THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE
AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF URBANITY:
INFORMAL PRACTICES in 1930s ANKARA

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
SEHER ŞEN

Department of
Political Science and Public Administration
Bilkent University
Ankara
December 2008

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF URBANITY: INFORMAL PRACTICES in 1930s ANKARA

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

SEHER ŞEN

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

December 2008

To my parents Mediha Şen and Mustafa Şen

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tahire Erman
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Berrak Burçak
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Assist. Prof. Dr. İnci Kale Basa
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Eren
Director

ABSTRACT

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE
AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF URBANITY:
INFORMAL PRACTICES in 1930s ANKARA

Şen, Seher

P.D., Department of Political Science

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar

December 2008

This study, employing the city space of Ankara as its case, aims at understanding the production of space and the construction of urbanity through a reconsideration of the Turkish modernization project. The study focuses on 1930s, the early Republican period, which were the years in which a nation-building process was accompanying the making of urban-citizens. During these years, in order to modernize the country the modernizing elite aimed at a civilizational shift, which brought with it the transformation of both the private and the public spheres. In this process, spatial practices -in both macro and micro level- were used as a tool to create desired urbane-citizens. Moving from here, the thesis discusses the construction of urbanity and its functions with reference to formal and informal spatial practices, both of which generated the modern space of Ankara. Through the analysis of this process of construction, the study also elaborates on the Turkish modernization project with reference to both informal and formal practices, in order to illuminate the struggles and tensions within it. Both the spatial practices and the modernization project are reconsidered through Henri Lefebvre's conceptualizations of social space.

Keywords: Spatial Practices, Urbanity, Henri Lefebvre, Formal-Informal, Modernization Project, Ankara

ÖZET

MEKANIN ÜRETİMİ VE KENTLİLİĞİN İNŞASI: 1930'LAR ANKARASI'NDA ENFORMAL PRATİKLER

Şen, Seher

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Alev Çınar

Aralık, 2008

Bu çalışma, Ankara örneği üzerinden, mekanın üretimi ve kentliliğin inşası sürecini, modernleşme projesini yeniden gözden geçirerek anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, kentli-vatandaş'ın *Ulus* kurma sürecine parallel olarak inşa edildiği 1930'lar Türkiyesi'ne, erken Cumhuriyet dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu dönemde Kemalist elitler, ülkeyi modernleştirmek amacıyla, kamusal alanın yanı sıra özel alanın da dönüşümünü getirecek bir uygarlık değişimini amaçlamışlardır. Bu süreçte, mekansal pratikler -hem mikro hem de makro düzeyde- istenen "kentli-vatandaş"ları yaratmak için bir araç olarak görülmüştür. Bu çalışmada, mekansal pratikleri daha iyi anlamak için, kentliliğin kurulma süreci ve işlevleri, Ankara'nın modern mekanını üreten formal ve enformal pratiklere referansla tartışılmaktadır. Kentliliğin inşa sürecinin analizi üzerinden, Türk modernleşme projesi de kendi içindeki gerilim ve mücadeleleri açığa çıkartmak üzere formal ve enformal pratikler kapsamında yeniden değerlendirilmektedir. Hem mekansal pratikler hem de modernleşme projesi tartışmasında Henri Lefebvre'nin toplumsal mekan kavramsallaştırmasından faydalanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mekansal Pratikler, Kentlilik, Henri Lefebvre, Formal-Enformal, Modernleşme Projesi, Ankara.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all the people who have helped and inspired me during my doctoral study. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Assist. Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar, who encouraged me in realizing this study. I am indebted to her for her valuable criticisms, support and understanding.

I would like to thank the committee members, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tahire Erman, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Güven Sargın, Assist. Prof. Dr. Berrak Burçak, and Assist. Prof. Dr. İnci Basa, for their constructive comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Prof. Dr. Orhan Tekelioğlu and Prof. Dr. Gülsüm Baydar for their help and inspiring conversations.

I owe a great dept to Özlem Yavuz who always been there for me and has offered her unconditional friendship and help since my undergraduate years. I am also grateful to my friends Nalan Özdemir, İnci Doğramacı, Zafer Çeler and Nurcan Turan for their patience, moral support and sharing nice times together.

I wish to express a special word of thanks to my dear friend Gülbanu Altunok for her kindness, encouragement, and also for her critical reading, valuable

comments, and intellectual support. I also want to thank Ayşe Deniz Temiz, Emre Gönlügür and Devrim Sezer for their helps and inspiring discussions in İzmir.

Many thanks go to my friends, Neslihan Demirtaş, Ertuğ Tombuş, Ali Soner, Filiz Başkan, Aysun Akan, İrem Özgören, Pırıl Erçoban, Cenk Saraçoğlu, Burcu Eğilmez, İbrahim Cansızoğlu, who gave their support to this study. I thank them all for having shared many experiences and thoughts with me throughout the last years of this project. Additional thanks to my office-mate Gökçen Karanfil for his help and motivation to complete this thesis in the final year.

I would like to extend my thanks to the staff of the Documentation Center of the parliament, but especially to Ömer İmamoğlu, for all their help and time. I am also thankful to Simon Mumford and Nesta Parry for revising the English of my manuscript. I should not to forget Güvenay Kazancı, the secretary of the Department, for providing kind help in many different ways during my doctorate study.

I feel a deep sense of gratitude for my family who has endured this long process with me. I would like to thank my mother, Mediha Şen, my father, Mustafa Şen, to whom this study is dedicated, for their unconditional love and support. I also want to thank my brother, Volkan Şen, for his generosity, intelligence and humor. Without their love and support this study would not have been possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT vi

ÖZET vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS x

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER II: POWER; SPACE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES 10

2.1. Power and Space 10

2.2. Spatial Construction of Urbanity: Urbanity in Henri Lefebvre 16

2.2.1 Social Space 17

2.2.2 City as Mediation 21

2.2.3 Abstract Space, Appropriation-Domination 24

2.2.4 The Body and Inside- Outside 30

2.2.5 Rhythm Analysis 37

2.2.6 Urban Life/ Urbanity 38

CHAPTER III: URBANITY: A DIFFICULT TERM 44

3.1 The Definition of Urbanity 44

3.2 Civilization, Civility, Culture and Urbanity 55

3.3 The Value of Urbanity 64

3.3.1 Political Implications: Public Sphere / Public Space 68

3.3.2 Spaces of citizenship 73

3.4 A Re-Definition of Urbanity: The Right to the City 78

CHAPTER IV: RETHINKING THE MODERNIZATION PROJECT OF TURKEY 90

4.1 Modernization Project and Urbanity 90

4.1.1 Formal-Informal Distinction 93

4.1.2 Center- Periphery 101

4.1.3 Totalizing Project of Elites 105

4.1.4 Civilizational Shift 107

4.2 The New Civilization as the Ideal of the Republic 112

4.2.1 "Nationalizing Process" as "Civilizing Process" 118

4.2.2 Formal Urban Life 121

4.3 1930s 124

CHAPTER V: THE MAKING OF URBANITES 128

5.1 Homogenized and Unified Community 128

5.2 Educating People and Creating Citizens 136

5.2.1 Educating bodies: Healthy Generations 140

5.2.2 Modern Women 144

5.3 Constructing Urbanite/Civilized Individuals: Etiquette Rules 151

5.3.1 Formal-Informal Span of Etiquette 155

5.3.2 Increasing Gap Between Formality and Informality 158

5.3.3 Learning to be Embarrassed 165

5.3.4 Borrowed Way of Life 172

CHAPTER VI: THE PRODUCTION OF THE CITY 180

6.1 Production of Space 180

6.2 Urban and Social Planning 181

6.2.1 Ankara: The New City of the New Nation 188
6.2.2 The Plan of Ankara 191
6.2.3 Construction of The Modern City 202
6.3 Modern Architecture, Modern Houses 207
6.3.1 The Houses in Ankara 208
6.3.2 Modern Architecture 213
6.3.3 Inside the Home: Modernization of the Private 222
CHAPTER VII: CONSTRUCTION OF THE CITY LIFE 232
7.1 A Livable City Having Elegant Activities 232
7.2 Distinguished Activities of Urbanites 241
7.3 Teaching to Entertain: Balls 247
7.4 Schools of Civilization: Restaurants 260
7.5 Other's Place: Coffeehouses 263
7.6 The New City: Yenişehir 267
7.7 Daily life in Yenişehir 276
CHAPTER VIII: URBANITES OF THE CITY 284
8.1 Urban-Rural Separations 284
8.2 *Ankaralı*: Urbanites vs. Villagers 293
8.3 Two Ankara and Two *Ankaralı* 299
8.4 Different Way of Lives 308
8.4 Rhythm of the two Ankara 314
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION 319
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 327

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Song of Childhood

When the child was a child,
It was the time for these questions:
Why am I me, and why not you?
Why am I here, and why not there?
When did time begin, and where does space end?
(Peter Handke, from the scenario of 'Wings of Desire')

"To practice space is thus to repeat the joyful and silent experience of childhood;
it is, in a place, to be other and to move toward the other"
(de Certeau, 1984:110)

This thesis is inspired from the above questioning of space -space of self and other- which is attributed to childhood by Handke and de Certeau. It derives from a curiosity searching for possible answers about the questions raised with reference to the spaces of self and the spaces of the other. I think, in the city space, these questions can be answered by questioning the boundaries which Baydar designates as the "sites of the encounter between the self and the other" (2002:240). And the quality of boundaries in urban space points out to the condition of urbanity. The individual's relations with her/his self and others in urban areas call in mind the issue of urbanity, which has been a vague and difficult issue.

The difficulty of the term urbanity is related with its position at the intersection of different domains such as social, political, economic and cultural. In addition to this aspect, it is a subject standing between public and private, between awareness in political life and personal manner referring to etiquette. With this position it also points to the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion by giving possibility to interact with others or keeping the status quo in an elitist manner. In spite of these contradictory aspects it has been a determinative quality in our relations with our selves, with other people and with institutions in urban area. Accordingly it still possesses inspiring potentialities for alternative imaginations of self, society, daily life and urban life.

Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to understand urbanity in the context of Turkey with reference to spatial practices. In addition to the above mentioned complexity, becoming urban has also been the core element of citizenship in Turkey. It has been a value-laden term referring to the quality of "being modern" in the context of the Turkish modernization process. As Van Krieken (1990) discusses, "being modern means being disciplined, by the state, by each other and by ourselves; that the soul, both ones own and that of others, became organized into the self, an object of reflection and analysis". As complementary to Van Krieken's point, "being urban" carries all the tensions and struggles of "being modern" in the Turkish case. Both urban space and urbanity have been seen important components of the project that would prove the modernness of the country. Especially in the early Republican period, urban space was used as a tool to construct urbane-citizens within the boundaries of the modernization project. Moreover, within the peculiarity of the Turkish case, the term urbanite also has carried the latent or implied dimensions of

social class and statue. Consequently, the history of urbanity means the history of modernization process and the history of construction of individuals/citizens which points out individual, society and state relations in Turkish society.

Within this context the main questions of the thesis are how urbanity is constructed and how it functions in the Turkish case. In order to answer these questions, I dwelled on the spatial practices in the construction process of the capital city: Ankara. Ankara was created as a symbol of the new Turkish Republic that negates the tradition of Ottoman Empire and was characterized by the nation-state and secularism. It was not only envisioned as a modern city in terms of its physical qualities, but also in terms of its modernized inhabitants and culture. Therefore, Ankara itself can be accepted as the most radical step towards the spatial construction of a modern and secular nation-state. By concentrating on the city space of Ankara, it is possible to capture certain aspects of the "local specificities of modernity" (Kandiyoti: 129) in a critical perspective. I believe that discussing the modernization process through the issue of space makes its goals, successes and limitations more visible.

Another limitation of this thesis is the period; the study will include the early Republican era of the 1930s. This period is important since it is the times of the "construction of the nation" carrying the difficulties of modernization process which are still waiting to be faced. Therefore the analysis of the period would be also illuminative in understanding today's discussions arising from the tensions of modernization.

In this thesis I employed Lefebvre's theory of space explaining the production of social space. Since his conceptualization of space aims to surmount dualities by underlying in-between quality of space, it helped to develop a critical understanding towards the Turkish case which is characterized by dualities. Moreover, according to Lefebvre, the urban question is the new way of developing the critique of everyday life. His theory is an attempt to understand the connection between personal moments and socio-spatial relations. While such an effort links us to the other's experiences at different times and in different places (Shields, 1999:62), it also gives us the opportunity to search for answers about the questions on space of self and space of other.

Through the analysis of urbanity within the above mentioned context, in this thesis I assert that, urbanity and spatial practices can only be understood by considering formal and informal practices together. In fact, modernization process in Turkey was reshaped by both formal and informal practices. We can simply define the term formal as having a legal base or having accordance with established institutions; and the term informal as unofficial, undenominated, and determined by social relations and morals in daily life. According to these definitions, it is possible to say that unofficial and undenominated practices accompanied the official ones in the processes of the production of space and the construction of urbanity in the modernization process of Turkey. Although informality is a well-known fact, its discussion is generally limited with informal economy. However, informality has co-existed with formality in social, political and cultural domains throughout the process of modernization like the existence of community relations, clientelism and traditional cultural practices as well as informal settlements and economy. This

continuous co-existence of the formal and informal makes the city life of modern Ankara. Informal practices, sometimes diffuse into formal ones, sometimes challenge them and conflict with them. Moreover, informal practices also existed in the practices of Republican elites, and they had multiple functions such as enabling elites to emphasis their distinctiveness, or allowing other groups to attach themselves into the modernization process. Therefore, informal practices as analytical tools are very explanatory to understand spatial practices and urbanity in the Turkish case.

In order to create desired spatial practices and urbanity in formal level, modernizing elites applied a project demanding a total change in both public and private. In fact it was a demand to a civilizational shift in order to modernize (Westernize) the country. In this process elites' insistence on binary oppositions like modern-traditional, new-old, urban-rural, *alaturka-alafranga* (Turkish style-European style) brought exclusionary practices preventing the emergence of "hybrid forms" (Göle, 1997:86-87). This situation contributed to an increase in the gap between formality and informality in the society. In addition, the mediation between the binary categories was left to the informal practices in daily life since possible hybrids were rejected in the formal level.

Another assertion of the thesis rests on the conceptual tools of Lefebvre. In the spatial practices ranging from body to city-space, both the content and container were aimed to change in order to achive the desired civilizational shift by modernizing elite. In order to overcome the duality of body and mind both of them were tried to be accorded with Western civilization in a selective way in the formulation of a new civilization. However, the total rejection of the people's way of

life, which means the neglect of the relationship between the content and the container, reproduced the duality of the content and container by reducing the former to latter. This mentality also reduced urbanity to mere forms.

The methodology of the thesis is based on qualitative analysis of the research data mainly stemming from the interpretation of the texts to understand meanings attributed to urbanity. Since the basic assertion of the thesis is related with the importance of informal practices, these practices can be drawn from the meaning attached to texts. Although it is easier to observe the "formal" aspects of the project through a study of state and institutions, informal practices are not readily observable since they are not institutionalized. Therefore the study of the informal emerges as an important question. In the thesis, these informal practices were captured by the interpretation of primary resources like editorials, news published in the newspaper, and books describing the city and the city life in these years.

Due to the nature of the subject matter, I have benefited from an inter-disciplinary literature, ranging from urban sociology, theory of space, political science to social history. The discussion of Turkish modernization with the emphasis on space also took an important part in my literature review. I used both primary and secondary sources. My main primary source is the archive of the newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (which was published with the title of *Ulus* after 1934) between the years 1929-1940. It was the official newspaper of the Republican regime, published in Ankara. Especially the column editorials were reflecting the understanding of the ideology of the new regime. Along with the news on politics, economy and world news, there were also news on social life, especially in Ankara,

like balls, meetings of the elites, celebrations and the construction of Ankara. Therefore it is the richest source of material in terms of the subject of this research.

This thesis is composed of nine chapters. Chapters two and three address the literature on with space and urbanity respectively. The fourth chapter is the reconsideration of the discussions of Turkish modernization. The rest of the chapters focus on the case of Ankara to understand the production of space and the construction of urbanity in detail.

In the second chapter, I evaluate the literature on space with a specific emphasis on Lefebvre's discussion of "the production of social space". Through this discussion I aim to define the conceptual tools to understand the production of space and construction of urbanity.

In the third chapter, I review the discussions on the issue of urbanity. Since it is an ambiguous term, I trace the history of the term through literature heavily resting on urban sociology. While discussing the term, I look at its association with the notions of culture, civilization and civility since they are interconnected with each other. In the last part of the chapter I tried to answer the question of "how to think about urbanity" by underlying its inclusive aspects in the city life.

In the fourth chapter by explaining formal-informal practices in more detail, I reconsider the main features of the modernization project that are very determinative in the construction process of urbanity: center-periphery dualism, and the construction of private as well as the public (a desire to civilizational shift). My

argument is that, informal practices are also important factors in the discussion of these qualities of Turkish modernization. In this chapter, I also discuss the formulation of the term “civilization” on which urbanity has been constructed. The main characteristic of the period was a civilizational shift aimed by Republican elites in order to reach the level of contemporary civilizations. This was an attempt to overcome the duality of body and mind without considering their relationship.

Fifth chapter discusses the way the (urban) individual was imagined within the context of the new civilization and the imagination of the nation. Educating people was the dominant discourse of the period to create desired urbanites. In this sense I discuss how etiquette rules were used as an important tool to construct urbanity and also helped to create a distinction between elites and people. Therefore, formalization of these rules increased the gap between the formal and informal. This chapter also shows the coexistence of formal and informal practices in etiquette rules, which also means the coexistence of two different ways of life both in public and private.

Sixth chapter discusses the spatial practices both in macro and micro level in relation to the construction of urbanity. Spatial practices were attributed a great importance as the visible proof of modernity; both modern planning and modern architecture were used as the tools of the creation of an idealized society. However, the formal production of space and urbanity has produced exclusions by drawing new boundaries in urban areas. In this chapter, I also show that although the production of space was tried to be controlled by political elites, the actual lived spaces emerged through formal and informal practices.

Seventh chapter expands the discussion of urbanity through the construction of city life with reference to Western counterparts. In this chapter, I discuss the places and activities within the city by showing how these activities and places served as a school, teaching the new way of life to new urbanites. In spite of the desire to create sterile places and ways of life, the continuous co-existence of the formal and informal constituted the city life of modern Ankara. These informal practices, sometimes diffused into modern manners, sometimes challenged them and sometimes conflicted with them. However, most importantly, they contributed to strengthening of community (Gemeinschaft) relations.

Finally in the chapter VIII, I discussed the role of rural life and villagers in the construction process of urbanity. Although there was a vague and contradictory attitude towards the issue of village and peasant, old *Ankaralı*s (people from Ankara) equated with peasants were ignored and excluded in the city life. While on the one hand this situation was the indicator of the increasing gap between formal and informal practices in an exclusionary way, on the other hand, informal practices became apparent in the rhythm of the city.

CHAPTER II

POWER; SPACE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES

"Things lie... in order to conceal their origins"
(Lefebvre, 1993:81)

2.1. Power and Space

Social practices are at the same time spatial practices and vice versa. In order to understand the production of space and construction of urbanity, in this chapter, I will look at the literature on space in general and Lefebvre's conceptualization in particular. Through this discussion I aim to clarify the conceptual tools used in understanding spatial practices. These tools will be helpful to analyze my research material based on the spatial practices in the early period of the Turkish Republic.

All social activities are located in time and space. However, this does not simply mean that all human activity occurs in particular places at particular times, but also that where and when such activity occurs is important in explaining and understanding it (Saunders, 1985:67). In this sense spatiality is the complementary part of the meaning of an activity. The query of meaning in an urban setting brings the issue of the social production of space that includes both social processes and

practices (Martin, McCann, Purcell, 2003). Here it is necessary to note that space and the political organization of space are not simply constituted by social processes, but they are also constitutive of them (Lefebvre, 1991). Harvey (1996) states that, there is a dialectical relationship between social processes and spatial practices[1]. Soja (1994:94) also underlines that "the production of space (and the making of history) can … be described as both the medium and the outcome of social action and relationship". In this sense spatiality emerges as the product of transformation process, but at the same time it is transformable (Soja, 1994:94). Spatiality can be continuously reproduced over time with the appearance of stability. Despite this appearance of stability, actually spatial practices are parts of ongoing processes.

Spatial practices are permanent grounds for social conflicts and struggles. Since space is constituted out of social relations, "spatiality is always and everywhere an expression and medium of power" (Massey, 1997: 104). Space is seen as an active constitutive component of hegemonic power: "an element in the fragmentation, dislocation and weakening of class power... both the medium and message of domination and subordination" (Keith & Pile, 1993:37). For Harvey, (cited in Savage & Warde, 1993: 125) built form is "the product of specific social

[1] Harvey points to the epistemological and ontological difficulty in examining the relationship between processes and things: "Whether to prioritize the process or the thing and whether or not it is even possible to separate the process from the things embodied in it" (Harvey, 1996:23). He (1996) proposes a dialectical way of thinking to this problem with two assumptions: (1) processes are regarded in some ways as more fundamental than things, and (2) processes are always mediated through the things they produce, sustain and dissolve. By emphasizing processes, Harvey tries to make a dialectical and relational formulation rather than causal thinking. Relational thinking "examines the way in which various forces become internalized to define and shape the character of different elements" (1996:222).

groups struggling for cultural hegemony and social and political power"[2]. Therefore, the city space is the place "where cultural contradictions could best be revealed and dominant cultures criticized" (Savage & Warde, 1993:123). Foucault (1984) also argues that space has a crucial role where discourses about power and knowledge are transformed into actual relations of power. Harvey (1990:256) also writes: "those who have the power to command and produce space possess a vital instrumentality for the reproduction and enhancement of their own power". From this perspective, space is fundamental in any exercise of power and so in the formation of the strategies of resistance. A building or a landscape can be interpreted as an internalization of all sorts of material, symbolic, cultural, social and economic forces (Harvey, 1996:222), and the co-existence of all these forces in urban theory leads to different approaches that emphasize different aspects of urban space.

In urban studies, there are two main critical systems of thought namely, the "political economy" approach, and the "symbolic economy" approach (Zukin, 1996)[3]. The political economy approach "emphasizes investment shifts among different circuits of capital that transfer the ownership and uses of land from one social class to another" (Zukin, 1996:45). The basic concepts of political economy approach are land, labour and capital. On the other hand, the symbolic economy approach focuses on "representations of social groups and visual means of

[2] As Keith and Pile (1993) note, in order to understand the multiple and flexible relations of domination, a variety of spatial metaphors are commonly being used, that is, "position, location, situation, mapping, geometric of domination, center-margin, open-closed, inside-outside, global-local, liminal space, third space, not-space, impossible space, the city...".

[3] Zukin, S. (1996), discusses these concepts in "Space and Symbols in an Age of Decline", in *Re-Presenting the City*, ed. King, A. D., Macmillan Press, London.

excluding or including them in public and private spaces" (Zukin, 1996:45). So we can define two parallel production systems in a city: (a) the production of space as a material reality and (b) the production of symbols. Therefore, building a city depends on symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement as well as the traditional economic factors of land, labour and capital. Accordingly it can be said that a city consists of both (symbolic) representations[4] and material arrangements that are real life arrangements of materials and constructions, both of which are permanent areas of contestation.

Representation in the city (urban) context can be defined as "complex formulations of material, techniques and ideologies in which social practice is indissolubly linked to social thought and imagination" (Shields, 1996). In this sense, material, political and social representations cannot be separated from the visual presence/representation in the urban area.[5] The stable and innocent guise of concrete spatiality is always enveloped in the complex and diverse representation. In the city space there are many competing representations, those that are imposed by authorities, those constructed by social practices, and the ones produced by the interaction of the two.

Although this competition among representations gives meaning to space, space as a product (both in the form of materiality and representation) may conceal

[4] Some urbanists prefer to use the term "Re-presenting the City" in order to stress both aspects of "the representations of the city" and "city as a concrete construction" (Shields, 1996:234).

[5] Thrift, in Spatial Formations (1996: 6-8) discusses the approach of "non-representational thinking". He says that this approach gives priority to the external and practices constituting our sense of real. "It is concerned with thought-in-action, with presentation rather than representation… it suggests that representation is always a part of presentation (1996:7).

the actors of the space. Representation cannot be neutral since it selects and in some cases has to select from the intertwined complex of the city. Any selection made for the representation of a city not only makes things visible, but also makes other aspects invisible (Dijkstra, 2000). In this respect, legibility hides what it omits (Lefebvre, 1996:193)[6]. "The look and feel of cities reflect decisions about what -and who- should be visible and what should not, on concepts of order and disorder, and uses of aesthetic power" (Zukin, 1995:7). With its aesthetic power urban culture has a privileged position for subtly suppressing the unwanted. As a source of images and memories, (urban) culture symbolizes "who belongs" in specific places (Zukin, 1995:1) and also who do not. Therefore any analysis of space has to consider the relation of exclusion as much as the inclusion; and the permeability of the borders as well as the borders.

In this context, involvement in space, especially in public space is the symbolically most apparent outcome of power relations in that city. The power struggle in and through space manifests itself in public spaces of the city with its users and non-users.[7] Presence and representation in the public space of the city provides clues about actors in the city regarding the relations in political and economic sphere (Shields, 1996). Absence, either intentionally or unintentionally also says many things about the power relations in the city. Therefore "who is intentionally or unintentionally invisible and *unrepresented*" is as important as

[6] Lefebvre asks, "is not the homology (homogeneity) of all the spaces represented and recorded on the surfaces the most efficient of reductive ideologies?"

"who is visible and represented" in the public space of the city. An approach taking into consideration both the materiality and representation on the one hand, and visibility and invisibility on the other, necessitates rather a complicated analysis, which has been preoccupying many urban scholars.

With a more detailed categorization, King (1996:4) also mentions different representational levels of cities, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is "the way the built environment, the material, physical and spatial forms of the city". It is itself "a representation of specific ideologies, of social, political, economic, and cultural relations and practices, of hierarchies and structures, which not only represent but also, inherently constitute these same relations and structures". The second is the symbolic level which is "constituted through visual representation, the semiotic domain where visual signifiers refer to some other signified, even though signs... can have infinite meanings". The third which depends on the existence of the first two is "the mental constructs which form the discourses". These categories are an attempt to end the distinction between a "real city" and a "discursive city" since one does not exist without the other[8]. These attempts to overcome the duality of real-discursive/imaginary constitute the main purpose of the current discussions of representation in urban studies[9] ((Savage & Warde, (1993); Zukin, (1996); Soja,

---

[7] For Zukin (1995:32), with raised property values, public spaces have "the greatest claim to be symbolic spaces for the city as a whole". In recent discussions privatization and militarization/ aestheticization process has given rise to inclusion and exclusion relations, which challenge the definition of public space. So the most important question is "does all public (all groups of society) have access to public spaces and under what conditions?"

[8] This conceptualization reminds Lefebvre's trilogy which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

[9] For another example see Shields (1991). With reference to Lefebvre, he develops the notion of "social spatialization" "to designate the ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imaginary (collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as interventions in the landscape (for example the built environment)" (cited in Savage & Warde, 1993: 131).

(1996); Thrift, (1996) and Shields, (1991)). However, although many of the studies on the urban issue aim to capture these two processes concomitantly, according to Savage and Warde (1993), they may fail to give equal importance to both sides. In the next part, I will discuss Henri Lefebvre's conceptualization of space that gives possibility to overcome these dualities in the understanding of space.

2.2. Spatial Construction of Urbanity: Urbanity in Henri Lefebvre

In fact, Lefebvre's theory is a search, in and through space, for a way to surmount these kinds of ossified separations that lack the possibilities of considering "in-between" situations. He gives precious insights that allow a rethinking of dualities through the space like material-mental, inside-outside, self-other, individual-society in the context of mediations.

In the following part I will review Henri Lefebvre's conceptualization of space through the reading of his *The Production of Space* (1993) and *Writings on Cities* (1996). Even though his analysis is quite comprehensive, I will limit my reading to concepts and discussions that may enable us to understand the production of space and urbanity in relation to socio-cultural and political contexts; and that will help to understand how space evolves in daily life through the interaction of macro and micro levels and formal and informal practices in "in-between" situations. These terms are specified as social space, mediation, abstract space, body, inside-outside, rhythm analysis, and urbanity respectively.

2.2.1 Social Space

First of all, for Lefebvre, space should be considered in the context of social processes. At the very heart of his theory lies the conceptualization of space as a social production process rather than as the placement of things. Social relations are concrete abstractions and they only exist in and through space; "their underpinning is spatial" (1993:404). For Lefebvre "(social) space is (socially) produced". He emphasizes the production process of space rather than spatial products as a static entity. For him "production is not merely the making of products: the term signifies on the one hand 'spiritual' production, that is to say creations (including social time and space), and on the other material production or the making of things" (cited in Elden, 2004a:184). Production activity is not limited to economic production of the things, it includes the production of society, knowledge and institutions (Elden, 2004a:184).

With his analysis of "social space", Lefebvre aims to propose the most comprehensive approach to the space. Under the title of "social space" he criticizes the traditional opposition of physical and mental space, and links them in relation to social space and he tries to overcome dualities by bridging these concepts. In fact in urban theory, Henri Lefebvre tries to surmount these kinds of dualities by proposing concepts that function as *"in between spaces"* (Shields, 1996). In his analysis, urban space is produced through the dialectical connection between material construction, social practice and representation (Harvey 1993:17). First of all I want

to recall his trilogy: spatial practices, representation of space and representational space (perceived, conceived, and lived space).

> *Spatial Practice*, (perceived space) which embraces production and reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation. Spatial practices ensure continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms of social space, and of each member of a given society's relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of performance.
>
> *Representations of space*, (conceived space) which are tied to the relations of production and to the 'order' which these relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to sign, to codes, and to 'frontal' relations.
>
> *Representational space*, (lived space) which embodies complex symbolism, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a code of space than as a code of representational spaces) (1993.33)… This is the dominated –and hence passively experienced- space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects (1993: 38-39).

Spatial practice embodies a close relationship between daily reality and urban reality, linking work, private life and leisure. Representation of space is the conceptualized space, dominant in any society. Under the notion of representation, ideology and knowledge are barely distinguishable. Representation of space combines the two, and it is passively experienced and justified in representational spaces. So, representational space is the dominated one, which is experienced passively. It is the space of subjects. It is the space "which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate" (1993:38-39). Its source is based on history, both the

history of people and that of the individual (1993:41). All these realms are interconnected for Lefebvre, levels may correspond or conflict with each other; in fact, the struggle between "spatial practice" and "representation of space" constitutes the "representational space".

> "The user's space is lived – not represented (or conceived). When compared with the abstract space of the experts… the space of everyday activities of users is a concrete one, which is to say, subjective. As a space of 'subjects' rather than of calculations, as a representational space, it has an origin, and that origin is childhood, with its hardships, its achievements, and its lacks. Lived space bears the stamp of the conflict between an inevitable, if long and difficult, maturation process and a failure to mature that leaves particular original resources and reserves untouched. It is in this space that the 'private' realm asserts itself, albeit more or less vigorously, and always in a conflictual way, against the public one" (1993:362).

With the conceptualization of user's space, Lefebvre tries to overcome the duality of physical- mental world. As Elden (2004:187-188) argues, by the concept representational space Lefebvre aims to overcome the Cartesian dualism of *res extensa* indicating a physical world, and *res cogitans* indicating the thinking thing. Within the Cartesian understanding, space is reduced either to a reality, outside of thought or a simple thought, an abstract and scientific quantification. This dualism is also the source of the body-mind separation, an important issue in Turkish modernization. Beyond these perceived (abstract thought of space) and conceived (concrete reality of space) spaces, with the conceptualization of lived space, Lefebvre links physical and mental space. Elden (2004:190) states that the third term refers to "the space of connaissance (less formal or more local forms of knowledge)". Within

this context, it can be said that lived space is produced and modified with the interaction of informal processes as well as the formal ones.

On the other hand, social space is constituted by the dialectical relationship of these three levels: perceived, conceived and lived describing practice, thought and imagined, in that order.[10] Reformulating the term dialectic with two antitheses (affirmation-negation-negation of negation), Lefebvre proposes a "spatilised", 'three-way dialectic': "thesis, anti-thesis, otherness (negation2) and synthesis". Based on this formulation, Rob Shields, (1999:120) argues that the third term, "negation of negation", opens up an "alternative route which displaces or reconfigures- divides- the dualism of affirmation-negation". This is the expansion of dialectics into trialectics that enables a position for otherness. Shields (1999:120) gives the relation of these three levels in a dialectical contradiction of: "everyday perception/ practice versus spatial theory/ concept revitalized by a transcendent, entirely other, moment: creative, fully lived space". Both perceived and conceived spaces are overturned by unpredictable, fully lived moments. Through this trialectic, social space has been produced.

Social space contains all the relations of production, the social relations of reproduction; and symbolic representation of them; and their interaction (Lefebvre, 1993:32). Lefebvre's triad appears from his attempt to bring physical, mental and social fields together (1993:11). For him, understanding social space:

[10] Soja (1996) uses this triad by proposing the concept of "thirdspace" which is the "trialectics of spatiality". (It is the trialectics of being consists of spatiality, historicality and sociality).

> …is to discover or construct a theoretical unity between fields which are apprehended separately… The fields we are concerned with are, first, the physical - nature, the cosmos; secondly, the mental, including logical and formal abstraction; and, thirdly, the social. In other words, we are concerned with logico-epistemological space, the space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory phenomena, including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, symbols, utopias (1993:11-12).

As his discussion shows, space is more than a merely product; and as his triology suggests, it should be analyzed as the intersection of physical, mental and social processes. This conceptualization of (social) space will be illuminative in the discussions of spatial practices of the early Republican period since it helps to understand the disparities between formal/official approaches toward space, and users' space.

2.2.2 City as Mediation

As complementary to his analysis of social space, Lefebvre concomitantly considers both the general and the particular. "Local acts and agents left their mark on cities, but also impersonal relations of production and property, and consequently, of classes and class struggles, that is, ideologies (religious and philosophical, that is, ethical, aesthetical, legal, etc.)" (1996:107). On the one hand, since socio-political contradictions are realized spatially, in order to understand the production activity, the assistance of political economy is needed (1993:365). On the other hand, he does not neglect the private, the concealed daily life: its rhythms, its occupation, its spatio-

temporal organization, its clandestine 'culture', its underground life (1996:113). For him, relations of inclusion-exclusion, of belonging or non-belonging to a particular space of the city can be grasped by considering different levels from most general to particular.

Lefebvre defines the city as mediation and it depends on relations of immediacy. City takes place between the mediated and unmediated relations. The condition of "in-betweenness" derives from this point and I think it is this characteristic that gives the city the potential to change or to create alternatives. According to Lefebvre (1996:100-101), the city, on the one hand, has connection with society as a whole with its constitutive elements (countryside and agriculture, offensive and defensive force, political power, states, etc.). City changes when society changes. On the other hand it also has close association with direct relations, like the ones between individuals and groups forming the society (families, organized bodies, crafts and guilds, etc.). These relations are called as *near order* and *far order*:

> [The city] is situated at an interface, half-way between what is called the *near order* (relations of individuals in groups of variable size, more or less organized and structured and the relations of these groups among themselves), and the *far order*, that of society, regulated by large and powerful institutions (Church and State), by a legal code formalized or not, by a 'culture' and significant ensembles endowed with powers, by which the *far order* projects itself at this 'higher' level and imposes itself (1996:101).

For Lefebvre (1996:101), between the near order and far order, "*the city is a mediation among mediations*":

> [Far order] persuades through and by the near order, which confirms its compelling power. It becomes apparent by and in immediacy. The city is a mediation among mediations. Containing the near order, it supports it; it maintains relations of production and property; it is the place of their reproduction. Contained in the far order, it supports it, it incarnates it; it projects it over a terrain (the site) and on a plan, that of immediate life; it inscribes it, prescribe it, writes it.

Their relationship is written in the city through the production process of space. It is written by the city and can be discovered by reflection. In this relation, "the far order projects itself in/on the near order. However, the near order does not reflect transparently the far order. The later subordinates the immediate through mediations" (1996:102).[11] However, Lefebvre (1996:194) also notes that it must be possible to mention the connection and the articulation of these two levels rather than the subordination of one to another.[12] This discussion of the articulation of macro and micro levels, or far and near order in space, will help in understanding of the interaction of formal and informal practices in my case.

Since the text/city is not an isolated complete system[13] we need to grasp the context. According to Lefebvre (1996:108) "The context, what is below the text to

[11] As an example he discusses the process of globalization (1996:107).

[12] In this context Shields (1988:4) says that "the internal contradictions of capitalism have been managed through the development of a mediating system of spatiality… the production of this capitalist spatialization is accomplished through the activities of the State".

[13]For Lefebvre semiology neglects the context by considering the city as "a signifying system, determined and closed as a system". For Lefebvre "In the course of its projection on a specific level, the general code of society is modified: the specific code of the urban is an incomprehensible modulation, a version, a translation without the original or origins. (Nietzsche?) Yes, the city can be read because it writes, because it was writing. However, it is not enough to examine this without recourse to context" (1996:108).

decipher (daily life, immediate relations, the unconscious of the urban, what is little said and of which even less is written), hides itself in the inhabited spaces –sexual and family life- and rarely confronts itself, and what is above this urban text (institutions, ideologies), can not be neglected in the deciphering". In order to uncover the context (from the text), we must consider immediate relations –which are "linked to a way of life, to inhabiting, and to regulating daily life"- as well as the general (mediated) processes.

If we remember the previous discussion of the representational space, in order to grasp the lived space, the near order should be considered as well as the far. Especially, the change in the spatial practices through the modernization process could be understood through local responses of users to formal regulations of political power. In fact, the conceptualization of space as mediation, points to the struggles –between the agents of far order and near order- in the production of social space; and the different articulations emerging in space provide clues about the result of the struggle that may produce alternative practices and that may contribute to the discussion of alternative modernities.

2.2.3 Abstract Space /Appropriation-Domination

Lefebvre deepens his analysis of struggles in and through space with the discussion of abstract space and appropriation and domination. In his discussion, Lefebvre

makes a detailed analysis of abstract space.[14] Under this definition he aims to demonstrate the contradictions inherent in capitalism and in planning rationality. For him, abstract space is the space of the bourgeoisie and of capitalism; it is the homogenization of space with abstract and qualitative codes. "Formal and quantitative, it erases distinctions, as much those which derive from nature and (historical) time" (1993:49). In short, it is homogenized (at least aiming homogeneity) and fragmented (because of the division of space under the control of power-functional fragmentation). Fragmentation and specialization accentuate the abstractness. Although abstract space is produced merely with the precondition of a consensus, it cannot conceal the violence either latent or hidden. Under the guise of security, it embraces a constant threat of violence (1993:57) and contradictions of fragmented space. In these spaces rationality and rationality of unification is used to justify violence.[15]

In fact this space has the capability of concealing what it contains. Its imaginary elements may refer to "something else". "It contains representations derived from the established order: statuses, norms, localized hierarchies and hierarchically arranged places, and roles, and values bound to particular places" (1993:311). For example, "the architects and city-planners offered -as an ideology in action- an empty space, a space that is primordial, a container ready to receive fragmentary contents, a neutral medium into which disjointed things, people and

[14] Lefebvre discusses the history of space with certain concepts respectively absolute space, sacred space, historical space, abstract space, contradictory space and differential space (Shields, 1998:170-172). Among them a*bsolute space* is the fragments of the nature, which is lived rather than conceived. It is the "the space of primitive nomad". In absolute space there is no distinction between public and private (1993:241).

habitat might be introduced" (1993:308). Such conceptualization of space brings incoherence and contradiction in the name of coherence on behalf of middle class under the appearances of neutrality between the bourgeoisie and working class. This space is not the expression of the middle class but what is assigned to them by the plan. In these places, the middle class finds what they are searching for: "a mirror of their 'reality', tranquillizing ideas, and the image of their social world in which they have their own specially labeled, guaranteed place" (1993:309). However, they are, in fact, manipulated by space along with their "unclear aspirations and their all-too-clear needs".

In this context, we should remember his discussion of "to inhabit" and habitat. With reference to Heidegger[16], Lefebvre defines "to inhabit" as taking part in a social life, a community, village or city (1996:76). On the other hand "habitat", concretized in mass housing, refers to a certain abstract and functional character with burdens of constraints. "…large housing estates achieve the concept of habitat, by excluding the notion of inhabit, that is, the plasticity of space, its modeling and the appropriation by groups, and individuals of the conditions of their existence" (1996:79). Planning, with its priority on speculation, on plots and property, reduces "to inhabit" to "habitat". Imaginary overdetermining logic has an important role in the logic of habitat: "…the logic of the habitat is only perceived in relation to make-believe, and make-believe in relation to logic. People represent themselves to

[15] "As a result, the trend towards homogeneousness, instead of appearing as such, is perceived only through such metaphors as 'consensus', parliamentary democracy, hegemony, or raison détat" (Lefebvre, 1993:282).

themselves by what they are lacking or believe to be lacking" (1996:80)[17]. "The make-believe world of habitat" (1996:84) guides the "way to happiness" in suburbs.

A complementary part of this process is the domination of "logic of visualization"[18] which have two dimensions: dependence on written world (with reference to Marshall McLuhann) and spectacularization (with reference to Guy Debord) (1993:286). Vision asserts its primacy over other senses, a process which is accentuated with the domination of consumption. The relation with urban life is constituted through consumption and the ideology of consumption (culture) (1996:144). "As a space where strategies are applied, abstract space is also the locus of all the agitations and disputations of mimesis: of fashion, sport, art, advertising, and sexuality transformed into ideology" (1993:309). Although urban space consists of quality, the planning rationality overemphasizes quantity by suppressing use value with exchange value. In this mentality, the city becomes a tool to organize production and consumption. "Sign of the city, the urban life, as the signs of the nature and the countryside, as those of joy and happiness, delivered to consumption without an effective social practice enabling the urban to enter daily life". The individual is also under the control of abstract space. In these spaces "the Ego no longer relates to its own nature, to the material world, or even to the 'thingness' of things (commodities), but only to things bound to their signs and indeed ousted and supplanted by them.

---

[16] For Heidegger (1971:8) Building belongs to dwelling and "dwelling… is the basic character of being in keeping with which mortals exist". For Hölderlin who affected both Heidegger and Lefebvre "man resides as a poet" (Lefebvre, 1993:314). Although Lefebvre uses the concept of dwelling, he criticizes the political implications of the term since it is elitist and class based. On a comparison of Lefebvre and Heidegger see Elden (2004b).

[17] He expands the discussion with reference to the ilusion of transparency and opacity (see 1993:27-30).

The sign-bearing 'I' no longer deals with anything but other bearers of signs" (1993:311). This space full of images and signs turns into a simulacrum of the space (1993:313).

All these contradictions, conflicts and tensions are immanent to abstract space and its mentality. In different contexts, Lefebvre refers to this concept as a foremost barrier between inside-outside, exchange and use values, and domination and appropriation relations. However, abstract space with its contradictions (like quantity-quality, global-local, and use value-exchange value) leads to *Differential Space*. Differences arise on the margins of the homogenized realm. In fact, abstract space is not fully homogenized space, "it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its "lens"" (1993:287). "…despite –or rather because of - its negativity, abstract space carries within itself the seeds of … "differential space" (1993:52). "What is different is, to begin with, what is excluded", like the edges of the city, shanty towns, and the spaces of forbidden games[19]. They arises either in the form of resistance or in the form of externalities: lateral, heterotopical, heterological (1993:373). They are the main forces against homogenization. In this sense differential spaces are the places of excluded, repressed or merely ignored groups by appropriation.

Related with this struggle in the cities, another conceptual pair is *dominated* and *appropriated* space. Dominated (dominant) space is the site of hegemonic forces

---

[18] In fact he (1993:285-287) mentions three elements of abstract space: the geometric formant, the optical (visiul) formant and the phallic formant.

[19] For Lefebvre in shanty towns, social life is more intense than in bourgeois districts since in there social life is based on self-defense.

and it involves political power. It is the space transformed and mediated by technology. "Such spaces are works of construction rather than 'works' in the sense… and they are not yet 'products' in its narrow, modern and industrial meaning; dominant space is invariably the realization of a master's project" (1993:164-165). On the other hand, appropriated space is the transformation of the natural space to serve the needs and possibilities of a group. It is like a work of art, but not an imitation of it. For the production of new spaces we need to reappropriate the space (1993:167). Differential spaces emerge as the places of resistance against to logic of abstract space with the acts of appropriation and reappropriation. Urban life rises through the appropriation of space by foiling the domination of space.

Through its use, space is produced and modified in daily life. In Lefebvre's discussion everyday life plays a crucial role to challenge domination relations. He shows how both space produces daily life and is produced by it. For Lefebvre, our daily and social practices cannot be separated, and our "consciousness is produced through material practices in the conduct of everyday life" (Shields, 1999). On the one hand, he criticizes the poverty of daily life, the loss of individual control over it and the materialization of life-styles[20]. In doing so, he also implies the possibilities of counteracting inherent to space. While everything (the whole) burdens the lower level of everyday life (daily life), everything (the whole) also depends on it: exploitation and domination, protection and repression (1993:366). Therefore, on the other hand "everyday life emerged as the ground of resistance and renewal, which

[20] Gregory (1997:205) points out the similarity of concern in the works of Habermas and Lefebvre in this sense. While Habermas talks about the colonization of the life-word by the system, Lefebvre shows the colonization of "everyday life" by the production of the abstract space although their conceptualization of modernity is totally dissimilar.

was essential to the ‘moments’ and flashes of unalienated presence that punctured it” (Shields, 1999:66). Everyday life is a dynamic area of practice. It is “the site of the authentic experience of self, of the body and engagement with others” (Shields, 1998:77). In everyday life person is both subject and object of becoming (Shields, 1998:71). Since everyday practice continuously refers from representation of space to representational space, it gives the possibility of challenging and appropriating the space (1993:233).

So far I have tried to introduce Lefebvre’s terms describing the production of space as a struggle emerged under the condition of “in-betweenness”. The discussions on the production of social space with the triads of conceived, perceived and lived space; city as mediation between far order and near order; and abstract space and the domination and appropriation of space will be helpful to understand the production of space and so the urban culture/urbanity which take place as a struggle between the state authority and the daily life practices of people in the early Republican period. I want to expand the discussion by introducing some of Lefebvre’s other terms which will complement the analysis of urban culture and urbanity and help to understand the locating the self and others in and through the space.

2.2.4 The Body and Inside- Outside

Lefebvre emphasizes that space has double determinants consisting of imaginary-real, produced-producing, material-social, immediate-mediated, connection-

separation and so on (1993:187). However, they are dialectically linked, to put it differently, those are not separable, but inseparable (1993:37). In his search for a (holistic) analysis of space, his discussions reflects the influence of Surrealists' searching for decoding of inner space and illuminating "the nature of the transition from this subjective space to the material realm of the body and the outside world, and thence to social life" (Lefebvre, 1993:18). It is an attempt to connect the physical sense of lived space with the symbolic meaning of space (Shields, 1998:155). This is a kind of search from inner experience of space to the city.

In "The Production of Space", Lefebvre traces the history of the space, which is also the history of the body. "There is an immediate relationship between the body and its space, between the body's deployment in space and its occupation of space" (1993:170). It means body as a space and body in space. "Each living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces that space… The body with the energies at its disposal, the living body, creates or produces its own space; conversely, the laws of space, which is to say the laws of discrimination in space, also govern the living body and deployment of its energies" (1993:170). For him, "the body is the concrete transcendence of the subject-object split, being both subject and object in space" (Shields-1999). In this sense the relationship between nature and space does not depend on the mediation of an external force, whether natural or divine, therefore, it is immediate (Lefebvre, 1993:172-173). This reciprocal inherence between space and what it contains may give the possibility of transition from mental to social and enforces the concept of the production of space (1993:171).

Every living being "constitutes itself from the outset as an internal space" (1993:175). And every spatial envelope has the barrier between the inside and the outside. Closure establishes the living being as a "distinct body". But this barrier is always relative and -with different degree- permeable like membranes (1993:176). Lefebvre underlines the natural aspect of the separation; however, ossification of this barrier, which means abstraction of space, inevitably deepens the separation of inside-outside, and damages the relatedness of both sides[21]. Unfortunately, "under the conditions of modern industry and city life abstraction hold sway over the relationship to the body"[22]. Abstract space destroys the immediate relation of body and space and so the relation of the self and the other. Because the ego's relationship to its body also determines the relationship to other bodies, and nature and space and vice versa: the relationship to space establishes the relationship to other (1993:204).

When the very indispensable separation of living being, inside- outside, turns into a barrier, it starts to produce many obstacles in our relationships with ourselves, with others with whom we share a house, apartment, street, workplace, and city, and different places that we belong to. On a different level, such barriers can prevent the relationships of different groups with each other. Although the history of life is constituted by complicated interaction between the inside and outside, it could be deceptively reduced to a clear inside-outside relationship (1993:173). This

[21] However, Lefebvre's analysis of the degradation of this organic spatiality includes the combination of humanism and romanticism unlike Lacan (Gregory, 1997:218) and the hope of reconstruction through reappropriation.

[22] This discussion makes connotation to Foucault's discussion of technologies of the self. Shields (1999:156) points out a critical distinction between Foucault and Lefebvre. For Foucault "power is embedded as a force in a dense network of bio-powers. For Lefebvre, power is 'political' rather than ethical; it is sovereign and conceived from above". On the other hand Lefebvre (1993:205) continues his discussion as that: "laying the blame for all the damage at the door of discourse alone is to exculpate not only that tradition but also 'real' abstract space".

distinction of inside- outside can be interpreted as the split between representation of space and representational space (1993:173-175) without any interaction between them. The logic of private property accentuates this split and within its logic space of a town, nation or nation state turns into "closed frontier" with an accentuated exclusion (1993:173). So the quality of relationship between the inside and outside is very important in terms of urbanity/urban culture since it determines the quality and quantity of relations in urban areas. Therefore, as it will be discussed in the next chapters, the borders and barriers which are produced either formally or informally are absolutely essential to evaluate how urbanity is constructed.

Lefebvre also discusses another duality important to understanding how individuals and groups locate themselves; the dual nature of (social) space in social life, "a dual general existence". On the one hand, "one… relates oneself to space, situates oneself in space, one places oneself at the centre, designates oneself, measures oneself, and uses oneself as a measure" (1993:182). It is the situation of self's immediacy and objectivity; the situation where self becomes a subject. Social status implies a role and function: "an individual and a public identity" and also "a location, a place in society and a position." In this sense, space is the place of opacities, bodies and object (1993:182-183). On the other hand, space functions as an intermediary or mediating role. It designates a domain of sequences, sets of objects "concatenation of bodies", and hence is relational. In this conception we realize that beyond the plane surface of the space, beyond its opaqueness, there is the tendency

through the transparency. The intersection of the two is life resembling a movement of the body.[23]

> Objects touch one another, feel, smell and hear one another. Then they contemplate one another with eye and gaze. One truly gets the impression that every space in space, every spatial plane, constitutes a mirror and produces a mirage effect; that within each body the rest of the word is reflected, and referred back to, in an ever-renewed to-and-fro of reciprocal reflection, an interplay of shifting colors, lights and forms (1993:183).

Subsequently, every spatial plane constitutes a mirror[24] reflecting the rest of the world within each body. While mirror transforms the subject into its sign and makes the split of being, at once abstract and concrete, invisible through its surface. By doing so, it discloses the relationship between "me and myself, my body and the consciousness of my body" (1993:185). And the mirror offers the most unifying and, at the same time, the most disjunctive relationship between form and content (1993:185-186). It can be said that it depends on which space of the mirror (absolute, representation of space or representational) the image is reflected[25] (1993:190). The mirror also gives information about space by bringing together the other objects in

---

[23] He (1993:27-30) discusses "the illusion of transparency" and "the illusion of opacity" are the illusions of idealism and materialism in respectively, and funtion to conceal the fact that "space is a social product".

[24] Lefebvre' analysis of mirror owes to Lacan although he barely refers to him (Gregory, 1997).

[25] For Althusser (1994) the mirror characteristic of the ideology enables "the calling of individual as a subject" and recognizing the other subjects as well as herself. Ideology calls the individual as "subject" and constitutes it. But, what about the individuals who have never been called/interpellated or who never recognized as an individual as an distict entity. In the Turkish case it can be asked that how Kemalism imagined and called the subject. What about the "subjects" who were never called by the modernization project of Turkey like in Edip Cansever's poem "Uncalled Yakup", Yakup is never called. (For Althusser the bourgeois ideology made the individual into subject. However, for Barrett such an approach neglects the mediating role of subject. For the discussion of this distinction and critique of Althusser see Barrett (1996: 101-133)).

relation to their spatial environment. "Into that space which is produced first by natural and later by social life the mirror introduces a truly dual spatiality: a space which is imaginary with respect to origin and separation, but also concrete and practical with respect to coexistences and differentiation" (1993:186). For Lefebvre (1993:189), the power of space derives from this mirror/mirage effect rather than its offering itself as a spectacle[26].

For Lefebvre (1993:170) "space is not a pre-existing void endowed with formal properties alone", neither is it "a container waiting to be filled by content". Such an understanding is a particular "representation of space" and it separates the container and content, making them further indifferent to each other; therefore, they cannot affect each other. The reduction of content to a container neglects the differences and dialectic movement, and also reduces the social space to a pure mental space (reduction of time to space, use value to exchange value, object to sign etc.) (1993:296). He argues:

> "True space" was… substituted for the "truth of space" and applied to such practical problems of those bureaucracy and power, rent and profit, and so on, so creating the illusion of a less chaotic reality; social space tended to become indistinguishable from the space of planners, politicians and administrators, and architectural space, with its social constructed character, from the (mental) space of architects (1993:300)

[26] He writes "Mirage effects have far-ranging consequences. Under the conditions of modernity, as absolute political space extends its sway, the impression of transparency becomes stronger and stronger, and the illusion of a new life is everywhere reinforced. Real life indeed appears quite close to us. We feel able, from within everyday life, to reach out and grasp it, as though nothing lay between us marvelous reality on the other side of the mirror. All the prerequisites for it exist –so what is missing? An utterance of some kind, spoken or written? A gesture? A successful attack on some particular aspects of things, or removal of some particular obstacle- ideology perhaps, or established knowledge, or some repressive institution or other, or religion, or theatricality, or the educational system, or the spectacle? The list is endless" (1993:189).

Both the inside-versus-outside relationship and the separation of content and container reflect the mentality intrinsic to representation of space. For Lefebvre (1993:175), to overcome the domination of representation of space, the representational spaces have a great importance, and it should be considered as a starting point. In order to reconnect the mental and the social, they have to be clearly recognized, and distinguished from one another; and then the mediations between them have to be reconstructed (1993:299). Because the concept of space connotes all physical, mental and social spaces, and separation of them means the abstraction of the space; and the notion of space refers to all spaces from production of body to city.

This understanding of space is particularly important within the context of this study. As I will show in the following chapters, construction of Ankara and *Ankaralı* as a major aspect of Turkish modernization is based on the separation of these different aspects of space without a relation. Reducing space to perceived or conceived one by ignoring the relationship between them as lived space, the modernization project constructed space and urbanity by reducing content to container. Especially in formal arrangement of the space, like in the planning process of Ankara, space is abstracted by domination of representation of space. More importantly, by rejecting mediations at the formal level, representational space is also dominated by this approach and mediations, as hybrid practices as we may call them, are left to informal practices in the city. As will be discussed in the case study, this process is also a part of struggles in and through urban space which characterize the modernization process of the country. Now I would like to briefly mention one

further term helpful in understanding the more subtle aspect of this struggle, rhythm analysis.

2.2.5 Rhythm Analysis

For Lefebvre the analysis of the production of space can be completed by rhythm analysis (1993: 405). Rhythm means repetition: both cyclical and linear: while the former is the cosmic repetition (natural and irrational)[27] which is always new, the latter is based on consecutiveness and sameness (unnatural and rational) and it "emanates from human and social activities, and particularly from the motions of work" (1993: 231). Both cyclical and linear repetitions are relative to each other; daily life consists of their mixture. An individual's rhythm depends on his/her relationship with a group, other people. But it also depends on one's relationship with his/her body, "with his tongue and speech, with his gestures, in a certain place and with gestural whole, and on the other hand, a relationship with the largest public space…" (1996:235). While the "rhythm of the self" is associated with private life and intimacy, "rhythm of the other" is linked to the rhythms of activities turned outwards, towards the public.

Rhythm analysis reflects the relationship between self and other especially in the public spaces of the city. The public spaces are also important because they provide an opportunity for protection from linear rhythms of daily routines. Since in public spaces, time is linked to the rhythms of people who occupy them, in these

places time is linked to the space (1996:237). It can be said that the changing rhythms in the city refer to changes in the rhythms of public spaces and so changes in actors of these spaces. Especially the "rhythm of the other" gives clues about the urban culture and the quality of urbanity which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Parallel to this argument, now, in the next last part, I will concentrate on the issue of urbanity in the context of Lefebvre's conceptualization of space.

2.2.6 Urban Life/ Urbanity

Although Lefebvre does not directly discuss the term urbanity, his whole theory while explaining the production of space, celebrates the urban culture as *oeuvre*. He sees cities as a work of art (*oeuvre*) rather than a simple material product (1996:101); therefore, it is impossible to mention urban society without the city as an "oeuvre" that has an association with use value[28]. In his formulation "the city is itself '*oeuvre*', a feature, which contrasts with the irreversible tendency towards exchange and products. Indeed, the *oeuvre* is use value and the product is exchange value" (1996:66). Urban culture, which is the basis of urbanity, rests on the oeuvre of the city meaning that the city is produced by the "use" of its citizens. The history of the

[27] Lefebvre says that "dawn is always new" (1996:231).

[28] Another important terms in Lefebvre's discussion are use value and exchange value and their conflicts in cities. For Lefebvre "city and urban reality are related to use value", therefore exchange value and commodification pose a real threat to them (1996:67-68). Although we can mention a continuous conflict between them, there is a certain dominance of exchange value over use value in cities. Lefebvre (1993:360) summarizes it as a clash between capitalist 'utilizers' and community 'users' (1993:360).

city is the "oeuvre" accomplished by the people in historical conditions[29]. The city is the place of *oeuvres* (work of art, monuments) as well as knowledge and technique (1996:66). *Oeuvre* is the use of the city as a celebration (*la Fête*), consuming unproductively for the purpose of pleasure; the use of streets and squares beyond the necessity of producing surplus. The urban is the oeuvre of its citizens that does not impose itself upon its citizens as a system (1996:117).[30]

In their history, of course "industrialization characterizes modern society" (1996:65), however, industrialization and urbanization should be accepted as two aspects of the same process such as growth and development, economic production and social life. "Industrial production, after a certain growth, produces urbanization, providing it with conditions, and possibilities" (1996:130). Although they constitute an inseparable unity, this process has been very conflictual and historically, there has been a violent clash between urban reality and industrial reality (1996:70). This conflict generally displays itself in urban centers, the hearts of the public life. In this process while old centers are in the process of dissolving, new centers of agglomerations appear. Lefebvre calls this transformation as "implosion-explosion" process (1996:71), which becomes apparent in the form of suburbs in industrialized countries and as shantytowns in developing countries (1996:125). In the same way, in developing countries with the dissolution of precapitalist agrarian structures, peasants have been moving to cities, generally settling in shanty towns/squatter settlements. The shanty town "becomes the (inadequate) mediator between town and country,

[29] He says "conditions which simultaneously enable and limit possibilities are never sufficient to explain what was born of them, in them, by them" (1996:101).

[30] For Lefebvre in order to resist the dominance of exchange value, we have art that "restitutes the meaning of the oeuvre, giving it multiple facets of appropriated time and space" (1996:157).

agricultural and industrial production. It often consolidates itself and offers a substitute of urban life, miserable and yet intense, to those which it shelters" (1996:125). In both industrialized and developing countries, the tension between industrialization and urbanization reproduces the urban centers/ public spaces with the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.

