



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**‘A MOST VOLUBLE PROPONENT OF ANTI-WESTERN
MULTI-FACETED FOREIGN POLICY’? AHMET GÜNDÜZ
ÖKÇÜN AS TURKEY’S FOREIGN MINISTER (1978-1979)**

MASTER THESIS

Tahir KAYA

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANKARA, 2021

T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**‘A MOST VOLUBLE PROPONENT OF ANTI-WESTERN
MULTI-FACETED FOREIGN POLICY’? AHMET GÜNDÜZ
ÖKÇÜN AS TURKEY’S FOREIGN MINISTER (1978-1979)**

MASTER THESIS

Tahir KAYA

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Supervisor
Assoc. Prof. Ömer ASLAN

ANKARA, 2021

THESIS ACCEPTANCE APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this thesis entitled ““A Most Voluble Proponent of Anti-Western Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy”? Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün as Turkey’s Foreign Minister (1978-1979)” submitted by Tahir KAYA has been approved with majority of votes by the examining committee members in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Committee Members	Institution	Signature
Assoc. Prof. Ömer ASLAN	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University	
Accept ☒ Reject ☐		
Asst. Prof. Sevinç ÖZCAN	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University	
Accept ☒ Reject ☐		
Assoc. Prof. Buğra SARI	Police Academy	
Accept ☐ Reject ☒		

Thesis Defense Date: 14/09/2021

I approve that the thesis fulfills the necessities to be deemed a master thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations.

Director of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Doç. Dr. Seyfullah YILDIRIM

PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise, I accept all legal responsibility.

Full Name : Tahir KAYA

Signature :





Anneme ve babama, Fahriye&Hasan Kaya...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Bu tezin yazılma sürecinde birçok kişinin bana desteęi oldu. Öncelikle tez danışmanım Ömer Aslan hocam titiz çalışması ve değerli yorumlarıyla tezin kalitesini ciddi miktarda arttırmakla birlikte onun nazik üslubu ve çalışma disiplini bana eşsiz bir örnek oldu. Danışmanımın paha biçilmez katkısı olmasaydı bu tez asla bitmeyecekti. Diğer yandan savunma jürime katılan Sevinç Özcan ve Buğra Sarı hocalarımın yorumları tezin eksik kısımlarını düzeltmemi sağladı, kendilerine çok teşekkür ediyorum.

Bütün zorluklara rağmen bana sevgi dolu ve her zaman özlenecek anılar yaşatan anneme, babama ve kardeşlerime olan minnettarlığı kelimelerle ifade etmem mümkün değil.

İstanbul'daki zor yaşam koşullarında benimle hayatını birleştirmeyi kabul eden eşim Elif ve hayatımıza neşe ve bereket getiren kızım Meryem Sare tezin yazılma sürecinde en çok fedakârlık eden kişiler oldu. Birlikte yaşayacağımız hayatta bunu telafi etmek için çabalayacağım.

Emekleriyle düşünce dünyanın olgunlaşmasında bana eşsiz bir katkı yapan, çalışma ahlakı ve nezaketiyle bana emsalsiz bir örneklik olan Muhammed Ali Ağcan hocama çok teşekkür ediyorum. Ayrıca farklı düşünme tarzıyla bana ilham veren Ali Kaya hocama ve düşünsel anlamda çok ciddi katkı sunan siyaset teorisi okuma grubundaki değerli arkadaşlarıma çok teşekkür ediyorum. Kendileriyle yaptığım konuşma ve görüşmeler benim için akademik çalışmaları çok daha anlamlı hale getirdi.

Son olarak, karşılıksız dostluklarıyla birlikte tez yazım sürecinde bana destek olan Onur, İlyas, Murat ve Serdar hocalarıma çok teşekkür ediyorum.

ABSTRACT

‘A Most Voluble Proponent of Anti-Western Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy’? Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün as Turkey’s Foreign Minister (1978-1979)

This thesis seeks to introduce Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, Turkey’s foreign minister in the 42th government (1978-1979) and discuss his role in Turkey’s foreign policy decision making in one of the most tumultuous periods in Turkey’s relations with the West. Notwithstanding vast Turkish foreign policy literature, there are yet only few studies on individual actors in foreign policy making in the history of Republican Turkey. Given the historical bureaucratic weight of Turkey’s foreign ministry in Turkish foreign policy making during the Cold War period, Ahmed Gündüz Ökçün’s non-conventional rise from academia to foreign ministry and his distinct role as foreign minister have remained understudied. This thesis aims to narrow down this gap by studying Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün in a period during the Cold War when Turkey’s western foreign policy orientation came under immense strain. While engaging Ökçün’s actorness, this thesis seeks to go beyond traditional biographical studies by critically discussing the role of individuals and their beliefs/worldviews on Turkey’s foreign policy at a particular time, that is Cold War, when systemic pressures on Turkish foreign policy was arguably the highest. To do so, this thesis examines all of Ökçün's writings before he became foreign minister, considers his speeches/statements during his ministry of foreign affairs, uses interviews conducted with diplomats who worked with him or knew him while he was foreign minister, and finally takes advantage of telegrams used for official communication between US Embassy in Ankara and Washington.

Keywords: Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, Foreign Ministry, Bülent Ecevit, New International Economic Order, Non-Aligned Movement, Détente,

ÖZET

‘Batı Karşıtı Çokyönlü Dış Politikanın En Yüksek Sesli Savunucusu’? Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanı olarak Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün (1978-1979)

Bu tez, 42. hükümette (1978-1979) Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışışleri Bakanı olan Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün'ü tanıtmayı ve Türkiye'nin Batı ile ilişkilerinin en çalkantılı dönemlerinden birinde Türkiye'nin dış politika karar alma sürecindeki rolünü tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Geniş Türk dış politikası literatürüne rağmen, Cumhuriyet tarihinde dış politika yapımında önemli bireysel aktörler hakkında çok az çalışma bulunmaktadır. Türkiye'de Soğuk Savaş döneminde dış politika yapımında Dışışleri Bakanlığının tarihsel bürokratik ağırlığı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Ahmed Gündüz Ökçün'ün akademik dünyadan dışışleri bakanlığına alışılmadık yükselişi ve dışışleri bakanı olarak görev yaptığı farklılaşan dönem yeterince çalışılmamıştır. Bu tez, dışışleri bakanı olarak Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün'ü Türkiye'nin Batı yönlü dış politikasının büyük baskı altında kaldığı bir dönem olan Soğuk Savaş döneminde inceleyerek literatürdeki bu açığı daraltmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez, bir yandan Ökçün'ün o dönemdeki aktörlüğünü ele alırken, diğer taraftan Türk dış politikası üzerindeki sistemik baskıların tartışmalı olarak en yüksek olduğu bir dönemde -Soğuk Savaş- Türkiye'nin dış politikasında bireylerin ve onların inançlarının/dünya görüşlerinin etkisini eleştirel bir şekilde tartışarak biyografik bir çalışma olmanın ötesine geçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, bu tez Ökçün'ün dışışleri bakanı olmadan önceki tüm yazılarını, dışışleri bakanlığı sırasında yaptığı konuşmaları/açıklamaları incelemekte, kendisi ile çalışmış veya dışışleri bakanı olduğu dönemde kendisini tanıyan diplomatlarla yapılan röportajları kullanmakta ve ayrıca ABD'nin Ankara Büyükelçiliğinin ilgili dönemde Vaşington ile diplomatik yazışmalarından faydalanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, Dışışleri Bakanlığı, Bülent Ecevit, Yeni Uluslararası Ekonomik Düzen, Bağlantısızlar Hareketi, Yumuşama Dönemi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
ÖZET	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Research Questions.....	2
1.3. Limitations	3
1.4. Sources and Scheme of the Thesis.....	4
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS	6
2.1. Foreign Policy Analysis.....	6
2.1.1. Individual Level Analysis	7
2.1.1.1. Individual Unit Studies in Turkish Foreign Policy	13
2.1.2. State Level Analysis.....	21
2.1.3. System Level Analysis.....	23
3. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DOMESTIC POLITICS OF TURKEY in 1970s.....	31
3.1. International Environment in 1970s	31
3.1.1. Cyprus Issue from 1960s to 1978	32
3.1.2. The Oil Crisis and Subsequent Developments in International Society	36
3.1.3. Jimmy Carter as US President	40
3.1.4. Camp David Accords and SALT II.....	45
3.1.5. Iran Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan	47
3.2. Domestic Politics of Turkey at 1970s.....	52
3.2.1. İnönü's Fragile Coalition Governments in the 1960s.....	52

3.2.2. Emergence of Anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion and intelligentsia.....	54
3.2.3. 1971 Turkish Military Memorandum.....	57
3.2.4. Bülent Ecevit and Transformation of RPP.....	59
3.2.5. Political Violence.....	60
3.2.6. Economic Crises.....	64
4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING ÖKÇÜN PERIOD.....	67
4.1. Ökçün at the Helm of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.....	67
4.1.1. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün's Profile.....	67
4.1.2. Ökçün's Conception about Turkish Foreign Policy.....	69
4.1.3. Resistance of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ökçün.....	76
4.1.4. Ökçün's Guarded Discourse vis-à-vis the West.....	78
4.2. Turkey-West Relations.....	80
4.2.1. Embargo and Cyprus Issue.....	81
4.2.1.1. Cyprus Issue in Bilateral Diplomatic Visits (February-March 1978).....	83
4.2.1.2. The Breaking Point for US-Turkey Relations: Zablocki Letter and the Montreux Summit (March 1978).....	85
4.2.1.3. The Lift of Embargo (July-September 1978).....	91
4.2.1.4. Economic and Military Aid Negotiations (December 1978 – November 1979).....	99
4.2.1.5. U-2 Crisis(August-November 1979).....	101
4.2.2. The Concern for Support to Separatist Kurdish Movements.....	104
4.2.3. Relations with the USSR and Socialist Countries.....	106
4.3. Turkey's New Approach with Muslim-Majority Countries.....	110
4.4. Turkey-Non-Aligned Movement Countries Relations.....	115
5. CONCLUSION.....	124
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	128

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO	: Central Treaty Organization
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
DCA	: Defense Cooperation Agreement
FPA	: Foreign Policy Analysis
FPS	: Faculty of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi)
G77	: Group of 77
IR	: International Relations
JP	: Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
LTA	: Leadership Trait Analysis
MFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAM	: Non-Aligned Countries
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIEO	: New International Economic Order
NMP	: Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NSP	: National Salvation Party (Milli Selamat Partisi)
NUC	: National Unity Committee
OPEC	: The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLO	: Palestine Liberation Organization
RPP	: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
SALT	: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
TAF	: Turkish Armed Forces
THKP-C	: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi (Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front)
TİKKO	: Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army)
UN	: United Nations
UNCTAD	: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WPT	: Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Wendt’s Mapping of Theories..... 27

Figure 2. Crude Oil Price..... 39

Figure 3. Vietnam War Deaths and Support Relations..... 43

Figure 4. Detente and the Soviet-American Nuclear Balance 46

Figure 5. Inflation in Turkey 1960-1982 65



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

During the 1970s, there were two central issues Turkish governments needed to address. First, tensions with the West that had begun before Turkey's 1974 Cyprus operation came to a head with the US military embargo after the operation. While Turkey's relations with the western alliance nosedived as a result, Turkey canceled defense cooperation agreement with the US, revoking U.S. soldiers' permission to use military bases in Turkey. Somehow repairing relations with the United States until the late 1970s was crucial because of Turkey's long and deep political, cultural, diplomatic and military relations with the United States.

The second issue, related to the first, that Turkey had to tackle was to try to pursue multidimensional foreign policy despite its traditionally western-oriented foreign relations under the Cold War conditions. This process had in fact started after the 1964 Cyprus Crisis and 1965 United Nations General Assembly vote on Cyprus, yet continued with Turkey's closer relations with the Islamic world and the warming ties with the Soviets in the 1970s. The issue of what relations with the new group of countries means and how to reconcile relations with these countries with Turkey's membership in the Western alliance has been the busy work for Turkish governments and foreign affairs. The three main problems made it difficult to tackle both issues: chaotic, unstable domestic politics that emerged in Turkey during the 1970s; the increasing importance of the public opinion in foreign policy, with concomitant rise of anti-Americanism; and fragile Turkish economy. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün served as Turkey's foreign minister at such a difficult time between 1978-1979. In close coordination with Prime Minister Ecevit, Ökçün used perhaps the most anti-Western discourse during his term as foreign minister in the Republican period. Ökçün as foreign minister and his role in Turkish foreign policy making at this very critical juncture deserves closer examination.

1.2. Research Questions

Although Ökçün and this period in Turkish politics are extraordinary in this respect, there are very few studies in the literature. Although there are many studies about presidents or high-level officials in the United States, such studies are rare for a number of reasons in Turkey.

Some of the research questions sought to be answered in this thesis are: What were the main problems and events in Turkey-Western relations during Ökçün era? How did Turkey's search for non-Western alliances take place in this period and how did they succeed? What was Ökçün's role in this quest? How can we understand his contribution to Turkey navigating complex and interrelated issues of that period? How did Ökçün see Turkey's role in the international system? How can we conceptualize Ökçün' role? Was Ökçün he a foreign policy maker or just a practitioner?

The main argument of this thesis is that Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün is the foreign minister who uses the most anti-Western rhetoric in Turkey republic history. It was in this period that Turkish elites started to feel disappointed with the West, entertaining the idea that fixation with western orientation to the disregard of other regions and at the expense of developing relations with the non-west had harmed Turkey. The U-2 crisis, Johnson letter, and the Cyprus issue had created a groundswell of disappointment among the Turkish elite and public. When Ökçün was at the helm at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, he became most convicted torch bearer of these ideas who actually tried to implement some of them under impossible circumstances of Cold War structure. According to him, the national interest of a country cannot be solely identified with physical security, therefore with armament; economic development cannot be disregarded. Ökçün thought that Turkey's understanding of NATO-centered security was therefore misguided. According to him, Turkey neglected its development. Moreover, even as a member of NATO, which Ökçün did not desire to be terminated, Turkey should pursue a foreign policy in line with its own national interests. For this reason, he believed that Turkey should strengthen its political and economic relations with non-Western countries, including therefore with NAM, which Turkey had been such an outspoken opponent of in the past. Ökçün thought that the security provided by development rather than armament was in the interests of the states. He prefers that each country must strive for this to exist in a more egalitarian position in the international system. On the other hand, Ökçün did not pay much attention to diplomatic practices. For this reason,

he not only drew the ire of US official at times but also clashed very openly with the Turkish diplomatic corps, an institutional bastion of Turkey's western oriented foreign policy. Given lack of adequate number of documents —official or unofficial— it is impossible to conclude whether Ökçün's performance was effective in solving myriad problems Turkey faced from the Cyprus issue to Turkey's search for economic aid. However, it is possible to say that given the circumstances of the Cold War, foreign policy vision Ökçün tried to chart for Turkey in accord with his government led by PM Bülent Ecevit can be considered as revolutionary and distinct.

By answering these questions, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on Turkish foreign policy in three particular ways. First, it seeks to contribute to a burgeoning literature on the effect of individuals on Turkish Foreign Policy. Second, the available literature on Ökçün itself is curiously very slim. This thesis intends to fill this large gap by making an argument about distinctive place Ökçün had at the very critical domestic, regional, and international juncture previously defined. Finally, it tries to conceptualize the role of Ökçün by thinking comparatively across other Turkish foreign ministers both before and after him such as Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, İhsan Çaglayangil, and Ahmet Davutoğlu.

1.3. Limitations

This thesis had to find its way around despite three major limitations. To begin with, in Turkey, unlike in countries such as the USA, people who come to high-rank positions have a relatively low habit of writing their memoirs, and they do not have a tradition of keeping their personal papers, notes, correspondence, and then publishing them. Ökçün was no exception in this regard. He neither penned his would-be rich memoirs nor it is possible to reach his personal papers, if he kept any. This study therefore had to collect relevant information about Ökçün and his time at the foreign ministry from a variety of sources and pierce that information together to make an argument. One of the most important secondary sources about Ökçün and his period has been written very recently.¹ However, Sert mentioned Ökçün in only a few pages in his work. Moreover, information about him is given only through bureaucrats. Similarly, in a thesis written on foreign policy by Bülent Ecevit, Ökçün is not mentioned even once, thus relegating his otherwise arguable important role

¹ Sert, Hüseyin (2018). *Memory of an institution: The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Diplomats in the 1960-1980 Period*, supervised by Prof. Dr. Aydın Babuna in Boğaziçi University.

into oblivion.² This thesis presents Ökçün's thoughts and stance in more detail by looking at Ökçün's own statements and using US Embassy cables.

Secondly, Turkish Foreign Policy literature is inundated with macro level studies offering bird's eye view and covering large time periods; micro-level studies on individuals and extensive discussions of historical episodes are not many. The tumultuous period of 1960 to 1980 is no exception in this regard either. Third, in addition, the scarcity of archival sources on Turkish foreign policy hampering any work on Turkey's foreign relations limited this study as well. The Covid-19 pandemic worsened the impact of this limitation as it made it very difficult to contact Ökçün's relatives and people working around Ökçün, and to take advantage of the already limited number of declassified state archives.

1.4. Sources and Scheme of the Thesis

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject and places it within the larger literature on Turkish foreign policy. The second chapter presents theoretical framework of the thesis. In the chapter, different approaches in foreign policy analysis are discussed and Turkish Foreign Policy studies that adopted individual foreign policy analysis are mentioned.

Third chapter illustrates domestic politics of Turkey and the international environment of Ökçün's period that is so-called détente period of Cold War. It therefore discusses Cold War, détente, US-China relations, Cyprus Issue, Oil Crisis, Jimmy Carter becoming US president, Camp David Accords, SALT II, Iranian Revolution and Afghanistan Invasion are depicted. In the chapter, some of the main events of domestic politics will be summarized such as fragile governments, rise of left-right confrontation and political violence, economic crisis. After Cyprus Operation Turkey had tried to strengthen its relation with non-Western countries such as USSR and Muslim-majority countries. At the same time, there was limited changes at attitude and worldviews of bureaucrats at Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bureaucrats in ministry were rather Western-centric until Cyprus Crisis. After crisis, few bureaucrats tried to seek cooperation with non-Western countries.

² Tarhan, Cemile (2019). Bülent Ecevit ve Türk Dış Politikası, Supervised by Assc. Prof. Esra Albayrakoglu in Bahçeşehir University

The final chapter takes stock of domestic and international context and seeks to pinpoint role Ökçün played. In this chapter, The role played by Ökçün and its effect on foreign policy are revealed by studying on besides other sources and Ökçün's own discourse, the telegrams written between the American Embassy in Ankara and Washington are also taken into account Turkey-West Relations, Turkey-Muslim Countries Relations, Turkey-Non-Aligned Movement Countries Relations.



2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

2.1. Foreign Policy Analysis

Scholars in IR have been developing variety of theories, methodologies, and conceptual framework in order to understand and explain phenomenon in IR or foreign policy of states. After the Cold War, the discipline became very diverse in this respect. One of the most popular and useful conceptual frameworks is Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). With FPA, it is tried to better understand and explain how actors in IR make the foreign policy. FPA is not result-oriented, it is process-oriented. It tries to explain process of a foreign policy making in detail. Valerie M. Hudson argue that there are five hallmarks of FPA as follow “multifactorial, multilevel, multi-/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented.”³ Foreign policy analysis is applied at different levels. Most of scholars in the IR have accepted categorization of Kenneth Waltz that are individual, state and systemic⁴. There are many studies examining foreign policy decision making of states at these levels.

In the early periods, studies were carried out mostly at the systemic and state level. For example, Singer discussed the systemic and state levels in 1961, without even mentioning the individual level.⁵ The majority of systemic studies were done in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Waltz published “Theory of International Politics”⁶ in 1979 and Immanuel Wallerstein published the first volume of “The Modern World-System”⁷ in 1974, Theda Skocpol also published “States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China”⁸ in 1979, a milestone book for historical sociology. There were very few

³ Hudson, Valerie M. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations, *Foreign Policy Analysis*. p. 2

⁴ Waltz, Kenneth (1959). *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press.

⁵ Singer, J. David (1961). “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations”, *World Politics* Vol. 14, No. 1, *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Oct., 1961), pp. 77-92.

⁶ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

⁷ Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press.

⁸ Skocpol, Theda (1974). *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, Cambridge University Press.

works examining foreign policy at the level of the individual in this period. “The American People and Foreign Policy”⁹ written by Gabriel A. Almond, published in 1950, is one of the exception. In this book, Almond discussed the attitude of the American public towards foreign policy. In the rest of the chapter, individual level studies are discussed in more detail, since the individual actor will be studied. After the individual unit discussions in the IR are summarized, the studies that analyze Turkey's foreign policy at the individual level will be described. Then, state and system level discussions will be discussed.

2.1.1. Individual Level Analysis

The level of individual considers individuals as actors in foreign policy decision-making. It tries to understand the foreign policy decision-making process through individuals' worldviews, beliefs, personalities, choices, behaviors and perception of phenomena. The basic assumption here is that states are not entities that can make decisions on their own. The individuals who govern the state decide what kind of foreign policy the state will implement. It is impossible for individuals to form a foreign policy by completely stripping them of their individual characteristics. For this reason, the individual's characteristics, especially psychology, beliefs, basic assumptions about how politics works and world operates provide important clues for understanding foreign policy. Individual unit level of analysis mostly appealed to political psychology studies. As stated earlier, individual level analysis had been relatively rare until end of Cold War. After the Cold War, individuals' influence on foreign policy substantially expanded. Studies adopting the individual level have increased. However, backbone of theoretical basis of individual unit created during Cold War by many IR and political science scholars.

The book “Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics” published in 1954 by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin is considered a touchstone work for the individual level studies.¹⁰ Hudson claim that there are three paradigmatic works in FPA including Synder et al.¹¹ Snyder etc. advocated that FPA must

⁹ Almond, Gabriel (1950). *The American People and Foreign Policy*. Harcourt, Brace.

¹⁰ Levy, Jack S.(2013). “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, in Sears, D. O. Huddy, L. Levy, J.S.(2013) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition p. 306

¹¹ Rosenau, James N. (1966) “Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy.” In *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*, edited by R. B. Farrell, pp. 115–169. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. The others are *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, written by James Rosenau, and *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, written by Harold and Margaret Sprout. Rosenau finds the individual level FPA too reductionist and criticizes it.

examine process rather than outputs and scholars must seriously take account perception and tendency of foreign policy decision-maker. This argument may sound like a simple cliché now. However, it was a revolutionary view for those times. Because it was incompatible with the hegemonic epistemology of the individual and actor at that time. Under the influence of positivism and behavioralism, there was the assumption of an actor without individual differences, who was always thought to make rational choices. “Individuals are assumed to maximize expected utility by determining the payoffs attached to all possible outcomes, assessing their probabilities, updating information on those probabilities, and choosing the strategy with the highest expected return.”¹²

Snyder et al. problematized the perception of the rational actor supposedly having full knowledge, free of values or detached from any worldviews. Since the assumption was that perceptions, preferences, and interests cannot be different for a rational actor, analyzing the individual level was considered futile. However, “by this time there was growing dissatisfaction with the rational, unitary, apolitical, and outcome-oriented focus of many existing studies of foreign policy.”¹³ In addition, “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” written by Graham Allison in 1971, is a work that undermined the rational actor model. Some researchers state that Allison's work is very important in the regression of objectivism in IR.¹⁴

Another crucial conceptual framework within individual level is “Operational Code”. Operational Code analysis is used to examine the opinions of decision makers. It was first used by the Soviet-born Nathan Leites to examine the beliefs of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin¹⁵. Nevertheless, Alexander George is one who actually developed the concept. George first added some epistemological considerations to the concept. He claims that there is some cognitive limits on rational choice model and there is three constraints on it. These are “(1) The political actor's information about situations with which he must deal is usually

¹² Hafner-Burton, Emilie Haggard, Stephan Lake, David A. Victor, David G. (2017). “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations”, *International Organization*, Volume 71. P. 6 Hafner-Burton and his colleagues discussed in detail how conception about rationality of actors has changed. I have benefited greatly from their views on this topic. In the following section, I will touch upon their main views.

¹³ Levy, Jack S.(2003). “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy”, in Sears, D. O. Huddy, L. Jervis, R.(2003) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 1st Edition p. 258
For more detail about rationality in Political Science please see Chong, D.(2013). “Degrees of Rationality in Politics in Sears”, D. O. Huddy, L. Levy, J.S. (2013) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition

¹⁴ Carlnaes, Walter (2016). *Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis in Smith*, Steve Hadfield, A. Dunne Tim (2016) *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press. p.119

¹⁵ Leites, Nathan(1951). *The Operational Code of the Politburo*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

incomplete; (2) his knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict reliably the consequences of choosing one or another course of action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action is “best”¹⁶.

By accepting these as constraints, he discredits rational choice theory. Therefore, there is no flawless, emotionless, predictable, universal actor in foreign policy decision-making. George thus accepts heterogeneity of actors. Then how can we understand, categorize and explain actors in FPA? George claims that the actor’s behavior can be understood via operational codes that he has. He advocates that the actor has instrumental and philosophical beliefs. While instrumental beliefs are about ends-means, philosophical beliefs “refer to assumptions and premise he makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics.”¹⁷ He urged that there are five questions to understand each set of beliefs.¹⁸

George tried to analyze Bolsheviks by answering these ten questions one by one. At the same time, he put forward that behavior of other actors in IR could be understood via these questions. Answers to these questions collected by speeches, papers, interviews, press conferences, diaries, and letters. Indeed, Operational Code has become one of the most famous conceptual framework in the individual level analysis. Recently Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker developed Operational Code¹⁹. Currently scholars quantitatively study on Operational Code via computer-assisted Verbs in Context System (VICS). Many actors in the IR has been studied via VICS.²⁰

¹⁶ George, Alexander L. (1969). The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making, *International Studies Quarterly*, Jun., 1969, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Jun., 1969), pp. 198.

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 199, 205-216

¹⁸ Ibid. pp..

¹⁹ Schafer, Mark , & Walker, Stephen G. (2001). “Political Leadership and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Code of Prime Minister Tony Blair”. In O. Feldman & L. O. Valenty (eds.), *Profiling political leaders: Cross-*

cultural studies of personality and political behavior (pp. 21–35). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Schafer, M. , & Walker, S. G. (Eds.). (2006). *Beliefs and leadership in world politics: Methods and applications of operational code analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Walker, S. G. (1990). “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis”, *Political Psychology*, 11, 403–418.

Walker, S. G. (2000). “Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance: Symposium Lessons And Future Research Directions”. *Political Psychology*, 21, 597–602.

Walker, S. G. , & Schafer, M. (2000). “The Political Universe of Lyndon Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes”. *Political Psychology*, 21, 529–543.

Walker, S. G. , & Schafer, M. (2007). “Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy”, *Political Psychology*, 28, 747–776.

²⁰ Levy, Jack S.(2013). “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, in Sears, D. O. Huddy, L. Levy, J.S.(2013) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition p. 442.

Robert Jervis is one of the most famous scholars who theoretically works on the individual level. Levy claims that it was Robert Jervis, who worked in the 1970s, who popularized individual-level approaches.²¹ Jervis tried to show how foreign policy makers' perceptions affect foreign policy decision-making. Jervis wrote one of the most important studies in the discipline in 1976. Jervis claims that beliefs and misperceptions have a significant place in foreign policy decision-making processes. The way the decision maker perceives the world and other people affects the decision and the process.²²

In social sciences, sometimes a theory produced in one discipline may gain wide acceptance, become a paradigm, and affect the philosophical foundation of other disciplines. Hafner-Burton et al. claim that arguments of psychologist Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have greatly influenced IR studies. According to them, Kahneman and Tversky succeeded in the emergence of a new paradigm by falsifying the rational choice actor. They said, "The current cognitive revolution begins with the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky."²³ Kahneman and Tversky studied on actor response in moments of crisis, heuristic, and prospect theory. They claim that there is two-level cognition which are "System 1" that is intuitive and immediate and "System 2" that is more slow, deliberative, and more rational.²⁴ There is little rationality at the System 1 level. The actor gives a heuristic answer by making analogies over the problems he has faced before. Kahneman and Tversky convinced many researchers that actors are not as rational as they thought and they violate the expected utility theory many times.²⁵ They also put forward that there is no absolute gains or loss, they can be evaluated only according to reference point.²⁶ There are many researchers working on individual level IR using the theory of Kahneman and Tversky. Prospect theory, heuristic and reference point are frequently used among researchers. Their thoughts deeply influenced the behaviorist approach and political

²¹ Levy, Jack S.(2003). "Political Psychology and Foreign Policy", in Sears, D. O. Huddy, L. Jervis, R. (2003) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 1st Edition p. 253.

²² Jervis, R.(1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton University Press p. 3 in 2017 Edition.

²³ Hafner-Burton, Emilie Haggard, Stephan Lake, David A, Victor, David G. (2017). "The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations", *International Organization*, Volume 71. P. 2

²⁴ See Chong, Dennis (2013). "Degrees of Rationality in Politics" in Sears, D. O. Huddy, L. Levy, J.S.(2013) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition, p.100

Kahneman, David(2011). *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

²⁵ Tversky, Amos Kahneman, David (1974). "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases". *Science* 185 (4157):1124–32.

²⁶ Kahneman, David Tversky, Amos (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk". *Econometrica* 47 (2):263–91.

psychology. The universal rational actor assumption is almost no longer accepted in the disciplines.

Margaret Hermann is one of the most important researchers studying on the impact of the individual on foreign policy. Hermann developed the concept of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA). According to her, there is seven traits for assessing leadership style: “(1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one's environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias.”²⁷ Each trait here has keywords. The character of the leader is determined by entering these keywords into certain statistical programs. On the other hand, Hermann claims that these traits provide “how political leaders respond to the constraints in their environment, how they process information, and what motivates them to action.”²⁸ Hermann distinguishes leaders' eight different style according to responsiveness to Constraints and Openness to Information. These styles are expansionistic, evangelistic, actively independent, directive, incremental, influential, opportunistic, and collegial²⁹.

There are many studies on the actor's beliefs and their reasons. Kaufman examined the attitude of German foreign policy on the Moroccan Crisis (1905-1906) in an article³⁰. He tried to understand the change in the beliefs of the actors in the face of new information. He concluded that actors avoided renewing their beliefs. Most of the researchers emphasizing psychological variables are close to this idea.³¹ For example, in the 1960s, Turkey faced the SCBB because of the U-2 spy planes³³. After the US lifted the military embargo on Turkey in 1978, US wanted to base U-2 planes in Turkey again. Ecevit and Ökçün believe that these

²⁷ Hermann, Margaret G. (2003). “Assessing Leadership Style: A Traits Analysis”, in *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton*, Jerrold M. Post (ed.), Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. P.186

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid. P.185

³⁰ Kaufman Chaim D. (1994). “Out of the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision Making”. *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 38, Issue 4, December 1994, Pages 557–586

³¹ Levy, Jack S.(2003). “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy”, in Sears, D. O. Huddy, L. Jervis, R.(2003) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, Oxford University Press. 1st Edition p. 269.

³³ U-2 spy plane departing from Pakistan was shot down by the Soviets on its way to Norway. Khrushchev threatened to strike US bases in neighboring countries. This threat targeted Pakistan, Norway and Turkey. Turkey, naturally, was disturbed by this threat. The issue will be touched upon later in the thesis.

planes will cause a new crisis again. The USA spent a lot of effort to convince Turkey of this. However, Ecevit's belief has not changed. Ecevit acquired such a belief by making analogies with the past. Often in IR, actors arrive at beliefs by making analogies in this way. Learning from past is usually a subjective process. For example, Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri stated that policy makers take history selectively and biased way,³² this however does not reduce the importance of considering how and what historical analogies policy decision makers make. It is also the case that though individual beliefs are prone to change, change does not come fast and easy. Radical belief changes are rare. Moreover, Philip Tetlock has shown that people with strong beliefs are weaker at predicting the future.³³

‘Learning from past’ as a shortcut used in policymaking is strictly related with poliheuristic decision-making process. Poliheuristic theory (PH) which developed by Alex Mintz tries to combine rational and cognitive methods. PH claims that decision-making processes consist of two stages. In the first stage, unacceptable options are eliminated.³⁴ Mintz “sees domestic politics as “the essence of decision”³⁵ in democratic regimes. Leaders do not implement foreign policy practices that would prevent them to win next elections. In the second stage, actors try to minimize risk and maximize benefit by using analytical tools.

Joseph Nye emphasized the role of individuals in foreign policy making as well.³⁶ Writing about the role of leadership in policy making process, Nye criticized international relations discipline for placing too little emphasis on individual actors. While he acknowledges the importance of structures limiting the scope of individual action, he claims that the preferences and behaviors of individuals are still of paramount importance. “Some see history as an overwhelming river whose current is shaped by the large structural forces of climate and topography. But there is a difference between portraying human agents as clinging to a log swept along by the current and portraying them as white-water rafters trying to steer and fend off rocks, occasionally overturning and sometimes succeeding...”³⁷

³² Brands, Hal Suri, Jeremi (2015). *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft*, Brookings Institution Press. P. 2.

³³ Tetlock, Philip E. (2005). *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

³⁴ Mintz, Alex(2004). “How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* , Feb., 2004, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp.3-13.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 7.

³⁶ Nye, Joseph (2013). *Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era*, Princeton University Press.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 73.

Hafner-Burton et al. claim that after the 1970s, a behavioral revolution took criticizing the rational choice theory. With this revolution, there is now heterogeneity of actors rather than a universal, monolithic, and uniform actor. With this revolution, the behavior of individual units will be better understood and explained. They assert that new approaches offer new opportunities, particularly for preferences, beliefs, and decision-making. They mention that there are two criticisms of behavioral approaches. These are external validity and replicability.³⁸ They state that generalizing surveys and experiments over a sample is acceptable in academia. They also claim that these problems are a problem of all disciplines, not just IR studies.

2.1.1.1. Individual Unit Studies in Turkish Foreign Policy

It can be said that studies on Turkish foreign policy largely mirrored structural orientations in the larger international relations literature, assigning only a marginal role to individuals in foreign policy making processes in Turkey. One reason behind this assumption was that it was accepted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a strong bureaucratic institution dominated foreign policy making. According to Harris, As George S. Harris states that “Particularly since the mid-1950s, foreign ministers have often been technicians drawn from the ranks of diplomats. Even when politicians have been chosen, they have operated as advisors rather than as formulators of major foreign policy initiatives.”³⁹ According to Taner Baytok, a seasoned diplomat, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs technocrat staff is the least affected by political changes in government.”⁴⁰ While national parliaments may become important actors in foreign policy in some countries, Turkish parliament, except in few extraordinary circumstances, does not have much influence over Turkish foreign policy in Turkey.⁴¹

³⁸ Hafner-Burton, Emilie Haggard, Stephan Lake, David A. Victor, David G. (2017). “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations”, *International Organization*, Volume 71. P. 21-22.

³⁹ Harris, George S.(2003). “Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Independent or Reactive?” in Brown, L. C.(2003).(ed.) *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*, I.B. Tauris. P. 260.

⁴⁰ Baytok, Taner(2005). *Dış Politikada bir Nefes*, Remzi Kitabevi. P.248 Baytok stated with Ökçün that this would be violated. This is mentioned in the last chapter of the thesis.

⁴¹ An important exception to this is the US's prevention of the use of Turkey's military bases in the invasion of Iraq on March 1, 2003. For more detail please see Kesgin, B. Kaarbo, J.(2010). “When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision”, *International Studies Perspectives* , February 2010, Vol. 11, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 19-36.

Studies of Turkish foreign policy followed in the footsteps of larger FPA analysis literature after the end of the Cold War in the sense that number of works on the role of individuals increased considerably. For instance, Yüksel examined the effect of Atatürk's leadership on foreign policy.⁴² Çetin wrote a thesis on Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu.⁴³ Yıldırım worked on İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, one of Turkey's most interesting foreign ministers who had risen through internal security bureaucracy.⁴⁴ Cemile Tarhan worked on Bülent Ecevit.⁴⁵ We can divide individual unit studies in Turkey into four different categories. These are as follows: studies examining the impact of worldviews/beliefs on foreign policy, studies using Leadership Trait Analysis, studies using Operational Code, and studies examining on personal diplomacy.

As an example of the first category, Meliha Altunışık discussed how worldviews of political leaders affected Turkey's foreign policy preferences and behaviors towards the Middle East.⁴⁶ In her work, she describes four ideational approaches: neo-traditional worldview, and three alternative worldviews in liberal functionalism, social democratic constructivism, and conservative constructivism on foreign policy. Altunışık study on three representatives who have worked in foreign policy decision-making positions from different political parties for each alternative worldview, these are Turgut Özal (ANAP), İsmail Cem (DSP) and Ahmet Davutoğlu (AKP), respectively. Neo-traditionalists (CHP-MHP) keep away themselves to cultural identification and do not attach importance to historical relations with Middle East countries or people⁴⁷. They think rise of Kurdish nationalism and Islamism are vital threats to Turkey.

Alternative worldviews emphasize on historical and cultural ties between Turkey and Middle East. "Unlike in the traditionalist and neo-traditionalist perspectives, history and culture are important factors in Turkey's relations with the region."⁴⁸ Turgut Özal is chosen

⁴² Yüksel, Adem (2017). "Türk Dış Politikasında Lider Odaklılık: Atatürk Dönemi (1923-1938)", Supervised by Asst. Dr. Soner Karagül in Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University.

