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MASTER’S THESIS

**THE IMPACT OF SECULAR-ISLAMIST
POLARIZATION OVER DEMOCRATIZATION IN
POST-MUBARAK EGYPT**

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis titled as "The Impact of Secular-Islamist Polarization Over Democratization in Post-Mubarak Egypt" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

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Furkan KOÇAR

ABSTRACT

Master's Thesis

The Impact of Secular-Islamist Polarization Over Democratization in Post-

Mubarak Egypt

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The Arab Spring which erupted in Tunisia in late 2010, has deeply affected Middle East politics. The revolutionary movements overthrew the authoritarian leaders, who had been in power for more than 30 years and they were then involved in democratization efforts in the region. Egypt, which is viewed as the heart of the Middle East was one of the countries to be affected mostly by the revolutionary movements. After eighteen days of protests, Hosni Mubarak could not resist the internal and the external pressures and had to resign.

The revolution launched a new transition period in Egypt. In this direction, the revolutionary coalition, consisting of a pluralist structure mobilized against the Mubarak regime, faced many obstacles which complicated the transition to democracy. Political polarization between the Islamists and the secularists was one of the greatest obstacles to democratization, leading to the dismantling of the revolutionary coalition and the loss of many Egyptian lives.

The main purpose of this study is to examine the reasons that have fed political polarization between the secularists and the Islamists in post-Revolutionary Egypt and to understand the role of polarization in the failed democratization process. Hence, the thesis will examine both the reasons behind the preservation of the authoritarian state structure and dimensions of political polarization in Egypt during the Morsi and Sisi periods. In this way, an evaluation of the failed democratization process in Egypt will be presented.

Keywords: Egypt, Arab Spring, Political Polarization, The Muslim Brotherhood, Democratization, Middle East



ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Mısır'da Arap Baharı Sonrası Seküler-İslamcı Kutuplaşmasının

Demokratikleşmeye Etkisi

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2010'da Tunus da başlayan Arap Baharı Ortadoğu siyasetini derinden etkilemiştir. Devrim hareketleriyle 30 yılı aşkın iktidarda olan otoriter liderler devrilmiş ve bölgede demokratikleşme hareketlerinde bulunmuşlardır. Ortadoğu'nun kalbi Mısır da devrim hareketlerinden en çok etkilenen ülkelerin başında gelmiştir. 18 günlük protestoların ardından, iç ve dış baskılara dayanamayan Hüsnü Mübarek, istifa etmek zorunda kalmıştır.

Devrim, Mısır'da yeni bir geçiş sürecini başlatmıştır. Bu doğrultuda çoğulcu bir yapıdan oluşan devrimci koalisyon, Mübarek rejime karşı seferber olmuş, ancak demokrasiye geçişi zorlaştıran birçok engelle karşılaşmıştır. Sekülerler ve İslamcılar arasındaki siyasi kutuplaşma, demokratikleşmenin önündeki en büyük engellerden biriydi ve devrimci koalisyonun dağılmasına ve birçok Mısırlının hayatını kaybetmesine yol açtı.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Mısır'da devrim sonrası seküler-İslamcı kutuplaşmasını besleyen nedenleri incelemek ve kutuplaşmanın başarısız demokratikleşme sürecindeki rolünü anlamaktır. Bu doğrultuda tez, Mursi ve Sisi dönemlerinde Mısır'da hem otoriter devlet yapısının korunmasının arkasındaki nedenleri hem de siyasi kutuplaşmanın boyutlarını inceleyecektir. Bu sayede Mısır'daki başarısız demokratikleşme süreci üzerinden bir değerlendirme sunulacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır, Arap Baharı, Siyasi Kutuplaşma, Müslüman Kardeşler, Demokratikleşme, Orta Doğu



**THE IMPACT OF SECULAR-ISLAMIST POLARIZATION OVER
DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-MUBARAK EGYPT**

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ABBREVIATIONS

CIHRS	Cairo Institute for Human Right Studies
EU	European Union
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GMEI	Greater Middle East Initiative
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IRI	International Republican Institute
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
NAC	National Association for Change
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDP	National Democratic Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SCC	Supreme Constitutional Court
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East has been home to political, economic and social instability for almost a century. Most of the Middle East countries are still suffering from violence engaged by the state itself or radical terrorist organisations due to mainly lack of a democratic government and unsolved deep cleavages among people regarding ethnicity, sectarian differences, religion and political ideologies. In this regard, there is a gap in social sciences in terms of examining the correlation between deep political polarization and democracy. This thesis will try to figure out the connection between these two concepts. Political polarization among Islamists and secularists is one of the under-examined topics in Middle East studies in terms of its impact over democratization. Especially in Egypt, which is the heart of the Middle East, political polarization resulted in the loss of many people's lives in the post-Arab Spring period. In order to find the reasons that fed the polarization in Egypt after the revolution, there needs to be an analysis of the transition process since the unfolding of the Arab Spring in the country including the failed democratic experiment violence committed by current president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

After thirty years of Mubarak's authoritarian rule, the Egyptians wanted an accountable and transparent government to get rid of Egypt's chronic problems such as corruption, nepotism, economic hardships and uneven distribution of state resources to a small segment of society and exclusion of the rest. These demands were common for the majority of Egyptians particularly in the last decade of Mubarak's rule. Both Islamists and the secularists forces were components of the revolutionary alliance against the Mubarak regime during the eighteen days of protests at the Tahrir Square no matter the difference among their ideologies. Against such a big coalition, there was no possibility of continuation of Mubarak's presidency. After the repeating protests, Mubarak had no choice other than the resignation. However, although the revolution was achieved by the efforts of the civilians, the roadmap for the transition period was created by the military. This led to dismantling of the revolutionary alliance between the Islamist and secularist forces and created an appropriate atmosphere for the polarization among people.

Since an alliance between the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) was created during the transition period, other actors in the revolutionary alliance were alienated from the transition process. The MB then enjoyed its alliance with the military to draw a roadmap which contributed to its accession to the power and to gain the majority in the new constitution drafting process. This was an indispensable strategy for the MB which was alienated and excluded by the ruling regime for many years. They were ready to take every step which would enable them to assume these goals. The MB leadership insisted on rapid democratic elections since they highly realized the scale of their organizational capacity to run for it. Thanks to the alliance with the SCAF, the MB's expectations were fulfilled. In this direction, Egypt held the first democratic elections in its history through January 2012 parliamentary elections which were then followed by the presidential elections in June 2012. These elections resulted in the decisive victory of the Islamist MB, while the secular and liberal parties did not gain much. Election results constituted one of the main reasons behind the considerable instability during the transition period.

Indeed, Egypt was not ready for the Islamist rule if we consider the balance of power in the country, where the bureaucratic tutelage existed. However, it should also be noted that Mohammed Morsi did not keep his promises about forming a plural coalition to write a new constitution. Mutual mistrust between Morsi and the opposition turned into a power struggle through time. In November 2012, Morsi's controversial constitutional declaration which enlarged his authority enormously infuriated the secularist forces and the opposition in general. After this date, Morsi increased the repression of whoever was against his rule. From November 2012 to 30 June 2013, the political polarization between the Islamists and non-Islamists reached such a high level, that clashing in the streets resulted in many casualties. When the MB and the military alliance came to end due to their clashing interests, Morsi was ousted from power in July 2013 through the military coup led by Sisi.

The military coup brought further devastating results in a polarized society. In order to consolidate his power, Sisi declared war on terror which meant war against the MB members and their supporters. His aim was to definitely purge the Islamists from every level of state structure and to suppress the Islamic uprising against the

military coup organized by himself. In this regard, Sisi turned into the most brutal leader in Egypt's history. During the anti-Sisi demonstrations, great bloodsheds occurred which was described as a massacre. Many civilians lost their lives due to state violence. In the end, Sisi brought an order as in the pre-revolution period, but at the expense of many Egyptians' lives.

In this regard, the main research question of the thesis is how has the political polarization among the Islamists and the secularists influenced the democratic transition process since the overthrow of the Mubarak regime? Additional research questions are: Why did the democratic experiment fail in Egypt after the revolution? What were the main factors that fed the political polarization among the Islamists and the secularists? What is the impact of authoritarian governments on polarized societies during the transition periods? How has the military influence contributed to the continuation of authoritarian rule in the post Arab Spring period?

The main hypothesis is that the political polarization between Islamists and secularists is the fundamental factor behind the failed democratic transition in the case of Egypt in the post-Arab Spring period.

This thesis includes both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. The quantitative method is needed since the election results are the main data to show the democratization process in Egypt. In this regard, the thesis contains electoral results from the 1984 Parliamentary Elections to the 2015 Parliamentary elections. The chapters include elections results in Egypt; chronologically of 1984, 1987, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2012, 2015 parliamentary elections and 2012 and 2014 presidential elections. Besides the electoral results, the quantitative research was used to show the exact number of protestors, political party members, wounded and deaths in the demonstrations. On the other hand, qualitative methodology is used to elaborate on research. In this respect, a number of speeches made by the Egyptian presidents including Nasser, Mubarak, Morsi and Sisi, by the supreme leaders of MB like Hedaybi or by important figures like Al Shatter. In addition, the thesis includes views, evaluations and discourses of different scholars, politicians, ideologues and organizations. All of these definitely need a qualitative research methodology.

The outline of the thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first chapter, the conceptual framework of the thesis is explained in terms of three concepts:

secularism, political Islam and democratization. Firstly, the secularism part will discuss the evolution of secularism based on the western sense since the beginning of the 14th century. This part will discuss how secularism had developed during the enlightenment process by examining the effects of the industrial revolution on secularism and the correlation between secularism and modernisation theory. After elaborating on secularism in the West, the development of secularism in the Middle East since the beginning of the 19th century will be evaluated. In this sense, the focus will be on the reasons behind different interpretations of secularism in the West and the Middle East regarding political, socioeconomic, cultural and religious conditions.

Secondly, the political Islam part will examine Islam as a concept that has different versions and interpretations which change from country to country throughout the Middle East due to the sectarian and cultural differences. In this regard, a differentiation will be made among the radical and moderate versions of political Islam by focusing on the motives behind these concepts. This part will also help to understand the evolution of political Islam in Egypt pointing out which periods it was radical or moderate. The third part will evaluate the development of democratization in the Middle East since the beginning of the 1950s and 1960s. This part will also analyse the roots of authoritarianism in the Middle East from four perspectives which are based on cultural, religious, historical and socio-economical differences with the West.

Then, in the second chapter, the historical background of the MB, which is the main representative of political Islam in Egypt and its relations with the state during Egypt's three presidents; Gamal Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak will be analysed. In this chapter, the MB's structural and ideological positions will be examined with a focus on the events from the establishment of the organization in 1928 to the resignation of Mubarak in 2011. Through elaborating on the relationship between the MB and the state, the deep roots behind the political polarization among the Islamists and the secularists will be analysed in the long term.

In the third chapter, the thesis will focus on the events that affected the polarization between the secularists and the Islamists since the unfolding of the Arab Spring in Egypt. In this sense, after the brief analysis of the causes of revolution, it will identify the new actors that arose in the 2000s both from the secular and Islamist

sides. These actors played an important role during the eighteen days of protests and the post-Mubarak period. Even though the actors are differentiated as Islamists or secularists in this chapter, these positions have not been constant since the material interests of the actors are changeable. Before the revolution, both Islamist and secularist actors formed the revolutionary coalition against Mubarak's regime without considering ideological differences. On the other hand, thanks to the overwhelming electoral victories of the Islamists, and the exclusion of secular actors from the decision-making processes during the Morsi period, boundaries between the secularists and the Islamists were shaped. This chapter will concentrate on the reasons behind disbanding of the revolutionary coalition in the post-Mubarak period, which encouraged the polarization between the secularists and the Islamists and its results outcomes including the military coup led by Sisi.

In the fourth chapter the correlation between political polarization and democratization in the post-Mubarak period will be pointed out. In this sense, first, there is need to analyse roots of polarization in society by examining difficulties in the transition period, the military's role in Egyptian political and economic life and the role of external actors. The second part of the chapter will concentrate on the specific events that showed the scale of polarization and its horrible results. Finally, the third part of the chapter will demonstrate the setbacks in the democratization process in Egypt after the ouster of Morsi with the military coup led by Sisi.

Overall, this thesis looks forward to contributing to current democratization literature by analysing the limitations of democratization process in Egypt with a special focus on political polarization as one of its significant reasons. Detailed analysis of the political polarization between the Islamists and the secularists in Egypt and its impact on the failed democratization process in the post-Arab Spring period can be regarded as the main contribution of the thesis to the literature. It is also fair to suggest that even though the studies about democratization in the Middle East increased after the Arab Spring, this field can be still seen as a relatively young and developing field in the literature.

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: SECULARISM, POLITICAL ISLAM, DEMOCRATIZATION

1.1. SECULARISM

Secularism is one of the most controversial concepts in the social sciences. This is probably because of its essence and the way of its emergence. If we look at the secularism concept today, it emerged directly against traditional order mostly oriented by religious institutions. For many years, it has embodied threats for the status quo therefore it can be counted as a revolutionary concept. But of course, this is only an interpretation from today. Secularism has multiple meaning over the centuries and is not close to what it is today. The term firstly derived by a French word 'seculer' that originally came from Latin word 'securis'. It denoted those members of the clergy who were not circumscribed by religious rules of monastic order. (Keddie, 2003: 14) In the modern sense, even if first footsteps of secularism could be seen in the Renaissance period in the 14th and 15th centuries, it emerged as a concept in the Enlightenment era in the 19th century. (Berger, 1996: 4)

George Jacob Holyoake devised the term of secularism in modern sense for the first time in the 1840s. His secularism referred to "a variety of utilitarian social ethics and sought human improvement through reason, science, and social organization." (Monshipouri, 1998: 10; Wu, 2007: 55) He argued that state should be tolerant and impartial against all citizens in terms of religious and philosophical affairs. Holyoake had been an influential figure in the Western countries until Charles Bradlaugh developed a more radical interpretation of secularism. In his famous work 'Doubts in Dialogue', he began to criticize all religions including Christianity and advocated that there is no such concept like secularism without separation between religion and politics. (Wu, 2007: 55) Holyoake and then Bradlaugh had a great impact for European way of life. Bradlaugh was a deputy in the British parliament. Thanks to support of skilful laborers from upper working class, he led a number of regulations to be adopted by the Parliament including abolishment of inequalities for nonbelievers, refusing religious oaths and so on. (Keddie, 2003: 15) These regulations are only a starting point before the massive secular transformation in the 20th century.

However; by the end of 19th century, after the death of Braudlaugh, secularism entered into some sort of a standstill period. Socialism and Darwism emerged as new counter forces and this pushed secularism a bit backward. In addition; Thomas Huxley presented his agnostic point of view, which replaced secularism for religious sceptics. (Keddie, 2003: 15) Secularists needed to revise their theories in order gain their prior position back. During the 19th century, secularism was referred as a concept which included various states' measures that weakened churches' actions and authorities including confiscation of churches' wealth, toleration for religious minorities, and increasing level of control on religious institutions. (Keddie, 2003: 15-16) But during the 20th century, when conditions were changed, secularism began to transform into its current shape.

Today's meaning of secularization has three fundamental parameters. It simply refers to an increasing number of people who embrace the secular way of life, a decreasing religious control over individuals' life and complete separation between state and religious affairs. These fundamentals are not valid of course for every state. Some states have used secularism as a tool in order to legitimize their strong control over the religious institutions like in Turkey, Pahlavi's Iran, Soviet Union and most of Eastern European countries. Secularism thus evolved to a transformative concept for every state which embraced it especially in their nation building process. (Keddie, 2003: 16; Ciddi, 2009)

One of the main reasons is that secularism has been seen as a precondition for modernization and westernization of these countries. For most of the nineteenth century and twentieth century, this agenda became popular among the political elites and founders. It was also supported by most of the social scientists like Comte, Durkheim and Marx. (Smith, 2008: 42) Although they had many incompatible ideas about most of the issues, they agreed on the importance of secularism for the modernization process. In the social sciences literature, secularism has been interpreted as a concept accompanied by dissemination of science, education and technology. So, it was a mobilizing factor for positivist way of thinking. Despite the recent revival of religious fundamentalism in most of the secular countries, this way of thinking is still preserving its effectiveness. Recent research indicates that most of

the people do not give up the strict state control over religious affairs. (Keddie, 2003: 16)

Secularism bolstered modernization because it made life easier for modernization process in a number of areas like urbanization, rationalization, professionalization, bureaucratization and so on. (McLay, 2000: 54) Contemporary way of this kind of thinking was developed by Peter Berger and Bryan Wilson during the 1960s and 1970s. They argued that when a society became more industrial and urban, people would become socially fragmented unlike the former communal structure in the countryside, therefore importance of religion would eventually decrease and marginalize. (Smith, 2008: 42) Steve Bruce also indicated that decline of the religiosity can be illustrated by three important factors; social fragmentation, the end of community and rationalization. The first one is directly related with the migration from the countryside to the big cities. This is the direct result of industrialization which would completely change the structure of society. Thanks to industrialization, society will become more and more fragmented while the former closed structure would gradually disappear. (Smith, 2008: 45)

The fragmented structure of new era had a number of elements. In the medieval era, the Roman Catholic Church was dominant in European social and political life. Its scope of authority was quite large. The Church was dealing with many areas including education, social welfare and healthcare. However, when the monarchs increased their authorities, Church had lost those authorities one by one. Modern professional groups like doctors, nurses, and scientists emerged as a successor of former church authorities. Distribution of various authorities to emerging new groups also highly contributed to the fragmented structure of European society. In the feudal era, roles of people became fixed. The only thing they needed to do was working for their landlords at very low prices. In these circumstances, there could be no social mobility. Since people were assigned new roles thanks to emerging new social groups, new social classes like middle and working classes, emerged thanks to rapid social mobility. (Smith, 2008: 45-46)

A second important element of modernization is the disruption of community understanding which basically regards that society is homogeneous and closed, not plural. Before the industrialization, people generally lived in small villages or towns

in the countryside. These people had similar ideologies, religious beliefs, customs because interaction with the people who had different views was limited. Besides other things, religious beliefs constituted the main agenda for those people who treated it as a fact or an unquestionable thing. When people in the countryside were faced with other people in big cities, religious beliefs had varied. There was no possibility to mention the same view about religion in big cities, even if all people believed in the same religion. Almost every religion has different sects so does different views about some issues. (Keane, 2000; Smith, 2008: 46-47)

Therefore, people eventually obtained some preferences about the religion unlike former unchangeable uniform religious view. Even some people chose not to believe in any religion. Thus, the options which could not be imagined in the past, emerged. So, social fragmentation and rupture from community led to religious freedom and choice. In Europe, the Church realized those challenges to the religious conformity and responded them through using state power. However, the Church no longer had its former enormous power. Its effectiveness on society was limited. After the number of struggles, European states had to adopt secular laws one by one. (Keane, 2000; Smith, 2008: 46-49)

Third important condition for modernization is changing mindset from religious dictates to rational thinking. When the Church lost its authority through translating bibles, reformation movements, increasing absolute powers of the Kings, European society had entered into a new phase called as Enlightenment. This dramatically changed the European mindset. Like social fragmentation and rupture from community, it had greatly impacted on European people. Religious thinking now evolved to the scientific one which basically referred to a mentality that wanted to understand the world through experiment and observation. Enlightenment thinkers and next-generation intellectuals encouraged scientific thinking against religious dogmas which was a dominant understanding in Europe for centuries. (Smith, 2008: 48-49) However, this does not mean that European people left religious thinking or religion completely. Religion just quitted being a thing, on which everybody agrees. This also slowly contributed to religion's reduction to private sphere. New secular states have thus separated religion from public. They are just responsible to protect citizens' freedoms like freedom of religion or choice. "Steve Bruce argued that social

fragmentation, breakdown from community and rationalization combine to make the West mainly secular.” (Smith, 2008: 50)

Nurullah Ardiç criticizes the uniform character of modernization-based secularization theory. He argues that secularization thesis is just based on the conflict between politics and religion and of decreasing importance of religion in modern times. Ardiç indicates two paradigms within those arguments. First one is about decreasing significance of religion in Europe through modernization and development of science. (Ardiç, 2012: 11) As Emile Durkheim stated, “if there is one truth that history has settled beyond all question, it is that religion embraces an ever-diminishing part of social life.” (Durkheim, 1947: 119) The theory is also called as ‘secularization thesis’ which includes two main features; on the one hand, ‘disappearance’ (Comte, 1969; Saint-Simon, 1975) and decline of religion through modernization phases, whereas on the other hand privatization of religion. (Cox, 1965; 1984; Luckmann, 1967; Fenn, 1978; Dobbelaere, 1985; Smith, 2003; Ardiç, 2012: 11) Ardiç points out two ignoring paradigms in secularization thesis. According to him, the underlying assumption in secularization thesis is based on that increasing distinction of religious institutions from other social and political institutions since the decline of supreme religious authority in Europe. (Ardiç, 2012: 11) The problem here is that secularization thesis only focuses on the definition of religion in term of institutional aspects rather than individual and ontological ones which are not affected by the institutional decline of religion. (Towler, 1974; Glasner, 1977; Ardiç, 2012: 11)

Second and more recent paradigm is religious economies approach which emphasizes effects of religions on aggregate level of individual religiosity. This approach advocates that religiosity has increased in modern age because of “free market of religions (absence of governmental regulation), competition among churches (‘firms’), and the efforts of ‘religious entrepreneurs’, especially in the US.” (Stark and Iannaccone, 1993; Finke, 1992; Finke and Iannaccone, 1993; Warner, 1993; Finke, 1997; Iannaccone, 1997; Stark and Finke, 2000)¹ Moreover, unlike the modernization theories which argue that urbanization and industrialization are the main reasons behind the decline of religiosity, the economic approach indicates that

¹ For a critique of this paradigm, see Ardiç, N. (2012). *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern modernization in the early 20th century*. London: Routledge.

people who live in big cities are more likely to participate religious activities than people, who live in rural areas. The religion here is not about a uniform religious view, it is about free participation to plural religious approaches. It means people are free to choose their religion from within a number of different religious views. (Finke and Stark, 1988: 41; Ardiç, 2012: 11)

1.1.1. Secularization in the Middle East

Secularization process is not only limited to the European countries. Rest of the world has also imported it from Europe thanks to the colonization process. The West colonized almost every country in the world from late 19th century until the decolonization process after the WWII. Therefore, we can see trace of secularism in most of the colonized countries. Middle East, of course, is one of the leading regions to see European cultural influence and secularism. When Ottoman Empire lost its power in the region in the mid-19th century, European powers fulfilled the power gap and launched their colonial administrations in the region. Disseminating secularism and modernization became the first agenda for new European powers. Zakariyya argued that secularism, at first, was characterized by three features. Firstly, it was seen as a footstep to ‘modernize’ Arab society. Secondly, it was an integration process to complying Arab way of life with the European way of life. The third one is actually a consequence of the first two. Secularism created a widespread negative attitude towards the West and colonization. (Zakariyya, 2007: 15-16; Wu, 2007: 56-57)

Albert Hourani, one of the well-known scholars in Arab Studies, indicated that “there were two generations of new Arab intellectuals during the 19th century.” (Wu, 2007: 57) The first generation (1830-1870) advocated that western political institutions should be imitated to create modern states. The second generation (1870-1900) considered the West both an enemy and model to be imitated. The main concern for these second-generation thinkers is how Islam can re-interpret with new secular values. “Among the intellectuals of the first generation such names could be found as al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) of Egypt, Khair al Din (1810-1899) of Tunisia and Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) of Lebanon, and among those of the second-generation Jamal al-Din al-Afgani (1839-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Abd al-Rahman al

Kawakibi (1854-1902).” (Wu, 2007: 57) The early claim for secularization did not come from Arab Muslims, instead it came from Arab Christians who have considerable population in Middle East. For instance, in the 1850s, secularism was demanded firstly by the Christian Arabs. Faris al-Shidyaq (1805-1887), a Lebanese Maronite Catholic, criticized the church because of its violent treatment of his brother. Religious authorities tortured him to convert his sect from catholic to protestant. After the incident, he questioned the Church’s unrelentless power. Butrus al-Bustani also criticized the Church. But he also noted that this criticism was directed only against the Church not the Ottoman Sultan. (Wu, 2007: 58) For a deep analysis of the historical development of secularism in the Middle East, we need to look at the theocratic structure of the Ottoman Empire and caliphate status.

Ottoman Empire kept most of the Middle Eastern territories together in a single empire for almost 400 years. Ottoman Sultans had a caliphate title since the beginning of 16th century. This granted direct legitimacy for Sultans to rule all Muslims in the Middle East. Like every state before the industrial revolution, religion was one of the first priorities for society and the empire itself. Thus; we can see religion at every level of society as well as state institutions. Thus, ‘Ottomans was a theocratic state’ is an incorrect statement. Ottoman Sultans enjoyed their supreme leadership position both in political and religious spheres. Caliphate status had provided great privileges and authorities for Ottoman Sultans over the Muslims in the Middle East for many years especially during the golden age of the empire in the 16th and 17th centuries. However, when the Empire declined during the 18th and 19th centuries, great significance of religion in the Empire became questionable. The Ottoman Sultans like Mahmud II (1808-1839) launched westernization programs firstly to prevent dissolution of the empire and then to restore the Empire’s power like in the past. From the late 18th century to the dissolution of the Empire in 1922, Western reforms had continued in a number of areas like in military, economy, social and political fields. Westernization also means the importation of revolutionary western values like nationalism and secularism.

Under these circumstances, secularization concept was developed slowly in the Middle East during the 19th century. Even, there were no secularization demands by the Muslim Arabs until the late 19th century because the questioning of caliphate’s

authority was seen as equal to a sin for many years. However later on, Arab Muslim secularists also came into the scene and increased their voices, like Christian Arabs, especially against the despotic Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II (reigned 1876-1909). Al-Kawakibi was the first thinker who mentioned about the secularism among Arab Muslims. He published the book named as *Umm al-Qura* in 1898 (Wu, 2007: 59). He advocated that state and religion should be separated completely and in *Taba'i al-Istibdad* noted that “if a Caliph was necessary, he should be only a pure spiritual authority, while the political, administrative and military power should be conferred with a Sultan.” (Yared, 2007: 26) Thus, Muslims should only regard the Sultan’s political authority without religious affiliation. (Wu, 2007: 59) After al-Kawakibi, pioneers of Arab Muslim secularists Qasim Amin (1865-1908) and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1963) even went further and “they began to work out the principles of a secular society in which Islam was honored but no longer the arbitrator of law and policy.” (Tamimi, 2000: 24) Thus, Islam should be separated from law as well as from politics. (Wu, 2007: 59)

There have also been many debates about secularization in the Middle East and its extent. These discussions have continued for almost 200 years. They could even be traced back to the Napoleonic War in Egypt in 1810. This war is considered as a milestone for Middle Eastern studies in Europe. European scholars started to concentrate their attention on the region after the war. Especially, during the late 19th century and first half of the 20th century, their interests on region constantly increased as Europeans became the sole power in the world. For many years, Middle Eastern researchers who were mostly affected by orientalist point of views, saw modernization and accordingly secularization in the region as an uncompleted task. They treated European modernization process as an absolute road map and believed that every state had to be developed in this way. They constantly rejected the argument that every state and their people had different characteristics. Even during the colonial period in the region (we can say from 1880 to 1950s) orientalist tendencies peaked. (Said, 1978; Pappé, 2014) After the gaining of independence by Middle Eastern states in the post-WWII era, Middle Eastern scholars strongly criticized Europeans in terms of their orientalist prejudices on Arabs during the colonial period. Due to world-wide anti-

imperialist campaigns, criticisms on Western-centric ideals have gradually increased. (Said, 1978; Pappé, 2014)

Despite the weight of orientalist approaches in Middle Eastern studies, the recent researches demonstrate that there is a shift from the orientalist and unquestionable approaches to more realistic and pluralist views. For instance; Esposito points out that “the post-Enlightenment tendency to define religion as a system of belief restricted to personal or private life, rather than as a way of life, has seriously hampered our ability to understand the nature of Islam and many of the world’s religions.” (Esposito, 2000: 13) Like Esposito, Berger also argues that the idea of decline of religion as a result of secularization is not a case for the Muslim world, since the development of secularism even increased the importance of religion. (Berger, 2000) In addition; Davutoğlu criticized universality of the secularization concept; arguing that secularization is a fully Westernized concept and imposed on the non-Western civilizations as a result of Western claim for cultural, social and political hegemony. (Davutoğlu, 1994) “Similarly, Tamimi observes that in the Arab world, westernization has been imposed as the only way of modernization.” (Tamimi, 2000; Ardıç, 2012: 15)

On the other hand; Keane remarks the conceptual differences between secularism in the West and Middle East. There is no exact equivalent of secularism in Arabic language. Some literal translations refer it as *la-diniyah* (non-religious), but it is rejected by most of the Muslims. (Keane, 2000; Ardıç, 2012: 15) Al-Ghannouchi also specifies the differences between the Western experience where “secularism is associated with scientific progress, industrial revolution and democratic government” and modernization in the Middle East where the “pseudo-secularism... has destroyed society and rendered it easy prey to a corrupt elite.” (Ghannouchi, 2000: 105; Ardıç, 2012: 15) Hence, these critical approaches agree on the narrowness and inadequacy of Western-centric perspectives to understand experiences of the Arab world. (Sayyid, 2003)

Here, the concept of *laïcité* is notably important. *Laïcité* is the French word, through which secularism is defined from a more extended perspective. In order to understand conceptual differences of secularism in Western countries and Islamic world, we also need to differentiate secularism and *laïcité* within itself. *Laïcité* is not

directly equal to secularism. Two questions can refer to the differentiation, which are “the separation church or dominate religious institutions and state (yes or no) and the position of religion in society (strong and weak).” (Roy, 2007: 13-14) If you choose yes and weak, your country is both secular and *laique*. But there are no states in the world which can count as both secular and *laique*. Some states can be secular but not *laique* like Great Britain and Denmark because they have an official religion. Or like in the United States, role of religion is quite strong in public sphere. For instance; American presidents take oath with their hands-on bible before beginning the office. On the other hand; in Islamic world, only Turkey where the law contains no Islamic reference, identifies itself as a *laique* country, but there is no complete separation between state and religion due to mainly existence of state controlled religious institutions such as Directorate of Religious Affairs. Imams are state employees in Turkey like pastors in Denmark. (Roy, 2007: 14) Other Islamic countries have identified themselves neither *laique* nor secular, despite most of the Middle Eastern states have been ruled by secular leaders for decades. Secular status of these leaders is also questionable. This topic will be mentioned in the second chapter.