The cities are growing, but as the new settlements could not relate themselves to the center, they turn inward and constitute their sub-centers and become a closed community separated from the center. Inevitably, their relation with the urban life and urban center, the space of urbanity, becomes a major problem. It is the subordination of urban life to industrialization. Although urbanization depends on industrialization, the urban society is the aim and the finality of industrialization (1996:177)[31]. That means urban life emerged through urbanization means more than industrialization. The subordination of urban life to the industrial growth appears as a most contradictory point in this process.

For Lefebvre, in order to understand this contradictory situation, we need a dialectical rationality, instead of a constricted rationality and its limits. First of all, "the urban contains the meaning of industrial production, as appropriation contains the sense of technical domination over nature, the latter becoming absurd without the former" (1996:131). However, it cannot be defined by attaching it to or detaching it from material morphology. It is a quality born from quantities (spaces, objects, products). And more than homogeneity, "it is a difference or rather, an ensemble of

[31] Lefebvre summarizes it as the contradiction between the 'socialization of society' and 'generalized segregation' (see 1996:157).

differences" with its vivid center. Urban life, urban society and the urban, is a particular social practice; "it is a mental and social form, that of simultaneity, of gathering, of convergence, of encounter (or rather, encounters)" (1996:131).

Therefore, urban cores or centers have a vital importance for the urban life – urbanity. With its aesthetic quality and the institutional headquarters, urban cores collect people together. Although they may deteriorate, urban cores never disappear, due to their dual role in capitalist city: "as place of consumption and consumption of place" (1993:73). While urban cores are the commercial centers underlying exchange value, they also protect their use value with activities such as entertainments, parades, promenades and festivities. However, as it is noted above, the problem in terms of the urban life arises from its relation with periphery and the domination of exchange value.

The relation with the urban center has a diagnostic role for urban life. Lefebvre stresses that "there is no urbanity without a center" (1996:208). It must be noted that this centrality is very different from the centrality with the claims of totality and superiority of political rationality (a state or urban rationality). Lefebvre defines it as a form of simultaneity: "the simultaneity of 'everything' that is susceptible of coming together –and thus of accumulating- in an act of thinking or in a social act, at a point or around that point" (1993:332). It is the gathering-together and meeting of whatever coexists in a given space. In this sense, suburbs can be accepted as non-urban as much as urban: "if one defines urban reality by dependency vis-à-vis the centre, suburbs are urban. If one defines urban order by a perceptible (legible) relationship between centrality and periphery, suburbs are de-urbanized"

(1996:79)[32]. Planning contributes to this process by damaging the legible urban reality by destroying streets, squares, monuments, and meeting places, all of which are the defining characteristics of the urban centrality.

> [E]ven when he is not wealthy the city dweller reaps the benefits of past glories and enjoys a considerable latitude of initiative, the make-believe existence of his environment is less fictitious and unsatisfactory than that of his suburban or new-town counterpart; it is enlivened by monuments, chance encounters and the various occupations and distractions forming part of his everyday experience; city make-believe favours the adaptation of time and space (Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, 1984:123 cited in Borden, 2001:181).

Lefebvre underlines the necessity of strengthening the centers and centralities (1996:73-74). Being away from the center of the city (e.g. in suburbs or shanty towns) means being away from the sense of *oeuvre* and the urban. As he shows, space is a social product. It is produced through a complex process, bringing together physical, mental and social fields. Through production of the social space, social life is also produced. Urbanity flourishes from this culture mainly depending on the life in urban centers, public spaces. Beyond the material and mental construct, there is socially lived space, urban life. For him urban life is the main focus of resistance. Urban life –urbanity- plays an important role to render the possibilities and restrictions. Therefore, he says, to change society we have to change the spatial practices diverging from body to urban center. As it will be discussed in the next chapters, the Republican regime aimed to change society by spatial practices;

[32] Lefebvre (1996:128) asks that "would it not be more coherent, more rational and agreeable to work in the suburbs and live in the city rather than work in the city while living in a hardly habitable

however, as Lefebvre shows, space is more than a container and should be thought of in the light of above discussion.

In this chapter, I have tried to sketch the contours of Lefebvre's theories of space with a specific focus on in-between quality of space and production of urbanity. Henry Lefebvre's conceptualization of space, with his triology (spatial practice, representation of space and representational space), and emphasis on the mediatory role of space and inside-outside relations are especially important for this study. I aim to search for a bridge between the production of social space and the construction of urbanity with reference to the complex relations network of the urban as much as possible. As it will be elaborated more in the following chapters, in the modernization project of Turkey, spatial practices have been seen in the mirror of representation of the space, by ignoring (the view of) user's space and its mediatory role. By making space abstract, representation of space has produced ossified barriers that made difficult to construct a relationship between inside and outside. Therefore Lefebvre's concepts will be specifically helpful in grasping peculiar features of Turkish modernization through spatial practices.

In the following chapter I will dwell more on the notion of urbanity. Since it is an ambiguous term which is used in various contexts, before the evaluation of the Turkish case, I will attempt to trace its meaning and associations in these different contexts.

---

suburbs?"

CHAPTER III

URBANITY: A DIFFICULT TERM

3.1 The Definition of Urbanity

For a reader, surveying the literature on urban studies results in considerable confusion with regard to the use of the term “urbanity”. We cannot talk about any definition of urbanity on which there is even a remote consensus. The difficulty of the term relates to its status at the intersection of different domains such as social, political, economic and cultural. Therefore in this chapter, an understanding of urbanity will be developed with its wide range of connotations.

According to Grönlund (1999) since urbanity involves different complex relations, it is a difficult phenomenon to think about or define. Urbanity can be talked about indirectly, but it is not measured. He asks, “where in the city is ‘the

urban'?" Due to its ambiguous character he uses the wind as a metaphor for urbanity.[33]

> It is neither an object, nor a subject. It is itself invisible, though you can sometimes see that it affects what it touches. It develops in fields of tension between high and low pressures. It also changes over time both with the day and the season… There are both dominant winds and local winds, etc. We would not be able to live and grow strong without the wind, but we can't live with too much of it either. The wind can give us power, but it can also destroy us (Grönlund, 1999).

Grönlund (1999) also discusses the differences between them: while wind can be measured, and is talked about directly, urbanity cannot be measured, and is only talked about indirectly, unsystematically and in a very fragmentary way. In parallel to Boyd's (2006:863) discussion of "civility", we may say that it is "most conspicuous in its absence". Although it seems difficult to generate a working definition, by following the contexts in which urbanity occurs, we can grasp both the functions and the value (moral significance) of the term.

If we look at the dictionary we see that there are certain definitions of urbanity. The term 'urbanity' generally signifies the quality and state of being 'urbane', as well as urban actions and behaviors. In the Collins Cobuild English Dictionary (1989:883) "urbane" is defined as "someone who is well-mannered, relaxed, and appears comfortable in social situations". It is equated with suavity: a

[33] Urban wind is defined in the dictionary as "a strong wind generated near or around a group of high-rise buildings, creating areas of intense air turbulence especially at street level" (cited in Grönlund, 1999).

refined politeness or courtesy (Zijderveld, 1998:21). Urbanity is etymologically connected to civility and politeness deriving from the Latin word civitas and urbanus meaning the city/citizenship. Those traits are seen as the achievement of urban and commercial life (Boyd, 2006:868). Another definition underlying this affinity: "an urbane person is a well-mannered, well-educated, and civilized individual who as an autonomous, "inner-directed" personality knows what he wants and above all what his capabilities and limits are"[34] (Zijderveld, 1998:39). According to Title and Grasmick, (2001:313) urbanity refers to "social psychological and behavioral characteristics of individuals, such as cognitive patterns, values, ways of behaving, and interpersonal relationship". In spite of these obvious emphases on individual characteristic, it has association with certain social, political and cultural conditions; it is the definition of the certain individualistic qualities in relation to others.

Recalling Lefebvre, we can say that urbanity is closely related to social space and urban life. Considering this aspect, Ruby (1999:241) defines urbanity as "the shape and social linkage of morals, daily life in the city, and social contacts within the city's boundaries". In this context urbanity appears as a bridge concept between individual and society (individual *vis-à-vis* state, society and community) in the frame of the city. It appears as a cultural category that refers to not only attitudes and behaviors but also the ways of thinking and feeling.

In other words, urbanity stands between the public and private sphere, meaning that it is neither merely an issue of individual, nor the social and political.

[34] According to Zijderveld (1998:39) emergence and development of this urbanity is the thing that is called as "the process of civilization" by Norbert Elias.

In addition it should be understood in terms of city space. According to Lefebvre (1996:103), city and urbanity are inseparable. While the city is an arrangement of objects in space, urban refers to a way of life (Katznelson, 1992:96). While the city consists of practical-material and architectural reality, urbanity refers to social reality of relations, which are conceived, constructed, and reconstructed through thinking. But it would be deceptive to use the terms of city and urbanity without reference to each other.

In the literature, the concept of urbanity is generally characterized by urbanization and industrialization process; and is used as synonym for urban culture. Classical urban sociology, based on Wirth's (1938) theorization, discusses urbanity as a mood that emerged with the change in size of place/settlements, heterogeneity, high density and spatial distribution of activities. Its emphasis is on the argument that the urban-rural dichotomy characterizes the modern age (Saunders, 1981:94)[35]. According to this approach, urbanity can be defined as opposed to the rural. Ferdinand Tönnies brought the best-known distinction with the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, in other words "community" and "society"'. While Gemeinschaft is defined as 'face-to-face' social relationships in a small and socially enclosed place, meaning (in effect) rural, Gesellschaft is, in contrast, an urban sociality, characterized by constantly changing impersonal relations which usually results in estrangement. This distinction between 'gemeinschaft' and 'gesellschaft' is reflected as tensions between the emotional and the rational, the personal and the contractual, the communal and the individual aspects of human interaction

[35] Classical sociologists like Durkheim, Weber and Parsons try to distinguish different types of social relationships through the development of analytical dichotomies (Saunders, 1981:83).

(Saunders, 1981:81). These are the tensions between rural and urban life. Within this context the quality of "urban" emerges from the qualities of Gesellschaft type relations based on contract, rationality and individual rather than personal relations, emotion and community.

For Saunders (1981) Tönnies' conceptualization refers to a process of social transition that accompanies capitalist development. Simmel (1969) portrays this transition with "modern urban life under the effect of the money economy". According to Simmel, in modern metropolis money is the key to all exchange through the abstraction of power. Simmel (1978:300) states that "the inhabitants of a modern metropolis are independent in the positive sense of the word, and even though they require innumerable suppliers, workers and cooperators and would be lost without them, their relationship to them is completely objective and is only embodied in money" (cited in Harvey, 1985:5). This abstract integrative power also applies in the domain of space where money "permits agreement over otherwise inaccessible distances, an inclusion of the most diverse persons in the same project, an interaction and therefore a unification of people who, because of their spatial, social, personal and other discrepancies in interests, could not possibly be integrated into any other group formation" (Harvey, 1985:14). In that sense, metropolis is the place permitting to the integration of time, space and social actors and so to a new society.

For Simmel, the growth of division of labour/ money economy in modern societies has three main effects for the forms of human association (Saunders, 1981:87-88): Firstly, it fragments and segmentalizes social life; secondly, it brings

self-consciousness engendered by an increase in size of settlements; and thirdly it leads to estrangement of the individual from the entire cultural world. Simmel discusses urban society by observing the micro-level behavior under the effect of money economy.[36] He underlines that money economy produces an increasing split between the objective culture deriving from the society and subjective culture emanating from the individual. This separation and the domination of the former on the latter are called as the "tragedy of the culture". In the modern city, objective culture develops at the cost of subjective (Delanty, 2004:37). While increasing division of labor brings the growth of objective culture, individuals are unable to grasp the totality of this culture.

While depicting the mental life of the metropolis, Simmel (1969:12) mentions certain characteristics of urbanites; firstly the urbanite reacts with the intellect rather than feelings and emotions, which are the characteristics of people from small towns. While the latter are rooted in the unconscious part of the mind, reason is embedded in conscious. Urban dwellers react with their head instead of their heart. Secondly, they have a calculative mind which means weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of each action (Savage, Warde: 1993:111). Thirdly, this intellectuality enables the individual to protect their inner life against the domination of metropolis. And finally they also develop a blasé attitude, a kind of indifference to others as a defense against emotional overload. In fact, being blasé is a kind of response to rapidly shifting

[36] Simmel (1969:11) in his famous article "the metropolis and the mental life" says "When one inquires about the products of the specifically modern aspects of contemporary life with reference to their inner meaning when, so to speak, one examines the body of culture with reference to the soul, as I am to do concerning the metropolis today the answer will require the investigation of the relationship which such a social structure promotes between the individual aspects of life and those which transcend the existence of single individuals. It will require the investigation of the adaptations made by the personality in its adjustment to the forces that lie outside of it".

stimulations in the city life. Without attributing any value, Simmel depicts the urbanite as inevitably rational, calculating and blasé as a result of the money economy dominating the metropolis.

Although Simmel shows both the positive and negative aspects of modern urban life, he underlines the freedom in urban life in comparison to traditional society. Simmel sees the city as "a rather exclusive society of self-reflexive urbanities that constitute in many ways a new historical community with very different mores and values to traditional society" (Parker, 2004:9). He claims that, "the pressures of metropolitan life are more than compensated by the freedom from parochialism and surveillance that Gemeinschaft (small town) existence perpetuates" (Parker, 2004:14). The money economy gives the opportunity of freedom to individuals. For him people having money/wealth are able to "secure goods and services without the need for coercion or resort to ideologies of domination as with traditional societies, thus facilitating, "independence from the will of others"" (Parker, 2004:14). This relative freedom also means indifference to others, which he discusses under the title of "blasé attitude". At this point, it should be noted that, in this time, people lacking money wealth constitutes a major problem, because these people still depend on community/gemeinschaft relations to survive, even in the city. In fact, urbanity in the Turkish context is shaped around these urban area gemeinshaft relations. In Lefebvre's terms, while the individual can surmount the boundaries of community relations, there emerges a new impermeable boundary on the basis of money.

Urbanization, for Simmel, is related to individual emancipated from traditional forms of social domination. Therefore he focuses on "the consciousness,

personality, and "character" of the individual social actor" (Parker, 2004:15). With societies becoming larger and more anonymous, individuals have gained relative freedom from the ties of traditional community. From this perspective, urbanity can be seen as "*freedom from parochialism and surveillance*", arising from the dominance of the money economy.

Another well-known author, Wirth (1938) discusses the importance of size for a settlement in his article "Urbanism as a Way of Life". In his formulation, drawing upon the ecological tradition, larger size means greater variation. For Wirth, the urban can be defined by three qualities: large size, high density and social diversity. In the city these qualities "will be reflected in the spatial segregation of different groups according to ethnicity, race, status, occupation and so on" (Saunders, 1981:95). He connects a relationship between the size and social relations. According to him, as cities become larger, denser and more heterogeneous, they will exhibit more urban characteristics. Change in size will bring the loosening of community ties and "their replacement with by mechanisms of formal and social control" (Parker, 2004:43). Relations between the urbanites are characterized by impersonality, temporality, isolation and being segmental (Wirth, 1938:12). Although Wirth accepts the existence of folkway of life/tradition in cities, he evaluates this formation as a consequence of unfinished process of urbanization (Saunders, 1981:95). The traces of this approach inspired by modernization school can be seen in the discussions of informal spatial practices such as squatter settlements in Turkey. Even though these practices were ignored or expected to disappear, they remained and helped shape cities.

According to Wirth, urban way of life emerges as a result of certain quantitative changes, however, the critiques point out that he fails to demonstrate this causal relationship between size and social relations. As Gans (cited in Saunders (1981:102-103)) argues, the generalization of this type of relationship cannot be possible for all proportion of the city's inhabitants because there are still different social structures and cultural patterns, which are either brought to the city, or developed by living in it.

These studies have been criticized since all define the urban with reference to rural as an opposite category. However, beyond this opposition it is possible to see features associated rural ways of life such as close kinship links or personal friendship among neighbors in the center of large cities (Saunders, 1981:100, Schwab, 1992:19). Moreover, the emergence of "urban villagers" has been shaped by factors like ethnicity, life cycle, and social class rather than the size, density and heterogeneity (Schwab, 1992:19). On the other hand, there are discussions of urban ways of life, characterized by sophistication and blasé attitudes in the countryside (Saunders, 1981:100). According to Saunders (1994:72), the problem of these formulations is that "they confuse the sociological effects of size with effects which are better explained with reference to the cultural impact of capitalist social relations". The critics of culturalist approach strongly emphasize the importance of the analysis of social structure and the necessity of considering local, as well as the national influences (Saunders, 1981:105). Complicated socio-cultural and economic processes transcend this simple dichotomy and necessitate more complex formulations. In the same way, the economic deterministic approach also fails to

explain urbanity because of its rigid distinction between urban and rural as an indicator of industrial development (Savage & Warde, 1993:35).

Another point that must be underlined is the different conceptualizations of both the rural and the urban in different contexts. The advantage of each is reflected in the disadvantages of the other:

> On the country has gathered the idea of natural ways of life: of peace, innocence and simple virtue. On the city has gathered the idea of an achieved center: of learning, communication, light. Powerful hostile associations have also developed: on the city as a place of noise, worldliness and ambition; on the country as a place of backwardness, ignorance, limitation. A contrast between country and city, as fundamental ways of life, reaches back into classical times (Williams, 1973 cited in Saunders, 1981:80).

Particularly depending on the positive or negative attribute to the modernization process, the urban can be portrayed as the sign of modernization, progress and development; and the rural can be symbolized as tradition, nature or humanly relations. According to Williams, the main sources and possibility of this imagery is social relationship in a capitalist society. “Capitalism divorces a necessary materialism from a necessary humanity, and this division is expressed, not only in the dichotomy of work and leisure, week and weekend, society and individual, but also in that between town and country” (Saunders, 1981:106). Since alienation is the accepted condition in Saunder’s view, “the rural-urban contrast is therefore the ideology through which we live and interpret our alienated existence under capitalism” (1981:107). This “deep and enduring tension of Anglo-Saxon

culture" (Saunders, 1981:80) can also be seen in the Turkish context with different attributions to urbanity and rurality. Especially in the nation-building process this dichotomy appears as reference point both to bless and curse urbanity and, thus, modernity. Therefore it is urbanity which carries the tensions and struggles of modernization process.

Although the term urbanization connotes the economic forces of industrialization process, the concept of urbanity transcends the mere meaning of economy. Zijderveld (1998) insistently underlines the unique character of urbanity to "Western civilization" and argues that urbanity characterizes Western capitalism and modernity[37]. Of course, any attempt to discuss urbanity inevitably involves in the peculiar history of cities, economy and modernization. However, as Keskinok (1997:14) argues, classical urban thought, together with the modernization school, make their evaluations with reference to "an implicitly idealized type of urban development…. and way of urban living". Therefore anything outside this idealized form is regarded as deviant and expected to integrate into the "modern-urban community". In that sense urbanity functions to perpetuate existing power relations and status quo deriving from the Western domination. In fact, since they were defined with reference to this idealization of Western practices, urban space and urban life in the context of the Turkish modernization project carries this tension.

[37] According to Zijderveld urbanity is in origin a European phenomenon. He (1998:11) views urbanity as the economic and civic culture of cities, which is closely related with Protestant ethic, brought out Western capitalism and Western modernity. (He has an apparent western bias that he does not deny. For him urbanity emerged and remained unique within Western cities). For him, in non-western societies, there were true cities in terms of quantitative and morphological sense. Nevertheless, they lacked urbanity since they could not generate a distinct economic and civic culture molding their inhabitants into true citizens. He adds, "modernization and modernity have by now become *mondial* phenomena, thus elements of urbanity may well spread over the world, in company with such originally Western phenomena as democracy and capitalism" (1998:17).

This issue will be discussed in detail in the next chapters. I will now continue with the discussion of urbanity with reference to the terms culture, civility and civilization.

3.2 Civilization, Civility, Culture and Urbanity

As it is noted in the beginning, the concept of urbanity has a strong association with different realms, such as political, social, cultural and economic spheres. Besides, in the general definition of the term, there is a special emphasis on the cultural aspect under the term "civilized". In general usage of the term, urbane means a cultured, cultivated, civilized person. Therefore it will be interesting to trace the transformation of the term "culture", "civility" and "civilization" since they follow a similar path to the term urbanity, corollary to the evolution of the bourgeoisie and the city.

While the term culture refers to crop (cultivation) in its origin, its meaning has changed with time. In the sixteenth century Europe, it was believed that only certain groups had "cultured" or cultivated minds and manners; and "that only some nations mainly European ones exhibited a high standard of culture or civilization" (Bocock, 1992:151). According to Williams (1983:88), culture gained a definite class association with the emergence of bourgeoisie by the eighteenth century. The words "cultivated" -which also means urbane- and "cultivation" were especially used to refer this class association (Williams, 1988:88). Bocock (1992:151-152)

emphasizes that using the words as "cultivated" and "cultured" in an evaluative way implies that "some ways of life or some kinds of taste are of higher value than others". The term has been connected with elitism and the elitist approach of the eighteenth century, the era of Enlightenment. Such an approach attributes a central and universal role to Europe as allegedly the highest point of civilization/cultured human development. In this sense "cultured" referred to distinguished people within a group, a state or world society[38].

With the unprecedented development of trade and industry, there emerged a new society directed by a new social class and a new type of person/personality (Nalbantoğlu, H.U., 2000:287). This new class, the bourgeoisie, as the etymological roots of the term points out, is an urbane class supporting private property guaranteed by private law and the freedom of individual. The 19th century is the period in which not only all aspects of European bourgeoisie were imitated by the upper classes of other countries, but also the way of thinking and institutions of "civil society" were transferred to different places (Nalbantoğlu, H.U., 2000:287). This transformation of "way of life" including values, norms and manners was a process starting from a limited elite group, disseminating to other parts of the society.

In the twentieth century the term culture also included the "popular culture" of the working and the lower middle class, which is in tension with "cultivated

[38] The critique of such an approach came from the anthropological approach that underlines the plurality and peculiarity of culture with reference to colonial countries. "While… anthropology established the validity of cultures in colonial countries, in the home states of the colonizers culture became a means not only to differentiate European cultures from non-Eoropean cultures, but also to assert a privileged status among European societies" (Miles, Hall &Borden, 2004:55). Cultures in

tastes of a cultured person" (Bocock, 1992:151). This development brought the separation of high and low culture, "representing opposed class interest". In the modern sense, the art and society are thought as separate and such a separation brought an elitist approach to art. For him, this separation of art from society derives from the fear of the urban working class in the nineteenth century (Miles, Hall &Borden, 2004:54). According to Williams, working-class culture is based on a collective idea. For him "the working class, because of its position, has not, since the Industrial Revolution, produced a culture in the narrower sense. The culture which it has produced… is the collective democratic institution, whether in the trade unions, the co-operative movement, or a political party" (Williams cited O'Connor, 1989:65)[39]. In this respect, Williams makes a distinction between working-class culture and mass culture. For him this differentiation is very important since "working-class culture offered a different vision of culture than the bourgeois culture -a way of life centered on the community rather than the individual" (Szeman, 2002:73). Miles, Hall &Borden, (2004:54) also asserts that the idea of "solidarity as culture" makes culture an active force. This culture has been the sources of the social movements in urban area. If we remember classical sociologists' portrayal of individual in the city life, it can be said that the degree of impersonality has been changing from one class to another one. However, it must be also noted that this solidarity emerging in the city is different from the solidarity of Gemeinschaft relations, explained in the previous section.

---

plural form refer to ways of life common to different groups: nations, classes and subcultures.

[39] According to Williams, in the twentieth century, while the working-class life is described by solidarity, the middle class life is characterized by career pattern.

The more recent meaning of culture refers to collectivities: “the collective name for forms of cultural production, dissemination, and reception; and the collective values of a social group as expressed in the habits and expression of everyday lives” (Miles, Hall &Borden, 2004:51). On the other hand, the term with its specific connection with “the arts” still reflects above mentioned class overtone: “since it refers not only to the actual work of artists and intellectuals, but to the general state of civilization associated with the pursuit of the arts by cultivated elite” (Bocock, 1992:151). In this sense it still has a distinct class overtone, in the same way that the terms “high” and “low” culture represent opposed class interest.

Another important point that must be underlined in the history of the term culture is its differentiation in German society. The German word “cultur” (kultur) was borrowed from French, and was used as synonymous for civilization: first “in the abstract sense of a general process of becoming ‘civilized’ or ‘cultivated’; and second, in the sense which had already been established for civilization by the historians of the Enlightenment, in the popular C18 form of the universal histories, as a description of the secular process of human development” (Williams, 1988:89). In the course of time, “kultur” started to be used specifically to refer to German culture, rather than the loosely defined term “civilization”. Its emphasis is on national differences and the particular identity of groups (Elias, 1994:5). As Williams states this differentiation was used to distinguish “material” and “spiritual” development. While “culture” referred to spiritual development, distinguishing Germans from other nations, civilization is used for material/mechanical developments. Ozbek (2004:80) contends that the fact that German romantism defends “Kultur” against “zivilisation” in the late 19th century can be interpreted as a sign of being late to modernization and

at the same time a reaction to "externality" and "artificiality" of English-French civilization[40]. In fact the separation was the reaction of German middle class which was excluded from the courtly life (Fletcher, 1997:8). As Elias (1994:6) points out although the terms of Kultur and civilization assert to represent the whole people, in general they bear the stamp of only certain classes of these people.

Similar tensions and the traces of the power struggle can be observed through the history of the terms "civility" and "civilization". Stillman (2005:102-103) defines civility as "a state of cultural refinement associated with good citizenship". Having a common root with the Latin word for city (*civitas*), civility refers to "the sophisticated behavior of an urbanite of the times, in contrast with rural coarseness or barbarism" (Stillman, 2005:103). In 14th -16th century the word "civil" was used as in the sense of orderly and educated, and the "civility" for the description of an ordered society in 17th and 18th century (Williams,1988:57-60). Especially for the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers who separated civil society from the state, civility was related to manners, education and cultivation. Within this understanding civilized societies were differentiated by their polished manners, taste and refined of social relationships (Keane, 1993:55; Boyd, 2006:868). Especially in the second half of the seventeenth century, manners were no longer seen as private matter; rather they became the indicators of ranking and social hierarchy. Rules of civility were seen as prerequisite for entering social and political circles. Etiquette governing "personal conduct and

[40] The affects of this approach can be found in Turkish modernization process. Ziya Gokalp's distinction of "*hars- medeniyet*" (culture-civilization) or Peyami Safa's "*ruh- madde*" (spirit-matter/body). Ozbek reads this distinction as a fear of artificiality and externality and as a romantic reaction intertwined with nationalism and conservatism with an emphasis on community, all deriving from the fear of being late to the modernity. In Peyami Safa's novels this distinction is represented as the conflict between "*taşralı genç*" (provincial youth) who is equated with the soul and spiritual values and "*züppe*" (dandy) who is modern, urbane and estranged to the community.

behavior in public" included table manners, bodily carriage, gestures, dress, facial expression, conversation, courtship, and personal hygiene (Stillman, 2005:102-103).[41] These proliferations of the rules made civility an effective tool for the elite to distinguish themselves from others and to construct their superiority over others.

Etiquette derives from the imitation of "the high standard of manners and etiquette" of the aristocracies (Bocock, 1992:180). The evolution of the term displays the evolution of the bourgeoisie life style; sets of values, norms and meanings in both economic and civic culture. Although in the beginning small upper-middle class tried to be like the noble estate of feudalism and developed "a semi-noble lifestyle and culture" (Zijderveld, 1998:37), gradually the lower-middle and "respectable working classes of Europe" began to use and imitate these standards of behavior" (Bocock, 1992:180). At the end it emerged as a bourgeois culture that dominated city life and urbanity[42]. As a code of civility, etiquette and manners became requirements for entry into elite social and political circles. By the end of the century, "the literature on manners did not at all include emphasis on virtue but rather emphasized the significance of appearance, grace and style of conduct" (Misztal, 1999:73). In fact, this emphasis on form rather than substance also began to be criticized as signs of hypocrisy and inauthenticity by the end of the eighteenth century, especially by Rousseau (Sennet, 1977:115-122, Elias, 1994:32, Boyd, 2006). However, in different degrees, the rules of civility remained a means of producing and reproducing social hierarchies both within and between cultures.

[41] Elias (1994:51) says that these rules are constantly contrasted to "coarse manners", the conduct of peasants.

[42] For Elias (1996:61), this bourgeoisification process created the codes which would be called as "national character" of a state-society.

In addition, in a similar manner to civility, the term civilization also served as a tool for exclusion and social control in different contexts. As Williams (1988:57-60) discusses, civilization in English refers to "an achieved state or condition of organized social life". From the 18th century, replacing civility, civilization began to be used to refer both to the state/condition and process, as opposed to barbarity. The term has been used variously, either as an ideological weapon in the service of Western colonialism or as "a generic term used to refer to the level of economic, political and social development achieved by a particular society in the past or present (Fletcher, 1997:6). Reflecting the Enlightenment spirit, the emphases of the term were on secular and progressive human development and an achieved condition of refinement and order (Williams, 1988:58). This usage asserted the superiority of the West rather than its difference.

At this point it will be illuminating to look at Norbert Elias's discussion of the "civilizing process". In *The Civilizing Process* (originally published in 1939), Norbert Elias (1994) discusses the evolution of civility in parallel to the socio-political transformation process involved in the transformation of human personality. For him, "civility is a new mode of social control or medium by which hierarchies are maintained" (Misztal, 1999:74). Norbert Elias (1994:3) says that "there is almost nothing which can not be done in a "civilized" and "uncivilized" way". However, if the function of the concept is examined, civilization, and the activities described as civilized, expresses the "self-consciousness of the West" or, in other words, the national consciousness. Civilization:

> …sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or "more primitive" contemporary ones. By this term, Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of its manners, the development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more (1994:3).

In this sense, civility and civilization express the superiority of western society and the "self-image of the European upper class in relation to others whom its members considered simpler or more primitive, and at the same time to characterize the specific kind of behavior through which this upper class felt itself different to all simpler and more primitive people" (Elias, 1994:32). These terms are used to underline the hierarchies between and within cultures.

Norbert Elias sees the "history of civilization" in terms of a gradual transformation of personality structure. By offering a link between Weber and Freud, he explains the history of the personality/ego with reference to the history of the state and the superego. This transformation can be summarized as the increasing 'constraint towards self-constraint' involving in regulation of the human body, impulses, passions and desires (1994, 443-456). He shows the connection between changes in the structure of society and changes in the structure of behavioral physical make-up. He says "the structure of civilized behavior is closely interrelated with the organization of Western societies in the form of states" (1994: xiv). For him, this transformation of personality has been parallel to an "increasing monopolization of violence which accompanied the process of state formation, the effects of the intensified competition between and within social groups' characteristics of a market

economy, as well as an accompanying historical tendency towards increasing social interdependency" (van Krieken, 1990). Monopolization of physical violence meant that individuals were required to engage in their social relationships peacefully and legally (Stillman, 2005:103-104). In this context, Szakolczai (2001:369-371) says that civilization, as "the limiting of violence in inter-human relations", has the normative connotation of restraining violence. "Even at its most formal sense of etiquette and refinement, it implies diminishing rudeness, aggressiveness, thus violence" (Szakolczai, 2001: 371). Through the civilizing process emerging from the court society, some of these rules began to diffuse from the social elites throughout the social hierarchy, particularly to the middle classes. However, as Stillman (2005:104) underlines "although the analysis echoes functionalism's concerns for social integration and the maintenance of social order, Elias also brings to it the critical sensibility of the Frankfurt school, by attending to the roles that social power and status inequalities play in governing lengthening chains of interdependence". In other words, the rules of civility have given to different people coming together in cities the opportunity of interaction with each other. Nevertheless, they have also functioned as a tool of the production and reproduction of social hierarchies.

This contradiction is also deeply embedded in the term urbanity. On the one hand, it has the virtue of giving possibility to different people's encounter beyond the exclusionary boundaries of Gemeinschaft society. On the other hand, urbanity draws new boundaries depending on the specific social contexts. This drawing up of boundaries is important in the understanding of the formation of urbanity within the Turkish context. In fact, my argument will be that, based on Lefebvre's comment on boundaries, impermeable ones pose a real threat to urbanity. The Turkish case reveals

that borders drawn by the modernization project of creating urbanites are relatively impermeable and exclusionary to local people and practices. However, these boundaries are not entirely impenetrable. This will be shown in my discussion of this tense process through the terms “formality-informality” and “strategies-tactics”.

Today the term culture and civilization are used to refer to both various cultural forms and ways of life. Although these terms have begun to be used in the plural, as Williams (1998:60) underlines, they still refer to a general condition or state, and are still contrasted with savagery or barbarism. Besides, the “ways of life” are defined with reference to the fragmented life styles of the urban life. However, as Lefebvre puts it, there is no urbanity without a (city) center that brings together these ways of life. And without a relationship between them we cannot discuss about urbanity.

3.3 The Value of Urbanity

Zijderveld (1998) in his book “A Theory of Urbanity”, while discussing the European history of urbanity, puts urbanity as the rational networks that are produced by common material interest. Following this definition, he evaluates urbanity with its positive and negative aspects within the European context. For him, (1998:73-74, 118-119) there are many “advantages of urbanity” that contributed to “take-off of modernization”. According to his definition, first of all, urbanity, as a modern type of solidarity gives people the opportunity of advancing in life socially and economically through rational solidarity, which is more open and flexible than

the traditional bonds of family, territory, and religion. Secondly, it enables peoples to avoid moralistic narrow-mindedness, and local chauvinism with its cosmopolitan character as well as its local quality[43]. Thirdly, with reference to Weber, Zijderveld defines urbanity as "a rational work ethic" which is "neither locked in by a traditional Gemeinschaft, nor alienated by bureaucratic regulations and professional rules and controls". In this sense, he sees urbanity as "a link between tradition and modernity". Fourthly, it has stimulated "urban democracy, urban social life, urban economy, the arts, the sciences, technology" which leads to participatory democracy. And lastly, urbanity can function as the best mediating structure between public and private spheres and its survival also depends on this mediation.

There are also negative aspects of the concept of urbanity. According to Zijderveld (1998:36), even in the context of Europe, which allegedly brought out the discussion of democracy and a free public sphere, it reflects inequality and clashes/conflicts. Although at the beginning the class system was an open system allowing for social mobility, soon after, ascription and immobility developed. Therefore, the history of urbanity directly includes the crucial internal conflicts deriving from basic socioeconomic and sociocultural inequalities and cleavages. "Strife and inequality have been characteristic of urbanity almost from its very inception in the ninth and tenth centuries" (Zijderveld, 1998:36). Especially, the industrial cities of the nineteenth century were characterized by exploitation, deprivation, and poverty. From these years on "urbanity fragmented along class lines" and lost its primacy vis-à-vis rising nationalism and ethnic pluralization

[43] In 18th cosmopolitan is defined as "a man who moves comfortably in diversity; he is comfortable in situations which have no links or parallels to what is familiar to him" (Sennett, 1977:17).

(Zijderveld, 1998:65-66). This fragmentation has accentuated the exclusionary tone of urbanity as the way of life of the upper classes. It helped to draw boundaries between different groups within a city. Especially in the form of etiquette, it produced and reproduced the social hierarchies.

Of course there were other certain displeasures within these developments. Although the European civilization was seen as technologically and industrially advanced, the nihilistic aspect of its moral philosophy and values began to be criticized by the late nineteenth century (Bocock, 1992:170)[44]. The critiques of industrialization and urbanization have underlined that the transition from rural to urban-industrial society has undermined people's moral, religious and everyday patterns of living. "Urbanization and industrialization broke down traditional ways of living, with their ideas and moral values about right and wrong. No new, clear set of values or norms developed in the new situation" (Bocock, 1992:177)[45]. As noted above in the evaluation of urbanization, urban life may change according to value attributed to modernization. These critiques are important in order to understand the issue with its full contradictions.

Because of these pros and cons of urbanity, it has been a difficult term to discuss especially in the Turkish context. Sennett (1974:264) says that it is difficult to talk about civility in modern life "without appearing to be a snob or a reactionary". Because "the oldest meaning of the term connects "civility" with the duties of

[44] It can be said that, the concepts like Marx's alienation, Weber's iron cage of bureaucracy and Durkheim's anomie point out certain aspects of this condition.

citizenship;" and also because "today "civility" means either knowing which vintage of Cos-d'Estournel to decant or refraining from noisy and unseemly political demonstrations". Similarly, urbanity may mean both certain manners such as being familiar with upper-class taste and accessing, as well as knowing the rights and duties of membership in a political community/city.

These two distinct connotations of urbanity have produced confusion. In the first, an understanding of urbanity emphasizes manners, politeness and formal rules of relations in the city and is a rather formal aspect of urbanity. In fact, this aspect of urbanity is necessary; it makes possible the relationships with other people outside the context of Gemeinschaft relations. As is discussed above, modern city life has been constructed through impersonal relations. An interaction in such an environment necessitates the formal rules of urbanity. In city life formal rules allow for the possibility of interaction between the inside and outside, especially when compared to the informal relations of communities. However, tension arises from the reduction of urbanity to etiquette, definite rules of certain groups reflecting a social hierarchy. The second meaning of urbanity refers to a certain capability and awareness in city/public life as well as a tolerance to difference. In this context, urbanity is a political phenomenon referring to civic culture that is a mental and behavioral mold for the political actions of urban dwellers (Zijderveld, 1998:13). Terms like "civil rights", "civil protests" or "civil disobedience" connotes a relationship between urbanity and civility, the terms sharing an etymological connection to the Greek *politeia* or city-state, or the Latin *civitas* and *urbanus* (Boyd,

[45] Smilar critiques are ditected to Republican elites of Turkey by Şerif Mardin (2008). For Mardin, in republican period, a new understanding of "good, right and beautiful" could not be produced instead

2006:864). The urban area has been the site of politics, and urbanity is the practice of citizenship in the context of the city. There has been a historical connection between urban culture/urbanity, the public sphere and citizenship. The formal aspect of urbanity is indispensable as long as it is seen as the necessity of the relationship within a politically organized society, of being together. In such an understanding of urbanity, there would be no two distinct connotations of the term since they are complementary to each other. In spite of the danger of producing exclusionary practices, urbanity is an indispensable concept especially in discussions searching for possibilities of living together. In the next section I want to expand this discussion of urbanity in relation to its association with politics and political organization.

3.3.1 Political Implications: Public Sphere / Public Space

The public sphere can be simply defined as the site of political struggle. It is neither a pure representation, nor a real space. Similar to Lefebvre's approach to space, Donald (1999:8) says it is an image which points to "a social and even spiritual element invested in space, a material, and so inevitably unsuccessful embodiment of the will to create relations between people that transcend the animal or the tribal; the will to community". This is the will shared by the "public", a heterogeneous group, rather than a homogeneous one. In Habermas' (1996) discussion, the public sphere (public space) is ideally based on egalitarian participation and the interaction of rational citizens that provides the democratization of society. However, in practice, this right of egalitarian participation is violated and reconstructed through the

of the traditional ones.

political and social participation of citizens. In this process, the city center appears as the area of this re-constructive process and conflict.

Both the public sphere and space depends on the existence of the "public". The emergence of the "public" depends completely on the presence of a political community and participation in it. According to Arendt (1958:73), while the private is the space of necessity -therefore refers to the deprivation in truly human life-, public space is the arena of freedom, permanence and honor. For her, the public indicates two interrelated phenomena: Firstly, it means that "everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity" (1958:50) and secondly, it refers to "the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us" (1958:52). Opposed to the private realm that is defined as the absence of others, public means being with others. Arendt (1958:57) defines this plurality as "… the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have different locations in it, and the location of two objects. Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public life…" For her, people become themselves through the awareness of the perception of others. Similar to Arendt, Sennett (1977:32) discusses that public, in the modern context, has been used to mean both "a region of social life located apart from the realm of family and close friends" and "the public realm of acquaintances and strangers including a relatively wide diversity of people". For him, "public" refers to a notion which put differences and varieties together. In correlation to these discussions, it is possible to say that differences and diversity are the constructive qualities of the public sphere and public space.

More specifically, public space, as the spatial aspect of the public realm, is the place where the public comes together. Public space is the place where the public sphere/realm is created. Sennett (1996) states that public spaces constitute the undeniable basis of the public sphere, with its openness to strangers and to difference. In this sense, public space is the place where one encounters strangers, and others. The central principle of public space is its openness to difference and collectivity (Fraser, 1999).

In this sense, while a city is the spatial context of the political community, public space is the spatial side of the public sphere and public life.[46] As Ethington asserts, "space… is a central dimension of the public sphere, and its value for a collective demonstration is part of what separates it so clearly from both society and the state" (cited in Goheen, 1998:493). Additionally, it is the space that makes a city. In other words, the existence of some kind of political community and public realm can turn an ordinary settlement into a city. Thus public space is also a precondition for a city. Public spaces reflect the historical development of cities; it is possible to follow the implications of changing dominant ideologies through these spaces (Bitusikova, 1998). In the public space, we can see the symbolically encoded power relations. Spatial forms, like squares, streets and cafés, are the constitutive elements of public spaces, which are produced through power struggles in cities. The forms, aesthetic qualities, and representations in public spaces reflect the public culture which is also the part of this struggle. It is a negotiation emerging from our daily life in the city, both materially and discursively. They refer to the connection

between material construction, social practice and representation. As Lefebre points out, through production, occupation and negotiation, public spaces are created and recreated.

Zukin (1995:10) defines "public culture" as a "process of negotiating images that are accepted by large numbers of people". It is also a struggle between different actors[47] to shape public space for social interaction and to construct a visual representation of the city (1995:24). Socially constructed public culture is produced by various social encounters that constitute daily life in streets, shops, and parks -the spaces in which we experience public life in cities. In this sense, public spaces are real spaces and places where people meet, and form their collective experiences. Since it is –must be-accessible to all, it has a greater potential for encounters (Dijkstra, 2000) [48]. In this sense, urban culture rising from public places has been the greatest achievement of urban life:

> With its concentrated population, accumulated wealth made possible by its complex division of labour and the taste for refinement in the arts and sciences that accompanied these material conditions, urban life came to partake of the qualities of a public sphere in which conversation flourished and ideas could be freely exchanged (Boyd, 2006:864).

Public spaces are the places where the relationship between the individual and society is reflected (Wildner, 2003). As Elias has shown, the appropriateness of

[46] For a detailed discussion of the issue see Sargın (2002), Toker and Tekin (2002).

[47] Zukin (1995:11) discusses two actors of this process: government and society.

[48] For Deleuze (cited in Thrift, 1996:29) "everything in the universe is encounters, happy or unhappy encounters".

the behaviors in public spaces is closely related with power sharing within that polity. Urbanity arises from these practices; it is produced through the encounter with strangers, and others. The public sphere always involves certain rules, regulations, and control mechanisms, which come into effect in public space (Wildner, 2003). In this sense, urbanity means developing appropriate manners and behaviour towards people different from those who are familiar, being open to encounters. Urbanity allows for the possibility of disappearing anonymously which is defined as "freedom from parochialism and surveillance" by Simmel. Therefore, public life necessitates both the formal rules of urbanity and a substantial part of it, the awareness of collectivity based on difference.

> In the ideal democratic city, the walls have fallen. Across the divides of difference, people connect; they agree to differ. Collective memory is organized into a then and now that celebrates the present as a collective achievement (Beauregard & Body-Gendrot, 1999:14).

By definition, public space is the space of all, and everybody has the right to access it. It must be used by all as well as be accessible. Although public space is inherently open to every one, "people with economic and political power have the greatest opportunity to shape public culture by controlling the building of city's public spaces in stone and concrete" (Zukin, 1995:11). Therefore, the social construction of public space is also shaped by the inequalities of the city, although they have been neglected due to competition for a better position in the urban hierarchical system (Tsoulouvis, 1996). Inequality and multiple social exclusions have been the main threats to public spaces which are based on difference. As Zukin

discusses, “who occupies public space is often decided by negotiations over physical security, cultural identity, and social and geographical community” (1995:24). So, the power struggle in and through space manifests itself in the public spaces of the city with its users and non-users. Existence and representation in the public space of the city gives the clue to the relations in the political and economic sphere (Shields, 1996). Through the history of these places, it is possible to observe inclusive and exclusive relations in its most “barbaric” or “civilized” forms.

Urbanity, with its political aspect, is generated from the struggles in public spaces of the city. So, it is sensitive to “...the right to be in these spaces, to use them in certain ways, to invest them with a sense of our selves and our communities -to claim them as ours and to be claimed in turn by them” (Zukin, 1995:24). Urbanity is shaped and reshaped by these claims and by the power struggles in the public sphere and space. It points to the awareness of citizenship rights and duties as well as appropriate behaviour defined in the public sphere of the city.

3.3.2 Spaces of citizenship

In addition to the discussion of public space, citizenship deserves to be discussed separately because of its relation to the city life and public space. Moreover, urbanity constitutes the core of the making citizenship in Turkey. In the modern era, nationality and citizenship are seen as the key concepts for establishing the meaning of full membership and unity in society (Holston & Appadurai, 1999:1, Leca, 1992:21). However, this unity is very similar to Berman’s (1988:15) depiction of

unity in modernity. It is a paradoxical one: "a unity of disunity"; "a perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish." It is the unity of "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991). In spite of the differences, exploitation and inequality between citizens, citizenship often creates a deep sense of identity in a society/ nation (Anderson, 1991). It is imagined as consisting of homogeneous citizens. For Turner, the "historical development of citizenship requires certain universalistic notions of the subject, the erosion of a particularistic kinship system in favor of an urban environment" (1992:39). According to this argument, citizenship can be possible in Gesellschaft type social relations. He points out that "the creation of citizenship within the Gesellschaft-like political space of the modern state may well require the subordination, or even eradication, of Gemeinschaft-like membership within an ethnic primary group" (1992:40) [49]. In this context, primary relations, organized around the Gemeinschaft type social groups, emerge as an impediment against the development of citizenship.

In a similar fashion, Leca (1991:22) sees citizenship as superior to all other identities, like religion, family, and ethnicity. Citizenship has the promises of including previously excluded groups on an equal basis and providing a source of national unity. For Holston & Appadurai (1999:1-2), this construction of citizenship has been both democratic and exclusionary. On the one hand, it erodes local hierarchies, statutes and privileges with the principle of the equality of rights. On the other hand, its exclusions create new inequalities; and "the mobilizations of

[49] He argues that "both Christianity and Islam contributed to the development of citizenship by providing a universalistic discourse of political space (the City of God and the Household of Islam)

those excluded from the circle of citizens, their rallies against the hypocrisies of its ideology of universal equality and respect have expanded democracies everywhere" (Holston & Appadurai, 1999:2); as a result, there emerged a new kinds of citizens. This contradiction is the most problematic issue in discussions on citizenship and it brings out the necessity of a continuous re-definition of the concept[50].

Citizenship can be simply defined as the system of rights, duties and membership in a political community. However, it must be noted that while citizenship as a legal status refers to the membership in a particular community, citizenship as a desirable activity means participation in that community (Kylimcka & Norman, 1995:284). Such a distinction shows that the concept contains not only political rights but also social rights (Mouffe, 1992:4). Isin and Wood, (1999:4) aim to enlarge the concept by including both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a collection of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual's membership in a polity. In this sense, it is seen "not only as a set of legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of their membership in a state, but also as the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights" (Isin & Wood, 1999:4). These reformulations are attempts to include what has been excluded before.

---

which challenged ethnicity and kinship as the primordial ties of the societal community" (1992:43).

[50] This point is meaningful in terms of urbanity discussions; becauses a similar tension is also immanent in the concept of urbanity. While urbanity is important to give possibility for interacting with dissimilar people, it may produce new exclusions.

Citizenship is pushed along by the development of social conflicts and social struggles (Turner, 1992:39). With reference to history of the term, Turner (1992:44-46) makes a distinction between "citizenship from above" and "citizenship from below". While in the first, rights are passive and especially given by the state, in the second, rights are the products of the social struggles over resources. He (1992:45) combines this distinction with the citizen's participation in public space and proposes "a heuristic typology of four political contexts for the institutionalization or creation of citizenship rights".

Citizenship

Below Above

Revolutionary context	Passive democracy	Public Space
Liberal pluralism	Plebiscitary authoritarianism	Private Space

Such a conceptualization is very instructive when discussing citizenship in a national or urban context. With a stress on the spatial aspect of the public sphere, this table can help to understand the urbanity in the Turkish context as an example of modernization from above. Because of the exclusionary formal boundaries of public space, the community relations on the basis of ethnic origin or of *hemşerilik* (being fellow countryman) have became an alternative to citizenship. These informal practices co-exist with the formal arrangements of the state.

In the process of spatial construction of the nation, public spaces are also envisaged as an arena of homogeneous citizens of imagined communities.

Therefore, the modern city has emerged as the site of modern citizen making. However, by their nature, public spaces become the arena of contestation that will reproduce or change their meaning. In addition, citizenship is not only a political right but also a collective action (Ruby, 1999:246), and this action can take place in urban spaces. Urban space, or more precisely, urban public space, gives the opportunity of constructing this active aspect of citizenship. According to Weber, "to leave the countryside in order to enter the city was typically connected with the process of civilization; to become urban was to 'citizenize' the person"[51] (Turner, 1992:p.49). For him, urban development has been the reference point for civic and democratic participation (Parker, 2004:12). By remembering the above discussions about the functions of the "civilizing process", it can be said that city space has brought about a flourishing of civility, citizenship and more egalitarian practices.

The development of a political culture of solidarity depends on urban residents who rediscover their citizenship (Rubry, 1999:246-247). In public spaces passive rights are turned into active and citizenship is redefined. While discussing the "qualities and attitudes of citizens", Kylimcka and Norman, (1995:283- 284) stress the importance of the ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves. For them, it is linked to the idea of attachment to a particular community as well as individual entitlement. Citizenship grounded in shared attachment to a built place provides an enduring home for members of a political community (Beiner, 2005:61). For Leca, (1992:21) citizenship takes the role

[51] For Weber (1996:223) "only in the Occident is found the concept of citizen (civis Romanus, citoyen, bourgeois) because only in the Occident again are there cities in the specific sense" (cited in Turner, 1992). For him "the sapling growth of urban community or civitas that was to be found in the guild-based merchantile associations of late medieval Europe was not replicated elsewhere" (Parker, 2004:12); and Asian cities were "bazaar cities", market places without an oikos (house), without any

of an "intermediary sphere" between public and private matters. With reference to Lefebvre, it may be concluded that, the place of this "intermediary sphere" is urban public spaces. Therefore, public spaces as the spaces of citizenship are an embodiment of urbanity as an awareness of being a member of a political community.

The right to the city is like a cry and a demand…
a transformed and renewed right to urban life"
(Lefebvre, 1996:158).

3.4 A Re-Definition of Urbanity: The Right to the City

As discussed above, urbanity is still an indispensable notion both as formal rules arranging our behaviour towards others and as a certain capability and awareness in city/public life. Therefore before the discussion of how urbanity has been produced in the Turkish case, I want to shortly discuss the redefinition of the concept by keeping in mind the history of the term involved in exclusionary practices.

The concept of urbanity, like civility (Stillman, 2005, p: 104-105), has theoretical implications for a further understanding of the modernization process at the intersection of individual and social structures. As is noted above, it takes place at the intersection of different domains such as social, political, economic and cultural. It involves the areas of socio-economic change, political transformation, culture and the theories of self. In terms of economy, it necessitates a consideration of the rise of capitalism and the social classes. In terms of social aspects, urbanity refers to both

traces of a Gemeindeverband (communal associations) (Zijderveld, 1998:34).

changes in social structure and in individual's behaviour, especially in terms of Gemeinschaft- gesellschaft type relations. It also indicates the emergence of the political domain. In addition, its function as a cultural capital indicates definition and redefinition of social hierarchies. It also signifies the molding of the individual personality by the society/social relations. And lastly, it refers to urban culture and public life constituted around the public space of the city.

If we return to the discussions on the conceptualization of urbanity, beyond the deterministic approaches, there is an attempt to understand urbanity with its positive connotations in terms of a potential means towards a more just[52] city and society. In terms of this approach, although size has an independent effect, a "shared culture of place" constitutes the main criteria of urbanity (Title & Grasmick, 2001:313). In fact, the emphasis on size and density in urbanity discussions signify the difference and the possibility of coming together of different sorts of people; quality emerging from quantity. If we consider some defined measures of urbanity, like anonymity, tolerance, alienation, community social bonds, deviant (out of ordinary) behavior and involvement in unconventional sub-cultures (Title & Grasmick, 2001:313), it is clear that all these properties refer to types of relationships with different people, particularly with strangers.

To a certain extent, transition from "community" (Gemeinschaft) to "society" (Gesellschaft) is the inevitable social condition of modernization. In modern society, although community formation has not disappeared, traditional social bonds based on kinship, neighborhood and family ties are weakened and replaced by formal

social relations. As is noted in the above discussion, in urban life, both the community and society relations may co-exist, depending on the social context. However, the tension arises when they exclude each other. Especially community relations can be evaluated as a threat when it prevents social relations that make possible the construction of public space-citizenship relations. In his depiction of this fragmentary quality of modern metropolitan life, Simmel (1969) emphasizes one crucial point that determines urbanity. In his observations, the fragmentary experience of city life has come to be personified in the figure of the *stranger*. "With the new forms of distantiated social relations that modernity ushered in, the entry of the stranger into the spaces of modernity was on the one hand entirely necessary, yet on the other necessarily fraught with anxiety" (Clarke, 1997). The entrance of the stranger, despite the anxiety, becomes possible with the decrease in Gemeinschaft type relations.

As Simmel shows, the stranger is vital to the new conditions of the social life of modernity[53]. The stranger denotes diversity and diversity indicates positive possibilities as well as tensions and conflicts through which urbanity generates itself. Alexander (2004:88) states that Simmel's discussion of stranger is "more complex and more cultural than the negative categories of classical work". "The stranger is not experienced by the host society simply as lower or excluded; rather, she is sensed to be different in some more fundamental way, even while she remains in some important sense a member of the wider society itself". In discussions of urbanity,

---

[52] By the term just I mean inclusive (spatial) practices rather than the exclusive ones.

[53] For Sennett (1977:264) "a city is a human settlement in which strangers are likely to meet. The public geography of a city is civility institutionalized". And "civility is treating others as though they were strangers and forging a social bond upon that distance"

many scholars try to include the stranger in the sense of Simmel's description. Beyond its exclusionary and stigmatizing use, it is applied as the indispensable part of urbanity. For example Sennett says:

> What I think of as urbanity is precisely making use of the density and differences in the city so that people find a more balanced sense of identification on the one hand with others who are like themselves but also a willingness to take risks with what is unlike, unknown.... It is the kinds of experiences that make people find out something about themselves that they didn't know before. That's what urbanity is at its best.... To me, how to privilege the notion of difference that is what urbanity is all about (1994, Lecture held in Copenhagen, cited in Grönlund, 1997).[54]

In this meaning, 'urbanity' can be understood as the conditions and qualities in the city that promote urbane manners and attitudes through the encounter with strangers and difference. As Zygmunt Bauman (1995) also points out, all city life "is carried on by strangers among strangers". The city, and especially the city center as the main public space of the city, is the place that displays different ways of life and different identities, and the context where there is the opportunity to confront difference. As a source of difference and a possibility of tolerance, urbanity suggests the possibility of living together.

[54] "Although for Sennett, the urbanity with its all-positive attributes has been disappearing from urban scene, it has been becoming more and more vital for democratic society and urban life and necessitates the reconsideration" (Grönlund, 1997).

As we have been discussing, the city as a complex structure consists of individual places, institutions and actors, activities and discourses. It is the place where political community is located and the public realm is created. In addition to the socio- political aspects of the urban, Sennett (1988) underlines the moral aspect:

> A city isn't just a place to live, to shop, to go out and have kids play. It's a place that implicates how one derives one's ethics, how one develops a sense of justice, and, most of all how one learns to talk with and learn from people who are unlike oneself- which is how a human being becomes human (Sennett, 1988:84).

The city is the place where we become human. Many thinkers use the metaphor of theater for the city and especially for the public space. For Lefebvre, (1996:172) the urban center is the "spontaneous theatre" of the city people. It is the place of movement, the unpredictable, the possible and encounters. Mumford (2004:29) also defines the city as a theatre: "the city creates the theater and is the theater". It is the place of social drama: "the physical organization of the city may deflate this drama or make it frustrate; or it may, through the deliberate efforts of art, politics, and education, make the drama more richly significant, as a stage-set, well-designed, intensifies and underlines the gestures of the actors and the action of the play".[55] Sennett (1977) also mentions different masks that are used in the city stage during the confrontation with different people (strangers). In fact, the earliest meaning of person (*persona*) means a mask used by a player (Williams, 1988:232, Sennett, 1977, Barrett, 1996:125). Being urbane also implies the using of a mask and therefore being formal (-disguising some aspects of one's personality/identity and

revealing those that is willed to be shown to others and therefore may be called hypocritical). Although the exaggeration of rule-bound formality has been criticized (Mistzal, 1999), as it is discussed above, formality in a certain extent again is a necessity of public life (a public-private distinction), unless it is reduced to strict etiquette rules, a mere superficiality. It is so because it gives the possibility of the coexistence of unlike individuals (strangers) in public space. It is the appreciation of impersonality and anonymity. Therefore, it gives the person a freedom from parochialism that is specific to city life. That is why "city air makes you free". Sennett (1977:264) defines civility as "the activity which protects people from each other and yet allows them to enjoy each other's company. Wearing a mask is the essence of civility. Masks permit pure sociability, detached from the circumstances of power, malaise, and private feelings of those who wear them. Civility has as its aim the shielding of others from being burdened with oneself"; and incivility is "burdening others with oneself; it is the decrease in sociability with others this burden of personality creates" (1977:265).

If we define identity as a bridge between personal and public worlds, inside and outside, that is formed in the interaction between self and society (Hall, 2001:275-276), or as the politics of the personal[56] (Pile and Thrift, 1995:9), it is possible to mention the plurality of identities, and "use of masks" becomes inevitable. In fact, for Sennett, playacting, which necessitates an audience of strangers, is the most influential ability of city dweller: "in a society with a strong public life there should be affinities between the domains of stage and street there

[55]For Mumford, "the city creates drama; the suburb lacks it".

[56] Especially the discussions of deliberative democracy underline these aspects of identity.

should be something comparable; in the expressive experience crowds have had in these two realms" (Sennett, 1977:37).[57] Also for Benjamin, intimacy and anonymity exist together in city life (whether it be in the shopping arcade, the café or the brothel), and this sets urban society apart from both classical and provincial society (Parker, 2004:9). It therefore leads to the possibilities of a constellation of writers, artists and poets and so to the diversity, difference and creativeness.

Of course, it is important to question the accessibility of people to these possibilities intrinsic to city life. In addition, it is necessary to explain the difference and diversity in urban life. Mouffe, (1992:13) calls attention to this; "one must be able to discriminate between differences that exist but should not exist and differences that do not exist but should exist". At this point, I apply again another concept of Lefebvre: "the right to the city".[58] It can be thought of as "a superior form of right: right to freedom, to individualization in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit. The right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city" (Lefebvre, 1996:174). For Lefebvre, the constitutive element of the right to the city is the centrality, which is the essential quality of the urban space as is discussed. As he asserts, there is no urbanity/urban reality without a centre, "without a gathering together of all that can be born in space and can be produced in it, without an encounter, actual or possible, of all 'objects' and 'subjects'" (1996:195). Coming

[57] For Sennett, theatricality is closely related to public life and so there is a hostile relation between theatricality and intimacy. "As the imbalance between public and intimate life has grown greater, people have become less expressive. With an emphasis on psychological authenticity, people become inartistic in daily life because they are unable to tap the fundamental creative strength of the actor, the ability to play with and invest feeling in external images of self" (1977:37). Agamben (1993:135-140) also points to the loss of gestures, which refers to the sphere of action (by the end of nineteenth century) and to the loss of its control.

together in an urban center means a rescue from being stuck in ghettos of either voluntary ones of privileged groups or inevitable ones of 'others' (cited in Kofman & Lebas, 1996:34).

