

**ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES**

**DOES HUMOUR NEED TO BE JUSTIFIED?:
AN INQUIRY ON HUMOUR AS POLITICAL PHENOMENON**

M.A. THESIS

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Department of Political Studies

Political Studies Programme

DECEMBER 2015

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POLİTİK BİR OLGU OLARAK MİZAH ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA**

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DOES HUMOUR NEED TO BE JUSTIFIED?: AN INQUIRY ON HUMOUR AS POLITICAL PHENOMENON

SUMMARY

This study addresses the question of justification for humour. As one of the essential features of life, humour is considered as political phenomenon in terms of its property, power. The argument of the thesis is that humour can be justified as long as it does not provoke discrimination and hatred or it does not fulfilled in a discriminating and hateful way. Despite of humour's political quality politics cannot be a criterion of the justification of humour rather humour can be justifiable or not with regard to the morality. Thus, the goal is to accomplish to have a universal assessment on the justification inquiry for humour.

In order to achieve this goal, first, humour by the accepting it as a thick concept, is conceptualized in terms of descriptive and normative thinking. Consequently, humour is decribed as incongruity, comical action, a type of communication and exercise of power. In addition to these descriptive properties, value character of humour taken into account. As an intrinsic and extrinsic value, humour has attributed both negativity and positivity. With regard to definitive properties, the place of humour in life is sought and for that the functions of humour is revealed in psychological, social, aesthetic and political realm. Having understanding the political functions as inclusive to all, political property of humour is re-considered in terms of power. Hence humour becomes a political phenomenon since it has the power inherently and its justification is only concerns it as an extrinsic value. In this sense, humour can be justified in terms of its consequences or its way of occurrence. With reference to egoist, utilitarian and moral pluralist view contribution to truth, promotion of happiness could be the rationales for justification of humour whereas discrimination and hatred would be the results, which could lead ethical restriction for humour. However, humour rather can be justified based upon its way of occurrence that is to say it is a matter of subjective decision that can be provided by the author of humour based upon Kant's ethical system.

MEŞRULAŞTIRILMAK ZORUNDA MIDIR?:POLİTİK BİR OLGU OLARAK MİZAH ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

ÖZET

Bu çalışma mizah için meşrulaştırma sorusunu irdeler. Yaşamın vazgeçilmez unsurlarından biri olarak mizah barındırdığı güç unsuru açısından politik bir olgu olarak ele alınmıştır. Tezin savı politik bir olgu olarak mizahın ayrımcılık ve nefreti kışkırtmadığı ya da ayrımcı ve nefret dolu bir biçimde gerçekleştirilmediği sürece meşrulaştırılabilir. Mizahın politik niteliğine rağmen, politika mizahı haklı çıkarmak için bir ölçüt olamaz, daha ziyade mizah ahlak ilkelerine göre meşrulaştırılabilir ya da meşrulaştırılamaz. Bunun için, amaç mizahı meşrulaştırma araştırmasında evrensel bir değerlendirmeye ulaşılması amaçlanmaktadır. Bu amacı gerçekleştirmek adına öncelikle mizahın “thick concept” (tanımlayıcı ve değerlendirci kavrayışa ihtiyaç duyan) olduğu kabulüyle, tanımlayıcı ve normatif düşünüşle kavramsallaştırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, mizah uyumsuzluk, komik eylem, bir çeşit iletişim biçimi ve bir güç kullanımıdır. Bu tanımlayıcı özelliklere ek olarak mizah bir değer olarak hesaba katılmıştır. Asıl değer ve ikincil değer olarak mizah, hem pozitif hem de negatif olma durumuyla ilişkilendirilmiştir. Belirleyici özelliklerinin sonucunda, mizahın yaşamdaki yeri ve işlevleri psikolojik, sosyal, estetik ve politik alanlarda ortaya çıkmıştır. Politik işlevin diğer sonuçlar için kapsayıcı olduğu anlayışıyla, mizah güç kavramıyla yeniden göz önünde bulundurulmuştur. Böylece, her koşulda gücü barındırması bakımından mizah politik bir olgudur ve meşrulaştırma sorunsalı yalnızca mizahın ikincil değeri için geçerlidir. Bu bağlamda, mizah sonuçları ya da oluşum biçimi açısından haklı çıkarılabilir. Egoist, faydacı ve ahlaki çoğulcu görüşten hareketle, doğruya katkı ve mutluluğu artırma mizahı meşrulaştırma için gerekçe olabilirken, ayrımcılık ve nefret mizahın kısıtlanmasına yol açan sonuçlar olacaktır. Ancak mizah daha ziyade nasıl oluştuğuna göre haklı çıkarılabilir, bu bağlamda meşruluk kararı Kant’ın etik sistemi referans alan mizahçı tarafından verilebilir.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Question of Humour and Purpose of the Thesis

One of my best friends from high school used to say, “Every joke has an element of truth”. Since her motivation behind that idea was not taking a joke, I remember to found it so ridiculous because I thought joke is just a joke and should be perceived as something independently from the truth it has. Well, now after ten years I can say that both of us may have a point. Nevertheless, the controversy between us, which was composed of just a battle of words, may not be always that innocent. It can lead to a disastrous end as in Charlie Hebdo massacre happened in Paris in 01/07/2015 (Url 1). It has been the most recent example of how humour can be controversial and unpredictable. The attack has broadly affected me as a human being but also inspired as a graduate student who has been studying on the realm of humour and politics for a while. Since then, once more I have realized that humour has a crucial importance in human life. Thereby, this study is grounded on my personal quest about the understanding of humour that is shaped in social and political sphere. The purpose of this thesis would be to find the principles in order to justify humour in terms of ethics. Power element of humour would bring the need for justification of humour. It also creates the links between humour and the political and the humour and ethics. Political justification of humour would depend on political virtues such as justice and freedom and power relations. Therefore, humour can be justifiable politically as long as it degrades the dominants by the dominated ones. However, that would not be the case for ethical justification of humour since it will seek an answer at cosmopolitan level. Accordingly, justification of humour in terms of ethics is provided by Kantian principles, it would be the subjective decision depending on the *Golden Rule* for the author of humour.

Humour is as such an indispensable feature of life, one of the major activities of human beings that make each of us human. It is one of the most distinctive aspects of humanity from the other living beings. It could penetrate anywhere in our lives in a

mysterious way. The concept of humour is mysterious because it is ambiguous and variable in terms of its creation and reception. Nevertheless, whether it is created or founded internal to the situation it seems as a universal phenomenon that is a component of human life and relationships. Whether humour has an essence or nature is a contentious issue. Several humour researchers in and outside philosophy, have denied the thought that one theory can assert the essence of humour. The idea is similar to Wittgenstein's example of "game" which is the concept there is no essence, but only an array of "family resemblances." (1958, p.27). Whereas those who presented theories of humour suggest that, all cases of humour have something in common. Accordingly, the most traditional theories in philosophy are Incongruity, Relief and Superiority Approach (Billig, 2005, p.5). Superiority is the one historically the first, some of the ideas originated from ancient times and in 17th century, Hobbes formulated the most famous of all theories of superiority (ibid, p.6). Superiority approach asserts that humour is the expression of superiority in the sense that we found something or someone ludicrous when we feel superior over them. In opposition in the 18th century, the conceptualizations of incongruity formulated represented polite reaction of taste and reason against Hobbes. This is an approach that sees humour as experience and resolution of incongruity (ibid, p.6). Lastly, the relief theories explained humour with released nervous energy by laughter (Freud, 1998, p.45).

In this inquiry humour will be argued as it does have an essence is to present some features that all cases of humour share which makes them all humour. Nevertheless it is assumed that humour has ambivalent foundation which makes it a two-edged sword. Humour can be both universal and particular (Billig, 2005 p.176). The understanding of funny is not the same for all humans yet, humour is something that all societies have (ibid, p.76). Part of the problem is resulted the fact that there are plenty of ways of being humorous. "Cleverness and stupidity, rebelliousness and conservatism, tolerance and bigotry, all can find their expression in humour (ibid, p.185)". For that very reason it cannot be understood as a simple phenomenon since it has contradictory elements. However, the contradiction resulted from volatility of humour based upon the context in which it is practiced. Thus it is not a logical contradiction but variability of the concept in the hands of its context-dependency.

Apart from ambivalent quality, it is assumed to be analysed as a thick concept that should be considered descriptively and normatively. Humour as value them is distinguished as intrinsic and extrinsic as well as as positive and negative. This distinction for humour should be considered in two ways; first in terms of its approach and second in terms of its effect. While positive humour is acted in a gentle manner, negative humour has cruel and aggressive nature. Positive humour is viewed that it has relevance with optimism (Hagaseth, 1988, p.60). Moreover positive humour can be articulated as “pure” humour that’s fundamental concerns are entertainment and laughter (Dziemidok, 1993, p.94). Positive humour is not an expression of disapproval or a form of criticism rather it has “neutral qualification” (ibid, p.93-94). On the other hand negative humour is mostly a form of criticism that is indignant, angry and contains emotions like contempt, grief. Unlike from simple or positive humour its structure is complex. Moreover negative approach contains judgement in an active way. There are also sub-categories of negative humour; subversive or degrading humour and satirical humour are two of them. Those tend to ridicule its object of interest and it is not the mere observation but judgement of the object. In both sense it is inevitably place in our lives.

Philosophizing about humour in social relations, therefore, requires building an extensive approach to the realm of political. The political thought that would suit the theoretical or philosophical model of humour would be dualistic just as the nature of humour; it can be grasped by conflictual account as well as liberating account. On the one hand, the political caused by the friend-enemy distinction (Schmitt, 2007, p.28), on the other deliberative account (Arendt, 1970, p.44) would provide ground for the derisive and benign kind of humour. These two understandings of the political would correspond to two understandings of power that would lead us to the ethical discussion of humour. Power is accepted as *sui generis* phenomenon because it is produced by action and rests between people in concert (Arendt,1970,p.44) and it is stated also the manipulative source that influences others as if they want to alter their decisions and actions (Lukes,2005,p.28).Whether in deliberative or in conflictual sense, power element of humour can be justified in any case based upon certain political virtues and power relations. For instance, humour practiced by dominated ones in order to degrade the power of the dominant ones can be justifiable since it

may liberate them so provides freedom as political virtue. On the other hand, in terms of ethics, power would remain problematic for the justification question.

The place of humour in our lives would be important in order to move on to the ethical discussion of humour. Why humour has such an indispensable feature of life and why do we need it? Its influence on the life exists in several realms, individually or societally. Joy, delight, relaxation, entertainment, embarrassment, humiliation and criticism can be resulted from humour. All outcomes would serve to the political in terms of they all corresponded to the exercise of power in particular ways. The most problematic function would be the political one since “power” element is the reason for the need for justification of humour. Superiority approach is the main idea of humour that would cause ethical discussion. Because what is problematic for humour is its power element and expression of superiority is a kind of expression of power. Humour would have certain consequences to evaluate as ethically good or bad. While the idea of incongruity about humour would have good results, humour as communication and power would have both good or bad outcomes. Communication quality of humour also indicates that the response element of humour triggers the ethical discussion along with the power element. It shows also the understanding and appreciation which involved in the response process might be the reasons for failures of humour. In this point, trying to find a political solution to the problematic would be a struggle in vain. Rather, failures of humour should be interpreted by means of ethical thinking. Consequently the questions comes to fore “Does or should humour has ethical limits?”, “What is justifiable for humour and what is not?”. This ethical inquiry for the justification of humour would be core argument for the thesis. The answer would be from the non-consequentialist point of view that argues we can only justify humour as a result of our reasoning based upon Kant’s golden rule and his principle of universality. Thus it is the responsibility and moral judgement of humourist who decide or not to perform an instance of humour.

by any limitation.

1.2 The Methodology

The conceptual analysis of the humour is done by treating it as a thick concept introduced by Zangwill(2013,p.198). In order to introduce descriptive elements, among philosophical traditions I will analyse incongruity approach as represented in

Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kant. In addition to that humour is conceptualized in terms of comical action by Bergson's account on humour as inherently social. After as a specific type of communication, humour is described with an emphasis interactivity of humour. Last of all I proposed another definitive property of humour that is power. In one sense it is inspired by the superiority tradition presented by Hobbes in other sense it is the liberation. Afterwards, to have a ground for problems of morality, I will focus on Collingwood's and Tolstoy's insights on art in *The Principles of Art*(1958) and *The Problems of Aesthetic*(1970) respectively. I try to show humour as intrinsic and extrinsic value throughout the distinction between these two accounts. Negativity and positivity will be the last step of normative evaluation of humour by means of Billig's distinction as presented in *Laughter and Ridicule* (2005). With respect to this conceptualization functions of humour will be asserted from several disciplines such as psychology, sociology and aesthetics. Since those functions also will locate in the discussion of justification ,the understanding of humour as political phenomenon will be critically analysed by means of Schmitt's approach in *The Concept of Political*(2007) translated by J. Harvey Lomax. As an alternative another version of Schmitt's account, Mouffe's critique ,as mentioned *On the Political* (2005), on that will provide better understanding to relate them to the forms of humour. In opposition to antagonist or agonistic account of the political Arendt's view as deliberative sphere will be attributed to the other side of humour. Correspondingly, the conceptualization of power in terms of control and effect will be stated as in Lukes's *Power*(2005). This dualistic nature of humour in both ways political gives the impression of the need to move away a search for justification politically and it will lead us to deal with discussions for freedom of speech and ethical systems. For intrinsic humour, I will present the arguments originated in liberalism by Mill's account that favours freedom of expression as pointed out *On Liberty and Other Essays*(1998) with the edition of John Gray. Humour as valuable in itself will be treated as limitless. This defence of free speech motivated by liberal thought will gain another perspective by discussions of hate speech. In order to have further account I will concern Dworkin's support allowance of hate speech against the legal regulations. Coming to examine justification question humour as an extrinsic value will be questioned by means of consequentialist approach in ethics. Presenting utilitarian, egoist thoughts and moral pluralist account by Ross, results of humour will be tested with regards to those traditions. In this time Waldron's

arguments in Harms in Hate Speech (2012) as opposed to Dworkin's will be dealt with in order to question discrimination and hatred effect. Even though consequentialist approach suggests a way for justification of humour, non-consequentialist way will be my concern later. By means of Kant's categorical imperatives deontic status of humour will be given as an entry in order to have principles that would justify humour.

1.3 The Framework and Outline of the Thesis

Humour studies have conducted in the realm of several disciplines such as linguistics, psychology, anthropology, sociology etc. each discipline evaluates it in terms of their methods and concerns prior to them. Thus, it mostly remains as ambiguous and mysterious concept with regard to how it understood, analysed and even experienced.

Still, for the purposes of this study I discuss humour through several conceptions. Therefore, the first chapter would evolve around question what is humour and examines philosophical approaches to humour. Then on, the place of humour in life will be settled. I argue that, humour is a thick concept, which needs to be treated as both descriptive and normative phenomenon. Descriptively, it is an incongruity, a comical action, a type of communication and an exercise of power. Humour is incongruity in terms that it is a discrepancy between the way something is and the way it is supposed to be (Hegel, 1964, p.351). It is comical action that is peculiar to humankind and social by its very nature. Its social quality points out another descriptive property, which is communication. Humour is in particular is a communication that is a connection self and other. Last of all, it is an exercise of power either in the sense of superiority and liberation.

The power element of humour would bring forth the necessity to examine the concept of the political and power. Thus, second part of this study dwells upon the concept of the political and power and establishes the relation between humour, political and power with the help of Carl Schmitt's definition. Accordingly, political is "the most intense and extreme antagonism" (p.29) that is grounded by friend-enemy distinction. In the light of the conceptualization that Schmitt offers to us, regarding the political and the friend-enemy distinction, Chantal Mouffe is visited in order to compare her definition to the former one: "By the political I refer to the

dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human society, antagonism that can take many different forms and can emerge in diverse social relations (2005, p.21)". As a tamed form of friend-enemy distinction, she suggests friend-opponent distinction by viewing the sphere of conflict as agonistic in favor of pluralism in democracy. As an alternative model, agonistic pluralism does not neglect the role of conflict for the political but it suggests that the opponents are legitimate to each other and communicative area should exist. With reference to the former and latter view humour forms are mentioned in the sense of friend-enemy and friend opponent distinctions. Correspondingly, power relational to humour is mentioned and liberating and oppressive humour is attributed to conceiving and conflictual approaches respectively. While liberating humour is the humour of the powerless, oppressive is the one performed by the dominant idea. At first glance, humour of the dominant ones to undermine the dominated ones would not be justifiable and the humour performed the powerless that degrades the power of the dominant would be justifiable in any case. So, political justification of humour can be possible depending on a context however, in order to build a universal thinking, the aim will be suggesting a link with ethics at cosmopolitan level.

Moral inquiry of humour grounded by its quality as value. Humour as extrinsic value can be good or bad in terms of its nature and consequences. Hence the questions "Why we need humour?, What does humour do in life?" becomes important.

Thus, in the third chapter, I discuss functions of humour according to the scope of influence. First, psychological functions are explained mostly derived from the main result that is amusement. Amusement with the possibilities of being cognitive and emotional would be source for the other derived functions such as self-esteem, anxiety management. Then, social effects of humour as corrective, cohesive and control functions are pointed out in relation to the psychological functions. As having both inclusive and exclusive outcome for members of society, once again the ambivalent nature of it is considered in terms of its consequences. As another category aesthetic function of humour is introduced by the outcomes of critical, creative or imaginative thinking. Last of all, in connection with all those effects, humour is examined in terms of its political function.

Political function is the ethically problematic function of humour and that is connected to the inquiry on ethical justification of humour. Independent from the

unequal power relations, an answer is tried to be found by means of ethical discussion at cosmopolitan level. Hence, the last chapter starts with the question of whether humour need any justification or not. Accordingly, the positive answer is given for the humour as an extrinsic value. Contrary to extrinsic humour, intrinsic humour is not a matter of question of justification. Once again humour as an extrinsic and intrinsic value is mentioned by the help of the Collingwood's distinction art and craft (1958,p.20). Humour as an intrinsic value adopted to the account of art as expression (ibid, p.110) that sees expression as valuable in itself. Moreover the liberal principles (Mill, 1998,p.20-21) for freedom of expression suggests free speech must be protected for the sake of expression. On the contrary, humour as an extrinsic value become the subject matter of the question of justification. Humour as a political phenomenon can be justified by means of ethical questioning, this is the only way to acquire a universal account. In order to conduct this interrogation, two ways of thinking are mentioned. First way of thinking is inspired by consequentialist approaches on ethics such as utilitarianism, egoism and moral pluralism. In the light of those accounts the results of humour is inquired in the sense that whether they are justifiable or not. Thus, the subject matter of the question shifts the values that humour provokes from the humour itself. While its contribution to truth and promotion of happiness are counted as values justifiable, discrimination and hatred are considered as unjustified values. With the necessity of having a universal account, second, non-consequentialist inquiry is conducted by means of Kant's deontological approach. Since humour is required to be compatible with the moral law that should be universal and treat others not as mere ends, humour can be justifiable depending on subjective reasoning resulted by Kant's golden rule. All in all, I argue that what matter is the use of humour responsibly, that is to say a humorist should be morally sensitive about the response process of humour. The necessity of sensitivity expected from humorist, indicates that it is a matter of subjective decision that can be provided by the author of humour. As a result, Kant's ethical system would be the preferred one in order to justify humour.

