

**THE FORD ADMINISTRATION
AGAINST
AN ASSERTIVE CONGRESS:
THE CASE OF THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO**

A Master's Thesis

by
BERÇİN YİĞİTASLAN

Department of History
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
January 2017

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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BERÇİN YİĞİTASLAN

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in

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İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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January 2017

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Edward P. Kohn
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.




Asst. Prof. Dr. Kenneth Weisbrode
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.



Asst. Prof. Dr. Bahar Gürsel
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Halime Demirkan
Director

ABSTRACT

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Yiğitaslan, Berçin

M.A., Department of History

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Edward Kohn

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This thesis focuses on Gerald Ford administration's struggle with the assertive Congress in foreign policy in the case of the Turkish arms embargo. In this new sequence of ongoing executive-legislative tug of war for foreign policy making, this thesis reveals how the Ford administration resisted the Congress decision of imposing embargo on Turkey following the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Besides, this study traces the history of congressional assertiveness in American foreign policy and identifies the reasons for the rise of it in the 1970s. Thus, it demonstrates the reversion of the embargo as a massive victory for President Gerald Ford and his administration when the historical context is taken into consideration.

Keywords: Congress, Gerald Ford, President, Turkish Arms Embargo, United States.

ÖZET

MÜDAHALECI KONGREYE KARŞI FORD YÖNETİMİ: TÜRK SİLAH AMBARGOSU VAKASI

Yiğitaslan, Berçin

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Edward Kohn

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Bu tez, Türk silah ambargosu örneğinde, Başkan Gerald Ford yönetiminin dış politikada müdahaleci kongre ile mücadelesine odaklanmaktadır. Yürütme ve yasama erkleri arasında dış politika yapımı için süregelen çekişmenin bu yeni kesitinde, bu tez Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a askeri müdahalesini müteakip Kongre'nin Türkiye'ye ambargo uygulama kararına Başkan Ford yönetiminin nasıl direndiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bunun yanında, bu çalışma, Amerikan dış politikasında kongre müdahaleciliği tarihinin izini sürmekte ve bunun 1970'lerdeki yükseliş sebeplerini sunmaktadır. Böylelikle, bu tez, tarihsel bağlam dikkate alındığında, ambargonun geri alınma kararının Başkan Ford ve yönetimi için muazzam bir başarı olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Başkan, Gerald Ford, Kongre, Türk Silah Ambargosu

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
Above all, I am so fortunate to have such a perfect family. Their moral support was valuable than everthing. I should confess that I could not finish this research without the precious presence of my beloved wife, Şöhret. She was the one whose motivation and encouragement provided me necessary determination to finish the research. This thesis is an achievement of hers as well as mine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Historiography.....	6
CHAPTER II: CONGRESSIONAL ASSERTIVENESS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY.....	21
2.1 Historical and Theoretical Background.....	22
2.2 Reasons for the Rise of Congressional Assertiveness in 1970s.....	39
CHAPTER III: FORD ADMINISTRATION AND TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO.....	50
3.1 Contradictory Reactions of the Administration and the Congress against Turkish Intervention of 1974.....	56
3.2 Activities of the Administration before the Congress Decision.....	65
3.3 Activities of the Administration after the Congress Decision.....	77
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION.....	94
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	99

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION



“Our foreign policy cannot be simply a collection of special economic or ethnic or ideological interests. There must be a deep concern for the overall design of our international actions. To achieve this design for peace and to assure that our individual acts have some coherence, the executive must have some flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy.”

On 10 April 1975, President Gerald R. Ford criticized the Congress decision to cut off aid to Turkey over the military intervention on Cyprus with the aforementioned words in his state of the World address. The flexibility in foreign policy was the main argument of the administration, while assertive members of the Congress were putting the law above all other arguments. Under the influence of past decades, the Congress found the case to tame the White House. The message was clear and explicit: the president is not above the law and Congress makes the law.

Frankly speaking, President Ford had neither a claim nor an intention to be an imperial president. On the contrary, a variety of evidence can be found to support the fact that he was realist with regard to his power and capabilities during his term. The most important reason for this was his extraordinary path to the oval office. Just one year before he assumed the presidency, he had been the House Minority Leader

for eight years. He took office after having served in Congress as the representative of the Grand Rapids congressional district of Michigan for 16 years as of 1949. During his term as the House Minority Leader, he had certainly enhanced his sphere of influence. When the Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned as a result of a bribery scandal, Ford was recommended unanimously by congressional leaders as the new vice president to President Richard Nixon. As Speaker of the House of Representatives Carl Albert underlined, they gave President Richard Nixon no choice but Ford.¹ The overwhelming majority in confirmation votes both in the House and the Senate can be seen as the sign of Ford's popularity among congressmen. Ford took the oath of the office of vice president on December 6, 1973. On that day, The Watergate scandal had already started to draw public attention, which eventually forced President Nixon to resign eight months later. When Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, Ford was sworn in as the president of the United States. As it is seen, two political scandals had paved the way to the oval office for him in one year. By taking this extraordinary path to the presidency, he was the first and to date the only person who served as both vice president and president of the United States without being elected to both offices. Ford's background in the Congress and the way he took office were important factors affecting his future relations with the Congress. During the Turkish arms embargo period, he acted in accordance with his background in order to facilitate a solution.

When Ford became president, Congress had already begun to make progress towards assuming a newly assertive and active outlook in foreign policy. The Vietnam fiasco, among other factors, was a turning point leading to a more assertive Congress. Scandals around the office of the presidency and most notably the

¹ *The New York Times*. December 28, 2006.

Watergate scandal had been a final blow to the prestige of the president, which was already at the lowest levels of history during Nixon's term. It was now easy for the Congress to practice its constitutional power of checking the president who lacked necessary popular support among the public. This thesis would not refer to reasons for congressional assertiveness in detail, but the Vietnam War is especially significant for the period that would be focused on because, when we look at executive-legislative relations over time, we can observe shifts in the balance of power in favor of Congress after failed wars and that these shifts generate the counter force for the subsequent shift.² The imperialist presidencies that had been enjoyed by Presidents Nixon, and relatively by Lyndon Johnson, caused Congress to watch for an opportunity to reassert its power. Congress found the opportunity to do so with the Vietnam disaster and leverage provided by the fall of President Nixon. Therefore, President Ford took over the presidency in such a political environment. The legislative branch was more aggressive than before, and an unelected president was a weak opponent for assertive Congress.

While the United States public and political attention was focused on the Watergate scandal, The Cyprus crisis erupted. On July 15, 1974, a military junta composed of Greek officers organized a coup in Cyprus; they overthrew President Makarios and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, whose ultimate ideal was to unite the island with mainland Greece. It was not the first time that Turkey decided to intervene. Coming up with the military intervention idea was not surprising, since Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly supported such a bold move. Back in 1965, intervention was on the table too, but pressure from the United States and the letter

² Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 6.

sent by President Lyndon B. Johnson to Turkish President İsmet İnönü hampered this action. Its harsh wording and threatening content leaked to the press and provoked Turkish public opinion against the United States. Known as the Johnson Letter now, this event greatly affected the future of relations between the two allies. In order to prevent such preclusion again, Turkey rapidly acted and started military intervention on the island on June 20, 1974. The newly elected Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and his cabinet did not hesitate about use of force based on the treaty of 1960 signed by Turkey, Greece and Great Britain. The first wave of the intervention that aimed to secure a bridgehead on the north of the island had lasted for four days. The second Turkish intervention came after the Greek side refused a federal solution plan initiated by British Foreign Minister James Callaghan and US Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco during the Geneva talks. In two days, starting on August 14, Turkish forces had occupied the entire northern third of the country.

In the Capitol, the first bill that called for cutting off military and economic aid to Turkey was introduced on August 14, 1974 in the House by Representative (D-IND) John Brademas, with forty other co-sponsors. On the senate level, a similar resolution was introduced on August 19 by Senator (D-CAL) John Tunney. One of the reasons behind these drafts in Congress was the powerful Greek Lobby in the United States and in the halls of the Congress. Their influence was such that leading advocates of the embargo, Representatives (D-MD) Paul Sarbanes, (D-PA) Gus Yatron, and (R-FL) Louis A. Bafalis together with Brademas were known and referred to in Congress as “the Greek Mafia”. Secondly, some senators and representatives who had not engaged in foreign relations matters before were actively involved in this process. Representative (D-NY) Mario Biaggi, who made a statement on August 8 in favor of suspending military aid to Turkey, for example,

had not previously taken a lead in foreign policy matters and was on none of the committees dealing with aspects of international relations. Similarly, the author of draft resolution of embargo in the Senate, Senator Tunney had not been notably active in foreign policymaking issues before his draft on August 19.³ Therefore, we can observe two powers behind the arms embargo decision. The first factor was the Greek Lobby and the second one was some independently acting, or namely, assertive members of Congress who were out of the control of congressional leadership. During this period, the State Department organized some meetings with leading Senators and Representatives about the issue. Contrary to general belief, official documents that are declassified after years clearly show that the State Department and especially Secretary Henry Kissinger did not underestimate the influence of the Greek Lobby in the Congress and the power of the assertive members of Congress who were in favor of arms embargo.

In this essay, the Ford administration will be taken into consideration regarding the case of the Turkish arms embargo. Against a highly assertive Congress of his time, President Ford and his administration fought as much as they could against a congressional decision to embargo arms' shipments to Turkey. When Congress compromised on the language of the resolution, he reluctantly signed the resolution. Later on, the Ford administration struggled to lift the embargo and endeavored to overcome this issue by all available means. The executive branch perceived this foreign policy decision by the legislative branch of the government as a definite blow to the national security of the United States.

³ Franck and Weisband. *Foreign Policy by Congress*, 37.

Literature on congressional assertiveness in foreign policy is deep and broad regarding the struggle against the presidency. The role of Congress in foreign policymaking relative to the executive branch has been an important question since the founding of the United States. Besides, the 1970s was a period when the power balance was in the favor of Congress. In such a political climate, President Ford firmly and fiercely stood against the foreign policy choice of Congress regarding the Turkish arms embargo. In this manner, this thesis would contribute to the literature by placing President Ford and his administration on the stage regarding the executive-legislative struggle on foreign policymaking process. In the absence of an adequate Turkish lobby, the Ford administration had clearly lobbied on behalf of Turkey. Activities of the administration which is presented in this thesis demonstrate the sense of the Ford administration on congressional assertiveness in the case of Turkish arms embargo. It is certain that President Ford acknowledged the power of Congress and acted accordingly. In this regard, this thesis would focus on the reaction of the Ford administration towards legislative attempts of the Congress to impose an embargo on Turkey. Even though President Ford could not secure a total lift of the embargo during his term, he was able to hand over a working process to the next president, Jimmy Carter.

1.1 Historiography

Literature about American presidents pays little attention to the presidency of Gerald Ford. When his term is compared to other presidencies, it can be observed that books and articles about him and his presidency are respectively narrow in

quantity and range. This may be caused by both the shortness of his term in the office and his coming to the office without an election. Since there are not plenty of sources about the Ford administration, one could not find strange that there is not a single book about Ford's relations with Congress. The case of the Turkish arms embargo and Ford's struggle with the Congress had always remained on the agenda during Ford's short presidency. However, this case has not been as popular among scholars as Nixon's pardon or withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. Nevertheless, books on congressional assertiveness in foreign policymaking have sometimes included chapters dedicated to the Turkish arms embargo and the Ford administration.

Thus, this thesis attempts to reveal the activities of the Ford administration, before and after the embargo decision of Congress, principally through primary documents. The main primary document of this work, not surprisingly, is the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Volume XXX of the series directly relates to the period.⁴ This FRUS volume is composed of intelligence notes, telegrams from embassies in Ankara and Athens, memorandums of conversations, phone conversations between officials including with the president and etc. between 1973 and 1976. It is a valuable source of information to reveal President Ford's struggle with the Congress in all extents. Moreover, this FRUS volume would help this work for the development of the Cyprus question since 1960s. Marc J. Susser, the writer of the Preface section, mentions Ford as "a neophyte when it comes to foreign policy" and argues that "he relies very much upon Kissinger, he was effective in dealing with

⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976*, eds. Laurie Van Hook and Edward C. Keefer (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 1-247. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/comp1> (accessed December 12, 2016)

Congress, and the documentation emphasizes his ability.”⁵ Regrettably, there are plenty of other primary sources that are not included in this FRUS volume. In this context, the Ford Presidential Library would be a significant address to satisfy the need for additional primary sources.

The Ford Presidential Library possesses plenty of different collections; some among them are available online. For instance, the John Marsh Files collection would provide valuable documents for this work.⁶ John Marsh had been the Counselor to the President until the end of Ford’s term. This position came after the advisory position in the VP office on foreign affairs and defense matters. As the Counselor, he was mainly dealing with congressional relations, so his documents consist of the lobbying efforts of the administration on the Congress. During the embargo battle with the administration throughout 1975, Marsh had been in a position of coordinating the administration lobbying effort. In this manner, the John Marsh collection would demonstrate the intensity and range of the administration’s efforts to lift the embargo. Its editor claims that the Marsh files are “strongest in documenting his work on congressional relations, legislation, defense matters, the bicentennial, intelligence investigations, and relations with former President Nixon over routine transition matters.”⁷

As stated above, FRUS documents depend on editorial choice and do not possess all available sources. In order to understand the development of anti-embargo sentiment in the White House and administration representatives, one series from the Ford Presidential Libraries would be a great addition to the aforementioned

⁵ Ibid., Preface.

⁶ *John Marsh Files, 1974-1977*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Harbor, Michigan. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/marshjfiles.asp> (accessed December 10, 2016)

⁷ Ibid., Introduction.

FRUS volume. This series is the Memoranda of conversations (MEMCON) of President Ford.⁸ This source will enable us to understand that the administration responded to Cyprus issue from the beginning as a matter of national security and acted accordingly during the case of the Turkish arms embargo. This is particularly important since national security concern was one of the three arguments of the administration for positioning itself against the embargo. These transcripts of conversations consisted of meeting records of the president with national security officials, foreign heads of states and governments, ambassadors, cabinet members and members of the Congress and etc. The majority of these records are based on Brent Scowcroft's notes. Scowcroft was serving as Deputy Assistant and then the Assistant to the president for national security affairs. This role came with the privilege of joining all meetings held in the oval office regarding National Security. In brief, MEMCONs of President Ford would help us to put forth additional primary evidences for arguments of this thesis, which are not included in FRUS source.

Primary sources from the Ford Presidential Library, which are cited above, are the most crucial ones for this research. However, in addition to those, this research is going to refer to some other series that are declassified in the Ford Presidential Library on rare occasions. Among them, for example, it would be interesting to refer to how Ford was briefed about the Cyprus issue in the *Presidential Transition Files* after he took office.⁹ After being informed on August 7, 1974 about Nixon's most likely resignation, Henry Kissinger as the national

⁸ *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977 Box 4-21*. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Harbor, Michigan.
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp (accessed December 9, 2016).

⁹ *The Presidential Transition File*, National Security Adviser Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Harbor, Michigan.
<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0353/1555879.pdf> (accessed August 25, 2016)

security adviser started to prepare a transition plan. In a very short time, Kissinger was able to prepare the plan and briefed the president with the help of his deputies. This plan included *Issue Papers*, some background information about ongoing foreign policy issues –including Cyprus- and outlining procedure of notifying foreign governments.¹⁰ This matter, the correspondence with foreign leaders, is particularly important. Ford did not have enough time, or literally did not have any time, to prepare for the oval office in the manner of an elected president. However, he had to become a master diplomat in such a short notice. We observe how President Ford was successful on face-to-face diplomacy in Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Files¹¹. This file also includes letters from and to Turkish and Greek counterparts during his presidency. Overall, all abovementioned collections are going to be supported by the official White House press releases of the Ron Nessen papers which would also reveal the press strategy of the administration¹². Moreover, it contains the handwritten notes of Ron Nessen, who had been the Press Secretary of the president Ford during his term, from several meetings and briefings.

There are some memoirs that this work will benefit from largely. First and most important of them, undoubtedly, is *A Time to Heal*, which is the autobiography of President Ford.¹³ In this book, Ford sincerely tells the story of his political career with brief chapters about his boyhood and post-presidency years. What the readers

¹⁰ “Issue Papers (1)” *The Presidential Transition File*, NSA Files, Ford Presidential Library. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0353/1555879.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2016)

¹¹ *Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974-1977*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Harbor, Michigan. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/presidentialcorrespondence.asp> (accessed December 15, 2016)

¹² *Ron Nessen Papers, 1974-77.*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Harbor, Michigan. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/nessenpapers.asp> (accessed October 12, 2016)

¹³ Gerald Ford, *A Time to Heal: the Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford*, (New York: Harper&Row, 1979).

witness in this book is the fact that Ford was impressively comfortable with his evaluation of events around him. In the chapter *Brief Honeymoon*, Ford especially focuses on the hardship of his job when he first assumed the presidency. Among other problems, he also comments on congressional assertiveness in foreign policy matters in general, and Turkish embargo case in particular.

When President Ford took office, Henry Kissinger was maintaining both roles of the national security adviser and the secretary of the state. He had been fulfilling the duty of national security adviser since 1969 and he was appointed as the secretary of state in 1973. This work would refer to the ideas, speeches and conversations with President Ford in various parts. Kissinger, for sure, is now regarded as master of the art of diplomacy and his high level ability provides Ford with much needed professional support. Above all the qualities Kissinger possesses, he is a man of productivity in literature of diplomatic history. The concluding volume of his 3 volume memoirs, *Years of Renewal*, is directly about the relevant period of time.¹⁴ Kissinger tactfully narrates the term of President Ford who healed the nation in this volume, and argues in the foreword that the Ford presidency will be remembered as ushering in an age of renewal when a series of extraordinary events in the world occur during his short presidency. The memoirs of Kissinger reflect both the character of Ford in a very detailed manner and it also points out how Ford took over a ruin when he became the president because of crises of the past. Even Ford himself declared the past as the national nightmare in his first speech after taking the presidential oath. Thus, he delicately chose the phrase of ‘renewal’ for the name of his book, since President Ford could enhance the public confidence to the office back to acceptable levels again at the end of his presidency.

¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999).