⁴³ Çetin, Remzi (2010). "II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Numan Menemencioğlu'nun Dışişleri Bakanlığı (1942-1944)", Supervised by Asst. Prof. Ahmet Mehmetefendioğlu in İzmir Dokuz Eylül University

⁴⁴ Yıldırım, Abdulsamet (2019). "Türk Siyasi Hayatında İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil", Supervised by Prof. Dr. Abdullah Gündoğdu in Ankara University.

⁴⁵ Tarhan, Cemile (2019). "Bülent Ecevit ve Türk Dış Politikası", Supervised by Asst. Prof. Esra Albayrakoglu in Bahçeşehir University. Interestingly, no reference was made to Ökçün, who was Ecevit's foreign minister, even once in this thesis.

⁴⁶ Altunışık, Meliha (2009). "Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 40. P.171-194.

⁴⁷ Ibid. P.177.

⁴⁸ Ibid. P.180.

as representative of liberal functionalism because he discredited traditional reactive and cautious foreign policy and adopt more proactive and risk-taking.⁴⁹ He thinks that opportunities are more than threats with Middle East. Özal valued Islamic identity conditioning it however with secularism, liberal democracy, and pro-western outlook.

İsmail Cem is chosen as representative of social democratic constructivism. Cem accuses traditional foreign policy of being alienated from Turkey's cultural and historical roots.⁵⁰ He recommends that Turkey must pursue a world-state strategy because it has both a European and an Asian identity. In the shed of his worldview, Cem tries to solve Turkey's problems with Syria, decides to appoint a mutual ambassador with Iran, starts negotiations to reduce tension in Iraq, and tries to be a facilitator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Altunışık chose Ahmet Davutoğlu as the representative of conservative constructivism as he was the chief advisor to the prime minister in the time. Davutoğlu criticizes the traditional approach as defensive, static, and passive.⁵¹ He claims that Turkey's alienation to Middle East makes impossible for Turkey to catch up developments in the region. Altunışık contends that new AKP vision enabled zero problems with its neighbors, institutionalized regional engagement, and eagerness to play third-party roles in regional conflicts.

Other researchers have studied the impact of worldviews on foreign policy. For example, Kübra Dere Ekici examined Özal's in foreign policy through constructivism and claimed that Özal followed a liberal-conservative, Neo-Ottomanist and proactive foreign policy.⁵² Duygu Demirdöven, on the other hand, compared the foreign policy behaviors of Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz, who are considered each other's predecessors. She claimed that both leaders emphasized liberal values and reduced the role of the military in politics. She argues that the biggest difference is in their personalities, while Özal taking more risk-taking attitude Yılmaz pursues a more cautious path in foreign policy.⁵³ Yusuf Erkul try to

⁴⁹ Ibid. P.181.

⁵⁰ Ibid. P.184.

⁵¹ Ibid. P.187.

⁵² Ekici, Kübra Deren (2018). "Sosyal Konstrüktivizme Göre Turgut Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası (1983-1993)". supervised by of Assoc. Prof. İrfan Kaya Ülger in Kocaeli University.

Other thesis and dissertation examining the foreign policy of Özal's period are as follows Bozkan, B.(2016). "Türk Dış Politikasında Turgut Özal Dönemi" supervised by Prof. Dr. Levent Ürer in Beykent University. Demir S.(2020). "Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası" supervised by Prof. Dr.Yelda Hatice Ongun in Ufuk University. Mor, H.(2002). "Türk Dış Politikasında Belirleyici Faktörler Ekseninde Özal'ın Dış Politika Konsepti" supervised by Prof. Dr. S. Gül Akyılmaz in Selçuk University.

⁵³ Demirdöven, Duygu (2014). "Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1983 And 1999: Comparison of Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz in The Period of Transition and Transformation of Turkey" supervised by Prof. Hüseyin Bağcı in Middle East Technical University.

show how Davutoğlu's values and perceptions affected his foreign policy stance, especially on the Palestinian cause.⁵⁴ In another thesis, the foreign policy decision-making approaches of Ahmet Davutoğlu and İsmail Cem were compared.⁵⁵

Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), developed by Margaret Hermann, is the most used method at the individual level of Turkey's foreign policy. For example, Aylin Görener and Meltem Ucal studied Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's role in Turkish foreign policy by charting his characteristics. Görener and Ucal analyzes Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's spontaneous responses at press conferences between 2004-2009. It also compares results of Erdoğan with a reference groups. Herman et al. using Profiler Plus software constructed this reference groups. One of the reference groups includes 214 world leaders, and the other includes 83 Middle East leaders.⁵⁶ They find that Erdoğan scored more than reference group in 'Can Control Events' and 'Distrust of Others' while scoring average as reference group on 'Need for Power', 'Self-Confidence'. He however scored substantially lower than the reference group on 'Conceptual Complexity', 'Ingroup Bias', 'Task Focus':

"Leaders such as Erdoğan... tend to confront issues decisively and often forcefully....tend to see the world in stark, black-and-white terms, with a low tolerance for ambiguity. They make strong distinctions between "us" and "them"... perceive their environment as dangerous and threatening....focus on the expectations and opinions of their support base at the expense of solving problems or addressing what they believe needs to be done."⁵⁷

Barış Kesgin did another study with LTA. In an article he published in 2013, Kesgin examined seven prime ministers with the LTA. According to Kesgin's results, Demirel is the person who thinks he can control events the most, while Ecevit is the least able prime minister. Ecevit has the highest score for conceptual complexity, while Gul has the lowest score. It is surprising that Çiller, who is a professor, is not higher than Ecevit. In addition, the scores of all prime ministers are lower than world average. While the person who does

⁵⁴ Erkul, Yusuf (2013). "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu'ya Yönelik Dış Politikasında Ahmet Davutoğlu Etkisi: Lider Düzeyi Analizi" supervised by Asst. Prof. Emre İşeri in Kadir Has University.

⁵⁵ Bahadır, Hasan Hüseyin (2019). "Dış Politika Analizinde Karar Alma Yaklaşımı, Dışişleri Bakanlığının Rolü: İsmail Cem ve Ahmet Davutoğlu Örneği" supervised by Asst. Prof. Erman Akıllı in Kırşehir Ahi Evran University.

⁵⁶ Görener, Aylin, Ş. Ucal, Meltem Ş. (2011). "The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Studies*, 12:3, Ibid. 364.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 367-368.

not trust others the most is Erbakan, the person who trusts the most is Ecevit. While Erbakan is the most suspicious of the individuals in the group and pursue power, Erdoğan is the most trusting. Erbakan has the highest self-confidence, while Çiller has the lowest. Gül is the most task-oriented, while Erbakan is the least.⁵⁸

Çuhadar et al. analyzed three different leaders in different positions in Turkish foreign policy with LTA⁵⁹. Character analysis of Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, and Abdullah Gül while they were prime minister and president. With this study, the effect of institutions and structures on the behavior of individuals has been tried to be measured. According to the structuralist approach, structures affect the behavior of individuals to a great extent, and according to the behavioral approach, the behaviors of individuals are similar in different structures. The results of LTA analysis of leaders as follows: Özal and Demirel's scores of seven traits are lower in the presidency. Gül's scores in conceptual complexity, self-confidence, and in-group bias increased while the other four scores decreased. Çuhadar et al. conclude that there was little change in the behavior of the leaders with the change of roles, so the effects of the structures on the individual behavior were limited.⁶⁰

Similarly, Çuhadar et al. recently conducted another study on the foreign policy behavior of Turkish leaders. Six different leaders, who are Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Turgut Özal, were studied with LTA framework over 18 cases. They are looking for answers to these question “Do Turkish leaders differ from each other in terms of their personality traits and styles? How did their styles affect their foreign policy choices?; and how did they react to various domestic and international constraints they encountered in cases of foreign policy?”⁶¹ According to results, while Erdogan believes that he can control events the most (BACE), Ecevit believes the least. While Özal is the person who can think with most complex concepts (CC), Erbakan is the least. While Ecevit is the person who trusts others the most (DIS), Erbakan is the person who trusts the others the least. Ecevit is the person with the most prejudice (IGB) in the group, while Erdoğan is the least. Erbakan is the most power seeker (PWR), while Özal

⁵⁸ Kesgin, Barış (2013). “Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers”, *Turkish Studies*, 14:1, 146

⁵⁹ Çuhadar, Esra Kaarbo, Julie Kesgin, Barış Özkeçeci-Taner, Binnur (2016). “Personality or Role? Comparisons of Turkish Leaders Across Different Institutional Positions”. *Political Psychology*, Vol. xx, No. Xx.

⁶⁰ Ibid. P. 13.

⁶¹ Çuhadar, Esra Kaarbo, Julie Kesgin, Barış Özkeçeci-Taner, Binnur (2020). “Turkish leaders and their foreign policy decision-making style: a comparative and multi-method perspective”, *Turkish Studies*. P. 1.

is the least. Ecevit is the person with the highest self-confidence (SC), while Erbakan is the least. While Gül is the most task-oriented (TASK), Erbakan is the least. On the other hand, all Turkish leaders have less prejudice (IGB) within the group and more self-confidence (SC) than the reference world leaders. Çuhadar et al. answered the research questions as follows “(a) Turkish leaders do not collectively fit in one category; (b) there are some stark differences among our six leaders, although some leaders are more similar to each other than others in terms of their personality traits and styles; (c) these differences were observable in the foreign policy decisions they made.”⁶²

Kürşat Kan did one of the most successful studies using LTA on Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. He analyzed seven speeches by Zorlu, three of which were spontaneous. Zorlu’s speeches delivered in different places from Bandung, CENTO meetings, London and parliament were selected.⁶³ Kan found that Zorlu’s score the belief that he will control challenging events, his expectation of power, and his focus on the task are lower than world leaders⁶⁴. Zorlu is interpreted as a leader who submits to obstacles, is open to information, and easy to reconcile. Indeed, we have other evidence and interpretations emphasizing that Zorlu has this character. For example, Ferdi Uzun reached similar results about it.⁶⁵ Furthermore, many retired bureaucrats from foreign ministry stated that Zorlu and other right-wing leaders left a wide area for them and do not interfere with the bureaucracy of ministry.⁶⁶

Britanny Wood conducted LTA analysis on Erdogan's speeches between 2010-2013 on Syria, Iran and Israel. According to her results,⁶⁷ while scores of Erdoğan’s need for power, In-group bias, distrust of others lower than world average, score about task focus is higher. Her results do not completely agree with other studies. She also admits this fact and

⁶² Ibid. P. 10.

⁶³ Kan, Kürşat (2016). “Dış Politikada Liderlik: Fatin Rüştü Zorlu Örneği” supervised by Prof. Dr. Şaban Çalış in Selçuk University P.113.

⁶⁴ Ibid. P.115.

⁶⁵ Uzun, Ferdi (2015). “Türk Dışişlerinde Fatin Rüştü Zorlu”, Supervised by Prof. Dr. Adnan Sofuoğlu in Hacettepe University.

Interestingly, many studies have been done on Zorlu. However, most of them are descriptive and do not defend any thesis. For more detail please see: Koşar, M. (2018). F”atin Rüştü Zorlu’nun Türkiye Dış Politikasındaki Rolü”, Supervised by Prof. Dr. Abdullah İlğazi in Eskişehir Osmangazi University and Kaya, F.(2017). “The Impact of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu on Turkish Foreign Policy and Cyprus Issue Between 1955-1960”, Supervised by Prof. Dr. Ahmet Taşağıl in Bahçeşehir University.

⁶⁶ For example, Coşkun Kırca argues with Zorlu and wants to resign. But Zorlu tries to persuade Kırca. He says, "I will leave this institution soon, but you will do a lot." Çalışlar, İ.(2009).(ed.) *Ekselans: Coşkun Kırca*, Galatasaray Eğitim Vakfı Yayınları. P. 306

⁶⁷ Wood, Brittany (2014). “Foreign Policy Analysis And Leadership Style: An Analysis of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East (2010-2013)” supervised by Asst. Porf. Müge Aknur in Dokuz Eylül University.

says that seasonal differences can be effective. Like the behavior of leaders, their personalities also change as a result of the events they experience.

Third, there are also studies using Operational Code method. Aydın Şihmantepe is another person who has written a competent dissertation on Demirel. He studied Demirel's behavior in nine crises and tried to reveal his operational codes. Şihmantepe concluded that Demirel was more status quo during his prime ministry and more interventionist during his presidency.⁶⁸ The author also reached Demirel's philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Each group has five different topics. According to the author, Demirel thinks that the nature of politics is conflict, it cannot be said that he is optimistic or pessimistic, politics is not predictable, he believes that structures are decisive, he is realistic and cautious.⁶⁹ In terms of instrumental beliefs; Demirel is close to cooperation, tends to protect a status quo, and avoids risk.⁷⁰

Similarly, Hande Oba analyzed Erdoğan with Operational Code during his prime ministry and presidency. She found that while Erdoğan more tended to reconciliation and cooperation during his prime ministership, he is more caution in his presidency. According to Oba, Erdoğan believes that the goals will be achieved with strong images and their maintenance, takes action when he believes that the result will be positive and in his favor, the nature of politics is harmony and cooperation, values and desires can be realized.⁷¹ She also states that Erdogan was more flexible when he was prime minister, more positive towards the West, and tougher during his Presidency.

Finally, there are studies drawing our attention to personal diplomacy. For example, Murat Ülgül's recent work is an example of personal diplomacy⁷². In his article, he showed how Recep Tayyip Erdogan used personal diplomacy in Turkey's foreign policy. He claims that Turkey is using personal diplomacy more and more. The reason is "Turkey's problems with other countries and the regional disorder in the Middle East and the Black Sea have

⁶⁸ Şihmantepe, Aydın (2016). "Türkiye'de Dış Politika Krizlerinde Karar Alıcının Operasyonel Kodları: Süleyman Demirel Örneği", Supervised by Assc. Prof. Fuat Aksu in Yıldız Teknik University. P. 185. However, this result seems to contradict the result of Çuhadar et al. They claimed that the Demirel were more passive when he were President.

⁶⁹ Ibid. P. 187.

⁷⁰ Ibid. P. 188.

⁷¹ Oba, Hande (2019). "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Karizmatik Liderlik Vasfı Çerçevesinde Operasyonel Kod Analizi: Avrupa Birliği-Ortadoğu" supervised by Prof. Dr. Giray Saynur Derman in Sakarya University.

⁷² Ülgül, Murat (2019). "Erdoğan's Personal Diplomacy and Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 21 No.4, pp. 161-182.

pushed Turkish officials to adopt personal diplomacy in order to bring about urgently needed solutions."⁷³ Ülgül claims that Erdogan has successfully conducted personal diplomacy with US President Trump. He claims that thanks to this diplomacy, Trump advocated interest of Turkey with regard to YPG and S-400 missiles.⁷⁴ He also asserts that there are some positive developments in Russian relations thanks to Erdogan's personal diplomacy to Vladimir Putin. However, I think the concept of personal diplomacy is a bit vague. It does not seem easy to measure how much of an impact it has. Maybe the leaders act that way for the sake of their interests, not for the sake of personnel diplomacy.

There are also descriptive studies that do not fall into the above four categories. For example, Hüseyin Sert did a study on Mahmut Dikerdem⁷⁵, the only person in the ministry who identified himself as a scientific socialist. In addition, he studied on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey between the years 1960-1980⁷⁶. Sert referred to the memoirs of many bureaucrats in his study. Studies on memories began to increase gradually. Lastly, in an article he published, he studied Third-Worldism in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based on the memories and interviews of foreign officials.⁷⁷

Süleyman Demirel is one of the most studied names in terms of foreign relations. Burak Kürkçü has written a comprehensive and competent thesis on Demirel. Kürkçü, who interviewed many retired bureaucrat other than domestic and foreign sources, reached conclusions about Demirel's foreign policy behavior. He claimed that Demirel took the decision by combining the recommendations of the technocrats with the demands of the citizens.⁷⁸ He also states that Demirel attaches importance to the National Security Council and bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is still a matter of debate whether Demirel or his minister Çağlayangil is the decision maker in foreign policy.

There are many political science and IR studies examining Turkey's President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan's role in Turkey's foreign policy. He is Turkey's longest

⁷³ Ibid. p. 173.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 176.

⁷⁵ Sert, Hüseyin (2018). "Aynılar İçinde Bir Ayır: Mahmut Dikerdem'in Dışişleri Memuriyeti", *Toplumsal Tarih*.

⁷⁶ Sert, Hüseyin (2018). "Memory of an institution: The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Diplomats in the 1960-1980 Period", Dissertation at Bogazici University.

⁷⁷ Sert, Hüseyin (2020). "Bir Raporun Hikayesi: Türkiye'nin Batı İle İttifakında Dışişleri Bürokrasisinin Rolü Ve Bakanlık İçeri Bir İtiraz Olarak "Üçüncü Dünyacılık", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt 75, No.1.

⁷⁸ Kürkçü, Burak (2019). "Decision-Making Process in Turkish Foreign Policy Crises: The Role Of State Institutions During Süleyman Demirel Administrations", Supervised by Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı in Middle East Technical University.

serving leader without interruption. He provides many materials for individual and leader-level analysis. For example, Ömer Ak examined Erdoğan through the 1 March parliamentary vote and the case of the Sulaymaniyah crisis. He says that although Erdogan's followers are anti-US, he sent the March 1 proposal to the parliament. However, the parliament did not accept the proposal. The United States retaliated by detaining Turkish soldiers in Sulaymaniyah. This event caused a serious reaction in Turkish society. Erdogan, who was relatively weak against the new and tutelary bureaucracy, took more risks. He sent another bill that would allow Turkish soldiers to operate in Iraq. The bill was passed on 7 October. Ak states that in this way Erdoğan attracted pro-US officials in the bureaucracy and strengthened his image in the West. He argues that Erdoğan is a charismatic leader who defies obstacles, is open to knowledge and has extrinsic motivation⁷⁹. He also says that the leaders have turned the crisis in their favor, as Erdogan did in the Sulaymaniyah crisis.

2.1.2. State Level Analysis

The second level of foreign policy analysis is the state. The state is considered the most fundamental actor in international relations. While states determine their foreign policies, they usually consider their military and economic power. Foreign policy decision-making is dependent on these capacities. In addition, the nature of the economy and military technology determines the foreign policy processes. States feel obliged to maintain the quality of their economic and military order.

Karl Hosti developed the concept of national role conception, which includes and exceeds all the material capacity of the state. According to him, in order to understand a state's foreign policy, it is necessary to know the country's position, resources, socio-economic needs, national values, ideology, traditional roles, and public opinion. These indicate how a nation sees itself and what role it assigns to him.⁸⁰ In this respect, the particular characteristics of a state gain serious importance. It gives insight into the country's culture and foreign policy how the nation defines itself. For example, some of Turkey's religious-conservative people expect Turkey's foreign policy to be more sensitive to the Islamic world. Turkey is given a special importance within the Islamic world, and it is

⁷⁹ Ak, Ömer (2009). "Dış Politika Analizi ve Liderlik: Süleymaniye Krizi Sürecinde R. T. Erdoğan Örneği" supervised by Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgöl in Ankara University.

⁸⁰ Holsti, Karl (1970). "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.14, No.3, Sep. P.245

considered essential for Turkey to fulfill this role. Of course, no country has a universal national role conception.

Another state level analysis is bureaucratic-organizational approaches. Every institution has norms and practices that transcend the people there. These norms and practices usually accumulated within many years, and it is difficult to change, sometimes even hard to notice. The awareness of new recruits is high, and they expect some habits must be changed. However, after a while, these people internalize the norms and practices of the institution. Policies are determined by following standardized methods in accordance with the general operating routine of the bureaucratic structures⁸¹. Individuals in the organization often internalize not only these methods but also values. For example, bureaucrats in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had come to identify themselves with the West and wanted to orient Turkey toward the West accordingly. Only a few people in the Turkish ministry have been in search of something outside the West, and they have had a great reaction. At this point, the staff of the foreign ministry expected the problems to be resolved in this way⁸².

In the theoretical sense, Kissinger⁸³ made the first emphasis on bureaucracy and bureaucrats in foreign policy making. However, Allison's influence on the literature has been tremendous in this respect. In "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis"⁸⁴, Allison showed that the rational actor model is insufficient to explain the decision-making process. According to Allison, "government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations."⁸⁵ The leader is the last decision maker of the government, but often sees problems through the lens of organizations. Therefore, the behavior of the government is understood as a result of the output of the organizations which mostly adopted standard behavior pattern. Therefore, Allison, says experts should focus on "government organizations and their standard operating procedures for (1) acquiring information, (2)

⁸¹ Goldstein, Joshua S. Pevehouse Jon C. (2006). *International Relations*, Pearson Longman p. 142 as cited in Kan, Kürşat (2016). "Dış Politikada Liderlik: Fatin Rüştü Zorlu Örneği" supervised by Prof. Dr. Şaban Çalış in Selçuk University P.16.

⁸² Hüseyin Sert studied on how the memory of the ministry was formed during this period and the discussions about it. See Sert, Hüseyin (2018). "Memory of an institution: The Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs and Turkish diplomats in the 1960-1980 period", Dissertation at Bogazici University

⁸³ Kissinger, Henry A. (1966). "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", *Daedalus*, Vol.95, No.2, Spring

⁸⁴ Allison, Graham (1971). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little, Brown, and Company.

⁸⁵ Ibid. P. 67.

defining feasible options, and (3) implementing a program."⁸⁶ Standard operating procedures, capabilities, and constraints of organization on them take crucial point in Organizational Process.

According to Bureaucratic Politics however, the government consists of several players. Therefore, negotiations among players in the government give us an idea about foreign policy making. This notion is very important especially in the foreign policy making of weak governments and coalitions. Foreign policy making is decided by bargaining between the government's partners. Moreover, the bureaucracy may have some autonomy on the agenda of the weak government.

While Rational Actor Model assumes governmental action as rational choice, Organizational Process as organizational output, Bureaucratic Politics as result of political bargain. In Model I, actors are fully informed and pursue absolute utility deliberately. However in others model, power of actors more situation and culture dependent. In Organizational Process, emphasize on heuristic, implementation reflects previously established routines. On the other hand, in Bureaucratic Politics, where you stand depends on where you sit.

Allison did a more detailed study⁸⁷ of bureaucratic politics with Morton H. Halperin. In this study, the effects of bureaucratic politics on US foreign policy are shown with some cases. Halperin has worked for many years in top institutions in the United States and has witnessed the making of foreign policy. In his book *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*⁸⁸, he has shown in detail how actors and bureaucratic institutions work in foreign policy.

2.1.3. System Level Analysis

The system is a third level of foreign policy analysis. At this level, the international system is based on the global order. The economic crisis, environmental problems, nuclear problems that affect all states are tried to be solved by looking at the entire international

⁸⁶ Allison, Graham (2016). "Cuban Missile Crisis" in Smith, Steve Hadfield, A. Dunne Tim (2016) *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford University Press. p.281

⁸⁷ Allison, Graham T. Halperin, Morton H.(1972). "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications" *World Politics* , Vol. 24, pp. 40-79

⁸⁸ Halperin, Morton H.(1974). *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

system. Kenneth Waltz, Immanuel Wallerstein, Robert Cox, and Alexander Wendt are considered to have done systemic studies. In this section, we will take a brief look at their work.

Morgenthau argued that the nature of politics is evil and the same as human nature⁸⁹. His IR assumptions were profoundly human-nature and normative that is has no sound empiric proofs. Behavioralism was influential in many social science disciplines in the 1950s-1960s. In IR, Morton Kaplan and David Singer criticized traditional IR theories, claiming they were unscientific. Morgenthau and Bull were their targets. This was considered the second great debate, Traditionalism vs Behaviouralism, in the IR discipline. On the other hand, liberal writers, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, via interdependence and transnational theory discredited realist theory. Kenneth Waltz reconstructed realism, which is entitled as neorealism or structural realism, with his book *Theory of International Politics* that is published in 1979.

According to Waltz, there are only two regulative principles, hierarchy and anarchy. There is a hierarchy within the country; a sovereign state is above all individuals and institutions. In discussions between units, the state decides. On the other hand, there is anarchy in international politics. There is no binding supreme institution in discussions between states. Therefore, every state in international politics must “put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so”⁹⁰. As can be seen, the anarchic structure of the international system directly determined what the actors should do. The functions of the states are the same, only their capacities may differ.⁹¹ Because of this understanding, it is accepted that neorealism takes the state to a billiard ball. The color of the billiard balls may be different, but they all serve the same function.

Due to the anarchic nature of the system, each state can only help itself. At the same time, there is no authority within the system to ensure the safety of actors. For this reason, there is always a feeling of insecurity for actors. The biggest concern of the actors in this environment is survivor. States try to become as strong as possible to protect existence of themselves. It does this internally or externally. The state try to either increase its military and economic power or balance it with foreign relations.⁹² Waltz says that international

⁸⁹ Morgenthau, Hans J.(1948). *Politics Among Nations*, A. A. Knopf.

⁹⁰ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. P. 107.

⁹¹ Ibid. P. 96.

⁹² Ibid. P. 126.

politics is not foreign relations⁹³. From this point of view, neorealism should not be used to understand the foreign policy of states. However, while it defines international politics, it also defines and assigns the role of states, which is a part of system. In this way, neorealism becomes a tool for understanding the foreign policy of states.

Waltz divides IR theories into systematic and reductionist theories. According to him, theories that work at the state or individual level are reductionist⁹⁴. It is futile for scholars to study at individuals to understand a state's foreign policy and what to do. How a state should behave is determined by the international system and distribution of power. The system has determined what is in the interest of that state. Whoever is the ruler of that state, it is clear what he should do. The values, thoughts, character of the individual do not change what he should do. In this respect, neorealism is indifferent to personalities. For example, Turkey perceived the Soviets as a threat during the Cold War, and joined the Western alliance. In other words, Turkey's national interest was determined by the systemic structure, not by individuals and closed to bargaining among relevant policy players and institutions.

Many people and theories have criticized neorealism. Here I can refer to the critique of neorealism at the level of the individual and the state. First, neorealism claims that the system or structure is very decisive on the individual. It defines the individual as ineffective, powerless, and a robot that is ready to do what is assigned to him by structure. However, recent studies have shown that leaders can be very impactful in foreign policy. In this respect, neorealism ignores the agency of the individual. Indeed, if the international system is very deterministic as neorealism illustrated, there should be no discussion of foreign policy within the country and all moves of a state in foreign policy should be predictable. Because what is beneficial and what should be done is obvious and it is futile to discuss. However, the explanatory power of neorealism about the origins of preferences is weak; it does not say much about change. In fact, the accusations neorealism makes to other theories can be made against itself. Neorealism is a reductionist theory because it ignores differences between individual and change.

Another systemic level analysis is Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory. Wallerstein built his theory on the classical Marxist theories of imperialism, the theories of

⁹³ Waltz, Kenneth (1996). "International Politics is not Foreign Policy", *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 54-57.

⁹⁴ Waltz, Kenneth (1979). *Theory of International Politics*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. P. 18.

dependency that developed by Andre Gunther Frank and the work of Fernand Braudel, who is considered as Annales historian.⁹⁵ In the 1960s, some institutional and theoretical changes took place thanks to the newly independent Non-Aligned Movement. The Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are organizations established in this atmosphere. On the other hand, academic studies on development and poverty began to increase. Andre Gunther Frank was discussing development and poverty in the 1960s, especially in Latin America. He classified the countries as core and periphery. Periphery provides cheap labor and raw materials to the core and the core becomes rich thanks to this.⁹⁶ Wallerstein took some of the concepts of dependency theory and produced a broader, systemic theory. He thinks that dependency theory does not address entire problem. The problem of development-underdevelopment and international relations can only be understood by looking at the entire capitalist world-system. Like Braudel, he thinks that the foundations of the capitalist world-system were laid in the long 16th century (1450-1640).⁹⁷ There are core, periphery and semi-periphery countries in the system. Core countries buy raw materials from periphery countries, process them and sell them more expensive, and they meet their labor from semi-periphery countries. Core's welfare increases with this surplus. According to him, there is a hierarchy between states due to uneven exchange. He also states that for capitalism to continue there must be a stability in the system and that hegemon provides this. Some researchers have found world-system analysis reductive and spurious. They criticized the reduction of state interests to the purely economy-dependent class of rulers and claimed that countries do not take position according to their labor regime in the world system.⁹⁸

The constructivist theorist Alexander Wendt did another important systemic study. He seriously take the structure-agent debate in IR in his studies and discusses the structure and the agent's power and limit. He divides IR theories into holistic and individualist, or materialist and idealist and makes a classification as follows⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Teschke, Benno (2010) "Marxism" in Reus-Smit, C. Snidal, D.(2010)(eds) *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press. p. 169.

⁹⁶ Viotti, P. R. Kauppi M. V.(2012). *International Relations Theory in Economic Structuralism: Global Capitalism and Postcolonialism* chapter, Pearson. P. 201.

⁹⁷ Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press.

⁹⁸ Teschke, Benno (2010) "Marxism" in Reus-Smit, C. Snidal, D.(2010)(eds) *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, p. 171.

⁹⁹ Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 32.




Figure 1. Wendt's Mapping of Theories

Wendt tries to construct a holistic (systemic) theory. He has serious criticisms of Waltz's systemic theory. According to him, contrary to widespread belief, Waltz's theory is not a systematic theory. Because Waltz's theory is individualistic, materialistic and neglect interaction between actors¹⁰⁰ which are essence of international system. He has three vital criticisms to neorealism. These are

“One is that Neorealism cannot explain structural change. A second problem is that Neorealism's theory of structure is too underspecified to generate falsifiable hypotheses. Finally, there is doubt that Neorealism adequately explains even the “small number of big and important things” claimed on its behalf.”¹⁰¹

However, he does not completely discard neorealism appraise an attempt of systemic analysis. He argues that neorealism requires several conceptual reorganizations. Such as “to reconceptualize what international structure is made of.”¹⁰²

According to Neorealism, the international system is determined by material phenomena. However, for Wendt, ideational structures determined by ideational phenomena, so Wendt's theory is ultimately an idealist theory. Wendt never claims that material structures are unimportant. He claims that only material structures derive their

¹⁰⁰ Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press. p. 17

¹⁰¹ Ibid. Pp.17-18.

¹⁰² Ibid. p.20.

meaning as a result of social interaction with other states: “[T]he character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures.”¹⁰³ Take, for example, the issue of anarchy in IR. Wendt, unlike Waltz, does not believe that anarchy will inevitably create hostility between states. In addition, anarchy has not meaning in itself anarchy is “what states make of it”¹⁰⁴. Wendt claims that there are there different cultures of anarchy these are the Hobbesian culture, the Lockean culture, and the Kantian culture¹⁰⁵.

There is severe enmity at Hobbesian culture of anarchy. Wendt defines Self and Other by using Carl Schmitt thought and social psychology studies. Although Other construct identity of Self, Other tries to destroy Self. Therefore, Other is relentless enemy. Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.¹⁰⁶ In the Hobbesian anarchy, notion of kill or be killed notion takes an important point.

States can form their identities like people do as described below in Hobbesian way. Wendt claim that in that case there is four implications for a state’s foreign policy posture and behavior: “First, states will tend to respond to enemies by acting like deep revisionists themselves, i.e., they will try to destroy or conquer them. Second, decision-making will tend to heavily discount the future and be oriented toward the worst-case. Third, relative military capabilities will be seen as crucial. Finally, if it comes to actual war, states will fight on the enemy's (perceived) terms.”¹⁰⁷

Realist theory taken Hobbesian anarchy as given and below four implications are very crucial in realism. Wendt acknowledges that most of world history has Hobbesian anarchy. However, anarchy does not have to Hobbesian notion forever. In Lockean anarchy culture, there is rivalry instead of hostility. The enemy and identity are again built on representations of Self and Other. However, rivals accept other’s sovereignty and right of existence and freedom. In the Lockean anarchy, the notion of live and let live takes important place.

¹⁰³ Ibid. P.20.

¹⁰⁴ Wendt, Alexander E. (1992). “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. *International Organization*, 42:2:391-425.

¹⁰⁵ Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press. p.247.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.260.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p.262.

However, they can still violate this principle in moments of crisis. Wendt claim that Lockean anarchy at least has four implication¹⁰⁸:

“[W]hatever conflicts they may have, states must behave in a status quo fashion toward each other's sovereignty. The second implication concerns the nature of rational behavior. Third, relative military power is still important because rivals know that others might use force to settle disputes, but its meaning is different than it is for enemies. Finally, if disputes do go to war, rivals will limit their own violence.”

Wendt claim that Westphalian state system has Lockean anarchy. Because of that state accept each of sovereignty, and apply war less. Enmity among states such as between South and North Korea and Israel-Palestine are very less today it is widely accepted as irrational. However, it seems Wendt is quite optimistic about assuming that because of modern international system has Lockean anarchy and there is less enmity between states. The most severe of wars and casualties, including two world wars, happened in the modern state system. Moreover, there is cross-border disputes among many countries and even some of them do not recognize other's sovereignty rights. It may be possible to say that period of European Concert was relatively peaceful.

Kantian anarchy is most optimistic kind of anarchy, and it relies on friendship among states. Kant, with book of Perpetual Peace, is one of the founding fathers of democratic cosmopolitanism. Wendt, by observing NATO, US-Canada, and US-UK relations, has written about Kantian anarchy. He, within friendship relationship, claim that states expect each other to observe two simple rules¹⁰⁹ “disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid).”

At the same time, he believes that “the two rules of friendship generate the macro-level logics and tendencies associated with “pluralistic security communities” and “collective security.”¹¹⁰ Collective security is relied on “all for one, one for all”. Therefore, states involve collective action against threats. It is possible to say that Wendt has progressive conception about process of anarchy. He claim that states will swap respectively

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p.282.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 298-299.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p.299.

Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. However, his conception of progressive is not obligatory it is contingent.

In summary, Wendt accused neorealist structuralism of ignoring idealist structures and intersubjective formations of actors' identity and meaning of material phenomena. Wendt claimed that the identities and material structures of the actors in the system are intersubjectively constructed by interaction. Social construction is the hallmark of the international system. Neorealism structuralism does not see this most vital process and relationship in the system. It takes actors as have no connection with each other and decide what to do with itself. Wendt therefore said that neorealism is individualistic, not genuine systemic.



3. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND DOMESTIC POLITICS OF TURKEY in 1970s

3.1. International Environment in 1970s

Every action or phenomena could be understood better within context in that happened. In order to understand Turkish Foreign Policy during Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün Era, we need to know which events and issues shaped international environment in those years. The most fundamental political development after 1945 was the rigid separation of the world into two camps. The liberal bloc led by the USA in one camp and the socialist camp led by the USSR in the other camp. These camps were centered on NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreement. This polarization has affected the policies of almost all countries in the world.

After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, relations between the USA and the USSR began to soften. Because of this softening, the period of 1960-1980 is considered as detente. During this period, SALT I was signed to limit armament, and SALT II negotiations were held. During this period, there was a softening in relations between China and the USA. The United States did not establish formal relations with China until 1972. Relations began in 1972 when US President Nixon visited China. In 1973, the USA opened the Liaison Office in Beijing. Thereafter, US-China relations have gradually improved. Many presidents and representatives made mutual visits.

Turkey's domestic and foreign policy was deeply influenced by aforementioned polarization in Cold War. After the Second World War, because of mainly threat of USSR and close identity links established since the late Ottoman period through modernization and westernization, Turkey has joined the Western bloc becoming a member of NATO in 1952. Until the mid-1960s, Turkey's relations with the US and the West remained very warm. Turkey had a Western-centered foreign policy. However, a few issues starting in 1960 with the U-2 spy plane crisis and escalating with the Johnson Letter of 1964 undermined confidence and trust in the US-Turkish relationship. With the thaw in superpower relations

provided by Détente, Turkey tried to follow a more autonomous foreign policy from the United States and the West starting in the mid-1960s. Therefore, several issues and new problem areas emerged in Turkey and United States relations throughout the 1970s. Sections below discuss these issues in order to provide the context within which Foreign Minister Ökçün had to operate.

3.1.1. Cyprus Issue from 1960s to 1978

Cyprus Issue occupied most important place in the relation of Turkey and US/West after 1974. It is possible to say that Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was most concerned with the Issue during his tenure. In the 1950s, conflicts broke out between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus. With US pressure on Turkey, Greece and the parties in Cyprus agreed on the idea of an independent Cyprus. The first conference for this purpose was held in Zurich on February 6, 1959. Menderes and Zorlu attended conference as representative of Turkey, Karamanlis and Averoff attended as representative of Greece. Turkey has demanded joint military troops on the island, increasement of Turkey military's presence. While the demand for a joint military unit was accepted, the idea of increasing the number of soldiers was not accepted. The parties published a statement on an independent Cyprus at the end of the conference.

However, Makarios, as a representative of the Greek Cypriots, objected to the aforementioned proposal. The parties planned to meet in London on February 17th. Makarios responded negatively to call. However, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis stated that there is nothing else he can do for Cyprus from now on. After that, Makarios reluctantly agreed to sign treaty at the 19 February London Conference. Adnan Menderes, Karamanlis and Fazıl Küçük signed treaties. Thus, the first legal text for the independent Cypriot state was created. After the conference, three important treaties were signed.

The Treaty of Guarantee gave recognition to the basic and unamendable articles of the Constitution, required the Republic of Cyprus to maintain the state of affairs established by the treaties and acknowledged the entitlement of three named Guarantor Powers, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, jointly or separately to maintain the state of affairs being established. The Treaty of Establishment included the right of the United Kingdom to retain

military base areas under British sovereignty. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus signed the Treaty of Alliance; they principally agreed to co-operate in their common defense.¹¹¹

According to the treaty, the President of Cyprus will be Greek and his deputy will be Turkish. Positions in the Assembly will be the same. 70% of the parliament is planned to be Greek and 30% Turkish. Greek and Turkish will be the official languages of the state. The Council of Ministers would consist of seven Greeks and three Turks. 70% of the civil servants would be Greek, and 30% would be Turks. In addition, according to the treaty, *taksim* and *enosis* were prohibited. Guarantorship of the status was undertaken by Britain, Turkey, and Greece. According to some commentators because of such a regulation, Cypriot state was not unitary or sovereign and had a very fragile structure.¹¹² For this reason, it is claimed that it is likely to fail.