2. WHAT IS HUMOUR?

2.1 A Conceptual Analysis

Humour has been crucial aspect of human life. In spite of this there are few things have been said along with the tendency to neglect it. What is it? What conditions does humour take inside necessarily? Is it possible to analyse or define it in full? With the purpose to thinking humour ethically critical, current chapter will discuss humour through several different conceptualizations by synthesizing them. Humour will be considered as one of the “thick concepts” as Zangwill (2013) would explain them by the feature of being both descriptive and evaluative (p.198). Thus, the manner will be two-sided; after revealing descriptive elements of humour, normative connotations will be concerned. Furthermore “literal indescribability” attributed to thick concepts would indicate that how challenging to have general approach on humour that wholly involves all qualities. Still, in order to build a starting point it will be attempted to have an insight of humour and its dynamics.

In this chapter, the conceptualization of humour will start to discuss descriptive properties by means of philosophical approaches. Accordingly with reference to the most accepted philosophical approach humour would be the experience of incongruity by the subject for something as socially normal. After the incongruity approach humour will be described as comical action with reference to its social quality. Since the social feature of humour refers to at least two people interact with each other, these two definite agents will point out another property that humour is stated as type of communication usually shared in social interaction (Kuipers, 2008, p. 365, Fine, 1983, p.150). In the light of sociological theory to humour, it will be argued that humour is a specific type of communication that is interaction of multi-numbered participants. As a last descriptive property will be exercise of power in the sense of superiority and liberation will define humour. Afterwards, as a second way of thinking humour will be interrogated as value in terms of normativity. Accordingly, it will be considered as intrinsic and extrinsic value and later as having negative and positive values. While, power element will be what is problematic and

leads to think us on political and ethical justification of humour, value character of humour will be the subject of the ethical discussion.

But before, it is important to note two terminological confusions. First, humour is often considered in relation to laughter that has been one of the most common effects of it. However, humour is not the only source of laughter which is a “physical activity”. For instance, tickling, nervousness or a shock can trigger laughter or to put it differently humour does not give rise to laughter all the time (Mc Donald, p.10). If the subject is in an extremely stressful situation, the laughter might not aroused by something funny. As Dziemidok (1993) stresses that solely mere laughter would be insufficient to distinguish a comical character (p.3) therefore it is required to make a distinction between a physiological laughter and humorous laughter resulted from the comic amusement.

The second one concerns the properties of being ludicrous and the properties of being humorous. Various distinctions have been made between humour and the ludicrous; however, majority of the theorists have been used them synonymously. In twentieth century philosophy and conceptualization of humour use the terms “humour, laughter, joking, comical, mirth” in similar sense and interchangeably (McDonald, p.11). This will be an inspiration for the analysis to discuss the theories in the same manner; by using humour and the ludicrous interchangeably.

2.2 Descriptive Implications

2.2.1 Humour as incongruity

Incongruity approach defines humour as the perception and experience of something incongruous that is incompatible with our expectations. In the eighteenth century it is resulted due to the several limitations of Hobbes’ superiority approach. Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kant and Morreall from contemporary scholars are some of the contributors to the incongruity approach (Url 2).

Hegel, sees the essence of humour “contrast between what is essential and its appearance, the object and its instrument”(Hegel, 1964, p.351). He states if such a thing does not itself comprise the ludicrous, humour is not justified and the laughter cannot emerges (ibid, p.351). Animated comedy movies would shed light to the contradiction between the idea and the appearance or between content and form. For

example, in Ice Age Animation Series, we see talking animals under the concept of human being by means of their behaviour. The situation seems incongruous or absurd. The appearance gains superiority over the idea –the concept of human being– and distorts it, so that the case becomes comical and humorous. Talking as feature of being human would seem absurd in the form an animal. In the similar vein Bergson (1911) claims that only things that are specific to humans that brings forth the ludicrous (p.3). A look could be elegant, noble, beautiful or ugly but never will be laughable unless we don't think of it in relevance to human. If we laugh at a hat, this would result from its given form comes from humans rather than its material to be either rug or straw (Bergson, 1911, p.4). Moreover, the peculiarity to humans results not from aforementioned “mere laughter” but humorous laughter which often attracted in a rational way, in conclusion to judgement and action. Thus, only emphasizing the objective character of humour would be misleading for us. At least it would be an inadequate attempt. Then, subjectivist and relational version of the incongruity approach are worth considering. Kant also seems to be the presenter of subjectivist version of incongruity approach. According to him, laughter “is an affectation arising from strained expectation being suddenly reduced nothing” (Kant, 1911, p.199). He states something absurd in understanding must evoke a lively laugh. Here the unfulfilled expectations become a pleasant surprise that leads to delight through our altered sensations.

Likewise, according to Schopenhauer, contradiction or incongruity explains humour. He concentrates incongruities occurred between the notion of object and the real object and emphasizes our perception for them (Schopenhauer, 1907, p.103). While considering the conflict between what is perceived and what is thought, he clarifies what is perceived is doubtlessly right and this “victory of perception over thought” lead us pleasure (ibid, p.104). The perception is considered as a certain element of animal nature and occurs to direct satisfaction. On the contrary, the conceptions of thought often contradicts “the gratification of our immediate desires”, they resembles “the vehicles of our fears, our repentance, and all our cares”(ibid, p.104). Just as Hegel sees the superiority of appearance over idea or thought as the source of humour, Schopenhauer views, “the victory of perception over thought” provides origin of humour.

In the late twentieth century, scholars criticized the inadequacy of incongruity for humour. For instance it has been criticized in terms that it provides a definition too broad, by Tomas Kulka (2007,p.322). He points out that the approach has a problem when the pleasurable feature of humour is considered (ibid.p.324). The amusement and laughter are seen as pleasurable by all theorists from ancient times to the present time. However, why the violence of the expectations and disappointment makes us laugh or amuse us? Most likely the incongruity approach sees incongruity as it is amusing and pleasurable one rather than being disturbing. So how we distinguish those pleasurable incongruities from the disturbing ones? The distance principle asserted by McGraw in his study, *What Makes Things Funny?* gives an insight to evaluate the question. According to the principle, someone who experiences humour should be distant enough from the incongruity (McGraw, p.76). For example, in case of joking, if a person will be only the spectator instead of being butt of a joke, that would be amusing for spectator, even it is kind of a practical joke. On the contrary, the butt of a joke might experience severe disappointment as a result of an unexpected turn and surprise. Then it is fulfilled in case of an object has features which are incongruent with the features accepted by subject as socially normal or with his individual sense of the normal and which is therefore perceived by the subject as abnormal. Nevertheless, here the abnormality is not too intense or painful to a certain extent and it cannot molest the subject's sense of personal security.

Incongruity approach describes humour as incongruity. The understanding of incongruity has been from subjective perspective in which incongruities must be considered along with the reference to human characters and relations. Hence, this consideration refers to the social substance of humour that is involved in flux, like the life itself, it is not stable but dynamic and alive just as an action contains comical elements. What would lead us to mention and analyse humour as comical action.

2.2.2 Humour as comical action

Humour is to be understood merely as a comical action, action and comical as two key words to define will be analysed. "To act" is originated from Greek word praxis that is also the root of "practical" in its current usage (Burnham,2000,p.13). What is the meaning of action or "to act" ? And what is its link to humour? "To act" means to

take an initiative in its most general sense, as it is asserted, “to start or to set something in motion”(Arendt,1958, p. 176). “New coming and beginning by virtue of birth” refers that the life has begun by an action (p.176). That is to say, the beginning, progression and sustainability for the practice of living rely on nothing but action. It is an indispensable feature of “living beings” that are humans (ibid,p.176) It is the necessity of men or the human plight. Aristotle (1984) also maintains that the movement , the ability of a living being comes from praxis, from action (405b34,406a1). To make an alteration in the world signify to act whenever someone acts something happens and is altered in the world (Korsgaard, 2009, p.95) in which we live and the entity of world as being in flux. Furthermore “The necessity of choosing and acting is not only causal logical, but it is our plight; it is the simple inexorable fact of human condition (ibid, p.2)”.

If an action contains comical elements, it denotes an action that aims to create an amusement or amusing result would be the side effect. What is particular to this action is its quality of being social. It is certain kinds of social activity either in everyday life or in art (Dziemidok,p.3). Comical action could be what makes a human being to be human being. Likewise, Borev, suggests understanding of the comical and correspondingly humour is possible considering its social nature: “A phenomenon may be comical only by means of its social significance as well as through its natural, biological or physiological properties.”(Borev, p.118). According to him the comical is not primary to the natural phenomenon and it is the social substance that makes the natural form as comical that is simultaneously ludicrous. Likewise, Bergson emphasizes the social importance of the concept and remarks that it is an indicator that how “human imagination works”, particularly social and collective imagination (Bergson,1911, p.3). In addition, he also credits the incongruity between the essence of reality that is “automatic” and “rigid” and the life that is mobile and alive is the source of comical action. It is “something mechanical encrusted upon living”(ibid, p.17). Hence comical action is socially relevant. Just as the comical action, humour also social by its very nature and it is peculiar to mankind.

So far, humour has been described as incongruity and comical action. It is a distinctive characteristic of human beings and having a social nature points out

another characteristic of humour that is its communicative property. It is also a communicative act.

2.2.3 Humour as a type of communication

Humour is conceived as type of communication here. It is a communicative activity performed in several kinds of interactions. As Oxford English Dictionary definition states communication is “interpersonal contact, social interaction, association” and also “The transmission or exchange of information, knowledge, or ideas, by means of speech, writing, mechanical or electronic media, etc.; an instance of this” (Url 2). Humour is also defined as a message sent by an individual or group with psychological motivations” (Lynch,p.430). This message can be an intended or an unintended but as a social relation it is resulted from a link between self and other. Moreover, the message or humour itself can be verbal or nonverbal, planned or spontaneous, directed or undirected. Humour manifests itself in any public sphere where two or more individuals involved so its outcomes or effects would be the concern of this communication. It becomes important to ask “Who says in which channel to whom and to what effect? (Davis, 2008, p.549).” From the communicative perspective and there are some elements in order to reveal the complexity of understanding and appreciating humour like sender, receiver, culture, situational characteristics. Even humour is a universal phenomenon in terms that it is exhibited in all cultures, the sense of humour is a subjective phenomenon that differs based on personality characteristics and values, virtues, vices of the actors of humour. All in all, humour becomes also subjective from the communicative point of view. Mulkay (1988) also explains of humour as a mode of communication. Unlike from serious mode, humour is amusing communication that produce positive emotions and cognitions in the individual or group. Yet, humorous communication that is non-rigid and socially constructed, interrelated with reality, which is firm and rigid.

Unlike the idea that reality is firm and rigid the view suggests the social world non-rigid and constructed social reality based on the humorous modes of perception (Kuipers, p.380). Mulkay also sees the world is constructed, arbitrary, multiple and tenuous. People who are communicating in the serious mode aim to do it in a reasonable, consistent and unambiguous way (ibid, p.215). Then, if serious mode is

such a proper way to communicate why people use unserious mode of communication? According to Mulkay the serious mode is mostly insufficient when we consider “multiplicity of meaning, mixed motives, ambiguities and contradictions that are inherent in all social discourse” (ibid, p.215). What is attractive about the humorous mode is that it provides a space to communicate about those various and contradictory meanings. Similar to communication, humour is a communicative action conducted by the plurality of actors. Humour too refers to a connection between self and other (Fine, 1983, p.159). Moreover just like communication humour needs an interaction between the creator or presenter and the perceiver. It triggers the contribution for two actors whether in consensus or dissensus.

The relationship between the perceiver and the humourist is a context dependent one just as it is among actors of communication. Then, if humour is “a message sent by an individual or group with psychological motivations” the humour is interpreted by another individual or group with respect to the context within it occurs (Lynch,p.430). To be able to experience humorous interaction and communication genuinely, common and shared meanings are required. Since those meanings will be context-dependent, a potentially humorous act between the actors will be interpreted with respect to the context. Thus, the description for something humorous or serious is built in the group of social interactions through those meanings rather than being given and ready-made (ibid, p.377). Humour derives from a group of meaning and culture, in other saying it refers to that system of meanings. Similar to its production, it also is interpreted and apprehended through that certain system of meanings. This circulation indicates that humour is self-referential practice. For instance making a joke is only possible with shared meanings hold by two subjects. Otherwise as form of humour jokes located in the humorous “frame” cannot have any reference to environing conditions and correspondingly neither can be understood nor interpreted.

Communicative property of humour points out its quality as a specific type of language. In this sense, humour is relational to power not only in the service of power but also in the service of undermining power as counter-power.

2.2.4 Humour as exercise of power

Another definitive property of humour is power. Humour as an expression of power can be understood in two ways in terms of its exercise. However, before examining

those accounts it is important to note that the concept of power here should be understood as actual power. That is to say its exercise is central to the view of power as described in Dahl's *The Concept of Power* (1969, p.80).

Humour's relation to some form of power to the idea of outdoing and dominating others. When we laugh at the faults and setbacks of our fellow men and women (a clumsy action for example) we express a feeling of superiority and a corresponding demeaning of the person laughed at. This view has its roots in Hobbes. In this case laughter imply a narcissistic satisfaction ,crowning our success and confirming our higher status. And this is associated with power. In this sense it is highly discriminating, highlighting faults and weaknesses or sometimes even prejudices reinforced by false assumptions.

In the first sense our understanding of humour would related to superiority theory which is originated in Ancient Greek. Superiority approach asserts that humour is the expression of superiority in the sense that we found something or someone ludicrous when we feel superior over them. Both Plato and Aristotle see the ludicrous as negative characteristic of mind and body. According to Plato laughter is malicious and it is directed at vice and leads to self-unawareness (Plato ,p.50). In the *Republic*, he says that the Guardians of the state should avoid laughter, "for ordinarily when one abandons himself to violent laughter, his condition provokes a violent reaction." (Plato, p.388e). His fear of uncontrolled laughter and also suspicion of anything causes the degradation of rational self-control displays his distrust to humour. Yet, it is not saying the guardians should never laugh. As Plato the guardians of state allowed to mock at the ones who deserves and should laugh for the sake of morality and discipline.

Similarly, Aristotle relates the laughter with degradation and violence. In *Poetics* while questioning the nature of comedy Aristotle notes comedies includes figures "worse than the average and the comic is a sub-species of the ugly" (1963,p. 10). This is the important point to make a relation Aristotle's remarks and superiority approach because the audience in the average level can feel superior to these figures under the average. For instance, when we laugh at the clumsiness of someone, we express a feeling of superiority and a corresponding degradation of the person laughed at. This view also has its roots in Hobbes. The experience of amusement results from a condition lower than us. When we discover other's deficiencies, we feel superior to

them and as a result we laugh (Hobbes, 1999, p.11:13). Laughter is counted as a sign of pleasure taken from other's foolishness, when we realize our quality which is not owned by them. While thinking about his view on human nature that is stupid, vain, greedy, cruel, ruthless, dirty, lubricious, and deficient it seems to be consistent that he claims humour is resulted from an implicit position of superiority.

Secondly, humour as exercise of power can be associated the survival sense. In this sense it has also demeaning quality however this time it is a degradation of dominance of more powerful ones. Scruton (1986) claims that "laughter de-values its object in the subject's eyes" and that the process of de-valuing is "integral to humour"(p.160). Then humour as an exercise of power struggles with the power of its object. As opposed to first type of exercise it is the liberating power that promotes the survival of humour authors.

Freud also stresses a liberating element in humour, which also may give a better insight about the power element of humour. In his essay Humour, he considers humour as a response that we give to the adverse situations (1998, p.260). Accordingly, humour not only has a liberating element but also has something elevating. Humour is "which is strong enough to assert itself here in the face of the adverse real circumstances"(ibid, p.263). In this way it is narcissist, invulnerable in terms that it refuses to be hurt by the troubles of reality or to suffer.

In both kinds humour is an exercise of power yet, their way of practice is variable. The distinction can be understood best by a few examples. For instance, if a joke about anti-Semitism told by a Jew would be different kinds of exercise than the case in which the same joke told by an outsider for the purpose of feeling superior corresponding to insult (Speier,1998,p.78). On the one hand, if its told by a Jewish person it is a joke at the teller's own expense and self-mockery on the other it would become a joke told at someone else's and mockery of other's culture and religion. Self-mockery bring forth awareness "the ability to step one's own immediate concerns"(Roberts,p.16). This kind of exercising power devalues the dominants. A member of a minority group actually ridicules the idea of being superior of those who have kind of mentality and discourse that undermines the group. For instance, Shazia Mirza who is a British stand-up performer with Pakistani and Muslim backgrounds, made a joke after 9/11 events and referring that attack; "My name is Shazia Mirza. At least, that's what it says on my pilot's licence"(Url 4). Audiences

were delighted by this joke and many more jokes about her experiences about being Muslim and Asian. Those experiences are where she has faced with biased and intolerant reactions, incongruous with the reality. What is common to all jokes is that they mock the dominant idea of “other’s” race or religion that is full of prejudices settled on Western societies. By taking out the comedy from prejudiced and predominant mentality, she undermines it and devaluates its power by using power namely, humour. Humour as an exercise of power, may not alter dominant mentality of those but it creates an illusion that would keep society sane and stable, yet, it can be potentially resistant in shaping an independent thinking.

Since humour has been taken into account as a thick concept it is a concept that loaded evaluatively and has also value character. Having made the conceptualization of humour by the descriptive properties of humour as incongruity, comical action and communication and exercise of power, now normative implications of humour is required to be discussed.

2.3 Normative Implications: Humour as Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value

So far, humour has been inquired by its descriptive elements and it is stated as experience of incongruity, comical-social action and as a mode of communication and exercise of power. With reference to our starting point that humour as one of the thick concepts, humour is required to be examined as a kind of value by means of normative implications. Accordingly, humour will be considered as an intrinsic and extrinsic value. In the former case humour will be the value that is end in itself whereas in the latter humour will have an instrument that serves for certain ends, in other words as means to ends.

