskişehir-İzmit Disputes) (1923), İstanbul Kaynak Publ., p: 105

Constitution “*Kurds were being disregarded along with their language, culture and their whole history. From the year 1925, the pressure on the Kurdish identity has intensified and speaking Kurdish has been banned.*” (Kahraman, 2003, p: 44-49)

The third period starting from the 1930’s, whereby ethnicist initiatives were made in the Turkish national identity, the assimilation politics have accelerated. Foremost among these are “the compulsory settlement laws”.

While the first of these laws was implemented in 1927 after various reports on the Reform in the East that were prepared right after the Sheik Said Rebellion (the rebellion which was presented as a reactionary act in the official discourse but was accepted as the first Kurdish rebellion), with the Settlement Law no. 2510¹, which was accepted in 1934, it was aimed to ethnically turkify Anatolia. Turkification was executed by placing non-Turks in Turkish regions and Turks in non-Turkish regions.

Although in the relatively more democratic setting of the 1940’s and 1950’s there was no need for the compulsory Settlement Law, the policies of assimilation weren’t limited to the compulsory Settlement Law. When the Kurdish issue acquired a military nature in 1980’s, a new migration policy has been implemented through the evacuation of villages from the 80’s till the 90’s. Furthermore, implementations such as not allowing broadcast and education in another language than Turkish, banning speaking Kurdish, making last names as well as names of places and villages Turkish, banning giving Kurdish names to children and turkifying Kurdish children with the Regional Boarding Schools were some of the assimilative policies. (Yeğen, 2012, p: 64-69) According to Yeğen, even though at certain times a part of the Kurds who were “the prospective Turks” of the Republic were turkified, it is difficult to say that the policies of assimilation were entirely successful. (Yeğen, 2012, p: 82-84)

In the 90’s, the Kurdish issue was seen as a matter of security and thus, strict military measures were taken, which gradually made the issue more problematic. As stated earlier, the Kurdish issue that was intensifying at the time and the emergence of PKK has resuscitated an ethnic, exclusive and chauvinistic discourse of nationalism.

¹ Official Journal, No: 2733, June 21 1934

In 2000's, on the other hand, the attempts of democratization and the external pressure on Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue through democratic ways as a result of Turkey's endeavors of becoming a member of the EU turning serious, has changed the course of the matter. Moreover, the formation of a Kurdish state in Iraq has also created a setting that instigated the alienation between Kurds and the Republic. (Yeğen, 2012, p: 83-84) These developments have necessitated a solution that excluded violence.

Within the scope of "the peace process" or "the solution process", which was introduced by the Justice and Development Party, the Prime Minister Erdoğan has given the first signals of in 2005, has begun in 2009 (has become a law in 2014) and is the continuation of the "democratic initiative process", solutions for the issue without violence have started to be discussed and a dialogue with the correspondents of the issue has been initiated. As this process and the developments until today are extensive enough to be the subject matter of another study, we will not dwell into the details. However, the understanding which we have defined as neo-liberal conservative nationalism earlier and today has become the ideology of the state, reveals the fact that the perspective on the Kurdish issue hasn't changed much. As Özkırımlı expresses, Kurds today are portrayed in the society and thus, in media with the "*good Kurds-bad Kurds*" distinction which is not too different to the distinction that the Kemalist regimes drew with the policies of assimilation. (Özkırımlı, July 27 2013, t24.com.tr)

4.3.3 Operation and History of The "Village Guard" System

As the case study that we deal with will be about those who are still guarding in Turkey, it would be useful to say a few words about what the guard system is, how it came about in our country, the way it works and its current situation.

The system of temporary village guarding is an implementation that we may see a few examples of in the world, whereby the civilians are armed for security purposes in order to create semi-military/paramilitary entities.

It may be said that the first examples of this implementation are the troops, which were formed under the name of “Hamidiye Regiments” in the Ottoman Empire. These troops were formed by Abdul Hamid II, who took the Kazakh Regiments in Russia as an example, with the aim of ensuring Kurds’ dependence on the Ottoman State and taking advantage of their potential as an armed force in the region. Yet, the Hamidiye Regiments has created a tension and conflict amongst the groups in the region with different ethnic identities and thus, has worsened the existing problems. (Hür, 2010)

However these problems could not prevent the formation of similar troops after the National Struggle for Independence.

Following the enactment of the 1924 Constitution, as per Article 68 of the Village Law no. 442, it was adjudged that guards would be appointed in order to protect the properties, the lives and the honours of those who lived within the village borders. (Hür, 2010)

This law that in fact has been in operation since 1924 in Turkey became in effect in 1985 with the enactment of the “temporary village guarding” and the issue of guarding started to be on the political agenda of the country. The government was given the authorisation to appoint temporary guards when needed with amendment that the Parliament has made in the Village Law. The Turgut Özal administration promptly exerted this authority entitled to them and started implementing the temporary village guard system.

The article, which was added with the amendment, is as follows:

“In the provinces that shall be determined by the Council of Ministers, in case serious indications requiring the declaration of a state of emergency or conducts of violence occur in or near a village, or in the case of a rise in conducts violating the lives or the properties of the villagers whatever the reason may be, it could be adjudicated that an adequate number of temporary villages guards shall be appointed with the proposal of the governor and the approval of the Minister of Internal Affairs.” (The Village Law no. 422, Article 74)

Thereby, shortly after the year of 1984 when PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) had started the armed conflict, this law has been put into effect and the implementation of “temporary village guarding” system whereby civilians were used as components of the internal security by means of armament, has been reactivated in regions with high Kurdish population. This implementation, since then has been one of the key pillar of the state’s military policy concerning the Kurdish issue.

As per to Article 74 of the Village Law, the unpaid voluntary guard system has also been initiated in the region in addition to the paid temporary village guards and these individuals have been armed as well. While the temporary guards could take part in operations outside of their own villages under the command of the gendarmerie, the voluntary guards could only carry weapons within the villages they reside in. (Regulation of Village Guards, Article 11)

There is a vague expression in regards to the number of guards to be appointed in the aforementioned amendment of the law. “An adequate number of” village guards shall be armed and yet, the standard training program that they are obliged to undergo has not been specified. Like their number and the training they will receive, their jurisdiction is also vague.

If needed, they only go through a training that is left to the authority of the Gendarmerie General Command with no set standards, before or during their service. (Regulation of Village Guards, Article 11)

Access to numeric data on the temporary village guards seems to be considerably problematic. As the state associates it with “state security” and it is regarded as a part of counter terrorism, information on temporary village guarding is not shared. We are able to access information on the number of village guards who are still on duty through the responses of the ministers to the parliamentary questions submitted to the Parliament. Most recently, the number of temporary and voluntary village guards actively on duty was asked to the Minister of Internal Affairs Efkân Ala in the parliamentary question submitted on December 4, 2014 by MHP Ankara MP Özcan Yeniçeri and this parliamentary question, which still seems to be “in

process”, was not answered at the time this thesis was written. (tbmm.gov.tr, December 2014) Another recent parliamentary question is of HDP Iğdır MP Pervin Buldan to the Minister of Internal Affairs, dated May 9, 2014. However, the answer to the parliamentary question of which the response time has expired, cannot be accessed. (tbmm.gov.tr., May 2014) The most up to date data that we have is the answer that the Minister of Internal Affairs Muammer Güler has given to CHP Malatya MP Veli Ağbaba's written parliamentary question about “The Employee Rights of the Temporary Village Guards”. Accordingly, as of February 1, 2013 46.195 temporary village guards have been serving. (veliagbaba.com, September 2013) Obviously the number of voluntary village guards should be added to this. With the volunteers, the total number is almost 70.000.

It is assumed that 123.000 village guards have served between the years of 1985 and 2009 for the guard system, which started off in 22 provinces in 1985 and spread to 35 provinces with the inclusion of 13 more provinces in 1993. It is uttered that the number of village guards has increased to 62.000 in 1995 and to 90.000 by the year 2000, whereas that it dropped down to 57.000 in 2000's with PKK's declaration of truce. (Uras, September 24, 2009)

Today the number seems to have dropped even more. The impact of “the solution process” or “the peace process”, which was initiated by the Justice and Development Party, became a law after being published on the Official Journal on July 16, 2014 with the heading *Law on the Termination of Terror and Strengthening the Social Integration* (Official Journal, July 2014) and is aimed at resolving the Kurdish issue, in this progression can be seen. Even though, the need for abolishing the guard system during this process is in debate, no action was taken in this direction yet.

There have been many sociological outcomes of the use of the civil society by means of arming them without putting them through training in the name of counter terrorism. Foremost among them is the rise in violence in the region.

The incident that took place on May 4, 2009 whereby 44 villagers were slaughtered in the Bilge (Zanqirt) village situated in the district called Mazıdağı of

Mardin, has caught the whole nation's attention once again on the guard system. The fact that both the offenders and the victims of the incident were guards and that the weaponry used belonged to the state has revealed the relation between the guard system and crime.

“The guards’ violation of the Kurdish civilians’ human rights is proven by tens of verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights that convicted the Turkish state while the petty and political offenses they have committed are proven by the official data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the report dated 1995 of the Parliament’s Research Commission which investigates the unidentified murders.” (Kurban, 2009, p: 256)

According to this report, some of the guards have taken advantage of their guard identities and smuggled guns and drugs easily. The guards still have control over most of the gun and drug smuggling in the region. The influential people in the local area have used their power that comes with being a guard. The chief village guards have put pressure on those who weren't their supporters and have reported them to security forces reporting them as 'PKK members'. Some guards have killed the villagers with whom they had a blood feud claiming that they were members of the PKK organisation or through pressure, forced them to flee from their villages. (Fedai Erdoğan 2005, p: 99)

Published by the Human Rights Association, *“The Special Report on the Violation of Human Rights Committed by the Village Guards During the Period from January 1990 to March 2009”*, reveals the numeric breakdown of the acts of violence that the guards have been involved in. According to this report, the breakdown of the violation of rights that the guards have committed between the years 1990 and 2009 are as follows: setting villages on fire (38), evacuating villages (14), harassment and rape (12), kidnapping (22), armed assault (294), murder (183), injury (259), disappearance (2), execution (50), robbery (70), torture and mistreatment (562), detention (59), causing suicide (9), setting forests on fire (17). (The Report of the Human Rights Association, May 2009)

The consequences of the guard system since 1985 that we tried to summarize above brings up the abolishment of the guard system in the solution process to pave the way for peace as an important petition.

4.4 Macro and Micro Analysis of the Case Study

Anadolu Agency is the source of the news about women guards serving in Tunceli on all of the news sites. Since the text provided by the agency was used without major changes, the text of the news is almost structurally the same on all of the websites. The news has been published as the front-page headline (that is to say on the main page of the sites).

Unlike the newspaper news, on the news sites, in a day 5 to 10 or even more news are presented to the reader on the main page with the most distinctive size and place. These headlines keep changing during the course of the day. Once a new headline appears, the other news becomes old and no longer appears on the main page. (Current or important news may be kept on the page by the editors.)

The news that is the subject of our case study has been published as the front-page headline on 9 of the news websites. We will try and analyze the way this news was covered as the main page headline on the 9 of the most clicked 10 news sites with its macro and microstructural attributes.

4.4.1 Macrostructure: Thematic and Schematic Analysis

As we have already discussed in detail, elements such as the headline, the lead, the spot (the first paragraph of the news, if there are none), the main event, the background, the comments and conclusions as well as the photographs are all dealt with within the macrostructure. The newsmakers use some macro rules whilst creating a news story.

4.4.1.1 Thematic Structural Analysis

In the thematic structure, the headline, the spot or when there is none, the first paragraph or the first sentence of the news text are analyzed. The headline and the spot are like the summary of the event reported in the news. Most of the news that we will be covering in our study has a spot. For the ones that do not have one, the introductory sentence of the news has been assessed as the spot.

4.4.1.1.1 Headlines

The original version (in Turkish) and the English translation of the headlines of the news published on April 1, 2013 on the 10 news sites that we deal with are as follows:

1 - *“Evde Türkan Hanım Dağda Komando Türkan”, “Mrs. Türkan at Home, Ranger Türkan on the mountains”*, Hürriyet.com.tr

2 - *“Kucakta Çocuk, Sırtta Keleş: Burası Tunceli”, “Children in arms, Kalash(nikovs)¹ on shoulders... This is Tunceli...”*, Milliyet.com.tr

3 - *“Tunceli’nin Korucu Anaları: Kara tülbentli / Komando bandanalı”, “Tunceli’s Guarding Mothers With Black Headscarves/Ranger Bandanas”*, ensonhaber.com

4 - *“Gazze Degil, Tunceli”, “Not Gaza, this is Tunceli”*, haberturk.com

5 - *“Kaleşnikofla Nöbet Tutan Anneler”, “Mothers who keep guard with Kalashnikovs! Anything for our Homeland”*, haberler.com

6 - *“FLAŞ! Türkiye’nin 25 kadını: Kucakta Çocuk, Sırtta Keleş” – “Camdaki Ayrıntıda Ölümüne Çarşı”, “News Flash! 25 Women of Turkey: Kids in Arms, Kalash(nikovs) on Shoulders” – “The detail on the window says Çarşı to death”*, sabah.com.tr

¹ Keleş: Kalash (“keleş” in Turkish) is the abbreviation in the Turkish street language for a type of weapon called Kalashnikov, which was named after its inventor. The detailed study of the word is conducted in the microstructural analysis.

7 - *“Yer: Tunceli, Silahlandılar!”*, *“Location: Tunceli, They got armed!”*, gazetevatan.com.tr

8 - *“Kucakta çocuk, sırtta keleş! Tunceli’de 25 kadın terörle mücadelede çocuklarını ve köylerini böyle koruyor!”*, *“Kids in Arms, Kalash(nikovs) on Shoulders! In the fight against terrorism, 25 Women in Tunceli protect their children and their village like this!”*, haber7.com

9 - *“Evde, tarlada, dağda çalışıyorlar: Eli Kalaşnikoflu Anneler”*, *“They work at their homes, in the fields and on the mountains: Mothers with Kalahsnikovs in their Hands”*, internethaber.com

The time has not been indicated in any of the headlines whereas the location has been indicated as “Tunceli”. In the headline no. 6, Turkey has been given as the location. In the headline no. 4, the location information has been highlighted. As a reference to what is seen in the photograph, it has been indicated with the headline that the location is not Gaza, but Tunceli. Rather than reporting the location, it is hereby implied that the situation in Tunceli is similar to the one in Gaza whereby in their everyday life, the civil society, who protect the Palestinian land occupied in Gaza is in a close relationship with weaponry and violence and that Tunceli is a part of the homeland “invaded or attacked by the enemy” which is being protected by the locals with weapons. Similarly, the emphasis on the location in the headline no. 7 implies a civil society armed against the enemy.