Like orientalist critics, Shākir al-Nāblūsī, a Jordanian scholar, stated that since the 1980s, the studies concerning secularism in Middle Eastern studies “had increased tremendously, exceeding any particular period of Arab history.” (Al-Nāblūsī, 2001: 186; Wu, 2007: 63) Rising religious fundamentalists during the 1980s increased pressure on the secular Arab scholars with their intensified criticisms. Some counter arguments also evolved. Zakariyya argued that Islamists attacked the core meaning of secularism. Their criticisms could be divided into two; scientific criticism and rhetorical ones. Both criticisms have common points with the inference in which secularism is a Eurocentric value and do not fit the values of Middle Eastern people. Zakariyya disagreed with those criticisms and responded them from three aspects. (Zakarriyya, 2005: 35; Wu, 2007: 64) Firstly, he found common features between religious authorities of Islam and Roman Catholic Church in Europe. Although a structure like Church in Europe does not exist in the Middle East, there are some religious institutions dealing with both political and religious affairs such as al-Azhar of Egypt which is the leader of spiritual institutions for Sunni Muslims. He concluded

that features similar to those in Medieval Europe also exist in Islamic institutions now. (Zakarriyya, 2005: 35; Wu, 2007: 64)

Secondly; he rejected Islamist argument that Islam is never against the science (unlike in Europe) and always supported tolerance and mutual understanding. “Zakarriyya denounces this opinion referring the trial of al-Mutazilah, Ibn Rushd, and Suhrawardi (1154-1191) and also ban of Charles Darwin, Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx as examples.” (Zakarriyya, 2005: 35; Wu, 2007: 65) Thirdly, Zakarriyya rejected that secularism could only emerge in the end of Medieval Era. He advocated that medieval mode of thinking can emerge every time, it is about point of views and perspectives of humans. Islamic world has suffered a lot from the Medieval mode of thinking. So, Islam needs secularism in the European sense. In addition, Zakariyya also continued with the argument that Islamic tradition is not far from secular values. Like what secularism did in the Enlightenment period, during the golden age of Islam, Islamic civilizations encouraged rationalism, intellectual independence, criticism and logic which could be found in al-Farabi (870-950), Ibn Rushd and Ibn Al-Haytham (965-1039). (Zakarriyya, 2005: 38, Wu, 2007: 64) Now arguments and counter arguments between Islamists and Secularists can be elaborated. But first, there is need to analyse political Islam deeply in order to reach a comprehensive analysis between secularism and political Islam.

1.2. POLITICAL ISLAM

This section will differentiate political Islam in detailed ways. Especially, the difference between moderate Islam and radical Islam will help to understand the latter sections.

1.2.1. Islam

Since its emergence as the third and the last great theistic religion (after Judaism and Christianity) in the early 7th century, Islam took its place as one of the most influential religions in world history. Such a faith has penetrated not only into spiritual realm, but also cultural, philosophical, economic and political realms of

people. For this reason, before examining political Islam, we need to understand fundamental features of Islam which are closed to interrogation. Like every theistic religion, Islam has some infallible truths which are composing the basis of it. Methodologically, there are two main sources of infallible principles in Islam; the holy book -Qur'an- and the practices of prophet Muhammad. In Islam, the prophet did not only convey the word of God, he also declared a community called as Umma which is described as divine will on earth assigned with the task of preserving the faith. Therefore, the community can be counted as the third infallible principle. These three principles are complementary to each other. "Thus, the Book is Islam as a system of beliefs and law, the Prophet is Islam as a person, and the community is Islam as a way of life. (Khundmiri, 2001: 22)

1.2.2. Moderate Islam

Political Islam is mainly the extension of the impact of Islam over politics. The term political Islam cannot be analysed separately from the schism in Islam because it led to the emergence of many different concepts in Middle Eastern and Islamic studies like militant Islam, radical Islam, extremist Islam, fundamentalist Islam and revolutionary Islam. Certainly, it cannot be argued that internal schism is the only reason for their emergence, but it is very important to understand continuous wave of violence in the Middle East. On the other hand, the use of the term, political Islam, has been controversial among the scholars due to various definitions of Islam. Middle East scholars generally prefer to use the term of Islamism instead of political Islam to encompassing various definitions of Islam. (Knudsen, 2003: 3) As Kari Karamé argues, the term of Islamism is also more harmonious with common Arabic words such as Islamist Movement (*al-harak al-Islamiyya*) and its followers Islamists (*Islamiyyun*). (Karamé, 1996; Knudsen, 2003: 3) Islamism and Islamist movements refer to broader concepts but according to Bjørn Olav Utvik, Islamist movements can be identified with three features. First of all, the movement should call itself an Islamic movement, secondly, their ultimate aim should be establishing an Islamic state ruled in accordance with Sharia, thirdly, they should organize themselves to reach their ultimate aims. (Utvik, 1993: 201; Knudsen, 2003: 3)

There is need to understand that political Islam or Islamism is a political ideology, not a theological doctrine. There is no single definition of political Islam in the Muslim world. Ideological preferences change from region to region. But there are fundamental principles on which Islamists generally agreed. Most of the adherents of political Islam advocate that “Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.” (Fuller, 2003: 11) However; this analysis is not adequate to explain various political activities undertaken in the name of Islam. More analytical definition is asserted by Guilian Denoux, who describes Islamism as a “form of instrumentalization.” (Denoux, 2002: 61) Accordingly, it is pointed out that political groups, individuals and various Islamist movements have utilized Islam to realize their personal or organizational gains.

They also invented new interpretations to answer today’s societal challenges in the Muslim world. Instrumentalization process of Islam include romanticized concepts like mythical Islamic golden age and the practices in this period. Thanks to that, various Islamist groups invented such concepts that provided the apparatus for de-historicization Islam and separated it from original Islamic civilization that flourished since the 7th century. (Ayoob, 2004: 1-2) In addition; “political manifestations of Islam, like the practice of Islam itself, are to a great extent context-specific, the result of the interpenetration of religious precepts and local culture, including political culture.” (Roy, 1994: 26; Ayoob, 2004: 1-2) This is one of the main reasons why Islam of Egypt does not work in Saudi Arabia or Islam of Saudi Arabia does not work in Turkey. (Ayoob, 2004: 1-2)

Modern political Islam is also a result of interaction between Muslims and Europeans during the colonial period. The term ‘Islamic State’ was proposed by modern Islamist thinkers as a response to existence of new European style sovereign states during de-colonization process. This attempt was a product of Islamic romanticism which was strengthened by feelings of Anti-Westernism and nationalism. Actually, Islamic state is never identified as a territorialized nation-state. The main objective is to have power over entirety of umma which refers to all ‘true’ Muslims in the world. (Roy, 1994: 13) But the conditions forced Islamists to postpone their ultimate aim for a while. Since the Muslims gave up to see Caliphate as a feasible

option to establishing Islamic state, Islamists have found an alternative way to express themselves what is called as 'Islamism' by Olivier Roy. (Roy, 1994: 26) Thus, they would focus on the Islamic transformation of society in various newly independent Muslim states instead of a single one. Within the framework of the new strategy, Islamists together with secular nationalist forces became leading mobilizing forces of resistance movements against Western power throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Islamists agreed with Arab nationalists on waging independence war against the West, but Islamist resistance like their Marxist peers, departed from nationalists by designing different roadmaps for social and political transformation. However, unlike Marxists, the prior objective of Islamists was moral and cultural transformation rather than socioeconomic change. (Ayoob, 2004: 2) Besides Islamic transformation, Islamists have also stressed national interests of their countries. In Palestinian territories, Hamas has challenged Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) not only because of Islamic concern but also that they blamed PLO for the betrayal of Palestinians' national interest. In addition; Hezbollah also stressed the national interests of Lebanese people during the Israeli occupation in 1982. (Roy, 2017: 63)

Life was not easier for Islamists even after the establishment of independent Muslim states. Arab nationalism obtained privileged ideological position thanks to charismatic leaders like Nasser who could mobilize people against the common enemy, Israel. During the period between the 1950s and 1970s, dreaming a 'Great Arab State' was far more attractive than an 'Islamic state' for the majority. But, when the Arab nationalists failed to keep their promises of economic welfare, inclusive political participation and glorifying national pride against Israelis, the popularity of Islamists dramatically increased. As their legitimacy crisis deepened, many post-colonial Arab leaders chose authoritarian policies against their opponents like Islamists. They implemented exclusionary policies against Islamists and harassed them in order to curb their influences on people. Conversely, these policies strengthened support for Islamists among people because post-colonial Arab leaders could not calculate that victimization of Islamists created sympathy for them among the masses. Being aware of this, Islamists constantly stressed this victimization through media. This was not the only factor contributing to the popularity of Islamists.

Moreover, when the state was inadequate, they offered various welfare services for the people including healthcare, medical and nutrition assistance. Mosques have also been used as a place where Islamists have been able to spread their messages to the masses. Thanks to these reasons, Islamists emerged as the strongest alternative for secular leaders in the Middle East during that period. In a sense, post-colonial Arab leaders created their political alternative with their hands. (Ayoob, 2004: 3; Karakır, 2007: 2)

Since the early 1970s, Muslims living in authoritarian Middle Eastern states have faced severe crisis in political, social and economic terms. Constant exclusionary and harassment policies by existing authoritarian regimes have also deepened the crisis. In a general sense, as population increased dramatically, Middle Eastern states have been unable to meet people's popular demands including employment, sufficient healthcare, education services, and political liberalization. 'Failed state' characteristics of Middle Eastern states have strengthened the hands of Islamists because Islamists have fulfilled these demands instead of state thanks to their effective charity organizations and management of local resources to offer healthcare, education and infrastructure. (Ayoob, 2004: 3; Richards, 1998: 91; Karakır, 2007: 2) Thus, Islamists obtained popular support although political leaders have constantly tried to suppress them. However, some Islamists have not continued their struggle moderately by using the political ground. Despite relatively less in numbers when compared with the political Islamists, some Islamists have been radicalized. They have used violence viewing it as a legitimate tool in order to reach their aims. Therefore, we need to separate them from political Islamists who choose democratic grounds for the solution of their multidimensional problems. In the next section, radical Islamism will be explained to understand its view on democracy.

1.2.3. Radical Islam

Today radical Islam constitutes the top security agenda for most of countries. Even it has been frequently pronounced within the framework of 'International Terrorism' after the 9/11 attacks. Although their numbers are few, radical Islamists increased their influence day by day with their bloody terrorist attacks. They have committed serious crimes and organized savage attacks such as beheading videos,

suicide bombings, executions without trial etc... all around the world. These frightening actions have naturally led them to become one of the significant international security problems. However, like other terrorist groups, radical Islamists have also ideological roots. In this section, these roots are shortly analysed to understand latter part of this thesis.

First of all, “Islam is not a monolithic religion. (Rahnema, 2008: 483)” Besides the main division between Sunnis and Shiites Islam has over 72 sub-sects within it. (Watt, 1998: 2) This multiple structure also brings serious interpretation differences. Some interpretations are more radical while some are more tolerant. However, since some interpretations contain violent arguments, the argument that essence of Islam is also violent is nonsense. (Rahnema, 2008: 483) In addition, in most of the radical Islamist cases, extremism has emerged together with cultural nationalism. For instance; Hamas of Palestine and Hezbollah of Lebanon have highly been fed by cultural nationalism or Islamo-nationalism when they carried out their terrorist attacks against civilians in the 1980s and 1990s. Their common argument has been that they defend people’s national interest against foreign powers. (Roy, 2017: 63) Instances can be proliferated. The extremist wing of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jama'at-e Islami in Pakistan and Khomeinism in Iran are also good examples for cultural nationalism. Despite Islam is common and it has been the most important incentive forces for these three movements, it is impossible to ignore the impact of cultural nationalism behind them². In addition, there are also two main ideological determinants for radical Islamists; first is dictates of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and Abul-Ala Mawdudi (1903-79) and the second is Neo-Wahhabism by Saudi regime. (Ayoob, 2004; Rahnema, 2008)

First, there is need to mention Sayyid Qutb who is one of the significant thinkers of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, paving the way of radical Islamist thinking. Even he is seen as the founding father of radical Islamism. His thoughts have influenced not only radical Islamists in Egypt but also radical Islamists in the world. He was the head of Islamic faction against Nasser in Egypt during the 1950s and the 1960s. Due to crime of plotting assassination for Nasser, he was in prison from 1954

² For a detailed analysis, see Rahmena, S. (2008). Radical Islamism and Failed Developmentalism, Third World Quarterly. 29(3): 483-496.

to 1964³. (Khatab, 2006) He secretly wrote his book at prison, called as *Signposts* which is the most influential reference book for radical Islamists. (Rahnema, 2008: 489) He basically argues that there is necessity to re-establish sovereignty of God because current world is like Jahilliyya which refers to the period before Prophet Muhammed. To reach this aim, he states that Muslims need to overthrow government, then to establish a new Islamic State which is based on Islamic law, sharia (Rahnema, 2008: 489; Khatab, 2006: 147-150). He also identifies Egypt and Syria as unbelievers and argues that Jihad against them would be a legitimate war. (Ayoob, 2004: 4)

Qutbist thought also includes high level of anti-Westernism and identifies Western civilization as a failure. He is quite influenced by thoughts of Alexis Carrel (1873-1944), the French Nobel Prize winner in Biology and later French fascist during the World War II (WWII), who had strongly criticized modernism and enlightenment of the West. Qutb also agrees with Carrel's biological views like the inferiority of women. (Choueiri, 1990: 140-149) Second important radical Islamist thinker is Abdul-Ala Mawdudi who has had significant impact on the proliferation of radical Islamism in the Indian sub-continent. In 1941, he established Jama'at-e Islami which is the most influential Islamic organization in Asia. His main argument was about the need for Islamization of society before Islamization of state because if state is Islamized before society, then it has to compel authoritarian policies against un-Islamised society. (Rahnema, 2008: 489-490) His view seems to focus on relations between civil society and politics at first sight, but as Moghissi argues in practice he did what he criticized before. (Moghissi, 1999: 69) He demanded an Islamic constitution through using violence when Pakistan became independent. He mobilized the masses against religious minorities to Islamize them forcefully and to obtain an Islamic constitution. (Rahnema, 2008: 489)

Second ideological determinant over radical Islamism is the most extremist sect in Islam, neo-Wahabism, which is quite common in Saudi Arabia. Wahabism actually provides status-quo when it is implemented from above to society in Saudi Arabia. However, the problem arises when Wahabism comes from below. Thoughts of Sayyid Qutb was quite effective to gain supporters among Saudi people. (Ayoob,

³ For a detailed analysis, see Khatab, S. (2006). *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah*. London: Routledge.

2004: 4) These new radicals in Saudi Arabia, called as Neo-Wahabists, simply identify themselves as the true Salafist accusing others as non-believers even if they identify themselves as Muslims. This pathological view has highly contributed to the evolution of a new kind of jihadism against 'non-believers.' Thus, they have claimed that jihad is a legitimate tool not only against non-Muslims but also against Muslims which are not true believers. (Phares, 2014: 123) In addition, Saudi governments have supported Neo-Wahabism for the sake of status quo in Saudi Arabia but not in the rest. Thanks to support of Saudi petrodollars, neo-Wahabism has increased its influence throughout the Middle East and Asia especially in Afghanistan during the 1980s and the 1990s. Radical Islamism eventually gained a militant characteristic with the establishment of Al Qaida. Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaida, was also highly influenced by Qutbist-Wahabist thoughts. Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, was also Bin Laden's chief ideologue and represented Qutb's heritage in Egypt. (Ayoob, 2004: 4) There is no need to explain the terrorism of Al Qaida here. It would be enough to say that Al Qaida transformed radical Islamism from a regional security threat to a global one. Its fundamental purpose was disseminating their cause universally.

Overall, political Islam has been more popular than radical Islamism in the current world. Political Islam has also been able to integrate into democratic structures of contemporary nation-states. We can easily observe this in the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood from a radical organization to a moderate one in the last two decades. In the second chapter, firstly radical and moderate phases of Muslim Brotherhood will be analysed. Then the focus will be on the struggle between secular and Islamist factions and its effects on the process of democratization in Egypt. Having examined secularism and Islam including political Islam and radical Islam, concentration will be on democratization. Particularly, process of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa will be analysed in the last section of this chapter.

1.3. DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

When the third wave of democratization erupted with the Portuguese Revolution in 1974, the world entered into a new phase of democracy and democratic

ideals have spread in all around world. The democratic revolution did not only sweep away authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, but also authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Asia, Africa and much of former Soviet countries. According to Freedom House reports, in 2004 there were 89 countries identified as free in terms of political rights and civil liberties while this number was just 42 in 1974. (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013: 32)⁴ It was such an intense wave for the academic community as well. With the end of Cold War, Francis Fukuyama (1989) put forward ‘the end of history’ thesis for the victory of liberalism and liberal democracies against communism and authoritarianism. The process of democratic transformation has been smooth although some Latin American countries brought authoritarian rulers back. (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013: 32)

However, the Middle East which has been resistant to democratization wave obstinately has maintained its status quo at a certain level even during the post-Cold war period. To put it differently, Middle Eastern countries were left out of the third wave of democratization since authoritarianism has proved to be persistent in the region. The scholars have attempted to answer the question ‘why authoritarianism is so persistent in the Middle East’ in a number of ways. Surely, there is no single answer for this question. Every approach includes some accurate and some missing points. But, the literature on democratization has evolved and developed gradually.

The first argument emerged in the late 1950s literature on democratization mostly focused on socioeconomic way thanks to Lipset’s empirical work on the correlation between democratization and socioeconomic factors. (Lipset, 1959: 69-105) In 1960, Rostow created a prescription for third world countries in order to reach political development and democratization in the end. Hinnebusch summarized Rostow’s arguments that urbanization, rising literacy, high level income and industrialization would eventually increase the possibility for political participation. (Hinnebusch, 2006: 374) This point of view was also highly supported by pioneer modernization theorists like Almond and Coleman (1960), Apter (1965) and Huntington (2006) who stressed the importance of economic indicators to fully embrace democratization. According to this approach, constant democratic deficit in

⁴ For the details, see Freedom House. Freedom in the World.
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>

the Middle East is a natural result of socioeconomic backwardness of the region. However, literature on democratization agree that modernization theories have some flaws in practice. For instance, they could not explain why democratic regimes exist in low-income countries like India, or why some developed countries preferred authoritarianism like Nazi Germany or Soviet Union. (Hinnebusch, 2006; Imai and Zeren, 2017: 9) In addition, modernization theories also cannot explain why oil rich Middle Eastern states have democratic deficits and have been ruled by authoritarian leaders for decades. (Bolme, 2015; Imai and Zeren, 2017: 9)

The second argument arose in the 1980s as a critique for Islam and Arab political culture. Huntington was one of the pioneers for essentialist mindset about Islam. In his work, *Third Wave of Democratization*, he argued that “whatever the compatibility of Islam and democracy in theory, in practice they have not gone together.” (Huntington, 1993: 307-308) First examples for this argument were found in Raphael Patai’s *Arab Mind* in 1973 and in Elie Kedourie’s *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* that simply argued that “the idea of democracy is alien to the mindset of Islam.” (Kedourie, 1994; Imai and Zeren, 2017: 11) On the other hand, other scholars strongly criticized this essentialist claims on Islam’s incompatibility with democracy. They simply argued that there was no fixed culture for every state and overgeneralization was wrong. (Ajami, 1992; Imai and Zeren, 2017: 11) Edward Said also argued that essentialist views on Islam is the main result of orientalism which disdain everyone and every culture except the Western people and the Western culture. (Said, 1994; Bolme, 2015; Imai and Zeren 2017: 11) Bellin stressed that Catholicism and Confucianism were also controversial about their compatibility with democracy but many countries in Latin America, Southern Europe and Southeast Asia were able to transform into democracies successfully. Moreover, the persistence of democracy in some Muslim-majority countries like Turkey, Indonesia and Bangladesh is definitely one of the supportive proofs for the argument against overgeneralization. (Bellin, 2004: 141)

The second argument also included the critiques on Arab political culture which is generally identified with neo-patrimonialism. Hirsham Sharabi indicated that there was no way to ignore the relationship between neo-patrimonialism and democratic deficit in the Middle East. (Sharabi, 1988) Many critics on neo-patrimonial

structure of the Middle East argued that inherent tribe-based thinking is one of the main obstacles for the concept of citizenship which desperately needs democracy and legal protection of civil liberties and political rights. In other sense, neo-patrimonial structure prevented creation of necessary requirements for the development of civil society which is vital for democratization. (Imai and Zeren, 2017: 12) However, according to Kazemi and Norton, most of Middle Eastern people desperately want inclusionary political governance and legal protection for their civil liberties and political rights from authoritarian rulers who used state resources to restrain civil society and to repress demands for change. (Kazemi and Norton, 2006: 202-207) Arab Spring was also an expression of this desire. (See details chapter II) So, political culture arguments, like the other essentialist claim on Islam, can be counted as a shortcut to explain democratic deficit in the Middle East since it is not comprehensive enough for the explanation. As Lisa Anderson indicated; “political culture analysis can be very seductive, particularly to policy-makers looking for short, neat explanations of the complexities they face... If we are not careful to specify its context and limits, we not only risk analytical confusion, we set the stage for sloppy, self-indulgent, or even damaging prescription.” (Anderson, 1995: 90)

The third argument concentrates on the roots of authoritarian state building in the Middle East. Regional state system is one of the legacies from Western imperialism, and is highly convenient for authoritarian rule. After the end of World War I, borders in the Middle East were drawn arbitrarily instead of considering cultural identities like sects or ethnicities by the colonial powers. This led to chronic societal problems in the Middle East in general and social cleavages constituted one of the main threats for the stability in the newly independent Middle Eastern states. More importantly, social cleavages have prevented the creation of a national identity which is accepted as a critical requirement for democratization. In such an environment, authoritarian leaders also used religious and ethnic differences to further polarization through stressing differences rather than commonalities. In the short term, this contributed a lot to their political success but in the long term, it led to devastating consequences for the region. The importance of congruent national identity for democratization can be seen in relatively democratic states; Turkey and Israel which were able to form their borders and national identities. (Hinnebusch, 2006: 377-378)

For this reason; intellectuals, coronels, and activists firstly focused on resolving societal fragmentation rather than dealing with democratization. At the same time, “the main stream political movements, -Pan-Arabism and Political Islam, hence have been dealt with authenticity, unity and identity not democratization.” (Hinnebusch, 2005: 378) “They have also used state power to seeking legitimacy through championing of identity rather than democratic approval. Arabism and Islamism thus emerged as a two main competitive identity against the common enemies like the West.” (Hinnebusch, 2005: 378) In addition, contested borders eventually led to irredentism which shortly refers to expansionist ambitions. Some states like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq followed this path during the two Gulf Wars generating security dilemmas for neighbouring countries. Irredentism thus caused high level insecurity and intrust among the countries in the Middle East. When they have invested more for armaments, they have also fallen short of democratization and democratic peace. (Hinnebusch, 2005: 378-379)

The fourth and the final argument involves the role of external powers which is undeniably significant to explain the persistence of authoritarianism in the region. Middle Eastern states, even after obtaining independence from the West, could not get rid of Western influence completely. New independent states have desperately needed external aids to afford requisites for sustaining economic growths. The fundamental purpose of the external aids was to preserve pro-Western or pro-Soviet authoritarian regimes which confronted legitimacy crises. Although the effective use of external aids was arguable, it was a fact that Middle Eastern states became more and more dependent on the West, particularly the US and Soviet Union (USSR) which were patron states for most of Middle Eastern states during the Cold War period. The Soviet influence in the region stemmed from not only its supports to Arab nationalists in their war against Israel but also from ideological similarities and the common notion of anti-imperialism. (Hinnebusch, 2005: 379-380)

On the other hand, the US, despite its traditional democratic rhetoric, supported authoritarian leaders continuously in exchange for their alignment with pro-Western policies. With the end of the Cold War, the US, as the sole hegemon power, fulfilled the power gap quickly and tried to become a new patron for former pro-Soviet countries while they remained blind to the democratic deficit in the region. There were several reasons behind the US' preference for the status quo in the Middle East. Firstly,

according to Heydemann, the US Foreign Policy generally prefers stability and economic liberalization instead of dealing with democratization. Furthermore, the US only supported democratization when its security was in danger. (Heydemann, 2002: 104) Secondly, as Bellin argued the US pursued good relations with the authoritarian regimes since they were seen as vital to realize US foreign policy objectives, namely secure access to rich energy resources, containment of radical Islam and guaranteeing the security of Israel. (Bellin, 2004: 149; Imai and Zeren, 2017: 13) Lastly, Bolme indicates that presence of elections is enough for the US if opposition groups are allowed to compete in the elections. The US does not also care whether the elections are free and fair as long as authoritarian but friendly regimes survive. (Bolme 2015; Imai and Zeren, 2017: 13)

In sum, Middle Eastern states have had democratic deficit since their establishment. Although a number of democratic reforms were launched in the region, we cannot maintain that they have fully accomplished their aims. In the meantime, the Arab Spring which is the one of the turning points in the region caused visible differences. It is an unprecedented social movement that strongly challenged the authoritarian regimes. Although most of the countries restored their authoritarian regimes again, the Arab Spring was definitely a warning for them. In the third chapter the Arab Spring and its effects will be analysed through a detailed examination former President Mursi's and President Sisi's periods in Egypt. Thus, we can evaluate whether there has been any democratization in Egypt so far. But first, in the following chapter, historical background of Muslim Brotherhood and its relations with secular forces and their contribution to Egyptian democracy under Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Mubarak periods will be analysed.

CHAPTER TWO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Polarization between the secular forces and the Islamists did not occur in one night. There are a number of long-term causes which have fed antagonism between the both sides. In order to understand the scope and the range of polarization, there is need to identify the actors historically. There is no doubt that many actors play a role behind the polarization in Egypt but this study focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood and analyses firstly the Muslim Brotherhood and its relations with the state under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periods.