It can be said that the Soviet threat is the most important factor that made the Cyprus agreement possible. Nevertheless, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Cold War passed the *détente* (relaxation) era. In this period, solidarity among the countries in the NATO bloc has decreased and nationalist governments have become in conflict with each other. *Détente* in the international system has seriously affected the Cyprus problem.

Shortly after the London Conference on May 27 coup took place in Turkey. However, since the National Unity Committee of coup announced that they accepted the agreement of the conference, therefore, did not affect the problem very much. Cyprus declared its independence on 16 August. Makarios became the President of Cyprus and Fazıl Küçük became his deputy. However, it became clear in a short time that the country could not be governed with the current regulations. No decision could be made on many issues. Makarios demanded the Greeks in favor of changing the constitution and arrived in Ankara for approval from Turkey. However, Turkey did not accept any change.

Problems in political-legal spheres spread to the society of Cyprus in a short time. On December 21, 1963, Greek police officers attempted to stop the car used by the Turks and check their identity. When the citizens objected, the police killed them.¹¹³ The Turks, who gathered at the scene, injured the police. The conflict spread to all of Cyprus in a short time.

¹¹¹ Dodd, Clement (2010). *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 38.

¹¹² Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 613.

¹¹³ Dodd, Clement (2010). *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 42.

Turkish villages on the island were enclaved. Greek forces blockaded Turkish villages. Soldiers of Turkey were trying to protect some areas of the island.

Under the leadership of the prime minister of İsmet İnönü, Turkey held a meeting. İnönü ordered Turkish jets to fly over Cyprus. In addition, diplomatic notes were sent to Greece, Britain and NATO. In this way, the international dimension of the problem continued. Britain, Greece and Turkey were invited to the conference in London. Rauf Denktaş attended the meeting that held in January 1964. Denktaş said that the 1960 constitution could not be implemented, so he proposed a federal country with two states. It was decided to send 10,000 NATO soldiers to the island. However, the Cypriot president Makarios did not accept this. Makarios was close to the Non-Aligned Movement¹¹⁴. Turkey has threatened to intervene. The Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the government to military intervene in Cyprus. Makarios agreed with the more neutral UN forces. In March 1964, the UN decided to send a Peace Force to Cyprus.

The fact that hardline George Papandreou became prime minister in Greece made things even more difficult. Papandreou claimed that the previous Prime Minister Karamanlis was too soft on Cyprus. The president of Cyprus, Makarios, was encouraged by Papandreou's inauguration. Makarios announced that he terminated the Treaty of Alliance. Turkey has declared that it is not acceptable. Prime Minister İnönü threatened the Western alliance in Time magazine in April 1964. "A new world order gets established and Turkey would find its place in this world,"¹¹⁵ he said. However, contrary to hope Turkey received very negative response. US President Johnson sent letter to İnönü on June 5, 1964, would lead to a radical change of Turkish Foreign Policy. The language of Johnson's letter was rude. It is widely accepted that the letter of Johnson provoked strong anti-Americanism in politics and society of Turkey. Johnson, told that the US and the NATO arms that given to Turkey cannot be used in Cyprus. He also threatened Turkey not to help in case of possible Soviet attack. If it is considered the most important factor in Turkey's entering to Western bloc is Soviet threat, then it is possible to estimate that how Johnson's letter was disappointing for Turkey. İnönü made this clear in his letter to Johnson a week later.

Inonu and Papandreou visited Washington in June. Johnson tried to reconcile the parties here but failed. Because the USA feared that the problem would grow, they wanted

¹¹⁴ Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 724.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 726.

to solve the problem with greater effort. Turkey, Greece and Britain, former US Secretary of State Acheson had set up the meeting in Geneva in mediation. Cyprus was invited, but Makarios did not accept to participate. Acheson listened to the parties separately and ultimately presented a solution plan. Greece and Turkey accept the solution plan. However, despite all efforts, Makarios did not accept the solution plan.

By the 1970s, the problem had gained a different dimension. The Colonels Junta did not have a strong representation on Cyprus, as it lacked popular support in Greece. They thought they would get stronger with the elimination of Makarios. Thus, several assassination attempts were made in early 1970 to kill Makarios. Georgios Grivas was sent back to Cyprus and the EOKA-B organization was established. In 1973, General Ioannides found the Papadopoulos administration weak and struck a coup. Makarios demanded the withdrawal of Greek soldiers from the island.

Greece had decided to get rid of Makarios permanently. On July 15, 1974, the Greek soldiers made a coup against Makarios, the Aphrodite Plan. Greece has clearly stated that the operation was carried out against Makarios and did not target the Turks. However, the appointment of the EOKA member as head of state frightened the Turks.

The National Security Council of Turkey convened in Ankara. Turkey has declared that putschist government in Cyprus is illegitimate.¹¹⁶ Prime Minister Ecevit ordered the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) to prepare for intervene to Cyprus. The atmosphere in the international society was in favor of Turkey. Britain and European countries condemned Greece. The USA did not make such a harsh statement. The USSR and Non-Aligned countries sharply criticized intervention of Greece. On July 17, Henry Kissenger wrote a telegram to Ecevit and suggested talk due to prevent any conflict. Ecevit stated that he would not meet with Greece because of their violation of the Treaty of Guarantee and would only meet with Britain, then, immediately flew to Britain.¹¹⁷ While Ecevit talking with representatives of the US in Ankara on July 20, Turkish troops sailed from Mersin harbor to Cyprus. The first extraction was made within 3 days. Ecevit declared that this intervention was made in order to establish peace in the island.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. p. 741.

¹¹⁷ Asmussen, Jan (2008), *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis*, I.B. Tauris, p. 57.

The Greek administration, on the other hand, was in complete chaos. On July 23, the commanders convened and decided to leave the country to a civilian government. Karamanlis, who was in exile, returned to Greece and came to power. Turkey responded the call for a ceasefire. The Geneva Conference was held between 25-30 July 1974. Britain, Greece and Turkey participated in the conference. Representatives of the USA, USSR and UN participated as observers. Representative of Turkey, Turan Güneş, proposed federal state formulation. Greece rejected talk on constitutional issues; first they proposed the withdrawal of Turkey's troops from the island. Many demands of Turkey were accepted at conference. The autonomy of two administrations on the island was accepted.

The Second Geneva Conference started on 12 August. Turkey had thoroughly worked on the federal government formulation before conference. Ecevit noticed Turan Güneş that in case of any inconvenience TAF ready to intervene the island again.¹¹⁸ A common solution plan could not be reached at the conference. Turkey launched a second extraction to Cyprus July 14 by code of "Ayşe should go on vacation"¹¹⁹. Turkey has spread its military existence in wider area on the island. Many countries criticized Turkey's action. Greece declared withdrawing from NATO's military wing. November 1, 1974, the UN General Assembly criticized Turkey because of extraction. After this date, Turkey's relations with the US and the West has been very tense. US has begun to implement an arms embargo to Turkey. All governments paid the price of this tension until the 1980 coup d'état. This tension was the most troubling issue for Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, who served in this period.

3.1.2. The Oil Crisis and Subsequent Developments in International Society

Another international event that affected Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün's period was the 1973 oil crisis. After the oil crisis, the oil price increased significantly. After 1973 War Turkey started to come closer to Arabian states than Israel and the West. Ökçün found himself such tendency. However, in my opinion, during Ökçün Era Turkey enhanced its close relationship with non-Western countries. After imposition of an embargo on Turkey because of Cyprus extraction, Turkey foreign currency income drop drastically. Turkey suffered to import oil because of sharp increase at the oil price. For this reason, long-term restrictions have been made within Turkey. It is possible to say that due to lack of oil in Turkey, Ökçün and other

¹¹⁸ Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 747

¹¹⁹ Dodd, Clement (2010). *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan.p 191

ministers of Ecevit's cabinet sought support Muslim countries, whose actually their ideological beliefs are totally incompatible. To understand the oil crisis, we need to know the history of OPEC and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in Baghdad in 1960 by five countries. These countries are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. These countries wanted to control oil prices¹²⁰. After the Second World War, Europe and Japan achieved tremendous prosperity by using oil. The production of developed countries became almost entirely dependent on oil. However, what kind of impact OPEC would have on the oil market could not be predicted at that time. The first event to test OPEC's strength was the 1967 Israel-Arab War.

After the Suez Crisis, Israel had to end its occupation in the Sinai Peninsula in a short time. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) has been created and distributed across the peninsula. Shortly after, resistance organizations were established in Palestine. These organizations were carrying out attacks on Israel via Jordan and Syria. In May 1967, intelligence agencies reported that Israel would make a military plan for the countries that host those Palestinian organizations.¹²¹ Gamal Abdel Nasser, who wanted to undertake the leadership of the Arab world, decided to preventive operation against such an Israeli plan. He deployed Egyptian troops to Sinai and demanded the withdrawal of UNEF forces. This request was quickly fulfilled. Abdel Nasser announced that he would not allow Israeli ships through the Tiran Strait. Some researchers claimed that Abdulnasser was bluffing and he expected the Soviets and the US to intervene in the conflict.¹²² Jordan and Iraq signed an alliance agreement with Egypt.

Israel was always afraid that the Arabs would form an alliance and attack it *en masse*. The Israeli government resorted to preventative warfare. On June 5, 1967, Israeli aircrafts attacked Egypt and destroyed most of Egypt's air force. On the other hand, the ground forces reached the Suez Canal. On the same day, Israel attacked Jordan. Jordanian forces withdrew from the West Bank. Israel, at the same time, attacked the Golan Heights in Syria. Egypt signed a ceasefire on June 9 and Syria on June 11. In this way, Israel defeated three Arab states in six days. Arab members of OPEC declared that they would impose an oil embargo

¹²⁰ Cleveland, William L(2008). *A History of Modern Middle East*, Westview Press. p. 479.

¹²¹ Todd, Ferry Gregory, M. Harms (2018). *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, Pluto Press. p.109.

¹²² Cleveland, William L (2008). *A History of Modern Middle East*, Westview Press. p. 338

on Israel's supporters on the second day of the war.¹²³ Nevertheless, this failed because it was a very vague and loose embargo. One year later, they reported that they stopped the oil embargo, but they declared that that will continue to use oil prices as a weapon in the future.¹²⁴

After the 1968 Events, an anti-imperialist atmosphere spread all around the world. Such an atmosphere could have been felt in streets and in the state administration. In 1968, the Ba'ath party made a coup in Iraq. A year later, Gaddafi came to power by making a coup in Libya. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was founded in 1968. A bigger crisis ensued shortly after these developments.

There were similar attempts in Turkey on that time. There was a rapprochement with the USSR, which for a long time had almost no relations. It was sought support in industrialization. Süleyman Demirel said in disappointment with the West that

“West neither do not want to industrialization of Turkey nor it is possible. They recommended us only agriculture and (...) light industry and were not happy with our heavy industry attempts. (...) We have negotiated with the Soviet Union, and decide to invest on heavy industry. West disturbed because of our attempt (...) I still remember their reaction that was in 1967 the American ambassador came to the prime ministry, visited me. He asked me immediately after entering my room "Are you shifting the axle?" US was very uncomfortable with the restoration of our relations with the Soviets.”¹²⁵

On October 6, 1973, Egyptian forces attacked the Suez Canal, while Hafez Assad Syria attacked Israeli forces in the Golan Heights. Egyptian forces made great progress at first. However, on October 16, Israel counterattacked and advanced rapidly. The Israeli army crossed the Suez Canal and approached Cairo. On October 22, the ceasefire was accepted that offered by the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

The United States provided great assistance to Israel throughout the war. Arab oil producers were very angry for that assistance. On October 16, OAPEC members gathered in

¹²³ Garavini, Giuliano (2019). *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, p.171

¹²⁴ Ibid, p.172

¹²⁵ Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 675-676.

Kuwait and decided to increase oil prices¹²⁶. During the meeting, the Iraqi prime minister suggested nationalizing the US oil in the Middle East. OPEC countries have announced that they will reduce oil production by 5%. Production dropped another 5% for each subsequent month. As a result, production had fallen by 30% within a few¹²⁷. Saudi Arabia stopped exporting oil to the United States altogether. In 1973, the barrel price of crude oil was 2.48 a barrel, but at the beginning of 1974, it became 11.58. Prices had increased by 366 percent within one year.

In 1978, oil workers in Iran organized massive strikes to protest the shah. This also stopped oil production in Iran. Therefore, the second oil crisis occurred. The price of oil increased almost three times. After the second oil crisis, Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün served for another year. Although the embargo was not implemented in the case of Turkey, it seriously affected by the rise in prices. Because Turkey's export did not grow as much as rise in the oil.

It is possible to see the striking increase in oil prices in the chart below:¹²⁸




Fig. 5.1. Evolution of the official price of Arab Light crude.
(Ian Skeet, *OPEC. Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics*, 1988).

Figure 2. Crude Oil Price

¹²⁶ Seymour, Ian (1980). *OPEC: Instrument of Change*, Palgrave Macmillan. P. 116.

¹²⁷ Ibid. P. 117.

¹²⁸ Garavini, Giuliano (2019). *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, p.222.

Oil prices increased approximately fifteen times in seven years after 1973. In the same period of the embargo was applied to Turkey and the flux of foreign currency to country cut significantly. Under those circumstances, it is possible to understand how Turkey suffer from crisis and why foreign policymaker pay a lot attention with relation of oil producers countries, especially Islamic ones. One of the issues that Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün and his colleagues were most interested in economically and politically was meeting the domestic demand for oil. Turkey had already started to get closer with Islamic countries in the 1960s. It can be said that oil crisis and rise of oil prices led to acceleration of rapprochement with Islamic countries. We will examine the impact of the rise in oil prices in Turkey in the next chapter.

3.1.3. Jimmy Carter as US President

One of the most crucial events that affected international politics in the 1970s is that Jimmy Carter became the president of the United States. It is necessary to know the basic paradigms of American foreign policy in order to understand what it means to be President of Carter.

According to an important study, there are four main traditions in American foreign policy¹²⁹. It is possible to say that the behavior of the US for foreign policy could be understood within the framework of these four traditions. According to Mead, these four traditions are Hamiltonianism, Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism, and Jacksonianism.

Hamiltonianism takes its name from Alexander Hamilton. According to this tradition, the primary goal of the American state should be to ensure the safety of American traders and investors. In this tradition, God and gold are equated with each other in foreign policy¹³⁰. The tradition attaches more importance to international trade than other traditions. Keeping sea lanes open for international trade, finding new markets for American goods become a priority for Hamiltonians. For this reason, relations with Britain, which has strong naval forces, are tried to be kept good¹³¹.

¹²⁹ Mead, Walter Russel (2002). *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed World*, Routledge.

¹³⁰ Anaz, Necati(2017). “Amerikan Muhafazakârlığı ve Dış Politika”, *Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi*, cilt 14. Sayı 51. P.42.

¹³¹ Mead, Walter Russel (2002). *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed World*, Routledge. P. 87.

The second tradition Wilsonianism takes its name from Woodrow Wilson. According to this tradition, American values are the most precious values produced by human history. For this reason and to keep America safe, American values such as democracy and freedom must be spread all over the world while war is to be avoided for its many costs. For this reason, a missionary foreign policy should be followed.¹³²

The third tradition Jeffersonianism takes its name from Thomas Jefferson. This tradition challenges the principles of Hamiltonianism. According to this tradition, agricultural development is more important than industrial development. Jeffersonians are most anxious to protect American rights and independence; they emphasize diplomacy to achieve objectives. They also would like to adopt an isolationist foreign policy, trying to stay away from any democratizing agenda to be pursued in other places. Because of its isolationist tendency, it does not pursue alliance with Britain.¹³³

The fourth tradition Jacksonianism takes its name from American general and President Andrew Jackson. This tradition has a populist tendency. It has a special belief in the wisdom and experience of the American people, therefore desiring to empower the public in domestic and foreign policy. It is believed that American values are exceptional. It tends to favor isolationist foreign policy unless American physical or economic interests are immediately threatened.

Jimmy Carter came closer to Wilsonian idealism than any other tradition. There was a very suitable atmosphere for Carter to choose such a path. According to many authors, Carter's election as president perfectly reflected the feelings of Americans society¹³⁴. The Americans were tired of the burden of the Vietnam War and there was great distrust of the state. Under those circumstances, it was not surprise that a man who cares about human rights and state cooperation like Jimmy Carter was elected president amid Cold War. However, for the above reasons, there was a ready ground for that. It can be said that the Watergate Scandal and the Vietnam War prepared this ground

¹³² Anaz, Necati (2017). "Amerikan Muhafazakârlığı ve Dış Politika", *Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi*, cilt 14. Sayı 51. P.43.

¹³³ Anaz, Necati (2017). "Amerikan Muhafazakârlığı ve Dış Politika", *Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi*, cilt 14. Sayı 51. P.42.

¹³⁴ Hook, Steven W. (2016). *U.S Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, CQ Press. p. 105.

The Watergate scandal made the American people doubt about their politics tradition. It has long been widely accepted that liberalism and democracy are very valuable principles in America. In addition, America is considered the country where these values come to life as the strongest. However, the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s caused suspicion of those beliefs. In 1972, five "thieves" were caught trying to break into the Watergate building. As a result of the interrogation, it was understood that the people who entered the building tried to install a device for the Democratic Party. As a result of the investigations, the Republican Party and the Republican president Richard Nixon, albeit covert, were accused. It was shocking to see such a scandal in the United States, which can be seen in corrupt countries. It turned out that American democracy was not that very good to be proud of. As a result of the scandal, Nixon resigned in 1974, and Gerald Ford became president. Nixon is the only US president to resign.

Another event that led to Carter's election as president is the Vietnam tragedy. When France withdrew from Vietnam in 1954, communist North Vietnam and anti-communist South Vietnam began to fight. In the USA, Dwight Eisenhower took office in 1953. Eisenhower believed that after a communist regime came to power in Vietnam, other countries would pass to the communist regime with the domino effect. The following statement summarizes the domino theory "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences."¹³⁵

John F Kennedy increased the number of American soldiers in Vietnam from 1000 to 16,000 with the MAAG program. After Gulf of Tonkin incident, U.S Congress enacted Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that give President Johnson authority to do whatever necessary at Vietnam. President Johnson increased the number of troops in Vietnam to 164,000. The US people or state had no doubts that they would succeed in this war. However, the Tet Offensive by North Vietnamese forces in 1968 shocked the United States. The USA realized that they are not capable of solving Vietnam issue. After this date, the USA sought ways to withdraw from the war. In the 1969 elections, both the Democratic Party candidate and the Republican Party candidate promised to make a deal in the war in Vietnam.

¹³⁵ Hook, Steven W. Spanier, John W. (2018). *American Foreign Policy since World War II* , CQ Press. p. 92

The below table shows the change in America's losses and the American people's support for Vietnam War¹³⁶:




Figure 3. Vietnam War Deaths and Support Relations

While there was no US loss in 1965, the support of the US people for the Vietnam War was over 60%, after the massive losses of the USA, the public support fell below 30%. However, Nixon also wanted to intervene in the communist initiative in Cambodia, ignoring the public's reaction. Americans organized many protests against such a plan. Police opened fire on Ohio Kent University students and injured nine people. Americans' support for the war significantly decreased. The US withdrew from the war after the ceasefire agreement signed in Paris in January 1973. However, there was a heavy burden of war in America. This psychology was recorded as Vietnam Syndrome.

It is not surprising that Jimmy Carter was elected president at a time when the US people were feeling aforementioned burden. US citizens were tired of pragmatism and war

¹³⁶ Larson, Eric V.(1996). "Casualties and Consensus: Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations". *RAND*. P.111 as cited in Hook, Steven W. Spanier, John W. (2018). *American Foreign Policy since World War II* , CQ Press. p. 92.

policies. For this reason, it was quite normal that someone who emphasized principles and world peace was elected president. Carter was outsider of Washington he was not tainted.¹³⁷ Even now, Carter continues to be associated with concepts such as morality, moralism, and idealism¹³⁸.

After Carter became president, he tried to implement his world peace and human rights agenda. He ordered the establishment of a Human Rights office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the preparation of annual human rights reports on countries. Even the report on Turkey, published in 1977, has confronted the United States with Turkey. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün has summoned the US Ambassador to his office for diplomatic notes. At the insistence of the ambassador, the USA made some adjustments in the report. Upon taking office, Carter appointed Zbigniew Brezinski, a harsh anti-communist, to the National Security Advisory. He brought the more negotiator Cyrus Vance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vance came to Turkey many times we will endeavor to restore the US-Turkey relations.

However, it is not possible to say that Carter's foreign policy is completely moral or consistent. On the hand, in his tenure attention was paid to democratic principles in relations between Argentina and Brazil and South Korea.¹³⁹ He signed a treaty to give control of the Panama Canal to Panama, which had been under the control of the USA since 1903. On the other hand, when Carter was president, it cannot be said that he pursued a completely moral and coherent foreign policy. For example, he had a close relationship with the authoritarian Shah of Iran. Carter expressed the following statement for the Shah “There is no other leader with whom I feel such deep personal gratitude and friendship.”¹⁴⁰

Although it is widely accepted that Carter pursued an idealistic foreign policy during his first term as president, it is claimed that there were exceptions. For example, Nur

¹³⁷ Mckrisken, Trevor B. (2003). *American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam U.S. Foreign Policy since 1974*, Palgrave Macmillian. P. 66

¹³⁸ Morris, E, Kenneth (1996). *Jimmy Carter, American Moralism*, University of Georgia

¹³⁹ Sümer, Gültekin (Güz 2008). “Amerikan Dış Politikasının Kökenleri ve Amerikan Dış Politik Kültürü”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 5, Sayı 19. P.74.

¹⁴⁰ Anderson, Perry (2015). *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers*, Verso Books. As cited in Emre, Y.(2016). “Book Review: American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 13:49. P. 135.

Çetinoğlu Harunoğlu claims that Carter maintains a realistic relationship with Saudi Arabia even within his early years at office¹⁴¹.

Nevertheless, it can be said that Carter carried out an idealistic foreign policy in the first two years of his duty, and after 1980, he pursued a more realistic and confrontational policy. While Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was in office, Carter valued world peace and human rights more. Turkey was considered guilty by Carter because of the Cyprus issue. It is possible to say that because of Carter's ideological agenda, the relations between Turkey and the US was difficult to be completely restored. In the following section we will see the Camp David Accords and SALT II treaty, a result of Carter's idealistic efforts. In the following chapters, we will examine the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which caused Carter to be more realist by moving away from idealism.

3.1.4. Camp David Accords and SALT II

It can be said that the last two evident cases of the Détente period are SALT II and the Camp David Accords. It is possible to say that Carter had a great effort in these two cases. Both treaties were signed while Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was in office. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are hallmarks of détente and aimed world peace. In these negotiations, the US and the Soviets were trying to control armament. According to some authors, these interviews had three different purposes.

The first was to make the arms race more predictable by establishing, documenting and reporting number of strategic weapons possessed by each side. The second objective was to ensure “parity”, or military equality... The third purpose of SALT was to reduce threats to each side’s deterrent forces.¹⁴² As a result of SALT I negotiations, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed in 1972. However, SALT I left a vacuum for nuclear armament. Both the USA and the USSR were rapidly continuing nuclear armament. It is possible to see the progress of countries' nuclear armament from the below table¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Harunoğlu, Nur Çetinoğlu (2020). “The “Realist” Idealism? An Evaluation on the USA-Saudi Arabia Relations in 1977-1978”, *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, Cilt 8, Sayı 1.

¹⁴² Hook, Steven W. Spanier, John W. (2018). *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, CQ Press. p. 111.

¹⁴³ Best, Antony Hanhimaki, Jussi M. Maiolo, Joseph A. Schulze Kirsten E. (eds.) (2004), *International History of Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2. Edition. Routledge.p.287.

	1969		1971		1975	
	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR
ICBMs	1,054	1,028	1,054	1,513	1,054	1,527
SLBMs	656	196	656	448	656	628
Bombers	560	145	505	145	422	140
Total	2,270	1,369	2,215	2,106	2,132	2,295

Nuclear warheads (ICBMs and SLBMs) parity						
	1971		1977		1983	
	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR
ICBMs	1,254	1,510	2,154	2,647	2,145	5,654
SLBMs	1,236	440	5,120	909	5,145	2,688
Total	2,490	1,950	7,274	3,556	7,290	8,342

Figure 4. Detente and the Soviet-American Nuclear Balance

SALT II was built in order to halt nuclear armament. Negotiations were held in Vladivostok in 1974. After long negotiations, the treaty was signed only in 1979. However, the US Congress did not approve SALT II due to the USSR invasion of Afghanistan.

Another crucial event that aimed world peace in Détente was Camp David Accords. While Sadat was speaking at the Egyptian parliament on November 9, he said that he personally wanted to go to Jerusalem and was ready to speak to Menachem Begin in the Knesset of the Israeli Assembly for peace. Yasser Arafat was also among the audience¹⁴⁴. Begin invited Sadat to Jerusalem. Ten days later invitation, Sadat spoke in the Israeli assembly. This incident has not been seen ever by that time. Sadat asked Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and invited Begin to visit Egypt. No concrete results were obtained in these negotiations.

Carter decided to continue the negotiations. Invited Sadat and Begin to the USA. Carter held talks with Sadat and Begin at Camp David from September 5-17. After 2 weeks of negotiations, two different Accords were signed. These are A Framework for Peace in the Middle East "and" A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and

¹⁴⁴ Todd, F. Gregory, M. H.(2018). *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, Pluto Press. p.128.

Israel ". The first agreement proposed the implementation of UN Resolution 242 for conflicts in the Middle East¹⁴⁵. Because of the second agreement, Egypt-Israel relations improved a lot in a short time. A few years later, the countries appointed mutual embassies, and Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. After the Camp David Accords, Sadat and Begin were applauded at the US congress. Carter had achieved an important success for the world order. Israel has reduced total radicalism of itself. Sadat shifted Egypt axis from Soviet orbit into Western orbit, but was condemned by all Arab countries.

3.1.5. Iran Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

In this section, two events that related to the termination of Détente and affected Turkey-US relations will be examined: Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both events affected the atmosphere of international system a lot. Detente indirectly, Iranian Revolution directly affected relation of US-Turkey.

The anti-imperialist tendency takes important place in the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The Pahlavi administration was a loyal ally of the USA. Tobacco Protest and the 1953 coup hold a very important place in the memory of the anti-imperialist discourse. In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh nationalized Iranian oil. Most of the oil's revenue went to foreign companies. A few years later, CIA-backed Operation Ajax coupled Mosaddegh¹⁴⁶. What happened to Mosaddegh holds a serious place in the memory of the anti-imperialist discourse in Iran.

The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was a staunch ally of the United States. Ayatollah Khomeini called Shah as *sag-i Carter*¹⁴⁷, Carter's dog. However, Carter's human rights policy was in conflict with the authoritarian rule of the Pahlavi. Jimmy Carter, who became the President of the United States in 1977, declared that he would no longer be tolerant of human rights violation in countries allied to the United States. Moreover, US Secretary of State Vance, who visited Tehran in May 1977, emphasized the importance of human rights to the Shah. This agenda of Carter is considered to have influenced the Iranian

¹⁴⁵ Cleveland, W. L.(2008). *A History of Modern Middle East*, Westview Press. p. 379.

¹⁴⁶ For more in detail see Kinzer, S.(2008). *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, Wiley Publication.

¹⁴⁷ Halliday, F.(1992). "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development And Religious Populism", *Journal of International Affairs* , Fall/Winter, 1982/83, Vol. 36, No. 2. P.203.

Revolution. However, it is accepted by many researchers that the real cause of revolution was authoritarian rule of the shah¹⁴⁸.

In 1977, Amnesty International declared that Iran is one of the countries that has the highest human rights violations. The shah started to make some reforms to get rid of this bad image. The shah went to America on 1 November 1977 to correct his bad image in the Western world. While Shah Pahlavi and Carter made a press statement in the garden of the White House, protests were being carried out against the Shah's regime outside of White House. The gas used by the police to disperse the protestors drifted through the air, affecting everyone in the White House garden¹⁴⁹. The shah seemed to be crying under the influence of the gas. After this incident, the Shah's reputation gradually decreased. As soon as the Shah returned to his country to escape the effects of that humiliating incident, he put pressure on protesters in the country. University teachers and students went to boycott. Shah closed the universities.

The main events that accelerated the revolution happened in 1978. On January 7, the newspaper *Ettela'at*, which is close to the government, published a cursing article about Ayatollah Khomeini, who played an important role in inviting the masses to the streets. The article said that Khomeini was not Iranian and was collaborating with communism¹⁵⁰. Two days later, a big march was held in Qum, with the call of religious leaders and the participation of bazaar tradesmen. Dozens of protesters were killed or injured as the police intervened. It was the first time that the clergy, who had never been taken into account by the opposition before, organized such a large organization against the king. Ayatollah Shariatmadari and other mullahs asked for forty days to mourn and not to open shops and do business. According to some researchers, with this incident, the mullahs became the engine of the revolution. Normally left and liberal groups also suffered greatly from the persecution of the shah and paid a great price for their actions. For a long time, leftist groups such as the People's Mujahedin of Iran and the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas were engaged in armed action for a long time.

40 days of commemoration was held in many parts of Iran on February 18. Many people died because of the police intervention in the demonstrations in Tabriz. After that,

¹⁴⁸ Abrahamian, E.(2008). *A History of Modern Iran*, Cambridge University Press. p.155.

¹⁴⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/16/archives/clashes-and-tear-gas-mar-shahs-welcome-in-capital-clashes-and-tear.html> (access: 24.03.2021).

¹⁵⁰ Abrahamian, E.(2008). *A History of Modern Iran*, Cambridge University Press. p.158.

the demonstrations were not interrupted. Protesters were killed at every demonstration; there were memorial protests after each death¹⁵¹. Deaths and commemorations had gained circulation.

Such insurgency must have been minimal for the shah that he went to an extraordinary economical regulation. High inflation has been a problem for Iran for a long time. The Shah government resorted to austerity policies. Salaries and investments were halted. This regulation brought serious unemployment. The unemployed poor were articulated in the Islamic discourse¹⁵², which served as the engine of the protests.

The Shah announced that free elections would be held on August 5, 1978, on the anniversary of the Persian Constitutional Revolution. However, this statement caused the protests to become more intensified beyond the cessation. A tragedy on 20 August gave new impetus to the revolution. The Rex Cinema in Abadan was set on fire and nearly 400 people died. Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that the secret police service SAVAK was responsible, while the police claimed that Khomeini was responsible. However, the community blamed the local police chief because he ordered the shooting of protesters in Qom in January¹⁵³. After the funeral of those who died by burning in the cinema, 10,000 people marched in Abadan. The biggest slogan of the march was "Burn the shah, End the Pahlavis". The fear wall of the Shah's administration was now broken.

On September 4, 1978, which coincided with the Eid al-Fitr, the biggest protest against the Shah was held. The activists were shouting "Death to Shah" in unison. Shah declared martial law in Tehran and 11 cities on the night of 7 September¹⁵⁴. However, on September 8, there was a crowded protest in Tehran again. The banner carried by the activists read, "We want an Islamic government, led by Imam Khomeini". Police opened fire on the demonstrators in Jaleh square. The 8th of September was named Black Friday for the Iranian revolution. According to Foucault, who was a reporter in Iran during the revolution, the death toll on Black Friday was 4,000.¹⁵⁵ Allegedly, even the king was so surprised to death toll¹⁵⁶ and understood that everything was over for him.

¹⁵¹ Cleveland, W. L.(2008). *A History of Modern Middle East*, Westview Press. p. 429.

¹⁵² Ibid. p. 429.

¹⁵³ Abrahamian, E.(2008). *A History of Modern Iran*, Cambridge University Press. p.159.

¹⁵⁴ Axworthy, M.(2013). *Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*, Oxford University Press, p.112.

¹⁵⁵ Abrahamian, E.(2008). *A History of Modern Iran*, Cambridge University Press. p.159.

¹⁵⁶ Axworthy, M.(2013). *Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*, Oxford University Press, p.113.

Until September 1978, Khomeini was staying in Najaf, Iraq. With the initiative of the Iranian Prime Minister, the Iraqi government put Khomeini under pressure. Upon this, Khomeini went to Paris in the beginning of October and led the revolution from here. On October 4, one of the leaders of the National Front, Kerim Sencabi went to Paris and met with Khomeini. Sencabi stated that he agreed with Khomeini and issued a 3-point statement. In the statement, firstly, the Shah's rule was illegitimate and the movement of opponents of the regime wanted the establishment of a system based on Islamic methods, democracy and independence. The shah realized that the actions could now overthrow his throne and said to the activists on November 6, "I heard the voice of your revolution."¹⁵⁷ Now it was too late, the king had only a few months left on the throne.

The last series of events that completed the revolution took place in the month of Muharram, in December 1978, which was sacred in Shi'ism. Protesters were showing their readiness for death by wearing shrouds in Tehran. Although 700 people died in the first 4 days of the protests, the protests did not stop. 2 million people marched in Tehran on December 12¹⁵⁸. The king's final trump game on December 31st. Shapour Bakhtiar, one of the close names, said that he will be the prime minister and the shah will be rest far away and that Khomeini is free to return to Iran. However, Khomeini did not accept any conditions. The shah realized that there was no solution for him anymore. He flew to Egypt from Mehrabad airport on January 16. It was announced¹⁵⁹ that the shah went abroad for a long time for medical treatment for his cancer. The Bakhtiar government was incapable of ruling the country. A few days later, Khomeini announced that he would return to Iran. On February 1, Khomeini returned to Iran with a crowded welcome.

What caused the US foreign policy and international system to harden soon happened. The shah got permission to enter the USA for treatment. Islamist youth organizations in Iran raided the American embassy on November 4, 1979 to react to this. Fifty-two people in the embassy were taken hostage for more than a year. Iran hostage crisis caused wide public angry to government within the US. Carter ordered the rescue of activists in April 1980. The army tried to rescue the prisoners with Operation Eagle Claw but failed. The hostage crisis is one of the events that increased the reaction against Carter in the United States the most. In the 1981 elections, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan accused Carter of constant

¹⁵⁷ Kurzman, C.(2005). *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, Harvard University Press. p.107.

¹⁵⁸ Cleveland, W. L.(2008). *A History of Modern Middle East*, Westview Press. p. 430.

¹⁵⁹ Axworthy, M.(2013). *Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*, Oxford University Press, p.113.

cowardice and working to the detriment of American interests, and he won the election against Carter. Therefore, Cold War warmed up again.

Thus, the Shah in the Iran, the closest ally of the USA in the Middle East, was overthrown. While Iran was the staunchest ally of the United States, it became its worst enemy. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was on office the entire time the revolution took place. After the revolution occurred in Iran, the US lost a great ally in the Middle East. On the other hand, it had gained an ally like Egypt. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that after the US lost loyalty of Iran, it needed Turkey more.

Another phenomenon affecting the international system and the Turkey-West relations are at the end of the 1970s Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, in 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan was the first president of Afghanistan, staging a coup against the last Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah. Daoud was actually a close ally of the USSR. However, by the end of the 1970s, he wanted to reduce the intense influence of the USSR at Afghanistan. In 1977, Daoud went to Moscow. Brezhnev said Afghanistan is hosting Western spies under the guise of technical expertise. Daoud responded it harshly that Afghanistan is an independent country and can act as he wishes¹⁶⁰. This is how Daoud prepared its end. He thought he could be articulated with the Western bloc like Egypt.

The USSR unified and supported socialist groups in Afghanistan. Soviet-backed People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) plotted coup d'état to oust Daoud Khan at April of 1978. However, the PDPA was divided into several different factions and the center was not homogeneous¹⁶¹. On the other hand, there was a serious reaction of the religious people to the socialist reforms carried out by the PDPA and the armed opposition started. Coup was completed, but PDPA was not qualified to govern country. Vice President Hafizullah Amin ordered murder of President Nur Muhammad Taraki. After this murder, The USSR feared a regime change in Afghanistan by an Islamic outburst similar to that of Iran. The state of Afghanistan was not strong enough to protect its entire territory. At this point, the SCCB decided to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine. According to the doctrine, if a revolution is made against socialist rule in a country, other Soviet countries must react it as

¹⁶⁰ Ewans, M.(2005). *Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in Assymetric Warfare*, Routledge. P.84.

¹⁶¹ Best, Antony Hanhimaki, Jussi M. Maiolo, Joseph A. Schulze Kirsten E. (eds.) (2004), *International History of Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2. Edition. Routledge.p.287.

well¹⁶². Otherwise, the counter-revolution in this country may threaten other socialist regimes. The USSR then began to occupy Afghanistan in December 1979¹⁶³.

As a result, the Iran Islamic Revolution and the invasion to Afghanistan ended Carter's idealism. Carter announced a new doctrine in January 1980. Carter reported that if America's interests in the Persian Gulf were endangered, it would intervene in the military if necessary. After Iran's Islamic Revolution and the invasion to Afghanistan, the United States needs Turkey has increased dramatically. In the next chapter, we examine domestic politics of Turkey at 1970s.

3.2. Domestic Politics of Turkey at 1970s

In the previous section, we summarized the international politics of the 1970s. In this chapter, we will look at what is going on in Turkey's domestic politics during 1970 and how it affected Turkish Foreign Policy. The period of 1960-1980 is often studied together in the political history of Turkey.