2.3.1 Humour as intrinsic value

First, humour as an intrinsic value means that it is valuable in itself rather than being means to an end. It would not be fulfilled by any intention rather it is in itself. On the other hand humour as an extrinsic value is for the sake of something else that is its external purpose. This issue can be grasped best by Collingwood’s account on the distinction between art and craft, since it has many resemblances. Accordingly, actions as means to ends, involved in the craft category (Collingwood, 1958, p.20). A craftwork like a ceramic pot made by a potter would differentiate from a pot with

artistic qualification with the idea of utility. A craftwork would be executed for the sake of some other end, either for money, for reputation, for any kind of usage. However an artwork would be lacking this direct purpose relation. It will be for the sake of itself with no prior intention preceding it (ibid, p.24). It is distinct process of planning from the process of execution. While ends precede means in planning in order to be acquired as a result, in execution means precede ends. Moreover, “art proper” is described as an expression that is to express emotions (ibid, p.110) which would be something also compatible with the understanding of humour as an intrinsic value. Then, for a humorous artwork, the artist should express himself with an aim of exploring his own emotions, not for the sake of creating mere amusement. In his discovery the audiences should only witness to it and “enable them to make a similar discovery about themselves (ibid, p.219)”. This process of expression for an artist aims to have an end that is to become conscious about his emotions. As a matter of fact it has an expectation in this way but the only thing is to experience the reflexive effect at the end. In other words, humour as an intrinsic value is an experience to express or to act which is not a one single process but a process as a whole which would have self-reflexivity effect at the end.

2.3.2 Humour as extrinsic value

Second type of humour as an extrinsic value is practiced by certain kinds of intentions like laughter, amusement or criticism. No matter what kind of intention is humour has an instrumental role and it is not an act in itself yet for the sake of something else. For instance a humorous work that is designed with the intention of giving rise laughter, pleasing the audience would be an example of craft as Collingwood would suggest. However in opposition to Collingwood’s insight, Tolstoy (1970) views art as one of the means of intercourse between men and thus “as indispensable means of communication”(p.751). The communicative property of humour can be corresponded to the intention for interaction and communication. With this regards, humour should be for the sake of interaction and communion. In order to have those outcomes, people should have two capacities; the capacity to receive thought and the capacity of being infected. If people lacked “the capacity being infected by art they might be almost mere savage still and more separated from, and more hostile to, one another”(ibid ,p.751). Likewise, humour can function in the same way in the sense it makes people more open to interact with each other

and tolerant to differences. In opposition a person who does not any sense of humour cannot be involved in this journey rather he/she remains strict and rigid like the serious mode suggests.

As articulated by Morreall (2005) the former category as aesthetic humour while the latter as instrumental humour (p.74). Aesthetic humour has no intention while it is generated. However it would have several natural consequences as a result of its existence. Whereas instrumental humour aims to attain various outcomes whether good or bad.

2.3.3 Good humour vs bad humour

Humour as an intrinsic or extrinsic value can have negative or positive quality. Since positivity and negativity of humour both as an intrinsic and extrinsic value would have a significant influence on the evaluation process, it is necessary to consider this difference with regard to its nature as well as its impacts.

Humour has been treated as both positive and negative phenomenon. This distinction is often related to the forms and styles of humour. In consideration of styles, humour is needed to be distinguished as “positive, loving, healing” humour and “negative, aggressive and destructive” humour (Hagaseth,1988, p.12). As it is pointed out, positive humour is relevant to optimism while pessimistic perspective provides the basis of negative humour with forms irony, satire, sarcasm (ibid,p.60). Moreover, positive humour is expected to have beneficial effects that 'will promote love healing and creativity' and negative humour is thought to has harmful effects (ibid,p.24). However, this point is doubtful in the sense that negative humour would also have beneficial effects like revealing hypocrisy, improving criticism. Having two categories as beneficial and harmful humour parallel to its positivity and negativity would be hard to acquire. Therefore, making a distinction in terms of its results would be a way more challenging task. Just as it has stated contrary to what would be believed negative humour has not always harmful effects. Perhaps satire as having a negative form, is the most obvious example of instrumental humour serves most often positive functions. Apart from that it also indicates the path between humour and the political and makes it clear. The history of satire from Horace and Juvenal satire's has been an expression of social and political criticism (Gray et al, 2009, p.11). Satire is a form of political discourse and a particularly potent form of political

communication (ibid,p.12). It may ridicule its target but the purpose of it would be “positive change” even it attempts this in a negative manner (ibid,p.12). Then, satire’s role in public space is being provocative rather than being dismissive. Satire is the use of humour that ridicules a subject by diminishing or derogating it in order to criticize shortcomings of it (Abrams, 2005, p.34). The critique may be conducted towards to individuals, institutions or groups. It is distinguished from other comedic forms in terms that while satire derides; that is, it uses laughter as a weapon, and against a butt that exists outside the work itself, the comic in that comedy evokes laughter mainly as an end in itself. Satire has usually been justified by those who practice it as a corrective of human vice and folly (ibid, p.45). Thus, its frequent claim is to ridicule the failing rather than the individual, and to limit its ridicule to corrigible faults, excluding those for which a person is not responsible. Then despite of the fact that, satire as a form of humour uses negative style, it can be counted as good humour in terms of its effects. In other words, it is the positive negativity of satirical humour.

As a form of humour satire points out the necessity further inquiry of humour in political context humour. It is required to make the moral ground clearer and distinguish it from political justification of humour in which it is questioned that whether it is justifiable or not in terms of power relations and political virtues.

2.4 Humour in Political Thought

Humour has been defined as a form of communication, incongruity comical action and power. In these senses, humour in politics refers a communicative source that deals with the incongruities in political discourse by making them visible. Humour is emerged based on the reality, however at the same time emphasizes the incongruities located in that reality and by playing with them converts the reality. Likewise, humour in political discourse originated in political reality and stresses the incongruities in political sphere. For instance a political joke is a representation an incongruity between the supposedly idea of butt of the joke and its existence as it is in the sense of reality.

It is important to make a distinction here between humour in general and humour in politics. Even though humour in general sense and humour in politics has similar techniques and structure , the latter often differ as being more sensitive than the

former in terms of its subjects, participants, acceptance. Because, the actors of humour in politics are less neutral and this makes political humour potentially an disturbing form. A political joke is “not universally considered to be in good taste by all members of the society, for it deals explicitly with certain beliefs held by only a portion of the society (Mulkey, 1988, p.85-86)”. Hence, the conditions of humour creation and the relation between the subjects and objects of humour would have a great impact on the appreciation process corresponding to the evaluation and justification of humour. Once again, it is the political justification of humour that would vary depending on the context.

2.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, what has been tried in this chapter is to describe humour as incongruity, comical action, as a type of communication and exercise of power. First, it is to experience incongruities in the social realm. It has stated as comical action in sense that its peculiarity to mankind and corresponding to being social. With regards to social quality it has assessed a communication in which the use of language and understanding never cease as long as the interaction to endure. Lastly, humour has described as an exercise of power first in the sense of superiority and second liberation. In addition to those descriptive properties, humour has been revealed both as an intrinsic value, activity in itself and as an extrinsic value with external purposes. Besides it can have two different kinds of styles whether it can be aggressive or benign and it can be potentially amusing as well as potentially abusive. In particular, humour as an expression of power in the political discourse would trigger the justification question since it is hard to have a consensus about its goodness.

What had been tried to be attained with this discussion was not confine to humour into boundaries but rather enable it to be defined for its importance on the further study of the justification of humour as political phenomenon. Since every aspect of human existence is intervoven with the political, the philosophical conceptualizations of humour should be considered within the political thought. In this regard, humour as having good or bad value will be examined in the sense of conflict and consent. The first link that is between humour and the political will be build by means of power element of humour. Therefore, what will be held in the next

chapter will be to as what makes humour political and to discuss the concepts of the political and power in order to consider political justification of humour. I argue that humour as an expression of power can have both liberating and oppressive role depending on its subjects and context. Power in the sense of “power over” or power for will intensify the insight of oppressive humour whereas power in the sense of “power to” will attribute liberating humour. This distinction between liberating and oppressive humour will be also associated with the power relations between subjects of humour.

3. WHAT MAKES HUMOUR POLITICAL?

This chapter aims to discover the connection between humour and the political since the aim of this study is to argue that what makes justify humour as political phenomenon. In order to connect humour and the political which political thought can be suggested compatible with the philosophical approaches of humour as incongruity, comical action, communication and an exercise of power? Political potentiality of humour has already been recognized by several scholars (Speier, 1998; Palmer, 2005). In particular, as an inherent one power exerting function will be the concern for having an understanding about connection between the political and humour. Before investigating this connection, it would be necessary to have an account on the concept of the political and power. Hence, several approaches will be revealed; on the one hand, the political is viewed as a scope of free discussion and public deliberation, on the other, it is asserted as an area of antagonism, power relation and conflict. The understanding of “the political” will belong to the latter one in order to emphasize the superiority aspect of the power while expressing humour. It will be argued that all kinds of humour are political in terms that humour is expression and exercise of power. When it comes to considering power, two ways of conceptualization will be evaluated; first is as “power to” act and “power over” someone. In other words, first account of power would refer ability to act whereas second would explain in as control and coercion over someone. Either the former or the latter sense power will be understood in association with the political that is conceptualized as sphere of conflict and hegemony. Then, humour as power is distinguished along with those sense of power. While liberating humour is revived in the frame of power to act and oppressive humour is arouse in the sense that power over or power over someone. This distinction will be based upon actors and targets of humour; authority is the object in liberating humour whereas it becomes the subject in oppressive case. Since, power relations among the subjects of humour will have role on the political evaluation on humour, an interrogation on the failure and acceptability of humour will be conducted later on. Politically, humour can be justifiable depending on its context in which power relations between the people of

humour matters. Besides, justice and freedom will be two political virtues that would justify humour. However, by the assumption that humour is always political, as a matter of superiority, power, hostility and liberation, it will be concluded that the main question is not political rather but ethical one, which leads to contemplate about what values justify humor.

3.1 The Question of Political

This part will try to build an understanding of the political in order to have further account on the relation between the political and humour. The study would grounded on a political thought in which morality is separated from politics. Since possible answers to the question what makes humour political, are based upon our understanding of the political, it would be inevitable for us to have a basis, namely an approach for the political. But before, the concept of political should be distinguished from politics to preclude terminological confusions. The remark of Chantal Mouffe (2005), would be helpful to envisage the distinction between the political and politics (p.8). According to this distinction, politics can be understood as an “ontic” term refers to practical dimension whereas the political is an “ontological” one denotes “the very way in which society is instituted” (ibid, p.8). While politics denotes “set of practices and institutions”, political denotes constitution of human societies (ibid,p.9). Thus while the former involved in the realm of political theory the latter would be in the empirical field.

Two significant accounts would be worth considering for the purpose to present political thought compatible with the theoretical base of humour as power. First, the political has been conceptualized as the area of free deliberation free discussion. One of the most prominent representative of the former approach is Hannah Arendt can be identified by the tradition originated by Aristotle (d'Entrèves,1994,p.2). Arendt asserts that roots of the political lied down under the deliberation and persuasion not under “force and violence”(Arendt, 1958, p.26). The genuine character of the political is attained by the deliberation in a public space which is a free space settled in the realm of social (ibid,p.30). On the contrary, second approach reveals the nature of the political as conflictual and antagonistic. The content of politics defined by “we” identity relational to “others” which potentially turn into friend- enemy distinction (Schmitt, 2007, p.34; Mouffe, 2005 p.21). This perspective leans its ideas

on the view that human beings are evil by nature and they needed to be controlled which requires the state.

The latter perspective constructs the understanding of “the political” in order to analyse the connection with humour, nevertheless more “tamed” version of it as Mouffe suggests (2005, p.20). The perspective views the political both as an area of conflict and power struggle and order, legitimacy. In this manner the understanding of political humour would be brighter due to the dualistic nature of humour it has both negative and positive nature and effects. Thus, Carl Schmitt’s conceptualization will be concerned first which defines political as antagonism and friend-enemy distinction. Next interest will be on Chantal Mouffe’s approach that is similar to Schmitt’s thought in terms of their challenge to liberalism and conflictive nature of the political. However, Mouffe (2005) is differentiated from him by means of her research for alternative understandings of friend enemy distinction in order to make the distinction compatible with democratic pluralism (ibid, p.21). Last concern will be on Derrida’s analysis on the political that explains it with friendship (1993, p. 359). Political is defined as antagonistic and conflictive space composed of we-they distinction in which the identification of “we” is always relational to the “others”.

Schmitt (2007) claims that in order to define the political we must clarify a specific distinction (p.25). Inspired by the distinctions in several fields like beautiful and ugly in aesthetics or good and evil in ethics he interrogates what would be the distinction peculiar and constitutive to the political (ibid, p.26). Accordingly, it is the friend-enemy distinction. What is essential to it is the property of being public not private (ibid,p.28). Thus one may have personal enemies however this has not do to with the political. The necessary condition for a public enemy is its relevance to the collectivity of men. This could be better understood by means of mutual enmity between two groups and the most extreme result of that grouping would be war (ibid, p.28). The political is defined as an antagonism at utmost degree “and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping (ibid, p.29)”.

Since political enemy is the other, the stranger, in certain situations there is the possibility of conflict with that enemy. But what makes him a political enemy? The decision is not based on “the judgement of a disinterested” but the norms specified beforehand. Then this process of forming “we” in contrast to “they” in a collective

manner that creates conflictive and antagonistic space is a matter of decision (*ibid*, p.27). The state “as an organized political entity” become an actor of this decision process, the friend enemy distinction (*ibid*, p.30). However, liberal states are criticized due to their potential of being inadequate in terms of make a proper friend-enemy group. As Schmitt thinks the idea that conflicts among agents can be solved by the public deliberation, is a sign inadequacy of liberal thought (*ibid*, p.45). Because it ignores the necessity of the political constituted from friend-enemy distinction. He criticizes this optimistic perspective on solution of conflict because he claims that all true political considerations formed their approach based on the idea that man is by nature evil, dangerous and risky being (*ibid*,p.58-68). Hence, it is necessary to control him by a certain authority, state. And the state must be able to make decision on the friend-enemy distinction (*ibid*,p.35). People are required to subject themselves to something or someone what has to be beyond legal process. The antagonistic character of the political excludes the idea that rational agents participate to free discussion and compromise through public deliberation. The human nature is seen as dynamic and dangerous beings and political is relational to the the conflict between friends and enemies.

Likewise, Chantal Mouffe (2005) views that the political is constituted by the antagonistic dimension which challenges the liberal thought credits public deliberation and consensus (p.2). She asserts that antagonism is the constitutive and central dimension of the political and human societies, which becomes unable to seen by the liberal perspective (*ibid*, p.2). Particularly, the challenge is conducted against two of the most common features of liberal thought. First is individualism and second the idea that it is possible to observe reconciliation among the rationalist agents, that leads to universal consensus (*ibid*, p.11). On the contrary as aforementioned antagonism constrains the any possibility of rational consensus.

Even though her challenge to liberal thought similar to Schmitt’s work to a certain extent, they differentiates in the way they see friend-enemy relation. As it could be remembered, Schmitt has viewed when we/they relation turns into an antagonistic form namely, friend/enemy relation, the necessary condition for the political is accomplished (Schmitt, 2007, p.30). On the other hand, Mouffe (2005) suggests an alternative form to this relation; agonistic rather than antagonist (p.20). Her purpose is to build a common base for both democratic pluralism and “eradicability of

antagonism” so that she provides an agonistic model composed of not “enemies” but “adversaries”. Yet, for Schmitt there is no place for plurality in democracy (ibid,p.20). His understanding of democracy is composed of homogenous “demos” thus this makes pluralistic feature impossible. In this sense Schmitt’s approach to the political is consistent with democratic politics. On the other hand Mouffe’s suggestion of agonism leaded by different understanding of liberal democratic politics. Her approach to the political centred around struggle, not physical elimination like Schmitt (ibid, p.21). Mouffe’s model includes adversaries rather than enemies (Mouffe, 2005, p.20). Adversaries are aware of there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless, they accept the legitimacy of each other. Conflict is essential, while agents are in association politically however they share “a common symbolic space (ibid, p.20)”. In this sense, the political not only consist of conflict but also principles of order and commonality.

If we think of different forms of humour in relation to the distinction between friend-enemy and friend-opponent relation, what forms would be compatible with which category? Inferentially, racist jokes would belong to the first category since they arose from the idea of racism, which can’t stand a sphere of plurality. In this sense, jokes nurtured from racism are completely antagonist whether obviously or implicatively reveal its message. Moreover, the vulgar language and the intention of harm of those jokes signify the friend-enemy case. We can say only negative humour in terms of both its nature and effects is always antagonistic. On the contrary, satiric magazines, variety shows, political cartoons would be the examples of the second category where the legitimacy of the opponents is accepted as representation of friend-opponent distinction. In particular, they sustain the public consciousness by criticizing the dominant discourses. Although, they counter hegemonic discourse, mostly they do that to the extent permitted by the “common symbolic space” that they share. They may contribute to the ongoing articulation of political thought by transforming the forms of hegemony into an agonistic field of proliferating voices. In addition, the teasing between two politicians who are opponents in the election could exemplify the friend-opponent distinction.

Moreover, the notion of hegemony is considered as a central theme to the question of the political (Mouffe, 2005, p.17). We can call something as “political” in case “it is the expression of particular structure of power relations (ibid, p.18)”. Whether social

or political, any order is “the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices (ibid, p.18)”. Thus, “the frontier between the social and the political” is not substantial and stable and order is result from “the exclusion of other possibilities.” (ibid, p.18). As Mouffe (2005) asserts we can call any order as “political” as long as it articulates “a particular structure of power relations” (p.18). There is the potentiality of being challenged for every hegemonic order, the practices that challenge the hegemonic order, are “counter hegemonic practices” which aims to transform “the existing hegemonic order” into the different form (ibid, p.18).

Exclusion of others can be best grasped with the notion “difference” asserted by Derrida (1993, p.354). He evaluates Schmitt’s concept of the political and concerns “the oppositional negativity” referring the hostile nature of politics (ibid, p.355). Accordingly, if political is explained by the friend-enemy distinction, the understanding of friend is important as well as the enemy. Nevertheless, in Schmitt analysis it only described within the “friend-enemy” opposition. Derrida (1993) describes a certain type of friendship relevant to the superiority(p.360). For instance “the friendship of a divine being for a man, of a governor for the governed” denotes the superior relation between friends (ibid, p.360). Here, it is obvious that there is hierarchal relation. Differences are constructed mostly based upon the hierarchy. Then the creation of an identity would result in differences since every identity constituted by the other.