> To exclude the urban from groups, classes, individuals, is also to exclude them from civilization, if from not society itself. The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and segregative organization. This right of the citizen… proclaims the inevitable crisis of the city centres based upon segregation and establishing it: centres of decision-making, wealth, power, of information and knowledge, which reject towards peripheral spaces all those who do not participate in political privileges. Equally, it stipulates the right to meetings and gathering; places and objects must answer to certain 'needs' generally misunderstood, to certain despised and moreover transfunctional 'functions': the 'need' for social life and a centre, the need and the function of play, the symbolic function of space (close to what exists over and above classified functions and needs, which cannot be objectified as such because of its figure of time, which gives rise to rhetoric and which only poets can call by its name: desire (Lefebvre, 1996:185).

It is neither a natural right nor a contractual one, but is the right of citizens and city dwellers (Lefebvre, 1996:194).

> The right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to information, should modify, concretize and make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of multiple services. It would affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in the urban area (cited in Kofman & Lebas, 1996:34).

---

[58] For the discussion of the term in the context of rights see Mitchell (2003:21-30).

"The right to the city" underlines the necessity of bringing together the urban dweller and the citizen to reformulate the framework of citizenship (Kofman & Lebas, 1996:34) [59]. The right to the city is not simply a visiting right but is the *right to urban life* (Lefebvre, 1996:158). And so to the renewed centrality, to places of encounter and exchange, disengaged from the exchange value, to life rhythms, and time uses, enabling the full and complete usage of these moments and places (1996:179). Moreover, such a conceptualization poses a radical challenge to "capitalist social relations and their increasing control over social life" (Purcell, 2003:565).[60]

Today it is asserted that the city, deemed as "the cradle of civilization", is turning out to be its opposite: a forest, the state of barbarism; and city life is becoming a state of nature and a place where terror rules (Diken & Laustsen, 2002). Besides, in recent discussions it is pointed out that there is a tendency towards "community" relations, a renewed form of Gemeinschaft type relations. Habermas (1989, 1997:278) calls this process "refeudalization"; a reappearance of the extended family relations in the form of "neighborhood". With the blurring of the distinction between the public and the private, private life has been publicized, while publicity appears in the form of privacy. So the reason of the community

[59] May be it must be noted that the wishes of "coming together of different classes" do not mean only the physical proximity as a just different colors in public space that legitimize the inequality, but the capability of sharing place that necessitates to narrow the gap between their socio-cultural and economic opportunities. The dual city or fragmented city preferred by some urbanists (I think the fact of the increasing gap does not change in both form) posits the most dangerous threat to urbanity. For Sennett (1996:162) "it is the mixing of… diverse elements that provides the materials for the "otherness" of visibly different life styles in a city; these materials of otherness are exactly what men need to learn about in order to become adults. Unfortunately, now these diverse city groups are each drawn into themselves, nursing their anger against the others without forums of expression. By bringing them together, we will increase the conflicts expressed and decrease the possibility of an eventual explosion of violence".

replaces the public reason. Sennett (1998:137-138) defines this process as a "return to community". For him, "one of the unintended consequences of modern capitalism is that it has strengthened the value of place, aroused a longing for community". The uncertainty of flexible capitalism forces people to search for safe grounds. In this sense, "we" has become the means of self-protection against outsiders as a consequence of "universal law that 'we' can be used as a defense against confusion and dislocation". It must be noted that "we" becomes dangerous when it is used with reference to the outside world. In this usage it may become the static abstraction of community standards or the veil of "the ill-fitting" assemblages, and its histories of internal conflicts (1998:138-139). On the other hand, Sennett prefers to emphasize the need of a search for the positive aspects of "we" as a resistance strategy. In this search, place has a central role: "Place is geography, a location for politics; community evokes the social and personal dimensions of place. A place becomes a community when people use the pronoun "we"" (1998:137). Community relations, which are the unintended product of capitalism, may reverse the process. For him, "place has power, and the new economy might be restrained by it". In this way, city emerges as a political phenomenon, which is generated through un-institutionalized political forms as well as institutionalized ones.[61]

This approach has similarities with Lefebvre's conceptualization of space or politics of space and is an important argument of this study. Lefebvre's suggestion of urban as lived experience urges us to rethink all these political and social

[60] Purcell calls this conceptualization as "Lefebvrian citizenship" (2003:565).

concepts in the context of our daily life. Thinking spatially while reconsidering social and political concepts gives the opportunity of alternative formulations. Lefebvre asks how one can be aware of oneself and adopt a critical stance with the repression of the lived and daily life and states that:

> …a counter-space can insert itself into spatial reality: against the Eye and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against power and arrogance of power, against the endless expansion of the 'private' and of industrial profitability; and against specialized spaces and a narrow localization of function (1993:382).

The first step may be to try to discover ways to reconnect the "inside-outside" through representational spaces. If urbanity can roughly be thought of as good manners in the public realm, the term good refers to respect to both one's self and respect to others. It means recognition of the existence of the other and acting accordingly; recognition of the rights of both one's self and others to the city. All of us have certain boundaries, starting with the body. As Baydar (2002:240) defines it, boundaries are "sites of the encounter between the self and the other". The merit of urbanity is directly related to the permeability of these boundaries, the possibility of relationship between inside and outside.

In this chapter, I have considered the meaning of the term urbanity despite its complexity. Tracing the meaning of the term reveals that it has historically evolved and has relations with industuralization, the dissolution of Gemeinschaft relations,

---

[61] He (1998:148) believes that "…if change occurs it happens on the ground, between persons speaking out of inner need, rather than through mass uprising". He continues like that "What political programs follow from those inner needs, I simply don't know. But I do know a regime which provides

and the emergence of modern (nation) states, citizenship and public life as well as personal conduct. Above discussion also shows that "formality" takes an important place in the discussion of urbanity. As is seen, though it is not possible to make a neat distinction between public and private, public space with its formal relations has some peculiar characteristics in the discussions of urbanity. Also I have used Lefebvre's "right to the city" and Sennet's understanding of the city in the context of stranger in order to argue that urbanity is revealed in thinking and in attitudes towards others, strangers.

My basic argument is that urbanity, in the context of openness to strangers, and urban space in the context of the right to public space, are inspirational concepts for the discussion of individual-state and society relations, especially in the Turkish context. The main argument of the thesis emerges from this point: different from the Western experience, urbanity in the Turkish context has been shaped and reshaped by informality as well as formality. In the following chapter, I will show how urbanization and urbanity is constructed in Turkey as a project of modernization with its formal and informal aspects. As the above discussions of space and urbanity show, the construction of (public) space is full of tensions and struggles. Even in the condition of the domination of "representation of space" as in top-down modernizations through the user's space, there is always the possibility of alternative practices which usually emerge in informal ways.

---

human beings no deep reasons to care about one other cannot long preserve its legitimacy".

CHAPTER IV

RETHINKING THE MODERNIZATION PROJECT OF TURKEY

4.1 Modernization Project and Urbanity

As discussed in the introduction, urbanity constitutes the core of Turkish modernization and making citizenship. The discussions of urban and urbanity inevitably evoke the discussions of modernization process. Especially in the Turkish context, the terms like urban way of life, urbane people and urbanity have been evaluated as important components of the modernity project. Urban life and urbanity were seen as the most concrete means and also evidence of modernization. Because of this special emphasis on urbanity, an assessment of the construction and the functioning of the terms will be illuminative for understanding the peculiar

modernization history of Turkey.[62] Although in the contemporary discussions it is asserted that urbanity has begun to erode in the era of nation-states, with the destruction of public -private distinction,[63] in the Turkish context, the early period of nation state is the main era of its re-construction process, the effects of which can still be felt.

Since the productions of urban space and urbanity have been presented as the hallmarks of the Turkish modernization project, they inevitably involve in the tensions and hierarchies of the process. In the Turkish case, urban space and urbanity have appeared as the most visible arena of the construction of the images of "modern" and "traditional". The tensions embedded in the concept of urbanity mainly derive from this sharply defined duality of "modern-traditional", as well as others which hold similar connotations such as "new-old", "urban-rural" "*alafranga-alaturka"* etc. The first parts of these pairs, in fact, reflect the qualities of the desired formal model of the modernizing elites in the early years of the Republic, while the second are neglected or officially declared as unwanted. Kasaba (1997:24) points out those political elites who used the categories of "old" and "new" or "traditional" or "western" in their own terms in order to "reduce the dimensions of their task to

[62] Referring to Berman, Kasaba (1997:19) defines modernization as "generalized images which summarize the various transformations of social life attendant upon the rise of a market society and the nation-state". This process dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century, the late Ottoman period for Turkish modernization. In this process the emphasis in both discourse and deed was always on institutional reforms. It is generally accepted that there was continuity between Ottoman modernizers and the founders of the Turkish state (Keyder, 1997:39). Since the new Turkish state changed personnel only to some extent, there was not a complete break between two state structures.

[63] See Sennett (1977), and Zijderveld (1998).

manageable proportions and represent themselves as the sole bearers of progress"[64]. At this point it is very important to be aware of the construction process of the images of tradition and modernity, and the tension between them.

As Kandiyoti (1997:129) puts it, "the attribution of "tradition" and "modernity" still continue to be part of a political struggle over different visions of the "good society"". In contrast to these reductively defined dualities, there have been more complicated conditions in the life of people at the intersection of social class, social status, occupation, the time spent in the city and being open / receptive to Western values (Tanpınar, cited in Duben & Behar, 1996:262). In the official model there has been no place for "in-between" situations or mediatory spaces. The construction of urbanity through these rigidly defined dualities has produced different exclusionary mechanisms. Besides, its exclusionary effects, which can be still felt in social, political and cultural areas, tell us much about the modernization process of the country. Today, contemporary developments in Turkish cities introduce new concepts such as "new urbane", "informal urban dweller", "Islamist urbane" or "white Turks", all of which are the signs of newly changing inclusion-exclusion relations of urbanity in addition to the old ones.

However, these contemporary terms also point out an important quality of the modernization project of Turkey in the early Republican period. The formal model put forward in the early period and represented by the first parts of the above

[64] Modernist view of history is ironically dehistoricizing (Holston, 1989). Renan (1990) remarks that forgetting is a prerequisite for creating a unified, homogeneous national society. Consistant with this approach according to core policy makers and ideologues of the Republic who gathered around Atatürk "anything that was newly attained, acquired, or built was naturally desirable and superior to everything that was inherited from the past and hence "old"" (Kasaba, 1997:16).

mentioned dualities could not be achieved; and it has been reconstructed by the practices deriving from the second parts. In this thesis it is asserted that the production of space and the construction of urbanity in the context of Turkish modernization have been realized both through informal practices and through the formal ones**.** An interesting point in this process is the existence of informal practices alongside the formal, and their coexistence in the practices of both so-called urbanites and others/peasants (center and periphery). Although modernization process necessitates the formalization to certain extent, both groups have applied to informal practices as a tactics or strategies, like maintaining the traditional order, and avoiding the necessities of new order. In the coming section, I will explain the use of 'formal' and 'informal' practices in order to develop my argument.

4.1.1 Formal-Informal Distinction

Rules can be simply categorized as formal defined by the 'law' or having a legal base and as informal that can be simply defined as unofficial, determined by social relations and morals or daily life. Informal practices may be socially acceptable, but they are certainly not acceptable when confronted with contradicting legal principles (Conrad, 2006). In theory, this approach seems to be the main boundary defining formality and informality. In practice there may be many other boundaries accentuating this differentiation, according to social and institutional belonging, especially in social and cultural domain. While formality in political and economic sphere refers to congruity with laws, in social and cultural sphere it may refer to generally accepted ways of behaviour. However, as Atkinson, (1982:88) points out

in many contexts, concepts of formality and informality involve the making of evaluative distinction.

Informality was not discussed by the main social theorists since their attention has been directed to the construction of a general theory of institutions and institutional change (at formal and macro levels) (Misztal, 1999:23). Nevertheless, the distinction of informal and formal is central to classical dichotomies explaining the modernization process such as Tönnie's Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity and Weber's traditional and legal-rational authority (Atkinson, 1982:86). In general modernization was depicted as the process of transformation from face-to face, homogeneous, communal and informal types of relationships to contract-based, heterogeneous, rational and formal types of relations. Weber characterizes the modern world as being dominated by bureaucracies, drawing on the framework of formal relations in spite of the peril of "iron cage". In the modern world, these bureaucracies are considered to be the embodiment of rationality and efficiency. According to Weber, the main characteristics of modern societies are impersonality, calculability, formalism and rationality. In Weber's account of modernity impersonality plays a central role in both state and market as a hallmark of modernity. He connects the rationalization of bureaucracy with democratization (Mistzal, 1999:87) which means freeing from

personal, irrational and emotional elements.[65] Also in the discussions of urbanity, it has been noted that the modern urban life is characterized by impersonality and formality. In these debates, while informal is seen as the characteristic of traditional societies, formal is defined as distinguishing quality of modern societies.

It is possible to discuss formal-informal differentiation with reference to different realms including economic, social, political and cultural spheres each of which is seen as component of modernization process. One significant aspect of the use of terms such as like informal economy, informal social relations, informal politics and citizenship, informal manners and values is that informality has been generally associated with practices existing in "developing countries".[66] And these practices have been seen as a threat to formal legal-base and institutionalization. As

[65] However, expansion of bureaucratic control also brings dehumanizing effect involving in weakening trust and unwillingness to taking responsibility or initiative as well as more hierarchical society. Mistzal (1999) notes that informalization was seen a kind of solution to the over formalization in western world. In this discussion informality is seen as "a source of group solidarity and emotional well-being for its members and contributing to their identity and feeling of belonging" (1999:21). For example Atkinson (1982:87) underlines the importance of informality in social interactions for the practical achievement of formal organizational goals. Moreover, in the economic domain, it is proposed as a method in the context of flexible organization models for developed countries. The need for a new combination between formal and informal rules is voiced. Therefore we can differentiate informality in the context of developing societies and informality in the context of developed societies.

Mistzal (1999:56-57) points out, while in formalization emerges as a solution to the threat of "iron cage" of overall bureaucratization and rationalization, or unfair demands of formal institutions, there is another threat: "the decline in importance of impersonal, rational regulations". The tendency towards the informalization produces the possibilities for corruption, cronyism and parochialism.

In the literature the most widely discussed example of informal practices is clientelism. Clientelism or patronage is defined as "a form of interaction and control over economic and political markets, shaped both by structural factors such as center-periphery relations and class and elite structures and by cultural factors, primarily the structure of trust and distrust" (Roniger cited in Mistzal, 2000:85). These are totally different from formalized bureaucratic exchange which is based on impersonal rules. In complete contrast to expectations, with the establishment of modern regimes or with economic development, clientelist arrangements do not tend to disappear. "Rather, although specific forms of such relationships may be undermined, new types have been found to crystallize in a great variety of forms, cutting across levels of

---

[66] With reference to the political sphere Conrad (2006:256-258) defines two kinds of informality: "traditional" informality which is based on a process of traditional Vergemeinschaftung (social integration) and a priori to formal politics; and "modern" informality, based on modern Vergemeinschaftung (social integration) and posteriori to formal politics. In traditional informality the behaviour is governed commonly by tradition, particular social hierarchies and "a limited contingency when it comes to the openness and direction of the political process". Among the members of the community, traditional order and hierarchy are legitimate and the community is based upon the validity of direct personal relationships such as patron-client relationships. In this form informality may not be seen as "a law-defying reaction to the modernisation of society" (2006:259-260). Rather than that it is an attempt to protect the community/tradition. On the other hand, modern informality emerges in relation to modern formality, therefore modern informal politics should be thought within the context of modern formal politics: "In order to escape the rigidity of formal politics and the social frigidity it creates; in order to soften the rules that are thrust upon the lives of individuals and the community from within the bureaucratic field, informal patterns of action are willingly or unwillingly adapted to (re-)introduce notions of community. Informality may well have an instrumental and rational side to it, namely the rationality that does not want to trust in the rationality of formal processes alone. But informality also tries to overcome rational, political processes where they seem to become unbearable, violate individual notions of fairness or create an atmosphere of social indifference. (Conrad, 2006:265)

economic development and types of political regimes and seemingly performing no less important functions within the more developed modern settings" (Roniger, 1994:3). In literature the co-existence of formal-informal practices is underlined (Mistzal, 1999; Guneş Ayata, 1994; Conrad, 2006). Misztal, (1999:25) notes that informal relations grow alongside institutionalization, not only just in "the gaps between institutions". But they can do both: support the institutional aims and work against them. Guneş Ayata (1994a:19) mentions two viewpoints emerged on the issue: The first one sees clientelism as a step towards political development. "It was the means of connecting center and periphery, serving to increase political consciousness where direct participation was limited". In contrast to this approach, the second approach asserted that clientelism did not contribute either to democratization or modernization. Rather, it discouraged the enactment of universalistic policies and development of citizen participation. Within this context, informality may emerge as a threat to fair and just treatment.

This confusion arises from the ambiguous and unpredictable nature of informal relations. Their contradictory nature can be illustrated by their being hierarchical but mutually beneficial, combining inequality and promised reciprocity, voluntarism and coercion, symbolic and instrumental resources (Misztal, 1999:85). Therefore, as an attempt to understand the issue in the context of our discussion we can differentiate informal practices as a strategy or tactic with reference to Michel de Certeau.

> I call a "strategy" the calc*Ulus* of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be

> isolated from an "environment." A strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as proper (propre) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, "clienteles," "targets," or "objects" of research). Political, economic, and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model.
>
> I call a "tactic," on the other hand, a calc*Ulus* which cannot count on a "proper" (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality. The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has at its disposal no base where it can capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence with respect to circumstances. The "proper" is a victory of space over time. On the contrary, because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time-it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized "on the wing." Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into "opportunities." The weak must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them (de Certeau, 1984:xix).

Strategies are related to institutions and structures of power, while "tactics" are developed to create space for individuals in environments defined by strategies. Tactic is immediate action, whereas strategy is the complete opposite, a long term plan of action designed to achieve a particular goal. In fact de Certeau's pair of strategy and tactic reminds Lefebvre's terms domination and appropriation. As it is discussed in the second chapter, while dominated space is the site of hegemonic forces and it involves political power, appropriated space serves to the needs and possibilities of a group; it is resistance to abstract space. The struggle between them contributes to emergence of representational spaces. In spite of the similarity, next to the spatial practices, there is a strong emphasis on individual's acts in de Certeau's conceptualization. For de Certeau (1984:91-110) city consists of strategies of

individual having will and power and tactics of others with the capability of resistance. With the help of these concepts, we can differentiate the informal practices as strategies and tactics (or domination and appropriation). It can be said that informal practices may be part of strategies as well as tactics in the city space. It is valid, especially in cases where informality is used by modern political and economic elites to control resources for their own advantage. In this context, clientelism emerges as main informality arranging the relation of society-state in Turkey:

> Social rights became a means for the state to extend its legitimacy into the population, thus dividing, creating clientelistic networks, and colonizing. The beneficiaries of social programs were defined according to their group attributes –not as individuals. The state's largesse was addressed to corporatized bodies whose very existence derived from the state's need to identify and control a freshly segmented society. When politics was reduced to a bargain over the distribution of material rewards, a strategic and procedural conception of political rights, oriented toward participation in the structure of patronage, seemed normal and sufficient (Keyder, 1997:41).

Because of the complicated nature of these practices, they also may emerge as a survival or resistance mechanism, a kind of response to duality of modern-traditional. In this sense, informality may emerge as a channel to challenge existing rigid, -perhaps indifferent- formal structure[67]. They may emerge as practices of civil disobedience. However, it must be noted that tactics may evolve strategies through

[67] Güneş Ayata (1994a:26) says that clientelism may challenge the unfair hostile demands of formal institutions. At least they offer hope for the future (as the ingenuity of villagers does).

the production of space. This point will be discussed in the construction process of Ankara.

However, informality should not be seen as functional, since it reflects the contradictions or inequality of power. These practices are closely related to power and domination relations, and, moreover, produce new exclusion mechanisms, since they are accessible only to those who are familiar, who know certain ways. It excludes those who do not know the entrance to the channels and passages of informality. It is asserted that informal institutions decrease the degree of "transparency, accountability and thus finally legitimacy" in a society (Conrad, 2006:261.). And lastly, as Guneş Ayata, (1994a:24) notes, through creating the communitarian political mechanism based on personalized and particularistic solutions; and with the notion of "us", clientelism privatizes public relations. If we remember the discussions on urbanity, in this sense, informal practices, by reproduction of Gemeinschaft relations in an exclusionary way, pose a serious threat towards urbanity. On the other hand, however, by giving the chance of appropriation of space, they lead to creation of user's space that is representational spaces in Lefebvrian terminology.

As it is discussed above, because of the contradictory nature of informal relations as being both strategy and tactic, informality cannot be judged as a mere threat, or practices that should be abandoned. Nevertheless the increasing gap between the formal and informal refers to unequal power relations in a society. With reference to the history of manners, Norbert Elias (1996) discusses the gap between formal and informal behaviors as the sign of social distance between different strata.

If we expand this argument arising from the cultural domain to other realms of politics, economy and social organization, again the increasing gap between formal and informal practices points out to unequal power relations and injustice in a society.

Acknowledging the co-existence of formal and informal practices is important in order to understand the production of space and construction of urbanity. This aspect of urbanity is also pertinent to the peculiar aspect of Turkish modernization. In literature, two important characteristics of Turkish modernization are underlined: center-periphery dualism, and the construction of private as well as the public (a desire to civilizational shift). Both of them are very important in the construction process of urbanity. My argument is that informal practices are also important factors in the discussion of these qualities. In order to clarify this aspect, I will explain these two features of Turkish modernization.

4.1.2 Center- Periphery

The Turkish case can be evaluated as an outcome/example of modernization-from-above. In making such an argument, I start from the idea that the difference between modernization-from-above and from below (modernization as a self-generating societal process) to be that in the former modernizers exercise state power and are agents with their own interest (Keyder, 1997:39). Barrington Moore's book of "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", evaluates modernity as an indivisible project consisting of different aspects, one of which is political

modernization. For him, the separation of any part of it by modernizers, leads to crises and especially the lack of political modernization might even lead to fascism.[68] With reference to this discussion, Keyder (1997:39) argues that in Turkey, modernizers delimited the scope of modernity by their choices determined by state tradition. As it is imposed from above the Turkish modernization process is generally defined as narrow and sterile by political elites (Kasaba, 1997:29). Many studies also underline the similarities between the Republican reformers and Jacobins, as both saw themselves as "the sole bearer of progress" (Kasaba, 1997:24). This similarity however, is not coincidental since the Turkish modernization has not only been an elite driven, consensus based, institution-building process, but also a project that took its inspiration exclusively from the West (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997:3-4).

The main critique directed at Turkish Modernization, this derives from two points. First of all it has been argued that the political elites saw themselves as the only force to change society. "The agency behind the project was the modernizing elite, and what they sought to achieve was the imposition of institutions, beliefs, and behavior consonant with their understanding of modernity on the chosen object: the people of Turkey" (Keyder, 1997:39). Secondly, it has been argued that there is a gap between the society and the ideals of the modernizing elite. For the latter group, the "Ottoman-Turkish society was a project, and the people who lived in Turkey

[68] Hall, Held and Mc Grew define certain historical processes articulation of which constituted modernity. Those are "the political (the rise of the secular state and polity), the economic (the global capitalist economy), the social (formation of classes and an advanced sexual and social division of labour), and the cultural (the transition from a religious to a secular culture)" (2001:2). Then the institutions that characterize the modernity are the nation-state, capitalist economic order; industrialism; the large scale administrative and bureaucratic systems of social organization; secular, materialist, rationalist and individualist cultural values; and the formal separation of the private from

could at most be the objects of their experiments" (Kasaba, 1997:24). [69] Therefore the history of Turkish society rests on the gap between the modernizing elites "whose discourse diverged radically from what could be popularly appropriated" (Keyder, 1997:45) and the voiceless masses.

Şerif Mardin (1980, 2003)'s infamous center-periphery model, in this respect aims to explain this gap between elites and people through the modernization of Turkey. According to this model from the Ottoman times, there has been a cleavage between the center and periphery which continued and even widened in the Republican period. The modernization process brought the estrangement of periphery from centre because the main connection between the two was religion. In the Ottoman period a bridge was established between elites and masses through the "recognition of religion as discourse –as foundational of society". For Mardin, in Republic era, rejecting the Islamic discourse and its role as a "cement" of society destroyed this bridge (1997:70-71).[70]

As a result, the distance between the educated and uneducated -meaning the distance between center and periphery- increased. In this process "the large majority

---

the public (2001:3).

[69] In the process of transformation, whether the demand for change comes from the "outside" or "inside" (above-below), the negative results, even the usual failures are always seen as the consequence of that what is new. At the end of the process, or through it the re/considerations may bring the nostalgia of the old days. If there is nothing left from the old or only memory and narrative, it may be reconstructed as the thing most desired. Although it is very natural to strive to defend personal intimate relations in the context of Okshat's conservatism, it may become a useless attempt to protect something that is disappearing or sublimating what has lost. Ozbek (2004) distinguishes Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar in this context. Although he is favorite writer of conservatives, he challenges conservatism by rejecting sublimating what has been lost, instead he aestheticizes the lost since the process is irreversible.

[70] "According to the Kemalists, the nation was derailed from its idealist path by reactionary forces bent on reasserting the primacy of religion in Turkish society" (Kasaba, 1997:17).

of Turks continued to live within social frameworks that had not been devised for a unitary nation and they received their sense of identity and purpose from smaller, local units which may be called communautarian" (Mardin, 1980:183). Only a small group educated in Republican high schools or lycées could join/socialize into the centre group. In a similar way, Keyder (1997:45) points out that there were no mediations developed between the modernizing discourse of elites and the practice of the masses. The villager communities, the majority of the population, remained intact within their gemeinschaft type relations. In their disconnectedness to the center, the notables in the towns of Turkey emerged as the only mediators. They were seen by villagers as a part of private life/Gemeinschaft as opposed to the cold and distant state bureaucracy (Guneş-Ayata, 1994b:51). The limited mediation between center and periphery was constructed through clientelist/informal relations.

In order to summarize the above mentioned tension, one of the defining characteristics of Turkish modernization has been argued to be this duality of center-periphery. This argument is valid to the extent that there was no conscious (formal) effort to bridge these groups and to create mediations. Therefore, as will be depicted in the next chapters, through the practices of urban life, informality in the form of strategies and tactics has produced limited mediation between center and periphery. In addition, as the informality in the form of strategies and tactics proposes, both groups applied to informal practices. In his discussion based on Western societies, Elias (1996) contends that there are correspondences between formal behaviour and upper classes; and informal behaviour and lower classes. In the Turkish case, however, both the Republican elites (centre) and mass of the people (periphery) engaged in informal practices.

Related with the co-existence of formal and informal relations, another important point in the Turkish modernization process is the public-private distinction. In this context, I want to discuss the second aspect of the project related with the construction of public and private.

4.1.3 Totalizing Project of Elites

Although Turkish modernizers neglected political modernization, Keyder (1997:37) underlines that Turkish modernizers conceptualized modernity as a "total project" embracing and internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Europe modern. Modernization, which simply increased rationality, bureaucratization and organizational efficiency, was seen insufficient, the transformation of the individual was also necessary, especially for the aspired secularization. In order the reach imagined ideal society, the private has been also seen as mission area alongside the public, and efforts were made to reconstruct both.

In modernization discussions, it is assumed that the public-private division was crystallized during the process of modernization. As far back as 18th century, the line between these two spheres was drawn to balance the claim of civility epitomized by public behaviour against the claims of nature epitomized by family (Sennett, 1977:18). The private is conceptualized as a sphere free from the concerns of social area emerged through the new and impersonal relations in the public sphere (Seligman, 1988:34). Through the process, this division is clarified and legally

enforced in a dichotomous, albeit confusing way. In spite of the alleged distinction, the private has been increasingly constructed and reconstructed by public. In this sense, the Turkish modernization has been a total project aiming to penetrate the private as well as the public (Çınar, 2005:57). Bozdoğan (2001) states that, the radical nature of the Kemalist project derives from its boldness in intervening into the private as well as the public space. However, As Baban, (2007:82) says the persistence of the tradition in the form of religion or ethnic identities were not seen as a problem as long as they remained in the private sphere and did not claim the recognition in the public sphere.[71]

Modernizing elites attempted to penetrate into the daily life of its "citizens", and to control it which is also the area of tactics and strategies through informal processes as well as formal ones.[72] Parallel to the discussion of the center-periphery, in the construction of the private, Republican elites also rejected the mediations in formal level. For Göle (1997:86-87), although the majority of the people can easily create "hybrid forms"[73] in their daily practice of religion, traditional conservatism, and modern aspirations, the Modernist elites reject this possibility by their insistence on binary oppositions. Thus, once more the mediation was left to the informal practices.

[71] With referance to Foucault, Keyman (2007:219) also says: "secularism is used by the state as an "effective technology of the government of the self" by creating a boundary between the public sphere and the private sphere, in which religious claims to identity are confined as private, individualistic and particular".

[72] Therefore, in spite of the difficulty of the discussion, the quality and the quantity of the penetration to daily life people within the context of total project also call for a close examination since strategies are defined as the tools of resistance.

The reason of this insistence on the binary opposition is Republican elite's strong desire for "civilizational shift" necessitating the "shift in habitus". In the civilizing process within the context of modernization project of Kemalist ideology modern –urbane- individual is imagined in both public and private spheres with reference to "new civilization", i.e. the Western one. Therefore Republican elites aimed a total break from the past; the new Republic would be a new civilization. Therefore modernization is equated with Westernization; and being urbane or civilized is connected to internalization of the Western daily practices and etiquettes in the Turkish case.

4.1.4 Civilizational Shift

In his discussion of the "civilizing process", Elias suggests that "what we experience as "civilization" is founded on a particular habitus" (van Krieken, 1998:95). He defines habitus as the habits and structures created by social structures[74]. It is the learned dispositions shared by most members of a group or society. Habitus "is expressed in an individual's codes of feeling and behaviour, the social standards of which change over generations" (Fletcher, 1997:11). Elias (1994:113) calls it "second nature", an automatic self-restraint functioning even when a person is alone. Through the internalization of social rules, "social commands and prohibitions become increasingly a part of the self, a strictly regulated superego" (Elias,

[73] Gole (1997:92) underlines that at the level of discourse, modernity is constantly criticized by Islamic identity "but at the levels of individual behavior, political competition, and social practice, the interaction between the two grows deeper and more complex daily".

[74] Bourdieu, also uses the term and define it as "socialized subjectivity".

1994:154). Through the internalization, the restraints of society become the restraints of the individual; external constraints have been transformed into internal constraints.[75]

According to Elias, the change in this "habitual self-restraint" can only be understood in connection with changes in broader social relationships. Since it is learned from early childhood onward, habitus cannot be changed easily. As is noted in the discussions of civilization, Elias connects the changes in individual's behaviour to social process; the change in habitus is related to balances of power within a society. Therefore, the civilizing process promises to be a detailed historical connection between the public and the private, linking personality to state formation (van Krieken, 1989)[76]. With this introduction to discussion of habitus, it could be said that the Turkish modernization project, with its intervention into the private as well as the public, aimed at changing the habitus of people, their "second nature". However, as Elias discusses, it is very difficult to change it; such an attempt creates problems, tensions, reactions and exclusions in the society. In certain contexts, it deepens the gap between formal and informal practices.

[75] van Krieken, (1990) compares Elias with Foucault: "Foucault and Elias agree with Weber that one can trace a developmental trend towards increasing self- discipline, a regularization and routinisation of the psyche, so that one's inner 'economy of the soul' coordinates with the outer economy of an increasingly bureaucratised, rationalised and individualised social world. Their work converges on the notion that there has been 'societalization of the self', a transition in European history from a social order based on external constraint (sovereign power, traditional power) to one dependent on the internalisation of constraint (disciplinary power, rational domination)".

Elias also mentions the possibility of discrepancy between social structure and habitus. For him, the change in social conditions can not always -rapidly or may not- produce its habitus. While discussing Germany after the First World War, he says "while the institutions underwent a noticeable change in the sense of greater democratization, the power relationships retained much more the authoritarian imprint which they had acquired in the centuries of autocratic rule" (1996:337). The "democratization of attitudes, beliefs and convictions" referring to a certain quality of a habitus would not come after the establishment of "democratic, parliamentary institutions". Under conditions of social changes often moving faster and further than psychological structures, Elias assumes a theory of a possible 'lag' between social conditions and habitus (van Krieken, 1998:125). In the Turkish case, rather than a lag, it would be appropriate to assess a discordance between the elite's desire/political will and habitus, summarized with dualities of modern-traditional, new-old, alafranga-alaturka, and urbane-rural, and redefined pubic -private.

Through the modernization process, the distinction of public-private has become more apparent in the daily life of the (modern) individual. The modern life of wo/men is marked with a tension of living between the public domain which is expected to be rational and the private one defined as emotional. In fact, as Elias says, for the realization of social order separated as "public" and "private", the emergence of an individual perceiving her/him self in the dilemma of "rational" and

[76] In his analysis of Germany, Elias says that because of the long period of autocratic regimes, and traditional code of command and obedience, the personality structure of people was attuned to strictly autocratic and hierarchical social order. It is the correspondence of personality structure with social structure creating a strong desire for "a stable hierarchy of dominance and subordination, expressed not least in strictly formalized rituals of social distance". "To people with such a personality structure, the social formalization of distinctions between those whose duty was to command and those whose duty was to obey gave clear bearings in social relations and made it easier to cope with the problems

"emotional" is inevitable. He says "…with the advance of civilization, the lives of human beings are increasingly split between an intimate and a public sphere, between secret and public behaviour. And this split is taken so much for granted, becomes so compulsive a habit, that is hardly perceived in consciousness" (1994:156).

In the Turkish case, with the demand for the change in habitus, in other words through the re-definition of public-private, there has emerged another tension. Esenbel (2000:33-34) points out that, for the "non-western" countries, the tension of the split between public and private has doubled for the individual: on the one hand there emerges a need to adopt a new definition of the rational and emotional according to Western culture. On the other hand, there is also the necessity of re-arranging the old/traditional understanding of rational and emotional and hence the spaces/places in which they were displayed[77]. As Esenbel underlines, this is not a simple equation of public with West and private with East as it is generally supposed since there was already a separation of private-public in the old culture in its own style.

In order to mitigate the tensions to a certain extent, certain informal tactics are applied as a response to formal strategies through the representational spaces. At this point, one more peculiar aspect of the Turkish case should be underlined. Parallel to the identification of public with reason and the private with emotions, in modernization discussions, a public-private distinction is also identified with a formal-informal dichotomy (Mistzal, 2000:22). Misztal (2005:182) says that in

---

which arose" (1996:69).

classical theory the private realm was seen as the sphere of intimacy, rule-independent informality. The public sphere was defined as the realm of rule-bound formality due to the presence of others. This equation can also be inferred from the depiction of modern city life and urbanity in the discussion held in chapter three. However, in the Turkish case, the overlapping distinctions of public-private with formal-informal also seems problematic. Through the implementation of clientalist policies and the creation of "modern Gemeinschaft" relations, informality has also apparently existed in the public sphere.

Up to this point, I have tried to explain two peculiar aspects of the Turkish case with reference to informal practices. The first, informality, is used both by modernizing elites who were expected to apply formality as pioneers of the modernization process and by the people constituting the periphery to create a type of balance between the old and the new as much as possible. And secondly, informality has dominated the public as well as the private. These aspects of Turkish modernization have been determinative in the discussion of urban space and urbanity.

In the next part of this chapter I will dwell on the issue of civilization and its construction as the reference point in the formulation of urbanity.

[77] As it is discussed in the third chapter, as the embodiment of the public-private spheres, public-private spaces higly involved in these tensions.

4.2 The New Civilization as the Ideal of the Republic

The terms, civilized (*medeni*) and civilization (*medeniyet*) are also important for understanding the term urbanity in the Turkish context. While the term civilized has been used interchangeably with the urbanity, the notion of "civilization" has been central to understand the aim of the modernization project, proposed by Republican elites.

Similar to its meaning in Western society, *medeni* (civilized) is a term used for urbane in Turkish. In the Dictionary of Ottoman Turkish-Turkish (Devellioglu, 2000) *medeni*[78] (civilized) is defined -as an Arabic adjective-: 1) (s.o.) from city, member of a city (medine), urbane, member of people of city, 2) (s.o.) connected to a region/country, 3) (s.o.) from city of Medina, 4) (metaphoric) well mannered, polite, refined, and polite. As is discussed in the third chapter, in Turkish culture it also refers to both formal aspects as being well mannered, and a member of a city. On the other hand *medeniyet* (civilization) is defined -as an Arabic noun-: being civilized (*medenilik*), being urbane (*kentlilik*), being civilized/civilization (*uygarlık*). As an antonym to *medeni*, *bedevi* (Badawi, Bedouin) means: nomad, (s.o.) living in the desert. Although it is not as common as *medeni*, *bedevi* still refers to people living out of the city. In addition, the term has begun to be used for the lower strata of cities (Tuğal, 2002:62). In addition, *beledi* means urbane while *belediyye* indicates the municipality. And lastly I want to note that civilized/urbane also means being familiar with "*Adab-ı muaşeret*" which means the rule of social intercourse/

[78] Medini is a word referring to (animal) belonging to city. The term, *vazaif-i medeniye* means the duty of the citizen (*yurttaslik vazifeleri*).

living together. Instead of this today the term "*görgü kuralı"* meaning etiquette, is used.

The term "*medeni*" begun to be used in "western" and "modern" terms from the end of the 19th century with the modernization movement in Ottoman society (Duben &Behar, 1996:31-32, 259). A frequently used term, "*muasır medeniyet*", points to the civilization of the age, or contemporary civilization. In fact, this contemporary civilization is specifically the western one, and it indicates a higher level that must be reached. This meaning of medeni (*uygar*) is still valid.

During pre-republican period, Turkish nationalism was formulated by Ziya Gökalp as Turkicization, Islamicization, and modernization. At the beginning, Kemalist emphasis on "universal civilization" was not the negation of "national culture" (Bozdoğan, 2001:109). In 1918, Ziya Gökalp writes:

> As there is no contradiction between the ideals of Turkism and Islamism, there is none between these and the ideal of modernism. The idea of modernity necessitates only the acceptance of the theoretical and practical sciences and techniques from Europe. There are certain moral needs, which will be sought in religion and nationality, as there were in Europe, but these cannot be imported from the West as if they were machines and techniques… Culture is national, civilization is international (in Bozdoğan, 2001:36 quoted from Berkes, p:97, 104).

In Gökalp's renowned formulation of the culture-civilization (*hars-medeniyet*) dichotomy, the material and scientific aspects of society is defined as civilization and the value system as culture. In the definition of the value system

there are also distinctions: Turkish polity and society (as an identity and the source of solidarity) and in the "individual's personal belief" level –resting on Islam (civilization-west; citizen-Turk, personality/individual-Islam). Tekeli (1998b:31) suggests that in Republican Turkey, the dualism of national culture and western civilization is removed and later, a full market integration with the world economic system is accepted without a rejection of the cultural impact that came with it.

As a representative of official ideology, Yakup Kadri apparently rejects the distinction between culture and civilization. He defines a unified concept of "contemporary civilization" grounded in scientific and technological progress which is a prerequisite for the desired artistic and cultural regeneration of the nation (cited in Bozdoğan, 2001:107). With this approach he subsumes the category of culture under the broader term civilization. And bringing this civilization to every corner of the country is defined as the aim of the Republic.

For the republican elites there was only one civilization and it referred to a higher level that must be reached. In 1923, Atatürk stated "there are a variety of countries, but there is only one civilization. In order for a nation to advance, it is necessary that it join this civilization" (cited in Çınar, 2005:5). This unique civilization is, of course, western: *"If our bodies are in the East our mentality is oriented toward the west.* We want to modernize our country. All our efforts are directed toward the building of a modern, therefore a Western, state in Turkey. Which nation is there that desires to become a part of civilization, but does not tend toward the West?" (cited in Çınar, 2005:5). It is assumed that "the civilization" is

composed of western nations. Spatial location of the body is not seen as an obstacle to the westernization of the mind.

The necessity of civilization was legitimized through the sublimation of science and progress. Civilization is seen as a capability that can explain everything. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk said that "civilization is a sublime force that pierces mountains, crosses the skies, enlightens and explores everything from the smallest particle of dust to the stars" (quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001:107). Civilization is a matter of necessity, because:

> We lived through pain because we did not understand the conditions of the world. Our thinking and our mentality will have to become civilized. Take a look at the entire Turkish and Islamic world. Because they failed to adapt to the conditions and rise, they found themselves in such a catastrophe and suffering. We cannot afford to stop anymore. We have to move forward… Civilization is such a fire that it burns and destroys those who ignore it (Ataturk'un soylev ve Demecleri 2, p:212, quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001:108).

In order to reach to the level of contemporary civilization, individuals should also be civilized. The entire modernization project was constituted on this base as above quotations demonstrate. While the project was justified with the aim of reaching to level of contemporary civilization, sometimes with a nationalist reaction, it was claimed that Turks were already civilized. Throughout the 1930s, there were several articles on the issue of the degree of civility of Turks. In some of them it was asserted that Turks were already members of "the civilization". Falih Rıfkı (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1st February 1931) quotes from a book written by Eugene

Pittard. It was said that "Anatolia is one of the homelands of European white people. Anatolia is a sacred land for white humanity and is a place of circumambulation for all civilizeds". It assumed that civilization belonged to "white people" originating from Anatolia, so Turks were already members of the civilization. In 1936, Sevket Süreyya (*Ulus*, 2nd July) wrote a reply to Norbert Von Bischoff who saw Turkish culture as nomadic. According to Sureyya, since Norbert Von Bischoff did not know Turkish history, he had made certain assumptions. For Süreyya, in fact, Turks civilized the places which they occupied and those Turks were urbanite and settled.

Settlement, as a part of civilization, and settled culture are in fact still controversial issues in the context of the Turkish culture. Since urban development and settled life refers to civilization, the existence of settled life has been attempted to overcome the accusation of the "barbaric Turks". Parallel to the claim of a "civilizational shift", there was another approach claiming that civilization was introduced to the Turks with the Republic. Celal Esat, in his article "what is a house and how a house should be set up" in *Modern Turkiye Mecmuası* (1938), touches on this subject. He believes the notion of settlement was not familiar to the Turkish people since they were busy with conquest and defeats. After the establishment of the Republic, Turkish people decided to settle permanently on this land. He says "that is why iron and concrete bridges replace wooden ones, stone and concrete houses take the place of adobe constructions" (cited in Baydar, 2002:234, 1998:311). For him, the Turkish citizen learnt the notion of home and so, civilization in the Republican period. In fact, this argument is applied when the necessity of explaining the disconnectedness of the Republican period from the Ottoman past is felt.

In all these arguments, we see two concomitant conceptualizations of civilized/civilization in relation to the construction of Turkish identity. On the one hand, the first approach aims to prove and searches for approval for the "civility" of Turks, by giving examples of urban settled way of lives from Turkish history/culture. As a reactionary attitude to the accusation of "barbaric Turks", the old meaning of civilization has been applied in order to defend the civility of Turks against Western eyes. This conception accepts the idea of western civility but looks for the origins in the tradition and in the past. On the other hand, the second approach defines Western civilization as a feature which is external to Turkish society and a level which is superior to the present level of culture. In order to reach this level, the past should be rejected and, in this way, the "new civilization" should be embraced.

The second approach was generally accepted by the modernizing elites. The aspiration of the Republican elites was this civilizational shift which necessitated not only institutional transformation but also the transformation of the "habitus" including the codes of behaviour, emotions and mentality. Their real difference from the past experiences emerges from this point. The main break of the Republican period from Ottoman past, in terms of a modernization movement, suggests that the Republican elites also strongly desired a change in the habitus of people although the necessary conditions were not considered.

4.2.1 "Nationalizing Process" as "Civilizing Process"

With the transition from empire to nation-state, the legitimating discourse of the state authority totally changed. The dominant ideology of the Ottoman Empire, a kind of mixture of Islamism and elite cohesion, was replaced with nationalism as a reply to the dissolution of the empire in the period of the early Republic. For Keyder (1997:41-42) "nationalism had provided the vocabulary for defensive modernization". It was the nationalism-from-above that defined the boundaries of the nation and the conditions threatening it. There were two groups defined as a threat by the nationalist discourse: the leaders of popular religious orders (tarikat) along with people who advocated an Islamist version of reforms and reorganization; and the non-Muslim communities (Kasaba, 1997:28). Through the history of the Republic, the discourse of threat deriving from these two groups has provided the legitimate ground for policies and even harsh measures taken by the state for the protection of the nation and the modern state.

The nation was imagined as a homogenous ethnic unity. Contrary to Ottoman system tolerated social heterogeneity because "it accepted the necessity of social symbiosis as premise"; new Republic was built on the Jacobin principle based on the "policy of the assimilation of deviant groups, who were characterized by republican ideologues as "feudal remnants"" (Mardin, 1997:71). [79] Keyder (1997:50) underlines that the social removal of ethnic groups considered alien "made it possible to imagine

[79] Mardin continues with "the old system took existential questions seriously; the new considered these issues to be "metaphysical" and a residue of scholasticism" (1997:71) and "religion not only functioned as an institution (i.e., the corps of ulamas, medreses [seminaries], vakifs [pious foundations], and sufi orders) but also established noninstitutional links as discourse between devlet and the common folk" (1997:73).

a fictional West with no immediate material reference"[80]. In a complementary way, Aptullah Ziya in his writing published in Ülkü in 1933, stated that "there are many citizens of our country who would consider it an insult if you called them a 'Turk'. It is our responsibility to construct their villages and to make them talk, dress, and live like the rest of us" (quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001:105). It seems that, ethnic homogenization was an important part of the nationalization process which would be tried to be achieved by "civilizing process" demanding a total change in way of life.

The state drew the boundaries of nation and defined the threats to this collective body. Keyder (1997:41-42) suggests that such an "organicist and societal" perspective never allowed a construct of a civic identity. Therefore, a citizenship based on universally applicable civil rights could not develop; in its place, authoritarian nationalism emerged with an emphasis on unity and collective purpose. Under this condition, populism of the nationalist discourse was limited to anything that referred to individual initiative, civil rights, and personal freedom (Kasaba, 1997:29). Rather than promoting democracy, the ruling bureaucratic class tried to improve the realm of administration and the power of the state.

In Turkey, the masses generally remained passive recipients of the nationalist message advocated by the elites. Especially Anatolian peasants remained silent partners. Keyder (1997:43-44) also points out that the main problem in this process was the lack of negotiation between the nationalist elites and the masses.

[80] Keyder (1997) says "once the negative dimension was eliminated, modernization could be presented as an entirely positive project against which no defensive posturing was necessary. The elites did not feel any colonial resentment; they did not see themselves as belonging to a world different from the one they sought to emulate". Therefore Western civilization is defined as the place in where Turkish nation should also take place.

The silence of the masses gave the opportunity for nationalist elites to construct the national identity in an entirely instrumental fashion that ignored popular sentiments. According to Keyder (1997:45) the silence of the masses also gave an opportunity to construct an imaginary "popular" by the elite.

> In the Turkish case… the freshly constituted elements of a popular "tradition" were represented to the masses as the authentic (and official) version, without much concern for preexisting versions. The defining vector of this reconstitution was an unsullied ethnic heritage endowed with all the positive virtues of might, unity, state-building acumen, and self-confidence. This trope, designed to boost self-esteem, established a matrix through which all the national symbols –from heroic sculptures to ethnographic detail, from folk music, legends, and heroes to public ceremonies- were defined. Henceforth, popular culture would be yet another realm amenable to social engineering (Keyder, 1997:45).

According to Keyder (1997), national developmentalism policies were successful in their economic promises. To a certain degree, it achieved considerable development, national economic integration, urbanization and increase in levels of welfare. And these achievements were transmitted to the people through "social entitlements, feeding into the populist rhetoric". Material progress, however, did not lead to the development of individual autonomy or legal right; quite the opposite, the success of the social entitlement programs challenged the concept of citizenship. With the help of populism, the claims and the status of a strong state have been perpetuated; "as long as the state remained strong, full citizenship could be suspended" (Keyder, 1997:41). The modern citizen was imagined with reference to Western way of life and consumption pattern, rather than individual autonomy and

legal rights. The construction of modern individual as modern citizen/urbanite within this context will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

4.2.2 Formal Urban Life

In order to reach the imagined modern society and individual, certain arrangements were put into place in the early Republican period. In this process, culture took a privileged position. Especially cities and city life with their desired urbanites were assumed to be the criteria of the level of modernization and civilization. Modernization, in general, was equated with formal urban life although there was limited urbanization in the country. As Ersoy (1985:10-11) discusses, this approach is the extension of the modernization school. For them, in periphery countries with the settling down of cultural values and consumption pattern of center in cities, rural people, those open to "adapt" themselves to the modern way of life and oppose the traditional and static structure of the rural, migrated to the cities giving them the possibility to modernize. Moreover, without considering the possible interactions, it measured urbanization with integration of rural culture into urban culture. In fact, such an approach defines urbanization with the movement to cities and so to urbanity, in a restricted meaning, with adaptation of "western values" as much as possible.

As the modernization project imposes a political will to **"**Westernize" in a non-Western context (Gole, 1997:83), the construction of urban life is equated with the

adoption of West European culture and lifestyles practiced in the urban space[81]. (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997; Keyder, 1997; Gole, 1997). Modern space was the constitutive part of this modern life. In the production process of modern space, health and hygiene were the popular terms of the period giving the sense of "modernness". In addition to these terms, in certain contexts, having homogeneous/ uniform quality was seen as an indicator of modernness especially as an opposition to having cosmopolite quality[82]. These terms were applied to every domain which was aimed to be rearranged by the modernization project such as city planning, architecture, body and etiquette rules.

In this process, "certain lifestyles, identities, relationships, mannerisms, and habits came to be defined as "modern", not by virtue of their intrinsic qualities but as a result of the specific policies of the modernizing elite" (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997:10). Kandiyoti (1997) warns us of the historically and socially constructed nature of these modern categories. What is modern was defined by the specific policies of modernizing elites with an apparent admiration of the West. Therefore, the different constructions of what it means to be modern have come to inform the most intimate aspects of daily life as well as the subtle codes of class and status (Kandiyoti, 1997:120). By defining what is "civilized", "urbane" and "modern"

[81] Gole (1997:84) states that with its dominance from Renaissance to the information age, the West has been the reference mark of modernity. "Non-Western experiences no longer make history and are defined as residual, granted an identity only in their reference from the West, namely, as non-Western…. As a result, their history becomes a continuous effort to imitate, to modernize, and to position themselves in relation to presumed Western superiority" (Gole, 1997:84-85). Gole, (1997:85) writes that, in this context, any attempt of modernization became a matter of civilization, which underlines the historical superiority of the West instead of "a historically relative way to each culture". Reforms like the abolition of caliphate and of the sharia (1924) adopting the Swiss Civil Code (1926), changing the alphabet from Arabic script to Latin (1927), replacing the Ottoman fez with the European-style hat were all examples of a rearrangement towards the "new civilization".

according to their aspirations, modernizing elites took these terms under their control. Being modern, being urbane, and being civilized were used interchangeably and all of them have displayed the struggles and tensions of the project.

Although it is easier to observe the effects of modernization on state structures, political institutions, and the industrial economy, the more penetrating effects are on the cultural level, in lifestyles, gender identities, and self-definition of identity (Gole, 1997:83). The most striking aspect in these constructions is emphasized formality. If we remember the discussion of urbanity, it refers to way of relationship with other/relational situations as well as formality. However, in the elite's formulation, the formal aspects are assumed as basic indicators of the term. Similar to mentality in Ottoman past, for Kemalist elite, formal elements of change, such as the outward appearance of people, the cleanliness of streets, and the type and nature of institutions, became synonymous with modernization; therefore, the modernization project was planned with reference to these formal elements of the modernization (Kasaba, 1997:24). By underlining this aspect, Bozdoğan and Kasaba (1997:5) state that; "institutional, ritual, symbolic, and aesthetic manifestations of modernity have become constituent elements of the Turkish collective consciousness since the 1920s" (images, photographs, propaganda films, modern architecture of public buildings in Republican Ankara and other major cities). Formal elements, with their visual power, displayed a powerful proof of modernity against foreigners as well as themselves.

---

[82] As it will be discussed in next chapters, the term cosmopolit was used with a negative connotation throughout the period.

As discussed in the section of “civilizational shift”, in modernization process of Turkey, in order to overcome the duality of the body and mind, both of them were aimed to be changed without considering their relationship. As Lefebvre discusses, the ignorance of the relationship between the content and container in the production of (social) space, inevitably brought the reduction of the content to the container. Therefore, forms and appearances emerged as the highly emphasized elements of the modernization process. As I will discuss in the next chapters, the change in the spatial practices which are reduced to container are seen enough to modernize the cities, houses, individuals etc.

4.3 1930s

The period from 1923 to 1945 was the period of a single-party the Republican People’s Party (RPP). While the 1920s were accepted as the years of upheavals and transformations with the inauguration of Republican reforms, the 1930s were characterized by the crystallization of Kemalist ideology and the consolidation of the new Turkish state (Batur, 1997:68). In the third congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1931, the six principles of Republican ideology were defined as republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, statism and reformism. Within this framework, the limits of the “project of modernization”, or, to put it differently, the project of the “civilizational shift” was drawn.

Generally, it can be said that the 1930s were the years of “imagining the nation” within the boundaries of the ideology of the Republican regime. Certain

institutions were crucial in the dissemination of this ideology like the Turkish Language Society, The Turkish Historical Society, the People's Houses, Universities, the Institution of the Airplane, The Society of Economy (*Tasarruf ve İktisat Cemiyeti*), and the National Turkish Student Union. In the context of imagining the nation, specifically three of them, as the extension of RPP, played a major role: the People's Houses (Halkevleri), The Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Society. While the first dealt with folk culture and vernacular traditions of Anatolia, the others focused on rewriting national history (Bozdoğan, 2001). For example the "Turkish history thesis" (1932) asserted that the first indigenous people of Anatolia were the ancestors of Turks. Or the "sun language theory" (published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* on 9-11 December 1935) claimed that all other languages emerged from Turkish. Also, in order to refine language, Ottoman Turkish words were translated into Turkish. Although most of these attempts were discredited, they were good examples summarizing the nationalist environment of the 1930s.

To give insight into the period, we can give an example from an article published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (26th December 1930). In his article titled as "There is no, and cannot be a Dictator" (*Türkiye'de Diktatür yoktur ve olamaz*), Siirt deputy Mahmut defends Mustafa Kemal against the accusation of being a dictator. Parallel to the developments in Europe, in the 1930s, there emerged a discussion of fascism and the dictatorial regime. These arguments also appeared in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* sometimes to praise it and sometimes to criticize. Since the 1930s were the years of the construction of the "imagined nation", religious movements and socialist demands were seen two important challenges to regime. In news (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4th January 1931) describing the meeting for the memory of Kubilay who

was killed in Menemen, two perils of the Republic were defined: black peril (religion) and red peril (socialism). The color of black peril would become green in following years.

Parallel to the developments in Europe, nationalism could be felt in every aspect of life and culture, especially in the circumstances of the late 1930s. In this era, "there were many Nazi sympathizers in Turkey, and ultranationalist publications like Milli Inkilap, edited by Cevat Rifat, published praise of the German National Socialists along with anti-Semitic editorials and cartoons" (Bozdoğan, 2001:236). In the 1930s, the rising nationalism also showed its effects on the urban space. In a column written under the pseudonym "*Ankaralı*" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14th October 1932), there was a demand to change all the names which were not in Turkish in the city. In May, 1935, the name of Hilal-i Ahmer was changed to Kizilay with the demand of Atatürk (*Ulus*, 9th May 1935).

The 1930s reflected all the features of the single-party period. The policy of the government in the relations with the public was "for the people in spite of the people". Most of the presidents of higher institutions were, at the same time, members of the party. In fact, this situation was one of the proofs of the unity of the party and the state (Sarıoğlu, 2001:135). Another important development in this period was the trial of a multi-party period. The Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) was established by Ataturk with this aim; however, it was forced to abolish itself four months later because of the significantly increasing support for this party.

Also in the economic domain, in the 1930s the Kemalist revolution completed the political prerequisites of the capitalist transformation. What were absent were the tools of economic policies that would examine whether it was possible to develop a national capitalism (Boratav, 1990:46). Boratav (1990:37) defines the period of 1923-1929 as the reconstruction under the condition of an open economy. It was the period in which newly emerging interest groups (emerging bourgeoisie) benefited by using the advantages of having close relationships with the political power holders (1990:44). Furthermore, the 1930s, just after the 1929 World Economic Crisis, were characterized with economic statist policies. In this period, import-substituting policies were implemented and the state started to make industrial investments.

In a conclusion, the period reflects the qualities of single- party regimes. The main feature of the period was the identification of the state with the party and so little dissidence. The 1930s were the years of the imagining nation and the consolidation of the new state in the direction of "new civilization".

CHAPTER V

THE MAKING OF URBANITES

5.1 Homogenized and Unified Community

Peyami Safa defines Kemalism as the "destruction of wooden buildings and wooden minds and construction of concrete ones" (cited by Cantek, 2004:40). Similar to the construction process of the city space, the modern individual should also be constructed according to "new civilization" defined by the dominant state ideology. In this sense, the modern individual was imagined as parallel to the imagination of the nation. As I discussed in the previous chapter civilizing process was formulated within the context of nationalizing process.

In western contexts, the birth of the "sovereign individual" is accepted as the engine of the whole social system of modernity (Hall, 2001:282). As it is discussed in chapter III, the history of urbanity also links with that of the individual. However, in the Turkish context, urbanity is one of the outcomes of the cultural representation of the construction of nation. As Bhabha (1990) points out, although the nation has a clear political definition, its cultural representation is ambivalent and temporal.

The “narrative of the nation” displays this in the manner in which it refers to an origin, continuity, tradition and timelessness. It establishes the national identity on the basis of a pure, original people or folk (Hall, 2001:293-295). Therefore, Anderson proposes that “nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which –as well as against which- it came into being” (1991:12).

Nationalism redefines a collectivity as a new community. Howmuch different its members are, nationalism tries to unify them into one homogeneous identity, belonging to the same “national family”. Turkish nationalism was constructed on the very vulnerability of the new homogeneous community and thus, the necessity of protecting it against internal and external hostile forces. To create the sense of homogeneous nation, the Republican elite frequently put into words the objective of creating a kind of “classless and united nation”. In this environment, as Keyder, says “authoritarianism became the necessary corollary to reliance on collectivist nationalism as the legitimating principle of the state” (1997:46). For him, modernization-from-above brought modernization of the solidarity of the nation but not of its individual members as it is noted in the previous chapter. Individuals were expected to continue living in their “*gemeinschaftlich”* (common) universe under state patronage (1997:46). As it is also asserted in this thesis, while majority of the people remained in their traditional community (*Gemeinschaft*) relations, for a limited (elite) group, it was tried to create a modern society

(*Gesellschaft*)[83] with an overemphasis on "modern/urban way of life". As discussed in the chapter III, with reference to the concept of urbanity, any attempt to create *Gesellschaft* society necessitates the freedom of individuals from their traditional obligations linked to kinship, ethnic and religious ties. However, as Baban discusses, in order to overcome these traditional ties, the republican regime created another communitarian project in which multiplicity and pluralism were limited in order to realize a common good" (2005:53). Difference and diversity, which are the core elements of urban life, were seen as a threat to national unity and social cohesion. As I will show in the next chapters, both the production of space and construction of city life/urbanity reflected this communitarian understanding which I call "modern *Gemeinschaft*".