3.2.1. İnönü's Fragile Coalition Governments in the 1960s

After the 1960 coup, the most important institutions in Turkey was National Unity Committee (NUC). In the NUC, Alparslan Türkeş was the vanguard of the hawk wing; he did not like civilian politicians and demanded radical reforms. General Cemal Madanoğlu, who was the most powerful officer in fact, preferred to return to free elections as soon as possible. Madanoğlu, who was disturbed by the radicalism of Türkeş, retired fourteen people from hawk wing of NUC, including Türkeş and assigned them to foreign missions on abroad, 6 months after the coup¹⁶⁴. In July 1961, the new constitution was accepted by referendum. The 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey is known as the most liberal constitution that caused flourishing of public opinion and debates.

While the constitution was being made, the powers of the parliament and other elected institutions were trying to be reduced as much as possible. With the National Security

¹⁶² Hook, Steven W. Spanier, John W. (2018). *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, CQ Press. p. 129.

¹⁶³ Best, Antony Hanhimaki, Jussi M. Maiolo, Joseph A. Schulze Kirsten E. (eds.) (2004), *International History of Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2. Edition. Routledge.p.289.

¹⁶⁴ Karpas, Kemal (1970). "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution". *The American Historical Review* Vol. 75, No. 6 (Oct., 1970). P.1678.

Council, the military gained a constitutional right to speak on politics¹⁶⁵. In addition, military increased its economic autonomy with OYAK. According to Feroz Ahmad, by founding of OYAK, military left its bipartisan position and became one of side in Turkey politics.¹⁶⁶ After 1961 constitution, military became one of a major actor in the politics of Turkey. According to Kemal Karpaz, the army meticulously planned and designed the constitution. Selected political parties or leaders became audited by many supra-institutions. According to the military "true democracy could be achieved only by imposition from the top, a procedure they described as a return to and reformulation of Kemalism."¹⁶⁷

At the beginning of 1961, political bans were lifted and many new parties were established. Among these parties, the Justice Party (JP) was seen as the continuation of the Democrat Party. The retired ex-general Ragıp Gümüşpala chaired the party. Another founded party was Workers' Party of Turkey(WPT). This is the first official socialist that founded in Turkey. This example can be shown as libertarian side of the 1961 constitution. A free general election was held in 1961 and JP received most of the votes. Many officers in the army were disturbed by the result election. They thought that the "revolution" became null. Some military officers thought to plot another coup and offered power to party that is more "competent"¹⁶⁸. Despite this, there were several coup attempts led by officers like Talat Aydemir, but no coup was successful due to the objections of the main body of army and İsmet İnönü.

During this period, there were two very important events affecting Turkey's foreign policy. First, the U-2 spy plane departing from Pakistan was shot down by the Soviets on its way to Norway in 1960. Khrushchev threatened to strike US bases in neighboring countries. This threat targeted Pakistan, Norway, and Turkey. Turkey, naturally, was disturbed by this threat. Another event was the Johnson letter. Turkey was a NATO member and key ally of Western Alliance, but despite this, its interests were threatened that cause deep disappointment about West. Amy Austin Holmes¹⁶⁹ emphasizes that these two crises cause Turkey to question its ties with the USA and NATO.

¹⁶⁵ Zurcher, Erich J.(2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris. P. 245.

¹⁶⁶ Ahmad, Feroz (1977). *Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975*, C. Hurst Company. p.281.

¹⁶⁷ Karpaz, Kemal (1970). "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution". *The American Historical Review* Vol. 75, No. 6 (Oct. 1970). P.1678.

¹⁶⁸ Aydın, Suavi and Taşkın, Yüksel (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları. P. 100.

¹⁶⁹ Holmes, Amy Austin (2014). *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945*, Cambridge University Press. P.60.

3.2.2. Emergence of Anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion and intelligentsia

Süleyman Demirel became chair of the JP in 1964. In the 1965 elections, the JP received a record percentage of votes. Demirel established the 30th Government and continued as prime minister until the next election. While, on the one hand, he was trying to keep his power by approaching the religious groups, on the other hand, criticized communism harshly. At the same time, he was trying not to confront the army or the founding ideological values of the Republic. According to Karpat, the mixed economy that Demirel implemented in his first period was successful.¹⁷⁰ Production and employment increased steadily; there was a noticeable change in people's lives.

RPP entered the 1965 elections with the "Left of Center"(in Turkish “Ortanın Solu”) declaration prepared by Bülent Ecevit and Turhan Feyzioğlu. The RPP had not presented itself as close to the left wing until this date. It can be said that RPP took a position against the right-wing rhetoric of Demirel's. Demirel made a harsh propaganda for the position of Left of Center of RPP. He kept saying "Left of center is road to Moscow" (*Ortanın solu, Moskova yolu*) in the public¹⁷¹. With this declaration, Ecevit aimed to appeal to masses and he became the party's general secretary in 1966. Ecevit had worked as a press attaché at the London embassy between 1946-1950. While Ecevit was in London, he studied Sanskrit, Hindi, and Bengali at university. He even translated some of Tagore's poems into Turkish. Thanks to these studies, he was aware of the non-Western world. It can even be said that when he was prime minister in the late 1970s, under that influence he seek to approach to the Non-Aligned Movement via India. In 1957, he became a member of parliament as one of the people whom İnönü decision to renew the party¹⁷². He served as the Minister of Labor from 1961 to 1965.

In fact, Ecevit's new positioning of the RPP did not bring new support to the party in the beginning. Because the left movement had already started to organize on other platforms since the 1960s. Workers' Party of Turkey was the party of the legal platform. In addition, Kemalist left thesis was started to be covered in Yön magazine at the end of 1961. The owner and editor-in-chief of the magazine was Doğan Avcıoğlu. Famous leftist scholars and

¹⁷⁰ Karpat, Kemal (2015). *Türk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, Timaş Yayınları. P.206.

¹⁷¹ Aydın, Suavi, Taşkın, Yüksel (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları. P. 136.

¹⁷² Ahmad, Feroz (1977). *Turkish Experiment in Democracy :1950-1975*, C. Hurst Company. p.319.

researchers signed the manifesto in the first issue such as İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal, Mümtaz Soysal, Niyazi Berkes, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Sadun Aren, İdris Küçükömer, Çetin Altan, Selahattin Hilav, Korkut Boratav, Altan Öymen¹⁷³. The leftist view spread seriously among not only academicians and students but also military officers during the 1960s. Doğan Avcıoğlu and the magazine Yön wanted to stage a left-wing coup with soldiers and intellectuals. This group was fiercely anti-US. Avcıoğlu had ultra-nationalist left Kemalist ideas. He believed it was vital to get rid of US influence on Turkey. He thought autonomy from US could be gained by following a pro-Soviet foreign policy¹⁷⁴. The group even attracted generals such as Faruk Gürler and Muhsin Batur.

It is inevitable that a growing social movement will become more heterogeneous. In a short time, left was divided into different fractions. Mehmet Ali Aybar and his friends were planning a more democratic and peaceful socialist revolution. However, a significant group believed that the Turkey is not ready for socialist revolution yet. Therefore, they envisioned a revolution led by intellectuals and military officers. This group is called the National Democratic Revolution. Mihri Belli, who led this group, was expelled from the party. Another divergence in the WPT occurred due to the irredentalist policies of the Soviets. Aybar condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia¹⁷⁵. However, Behice Boran and Sadun Aren, who are eminent figures in the party, approved and praised invasion. Because of this separation, the party was divided. Divisions within the left increasingly continued. In the late 1960s, a group led by Doğu Perinçek formed a Maoist movement within the National Democratic Revolution movement. Later, radical left organizations were established such as TİKKO Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu – Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army), THKO (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu – Turkish People’s Liberation Army), THKP-C (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi – Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front). These organizations began to commit terrorist actions. Another event that caused the spread of leftist organizations was the events of 1968, which had a global impact. The leftist groups started to exercise violence. They, on the one hand, protest and attack on the US soldiers or diplomats, on the other hand, try to control universities strictly. Some of these socialist groups were close to the Soviets, others to Mao's China. Nevertheless, they were all highly

¹⁷³ Aydınların Ortak Bildirisi(20 Aralık 1961). Yön Dergisi.

¹⁷⁴ Avcıoğlu, Doğan (1968). *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın*, Bilgi Yayınevi. P.408, 473. As cited in Mufti, Malik (2009). *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, Palgrave Macmillan. P. 38.

¹⁷⁵ Zurcher, Erich Jan (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris. P. 255.

Anti-American. These socialist groups reacted very harshly to the 6th Fleet that came to Istanbul in 1968. For days there were anti-US, anti-NATO protests in İstanbul. NATO was portrayed as an exploitative and harmful institution for Turkey. In this way, public opinion became more decisive in Turkey's foreign policy. For example, there were 24,000 US soldiers in Turkey during those years. Because of intense protest and criticism, the visibility of the Americans was reduced.¹⁷⁶

The protests against the US during this period were not limited to this. Amy Austin Holmes divided the US protests in Turkey in this period into four categories: parliamentary opposition, labor unrest, civil disobedience, and violent attacks.¹⁷⁷ As an example of parliamentary opposition, she shows discourse and actions of leaders of Workers' Party of Turkey, especially its leader Mehmet Ali Aybar. Behice Boran goes even further and claims that the Soviets were not a threat.¹⁷⁸ Secondly, there were thousands Turkish workers working in the American bases, and they sometimes went on strike. In the 1960s, about 8,000 workers were employed at the American bases¹⁷⁹. In 1967 and 1969, Turkish workers organized massive strikes at many military bases. Thirdly, Holmes points to the protests of the Sixth Fleet's visits to Istanbul and Izmir as civil disobedience. Finally, Holmes mentions about THKO and THKP-C's attacks on US diplomats and soldiers.

Although not as much as vivid as the left, there was effort for organizing in the right as well. Alparslan Türkeş joined the Republican Peasant' Nation Party (in Turkish Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi- CKMP) in 1965. Turkes soon became the party leader and turned the party into an ultra-nationalist and militant party. The name of the party was changed to Nationalist Movement Party (in Turkish Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) in 1969. The youth organization was named officially Idealist Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları), unofficially Grey Wolves (*Bozkurtlar*). By beginning of 1970s, Türkeş have moved away from tough secularist position and started to look a more sympathetic to Islam because of his opposition to communism. Moreover, there was preparation for new rightist part, an

¹⁷⁶ Mufti, Malik (2009). *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, Palgrave Macmillan. P. 40.

¹⁷⁷ Holmes, Amy Austin (2014). *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945*, Cambridge University Press. P.61-62.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. P.66.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. P.75.

Islamist party, in the late 1960s. Right-wing groups were not very reactive to US because of Soviet antipathy, but they were not wholeheartedly loyal to West or US.

During this period, relations with Asian and African countries began or improved. For example, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel visited Moscow in 1969 and got credits for important investments. In 1972, the Soviet President visited Turkey. In addition, Demirel and Çağlayangil prevented the use of U-2 aircraft against the Soviets via Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey started to develop its relations with Arab countries during this period. Moreover, Turkey criticized Israel in the 1967 war.¹⁸⁰

3.2.3. 1971 Turkish Military Memorandum

Demirel had never been able to stop the anarchy in the university and on the streets. There was also concern within the army that left-leaning military officers would do a coup. On March 9, 1971, left-leaning National Democratic Revolution supporters, including retired General Cemal Madanoğlu, attempted the coup. However, the Chief of General Staff, force commanders, and other top generals were against a left-leaning coup. This coup attempt was blocked. Who defend the National Democratic Revolution thesis such as Cemal Madanoğlu Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhan Selçuk and Hasan Cemal¹⁸¹ were arrested and questioned.

Chief of General Staff and force commanders gave a memorandum to the government on March 12, 1971. The memorandum demanded the establishment of a government that embraced the Kemalist thought that would end anarchy. Otherwise, the army "is determined to take over power directly."¹⁸² Demirel government resigned after the memorandum. In the RPP, Nihat Erim resigned from his party and formed a technocrat, nonpartisan cabinet. İnönü said he would support Erim's government. However, Ecevit was very angry at this and resigned from his party's general secretary. Ecevit thought that supporting the coups would harm the RPP.

¹⁸⁰ Kösebalan, Hasan (2011). *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization*, Palgrave Macmillian, p. 102.

¹⁸¹ Cemal later write about how they try to persuade the leftist military officers for the coup. See: Cemal, Hasan (2005). *Cumhuriyeti Çok Sevmiştim*, Everest Yayınları.

¹⁸² Aydın, Suavi, Taşkın, Yüksel (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları. P. 205.

The biggest aim of 1971 memorandum was to end the political terror in the cities. Nevertheless, shortly after the memorandum, political terror started again. Martial law was taken in some provinces at the National Security Council in April. However, radical left organizations such as THKO - THKP-C were constantly involved in terrorist acts. These organizations robbed banks several times and kidnapped the Israeli consul general, Efraim Elrom.

As mentioned above, the 1971 memorandum was in favor of NATO. One of the most pressing problems in Turkey-US relations since the 1960s was the cultivation of poppy. The USA claimed that opium that illegally arrived to US from Turkey and wanted completely ban the poppy cultivation in Turkey. Otherwise, The US said it would cut aid to Turkey.¹⁸³ However, in the 1960s governments did not accept this. The technocratic government that came to power after the coup completely banned poppy cultivation in 1971. This increased Anti-Americanism in Turkey and Ecevit would try to get support from this reaction in the future.

Due to its heterogeneous structure, Erim cabinet hardly carry out his activities. In 1972, Ferit Melen, who was the Minister of National Defense in the Erim cabinet, established a government¹⁸⁴. In fact, both Erim and Melen belonged to the Trust Party. It cannot be a coincidence that the army wanted Erim and Melen as prime ministers of bipartisan governments. The military was probably uncomfortable with the RPP and their “Left of Center” rhetoric. Instead, they relied more on the staff of the Trust Party, which was again Kemalist but at the “right of center”. It can even be said that many names from the AP were made ministers because of the fear of communism. The RPP had only just defined itself on the left, and this coup harmed the left movements. There was a lot of confusion within the RPP. Although Ecevit resigned from his position in the party, he had a very serious fan base. Ecevit said that the March 12 intervention was "a rightist coup that targeted them"¹⁸⁵ and harshly criticized İnönü. He became president of the RPP in 1972 and his new theorization would permanently change the trajectory of the RPP. Ecevit's march to power will seriously affect Turkey's foreign policy. For example, İnönü adhered to neutrality, which was the basic principle of the foreign policy of the republic. By the 1960s, he had begun to question Turkey

¹⁸³ Kösebalan, Hasan (2011). *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalization*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 100.

¹⁸⁴ Aydın, Suavi, Taşkın, Yüksel (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi, İletişim Yayınları*. P. 238.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. P. 237.

deep dependence on the Western alliance. However, he found new alliances and supporting one sides of conflicts is dangerous. However, Ecevit has a more proactive attitude in foreign policy. For example, in 1974 he stated 'We have shown that we will not accept the role of the West's agent in the Middle East.'¹⁸⁶

3.2.4. Bülent Ecevit and Transformation of RPP

RPP with Ecevit got the most votes in 1973 election. Ecevit's success in such a short time surprised many. Nevertheless, the RPP, with the task of forming the Government, could not come to power alone. Ecevit started negotiations to form a coalition. Ecevit surprisingly decided to ally with the NSP. Karpas says Ecevit's RPP and NSP have more in common than it seems¹⁸⁷.

According to him, both parties oppose capitalism and Westernism and gave importance to modernization, national independence and cooperation with third world countries. Indeed, Ecevit's government relations in 1977 with the Muslim and Third World countries won plaudits even from conservative Islamic circles in Turkey¹⁸⁸. Ecevit, on the other hand, probably thought the NSP was weaker than the JP and DP and would be easier to manipulate. There were seven NSP ministers with 17 RPPs in the 37th government where Ecevit was the prime minister. Most of the ministers in this government served in the 42nd Government with Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün.

In the 1970s, Turkey not only dealt with Cyprus problem but also Armenian terrorist attacks. An Armenians terrorist killed Los Angeles consul general of Turkey in 1973. A few years later, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was established in Lebanon. ASALA has committed many terrorist acts, mostly in Europe. More than forty diplomats of Turkey were killed across the world. Turkey was struggling many problems in inside and outside in 1970s.

One of the first actions of the RPP-NSP government was to remove the poppy cultivation, which was previously put under pressure from the USA. Later, many political

¹⁸⁶ Mufti, Malik (2009). *Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea*, Palgrave Macmillan. P. 43.

¹⁸⁷ Karpas, Kemal (2015). *Türk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, Timaş Yayınları. P.336.

¹⁸⁸ Since we will see the efforts of this government and Ökçün in detail in the next section, I do not give details here.

prisoners were released with the amnesty law. Shortly after this government was formed, the Cyprus problem broke out. Ecevit ordered a military operation on the island. Shortly after, this government was overthrown and the First Nationalist Front was established in its place. Süleyman Demirel became prime minister, and deputy prime ministers were Erbakan from the NSP, Turhan Feyzioğlu from CGP and Alparslan Türkeş from the NAP. Despite its heterogeneous structure, this government remained in power until the 1977 elections.

After 1977 elections, Ecevit established the 40th Government. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün entered the parliament for the first time as Eskişehir deputy and became foreign minister in the cabinet. It is interesting that when Ökçün was elected as the foreign minister, there were many experienced MPs in the cabinet and parliament. His close circle was surprised that Ökçün had entered politics or was elected a minister. However, this government could not take office because it did not get a vote of confidence. Thereupon, Demirel allied with the NSP and NAP to form the Second Nationalist Front government. This government was able to stay in power for only 5 months and Ecevit formed the 42nd Government. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was the foreign minister in this cabinet. This government served a considerably longer period than the government at that time: almost 2 years.

Throughout of 1970s, Turkey had severe big problems that occupied most of the domestic politics: political violence and economical crisis. We will try to understand the period by briefly summarizing these two problems.

3.2.5. Political Violence

The most fundamental problem of Turkey's politics during 1970s was political violence and fragile governments. One of intention of military's at 1971 memorandum was to end anarchy. Nevertheless, that never achieved. Political violence has increased dramatically due to the right-left division within Turkey during 1970s.

According to Kemal Karpat, the thing that increased the conflict in this period is the deterioration of the traditional social and economic structure because of intense immigration¹⁸⁹. Between 1950 and 1980, the population of cities such as Istanbul and Ankara tripled. This statistic shows very well how intense immigration is. Immigration brought

¹⁸⁹ Karpat, Kemal (2015). *Türk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, Timaş Yayınları. P.301

social alienation and the new residents of the city felt insecure. These individuals supported right-wing political movements that emphasized religious and national values. On the other hand, immigration slums and development created income injustice. This phenomenon enabled the left ideology to gain strength. According to Karpaz, which started special studies on slums very early, slum residents voted for the JP in the first periods¹⁹⁰. However, Ecevit, who raced at the 1973 elections with the “Left of Center” agenda, became the hope of the poor people and got high votes from the slums. Karpaz argues that while WPT’s vote was around %3 overall in Turkey, it got around %10 votes of slums. Right and left radicalization in slums is a very crucial factor that increases political violence. Karpaz quotes from the work of Dogu Ergil that done in 1980¹⁹¹. Ergil done a survey on political prisoners after the 1980 coup. According to his survey, 39% of leftists, 34% of rightists were born in the village, 60% of leftists and 63% of rightists lived in slums¹⁹².

In the late 1960s, the violence of leftist militants was mostly directed against US soldiers and banks. However, Gray Wolves militants were organized under the leadership of the NAP and violence increased over the right and left. Especially in the second half of the 1970s, many citizens lost their lives due to political violence. The number of people who lost their lives in these years can be seen below¹⁹³.

Year	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Number of Killed Person Because of Political Violence	27	37	108	319	1095	1362	2206

¹⁹⁰ Karpaz, Kemal (1976). *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹¹ Karpaz, Kemal (2015). *Türk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, Timaş Yayınları. P.305-306.

¹⁹² Ergil, Doğu(1980).*Türkiye’de Terör ve Şiddet, Yapısal ve Kültürel Kaynaklar*, Ankara, Turhan Kitabevi as cited in Karpaz, Kemal (2015). *Türk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, Timaş Yayınları. P.305-306.

¹⁹³ Keleş, Ruşen, Ünsal, Artun (1982). *Kent ve Siyasal Şiddet*, A.Ü. S.B.F. Basın Ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi. P.22 In this study, Keleş and Ünsal claim that the onset of the economic crisis in 1974 triggered the violence.

The left that was one side of the political violence consisted of many groups. WPT shut down after the 1971 memorandum. THKP-C, THKO and Maoist Aydınlik movements emerged from among the MDD movement that left the WPT. Mehmet Ali Aybar and WPT were positive about democratic politics and elections. However, illegal groups such as THKP-C and THKO believe that socialist revolution in Turkey can be actualized only via armed way. They widely appeal to arms and terror attacks. In particular, THKP-C leader Mahir Çayan was very impressed by the Latin American Foquismo method¹⁹⁴. Çayan accused Sadun Aren and other WPT members of revisionism and treason¹⁹⁵. Armed leftist groups even accused and attacked each other. Even in the second half of the 1970s, leftist groups started to clash with each other. While going to the celebrations of May 1 of 1977, there was a very tense atmosphere. Clashes between Maoist groups and pro-Soviet groups were suspected¹⁹⁶. During the May 1 celebrations, as a result of the shooting from an unknown point, a brawl occurred and 34 people lost their lives. In this incident, most of leftist groups blamed the state and the Nationalist Front. However, there are many who claim that this is a left-hand showdown within themselves.

There were leftist groups working with legal methods other than armed struggle, but these did not attract the attention of leftist youth¹⁹⁷. Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey was founded in 1974. In 1975, WPT was re-established under the leadership of Behice Boran. Turkey Workers Party, the Socialist Revolutionary Party were other legal parties.

On the other side of the political violence in the 1970s, there were right-wing movements. The most prominent of these groups is the Idealist Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları), which have an inorganic link with the NAP. The association was established in 1975. His followers call themselves Gray Wolves as a mythological inspiration. NAP and Idealist' are shown as the most important part of the violence in this period.

¹⁹⁴ Belge, Murat (2006). "The Left" P. 173-174 in Schick, I. C. Tonak, E. A.(2006) *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Belge Yayınları.

¹⁹⁵ Çayan, Mahir (1969). "Aren Oportünizminin Niteliği".

¹⁹⁶ This claim has been expressed by representatives of different leftist movements. For example:

<https://t24.com.tr/haber/prof-dr-halil-berktay-kanli-1-mayis-solcularin-isiydi,202924>

<https://www.indyturk.com/node/26561/t%C3%BCrki%C3%87yeden-sesler/gece-bilir-%E2%80%9Csabah%C4%B1n-bir-sahibinin-var-oldu%C4%9Funu>

<https://m.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/146248-1-mayis-1977-neden-ve-nasil-kana-bulandi>

<https://t24.com.tr/haber/kimse-kitleye-direkt-ates-etmedi,203860>

¹⁹⁷ Aydın, Suavi, Taşkın, Yüksel (2014). *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları. P. 278.

Also, during this period another left-wing movement started, it will be a much bigger problem in the future for Turkey. Abdullah Öcalan, the divine leader of the present PKK, was detained in 1971 at the Ankara Faculty of Political Sciences while protesting the Kızılder conflict. Öcalan was a fan of THKP-C back then¹⁹⁸. Öcalan was in prison for about a year. When he was released, he started his studies in Ankara Higher Education Student Association. In 1975, Öcalan founded an organization with a group of militants. The organization called itself the Kurdistan Revolutionaries. They were also known as the Apoists¹⁹⁹. Öcalan and his friends decided to settle in Kurdistan and start their revolution. They founded the Kurdistan Workers' Party (in Kurdish Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) in Diyarbakır Lice in 1978. Shortly after the organization was founded, it began to carry out bloody attacks on other left-wing groups, Kurdish groups and landowners. In the 1979 local elections, people close to the PKK entered the election as independent candidates. They won the elections in Diyarbakır and Batman municipalities. In 1979, Edip Solmaz, the mayor of Batman, was killed. The 1977 elections and the murder of Solmaz still have an important place in the collective memory of the Kurdish nationalism. Fear of secessionist terrorism in Turkey began in the late 1970s. Governments during this period doubted that the US or other countries would support such a separatist movement. This topic is one of the most occupied issue Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün's tenure. For example, Süleyman Demirel said, "In the south-east, the Apoists have replaced the State."²⁰⁰

The most intense political violence was experienced in December 1978 in Maraş. A bomb was dropped while the nationalist and Idealist' were gathering to watch movies at cinema. Thereupon, nationalists attacked the homes of Alevi citizens. More than 100 people, some of them children and women, were brutally murdered. Ecevit and Ökçün were on duty at the time of the incident and is considered to be one of the reasons for the 1980 coup.

¹⁹⁸ Özcan, Ali Kemal (2005). *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan*, Routledge. p. 78.

¹⁹⁹ Mango, Andrew (2005). *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone*, Routledge. P.34.

²⁰⁰ Mango, Andrew (2005). *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone*, Routledge. P.34.

3.2.6. Economic Crises

Another burning issue was the economic situation for Turkey in the 1970s. Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s followed import substitution policy²⁰¹. However, since 1971 the economic situation started to deteriorate. With the oil crisis in 1973, the price of oil quadrupled. It affected Turkey a lot because production of it strictly depended on oil. Serious deficit in the balance of payments started to appear. For example, even in the 1974, money spent on oil reached half of all export revenues. In below table, the amount that spent on oil by annual and its proportion to total export and import can be seen²⁰²:

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Oil	155	222	752	806	1106	1436	1396	1712	3862
Total Import	1563	2086	3777	4738	5129	5797	4599	5069	7909
Percentage in Total Import	9, 91	10, 64	19,90	17,01	19,07	24,77	30,35	33,77	48,83
Total Export	884	1317	1532	1401	1960	1753	2288	2261	2910
Percentage in Total Export	17,53	16,85	49,08	57,53	56,42	81,91	61,01	75,71	132,71

By the year 1980, Turkey's exports were just staying even well below the costs of oil. The foreign exchange shortage and deficit in the foreign trade balance affected inflation very badly. In 1971, inflation rose above 10% and gradually increased. In 1977, the momentum

²⁰¹ Keyder, Çağlar (2006) "İktisadi Gelişme ve Bunalım: 1950-1980" p. 316 in Schick, I. C. Tonak, E. A.(2006) *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Belge Yayınları.

²⁰² OECD Economic Surveys March 1981, p. 61-62, OECD Economic Surveys January 1985, p.59-60.

of inflation skyrocketed. In 1980, inflation peaked at 93%. The inflation rate between 1960-1980 can be seen from the table below²⁰³




Figure 5. Inflation in Turkey 1960-1982

As can be seen from the table, inflation has increased significantly between 1977-1980.

After 1974, as a result of the embargoes, US financial aid was cut. The Nationalist Front government tried to solve the problem with short-term foreign borrowing. Demirel statement that "Turkey need even 70 cents" summarizes well the tragedy of this period. In 1977, many products were not imported due to the currency shortage. Apart from petroleum products, products such as sugar, salt, oil, light bulbs and cigarettes became unavailable in the market. Long-term power outages in Istanbul were now commonplace. In the winter of 1979, Istanbul was not even warming up properly.

The Ecevit government felt the burden of the economic crisis very seriously. On the one hand, he held many meetings with the OECD, IMF and World Bank to get a loan. On the other hand, Ecevit, Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, and other ministers such as Hikmet Çetin, Deniz Baykal wanted to improve the economy by traveling country by country including Islamic countries. However, by showing the Cyprus problem the US prevent Turkey to get

²⁰³ World Bank,
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?end=1982&locations=TR&start=1960>
(Access: 11.04.2021)

any loan from international institutions. The US and Western countries on the one hand seemed friendly to Turkey, other hand did not offer any tangible assistance. During this period, Turkey was trying to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union and Non-Aligned movement. We will see these efforts in detail in the next chapter.

According to Zurcher, because JP and RPP failed to establish a coalition during the 1970s, Turkey politics witnessed atomization²⁰⁴. As a result, governments were unable to execute ordinary plans. Because of weak and fragile governments, Turkey experienced political violence and high inflation and finally country and society was paralyzed.

The most important events in Turkish politics in the 1970s were economic crises, political violence. Economic crises increased the search for foreign resources. Relations with Asian-African countries, which started in the 1960s, were tried to be developed. Ministers began to visit many countries and embassies were opened for pursuing economic benefits.

²⁰⁴ Zurcher, Eric Jan (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris. P. 262.

4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING ÖKÇÜN PERIOD

This chapter discusses Turkey's foreign policy in the era of Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün. After a brief introduction of Ökçün, his views as related to foreign policy area and his clash with the Turkish Foreign Ministry are discussed. His role in Turkey's foreign policy making in this volatile period will also be discussed by reference to particular issues towering high during Ökçün's tenure.

4.1. Ökçün at the Helm of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

4.1.1. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün's Profile

Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was born in 1936 in Eskişehir. It has been claimed that Ökçün's grandfather was a “mudarris”-which is highest lecturer in Islamic education- who immigrated from Macedonia²⁰⁵. Ökçün graduated from Ankara University's renowned Faculty of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi or Mülkiye - FPS) in 1958. The foundations of Mülkiye (School of Government) were laid in the Ottoman Empire and it became a faculty with the Republic. At that time, most of the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs graduated from FPS.²⁰⁶

After graduation from Mülkiye, Ökçün began working as an assistant at the Faculty's Institute of Foreign Relations. In 1961, he was sent by government to a seminar called “The

²⁰⁵ Demirci, Mehmet (27.04.2020). Melami Torunu bir Bakan Yeni Asır Gazetesi .

Access: <https://www.yeniasir.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet.demirci/2020/04/27/melami-torunu-bir-bakan>

Gündüz Ökçün to fulfill his grandfather's legacy took his books to the sheikh named Alaaddin Baba in Izmir in 1985. The Sheikh asked why he entered politics. It was claimed that Ökçün said, “I wasted my breath in politics for a while because of the excitement of youth. Politics is a shirt of fire, I wore it without knowing it, but now I took it off. I resigned from RPP and left there. Now my intention is to follow my grandfather's advice, fortunately, I found you. I am very happy right now.”

Demirci, Mehmet (30.04.2020). Ökçün Halveti Dergahında Yeni Asır Gazetesi

Access: <https://www.yeniasir.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet.demirci/2020/04/30/gunduz-okcun-halveti-dergahinda>

Mehmet Demirci later spoke to Gündüz Ökçün's sister, Ülkü Ökçün, and said that he confirmed above claims.
²⁰⁶ For more information, please see: Aydın, Ersel and Mathews Julie (2008). “Periphery Theorising For a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory Out of Anatolia”, *Review of International Studies*, 34, pp. 693–712.

Relations between the Atlantic States and the Developing Countries” organized by NATO²⁰⁷. He was a visiting researcher at the University of London, a position funded by The Rockefeller Foundation in 1962-1964.²⁰⁸ He completed his doctorate in states' private law. He became a faculty member at the FPS and professor in 1974. Ökçün studied on international private law, Turkish economic history and foreign law in Turkey. Interestingly, Ökçün made quotations from Yunus Emre and Mawlana Rumi at the beginning of almost all of his books. For example, he put a quote from Mawlana's Mathnawi at the beginning of his thesis associate professorship: "Knowledge arising from imitation is temporary. But we think that it is our property."²⁰⁹

Ökçün was at one time also a researcher at Columbia University. In 1974/1975, he gave a lecture on "Ottoman Reforms and Political Development" at Columbia University.²¹⁰ While there, he was a student and colleague of J. C. Horowitz. In fact, when Ökçün took office, the US Embassy in Israel wrote a telegram to the Ankara Embassy, stating that it would be very beneficial for the US and Israel to request Horowitz to congratulate Ökçün. Ökçün has written many works, many of which are technically intensive.²¹¹ Ökçün became the dean of the FPS in 1976. It is claimed that he was a member of Association of Solidarity with the People of Vietnam,²¹² (*Vietnam Halkıyla Dayanışma Derneği*) which had been an issue on the agenda of leftist circles in Turkey. He was elected as CHP Eskişehir deputy in 1977 elections. Many of his close friends was surprised by his entering politics.²¹³ While Ökçün was in office, he tried to strengthen the ties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the FPS²¹⁴, where he worked for many years. He tried to benefit from the experience of many

²⁰⁷ Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivi, Yer Bilgisi: 160 - 30 – 5 Belge Tarihi: 03.06.1961-00.00.0000 Access: <https://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Sayfalar/eSatis/BelgeGoster.aspx?ItemId=191012&Hash=976DB0DC0CAAEE72C9E4C6BE59EEE3E2C35407B87C188C4D522D1032ED8FA937A&Mi=0>

²⁰⁸ Ökçün, Ahmet Gündüz(1997). *Devletler Hususi Hukuku'nun Kaynakları ve Kamu Düzeni*, Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu, 2. Baskı. P. VIII.

²⁰⁹ Unat, İlhan (1992). Gündüz Ökçün'ün Ardından, *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*. (The text that Prof. İlhan Unat read at Ökçün's funeral was later transcribed.)

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Some of them are Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu 1909 Belgeler-Yorumlar, İktisat Tarihi Yayınları, Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-İzmir Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar, 1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerde Yabancı Sermaye, Osmanlı Sanayii 1913 1915 Yılları Sanayi İstatistiki, Devletler Hususi Hukuku'nun Kaynakları v Kamu Düzeni, Yabancıların türkiye'de Çalışma Hürriyeti, Trans-Municipal Law, Milletarası Hukuk Yazıları,Tarımda Çalışma ve Ekme Yükümlülüğü 1914-1922 Belgeler.

²¹² Eralp,Yalım (2021) Semi-Structured Interview. However, I have not able to confirm this allegation any other source.

²¹³ Unat, İlhan (1992). Gündüz Ökçün'ün Ardından, *Ankara üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*.

²¹⁴ Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer (1992). Gündüz Ökçün'ün Öğrettikleri ve Düşündürdükleri. *Ankara üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt: 47 Sayı: 01 p.6.

academics in the faculty.²¹⁵ Ökçün's life after ministry was difficult. After the 1980 coup, Ökçün was banned from politics for 10 years. After his political duties, he attempted to return to his faculty as academician.²¹⁶ However, Ankara University administration did not accept his application. He had discussed with many bureaucrats while he was in tenure. Probably Ökçün was disliked and ostracized because of his views. He worked in the office with his lawyer friends. He passed away in 1986.

4.1.2. Ökçün's Conception about Turkish Foreign Policy

Ökçün's conception of Turkish foreign policy provides clues about why Ökçün could have been chosen by Prime Minister Ecevit as foreign minister. In this section, I will look at two important studies of Ökçün on foreign policy that he wrote before became a minister. Moreover, we will examine the relationship of Ökçün's standpoint with Ecevit's foreign policy conception.

Ökçün's first article on the concept of 'national interests' was published before he became foreign minister. According to him, the most fundamental principle of states in foreign policy is national interest.²¹⁷ Moreover, he thinks that national interest consists of two fields: economic interest and national security.²¹⁸ He states that the national security can only be protected by economic power. For this reason, it is possible to say, for Ökçün, that economic power is more crucial than military security. He strongly opposes seeing the national interest in exclusively national -military- security.²¹⁹ According to him, national interest is a phenomenon that transcends and precedes security. He thinks that overreliance on physical security to the detriment and neglect of economic development undermines national interests. As a result, in his own formulation "National interest = national security + economic prosperity + reputation, glory and honor".²²⁰ In this, Ökçün was clearly opposing the narrow conception of Turkey's national interests as 'military/physical security'. In this respect, it is possible to say that Ökçün's foreign policy envisioning is compatible with liberal IR theory's ontology more than realist theories. He cites the contradiction of Morgenthau's

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ekmekçi, Mustafa (1986). Mülâyim-Ökçün-Dikerdem... Cumhuriyet. Access: <https://gazetecimustafaekmekci.com/yazilar/cumhuriyet/mulayim-okcun-dikerdem>

²¹⁷ Ökçün, Ahmet Gündüz (1958). "Dış Politikada Milli Menfaat", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt 13, Sayı 04. Pp. 180-192.

²¹⁸ Ibid. P. 181.

²¹⁹ Ibid. P. 182.

²²⁰ Ibid. P. 183.

morality and foreign policy. He only admits that in some cases morality and foreign policy contradict. However, even in this case, he states that states use moral discourses to legitimize their foreign policies. By this, he claims that morality is ideal and positive for everybody and cooperation among countries is unavoidable.²²¹ For this reason, it is very difficult to distinguish between national interests and moral principles. Considering that, this article was written in 1958, which was seen triumph of classical realism, what Ökçün said about security and morality in foreign policy relationship is quite revolutionary.

Ökçün's above thoughts inevitably have some implications on foreign policy. First of all, he is completely against the military security-centered foreign policy. He attaches great importance to economic power and development. Indeed, the concept of "development" is one of Ökçün's most frequently used concept when he became foreign minister. Ökçün thinks that pure NATO-centric foreign policy is extremely security-oriented. However, this approach does not contribute much to Turkey's economic interests and image. On the contrary, it hinders Turkey's development because although Turkey is in NATO, it is still a developing country. The foreign policy determined by solely NATO-centric does not fully meet Turkey's development needs. Therefore, the NATO-centric approach is not fully compatible with Turkey's national interest. Turkey's national interest lies in development, and it can only be done by strengthening non-Western relations. Therefore, Turkey should strengthen its relations with non-Western countries. For Ökçün, Détente provides an excellent opportunity for Turkey to be able to pursue its true national interests. Naturally, he knew that Turkey's military and economy were heavily dependent on the West. Moreover, he knew that it was not possible for them to change all at once. However, he thought that since the tension and the risk of hot conflict decreased during the detente period, it provided some flexibility to countries like Turkey that wanted to change, less or more, their axis. Even at a young age, where there was no substantial tension between Turkey and NATO, Ökçün had serious ideas about the relationship between security and development. The Johnson letter, the Cyprus crisis and other tensions with the West must have reinforced Ökçün's thoughts. Indeed, when he became the foreign minister, he wanted Turkey to pursue its national interests by taking into consideration its economic development that went beyond linkages with the West.