2.1. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Muslim Brotherhood will become the main focus of this section since they are one of the main political organizations which represent political Islam in Egypt.

2.1.1. Early Years of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928-1952)

The MB is the most influential and successful Islamist organization in the world. Today, it is the most significant non-state actor s in Egypt which is largest country in the Middle East with its eighty million population. Ideologically, it represents Sunni revivalist Islam. It has also a number of affiliate organizations in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain and Sudan which are independent from each other. Although the organization have bunch of independent entities, their headquarter is (still) in Cairo, Egypt. Therefore, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have always been the locomotive of the organization. (Wickham, 2013: 20) Conceptually, the next chapters will just refer to the MB in Egypt.

The MB was founded by Hasan Al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. Banna is not only counted as the founder of the organization but also, he is a role model and a charismatic leader for the followers of the Muslim Brotherhood who describe s his ideology as exemplifying Islamic ideals even today. (Zollner. 2009: 9) Ideologically, Hasan Al-Banna can be regarded as one of the first representatives of radical Islam. During his leadership, he was highly influenced by fascism in Europe and established a

totalitarian system within the organization. During the fifth congress of society in 1938, he clearly drew the society's guide that the Muslim Brotherhood would not only be interested in the precepts of Islam but also identified that "Islam is creed and worship, country and nationality, religion and government, action and spirituality, Book -the Qu'ran- and sword." (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 40) Thanks to the Banna's vision to extend the society's space, the Muslim Brotherhood had been gradually politicized and held mass demonstrations to raise their voices in order to restore implementation of Sharia law and to challenge rival groups like pro-fascist Young Egypt Party and the nationalist Wafd Party. Hasan Al-Banna also established a militant wing of the society, called as "Special Apparatus" after his exile from Cairo and brief imprisonment due to accusations of organizing pro-axis activities in Egypt. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 40)

In order to legitimize totalitarian structure of the brothers, Banna canalized the members toward a single cause while ending the party system within the organization. He argued that according to some interpretation of Islamic texts, political parties could be seen as a sin since they divided Umma into different directions. Political parties were thus viewed as a cause of further sectarianism and as a thing that needs to be destroyed. (Hassan, 2005; Zahid, 2010: 85-86) Banna created another important motive for his followers: reviving the idea of Islamic caliphate. In this direction, the brothers paid their attention to improving ties with the entire Arab region. Banna also stressed the sufferings of the Palestinians during crises in the 1930s and 1940s through distribution of brochures, managing sermons and operating demonstrations. Banna's political discourse thus played an important role to rallying Egyptian people against the Israelis during the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. (Zahid, 2010: 86) These efforts had also highly contributed to the extension of the organization to the outside of Egypt. (Hassan, 2005) In 1948, the organization had approximately 150.000 official members and one million followers in Egypt alone. (Zahid, 2010: 86)

In addition to the brothers' stance against political events in the 1930s and 1940s, there were three main leading factors in dramatic rise of the brothers' popularity. First factor was that the MB have offered various public services to the people including financial aids for lower classes, education for children of poorer families, medical assistance to sick people who cannot afford the expensive medicines.

(Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 40; Zahid, 2010: 72) The MB reached thus enormous number of people even further than what Banna thought because Egyptian economy was in a bad shape and most of the Egyptians were living under the hunger threshold. This was highly significant in terms of showing the MB's ability to commit economic and social promises to Egyptian people. (Munson, 2001) According to some commentators in media, the MB activities can be identified as a state within state. This is a very common comment about the MB in media even for today. (Zahid, 2010: 72) The confusion of authority has comprised one of the main reasons behind the constant disagreement between the state and the MB.

The second factor was importance of mosques to deliver the MB's propaganda messages to Egyptian population. (Yakran, 1998; Zahid, 2010: 73) Mosques are one of the rare free spaces in Egypt which are allowed for gathering of people by the Egyptian government since mosques are sacred places for Muslims. The government intervention on mosques has only been at limited level like controlling messages of preachers in Islamic sermons. The mosques are also convenient places for an Islamic organization to recruit new members and to disseminate its messages. (Munson, 2001)

Lastly, the third factor was Banna's charismatic leadership and his effect on people. He was a great orator who could gather huge number of people in sermons (Goldberg, 1986) Banna's speeches had easily attracted people's attention to the MB. and contributed to a highly dramatic rise in the number of memberships. Banna's personal efforts and charisma had a great impact in turning the Brotherhood from a local Islamic movement to a mass political movement. Even the members of the MB had seen him as a new sufi leader. (Zahid, 2010: 73) Thanks to this strong support, Banna had behaved like as a religious leader in Egypt and delivering many advises, public letters and memorandums to the Egyptian Monarchy and Egyptian Prime Ministers in various subject. The main subjects of these memorandums included enforcement of the Islamic law and immediate support for the Palestinians against Israelis. (Zahid, 2010: 73-74; Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 40) On the other hand, "in publicised letters, he called for specific measures, such as the banning of usury, the banning of alcohol, the expansion of hospitals and clinics, the improvement of working conditions, and a minimum wage." (Zahid 2010, 74)

Meanwhile, despite Al Banna seemed as a flawless leader in the eyes of the members of the brothers, during his leadership, he faced two important dissident events which shook his authority harshly. First was related with Abd-al Hakim Abidin who was Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood and the brother-in law of Al Banna. In 1945, there was a general discontent within the organization against Abidin's corrupt activities and abuse of his position to acquire material and spiritual interests. General complaints about him continued until the early 1947. Finally, the Guidance Council which was one of the strong institutional mechanisms within the organization judged over the dismissal of Abidin after the advice of the Internal Committee. (Mitchell, 1993: 52-54) However, Banna did not endorse this decision about his brother-in-law and helped to launder him from all accusations despite the presence of strong evidence for Abidin's corruption record. Banna thus did not recognize democracy within the organization despite the fact that this arbitrary decision blew up his authority. Some leading members like Ibrahim Hassan quitted the organization to protest Banna's decision. (Zollner, 2009: 15)

The second significant dissident event stemmed from the organization's second man, Abd-al Rahman al Sukkari who was the deputy leader after Banna. Unlike Banna, Al-Sukkari had different opinions about the organization's antagonistic policies against the Wafd Party. In the first chance, he raised concerns about Banna's leadership. However, thanks to Banna's pressure, the Consultative Assembly of the Muslim Brotherhood decided to exclude al-Sukkari from all organizational activities. Banna thus refused the second inquiry for his leadership and secured the continuation of strong leadership within the organization. (Zollner, 2009: 15)

After al-Sukkari, Salih al-Ashmawi who was the leader of the Brotherhood's paramilitary group; the Special Apparatus, took his position. Al-Ashmawi became the second powerful figure within the organization. Under al-Ashmawi's leadership, the Special Apparatus organized many brutal attacks against the British, Egyptian Jews and Egyptian public officials. These violent activities accelerated when the Egyptian government cruelly punished the members who were found guilty. Ashmawi's revanchist discourse had kept members' willingness high to carry out further attacks. (Zollner, 2009: 13) Especially in 1948, the Secret Unit assassinated an Egyptian judge Ahmad al-Khazandar who punished the brotherhoods' members harshly in the past.

(Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 40-41) In response, the government launched massive counter attacks against the Muslim Brotherhood. The government also found some evidences about the linkage between organization and the assassinations. Saudi Prime Minister, Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi declared the brotherhood as a terrorist organization and announced its dissolution on 8 December, 1948. (Zollner, 2009: 13)

The Muslim Brotherhood was accused of serious crimes including committing a number of assassinations and plotting a coup against the government. (Shadi, 1981: 337-346) The decree in 8 December would not become a cure for the violence circle in the country. Even the number of reprisal attacks dramatically increased. Rising violence circle resulted in the assassination of prime minister on 28 December, 1948. The Saudi leader, Abd-al Hadi came to power, replacing the Nuqrashi. (Zollner, 2009: 13-14) Taking advantages of the power gap, Al Banna planned a coup for the new government but, during the coup attempt, he was shot by a police officer on February 12, 1949. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 41)

With Al Banna's death, the brotherhood entered a short standstill period. From Al Banna's death on February 12, 1949, to Hudaybi's coming to power in the mid-1951, the organization faced a number of challenges that jeopardized even the organization's existence. During the period, bunch of trials started and many high ranks, famous the MB members were tortured and jailed. The organization's reputation was also highly depleted in the eyes of public. In order to prevent annihilation both on the public and societal level, the brotherhood used strong personal networks both with the people and public officials who sympathised with the organization. (Zollner, 2009: 16)

Another important challenge that needed to be overcome was the question of who would be in charge. Decision on future leadership would not be an easy process because this was the first experience in the organization's history. According to the brotherhood's constitution, the new leader must be elected by majority of the votes as long as eighty percent of the members attended the ballot in the Brotherhood's General Assembly. (Mitchell, 1993: 165) However, due to imprisonment of the Brotherhoods members, the General Assembly would not be held with eighty percent attendance for a while. Normally, the leader of Muslim Brotherhood needs to be the man who have all political support of the members without facing any serious objections like Al

Banna but this time, there was multiple candidates which had equal chance to lead the organization. This naturally created political competition between the candidates until the election for the new leadership. Prominent candidates were Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, Mustafa Mu'min, Shaykh Hasan al-Baquri and Abd-al Hakim Abidin. (Zollner, 2009: 16)

On the other hand, Salih al-Ashmawi, the head of Special Apparatus, was seen as the strongest candidate to the new leadership due to his possession of armed force. Ideologically, Al-Ashmawi had always preferred use of force and violence as a prior tool for reaching an ultimate cause rather than dealing with democratic ways. In this regard, he was one of the representatives of radical Islamist faction within the organization while the other four candidates had more moderate visions. However; the general trend within the organization complied with Al-Ashmawi's stance due to violence against Brotherhood's members. Thanks to revanchist feelings, Al-Ashmawi was able to eliminate his rivals for leadership one by one. When the dispute arose between Al-Ashmawi and Mustafa Mu'min, Guide Council decided in the behalf of Al-Ashmawi and expelled Mu'min from Egypt. (Zollner, 2009: 16-17) Al-Ashmawi had thus the strongest position for the new leadership. But, despite of all his advantages, Al-Ashmawi could never come to power. There was consensus among high rank members that Al-Ashmawi's hard liner stance would not be good for organization's reconciling process with the Egyptian government. There was a danger for the brotherhood's conversion into an underground organization. This was highly against the brotherhood's ultimate purpose to be a mass political movement in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood needed to remove terrorist stamp through reconciling with the government. There was a belief that this would not occur under Al-Ashmawi leadership. (Zollner, 2009: 17-18)

After almost three years standstill period, the organization found a new leader on October 1951, Hasan al-Hudaybi who was an unknown and low-profile figure within the organization despite he was a respected judge with twenty-five years' experience (Wickham, 2013: 26). Although this decision created number of factions, the members thought that Hudaybi's leadership could eliminate the threat of annihilation. (Zollner, 2009: 19) Ideologically, Hasan al Hudaybi who was a moderate leader had close relations with the Saudi government and Egyptian wealthy

landowners. His main purpose was to remove the Dissolution Act of December 1948 and to get back the organization into political party system again. (Zollner, 2009: 20) Despite Hedaybi's moderate stance, the organization would not move toward moderate Islamism yet but it would preserve its existence. Thanks to the prominent members like Sayyid Qutb who joined the ranks of the brotherhoods in the 1950s, turning the brothers into moderate organization became a hard task even for Hedaybi. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 41)

2.1.2. Muslim Brotherhood Under Nasser's Egypt: Nasser, Free Officers and The Muslim Brotherhood

The Free Officers was founded in July 1949 by Gamal Abdal Nasser, Kamaledine Hussein, Hassan Ibrahim, Abdel Rauf, Khaled Muhiyeddine, and Abdel Monem who were all former members of Special Apparatus from 1945 to 1946. (Zahid, 2010: 78) Their main and urgent purpose was nationalizing Egyptian economic estates and to get rid of Saudi monarchy and foreign influence. In order to realize that quickly, the Free Officers plotted a successful coup against the government on 23 July 1952. (Zahid, 2010: 78; Zollner, 2009: 25; Wickham, 2013: 27; Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 41). Some suggested that the MB played an important role during the coup. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 41) The linkage between the Free Officers and the MB was obvious but they had up-and-down and mostly hostile relations during the Nasser period unlike the MB elites' guesses.

Nasser had welcomed all political and military support wherever it came from in order to obtain Egyptian leadership. However, his goal did not include equal representation or any democratization attempts. Nasser just wanted absolute authority without any dissidents or objections to his calls. Despite the MB's losses like detention of prominent members during the standstill period, the organization was still powerful for competing for Egyptian leadership. Nasser therefore saw the MB as a rival rather than a companion despite he was also a former member of the MB. Nasser's first move was that when the first government was formed in September 1952 under the leadership of Mohammed Naguib (who was appointed as a commander of chief by the Free Officers), any MB member would not be allowed to join the cabinet. (Zahid,

2010: 79-80) This exclusion attempt encouraged oppositions among the public against the Free Officers. The MB mobilized the people and arranged a number of demonstrations together with the leftists demanding civilian rule. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 41)

As objections increased, the government decided to implement harsh measures against the dissidents. The new MB leader, Hudaybi obtained information from his personal connections within the government officials about the Nasser's harsh measures by the end of 1952. Hudaybi thus prevented the prohibition of the MB from all political activities by avoiding efforts to register the MB as a political party. As Hudaybi guessed, Nasser banned all political parties in November 1953 except the MB which was identified as an organization, not a political party. (Zahid, 2010: 79) On the other hand, some authors argued that the government exempted the MB from the prohibition of political parties because they could not give up the MB's political and social support while the regime was still vulnerable. (Zollner, 2009: 31) For both approaches; the MB remained as a sole power which could be seen as a threat for Nasser's rule. Nasser was highly resented high-level autonomy of the MB. He needed to do something in order to absorb the MB's power. In this direction, he offered a political party status to the MB but just under the Freedom Committee umbrella. Nasser wanted to control the MB through identifying it as a government-backed political party. (Zollner, 2009: 31) Hudaybi rejected Nasser's proposal since he was not ready to give up the organization's autonomy and replied that "parties with principles cannot be established through the army and the police." (Zahid 2010: 79) After that reply, Nasser openly started to support Hudaybi's dissidents in the MB to overthrow him for the sake of a Nasserist leader in the MB. Nasser's attempt was highly effective because there was a considerable number of members which were against Hudaybi's leadership within the MB. (Gordon, 1992: 103; Mitchell, 1993: 116-25)

Unsurprisingly, the tensions between the new government and the MB dramatically increased especially on May 1953. Nasser launched serious precautions to end the 'state within state' status of the MB. First precaution was related to the recruitment process of the MB. Nasser was strongly against the expansion of the MB recruitment through government officials like the military and police. This was

provided with the MB's access to easy information from the state institutions through the government officials who were also the MB members. (Zahid, 2010: 79) Secondly, Nasser was highly against the presence of military groups except Egypt National Army. In order to realize this, he wanted to purge all military activities of the MB by disbanding the Special Apparatus. However, the MB did not have any intention to abandon the Special Apparatus without severe confrontation. Hudaybi challenged Nasser by rejecting these precautions and resorted to violence against Nasserists even within the MB. (Zahid, 2010: 79)

Nasser's support was not the only motive behind the growing number of dissidents against Hudaybi's leadership. Dissidents also demanded more democratic structures that would enable the discussion of different views and administrative reforms to get rid of hierarchical and authoritarian structure in the MB. (Zollner, 2009: 32) Here, the real problem was that opponents wanted to realize their purposes by force, not by conciliatory ways. On 27 November 1953, they invaded Hudaybi's house forcing him to abandon the MB leadership. This event was controlled by Hudaybi's supporters immediately but it was important to show capabilities of opponents. (Zollner, 2009: 33)

Nasser saw the internal turmoil between Hudaybi and his opponents as a chance for the dissolution of the organization. By January 1954, under Nasser's influence, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) ordered the dissolution of the MB. (Mitchell, 1993: 126). Many MB members and Hudaybi supporters were arrested including Hudaybi himself who was the main target of the operation. Hudaybi sent a letter to president of Egypt, Muhammed Naguip about the unfair decisions and the real cause of the MB. Since Nasser was not president of Egypt yet, Naguip who still wanted to deal with the MB through conciliatory ways, withdrew the dissolution act. Despite Nasser's influence was high both in military and in the RCC, Naguip was giving final decisions as the president. Nasser was highly resented his ineffectiveness in the final governmental calls. Things were to change after Nasser became Prime Minister on 18 April, 1954. (Zollner, 2009: 34-35)

The complete rupture between Nasser and the MB occurred during the signing of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty that was about the withdrawal of British troops in Egypt. Hudaybi did not want any renewal of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, instead he

argued that the new agreement should have better conditions for Egyptians. (Zollner, 2009: 35) Despite the MB's concerns, Nasser rushed to reach an agreement. Thanks to willingness of both sides, Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was renewed on October 1954. The agreement without the MB's approval demonstrated that Nasser would not care any request of the MB anymore. This decision led to upheaval among the MB members. (Zollner, 2009: 35) Even, during Nasser's celebration speech on Anglo-Egyptian treaty, an assassination attempt took place. The Manshiyya incident, named after the place where the assassination attempt took place, was also the starting point for the exclusion of the MB from political system since alleged claims by the government and the media had shown the MB as the main target and accused it of being responsible for the attempt. (Zollner, 2009: 35)

After the incident, "the Egyptian government detained over 4,000 members of the MB, and began dismantling the movement through a 'People's Tribunal', which imposed harsh sentences on those convicted". (Zahid, 2010: 80) Hence Hudaybi called a popular uprising to overthrow the government, in return, he promised a 'democratic' government although his discourse and his method were highly incompatible with democracy. However, this call did not find a return from people, Hudaybi was sentenced to death penalty by "People's Tribunal, despite his punishment changed to house arrest later". (Zahid, 2010: 80; 2010; Zollner, 2009: 39) During the trials, Nasser repeatedly called the MB as a terrorist organization that wanted to overthrow the political system completely. The government media also highly eased Nasser's efforts. (Zollner, 2009: 36) Hudaybi's popular uprising call also made life easier for Nasser to purge the MB completely. (Zahid, 80: 2010) After the incident, Nasser did not only get rid of the MB's opposition, but he also purged the dissidents within the RCC including President Naguib, pushing him out of office due to accusation of conspiring with the MB against himself. Thus, Nasser became the new president of Egypt until his death in 1971. During his rule, Nasser did not face any serious opposition thanks to exclusion of all opposition groups, and his unshaken image among Arab nationalists in the Middle East. (Zollner, 2009: 36)

On the other hand, for the Muslim Brotherhood, from 1954 to 1971 was known as time of persecution. (Zollner, 2009: 25) Cycle of persecutions also marginalized the MB members and led to proliferation of radical Islamists within the MB. The

intellectual phase of radicalization consisted of Sayyed Qutb, the third leader of the MB during Hudaybi period, who was detained after the failed assassination attempt in 1954. He was jailed until his execution in 1966. Qutb was an ideologue for the radical Islamists both in his time and in the latter years. He was an author therefore could express his own views clearly through the books. He spent two years in the US for his education. According to him, this period helped him to observe western society closely. (Abdel Malek, 2000: 10) In his book, '*The America I Have Seen*', even though he praised the scientific progress and economic development in the US, he strongly criticized the people's behaviours and western values like individualism, freedom and materialism. He argued that these values were the main reason behind the chronic problems of the US such as excessive consumerism, immorality and sexual discrimination. (Henzel, 2005) Consequently, he identified the US as state of *Jahiliyyah* ('ignorance') (Zahid, 2010: 87). Qutb finally argued that whoever ignored the Quran's teachings, would fall into Jahilliyya. However, his definition of ignorance is problematic because Quran's teachings can be interpreted differently. There are many interpretations of Quran that change from one region to another region throughout the Middle East. For instance; the combination of Wahabist interpretations and Qutbist arguments would proliferate radical Islamism enormously within the MB. (Zahid, 2010: 87)

Qutb was also a fierce opponent of Nasser and actually, his thoughts were fully incompatible with the secular state structure. He also demanded an Islamic legal system through the Sharia law and an Islamic State through a revolution with violence. He advocated that every kind of violence was legitimate for an ultimate cause. This kind of thinking was offering an open check to violent activities for his followers. He also argued that there was no necessity to wait for people's demands from below to above for establishing an Islamic State which could also be realized by the state from above to below. Therefore, he fiercely advocated that Islamic revolution through force was the only solution to establish an Islamic State. (Servold, 2003: 49) "With the infusion of Qutb's ideology, the Brotherhood became a powerful opponent of Nasser's regime". (Servold, 2003: 49) He wanted to get rid of nationalism and socialism by overthrowing Baathist regimes throughout the Middle East. Since Islamic revolution meant a call for overthrowing the governments, Qutb and his ideas would not only

target the Nasser regime but also targeted other secular governments in the Middle East. (Zahid, 2010: 88)

Qutbist ideas were very attractive for the members of the MB who were exposed to cycle of persecution and detainment during the persecution period, as Qutb viewed bloody terrorist attacks as legitimate. In the latter periods, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, his ideas would spread rapidly and became one of the leading factors together with Wahabism for many terrorist attacks globally which were committed by the MB and other radical Islamist organizations. The MB members were influenced by Wahabism for the first-time during Egypt-Saudi conflict in Yemeni s Civil War during 1962-1967. Egypt and Saudi Arabia had supported different conflicting armed groups in Yemen, so they were in conflict indirectly. Because of the unexpected intervention of Nasser, Saudis were angered and started to support the exclusion of MB members in Egypt both financially and ideologically. As a result, many Wahabist books were published in Egypt. "The most prominent ones are *Minhaj al-Muslim*" by *Jabir al-Jaza'iri* and "*Fath al-Majid*" (*The "Gospel" of Wahhabism*) by Ibn Abd al-Wahhad". (Servold, 2003: 50).

By 1964, general amnesty was granted to MB members including the most radical ones like Sayyed Qutb. (Servold, 2003: 51) Since the MB members highly suffered from systematic harassment, the public started to see them as aggrieved. Nasser noticed the revival of MB feelings among the public. General amnesty was a necessity for his ruling but there were various interpretations among the scholars about the releasing of Sayyed Qutb. Some scholars argued that Nasser intentionally released Sayyed Qutb to take quick repressive action against the MB members again by accusing them as people who wanted to destroy political system. (Zollner, 2009: 44) It was really obvious that Nasser needed to convince the public about the crimes of MB. As Nasser expected, Sayyed Qutb and the others gave this chance to Nasser many times. In addition, international reasons also motivated Nasser to wipe out the MB again. There were close relations between Egypt and the USSR during Cold War until the late 1970s. USSR provided military and economic assistance to Egypt in many areas. Nasser desperately needed this help in order to wage a war against Israel. Nasser believed that anti-communist stance of the Qutb and Hedaybi would jeopardize the close relations between the two countries. (Zollner, 2009: 44)

After his release, Qutb became a hero and natural leader of the MB because he represented anti-Nasserism. Qutb thus wanted a spiritual leader position from Hudaybi in 1965. Hudaybi accepted his demand but that meant also no step back from radicalism and violence (Zollner, 2009: 43). During his short spiritual leadership, Qutb became very famous among radical Islamists, even after his death, radicalism increasingly continued in Egypt. Under Qutb's leadership, there were three failed assassination attempts against Nasser (Servold, 2003: 51). During the trial process, military trials found high profile MB members guilty, including Qutb, Hudaybi. (Zollner, 2009: 44) In February 1966, both were sentenced to death penalty, and more than hundred MB members were sentenced to life imprisonment. Qutb was executed in 26 August 1966, but Hudaybi's punishment was suspended and turned into life imprisonment again. (Zollner, 2009: 44)

After Qutb died, Hudaybi faced two different paths. Qutbist radical Islamists wanted to overthrow the government through violence in order to take Qutb's revenge while moderate Islamists were favouring gradual Islamization of society to establish an Islamic state. (Zollner, 2009: 45-46) Meanwhile, there was a loosening in Nasser's rule against the opposition groups. It was highly related with humiliating defeat of Egypt against Israel in Six Days War of 1967. After the defeat, Nasser removed strict decisions against the MB. (Wickham, 2002: 21-35) Nearly 1000 MB members were released from the prison. (Servold, 2003: 51) Thanks to positive steps of Nasser, Hudaybi finally condemned Qutbist radicalism in his book, *Du'a la Quda (Preachers, Not Judges)*. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 42) Hudaybi thus chose moderate path, however the real change would begin when Umar al-Tilemensani became the new leader of the MB after the sudden death of Hudaybi in 1973. "Unlike Hudaybi, Al Tilemensani was pragmatic, a visionary, who sought to lead the MB to new ground by shifting it from its traditional focus on spiritual piety towards political activism." (Zahid, 2010: 89)

2.1.3. Anwar Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood: A Discourse of Political Liberalization

After the sudden death of Nasser in 1970, Anwar Sadat became the third president of Egypt. He took over an Egypt that suffered from economic hardship. As the result of certain defeat in the Six Days War, Egypt lost all of the Sinai Peninsula and full control of the Suez Canal that was one of the main economic resources for Egyptian economy. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 41) In these circumstances, it was very obvious that Egypt could not afford continuous wars with Israel and increasing military expenditures by itself. Therefore, they highly needed economic and military aids from the great powers. In the Cold War atmosphere, Sadat's options were of course very limited. Egypt confronted two natural options during the Cold War either the US or the USSR again despite they had great relations with the USSR since the 1950s. Actually, Egypt was highly dissatisfied with the Soviet's capability of aid during the Six Days War. Hence, the new leadership thought that there was no reason to continue with Soviet's aids alone, the western funding was also necessary to restructure Egypt's economy, and to get back former territories from Israel. (Baker, 1978: 132)

In such an atmosphere, Sadat declared big economic liberalization move together with recognizing some political liberalization measures. This also meant abandoning Arab socialism in a certain way. His policy of Infitah (Open Door Policy) aimed to attract Arab and Western investment to Egypt despite the West approached his open-door policy in a cautious way. (Baker 1978, 132; Aknur and Karakır 2007: 313) In addition, Sadat lacked the charisma of Nasser. Nasser was still seen the leader of Arab nationalism and preserved much prestige among Arab Nationalists despite of his defeat to Israelis in 1967. Therefore, if Sadat wanted to rule Egypt for a long time like his successor and predecessor, he needed to form internal alliances with other political parties, organizations and associate groups. This was indispensable to solving his legitimacy problem. Considering relative power within the dissidents, the best and easy way to consolidate his own rule was of course reconciliation with the MB through loosening policies against them and to 'bring them into the democratic system.' (Zollner, 2009: 48; Aknur and Karakır, 2007: 313)

Furthermore, unlike Nasser's nationalist discourses, Sadat had often used religious discourses to build own personal cult as "the Believing or Pious President". (Zollner, 2009: 48; Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 42; Wickham, 2013: 30) Sadat desperately needed Islamic discourse to counter rising leftist opposition in Egypt. He would also become one of the fierce followers of the US' "Green Belt Policy" against the leftist zealot throughout the Middle East. (Kodmani, 2005; Zahid, 2010: 82; Wickham, 2013: 30) The reconciliation with the MB was extremely significant for his discourse's reliability and demonstrativeness since there was no convenient actor in Egypt other than the MB which fit the new president's religious discourses. Therefore, he realized that reconciliation with the MB was highly important to his search for legitimacy by using religious discourses like an Islamic state and sharia-based law. (Zahid, 2010: 82)

Sadat thought that Yom Kipur War gave himself enough prestige to solve the legitimacy problem. (Baker, 1978: 136) Although there was no certain victorious in the war, Egypt did not lose the war as in the Six Days War. Indeed, this war gave Sadat large space for future decisions of the country. But, as the result of the war, Sadat highly realized that Egypt would not get back its territories from Israel through constant warfare. In the mid-1970s, he started to implement policies to create a more stable economic and political atmosphere in Egypt. This was also a signal of a shift from anti-Western stance to a pro-Western one. Sadat believed that if Egypt wanted to eliminate economic and political isolation, Nasserist policies needed to be abandoned immediately. Hence, he tried to establish a new ideological mindset through his four main policies; "the Open Door, democratization, alliance with the West, and conciliation with Israel". (Ibrahim, 1982: 77-78)

