

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT:
THE CASE OF KARDAK CRISIS

A Master's Thesis

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April 2008

To my family

**THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT:
THE CASE OF KARDAK CRISIS**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the role of national security culture in crisis management. The use and significance of national security culture in the management of a crisis is the main concern discussed throughout this study. It is assumed that national security culture serves as the main guideline of states during crisis management and the states manage crises in line with their national security culture. This can be assessed from the responsibility undertaken by state institutions to preserve and transfer this culture. Such an assessment contributes to understanding of why national security culture is reliable in crisis management. The case of Kardak Crisis between Turkey and Greece in 1996 is examined within the framework of study purpose. The thesis traces Kardak Crisis and seeks to answer questions such as whether the Turkish national security culture was influential during the management of the crisis and if so in what ways. The case is examined in order to make the main concern of the study more clear.

Keywords: Crisis, Crisis Management, National Security Culture.

ÖZET

MİLLİ GÜVENLİK KÜLTÜRÜNÜN KRİZ YÖNETİMİNDEKİ ROLÜ: KARDAK KRİZİ ÖRNEĞİ

Savaş, Özlem

Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, milli güvenlik kültürünün kriz yönetimindeki rolünü incelemektedir. Milli güvenlik kültürünün kriz yönetimindeki rolü ve önemi çalışmada tartışılan temel konudur. Bu bağlamda, milli güvenlik kültürünün kriz yönetimi sırasında ülkelerin temel kılavuzu olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Buna göre ülkeler krizi yönetirken milli güvenlik kültürleri çerçevesinde hareket etmektedirler. Bu durum, milli güvenlik kültürünün korunup aktarılması amacı ile sorumluluk üstlenen devlet kurumlarından anlaşılabilir. Bu anlayış, milli güvenlik kültürünün neden kriz yönetiminde ülkeler için güvenilir olduğunu anlamak için katkıda bulunacaktır. Çalışma, amacı doğrultusunda, 1996 yılında Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında ortaya çıkan Kardak Krizi'ni de örnek olay olarak incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, tez aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin milli güvenlik kültürünün bu krizde nasıl bir rolü olduğu sorusunu yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Ele alınan örnek olay, temel tartışma konusunu netleştirmek amacı ile incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriz, Kriz Yönetimi, Milli Güvenlik Kültürü

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the most debated issues with regard to international security is the role, capacity and efficiency of states in maintaining security both at the domestic and international levels. The debates generally revolve around the challenges on states in their ability to control and overcome the threats. The basic questions in this issue arise from the difficulty to define what is meant by security, what the threats are, how and by whom they are defined.

The recent security studies have developed different approaches in their attempts to answer these questions. The multiplicity of threats ranging from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts, emergence of non-state actors and intensification of globalization are usually demonstrated as the main trends and challenges on the sovereignty of states in controlling security-involved issues. Consequently, the concept of national security is in the centre of debates among both academic and political circles. There are views both in favor of and against the relevance of this concept in today's world. Particularly, with regard to the security-involved crisis, the priorities of states in response to crises situations are discussed and criticized.

The purpose of this study is to contribute to understanding the role of national security culture in the management of security-involved crises in international

relations. In order to make this contribution, the thesis tries to answer the questions of how national security culture influences the way threats are defined by a state, how the threat perceptions are shaped according to these definitions and how the policies and decisions are made accordingly. Therefore, this study argues that the answers to these questions lie at the heart of national security culture of that state.

The thesis focuses on the statement that national security culture serves as the primary guideline for states during crisis management in order to remove the threats. During crisis management, states act within the framework of their national security culture, primarily by defining the threats and then formulating the strategies. A state relies on its national security culture and uses it as a guideline in order to act against the defined threats. One or more institutions of the state undertake the responsibility of preserving and transferring the basic characteristics of this culture. This usually works through the intentional efforts of the institutions and decision makers.

In this case, the Kardak Crisis between Turkey and Greece in 1996 is examined to contribute to a better comprehension of the issue. The case is studied from the perspective of Turkish side. How Turkey perceived the emergence of threats during Kardak Crisis can be answered by examining the national security culture of Turkey, since it is assumed that Turkey managed the crisis by considering what its national security culture requires it to do in such a case in order to neutralize the threats. Here, the military is the key institution in the management of the crisis as in most of the international security crises Turkey experiences. One can regard it as one of the basic institutions which undertake the responsibility of preserving the characteristics of national security culture. This will be traced from the official documents and declarations of the government as well as from the discourses of the leaders. The mechanism through which the military assumes responsibility for crisis

management will be examined in order to highlight the role of Turkish national security culture in crisis management.

The above mentioned thesis statement is formulated building on some of the recent studies on crisis, crisis management and national security culture. In doing this, I consider the post-Cold War trends in security studies as a framework. There are two main reasons why I consider the post-Cold War period. First, the selected case takes place in 1996. Secondly, the transformations in international order with the end of the Cold War has had significant impact on the understanding of the concepts of crisis, crisis management and national security culture which constitute the conceptual framework. This is especially evident in the increased number of studies on the challenges that states face due to the rapidly globalizing world.

After studying on the conceptual framework and putting forward the main concepts with their operational meanings, the study is supported by a case study. There are a number of reasons why a case study is used and why particularly Kardak Crisis is selected. Kardak Crisis is usually regarded as one of the most important international crises Turkey experienced in the last decade. Moreover, Kardak Crisis constitutes an appropriate example with the ways it emerged between Turkey and Greece in terms of recalling the history of relations between these two states and the basic premises of Turkish national security culture.

There are both advantages and limitations of using case study methods in international security studies. While they help to analyze “causal relations” and to make “detailed explanations of particular cases”, the problems of “case-selection bias” and high degree of parsimony resulting from small number of variables or cases are among the limitations of case studies (Kacowicz, 2003: 107-108). If the researcher selects the case which matches the purpose of study and which is the most appropriate

for testing the hypotheses (Van Evera, 1997:78), the challenge of such problems would be minimal. Within this context, Kardak Crisis is selected by considering both the advantages and limitations of this method.

The thesis intends to point out the significance of national security culture for the states in the current international relations, particularly in times of crises. Although it is possible to formulate policy recommendations or criticize the formulated policy recommendations drawn upon the role of national security culture in crisis management, such an outlook does not fall into the scope of this study. The aim of this study is to point out the intentional or unintentional use of national security culture by states as a guideline in crisis management in order to define and remove the threats. Moreover, understanding why and how national security culture is used as a guideline by states in crisis management can contribute to the policy and decision makers, to those who study on this issue or to those who criticize the policies built on national security culture.

In Chapter II, I describe the analytical and conceptual framework of the thesis. I explain each of the key concepts of the study, *crisis*, *crisis management* and *national security culture* in different sections by giving reference to some of the recent studies. After elaborating on some of the perspectives in understanding these concepts, I use the terms with their operational meanings in line with the purpose of this study.

In Chapter III, I try to explain the national security culture of Turkey by focusing on the dominant views on this topic. First, I discuss the brief background information on the factors influential in the formation and evolution of Turkish national security culture. I concentrate on the *Historical Experiences* as one of these factors. The conditions before and during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as well as the atmosphere of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period are

important because they constitute the roots of certain threat perceptions which are still evident today and which emerge particularly in crises times. After that, I focus on the *national identity* as a driver of Turkish national security culture. In doing this, I explain the *role of NATO membership* as a choice of the state in building up its national identity and the *role of the military* in terms of its *responsibility* to preserve the main characteristics of Turkish national security culture and its expertise with regard to external security matters.

In Chapter IV, I examine the case of Kardak Crisis in two sections. In the first section, I briefly explain the *Aegean disputes* in order to understand the case better since it determines the approach of Turkey to the crisis to a great extent. The historical background of these disputes as well as the attitude of Turkey in balancing its interests in the Aegean is the main concern. In the second section, I explain the case descriptively by focusing on the emergence and development of the crisis. I briefly review the crisis in terms of its elements in order to understand how national security culture was influential in controlling these elements and thus managing the crisis.

In the last chapter of the thesis, I summarize the conclusions drawn out from the study as a whole and discuss the main result as the concluding remark. I discuss how Turkey managed the crisis and how it tried to balance between different elements of its national security culture. Although it seems difficult to measure the degree Turkey attaches importance to its national security culture with regard to this case, the basic documents and declarations released as a result of the crisis and the chain of events following the emergence of the crisis give an idea about the role of Turkish national security culture in Kardak Crisis. I also point out the difficulties and the

limitations I encounter during my research and studies in order to clarify the possible barriers in such studies and to contribute to further studies.

CHAPTER II

ANALYTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Crisis and Crisis Management

The studies focus on different aspects of crisis and crisis management as the conditions of the international order change and different types of crises emerge. The states prefer to update or reformulate their strategies and tools in order to adapt to these conditions. During this adaptation process, the purposes of states during crisis management are usually based on preserving their interests. In this study, I use the concepts of *crisis* and *crisis management* considering this aspect of the issue.

2.1.1. Definition of crisis and its constitutive elements

There are different definitions for crisis. Similar to most of the significant concepts of social sciences, there is not a definition which is commonly accepted because the researchers usually define the concepts in line with their methodological perspectives or the focus of concern in their studies (Lebow, 1984:7). Following this tendency, I put forward my definition of crisis and how I use the concept in line with the purpose of this study after pointing out some of the definitions.

By its nature, a crisis emerges “with little or no warning” (Youngson, 2001: 52). The crisis situation for a state can also be defined as the existence of “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 3). Crisis is also defined as “a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war” (Synder and Diesing, 1977: 6). Crisis is commonly defined as a turning point when decisions are made by states (Bell, 1971: 6; Tayfur, 1994: 137). In a crisis situation “an (unanticipated) threat is directed to high priority goals of a state which in turn require action in a short time” (Tayfur, 1994: 137). Crises can also be defined as “the outgrowth of national and international developments whose roots may go back years”. In this sense, “each crisis is rooted in a particular historical context from which it cannot be divorced without losing much of its meaning” (Lebow, 1981:4, 23). Thus, it can be argued that “the shape of a crisis is determined by its history” (Zartman, 1988:199).

In many definitions, there are some common characteristics such as threat perceptions, high level of anxiety on the side of decision-makers, the probability of violence, the assumption that vital decisions need to be taken, the existence of incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. As a result of such characteristics, decision-making in a crisis differs from a normally formulated foreign policy situation (Lebow, 1981:8-9, 12, 269). For this reason, the crisis management requires a particular concern for states who would like to preserve their interests in such a vulnerable environment.

Within the framework of these characteristics, there are some constitutive elements of a crisis situation. These include the historical roots of the crisis, the existence of a threat to the national interests of the state, the necessity to respond in a limited time, the probability of a military conflict and the need for preserving the interests or the position within the region/international system. The states recognize these elements and try to control them while managing the crises. Throughout this study, I use the term *crisis* referring to an *international security crisis* where a state attempts to immediately thwart the perceived threat to its pre-determined vital interests in order to exist within the international system in line with its priorities and conditions. I try to demonstrate that states rely on their national security culture while doing this.

2.1.2. Crisis management studies

The descriptive analysis of crises rather than an analytical one rarely provides a convincing idea about crisis management and the nature of crises (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980: 642). The concept of crisis has been intensively discussed among scholars whereas the concept of crisis management has not attracted that much attention. This seems to be related to the variety of objectives sought by decision makers in a crisis (Richardson, 1988:14, 16). In general, crisis management can be defined as “the practice of attempting to avoid an outcome in interstate relations that leads to violence or war, without abandoning at the same time one’s position” (Winham, 1988: ix). There has been an increasing interest on crisis management particularly in the universities, agendas of governments and NATO, where special budgets and departments are established working on the topic. Such an interest was

initially inflamed with the Cuban missile crisis in the Cold War when the superpower conflict was at the peak (Lebow, 1981: 291).

During the Cold War, most of the research and studies on the behavior of states during crisis management have usually focused on accumulating data, formulating and testing hypotheses about the impact of stress on decision makers during times of crises, discovering regular patterns concerning the activities of superpowers and the role of international organizations, drawing conclusions from past experiences for the sake of peace and order (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997:1). Towards the end of the Cold War, crisis management studies were regarded as “one of the most interesting and exciting developments in the field of international relations” by some scholars. These studies were attributed a role which would contribute to better policy making (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980: 641). There are multiple variables involved in the development and outcomes of crises. Each crisis has its own context with different variables. Given such an outlook, it is difficult to put forward a concrete theory of crisis management which would explain regular and alternative behavior and interaction patterns in order to predict whether a particular crisis will end with success or failure (George, 1991:23-24). The huge number of different crises in international relations also prevents the analysts to make generalizations about crisis management (Winham, 1988:4).

One of the concerns about crisis management in the post-Cold War is the decreased tension due to the low probability of a global war (Youngson, 2001: 47). Instead, during the chain of events in a crisis, leaders come across a number of challenges on national or individual interests (Lebow, 1981:5). Such a change seems to have an encouraging effect on the states to act according to their national interests since they are no longer bound with the influence of superpowers.

The literature on crisis usually focuses on material concerns and capabilities of the actors in managing the crisis, whereas the role of cultural factors in crisis management are underestimated. Crisis management literature usually does not touch upon national security culture directly. On the other hand, crisis management is often explained with reference to national interests and the security of that state. For this reason, in examining the security-involved crises, it seems useful to consider the cultural factors particularly those that fall into the category of national security culture. These cultural factors can be examined within the framework of national interests and security. It can be argued that national security culture serves as a guideline for states in two ways. Firstly, through the intentional efforts of institutions or top level decision makers. They may do this either for the sake of preserving and transferring the national security culture or for benefiting from the basic elements of this culture even through a manipulation of these elements for legitimizing their behaviors. Secondly, in a spontaneous way by influencing the behavior of the actors through cognitive processes. Therefore, if we approach crises from this perspective, it might be possible to find out, or at least have an opinion on the role of national security culture in crisis management process.

2.1.3. National interests in crisis management

Since the emergence of states, one of the unchanged characteristics of “national behavior” is that states continue to act according to their national interests. Whatever the type of international order, for states, the top priority has been their national interests in their relations with other actors. Those actions which are not compatible with the national interests risk the national security of that state. Moreover, in terms of the duties of a state, national interests need to be considered. In

this sense, the international crises are managed according to the national interests of states (Youngson, 2001: 39-40).

The management of crises by any state directly involves the considerations of national interests rather than acting for the benefit of international community, no matter what the formal declarations of states put forward in favor of ethical concerns (Youngson, 2001: 49). When a crisis starts, the sides feel obliged to do “what is needed to protect or advance its most important interests” (George, 1991:23). The basic driving force and the aimed outcome during a crisis management is to make gains for the sake of national interests (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980:645). There is a need to study on this point as “national security is best enhanced by devoting most of our attention to the diverse elements of management” (Young, 1977:8).

While managing crises, decision makers tend to base their decisions on previous experiences and memories in order to determine their actions, since the lack of information required cannot be overcome easily and solely through the advice of experts or gathering intelligence. At this point, the common memories of people, including policy-makers, media personnel and the communities enter into scene (Brandström, Hart, et al., 2004: 191, 193) recalling for instance, the relations between the two states that are parties to that crisis. Therefore, the significance of historical experiences, perceptions and belief systems in crisis management is revealed in this situation. Thus, states would try to base their actions upon the basic drivers of its security culture in relation to that particular crisis.