If expressing power in a systematic way is constitutive for the political, what would be the account on power? What is power and what does power consist of? When the conceptualizations of power are considered it is realized there are two categories that is “power to” and “power over”. Gerald (2000) distinguishes them; accordingly, “power to” is umbrella term that includes “power over” in sense that having power to do things may use the way having power over others (p.106). “Power to” is linked with the notion power to act (ibid, p.105) which would be in connection with liberating effect of humour. In this sense power is the capacity or ability to fulfil wishes and desires (ibid, p.105). Arendt’s conceptualization which views power as to be able to act in concert (1970, p.44), seems to fit into this category. She states that power can be owned by groups not by individuals and it exists as long as the group maintains their unity (ibid, p.44). If someone possesses power it means that he acts on the behalf of others because he is “empowered” by some amount of people (ibid,

p.44). The support of the people or group is put as necessary condition for power and as soon as it is gone, his power is also disappears. Moreover, the institutional power can be explained by this support and the laws are the consequences of the maintained consent. “All political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power” that are determined by public opinion and once people withdraws their support that is constitutive of power, those institutions becomes nothing (ibid, p.41).

Conceiving power in this way indicates that Arendt’s reference to Ancient tradition once again. The rule of law resulted from “the power of people”, builds the republic. From this point of view power does not refer to a situation in which one command and other obeys rather it is a consensus in which there is no need to justify but to legitimize. Power is stated as “being inherent in the very existence of political communities”(ibid,52).

Arendt’s view of power is parallel to her view of the political where it is a sphere of free speech and public deliberation. Likewise the conceptualization of power indicates that consent is principle among “behave non-violently and argue rationally”(Arendt,1970, p.56). In this sense power contradicts violence what would never be legitimized (ibid, p.52). Power and violence quite the opposites of each other; in case of existence of violence power seem to be at stake or the other way around where power has the complete dominancy, there would be no violence (ibid, p.56). It is a sui generis phenomenon which is actualized with communicative purposes rather than instrumental or strategic ones. This understanding of power would be one pole of humour analysis in which it is treated as intrinsic value. In addition it would refer to humour as an extrinsic value in terms of its instrumental role for the truth.

Thus, the conflictual approaches that deal with the concept of power in terms of having power over someone, comes into consideration. What happens if two or more persons have relationship in which power exists? It signifies that a person has “power over” others, can make them do or believe things that they would otherwise not do or believe (Benn, 1965, p.88). As Gerald (2000) suggests it would better to evaluate two approaches in general that are conflict and effect, in order to avoid confusions in the complex network or power debate (p.106).

Control approach argues that if we are able to control others we have power over them (ibid, p.106). Coercion is necessary condition for having power in the sense of control. For instance, if a father has power over his son, the father controls son's decisions, desires, in short some features of his life by the coercion and brainwashing. It is separated influencing one's decision by means of a dialogue with him (p.106).

The other account on power is the effect approach. Probably one of the most comprehensive analysis made by Lukes (2005) who evaluates three accounts namely, one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three dimensional views (p.16-28). First one, called pluralist approach as well based on Dahl's concept of power (1957), it views power as winning an argument or issue that contains an "actual, observable" conflict (p.16). For instance, a parent wins an argument with their child, so they have the power. Second, he said you have real power if you can set the agenda. This is because you can decide what will be argued about, therefore dictating the situation (ibid, p.24). As an example, the chairman in a meeting has the power as he can decide what is talking about, which means he isn't at risk of being challenged as he can then just change the topic of discussion. The first two faces of power describe how power can be used to overtly get someone to do what you want them to, even if it against their own will. Conversely, the third face of power described how power can manipulate others to do something they might not actually want to do by changing what they want. Instead of an observable conflict there is a "latent conflict" in this situation (ibid, p.28). With reference to his account on power, Lukes points out an insufficiency of the view of conceiving power presented by Arendt. First, it focuses only "power to" without considering "power over". In this way power refers a "capacity", a "facility", an "ability" but not a relationship. Like this it ignores the conflictual approach which refers to "power over" since it focuses on "securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition (p.34)". As aforementioned in the previous chapter humour as an exercise of power could have been performed in both dimensions as "power over" and "power to" depending on its use.

3.2 What Makes Humour Political?

Since our answer to this question would not be independent from our understanding of the political, it has just been described as an antagonism and power struggle. Just as the political, humour is viewed as an expression of conflict or antagonism by the conflict approaches. Speier (1998) states humour as a weapon, a form of attack, a means of defence (p.1352). Humour in the sense that it is an exercise of power, all humour would be political. Then, inherently humour gives rise to an impact of certain power and that makes it political. By being an exercise of power and political it would have an effect on the power relations as well. Humour is political because it is an expression of power correlated with conflict. Furthermore, just as the political, humour a matter of power struggle. I consider humour as political phenomenon not merely by its topic but by its effect. For that very reason, while humour as “power to” act would be liberating, humour as “power over” would be oppressive one. Accordingly, if humour is fulfilled by the strong, he will have power over to the weak and this would represent the oppressive humour while humour of the powerless would refer power to act and will called liberating humour.

In the former sense, humour represses those who are inferior in power by the authority. In case of joking, the butt of the joke namely “victim” will be the weak (ibid, p.1386). However, if the strong laughs with the one who is inferior in power, there is no degradation of the weak rather “the servant may value being allowed to laugh together with his lord” (ibid, p.1388). On the other hand, if the strong laugh at to several defects like stupidity, superstition, desperateness of the weak, the situation become savage and cruel (ibid, p.1389). Such laughter would mock the weak and “fuels the arrogance and ignorance of strong”(p.91). For instance, jokes for the purpose of propaganda used by the totalitarian governments, chose their victims among “political, religious and ethnic minorities”. During the Nazi period it was an obligatory to release those kinds of joke in mass media (ibid, p.1390). Disciplinary humour articulated by Billig (2005, p.202) seems to be primitive form of oppressive humour. Disciplinary humour is defined as the mockery in case that social rules are broken by people (ibid, p.202). Disciplinary way reinforces the power by the humour of mockery against the rule-breakers. Michael Wolf views laughter along with humour is the protector of “norms of correctness”, “social commonality”. For example in work groups people exposed to mockery if they wear in an inappropriate

way (ibid, p.206). Another example can be given from the ethnic jokes made by majority of a culture for the minorities who speaks their language poorly (ibid,p.206). The actor who is superior in power intends to strengthen and maintain his power by ridiculing the weak by disguising into the aim of correction. Even this kind of mockery is intended as form of instruction, the corrective function of it may turn into the repressive consequence for whom is mocked at the end.

Second, liberating humour is considered in the form of “power to” act. If humour is performed by those who are inferior in power, it would liberate them. Humour brings freedom that liberates political constraints, social mores and logic and reason itself. This means that loss of freedom and loss of imagination cause loss of capacity of humour (Morreall, 2009, p.45). Liberating humour is most obviously appeared in the political sphere since it brings non-domination of an individual. Since authority is one of the most significant targets of liberating humour, it is crucial to consider it in particular. Humour directed at authority is nourished from corruption, arrogance, scandals of rulers (Paletz,1990, p.483). It seems very reasonable since humour in general too, sourced by the human follies, defects. Authority holders can be parents, bosses, sport coaches, professors however; our main concern will be on political authority. The existence of political authority is revealed in five different levels, respectively; authority position possessed by an individual, by a policy, position itself, an institution and lastly the whole political regime along with its ideology (Paletz, 1990, p.485). These levels would be determinative about the characteristic of humour. Paletz(1990) suggests a spectrum for the humour directed at authority, it has four degrees; supportive, benign, undermining and subversive(p.483). Accordingly, humour directed against a whole political system would be potentially more subversive than humour targeted an individual in the political discourse (ibid,p.485). Likewise as George Orwell (1968) said: “And the bigger the fall, the bigger the joke. It would be better fun to throw a custard pie at a bishop than at a curate”(p.284).

Liberating humour would have different processes in various political and social contexts. Nevertheless, whether in open societies or strict political regimes the limits of freedom of thought are extended by humour. Political humour and satire are considered important and conducted both at institutional and individual in open societies (Speier,1998; Lockyer and Pickering, 2006). Humorous practices are institutionalized where are the “free spaces” and those in power can be mocked and

ridiculed within their assigned spaces and clear limitations, much is allowed and politics can be criticized clearly (Palmer, 2005, p.78). For instance, during the early period of democracy in Britain political caricature came into existence (Billig,2005,p.209). William Hogarth's works within British caricature conveyed object of mockery and the powerful became who is mocked (ibid, p.209).

On the contrary, in oppressive regimes what is institutionalised is the control and manipulation of political humour instead of humorous genres. The intervention and censor may appear in the private sphere as well as in the media and the public sphere, as an act of the state (Tsakona and Popa, 2011,p.12). Humour is most often encourages by this repressive ambience. For example, politicians were attacked and by political jokes aims at protesting against political authority, coercion, and the monopoly of political power Eastern European Socialist states before 1989 (ibid,p.12).

Liberating humour also seems to have similarities with rebellious humour. Rebellious humour is used to mock social rules and the ruler, namely authority (Billig, 2005, 202). Likewise, social position of the actor is inferior in power than the target of humour. The rules and the rulers are exposed to the mockery in case of rebellious humour (ibid,p.207). It rebels against the social codes, norms, conventions that limit people.

In case of a liberating joke of the powerless, the relation between the joking subject and butt of the joke is not only mutual but also a distorted one, similar to oppressive humour. This distortion caused by the skewed power distribution throughout the society. As Bergson (1911) states: "In laughter we always find and unadmitted intention to humiliate (p.148)". If we take this account for humour in unequal power relations, the jokes are often aggressive. In a similar vein, Freud's approach to humour says it is while we experience humour we feel the aggression simultaneously toward institutions and individuals that are superior to us (1998, p.67). Moreover laughing at those who has power over us denotes hostility (ibid, p.34). The aggression of the powerless might be "brutish and remorseless" however it does not lead to any destruction of power rather it caricatures power (Speier, 1998,p.1395). In a similar vein, Benton (1988) asserts for the political joke have the capacity for "momentarily freeing the lives of millions from the tensions and frustrations (p.54)".

Although political jokes are against “greed, injustice, cruelty and oppression”, they are sourced by them existentially (ibid, p.54).

It can be inferred that humour between unequal power relations can be justified politically, whenever it is performed by the dominated ones in order to promote freedom and justice. As opposed to that, humour is fulfilled by the power-holder by the aim of oppression can not be justified. It is obvious that, anyone would suggest that the latter case cannot be justifiable since it pressurizes the already dominated ones. What remains problematic ethically is the former case in which author of humour feels liberation as a result of the ridicule of the dominants. That would bring forth certain kind of cases within which humour is not tolerated by those who experience it and the ethical discussion of humour.

3.3 Conclusion

So far it has been argued that all kinds of humour are political since it is an expression of power. The political has remarked as a sphere of conflict and antagonism and also as a matter of power. Understanding of power has been in two senses, first is power to act and second power over someone. According to these two understandings of power, and social positions of actors of humour based upon their power degrees, we have considered liberating and oppressive humour. While liberating humour is directed at authority by those who are inferior in power, oppressive humour is fulfilled by the authority itself towards the powerless. In the latter case one could see that authority is the actor of humour while in former case authority is the butt of humour. In order to justify humour politically, liberating humour would be justifiable while oppressive humour cannot be justified since it is against justice and freedom in a society. Nevertheless when liberating humour cannot be always count as justifiable ethically.

If all humour is an expression of power and can be justified according to the power relations politically, the real question should be ethical rather than political. Does that mean humour works should have been tamed depending on moral values? Do or should they have any ethical limitations or it is beyond any moral concerns? In order to interrogate those questions, next chapter will focus on the justification of humour in terms of its consequences classified in psychological, social, aesthetic and political realm.

4. WHAT DOES HUMOUR DO?

Humour has been conceptualized as an experience of incongruity, comical action and a type of communication and an expression of power. Apart from these descriptive elements, humour has considered as intrinsic and extrinsic values and distinguishes into positive and negative. Power element of humour is what makes it political and problematic in terms of justification. Conflictual account of the political has been considered compatible with the understanding of humour as an exercise of power and it has been stated that humour is justifiable politically as long as it liberates the dominated ones whereas it is unjustified if it oppresses the dominated ones. Political justification can be provided depending on that power relations yet, what if the powerless become the powerful? Would it be possible to say, liberating effect would always provides a ground for justification? Exercise of power is an issue ethically problematic and this would lead us the ethical discussion of humour by means the results of humour that would serve one main function what would be the political one. It is required to have an understanding about those functions since ethical discussion of humour cannot be considered independent from the response or reaction process of humour. Whether purposively or not, humour may serve both primary and secondary or derived functions. Both are crucial in terms that they provide the possibility to vivify humorous realm. Functions of humour sometimes can be interwoven and not solely for the sake of a certain definitive property but for all. They involved in a complex network by being integrated to each other as a whole. In this chapter it will be argued that humour as incongruity and comical action, communication and exercise of power will have psychological ,social ,cultural, aesthetic and political functions. Psychologically they are served in order to break tension, to present the self and as a method of coping with embarrassment, socially to build solidarity through in-group inclusion and out-group exclusion, ethnically to create a sense of community, to express hostility, aesthetically for enhancing imagination and social commentary and critique and lastly politically for exerting power. What is necessary is to analyse these outcomes of humour.

4.1 Psychological Functions of Humour

The functions of humour can be investigated first in the realm of psychology. Among psychological results comic amusement would be one of the most significant one. Comic amusement is the state caused by humour. It is necessary to question whether humour is an emotional state or a cognitive process in sense of amusement in order to have a better understanding on its derived effects.

Amusement is qualified as an emotion by Robert Sharpe(p.209). One of the reason given by him is that amusement has objects like emotions. We love or hate some object, similarly amusement requires an object (Sharpe ,.209). Second, there are degrees of amusement so that we can only partially suppress amusement. Just as we can control our fear or anger to a certain degree, we can constrain our amusement partially. Because the physical signal might betray the amusement if it is in a very strong degree. Moreover, amusement can be either positive or negative like emotions (ibid,210). For instance, love is tend to be positive and hate is negative and in general amusement accepted as positive practice, however there are the cases in which it is pernicious. This would be a part of another discussion which will be conducted under the rubric of political humour.

Noel Carroll (2014) also mentions the similarities between the amusement resulted from humour, and emotions. Accordingly, both can be the cause of self-deception (Carroll, p.56). For example, one might want to hide fear and avoid to admit it and the same situation is obvious for the amusement. If we tend to comically amused by a racist joke we might be not willing to express it and conceal it. Also, he states the “animating affective state” for both emotions and comic amusement. If one is angry, there is a tendency of finding more things that reinforce the anger incrementally. Likewise, if one is comically amused, he /she tries to find more “absurdities and circumstances” to multiply the amusement (ibid, p.56) Furthermore, he points out that both emotions and amusement are infectious (ibid,57). Very typical example can be given about the anger and how it can suddenly and gradually increased in a group of people. It can also be observed for the comic amusement among the audiences in a theatre play, after one laughs, it might trigger the others and the effect expands.

One objection to the idea that comic amusement as an emotional state, claimed by Morreall in the sense that amusement connected to cognition. According to Morreall

our amusement occurs in an intellectual level as incongruity approach suggests and there should be cognitive development in a level higher than basic emotions takes place. In a world full of incongruities our capacity to confront with them requires sophisticated level of thinking that leads to a “rational perspective”(Morreall,1986, p.223). The capacity for amusement might be improved together with the progress of reason, since it is able to suppress emotions. While emotions guide our actions, comic amusement has not practical concerns (ibid,p.224). Humorous mode refers to a playful state of mind rather than practical concerns. The playful state of mind is possible with reason. In the favor of Morreall’s objection we can think in case we experience a failure; instead of being sad and depressed and inactive for a certain amount of time, we can make fun of it and become get to work on right away. Thus, we will able to think rationally as an outcome of being amused and escaping engagement with emotions which would harm reasoning by its practical concerns.

The link between comic amusement and cognition is also stressed by also Collins-Swabey. In *Comic Laughter* she argues the comical is perceived as a result of incongruity, may be real one however not a painful one. According to her, it is the intellect itself decides what is worth laughing or not (Collins-Swabey,p.15). Thus we should not restrict the perception of comical to emotional and physiological reactions only. Furthermore, our laughter caused by incongruities and contradictions means that we “reaffirm the supremacy of the logical world and the cogency of thought to grasp it”(ibid ,p.15).

As a matter of fact the examples in the world we live in, would affirm either amusement as emotion or as cognition. It actually depends on the humorous source that gives rise to comic amusement. In favor of Sharpe’s thinking, for instance, amusement sourced by burlesque performance in the form of variety shows includes bawdy comedy and female striptease can be seen as pure emotion. Also, movies involved in light comedy category trigger comic amusement as pure joy for some audiences. Hence, it is not surprising to see IMDB title “Feel-Good Movies” for this category since it refers solely “feeling”. On the other hand there the cases that amusement features rational thinking process as Morreall suggested. For example as a significant source of comic amusement satire motivates the reasoning. Satirical performances are created in order to influence our certain forms of beliefs and actions in the political discourse. Likewise, political caricatures and cartoons give

rise type of amusement demanding an intellectual level of thinking. More precisely, latter examples may contain a kind of comic amusement both emotional and rational. Amusement considered by itself seems to be a consequence ethically defensible, however the object of the amusement is a sensitive matter.