First; Sadat launched the Open-Door policy to attract foreign investment which Egypt desperately needed. (Beattie, 2001: 134-149) The Open-Door policy was a set of measures to remove barriers in Egypt's trade with the West. The measures granted some special privileges to foreign investors like the tax exemptions, removal of custom duties etc... These policies also opened a channel for Sadat to reach US' economic aids. (Ibrahim, 1982: 78) Despite the cautious approach of the West toward the Sadat government, the US quietly wanted to pull back Egypt from Soviet's orbit. Foreign investment was an important tool to do so. Thus, Sadat government could attract

considerable amount of foreign investment. In addition, First Oil Crisis was also an opportunity for economic recovery. For the oil exporter countries like Egypt, this meant unexpected extra cash to get rid of economic recessions of the 1970s. However, despite these opportunities, Sadat could not use this money for the benefits of people. He just used it for the benefit of few. In sum, economic liberalization through intifah policy increased income inequality which deepened social cleavages. (Beattie, 2001: 149)

Second major policy change was also the first major democratization attempt of Egypt. Democratization is of course a broad concept which needs a number of objectives to be fulfilled. But, for Sadat's Egypt, the situation was different. Sadat noticed that economic liberalization also needs some political liberalization attempts. If Egypt wanted to attract the foreign investors, it had to establish the rule of law. (Ibrahim, 1982: 78) In 1971, Egypt firstly ratified the permanent constitution which was its counterparts in the West. Sadat thus guaranteed to protect civil liberties and political rights of the citizens. Second big step was removal of the single party system in 1976, so that multi-party system entered into force. Thus, for the first time in Egypt's history, competitive elections would be held. Third big step aimed to prohibit arbitrary arrests of all kind and to prevent detentions of citizens without legal process. Freedom of press was also a little bit enlarged (Ibrahim, 1982: 78) "The government now allowed two of each newspaper that operated by the three opposition parties; the Progressive National Unionist party, the Labor party, and the Liberal Party." (Ibrahim, 1982: 78)

Although the Muslim Brotherhoods did not obtain political party status yet, it was the most benefited group from any kind of democratization attempt. Thanks to Sadat's democratization attempts, in 1975, there were no MB members left in prison. (Kogelmann, 1991: 100; Servold, 2003: 51; Zollner, 2009: 48) The government also allowed some important exiled members to return Egypt including Yusuf Al Qaradawi, Ahmad al Asaf and Salim Nijm. (Al Awadi, 2004) "The MB was also allowed to reclaim its headquarters in Cairo, reconvene its regular meetings inside the mosques, and to continue its activities on university campuses and its recruitment of new members." (Kodmani, 2005; Zahid, 2010: 82) However; Sadat's moves could not go further than that. He had never removed official ban of the MB but as long as the MB

continued to serve the public in various fields, Egypt's legislation had to accept their 'half-official' status. Nevertheless, the legislation still did not allow their participation to electoral politics or recognized them as a political party. (Zollner, 2009: 48) Since the MB could not participate the elections, many MB members joined the general elections as independent candidates or as a candidate of Sadat's Arab Socialist Party. As a result, they gained 15 seats in the parliament for the first time in Egypt's political history. (Servold, 2003: 51)

On the other hand, the new MB leader, al-Tilmisani welcomed any reconciliation attempts coming from the government. He highly realized that confrontation with the regime had many catastrophic results for the brotherhoods in the past. He was also jailed for seventeen years during the Nasser period. Therefore, he insistently stressed in one of his speeches that "if what is meant by movement is to confront the regime by force and violence, then we believe that this is a futile use of the people's strength which benefits no one but the enemies of this country." (Wickham, 2013: 30) He also added that the only guide for the MB was the principles of sharia, not any ruler. Sadat highly resented sharia discourse and used it against Tilmisani for every single political recognition demand of the MB. For instance; in the post-1976 election, Tilmisani strongly demanded political recognition for the MB as a political party. (Wickham, 2013: 30)

After a bunch of negotiations, Sadat did not accept any demand of recognition, as long as the MB preserved sharia as the first principle in their party program. In 1979, he just offered to recognize them as an association under the Ministry of Social Affairs. Tilmisani rejected the offer and political exclusion of the MB continued for a while. (Wickham, 2013: 31) But here the important point is that for the first time, besides the power struggle, divergence in the Islamic tendencies were main reason for cleavages between the state and the MB. It is fair to suggest that secular wing of state did not want any power gain of the MB as a result of fully political recognition.

Third major policy change was also directly related with the fourth one because in the Cold War atmosphere, there was no possibility for the reconciliation with Israel without the West's mediatory role. Sadat highly realized that the US' diplomatic support was crucial to get back their former lands from Israel. At the same time, Egypt gradually began to move away from the Soviet's auspices. Sadat declared Soviet

incapability over and over again in his speeches during and after the October War in 1973. Since Egypt could not re-take its lands from Israel, Sadat blamed the Soviets about inabilities during the negotiations of peace treaty. After the peace treaty, ideological criticisms were also added to Sadat's rhetoric. Sadat finally dismissed the friendship agreement between the Egypt and the Soviet Union in 1976. This was a turning point and the signal of Egypt's shift from the East to the West. When the Soviet's auspices ended, Egypt received high number of foreign aids which was coming from the US. Total US economic aid reached 6 billion dollars in 1977 and arms sales gradually increased since 1977. Sadat was highly pleased with the US' support and considered it as one of friends of Egypt. (Ibrahim, 1982: 79)

Fourth and final major policy change was the conciliation with Israel. That would not be wrong to maintain that this major change also brought the Sadat's rule in Egypt to an end in 1981. Sadat actually stressed the willingness for peaceful coexistence for the first time in 1971 but neither the US nor Israel took him into account until the October War in 1973. After the War, Sadat realized that conciliation with Israel was a necessity to retake their former territories and economic recovery. Until the end of his rule, he tried to search a way of conciliation. The US created this chance for him and the conciliation process started when Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977. After a bunch of negotiations, the Camp David Accord in 1978 and the Peace Treaty Agreement in 1979 were signed between Israel and Egypt under the moderatorship of the US. Egypt diplomatically recognized Israel and normalized relations with it in return for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied land Sinai Peninsula and granted political autonomy for Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza. (Ibrahim, 1982: 79-80)

Although Sadat's media highly praised him about his success for bringing peace for the Egyptians, the MB and the Arab World did not view the event from this perspective. They evaluated the situation as a treason for the Palestinian cause since Egypt recognized current borders of Israel. After the Peace Treaty, the MB struggled for withdrawal from the agreement. (Ibrahim, 1982: 80) They raised harsh criticisms to the President through their newspaper al-Dawa and public protests. But they received harsh answers from the President. Sadat was also highly criticized by the Arab World. He faced a number of oppositions both inside and outside. In the face of

all these criticisms, his response was become even more authoritarian like his predecessors and successors. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 43) In February 1981, massive arrest campaign was started not only against the MB members but also against the secular dissidents. Nearly 2000 dissidents were arrested during the arrest campaign from February to September in 1981. (Servold, 2003: 51) This move provoked the Islamic radicals and four MB radicals assassinated Sadat ironically on October 6 during the military ceremony for the anniversary of 1973 War. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 43)

2.1.4. Hosni Mubarak Years: A Search for Political Recognition

Hosni Mubarak who was the vice president of Sadat so far, assumed power immediately in 1981 after the assassination of his predecessor. Mubarak's presidency was not a surprise for public opinion in Egypt because he was already a vice president that meant the person who was supposed to rule after the president. (Awadi, 2004: 12) In liberal democracies, if the president dies during his tenure of office, the vice president comes to power until the next elections. So, this was a temporary flag exchange. But in Egypt, this process lasted for 30 years from 14 October 1981 to 11 February 2011.

Nevertheless, when Mubarak came to office, he did not deal with legitimacy crises as much as former presidents despite he lacked charisma and did not care about religious discourses as much as Sadat. (Awadi, 2004: 12) Instead, Mubarak enjoyed his legal authority in dealing with the legitimacy problem. On the other hand, due to some changes in way of governing, concept of legitimacy evolved especially after the welfare states emerged. According to Poggi, through using Weber's definition of legitimacy from the perspective of traditional, rational and legal ways, welfare states make eudaemonic legitimacy as an important source of legitimacy for rulers. According to this perspective, Mubarak would increase his legitimacy if he provided advantages of the welfare state to the Egyptian people. (Poggi, 1978: 134)

Another issue which Mubarak needed to deal was of course the MB' political and socioeconomical demands. If Mubarak wanted to consolidate his rule, he needed to deal with the MB which is largest and most organized opposition group in Egypt.

(Noueihed and Warren, 2012) Mubarak did this through strategic relationships discourse in which he was very careful to select the MB's demands. He fulfilled some demands from the MB while constantly rejected their one of the most important demands like political recognition. (Nawawy and Elmasry, 2018: 28-29) Mubarak constantly opposed changing the law about political parties' eligibility for the electoral process in the Egyptian constitution and establishment of religious parties remained prohibited. The essence of the law demonstrated that relatively secular military governments in Egypt since Nasser did not want an Islamist political party in electoral processes since they shared the view that Islamism was a direct threat to the existence of the Egyptian state and secular institutions. (Servold, 2003: 51; Nawawy and Elmasry, 2018: 29)

On the other hand, the MB did not express a clear view about Mubarak's presidency in the first place since all high rank members of the MB, including Tilmisani, were in prison. The MB welcomed any kind of steps coming from the government but political recognition was the red line in their relations with Mubarak. Nevertheless, until the Arab Spring, the MB avoided any direct confrontation with Mubarak regime through using violent actions. Thus, it switched its ideological position from Qutb's radicalism to Al Banna's moderate approach since they realized that Al Banna's view was the only plausible option to obtain political recognition and to preserve the brotherhood's existence. (Servold, 2003: 51) Even though the MB did not obtain political recognition for many years, they applied alternative ways to participate electoral process. They formed some electoral alliances with other opposition parties. Thanks to these alliances, the MB started to gain seats in the Egyptian parliament and gradually increased its voices in public sphere. (Servold, 2003: 51-52)

Political exclusion did not avoid the MB initiatives this time since it ended violent activities. Language of democracy also attracted people into the MB's "da'wa" and created a sympathy among the public. (Wickham, 2013: 46) Meanwhile, they also continued their public missions to help people despite of Mubarak's limitations. For these reasons, the MB increased its popularity day by day and people started to prefer the MB's candidates in the elections. However, vicious circle in Egypt and cleavages between the state and the MB prevented again any changes in the status quo. While

the MB increased its power in the public sphere, the Egyptian state became more authoritarian more and more like Nasser and Sadat periods. (Servold, 2003: 51-52; Nawawy and Elmasry, 2018: 29)

Mubarak actually came to power with the thought of some sort of political liberalization. In the first years of his presidency, Mubarak could even be perceived as a democratic leader. He allowed relatively free, fair and competitive elections two times in 1984 and 1987 without implementing any serious limitations and censoring. New political parties also emerged in that period like New Wafd Party that formed an alliance with the MB in 1984 elections. Thanks to the alliance between the Brotherhood and the Wafd, the MB candidates were able to join the elections from the New Wafd Party lists. (Aknur and Karakır, 2007: 314; Nawawy and Elmasry, 2018: 29) As the result of 1984 parliamentary elections, “the alliance won 58 out of 448 seats, including eight Brotherhood seats.” (Nawawy and Elmasry, 2018: 29) Although Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) won the election with an overwhelming advantage, he was quite uncomfortable with the Muslim Brotherhood candidates’ entry into the parliament. Nevertheless, until the 1987 elections, Mubarak did not prefer to disrupt liberalization atmosphere in the country. He also thought that the MB’s victory was temporary and insignificant. However, the reality was not similar with Mubarak’s predictions and 1987 parliamentary elections would be a historical moment for Egyptian democratization. At the result of 1987 elections, the MB gained 36 seats thanks to their new alliances with Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party that created the biggest opposition bloc in the Egypt’s history. (Aknur and Karakır, 2007: 314). Since the MB gained the biggest piece of cake in the coalition, it became “the largest opposition group in the parliament.” (Awadi, 2004: 114)

1987 election results were a real surprise for the president. He did not imagine that popular support for the MB candidates were enlarged in such extent. Not surprisingly, Mubarak’s resentment turned to authoritarian precautions toward the opposition bloc. Firstly, with the request of the president, “the Higher Constitutional Court declared the electoral law in 1987 elections as unconstitutional.” (Wickham, 2013: 56) Mubarak thus dissolved the parliament until the next elections in 1990. Opposition bloc actually could not do anything due to the closure in the way of parliamentary politics even though they organized some demonstrations for the

removal of the decision. In the 1990 first Shura Council elections for the upper house of the parliament under the monitoring of the president himself, opposition bloc gained no seats. (Aknur and Karakır, 2007: 314) This result led to serious accusations for Mubarak about the fraud and secret counting of ballots in the election. Thus, opposition parties including the new Wafd Party, Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal party, boycotted the parliamentary elections in 1990 despite the huge amount of popular support especially for the Muslim Brotherhood candidates. (Wickham, 2013: 56; Aknur and Karakır, 2007: 314) Even though opposition parties did not represent their views on the parliament during one term, this symbolic decision was highly significant to show Mubarak's authoritarianism to the people. This was not a complete withdrawal from electoral politics, but was an action in order to undermine the legitimacy of Mubarak regime. (Wickham, 2013: 56-57)

During the 1990s, schism between the MB and the government was enlarged. After the boycott decision, the MB's elite decided to invest more and more to social services where the government was not able to provide to the people. (Nawavy and Elmasry, 2018: 29) "The MB thus gained a legitimacy from three important components; first, the social services; second, an organised network enabling such services to be delivered effectively, and third, the politicisation of this legitimacy." (Awadi, 2004: 21) The MB was also involved in the elections of syndicates that were critical for the social services mission of the MB. During the period, the MB obtained the control of most of the syndicates including doctors, lawyers, dentists, engineers and so on. (Mitchell, 1993; Nawavy and Elmasry, 2018: 29) In return, the government implemented new regulations against the MB's influence that allowed the judiciary's intervention in syndicates elections. (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, 1999: 55) But this move did not prevent the growing influence of the MB toward syndicates.

Syndicate influences of the MB also spread to the unions in the universities. The MB presence was observable more and more in the university campuses. Most of the student groups that were related with the MB won the union elections in the major universities in Cairo and in Alexandria. (Nawavy & Elmasry, 2018: 30) This was opening channels for the MB to new recruitment and propagating its own doctrines to the young brains. Under these circumstances, everybody expected a record number of the MB candidates who would be elected to the parliament in the 1995 elections but

that was not the actual case. The MB joined the elections with 170 independent candidates but they just won only one seat while the NDP won 417 seats out of 444. Mubarak gained a solid victory but the 1995 elections was one of the worst elections for the Egyptian democracy. During the two election days, 51 people were killed by police forces or unknown perpetrators while 878 people got injured. (Kienle, 1998: 234) Furthermore, the regime arrested important figures of the MB before the election including Essam Al Aryan and Abu Al-Futuh. (Awadi, 2004: 172) They were tried by military trials despite they were civilians. This decision was highly condemned by the national and international human rights organizations. Mubarak saw the violence and the harassment policies as a chance to revenge for the boycott in the 1990 elections and to secure its fourth term nomination for the presidency since he needed a solid majority in the parliament. (Awadi, 2004: 171-172)

During the 2000s, the MB refrained any kind of confrontation with the regime since they didn't want another trial process for their members. The MB's accommodating approach contributed to the normalization of the relations with the regime. In this direction, in the beginning of the millennium, leaders of the MB, Al-Aryan and Al-Futuh were released. In 2000 parliamentary elections, the MB wanted an acceptable victory. They didn't want to frighten the regime again. Therefore, the MB declared its wishes before the election just for the 75 seats out of 444. (Wickham, 2002: 225) The MB also selected its candidates under strict state monitoring. They could not choose the high-profile candidates for certain regions due to the regime's interferences. The regime also banned the utilization of the slogan "Islam is the solution" which they used before, instead, they had to use the slogan that "Constitution is the solution." (Wickham, 2013: 97) Although the regime allowed the judiciary's supervisor position over the elections, there wasn't any safe environment for the opposition groups. Number of important figures of opposition were arrested again. Despite the number of limitations and harassment policies, the MB won 17 seats that was equal to the sum of all other opposition parties. (Thabet, 2006: 17)

After the election, the MB was still decisive to act under the rule of law and invited regime to perform such behaviour. In 2004, the MB declared a manifestation that included their commitment to the democratic principles and their detailed reform program. This initiative aimed "the construction of Egyptian person" that conformed

Islamic moral and democratic values together. (Wickham, 2013: 105) The manifestation of the reform program stated that "the ultimate goal of our mission is a genuine and comprehensive reform, which we all must work for together, through constitutional and legal channels, to establish the Law of God [Shar' Allah]." (Altman, 2006; Wickham, 2013: 106) The MB openly declared that democracy was a tool for the ultimate ends, not the ends itself.

The reform program was an important move to show MB's unofficial claim for becoming the first political party in Egypt. The MB was offering something to people while Mubarak failed to cope with economic hardships. (Zahid, 2010: 155-157) The MB's assertive initiatives would reflect strongly for the Parliamentary Elections in 2005. In the first round of the elections, there was no state intervention and the MB won more seats than the NDP. The result highly surprised and frightened Mubarak. Thanks to his unfinished emergency law authorities, the government intervened the second and the third round of the elections through using violence and high-level fraud. In some rural areas, the security forces attacked the voters who did not vote for the NDP. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 51; Wickham, 2013: 118) "According to a report by an independent Egyptian monitoring group, there were 2,271 arrests, 819 people wounded, and 14 deaths". (Antar, 2006; Wickham, 2013: 118) The NDP thus won every single seat during second and third round to balance electoral results at the stake of Mubarak. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 51) Nevertheless, thanks to decisive victory in the first round, the MB won 88 seats out of 444 seats in the parliament, while the NDP just won 145 seats. But most of the independent candidates joined the NDP after the elections, thus total seats of the NDP increased to 311. (Caromba and Solomon, 2010: 119; Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 51; Wickham, 2013: 118; Nawavy and Elmasry 2018: 30)

2005 elections were indeed a victory for the MB. It became officially the biggest opposition group, even they could win seats equal with the NDP if the government had not used any violence or electoral frauds in the elections. Nevertheless, these results guaranteed the position of the MB as a critical player in Egyptian politics. On the other hand, Mubarak highly resented the dramatic decrease in his party's vote and the rising presence of the MB. He believed that there was no possibility to stay in power unless the repressive policies against the MB were enacted.

(Wickham, 2013: 119) In 2007, Mubarak declared a constitutional reform program that granted serious authority to himself including cancelling the parliament, weakening the monitor status of judiciary in the elections, and obtaining new security laws that were mostly used against the opposition groups. (BBC, 2007; Caromba and Solomon 2010: 120)

In addition, through constitutional reform program, the parliament was banned to use religion for political purposes and complicated the process to become independent candidates for running seats in the parliament. This was a direct move against the MB and limited the way of running parliamentary elections for their candidates. The MB's reaction was fierce. A number of intellectuals declared manifestations to criticize constitutional reforms of 2007 that would open the way of authoritarian policies against the MB and the other opposition groups. (Soage and Franganillo, 2010: 52) On the other hand, despite the high-level authoritarianism and the violation of human rights, Mubarak did not receive any serious criticism by the Western countries that did not want any rising Islamic group in Egypt. Lack of international reaction also strengthened the hands of Mubarak.

Before the parliamentary elections in 2010, Muhammed Baradei who was the former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) consolidated the opposition to mobilize them for electoral reforms. Baradei established a forum for all opposition forces, called the National Association for Change (NAC) and simply demanded that the government must abolish all constraints on independent candidates and re-establish the judiciary monitoring mission for the future elections. (Wickham, 2013: 148) Baradei also emphasized that if the government rejected their immediate demands, then NAC would decide total boycott of 2010 parliamentary elections. Mubarak refused to negotiate with the NAC, thus the boycott started. Baradei declared the boycott decision through using a twitter page. This was also highly significant since Twitter played an important role for the protests during the Arab Spring. Two opposition parties, Al-Ghad and the National Democratic Front attended the boycott under the NAC. The biggest opposition groups, the MB, the Wafd and Tagammu Parties supported Baradei's movement but they didn't want to give up their place in the parliament for the next five years. (Wickham, 2013: 148-149)

The MB leadership decided to attend the 2010 parliamentary elections but they would retreat the elections before the second round started. Not surprisingly, the electoral fraud and violence were utilized by the government again. Mubarak wanted to have a decisive victory and in order to do that, he did not hesitate taking any measures. At the end of the first round, the NDP won 208 seats out of 221 while none of the MB candidates were elected. (Wickham, 2013: 150; Durac, 2016: 74-76) According to official results, the other opposition parties just won 15 of the seats while the NDP won rest of the 493 seats (number of seats for parliament increased from 444 to 508 in 2005, 64 seats were reserved for women). (Wickham, 2013: 150) As the outcome of the 2010 elections, the MB leadership met with Baradei and the other opposition parties one by one. The opposition bloc decided to establish a 'parallel parliament' to check government's decisions and to enforce laws. (Wickham, 2013: 150; Durac, 2016: 74-76) 'The parallel parliament' did not have any authority of course but this was a very important step symbolically to protest the authoritarianism of Mubarak government. Mubarak gained a solid victory from 2010 elections but he could not calculate the reactions of people this time. On January 25, 2011, when the protesters started gathering at the Tahrir Square against him, Mubarak was probably enjoying his electoral victory in the presidential palace.

CHAPTER THREE

ISLAMIST-SECULARIST POLARIZATION IN EGYPT SINCE THE UNFOLDING OF THE ARAB SPRING

In this chapter, the thesis will analyse polarization between Islamists and secularists during the transition period in the post-Mubarak period by examining actors, events and policies during SCAF, Morsi and Sisi periods. The chapter also tried to answer the questions that how the revolutionary coalition fell apart after the revolution; how did Egyptian society split into two camps during the Morsi period?

3.1. OUTBREAK OF ARAB SPRING

On November 17 2010, nobody expected such a great scale of protest waves would erupt everywhere in the Middle East when Mohammed al-Bouazizi who was a Tunisian young street vendor burned himself to get rid of the troubles of economic hardship and the violence that was exposed by security forces. Bouazizi's tragic death, of course, was not the only reason behind the whole Arab Spring protests, but it was an ignition force for the protesters that got tired by autocratic governments and economic hardships. Just fifty-seven days later from Bouazizi's death, Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had to flee to Saudi Arabia with his family. (Pargeter, 2013: 182) This was one of the turning points in Middle East politics. For the first time, an autocratic ruler had to resign due to the public protests. So far in the Middle East, the changes always came from the top but now the demand came from the below, from the people. Such a great change of course would have some repercussions. Tunisian revolution would be an example for the protesters in other Arab countries including Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Jordan. These protest waves are also known as the Arab Spring.

There were many reasons behind the unfolding of the Arab Spring; the reasons also changed from country to country, but most of the analysis relies on the main three factors. First; new technological tools like social media contributed to both disseminating the ideas fast and gathering the protestors in more organized ways. Especially; if we examine the Arab Spring cases one by one, we can see the importance

of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube among the young people that would become the main actors during the protests. The second analysis concentrated on Tunisia and argued that Tunisian revolution led to spill-over effects on the whole region. This view just focused on the inspiration of the Tunisian revolution for the other Arab countries in the region. The third analysis argued that economic hardships and soaring prices led to general reactions to autocratic rulers who could not solve the problems for decades. None of the three arguments is false. (Shokr, 2012: 42) In fact, the combination of three factors can be counted as the reason. Every case also has some unique features. In Egypt for instance, Arab Spring cannot be imagined without analysing accumulated polarization between the Secularists and Islamists forces and the people themselves. Before examining impacts of polarization in societal level, there need to understand first, reasons behind the revolution in Egypt particularly and second, to identify political actors that played important roles in recent Egyptian history.

3.1.1 Causes of the 2011 Revolution in Egypt

When the protests started at Tahrir Square on 24 January, 2011, nobody expected that this would turn into a revolution. Nobody faced such a revolution that came from below in Egypt before. Revolutionaries were just the member of political parties and civil society or the regular citizens who were tired from Mubarak's oppression. Ismail Numan Telci's argues that there was no tangible effect of external actors to the revolution in the first place. Until the counter revolution that was realized by Abdul Fattah al-Sisi with a military coup on 3 July, 2013, external actors approached cautiously to the revolution. (Telci, 2017: 42-43) For this reason, there is need to focus on the reasons behind the rage of people Mubarak regime. The concentration will be on internal actors during this chapter.

Like every revolution in history, the first reason behind the revolution in Egypt was economic hardship. Since the foundation of the country, Egyptian people had to deal with chronic economic problems like hyperinflation, low wages, high unemployment rate, but everything was getting worse when Mubarak appointed Ahmed Nazif as the Prime Minister in 2004. Immediately after he came to power, Ahmed Nazif and his cabinet launched new economic program oriented by neoliberal

measures. Thanks to Baathist ideology, Egypt adopted a socialist economy for most of the time during the Cold War and in the aftermath public enterprises were still big. Most of the Egyptians were working there. Undoubtedly, the most annoying thing for Egyptian people here was the privatization waves in every level. Privatization led to dismissal of many Egyptian people from their regular jobs. Unemployment rate dramatically increased. Prices soared and this led to high inflation enormously. These economic problems triggered mobilization of people during the 2000s especially among workers and intellectuals. (Telci, 2017: 46)

The second reason which led to the revolution in Egypt was obviously Mubarak's explanations about his son Gamal Mubarak's future within Egyptian political rule. According to the Egyptian public opinion and the media, Mubarak had already chosen his successor and that person was obviously his son Gamal Mubarak. During the 2000s, Gamal Mubarak came to an important position within the NDP and people from different ranks of the party declared their allegiance to him after his father's rule. Gamal Mubarak's presidency was not acceptable for the people who had been tired from Mubarak's oppression. Especially in 2010, after he became the general secretary of the NDP, many revolutionary groups started to mobilize against him through demonstrations. (Telci, 2017: 46-47)

The third reason was of course Mubarak's cruelty and oppression. In the previous chapter, his repressive policies against the MB members were already mentioned. This was not only limited to them. Mubarak harassed every opposition group including liberals, socialists and secularists during his reign. He was systematically involved in electoral frauds again and again. No opposition party was represented in the parliament seriously except the MB obtaining 88 seats in the 2005 election. After the MB's electoral victory in 2005, he became even more authoritarian and as a result of the 2010 elections, thanks to the widespread electoral frauds, the MB just won 1 seat. He was also ruling the country with emergency law and detained many dissidents in every public protest. These repressive policies were of course one of the contributing factors for the rage of people against the Mubarak regime. (Wickham, 2013)

The fourth reason was that the inconvenience of public opinion regarding Mubarak's alliance with the West increased day by day due to the number of

reactionary events in the Arab world and in the Middle East. The rage against the West actually was a result of accumulated process. These events can be illustrated as Second Intifada (2000-2005), US invasion of Iraq (2003), Israel's attacks on Lebanon (2006) and Israel attacks on Gaza (2008-2010). During these events, Mubarak regime done anything except the so-called condemnation of the Western actors. This of course led to some reaction among Egyptians. Islamists and secular intellectuals criticized Mubarak's alliance with the West in every chance. Especially, Palestinian question became one of the merging reasons for the opposition forces against Mubarak regime before the revolution. (Telci, 2017: 48)

The fifth reason was that thanks to the dramatic increase in social media usage, Egyptians now learned many things about regional and international developments. Although Mubarak tried to cut the internet many times to prevent opposition waves, the opposition forces found new ways to access the internet and social media again and again. Internet revolution led Mubarak's strict censorship meaningless somehow. Facebook usage among Egyptians was one of the signs of Mubarak's failed effort to cut the internet. Facebook had used by 2.2 million people in 2009. This number reached 4.2 million in 2010 and 9.8 million in 2011. Facebook was seemed to provide a free ground, especially for the younger people who sicked Mubarak's oppression. For instance, the page that dedicated the memory of Khaled Said has created by the opposition forces in 2010 and became a ground to react and criticize Mubarak regime mostly for young Egyptians. (Telci, 2017: 49)

3.2. ACTORS IN THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

Before analysing polarization between Islamists and secularists and its impact on democratization in Egypt, there is need to identify the leading actors in order to understand their role during the revolution and the counterrevolution process. Here the important thing is analysing mostly internal actors one by one to specify the polarity of two conflicting sides in the society. In Egypt, we cannot mention that the actors always support one of the sides among secularist and Islamist forces. Their positions have always been changeable. For instance, before the revolution, both Islamists and secularist actors merged their efforts against the Mubarak regime but later on, all

playmaker actors during the revolution took a side against the MB leadership. For these reasons, identification of internal actors is crucial to understand different poles, changeable interests, priorities and leading factors to the military coup in 2013. It would also be fair to suggest that these actors are neither completely liberal nor secular like their Western counterparts. Egypt has its own characteristics and factors that have shaped the people and civil society accordingly. So Western ideologies like liberalism, socialism, secularism should be evaluated within the context of Egypt. These ideologies will be mentioned within the context of Egypt in the latter parts.