²²¹ Ibid. P. 189.

Ökçün's second article that is crucial for understanding his conception about foreign policy is about international legal framework determining trial of NATO officers that are on duty in another country. This article is particularly relevant because 'privileges and concessions given to US officers on duty in Turkey under Democrat Party governments' and release without trial of an American officer getting mixed up in a traffic accident in Turkey in the 1950s had been hotly debated after 1960 coup in Turkey. Ökçün's article must be read in this context.

These topics were covered in the 7th article of "North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces".²²² "Concurrent Jurisdiction" has been accepted in these agreements.²²³ According to this principle, where the person will be tried is determined by crimes that is subjected. While the sending state judges some crimes, the receiving state judges other crimes. On the other hand, even if the staff is in NATO, there are laws that US wants to apply to its soldiers. These laws are called "Uniform Code of Justice". Ökçün is uncomfortable with the application of the "Uniform Code of Justice" to NATO soldiers and the excessive flexig of the NATO Treaty in favor of the USA. He claims that almost every crime can fall under the "Uniform Code of Justice" so that U.S. soldiers can never be prosecuted in receiving states²²⁴. As a matter of fact, this is how Ökçün evaluates the case of Vilfirt Kunk and Sergeant Major Arnold.²²⁵ In these two cases, Turkish courts have concluded that these soldiers committed crimes in the performance of their duties and therefore should be tried in their own country. As a result, Ökçün thinks that the principle of that crime in the performance of duty must be investigated by the sending country had been abused in favor of the USA. With this article, he aims to expand authority of Turkey in jurisdiction process in expense of USA.

On the other hand, in order to understand Ökçün's conception about Turkish foreign policy, we have to mention some of Gündüz Ökçün's statements when he was minister to complement this picture of Ökçün's thinking. Shortly after Ökçün became a minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget discussions were held in the parliament. Ökçün gave a

²²² Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 19 Jun. 1951. Access: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17265.htm (Access: 20.09.2021)

²²³ Ökçün, Ahmet Gündüz(1960). NATO Kuvvetler Statüsü Sözleşmesine Göre Cezaî Kaza Salahiyetinin Tesbiti, *Adliye Dergisi*, Yıl 51, Sayı:1. P. 60.

²²⁴ Ibid. p. 66.

²²⁵ Ibid. p. 71.

long speech there. According to him, three things must be done together for the protection of Turkey's national interests in the foreign policy:

“Turkey's national security must be protected. Turkey's economic and social development should be ensured, and Turkish foreign policy should be pursued in a way that protects national rights, economic and social development, as well as foreign security. In other words; security, foreign policy and economic development are inseparable.”²²⁶

By mentioning inseparability of national security and economic development he means that NATO-centric security or armament is not in the national interests of Turkey. Turkey also must ensure its development, probably, via flourishing its political and economic relation with non-Western countries. West or US should not object or prevent this initiative of Turkey. Ökçün and Ecevit was thinking that the West does not tolerate this and even tries to prevent it. For example, while Portugal is both a NATO member and an observer in NAM, Turkey's initiative was trying to be blocked.²²⁷

Ökçün's statement to Norwegian state officials in Norway also perfectly reflects the character of foreign policy he wanted Turkey to follow. According to Norwegian authorities, “Ökçün characterized Turkey's new foreign policy as a policy of the three ds--detente, disarmament, and development. A policy, he said, which was aimed at achieving a more balanced relationship with the East and with the Nonaligned world and which would also foster Turkish internal development.”²²⁸

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Ökçün thought any differently on these issues than PM Ecevit in this cabinet. After all, it was Ecevit who brought Ökçün to office. There were strong parallels between Ökçün and Ecevit's thinking in these respects. How Ecevit succeeded in the transformation in RPP since the second half of the 1960s was discussed previously. Ecevit also transformed the RPP's foreign policy attitude. After İnönü Johnson's letter, he gradually returned to the classical Republican foreign policy of “neutrality”. He opposed some of Çağlayangil's statements that affirmed the US' Middle East policies. According to İnönü, there was no need to be friends or enemies with countries. For him, neutrality was the most important principle. Ecevit, on the other hand, adopted a more proactive foreign policy. According to him, “Turkey has fallen into a very disadvantageous

²²⁶ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem:5, Toplantı:1, Birleşim:114, Oturum:2, 1978, C.3, s.662.

²²⁷Visit To Norway of Turkish Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün, July 19-22, OSLO 03593, 27 July 1978.

²²⁸ Ibid.

position”²²⁹ by relying heavily on NATO. Turkey seems had forgotten its historical and geographical realities and should be given more importance to them. He brings a new definition of Turkey's position in international system:

“Historically and geographic ally Turkey is primarily a Balkan, Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean country. This certainly does not exclude the fact that Turkey is also a member of the community of Europe, but our starting point is the Balkan area, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.”²³⁰

According to him, mutual confidence should be established beyond good relations with neighbor countries and this is a safer environment than armament.²³¹ This principle requires stronger political and economic ties with neighbor countries, especially with Middle East and Balkan countries, rather than NATO-centric armament. These statements currently can be considered a cliché. However, for that period (1978) this definition was quite a revolutionary conception. Many Turkish Foreign Policy scholars think that this foreign policy understanding in Turkey emerged in the 1990s, when İsmail Cem would become Turkey's Foreign Minister, again in a government led by Bülent Ecevit.. However, Ecevit had expressed this conception much earlier. When Ecevit had become prime minister in 1973, he and his coalition partner NSP clearly expressed his foreign policy approach in the program. "Good relations with countries that has historical, traditional and spiritual ties" with Turkey and "a special proximity to countries that have just attained or are trying to gain their independence"²³² were the priorities of the government. Turan Güneş, the foreign minister of this government, has also openly expressed the sensitivities of this Turkey. Turan Güneş, the foreign minister of this government, also openly stated these notions about Turkish foreign policy of the time. He told Guardian reporter that NATO was insufficient for Turkey's security, and “Turkey's geographical, historical, and cultural position made it imperative to have closer ties with Middle East, Asian and African countries.”²³³ Moreover, he also said that Turkey thinking to lift the opium ban, make investments in the domestic weapons industry independent of NATO, and increase Turkey's control over military bases. It is accepted that after the arms embargo after Cyprus Operation, Turkey's attitude towards

²²⁹ Ecevit, Bülent (1978), “Turkey's Security Policies”, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*. P. 203.

²³⁰ Ibid. P. 205.

²³¹ Ibid. P. 206.

²³² Balcı, Ali (2015). *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, 2. Baskı, Etkileşim Yayınları. P.134.

²³³ Guardian Interview With New Turkish Foreign Minister, ANKARA 0915, 6 February 1974.

NATO and military bases suddenly became tougher. However, this telegram shows that even before the embargo was imposed, Turkey's relations with the USA and NATO began to be questioned.

Ecevit openly expressed his views on Turkey's foreign policy on 28 June 1977 where he delivered his government program after election. Turkey should not rely too much on other countries for defense, which its importance had increased after imposing embargo.²³⁴ Turkey must adopt kind of national defense for own needs and potential. Ecevit was thinking that could be ensured by following a foreign policy compatible with Turkey's realities. "Turkey, which, from the viewpoint of history and geography, is a Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, and Balkan country, must appraise this fact as a lasting element while expanding and developing its relations and defining its place in the world....".²³⁵

The notion of "expanding and developing its relations and defining its place in the world" and Ökçün's notion of development and a foreign policy suitable for glory, fame and reputation for the sake of national interest of a country are in serious harmony with each other. In other words, there is a serious overlap between Ecevit's criticism of Turkey's heavily reliance on NATO and Turkey's weak relations with neighboring countries and Ökçün's idea that Turkey must prioritize development more than NATO-centric armament for its national interests. This clearly shows why Ecevit wants to work with Ökçün and ideational affinity between them. Probably because of this harmony, Ecevit wanted to work with Ökçün.

Indeed, there is other evidence confirming this. For example, Temel İskit, who was appointed as a senior officer at that time, says that Ökçün was in a group that gave advice to Ecevit on foreign policy before he became a minister²³⁶. In addition, İldeniz Divanlıoğlu underlines how identical Ökçün's views with Ecevit was and how Ökçün operated as part of his government.²³⁷ However, US Ambassador Ronald Spiers claimed that there is very crucial differences between Ökçün and Ecevit and others. He put forwarded that Ecevit and many others "pursue Turkish interests wherever they lay"²³⁸ and they are not against West or NATO. However, case is different for Ökçün. According to him, "While those favoring a "multi-faceted" foreign policy are not necessarily Anti-West, there is a strong streak of such

²³⁴ Foreign Policy Section Of New Turkish Government's Program, ANKARA 04963, 30 June 1977.

²³⁵ Ibid. 4.

²³⁶ İskit, Temel (2021) Semi-Structured Interview.

²³⁷ Divanlıoğlu, İldeniz (2007). *Emekli Büyükelçi Horoz gibi Ötünce*, Doğan Kitap. P. 88.

²³⁸ Turkey and the Arab World: An Overview, ANKARA 2397, 26 March 1979.

sentiments, especially in the personality of its most voluble proponent--fonmin Gündüz Ökçün".²³⁹ Indeed, he claimed that the idea that Ökçün is more anti-Western seems reasonable, as will be shown in the interviews and records of speeches of him in below. Yalım Eralp, who played an important role in relations with the West in this period, argues similar argument. He claims that Ökçün is not someone who has minor problems with NATO, but is very hostile to the West. He tells an anecdote about it. When Ökçün was in India in June 1978, he was is reading the official text in during his official meetings with the authorities. However, he tells the Indian authorities that Turkey wants to leave NATO completely during the tea hours that are not recorded²⁴⁰. Eralp alleges that Ökçün had made the foreign staff swear not to tell anyone about this, which he heard from staff in India and the United Kingdom.

However, it is not possible to say that anti-Western foreign policy was pursued during the Ökçün term or a policy that would completely break with the West. Besides it was not realistic because Turkey dependence on West by military and economical aspect. Turkey did not just consent to the unconditional Western alliance as before. It had been sought how to cooperate with Non-Western countries and regions that have been ignored for many years. Ecevit himself stated that Turkey do not have a clear Western or anti-Western foreign policy.²⁴¹

Lastly, there was heterogeneity within the RPP. Spiers classified RPP's senior figures after his interviews, and claimed that there were three different factions within the party.²⁴² The first faction is the mainstream, led by Ali Topuz. This movement was the group most supported by the public and had a "social democrat" line. Second faction and was close to the radical left line and Deniz Baykal was the leader of the faction. The leader of the last faction was Minister of Education Necdet Uğur. As a Third Worldist, there were important names in this faction. Ökçün, RPP Secretary General Mustafa Üstündağ, Uğur Alacakaptan, Minister of Interior İrfan Özyaydın and Minister of Enterprises Kenan Bulutoğlu were prominent figures. This faction ruled the cabinet. They did not have as much social base as the first two factions.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Eralp, Yalım (2021) Semi-Structured Interview.

²⁴¹ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem:5, Toplantı:2, Birleşim:60, Oturum:4, 1979, C.10, s.713.

Opposition parties considered this as instability and criticized the government in the parliament.

²⁴² Unrest in the Republican People's Party, ANKARA 9004, 18 December 1978.

4.1.3. Resistance of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ökçün

After 1977 elections, Ecevit established the 40th Government. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün entered the parliament for the first time as Eskişehir deputy and became foreign minister in the cabinet. However, this government could not take office because it did not get a vote of confidence. Thereupon, Demirel allied with the NSP and NAP to form the Second Nationalist Front government. This government was able to stay in power for only 5 months and Ecevit formed the 42nd Government. Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün was the foreign minister in this cabinet. It is striking that Ökçün as novice in politics was chosen as the foreign minister, while there are many experienced MPs in the cabinet and parliament. For example, Ecevit's experienced former foreign minister was shown as a minister in the 40th government, but not in the 42nd government. Ecevit's decision for Ökçün, instead of Turan Güneş, shows that Ecevit attaches great importance to Ökçün's stance in foreign policy. Probably because Ecevit wanted to implement a risk-taking foreign policy against the West, he was looking for a foreign minister to carry out this agenda. It was difficult for this person to be from within MFA because the traditional codes of the institution were rather Western-centric and status-quo oriented. On the other hand, interestingly, Yalım Eralp, who had worked in MFA long time, told that since Ecevit did not graduate from university, he was interested in the professor label, so Ökçün may have been chosen.²⁴³ According to Temel İskit, who were active top-rank bureaucrat in those days, Ecevit had a team in Ankara with which he consulted on foreign affairs for a long time, and Ökçün was in this team.²⁴⁴

When Gündüz Ökçün took office, he faced with serious tensions with foreign ministry personnel. He made assignments and changes in cadres within the ministry according to his agenda. It seems he did not follow traditional appointment protocols. Before Ökçün took office, there was a team in the ministry under the leadership of Temel İskit and Gündüz Aktan, advocating that Turkey should strengthen its relations with the third world. There were many officials those who were angry at Ökçün's appointment of these officers and young officers to higher positions. This change and the tension of the minister-staff was very palpable. For example, Taner Baytok says:

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs technocrat staff is the least affected by political changes in government. When Bülent Ecevit became the prime minister and Gündüz Ökçün

²⁴³ Eralp, Yalım (2021) Semi-Structured Interview.

²⁴⁴ İskit, Temel (2021) Semi-Structured Interview.

began to serve as the foreign minister, a radical change of staff was introduced in our ministry. A veritable reform cadre was formed with predominantly left-leaning diplomats.”²⁴⁵

However, names such as Yaman Başkut, who are labeled as leftists, claim that they were defamed. He states that they have no such intentions, they just want to use the possibilities of NİEO²⁴⁶. However, many people report that Ökçün changes the positions of bureaucrats very easily and does not care at any ministry practices. For example, Ayhan Kamel rises quickly in job²⁴⁷. As another example, Ökçün appoints İldeniz Divanlıoğlu as the General Director of Information in the ministry. When İldeniz does something small that will make Ecevit uncomfortable, he is quickly sent on a very simple position by Ökçün²⁴⁸. İldeniz tells Ökçün that the ministry should not be so affected by political debates. Another bureaucrat, Kemal Girgin, also raises the same notion. Girgin stated that Ökçün appointed his relatively young friends, mostly from the Faculty of Political Sciences, to all high-positions, while he appointed senior bureaucrats to low-positions.²⁴⁹ Girgin also states that the next minister, Erkmen, appointed this staff to low-positions and that these two groups called each other "mafia".²⁵⁰

It is seen that Ökçün was not widely accepted by the diplomats MFA. He and Ecevit used a discourse that would offend Western countries. Especially pro-Western diplomats in the ministry were brought to passive posts. Coşkun Kırca and İlter Türkmen, who are known to be pro-NATO, were also pacified.²⁵¹ Especially, pro-Western diplomats seem to have had serious tension with Ökçün. Eralp was a mid-range bureaucrat at the time. He says that Ökçün always called him “traitor”, probably, because of his pro-Western orientation²⁵². Moreover, he claimed that Ökçün is written essays devoted to Mümtaz Soysal, close friend of Ökçün’s, for discrediting Yalım Eralp and Şükrü Elekdağ, who were pro-NATO and pro-Western in that time. He says that there is a polarization within the ministry and that people

²⁴⁵ Baytok, Taner(2005). *Dış Politikada bir Nefes*, Remzi Kitabevi. P.248.

²⁴⁶ Başkut, Yaman (2004). *Aferin İyiydin...*, İnkılap Yayınları, p. 46.

²⁴⁷ Kamel, Ayhan (2008). *Gerçek Dost Pakistan*, Aşina Kitaplar. P. 11.

²⁴⁸ Divanlıoğlu, İldeniz (2007). *Emekli Büyükelçi Horoz gibi Ötünce*, Doğan Kitap. P. 88.

²⁴⁹ Girgin, Kemal (1998). *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı*, Milliyet Yayınları, p.197.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Eralp, Yalım(2017). *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı*, Doğan Kitap. P.46

²⁵² Ibid.

close to the leftist or Non-Aligned movement are placed in high positions in the ministry. According to him, Ökçün is the worst foreign minister of Turkey.²⁵³

On the other hand, it is seen in many documents that foreign affairs personnel criticize or belittle Ökçün's actions when they talked with US embassy officials. For example, Robert Sherwood Dillon sent a long telegram in which he examines Turkey-NAM relations after Ökçün visit to India. In the telegram, Dillon says that the Turkish foreign ministry staff had said that the NIEO is not so important to Turkey as to be exaggerated, but its relations with the OECD are important.²⁵⁴ As a second example, in a meeting in Norway, another Turkish foreign affairs staff said that NAM was not as important to Ecevit as Ökçün. He implied that do not take too seriously what Ökçün say about NAM.

During this period, many bureaucrats, especially Ökçün, visited many countries. Due to the currency crisis and the fear of being alone in the international community, many visits were made to the West, the Soviets, Islamic countries or Non-Aligned countries. In the rest of this chapter, we will examine Turkey's international relations under three parts. We will examine the relations between Turkey and the West in the first part, Turkey-Islamic countries relations in the second part, and the relations between Turkey and the Non-Aligned movement in the third part.

4.1.4. Ökçün's Guarded Discourse vis-à-vis the West

Ökçün had a discourse that would disturb the West even after the embargo was lifted. He was particularly anti-Western on issues such as Iran, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. Even after the embargo was lifted, there was an anti-US atmosphere in Turkey. There was always news against the USA in the media. There was an interesting discussion in this context. The second secretary of the US Embassy, Robert Alexander Peck, visited Amasya and Çorum in 1979. Where Peck went, he met with top-rank people in cities, including the governor and the mayor. Allegedly, Peck was collecting information on the Alawite-Sunni divide in these cities. Allegedly, Amasya mayor Gündüz Türen called for interior minister Hasan Güneş.

²⁵³ İskit, Temel (2021) Semi-Structured Interview.

²⁵⁴ Turkish Approach to Non-Aligned Movement, ANKARA 5296, 21 July 1978.

He said that Robert Alexander Peck had asked weird questions, which are about ethnic and religious, which were as cause for political violence in society, to people in the city.²⁵⁵

Thereupon, Hasan Güneş called the governor of Amasya, Aydemir Ceylan. He claimed that Peck had asked similar questions to him. This issue received serious coverage in the media. It is widely said that Peck provoked the Alawite-Sunni or leftist-rightist conflict. Hasan Güneş told the press that Peck provoked and conflicts began wherever he went. The US Embassy is extremely disturbed by such news. Spiers expressed his disturbance to Ökçün on February 16. He said the Turkish government should publicly deny these allegations that had presented in the media. Ökçün did not accept his request and said it would be more appropriate for Peck to leave Turkey.²⁵⁶ On February 20, the Financial Times newspaper publicizes the details of this meeting.²⁵⁷ On March 21, Cetin Uygur, head of Dev Maden-Sen, affiliated with DISK, claimed that "fascist" attacks increased after Peck met for the second time in Amasya Suluova. For this reason, he said that there is cooperation between US imperialism and fascist forces²⁵⁸. Spiers was thinking that such news will seriously damage Turkey-US relations and demanded Washington to meet with Esenbel and said that there is an outrage from these allegations. On the other hand, Spiers wrote to Ecevit, demanding that he must refute "false allegations"²⁵⁹. Indeed, violence against Allawi's took place in Amasya and Maraş shortly after Peck's visit. On the other hand, attacks to US soldiers and diplomats keep continue in Turkey. In April, two US soldiers were attacked in İzmir Çakmaklı, one of them was killed.²⁶⁰

It was not only at home that Ökçün openly clashed with western allies and perspectives but also abroad. For instance, in his meetings during this visit to Madrid in 1979, Ökçün praised Ayatollah Khomeini in these meetings.²⁶¹ Then Ökçün attended the NATO ministerial meeting on 30-31 May 1979. Articulated "urgency of the Turkish situation had

²⁵⁵ Can, Celalettin, Maraş, Maraş olalı böyle bir zulüm görmedi!.. 22 December 2020. Access: <https://www.indyturk.com/node/289021/t%C3%BCrki%C3%87yeden-sesler/mara%C5%9F-mara%C5%9F-olal%C4%B1-b%C3%B6yle-bir-zul%C3%BCm-g%C3%B6rmedi>
Üstel, Aziz. Amasya'da Bir CIA Ajanı, 13 February 2017 Access: <https://www.star.com.tr/yazar/amasyada-bir-cia-ajani-yazi-1185842/>

²⁵⁶ Controversy over Embassy Travel: Amb's Demarche to Foreign Minister, ANKARA 1411, 16 February 1979.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Union Official Accuses Emboff Peck, ANKARA 2342, 22 March 1979.

²⁵⁹ Peck Affair, ANKARA 2104, 14 March 1979.

²⁶⁰ Izmir Attack on U.S. Servicemen, ANKARA 2953, 16 April 1979.

²⁶¹ Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, MADRID 06819, 21 May 1979.

not been taken fully into account.”²⁶² He said that Turkey's military equipment should be modernized along with economic aid. He also voiced the need to strengthen the North-South dialogue. Namibia's war of independence and the Middle East were discussed at the meeting. Ökçün said that the UK and UN should accept the independence of Namibia. On the other hand, he said that the Palestinians should establish their own state. He told that Camp David Accords “does not adequately deal with the evacuation of territory and the recognition of rights for the Palestinians.”²⁶³

Ökçün clearly defended the Iranian revolution at this meeting. He claimed that NATO and the West should pay attention to three notions in their Iran policy. No interference from outside, territorial integrity of Iran, stability and unity of Iran should be protected. Maybe he was worried about the possibility of intervening in Turkey because of Kurdism if the West intervened in Iran. Interestingly he advocated that Marxists in Iran tries to weaken central authority and allied countries must support Iran for dealing with its problem. Although the RRP is a leftist party, it is surprising that it supports the "Islamist" side rather than the Marxist groups.

After the meeting, Ökçün met with Vance. Ökçün said that despite the continuous promises made by the USA, they did not provide any assistance. Iran and Israel were also spoken. Ökçün said that no country should intervene in Iran.²⁶⁴

4.2. Turkey-West Relations

When Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün took office, Turkey tried to make a serious change in its foreign policy by taking risks as never before. We will examine the Turkey-West relations under three sections. The first is the lifting of arms and political embargoes, and financial assistance from organizations such as the IMF and OECD. The second is Turkey's concern that the West supports the separatist Kurdish movements. The third is Turkey-Soviet relations.

²⁶² Natomin: Conclusion of May 310-31 NAC Ministerial Meeting, SECTO 4109, 31 May 1979.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ NAC Ministerial: Secretary Vance's Bilateral With Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün, SECTO 4118, 1 June 1979

4.2.1. Embargo and Cyprus Issue

During this period, one of the problems that occupied Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün and his friends the most was the arms embargo imposed by the USA, financial aid from abroad and a defense cooperation agreement with the USA.

After the Second World War, Turkey's foreign policy has been US-NATO oriented. With the Truman doctrine and Marshall Aid, Turkey-US relations have been strengthened. After Turkey sent troops to the Korean War, Turkey joined NATO in 1952. U.S.-Turkish relations were thought to be mutually beneficial. The United States had prevented the Soviets from going further south and had acquired important military bases in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey, on the other hand, was protected himself from the Soviet threat and received important military-economic aid. In 1969, the Turkish-American Joint Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was signed between Turkey and the USA²⁶⁵.

By DCA, the US obtained rights to use military bases in Turkey. However, after the 1974 Cyprus Operation, US-Turkish relations deteriorated rapidly. Relations had soured earlier because of the Saturn Missiles and the Johnson letter. Nevertheless, after 1974, relations de facto deteriorated. The United States began to impose a military embargo against Turkey. Thereupon, Turkey declared that it abolished DCA in 1975 and took control of all military bases used by the USA, except for Incirlik Air Base. This was the legacy left to Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün. The US wanted to use military bases in Turkey again. Turkey, on the other hand, wanted a new security agreement to be signed and the arms embargo to be lifted. This issue has occupied the 42nd Government from beginning to end.

As soon as the Ecevit government took office on January 5, 1978, the US Cyprus ambassador William Rex Crawford Jr. met with Turkey Nicosia ambassador Candemir Onhon and asked the position of Ökçün and the new cabinet on the Cyprus issue²⁶⁶. Onhon states that he will inform when he finds out about it. Shortly after that, UN Secretary Kurt Waldheim visited Turkey. Both Ecevit and Waldheim say that the visit was very positive. Ecevit and Ökçün stated that they wanted to find solutions to problems including Cyprus. The US and Greece met this with optimism.²⁶⁷ Spiers met with Ecevit privately on January 10 and asked details of Waldheim meetings. He told that “President, Secretary Vance, Clark

²⁶⁵ Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 697.

²⁶⁶ Cyprus Missing Persons, NICOSIA 0042, 5 January 1978.

²⁶⁷ CIA, 19 January 1978, CIA-RDP79T00912A001900010002-6.

Clifford and others in Washington are determined to restore a strong US-Turkish relationship.”²⁶⁸

Before this meeting, Ecevit had said that other countries should not interfere in the Cyprus Issue. Spiers asked what that means. Ecevit said that this statement is not intended to exclude the USA. He stated that Turkey wants to solve the Cyprus problem as soon as possible. However, he claimed that the fact that the USA sees Turkey-US relations intertwined with the Cyprus Issue makes the problem difficult, and that Turkey-US relations should be developed independently of the issue. Ecevit spoke a little more frankly, saying that Turkey-Greece relations will be better when superpowers “occupy” other places. He cited the periods of Atatürk and Menderes as an example. Spiers articulated that President Carter attaches great importance to restoring US-Turkish relations, but Congress sees the Cyprus issue as a factor in Turkish relations. In the telegram, Spiers wrote to Washington, he finds Ecevit's appointment positive and said “His interest in starting momentum going towards a settlement strikingly coincides with our own, and I think there are clear advantages to finding ways of adapting to and encouraging his initiative.”²⁶⁹

In fact, these two arguments have been repeated over and over during this period. Turkey has always demanded that the Cyprus Issue must be evaluated independently of the Turkey-US relations. The US administration verbally accepted this, but de facto expected Turkey to settle the Cyprus Issue first. The settlement of the problem was a solution that Greece would agree to. Shortly after being elected, Ecevit stated that he wanted to end Turkey's international problems. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis stated that he is ready for a possible solution.

On January 20, a high-level visit from the USA took place. US Secretary of State Cyprus Vance also visited Turkey during her visit to the Middle East. The Turkish press attributed great importance to Vance's visit and followed it closely. TRT conveys Vance's speech in Jerusalem that “Aim of trip is to accelerate process of finding peaceful solution to Cyprus quest.”²⁷⁰

Vance, when he arrived at the Esenboğa airport, said that the purpose of his visit is “To understand better the police of the new Turkish government....to discuss the general

²⁶⁸ US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 0212, 10 January 1978.

²⁶⁹ US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 0292, 12 January 1978.

²⁷⁰ Turkish Media Coverage of Secretary's Visit to Ankara, ANKARA 0425, 18 January 1978.

situation in the eastern Mediterranean”²⁷¹ He reiterated that the USA has no plan for Cyprus and emphasized that democratic regimes should cooperate more with each other. He also praised Ecevit and Karamanlis' requests to meet for a solution.

In press statement after Vance Ökçün told that “Mr. Vance is a very famous statesman in the international field, and he is known as a troubleshooter no. 1 in international affairs.”²⁷² However, Vance politely said that he does not have enough time to deal with the Cyprus Issue. Moreover, he said that the Cyprus problem should be resolved between the parties and that foreign or great powers should not interfere with it. Turkey also did not want anyone other than the United Kingdom, which was a signatory to the guarantor agreement, to be involved in this issue. Turkey representatives has stated that many times.

When Vance came to Turkey, about 300 leftist students burned the American flag in Ankara and announced that Vance would give “orders” to Turkey regarding Cyprus.²⁷³

The American Press gave wide coverage to Vance's visit. The Washington Post wrote that Ökçün bluntly warned that no countries should intervene in the Cyprus issue. In addition, the newspaper wrote, “Both allied and Turkish sources seem to feel that if breakthrough is not made soon on either arms embargo on Cyprus, the “glow” and opportunities of new Ecevit government will fade.”²⁷⁴

Ecevit and Ökçün stated that they intend to solve the problem in this way, but they have some demands. Westerners thought that an opportunity arose in their relations with Turkey and that the problem would get worse if they did not take advantage of it.

4.2.1.1. Cyprus Issue in Bilateral Diplomatic Visits (February-March 1978)

Most of the negotiations with the West in this period were on Cyprus Issue. Specially, US officials stated in all visits that the arms embargo could be lifted after Turkey made some changes in Cyprus. On February 2, Hamit Batu, MFA deputy secretary general for international security affiliations, called Spiers and asked how to improve Turkey-US relations. Especially what can be done on the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was

²⁷¹ Announcement Of Ankara Visit, STATE 011774 TOSEC 010014, 17 January 1978.

²⁷² Transcript Of Statement By Got Fonmin Gündüz Ökçün Secretary Vance To Ankara, ANKARA 0551, 20 January 1978.

²⁷³ Morning Travelling Press Summary, STATE 017247 TOSEC 010148, 21 January 1978.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

discussed. Batu says that Ecevit thinks that a possible DCA should focus less on the military aspect and more on the democratic culture of the two countries. Spiers confirms this, stating that the common interests of the two countries are built on democracy.²⁷⁵

Afterward, at the beginning of February, Turkey US Ambassador Esenbel invited Matthew Nimetz to Turkey. Vance thinks the meeting will be good, but he has some drawbacks. He suspects that Ecevit may appear as flexible on Cyprus to ensuring lift of the arms embargo but not open military bases.²⁷⁶ He demands that credible answers be prepared for those in Washington who have similar questions.

The initial stance of the 42nd government seems to have given confidence to the international community. At the beginning of February, Germany provided a loan to the worth of 130 million German mark to Turkey. Between 8-10 February, the Norwegian Foreign Minister visited Ankara. Commercial, economic, and technical agreements were signed between Turkey and Norway. Moreover, it was announced that Turkey's debts to Norway were canceled²⁷⁷. The Norwegian Foreign Minister said that Turkey's stance on Cyprus is positive and that he hopes the problem will be resolved after the Ecevit-Karamanlis vis-à-vis meeting.

However, although the government adopted a flexible attitude, it did not seem to accept every demand. In 1978, during the budget negotiations in the parliament, Ökçün criticized the movements of Greece in the Aegean Sea. Greece was armed on some islands, trying to control Aegean airspace and to increase its territorial waters from six kilometers to 12 kilometers. He told "Greece was trying to "choke the country by encircling Turkey from the west and blocking its access to the Mediterranean Sea."²⁷⁸ Upon his statements, Greek foreign minister said, "Daily statements by Turkish officials do not facilitate the creation of a mild political climate which is essential for the conduct of a dialogue."²⁷⁹

After Ecevit took office, he constantly called to the United States and stated that he was waiting for a senior executive to come to Ankara. In the middle of February, Counselor

²⁷⁵ Follow-Up to Secretary's Visit, ANKARA 909, 3 February 1978.

²⁷⁶ Follow-Up On Secretary's Visit To Ankara, STATE 027451, 2 February 1978.

²⁷⁷ Norwegian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey, ANKARA 01253, 16 February 1978.

²⁷⁸ Papaligouras Takes Issue With Reported Statements By Turkish Foreign Minister, ATHENS 1349, 14 February 1978.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

Nimetz visited Ankara. At this meeting, it was discussed how the US-Turkey relations could be revived and the embargo lifted by the congress.²⁸⁰

Compared to the US, Ecevit's relations with Europe were better. Good relations have been established, especially with leftist parties in Europe. On February 20, a socialist group from the European parliament visited Ecevit and conveyed a special message from Social Democratic Party leader Willy Brandt.²⁸¹

Ökçün and Ecevit always doubted why although Carter wanted to lift the embargo and sign a new security agreement, this could not be done. Many times, they thought that what Carter said and what he did differ. Ökçün invited Spiers for a meeting on 8 March. Ökçün said they knew that some congressman in the US had sent Spiers a letter stating that it was a good time to lift the embargo²⁸². Congressman Hamilton told US ambassador Esenbel that it was the Carter administration, not the senate that caused the delay in the embargo being lifted²⁸³. Ökçün stated that Carter did not take the necessary decision and therefore he had serious doubts about the US administration. Ökçün spoke more frankly and said that Turkey needs DCA less than the United States: "We cannot be more concerned with the DCA than the U.S. if the U.S. considers it negligible with the context of the global strategy of the U.S."²⁸⁴ Since the Turkish representatives had rested many times as above, the US officials had no doubt about Turkey's intentions.

4.2.1.2. The Breaking Point for US-Turkey Relations: Zablocki Letter and the Montreux Summit (March 1978)

Ecevit-Karamanlis meeting was planned in Montreux. In the USA, the Greek lobbies were working intensively. Karamanlis, on the other hand, had a meeting with Ecevit and suggested not to make statements to the journalists so that the meeting would not be affected. Although Ecevit made only positive comments, Karamanlis made negative comments to media. Ecevit was very angry at Karamanlis' negative statements. He said that because of US support to Greece, the Greek side played hard. For this reason, he said that if the embargo

²⁸⁰ Foreign Ministry Statement on Nimetz Visit, ANKARA 1444, 24 February 1978.

²⁸¹ Press Reports Nimetz, Jalloud, Other High Level Visits, ANKARA 1346, 21 February 1978.

²⁸² Personal Message from Prime Minister Ecevit Urging Decision on DCA, ANKARA 1760, 8 March 1978. Message for Prime Minister Ecevit, STATE 060401, 9 March 1978.

²⁸³ US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 1850, 11 March 1978.

²⁸⁴ Personal Message from Prime Minister Ecevit Urging Decision on DCA, ANKARA 1760, 8 March 1978.

is lifted and DCA is signed, Greece would be more conciliatory in the talking. Turkey was expecting a public statement that the embargo would be lifted or the DCA would be signed before Ecevit-Karamanlis summit at Montreux. Accordingly, the US encouraged Greece and acted differently from what they officially said. While the US representatives said that, they did not make a linkage against Turkey on DCA and Cyprus, their behavior was the opposite. For signing new DCA, they were waiting for the resolution of Cyprus Issue. This meant that Turkey had to make some concessions to Greece. Nevertheless, by relying on US implicit support, Greece was playing hard. Turkey has always been suspicious because it knows this attitude of the US.

Spiers quickly relayed Ökçün's request to Vance in Washington. Vance quickly wrote a letter to Ecevit. Spiers read the letter to Ökçün the next day. Vance stated in his letter that no public statement would be made stating that the embargo would be lifted or the DCA would be signed²⁸⁵. In the letter, it is said "US will maintain a "constant low-key support position." Ökçün expressed his suspicion and disappointment about U.S position.

On March 10-11, Ecevit and Karamanlis met in Montreux. The meeting went very badly. On the night of March 10, Ökçün requested an urgent meeting with Spiers. At the meeting the next day, Ökçün said that Ecevit was calling him and that he should send a strong protest to the United States on behalf of the Turkish state²⁸⁶. In a letter he wrote to Washington after this meeting, Spiers suggested that Turkey was really angry and suggested that Vance or Nimetz should meet with Esenbel as soon as possible and relieve Turkey regarding DCA and the Eastern Mediterranean²⁸⁷. Speaking to journalists in Montreux on March 11, Ecevit said Vance's statements made it necessary to reconsider US-Turkey relations²⁸⁸. Ecevit was referring to Vance's reply to Zablocki's letter. This letter greatly affected Turkey's stance. Members of the house international relations committee sent letter to Vance about relation of Turkey and the U.S. in 14th February. It is revealed at 8 March. While answering that Vance made linkage between not only with DCA and Cyprus but also between DCA and Montreux meeting.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁵ Delivery of Secretary's Oral Message to Prime Minister, ANKARA 1807, 9 March.

²⁸⁶ US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 1850, 11 March 1978.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Got Announces Demarch On Secretary's Statement; Ecevit Says Us-Turkish Relations To Be Reviewed, ANKARA 1852, 11 March 1978.

²⁸⁹ Turkish-American Relations: Javits-Ecevit Conversation, ANKARA 2249, 24 March 1978.

This crisis was the second major crisis after the human rights report. After this meeting, Turkey hardened its policy. Turkey proclaimed the New Concept of National Defense and declared that the main threat to Turkey comes from Greece²⁹⁰. After Ecevit's statement, Spiers wrote that newspapers in Turkey give great support to Ecevit. One of high level of MFA official told Mehmet Ali Birand that "The coming months will be critical for Turkish foreign policy."²⁹¹ Spiers is disturbed by the intensification of anti-American atmosphere in Turkey. On March 14, he had a meeting with Şükrü Elekdağ. He articulated that Ecevit's "overreaction" attitude greatly strengthened the anti-American tendency in Turkey²⁹². He states that an American will be very scared if he sees the last two daily newspapers written in Turkey. Elekdağ says that from Vance's reply to Zablocki's letter, it is clear that the United States does not take a position in favor of Turkey and that Ecevit's reaction is natural. Spiers writes in his telegram his concern "... that the lesson the Turks will take from this episode is that the best way to deal with Americans is to play tough."²⁹³

On March 17, Spiers informed Nazif Cuhruk, deputy secretary general economic affairs MFA, that Vance had talks with McNamara about Turkey. McNamara stated that he would met with the IMF and that they would help Turkey.²⁹⁴ After the Ecevit-Karamanlis meeting, Turkey-US relations reached it's worst point. However, within a short time, the US sent delegations to Turkey one after another and accepted many offers from Turkey to improve relations. Firstly, Jacob K. Javits, member of senate foreign relations committee, visited Turkey on 24-25 March. The purpose of the visit was "to discuss prospects for alleviation of Greek-Turkish differences and improvement of bilateral relations with US"²⁹⁵

During this visit, Javits had meetings with Ökçün and Ecevit. Javits reiterated to Ökcun that both Ford and Carter wanted to ratify DCA, but Congress was causing trouble. However, he assured that in this spring the administration would insist for DCA on congress²⁹⁶. He appraised key alliance of Turkey but "Turkey was critical to the free world and it was time to get things back on the track."²⁹⁷ Javits told, "DCA was good because it was a reciprocal." However, Ökçün objected it by mentioning Turkey had no military bases in the U.S. In fact,

²⁹⁰ Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 697.