In all of the headlines, there is the theme of “women” in accordance with the main event. While the location is stressed in headlines no. 4 and 7, there is a generalization in all the other headlines and all the women featured in the news are referred to as “mothers”. The word “mother” or “ma” (“ana”, a pure Turkish word, which is still being used in Anatolia, denoting mother) is used only in headlines no. 3, 5 and 9, whereas even though these words do not appear in the other headlines, the phrases are formed in such way that they connote motherhood. For instance, the denotation of the woman carrying their children in their arms in the sentence “Kids in Arms, Kalash(nikovs) on Shoulders!” in the headlines 2, 6 and 8, accentuates that

these women are “mothers”. In the headline no. 1, the phrase “Mrs. Türkan at home...” connotes a “mother” taking care of housework and children. In all of the headlines, “women” are attributed the duty of motherhood as well as heroism. The subtext “They are all mothers but they take up a weapon and defend their homeland” can be read in almost all of the headlines. (Although it has not been expressed directly, this comes out when the headline is interpreted with the image of an armed “woman” in the photograph.)

Militarist words with a nationalist association and linked to violence such as “weapon”, “mountain”, “ranger”, “keleş” (kalash) and “Kalashnikov” are used in all the headlines.

In all the headlines apart from no. 7 and 9 (apart from internethaber.com and gazetevatan.com), the theme of “child” can be noticed.

On the whole, the emphasis in all the headlines is on the guarding women managing of both their motherhood and vocational (since it is paid, we may qualify “guarding” as a job) roles at the same time. The women are heroised with the glorification of “motherhood” and their duty of “defending their homeland”.

4.4.1.1.2 Leads

Leads are the sections that follow the headline, summarize the news and recount the main event.

It was observed that of all the news sites that are analyzed in this study, the news on hurriyet.com, sabah.com.tr, gazetevatan.com and internethaber.com do not have a spot. For this reason, the first paragraphs of the concerned news on the aforementioned sites have been studied under this heading.

The leads of the news that we handle in our case study are as follows:

“In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.” (hurriyet.com.tr)

“In Tunceli, 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m. The women guards who face the challenges of the rural life, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves. – The temporary village women guards who support the peace process, dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future.” (milliyet.com.tr, April 2013)

“They are always ready to be on duty with their military vests and shalwars...” (ensonhaber.com)

“In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages.” (haberturk.com)

“25 women in Tunceli protect their villages with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.” (haberler.com)

“In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages.” (gazetevatan.com)

“In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.” (haber7.com)

“The female village guards in Tunceli, both do their daily work and protect their village at sites with Kalashnikovs in their hands.” (internethaber.com)

As can be seen in the leads, what makes this subject “a news” is not the guard system, which already has been running for 30 years. The fact that those who were assigned as guards are “women” has made all these news sites consider the subject to have a news value.

All these leads broadly summarize the main event. Yet, it is difficult to argue that the questions of what, when, where, how, why and who have all been answered. Information about the time is missing in all of them. There is no information about when the event took place meaning when these women became guards. The question as to why they did so is assumed to be known by the reader and thus, has not been indicated. Against whom they protect their villages from hasn’t been specified either. There is the image of an “enemy” whose identity is unknown. While within the definition of “us”, the subjects have been described as women who both do their duties at home and bravely defend their villages against the “enemy”, “the enemy/other” has not been defined as a person or group. Only in the leads of haberturk.com, sabah.com.tr and gazetevatan.com, the word “terror” has been used.

There isn’t an ethnic emphasis in the definition of “us”, whereas the definition of the enemy/other does not appear in the lead and the expression “fight against terrorism” has been used. This way, the Kurdish issue that has been going on in the country has been presented as a matter of “security” in the country rather than a matter of the rights of the Kurdish citizens. There isn’t an ethnic grounding about the news actors, whereas a contrast of “the patriotic citizen protecting his/her country” and “the citizen threatening the security” has been created. The words “peace process” in the lead of the news on milliyet.com.tr, once again, draws attention to the Kurdish issue and the process that the government has initiated for peace but the issue to be solved has not been defined.

On hurriyet.com, milliyet.com, haber7.com and internethaber.com, the stress has been placed on the fact that the 25 women, who are the subjects of the news, manage their duties both as a housewife and as a guard at the same time.

On milliyet.com and ensonhaber.com, the words “military vest” and “shalwar” have been used in combination. The different social roles of the women

have been represented with the clothes that they wear. In this respect, the civilian women have been presented in “militarized” fashion. The sites whereby the women guards serve their duties have been mentioned with their altitude of 1400 on hurriyet.com, milliyet.com, haberler.com and haber7.com. With the enunciation of the “altitude”, the stress has been laid on the difficulty of this job and the courage, even heroism of these women who are able to overcome this difficulty with their “patriotism”. After all, the image of “the woman defending her homeland” under tough conditions is present in all the news’ leads. Therefore, one could speak of an explicit “nationalist” discourse.

4.4.1.1.3 Photographs

All of the news sites have used their image gallery for this news. The total number of photographs used on the news sites is 52. We will be studying especially the ones that have been placed on the main page.

The photographs that appear on all of the captions of our study have been used in accordance with the theme of the news.

The women in all the headlines can be seen with weapons, military vests and military caps. These militarist symbols seem to support the nationalist discourse used in the headlines. The sign that says, “anything for our homeland” on the wall on haberler.com is the most explicit indication of this.

The photograph, in which a woman is carrying a weapon on her back and in her arms, her child who seems to be 4 or 5 years old and is playing with her weapon, has been used on milliyet.com.tr, ensonhaber.com, haberturk.com and haber7.com. This photograph, which features the woman, the child and the weapon at the same time, strengthens the image of “mothers” who “defend their homeland” in accordance with the headline and the spots.

The photographs in all of the headlines contain a weapon. All of the women are portrayed with their weaponry, which is why one could say that all the headlines contain an element of violence.

4.4.1.2 Schematic Analysis

According to Van Dijk, the schematic analysis is carried out through the situation and comments. The situational category involves the main events and consequences as well as the context and history. The main event is summarized in the lead. The verbal reactions, evaluations and expectations, if there are any, are featured in the comments section. (Van Dijk, 1988, p: 55)

4.4.1.2.1 Main Events and Consequences

In the studied leads, the main event presented is the 25 women in Tunceli serving as guards and the way they manage doing this together with their daily duties and work they need to do because they are women such as housework and childcare. This is the theme that is underlined in all of the news texts. The news text that was provided by the Anadolu Agency has been used without many changes.

Apart from a few minor differences the news text has been used as it is on hurriyet.com.tr, milliyet.com.tr, haberler.com, gazetevatan.com and haber7.com. First, the daily lives of the women have been recounted after which the way they manage both the housework and their jobs as a guard has been conveyed. It has been stated that they protect their villages under the sign that says, “anything for our homeland”. In these news texts, there are statements quoted from the guards such as “shootouts with terrorists...”, “we are behind our Prime Minister”, “we are on the side of peace”, “the peace process”, “dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life” and “a nice environment and a good future for her children”.

On Ensonhaber.com, haberturk.com, sabah.com.tr and internethaber.com, the text has been shortened and some points have been highlighted. On ensonhaber.com, issues such as “a more peaceful life”, “a more peaceful environment for the children” and “the peace process” has been focused on. The support that the guards give to “the peace process” has been underlined. On haberturk.com, it has been relayed that the guards “fight against terrorism” under difficult conditions. On sabah.com.tr, on the other hand, statements like “anything for our homeland”, “our children grew up

with weapons”, “we don’t want blood to be shed” and “the peace process” have been featured. The enunciation of “the peace process” and the guards’ support to it has appeared on internethaber.com. The phrase “raising children in a more peaceful environment” has been included here as well. The social gender roles have been accentuated with the statement “Women with dough in their hands, now hold Kalashnikovs”. The fact that due to the circumstances, women take on this duty alongside with men even though it is not their job to do homeland defense has been praised.

All the news texts contain similar themes in parallel to the leads and the headlines. Except for haberturk.com, in all of the texts there is a reference to “the peace process”. What has been implied by this, is the process that was initiated by the Justice and Development Party to solve the Kurdish issue and during which the discussions for resolving the Kurdish issue were proceeding. However, ethnic words such as “Kurd” or “Turk” have not been utilized. Instead, there are definitions of a public “protecting the homeland” and “terrorists” who attack their lands. The definition of “us” comprises someone who is dedicated to his/her state, loves his/her homeland, protects it and when needed fights for it. “The other”, on the other hand, is a “terrorist”, “someone who attacks his/her own people” and “threatens the peace and security”.

On all the sites apart from internethaber.com, ensonhaber.com and haberturk.com where the texts have been kept short, the guards’ economic statuses have been pointed out in the respective news texts. It has been conveyed that some of the guards wear slippers, some sneakers and others boots, and that they have low wages with no social security.

It is crucial to remember, at this point, the issue of not all ideological and political elements having class belongingness, which Ernest Laclau has put forth, as mentioned in the theoretical section (Chapter 2). (1985, p: 172-173) Nationalism has no class connotation. The ideology of the dominant class “interpellates”, with Althusser’s term, not only the members of this class, but at the same time the members of the oppressed class. (ibid., p: 173-175)

Provided by the state owned Anadolu Agency, in this news that carries the dominant ideology, the story of the guards who work for more or less the minimum wage without even having a shoe to wear and “defend their homeland” under a sign that says, “anything for our homeland”, wearing their military caps with the Turkish flag, has been recounted. In other words, it has been suggested that nationalism does not have a class based characteristic and that anyone, rich or poor, young or old, woman or man, can be a part of the “homeland defense”. However, against whom or what this “defense”, the subject of the news, is or who “the enemy” is hasn’t been specified. The type of nationalism in this news may not be based on ethnicity or seem to be predicated on territorial integrity but taking into account that the majority of the population in Tunceli is Kurdish, both the defender and “the enemy” are, in fact, the Kurdish citizens.

Furthermore, in all of the news texts the peace process is supported. Nevertheless, what is spoken of is not a “war” of which the end will be peace, but acts of terror. It is uncertain with whom peace will be made.

In all of the news texts, it has been stated that in conclusion, peace must be made and that the guards support the peace process. However this conclusion has not been used in any of the leads or spots.

4.4.1.2.2 Context and History

In Van Dijk’s view, the background is the social and political aspect of the event and bears traces of history. That is why the news discourse must be analyzed in order to be understood.

The news has not been tackled enough in terms of the background or the context of the events on any of the news sites that are the subject of our study. It has been stated that the subjects of the news serve as guards in order to “defend their homeland”, “fight against terrorism” and “protect their villages”. The social reasons and consequences of these individuals becoming guards or being chosen to become guards have not been touched upon and, information on why and how the guard system has come out in history have not been covered in the news. Within the

framework of “counter terrorism” or “the Kurdish issue”, it has been presumed that the reader already possesses this knowledge and no new or different information, which could provide the reader a new perspective, has been given.

The conducts of violence that the guards have been involved in, which were proven by tens of verdicts that the European Court of Human Rights has convicted the Turkish state, the official data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the report of the Parliament’s Research Commission which investigates the unidentified murders, as well as the social impacts of guarding have not been even mentioned.

4.4.1.2.3 Verbal Reactions, Evaluations, Expectations

It was noticed that Anadolu Agency was the source of the studied news and thus, that a secondary source was used.

On all Internet sites except for haberturk.com, the village guarding women, as the subjects of the news, have been asked their opinion. On hurriyet.com.tr, mlliyet.com.tr, haberler.com, gazetevatan.com and haber7.com, the views of the guards named Türkan Budak, Hatice Arslan, Halise Arslan, Nurgül Arslan and İrfan Arslan as well as of The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, İbrahim Kuzu have been featured. While on sabah.com.tr, the views of Türkan Budak, Halise Arslan and Hatice Arslan have been cited; on haberturk.com and ensonhaber.com, only Türkan Budak’s views have been included. On haberturk.com, none of the opinions have been stated.

The main parties of the news are “the guards” and “the terrorists”. In this case, only the guards’ opinions on the main event have been asked. In addition to this, no official authorities’ points of view on the guards’ wish for peace and the protection of their rights in case peace is made, as well as their demand for the improvement of their social security and economic conditions have been included.

The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, İbrahim Kuzu’s statements whereby he

expresses the demand for the rights of the guards, have been featured on hurriyet.com.tr, mliyet.com.tr, haberler.com, gazetevatan.com and haber7.com.

Other than that, the opinions of different parties that could make the readers gain a new perspective have not been added. For instance, neither the villagers have been conferred on how those who are not guards perceive the guards, nor the social impacts of the guard system have been discussed. Even more, politicians, sociologists or journalists researching the subject haven't been conferred on the considerable conducts of violence that the guards have been involved in.

4.4.2 Microstructural Analysis

The microstructural analysis of a news text consists of syntactic analysis, local coherence, lexical choice and rhetoric analyses. Factors such as the structure of the sentences, their simplicity/complexity, their active/passive fragmentation, choices of words, the causal, functional and referential links that are tried to be obtained with the consecutive sentences within the news text, the numeric data used in order to enhance the news believability, the statements of the parties and the witnesses, the photographs and the opinions conveyed as quotations. (Özer, 2001, p: 83-84)

4.4.2.1 “Good Citizens” or “Agreeable Citizens”

While the news texts used on all the news sites that we deal with in our case study are repetitive, all of the sentences are written in active voice. There are no sentences in passive structure. The guards who are “defending the homeland” are affirmed as the subjects of the news and are included within the definition of “us”. Even though the nationalist discourse that divides the world into two and defines “us” based on “the others” (Özkırımlı, 2008, p: 285-286) hereby does not make an explicit definition as to who “the others” are, “us” can become possible only through the presence of the other. In this case, although tacit, there is a signification of “the other”. “Us” and “the other” are hereby defined through the distinctions of “good citizen/bad citizen” or “*good Kurd/bad Kurd*” (Özkırımlı, July 27 2013, t24.com.tr) without a specific “ethnic” emphasis. On one side, stand the guards (especially women), who protect their homeland and do anything it takes do so, while on the

other side stand the terrorists. Since the state is not in a war with another state or country, what is implied here is the “the enemy within” or “*the traitors amongst us who are the pawns of foreign forces*” which is one of the unique discourses of Turkish nationalism. (Özkırmılı, July 27 2013, t24.com.tr)

As Fowler argues, while determining the news value, certain people and events are made more understandable with references to “stereotypes”, frameworks, paradigms and schemes such as mother, patriot, businessman, neighbour, hooligan, foreigner and so on. (Fowler, 1991, p: 17) The guarding mothers herein have become the subjects of the news as “mothers” and “patriots”. Although there is no emphasis on their ethnic roots, they have been coded as “good citizens” or “agreeable citizens”. As Van Dijk has put forth with the studies he has conducted (1988, p: 113), the guards who do “homeland defence” are rendered in the news with positive self-presentation. Furthermore, Van Dijk argues that (ibid., p: 75) “our-negative actions” of the members of the dominant group are never stressed in the news. This is the case in our case study as well. The issue about the involvement in crimes and conducts of violence detected with the reports of the Parliament has not been included in the news.

The news explicitly uses the nationalist discourse and legitimizes violence. According to Özkırmılı, (2008, p: 285-286) “*the nation comes before anything in the nationalist discourse. National interests are above all other values and interests, and acting for the nation makes many things, which under normal circumstances could be considered as a crime, legitimate*”. In this news, the use of weaponry and violence has been legitimized with the duality of “the attacker” and “the protector”. In fact, milliyet.com, ensonhaber.com, haberturk.com and haber7.com have put the photographs of a child touching the barrel of a gun on their headlines. The state arming a civil society has been portrayed as an acceptable situation and a discourse in accordance with the dominant ideology or the ideology of the state has been used on all the news sites.