3.2.1. Secular Actors

This section will be examined the secular actors who played an important role during the revolution in Egypt.

3.2.1.1. April 6 Movement

The first actor that emerged before the revolution on the secular side is April 6 Movement. This movement arose by economic difficulties of workers especially thanks to Ahmed Nazif's unsuccessful neoliberal program. Workers had always certain living standards in Egypt especially during the Cold War but this time, because of the high inflation rate, they could not afford ordinary requirements to sustain minimum living standards. Mubarak realized the accumulated anger among workers and in order to appease them he condoned their protests time to time. Workers thus started to increase their volumes with major strikes. The most sonorous strike was operated by approximately twenty thousand workers on 6 April, 2008. The workers were supported by bunch of intellectuals and activists led by ex-Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammed Adel, Ahmed Maher and Velid Resid. On 28 March, 2008, the movement created a Facebook group led by these intellectuals to organize fast and to reach more people. From 28 March to 6 April, the number of members reached to 70.000. (Telci 2014, 330)

The real purpose of these intellectuals actually was to turn mass strikes into anti-Mubarak protests everywhere in Egypt. However, the Mubarak regime was highly

prepared for the protests and repressed the protesters through a number of repressive measures like using force, torture. All intellectual leaders of the movements were jailed albeit for a short period. The first attempt of the movement failed but they made their voices heard and got more and more supporters. On the first anniversary of the strike, on 6 April 2009, the movement demanded two immediate requests from the Mubarak regime that minimum wages should be increased and that the new constitution should be prepared in favour of workers. Protesters organized through the movement's Facebook group and gathered simultaneously in major cities including Cairo, and Alexandria. One hundred deputies of the MB showed their supports to protesters and became their voice in the parliament. But Mubarak's response was harsh again. During the protests, Mubarak jailed approximately 300 people mostly composed of university students. (Ikhwanweb, 2009; Telci, 2011: 102)

On the second anniversary of the strike, on 6 April 2010, the movement did not only focus on the workers' rights, but also, they focused on the interests of other repressed groups. The movement demanded from the Mubarak regime that the emergency law, which is the most important obstacle to democracy and freedoms, should be abolished immediately. In this direction, a huge protest wave rapidly disseminated in every major city in Egypt. April 6 Movement also received support from the wide coalition that started to form against Mubarak during these protests. Demonstrations were again suppressed by the government but there was no doubt that the April 6 Movement became one of the pioneer actors during the Eighteen Days of protests at Tahrir Square before the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. (Telci, 2017: 83)

3.2.1.2. Kefaya (Enough) Movement

Another important secular actor before the revolution was the Kefaya movement that was created by approximately 300 intellectuals through gathering signatures against Mubarak's authoritarianism in 2004. Kefaya's main demands from the Mubarak regime were political and economic reforms to trigger democratization and economic development in Egypt. The movement starting from their constituent conference on 22 September 2004 became one of the significant actors to address human rights violations, economic difficulties and social problems in Mubarak's

Egypt. Despite the liberal and secular characteristics of the movement, Kefaya followed nationalist discourses in every chance to stand against Israel and the US. In this manner, Kefaya was a group that defended the Palestinian cause against Israel and the US. So, their anti-Israel and anti-US stance was also one of contributing factors for their opposition against the Mubarak regime that had close ties with both countries. Although Kefaya can be counted as a liberal-secular opposition group, its members were not ideologically homogenous. Some prominent intellectuals in the Kefaya movement like Macid Ahmad Husayin or Abul-Ala Madi were conservatives, or George Ishak was a socialist Coptic. These intellectuals put aside their ideological differences with many liberal-secular members to get rid of Mubarak's oppression and to create a democratic environment in Egypt. (Clarke 2011: 399-400)

Kefaya movement led to demonstrations countrywide in 2005 against the Mubarak regime in order to realize democratization reforms. In a short period of time, they gathered much supports from oppressed people by the regime. Upon this, Mubarak had to change article 76 of the Egyptian Constitution that regulated the eligibility of attending presidential elections. According to article 76, if an Egyptian wanted to join the presidential election, 250 deputies needed to show him/her as a candidate. Until that time, Egyptian presidents in power including Nasser and Sadat always benefited from this article since they had an overwhelming majority in all parliamentary elections due to mainly strict censorship and harassment policies against opposition parties. So, the next president was obvious before the elections because there was only one candidate, the president himself. (Telci, 2017: 90)

Through amendment in Article 76, Mubarak allowed the attaining of other candidates into the presidential elections. Thanks to this amendment Ayman Nour became the first person who raced against Mubarak in the presidential elections. (Nugent, 2020: 118-119) Despite this being just a so-called democratic move because of the disseminated use of electoral fraud, it is really important to see the role of civil society even in one of the most authoritarian countries in the world. Kefaya movement supported opposition forces many times until the resignation of Mubarak and boycotted the presidential elections in 2010. They became the driving force in starting protests of Eighteen Days at Tahrir Square. (Telci, 2017: 92)

3.2.1.3. National Association for Change (NAC)

The NAC was founded in February 2010 by Mohammed Baradei who is the former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The association's main goal was to unite all opposition forces under the NAC umbrella in order to realize free and fair elections and democratic governance in Egypt. Baradei convinced more than 30 important figures in Egyptian politics including Ayman Nour and Alaa Aswani to give their supports for the NAC. In addition, Baradei declared that the NAC would not accept any efforts to open a way for Gamal Mubarak's presidency after his father. Baradei also highly realized that if Hosni Mubarak stayed in power, there was no possibility for Egypt to take democratic steps forward. Due to the usage of many electoral frauds and high-level censorship to opposition groups during the parliamentary elections in 2010, the NAC decided to boycott the elections together with two opposition parties; Al-Ghad and the National Democratic Front (NDF) and Kefaya movement. (Wickham, 2013: 148)

Although Baradei declared that the NAC was a secular association every time, he did not avoid forming an alliance with the MB against the Mubarak regime. For instance, in 2010, Baradei needed to collect signatures for his reform petition towards democratization and launched a campaign for it. The MB offered its assistance to the campaign in order to increase the voice of the opposition. As a result of the campaign, Baradei collected approximately 813.000 signatures for the petition. There is no doubt that Baradei reached this huge number thanks to support of the MB because the NAC just collected 113.000 signatures, while the MB collected 700.000 signatures. (Hamid, 2010) The alliance between the NAC and the MB continued until Mohammed Morsi was elected as the president in 2012. The NAC supported MB's candidate in the second round of the elections. But before the elections, they did not give up their secular position and demanded some guarantees from the MB about respecting secular values during Morsi's presidency. (Telci, 2017: 95)

3.2.1.4. Coptic Egyptians

Another important secular group in Egypt is obviously Coptic Egyptians that comprise 10% of the Egyptian population. Since the establishment of modern Egypt, Coptic Egyptians were excluded by the government from every important sphere in bureaucracy, private sector, industry and social life. Most of the Coptics were jailed when an oppositional event occurred. Although Coptics are exposed state violence in the past, they never engaged in an anti-regime movement. Although systematic exclusion operated for them during Nasser and Sadat periods, Coptic Egyptians were trying to manage good relations with the regime. Collaboration with the regime was inevitable because they were afraid of even further violence due to their minority position in the country. Coptics imagined that the alternatives of Nasser and Sadat were even worse since the unexpected revolutionary action could be threatening the secular life in Egypt. When Mubarak came to power, the conditions for Coptics also changed. Mubarak adopted relatively free measures for Coptics during his rule. Coptics gained important positions in various fields such as in the private sector. Coptic businessmen and intellectuals emerged thanks to their special position during the Mubarak rule. (Delhay, 2012: 71-98)

However, the close relationship between the Coptics and the Mubarak regime was shaken by a bunch of violent attacks committed by extremist Islamists against Coptic Christians during the 2000s. (Phares, 2010: 296-298) In 2000, as a result of these attacks, more than 20 Coptics were killed, their stores and properties were pillaged. (Saad, 2014: 100) This traumatic event is engraved in the memory of Coptics. But this was not the last attack against them. As a result of attacks in 2008, 2010 and 2011, 13 Coptics in total were killed. (BBC, 2008; Shenker, 2010; Stack and Fahim, 2011) The last attack before the revolution was that on 7 January 2011, 23 people were killed with terror bombing attacks during the Coptic ceremony for Christmas at Alexandria. (Hassan, 2015: 37) Especially the attacks in Alexandria during the sacred ceremony and passive response of the government led to a distrust of the regime among young Coptics. They thus made sure that Mubarak cannot guarantee the protection of Coptics. Although the Coptic community was still declared loyal to the Mubarak regime especially showing this their condemnation against an anti-regime protest that

broke out on 25 January 2011, young Coptics became one of the enthusiastic protesters during Eighteen Days of anti-regime protests. (Telci, 2017: 115)

3.2.2. The Military

Since the establishment of modern Egypt through the Free Officer Coup in 1952, the Egyptian military always preserved their exclusive position in Egypt's socio-economic life. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all had military backgrounds and gave the military a special position in every sphere. Thanks to the benefits of being in power with an exclusive position, military obtained many enterprises in various fields like industry, finance, tourism, construction, textile and food. During Mubarak period, enterprises owned by military comprised 30% of the whole Egyptian economy. (Telci, 2017: 123) Such an asymmetric economic power in state mechanism obviously did not respect the boundaries in civil-military relations. Undoubtedly, military established a tutelage over Egyptian politics in certain issues. For instance, military has been a decisive actor in foreign policy making. The military has had a special relationship with both the US and Israel. Since the Camp David Accords, military became the guarantor of this alliance in the region. External actors like the US have also been highly pleased with the role of military in Egyptian politics. They have delivered a lot of economic and military assistance to the modernization of the army and continuation of its tutelage in Egyptian politics. (Marshall, 2015: 5-6)

In addition, external actors also supported military-backed rulers in Egypt who in return military became the guardian of secular values and prevented possible Islamist MB's rule in power at every chance. Therefore, the military faced a dilemma when Mubarak had to resign from the presidency. Shall they leave the power to civilians or appoint a candidate that has a military background like predecessors? They chose the first path thinking that the new government would guarantee respect to secular values. On the other hand, despite Mubarak was a military-backed leader, the military did not support Mubarak unconditionally. When the demonstrations reached huge numbers and took attention from everywhere in the world, the military pushed Mubarak to resign from all duties. The military ruled the country through the SCAF until Mohammed Mursi became the president in August 2012. Meanwhile, the military

was unwillingly given the power to civilians as a result of high pressure coming from actors who engaged in the revolution. (Telci, 2017: 125) But they still cope with their suspicions about the MB's candidate whether he would respect the secular order. This suspicion always continued during Morsi's rule. When Morsi wanted to assume more power to himself with the constitutional declaration on 22 November, they would dismiss him through a military coup led by Sisi.

3.2.3. Islamist Actors

This section will be examined the Islamist actors who played an important role during the revolution in Egypt.

3.2.3.1. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

The first and the main Islamist actor since the founding of the country is of course the MB in terms of its size, influence and organizational structure. Therefore, every step taken by the MB was quite significant for the future of Mubarak. During the 2000s, the MB gave much assistance to the opposition groups thanks to their wide base and social networks. They even formed implicit alliances with the other opposition groups from time to time no matter what their ideologies were. In addition, on 27 March 2005, the MB arranged an anti-Mubarak protest with great participation. This brought huge repercussions and the mass protests continued with 23 additional protests. (Telci, 2017: 102) However, when the revolution started at the Tahrir Square, the MB seemed approaching to future of Mubarak cautiously. For instance, while all secular groups decided to boycott the elections in 2010, the MB did not join this decision at the expense of gaining antipathy among secular opposition groups. Nevertheless, the MB retreated from the elections in the second round due to the number of cheats and frauds sponsored by the government. The MB was not sure about the future of Mubarak in the first place because of the painful experiences in the past. In a failed attempt, leaders of the MB realized that government would target the MB more than every other opposition group. Still, they did not bring any limitations to the young members of the organization attending the demonstrations. From the third day

of demonstrations, MB leadership also decided to join revolution to prevent exclusion in the post-Mubarak era. (Telci, 2017: 103-104)

While the MB leadership wanted to keep the MB in the background throughout the demonstrations, they also decided to minimize the usage of religious slogans in the street. The main reason was that these slogans could be used by the government-affiliated media to image the revolution as Islamic in order to create fears both inside and outside of the country. However, especially in the international media, thanks to the MB members joining the ranks of revolutionaries, the revolution was begun to be seen as Islamic. (Pargeter, 2012: 185). This news also interrogated the MB's intention at the outcome of the revolution. In order to relax the international atmosphere, the MB showed their allegiance to moderate Islamism and tried to decrease tension both inside and outside of the country. (Telci, 2017: 105-106)

3.2.3.2. The Salafis

The second Islamist group in the country is the Salafis that emerge from a different version of Islamist interpretation. Salafis differentiate themselves according to their interpretations. For instance, the Jihadist which is the most extremist version of Islam is also counted as a version of the Salafis. Egyptian Salafis committed a number of violent attacks on tourists, intellectuals and government officials in the past through al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya which is a jihadist Islamist group. However, after the failed assassination attempt against himself, Mubarak purged the group's activities. (Telci, 2017: 110) On the other hand, the other version of Salafis in Egypt is not interest in politics ideologically since the foundation of the country. However, this started to change after Mubarak's future become ambiguous. Salafis then wanted to be part of Egyptian politics and to take a big piece of cake there. Despite Salafis approaching the revolution cautiously, many members of Salafis attended the revolutionaries at the Tahrir Square. (Aswal, 2013: 3)

In the post-Mubarak period, Salafis found Nour Party in order to maximize their representation in the parliament. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, they gained 123 seats thanks to their strict Islamist propaganda during the election process. (Telci, 2017: 111) They shaped their election campaign around anti-secular agenda. They constantly advocated that the source of law is 'sharia' and condemned some secular

groups due to their interrogation of sharia law. (Aswal, 2013: 5) If we think of the low profile of the MB in that period, Nour Party's Islamist agenda filled some sort of gap in Egyptian politics. Nour Party did not appoint a candidate during the Presidential Elections in 2012, instead, they supported Abul Futuh in the first round and Mohammed Morsi in the second round. (Telci, 2017: 113) During the Morsi period, they had close relationship with the government until the controversial declaration on 22 November.

3.3. THE REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

This section will be examined the revolution in Egypt and its short-term consequences.

3.3.1. Eighteen Days

After the fall of Ben Ali regime in Tunisia on 14 January 2011, all authoritarian leaders in the Middle East were feeling the pressure and danger for their future in power. Just eleven days later, the protests would jump into the Tahrir Square in Egypt. Of course, the people did not decide to gather against the government suddenly. Day by day, tension in Egypt rose against the Mubarak government. Before the protests started, violent incidents happened. On 7 January 2011, 23 people were killed with terror bombing attacks during Coptic ceremony for the Christmas at the outside of two churches in Sidi Bishr and Alexandria. (Hassan, 2015: 37) Mubarak condemned the attack and blamed the Islamic militants as perpetrators. (Milton Edwards, 2016: 36) After the incident, the Coptic Christians organized the protests against the government that could not investigate the event in a detailed way. They have just stressed their slogan 'Christian+Muslim =Egyptian.' However, the police forces displayed harsh attitudes against them. This of course created an anger among the protesters. (Hassan, 2015: 37)

In such an atmosphere, opposition groups heard the news from Tunisia. The MB immediately used their social media channels in Facebook, Twitter and Youtube in order to mobilize people and to invite them to the Tahrir Square on 25 January. (Ikhwanweb, 2015; Milton Edwards, 2016: 36;) This date was chosen intentionally

since it is a national holiday and is celebrated as the Police Day. Mubarak himself declared this date as national holiday to symbolize victory in 1952 against British forces. The protesters used this heroic narrative to create their own. This date would symbolize getting rid of police violence for years. The organizers wrote on Facebook page: “25 January is not a revolution by means of a coup but a revolution against the government, to tell them that we’ve begun to be concerned with our own affairs and we will get back all our rights and not remain silent after this day.” (Hassan, 2015: 38) The organizers also reminded the young protestor, Khaled Said who was deadly beaten by police in 2010. They wrote on Facebook page: “We are all Khaled Said.” (Hassan, 2015: 37) This slogan was base for the change in Egypt during ‘Eighteen Days’ from 25 January to 11 February 2011. (Shokr, 2012; Hassan, 2015: 37; Milton Edwards, 2016: 36)

Protesters in Tahrir Square did not have an intention for radical change or revolution in the first place. Despite Tahrir means ‘liberation’ in Arabic, their demands were mainly addressing the chronic problems; poverty and low-level minimum wage, ending the emergency law and ceasing intervention of security forces into public life and implementing some of democratic apparatus like unchangeable presidential limits, free and fair elections, transparency. (Shokr, 2012: 52-55) These demands were listed on Facebook page before the protests began. Facebook page also specified what protesters needed to do during the protests. Mainly; they should carry only Egyptian flag instead of different party or organization flags that they were affiliated with. They should avoid arguing with security forces, instead, they just needed to stress the common problems; poverty, unemployment and political freedoms. (Shokr, 2012; Hassan, 2015: 37)

However, in reality the case was obviously different. When the angry crowd gathered in Tahrir Square on 25 January, people started to demand not only basic freedoms, but also the resignation of Mubarak immediately. They used slogans such as “Down with Mubarak!”, “Revolution in Tunisia. Revolution in Egypt,” “Revolution in all the streets of Egypt!” (Hassan, 2015: 39) Mubarak prohibited the protests and the Interior Minister assigned lots of security forces on 26 January to the Tahrir Square. Police used water cannons, tear gasses and rubber-coated bullets to dismantling the protestors. Protesters often used patriotic slogans when they were exposed to violence

by security forces. This created sympathy for the protestors among the public opinion. (Shokr, 2012; Hassan, 2015: 42)

When “We are all Khaled Said” page reached 400,000 subscribers, Mubarak cut internet and all social media networks to cease communication among the protestors. Despite the serious prohibitions of government, number of protestors increased from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands within three days. On 29 January, even one million people gathered and called for resignation of Mubarak at the Tahrir Square. (Hassan, 2015: 50) Undoubtedly, this was the biggest demonstration that ever happened in the Egyptian history. When the size of protests increased, international media also turned their face to the developments in Egypt. The international media giants such as CNN, BBC Deutsche Welle started broadcasting developments in Egypt live. The combination of both inside and outside pressures endangered Mubarak’s future in the presidency. After eighteen days of struggle between the people and the ancient regime forces, on 11 February 2011, SCAF ousted Mubarak from power and assumed power during the transition process. (Helyer, 2016: 24)

3.3.2. Rising Power of the MB

The MB became the strongest opposition force in the post-Mubarak regime since their leadership followed pragmatic and decisive policies during the eighteen days of protests. Despite the cautious attitude of the MB in the first place, just three days after the demonstrations broke out, the MB leadership pragmatically declared their full joining into the side of revolutionaries against the Mubarak regime. The MB leadership saw the meaning of the protests for the people and realized that in a possible change, the MB would not be on the side of the winners, who would shape Egyptian politics in the post-Mubarak era if they did not change their cautious attitude. (Pargeter, 2012: 184). However, the MB was still reluctant to become the leading actor of the protests. The MB leadership did not want to be a part of regime’s propaganda through imaging them as a first perpetrators of the revolution. Such a way, regime would be able to blame revolutionaries to serve efforts for the MB’s ultimate goal that was the establishment of an Islamic State in Egypt. The regime also resembled the

ultimate outcome of the revolution to that of in Iran. In response to such claims, the MB always mentioned political freedoms and social justice rather than the establishment of an Islamic state. (Pargeter, 2012: 186)

Despite the MB wanted to seem as low-profile during the protests, their social assistance networks did not allow them. The MB helped many revolutionaries at Tahrir Square by forming assistance tents in order to distribute food, medicine, first aid kits and hot drinks. They also printed banners to reminding the young Egyptians who were killed by the Mubarak regime. The MB members also provided security at Tahrir Square to prevent any provocation that would be harmful to the cause of revolutionaries. So, the MB became one of the leading actors during the protests together with Baradei and other secular and leftist groups. The MB's role during the protests also demonstrated that their organizational capacity was unrivalled in Egypt. (Pargeter, 2012: 186-191)

Although the MB arose as the strongest actor during the protests, they were constantly saying that they did not claim power and did not have any intention for the presidency in the post-Mubarak period. The main reason behind the reluctant view of the MB to assume power was that they did not want to frighten secular groups, especially the military. The MB leadership highly realized that compromising the military was the key to assuming Presidency. Even the MB could be excluded from the political process again in a possible conflict with the military. Besides, SCAF was in power at that time and they needed to leave power immediately to the civilians. (Pargeter, 2012: 191) All these reasons were obviously contributing factors to intimacy between the military and the MB. However, the MB leadership now faced a dilemma: if they formed an alliance with the military, they could alienate people and the other revolutionary groups since revolutionaries did not want any kind of military-backed tutelage.

The MB leadership chose the path with the side of the military by presenting them a transition plan that contained returning power to the civilians. But this did not mean indefectible alliance between two sides. Even the MB played with the two sides, the military and the revolutionaries during the transition period. Their main motive was guaranteeing their strong position in the post-Mubarak era. The MB also wanted to rush election process since they were the most organized groups. Their secular

alternatives like Kefaya, 6 April Movement or NAC were all divided and fragmented. The MB leadership knew that in a possible election, their possibility of victory was the highest. (Telci, 2017)

Military's reaction to the MB's transition plan was cautious in the first place because of ideological concerns. But, SCAF was also aware that elections should be held after a revolution took place. Military saw the MB's plan as the quickest solution for themselves. On 19 March, they held a referendum that included bunch of constitutional changes presented by the MB. Secular opposition was strongly against this referendum since they wanted to prepare civil constitution first instead of changes in the current constitution. Despite secular opposition's objections, the referendum passed with 77.3 percent 'Yes' thanks to efforts of the MB. (Pargeter, 2012: 193) The pragmatic alliance between the MB and the military thus gave a result in that referendum. However, during the referendum process, the MB used a dangerous tongue in which 'saying no' was equal with "saying no to the article II of the 1971 constitution that identify Sharia is a principal source of legislation". (International Crisis Group, 2012; Pargeter, 2012: 193). Furthermore, some reports claimed that "the Brotherhood resorted to even cruder tactics in order to convince people to vote 'yes', allegedly adopting slogans such as 'Voting yes, with Allah' or 'Voting no is siding with the Copts.'" (Pargeter, 2012: 193) These kinds of slogans contributed to polarization between the Islamic side of the revolution which is the MB and the secular side of the revolution which are liberal and leftist groups. In other words, the MB alienated the other opposition groups at the expense of their pragmatic alliance with the military.

3.3.3. The Freedom and Justice Party and the First Elected President

After the resignation of the Mubarak, both Islamist and secular oppositions groups shared a common demand from the SCAF to shift power from the military to the civilians. As long as SCAF seemed unwilling to retreat from the power, opposition groups tried to increase pressure on the military through demonstrations, banners, slogans and social media. Their efforts were quite successful and led the military to welcome MB's transition plan desperately. Thus, the former enemies, the military and

the MB now became friends. Both sides wanted to keep control of each other through using this alliance. However, this time the MB benefitted from the transition plan more. Thanks to the referendum, the power would return to the civilians through a free and fair election. The MB knew that their chance of winning was the highest in an immediate election since they were the most organized and the richest opposition group in Egypt. So, the MB finally found a free space into political scene without strict censorship imposed by the government. (Pargeter, 2012: 180-191)

In this direction, the MB leadership declared their intention to form a political party. In April 2011, the MB formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). They appointed three members of the Guidance Council to head the party. Mohammed Morsi was thus appointed as the leader, Issiam Al- Arian as his deputy and Saad al-Kattani as the secretary-general of FJP. (Anani, 2011; Pargeter, 2012: 195) After the establishment of the FJP, there was an internal debate inside the MB about whether its members were free to choose whichever political party they supported. Actually, in theory; the MB leadership guaranteed the autonomy of both entities which were the party and the community. But in practice, the party leaders were appointed by the community. In addition, Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie closed the way for the brotherhood's members to join other political parties. It is obvious that FJP was controlled by the MB itself during this process. (Pargeter, 2012: 196) Some younger members of the MB formed a different party, al-Wasat to protest the lack of democracy within the community. Badie expelled them from the community and depicted them as 'errant youth'. (Fahmy, 2016, 90-91) So, in the post-Mubarak era, we cannot mention any democratic actions within the organizational structure of the MB although they continuously advocated the necessity of launching democratization steps.

As elections approached, the power struggle between the military and the MB took place. The military started to resent the MB's strong position in upcoming elections. They did not want to allow preparing a new constitution by the solid majority of the FJP which would emphasize Islamic values more than other things. However, since they accepted the transition plan, SCAF had to leave the power to civilians. They needed to find a new path to control the MB's actions. In order to control the new constitution process, in July 2011, SCAF changed the parliament law to limit the new government's executive power enormously. According to the new law, in the Lower

House, 50 percent of the parliament is reserved for the individual candidates, while the other 50 percent is elected from the party's list. (Pargeter, 2012: 197) This law not only targeted the MB, but also Salafis and secular movements. Moreover, the law determined that only 28 constituencies in the Shura Council or the Upper House were spared for the party lists, while the other 65 constituencies were reserved for individual candidates. This meant that any political party cannot change the constitution itself even if they had got a solid majority in the democratic elections. The FJP and other political parties desperately protested these decisions and the military finally had to increase the portion of party lists from 50 percent to two-thirds of the Lower House. But this would still work to limit the power of the new government. (Pargeter, 2012: 197)

Military also supported Nasser's parliamentary law in which half of the contested parliamentary seats should be reserved for farmers and labours. In the recent year of Mubarak regime, these seats were only reserved for retired military officials instead of regular citizens. New regulations demonstrated military's domination in the political scene explicitly even if the new government would be elected by civilians. On the other hand, the MB would not accept the military's tutelage in an easy way. For almost a century in the opposition, the MB highly experienced about the manoeuvres in the power struggle. FJP immediately gathered a meeting together with ten political parties to protest the SCAF's regulations in parliamentary law and they established 'the Democratic Alliance for Egypt' in order to claim every seat in the parliament without any reserved seats. The alliance led by FJP even threatened SCAF to boycott the elections if they did not give up the new parliamentary law. Finally, due to the pressures coming from all sides, SCAF had to accept that all seats would be contested in the upcoming elections. (Pargeter, 2012: 197-198)

This victory for the MB would not last too long. The military proposed bunch of supranational principles in order to control executive power of the assembly. These principles contained that the military budget would be unquestionable and that SCAF was giving itself to right to object to articles in the new constitution that if the parliament failed to draft the new constitution, then the constitution would draft by SCAF itself. Even the worse part of the regulation for the MB was that SCAF would select 80 out of 100 members of the constitution committee. The MB's answer was

harsh. Thanks to efforts of the MB, people gathered at Tahrir Square to protest SCAF's contradictory decisions. Secular and leftist groups were also supported the demonstrations since they did not want another authoritarian government after Mubarak. In the face of mass demonstrations, the military stepped back again and declared that supranational principles are not binding, but are just advisory. In addition, "the SCAF also amended the principles so that the military would be placed directly under a civilian government, asserting that it should abide by the constitutional and legislative regulations." (New York Times, 2011; Pargeter, 2012: 199) Despite the fact that the military preserved many privileges, and even increased the scale, the MB was only caring about FJD's victory in the upcoming elections.