Secondary sources are also going to be referred to in the subsequent chapters. First of all, literature on congressional assertiveness is taken into consideration. Frankly speaking, the literature about this issue is deep and broad. There are already some great books and research papers dealing with the subject more or less. Since the first aim of this thesis is to show how the Ford administration struggled with the Congress on the Turkish arms embargo case, the selected bibliography is mainly about the congressional assertiveness in 1970s with its reasons and consequences. One of them, and one that is referred to most, is the book of Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband's *Foreign Policy by Congress*.¹⁵ Published in 1979, Franck and Weisband investigate the congressional assertiveness and its relations with the executive in foreign policy making starting with disengagement in Indochina. As it is referred to in introduction, Franck and Weisband mention Pendulum theory, in which it is claimed that there are swings in American history between the Congress and the President in terms of political power. However, they think that the pendulum theory may be an unreliable interpreter of the present period of 1970s. They think that "there is persuasive evidence that the present period of congressional ascendancy is not just a swing of a pendulum; that what we are experiencing is a revolution that will not be unmade."¹⁶ However, in another leading source of related literature, Crabb and Hold have different arguments about this power shift. In *Invitation to Struggle*¹⁷, they point out the fact that the president is still in charge of foreign policy, although recent years have witnessed a new congressional assertiveness in foreign policy. They imply that

¹⁵ Franck and Weisband.

¹⁶ Ibid., 6.

¹⁷ Cecil, Jr Crabb, and Pat M. Holt., *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and the Foreign Policy*, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992).

“Congress’s powers are limited to telling the White House what it cannot do beyond the country’s borders, but accordingly, power to decide what United States will undertake in its relations with other countries reside with the chief executive.”¹⁸ Crabb and Holt contribute much to this work, especially for their systematic manifestation on why congressional assertiveness comes up in the 1970s and what consequences and implications it holds. Besides, the title of the book reminds us of Edward S. Corwin’s famous argument that the constitution creates an invitation to struggle between the president and the Congress for the privilege of directing American foreign affairs.¹⁹ Corwin, for sure, is the most prominent scholar in related literature.

Just like Corwin’s “invitation to struggle”, there is another phrase in the literature that has now become a term, which is the imperial presidency. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s *The Imperial presidency* is published in 1973 during the last breathes of Nixon.²⁰ With his words, this book “deals essentially with the shift in the constitutional balance of powers reserved by the constitution and by long historical practice to Congress.” By saying constitutional balance, he points out the appropriation by the presidency, and particularly by the contemporary presidency.²¹ He traces the Imperial presidency back to Founding Fathers through Vietnam, Korea, the Second World War, and the 19th century. During his chapters, he devotes special attention to the war-making powers, since he describes it as the most vital of national decisions. Schlesinger’s work would contribute much to this work in demonstrating Congress’ eagerness and micro-regulator outlook after the Nixon presidency. As

¹⁸ Ibid., 2.

¹⁹ Edward S. Corwin, *the President, Office and Powers*, (New York: New York University Press, 1958).

²⁰ Arthur M. Jr. Schlesinger, *the Imperial Presidency*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973).

²¹ Ibid., Foreword, viii.

Schlesinger writes, “nearly every president who extended the reach of the White House provoked a reaction toward a more restrictive theory of the presidency.”²²

In another work named *Congress and the Foreign Policy Process*²³, Cecil Crabb together with Glenn Antizzo and Leila Saredidine, primarily focus on Congress with its specific powers and responsibilities and the overall operation of Congress as well. With some case events from history, they believe sensibly that there are four different modes of legislative behavior, which are congressional assertiveness, legislative acquiescence, collaboration and division of labor, in the foreign policy process. They argue that the pattern of legislative acquiescence in diplomatic leadership by the president is most frequently characterized as the congressional approach to foreign policy issues and in other words, “this mode can be considered the norm in the American foreign policy process.”²⁴

British scholar John Dumbrell’s *The Making of US Foreign Policy* is a well-written introductory source from an outsider to the American foreign policy making process.²⁵ It studies a major institution of foreign policy-making in each chapter: the president, Congress, the executive branch, the intelligence community and public opinion. Strange enough is the fact that the most powerful and beneficial chapter in this work is about Presidential Foreign Policy was written by another British scholar David Barrett. Yet, Dumbrell’s talent in this book can be observed as supplementing chapters with various secondary sources, which suits the general tone of the book well. In this introductory category, Gerald Felix Warburg’s book *Conflict and*

²² Ibid., 68.

²³ Cecil V. Crabb, Glenn J. Antizzo, and Leila E. Saredidine, *Congress and the Foreign Policy Process: Modes of Legislative Behavior*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

²⁴ Ibid., 189.

²⁵ John Dumbrell, *the Making of US Foreign Policy*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

Consensus is also valuable especially for providing a good historical context to present the struggle between Presidents and Congress.²⁶ Similarly, Louis Fisher attempts to show his arguments in a case-by-case approach in his book *Presidential War Power*.²⁷ In addition, Fisher handles the subject from the perspective of War making powers. Thus, presidential war making power and Congress' struggle with that power is the main concern of this book. Finally, Hrach Gregorian's article would be a valuable resource by providing useful and systemic observation on the rise of congressional assertiveness in the post-Vietnam period.²⁸

Contrary to those mentioned above, Barbara Hinckley asserts a completely different view regarding the struggle between Presidents and the Congress in foreign policy making. According to her, there is more illusion and "less of a struggle for influence than meets the eye."²⁹ She believes that Congress remains passive and tends to pass symbolic and non-binding resolutions, since the President can go around the congressional acts if he or she finds it is for the national interest. Therefore, Hinckley believes that congressional assertiveness is a myth, which she discredits spectacularly.

There are some general history books related to the Cyprus issue regarding the bilateral relations of Turkey and the United States. Monteagle Stearns, for example, especially focuses on U.S. foreign policy about the Aegean and Cyprus

²⁶ Gerald Felix Warburg, *Conflict and Consensus: the Struggle between Congress and the President over Foreign Policymaking* (New York: Harper & Row , 1989).

²⁷ Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995).

²⁸ Hrach Gregorian. "Assessing congressional Involvement in Foreign Policy: Lessons of the Post-Vietnam Period" *Review of Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Jan., 1984).

²⁹ Barbara Hinckley, *Less than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994)

issue in *Entangled Allies*.³⁰ As a former ambassador to Greece (1981-1985), Stearns takes a critical approach to US foreign policy since the Truman Doctrine. Accordingly, he argues that the United States has generally disregarded Turkey and Greece's own foreign policy concerns until they coincided with US foreign policy, "abandoning forever those national interests and objectives that were incompatible with US efforts to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union."³¹ Therefore, because of this apathy to two countries' own policies, the United States had only one policy choice regarding the region, which is to prevent open hostilities between two NATO allies. Similar analysis is available in Richard C. Company Jr.'s book *Turkey and the United States, the Arms Embargo Period*³², which is the only book directly related to the topic. Company thinks that during the 1970s, "neither side defined the nature of its implicit assumptions and expectations in a suitable forum."³³ In general, Company's book is unsystematically organized, tries to mention too much information with very little details and can sometimes refer to unnecessary background information. However, Company was a U.S. Air Force officer and a linguist in Turkey when arms embargo was imposed. Therefore, his accounts would be unique for this thesis.

Some Turkish accounts of the issue are also consulted in order to get more familiar with the Turkish response to Congress's decision. It would also help us to observe somewhat Turkish pressure on the Ford administration to solve the problem. One of the greatest books in Turkish is Faruk Sönmezoğlu's American foreign policy

³⁰ Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992)

³¹ Ibid, 6.

³² Richard C. Company Jr., *Turkey and the United States: the Arms Embargo Period*, (New York: Praeger, 1986).

³³ Ibid., 27.

analysis on Turkey between 1964 and 1980.³⁴ Sönmezoğlu regards his book as a diplomatic history work that occasionally contains foreign policy analysis. He tries to reveal why the United States could not prevent Turkish intervention in 1974 like it achieved in 1964 and 1967 crisis on the island. On the other hand, Suha Bolukbasi takes a different path in his work titled *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*.³⁵ He diffusively examines the Cyprus issue and its effects on the relations of the two countries from the perspective of the relationship between a superpower and a third world country. By taking the Cyprus crises of 1964, 1967 and 1974 into consideration, Bolukbasi reaches the argument that domestic, geopolitical and functional factors affected the influence relationship between two countries and thus determined the outcomes of each crisis differently.³⁶ In this manner, it is parallel to Dale C. Tatum's work³⁷ on superpower – third world country relations, which have specific chapters on US-Turkey relations in the cases of the 1964 and 1974 crises. Another leading work, Nasuh Uslu's *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American relations*, is mainly about the Cyprus question in general, but it analyses the Cyprus coup and the military intervention of Turkey by focusing on the US role and attitude.³⁸ Uslu perfectly achieves to combine general literature with Turkish accounts of events by referring to newspapers, memoirs, and official papers of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a similar work to Uslu, Oberling successfully narrates the story of the island from 1960 to the second peace operation of Turkey. The work of Oberling can be labeled as pro-Turkish;

³⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye politikası*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınevi, 1995).

³⁵ Suha Bolukbasi, *The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*. (Maryland: University Press of America, 1988).

³⁶ Ibid., 9.

³⁷ Dale C. Tatum, *Who Influenced Whom? Lessons from the Cold War*, (Maryland: University Press of America, 2002)

³⁸ Nasuh Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American relations*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003).

nevertheless he fairly recounts the situation on the island before the Turkish intervention.³⁹ In addition to the aforementioned works, this work would benefit from Fahir Armaoğlu's book that reveals the most significant documents in US-Turkish relations since the beginning of establishing diplomatic relations.⁴⁰ This book contains the full text of Defense cooperation treaties, presidential doctrines and declarations and other milestone documents in relation with two countries. Armaoğlu chooses to limit commentary as much as he can, but still it would be helpful for this thesis with its chronological presentation of documents.

The Greek lobbying effort had a substantial effect on the embargo decision of the Congress. Lobbying, as a concept, has always been an unknown area for Turkish public opinion. Since there is no such concept in the Turkish political system as an institution, it has always been perceived as mysterious. Tayyar Arı, one of the most prominent scholars on Turkish – American relations, is the one who tries to solve this mystery with his powerful book about lobbying in the US political system.⁴¹ He investigates the decision making process in Washington and the effect of lobbying as an actor of the process. In the last chapter, he analyzes Greek, Jewish and Turkish lobbies and their relations with executive and legislative branches in a comparative manner. A similar effort of studying the interaction of ethnic American organizations with official policymakers in the executive and Congress is observed in Paul Y. Watanabe's work, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: the Politics of the Turkish Embargo*.⁴² However, contrary to Arı's book,

³⁹ Oberling, Pierre. *The Road to Bellapais: Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)

⁴⁰ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk – Amerikan Münasebetleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).

⁴¹ Tayyar Arı, *Amerika'da Siyasal Yapı: Lobiler ve Dış Politika*. (İstanbul: Alfa Basım, 1997)

⁴² Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Turkish arms embargo*. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984).

Watanabe comes up with the idea that ethnic groups can make strong, positive contributions to the formulation of rational, workable and humane policies. He disregards the popular view of what ethnic groups dangerously promotes parochial interests at the expense of the national interest.⁴³ Unfortunately, Watanabe is far from explaining how the Turkish arms embargo is compatible with the American national interest, even though he is skeptical about the administration's views about the embargo being against the American national interest.

It should be noted that some other resources may also be referred to in coming Chapters. Those are not included in this part because they would not affect the overall language of this thesis. Moreover, readers of this thesis would observe that the usage of mentioned sources can be separated into two groups according to their general theme. While the second chapter is going to make references to secondary resources almost completely, the third chapter is giving more credit to primary sources.

In the second chapter of this work, the theory of congressional assertiveness will be taken into consideration from a historical perspective. This background information would be helpful to understand some fundamental milestones in presidential-congressional relations in United States history. Furthermore, Chapter II will particularly concentrate on the reasons for the rise of congressional assertiveness in 1970s. Thus, second chapter will generally supported by secondary sources, which provide a theoretical dimension to his work. In the third chapter, President Ford and his administration will be focused on during the Turkish arms embargo period. This thesis will first evaluate different positions of Ford administration and the Congress

⁴³ Ibid. Introduction, xiii-xiv.

in the wake of Turkish intervention of Cyprus. Later on, activities of the Ford administration will be revealed within the historical process against the assertive Congress which strongly favors an arms embargo on Turkey.



CHAPTER II

CONGRESSIONAL ASSERTIVENESS IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

“The Pendulum has swung so far that you could almost say we have moved from an imperial presidency to an imperiled presidency. Now we have a Congress that is broadening its powers in foreign relations too greatly.”

In 1976, President Ford expressed the assertive attitude of the Congress in foreign relations with these words. He was concerned that the attitude was threatening the existence of the office of the presidency in the conduct of foreign policy. The struggle of power between the president and the Congress is as old as the history of the United States. Even George Washington, who was elected with the greatest consensus of the country’s history, was criticized as ‘his majesty’ by opponents of the Jay treaty with England. Some legislators thought that Washington was excluding the Congress from participating in such an important foreign policy issue.⁴⁴ Since the problem is as old as the United States, one should look at the pillars of the newly founded republic. When considered from this point of view, The United States constitution should be the first source to inspect to get more familiar with the

⁴⁴ Crabb and Hold, *Invitation to Struggle*, ix.

problem. Of course, whether it is really a problem or what the Founding Fathers had exactly projected to be is a matter of interpretation.

2.1 Historical and Theoretical Background

The United States constitution predominantly relies on the doctrine of the separation of powers. This doctrine was first introduced by Baron de Montesquieu in 1748 in his work *The Spirit of Laws*. Montesquieu argues this doctrine is a prerequisite to preserve the political liberty, which is available in republics and to some extent in monarchies. Separation of powers actually draws a very basic outline for the sake of a republic. Accordingly, the government should have different bodies governing its executive, legislative and judicial branches. By this separation of powers, if any of the branches attempts to exceed its boundaries, which is referred to as threatening the political liberty of citizens in Montesquieu writings, the other branches can prevent this attempt. This implies the checks and balances system, which is the supplementary idea of the separation of powers. Today, every constitution that depends on separation of powers also possesses checks and balances systems at different levels. So does the constitution of the United States. Actually, the United States' constitution, in the newly founded republic, is the first example of such a governmental system. Warburg thinks that the US constitution that is the oldest living government charter in the world remains one of the most revolutionary, offering an abundance of self-correcting mechanisms.⁴⁵ It is true the United States

⁴⁵ Warburg, *Conflict and Consensus*, 6.

constitution can be regarded as the most rigid version with its various checks and balances instruments. The governing document of the confederation before the drafting the constitution, the Articles of Confederation, offered both executive and legislative powers to the Congress. According to Schlesinger, the Founding Fathers intended to correct the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation with the constitution. In this manner, the new constitution created separate executive and judicial branches, and designed a division of authority between the legislative and executive branches.⁴⁶

While the division of authority between legislative and executive branches in domestic policy was reasonably clear, it was often cryptic, ambiguous and incomplete in foreign affairs.⁴⁷ Warburg thinks that the framers deliberately and systematically overlapped powers in foreign policy making.⁴⁸ As Edward Corwin asserts, what the Constitution does is to confer Presidential and congressional powers of the same kind in foreign relations, “but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.”⁴⁹ These ‘overlapping’ powers of the president and the Congress should be examined in more detail. First of all, Article I of the constitution describes the powers and responsibilities of the Congress. It should be noted that Article I was written in much greater detail than Article II, which outlines the powers of the president. This article vests the Congress with seven foreign policy powers. The most important ones, which the House and the Senate exercise jointly, are to declare war and to raise and to maintain armies. The Senate itself, additionally, has the authority

⁴⁶ Schlesinger Jr., *The Imperial presidency*, 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Warburg, 10.

⁴⁹ Corwin, *the President, Office and Powers*, 171.

to give advice and consent to treaties and confirm the executive's ambassador appointments.⁵⁰ Secondly, article II of the constitution describes powers of the executive. Accordingly, the president's authorities are to command the army and the navy as the commander-in-chief, to receive foreign ambassadors and to negotiate treaties with foreign countries, as well as appoint ambassadors with the consent of the Senate. As it is seen, presidential powers in foreign policy are far more briefly described in the constitution than corresponding congressional powers. Nevertheless, commander-in-chief power is fundamentally important, because this position has become one of the most influential presidential powers in foreign policy. As Crabb and Holt argue, "successive presidents since Lincoln have interpreted their authority in this realm broadly and dynamically."⁵¹

In short, the constitution can be regarded as the source of the conflict in this subject. Schlesinger Jr. perfectly describes the problem while identifying the separation of power in the constitution as "inherently unstable." Hereunder, "if the president were to claim all the implications of his control of diplomacy, he could, by creating an antecedent state of things, swallow up the congressional power to authorize hostilities." On the other hand, he claims that "if Congress were to claim all the implications of its power to authorize hostilities, it could swallow up much of the presidential power to conduct diplomacy."⁵² In the writing of the constitution, the president has the authority to direct the military, but only after Congress declares war on a target country and funds military forces for waging the war. However, it is soon to turn into an inapplicable process. During the Civil War, the Supreme Court ruled

⁵⁰ Warburg, 9; Crabb and Holt, 42; Schlesinger Jr., 3-7.

⁵¹ Crabb and Holt, 12.

⁵² Schlesinger Jr., 35.

President Abraham Lincoln's decision to blockade southern ports constitutional.⁵³ In this case, the court emphasized that the president was not required to await a declaration of war from the Congress before responding to external threats.⁵⁴ It is estimated that the United States "has been involved in more than 125 "undeclared wars" and other instances of violent conflict abroad conducted under presidential authority."⁵⁵ Presidential war examples vary from President James K. Polk's order to occupy a territory within Mexican borders to President Harry S. Truman's order to repel North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950. Presidential and undeclared wars are going to be restrained by the War Powers Resolution in 1973.

Scholars of the Congress-presidential relations tend to argue the theory of swings of congressional assertiveness in foreign policy making. Schlesinger Jr. focuses on presidential histories with regards to foreign policy in order to observe these swings.⁵⁶ Consequently, the widely acclaimed argument on this matter identifies three swings of congressional dominance in foreign policy. The first period of congressional dominance in foreign policy was between 1837 and 1861, which has just come after Andrew Jackson administration until the civil war. One example of the period is that the House of Representatives censured President Polk's action that triggered the Mexican-American war of 1846 on the grounds that the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally started by the President of the United States."⁵⁷ The second swing started at the end of the Civil War and ended with President William McKinley. One of the notable congressional interferences to foreign policy in this period was that the Congress forced the cautious President

⁵³ *The Prize Cases*, 67 U.S. 2 Black 635 635 (1862)

⁵⁴ Crabb and Holt, 50.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 12.

⁵⁶ Schlesinger Jr., 68-99.

⁵⁷ Cong. 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848)

McKinley into war with Spain over Cuba in 1898.⁵⁸ The last and third swing to Congress started with President Woodrow Wilson's second term and ended with President Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁵⁹ One of the greatest examples for this period was Congress's refusal to join the League of Nations, which President Wilson himself had actually projected for lasting world peace. According to this division of swings, Franck and Weisband make three generalizations. Firstly, wars tend to end the swing of power to Congress, and the ending of a war tends to trigger a swing back. Secondly, each swing contains within itself the excesses that generate the counter-force for the next swing. Third and last, the duration of the swing, historically, may be getting shorter.⁶⁰ Since their book is published in 1979, they were able to analyze until late 1970s. Another division identifies four periods of congressional assertiveness in foreign relations, years between 1776-1798, 1824-1844, 1871-1891 and 1918-1940 respectively. Accordingly, these periods also symbolize relatively isolationist cycles of the United States History, "when the legislative branch has been relatively ascendant, assertive in its powers during periods of national retreat."⁶¹

Towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the social-economic structure of American society has radically changed. The shift was towards a more industrialized and capitalist society, just like western European countries, from agrarian, agricultural economy. The flow of immigrants who sought new jobs and a new life reached peak levels and the growing capitalist economy made new jobs possible for them across the country. One of the significant outcomes of industrialization was that international affairs had become a matter of interest for a

⁵⁸ Schlesinger Jr., 82.

⁵⁹ Franck and Weisband, 5-6.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Warburg, 19-20.

greater portion of society, since their welfare had started to depend on international trade. This new society had also transformed presidents and their thinking about international affairs and the role of the United States.⁶² Popular feelings were in favor of more involvement in international affairs, so presidents of the period could ignore President George Washington's advice to avoid entangled alliances in his famous Farewell Address. As Warburg indicates, "in times when voters have favored international involvement, no amount of legislative rope-tying by congressional Lilliputians has proved sufficient to restrain the presidential Gulliver."⁶³ The first three presidents of the 20th century, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson were eager to be Gulliver, and they personified the new thinking about America's role in world politics and their role as president in managing American foreign policy.⁶⁴ Dumbrell quotes what T. Roosevelt once said: "I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the nation could not be done by the president unless he could find some specific authorization to do it."⁶⁵ Thus, President T. Roosevelt on several occasions created and exploited faits accomplis to consolidate the power of his office. For example, in 1907, when he desired to send a fleet around the world, the chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee declared that the Senate would not reserve the money needed for this expedition. T. Roosevelt responded that he had enough money to send the fleet around the Pacific, but, "if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific."⁶⁶ On another occasion, when the Senate threatened to imprison one executive head if he did not deliver desired

⁶² Dumbrell, *the Making of US Foreign Policy*, 56.

⁶³ Warburg, 21.

⁶⁴ Dumbrell, 57.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Roosevelt, Theodore. *An Autobiography* (New York: MacMillan, 1913), 553. Qtd in. Schlesinger Jr., 308.

information to one subcommittee, T. Roosevelt ordered documents to the White House and challenged the Senate to come and get them.⁶⁷ Similarly, President Wilson thought that the president was uniquely endowed to represent the democratic values of the American people in world affairs.⁶⁸ Thus, he outlined and declared the famous fourteen points, a set of principles that ought to be taken into consideration for lasting peace at the end of the Great War. One of the principles of President Wilson emphasizes the formation of “a general association of nations.” He thus threw himself into an exhaustive (albeit failed) mission to persuade the necessary two-thirds of the Senate to approve American entry into the League of Nations.⁶⁹ It was the period of new American isolationism which had been influential among American public until the Second World War. It also suits well with Franck and Weisband’s argument in which they claim ending of a war tends to change the power balance in favor of the Congress. Isolationist sentiments in Congress and particularly in the Senate had been very influential and actuated the country’s foreign policy during the interwar period.⁷⁰

Interwar isolationism is particularly significant since it boosted the legislative assertiveness in foreign policy during the period. Isolationist sentiments in the Congress were especially intensified by certain emotional, psychological and personal factors. One factor is partisanship, which influenced the decision of America’s rejection of League of Nations or its refusal to join the World court. Another factor was powerful personal animosities between President Wilson and his opponents and President F. D. Roosevelt and congressional isolationists. FDR’s

⁶⁷ Schlesinger Jr., 84.

⁶⁸ Dumbrell, 57.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Crabb and Holt, 44.

isolationist opponents, for example, labeled his *brain trust* as out of touch with the thinking of ordinary citizens, while they perceived themselves as in the same tune with American public opinion.⁷¹ Moreover, as a master political strategist, FDR thinks that isolationist sentiments among the public were too strong to oppose, and opposing it may be the same mistake Wilson had attempted and failed. Therefore, FDR avoided clashing openly with congressional opposition, since he had “no desire to incur a well-publicized defeat at the hands of its isolationist opponents. In FDR’s view, such a result would merely intensify the prevailing isolationist mentality and endanger the passage of needed domestic programs.”⁷² Moreover, the Congress somewhat reinforced the isolationist mentality in American public opinion. In this manner, for example, the Nye committee of the Senate, which investigated the role of American finance and arms sectors on the country’s participation in World War I, had a major impact on public opinion.⁷³ Prior to the Second World War, the legislative power had tried to keep the United States out of a foreign war, most importantly through the neutrality acts of 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939. Although FDR had supported the neutrality acts of the 1930s and even called their purpose as “wholly excellent” and “wholly good”, he openly criticized the embargo provisions of 1935 and 1937 as he successfully fought for their removal from the 1939 bill.⁷⁴ He thought that “some inflexible (embargo) provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out.”⁷⁵ FDR was not the first and would not be the last president to call for flexibility in foreign affairs. On the other hand, when we look at the issue from the other side, it is very doubtful what isolationists in Congress had really achieved.

⁷¹ Crabb, Antizzo, and Saredidine, *Congress and the Foreign Policy Process*, 33.

⁷² Ibid., 34.

⁷³ Crabb and Holt, 55.

⁷⁴ Louis Fisher. *Presidential War Power*, 62-63.

⁷⁵ Qtd in Ibid., 62.

It is true that they kept the United States out of war until it was directly attacked by an axis power. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull once said, FDR could have joined the war earlier in efforts to stop Axis expansionism and to prevent the Second World War. However, when the war finally came, it was now a total war, instead of a preemptive or limited military confrontation. In such a total war, FDR asserted all possible executive authorities. Therefore, “the isolationists in Capitol Hill and throughout the nation at large played a crucial role in creating a danger they feared most: virtually unlimited executive power in the foreign policy field.”⁷⁶

The Second World War is a turning point in American history in every possible aspect. Once the war finished, there was no way to go back to the old isolationist days of the country anymore. During the war, the American economy, as well as American society, had been strongly integrated into the world economy through wartime cooperation agreements. Europe had been ruined during the war and the United States had to continue its assistance in order to develop devastated European economies. It was now the plain truth that the United States was the most powerful country in the world. Moreover, there was an imminent communist threat coming from the Soviet Union, whose founding principles and existence were directly challenging the American system. American politics were also affected by this new bipolar world system. As it is stated above, Franck and Weisband argue that ending of a war tends to trigger a swing to Congress, but it was not the case after the Second World War. Actually, President Truman had continued to retain some wartime powers for a period of time. President Truman announced the termination of hostilities more than sixteen months after Japan surrendered. However, he did not sign a statement terminating the state of war with Japan and the national emergencies

⁷⁶ Crabb, Antizzo, and Saredine, 36-37.

proclaimed by Roosevelt in 1939 and 1941 until April 1952. Therefore, he exercised certain emergency and war powers for more than 6 years after the war actually finished.⁷⁷ Arguing that Congress did not strike back after the war can still be regarded a wrong assumption. Just like after the Civil War against President Andrew Johnson, or after World War I against Wilson, Congress had tried and achieved to repudiate Roosevelt by recommending the 22nd amendment which limits all future Presidents to two terms.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, this time congressional intervention had limits because of the aforementioned international climate. As Schlesinger puts forth, many thoughtful congressional leaders had now started to confess the institutional inferiority of Congress in contrast to the presidency. The Cold War, with its uncertain definitions and ambiguous areas of struggle, required a concentration of power within the government for instant decision and response.⁷⁹ Members of Congress were sympathetic to the extraordinarily difficult situation which Truman faced, and many of them respected the White House's superior sources of intelligence and military analysis in an unusually complex time.⁸⁰ In such an international climate, in the middle of Truman's 8-year presidency, Republicans won majorities in both houses of the 80th Congress. Truman was a moderate-to-liberal Democrat, who would struggle with a Republican Congress now.⁸¹ Truman's idea to overcome this situation and his relative success in relations with the Congress on foreign policy was enabled by the creation of bipartisan foreign policy. An indispensable partner of this initiative was the chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, the Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who preferred to call

⁷⁷ Fisher, 69.

⁷⁸ U.S. Const. amend. XXII, § 1.

⁷⁹ Schlesinger Jr., 127-128.

⁸⁰ Warburg, 31-32.

⁸¹ Ford, *Time to Heal*, 156.

this foreign policy outlook as nonpartisan foreign policy. According to Vandenberg, bipartisanship means placing national security ahead of partisan advantage.⁸² Schlesinger Jr., on the contrary, believes that the national security was the new peacetime weapon of the presidency, which was gifted by bipartisan foreign policy.⁸³ Nevertheless, by this invention, Democratic President Truman was able to get necessary consent from the Republican Congress in certain important foreign policy matters of his time such as the British loan, the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan or the ratification of the NATO treaty.

As it is stated above, anti-communist consensus in the post-war United States had surpassed partisan politics in Capitol Hill, as well as isolationist sentiments in the public. As Vandenberg once recommended, Truman did “scare hell out of the country” against the communist threat.⁸⁴ Thus, he sharply and decisively asserted the presidential power in foreign policy in the new world order. In this new world, Americans admitted Truman’s new roles and responsibilities, since their president was not only the leader of the United States, but also leader of the free world.⁸⁵ Other occupants of the White House after Truman, namely Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon for some time, would enjoy strong presidential powers in foreign policy. In this manner they owed much to Truman, since he laid the fundamental groundwork for presidential power in foreign policy for future presidents. During the war years, the federal government had expanded enormously out of necessity. The Truman administration made most of the wartime institutions permanent or turned them into practical

⁸² Schlesinger Jr., 128-129.

⁸³ Ibid., 130.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 128.

⁸⁵ Dumbrell, 59.

agencies for federal government. Dean Acheson wrote on the issue in 1946 that “the United States was getting itself together to address its new global responsibilities, rising to the challenge of the emerging Cold War in which new diplomatic tools would be required.”⁸⁶ The most significant example is the National Security act of 1947. This act created some institutions like the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and re-organized the military under the Department of Defense, which altogether would hold extensive roles in the Cold War. These establishments had greatly enhanced the presidential power and ability to lead in foreign policy.

Republican President Eisenhower had worked with a Democratic majority Congress during most of his presidency. Truman’s experience with the 80th Congress provided him with an example. He established good relations with Democratic members of Congress and reaped the benefit of good relations. On various occasions, as Hinckley observes, Republicans gave “mixed support to requests of Eisenhower, a president of their own party.” His victories in both houses, accordingly, “depended on the Democrats and on compromises in the program to win some Republican votes.”⁸⁷ This is actually because of Eisenhower’s consideration of himself as above political parties.⁸⁸ As Crabb and Holt imply, it is significant that Eisenhower was the most diffident of all the post-World War II presidents in asserting his powers as commander in chief.⁸⁹ Although President Eisenhower displayed skepticism about conventional war waged by regular armies, this does not mean that he was skeptical about clandestine tactics. During his term, the CIA had become the primary

⁸⁶ Warburg, 30.

⁸⁷ Hinckley, *Less than meets the Eye*, 106.

⁸⁸ Schlesinger Jr., 209.

⁸⁹ Crabb and Hold, 160.

instrument of American intervention in other countries.⁹⁰ On the other hand, the National Security Council had become the center of foreign policy production with a series of top secret National Security Council directives. Consequently, the executive actions were turned into a black hole for Congress, which had no effective means to provide oversight. As Schlesinger Jr. rightfully claims, the President got solid intelligence from his diplomatic, military, intelligence and economic agents all over the world, where “Congress had to rely on what it could spell out in the Washington Post and New York Times.”⁹¹ Moreover, Schlesinger Jr. labels developments of the 1950s as encouragement of the displacement of power both practically and constitutionally from acquiescent Congress into an increasingly imperial presidency.⁹² According to him, “in the decade after Korea, Congress receded not alone from the effort to control the war making power but almost from the effort to participate in it, except on occasions when national security zealots on the Hill condemned the executive branch for inadequate bellicosity.”⁹³ Yet still, there are some examples about Eisenhower’s diffidence on the use of force without consent of the Congress. The most important example was about the course of events in Vietnam where French forces were finally besieged in Dien Bien Phu by the communist Vietcong. The French asked for U.S. support with air strikes, but Eisenhower was reluctant to act without congressional support. The congressional consultation in this example was particularly important, since future presidents Senator John F. Kennedy and Majority Leader Johnson, who would increase

⁹⁰ Schlesinger Jr., 167.

⁹¹ Ibid., 166.

⁹² Ibid., 164.

⁹³ Ibid., 169.

American involvement in Vietnam in the upcoming decade, were among others who were publicly opposed to any US intervention in Vietnam.⁹⁴

Unlike Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy was eager to assert his power in foreign policy. While Eisenhower was primarily seeking for cooperation with the Congress, JFK acted in a more independent manner in foreign policy. In domestic affairs, “Kennedy was a somewhat beleaguered president”.⁹⁵ However, in foreign affairs, he inherently possessed more authority, which he did not hesitate to use. Actually, JFK was too powerful for the Congress to clash in foreign policy matters. Dramatic moves in foreign policy, like appearing at the Berlin Wall or forcing Soviet Union to retreat in Cuban Missile Crisis, let JFK to become a foreign policy hero, and his rivals in the Congress found it “nearly impossible to challenge him successfully”.⁹⁶ Cuban missile crisis was a perfect example of how he perceived his presidential authority. During the crisis, JFK had developed the response of the United States, without any consultation with the legislative branch. He had called in congressional leaders only after he made his decision, and his aim was to inform them but not to consult them.⁹⁷ President Kennedy acted “by executive order, presidential proclamation and inherent powers, not under any resolution or act of Congress.”⁹⁸ Back in September, JFK made clear in a news conference that as the Commander of Chief, he possessed full authority to take a swift action against Cuba.⁹⁹ On October 23, Kennedy’s proclamation of quarantine emphasized that he was “acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon –him- by the

⁹⁴ Crabb and Hold, 142.

⁹⁵ Schlesinger Jr., 171.

⁹⁶ Crabb and Hold, 23.

⁹⁷ Schlesinger Jr., 174-175.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 175.

⁹⁹ John F. Kennedy, “378 - The President's News Conference, September 13, 1962” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*

Constitution and statutes of the United States”¹⁰⁰ Schlesinger Jr. thinks that Cuban Missile Crisis was a very unique example that required perfect unilateral and independent presidential action. However, he warns that “one of its legacies was the imperial conception of the presidency that brought the republic so low in Vietnam.”¹⁰¹

By the death of President Kennedy, 16.000 American ‘advisers’ had already been deployed in Vietnam. They were occasionally participating in South Vietnamese operations. Since casualties were very low and the intervention was very limited, involvement in Vietnam did not create any debate in the country.¹⁰² However, the course of events had gradually changed under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Gulf of Tonkin incident was a turning point for the escalation of war. In August 1964, President Johnson reported attacks on U.S. vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, and demanded an authorization from the Congress to use of force. The House passed a resolution unanimously and the Senate followed the House action with only two objections. The joint resolution authorized the president to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack or to prevent any further aggression against the United States.”¹⁰³ Later on, Gulf of Tonkin resolution had been used by Johnson as a base for escalating the military presence in Southeast Asia.”¹⁰⁴ In 1965, Johnson ordered to send additional American troops, while bombing campaigns were started to be conducted on a daily basis against North Vietnam. By 1969, American military presence in Vietnam had reached at its peak of 550.000 troops. Language of the resolution, which was actually ambiguous on its extents, allowed the president to

¹⁰⁰ John F. Kennedy, “486 - Proclamation 3504—Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, October 23, 1962” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 176.

¹⁰² Schlesinger Jr., 177.

¹⁰³ PL 88-408, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964)

¹⁰⁴ Crabb and Hold, 143.

do so. As Crabb and Holt indicate, “Johnson was fond of carrying a tattered copy of it in his pocket and showing it to anyone who questioned his authority.”¹⁰⁵ Thus, by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the Congress handed over its war making power to the president. How the Congress so willingly and overwhelmingly passed this authority is still a point of debate in the literature. Crabb and Holt think that immediate military response to the incident was very limited, which depicted Johnson as moderate against his Republican opponent Senator Barry Goldwater in the upcoming presidential election. They think that this is why the Congress passed the resolution “so promptly and overwhelmingly.”¹⁰⁶ Later investigations of the Congress raised great suspicion among members of the Congress about the fact that Johnson administration had intentionally misled the Congress about the Vietnam War.¹⁰⁷ Back in 1964, Johnson had been able to get the resolution with fervent support of some prominent congressional leaders like the chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator William J. Fulbright. In spring of 1966, Senator Fulbright suggested on a televised hearing that the incident might have been fabricated by the Johnson administration. He was able to present his conclusive evidence only in 1968.¹⁰⁸ Warburg thinks that questions on the conduct of the Vietnam War and alleged abuses of executive power by Johnson had “ultimately undermined the president’s ability to govern.”¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, the biggest problem for Johnson was “the credibility gap between his presidential statements and reality on the ground”, while members of the Congress were accumulating “a silent anger at the way

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Crabb, Antizzo, and Sarieddine, 72.

¹⁰⁸ Warburg, 41.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 41.

Johnson repeatedly intimidated members on Vietnam issues.”¹¹⁰ Decreasing public support had forced Johnson to declare that he was not running for president again in 1968 elections. However, as Warburg points out, the “growing dispute between the branches of government was magnified” with the election of Nixon.¹¹¹

President Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 with a promise of ending the Vietnam War. In reality, he expanded the war with the incursion into Cambodia and Laos in 1970. On May 30, 1970, he declared in an address to the nation that his responsibility as the Commander of Chief required him to take actions he considered necessary for the defense of American soldiers in Vietnam.¹¹² Schlesinger rightfully draws attention to Nixon’s repeated use of the title of Commander in Chief. He thinks that while this title was technically referring to the position of the topmost officer in the armed forces, by the 1970s, it had acquired “almost a sacramental aura, translating its holder from worldly matters into an ineffable realm of higher duty.”¹¹³ There was no doubt that the President was the chief of armed forces in times of war. But the problem aroused from the fact that, for example, President Johnson had exploited the title while he was arguing that the attack against an ally could have direct effect on the national security of the United States. President Nixon, on the other hand, had exploited the title by arguing a potential attack from Cambodia against American Forces in Vietnam.¹¹⁴ After all, Cambodia was a neutral country. Therefore, Cambodia had created a great protest all over the country. The Congress finally acted to stop the Presidential abuse of war making power. First of all, the Congress eliminated the source of the presidential war making power in Vietnam, by

¹¹⁰ Warburg, 39.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 41.

¹¹² Richard Nixon, “139 - Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia, April 30, 1970” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon*

¹¹³ Schlesinger Jr., 188.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 193.

repealing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1971. In the meanwhile, the Congress acted in accordance with its most basic authority of the power of the purse. Thus, it denied use of funds for American combat troops in Laos and Thailand in 1969 and added Cambodia in 1970. Between 1970 and 1974, the Congress prohibited the use of funds for military operations in Indochina with at least eight different amendments.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the Congress enacted an amendment to the Defense Procurement Authorization Act of 1971 and called for immediate halt of all military operations in Indochina, as a reply to Nixon's repeated promise of doing so.¹¹⁶ Warburg thinks that "Congress had moved with sustained legislative reaction in virtually every field of policymaking where President Nixon and his predecessors had asserted strong powers."¹¹⁷ In short, a decade of congressional acquiescence in the foreign policy had disappeared. The Congress had finally realized that the foreign policy powers of the president had moved beyond its limits and undermined the founding ideals of the country.

2.2 Reasons for the Rise of Congressional Assertiveness in the 1970s

According to figures, the Vietnam War cost nearly sixty thousand American soldiers' lives. However, life was not the only casualty. Flag draped coffins coming from a distant part of the world caused great public unrest across the country. The

¹¹⁵ Crabb and Holt, 144.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 194.

¹¹⁷ Warburg, 50.

spread of this unrest to the halls of Congress was inevitable. The national consensus and the bipartisanship, which were actually gifts of the cold war climate, became other casualties of the Vietnam War in American politics. President Ford, who should supposedly heal the country, thinks that the 93rd Congress (1973-1975) started to tear apart the bipartisanship. He worries that “if this destruction of a bipartisan foreign policy goes on, our leadership in this country, no President, me or anyone that follows me, can do a job for peace--a job for peace.”¹¹⁸ Unfortunately, President Ford could not elude legislative intervention on his foreign policy. America’s defeat in that traumatic war led to efforts to place the blame not only on former President Nixon but also on the office of the presidency in order to avoid another Vietnam in the future. A new kind of legislative assertiveness, thus, had emerged and had come to the forefront of policy making.¹¹⁹ It was the first time since the end of WWII that presidential dominance in foreign policy was shaken.¹²⁰ This was mainly caused by the undermined prestige of the president. In the previous two decades, presidents cultivated a popular public image. Accordingly, an American president was an able man and followed the most suitable path for the country with the help of *best and brightest men*. However, the Vietnam War destroyed that image, and consequently it cut into the executive’s operational flexibility in foreign policy.¹²¹ Deprivation of public consent to the presidency paved the way for Congress to challenge the President in foreign policy making. Like most nations that lose a war, the United

¹¹⁸ Gerald Ford, “184 - Remarks in Cleveland, Ohio, October 22, 1974” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

¹¹⁹ Crabb, Antizzo, and Sarieddine, 39.

¹²⁰ Gregorian, *Assessing Congressional Involvement in Foreign Policy*, 98.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 94.

States had suffered a revolution at home, but this revolution occurred in the halls of Congress rather than in the streets of the country.¹²²

Abuse of presidential power, which had been publicized through the media, had wiped away the remaining confidence in presidency, if the office still possessed any after the Vietnam War. In June 1971, for example, *The New York Times* started to publish the Pentagon Papers, the study of the Department of Defense regarding the history of American involvement in Vietnam until 1967. While Schlesinger Jr. notes that newspapers were actually publishing everything while it was happening in Vietnam, “the Pentagon Papers came to many Americans with the shock of revelation.”¹²³ Furthermore, publication of congressional committee hearings about the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy had uncovered “executive malfeasance everywhere from Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Europe and the Americas.”¹²⁴ Final blow to the Presidential prestige was the Watergate scandal. This scandal simply showed the Congress how presidential powers could be abused by an ‘uncontrolled’, ‘imperial’ President. In February 1973, the Senate established a selected committee to investigate Watergate. During the summer of 1973, the Senate Watergate investigation drew great public attention, and committee hearings led to the revelation of the White House tapes. On February 6, 1974, the House passed a resolution with an overwhelming consensus (410-4) to provide appropriate power to the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate whether sufficient grounds existed to impeach President Nixon.¹²⁵ Until his resignation on August 8, Numerous White House tapes as well as congressional and public debate on impeachment had

¹²² Franck and Weisband, 27.

¹²³ Schlesinger Jr., 374.

¹²⁴ Gregorian, 95.

¹²⁵ H.Res.803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974)

“absorbed more and more of President Nixon’s intellectual and emotional capital.”¹²⁶ The office of the presidency could not be eluding this damage. The effect of Watergate and the impeachment debates had diminished the prestige of the presidency severely. As Gregorian puts it, “the vision of a disgraced chief executive forced out of office by congressional tribunal intent on pressing impeachment severely sapped the presidency of its lofty image.”¹²⁷ Thus, Watergate had created a political climate of suspicion and lack of trust in the presidency.

During the process in which the Vietnam War had gradually turned into a quagmire, Congress started to evaluate its role in recent wars of the country. Congress actually had no role at all in the cases of Korea and Vietnam. These wars were started without any declaration of war by Congress, as it was actually the only way that Congress could check and limit the president’s ability to wage war. The consequence of a long national debate regarding this issue was the War Powers Resolution of 1973.¹²⁸ This resolution calls for the consultation and collective judgment of both Congress and the president prior to the introduction of American soldiers into hostilities. Moreover, it empowered Congress to withdraw American troops from a foreign soil with a concurrent resolution in absences of an actual declaration of war and of the consent of Congress. President Nixon found it unconstitutional and vetoed the resolution, but both houses of Congress overrode his veto.¹²⁹ The War Powers Act of 1973 had raised serious questions especially because of its deficiencies in implementation. Most of the future presidents would not follow the rules of the resolution regarding consulting, responding and reporting obligations

¹²⁶ Kissinger, 18.

¹²⁷ Gregorian, 95.

¹²⁸ Fisher, 115.

¹²⁹ P.L. 93 – 148. November 7, 1973.

to Congress.¹³⁰ According to Dumbrell, no president since 1973 has fully showed his support or agreement to the War Power Resolution.¹³¹ Nevertheless, what makes an unapplied resolution especially significant is that it was a direct and a forceful attempt to limit the actions of the president and his traditionally assumed power of waging war. In this manner, the War Powers Act has been the symbol of the post-Vietnam era congressional assertiveness in the literature. As Hinckley believes, “the act allows both the President and Congress to appear more responsible: they have learned the lessons of Vietnam.”¹³² Therefore, Congress aggressively attempted to assert its right to have a voice on war making power, which had been the most debated issue in executive-legislature relations since the foundation. However, Congress’s attempt was unable to go beyond being a symbol, “as required in a post-reform and post-Vietnam era.”¹³³

The Vietnam War and the following scandals around the office of the presidency can be regarded as the foremost causes of the rise of congressional assertiveness in the 1970s, but it cannot be limited to these two events. In the literature, there is a consensus that internal changes in the Congress as well as some external influences on the Congress caused the rise of legislative activism in foreign affairs in the post-Vietnam era.¹³⁴ Accordingly, the first of internal changes in the Congress is the growing *Diffusion of Power*. While congressmen were gradually raising their voices against President Nixon, they also reformed the structure in the Congress through a series of acts like the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. Some important institutional changes include the revision of executive control

¹³⁰ Hinckley, 84-90.

¹³¹ Barrett, *Presidential Foreign Policy*, in Dumbrell, 62.

¹³² Ibid., 99.

¹³³ Ibid., 90.

¹³⁴ Crabb and Holt, 270-276; Crabb, Antizzo, and Saredidine, 40; Franck and Weisband, 6-7; Gregorian, 95.

mechanism on committees, election procedures of committee and subcommittee chairmen, the rapid increase of the number of subcommittees, etc. Most importantly, many congressional committees or subcommittees desired to take a role in foreign policy making process, simply because “it gets press coverage and it interests the voters.”¹³⁵ Committee membership system was changed to turnover system, in which younger members of Congress who were harder to control by the leadership, started to get in more. As Franck and Weisband note, “the executive can no longer keep Congress on a short leash by coopting a few Arthur Vandenberges. The president is now dealing with 535 members, most of them reasonably autonomous.”¹³⁶ This was a visible case during President Ford’s relations with Congress during Turkish arms embargo battle, which would be expressed in more detail in Chapter 3. On the other hand; Hinckley draws attention to the dilemma that was caused by two reform strands in Congress. Accordingly, one set of reforms democratizes the policy making process and thus strengthens the individual congressmen, other sets of reforms decentralized and thus diminished the influence of the Congress by diffusing power. Therefore, congressional activity increased, but the coherent action and making policy had decreased.¹³⁷ The last contribution to the diffusion of power is the fact that younger, anti-war, liberal democrat candidates had moved into the Congress with the Vietnam War, Gregorian thinks that, “these mavericks had a very real political stake in opposing the administration and its allies on the Hill.”¹³⁸ Overall, newly elected members of the Congress remarkably affected the general trend towards the diffusion of power. The second internal change in the Congress was the *Expansion of Staff*. According to figures, the average number of staff per a Senator

¹³⁵ Franck and Weisband, 7.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Hinckley, 15.

¹³⁸ Gregorian, 94.

was thirty-four in 1969, ten years later, it jumped to sixty-eight.¹³⁹ Change was not only in quantity but also in quality. These new recruits were highly educated experts. It is a common observation that the Congress established a counter-State Department for itself by recruiting foreign policy specialists to related committees, while these newly recruited aides were also feeding individual members of Congress who previously lacked expertise in international relations.¹⁴⁰ Lastly, the relevant period witnessed *an increased participation by the House* in foreign policy making. This was actually an outcome of the aforementioned internal factors. In addition, growing interdependence of domestic and foreign affairs pushed for more roles by the House in Foreign Policy making. Supporters of a greater role for the House argue that the House elections taking place every two years could provide a kind of plebiscite for the foreign policy of the country.¹⁴¹

As external factors on the Congress for rising assertiveness in foreign policy, Crabb and Holt identify *Public Opinion, Lobbying by interest groups and foreign governments and lobbying by the executive Branch*. Regarding *the Public Opinion*, arguments were similar to those defending an increased role for the House, which is that the Congress itself is the most able body of the government to represent the will of the public. This perspective provided the Congress with an incentive to assert more roles in foreign policy making. On the other hand, other aforementioned external factors were especially influential on the Congress during its assertive outlook around the decision of the Turkish arms embargo. In this regard, these factors would be taken into consideration specifically through efforts of the Greek Lobby during the embargo crisis.

¹³⁹ Crabb and Holt, 272.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 272; Franck and Weisband, 6.

¹⁴¹ Crabb and Holt, 273.

Frankly speaking, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the Greek lobby in the United States was the force behind the decision of the embargo on Turkey. Naturally, it was the force that President Ford had to tackle for half of his short term. The Greek lobbying effort was mainly overseen by three organizations, the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, the AHEPA, and the American Hellenic Institute – Public Affairs Committee (AHI-PAC). The Greek Orthodox Church, first of all, was the major force among them. It mainly originated from the fact that it was directly in touch with the Greek population across the country. In the beginning, the Church had mainly concentrated on humanitarian relief, had raised funds for Greek Cypriot refugees. By the end of 1974, for example, the church had raised approximately one million dollars in cash, in addition to non-cash relief donations. This humanitarian effort had easily evolved into lobbying, as Watanabe observes, “It was not uncommon to hear speeches emanating from pulpits reminding congregations to support friendly members of Congress and condemning those who acted against the Turkish arms embargo.”¹⁴² During church services, for example, petitions urging the Congress to support the aid cutoff were circulated among participants.¹⁴³ In addition to Greek Orthodox Church, AHEPA had assumed the flagship of the Greek lobbying effort, which had campaigned “all out” for the embargo, as President Ford observes.¹⁴⁴ President Ford had close relations with the AHEPA from his days in Congress, and even Kissinger remembers that President Ford was quite relaxed about his old friends in the AHEPA and assured him that they

¹⁴² Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and Foreign Policy*, 140.

¹⁴³ Bolukbasi, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, 214.

¹⁴⁴ “Ford, Republican Congressional Leadership” July 10, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553157.pdf>

had never been involved in foreign policy issues.¹⁴⁵ However, they would soon prove the reverse. The AHEPA's foundation goes back to 1922, thus it had established a well organized and running internal structure in fifty years. 125.000 active members around the country with extensive resources and well established network had made AHEPA very influential in Washington, where it set up its headquarters. The organization had especially played an important role in communicating information to Congress and to the public about the Cyprus question. The organization had well-established contacts in Capitol Hill, and exhibited close working relationship with embargo proponents in Congress. Until July the 1975 vote in the Senate, Secretary Kissinger had received the AHEPA delegation four times, in order to shake the willingness of the organization.¹⁴⁶ Lastly, AHI-PAC, which was founded during the crisis of 1974, is the legal lobbying company of Greek-Americans. It had greatly professionalized the lobbying effort on Congress, thanks to its founder Eugene Rossides, who had worked under the Nixon administration as assistant secretary of the treasury.

Franck and Weisband, to some degree, underestimate the effect of the Greek Lobby on individual members of Congress for the embargo decision. According to them, there were mainly two motivations among majority of members in the Congress, which were "deep distrust of the presidency" and "a determination to 'get a handle' on foreign policy."¹⁴⁷ In this manner, they reject any profound commitment of some representatives to ethnic interests. It is true that the two motivations mentioned before were particularly influential on Capitol Hill in that time, in Dumbrell's words, "everywhere loomed the memory of Vietnam and the

¹⁴⁵ Kissinger, 233.

¹⁴⁶ Watanabe, 144.

¹⁴⁷ Franck and Weisband, 35.

remembered nightmare of uncontrolled Presidential discretion.”¹⁴⁸ Yet still, the influence of ethnicity in Congress is undeniable and an obvious truth in the decision of the Turkish arms embargo. Representative (D-IN) John Brademas, for example, who introduced the embargo bill in the House, was the son of a Greek immigrant father. The other prominent leader, Representative (D-MD) Paul Sarbanes was the first generation of a Greek family who was born in America. As stated in the introduction, Brademas and Sarbanes, together with Representative (D-PA) Gus Yatron, and Representative (D-FL) Bafalis, were known and called in the Congress as “the Greek Mafia”.¹⁴⁹ These legislators were representing about two-to-three million American Greeks.¹⁵⁰ President Ford adds Representative Rosenthal to the list of the leaders of the embargo effort in the House.¹⁵¹ Altogether, Greek-American legislators had a “fervent” desire to punish Turkish aggression on Cypriot Greeks.¹⁵² On the other hand, Greek-American members, or the Greek lobby in Congress, had forged an alliance with other ethnic lobbies and created a common ground. During the arms embargo battle, Greek-American members of Congress bought the support of the Jewish lobby in exchange for Greek lobby support for matters favoring Israel in United States’ relations with Arab states.¹⁵³

In brief, the Greek ethnic lobby had mobilized Congress to impose the embargo on Turkey. In this instance, we see the creation of policy by an ethnic Congress, rather than its typical role of influencing existing policy. Such ability had created great disturbance in the executive branch. Secretary Kissinger observes that, “we are in the position that three million Israelis and three million Greeks are

¹⁴⁸ Dumbrell, 125.

¹⁴⁹ Franck and Weisband, 36.

¹⁵⁰ Crabb, Antizzo, and Saredidine, 147.

¹⁵¹ Ford, 137.

¹⁵² Warburg, 192.

¹⁵³ Franck and Weisband, 193.

running American foreign policy.”¹⁵⁴ In the meanwhile, there was no Turkish ethnic lobby worth mentioning in American politics. American-Turkish society in those times counted around two hundred thousand, which was poorly organized and substantially ineffective around Capitol Hill.¹⁵⁵ Since there was no balancing Turkish ethnic lobby, the Greek American lobby was almost unchallenged by any equivalent Turkish American lobby.¹⁵⁶ Thus, Turkish interests were mostly supported by the executive itself in Washington. The Cyprus case was one but would not be the only case in which even the President himself lobbied on behalf of Turkish interests.

¹⁵⁴ “Ford, Kissinger” March 26, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553003.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ Crabb, Antizzo, and Sarieddine, 147.

¹⁵⁶ Dumbrell, 155.

CHAPTER III

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND THE TURKISH ARMS EMBARGO

“As President, within the limits of basic principles, my motto toward the Congress is communication, conciliation, compromise, and cooperation ... This Congress, unless it has changed, I am confident, will be my working partner as well as my most constructive critic. I am not asking for conformity ... I do not want a honeymoon with you. I want a good marriage.”¹⁵⁷

President Ford’s optimistic attitude towards Congress would soon come to be no more than being a Pollyanna. In foreign policy, Ford had experienced neither a honeymoon nor even a troubled marriage with the Congress during his short twenty-nine months term. Congress had changed since he was one of the leaders of the House. Above all reasons, he was a nonelected Republican president and Democrats had a strong majority in Congress. Moreover, his predecessors, Nixon swept away all support and trust in the office, and Ford had to revive it. The Vietnam War and the

¹⁵⁷ Gerald Ford, “6 - Address to a Joint Session of the Congress, August 12, 1974” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4694>

Watergate scandal created serious polarization among the American public and he needed to re-unite the country. Ford himself admits extraordinary circumstances which were never experienced before and he acted accordingly.¹⁵⁸ He would act in his genuine and unique way, since he was “a Ford, not a Lincoln”, like he said when he assumed the vice presidency. Kissinger thinks that he was “at peace with himself and argues that it was precisely what the nation needed for healing its divisions.”¹⁵⁹ Overall, American domestic politics heaved a sigh of relief with the new President. On the other hand, the real challenge for Ford lied in the foreign policy arena. When we put Nixon’s domestic scandals aside, he was a relatively active and successful president in foreign policy. He brought the peace in Vietnam, he constructed good relations with communist China and Détente with the Soviet Union had reached its peak during his term. Kissinger admits Ford’s difficulty in foreign policy by saying that “no new president since Truman inherited quite the same gamut of foreign policy challenges in his first weeks in office”, in addition to a domestic environment that was the most “uncongenial” since President Truman¹⁶⁰ Ford had definitely one of the least supportive circumstances among other presidents to create his own foreign policy agenda.¹⁶¹ One cannot argue that he did not try. If numbers matter, for example, Ford met with more heads of state/government than any previous president over a two year period.¹⁶² This is mainly because Nixon left some serious foreign policy issues on Ford’s shoulders. The Cyprus issue was just one of them. It is particularly important since Cyprus would soon be the first battleground between the

¹⁵⁸ Ford, 40.

¹⁵⁹ Kissinger, 25.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 33.

¹⁶¹ Hinckley, 40.

¹⁶² “Second Debate: Ford Meetings with Foreign Leaders”, *White House Special Files Unit Presidential Files, 1974-77*. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Harbor, Michigan.
<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/whspecialfiles.asp>

President and Congress. Real combatants of the war were in cease-fire and conducting peace talks when Ford took office. However, on the fourth day of Ford's presidency, things had gone worse with the second phase of Turkish military intervention on Cyprus, which could soon escalate into a catastrophic war between two NATO allies of Turkey and Greece.

As it is stated previously, the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 was the third of similar crises after 1964 and 1967. In all events, ethnic clashes, or to put it more clearly, ethnic assaults on Turkish minority communities, had paved the way to the crisis. As undersecretary of State George Ball agrees, the United States recognized the fact that the Greek Cypriot majority had largely created the problem by terrorizing Turkish Cypriots.¹⁶³ In both crises, the United States was able to prevent ethnic conflict escalating into broader conflict between the two NATO countries. Back in 1964, Turkish military intervention was almost imminent, which was precluded only by the letter of President Johnson, which is defined later as "the most brutal diplomatic note ever seen"¹⁶⁴ and "a startling specimen of diplomatic kill."¹⁶⁵ Future Prime Minister Ecevit, who would make the decision of intervention in 1974, writes that the Johnson Letter violated Turkey's sovereignty since it demanded Turkey to seek the consent of the United States first before taking any foreign policy action.¹⁶⁶ The crisis of 1967 was a bit different in terms of US involvement. The crisis was similarly caused by attacks against two Turkish villages by the Cypriot National Guard, which was led by mainland-originated Greek officers.¹⁶⁷ This time, the context was more favorable for Turkey than Greece since a military junta staged a coup and seized power in

¹⁶³ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 June 1964. Qtd. In Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, 55.

¹⁶⁴ George W. Ball, *The Past has Another Pattern*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 350.

¹⁶⁵ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, 36.

¹⁶⁶ Bülent Ecevit, "Mektuplar", *Akis*, January 22, 1966., 8-9.

¹⁶⁷ Stearns, 13.

mainland Greece in April 1967. The Greek Junta lacked international support for their newly established regime. There was diplomatic pressure on the regime. After the coup, for example, the United States had levied an embargo on heavy arms transfers to Greece, and it was still trying to keep its distance from the Greek Junta.¹⁶⁸ The United States acted in coordination with the Great Britain and Canada for peaceful resolution of the conflict on the island, and these three countries developed a settlement formula, which was closer to Turkish demands.¹⁶⁹ During this crisis, President Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance as its special envoy for mediation. The Vance mission conducted shuttle diplomacy and averted broader conflict between Greece and Turkey on 30 November, 1967.¹⁷⁰

When the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 erupted, Greece had been ruled by a military junta, a bunch of right-wing young colonels since April 1967. Thereafter, the coup produced a counter-coup, and then the counter-coup produced a coup-led liberalization effort, and this effort finalized with another coup led by Brigadier Ioannidis. This one-sentence summary of what had been happening in Greece since 1967 is irrelevant. What is relevant for this thesis is the ideology of the Ioannides regime and its relations with Makarios, the president of Cyprus. Ioannides, above all, was a Greek nationalist, whose ultimate ideal was to create *Enosis*, which means the unification of Cyprus, where Greece has a historical claim, with mainland Greece. The latest attempt towards *Enosis* by a nationalist government was the occupation of western Anatolia after World War I, which ignited the Turkish War of Independence. Therefore, bitter memories of *Enosis* were still powerful in Turkish public opinion. In the meanwhile, Makarios had become alienated from the Junta day

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ *The Times*, November 29, 1967. Qtd in Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası*, 24.

¹⁷⁰ *New York Times*, December 1, 1967.

by day. As Kissinger thinks, Makarios, “the wily archbishop”¹⁷¹ was the man who preferred to be the president of independent Cyprus rather than being the governor of a Greek province. In return, he was perceived as “an obstacle to fulfilling Greece’s national mission” by the Junta.¹⁷² This alienation was especially accelerated when Makarios heard about the secret talks of the Greek junta with the Turkish side to find a political settlement to the Cyprus problem. As Greek President Caramanlis explained in his interviews with *Le Monde* and *The Times* on 29 November 1968, he said some concessions should be granted to Turkey, like a military base or single but small Turkish enclave that has an exit to the sea on the island.¹⁷³ The Greek Junta thought that the solution, which the Junta desperately needed to increase its popularity both in the country and abroad, could not be reached without compromise.¹⁷⁴ Colonels admitted that unification with Greece should be on the grounds that the settlement was acceptable both by the United States and Turkey.¹⁷⁵ Makarios on the other hand, rejected any concession. Well aware of this perception in Athens, Makarios had looked for new allies in the non-aligned movement while in domestic politics, he was bargaining for the support of the Cypriot communist party AKEL.¹⁷⁶ In order to secure its position, he bought arms from Czechoslovakia for his presidential guard and Greek police, but he in return faced with great pressure from Greece, Turkey, and the United States.¹⁷⁷ The Greek junta organized a series of assassination attempts, but Makarios was able to survive on each occasion. Especially after Makarios’ landslide election victory in 1968, several terrorist

¹⁷¹ Kissinger, 197.

¹⁷² Ibid., 197.

¹⁷³ Uslu, 105.

¹⁷⁴ Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, 136.

¹⁷⁵ Uslu, 106.

¹⁷⁶ Kissinger, 198-199.

¹⁷⁷ Oberling, 133; Kissinger, 199; Uslu, 107.

organizations were established, which aimed to overthrow Makarios and fight for Enosis.¹⁷⁸ By 1974, Greece had complete control on the Greek-Cypriot National Guards and EOKA-B, the aggressive terrorist organization that was behind most of attacks on the Turkish Cypriot communities on the Island. Ioannides, the leader of the Greek junta since November 1973, was an extremist pro-Enosis. His project, what he once explained to Makarios in 1964, was “to attack the Turkish Cypriots suddenly, everywhere on the island, and eliminate them to the last one.”¹⁷⁹

Years of tension between the Greek junta and Makarios had reached its peak in July 1974. Makarios, so uncomfortable with the mainland Greek influence on the National Guards, took two radical steps to curb Greece influence on the island. Firstly, he reduced the length of military service from two years to 14 months, which would reduce the size of Greek-controlled National Guards. Secondly, he sent a provocative letter to the president of Greece, “accusing the junta of masterminding the campaign of terror” on the island, while he also leaked it to the press that published it on July 6, 1974.¹⁸⁰ In this letter, Makarios argued that “cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activity of EOKA-B terrorist organization”, thus, at the end of the letter, he demanded that all of 650 Greek officers in the National Guard be recalled by the junta.¹⁸¹ Greek junta not surprisingly rejected all the demands and the letter further antagonized the junta and it ordered the National Guard to seize the power and kill Makarios. On 15 July, 1974, the coup forces stepped into action. National Guard forces attacked the presidential palace, from which Makarios had been able to sneak out and escape. With initial

¹⁷⁸ Bolukbasi, 168.

¹⁷⁹ *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1974. Oberling, 155.

¹⁸⁰ Bolukbasi, 170.

¹⁸¹ Oberling, 156.

success, Nikos Sampson, who was “a killer, a most unattractive guy for Turkey and a passionate advocate of the Enosis”¹⁸², was declared as president.

3.1 The Contradictory Reactions of the Administration and Congress Against the Turkish Intervention of 1974

Stearns properly argues that the United States regional policy of Mediterranean since Truman was the first of many instances that the United States neglected the national objectives of Turkey and Greece under the illusion of the global objectives the United States had assigned to them.¹⁸³ Since the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and through repetitive and identical crises, the United States had only acted to prevent bigger confrontation between two NATO allies. Therefore, its mediation efforts were limited and futile. Kissinger admits the difficulty for the United States of mediating on such an ethnic problem, where “hallowed American principles almost inevitably clash.”¹⁸⁴ But more importantly, all American initiatives for the problem were like firefighting operations that only aimed to find comprehensive solutions for underlying differences on a minor scale.¹⁸⁵ The region was “quiescent” for the United States, since it was engaged in other serious problems in Indochina, the Middle East and India/Pakistan.¹⁸⁶ In short, the United States defended the status quo as much as it could to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece. And if the status quo could change by acceptance of

¹⁸² *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 91.

¹⁸³ Stearns, 27.

¹⁸⁴ Kissinger, 195.

¹⁸⁵ Stearns, 11.

¹⁸⁶ Kissinger, 201.

two countries, it was acceptable too. The United States was indifferent to the Enosis plan of Greece or the partition plan of Turkey, since the island would be controlled by one or two NATO countries in each case. The worst scenario for the United States would be a Soviet interference in the problem. Back in 1965, President Johnson warned Prime Minister İsmet İnönü about the issue and emphasized that NATO would not defend Turkey if Soviets interfered as a result of Turkish intervention in Cyprus.¹⁸⁷ This point on the letter was actually the reason for regarding the Johnson Letter as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey realized that the United States and NATO would leave Turkey alone if it acted directly and only in line with the super power's national interests. Thus, one of the immediate effects of the Johnson Letter was the demarche of Turkey for rapprochement with the Soviet Union and communist countries in the region. While the Soviets were defending the independent and thus non-NATO status of Cyprus, a series of bilateral official visits after 1965 had resulted in the Soviet Union leaning gradually towards the two-community solution advocated by Turkey.¹⁸⁸ It should be noted that only the Soviet Union had backed Turkey in the 1974 crisis about intervention, since it would cause a split in the western alliance and it would also humiliate the anti-communist Greek junta. The Soviets even offered help to restore Makarios to the power.¹⁸⁹

On the day of the coup, Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) was formed from different agencies to manage the crisis. WSAG was sure that Turkey would never accept Enosis, turning Cyprus into a province of Greece. Thus, in the very first meeting, WSAG searched for options to prevent the crisis from spreading and minimize the chance of outside intervention by Turkey. Kissinger entitles this

¹⁸⁷ Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri*, 268.

¹⁸⁸ Oberling, 123.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 162.

effort as low-key diplomacy and honest-broker¹⁹⁰, which means that the United States had tried to minimize its involvement while emphasizing its concerns of escalation clearly to all relevant parties.¹⁹¹ Kissinger sent undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco to London, where he met with British Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit. It is important to note that PM Ecevit rejected the offer of trilateral talks but he rather preferred to meet with Sisco separately. While he was arguing that the United States was not a guarantor of power, he actually did not want Soviets to think that the intervention was a NATO plan.¹⁹² The Soviets were ready to consent to limited military opposition as long as it preserved the independent status of Cyprus. During the week between the Greek coup and Turkish intervention, Turkish officials repeatedly assured the Soviet ambassador about the fact that Turkey's intention was not annexation or partition; furthermore, Turkey would respect the independence of the island as well as its non-alignment.¹⁹³ After the London meeting, Sisco went to Ankara twice and to Athens once, nevertheless he was unable to prevent the Turkish military landing on Cyprus. Ecevit made four demands to cancel the intervention. Sisco negotiated these demands with Ioannides and other Greek officials. However, he failed to convince Greeks on any of the demands. As Sisco observes that "no matter what is done in this situation, the Turks see it as an ideal time to achieve by military intervention a longstanding objective, namely, double enosis."¹⁹⁴ Kissinger, as a realist observer, accepted the favorable condition of Ecevit with these words: "Nixon was on the verge of impeachment, the Cyprus regime was not recognized by any state, and the Greek Junta was an

¹⁹⁰ Kissinger, 227.

¹⁹¹ *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 80.

¹⁹² Bolukbasi, 191.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁹⁴ *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 99.

international pariah. Ecevit found the temptation provided by this combination of circumstances impossible to resist.”¹⁹⁵

The cut-off complex had become an issue since the first day of the Turkish intervention. Secretary Kissinger was the first American official who drew attention to American arms shipments in the crisis. On July 20, Kissinger argues that two countries of Greece and Turkey would not fight with American weapons; and even if they started the war with American products, the United States would not provide them with an open supply line.¹⁹⁶ It is a clear expression of the balanced attitude of the administration. What really matters on this remark is Kissinger’s neutral approach to two countries in order to get some concessions for the solution. On the other hand, the only exception to this balanced and cautious attitude of administration was Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. For example, on July 21, 1974, the *Washington Post* argues that the Defense Department supported cutting-off military aid to Greece, which was leaked by the Defense Department as Kissinger implies.¹⁹⁷ Similarly, after the second Turkish intervention in August, Secretary Schlesinger this time told the press that his department was inspecting U.S. military aid to Turkey in view of Cyprus events.¹⁹⁸ He implies that Turkish military intervention had exceeded what “any of its friends or sympathizers would have anticipated and is prepared to accept.”¹⁹⁹ Disturbing comments made to the press by Schlesinger, or one could think of it as leaking to the press, had occurred more than once. Secretary Schlesinger’s frequently arrogant and aloof manner had annoyed President Ford on several occasions until President Ford got rid of him after fifteen

¹⁹⁵ Kissinger, 214.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹⁹⁷ *Washington Post*, July 21, 1974. *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 110.

¹⁹⁸ *The New York Times*, August 19, 1974, 1, 5. Franck and Weisband, 36.

¹⁹⁹ Franck and Weisband, 36.

months in office.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, the Congress' reactions to the events around the crisis were more impetuous and ill-considered. This is especially seen in incoherent actions of the Congress starting with the coup in Cyprus. President Ford recognizes it in that the Congress acted against Turkey in a hurry, instead of blaming the former Greek government, the military junta, for starting the incident. Accordingly, the Congress acted because they "simply wanted to punish the Turks."²⁰¹ After the first intervention and the collapse of the Greek military junta, congressional outlook drastically changed. Restoration of democracy in Greece was the turning point in the course of events leading to aid cut-off. While the administration had been criticized for failing to pressure Greece since the coup, Kissinger remembers, "suddenly within the space of a few days", they had been attacked for failing to force Turkey in order to assist democratic Greece.²⁰² What Kissinger did not take into consideration was that there was no Turkish pressure group who insisted on punishing Greece, similar to the Greek lobby that put the pressure after democracy was restored. "Greece did have a volatile and extraordinarily effective domestic constituency demanding sanctions against Turkey, after democracy was restored in Greece."²⁰³

The administration's efforts to prevent the Cyprus crisis have always been seen as insufficient by assertive congressmen. It was actually a great opportunity for Congress, since it had always been criticized by the administration for falling short of a quick and accurate reaction to international crises. This time, Congress found its reason for blaming administration for a failure to act. In 1976, for example, a Senate

²⁰⁰ Ford, 320-324.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 137.

²⁰² Kissinger, 225.

²⁰³ Ibid, 226.

select committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities emphasizes that there is a difference between an intelligence failure and policy failure.²⁰⁴ In this manner, while the report was admitting that the intelligence community anticipated a possible Turkish intervention of Cyprus; the administration did not take effective measures to prevent the intervention.²⁰⁵ In this report, one can observe the tendency of the Senate to blame the administration policy regarding the Cyprus Crisis. The report was quoting from the CIA's one post-mortem, "An Examination of the intelligence Community's Performance Before and During the Cyprus Crisis of 1974".²⁰⁶ However, the report was not referring to the other part of CIA's post-mortem which argues that the CIA had failed to report any significant crisis that American policymakers needed to focus on. In the region, the only tension between Turkey and Greece on those days was caused by Aegean Sea territorial dispute due to oil exploration undertaken by Greeks. Actually, even the DCI had been surprised by the coup, and ordered an examination, which the Senate select committee quoted from selectively for its own purposes. Kissinger criticizes this tendency too. In a large bureaucratic government, finding some evidence is almost always possible since bureaucracy tries to cover all possibilities. According to him, "what really matters is context"²⁰⁷, which was preoccupied with other issues that are both domestic and international. This Senate select committee is just one example of congressional skepticism about the administration's efforts. Kissinger was personally not very much liked by congressmen. He knew that and he was also aware of the fact

²⁰⁴ U.S. Senate, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities*. Rep. No: 94 – 755, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. April 26, 1976., 443.
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_I.pdf

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 269.

²⁰⁶ Richard, W. Shryock. *The Intelligence Community Post-Mortem Program, 1973-1975. (Part of FOIA request) Collection: President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War*
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1977-09-01.pdf>

²⁰⁷ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 204.

that his anti-embargo attitude was used against him politically.²⁰⁸ He was already receiving harsh criticism for détente politics, trade with the Soviet Union, and he was actually a reminder of the old era of administration abuses; all of which had enormously reduced his influence on Congress.²⁰⁹ Senator Thomas Eagleton, for example, told about him during the debate over the Turkish embargo saying that “we are not intervening in the private life or private preserve of Secretary Kissinger by asserting ourselves in foreign policy.”²¹⁰ Especially in the period between July and September, criticism towards the administration’s failure had focused on four periods. At first, the administration failed to foresee the coup in Cyprus. Secondly, the administration did not strongly condemn the coup. Thirdly and most regrettably, the administration could not prevent Turkish intervention. Lastly, the administration did not sufficiently support the newly founded democratic regime in Greece. These examination processes provided “the major impetus for the spirited legislative effort that followed.”²¹¹

Since the beginning of the embargo debate, the Ford administration objected to the arms embargo on Turkey in three aspects. First and most substantial of all, the United States would definitely lose leverage in Ankara for peaceful resolution of the dispute. This aspect comes out from the prediction that an embargo decision would create an outrage in Turkey, since its key ally uses bilateral security arrangements as a matter of blackmail.²¹² Accordingly, as soon as the embargo was enacted, Turkey would not be open to concessions mediated by the United States. Kissinger identifies this as the flexibility, and argues that Turks would not negotiate “under the gun of

²⁰⁸ *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 210.

²⁰⁹ Campney, *Turkey and the United States: arms embargo Period*, 78.

²¹⁰ Qtd. In Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, 40.

²¹¹ Watanabe, 87.

²¹² Kissinger, 236.

what, in Ankara, would be perceived as an anti-Turkish law.”²¹³ On the other side of the negotiations, Greeks were pleased to have an anti-Turkish sentiment in Congress. After the halls of the Congress started to echo with the cutoff debate, Greece slowed the negotiation process down and waited to see the consequence of intense pressure on Turks. As Franck and Weisband argue, Greece did not see any reason to rush into concessions before the embargo took effect, while Turkey reacted to the embargo decision as public humiliation, “without being in the least mollified by the hard-won grace period.”²¹⁴ The same reasoning continued after the embargo, since Greeks would want to see the harsh outcomes of the embargo for the Turkish army in the upcoming years. Therefore, negotiations reached a stalemate as a result of the American arms embargo on Turkey. This is what Kissinger once predicted and explained to the members of Congress: “the only way the situation can be worked out is American influence on Turks... If we cut beforehand, we get nothing for it, and the Greeks get nothing for it.”²¹⁵ Secondly, the administration repeatedly called out that the national security concern of the United States requires Turkey to be strong in the region. By bordering on the Middle East, the Soviet Union, Europe and Central Asia, Turkey was indispensable to American policy in each of these areas.²¹⁶ This interpretation comes out with the fact that Turkey had been a staunch ally of NATO since its participation while it was providing the third largest standing army to the alliance, with its precious geographical position. Turkey was a vital partner in near eastern security context of NATO by any measure. This interpretation was repeatedly shared with the Congress both before the embargo decision and after to

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Franck and Weisband, 42.

²¹⁵ “Ford, Bipartisan congressional Leadership” September 12, 1974. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552782.pdf>

²¹⁶ Kissinger, 225.

ease the embargo terms. However, Congress was not concerned about the argument as President Ford emphasizes, which is “Turkish withdrawal from the NATO alliance – something the Turks were threatening at the time – would imperil the security of the entire eastern Mediterranean.”²¹⁷ Even if Turkey didn’t withdraw from the Alliance, it would still have been catastrophic for NATO’s south eastern flank, since the effectiveness of Turkish Armed Forces would deteriorate seriously. This is mainly because Turkey depended overwhelmingly on U.S. arms import. According to one CIA report, the United States had supplied over 90 percent of Turkey’s military equipment. Moreover, all of Turkey’s field artillery and personnel carriers, 95 percent of its medium tanks and 85 percent of its aircraft were coming from the United States at the time of Cyprus intervention. The report estimates that the impact of a cutoff would be felt seriously in three months in the Air Force, and almost immediately in the Army, this altogether undermined the combat readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces.²¹⁸ President Ford had also acknowledged this damaging effect of the embargo by saying it will affect not only the western security but the strategic situation in the Middle East.²¹⁹ President Ford deliberately played the Middle East card on his statement because during the Yom Kippur war, the United States had been able to observe the Arab countries’ movements through its own military installations in Turkey. This issue was actually the third point of the administration while dealing with the Congress. Because of bilateral security arrangements between the two countries, Turkey hosted twenty six US military installations around the country with its eight thousand U.S. personnel. Some of them were irreplaceable electronic stations which made it possible to monitor Soviet

²¹⁷ Ford, 137.

²¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 217.

²¹⁹ “Statement by the President” February 5, 1975. *White House Press Releases, 1974-77*. Box 7. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Missile and Space activities from Turkish territories.²²⁰ Thus, Turkish threat of closing down US military bases would have a terrifying outcome, about which even the Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, who was the closest administration member to the embargo decision, was concerned about. Thus, while President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were criticizing Congress's decision-making for not taking the US's vital interests into consideration, one of their prominent concerns was the US military installations and deteriorating conditions of US personnel in Turkey. In brief, throughout the Turkish embargo fight with Congress, the Ford administration had constructed its opposition around three points. The first one was the depletion of negotiation flexibility; the second one was jeopardizing the US national security in the region, and the final point was the fate of its military installations and the deteriorating conditions of US military personnel in Turkey.

3.2 Activities of the Administration before the Congress Decision

Immediately after Ford took office, his struggle with Congress began. It is the fact that the Turkish arms embargo was not the single issue that the Congress asserted itself aggressively. However, President Ford identifies the congressional response to the Turkish intervention of Cyprus as one of two equally disturbing challenges he received from the Congress.²²¹ The other one was a budget cut of 5.1 billion dollars by a Senate subcommittee, and decreasing the military and economic

²²⁰ Kissinger, 225.

²²¹ Ford, 137.

aid to South Vietnam by 1 billion. The fiercest period of the legislative battle over the Turkish embargo had lasted for more than thirteen months starting from September 1974 until when it was partially lifted in October 1975. Nevertheless, the Ford administration had continued to confront Congress for the total removal of arms restrictions, but his presidency did not last long enough to see the accomplishment.

The first legislative action was on September 19, when the Senate adopted (64-27) a sense of the Senate amendment of Senators Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) and Adlai Stevenson (D-IL) to the export-import bank bill (S.3917), stating that the president should declare Turkey ineligible for any U.S. foreign aid because of its activities in Cyprus.²²² Although it was not binding, it is still important because it exhibits the sentiment in the Senate about the issue. Attempting to amend the continuing appropriations legislation was the primary vehicle for embargo proponents in the early fall of 1974.²²³ Within a week, on September 24, the House showed its sentiment more aggressively than the Senate with a strong vote of 374-26 by adopting Ben Rosenthal (D-NY) and Pierre du Pont (R-DE) amendment to the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 1975 bill.²²⁴ The amendment calls for an immediate ban on all military sales and grants to Turkey “until the President certifies to Congress that ‘substantial progress’ has been made regarding military forces on Cyprus.”²²⁵ On September 30, the Senate adopted (57-20) language similar to the Eagleton amendment in the continuing appropriations bill. In addition to the wording of ‘substantial progress’, this amendment also forbade the use of funds for military assistance to Turkey until the president certifies that government of Turkey is

²²² S. 3917, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)

²²³ Watanabe, 107.

²²⁴ H.J. Res. 1131, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)

²²⁵ U.S., *Congressional Record*, September 24, 1974, 120:32430.

compliant with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act. Thus, Congress reminds us of the related article of the 1961 act that prohibits the use of American military assistance other than in self-defense or internal security. Two days after the vote in the House, on September 26, President Ford hosted a breakfast with bipartisan congressional leadership in the White House.²²⁶ In this meeting, President Ford implies the importance of weakening the language of Eagleton and Rosenthal-Du Pont amendments by replacing ‘good faith efforts by Turkey’ with ‘substantial progress. Because, the latter wording gives the Greeks the opportunity to argue there isn’t any progress at any time. In the version of the bill that was produced by the conference committee which is in principle selected by leadership, “aid to Turkey could continue if the President would stipulate that ‘good-faith efforts’ were being made to reach a solution.”²²⁷ Unfortunately, The House rejected (69-291) House-Senate conference amendment to H.J. 1131 to insert ‘good-faith efforts’ wording on October 7. In the following days, masterminds of the embargo, Representatives Sarbanes, Rosenthal and Brademas met with Senator Eagleton to write identical amendments in order to prevent the interference from the leadership with conference amendments. Franck and Weisband are right while saying that it was a rare moment. “So passionate was the revolutionary camaraderie, that the unmemorable tribal rivalries between the chambers, the immutable rules against such an execrable practice as coordination, were temporarily suspended.”²²⁸ On the same day as the House voting, during the meeting with the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, President Ford mentions the

²²⁶ “Ford, Bipartisan congressional Leadership” September 26, 1974. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552805.pdf>

²²⁷ Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, 40.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

‘good faith effort’ offer he made and made clear that he would veto the continuing appropriations resolution if his offer was turned down and the resolution had an Eagleton-type agreement.²²⁹ He did veto the H. J. Res. 1131 on October 14, after the latest legislative attempt by Senator Mansfield (D) to delay the termination of military aid until 15 December 1974 was defeated by the House (171-187) on October 11. The House dragged out the strife with an attempt to override President Ford’s veto, but it was defeated. (223-135) President Ford sent a letter with his veto to the House of Representatives. In this letter, while the President was emphasizing his public objection and unanimous opposition of bipartisan leadership of both houses of Congress, he also summarized reasons why the administration objected to such a legislative action:

An arms cut-off to Turkey could mean the indefinite postponement of meaningful negotiations. Instead of strengthening America's ability to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute, it would lessen our influence on all the parties concerned. It would as well imperil our relationships with our Turkish ally and weaken us in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. It directly jeopardizes the NATO alliance.... Most tragic of all, an arms cut-off would not help Greece or the Greek Cypriot people who have suffered so tragically over the past several months ... And it is they who have the most to lose from continued deadlock.²³⁰

On October 16, The House adopted a new resolution (287-30) which mandated a complete cutoff of military aid to Turkey if any of the United States equipment given to Turkey was used in the Cyprus operation or shipped after the intervention.²³¹ The Senate followed the House to adopt the H. J. Res. 1163 (45-23) on the same day. On October 17, President Ford vetoed the resolution for the second time because of the Turkish embargo measure in it. The attempt to override the Presidential veto was

²²⁹ “Ford, Kissinger, Archbishop Iakovos” October 7, 1974. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552819.pdf>

²³⁰ Gerald Ford, “145 - Veto of Continuing Appropriations Resolution, October 14, 1974” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

²³¹ H.J. Res. 1163, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)

defeated (161-83) by only two votes this time. Because of the Turkish embargo provision, whole foreign assistance programs of different departments of the government were at risk of insufficient funding. On the same day of the veto, a third continuing appropriations bill had passed both houses, which included the compromise of postponement of the ban on military aid to Turkey until December 10, 1974. The embargo would be imposed immediately if Turkey reinforced its forces on the island with American supplies, or increased its troops in Cyprus. Finally, on October 18, President Ford could not resist further since he could not take the chance of an override of his veto, which seemed highly probable if he vetoed again. He agreed to sign the bill, “very, very reluctantly”²³², despite Kissinger’s objection.²³³ President Ford thought that between October 18 and December 10, “Congress would come to its senses and reverse its foolish ban on aid to a valued ally.”²³⁴ He publicly declared the Congress decision as “ill-advised and dangerous.” In addition to familiar arguments about administration position regarding military aid to Turkey, President Ford’s statement pointed out Congress and indicated that those who overrode the congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for a failure in resolving the Cyprus dispute.²³⁵

The final legislative initiative came at the beginning of December with amendments to the Foreign Aid authorization bill for fiscal year 1975. While embargo supporters sought to make embargo more permanent by amending the foreign aid bill, it was the last chance for the administration to reverse the aid cut-

²³² Watanabe, 108.

²³³ H.J. Res. 1167 (P.L. 93 – 448), 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)

²³⁴ Ford, 199.

²³⁵ Gerald Ford, “164 - Statement on Signing the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, October 18, 1974” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

off.²³⁶ The Senate adopted (55-36) Senator Hubert Humphrey's (D) amendment, which gave the president a chance of delay until February 1975. Senator Humphrey, "the prestigious floor manager", believes that Turks were not amenable to any kind of pressure Congress exerted on them.²³⁷ However, the House refused to join the Senate, insisted on its own version H.R. 17234 of the foreign aid authorization, which called for an immediate cutoff. On December 17, the Senate adopted (49-43), and on December 18, the House adopted (209-189) the conference committee report amendments on S.3394. The compromise that was reached at the conference committee allowed the President to delay the embargo in effect until February 5. As Franck and Weisband tactfully narrate, "two Presidential vetoes and three congressional bills later, a compromise of exhaustion was reached which appeared to give both President and Congress some of what they wanted."²³⁸ On December 31, President Ford signed the bill.²³⁹ He appreciated the spirit of the compromise that enables him to extend military aid until February, but he still noted his regret about the restriction at all.²⁴⁰

The aforementioned vote counts, which were overwhelmingly pro-embargo, raise the question of whether the administration could foresee this sentiment or not. Franck and Weisband think so, that the administration was aware of the pro-Greek sentiment, but 'fatally' underestimated it.²⁴¹ Accordingly, the legislative assistant of Senator Eagleton had warned undersecretary of State about pro-embargo consensus in Congress. Moreover, during a bipartisan congressional leadership breakfast on

²³⁶ Watanabe, 108; Franck and Weisband, 41.

²³⁷ Franck and Weisband, 41.

²³⁸ Ibid., 42.

²³⁹ S. 3394 (PL 93-559), 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)

²⁴⁰ Gerald Ford, "325 - Statement on Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974" in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

²⁴¹ Franck and Weisband, 37.

September 12, Representative Wayne L. Hays (D) warned the administration about working on Turkish aid among other legislative issues because he was afraid of that Foreign Relations committee may put the Turkish aid prohibition into effect.²⁴² However, it is now seen almost clear from presidential transition documents prepared by Secretary Kissinger that the administration did not underestimate the power of pro-embargo sentiments in Congress. As early as August, Secretary Kissinger actually anticipated ‘strong efforts’ in both houses for the termination of US military aid to Turkey and warned President Ford.²⁴³ On the other hand, the Ford administration’s policy on legislative relations during the first months of the crisis was to maintain relations with Congress through congressional leadership. The Ford administration found the support of bipartisan leadership sufficient to control Capitol Hill. This is why Kissinger was relieved when Senate Majority Leader Mansfield said that “there was no substantial feeling in the Senate for a Turkish arms embargo.”²⁴⁴ However, a traditional approach could not be pursued anymore while dealing with such an assertive Congress. During the crucial first months of the crisis, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger mainly concentrated on seeking support of bipartisan congressional leaders. Soon, it would appear that congressional leadership was not in control of the Congress anymore. Warburg describes it as a ‘back-bench revolt’ of junior members, who ultimately undermined the authority of congressional leaders to contain passionate young members of Congress.²⁴⁵ “Junior members of Congress overrode their own leadership to make the embargo stick.”²⁴⁶ Kissinger

²⁴² “Ford, Bipartisan congressional Leadership” September 12, 1974. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552782.pdf>

²⁴³ “Issue Papers (1)” *The Presidential Transition File*, NSA Files, Ford Presidential Library.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0353/1555879.pdf>

²⁴⁴ Franck and Weisband, 37.

²⁴⁵ Warburg, 192.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 51

complained later that “congressional Leadership no longer could be counted on to lead, or even predict, the course of a runaway legislative rabble.”²⁴⁷ Therefore, it could be argued that the most important shortcoming of the administration was exaggerating the authority of congressional leadership. It clearly did not understand the revolution in Congress, which was beyond the control of the leadership.²⁴⁸ President Ford seemed to realize this fact after two months in the office. During his addresses in different states for upcoming congressional elections, he repeatedly reminded people of great bipartisan legislative actions during the Truman era, when he was a junior member of Congress. He harshly criticized Congress, and he, on one occasion, said that the bipartisanship in foreign policy since the Truman era was being “eroded by irresponsible actions of some Members of the Congress.”²⁴⁹

During the meeting with the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger seemed to convince the Archbishop to work for the administration’s cause. However, the Archbishop complained about the fact that he could not reason with his people and actually his people were protesting him for not having done anything for the embargo cause. Moreover, his Reverend aides suggested that the President should call Greek-American members of Congress to explain what they were told during the meeting, which means a tacit approval of their ineffectiveness on Greek-American public opinion.²⁵⁰ The ‘Greek Mafia’ in the Congress was actually steering the Greek-American public opinion in those days. As it is stated in the first chapter, Ford identifies leaders of the embargo movement in the House as Representatives

²⁴⁷ Franck and Weisband, 38.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 38.

²⁴⁹ Gerald Ford, “211 - Remarks in Los Angeles, California., October 31, 1974” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

²⁵⁰ “Ford, Kissinger, Archbishop Iakovos” October 7, 1974. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552819.pdf>

Rosenthal, Sarbanes and Brademas. Accordingly, Senator Eagleton was leading a similar effort in the Senate. ‘Greek Mafia’ and Rule of Law activists in the Congress were out of control of the leadership. The coalition they created in both houses of Congress was not in senior positions but they regularly outvoted the leadership.²⁵¹ President Ford tells how he tried to persuade them to reverse the embargo efforts in his memoirs. One of his claims was the vitality of American intelligence facilities located across Turkey. He said to members of Congress that “if we stopped delivery of arms – which Turks had paid for already – they would probably respond by closing vital intelligence facilities we had been using for years near their border with the Soviets.”²⁵² Among these Representatives, Rosenthal was especially significant since he can be regarded as a member of the Jewish lobby in the House. President Ford separately tried to convince him that a weakened Turkey and worsened relations with this NATO ally in the Middle East would also imperil the future security of Israel in the region. Unfortunately, he could not convince leaders of the embargo movement. As Ford observes, “Congress was determined to interfere with the President’s traditional right to manage foreign policy.”²⁵³ In this manner, he believes that Congress did not care about the dire consequences of their interference.²⁵⁴ According to Warburg, the skepticism of members of Congress about the willingness of the administration to press Turkey caused the failure of the President’s efforts.²⁵⁵ This is the criticism the Ford administration had faced since the first military intervention of Turkey. Moreover, Kissinger’s image among members of Congress was another factor impacting the decision. He was being

²⁵¹ Franck and Weisband, 43.

²⁵² Ford, 137.

²⁵³ Ibid., 138.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Warburg, 226n8.

“unreasonably secretive, uncompromising and duplicitous”,²⁵⁶ which altogether created an image of arrogance. While the congressional opposition to the administration’s foreign policy choices was concentrated on personal animosity around Secretary Kissinger, Kissinger perceived the issue from another perspective. During his meeting with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, he labeled what the Congress was doing against Turkey as the symbol of what they were doing against US foreign policy.²⁵⁷ His well-known idea was that such a bold action to an ally country by Congress would create suspicion among other allies and would hurt the American foreign policy. On the other hand, one of the other shortcomings of the administration was well-identified by Senator Humphrey during one bipartisan breakfast in the White House.²⁵⁸ He draws the attention of the administration to the upcoming November 1974 congressional elections and claimed that the administration’s failure was due to intensive Greek lobbying efforts and the fear that members of Congress had of losing the votes of Greek-Americans, which possessed the power of deciding votes in some congressional districts.

The administration had made a great effort to prevent an embargo decision by Congress. By the time the embargo went into effect on February 5, 1975, President Ford had personally lobbied more than 100 House members.²⁵⁹ Moreover, between 20 August 1974 and 5 February 1975, the President hosted seven bipartisan leadership breakfasts, in which Turkish aid was the major topic of discussion on the

²⁵⁶ Stanley J. Heginbotham, “Dateline Washington: The Rules of the Games”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 53 (Winter, 1983-1984), pp. 157-172, (Published by: Washington post. Newsweek Interactive, LLC.), 165.

²⁵⁷ *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 165.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Document 211.

²⁵⁹ Warburg, 226n8.

table.²⁶⁰ In the meantime, Secretary Kissinger met more than once with his counterparts from Greece and Turkey in New York during the UN General Assembly gathering in September. In December, he met with each of Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers about five times during the NATO meeting in Brussels.²⁶¹ The main objective of the Secretary was to give President Ford an opportunity to certify the Congress that there was substantial progress toward agreement regarding Turkish military forces on the island. This was the only way that the President was able to suspend the implementation of the embargo, and it was actually the reason why the administration demanded the delay until February 1975 for the implementation of the embargo. Unfortunately, domestic political climates in both Greece and Turkey blocked any positive development from October to February. Firstly, Greek government demanded from the U.S. not to push for negotiations before the Greek election on November 17. More unfortunate developments came from Turkey on the day of Greek election and Ecevit government fell apart. A caretaker government was established to govern the country until March 1975. This further slowed down the negotiations since the interim government of Turkey “was in no position to negotiate seriously, nor did it attempt to do so.”²⁶² Therefore, crucial time that was hardly earned from the Congress for diplomatic flexibility was wasted because of unwillingness of the parties on the negotiation table. Actually, Secretary Kissinger still believed he could get a peaceful settlement in six months to one year as of

²⁶⁰ These breakfasts were held in August 20, September 12, September 26, November 26, December 11, December 17, February 3 (1975). *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp

²⁶¹ “Ford, Kissinger, Bipartisan congressional Leadership” December 17, 1974. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552890.pdf>

²⁶² Kissinger, 237.

February, if the administration was left alone by the Congress.²⁶³ Secretary Kissinger's latest attempt was to meet with embargo proponents Senator Eagleton and Representatives Rosenthal, Brademas, Sarbanes on February 1, 1975.²⁶⁴ In this significant encounter, while accepting that there was no substantial progress until that date, Secretary Kissinger sounds members of Congress out for possible extension for the implementation date of the embargo. Members of Congress, not surprisingly, opposed such an action. Rep. Rosenthal, in referring to Secretary's repeated emphasis on consultations with bipartisan leadership since the beginning of the crisis, makes no secret of the fact that if those who participated in that meeting could not be persuaded, the administration would not get any congressional action. Brademas went further and indicated that there was a whole new ballgame in Congress and if the administration tries to get overturned, they will be clobbered and it would worsen the administration's relations with the Congress. Sarbanes and Eagleton were softer in their tone and they raise the binding nature of the law required for the cut-off, unless big gestures were being made by Turkey like giving permission to Greek Cypriot refugees to return their homes. During the meeting, Secretary Kissinger reported 'some' progress by noting unilateral withdrawal of a Turkish brigade from Cyprus by Turkey and renewed peace talks in Geneva between Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas and Greek Cypriot leader Clerides. However, Eagleton believed that these developments did not mean 'substantial' progress, which was required by law for suspending the aid cut-off.²⁶⁵ Therefore, Secretary

²⁶³ "Ford, Kissinger, Rockefeller, Brown, Bipartisan congressional Leadership" February 3, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552938.pdf>

²⁶⁴ *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 172.

²⁶⁵ Franck and Weisband, 43.

Kissinger understood that it was too late and there was no way now to avert the arms embargo.

3.3 Activities of the Administration after the Congress Decision

On February 5, 1975, the Turkish arms embargo of the United States came into effect. As a result, over 200 million dollars worth of military purchases and foreign military aid materials which were scheduled to be delivered to Turkey were withheld. The most shocking of all for Turkey, the ban included 78 million dollars worth of free market purchases that were already paid for²⁶⁶, most notably F-4 aircrafts.²⁶⁷ The Turkish government's position regarding the military aid was in parallel with the Ford administration's position. Accordingly, and once Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel told in the Turkish Senate, military aid to Turkey was not a favor to Turkey, but it was rather a requirement of the NATO system. In the same speech, FM Esenbel makes clear that Turkey would not make any concessions on Cyprus in return for resumption of American aid.²⁶⁸ Beginning in February, Turkish government made various statements threatening to take counter measures if the embargo was not lifted. However, Turkey's only tangible response to the embargo was suspending talks with the United States regarding joint defense installations in Turkey, and withdrawing from NATO winter exercises. The closing of the US

²⁶⁶ K.R. Legg, "Congress as Trojan House, the Turkish embargo Problem, 1974-1978", in Spanier, John and Nogee, Joseph (eds.), *Congress, the presidency and American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 121.

²⁶⁷ Stearns, 154.

²⁶⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December 1974, 7, Qtd in Uslu, 152.

military installations was only realized when the House rejected to lift the embargo partially in July. This relatively soft response from Turkey was actually originated from extensive efforts of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. On February 5, President Ford sent a letter to President Korutürk to soften the rage of Turkey.²⁶⁹ In this letter, President Ford made reference to his public statement on the same day²⁷⁰, in which he expressed that the action of Congress was in contrary to the vital interests of both countries. He assured President Korutürk about seeking for authorization from Congress for the resumption of the ‘military supply relationship’ with Turkey as soon as possible. Most significantly, he demanded restraint while major efforts were under way by the administration to restore the aid. President Korutürk, in response, appreciated the efforts of the administration but still pointed out the hardship of keeping friendly relations between two countries undisturbed by Congress’ action. The most drastic move by Turkey was maybe the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13, 1975. Although its practical outcome was little since Cyprus had already evolved into two completely separated administrations, embargo proponents perceived this step as further ‘Turkish bad faith’, while the Ford administration suggested this action as a “natural consequence of congressional action.”²⁷¹ In March, Secretary Kissinger made his way to Turkey after being rejected by the Turkish government in February. The Secretary outlined his series of talks with Turkish leaders to President Ford in three different cables.²⁷² There are three important points in these cables regarding the aid cut-off. First of all,

²⁶⁹ Gerald, Ford. Letter to President of Turkey Fahri Korutürk. February 5, 1975. “Turkey - President Korutürk” *National Security Adviser. Presidential Correspondence With Foreign Leaders, 1974-77* ., <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0351/1555860.pdf>

²⁷⁰ Gerald Ford, “73 - Statement on Suspension of United States Military Assistance to Turkey. February 5, 1975” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

²⁷¹ *FRUS, 1969–1976*, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 176.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, Documents 218, 219, and 220.

regarding Cyprus negotiations, Secretary Kissinger noted that Turkish political leaders do not like to appear to be making concessions. He expressed that the repeal of the embargo would not only be a 'stimulus' for negotiations to resume but it would also be the key to conclude negotiations successfully. Secondly, Secretary Kissinger evaluated that the public position that had been adopted by the administration and statements of President Ford helped decisively in keeping the Turkish response in control and averted more serious decisions by the Turkish government. Lastly, Secretary Kissinger indicated that he felt even stronger than before that the US administration had no alternative but to push an all-out effort to get the aid totally restored. It should be noted that the Secretary told the President in one of their meeting in February that the "Turkish thing is the worst thing we have done since the Suez in '56. Even if we do it, we will suffer for years, even though you and I will be heroes in Turkey. The reaction among the Turkish military is unbelievable."²⁷³

As soon as the embargo went into effect, the administration took the offensive outlook to revert the decision. In February, Kissinger met with embargo proponents two times on the 25th and the 27th, while President Ford was meeting with congressional leaders and some individual members of Congress. During these meetings, President Ford and congressional leaders discussed a waiver resolution for Turkey, which would equalize the arguments of Senator Eagleton about the rule of law.²⁷⁴ In the meantime, Kissinger tried to soften "Brademas team", which he concluded was a hopeless effort. He was told in one meeting by Brademas that "we had seven months of negotiations with aid; give us seven months of a cutoff--if it

²⁷³ "Ford, Kissinger," February 20, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552957.pdf>

²⁷⁴ Meetings were held on Feb. 6 and Feb. 20.

doesn't work, we will change.”²⁷⁵ This expression clearly shows the motivation of Brademas regarding the aid cut-off. They thought of embargo as a matter of pride and they did not want to accept negative outcomes of the embargo for United States foreign policy. In their meeting with the President on March 21, Brademas asked the President whether the administration gave priority to a Cyprus settlement or to the premise that Congress was wrong and should reverse itself. He challenges the President by saying that “if it's the former, we will help; if it's the latter, we will fight.”²⁷⁶ Nevertheless, President Ford reached an understanding with embargo proponents in that meeting. According to the plan, embargo supporters would not object to a Senate passage if Turkey offered concessions on troop withdrawals, and some territorial changes in Cyprus. Then, the passage would go through the House, where the Greek lobby would not oppose it because of Turkish concessions. President Ford outlined this achieved understanding to Secretary Kissinger after he came back from Turkey.²⁷⁷ Kissinger firmly indicated that this can't work anymore, since no Turkish government could agree to concessions before aid is totally restored. Kissinger made clear to the President that new negotiations between two communities in Vienna depend on a comprehensive solution. Therefore, the real problem was the fact that new negotiations would try to reach a package deal, but not through a step-by-step approach which means that President Ford would not be able to certify ‘substantial progress’ had been made, nor would the Turkish side show any gesture as a part of negotiations.

²⁷⁵ “Ford, Kissinger,” February 25, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552965.pdf>

²⁷⁶ “Ford and Representatives Brademas, Sarbanes, Rosenthal” March 20, 1975 *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552995.pdf>

²⁷⁷ “Ford, Kissinger” March 24, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*. <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552996.pdf>

On April 10, 1975, President Ford addressed before the joint session of the Congress reporting on the United States Foreign Policy.²⁷⁸ In this State of the World address, he criticized the embargo action by claiming that the United States Foreign Policy could not be a collection of special ethnic, economic or ideological interests of Congress. He summarized the three-point objection of the administration to the embargo: firstly, it blocked the progress toward peaceful settlement; secondly, it threatened the national security of the United States in the region; and thirdly, US military installations in Turkey were vital to United States security as they are to the defense of NATO. Therefore, President Ford called for lifting the embargo, by passing the bipartisan Mansfield-Scott bill, which was before the Senate. The bill would authorize the president to suspend the embargo if it contributed to negotiations and if Turkey abided by the ceasefire and it sent neither new troops nor additional American arms to Cyprus. The bill also required the President to report every thirty days to the Congress on progress toward a negotiated settlement.²⁷⁹ All senior Senate leaders, including Foreign Relations Committee chairman Sparkman, the Armed Services Committee chairman John Stennis, and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, were in favor of the bill, while “ranged against these heavy guns was the array of the rank and file led by the irrepressible Senator Eagleton.”²⁸⁰ The bill, which was actually introduced in February, was adopted by a narrow margin (41-40) on May 19, 1975. Before this critical voting, the administration and leadership came to the conclusion that it would be tough to get the necessary votes. Thus, President Ford instructed his Counselor Jack Marsh to work on Senators who may shift their

²⁷⁸ Gerald Ford, “179 - Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States Foreign Policy., April 10, 1975” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

²⁷⁹ S. 846, 94rd Cong., 1d Sess. (1975)

²⁸⁰ Franck and Weisband, 44.

votes.²⁸¹ In the coming months, Marsh would be the one who coordinated and managed the administration efforts to lift the embargo.

After the Senate vote, the administration focused on negotiating with Turkey to make progress in settlement negotiations. Kissinger went to Turkey just three days after the Senate vote on May 22, where he met with newly organized Turkish government Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil and its Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. Kissinger warned President Ford that time was running out before Turkey could take some retaliatory measures because of domestic pressure on the government.²⁸² Nevertheless, Kissinger believed he set a useful background for the President for the upcoming meeting with Demirel in the following week. On May 29, President Ford met with Prime Minister Demirel in Brussels during NATO meetings. In response to Demirel's array of complaints about the embargo, Ford replied it was a personal opportunity for him to hear the Turkish point of view and said that "it will fortify me in my vigor to change our congressional action. It is incomprehensible to me why Congress does not see this." During the course of the meeting, Demirel seemed to reject talking about negotiations; his only promise was to do his utmost in good will to get a settlement only if the aid was restored again.²⁸³ On the other hand, President Ford asked Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis to take a public position about restoring the aid to Turkey, since it was the only way to prompt

²⁸¹ "Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Marsh, Senators Mansfield, Sparkman, Case" May 16, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553082.pdf>

²⁸² *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 225 - 226.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, Document 227.

Turkish willingness for settlement. This step would also obviously strengthen the administration's hand. However, Caramanlis did not accept.²⁸⁴

After the Senate voting and NATO summit, President Ford became optimistic about lifting the embargo, but this optimism was wiped off during his meetings with congressional leaders and embargo proponents in June. In one meeting with republican leadership, Ford assured that he would make personal interventions to get the desired result in response to the skepticism of some members of Congress.²⁸⁵ In another meeting, Ford offered to receive forty to fifty members of Congress in a day, if it was helpful.²⁸⁶ In that meeting, Ford told them the situation was getting more serious now, since Turkey indicated its desire to re-negotiate its base arrangements within 30 days. Kissinger indicated he bought some time from Turkey, but the bill should come to the House committee by July 15 at the latest. He was then able to buy more time until the House voting; even though the deadline set forth for the base closure in Turkey set was July 17. Speaker of the House Carl Albert questioned Kissinger about how useful these bases had been during the October war of 1973, since it might help to buy votes of pro-Jewish members of Congress. In short, the base closure increased the graveness of the issue for the administration. In late June, the administration arranged three different meetings with supporters of embargo in the House and with the leadership.²⁸⁷ During the crucial month of July, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger increased their personal

²⁸⁴ "Ford, Kissinger, Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis" May, 29, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553093.pdf>

²⁸⁵ "Ford, Republican congressional Leadership" June 5, 1975.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553110.pdf>

²⁸⁶ *FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 230.*

²⁸⁷ Meetings were held in June 19, June 23, and June 26. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/Memoranda_of_Conversations.asp

efforts. In total, the president and the secretary talked with more than 325 members of Congress.²⁸⁸ The President hosted two breakfasts in the White House with broad participation of 260 members of Congress on July 9 and July 17, which the House minority whip Robert Michel thought were “tremendously effective.”²⁸⁹ Franck and Weisband think that it was one of the most intensive lobbying efforts ever attempted by an administration on a foreign policy issue, while it was reported in the New York Times on July 20 as many members of Congress switched to the administration’s side. Representative Rosenthal, the leading embargo supporter, later admitted that “the administration’s lobbying has been the most strenuous of any that I’ve ever seen in my thirteen years in Congress.”²⁹⁰ The outcome of these meetings was a compromise bill, different in language from the Senate version of S.846. All bipartisan congressional leaders were supporting the compromise language. Accordingly, the bill would lift the embargo of defense purchases worth approximately 200 million dollars contracted before the embargo came into effect. This clause was the most protested one by Turkey, since they could not receive which they had already paid for. Demirel was complaining in the NATO summit to Ford that Turkey was even demanded to pay the storage fee by private contractors for undelivered shipments. Furthermore, the proposed compromise bill would permit Turkey to buy military equipment from the American free market with cash. Therefore, if it was voted yes in the House, the only prohibition that was left out was direct military grants and assistance to Turkey. Other parts of the bill were kept the same as the version in the Senate, like reporting responsibility of the president and about those concerning the troops in Cyprus. Regrettably, The House rejected the bill

²⁸⁸ Ibid. Document 233.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. Document 232.

²⁹⁰ Franck and Weisband, 44-45.

(206-223) on July 24, 1975, when President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were about to leave for the Helsinki summit. Ford remembers in his memoirs that “Congress slapped me in the face by refusing to lift its embargo on the shipment of arms to Turkey. I considered this the single most irresponsible, short-sighted foreign policy decision Congress had made in all the years I’d been in Washington.”²⁹¹ Secretary Kissinger takes a similar position by saying that it was the most senseless act he had seen in his years in Washington, while Speaker of the House made a similar comment to President Ford that it was the worst vote he had witnessed in the House in 28 years.²⁹² President Ford remarked in his public statement on the irreparable and serious damage of this decision, and urged for a prompt and affirmative action by the House to reverse it.²⁹³

The administration’s efforts were, in fact, much deeper and systemically conducted, which cannot be limited to the president’s and the secretary’s personal efforts. As it is stated above, Counselor to the President Jack Marsh was the chief of the whole operation. Marsh’s office, for example, sent a factsheet to all members of Congress on July 9, at the end of which the argument was that “lifting the embargo will enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO role, will safeguard vital U.S. installations in Turkey, and will remove a substantial impediment to progress in the Cyprus negotiations.”²⁹⁴ An important portion of the Congress thought that Turkey uses military bases as a tool of blackmail to pressure the Congress. Counselor Marsh reported to the president several Republican members of Congress, who would vote

²⁹¹ Ford, 302.

²⁹² *FRUS, 1969–1976*, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 233.

²⁹³ Gerald Ford, “427 - Statement on House Action Refusing To Modify the embargo on United States Military Assistance to Turkey, July 24, 1975” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

²⁹⁴ “Turkey – Military Aid embargo (2)” *John Marsh Files, 1974-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0067/7787167.pdf>

no because of this perception. In total, Marsh believes, forty-four Republicans in the House had had negative voting records on Turkey. Therefore, before Democratic representatives, administration lobbying targeted these forty-four republicans. The July 22 memorandum shows that President Ford ordered Cabinet members to work on Turkish aid vote, and accordingly, all cabinet secretaries were matched with certain representatives to make a call and convince them.²⁹⁵ One of the most interesting documents among files from Marsh's office is regarding two giant White House breakfasts on July 9 and 17. Apart from notes and talking points, documents show how participant representatives were selected and separated into two groups. Accordingly, all representatives were marked with certain signs indicating whether they voted pro-administration or anti-administration on the last 7 votes in the House of Representatives. An additional note indicates whether certain representatives were leaning towards administration or leaning away. In light of this information, the White House decided which representatives to invite to the breakfast or not. Those who voted anti-administration in all seven votes before and were known for their opposition to lift the embargo were not invited to the breakfast. Moreover, undecided representatives were grouped by their parties and lists were presented to the president before the breakfast. It should be noted that Jack Marsh reports about some certain representatives in detail, who were regarded as having the possibility of reversing their anti-administration vote. These representatives were Whitehurst (R-VA), Rousselot (R-CAL), Byron (D-MD), Martin (R-NC), Clancy (R-OH), Taylor (D-

²⁹⁵ "Turkey – Military Aid embargo (2)" *John Marsh Files, 1974-1977*.
<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0067/7787167.pdf>

NC) and Wydler (R-NY). Marsh clearly recommended what should be done in order to obtain the affirmative vote of the aforementioned representatives one by one.²⁹⁶

On July 15, Jack Marsh demanded the press office to pull together any favorable editorial comments or columns and to put them into a package. Jack Marsh's plan was to deliver them to Representatives John Rhodes, Doc Morgan and Bill Broomfield who were leading the resumption effort of aid in the Congress, since they might find these helpful in persuading negative members of Congress. As a result, some positive editorials in *New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Washington Star* and *Indianapolis Star* were reported before the House Committee on International Relations during hearings in September.²⁹⁷ These editorials were actually delivered to co-sponsors of the bill by the White House Press Office. During the embargo fighting, Ron Nessen's Press office was tasked with creating public support for lifting the ban upon the request of the president. In this manner, the Press office of the White House worked on influencing written and visual media outlets. On July 10, officers had called several editorial writers across the country to give factual information on newly handed bill on the House Floor. These editorial writers that got a call from the Press office were from *New York Daily News*, *Baltimore Sun*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Fayetteville Eagle – Bulletin*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Milwaukee Journal*, *Houston Post* and *Atlanta Constitution*. In case of specific questions from editors, an official from the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs was present at the White House. Indeed, it was useful while editorial writer Jim Adams interviewed the State Department

²⁹⁶ "Turkey – Military Aid embargo (1)" *John Marsh Files, 1974-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0067/1563219.pdf>

²⁹⁷ U.S. House of Representatives, *Report of the Committee on International Relations together with Opposing, Separate, Supplemental, and Additional views on S.2230*. Rep. No: 94 – 500, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. September 22, 1975., 21-29.

official for fifteen minutes on the phone. The memorandum for Ron Nessen shows that the attempt seems to have been successful, since some editors promised to write supportive editorial in their next issues.²⁹⁸ During the most critical days, *Christian Science Monitor*, for example published two positive editorials on July 16 and July 28.

The Turkish government's response to the July 24 voting in the House was more serious than previous ones. While waiting for a positive result, they got disappointed by Congress again. During the Helsinki meeting, when President Ford proposed a one-time aid delivery worth 50 million dollars, Demirel refused it by saying that Turkey was not after being given aid but desired to see the friendship of the United States. Turkey was the only country subject to an embargo in the world and even Tito of Yugoslavia could get American weapons while Turkey could not.²⁹⁹ These remarks make it clear that Turkey perceived the embargo, and naturally the failure to reverse it, as an act of aggression from an ally. The day after the House rejected to reverse the embargo; the Turkish government finally acted and officially declared that there was no legal basis left for the continuation of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969 between the two countries. Thus, the Turkish government announced that all U.S. military activities in joint bases in the country except NATO activities in Incirlik air base would be suspended and these bases would be brought under the control and custody of the Turkish Armed Forces as of 26 July, 1975.³⁰⁰ Operations in four U.S. intelligence centres at Karamürsel,

²⁹⁸ "Turkey – arms embargo", *Ron Nessen Papers, 1974-77*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0204/1511990.pdf>

²⁹⁹ Caglayangil "Ford, Kissinger, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel" 31 July, 1975. *National Security Adviser: Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*.

<https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553191.pdf>

³⁰⁰ Armaoğlu, 287.

Sinop, Diyarbakır and Belbaşı were suspended.³⁰¹ Accordingly, those intelligence bases were significant to monitor Soviet missile development and testing, troop movements, and atomic energy matters. Therefore, it severely limited the ability of the United States to monitor the Soviet Union military activities.³⁰² According to estimates, the closing of the American bases resulted in fifteen percent loss in total information regarding Soviet weapon systems development, and fifty percent loss regarding movements of Soviet military forces in the Southwestern part of the Soviet Union.³⁰³ Turkey's base closure decision also coincided with the Soviet Union's more activist foreign policy, which further exacerbated the consequences for the United States.³⁰⁴ As of 1975, the American personnel presence in Turkey exceeded 10.000 together with their dependents. Free movement of the US personnel in Turkey was restricted, 'provisional status' of bases led to Turkish laws being applied in bases, and on August 16, the Turkish government announced that US Army Post Office deliveries would not be allowed to enter Turkey after September 15.³⁰⁵ Thus, some privileges of the US military personnel which were enjoyed because of bilateral DCA agreements were suspended. Working conditions of the American military personnel severely deteriorated, which had already been a case for some years because of the rising anti-Americanism.

The Ford administration responded to the base closures in a very unique way. Since the national security argument did not affect the members of Congress in July voting, the administration raised the question of deteriorating conditions of

³⁰¹ Uslu, 154.

³⁰² U.S. House of Representatives, *Report of the Committee on International Relations together with Opposing, Separate, Supplemental, and Additional views on S.2230*. Rep. No: 94 – 500, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. September 22, 1975., 8.

³⁰³ National Security Council Memo, *Vernon Loen and Charles Lippart Files*, White House Central Files, Gerald Ford Library, quoted in Tatum, 54.

³⁰⁴ Tatum, 55.

³⁰⁵ Campany, 57.

American citizens, military and intelligence personnel stationed in Turkey. In order to do that, President Ford met with military societies on September 8, 1974 to brief them about arms embargo issue in general and the situation of military personnel in Turkey. Those participating representatives were from societies of, *American Veterans of WWII-Korea-Vietnam (AMVETS)*, *American Society of Naval Engineers*, *Air Force Association*, *Reserve Officers Association of the United States*, and *Air Force Sergeants Associations*. Thus, President Ford brought veteran societies, which were naturally sensitive about American soldiers commissioned abroad, into the embargo war. The outcome was the tremendous pressure of veteran societies on Congress through public announcements, collective letters, and annual meeting resolutions. AMVETS National Commander Paul C. Welsh, for example, urged all *AMVETS* members to write to their congressional delegation to vote in favor of S.2230 bill to lift the Turkish arms embargo. *Air Force Association* urged the Congress to reverse embargo on their daily publication *AFA Profile*. *Air Force Sergeants* sent identical letters to all members of the Committee on Rules, Armed Services Committee, Appropriations Committee, and Veterans Committee. In this letter, the society indicates they are vitally concerned about the health, morale and welfare of the American military personnel and argue that immediate action on S.2230 was necessary for “the protection of dedicated Americans in Turkey”. *Reserve Officers Association of the United States*, lastly, took a unanimous decision in its National executive Committee on September 13, urging the Congress to support the policy of the administration to lift the embargo. They sent a letter to all members of Congress on September 17 to announce the decision. What is most significant in the efforts of veteran societies is that they sent copies of their letters, decisions etc. to the White House. Marsh was thus able to collect and inform

President Ford about the process. Moreover, President Ford personally called for pressure on Congress about this issue. In his address before the 57th National Convention of *the American Legion* on August 19, 1975, he concluded his words about the Turkish embargo by saying that “your representatives in Congress need to know where you stand. They have to realize that you place America's security above personal and political considerations.”³⁰⁶ President Ford’s relations with American military societies had always been good, he was even chosen as the man of the year by the Reserve Officers Association of the United States before.³⁰⁷ Therefore, it was not a tough decision to follow the path of the president for a veteran society. Thus, *the American Legion* declared Resolution no: 336 on August 21, urging the Congress to lift the Turkish embargo immediately. *Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States* followed the American Legion example with a similar resolution on August 22.³⁰⁸

Suspension of the US military operations in Turkey changed the climate drastically in Washington. President Ford took the credit immediately after the Turkish decision by publicly stating that it was the extremely serious consequence about which he had repeatedly warned the House of Representatives.³⁰⁹ Three days later, President Ford sent a publicized letter to the speaker of the House, urging the immediate reconsideration of the House action.³¹⁰ By the help of congressional

³⁰⁶ Gerald Ford, “492 - Address in Minneapolis Before the Annual Convention of the American Legion., August 19, 1975” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

³⁰⁷ Ford received the award on February 21, 1975.

³⁰⁸ U.S. House of Representatives, *Report of the Committee on International Relations together with Opposing, Separate, Supplemental, and Additional views on S.2230*. Rep. No: 94 – 500, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. September 22, 1975., Appendix 1-2.

³⁰⁹ Gerald Ford, “434 - Statement on Suspension of United States Military Operations in Turkey., July 25, 1975” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

³¹⁰ Gerald Ford, “447 - Letter to the Speaker of the House Urging Reconsideration of House Action Refusing Modification of the embargo on United States Military Assistance to Turkey, July 28, 1975” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald Ford*.

leadership, an identical language bill (S.2230) of the House-rejected compromise was introduced in the Senate, and it was approved (47-46) on July 31. The bill was then sent to the House Rules Committee, where Chairman Ray Madden refused to convene the committee in time to bring it to the House floor before the August recess. Therefore, the House voting was delayed until late September, and it gave more time to the administration. Before the House voting, the Ford administration intervened in order not to fail this time. The most interesting attempt was trying to get support of Black caucus votes. Black caucus members were especially sensitive regarding the opium production issue in Turkey, which had been kept in the background because of the Cyprus issue. On July 28, the Chairman of the Black Caucus, Member of Congress Charles Rangel called Jack Marsh and indicated that if some positive direction was taken regarding narcotics issue and its relationship to Turkey, sixteen votes of the caucus could be picked up on the Turkish aid vote.³¹¹ Counselor Marsh immediately notified the team in Helsinki. During the Helsinki meeting, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger questioned Prime Minister Demirel on the issue. After getting clear assurance about tight control of Turkish government on opium production³¹², President Ford sent a letter to Rangel on July 31, saying the most effective controls had been underway by the Turkish government.³¹³ Thus, President Ford secured sixteen more votes for the House voting. During September, it was understood that this time the administration “will win”; as Kissinger indicated the administration even got the support of Brademas now.³¹⁴ During President Ford’s meeting with the bipartisan leadership on September 25, the Vice President notes that even the former President of the AHEPA was now supporting the administration

³¹¹ “Turkey – Military Aid embargo (6)” *John Marsh Files, 1974-1977*.

³¹² *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 233*.

³¹³ “Turkey – Military Aid embargo (6)” *John Marsh Files, 1974-1977*.


³¹⁴ *FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 236*.

in lifting the embargo, because it was seen as the only way to help Greek refugees on the island. On the other hand, Ford's approach was more cautious in the same meeting. Because he believes that another defeat would "deteriorate the situation to an absolutely irretrievable level." He assured the leadership that "every element of the administration will be going all out to achieve an affirmative vote." Fortunately, the Ford administration was able to get the necessary vote this time. The House finally passed (237-176) the bill S. 2230 on October 2, and President Ford triumphantly signed the bill into law on October 6.³¹⁵ Therefore, the embargo, which went into effect in February 1975, was partially lifted in October 1975. Turkey, on the other hand, did not reconsider its retaliation measures. Restrictions on U.S. military installations in Turkey had continued to be implemented until the embargo was completely removed in September 1978.

³¹⁵ S. 2230 (PL 94-104), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION



How could we reassert the President's moral and legal authority to act decisively in foreign policy? How could we resist the "ethnic awareness" that tended to influence congressional decisions affecting the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and the nations of black Africa? In the wake of Vietnam, should the U.S. retreat from its role as world policeman, and if so, how fast?

President Ford tells us in his memoirs that these questions were always on the agenda in daily meetings with Secretary Kissinger. By saying "Ethnic awareness", one of President Ford's most likely targets were the Greek-Americans and their representatives in Congress. In light of this work, we can say that President Ford successfully resisted the ethnically-motivated congressional act of embargo on Turkey. His struggle with Congress lasted for thirteen months. Only after thirteen months of administration lobbying, could Congress finally be persuaded of the 'dire consequences' of their act. Even so, President Ford could have been able to lift the embargo totally, but he was contented with himself and what he achieved, the partial

lifting of the embargo. President Carter who was the next president would achieve the total lift of the embargo in 1978.

Once again, the separation of powers in the constitution had caused a conflict of powers between the executive and the legislative. However, the new wave of congressional assertiveness in 1970s was more aggressive and acute. It had started to rise concurrently with the public dissent around the Vietnam War. 'The silent majority' of President Nixon secured him another Presidential election win in 1972, but the disintegration of American society was high. The visible outcome of this social fact was the collapse of Cold War consensus and bipartisanship in Congress regarding the foreign policy. The democratic majority of Congress had an ever-increasing interest in restoring congressional power against the president. While the Congress was consolidating its power through reasoned reforms, the Watergate Scandal offered a heavenly opportunity to sentence President Nixon to death. Nixon himself was not the only victim, but also the office of the presidency, regardless of the personality of the president, had to bear consequences of the new assertive Congress.

The Cyprus crisis exploded in such a domestic climate in the United States, which certainly diminished timely reaction of the United States. President Ford had found himself in a very delicate situation between two NATO allies. While he was trying to settle the crisis with the help of Secretary Kissinger, the Greek ethnic lobby made its move. Greek-American members of Congress urged Congress to punish the Turkish military action in Cyprus. Thus, the struggle of the Ford administration was to neutralize the anti-Turkish sentiment in Congress. The administration had three objections to the embargo: it would not help with the negotiations; it would jeopardize the bilateral relations with a key NATO ally; and the possible reaction of

closing down the American bases by Turkey would be a catastrophe for the United States. Altogether, the Ford administration had strongly argued that the embargo was against the national interest of the United States.

The absence of a countervailing Turkish lobby in the United States caused the Ford administration to take initiative. President Ford personally got into the lobbying effort of the administration. He met with independent Senators and Representatives on numerous occasions; he made heaps of public statements to influence Congress; he even directly negotiated with the Greek Mafia of Congress about very specific provisions of the suggested embargo resolutions. One of the most interesting findings throughout this work is the resoluteness of President Ford. After each failed attempt, he started over again and made more intensified efforts. This determination manifests itself in the new initiatives the administration took after each failed vote in Congress. In the beginning, President Ford had devoted the biggest effort to creating a front with bipartisan leadership of Congress against the embargo decision, which he actually achieved. When it was understood that the order in Congress was so shaken and that embargo forces were beyond the control of the leadership, he started to concentrate on individual members of Congress. After the failure of July 1975, he added a new tactic of creating public pressure on Congress. In previous years, free press played a substantial role on rising congressional assertiveness against presidential foreign policy. Ford reversed that process and led the public to question about the real benefit of embargo that the Congress insisted on. The cumulative outcome of the massive effort that the Ford administration had made in thirteen months was the partial lifting of the embargo in October 1975.

The literature of executive-legislative relation in foreign policy barely mentions the Ford administration's struggle with Congress. Related resources claim

that there was an effort, but the extents of it are not completely illustrated. In this manner, this thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by piecing together all the activities of the Ford administration during its fierce battle with Congress. President Ford was definitely the victor of the Turkish embargo battle. Accuracy of Ford's decision to resist the embargo manifested itself later when President Carter had moved for a total removal of embargo, even if he was a strong defender of it against Ford during presidential election campaign.

Assertive congress had continued to target presidential foreign policy throughout the 1970s. One of the most serious consequences of it in foreign policy was that the American foreign policy was no more a unified voice. Recent years showed that the president and the Congress could follow completely opposite policies on a matter, which created a suspicion among other countries. Therefore, while the congress was consolidating its foreign policy powers, it also contributed to decline of American influence around the world. Ford administration was well aware of the aforementioned adverse effect. Actually, this is why the Ford administration was significant in the history of executive-legislative tug of war. Ford had not objected to Congress of playing a greater role in foreign policy making process. For their part, as Secretary Kissinger once admitted, the decade-long struggle over foreign policy making had been over by 1975. They believed that a successful foreign policy now depended on mutual efforts of two branches of the government. Ford believes that the executive should have the decisive role, but the congress should be included in the policy making process. Successive presidents had followed the path of Ford while they were acknowledging the role that congress could play in foreign policy making. Thus, especially after 1980s, the Congress had deescalated its

aggressive stance against presidential foreign policy prerogatives, since its inherent role in foreign policy had finally been acknowledged.



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