4.4.2.2 “Motherhood” and “Womanhood”

We had already tackled how the themes of motherhood / womanhood are included on each news site in the macro analysis. We will now be focusing on the micro analysis of the words.

Highlighted in all news that we deal with, the themes of “motherhood / womanhood” are in fact notions intertwined with the discourse of nation-state. In Yuval Davis’ view (2010), some of the leading theoreticians of nationalism ignore the gender relations as if they have no relevance to the subject. However, the primordialists whom we have mentioned earlier have argued that like “nation” and “family”, kinships have a natural and innate characteristic. It is women who “*biologically, culturally and symbolically*” reproduce nations. (p: 18-19) Although he hasn’t dealt with gender relations in his theory, Anderson states that unlike the modern state, empires or kingdoms expand not only through wars, but also with gender politics. Inter dynasty marriages, heterogeneous populations and new political frameworks... Moreover, in dynasties whereby the religion allowed polygamy (like the Ottoman Empire), on the contrary to the pure racial union in marriages, the royal families could make polygamous marriage with different ethnicities and would gain their reputation from the genealogical mix. (Anderson, 2006, p: 34-35) In the modern state, though, this understanding of multi ethnicity has changed. With his notion of “bio-power” (as we have discussed in detail in the Chapter 3), Foucault speaks of the population politics of the modern state that aim to conserve the union of gender and race/kinred. (Foucault, cited in Mermertaş, 2012, p: 162)

It seems that power relations are immanent with the issues of masculinity/femininity. Even more, a nation-state cannot be thought independent of gender relations. As Afsaneh Najmabadi states, “*Modern nations have often been explicitly imagined through familial metaphors. In particular, the construction of the national community as a brotherhood (a fraternity) has pointed both to the centrality of male bonding in the production of nationalist sentiment and to the exclusion of women from the social contract.*” (1997, p: 442) This analogy between family and nation creates a secret “brotherhood” that unites people who are not related to one another. (ibid., p: 463)

“...nation is a male-headed household in which both men and women have ‘natural’ roles to play. While women may be subordinated politically in nationalist movements and politics, as we have seen asserted above, they occupy an important symbolic place as the mothers of the nation.” (Nagel, 1998, p: 254)

In the news text that we analyze, a family life has been portrayed with statements such as “women, most of whom are married” or “the only single village guard”. It has been emphasized that the women take care of “*cooking, cleaning, childcare, work in the fields and animal care*”. In the meantime, it has been stated that they “defend their homeland” that is to say that the aforementioned work has been considered as their “primary duty”. By laying stress on their motherhood duties, they have been coded as the biological reproducers of generations, at the same time the transmitters of culture who raise generations and “the mothers of nation” in a symbolic way.

We may argue that this point of view is in parallel with the dominant ideology. Although women were granted the right to vote and be voted before many of the European countries, this hasn’t made a change in their patriarchal position within the society. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s quote “*The greatest duty of women is motherhood.*” (Arı, 1991, p: 257 cited in Şerifsoy, 2013 p: 177) demonstrates this patriarchal structure once again. Initiatives with the official reports¹ prepared during the early periods of the Republic such as opening girls’ schools in areas where mainly Kurds reside, encouraging girls to learn Turkish and to marry Western civil servants who serve in the region are the most significant examples of the establishment of a nation-state through women in Turkey. The debates carried out nowadays by the political powers about woman’s body like abortion, caesarian birth, birth rate or hemline, are not coincidental.

Anthias and Yuval Davis (1989) claim that there are five major ways in which women could participate in the ethnic and national process:

¹ For detailed information about the reports see: Bayrak, Mehmet, **Kürdoloji Belgeleri (Kurdology Documents)**, Özge Publ., Ankara 1994, p: 255-260 and Ahmet Mesut, **İngiliz Belgelerinde Kürdistan (Kurdistan in English Documents)**, Doz Publ., Istanbul, 1992, p: 1263-286)

- “- as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities,*
- as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national group;*
- as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture;*
- as signifiers of ethnic/national differences – as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories;*
- as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles.” (p: 7)*

Women, in the news that we analyze, are portrayed as bearers of children and raisers of generations, in other words as the biological reproducers of populations and the transmitters of culture. We had discussed how the location (Tunceli) was put stress on in the macro analysis (This is Tunceli, Place: Tunceli and so on). With this information of location, women are portrayed as the reproducers of the geographical borders of the nation-state and have been turned into a symbol by being placed at the core of this ideological discourse. Their participation in the military combat has been conveyed through the statements about them defending the homeland with weapons in their hands. As a result, the women guards who are the news subject have been presented in a militarized way. Words mentioned in the macro analysis such as ranger, military vest, cap, weapon, to be armed, Kalash and Kalashnikov are the manifestation of these militarist expressions.

4.4.2.3 Militarism and “Army-Nation”

Militarism, in the broadest sense of the word, is the concept of “*a society united with its army*”. Alfred Vagts has spoken of the penetration of militarism into all areas of the society such as culture, economic field, memory and art. (Altınay, 2013, p: 280) Both in Europe and in Turkey, modern nation-states have been established after wars. Wars and armies have played a constitutive role for the nation-states. (Altınay, Bora, 2008, p: 140) It is only when a nation is formed, at times of peace that the usage of violence related words form a prevalent discourse woven with militarism.

The most distinctive characteristic of the ideologies of Turkish nationalism, which are founded on the myth of “an army-nation”, is the scope of the vocabulary and the centrality. (ibid., p: 141-144)

Since it strengthens the connection of masculinity-state-soldiership, the compulsory military service is a field whereby the relations of state and gender are manifested. It is men who become a first class citizen by means of the military service, which is “the sacred duty”. Women, in this set up, may be in two different positions. *“Blessed motherhood (especially being the mother of a soldier) and in exceptional cases (!) belligerence (the most famous and striking example of these cases is the first female combat pilot Sabiha Gökçen.)”*¹ (ibid., p: 144-145)

In the news that we handle, there is the implication of an “extraordinary” situation, which necessitates the participation of “even” women in a battle. Nurturing Turkish nationalism, the “perpetuity syndrome” and the perception of “inner threat” are the reasons for this extraordinary situation. Under the threat of “terror”, a similar feeling has been evoked and the image of “a woman carrying a missile to the battlefield (with her baby on her back)”² in the War of Independence has been revived.

Kalashnikov, which is a type of weapon and is named after its designer, has been referred to as “Kalash” (Keleş) in all of the news. According to the dictionary of the Turkish Institute of Language, in the folk speech “keleş” connotes 1. “brave, courageous, valiant”, 2. “very handsome, very beautiful”, 3. “a simple body build”, 4. “ugly, bad”. (tdk.gov.tr) In the news, the word, which is used in its first sense, is both the abbreviation of the weapon that the guards carry, Kalashnikov and makes a reference implicating masculinity in the senses of “brave, courageous, valiant”, heroism and violence.

¹ The exclamation mark has been added.

² The examples of this image are seen in mediums such as art, literary work and schoolbooks. For instance, Halil Dikmen’s painting titled “İstiklal Harbinde Cephane Taşıyan Köylü Kadınlar” (Villager Women Carrying Missiles to the Battlefield at the War of Independence) (1933, Istanbul Painting and Sculpture Museum’s Collection), the Ulus Victory Monument by Heinrich Krippel (1927, Ankara), Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca’s poem titled “Mustafa Kemal’in Kağnısı” (Mustafa Kemal’s Bullock Cart) and so on.

Words like honor, patriotism, cowardice, bravery and duty (a word that often comes up in the news text) are both associated to nation and masculinity. Masculinity corresponds to the militarist demands of nationalism. (Nagel, p: 251-252)

4.4.2.4 “Homeland”: Geographical Definition of “Us”

As we have stated before, one of the most distinctive words of the nationalist discourse is “homeland”. In the news, it has been shown that they serve their duties under the sign that says, “anything for our homeland” and has been accompanied with the photographs.

The idea of a nation, without a doubt, cannot quite be –with Anderson’s term– imagined without a piece of land with set borders. Despite of the fact that these borders could be claimed to have become indistinct in the globalizing world, identities are still being determined in reference to these pieces of land in this day and age.

Division of the country, which *“gives an identity to those who are a part of it or on the opposite, is geography founded by those who attribute an identity to themselves around them,”* means “new identities” coming out from within. Homeland, which is *“the fiery rhetoric of the nationalist perspective”*, is perhaps *“an indivisible whole”* for this reason. (Nalçaoğlu, p: 293-296) A word, which determines the geographic and the most concrete borders of the definition of “us”, thus undoubtedly becomes the center of the nationalist discourse in our news as well.

When examined in terms of the local coherence, a “conditional” relationship between the sentences within a news text could usually be seen. The fact that these women serve as guards, their house work in their everyday lives and the work required by the duty of guarding have been recounted and in the following sentences, the fact that they do this in order to protect their villages and to fight against terrorist has been expressed. It has been stressed that the guards would support it if “the peace process” did succeed and peace was made. It has been enucleated that the guards want a peaceful life for their children. Most of the phrases are simple and do not have a complex structure. The difficulties that face they have been explained. Through the statements of these women guards whose names have been given, these

difficulties have been conveyed and with a large number of photographs (in the image galleries) this situation has been pointed out. In short, a referential relationship between the sentences has been established.

When we examine the rhetoric of the news, we notice that on each site a lot of photographs have been used (apart from the front-page headline photograph). Accordingly, on hurriyet.com.tr 31, on milliyet.com.tr 2, on ensonhaber.com 14, on haberturk.com 52, haberler.com 4, on sabah.com.tr 48, on haber7.com 49, on gazetevatan.com 21, on internethaber.com 25 photographs have been used along with quotations and a numeric data.

On all the news sites except for haberturk.com.tr, there are quoted passages from the women guards' statements. The statements have been directly cited in inverted commas. On the news sites apart from haberturk.com and sabah.com.tr, the statements of İbrahim Kuzu, The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, have been also quoted word by word. Kuzu's statements include some numeric data. One of these is that the guards are on duty 24 hours 7 days, while the other is that 630 guards serve in Tunceli of which 25 are women. We may state that it was intended to increase believability with the use of a large number of photographs. The women guards have been photographed at home, with their children, in the everyday life, on the street, at the watchtower and on the mountains with their military garments and weapons, which they wear on top of their civilian, regional clothes.

CONCLUSION

Nationalism has sustained itself historically and theoretically in different forms by being articulated with various concepts and ideologies. Discursively though, the most distinctive of its characteristics is that it constantly reproduces itself in its language with the distinction of “us” and the “other”. Media is one of the most significant tools that use this language. While the definition of “us” describes itself as agreeable, accepted and normal, the “others” are coded as abnormal, deviant and as those who need to be alienated from the society. Media feeds the prejudices against them and especially during the times of conflict or crisis, present them as a threat and thus, create an atmosphere of “lynch”.

It has been revealed in many studies that racism that articulates with nationalism and discursive violence that can bring out the feeling of violence in the society by means of language, is often used in the mainstream media. Considering this assumption, the question for which we have sought an answer with this study was whether Internet news sites also use the dominant discourse or not.

Even though the news produced on news sites differ from newspaper, television or radio news in many aspects, the most substantive difference for this study is that it is a product of professional journalism (that it goes through an editorial process) like the mainstream media and yet, at the same time, like all other products in the Internet medium the content could be shaped, though partially, with the comments/likes or clicks of the reader/viewer. Another significance is that of the ownership structure. Owning a news site is a lot easier and cheaper than owning a television channel or a newspaper. Without the need for big investments, featuring news that are capable of capturing the reader/viewer’s interest may be enough to make a news site long lasting.

Although we herein state that these characteristics are significant to our study, we haven't made an analysis of comments/likes (reception analysis) or a research on the ownership relations. However, as the editor selects the news that are featured on "the most clicked" sites, thinking they will get a lot of clicks or considering the topics that got a large number of clicks until now, we may say that these news (considerably more than the news covered in the mainstream media) are shaped according to the tendencies of the readers. The fact that among "the most clicked news sites" which we have examined in our case study, some Internet new sites are considered to be independent in terms of ownership (not a part of a multiple media holding company) while some are affiliated to a media holding company, has been significant in terms of being able to see whether they have had different approaches or not.

In conclusion, it has been observed that the news about "The female guards who serve in Tunceli" has appeared concurrently as a main page headline on 9 of the most clicked 10 Internet sites on the day it was published, without many changes in the news text, as it was served by the state's news agency Anadolu Agency. The only news site of all the studied sites on which the news hasn't been published is ntvmsnbc.com.tr. Macro and micro analyses of the news and its coverage has been conducted with Van Dijk's method of "Critical Discourse Analysis".

9 of the news sites, which we have dealt with (hurriyet.com.tr, milliyet.com.tr, ensonhaber.com, haberturk.com, haberler.com, sabah.com.tr, gazetevatan.com.tr, haber7.com, internethaber.com), have published the news that carries the dominant ideology and have not felt the need to seek for more information or resources beside the source they have used. This situation has made it impossible to make different analyses on each news site and has limited our analysis. Nevertheless, at the same time even setting this forth reveals a crucial fact in our analysis: Nationalist news legitimizing violence that are produced in media are substantially widespread and are constantly reproduced almost as if they are resonating. No one feels obliged to question them or bear in mind the principles of international journalism while making news. What is more interesting is that the ownership structure does not carry any significance in this. For instance, haberturk.com, which incorporates newspaper, television as well as radio, and of

which the boss is a businessman with other investments beside media, has published this news but internethaber.com, which has nothing to do with these structures and is relatively independent, has also published it in a similar way. From this, the conclusion about how the nationalist discourse that is connected to violence without any coercion or pressure is “internalized” and “normalized” derives.

The news has not appeared only on ntvmsnbc.com.tr of all the news sites that we examine in our case study. However, we cannot reach a generalization that this site uses a discourse other than the dominant discourse. We may only say that this has been an editorial choice unique to this instance.

As discussed in detail in the analysis, the news text and the photographs are loaded with nationalist, militarist words and symbols. In the news, it has been roughly conveyed that the women guards “protect” their villages and “defend their homeland” under the sign that says, “anything for our homeland”, wearing military caps with Turkish flags and vests on their civilian/traditional clothes along with their Kalashnikovs (their guns). Women have been praised for not hindering their “primary” duties of housework and motherhood. The homeland is under such danger that an “extraordinary” situation has been portrayed that necessitates the participation of women as well in homeland defense, which actually is a men’s duty. While women are regarded merely as soldiers’ mothers and providers of the biological and cultural sustainability of the future generations, soldiership and homeland defense are originally men’s work. However, this “extraordinary” situation has made women “combatants”.

Looking at the analysis that we briefly summarized, we note that there hasn’t been made any sort of an “ethnic” emphasis and that the news is based on the identity of “us” which overall is presented in a positive manner. Particular groups or communities have not been pointed at with the denominations such as “the other”, “terror” or “terrorist”. The discourse that the news uses may seem as though it does not make a negative presentation and yet, it is in line with the dominant discourse, which from the history of Turkish nationalism until today has described Kurds with the distinction of “good Kurds/bad Kurds”. A separation has been made between “the citizen who defends the homeland, loves the state and faces all kinds of

difficulties in order to protect it” and “the terrorist”. Most often regarded as “a matter of security” rather than a cultural matter about identity in Turkish nationalism, the Kurdish issue has been treated on the basis of “security”. As is, it uses the dominant discourse.