After the thirteen days of the election process, on 11 January 2012, Democratic Alliance for Egypt (DAE) won the parliamentary elections with an overwhelming majority. The alliance got 47.2 percent of the votes and won 235 seats in the Egyptian parliament. (Nugent, 2020; 235-236) The FJP, of course, was the leading party and most of the deputies were elected from the FJP's party list. This election was also the first democratic election in the Egyptian history. It took place in a free, fair and competitive atmosphere despite SCAF's undemocratic nature. In the same election, the Salafist Nour Party won 120 seats and consisted second majority group in the parliament after the FJP. (Anani and Malik, 2013) So, two Islamist parties comprised almost two-thirds of the parliament. On the other hand, secular and leftist groups won nothing despite their contributions to the revolution process. This results also showed them importance of Islam based politics in Egyptian society.

However, secular and leftist groups did not give up since presidential elections would be decisive in the power struggle in the post-Mubarak era. The election results were not a surprise for SCAF but was disastrous. As a secular actor, the military was not happy to see the victory of Islamists without any strong secular opposition in the parliament. Moreover, the power struggle between the military and the MB still continued. On March 2012, the FJP confronted many obstacles while exercising executive power due to a number of regulations initiated by the SCAF. The FJP tried to work under strict surveillance of the SCAF during constitution making process but they did not make it. In order to curve the authority of SCAF, the FJP launched dangerous steps that would extend the authority of Islamists in the new constitution

process. They formed an implicit alliance with the Salafist Nour Party which finalized that 75 percent of constitution committee to be elected by both the FJP and the Nour Party. Although the MB advocated that the assignments in the constitution committee reflected the result of the elections, there was no doubt that secular groups were already estranged. (Pargeter, 2012: 201-202)

As presidential elections approached, the FJP showed Khairat al-Shater, who was the strongest person in the party, as a candidate in the upcoming elections. Al-Shater's nomination was a controversial decision within the movement since the MB leadership did not want a person who viewed himself above the movement. Nevertheless, because of the ongoing struggle, the MB needed to compete with their strongest candidate. In addition; maybe al-Shater's main mistake took place during his interview with New York Times in March 2012 when he said that "Egyptians were demanding 'an explicitly Islamic state.'" (New York Times, 2012; Pargeter, 2012: 202) Meanwhile, the FJP's excluding attempts against the seculars in the member selecting process created a small political crisis. Secular and leftist parties boycotted the work of the constitution committee. On the other hand, SCAF highly resented the FJP's appointment. Al-Shater's statements also strengthened the hands of the military. In this direction, the SCAF dissolved the constitution committee on June 15, 2012. This was a huge blow to the interests of the MB in politics. Now they knew that winning upcoming elections were critical to consolidating executive power and getting rid of the tutelage of the military in politics. (Nugent, 2020: 239-240)

After the suspension of the committee, the military took another step to curb MB's power in executive power and dissolved the parliament by sending troops to the assembly. In addition, the SCAF banned Al Shater's name from the presidential candidates list since he had a criminal record of being convicted with money laundering in the name of the MB in 2008. That was a shock decision for the MB leaders because they made sure that Al Shater would be the next president of Egypt. The MB but launched a back-up plan for presidential race. Mohammed Morsi who was a low-profile leader would be new candidate of FJP for presidency. Morsi joined the MB during his PhD in the US. He was elected as a deputy in 2000 and became the leader of parliamentary part of the MB until 2005. Although public opinion has common thought that Morsi's chance was quite low, he took 24.78 percent of the

votes in the first round. This was enough rate to be qualified for the second round of presidential election. In the second round, Mohammed Morsi received 51.73 percent of votes against Ahmed Shafiq and declared his presidency on 24 June, 2012. (Pargeter, 2012: 203-204) Thus, after the painful opposition process against political Islam since establishment of the country, the MB was in the power. They did not come to power through using force, instead they used the electoral process. As a result, Mohammed Morsi became the first president in Egypt who was elected by free, fair and competitive elections.

3.4. MORSI IN POWER

This section will be analysed the rise and fall of Morsi in different perspectives.

3.4.1. Ups and Downs of Morsi Government

Mohammed Morsi who is the first elected president in Egypt had experienced a controversial presidential term during his rule. His period had a few ups and many downs that would eventually lead to a military coup by his defence minister Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. Morsi's presidency started with a positive atmosphere. As an elected leader, he did not suffer from legitimacy problems as much as his predecessors Sadat and Mubarak. Nevertheless, the new president desperately needed to consolidate his power. Morsi faced serious obstacles in order to do so. The main challenge to the new president was coming from secular state bureaucracy mainly the military and the judiciary. On the other hand, Morsi thought that the presidential election was the ultimate result to assume executive power without facing any opposition either from secular parties or from bureaucratic elites. His miscalculations would eventually bring the end of his elected presidential rule.

Although Morsi neglected bureaucratic elites during his term, the first couple of months were quite good for Morsi's government. He had used the outbreak of crisis to curb the military's relentless power in state affairs. Because even if Morsi won the presidential election, SCAF did not abandon their excessive powers yet including dissolving parliament and constitution committee, appointing senior generals etc.

Meanwhile, on 5 August 2012, sixteen Egyptian soldiers were killed in the Sinai Peninsula by a brutal terrorist attack. After the incident, there was a general belief that the military must do its job instead of dealing with state affairs. As in many democracies, the military needed to deal with security issues. The rest was not the business of the military. For the first time in Egypt's history, there was such a belief in the general sense. This was a really strong proof to show the desire for democratization in public opinion. Despite we cannot reduce it into a single event, it showed that after three authoritarian leaders, Egyptians were trying a democratic experience. (Hellyer, 2016: 98)

In this optimism, Morsi used the chance effectively by dismissing Tantawi to keep military under the control. Tantawi was the defence minister for a while and he was an important figure for the military's involvement in state affairs. He was related with the old regime and symbolized the military tutelage. These features were obviously something that Morsi and the MB leadership hated. Instead of Tantawi, Morsi appointed an unknown and low rank officer Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi as defence minister. Morsi-Sisi relations would continue surprisingly well despite of the rivalry between the MB and the military until the last period of Morsi's rule. That's why, this move was seemed to be a success in the first months of Morsi's presidency. (Hellyer, 2016: 98)

The second success for the Morsi government came in foreign policy. In November 2012, Israel launched a military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Due to the losses of civilians after Israel's attacks, the necessity of a ceasefire became an international issue. Morsi took this chance to play a mediator role between Israel and Hamas. The MB had strong relationship with Hamas for years while rapprochement between Israel and Egypt still continued since the Camp David Accords. So, there was no better actor than Morsi to mediate between the two sides. Thanks to efforts of Morsi, on 22 November 2012, both sides agreed on a ceasefire despite both sides were unsatisfied. Nevertheless, the ceasefire did not only bring the war to an end but also increased international prestige of the new president. (Hellyer, 2016: 101)

After the consecutive success both inside and outside of the country, Morsi government entered downs period that would eventually end by the military coup.

Morsi faced first challenge by secular bureaucracy mainly judiciary. During Mubarak period, judiciary had an untouchable position due to its alliance with the president. This is not same with the judicial independence in democratic countries. Instead, they have a kind of tutelage over law thanks to patronage of the government. A good example in Morsi period had shown judicial tutelage in Egypt. After dismissal of Tantawi, Morsi took another step this time against judiciary. Prosecutor general Abd al-Majid Mahmud who freed many perpetrators of deaths in eighteen days protests preserved his position without any trials despite the revolutionaries were now in the power. Morsi wanted to remove him immediately as well as other revolutionary groups. However, he faced unexpected resistance in judiciary itself. The powerful judges' association stated that Morsi's attempt was a violation of judicial independence. There was no internal support to Morsi's decision in judiciary. Eventually, Morsi had to give up this attempt since he did not have support as much as Tantawi's dismissal. Mahmud thus preserved his position until the age of retirement. (Al Jazeera 2012; Hellyer, 2016: 102-103)

Morsi's first failure actually arose from a lack of power in revolutionary means. Morsi came to power after the revolution took place but he was not the president of all revolutionaries. In Egypt, every eight out of ten people supported the revolution and Mubarak had to resign against these angered crowds. However, after the transition period under SCAF, Morsi came to power by receiving just 24.78 percent of the total votes in the first round. This was not enough number to represent all people in a majoritarian electoral system which has the logic of 'winner takes all.' (Hellyer, 2016: 104) Morsi thus gained all legislative and executive authority as a result of the presidential election. Even there was no serious institution to check new government's actions. Parliament was already dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) before the presidential elections because the election results were found as unconstitutional. (Nugent, 2020: 239-240) Revolutionaries might want a democratic system but Egypt did not have appropriate institutional structure and legislation system. The only checking institution was military which is essentially against the nature of democracy. Egypt therefore desperately needed a new constitution and regulations that would stimulate the democratization process. (Hellyer, 2016: 104)

Nevertheless, in democratic means, the situation was far better than past during the first months of Morsi period. Contrary to his predecessors, Morsi needed to be president of all people if he wanted to be seen as a revolutionary leader. This was good somehow because the president should act according to the will of people. However, due to the winner takes all logic, Morsi was unable to obtain the extraordinary power of revolutionary leaders. His authority remained limited from the legal perspective even if the case would be dismissing a criminal from the public work. Morsi thus could not dismiss prosecutor general as a demand of revolution. As elected president, Morsi had limited power within legal framework, but did not want to stay within those boundaries. His move against judiciary was the first proof of that understanding. (Hellyer, 2016: 104-106)

Meanwhile, in June 2012, Morsi presented a new path to create a constitutional assembly again. According to the plan, the members of the assembly consisted of politicians, religious leaders from both Muslim and Christian communities, and the members of syndicates. Thirty-nine out of 100 seats were reserved by politicians that would be elected from mainstream political parties. Until here, everything seemed to be perfect and very democratic but when the member list was declared, the reserved seats were asymmetrically given to FJP and MB members as well as their Salafis ally, Nour Party members. Furthermore, Ahmet Maher who is the one of the founding members of April 6 movement argued that the assembly negotiated the articles according to directives coming from the MB and non-Islamist members did not have any effect in the assembly. (Anani & Malik, 2013: 67-68) Therefore, Maher and some prominent figures including Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat, son of former president, Amr Moussa, the former secretary of Arab League, and various syndicate and guild members would withdraw from assembly to protest their decision-making process. Opposition parties and military strongly criticized the assembly's activities. This was the first breakaway between Morsi and opposition parties since Morsi's inauguration. (Hafez 2012; Hellyer, 2016: 108)

The second tension between Morsi government and Egyptian bureaucracy occurred when Morsi issued a decree in order to restore parliament like before the election. The SCC immediately rejected the decree since they were determined to prevent Islamist dominated parliamentary sessions in the lower house. There was no

doubt that Morsi wanted to have absolute power as Mubarak had or as SCAF had but he faced limitations like every elected president. On the other hand, these confrontations also fed the polarization between Islamists and secular groups day by day. As the president, Morsi did not try reconciliation with the opposition groups. Instead, he increased his hand to get rid of legal limitations. (Hellyer, 2016: 107-108)

3.4.2. Constitutional Declaration of 22 November

On November 2012, Morsi took the most controversial step in order to get rid of all troubles in the first months of his period. Morsi was determined to assume all power as his predecessors. In order to do that, he needed to eliminate the opposition and made them vulnerable against the president. So, constitutional declaration on November 22 was the exact fit for these goals.

The decree ensured that: investigations into the killing of protesters would be re-conducted; all decrees made by Mursi could not be appealed by anybody; the public prosecutor would be appointed by the president for a fixed term of four years; no judicial authority could dissolve the Constituent Assembly and Shura Council; and the presidency would be authorised to take any other measures that it saw fit to 'preserve the revolution', 'nationality unity' or 'national security'. (Hellyer, 2016: 110)

Thanks to these regulations, Mursi obtained unrivalled power since every article in the decree was carefully specified to eliminate opposition. First, Morsi targeted the resistance of the Judiciary in terms of the prosecution of criminals during the revolution and the dismissal of the prosecutor general. Thanks to the decree, Morsi now could appoint a public prosecutor and to restart the investigations of the crimes committed against revolutionaries. With that move, the judiciary lost its independence since the public prosecutor became responsible to the president instead of the law. Most importantly, Morsi gave his decisions under immunity from the law. This meant that there was no authority above Morsi except himself. This was the exact way for authoritarian rule in future years as Egypt experienced in the Mubarak era. (Rashed, 2016: 139)

Second, Morsi gave ultimate legislative authority to the Constituent Assembly and Shura Council which mostly included the MB-dominated members. Since the parliament was dissolved by Supreme Court, the Constituent Assembly and Shura Council gained immunity from the Judiciary. There was no possibility to enact a law without the permission of Morsi and the MB in both assemblies since their members were mostly selected from the list of FJP and the Salafist Nour Party. (Azeem, 2013; Hellyer, 2016: 110) In these circumstances, it can easily be suggested that Islamists excluded secular opposition from the legislative and executive decision-making processes. Indeed, this was not different from the exclusion of the MB members from politics for many years. Moreover, Morsi gave himself absolute authority by using unclear statements. All statements here were interpretative. This was even similar to the eternal emergency law during the Mubarak era. These statements can be evaluated as preserving neither the revolution nor national security terms as democratic. Morsi was able to interpret every case as a threat to the revolution or national security. This meant that Constitutional Declaration on November 22 gave Morsi absolute authority. (Hellyer, 2016: 110-111; Rashed, 2016: 139)

3.4.3. Anti-Morsi coalition

Morsi's demand for absolute authority created a shock affect for secular opposition. Morsi used the revolution to suppress the opposition despite the secular and leftist groups consisted of main component which triggered the revolution in the first place. There was general frustration in the opposition against Morsi's declaration. Opposition leaders blamed Morsi of pretending like 'new pharaoh.' Secular and leftist groups organized demonstrations nationwide to retreat from Declaration 22 November. Some of demonstrations resulted with the burning buildings of FJP. Some non-Islamist advisors of Morsi resigned to protest the decision. Judges and prosecutors went a strike. Opposition groups applied to the Court of Administrative Justice for the removal of the decree. Protestors confronted with the police and Morsi's supporters in the street. Police's answer to the protestors was harsh. As a result of nationwide protests, a number of protestors were injured. (Salweh and Blair, 2012; Hellyer, 2016: 111) In these circumstances, the opposition leaders led by Baradei decided to establish

a coalition against Morsi, named as National Salvation Front (NSF) which included bunch of political parties and opposition groups mainly; Nasserist, leftists, liberals and ancient regime supporters. This coalition was short lived since it contained the elements of Mubarak regime like Amr Moussa who was the foreign minister in Mubarak's government. Nevertheless, NSF was important to show that an alliance among more than thirty political parties was possible. (Hellyer, 2016: 111-112)

Morsi's decision about the referendum in December resulted in favour of Morsi. Referendum was passed while the tension and polarization deepened. This meant the complete breakdown and end of revolutionary coalition between the MB and secular groups. On December 5, opposition leaders mainly Baradei and Al-Sayyid Al-Badawi who was the leader of Wafd party called a protest in front of presidential palace in Ittahidiya. Morsi backed public prosecutor blamed these two leaders of plotting coup against the government. (Egypt Independent, 2012; Hellyer, 2016: 117) According to Human Rights Watch, escalated tension in Ittahidiya resulted with ten of people dead and more than 748 people injured. The public prosecutor detained 49 protestors during the demonstrations. (Human Rights Watch, 2012) Police forces were still loyal to the president and enjoyed the right of use of force against the protestors therefore this was an unsuccessful attempt to remove him from the office. However, anti-Morsi coalition grew day by day. (Hellyer, 2016: 117-120)

Morsi's hand was not strong when he declared a war against state bureaucracy and the opposition. Even the split was not limited with the bureaucracy. During the Morsi's visit to Russia in the early 2013, his foreign minister did not attend the meeting. Most of the experts interpreted this as a reaction for Morsi's controversial decree. (Hellyer, 2016: 134)

In early 2013, the conditions were not good for ordinary citizens. There was no sign of the improvement in economic conditions for the Egyptians. People would be angry if the Morsi government could not increase the purchasing power of the people, during Ramadan in which demands of people gradually grew. (Hellyer; 2016: 134) Morsi realized the bad economic conditions and needed to fund the economy with foreign investments for a rapid boost. He arranged a number of meetings abroad in order to attract foreign investors, especially in the US, the EU and the Gulf States. Meanwhile, both parties approached Morsi's government in unfriendly ways. Morsi

did not find any funds in the West since both the EU and the US did not want an MB rule in Egypt. Their reason was that this could stimulate the Islamist extremism in the region. Egypt is one of the core states for the West in the Middle East in order to repress the Islamist extremist threat in the region. The West did not trust Morsi's government because of his Islamist ideology and his exclusion of seculars from the decision-making processes. (Telci, 2017: 147-168)

On the other hand, in the Gulf States especially in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which were the best allies of Egypt during the Mubarak period, there was the same coolness toward Morsi. Saudi government highly resented the MB rule in Egypt which is the main rival in the region in terms of sectarian differences. Saudis saw the MB rule as the main obstacle to the dissemination of Wahabist ideology in the region. In addition, both states are close Western allies. Hence, there was no possibility to find an ally in the region without the Western linkage. Despite all these concerns, finally on May 2013, Morsi did convince the foreign investors that his rule would be long lasting. The US wanted to assist Egypt in order to prevent any economic instability in Egypt that would lead to a domino effect in the region. But this deal would be too late for saving Morsi. (Hellyer, 2016: 137-138)

On April 28, 2013, Tamarod (rebel) which was an initiative founded by group of Nasserist activists demanded early presidential elections. This was a one of the turning points in Morsi period and a sign for ending of Morsi rule. Tamarod wanted to collect more than two million signatures to call for early presidential elections. Despite the MB accused them as a supporter of Mubarak regime, the movement received support from every part of the society. Even interior ministry of Morsi government gave signature to the campaign. (Saleh and Alsharif 2013; Hellyer, 2016: 138) On June 30, the huge demonstrations which triggered the military coup was organized by the Tamarod movement. (Hellyer, 2016: 138)

Egyptians entered the month of Ramadan in July with the deepened economic problems and political polarization. Much of the private media also criticized Morsi strongly because they were dominated by dissidents of Morsi like Bassem Youssef who is one of the most famous persons in Arab world. (Hellyer, 2016: 136) On the other hand, state media broadcasted the hatred speeches that deepened the political polarization. In this atmosphere, Morsi made another mistake. He made a sectarian

speech and denounced the Shias in Syria and praised the warriors who fought against them and who were not other than Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in that period. (Human Rights Watch, 2013) ISIS was not popular in the West in that period but everybody knew their extremist Islamist practices. Indeed, Morsi's speech led to rebirth of the fear of Islamist extremism for Western countries. (Hellyer, 2016: 139)

3.4.4. Fall of Morsi

On June 30, at the first anniversary of inauguration of Morsi, thanks to Tamarrod campaign, thousands of people gathered in front of presidential palace. However, before this date, to the response of Tamarrod campaign, MB leadership and Morsi realized the danger of uprising against their rule. The MB's strategy was quite dangerous since they called counter demonstrations to support Morsi and continuation his rule. Before June 30, even pro-Morsi protestors gathered at the Rab'a al-Adawiya mosque. (Hellyer, 2016: 141) On June 27, Morsi made a speech that accused the opposition as criminals. This speech dramatically increased the tension between the opposition and pro-Morsi groups. For opposition, this was a stimulating factor for bigger demonstrations while for the pro-Morsi supporters, it was a signal to stand with the president itself. In this direction, pro-Morsi supporters arranged sitting protests at the Masjid Rab'a al-Adawiyya. Sitting protests would become the symbol for the Islamists even after the fall of Morsi. An Islamist solidarity emerged due to the people who attended the protest. This would then turn into an alliance named as National Alliance for Legitimacy that included the FJP and some marginalized Salafist parties mainly, the Wasat Party, the Watan Party, and Building and Development Party. (Durac, 2016; Alianak, 2022: 90) On the other hand, these mutual demonstrations were a signal for hot clashes in the street. There was no guarantee that on June 30, pro-Morsi forces would be out of the street. As political polarization deepened, the risk of internal conflict in Egypt dramatically increased. Unfortunately, nobody wanted to solve that problem unless Morsi was deposed from power.

Private media also continued their anti-Islamist campaign and used antagonistic tongue against Morsi and his supporters. They even identified the MB as a terrorist organization even if the president of Egypt has the MB linkage (Hassan

2015: 155-159) When the reactions were getting out of control, the MB leadership declared that if the protests jumped into Morsi's presidential palace to depose him, then the MB members would do necessary things to save their president. As expected, when Tamarrod's protests started, pro-Morsi forces were also in the street. Many people were dead and injured as the results of the clashes between two sides. When the conflicts escalated, the military which followed a silent and cautious way since the controversial constitutional declaration was validated, surprisingly detained the president Morsi on July 3 as a result of the 'coup' led by Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi. There were many arguments which identified this coup as a revolution but there is also a counter argument that the results of this military coup showed that it was a counter revolutionary attempt. (Telci, 2017: 61-68)

3.5. THE SISI PERIOD AND THE RESULTS OF THE POLITICAL POLARIZATION

The military restored the order on July 3 at the expense of thousands of lives. There was a cycle of bloodshed in the streets after the Morsi's detention. Anti-Morsi and pro-Morsi forces confronted many times and the security forces did nothing to prevent deaths. They even encouraged it to break resistance of the MB's supporters. According to report of British journalist Patrick Kingsley, "fifty-one Mursi supporters had been killed by the state forces." (Kingsley, 2013) The level of massacres increased toward the end of July. On 24 July, Sisi made a speech to invite all Egyptians to fight against the terrorism spawned. (Kingsley, 2013) With this speech, after a brief period in the power, the MB was blamed again as a terrorist organization by the Egyptian state. This was in fact the sign of a vicious circle in Egyptian politics. It does not matter whoever has assumed power from the secular side like Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak governments, Egyptian states has marginalized the political Islam. On the contrary, during the short period of the Morsi period, seculars this time were excluded from decision-making processes by the government. So, Egypt has indeed experienced a vicious circle as deep political polarization has never left the country.

After Sisi's speech, police forces increased the level of violence against the Morsi's supporters. Massacre weeks actually begun. On 14 August 2013, Egyptians

exposed the extreme level of violence by security forces. According to Human Rights Watch reports, this day is remembered as a massacre that is committed by the Egyptian security forces. (Human Right Watch, 2014) As a result of brutal intervention of security forces, 904 people including women and children were killed in Rab'a and Al-Nahda. (Hellyer, 2016: 165) The supreme court which is one of the opposing institutions for the Morsi government decided that no investigation necessary for the military's infringement during the intervention. Just two days later, on 16 August 2013, 120 people and 2 police were killed as a result of clashes between the Mursi supporters and the security forces. Again, there was no investigation to find who was/were responsible from the deaths. (Hellyer, 2016: 167) To summarize, several violent events happened after the military coup⁵.

Sisi's first job in power was to disband the MB assets in every realm. He cut the connection of MB with the Egyptian state. First, the MB's political branch, the FJP was banned. Second, the MB was declared as a terrorist organization and was blamed of a bunch of crimes in the past. (Hellyer, 2016: 175) This also meant that the state now can take every necessary measure against the MB. Indeed, Sisi as an interim president, passed a law on December 2013 that prohibited the freedom of assembly without the permission of security forces. The revolution thus ended with this law since it occurred at Tahrir Square as a result of demonstrations. The gains of the revolution were completely gone. Now Egyptians could not arrange any meetings, demonstrations or sitting protests without the permission of Sisi himself. This law directly targeted supporters of Morsi. (Hellyer, 2016: 175; Alianak 2022: 90-92) It means that if Egyptians would arrange demonstrations against Sisi, then they would face a brutal police force as mentioned above.

Sisi's 'war on terror' brought many human rights violations together. Sisi re-operated emergency law as Mubarak did and approximately 3.000 people were tried during 2014 and 2015 by military courts without any rights for human dignity. (Hellyer, 2016: 183) Sisi's emergency law also gave all power to him without any resistance. His brutality broke the opposition naturally since people did not want to

⁵ For a detailed analysis see Hellyer, H. A. (2016). *A Revolution Undone: Egypt's Road Beyond Revolt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

engage in another conflict with the government. Since the beginning of 2000s, the demonstration culture which was created in Egypt against the authoritarian leaders, ended for a while together with Sisi period. However, despite the entrance of silence period, Egyptian society is still deeply polarized. Islamist and secularist cleavages are still there leading the political and economic instability of the country. If the polarization does not lessen with plural policies, there will be no possibility to see a democratic government in Egypt in the near future. Next chapter will be analysing the roots of political polarization between the Islamist and secular actors and its impact on democratization in Egypt.



CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION ON DEMOCRATIZATION IN EGYPT

In the previous chapters, political polarization between the Islamist and secularist forces in Egypt was largely mentioned but it was not directly stated that political polarization is the main reason behind the lack of democratic governance in Egypt. Democratization needs a number of preconditions to support itself. Minimized political polarization is one of the preconditions for democratization since it is inevitably needed for encouraging compromise, cooperation and democratic culture in democracies. This chapter will focus on the impacts of political polarization on the failure of the democratization experiment in Egypt in the post-revolutionary period. In this direction, first, there is need to analyse the roots of political polarization between the Islamists and secularists. Second, we shall definitely focus on the indicators for setbacks of democratization during Morsi and Sisi periods. Third part will be examining the instances of polarization.

4.1. ROOTS OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION

Political polarization is simply the natural result of authoritarian policies that led to the loss of the balance between the state and the people. In liberal democracies, the first precondition is that the state should be neutralized. This means that state resources cannot be used to support privileged groups of people regarding ideology, ethnicity, classes, religion and sectarian differences. On the other hand, in an authoritarian state like Egypt, this balance has always been lost in favour of privileged groups that have been changed according to whoever is in the power. If one group of society feels itself excluded by the government in social, economic and political realms, political polarization inevitably occurs. Unprivileged groups probably start to ask why the state excludes them according to the ideological differences for instance. This naturally creates anger against the state and even against the privileged parts of the society. Therefore, in authoritarian states, the power struggle is tough and brutal

since the winner obtains patronage from the government while the loser's fate is the exclusion from every realm.

Egyptian case quite fits in the deterioration of the balance between the state and people. Since the founding of the country, during both Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periods, there had always been some excluded group of people which constituted the oppositions mainly the MB. After the Arab Spring, when the excluded group, the MB came to power, the leader of MB's political party, Mohammed Morsi, this time searched for the ways to gain absolute authority like his predecessors. In this direction, Morsi first disbanded the revolutionary coalition that was established for democratization reforms. Second, he deployed Islamists in important positions without considering the secularist sensibilities. Then despite the expectations of the for further democratization attempts from the elected president, he preferred to end the democratic experiment with a controversial declaration on November 22, 2012. Morsi's search for the ultimate authority led to frustration and complete fragmentation of the society. His further attempts like hatred speeches, unmeritocratic decisions eventually fed the political polarization in the country to a large extent. The society split into two as; anti-Morsi secular coalitions on the one hand and pro-Morsi Islamist supporters on the other hand. After a series of demonstrations, the military led by defence minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, decided to oust Morsi from power and crushed Morsi's supporters through bloody massacres. As a result of the deepened political polarization between Islamists and Secularists, thousands of Egyptians were dead. Egypt has highly suffered from the polarization between the two camps since the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. There have been many reasons for the growing political polarization in Egypt despite the fact that the first democratic elections were held.