In this context, it can be said that the collectivist nationalism did not facilitate the individuation of the component parts of the national unity in the Turkish modernization project. For the Republican modernists "the best interest of society came prior to the best interest of the individual or any groups of individuals and that the modernizing elite responsible for guarding the "best interest" also knew what it consisted of" (Arat, 1997:104). Within this framework, for the modernizing elite, the ultimate goal was the unity of the society achieved through a Western type of "progress", therefore, all kinds of differences –ethnic, ideological, religious, and

[83] The modernization project did not include the whole society as it promised both in Ottoman and the early period of Turkish Republic era, reforms done for the modernization project reached to only small part of society (Kasaba, 1997:30). The excluded groups began to display their discontent towards the policies of the Kemalist state especially after the one-party era, which was also the period of mass migration from rural areas to cities. Since that time it was realized that the society is not homogenous and classless as the Kemalist ideology asserted. After 1980s the challenges to modernization project became more apparent especially by Islamist intellectuals and the discussion of different modernities came into agenda (Kasaba, 1997:30).

economic- were presumed to be a threat to unity and progress (Gole, 1997:84). The elite also saw their endurance in the survival of the state and the nation, resting on an understanding of a homogeneous and unified community.

Within this context, after World War I, most of the Christian population was expelled[84]. Before the Republican period, Ankara had the quality of a cosmopolitan city (Nalbantoğlu, 2000). There were six ethnic groups living in the city: 25 thousands Turks, 15 thousands Armenians, 3 thousands Greeks, one thousand Jews and a limited number of French and Italian people (Şenol Cantek, 2003:128). The numbers of non-Muslim population would decrease through out the Republican period.

One of the important features of Turkish modernization that directly affects the history of urbanity is the absence of a bourgeoisie or the classes that would a threat to the power of the state. Therefore unlike Europe, there were not any classes or groups to challenge the authority of the state. Due to the absence of landlords in Ottoman society and the resulting relative independence of the bureaucracy, there were no guardians of the ancien régime except the non-reformist wing of the bureaucracy (Keyder, 1997:40). Because of the ethnic and economic structure of the empire, and with the exile of non-Muslims, there were no longer merchants, bankers, and industrialists when the Republic was established (Keyder, 1997:39). Therefore, state elites did not confront a serious opposition or reluctance of a strong bourgeoisie class. On the other hand, in this period since it is impossible to speak of

[84] Population exchanges have taken place between Greece and Turkey after the first WW. About 1.5 million Greeks by Turkey and half a million Muslims by Greek were expelled.

the existence of a bourgeoisie as a separate group, establishing a national bourgeoisie and creating a national culture became an important issue.

The aim was to move away from the cosmopolitan Ottoman community towards Turkish nation's culture (Baban, 2005:55, Sarıoğlu, 2001:100). In the discussion of the reasons for choosing Ankara as the capital city instead of İstanbul, one of the main reasons was given as the cosmopolitan quality of İstanbul (Sarıoğlu, 2001:26, Tekeli, 1998a). Sarıoğlu argues that the deputies of the new Republic wanted to eliminate this environment which embodied a complexity of values that would prevent the emergence of a national Turkish spirit. Burhan Asaf (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11th August 1931) in his article entitled "Between Two Cities" characterizes life in İstanbul with mixed/hybrid architecture, population and way of life resulting in a deteriorating individualist culture. He says "the first and the foremost safety measure to destroy the cosmopolitan environment of İstanbul, is to Turkify the production system of İstanbul". The cosmopolitan quality, closely associated with the Ottoman past of the city, was symbolized as the main enemy of the regime.

Similar to other Ottoman cities, in that period the wealthy people of Ankara consisted of Greeks, Armenians and Jews who were involved in trade. On the other hand Turks (Muslims) were occupied with agriculture, stockbreeding and crafts (Sarıoğlu, 2001:18-19). With the establishment of the Republic, Turks gained power

in trade and monetary issues[85]. Just after the First World War, with the intervention of the political authority to the economic domain, the power of non-Muslims weakened, and the ownership of real estate was transferred to the newcomers to the city (Nalbantoğlu, H.U. 2000:293). In an article published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (17th February 1936) demanding cheap lands from the state, it was noted that the ownership of the best land that belonged to Armenians and Rums were transferred to the state. However, although the state confiscated these lands, they could not be used efficiently because of the land speculation in the city. So these lands were informally transferred to the newly emerging bourgeoisie of the Republic.

Falih Rıfkı (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17th August 1931) notes that in the Ottoman Empire bourgeoisie means foreigner (*ecnebi*), i.e. Christians and Jews. They were considered neither Turkish nor "good citizens". On the other hand, the Union and Progress Party in the Ottoman period created many rich people and considered them as the Turkish bourgeoisie. According to Falih Rıfkı these people were war-bourgeois. For him, both groups –foreigners and Ottoman rich people- hated Ankara; therefore, the regime would have to create its own bourgeoisie. In order to explain why the Republics deputies' salaries were high compared to the Europeans, an unsigned article was published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (29th August 1930). It said that deputies were given high salary because there was no bourgeoisie in Turkey. Life in

[85] According to 1927 census, there are 29.348 men and 25.205 women in Ankara (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 29th July 1929). According to data displaying the main occupations, 4.625 men and 175 women are civil servant and 10.560 men are the member of army. 21.491 men and 7.194 women of this population know reading (Arabic alphabet not the Latin one). 47.032 men and 23.646 men are Muslim, 703 men and 527 women are catholic, 190 men and 97 women are protestant, 453 men and 64 women are orthodox, 276 men and 402 women are Armenian; 206 men and 83 women are Christian; 330 men and 328 women are Jewish and 53 men and 16 women are belong to other religions (Sarıoğlu, 2001:78). %45 of the married men in Ankara live single (*Ulus*, 13th November 1937).

Ankara was very expensive, and also there was housing shortage. Because of this and other deprivations in Ankara, it was argued that the deputies deserved higher incomes. It is asserted that if Turkish deputies were not supported by high salaries the "assembly would be filled of with "brokers of Galata", shopkeepers of Beyoğlu and Armenian jewellers".

In fact, there was an overt jealousy because of the wealth of these groups stemmed from pre-Republican period (Cantek, 2003:303-304). Apart from their wealth, the communities of non-Muslims were differentiated from the Muslim population also by their way of life. Their dress style, life standards and aesthetic taste were totally different from the Turks. Cantek (2003:304-305) suggests that while some Turks accused and resented them because of their wealth, others admired and appreciated them, and even imitated them since they were seen as advanced/civilized people. Their way of life was the one which was tried to be adopted with the civilizational shift. Therefore, they would be the instructors of people who were eager to learn the new way of life of the Republic. Non-Muslims taught the "art of living" since they had "a more developed civilization" in terms of their eating habits, craftsmanship or the poetic sound of (French) language (Cantek, 2003:305). They were the pioneers of etiquette rules which were demanded by the Republican elites.

Aktüre (2001:60-61) argues that there were mainly three groups comprising the middle class in the 1930s' Ankara: the first was the national bourgeoisie which had been supported since the years of war and which began to dominate city life (e.g. the families of Koclar, Toygarlar, Kınacılar, Kütükcüler, Attarlar, Hanifler). The

people who became wealthy in a short time from the construction sector and real estate also belonged in this group. Their offices were mainly in the old city and they were the owners of the buildings in this area, and some were trying to establish themselves in the new areas of the city. The second group was the civil and military bureaucrats, most of whom originated from the İstanbul elites; they lived in rental houses of the old city at the beginning. And lastly, the craftsmen, artisans and tradesman –like grocers, bakers, barbers- who originated from Ankara constituted the third group. They were located in the old city but some of them began to open stores in the new districts of the city in the period. The lowest strata of the city consisted of unskilled workers (*amele*) living on construction sites or in hostelry's (*Han*) rooms.

The wealthy of Ankara who came into being through trade married among themselves to protect their interests (Sarıoğlu, 2001:33). They retained their communal relations. In terms of their life style these people produced the pre-capitalist culture and could not attune to attitudes of politicians who saw themselves to be in charge of teaching how to be civilized/urbane and modern (Sarıoğlu, 2001:33-34). Although they could not adapt to the "new civilization", there emerged eclectic ways of life which were likewise seen as inappropriate to the desired image of "modern" life and the city. Therefore these groups also would be excluded by the elites of Ankara in the early Republican period.[86]

In spite of the underlined unity, without privilege and class, there was a clear attempt to create a Turkish bourgeoisie which was expected to display a bourgeoisie

[86] Cantek, Ş (2003) says that the native riches of Ankara would able to be apparent in the period of Democrat Party

way of life. In fact the way of life defined with an admiration to Western societies would be the defining quality of the new classes of Turkish Republic. In addition, the notion of individual, urbanite also was defined with reference to this way of life rearranged by the understanding of nationalist collectivity.

5.2 Educating People and Creating Citizens

Educating the people in the direction of Republican ideals was the main concerns of the 1930s's political agenda as a part of the consolidation of the Republic. The verbs like to vaccinate, discipline, educate, cultivate or teach were frequently used to describe the roles of the intellectuals of the Republic. In order to achieve the "civilizational shift" demanding the change of habitus, people of the new Republic should be re-constructed. In 1933, Hamit Zubeyr clearly explains the details of "education of people" in Ulku:

> Training the people means molding a unified social body and a unified nation out of ethnically and linguistically, and civilizationally diverse groups living in our country. It means the cultivation of the spirit in such a way that the thinking, feelings, and desires of individuals will fully coincide with national ideals… Words, publications, art, music, film, and radios are among the most effective vehicles of popular training (quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001:94).

Hamit Zubeyr summarizes the understanding of education: the institutional transformation is never enough, in order to change the civilization, the thinking, feeling, and desires should also be changed. To do this everything would be done

"for the people, in spite of the people"; "the people should be made into men". As Cantek (2003:226) points out, the mentality summarized as "educating people" by the constructive elites was also internalized by the people with the saying of "making man".[87] In that sense "making man" refers to "purification from the habits of rudeness and backwardness" in other words creating new wo/men appropriate to the "civilizational shift". This was a desire to change the habitus of people, the second nature which is the sources of personality.

In Republican period, secular education was one of the effective tools used to instill the desired way of life and thinking to individual in the context of the family and the national collectivity. Compulsory education contributed to the emergence of desired average manners expected from individuals. Turkish Hearths (*Türkocakları*), People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) were also institutions with the mission of educating people. Institutionally, Turkish Hearths undertook the mission of educating people, until 1931 when People's Houses replaced them and their mission. These institutions acted as the school of "civilization" including lessons ranging from European music (*alafranga* music) to typing and gymnastic (education of body (*terbiye-i bedeniye*)) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 20th March 1929). The programs were designed to respond to all demands of "modern people". For example, the building of Turkish Hearth in Ankara was planned as a hotel, theater, museum and library (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22nd November 1928) at the meeting point of the old and the new city.

[87] She also notes that this term is used for other people but never for the speaker who was describing the period.

People's Houses were established in 1931 to educate people and "bring civilization to every corner of the country".[88] According to Bozdoğan, (2001:93) they were "the most important secular centers of assembly and socialization, replacing the traditional social function of the mosque, as well as its architectural prominence in the urban order". Although the religion was removed from these places, the discourse on the sacred was continued through the notion of the nation. The mission of People's Houses was explained as the creation of a "morality" that would ensure all the conditions of the being a good citizen (*Ulus*, 29th September 1937). The new culture of the Republic would be disseminated by People's Houses. Their activities were varied, including language-history-literature, the arts, performances, sports, social work, vocational training, library-publications, museums-exhibitions, and village work (Bozdoğan, 2001:94). They would be the school of good citizens. Reşit Galip (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 20th February 1932) announced that on the stages of the People's House only the plays defending the national thesis could be acted. Those plays would be "the comparison of sultanate and republic; reaction (*irtica*) and revolutions; modern schools and *köhne medrese* (fusty Muslim theological school); good citizen and bad citizen; common interests and self interests…" By this explanation he summarizes the dualities of the cultural background of the state ideology which refused to consider any compromise and therefore, which was closed to hybrids, in-between situations.

In the dominant discourse of the period there was a clear distinction between "citizen" and "people". The citizen was the modern individual, endowed with rights and duties of the Republic, loyal to the ideal of modernization and hence someone

[88] For a detailed discussion of People's Houses see Yesilkaya (2003).

who could represent the Turkish Republic. The modern individual of the Republic was the individual expected to act in accordance with the duties of citizenship, even in her/his personal life (Üstel, 2002:281). The citizen was the individual who internalized the demands of new civilization defined by the state. On the other hand, the people are the mass inherited from the Ottoman past, having traditional and religious ties, and yet loyal to the Republican regime (Şenol Cantek, 2003:34, 217). The object of Republican education was of course these people. From most intimate space to city scale, they should be thought to be "civilized" and should be "made men" (*adam etmek*). In fact, the people having a higher educational level and having participation in social life supported the implementations of the Republic, and seeing the implementations as in evitable and appropriate to overcome the difficulties of the period and the peril of "retrogradation" (Şenol Cantek, 2003:256). Şenol Cantek (2003:254-255) notes that the Republican elite's claim of "making man" was criticized by the dissidents/opponents of the regime on grounds of its social Darwinism. For these latter, seeing the people as uneducated (*terbiyeden mahrum*) meant seeing all the tradition, custom, beliefs and rituals as primitive and so rejecting them. Falih Rıfkı also replies to these critiques in 1932:

> Do you know what I fear? That we could no more mention education of people… When you voice the word, education [the reply is]:
> Oh! The uneducated one is not the people, but you…
> The sentence "people know" is recognized as the words of God. If they know everything, why do we force them in every issue from regime to customs and dressing? (cited in Şenol Cantek, 2003:255)

Falih Rıfkı and other Republican elites saw no problem in forcing people to change their habitus. However, this radicalness rejecting any mediation increased the gap between elite and people, or formal and informal practices. For Bozdoğan (2001:94) in spite of its political and ideological functions, People's Houses play a progressive role: "It was in People's Houses that many provincial Turks living in small towns first encountered theater, classical music, books, and art exhibitions. It was in these buildings that many people engaged in sports or learned typing, accounting, mechanics, vine growing, sewing, embroidery, and hat making". In spite of the limitations, education on above mentioned activities was an opportunity for people having access to them. However, the understanding of total modernization was also included in this education. In fact they reflect the general dilemma of the public spaces created by Republican regime: they gave the possibility of publicity which was limited with the ideology of the Kemalist elite. These institutions were in fact an opportunity to construct mediation between center and periphery (far order and near order). However, as I discussed in the previous chapter, because of the total quality of the project reducing content to container, this mediation remained limited.

5.2.1 Educating bodies: Healthy Generations

The motto "healthy generations" was another emphasis in the dominant discourse on the education of the people. In this context, health and hygiene were used as the indicator of modernness. Also the desired nation and people was summarized with the term healthy new generations. In an article, published in *Ulus* (19th May 1937), the aim of People's Houses is defined as producing healthy, robust masses, rather

than “producing elite people”. Apart from the discussion of “citizens”, in popular discourse modern nation’s modern people was defined with the quality of health.

In the beginning of the 1930s there were articles praising the acts of fascist regimes as in Italy. In such news, the education of youth was seen as the main success of a fascist regime: physical education, national education and moral education (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11th July 1931). A similar narrative was used about the education of healthy new generations. There were gymnasium festivals (firstly held in May 1927) in which the different physical exercises were displayed by female and male students (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18th May 1929). In all related news, those acts, performed as a group, were interpreted as the symbol of national will. In an article, girls in a youth camp were described as “healthy, tanned, robust girls, each looking like an image of health” (cited in Baydar, 2002:238). With their healthy good-looking (modern) bodies, they represented the nation.

In Ankara, capital city of the new regime, urbanites should have bodies appropriate to the civilization project. However, in order to reach to the level of civilized countries, much worked needed to be done. This was described by Falih Rıfkı: “Let’s realize the claim of proportion (*tenasüp davası*). A lot of shapeless women and men with bellies like package, jowls like oilcans, bandy legs, pale faces… On the other hand imagine a Paris Street, a Berlin Boulevard and a Stockholm Avenue. Selim Sırrı[89] has been trying to lengthen the dwarf (*cüce uzatmak*), to make humpbacks flat (*kambur yassılamak*)”. He was very annoyed by the view of the people in the streets. In the representation of space, there was no

place for "dwarfs" and "humpbacks" in Ankara. In order to accord with the new civilization, bodies should be reconstructed. The "man" in the street should be molded in a way that would resemble to idealized individuals of the Europe.

As body and mind integration was essential for the founders of the Republic, children were to be raised using this formula. Not only were their personalities important, but also their bodies, which had to be robust to build up a strong nation. Nevzat Mahmut advised parents to pay attention to the body while raising their children; allowing them "to play in the open air and not put them under a great burden of lessons which would make them sedentary and harm their immune systems" (cited in Mahir, 2005:24). In another writing explaining the sport activities of People's Houses, the aim was described as the development of the body, the spirit and the mind all together (*Ulus*, 19th May 1937). In the same article, it is said that at the beginning the sport activities were deemed as luxury, but People's Houses made them widespread, however, as will be discussed in chapter VI, the elites' in other words, citizen's branch of sport was totally different.

The issue of the care of bodies also occurred in etiquette books. Dr. Zeki Zeren (1940:10) begins his etiquette book "Health, Education and Dress" with the information about health since "the liveliness of the society depends on the health of the individuals". The health of individual was seen as necessary for the health of the nation. He discusses the importance of the healthy body and underlines the danger of microbes threatening "the urbanites" (1940:13).

[89] Selim Sırrı Tarcan was the chairman of the National Olympiad Committee of Turkey.

Having a healthy body was seen as a duty to nation. Dr. Zeki Zeren (1940:10) discussed prerequisites of "modern hygiene"[90] to protect the health under four titles: material conditions related to eating habits and body exercise; living conditions describing the living places with fresh air; personal conditions necessitating "knowing one's own nature" and psychological (*ruhi*) conditions such as being happy, loving others, enjoying "the loyalty to personal and national duties" and "searching for a link between the great power governing the universe and spirit, conscience" (1940:16-19). In this narration, body was also connected to national and spiritual values; fulfilling these conditions was the main duty of the individual. The aim was to create healthy and civilized individuals in a Western guise who were also loyal to the nation and the state.

Corollary, Ankara was defined as healthy city, as an example of modern city. The newness and cleanness of Ankara is always celebrated in contrast to the dirt and dust of İstanbul (Bozdoğan, 2001:67). In an editorial written by *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 13th October 1933), Ankara was compared to İstanbul. He likens Ankara to a sanatorium and says that after a month in Ankara while a person may not be as sophisticated, fragrant and polite as a person from İstanbul, s/he will be healthier and more powerful. In this context, in opposition to elegance of İstanbul, Ankara is defined as a robust city and therefore modern.

As a modern, robust city, Ankara should also have urbanites to suit the city. In *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (6th June 1929), a morning in the city was joyfully depicted.

[90] In 18th century Europe, the necessity of etiquette rules was explained by saying "it is courtly". In twentieth century this explanation was replaced with hygiene (Elias, 1994:92)

The people going to work early in the morning was portrayed with their newly shaved fresh faces, newly shined shoes and ironed mind (*dimağlari utulenmiş kafileler*). Although this picture from the city was limited to a certain district, the desired city was celebrated with desired bodies. The depiction shows that to overcome the duality of body and mind, total project necessitated the regulation of both bodies and minds.

Parallel to the understanding of individual, the health of the individual is connected to national discourse. An individual's health is necessary for the health of the nation. In addition, complementary to civilized manners and behaviors, a robust body is a prerequisite for the desired urbanites of the regime.

5.2.2 Modern Women

Since the issue of women in relation to production of space and construction of urbanity can be a subject to a separate thesis, I try to summarize it in relation to the education of peoples and urbanites since it is an important title in the discussions of modern space.[91] The change in the Civil Code in 1926 brought important changes to family life. Although it had its inadequacies, the Code granted women certain rights and enabled them to participate in public space within the context of the

[91] For a detailed discussion see Kandiyoti (1997, 2007) and Arat (1997).

reconstructed patriarchy. [92] The goal of the Code was the Europeanization of Turkish institutions and especially of family and personal life (Duben and Behar, 1996). Women's acquisition of legal rights to property and the abolition of polygamy, shortly the replacement of the sheri'a code and the recognition of women's suffrage were seen as revolutionary transformations.

Through the reforms women's access to education and appearance in the public sphere increased and "women became highly visible agents of the modern project" (Baydar, 2002:230). Women's access to the public realm in education, professional employment and city life from streets to entertainment increased and this increase was an important source of pride for the Republic. The image of modern women was also an indicator of the success of the nation in detaching itself from the Ottoman past. Similar to modern Ankara, modern women were associated with the qualities of beauty, youth, health and progress and juxtaposed with their old counterparts (Bozdoğan, 2001:80). By regulating and controlling the public visibility, modernity intervenes into the bodies (Çınar, 2005:25) and most apparently to women's bodies. With her body and mind, women were seen as the showroom of the modernization project, and a complementary part of desired urbanity.

With reference to the speech of Atatürk, Baydar (2002:237-238) points out to the gender hierarchies in the discourse on women's rights: "the potentially unruly

[92] Mahir (2005:22) goes over the main points: "In spite of the revolutionary aspects of the code, there were some articles that legitimized the patriarchal family and gave women a secondary status at home. In these articles, the husband was determined as the head of the family. He was responsible for the economic decisions within the family and was the breadwinner of the house. The wife had no legal right to work without the consent of the husband. These articles were important in the sense that they reflected the limitations of the state feminism of the time, which was thought of as a modernizing movement that would liberate Turkish women their rights".

woman is allowed to have public face only after being re-formed by men. She needs to be tamed by men's national and moral values in order not to pose any threat". Despite the liberating claims of Kemalism on women, the idealized image of Turkish women has mainly been the enlightened mother, and the obedient wife. The current feminist critiques argue that the Kemalist reforms were "essentially a paternalistic program casting women as objects of nationalist modernization rather than as subjects in their own lives –as individuals with unique capacities and desires" (Bozdoğan, 2001:82). Peyami Safa, in "*Modern Türkiye Mecmuası*" clearly advocates this approach:

> The modern Turkish woman differs from her predecessors… by being an enlightened woman and mother who carries out her domestic and parental duties with love, knowledge and technical skills, besides having some understanding of world events". In the same writing he says "some fools talk as if the Turkish revolution intends to move the Turkish girl's center of operation [karargah] from home to street. They talk as if hatred of family, hatred of marriage, and hatred of children are the primary features of modern sensibility… From time immemorial, every woman's center of operation has been her home: so will it be for the modern Turkish girl and woman. Through sun, air, books, and radio, this center, this home, will be flooded with all the amenities, interests, and excitement of both nature and the society outside (quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001: 197-198).

Since women were the teachers, caregivers and the educators of society and the children as mothers, (Sirman, 1998:58), their education was also important. They had to be educated so that they could educate the children and the society. Girl Institutes were one of the important institutions of the Republic, established for the

education of daughters of middle-class families. The aim of these schools was to nurture enlightened wives, mothers and homemakers who were "well adapted to Western lifestyles, manners and cuisine" (Bozdoğan, 2001:87). These institutes introduced the Taylorist principles to housework with an emphasis on "national culture" and "scientific housework" (2001:198). "Courses focused on the rational organization of domestic space and on appropriate work schedules to increase household efficiency and productivity" (2001:200). Women were educated in rational methods of cooking, cleaning, washing, ironing, sewing, and child rearing. They learned to make European style fruit pies, cakes, sauces, and soufflés - unknown in their mothers' traditional kitchen - by applying precise measurements rather than guesswork (Bozdoğan, 2001:200). These merits would differentiate them from mothers as the urbanite/modern women of the Republic.

After the legislation of the Hat Law on 25 November in 1925, many women abandoned the custom of veiling and started taking up the streets with their clothing similar to the women of Europe. Following the European fashions, some women begun to dress like men and cut their hair short in a style called "*à la garcon*" (Ormanlar, 1999:47-49). The lengths of the skirts also relatively shortened.

> In contrast to the opening up of women's clothing, limitations on femininity in dress became an issue of morality and decency and were an ongoing topic of discussion in the magazines of the time. It became a strict etiquette rule that others should not see one's underclothing. Thus, opening up went hand in hand with modesty, adding to the dualities that Turkish women encountered (Mahir, 2005:21).

Publicity and freedom are given within the context of formal definition of civilization and modernity. The popular magazines of the period had the mission of teaching civilized lifestyles to women. In addition to articles about housework, there were also commentaries on parenting. (Mahir, 2005:23-24). Especially for women, there were popular journals (*Yedigun* (Sevenday), *Resimli Ay* (Monthly Illustrated)) aiming at educating women along Republican ideals. Maternal qualities of women were underlined by publications on the issues of domesticity, marriage, and family. Furthermore, as Baydar (2002:239) discusses, working women were also depicted as "sacrificing family life for the good of the nation or selflessly generating income to support their families". The working woman was seen acceptable to the extent that she was self-less.

In urban area, modern women are the inhabitants of the modern spaces (Bozdoğan, 2001:82). In fact in terms of the Kemalist modernization project this is a very consistent location for women. Both the city/architecture and women are seen as the spaces of the "exhibition of modernity". Bozdoğan (2001:82-87) and Baydar (2002) discuss the identification of modern architecture with the Kemalist women in detail. Both the issue of women and architecture are seen as visible components of the Turkish modernization project. "Modern architecture" and "modern woman" are used as corresponding terms (Bozdoğan, 2001:82, Baydar, 2002, Arat, 1997). The descriptions used for modern home and modern women correspond to the attributes of desirable modern Turkish women like simplicity, beauty without extravagance, health, youth, practicality and scientific worldview (Bozdoğan, 2001:82, Baydar, 2002:232). Baydar (2002:240) underlines the identification of the modern house with the space of the nation: both of them are owned and guarded by men. Furthermore,

health and hygiene as the "scientific" qualities of being modern are used for the description of desired modern spaces and modern women. She (2001:84) underlines the similarities between objections to veiling of women and reasoning of modern architecture: rationality and physical wellbeing.[93] In order to modernize women, so-called modern lexicon was used to describe the place of women.

Baydar (2002:238) underlines the metaphorical exchange that is established between the nation, the modern house and the Turkish women. Women's bodies are discussed with the notions of boundary and control. "Women's bodies are sites of discipline, control and regulation. Their contours need to be carefully delineated to overcome lack and to guard against excess". Woman's body has been seen through the mirror of "representation of space".

Women's existence, specifically their bodies, are seen as the spaces of "exhibition of modernity" and representation of it. In this sense, appearance and manner are the signs of respectability (Bora, 2007: 57) and modernity not only for women themselves, but also for their husbands and family[94]. Being married to a "modern woman" also signifies the modernness of a man. Therefore the women who adopted modern manners were seen as the ideal wives in the circles of Ankara elites. Since there were limited numbers of such women among the local people, the single women from İstanbul were making trips to Ankara to find husbands (Şenol Cantek, 2003:94). In this sense women's bodies became components of visual politics.

[93] The issue of Modern architecture is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

[94] There are four fundamental symbolic domains in which "high" and "low" value take on specific significance for the ordering and maintenance of social distinctions: psychic forms, the body, geographical space and the social order (Pile, 1996:175)

Republican regime, while freeing women from the traditional visual control, recreated another visual control mechanism. Moreover, if we consider the main quality of urbanity to be freedom from parochialism and surveillance, women are further away from the freedom of urban life. Republican arrangements while trying to create a freedom from the surveillance of Gemeinschaft reproduced the control by the surveillance of a "modern Gemeinschaft".

As I discussed in chapter II, Lefebvre says there is an immediate relationship between the body and its space. As being both the subject and the object, the body transcends this split. However the reflection of the (women's) body from the representation of space, by abstracting it, destroys the immediate relation between the body and its space. This destruction affects (women's) relations with both the self and the other. In Republic's representation of space women were mother, educator, or an image demonstrating the modernness of men with their forms. Therefore, within the construction of urbanity, women were reduced to being objects. In addition, if we remember Lefebvre's discussion of content and container, neglecting their relationship brings the reduction of content to container. Changing body as space, and changing the space in which body is located are seen enough to create modern individuals. Although this reductionist approach affects the discussion of urbanity/citizenship in general, it is more apparent in the issue of women in the Republican period. This overemphasis on formal aspects of the issue of "women freedom" has been still continuing in the discussions of urbanity.

5.3 Constructing Urbanite/Civilized Individuals: Etiquette Rules

As discussed in the above section, the nation was imagined homogenously without privilege and class in official discourse. However, the definition of desired individuals referred to as citizen or urbanite or modern was not consistent with this discourse. In order to realize the civilizational shift, individuals were expected to internalize the Western way of life with its consumption pattern. Being urbane and being civilized has been equated with the application of Western codes of behaviour. And the demanded formal arrangements inevitably created a distinction/border between people adopting these Western way of life and others. There emerged a gap between the formal behaviors defined with reference to Western way of life and informal behaviors based on the traditional way of life. In the process of modernization, it was natural to expect changes in the manner parallel to the transformation of way of life/culture. However, the most problematic aspect of this transformation seem to be, the reducing of the idea of "civilization" to the norms and forms of Western civility and their reification by the Republican elite. This tension is particularly apparent in situations linked to the terms "civilized" and "urbanite" as they become reduced to everything that is simply opposite of the East.

Esenbel (2000:28) says that in the context of "East-West" dilemma, there is no fact more explanatory than the transformation of the etiquette rules expected from modern individual and society to display the social and psychological problems of this process. Since the codes of behavior are deeply embedded in habitus, any attempt to change them in a short time will cause tensions for both the individual and the society. Therefore, my contention is that the most controversial aspect of

Westernization of the culture on the path to modernization emerged with the introduction of the rules of Western etiquette for everyday life.

The cultural crisis of modernization process appeared in the daily life of urban people with the transformation of "the rules of good manners" (etiquette, *adab-ı muaseret*), explaining clothing, rhetoric, writing style, civil law, and the role of religion (Duben &Behar, 1996:59). Cultural modernization "involved a selective appropriation of items of material culture, habit, and taste by different strata of society, creating styles that were also insignia of social status" (Kandiyoti, 1997:119). As a result of this selection process, certain cultural consumption patterns were equated with the condition of modernity by the Republican elites. "Wearing neckties, eating with forks, shaving, attending the theater, shaking hands, dancing and wearing hats in public, and writing from left to right are some of the behaviors that characterize a progressive and civilized person" (Göle, 1997:85-86). This characterization was done with a clear admiration of the West; and as the signs of Westernization, they were expected to be adopted by the people who had totally different codes of behaviour in their daily life.

Application of these rules has been the symbol of civilization and the civilized way of life in the modernization history of the country. In fact, the transformation of the daily life along European models dates back to the Ottoman period, with the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839. Westernization was exhibited in the way of life, dress codes, and interior furnishings. At the end of the 19th century, popular newspapers, journals and novels had the function of introducing a new pattern of thought and behavior, called as "*alafranga*". Especially those published for women,

consisted of the critiques of the Ottoman family life and of knowledge about the European etiquette rules and values, and suggestions about the Western/civilized way of life (Duben & Behar, 1996:32). Similar to the role that they played in Europe; these publications have an important function to determine "the social codes that constitute the way of behavior of middle class" (Duben & Behar, 1996:219). Especially in the last thirty years of the 19th century, as Duben & Behar (1996:218-219) discuss, the ordinary routines and ceremonies of daily life changed to a great extent.[95] While the old cultural materials of daily life were disappearing, they were substituted by imported goods. Educated officials were the pioneers of the modern Western thoughts and institutions, especially in issues like marriage and family. Duben &Behar (1996:224-225) note that although it was difficult to get used to certain rules, the ones who were already accustomed to them or who adopted them faster begun to humiliate "*alaturka*" ways. Especially the "*alafranga*" rules related with "food culture" were defined in the context of hygiene and on the basis of "not disgusting others"[96]. This meant that people had to learn to be disgusted from their habits of eating which rested in centuries-long traditions (Duben & Behar, 1996:225).

However, the understanding of etiquette in Ottoman period was different from the one in Republican period. For Işın (1987b:14-15), the former had a civic character while the later had official quality. In Ottoman period the upper strata could follow an independent path from the court. "The most important factor constituting

[95] The war of the Crimea that brought European people to Istanbul and the migration of Europeanized Turkish from Egypt accelerated the use of European consumption style (Duben &Behar, 1996:218).

[96] Bourdieu points out that, "the redefinition of apparently banal physical practices constitutes an attempt to refashion habit among social groups seeking to shape new subjects" (cited in Kandiyoti, 1997:119). Preferences in fashion, food, music, and general aesthetics map out a complex topography of status.

the civil character of Ottoman etiquette was the lack of a centralist motivation and parallel to this; keeping the flexibility of different social groups' adaptation of their norms to modern image"[97]. However, for Republican elites this understanding of localness could not cater to a consistent image of contemporaneity /modernity. Their aim was to unite the people around a single, official project: "the modernization of the nation". Of course the actors putting this project into practice were staff soldiers and the symbol of the project was the leader introducing both material and nonmaterial (moral) aspects of civilized/modern human being.

Although it was limited, in Republican era there was also a "more prominent" elitist approach resting on the former period (Işın, 1987b:20). The traces of the residue of this elitist approach could be seen in the etiquette book of Abdullah Cevdet. Rather than elaborating on daily life practices, his book gives particular ways of behavior determined by the changing social relations, such as "what to say on the telephone?", "how to behave in an elevator" (Meriç, 2000:239). His attempt is evaluated by Işın as the support of elitist tradition against the populist tendency of the Republic[98], since according to Abdullah Cevdet, making etiquette rules widespread would mean populism that would degenerate elitist spirit. Etiquette rules were for high society, not for the people in general. However, creating average etiquette rules in a practical manner could open the doors to the modern world (Işın, 1987b:20). Within the mentality of Republican elites, through these average rules, a

[97] According to Ahmed Midhat Efendi who published the book of "European Etiquette or Alafranga" in 1894, international etiquette which he referred to as "savoir vivre cosmopolite" was the product of abstraction; and it had no link with the social dynamics of daily life (Işın, 1987a:33).

[98] Işın (1987b:16) says that encyclopedists, one of whom was Abdullah Cevdet, believed that social modernization could be realized through a gradual culturation process instead of daily life politics. He rejects the culturation process compatible with people's daily life practices.

homogeneous society beyond the cultural and class differences could be created. Although Republican elites wanted to mitigate the strictness of these rules in comparison to Ottoman period, because of the radicalness of demanding a change in the habitus, application of the etiquette rules produced new exclusions by increasing the gap between formal and informal behaviour. I will expand this discussion of distinction created by etiquette through Elias's concept of the "formal-informal span".

5.3.1 Formal-Informal Span of Etiquette

In all more differentiated societies there are social situations demanding formal codes of behaviour; and other situations in which informal behaviors are appropriate. Elias (1996:28-29) discusses this aspect of civilization with the term "formality-informality span". "Formality-informality span" refers to "the extent and strictness of the social rituals which bind the behaviour of people in their dealings with each other" (Elias, 1996:70).[99] For him the formality-informality gradient is quite related to power gradient of a society (1996:53) since the gap between them reflects the social distance between different strata. This can perhaps be better understood through a discussion of the function of formalization. According to Elias, the main

[99] For Elias (1996:33-35) the hallmark of the civilizing process is the change in the relation between external social constraints and individual self-constraints. In this process, the self constraint apparatus becomes relatively stronger than external constraints, and becomes "more even and all-embracing". However, he also mentions the differentiation in the degree of self constraint in accordance with the unequal power relations among groups. He says that a non-absolutist, multi-party regime requires stronger self control. Nevertheless, in societies with unequal power relations, self-control apparatus develops for those in power, those who are higher in rank. For social subordinates there is no need for self restriction. They can "let themselves go". As an example he discusses the informality of brawling for lower classes, and formality of dueling for upper class.

functions of formalization are to differentiate and distance the higher and lower strata with that of "promoting the integration of the higher group itself" (1996:72).

> Together with their feeling of separation from the lower groups, it reinforced their feeling of belonging to the higher groups and their pride in their membership. This is a recurring double function of the formalization of behavioral strategies in established groups. They impose upon their members patters of self constraint, which vary according to the situation and stage of social development; they imposed forms of self-denial which also serve as signs of distancing, marks of distinction and symbols of superiority. As reward and compensation for this self-denial, members are offered an increased sense of personal worth, the deep satisfaction of to be repeatedly drawn from the awareness of belonging to the higher ranking group, and the self conception of being one of the 'better sort of people' which usually goes along with that (1996:72).

In this sense, formalization is a way to create "distinction". The polarization between formal and informal behaviour refers to an increasing gap between the upper and lower classes. Therefore, according to Elias (1996:30) the process of functional democratization which he defines as "the thrust towards diminishing the power gradient between rulers and ruled, between the entire state establishment and the great mass of outsiders" contributed to the decrease in formal-informal span[100]. On the one hand this decrease is related with the spread of formalization to middle classes. For Elias (1996:33-35), since power differentials have lessened in the course of the process of democratization, in modern world people - including subordinates - have had to develop a high degree of self-restraint. On the other hand, however,

formalization process was challenged by informalization process. The formalization process of upper and upper-middle classes was partially challenged by "informalization process" raised in the 20th century with the effect of urbanization: "…the attraction felt by middle-class strata for upper-class models gradually decreased after the turn of the century, as the weakness of the nobility and its inability to protect the middle classes from the rise of the working classes became ever clearer. Advancing industrialization and especially urbanization contributed decisively to this development" (1996:85). In the 20th century, power differential between certain groups like men and women, parents and children, rulers and ruled lessened (Elias, 1996:25).

Within this context, informalization means emancipation from the external constraints of a preordained social ritual, however, it must be noted that it brings higher demands on the self-constraint apparatus of the individual (Elias, 1996:37). On the one hand "the contrasts in conduct between the upper and lower groups are reduced with the spread of civilization"; on the other hand "the varieties or nuances of civilized conduct are increased" (Elias, 1994:464). Through this process, self constraints become stronger. According to Elias, the formality-informality span has been getting smaller in modern societies[101]. Elias underlines that the "tendency – partly unintended, partly intended is towards the same behaviour in all situations" (Elias, 1996:29). For each generation it is possible to talk about the relaxation of

[100] Smith, (1999:94) says that in Elias's view, "during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there have been strong tendencies toward functional democratization and the equalization of relations between established and outsider groups". However, according to Foucault, "the French Revolutionary period inaugurated a regime of centralized scientific-legal domination". However, Smith overlooks the fact that in Elias' discussion, the decreasing gradient refers to the internalization of external constraints.

previously formal behaviour, although "formality-informality gradient can also have a quite different structure in different nations in a particular period" (1996:30).

5.3.2 Increasing Gap between Formality and Informality

When we look at the modernization project of Turkey, its main problematique seems to be the gap between the formality and informality. While the institutions were being arranged according to formal rules of "new civilization", in daily life people were living within their traditional habitus. Although this situation might not be a total source of contradiction, modernization in the sense of Westernization demanded the change in private sphere which also necessitated its formal arrangement. It was an attempt to change people's habitus without providing necessary base structure. Hence, there emerged a gap between the formal rules demanded by the Republican elites and the informal rules coming from the tradition, the actual "second nature" of many people. This condition has been pronounced as the rupture between two different ways of life. Since Kemalist ideology strictly rejected the hybrid forms and intermediary spaces, disconnectedness became the defining quality of modernization process. However, through daily life, individuals had to deal with this contradiction and this had a profound impact on personality structure. This process of dealing manifested itself as the inevitable emergence of informal hybrids. As Çınar (2005:16) discusses the "hybrid adaptation tailored to the particularities of local sociopolitical practices" in Turkey. Hybrid adaptations (synthesis) have been produced through the

[101] Although there are exception periods like Nazi Germany (decivilizing), the span has been decreasing (Elias, 1996:29).

interaction of formal and informal; through the struggle of strategies and tactics; and through the mediation of space.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, in order to overcome the duality of body and mind, Republican elites aimed at changing them both through changing habitus with reference to their definition of new civilization. A demand to change habitus is also a demand to change privacy, even inclusive of the personality structure. According to Işın (1987b:15), in etiquette of the Republic, an exaggerated importance was attributed to complementary composition of body and mind/soul, aiming to provide an explicit extroversion. This consistency was expected especially in terms of laicite. In addition to his/her appearance, the individual's inner world was also expected to display secular manners, attitudes and gestures. In this sense, Western appearance was seen as the container of an idealist mind/soul that espoused the laicité of the Republic. Through the etiquette, Republican elites were aiming to change the moral pattern of daily life according to the model of secular society (Işın, 1987b: 13-14). Bureaucrats were the first to adopt this pattern and they seemed to be molded into the desired form in a short period of time; therefore, formalization initiated in this social circle.

In fact, etiquette as a part of *cultural capital* was a tool to draw (exclusionary) boundaries between elites and people. Elias suggests that (1994, 1996) these formal rules have the function of symbolling a social membership and social distance. As discussed above, one of the main functions of formalization of etiquette is to distinguish the higher standing group and to differentiate people of higher and lower

strata (1996:72). Separate from the aim of Westernization, Western way of life also functioned to create the sense of distinction for the elites of the Republic.

> …for the newly emerging Turkish elites who lacked the economic capital to distinguish themselves from the masses, etiquette served as a means of cultural segregation. For this reason etiquette, which was considered to be one of the most apparent signs of modernization, was found strong support among the Republican elites since it contributed to determining their social status (Mahir, 2005:15)

Starting from the early years of the Republic these rules were applied as the signs of distinction, especially in the environment of "modern gemeinschaft". Through formalization, the daily life was controlled by these external constraints within the community. In the spread of etiquette rules throughout the society, soldiers, bureaucrats, and teachers were the agents of the process[102]. For a bureaucrat, family life was not independent from working life because of the formal character of the personal life (Işın, 1987b: 15). Within this environment, all families were acquainted with each other and they were organizing all activities together. As I will elaborate in chapter VII, the life in Yenişehir was turning around a small community in which everybody knew each other. Public life of the city consisted of balls, parties, visiting days, and activities done as groups, like visiting villages. All of these practices were carrying the formality of the Republican ideals. Işın (1987b) underlines the morality attributed to these activities within this life of the city. All the activities were seen as a mission to disseminate the ideals of the Republic. Even

within the family, this morality was lived together by the family members. Especially bureaucrat families were the pioneers of the dissemination of Western etiquette.

As noted before, Jews in the city and the people coming from İstanbul who were "open to civilization" in the city also acted as people's guides. (Ş.Cantek, 2003:149). Moreover, as I will discuss in the section of "city life", the elegant places of the city were the schools of the new etiquette. While discussing the history of civility, Elias (1993:63) says being civilized gradually became more and more bound up with manners of seeing. "In order to be really "courteous" by the standards of civilité, one is to some extent obliged to observe, to look about oneself and pay attention to people and their motives". Observing themselves and others brought molding: molding themselves and others. By attending to public spaces of the new civilization such as an "elegant" pub, restaurant, or a ball, being civilized/urbane was learnt by observing how to dance, drink and act towards the opposite sex. However, this type of "education" was open to people who also have access to these public spaces.

In the early Republican period books were written and translated to teach etiquette rules. Some of them were: "Etiquette: the Latest and the Most Advanced Social Manners" by Gottfried Andreas, "Protocol and Etiquette" by Lütfi Simavi, Illustrated Perfect Etiquette by Abdullah Cevdet (1927), "Conversations on Etiquette" by Saffeti Ziya (1927), "New Etiquette for the Man of the New Life" by

---

[102] According to Esenbel (2000:21-22), the case of Turkish modernization is not just a local alternative and a unique/peculiar example. In order to be a part of contemporary /modern times, most of the population of the Europe had to learn to import the culture disseminating from city centers like Rome, Paris and London accepted as a "high" culture. They had to learn to adopt that culture to their local and individual environment

Muhittin Dalkılıç (1932) "Health, Education and Dress" by Dr. Zeki Zeren (1940). The magazines of the period like Muhit and Aile Dostu also contributed to the education of people in terms of etiquette rules (Mahir, 2005:19). In these writings, there were discussions of family life, activities at home, visiting, ceremonies, balls; rules of being a guest at dinner parties, street manners, table manners, etc. The issues were given in detail like how to kiss the hand of a woman and how to talk with a woman. The issue of communications between men and women was an important topic. In these books there were also certain subjects that had no counterpart in Turkish society like visiting church or eating pork at the breakfast (Işın, 1987b, Meriç, 2000:64-72, 240).

As I discussed in the previous chapter, construction of the inner world/morality through private sphere was the radical aspect of the modernization project. Modern family life was the main medium for this intervention. Activities taking place in the family constitutes an important part of etiquette rules. Banquets, visiting days, meetings were especially important to show the capability of displaying social utopia by family (Işın, 1987b: 15). Yielding to meal times and coming together around a table are official aspects of new etiquette and are introduced by the Republic. The regulation of the time was also important: times to sleep, time to wake up and be at work, times of breakfast, lunch and dinner were all determined. "Daily activities were regulated according to rules and the new generation was to learn modernity by their application" (Mahir, 2005:19-20). The celebrations of birthdays or wedding anniversaries reflecting a secular culture also became widespread in the Republican period. No such traditions existed in the Ottoman culture; one and only

ritual related with human being was the commemorating of death anniversaries as a necessity of religion (Işın, 1987b: 15).

The application of these rules to everyday life in detail is the proof of being civilized and urbanite -at least- through appearances. In order to overcome the duality of body and mind, in Lefebvre's terms, content is reduced to container in the application of these formal codes of behaviour. The most efficient and rapid way to create a modern/civilized individual was to create his/her guise according to the standards of Western society.[103] Etiquette rules were the complementary part of the visual transformation especially through clothing and way of behavior. With the introduction of hat law in 1925, men's clothing that was worthy of the nation was explained by Mustafa Kemal: "boots or shoes on our feet, slim trousers on our legs, shirt and tie, jacket and waistcoat, and of course, to complete these, a cover with a brim on our heads, this head covering is called a hat" (quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001:58-59). The details of the clothing were discussed in length in etiquette books of the period. Especially the parts seen as accessories -not having practical usage like hat, glove and umbrella- were specifically necessitated to explain in detail. [104]

While criticizing the period from the eye of a character in his novel, *Ankara*, Karaosmanoğlu (2003:106) says that for some people "after the change in way of clothing, national affair turned into the affair of being "monden" (high society): dressing, dancing, entertaining, in brief living like a European was as important as winning a victory". The path to success in a civilizational shift was through a

[103] For the discussion of "the constitutive power of clothing" see Çınar (2005:55-59).
[104] For the contents of these books see Meriç (2000)

struggle to change civilization from "*alaturka*" to "*alafranga*". Although Karaosmanoğlu criticizes it, etiquette drew impermeable boundaries between the ordinary people and the Republican elite who developed different life-styles and remained estranged to each other. As noted above, these formal rules have been effective tools for elites to distinguish themselves from others and to construct their superiority over others in order to strengthen social hierarchies. Therefore, etiquette, by formalizing the daily life, not only cut the ties with the Ottoman traditions, but also isolated the elites from the people they sought to rule (Mahir, 2005:18). There emerged an increasing gap between formal and informal practices that increased the gap between elites and people in terms of manners.

In this process, although bureaucrats and civil servants were first to adapt etiquette, as it is noted it was not an easy process to change habitus. Therefore it was possible to encounter informal/traditional habits among these social settings as well. When narrating the memory of her mother who came to Ankara due to her husband's work, Nezihe Araz (cited in Ş.Cantek, 2003:250) mentions that she was very disappointed since she could not see a single gentleman in Ankara. Her father in law took her to a government office to show the gentlemen of Ankara. She was still disappointed since it was not convincing for her "to call men wearing wool socks gentlemen". Although informal/traditional rules were still regulating the life of many people, through education, etiquette was expected to disseminate to the society, starting from the bureaucrats and civil servants. As I will also discuss in the part of city life, the realization of formalization was tried to be achieved by mechanisms like education, exclusions, internalization of foreign gaze and embarrassment. These have been effective tools in the construction of urbanity.

5.3.3 Learning to be Embarrassed

Personality is not a private issue, it is extremely governed. As White and Hunt, underlines, in modern times, "to be a citizen is both to be part of an imagined community and, at the same time, a self-conscious and self-monitoring ethical being" (2000:106). The changes of the codes of behaviour/civility correspond to the changes in "people's personality structure". To put it differently, the history of the "civilizing process" is also the history of the subject and subjectivization[105]. Therefore in Turkish context, the social history of subjectivity should be discussed by considering the "civilizational shift" which is realized as a "nationalizing process".

As Esenbel (2000:20) points out, the psychological history of modernization is still unwritten for the countries outside the Western world. However, as Elias (1994) points out, the changes in personality structure should be thought within the context of social change. For him sociogenesis, the study of processes of social development and transformation, is necessarily linked to the analysis of psychogenesis – the study of the processes of psychological development and transformation (van Krieken, 1998:6). Current theories on the formation of subjects and their imbued subjectivity tend to focus on power relations or the act of an individual in relation to the "other". One definition of the "self" is the awareness of one's distinctiveness, or separateness, of having borders/boundaries between oneself

[105] "The history of Western societies is seen to be characterized by an increasing objectification and disciplining of subjectivity, an ever- intensifying ordering of the soul, which, coupled with increasing individualization, seems to have turned us moderns into thoroughly self-controlled, administered, not to mention depressed 'autistic neutrums'" (Kamper cited in van Krieken,1990:353).

and others - or to put differently, between the inside and the outside. The possibility and the intensity of the permeability between inside and outside of the "space", therefore, determine the relationship with others. Tracing the history of urbane/urbanity in Turkish context , in one sense means tracing the history of the "modern individual"/subject and also the habitus determining the way of relationship with strangers/social conduct. If we think urbanity as the way of relationship with others/strangers, this relationship is quite related with the quality of borders that separate self from others in different scales of space ranging from body to city scales.

As I noted above, in order to overcome the duality of body and mind, Republican elites aimed to change both of them to achieve a civilizational shift, necessitating a change in habitus. However, ensuring the composition of body and mind is a difficult issue as it is inclusive of the social and psychological problems within this process. The increasing gap between the formal and informal behaviors also put extra pressure on the individual in her/his relationship with her/his self and others.

Formalization which was initiated by the imposition of external (formal) rules which was expected to be internalized in the longer run by the ideal citizens of the Republic through the help of above mentioned controlling mechanisms. In a particular social environment, internalization succeeded in creating the feeling of embarrassment; however, it was not enough to create self-confident individuals. Although desired urbanites were created in appearance to a certain degree, there were problems in the desired composition of the body and the mind which were apparent in the unnatural and confused behaviors of individual. The problems such as the lack

of “naturalness” and “confidence” were inevitably uttered by people pioneering this process of “civilizational shift” as well. According to Işın (1987b:15), “a self confident person’s easiness in behavior or the capability of flexible gestures did not become established” in the manners of the Republican individual. The main reason for this situation was the increasing gap between formal and informal behaviors, and absence of mediations between them. Rejection of formal mediations by modernizing elite slowed down the process of the dissemination of etiquette to society, and increased the gap between center and periphery.

The separateness of two different ways of life in Ankara became embodied in manners, beliefs, way of clothing and language. However, the most striking example has been manners at the dining table since it is the most visible one. The conflict stemming from the differences in beliefs and manners was discussed by Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın (1999) by underlying the differences between yesterday and today; son and parent in 1930s. His writing was titled “A Deep Crisis: Yesterday”. According to him, by reading the publications of the period, new generations were discovering new worlds that they did not previously know. However, they still remained strangers to this world since they learnt it just by reading about it. But reading was enough for them to disapprove of their mothers and fathers, of the old order of this country and its state of affair/goings-on. For Yalçın, this situation brought children and parents to a conflict and spiritual detachedness (*ruh ayrılığı*), so they could not find a word to say to each other. While the father was mentioning faith, fatalism and death, the son was very doubtful about these notions. While the parent was conceiving this world as temporary and a place of trial, the son was yearning for happiness in this word.

> While the mother and father were eating from a shared bowl, kneeling down around a copper tray (*sini*) on the ground, the son was disgusted from people who did not eat from their own personal bowls with a fork and a knife, on a table with four legs (1999:22).

He says that the father was sorry for his son and the son was ashamed of his father. Therefore, these people who were in fact the real best friends and supporters of each other would inevitably offend and annoy each other. According to Yalçın, this situation was inevitable because of the revolutionary feature of the time: "the souls in the times of the revolution would suffer this pain at the expense of the progress" (1999:22). The suffering and embarrassment of the individual who stands in between the formal and informal behaviors is seen as normal by Yalçın. Even a project aiming a total change in order to prevent the duality of body and mind would not be sufficient to end this suffering.

Eating from a common bowl or the use of *sini* are (still) widely used indicators of urbanity in the Turkey. The feelings of embarrassment and disgust are defined with reference to these eating habits. While discussing the civilizing process, Elias also discusses similar situations for Western societies' reference to the fork:

> ….Why is it more civilized to eat with a fork?
> 'Because it is unhygienic to eat with one's fingers'. That sounds convincing. To our sensibility it is unhygienic if different people put their fingers into the same dish, because there is a danger of contracting disease through contact with others. Each of us seems to fear that the others are diseased.
> But this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Nowadays we do not eat from common dishes. Everyone puts food into his mouth from his own plate. To pick it up from ones own plate with one's fingers cannot be more 'unhygienic' than to put

> cake, bread, chocolate, or anything else into one's mouth with one's own fingers.
>
> So why does one really need a fork? Why is it 'barbaric' and 'uncivilized' to put food into one's mouth by hand from one's own plate? Because it is distasteful to dirty one's fingers, or at least to be seen in society with dirty fingers. The suppression of eating by hand from one's own plate has very little to do with the danger of illness, the so-called 'rational' explanation. In observing our feelings toward the fork ritual, we can see with particular clarity that the first authority in our decision between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' behaviour at table is our feeling of distaste. The fork is nothing other than the embodiment of a specific standard of emotions and a specific level of revulsion (1994:103-104).

For him the reason of the change in eating techniques in modern times is related with the change in the structure of drives and emotions[106]. The standards of delicacy rise corresponding to social prohibitions. "These taboos, so far as can be ascertained, are nothing other than ritualized or institutionalized feelings of displeasure, distaste, disgust, fear, or shame, feelings which have been socially nurtured under quite specific conditions and which are constantly reproduced, not solely but mainly because they have become institutionally embedded in a particular ritual, in particular forms of conduct"(1994:103-104). For him, in modern times, rules of behavior became more detailed, and thresholds of embarrassment are lowered. For Elias, from the childhood, the behaviors and feelings are molded into conformity with certain standard by external pressure. These limitations are internalized and become superego "that forbids the individual to eat in any other way than with a fork". Rules of behaviour by becoming the part of automatic constraint become a habit (1994:153).

In a similar way in the situation of civilizational shift, there is the expectation of shift in habitus which is a "second nature" also functioning when a person is alone. All the codes of behaviour and feelings are demanded to be re-moulded in accordance with new ones. Therefore, the feeling of embarrassment is also re-defined. In the Turkish context, through the construction process of urbanity *alaturka* manners and feelings are accepted as the source of embarrassment.

By voicing the feeling of shame in this context, urbanity has been constructed on opposition to *alaturka* manners. The encounter of modern and traditional forms could be accepted as the causes of such situations. Similar to the case of embarrassment from parents, a witness of the period mentions his memory from childhood coinciding to the period (Ş. Cantek, 2003:153). He talks about the tshirt and sport shoes wanted for the gymnastic lesson at the school. Since he could not afford to buy them, his mother had sewed an athlete and had knitted a bootee instead of shoes. When he saw other students with original clothes at school, he felt embarrassed. With the internalization of the rules of behaviour with reference to constructed (formal) urbanity, the feeling of embarrassment would be redefined with reference to this formality.

While explaining the changes in people's actual behaviors and feelings, Elias (1994) says "superior" and "inferior" are defined often quite arbitrarily. This arbitrariness is limited by the power relations within the society. The distinctions

---

[106] Freud (1989) in Totem and Taboo discusses the relationship between external human civility and internal struggle through the use of the terms repression and desire. In this context civility as a form of

produced by these relations are accepted by individuals in order to acquire social respectability and avoid shame. What is felt as a source of embarrassment and found offensive is determined according to the power relations within that society. In order to join a group, their etiquette must be internalized or at least must be pretended[107]. Getting used to this new etiquette emerges as a problem challenging personality for especially people just entered to this group.

Bozdoğan states that "Republican leaders wanted to import Western forms, institutions, and lifestyles without importing the feeling of "alienation" and individual subjectivity that are central to the experience of modernity" (2001:235). However, in modernization process, it wasn't possible for an individual to be either a loyal follower of tradition or a complete Westerner. Esenbel (2000:19) asserts that, as early as the Ottoman times, the elite's anxiety of constructing a daily life similar to Western culture has constituted the peculiar aspect of its own identity of "modern individual", and that the vacillation of the individual between tradition and modernity has produced eclectic cultural patterns that were experienced by each new generation of the Republic. As Esenbel (2000:33) notes, although the feeling of uneasiness also accompanied the elite, this situation involving conflict and anxiety on a personal level could be overcome by them easier. However, for the less advantaged others, it would not be so easy to solve problems deriving from this tension of modern-traditional, because of the limited access to the opportunities of modern life that would mitigate the tension affecting the personality structure.

---

repression can be defined as the mask of urbanites.

[107] Bourdieu (1986:47) distinguishes three types of Cultural Capital: embodied, objectified and institutionalized. According to this categorization, pretension is limited with the type of cultural capital.

5.3.4 Borrowed Way of Life

As I discussed above, this formalization is accompanied by an increasing gap between formal and informal manners. Starting from the civil servants and bureaucrats of the period, this new etiquette was tried to be applied in the daily lives of elites of the Republic. Because of the rejection of mediation and overemphasis on form, the dissemination of this new etiquette to the society was very limited. In fact, there have been different reactions towards these changes.

We can differentiate the reactions through following the responses and reactions to the hat law. Since there were strict legal sanctions - including capital punishment -, the use of hat turned into a symbol of power struggle. Şenol-Cantek (2003:245-247) with reference to her interviews with the witnesses of the period, mentions different attitudes in Ankara. Although it was said that "*many people*" celebrated it as the symbol of modernization, some people opposed the hat law to show their dissatisfaction to the regime. Therefore, to reject wearing a hat was an attitude of people challenging the new regime. Apart from these there were two other groups: One of these was the people who could not wear a hat even if they wanted because of the binding effects of their already established habits. The new appearance was too unfamiliar and disturbing to their daily life. For this group ideological references had secondary importance. These people tended to isolate themselves from the public space rather than having to wear a hat. The second group consisted of people who were wearing hats due to obligatory laws although they could not

become accustomed to this new way of daily life. However, these radical formal rules could be surmounted by informal tactics, like buying one hat and using it commonly in a group.

Since hat became the sign of the state-of-belonging to a "civilized community", wearing it was the shortest way to satisfy the desire of inclusion into this community. In particular situations, hat looked like a borrowed thing ("e*ğreti durmak*"[108]) on these people in their daily lives. "Borrowedness" is commonly used term especially in the arrangements ignoring the relationship between content and container. Fear of punishment and the feeling of necessity to prove loyalty to the new regime might force people to adapt new accessories. As Şenol Cantek underlines, people show pictures of their family members with hats even today, to demonstrate how modern families they have. Within this group, there were exaggerations like using hats while resting and this situation was the source of many anecdotes and was subject to the mockery of the elites (as the "real owner" of the hat).