At this point, we must touch upon the notion of “hate speech” which is closely related to our subject. Although it does not have a definition recognized by all, “hate speech” is broadly studied in categories such as swearword, insult, humiliation, use of discriminatory language to minorities or immigrants, generalization of negativities and their ascription to a certain ethnic or religious group as well as hostility and war discourses. Hate speech is the embodiment of discursive violence, which is directed to groups of “others” and leads to hate crimes. On the other hand, in the news that we deal with, there is no direct use of swearwords, insults or explicit labeling of an ethnic or religious group. Women village guards have been portrayed with a positive presentation within the definition of “us”. Those who are positioned in opposition to these women, who are “patriots”, “heroines” and defend their homeland with devotion by any means, are “terrorists” threatening the “security” of the country. Swearwords, humiliation, insult or a discriminative language have not been explicitly used for a certain racial, religious, cultural etc. community. Both those who served the news and published it on their sites think that they have used a positive language that supports “peace” since the statements of the women guards, which support “peace” or “the peace process”, have been often used in the news content. Nonetheless, the fact that these sentences have been included in the news and that an ethnic community has not been named, does not mean that this news uses “peace discourse” or that it has no link to violence. As Van Dijk says, in the minds of the readers in socio-cognitive way, Tunceli associates with the Kurdish population living densely in the province and terror with PKK. An implicit definition of the “other” group has been made and a distinction of “acceptable Kurd” and “bad/terrorist Kurd” has been drawn. Özkırımlı’s thesis of “Kurds today being represented in the society and thus, in media with the *“good Kurds-bad Kurds”* distinction, which is not too different to the distinction that the Kemalist regimes drew with the policies of assimilation” becomes validated through this example. (July 27 2013, t24.com.tr)

Even though hate speech provides a field that is easier to identify and more possible to categorize, at times the nationalist discourse, which we cannot categorize as hate speech and is based on racial or ethnic otherization, may seem “natural” and “normal” in society and media.

One could only speak of a “war discourse” in a news whereby militarist words associated with violence such as military vest, Kalashnikov, weapon, mountain, ranger and as such, and a large number of photographs of women guards in military clothes with guns have been used.

In this respect, looking for ways to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence, the importance of “peace journalism” as a solution arises.

Two important names of “peace journalism”, Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick suggest journalists an approach that will lead the conflict to a solution and not to a war, and will help prevent violence. Among the principles that they have set down, there are elements such as the following: not making a separation of “me”-“other”; including the future outcomes of a conflict; considering also the psychological and social outcomes of violence in the long term; highlighting the commonalities rather than the discrepancies; avoiding the assertion that the only explanation for “violence” is the “violence” prior to it; not focusing on only one party’s pain and creating the dichotomy of “villains” and “victims”; avoiding the often use of the words “massacre”, “tragedy”, “assassination”, “genocide”; not “otherizing” by using adjectives such as “vicious”, “cruel”, “felon” “brutal”, “barbaric”, “terrorist”, “extremist”, “fanatic” or “fundamentalist” and not only making news about the violation of rights of one of the parties but also about both parties of the conflict. (2000, p: 30-33)

Recognized in the national and international arenas, the practical suggestions of the “peace journalism” seems to be effective in adopting and performing an understanding of journalism that distances itself from war, violence, discrimination and racism.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1

Örneklem

Hürriyet.com.tr



(Hurriyet.com.tr, Nisan 2013)

Nöbet tutan anneler

Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor. Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Görevlerinin ardından döndüklerin evlerinde kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik, bir yandan çocuklarının bakımını, bir yandan da sacda ekmek pişiriyor.

Evde kalaşnikoflarının bakımını yapan kadınlar, tarladaki işleri ve hayvanların bakımını da yapıyor.

Köyde nöbet tutan geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, bazen köydeki diğer kadınların arasına karışarak onlarla sohbet ediyor. Köyde nöbet tutan kadınlara, kimi zaman çocukları da eşlik ediyor.

Pertek ilçesine bağlı Konaklar köyünde geçici köy korucusu 10 kadın, sabahın erken saatlerinde uyanıp, önce sobayı yakarak çocuklarına kahvaltı hazırlıyor. Sonra geçici köy korucusu olan erkeklerden nöbeti devralan kadınlar, köydeki gözetleme kulesinden köyün güvenliğini sağlıyor. Kadınların kimisinin terlik kimisinin spor ayakkabı kimisinin de bot giymesi dikkati çekiyor.

Kadınlar bin 400 rakımla yüksek tepelere kurulan mevzilerde de “her şey vatan için” yazısı altında vatan savunmasını en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışarak nöbet tutuyor.

Kışın soğuk, yazın sıcak günlerde mevzide nöbet tutan kadınlar, birbirleriyle yaptıkları sohbetlerde bir yandan dertleşiyor, bir yandan da gelecekte daha huzurlu ve rahat bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Köy dışındaki alanda zaman zaman eğitim çalışması yapan kadınlar, silahı nasıl kullanacakları, silahın bakım ve temizliği ile bir saldırı anında nasıl davranacakları konusunda bilgi sahibi oluyor.

Nöbetlerinin ardından eve dönen kadınlar, evde onları bekleyen aileleri için sıcak bir yuva ortamı oluşturmak ve çocuklarına anne sevgisini doya doya vermenin gayreti içerisinde oluyor.

Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, uzun yıllardır geçici köy korucusu olmalarına rağmen sosyal güvencelerinin bulunmadığını, bu nedenle çok sıkıntılar çektiklerini söyledi.

Birçok çatışmaya girdiklerini, kadın olarak erkeklerle beraber teröristlerle girilen silahlı çatışmalarda yer aldığını aktaran Budak, gün içerisinde evle ilgilendiğini, hayvanların bakımını yaptığını bildirdi.

Geçici köy korucusu olduğu için köyün dışına çıkamadığından yakınan Budak, köyün güvenliğini sağladıklarını, gece erkeklerin, gündüz kadınların nöbet tuttuğunu belirtti.

Sabah namaz vakti nöbeti kadınların devraldığını dile getiren Budak, “Köyümüze teröristlerce yoğun baskınlar oldu. Köy arabasının önü kesildi. Bu yaşamın içerisinde biz de zorluklara katlanıyoruz. Bu süreçte biz güvence talep ediyoruz. Çözüm süreci ülkemiz ve bizim için hayırlı olacaksa istiyoruz. Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocukları huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister. Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü” dedi.

Geçici köy korucusu Halise Arslan (33) da 2 çocuğunun olduğunu, 5 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yaptığını belirterek, kadın olarak ev işleri ve çocukları ile ilgilendiğini kaydetti.

“İlk işe başladığımda eğitim çalışması oldu. 17 gün eğitim gördüm. Bizim sağlık güvencemiz yok. Biz her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız. Bunu hiç unutmasınlar. Emekli olan geçici köy korucuları sadece ayda 300 lira alıyor. Yıllarca bu işe emek veriliyor. Çocuklarımızı istediğimiz gibi okutamıyoruz” diyen Arslan, ailesinin 22 yıldır koruculuk yaptığını, ancak düşük ücret aldıklarını anlattı.

Her şeye devlet için katlandıklarını bildiren Arslan, “Devletimizin bizi görmesini istiyoruz. Biz daima Başbakanımızın arkasındayız. Çözüm süreci konusunda da her zaman Başbakanın arkasındayız. Geçmişte köyümüzde silahlı çatışmalar oluyordu, silah seslerinden yatamıyorduk, dışarı çıkamıyorduk. Artık bunların sona ermesini istiyoruz. Barıştan yanayız” diye konuştu.

Köydeki tek bekar geçici köy korucusu olan 25 yaşındaki Hatice Arslan ise 2009 yılında geçici köy korucusu olduğunu, köyde silahların korkusuyla büyüdülerini, okula korkuyla gittiklerini aktararak, şöyle konuştu:

“Dışarıda oynarken hep dağlara bakardık, bir saldırı olacak mı korkusuyla oynardık. Akşam hava kararmadan evlerimize çekiliyorduk. Sürekli köyümüzde çatışma çıkıyordu. Köylülerimiz teröristler tarafından rehin alındı. Köye baskın düzenlenmek istendi.

Liseyi Tokat'ta okumak zorunda kaldım. Üniversiteye gitme imkanım olmadığı için korucu oldum. Çok zorluk yaşadık. Köyde herkes korucu. Dış görevler oluyor. Köyde nöbet tutuyoruz. Özellikle evli olan kadınlar çok zorlanıyor. Bir yandan ev bir yandan bu iş gerçekten çok zor oluyor. Artık kan dökülmesini istemiyoruz. Bu sorun bitecek mi yoksa devam mı edecek korkusu var halen içimizde. İsteriz barış olmasını. Bundan sonra korucuların haklarının verilmesini talep ediyoruz. Maaşımız az. Ayda yaklaşık 850 lira alıyoruz. Başbakanımıza sesleniyorum. 30 yıldır bu ülke için mücadele eden geçici köy korucularını unutmamalarını haklarımızın verilmesini istiyoruz.”

Eşi ile 17 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olan 2 çocuklu Nurgül Arslan, korucu olmak için eğitim aldıklarını, yaptıkları işin zor yönlerinin olduğunu söyleyerek, özellikle hamilelik döneminde çok zorlandığını ifade etti.

Türkiye'de güzel bir ortam ve çocuklarına güzel bir gelecek hazırlamak istediğini anlatan Arslan,

“Evde nasıl iş yapıyorsam, silahın bakımını da yapıyorum. Erkeklerden daha iyi yapıyoruz. Bundan sonra inşallah daha iyi olur. Türkiye için hayırlı olanı istiyorum” dedi.

Eşi ile koruculuk yapan İrfan Arslan (33), eşi ile dönüşümlü çocuklara baktıklarını, eşi evde olmadığı zaman ev işlerini de yaptığını bildirerek, eşi ile aynı göreve gittikleri zaman çocuklarının ortada kaldığını söyledi.

Köylerinde yaşayan insanların sürekli diken üstünde olduğunu, çatışmalar ve huzursuzluk yaşandığını dile getiren Arslan, çözüm sürecinden umutlu olduklarını, bu konuda devletin yanında bulunduklarını bildirdi.

Tunceli Geçici Köy Korucularının Haklarını Koruma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Başkanı İbrahim Kuzu, geçici köy koruculuk sisteminde sosyal güvencenin olmamasından yakınarak, korucuların 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalıştığını dile getirdi.

Kuzu, şunları kaydetti:

“Her an göreve hazır bir şekilde çalışıyorlar. Yeri gelir dağda yeri gelir köyünde her türlü zorluğa göğüs germişlerdir.

Çözüm süreci içerisinde geçici köy korucularına da bir düzenleme getirilmesini istiyoruz. Yıllardır devletimizle birlikteyiz, halen birlikte olmaya da devam ediyoruz. Tunceli'de 630 geçici köy korucusu bulunuyor, bunlarının 25'i kadın.”

(online :

<http://fotogaleri.hurriyet.com.tr/galeridetay.aspx?cid=67427&rid=2&p=1&hid=22941111>)

Milliyet.com.tr



Elde silah kucakta çocuk: Burası Tunceli

Tunceli'de 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor

Kırsal yaşamın zorluklarını çeken korucu kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetlerinin üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor -Çözüm sürecine destek veren geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, gelecekte daha huzurlu ve mutlu bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor. Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Görevlerinin ardından döndüklerin evlerinde kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik, bir yandan çocuklarının bakımını, bir yandan da sacda ekmek pişiriyor.

Evde kalaşnikoflarının bakımını yapan kadınlar, tarladaki işleri ve hayvanların bakımını da yapıyor.

Köyde nöbet tutan geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, bazen köydeki diğer kadınların arasına karışarak onlarla sohbet ediyor. Köyde nöbet tutan kadınlara, kimi zaman çocukları da eşlik ediyor.

-Köyün güvenliğini sağlıyorlar-

Pertek ilçesine bağlı Konaklar köyünde geçici köy korucusu 10 kadın, sabahın erken saatlerinde uyanıp, önce sobayı yakarak çocuklarına kahvaltı hazırlıyor. Sonra geçici köy korucusu olan erkeklerden nöbeti devralan kadınlar, köydeki gözetleme kulesinden köyün güvenliğini sağlıyor. Kadınların kimisinin terlik kimisinin spor ayakkabı kimisinin de bot giymesi dikkati çekiyor.

Kadınlar bin 400 rakımla yüksek tepelere kurulan mevzilerde de "her şey vatan için" yazısı altında vatan savunmasını en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışarak nöbet tutuyor.

Kışın soğuk, yazın sıcak günlerde mevzide nöbet tutan kadınlar, birbirleriyle yaptıkları sohbetlerde bir yandan dertleşiyor, bir yandan da gelecekte daha huzurlu ve rahat bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Köy dışındaki alanda zaman zaman eğitim çalışması yapan kadınlar, silahı nasıl kullanacakları, silahın bakım ve temizliği ile bir saldırı anında nasıl davranacakları konusunda bilgi sahibi oluyor.

Nöbetlerinin ardından eve dönen kadınlar, evde onları bekleyen aileleri için sıcak bir yuva ortamı oluşturmak ve çocuklarına anne sevgisini doya doya vermenin gayreti içerisinde oluyor.

-”Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü”-

Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, uzun yıllardır geçici köy korucusu olmalarına rağmen sosyal güvencelerinin bulunmadığını, bu nedenle çok sıkıntılar çektiklerini söyledi.

Birçok çatışmaya girdiklerini, kadın olarak erkeklerle beraber teröristlerle girilen silahlı çatışmalarda yer aldığını aktaran Budak, gün içerisinde evle ilgilendiğini, hayvanların bakımını yaptığını bildirdi.

Geçici köy korucusu olduğu için köyün dışına çıkamadığından yakınan Budak, köyün güvenliğini sağladıklarını, gece erkeklerin, gündüz kadınların nöbet tuttuğunu belirtti.

Sabah namaz vakti nöbeti kadınların devraldığını dile getiren Budak, "Köyümüze teröristlerce yoğun baskınlar oldu. Köy arabasının önü kesildi. Bu yaşamın içerisinde biz de zorluklara katlanıyoruz. Bu süreçte biz güvence talep ediyoruz. Çözüm süreci ülkemiz ve bizim için hayırlı olacaksa istiyoruz. Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocukları huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister. Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü" dedi.

-”Her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız”-

Geçici köy korucusu Halise Arslan (33) da 2 çocuğunun olduğunu, 5 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yaptığını belirterek, kadın olarak ev işleri ve çocukları ile ilgilendiğini kaydetti.

”İlk işe başladığımda eğitim çalışması oldu. 17 gün eğitim gördüm. Bizim sağlık güvencemiz yok. Biz her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız. Bunu hiç unutmasınlar. Emekli olan geçici köy korucuları sadece ayda 300 lira alıyor. Yıllarca bu işe emek veriliyor. Çocuklarımızı istediğimiz gibi okutamıyoruz” diyen Arslan, ailesinin 22 yıldır koruculuk yaptığını, ancak düşük ücret aldıklarını anlattı.