4.1.1. Difficulties of the Transition Period

On 25 January 2011, Egyptians who had suffered from Mubarak's oppression rebelled against the government and demanded the ouster of Mubarak immediately. These people demanded the ending of authoritarian policies and the opening of the country's political system to the direction of democracy. Haass also added that

democracy was not the primary demand for most of the people who gathered at the Tahrir Square since they simply wanted to end widespread corruption, unemployment and the bad standard of living. (Haass, 2011; Rezaei, 2015) But there was a general belief for a democratic government, especially among educated demonstrators. Kimenyi stated that when the number of educated people increased like in Egypt, providing legitimate ground for corruption, nepotism and exclusion of the general population from state resources would become impossible for the autocratic regimes. (Kimenyi, 2011; Rezaei, 2015) Egypt definitely needed the general belief for democratic transition. But this was not enough by itself. For accomplishing democratic transition properly, there needs to be a general consensus on democratic order between the elites in the secular circles and Islamist forces and a room for people to express their views and concerns about the new democratic order to take place. (Brown, 2013: 46)

Eighteen days of protests was a historical moment in Egypt's history. For the first time, people could make their voices heard by the government for a radical demand like resignation. They were indeed successful but launching a democratic reform process was not easy in a bureaucratic authoritarian state like Egypt. The first difficulty was created by the military. The SCAF directly took the control of the state after the resignation of Mubarak. Thus, the hopes for democratic transition were cut by an undemocratic actor for a while. However, this was not the complete loss of democracy. On the contrary, due to the pressures that came from the revolutionary alliance between the Islamist and secularist forces, the military had to return power to the civilians. Before the revolution, Islamists led by the MB and the secular civil society organizations merged against the Mubarak's authoritarianism. This alliance continued until the first democratic elections were held and asymmetric balance emerged between two opposite groups. Common goals for democracy sustained this alliance for a while, but the opposition during Mubarak period first time saw the actual preferences of Egyptians in democratic elections. (Nugent, 2020: 233-234)

The main problem was that the polarization would prevail again to fall apart this coalition. In a polarized country like Egypt, seeking democratic transition through rushing the elections could be problematic since the loser of the elections might not respect the results because of the deep mistrust against the state and fairness of the

elections. Even if they accepted the results of elections, they would not regard an asymmetric order in decision making processes at the outcome of the elections. This was the case during the democratic transition in Egypt. Secularists did not accept any order presented by the Islamists unless they were the privileged side. (Rashed, 2016: 139-140) Furthermore, if there is deep polarization among the actors, the winners probably choose 'the winner takes all' type of governance. This meant the exclusion of the rest of the society from the decision-making process like the FJP did in the post-election process. If the actors were less polarized, Islamists would have listened concerns of the secularists during the constitution-making process. But this was not the case in Egypt. (Nugent, 2020: 217)

The revolutionary alliance fell apart firstly due to constitutional amendments prepared by the MB and the SCAF to rush elections instead of reaching a consensus among the factions in the alliance. Islamists adopted the amendments rapidly to skip election phase because they were the most organized political groups in the political scene. On the other hand, secularists could not propose any alternative other than rushing for the elections despite the military-backed amendments offered unbalanced authorities to whoever was in the power. (Brown, 2013: 47) With the acceptance of the plan, two elections, first parliamentary and then the presidential elections were to be held in Egypt. Although the Islamists won the two elections with a slight difference, they obtained power with tremendous authority. However, the MB elites highly realized that constitutional amendments also gave a supervisory role to the military on the Egyptian parliament. There was no possibility of drafting a law without the approval of military in these circumstances. The military elites argued that once the president was elected, the military's supervisory role would come to end. This meant that the role of parliament would be meaningless during the constitution drafting process until the new president was elected. (Brown, 2013: 47)

Thanks to the efforts of the revolutionary alliance, Egypt held the first democratic elections in its history. However, the elections even led to deeper cleavages rather than easing the tension within the society. (Brown, 2013: 46) Both parties in the democratic alliance did not have any intention of giving concessions or to reach a compromise in order to ensure continuity of the coalition and to accommodate democratic transition in Egypt. (Anani, 2020: 2) In addition, no party had a roadmap

for democratic transition other than rushing for the elections serving to material interests of associated groups. (Alashwal, 2020: 2) As the winner of the elections, the FJP did not have any intention to give any concession to the secular opposition, instead, they excluded secularists from important institutions for the continuation of democracy like the constitution committee by deploying Islamist candidates with an overwhelming majority. (Pargeter, 2012: 201-202) Failing efforts during the new constitution writing process were the most striking example to show the failure of the democratic transition period in Egypt.

A constitution that is created by every part of the society is the first step for consolidating democracy. Egypt had a chance to do this after the FJP took power through democratic elections. However, neither party agreed on a democratic constitution since there was no compromise or concession between them. After the parliament was elected on January 2012, revolutionary forces wanted to have a new democratic constitution for accomplishing the democratic transition. It was to be prepared by the constitution committee with 100 members within a time frame of six months. According to the roadmap, half of the committee members would be chosen from the parliament, where Islamists had an overwhelming majority while the other half would be chosen from the various groups, where the Islamists had a majority as well. (Nugent, 2020: 238) This meant the exclusion of non-Islamists from the constitution writing process. After secularist candidates boycotted joining the works of the constitution committee and applied to the Supreme Court for the suspension of the committee, Supreme Court suspended it thanks to efforts of both military and bureaucratic elites who did not want a constitution that was prepared by Islamists alone. (Brown, 2013: 48)

Egypt's second democratic election taking place in May 2012 also brought conflict instead of stability. Mohammed Morsi was the second choice of the MB after al-Shater's ineligibility for the presidential candidacy. Morsi won the elections in the second round with small difference against Ahmad Shafiq who had a bad reputation in society because of his military past and his linkage with the old regime (Nugent, 2020: 237). So, Morsi definitely was not the candidate that wide coalitions agreed on. Instead, he seemed to be a lesser evil than his alternative. In addition, before a couple of days in the second round, when Morsi's victory was obvious, first blow for the

democratic elections came from the secular bureaucracy. Supreme Court declared the result of parliamentary elections as unconstitutional and dissolved the parliament until the next elections. Furthermore, the military declared its dominance in constitution writing process. According to the new constitutional declaration, the constitutional committee could not draft a law without the consent of military generals. So, even before Morsi became the president, the FJP and the MB lost most of their gains in the parliamentary elections. (Brown, 2013: 48)

Once Morsi was elected as the new president of Egypt, he found himself in a power struggle. Morsi needed to use the MB's gains to consolidate his power. This eventually led to many conflicts between the new president and the opposition. FJP tried to eliminate opposition forces within the bureaucracy and political scene in order to be the only player in power. Therefore, the transition period was shaken many times by the rivalry between the judiciary and the FJP, between the military and the MB, and later between the FJP and the NSF. Morsi's first steps were breaking the power of bureaucracy in politics. Through using democratic narratives, they created a general consensus on the military's retreat from political scene. Thanks to this, Morsi even deposed the chief of the military without facing any reaction from the bureaucracy. He was able to appoint no-name candidate Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as the defence minister, replacing Tantawi. Sisi was loyal to Morsi in the first place, therefore, this move was perceived as a triumph of Morsi over bureaucracy. But this was not the actual scenario. The Supreme Court and the military were still one of the resistant forces against the MB rule in the power especially if the case threatened the secular values. (Brown, 2013: 48)

After the dismissal of the defence minister, the secular opposition feared Morsi's unchecked power and criticised the current system in the constitution. Egypt still had the constitution that was prepared by the old regime. It was granting the president wide authorities while the opposition was easily oppressed. Morsi enjoyed his extended power and he even wanted more power to design the country by himself. The secular opposition obviously was not pleased from the emerging system since it could evolve into an authoritarian government. There was no mechanism to check the president. The situation created fear among the opposition about how they would raise their criticisms regarding Morsi's unilateral decisions. Morsi ignored their concerns

since he was busy to obtain further power in various fields. On November 2012, he took the most controversial steps during his rule. Even the opposition expected from the president a democratic constitution through increasing checks and balances structures over the president. On the other hand, Morsi presented a constitution which legitimize an authoritarian system. From 15 December to 22 December, Egyptians went to the ballot box to evaluate Morsi's constitution. Referendum was passed with huge percentage but voter turnout was just 33 percent. (Brown, 2013: 49) Indeed, the opposition boycotted the referendum that paved the way of a coalition against Morsi.

According to the newly adopted constitutional referendum, new parliamentary elections would be held. But there was need to prepare an electoral law by the upper house of parliament which was the only remaining legislative actor at that time. After a rigorous work process, they submitted the law twice to the Supreme Court during the Morsi period, but the court rejected them because of some constitutional mistakes. However, after the Morsi was deposed from power, the Supreme Court endorsed the electoral law rapidly to elect a new parliament and a new president even if there was no constitution or upper houses in the political system. (Brown 2013, 50) The problem arose here from the government side that constitution could not be prepared by a plural coalition. Morsi saw the right to prepare constitution just for himself and his supporters. He neglected the other parts of society which consisted of a considerable portion. (Brown, 2013: 50; Nugent, 2020: 239)

On the other hand, the opposition also contributed to the failure of the democratic transition period. Firstly, they did not respect the results of the elections if the results would not fit their choices. The opposition always used the street demonstrations as a weapon to enforce their wishes to the government. This was one of the contributing factors behind instability during the Morsi period. Democracy works in a stable atmosphere. If there is a threat to the regime, then the regime would increase the pressure on the opposition. Morsi's government felt threat for themselves since the secular opposition generally tried to resort to the Supreme Court or seek the military's help to cancelling the legislation that they dislike. So, the secular opposition needed to act within the boundaries of democracy against the government if they wanted to consolidate democracy in Egypt. (Brown, 2013: 51) In addition, the opposition did whatever they disliked during the Morsi period after the military coup

in July 2013. Even they formed the most brutal government in Egypt's history. Their acts included violence against protestors, purging Islamists from important positions, closing Islamist channels and capturing Islamists' assets. (Rashed 2016: 141; Anani, 2020: 2)

In a deeper analysis, the failure of democratic transition period arose by the authoritarian character of the Egyptian state structure and people, who had been affected by this atmosphere for many years. There were four features which fed the authoritarian legacy in Egypt. First was that democratic transition period was planned by an authoritarian actor like the military. Despite the existing influence of the MB, the military regulated and accepted the constitutional amendments in March 2011. They supposed that the elections were the only precondition for the democratization process in Egypt. The main problem here was that the elected government of Morsi had to give compromise and concession to an undemocratic actor in order to get full authority in executive processes. It was obvious that without the military's consent, there would be no civilian government in Egypt during the transition process. On the other hand, the opposition also invited the military to depose Morsi from the power, but they did not realize that the actor whom they wanted help was to form the most autocratic government in Egypt. (Brown, 2013: 51)

The second was that the authoritarian legacy disrupted the equality between Islamists and secularists in the political sense. During all Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periods, Islamists were exposed to more oppression than the secularists. They had to become more organized in order to catch up with the privileged parts of the society in which they were mostly chosen from the secular side thanks to the patronage of the government. That's why Islamists were able to turn this organizational structure into political party. This field that secularists did not have to deal with. Islamist victory in elections, therefore, was not a surprise in Egypt. However, the election results led to mistrust among secularists for democratic elections. This was also one of the reasons for why the power was not transferred to civilians again after the military coup in July 2013. (Brown, 2013: 51)

The third was that the authoritarian legacy was felt deeply in the state structure. Even if the permanent emergency law ended in 2012, relevant legislations in the law and institutions still remained. Old regime tools like military trials still existed in some

cases. Public prosecutors were too powerful than they should be. State-owned media was large and fictionized the truth for propaganda purposes on behalf of the government and military. Furthermore, judicial courts and religious institutions enjoyed large autonomy. Even if the religious institutions did not deal with politics, judicial courts indeed intervened in that area. Their power was beyond judicial limitations. This should not be confused with judicial independence in liberal democracies. The judiciary prioritized its interests or affiliated groups' interests rather than providing justice for the people. This attitude during that process indeed harmed the democratic apparatus. (Brown, 2013: 52-53) The fourth was that authoritarian rule indeed left a strong mistrust among people. Both Islamists and secularists did not have enough trust in each other to reach a consensus about establishing a democratic order. The suspicion against the rivals was normalized in Egyptian society in the past. Therefore, democratic promises were really hard to trust for both the government and the opposition since they were given many times before. (Anani, 2020: 2; Alashwal, 2020:2)

4.1.2. The Military Tutelage

The second factor which has affected the polarisation between the Islamists and the secularists and the failure of democratization efforts in Egypt is obviously the existence of military tutelage at every level of the state structure. Since the country's foundation, the armed forces have had a privileged status in economic, social and political life in Egypt. They even increased their influence day by day thanks to the concessions made by the Egyptian governments. Until the first democratic elections in 2012, three presidents; Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak had a military origin. They had both unique relations with the armed forces that secured the continuity of presidents' rule in return for preserving the military's autonomy. Armed forces especially dramatically increased their power during the Mubarak period. The military's economic enterprises consisted of thirty percent of total Egypt's GDP at the end of the Mubarak period. (Telci, 2017: 123)

Besides economic power, the military has had an enormous influence in Egyptian political life. After eighteen days of protests, the military decided to ouster

Mubarak from power. It might seem like the military had no choice other than to ouster Mubarak from the power, but Egyptians could pay higher prices to dismiss Mubarak without the military's approval. After the detention of Morsi on June 3, 2013, there were many bad examples of massacre weeks. Sisi stayed in power at the expense of many Egyptians' lives thanks to the support of the armed forces. For these reasons, the military tutelage is one of the obstacles to developing democracy in Egypt and providing social peace among polarized people. Well, how did the military obtain its tutelage position in Egypt?

Economically, armed forces built an economic empire in Egypt since the beginning of Nasser period. Their economic power was based on the state enterprises which consisted of huge portion of Egyptian economy. During Nasser period, Egypt's economic development was launched with high level military investments thanks to the Arab-Israeli wars. In this period, Egypt received considerable military assistances from the Soviet Union against the US-backed Israel. There was no doubt that military expenditures were the highest within Egypt's economy in these years. If we think about the economic model of 1960s and 1970s, thanks to the state-led economic development, military economy developed enormously. High-rank military officers were appointed as heads of big state enterprises in various sectors. Military thus could influence other areas outside of military economy. (Nassif, 2013: 4-5; Marshall, 2015: 4) In Sadat period, thanks to the peace between Israel and Egypt in 1979, Egypt turned its face from the USSR to the US. Foreign direct investments started to flow to Egypt from the West including military field. The military was highly pleased from the U.S military assistances since it included sophisticated assistances like military training, equipment and technology. For instance, thanks to US aids, first domestic military factory was built for the rehabilitation of armament in 1979. This was a military technology that Egyptians got decades earlier from most of the European countries. (Stork 1987; Marshall, 2015: 5)

In Mubarak period, military's economic range enlarged enormously. Armed forces obtained many privileges from the government in various fields. The military now captured the important state enterprises that could bolster the Egyptian economy directly.

The military did manage to maintain a long list of financial and industrial privileges, including subsidized fuel inputs, control over lucrative real estate, conscript labour, capital equipment transferred under arms sales agreements, preferential access to state contracts, and the use of special permits to exercise extra-legal oversight in sectors ranging from petrochemicals to tourism. (Marshall, 2015: 5)

Furthermore, the military managed joint ventures together with state and foreign investments. The military operated many big projects with these joint ventures in infrastructure and transportation fields. The military's economic assets reached such a figure that the military had full control of profits from the joint ventures while having zero obligation for financial losses in political means. Mubarak was bearing the burden of every financial loss that could trigger the economic recession, despite most of the Egyptian state assets being in the control of the military. (Marshall, 2015: 5-6)

After Morsi came to power, the military took necessary economic guarantees from the new president to maintain their economic assets or even to further develop them. In return, the military did not pose a threat to Morsi's government, they even accepted Morsi's decision about the dismissal of defence minister Tantawi. Morsi actually was trying to cut military influence over the economy such as cutting fuel subsidies to military enterprises, but the military's budget was not open to interrogation. Both parties highly realized that any limitations that came from the government would not affect the military enterprises unless the military's budget was open to the parliament and was thus open to questioning. (Marshall, 2015: 9) The alliance between the MB and the military strained when Morsi announced the plan for Suez Canal in late 2012. Suez Canal Project is one of the biggest infrastructure projects in Egypt which has ever been made. Therefore, military enterprises saw this project as a big opportunity to make profits. However, Morsi appointed his deputy prime minister as a responsible for this project who would only report to Morsi himself. The military saw this move against itself since they had the biggest companies which dealt with this project. This was therefore the first crack between the military and the FJP alliance. (Marshall, 2015: 12) Obviously, we cannot evaluate this as the main reason behind the military coup in July 2013, but it was definitely a contributing factor.

Politically, the military always remained as an influential actor on the background. They provided many suggestions, even sometimes ultimatums, to the governments in domestic and foreign affairs during Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periods. After the revolution, military's role was needed to be updated since the democratic transition period started. All parties in revolutionary alliance agreed on that the military should only deal with the security issues and stay out of the political affairs. After the resignation of Mubarak, the SCAF established an interim government until the new roadmap for democratic transition was declared. The problem here was that the roadmap for democratic transition was defined by an undemocratic actor instead of the revolutionary alliance led by civilian politicians who represented different parts of the society. During the transition period, the SCAF remained in power from Mubarak's resignation on 11 February 2011 to Morsi's inauguration on 30 June 2012. During this period, the SCAF resisted to give power to the civilians despite the revolution took place. The main reason behind the resistance of the military was obviously fearing to lose its privileged status before the revolution. Democracy was a good thing for the military generals unless it threatened the military's interests directly. There is also a contradiction here as there can be no democracy in a country with the existence of military tutelage. The SCAF ironically both decided to present a roadmap for democratic transition and wanted to preserve its supranational status. (Brown, 2013: 51; Nugent, 2020: 233-234)

The military actually did not want to return the power to civilians unless three main conditions that preserved the military's special status in the constitution were fulfilled. First, they wanted full immunity from the civilian supervisory tools for the military's affairs even if these affairs exceeded the lines of security issues. The immunity included that the military budget and military economic enterprises should be unquestionable and that ministry of defence should be elected by the military officers, not by the civilians. Second, the military wanted to form a National Defence Council with vast powers over security issues. Third, even if the emergency law was abolished, the military wanted to try civilians in military tribunals. Thanks to the alliance between the MB and the military, the Morsi government secured these three demands in articles 193, 195, 197 and 198 with the controversial constitutional amendments in November 2012. (Saleh, 2012; Nassif, 2017: 162)

However, when the alliance between the military and the FJP was disrupted, the military started to voice its concerns about the Morsi government from three perspectives. First, the military was not happy with the word of democracy. They already knew that this was eventually the end of their special position. Therefore, they stimulated polarization to end the democratic experiment completely by disseminating false news using their media networks. (Brown, 2013: 53; Nassif, 2017: 163) Second, due to the ideological rivalry between the MB and the military, the military generals did not want the MB-backed party in power. Third, the military feared that Morsi could undermine the power of the military after repressing the secular opposition. (Nassif, 2017: 163) These three concerns were obviously always there even at the closest time of the MB-Military alliances. Why did the military give up its support for Morsi and ouster him with a military coup?

The division between the MB and the military started before the FJP came to power. The SCAF dissolved the parliament two days before Morsi's inauguration. This was the first democratically elected parliament where Islamists had an overwhelming majority. As a revanche, Morsi dismissed the defence minister Tantawi and chief of staff, Sami Anan to tame the military's actions. Despite these moves, both sides continued their de facto alliance. The first breakdown happened on October 2012 when the rumours outbreak about the prosecution of Tantawi and Anan for the corruption charge. (Nassif, 2017: 168) The second took place when there were rumours about Morsi's intention to ouster Sisi from his position as the defence minister on February 2013. Upon this, the military warned the government that there would be no repeated processes like dismissal of Tantawi or Anan. They also added that this would be a suicide for Morsi government. This was some kind of ultimatum to the elected government. On March 2013, the military started to reject demands that came from the government. The process would be called later as 'silent mutiny'. (Nassif, 2017: 168)

In addition, the military guarded the founders of the Tamarrod movement from the pro-Morsi forces. These people were also financed by the military to disseminate anti-Morsi messages through media and the internet. With these moves, the military did its own propaganda while undermining Morsi's prestige. They were preparing the right circumstances for the military coup. The immunity that was given by the armed forces encouraged the anti-Morsi protestors to go out in the streets and in this sense

paved the way for a civil war. Sisi encouraged anti-Morsi forces to go out to the streets so that he could ensure an invitation from the protestors to the military coup. This would be much easier than military intervention. Thanks to that, Sisi could legitimize the military coup as the will of the people. (Hellyer, 2016: 141; Nassif, 2017: 168)

When the military took power again on July 3, 2013, they committed bloody massacres against civilians. These massacres had obviously some repercussions on people's memories. There was no possibility to mention any lessened polarization in the Sisi period. Even if there is no serious event that threatens the stability of the country after the massacre weeks, Egyptians continued to suffer repression by an authoritarian government. So, democratic gains as the result of the revolution are completely lost. In sum, military tutelage is one of the main problems triggering polarization and creating setbacks of democratization in Egypt. In a general sense, the armed forces did not behave in accordance with their role, especially during the Mubarak and the Morsi periods. Their actions were not compatible with the military's role in liberal democracies. The SCAF established a tutelage over the governments in political and economic terms. It received concessions from the elected government at the expense of their loyalty. Its behaviours were completely problematic for the democratization process. The military even gave an ultimatum to the elected government unless their requests were fulfilled. Finally, they were engaged in a military coup against the elected government.

4.1.3. Role of External Actors

The role of external actors is another important topic that has affected polarization between the Islamists and secularists and the failed democratic transition in Egypt in the post-Arab Spring period. There are arguments that external actors did not play an important role during the revolution in Egypt. However, they had an important role in undermining democratic experiments during the transition period. (Telci, 2017: 42-43) Since the foundation of the country, Egypt has always become a significant country for the great powers because of its strategic location, the huge population and its influence on the whole Arab world in the Middle East. During the Cold War, Egypt was the hub in the region together with Israel for great power politics.

As a non-aligned country, due to the effects of Arab Nationalism and Baathist ideology, Egypt engaged in close relationship with the Soviet Union in order to get rid of Western influence in the Suez Canal and the US-backed Israeli. When the Egyptian ruling elites noticed the incapability of Soviet military aid against the West, they changed their country's face to the West since the Soviet's help was not comparable with the Western assistance capabilities. Sadat managed this process successfully and signed Camp David Accords in 1979 with Israel with the support of the US to guarantee permanent peace between Israel and Egypt. After this date, Egypt became one of the closest allies of the US in the region. Following the Camp David Accords, Egypt received 2 billion dollars in military aid and 450 million dollars in economic aid each year from the US and these numbers amounted as the second largest aid that the US gave after Israel in the region. (Sharp, 2011; Erdoğan, 2020: 181)

During the Mubarak period, Egypt's alliance with the West was one of the controversial topics among the opposition. The MB always criticized Mubarak from that perspective. In this sense, after Morsi came to power through democratic elections, the Western countries were not sure about how to react. The Western countries in fact experienced a dilemma within themselves. Western values like democracy and human rights would finally be applicable in Egypt but the electoral results were not satisfying for them. As a result of the two elections, Islamist parties won the elections with an overwhelming difference. The results did not fit their interests since Mubarak and the military were able to keep out Islamists from power. The main concern for the West was that the possible MB rule in Egypt could trigger extreme Islamism throughout the region. This could lead to the proliferation of terrorist activities in the region which threaten Western security. In addition, the US could not afford to lose an ally like Egypt in the Middle East. Egypt is indispensable for the US and Israel's interests in the region. In the past, they proved this many times. For instance, in accordance with the US interests, the Mubarak regime supported the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, containment of Iran since 1979, and Israel's attacks on Gaza in 2006. (Selim, 2015: 177-178)

Actually, the US pursued democracy promotion policies towards the Middle East after the 9/11 attacks. Bush administration thought that the only way to prevent the proliferation of terrorism in the region was the rise of democratic governments

instead of the dictators who led to suffering of the people through repression and violence. In this direction, the US launched democratization programs in the region to promote political liberalization and active civil society such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI). Due to the US and the EU pressures, Mubarak lessened the pressure against the opposition by allowing transparent elections and some civil society freedoms. (Erdoğan, 2020: 174-175) For instance, in 2005, Mubarak allowed Ayman Nour to compete for the presidency against himself. Moreover, the Mubarak regime also ignored the civil society activities during the 2000s in which the secular opposition established many organizations like Kefaya and April 6 Movement. (Telci, 2017; Nugent, 2020: 118) Until 2005, the US and the EU's main demand from the authoritarian governments of the region was securing free, fair and competitive elections. In this direction, the region confronted its first time relatively free elections during the 2005s and 2006s. However, the results were not satisfying for both US and the EU countries. Islamists showed great success in the elections throughout the region. In 2005, the MB gained 88 seats despite the existence of high-level electoral fraud. In Lebanon, Hizbullah's party dominated the elections in 2005 while in Palestine, Hamas won the elections in 2006. (Erdoğan, 2020: 178)

From 2005 onwards, the US and the EU changed their democracy promotion policies in the region. Owing to electoral victories of political Islam in relatively free elections, the US and the EU countries were alarmed about the proliferation of extreme Islamist activities and terrorism. After that, the US and the EU countries prioritized preserving of status quo in the region. In Egypt, the West thus supported the authoritarian military-led governments to crush extreme Islamists rapidly and to preserve Egypt's partnership with the US and Israel. Although the existence of a number of human rights violations during the massacre weeks, they recognized Sisi as the president of Egypt and refrained identifying the ouster of Morsi as a military coup. (Erdoğan, 2020: 179)

As a close partner of the Mubarak regime, following the resignation of Mubarak after the revolution, the US and the EU could not develop a stable policy against Egypt for a while. They were anxious about the possible extreme Islamist rule in the post-Arab Spring period, but there was a reality that people were fed up with

human rights violations and repression of the Mubarak regime. Within this dilemma, they decided to remain cautious until the new strategy was developed. The new policy certainly included the establishment of a new US aligned regime in Egypt to secure US interests in the region. (Selim, 2013: 259-261; Selim, 2015: 179) For instance; Omar Suleiman who was the leader of SCAF after the revolution, was quite fit for this description for the next presidency due to his special relationship with the US but the revolutionaries saw him as an old regime actor because he served Mubarak for many years. (Telci, 2017: 150) As the demand for democratic transition grew, the US realized that the change in Egypt was indispensable. Therefore, they should revise their policy according to the internal dynamics at least until the counter-revolutionary forces took power again. The US policy was thus shaped according to two principles during the transition period. First, the US alliance with the SCAF needed to continue against the revolutionary forces. Second, the US needed the MB's partnership to keep control of them during Morsi's rule. (Selim, 2015: 179)

In a general sense, the US and most of the EU countries did not promote the democratic transition process in Egypt after the Arab Spring. They ignored and even supported the anti-democratic implementations of SCAF and the Morsi government over the revolutionary forces during the transition period to secure Western interests in the region. (Erdoğan, 2020: 184-186) Firstly, after the resignation of Mubarak and the SCAF's taking over power, the Obama administration immediately renewed US military and economic aid to the SCAF despite their own economic hardship in the same year. (Selim, 2015: 180) This agreement also showed the unconditional support for the SCAF regime and the continuation of the US-Egypt partnership.