Exaggeration of these rules was seen as the indicator of being artificial, hypocritical and double-faced. Roughly, we can differentiate this act of exaggeration according to different socio-classes in this period. On the one hand, some elite, who were more familiar with these rules, exaggerated the etiquette to highlight their distinction from others. On the other, some people, having the expectation of entering

into elite circle, also exaggerated in order to compensate their unfamiliarity with etiquette as in the example of the hat. The latter were called to as "parvenu"[109]. Within this context, in both situations, the exaggeration of etiquette rules was called as "*alafranga* unmannerliness".

Işın (1987a:32) argues that with modern life, alafranga unmannerliness emerged due to the lack of ability to use and organize the practical objects belonging to modern space of daily life. In this sense, he underlines two different understandings of time and space in 19th century daily life: modern and traditional; and the attempt to balance these different worlds. To a certain degree, this confusion, bringing conflict, continued in the Republican period. The person confusing the time and space of modern and traditional worlds in daily life was an important figure in 19th century novels. He was a tragicomic character, "an imitator who masked his unculturedness with a snob attitude" (Işın, 1987a:32). He was also a threat to the myth of civilized Europe. As Işın (1987a:32) argues, the Ottoman term "*âdâb-ı muâşeret*" (etiquette) was created to reduce the friction between the traditional and modern patterns of life to a minimum; to call attention to the complementary points in each one; and most importantly to keep the myth of Europe alive. However, as noted above, the exclusion of localness by Republican elites to create a consistent image of contemporary civilization resulted in the friction between the modern and

[108] "*Eğreti" (iğreti)* means not owned but borrowed; it is a term used for inappropriate/unsuited situations. It may refer to cultural contradictions involving class positions. Erdoğan (2007:23) points out that being poor/subaltern means lacking the "tools to express themselves". Apart from other things, it is the lack of ability to speak in one's own language and in language socially defined as respectful and legitimate. These people while on one hand, reject to be despised, on the other may not like their language and narration or may depreciate/devalue their own thoughts. Therefore, Erdogan points out their in-between situation as being between "narrating his/her self" and speaking in "other's language". Other's language can be interpreted as borrowed language.

the traditional. In fact, for two periods the same example was used to explain the dilemma: a university student vacillating between the manners related with meal on the table and meal on the "*sini*".

While the individuals who wanted to be included by elites applied to exaggeration to overcome this vacillation, there were also reactions to the etiquette of the new civilization, since these new rules were seen inappropriate to the tradition of the country. This response can be interpreted as a romantic reaction to modernization. Gürbilek (2004a:80) points out the similarity of this reaction between Turkish and German modernization processes. She states that German romanticism, defending "kultur" against "zivilisation" at the end of the 19th century, can be interpreted as both a sign of belated modernization and a reaction to artificiality of English-French civilization. For her, the effects of this approach can be found in Turkish modernization history such as in Ziya Gökalp's dualism of culture-civilization, or Peyami Safa's body-mind. Gürbilek interprets this emphasis on dualisms as a fear of artificiality and externality, and as a romantic reaction intertwined with nationalism and conservatism with an emphasis on community - all deriving from a fear of being latecomer to modernity. In a similar way, Işın (1987a:34) says that since the ideal of freedom could not be reached, the thing left behind was the design of modern morality. In this environment, romanticism emerged as a result of the belief that modern ideals fell behind the interests in daily life. In Peyami Safa's novels this distinction is represented as the conflict between country man (*taşralı genç*) who is

[109] The term parvenu refers to the condition of eclecticism rather than a synthesis (reinterpretation creating mediation).

equated with the soul and spiritual values and dandy (*züppe*) who is modern, urbane and estranged to the community.

Dandy has been a popular theme in Turkish literature (Moran, 2007, Gürbilek, 2004b) [110]. In fact, he emerged as a main character of novels with the modernization movement in Ottoman times. However, he has also transformed through the different steps of modernization. As Moran (2007: 259-268) discusses, while he was initially ridiculous with his *alafranga* (western), spoilt character, later he became educated, clever and disloyal (to the nation) with the effect of rising nationalism. Yet the unchanged feature of dandy has been his positioning as individualistic, urbanite and estranged to community. These qualities have also been defined as detrimental and unnecessary to organic solidarity of the nation (as well as the traditional social structure organized around religion). In this sense, the character of dandy, totally different from the European context[111], emerged as a reaction to modernization and Westernization. He is the embodiment of the fear of estrangement to society. This fear of estrangement brought the search of authenticity as a moral virtue as opposed to the etiquette of the Republic.

In his novel "*Ankara*", Karaosmanoğlu (2003:109), also a member of Republican elite, criticizes this attitude through the eyes of the main character Sema

[110] Boyd (2006:872) also gives examples from Western literature depicting the function of etiquette to block the mobility of young men of new wealth in Europe.

[111] Charles Baudelaire in 1863 defined the dandy as one who elevates aesthetics to a living religion and whose existence accuses the responsible citizen of the middle class: "Dandyism in certain respects comes close to spirituality and to stoicism" and "These beings have no other status, but that of cultivating the idea of beauty in their own persons, of satisfying their passions, of feeling and thinking .... Contrary to what many thoughtless people seem to believe, dandyism is not even an excessive delight in clothes and material elegance. For the perfect dandy, these things are no more than the symbol of the aristocratic superiority of his mind."

who defines "*monden*" life (the life of high-society) as an "artificial world". She could not reconcile her husband's old-fashioned alafranga attitudes (2003:117) although he was very assertive about the rightness of his attitudes since he had been in Europe and read all the etiquette books. "After she saw the attitudes of the European men, she could better understand the incongruity of kissing a woman's hand by bending, keeping the hat in hand during the conversation and reverencing in every occasion" (2003:117). For Sema, the acts and attitudes of these people were fake, pretended, borrowed, artificial, and fictive, like a banal drama in a theatre (2003:135). Exaggeration of etiquette rules was interpreted as a sign of insincerity, and therefore was related with acting, posing and show (of courtesy) (*nezaket gosterisi*). Selma prefers people who are illiterate of etiquette to her husband, behaving like an actress/performer (*artist*). "It is less ridiculous and worth despising to stand like a motionless model, as others do, then being a set up puppet like her husband" (2003:99). According to this narration, since the new regime could not create its individuals, there emerged motionless models who were embarrassed to act and bad actresses who were like puppets, exaggerating their roles in the urban stage of the Republic.

In a similar way, Sennett (1977:115-122) discusses Rousseau's condemnation of the city as theater. Rousseau hates the theatrical qualities of city life since it prevents the formation of "authentic relationships" which are the opposite of cosmopolitanism. Theater is the agent of loss of self since it enforces acting opposite of authenticity. The more people interact outside the strictures of necessity, the more they become actors. For Rousseau the public culture of a cosmopolitan city is "the

realm where this loss of self occurs". *Moeurs* - which is translated by Sennett as the cross of manners, morals and beliefs - corrupts in a big city.

According to this approach, being authentic as opposed to being artificial/imitated/borrowed was one more dualism which emerged as a response to modernization and city life. Imitation or internalization of western etiquette rules in the daily life was interpreted as two-facedness, false appearances, acting or posing. On the one hand, this is partly a reaction to exaggerated formalism of etiquette, reducing content to container; and a reaction to an increasing gap between formal and informal behaviors through the rejection of mediations, although they co-exist in many people's daily lives. On the other hand, it is a partly conservative reaction to newly emerging relations in the city life.

Apart from exaggerated situations reminding the distinctions in the society, as I discussed in chapter III, city life is likened to theatre. And it may necessitate acting, and posing in the sense of formality, giving possibility to interact with strangers outside the language of Gemeinschaft relations. With the help of this formality, we can talk about the freedom from surveillance and parochialism in the city life. As Sennett, (1977:120) says "…poses sometimes heal deformities of nature or the wounds of circumstances". In that sense using mask is not a false face, but is the condition for existence in the public sphere.

According to Sennett, in the city, in the milieu of strangers, there emerges a problem of audience similar to the one an actor faces in the theatre:

> In a milieu of strangers, the people who witness one's actions, declarations, and professions usually have no knowledge of one's history, and no experience of similar actions, declarations, and professions in one's past; thus it becomes difficult for this audience to judge, by an external standard of experience with a particular person, whether he is to be believed or not in a given situation. The knowledge on which belief can be based is confined to the frame of the immediate situation. The arousal of belief therefore depends on how one behaves- talks, gestures, moves, dresses, listens- within the situation itself (1977:39).

For him, city is the place where such problems of enactment/performance routinely arise. Urbanity, in this sense, is the ability to deal with it.

In this chapter, I have tried to show the coexistence of formal and informal practices in etiquette rules which brought the coexistence of two different ways of life both in public and private life. Although to the certain extent this was plausible in the context of modernization process, the increasing gap between formal and informal practices referred to unequal power relations, and it reproduced inequalities and exclusions in the daily life of individuals. While the project of elite aimed to construct the modern individual, it limited modernity with formal aspects, and limited the individual with a national collectivity and modern Gemeinschaft.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRODUCTION OF THE CITY

6.1 Production of Space

In this chapter I will discuss the production of space in macro and micro level in relation to the construction of urbanity. As I showed in the second chapter with reference to Lefebvre, space cannot be reduced to either perceived or conceived space. Although political elites tried to control the production of space[112], lived spaces emerged by formal and informal practices as both strategies and tactics. Meanwhile, in this process, mediation, formally rejected by political elites, was left to informal practices, which directly reshaped the urbanity defined by the elites of the Republic. In the first part of the chapter, I will concentrate on the city scale with an emphasis on planning of the city; and in the second, I will focus on the production of houses and interior spaces.

[112] For the detailed discussion of the formal production of space in the period see Tankut (1990, 2000) and Aslanoğlu (2001a, 2001b).

6.2 Urban and Social Planning

Urban planning is an effective tool to shape society as well as the city; especially, contemporary critiques see it as an instrument of "engineering of society". Although the history of planning goes back to ancient times, the origin of the idea of planning is rooted in the modern era "when ambiguity entered society's code of behavior" (Camhis, 1979:3)[113]. Planning is involved in the city of industrial capitalism and institutionalized as a "form of state intervention" (Beauregard, 1996:217). For Healey (1996:237), it can be seen as a part of the dominatory power of systematic reason pursued through state bureaucracies. In the context of the paradigm of modernity, planning became a tool for re/shaping society. As Holston underlines "whether in the form of urban design or applied social science… the idea of planning is central to the attempt to create and legitimate new kinds of public spheres, with new subjects and subjectivities for them" (1999:158).

Under the guise of aesthetics and collective welfare, urban planning has an ideological, political and economic base. In this context, planning may function as the institutionalization of urban life and urban space through the services decided and run from "above". According to modern architecture and city planning, the city can be controlled and perfected according to its master plan (Beauregard, 1996:219). Sennett (1999a) argues that urban planning has indeed been guided by a 'purified' vision of the good city. Implicitly or explicitly, planning tries to control the potential conflicts. The aspiration for order, coherence and homogeneity in urban planning is realized by functional separation that aims to avoid potential conflict. It is believed

that by planning, the “unwanted present” can be replaced by “imagined future” (Holston, 1999:158). Bauman (1995) also says that modern urban planning is "a war declared on strangers" in which the element of surprise and unpredictability in the conduct of strangers is reduced. As Foucault (1979) argues the control and division of space became a vital means for the discipline and surveillance of individual. This aspect of planning can be extremely determinative in the production of urban life. It is defined as the “social transformation without social upheaval” (Holston, 1999:78). Planning is apt to formulate the problems of society within the terms of space. Such an approach leads to defining spatial pathologies (Lefebvre, 1996:99) and the claim of treating/ normalizing them. Within this context, planning produces merely “representation of space” functioning to order space.

Modernization is regarded as a gradual increase in functional rationality that dominates substantial rationality (Holston, 1989; Zijderveld, 1998). The legitimizing claims for the functional rationality of planning are the preventing crime, informality and illegality through the control of space. It is believed that being under the public eye, surveillance would prevent illegality. As Dijkstra (2000:13) notes, this may be reasonable if all illegal activities are inappropriate, however, “as civil disobedience is often illegal and certain laws disproportionately disadvantage distinct groups in society, planning that aims at reinforcing these laws inevitably reinforces the authoritarian and discriminating aspects of legal regulations”. If we remember our differentiation of informality, between informality as strategy and informality as tactic, both are seen as threat within the mentality of planning. However, informality as tactic, as a practice of civil disobedience, may emerge as the only chance to create

[113] We can interpret this as the entrance of stranger to the social life.

user's space and as a channel to create representational space against the dominatory aspect of representation of space.

According to Holston (1989) modern planning has failed because of its utopian nature that insists on counter-formulations such as dehistoricization and decontextualization, and, in fact, "its defamiliarizations are very likely to end in perversion" (1989:316).[114] Holston calls this process as "the negation of the negation", the contradiction between the intended and what was produced. Moreover, he claims that modern city planning not only failed its subversive aims, but actually strengthened what it challenged[115]. In a similar way, in the case of Ankara, the city plan was legitimized with the discourse of a unified, classless, organic society created new exclusion mechanisms. Moreover, in spite of its claim to create modern city life, modern planning contributed to the emergence of modern Gemeinschaft by creating sterile public spaces and drawn impermeable boundaries between different groups in the city.

In Lefebvrian terms, we can say that modern planning neglects the production of social space which is produced through the interaction of triology: spatial practices, representation of space and representational space. Therefore it helps to produce abstract spaces in the cities. Such spaces/cities produced with abstraction will lack urbanity. "Cities without urbanity are rationalized and abstract places in that

[114] However, Holston (1989:316) underlines that plans naturally have to have the projects of alternative futures: "without a utopian factor, are not plans likely to reproduce the oppressive status quo? Is not the elimination of desire for the future equally oppressive?" Parallel to the discussions of modernity in terms of technical reason-critical reason, planning also should be reconsidered.

[115] He makes this discussion in the context of the building Brasilia and the promises of egalitarian society.

they no longer constitute an urban commonwealth but rather a sum of differentiated functions and divided subcultures" (Zijderveld, 1998:76). Such an approach to space is seen one of the outcomes of the decisions taken in CIAM (Congrés Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne) founded in 1928, by inspiring from the principles of Le Corbusier[116], according to whom the four basic functions of a modern city, -housing, work, recreation, and traffic- should be rigidly separated (Holston, 1989). Such a separation stresses the exchanges and places of exchange: "it emphasizes the quantity of economic exchanges and leaves aside quality, the essential difference between use value and exchange value" (Lefebvre, 1996:124).

This mentality of exchange tries to impose its functional order on cities, however, Zijderveld (164-166) contends functionalism is very detrimental to urbanity, for which a mix of different functions is vitally important. "A lively city is always characterized by alternations, varieties, contradictions, and ambiguities –not just in architectural styles, but also first and foremost in styles of living, behaviour, and conduct on the part of the urban inhabitants" (167-168). Fully controlled cities may be the subject of dystopia. Of course urbanity stipulates certain kind of rationality/reason and formality especially in comparison to rural life, which may depend on closed community relations and sacralized earth. However, the pure authoritarian power of so-called technical rationality or, in Lefebvre's words

[116] In his discussion of the high modernism James C. Scott (cited in Bozdoğan, 2001:5) says that "High Modernism is the most visionary and ultimately devastating ideology of the twentieth century". It is "a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied, usually through the state, in every field of human activity". (Scott also says that (cited in Bozdoğan, 2001:8) "one of the great paradoxes of social engineering is that it seems at odds with the experience of modernity generally. Trying to jell a social world, the most striking characteristic of which appears to be flux, seems rather like trying to manage a whirlwind". So Bozdoğan adds that it is problematic to identify modernism with nation building under the auspices of an authotorian state). With referance to Scott, Bozdoğan (2001:5) says that "that high modernism tends to simplfy reality, making it legible

planning rationality, transforms cities into a material tool to organize production, control the daily life of the producers and the consumption of the product (Lefebvre, 1996:126).

In non-Western countries, modern architecture and design has functioned as a representation of modernity without industrialism, capitalist production, and an autonomous bourgeoisie being the basis of its real material and social organization. (Bozdoğan, 2001:10; 1997:136). In this process, design and construction appeared as the main tools to create a new society by transforming it. In fact the lack of the conditions under which Western modernism flourished was tried to compensate with architectural forms. In the countries where modernization was not an experience resulting from the transformation of industrial, urban and market-oriented order, there has been striking emphasis on architecture and urbanism as a form of "visible politics" (Bozdoğan, 2001:9). As with the Turkish case, usually in these countries the state has been the major actor of the modernization project, mainly based on architecture and city planning. It is strongly believed that the creation of "new forms of social experience" would transform the society (Holston, 1989:52). The underlying assumption was that new (modern) forms would create new (modern) individuals and society. It was supposed that once the environment/space was changed, the behavior of individuals could be easily molded and made to fit the requirements of the newly created circumstances[117] (Kasaba, 1997:24). Therefore the most direct way to modernization appears as the reshaping of the physical

---

and ultimately controllable, and that it sees the past as an impediment to the realization of an idealized future... are particularly pertinent to an analysis of Kemalist Turkey in the 1930s".

[117] Also for Ottoman period, Lewis (1968:228) says that "The Young Turks may have failed to give Turkey constitutional government. They did, however, give Istanbul drains".

environment in the direction of modern/European counterparts. In Lefebvre's world, this approach, based on the duality of container-content, reduces the space to "a container waiting to be filled by content". Political elites thought that they could change the habitus by changing its forms, neglecting the relationship between them.

Not surprisingly, in the Turkish context, architecture and urban space appeared as the most powerful symbols for the project of modernity. The lack of historical conditions necessary to attain "contemporary civilizations", were intended to be overcome simply by creating the forms of "contemporary civilizations". Bozdoğan believes that impatience to reach desired level of "civilizations" in the shortest possible time meant that certain stages were omitted, and argues that republican modernizers with a historical restlessness, were preoccupied with "the recognizable symbols and exterior forms of modernity, rather than its substance" (2001:57)[118]. The container was separated from the content; and the discourse of the new body of the new nation dominated to the discussions on Ankara. For example, Mehmet Saffet (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 20th June 1929), in his article "moral Ankara" defines the city as the "body of the soul of the new world", the new regime. In fact, it was believed that once this body emerged, the soul would follow it.

Inevitably, reshaping the physical environment constituted the most significant and tangible part of the Turkish modernization process. In such a condition, urban space, especially the city of Ankara, became the main area of "visible politics" of modernizing elites of Turkey. In this sense, Kocabaşoğlu

(1990:200) describes Ankara as the (display) window of the regime. It would be such a window that would display the desired individual, citizen and society as well as the desired spaces/cities. This was seen necessary, to give the most "visible" evidence demonstrating the modernness of the country to both foreigners and people of the country. In addition, it would be a model to other people and other cities of the country.

It must be noted that, this excessive emphasis on forms, and defining these forms as the most persuasive criteria of being modern inevitably brought their over-politization. They became the battle ground of domination and appropriation relations, through which the struggle for modernization took place almost exclusively. Especially urbanity as a synonym of modernity was defined through these forms varying from appearances of people (especially of women) to the arrangement of their place. By disconnecting the container and content, urbanity was also reduced to (Western) forms. On the one hand, this reductionist approach defining desired sterile forms (city, public space, street, houses, and bodies) contributed to the production of impermeable boundaries, and exclusions in the formal level. On the other hand, this strictness rejecting mediation was challenged by informal practices. In the following sections, I will discuss these points by looking at the image of Ankara, and its planning process respectively.

[118] However, she also says that "... to its contemporaries modernism was an expression of the desire of "other cultures" to contest their "otherness" and to claim subjectivity in making their own history"

6.2.1 Ankara: The New City of the New Nation

Tankut (1990:18) says that in spite of the difficulty of explaining Ankara's economic sources, it is the most assertive example of the Atatürk principles that have been realized, undertaking all the roles defined within the framework of modern planning. While Ankara was designed as a symbol of Turkish Republic[119], the people of Ankara were supposed to be a model for Turkish citizens and urban people of the new Republic.

At the end of the 1930s, Ankara was defined as a reality that emerged from an imagination (*tasavvur*) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8th December 1937). In that sense it is the imagination of certain elites, rather than the spaces of people. Ankara, a small Ottoman town of the time, was selected as the capital city just before the declaration of Republic in 1923. Bator (1998:71) says that the choice of Ankara as a capital city "provided a *tabula rasa* upon which a new order could be constructed". Its poor environmental conditions also provided the opportunity to re/construct the city from the beginning. With its population of only 20-25 000 in year of 1923, this reconstruction could be done easily. In fact, the term "tabula rasa" is widely used to refer the absence of already settled structures that would resist changing; and the term directly refers to abstraction in the understanding of the city space.

After becoming the capital city, Ankara would be symbol/model of the Turkish Republic, both as a space and way of life. New institutions, new

(Bozdoğan, 2001:10).

environmental design and also new individuals fitting this new order should be created as soon as possible. The aim of creating a new, modern, European city also included the lifestyle symbols ranging from boulevards, city squares, cafes, balls, to houses, clothing, etiquette rules etc. Ankara was the symbol of the "new" in every aspect of life. In these years, "visible symbols of modernity were actively deployed to publicize the image of the new nation as a radical break from its Islamic Ottoman past" (Baydar, 2002:229). The claim of newness was also a strong challenge to old system.[120] To demonstrate this newness, Ankara was contrasted with İstanbul in many respects. While Ankara was the city of the superior morality and nationalist sentiments, İstanbul was the place of corruption, minorities, cosmopolitanism and dynastic tradition. Shortly, Ankara was the city of the future, however İstanbul was the city of the past (Bozdoğan, 2001:67). In this context, the old was declared as backward and disqualified, and the new was naturally progressive and desired.

This desire for newness derived from the ideology of modern planning as well as the Kemalist ideology. The foremost feature of modern planning and architecture is its negation/denial of existing social and urban conditions. A break with the past is essential for modern planning. Holston calls this break as *total decontextualization* leading to an antagonism between the old and the new parts of the city. Inspiration

---

[119] Just after the death of Atatürk, the assembly of municipality proposes to change the name of the city Ankara as Atatürk (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16th November 1938).

[120] Jansen drew two detailed plan showing two cemetery of the city, one is for Muslims and the other is for Christians. Burhan Asaf criticizes it: since details are drawn to show the most important parts of the plan, cemetery can not be an important issue for a newly born city (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11th May 1929). In all projects in competition the location of the cemetary was not approved by the juri (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 27th May 1929).

from modern art, modern planning applies the strategy of defamiliarization[121]: "The modernist strategy of defamiliarizations intends to make the city strange. It consists of the attempt to impose a new urban order through a set of transformations that negate previous expectations about urban life" (1989:53-55). This total decontextualization was voiced by Burhan Asaf in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, (10th September 1929): "construction [of the city] resembles revolution (*inkılap*). You can not bring it to fulfillment without preparing the clean air of young tree and cleaning the land from weeds and degenerated soil". The old land, the habitus of people, is resembled to "degenerated" soil.

The contrast between the new and the old was widely used in the discourse of Kemalist culture in the 1930s. This emphasis on newness can be observed in nearly all articles on Ankara, a popular theme of the period. In *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* new regime's new city was depicted at length, and it even started to give a fascicle titled "Ankara" in 1937. In one of these articles, Hasan Cemil (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5th November1929) defines Ankara as the renaissance with its modern (*asri*) and rational buildings, describing it as "a hurricane that destroys the old and constructs the new from the foundations". Falih Rıfkı (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 21st May, 1935) also believed that the old should be destroyed mercilessly. Destroying the old to create a new was voiced with proud frequently, since the old was totally dispraised.

Similar metaphors were used in the publications of the period. Interestingly, at the beginning of the 1930s some religious terms were also used to celebrate

[121] In modern art, "it is a means of breaking through the deadening and mechanical habits of daily routines in order to desacralize unquestioned values, to restore conscious experience, and to generate a

Ankara. For example, it was defined as the Turkish temple and "national Kaaba" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16th August 1930). This term was firstly used by Halide Edip in her novel "*Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihanı*" (Sarıoğlu, 2001:18). For Bozdoğan (2001:46) certain religious terms, used to describe the nationalist spirit, reveal the complex and conflicting undercurrents in Kemalist culture in the first decade of the Republic. Through 1930s, the official discourse would be free from religious terms. Even a French Deputy, Paul Bastid, writing in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (21st September 1933) about his impressions on Ankara, seems impressed by the transformation of Ankara. He says "Turks are inspired by laicism and rationalism". Interestingly in this writing he adds that the only possible critique that can be directed at them, that they elevate laicism to a new religion. The critique was of course directed to the Republican elites in formal/institutional level; on the other hand through informal practices, the daily life of the many people continued under the influence of religion, since habitus – including also religion- is resistant to change.[122]

6.2.2 The Plan of Ankara

After the declaration of Ankara as the capital city of the new Republic, the most comprehensive plan of the city was made in 1927 as an outcome of a competition. The winner, Hermann Jansen, was announced in the beginning of 1929 and the plan was authorized in the assembly in the middle of 1932 (Tankut, 1990: 4-5). The plan was the result of the synthesis of the aspirations of the Republic bureaucrats and the

---

critical reappraisal of the objects and institutions around us" (Holston, 1989:54-55).

philosophy of the European city planning in late 19th century as well as Hermann Jansen's own experiences (Tankut, 1990: 4). This synthesis was also supported by the news and editorial articles published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*.

The technical aspects of the whole process: competition, the planning process, and the application of the plan, are discussed in detail by Gonul Tankut (1990). At this point, the planning process will be evaluated in terms of general developments affecting the growth of the city, city life and specifically the construction of urbanity. As noted in the 1930s, economy was characterized by statist policies. The reflection of the statist policies on the city construction activities can be summarized under three titles: confiscations, factories producing construction material and electricity, and the Bank of Emlak and Eytam giving housing credits (Tankut, 1990:91, Sarıoğlu, 2001:40-41). Civil servants also received rent compensation beginning from 1927 to 1951 (Tankut, 1990:91). Tankut (1990:65) defines 1930s as the most planned period in spite of the problems in the application. However, the statist policies would not be implemented effectively through the construction of Ankara, especially on the issue of low income settlements. For Tankut (1990:91) although the state supported the housing sector by credits and compensations, it did not directly intervene into it and left the solution willingly to (small) entrepreneurs. Therefore subsidiaries provided the transfer of money to freeholders. This attitude was also consistent with the policy of creating a national bourgeoisie.

[122] See Keyman (2007) for the discussion of the issue with the terms "objective secularism" and "subjective secularism".

Harsh critiques of Jansen and the plan started at the very beginning. In *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* there were responses to the critiques of Jansen and his plan. From the writing published in 6th November 1931, it can be understood that the government and the works related to the plan were accused of being extravagant/improvident and ineffective. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, as the publication of state, published many responses to these critiques, assuming responsibility for the plan, until they met undeniable problems.

At the beginning there was a dedicated attitude towards the plan. Atay, (2006:459) narrates a conversation between Jansen and Atatürk. When Jansen asked Atatürk "do you have sufficient will to apply a city plan?" Ataturk became angry: how could such a regime which achieved many revolutions be unable to apply a plan? The planning of Ankara was seen as "national issue". In an article written under the identity of A.M. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2nd September 1933) the plan was legitimized using the discourse of a unified, classless, organic society. The construction activities (*iymar faaliyetleri*) were described as, "Turkish engineer, Turkish architecture, Turkish craftsman and Turkish workers are the workers for national ideal, without class and conflict, under the order of Gazi". However this claim of classless unity would fail soon with the rise of land speculations in the city.

Although Falih Rıfkı (2006:457) blames the failures in the planning of Ankara on the inexperience of the new regime, informal relations through clientelism played a major role in this failure. Tankut (1990:219) states that although the elites of

the Republic did not make concession in certain issues, they did not display same attitude in the planning issues.[123]

The reasons for the failure in the implementation of the plan can be summarized as: deviation from the plan, conflicts of interest, speculation and the absence of control. One of the failures in the process of planning was the incapability of controlling the 4000 square meters (in Yenişehir) expropriated by *Ankara Şehremaneti* (Municipality), which operated between 1924 and 1930. It was a lost chance to create a desired city. First of all, the opportunity for mass construction and cheap houses for low income groups was lost because of this mistake (Tankut, 1990:32). A formal arrangement, made in the name of modernity failed because of (strategic) informal practices. This was a lost opportunity to produce a solution for housing problem of lower classes. This failure gradually undermined the plan and affected whole process and gave way to land speculation and illegal housing.

The problems would be complicated with the conflict between the Office of Development (*imar müdürlüğü*) and deputies. Some members of the assembly started to voice objections to the plan just after its acceptance. Parallel to nationalist architecture[124], there were also demands such as the city plan should be drawn up by Turkish architects (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22nd November 1933). In this year the tension between the governor and the mayor of the city, Nevzat Tandoğan and Jansen became apparent (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:203). In 1933, the Office of Development

[123]According to Tankut (1990:236-237) Ankara is as successful as 27 over 100, so it is not.

[124] At the beginning important buildings were done by Turkish architects like Architect Kemelettin, Architect Vedat and Architect A. Hikmet until 1927 the date in which the thrust to west was reconstructed. However, the 1929 World Economic Crises reversed this process (Sarioglu, 2001:52).

(*İmar Müdürlüğü*) responsible for the continued planning of the city was asked to hand over power to the Municipality. Tankut (1990:107) sees this devolution as an attempt to avoid/overcome the construction control dictated by planned development. The planning process detoriated after Tandoğan's takeover. Therefore, bureaucratic problems like lack of coordination, the intervention in the plan by people not qualified, slow progress and, of course, illegal construction raised and could not be prevented (Tankut, 1990:117; Sarıoğlu, 2001:72). Even the decisions taken regarding the demolition of the illegal buildings could not be implemented.

Tankut (1990:40) notes that in the early years of the Republic (1923-1927) the issues related with the construction activities in the city could be discussed objectively in the assembly. This is because the deputies did not yet own property. Later, discussions would become conflicts as personal interests came to dominate the discussions of deputies (1990:69). After 1932, the bureaucrats' approach to the planning of the city changed. Tankut (2000:313-314) mentions three reasons for this change: the first is the bureaucratization of revolutionary ideals and the loss of enthusiasm for the Republican ideals and thus the rise of self-interested concerns. Secondly, there was the increase in the profitability of the land market with the loss of doubt regarding the move of the capital city to İstanbul. The final reason was is the loss of independence of the bureaucrats in favor of newly emergent bourgeoisie. The pressure of the real estate owners was always felt on the plan[125]. Clientelist relations, as informal strategies, begun to challenge the planning process in favor of newly emerging bourgeoisie.

[125] In 1932, a clerk of Ankara Development (Ankara tapu katibi) was catched while he wass taking bribe from a man named Keğork (Tankut, 1990:88).

In fact land speculation emerged as the most detrimental factor to the plan. The issue of land speculation also reflected to the news in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* at the end of the 1930s. Not only limited to Ankara, there was news announcing land speculation in all developing cities of Turkey (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 24th June 1937). It was accepted that, especially in Ankara, the planned city, speculators were manipulating the land market. Interestingly the speculative rise of the land prices was resented since it kept middle classes (civil servants) from being homeowners. In the news, it was also declared that "the Ministry of Interior Affairs had developed a plan to prevent land speculation", however this could not be applied either.

Tankut (1990:218) observes that unlike the corresponding examples of constructing capital cities such as Canberra, Brasilia or Islamabad, no land policy was developed for Ankara to prevent unjust and excessive gain. Although Canberra was constructed before Ankara, this example was never discussed or even mentioned, either by Turkish officials or Jansen. Although new lands were made available to construction to prevent speculation in the old city, this land policy just shifted the location of speculation (Sarıoğlu, 2001:38), and it could not be directed. As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the foundation of the Republic and the construction of urban space as part of modernization, the elites also applied to informal practices. Therefore, formal policies within the context of the plan just changed the form and actors of informal practices in the city rather than preventing it. Especially with the opening of the Atatürk Boulevard, there started a huge land speculation in the empty agricultural lands of Yenişehir. Land speculation appeared as the main way to become rich easily. People were competing to buy empty land to

sell it in the future (Sarıoğlu, 2001:40, 49). Even people living in İstanbul bought real estate property from Ankara as a profitable investment (Tankut, 1990:222). At the end of the 1920s many deputies and ministers become owners of land on the Boulevard. Also the old families of Ankara like Vehbi Koc, Ali Nazmi and Nasit Toygar owned lands on the boulevard.

The land between Yenişehir and Çankaya was the most profitable in terms of the speculative gains. Bureaucrats like Celal Bayar, Refik Saydam were the well known people taking the advantage of this situation (Ş. Cantek, 2003:116). Also Yakup Kadri became an owner of a vineyard in Çankaya, taking a loan from İş Bank "with the order and inducement of Mustafa Kemal.". However, he would have to sell it since he could not afford to pay the loan back. Ş. Cantek (2003:117) interprets this example as the indicator of Mustafa Kemal's desire to create a kind of community consisting of founder elites of the Republic and to control their private life. As it will be discussed in the section of "city life", the creation of a "new community" was aimed at by the conglomeration of elites in this part of the city. In that sense, it is possible to say that the modern tool of planning was used to create a kind of "modern Gemeinschaft", a closed community sharing the formal aspect of modernity defined by the Republican elites. With the help of plan's direction, people who adopted or were trying to adopt Western norms separated themselves from the rest of the people in Ankara. As I have argued in the previous chapters, in literature modern urban life/urbanity is characterized with Gesellschaft relations, in spite of the possibility of existence of traditional Gemeinschaft relations. However, in the Turkish case, urbanity has been mainly shaped by modern gemeinschaft relations and the tension

created by them. I will expand this aspect of the Turkish case in the next parts of thesis.

Another important development related to congregational tendency within the city was taking place in lower income groups clustered around the "old city. It was clearly stated that the main concern of the plan was the "new city" and actual success was expected in Yenişehir (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 27th May 1929) the district created for the "citizens" of the Republic. As it was clearly uttered in the discussions of the plan, the relationship with the old city was constructed by main roads and all other arrangement within the old part was left to the time. Existing shanty houses were included within the border of plan, but in fact they were assumed to be non-existent. This is in fact very interesting point, since as it is argued before, for the Turkish elites, any social reality not in accordance with their total project, any practice not comply with desired Western standards were ignored and denied. For instance, local people living in the shanty houses were not interpellated by the master plan at all. Inevitably these people were left to informal practices to exist in the city space; and this policy contributed to emergence of impermeable boundaries in the city.

Their absence in the representation of the space posits another exclusion in addition to ones emerged through representation of space[126]. By the lack of representation, as I discussed in the previous chapters "the right to the city" of other people of Ankara was ignored. This ignorance, which was a latent exclusion of low income settlements especially in the old city, and the lack of the control over those

[126] For the discussion of squatter settlement in the context of "exclusionary inclusion" and "inclusionary exclusion" see Diken (2004).

areas, and the absence of low income settlements in the plan, had complicated the problem. Since there was no plan for low income group settlements, they let to produce their own solutions through informal practices based on the solidarity of community (a sort of traditional gemeinschaft). For example, the first shanty houses appeared near to the (old) city center[127] (Sarıoğlu, 2001:95). In one of the news published in 1929, it was said that everyday there emerged a new house completed "in a night" in Cebeci (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28th June 1929). This definition would be the name of squatter settlements in Turkey: *Gecekondu* (built overnight); and they would come to dominate the urbanization in Turkey. In the booklet published by *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (29th October 1933, p: 90) to evaluate the tenth year of Republic in 1933, *gecekondu*s were also mentioned. It was reported that nearly 1500 houses were built without permission by "workers and craftsmen". It was also said that these houses were built in the districts outside the city plan such as Atıf Bey, Altındağ and Yenidoğan. In the news the backside of the *Ulus* was called as "illegal city". However, illegality in the construction issue was not limited to *gecekondu*s. Even in Yenişehir in the mid 1930s there were illegal construction activities according to writings of Falih Rıfkı (26th April 1935, 21st May 1935).

Again, in the beginning of 1930s mass housing, a well-known solution, was proposed to supply houses to civil servants and workers, in other words, to all socio-economic groups.[128] At this time, however, the housing problem of civil servants was given priority over the other groups in the city. The cooperative of Ankara Bahçelievler (the houses with garden) was the first example of cooperative housing.

[127] The first gecekondu appered in the district of Atıf Bey (near Bent deresi) at the end of 1920s (Tankut, 2000:303).

In September 1938 Bahçelievler were handed over to their owners (*Ulus*, 24 September 1938). Bahçelievler was established to supply low-cost housing to people; nevertheless the owners of Bahçelievler were in fact the people held relatively high positions in the bureaucracy.

These developments, showing that conjunction of formal and informal practices had been observed by the elites/media, caused discussions, questioning the level of 'modernity' of the state and the city. On the issue of cooperative housing, again a debate took place in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (26th May 1934, 17th November 1934). Nusret Namık (*Ulus*, 17th February 1936), in his speech explaining the necessity of cooperative housing, stated that "if a cooperative cannot be established, that means there is no problem of housing in Ankara -(which is not true)- or we are still not freed from the malady of patience (*tevekkül*) given by Islam". In another example, Burhan Asaf (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5th June 1934) in his article, on the issue of cooperative housing for the civil servants, celebrates these houses with playgrounds, tennis court and common gardens. These were clearly houses for the upper classes. For him "the intellectuals (*münevverler*) should live together for the feeling of solidarity bringing social authority (*içtimai salahiyet*) and material power". He imagines these places as the castles of elite and clearly states this: the imagined citizen should be in solidarity in imagined settlements against the "outside". These discussions show that planning was used to produce, or at least define line boundaries of these protected innerspaces which were based on an exclusionary understanding of inside-outside.

[128] Sarıoğlu (2001:91) gives the list of cooperative houses.

Although cooperative housing could have become a solution to housing problem of lower income groups, the limited examples could just bring solution to problems of higher-ranking bureaucrats in Ankara[129]. In addition, for Tankut (1990:159), although cooperative housing was supported to solve housing problem, they also became a problem because of their unplanned locations within the city.

As a summary, we can say that informal construction activities have been dominated Turkish cities and urban culture. Since the approach to urbanization was limited and exclusive, on the issue of housing, state could not develop comprehensive solutions. Even it was difficult to say that state had a strong and planned approach to the problem (Sarıoğlu, 2001:90). After the emergence of shantytowns in the 1930s, the municipality had published announcements prohibiting the construction of a building without license (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12th July 1930). However, the necessary sanctions in order to keep to the plan were not applied because of the above mentioned reasons. Apparently, starting from these years, by approving illegal construction, the Committee of Construction encouraged similar attempts in every part of the city (Tankut, 1990:156).

In fact, under the condition of neglect by the formal policies, the squatter settlements emerged as an informal "backdoor entrance" for poorer people into the formal system. They were survival strategy of the poor appropriating space through use value. In this sense they were the informal tactics of the urban poor. However,

[129] Bozdoğan, (2001:223) says that "speculative real estate values in major cities, the lack of comprehensive planning and land appropriation policies, and the regime's priority on public buildings, coupled with the nonexistence of a strong private sector to undertake housing developments, were as responsible for inhibiting mass housing as was the lack of advanced technology for serialized production".

they would partially lose this quality through commodification in later decades and would turn into informal strategies based on their exchange value. However, as it is noted above other illegal construction activities taking place in planned areas of the city, which can be regarded as informal strategies have also continued as an important tool in redistribution of rent in favor of advantaged groups in the city. These cases show that, as discussed in the fourth chapter, both the center and periphery have been involved in informal practices, and through these practices urban space and urbanity have been produced.

6.2.3 Construction of the Modern City

As noted in chapter IV, urban space and urbanity were used as an effective tool to construct the category of "modern" and "modernness". These categories were also used in the planning process. In the planning process of Ankara, from the beginning of the contest, Jansen's plan was praised as the most modern project of all the proposals. It was defined as modern since it had a simple beauty (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 27th May 1929). As in the discussion of "modern house", simplicity and health were applauded as the main criterion of "modern city". In the period, the "simple beauty" and "health" were diagnostic terms frequently used to describe "being modern".

Using the terms related to "health" has been a very common attitude in the discussions of city and city life, to underline the modern character. Ankara was frequently compared to a place of healing such as a sanatorium. It was asserted that "the people who come to Ankara are cured, and become renewed and invigorated"

both bodily and spiritually (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22nd November 1933). "Healthy city" was the motto of the period, especially in the discussion of city master plan (the plan of Jansen). Jansen (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th July 1929) also emphasized this term in his justification of the plan with reference to European cities. For him, the backs of the European Boulevards were airless and aphotic/dusty but Ankara would not like that. The wide streets (avenues) identified with air and light would ensure the health of the people (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5th December 1929).

In the pages of "city planning" (*şehircilik*) inspiring by European cities, especially from France and Haussman, huge boulevards and multi-stored business buildings were suggested for the city center (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5th December 1929). All justifications were made with reference to the modern way of life. A frequently used example was modern work life. According to this depiction, in a modern work life, people spending 8-10 hours a day working in dusty, narrow rooms, could refresh themselves with clean air and light. For Celal Esat (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12th December 1929) since the people of this (modern) age work hard, they feel nervous and need a healthy environment. Thus, the office buildings should be built high and the green spaces should be increased. As in this example, the effect of Le Corbusier could be easily seen in the discussions of the good/modern city. Corbusean themes such as air, sun, ventilation and greenery were specifically underlined in the discussions of the city. Similar to Jansen, Celal Esat criticized the big cities of Europe and called them as sick. For him in order to cure these cities, they had to be reconstructed with wide boulevards. In this discourse, there was the claim that a more modern city than Europe, even, would be constructed.

In an article written by VN (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17th July 1930) that spectacle of a city was defined as a common and national issue of the country. As it is put before, as a part of visual politics, Ankara would be the indicator of modernness of the nation and the country. In the planning process the reference point of beauty of the city was what a foreigner (ecnebi) would think and how s/he would see the city when he enters the city (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8th April 1929; 18th May 1929). In fact "the gaze of foreigners" is a very important source of anxiety that was frequently voiced. The spaces varying from body to streets were continuously imagined from the outside of them to understand the impression given to foreigners. Such an approach to space by accentuating the inside and outside distinction helps to produce abstract space. With Lefebvre's term such an approach forces individuals to see the things in the mirror of "representation of space". While explaining his plan in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, Jansen also discusses the impression of the city on a stranger (9th July 1929). He says, the first impression would be felt when "stranger" entered the city from the station, and went through the boulevards toward the city; so these places should be impressive (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3rd July 1931). Attracting the foreigner's eye, seeing the city and people from the eyes of foreigner established the basis in the production of the space. As a feature of abstract space, the space was represented with "what it was lacking or believed to be lacking" (Lefebvre, 1993). Therefore space was imagined from the eyes of foreigners whose culture was tried to reach by the Republican elites.

The beauty of the city was main concern of the elites and the board (*imar yönetimi-heyeti*). In the name of the beautiful city, Yenişehir, and more specifically, Atatürk Boulevard were given attention and considered as a model of modern city

and modern life. In particular Atatürk Boulevard was seen as a stage to display the beauty of the city. Nevzat Tandoğan, who was both the mayor and the governor of the city, spent the most of his time and money for this boulevard, which was always used by Ataturk[130] (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:204). Since Ankara meant Ataturk Boulevard, everyday it was swept and cleaned and its lighting was checked by the municipality (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:204). To create a harmony in Atatürk Boulevard, rules were continuously re-arranged, however, it was done according to existing constructions, not to the plan (Tankut, 1995:197). The informal rules of Tandoğan prevailed over the formal rules generating from the master plan[131]. This understanding became established in the governing of the city. Even for the beauty of the city, the rules could be ignored and if the "ugly things" could not be eliminated, then they were hidden as a solution. For Tankut (1990:197-199) this concern of beauty remained superficial and could not affect the plan in spite of the good will. In 1935, Falih Rıfkı (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3rd June) underlining the artistic aspect of urbanism, complained about the lack of plan and artistic control in the cities. Although he frequently stressed that to create the new, the old should be destroyed (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 21st May 1935), it was clear that the new also could not be controlled.

[130] Tandoğan even opposed road junctions on the Boulevard in the plan, since this might lead to an attempt of assassination to Atatürk (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:207).

[131] He even objected to the decions taken by council of state (*danıştay*) by saying that "my rules are valid here" (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:197).

The new city was created as a modern model reflected purely by representation of space. Nazım Hikmet (1978:228) in his book "Human Landscapes from My Country" (*Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları*)[132] depicts his impression as:

……
… passing by the stadium:
here is oddly new, like a ironed ready-made cloth
and it seems like
not a dressed city
but a dressed mannequin in the window displays.[133]

Although in the representation of space, this area was designed to convince strangers to the modernity of the city, in the representational space of Nazım, the space was not seen as convincing. Since it was not the users' space, lived space, it had no connection with the rest of the city; therefore it was like a show space (of the state). Isolated from the environment, and protected with glass, it was an impermeable space lacking of urbanity although it was created as a model to modern way of life. Besides the comparison with mannequin can be interpreted as the abstractness of space which is far away from the life of inhabitants of the city.

Even though a certain amount of good will should be appreciated, the planning process of Ankara contains many problems. The dedication shown at the beginning shortly after turned into window dressing. Planned construction of the city was in fact a décor for the modern life foreseen by the principles of populism and civilization (*halkcilik ve cagdaslasma*) (Tankut, 1990:115). It was an attempt to

[132] He started to write this book in 1939.

[133] .....
geçiliyor stadyumun yanından:
burası hazır elbise gibi bir tuhaf yeni, bir tuhaf ütülü
ve şehre değil de
camekanda bir mankene giydirilmiş gibi duruyor.

create modern city and its culture. It was true that the city life necessitates the production of stages; however the quality and the quantity of the stages were also important. Planning of the sterile spaces neglecting the inside-outside relations and an approach reducing urbanity to Western forms produced new exclusions in Ankara. Informal strategies have also supported this tendency in Ankara.

6.3 Modern Architecture, Modern Houses

As it is argued in the previous chapters, the Kemalist modernization project aimed a total transformation to western ideals through a radical break with the past and western oriented endeavor. The radical nature of this endeavor derives from its attempt to intervene both the public and private spheres. For the achievement of modernization ideals, criteria of which are determined by the elites required a transformation of both body and mind. The production of space, spatial context, as it argued, is one of the basic components of this project. Not only the city and the public places, but also houses, the residents of people, were seen part of the "civilizational shift" project. Furthermore, a special attention was paid to houses since they were considered as components of the city; and complementary parts of people's "way of life".

6.3.1 The Houses in Ankara

In Ankara, there were four types of building after 1925 (Sarioglu, 2001:82-83). The first was buildings in the old city, most of which were without water, electricity and gas. The second group was again in the old Ankara: apartments with high ceilings[134] and having basement for storage. The third was villas of high-income groups (having close relations with Mustafa Kemal) located in the new city especially on the south part of the Boulevard towards Kavaklıdere- Çankaya. Lastly, there were houses for civil servants like those on the street of Kazım Özalp in Yenişehir, for people who could not afford to buy villas and who could not accept living in old houses of the old districts[135]. These apartments and villas reflect the inner differentiation of the Republican elites through spatial patterns. After the application of the plan, instead of detached houses with gardens, more economic semi-detached houses with common gardens or open space/squares would be constructed in Yenişehir (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19th May 1929). Şenol Cantek (2003:128) notes that the houses such as cooperative houses, building complexes (*site*), and public housings (*lojman*) gave the possibility of agglomeration of families with similar status and contributed to construction of exclusive elite communities. Therefore these community type settlements had the function of maintaining distance between elite cadres and natives, with the exception of the rich and respectable families of them. Types of housing was

[134] Tansi Şenyapılı, (1985:29) says that the high ceilings points to the transformation of the commercial capital.

[135] According to the census of 1935, (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4th March 1939) there were 17.372 dwelling in Ankara. 15.879 of them were detached houses, 351 of them were apartment buildings, 12 of the were pensions, 41 of them were hotels, 37 of them were hostels (*han*), 115 of them are rooms for singles, and 937 of them were barracks. The number of dwellings having electricity, natural gas (hava gazı) and water was only 1.056.

also supported the tendency towards "modern gemeinschaft" relations among New *Ankaralı*s, who separated themselves from old *Ankaralı*s.

People like civil servants, bureaucrats and journalists who came to Ankara after it became capital city firstly settled in old Ankara incomfortless conditions which they were not used to. Their housing problems were the subject of many novels of the period (Karaosmanoğlu, 2003; Esendal, 2002). In this period, "amenities such as hot water, heating systems, proper ventilation, electricity for lighting, and household appliances were seen as prestigious symbols of civilization and contemporariness (Bozdoğan, 2001:215), and thus, urbanity. When they moved to the new city (Yenişehir) they were able to find the comfort that they had demanded.

In Ankara, the desire to create a more "civilized", higher standard of living was expressed in the form of low-rise buildings with gardens in green, low density areas (Tankut: 1990, 19). In this period, newspapers and magazines began to publish the examples of "modern" house plans to guide people. The several examples of modern small house plans were published in the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (27th, 29th June; 1st, 5th July 1932). Also there were examples of garden arrangements to create a "beautiful" and "modern" environment. Statues had also begun to be used in garden decoration. Parallel to tendencies in the city planning, they were suggested as necessities of the modern urbanism (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th July 1929).

Apartment life, introduced firstly in cosmopolitan and commercial districts of İstanbul in the Ottoman period was attacked by many Republican intellectuals.

Apartments had been seen as the result of greed, profit motive and land speculation (Bozdoğan, 2001:231). By emphasizing the corruption, cosmopolitanism and unhealthiness of apartment living of İstanbul, detached small, single family houses were celebrated as national symbols in Ankara. Celal Esat (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23rd October 1929) glorifies the detached houses (with garden): "in terms of morality, detached houses are better than the apartments where a hundred of family reside together like a barracks". Also in 1938 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın stated that "we are destined to be miserable in those [new] apartments. In this contemporary civilization, apartments have turned us into nomads (*bedevi*) without home and hearth" (cited in Bozdoğan, 2001:237/258). Also there were complaints about the smallness of apartments (Nalbantoğlu, 2000:257). Urban apartments and congested living were criticized in favor of single-family houses within gardens.

At the end of the 1930s, however, since the construction of an apartment necessitates more investment, living in an apartment became a sign of prestige (Nalbantoğlu, 2000:254). Moving into an apartment became to mean upward mobility at this time. Apartment life's demands to change way of life were also accepted as the necessities of new way of life. At the end of the 1930s apartments started to rise in Yenişehir and became the symbol of modernness and urbanity.

However, in spite of the emphasis of appearances, there was a huge range of variation in the materials and ornamentation of the buildings in the early years of the Republic. The new houses with exaggerated ornamentation resembled to castles (Tankut, 1990:35). Austrian architect Robert Oerley compared the exaggerated ornamentation of new houses in Ankara to "perfume of dirty woman" (*Hakimiyet-i*

Milliye, 3rd May 1929). Jansen also complained about the young Turkish architects who were under the influence of new fashions in architecture, because their works destroyed the integrity of the image of the city (Tankut, 1990:149). Since the examples taken from different Western countries were imitated according to preference of the owner, there was no consistency between these houses.

There was a clear difference between official buildings showing a uniform pattern and private houses displaying a variety of styles. According to news published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, (17th July 1930) it was related to the situation of being unfamiliar with the notion of modern: although official buildings were constructed in the latest fashion, private houses displayed disorder since they were built by uneducated headworkers or by the architect who had never seen examples of modern architecture. In fact the houses were built by teams of people with different experience. The master (*usta*) organized the construction with an incomplete plan, and the ornaments were done by Bulgarian, Roum (*rum*) and Armenian craftsmen. Eventually, buildings become the results of this collective work and reflect the taste of collaborators (Nalbantoğlu, 2000:255). Especially, Yenişehir reflected this chaos, with its kiosques constructed in different styles[136] (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22 Mart 1931). Most of the buildings, houses and apartments were constructed by Turkish architects in Yenişehir (Sarıoğlu, 2001:110-111) and each building reflected both the architect's range of knowledge accumulation and owner's taste (Sarıoğlu, 2001:46-47).

[136] Tanpınar (2001:29) says that each villa looked like an exact copy of the model published in architectural magazines.

The need for common set of aesthetic rules for the construction of houses in the city began to be voiced. For Celal Esat (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12th December 1929) in order to create a beautiful city, individuals should cease to construct their own houses with their own rules, which would bring chaos to the city. He adds that the restrictions on the form of private houses were not a limitation of individual's freedom. In another example, the modern way of life was defined as objective and collective, not subjective and individualistic (Ludwig Hilberseimer, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18th September 1930). In order to explain the necessity of common rules Architects Behçet and Bedrettin (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22nd November 1933) compared the city to a body, organized around a center with the function of "thinking, seeing and hearing". Around the center there are agglomerations similar to a family members consisting of people with different temper but similar needs, understanding and opinions. He adds that "so cities also have the unity of families". In that sense city means "an imaginary individual embodied by the whole mass consisting of parts connected to each other". The necessity of visual harmony is explained with the necessity of harmony in way of life and thinking. This analogy is the extension of the "imagined nation". Parallel to this, imagined urbanites are also people having same "needs, understanding and opinion" as a imagined community.

To solve the problem, with an enacted law, the directorate of reconstruction began to make housing plans free of charge for people who wanted to construct buildings (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2nd December 1932). Also, to overcome the problem of mixed style in architecture, the national architectural style was proposed as a solution (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22nd March 1931; 20th November 1931), but could not be realized. With the restrictions brought by the law of Construction and Roads (*Yapı*

ve Yollar Kanunu) a view of the street of Ankara became relatively monotonous (Nalbantoğlu, G, 2000:258). However, lack of harmony between the appearances of individual building remained as an issue of general complaint in Turkey.

6.3.2 Modern Architecture

The project of modernity in architecture is historically complex and ambiguous process (Bozdoğan, 1997:133). It consists of "complicated articulation between architectural form, political discourse, aesthetic conviction, ideological expression, cultural debates and nationalist sentiments" (Baydar, 2002:230). Each articulation may contain different emphasis on each component. The history of modern architecture reflects the change in the tone of the emphasis. In the early period of the Republic, the architectural culture tried to reconcile "modern" with national with different combinations. In other words it was an attempt to "nationalize the modern" (Bozdoğan, 2001:7). In this process, the national was presented as the one which was already modern. As Sarıoğlu (2001:119) says the main argument was "national consciousness starts with Western education; the thing that takes away us from being Eastern, makes us closer to being Turkish and nationalist".

The movement of the "first National Architecture" reflects the nationalist idea arising at the end of 19th century, continuing until the early 1930s. While the interior decoration of the buildings in this style consists of foreign elements alien to Turkish housing, such as elevators, central heating, electricity, bath tub or European toilets (*alafranga*), the exterior facades reflects the Turkish architecture tradition resting on

the Ottoman tradition (Yavuz, 2000:239). With its domes, it gives the sense of Ottoman architecture like the buildings of Ankara Palas and Turkish Hearth. In that period, the building of the Turkish Hearth was interpreted as the building that unites all national sentiments (Sarioglu, 2001:113). However, it consisted of exaggerated examples of articulated eastern architecture; and in fact its only nationalist aspect was its name (Tankut, 1990:93). According to Yavuz (2000:233-234) although the buildings constructed in accordance with this style reflected the understanding of western comfort demanded by Turkish bourgeoisie (*kent-soylu*), they were seen as alien to local culture since they were monotonous, remote from humanism and closed to social relations. By neglecting the relationship between container and content, and the power of habitus, the change in form was seen enough to change content. For example, these buildings, without common spaces, were just contrary to traditional culture based on good neighborhood relations. For Yakup Kadri, (2003:99-117, cited in Yavuz, 2000:234-237) since their plan excluded good neighborhood and social relations, they could not be called national. These first multi-stored buildings, therefore, contributed to creation of similar spaces which were again unhealthy, boring, unhappy and deprived of common spaces because of the speculative reasons (Yavuz, 2000:239). In spite of these critiques, these new apartments gave the opportunity to new-comers to the city to be provided with "civilized necessities" (*medeni ihtiyaçlar*) without encountering local/native people (Şenol Cantek, 2003:109); and therefore as a symbol of modernness they would become an object of desire.

The First National Architectural Movement was abandoned since it was declared anachronistic[137] and not national/modern (Batur, 1998:76). According to this approach, national architecture should be first of all appropriate to the people of the country, and then suitable to building workers of the country and lastly, appropriate to the "soil" (building materials) of the country (Sarıoğlu, 2001:112). In the 1930s, arrival of the Modern Movement in Ankara was celebrated "as a historical moment marking the country's entry into the twentieth century" (Bozdoğan, 2001:5). In the 1930s, modern architecture's principles were applied to create Modern Turkish Architecture[138]. In 1931 Celal Esat (Arseven) wrote a book titled "New Architecture" which is accepted as the first book introducing "the general outlines of the establishment of CIAM, and the principles of the Modern Movement, the German Functionalist and Le Corbusier" (Batur, 1998:84). Throughout the 1930s, "modern" which was also named as International Architecture, would dominate to the search of national architecture in the country.

The 1930s were the years of the promotion of modernist aesthetics in architecture and the visual arts (Baydar, 2002:231). Modern architecture's main themes of rationalism and functionalism were celebrated with its emphasis on health and efficiency. First of all, modern architecture, with its functional character, was seen as a prerequisite for modernization. The high-paid military and civilian officials of the Republic could finally find a response to their search for a new life-style in

[137] Towards the end of his life Mimar Kemalettin, one of the pioneers of the movement says that "now they humiliate this style by calling it as the architecture of türbe and mosque" (Sarıoğlu, 2001:114).

modern architecture (Batur, 1998:76- 77). In the discussion of the period, some architects asserted that modern architecture was indifferent to and independent of class and wealth. However, the differences of size, budget and client status were concealed behind the unified aesthetic and undecorated simplicity of modern/ cubic house (Bozdoğan, 2001:217). Therefore cubic/modern style would be the sign of status among the elite group of Ankara in the 1930s. Also, the promotion of new aesthetic sensibilities would stamp the period with an overemphasis on the term "cubic". "Cubic movement" complemented the image of the modern, civilized and secular nation that Turkey aspired to become (Baydar, 2002:230). The term "cubic" would be a symbol of the period indicating the new way of life in the context of "new civilization".

As stated, the modern architecture was representing the new/modern way of life. The modern, hygienic and rationally planned houses were presented as the places breeding a youthful, healthy and patriotic nation in the popular publications in a similar way to their counterparts in Fascist Italy (Bozdoğan, 2001:197). A healthy living as well as a healthy body is seen as a national matter, rather than individualistic concern. Starting from body to city scale, spaces have been imagined to represent the nation. Therefore, owning a modern house was also an important issue in representing the modernness of the country. It was also a prerequisite for entering the "civilized community" in Ankara. Falih Rıfkı (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 31st July 1929) ascribes an *Ankaralı* merchant who was searching for a new architect to

---

[138] According to Bozdoğan, (2001:49-50) in spite of the stylistic oppositions modernist movements of the 1930s also shares same ideological and political grounds with the first nationalist architecture: both of them are identified with authoritarian state power under the rule of single- party. And most significantly both of them are "shaped, to a large extent, by a distaste for the stylistic eclecticism and cosmopolitan character of late-nineteenth-century Ottoman architecture, the work of Armenian, Greek,

draw his house, so that he could avoid the disdaining eye. Since the core elites of Ankara saw themselves as authorities on appropriateness of houses to modernness, their approved meant acceptance into their modern community. The reflected image from the disdaining eye of the elites (representation of space) increased the disconnectedness of content and container, and the avoidance of being ridiculous and embarrassed has been a strong motive in the construction of urbanity.

From the beginning of the period, news of the small modern houses appeared in magazines and newspapers to encourage people to construct similar ones. These houses were defined as small and functional for the ideal family consisted of four members (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16th December 1930). Since the small nuclear family was accepted as a Republican ideal, the modern houses were seen as suitable for these families, as oppose to the kiosk typical of the Ottoman way of life (Bozdoğan, 2001:196). It was asserted that, since these houses were small, they were easy to keep clean, and therefore, there was no need for servants at home. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16th December 1930). In this context, modern architecture's qualities of simplicity, functionality and rationality constitute a desirable contrast with the heavily ornamented eclecticism of late Ottoman architecture (Baydar, 2002:230). The idea of home as a part of the modern city was presented as a part of the Republican project. As well as the form, Republic was also praised with permanence of this architecture, by underlining the ephemeral nature of materials used in Ottoman residential architecture (Bozdoğan, 2001:195). So, desired contrast of new and old to underline the total rupture from the past would also find a response in the domain of architecture.