Derived from the amusement another one is, as stressed by Foot and Mc Creddie (2006) self-presenting role of humour (p.300). Accordingly, we express our characters by means of humour if we are in the face of stress or trouble (ibid, p.300). As aforementioned in the previous chapter, the distance principle is accomplished here; by choosing the “humorous perspective” for evaluating source of the stress, someone keeps his/her distance from the trouble. Therefore, confrontation with problems and distressing becomes less tense. Taking problems less seriously even annihilates the stress and functions like a therapy. People who have low sense of humour tend to be experience intense depressions, whereas the ones with high sense of humour are capable of taming the stressful situations in life (ibid,301). Hence, “more self-esteem” and “more realistic standards for the evaluation of self-worth” are considered being related with the high sense of humour (ibid,p.301). Humorous activities are part of our personality which we construct and perform in public space. Exact the opposite way humour can serve self-love that is described as a desire to be evaluated by others and having value compare to others (Rousseau,1997, p.218). Self-love should be understood here in its potentially corrupted form that becomes a source of vice once we determine our self-worth based upon the feeling of superiority over others (ibid, p.218). This use of humour is also an example for negative humour, namely ridicule. For instance, someone produces humour based upon bodily or spiritual defects by means of ridiculing and exaggerating them, satisfies his self-love at the end. The emphasis is on the comparative feature that demands not only being valued by others but also the need for feeling superior compare to others (ibid, p.218). Articulated as “amour-propre” by Rousseau (ibid ,p.218) translated as vanity, is not a natural sentiment but relational and artificial sentiment arose in the realm of social. Hence, particularly negative humour that is social by nature is motivated by self-love and reciprocally causes it as an outcome. This would be one of the unethical outcome of humour since it promotes the arrogance and oppressive feature of humour.

Another psychological function, which resembles to the previous one, would be anxiety management (Kuipers, 2008, p.371). But how humour helps to moderate anxiety level? Humour is a tension release and relief process that triggers amusement as relief approach would have explained. Then, in case of high levels of stress that is unwanted and unpleasant, it takes the role to reduce it by bringing us from threatening situation to safe situation (ibid, p. 371). It should be emphasized that sharing that humour and amusement with a “fellow sufferer” of anxiety would reinforce the effect (Foot and McCreddie,2006, p.305). This denotes social feature of humorous experience. Moreover, humour would be therapeutic for both humourists and their spectators.

Likewise anxiety, humour makes easier to cope with embarrassment. As a result of an accidental situation we experience embarrassment and in order to alter our “image” by acting like a trivial thing has just happen (ibid,p.304). For instance, when we fall down, if it is not too painful and serious we act like it is only an accident try to give the message that anyone could have been in the same position by making fun of ourselves. We are distant enough from the threat of being hurt as the distance principle would suggest. Coping with stress, anxiety management are another outcomes seemed to be ethically acceptable likewise the amusement itself.

All those psychological functions have indicated that whether individually or collectively, humour helps us to deal with unpleasant experiences. They show the therapeutic potential of humour. Collective aspect indicates that humour’s functions would be social as well as psychological. It controls the everyday social interactions and “facilitate or inhibit the flow of conversation”(ibid,p.302). Just as it affects the daily interactions, it serves consequences for a whole society or social group that will be our concern under the rubric of social effects of humour.

4.2 Social Functions of Humour

As it could be recalled from the second chapter, humour is social by its very nature. It is the crucial aspect of the social life. It leaks every area of everyday practices and interactions whether it is appropriate or inappropriate. As a result humour has several functions on the realm of social.

First, humour provides social cohesion. Gary Alan Fine (1983) asserts, every group aims to maintain its unity towards any potential threat and humour is a very good reaction to this danger (p.173). In case of a “tragic situation” within which the group struggles to alter their position “by poking fun at their oppressors”, particularly by means of “gallows humour” which is the most significant source of cohesive function (ibid,p.173). The gallows humour is not unfamiliar to the society in Turkey. The most obvious examples have been performed during the Gezi Movement in June 2013 in order to cope with the police violence that concludes visible cohesion in the society. Street humour was the most prominent examples involves several street writing with full of statements from different kind of moods. Like “Pepper gas makes the skin healthy”, “Police! Help! Oh never mind, I guess you’re busy.” referring the response of police that is excessively violent and “You banned alcohol, the people sobered up!” referring the recent ban on alcohol implemented by parliament (Url 5).

What is common to all is that the people ridicules both themselves and practices of government and its institutional organizations. They step outside the immediate concerns by the comic distance and improve solidarity among them.

However humour’s cohesive function is not special to oppressed groups. In the case study conducted in the hospital ward, it has been showed that joking gives rise to cohesion, solidarity between patients (Coser, 1959, p.172). Moreover, humour is interpreted as an “invitation” and its goal as decreasing social distance. If it responded with a laugh or a smile it means that the invitation has been accepted (ibid, p.172). Hence, the shared experience and shared laughter indicate that group members have communal relation and identity through the inclusive function of humour.

On the other hand there is “exclusive function” of humour that is articulated as “the flip side of this inclusive function” (Kuipers, 2008 ,p.370). For those who does not accept the invitation and does not participate to laughter, humour will provide exclusion. Exclusive function is considered as a foundation of the social corrective and control function of humour (ibid, p.370).

How humour controls the members of a social group? Billig (2005) reviews corrective function of humour in close relation with the embarrassment (p.201). If one unintentionally fails to comply with every day norms, he/she will probably be

embarrassed. This embarrassment is comical on the eye of beholders (ibid,p.202). Since actors afraid of to be embarrassed through ridicule, to be laughed at, humour in the sense of ridicule provides correction and control as a protective of social order (ibid,p.202). This perspective refers to the cruel and aggressive feature of humour. Some thinks aggression element, at least to a certain degree, should be inherently possessed by humour (Norrick, 2001, p.1438). Aggressive humour intentionally and perniciously turned against a victim that would be constitutive for teasing and mocking. Bergson (1911) also views that humour aims at controlling group members, usually through ridicule, and make them to accept group norms and deny the deviance (p.21). Members of society are surrounded by particular social norms towards which they must be sensitive. People cannot think themselves separated from others and each individual 'must model himself on his environment' (ibid, 135). Being laughed at is dreadful for people because Humour causes potential humiliation for the one who is directed at, mostly in a cruel manner (ibid, p.135). For that very reason humour serves corrective and control function.

In order to have a better understanding of control function, social roles have important role. It can be appeared between the superior and the subordinate or between equals. For instance between a parent and a child or two people who are flirting. The case study conducted by Coser (1959), points out that social hierarchy has an impact on the degree and course of joking (p.168). Joking by keeping everyone "in their place" maintains the hierarchy among the doctors, nurses and patients protects the social order. Then, the position of teller is a determinant on the impact of humour.

Social roles are significant about the interpretation of a humorous act whether it has negativity or positivity, it is good or bad. While the fool has the potential to be the butt of the joke, the joker is expected to be the subject of the joke.

In addition to social roles context of the group is determinative for the function of humour. Then, humour can result in inclusion and exclusion at once. It is a matter of "idioculture" that is defined as "a system of knowledge, beliefs, behaviours and shared by members of an interacting group to which members can refer and employ as the basis of further interaction"(Fine,1983,p.170). Accordingly the content of humour has to be understandable to the group otherwise it does not provoke any apprehension and reaction (ibid, p.170). Otherwise, members of the group find

references familiar to their experiences and share the joy, this makes identification process stronger. At the same time, humour excludes and differentiates people who does not have the knowledge of the in-group's reference or structure (Lynch,2002, p.434). More intense form of differentiation and exclusion function of humour might be served for the purpose of discrimination. Ethnic humour that targets particular ethnic groups, is the most obvious example of it, particularly ethnic joking. Christie Davies in his work *Ethnic Humour Around the World* examines the ethnic jokes, accordingly the joker belong to dominant group, tells a joke about those whose characteristics outside the norm by "surplus or deficit" and this is humorous to the dominant group. Ethnic jokes are categorized depending on their stereotypes they articulate. Those stereotypes are "dirty, mean, canny, cowardly or militaristic."(Davies,1990, p.40). These stereotypes are supported in the hand of narrow-minded people that would strengthen also existing ideology, status and values within the dominant group (Foot and McCreaddie,p.301). It is negative in terms that it is fulfilled with the intention of expressing hostility against those groups inferior. Creating in groups and social cohesion would be ethically defensible but how they treat to others is a sensitive issue.

Thus, the role of humour can differ within in-group and out group; while humour contributes the identification of in-group, it differentiates another group. In this sense humour is an expression of culture since it denotes a certain meaning and value. Culture contains certain aesthetic codes as well as common beliefs, behaviours. As a result, aesthetic functions will be considered, which enhances imagination and creativity.

4.3 Aesthetic Functions of Humour

To be able to have an insight about aesthetic functions of humour, it is necessary to envisage the connection between humour and aesthetic experience. Humour is accepted as an aesthetic experience in terms of its disengagement both knowledge and truth (Morreall, 2004 ,p.70). Perceiving or contemplating of something is the experience end in itself not for the sake of something else. As the "disinterestedness" would explain; lack of self-concern and personal advantage are crucial features of aesthetic experience. "Humorous amusement" too, is not related any practical concerns and is not in order to attain anything (ibid ,p.70).

Moreover for Morreall, both humor and aesthetic experience involve the use of the imagination, are accompanied by a sense of freedom, and often lead to surprises that we did not anticipate (ibid, p.71). Examples, within literary or performing arts in comedy genre reinforce the connection between humour and aesthetic experience (ibid, p.71). Imagination, surprise and creativity would be some of the most significant family resemblances between humour and aesthetic experience.

Aesthetic functions of humour are very much associated with those characteristics which are similar to humour and aesthetic experience. According to Gordon (2012), humorous experience serves aesthetic functions as soon as it arouses imagination and creativity, triggers novel comprehensions about human existence and provokes critical thinking about the issues taken for granted (p.66).

How humour feeds imagination and creativity namely functions aesthetically? In fact, it does that by means of its intrinsic elements such as surprise. Humour pleases our imagination by surprising us. It contains unexpected juxtaposition of ideas and relationships and it inverts values. According to Speier (1998), unexpectedness in a single point would give the best efficiency of surprise element (p.1361). Creativity is also strengthened by means of humour. The language of humour is called “a puzzle takes on a high-spirited recklessness” (ibid, p.1369), that is there is almost no boundaries within the world of humour at least in terms of its being beyond actuality. Humour seems to have reciprocal relationship with imagination and creativity in other words loss of imagination would be loss of ability for humour.

Thought provoking and promoting new insights would be other aesthetic functions of humour (Gordon, 2012, p.66). Humour provides us the second insight about the reality. This second view is the outcome of humour in other words a situation becomes humorous “when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether independent series of events and is capable of being interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the same time.”(Bergson,1911,p.31). Similar to aesthetic experience humor has the potential to attract our attention about the incongruities, contradictions, absurdities that essential to human existence and the world we live in. For instance, amusing works of literary and performing arts in the political discourse such as Aristophanes’s comedy, *Lysistrata*, an ancient play written in 411 BCE, and Alfred Jarry’s play, *Ubu Roi*, a satirical play written in the 1890s, are remarkable examples displaying distorted and incongruous nature of power-holders and leads audiences to

think critically about the issue. *Lysistrata* is an anti-war comedy which staged just two years after Athens' catastrophic defeat during the long-running Peloponnesian War against Sparta. *Lysistrata* can be translated as “releaser of war” or “army disbander”(Url 6) is a woman who has the mission to end the war. The play in which *Lysistrata* organize the rest of the women of Greece to stop making love with their husbands in order to convince the men to have peace settlement is the comic interpretation of the real situation of Athens. Inferentially, audiences are expected to think critically about the object from reality, namely the “war”. Besides, *Ubu Roi*, which would be considered as reaction to bourgeois values and traditional theatre (Jarry,2004,p.1-64), satirizes power, greed of the character Ubu and by abusing his authority it provokes critical thinking about the inured ideas and practices. We come across with the greediness and selfishness of the modern man (Coulter, 2013, p.38) in an invented and novel actuality that gets us to think more critically on our selfishness and greediness. Therefore, it provides new ways of thinking and can often lead us to think more deeply and critical about the issues we don't always think about.

What about the content of humorous work? If the work has vulgar or offensive language or content, can it serve aesthetic functions? According to Gordon, if it provides new ways of thinking and emancipates the brain, then, yes, it has aesthetic functions (p.67-68). I would agree with that as long as the humorous work is sophisticated rather than being crude and dull. In this point,two plays, *Lysistrata* and *Ubu Roi* once again should be visited. In spite of the bawdy language of *Lysistrata* it is not dull or crude on the contrary it enchances imagination and an alternative way of seeing the reality. Likewise, one might evaluate the language of *Ubu Roi* as vulgar, cruel and obscene, yet it is an attack against a barbaric character and morals represented by him. In this way, the play is valuable in itself since it promotes criticism against the deformity. Nevertheless, the critique made by the actor of humour must move beyond his personal dislike and should points out a genuine social problem (ibid, p.68). Aesthetic function should not be confined into an individual degree but its impact occurs in the realm of social (Gordon, 2012, p.68), just like other functions of humour. Morreall(2004) also thinks that certain kinds of humour cannot function in an aesthetic way such as male joking and sexual jokes (p.71-72). In the former case, amusement is resulted along with the feelings

competition, pleasing by others failures and humiliation so that this kind of outcomes cannot be aesthetic. Similarly, the latter case provokes “embarrassment or shock” that are not pleasing at all (ibid, p.72). This point signifies the double effect of humour, in particular negative form of humour since at once it pleases the joker and abuses the target. Nonetheless, aesthetic functions are also ethically unproblematic as long as the target of humour is an idea rather than a human-being. It is also important to note that what joker does is an exercise of power in the sense of feeling superior, as has mentioned in the second chapter. Moreover, two examples as has mentioned above points out the power property of humour. The inherent relation with power would bring a need to discuss humour’s political functions.

4.4 Political Functions of Humour

Each of the illustrated functions may be used by institutions to for the purpose of secondary (derived) functions. As one could remember from the previous chapter humour can be a process end in itself or it can have definite purposes. In the former case political functions results from the natural existence of humorous examples while in the latter functions can be aimed during the process. Political functions of humour have both negative and positive impact on people. But it would be more comprehensive to examine some certain political functions in advance. One of the most significant political functions of humour is exertion of power (Brock, 2008, p.551) what would be an inherent result. As it could be recalled from the previous chapter, humour has been defined as a type of communication. Humour helps to exert power during that communication by controlling or leading the interaction. Humorous mode of communication is an act contains comical elements and if it is established by one party then it will take the control and lead the communication. Moreover, as another way of exerting power, participant’s might be trivialized by the speakers (ibid, p.551). Apart from that it is also possible to level power by humour (ibid, p.551). While the first aspect emphasizes power relations within narrow scope namely, on-going the second one focus on macro level, the whole society. In case of the court jester who entertains his master by mocking him, the power of the jester exceeds also the ones inferior in power will interrogates and criticizes the superior (Speier, 1998, p.1386). Professional comedians in contemporary world too, level the power by working to gain public appreciation.

In political discourse humour's functions can differ depending on the actors of humour. For instance humour can be used by a politician in order to undermine his opponents (Morreall, 2005, p.75). It is a way of exerting power to oversimplify them. The actors of humour in politics can be journalists, artists, cartoonists and ordinary people as well as politicians. In this case, humour is usually product to serve as a critique politics and against politicians (Morreall, p.72) which would level power. Furthermore, political humour spots and highlights political activities that are inconsistent or insufficient and points out the incompetence, recklessness and corruption of politicians and leaders (Tsakona, Popa, p.6). In latter sense political humour serves as means of giving information and unveiling hypocrisy. For instance, political cartooning aims to indicate the actual motivation underlies the privileges of politicians, ruling and superior class (Foot and McCreddie, p.301). Here, inferentially one could see that exertion of power in terms of levelling power is derived by critical function of humour.

Since main political function of humour, exertion of power has been considered, we can move to the evaluative aspect on them. Political function of humour can be evaluated in bidirectional way. In terms of its impact on people, it can be negative or positive. Once, instrumental humour is considered its aims and results can be good or bad. Thus, as aforementioned instrumental humour can be evaluated in two distinct categories; as good humour and bad humour. The concern here brings forth an ethical discussion about humour. In the study, *Humour and the Conduct of Politics*, ethics of humour is dealing with regards the question whether political humour has good or bad results (Morreall, 2005, p.69). Accordingly, political advertisements, oral humour performed by a politician for the sake of propaganda or to oversimplify the bad news are some examples of instrumental humour (ibid, p.75). This type of instrumental humour seems to be in the category of bad. Because it is mostly used in order to manipulate people by politicians. Since it is performed to reach a specific goal it will be probably failed to amuse which is paradoxical according to Morreall (ibid, p.76). On the other hand if it will succeed we may call this effect as influencing opinions and emotions which would have further consequences like the increase on the support of those manipulative politicians.

4.5 Conclusion

So far, it has been argued that the place of humour in our lives has been interrogated in terms of the consequences of humour. In order to evaluate them ethically, it has required to have detailed knowledge about outcomes of humour. Those functions of humour are psychological, social, aesthetic and political humour. Psychological functions namely, self-presentation, breaking tension, coping with injustice or trauma points out its role as a survival tactic. Furthermore while social cohesion and control by means of constructing in-group inclusion and out-group exclusion would be social functions, ethnic functions has said to include expressing hostility, creating sense of community and supporting or hindering existing prejudices. It also has the ability to act as constitutive for imagination and for criticizing and re-considering the values of the society, bringing out new ways of thinking. Lastly, in interrelation with all these consequences, humour whether it is instrumental or aesthetic, will exert power in the realm of political. Since each of those functions is a matter of power, they become located under the realm of political.

Power creates the second link that is between humour and ethics. Thus, apart from political justification, humour is needed to be justified ethically. For that very reason in the next chapter the aim would bring ethical discussion of humour in terms of consequentialist and non-consequentialist approach.

5. WHAT JUSTIFIES HUMOUR IN TERMS OF POWER?

Humour is always political in terms that it's an expression of power. Power can be conceptualized as "power to" act that is ability to act and "power for" someone. Similarly political humour has distinguished in terms of power degrees of subjects; on the one hand liberating humour which conducted by the powerless against authority would corresponds to account "power to", on the other, oppressive humour fulfilled by the authority against the weak would refer to account and "power over" or "power for". Thus, first kind of humour would attribute to a capacity and conceiving aspect whereas the latter one would be conflictual aspect of power whether in a potential or actual way. However, both kinds As of power would be real and effective in direct or implicit ways (Lukes, 2005,p.64) as has stated. In a similar vein, humour as an exercise of power is effective in liberating and oppressive ways.

Since all humour is political, and the political is the sphere of conflict, political justification of humour is possible depending on the context and the people of humour. Nevertheless, exercise of power as political function remains problematic in terms of ethical consideration. Then, what justifies this use of power by humour is required to be asked.

Hence in this chapter, it will be examined that humour is political in two different lines and according to these lines, justification question will be asked. As aforementioned in the first chapter on the one hand it will be an intrinsic value that is not means to end and will be expression for sake of expression. On the other, it will be considered as an extrinsic value that is fulfilled intentionally to reach to an end. While in former case justification will not be the concern and even it would have side effects naturally humour cannot be limited, in latter case justification will be investigated in terms of its effects and its way of fulfilment independent of its conclusions. It will be argued that humour as an intrinsic value and individualist expression cannot be restricted under any circumstances however humour as an extrinsic value needs to be justified in terms of its outcomes and the way it is

performed. What would require a justification is not the humour itself but the values and results that it promotes.