Her şeye devlet için katlandıklarını bildiren Arslan, ”Devletimizin bizi görmesini istiyoruz. Biz daima Başbakanımızın arkasındayız. Çözüm süreci konusunda da her zaman Başbakanın arkasındayız. Geçmişte köyümüzde silahlı çatışmalar oluyordu, silah seslerinden yatamıyorduk, dışarı çıkamıyorduk. Artık bunların sona ermesini istiyoruz. Barıştan yanayız” diye konuştu.

-Liseyi Tokat’ta okumak zorunda kaldı-

Köydeki tek bekar geçici köy korucusu olan 25 yaşındaki Hatice Arslan ise 2009 yılında geçici köy korucusu olduğunu, köyde silahların korkusuyla büyüdüklerini, okula korkuyla gittiklerini aktararak, şöyle konuştu: ”Dışarıda oynarken hep dağlara bakardık, bir saldırı olacak mı korkusuyla oynardık. Akşam hava kararmadan evlerimize çekiliyorduk. Sürekli köyümüzde çatışma çıkıyordu. Köylülerimiz teröristler tarafından rehin alındı. Köye baskın düzenlenmek istendi. Liseyi Tokat’ta okumak zorunda kaldım. Üniversiteye gitme imkanım olmadığı için korucu oldum. Çok zorluk yaşadık. Köyde herkes korucu. Dış görevler oluyor. Köyde nöbet tutuyoruz. Özellikle evli olan kadınlar çok zorlanıyor. Bir yandan ev bir yandan bu iş gerçekten çok zor oluyor. Artık kan dökülmesini istemiyoruz. Bu sorun bitecek mi yoksa devam mı edecek korkusu var halen içimizde. İsteriz barış olmasını. Bundan sonra korucuların haklarının verilmesini talep ediyoruz. Maaşımız az. Ayda yaklaşık 850 lira alıyoruz. Başbakanımıza sesleniyorum. 30 yıldır bu ülke için mücadele eden geçici köy korucularını unutmamalarını haklarımızın verilmesini istiyoruz.

-Korucu olmak zor-

Eşi ile 17 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olan 2 çocuklu Nurgül Arslan, korucu olmak için eğitim aldıklarını, yaptıkları işin zor yönlerinin olduğunu söyleyerek, özellikle hamilelik döneminde çok zorlandığını ifade etti.

Türkiye’de güzel bir ortam ve çocuklarına güzel bir gelecek hazırlamak istediğini anlatan Arslan, ”Evde nasıl iş yapıyorsam, silahın bakımını da yapıyorum. Erkeklerden daha iyi yapıyoruz. Bundan sonra inşallah daha iyi olur. Türkiye için hayırlı olanı istiyorum” dedi.

-Çocuklar ortada kalıyor-

Eşi ile koruculuk yapan İrfan Arslan (33), eşi ile dönüşümlü çocuklara baktıklarını, eşi evde olmadığı zaman ev işlerini de yaptığını bildirerek, eşi ile aynı göreve gittikleri zaman çocuklarının ortada kaldığını söyledi.

Köylerinde yaşayan insanların sürekli diken üstünde olduğunu, çatışmalar ve huzursuzluk yaşandığını dile getiren Arslan, çözüm sürecinden umutlu olduklarını, bu konuda devletin yanında bulunduklarını bildirdi.

-Korucular 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalışıyor-

Tunceli Geçici Köy Korucularının Haklarını Koruma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Başkanı İbrahim Kuzu, geçici köy koruculuk sisteminde sosyal güvencenin olmamasından yakınarak, korucuların 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalıştığını dile getirdi.

Kuzu, şunları kaydetti: "Her an göreve hazır bir şekilde çalışıyorlar. Yeri gelir dağda yeri gelir köyünde her türlü zorluğa göğüs germişlerdir. Çözüm süreci içerisinde geçici köy korucularına da bir düzenleme getirilmesini istiyoruz. Yıllardır devletimizle birlikteyiz, halen birlikte olmaya da devam ediyoruz. Tunceli'de 630 geçici köy korucusu bulunuyor, bunlarının 25'i kadın."

Online: (<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/elde-silah-kucakta-cocuk-burasi-tunceli/gundem/gundemdetay/01.04.2013/1687951/default.htm>)

Ensonhaber.com

Ensonhaber.com, Nisan 2013

Tunceli'nin anne köy korucuları

Asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile göreve her zaman hazırlar..

Tunceli'de kadın köy korucuları, hem günlük işlerini yapıp hem de mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Kırsal yaşamın zorluklarını çeken korucu kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetlerinin üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

ÇÖZÜM SÜRECİNE DESTEKLERİ TAM

Çözüm sürecine destek veren geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, gelecekte daha huzurlu ve mutlu bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, **"Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocuklarını huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister"** dedi.

Galeride 14 fotoğraf bulunuyor. Haber metnindeki cümlelerden bazıları fotoğraf altı olarak kullanılmış.

Online: <http://www.ensonhaber.com/tuncelinin-anne-koy-koruculari-2013-04-01.html>

haberturk.com



Tunceli'de anneler böyle nöbet tutuyor!

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadele güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak için geçici koruyucu olarak görev yapıyor.

Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor.

Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Görevlerinin ardından döndükleri evlerinde kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik yaparken, bir yandan çocuklarının bakımıyla ilgileniyor, bir yandan da sacda ekmek pişiriyor.

<http://galeri.haberturk.com/gundem/galeri/426133-tuncelide-anneler-boyle-nobet-tutuyor>



<http://www.haberler.com/kalesnikofla-nobet-tutan-anneler-4484085-haberi/>

Kaleşnikofla Nöbet Tutan Anneler!

Tunceli'de 25 kadın, geçici köy korucusu olarak 1400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

YÖRESEL KIYAFETLERLE GÜVENLİĞİ SAĞLIYORLAR

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı **Tunceli**'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor. Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Görevlerinin ardından döndüklerin evlerinde kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik, bir yandan çocuklarının bakımını, bir yandan da sacda ekmek pişiriyor.

ÇOCUKLARI ANALARINI YALNIZ BIRAKMIYOR

Evde kalaşnikoflarının bakımını yapan kadınlar, tarladaki işleri ve hayvanların bakımını da yapıyor.

Köyde nöbet tutan geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, bazen köydeki diğer kadınların arasına karışarak onlarla sohbet ediyor. Köyde nöbet tutan kadınlara, kimi zaman çocukları da eşlik ediyor.

KÖYÜN GÜVENLİĞİNİ SAĞLIYORLAR

Pertek ilçesine bağlı Konaklar köyünde geçici köy korucusu 10 kadın, sabahın erken saatlerinde uyanıp, önce sobayı yakarak çocuklarına kahvaltı hazırlıyor. Sonra geçici köy korucusu olan erkeklerden nöbeti devralan kadınlar, köydeki gözetleme kulesinden köyün güvenliğini sağlıyor. Kadınların kimisinin terlik kimisinin spor ayakkabı kimisinin de bot giymesi dikkati çekiyor.

Kadınlar bin 400 rakımla yüksek tepelere kurulan mevzilerde de "her şey vatan için" yazısı altında vatan savunmasını en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışarak nöbet tutuyor.

Kışın soğuk, yazın sıcak günlerde mevzide nöbet tutan kadınlar, birbirleriyle yaptıkları sohbetlerde bir yandan dertleşiyor, bir yandan da gelecekte daha huzurlu ve rahat bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Köy dışındaki alanda zaman zaman eğitim çalışması yapan kadınlar, silahı nasıl kullanacakları, silahın bakım ve temizliği ile bir saldırı anında nasıl davranacakları konusunda bilgi sahibi oluyor.

Nöbetlerinin ardından eve dönen kadınlar, evde onları bekleyen aileleri için sıcak bir yuva ortamı oluşturmak ve çocuklarına anne sevgisini doya doya vermenin gayreti içerisinde oluyor.

"ÇOCUKLARIMIZ SİLAHLARLA BÜYÜDÜ"

Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, uzun yıllardır geçici köy korucusu olmalarına rağmen sosyal güvencelerinin bulunmadığını, bu nedenle çok sıkıntılar çektiklerini söyledi.

Birçok çatışmaya girdiklerini, kadın olarak erkeklerle beraber teröristlerle girilen silahlı çatışmalarda yer aldığını aktaran Budak, gün içerisinde evle ilgilendiğini, hayvanların bakımını yaptığını bildirdi.

Geçici köy korucusu olduğu için köyün dışına çıkamadığından yakınan Budak, köyün güvenliğini sağladıklarını, gece erkeklerin, gündüz kadınların nöbet tuttuğunu belirtti.

Sabah namaz vakti nöbeti kadınların devraldığını dile getiren Budak,

"Köyümüze teröristlerce yoğun baskınlar oldu. Köy arabasının önü kesildi. Bu yaşamın içerisinde biz de zorluklara katlanıyoruz. Bu süreçte biz güvence talep ediyoruz. Çözüm süreci ülkemiz ve bizim için hayırlı olacaksa istiyoruz. Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocukları huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister. Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü" dedi.

"HER ZAMAN DEVLETİMİZİN ARKASINDAYIZ"

Geçici köy korucusu Halise Arslan (33) da 2 çocuğunun olduğunu, 5 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yaptığını belirterek, kadın olarak ev işleri ve çocukları ile ilgilendiğini kaydetti.

"İlk işe başladığımda eğitim çalışması oldu. 17 gün eğitim gördüm. Bizim sağlık güvencemiz yok. Biz her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız. Bunu hiç unutmasınlar. Emekli olan geçici köy korucuları sadece ayda 300 lira alıyor. Yıllarca bu işe emek veriliyor. Çocuklarımızı istediğimiz gibi okutamıyoruz" diyen Arslan, ailesinin 22 yıldır koruculuk yaptığını, ancak düşük ücret aldıklarını anlattı.

Her şeye devlet için katlandıklarını bildiren Arslan, "Devletimizin bizi görmesini istiyoruz. Biz daima Başbakanımızın arkasındayız. Çözüm süreci konusunda da her zaman Başbakanın arkasındayız. Geçmişte köyümüzde silahlı çatışmalar oluyordu, silah seslerinden yatamıyorduk, dışarı çıkamıyorduk. Artık bunların sona ermesini istiyoruz. Barıştan yanayız" diye konuştu.

LİSEYİ TOKAT'TA OKUMAK ZORUNDA KALDI

Köydeki tek bekar geçici köy korucusu olan 25 yaşındaki **Hatice Arslan** ise 2009 yılında geçici köy korucusu olduğunu, köyde silahların korkusuyla büyüdüklerini, okula korkuyla gittiklerini aktararak, şöyle konuştu:

"Dışarıda oynarken hep dağlara bakardık, bir saldırı olacak mı korkusuyla oynardık. Akşam hava kararmadan evlerimize çekiliyorduk. Sürekli köyümüzde çatışma çıkıyordu. Köylülerimiz teröristler tarafından rehin alındı. Köye baskın düzenlenmek istendi. Liseyi Tokat'ta okumak zorunda kaldım. Üniversiteye gitme imkanım olmadığı için korucu oldum. Çok zorluk yaşadık. Köyde herkes korucu. Dış görevler oluyor. Köyde nöbet tutuyoruz. Özellikle evli olan kadınlar çok zorlanıyor. Bir yandan ev bir yandan bu iş gerçekten çok zor oluyor. Artık kan dökülmesini istemiyoruz. Bu sorun bitecek mi yoksa devam mı edecek korkusu var halen içimizde. İsteriz barış olmasını. Bundan sonra korucuların haklarının verilmesini talep ediyoruz. Maaşımız az. Ayda yaklaşık 850 lira alıyoruz. Başbakanımıza sesleniyorum. 30 yıldır bu ülke için mücadele eden geçici köy korucularını unutmamalarını haklarımızın verilmesini istiyoruz."

KORUCU OLMAK ZOR

Eşi ile 17 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olan 2 çocuklu Nurgül Arslan, korucu olmak için eğitim aldıklarını, yaptıkları işin zor yönlerinin olduğunu söyleyerek, özellikle hamilelik döneminde çok zorlandığını ifade etti.

Türkiye'de güzel bir ortam ve çocuklarına güzel bir gelecek hazırlamak istediğini anlatan Arslan, "Evde nasıl iş yapıyorsam, silahın bakımını da yapıyorum. Erkeklerden daha iyi yapıyoruz. Bundan sonra inşallah daha iyi olur. **Türkiye** için hayırlı olanı istiyorum" dedi.

"ÇOCUKLAR ORTADA KALİYOR"

Eşi ile koruculuk yapan **İrfan Arslan** (33), eşi ile dönüşümlü çocuklara baktıklarını, eşi evde olmadığı zaman ev işlerini de yaptığını bildirerek, eşi ile aynı göreve gittikleri zaman çocuklarının ortada kaldığını söyledi.

Köylerinde yaşayan insanların sürekli diken üstünde olduğunu, çatışmalar ve huzursuzluk yaşandığını dile getiren Arslan, çözüm sürecinden umutlu olduklarını, bu konuda devletin yanında bulunduklarını bildirdi.

"KORUCULAR 7 GÜN 24 SAAT ÇALIŞIYOR"


Tunceli Geçici Köy Korucularının Haklarını Koruma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Başkanı İbrahim Kuzu, geçici köy koruculuk sisteminde sosyal güvencenin olmamasından yakınarak, korucuların 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalıştığını dile getirdi.

Kuzu, şunları kaydetti:

"Her an göreve hazır bir şekilde çalışıyorlar. Yeri gelir dağda yeri gelir köyünde her türlü zorluğa göğüs germişlerdir. Çözüm süreci içerisinde geçici köy korucularına da bir düzenleme getirilmesini istiyoruz. Yıllardır devletimizle birlikteyiz, halen birlikte olmaya da devam ediyoruz. **Tunceli**'de 630 geçici köy korucusu bulunuyor, bunlarının 25'i kadın."

Galeri yok. Haber metninin aralarında 4 fotoğraf kullanılmış.

Sabah.com.tr



<http://www.sabah.com.tr/multimedya/galeri/turkiye/sirtinda-kelesle-nobet-tutan-25-korucu-anne?albumId=47434>

Evde anne dağda korucular

02.04.2013

Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor. Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları, başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleri elleri tetikte nöbet tutuyor. Görev dönüşü Kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik yapıyor, bir yandan çocuklarına bakıyor, bir yandan da yemek hazırlıyor. Pertek ilçesine bağlı Konaklar köyünde geçici köy korucusu 10 kadın, 1400 rakımlı yüksek

tepelere kurulan mevzilerde de "Her şey vatan için" yazısı altında nöbet tutuyor. Kadınlar köy dışındaki alanda da eğitim çalışması yapıyor.

SİLAHLA BÜYÜDÜLER

17 yıllık korucu Türkan Budak (47), birçok silahlı çatışmaya girdiğini anlatarak, "Gece erkekler, gündüz biz nöbet tutuyoruz. Köyümüze teröristlerce yoğun baskınlar oldu. Çözüm süreci ülkemiz ve bizim için hayırlı olacaksa istiyoruz. Herkes çocukları huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister. Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü" dedi. 2 çocuk annesi Halise Arslan (33) da "Biz her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız. Emekli olan geçici köy korucuları sadece ayda 300 lira alıyor. Çocuklarımızı istediğimiz gibi okutamıyoruz" diye konuştu. Hatice Arslan (25) ise "Çocukken saldırı olacak mı korkusuyla oynardık. Üniversiteye gidemeyince korucu oldum. Artık kan dökülmesini istemiyoruz" dedi.