Levantine and European architects living and working within the empire" (2001:50).

From the beginning of 1930s (June 1932), the newspaper began to publish examples of small house plans, with the purpose of "improving the common taste of the country as well as providing the comfort of individuals". This was also intended to change traditional taste deriving from the habitus of people towards that of the desired urbanites. These houses were specifically proposed for merchants, civil servants, and tradesmen (*esnaf*). Through similar news, "cubic architecture" with its association with modernity was introduced as functional and rational. Throughout the period, many models of cubic architecture taken from foreign publications were published in newspapers and magazines. Although this new understanding of open and continuous space and transparency between layers were unfamiliar to traditional understanding of privacy (Bozdoğan, 2001:207), in some examples these plans were directly, with no adaptation to allow for the conditions of the country (Nalbantoğlu, U, 2000:258).

However, in some adopted versions foreignness of western examples were mitigated by adding Turkish-style toilets (*alaturka*), and rigid division of rooms along a corridor similar to traditional Turkish houses (Bozdoğan, 2001:209). In the 1930s, rooms of different size and function began to emerge in the interior spaces of the houses. Similar size rooms were started to differentiate to be used as bedroom and *salon* (drawing room), whereas, earlier, the plans of the houses consisted of same size rooms clustered around the service spaces; therefore it was impossible to differentiate the bedroom from the living room (Nalbantoğlu, 2000:258-256). It can be said that in this period house plans were shaped and sized according to function. The plan was arranged around a large central hall in both detached houses and

apartment buildings (Batur, 1998:85). In fact as discussed before, this was the re-arrangement of the public and private within the (private space of) the house as a result of the tension between modern public-private distinction and traditional one.

Modern architecture was also discussed as a national issue in the same way as the issue of city planning. Modern architecture was declared as the national symbol of the country. Celal Esad, (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 16th October 1929) stated that the style in architecture should be both modern and national. These new houses were described as modern and family house which were Turkish in essence: the modern one was already Turkish and vice versa. While celebrating the national architecture, Architects Behçet and Bedrettin (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 18th and 22nd November 1933) discussed that "there is no place for homelandless and nationless art in this country". In the *Ulus*, Ernst Egli (6th March 1937), a Swiss architect, wrote that a person who wants to do something positive should go to an architect and say "try to construct a house which is Turkish in essence and will be an example to show the appropriate way to build a house in this country". In a similar way, Celal Esat (cited in Baydar, 2002:233) states that "amongst all nations, Turkish architecture attracts particular attention for its rationality and affinity with modern architecture. That is why this new architecture will not look alien to us". This was an attempt, again as a reflex of nationalist defense, to prove through architecture that that Turks were already the member of "new civilization".

The discourse on the modern house was involved in political and ideological interests of the period. Baydar (2002:234) points out that "architecture was a potent pedagogical field where modernist sentiments became highly visible. Architectural

agency played an irreducible role in setting up the relationship between the individual citizen and the symbolic space of nationhood". This situation was even more apparent in the construction of official buildings. They reflected the feeling of greatness and power with their huge scale, symmetric blocks. These buildings were designed to be the symbol of the state authority through their monumentality (Aslanoğlu, 2000:274-275; Bozdoğan, 2001). The inner arrangements of these buildings were also supporting this understanding of representation of the state authority. As Şenol Cantek (2003:123) points out similar to the exterior, inner decoration reflected this monumentality with entrance shafts, monumental stairs, courtyards, squares, and entrance colonnades.

Although the discussion of "modern architecture" had been directly influenced by the discussions in Europe, especially by CIAM and Le Corbusier, the contents of the term "modern" and the attributions to the concept seems totally different. In Turkey, the attributions to being modern and modernization carry the marks of the 1930s Kemalist ideology. In the definition of modern categories, in addition to emphasis on forms/formal aspects, there was the domination of nationalist discourse. Nalbantoğlu G.B. (1999:307-308) gives a specific example of this differentiation. While discussing the supremacy of "straight road" over "twisted (traditional) road", Le Corbusier identifies the straight road with action, intentionality, and being master of the self; and twisted road with looseness, indifference, fecklessness/thoughtlessness and animal instincts. He emphasizes superiority of reason and civilization over irrational and savagery. However, Celal Esat mentions their effect on the soul: while people living in a city with straight roads are happy, with other forms of roads, people are depressed. Nalbantoğlu interprets

this discourse as an example of blurring distinction between public and private: Esat depicts the public with the terms of the private. Within the dominant discourse of nationalism in the 1930s, the distinctions of public-private and reason-emotion intermingled with each other; the domination of public over private and emotion over reason increased.

At the end of the 1930s the Modern Architecture identified with foreign architects was declared alien. Under the influence of rising nationalism, the German and Italian monumental architectures were popular in the single-party period (Batur, 1998:88). At the end of the 1930s by showing the compatibility between Turkish building tradition and the rationalist precepts of modern architecture, an attempt was made to "nationalize the modern" with different emphasis (Bozdoğan, 2001:241) under the title of "Second Nationalist Architecture"[139] (1940-1950). While the modern architecture represented the future-oriented aspirations of the new nation, the new nationalist movement symbolized the desire to construct a deep-rooted historical national identity (Bozdoğan, 2001:241). However, For Sarioglu (Sarıoğlu, 2001:120), neither the first nor second national architecture movements were able to create a style reflecting the new regime. Nalbantoğlu, (2000:260) also says that both of national movements stayed superficial and dealed only with appearances[140]. In the

[139] In fact, Bozdoğan (2001:294-295) criticizes this categorization of the periods as "the first national style" (ottoman revivalism), the "international style" (the New Architecture), and the "second national style" (vernacular and classic references) with specific emphasis on the terms of national and international. For her such a categorization may disguise the continuity between 1908 and 1950 which is nationalism. In fact through this period architecture had been under the service of nation building and nationalism was the driving force of Turkish architecture culture.

[140] Also Bozdoğan notes that (2001:295) "by the time modernism "arrived" in Turkey under the rubric of the New Architecture, it had already lost its critical edge in the west and had become an aesthetic formula certified by the term "international style". This label amounted to a tacit admission that the rationalist and functionalist doctrines could not offer an adequate basis for formal articulation and that modernism was, before everything else, a "style"".

discussion of national architecture, the socio-economic conditions, the possibility of organization and the habitus of people were never considered.

6.3.3 Inside the Home: Modernization of the Private

The transformation of houses was parallel to the macro transformation that happened in the society (Duben & Behar, 1996:19). "Everything that is *alafranga* is deemed proper and valuable; anything *alaturka* acquires a negative connotation and is somehow inferior" (Gole, 1997:85). Duben and Behar (cited in Kandiyoti, 1997:119) underline this division between *alaturka* and *alafranga* and argue that it was originally created through the "Europeanization" of the Ottoman upper and middle classes,[141] and it penetrated the inner workings of family life by changing habits of furniture, clothing, and eating. As Duben & Behar (1996:220) point out the contrast of *alaturka* and *alafranga,* even though less pronounced, can be still noticed in Turkish family/house. In fact the constructed categories of urbanity in the early period of the Republic continue to dominate present discussion.

Making a modern (western) domestic culture was very important complementary part of the Westernization process. In the formal level of the modernization project, only by transforming the interiors of houses, the "civilizational shift" could be complemented. To do this of course, the private should be re-arranged according to Western models. In this sense, houses were seen as

[141] This distinction penetrated the inner workings of family life by changing the habits of furniture, clothing, eating etc.

milieu where the ideals of modernization (Westernization) could be achieved. According to Bozdoğan (2001:196), "through the design of houses and interiors, people's existing habits, lifestyles, and worldviews could be transformed along the precepts of Kemalism". Within this context, architecture has been an "agent of civilization" not only in the public spaces of the nation, but also in the most intimate domestic space of the family (Bozdoğan, 2001: 196).

Gülsüm Baydar Nalbantoğlu, (1999:305) says that the modern house is the place where modern subject is constructed. It is an architectural place where public and private; subjects and institutions are located with reference to each other. "The house functioned as the locus where the private and the public spheres intersected and their meanings were (re)produced within their interrelation". The architectural discourse of the early Republican period on the one hand undertakes the burden of cultural ideology of the period. On the other hand it deals with subjective situations such as the comfort of the individual. Nalbantoğlu (1999:305) underlines the acceptance of the subjective situations as a direct and natural extension of general ideological frames, but with no consideration of the gap between these two extremes. In the discourse of the "new" in this period, physical structure, institutional and individual structuring are thought within the limits of same mentality: To create a new nation, a new political structure (Republic), a new capital city (Ankara), new institutions and individuals should be restructured (1999:307). Such a policy would define public as mission area as well as the private.

Interior spaces were seen within this context. The design of domestic interior was seen as a task of "civilized" individuals. It was hoped that habits such as those

involving use of home space and furnishing would become established "with the elevation of the social and civilizational level of the individual" (Bozdoğan, 2001:211). However, to do this there should be models of desired domestic spaces to teach "how a modern house should be" to guide the "individual" to fulfill this task in the private life. The popular magazines of the period adopted this duty, providing illustrative examples with furnishing in European or American style. In magazines' sections of "contemporary homes", furnishings such as coffee tables, table lamps, and curtains were shown in detail.

The anxiety of a stranger (foreigners)'s gaze and the feeling of embarrassment became critical instruments used in the creation of desire for 'modernity' and to explain the necessity for modern home decoration. An article published in "Turkiye Mecmuasi", states that "a person having and decorating such a (modern) house can show it to a stranger without embarrassment and can be proud of it" (cited in Nalbantoğlu, B. 1999). In other words, it can be clearly seen that the sources of embarrassment is an "ugly" (or in this context, an unmodern) house. The embarrassment from one's own house similar to other conditions of embarrassment has been produced through the creation of desire to new habitus of the "new civilization". On the other hand, Nalbantoğlu .B. (1999:310-311) emphasizes the word of "stranger" instead of "guest", which is more common in Turkish culture. Although the tradition of "guest room" (*salon* (drawing room)) was very common in middle and upper classes, it was also accepted as unsuitable for modern life since it separated rooms for entertaining from the rest of the house. It was said that, there was no more need for a room for guest in modern social life (1999:310). In contrast to the traditional cultural practice, there was no place reserved as the guest room in the

representation of space of ideal modern house. Therefore the person who came to home was seen as stranger who would leave the home in a short time. In fact, such an intervention into the plan of houses demonstrates the demand for remarkable change in the habitus of people.

The most striking change in the period began from the decoration, the furniture. Although "modern furniture" was first used by the rich families of Ankara at the end of the 19th century, the cost fell and became widespread as early as the 1950s (Şenol Cantek, 2003:131). The model houses of Ankara were decorated with expensive furniture brought from Europe. Although European furniture had been used by upper classes in the Ottoman Empire, the Republic bought the change to the middle classes (Tekeli, 1998a:17). The main components of traditional furniture had been cushion, mattress, round tray (*sini*), carpet, and rug (*kilim*). The striking difference between the modern and traditional ones was the height from the floor. While the traditional furniture was placed directly on the floor, the modern furniture with legs, such as chairs, couches, tables and coffee tables enabled people to elevate themselves from the ground. The change from traditional to modern also changed the "rhythm of other" linked to the rhythms of activities turned outwards within the scale of the house.

At first the privilege of using this furniture, and the increase in physical space it led to, was restricted to older members and men of family reflecting the hierarchy within the family (Şenol Cantek, 2003:131). As Elias (1996) describes, this formality would disappear through dissemination and internalization of these conducts. At the beginning these furniture were objects to be watched especially for the inhabitants of

the old Ankara. However, through the time they had become objects of desire (Şenol Cantek, 2003:252-253). The socio-cultural meanings attached to goods are effective in their becoming widespread. Elias (1994) notes that rather than functionality, the representation of status determines the code of behavior. Therefore the goods used in daily life also reflect the power relations prevalent in that society. Having "modern furniture" is a way to feel "modern", "urbanite", since being modern is linked to ownership of this furniture. Of course ownership does not mean actually using these goods in daily life, since use is related to the habitus of the individual.

In 1930s "cubic style" started to be used in home decoration as a sign of "western way of life" (Nalbantoğlu, G: 2000:257). Parallel to the "cubic movement" in architecture, "cubic furniture" also became popular because of its qualities of practicality, lightness, ease of maintenance, and simple geometric designs devoid of ornamentation[142]. A full cubic house in the sense of its exterior and interior space was the ideal house of the period. The cubic style and the term cubic emerged as a symbol representative of certain way of life and certain groups in the city. Therefore, owning a cubic property increased the possibility of entrance to this modern community.

[142] Cubist/functional architecture (1927-1939 Bauhaus movement) can be characterized with forms having simplified planes, lines and geometric shapes.

In the operatta "*Lüküs Hayat*" (Luxury Life) written in the beginning of 1930s[143] and staged firstly in 1933, the tenth year of the Republic, the life of the elites was depicted as:

"What a pity if you don't have an apartment in Şişli
nickel-cubic furniture, oil color paintings on the wall
two automobile, one of them is roadster
cook, maid, servants, full kitchen, full larder
wife goes visit, you too, to drink tea in daytime
in the evening you are invited to a dine or a ball"

In this representational space, the representation of the space is challenged. In fact in the text of this operetta, attributed to Nazım Hikmet, the modern way of life reduced to above mentioned forms and activities are satirized by narrating the parvenus' life. However, it gives clues about the modern decoration and way of life of the period. Moreover, in his novel *Ankara*, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (2003:130-131) mentions a house decorated by a character, Hakkı Bey:

> "Hakkı Bey as such in all issues went beyond in the matter of the house and showed the first example of the *cubist* to everybody. The first house with glazed corners, lacquered doors and ceiling hollowed out for concealed electrical installations belonged to him. Selma Hanım's husband feels a hidden pride in this situation. He was cheerful like a child in his *bayramlık*, especially in the first days of his show of rooms and *salon* (drawing room) decorated according to the latest catalogue of furniture from Berlin and Paris".

[143] "Şişli'de bir apartıman, yoksa eğer halin yaman
nikel-kübik mobilyalar, duvarda yağlı boyalar
iki tane otomobil, biri açık, biri değil
aşçı, uşak, hizmetçiler, dolu mutfak, dolu kiler
hanım gider, sen gidersin, gündüzleri çaydan çaya
gece olur, davetlisin, ya dine'ye ya baloya"

Having a cubic house and decorating it with furniture brought from abroad was a matter of prestige in the period. However, Karaosmanoğlu underlines the similarity of these rooms with the cold glitter/lustre of a clinic, because of the furniture resembling the dentist's chair, divans (*sedir*) looking like operating table, couches like the inside of an automobile, octangular tables, cupboards no different from old stores of grain, waiting tables (*dresuvars*), and knickknacks scattered over all these things, naked walls, and naked floor. Interestingly the qualities of the furniture are the desired characteristics of the "modern house". However in the narration of Karaosmanoğlu, these features depict the coldness and sterility of modern life and the estrangement of the individual.

In fact Karaosmanoğlu's depiction also signals the critiques towards cubism. At the end of the 1930s, parallel to the nationalist attacks on the modernist avant-garde in Germany and other places, the term "cubic" gained a negative connotation[144] (Bozdoğan, 2001:234). Cubic apartments were accused of being degenerate, cosmopolite and homelandless. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, in 1937 says that "now we are building cubic apartments and furnishing truly alafranga *salon*s (drawing room). But none of these reflect a spirit or taste that is authentically ours, and the noble taste of the past is watching us with a broken heart from behind our old monuments and our old houses within gardens" (quoted from Bozdoğan, 2001:237/258). In 1936, Peyami Safa (1999:245) also harshly criticizes cubism, stating that Turks had simply taken the word of cubic and "attributed a different content full of distortion, ineffectuality and levity" (*çarpıklık, kofluk, cıvıklık*). "This understanding of cubic was transferred

from an "imaginary Europe" of whose tastes and perceptions are adopted to our nature, but not from "real Europe". The understanding of profound simplicity was turned into gimcrack ornament (*cici bicilik*)"[145]. Therefore, for him, this "work of cubic" devalued not only the aesthetic understanding and meaning of houses, but also the human reason; it should be immediately prevented.

In a similar way, in Memduh Şevket Esendal's (2002:84) novel, "*Ayaşlı ile Kiracıları*" (Ayaşlı and His Tenants) published in 1934, a group of people playing bezique dispute with each other. One of them says to another who is spoiling the game "everything about you is cubic". The accused replies "no, it is not. It is natural". In Turkish, being natural denotes a positive quality of temperament/personality as oppose to the being artificial. In this context, the objection to being cubic means being "authentic" and being without mask which are important points in the discussions of culture of urbanity. As a reaction to imposition of western norms and values in the name of urbanity, and to constructed hierarchy between different ways of life, such an attitude was developed as a challenge to formalism of official ideology.

Existence and decoration of "guest room", in other words the "*salon*" (drawing room) has been also another remarkable issue in the organization of interior space. As it is noted, in cultural practice *salon* has been very common in middle and

---

[144] Especially after the exhibition of "degenerate art" ridiculing and condemning the modernist avant-garde, the critiques of cubism like the accusations of individualism and disconnection from tradition increased in the country (Bozdoğan, 2001:236).

[145] He (1999:245) continues as "in our culture... everything multicolored is called as cubic. Dandy artist, Armenian headworker, perception and temperament of hungry Russian decorator, incapability, cheapness, banality, ugliness and tastelessness are all called as cubic".

upper classes. They are decorated with care and reserved for formal guests. Ayata (1988) proposes that they are the indicator of status and westernization since they are the most Europeanized part of the house. It is assumed that they are the public spaces dominated by "reason", where the most Europeanized manners should be displayed (Esenbel, 2000). Related with the desire for modernization if not others, at least these rooms have been decorated in Western style. In comparison to other rooms, they have become the most formal spaces of the houses at the same time. Even if there has been different way of life deriving from the habitus of the house owner, certain formality within the context of westernization have been displayed in *salon*s. If we apply the span of formal-informal to a house, the disconnectedness of the *salon* and living room give clues about the existence of distinctions in cultural life of the city.

In fact the co-existence of formal-informal in terms of taste was also a common situation in the cultural domain. Although certain "modern" forms, especially cubism dominated to aesthetic understanding of the period, as Bozdoğan (2001:212) points out, only a few Republican interior could match the idealized style of the period. "In many cases, highly eclectic and ornamented furniture crowded the interiors of the most "cubic" houses of 1930s". Although cubism was celebrated as the sign of modernity, in the user's space it could not find a response. It was re-arranged by informal practices resting on traditional habitus in daily life. "Many families were unwilling to dispense with their inherited furniture and family paraphernalia inside the house, even when they moved to the new cubic villas" (Bozdoğan, 2001:212). According to Bozdoğan, the decoration of the houses with traditional household goods can be interpreted as the protection of "home" (*yuva*) character of the inner space. Even the *salon*s (drawing rooms) the "most modern"

part of the house, has displayed traces of this kind of eclectic taste. Throughout the history of the Republic, this eclectic situation sometimes has brought a synthesis and help to produce hybrid forms in spite of the resistance of state elites. On the other hand, sometimes it remained in –inconsistent- eclectic form, which has been evaluated as unnatural, enforced culture and became the issue of harsh criticism/satire or humor (especially under the title of parvenu).

Bozdoğan (2001:196-197) argues that until 1950s the built houses were the result of either a limited architect-client relationship or state or philanthropic initiatives, they lacked the quality of a commodity produced within the market mechanisms of a modern society. “In this sense, even when houses had a “modern” appearance and suggested “modern” lifestyle, they did not represent a social and historical “modernity”” (2001:196-197). Bozdoğan (2001:234) also states that “for the most part, republican ideology was willing to take modernism (and “cubic” as its stylistic expression) on board for its scientific and progressive connotations but was deeply uneasy with its urban, cosmopolitan, and “international” signifiers”. In fact this discussion of architecture is very insightful full discussion on modernity in general.

The strict formal production of space and urbanity produced exclusions by drawing boundaries in urban area. However, both elites and the mass of the people are involved in informal practices in this process. And these informal practices emerged as the only possibility of mediation between the inside and the outside, between far order and near order. In the next chapter I will expand on the discussion by concentrating on the issue of city life.

CHAPTER VII

CONSTRUCTION OF THE CITY LIFE

7.1 A Livable City Having Elegant Activities

While narrating his impressions of Ankara in the late 1920s', Tanpınar (2001:30) says that, although the days of the war and decision were still the main issue of the agenda, the magic of this story had faded away. "The people, who made history five years ago, now went out from the illumination of it and were living in the light of daily things". He says the agenda of the city consisted of the construction of new buildings and the life of Mustafa Kemal[146]. In the 1930s, the years of the consolidation of the state, the agenda of the city was the "new civilization" and its necessities, with its new buildings and new places promising a "new way of life" for certain groups.

The belief was that, to realize the "new civilization", there should be a city that would make it possible. Therefore, the attempt to create a livable (modern) city

[146] The dinner in Çankaya Kiosk and the people being invited to it was the main issue of the day after (Şenol Cantek, 2003:141).

was a main issue in that period. In the early years, although İstanbul was rejected as the inheritance of old regime, in terms of services in the city, there was an inevitable yearning for İstanbul. Many of the inhabitants of the city had come from İstanbul and they were looking for the conditions that they were familiar with. Since, in Ankara, there were very limited services like restaurants, tailors, hat makers, barbers and hotels, the elite of the city had to go to İstanbul to satisfy their needs (*Ulus*, 3rd February 1935). Therefore, the first thing that was needed was to make Ankara a satisfactory city for the needs of Republican elite. In the middle of 1930s there was news announcing the increasing services in the city of Ankara (*Ulus*, 3rd February 1935). In the news, the increasing number of restaurants, tailors, hat makers, barbers, and hotels was celebrated. This happiness was explained as "the people of Ankara no more have to go İstanbul for dressmaking or shopping". The people of Ankara or the elites of Ankara could stay in Ankara.

In the news and editorials, the main issue of complaints was people going to İstanbul at the first opportunity. Especially in the summers of Ankara, the elite were leaving for İstanbul and the city was being left to natives. In 1931, Aka Gündüz (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 15th October) says that "the population of the city is 60.000 but in the summer 15.000 of it leave Ankara". For him, in the summers, Ankara was like a "squeezed lemon". He also complained that the money earned in Ankara was being spent in İstanbul. In the cultural environment of the city, leaving Ankara in the summers was a kind of fashion for the elite. Having a trip to İstanbul at the first opportunity was even seen as an element of prestige. Aka Gündüz (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th August 1931, 17th October 1931) writes on this issue frequently and gives clues about the city life in those years. He says that in elite circles, leaving Ankara in

summer was seen as a kind of sign of "bourgeois gentility". Having trips to İstanbul and talking about the trip and shopping were assumed to be the indicators of being bourgeoisie. In this sense, being an urbanite of Ankara equated to having a visit to İstanbul. He harshly criticizes this tendency and says there should be summer *Ankaralı* (urbanites of Ankara), and, more importantly, that *Ankaralı* "should be created".

Therefore, creating *Ankaralı* was the main issue of the period. To create *Ankaralı* there needed to be "bourgeoisie way of life" in Ankara. On the one hand, it was aimed to create such a city within the context of the period's understanding of a lively bourgeoisie city. On the other hand, such claims were responded with a nationalist discourse rejecting the "material culture" and reminding people of the duties of citizens. In the beginning of the 1930s, there were articles published as a reaction to complaints about the lack of city life in Ankara, as well as the articles demanding a lively city life. Mehmet Saffet (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 20th June 1929), in his article titled "Spiritual Ankara" accuses people who did not like Ankara for being too materialist; for him, they were the "foreigners" in the city who could not be a part of the community. Parallel to the title of his article, he adds that the beauty of Ankara could not be understood with a material gaze.

In these responsive writings, the moral duty of citizenship is raised, and being in Ankara, or in other words "abiding in Ankara" is presented as a "moral duty". In another article, written under the alias *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10th September 1932), the discontent felt by the elite was due to foreigners' frequent question "how do you stand living in Ankara". He says that he answers all those questions by saying

"by working". In these writings, boring city life was not rejected but tolerating it was defined as a duty. While İstanbul was seen as the city of entertainment, Ankara was associated with just the opposite quality. Although the complaints about certain deficiencies took part in the newspaper too, in these responses, being *Ankaralı* was formulated as a duty and diligence.[147] This discourse was applied when it was needed to defend Ankara by accepting the limited city life.

As is noted, furthermore, in order to prevent the move from Ankara to İstanbul, many projects were suggested. Most of these were related to places of entertainment and recreational areas associated with water, such as the creation of beaches or the use of lakes and pools (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6th July 1929, 23rd July 1931, 9th August 1931, 5th September 1932) since İstanbul was seen as a city of water. Parks, gardens, recreational areas close to dams and pools were opened progressively as well as clubs, restaurants, and ballrooms. In contrast to İstanbul, these places also had the mission of teaching a civilized way of life. Most of them belonged to state institutions or were supported by it, and their common aim was to create a new "*Ankaralı*" by constructing a new way of life. In this sense, these places of entertainment functioned as the carrier of the project of modernization and Westernization, which are discussed above. Also, Öztürkmen (1999:183-184) suggests that these places were thought of as a way to entertain society where there was a limited understanding of entertainment outside the privacy of the family. In terms of our discussion, these places had a double function. On the one hand they were seen as the places of creating the desired modern individuals, and so urbanites.

[147] Within this approach towards the end of the 1930s, Aka Gündüz (*Ulus*, 31st May 1938) would propose establishing a "society of people loving Ankara".

They were the obvious places where the state intervened in the private domain of individuals, by determining how they should act. On the other, hand they gave the opportunity of creating public spaces by developing outdoor entertainment areas for families, including women. As was discussed in the chapter V, since women's existence in public was seen as prerequisite for being urbanite, women from certain strata could access public space through these entertainment activities. Of course, it was a limited and exclusionary public space which was demarcated by the state and its ideology.

Öztürkmen (1999:183-184) summarizes the ways of entertainment in the early Republican period in two categories. The first is the more traditional that were reinterpreted in the Republican culture, such as wedding ceremonies, outdoor meals, or seaside promenades[148]. In fact, this group was realigned towards the direction of the necessity of a new civilization. The other is more peculiar to the Republican culture that emerged around the places opened by civil servants, especially in the country. These places mostly belonged to state institutions like Orduevi (Officer's Club), Turkish Hearth and People's Houses, and they are the places where the ways of modern entertainment were invented (Öztürkmen, 1998:190). This categorization can be used to describe the elite's city life in Ankara, too. The first was outdoor activities consisting of a reordering of the traditional understanding of promenades and picnics. The newness of these activities was due to their rearrangement according

[148] Hamamönü (22nd May 1929) and Cebeci (18th March 1929) were the main places for the bayram (regional fests) entertainments. The "place of bayram" (*bayram yeri*) was an important notion for the entertainment of children. Although at the beginning of 1930s there was much news related to these places, it would decrease towards the end of 1930s. Onur (1999:229-230) mentions different memories related with the activities of the "place of bayram". For him, the disappearance of free playing areas signaled the increase in the purchase of toys denoting private space (like home) and individualism and the rise of a relatively rich middle class.

to formal rules inspired by the "new civilization"; and secondly, new "modern" entertainment life introduced with the Republican period and organized around places like saloons and clubs. On the other hand, the other *Ankaralı*s, including old *Ankaralı*s and newcomers, still maintained the traditional understanding of entertainment, with little changes. These activities were informal in comparison to elite's understanding of entertainment.

If we look to places related with the first category, a well-known place of outdoor activity was Gazi (Atatürk) Forest Farm, constructed in 1925. While it was a place for agricultural education, it also served the needs of urbanites (Sarıoğlu, 2001:47) as a recreational area. In 1931, the favorite places for weekends, announced in the newspaper, were the garden of the assembly, the garden of Nation (*millet bahçesi*), the Marmara Park and tree nursery of Cebeci (*fidanlık*) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23rd July 1931). Another important common place, introduced to create a lively city, was the pool of Karadeniz, completed in 1931 at Gazi Forest Farm. With its pool, beach, night-clubs (*gazino*), beer parks[149], and garden parties, Forest Farm assumed a huge place, both in the entertainment life of the city and in the newspaper, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. The new recreational spaces were also designed and opened while the city was being restructured through the planning process. An attempt to combat the arid climate of Ankara was compensated by creating green areas. In 1935, Forest Farm, Çubuk Dam, the garden of Kizilay (Yenişehir) and Mamak were added to the list published in the newspaper (*Ulus*, June 1935). These places were the main public spaces of the city in which people saw each other.

As the traditional picnic was represented as strange, more "modern resorts" would be demanded. Voicing this demand, Yasar Nabi (*Ulus*, 31st May 1938) stated that the number of "modern resorts" (*modern mesire*) like the Farm and Baraj needed to be increased. In 1938, when the casino of Çubuk Dam was finished, it was celebrated since it had "the outlook of a European summer house" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 31st May 1938). Imitating Western counterparts constituted the core of the production of space and the construction of urbanity in the period.

Although all these places were the spaces of traditional outdoor activities such as picnic and promenade areas, they were differentiated from the ordinary green areas like Kayaş and İncesu, the traditional picnic areas of other *Ankaralı*s. These places were announced as "elegant" resort (*mesire*) and promenade places (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23rd July 1931). They were elegant because they were designed for the desired individuals and citizens of the Republic. Therefore, there were expected way of behaviors appropriate to individuals of the "new civilization". These limitations emerged from the formal rules not in the sense of legality but in the sense of socially expected behavior in elite groups, in order to be approved as urbanite and modern. In the news (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23rd July 1931) mentioning these "elegant" resort and promenade places, it was noted that apart from these places, there were Kayaş and İncesu which were full of people with a different understanding of entertainment. Although there was no additional comment, the emphasis of "different" was a value-laden evaluation referring to informality and a deviation from the desired attitudes.

[149] There were also continuous beer advertisements explaining the utility of it in the newspaper. In one of them it was said that "the beer is good for typhoid" (*Ulus*, 4th January 1934). Beer was defined as a

With this and similar emphases, the span of formal and informal was extended to underline the distinction between the elite and others.

In fact, the activities of picnicking and promenading differentiated across social class lines. The same activity was done differently by groups displaying different "ways of life". The distinction, referring to urbanity, was created according to an affinity to Western codes of behaviour rather than codes allowing a possibility of the existence of others. In fact, in many activities involved in the discussion of urbanity, it is possible to see this formal distinction. The most striking difference between modern and traditional picnic activities was that in "elegant" places there were tables for people in western styles of clothing instead of "*yer sofrası*" (meal eaten on the floor). As discussed in chapter V, the change in the habit of eating symbolized with the dining table was an important indicator of being modern and urbanite. Photographs taken in popular "Garden Parties" of the period (also announced in French) and published with pride, displayed these people around a table eating and drinking alcohol[150] (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25th July 1930, 13th June 1935). In fact, the possibility of the existence of women at an outdoor meal served with alcohol could be accepted as a difference between the "traditional" and the "modern", pointing out the change in codes which gave the possibility to existence of others (women), although was limited to the participation of (elite) women within the confines of official ideology.[151]

---

watery bread, and bread which is drunk, since it was produced from barley (*Ulus*. 20th March 1934).

[150] For this (modern) group, to pose for photograph and looking to the photographs taken in the picnic were also other forms of entertainment in themselves (Öztürkmen, 1999:188).

[151] See Kandiyoti (1997, 2007).

In the dominant discourse of the Republican regime, urbanity was constructed by emphasizing the difference between new and traditional appearances rather than with reference to relationships with others[152]. In the narration of the parties, the term "elegant" was underlined with reference to the Western clothes of participants. For example, one, organized by Hilal-i Ahmer in Marmara Park in Atatürk Orman Çiftliği, was reported as "the distinguished (*mümtaz*) families were participants" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25th July 1930). By increasing the gap between formal and informal practices in codes of behaviour, the attempt to create a national bourgeoisie was tied to support in the city space. Moreover, the rejection of mediations at a formal level also contributed to an increase in the gap.

In Turkey, as Çınar (2005:4) discusses, "modernity not only is about a particular lifestyle, institution, practice or culture, but also is a widely used word in daily popular discourse". If we look to the names of the new places in the city, we can follow the emphasis on the construction of urban life. At the beginning of 1930, many new places were named with the term "new", referring to the new Republic and the new civilization, like New Cinema, New Pub (with European artists), New Restaurant (serving Turkish and French foods), New Garden and so on (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 29th June 1929). Throughout the 1930s, the assertion of modernization found its expression in the names of these shops and services. Most of them at this time were defined with the term "modern" (*asri*) (Çiçekoğlu, 1998:147; Ergin, 2004): *Asri* Barber, *Asri* Photographer, *Asri* Restaurant, *Asri* Cebeci Cemetery and even the famous *Asri* Toilet in the street of Anafartalar. The emphasis of the newness of the

[152] As I discussed in the Chapter III, the notion of urbanity simply refers to the possibility of relationship with others.

Republic was replaced with modernness. As Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu (2000:297) discusses, the movement of being "*asri*" (*asrilik furyası*) was a reflection of the Western way of life and consumption patterns, and dominated urban life. Evolving through the time from "*asri*" to "*çağdaş*" and "*modern*", the term has always referred to being engaged in the project of the Republic. In the construction of urbanity, the term, as an adjective has an important place referring to the state of being urbane.

7.2 Distinguished Activities of Urbanites

The new activities arranged to construct a new way of life were generally announced as distinguished activities, participated in by elegant persons and families. This emphasis on distinquishedness, in fact, helped to increase the gap between formal and informal ways of life. One of these distinguished activities for the "civilized" elites was sport. Similar to the practice of promenading and eating, sport was another class specific activity[153]. The need for sport service areas was frequently voiced by the writers of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (especially by Falih Rıfkı, 5th September 1932). However, the type of activity was also chosen according to the "new civilization". Exclusive sports like horse riding and tennis were the popular sports of the period. These sports were equated with the elite of the city. In a poem, published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (10th July 1930), a writer with a pen name Özüköy narrates his impressions in the district of Çankaya and Kavaklıdere[154]. In the poem, he says that,

[153] See Bourdieu (1978). Elias (1996) also discusses sport activities in the context of the "civilizing process". He compares fencing and fight in terms of the control of violence by different classes.

[154] Gezdim bütün Cankaya'yı/ Aldim nese, hayat payi, / Tenis oynar iken gördüm / Kavakli'da Atalay'i

while wandering in Çankaya he saw Atalay (most probably he was Besim Atalay, one of the deputies of the period) playing tennis in Kavaklı and he adds that Kavaklı was aristocratic. Referred as bourgeoisie or aristocratic, the perception of a distinguished way of life was also supported with activities like sport. In this sense, the aristocratic quality of Kavaklı was produced through the domination of the representation of space. Complementary to this representation, at the end of the 1930s, a golf course that would be built on the road of Akkara-Çubuk, was announced (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23rd March 1938).

As a complementary part of the new way of life, there were other activities, although they were limited. The first cinema of the city was Büyük Cinema in *Ulus*. Then Cinema Klüp and New Cinema were also opened in *Ulus*. They advertised in the newspaper. Additionally, Cinema *Ulus* was the first in Yenişehir constructed in 1938. Apart from the cinema sometimes there were exhibitions of paintings (of M. Wemberg) in Ankara Palas (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 29th April 1929)[155]. The most striking activity was concerts where mostly classical music was played. Music shows (*musiki müsameresi*) were arranged, especially in the German embassy (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25th February 1929, 13th February 1935).

Dallar yesil yaprakli / Gölgelerde nese sakli / Akköprü'den daha fazlı, /Aristokrattir Kavaklı (written by Özüköy).

[155] In 1936 there were also an exhibition of the group D searching for a new understanding of art, in Sergievi (2nd February 1936). Group D introduced a belated version of cubism and constructivism to Turkey (Bozdoğan, 2001:148). However, Bozdoğan (2001:151) has suspicions about the avant-garde feature of similar groups in this period. "The avant-garde had exalted the creativity of the freethinking individual, not that of the conformist. It had embraced the abstract and the universal in art, not the figurative and the local. Such a celebration of art, as an autonomous, individualistic, often unpopular creative act was anathema to the republican belief in art as an expression of national interest" (2001:150). Therefore by "channeling their formal and abstract experiments towards the prevailing folkloric and nationalist themes of the 1930s, they produced… "a peasant cubism"" (2001:152) by adapting cubist abstraction techniques to folkloric motifs, peasant women, and Anatolian landscapes (2001:253). In every branch of arts, music, literature, drama, painting, and sculpture, "Western genres and techniques were applied to Anotolian subject matters" (Bozdoğan, 2001:253

Creating a kind of "love of classical (Western) music" was another desired situation in the name of modernization and westernization. Atatürk encouraged Western music by labeling traditional Turkish (*alaturka*) music as narcotic and an incentive to laziness and also "far from being representable (*yüz agartacak değerde olmaktan uzak*)" (Meriç, 1999:194). In 1926, the education of Turkish music was banned and from 1934 to 1976 it was removed from radio programs. Radio of Ankara also broadcasted predominantly classical music and jazz. However, the radio of İstanbul was broadcasting Turkish music as well as classic music. In *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (17th April 1929), there were complaints about the "moaning" violin, *kemençe,* drum and *ney* on radio İstanbul. In these years there also emerged an attempt to blend polyphonic Western music with Turkish music, especially with the contributions of Ahmed Adnan Saygun. The first Turkish opera, *Özsoy*, composed by Ahmet Adnan Saygun, premiered on 23rd June 1934.

In 1936 Celal Esad Arseven (*Ulus*, 25th March 1936), an important name in the study and construction of "Turkish culture" (Bozdoğan, 2001:246-247), wrote an article comparing two concerts, one in İstanbul in 1896, and the other in Ankara in 1936. First, he mentioned that he participated in the first with two other Turkish friends. It was arranged in the Embassy of France in Beyoğlu Street by a Society composed of foreigners to satisfy their need for music. He says that the three of them did not show that they were Turkish, hiding their fezs, because all the other people were foreigners with their hats, tailcoats, fur and walking sticks; they thought that their fezs were not appropriate to this place. This discourse of embarrassment was frequently used to justify the formal change within the Republic. He sadly continues

that they had been yearning for such activities to be arranged and participated in by Turks. In 1936, their wishes were realized at the concert of Necdet Atak who was playing like a Western artist at the School of Music Teachers in Ankara. He was touched by the scene composed of men and women wearing hats, accessories and speaking Turkish in a modern building. Even the love of Western classical music was not seen enough, it had to be completed with appropriate clothing while listening.

Classical music became the symbol of official (formal) westernization. With the mission of educating people, the Orchestra of the President performed concerts regularly in Yenişehir. This mission was explained in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (8th December 1930) as: "enjoying civilized music is defined as the main criterion of Westernization. Therefore, these concerts must be compulsory for the young generation. The mass is educated in this way" (*kütle böyle terbiye edilir*)[156]. With this mentality, modernization was equated with Westernization, and Westernization was linked to the consumption of "civilized" music. As discussed in chapter IV, the quality of being civilized was closely related with being Western; having a Western form was seen as enough to be modern. In the same above mentioned article, it was also added that "we also have to westernize the inside of our mind which was saved from the fez". This sentence in itself is a good example to attempt to solve the problem of body-mind dualism, without considering their relationship.

However, this insistent demand to change both of them (simply habitus) was challenged by informal practices. Although the news and editorials published in

Hakimiyet-i Milliye celebrated Western classic music activities, it was difficult to change musical taste, similar to other tastes embedded in habitus. Meriç, (1999:194) argues that in the 1930s, while people were enthused with operetta (amusing opera) in İstanbul, bureaucrats and modern intellectuals of Ankara were going to opera or concerts for different reasons, such as state compulsion, fashion or even real interest in music. Although classical music was imposed on public formally, people continued to listen to music familiar to them (informally). People who were not used to Western classical music, preferred to listen to Arabic, Persian and Indian radio instead of the state radio, persistently broadcasting Western music[157] (Meriç, 1999:195). Even Atatürk continued to listen to classical Turkish music.

According to the news, published in 1937 (*Ulus*, 10th November), there were "one People's House, two cinemas, one pub and 107 coffeehouses" as entertainment places in Ankara in 1937. These places were considered inadequate for Ankara, and especially, the need for a theatre was voiced. In the news, it was said that, since there were not enough places of entertain, *Ankaralı* went to sleep very early and there was no night life in the city. It also added that, in this poor environment "there is no option other than to go visiting each other". However, in 1931, Falih Rıfkı complained that "only to fill the sole theater of Ankara, people are woken up from their sleep" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1st February 1931). He criticized the lack of enthusiasm among people. He said *"*arid rules (*kuru düstur*) and cold reason can not

---

[156] In one of the concerts of the State Symphony Orchestra in Anatolia, it is said that one of the members of the audience at the end of the concert said "*bayburt bayburt olalı böyle zulüm görmemiştir*" (Meriç, 1999:194)

[157] Meriç, (1999:195) says that this choice would bring another brand of Turkish and Arabic music in 1950s, and would end with Arabesk. This informal hybrid would dominate city life, and would be discussed as the return of the suppressed.

stimulate the creative ability of society". Although sometimes there were fragments of self-critique, the formal modernization continued to be imposed on people.

The limited activity at nights was another issue of complaint. The owner of a hotel complained about the lack of night life in Ankara (*Ulus*, 29th January 1935). Because of this he said people spent a very short time in Ankara and they went to İstanbul immediately after they had completed their work. The limited places of night life in the city were Fresko Pub and Elhamra Pub, as well as Ankara Palas (Nalbantoğlu, H. U., 2000:296). These pubs were places to display the ability to dance gained from the dance lessons. In the night life of the city, the most popular activities were balls, arranged once a week in Ankara Palas, and parties given at home, especially in Yenişehir. In the description of model houses published in popular magazines, even houses with large *salon*s (drawing rooms), wide terraces and flat roof tops were described as possible dancing floors that could be used for appropriate occasions (Bozdoğan, 2001:212). The houses of Yenişehir were the places of parties with music and dance throughout the night. Even in 1934, the municipality prohibited noisy meetings that disturbed neighbors after midnight (*Ulus*, 10th August 1934). While parties at home demonstrated limited city life at nights, they were also indicators of semi-public life.

These meetings and activities can be seen as the continuation of the semi-public life within a closed community who encountered each other in every corner of Yenişehir (Erim, 1993). The participants of these activities constituted a kind of "modern gemeinschaft", constructed by people knowing each other very well. Atay (2006:382) says "since the people wandering in the streets, meeting in the chief

restaurant near the Assembly and in the garden of Municipality were the same, we did not even need to greet each other". While depicting Ankara, Tanpınar (2001:30) also says that the agenda of the city was like a newspaper anonymously published. "In a city where you inevitably come across the same person a couple of times a day, you can hear an anecdote from 20 persons in one hour". This condition also refers to the surveillance mechanism of the new gemeinschaft. If we remember the discussion of urbanity in the third chapter, the 1930s's Ankara was very distant from urbanity as a freedom from parochialism and surveillance, since they were reproduced in a different form.

In the next part I will discuss the balls as the most striking activities of the period. Although participation was limited to a certain elite group, balls were very important in terms of the official construction of urbanity.

7.3 Teaching to Entertain: Balls

Spreading the new way of social entertainment to all the people was accepted as a mission of the Republic. Balls and parties were important activities which ensured that the way of life had a western outlook[158]. Such entertainments were seen as the indicator of a Western way of life as much as the legal requirements like the civil law or the law of clothing (hat). They were specifically seen as ideological tools which were used for the cultural and social change desired the by elite of the Republic (Duman, 1997:45). These balls were the easiest way to prove westernization and a

western way of life. Öztürkmen (1999:181), quoting from a conversation with Mina Urgan, says that the primary reason for these balls was not entertainment, but "to teach people how to entertain". The main function of the balls was explained as teaching men and women to have conversation and meals together. Balls were the stages for displaying the learnt attitudes and behaviour of the "new civilization". There were even special balls for children, aimed at teaching them the etiquette of Europe (Işın, 1987b:17). The Republican elite were aware of the importance of childhood in terms of the internalization of a code of behaviour. As discussed before, habitus can not be easily changed since it is learned from early childhood onward. One of the characters in the novel of *Ankara*, Murat Bey, a "parvenu due to land speculation", brought his children to Ankara Palas. He said: "I brought them on purpose… They should get used to it at an early ages. They should not suffer from inexperience like us" (Karaosmanoğlu, 2003:115). This example is important since it points to the difficulty and anxiety of people who had a different habitus from what was needed at these balls. The discordance was a problem since not knowing the etiquette of "modern life" was a sufficient reason for disdain and exclusion in this social circle.

The first official ball was held on the anniversary of the Republic on the 29th September, 1925 (Duman, 1997:46). It then, it spread to the city life and dominated the agenda with its preparations and activities. They were arranged with different titles like only entertainment, or social solidarity or charity[159]. Christmas also began to be celebrated with balls by the elite in Ankara Palas, under the name of "*Noel*

---

[158]rkey was ordered by Atatürk in 1925 in İzmir (Duman, 1997:45).

[159] Turk Ocağı, Hilal-i Ahmer and Himaye-i Etfal were the holders of charity balls.

Reveyyonu"[160]. In these balls, people drank, danced, and participated in different entertainment activities, like lottery for fun or charity, or listening to the orchestra (jazz band) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2nd February 1929). These activities generally continued all night long. Especially in the evenings of national fests or New Year, balls were organized in different places of the city, like Ankara Palace, the most prestigious, Embassies and People's Houses. With the increase in the number of ball rooms, there emerged a hierarchy between places according to social status of the participants. In 1935 there were two balls for the New Year, one of them in the Sergievi, arranged by Hilali Ahmer, and the other in Ankara Palas. Atatürk firstly attended the first one for nearly one hour, and then went to Ankara Palas (*Ulus*, 2nd January 1935). In 1938, the places of entertainment were Ankara Palas, Karpiç, Sergievi, Halkevi, İmren Restaurant and Keciören casino. According to the news, the most elegant people collected in Ankara Palas and the most expensive and luxurious dressings could be seen in Ankara Palas and Karpiç that night (*Ulus*, 1st January 1938). Classification was done according to "elegance" meaning the high degree of internalization of western codes and luxury dressing signifying a following of fashion as well as having money.

As can be understood, the favorite place was Ankara Palace. These organizations appeared in the newspaper both before and after the event. Since preparations took a long time, the news of them was published for days[161]. In general, preparations were done by the "ladies" of those "high families". The names of the committee for preparations were announced in the newspaper (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*,

[160] The menu was announced in French (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19 December 1929).

19th October 1928, 1st March 1929, and 26th November 1932). It generally consisted of the wives of the deputies and the wives of ambassadors.

Those balls were generally described as "both Turkish and foreign "high families" of our city came together to…" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 1st March 1929; 7th April 1932). The people participating in these organizations were represented as "*mümtaz*" (distinguished), "*seçkin*" (exclusive), and "*kibar sınıf*" (gentle class). Additionally, in an article written by under abbreviation of T.Ç. (*Ulus,* 3rd November1936), it was asserted that "by means of these balls, Ankara shows that it is the city of a united nation (*kaynaşmış millet*) without privilege and class". The "altruistic" work of the ladies from the distinguished families of the city was interpreted as a sign of "national unity without privilege and class" which was the discursive assertion of the state ideology.

In contrast to this discourse, balls were actually the places of show-off. They "were occasions on which the wives and daughters of the new elite would show off the latest fashions as if competing to demonstrate their level of modernity" (Mahir, 2005:20). The thing that had to be proved with a costume was not elegance or beauty but modernness. In some cases, the obligatory costume for men was announced in the newspaper. For example, for the anniversary ceremony of the Republic the necessary costume was announced in detail as "tailcoat, black waistcoat, white starched shirt, pasted collar, black shoes with laces and opera hat" and it was added that "gloves are not compulsory" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 27th October 1928). Robes, tailcoats, handbags

[161] For example, the news related to the preparation of the 23rd April begun to be published on 1st March, 1929.

and shoes were being brought from İstanbul (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2nd February 1929). As the Elias' discussion of informalization asserts, the detail of the list would decrease through the internalization of external constraints within this elite group. In *Ankara*, Karaosmanoğlu (2003:109) depicts these preparations starting two months previously. He says that "women were going to İstanbul" to see the latest fashions from Paris, from "Kaligurisi" and "Fegara". To aid in this competition among the dress-conscious women of Ankara, there would be seasonal clothes exhibitions like Madam Fegara's exhibition in Ankara Palas (*Ulus*, 18th April 1934). In Karaosmanoğlu's novel, people who could not find these clothes in İstanbul, ordered them from Europe (Karaosmanoğlu, 2003:109). Balls were the main stages to display "modernness" with the use of "western" clothes. The effect of western clothes was so appreciated that, in an article about balls, it was said that "when men with tailcoats and tuxedos go to the pubs of Ankara in the late times of ball nights, they bestow these places a European color" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2nd February 1929). It was implied that Western clothes could give the sense of Europeanness/ modernness to places where they had been.

Dancing, as an activity displaying the body, was an important part of a modern way of life. It was evidence to show how modern one had become during the balls and parties. "In modern neighborhoods", not knowing how to dance was interpreted as being backward, unmodern, and uncivilized (Öztürkmen, 1999:182). In the situations of the absence of a lady or a cavalier, or a family ban on mixed gender dancing, women danced with women and men with men.

Dances like the tango, the swing, the Charleston, the fox trot, and the waltz were popular, and within a short time, dance schools were opened for adults, and private lessons were taken (Öztürkmen, 1999:182). Newspapers and magazines published articles to teach dancing. The etiquette rules of dancing like the invitation to dance, the proper suit and gloves for balls, and the manners during and after the dance were all explained in this guidance (Mahir, 2005:20). The interest, even the "support of the state", dancing was the expression of the desire for modern life and Westernization, although this pressure sometimes brought stumbling and sorrow.

In official balls, the waltz and the tango were the favorite dances. Traditional dances were not included in the repertoire since they were not seen as "civilized". In 1925, Selim Sırrı Tarcan re-arranged the zeybek, a "national dance", and displayed it to Ataturk who said "Ladies and Gentlemen! When Selim Sırrı Bey revived the dance, *zeybek*, he gave it a civilized form *(şekl-i medeni)*. The work of this master artist has become perfect and is aesthetic enough to be gladly accepted into our national and social life by all of us. Now we can say to Europeans that we also have a perfect dance and we can display this dance in our ballrooms and shows. The dance, *zeybek*, can be and should be done with women in every dance hall" (quoted from Öztürkmen, 1998:183). *Zeybek* was added to the end of the dance programs just after tango and waltz[162]. It was an exceptional re-arrangement of the informal which was contained by the formal in this period.

[162] Still in similar official organizations traditional/Turkish music (and dance) is played at the end of the program though it is not included in official program.

Since so much meaning was attributed to balls, they became a kind of official exam to prove modernity. Using the abbreviation B.A. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2nd February 1929), a writer criticized these preparations since they were exaggerated. He said that people got too exited and so lost their "naturalness" and "confidence". As discussed in chapter III, the qualities of naturalness and confidence are taken as the indicators of being civilized and urbane, according to certain approaches. They signal that the individual knows the appropriate way of behavior approved by that social group. A hesitation by an individual about the appropriateness of his/her acts may bring a lack of confidence and naturalness. As noted before in the history of codes of civility, a judgment on the appropriate code of behavior or emotions has a close association with power relations in society. As Elias (1996) discusses, if there is a huge gap between the formal and informal way of behavior in the definition of appropriate behavior, it is the indicator of unequal power relations. As it is discussed with reference to Elias above, the main functions of formalization is to differentiate and distance the higher and lower strata by means of "promoting the integration of the higher group itself" (1996:72). By creating a formality specific to these balls, the distinction of the Republican elite would be underlined. However, formalization inevitably brings an increasing gap between the formality-informality span. In this example, the inconfidence or artificiality can be derived from such a gap, emerging from the attempt to create formality according to Western norms, for people who have a different habitus. In addition, the anxiety of being approved of by the controlling gaze of Mustafa Kemal (core elite) also contributed to this tension. B.A. says "women are exited as in a wedding and men like the eve of job exams". For him, therefore, there was no fun in these balls. However, if was participation was with natural and confident, there could be fun. "If you tremble whenever starting a

job, it will cause stumbling, faltering, hesitation and sorrow". In opposition to the state of trembling, self reliance means being relaxed in manner or the ability to interact with others easily, which is possible in relatively equal power relations (Elias, 1996). The "borrowed" language or attitudes which are not derived from the people's own habitus may create a sense of insecurity that will cause stumbling, faltering, hesitation and sorrow.

Yakup Kadri (2003: 98-99) also depicts the people in these balls with the voice of Selma in his novel "Ankara". Especially at the beginning "…people did not yet know how to act, how to wander, how to dance, how to manage the eyes, hands and head. It was possible to see motionless groups of women standing near the walls; gentlemen standing up like models at the door; timid and inexperienced young people, without speaking, toasting continuously around the buffet". It was impossible to disregard the timidity of the people, especially of the women in these balls.

These cases show that the formally defined rules were still strange to some people participating in these balls; and at the informal level, the traditional rules defined by "what had been done" were still part of the life of some of the elite of Ankara. The mere co-existence of formal- and informal norms (and values defining the way of life) could not be the reason for the condition of anxiety. Nevertheless, the increasing gap and very clearly defined rejection of the informal, deriving from unwanted tradition, and the difficulty in changing it, enforced the tension of individuals. B.A. ends his writing with a wish: "if the balls are not protocolary, people can have more fun". As noted at the beginning, in fact these balls were arranged not for fun but to teach people how to have fun.

However, one of the reasons of the exceptional importance attached to these balls was they were *mixed-gender entertainments*, and a symbol of Republican modernization[163]. The presence of Muslim women with men in a "stranger environment" was seen as a revolutionary aspect of the Republican period (Duman, 1997:45-46). For this reason, women, as representative of Republican ideology in social life, had a special place at these balls. "… they were to dress like European women, and were to talk, dance, and drink like them and from now on were to learn to share the same physical space with men" (Mahir, 2005:20)[164]. Again, it was not easy to change the relationship between men and women without the change in the habitus; therefore, women especially could not be comfortable at these balls. This "uncivilized" situation was disappointing and made Mustafa Kemal angry, so he felt the need to intervene in the situation. At a ball, after he learnt that women rejected the offer of a dance with men, he loudly said "Friends! I can not accept a woman's rejection of the offer of a Turk wearing an army officer uniform in all the world. Now, I command you. Go to the hall! Quick march! Dance!" (Şenol Cantek, 2003:265-266). With reference to this case, Şenol Cantek says that women's feelings of loyalty to military officers who had "saved the honor" of these women, placed them at the men's service to support their power and ego. This was so, even in the most formal public space of the Republic.

[163] Duman (1997:46-48) mentions two balls, one in Izmir and other in Kastomonu, in which the participation of men (governor in Kastomonu) without their wives were criticized and objected to, a discussion was started about the appropriateness of the situation to the rules of "adab-I muaseret" (etiquette).

Another detail from these balls which depicted the gap between formal and informal was eating habits. A witness of the period (cited in Şenol Cantek, 2003:247) attending these balls mentions a rich buffet dinner prepared carefully. However, she complained about the guests who were interested in nothing but the buffet. For her, guests rushed at the food, so to say. Another witness, in a similar way, mentions the deputies coming to balls with tailcoats and tuxedos and eating the meal with their hands. At the end of the dinner, the deputies' shirts and ties were stained with tomato paste. In the narration of the witnesses, it was believed that this unmannerliness would decrease through the years especially with the "education of the people". Through the internalization of the external constraints of the "new civilization", bureaucrats and rich families of Ankara would also be "civilized", although most of the people were far from this "civilized way of life". At this point, we can say that informalization, in the context of Elias' discussion, was possible in the near social surrounding of the elite. Because of the disconnectedness between the so-called center and the periphery, informalization would be difficult in the civilizing history of Turkey.

At the beginning of the 1930s, the effects of the Great Depression were felt. Therefore, an attempt to reduce the luxury of parties and balls was promoted in the newspaper by announcing the necessity of being modest. In one article, it was suggested to prepare a radio program and to write articles in order to prevent wastage in the celebration of Christmas (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 December 1930; 2nd January 1932). The necessity of being modest or avoiding luxury had been frequently

[164] Because of the rumor about the flirtatious attitudes of the "constant people" (*mutad zevad*) who were the constant guests of Mustafa Kemal in Çankaya Kiosk, many men did not want to go these balls

underlined. Before the New-Year party, Hilal-i Ahmer, by sending a letter to the ladies of Ankara, asked for a preparation with a modest budget and for the preference of old dress clothes or domestic products (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17th December 1931). After the party, it was said that the preparations were not like the ones in previous years (2nd January 1932). In those years, the national economic mobilization (*milli iktisat seferberliği*) was declared in order to support the use of domestic goods (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28th November 1931). This mobilization was reflected in the parties and balls, with the introduction of the terms "national clothes" or national folk dance. They were announced as "costume balls" or "National Costume Balls" like the one arranged by the "Society of Child Protection" (Himaye-i Etfal) in Ankara Palas. It was said "apart from "Gazi Hazretleri", deputies, ambassadors and all the "gentle/civilized families of Ankara" participated to the ball". In this "costume ball" "national clothes" were worn. According to the news, by wearing local costumes, the rule of wearing regular dress clothes, tailcoat and tuxedo was broken (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th April 1931; 26th November 1932; 29th November 1935). Wearing western clothes had become a tradition, and this newness broke the tradition.

However, in spite of the above mentioned attempts to make balls modest, they continued in a sumptuous way. According to Falih Rıfkı, "living expenses was cheap, but life style was expensive" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th August 1932). By "life style" he meant the western way of life and consumption patterns, and it was costly. He said that "outdoor activities are accepted as a duty", and criticized the amount of money spent on outdoor activities. For him, these activities should be simplified and this

---

with their doughters and wives (Şenol Cantek, 2003:138).

was the duty of women in a family. In spite of this critique, the "duties of being a civilized member of the new nation" were continued.

This understanding of entertainment was totally unfamiliar to "other *Ankaralı*", old *Ankaralı*s and lower-class new comers. In *Ankara*, Karaosmanoğlu (2003:113) describes the people gathered in front of Ankara Palas and to watch the "other people" coming to the ball:

> …according to the street mass, consisting of local people and villagers who watched these just like a slow-motion cinema film, the thing that was called a ball began and ended here, because they could no longer see these people after they got out of their cars, and climbed the stairs, [they could not see] how took of their coats and hats in checkroom, and how they entered the dance hall. Beyond this was left to supposition and imagination (2003:110-111).

At the entrance, in the "outside" of the building, people disagreed what these people were doing "inside" the building. Although, it was asserted that the balls were the indicator of "a united nation without privilege and class", the above representational space of Ankara Palas, with its impermeable distinction between inside and outside, invalidates this claim. However, this claim was maintained by ignoring the differences and divisions within society. Tandoğan even expelled the journalist, Ertuğrul Şevket, from the city of Ankara since he had depicted the poor children watching a ball held in Ankara Palas (Oktay, 1994:381). The differences between the people inside and outside of Ankara Palas point to the increased gap between the formality and informality although informal practices also existed at inside (center).

There were also negative critiques directed at these balls. On the one hand, as Işın, (1987b:15) discusses, for the persons who had witnessed the protocol in the Ottoman palace, the balls of the Republic were not different from town fairs: people did not know when and how to behave, misusing the words of respect, and dancing the zeybek after the tango and waltz. For Işın, in fact this articulation was inevitable. The staff soldiers, who had been in the frontline in the war and had become used to the simple order of the barracks, had a practical relationship with daily life. Because of the deprivation that they undergone, they even despised the upper strata: "Their national pride with behavior which was judged rude, found expression in their defense of natural morality against the cosmopolitan morality". Işın summarizes this as the contrast between practical formalism and elitist formalism, although it was limited.[165] In fact, each of them consisted of a kind of articulated cultural pattern including different ratios of "traditional" and "modern" culture, and hierarchies between them were constructed according to power relations within the society.