²⁹¹ Turkish Press On Strains In Us-Turkish Relations, MARCH 14, ANKARA 1933, 14 March 1978.

²⁹² Us-Turkish Relations-Conversation with Elekdağ, ANKARA 1956, 15 March 1978.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 2051, 17 March 1978.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Turkish-American Relations: Javits-Ecevit Conversation, ANKARA 2249, 24 March 1978.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

the Turkish elite used to think that DCA was reciprocal. Because while America was using Turkey's military bases, Turkey was being protected against the USSR and was receiving military support from the United States. Now, with the negative atmosphere in relations, even old acceptances were being questioned.

Ecevit told Javits that the US had claimed that they do not make a linkage between Cyprus and DCA, but Vance's reply to Zablocki's letter proved otherwise. He says that Greece knew the reality thanks to the strong Greek lobby in America, and that is why they play hard in Montreux²⁹⁸. Javits first conveyed Carter's sincere greeting and letter to Ecevit. He then told that had not meet with Vance, but that there was a misunderstanding. He claimed that Vance is a friend of Turkey and was talking about the past, stating the reason for the embargo. Javits argued that as soon as he returns to the USA, he will meet with the president to approve the DCA and will do what is necessary. In addition, Ecevit expressed that the old version of DCA focused only on military issues and ignored economic issues.

Javits' visit, naturally, received wide media coverage. Some newspapers said that Javits was the leader of the Jewish lobby and found it positive that he came to Ankara²⁹⁹. Others claimed that they came to warn Turkey due to its recent reactions. The US wanted to improve its relation with Turkey after Javits visit. A few days later, on March 29, a large team from America came to the meeting. The team included Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, Counselor Nimetz, assistant secretary (eur) Vest, Eur/se director Ewing, and DCM Dillon. It was said "the aim of the visit is to pressure Ecevit to maintain Turkey's allegiance to the West."³⁰⁰ A meeting was held with Ecevit, Ökçün and ministry personnel. Ecevit told Deputy Secretary that they made important decisions in Turkey-US relations. He also highlighted importance of revitalizing of Turkey-US relations. Deputy Secretary said on March 27 that they discussed the entire Turkey-US relations with US Vice President Mondale, Vance, Brown and Brzezinski.³⁰¹ As a result of the meetings, it was decided to completely improve relations with Turkey. Accordingly, a 4-stage plan was made³⁰². IN the first stage, on April 6, Congress would be asked to lift the embargo. In the second stage, 50 million dollar security supporting assistance loan will be given to Turkey. In the third stage,

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Press Coverage of Senator Javits' Visit, ANKARA 2270, 27 March 1978.

³⁰⁰ Turkish Press On Deputy Secretary Christopher's Visit, MARCH 30, ANKARA 2381, 30 March 1978.

³⁰¹ Us-Turkey Relations: Deputy Secretary's Meeting With Prime Minister Ecevit, ANKARA 2351, 29 March 1978.

³⁰² Ibid.

175 million dollars of military sales credit will be given. Finally, DCA will be reviewed and renegotiated. Ecevit asks what the United States would do if the Greek government opposes the signing of DCA. Christopher states that it does not matter what the Greek government does. Spiers said the following in this meeting, almost as if he was facing Greece "...With the embargo gone, Greeks would be faced with a fundamentally different situation."³⁰³

Spiers states that Ecevit had very pleased with the plan³⁰⁴. On the same day, Nimetz met with Ökçün and the senior foreign minister staff. Nimetz and Spiers shared the plan here, too. Ökçün expressed that Turkey has economic needs and that the amount of aid should be increased. It is stated that Turkey's military equipment is at risk of being scrapped due to the embargo.

It can be said that European politicians are more constructive in Turkey-West relations. During this period, some European politicians stated that Turkey was treated unfairly in the context of Turkey-West relations. Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet visited Ankara on 27-28 March 1978. US Ambassador Spiers was also invited to the meeting. During this visit, Simonet praised Turkey's contribution to NATO and emphasized that Western countries do not fully understand Turkey³⁰⁵. Simonet claimed that the US embargo was flawed and that it alienated Turkey from the West.

These days, top-rank politicians from the United States have constantly visited Turkey. Shortly after Javits and Christopher's visit, Congressman Stephen Solarz visited Ankara on April 4. Apart from Ecevit and Ökçün, Solarz also held meetings with Demirel, Erbakan and Türkeş. Solarz was known as pro-Turkey in the US. For this reason, he said that if he met with Ecevit alone, it would be a more sincere conversation, and he had a one-on-one meeting with Ecevit without embassy officials. Solarz has made it clear in all his talks that the US administration is determined to lift the embargo.³⁰⁶ Solarz asked that "What would happen if the administration's efforts to lift the embargo failed"³⁰⁷. Ecevit told that in that case Turkey have to revise its present posture. At the same time, Solarz told Ambassador Spiers that from Ecevit's response to him, he understood that even If Turkey withdraw from NATO it will not align with Soviet Union. Solarz and Ecevit agreed that the US would use military

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ First Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, ANKARA 2342, 29 March 1978.

³⁰⁵ Belgian Fonmin Simonet Visits Ankara, ANKARA 2348, 29 March 1978.

³⁰⁶ Congressman Stephen Solarz' Visit To Ankara, ANKARA 2580, 5 April 1978.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

bases after the embargo was lifted. They also talked about the Cyprus issue. Solarz says that Turkey is sincere about solving the problem, while Greece is not.

On the other hand, Solarz met with other political party leaders. He had a meeting with Türkeş. Türkeş says that he is affiliated with the Western, NATO and American bloc, but if the embargo is not lifted, it will not be easy to stand against socialist pressures that is clearly anti-US in Turkey. Solarz later met with Israeli embassy. Israeli officials say that Turkey's cooperation with the West is in their favor. They stated that if Turkey moves away from the Western alliance, it would lead them to cooperate with Arab countries against Israel. Solarz later discussed the Cyprus issue with Erbakan and finally met with Demirel. All the leaders gave almost similar answers to Solarz. Each of them stated that Turkey wanted to continue the alliance with the US-West, but that they would seek new alliances if the US continued to impose sanctions. However, none of them implied joining the Soviet bloc.

During this period, many countries representatives visited Turkey and Ökçün visited many places. Ökçün left Turkey on 18 April and first attended the CENTO meeting in London, then attended the Islamic Cooperation meeting in Senegal and finally attended the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg on 27 April. Apart from this, many ministers or bureaucrats were visiting many countries at the same time. At the same time, there were teams from Bulgaria, Norway, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviets visiting Turkey. During this period, as the workload of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased, it was decided to appoint about 40 ambassadors.³⁰⁸ In his telegram, Spiers wrote that the staff of the MFA said that Ecevit was both novice and authoritarian. He mentions that Ecevit did not accept any advice on anything, and that they always tried to implement their own views. Until this period, the foreign ministry was able to act with a degree of autonomy from the elected government. The foreign minister was trying not to confront the ministry staff. However, now the prime minister and foreign minister had come to a stronger and more authoritarian position. Most of the diplomats working in this period will support this view in the memoirs they will write in the following years. Spiers claims that Ecevit's "highly personalized style" could harm to US-Turkey relations.

Ökçün met with Greek Foreign Minister Papaligouras on April 27 in Strasbourg. Turkey was proposing some changes over its position in Cyprus, but Greece and America

³⁰⁸ Diplomatic Traffic Jam in Ankara, ANKARA 3219, 21 April 1978.

found them insufficient³⁰⁹. Turkey accepted to settle in 32% of the island and accepted the settlement of Greeks in Varosha district.³¹⁰ European politicians were more sympathetic towards Turkey. Austrian MP Franz Karasek was one of the names that supported Turkey the most. He reportedly said that “He believes the Turkish Cypriot proposals are sufficient to begin talks and he does not understand the unwillingness of the Greek side to sit at the negotiating table.”³¹¹ Karasek presented the report that found Turkey position plausible in the meeting and it was approved. That shows many European parliamentarians approve position of Turkey.

4.2.1.3. The Lift of Embargo (July-September 1978)

Javits and Christopher in their visiting strongly emphasized that they will immensely effort for lift of embargo in the US. Once Christopher returned to the US, he planned how to do that. Finally, in the Committee of Foreign Relations in 2nd May of 1978, the lift of embargo was talked in the framework of Eastern Mediterranean Program. On the other hand, for alleviation of the lift of embargo requested from Turkey to convey flexible and positive statements about Cyprus. Spiers requested this demand by Ökçün on May 1³¹². However, Ökçün could not give a positive answer. On May 3, Nimetz met with Esenbel in Washington. He said that many senators were disturbed by the lifting of the Turkish embargo. He said that it is essential for Turkey to make some flexible statements. Esenbel asked what he was suggesting. Nimetz asked Turkey to state that if the embargo ends, the US weapons will be used only for defensive and NATO purposes, and that Turkey will withdraw from part of its settlement in Cyprus³¹³. Esenbel reminded that the USA has long claimed that it has not established a linkage between the embargo and Cyprus. It was once again seen with this demand that the USA established a connection between the embargo and Cyprus. Spiers makes the same demands in his meeting with Elekdağ on 5 May and Ecevit on 6 May.

One of the most important meetings in Turkey-US relations was held on May 30-31. NATO meeting was held in Washington. Ecevit, Ökçün, Hasan Esat Işık, Sükrü Elekdağ,

³⁰⁹ For The Ambassador from the Secretary, ANKARA 3187, 26 April 1978.

³¹⁰ Turkish Cypriot Proposals: Congressional Consideration Of Eastern Mediterranean Program, STATE 110036, 29 April 1978.

³¹¹ Turkish Press Reports Greek And Turkish Fonmins Meet In Strasbourg, Karasek Report Approved, ANKARA 3310, 28 April 1978.

³¹² Cyprus Negotiations, ANKARA 3328, 1 May 1978.

³¹³ Nimetz-Esenbel Meeting May 3, STATE 113201, 3 MAY 1978.

Coşkun Kırca and many other bureaucrats attended the meeting. Yalım Eralp writes that Ecevit had not wanted to attend this summit but agreed to attend at the insistence of pro-Western bureaucrats.³¹⁴

The US was demanding that NATO members must spend 3% of their GDP on common defense. Turkey said they could not do this because of the embargo. There was a duel between Ecevit and Karamanlis. German Chancellor Schmidt scolded Ecevit, saying, "Mr. Ecevit, do not use the trump card that you do not have."³¹⁵ Carter intervened, promising Congress that he would lift the embargo. Turkey-Greece relations were also discussed at the meeting. One of the concluding statements of the meeting was about that "The Allies noted with satisfaction the meeting of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. They expressed the hope that this dialogue on bilateral questions will contribute to the solution of the differences between the two countries."³¹⁶

Ecevit met face-to-face with US President Carter as prime minister for the first time. The meeting hold on the morning of May 31 lasted for 1 hour. As a result of the meeting, the White Press Secretary released a statement. There were references to collective security and democratic values in the statement: "The president and prime minister noted the important place Turkey occupies in the NATO alliance and stressed the alliance's important contribution to the preservation of stability, peace, democracy and human values."³¹⁷ During the visit, the Turkish delegation also met with many ministers in the USA. There were crucial negotiations in the improvement of relations between Turkey and the USA.

After NATO summit, it was tried to write a text that would accept the congress to lift the embargo. Yalım Eralp had great responsibility in this task. According to Eralp's claim, Ökçün said, "I don't want the embargo to be lifted," while he was meeting with Spiers, the US ambassador. "Repeat slowly," Spiers said I will report your expression to Washington," he said. This time Ökçün took a step back and said, "Negotiate it with Yalım". After Ökçün's leave, "I hate your minister,"³¹⁸ Spiers told to Yalım. However, there is no way to confirm this claim. In fact, Ökçün thought that even the lifting of the embargo was not very crucial.

³¹⁴ Eralp, Yalım (2017). *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı*, Doğan Kitap. P.47-48.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council Washington 30th-31th May 1978. Access: <https://nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c780530a.htm>

³¹⁷ President's Meeting With Turkish Prime Minister: Press Statement, STATE 137693, 31 MAY 1978.

³¹⁸ Eralp, Yalım (2017). *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı*, Doğan Kitap. P.49.

Ökçün may said, "It would not be the end of the world if the embargo is not lifted"³¹⁹. Similarly, Eralp claimed that he heard a similar statement from another US senator. Stephen Solarz has defended Turkey many times in the US Congress. Ökçün had told him in an interview, "You are giving us garbage as weapons". Solarz then told Eralp "this minister will increase enemies". Many people stated that Ökçün was not professional like a bureaucrat and gave abnormal reactions in his speeches. Maybe this reaction of Ökçün can be counted as one of them.

On the other hand, in the Turkish public opinion, both the left and the right were against establishing good relations with the USA and the West. Left-wing groups in Turkey were organizing terrorist acts against US soldiers and diplomats many times. An interesting event similar to this took place near Ankara Air Station on June 15. Counselor for public affairs, Charles E. Courtney while was driving in her car, her way was blocked by three masked people. Two of the attackers had automatic weapons. Courtney offered to give the car keys to people they thought were robbers.³²⁰ However, the attackers did not accept, they took his wallet, watch, and left. Courtney said the attackers were college-aged and polite, suspecting that the robbery was prime-motivated. It was never known whether the attack was aimed at the diplomat.

Ecevit's visit to Moscow between 21-25 June worried US diplomats. In a telegram, Spiers wrote to Washington that with the agreements signed in Moscow, the presence of the Soviets in Turkey could seriously increase. He met with Ecevit Spiers on 1 July and explained his impressions of Moscow. Ecevit felt the need to do this because he wanted to show the West that Turkey does not intend to make a radical change. Ecevit said that the Soviets had not bothered by the fact that Turkey is in NATO and expressed that it is very normal for them Turkey to be in the Western Alliance³²¹. He also argued that he told Brezhnev that Carter was sincere about the detente. He said his goal is signing the SALT and limiting armament and that Brezhnev believes the same way. Ecevit acted as a representative of West in Moscow. Spiers also cited that Ecevit is not like the leader of an isolated country, but like the representative of the West. Spiers told Ecevit that he believed he dealt with the serious problems between East and West. He advised Washington to say similar words. These views were probably more pragmatic than sincere. Nevertheless, the

³¹⁹ Turkish Foreign Minister's Press Conference, NEW DELHI 10722, 13 July 1978.

³²⁰ 320 Terrorist Incident Involving U.S. Government Employee, ANKARA04538, 16 June 1978.

³²¹ Ecevit Debriefing on His Soviet Trip, ANKARA 04874, 3 July 1978.

fact that he feels obliged to at least say these words shows that they take Turkey's initiatives seriously. The telegram expressed below is evidence that Turkey's intentions are taken seriously.

In the telegram written from Washington to Ankara on June 26, it was written that the lifting of the embargo was very close to the Senate and the House of Representative³²². In the telegram, it was reported that there were 150 people in the House who supported the lifting of the embargo, and 130 people who did not. In the Senate, it was written that 45 people supported and 40 people did not. It was stated that President Carter was working hard to increase the number of supporters. It was recommended to report this to Ecevit and Ökçün.

As a result of the efforts of US President Carter, the US Senate on July 26, 1978, and the House of Representatives on August 1, took the decision to lift the embargo they were applying against Turkey. The article accepted by the US Congress entered into force after being signed by President Carter on September 26, and the US arms embargo, which had been going on since February 5, 1975, was officially lifted with 273 yes votes, against 176 votes³²³. Carter, in his statement after sign, expressed his pleasure and told that “this action will support efforts to encourage the restoration of a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the eastern Mediterranean.”³²⁴ This final statement showed again that US administration make linkage between Cyprus Issue and arms embargo. Carter told benefits of lift of restriction would be as follow “The United States will be better able to accomplish its goals in the vital eastern Mediterranean region: to improve our bilateral relationships with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus; to strengthen NATO's southern flank; and to help promote a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem.”³²⁵

His statement revealed the importance of Turkey in NATO. He told that US relation with Turkey is important not only collective security but also shared commitment to democracy. Warren Christopher also acknowledged the importance of alliance with Turkey: “The resumption of full military cooperation with Turkey is in the national interest of the United States and in the interest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”³²⁶ After lift of

³²² Congressional Consideration Of Proposal To Lift Turkish Embargo, STATE 162536, 26 June 1978.

³²³ Termination of the Turkish Arms Embargo, STATE 244842, 26 September 1978.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Presidential Statement Concerning Resumption of Full Military Cooperation with Turkey, STATE 244790, 26 September 1978.

³²⁶ Presidential Certification on the Embargo, STATE 244788, 26 September 1978.

embargo, naturally, US administration attempted to justify their regulation. It may not directly show the importance of Turkey. However, while there is no major changes in Turkey position in Cyprus or other policies, lifting of embargo clearly shows importance of Turkey for the West. Turkey only pledged some changes in his position but had not acted until removal of embargo.

Ökçün stated that their governments entered a rapid process to improve bilateral relations after the lifting of the embargo, and that they were working on a basic agreement with four sub-titles with the United States by making great efforts. These sub-titles as follow joint defense production, military vehicle supply agreement, economic and technical cooperation and facilities agreement.³²⁷

After lift of embargo, Turkey administration decided to reactivate US Defense installation in Turkey. MFA Secretary General Şükrü Elekdağ told Turkey's decision to counselor Nimetz on 8 September at Turkish Consulate in Munich³²⁸. After short time, journalist speculated about military bases. For example, Cumhuriyet newspaper claimed that only two, Sinop and Pirinçlik, would be open.³²⁹

After the arms embargo lifted, the top meeting between the US and Turkey was held at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September. Ökçün went to New York and made many interviews before and after the assembly. Ökçün, Elekdağ and Onur Öymen interviewed Vance and Nimetz on September 27. Vance firstly expressed his satisfaction that Ecevit announced that the U.S. Defense installation would be opened³³⁰. Apart from the military embargo, the most talked about topic between the Turkish-US delegations was the Defense Agreement Cooperation. In 1975, Turkey's Defense Agreement Cooperation was canceled. A new agreement was made in 1976. However, Turkey's parliament and the Senate in the USA did not approve it. Now, after the lifting of the embargo, a new Defense Agreement Cooperation could be signed. This agreement also included annual financial assistance to Turkey. Previously this was \$300 million per year. Nevertheless, Turkey began to ask for 500 million dollars, saying that its expenses have increased. Although the US team did not confirm this amount, they said they would do their

³²⁷ Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem:5, Toplantı:2, Birleşim:60, Oturum:4, 1979, C.10, s.727-728.

³²⁸ US-Turkey Discussions, Munich, Sept. 8, STATE 230545, 12 September 1978.

³²⁹ Cumhuriyet, 25 September 1978.

³³⁰ Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün Met With Secretary Vance At Latter's Suite At U.N. Plaza Hotel, STATE 248372, 29 September 1978.

best. Ökçün then asked Esenbel to meet with the US administration. Esenbel met with Nimetz on November 1 and said that the Turkish public was wondering that the US how much economic aid will provide in return for the opening of military bases.³³¹

Vance asked how Turkey would go about getting out of the economic crisis. Ökçün asked the USA to persuade private banks to give loans to Turkey in this regard. He also said that Ziya Müezzinoğlu met with the representatives of seven banks here and demanded that Turkey's debts be rescheduled. Vance and Ökçün also interviewed Prisoner Exchange treaty. In addition, Ökçün requested intelligence assistance from the USA against possible ASALA attacks against Turkish bureaucrats and diplomats³³². Finally, the biggest problem in Turkey-Greece relations in this period was the Aegean Sea airspace. Vance discussed this issue with both Greece and Turkey in New York³³³. The next day, Ökçün and Greek Foreign Minister Georgios Rallis discussed the Aegean airspace issue. Although the meeting was positive, Turkey did not accept Greece's request for 10 nautical miles.³³⁴ In 6 October, Nimetz met with Rauf Denктаş and stated that the President of Cyprus, Kyprianou, was ready to meet with the Turkish Cypriot administration³³⁵.

Ökçün joined the United Nations General Assembly on 3-4 October 1978. The speech he gave in UNGA bears detailed information about Ökçün's understanding of foreign policy and international relations. He told that "The 'three d's' of détente, disarmament and development that constitute the 'main pillars of peace.'"³³⁶ Yet, he pointed out that détente is based on armed deterrence, instead of on mutual confidence among states. Ökçün also criticizes armament and hard security. According to him, despite the supposed thaw in superpower politics, armament continues unabated. He argues that 3D should be established in order to establish an equal and fair economic order, which Turkey, actually his government, attaches great importance to. Ökçün expressed that NIEO is important in this context, and complains that although many efforts are made under the UN umbrella, no

³³¹ Esenbel's Meeting With Nimetz: Fy-80 Assistance And Eximbank Activities In Turkey, STATE 278395, 2 November 1978.

³³² Exchange of Security Information, State 249586, 30 September 1978.

Turkish Press Reports Ökçün-Rallis Meeting At UN, ANKARA 06977, 29 September 1978.

³³³ Secretary Vance's Meeting With Greek Foreign Minister Rallis, New York, Sept 27, U.S. Parole Board, STATE 248371, 29 September 1978.

³³⁴ Meeting Between Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, SEPTEMBER 29, SECTO 11014, 29 September 1978.

³³⁵ NIMETZ-DENKTASH MEETING, OCTOBER 5, STATE 254588, 6 October 1978.

³³⁶ 33rd General Assembly: General Debate, October 3 Pm, USUN NEW YORK 04061, 6 October 1978.

concrete results have been achieved³³⁷. Ökçün also contented that developing countries have a very important place in world production, but the economic order does not provide welfare to these countries. He quoted Ecevit's recommendations for developing countries at the NIEO seminar: developing countries should increase economic cooperation in adapting and developing technology, increase their collective effectiveness and subscribe to a new development concept.

Moreover, in his UNGA speech Ökçün asserted that economic and social rights are inseparable than civil and political rights. He expressed a very serious objection in terms of political rights. He stated that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk fought against imperialism and all kinds of colonialism. He considers the apartheid regime in South Africa, situation in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia as the affront of humanity and violation of basic human rights. He called on the international community to put immense pressure on the racist Pretoria regime. He stated that Turkey had been in the UN Namibia council and supported the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which represents blacks against the apartheid regime. He, similarly, remarked that Turkey supports indigenous people in Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe against the white racist minority.

In addition to conflicts in Africa, he mentioned for Middle East conflicts too. He underlined that for peace in the Middle East, Israel's occupation since 1967 must end and the forced land acquisition must end. On the other hand, he stated that Turkey had proposed some suggestions, including start of intercommunal talks, opening of Varosha, re-opening Nicosia airport etc., for the Cyprus problem and was flexible in this regard. He underlined that Greeks and Turks in Cyprus should be treated equally. Ökçün finally concluded his speech with a quote from Gandhi on love.

After the lifting of embargo, the Cyprus Issue continued to be the main problem in Turkey-Western relations. Apart from the United States, the UN and European Union countries were also holding meetings and negotiations on the Cyprus problem. Turkey offered intercommunal talks on every platform. About a month later at the United Nations meeting, Ökçün went to New York again. Then he went to Canada and London. He met with Waldheim on 1 November 1978; the most important topic were Cyprus. He told that

³³⁷ United Nations, General Assembly, 19th Plenary Meeting, 33 Sesssion, 3 October 1978, New york. Access: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/004/10/PDF/NL800410.pdf?OpenElement> (Access:21.09.2021).

“Attempts which might be made outside of the intercommunal talks for the solution of the Cyprus Problem will simply make matters more difficult and diminish the role of the secretary general.”³³⁸

On November 6, the US, Canadian, British and German ambassadors met in Ankara and discussed how they would discuss the Cyprus issue with Ökçün and Ecevit³³⁹. On November 16, NATO Secretary General Luns visited Turkey and said that Turkey's economic problem would be dealt with. He emphasized that “In the face of events in Africa and Afghanistan, Turkey has yet more importance to NATO and CENTO.”³⁴⁰

Another issue that came to the agenda after the lifting of the embargo was the re-engagement of Greece to the military wing of NATO. It was expected that Turkey would not oppose this. Ökçün told Luns that Turkey has no problem with this and that they are ready to hold a summit with Greece.³⁴¹ Ökçün, who attended the Council of Europe Ministerial in Strasbourg on November 23, 1978, met with his counterpart Rallis here. During the meeting, it was decided to talk about the continental shelf and the Evros border and to lower the tension between countries.³⁴²

On the other hand, meetings on Cyprus were planned. On December 6, opposition parties and newspapers in Turkey said that Turkey had accepted the "American Plan".³⁴³ Turkey had become “dependent” on America from its radical anti-Westernism. The opposition's criticism of both periods illustrates well the polarization in politics in this period. This polarization hindered stability and made a successful foreign policy difficult.

Ökçün also attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 7-8 December. Issues on human rights was discussed at the meeting. Ökçün said that North-South problems are more important than East-West issues. He previously mentioned 3D as the priority of Turkish foreign policy; these are detente, disarmament, and development. Ökçün added 2 more D's to these and announced his new agenda. He told that

³³⁸ Ökçün Warns Against Attempts To Solve Cyprus Problem Outside Of Intercommunal Talks, ANKARA 7811, 1 November 1978.

³³⁹ Cyprus Initiative: Timing, Coordination with Allies, Press Treatment, ANKARA 7938, 6 November 1978.

³⁴⁰ Turkish Press Reports Luns Visit To Ankara, ANKARA 8227, 17 November 1978.

³⁴¹ Greek-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 8213, 17 November 1978.

³⁴² Foreign Relations: Greek And Turkish Foreign Ministers Agree To Resume Continental Shelf Talks, ATHENS 10316, 24 November 1978.

³⁴³ Turkish Press on Cyprus December 6, ANKARA 8699, 6 December 1978.

“Five questions characterized the current international situation: detente, disarmament, democracy (i.e., human rights), decolonization, and development. Human rights should not be considered only in the political sense, but also in the light of economic and social realities.”³⁴⁴ The emphasis on democracy seems to have been added as a result of Turkey's rapprochement with the Western bloc.

4.2.1.4. Economic and Military Aid Negotiations (December 1978 – November 1979)

Ökçün spoke with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher on December 7 and explained the seriousness of the economic challenge Turkey is facing. The OECD asked for help in rescheduling debt to the IMF and banks. He said that the Turkish public expects concrete helps from the West and that this will symbolize the improvement in relations.³⁴⁵ He also added that “It was extremely important to Turkish public opinion that the NATO communique contain strong language concerning assistance to less-developed members.”³⁴⁶ Christopher said that he is aware of the seriousness of the economic problem of Turkey. Nevertheless, he said there are IMF standards and banks are private and they cannot do anything relating to them. They said they would determine the amount of aid under DCA in the upcoming budget planning.

A few days later, Ecevit had a short meeting with Ökçün, Spiers and the Greek ambassador at farewell reception. Ecevit said that he liked the statements from NATO summit, but that now the West should do something concrete. Because “There were many in turkey who wanted to turn in another direction.” Spiers put forwarded the classic excuse: they are not able interfere with private banks and institutions. Ökçün had a violent reaction to his argument. First, he started with a “polite” invitation: “Let’s talk like grown men”. He said that he met with Kissinger during his last visit and they talked about Turkey and Argentina, which is in a similar situation. He told that Kissinger told him that when “circumstances” were ready “Pressed the button with the banks and the money flowed.”³⁴⁷ Both Ökçün and the US representatives knew that the decisions of banks and international

³⁴⁴ NATOMIN: Human Rights, Detente, And CSCE, STATE 309912, 8 December 1978.

³⁴⁵ Meeting Between Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün and Deputy Secretary December 7, BRUSSELS 23192, 8 December 1978.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Spiers said Ökçün is “heated and impassioned” and Ökçün would use this argument later and it would be good to produce a counter-argument for him.

organizations were heavily influenced by the United States. Nevertheless, the USA has consistently expressed below argumentation. Temel İskit, who worked in the OECD during this period, states that Western bureaucrats and organizations had a negative view of Turkey and Ecevit.³⁴⁸

Ökçün visited Sweden with Ecevit and Hikmet Çetin between 18-20 December. According to Sweden MFA Chief Knut Thyberg the visit was “disorganized, improvised, and poorly prepared,” marked by vague discussions centered on exaggerated Turkish demands³⁴⁹ A 2-day visit to Finland was made after this visit. Social Democrat Party(SDP) was in power in Finland and it's prime minister had met with Ecevit long time ago. They discussed “The possibilities of joint Finnish/Turkish construction projects in Turkey and in third countries.”³⁵⁰

Similar issues were discussed in 1979 as well. At the beginning of January, Warren Christopher visited Turkey. On January 11, they had a three and a half-hour long meeting with Ecevit and Ökçün. At the meeting, it was agreed on the resumption of intercommunal talks in Cyprus and the settlement in Varosha³⁵¹. In addition, economic and defense cooperation agreement was discussed. Turkey was demanding 500 million dollars of aid annually within the scope of the new defense cooperation agreement. Nevertheless, the USA only consented to give 300 million dollars instead of this amount as stated in the old agreement. Ökçün stated to Christopher that while the embargo was imposed on Turkey, all his neighbors and socialist states were armed. For this reason, he said that military aid should be more for Turkey's security.³⁵²

The events in Iran at the beginning of 1979 quickly affected Turkey-Western relations. The shah of Iran was one of the most loyal allies of the United States. Anti-Shah forces were about to seize power in Iran, and the United States was watching the developments with concern. Turkey's importance increased in the turbulence experienced in Iran. Warren Christopher was asked about Turkey's situation in the context of the events in Iran at the

³⁴⁸ Temel İskit (2021), Semi-structured interview.

³⁴⁹ Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit Visit to Sweden, STOCKHOLM 5057, 21 December 1978.

³⁵⁰ Visit of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to Finland December 20-22, HELSINKI 0013, 2 January 1979.

³⁵¹ Ecevit/Christopher Conversation: Cypriot Aspects, ANKARA 0334, 11 January 1978.

³⁵² Christopher Visit: US Security Assistance, ANKARA 0354, 12 January 1979.

Esenboğa airport. Christopher told “The events in Iran remind us of the strategic importance of Turkey.”³⁵³

In this period, Turkey first allowed US helicopters to settle in Incirlik base. These helicopters would be used in case of evacuation of American citizens from Iran³⁵⁴. Vance sent Ökçün a telegram of thanks for this help. On the other hand, it was alleged that the US monitoring equipment in Iran would be transferred to Turkey. However, Ökçün officially denied this.³⁵⁵ There is an interesting telegram in the US sources on this subject. The conversation took place between Cyprus Foreign Minister Nicos A. Rolandis and the US Ambassador to Cyprus Galen L. Stone. Rolandis alleged that Ökçün told a close colleague that he was very much against Waldheim and the American plans regarding Cyprus and that they wanted the Turkish Cypriots to be independent. Rolandis claims that “This apparent hardening of the Turkish position had occurred as a result of the situation in Iran and the realization by the Turks of western dependence on them.”³⁵⁶

It has been claimed by many that Ökçün expressed on a different line from Turkey's official line in matters that are not recorded. Nevertheless, these statements have hardened the attitude towards Turkey many times. It is possible that Ökçün said this because of his inexperience.

Ökçün visited Austria on 23-25 January 1979. Ökçün requested new loans for Turkey here, but no results were obtained.³⁵⁷ Furthermore, on February 8-9, Greek MFA Secretary General Byron Theodoropoulos visited Ankara. He interviewed many people, including Ökçün and Ecevit. After meetings it was claimed that Ankara has impression that “Greece did not want an early solution to the Aegean problem.”³⁵⁸

4.1.1.5. U-2 Crisis(August-November 1979)

In May-June 1979, the U-2 spy planes of the USA became the cause of crisis in Turkey-US relations. The USA wanted to monitor the Soviet lands with U-2 spy planes.

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ Helicopters at Incirlik, STATE 048952, 1 February 1979.

³⁵⁵ Turkish Fonmin Denies That US Monitoring Equipment In Iran Will Be Transferred To Turkey, ANKARA 0831, 29 January 1979.

³⁵⁶ Meeting With Fonmin Rolandis February 1, NICOSIA 0325, 1 February 1979.

³⁵⁷ Turkish Foreign Minister Visits Austria, VIENNA 00884, 20 January 1979.

³⁵⁸ First Day of Greek-Turkish Secgen Talks, ANKARA 1246, 12 February 1979.

After signing SALT II on June 18, they insisted on their demand. Turkey did not want to have problems with the Soviets because of the U-2 planes. In the 1960s, the USA was flying U-2 planes on USSR over Turkey. When this emerged, the USSR threatened Turkey and a crisis ensued. Turkey did not want to experience a similar crisis again. Ecevit and Ökçün have consistently responded negatively to requests for the U-2. Solarz visited Turkey on 20-21 August. Solarz asked if Turkey would allow U2 planes to fly. Ecevit and Ökçün said that it was impossible for them to allow these flights without the consent of USSR³⁵⁹.

On August 8, representatives from the USA came to Ankara under the leadership of Dan Daniel. During the visit, Turkey's relations with the west, relations with Eastern Europe, Salt-II and U-2 verification, Greek integration into NATO, and turkey's commitment to democracy were discussed. Ökçün, Ecevit and even Chief of Staff Kenan Evren were asked many times about SALT II and U-2 flights. The answers given were always similar: "Turkey wished to contribute to the implementation of Salt II, but could not do so in the face of soviet objections."³⁶⁰

Normally, military aid in the USA was planned a year in advance. For this reason, aid was to be given to Turkey in 1980. However, with the insistence of Turkey and Spiers, 100 million dollars of aid was given to Turkey in 1979³⁶¹. Towards the end of 1979, the USA wanted to determine Turkey's needs and aids in defense areas. For this, meetings were held with Turkish authorities.³⁶² Accordingly, military and material aid would be given to Turkey.

Ökçün went to New York on 22 September 1979 for the 34th session of the United Nations General Assembly. He met with Waldheim on September 27³⁶³. On October 4-5, he met with Vance. Ökçün said that Turkey-US relations are at a good level and defense talks are going well, but there are some problems. Nimetz, who was in the meeting, confirmed this and said that it is difficult to supply any equipment that Turkey requested³⁶⁴. Ökçün and Elekdağ said that Turkey wants to develop in the defense industry, and they expect support from the USA in this regard. Ökçün also said that they wanted to sell submarines to Libya and that France was against it. He demanded the persuasion of the French state. Ökçün went

³⁵⁹ Turkey and Salt II Verfication, ANKARA 6180, 21 August 1979.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Meeting with Prime Minister: Us Assistance and Defense, ANKARA 6973, 20 September 1979.

³⁶² US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Negotiations, ANKARA 6985, 20 September 1979.

US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Negotiations, ANKARA 7433, 9 October 1979.

³⁶³ September 28 Press Summary, ANKARA 7205, 28 September 1979.

³⁶⁴ Secretary's October 4-5 Bilateral With Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün, STATE 265783, 11 October 1979.

to London after the USA. In there he said that “The recent Greek decision to permit Soviet ships to be repaired in a Greek shipyard may have a negative influence on Greek-Turkish relations and that the decision itself was unacceptable.”³⁶⁵

US-Turkish defense cooperation negotiations concluded on 11 October. On October 16, Undersecretary of Defense Dr. William Perry came to Ankara and met with Ökçün. Perry said in his interview that the plea deal had three outcomes. “Permit the up-grading and modernization of equipment already in the inventory of the Turkish armed forces. Introduce new and more advanced weaponry into the Turkish inventory, e.g., rocket manufacture. Sales of this equipment to other NATO countries, which the US would help to facilitate.”³⁶⁶

Ökçün said that these promises exactly match with Turkey's wishes and he is very pleased with it. He said that these projects should be implemented quickly³⁶⁷. He also demanded that sales to non-NATO countries must be free. On 14 October 1979, elections were held in five provinces of Turkey. All of the deputies were elected from JP. About a month later, the 42nd Government did not receive a vote of confidence and the government resigned. Spiers wrote a telegram on how the election results would affect U.S. interests. In his telegram, he said that it would be better for them to have a more "agreeable" minister instead of Ökçün.³⁶⁸

Ökçün's term of office expired when the 43rd Government was established on 12 November. Vance sent a farewell message to Ökçün³⁶⁹. In the new government, Hayrettin Erkmen became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Erkmen was a pro-US and pro-Western bureaucrat. On the hand, Ökçün's meeting with the US representatives was always full of discussion and bargaining. US officials always spoke negatively about Ökçün and the conversation with him. On the other hand, Erkmen was very warm to US. They must have been very pleased with Erkmen's pleading attitude. Erkmen criticized the previous government, which implied Ökçün too, and said that they would restore NATO's trust in

³⁶⁵ Oct 11 Press Summary, ANKARA 7545, 11 October 1979.

³⁶⁶ US-Turkish Defense Industrial Cooperation: Dr. Perry's Meeting With Fonmin Ökçün, ANKARA 07749, 18 October 1979.