Gazetevatan.com



<http://fotogaleri.gazetevatan.com/galeri/27098/1/yasam>

Nöbet tutan anneler!

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor. Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Görevlerinin ardından döndüklerin evlerinde kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik, bir yandan çocuklarının bakımını, bir yandan da sacda ekmek pişiriyor. Evde kalaşnikoflarının bakımını yapan kadınlar, tarladaki işleri ve hayvanların bakımını da yapıyor. Köyde nöbet tutan geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, bazen köydeki diğer kadınların arasına karışarak onlarla sohbet ediyor. Köyde nöbet tutan kadınlara, kimi zaman çocukları da eşlik ediyor. Pertek ilçesine bağlı Konaklar köyünde geçici köy korucusu 10 kadın, sabahın erken saatlerinde uyanıp, önce sobayı yakarak çocuklarına kahvaltı hazırlıyor. Sonra geçici köy korucusu olan erkeklerden nöbeti devralan kadınlar, köydeki gözetleme kulesinden

köyün güvenliğini sağlıyor. Kadınların kimisinin terlik kimisinin spor ayakkabı kimisinin de bot giymesi dikkati çekiyor. Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor. Kadınlar bin 400 rakımla yüksek tepelere kurulan mevzilerde de "her şey vatan için" yazısı altında vatan savunmasını en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışarak nöbet tutuyor. Kışın soğuk, yazın sıcak günlerde mevzide nöbet tutan kadınlar, birbirleriyle yaptıkları sohbetlerde bir yandan dertleşiyor, bir yandan da gelecekte daha huzurlu ve rahat bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor. Köy dışındaki alanda zaman zaman eğitim çalışması yapan kadınlar, silahı nasıl kullanacakları, silahın bakım ve temizliği ile bir saldırı anında nasıl davranacakları konusunda bilgi sahibi oluyor. Nöbetlerinin ardından eve dönen kadınlar, evde onları bekleyen aileleri için sıcak bir yuva ortamı oluşturmak ve çocuklarına anne sevgisini doya doya vermenin gayreti içerisinde oluyor. Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, uzun yıllardır geçici köy korucusu olmalarına rağmen sosyal güvencelerinin bulunmadığını, bu nedenle çok sıkıntılar çektiklerini söyledi. Birçok çatışmaya girdiklerini, kadın olarak erkeklerle beraber teröristlerle girilen silahlı çatışmalarda yer aldığını aktaran Budak, gün içerisinde evle ilgilendiğini, hayvanların bakımını yaptığını bildirdi. Geçici köy korucusu olduğu için köyün dışına çıkamadığından yakınan Budak, köyün güvenliğini sağladıklarını, gece erkeklerin, gündüz kadınların nöbet tuttuğunu belirtti. Sabah namaz vakti nöbeti kadınların devraldığını dile getiren Budak, "Köyümüze teröristlerce yoğun baskınlar oldu. Köy arabasının önü kesildi. Bu yaşamın içerisinde biz de zorluklara katlanıyoruz. Bu süreçte biz güvence talep ediyoruz. Çözüm süreci ülkemiz ve bizim için hayırlı olacaksa istiyoruz. Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocukları huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister. Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü" dedi. Geçici köy korucusu Halise Arslan (33) da 2 çocuğunun olduğunu, 5 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yaptığını belirterek, kadın olarak ev işleri ve çocukları ile ilgilendiğini kaydetti. "İlk işe başladığımda eğitim çalışması oldu. 17 gün eğitim gördüm. Bizim sağlık güvencemiz yok. Biz her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız. Bunu hiç unutmasınlar. Emekli olan geçici köy korucuları sadece ayda 300 lira alıyor. Yıllarca bu işe emek veriliyor. Çocuklarımızı istediğimiz gibi okutamıyoruz" diyen Arslan, ailesinin 22 yıldır koruculuk yaptığını, ancak düşük ücret aldıklarını anlattı. Her şeye devlet için katlandıklarını bildiren Arslan, "Devletimizin bizi görmesini istiyoruz. Biz daima Başbakanımızın arkasındayız. Çözüm süreci konusunda da her zaman Başbakanın arkasındayız. Geçmişte köyümüzde silahlı çatışmalar oluyordu, silah seslerinden yatamıyorduk, dışarı çıkamıyorduk. Artık bunların sona ermesini istiyoruz. Barıştan yanayız" diye konuştu. Köydeki tek bekar geçici köy korucusu olan 25 yaşındaki Hatice Arslan ise 2009 yılında geçici köy korucusu olduğunu, köyde silahların korkusuyla büyüdüklerini, okula korkuyla gittiklerini aktararak, şöyle konuştu: "Dışarıda oynarken hep dağlara bakardık, bir saldırı olacak mı korkusuyla oynardık. Akşam hava kararmadan evlerimize çekiliyorduk. Sürekli köyümüzde çatışma çıkıyordu. Köylülerimiz teröristler tarafından rehin alındı. Köye baskın düzenlenmek istendi. Liseyi Tokat'ta okumak zorunda kaldım. Üniversiteye gitme imkanım olmadığı için korucu oldum. Çok zorluk yaşadık. Köyde herkes korucu. Dış görevler oluyor. Köyde nöbet tutuyoruz. Özellikle evli olan kadınlar çok zorlanıyor. Bir yandan ev bir yandan bu iş gerçekten çok zor oluyor. Artık kan dökülmesini istemiyoruz. Bu sorun bitecek mi yoksa devam mı edecek korkusu var halen içimizde. İsteriz barış olmasını. Bundan sonra korucuların haklarının verilmesini talep ediyoruz. Maaşımız az. Ayda yaklaşık 850 lira alıyoruz. Başbakanımıza sesleniyorum. 30 yıldır bu ülke için mücadele eden

geçici köy korucularını unutmamalarını haklarımızın verilmesini istiyoruz." Eşi ile 17 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olan 2 çocuklu Nurgül Arslan, korucu olmak için eğitim aldıklarını, yaptıkları işin zor yönlerinin olduğunu söyleyerek, özellikle hamilelik döneminde çok zorlandığını ifade etti. Türkiye'de güzel bir ortam ve çocuklarına güzel bir gelecek hazırlamak istediğini anlatan Arslan, "Evde nasıl iş yapıyorsam, silahın bakımını da yapıyorum. Erkeklerden daha iyi yapıyoruz. Bundan sonra inşallah daha iyi olur. Türkiye için hayırlı olanı istiyorum" dedi. Eşi ile koruculuk yapan İrfan Arslan (33), eşi ile dönüşümlü çocuklara baktıklarını, eşi evde olmadığı zaman ev işlerini de yaptığını bildirerek, eşi ile aynı göreve gittikleri zaman çocuklarının ortada kaldığını söyledi. Köylerinde yaşayan insanların sürekli diken üstünde olduğunu, çatışmalar ve huzursuzluk yaşandığını dile getiren Arslan, çözüm sürecinden umutlu olduklarını, bu konuda devletin yanında bulunduklarını bildirdi. Tunceli Geçici Köy Korucularının Haklarını Koruma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Başkanı İbrahim Kuzu, geçici köy koruculuk sisteminde sosyal güvencenin olmamasından yakınarak, korucuların 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalıştığını dile getirdi. Kuzu, şunları kaydetti: "Her an göreve hazır bir şekilde çalışıyorlar. Yeri gelir dağda yeri gelir köyünde her türlü zorluğa göğüs germişlerdir. Çözüm süreci içerisinde geçici köy korucularına da bir düzenleme getirilmesini istiyoruz. Yıllardır devletimizle birlikteyiz, halen birlikte olmaya da devam ediyoruz. Tunceli'de 630 geçici köy korucusu bulunuyor, bunlarının 25'i kadın."

Haber 7.com



Ellerinde Keleşle Nöbet Tutan 25 Korucu Anne

Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Uzun yıllar terör olaylarının yoğun yaşandığı Tunceli'de 25 kadın, terörle mücadelede güvenlik güçlerine yardımcı olmak ve köylerini korumak amacıyla geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yapıyor. Çoğu evli olan kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetleri üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın

üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Görevlerinin ardından döndüklerin evlerinde kalaşnikoflarını evin bir köşesine bırakan kadınlar, bir yandan temizlik, bir yandan çocuklarının bakımını, bir yandan da sacda ekmek pişiriyor.

Evde kalaşnikoflarının bakımını yapan kadınlar, tarladaki işleri ve hayvanların bakımını da yapıyor.

Köyde nöbet tutan geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, bazen köydeki diğer kadınların arasına karışarak onlarla sohbet ediyor. Köyde nöbet tutan kadınlara, kimi zaman çocukları da eşlik ediyor.

-Köyün güvenliğini sağlıyorlar-

Pertek ilçesine bağlı Konaklar köyünde geçici köy korucusu 10 kadın, sabahın erken saatlerinde uyanıp, önce sobayı yakarak çocuklarına kahvaltı hazırlıyor. Sonra geçici köy korucusu olan erkeklerden nöbeti devralan kadınlar, köydeki gözetleme kulesinden köyün güvenliğini sağlıyor. Kadınların kimisinin terlik kimisinin spor ayakkabı kimisinin de bot giymesi dikkati çekiyor.

Kadınlar bin 400 rakımla yüksek tepelere kurulan mevzilerde de "her şey vatan için" yazısı altında vatan savunmasını en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışarak nöbet tutuyor.

Kışın soğuk, yazın sıcak günlerde mevzide nöbet tutan kadınlar, birbirleriyle yaptıkları sohbetlerde bir yandan dertleşiyor, bir yandan da gelecekte daha huzurlu ve rahat bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Köy dışındaki alanda zaman zaman eğitim çalışması yapan kadınlar, silahı nasıl kullanacakları, silahın bakım ve temizliği ile bir saldırı anında nasıl davranacakları konusunda bilgi sahibi oluyor.

Nöbetlerinin ardından eve dönen kadınlar, evde onları bekleyen aileleri için sıcak bir yuva ortamı oluşturmak ve çocuklarına anne sevgisini doya doya vermenin gayreti içerisinde oluyor.

-"Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü"-

Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, uzun yıllardır geçici köy korucusu olmalarına rağmen sosyal güvencelerinin bulunmadığını, bu nedenle çok sıkıntılar çektiklerini söyledi.

Birçok çatışmaya girdiklerini, kadın olarak erkeklerle beraber teröristlerle girilen silahlı çatışmalarda yer aldığını aktaran Budak, gün içerisinde evle ilgilendiğini, hayvanların bakımını yaptığını bildirdi.

Geçici köy korucusu olduğu için köyün dışına çıkamadığından yakınan Budak, köyün güvenliğini sağladıklarını, gece erkeklerin, gündüz kadınların nöbet tuttuğunu belirtti.

Sabah namaz vakti nöbeti kadınların devraldığını dile getiren Budak, "Köyümüze teröristlerce yoğun baskınlar oldu. Köy arabasının önü kesildi. Bu yaşamın içerisinde biz de zorluklara katlanıyoruz. Bu süreçte biz güvence talep ediyoruz. Çözüm süreci ülkemiz ve bizim için hayırlı olacaksa istiyoruz. Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocukları huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister. Çocuklarımız silahlarla büyüdü" dedi.

-"Her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız"-

Geçici köy korucusu Halise Arslan (33) da 2 çocuğunun olduğunu, 5 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olarak görev yaptığını belirterek, kadın olarak ev işleri ve çocukları ile ilgilendiğini kaydetti.

"İlk işe başladığımda eğitim çalışması oldu. 17 gün eğitim gördüm. Bizim sağlık güvencemiz yok. Biz her zaman devletimizin arkasındayız. Bunu hiç unutmasınlar. Emekli olan geçici köy korucuları sadece ayda 300 lira alıyor. Yıllarca bu işe emek veriliyor. Çocuklarımızı istediğimiz gibi okutamıyoruz" diyen Arslan, ailesinin 22 yıldır koruculuk yaptığını, ancak düşük ücret aldıklarını anlattı.

Her şeye devlet için katlandıklarını bildiren Arslan, "Devletimizin bizi görmesini istiyoruz. Biz daima Başbakanımızın arkasındayız. Çözüm süreci konusunda da her zaman Başbakanın arkasındayız. Geçmişte köyümüzde silahlı çatışmalar oluyordu, silah seslerinden yatamıyorduk, dışarı çıkamıyorduk. Artık bunların sona ermesini istiyoruz. Barıştan yanayız" diye konuştu.

-Liseyi Tokat'ta okumak zorunda kaldı-

Köydeki tek bekar geçici köy korucusu olan 25 yaşındaki Hatice Arslan ise 2009 yılında geçici köy korucusu olduğunu, köyde silahların korkusuyla büyüdüklerini, okula korkuyla gittiklerini aktararak, şöyle konuştu:

"Dışarıda oynarken hep dağlara bakardık, bir saldırı olacak mı korkusuyla oynardık. Akşam hava kararmadan evlerimize çekiliyorduk. Sürekli köyümüzde çatışma çıkıyordu. Köylülerimiz teröristler tarafından rehin alındı. Köye baskın düzenlenmek istendi. Liseyi Tokat'ta okumak zorunda kaldım. Üniversiteye gitme imkanım olmadığı için korucu oldum. Çok zorluk yaşadık. Köyde herkes korucu. Dış görevler oluyor. Köyde nöbet tutuyoruz. Özellikle evli olan kadınlar çok zorlanıyor. Bir yandan ev bir yandan bu iş gerçekten çok zor oluyor. Artık kan dökülmesini istemiyoruz. Bu sorun bitecek mi yoksa devam mı edecek korkusu var halen içimizde. İsteriz barış olmasını. Bundan sonra korucuların haklarının verilmesini talep ediyoruz. Maaşımız az. Ayda yaklaşık 850 lira alıyoruz. Başbakanımıza sesleniyorum. 30 yıldır bu ülke için mücadele eden geçici köy korucularını unutmamalarını haklarımızın verilmesini istiyoruz."

-Korucu olmak zor-

Eşi ile 17 yıldır geçici köy korucusu olan 2 çocuklu Nurgül Arslan, korucu olmak için eğitim aldıklarını, yaptıkları işin zor yönlerinin olduğunu söyleyerek, özellikle hamilelik döneminde çok zorlandığını ifade etti.

Türkiye'de güzel bir ortam ve çocuklarına güzel bir gelecek hazırlamak istediğini anlatan Arslan, "Evde nasıl iş yapıyorsam, silahın bakımını da yapıyorum. Erkeklerden daha iyi yapıyoruz. Bundan sonra inşallah daha iyi olur. Türkiye için hayırlı olanı istiyorum" dedi.

-Çocuklar ortada kalıyor-

Eşi ile koruculuk yapan İrfan Arslan (33), eşi ile dönüşümlü çocuklara baktıklarını, eşi evde olmadığı zaman ev işlerini de yaptığını bildirerek, eşi ile aynı göreve gittikleri zaman çocuklarının ortada kaldığını söyledi.

Köylerinde yaşayan insanların sürekli diken üstünde olduğunu, çatışmalar ve huzursuzluk yaşandığını dile getiren Arslan, çözüm sürecinden umutlu olduklarını, bu konuda devletin yanında bulunduklarını bildirdi.

-Korucular 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalışıyor-

Tunceli Geçici Köy Korucularının Haklarını Koruma ve Yardımlaşma Derneği Başkanı İbrahim Kuzu, geçici köy koruculuk sisteminde sosyal güvencenin olmamasından yakınarak, korucuların 7 gün 24 saat esasına göre çalıştığını dile getirdi.

Kuzu, şunları kaydetti:

"Her an göreve hazır bir şekilde çalışıyorlar. Yeri gelir dağda yeri gelir köyünde her türlü zorluğa göğüs germişlerdir. Çözüm süreci içerisinde geçici köy korucularına da bir düzenleme getirilmesini istiyoruz. Yıllardır devletimizle birlikteyiz, halen birlikte olmaya da devam ediyoruz. Tunceli'de 630 geçici köy korucusu bulunuyor, bunlarının 25'i kadın."

Kaynak: AA



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<http://www.internethaber.com/kadin-korucular-nobette-foto-galerisi-26937.htm>

Eli kalaşnikoflu anneler

Tunceli'de kadın köy korucuları, hem günlük işlerini yapıp hem de mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Evde annelik yapıyor, dağda teröristlerle çarpışıyorlar. Elleri hamurlu kadınlar artık kalaşnikof tutuyor. Tunceli'de yaklaşık 25 kadın, bir yandan evde ve tarlada çalışırken, diğer yandan da geçici köy korucusu olarak bin 400 rakımlı mevzilerde ellerinde kalaşnikoflarla köylerini koruyor.

Kırsal yaşamın zorluklarını çeken korucu kadınlar, yöresel kıyafetlerinin üzerine giydikleri asker yelekleri ve şalvarları ile başlarındaki yazmanın üstüne taktıkları kepleriyle sabahın erken saatlerinden itibaren görevlerini en iyi şekilde yapmaya çalışıyor.

Çözüm sürecine destek veren geçici köy korucusu kadınlar, gelecekte daha huzurlu ve mutlu bir hayatın hayalini kuruyor.

Köylerinde 17 yıldır geçici köy korucu olan 47 yaşındaki Türkan Budak, AA muhabirine yaptığı açıklamada, "Herkes huzur ve rahat bir hayat ister. Çocuklarını huzurlu bir ortamda büyütmek ister" dedi.

10 - ntvmsnbc.com

Haber, bu sitede yer almadı.

Appendix 2

Case Study

Hürriyet.com : “Mrs. Türkan at Home, Ranger Türkan on the mountains”



Mothers on guard

In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittently for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages. These women, most of whom are married, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from the early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The women, who put their Kalashnikovs aside once they are back at their houses after the duty, do the cleaning on one hand, take care of their children on the other and also make bread on their steel sheets.

The women, who maintain their Kalashnikovs at home, also take care of the field work and their animals.

The female temporary village guards, who keep watch over the village, occasionally mingle with the other women of the village and chat with them. At times, the children of the village's guarding women join them.

The 10 temporary village women guard at the Konaklar village of Pertek district, wake up early in the morning, first light their stoves and then prepare breakfast for their children. Afterwards, they relieve the temporary male village guards on duty and police the village from the watchtower of the village. It strikes attention that some women wear slippers; some sneakers and others boots.

The women keep watch even at sites set on hills with an altitude of 1400m whilst trying to defend their homeland in the best way they can, under the sign that says “anything for our homeland”.

The women, who guard the sites on cold days in winter and on hot days of summer, share their troubles and dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future while they converse.

The women, who at times have trainings outside of the village, learn how to use their weapons, how to maintain and clean them as well as how to act in the case of an attack.

The women, who return home after their watch, strive to create a cozy home environment for their awaiting family and to share their motherly love with their children as much as possible.

47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter that although they have been temporary village guards for many years, they still have no social security and thus, they experience great difficulties.

Budak stated that they have been in many armed conflicts and that they, as the women, have been engaged in shootouts with terrorists alongside men. She expressed that she takes care of her house and their animals during the day.

Budak, who complains about not being able to get out of the village since they are temporary village guards, said that they ensure the security of the village and that men are on duty at nights and women during the day.

Expressing that the women relieve guard at the time of morning prayer, Budak said, “There have been intense terrorist raids on our village. The village car was waylaid. We are enduring the difficulties in this life. We demand security in this process. We want the peace process if it will prove out to be beneficial for our country and for us. Everyone would want peace and a comfortable life. They would want to raise their children in a peaceful environment. Our children grew up with guns.”.

A temporary village guard Halise Arslan (33), on the other hand, indicated that she has 2 children and that she has been serving as a temporary village guard for 5 years while as a woman, she takes care of the house work and her children.

Arslan said; “When I first started I went through a training program. I got trained for 17 days. We don’t have a health insurance. We always stand behind our state. They shall never forget this. The retired temporary village guards get only 300 liras a month. One takes great pains for years to do this. We cannot provide education for

our children like we want to.”. She also mentioned that her family has been working as guards for 22 years but that they get a very low salary.

Arslan, who expressed that they put up with everything for the state, said; “We want our government to acknowledge us. We are always behind our prime minister. We are behind him about the peace process as well. There were armed conflicts in our village in the past, we couldn’t sleep because of the gun noises, couldn’t go out. We want this to be over. We are on the side of peace.”.

The only single temporary village guard, 25 year-old Hatice Arslan quoted that she became a temporary village guard in 2009, that they grew up with the fear of guns in the village and went to school in horror. She stated:

“We would always look at the mountains while playing outside; we would always play dreading that an attack would happen. We would get back home before it got dark in the evening. There were constant conflicts in the village. Our villagers were held hostage by the terrorists. They wanted to raid the village.

I had to go to high school in Tokat. As I didn’t have the chance to go to university, I became a guard. We went through a lot of difficulties. Everyone’s a guard at the village. There are outside duties. We keep watch at the village. Especially those women who are married find it very difficult. It’s really hard having the housework one on side and this job on the other. We don’t want more blood to be shed. We still have the fear about whether this problem is going to end or continue. We do want there to be peace. From now on, we demand that the guards’ rights are granted. Our wage is low. We get about 850 liras per month. I am addressing our prime minister. We ask them not to neglect the temporary village guards who have been fighting for this country for 30 years and we want to be given our rights.”.

The mother of 2 children, Nurgül Arslan, who has been working as a temporary village guard with her husband for 17 years, stated that they get trained to become guards and that their job has its difficult aspects. She expressed that she struggled a lot especially during her pregnancy period.

Arslan who said that she wants to prepare a nice environment in Turkey and a good future for her children, added;

“Just as I do housework, I also maintain my gun. We do this better than men do. I hope things will get better from now on. I want what’s best for Turkey.”.

İrfan Arslan (33) who is a guard like his wife, stated that they take care of the children alternately and that when his wife is not at home, he does the housework as well. He added that when they are both on duty together, their children are left unattended.

Mentioning that the people who live in the village are always alert and that there are always conflicts and uneasiness, Arslan quoted that they are hopeful about the peace process and that they stand by the state concerning this matter.

The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, İbrahim Kuzu, complained about the lack of social security in the temporary village guard system and stated that the guards work 24 hours, 7 days a week.

Kuzu quoted as follows:

“They work in such a way that they are always ready for duty. Whether on the mountain or in the village, they have always faced all kinds of difficulties.

We are asking for a new regulation to be issued during the peace process for the temporary village guards as well. We have been standing by our government for years and we continue to do so. There are 630 temporary village guards in Tunceli, out of which 25 are women.”.

Milliyet.com.tr: “Children in arms, Kalashnikovs on shoulders... This is Tunceli”



<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/elde-silah-kucakta-cocuk-burasi-tunceli/gundem/gundemdetay/01.04.2013/1687951/default.htm>

Guns in hands, children in arms: This is Tunceli

In Tunceli, 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m. The women guards who face the challenges of the rural life, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves. – The temporary village women guards who support the peace process, dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future.

In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites an altitude of 1400m.

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages. These women, most of whom are married, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours,

wearing soldier vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The women, who put their Kalashnikovs aside once they are back at their houses after the duty, do the cleaning on one hand, take care of their children on the other and also make bread on their steel sheets.

The women, who maintain their Kalashnikovs at home, also take care of the field work and their animals.

The female temporary village guards, who keep watch over the village, occasionally mingle with the other women of the village and chat with them.

At times, the children of the village's guarding women join them.

-They police the village-

The 10 temporary village women guard at the Konaklar village of Pertek district, wake up early in the morning, first light their stoves and then prepare breakfast for their children. Afterwards, they relieve the temporary male village guards on duty and police the village from the watchtower of the village. It strikes attention that some women wear slippers; some sneakers and others boots.

The women keep watch even at sites set on hills with an altitude of 1400m whilst trying to defend their homeland in the best way they can, under the sign that says "anything for our homeland".

The women who guard the sites on cold days in winter and on hot days of summer, share their troubles and dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future while they converse.

The women, who at times have trainings outside of the village, learn how to use their weapons, how to maintain and clean them as well as how to act in the case of an attack.

The women who return home after their watch, strive to create a cozy home environment for their awaiting family and to share their motherly love with their children as much as possible.

-“Our children grew up with guns”-

47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter that although they have been temporary village guards for many years, they still have no social security and thus, they experience great difficulties.

Budak stated that they have been in many armed conflicts and that they, as the women, have been engaged in shootouts with terrorists alongside men. She expressed that she takes care of her house and their animals during the day.

Budak, who complains about not being able to get out of the village since they are temporary village guards, said that they ensure the security of the village and that men are on duty at nights and women during the day.

Expressing that the women relieve guard at the time of morning prayer, Budak said, “There have been intense terrorist raids on our village. The village car was waylaid. We are enduring the difficulties in this life. We demand security in this process. We want the peace process if it will prove out to be beneficial for our country and for us. Everyone would want peace and a comfortable life. They would want to raise their children in a peaceful environment. Our children grew up with guns.”.

-“We always stand behind our state”-

A temporary village guard Halise Arslan (33), on the other hand, indicated that she has 2 children and that she has been serving as a temporary village guard for 5 years while being a woman, she takes care of the house work and her children.

Arslan said; “When I first started I went through a training program. I got trained for 17 days. We don’t have a health insurance. We always stand behind our state. They shall never forget this. The retired temporary village guards get only 300 liras a month. One takes great pains for years to do this. We cannot provide education for our children like we want to.”. She also mentioned that her family has been working as guards for 22 years but that they get a very low salary.

Arslan, who expressed that they put up with everything for the state, said; “We want our government to acknowledge us. We are always behind our prime minister. We are behind him about the peace process as well. There were armed conflicts in our village in the past, we couldn’t sleep because of the gun noises, couldn’t go out. We want this to be over. We are on the side of peace.”.

-She had to go to high school in Tokat-

The only single temporary village guard, 25 year-old Hatice Arslan quoted that she became a temporary village guard in 2009, that they grew up with the fear of guns in the village and went to school in horror. She stated:

“We would always look at the mountains while playing outside; we would always play dreading that an attack would happen. We would get back home before it got dark in the evening. There were constant conflicts in the village. Our villagers were held hostage by the terrorists. They wanted to raid the village. I had to go to high school in Tokat. As I didn’t have the chance to go to university, I became a guard. We went through a lot of difficulties. Everyone’s a guard at the village. There are outside duties. We keep watch at the village. Especially those women who are married find it very difficult. It’s really hard having the housework one on side and this job on the other. We don’t want more blood to be shed. We still have the fear about whether this problem is going to end or continue. We do want there to be peace. From now on, we demand that the guards’ rights are granted. Our wage is low. We get about 850 liras per month. I am addressing our prime minister. We ask them not to neglect the temporary village guards who have been fighting for this country for 30 years and we want to be given our rights.”.

-“It’s hard being a guard”-

The mother of 2 children, Nurgül Arslan, who has been working as a temporary village guard with her husband for 17 years, stated that they get trained to become

guards and that their job has its difficult aspects. She expressed that she struggled a lot especially during her pregnancy period.

Arslan who said that she wants to prepare a nice environment in Turkey and a good future for her children, added; “Just as I do housework, I also maintain my gun. We do this better than men do. I hope things will get better from now on. I want what’s best for Turkey.”.

-The children are left unattended-

İrfan Arslan (33) who is a guard like his wife, stated that they take care of the children alternately and that when his wife is not at home, he does the housework as well. He added that when they are both on duty together, their children are left unattended.


Mentioning that the people who live in the village are always alert and that there are always conflicts and uneasiness, Arslan quoted that they are hopeful about the peace process and that they stand by the state concerning this matter.

-The guards work 24 hours, 7 days a week -

The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, İbrahim Kuzu, complained about the lack of social security in the temporary village guard system and stated that the guards work 24 hours, 7 days a week.

Kuzu quoted as follows: “They work in such a way that they are always ready for duty. Whether on the mountain or in the village, they have always faced all kinds of difficulties. We are asking for a new regulation to be issued during the peace process for the temporary village guards as well. We have been standing by our government for years and we continue to do so. There are 630 temporary village guards in Tunceli, out of which 25 are women.”.

Ensonhaber.com: “Tunceli’s Guarding Mothers With Black Headscarves/Ranger Bandanas”



<http://www.ensonhaber.com/tuncelinin-anne-koy-koruculari-2013-04-01.html>

The village guard-mothers of Tunceli

They are always ready to be on duty with their military vests and shalwars...

The female village guards in Tunceli, both do their daily work and protect their village at sites with Kalashnikovs in their hands.

The women guards who face the challenges of the rural life, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

THEY HAVE THEIR FULL SUPPORT IN THE PEACE PROCESS

The temporary village women guards who support the peace process, dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future.

47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter, “Everyone would want peace and a comfortable life. They would want to raise their children in a peaceful environment.”.

There are 14 photographs in the gallery. Some of the sentences in the news text are used under the photographs.

Haberturk.com: “Not Gaza, this is Tunceli”



<http://galeri.haberturk.com/gundem/galeri/426133-tuncelide-anneler-boyle-nobet-tutuyor>

Mothers in Tunceli keep watch like this!

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unrelentingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages.

In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unrelentingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages.

These women, most of whom are married, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The women, who put their Kalashnikovs aside once they are back at their houses after the duty, do the cleaning on one hand, take care of their children on the other and also make bread on their steel sheets.

haberler.com: “Mothers who Keep guard with Kalashnikovs: Anything for our homeland”



Mothers who Guard with Kalashnikovs!

25 women in Tunceli protect their villages with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.

In Tunceli, 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.

THEY POLICE WITH THEIR REGIONAL CLOTHES

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages. These women, most of whom are married, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing soldier vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

THE CHILDREN KEEP THEIR MOTHERS COMPANY

The women, who maintain their Kalashnikovs at home, also take care of the field work and their animals.

The female temporary village guards, who keep watch over the village, occasionally mingle with the other women of the village and chat with them. At times, the children of the village's guarding women join them.

THEY POLICE THE VILLAGE

The 10 temporary village women guard at the Konaklar village of Pertek district, wake up early in the morning, first light their stoves and then prepare breakfast for their children. Afterwards, they relieve the temporary male village guards on duty and police the village from the watchtower of the village. It strikes attention that some women wear slippers; some sneakers and others boots.

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The women who return home after their watch, strive to create a cozy home environment for their awaiting family and to share their motherly love with their children as much as possible.

“OUR CHILDREN GREW UP WITH GUNS”

47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter that although they have been temporary village guards for many years, they still have no social security and thus, they experience great difficulties.

Budak stated that they have been in many armed conflicts and that they, as the women, have been engaged in shootouts with terrorists alongside men. She expressed that she takes care of her house and their animals during the day.

Budak, who complains about not being able to get out of the village since they are temporary village guards, said that they ensure the security of the village and that men are on duty at nights and women during the day.

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“WE ALWAYS STAND BEHIND OUR STATE”

A temporary village guard Halise Arslan (33), on the other hand, indicated that she has 2 children and that she has been serving as a temporary village guard for 5 years while being a woman, she takes care of the house work and her children.

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shall never forget this. The retired temporary village guards get only 300 liras a month. One takes great pains for years to do this. We cannot provide education for our children like we want to.”. She also mentioned that her family has been working as guards for 22 years but that they get a very low salary.

Arslan, who expressed that they put up with everything for the state, said; “We want our government to acknowledge us. We are always behind our prime minister. We are behind him about the peace process as well. There were armed conflicts in our village in the past, we couldn’t sleep because of the gun noises, couldn’t go out. We want this to be over. We are on the side of peace.”.

SHE HAD TO GO TO HIGH SCHOOL IN TOKAT

The only single temporary village guard, 25 year-old Hatice Arslan quoted that she became a temporary village guard in 2009, that they grew up with the fear of guns in the village and went to school in horror. She stated:

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IT’S HARD BEING A GUARD

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“THE CHILDREN ARE LEFT UNATTENDED”

İrfan Arslan (33) who is a guard like his wife, stated that they take care of the children alternately and that when his wife is not at home, he does the housework as well. He added that when they are both on duty together, their children are left unattended.

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“THE GUARDS WORK 24 HOURS, 7 DAYS”

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There isn't a photograph gallery. 4 photographs are used in between the news text.

Sabah.com.tr: “News Flash! 25 Women of Turkey: Kids in Arms, Kalashnikovs on Shoulders”



<http://www.sabah.com.tr/multimedya/galeri/turkiye/sirtinda-kelesle-nobet-tutan-25-korucu-anne?albumId=47434>

Mothers at home, guards on the mountains

In Tunceli, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages. These women, most of whom are married, keep watch with their hands on the trigger, wearing soldier vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The woman who put their Kalashnikovs aside once they are back from duty, do the cleaning on one hand, take care of their children on the other and also prepare food. The 10 temporary village women guard at the Konaklar village of Pertek district, keep watch even at sites set on hills with an altitude of 1400m, under the sign that says “anything for our homeland”. The women train outside of the village as well.

THEY GREW UP WITH GUNS

Türkan Budak (47), who has been a guard for 17 years, said they have been in many armed conflicts and added, “Men keep watch at nights and we do during the day. There have been intense terrorist raids on our village. We want the peace process if it will prove out to be beneficial for our country and for us. Everyone would want to raise their children in a peaceful environment. Our children grew up with guns.”. Halise Arslan (33), a mother of 2 children, stated, “We always stand behind our state. The retired temporary village guards get only 300 liras a month. We cannot provide education for our children like we want to.”. Hatice Arslan (25), on the other hand, “When we were kids, we would play around dreading that an attack would happen. As I didn’t have the chance to go to university, I became a guard. We don’t want more blood to be shed.”.

Gazetevatan.com: “Location: Tunceli. They got armed!”



<http://fotogaleri.gazetevatan.com/galeri/27098/1/yasam>

Mothers on guard!

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages. These women, most of whom are married, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing soldier vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The women, who put their Kalashnikovs aside once they are back at their houses after the duty, do the cleaning on one hand, take care of their children on the other and also make bread on their steel sheets. The women, who maintain their Kalashnikovs at home, also take care of the field work and their animals. The female temporary village guards, who keep watch over the village, occasionally mingle with the other women of the village and chat with them. At times, the children of the village's guarding women join them. The 10 temporary village women guard at the Konaklar village of Pertek district, wake up early in the morning, first light their stoves and then prepare breakfast for their children. Afterwards, they relieve the temporary male village guards on duty and police the village from the watchtower of the village. It strikes attention that some women wear slippers; some sneakers and others boots. In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m. The women keep watch even at sites set on hills with an altitude of 1400m whilst trying to defend their homeland in the best way they can, under the sign that says "anything for our homeland". The women, who guard the sites on cold days in winter and on hot days of summer, share their troubles and dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future while they converse. The women, who at times have trainings outside of the village, learn how to use their weapons, how to maintain and clean them as well as how to act in the case of an attack. The women, who return home after their watch, strive to create a cozy home environment for their awaiting family and to share their motherly love with their children as much as possible. 47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter that although they have been temporary village guards for many years, they still have no social security and thus, they experience great difficulties. Budak stated that they have been in many armed conflicts and that they, as the women, have been engaged in shootouts with terrorists alongside men. She expressed that she takes care of her house and their animals during the day. Budak, who complains about not being able to get out of the village since they are temporary village guards, said that they ensure the security of the village and that men are on duty at nights and women during the day. Expressing that the women relieve guard at the time of morning prayer, Budak said, "There have been intense terrorist raids on our village. The village car was waylaid. We are enduring the difficulties in this life. We demand security in this process. We want the peace process if it will prove out to be beneficial for our country and for us. Everyone would want peace and a comfortable life. They would want to raise their children in a peaceful environment. Our children grew up with guns.". A temporary village guard Halise Arslan (33), on the other hand, indicated that she has 2 children and that she has been serving as a temporary village guard for 5 years while being a woman, she takes care of the house work and her children. Arslan said; "When I first started I went through a training program. I got trained for 17 days. We don't have a health insurance. We always stand behind our state. They shall never forget this. The retired temporary village guards get only 300 liras a month. One takes great pains for years to do this. We cannot provide education for our children like we want to.". She also mentioned that her family has been working as guards for 22 years but that they get a very low salary. Arslan, who expressed that they put up with everything for the state, said; "We want our government to acknowledge us. We are always behind our prime minister. We are behind him about the peace process as well. There were armed conflicts in our village in the past, we couldn't sleep because of the gun noises, couldn't go out. We want this to be over. We are on the side of peace.". The only single temporary village guard, 25 year-old

Hatice Arslan quoted that she became a temporary village guard in 2009, that they grew up with the fear of guns in the village and went to school in horror. She stated: “We would always look at the mountains while playing outside; we would always play dreading that an attack would happen. We would get back home before it got dark in the evening. There were constant conflicts in the village. Our villagers were held hostage by the terrorists. They wanted to raid the village. I had to go to high school in Tokat. As I didn’t have the chance to go to university, I became a guard. We went through a lot of difficulties. Everyone’s a guard at the village. There are outside duties. We keep watch at the village. Especially those women who are married find it very difficult. It’s really hard having the housework one on side and this job on the other. We don’t want more blood to be shed. We still have the fear about whether this problem is going to end or continue. We do want there to be peace. From now on, we demand that the guards’ rights are granted. Our wage is low. We get about 850 liras per month. I am addressing our prime minister. We ask them not to neglect the temporary village guards who have been fighting for this country for 30 years and we want to be given our rights.”. The mother of 2 children, Nurgül Arslan, who has been working as a temporary village guard with her husband for 17 years, stated that they get trained to become guards and that their job has its difficult aspects. She expressed that she struggled a lot especially during her pregnancy period. Arslan who said that she wants to prepare a nice environment in Turkey and a good future for her children, added; “Just as I do housework, I also maintain my gun. We do this better than men do. I hope things will get better from now on. I want what’s best for Turkey.”. İrfan Arslan (33) who is a guard like his wife, stated that they take care of the children alternately and that when his wife is not at home, he does the housework as well. He added that when they are both on duty together, their children are left unattended. Mentioning that the people who live in the village are always alert and that there are always conflicts and uneasiness, Arslan quoted that they are hopeful about the peace process and that they stand by the state concerning this matter. The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, İbrahim Kuzu, complained about the lack of social security in the temporary village guard system and stated that the guards work 24 hours, 7 days a week. Kuzu quoted as follows: “They work in such a way that they are always ready for duty. Whether on the mountain or in the village, they have always faced all kinds of difficulties. We are asking for a new regulation to be issued during the peace process for the temporary village guards as well. We have been standing by our government for years and we continue to do so. There are 630 temporary village guards in Tunceli, out of which 25 are women.”.

Haber 7.com: *“Children in Arms, Kalahsnikovs on Shoulders! In the fight against terrorism, 25 Women in Tunceli protect their children and their village like this!”*



25 Guarding Mothers who Keep Watch with Kalashnikovs in their Hands

In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.

In Tunceli where terror incidents have been taking place unremittingly for many years, 25 women serve as temporary village guards in order to help security forces in fighting with terrorism and to protect their villages. These women, most of whom are married, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The women, who put their Kalashnikovs aside once they are back at their houses after the duty, do the cleaning on one hand, take care of their children on the other and also make bread on their steel sheets.

The women, who maintain their Kalashnikovs at home, also take care of the field work and their animals.

The female temporary village guards, who keep watch over the village, occasionally mingle with the other women of the village and chat with them. At times, the children of the village's guarding women join them.

-They police the village-

The 10 temporary village women guard at the Konaklar village of Pertek district, wake up early in the morning, first light their stoves and then prepare breakfast for their children. Afterwards, they relieve the temporary male village guards on duty and police the village from the watchtower of the village. It strikes attention that some women wear slippers; some sneakers and others boots.

The women keep watch even at sites set on hills with an altitude of 1400m whilst trying to defend their homeland in the best way they can, under the sign that says “anything for our homeland”.

The women, who guard the sites on cold days in winter and on hot days of summer, share their troubles and dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future while they converse.

The women, who at times have trainings outside of the village, learn how to use their weapons, how to maintain and clean them as well as how to act in the case of an attack.

The women, who return home after their watch, strive to create a cozy home environment for their awaiting family and to share their motherly love with their children as much as possible.

-“Our children grew up with guns”-

47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter that although they have been temporary village guards for many years, they still have no social security and thus, they experience great difficulties.

Budak stated that they have been in many armed conflicts and that they, as the women, have been engaged in shootouts with terrorists alongside men. She expressed that she takes care of her house and their animals during the day.

Budak, who complains about not being able to get out of the village since they are temporary village guards, said that they ensure the security of the village and that men are on duty at nights and women during the day.

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-“We always stand behind our state”-

A temporary village guard Halise Arslan (33), on the other hand, indicated that she has 2 children and that she has been serving as a temporary village guard for 5 years while being a woman, she takes care of the house work and her children.

Arslan said; “When I first started I went through a training program. I got trained for 17 days. We don’t have a health insurance. We always stand behind our state. They shall never forget this. The retired temporary village guards get only 300 liras a month. One takes great pains for years to do this. We cannot provide education for our children like we want to.”. She also mentioned that her family has been working as guards for 22 years but that they get a very low salary.

Arslan, who expressed that they put up with everything for the state, said; “We want our government to acknowledge us. We are always behind our prime minister. We are behind him about the peace process as well. There were armed conflicts in our

village in the past, we couldn't sleep because of the gun noises, couldn't go out. We want this to be over. We are on the side of peace.”.

-She had to go to high school in Tokat-

The only single temporary village guard, 25 year-old Hatice Arslan quoted that she became a temporary village guard in 2009, that they grew up with the fear of guns in the village and went to school in horror. She stated:

“We would always look at the mountains while playing outside; we would always play dreading that an attack would happen. We would get back home before it got dark in the evening. There were constant conflicts in the village. Our villagers were held hostage by the terrorists. They wanted to raid the village. I had to go to high school in Tokat. As I didn't have the chance to go to university, I became a guard. We went through a lot of difficulties. Everyone's a guard at the village. There are outside duties. We keep watch at the village. Especially those women who are married find it very difficult. It's really hard having the housework one on side and this job on the other. We don't want more blood to be shed. We still have the fear about whether this problem is going to end or continue. We do want there to be peace. From now on, we demand that the guards' rights are granted. Our wage is low. We get about 850 liras per month. I am addressing our prime minister. We ask them not to neglect the temporary village guards who have been fighting for this country for 30 years and we want to be given our rights.”.

-“It's hard being a guard”-

The mother of 2 children, Nurgül Arslan, who has been working as a temporary village guard with her husband for 17 years, stated that they get trained to become guards and that their job has its difficult aspects. She expressed that she struggled a lot especially during her pregnancy period.

Arslan who said that she wants to prepare a nice environment in Turkey and a good future for her children, added; “Just as I do housework, I also maintain my gun. We do this better than men do. I hope things will get better from now on. I want what's best for Turkey.”.

-The children are left unattended-

İrfan Arslan (33) who is a guard like his wife, stated that they take care of the children alternately and that when his wife is not at home, he does the housework as well. He added that when they are both on duty together, their children are left unattended.

Mentioning that the people who live in the village are always alert and that there are always conflicts and uneasiness, Arslan quoted that they are hopeful about the peace process and that they stand by the state concerning this matter.

-The guards work 24 hours, 7 days a week-

The President of Tunceli Association for Protecting the Rights of the Temporary Village Guards and Cooperation, İbrahim Kuzu, complained about the lack of social security in the temporary village guard system and stated that the guards work 24 hours, 7 days a week.

Kuzu quoted as follows:

“They work in such a way that they are always ready for duty. Whether on the mountain or in the village, they have always faced all kinds of difficulties. We are asking for a new regulation to be issued during the peace process for the temporary village guards as well. We have been standing by our government for years and we continue to do so. There are 630 temporary village guards in Tunceli, out of which 25 are women.”.

Source: AA

İnternethaber.com: “They work at their homes, in the fields and on the mountains: Mothers with Kalashnikovs in their Hands”



<http://www.internethaber.com/kadin-korucular-nobette-foto-galerisi-26937.htm>

Mothers with Kalashnikovs in their Hands

The female village guards in Tunceli, both do their daily work and protect their village at sites with Kalashnikovs in their hands.

They do their motherly duties at home and combat with terrorists on the mountains. Women with dough in their hands, now hold Kalashnikovs. In Tunceli, about 25 women work at home and in the fields while in the meantime, they guard their villages as temporary village guards with Kalashnikovs in their hands at sites with an altitude of 1400m.

The women guards who face the challenges of the rural life, try to fulfill their duties as best they can, starting from early morning hours, wearing military vests and shalwars on top of their regional clothes and caps on top of their headscarves.

The temporary village women guards who support the peace process, dream of a more peaceful and comfortable life for the future.

47 year-old Türkan Budak, who has been a temporary village guard in the village for 17 years, told the AA reporter, *“Everyone would want peace and a comfortable life. They would want to raise their children in a peaceful environment.”*.

Ntvmsnbc.com

The news didn't appear on this website.

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