In addition, there was disturbance among the local people of Ankara because of the balls. Women and men dancing together, the appearance of certain parts of women's bodies and rumors about the flirtatious behaviour of certain men were criticized by the natives (Şenol Cantek, 2003:266). These practices of mixed gender dancing, entertaining and drinking would be criticized as examples of corruption and

[165] Işın (1987b:16) narrates how Sultan Reşad surprised and disapproved of Enver Paşa who drank water just after the meal of okra. This tradition of elitist culture was carried by and represented in the new period by "civil diplomats" who withdraw into their shells in the face of the official etiquette of the Republic and most of whom went to Europe.

decadent lives, devoid of traditional Turkish values by the end of 1930s (Bozdoğan, 2001:215).

As a result, balls and parties were seen as activities more than entertainment. They were the symbol and stage of a new way of life. Parallel to the creation of new places, the activities in this period were also invented. On the one hand, these new places gave the opportunity for developing public entertainment and togetherness, especially with the participation of women. On the other hand, limitations deriving from the strict definition of a desirable way of life, social class and gender in daily life were determinative in the use of these opportunities. For Öztürkmen (1999:191), although these invented activities were not always internalized, they allowed the experience of some entertainment forms different from traditional ones. However, while they created a relative freedom for individuals, they also brought new restrictions and exclusions in society.

7.4 Schools of Civilization: Restaurants

In order to support the new way of life, restaurants functioned as schools of the new civilization. In Ankara, "modern" restaurants and eating-places were limited, since native people did not feel their absence. They preferred to eat in "*aşçı lokantaları*" (chief restaurants) (Cantek, L., 1996:122), or *börekçi* (stores selling pastry). This condition was also an issue of complaint and embarrassment for the elite of the city. The absence of elegant restaurants was explained by the lack of culture and

shoddyism (low taste of people). It was said that "since people are keen on cheap meals, there were not qualified/high class restaurants like the ones in İstanbul or İzmir. The biggest rivals of restaurants were hawkers, tripe restaurants, stores selling bean salad, and patty sellers (*seyyarlar, işkembeciler ve piyazcılar, börekçiler*) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 27rd January 1935). In the same article, a restaurant owner's opinion was asked: he said that "hawkers attract workers, tripe restaurants attract people looking for a cheap meal, and patty sellers pull in young people". Therefore classy restaurants could not be opened.

With the increasing demand of the Republican elite, there emerged "elegant" restaurants similar to ones in İstanbul. In order to create the "places to go" as well as the "places to live", experts about restaurants were invited to Ankara from İstanbul (Cantek, L., 1996:121). The most famous one of the period was Karpiç, Juri George Karpovitch's restaurant in Taşhan. In Ünsal's (1999:159-160) words, it was a true Republican school, teaching the Western etiquette rules to the elite of the nation. It was defined as the missionary of the Republic, teaching the culture of Western eating habits, but was not limited to eating habit; "civilization" was demanded in all respects. For example, the men who weren't wearing a tie were not accepted into the place (Ünsal 1999: 161). Karpiç was indispensable for writers of the period as well as diplomats and the elite. [166] It offered a kind of public space defined with the criterion of the "new civilization". At the same time, the restaurant offered tasty food from different cuisines of the world, primarily Russian, at reasonable prices. It also served

[166] Karpiç and similar places were also the places to wait for a call from Mustafa Kemal to be invited to Çankaya dinners (Şenol Cantek, 2003:138).

table d'hote for those on a limited budget. It was an accepted belief that Karpiç was one of the important schools of urbanites of the period.

The hotel Ankara Palas had another Western style restaurant, serving mainly French food. The restaurant was run by Süreyya Bey, whose Russian name was Sergei Homya, and by Mösyö Jorj, who was known as the "chef of Atatürk" (Ünsal, 1999:161). There were other restaurants serving to people with relatively limited budgets and not belonging to the "elite of the city", such as Cumhuriyet Yıldız, Turan and Havuzlu Çiçek (Ünsal, 1999:161). However, all of them attempted to adapt to Western norms of eating. The problem of decorum in the restaurants was solved by translating etiquette books into Turkish (Mahir, 2005:19). The chapters on table manners included all details of eating habits, like how to eat and talk in a restaurant and how to communicate with women or waiters.

Restaurants were seen as important places for learning how to act as modern people. For the cultural and political elite, eating in these restaurants was a privilege and also they gave the possibility of escaping from the traditional Ankara (Mahir, 2005: 19). They also kept the elite from being ashamed in front of foreign diplomats because of the absence of similar places. Such places had the mission of beautifying the image of Ankara for foreigners. Therefore, such restaurants, specifically Karpiç and Ankara Palas, were also supported by the state (Ünsal, 1999:161). They were the (semi) public spaces of the city which were open to the elite of Ankara, under the surveillance of official ideology. Most importantly, the newly learnt formal rules were practiced in these places.

In addition, there were new "cafes"[167] in the city which were totally different from the traditional coffeehouses. They were similar to the ones in European cities and appropriate to the "new civilization". Most of them were in Yenişehir and, they were the source of pride in opposition to the old coffeehouses. I will discuss them in the section of Yenişehir. Now, I want to continue with the traditional coffeehouses, which were the main entertainment places of other *Ankaralı*s.

7.5 Other's Place: Coffeehouses

Another example of (semi) public spaces of the period was coffeehouse (*kahvehane*) through which we can gain information about the city life of other *Ankarlı*s. These places were relatively free from the surveillance of the state since they were ignored although the need to intervention into them was voiced by editorials. Different from the cafes of elite, coffeehouses were the places of other (male) *Ankaralı*s, thus, they can be called as informal public spaces of the city.

In the 1930s, there were many coffeehouses in Ankara. According to the news in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, if women and children were excluded, there was one coffeehouse per 330 persons in 1935 (*Ulus*, 25th January) and per 490 persons in 1937 (*Ulus*, 25th May). Coffeehouses have always been a very important component of city life. Generally they are considered as the traditional public spaces in Turkish culture. However, in addition to public, they can also be considered as "semi-public" since they tend to collect people of certain communities. In general, these places have

[167] In today's Turkish they can be differentiated as *kahve* and *kafe*.

certain communities based on occupation, age or *origin*. Especially, the city of origin is an important criterion in choosing a coffeehouse. Starting from this period, the poor people migrating to Ankara tended to settle near to each other and constituted a kind of community based on the city of origin. They kept their contact with each other in different ways and displayed a kind of solidarity with each other. It was the main tactic of lower class people, produced through a space against the ignorant attitude of the state elite towards them. By accumulating in the same places in old Ankara or squatter settlements, they developed survival strategies (in fact, tactics in de Certau's term) by carrying the Gemeinschaft relations to the city. Informal relations, even in the form of clientelism, were perpetuated through "*hemşerilik*" (being fellow countryman) relations. If we remember the discussion of *gecekondu*s, these informal relations helped people to produce informal tactics enabling them to exist in urban areas, although some of these tactics would turn into informal strategies in later years.

In 1935, the concentration around the "*hemşerilik*" in low income settlements was exemplified as "people from Adana go to Adana coffeehouses to read Adana newspapers and, in a similar way people from Samsun go to Samsun ones to read the news of Samsun" (*Ulus*, 2nd January 1935). In the discussions of the history of public spaces, cafes have an important place in the spatial aspect (Habermas, 1989; Sennett, 1977). Although it was accepted that coffeehouses have a very important place in social life, traditional Turkish coffeehouses were found inappropriate to the "new civilization". In a news article taking place in *Ulus* (25th January 1935), it was said that "they are not the places where social life flourishes like in advanced countries". They were defined as the place of killing time, gambling and fighting.

Then the questions arose: how to transform these places into ones like in Europe; and how these places can be conformed to the modernization project. This news continued with the opinion of a man who was a so-called owner of a coffeehouse in Ankara. He had a very interesting suggestion for transforming coffeehouses in Ankara. He said that these places should be expropriated/ nationalized. In this way, coffeehouses would be turned into schools of the nation, and institutions of national education (*Ulusal terbiye kurumu*). He went on to say that, since people by themselves come to coffeehouses and discuss the daily issues; there is only one thing to do: "to establish an organization to guide these discussions in an intentional manner". Reconstruction and reshaping of these places was seen as a matter of organization.

Traditional coffeehouses are in fact user's space; however, they have had exclusion mechanisms based on gender or community relations. Without problematizing these aspects of them, turning them into the representation of space was suggested as only policy in the period. In order to achieve this, there was another suggestion in *Ulus*: transforming those places (coffee houses) into Halkevi (People's House) to inform and illuminate people about the interests of the nation and regime (2nd July 1937, 25th May 1937), because Cemal Kutay (*Ulus*, 2nd July 1937) confessed that the revolution could not yet enter these places. It is an important confession, because it accepted that, apart from the representation of space, in the spaces of the daily life of the people (other *Ankaralı*), nothing much had changed. Beyond the formal definition of Republican life, informal relations had continued in the informal (illegal) parts of the city. In spite of this fact, much more was demanded from the people in the name of being "civilized". For Cemal Kutay, the problem

could be only solved with the total domination these places by the state; he suggested "I think the situation where the people read newspapers and books should be decided by state". For him, the revolutions could be achieved only in this way. He was also aware of the difficulty in transforming these places (user's space). He stated that "coffeehouses are really conservative" and that this may have been "because of that conservative aspect, they are so prestigious"; therefore, to transform them, their qualities should be considered. The pictures hanging on the walls in these coffeehouses were also problematic since they were considered to be an "issue of national pride" (*Ulus*, 25th May 1937). It was proposed that they should be also selected carefully to represent the state and its ideology. The only policy suggested was to take these places under the control of the representation of space.

All city life in Ankara was arranged for the new *Ankaralı*s, similar to the city plan which was done for the new Ankara. All the "other" things were assumed as non-existant until they challenged the "new civilization". In the situations of inevitable encounter between the new and the old, an attempt to remove unwanted "old", or was let to stay within its informality in the city. In the later years of the Republic, the informal practices (of the periphery) would permeate into the formal practices (of center).

In the next section, I will specifically discuss Yenişehir which was produced as a symbol of the new Republic. Both the production of space and the construction of urbanity can be followed from this microcosm of the Republic.

7.6 The New City: Yenişehir

.....
passing by the hippodrome
and there a new city lying down:
arrogant and victorious
denying its squatters
in the middle of the plain suddenly emerging with a careless extravagance[168]
(Nazım Hikmet: 1978:228).

Yenişehir (the new city) was the center of Ankara, the center of the Republic. It was a full representation of space designed to represent state power. It was a model that would guide the city and so the nation/country. It was designed as the place for government buildings and the residences of the elite of the Republic. The first plan of Yenişehir was the Lörcher Plan made in 1924-1925[169]. Apart from the development of the old city, in this plan a new city was proposed in the southern area. With the expropriation of 4000 hectares in 1925, Yenişehir began to be developed as the new city, and the main axes of Yenişehir were irreversibly fixed (Tankut, 1990:37-45) by Atatürk Boulevard, uniting the old and the new city.

In the 1920s Yenişehir was constructed as a residential area for the state elite and wealthy families, most of whom had come from İstanbul. At the beginning, there were just villas for the Republican elite. The most prominent villa in Yenişehir was that of Cemil Uybadin, the Minister of Internal Affairs. With its towers, it resembled a castle. Karaosmanoğlu (2003:149) says that "all the houses in Yenişehir appear to

[168] "[....]
ipodrom'un yanından geçiliyor.
ve yepyeni bir şehir karşıdadır:
kibirli ve muzaffer
inkar ederek varoşlarını
bozkırın ortasında başıboş bir israfla peyda oluveren".

[169] The exact date of the plan is not known since the documents are not archived (Tankut, 1990:31).

be castles of individuality and selfishness… they seem the nests of egoism… therefore, Yenişehir is always deeply silent and lonely". Throughout the years it would become more and more crowded.

The square in the middle of Yenişehir[170] would become the square of the city with the passing of the years. The old name of the square was "*tosbağa yatağı*" (bed of the turtle) (Ergir, 2004). Its name was changed to Havuzbasi after the construction of a pool with a bronze statue. The pool, with its environment, was designed as a park which would be the center of the entertainment activities in Yenişehir. It was the main public space of the "new bourgeoisie", where they could appear, gather, and walk around[171]. In winters, when the water froze, it was used for skating by children (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4th February 1929). This event was published with the comment "unfortunately the snow of Ankara is not suitable for ski and sledge" as if these sports were the tradition of the elite. In 1934, there was a headline: "in winters, people ski in Yenişehir": "Young people, children, foreigners, natives, women, men" skied in Yenişehir (*Ulus*, 16th September 1934).

In the park of Yenişehir, the Orchestra of the President played every night (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3rd October 1928) between 5 and 7 pm (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*,

[170] During the construction period, Yenişehir was compared to an amphitheatre that was steadily rising by the hill (Celal Esat, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 27th November 1929). It was supposed to be the main stage of the city. Being the center of the plan of Ankara, Yenişehir was defined as the a focus of the country (*vatanin mihrakı*). It was stated that therefore, there should be a statue that would be an "ideal" (of the Republic) (1929). In contrast, Celal Esat (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 October 1929) believed that the center of the square should be empty; a statue would weaken the power of the square. As a focus of the city and the "new civilization" it was at the heart of discussions about the city and city life.

31st March 1929). This orchestra was seen as the main tool of education to establish the revolution. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8th December 1930). The orchestra just played Western classical music, since it had a definite mission of educating people, as discussed above. Related to these concerts, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (8th December 1930) suggested that "enjoying civilized music is defined as the main criterion of westernization. Therefore these concerts must be compulsory for the young generation". So, the main stage of the city was seen as a school for the "education of the masses".

There were also complaints about the Havuzbaşı. It was said that besides its ugliness, it was not good for either traffic or people who rested in it, since it was surrounded by roads (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1st April 1931). The pool (*havuzbaşı*) was removed in April, 1932, with the application of Jansen's plan. In the new arrangement there would be a statue in the square which would be a monument of Guvenlik. After the monument of Guvenlik was constructed, the place was named after the monument. Its environment was arranged as a park which would be called Güvenpark. Since the old name was still used, the newspaper published a notice instructing people, not to call the square Havuzbasi (*Ulus*, 25th April 1936). Changing the names of parks or streets in the urban area has been an important indicator of the power struggle in Turkey. Since the names are part of collective memory, to change them is not as easy as changing the representations of space.

---

[171] The first "day of Ankara" was celebrated on 27th December, 1932, the anniversary of Mustafa Kemal's first visit to Ankara (28th December 1932). The people including those who came from the villages firstly gathered in Yenişehir. This was the first news announcing the square of Emniyet as a meeting place.

The Building of *Hilal-i Ahmer* (*Kizilay*/ Red Crescent) began to be constructed in 1929. It would give its name to the square and would, with its park, be an important reference point in the district. The building would be the node and the park would be the frame of the new public space. The park, designed in front of the building, was opened in June 1933 (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 31st May 1933). The new park was announced with pride as a "product of very subtle taste". In the news, the sideboard in the park, selling mineral water, was also called "classy" (*şık büfe*). Families went there after dinner to drink "ice-cold mineral water" for which the Red Crescent building had a monopoly (Erim, 1993:76). As Lefebvre discussed, planning, with its logic of habitat, tries to make people believe to its imagination about space. The mirror of the representation of space in Yenişehir reflects this space with its inhabitants, described as "civilized", "classy", "refined", "elegant" which were seen as the qualities needed to prove the modernness of the country and new Republic. These terms were uttered whenever the subject was Yenişehir and its inhabitants (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5th August 1929, 1st August 1933). This strong desire for modernization simply finds its embodiment in the "red sand" of Kızılay Park. In the news about the park, the red sand of the playground was cautiously underlined (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1st August 1933). The playground with "red sand" would become a symbol of the elegancy in the city, as described in the poem of Orhan Veli:

Altındağ,
Someone has a dream of a husband
A polite man salaried with a hundred lira
they get married and move to the city
get letters to their address:
the apartment of şen yuva (happy nest), basement floor
they live in a cozy apartment.
neither cleaning nor doing laundry [for others] any more;
only washing their own dishes.

they have babies; shining ones
and buy a second hand car.
they go to Kızılay Park in the mornings;
for little Yılmaz to play in the sand,
like the children of the elite [172]
(O. Veli 1947 Altındağ. Yenisi, 1947)

Objects such as red sand, western clothes, elegant places, and restaurants satisfied the need to feel "modern" and "urbane" for the elite. Their belief made others believe, so the representation of the square was constructed through the application of these terms.

In addition, as discussed in the planning of the city, there was also an obsession with health, and hygiene as qualities of being modern. In discussions it was said that the squares should be storage of light and air. Celal Esat (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25th September 1929) in the page on "urbanism" said that "although the squares were a kind of open air national assembly where people came together, and where pool festivals were arranged, now, social life is transferred to buildings, and therefore, the squares have turned into an empty space, in other words, they have become the place of rest and health, as a source of air and light". In fact, Celal Esat declared the end of public space before the construction of the biggest public space of

[172]" altındağ
biri bir koca gorur ruyasinda:
yuz lira maasli kibar bir adam.
evlenir, sehire tasinirlar.
mektuplar gelir adreslerine:
$en yuva apartimani, bodrum kati.
kutu gibi bir dairede otururlar.
ne camasira gidilir artik, ne can silmeye;
bulasiksa kendi bulasiklari.
cocuklari olur, nur topu gibi;
elden dusme bir araba satin alinir.
kizilay bahcesi'ne gidilir sabahlari;
kumda oynasin diye kucuk Yılmaz,
kibar cocuklari gibi".

the city. With this approach, public space is transferred to semi-public and private space. As discussed in chapter VI, it also signals the role attributed to buildings/houses in the construction of the publicity involved in the integration of public and private.[173]

Another component of public space is monuments. The monument that would be done in Yenişehir also took an important place in the agenda of the city. On the 4th December, 1929, there was news related to a project for a monument by M Kripel, near the pool in Yenişehir, in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. It would be done for the police (*zabıta*) who died for the country and would be named the "Police Monument" (*Zabıta Abidesi*). In this memorial, there would be figures symbolizing a peaceful family and around it there would be police fighting with enemies trying to break this felicity. In this depiction, security was equated with the security of the "Turkish family" and the force protecting the family was depicted as the police forces responsible from interior order. Gülsüm Nalbantoğlu (1999) makes a detailed analysis of this project of the memorial, described in the news, and points out the blurring distinction between public and private within this discourse. For her, this monument, by taking them out from the home, places the family in the middle of the public space of the city. "In the monument, family and people exchange their place" (1999:308). The family representing the people is protected from the (internal) enemy, the stranger; who is assumed to be a threat to "interior order", therefore it is protected by the police. This interpretation asserts the stranger (difference) who is

[173] Also the factors like lack of public space culture, not being familiar with public life have to be taken into consideration.

seen as a threat in the city space: a threat to created modern Gemeinschaft, representing unity without privilege and class.

However, this idea of the "Police Monument" was abandoned and in its place the "Security Monument" (*Güvenlik Anıtı*) was erected by Anton Honak and Joseph Thorak in1935. It was an assertive statue, dominating the whole square, and reflects the influence of Nazi art (Bozdoğan, 2001:284). The money to construct this monument was equal to 12% of the total budget of the municipality for the year of 1934 (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:202). The Monument consisted of a granite wall showing Ataturk accompanied by four naked male youths; two of them on one side, and two on other side. On the other side of the wall there are two standing male figures with austere expressions. Under these figures there are the words of Ataturk –Turk, be proud, work hard, and be confident! (*Türk, öğün, çalış, güven*),[174] and on the both sides of the dictum there are human figures in relief. The Security Monument portrays a strong figure, summarizing the new publicity which is being scrutinized by the brutal gaze of the masculine figures, representing the power of the new state.

On a smaller scale, similar statues, gazing at the people, would be placed around cities. Ornamenting the city's squares with statues was another example of window dressing (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:202). Because of the lack of Turkish sculptors in the early years of the Republic, many young people were sent to Europe to learn the art. In these years, many of the statues were made by foreigner sculptors, like Heinrich Krippel, and Pietro Canonica (Sarıoğlu, 2001:121-122). The first statue of

Atatürk was made by Heinrich Krippel and located in Sarayburnu in 1926. The first in Ankara is the one of Atatürk with a horse, in front of the museum of Ethnography, and the one in Yenişehir made in the year of 1927 (Sarıoğlu, 2001:122) [175]. They would be the representation of the "new civilization" in "every corner of the country".

In the middle of the 1930s "Kizilay Square" was the source of pride as a "place similar to European ones". Little boats were put into the pool in front of the Güvenlik Monument by Denizbank and CHP. In the announcement, it said that "it completed the European view of the square" (*Ulus*, 15th October 1938). In a similar way, Falih Rıfkı (*Ulus*, 21st May 1935) narrated the night spent with friends who came from İstanbul. He said that, all of them were impressed by the view of the garden of the Security Monument: "On the opposite side of the tidy garden of Kizilay, in the distance, mass state buildings, huge trees in a wide avenue": For him it was the view of the latest, the newest, the most beautiful European city. To be convincing, he added that one of his friends, who had just come from Switzerland, said that he could not believe that he was in Ankara. In spite of the happy identification of Ankara with European cities, unfortunately in the same writing, it revealed that illegal construction activities had already started in Yenişehir.

---

[174] These worlds would be the subject to a poem written by Hasan Hüseyin Korkmazgil, "The Bazaar of the Human Being" narrating the people's perception of the monument in squatter settlement of Ankara.

[175] The statues of Ataturk signal his transformation into a cult hero, personifying the nation. This situation started in his lifetime and gained impetus after his death. Throughout the country, public spaces were filled with statues of him, a still disputatious issue, because of the meaning attributed to these statues by certain groups. For Bozdoğan, (2001:283) "it can be said that the production of Ataturk imagery has been a major industry in modern Turkey, not unlike the production of religious icons in Catholic and Orthodox communities". His elevation to the status of "deity" was complete after his death on 10th November 1938. "Thereafter his image watched over the entire nation from every corner" (Bozdoğan, 2001:284).

In 1931 the plots in Yenişehir were all sold (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 24th July 1931). In fact, as discussed in chapter VI, Yenişehir was the focus of land speculation directing the development of the city. The deputies and civil servants, those with close relations with Atatürk, bought the plots very cheaply at about 50 lira and then sold them to brokers for 1000 lira, who would then sell these plots to another person with a price of 30-35 thousands lira (Aktüre, 2001:59). In Jansen's plan, Yenişehir was authorized to construct two story detached buildings. However, because of the increased pressure of land owners, in 1934 it was authorized to three story bloc, thus, four story buildings plus store was allowed for Atatürk Boulevard (Tankut, 1990:125,129). [176] In 1935, the buildings on the boulevard of Ataturk began to be transformed into apartments with 3 or 4 stories (*Ulus*, 23rd August 1935). While Falih Rıfkı Atay complained that Yenişehir was turning into an agglomeration of concrete because of the lack of green spaces (*Ulus*, 5th June 1935), in these years, apartments appeared as a symbol of the new way of life and the new economy (Nalbantoğlu, 2000:257) in contrast to previous years.

There emerged shops on the ground floors of these apartments, since the inhabitants of Yenişehir found it difficult to go to *Ulus* for shopping. In Jansen's plan there was no specific place allocated to a bazaar/commercial center. There were insistent demands to open a store everywhere in the district. Although, in 1936, the street of Meşrutiyet was designated as a market place, in 1938, there were already many stores with temporary or permanent authorization out of the market place

(Tankut, 1990:192). In 1937, Yasar Nabi (*Ulus*, 3rd April) wrote that the shops on the Atatürk Boulevard were very popular, although this was not so at the beginning. The Boulevard and its environment would be the prestigious market space of the city. The wealth emerging through the valuation of the district, could not be channelized to the city; rather, it helped to create new riches within the network of informal power relations. Formal policies have been continuously challenged by the informality produced as tactics and strategies.

7.7 Daily life in Yenişehir

The inhabitants of Yenişehir were known as "*citizens*" (*Ulus*, 13th November 1937) in contrast to the rest of the people in Ankara. Families in Yenişehir were mostly people who had come from İstanbul, and these people living in Yenişehir were already relatively familiar with the Western way of life. In general, the inhabitants of Yenişehir were also participants in all the gentle meetings, parties and balls in the city life. As mentioned above, Yenişehir was the place of house parties, with music and dances lasting the whole night. Dance parties in the villas were very prominent examples of the western way of life promoted by the elite of the period (Nalbantoğlu, 2000:254-255), so the inhabitants of the district were seen as models of "new citizens" of the new regime.

[176] According to the statistics published by the newspaper in 1937, 10.569 "*citizens*" lived in Yenişehir. There were 838 detached houses and 156 apartment buildings. While there was one room per 2 persons in Yenişehir, there was one room per 3 persons in Ankara (*Ulus*, 13th November 1937).

The people living in Yenişehir tried to do their best to represent the "modern" individuals of the Republic. They were the pioneers of the elite life in Ankara. Throughout the 1930s, there were notices in the newspapers looking for foreign governesses, babysitters and cooks for families residing in Yenişehir.[177] Ünal Nalbantoğlu (2000:298) states that, while the richest families hired foreign educators (*yabancı matmazel*) for children, cooks and servants, the lower strata families contended with "*evlatlık*" (adopted child) who were educated to address the girls of the family as "*kucuk hanimefendi"* (young lady) -although they were beaten by the family-.[178] It shows that formally defined necessities of unwritten rule of having an elegant life were tried to fulfill by the families of Yenişehir.

Especially, the inhabitants of Yenişehir had a semi-public life within a closed community, encountering each other in every corner of Yenişehir. In general, everybody knew each other and everybody greeted each other when walking along the Boulevard (Cantek, L., 1996:122, Erim, 1993:78). In an advertisement in *Ulus* (29th January 1936), a dinner, entitled "*Büyük Dine Dansan*" was announced as a "family meeting of the Yenişehir district"[179]. The people of Yenişehir were seen as members of a big family similar to the people of Turkish nation which was defined as a unity without privileges and classes. As argued in the section on the planning of the city, concomitant with the production of space, the social relations in Yenişehir were constructed as "modern gemeinschaft". It was community relations based on

[177] It was also possible to notice advertisements like for a cooker who would serve to a Viennese madam (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 October 1929).

[178] While depicting these families Nalbantoğlu (2000:298) adds that the wife of these families who were generally the doughter of a countryman, were living in the order of "modern patriarchy" having differnt norms and protocole from his father's house.

[179] It was hold in Karpiç, and wearing tuxedo was compulsory.

homogeneity. The old *Ankaralı*s frequently came to Yenişehir to see these "villa" styles of houses, with their new architecture, garden and the new way of life taking place in them (Aktüre, 2001:60).

Complementary to this argument, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (cited in Ş.Cantek, 2003:165) depicts Ankara in this manner; "streets were like the corridor of a house, faces were familiar, and the people from other cities were easily recognized and treated as strangers". Similar to the above examples showing the blurring of the distinction between the public and private sphere, the city was likened to a house and city dwellers (urbanites) were the family members. Any element taking place outside this community was seen as a threat, a stranger with all its negative connotations. It was far from Simmel's depiction of city life: "being free from parochialism and surveillance". While mentioning these years, Falih Rıfkı Atay (2006:382) voices the aspiration of the period as "oh we wished to be anonymous, be lost through crowds". It was impossible to feel the freedom of city life as an individual in these years in Ankara.

Attempts to control daily life in the street were also implemented according to the "new civilization". Ottoman streets were controlled to a certain degree in the period of the Republic. The variety of traditional apparel and the complicated structure of salutation were replaced by practical forms of official populism. In the 1930s, streets were less colorful in comparison to previous times (Işın, 1987b:20). The aim was to capture a standard view similar to European examples. Going out

into the street meant representing a modern image of the man to Europe.[180] The gaze of the European man with the interpretation of Republican elite was felt in every place in Yenişehir; in fact, it was internalized and used to scrutinize the "self" and "others".

The sidewalk along the Ataturk Boulevard was the main promenade of Yenişehir and so of the city. Newly opened coffeehouses, resembled the cafés of Paris, were the prestigious places of the Boulevard. Of course, as a symbol of the new publicity, they were totally different from the traditional ones discussed in the above section. A writer identified as B.B. (*Ulus*, 27th June 1937) stated that "urbanites are getting used to coffee life (*kahve hayatı*). They spend a lot of money everyday on coffee in the Boulevard". He also added that they desired a small band in these places. Yasar Nabi (31 May 1938) stated that patisseries were increasing, with a "*civilized crowd*" consisting of women and men instead of "*selamlık*" (reserved for men) coffeehouses. For him, this was a good development for a capital city in terms of reflecting social levels as well as general scenery (physical appearances). The increase in the number of people having a Western appearance was the main indicator of the modernness of the district.

B.B. also (*Ulus*, 25th July 1937) wrote that "Atatürk Boulevard has become the center of gathering and entertainment" especially in the evenings. The park around the Security Monument, the garden of the Kızılay, and patisseries like "Kutlu" and "Özen were the main places of these meetings. According to him, "you can see in these places everything that exists in Ankara". Of course the absent things,

[180] The limitations on women in the street also continued in the Republican period (Işın, 1987b:20).

which existed in Ankara, were already not the concern of the people belonging to the "new civilization". B.B. added that "Yenişehir will be the great, clean and elegant/courteous district of Ankara". In order to protect this "civilized view", certain measures were taken. For example, during Tandoğan's period, in order to take a stroll along Ataturk Boulevard, a man had to wear a tie. If he did not have one, he was not allowed to walk on the Boulevard (Balcıoğlu, 1993:78). People having a traditional appearance not consistent with this "modern scenery" were excluded as much as possible.

However, although Yenişehir was built as a model city and the place of model urbanites, the formal process describing the imagined city and citizen/urbanite was continuously being challenged by informal processes. As discussed in the previous chapters, this informality not only belonged to old *Ankaralı* as has been supposed. As discussed in chapter IV, informal relations and attitudes also existed in the elite's way of life. This informality was especially apparent in the complaints about the acts that did not fit with (the imagined) Yenişehir and Yenişehirli. The issue of pollution was one of the main themes of these complaints about Yenişehir. Environmental pollution, more specifically, street pollution was a major one, even in Yenişehir. The articles on this issue in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* were generally published under the pseudonym "Urbanite" (*Şehirli*) or *Ankaralı*. In his writings, Urbanite tired to construct a kind of consciousness of the urbanite. As a solution to urban problems, *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 15th October 1932) wrote that the best things that should be done for the city were known by urbanite people and done by them. For *Ankaralı* "no city urbanite has the concern of city beauty like an *Ankaralı*" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10th September 1932). With such an introduction, he invited

people to be more sensitive about the cleanness of the streets. In a similar way, Aka Gündüz (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th December 1931) complained about the insensitive attitudes towards the city and city life. For him, people were too individualistic, and used the street for private purposes or threw garbage on the streets. He criticized people's and citizens' irresponsible attitudes towards the space of the common/public life in the city.

Another form of pollution complained about was "visual and auditory pollution" not fitting to "civilized Yenişehir". Again, *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14th October 1932, 9th August 1933), in his column depicted his district. Although he does not give the name of his district, it can be understood that he was living in/near Yenişehir. Although he defined that district as "modern" one, he wrote that "the people of the district have a contradictory voice, way of clothing and manners". He complained about the volume of different kinds of music "from *alaturka* to *alfranga*"; "from *gazel* to opera". He was disturbed by people's heterogeneous taste in music as well as the volume. His comment also shows that the intended homogenization was not successful, even in Yenişehir. In fact, this was a common attitude in the construction of urbanity in Turkey. Differentiation of tastes was assumed as a contradictory situation; the co-existence of "*alaturka*" and "*alafranga*" was especially seen as a total contradiction. However, this situation helped to produce hybrid forms through daily life in spite of the resistance of the Republican elite in formal level.

Ankaralı continued his complaints about the "visual inconsistency". He depicted a man from Yenişehir having dinner in their pyjamas in the garden of his

house. By irritating readers with his reference to pyjamas, he says "some men wore pyjamas as a tuxedo at dinners". He was annoyed with the appearance of man who was totally different from the definition of the ideal "urbane"/"civilized" man of the period [181]. Another detail from his depiction was the unfinished wall surrounding the garden. This view of "continuous construction activities" was another frequently voiced complaint in the city life of Ankara.

Ankaralı ended his article this "I am still living in a décor belonging to half a century ago". Starting from these years, the so-called inconsistency between the décor and the way of life in different contexts was the major point in discussions of urbanity: either through "modern" individual encounters with an "unmodern" décor, or that within the "modern" décor of the city, there are "unmodern" individuals. In this case, although the way of life also tried to fit into the modern décor, there were the informal behaviors of inhabitants in daily life who maintained a traditional way of life. In spite of the project trying to totally control all aspects of life in order to create the desired individual, it was not easy to change the habitus which determined the acts, feelings and beliefs in daily life. Moreover, as Elias discusses such gaps between the formal-informal span in the attitudes of the individual (he interprets it as double morality (1996:104)) points to the unequal power relations.

In this chapter, I have presented the construction of city life in Ankara in the early Republican Period. In order to create the desired urban life and urbanity, at a

[181] It is possible to encounter with the similar discussions in the context of urbanity in today's Turkey. If we continue on this example, a man wearing pyjamas may be disturbing according to social context if we consider the urbanity as a way of relation with others. Rather than the visual consistency this specific issue could be understood only if it is thought through the codes of gender and class relations.

formal level the creation of a Western way of life was attempted through certain activities like picnics, parties, dinners, and balls. Appearances and behaviors were arranged formally in this direction. We have seen that the mechanisms of education, embarrassment, the assumption of the existence of a foreign gaze were effective tools in the construction of urbanity; and were also functional in the creation of a public atmosphere. With balls, restaurants, parties at home, and coffeehouses, the education and transformation of people was attempted.

In this process, however, we see two tendencies: one was the continuous critique of the elite of the masses, structures, and habits which did not fit the modern image of the city/urbanity. The second is the endurance of practices which I have called "informal" within this process. These informal practices sometimes diffuse into modern manners, sometimes challenge them and sometimes conflict with them. Informal practices have sometimes constructed the relationship between content and container by producing hybrids like the adaptation of manners to the new civilization, and sometimes have challenged the formal structures as in the land speculation in Yenişehir or clientelist relations. This continuous co-existence of the formal and informal made the city life of modern Ankara.

CHAPTER VIII

URBANITES OF THE CITY

8.1 Urban-Rural Separations

As I discussed in previous chapters in different contexts, the Turkish modernization project in general and the concept of urbanity in particular are based on certain dualities such as modern-traditional, "new-old", "urban-rural" "*alafranga-alaturka"* with no formal mediation between them. In this chapter I will specifically discuss the urban–rural one since rural has been so central in the making of the urban. This centrality is more apparent in the informal practices of the city dwellers.

In the Dictionary of the "Terms of Urban Studies" by Ruşen Keleş (1998) both urban and rural are defined with reference to each other. The differentiation is based occupation, division of labour, population and the type of relation between the inhabitants. Apart from the definition, In Turkish, as with other languages, a negative connotation accompanies the word peasant (*köylü*) (Oktay, 2002). It is said that peasant's social movements have generally ended with failure since they

consisted of disorganized, unsteady, "slippery" coalitions (Kurt, 2003:23). According to Wolf (cited in Kurt, 2003:23) the short term interests of peasants are stronger than the long term, so they are inclined to be stable.

Due to fragmented and small-scale land ownership, the villagers as petty commodity producers cannot succeed to keep the value that they have produced (Keyder, 1999:165). The merchants in towns have generally appropriated this value produced by the villagers. According to Kıray (cited in Akşit, 1999:175) this situation is the most important impediment to "cultural modernization". However, they can survive by self-exploitation, community relations and reliance on property. For Keyder (1999:172), the petty commodity producers are irrationally devoted to their independence. One of the powerful support mechanisms of petty commodity producers is the strong clientelist relation that assures political power by redistributing the surplus value (Keyder, 1999:165-166). These strong protective relations within the family and with state continued when villagers moved to the city. Peker (1999:302), with reference to Luhmann, argues that these relations constitute a real obstacle to transformation. For Luhmann, in modern societies, work continues by means of the operation of institutions. However, in traditional societies the main source of security derives from the loyalty to individuals, myths, or religion (Mardin, 1999:344). With the preservation of these relations in the cities, this strong sense of community (*Gemeinschaft*) has come to dominate to city life as well as the life in villages.

According to Güneş-Ayata (1994b:50-52) because of the lack of competitive political system in one-party period, political elites did not need to gain the support

of villagers. Therefore, "state and politics remained peripheral to the daily life of the village community" (1994b:50-52). As with all elements in appropriate to "new civilization", they saw villagers as the people having traditional values; and temporary components which would be replaced with modern/western ones. In fact, as discussed in chapter IV, villagers constituted the majority of people who were disconnected from the center; their relations with state were limited to performing military service and paying taxes. In center-periphery formulation, villagers have been the major part of the periphery. Attempt to overcome this disconnectedness used existing important figures, to coopt them into the political system and the Republican People's party. Under this condition, since clientelism was the only form of politics, notables –these important figures- were the only link, mediator between the state and the periphery.

At the beginning of 1920s, 10.3 million of people -out of a total 13.6 million- lived in villages in Turkey. The first village law was enacted in 1924 but unfortunately it was insufficient to change the poor condition of villages (Kurt, 2003:53-54). In this period -1920s- that can be called as "romantic villagerism", intellectuals lacked awareness and unaware of the poverty and deprivation of the villages (Kurt, 2003:53-54, Oktay, 2002). According to Kurt (2003:55) the first serious and critical approach was developed by the "*Kadro*" movement, who demanded state-induced industrialization to solve the problems of villages (Karaömerlioğlu, 2006:224).

For Tütengil (1999:202) the approach of the Kadro was limited to dreams of creating the European village in Anatolia, and they imagined a city rather than a

village. The affect of this approach can be seen in the discussion of village planning. The "civilizing mission" of Kemalism was including building new villages with modern and scientific standards, as well as the modernization of existing villages. In this context, the understanding of "modern space" was not different from the ones which dominated Ankara: a total "representation of space" based on abstractness. In 1936 Zeki Sayar explains the main motivations in the plans of the new villages in his article titled "Interior Colonization":

> Although we must consider the habits and lifestyles of the peasants when we are constructing the new villages, we should not hesitate to go against these traditions wherever they clash with contemporary social and hygienic standards. The new village plans should also provide the users with the means for civilized living. A revolution in lifestyles is also necessary to teach them to sleep on individual beds rather than together on the earth, to teach them to use chairs and tables rather than sitting and eating on the floor. Kitchens, stoves, and bathrooms should be standardized into a number of different types so as to obtain the most economic and functional results (cited in Bozdoğan, 2001:101).

In fact Sayar summarizes the understanding of civilization in the modernization project. The total project of Kemalism demanded a total change in habitus of people[182]. To succeed it interior space was seen as a tool to civilize villagers. The writer identified as GA, in his editorial, also explains the necessity of "urbanism in villages" (*Ulus*, 29th April 1938): in order to make villagers to stay in their villages and provide urbanites beautiful places to rest in, villages should be planned, and developed. In fact, as it is clearly voiced, keeping villagers in their

[182] Bozdoğan (2001:100-101) points out the absence of the mosque which are the primary landmark of most Turkish villages in these plans

village was the main concern of the Republican elites. Karaömerlioğlu (2006: 223-225) explains this situation with the fear of urbanization. He asserts that although the Kemalist elites were seen as supporter of industrialization, their ideologies were not consistent, but contradictory and articulated. In the 1930s although there was an aspiration towards industrialization, they feared the social and political results of industrialization and urbanization. Therefore they avoided developing strong policies that would dissolve the traditional social and political structure.[183] This situation also contributed to maintenance of informal relations such as clientelism as the only social and political mediation.

In the 1930s the gap between urban and rural and disconnectedness had been frequently voiced. This gap was also an indicator of increasing span of formal and informal relations. The disconnectedness of city and village and the tension between them also can be seen in literature, where there was a sharp distinction between the fiction of village and city (Baykurt, 1999:202).[184] However, there was very limited approach to solving the problem: "urbanites" were simply advised to visit villages. In order to construct a relationship trips were arranged from cities to villages; but these would be merely picnics of the urbanites in "authentic" places. Villagers generally came into urbanite's agenda as a complementary part of the urban life. For example while explaining the necessity of planning in villages; GA (*Ulus*, 29th April 1938) states that, the beauty and cleanness of villages are necessary for attracting

[183] Karaömerlioğlu (2006:225-226) also discusses the land reforms within this context. He says, as a result of conservative aspect of Kemalism, rather than transforming the social relations, with this reform, it was aimed to keep villagers in their village and to prevent migration to cities.

[184] The village novels have been criticized as being very schematic and its subject was limited with the conflicts between imam-teacher and agha- farm laborer. For Baykurt (1999:202) bourgeoisie writers have been always looked down on the writers of village, in their words the writers from the lower strata. He also criticizes the narrowing the subject of these novels as the city and the village.

urbanites. The interaction was so limited that even "cheap peasant bazaars" which opened in Yenişehir as a solution to high cost of living in cities would become celebrated as the encounter of the "urbanite" and "villager" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2 January 1931). [185] In the news, one more detail was that the early customers of bazaars were foreign ladies, and respectable ladies of Yenişehir with their cooks.

As opposed to this awareness of disconnectedness, villages were defined as the sources of "national (real) culture" by the nationalist discourse.[186] In an editorial written by a writer identified as HF (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18th March 1929), loving villages and being devoted to villages were defined as the sign of the "love of nation". In 1923, Gökalp (cited in Tütengil, 1999) states that distinguished people (*guzideler*) should move out and live with the people to understand the national culture (*hars*). In the environment of ascendant nationalism of the 1930s, the "national essence" searched for by nationalist ideology of the Republic was hidden in the villages of Anatolia. As opposed to the discourse of "one civilization", it was believed that the synthesis of this essence with Western civilization would create national culture. In the program of RPP in 1935, it was stated that "technique is international, spirit is Turkish, method is Turkish, and style is Turkish" (quoted from Yeşilkaya, 2003:88).

[185] Yakup Kadri (2003:112-113) in his novel Ankara depicts a villager trying to watch the people entering from the door of Ankara Palas to a ball. He gets tired and crouches down and wraps himselfin a quilt. A hodja sees him and asks "hey! What are you doing there?" After this question villager tries to speak and tell his story to hodja although he is not very interested in villager. Yakup Kadri explains this attempt of villager as being: "since he was the first man addressing him in the big city, he necessitates having a heart to heart talk".

Karaömerlioğlu (2006:14) uses the term villagerism to explain this glorification of the village culture. He defines the term as the importance attributed to rural values and way of life in a period characterized with the industrialization and urbanization. In this period, villagerism was the result of the aspirations to a static, undifferentiated, classless unity rejecting the liberal and socialist class-based ideologies. Because, according to villagerist, urbanization was a threat to the state's power since it would bring cosmopolitanism, class conflict, unemployment, economic crises, and strikes (2006:67). Therefore, it should be prevented by keeping villagers in their villages. In addition, villagerist discourse also prepared the way for nationalism in a country where the most of the population were villagers (2006:58). With this discourse, it was expected to reach people who were thought to be untouched by the Kemalist revolutions.

In 1932, People's Houses were established to disseminate villagerism. For Reşit Galip, the aim of People's Houses was to increase the villagerism in the country and to increase the interaction between rural and urban people; "between rural people and intellectuals" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 20th February 1932). As discussed in chapter V, these would be centers disseminating the new culture of the Republic. In People's Houses there were courses on literature, history, social work, vocational training, sports, performance, arts etc. In the 1930s, People's Houses were

[186] In the nationalist environment of 1930s the names of the villages were also started to change (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 20th December 1932). Considering the names of the villages, HF (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18th March 1929) says Turks are slow to adopt/ appropriate, Turkify and assimilate these places. However, by quoting from a teacher working in a village he says "the names of the villages give us the sense of the strong, clean Turkish public". He says 30.000 of 40.000 villages have names in Turkish and tries to explain the meaning of some of these names.

celebrated as the places that would solve the problem of disconnectedness of urbanites and rural people.

In these places, the traditional culture was reinvented as an authentic one. In People's House in Ankara there were concerts of the poets of *bağlama*. For these concerts people were expected to be dressed in "national clothes". In describing these nights it was said that "we can see the villager clothes that we have been yearning for" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4th February 1932). Celal Davut (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6th February 1931)) also mentions the beauty of "national clothes"; however, he complains about the intellectuals who did not attend those concerts. He also adds that the people who came to the concert were more excited than the villagers who would sing because of curiosity as to whether they would be successful, or if they would make mistakes and embarrassed. In fact in an environment where rurality was seen as uncivilizedness, they attribute their embarrassment to villager.

According to Kurt (2003:64), People's Houses mainly functioned to construct the national identity in rural areas in where people shared the identity of "*ümmet*" (community). Apart from it, People's Houses became a temporary and exclusive movement, although they could have been an important step towards the

improvement of villages. At this early time, they became simply village outings for intellectuals (Kurt 2003, Tütengil, 1999).[187]

As summarized above, there was a contradictory discourse on the issue of villages and villagers. Although with the movement of villagerism, the rural culture was celebrated, in order to reach to level of the "new civilization", the understanding of "for people in spite of people" was maintained. In spite of the discourse celebrating villagers, they were, in fact, the people who would be "civilized" in their own villages. In the construction of urbanity, rurality was the anti-model that should be eradicated. However, the significance of the centrality of the rural cannot be understood merely by looking at such formal interventions. As shown, the rural is far more important as an "image" evoked in informal spaces such as in daily conversations, and novels. In the next parts, I specifically discuss the place of villagers in the construction of urbanity in the context of Ankara.

[187] The establishment of Köy Enstitüsü (Village Institutes) in 1940 was a real attempt to solve the problems of villages. It attempted to change villages with their own dynamics and own people by combining theory and practice. It gave the education of health, agriculture, building, beekeeping and art to peasants who would return to their villages. For Tutengil (1999) since the intellectual did not go to village, it was decided to educate the villager (Tutengil, 1999:210). Due to the crisis of Second World War and political power struggle of multi-party period brought the end of them (Kurt, 2003:59). Karaömerlioğlu (2006:225) says that the tension between conservative aspiration of elites and radical necessities to transform rural area destructed these Institutions. According to Turkoglu (1999:224) if the Institutes had not been closed, today we would have fewer problems in cities, since the masses would have been able to learn the necessary skills of industrialization and urbanization, and to develop sub-cultural patterns.

8.2 *Ankaralı*: Urbanites vs. Villagers

In this period the terms "*Ankaralı*" and "urbanite" were frequently used in both news and columns. These words had proud and positive connotation, as the creations of the Republic. On the other hand, the villager and provincial were the negative notions that did not accord with the new desired way of life. The deputy of Edirne, Şeref (Aykut) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 6th December 1933) criticizes the world "*taşralı*" (provincial people/rustic) as used in his grandchildren's textbook. He says that "*taşra*" means Turkishness which is seen as inferior, banal and vulgar by the Ottoman palace and those who remained loyal to it. "Those people feel humiliated even by having a look on "taşralı" person". Since it is a contemptuous world humiliating Turks, he states that he rejects to explain it to his grandchildren and demands to the removal of this world and similar ones from textbooks. Rather than discussing the term being *taşralı,* he simply refuses to use term.

The discussions of the issue of being urbanite and *Ankaralı* reflect the understanding of individual within the context of collectivist nationalism, discussed in chapter V. Specifically, in the articles written by the writer identified as B.A., being described as *Ankaralı* was equated to being a "civilized Turk". According to this writer (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 24 January 1929), the "construction of the nation" and the "construction of Ankara" would be completed on the same day. In fact he relates the emergence of *Ankaralı* to the emergence of Turks who would be the product of "new civilization". He states "we will see the first *Ankaralı* generated by Ankara concomitant to the first Turks created by Turkey". B.A. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26th January 1929) believes that there would be *Ankaralı* among the new streets,

squares, and monuments wandering with all the confidence of the owner. This writer gives a detailed definition: "Here is the man that would be civilized human being while even he is breathing -since he will learn the civilized city life while he is going to school- in the civilized city of a civilized nation that lives in the community of civilization and that man will be called as *Ankaralı*". The expectation of "being civilized even in one's breathing" signals the radicalness of the project, although it is difficult to describe how radical it was.

As it can be guessed from the emergence of *Ankaralı* concomitant to nation, the urbanite was imagined in the context of "imagined community"; and thus was the part of the "community of nation". Defining *Ankaralı*, Neşet Halil (Atay) (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9th December 1933) states that the "*Ankaralı* is a communitarian, who never says "I". *Ankaralı* is not just an urbanite; but a person of will, of an ideal". The ideal *Ankaralı* was depicted within the context of the ideology of the period. S/he would be a uniform individual of the nation. "In the Ankara of the *Ankaralı*, one type of Turkish will be heard, one type of face will be washed and people will sit around the same table (*sofra*) and the meaning of the city will be same for all" (B.A., 26th January 1929). In a similar way, Kamuran Bozkır (*Ulus*, 24 September 1936) states that the defining characteristic of Ankaralı was loyalty to the regime. *Ankaralı* is loyal to revolution (*inkılap*) not to a city: "being *Ankaralı* (*Ankaralı*lık) means being loyal to new spirit of Turkey, new life, new ideals and new generations".

In another piece of writing dated on 23rd September 1934 the writer, *Ankaralı*, rejects the idea that being born in a city in it self can not be a criterion for

being urbanite. “If a citizen contributes to the revenue of the city in which s/he lives and can help to the city services, than s/he is an urbanite”. For him, simply possessing property and earning rent also could not be an indicator of being urbanite. However, *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19th August 1933) describes urbanites in Ankara as selfish: “although they seem to be attuned to common life and can talk about social manners, in fact they behave in a very individualistic and selfish way”. Although as a common feature of the period, he dispraised individualism, in fact, he was referring to feeling of responsibility toward the city life. It was noted in the part of city life that even in Yenişehir people behaved careless in the streets and common places. In spite of the all celebrated formal qualities of urbanite, in daily life, the formalization demanded by *Ankaralı* people could not be achieved, and informal behaviour was apparent even in the most formal spaces of the city.

Another way to describe the “*Ankaralı*” was to compare the city of Ankara and İstanbul and their urbanites. A writer known as K.Z. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25th March 1929) discusses this differentiation by comparing the newspapers of these cities: For him, while there were news of personal conflicts and gossip in İstanbul newspapers or the issue of Hronika,[188] articles and serious writing discussing ideas appeared in Ankara newspapers. He noted that İstanbul can be characterized by individualism that is expressed in an unhealthy and anti-communitarian way. Meanwhile, individualism was defined as an illness, a threat to communitarian collectivity. Interestingly, he also denies that tolerance, the lifeblood of education of a society, exists in İstanbul. He gives the examples of continuing disputes in newspapers as a lack of tolerance. Lack of dissent was interpreted as tolerance in the

city. In fact, all of the above mentioned emphasis on the loyalty to community refers to the attempt to create a modern Gemeinschaft in Ankara as discussed in previous chapters. First of *Ankaralı*s are seen as being essentially part of community, rather than individual in their own right.

In these formal representations of *Ankaralı*, it is explained how an *Ankaralı* should be, without mentioning existing (informal) *Ankaralı*. Because (informal) *Ankaralı*s were seen as the temporary elements of the city that would be transformed through the education of bodies and minds. Aka Gündüz (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17th October 1931) notes that "we do not deny that we are trying to change the old Ankara into the modern Ankara by means of labor, patience and force. However, this is not enough. We have to make the habitants of Ankara become *Ankaralı* by means of labor, manipulation (*vasıta*) and even of force".

As mentioned in chapter VI, the mayor Nevzat Tandoğan[189] was another of the well-known names who undertook this duty of creating urbanite/*Ankaralı* by applying force. According to Kocabaşoğlu (1990:207) the city of Ankara experienced "urban education" (*kent terbiyesi*) under the rule of Nevzat Tandoğan lasting 17 years[190]. Tandoğan mostly was concerned with the image of modern city and modern citizen. He used all possible methods, using every possible power, even making and breaking rules, to achieve this image of Ankara. Kocabaşoğlu (1990:197) likens Tandoğan's relation with people to a tutelage relation, which was dominated by the

[188] Hronika was a newspaper published in Greek in Istanbul.

[189] In 1946 he commits suitcide, and shoots himself.

[190] For Kocabaşoğlu, the way of this education may be disputatious; however, there was no other choice to construct an assertive city of 20th century from the town of Middle Ages.

concern of "protecting people from perils", and most importantly "educating and modernizing people" in spite of the people themselves. He was an ambitious mayor and former police officer; to realize his aims he could only realize his aims by acting in a despotic manner (Sarıoğlu, 2001:155). This mentality was consistent with the attitude of Republican elite's towards the people, the object of modernization.

In the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, he made publish announcements prohibiting trampling grass, illegal domestic servants; determining the price of hotels and restaurants, and introducing the new weighing machines and measures. While he was setting up formal rules regulating the city life, he also used his own informal rules to create urbanites of Ankara even by violating the formal ones (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:197). He was so dedicated to his ideals that, even in the festivals of Republic he predetermined and announced who would sit where (the plan of the seats), and the proper time and manner in participate to festival in the newspapers (*Ulus*, 26th October 1935 cited in Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:198).

In the "Regulation Book of Ankara Municipal Police" (*Ankara Belediye Zabıtası Talimatnamesi*) almost all articles consist of imperious dictums like "it is compulsory, forbidden or banned" (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990: 207-208). For example: "in common places … it is forbidden to jump the queue and disturb others in order to avoid waiting"; "…it is forbidden to spit and do anything that would disgust the people"; "it is forbidden to enter common places and public transportation with dirty and smelly working clothes and disgusting clothing". All articles, especially the ones related with "disgusting" acts were reflected the desired habitus, defined with the emphasis of being modern and civilized. Although some of these restrictions were

specifically for other *Ankaralı*s who did not know how to act in a civilized manner or dress inappropriately; even in Yenişehir these rules were not internalized/formalized in these years.

More examples could be given to rules regulating city life towards the creation of norms of urbanite/citizenship: "The streets and roads cannot be obstructed for any reason by anybody", "except the places appointed by the municipality, it is forbidden to roll hoops, wheels, or barrels, to skate or use coaster, to play snowball, football etc. and all other games, to fly kite, to fire skyrocket, in short the things that will disturb people, and will block going and coming are forbidden for minors, and it is the responsibility for their guardians to see that they obey these rules". "Defacing, scratching and destroying the monuments and statues of the city even in insignificant ways and showing disrespect to them in any way is forbidden". Many details of the city life are cowered by regulations such as beating carpets in the street, spitting, cock fighting, and driving taxies with no passengers. These regulations and rules were meticulously applied (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:208). These precautions were taken due to people's inability to adopt "civilizational process" as was desired, since the internalization of these rules would take time. And until the time that desired Ankaralı would emerge, people should be guided even with the application of force.

In all discussions of the urbanite of Ankara/*Ankaralı*, it was assumed that it was the people themselves who were engaged in the project of "civilizational shift". The writer "*Ankaralı*" expresses this situation, by stating that everybody describes a different Ankara according to their life space (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7th September 1932). For example, a person who spent winters in Yenişehir and spent summers in

Dikmen had totally different view of Ankara from a person who had just come from İstanbul and had to live in Samanpazarı or Cebeci. He never actually mentioned "other *Ankaralı*s" in this article. There was no place for "other *Ankaralı*s" in these discussions of *Ankaralı*; they would only emerge in writings through implications, or in some negative context.

8.3 Two Ankara and Two *Ankaralı*

As noted before, the discourse of "classless and united nation" was used by Republican elites to create a homogenous sense of nation. However the "civilizational shift" with the aim of creating a "modern/western" way of life, inevitably created new distinctions between people with the connotations of class and culture. As also discussed in a previous chapter, the new city, Yenişehir was designed as a new place suitable to the ideals of the new Republic. Tankut (1990:31) says the old traditional Ankara as quite opposite to the image of the bourgeoisie that was wanted to create as a symbol of new culture and way of life. Therefore, while the city was "developing" in the axis of north-south, in line with the desires of the Republican elites, the east-west axis was also "expanding", with the migration from the surrounding local environment. Altındağ, Samanpazarı, Hacettepe and Hamamönü were the main sources of these new comers/others[191]. Falih Rıfkı (7th September 1932) admits this division by saying that "after completion of the plan,

[191] In the early years of the Republic the increase of the population is due to civil servants coming from Istanbul. Later on people from different places begin to come to Ankara. By 1950 its population had increased 14.3 times (Sarıoğlu, 2001:79).

Ankara has divided into two parts like a row of teeth from which the middle teeth were extracted".

In addition to this division, there were certain agglomerations according to the city of origin in east-west axis. People from the eastern Anatolia had settled in the district of Erzurum, Bosnians in Sakarya, Albanians in Aktaş, people from Gümüşhane and Bayburt in Atıfbey (Cantek, L., 1996:122). Also there was a tendency towards a certain division of labour according to city of origin. Most of the migrants from Bayburt were carriage drivers, and Kurdish people were street sellers (Ayata, A. 1993:72). The inhabitants of these places were clustered according to their city of origin in the areas of housing and occupation as an informal tactic in the city. To survive in Ankara, they maintained their traditional community relations on the basis of *hemşerilik* in the city.

Levent Cantek (1996) argues that the fringe of the city/slum (*kenar mahalle*) had its peculiar order under the rule of local strong men (*kabadayı*) who varied between being "wild youth" (*delikanlılık*) and being a members of a mafia-type organization. These places were representational spaces that were relatively free from the representation of space since they were assumed as non-existant by planning process. However, relatively high rate of crime in these places forced the state to form the "thunderbolt team" (*yıldırım ekipler*) in the area of the Stadium to intervene in states of emergency. Although they were excluded by formal arrangements, the state was represented with execution of capital punishments which were carried out in Samanpazarı and Bentderesi. According to Cantek (1996:122-123) this was sufficient to frighten people living here:

> The things that could be done by the people of slum and their relations with center were quite limited: they were asked to be "civilized", and they became "civilized" as much as possible. They let their children go to the school, heard [from their children] the things that they never pleased with, [however] they kept silence since they avoided conflict with state.

There were fights between the *kabadayı*s of edge city, also there were a small number of examples of conflict between *Ankaralı*s and other *Ankaralı*s, such as a fight between the students of military school (*Harbiyeliler*) and *kabadayı*s (Cantek, L., 1996:124). Although, modern new *Ankaralı*s saw themselves as having the mission of being model citizens and educating the others to become like them (Sarıoğlu, 2001:39), when they could not cope with other *Ankaralı*, they developed more radical solutions. According to Levent Cantek, (1996:124) the will of inhabitants of Yenişehir to punish the people of Hacettepe would bring the expropriation of the district and latter the construction of The Hacettepe Hospital by İhsan Doğramacı in 1950s. In other words, the districts which could not be improved/ civilized would be destroyed totally.

In addition, the bureaucrats of the Republic tried to prevent the intervention of the local people to the government of the city even though they were relatively wealthy (Tankut, 1990; Sarıoğlu, 2001:35). However, according to procedure copied from the municipality of İstanbul, being an owner of a real estate was necessary to become the member of general assembly of the Municipality. Therefore to exclude the native people of Ankara, bureaucrats rearranged the prerequisites for entering to

the Assembly. As mentioned previously, being landowner was not a necessary requirement of being an *Ankaralı*. According to Sarıoğlu (2001:41-42) the development of the city was left to the socio-economic struggle between inhabitants of the old city and of the new city, saying that the politicians attempted to weaken the power of people from the old city who were speculator, opportunist and newly rich. However, this was done to protect their own interests and this power struggle shaped the development of the city.