³⁶⁷ This speech is one of Ökçün's most positive speeches. In previous conversations, he has always been a reluctant and sullen person. By a twist of fate, this speech took place at the very end of his term.

³⁶⁸ U.S. Interest Issues - How Will A New Government Handle?, ANKARA 07844, 22 October 1979.

³⁶⁹ Message from Secretary, STATE 308770, 30 November 1979.

Turkey.³⁷⁰ Ökçün criticized Erkmen's statement in the Tercüman newspaper on 16 December. He told, "The question is not restoring NATO's confidence in Turkey. The question is restoring Turkey's confidence in NATO."³⁷¹

4.2.2. The Concern for Support to Separatist Kurdish Movements

In the last period of the Ottoman Empire, foreign powers harmed a lot to the Ottoman Empire by supporting minority ethnic groups. This phenomenon occupied a very serious place in the minds of the Republican administrators. In the 1970s, there were very important events that mobilized this concern. Under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan, the Apoist group tried to achieve political mobilization through Kurdish nationalism. With the establishment of the PKK in 1978, this concern gained a serious dimension. The idea that foreign powers would weaken Turkey by supporting the PKK had become widespread. 42. The Government felt this concern seriously.

Within a month after the 42nd government took office, the US Congress published a human rights report on Turkey. Late in the evening of January 30, the ministry called the US ambassador Spiers and said that Ökçün wanted to meet with him at 11 am. MFA Secretary General Şükrü Elekdağ told Spiers that the Kurds paragraph in the report is disturbing for Turkey.³⁷² Ökçün, who met with Spiers the next day, stated that this report ignored Ecevit's democracy and human rights agenda. "He said the new report appeared to him to be unfriendly, if not hostile"³⁷³

Ökçün stated that the report advised US government should embrace new policy toward Turkey about Kurdish right. He articulated that such expressions threaten Turkey national and territorial integrity. Moreover, while Ecevit government was trying to restore Turkey-US relations, US had prepared a report that could be harmful for US-Turkey relations. Ökçün requested some changes in the report. Ökçün also said that "if the report

³⁷⁰ Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977-1980, VOLUME XXI, CYPRUS; TURKEY; GREECE, 14 December 1979 Access: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v21/d146>

³⁷¹ Turkish Press Review: December 15-17, ANKARA 09061, 17 December 1979.

³⁷² Human Rights Report to Congress on Turkey, ANKARA 0801, 31 January 1978.

³⁷³ Ibid.

issued in its present form (i.e., modified per ref b), he is convinced it will do serious damage to Turkish-American relations, and it may also have other unspecified effects.”³⁷⁴

Spiers said at the end of this telegram that Ökçün was extremely agitated because of his human rights report. Spiers himself says that this report contains many unfair statements and that the report should be edited. He adds that the Greek claims about Cyprus have been extensively covered, and that this should be more balanced. Finally, he says that such a report could create serious obstacles in US-Turkey relations.³⁷⁵

Spiers wrote more clearly about his concern in the telegram the next day. US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Turkey 10 days ago and met with Ecevit. Ecevit frankly “Raised the subject of possible US involvement with Kurdish separatism and received an assurance that the US was not involved.”³⁷⁶

However, Spiers said this report embodied of suspicion of Turkey. He added that Turkey constantly remembers the USA's support for Barzani in the 1970s. Moreover, told that this is very much on Turks' minds. Spiers repeated again such a report is rather detrimental to US-Turkey relations. He stated that there is a challenge to his efforts to improve relations with Turkey.

After intense of efforts Spiers', serious changes were made in the report. Aydın Yeğen, MFA Western Department Director, interviewed Spiers again after corrections. He said that the changes were made more than he was expected, but still insufficient. Specifies that the concept of Kurd should not be present in the report at all³⁷⁷. A few days of crisis is resolved in a busy rush. Spiers has worked hard in this crisis. In a few days, he met with many people from Turkey and the US and tried to win everyone's heart. The last thing he wanted from Washington after the crisis was: “We would, of course, have preferred to have been involved in the process earlier and, perhaps in that way, been able to avoid this last-minute panic and resulting strain in US-Turkish relations”³⁷⁸

With the visits of Ecevit and Kenan Evren to the southeast of Turkey in June 1978, the Kurdish question began to be discussed more seriously. Especially the articles written in

³⁷⁴ Annual Human Rights Report On Turkey, ANKARA 0816, 31 January 1978.

³⁷⁵ Human Rights Report to Congress on Turkey, ANKARA 0801, 31 January 1978.

³⁷⁶ Annual Human Rights Report on Turkey, ANKARA 0804, 31 January 1978.

³⁷⁷ Human Rights Report on Turkey, ANKARA 0859, 1 February 1978.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

Hürriyet newspaper attracted public attention. On June 11, Hurriyet wrote that Iran supports the Kurdish separatist group KAWA, so the MIT cut off its cooperation with SAVAK³⁷⁹. The next day, the newspaper wrote that the Shah of Iran was the architect of the separatist movement in Turkey. When Ökçün is asked about these allegations, he says that it is not right to talk without proof that this issue is sensitive. Hürriyet reports on the Barzani and Talabani forces clashing on the Turkish border on June 18. According to the newspaper's sources, the CIA and SAVAK support Barzani, while Talabani is supported by the Soviets. According to telegram from Spiers to Washington

“Articles have played on Turkish paranoia that there must be a foreign hand behind all of the country's problems, and they have stimulated the unrealistic Turkish belief that their country is so strategically important to foreign powers that they are openly competing for power and influence here.”³⁸⁰

Another point that the Turkish state and society doubted about the West was that they want Turkey to be divided or weakened. In fact, this idea has been an important social concern since the founding of the Republic.

4.2.3. Relations with the USSR and Socialist Countries

After the Second World War, Turkey-USSR relations were rather minimal. Only in the last two years of the Menderes government, relations were tried to be improved, but it was short lived. However, with the detente, relations between Turkey and the USSR began to develop. In the 1960s, Turkey began to receive loans from the USSR for heavy industry. During the 42nd Government, relations with the USSR were tried to be expanded as much as possible. After the Cyprus Issue, Turkey was left alone by the Western countries. Two blocks remained for Turkey: the USSR or the Non-Aligned. During the Ökçün period, relations with the Soviets were tried to be developed.

Shortly after Ecevit became prime minister, the USSR invited him to Moscow. On February 3, Ecevit announced that he would go to Moscow in 1978. This was a very quick start for the politics of Turkey, which had forgotten Moscow's path for years. Kosygin last visited Ankara in 1975. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil paid to visit Moscow in 1977. Spiers had a

³⁷⁹ Kurdish Activities Become Subject of Intense Media and Public Interest, ANKARA 4606, 21 June 1978.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

conversation with Selçuk Tarlan, MFA Eastern Department Deputy Director, regarding the content of the meeting. Tarlan said that he is working on an agreement with the Soviets and would share the final version with his NATO allies. Spiers, in his telegram, argued that Turkey would avoid appearing to be doing what the US wants³⁸¹. He stated that they will provide some useful information to Turkey and that this will be very useful for the United States. However, he articulated that they would avoid appearing to interfere while doing this.

During this period, Turkey improved its relations with many socialist countries. On March 6, newspapers announced that Turkey and Cuba would accredit mutual ambassadors: “Turkish ambassador to the United Nations would be accredited to Havana and Cuban ambassador to Sofia would be accredited to Ankara, with establishment of permanent missions in Havana and Ankara likely to follow.”³⁸²

In the US embassy telegrams, there are many telegrams about the relationship between Turkey and socialist countries. The Americans closely followed Turkey's relations with the socialist countries. Spiers told that such a decision “Could spring both from Primin Ecevit's desire to show independence from the US during period of continuing strain in US-Turkish relations and from his need from time to time to make gestures to pacify his party's left wing and uphold his own leftist credentials.”³⁸³

In this telegram, it was also written that Turkey's relations with socialist Vietnam would be strengthened. A month later, Spiers learned that Turkey will open an embassy in Cuba during his meeting with MFA Western Department Director Aydin Yegen³⁸⁴. This decision seems to have been made for ideological reasons rather than interests. At that time, Turkey only had embassies in Colombia and Mexico. Embassies of 14 different Latin American countries were accredited here. Much larger countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile did not have embassies yet. Opening an embassy in a relatively small island country such as Cuba seems less beneficial financially when there is no embassy in these countries. The desire to open an embassy in Cuba instead of big countries probably had ideological reasons. Cuba was a party in the recent missile crisis. Moreover, with this move, it was tried to show that Turkey could act independently from the US.

³⁸¹ Ecevit Accepts Invitation to Visit Soviet Union, ANKARA 1051, 8 February 1978.

³⁸² Turkey Reactivates Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, ANKARA 1709, 7 MARCH 1978.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Establishment of Turkish Embassy in Cuba, ANKARA 2743, 11 April 1978.

Ecevit, Ökçün and many bureaucrats attended the NATO meeting in Washington on May 30-31, 1978. While the Turkish team had not yet returned to Turkey, Spiers was complaining about Turkey to Washington under the heading "Turkey Expands Its Ties with Communist States".³⁸⁵ President Korutürk received letter of credence of the Cuban ambassador on 30 May. On June 1, the foreign ministry announced that it would establish a consulate with the socialist republic of Vietnam. On June 2, the Maoist *Aydınlık* newspaper announced that Huang Hua, the Chinese foreign minister, would visit Turkey on June 11-15. Likewise, he wrote that the ambassadors of Turkey and Cambodia held talks in China to strengthen the relations between the two countries. These were extraordinary developments in terms of Turkey's classical foreign policy. Until that time, Turkey had little diplomatic relations with these socialist countries. Spiers said that the timing of the Vietnam statement was planned to quell leftist criticism in Turkey and the CHP. In addition, he stated that he would meet with the MFA about these developments in a few days. At the same time, the Minister of Industry Orhan Alp visited to communist Hungary and held a meeting with the Turkish-Hungarian Joint Economic Committee. On the other hand, the Albanian minister under socialist Enver Hoxha visited Turkey and suggested increasing bilateral trade.³⁸⁶

Between 11-15 June 1978, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Turkey. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and the People's Republic of China started in 1971. In 1974, Foreign Minister Turan Güneş visited China. Huang's visit was a top-notch visit. Although China was governed by Mao Zedong's communist ideology, it was in competition with the Soviets. That is why China is happy that Turkey stays away from the USSR and close to the USA. Huang did not refrain from vilifying the Soviets during this visit. According to American embassy sources, China highly praises Turkey's being in the NATO alliance³⁸⁷. He told, "The soviets were attempting to encircle Western Europe "from the wings"³⁸⁸ Huang mentioned danger of Soviet imperialism and activities of Cuba and Soviets in the Africa. On the other hand, Turkey articulated its new foreign policy that broadening ties with Asian and African countries.

Between 21-25 June, Ecevit visited Moscow. This was the highest level visit in a long time. According to the newspapers in Turkey, the meeting took place in a warm

³⁸⁵ Turkey Expands Its Ties With Communist States, Ankara 4178, 2 June 1978.

³⁸⁶ Recent Turkish Economic Contacts with Hungary, Cuba and Albania, ANKARA 4340, 8 June 1978.

³⁸⁷ Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hau's Visit to Turkey, ANKARA 4255, 16 June 1978.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

atmosphere.³⁸⁹ This visit strengthened the image of Turkey following a more balanced policy in the international system. Continental shelf delimitation and traffic control in the Black Sea were talked on the meetings, technical and economic cooperation were tried to improve.³⁹⁰ Turkey especially tried to seek support for oil, which it had difficulty to obtain for himself. The Soviet Union is reported to have agreed to provide Turkey with 3 million metric tons of crude petroleum each year from 1979 to 1981 and an additional one million tons during 1978. Three million tons represents about 25 percent of turkey's 1977 crude imports.³⁹¹

The US followed the visits and meetings closely. Vance stated in his press statement that Ecevit's visit was an ordinary visit and that Turkey did not stray from the Western alliance with it. He told that the agreements made between Turkey and USSR "Restatement of the general principles of the Helsinki final act and was very similar to agreements, which France and Norway have signed with the Soviet Union in recent years."³⁹² However, the telegram Spiers sent to Washington was bearing serious concern. Spiers claimed that Ecevit "Moved toward his party's left-wing while demonstrating that the RPP's traditional advocacy of better relations with the USSR can bring tangible benefits to turkey without damaging its western ties."³⁹³

He also stated that this visit would strengthen the Soviet presence in Turkey in the long run. It was written that if the West did not respond to Turkey's economic and military needs, the agreements could be strengthened. Finally, he commented on the relationship of this visit with the embargo talks in the USA. "It may also make Turks feel that they can respond more strongly in cutting back their bilateral relationship with us if the effort to lift the embargo fails." Ökçün went to New York in November 1978. From here, he joined Vancouver at the 14th Socialist International summit. Moreover, he invited the community members to Turkey for the next summit.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁹ Turkish Media on Ecevit Visit to the Soviet Union, ANKARA 04728, 26 June 1978.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Turkish-Soviet Talks On Economic Cooperation, ANKARA 4745, 27 June 1978.

³⁹² Turkish/Soviet Relations, STATE 162414, 26 June 1978.

³⁹³ Ecevit Visit to Moscow: Political Aspects, ANKARA 04764, 27 June 1978.

³⁹⁴ Comment on Socialist International (Si) Vancouver - Congress, OTTAWA05453, 8 November 1978.

4.3. Turkey's New Approach with Muslim-Majority Countries

Under the influence of the rigid secular foundations of the republic, Turkey's foreign policy was carried out for a long time unaware, sometimes even hostile, of Islamic countries. For example, Turkey was first Muslim country that recognized Israel. Turkey was not vocal in support of Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis either. Turkey was also not an outspoken supporter of Algeria in its independence war against France. Turkey's western orientation and its secular state identity were largely responsible for its relations with the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries. For example, Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact with pro-Western states. The event that caused Turkey to review its relations with the Middle East was the 1965 UN Cyprus vote³⁹⁵ because only a few countries voted in favor of Turkey in the voting. Turkey saw that following a US-based foreign policy caused to leave Turkey alone in the international community.

By the second half of the 1960s, Turkey's attitude towards the Middle East and Muslim countries therefore began to change. For example, Turkey supported the Arab side in the 1967 war with Israel. Demirel and Çağlayangil said that military bases in Turkey would not be allowed to be used against Arabs.³⁹⁶ At the same time, in the 1973 war, Turkey did not allow NATO to use the Incirlik base in favor of Israel but allowed the Soviets to use the airspace to support the Arabs. On the other hand, Çağlayangil attended the first Islamic Organization Conference on behalf of Turkey in 1969. Turkey then both attended the 1975 Jeddah meeting and hosted the OIC meeting in Istanbul in 1976. In Istanbul, Turkey announced that Turkey will allow PLO to establish office in Turkey³⁹⁷. It has been claimed that there were two reasons for Turkey's rapprochement with Islamic world, to find support in international society especially for a Cyprus issue and to recover from the effects of oil crises.³⁹⁸ In the 1979 Rabat meeting, the OIC accepted Northern Cyprus as a guest country. In conclusion, as Baykan points out, in the West, it is thought that Turkey getting closer to

³⁹⁵ Balcı, Ali (2015). *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, 2. Baskı, Etkileşim Yayınları. P.134.

³⁹⁶ Oran, Baskın (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, İletişim Yayınları, 15. Baskı İstanbul. p. 790.

³⁹⁷ Aykan, Mahmut Bali (1993). Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.25 N.1 p. 98.

³⁹⁸ Balcı, Ali (2015). *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, 2. Baskı, Etkileşim Yayınları. P.149.

Islamic countries at the expense of its relations with the West³⁹⁹. Yet in fact, when relations with the West deteriorated, Turkey approached Islamic countries.

The 42nd government continued to get closer to the Islamic world that started in the 1960s. Good relations were established, especially with Libya and Iraq, which are oil-rich and radically anti-Western. Shortly after Ecevit came to the government, Jalloud, the prime minister of Libya, a major oil producer, visited Ankara. "Our meeting with my brother Ecevit will be successful," said Jalloud. Libya agreed to give 2 million tons more oil annually to Turkey. In this period, Turkey urged U.S to reconsider its relation with Iraq and Libya⁴⁰⁰. Not only Ecevit and Ökçün visited other countries but also Hikmet Çetin, minister of state, and Deniz Baykal, minister of energy and natural resources. These ministers specially was in search of petroleum from Muslim countries. For example, Hikmet Çetin visited Iran at 10-11 July 1978 for Turkey emergency need for oil⁴⁰¹. It is possible to say that such an effort bring some rewards. For instance, a delegation from Iraq whose minister of petroleum Adnan Huseyin Hamadani was in leadership visited Ankara at 22-25 August. Iraq accepted oil shipments on credit and Turkish products in the return of Turkey petroleum debts.⁴⁰²

One of the most important events related to Islamic countries during the period took place in March 1979. The Islamic Conference convened in Istanbul on March 6 to discuss the law of the sea. Ecevit sent a brief message and told that "Ideals and principles of Islam emphasizing justice and equity may be a very rich source of inspiration" for deliberations of third U.N. conference on law of sea."⁴⁰³ Ökçün addressed the opening speech of the meeting. Ökçün said that "Islamic solidarity will be our guide" at the meeting⁴⁰⁴. In the time, political polarization in Turkey was very sharp. Despite this, Ökçün's statement was received very positively in the conservative community. For example, the nationalist-conservative journal of *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* liked and appraised Ökçün's statement. Ökçün was, of course, the secular RPP minister who was distant from Islam. There is not much evidence to show his sincere adherence to Islamic values. Ökçün must have said this to get support from Islamic countries, which are mostly oil producers.

³⁹⁹ Aykan, Mahmut Bali (1993). Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.25 N.1 p. 91.

⁴⁰⁰ Turkish Request for Review of U.S. Relations with Iraq and Libya, ANKARA 7300, 13 October 1978.

⁴⁰¹ Political Trends Analysis: Turkish Politics Heads Into Summer Slump, ANKARA 5021, 10 July 1978.

⁴⁰² Turkey Signs Economic Agreement With Iraq, ANKARA 6153, 28 August 1978.

⁴⁰³ Islamic Law of Sea Conference, ISTANBUL 0918, 8 March 1979.

⁴⁰⁴ *Yeniden Milli Mücadele Dergisi*, 13-20 Mart 1979, Year:10 Volume:476.

After the meeting above, Spiers wrote a long telegram to Washington about Turkey-Arab relations. He began his telegram by saying that “The substantial shift of economic and political power to the Arab oil-producing states since 1974, coupled with a deep economic crisis in turkey, has caused the Turks to work hard at improving relations with a portion of the world they had studiously ignored since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.”⁴⁰⁵

Spiers stated that these efforts of Turkey are based on oil demand, so there are many talks with Libya and Iraq. He reminded that Turkey is the only Islamic country that recognizes Israel, but that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will open an office in Ankara soon. In fact, this dichotomy fully demonstrates Turkey's foreign policy at that time. It is neither fully Western nor completely anti-Western. In fact, the entire history of the Republic of Turkey can be seen like this. However, it is possible to say that anti-Western sentiment was relatively high in this period. Spiers also claimed that Ecevit's foreign policy “He has stressed the need for a "multi-faceted" Turkish foreign policy free from great power domination and able to pursue Turkish interests wherever they lay.”⁴⁰⁶

There has been an event that perfectly demonstrates the courage of Turkey's quest. Shortly after the revolution in Iran, Ökçün planned to visit Iran on April 17. Considering how anti-Western Iran is, Turkey's plan to do such a visit immediately after revolution shows the distance from the Western-centered foreign policy. Spiers wanted to meet Ökçün before he left. He asked Washington for advice on the latest situation in Iran and what he would say to Ökçün. Christopher wrote a telegram to Spiers describing the latest situation in Iran, and also asked Ökçün to say that the United States is sincerely ready to cooperate with Iran. He also stated that they wanted to listen to Ökçün's observations on Iran on his return⁴⁰⁷. Moreover, Ökçün praised Khomeini during the meetings he held in Spain on May 2.⁴⁰⁸

Due to the ongoing conflicts in Iran, Ökçün postponed his visit to Iran. Instead, he went to the opening of the embassy in Abu Dhabi on April 23. Ökçün became the second foreign minister to go to the UAE. A joint press release was made at the end of the visits. In the statement, it was emphasized that Israel should withdraw from all occupied territories⁴⁰⁹. After the Camp David Accords, Arab countries broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt.

⁴⁰⁵ Turkey and the Arab World: An Overview, ANKARA 2397, 26 March 1979.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Turkish Foreign Minister's Visit to Iran, STATE 093212, 12 April 1979.

⁴⁰⁸ Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, MADRID 06819, 21 May 1979.

⁴⁰⁹ Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, ABU DHABI 1098, 24 April 1979.

UAE Foreign Minister Ahmad Suwaidi told the US ambassador that they agreed with Ökçün that Turkey would represent UAE interests in Egypt⁴¹⁰. Turkey would also represent Egyptian interests in the UAE.

After the 1973 war, all Islamic countries cut off their relations with Israel. When Iran broke off its relations after the revolution, Turkey remained the only country that had relations with Israel. Turkey thought that he would receive serious pressure due to this issue at the Islamic Foreign Ministers conference to be held in 1979. The State Department shared these concerns with Spiers. Vance wrote a telegram in response to these concerns. He claimed that Egypt was likely to be expelled from the Islamic Conference due to the Camp David agreement. In addition, asked Turkey to strongly resist it.⁴¹¹ He also said that Turkey-Israel relations would support stability in the region.

Turkey and the PLO were in talks to open an office in Ankara. Elekdağ said that they wanted four conditions from PLO as written document:

No one assigned to the PLO office should have any overt connection with terrorist activities. The office would not be used as a base for activities against other countries. The office would not be used as a base for activity inside Turkey. The PLO would stop its training of Turkish nationals.⁴¹² Elekdağ said that the PLO accepted this verbally but not in writing, so the talks were deadlocked.

During this period, Turkey's PLO relations were very close. So much so that the PLO sent messages to the USA via Turkey. Abu Firus, one of the leaders of the PLO, sent an oral message to the Turkish embassy in Beirut on July 6, 1979 to be delivered to the United States. Ökçün conveyed this message to Spiers⁴¹³. The PLO demanded that Israel end its attacks on South Lebanon.

Four PLO militants captured the Egyptian embassy in Turkey on 13 July⁴¹⁴. Ökçün worked as a mediator for 2 days. The militants eventually surrendered. One person was killed and another injured in the raid. Interior Minister Hasan Fehmi Güneş hugged and kissed the

⁴¹⁰ Turkey to Represent UAE Interests in Egypt and Egyptian Interests in UAE, ABU DHABI 1154, 30 April 1979.

⁴¹¹ Tenth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference: Egyptian Expulsion; Relations With Israel, STATE 115649, 7 May 1979.

⁴¹² Turkey And The PLO, ANKARA 3431, 4 May 1979.

⁴¹³ Got Passes Oral Message From PLO, ANKARA 5072, 6 July 1979.

⁴¹⁴ Terrorist Attack on Egyptian Embassy Sitrep No. Seven, ANKARA 5263, 13 July 1979.

surrendered militants. Upon this, Demirel said “A Minister of Interior who hugs and kisses the murderer who martyred the Turkish police and its guard and puts him in his official car cannot stay in his official positions even for a day.”⁴¹⁵

On 31 July, the PLO delegation led by Abu Firus arrived in Turkey. They met with Ökçün and demanded the release of four PLO militants⁴¹⁶. Newspapers announced that PLO would open an office in Ankara. On October 5, Yasir Arafat arrived in Ankara and was warmly welcomed by Ecevit. PLO Office was opened in Ankara.

Shortly after the revolution in Iran, Ökçün wanted to go to Iran, but could not go due to security problems. Ökçün visited Iran on 9-11 May 1979. During the visit, Iran agreed to give 60% more crude oil to Turkey in 1979. In addition, it was decided to work on the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines from Iran to black sea or Mediterranean. Turkey has never benefited so much from any country it has visited. Spiers also denoted the point in a telegram:

“The Turkish foreign minister's visit to Iran was more successful than his tour of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in early May. Not only did Ökçün establish the groundwork for closer economic relations, as on his Middle East tour, but he also started building the superstructure.”⁴¹⁷

Ökçün became the highest-ranking representative of Turkey to visit Iran. There is a photograph of him from his meeting with Khomeini. Spiers met with Ökçün to listen to his impressions of Iran. He said that Khomeini has an uncompromising and Makarios-like character, while Shariat Madari is more democratic and humanistic.⁴¹⁸

Ökçün's last issue while on tenure was about the release of American prisoners in Iran. Dillon met with Ayhan Kamel from the MFA on November 5 and asked Turkey to act as an intermediary for the hostages in Iran⁴¹⁹. Kamel announced that he would forward the problem to Ökçün. Ökçün said that he had met with Spiers on November 7 and had asked the PLO to discuss the issue with Iran.⁴²⁰ Later, he said that the PLO and the Turkish

⁴¹⁵ Access: <https://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2006/subat/19/izdusum.html>

⁴¹⁶ PLO Reps Arrive In Ankara, ANKARA 5702, 1 August 1979.

⁴¹⁷ Foreign Minister Obtains Increase In Iran's Oil Commitments, ANKARA 4538, 14 June 1978.

⁴¹⁸ Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister to Iran, ANKARA 4647, 19 June 1979.

⁴¹⁹ Approach to Turkey On Behalf Of Detained Americans in Iran, ANKARA 8062, 5 November 1979.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

ambassador, Turgut Tülümen, were working together to release the hostages⁴²¹ and that Tülümen met with Bruce Laingen several times. Ökçün and Tülümen held many meetings to resolve the hostage crisis.

4.4. Turkey-Non-Aligned Movement Countries Relations

Shortly after the Second World War, many countries were decolonized and gained their independence. These countries were deciding where to stand in the international system during the Cold War. While some of them approached the Western bloc, others approached the communist bloc. However, most of the independent countries did not want to take part in these camps. These countries met in Bandung in 1955. 29 countries, including Turkey, attended the conference⁴²². The purpose of the conference was to strengthen relations between Asian and African countries and to oppose colonization. Tito invited non-aligned countries to Belgrade. In September 1961, these countries met in Belgrade. Josip Broz Tito, the president of Yugoslavia; Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt; and Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, Sukarno Indonesian President were prominent speakers at the summit⁴²³. With this summit, the Non-Aligned Movement is considered to have been established. The movement wanted to remain neutral in the bipolar international system between capitalist West and communist Eastern countries. Countries could have a liberal or socialist ideology, but bandwagoning with the US and the Soviets was unacceptable. Indeed, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba and Egypt had a communist ideology but did not wish to be Soviet satellites.

The Western alliance could not first decide what to do against this bloc. United Nations secretaries were invited to the Non-Alignment Movement summits, but they refused to attend the first three summits. However, Kurt Waldheim attended the fourth summit in Algiers⁴²⁴. After a short time, the UN became more moderate towards the “Third World” countries. These countries demanded some regulations to carry out their own agendas.

⁴²¹ Approach On Behalf Of Detained Americans, ANKARA 08143, 7 November 1979.

⁴²² Mišković, Nataša (2014). “Introduction” in *The Non- Aligned Movement and the Cold War* Nataša Mišković Harald Fischer- Tiné Nada Boškowska, Routledge. P.5.

⁴²³ Luthi, Lorenz M. (2016) “Non-Alignment, 1961-1974 in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War, The Non-Aligned Movement*” in *the East-West Conflict, Between or within the blocks?* Bott, Sandra Hanhimäki, Jussi M. Schaufelbuehl, Janick Maria Wyss, Marco (2016). Routledge, p. 91.

⁴²⁴ Dinkel, Jürgen (2016). “NAM and the North–South Conflict in the 1970s in *Neutrality and Neutralism*” in *the Global Cold War, The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict, Between or within the blocks?* Bott, Sandra Hanhimäki, Jussi M. Schaufelbuehl, Janick Maria Wyss, Marco (2016). Routledge, p. 91.

Because of these demands, “United Nations Conference on Trade and Development” (UNCTAD) was established in 1964 under the umbrella of UN.⁴²⁵ With UNCTAD, the UN has left the door open to the developing Third World countries and has succeeded in integrating these countries into the monopoly of the international system. Group of 77(G77) was established at UNCTAD's first meeting in Geneva in 1964. This group consisted of 77 countries. All of the countries were from the Southern hemisphere and were demanding developed countries to pay more attention to the less developed countries. At the end of the first meeting in Geneva, they demanded more attractive prices for raw materials.⁴²⁶

Most of the Southern hemisphere countries in had recently become politically independent but were still economically dependent. After the Second World War, there was tremendous prosperity in Western countries, while there was severe poverty in undeveloped countries. Global trade was increasing, but countries that produce raw materials and have natural resources did not gain benefit of enormous global trade. In 1973, the Fourth Non-Aligned summit was held in Algeria. At this summit, Algerian president Houari Boumédiène demanded the New International Economic Order (NIEO) for a fairer economic order.

The NIEO sought to address a wide array of global economic questions, including the ownership of natural resources on land and in the seas, the relationship of multinational corporations to state authority, and the transportation and distribution of traded goods. However, at its core, this project sought to address the unequal relations of trade between developing and developed nations.⁴²⁷ NIEO was declared as a result of the United Nation's Sixth Special Session in 1974⁴²⁸. In this way, developed countries (Global North) were responding to the calls of underdeveloped countries (Global South). Along 1970s, developing or newly independent states, which is called Third World, bargained with

⁴²⁵ Prashad, Vijay (2008). *The Darker Nations A People's History of the Third World*, The New Press. p. XVI.

⁴²⁶ Rothermund, Dietmar (2014). “The Era of Non-Alignment” in *The Non- Aligned Movement and the Cold War* Nataša Mišković Harald Fischer- Tiné Nada Boškowska, Routledge. P.27.

⁴²⁷ Getachew, Adom (2019). *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*, Princeton University Press. p. 144.

For more detail, please see Sauvart, K. And P.Hasenpflug, H.(1977). *The New Economical Order, Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South?*, Routledge.

⁴²⁸ Corea, Gamani (1977) “North-South Dialogue At The United Nations UNCTAD And The New International Economic Order”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 53, No.2 April 1977. P.177

Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN. General Assembly (6th special sess. : 1974)

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218450?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header> Access: 09.06.2021

developed North-Western countries. The North-South Dialogue refers to these period and developments⁴²⁹

During the 42nd government, Turkey tried to improve its relations with Non-Aligned and Global South countries more than ever before. In fact, there was a staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey who followed the North-South dialogue from the very beginning. With the approval of Şükrü Elekdağ, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, a working group on this issue is formed and a report is requested from them. The leading name of the team was Temel İskit. In 1977, this team published a report titled “New International Economic Order and Turkey”.⁴³⁰ In the report, it was claimed that there was no symbiosis relation in the economies of Western countries, which Turkey is an ally, and Turkey. In this report, it was stated that the economic order was against the developing countries. It is emphasized that these countries should reduce their dependence on developed countries. Yaman Başkut, who was one of member in team, says that Temel İskit advised us not to suggest anything in conclusion⁴³¹. However, at the insistence of more radicals, recommendations were offered. In the conclusion, it was claimed that Turkey had reached the limit in its economic relations with the West and that Turkey should now join the 77's group⁴³².

Yalım Eralp, who was in charge of the NATO department at the MFA at that time, described this period in his memoirs. He wrote that reportedly Onur Öymen, Temel İskit and Gündüz Aktan were the leaders of this team and were in contact with the prominent socialist academician and economist Prof. Korkut Boratav. According to Eralp, when Gündüz Ökçün became a minister, he pacified names pro-Western bureaucrats such as Coşkun Kırca and İlter Türkmen, and appointed the group that wanted turn Turkey face to the Third World⁴³³. One of the people Eralp mentioned is Ayhan Kamel. Kamel works in Moscow in 1978 and is called to Ankara by Ökçün. Before he became an ambassador, he was first appointed to the General Directorate of Political Affairs and then to the Deputy Secretary General.

⁴²⁹ Rothstein, Robert L. (2015). *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order*, Princeton University.

⁴³⁰ Sert, Hüseyin(2020). “Bir Raporun Hikayesi: Türkiye’nin Batı İle İttifakında Dışışleri Bürokrasisinin Rolü ve Bakanlık İç Bir İtiraz Olarak “Üçüncü Dünyacılık”, *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt 75, No.1. p. 110

⁴³¹ Başkut, Yaman (2004). *Aferin İyiydin...*, İnkılap Yayınları, p. 44.

⁴³² Sert, Hüseyin(2020). “Bir Raporun Hikayesi: Türkiye’nin Batı İle İttifakında Dışışleri Bürokrasisinin Rolü ve Bakanlık İç Bir İtiraz Olarak “Üçüncü Dünyacılık”, *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* , Cilt 75, No.1. p. 113.

⁴³³ Eralp, Yalım(2017). *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı*, Doğan Kitap. P.50-51.

Hierarchy is very important in foreign affairs and it is unacceptable to bypass it. Kamel's rapid rise to office has angered former senior bureaucrats and there have been resignations.⁴³⁴ Kamel says that he is known as a leftist together with Onur Öymen, Temel İskit, Gündüz Aktan, Yaşar Yakis. He states that there was a smear campaign about them after Ökçün and that they had difficulties⁴³⁵.

During this period, Ecevit claimed that he could make a non-Western alliance by saying, "I will skip the wall". The pro-Western Eralp was alarmed during this period. He argued that one of the generals of the time, Ali Haydar Saltik, called him and said, "Oh, don't follow this man's nonsense."⁴³⁶ There are other people who claim that Turkey-US relations were at the worst level in history during this period. For example, Taner Baytok, who held high-level positions at that time, said in his memoir: "The government under Bülent Ecevit's premiership was probably the most contradictory government with the US Government and its policies in our republican history."⁴³⁷

Ecevit and Ökçün increased their contacts with Non-Aligned countries in July 1978. Ökçün visited India between 9-14 July. Immediately after, he visited Pakistan between 14-17 July. The American embassy tried to closely examine Turkey's relations with NAM. On July 10, 1978, it was written that Ecevit sent Ökçün to India within the framework of "multilateral diplomacy"⁴³⁸. Ökçün's visit created a serious repercussion in India. Ökçün first met with the foreign minister Vajpayee. Indian media wrote that there is observable change in Turkey's foreign policy that try to distance from bloc politics and come closer to NAM⁴³⁹. Reportedly, Ökçün appraised NAM and Indian's role in it. Ökçün also said that "Turkey was in search of a new world order that would lead to a more equitable share of the fruits of progress"⁴⁴⁰ "Equitable share of the fruits of progress" is the main objective of NAM. Turkey's intention perfectly coincided with NAM's objective.

At the end of the visit, Ökçün talked at a press conference. He told that Turkey wanted to develop its relation with NAM and Turkey's desire to gain guest status at NAM such as Portugal and Romania and such a desire is not incompatible be member of NATO. Before

⁴³⁴ Kamel, Ayhan(2008). *Gerçek Dost Pakistan*, Aşina Kitaplar. P. 12.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Eralp, Yalım(2017). *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı*, Doğan Kitap. P.51.

⁴³⁷ Baytok, Taner (2005). *Dış Politikada bir Nefes*, Remzi Kitabevi. p.239.

⁴³⁸ Political Trends Analysis: Turkish Politics Heads into Summer Slump, ANKARA 5021, 10 July 1978.

⁴³⁹ Indo-Turkish Talks: Another Guest For The Non-Aligned?, DELHI 10561, 11 July 1978.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

the Ökçün government, Turkey had attempted to attend NAM as an observer or guest⁴⁴¹. Ökçün said that "Although Turkey was a member of a collective security system, conditions had changed since it is now an era of detente and turkey wanted to develop its relations with the Non-Aligned countries."⁴⁴² At the same time, he told that Turkey would not quit NATO or CENTO. Nevertheless, he added, "Our contribution to NATO should not be bigger than NATO's contribution to Turkey."⁴⁴³

After India's visit, Ökçün moved to Pakistan in 13th July. American Embassy in Islamabad wrote that they had heard "Visit, of course, could focus heavily on Pakistan attitudes toward CENTO and on Pakistan and Turkish attitudes toward the Non-Aligned Movement and the USSR following the Ecevit visit to Moscow and on the eve of Pakistan finance minister Ghulam Ishaq's sortie to the soviet capital."⁴⁴⁴

Answers that Ökçün gave to journalists in the Islamabad is perfectly shows main track of current Turkish foreign policy. He told that Regional Cooperation for Development is vital for Turkey, however the function of CENTO must be questioning anymore. He told that because "I believe our age is not an age of confrontation but one of cooperation and detente."⁴⁴⁵ Interestingly there was similar trend in the Pakistan at the time. Pakistan was also questioning necessity of CENTO and trying to develop its relationship with USSR.

Ökçün, who met with the ambassadors of eighteen countries belonging to the Non-Aligned group in Ankara in July 1978, emphasized that "Turkey's relations with non-aligned countries will be developed".⁴⁴⁶ The speeches of then Prime Minister Ecevit and Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün at the opening session of meeting can be interpreted as proof of the support given by the political power to this initiative. In their speeches, both Ecevit and Ökçün talked about "establishing a more equitable economic order" in the world and Turkey's "cooperation with developing countries" in this process. The editor-in-chief of the daily Milliyet, Abdi İpekçi, attributed Turkey's indifference to the "New International Order" phenomenon to the "indifference of the National Front governments in this area". He

⁴⁴¹ Multilateral Affairs: Turkey And The Non-Aligned Summit, ANKARA 3615, 6 May 1976.

⁴⁴² Turkish Foreign Minister's Press Conference, NEW DELHI 10722, 13 July 1978.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Turkish Foreign Minister's Visit to Pakistan, ISLAMABAD 6710, 12 July 1978.