First, the interrogation of humour as an intrinsic value and individualistic expression will be conducted in terms of Collingwood's account of art and discussions of freedom of expression. After, justification from consequentialist perspective would be investigated by means of the arguments of utilitarianism, egoism and Ross's moral pluralist view. Later, by non-consequentialist way independent of its results humour as a tool of power can be justified in consideration with Kant's categorical imperatives that can be called as universality and respect to humanity. Moreover, I will introduce some examples in which humour fails, and evaluate them in the light of ethical approaches.

5.1 Humour as an Intrinsic Value: Unlimited Expression

Humour as an expression of power is always justifiable in terms that it is an individual expression unintentionally practiced. Humour is also political in this way because it is an expression an expression of power as well as one's own existence and freedom. In spite of the fact that it is performed for the sake of itself it may have several side effects. Whether those side effects are wanted or not, restriction should not be a matter of question in order to maintain freedom of expression that is one of the most significant aspect of individuality.

Collingwood account on art can be adopted to humour in order to have an understanding it as an intrinsic value. "Art proper" as expression is to express one's self not done with the intention of arousing an emotion(1958, p.110). In Collingwood's sense expression has something to do with emotion, it is getting rid of the oppressed state with a shift from unexpressed to expressed and as a result reaching a "lightened and eased state of mind"(ibid,p.110). Thus, it is not an unconscious state of revealing emotions but to realize those emotions intelligibly. However, this relief of emotions should not be confused with "catharsis" in which emotions are discharged unconsciously. The feeling still remains there, for instance if one is angry and expresses the anger, after he/she still feels the anger. It is just his/her awareness of that emotion as anger after expressing it. Moreover, we may address someone with our speech but if we express it there would be no intention to affect him in any way. The only expectation from to make him understand how we

feel but actually this is the reflexive effect that provides us an understanding about how we feel (ibid, 110). It explains well also why expression of self is an individual act that individualises (ibid,p.113) the emotion rather than describes it.

This point is crucial in terms that it shows humour as an expression is intrinsically valuable so that free expression of humour should not be restricted. Inferentially, it can be a reference for the importance of individuality and self-expression at the issue of free expression. One of the most significant defenders of freedom of expression that is Mill who thinks no matter how immoral is, there should be a complete liberty of professing and discussing any doctrine (1998,p. 20-21). In order to have “absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological” we should maintain such liberty (1998,p.16). Fulllest liberty of expression is necessary also because of having the right of individuality. The right to individuality requires the area in which there is liberty of conscience, namely, liberty of thought and expression, “liberty of tastes and pursuits” and liberty of association (Mill,1998, p.16-17). Persons who have individuality will be able to form their own beliefs and opinions as well as own judgements rather than have them imposed by others (ibid, p.17). What is most threatening to these liberties is social tyranny (ibid, p.8) that is even denser than the effect of political oppression (ibid,p.9). As Collingwood’s account says that expression of emotions is becoming conscious and having an understanding about of one’s self, free expression of opinions and beliefs is an understanding the meaning and grounds for these opinions and this requires to be open to all arguments.

Surely, unintentional expression of humour freely would have side effects naturally occur whether desired or undesired. With reference to individuality we can think of first that is individual autonomy. As a matter of fact as well as being side effect, autonomy would be also the rationale for free expression. An individual autonomy of act is required in order to maintain self-fulfilment and self-expression (Sadurski,1999,p.17). This brings us the communication that is crucial for self-fulfilment and self-definition because the in order to determine who we really are we need to communicate freely with other human beings. Furthermore individual autonomy can be considered as prerequisite for freedom of choice (Kent,1995,p.5). In this case, free communication would be crucial too, since it makes people to interact with each other. Also people state their wishes, interests and as a result built

their character and social and political stances. Among various desires and interest, tolerance would be another outcome to be taught by open communication so that by free expression of humour (ibid,p.5). But what about if the best way of expressing ourselves has the very risk harm to others? The criticism is stressed by Sadurski (1999) as implausibility of the argument of self-expression through the autonomy of action. (p.17). He states that “self-expression” or “self-fulfilment” as derived principles of autonomy are risky effects to maintain free expression (ibid,p.18). For instance, would drawing a racist sketch be still unquestionable for the sake of free expression? The answer should be yes if the expression is fulfilled just to express one’s self and it remains in space of that individual or group of friends. That is to say, as long as it is not published or shared in social media accounts there is no way to apply any legal regulation for anyone. Unlike from what Sadurski states self-expression cannot be a determinative for limitation of free expression if the speaker has not any aim to create harm. As it is stated the situation in which the owner of the humorous expression does not aware that the sorts of expression might lead a violent response is an exception and in this case for the sake of an freedom of expression, there should be no limitation since “the lowest appropriate standard of culpability would require some understanding of danger by speaker” (Kent, 1995, p,51). It seems plausible to apply the last exception to humorous expression since even there is no anticipation of the provocation violent response, expressing a racist or sexist humour should not be prevented if the joker is not protected in this case, freedom of expression would be at stake.

If we take the promotion of autonomy and self-expression as desired side-effect another would be the contribution for truth. It is one of the principles that originated within arguments of the liberal democracy. Firstly revealed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes by saying free trade in the market would give the best way for testing the truth (Kent,1995,p.3). In order to test that, truth-discovery account claims that it will be more possible for us to become closer to the truth only if variety of assertions exist (ibid,p.3). Mill also points out the importance of this consequence. His arguments in *On liberty* appeal the value of truth and state whether an opinion is right or wrong it should not “compelled to silence” because if its right the “opportunity of exchanging error for truth” will be no longer possible (ibid,p.76). On the other hand if it is wrong, the chance for clearer and livelier perception of truth

will be lost (ibid,p.76). In both case origins and meanings of opinions should be discussed freely. Moreover, “fallibility” as a quality for individuals and societies should be considered while seeking the truth (ibid,115-6). Being failed or being mistaken refers to fallibility. Then, if morality is thought along with fallibility it can be claimed that the truth about morality cannot be always known by people even if they are sure of themselves. This is not to give equal credit and concern all opinions at the same level by relativist manner but allowing other opinions to be expressed. Thus even if the points of view are not right a censor may not be operated. But what if we are sure that a point of view for instance racism is wrong and so that censoring racist kind of expressions is justifiable which would not risk the search for truth? Mill’s response to this, certainty is something that we can reach by means of free expression (1998, p.80). So just as mentioned freedom of expression is also worth protecting for the sake of itself. Even if a certainly false opinion should be expressed without any limitation, because the truth perceived by means of the opposites too (ibid, p.80). So just as mentioned whether they are completely false or partially true all kinds of opinions should be expressed freely without being censored. In order to recall the intrinsic value of humour as an expression and have better understanding on the truth-discovery effect we go back to the Collingwood’s account that says:

“[U]ntil a man has expresses his emotions he does not yet know what emotion is. The act of expressing it is therefore an exploration of his own emotions. He is trying to find out what these emotions are. There is certainly here a directed process: an effort, that is directed upon a certain end; but the end is not something foreseen and preconceived, to which appropriate means can be thought out in the light of our knowledge of its special character.”(Collingwood,1958, p.111).

Just as art as an expression provides “an exploration and knowledge of emotions”, free expression of humour will contribute naturally the knowledge about the truth. In this case only a natural effect is under consideration since the practitioner of humour does not have any intention for discovery of truth.

Yet according to truth discovery argument one might think racist or sexist humour can be freely performed since the obviously false ideas which involved in it would be useful for seeking of truth by preventing true opinions from becoming dogma. But what if the dangerous opinions have harmful consequences on people? What if humour has a discriminative and hateful result which is leaded by a wholly false

belief involved in humour? Can we still justify humour? Our answer to this question would be only possible by an understanding of hatred. Hatred is treated as an intense dislike or extreme aversion or hostility (Post, 2010, p.125). Then, how do we distinguish hatred from ordinary dislike or disagreement? The distinction can be made in terms that ordinary dislike or disagreement does not aim to provoke harm it is just a feeling, on the other hand expression of hatred is exactly aims to create harm purposively. Thus, the criterion to define hatred would be its intention and conscious desire to hurt. In this sense, intrinsic humour should be considered outside from the category for the justification question. Because, there is no intention for humour as end in itself. Rather humour as an instrument to hatred, would be the subject-matter of our question.

So far, humour has been examined from the one point of view that sees it as an intrinsic value and an individualistic power expression fulfilled unintentionally. From this insight humorous expression always should be protected since it is to express for the sake of expressing. Independent of its natural effects such as deliberation, individual autonomy and truth-discovery, defamation of a group, humour as an intrinsic value does not need any kind of justification. Since leaving the inquiry here would give an uncomplete account it is required to follow the interrogation with humour as an extrinsic value. What if those and some other effects occurred by intention as a result of intention? What about humour as a value means to ends? Accordingly, justification inquiry will be conducted in two ways. First, the discussion will be dependent on the intended results of humour, namely ethical values, truth, happiness. Later then, the way of humour practice would be the focus in order to seek the answer to the question of justification.

5.2 Humour as an Extrinsic Value : Ethical Inquiry

5.2.1 Consequentialist way: What values justify humour as their instrument?

Humour can be expressed as means to an ends. If so the expression of humour turn into an extrinsic value that is fulfilled with an intention to reach certain kinds of goals. The goals and values which are in relation with humour instrumentally, become the subject matter of justification question. That is to say the discussion acquires another dimension; instead of questioning humour, we question that what kind of values that humour aims to promote can be justifiable? Which aim of humour

can be morally acceptable? In this point our sense of morality cannot be thought hand in hand with moral codes of the culture or conventions. Rather, it is the “true morality” that is for the judgement of conventional morality critically and motivated by reason (Feinberg, 2003, p.39). Thus, a moral right in this sense can be opposed to legislative rule or social practice. However, moral rights that are deliberately discussed in the light of true morality may also belong to the conventional morality of many societies, like the right not to be murdered (ibid, p.39). Feinberg suggests for moral rights:

“The candidate moral right turns out to be genuine moral right if and only if the act/policy of maintaining or introducing it into the system of conventional rules is, in the actual present circumstances, justified by the correct principles of moral justification, whichever they are (ibid, p.51).”

In our case, proper principles of moral justification of humour would be the principle of moral pluralism presented by Ross.

From the instrumentality point of view humour will be examined not for its own sake but for the sake of something else to which they are related in some way. Therefore, to answer that these questions humour can be justifiable or not only in a derivative sense. For that very reason humour would have causal relation or the means-end relation with the values. Accordingly, Humour can be justifiable in terms that it contributes the truth, promotes happiness and virtues. On the contrary, it cannot be justified as long as it promotes pain, injustice by being a representation of racism and sexism.

The effects of humour can be observed in different scales; it can have consequences on individual, society or a group of elites. Besides, the place and the relations of people can make variations on consequences of humour. As it is said “Who is comically treated by whom and with what consequences” are crucial factors that can determine the outcome of a joke and whether or not it is regarded as unjustifiable (Lockyer, Pickering, 2005, p.9).

5.2.1.1 Contribution to truth

One of the purpose humour can be contribution for truth. As well as being a side effect it can be the intentional purpose of humour. Humour should be justifiable once it contributes the truth-discovery process. In order to explain why Ross’s moral

pluralist view would be helpful. But before it is necessary to see the way in which humour does support seek for truth.

A way to do that is representing the incongruous reality. As one of the property of humour, representation as imitation makes us to learn. Humour can be representational in terms that Aristotle's notion of mimesis. Accordingly, it is a process involving the use by different art forms of different means of representation, different manners of communicating that representation to an addressees, and different levels of ethical of behavior as objects of the artistic representation and its goal is the representation of truth that which is universal(Aristotle, 2000, p.4-7). Mimetic quality of humour coming from its representational characteristic of reality. Humour in the sense of representation not only provides the change from ignorance to knowledge by anagnorisis that is a recognition of some unknown fact (ibid,p.11) but also a pleasure from learning(p.7).

Aristotle's concept of mimesis may help us to explain what is distinctive about our experience of humour. As a result of an imaginative space provided by humour we become to realize about objects in world behind appearance or mask. In order to learn from this experience it is crucial to be distanced enough so that we can have reflection. One possible result of this representation is coming to close more knowledge about the truth. Knowledge described "apprehension of fact"(p.146) and differs from right opinion, is among the group of intrinsic goods presented by W.D Ross(2002,p.140). As a moral realist Ross thinks that rightness and wrongness are objective features of the world, our moral attitudes or cultures do not make our acts right or wrong. Having a pluralist view about moral values Ross classified duties in two groups as duties of special obligation and value-based duties (ibid, p.21). Duties of special obligation contain duties of fidelity, reparation and gratitude. Duties of contains keeping one's promise and avoid lying and deception. Duties of reparation refer to repairing a mistake a wrongful act from the past and lastly duties of gratitude are acts about paying back to one of the beneficiaries. Second group includes duties of justice that says in case someone gets more or less than she/he deserves, then we should intervene and rectify the situation, duties of beneficence meaning to help others to increase their pleasure and reduce the pain. Duties of maleficence referring to avoid injuring others and duties of self-improvement that are the actions to improve our character and intelligence (ibid, p.21). For all these duties, his theory of

right conduct that says they don't need any proof, they are self-evident (ibid, p.25) and all of them are in order to reach four kinds of intrinsic good namely virtue, knowledge, pleasure, the state consisting pleasure in proportion to virtue. Accordingly, humour as an instrument to seek for truth should be justifiable since it serves already for pleasure and knowledge. In addition, the works of satire that aims to function as a correction of deception and hypocrisy of political actors correspond to both the duties of fidelity and duties of self-improvement. Hence, works of satire can be justified in terms that they contribute the truth.

5.2.1.2 Promotion of happiness

Happiness would be another value promoted by humour to question whether it is justifiable or not. Happiness as "eudaimonia", "well-being" defined "as an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue" (Aristotle, 1102a 5). Then if happiness is described as an "activity of soul" and it is founded by humour, consequently humour functions to express virtues (p.7.).

According to Morreall (2009), humour promotes our virtues in two kinds (p.112). Firstly, it fosters our intellectual virtues; open-mindedness, creative thinking and critical thinking (ibid, p.112-113). As it can be recalled from second chapter creative and critical thinking among aesthetic functions. Apart from intellectual virtues, humour also fosters our moral virtues, as a matter of fact such virtues are derived from the first type. It is suggested that humour can be a useful tool in order to develop one's moral character (Morreall, 2009, p.118). Patience, perseverance and humility are among the "quasi-virtues" (p.114-118). One condition is required for them is the comic distance. The main point of comic distance is that humour provides capacity to see limitedness of human and as a result self-knowledge, integrity, and mental health are improved (ibid, p.116). In addition to aesthetic functions we can rethink of psychological functions from the second chapter in order to have the sense of virtues here. Self-esteem, self-recognition, pleasure are all contribute to happiness at an individual level. As Basu (1999) points out "humour keeps the process of reasoning open-ended, and the pleasure thereby obtained makes it habitual" (p.388). All of those outcomes can refer humour's justification since they can be considered in the scope of Ross's category, duties of self-improvement in terms that they enhance our character and our intelligence.

Another way to justify humour in terms of its effect happiness would be by egoist approach. But this time happiness would be considered in terms of pleasure. According to egoism one's self is or should be the motivation and the goal of one's own action and this is a theory based on pleasure (Timmons,2002,p.124). We look for to fulfill our own interest namely, individual happiness here while practicing humour. Also from the utilitarian point of view we can justify happiness since it says what is right is what produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Since what matters is the ration between the amount of happiness and pain, the happiness of the majority would outweigh the pain of minority.

5.2.1.3 Discrimination and hatred

Humour might be used also for the purposes discrimination and hatred. In this case it is the representation and expression of ideas like racism and sexism. When humour is practiced in order to disseminate discrimination and hatred it should be unjustifiable. The limitation of humour that causes discrimination of hatred would be primarily the ethical one. Yet, this ethical limitation can be a motivation for a legal limitation as well, like it will be discussed by Waldron's insight. But first it is crucial to have an aspect about the connection between humour and hatred.

How a humorous expression is able to release hatred? The links between humour and hatred has been analysed by Billig (2001,p.1-41).According to the study which sourced by "bigotry", the first commonality between humour and hatred is that both leads to experience amusement (ibid, p.3). When thinking about bigotry, extreme racism is one of the examples that can demonstrate the intersection between humour and hatred. By relying on unconscious acceptance of being superior a racist feels joy of his/her race and mock the victims mocked mostly by stereotyping (ibid, p.4). The motivation for making racist jokes is that mostly the prejudices. Thus, it would be important to note the debate here, which is central to ethnic humour about the connection between prejudice and humour. This debate basically questioned that if an ethnic joke is "just a joke" or is it a representation of a prejudice? Davies views that since the utterance is told as humour, it is not a "genuine racism."(1988, p.15). The stereotypes ascribed to the ethnic group, are not the actual thoughts of the joker. On the other hand, Billig (2005) stresses the possibility for a link between the prejudice and humour. He also stresses the importance of the context of joke-telling

for better comprehension on its motives and results (p.30). Thus it is problematic that the debate focus on the joke's content "in the abstract" rather than investigating the social context (ibid, p.31). Hence, this kind of sense humour not only support the existing prejudices but also expresses hostility against those stereotyped group. Similarly in practice the use of humour against another group contains expression of hostility and feeling joy at the same time.

Apart from pleasure, both humour and hatred have disturbing character in consideration of the violent and subversive humour (Billig, 2003, p.3). Aggressive nature of humour can be grasped better with reference to Freud's point saying that the pleasurable quality of jokes coming from the expression of hostility, aggression and sexuality(1998,p.89). So, it can be said that just like a hateful expression, language of humour prone to shock their targets and also others. In spite of the fact that epithets might have positive, negative or neutral features, they mostly have the evil quality(Kent,1995, p.47). Group epithets are more "vague" in terms of their language and remind qualities such as laziness, greed, dishonesty, stupidity, vulgarity (ibid, p.48) which perfectly exemplifies the stereotypes of hateful humour. Moreover, a practitioner mostly aware of the hatred in his/her expression and design it by intention to humiliate the target. "He or she aims to make the other feel degraded and hated and chooses words to achieve that effect"(ibid, p.49). This shows that the intention of the speaker is totally negative. Then we can consider this kind of humour as a hate expression.