Some of the natives seized the opportunity of capital accumulation and renting their house during the transformation of the city (Ayata, 1993:72). Since there was no economic base structure for the emergence of new way of life in Ankara, few local merchants who became rich by means of close relations with the state (Nalbantoğlu, U., 2000:295). This was the only way local merchants could penetrate into the life of city elites. Ünal Nalbantoğlu (2000:295) argues that many of the bureaucrats –the elite of the period- were also reluctant to share this new way of life with local middle class. The elite protected their positions in the institutions which were seen as the symbol of modernness; and they did not let local people replace them.

Şenol Cantek (2003) discusses this tension in terms of strangers vs. natives (*yabanlar-yerliler*). While the new comers were called as *yaban* (stranger), new comers also called local people as "*yabani*" (savage) (2003:159). In the view of natives of Ankara, the people coming from outside were all from İstanbul. They were strangers because of their different way of clothing, behavior and speaking. Among them there were also people coming from provincial areas (*taşra*) with similar living

conditions to Ankara. Although they attempted to imitate the Ankara elite, and emphasized their difference from the natives, they were accepted neither by elites nor by the natives of the city (2003:141).

The people coming from İstanbul were characterized of Ankara as rude, vulgar and "*yobaz*" (bigoted). In the interviews done by Funda Şenol Cantek (2003: 145-146, 148-149) one lady from İstanbul in that period mocks natives by imitating their local language, complaining about the smell of onion and rice coming from their houses. The other signs of their backwardness are their early retirement to bed before nightfall, women hiding their whole body (from men) except their eyes, the food that they serve at wedding ceremonies such as raisin, colorful candies and home-made bread, long visits to other's home starting from 8.30 a.m., and their critiques of people eating at the table as "*gavur*" (giaour), and describing tea as "yellow water". It was possible to mention a kind of hierarchy between different groups in Ankara in terms of etiquette rules. The group that had internalized the Western etiquette relatively well tended to humiliate those who had not.

However, in certain context "hospitality" of the natives (other *Ankaralı*s) was used to cover their lack of manners. Especially those who were late in adopting this new way of life used this quality as an excuse to mitigate their inferiority complex (Ş.Cantek, 2003:150). This characteristic hospitality was a factor that helped younger people to tolerate the "unmannerliness" of the older generation. In fact, this strategy was also applied to overcome the contradiction between villagerism and the idea of the new civilization; villagers were praised for their authenticity and hospitality.

On the other hand, the natives of Ankara also disapproved the new *Ankaralı*s. Atay (2006: 383-384) notes that at the beginning "natives were discontent with that [Ankara] remained as capital city. The life would be expensive". And also they feared that they would lose their identity and become indistinguishable from strangers[192]. They were disturbed by these "strangers" having different way of life with different clothes, attitudes and speaking. Their children expressed this discomfort by shouting "tango" or "*gavur*" after them in the streets (Ş. Cantek, 2003:141).[193] A tongue twister even originated among the children following the dressy ladies in the street: "tango, tango ribbon [hanging] in her back" (Nalbantoğlu, U. 2000:297).[194] Tango not only denoted the dance performed in balls, is also a term used for the woman who dressed in latest fashion. Especially women labeled as "*sosyete gadınları*" (women of high society), wearing hats were seen as exaggerated and anomalous in the context of "Muslim tradition" (Ş. Cantek, 2003:152). In Karaosmanoğlu's novel *Ankara* (2003:111), two local people outside of the Ankara Palas discuss "what is happening inside". A third person, who also comes to watch the people coming to the ball, joins the conversation and says "there is tango". The response to this answer is "who is tango?" The answer of this question is very difficult because, "the meaning of tango for him was rather vague and wide. This may be the name of a ritual, a meal or an instrument. It may be a name of a person". In short it refers to the "new way of life" in the eyes of local people; and mocking

[192] He adds that the natives could not imagine that the persons having even a small piece of land would be rich in a few years.

[193] Süreyya Ağaoğlu says that in the 1920s Ankara the woman without a veil or covering her head cursorily were mocked as "two head one nose, here is monkey" (*iki kafa bir burun, işte geliyor maymun*) (cited in Ş.Cantek, 2003:141).

"tango lives", was the main way to show hostility towards the elite. In the representational spaces of people, satire was an important tool for challenging the dominated spaces.

The coexistence of these two groups resembled to the coexistence of olive oil and vinegar. While new *Ankaralı*s isolated themselves from the natives like olive oil, natives showed their sour-vinegar like face (Ş. Cantek, 2003:159). The only attempt to form a relationship between these two groups was proposed by underlying the nationalist discourse. For example, the writer known as B.A. (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 24th January 1929) attempting to define the *Ankaralı*, mentions two components of the "Turkish inhabitants" of the city: the people of the city center and the people of the peripheral Ankara (*vilayet merkezi ve taşra Ankarası*), in other words, the new comers and the old inhabitants of the city. He says that these groups have no interaction between: they have been living together not as the parts of a larger society, nation, but like the Christian and Muslim communities, living side by side without interaction (*sürünüp bulaşmamak düsturunu güden*). They still exist as thesis and anti-thesis, however, since "both of them belong to same blood, use same language and both call the same gloriest land "*vatan*" (homeland), there is a maximum connection between them. And for him, to begin an interaction, "an exterior stimulation is needed for synthesis". He predicted that the future *Ankaralı* would be a synthesis between city center and the periphery, between new comers and old inhabitants. For him this synthesis would generate the (real) *Ankaralı*.

---

[194] Another tongue twister of the period was used by Peyami Safa in his book "*Cumbadan Rumbaya*". It was about a young lady who jumped from traditional way of life symbolized with "oriel" to "rumba", a new way of life. He ends his book (1936) as: "Stampling hearts / Rumba da rumba rumba". (*Kalplere vurur bir zımba/ Rumba da rumba rumba*).

Also a character from the novel *Ankara* explains the democracy as the (social) mobility from below to above, so the real meaning of the term "towards people" is pulling people towards yourself" (Karaosmanoğlu, 2003:113-114). However they remained isolated from each other since there was no formal attempt to mediate between them. Over the years this tendency of separated the two Ankaras has increased rather than decreased. In 1932, writer *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12th September) defines different types of urbanites according to district such as those from Kale, Cebeci, old city and Yenişehir.[195] In the discussion of "urbanites" of Ankara, it was possible to define different groups of urbanites. Therefore *Ankaralı* uses a term "city urbanites" (*şehir şehirlisi*) to describe the "real" urban people. It can be inferred that "city urbanites" are the people of "high society", a term frequently used in the newspaper. In this writing he defends this last group. Without explaining the origin of insult, he says that "we should not disparage the needs of city urbanites". Most probably he is explaining excessive consumption of the "city urbanites"; therefore, he needs to add that people should consider the limitations of the city life and institutions.

Sarıoğlu discusses that from 1920s to 1950s the "new culture" gave no chance of survival to the traditional culture of Ankara: "the old culture in a sense became the victim of the conservatism of the new culture" (2001:39). Although Ankara had the mechanisms that could be source to the richness of city life, it was deprived of this

[195] He gives an example from a dialogue between a villager and an urbanite salesman trying to cheat the villagers in Koyunpazarı. The content of anecdotes would change after 1940s. Cheated villagers would start to cheat urbanites (as result of the transformation of informal tactics into informal strategies).

because there was no interest in reviving them. While a new city (Yenişehir) was being constructed, the neglect of the old Ankara brought the destruction of old traditional pattern of the city (Sarıoğlu, 2001:39). Such ignorance also brought the neglect of the socio-cultural heritage. Therefore while a new and modern culture was in the process of being constructed, the old culture was forgotten, neglected, and even eroded and dispraised (Sarıoğlu, 2001:158). In 1933, Hamit Zübeyr Koşar expresses a similar anxiety about the change in Ankara (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 15th January 1933): "Engürü of the natives is being displaced by [new] Ankara. We can extend this transformation to people and their souls. While the natives of Ankara have been learning "manner" and new tradition from intellectuals who were known as "*yaban*s" meaning strangers; they have been inevitably losing something from traditional culture constituting their old existence".

Because of this indifference to natives and low income settlements, especially in the old city, they were left to informal tactics, some of which would turn into strategies using clientelist relations in the city. Of course, the limited budget was one of the constraints of the period. The Minister of Internal Affairs attributes the lack of electricity, water and roads in the old city with deficiency in the budget (Sarıoğlu, 2001:67). However, in the budget discussions of the assembly, it was said that all the money for construction activities was spent for Yenişehir and the old city was excluded (Tankut, 1990:101). Therefore mediatory spaces could not be produced at a formal level within the context of the project. As understood from Hamit Zübeyr Koşar, while the natives of Ankara had been learning modern rules of conduct (formalization of Republican etiquette) to certain degree, the interaction remained

within this framework and the (informal) hybrid forms emerged from this limited interaction.

8.4 Different Way of Lives

This strict separation contributed to the construction of urbanity with reference to its other. The lifestyles of these two groups were underlined by the differences between them, and many articles and editorials depicted these differences. In some, the observations from the visit to the other Ankara were narrated in the same way as an anthropological observation, using very exclusionary language. In his observations on Altındağ, the writer *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17th September 1932) stated that people who work in service sector of the city live here. For him Altındağ resembled villages in Eastern Anatolia: "the cost of living is low here; people pursue their life style that is peculiar to village with their language and custom" (wedding ceremony). Both language and wedding ceremony are important criterions to test the "change in civilization". In the Republican period, wedding ceremonies shifted to municipality buildings with wedding halls. Some buildings of Halkevleri were also used for these ceremonies. According to Öztürkmen (1999:185), these places helped to regulate and control the weddings which were frequently-encountered form of legitimate mass entertainment as well as service to people. Of course in Altındağ wedding ceremonies were still held in the traditional way, since formal ceremonies had totally different understanding of entertainment. In the same writing, *Ankaralı* underlines the language reflecting vernaculars of people in these places. Language is an important component of etiquette, referring to degree of being civilized/urbanite.

There were complaints about the streets of *Ulus* in where Turkish was rarely heard (*Ulus*, 9th May 1935). These streets resembled to Beyoğlu and Mersin, the places characterized by cosmopolitanism, a term considered negative by the Republican elite.

The form of entertainment was another issue to be considered within this context. The places chosen for entertainments by "other" *Ankaralı* were also different from the "clean" (*nezih*) places of the elite. The cafehouses, traditional musical places selling alcoholic drink near the Citadel and at the back of *Ulus* served these people (Cantek, L., 1999:122). However, a sharp differentiation was made by writer, *Ankaralı*, according to entertainment places of weekends. *Ankaralı* (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19th August 1933) describes two very different types of weekend entertainment and dress associated with them. While he considered people visiting Mamak, Kayaş and Hatipçayı as "retrogressive", people going to Park of Farm, Marmara and Karadeniz as "progressive". He says that the first group of places, Mamak belongs to *Tanzimat*, but the second group belongs to Ankara. He depicts the people in Mamak as "they were playing saz, doing belly dance and drinking alcohol". He continues "if you can not make Mamak resemble to the Farm, if you can not put the orchestra instead of the *incesaz*, you can never create the scene of unity". In the newspaper there are also photographs of people in Mamak. One of them shows a woman with a subtitle: "a woman whose head is covered, samovar is open" (*semaveri acikta başı örtüde bir kadın*).

Ankaralı (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19th August 1933) continues with several questions: "Why do half of Ankara's people go not to the Farm, but to Mamak,

Kayaş and Hatipcayı?" and "What and who separates the people of the city, which inculcation (*hangi telkin*) and which life necessity (*hangi hayat ihtiyacı*)?" "Is it wealth or poverty?"[196] However, he does not answer these questions. In this writing and in other similar ones the implied answer was the people's inability to internalize the rules of "civilization process". This was also valid for "real *Ankaralı*s" going to the Farm for the weekends. *Ankaralı* points out the similarity between these two groups: "neither of them can enjoy". He does not explain the reasons of it in Mamak, however, it can be said that he did not accept activities such as having a picnic (especially involving cooking) as entertainment. Interestingly, for the people in the Farm, he says that "people listen jazz music in a similar way to *incesaz*". Even the alcohol is drunk reluctantly (*yüz buruşturarak*). He says "*Ankaralı* sit in Marmara as if it were in a doctor's waiting room ("*ve Ankaralı Marmara'da bir doctor anti-şambr'ında bekler gibi oturuyor"*): if a person becomes cheerful, it is disapproved of as if it were a crime. In fact this unusual confession refers to the gap between formal and informal behaviors not only between the old and new *Ankaralı*s, but also within the new *Ankaralı*s visiting the Farm.

Similar to the above example, the terms "retrogressive" and "progressive" were frequently used to describe two Ankara and *Ankaralı*. Falih Rıfkı Atay (*Ulus*, 26th April 1935) in his editorial entitled as "Two Ankaras" says that the life is retrogressive at the back of *Ulus* and progressive in Yenişehir. Falih Rıfkı characterizes the back of *Ulus* with Asian adobe that has been piled up and he says

[196] Koymen (1999) says that between the years of 1938-1948, due to the war economy and inflation, peasants who had the opportunity of supplying huge amounts of wheat made big profit. In this way the rich peasants and merchants of towns by expanding their business began to make investments and started to participate in entertainment life of Istanbul. The number of big night clubs (*çalgılı gazino*) playing music mixed of rıumba and traditional music of Konya increased in this period. These

that this mass hurts very deeply if you consider "the all social ideals of the Republic". In spite of this comment there was no formal policy to solve the problems of low income settlements. In another article in *Ulus* (23rd January 1934), the reconstructed district of Işıklar ("old district of giaour" (*gavur*)) was described as a part of new Ankara. This district is noted for women wandering with pushchairs, servants, dogs sunbathing, and houses with elegant tulle curtains. In contrast, adjacent to Işıklar, The Clock Tower, and Atpazarı were seen as having décor belonging to ten years earlier, with their villager people wearing colorful clothes. Once more, the appearance of other Ankaralı was seen inferior.

Disparaging comments were made whenever these two groups encountered each other. For example, the people were made picnic in Dam Park with their barbecue (*mangal*), coal and swing for children are regarded strange, and said that "the dam is not constructed for this kind of people" (*Ulus*, 26th July 1937, cited in Aslanoğlu, 2001b:331). Also, in a comment (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6th August 1932) related to the views from Karadeniz Pool in the Farm, it was said that "in all this beautiful sight, the existence of people who had not bought a swimsuit but who were walking around in short white pants was annoying. The administration of the Farm took measures against this. They decided not to allow people without swimsuit to enter both pool anymore". Of course, these people were not the inhabitants of Yenişehir. The same issues continue to be discussed in regard to urbanity in present day Turkey. It is summarized as the "people rushed to beach, so the citizen could not swim" (*halk sahile hucum etti, vatandaş denize giremedi*). The term "people" has

developments would start another discussion of entertainment understanding.

been referred to people that could not be civilized. Rather than their existence, their visibility has been defined as the major problem for the elite.

In another article, Yakub Sabri (*Ulus*, 1st September 1935) describes an anonymous district of Ankara. It is one of the districts at the back of *Ulus* where "the most joyful, canny, chatty people of the city" come together. He depicts the women groups sitting in front of the houses, children playing in their underwear and the men using a scurrilous language. Yakup Sabri notes that in these places the outsider (stranger) entering the district can be noticed easily by the way he walks. The groups of people stop speaking to scrutinize him because he walks rapidly; the rhythm of his steps is never interrupted. Yakup Sabri says, nevertheless it is usual for a person from outside the district to stop and chat to these groups. As Lefebvre argues, these two different rhythms refer to different lifestyles in the same city. It can be said these very different rhythms of the city stem from closed community life of districts, therefore, the dissimilar factors could be easily discerned. Although Yakup Sabri makes some attempt to avoid painting a very negative picture of the area, using words like "colorful", he compares the district to "tribal encampment" (*kabile karargahı*), depreciating the area in a subtle way.

Most strikingly, Yaşar Nabi (Nayır) (*Ulus*, 8th October 1938) complains about the worker peasants who are wandering in the streets of the capital city in the evenings in miserable clothes. For him, this scene is an inappropriate one for the modern and civilized spectacle/scenery of Ankara. He believed that the people who do not know much about the country may think that all the Turkish villagers are poor and miserable, but this was not the case. Only the poorest ones come to Ankara to

earn money, however they did not spend money on clothes. He proposed an interesting solution to this problem: by deducting money from their weekly wage, and "clean and civilized" clothes could be bought for them. Although this suggestion was not applied, the people with "inappropriate clothes" were removed by police from Yenişehir (Cantek, L.1996:123) the higher-class districts of the city. Şenol Cantek (2003:111) states that according to Republican cadre, the people from outlying neighborhoods (mahalle) did not suit to street/boulevard. Therefore, the problem was solved by restrictions, making unwanted people invisible. A witness of the period who had come to Ankara from İstanbul noted since natives and villagers could not come to the Boulevard, they felt comfortable in Kızılay. She also adds that their comfort and order ended in the period of Menderes, when those people were allowed to appear in the district (Ş.Cantek, 2003:220).

As well as the official sanctions, Şenol Cantek (2003:111-112) points out that the inhabitants of the old city also avoided visiting new city because of the scrutinizing eyes of the new *Ankaralı*s. Visiting Yenişehir, known as "going down to the city" (*şehre inmek*) was a cause of nervousness because of the fear of being watched (by the internalized gazes of foreigner). The modern buildings, the Boulevard, the streets with trees seemed attractive but inaccessible.

Although the first generation of the natives in the Republican period regarded themselves as strangers to this new way of life, the second generation would be more conformist, with desire for approval (Şenol Cantek, 2003:268). There were also families praising the new *Ankaralı*s and the new way of life, although they themselves had not been able to adapt to it because their daily life was so steeped in

the traditional way of life and only their children could have the possibility of joining this group of ideal citizens. They tried to give their children the possibility of joining to this new way of life by educating them and raising them in accordance with the ideal citizens of the Republic [197] (Şenol Cantek, 2003:270). In order to enter the modern Gemeinschaft, at least the appearance of ideal citizen should be accomplished; but this opportunity was not accessible to the majority of the population.

At the formal level, the other *Ankaralı*s were harshly excluded in early Republican period. These people's right to the city was not recognized; recognition of this right was bound to fulfillment of the necessities of "being civilized" defined by the official ideology. Therefore, impermeable boundaries rejecting the relationship were drawn to construct desired (civilized) urbanites. The quality of these boundaries accelerated the tendencies of community (Gemeinschaft) relations within each one and legitimized the informal practices. The only weak challenges to these boundaries could be raised by informal tactics rather than the strategies.

8.4 Rhythm of the two Ankara

Although, both in the planning process and daily life, the new and old city and their inhabitants were separated from each other, and so were considered to have different

[197] Social mobility for the children of these families became possible through education or marriage especially for girls. However, the community consisting of this second generation emerged around the 1940s was in fact seperate and different from the elites of the early republican period. It was the community of rich and country origin people that would be more visible in the period of Democrat

paths and rhythm in the city; their encounter and intersection in the daily life can be caught through the rhythm of the city. In fact the rhythm of the city emerged as a result of the synthesis of formal and informal processes within the city. Urbanite villagers, villagers in the city, urban villages, and all these terms used to discuss the urban culture in Turkish cities points to the rhythm emerged as a result of this synthesis with different accentuation.

At the beginning of the 1930s Ankara still had the appearance from a village. This view was frequently a complaint of the writers of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*. Burhan Asaf (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23rd April 1929) complains about the cattle and donkeys of bread sellers in the city center (the square of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*). As a result of the internalization of a stranger's eye his main concern is "what a stranger would think about it when he enters to the city from the station". In the beginning of the 1930s, the municipality published many announcements prohibiting the herds passing through city. It had been announced that animals grazing in or passing through city space in daytime were strictly prohibited (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12th July 1930, 27th July 1930). Another custom that would become a symbol in the discussions of urbanity was rearing fowl in apartments. Although the noise was a general problem, this noise peculiar to rural life was specifically condemned one. In February, 1937, rearing fowl in the backyards of apartment blocks was prohibited by municipality. It was allowed for detached houses with large garden on the condition that it did not disturb the neighbors. This decision was seen as an appropriate one to prevent the noise that was peculiar to a village rather than a city (*Ulus*, 13th February 1937). Although noise in general was a serious problem in this period, in this news, the

Party (Şenol Cantek, 2003:270).

problem was defined as the noise inappropriate to “city life”. Since “city life” was constructed with reference to Western counterparts, these customs were declared as unacceptable.

At the beginning of the 1930s, in the early years of the construction of Yenişehir it was also said that because of the work of setting networks of electricity, gas, telegram and telephone parquets roads have been reconstructed again and again (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 29th January 1931). Also because of the deficiencies in the planning process, the drainage system could not be constructed permanently for many years (Tankut, 1990:194-195). Reconstruction again and again was another factor determining the rhythm of the city. Also there were complaints about the muddy streets. People went for a walk had to clean their shoes (*Ulus*, 13 February 1937, 21st September 1929). BA commented that after the rain, Ankara appeared like a woman without make-up in the morning (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8th March 1929). He added that “the use of cheap material/equipment and imitation made the city into a country whore”. While comparisons reflect the conspicuous patriarchy, formal arrangements in the space were called as “make-up”. Continuous reconstruction has been also another aspect of city life.

Because of the absence of the formal policies on the issue of low income groups and low income settlements, other *Ankarlı*s produced their solutions using informal practices. By ignoring these people, temporary (make-up) solutions were produced or informal solutions were approved, such in the issue of *gecekondu* discussed in chapter VI. Other problems raised in the newspaper such as peddlers, porters, beggars were dealed in the same way. Because of the increasing number of

peddlers, the municipality allocated certain places to them in exchange for 1 lira per month (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye,* 16th April 1933). However, this arrangement could not solve the problem and complaints about them continued. Also porters and their appearances were seen as problems due to their inappropriateness to the project of creating a civilized and modern city and city life. And as a solution porters began to use a trolley instead of a dosser (*küfe*) making it easier to carry goods and "shows porter more presentable" (*Ulus,* 3rd March 1937).

It was also possible to see titles like as "terrible conditions of beggars" in the newspaper throughout the 1930s. This complaint was not due to the poor situation of beggars but the poor environmental quality they caused. According to news, the beggar groups who had been in the (old) city center began to invade Yenişehir. They created an unbearable situation since they occupied the pavement/sidewalk. It was said that "it is impossible to walk in the city", therefore "the city should be saved from them" (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7th January 1929). Beggars have been another permanent issue for Turkish cities that determines the rhythm of the city.

The contrast emerged from the encounter of two *Ankaralı*s which Mayor Nevzat Tandoğan tried to avoid. He did not allow the villagers with donkeys move along asphalted streets. He had drivers who crashed into locust tree beaten, and left drunks in Elmadağ, even the winter (Kocabaşoğlu, 1990:207). In this way problems could be hidden rather than solved by the application of informal practices.

In this chapter, by discussing the place of the village community and villagers, I analyzed the construction of urbanity with reference to the village and villagerism.

Although there was a vague and contradictory attitude towards these issues, formal arrangements made for the new *Ankaralı*s in the 1930s ignored villagers and old *Ankaralı* as villagers. In contrast to the discourse of villagerism, rural way of life and rurality were despised with reference to newly introduced etiquette of new civilization. While this situation was the indicator of the increasing gap between formal and informal practices, the most apparent common ground between these separate groups was informal practices determining the rhythm of the city.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Why do we have to kill villagers?
Cause they are sluggish towards a changing world
Hard as mud brick walls
Waterless as thorns
They live resisting, indifferently
They are dim, abrupt and sly
They lie in belief and easily
They have a talent in seeming poor although they have excess money
They underestimate everything and swear at everyone
They cannot think of rain, wind and sun, for once, without their crops in their minds
They try to expand their land by plowing the boundaries of others…[198]

Şükrü Erbaş

Şükrü Erbaş starts his poem by asking "Why do we have to kill villagers?", and tries to answer this question by explaining the reasons one by one in a long list. In fact, all these reasons are the negative qualities deriving from parochialism, which is not limited to villager *per-se*. Therefore, it can be said that, in this poem, rather than the villagers themselves, the concept of "being a villager" is condemned with its

[198] köylüleri niçin öldürmeliyiz ?/ çünkü onlar ağırkanlı adamlardır.
değişen bir dünyaya karşı / kerpiç duvarlar gibi katı
çakır dikenleri gibi susuz / kayıtsızca direnerek yaşarlar.
aptal, kaba ve kurnazdırlar. / inanarak ve kolayca yalan söylerler.
paraları olsa da / yoksul görünmek gibi bir hünerleri vardır.
herşeyi hafife alır ve herkese söverler. / yağmuru, rüzgarı ve güneşi
birgün olsun ekinleri akıllarına gelmeden / düşünemezler...
ve birbirlerinin sınırlarını sürerek / topraklarını
büyütmeye çalışırlar...

association with parochialism. By doing so, this poem in fact, explains the value of urbanity which is defined as freedom from parochialism and surveillance.

We have to realize however that, although "being urbane" is considered as an opposite category to "being a villager", as I have discussed in the Introduction of the thesis, similar to "being modern", "being urbane" also means being constructed by the state, by society/community, by each other and by ourselves in the urban space. In this process, individual is supposed to be a subject as well as the object. If we remember Berman's (1988:5) definition of modernism, it is "any attempt by modern men and women to become subjects as well as objects of modernization, to get a grip on the modern world and make themselves at home in it". Parallel to modernization, urbanity and urban space are produced through a process involving constant change, interaction and reconstruction.

In this thesis, I have suggested that in Turkish modernization history, being urban (was) equated with being modern, which was defined by the determinative boundaries of the modernization project. "Being urban" carried all the tensions and struggles of modernization, since it was the core element defining the citizens of the Republic. Although there was a fear from the consequences of urbanization and industrialization (Karaömerlioğlu, 2005), urban way of life, defined with reference to Western way of life, was accepted as an indicator of modernness - especially within a limited elite circle. In this (formal) construction process, individuals were seen as objects rather than the subjects of the process. Most of the people, living far from the formal definition of modernity, participated within this struggle of modernization with the informal practices, only barely making them subjects.

Therefore, in order to understand the creation of urban modern citizenship and modern space, in this thesis, I have taken into consideration the informal practices in relation to the formal ones in the process of production of space in the early Republican period. I have shown how in Turkish modernization, both elites and the rest of the people applied to informal practices. While on the formal level, the modernization project was strictly defined within the limits of the ideology of the state, on the informal level, different practices emerged such as clientelism, community relations, persistence of traditional culture; and they sometimes diffused into, sometimes transformed and sometimes conflicted with formal practices.

Although formalization was desired by the elite group, they also employed informal practices. I have shown in this thesis, how the planning process of Ankara was continuously challenged by the informal strategies of the elite like land speculation and clientelism. Although the formal arrangements were mostly done for new *Ankaralı*s, they were also challenged by them with the application of informal practices. Furthermore, the relationship between the elite and people was also organized around informal practices such as clientelism, which linked these two groups. This in return, hindered the cultivation of a city construction and urbanity, which as I have discussed in chapter III, are based on autonomous individuals. One of my main arguments has been that, in the Turkish context, the urban modern citizenship was created through formal and especially informal practices that fostered a communitarian understanding. I have shown how this communitarian understanding which did not allow for the rise of modern

autonomous individuals was produced and reproduced through the production of space, which is itself inseparable from the construction of urbanity.

According to Kasaba (1997:19), modernization entails "the freeing of individuals and communities from some of their traditional obligations, enabling them to take part in the expanding market society". However, in the Turkish case, modernization from above, a kind of social engineering, neglected the ideal of a society of free and equal individuals or, in other words, of citizens (Keyder:, 1997:38). As I have articulated in the description of *Ankaralı* in the 1930s, the urbanite was defined within the context of a communal society; it referred to a person who would be in accordance with the national ideals.

On the city level, impermeable boundaries were produced by encouraging Gemeinschaft tendencies. For the new *Ankaralı*s (elite), new city and city life emerged as a concentration area by excluding difference with the help of planning. These places were produced as homogeneous areas which I have referred to as the modern Gemeinschaft. On the other hand, I have argued, since the planning process ignored them, other *Ankaralı*s maintained traditional relationships based on the traditional Gemeinschaft. They settled in neighborhoods in the city space and took up occupations, both of which were concentrated by migrants from their city of origin/ *hemşeri*s. Therefore, through the formal and informal spatial practices, in the form of tactics or strategies, impermeable boundaries were produced within the city.

The urbanite was tried to be created with reference to the Western way of life and consumption pattern in spite of the dominant discourse of the "society

without privilege and class" .The modernization project aimed at intervening into both the private and the public in order to transform the society (a demand to change the habitus). Since it could only reach a limited group because of its rejection of formal mediations, many people remained with their traditional (Gemeinschaft) relations.

The application of Western etiquette in the manners, with the ideal of creating a modern-urban-citizen increased the gap between formal and informal. As Elias (1996) discusses, this is the sign of unequal power relations and increasing gap between the center and the periphery. Although in formal level, the discourse of a unified nation without classes or special privileges was tried to be constructed, urbanity was used to distinguish elite from the rest of the people. Because of the large span of formal-informal, formalization could not spread to the people easily. The Republican elite's rejection of hybrid forms (mediations) supported this separateness of two ways of life. Because of the increasing gap between formal and informal, traditional (informal) ways of life were also despised as an extension of the village way of life. Although the period was marked with villagerism, village culture was despised and used as a negative model of urbanity. The limited mediation between them could emerge through informal practices producing eclectic patterns.

Since spatial practices, varying from city scale to the body of ideal citizens, were produced with the domination of the "representation of space", it contributed to the emergence of abstract spaces which are based on simple dualities with a reductionist mentality. Republican elite believed that in order to overcome the duality of body-mind -as a reflection of the duality of East–West -, both of them

needed to be changed contrary to Gökalp's formulation of culture and civilization. To solve the problem of so-called inconsistency of content and container, both had to be changed in the direction of the new civilization (Western societies) with a civilizational shift. However, as Lefebvre (1993:170) discusses, the understanding that sees space as a void waiting to be filled by content, separates the container and content, and makes them indifferent to each other. Therefore, since their relationship was never questioned, urbanity and urban space were produced with an emphasis on forms. Furthermore, the individuals and the groups which were reflected through the mirror of representation of space reproduced the split between body and mind – hence, inside and outside - which was aimed to be overcome with a civilizational shift.

Beneath and beyond these constructed dualities through representations of space, there had been interactions of formal and informal, modern and tradition, content and container which were only able to emerge in representational spaces. Although they were limited, these interactions produced different eclectic practices which partly challenged and partly diffused into the project. In fact, urban space and urbanity are expected to be mediatory practices in the transformation of societies; however, in the Turkish case, rather than doing this, they became the arena of dualities such as modern-traditional, new-old, *alafranga-alaturka* with an emphasis on forms. This study also shows that, spatial and urban practices have great potentials of mediatory roles. Rather than emphasizing dualities, concentrating on their "in between" qualities of them will be illuminative to understand these practices in daily life. Finally, such an understanding may help to locate ourselves and others as subjects as well as objects of modernization.

Although the contemporary urban literature points to the structural transformation of cities with concepts like urbanization without cities, deterioration of the center, I argue, urbanity is still a critical issue that should be dealt with both analytically and normatively without being romanticized. Although it has been frequently implied in different contexts, there are limited studies that directly analyze the concept with its associations in Turkish context. Urbanity and urban space have been important issues in the Turkish modernization project; and they are still the sources of tensions and struggles.

This thesis has aimed to understand the certain aspects of these persistent tensions in the spatial and urban practices by focusing on 1930s Ankara. I have emphasized that these practices could not be understood without the study of informal practices as well as the formal ones. Since the urban space and urbanity were produced by their interaction, the urban(e) history of Turkey should be thought within this context. The studies considering their co-existence in the practices of different social groups can contribute to developing critical perspectives in urban studies beyond the limitation of dualities. Such an understanding can enable us to capture the power struggles and their actors in and through space more clearly; and it will help to develop the more inclusive practices in urban area.

This study is limited with the 1930s Ankara. The new studies researching the formal-informal interaction in space, within the context of the later periods of this thesis, will contribute to the comprehension of the transformation of these power struggles through the history of the modernization of the country. Furthermore, I should like to conclude this thesis by arguing that before understanding the history of formal-informal practices in different contexts it is not possible to have a complete understanding of the history of modernization.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Collins Cobuild English Dictionary. 1989. London: Collins Publishers.

Agamben, Giorgio. 1993. *Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience*. London: Verso.

Akşit, Bahattin. 1999. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye Köylerindeki Dönüşümler." In Oya Baydar, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 173-186.

Aktüre, Sevgi. 2001. "1930'dan 1930'a Ankara'da Günlük Yaşam." In Yıldırım Yavuz, ed., *Tarih İçinde Ankara II*. Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 35-74.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2004. "Rethinking Strangeness: From Structures in Space to Discourses in Civil Society," *Thesis Eleven* 79: 87-104.

Altaban, Özcan. 1998. "Cumhuriyetin Kent Planlama Politikaları ve Ankara Deneyimi." In *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık.* İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 41-64.

Althusser, Louis. 1994. *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Arat, Yeşim. 1997. "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Raşit Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 95-112.

Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Aslanoğlu, İnci. 2000. "1928-1946 Döneminde Ankara'da Yapılan Resmi Yapıların Mimarisinin Değerlendirilmesi," In Ayşıl T. Yavuz, ed., *Tarih İçinde Ankara*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 257-273.

-----. 2001a. *Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığı: 1923-1938*. Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi.

-----. 2001b. "1930-1950 Yılları Ankara'sının Eğlence Yaşamı İçinde Gazino Binaları." In Yıldırım Yavuz, ed., *Tarih İçinde Ankara II*. Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 327-340.

Atay, Falih R.. 2006. *Çankaya*. İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları.

Atkinson, Maxwell J.. 1982. "Understanding Formality: the Categorization and Production of 'Formal' Interaction," *The British Journal of Sociology* 33(1): 86-117.

Ayata, Ayşe. 1993. "Bir Başkentin Portresi: Sosyal İlişkiler, Dayanışma Ağları, Komşuluk Birimleri." In Zeynep Aktüre, Süleyman Doğan and Sibel Köse, eds., *Kimlik, Sınırsallık, Mekan*. Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 71-76.

Ayata, Sencer. 1988. "Kentsel Orta Sınıf Ailelerde Statü Yarışması ve Salon Kullanımı," *Toplum ve Bilim* 42: 5-25.

Baban, Feyzi. 2005. "Community, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey." In E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, eds., *Citizenship in a Global World*. London: Routledge, 52-69.

-----. 2007. "The Public Sphere and the Question of Identity in Turkey." In E. Fuat Keyman, ed., *Remaking Turkey*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Balcıoğlu, E. Mahir. 1993. "Ancyra'dan Ankara'ya: 3000 Senelik Bir Destan." In Zeynep Aktüre, Süleyman Doğan and Sibel Köse, eds., *Kimlik, Sınırsallık, Mekan*. Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 61-66.

Barrett, Michèle. 1996. *Marx'tan Foucault'ya İdeoloji*. İstanbul: Sarmal.

Batuman, Bülent. 2003. “Imagination as Appropriation: Student Riots and (Re)Claiming of Public Space,” *Space & Culture* 6(3): 261-275.

Batur, Afife. 1984. “To be Modern: Search for a Republican Architecture” In Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Modern Turkish Architecture*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 68-93.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1995. *Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Baydar, Gülsüm. 2002. “Tenuous Boundaries: Women, Domesticity and Nationhood in 1930s Turkey,” *The Journal of Architecture* 7(Autumn): 229-244.

Baykurt, Fakir. 1999. “Köyden Fışkıran Edebiyat.” In Oya Baydar, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere.* İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları,

Baudelaire, Charles. “The Dandy”, in *The Painter of Modern Life*, retrieved from http://www.dandyism.net/?page_id=178

Beauregard, Robert A., and Sophie Body-Gendrot. 1999. “Imagined Cities, Engaged Citizens.” In Robert A. Beauregard, Sophie Body-Gendrot and Line Beauregard, eds., *The Urban Moment.* London: Sage Publications, 3-22.

-----. 1996. “Between Modernity and Postmodernity : the Ambigious Position of U.S. Planning.” In Scott Campbell and Susan Fainstein, eds., *Readings in Planning Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell,

Beiner, Ronald. 2005. “Our Relationship to Architecture as a Mode of Shared Citizenship: Some Arendtian Thoughts,” *Techné* 9 (1): 56-67.

Berman, Marshall. 1988. *All That is Solid Melts into Air: the Experience of Modernity*. London: Penguin Books.

Bhabha, Homi K.. 1990. *Nation and Narration*. London: Routledge.

Bitusikova, Alexandra. 1998. “Transformation of the City Center in the Light of Ideologies: The Case of Banska Bystrica, Slovakia,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 22(4): 614-622.

Bocock, Robert. 1992. “The Cultural Formations of Modernity.” In Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, eds., *Formations of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity.

Bora, Aksu. 2005. *Kadınların Sınıfı: Ücretli Ev Emeği ve Kadın Öznelliğinin İnşası*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Boran, Behice. 1999. “Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları: İki Köy Çeşidinin Mukayeseli Tetkiki.” In Oya Baydar, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 141-150.

Boratav, Korkut. 1990. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-1985*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi.

Borden, Iain. 2001. “Another Pavement, Another Beach: Skateboarding and the Performative Critique of Architecture” In Iain Borden, Jane Rendell and Joe Kerr, eds., *The Unknown City: Contesting Architecture and Social Space*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 178-199.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1978. “Sport and Social Class,” *Social Science Information* 12(6): 819-840.

Boyd, Richard. 2006. “The Value of Civility,” *Urban Studies* 43(5/6): 863-878.

Bozdoğan, Sibel. 1997. “The Predicament of Modernism in Turkish Architectural Culture: an Overview.” In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 133-156.

-----. 2001. *Modernism and Nation Building*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

-----. 2003. “Modern Yaşamak: Erken Cumhuriyet Kültüründe Kübik Ev” retrieved from http://www.arkitera.com/v1/diyalog/sibelBozdoğan/habitat01.htm

Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Reşat Kasaba. 1997. "Introduction." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 3-14.

Camhis, Marios. 1979. *Planning Theory and Philosophy*. London: Tavistock.

Cantek, Funda Şenol. 2003. *'Yaban'lar ve Yerliler: Başkent Olma Sürecinde Ankara*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Cantek, Levent. 1999. "Hacettepe ile Yenişehir ve Saireye Dair Hikayat," *Birikim* 86/87: 120-125.

Çetin, Türkan. 1999. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycülük Politikaları" In Oya Baydar, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları,

Clarke, David B.. 1997. "Consumption and the City, Modern and Postmodern," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 21(2): 218-237.

Conrad, Burkhard. 2006. "Informal Politics", hrss. Retrieved from http://www.hamburg-review.com/fileadmin/pdf/01_03/September_2006_Conrad.pdf

Çınar, Alev. 2005. *Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Çiçekoğlu, Feride. 1998. "Asri, Modern, Çağdaş." In Uğur Tanyeli, ed., *Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet*. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 146-153.

de Certeau, Michel. 1984. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. California: University of California Press.

Delanty, Gerard. 2004. "The Foundation of Social Theory: Origins and Trajectories." In Bryan Turner, ed., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 21-46.

Devellioğlu, Ferit. 2000. *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*. Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi Yayınları.

Dijkstra, Lewis W.. 2000. “Public Spaces: A Comparative Discussion of the Criteria for Public Space.” In Ray Hutchison, ed., *Construction of Urban Space*. Stamford: Jai Press Inc, 1-22.

Diken, Bülent. 2004. “City of God” retrieved from: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/diken-city-of-god.pdf

Diken, Bülent, and Laustsen, Carsten B**..** 2002. “Zones of Indistinction- Security, Terror, and Bare Life”. Retrieved from: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/diken-laustsen-zones-of-indistinction.pdf

Donald, James. 1999. *Imagining the Modern City*. London: the Athlone Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert, and Paul Rabinow. 1993. “Can There be a Science of Existential Structure and Social Meaning?” In Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma and Moishe Postone, eds., *Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 113-128.

Duben, Alan, and Cem Behar. 1996. *İstanbul Haneleri*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Duman, Doğan. 1997. “Cumhuriyet Baloları,” *Toplumsal Tarih* 37: 45-48.

Elden, Stuart. 2004a. *Understanding Henri Lefebvre*. London: Continuum.

-----. 2004b. “Between Marx and Heidegger: Politics, Philosophy and Lefebvre’s The Production of Space,” *Antipode* 36(1): 86–105.

Elias, Norbert. 1994. *The Civilizing Process*. Oxford, Blackwell**.**

-----. 1996. *The Germans*. New York: Colombia University Press**.**

Erdoğan, Necmi. 2007. “Garibanların Dünyası: Türkiye’de Yoksulların Kültürel Temsilleri.” In Necmi Erdoğan and Tanıl Bora, eds., *Yoksulluk Halleri*. İstanbul: İletişim,

Ergir, Yalçın. 2004. "Ankara, 1920'ler ve Ötesinden Beriye", retrieved from http://www.ergir.com/Ankara.htm

Erim, Aydan. 1993. "Sözel Fotoğraflarla Kentsel Tarih" In Zeynep Aktüre, Süleyman Doğan and Sibel Köse, eds., *Kimlik, Sınırsallık, Mekan*. Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 76-78.

Ersoy, Melih. 1985. *Göç ve Kentsel Bütünleşme*. Ankara: AÜ. SBF. ve Basın Yayın Yüksekokulu Basımevi.

Esenbel, Selçuk. 2000. "Türk ve Japon Modernleşmesi: 'Uygarlık Süreci' Kavramı Açısından Bir Mukayese," *Toplum ve Bilim* 84: 18-36.

Esendal Memduh. Ş.. 2002. *Ayaşlı ile Kiracıları*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi.

Fletcher, Jonathan. 1997. *Violence and Civilization: An Introduction to the Work of Norbert Elias*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1979. *Discipline & Punish*. New York: Vintage Books.

-----. 1984. "Space: Knowledge and Power," *The Foucault Reader*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Fraser, Nancy. 1999. "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy." In Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 109-142.

Freud, Sigmund. 1989. *Totem and Taboo*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Goheen, Peter G. 1998. "Public Space and the Geography of the Modern City," *Progress in Human Geography* 22(4): 479-496.

Göle, Nilüfer. 1997. "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba eds, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 81-94.

Gregory, Derek. 1997. “Lacan and Geography: the Production of Space Revisited.” In Georges Benko and Ulf Strohmayer, eds., *Space and Social Theory.* Oxford: Blackwell, 3-234.

Grönlund, Bo. 1997. “The Civitas of Seeing and the Design of Cities- on the Urbanism of Richard Sennett.” Retrieved from http://hjem.get2net.dk/gronlund/Sennett_ny_tekst_97kort.html#anchor365809

-----. 1999. “Urban Winds.” Retrieved from http://hjem.get2net.dk/gronlund/UrbanWinds_phd.html

Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe. 1994a. “Clientelism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern.” In Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society.* London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 19-28.

-----. 1994b. “Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey.” In Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 49-63.

Gürbilek, Nurdan. 2004a. “Züppeleşme Korkusu, Etkilenme Endişesi…,” *Birikim* 188: 76-84.

-----. 2004b. *Kör Ayna, Kayıp Şark: Edebiyat ve Endişe*. İstanbul: Metis.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1989. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

Hall, Stuart, David Held, and Tony McGrew. 2001. “Introduction.” In Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew, eds, *Modernity and its Futures*. Cambridge: Polity Press,

Hall, Stuart. 2001. “The Question of Cultural Identity.” In Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew, eds, *Modernity and its Futures*. Cambridge: Polity Press 274-316.

Harvey, David. 1990. “Flexible Accumulation Through Urbanization,” *Spectra, The Yale Architectural Journal* 26: 251-272.

-----. 1993. “From Space to Place and Back Again: Reflections on the Condition of Modernity.” In Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson and Lisa Tickner, eds., *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*. London: Routledge, 3-29.

----- 1996. “On Architects, Bees and Possible Urban Worlds.” In Cynthia Davidson, ed., *Anywise*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 216-227.

-----. 1996. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. London: Basic Blackwell.

Healey, Patsy. 1996. “Planning Through Debate: the Communicative Turn in Planning Theory.” In Scott Campbell and Susan Fainstein, eds., *Readings in Planning Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 234-257.

Heidegger, Martin. 1971. “Building Dwelling Thinking.” retrieved from http://foucault.info/links/related-heidegger/heidegger.buildingDwellingThinking.en.html

Hikmet, Nazım. 1978. *İnsan Manzaraları.* İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.

Holston, James. 1989. *The Modernist City*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

-----. 1999. “Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship.” In James Holston, ed, *Cities and Citizenship*, Durham: Duke University Press, 35-51.

Holston, James, and Arjun Appadurai. 1999. ‘Introduction: Cities and Citizenship.’ In James Holston, ed., *Cities and Citizenship*. Durham, Duke University Press, 1-18.

Işın, Ekrem. 1987a “Ahmed Midhat Efendi ve Gündelik Hayatın Pratik Bilgisi: Âdâb-ı Muâşeret.” *Tarih ve Toplum* 44: 31-38.

-----. 1987b. “Abdullah Cevdet’in Cumhuriyet Âdâb-ı Muâşereti.” *Tarih ve Toplum* 48: 13-20.

Işın, Engin, and Patricia Wood. 1999. *Citizenship and Identity*. London: Sage.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1997. “Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity.” In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 113-132.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. 2007. *Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar.* İstanbul: Metis.

Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup K. 2003. *Ankara*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Karaömerlioğlu, Asım. 2006. *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Kasaba, Reşat. 1997. “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities.” In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey,* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 15-36.

Katznelson, Ira. 1992. *Marxism and the City*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Keane, John. 1988. *Sivil Toplum ve Devlet-Avrupada Yeni Yaklaşımlar.* İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.

Keith, Michael, and Steve Pile. 1993. *Place and the Politics of Identity*. London: Routledge.

Keles, Ruşen. 1998. *Kentbilim Terimleri Sözlüğü*. Ankara: İmge.

Kemal, Mehmet. 1983. *Türkiye’nin Kalbi Ankara*. Ankara: Çağdaş Yayınları.

Keskinok, H. Çağatay, 1997. *State and the (Re)production of Urban Space*. Ankara: METU Faculty of Architecture Press.

Keyder, Çağlar. 1997. “Whither the Project of Modernity?” In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 37-51.

-----. 1999. “Türkiye’de Tarımda Küçük Meta Üretiminin Oluşumu.” In Oya Baydar, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları,

Keyman, Fuat. 2007. “Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 24(2): 215-234.

King, D. Anthony. 1996. “Introduction: Cities, Texts and Paradigms.” In D. Anthony King, ed., *Re-Presenting the City*. London: Macmillan Press, 1-19.

Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur. 1990. “Bir Devir, Bir Şehir, Bir Adam: 1929-1946 Ankara’sı ve Nevzat Tandoğan.” In *Türk Belediyeciliğinde 60 Yıl*. Ankara: IULA-EMME, 193-213.

Kofman, Eleonore and Lebas, Elizabeth (1996), “Lost in Transposition –Time, Space and the city“, in in Lefebvre, Henri, *Writings on Cities*, trans. and ed. Eleonore Kofman., and Elizabeth Lebas, E. Oxford: Blackwell, 3-60.

Köymen, Oya. 1999. “Cumhuriyet Doneminde Tarımsal Yapı ve Tarım Politikaları.” In Oya Baydar, ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere.* İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1-30.

Kurt, Hacı. 2003. *Türkiye’de Kent-Köy Çelişkisi*. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi.

Kylimcka, Will and Norman Wayne. 1995. “Return of the Citizen: a Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory.” In Ronald Beiner, ed., *Theorizing Citizenship*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 283-322.

Leca, Jean. 1992. “Questions on Citizenship.” In Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community.* London: Verso, 17-32.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1993. *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.

-----. 1996. *Writings on Cities.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Mahir, Elif. 2005. "Etiquette Rules in the Early Republican Period," *Journal of Historical Studies* 3: 15-32.

Mardin, Şerif. 1980. "Centre-Periphery as a Concept for the Study of the Social Transformation of Turkey." In R.D. Grillo, ed., *Nation and State in Europe: Anthropological Perspectives.* London: Academic Press, 173-189.

-----. 1997. "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 64-80.

-----. 1999. *Bediuzzaman Said Nursi Olayı.* İstanbul: İletişim.

Martin, Deborah, Eugene McCann, and Mark Purcell. 2003. "Space, Scale, Governance, and Representation: Contemporary Geographical Perspectives on Urban Politics and Policy," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 25(2): 113-121.

Massey, Doreen. 1997. "Space/Power, Identity/Difference: Tensions in the City." In Andy Merrifield and Erik Swyngedouw, eds., *The Urbanization of Injustice*. New York: New York University Press, 100-116.

Meriç, Murat. 1999. "Neler Dinledik, Nelerle Coştuk?" In Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan, *eds., 75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 193-207.

Meriç, Nevin. 2000. *Osmanlı'da Gündelik Hayatın Değişimi: Adab-ı Muaşeret*. İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları.

Miles, Malcom, Tim Hall, and Iain Borden 2004, "Introduction to Part Two." In Malcom Miles, Tim Hall and Iain Borden, *eds., The City Cultures Reader*. London: Routledge, 51-57.

Misztal, Barbara A.. 1999. *Informality: Social Theory and Contemporary Practice*. London: Routledge.

-----. 2005. “New Importance of the Relationship Between Formality and Informality,” *Feminist Theory* 6(2): 173-194.

Mitchell, Don. 2003. *The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space*. London: The Guilford Press.

Moran, Berna. 2007. *Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Mouffe, Chantal. 1992. “Preface: Democratic Politics Today,” In Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, London: Verso, 1-14.

Mumford, Lewis. 2004. “What is a City?” In Malcom Miles, Tim Hall and Iain Borden *eds., The City Cultures Reader*. London: Routledge, 28-32.

Nalbantoğlu, Gülsüm B. 1999. “Modern Ev’in Çeperleri,” In Zeynep Rona ed., *Bilanço: 1923-1998.* İstanbul,:Tarih Vakfı, 305-314.

-----. 2000. “1928-1946 Döneminde Ankara’da Yapılan Konutların Mimari Değerlendirilmesi,” In T. Ayşıl Yavuz ed., *Tarih İçinde Ankara*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 253-269.

Nalbantoğlu, H.Ünal. 2000, “Cumhuriyet Donemi Ankarası’nda Yükselen “Orta Sinif” Uzerine,” In T. Ayşıl Yavuz *ed., Tarih Içinde Ankara*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 287-300.

O’Connor, Alan. 1989. *Raymond Williams: Writing, Culture, Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Oktay, Ahmet. 1994. “Gerçekleştirilemeyen Düş,” In Enis Batur *ed., Ankara Ankara,* İstanbul: YKY,

Onur, Bekir. 1999. “Çocuklar, Oyunlar, Oyuncaklar da Değişir, ama…,” In Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan eds., *75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 219-235.

Ormanlar, Çağla. 1999. “Giyim Kuşam Modaları.” In Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan *eds., 75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 42-65.

Osmay, Sevin. 1998. “1923’ten Bugüne Kent Merkezlerinin Dönüşümü”, in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlik*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari, 99-106.

Öztürkmen, Arzu. 1999. “Zamanı Eylemek, Eğlenmek: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Eğlence Biçimlerini Yeniden Düşünmek.” In Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan eds., *75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*. İstanbul:Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 179-191.

Parker, Simon. 2004. *Urban Theory and the Urban Experience*. London: Routledge.

Peker, Mümtaz. 1999. “Türkiye’de İç Göçün Değişen Yapısı,” In Oya Baydar ed., *75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları,

Pile, Steve. 1996. *The Body and the City: Psychoanalysis, Space and Subjectivity*. London: Routledge.

Pile, Steve and Nigel Thrift. 1995. “Introduction.” In Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift, eds., *Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural Transformation*. London: Routledge,

Purcell, Mark. 2003. “Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(3): 564-590.

Renan, Ernest. 1990. “What is a Nation?” In Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration*. London: Routledge, 8-22.

Roniger, Luis. 1994. “The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World.” In Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1-18.

Ruby, Christian. 1999. “(Promised) Scenes of Urbanity.” In Sallie Marston and David C. Perry, eds., *The Urban Moment.* London: Sage Publications, 241-248.

Safa, Peyami. 1936. *Cumbadan Rumbaya*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi.

-----. 1999. "Bizde ve Avrupa'da Kübik." In Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan eds., *75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*, (Yedigün, VIII-188, 1936, 6-7), İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 245.

Sargın, Güven Arif. 2002. "Kamu, Kent ve Polytika." In Güven Arif Sargın ed., *Ankara'nın Kamusal Yüzleri*. İstanbul: İletişim,

Sarıoğlu, Mehmet. 2001. *Ankara: Bir Modernleşme Öyküsü*. Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı.

Saunders, Peter. 1981. *Social Theory and the Urban Question*. London: Hutchinson.

-----. 1994. "Space, the City and Urban Sociology." In Derek Gregory and John Urry, eds., *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. London: Macmillan, 67-89.

Savage, Mike and Alan Warde. 1993. *Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity*. London: Macmillan.

Schwab, William A. 1992. *The Sociology of Cities*. New York: Prentice Hall.

Seligman, Adam B. 1998. "Between Public and Private," *Society* 35(3): 30-6.

Sennett, Richard. 1977. *The Fall of Public Man*. New York: Knopf.

-----. 1988. "The Civitas of Seeing," *Place* 5(4): 82-84.

-----. September 22, 1995. "Something in the City," *Times Literary Supplement*, 13-15.

-----. 1996. *The Uses of Disorder*. London: Faber and Faber.

-----. 1998. *The Corrosion of Character*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

-----. 1999a. *Gözün Vicdanı.* İstanbul: Ayrıntı.

-----. 1999b. "Yeni Kapitalizm," *Defter* 35: 31-46.

-----. 1999c. "The Spaces of Democracy." In Robert A. Beauregard, and Sophie Body-Gendrot *eds., The Urban Moment. L*ondon: Sage Publications, 273-285.

Shields, Rob. 1991. *Places on the Margin*. London: Routledge.

-----. 1996. "A Guide to Urban Representation and What to Do About It: Alternative Traditions of Urban Theory." In Anthony King *ed., Re-presenting City.* London: Macmillan, 227-252.

-----. 1999. *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics*. London: Routledge.

Simmel, Georg. 1969. "The Metropolis and the Mental Life." In Richard Sennett, *ed., Classic Essays in the Culture of Cities*. New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 409-424.

Sirman, Nükhet. 1998. "Müsavattan Eşitliğe." In Uğur Tanyeli, ed., *Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet*. İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 37-39.

Smith, Dennis. 1999. "'The Civilizing Process' and 'The History of Sexuality': Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault," *Theory and Society* 28(1): 79-100.

Soja, Edward. 1994. "The Spatiality of Social Life: Towards a Transformative Retheorisation", In Derek Gregory and John Urry, eds., *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. London, Macmillan, 473-474.

-----. 1996. *Thirdspace*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Stillman, Todd (2005), "Civility" In George Ritzer, ed., *Encyclopedia of Social Theory*. London: Sage Publications, 102-105.

Szakolczai, Arpad. 2001. “Civilization and its Sources,” *International Sociology* 16(3): 369-386.

Szeman, Imre. 2002. “The Limits of Culture: The Frankfurt School and/for Cultural Studies.” In Caren Irr and Jeffrey Nealon, eds., *Rethinking the Frankfurt School: Alternative Legacies of Cultural Critique*. retrieved from http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~szeman/fs.htm

Tankut, Gönül. 1990. *Bir Başkentin İmarı: Ankara (1929-1939*). Ankara: ODTÜ.

-----. 2000. “Jansen Planı: Uygulama Sorunları ve Cumhuriyet Bürokrasisinin Kent Planına Yaklaşımı.” In Ayşıl T. Yavuz ed., *Tarih Içinde Ankara*, Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 301-316.

Tanpınar, Ahmet H. 2001. *Beş Şehir*. İstanbul: YKY.

Tekeli, Ilhan. 1998a. “Turkiye’de Cumhuriyet Doneminde Kentsel Gelisme ve Kent Planlamasi.” In Yıldız Sey ed., *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlik*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1-24.

-----. 1998b. “The Social Context of the Development of Architecture in Turkey.” In Reneta Holod, and Ahmet Evin eds., *Modern Turkish Architecture*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 9-33.

Thrift, Nigel. 1996. *Spatial Formations*. London: Sage.

Title, Charles R., and Harold G. Grasmick. 2001. “Urbanity: Influences of Urbanness, Structure, and Culture,” *Social Science Research* 30: 313-335.

Toker, Nilgün and Serdar Tekin. 2002. “Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: ‘Kamusuz Cumhuriyet’ten ‘Kamusuz Demokrasi’ye.” In Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil eds., *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, İstanbul: İletişim.

Tsoulouvis, Lefteris. 1996. “Urban Planning, Social Policy and New Forms of Urban Inequality and Social Exclusion in Greek Cities,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 20(4): 718-732.

Tugal, Cihan. 2002. “Hakim Kentin Ötekileri,” *Birikim* 159: 56-67.

Türkoğlu, Pakize. 1999. “Köy Enstitülerinde Köyden Alma- Köye Gönderme Politikası.” In Oya Baydar *ed., 75 Yılda Köylerden Şehirlere.* İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları.

Turner, Bryan. 1992. “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship.” In Chantal Mouffe ed., Dimensions *of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship*, Community. London: Verso, 33-62.

Tutengil, Cavit O. 1999. “Köycülük Üzerine.” In Oya Baydar *ed., 75 Yilda Koylerden Şehirlere*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları.

Urry, John. 1994. “Social Relations, Space and Time.” In Derek Gregory and John Urry *eds., Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. London: Macmillan, 20-48.

Ünsal, Artun (1999), “Cumhuriyet’in Lokantaları.” In *75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*, ed. by Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan, İstanbul, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 155-170.

Üstel, Füsun. 2002. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Resmi Yurttaş Profilinin Evrimi.” In *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce-Milliyetçilik*. (4 Vols.) İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 275-283.

van Krieken, Robert. 1989. “Violence, Self-discipline and Modernity: Beyond the ‘Civilizing Process’,” *Sociological Review* 37(2): 193-218.

-----. 1990. `The organisation of the soul: Elias and Foucault on discipline and the self', *Archives Europeénes de Sociologie*, retrieved from http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/social/robert/papers/soul.html

van Krieken, Robert. 1998. *Norbert Elias*. London: Rouledge.

White, Melanie, and Alan Hunt. 2000. "Citizenship: Care of the Self, Character and Personality,” *Citizenship Studies* 4(2): 93-116.

Wildner, Kathrin. 2003. La Plaza: Public Space as Space of Negotiation, retrieved from http://republicart.net/disc/realpublicspaces/wildner01_en.htm

Williams, Raymond. 1988. *Keywords.* London: Fontana Press.

Wirth, Louis. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *The American Journal of Society,* 44(1): 1-24.

Yalçın, Hüseyin Cahid. 1999. "Bir Derin Buhran: Dün." In Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan eds., *75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları*, İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 22.

Yıldırım, Yavuz. 2000. "1923-1928 Ankara'sında Konut Sorunu ve Konut Gelişmesi." In Ayşıl T. Yavuz ed., *Tarih İçinde Ankara*. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 233-252.

Yeşilkaya, Neşe G. 2003. *Halkevleri: Ideoloji ve Mimarlık.* İstanbul: İletişim.

Zeren, Zeki. 1940. *Sıhhat, Terbiye ve Giyim Hakkında Umumi Prensip ve Adetler*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi.

Zijderveld, Anton C. 1998. *A Theory of Urbanity*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Zukin, Sharon. 1995. *Cultures of Cities.* Cambridge: Blackwell.

-----. 1996. "Space and Symbols in an Age of Decline." In Anthony King, ed., *Re-presenting City*, 43-59.