2.1.4. The source of perceptions in crisis management

During crisis management, the information at the hand of states are usually interpreted in line with the dominant beliefs whether they are rational or irrational, since there is a time limitation and stress which may avoid the flow of sufficient and relevant information (Forsberg and Pursiainen, 2006: 252). With the stress of the crisis, decision makers' perceptions direct them to act differently compared to normal situations (Tayfur, 1994: 137). Since a crisis occurs abruptly, necessitates immediate decisions, threatens the interests and gives birth to many uncertainties, it is sometimes regarded as a *frightening* issue to deal with (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980: 642). In this sense, it is very likely that states would prefer to apply to their so-called guidelines, to their national security culture which shapes the perceptions and the belief system. This mostly emerges from the need for a reliable source in making decisions for taking actions during crisis management.

It is usually assumed that states act rationally while they are making decisions during a crisis in order to choose the best alternative of actions, which is called the rational actor paradigm. Nevertheless, a considerable number of research demonstrate that in practice this is not always the case. The process is much more complicated as a result of multiple "personal, political, institutional, and cultural considerations" shaping the decisions. This may lead to certain misperceptions or problems in processing the information received during a crisis. In psychological approaches, an example of the latter is *cognitive consistency* which makes people "keep their beliefs, feelings, actions, and cognitions mutually consistent" (Lebow, 1981, 101-102). The decision makers usually interpret the national interest in conformity with their values, interests and objectives (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980:653). "It is through culture that anything we might call 'interests' is constructed" as Banerjee (1997: 29) argues. The

policy makers of a state are socialized differently from those of another state as the cultural contexts and consequently the choices in a same situation differ. The societies they live in have different assumptions and perceptions about the world, which help define the threats and interests compared to other states'. National interests and policies are defined by Latham (1998:129-130) as "social constructions that derive their meanings out of the inter-subjective and culturally established representations through which foreign policy officials make sense of the world".

Most of the scholarly works on this issue may lead one to regard such a trend in decision-making as distorting the pace of events or the received information. Nevertheless, such a tendency seems inevitable. Because, states act according to the decisions made by policy-makers who are socialized in a given society where a set of cultural norms are inherent. Thus, it can be argued that during times of crises the states act in accordance with the assumptions shaped by threat perceptions which emerge through the established beliefs and historical experiences.

The *psychology of perceptions* needs to be considered carefully in understanding the underlying reasons of political behavior (Smoke, 1991:56). During a crisis, the policy makers need to understand "the nature and degree of threats to their country's interests". Either intentionally or unintentionally, they interpret the situations at a crisis through *systematically developed beliefs* about the *image of the adversary*, the forces about the escalation of crisis and the ways of controlling it, and the rules of bargaining to resolve the crisis in line with the interests of the country. These beliefs are called *crisis bargaining codes* which can also be regarded as a *cognitive prism*. These beliefs may not work in exactly the same way in each crisis and the application of strategies by policy makers may differ (Rogers, 1991: 413-414). From the perspective of cognitive dimension, the decision makers from different

cultural environments and geographies require more information in order to process it relying on their experience which will serve as a guide while choosing an option (Brecher, 1993: 537-538). In other words, the states try to control the elements of the crisis through this cognitive prism/crisis bargaining codes. These codes are formulated as a part of security culture of that state.

Concerning crisis management, the role national character deserves particular attention. This concept is usually attached a negative meaning referring to the prejudices of a researcher and the *crude stereotypes* rather than the character of the people or the nation studied. The character of a nation usually determines roles, the attitudes which differ from one state to another. In this sense, it has a significant impact on policy during crisis management. The national self-images are shaped according to the national character and they are based on an “idea or principle that is concrete, tangible, and readily understandable to members of the nationality” as Lebow puts it (1981: 193-195, 197). The national character has its roots in the historical experiences which penetrate into the formation of national identity and foreign policy thinking of the state.

This point becomes clearer when the national security culture which is based on history, culture, norms, etc. is discussed in more detail in the next section. No matter how past influences the quality of decisions, it may serve as a constraint, but the decision makers rely on their perceptions, experiences and belief system, thus, intentionally or unintentionally, take national security culture as the guideline in crisis management. The main purposes of crisis management determine what is meant by successful crisis management for states. Naturally, a state wants to preserve its interests during crises times as in general. Here, the point is how national security

culture contributes to the success of crisis management or why states rely on it as a guideline during the hard times of crisis.

2.2 National Security Culture

The concept of national security culture has been studied by many scholars up to now. Since it is composed of the words of “national”, “security”, and “culture”, it deserves a careful examination within the framework of this study. Moreover, again there is a need to point out different perspectives which attempt to explain what national security culture is.

2.2.1 The studies on the concept of *national security*

The post-Cold War period has been witnessing an increasing number of studies on broadening the conceptualization of security moving beyond its narrow definitions (Katzenstein, 1996a: 8-9; Katzenstein, 1996b: 3) which mainly focus on “material capacity and the use and control of military force by states” (Walt, 1991:212). States have been reevaluating their security strategies, particularly in terms of internal security, considering this comprehensive understanding of security by integrating different aspects of security such as, social, economic, political, and ecological. Nevertheless, concerning the military issues, more traditional security strategies remain as the basics of decisions (Katzenstein, 1996b: 6). In other words, particularly in international security issues or crises, traditional outlooks still seem to be dominant. This leads to the idea that during times of crises, due to the urgency of the issue at hand, the states would resort to traditionally established security strategies.

Globalization has been affecting the *national security state* in different ways, both positively and negatively (Paul, 2005: 49; Booth, 2005: 32). Particularly, since the end of the Cold War, the factors influencing national security have increased to include culture, identities, and norms. The interests of states in security matters have been increasingly shaped by the responses of actors to cultural factors (Katzenstein, 1996a: 2). This implies that the states do not exist merely within a material security environment, but also within a cultural one which affects the incentives as the source of different state behaviors (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996: 33).

The questions on the structure of the international system and the sources of conflicts between states necessitated a search on alternative explanations of security issues (Katzenstein, 1996a: 3-4). In this sense, there have been challenges to the conceptualization of national security. The post-Cold War context emerging with the disappearance of superpower conflict and its effects on the international relations, the intense effects of globalization as well as the increasing consciousness of people about the meaning of security with regard to their definitions of identity constitute the basis for the development of alternative approaches to security.

The term national security usually covers issues related to both domestic and international security and the national interests of a state are closely associated with the national security of that state (Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, 2002: 7, 11). The recent studies on national security have pointed out the significance and the role of social factors, particularly the *constructed identity of states* and the cultural context as the hitherto undermined determinants of national security policies (Katzenstein, 1996a: 4-5).

In security studies, the issue of referent objects deserves particular attention. Ken Booth (1991: 319) argues that states are clearly significant features of world politics, but they can not be regarded as “the primary referent objects for a comprehensive theory of security”. He claims that some states are not interested in security while others use it as a means for its own security rather than the end to provide security to its people. Moreover, states are “too diverse in their character” and this leads to the argument that “a theory of state is misplaced” moving away from the interests of its own people. For him, the question of *whose security* should be answered in favor of people rather than the state and he regards national security as a *top-down* process (Booth, 1991: 319-320).

Barry Buzan argues that each state has a different national security problem. For this reason there is no universal definition for national security. Nevertheless, it is possible to analyze the national security of states by distinguishing weak and strong states. This distinction is made according to “the degree of socio-political cohesion”. For Buzan, weak states exist only with their physical base and with the recognition of other states. They do not have “a widely accepted and coherent idea of the state among their populations” nor the ability to provide unity when political consensus disappears. On the other hand, strong states are not threatened from within, because they have a clear and stable “idea of state” with a “coherent national identity”. Therefore, in strong states, it would be easier to maintain individual and national security together. Consequently, this would contribute to international security (Buzan, 1991: 96-107).

Such a distinction of weak and strong states made by Buzan may help us understand the reasons why states would choose to regard security as a means for its existence. It seems that the criticisms on the security policies of states which give

priority to their national security are focused on weak states rather than strong ones. Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the role of national security for states, since the concept of national security, in its nature does not exclude the duty of state in providing “socio-political cohesion” and security for its citizens. Moreover, after 9/11, it is difficult to claim that national security is a priority merely for weak states. We can regard the US, as a strong state which gives utmost importance to its national security. In other words, national security is a central concept for all states, no matter whether they are weak or strong states.

Furthermore, the concept of national security inherently refers and serves to the security of the members of that state as it helps to overcome ethnic, racial, and class differences and provides “an extraordinary degree of unity” (Lebow, 1981: 197-198). In other words, it is true that states exist in order to provide security and order for its citizens, however, the abuse of state power by political leaders should not lead to a negative understanding about the idea of state and national security, which inherently requires the preservation of individual interests. We should comprehend the criticisms upon the concept of national security within this context.

2.2.2 The concept of culture in security studies

The concept of culture has various definitions. In general, it is usually referred to as “collectively held semi-conscious or unconscious images, assumptions, ‘codes’, and ‘scripts’ which define the external environment” and it “consists of shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment” (Johnston, 1995: 44-45). It inherently accommodates many other concepts such as “attitudes, beliefs, ... conceptual models, feelings, ideas, images,

knowledge, ... , mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, symbols, values, world views” which are shared by a certain group (Duffield, 1999a: 769).

The concept can also be defined in terms of its relation to foreign policy and security issues. According to Gray (1990: 45), it “refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community”. Although, there is a common belief that it is difficult to define culture, it is related to how the concept is applied and operationalized (Hudson, 1997: 15-17; Desch, 1998: 152). The concept should be defined by emphasizing the “collectively held ideas that do not vary in the face of environmental or structural changes”. In addition, the “ideas should be particular to individual states, rather than held commonly across the international system” (Desch, 1998: 152). There might exist a number of cultures within a state, however usually there is “a dominant culture whose holders are interested in preserving the status-quo” (Johnston, 1995: 45). All members of a society may not share all aspects of the dominant culture; however this does not necessarily mean the irrelevance or inexistence of a dominant culture which is particularly shared among the elites (Latham, 1998: 156). According to some, culture “denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law” and it “refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models)” defining the actors and their behaviors in a system (Katzenstein, 1996a: 6).

The studies on cultural dimensions of international politics use different concepts of culture such as political, diplomatic, and strategic culture. These elements can be examined within a single concept of *security culture*. The *diplomatic culture* in general “refers to the rules of conduct that govern the interactions of state

representatives in formal and informal contexts”. They “include specific procedures and protocols, the use of a particular terminology in agreements and more general ‘signals’ between states”. The decision-makers are aware of the diplomatic culture of other states during negotiations or security agreements and they behave accordingly. The *political culture* of a state is a reflection of its “domestic political arrangements and traditions” as the “political outcomes ... [and] the external expressions or projections”. The *strategic culture* of a state builds on “the tradition of political culture, but turns it towards a specific set of issues concerning war and military”. Drawing on these three dimensions of culture, the concept of security culture acquires significance in understanding the security interests shaped by historical, social and cultural experiences of states. A common definition for security culture can point out “enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived ... by political actors and elites”. This definition is useful for understanding how cultural factors may determine the “complex calculations of material capabilities or interests” underlying the policies. In this sense, culture should be understood in its own context in order to assess the relevance of certain influences in particular regions or issues (Krause, 1998: 3-11, 14).

2.2.3 The explanatory power of culture in security studies

There has been a growing interest in the studies linking the national security issues with culture (Oren, 2000: 543; Krause, 1998: 1). Although the interdependency between states has been rapidly increasing, the cultural factors are stable sources of foreign policy (Tassell, 1997: 234). The interest in incorporating culture into security studies has increased and the state behaviors have become to be explained with

cultural outlooks (Johnston, 1995: 33). Many scholars¹ studying culture in security studies think that culture by focusing on *ideational factors* explains the world better than the realism does in international relations. Here, the crucial question is whether cultural theories should be considered as contributing to and enlarging our understanding of security issues or as a new way of thinking superseding the dominant approach in security studies, namely the realist paradigm. The former view suggests that the cultural explanations should be regarded as a supplement to the current theories in national security. It is because they can help to understand the irrational behaviors of states and their failures to adapt to the constraints of the international system from time to time. Moreover, the domestic cultural variables have a high explanatory power and impact during “structurally indeterminate situations”. In this sense, the culture seems to have an explanatory power mostly as an *intervening*, rather than an *independent causal variable* (Desch, 1998: 141, 166, 170).

Whether cultural variables have “observable effect on behavior” is among the debated issues. The relationship between the values of a particular culture and behavior of a state increases as the decision makers during times of crises act according to those values in which they are socialized, no matter their choices are constrained or they manipulate the cultural values. This relationship often remains

¹ Some of these scholars are cited by Desch (1998:141-142) : “Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), ... Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), 84-118; ... *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II,” *International Security* 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” *International Security* 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,” *International Security* 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W. Legro, “Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” *American Political Science Review* 90, No. 1 (March 1996), 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); ... Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” *International Security* 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp 23 and 24.”

vague in the sense that it is difficult to prove a “one-to-one correspondence between cultural forms and observable decisions” (Johnston, 1995: 40, 42-44). It seems difficult to observe and prove the impact of cultural factors on information-processing during decision-making in foreign policy. Nevertheless, this does not prove that they have little influence (Vertzberger, 1990: 261). Moreover, it is still possible to trace “the basic contours of the dominant security culture” in order to discover the “hidden cultural premises” behind the policies of a state (Latham, 1998: 130).

In explaining the behavior and actions of states, culture can have a strong explanatory power. Similar to national traditions and norms, culture shapes the behavior of states by determining the military strategies and by defining *who they are* and *what they should do* (Farrel, 1998: 408, 416). States have different preferences which have their roots in the establishment of that state and are affected by its cultural, cognitive, philosophical, and political characteristics. The material conditions acquire meaning with the culture of that state. However, this does not necessarily mean that culture opposes rationality. In different cultures, the interpretation of a strategic reality differs due to different socialization processes of the actors (Johnston, 1995: 34-35). Consequently, as Katzenstein (1996b: 11) argues, the definition and pursuit of security objectives differ for each state. Therefore, we can argue that national security culture matters.

There are different cultural approaches in security studies since the Cold War period. Consequently, there exist different variables that the scholars focus on while they are explaining national security. As it is often difficult to define these variables and operationalize them, the cultural approach is criticized due to its low explanatory power. Since the cultural variables are peculiar to the specific case which they explain, it seems difficult to apply and test them in a broad range of cases. Although

cultural variables may not provide a general theory explaining the behavior of all states, they may explain the foreign policy behavior of a particular state (Desch, 1998: 142-143, 150, 155). The cultural differences help us understand different paths in certain policy issues and reflect different motivations or their contexts (Krause: 1998: 2). As long as the behaviors are observed, it is possible to make predictions which can be tested according to a sui generis culture (Duffield, 1999b: 158).

Operationalizing the concept of culture in restrictive terms and focusing on the variables under scrutiny would make it possible to reach convincing cultural explanations and decrease the vagueness (Gaenslen, 1997: 273). In this sense, when the national security culture is concerned, it restricts the term of culture into its components regarding the security understanding of that state, particularly in its relations with other states and international actors. These components would naturally vary from culture to culture depending on the characteristics of a particular state. I define the concept of national security culture as *a set of characteristics, values and priorities shaping the nation-wide security thinking and policies through the legacies of the past and inherent within the state structures and the minds of people.*

2.2.4 The basic drivers of national security culture

2.2.4.1 Historical Experiences

It is not very convincing that globalization leads to a homogenization of cultural and social spheres as history demonstrates that the security communities evaluate their options through their own cultural and social contexts as well as their existent geostrategic and geopolitical conditions. In this sense, “history is the *only* guide available”, although most of the people hesitate to accept this as a truth and

even expect to manage the security issues more peacefully (Gray, 2005: 386-387, 396). Such a view merely distorts the fact that today states do not behave independent from their histories, which is also reflected in their national security culture.