As Ross's theory suggests duties of maleficence include to avoid injuring others (Ross,2002,p.21). From this point of view making a hateful joke with an intention to defame and denigrate a group of people is not compatible with the good. Therefore it cannot be justifiable and should be restricted ethically. The ethical limitation of humour might lead a new perspective for restriction, which is legal.

One of the defenders of hate speech legislation Waldron (2012) argues that hate speech legislation is necessary in order to assure public good and the justice itself. He mentioned social peace, respect and multicultural society are damaged by hate speech and since they should be concerned for "the public good of inclusiveness" laws about hate speech are justified (p.4). His notion of public good is explained by the practice of living and working together of different people in terms of race, ethnicity, appearance and religion. What is emphasized as a base point the idea that

an acceptance of all sorts of difference is a must and the assurance of protection from “hostility, violence, discrimination or exclusion of others”(ibid, p.4). Public good is described by the “sense of security in the space” that should be contributed by all component of society (ibid,p.5). Nevertheless this is at stake once hate speech is free since it would damage social peace and public good in a sneaky manner. Thus legislation of hate speech is necessary however the laws should not design to protect people offense, their feelings but the social standing of them (Url 11). Social standing that is also called dignity is another way to reveal the concern about hate speech. For the minorities that contains members of the same society who assured by “confirmation of their membership” they must make presence and interact with others and be treated properly in public (ibid,p.5). Also what should be highlighted that the concern of maintaining justice. Coming from Rawls’s political theory the notion of well-ordered society and principles of justice are significant points of Waldron’s account on hate speech legislation. In brief, Rawls asserts well-ordered society has a structure built by fundamental principles of justice and composed of people who takes justice seriously(p.54). His model of society is called as “highly idealized” by himself and questioned it in order to test “under conditions of religious and philosophical diversity.”(p. 66).

It is important to point out here, Waldron’s distinction between offense and dignity mostly based on the objective and subjective grounds. As stated before dignity is a notion described by the social standing of a person(2012, p.106). On the other hand offense would describe as a subjective matter composed of feelings such as “hurt, shock and anger on the other.”(ibid,106) The dignity of a person is relational to the society and it would be the proper concern for legislation (p.106). Waldron’s care on dignity stem from how he describes the notion. Its importance for equality among people and justice principles that are committed by all citizens lead to a necessity of legal protection in case of an assault. Despite of the fact that an assault on dignity would have damaging and hurtful to one’s psychology, psychological effect will be on the secondary position. In other words it cannot be the proper object of this legislation (ibid,p.107).

On the contrary offense has subjective quality that is accepted as intrinsically subjective response. Offending or wounding act causes displeasure, annoyance or resentment. So to protect people from offense or from being offended is to protect

them from a certain sort of effect on their feelings. And this is different from protecting their dignity and the assurance of their decent treatment in society. An assault to dignity is not just hurting feelings but because it damages the esteem and undermines the respect that would prevent from being able to in good standing in society. A democratic society cannot work socially or politically, unless its members are respected in their character as equals, and accorded the authority associated with their vote and their basic rights. This distinction may have point since any act can be offensive for the targets of humour. However if offence has connection with social and cultural position of the target in the society this kind of offense as damaging effect is counted rather the mere offense to feelings.

Unlike Waldron, Dworkin (2006) thinks the respect for citizens as the responsibility of government not the citizens (p.6). He suggests freedom should be maintained for hate speech. The argument begins with the emphasis of legal protection of people from discrimination and we should have those kinds of laws. Yet he points out open debate as necessary condition to have them in a legitimate way (p.8). This open debate can also have hate expressions that are preferred by some citizens (ibid, p.8). Furthermore protection from violence and discrimination for people and especially minorities is important for Dworkin (ibid, p.7). Such protection from unfairness and inequality should be provided by certain laws in any area of social life; “[I]n employment or education or housing or the criminal process (ibid, p.8). Thus he has the commitment to these anti-discrimination laws as any proponent of racial and ethnic equality. But at the same time it he suggests even if there are few people who are a party to discrimination and racial violence the laws should be enforced after they should be allowed to express their opinion. Voice of opponents rather than their vote is important during the adoption of the laws:

“Fair democracy requires... that each citizen have not just a vote but a voice: a majority decision is not fair unless everyone has had a fair opportunity to express his or her attitudes or opinions or fears or tastes or presuppositions or prejudices or ideals, not just in the hope of influencing others (though that hope is crucially important), but also just to confirm his or her standing as a responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of collective action.” (ibid, p.8).

Hence, in order to make anti-discrimination laws legitimate opponents should be taken into account before the enactment and enforcement of laws. While some of the

opponents may prefer hateful speech some may not. It is obvious that for whom do prefer hateful language the main purpose is certainly defamation and denigration of the group. Still, it doesn't matter how hateful the language is they should be allowed to voice this opposition. But what kind of contribution we expect to have by such hateful expressions? According to his argument the point is not the quality of contribution but having an open debate and provide a space for the oppositions among the ideas of the majority (ibid, p.8). There are situations in which we think certain exceptions are indispensable for this principle, like the situations "Pouring pornography or racial hatred into the culture" (ibid, p.8). In spite that we think people do not have right to do that without challenging those ideas by our moral aspect we cannot restrain them by the law. With reference to this argument the legitimacy of the state also depends on in part of its tolerance of hate speech. It is the government who needs to protect equal concern and respect for citizens, this concern is not obligatory for citizens (Dworkin, 1986, p.296).

If we think of Dworkin's argument in opposition, in case we are considering humour performed as a mean to ends (here the ends are discrimination and hatred), Waldron's arguments sounds more plausible. The reason for that is the sense of security in the social world. It is crucial to feel secure and have the assurance of anti-discrimination. Justice principles in a society has been revealed as a primary condition of this assurance. In case that an instance of humour express hatred, shared commitment to justice takes precedence over the open debate that Dworkin suggests. Because the harm of humour that release hatred is not confined with the moment it is occurred thus the focus should be on the objects of this kind of humour for long term. "In a social environment polluted by these materials (Waldron, 2012, p.9-10)" it would be near impossible for targets to live in good social standing. Mainly because harm would release secondary effects. The Austin's (1975) distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts would give better understanding (p.13). A racist expression as an "illocutionary act" causes discrimination and racial hatred in a performative way. It also has "perlocutionary" effects like the dissemination of the ideas that favors racial superiority (Langton, 2012, p.80).

After all, the amusement by sexist and racist jokes is shared only by people has the assumptions on the targets and those are objectionable because those assumptions can be false and most importantly morally harmful in terms that they strengthen and

perpetuate false stereotypes and so unjust treatment of the target group. Inferentially, in addition to duties of maleficence, duties of justice stated by Ross also suggests avoidance and restriction of hateful humour.

On the contrary, from the egoist point of view we can make jokes to denigrate minority since it pleases to us. Because, we, ourselves are the motivation for our act of humour. Similarly utilitarianism may justify this kind of effect because as aforementioned in a group discriminative jokes that express hostility to a minority group also brings joy the jokers. Then, utilitarianism that determines the good by means of total profit would suggest the pleasure of the majority outweighs the pain of minority.

Moreover, as stated in the previous part discussion in liberal thought shows that truth-discovery can be a rationale for free expression of humour. The thought has supported free expression opinions or beliefs of any kinds whether true or false and no matter how immoral they are. However, in this sense one might point out a contradictory or conflict between immorality of humorous expression and its contribution to truth. For instance, a racist joke based upon a Holocaust can be justifiable according to truth-discovery but not justifiable with respect to the duties of maleficence that are for the avoidance of injuring others. One might say that if the joker has the intention the revealing truth and not injure others, yet we cannot read people's minds so that people's motivations are generally speaking not easily identified let alone understood. However, as Kant recognized, people's motivations matter greatly with respect to moral issues. It could lead us to think in another way namely with Kant's categorical imperatives, for justification of humour.

This multiplicity of answers arise a necessity of another way of thinking which is not depending on results of the humour. For that very reason humour should be inquired as an extrinsic value once more, but this time independent of its effects. Rather, it should be considered as expression of power in terms of its way of application by means of deontology.

5.3 Non-consequentialist Way: Justification of Humour by Deontic Approach

Non-consequentialist inquiry has been resulted from the need for a more universal account on justification of humour. Then, it is necessary to question humour as an

instrumental expression of power is justifiable or not independent of its effect. In order to conduct this interrogation Kant's categorical imperatives will be suggested to justify or not to justify humour as an extrinsic value. But before adopting those imperatives to humour and its justification problem, it would be necessary to have an idea about the fundamentals of Kant's moral philosophy in which categorical imperatives originated.

Human autonomy is the essential idea of Kant's moral philosophy. Autonomy in Kant's understanding provides laws that constitute the a priori framework of our experience (1998,p.47). This framework composed of a single principle that is also the basis of morality. Morality is founded on this single principle that is essential to all moral duties. Autonomy as a capacity inherent in all rational agents is the basis of moral requirements namely categorical imperatives. The first is to act only in a way that one could recommend that everyone act and the second is to always treat persons as valuable in themselves, never merely as a means to one's ends. The categorical imperative is this moral law. Whereas basic laws of nature are influences of our understanding, his moral law is manifested to us as an outcome of reason. Moral law only depends on nature of reason and not the nature of any qualities peculiar to human nature. Nevertheless categorical imperative of law of duty derived from the moral law shows that pure reason is not necessarily the source of the human will and there is also the influence of other criteria namely, motives originated in our needs and inclinations and the contingencies of human life(ibid, p.25).

With reference to self-consciousness that is the highest principle of theoretical philosophy we have the knowledge of the basic laws of nature. Accordingly, our experiences are constructed led by the understanding of those a priori laws. In other words we construct a world of experience or nature by means of the intuition. On the other hand, it is the moral law as being the highest principle of the practical philosophy. And according to the moral law, duties are derived which command how to act in particular situations. All those reflections on moral law and the need for happiness result in the thought of an ideal world, which is named as the highest good. The highest good is reachable, it is not just "a phantom of human imagination" because a person can possess the highest good in accordance with the virtue what would lead the highest good of a possible world (1998,p.20). Thus, as human beings who have the knowledge of how the world is and how it ought to be, the aim is to

construct or realize the highest good in order to transform the world and make it better.

Another significant point is the reciprocal relation between the morality and freedom stated by Kant. If to act morally is to exercise freedom then to act morally is the necessary condition to exercise freedom in full sense (ibid, p.53). To measure the moral rightness and wrongness of an act the agent must be free. Only free agents have the ability and power to act otherwise than they do which explains the freedom in Kant's sense (ibid, p.54)

Having explained the fundamentals of Kant's moral philosophy, now we can deal with the argument in which the categorical imperative is located. Accordingly we have a will that refers acting on some principle, namely maxim which are the general rules that describe how one does act (1998, p.14). Even there is unawareness of those maxims or inconsistently acting, as rational beings the actions always aim at some sort of end or goal expressed by the maxims. Moreover there is a distinction between two kinds of principles as formal and material. While material principles we can act on are exists in order to satisfy some desire, formal principles have no reference to any desire all. Correspondingly, we have hypothetical and categorical imperatives (ibid,p.25). Hypothetical imperatives are the principles of rationality however should be considered outside the category of act freely since our nature and desires have control on us. Whereas categorical imperatives command unconditionally, no matter the desires will be it says the way how should be acted. Categorical imperatives are applied without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. First categorical imperative is points out the universality of an act that is to say if everyone could act on a maxim without any contradiction or exception, that maxim is morally permissible (ibid,p.15). Second imperative commands the treatment to other persons always as valuable in themselves and never merely as means to one's own ends (ibid, p.38). The term humanity stated by Kant (1996, p.516) refers to the sort of autonomy that is an unconditional requirement to respect it. In the light of these imperatives, two groups of general duties can be derived. First group is the duty of self-perfection and the second one is the duty promotion of happiness (Kant,1996,p.517). Duties to oneself regarding self-perfection are defended by the appeal of considerations of respecting one's own humanity. Accordingly they are distinguished as "perfect" and "imperfect" duties. The former category is also called narrow duties since the kinds

of actions forbidden that is precisely specified and presumably we are avoid from such types of action. Lying, avarice, servility are some of the examples that we should refrain from. On the other hand, there are imperfect duties to develop that are so called wide duties since the possibilities for their fulfilment are way wider for the agents. Exercise our reason, or to develop our capacities like memory and imagination can be involved in the second group (ibid,p.518). Second group is duties to others regarding their happiness are distinguished as duties of love and duties of respect (ibid,p.519-p.530). Envy, ingratitude, malice, arrogance, defamation are among those that fail to respect humanity as end in itself. Whereas actions of beneficence, gratitude, sympathy and respect for others as ends in themselves, promotes humanity as an end in itself.

In consideration of those imperatives how we can evaluate humour that is fulfilled by certain kind of intentions? How can we justify humour as an expression of power not in association with its results but in terms of its way of doing? Both of those categorical imperatives may be helpful to for the most contentious examples of humour those are based upon an ethnicity, race, gender. Since morality mainly needs that we respect humanity, ethnic, racist and sexist humour cannot be justified. In those kinds humorists empty other's gender, ethnicity or race and their humour is nourished by this act of "othering". Accordingly, those kind of humour that is based on the idea of "other" would be unjustified. Because it is compatible with neither the first nor the second imperative. We cannot talk about any universality for humour that degrades some and praises others. Therefore, such kind of humorous act cannot be morally good. Moreover, the relation between hatred and humour has showed that the people who are the target of hateful are treated merely as ends of the actor's joy. This point also shows that hateful humour by the intention of release hatred cannot be justified. According to Kent(2005), the use of hateful expressions mostly occurred during the moments of high emotion (p.49) which demonstrates humorous acts like is not motivated from rationality but mere desire to be pleased. This is something not compatible with Kant's insight of rationality that guides the moral law and correspondingly our duties of morality. Because to act morally is to act in a way that is rational. Apart from those jokes with problematic contents, the nature of humour might risk the process's accomplishment. For instance, political cartoons as has mentioned were not appreciated. At first glance it seems an action that fails to respect

humanity. However this is not the case, rather cartoonists criticize the policy, idea etc. and it's a product of exercise of reason. It is something like the distinction Waldron has made between criticizing the doctrine, opinion or an idea and targeting the person him/herself. What is necessary is to consider some specific examples of humour failures and evaluate them by means of consequentialist and non-consequentialist approach in ethics.

5.4 Failures of Humour

There are several cases in which humour disturbs specific group of people who shows a severe reaction. Before introducing those cases, to be able to evaluate them ethically, it is important to have an understanding about some principles. According to Palmer (1994) there are certain principles must be fulfilled in order to attain success in humour process, it should be comprehensible, adequate in performance and inoffensive (p.174). Our main concern will be on offensiveness criterion in order to interrogate disapproval for humour. It is stated that the success of humour depends on not only its structure, but also its process. This process has to contain negotiation (ibid, p.174). Hay's model of humour support which contains three steps, recognition, understanding and appreciation, points out a gap between understanding and appreciation (Hell,2005,p.128). It is explained that the gap between the two is only filled by negotiation (ibid, p.128). From this point of view the focus is on the social process in which all parties involved in humour should have satisfaction in this process of negotiation(ibid, p.149). Otherwise, humour can be misunderstood hence, would be offensive. On what basis humour is potentially offensive instead of being comical and amusing? Palmer (1994) points out three criteria that lead likely offensiveness; those are the relationship among the subjects of humour, the occasions for humour and lastly the nature of humour (p.164). On the relationship between subjects of humour, liberating and oppressive humour has been already examined according to the actor's social position. In the case of liberating humour or the humour of powerless against political authority would be mostly acceptable in open societies and strongly pressurized in strict and conservative society. One of the most striking examples of the disapproval of humour is the case that the prime minister of Turkey himself sued political cartoonist Musa Kart based on his critical work on the issue of Imam-Hatip High Schools, in which the minister had caricaturized as if he is

a cat, appeared in Cumhuriyet newspaper on 9 May 2004 (Url 7). The claim for damages was resulted in favour of Musa Kart by the supreme court of appeal with the justification that humour is needed to be tolerated and politicians must be put up with criticism, even in its strong forms (Url 8).

Second criterion, possibly makes humour offensive is the occasions for humour (ibid,p.164). Even though we all have limits to what we can joke and laugh about, making a generalization about appropriate occasions for humour would be a struggle in vain. The reason for that is its context-boundedness and since there are various social contexts there is no common criterion in order to clarify the suitability for the occasion. The example of religion perhaps gives us better understanding; while religious occasions most often is not considered as an appropriate matter for humour in monotheistic religions however clowns were part of religious practices in the institutional level in tribal societies (Palmer, 1994, p.164). Two very significant examples that proves the sensibility on the issue of religion are located in recent history; they are the caricatures of Muhammad considered as the last prophet of Muslims, published by Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten on September 30,2005 (Lewis et. Al.p.22), and by French satirical weekly newspaper, Charlie Hebdo published on November 3, 2011(Url 9). Among the Danish caricature the cartoon drawn by Kurt Westegaard of Muhammad wearing turban shaped like a bomb is probably the most criticized one. Most likely the motive of the caricaturist is ridicule rather than amusement by pointing out radical Islamic groups use violence in the name of Islam. Nevertheless, Muslims interpreted it as the Prophet shown in cartoons is associated with the terror and violence implicitly and cartoons have been placed on all over the world as a result of the complaint of the groups in Denmark, later on the world witnessed violent protests, demonstrations and riots in the Middle East (Lewis et. al.p.4). The cartoons have been supported as well by the concern of protection of freedom of speech. For instance, Charlie Hebdo re-published the same cartoons in 2006. In Charlie Hebdo case Muhammed has drawn with the speech balloon shows him saying “a hundred lashes if you don’t die laughing.”(ibid). The reaction against Muhammad image was catastrophic;10 journalists and 2 officers were murdered by the attackers on May 7, 2015 (ibid).

The conflict remains open between those concerned to protect freedom and speech and those concerned to protect minority, oppressed and persecuted groups from

public expression of bigotry, abusive stereotyping, discrimination and hatred. The distinction between the two contexts namely Western societies and Arab and Middle Eastern countries might be the reason for this conflict. It is stated that mocking the most sacred texts and images of all religions has been ordinary activity within secular Western tradition (Lewis et. al.p.4) while in predominant Muslim populations those kind of humour would be unacceptable and ultimately gain anger and indignation. Here the dilemma caused by two distinct cultural and political codes shows that we cannot deal with this contradictory case by means of political or cultural criterion. Rather, it will be the ethical principles which could provide a universal approach. Furthermore, the advertisement called “What Women Want” prepared for the campaign of Doğadan (Url 10) has been drawn wide criticism since its sexist content. As a result of the petition that demands its withdrawal, it is discontinued broadcasting by the company with an apology (ibid). In this case, obviously the tone used in the advertisement tried to be entertaining and amuse people but instead strengthens the gender roles assigned for women such as vulnerability, inconsistency, unreasonableness etc. Whether this is intended or not, this kind of mindset would reinforce the dominant idea that is second-rate position of women in our society and this might have further severe consequences for women kind.