Their partnership also rested on the repression of revolutionary forces' demands that could jeopardize the military and the US interests in Egypt. During the SCAF period, this goal was mostly accomplished successfully through strict censorship, undemocratic decision-making in the legislation and executive processes, control of media, and use of violence against revolutionary youth groups. (Selim 2015, 180) In order to crush revolutionary groups, the SCAF launched serious undemocratic precautions against them. By using military trial networks, they detained 12.000 people due to their joining the revolution during the eighteen days of protest (Selim 2015, 184). According to the Human Rights Watch reports, this number included more

detentions than that of during the 30-year Mubarak rule combined. (Human Rights Watch, 2011)

Furthermore, the SCAF declared a number of secular civil society organizations, youth groups and think tanks as illegal organizations, accusing them as foreign-funded agents working against the Egyptian people. These groups were mostly the leading groups during the revolution including “the April 6 Movement, Kefaya, and Cairo Institute for Human Right Studies (CIHRS), This was in addition to three Western-based organizations that are the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and Freedom House.” (Selim, 2015: 184) This was the same implementation as what Mubarak did. Ironically, the Islamist civil society organizations, funded by the Gulf States, enjoyed their autonomy during that process. This double standard of SCAF indeed contributed to the polarization among the secularists and Islamists. Moreover, the revolutionaries who protested the SCAF’s decision was exposed to police violence. Many civilians were dead a result of the massacres committed by the military. There were no severe critics from the Obama administration about the human rights violations during that process. The SCAF really enjoyed its alliance with the US while the revolutionary alliance was alienated. The US-SCAF alliance was definitely deleterious for the revolutionary ideals and democratic transition period. (Selim, 2015: 186-187)

Nevertheless, the SCAF realized that there was need for changes in the political sphere through democratic elections. There was a strong demand for the democratic transition from the revolutionary alliance and the MB. This meant that the SCAF could no longer stay in power. After the MB’s victories in parliamentary elections, the US decided to form a linkage with the MB immediately. The US foreign policymakers already noticed that the MB would dominate Egyptian politics for a while. In April 2012, the group from the FJP went to Washington for an official visit. During the visit, the FJP delegation guaranteed the continuation of US influence in Egypt. Their commitments included the continuation of close cooperation with Israel in the region, no support for Hamas, and encouragement of neo-liberal economic policies in Egypt. (Birnbaum, 2012; Selim, 2015: 188)

Indeed, after Morsi came to power in June 2012, the government renewed these commitments immediately. As long as Morsi pursued the US aligned policies, the

Obama administration remained silent against the authoritarian policies of the MB. Against Morsi's policies like the exclusion of secular opposition from the constitution committee, November 2012 constitutional declaration, harassment and police violence to opposition groups, the US administration refrained to make harsh statements. (Selim 2015, 188-194) For instance, on 23 November after the constitutional declaration of Morsi, the US Department of State made a short statement that "all Egyptians to resolve their differences over these important issues peacefully and through democratic dialogue." (US Department of State, 2012; Selim, 2015: 194) After a short period of time, the same period with when the national unrest reached peak point against the Morsi, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry declared 250 billion dollars economic aid to the Morsi government. (Gordon, 2013; Selim, 2015: 194) Obama administration seemed to secure US economic and security interests while ignoring the violation of human rights. (Erdoğan, 2020: 186)

After the military coup in July 2013, despite the ouster of the democratically elected president, the US administration seemed happy to see the old partner in power again. Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns made a statement after their negotiations with Sisi that Egyptians will decide their own future and the US doesn't have any doubts that Egypt would be going through democracy with this government. (Heather, 2013; Telci, 2017: 247) Ironically in August 2013, despite the massacres against pro-Morsi supporters, the US Secretary of State identified the military coup as an attempt to restore democracy in Egypt. (Bradley, 2013) Furthermore, the US declared 60 billion dollars of military aid to the Egyptian military after the ouster of Mursi. (Stacher, 2020: 149) However, the US law forbids every kind of support to the military governments that came to power with military coups. (Stacher, 2020: 149) In the post-coup period, the US activities demonstrated their support for Sisi openly and proved that there would be no difference in the US's position against whoever came to power in Egypt unless their interests would be in danger. (Telci, 2017: 248) Indeed, the US position on Egypt is one of the contributing factors behind the failure of democratic transition process.

Finally, from the Gulf States' perspective, the prospects for democracy in Egypt is seen as a danger for the future of monarchies in the Gulf States. With the rise of revolutionary ideals in Egypt, Gulf States were confronted with the civil unrest.

Therefore, these states tend to support military-led authoritarian governments in order to prevent any other actors to assume power. However, the rise of the MB after the revolution opened a new phase for Egypt's relations with the Gulf States. After Morsi came to power, all countries in the Gulf except Qatar strained their relations with Egypt. Especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates interrupted the economic aids immediately after the Morsi become the president. As the leading country in the region, Saudi Arabia's reaction was important here. There were a number of reasons behind the Saudi's hostility against the MB rule. First, the MB has great influence in the Gulf region which can threaten the future of monarchies. The MB could spread the revolution through using that linkage. Despite the Morsi's repeated speeches that their goal did not include the spread of revolution to any other countries, the Gulf States except Qatar tried to support any attempt which contained the demands for democracy. (El-Auwad, 2012; Erdoğan, 2020: 192)

Second, ideologically, there is a historical rivalry between Saudi Wahabism and the MB version of Islam. Both views claimed to be the true versions of Islam. Saudi Arabia did not want dissemination of the MB version of Islam in the Gulf region. Third, Saudis resented to the rapprochement between Egypt and Iran after the revolution. Iran became one of the first countries which congratulated Morsi after his inauguration. Iran had ideological intimacy with the MB since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was affected by Sayyid Qutb's views and translated his works into Persian. The best thing that showed the rapprochement between the two countries was Morsi's official visit to Iran two months after his inauguration. This was a turning point in the relations because there were no diplomatic ties between the two countries since Camp David Accords were signed in 1979. (Erdoğan, 2020: 192) But possible Iran-Egypt alliance has highly concerned the West and the Gulf States since the balance of power in the region would be changed in favour of Iran. For the US, Iran was also a redline for its interests in the region. After this move, the US also started to question Morsi's future.

Due to all these concerns, the Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait became the main financial supporters for the growing opposition waves against Morsi after the controversial referendum in November 2012. These three states openly supported the Tamarrod movement which was directly established

to ouster Morsi from power and to repress the revolutionary ideals. After the military coup, Gulf States celebrated Sisi for his decision that declared the MB a terrorist organization. They also prepared a 12-billion-dollar aid package for the Sisi government. (Hearst, 2013; Erdoğan, 2020: 194) This was the biggest aid package which Egypt ever received. With this move, the Gulf States recognized Sisi as a legitimate ruler and were glad to restore the status quo in Egypt with a military-led authoritarian government again. In sum, the role of external actors was decisive in the growing polarization and failure of the democratic experiment in Egypt. External actors supported counter-revolutionary forces after the revolution to preserve the status quo established by Camp David Accords in 1979 and to suppress the revolutionary ideals which could threaten the stability of authoritarian governments and monarchies in the Middle East. (Selim 2015; Telci 2017; Erdoğan 2020)

4.2. INSTANCES OF THE POLARIZATION

Polarization in Egypt after the Arab Spring was a result of accumulated events to create anger and seeded the weeds of mistrust among the Islamists and the secularists. Division in the society prevented the reconciliation and consensus for accomplishing democratization in Egypt in the post-Arab Spring period. There are many reasons behind the fragmented society within the democratic transition period but in this part, the events that fed the polarization between secularists and Islamists within this process will be analysed. As mentioned under the military part in the fourth chapter, the SCAF rule after the Mubarak was a break for democratic transition. In this period, the SCAF decided on the roadmap for the transition as an undemocratic actor. Their temporary alliance with the MB sustained the authoritarian rule despite some democratization efforts. When their alliance with the MB ended, they supported the factions against the pro-Morsi forces to prepare a convenient time for the military coup. Other than this, there were many events during SCAF, Morsi and Sisi periods that alienated the opposition and fed the polarization within the society.

The first event was that during the candidacy process, Khairat al-Shater, the first presidential candidate of the FJP made a speech to New York Times. The speech actually seemed to show the long-term purposes of the MB rule. He claimed that

“Egyptians want an establishment of Islamic State and added that all institutions should revise their cultures, their training programs and the way they build their individuals in the light of this real popular choice.” (Kirkpatrick, 2012; Pargeter 2013: 202) This speech resulted in the suspension of the constitution committee and al-Shater’s ineligibility for the presidential candidacy. The speech included provocative messages that fed the animosity against people who did not want an Islamic state. Al-Shater maybe repeated Al-Banna’s dream of transition through moderate ways but the establishment of the Islamic State meant ignoring secular opposition which would closely lose the presidential election. The right way to change the government system should be through a consensus that every party agrees on. This could not be done by a majoritarian electoral system like Egypt had. Without the reconciliation, these types of explanations feed polarisation and animosity, nothing more.

During the referendum processes, first for the roadmap prepared by SCAF and the MB and second, for the constitutional referendum in December 2012, Islamist election campaigns definitely contributed to the polarization within society. During both elections, the MB’s language for the mobilization of Islamists was provocative for the integrity of the society. For instance, in the first referendum, the MB contributed to the vote for ‘Yes’ by using Islamic references. They said that voting ‘No’ was equal to rejection of Article II of the 1971 constitution which described the Islamic law, Sharia. Owing to MB’s use of an antagonistic language, the referendum passed with a 70 percent ‘Yes’ vote while the people, who voted for ‘No’ were alienated. This referendum was also a sign of the MB’s rupture from the revolutionary alliance which demanded a mainly a secular and democratic country since the roadmap preserved the authoritarian state structures. (Selim, 2015: 186)

In the same direction, when Morsi granted all power to himself in order to complete brotherhoodization of the state with the constitutional referendum, the MB conducted its election campaign by blaming the opposition that voting ‘No’ to the new constitution was equal to saying no to God’s words. (Fahmy, 2016: 90) The new constitution prepared by the Islamist majority also brought controversial articles for the secular parts of the society. For instance, controversial Article 2 remained untouched in which “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic sharia are the principal source of legislation.”

(Nugent, 2020: 242-243) Salafist Nour Party members added new conservative interpretations during the implementation of Sharia law according to Sunni doctrines. In addition, Article 4 gave monitoring power to Al Azhar's Council of Senior Scholars which was investigating the compatibility of Islamic Sharia with the actions of people. (Nugent, 2020: 243) These articles in the new constitution neglected a considerable portion of the Egyptian people. Egypt has considerable amount non-Islamist people including 10 percent Coptic population. Indeed, after the constitutional referendum, Coptic people confronted many violent attacks on their properties and accused Morsi due to his reckless attitude. (Pierce, 2014: 68-86; Erdoğan, 2020: 185) The new constitution was prepared in majoritarian ways instead of plural ones. The 2012 constitution, therefore, was one of the reasons behind the growing polarization in Egypt in the last months of Morsi's rule.

After the military coup led by Sisi, Islamists were exposed to the same exclusion as Morsi did to the secular opposition. Secular opposition actually welcomed end of Morsi rule and de-brotherhoodization process despite bloody massacres conducted against Islamists.

As Shadi Hamid explained, the current military government is much more ambitious, with its aim to dismantle the Brotherhood and destroy it as a political force. It's no surprise when armies use force. That's what armies do. But it is scary to see ordinary Egyptians, 'liberal' political parties and much of the country's media class cheering it on so enthusiastically. (Hamid 2013; Milton-Edwards, 2016: 50)

This revanchist attitude was not good for ending polarization within the Egyptian society. It fed the animosity between Islamist and secular forces that may lead to further instability and massacres in the future. If Egyptian people want to develop a sustainable democratic structure, then they need to avoid any kind of revanchist attitudes. Egypt's democratization also depends on the accomplishment of reconciliation between Islamists and secularist forces. This is a precondition to reach social peace and to create plural institutions.

4.3. CORRELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND SETBACKS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

With the ending of the democratic experiment, politics was dominated by the military, not by the civilians. There were remarkable setbacks in democratization after a military coup. This part will analyse how Egypt's defective democracy turned into an authoritarian regime as in the case of the Mubarak period before the revolution. As a result of a military coup, Sisi immediately declared the ouster of Morsi, removed 2012 constitution and appointed of Adly Mansour as the interim president of Egypt. The ouster of the elected president despite the existence of strong public support for the military's intervention was definitely a setback for democratization. After six months of the interim government of Mansour, the military declared Sisi as the president of Egypt in June 2014. This was indeed a bilateral decision since there were no free elections before Sisi came to power. Sisi was not elected like Morsi as a result of democratic elections by the Egyptians. This created a legitimacy problem for Sisi's rule. Sisi desperately needed legitimacy for continuation of his presidency. The only thing Sisi had a stick to the people who opposed his rule. (Rashed, 2016: 141)

Nevertheless, first Sisi needed so-called elections for the presidency. In June 2014, the presidential elections were held with high-level repression and censorship. Sisi won the elections with 97 percent of the votes and stressed that will of people was finally reflected in the elections. This reminded elections during Mubarak period where he was elected with the overwhelming majority since Mubarak was the only candidate to join the presidential elections. Sisi allowed other candidates to run for presidency unless they had Islamist origins. (Winter, 2015: 13) When we think of the circumstances where Islamists were subject to military trials and Sisi's war on terror against the MB members and the MB's boycott of the elections, the result was not surprising and the elections were neither free nor democratic. Election results thus might not be enough for Sisi's legitimacy for the presidency. After he accessed the office, Sisi tried to purge all ruins of the old regime from the state. Most of the MB leaders were jailed for the accusation of membership in a terrorist organization. In May 2015, after the end of the military trial, former President Morsi was sentenced to the death penalty, and then. died under custody. The witch hunt against the MB members

have continued in Sisi period as during the Mubarak period since the war on terror has consisted of the main source of Sisi's legitimacy. (Winter, 2015: 11)

Unlike his actions, Sisi has always used the word democracy as an ideal thing in his speeches. He has defined the military coup as will of the people and depicted it as a democratic choice. Sisi has also re-interpreted the liberal values like freedom, human rights and freedom of expression by suiting them to the interest of his regime. Sisi's freedom interpretation has mainly focused on the civil liberties instead of political freedoms. He has concentrated "primarily on freedom from poverty, freedom from educational ignorance, and freedom from religious coercion in the style of the Muslim Brotherhood." (Winter, 2015: 15) In terms of human rights, Sisi has stressed the right to free education and healthcare, improving workers' rights and increasing life expectancy. Thus, Sisi's main goal has been to provide economic freedoms to the people while ignoring the political ones (Winter, 2015: 15). He has believed that increasing the economic conditions of people would increase the legitimacy of the new president even if the authoritarian rule continue to exist on the political scene.

Indeed, Egyptian economy has remained at the same level with the Morsi period in 2014 despite the taking place of the military coup and many massacres. Sisi of course has received some rewards from external powers due to his elimination the MB threat completely. (Stacher, 2020: 147-148) However, the economic conditions of Egyptians are getting worse day by day. Sisi has trusted the military enterprises and built his regime around them to stimulate the economic growth and to guarantee his political career. During Sisi period, military enterprises have received many big infrastructure projects such as the New Suez Canal Project, the Electoral Power plan and the Million-Unit Housing Project. Sisi has used these big projects for his political purposes. (Stacher, 2020: 154) State media has also manipulated these investments successfully for Sisi's propaganda purposes. But there was a cost in return for these big investments. Egyptian economy actually did not have enough capital to finish these projects and desperately needed foreign investment. When the foreign aid decreased for the Sisi government in 2015 and 2016, compared with 2014, Egyptians needed to pay the missing amount. Real problem was that these projects could not generate profits for the Egyptian economy. So, big investments brought a huge burden on the economy. For these reasons, the Egyptian economy entered a recession period during

the fiscal years of 2016 and 2017. The value of Egypt's currency depreciated in front of dollars from 7.75 to 18.17 at the end of 2017. (Stacher, 2020: 155) In the same year, Egypt's trade deficit became more than during the Mubarak period. So, Sisi's big investments turned into a disaster for ordinary Egyptian citizens due to the high inflation and decrease in wages.

In the political sphere, Sisi's relations with the secular opposition were also tumultuous. Although the secular opposition was happy with the ouster of Morsi, they did not want to turn back to the pre-revolutionary period in terms of democracy and human rights. The secular parties, like the Constitution, Dignity, Strong Egypt, Bread and Freedom parties and the Popular Alliance, consisted of a small percentage of political life, but they have openly criticized Sisi's authoritarian policies. (Durac, 2018, 83) However, these parties or the secular independent candidates that criticize the regime and the military could not win any single seats where the parliamentary elections in December 2015 resulted in the victory of Sisi and pro-regime parties. With the regulations in election law 2015, the number of independent candidates dramatically increased to 448 seats. Most of the independent candidates are appointed either by the president or by the representatives chosen by the president. The new election law thus limited party politics while increasing the control of the regime in the parliament. When we consider the total seat as 596, only one-fifth seats of the parliament were opened to parliamentary elections. Even this small number was dominated by the pro-regime parties. Because of the repression and fear created by the regime, these seats were won by pro-regime parties in which Free Egyptians won 65 seats, the Nation's Future and the Wafd won respectively 53 and 35 seats. The Salafist Nour Party which was backed by Sisi during the presidential race won also just 11 seats due to the atmosphere created by the regime against the Islamists (Durac, 2018: 83).

Actually, the results were not surprising since Egyptians had suffered tumultuous years when multi-party politics dominated Egyptian political life during 2011 and 2012. In Egypt, these years definitely led to deep mistrust and suspicion toward democratic elections and party politics. Egyptians are tired of the unstable political atmosphere that can lead to further economic hardship and ambiguity. Thus, Sisi's domination in two elections and lack of strong opposition must be seen from

that perspective. (Durac, 2018: 83) However, the setback of democratization here is undeniable. In Egypt, the only thing implemented well for democratization was free elections held during the transition period. But since counter-revolution took place, there is has been no possibility to mention a free atmosphere prior to the elections in Egypt. Furthermore, despite the SCAF's and Morsi's policies cannot be evaluated as democratic, the government at least did not identify some parts of the society as terrorists or banned them from the politics. These are certainly undeniable setbacks from democratization.



CONCLUSION

In order to understand the political polarization between the Islamists and the secularists and their impact on the democratization process in Egypt since the unfolding of the Arab Spring in the country, firstly there is need to analyse relevant concepts including secularism, political Islam and democratization in the Middle East. Secularism is a Western-led concept which emerged firstly in the 14th century Europe. It is important to underline that secularism today is not the same thing as its first version in the 14th century. It evolved together with the historical developments in Europe. In the modern sense, secularism started to be shaped together with the enlightenment era and the industrial revolution in the 19th century. Through time secularism has simply referred to three main principles which are freedom of religion, decreasing state control over the religious sphere and state neutrality over all religions. On the other hand, secularism started to develop in the Middle East in the mid-19th century which was the same period as the development of secularism in the West. However, the dissemination of secularism has been slow in the region. Since the 1950s and the 1960s, secularism has been one of the main controversial issues within the Middle East studies but has never become influential as much as political Islam. Due to the influence of Islam in the region, the development of secularism depends on different preconditions than those of in Europe. The reason behind the slow evolution of secularism in the Middle East, compared with Europe, is about different characteristics of Islam and Christianity and the importance of Islam in the individual life of Middle Eastern people. In almost every country in the Middle East, secularists thus constitute the minority against the Islamist majority even if they have influence on the governments and decision-making processes. This unbalanced situation has created conflicts and stability in the region.

The second concept, political Islam, is essentially one of the most influential concepts throughout the Middle East since the role of Islam is still important in the political scene for most of the Middle Eastern countries. The MB can be seen as the main representative of political Islam since it has the most influential Islamic organizations that has ever been founded. Since its establishment in 1928, even though the MB had different ideological positions between radical and moderate Islamism, it

has become mainly a moderate Islamist organization which advocates change through the electoral process and the current political system. Despite the MB's interaction with Qutb and the Wahabist ideology and its radical period in the 1960s and the 1970s, the organization started to evolve from a radical one into a moderate one after the assassination of Sadat in 1981. During the Mubarak period, the MB tried to integrate into the political system and demanded political recognition for 30 years despite systematic exclusion and state violence against its supporters. Additionally, the MB's charity network has been quite useful for the services that the state could not provide. Through time these factors led to enormous sympathy for the MB at the societal level. Mubarak thus saw Islamists as the main threat to his rule since they were the main opposition force. Therefore, in the post-revolutionary Egypt, the emergence of the MB as the strongest actor could not be seen as a coincidence, instead, it was the result of an accumulated process during the Mubarak period.

The third concept, democratization is definitely a new concept for Middle East studies. Some theoretical approaches have been put forward since the 1950s about the lack of democratization in the Middle East. These theories are shaped by four perspectives which are the economic backwardness of the region, cultural and religious differences, societal cleavages and the role of external actors. Political polarization between the Islamists and the secularists triggers societal cleavages and post-revolutionary Egypt reflects it quite well.

On January 25, 2011, when the eighteen days of protests started, nobody expected that this would be end with the collapse of thirty years of authoritarian rule in Egypt. People who were tired of Mubarak's oppression and economic hardship gathered at the Tahrir Square and demanded the resignation of Mubarak and the establishment of a democratic government encompassing the revolutionary coalition. Mubarak resigned, but democratic transition never occurred as desired by the revolutionaries. The military which is one of the reasons of persistence of authoritarianism in Egypt captured power under the leadership of the SCAF after the resignation of Mubarak. The SCAF leadership proved that nothing changed in Egypt after the eighteen days of protests, but the SCAF could not remain in power forever. Here, the military's main goal was to prevent the possibility of arising of any sort of

radical views from both the Islamist and the secularist sides in the post-Revolutionary period. The military simply desired to shape the political order by dictates of itself.

In this direction, the military needed a civilian alliance in order to control the transition period. The best option was the MB which desperately needed political recognition and a proper position in the post-Revolutionary political order. In these circumstances, forming a pragmatic alliance between the military and the MB was not a surprising event but both parties needed to specify the boundaries of the alliance. The transition period demonstrated that these boundaries could not be drawn well since the alliance was short and conflictual. On the other hand, the most important result of the MB-SCAF alliance was the change in the balance of power in politics in favour of the Islamists. With the merging of the MB's organizational capacity and the consent of the military, the MB emerged as the strongest civilian power in politics.

The SCAF-MB alliance specified the roadmap for the democratic transition period. According to the roadmap, Egypt was to experience rapid elections that were free, fair and competitive. The most beneficial side from the roadmap was, definitely the MB which was the most prepared organization for the rapid elections. The roadmap also permitted the establishment of an Islamist party, the FJP, as an MB affiliate political party. In January 2012, parliamentary elections were held. Democratic Alliance for Egypt led by the FJP gained 47.2 percent of the votes and won 235 seats in the parliament. The alliance partner, the military, did not expect such a victory from the Islamists in the first elections. From the period of parliamentary elections to the presidential elections in July 2012, the military tried to curb the power of the Islamists and to prevent an Islamist constitution prepared by the MB. The dissolution of the Egyptian parliament on June 15 by the SCAF was a good example of the ongoing power struggle between the MB and the military. On the surface, the military and the MB seemed to be partners, while in the background, this partnership consisted of two rival actors in the power struggle.

The main problem here is that the alliance between the MB and the military led to the dismantling of the revolutionary alliance that was established against the Mubarak regime and the alienation of secular and liberal parties from the government. The revolutionary coalition that contained different views within the society, was a great chance to prepare a plural constitution in the post-Mubarak period. However, the

MB chose the Egyptian military as a partner and this created two hostile poles between the Islamists and the secularists. In June 2012, Mohammed Morsi became the president of Egypt, gaining 24 percent of the votes in the first round and 51 percent of the votes in the second round against his rival Ahmed Shafiq who was the ex-general of Mubarak. Although the MB won the presidential elections with a small difference, Morsi sought to obtain absolute authority like the previous Egyptian presidents. Morsi broke his promises to the opposition during the election process about preparing a plural constitution by a vast coalition. Instead, he excluded secular and liberal political parties from the constitution writing process. This was the first and huge mistake of his period that alienated the opposition and made him the target of the secularists and Egyptian bureaucracy.

Furthermore, in November 2012, Morsi took the most controversial step in his period. Through the constitutional referendum, he removed all obstacles that guaranteed the democratic checks and balances mechanism of the opposition and the Egyptian institutions. Morsi chose again a majoritarian way instead of a plural one. Morsi never guessed that such a big coalition resented this referendum since, after the decision, Egypt entered into a chaotic period that was fed by a demonstration cycle engaged by Morsi supporters and the anti-Morsi coalition. In such an atmosphere, Morsi also lost the alliance of the military due to differences with the military's economic and political interests. In the end, after serious struggles in the streets between Islamists and Secularists and due to an invitation coming from the anti-Morsi coalition, the military led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ousted Morsi from power and launched a war on terror against Morsi supporters and the MB members. As a result of the witch hunt undertaken by Sisi, many Egyptians lost their lives. Despite Sisi turned into the most brutal leader in Egypt's history, he became the president in 2014 and has remained in power until today.

In sum, Egypt suffered from a failed democratic transition period and hope for democracy ended with a counter-revolutionary attempt led by the Egyptian military. This thesis examined the reasons behind the growing polarization and persistence of authoritarianism in Egypt from four perspectives. First, difficulties in the transition period are definitely needed to be overcome. Democracy is needed to be accomplished with a general consensus by the plural coalition that represents every segment of

society. In post-Revolutionary Egypt, there was no possibility for such a coalition to exist. The main problem was related with the political elites putting their interests above the interests of the people. Therefore, political elites followed majoritarian ways instead of plural ones. More importantly, majoritarian policies fed antagonism between the Islamists and the secularists dangerously. The exclusion of secular and liberal parties from the constitution writing process led to the falling apart of the revolutionary coalition and eventually destroyed the hope for democratization during the transition period.

On the other hand, secular opposition also threatened the transition period in many ways. Democracy needs a stable atmosphere, but the opposition increased the tension and endangered stability through street demonstrations. The opposition had also strong dissatisfaction due to the Islamists' electoral victories. They behaved disrespectfully toward the government's decisions by using the supreme court and the military's channels. Thus, the opposition could be able to cancel every decision which the secularists disliked. In addition, the legacy of the authoritarian state structure in Egypt played an important role in the collapse of the democratic transition period. Egypt has a strong bureaucratic structure that guaranteed the continuation of the authoritarian regime. The military and the judiciary have dominated Egyptian politics for many years. Even if the leader has a military past, he needs to establish patronage of interests of these two bureaucratic bodies in order to preserve his rule.

Secondly, the power of the Egyptian military in the political and economic scene is not comparable with its equivalents in liberal democracies. During all in Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak periods, the military possessed enormous wealth in return for its support to the president. At the end of the Mubarak period, the military's economic assets consisted of thirty percent of the whole Egyptian economy. When the revolution took place, the military obtained control in order to prevent any movement that could threaten the military's assets. Furthermore, its alliance with the MB continued until the military's economic and political interests were endangered by the Morsi government. Most importantly, the Egyptian military engaged in a military coup against an elected president without facing any sanctions. Indeed, this needed enormous support both internally and externally.

Thirdly; externally, both the US and the EU ignored the military's authoritarian policies as long as Egypt preserved the interests of Western countries in the Middle East. Therefore, the US and the EU never stopped economic and military aid to Egypt since the Camp David Accords in 1979 for the continuation of the status quo and oppression of the extreme Islamism in the region. They generally supported the Egyptian military against the resurgence of political Islam in Egypt. However, when the most frightening thing happened in Egypt, which was the accession of the Islamists to power, the EU and the US cautiously approached to the revolution. Despite their promotion of democracy and human rights, Egypt was definitely seen as an exception. In many ways, the US and the EU countries contributed to the stability of the military-backed authoritarian government in Egypt. For instance, despite the military was engaged in a military coup against the elected president, they supported the Sisi government with economic aid packages. The same thing is valid for the Gulf countries except for Qatar as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf states, celebrated Sisi's military coup and its bloodsheds aftermath.

Lastly, during the Sisi period, the democratization process in Egypt has completely ended. After the repression of opposition with state violence, Egypt returned back to the situation in the Mubarak years in terms of lack of democracy and human rights. In a democratic transition period, every political view is expected to compete in the elections without any censorship or prohibition while during the Sisi period, the MB and its supporters have been declared as terrorists and have been banned from politics infinitely. Because of Sisi's witch hunt, many people have been excluded from the political processes. 2014 presidential elections and 2015 parliamentary elections demonstrated that setbacks of democratization are a reality in the case of Egypt when the candidates and political parties that were eligible to attend the elections were taken into consideration.

As a result, this thesis has examined the reasons behind the failed democratic transition process in Egypt by concentrating on the political polarization between the Islamists and the secularists in the post-revolutionary period. The persistence of authoritarianism in Egypt has had deep roots but if Egyptians would overcome factors that feed antagonism between the Islamists and the secularists, the beginning of a new democratization process will be an option. In the near future, power in Egypt seems to

remain in the hands of the military, but how Islamists will react to the state violence is a matter of curiosity both in terms of Egyptian politics and in terms of the content of Middle East studies in international relations.



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