Some scholars assume that political issues can be analyzed without considering historical and cultural elements shaping a society despite the existence of studies which draw attention to the significance of “historical experience” in examining the nature of international crises (Lebow, 1981: ix-x). The cultural explanations usually challenge the “structural explanations of choice” which are based on “a-historical calculations of interests and capabilities”, though their conclusions may also support each other.

Despite the existence of a high number of studies on culture in security studies, they appear to be under theorized. For this reason, there are different views on the degree of determinism of cultural explanations which may appear at the extremes. Whatever the shortcomings these studies may experience, the possible implications of “values and assumptions with roots deep in a state’s ideational history” on state behavior is attractive enough both in theoretical terms and in policy means (Johnston, 1995: 63). The security culture involves “a set of widely resonating ideas that have evolved out of a long historical experience and that are deeply rooted in the shared consciousness or ‘common sense’” (Latham, 1998: 132). This is a fertile ground to encourage further studies on security matters from this perspective.

The turning points in the history of a state, the existence of a “heroic history”, the “founding of the state”, the existence and type of “colonizing experience” can be counted among the elements shaping the core beliefs inherent in the cultural roots of that state. The turning point events may modify the existing beliefs about the role of that state or nation at international sphere. The existence of a heroic history would

lead to the belief that the state can determine its own fate and can be an effective international actor. If the establishment of the state is based on heroic acts performed by national leaders, a similar perception would be dominant in the minds of decision makers as the national legacy. Whether the state has ever been colonized or had colonies during its history also makes a difference in the values and responsibilities of the decision makers. Such variables can be empirically studied by focusing on the actions and rhetoric of decision makers. Their emphasis on certain matters reveals “the degree to which particular axiomatic beliefs guide decision makers”. Within this context, those decision makers who are cognizant of the cultural values influential in the foreign policy of another state would negotiate and communicate more effectively. Thus, if applied cautiously, the cultural variables make a valuable contribution to other explanations in understanding the foreign policy behavior of a state (Breuning, 1997: 110-115, 119-120).

2.2.4.2 National identity

The national identity involves “a *heritage* that traces the nation’s cultural and ethnic genesis”. This “cultural genesis” determines the heritage carried through generations. This heritage describes “critical strengths and foundations for exclusive unity” as well as the “distinctive weaknesses and vulnerabilities” of that nation. The realization of the *destiny* of the nation requires the pursuit of that heritage. In this sense, those who contribute to this aim are regarded as *friends*; “those who deny that heritage” and challenge it are *rivals*. When the nation comes across a *danger*, it should not fail to do what its heritage requires in order not to be defeated by its weaknesses and vulnerabilities (Banerjee, 1997: 33-34). This understanding influences the formation of national security culture of a state. A state determines its

position in the international system according to its national identity. In other words, the way state defines itself with respect to the others in the system is reflected in its foreign policy orientation. This choice is usually inter-related with the historical experiences of that state.

The security culture of a state is also shaped by the dynamics of the international system and the common perceptions in the regional context that the state is situated within. It can change over time through modifications, manipulations and adaptations. States may intentionally preserve certain traditions and let others alter. For this reason, security culture is not merely a “product of history and socialization but of political and social choice” (Latham, 1998: 133,154).

Since strategic and political culture is “the product of a particular national historical experience which has been shaped by a more or less unique, though not necessarily unvarying geographical context”, the location of that state and its neighbors are also significant in the formulation of strategies (Gray, 1990: 49-50). Because, the historical relations of a state with other states, particularly with the neighbors; the preferences of the state in integration with certain alliances within the international system and the national identity influence the security culture of that state.

2.2.5 The use of national security culture in understanding state behavior

Culture helps us understand the preferences of states (Wildavsky, 1987: 3). The statements of high level decision makers give an idea about the vision and interpretation of the world events revealing certain patterns of the role the state has undertaken as a part of its national culture (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot, 1997:

184-185, 193). The elements to be traced as a reflection of cultural factors in national security decisions of a state, particularly in crisis management, can be determined according to the specific case under examination. It seems relevant that the researcher should look for the evidences of dominant elements of the national security culture of that state while studying on the actions and discourses of top level decision makers and leaders, within the country.

The use of cultural explanations would differ according to how they are applied by states. If analyzed well, the cultural explanations may give a clear idea about the different perceptions of actors in the same *game* played, which would reduce problems and uncertainties in taking decisions. On the other hand, a problematic analysis would lead to invalid or wrongly-formulated stereotypes about the *other*, which would reduce policy options of that state as well as the possible security alliances. Because, the cultural explanations, in essence do not necessarily lead to a conclusion that cultural differences are a source of disputes or disagreements between states (Johnston, 1995: 63-64; Krause, 1998: 4-7). Rather, they should be regarded as a source of mutual understanding between different actors and creating empathy. This would pave the way for further opportunities of agreements, trust and understanding in international security.

Hudson (1997: 18) argues that it is important to think of the conditions when culture plays “a more pivotal role in national behavior”. When a state or a nation feels *threatened*, it acts against those threats considering the *culturally acceptable* modes of behavior. During turbulent times and in the case of considerable uncertainties, the cultural explanations are expected to be more convincing (Gaenslen, 1997: 270). Therefore, this is a point for more investigation on the influence of culture on state behavior and foreign policy in crisis times.

In times of crises, states may demand sacrifices enforced on individuals in order to survive and this may go beyond “pure rationality” and require a recalling of societal memories or even myths in which the nation situates its existence. There may even be failures; however, the nation is inclined to behave in line with their perceptions and interpretations of the world and to feel the satisfaction of taking a decision compatible with its own foundation. For this reason, the political actors may want to manipulate the public opinion through the core beliefs within the society (Lotz, 1997: 75-79, 92). Even in this case such a manipulation and the basis of decisions take their legitimacy or reliability from such cultural elements, which in turn demonstrate the role of culture on state behavior.

It can be argued that it is useful to incorporate cultural explanations into the research programs of security studies. This would lead to more fertile ground in security studies (Farrell, 1999: 168). The approaches ignoring social factors close the way for further “empirical research and theoretical insight” which are necessary for explaining certain aspects of national security (Katzenstein, 1996a: 7). In this sense, most scholars agree on the point that cultural dimension matters in explaining “particular security policies” (Krause, 1998: 2).

It is important to benefit from different and seemingly opposite perspectives on security studies, for instance one studying “the social determinants of national security policy”, the other adopting “a traditional, narrow definition of security studies”. This would pave the way for dealing with complex issues of security. The interest of rationalists in cultural explanations seems to be related to such an understanding as cross-paradigm debates contribute to our understanding much more than those involving common perspectives. Thus, a more promising analytical perspective includes culture among the important factors which “define the interests

and constitute the actors that shape national security policies” (Katzenstein, 1996a: 10-11, 527, 537). Gray (1990: 79) argues that in the formulation of national security policies and decision-making particularly in strategic matters, the two approaches work simultaneously, one historical and the other is materialist, while the former constitutes a source for *inspiration*, the latter determines the *performance*.

Therefore, national security culture is in a sense “the source for inspiration”. For this reason, the states may assume that it is as a reliable guide during crisis management. One can trace the evidences of this argument within the discourses of decision makers as well as the official documents and declarations of the state, the decisions made and the results of the crisis. The point is to understand to what extent the basic elements of national security culture are resorted before taking actions, no matter they really constitute the basis of actions or manipulated by the decision makers and stay merely at discursive or symbolic levels. Before analyzing the case according to this perspective, I discuss the national security culture of Turkey in the next chapter by putting forward the relevant dimensions in relation to Kardak Crisis.

CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE OF TURKEY

3.1 The Main Drivers of Turkish National Security Culture

Huntington (1996: 138) thinks that Turkey is a torn country “where there is a single predominant culture belonging to one civilization, but whose leaders are attempting to shift it to another civilization”. Brzezinski (1997: 47) regards Turkey as a geopolitical pivot which has significance arising from its “sensitive location” and potential vulnerability. Even without an in-depth analysis on the relevance of these conceptualizations about Turkey, these interesting interpretations can at least lead us to the idea that Turkey is a peculiar country which cannot be categorized easily. This in turn has impact on the security culture of Turkey and deserves particular attention in analyzing the security policies of the country.

There has been an increasing concern on the history of Turkey at international sphere (Jenkins, 2001: 5; Shaw, 2000: 634). In fact, the writings on Turkish history go back to the Byzantine writings and later on to the fifteenth and particularly sixteenth centuries. In the US, these studies were intensified in 1940s with particular reference to the relation of Ottoman history to the European history in order to understand the Western civilization better. Particularly during Cold War years, “the strictly

Orientalist approach by which Islam was looked upon as a total culture has been supplemented by the new approaches and methods [of] history, political science, sociology, anthropology and economics” (Shaw, 2000: 627). It should be kept in mind that without “a basic knowledge and understanding ... of the country, its language, people and culture”, the studies and interpretations of Turkish history would be incomplete with “merely a short range interest stimulated by the contemporary international scene” (Shaw, 2000: 632-634). Each nation has continuity in its history and this rarely presents a complete break from the past (Ahmad, 2002: 11). Though risky, we require prediction in international relations. The consistent and slowly changing Turkish foreign policy gives us the opportunity to understand particularly the security policies (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 346). This is mainly true for Turkey, given the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of Republic of Turkey and the long history of the Turks. In understanding the security policies of Turkey, we need to consider its cultural and historical context (Karaosmanoglu, 2000: 199). The *psychology of perceptions* lying under the motives and decisions of policy makers can be traced back to the historical experiences of the country and its people.

3.1.1 Historical experiences as a source of perceptions/as a driver of Turkish national security culture

As Karaosmanoglu (2000: 200-201) argues, in Turkish history, there is “a relatively consistent security culture of *realpolitik* which has evolved across the centuries from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one”. “Ottoman *realpolitik* began to acquire a defensive character” in order to preserve the status quo through military and diplomatic means. The concept of balance of power

became an inevitable part of its diplomatic and strategic policy which was in fact inherited by Turkey. The fear of loss of territory and the secret plans of the Europeans on the lands of late Ottoman Empire was transferred to the Turkish Republic through the Treaty of Sevres which proves the reasons of the *Sevres Syndrome*. The Treaty of Sevres according to which the Ottoman territory was partitioned among the European powers, marked the end of the Ottoman Empire following the end of First World War (Davutoglu, 2001: 515).

It is a fact that Turkey inherited the heartland and population of the Ottoman Empire which resulted in a transfer of Ottoman legacy to the Republic of Turkey either with certain advantages and disadvantages affecting its foreign policy seriously. Aydin divides these effects into two as *constructive* and *problematic* legacies. The constructive legacies include “the established traditions in state governance, importance given to territory and its continuity, ... carefully articulated foreign and security policies, benefiting from the hindsight”. On the other hand, problematic legacies included “the bitter memories of neighboring countries, misleading images about the country and the people, and remembrance of past misdeeds of foreign states”. This gave birth to “a sense of continual harassment and thus a ‘security syndrome’ within the country” (Aydin, 2003: 307).

Moreover, according to Bilgin (2005: 187), the policy-makers in Turkey are used to formulate policies by giving reference to the “geographical location to justify both ‘Turkey’s unique sensitiveness’ argument and ‘Turkey’s unique opportunities’ argument. This has dominated the security discourses since the establishment of the Republic (Bilgin, 2005: 187; Sezer, 1992: 19). For this reason, there is a “moderation and caution that has traditionally characterized Turkey's approach to international and

regional affairs” as Sayari (2000: 169) argues. This arises from *Sevres-phobia* which can be defined as a syndrome that the “external world and their internal collaborators are trying to weaken and divide Turkey” (Mufti, 1998: 43).

It is argued that the leaders of the newly established Republic searched for ways of breaking with the Ottoman past as they associated the Ottoman legacy with “ignorance, corruption, backwardness and dogmas” (Aydin, 2003: 307). In order to establish a totally new state, “they had to clear away the ruins of the Empire, disown its legacy and discover new virtues based on the ‘Turkish nation’ ” (Aydin, 2003: 307-308). With its establishment, Turkey transformed itself into a totally different structure. Because, unlike the Ottoman Empire, it was a nation-state “based on the preservation of the status quo rather than on expansionist principles; possessing a more homogenous society in contrast to the multinational character of the empire.” (Aydin, 2003: 308).

In the late Ottoman Empire the process of westernization started and was transferred to the Republic of Turkey by the progressive elite from the Empire. This was a great motivation for Turkey’s Western-oriented policies and incorporated “liberal and internationalist elements” into foreign and security policies of the country. In this sense, both the Turks and the Europeans have influenced each other playing a significant role on each other’s policies. The paradox of “being in Europe but not of Europe” became a characteristic of Turkish–European relations (Aydin, 2003: 307-309). On the other hand, according to Heper (1993: 1),

for many Westerners, the stereotype of ‘the terrible Turk’ never lost its salience. This ambiguous attitude towards the Turks was perhaps best expressed when in the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was referred to as ‘the sick man of Europe’ – ‘of Europe’ but ‘sick’.

The differences in religious, cultural and socio-political systems as well as the statecraft made the two worlds of Europe and the Ottomans separated from each other which do not seem to have disappeared completely. This still poses challenges to Turkey's relations with the Europeans (Karaosmanoglu, 1991: 159). The Europeans think that as "the Turks do not share European culture", they cannot integrate into Europe (Heper, 1993: 4). The different security cultures of Turkey and European Union result from diverse paths of thinking upon and practicing security in history. In fact, these differences have become more apparent with the end of the Cold War (Bilgin, 2004: 26). Today, although the Europeans are reluctant to regard the Turks as a part of Europe, it is without doubt that the Ottoman legacy has left Europeans a prejudiced image of the Turks (Aydin, 2003: 309). This image is regarded by Stanford Shaw (2000: 14) as "the ugly, biased view of the Turks which had been developed in Christian Europe for centuries". This view dominates the Western sources of history which attempt to study Ottoman and Turkish history.

The reason behind the reluctance of those who are skeptic about Turkey's EU membership (*Eurosceptics*) is rooted in this legacy. They regard the EU reforms as a threat to the unity and integrity of the country (Bilgin, 2005: 189). In other words, "the West's influence in Turkey ... has always gone through a filtering process" and based on "the images of the West held by critical groups in Turkey" (Heper, Oncu and Kramer, 1993: vii). The Western orientation in Turkish Foreign Policy is remarkable in the sense that it has constituted one of the main tendencies affecting the foreign policy behavior of the state. Today, the point is that, Turkey, as a candidate of the EU is in a fragile position due to the possible challenges that might be directed towards Turkey during the membership negotiations. It seems that Turkey will act without a serious divergence from its national security culture in the sense that the ultimate aim

of the Republic of Turkey, that is the survival and going beyond the level of contemporary civilization with full independence will be dominant as the core of foreign policy principles.

As the Cold War years, the post-Cold War era has brought Turkey further challenges such as “the instability and conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and eastern Mediterranean” complicating Turkey’s traditional foreign policy. Rising Kurdish nationalism due to rising ethnicity has also made Turkey to be more cautious and defensive about the issues of sovereignty (Aydin, 2003: 324; Lesser, 1992: 41). Turkey, although increasingly involved in the neighboring regions, its “principal strategic, political and economic relations continue to be with the United States and Western Europe” (Sayari, 2000). As Fuller (2004: 51-64) argues, Turkey is trying to enlarge its strategic targets within the context of EU membership, international terrorism and Middle East problems. In fact, whatever the priorities and the policies of Turkey, “be it EU membership, leadership in Eurasia, or strategic partnership with the US”, Turkey is forced to make a choice between becoming a “ ‘stable’ regional or pivotal power willing to project power beyond its borders” with the traditional “military and security considerations” and becoming an “ordinary, but ‘democratic’ and self-sufficient state” with “necessary economic and political reforms and restructuring and transformation of its system” (Bagci and Kardas, 2004: 454-455). This choice poses a difficult task on Turkey which once again proves the ever lasting challenges on Turkey arising from its historical background and geographical location. Thus, it can be argued that the strategic thinking should not be underestimated in the foreign policy making of Turkey, as it was not underestimated in the military tactics during history. The geopolitics and the dynamics of the region

put pressure on Turkey to adjust itself to the changing conditions which is possible through the existence of multiple strategies and tools.

For the coming years, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will be flexible enough to succeed in adjusting itself to the international circumstances and moving further towards strengthening itself through using the advantages of the characteristics of its foreign policy in line with its national security culture in order to overcome the posed challenges and threats. Indeed, the success of Turkey is likely to depend on the pursuit of pro-active policies with a strategic thinking and a sense of self confidence rather than following reactive policies which may decrease the policy choices and flexibility to respond to the various challenges arising from international circumstances.

3.1.2 National identity as a driver of Turkish national security culture

National identity is another important aspect of Turkish national security culture. During the Turkish War of Independence, “the Turks learned from their enemies ... how to use nationalism as a constructive device to achieve national ends” (Shaw, 2000: 450). “Turkish nationalism” emerged as a unifying factor by preventing “the class struggles and ideological divisiveness”. It “encouraged the Turks to rebuild their own land, without fostering aggressive irredentist aspirations”. Because it was “not imperialistic; it did not seek to achieve greatness by regaining lands once ruled by the Ottomans, even in the case of areas still inhabited by considerable Turkish minorities”. The Turks preferred to establish “a modern state for the Turks within the boundaries of the Republic created by the Treaty of Lausanne”. The only purpose concerning “the lost territories, was to make sure the Turks living in them were

treated fairly and justly”. The policy towards the neighbors rested on “cooperation for mutual benefit” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 376). Today, Turkish nationalism is still regarded as the very basis of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, which seems to continue as an inevitable factor of the survival of the state, however not necessarily in extreme and destructive terms, but rather in constructive terms providing integrity. This is mostly due to the nature of nationalism defined by Ataturk. The Republic of Turkey was established upon the principle of nationalism which rejects xenophobia and relies on the basis of citizenship. The national character was shaped within this framework. The nation, sharing a common past, also determined the characteristics of the relations with the other nations.

This understanding of national identity determines the choice of the country in the international system. Within the context of the historical experiences, Turkish people are sensitive about their national identities and consider it as a part of integrity of the country. At the same time, they did not rely on imperialistic aspirations, but rather focused on status-quo, international peace and cooperation.

3.1.2.1 The role of NATO membership

In contrast to what Ataturk had determined as one of the priorities of the Republic of Turkey, the “complete independence” principle had to be left after World War II within the context of international politics. As Bagci (2001: 129) argues, this was a sign of a new trend in Turkish Foreign Policy. During the Cold War, Turkey, by burdening the “key role” that is given to her in the Near East, Americanized its foreign policy. The Turkish Government searched for a formal alliance, and a link

with the Western defense system which was made possible with Turkey's accession to NATO on February 18, 1952.

Close Turkish-American relations started after World War II due to the Soviet threat directed towards Turkey. On March 12, 1947, the American support to Turkey started with the Truman Doctrine which envisaged giving support to Turkey and Greece in order to prevent Soviet expansionism. From that time onwards, the main target for Turkey has been to become a member of all political, military and economic organizations which had been established in the leadership of the West. Turkey regarded this doctrine as a tight common policy. This was the sign of Western orientation in Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the NATO membership of Turkey proved the determinacy of Turkey for being a Western ally which was in fact one of the turning points in Turkish history. The Turkish-American interests converged within the context of Eisenhower Doctrine of the United States which aimed at preventing the Soviet influence and filling the power vacuum in the Middle East where the British influence gradually decreased (Bagci, 2001: 3-8, 35, 84-92).

NATO has been a pillar in Turkish security policy and it served at *psychological level* through which Turkey perceived the world and its relations with external actors (Sezer, 1989: 52). The NATO membership of Turkey “contributed to bridging the psychological gap with the West”, if not totally removed the lack of trust towards the West. All in all, “NATO is very useful for Turkey's security, and it constitutes a valuable tie with the West” (Karaosmanoglu, 1993: 31). From the 1990s onwards, Turkey attempted to further internalize the identity of the Alliance in order to deal with the post-Cold War challenges (Oguzlu, 2004a: 471). Thus, it can be argued that as long as the long term interests of Turkey and the United States

continue, despite the natural divergent policy priorities in defining the threat perceptions from time to time (Okman, 2004: 24), their close relations and the alliance will continue.

NATO membership has a role of introducing new elements to the security culture of Turkey such as the crisis-management habits and tactics. After the Cold War, NATO has transformed itself in many respects including “its involvement in ending conflict, restoring peace and building stability in crisis regions” (NATO, 2005:1).² While the new tactics mainly focus on the crisis management tactics in possible conflicts on different locations of the world, “far from Alliance territory” (NATO, 2005:6), the Alliance has also developed techniques for providing peace and stability among its members. As stated in NATO Review (NATO, 2006: 13), the position of NATO in a possible conflict between the member states was determined as in the following:

“Any dispute between member countries which has not proved capable of direct settlement should be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework, before resorting to any other international agency (except for disputes of a legal or an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialized organizations). The Secretary General should be empowered to offer his good offices to the countries in dispute and, with their consent, to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.”

Turkey has been very active in NATO initiatives. Particularly, after the end of Cold War, it has contributed greatly to the peace building efforts of the alliance through various means. Within this context, through courses and seminars for NATO countries, it has been supporting the “Partnership for Peace” program which is

² For information about NATO’s strategic concept approved on 23-24 April 1999 in relation to “Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”, see NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>; Aybet, Gulnur, June 1999. “NATO’s Developing Role in Collective Security: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”. *SAM Papers* No. 4/99: 91.

launched by the Alliance for “forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners” (Aybet, 1999:91) and for the purpose of maintaining good relations among the states in Eurasia (Turkish Armed Forces, 2007):

In the light of the decisions taken "In the January 1994 NATO Summit" in Brussels, Turkey decided to establish a "PfP Training Center", and declared the establishment of PfP Training Center at the EAPC (Euro Atlantic Partnership Council) meeting in Sintra / Portugal on 30 May 1997.

Therefore, NATO membership is an important stage in the evolution of Turkish identity and the national security culture. NATO as a representative of Western identity helped Turkey to define itself as Western in the international system. Moreover, becoming a member of a security community served as a deterrent against fighting with another member of that community. This has a special significance when it comes to crisis situations, complicating the strategies and decisions of that country. In other words, this choice of Turkey has restricted its behavior and moves as it has to keep a balance between the different elements of its national security culture.

3.1.2.2 The role of military in national security culture of Turkey

The military is one of the state institutions which undertake the responsibility of preserving and transferring the basic characteristics of Turkish national security culture. Its role in national security culture is considered within this framework. The Turkish foreign policy tradition attaches the military force a deterrent character, which is in line with the aim of preservation of the status quo. Besides, in order to provide security beyond the borders and to preserve peace and security of the country within the international system the military undertakes the mission of providing

expertise and knowledge on key security issues. In Turkey, military is the institution which perceives threats and comprehends the historical experiences well and which has technical and practical expertise, particularly within NATO context as NATO is mostly well-known by military personnel compared to the other institutions.

In the shaping of Turkish culture and societal structure, military has had a significant role. The Turkish armed forces take its heritage from the Ottoman army which was “the vanguard of reform and Westernization” in the Empire (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 313). The establishment of modern Republic of Turkey was possible after driving out the occupying forces and the Greek army with the War of Independence led by Ataturk following World War I (Jenkins, 2001: 10). This implies that in Turkish history the military constitutes the basis of the state and its survival. The understanding of national security is shaped accordingly.

The post-Cold War context seems to have created a different security understanding for Turkey. A “broadening of Turkey’s security agenda” and “the convergence of foreign and security policies since the 1990s” can be regarded as the response of Turkey to “the challenge of globalised security” (Bilgin, 2005). The role of the military in external security issues should be considered within this context. Despite the challenges of globalization, the core principles inherent in the national security culture of Turkey continue to be incorporated into the decision making process and serve as guidelines particularly during crisis management. This is realized both through the efforts of the military and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) which embodies the foreign policy culture of Turkey.

In Turkey, the role of national security culture on foreign policy and particularly in crisis management can be observed in the meetings, reports and

declarations of NSC. Here, it should be noted that rather than examining the mechanical process of decision making or formal procedures, observing the priority and sensitivity attached to the national security culture deserves particular attention. These priorities and sensitivity is inherent firstly among the large segments of the society in the form of public opinion, which influences the decision makers; secondly and more importantly reflected and raised in NSC meetings.

In Turkey, the main institutions of foreign policy and decision making have been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces (Tayfur and Goymen, 2002: 101). The Turkish military plays a role through “formal and informal mechanisms, both utilizing official platforms, such as participation in the NSC, and setting policy parameters through public and private expressions of opinion”. The latter is particularly influential on policy making. The policy objectives of the military are described within the “National Security Policy Document (NSPD)”. This document is updated and prepared by “the TGS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the National Intelligence Organization (NIO) under the coordination of the NSC General Secretariat” in approximately every five-year period. However, the military does not intervene in the legislation process. For this reason, it influences the policy and decision making through “guidelines in order to ensure either that government policy remains within specific parameters or that the government takes measures to address specific threats”. The recommended policies may or may not be immediately implemented by the civilian government. The governments usually do not contradict with what military recommends in terms of external security policies. More importantly, whenever the issues are “urgent or critical, such as a perceived imminent threat”, the military puts increasing pressure upon the government to act (Jenkins: 2001: 41-42, 47, Ozcan, 1998: 77-80).

The role of General Secretariat of NSC has increased with legal regulations. On 9 January 1997, the code of Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center³ entered into force. According to the code, the NSC is the competent body in the management of crises. The threat perceptions and the measures to be taken are decided by the Council (Ozcan, 1998: 75-76, 96).

The Defense White Paper 2000⁴, prepared by Turkish Ministry of National Defense aims at:

“... providing the public in Turkey and abroad with a better understanding and clarity of the basic information on the National Defense Policies and the Turkish Armed Forces constituted by secular and democratic Turkey, which places the highest priority on deterrence for the establishment and maintenance of peace in the region, that is a critical region from all aspects”.

The document explains the priorities of Turkey and how these priorities determine the national security policies of the country. The views of NSC are given utmost importance in the formulation of these policies. It is emphasized that the Council undertakes its responsibilities within the framework of the laws and regulations provided. Particularly in crisis times, the NSC operates quite effectively. For this reason, from time to time it is regarded as the most supreme body within the country. (Karaoz, 2003: ix, 68).

The influence of the military in shaping the foreign and security policy of Turkey has increased in the late 1990s.⁵ Particularly in security matters, the threat

³ The code was published in the official gazette, on 9 January 1997, No.22872. For the full text of the code, see <http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/20240.html> .

⁴ For the full text, see <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GNPP/html/pdf/PREF.pdf> .

⁵ It should also be noted that as it is mostly mentioned by media and some analysts, during the periods of Ozal in the 1980s (Cowell, 1987) and AKP government since early 2000s (Taspinar, 2004), the role of military is challenged. For instance, the advices of the military on the last Annan Plan concerning

perceptions concerning the Middle East countries and Greece, the policies have been determined in accordance with the opinions of military elites (Kut, 1998: 59, Ozcan, 1998: 81). The degree of public support, the cooperation with the civilians and the degree of vitality of the issue determine the extent of influence of the military on security and defense policy making. In general, it would not be wrong to argue that concerning the external *key security issues*, the civilians rarely oppose the recommendations of the military.

3.2 The Explanatory power of culture in Turkish Foreign and Security

Policy

The characteristics of Turkish national security culture observed in an analysis of historical experiences can be traced in the foreign policy culture of the country. Moreover, these characteristics are reflected in the foreign and security policies of the state. In Turkey, status-quo and Westernization are among the characteristics inherent in the national security culture shaping the foreign and security policies.

According to Davutoglu (2001: 17), culture is among the constant determinants of foreign policy. Although Oran (2001: 46-53) argues that it is difficult to reduce the foreign policy of a state having more than eighty years history to a few principles or to find a continuous and consistent factor, he puts forward two main principles of Turkish Foreign Policy as being a state searching for the preservation of

Cyprus were not taken into consideration. Moreover, AKP government has not paid attention to the recommendations of the military on EU policies in relation to Turkey's security interests. These trends lead to certain discussions of whether Turkey's security interests are undermined or not. The doubts whether these policies create a security gap, result from the fact that they may underestimate the elements of Turkey's national security culture. Since the case of this thesis takes place in other than these periods and the debate would involve a domestic political context, it falls beyond the scope of this study. Thus, it is assumed that the military has an influential role in decisions about international security issues as a general tendency of Turkish national security culture.

status quo and westernism. Rosenau (1971: 19-20) states that “the land, its fertility and climate, and its location ... all contribute both to the psychological environment through which officials and publics define their links to the external world”.

As Hale (2000: 7) argues, the geographical situation, human and natural resources and the economic development of Turkey affect its international position. The defensive character inherent in the security culture of Turkey is stated by Aydın (2003: 310-311) as such: Turks “learned, as a result of centuries-long hostilities with their neighbors, not to trust any state, to rely on nothing but their power, and to be ready to fight at any given time.” This is also reflected in “Turkish sayings” such as “‘water sleeps, the enemy never sleeps’ and ‘prepare for war, if you want peace’”. For this reason, “the Turkish diplomatic apparatus is known today, among other things, for being skeptical and cautious to the extreme.” For instance, the “Turkish sensitivity about Greek efforts to internationalize Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul or any possibility of accepting Armenian genocide claims” should be considered within this context (Aydın, 2003: 311-312). In the post Cold War period, in Turkey, there is a feeling of being *lonely* in international relations with the newly emerging threats and increasing problems on the issues such as cross border terrorism, ethnic conflicts, immigration, Kurdish separatism, disputes with Greece, Cyprus problem and the water dispute in the Middle East (Bagci and Bal, 2004: 105). It seems that Turkey will continue to face threats which create security problems (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 347). This picture reflects the inherent elements of national security culture of Turkey and reflected in the foreign policy orientation of the state.

Turkey, “from a purely military perspective” can be regarded as “the strongest regional power” (Alp and Turkes, 2001: 142). The principle of “Peace at home, peace

abroad” was formulated by Ataturk and it constitutes “the cornerstone of Turkey’s conduct in external relations”. It implies preserving the status quo in terms of the unity and integrity of the state and the “clear Turkish identity” in “a relatively homogenous national state”. Signing significant treaties and non-aggression pacts with neighbors was an example of the search for peace and status quo in its region. Nevertheless, this had to be managed “in a Machiavellian world of power politics”, avoiding “any illusion about the nature of the international system” as stated by Karaosmanoglu (2000: 208; 1993: 30).

CHAPTER IV

THE CASE OF KARDAK CRISIS

Kardak Crisis occurred in 1996 which corresponds to a time when Turkey, as most of the states was trying to adapt itself into the changing conditions of the post-Cold War period.

4.1 The Aegean Disputes

Greece and Turkey periodically experience crises which shape their bilateral relations. Despite the existence of crises there is a status-quo based continuity in the relationship. The people of both countries pass through a process carrying the inheritance of past experiences. This leads to an aggregate behavior of the states towards each other rather than rational or conscious acts. Despite the existence of crises over a number of disputes, there has been no war between the two (Guner, 2004: 297). The relations between Turkey and Greece are examined to the extent that it constitutes the basis of the perceptions and approaches of the two countries towards each other. It will contribute to understanding the Turkish side's priorities, reactions, and responses in managing Kardak crisis.

Gunduz (2001: 81) outlines the disputes between Turkey and Greece mainly in three groups:

- Aegean disputes, which in turn may be further divided into six closely related categories: a) the dispute over the boundaries of territorial waters; b) the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf; c) the dispute over the extent of Greek airspace; d) the dispute over the demilitarized status of some Greek islands in the close vicinity of Turkish coasts; e) the dispute over the flight information region (FIR) line; and f) the dispute over the ownership of those geographical formations, islets, or rocks that according to Turkey were not ceded to Greece by international treaties
- The Cyprus conflict
- Minority issues.

Also of concern are command-and-control issues in the Aegean within the framework of NATO.

For Kramer (1991: 61), “Turkey reacts like any state” and “tries to get as much as possible ... by declaring these issues to be cases of national interest”. This is “the collective psychological map of Turkey on which a compromise is very difficult” as Turkey associates it with *defeat*. The solutions in these issues should simultaneously bring material satisfaction and be “free from any inclination [of] sacrifices with respect to the integrity of the Turkish nation and its territory”. The politico-psychological background in Turkish-Greek relations and the high sensitivity about national integrity and sovereignty of both countries explain why some seemingly *technical problems* are very difficult to deal with.

4.1.1 The dispute over the ownership of islets and rocks

Turkish side attributes the Aegean Sea a *sui generis* character. With many scattered islands and islets, it is a *semi-closed sea*. For this reason, Turkey claims that “1958 and 1982 Conventions on the Law of the Sea cannot be applied here”. This

approach is contrary to the arguments of the Greeks who claim that “all the islands with the Greek mainland have their own continental shelves”. In the case of application of those conventions in line with the Greek arguments, Greeks would have serious gains (Oguzlu, 1998: 33-34, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 339-341) and the Aegean Sea would turn out to be a *Greek Sea*.

Inan and Baseren (1997: 1) explains the legal aspect of Kardak crisis in *Status of Kardak Rocks*. They argue that Greece does not base its claims on geographical, historical and legal facts. The boundary and the name of *Limnia/Imia* on some of the maps that Greece relies on are “not envisaged in international treaties”.

Lausanne Treaty of 1923 is the basic document determining the boundaries of Turkey including the status of islands in the Aegean. In this Treaty, the islands ceded to Italy are also mentioned. According to Greece’s claims, the 1932 Ankara Convention determines the status of the Rocks together with a number of islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean. However, the treaty signed between Turkey and Italy only solved sovereignty disputes over Castellorizo Region. The additional meetings and prepared documents of Italian and Turkish technicians on the status of Dodecanese islands did not gain legality and ratified by the parties. For this reason, it did not enter into force. After the World War II, these islands under Italian sovereignty including those in the Dodecanese Region were ceded to Greece by Paris Treaty of 1947. Contrary to Greek claims, Turkey argues that those islands, islets and rocks including Kardak were not ceded to Italy with the Proces Verbal of 1932 which did not enter into force and therefore stayed within Turkish territorial waters.⁶ For

⁶ For details about legal claims of Turkey and Greece, the relevant articles of international treaties and documents, see Inan, Yuksel and Sertac H. Baseren. 1997. *Status of Kardak Rocks*. Ankara: n.p. (ISBN 975-96281-0-4), 4-16; and also Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, “Aegean Disputes”, available at http://www.turkishembassy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=225&Itemid=240.

Turkey, Greece cannot legally prove that it has sovereignty over Kardak Rocks as Turkey did not cede these rocks to Greece according to the international treaties. The unilateral attempts of Greece do not have an international binding effect. This is only “a symptom of expansionist desires of Greece” (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2-9).

4.1.2 Military balance in the Aegean

The balance between Turkey and Greece was made with the Lausanne Treaty. This balance regulated the bilateral relations until the two states attempted to change the status-quo. Oguzlu (1998: 70-71) points out these attempts:

The Greek attempts to militarize the Eastern Aegean islands off the Turkish coast, Greece’s attempt extending its territorial waters beyond the existing six miles, turning the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake, and the unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece were perceived by Turkey as a calculated attempt by Athens at changing the Lausanne balance. On the other hand, the Greek governments have been accusing Turkey of altering the status quo both in the Aegean and in Cyprus. The de facto partition of Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1974 military operation has been referred to by Greece as evidence to prove their arguments.

In Greece, Turkey is regarded as “a revisionist state, seeking to change or even to thwart the status quo in its favor”. Greece, on the other hand is presented as “a status quo state”, willing to preserve “what it possesses in law”. According to the perspective of Turkey, the situation is the opposite of Greek perceptions that Greece “unilaterally defines and declares its own ‘rights’ in the Aegean and ... creates its own de facto status quo”. Greece’s refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations explains this attitude. This is against international law in the sense that the boundary and sovereignty disputes need to be solved bilaterally, not unilaterally. The Greek attitude

constitutes a potential for further tensions and an obstacle to peaceful relations (Gunguz, 2001: 87, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 339).

Whereas for Greeks, the Aegean Sea *exclusively* belongs to them, Turkey does not have such an attitude. According to the arguments of Turkey, “Ankara seems to share certain deposits under the seabed and wants to have unhindered navigational access to its military and maritime ships”. For this reason *the question of sovereignty* is at the center of debates concerning Aegean Sea. They always constitute a source for possible tensions. Turkey wants to solve each of these disputes separately by dealing with *on its own merits* rather than linking the issues with other disputed areas such as Cyprus (Oguzlu, 1998: 31, 87-88).

For Turkey, “the *international legal base* of the republic” is “another [sensitive] motive of Turkish foreign policy”. The outsiders have difficulty in understanding this legal stand point. Because, even in cases where there is no concrete limitation for Turkey’s international position or activities, Turkey applies this approach. An example is the attitude of Turkey in “the remilitarization of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean” even under NATO, and despite the advantageous position of Turkey in terms of the *overall military balance* between Turkey and Greece.⁷ It seems that Turkey wants to prevent other states to demand revisions in relation to their positions determined by Lausanne. (Kramer, 1991: 61-62).

⁷ For a comparison of “Conventional Armed Forces” between Turkey and Greece in 1997, see the statistics provided by International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1997. *The Military Balance, 1997/1998*. London: Oxford University Press, available at <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP29appendix.htm>.

4.1.3 The balance of interests between peace and war

4.1.3.1 The historical experiences as a source of perceptions

In understanding the foreign policy of a country, it is difficult to have an opinion about the interests and motivations of that country. This mainly results from the ambiguous meanings of the concepts due to the lack of a certain definition which is commonly accepted. When it is assumed that the *motives* refer to the “basic factors which guide foreign policy behavior” and the *interests* referring to the goals, this implies that the analysis focuses on *non-material* factors. Such an outlook, despite the difficulty in dealing with these concepts, can contribute to the better comprehension of the roots of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Greece. In this sense, objective factors such as geography, economy or military considerations are not merely enough in exploring the non-materialistic aspect of the issues. According to Kramer, this background is shaped by “the common history of both countries and the imprints that this history has left on the collective psychological map of both publics”. This common heritage of “traumatic historical experiences” can explain the perceptions and behaviors of each side. The determinants of Turkey’s attitude towards Greece can also be observed in the general motivations of Turkish foreign policy (Kramer, 1991: 57-59).

Turkey and Greece tend to base their arguments on legal grounds. However, the underlying source of the disputes are basically “nationalistic perceptions and historically defined attitudes” (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 339). The two states could not coexist peacefully due to the root causes of problems, particularly the *psychological barriers*. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the past experiences of the two sides. However, we should keep in mind that there have been many distortions of

history provoking both sides against each other, legitimizing certain arguments and increasing the conflicts (Oguzlu, 1998: 2, 5). Therefore, anyone who wants to comprehend the dynamics of the relations would require a well-done analysis.

The problems between Turkey and Greece have such a characteristic that they are transferred from one generation to another. At the basis of their images of each other and threat perceptions are shaped by cognitive processes which have influenced the feelings and behaviors of the two sides (Ayman, 1998: 291-292, 293). The national thinking in two states has been influenced with a *cultural mistrust* dating back to history (Oguzlu, 2004b: 98). The relations between the two states have often been shaped by mutual distrust and *deterrence* rather than by mutual trust and cooperation efforts. Kramer (1991: 58) summarizes the underlying nature of the attitudes of Greece and Turkey towards each other as such:

Modern Greece establishes her national identity to a large extent on the successful struggle against the Ottoman yoke, which in the Turkish view is identical with the acceleration of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Republic of Turkey owes her existence, *inter alia*, to a successful 'war of independence' in which Greek occupational troops in western and central Anatolia were the main enemy. What is for the Turks the birth of their state is for the Greeks the definite end of some type of neo-imperialistic ideology.

Concerning the Greek perceptions, Oguzlu (1998: 2) points out the origins of Greek attitude:

The Greek nation could get its independence mainly through the help of outside powers and this fact later enabled these countries to shape this newly borne Greek nation according to their ideals. In this respect, the impositions of "Hellenism" on the Greek nation necessitated the portrayal of the Turks as their enemy par excellence. This in turn determined in the next decades, especially after the W.W.II [World War II], the main patterns of Greek behavior towards Turkey.

With the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans, the Orthodox Greeks started to live under Ottoman domination. In 19th century, the Empire started to experience difficult times with the revolts of different nations under its domination. The first of these influenced from French Revolution ideas was the Greek community. After the independence of the Serbs in 1814, the Greeks obtained their independence in 1830 with the support of European powers. These supports continued in the following centuries. The continuous foreign support in Greek foreign policy since its independence led to the fact that “the Greeks could not face the Turks on their own”. Moreover, their territories extended at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, including many Aegean islands following 1913 Balkan Wars (Oguzlu, 1998: 6-11, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 292; Ayman, 1998: 299, 309).

With the end of World War I, the Greek troops attempted to impose the Sevres Treaty in Anatolian territories (Oguzlu, 1998: 11). In 1919, when Greek forces invaded Izmir, they massacred thousands of Turks. The Muslims in the Aegean region of Anatolia were “killed or deported and replaced ... with Greek settlers who were said to be ‘returning’ to their homes, to provide demographic justification for their ambition to annex the area to imperial Greece” (Shaw, 2000: 418, 447). The Turkish War of Independence started upon this experience of invasion, particularly of the Greece’s (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 357; Sezer, 1992: 18).

With the improvement of bilateral relations (Oguzlu, 1998: 11), in 1930, Greece and Turkey signed a treaty of friendship which set the boundaries and resolved the problems of population exchange. They also agreed on “naval equality in the Eastern Mediterranean” and confirmed the status quo (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 376). Until 1950s, the two countries were strategic allies. The historians think that this period

proves the possibility of a peaceful coexistence for Turkey and Greece. In fact, the improvement of relations resulted from the deteriorated capabilities and domestic problems of Greece, the status quo orientation of the two states following the World War I, and the absence of Cyprus and Aegean disputes triggered by the support of foreign powers (Oguzlu, 1998: 11-13).

Unfortunately, the politicians of the both sides have used the existing perceptions of the two sides for weakening their political rivals and increasing their domestic popularity. Because, such policies seem *attractive* in order to win the elections (Oguzlu, 1998: 21). In contrast to such a situation at *state level*, at the *personal level*, the Turks do not feel direct hostility against Greek people that “the image of the other side as the ‘arch enemy’ is more a collective image” rather than an individual one. Furthermore, this image among the public opinion is shaped by an “indifference rather than as emotional interest” (Kramer, 1991: 59; Ayman, 1998: 305-306). As it is argued in the descriptive explanation of the case, the discourses of political leaders in Kardak crisis and the attitude of Turkish media are examples to the use of inherent sentiments in the national security culture for political or material considerations. In fact, the historical background and the perceptions influence the policy making and actions of the state, not directly the individual conduct of relations.

The *Western factor* played a significant role in the misperceptions of the both sides. The Greeks, in order to emerge as a nation had to adapt an anti-Turkish stance by labeling the Turks as *barbar* and *uncivilized*. It is noteworthy that Hellenism embodied anti-Turkish attitudes and it was formulated in Western European capitals through idealization of Greek civilization as the source of western civilization. Similarly, the Turks constructed their anti-Greek attitude through a Western

perspective and regarded Greece as the *naughty boy of the West*. It seems that the West is close to Greeks in civilizational and cultural terms, while willing to keep Turkey as a strategic and economic ally. Such a Western approach influences the perceptions of the two actors in a negative way both in terms of bilateral relations and the international security (Oguzlu, 1998: 17-18; Ayman, 1998: 305).

The Greek myth of *Megali Idea* is based on “the hope that Greece would one day re-take all the territories that it or its antecedents lost to Turkey hundreds of years ago”. This is regarded by many Turks as the *hidden agenda of Greeks* who try to implement this since its independence in 1830 through expansion of territories at the expense of Turkey. This perception constitutes the basis of Turkish fears of a possible institutionalization of Greek hostility toward Turkey (Gunduz, 2001: 83). Similarly, declaration of Turkey that “it would consider any extension of the Greek territorial sea a *casus belli*⁸” (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 92; Ayman, 1998: 285) creates a fear on the Greek side.

The threat perceptions of the two sides are shaped by historical experiences, beliefs and approaches. In this sense, the current relations are also shaped by the learned behaviors and any development is processed through cognitive consistency confirming the existing images (Ayman, 1998: 312, 318). It seems that the reaction of the two sides to the fears or actions created by the other party result in some of the disputes. In this sense firstly the real causes of the problems should be removed (Gunduz, 2001: 99) in order to create mutual confidence. Nevertheless, the inherent misperceptions are difficult to overcome.

⁸ *Casus belli* is an event or act which precipitates or is used to justify resort to war” (Berridge and James, 2001: 30).

4.1.3.2 The role of NATO membership in Turkish-Greek relations

Turkey, having a mixed policy of deterrence and negotiation towards Greece, attaches importance to NATO membership. As both countries are members of NATO, the role of this institution has a particular significance in understanding the relations between Turkey and Greece. NATO prevents the escalation of the crises between the two states.

During World War II, the good relations continued. After the war, the US strategic objectives required to give priority to Greece and Turkey under 1947 Truman Doctrine and 1948 Marshall Plan (Oguzlu, 1998: 14, 56). With the emergence of the Cold War, as a result of the common threat perception, the Soviet Union and its allies, Turkey and Greece entered into close political cooperation and became members of NATO in 1952. In the absence of such common threat perceptions, which has become more apparent with the end of the Cold War, the two countries seem to enter into a different atmosphere (Clogg, 1991: 13, 22), still carrying the impact of past experiences and the unclear ongoing disagreements on a number of issues.

Even after becoming NATO members, Turkey paid special attention to a possible discrimination in favor of Greece. Because, unlike Turkey, they regarded Greece as “a natural part of the West and of Europe”. It seems that Turkey has feared from possible Greek attempts of isolating Turkey from the West through the Aegean disputes and making the Aegean a *Greek Sea*. According to this view, “As the Aegean is a European sea, any country that can claim to be an Aegean country is a European country as well” (Kramer, 1991: 65-66).

Turkey has special geopolitical importance for the interests of Western security. The location of Turkey both creates security for Turkey, and contributes to Western security (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 287-289). NATO, EU and the US constitute the basic “institutional frameworks of Turkey’s affiliation to the West”. At the same time, they have been the other international actors, influencing Turkish-Greek relations in a *subtle* way. Nevertheless, they have not been very successful in solving the disputes between the two states in contrary to the expectations (Kramer, 1991: 65; Oguzlu, 1998: iv), despite the fact that any tension between Turkey and Greece has negative impact on the harmony of NATO (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 338, Farington, 1989: 199). The two states could not manage to establish a regional security community within the framework of a collective identity under NATO by converging their interests and national identities (Oguzlu, 2004a; 458, 461).

According to Oguzlu (1998: iv, 1), an *interesting* process started as the two states attempted to integrate themselves with the West. Because, not only the former problems intensified, but also new disputes emerged in relation to Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. Particularly, the Cyprus dispute greatly furthered the problems in the Aegean. This intensification can be traced in the *somehow* contribution of the third parties to the lack of trust and the negative perceptions in two states towards each other. Whereas in Turkey, the EU is regarded as pro-Greek; NATO is regarded by the Greeks an institution favoring Turkish interests (Oguzlu, 1998: iv, 1).

The increasing problems from 1950s onwards despite NATO membership of Turkey and Greece is related to some extent “the emergence of a suitable environment ... to voice their old arguments more freely”. Because both sides were assuming that “the western alliance would not allow them to fight and endanger their security

environment”. The two states even carried the disputes to the brink of disasters in the crises concerning the Aegean Sea such as “Kardak/Imia Crisis of 1996” (Oguzlu, 1998: 20).

Krebs (1999: 369) summarizes the position of NATO in Turkish-Greek disputes as follows:

First, NATO ensured that Greek and Turkish leaders met regularly. When such meetings were necessary to defuse tensions, yet politically impossible to arrange bilaterally, NATO usefully supplied a face-saving forum in which statesmen could move beyond rhetoric. Second, the alliance powerfully influenced the rivals indirectly, through the regular interaction of Greek and Turkish military officers, who gained greater understanding of their respective interests and perceptions. Third, their membership in the alliance provided the United States with a measure of influence over their behavior. Yet only under extraordinary circumstances did the United States summon the political will to force the pair to bend, and such moments were all too rare to stifle the conflict. However, despite the continual armed skirmishes and the virtually continuous war of words, the dispute never did erupt into full-fledged war, and for that NATO deserves some credit.

4.1.3.3 The position of Turkey in Aegean Dispute as a reflection of its national security culture: Balancing interests between peace and war

Turkey’s foreign policy towards Greece has focused on *deterrence* and *negotiation*. While the former has been realized with the existence of a powerful army, the latter results from favoring status-quo. In other words, Turkey does not prefer to use its military power in order to change the status-quo, but rather for deterrence. This can be regarded as a mixed strategy composed of deterring expansionist Greek efforts through a powerful military and threat of war on the one hand; and posing bilateral negotiations in order to solve the disputes legally and peacefully (Ayman, 1998: 285-286). This is in line with the foreign policy of Turkey which implies an *anti-revisionist*

status-quo orientation. This involves keeping away from disputes among regional forces which might influence Turkey negatively. Consequently, Turkey gives utmost importance to cooperation and good relations particularly with its neighbors since the establishment of the Republic. The reconciliation with Greece following the War of Independence is an example to this policy. Besides, Turkey avoided to use force in solving the problems and defending its national interests and preferred to base its policies and arguments on diplomatic and legal grounds (Kramer, 1991: 59-60).

This line of policy can be observed in Turkey's attitude towards Greece. Kramer (1991: 60, 70) points out the tendencies in Turkish approach to its relations with Greece:

The process of reconciliation started by Ataturk and Venizelos after the war of independence was crowned by the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation of 1933. And since the mid-1950s when the relationship between both countries was again marked more by conflict and tensions than by friendship and reconciliation, every Turkish government has tried to reach a solution by direct bilateral negotiations and has normally abstained from the use of force. And if Turkey sometimes had recourse to force, this normally did not go beyond the form of demonstrative acts and/or threats and was accompanied by a policy of careful crisis management which avoided a large scale military confrontation. ... On the other hand, the Turkish desire to prevent critical situations from developing into a military confrontation can be substantiated by the de-escalative behavior with respect to some border incidents during which soldiers on both sides were shot.

Turkey only prefers to use force against what Turkey officially calls "domestic 'separatist forces' that endanger the territorial integrity of the country". Even towards those neighbors who allegedly support terrorist activities, Turkey generally relies on diplomatic grounds. Preserving the territorial integrity implies "not yielding an inch of what was established and internationally recognized as the Republic of Turkey at Lausanne in 1923". Usually this principle is respected by the neighbors with an exception of the issues "that were not dealt with at Lausanne or with respect to which

new international developments occur”. The questions of international waters are examples to such a situation. (Kramer: 1991: 61).

Turkey and Greece have different solutions to the problems. Turkey wants to negotiate with Greece bilaterally, while Greece wants to use international courts. However, this would only be possible with the consent of the two sides together. (Oguzlu, 1998: 34-35, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 340; Sezer, 1989: 49).

Kramer argues that for Turkey, the only way for the realization of its interests in Aegean Sea is Greece’s will to enter into negotiations. Unilaterally, Turkey can only preserve the status-quo, which would be unsatisfactory for both sides. In a possible negotiation process, “due to the national consensus about the basic motives of Turkish foreign policy”, any Turkish government would be so careful to “respect national sensitivities ... with respect to the content and course of the dialogue”. A deviation from the *established national consensus* would only be in return for a “considerable Greek ... offer” (Kramer, 1991: 68).

It should be noted that “for the Turks, ... the principle holds true that to talk together in any case is preferable to shooting each other” (Kramer, 1991: 69). A *no-talk policy* cannot solve *sensitive disputes* (Gunduz, 2001: 84). However, given the source of existing problems, it seems a long process for the two sides to come to terms with a permanent solution (Oguzlu, 1998: 91).

4.2 Descriptive Explanation of the Case

4.2.1 The Chain of Events

In this section, in order to understand the reaction of Turkey to the crisis, the declarations of the leaders following the emergence of the crisis, the main developments and the actions of Turkey in managing the crisis are mentioned. These are mainly traced from the archives of Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Directorate General of Press and Information (1996a) as well as the other sources.

25 December 1995

The sovereignty disputes over Kardak turned out to be crisis after 25 December 1995 when “A ship named Figen Akad ran aground on Kardak Rocks” (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2). “The captain refused assistance from the competent Greek authorities” and asserted that the accident occurred within the area under Turkish sovereignty (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429).

28 December 1995

On 28 December, the ship was rescued to the closest Turkish port with the escort of Greek ships (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429).

29 December 1995

On 29 December, “Turkey addressed a brief *note verbale* to Greece ... claiming that the Kardak (Imia) Rocks were an integral part of Turkish territory” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429), protesting the rescue of Figen Akad by Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

9 January 1996

On 9 January, the response of Greece with a *note verbale* rejected Turkish claim relying on 1932 Agreements between Turkey and Italy and the 1947 Paris Treaty. Greece claimed that Kardak Rocks belonged to Greece according to these agreements (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429).

24-25 January 1996

On 24-25 January, the crisis was discussed intensively among both Turkish and Greek media.⁹ On 25 January, the details of the previously unreported incident” was published in *Hurriyet*, one of the Turkish daily newspapers. On the same day, “the mayor of Kalymnos, apparently on his own initiative, planted the Greek flag” on Kardak Rocks (Jacobides, 2005: 14).

⁹ For a detailed information on the reflection of the crisis in Turkish media, see Akca, Emel Basturk. 1999. “*Ulusal Söylemin İnşasında Yazılı Basın ve Kardak Krizi Örnek Olayı*.” (The Written Press in the Construction of National Discourse and the Case of Kardak Crisis). Unpublished Master’s Thesis. Ankara: Ankara University, Turkey.

27 January 1996

After “the Greek local authorities placed a Greek flag on the ... Rocks”, on 27 January, Turkish journalists removed it and placed a Turkish one. The scenes of these actions were broadcasted on TV in Greece and Turkey (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429; Veremis, 2001: 44).

28 January 1996

On 28 January, when Greek soldiers replaced the flag, “fully equipped Turkish coastguard vessels appeared in the area and the Greek regional forces were in a state of preparedness in order to deter any action against the Imia Rocks”. On the following day, a small Greek commando force landed on the Rocks and Turkey addressed another *note verbale* that “the 1932 Agreements between Italy and Turkey were not in force because they had been negotiated in the context of the special political situation prevailing in the region before World War II” and the 1947 Paris Treaty did not cover Kardak Rocks. Turkey declared its readiness “to enter into negotiations to determine the regime of the islets and rocks of the eastern Aegean Sea”, as well as “the maritime boundaries between the two countries”. Turkey also demanded the withdrawal of Greek forces and *all symbols of sovereignty* (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429, 431; Veremis, 2001: 44). Greece insisted that Kardak belonged to Greek territory and “that the signed treaties left no legal ambiguities, and hence that there was nothing to discuss”. After receiving information about Turkish military moves, “seven Greek commandos were dispatched to the island to guard the flag” (Jacobides, 2005: 15).

29 January 1996

The NSC was held under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller.¹⁰ During the meeting the Kardak issue was evaluated and it was stated that Greece cannot claim sovereignty over the Rocks. Ciller stated that they want to solve the dispute through diplomatic means and they had initiatives at the level of NATO and the United Nations. She emphasized that it was out of question for Turkey to give up its sovereignty rights and the Greek flag would be taken off and the Greek soldiers would withdraw (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). However, it should be noted that prior to the NSC meeting, the Prime Minister Ciller indicated the status of Kardak was ambiguous. After the discussion of military and civilian officials in the meeting, Kardak Rocks were declared as within Turkish territory (Hickok, 2001: 46).

30 January 1996

The crisis reached its peak on 30 January 1996 when Turkey sent naval forces to the area. Greece, as a response, sent additional fleet to the area (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427) Greek Foreign Minister stated “that under no circumstances would Greece remove its flag from the islet”. The crisis escalated at the diplomatic level. In the afternoon, “the entire Greek army had been mobilized, and adult males residing on nearby islands begin receiving draft notices”. At the end of the day, there was “huge firepower in the region” (Jacobides, 2005: 15). After that, “Greece demanded that Turkey immediately cease violating Greek territorial sea and airspace pointing out the danger of a military confrontation”. Turkey responded by demanding “the withdrawal

¹⁰ The participants of NSC meeting included Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Oymen, Deputy-Chief of General Staff Cevik Bir, National Intelligence Agency Undersecretary Sonmez Koksak, Navy Commander Adm.Guven Erkaya, and officials of General Staff.

of ships, men and flags from the area”. At that point, the US intervened with efforts of de-escalating the crisis. The US mediation in the crisis resulted in the establishment of “a tripartite consultation process” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427).

In the evening, the “US Secretary of Defense William Perry telephoned Greek Defense Minister ... for an evaluation of the situation”. The Greek Minister told “that the Turks had provoked the confrontation; but offered to recall Greek ships from the area and to have the commandos leave Imia if the Turks would recall their ships - but he insisted the Greek flag should remain on the islet”. The answer from the US was “that both the US and Turkey sought a de-escalation, but that Turkey would withdraw its forces only if the Greek flag was removed”. However, this did not solve the problem (Jacobides, 2005: 15).

At night, US President Clinton telephoned Greek Prime Minister Simitis “to inform him that Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller was threatening to attack after midnight if the situation was not diffused”. There were also long telephone calls with the initiative of US Secretary of State Warren Christopher between Greek Foreign Minister and “the US State Department with Richard Holbrooke assuming the role of chief mediator” (Jacobides, 2005: 15).

According to the Turkish Press Review Released by Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information (1996a), during a night long security conference among Turkish Prime Minister Ciller, Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal and “senior military and intelligence officers”¹¹, Ciller stated that Kardak Rocks are within Turkish territory and that “It is out of question for Turkey to allow

¹¹ Other participants of the meeting were “Navy Commander Adm.Guven Erkaya, Deputy-Chief of General Staff Cevik Bir, Security Council Secretary-General Gen. Ilhan Kilic, Chief of the Intelligence Service Sonmez Koksak and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Oymen”. The three-hour long meeting was called the “War Council” among the press.

others to have designs on its territory this way or another”. She emphasized that Turkey preferred to solve the dispute peacefully and to start the negotiations immediately. Similarly, Baykal mentioned the importance of a diplomatic solution. However he added: “We are prepared for every eventuality”, indirectly confirming the reports which alerted the armed forces. The Foreign Minister also stated that the claims of Greece were not supported by international treaties. Following the council, the cabinet members also gathered in a meeting. In the press conference, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Omer Akbel stated “We have told them both sides should refrain from unilateral action that could increase tensions. In this context, we have asked Greece to withdraw the Greek troops dispatched to the rocks and remove any sign that tries to prove Greek sovereignty”. After addressing the note to Greece, in another press conference, Akbel explained details about the legal arguments of Turkey.¹²

31 January 1996

During the consultation process in the first hours of 31 January, “Turkey landed a small commando force on the small unguarded West Imia” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427). “Greece had no commandos there, but its warships were within 400 meters ... Under pressure from Holbrooke, the Greek government considered the possibility of removing the flag. Holbrooke set 3:30 a.m. as the deadline for a decision” (Jacobides, 2005: 15-16). In the end, with the support of US, and through

¹² Akbel explained that according to the Turkish view, 1932 agreements between Turkey and Italy, who was the possessor of the islands, were not valid. Because, they were never finalized. He said: “Greeks themselves have implicitly acknowledged the vacuum in the issue, as they wanted to take up the matter with Turkey in 1950 and 1953”. However, no steps were taken for that although Turkey agreed to dialogue. The sole valid agreement on the status of Kardak was the 1947 Paris Treaty, which referred to “adjacent islands”. He continued: However, the Kardak Rocks, which are 5.5 miles away from the nearest Greek island, are neither adjacent nor are they islets”. Akbel added that Turkey informed the US Ambassador Marc Grossman about the issue and would also inform the EU and NATO countries.

indirect contacts, Turkey and Greece accepted “an agreement of disentanglement [of] no ships, no men, no flags” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427). According to the agreement, “both sides agreed that the situation would return to the *status quo ante*” (Jacobides, 2005: 16). Eventually, Turkey and Greece “simultaneously withdrew step by step, all their forces from the area” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427).

As it is mentioned in the reviews of Directorate General of Press and Information (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a) during the crisis, the US warned the parties “that whoever fired the first shot would be held responsible”. The Aegean is *ultra-sensitive* for both sides. For this reason, neither Turkey nor Greece gave up until the crisis escalated to its peak in spite of intensive diplomatic contacts, and Turkish offers of negotiations. Among NATO members and the US the events attracted great attention.

According to the press release of monthly meeting of Turkish NSC (Secretariat General of the National Security Council, 1996), the members of the council discussed the problem concerning the Kardak Rocks, *which is under Turkish sovereignty*. The Council stated that during the events, it observed with great pleasure that the determined and supreme attitude of all institutions and organizations of the state in defending the sovereignty rights of Turkey as well as the support of the public to the national policies resulted in a common sense among the country. This subject was evaluated as an integral part of the Aegean problem and all other problems concerning the Aegean were discussed. It was emphasized that the problems should be handled through peaceful means and that the related parties need to cooperate.

President Demirel, in his written statement, said that the rapidly escalated crisis has been overcome with common sense before it turned out to be a great

depression. Prime Minister Ciller mentioned that “the issue was handled with determinacy and the results were taken”. Foreign Minister Baykal, in his speech to *Cumhuriyet* stated that they did not inform the US about the decision of sending military force to Kardak. He also mentioned that the government was pleased to know that the allies understood our target of agreement with Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

1 February 1996

The crisis over Kardak Rocks ended as both parties had withdrawn from the region in the early hours of the morning, as the press informs. However, the status of Kardak Rocks as well as that of some other islets within the region is left for diplomatic negotiation. Turkey considers the withdrawal of Greece “as a climb down by the Greeks” and “a victory for Turkey”. President Clinton had stated that he was glad that the crisis ended through diplomatic means rather than military means. After the crisis ended, the declarations of Turkish leaders were mentioned among the press:

President Suleyman Demirel declared that he was glad commonsense had prevailed and he thanked all those concerned for acting with caution and sensitivity. Prime Minister Ciller noted too, that she had kept her promise to the nation in that Turkey had not lost "even a pebble" in the very volatile confrontation. Ciller also thanked everyone for staying cool at a time when issues were growing hotter by the minute. Once negotiations over the ownership of the islands have begun, the way will be open for other issues concerning the Aegean Sea to be taken up. Foreign Ministry spokesman Omer Akbel said yesterday that so far no reply had been forthcoming from Athens about opening up talks. The news from Athens is that the government there is in deep trouble, facing calls to resign and accusations that it was guilty of treason for compromising with Turkey.

Ciller also stated that Aegean is one of the most critical points of the world and that it was declared to the world that any Greek attempt of increasing the limit of territorial waters to 12 miles will be a *casus belli* (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

3 February 1996

In a press meeting, Prime Minister Ciller said:

“The world has checked our national consciousness to the end. We have acted determinately. We have not made any concessions and eventually showed the power of Turkey. This event also has given the opportunity to put forward the arguments of Turkey”.

The Foreign Minister Undersecretary Oymen, in his speech to *Cumhuriyet*, argued that the Foreign Ministry has never doubted about the Kardak Rocks’ status under Turkish sovereignty. AEJ (Association of European Journalists) criticized the Greek and Turkish journalists’ attitude in flags issue and stated that their job was to broadcast the news, not to *create* the news (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

5 February 1996

According to Turkish daily *Sabah* and as it is mentioned in the Turkish Press Review:

Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal said over the weekend that Greece had added to the tension between Turkey and Greece by creating an incident over the Kardak rocks. Baykal added that Turkey had not been looking for a confrontation over the rocks, and had not sought either a political or diplomatic victory. Rather, Turkey had wanted a quick return to the earlier status quo, without taking the issue any further.

6 February 1996

The tension in the Aegean once again tends to grow due to the Greek military and naval activities closer to Kardak Rocks. Turkish government tries to stay calm. In a press conference, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Akbel said “that as far as Turkey knew, the present situation was ‘not serious’ ”. On the other hand, the representatives of Chief of General Staff stated that “to avoid another crisis, the area was being very closely watched and measures were being taken to keep the situation in check”. The press notes that the crisis does not seem to be over for the Greeks as it is understood from the military activities of Greece in the region (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

Concerning the military activities of Greeks, Baykal stated that the situation should be normalized and Greece should also spend efforts for that. Oymen mentioned the need for bilateral negotiations and stated that the Greek attempts against the interests of Turkey are not appropriate, and that Turkey expected Greece to accept the negotiation process (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

7 February 1996

Turkish Foreign Minister stated that there was an *artificial crisis* and the issue should be *concluded*. He said: “Turkey will do all it can for a constructive and just solution ... I hope the way Turkey behaved during the crisis has given the whole region a message regarding the Turkish attitude”. He added that Turkey, concerning its interests in any situation, “would not accept any fait accompli in the Aegean”.

Once again, Akbel emphasized: “Turkey believes the best way to solve the problems is through talks. We are always open to talks”. He also mentioned the attitude of Ankara towards the EU’s position in the case of “Greek threats to block EU aid to Turkey”: “The EU is committed to providing financial assistance to Turkey. This is essential for the Customs Union. ... We expect the EU to continue to act according to its contractual obligations” (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b).

As it is mentioned in Turkish Press Review (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b), *Milliyet* informs about the US opinion on Greek attitude during and after the crisis:

US political circles are disturbed by the negative attitude of Greece towards American attempts to mediate for a lasting solution to Turco-Greek disputes. ... Washington is worried about the fact that US mediation, in the case of a possible new crisis, has become almost impossible after the negative reaction of Greece. The US fears uncontrolled escalations of the increasing tension in the region. Furthermore, US officials tend to interpret Greek attempts to bring in EU mediation as a move against Ankara, and Washington is suspicious about the effectiveness of a mediator not trusted by both sides in the dispute. Washington’s attitude is simply that NATO will not remain passive in the event of a new crisis. US officials also stress that with the last developments, a vital chance for finding a solution to the Cyprus question was lost.

The US President, on the other hand, congratulated Turkish Prime Minister Ciller in his letter, as it is stated in Turkish Press Review of *Hurriyet* and *Milliyet* (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b):

I congratulate you for your efforts towards a peaceful end to the crisis over the Kardak islets...You and your government have showed a moderation and statesmanship in eliminating a conflict that could harm the security of the whole region.

9 February 1996

News appeared on *Milliyet* and noted in Turkish Press Review concerning the EU attitude of the crisis. The EU emphasized the significance of preserving peaceful relations between Turkey and Greece and supported judicial solutions to the problems. The officials of the European Commission “expressed their support for Greece”, whereas the European Council, the final decision-making body of the EU, has not yet expressed its opinion.

11 February 1996

Foreign Minister Baykal, in his speech to *Cumhuriyet*, stated that the operation of Nimble Paw did not have any provocative aspect (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

12 February 1996

Following the Greek military exercises after the crisis, Turkey also started to carry out training programs in the region. The Turkish Review Press (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b), upon the news of *Cumhuriyet* states that according to the military sources, these military and naval exercises had already been planned for some time and they were routine training exercises and had “nothing to do” with the recent crisis. The two sides are careful observing the developments in the region.

13 February 1996

According to the reviewed news from *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Hurriyet* (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b) Turkey is starting a diplomatic initiative this week “in order to explain the Turkish position on the Kardak Rocks”. Following a security meeting¹³, Prime Minister Ciller stated that Kardak crisis demonstrated the possibility of a similar crisis in the region. She said, “There is the need to take up the issue of the Aegean as a whole, and to start the dialogue on the subject of islets and rocks whose status is not clear”. She mentioned that the fact that Turkey would like to have friendly relations with Greece did not mean that it would renounce its rights in the Aegean Sea. As a part of this diplomatic initiative, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister will make visits in European countries including Italy, London, Belgium in order to meet NATO and EU officials. Akbel told that the purpose of these visits did not only cover Kardak issue, but also other issues of Turkish foreign policy. Concerning the Turkish military exercises in the Aegean:

Akbel denied that a series of Turkish exercises in the Aegean and the Mediterranean were “a provocation” at a sensitive time. “I do not see anything provocative about a previously-scheduled exercise” the spokesman said. He said that the Greek side had been informed of the military exercise, scheduled to take place between February 12 and 16. “These military exercises, called Nimble Paw (Cevik Pence), will be carried out in Turkish waters and international waters” he said, adding that the exercises would take place at nine different locations. While the Greek media continued to cover the military exercise as a “Turkish provocation”, Greek Defence Minister Gerassimos Arsenis said Greece had been informed of the military exercise, which was a scheduled and routine one. “It creates no threat” he said. Meanwhile, Greek Armed Forces are holding a military exercise “Egialos 2/96”. The Greek Defence Ministry said that the exercise would continue until 16 February.

¹³ The participants to this meeting were “Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Cevik Bir, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Gen. Ilhan Kilic, Prime Ministry Undersecretary Arif Yuksel, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ambassador Onur Oymen, Chief Advisor of the Prime Ministry Murat Sungar and military officials and technocrats from the foreign ministry”.

According to the EU discussions on Kardak, the EP (European Parliament) is for the peaceful solution of the problem according to international agreements in order to prevent possible tensions between either Turkey and Greece or Turkey and the EU.

14 February 1996

As stated in the Turkish Press Review (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b), it appeared in *Sabah* that “The Press Advisor of the Turkish Embassy in Washington, Bulent Erdemgil, in a letter to the New York Times said that the intransigent Greek attitude led to the Kardak Crisis”. He stated that the concern was related to preventing Greek to make the Aegean Sea a *Greek Lake*. Erdemgil also noted that Greek did not consider international law and rejected bilateral negotiations.

The draft reports of the EP, which constitutes the subject matter of the *urgent issues* debate on the following day, supports Greeks. They claim that “Turkey threatened Greek sovereignty during the Kardak island dispute because in reality the islands belong to Greece. As a response, Turkish Foreign Minister Baykal stated that the EU should be impartial in this issue; he added that the crisis emerged due to the inexistence of legal documents determining the exact borders between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996). The US stated its opinion on Kardak issue and supported Greek proposal of carrying the issue to “International Tribunal”. Clinton, in his message to American Hellenic Educational Protective Association (AHEPA) said, “I want to assure you that the US strongly supports the principle of respect for international treaties, for internationally recognized borders and for territorial integrity”. He added that the two sides should resolve the disputes peacefully.

15 February 1996

The EP made a draft decision criticizing the Turkish attitude in the crisis. According to the decision, Turkey is regarded as questioning the sovereignty rights of an EU member and demanding territory. The EP claims that Kardak Rocks are included within Greek territories according to Lausanne Treaty, the 1932 Treaty between Turkey and Italy and the 1947 Paris Treaty. The Deputy Undersecretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry responded that none of the valid documents in the related treaties proves that Kardak Rocks belong to Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

16 February 1996

Greece responded to the 29 January *note verbale* of Turkey, and rejected the Turkish proposal of negotiations on the grounds that there is no legal document proving Turkish claims and emphasized that Kardak Rocks belonged to Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

17-22 February 1996

In various European meetings, Turkish Prime minister and Foreign Minister expressed the position and arguments of Turkey and expected the solution of the problems through bilateral negotiations with Greece. They also reminded the officials of the EU the obligations of the Union regarding the customs union (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

26 February 1996

Ankara called the Turkish ambassador to Greece, Umit Pamir. The ambassador firstly discussed the issue with Foreign Minister Baykal and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Oymen. He will also talk with other foreign ministry officials. In a meeting of the EU, the foreign ministers will discuss the relations between Turkey and Greece. According to EU reports, the Union is not comfortable with Greek attitude of influencing EU thinking about Turkey through its veto threat. The Turkish Permanent Representative to the EU, Uluc Ozulker stated that The EU should eventually stop yielding to Greek demands and it should implement economic pressures on Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).

27 February 1996

During the meetings, the EU demanded from Greece to “fulfill its obligations regarding Turkey” within the context of customs union obligations and called for dialogue. Ciller, on her way to visit EU’s term president, Italy, stated “I will explain the term president of the EU Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Greece in various bilateral conflicts”. She regarded the Greek attitude of blocking the EU financial assistance to Turkey as “unjust” and an “abuse of Greek membership in the Union. She said: “We search for friends in the region but it is out of question that Ankara will let Greece violate Turkish rights ... Turkey cannot be left in the waiting room. It is time for Turkey to receive its place and status”. Following the meetings, the Italian officials mentioned the support of Italy to Turkey (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b).

About the return date of Turkish ambassador to Greece, Akbel said that it was not clear, and he said: “Greece is trying to undermine Turkish interests in a number of ways. Turkey will retaliate in a reciprocal manner” (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b).

28 February 1996

According to the Turkish Ministry statement as it appeared on Turkish Press Review (Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b) “Turkey welcomes the reaffirmation of the EU’s fourteen members to carry out their obligations to Turkey within the framework of customs union agreement”, opposing the Greek claims. Turkey is preparing for increased diplomatic pressure on EU. President Clinton, in his letter to Ciller, stated that the EU should remain faithful to its pledges to Turkey and mentioned his pleasure about calmness of Turkey and Greece during and after the crisis. The US also supports the dialogue proposal of Turkey to resolve the disputes with Greece (Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b).

29 February 1996

The Foreign Ministry officials stated that Turkish Ambassador Pamir would return to Greece and launch a “program of political and diplomatic pressure on Greece. He explained the details of this program to President Demirel. The program had been discussed in the NSC. There are mainly four targets of the program (Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b):

Turkey will press for satisfaction in connection with the rights of the Turkish minority living in Thrace, and will demonstrate how Athens has ignored past agreements made to deal with this sensitive issue. The problems of Turkish families living on Aegean islands belonging to Greece will also be brought to international platforms. Thirdly, Ankara will also bring up the matter of how Greece is quietly arming islands in the Aegean in contravention of international agreements. Along with this, air corridors and coastal limits will be taken up. Pressure against Greece will be increased by developing existing agreements with Albania and Macedonia. There have already been suggestions that Turkey wants joint military exercises with those two countries, that both back onto Greece.

British Foreign Minister, in his speech to journalists mentioned the opinion of London against Greek attitude of implementing political and diplomatic aggression on Turkey. He also stated that EU-Turkey relations should not be influenced from the disputes between Turkey and Greece. (Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b)

4.2.2 Elements of the Crisis

It has been mentioned that constitutive elements of a crisis situation are as follows:

- the historical roots of the crisis,
- the existence of a threat to the national interests of the state,
- the necessity to respond in a limited time,
- the probability of a military conflict and
- the need for preserving the interests or the position of the state within the region/international system.

The historical past between Turkey and Greece constitutes another background for the emergence and management of the crisis. This first element exists as a source

of perceptions between Turkey and Greece in Kardak crisis. The historical origin of these perceptions influenced the attitude of Turkey during the crisis.¹⁴

Another element is the existence of a threat to the national interests of Turkey during the crisis. This was a threat to the territorial integrity of the country as Kardak Rocks represented the sensitiveness of Turkey about any claims on Turkish territory.

Like many security crises, Turkey tried to act rapidly but cautiously as it responded to the emergence of the crisis. The government and the military experts formulated their strategies in a limited time. The leaders had urgent security meetings often held by the NSC.¹⁵

A possible escalation of the crisis would mean a military confrontation with serious consequences. A war between the two states would mean a war between two NATO members. This would have serious repercussions both in terms of the balances in the region and the international system. Both sides were aware that there was a very thin line between peace and war. For this reason, the crisis did not escalate into war despite the probability of a serious military conflict.

Each state has certain national interests which are inherent in its national security culture. The position of Turkey within the international system and the characteristics of its national security culture require it to act in a certain way during the crisis. Although it seemed to be a dilemma of balancing the interests between peace and war, the priority given to the territorial integrity of the country, the decisiveness in the case of a possible military confrontation, the deterrent behaviors

¹⁴ This issue has been examined in section 4.1.3.1 *The historical experiences as a source of perceptions*.

¹⁵ More details about the response of Turkey to the crisis can be traced from the section of 4.2.1 *The Chain of Events*.

against the other side's possible attack as well as the balance and peace within the region, Turkey managed the crisis in conformity with its national security culture.

4.2.3 The Symbolic Aspects of Kardak Crisis

“Kardak Rocks form a symbol” in terms of its advantages in political and legal terms for the party who obtained their sovereignty. Given the low economic or geographical importance attached to Kardak, this point was difficult to understand for the outsiders. For them, Kardak Rocks do not worth to come to the brink of war. Some even interpreted the situation as *weird* or *ridiculous* (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2). Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 374) consider Kardak dispute as a *minicrisis* and an evidence of continuing unresolved crises between Turkey and Greece. However, Kardak crisis was a sign that Turkish-Greek relations were worsening further since the end of the Cold War. If such crises are not paid enough attention and avoided in time, they may turn out to be major crises (Stearns, 2001: 239-240).

In the case of Greek sovereignty over the Rocks, the territorial waters and further claims of Greece over the disputed islands, islets and rocks would increase at the expense of Turkey. Moreover, the maritime boundary in Aegean will legally become certain. Greece presents this as the western boundary of Turkey and the eastern boundary of Europe (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2-3).

According to Turkish approach, Kardak rocks are an integral part of the Aegean Sea which has a *sui generis* character with *geographical and historical peculiarities*. Consequently, only Turkey and Greece can overcome the complexities of the issue through negotiations rather than letting a third party involve in it. On the

other hand, Greek approach considers Aegean as a *Greek lake* and Greece is unwilling to 'share' it with "the other riparian state Turkey (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 10).

In 1990s, Turkey developed its national security policies to demonstrate itself as a strong regional power initiating and participating in international peace operations particularly in the Balkans (Guvenc, 1998: 136; Uzgel, 1998: 436; Kazan, 2005: 592-593). It also tried to decrease its dependency in defense industry as a response to Greek efforts of armament and in order to maintain the balance in the Aegean in its favor. Kardak Crisis has one of the incidents which gave Turkey the opportunity to prove that if necessary it has the power and will to use force in order to preserve its vital national interests, risking having problems with the Western allies. In this sense, by launching a military operation on its own, Turkey realized its military purposes in Kardak Crisis (Guvenc, 1998: 136, 147, 155-157).

4.2.4 Post-Crisis Period

In 1990s, the military in Turkey was highly interested in a possible "deviation from state policy towards Greece and Cyprus". In 1995, the prime minister of the time, Tansu Ciller was inclined to "make concessions over Cyprus in order to secure a Customs Union agreement with the EU". According to an interview with then the head of the navy, Admiral Guven Erkaya in Istanbul in October 1998 (Jenkins, 2001: 78):

In January 1996 the TGS was further alarmed by Ciller's naivety and adventurism when Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war over the disputed Aegean islet of Imia/Kardak. During an emergency meeting to discuss a Greek landing on the islet, Ciller first asked whether it belonged to Turkey and, after being told that it did, proposed sending in troops and expelling the Greeks by force. She

was informed by the head of the navy, Admiral Guven Erkaya, that such an operation would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Greece and was persuaded to land Turkish commandos on a nearby islet whose sovereignty was not in dispute.

As it is stated in an interview made with a MFA officer in January 1997, after convincing Greece “to withdraw its troops under pressure from Washington” the crisis was settled. More significantly, the pace of events in the crisis proved that the policies towards Greece and Cyprus were under the control of the NSC and this was ensured by the TGS (Jenkins, 2001: 79).

On 8 July 1997, in NATO Summit in Madrid, the foreign ministers of the two states were hosted by the US Secretary Albright. At the end of the meeting the two states “reached a convergence of views on a basis for promoting better relations” (Bolukbasi, 2004: 73-74; British American Security Information Council):

- A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of good neighborly relations;
- Respect for each other’s sovereignty;
- Respect for the principles of international law and international agreements;
- Respect for each other’s legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty;
- Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding; and
- Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without use of force or threat of force.

In 1997, the NSDP outlined “the primary foreign and domestic threats to Turkey”: The foreign threats as “Greece” and “The South (meaning Syria/Iraq)”. The Document warned about a possible “military clash with Greece” which would consequently lead to further fronts with other neighbors such as Syria. The domestic threats were complicating the security environment of the country (Jenkins, 2001: 48).

Kardak crisis was resolved; although the root causes of the problem still exist. However, Turkey has made efforts in the resolution of the conflicts through peaceful means in line with its policies of enhancing peace, stability and mutual trust within the region (Sihmantepe, 2002). In the following years of Kardak Crisis, the military continued to be cautious towards Greece despite the rapprochement between two states as a result of 1999 earthquake in Turkey and the improvements in the dialogues between the foreign ministers. While for Greece “the definition of the continental shelf” was the sole problem, for Turkey, the “differences over mineral exploration rights, airspace, Greece’s right to extend its territorial waters and the ownership of a number of Aegean islets” had to be discussed (Jenkins, 2001: 79).

A possible military confrontation between Turkey and Greece in Kardak crisis would have serious negative impact on the security of Eastern Mediterranean as well as on the image of NATO “as an effective security manager in the region”. This explains the interests of EU and NATO in supporting reconciliation between Turkey and Greece. However, it should be noted that the “Greek-Turkish rapprochement is fragile” with continuing misperceptions and misunderstandings and in the absence of “goodwill and a willingness” (Larrabee, 2001: 235, 237). Although, the existing status quo in the Aegean remains the resources of the Sea unexplored, in the near future a regime uniting the parties seems difficult to implement in the absence of mutual confidence (Stearns, 2001: 243).

Today, the positions of the two sides are not different from the past in essence (Ayman, 1998; 288), although Turkey and Greece seems to have a smooth functioning relationship. The lack of permanent agreements over a number of Aegean disputes leaves the future ambiguous.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1 How Turkey Managed the Crisis and the Role of Turkish National Security Culture

Considering the given information on Turkish-Greek Relations, the details of the crisis, and the attitude of the Turkish side in managing the crisis, it is possible to assess the role of national security culture in Kardak Crisis and how Turkey acted in accordance with its national security culture.

During the period of Kardak Crisis, TAF and NSC had a considerable influence on the foreign policy decisions concerning national security issues including Turkish-Greek relations. This is particularly evident during 1990s' coalition governments which struggled in foreign policy due to their domestic policy interests as well as lack of information or willingness in managing national security issues. At the initial stage of the crisis, Prime Minister Ciller surprisingly stated that there were no documents in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the legal status of Kardak Rocks. This statement damaged the reliability of the Turkish thesis. At the initial stage of the crisis, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the TAF, Turkey's diplomatic reaction to Greece remained insufficient. Nevertheless, later on legal documents such as treaties and land registrations were

cited by various officials to support the Turkish claims. In this sense, the diplomatic responses were insufficient at this initial stage of the crisis as the government did not pay enough attention to the security experts both from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the TAF. The ruling political party in the government presented an image that it used this international security crisis for its domestic political interests (Aksu, 2001).

One of the interesting points about the Kardak Crisis was that neither NATO nor the EU countries realized the rapidly escalating crisis until it nearly exploded. This raised questions about the “exchange of information between civilian and military leadership in both countries. Hickok (2001: 39, 45) describes this situation:

The Turkish General Staff responded to the build-up of Greek forces near Imia/Kardak by sending the Turkish navy to sea. By the 29th one Meko-class frigate, two missile boats, and two patrol boats were cruising toward the islet. Another frigate was in route but still north of the immediate area. The military was reacting to a rapidly changing military condition just off its coast without a clear understanding of the diplomatic and political context. Moreover, the senior officials recognized that Prime Minister Ciller’s caretaker government was likely to offer only weak support and guidance given the domestic political situation. ... Articles [in Turkish press] on the difficulties between Turkey and Greece focused on the Cyprus problem and on the impending visit from United States Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke with little to mention of the rising confrontation over Imia/Kardak. Ciller further confused the state of civilian leadership in Ankara in an interview with a hard line nationalist newspaper. She indicated that she was prepared to take her party into opposition against an Islamist coalition. On the eve of an expanding military crisis, the Turkish prime minister declared publicly her willingness to abdicate her office to an Islamist prime minister, badly undercutting her authority and credibility as events began to unfold. Moreover, it raised a suspicion among senior military officers that her council over the next few days was guided more by domestic political calculations than Turkish national interests.

Furthermore, when Ankara realized that it had the military capability to deal with the situation, they started to disregard the outside mediations. “Internal

miscommunications about political objective and military means hampered effective crisis management and, in fact, increased the pace of the conflict” (Hickok, 2001: 47).

The Turkish military proved competent in avoiding an extreme reaction against what it considered as a provocation by Greece. The crisis left the military “with a renewed boldness in foreign affairs”. Because, during the crisis the senior military officers sorted out possible policy alternatives and passed the issue to the civilians to provide justification of the determined policy (Hickok, 2001: 49-50).

In Kardak crisis, the ignorance of the US about the roots of the dispute revealed itself in the difficulty of controlling the escalation of the crisis. This led to the idea that in the coming crises the outside intervention might be rejected. Moreover, one of the lessons of the crisis was that “unilateral military actions followed by an immediate call to negotiate put the opposite side at a diplomatic disadvantage in the international fora” (Hickok, 2001: 50-51).

Both sides preferred to use naval forces as a navy is slower and more suitable for deterrence and preventing the escalation of the crisis. Moreover, commanding the naval forces is relatively easy, which makes it easier to control the escalation of the crisis. Turkey’s main position during the crisis is in line with this military strategy which demonstrated the caution to avoid a military confrontation. However, as it was mentioned by Kramer (1991:60, 70), Turkey showed its decisiveness through “demonstrative acts and/or threats” maintaining a balance of interests while at the same time offering negotiations at almost every stage of the crisis. In this sense, the crisis management can be regarded as successful as both sides agreed on “no ships, no men, no flags” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427) and the crisis ended without a war or a concession. Nevertheless, the status of the Rocks was left for further negotiations.

Having examined the national security culture of Turkey and the attitude of Turkey in Kardak Crisis, it can be argued that the Turkish government relied on the basic characteristics of its national security culture during crisis management. The military, as one of the basic state institutions (together with MFA) undertaking the responsibility of preserving and transferring the characteristics of national security culture had acted in line with its mission as usual in international security crises. Moreover, the civilian leaders of the country, the public opinion and the media proved themselves as attaching great importance to the basic and sensitive features of Turkish national security culture during crisis management. The Turkish media was very concerned about the chain of events, discussed the crisis and even became a part of the issue by removing and placing flags on the Kardak Rocks. It is possible that some members of the press were interested in the crisis merely for their personal or organizational gains, though it is difficult to prove that. However, regardless of their intentions, what they emphasized were the sensitive issues pointed out also by the political leaders of the country. The declarations of political leaders reveal that they adjusted their attitude both according to the reactions coming from the experienced MFA personnel and military elites; and their domestic political interests influenced by the public opinion and the media. A broader analysis on Turkish media and public opinion during the crisis can demonstrate how they give priority to dominant features of security culture.

During the crisis, the leaders used the *crisis bargaining codes* or managed the crisis through their *cognitive mechanism* while formulating the strategies. In other words, they relied on their previous experiences as a guideline while processing the information before making a decision. For this case, the cognitive prism is composed of the threat perceptions during the crisis (the threat to the territorial integrity of the

country) and the beliefs about the intentions of the adversary (claims of Greece on Turkish territory). While making a decision, Turkey had to keep a balance between conflict and cooperation, war and peace during the crisis through these codes. The deterrence and negotiation were the basic tools that Turkey relied on as a product of its national security culture which has different elements.

5.1.1 Striking a balance between conflict and cooperation: Balancing between different elements of Turkey's security culture during crisis management

Nation states, as the actors of the international system have to deal with multiple security problems all the time. These problems intensify during periods of crisis. International security crises are critical points for states' national interests. They need reliable sources to guide them for a successful crisis management. This study has asserted that national security culture serves as the guideline for states in crisis management. This role can be performed through the intentional efforts of those institutions responsible from the preservation or transfer of the inherent characteristics of this culture.

In Turkey, this process can be observed in the role of certain institutions such as the military and the MFA. In this study, the role of military in foreign and security policies has been examined with reference to its historical significance in terms of Turkish national security culture. The policy makers who have been socialized within this security culture act accordingly while making decisions and interpreting the security matters. This fact is not invalidated with possible manipulations by politicians or any actor using the sensitive elements of this culture for their own benefit. One can observe this process more obviously in crisis management as the

crises times suggest a high degree of caution, decisiveness and urgency. In such situations, the states would rely on their national security culture in order to overcome the security crisis in the least *frightening* way possible.

The study has also examined the Kardak Crisis as the case reflecting the significance of national security culture in a crisis situation. During the Kardak Crisis, the declarations of leaders in the government pointed out the priorities of Turkey. These were in line with the national security culture of Turkey. Basically, the historical experiences of the country with Greece were the framework of Turkey's attitude in the crisis. The threat perceptions shaped since the establishment of the country and the significance attached to peace and security at domestic and international levels have led the country to prioritize the status quo within the region and deterrence as the pillars of foreign and security policy. We can observe this in Kardak crisis where Turkey decisively applied both deterrence with its military and the will for bilateral negotiations in order to manage the crisis in a peaceful way. In other words, it tried to keep a balance between conflict and cooperation by balancing different elements of its security culture. The NSC meetings highlighted the necessity of behaving cautiously in order not to cause a war with Greece, but also deterring Greece to act against the national interests of Turkey. In the management of the crisis it was observed that the political leaders, the high level, MFA personnel, the military elites in the end behaved in conformity after long discussions about the reaction of Turkey to the crisis. We can understand this from the press release of the NSC (Secretariat General of the National Security Council, 1996) after the crisis on 31 January 1996. The Council stated that during the events, it observed with great pleasure that the determined and supreme attitude of all institutions and organizations of the state in defending the sovereignty rights of Turkey as well as the support of the

public to the national policies resulted in a common sense among the country. Similarly, President Demirel said that escalation of the crisis has been overcome with common sense. Prime Minister Ciller mentioned that “the issue was handled with determinacy and the results were taken” (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). This conformity was provided with the impact of national security culture.

The Turkish attitude and effort of keeping a balance between conflict and cooperation takes its roots from the different elements of its security culture. The main drivers of Turkish national security culture, namely the historical experiences as a source of perceptions, the NATO membership and the role of military as a part of its national identity within the international system determined how it acted during crisis management. Turkey as a part of a security community and an active member of NATO with a powerful and deterrent military, willing for various international cooperation and peace arrangements, has a key role both in its region and where the crises emerge in different parts of the world. This demonstrates its responsibility in international security issues and its choice of national identity within the international system. When these elements interplay, in a possible international security crisis, Turkey seems to face a challenging task of striking a balance between defending its interests through cooperation and showing its decisiveness about any defense acts through military deterrence. Although it seems like a hard and complicated task, this is a natural consequence of its national security culture which is composed of a complex set of elements. I attempted to point out merely a limited number of these factors which are dominant in Turkish national security culture.

The thesis has also pointed out the relevance and use of cultural factors in understanding the security policies of states particularly in terms of their behaviors during crisis management. The national security culture of a state is usually shaped by

the historical experiences and the inherent characteristics within the national identity, the national character and the turning point events during the establishment of the state. These characteristics vary from one state to another and depend on the cases. This constitutes the differences for the security cultures of each country. For this reason, examination of particular security cultures may help us understand different modes of behaviors of states in the same situation or crisis. In fact, a comparative study on the respective national security cultures of two states in a crisis would reveal a better explanation on their use in crisis management studies. Therefore, further studies on the relation between national security culture and crisis management as well as the role of national security culture in security policies would contribute to understanding the security policies of states. This would in turn constitute a framework for increasing opportunities of agreement and understanding between states, and consequently contribute to international security.

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