Last criterion that leads to offensiveness is the nature of humour (Palmer,1994,p.164). Accordingly, the more unacceptable a piece of humour the more cynical, aggressive it is. The tendency for disapproval of humour would increase as it becomes daring and outrageous. The reason for that seems as the threat on the audience’s personal security along with unwanted and painful outcomes caused by subversive humour (Paletz,1990,p.487). Hence, without rare exceptions, the audience avoids confronting with the problem which is the starting point of humour. In institutional level too, humour that is considered as “anarchic and subversive” would be unacceptable. In fact “authority- holders who feeling threatened by humour contrive to suppress it are simply being sensitive to their power stakes, to the vulnerability of their authority (ibid, p.484)”, that has been already exemplified in case Musa Kart’s caricature.

On the other hand, benign and innocent humour mostly is allowed and appreciated since it is considered harmless. In this point it is necessary to point out that the occasion or in other words the content of humour has priority over the nature of

humour. Because, for instance if a joke has contentious target like gender, race or religion, no matter how innocent it is, there is a risk for being offensive.

If we evaluate Musa Kart's cartoon by means of consequentialist approach it would be justified since it promotes critical thinking. The work of him would be included in the scope of freedom of expression. Offense whether coming from its nature or the reaction of target or audiences does not legitimate its restriction. Since any kind of aggressive humour can be offensive to its target, he suggests some criteria in order to narrow the category; those are the aim of the humourist, the way of the language and damage experienced by the target. In this case it would be unfair to think the aim of the humourist is express his hatred to the target of the cartoon rather his aim as a political cartoonist is to bring criticism to the policy for imam-hatip high schools. Furthermore the language that is used in the image has not any abuse or swearword. Surely being described as a cat might be offensive for the target however this feeling of offence cannot go beyond the mere psychological discomfort. Moreover, non-consequentialist approach would consider this example as ethically acceptable because the object of the ridicule is not the human-being but the policy that was conducted. Thus, the target of humour in ridicule form would not unjustify this instance of humour.

Moreover I consider the cases about religion, as aforementioned, one very contentious example can be the cartoons portraying the prophet Muhammad as bomb-throwing terrorist that were published in a Danish newspaper. The reaction to the cartoons were huge since they are interpreted as libel of Muslims. But what if they are interpreted as a critique of Islam that reveals the contradictory between the prophet's teaching and aspects of modern jihadism which is full of violence? If we think with reference to the separation between an assault on the Muslims and the idea of jihadism, then the cartoons can be considered in the scope of criticism. On the other hand if they would prepared by the aim to imply violence whether political or religious is supported by believers of Islam. Like Pinto suggests: "cartoons that associate the prophet Muhammad with terror tend to reduce the social status of Muslim identity as they enforce a negative stigma, according to which terror is part and parcel of Islam."(2010,p.721). Another possibility is told that the cartoons are created particularly against Muslims lives in Danish society that rejects liberal organizations and secular society(Waldron,2012,p.125). Then, among these

possibilities how they should be treated? The treatment of consequentialist approach to this case varies depending on the possibilities. One might argue it promotes imagination and critical thinking and justify it, other can say it discriminates and causes religious hatred so it can not be justified. Because of this duality, non-consequentialist approach would give better evaluation ethically. According to the *Golden Rule* principle people can not be the tool for the sake of our purposes. In this case, the prophet whose doctrine is adopted by Muslim identity and Muslims are also the object of the cartoons. When the prophet is described as suicide bomber, inferentially terror can be attributed to Muslim identity. Therefore, it is ethically unacceptable and unjustified like Charlie Hebdo case. What about a legal justification? Those cartoons should be restricted legally? According to Waldron(2012) it is more difficult to make a division between offending people and assaulting dignity(p.118). Religious hate speech is counted more contentious (p.118-119). Part of the reason is coming from Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006 as it is stated (ibid,p.119). The understanding for a blasphemous libel counts it as an attack to the belief instead of “an attack the believers or on their reputation or social standing”. And the only consideration was for the Christianity. It is very understandable that this counted as an unfair application. After that the protection on Christian faith cancelled too (ibid,p.120). In order to avoid confusion between the two objects namely the beliefs themselves and persons holding them, it is required to describe religious hatred. According to the U.K.’s Public Order Act of 1986 it is described as “hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief”(ibid, p.120). By this definition the focus is switched from the protection of beliefs to the protection of believers. As stated whatever the religious belief is protection against defamation of its members is entitled rather than the protection for the belief itself (ibid, p.123). This is to say any saint, pope or doctrine of Christianity or the Koran or the prophet of Islam are not under protection against defamation because it would not degrade the dignity of that groups and what matter is “to protect individuals, not groups as such(ibid, p.123).” Apparently the dignity and social standing in the society of members of a group distinguished from the status of their beliefs. This point of Waldron is worth considering since protection of belief systems might lead to a desire to prevent the belief itself from criticism. Instead of a protecting from denigrating the believers from religious hatred, laws protect religion from criticism. About Danish cartoons, Waldron thinks that even if “Western

liberals” have right for publication and republication of those, is unnecessary and offensive but still it does not require any legal regulation (ibid, p.126). Because mere offense by itself is not considered as a good motive to adopt law for these kind of problematic expressions of humour. Apart from legal restriction, even Danish newspaper has right to publish those cartoons, it doesn’t have to do fulfilled and the cartoonists should accept that an isolation from moral criticism would not possible (ibid, p.126). Nevertheless, independent from the humourist’s intention those cartoons have risk to degrade cultural and social position of Muslims in that society. With Waldron’s term if they endanger the social standing of the believers of Islam, then they may need the legal regulation. It is obvious that these cartoons are ethically unjustified since they target people and promotes prejudices that would injure the tolerance in multicultural society. Apart from legal restriction, self-censorship may be an action in that case in order to show condemnation, like British newspapers did.

Likewise, advertisement for the campaign of Doğan is ethically unjustified. From the consequentialist point of view it is unjustified because it discriminates women. Similarly, non-consequentialist approach would not see it ethically defensible since it is a ridicule of gender roles attributed to “being female” so women are the target of the humour in the story.

One last example is considered as racist humour by a group of people, it is the green card joke about the Mexican director Inarritu made by Sean Penn at the 87th Oscars. Announcing the award which was the fourth of the night for Inarritu's film, Penn said, "Who gave this son of a bitch his green card?"(Url 12). The director who told they had a very close friendship with Penn found the joke funny. However the joke is found racist some people and got reaction. It seems that it is the indiscretion of Penn and even if it is meant to be a joke it contains racist expression. Later, Penn asserted that the reactions are “flagrant stupidity” and blame “[a]nybody who is so stupid not to have gotten the irony when you've got a country that is so xenophobic”(ibid). The aim of the practitioner might change the treatment to the joke however the cheesy language it still remains contestable. Consequentialist approach may justify this instance of humour since it promotes happiness and also may unjustify since Penn is being indiscreet even by making this joke in a “so xenophobic” country that the discriminative effect of racial content can easily release. Nevertheless non-consequentialist approach would only unjustify this instance of humour. Because, it

ridicules the Mexican identity and Mexican people. Another example is that “Why doesn't Mexico have an Olympic team? Because everybody who can run, jump and swim are already in the U.S.”(Url 13). The joke may not have cheezy language however it denigrates Mexican people in general and discriminates them from US society. Thus, this joke is unjustified according to both consequentialist and non-consequentialist approach

5.5 Conclusion

What is tried to accomplished in this chapter to show that the principles morally good that makes humour justifiable depending on its results or independent from consequences. The ground for this argument is that humour as political phenomenon and exercise of power can be justified only in terms of ethical inquiry. Humour as an intrinsic value cannot be the matter of justification question since it is an expression for sake of expression and does not have any intention. Whereas, humour as extrinsic value has instrumental role for some other values namely, the truth, virtues and happiness and “non-values” discrimination and hatred. Hence, we can interrogate humour whether it is justifiable or not by means of its consequences. Accordingly, the truth contribution, happiness and pleasure are the values that makes justify humour. However for certain times which humour is bilateral in terms that when it causes pleasure of one side, it could be painful for the other side. For instance, if the case for humour based on a contested issue such as ethnicity, gender or race then, a utilitarian view would lead justification of humour for the mockery of minority can be possible since it cares the amount of happiness. Thus, another approach would be necessary to universalize the way for justification of humour as an extrinsic value. It has been the deontic inquiry of humour that evaluates humour not in terms of its effects rather as an instrumental value itself. Accordingly the most contentious cases namely sexist and racist humour cannot be justifiable since those are not the rational products that are possible to universalize and treat others merely as mean to an ends.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the conceptual analysis of humour it has been argued as an experience of incongruity, a comical action, a type of communication and an exercise of power. It has been an incongruity in the sense that the contrast between the expectation and reality, a comical action for being special to human beings and social, a type of communication since it transmits a message between or among people, it also an exercise of power in two senses, superiority and survival or liberation. The property of power has been the main reason for further inquiry on justification. It is assumed to be one of the thick concepts which would require a normative evaluation too. Thus, humour has been treated as value and it has been assessed as both intrinsic and extrinsic values. Intrinsic humour has been described as end in itself whereas extrinsic humour means to an end. Unlike from the former one, extrinsic humour has an instrumental role that would provoke certain kinds of values and results by intention. Besides, humour has been distinguished as good and bad humour. First, it has noted that it is negative or positive in terms of its form. Accordingly, while derisive and aggressive forms of humour are involved in the negative category, gentle and naive forms are attributed to the positive. Humour in political discourse has stated mostly in the negative category and not accepted as good taste universally. That has brought an inquiry on the concept of the political.

Hence, in third chapter, by the intention of having understanding on the link between two concepts, namely humour and the political, "What is the political?" has asked. As Schmitt has answered political is a form of antagonism and conflict and can be described by the distinction of friend-enemy. The friends and enemies are aware that the conflict cannot be resolved by themselves rationally. Rather it is the state who would be the author of the conflict. On the other hand Mouffe suggests agonistic model for the sake of democratic plurality. It differs from antagonistic model stressed by Schmitt, in the sense that it is based on the legitimacy of each other for agents. That is to say, rather than being friend-enemies they are friend-opponent and even both know there is no rational solution for the conflict, they accept the existence of

non-violent communicative conflict. By means of Schmitt's and Mouffe's insights of the concept of the political, humour forms has thought in relation to friend enemy and friend opponent distinctions. While the vulgar jokes with the intention of discrimination has attributed to antagonist conflict, satire, political cartooning has associated with the agonistic conflict. After having an account for "the concept of political" the concept of power has analysed by means of two accounts. First, power has explained in the conceiving sense presented by Arendt (1970, p.44) suggests power rests upon persuasion and is raised from the concerted activities and it needs no justification since it is an inherent property of societies. This aspect of power as an "ability" has its relation to humour as an intrinsic value since similarly it indicates a capacity and there hasn't be any need for justification of intrinsic humour. Contrary to this account, conflictual account of power has mentioned concerning the relationship between people. Accordingly, it can indicate both actual or latent conflict between people and it signifies a manipulative effect (Lukes, 2005, p.28). As regards to conflictual aspect of power humour has distinguished into liberating and oppressive humour based upon the unequal power relations between the actors of humour. While liberating humour has been the humour of the powerless, oppressive humour has practiced by the dominant side, authority. From political point of view humour can justifiable if it undermines the power of the dominants so that it promotes justice. Moreover, as long as it promotes political virtues like freedom it can be justifiable. On the other hand, if it degrades the dominated ones it is unjustified. Like oppressive humour during the Nazi era in Germany. However, can we say that use of humour by dominated ones is always justifiable, since it undermines power of the power-holders without exception? My answer to this question would be no since humour of the powerless can be also problematic in terms of ethics. Therefore, we should have a more inclusionary account on justification of humour. Thus, questioning the ethical justification of humour will be necessary. In order to that, our context would not be irrelevant to seek an understanding of ethics at cosmopolitan level. Kantian approach would provide the golden rule and understanding of ethics in a universal way. In order to evaluate humour ethically at cosmopolitan level and conduct an ethical discussion, the place of humour in life has needed to be analysed. From this point of view, functions of humour has been introduced in the forth chapter.

Functions of humour has been discussed considering both intentional results and natural outcomes, namely side-effects. Main and derived functions of humour has assessed with regards to psychological, social, aesthetic and political realm. Since power is an inherent quality of humour and exertion of power is one of the political functions of humour that has been inclusive to all other consequences. The idea that humour is an exercise of power, this use of power and its effects, bring the ethical justification issue for discussion along with the questions; whether those kinds of humour that fails during their creation or reception should be limited ethically or legally and are they justifiable or not?

Therefore, in the last chapter the question what justifies humour has asked. In the light of the distinction as has argued in the second chapter, humour has considered as intrinsic and extrinsic values. Accordingly, humour as an intrinsic value does not need any justification process and cannot be interfered. Because it has pointed out that this kind of humour as an individualist expression and as valuable in itself. There is no doubt that it would also have several side-effects whether harmful or beneficial, as a result of its existence. Nevertheless, even if we have negative outcomes it cannot be the motive for restriction unless the side-effect remains in a limited sphere that is the private sphere in which the author is alone with her/himself or is among in a couple of friends. Apart from negative results, individual autonomy corresponding to self-expression and truth-discovery have stated as other possible natural outcomes which can be counted as positive and benign ones. Still, it has pointed out, no matter what would be its consequence, humour cannot be limited, since it is intrinsically valuable and it is an expression for the sake of expression. After, humour is treated as an extrinsic value and it is questioned with the help of consequentialist and non-consequentialist way. First way of thinking, a consequentialist one, focus on the results of humour. Accordingly, it suggests humour can be justifiable once it contributes the truth, promote happiness and cannot be justifiable if it promotes discrimination and hatred. Contribution to the truth is argued with Aristotle's concept of mimesis in which humour is adopted as a represented reality. In this way it contributes the truth since it becomes the recognition of unknown fact. Just like the satirical works of humour does reveal the fact by criticising distorted policies of a politician or government. In addition, promotion of happiness has discussed as a rationale for the justification of humour. Ross's thought has considered that the

dutiful action should be led by the motive of duty. Yet, rather than seeing it as sole motive, Ross states two other motives that possess an intrinsic moral worth. First it is the direct desire to produce good that contains the desire to improve one's own and other's moral and intellectual character. Second, it is the desire to produce pleasure or prevent pain for others. Thus, some of the prima-facie duties are related to the effects of our actions on others and ourselves. Those have been called as value-based duties; beneficence, self-improvement, justice and non-maleficence. Accordingly, whether happiness is understood in Aristotle's sense or in the sense of pleasure, it has been noted as a positive effect. Thus, humour is justifiable because it promotes virtues, both moral and intellectual corresponding to happiness. In opposition, the effect of discrimination and hatred has been stated as rationales, which make humour unjustified. In case of discriminating consequences, humour has related to hatred and prejudices. Nonetheless, consequentialist way has resulted in certain confusions between the positive and negative effects. For instance, once the promotion of happiness is considered, utilitarian approach gives chance to justify an example of racist humour in which the minority is a means for the joy of majority. Therefore, a non-consequentialist way of justification has been suggested, in order to interrogate humour independent of its results. Accordingly, humour as an extrinsic value has become a matter of question itself. With the help of Kant's categorical imperatives humour can be justifiable if it is a universal act and unless it does not treat its objects as mere ends. Mentioning the racial, ethnic or sexist humour, it is obvious that they cannot be involved in universal category since they discriminate others by targeting them as mere ends for their joy. It is not the aggressive nature of humour that makes it unjustified but the way it is created based upon the targets as means to pleasure. Contrary to this kind of humour, mostly jokes, satirical works can be justified as long as their targets are mainly the ideas not the people themselves. As it can be recalled from the first chapter satire aims to criticise the failure of the idea not the person itself and as a result aims to correct the falsity.

Having examined two central parts of humour as political phenomenon, from the intrinsic and extrinsic points of view, to evaluate the question of justification both consequentialist or non-consequentialist approach can be an option. Nevertheless, I take stand with the latter one since the justification of humour is a subjective decision resulted from our reason. Yet, I found Kant's approach a rigoristic one for

negative forms of humour since it only recognizes the motive of duty as having genuine moral worth. For instance, ridicule is accepted out of the category of respect duties. However, humour in negative styles like satire nurtures from ridicule should be credited since it promotes critical thinking and knowledge. Only in this case, the consequentialist principles can be overridden. All in all, what matter is the use of humour responsibly, that is to say they should be morally sensitive about the response process of humour. The necessity of sensitivity expected from humorist, indicates that it is a matter of subjective decision that can be provided by the author of humour. As a result, Kant's ethical system would be the preferred one in order to justify humour. With reference to moral vulnerabilities, humorist would choose to not initiate humour. Then, self-censorship is one way to avoid from problematic aspect of humour. To answer the question when should state act I would take stand Waldron's position in which hate speech regulation is necessary for the protection of social standing of members of society. The criterion that motivates a restriction on humour can be the moral one and non-consequentialist way of thinking in ethics. It is not any political measure that limits humour but some moral criteria. It is important to note that, in particular problematic kinds of humour have taken into consideration. Because as has mentioned in the third part, those would most likely fails in terms of creation or appreciation process.

The original contribution to this study would be providing an explanation and understanding of humour. As Weber's *Verstehen* refers, the understanding of the action of humour from my point of view tried to be related to others in the society. Despite of the subjective dimension of it, *Versheten* is not an understanding linked to a non-cognitive or intuitive process but it can be valid objectively when the meanings and values to be comprehended as a result of its causal explanation of the action's course and effects (Weber,1978, p.88). It is the quest for having empathetic understanding of humour for the individuals in our society.

In this study justification question of humor has been dealt with in consideration of values and it has been defended humour as political phenomenon can be justified according to subjective decision of the author with the reasoning of Kantian approach. As a matter of fact humour exist in a network of meanings. Hence it would be very inspiring to set out determining some criteria that help the problematic of meanings. A future study within semantics could be worth considering. Moreover,

unconscious state of mind may cause certain type of uncontrolled situations in which golden rule cannot be operated. Instead as the author of humour we put our foot in our mouth and while being indiscreet. This would be also a base point for another future project.

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