⁴⁴⁵ Visit Of Turkish Foreign Minister -- Comparing Notes On Cento, RCD, The NAM, and Moscow, ISLAMABAD 7005, 18 July 1978.

⁴⁴⁶ Milliyet, 18 July 1978: 6.

mentions that “the warnings made by the foreign affairs officers from time to time and the files they prepare and present do not make anyone take action”.⁴⁴⁷

Ankara Embassy, indeed Robert Sherwood Dillon, wrote detailed commentary telegram to Washington about Ökçün’s visit to India and Turkey’s relation with NAM countries at 21 July. The telegram clearly shows that how the US perceive Turkey foreign policy in the time. Dillon wrote that Turkey is following two-track foreign policy. While Ökçün appeals “leftist, anti-imperialist” rhetoric, Ecevit appeals traditional, pro-Western rhetoric.⁴⁴⁸ Dillon was thinking latter one is Turkey’s real intention. Dillon argued that by referring US embassy personals conversation with Turkish diplomats at the ministry. He told that Erdoğan Sanalan, MFA Director of Middle East and African Affairs, embarrassed by statement of Ökçün that he articulated at India and Pakistan. With apologetic tendency, Sanalan told them that “Turkey’s desire to improve relations with the third world would not affect in any way its alliance commitments.”⁴⁴⁹ He also claimed that Turkey’s policy toward CENTO had not changed. It was claimed that the British also were shocked because of Ökçün speech about CENTO.

Furthermore, Turkey tried to develop its relation with NAM especially over three countries India, Algeria and Yugoslavia. Both Indian and Yugoslav officials signaled come skepticism for Turkey because of its close relation with West and Cyprus issue. Because since Makarios, Cyprus was one of the eminent countries for NAM initiative. Dillon claimed that Turkey’s appealing to developing countries rhetoric does not mean “Turkey is preparing to ally itself uniformly with G-77 in North-South economic discussions.”⁴⁵⁰ When we look at Dillon’s argumentation, it seems plausible. However, statements of Erdoğan Sanalan is extraordinary. In that respect, either MFA bureaucrats did not support and like Ökçün or Turkey administration, Ecevit or Ökçün, told him spoke in that way and try to illustrate such impression. İldeniz Divanlıoğlu, who is high-rank official in time, says that Ökçün has no any autonomy than Ecevit.⁴⁵¹ Nevertheless, former option easily reveals intention of Turkey. On the other hand, conservative political magazine Yeniden Milli Mücadele (National Struggle Again) articulated similar argument of Dillon. They claim that Ökçün’s rhetoric

⁴⁴⁷ İpekçi, A. Milliyet Gazetesi 8 August 1978.

⁴⁴⁸ Turkish Approach to Non-Aligned Movement, ANKARA 5296, 21 July 1978.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Divanlıoğlu, İldeniz (2007). *Emekli Büyükelçi Horoz gibi Ötünce*, Doğan Kitap. P. 88.

and effort with Third World countries contradict with Ecevit's rhetoric and visits to European countries.⁴⁵²

Another crucial event was that Conference on the New International Economic Order(NIEO), which is one of main ideological concept of Third World, was held at Political Science Faculty, Ankara University, at 7 August. While many well-known international person attended conference, Ecevit and Ökçün delivered opening speech. Ecevit, in his speech, criticized⁴⁵³ present global economic order by many aspects and proclaimed that Turkey plans to cooperate more closely with the developing countries, which is mostly were referred to NAM or G77. An MFA official stated to US official that MFA personnel were uncomfortable with these activities, but they are trying to pass: "One MFA source has discounted the seminar in advance saying that it is healthy to permit discussion and that the suppression of discussion of views not fully shared by MFA would give rise to strong pressures for their acceptance."⁴⁵⁴

Spiers sent telegram to Washington and most of NAM capitals for explaining current position of Turkey at North-South dialogue. Spiers told that Turkey use dialogue for more pressing on Western countries for getting economic and military assistance.⁴⁵⁵ Now, it seems Turkey is only the country that one foot is in Group B and one in G77. Furthermore, he wrote that Turkey could not give up easily his gaining from NATO and OECD. However, if Turkey cannot resume these gains and think that relation with G77 countries is more beneficial then Turkey may adopt South discourse more radically. Spiers claims that this policy is defended by very few bureaucrats except Ecevit and Ökçün.⁴⁵⁶

The change experienced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Ökçün is evident with some examples. At the time of İhsan Çağlayangil, the ministry and its staff could not even bear to hear the concepts of NAM and NIEO. The report of Temel İskit and his colleagues was harshly criticized. On the contrary, in Ökçün's time, the ministry started to organize programs related to NAM and NIEO. Ökçün told Yaman Başkut, a ministry staff who was devoted himself to NIEO at that time, to organize a colloquy about NIEO. With the support of the Human Rights Center of Political Science Faculty of Ankara University, the program

452 Yeniden Milli Mücadele, 1 Ağustos 1978.

453 Conference on the New International Economic Order Opens, ISTANBUL 2444, 9 August 1978.

454 Turkish Approach to Non-Aligned Movement, ANKARA 5296, 21 July 1978.

455 Review of US Strategy in North/South Dialogue, ANKARA 7807, 1 November 1978.

456 Ibid.

was held in Istanbul between 28-30 March 1979. Başkut expresses that while this program was being organized, they received serious support from Prof. Dr. Korkut Boratav who is prominent socialist academician in Turkey, and Prof. Dr. Çelik Kurdoğlu⁴⁵⁷ from Political Science Faculty. Representatives of Bulgaria, Greece, Iraq, Romania, Syria, Turkey, USSR and Yugoslavia attended the conference. Ökçün addressed an opening speech in colloquy. While Ökçün was on duty, he made many programs with Political Science Faculty. Spiers claimed that these international conference “Served as broadening and deepening Turkey's international contacts.”⁴⁵⁸

Ökçün attended the UNCTAD 5th Session on May 15, 1979 in Manila. He argued that governing rules of international economic relations must be redefined⁴⁵⁹. He proposed a transformation in the financial system and international institutions. Ökçün went to Japan after visiting the Philippines. Ökçün talked about Middle East politics and Turkey's economic difficulties. Japan said it could give 35 million credits to Turkey⁴⁶⁰.

In fact, Turkey practically did not get any practical benefit from NAM countries. In the 1979 Havana meeting, NAM declared that it fully supported the Republic of Cyprus and said that the UN resolutions should be implemented⁴⁶¹. Ökçün stated that the Havana decisions are not binding for Turkey.⁴⁶² In the end, 42th government has come to a closer point to the West and farther from the Third World than from its initial position.

⁴⁵⁷ Başkut, Yaman (2004). *Aferin İyiydin...*, İnkılap Yayınları, p. 46.

⁴⁵⁸ Human Rights Colloquy in Istanbul, ISTANBUL 1308, 4 April 1979.

⁴⁵⁹ Plenary Debate For Monday, MAY 15, MANILA 09591, 17 May 1979.

⁴⁶⁰ Multilateral Assistance for Turkey: Message from Japanese Foreign Minister, STATE 130745, 22 May 1979.

⁴⁶¹ 6th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba 3 – 9 September 1979 p. 63-64.

Access:
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf

⁴⁶² September 17 Turkish Press Summary, ANKARA 6849, 17 September 1979.

As a result, I can make an assessment about Ökçün in terms of his foreign policy attitude. However, when evaluating something, we need a reference point. We can only do that by comparison. Here I will compare Ökçün's performance, attitudes, and thoughts with Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as foreign minister relatively short time ago. First of all, Davutoğlu is a professional IR specialist. Before taking office, he had thought a lot about Turkey's foreign policy and published studies. For example, He has “zero problems with neighbors” and “Turkey central country” plans. On the other hand, Ökçün wrote very little on foreign policy. He has no clear agenda about Turkish foreign policy as much as Davutoğlu. However, Ökçün is not kind of “yes-man”; he builds national interest through development and strongly believes that a foreign policy should be established accordingly. I can say both leader has specific idea about what state should pursue for it’s national interest. On the other hand, neither leader was accepted by the ministry staff. Both leaders gave importance to the domestic defense industry and the economy that is not dependent on the West. However, Ökçün's term was much more painful due to the Cold War conditions, the US embargo, the Westernist foreign ministry and the army officials, and the economic crises.. Both leaders do not seem very open to information or flexible. Despite this, Davutoğlu is more insistent on applying what he knows and, according to Ökçün, he was much more autonomous towards the prime minister. Both aimed to strengthen political and economic relations with non-Western countries.

5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the foreign policy of Turkey in the period of Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün has been examined. When Ökçün took office, Turkey-West relations were tense due to the Cyprus Operation. After the Second World War, Turkey followed a fully Western-centric foreign policy. Turkey's international policy and military system was organized under NATO. However, after the 1964 Johnson letter, Turkey began to question its relationship with the West. Moreover, its 1974 Cyprus Operation strained relations. After the operation, the USA imposed a military embargo on Turkey. Turkey canceled the Defense Cooperation Agreement. After that, the US soldiers could not use the military bases in Turkey. Shortly after, Turkey again demanded a joint agreement, but the US expected concessions on Cyprus in return. Ökçün started his career in just such a conjuncture. When he took office, Turkey's relations with the West were already strained. However, Turkey-West relations reached its worst point during the Ökçün period.

The thesis consists of four chapters in order to scrutinize role of Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün in Turkish foreign policy. In the first chapter, introduction, touch upon research questions, limitations and sources of the thesis.

In second chapter, which is devoted theoretical framework of the thesis, Foreign Policy Analysis and its implication to Turkish foreign policy has been examined. At the individual level, especially the works of Alexander George, Robert Jervis, Margaret Hermann were discussed. Afterwards, studies examining Turkish foreign policy at the individual level were introduced. At the state level, the studies of Karl Holsti, Graham Allison and Morton Halper were mentioned. Finally, system level studies, theories of Kenneth Waltz, Immanuel Wallerstein, Alexander Wendt, were discussed.

In the third chapter, international and domestic environment was illustrated. After Second World War, Turkey joined to Western camp because of both the Soviet threat and state and society identity that formed after long Westernization. Moreover, because Turkey's engagement to NATO, its military system was established entirely within NATO concept.

After the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the early 1960s, the international system entered a period of detente. With 1960s, conflicts started to increase between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus. In 1964, the prime minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, announced that the Turkey would be intervened to the island if necessary. Thereupon, US President Johnson

wrote a letter threatening Turkey. This letter is considered to have caused a break in Turkey-US relations. After Turkey's intervention on the island in 1974, Turkey-Western relations strained. Cyprus Issue occupied agenda of Turkey foreign policy whole 1970s.

Another event that affected the international system a lot in this period was the 1973 oil crisis. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, OPEC countries stopped importing oil to countries that supported Israel and decreased oil production. In 1973, the price of oil increased almost four times. No oil embargo was imposed to Turkey. However, since Turkey's exports were relatively low, it had difficulty in importing oil.

One of the important agendas in the international community in the 1970s was the Non-Aligned Movement and the North-South dialogue. Non-Aligned Movement countries were underdeveloped and supplying Western countries in respect of raw materials. NAM countries demanded fairer share from world economy. Turkey and especially Ökçün tried to benefit from this discourse. Furthermore, Iran Revolution and invasion of Afghanistan which increased importance of Turkey were two other events during 1970s.

On the other hand, during the period, the most decisive factors in Turkey's domestic politics were weak governments, fragile coalitions, political violence and economic crisis. In the 1970s, the most important figures in Turkish politics were Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel. Ecevit not only transformed domestic standpoint of RPP but also in international, which is more Anti-Western.

I examined Turkey's international relations in the Ökçün period under three sub-section as follows the relations between Turkey-West, Turkey-Muslim majority countries, and Turkey-Non-Aligned Movement countries.

At the beginning of the fourth chapter, I tried to present Ökçün's understanding of foreign policy. Ökçün generally believes that Turkey's interest in foreign policy based on development-based foreign policy rather than NATO-centered armament. Turkey should strengthen its political and economic ties with non-Western countries in order to complete its development, and the West should not be disturbed by Turkey's initiative. He believed that although detente and NIEO offer unique opportunity for fulfilling it, the West ignores, if not prevent, Turkey's needs. Because of that, Ökçün has used a harsh rhetoric against the West, and is mentioned as “a most voluble proponent of anti-western multi-faceted foreign policy” in the sources.

During the Ökçün period, the most important issues in Turkey-West relations were Cyprus Issue, arms embargo, foreign aid, U-2 crisis, separatist Kurdish terrorist organizations and Soviet relations.

The breaking point in Turkish-US relations happened in 1978, during the Montreux meeting of Ecevit and Karamanlis. On the hand, Ecevit thought that Greece was intransigent because the West was behind it. On the other hand, Zablocki's letter revealed that the US had established a clear link between Cyprus and the arms embargo and defense agreement. Ecevit was very angry after the disclosure of Zablocki's letter. After the Ecevit-Karamanlis meeting, Turkey-US relations reached its worst point. Nevertheless, after that, relations continued to improve very quickly. Many important representative from US came to visit Turkey in a short time. The representatives assured that they would do their best to lift the arms embargo. Turkey, on the other hand, said it would reopen military bases and make some concessions on Cyprus. As a result, the arms embargo was lifted in August 1978.

Since there was a burning economic crisis in Turkey, foreign aid was sought from all sides. Turkey wanted the United States to insist on the IMF, OECD and banks to lend. The United States, on the other hand, said that these institutions were beyond its control. Ökçün did not find their argument as convincing.

Another crisis occurred because of the U-2 spy planes. The US wanted to oversee the USSR's nuclear and military work to oversee SALT II. They wanted to monitor that over Turkey territory with U-2 spy planes. However, Turkey said it was impossible to accept that without the consent of the USSR. After long negotiations, no result was obtained. Another fear of Turkey was that the US and the West might support separatist Kurdish organizations. Newspapers have appeared many times that the CIA is behind terrorist organizations. Although Spiers asked Ökçün to deny allegations officially, Ökçün did not accept his offer.

During this period, Turkey strengthened its relations with socialist countries. Turkey tried to improve relations with countries such as China, Cuba, Albania and Vietnam. Ecevit visited the USSR in June 1978 at the invitation of the Soviets. On the other hand, relations with Muslim majority countries were better than ever before. Not only Ökçün other ministers also visited Iraq and Libya, especially due to the need for reasonable oil. Warm messages were sent through The Islamic Conference. Turkey moved away from Israel and approached the Palestine Liberation Organization. Yasser Arafat held warm meetings with Ecevit and

Ökçün in Ankara. PLO opened an office in Ankara. Ökçün visited Iran shortly after the revolution and met with Khomeini. Ökçün was one of the first foreign ministers to visit Iran.

Turkey has also improved its relations with Non-Aligned Movement countries. Even though Turkey is not a member of NAM, it used its rhetoric extensively. Ökçün expressed that the North-South relations should be strengthened as much as the East-West relations. Ökçün's visit to India in July shows the peak in his relations with NAM. Thanks to NAM agenda, Turkey has only included in the preferences system and exempted from some taxes.

As a result, Ökçün served in a very difficult period. There was political violence and economic crisis at home, and military and economic boycott abroad. Apart from that, Ökçün had no experience in politics and bureaucracy. Shortly after becoming a deputy, he became foreign minister. As we understand from the memories of retired bureaucrats, there was a serious tension between Ökçün and the ministry personnel. Diplomats were constantly disturbed by Ökçün's harsh anti-Westernism. It is said that Ökçün did not have a determined, planned discourse or plan. It is also said that he did not pay much attention to diplomatic customs.

In conclusion, I can say that Ökçün was totally opposed to the idea that Turkey's interests depended on NATO-centered armament. He believed that Turkey should prioritize its development by strengthening its political and economic relations with non-Western countries. Since he sees the relationship with non-Western countries as essential, he has serious similarities with Ecevit in terms of his foreign policy understanding. Ecevit seems to have worked with Ökçün for this reason. We have no evidence that Ökçün influenced Ecevit's foreign policy decision-making processes, which is something rare in Turkey. However, it seems that Ökçün had his own ideas in foreign policy, even revolutionary for his time, and made a great effort to implement them when he was in office. Considering the arm and political embargo of the West, the burning economic crisis, escalating domestic violence, the fact of an army, bureaucracy and economy that heavily dependent on the West, it is unlikely that Ökçün will be able to take more effective initiatives in a short period. Under the given conditions, it is possible to say that Ökçün has the most anti-Western discourse and attitude among foreign ministers of Turkey.

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahamian, E. (2008). A History of Modern Iran, Cambridge University Press

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit To Norway of Turkish Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün, July 19-22, OSLO 03593, 27 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=188684&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Foreign Policy Section of New Turkish Government's Program, ANKARA 04963, 30 June 1977.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=138414&dt=2532&dl=1629>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Guardian Interview with New Turkish Foreign Minister, ANKARA 0915, 6 February 1974.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=32689&dt=2474&dl=1345>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey and the Arab World: An Overview, ANKARA 2397, 26 March 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=201946&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Unrest in the Republican People's Party, ANKARA 9004, 18 December 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=315885&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Approach to Non-Aligned Movement, ANKARA 5296, 21 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=183170&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Controversy over Embassy Travel: Amb's Demarche to Foreign Minister, ANKARA 1411, 16 February 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=92293&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Union Official Accuses Emboff Peck, ANKARA 2342, 22 March 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=198266&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Peck Affair, ANKARA 2104, 14 March 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=189307&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Izmir Attack on U.S. Servicemen, ANKARA 2953, 16 April 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10627&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, MADRID 06819, 21 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=229008&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), NATOMIN: Conclusion of May 310-31 NAC Ministerial Meeting, SECTO 4109, 31 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=232629&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), NAC Ministerial: Secretary Vance's Bilateral With Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün, SECTO 4118, 1 June 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=179834&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Cyprus Missing Persons, NICOSIA 0042, 5 January 1978.

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Cyprus Missing Persons, NICOSIA 0042, 5 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=630&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 0292, 12 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=7561&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Media Coverage of Secretary's Visit to Ankara, ANKARA 0425, 18 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=12348&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Announcement Of Ankara Visit, STATE 011774 TOSEC 010014, 17 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=11763&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Transcript Of Statement By Got Fonmin Gündüz Ökçün Secretary Vance To Ankara, ANKARA 0551, 20 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=15011&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Morning Travelling Press Summary, STATE 017247 TOSEC 010148, 21 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=16802&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Follow-Up to Secretary's Visit, ANKARA 909, 3 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=26751&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Follow-Up On Secretary's Visit To Ankara, STATE 027451, 2 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=51961&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Norwegian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey, ANKARA 01253, 16 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=38691&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Papaligouras Takes Issue With Reported Statements By Turkish Foreign Minister, ATHENS 1349, 14 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=36096&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Foreign Ministry Statement on Nimetz Visit, ANKARA 1444, 24 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=46144&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Press Reports Nimetz, Jalloud, Other High Level Visits, ANKARA 1346, 21 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=42191&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Personal Message from Prime Minister Ecevit Urging Decision on DCA, ANKARA 1760, 8 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=53634&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Message for Prime Minister Ecevit, STATE 060401, 9 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=55855&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 1850, 11 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=58023&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Personal Message from Prime Minister Ecevit Urging Decision on DCA, ANKARA 1760, 8 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=53634&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Delivery of Secretary's Oral Message to Prime Minister, ANKARA 1807, 9 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=54834&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 1850, 11 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=58023&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), GOT Announces Demarch On Secretary's Statement; Ecevit Says Us-Turkish Relations To Be Reviewed, ANKARA 1852, 11 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=58340&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish-American Relations: Javits-Ecevit Conversation, ANKARA 2249, 24 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=71516&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press on Strains In Us-Turkish Relations, MARCH 14, ANKARA 1933, 14 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=59519&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Relations-Conversation with Elekdag, ANKARA 1956, 15 March 1978

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=60968&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 2051, 17 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=63840&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Press Coverage of Senator Javits' Visit, ANKARA 2270, 27 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=73097&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press on Deputy Secretary Christopher's Visit, MARCH 30, ANKARA 2381, 30 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=79846&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkey Relations: Deputy Secretary's Meeting With Prime Minister Ecevit, ANKARA 2351, 29 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=75215&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), First Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, ANKARA 2342, 29 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=75209&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Belgian Fonmin Simonet Visits Ankara, ANKARA 2348, 29 March 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=75212&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Congressman Stephen Solarz' Visit To Ankara, ANKARA 2580, 5 April 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=84832&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Diplomatic Traffic Jam in Ankara, ANKARA 3219, 26 April 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=107384&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Cypriot Proposals: Congressional Consideration Of Eastern Mediterranean Program, STATE 110036, 29 April 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=110852&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press Reports Greek And Turkish Fonmins Meet In Strasbourg, Karasek Report Approved, ANKARA 3310, 28 April 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=91564&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Cyprus Negotiations, ANKARA 3328, 1 May 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=136463&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Nimetz-Esenbel Meeting May 3, STATE 113201, 3 MAY 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=112196&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), President's Meeting With Turkish Prime Minister: Press Statement, STATE 137693, 31 MAY 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=133776&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Terrorist Incident Involving U.S. Government Employee, ANKARA04538, 16 June 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151269&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Ecevit Debriefing on His Soviet Trip, ANKARA 04874, 3 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=190352&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Congressional Consideration of Proposal to Lift Turkish Embargo, STATE 162536, 26 June 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=160578&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Termination of the Turkish Arms Embargo, STATE 244842, 26 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=239056&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkey Discussions, Munich, Sept. 8, STATE 230545, 12 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=241029&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün Met With Secretary Vance At Latter's Suite At U.N. Plaza Hotel, STATE 248372, 29 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=240909&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Exchange of Security Information, State 249586, 30 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=244402&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press Reports Ökçün-Rallis Meeting At UN, ANKARA 06977, 29 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=238772&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Secretary Vance's Meeting With Greek Foreign Minister Rallis, New York, Sept 27, U.S. Parole Board, STATE 248371, 29 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=233646&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Meeting Between Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, SEPTEMBER 29, SECTO 11014, 29 September 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=230948&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Nimetz-Denktaş Meeting, OCTOBER 5, STATE 254588, 6 October 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=245854&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), 33rd General Assembly: General Debate, October 3 Pm, USUN NEW YORK 04061, 6 October 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=246278&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Ökçün Warns Against Attempts To Solve Cyprus Problem Outside Of Intercommunal Talks, ANKARA 7811, 1 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=297733&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Cyprus Initiative: Timing, Coordination with Allies, Press Treatment, ANKARA 7938, 6 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=274850&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press Reports Luns Visit To Ankara, ANKARA 8227, 17 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=285596&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Greek-Turkish Relations, ANKARA 8213, 17 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=285593&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Foreign Relations: Greek And Turkish Foreign Ministers Agree To Resume Continental Shelf Talks, ATHENS 10316, 24 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=292402&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press on Cyprus December 6, ANKARA 8699, 6 December 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=304039&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), NATOMIN: Human Rights, Detente, And CSCE, STATE 309912, 8 December 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=324277&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Meeting Between Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün and Deputy Secretary December 7, BRUSSELS 23192, 8 December 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=307066&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit Visit to Sweden, STOCKHOLM 5057, 21 December 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=320358&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to Finland December 20-22, HELSINKI 0013, 2 January 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=126850&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Christopher Visit: US Security Assistance, ANKARA 0354, 12 January 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=109396&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Helicopters at Incirlik, STATE 048952, 1 February 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=101845&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Fonmin Denies That US Monitoring Equipment In Iran Will Be Transferred To Turkey, ANKARA 0831, 29 January 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=125181&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Meeting with Fonmin Rolandis February 1, NICOSIA 0325, 1 February 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=102554&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Foreign Minister Visits Austria, VIENNA 00884, 20 January 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=111544&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), First Day of Greek-Turkish Secgen Talks, ANKARA 1246, 12 February 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=87531&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey and Salt II Verification, ANKARA 6180, 21 August 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=35938&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Meeting with Prime Minister: US Assistance and Defense, ANKARA 6973, 20 September 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=310944&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Negotiations, ANKARA 6985, 20 September 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=310952&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Negotiations, ANKARA 7433, 9 October 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=297618&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), September 28 Press Summary, ANKARA 7205, 28 September 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=304802&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Secretary's October 4-5 Bilateral With Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçün, STATE 265783, 11 October 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=290437&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Oct 11 Press Summary, ANKARA 7545, 11 October 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=272508&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), US-Turkish Defense Industrial Cooperation: Dr. Perry's Meeting With Fonmin Ökçün, ANKARA 07749, 18 October 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=279150&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), U.S. Interest Issues - How Will A New Government Handle?, ANKARA 07844, 22 October 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=282237&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Message from Secretary, STATE 308770, 30 November 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=262676&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Press Review: December 15-17, ANKARA 09061, 17 December 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=66617&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Human Rights Report to Congress on Turkey, ANKARA 0801, 31 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10504&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Annual Human Rights Report On Turkey, ANKARA 0816, 31 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10508&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Annual Human Rights Report on Turkey, ANKARA 0804, 31 January 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=10506&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Human Rights Report on Turkey, ANKARA 0859, 1 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=50189&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Kurdish Activities Become Subject of Intense Media and Public Interest, ANKARA 4606, 21 June 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=155552&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Ecevit Accepts Invitation to Visit Soviet Union, ANKARA 1051, 8 February 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=30691&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey Expands Its Ties With Communist States, Ankara 4178, 2 June 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=164161&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hau's Visit to Turkey, ANKARA 4255, 16 June 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=151266&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Comment on Socialist International (Si) Vancouver - Congress, OTTAWA05453, 8 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=277658&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Request for Review of U.S. Relations with Iraq and Libya, ANKARA 7300, 13 October 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=252204&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey Signs Economic Agreement with Iraq, ANKARA 6153, 28 August 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=212863&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Islamic Law of Sea Conference, ISTANBUL 0918, 8 March 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=213904&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey and the Arab World: An Overview, ANKARA 2397, 26 March 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=201946&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, MADRID 06819, 21 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=229008&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, ABU DHABI 1098, 24 April 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=17985&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey to Represent UAE Interests in Egypt and Egyptian Interests in UAE, ABU DHABI 1154, 30 April 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=12438&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Tenth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference: Egyptian Expulsion; Relations with Israel, STATE 115649, 7 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=215456&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkey and the PLO, ANKARA 3431, 4 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=240286&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), GOT Passes Oral Message From PLO, ANKARA 5072, 6 July 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=155815&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Terrorist Attack on Egyptian Embassy Sitrep No. Seven, ANKARA 5263, 13 July 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=136329&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), PLO Reps Arrive In Ankara, ANKARA 5702, 1 August 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=45610&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister to Iran, ANKARA 4647, 19 June 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=168756&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Approach to Turkey On Behalf Of Detained Americans in Iran, ANKARA 8062, 5 November 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=268650&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Approach On Behalf Of Detained Americans, ANKARA 08143, 7 November 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=243644&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Political Trends Analysis: Turkish Politics Heads into Summer Slump, ANKARA 5021, 10 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=170920&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Indo-Turkish Talks: Another Guest For The Non-Aligned?, DELHI 10561, 11 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=172779&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Multilateral Affairs: Turkey and the Non-Aligned Summit, ANKARA 3615, 6 May 1976.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=259862&dt=2082&dl=1345>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Foreign Minister's Press Conference, NEW DELHI 10722, 13 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=175469&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Foreign Minister to Visit Pakistan, ISLAMABAD 6710, 12 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=173769&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister -- Comparing Notes on CENTO, RCD, the NAM, and Moscow, ISLAMABAD 7005, 18 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=179785&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Turkish Approach to Non-Aligned Movement, ANKARA 5296, 21 July 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=183170&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Conference on the New International Economic Order Opens, ISTANBUL 2444, 9 August 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=195074&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Review of US Strategy in North/South Dialogue, ANKARA 7807, 1 November 1978.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=297731&dt=2694&dl=2009>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Human Rights Colloquy in Istanbul, ISTANBUL 1308, 4 April 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=24820&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Plenary Debate for Monday, MAY 15, MANILA 09591, 17 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=225540&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), Multilateral Assistance for Turkey: Message from Japanese Foreign Minister, STATE 130745, 22 May 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=230772&dt=2776&dl=2169>

Access to Archival Databases (AAD), September 17 Turkish Press Summary, ANKARA 6849, 17 September 1979.

<https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=306911&dt=2776&dl=2169>

ADST(1991). The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR RONALD I. SPIERS, p.76

Ahmad, F. (1977). Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1950-1975, C. Hurst Company

Ahmad, F. (1993). The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge

Ahmad, F. (2010). Military and Politics in Turkey in Turkey's Engagement within Modernity: conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century, Palgrave Macmillian

Anaz, N. (2017). Amerikan Muhafazakârlığı Ve Dış Politika, Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi

Anderson, P. (2015). American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers, Verso Books

Asmussen, J. (2008), Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis, I.B. Tauris

Axworthy, M. (2013). Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, Oxford University Press

Aydın, S. Taşkın, Y. (2014). 1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi, İletişim Yayınları

Bahman, N. (1988). İran: Soluyor Çiçekler Parmaklıklar Ardında, Belge Yayınları

Başkut, Y. (2004). Aferin İyiydin..., İnkılap Yayınları

Baytok, T.(2005). Dış Politikada bir Nefes, Remzi Kitabevi

Belge, M. (2006). The Left P. 173-174 in Schick, I. C. Tonak, E. A.(2006) Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye, Belge Yayınları

Best, A. Hanhimaki, JM. Maiolo, JA. Schulze KE. (eds.) (2004), International History of Twentieth Century and Beyond, 2. Edition. Routledge

Bott, S. Hanhimäki, J. M. Schaufelbuehl, J. M. Wyss, M. (2016). Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War, The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict, Between or within the blocks? Routledge

Can, Celalettin, Maraş, Maraş olalı böyle bir zulüm görmedi!.. 22 December 2020. Access:<https://www.indyturk.com/node/289021/t%C3%BCrki%C3%87yeden-sesler/mara%C5%9F-mara%C5%9F-olal%C4%B1-b%C3%B6yle-bir-zul%C3%BCm-g%C3%B6rmedi>

Cemal, H. (2005). Cumhuriyeti Çok Sevmiştim, Everest Yayınları

- Cleveland, W. L. (2008). A History of Modern Middle East, Westview Press
- Corea, G.(1977) North-South Dialogue At The United Nations UNCTAD And The New International Economic Order, International Affairs, Vol. 53, No.2 April 1977
- Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivi, Yer Bilgisi: 160 - 30 – 5 Belge Tarihi: 03.06.1961-00.00.0000 Access: <https://katalog.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/Sayfalar/eSatis/BelgeGoster.aspx?ItemId=191012&Hash=976DB0DC0CAAE72C9E4C6BE59EEE3E2C35407B87C188C4D522D1032ED8FA937A&Mi=0>
- Çayan, M. (1969). Aren Oportünizminin Niteliği
- Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN. General Assembly (6th special sess. : 1974)
- <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218450?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header>
Access: 09.06.2021
- Demirci, M. (27.04.2020). Melami Torunu bir Bakan Yeni Asır Gazetesi
- Access: <https://www.yeniasir.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet.demirci/2020/04/27/melami-torunu-bir-bakan>
- Demirci, M. (30.04.2020). Ökçün Halveti Dergahında Yeni Asır Gazetesi
- Access: <https://www.yeniasir.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet.demirci/2020/04/30/gunduz-okcun-halveti-dergahinda>
- Dinkel, J. (2016). NAM and the North–South conflict in the 1970s in Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War, The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict, Between or within the blocks? Bott, S. Hanhimäki, J. M. Schaufelbuehl, J. M. Wyss, M. (2016). Routledge
- Dodd, C. (2010). The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict
- Ecevit, B. (1966). Ortanın Solu, KİM Yayınları
- Ellis, S. (2009). Historical Dictionary of Anglo-American Relations, The Scarecrow Press
- Eralp, Y. (2017). Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı, Doğan Kitap.
- Ergil, D. (1980). Türkiye’de Terör ve Şiddet, Yapısal ve Kültürel Kaynaklar, Ankara, Turhan
- Ewans, M. (2005). Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in Assymetric Warfare, Routledge
- FRUS, Remarks by Jimmy Carter, Our Foreign Relations Foreign Relations, Chicago, March 15, 1976 1977–1980, Volume I
- FRUS, Address by Jimmy Carter, Relation Between World’s Democracies, New York, June 23, 1976, Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume I

- Garavini, G. (2019). *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press
- Getachew, A. (2019). *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*, Princeton University Press
- Halliday, F. (1992). *The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development And Religious Populism*, *Journal of International Affairs* , FALL/WINTER 1982/83, Vol. 36, No. 2
- Harunoğlu, N. Ç. (2020). *The “Realist” Idealism? An Evaluation on the USA-Saudi Arabia Relations in 1977-1978*
- Hook, S. W. (2016). *U.S Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power*, CQ Press
- Hook, S. W. Spanier, J. W. (2018). *American Foreign Policy since World War II* , CQ Press
- Holmes, A. H.(2014). *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945*, Cambridge University Press
- İpekçi, A. *Milliyet Gazetesi* 8 August 1978
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton University Press
- Kamel, A.(2008). *Gerçek Dost Pakistan, Aşına Kitaplar*
- Karakoç, E. Olkun, M. (2020). *Dışişleri Bakanı Feridun Cemal Erkin Dönemi Türkiye’nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1962-1965)’’, Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi, C. 7, S. 4*
- Karpat, K. (1970). *The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution*. *The American Historical Review* Vol. 75, No. 6 (Oct., 1970)
- Karpat, K. (1976). *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Karpat, K. (2015). *Türk Siyasi Tarihi, Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi*, Timaş Yayınları
- Karpat, K. (2019). *Kısa Türkiye Tarihi*, Timaş Yayınları
- Keleş, R. Ünsal, A. (1982). *Kent ve Siyasal Şiddet*, A.Ü. S.B.F. Basın Ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi
- Keyder, Ç.(2006) *İktisadi Gelişme ve Bunalım: 1950-1980* p. 316 in Schick, I. C. Tonak, E. A.(2006) *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Belge Yayınları
- Kinzer, S. (2008). *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, Wiley Publication
- Kurzman, C. (2005). *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, Harvard University Press
- Kürkçüoğlu, Ö. (1992). *Gündüz Ökçün’ün Öğrettikleri ve Düşündürdükleri*. Ankara üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Cilt:47 Sayı:01

- Larson, E. V. (1996). *Casulties and Consensus: Historical Role of Casulties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*. RAND
- Luthi, L. M.(2016) *Non-Alignment, 1961-1974 in Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War, The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict, Between or within the blocks?* Bott, S. Hanhimäki, J. M. Schaufelbuehl, J. M. Wyss, M.(2016). Routledge
- Mango, A. (2005). *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone*, Routledge
- Mckrisken, T, B. (2003). *American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1974*, Palgrave Macmillian
- Mead, W. R. (2002). *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed World*, Routledge
- Milliyet, 18 July 1978
- Mišković, N. (2014). *Introduction in The Non- Aligned Movement and the Cold War* Nataša Mišković Harald Fischer- Tiné Nada Boškowska, Routledge
- Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem:5, Toplantı:1, Birleşim:114, Oturum:2, 1978, C.3
- Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem:5, Toplantı:2, Birleşim:60, Oturum:4, 1979, C.10
- Morris, E, K. (1996). *Jimmy Carter, American Moralst*, University of Georgia
- NATO Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council Washington 30th-31th May, 1978. Access: <https://nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c780530a.htm>
- <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/16/archives/clashes-and-tear-gas-mar-shahs-welcome-in-capital-clashes-and-tear.html>
- 6th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba 3 – 9 September 1979 p. 63-64.
- Access:
http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf
- OECD Economic Surveys March 1981, p. 61-62, OECD Economic Surveys January 1985
- Oran, B. (2001). *Türkiye Dış Politikası, İletişim Yayınları*, 15. Baskı İstanbul
- Özcan, A. K. (2005). *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan*, Routledge
- <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/dnc-2016-jimmy-carter-226249>
- Post Jerrold M. (ed.) (2003). *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton*, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press

Prashad, V. (2008). The Darker Nations A People's History of the Third World, The New Press

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/luks-anayasa-1072245/>

Rothermund, D. (2014). The Era of Non-Alignment ib The Non- Aligned Movement and the Cold War Nataša Mišković Harald Fischer- Tiné Nada Boškowska, Routledge

Rothstein,R. L.(2015). Global bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order, Princeton University.

Sauvant, K. and P.Hasenpflug, H. (1977). The New Economical Order, Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South? Routledge

Sert, H. (2020). Bir Raporun Hikayesi: Türkiye'nin Batı İle İttifakında Dışışleri Bürokrasisinin Rolü Ve Bakanlık İçi Bir İtiraz Olarak "Üçüncü Dünyacılık", Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, Cilt 75, No.1.

Seymour, I. (1980). OPEC: Instrument of Change, Palgrave Macmillian

Sümer, G. (Güz 2008). "Amerikan Dış Politikasının Kökenleri ve Amerikan Dış Politik Kültürü", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 5, Sayı 19

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?end=1982&locations=TR&start=1960>

Unat, İ. (1992). Gündüz Ökçün'ün Ardından, Ankara üniversitesi SBF Dergisi

Üstel, A. (2017). Amasya'da Bir CIA Ajanı, 13 February 2017 Acces:

<https://www.star.com.tr/yazar/amasyada-bir-cia-ajani-yazi-1185842/>

Yeniden Milli Mücadele, 1 Ağustos 1978

Yeniden Milli Mücadele Dergisi, 13-20 Mart 1979, Year:10 Volume:476

Aydınların Ortak Bildirisi(20 Aralık 1961). Yön Dergisi

Zurcher, E. J. (2004). Turkey: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris