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**POPULISM, IDENTITY, AND LEADERSHIP IN
SUPPORTING PRO-REFUGE POLICIES: SOCIAL
IDENTITY APPROACH**

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İZMİR - 2021

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE



DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “Populism, Identity and Leadership in Supporting Pro-Refugee Policies: Social Identity Approach” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned recourses in the references list. I verify all these with my honor.

27.12.2021

Mete Sefa UYSAL

ABSTRACT

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The role of national identification, identity-leadership, and populist attitudes on the attitudes towards refugee policies regarding Syrian refugees in Turkey constitutes a unique case for Turkey, when compared with European and Northern American based research: *i)* While studies focusing on the relationship between populism – identity – refugees mostly focus on right-wing populist and anti-refugee opposition parties who are against mainstream ruling parties representing liberal democracy, this thesis focusing the links between populism, identity, leadership and attitudes towards refugee policies in the context of *populism in power* case, Turkey; *ii)* While studies Europe and Northern American research are focusing on the populism-identity-refugee policy link in contexts where host community and refugees often have conflicting religious identities (i.e., Christian natives vs. Muslim refugees), this thesis is testing the role of national identification, identity-leadership, and populist attitudes on the host community members' support for pro-refugee policies in a context where most of host community and refugees share the religious superordinate identity (e.g., Muslim identity). In addition to these contextual novelties, I used individual-centered (e.g., latent profile analysis) and variable-centered (moderated mediation) analysis together and performed two cross-sectional survey studies ($N_1 = 190$; $N_2 = 306$) targeting two different samples (student and online community sample). Results showed that there is a strong negative relationship

between national identification and supporting pro-refugee policies. Findings also implied that the populist-nationalist leadership have two conflicting impacts on the attitudes towards policies about Syrian refugees. While support for a populist leader who is seen as responsible for refugee policies in Turkey directly predicted support for pro-refugee policies, it indirectly and negatively predicted the support for pro-refugee policies through national identification. Moreover, I found that populist attitudes moderated the relationship between national identification and support for pro-refugee policies. The negative effect of national identification on support for pro-refugee policies was its highest level when combined with higher populist attitudes. This finding contributes to the populism literature that implicates populism becomes more concrete when combined with other thick-centered ideologies such as nationalism. Last, the latent profile analysis findings reveal that participants' levels of support for pro-refugee policies differ according to their levels of competitive victimhood and intergroup threat, as well as national identification. Participants with low levels of competitive victimhood and intergroup threat but high levels of national identification showed lower pro-refugee policy support than many participants who have high national identification but low competitive victimhood and intergroup threat.

Keywords: populism, identity-leadership, national identification, social identity, attitudes towards refugee, refugee policy, latent profile analysis

ÖZET

Doktora Tezi

Mülteci Yanlısı Politikaları Desteklemede Popülizm, Kimlik ve Liderlik: Sosyal

Kimlik Yaklaşımı

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Ulusal kimlik, liderlik ve popülist tutumların mülteci politikalarına verilen destek üzerindeki rolü söz konusu olduğunda Türkiye, Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika merkezli çalışmalarla karşılaştırdığımızda, eşsiz bir örnek teşkil ediyor: i) Popülizm – kimlik – göç ilişkisine odaklanan çalışmalar yoğunlukla liberal demokrasiyi temsilen iktidarda olan ana-akım partilerin karşısında yer alan sağ-kanat popülist ve mülteci karşıtı muhalif partileri çalışırken, bu tez çalışması popülist siyasetin iktidarda olduğu bir örnek olarak Türkiye’de popülizm – kimlik - göç ilişkisine odaklanıyor; ii) Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika merkezli çalışmalar popülizm – kimlik – göç ilişkisini ev sahibi ve mülteci nüfusun çoğunlukla çatışan dini kimliklere sahip olduğu bağlamlara odaklanırken, bu tez çalışması yerli ve mülteci nüfusun çoğunlukla aynı dini üst-kimliğe sahip olduğu bir bağlamda yerli nüfusun mülteci yanlısı politikaları desteklemesinde ulusal kimliğin, liderliğin ve popülist tutumların rolünü test ediyor. Bu bağlamsal yeniliklere ek olarak birey-merkezli (örtük profil analizi) ve değişken-merkezli (düzenleyicili aracılık analizi ve regresyon) analiz stratejilerini birlikte kullanan bu tez çalışması, farklı örneklemeleri hedef alan (öğrenci ve genel örneklem) iki kesitsel anket çalışmasından oluşmaktadır ($N_1 = 190$; $N_2 = 306$). Araştırma bulguları ulusal kimlik ile mülteci yanlısı politikaları destekleme arasında güçlü bir negatif ilişki ortaya koyarken, popülist-milliyetçi liderliğin mülteci politikalarına verilen destek üzerindeki iki yönlü etkisine de dikkat çekmektedir: mülteci politikalarından sorumlu olduğuna inanılan lidere verilen desteğin

doğrudan etkisi pozitifken, yüksek ulusal kimlik aracılığıyla dolaylı etkisi negatiftir. Ayrıca, katılımcıların ne düzeyde popülist tutumlara sahip olduğu, ulusal kimliğin mülteci yanlısı politikalar üzerindeki etki düzeyini belirlemektedir: Ulusal kimliğin mülteci yanlısı politikalar üzerindeki negatif etkisi popülist tutumların da yüksek olduğu durumda zirve yaparken, popülist tutumların düşük olduğu koşullarda azalmaktadır. Bu bulgu popülizm literatüründe sıklıkla tartışılan ve popülizmi milliyetçilik gibi köklü ve yerleşmiş ideolojilerle bir araya geldiğinde somutlaşan ince merkezli bir ideoloji olarak tanımlayan argümanları destekler niteliktedir. Son olarak örtük profil analizi bulguları, katılımcıların mülteci yanlısı politikaları destekleme düzeylerinin ulusal kimlik kadar rekabetçi mağduriyet ve gruplararası tehdit algısı düzeylerine göre de farklılaştığını ortaya koymaktadır. Ulusal kimlik düşüken rekabetçi mağduriyet ve gruplararası tehdit düzeyleri yüksek olan katılımcılar, ulusal kimliği yüksek pek çok katılımcıya göre daha düşük düzeyde mülteci yanlısı politika desteği göstermişlerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: popülizm, kimlik-liderlik, ulusal kimlik, sosyal kimlik, mültecilere yönelik tutumlar, mülteci politikaları, örtük profil analizi

**POPULISM, IDENTITY, AND LEADERSHIP IN SUPPORTING PRO-
REFUGEE POLICIES: A SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH**

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ABBREVIATIONS

BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
CFA	Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
GFI	Goodness of Fit Index
ILI	Identity-Leadership Inventory
ILM	Identity-Leadership Model
LPA	Latent Profile Analysis
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
SE	Standard Error
SIT	Social Identity Theory
TLI	Tucker Lewis Index

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INTRODUCTION

The influx of Syrian refugees, which started with the Syrian civil war in 2011, reached 3.5 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey (UNHCR, 2018: 3). Moreover, it is estimated that around 700.000 unregistered refugees live in Turkey (International Crisis Group, 2018: 4). These numbers make Turkey host of the largest population of Syrian refugees in the world. Today, Syrian refugees in Turkey (almost 4 million) is representing five percent of Turkey's population. Moreover, considering that Syrian population was about 21 million before the civil war in 2011, almost twenty percent of Syrian population resides in Turkey.

From the first days of mass migration, the Turkish government adopted a "temporary approach" which based on an anticipation that civil war in Syrian will end soon, and Syrian refugees will return (İçduygu, 2015: 7; Sert, 2019). As a result of this temporary approach, they introduced encampment policy based on the settlement of Syrian refugees in camps in the Southern border cities in Turkey (İçduygu & Nimer, 2020: 6). As over 92 percent of Syrian refugees in Turkey do not live in camps today, it can be said that camp-settlement plan is failed. Furthermore, research showed that Syrian refugees are subject to discrimination, xenophobia, inequalities, and hardships (Şafak-Ayvazoglu, Kunuroglu, & Yağmur, 2021; Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018a, 2018b, 2020). A significant portion of these negative experiences are the results of intergroup relations, whereas vast majority based on policy-based precarities.

Syrian refugees do not legally recognize as refugees in Turkey. Because of Turkey's (partial) agreement of the 1951 Geneva Convention with geographical limitation, only European asylum seekers can legally apply to Turkey as refugees. With this legal limitation of the state, Syrian refugees labeled as "people with temporary protection status", rather than "refugees". Indeed, this is not only an issue of labeling and have more complex consequences. Recognize people as "refugees" attributes some legal and social responsibilities to governments including financial support, health-care, and educational rights. In other words, absence of refugee status of Syrians in Turkey led the lack of accessing some fundamental rights and become barrier for the integration (İçduygu & Şimşek, 2016, 2020: 4; Şimşek, 2019). Nevertheless, along with thesis, I am using the term of "refugees" to avoid

methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003) which is known as a tendency to consider the boundaries of nation-states and their interests as boundaries of academic studies. This fallacy leads narrowing down of the research rationale according to boundaries of the nation-state narratives.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Turkish government adopted an open-door policy. In early days of influx, they called the Syrian refugees as “guests” and endorsed an accepting rhetoric by pointing Muslim brotherhood and common Ottoman heritage (Kaya & Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019; Kaya, Robert, & Tecmen, 2020; Lazarev & Sharma, 2017; Saraçoğlu & Belanger, 2019). Official discourse on those days was centering around the “Muslim brothers and sisters” rhetoric (Kaya & Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019), insomuch, deputy minister of 2014 called Turkish citizens who welcomed their Muslim brother and sisters as “Ansar” which is an Islamic reference for Muslims who opened their homes to the prophet Muhammad and his family in Medina. Despite the government's effort for creating a religion-based superordinate identity, most Turkish citizens have negative sentiments against refugees regardless of ideological positions or political party affiliation (Kaya et al., 2020). Almost 9 of the 10 Turkish citizens think that the government have a mistake with the open-door policy and should send the Syrian refugees back (Erdoğan, 2018). This thesis aims to make contribution previous research and discussion on the role of populism, national identity, and leadership on the public debates on Syrian refugees in Turkey (see İçduygu, Üstübcü, Aral, & Ayar, 2017; Kaya & Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019; Kaya et al., 2020; Yanaşmayan, Üstübcü, & Kaşlı, 2019).

One hundred twenty years after Marx’s “specter haunting Europe”, Ionescu and Gellner (1969) warned us for the arrival of “populist zeitgeist” (Mudde, 2004: 542) with the “specter haunting the world”. While globalization changes the world extremely rapidly, the specter of populism did not wait for too long and manifested itself in the electoral success of the populist parties all around the world in the last decade. The success of the radical right-wing populist parties in Europe such as the French National Front, The United Kingdom Independence Party, Danish People’s Party, and Alternative für Deutschland as well as populist causes such as Brexit in particular, made populism the rising topic of academic investigation. Furthermore, elections of the populist leaders in non-WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized,

Rich, and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) countries such as Turkey, Philippines, Brazil and India, make populism more a global issue.

In addition to approaching the populism as a context (e.g., *populist era*, *populist zeitgeist*) that surround all our social behaviours, this thesis also measures populism at the level of individual attitudes and examines the relationship between national identity and leadership, as well as the host society's support for pro-refugee policies in Turkey. Before these studies, you will read five theoretical and contextual chapters. While the first chapter will focus on what exactly populism is and what social psychological components it consists of, it will also trace populism in Turkey's political history. The second chapter will introduce the social identity approach, which is the theoretical basis of this thesis, and discuss the possibilities of addressing populism through the lens of social identity perspective. The third chapter, which is a continuation of the second chapter, will focus on the social identity approach to leadership and argue the shared features of populist leaders with this theoretical model. The fourth chapter will explore the social psychological variables that might be barriers for supporting pro-refugee policies in Turkey such as competitive victimhood, intergroup threat, political distrust, collective efficacy and intergroup emotions, Last, I will introduce the research context, its historical background in terms of populism, leadership, and national identity, and research hypothesis in the fifth chapter.

CHAPTER ONE

POPULISM

Although one of the first seeks in social sciences to mapping populism as a distinct phenomenon date back to Shils (1956), there was no consensus on the definition of populism until recently. One of the most important reasons for the absence of a universally recognized definition of populism, probably lies in its contextual nature and pejorative use. Populism manifests itself differently in many broad ways depending on the contextual condition. This “conceptual slipperiness” of populism (Taggart, 2000, 2004) led that Canovan (1999: 3) defined populism as a “notoriously vague term”. Mudde (2004) also defined populism as a thin-centered ideology¹. Ünüvar (2018: 7) reflected the vagueness of populism by counting the aspects that populism can take: a concept, a deviation, a moment, a symptom, an error, a lever, a propaganda tool that every ideology needs, an aspect of propaganda, an amplificatore that raises the power of the political voice and so on. Related to the natural potential of populism to show up in different and sometimes unique ways, the term of populism is used to describe leftist presidents in Latin America (de la Torre, 2010; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014) such as Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez; rising right-wing populist parties in Europe (Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013) such the French National Front and Alternative für Deutschland; and both democrat and republican political actors in the US (Kazin, 1995) which we witnessed the 2020 President Election of US.

The Cambridge Dictionary defines populism as “political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want” in very concentrate ways, however, conflicted ideas on the definition and components of populism are still going on. Challenges for describing populism and related debates has been revolving around three main issues: definition, origin, and impact. For the definition of the concept, various approaches have been adopted: as a political strategy, style, discourse, ideology, or combination of some of those. Mudde and Rovira

¹ The term of thin-centered ideology refers to the ideologies that address only part of the political agenda or specific political questions, rather than cover all aspects of life. While thick-centered ideologies such as socialism, fascism, or liberalism provide information and offer transformation for the economic and political system, thin-centered ideologies like populism have not far-reaching ideas for political life.

Kaltwasser (Mudde, 2004, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017) define it as an ideology. It also has been regarded as a strategy (Weyland, 2001), a frame or worldview (Caiani & della Porta, 2011), and as a political discourse (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019). Although there is a heated debate around the definition of populism, focusing the communalities and intersections of these already made definitions (see Elçi, 2019: 3) would help us to create a broad understanding as a first step of social psychology of populism.

Although countless answers have been given to the question of "what is populism", I would like to briefly focus on the populism conceptualization of four pioneer theorists in this section: Mudde, Weyland, Laclau and Ostigay. Mudde (2004) defines populism as an "ideology" systematically using the distinction between the *people* and the *elites*. Weyland (2001), on the other hand, conceptualize the populism as a strategy used by a personalistic leadership in order to come to power by un-established, unmediated, non-institutionalized connections with the crowds. Laclau (2005) defines the concept of populism as an antagonistic political logic that construct the "the people" and mobilizes them against an enemy, the "others". Ostiguy (2017) argues that populism should be understood as a political style that activates and politicizes widespread and deep-rooted socio-cultural hierarchies in a society, related to the people and social classes (for comparative analysis of these populism conceptualizations see Baykan, 2017, 2018). In this thesis, I am following the Mudde's ideational approach to address individuals' populist attitudes as a social-psychological concept. I am also using Weyland, Laclau, and Ostiguy's conceptualizations to deepen the understanding about the role of social identity perspective of populist leadership in terms of anti-immigration and leader-follower dynamics in Turkey.

Hence, scholars discussed populism as a unique set of ideas or ideology, in which politics are a *Manichean* encounter between two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: pure people and corrupt elites (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Bakker, Roodujin, & Schumacher, 2016; Barr, 2009; Canovan, 2005; Hawkins, 2009; Mudde, 2004, 2017; Stanley, 2008). This antagonism reflects anti-elitism which generally built on two social psychological mechanisms: 1) the relative deprivation that flows from the elite's repression on "silent majority" and 2) moralization through social identity processes (e.g., identity-leadership) to differentiate "us" and "them" by attaching

qualities such as purity and authenticity to “the people” on one hand, and immorality, non-nativism, and self-serving to “corrupt elites” on the other (Mudde, 2017).

These communalities among definitions of populism encapsulates the three key components of populist attitudes: *Manichean worldview*, *exaggerated belief in people’s will*, and *anti-establishment*. In accordance with the Manichean worldview, populists usually define the people of a country as a homogeneous (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008) or monolithic group (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Accordingly, populist ideologies defend the idea that a society is separated into two homogeneous groups in which one of them is good and the other is evil (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). In general, elites are put in the evil side against the good, honorable, and aggrieved people of the society (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Jansen, 2011). Manichean outlook of populism combines people-centrism and anti-elitism. Wirth et al. (2016, p.49) defined people-centrism as “the populist claim for unrestricted popular sovereignty which is closely connected to specific understanding and valorization of the people”. It is important to remind that “the people” is an empty signifier and construction of the political actors (Laclau, 2005). The claim that there is “the people” as ultimate decision-maker for politics who share common beliefs and concerns constructed by political actors to legitimize their governing or political choices. On the other hand, Aslanidis (2016, p.15) described anti-elitism as “references against slim minority of unacceptable power holders engaging in the misappropriation of popular sovereignty”. According to the populist understanding of anti-elitism, elites are against the popular will and they simply prefer to maintain their secret interests. It is important to remind that anti-elitism in vertical refers political or economic elites, whereas anti-elitism in horizontal axis targets the dangerous others such as refugees, which I will discuss it in following chapters.

The construction of the elites as a nemesis of the people’s will by populist actors is also closely related to the anti-establishment and the belief in people’s will. Although the rhetoric of a “general will” seems like a democratic discourse, populist actors may aim to represent general will of the people directly rather than indirectly. Thus, they may see the democratic institutions and values as a threat (see Barr, 2009; Schulz et al., 2018). To fight for these so-called democratic values and get a right for direct rule, they target the people’s feelings of (relative and nostalgic) deprivation and

point out the current political system as responsible for their deprivation which is closely related to the anti-establishment attitudes (see Golder, 2016; Pettigrew, 2017). All three components of populism point out the importance of us-them distinction as a socio-cognitive self-categorization process and followers-leader interaction as a function of the formation of common ingroup identity, hence, I believe that the social identity perspective may contribute a lot to the conceptualization of populism and its social-psychological impacts.



CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH

Social identity was defined as the knowledge of belonging to a social category or group accompanied with an emotional significance and value attribution to group membership (Tajfel, 1978). Shared emotions, values, opinions, and experiences help to build this kind of sense of belonging and strengthen the perception of being a member of a social group (Brewer, 2001; Hornsey, 2008; Reicher, 2004), in turn, it reinforces the prototypicality of in-group by creating a “we-ness” through embedding in-group norms (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992; Hogg, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

The basis of the social identity approach (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) is the assumption that group memberships make significant contributions to self-definition. People define themselves not only by their unique personal characteristics and interpersonal relationships (*I*), but also by the collective characteristics they feel belonging to (*we*). While the first part of this distinction represents personal identity and self, the latter reflects social identity and collective self (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Hogg & Williams, 2000; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). According to SIT (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) social behaviours diversify along a continuum between interpersonal behaviours and intergroup behaviours. While a purely interpersonal behaviour is formed only by the personal characteristics, and an interpersonal relationship is formed between two or more persons or shaped by personal identity; a purely intergroup behaviour is one that is determined only by a social category made up of two or more persons, in other words, collective identity. However, there is no such pure interpersonal or pure intergroup behaviours in our social world. Behaviours generally take place in a balance and continuity between these two extremes. Reicher (2001), on the other hand, agrees with this distinction made by social identity approach, but claims that this distinction has led to a misunderstanding. According to Reicher, all the selves of an individual are fundamentally social and related to a group context. Even for the personal self, one needs a reference point where one can define oneself with different characteristics from others, in turn, needs a group of people.

The social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) suggested that people have shared social identities based on group memberships in addition to their personal identities and collective behaviours become possible only if there is a shared social identity. Shared social identity is defined as a part of individuals' self-concepts that enable them to behave together within the social normative framework. To put it another way, an action can only be labelled as collective, when individuals first define themselves as a member of same group. (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Klandermans, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Hence, shared social identity provides definitions of appropriate and possible conduct and in turn enables people to act collectively in normative ways according to in-group norms. However, the enactment of in-group norms takes place within the inter-group contexts where out-groups might have different values or perceptions of these norms. These inter-group contexts are often created by the dynamic actions of out-groups such as the police and representatives of political authorities. According to the reconceptualization of the context and social identity of Elaborated Social Identity Model (Drury & Reicher, 2000), context and identity are intertwined moments in the same historical process, whereas social identity is defined as a way in which people comprehend their place in relation to others, as well as the actions that result from that place (Drury & Reicher, 2000, p. 581; Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2012, p.14). Hence, the social identity approach views social identity as a complex and dynamic social construct that can both cause and result of actions. (Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2002; Reicher, 1996; Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a) as well as leader-follower dynamics (Uysal & Akfirat, 2021b). Moreover, considering how social identity and context interrelated concepts, I believe that populism as a meta-context of today's politics needs to be explained within a social identity framework.

2.1. TOWARDS A SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH OF POPULISM

Social identity approach states that the group members strive to maintain a positive self-esteem through their collective self-definition by increasing intergroup differentiation (Jetten & Spears, 2003; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 2001; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). In other words, in-group favours its members and puts

them into a superior status; hence, it draws a boundary between *us* and *them*, a negative image distinguishes the ingroup from the outgroup who are perceived as threatening and evil (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is important to remind Laclau's populism conceptualization (2005) that refers populism as an antagonistic political logic that construct *the people* and mobilizes them against the *others, an enemy*. The populist logic always encourages the formation of antagonistic camps that hold a positive image in favour of the ingroup (Bos et al., 2020; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004; Schulz et al., 2018). For instance, studies showed that the AKP and President Erdogan have been frequently using the themes of "elites versus ordinary people" as well as "us versus others"; strategically appealing to the opposition of "Turkish society" versus "others hostile to national sovereignty" and defining them as homogeneous categories (Erçetin & Erdoğan, 2018; Erdoğan, Erçetin, & Thomeczek, 2018).

In recent years, there have been a significant number of studies addressing populism with a social identity perspective (e.g., Bos et al., 2020; Jetten, 2019; Jetten & Mols, 2021; Jetten, Ryan, & Mols, 2017; Hameelers, Reinemann, Schmuck, & Fawzi, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2016, 2020; Obradovic, Power, & Sheehy-Skeffington, 2020). For instance, Hameelers and de Vreese (2020) sought the ways to combine the basic propositions about populism with the premises of social identity theory. Accordingly, they posit that there are vertical and horizontal outgroups against "the ordinary and pure people"; and individuals' populist attitudes against these vertical and horizontal outgroups differ. It is important to remind that one of the most important features of populism is its elasticity, which is closely related to its over-emotionality function. Relatedly, populism is an emotion-focused ideology shaped according to the cultural-political-religious patterns (Öney, 2017) and overlaps with concepts such as post-truth and alternative facts (Hünler, 2019). Hence, the constructing and opposition to the elites, which is claimed by many theorists as an inherent feature of populism, may appear in different shapes in different contexts. Whereas ordinary people may be side by side with corrupt elites, the responsibility for intergroup injustices may be horizontally attributed to other social out-groups. From this point of view, it is argued that a dynamic social identity process appeared as an important component of populism.

Populist actors do not solely blame the elites, they also accuse refugees or other outgroups of taking from the in-group's resources (Jetten, 2019; Rothmund, Bromme, & Azevedo, 2020). In injustice, instability and crisis, minorities may become targets of populist rage as an outgroup (see Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömback, & de Vreese, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Jay, Batruch, Jetten, McGarty, & Muldoon, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2016). In these contexts, the enemy poses a threat from horizontal (e.g., refugees), not from vertical (e.g. elites) level. On this theoretical basis, the mechanisms of identification with the ingroup and differentiation from the outgroup become pivotal to both anti-establishment and exclusionary populist attitudes. The construction of the "pure, ordinary people" as a group can distinguish exclusionary populist views from basic nationalist attitudes. In nationalism, there is an ingroup that identifies with the nation-state, whereas, in populism, the inner group may be broader or narrower than the nation-state (see De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017; Erdoğan & Semerci, 2020).

Nevertheless, uniting citizens under a common ingroup identity is one of the crucial successes of populist leaders. In defining this common identity, it is very important to emphasize the shared grievances of the in-group and the systematic construction of *the others* who will scapegoat of these grievances (Hochschild, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Jay et al., 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Given the fact that, nativism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism are key correlates of populism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; van Assche, Dhont, & Pettigrew, 2019), national ingroup created by populist antagonism easily mobilized against the non-native others who are responsible for the shared grievances and threaten our nativeness (Bieber, 2018; Bonikowski, 2017; Staerke & Green, 2018). These others usually consist of both elites (vertical) and foreigners such as refugees (horizontal) (Bos et al., 2020; Brubaker, 2017; Hameelers & de Vreese, 2020). By positioning ingroup against both vertical and horizontal threats, populist actors unite the citizens under a common identity and create a moral majority that can overcome both economic and cultural divides (Jay et al., 2019; Jetten, 2019; Mols & Jetten, 2016). Hence, using shared grievances, populist actors frame the problems and inequalities created by the current liberal-democratic political system as the irreconcilable differences between social identities and group norms by boosting intragroup homogeneity and intergroup

differentiation, in line with social identity approach (Bos et al., 2020). In other words, while populism addresses individuals' shared grievances, it also promises positive self-esteem through social identity processes (see Uysal & Düzen, 2021). National identity is one of the most effective sources for populist hope that promise positive self-esteem through salvation from relative deprivation by challenging others (e.g., refugees).

2.2. THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

The social identity approach detailed above is one of the most effective theorizations in explaining anti-immigration in social psychology literature, and many researchers utilized the social identity approach to examine anti-immigration (e.g., Jetten, 2019; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). Many researchers have employed the social identity approach to analyse covariations between the national identification and anti-refugee attitudes. Some research on anti-immigration that utilize the social identity theory focused on the contents and its implications of national ingroup definitions. In other words, they focused on how individuals' anti-refugee sentiments differ according to the narrower or broader national ingroup definitions. Individuals who exclude refugees have a narrow definition of the national ingroup, and they exhibit higher hostility toward refugees (e.g., Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). Considering that the Turkish national identity was formed ethnically and includes only Sunni Turks (Ünlü, 2018), I will use national and ethnic identity terms interchangeably in this section, yet I will discuss the commonalities and distinctions in terms of anti-refugee attitudes.

Minority and majority ethnic group members form ethnic and national identities in ethnically diverse cultures (e.g., Phinney, 1990; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). These identities play vital roles in the lives of many individuals in regions where there are protracted and intractable conflicts between different groups such as Northern Ireland (e.g., McGlynn, Niens, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2004), Israel (e.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1999), and Turkey (e.g., Bağcı & Çelebi, 2017; Çoymak, 2018; Şen, 2017; Uluğ & Uysal, 2021; Yılmaz, Cesur, & Bayad, 2018). The national identity emerges as an identity that is based on citizenship and includes feelings of belonging

and loyalty to a nation-state (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010). Most studies conducted in different countries have shown that when the national identity is seen as a common ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) based on citizenship and promotes inclusive group memberships, it increases intergroup harmony (Vollhardt, Migacheva, & Tropp, 2009) and positive outgroup attitudes (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Mähönen, & Ketokivi, 2012) and leads to greater support of multicultural ideologies (Asari, Halikiopoulou, & Mock, 2008). However, people generally do not see the national identities as superordinate or common ingroup identities in the ethnically diverse nation-states. In these kinds of societies, in accordance with the social identity approach, the national identities are essentially the ethnic identities of the majority groups and are perceived as threatened social identity by majority group members, while for the minority groups it is the ethnic identity of the conflicted outgroup and very difficult to identify as a superordinate identity for minority group members. This is the reason why research found that national identities have negative impact on intergroup relations in these contexts.

Therefore, national identification plays a vital role in the communication between majority group members and refugees. For majority group members, national identification mostly means being less inclined to recognize refugees' rights because granting them may be a threat to the advantaged position of their groups (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Verkuyten, 2006). Thus, the national identification of majority group members usually correlates with more negative intergroup outcomes regarding migration contexts. For example, greater ethnic and/or national identification is associated with the low level of support for multiculturalism and minority rights (Çelebi, Verkuyten, & Smyrnioti, 2016; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006), greater ingroup favoritism (Masson & Verkuyten, 1993); higher prejudicial attitudes towards minorities (Stewart, Latu, Branscombe, Phillips, & Denney, 2012); higher prejudices against outgroups (Negy, Shreve, Jensen, & Uddin, 2003); more outgroup derogation (Mummendey et al., 2001); more intergroup hostility (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008); and higher inclination to protect ingroup interests (Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006) among majority group members. Hence, I hypothesized that national identification of Turkish participants is likely to predict lower support for pro-refugee policies in Turkey (*Hypothesis 1*).

Furthermore, Mudde (2007) posits that nativism is the fundamental component of populist ideologies and the Manichean outlook of populist attitudes is closely associated with the national identity. Accordingly, populists consider that politics are a war between good versus evil, i.e., *ordinary people* versus *elites*. This separation of good people versus evil elites may be swiftly transformed into members of our nation versus non-native agents by the effect of national identity (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Moreover, populism becomes more concrete when combining with other thick-centered ideologies such as nationalism (Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Hence, nativism and national identity are usually conveyed with anti-refugee sentiments in the *populist zeitgeist*. Thus, populist attitudes are likely to moderate the relationship between national identity and support for pro-refugee policies in Turkey. Specifically, I hypothesize that negative relationship between national identity and pro-refugee policies would strengthen for higher populist attitudes, whereas it would weaken for lower populist attitudes (*Hypothesis 2; moderation hypothesis*).

CHAPTER THREE

LEADERSHIP

In addition to ideational approach to populism (Mudde, 2004, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017), discursive approach to populism (Hawkins, 2009; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Laclau, 2005) presents the communalities with social identity framework of populism. For instance, Bos et al. (2020) argue three types of populist communication which create blame-shifting by social identity framing: anti-elitism, anti-immigration, and combination of the two. Accordingly, the answer to how populist messages of the leaders persuade voters may be social identity framed as populist communication that increases -the salience of- ingroup identification (with *the people*) and bolsters out-group derogation or intergroup hostility (Mols, 2012). In other words, there is a process that I called “identity-framed populism loop”. Populist leaders’ messages construct the in-group using shared grievances and blame-shifting (Bos et al., 2020; Hameelers, 2020; Hameelers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017) to communize worldviews by communicated group norms (Cohen, 2003) or “norm talk” (Hogg & Giles, 2012). Thus, salient ingroup identity increases similarity among in-group members and intergroup differentiation and, in turn, it strengthens credibility of messages coming from the in-group sources (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Mackie & Queller, 2000).

Relatedly, recent research showed that populist messages blaming the elites are more persuasive among the high identifiers (Hameelers & Schmuck, 2017). When populist actor address to the shared grievances or to the societal inequalities by blaming not only elites but also refugees (Bos et al., 2020; Hameelers & de Vreese, 2020), citizens who share the group memberships and see the populist leaders as a member of this group, internalize this populist messages and mobilize accordingly (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg & Reid, 2006; Reicher & Haslam, 2017). Hence, the persuasion and mobilization power of populist messages is related not only to the fact that members of the group share the same salient identity, but it is also related to what extent the people see the leader as a representative member of that group and attribute the related characteristics.

Leadership can be defined as a mode of relationship in which some people persuade others to accept new values, attitudes and goals and to strive to achieve those values, attitudes and goals (Hogg et al., 2006). From the past to the present, there have been many portraits of leaders: from Nietzsche's *Übermensch* who will not allow to anything to prevent himself from the satisfaction of his own desires; to LeBon's hypnotic crowd leader who controls the masses; from Weber's charismatic leader to Kohut's narcissistic leader. Since people have always been living in groups historically, the follower-leader relationship emerges easily and naturally (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). In this natural and immanent relationship, the leaders' effectiveness is mostly defined by their power to motivate the followers for collective goals by social scientists (e.g., Chemers, 2001). However, despite this definition of effectiveness based on social interaction and influence, the leadership theories often focus on the leader's personal characteristics. To deepen our understanding of the leadership, it is important not only to focus on the leader but also on the leader's interactions with the followers and the contextual features of this mobilization process. The social identity perspective has been able to bring together many traditional and current perspectives that may be related to the leadership including social categorization, collective self-perception, belonging, intergroup relations, and social influence (Haslam et al., 2011; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Turner et al., 1987).

The features and behaviours of populist leaders have been overwhelmingly studied with supply-side explanations which are concerned with the structural basis of electoral systems or communication strategies (Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). On the other hand, research on demand-side explanations focus on leadership indirectly in the sense that how political attitudes motivate people to vote for populist parties (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; van Hauwaert, Schimpf, & Azevedo, 2020). However, social identity approach of leadership (Haslam et al., 2011; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; Reicher et al., 2005) views leadership as a group process that is jointly produced by the leaders and the followers as the members of the same social group. Therefore, populist attitudes and outcomes such as nationalism and anti-immigration are seen as closely related with these group dynamics, rather than being related to the sole characteristics of the

leader. Following this approach and particularly the identity-leadership model, I argue the relationships between leadership and populist attitudes from an interactive analysis that includes both supply-side and demand-side explanations.

3.1. IDENTITY-LEADERSHIP MODEL

According to Haslam and colleagues (2011), an inclusive leadership theory should be able to explain why different contexts require different leadership styles; to analyse the leadership process within the framework of dynamic interaction between the leader and the followers; to include the transformative characteristics of the leaders and to explain how and under what conditions this transformation took place. They suggest that focusing on social identity processes and psychological groupness that include not only the followers but also the leaders may provide an answer for aforementioned necessities. According to Identity Leadership Model (ILM) by Haslam and colleagues (2011), leadership is a process that the followers and the leaders who are the members of same social group and share the same social identity produce together.

ILM suggested four characteristics that are required for the potential leader to be perceived by the followers as the leader of the group. First is *group prototypicality*. It refers that the leader should be seen as a representative of unique qualities that define the group, as having the basic features that distinguish the group from the other groups -especially the outgroups- and should be perceived as a model member of the group. Research reveals that the group prototypicality is vital in order to be recognized as the leader of the ingroup (Duck & Fielding, 2003; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). For instance, people see the prototypical members as more credible (van Dijke & de Cremer, 2008) and more capable (Steffens, Haslam, Ryan, & Kessler, 2013). They are seen as the most influential and effective leaders (Cicero, Pierro, & van Knippenberg, 2010; Fielding & Hogg, 1997; Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008; Giessner, van Knippenberg, & Sleebos, 2009; Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; van Knippenberg, 2011).

The second factor is *the identity advancement*. Haslam and colleagues (2011) defined the identity advancement as a leader's capacity to achieve and advance the group's key goals, tasks and favour the group in any matter, defend the group's interest

rather than personal interests even under threat, and preserve or enhance the group's prestige. Research showed that the potential leaders can become prominent if they can proceed in-group goals instead of their own goals (de Cremer, 2002; Haslam et al., 2011; Subašić, Reynolds, Turner, Veenstra, & Haslam, 2011; van Dick et al., 2018; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005; van Vugt & de Cremer, 1999).

The third is the leader's *identity entrepreneurship*. It reflects the leader's ability to bring people together by forming a shared sense of "we-ness", make all members of the ingroup feel that they are part of the same group, create and sustain the cohesion within the group, shape and clarify members' understanding of what ingroup represent and does not represent by defining and shaping ingroup norms, values, and ideals. Research showed that the leaders who can craft an understanding of the group, that is, a sense of us become preeminent among the members (see Gleibs, Hendricks, & Kurz, 2018; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Steffens et al., 2013).

The last one is *the identity impresarioship*. It is defined as a leader's capacity to "embedding a sense of us" by providing structures for operating the group well; to engage in activities and generate outcomes that allow the group members to live out their group membership in meaningful ways; to create material realities that are coherent with, and serve to embed, a social identity (Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014; van Dick et al., 2018). A leader's identity impresarioship reinforces the image of a leader's effectiveness (Bluedorn, Turban, & Love, 1999). Hence, these conceptualizations of social identity-framed leadership supported by many research such as on organizational psychology (Fladerer, Haslam, Steffens, & Frey, 2020; Steffens, Haslam, Peters, & Quiggin, 2020; for review see van Dick & Kerschreiter, 2016), sport and performance psychology (Leo, Garcia-Calvo, Gonzalez-Ponce, Pulido, & Fransen, 2019; Slater & Barker, 2019; Steffens, Slade, Stevens, Haslam, & Rees, 2019; Stevens et al., 2020), media psychology (Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a), and social movement studies (Selvanathan, Khoo, & Lickel, 2019; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021a).

3.2. TOWARDS AN IDENTITY-LEADERSHIP APPROACH OF POPULIST LEADERSHIP

By looking at populist leadership from a social identity perspective, we can find many examples referring to the dimensions of the ILM, especially ingroup prototypicality and identity entrepreneurship, in classical definitions and descriptions of populism. For instance, the effective populist leadership is generally defined as the ability of creating “we-ness” among targeted citizens, bond them as a homogeneous group by addressing their moral superiority, and ensure their identification with the leader (Aslanidis, 2018; Erçetin, 2020; Wodak & Krzyanowski, 2017), consistent with prototypicality and entrepreneurship. Moreover, recent research showed that voters of the populist leaders are convinced that their leaders are not part of the current political establishment which is seen as the reason of people’s deprivation. In other words, mobilization power of the populist leaders is lying in their ability to convince people that “*I am one among you, not them*” (Kotwas & Kubik, 2019).


In addition to being a prototypical member of *the people*, the populist leaders should be identity entrepreneurs who create homogenous and evil *others* and embed the image of these evil others among the understandings of in-group members (Pappas, 2014; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). Populist leaders who are identity entrepreneurs frequently use blaming discourse to build *others* as an outgroup and create intergroup differentiation between ingroup and outgroup (Hameelers, 2020; Hameelers & Schmuck, 2017; Lozada, 2014; Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou, & Exadaktylos, 2014). Blaming discourse both ensures the moral superiority of ingroup and justifies the exclusion of *others*. Moreover, blaming discourse may serve as a tool for creating intergroup threats among ingroup members (Hameelers et al., 2017; Hameelers & Schmuck, 2017; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbck, & de Vreese, 2017). Promoting fear-based scenarios through perceived intergroup threat and offering their leadership -representativeness of the people- as a hope is the core mechanism of the populist leadership; because “populist framing begins by making context-based inter-group distinctions” (Erçetin, 2020, p. 52).

Accordingly, I believe that social identity approach of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; Reicher et al., 2005) in general and identity-leadership model (Haslam et al., 2011) in particular, are most effective theorizations to capture support for populist-nationalist leaders (i.e., Erdoğan) in Turkey. Identity-leadership approach suggested that influential leaders, populist or not, play a key role in crafting a sense of “us”, bringing people together by inducing a shared social identity, clarifying and shaping people’s understanding of what group represents by defining norms, values, goals, and ideals of the in-group. In that sense, populist leaders may produce populist discourse related to refugee policies to generate anti- or pro-immigrant sentiments among in-group members. Given the fact that populist leaders enrich the nativist sentiments (Mudde, 2004), I hypothesize that support for Erdoğan and his government in terms of identity-leadership model (e.g., prototypicality, entrepreneurship, advancement; Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014) is likely to be associated with higher national identity (*Hypothesis 3*).

Moreover, I hypothesize that national would mediate the relationship between identity-leadership and supporting pro-refugee policies. The *mediation hypothesis* is based on the peculiarity of the current Turkish populist-nationalist leadership. Recent analyses showed that AKP government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have increased their populist-nationalist tone in last ten years and currently they are one of the most populist leaders around the world (Lewis et al., 2019). However, there is a unique aspect of AKP’s and Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric. In general, the anti-refugee discourse is placed at the centre in the speeches of populist leaders. Although nationalist-populist discourse generally occupies a large place in Erdoğan's speeches, there has been no anti-refugee discourse. On the contrary, many times he has boasted about how Turkey embraced the Syrian refugees. Thus, I believe that the direct impact of identity-leadership on supporting pro-refugee policies would be positive. However, despite Erdoğan’s and other AKP representatives’ pro-refugee discourses, Turkish people who have given support for AKP, overwhelmingly have strong nationalist attitudes, and they have anti-refugee sentiments. It is fair to argue that these strong nationalist attitudes are strongly boosted by the government nationalist policies and representatives’ nationalist discourses. Hence, I hypothesize that identity-leadership

indirectly predict lower support for pro-refugee policies through higher national identity (*Hypothesis 4; mediation hypothesis*; see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Path Diagram of the Conceptual Model



CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF (NOT) SUPPORTING PRO-REFUGEE POLICIES

4.1. COMPETITIVE VICTIMHOOD

In addition to national identity, I believe that people's belief that their group suffered more than the outgroup would predict people's attitudes towards pro-refugee policies in the conflicted contexts such as Turkey. Competitive victimhood is based on focusing suffers of ingroups while denying victimization of outgroups. We witnessed how victimhood experiences provoked by leaders who could convince their followers for political violence in different conflicted settings such as Rwanda and Yugoslavia led destructive consequences for intergroup relations.

Before intergroup competitive victimhood model (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Shnabel & Noor, 2012), researchers discussed the asymmetrical nature of victimhood narratives among conflicted groups. Bronfenbrenner (1961) argued how Americans and Soviets perceived each other as unreliable and barbaric during the cold war with the term *mirror image*. More recently, Bar-Tal (1998) explained how dominant narratives about the conflict in a society can create asymmetrical and conflicted understanding about the conflict by introducing the term of the *ethos of conflict*. Accordingly, while these dominant narratives are socially shared by advantaged groups, disadvantaged groups develop and endorse alternative narratives about the conflict (for research on dominant and alternative conflict narratives on Turkish-Kurdish conflict see Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Uluğ & Uysal, 2021). Research conducted on different conflicted groups showed that endorsing ethos of conflict predicted lower support for reconciliation and conflict resolution by creating social psychological barriers to peace (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

Intergroup competitive victimhood research argues that the disposition to see ingroup as the legitimate victim of the conflict generally one of the most important reason of maintaining conflict (see Noor, Brown, Gonzalez et al., 2008). Competitive victimhood, as an exclusive form of victim consciousness, predicted negative

outcomes of intergroup relations. For instance, competitive victimhood is found associated with lower intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation intention in different conflicted settings such as Israel, Chile, and Northern Ireland (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). Vice versa, reduction of competitive victimhood predicted higher intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation among Israeli Jews and Palestinians (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013). Similarly, reduction of competitive victimhood also found associated with greater trust and lower dehumanization of outgroup in Kosova (Andrighetto, Mari, Volpato, & Behluli, 2012) as well as higher empathy and trust in Chile (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Scholars also suggest that conflicted groups' biased beliefs on their victimhood lead attributing responsibility of their deprivations and sufferings to the outgroup and perceiving intergroup threat (Bar-Tal, 2000; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008)

One can ask why people compete to be a victim? There may be several reasons. One of the reasons is that competitive victimhood serves to attain third-party support (Adelman, Leidner, Ünal, Nahhas, & Shnabel, 2016) by gaining moral high ground. Our instinct is perceiving victims or members of victimized groups as innocent, whereas powerful groups as cold or immoral (Branscombe, Warner, Klar, & Fernandez, 2015; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). As social psychological research showed that individuals are more willing to help people if they see themselves as victims of competition or conflict (Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007; Zagefka, Noor, Brown, de Moura, & Hopthrow, 2011), it is logical that people use competitive victimhood to gain support of other groups. Moreover, competitive victimhood serves justifying intergroup violence committed by ingroup while denying ingroup responsibility and avoiding negative collective emotions such as collective guilt (Noor et al., 2012). That's why competitive victimhood can be adaptive for not only disadvantaged group members, but also members of advantaged or perpetrator groups (Reicher & Uluşahin, 2020; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). For instance, members of advantaged non-aboriginal groups endorsed the subjective and biased belief that Aborigines are advantaged position in Australia (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007). Moreover, this study showed that having this kind of inverted deprivation (e.g., minorities are advantaged) predicted lower support for pro-minority policies. As Turkey is the most affected countries of the Syrian civil war

beyond the Syria (UNHCR, 2018), it is expected that Turkish citizens may compete for victimhood with Syrian refugees to gain moral high ground, legitimize negative intergroup behaviors of ingroup, deny responsibilities to negative life conditions of Syrian refugees in Turkey, or protect realistic and symbolic ingroup interests. Hence, I hypothesize that participants who have higher competitive victimhood (e.g., Turkish citizens suffers more than Syrian refugees) would less likely support pro-refugee policies in Turkey (*Hypothesis 5*).

4.2. INTERGROUP THREAT

Intergroup threat is one of the variables most frequently associated with negative attitudes towards refugees in social psychology literature (e.g., Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Hadarics, Szabo, & Kende, 2020; Schmid, Hewstone, Küpper, Zick, & Tausch, 2014; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). Stephan and colleagues (Stephan & Renfro, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999) argued two dimensions of intergroup threat. While realistic threat reflects the concerns about controlling material resources and well-being of ingroup members, symbolic threat refers concerns based on ingroup's worldviews, social norms and value systems.

People's reactions against group-level threat are overwhelmingly negative intergroup behaviors such as aggression, hostility, and discrimination, regardless of threat type; in other words, both realistic and symbolic threats evoke negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors (see Chang, Krosch, & Cikara, 2016; Riek et al., 2006; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2016). There are several negative consequences of intergroup threat showed by social psychological research. When people perceive intergroup threat, higher discrimination (Cadinu & Reggiori, 2002) and ethnocentrism (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011), higher prejudice (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010) and intolerance (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004), anger (Skitka et al., 2004), contempt and disgust (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), and higher collective narcissism (Guerra et al., 2020) occurred. For instance, Aydın-Çakır and Uysal (2020) showed that threat-evoking social conditions increase Turkish people's prejudice level against Syrian refugees. Furthermore, research showed that

higher opposition to the policies that favor the outgroup are elicited as a response to the intergroup threat (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006; Sawires & Peacock, 2000). Hence, I hypothesize that participants who have higher perceived intergroup threat would less likely support pro-refugee policies in Turkey (*Hypothesis 6*).

4.3. COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

Group efficacy is defined as a belief that an ingroup can achieve social change through collective effort: in other words, it is a belief that “we can change the situation in favour of our group via collective action” (Bandura, 2000; Cohen-Chen & van Zomeren, 2018; Klandermans, 1984, 2004; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; Wright & Lubensky, 2009). The subjective resource mobilization approach (Klandermans, 1984) also defines collective efficacy as a sense of control, influence, strength, and effectiveness to meet the challenge of group problems. It is a sense of collective agency directed to social change, thus, a vast majority of research showed that it is highly associated with individuals' intention to participate in collective action (Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009; Uysal & Akfirat, 2021b; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas, 2013). Although collective efficacy generally conceptualized and measured change-focused (e.g., Cohen-Chen & van Zomeren, 2018; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2010), reactionary collective actions including rejecting pro-refugee policies and demanding anti-immigrant policies collectively are generally aimed to protect status quo, prevent liberal changes, or reverse the positive social changes (Drury, 2002; Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2019). However, rejecting pro-refugee policies can be seen as a way to show anti-government political stances in Turkey. Vice versa, supporting pro-refugee policies can be seen as pro-government political behaviour rather than a progressive collective action. This multifaceted nature of attitudes towards refugees in Turkey, make developing a specific hypothesis on the impact of collective efficacy on supporting pro-refugee policies in Turkey harder. Thus, I aim to explanatory investigate whether the participants who have high or low collective efficacy are clustered and differentiate in terms of supporting pro-refugee policies.

4.4. POLITICAL TRUST

Individuals' general satisfaction with the performance of representatives and their trust in institutions and the systems can be defined as political trust (Lindstrom & Mohseni, 2009). Political trust is an important component of social capital, hence, closely related to well-being and positive social identity (Acar & Uluğ, 2021). However, this social capital and its positive impact on mental health don't be distributed equally among members of society. People who are awarded by the political system generally display higher political trust (Ekici & Koydemir, 2014). Thus, in non-democratic systems that social capital is distributed more unequally than democratic ones, political trust becomes an important aspect of polarization. In Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime (Castaldo, 2018), people who are opponents to the current government showed lower political trust (Cinar & Kose, 2020). Previous research showed that lower political trust or political distrust is associated with protest voting and opponent collective actions (Acar & Uluğ, 2021; Otjes, Stroebe, & Postmes, 2020; Sika, 2020). Thus, people who have lower political trust in Turkey may consider not supporting pro-refugee policies as a playground for showing their opponent stances. Hence, I hypothesize that participants who reported higher political trust would be more likely to support pro-refugee policies (*Hypothesis 7*).

4.5. INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

Identifying oneself as a member of a certain group cognitively lead to group-based emotional experience (Maitner, Smith, & Mackie, 2017). One of the first scholars who pointed out the strong link between identity and emotion was William James, which he describes the emotion as a psychological element embedded in identity (James, 1890). People form appraisals, and thus emotions, on events and other individuals with a reference point or framework that utilize from their ingroup membership when their social identity is salient (see Mackie et al., 2000).

Previous research showed that group-based emotions are crucial predictors for intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011). For instance, fear and anger are

associated with political attitudes that lead to aggressive retaliation against outgroup attacks (Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007; Skitka et al., 2004). Moreover, group-based emotions such as hope, anger, hatred can make a great deal of impact on people's attitudes on peace and reconciliation (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Halperin, Russell et al., 2011).

Social identity amplifies the group-based emotions, especially the anger and injustice. The level of group identification determines the level of group-based anger and its behavioural consequences. For instance, group members who have higher identification indicate more group-based anger and risky behaviour intention (Moons, Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2009). Similarly, high-identifiers reported more anger and greater intention to attack to outgroups than low-identifiers (Mackie et al., 2000). Among participants who were randomly assigned as residents of the city versus students at the university, participants who were categorized as students feel more anger and injustice than those who were categorized as citizens when they read a proposal that offers a raise increase for students who come from different cities (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006). In another study, among the participants who were randomly assigned to the conditions that activated American identity or student identity, participants who were categorized as students report higher anger towards police and lower anger towards Muslims, than participants who were categorized as Americans (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). Group identity did not only moderate the level of group-based emotions, but it also determines which group-based emotion occurred according to level of identification. High-identifier group members feel anger when their team lost, whereas low-identifiers feel sadness rather instead anger (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007). Group status and perceived power of the outgroup also strongly related to group-based emotions. People feel greater anger when they perceive the outgroup weak, whereas they feel fear when outgroup is perceived as strong (Giner-Sorolla & Maitner, 2013; Mackie et al., 2000).

People feel group-based anger when they perceived the outgroup's actions as unjust or unacceptable in terms of ingroup norms (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). A vast majority of research conducted on group-based anger showed that it associated with ingroup bias, ingroup favouritism, harm-doing, confrontation intention, defensive reactions for ingroup sources, and protests outgroup (Gordijn et

al., 2006; Johnston & Glasford, 2014; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Although disgust leads the more radical intergroup confrontation such as violence or non-normative collective actions; group-based anger predicts support for normative encounters such as peaceful protest and signing petition (Tausch et al., 2011). Accordingly, I believe that political demands in direction to anti- or pro-immigrant policies can be seen as a normative form of collective action, thus, group-based anger would be highly associated with it. Although intergroup relations literature generally focused on the role group-based anger, I am also focussing the role of three negative collective emotions which strongly associated with anger: injustice (see Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Landmann & Rohmann, 2020; Tausch et al., 2011), frustration (see Kuppens & van Mechelen, 2007; Pawliczek et al., 2013), and despair (see Bowlby, 1973). I hypothesize that participants who reported greater group-based negative emotions against Turkish politics would be less likely to support pro-refugee policies (*Hypothesis 8*).

CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

5.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When we consider the similarity among the strategies and discourses of political parties from across the political spectrum, populism and nativism has been most essential constitutive elements of politics in Turkey (see Boyraz, 2020). Elçi (2019: 15) even described populist core of Turkish politics as an endemic issue. It is important to say that these similarities are beyond the right-left distinction and time. From the early republican period to junta governments, during post-coup eras, from the coalition governments to the AKP era, populism and nationalism have been widespread through political, economic, and cultural policies and discourses.

Almost a centenary general narrative of democracy in Turkey hinges on the effort to contextualize the peculiarity of populism: traditional-religious-provincial versus modernist-secularist-urban rather than the basic and simple distinction of populism, that is *the elites* versus *the people*. Despite the endless combination of these distinctions, constant dichotomies make the political narrative of Turkey populist. Such dichotomy was a fertile soil of right-wing populist discourse in Turkey (see Elçi, 2019: 5). Adnan Menderes, Süleyman Demirel, Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan built their discourses on the dichotomy of secularist state which does not represent “real national values” versus religious ordinary people (Çınar & Sayın, 2014; Sözen, 2020: 16). Although some scholars transcend these deep-seated dualities and claim that the term of populism is not an efficient theoretical tool to capture the complexity of intergroup conflicts and relations in Turkey (e.g., Erdoğan, 1998; Yalman, 1985), I believe that a historical summarization of right and left populism in Turkey is needed to develop an understanding for the role of populism, leadership, nationalism, and anti-immigration in today’s politics.

5.1.1. Leftwing Populism and Left Populist Leadership in Turkey

Some scholars argue that origin of the Turkish populism goes back to the Six Arrow Principles (*Altı Ok*) of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*; CHP) (Boyraz, 2020). One of these constituent codes of newly founded Turkish Republic was populism (*halkçılık*). However, some of them stated that Kemalist founders of Turkish republic approached *halkçılık* as a not-populist, even anti-populist framework (Sözen, 2020: 15). For founders and first politics of CHP did not use *national will* discourse within *Manichean* and pejorative terms, rather they used it as a homogenizing ideology, e.g., the whole society against external forces. Nonetheless, corporatist and solidarist tones of first years embodied a deliberative strategy for eliminating the development of class struggles (Dumont, 1984) and ethnic and religious movements (Boyraz, 2017). Since a “national will” discourse similar to the example given above is one of the main features of populism; it has been the dominant political theme since the foundation of the Turkish republic, (see Mudde, 2004, 2007).

Whether originated from constituent codes or not, CHP's populist rhetoric in the single-party era struggled with the economic hardships after Great Depression and Second World War. The fact that Democrat Party's (DP) successfully used “the national will” rhetoric, was one of the main reasons of the failure of CHP's populist strategy (Sunar, 2008). Challenges created by economic hardships and DP's strategic accusations on elitism and non-nativism were the underlying causes of CHP's electoral failures in the first years of multi-party period until the 1970s (Boyraz, 2020; Sözen, 2020).

In 1970s, Bülent Ecevit took the lead of CHP and reformulated the Kemalist framework of populism. Ecevit redescribed the political position and notion of the party as the Left of the Center (*ortanın solu*). This new conceptualization meant to reflect that CHP abandoned its traditional statist and anti-class Kemalist discourse and adopted more a social democratic discourse advocating a fairer distribution of income (Boyraz, 2020), which is a crucial feature of left populism, especially in Latin American populist tradition (Campos-Herrera & de Reguero, 2019; de la Torre, 2017; Rovira Kaltwasser & van Hauwaert, 2020). Hence, the oppressed workers and peasants were placed closer to the center in the populist construction of “the people”

in CHP's new left populist discourse. As a one of the crucial features of left populism, Ecevit used the rhetoric of Manichean moralization and attributed higher moral values such as solidarity, participation, and democracy to this new "people". Ecevit emphasized this re-shaped "people" and avoided mentioning the contradictions between religious conservatism and secular progressiveness, which were the most important reasons for the relative success of CHP in elections between 1970-1980 (Erdoğan, 1998).

In the post-coup era, Social Democrat Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Parti*, SODEP) and its successors Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*; SHP) also achieved relatively successful results in elections during 1980s, by adding a little more concern about the *Kurdish Question* and working-class problems into the new left populist appeal of Ecevit's CHP (Wuthrich, 2018). SHP won Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir municipalities in the 1989 election by softening the traditional Kemalist nationalism of the CHP, centering the urban working class' economic problems, criticizing Özal's anti-labor policies. By doing this, they maintained the populist discourse on moralization of "the people" which now included Kurds and urban working class, and the anti-establishment rhetoric through fairer distribution demand.

Despite the success of CHP in the 1970s and SHP in the 1980s, this new, more inclusive populist rhetoric (see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013) did not live long and the statist, nationalist, and secularist tradition dominated the Turkish left populism once again in the 1990s and 2000s (Bora, 2007; Boyraz, 2020). Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*; AKP) came to power in 2002 and the long-term "left populism in opposition era" started for all of the left populist actors in Turkey, for CHP in particular. In the 2000s and 2010s, AKP adopted "servant of the nation" discourse and criticized CHP's statist tradition as being non-nativist and elitist, a similar discourse to that of DP in the 1950s (Boyraz, 2020; Sözen, 2020: 20). Moreover, the struggle against this tradition was reflected as the main issue of the party during the first years of the ruling party's government. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who became the leader of the party in 2010, did not move beyond the traditional Kemalist nationalist-secularist lines. This strengthened the ruling party's counter-discourse (Yalman, 2009) and prevented the inclusive opposition for left populist actors such as

ethnic and religious minorities. As a result, even though AKP represents “the populism in power”, the ruling party has been using the “anti-establishment” and “nativist” rhetoric against the opposing CHP’s deep-seated hegemonic statist tradition.

5.1.2. Rightwing Populism and Right Populist Leadership in Turkey

It is quite interesting that Turkey experienced populism in power in the earlier and the latest days of the multi-party era with two parties that adopted important similarities in terms of right-wing populism as Sözen (2020) extensively discussed: DP and AKP. DP criticized CHP’s authoritarian single-party era policies and started to use “people’s will” discourse against them during the 1950 electoral campaign. Moreover, DP used anti-elitist discourse successfully against CHP by framing the people as peasants and merchants against ruling elites (Sayarı, 2002). Adnan Menderes one of the founders of the party, described CHP policies and political strategies as “enlightened despotism”. Similarly, CHP’s populism in the single-party period described later as intellectual populism (Toprak, 1992). This Manichean populist discourse created distinction between educated-secular-modernist-center and native-traditional-periphery (see Mardin, 1973) which has become a long-lived fertile ground for the *right-wing populism a la Turca* (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, & Elçi, 2021; Aytaç & Elçi, 2019; Elçi, 2019).

In the first post-coup era (1960-1980), ex-members of DP established the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*; AP). Suleyman Demirel was the leader of AP for a long time. Demirel determined the struggle of the people against elites which is a crucial component of contemporary populism as a primary theme of his speeches. He strengthened populist rhetoric which composed of Manichean and nativist elements with an additional “threat of Communism” discourse. In the end, Demirel achieved important electoral success in 1960s and 1970s with this traditional populist discourse.

After the 1980 Coup, AP and newly founded Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*; ANAP) represented center-right populism in 1980s. While AP used conservative nativist rhetoric in their populist discourse in 1960s and 1970s, ANAP adopted different strategies. Although ANAP was described as a conservative right-wing populist party following the tradition of DP and AP, they re-defined the

conservatism and chose a strategy that combines liberal economy and “national and native values” which occupies a very large place in the current populist strategy in Turkey. With this strategy, they were seen as “saviours” in the times of economic hardships and the transition to democracy again and achieved important electoral successes in 1980s.

In 2002, AKP won the majority in the parliament, just one year after its establishment. There is no full consensus among scholars on the party’s ideology and its place in terms of populism; for while the party adopted a social vision inherited from DP (Sözen, 2020) and an economic vision from ANAP, it also incorporated these different types of conservative populist visions with many innovations in terms of right-wing populist politics brought by the age. For instance, Sözen (2008, 2010) defined party’s political strategy as “neo-conservative populism”. Similar to Sözen, Yıldırım (2009) described it as “neoliberal populism”. Taşkın (2008, 2012) named the ideology of AKP as “conservative populism”. Another challenge for discussing the political stance of the AKP is whether the party is a continuation of the center-right tradition (DP, AP, and ANAP) or Islamist tradition (*Refah* and *Fazilet*) (see Hale & Özbudun, 2010; Heper, 2013). No matter how it is defined, political stance of AKP is mostly discussed within the triangle of populism, neoliberalism, and Islamist conservatism.

Although Erdoğan and AKP have been using very similar populist discourse with DP (Sözen, 2020), AKP’s populist rhetoric exceedingly hinge upon the construction of Manichean duality between non-native secular citizens and conservative Sunni Muslim Turkish citizens. In other words, while AKP chose authentic but oppressed people (Sunni Muslim Turkish citizens) as *the people*, they located the secular elites as *degenerated anti-people*. In this respect, AKP’s political strategy contains a crucial feature of populism for conservative masses which it defined as oppressed majority: redemptive promise (see Canovan, 1999) and anti-establishment (see Mudde, 2004). Hence, one of the most common populist themes recurring in Erdoğan’s speeches has been how Kemalist ideology oppressed the silent majority of Turkey from 1923 to 2002 and how AKP is representing the people’s will (Elci, 2019). I believe that social identity approach and ideational approach to populist

attitudes, may explain these central elements in AKP's populist rhetoric and its social psychological impacts.

5.2. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES

I believe that this thesis reflects three important and interrelated novelties in terms of relationships between national identification, leadership, populism, and attitudes towards immigration policies in Turkey. Firstly, our research focuses on the *populism in power*. The literature overwhelmingly focused on cases where the populist actors are in a war against the liberal democracies through anti-establishment rhetoric and its demand-side implications, such as the populist attitudes of individuals who vote for the populist opposition (e.g., Akkerman, Zaslove, & Spruyt, 2017; Bowler, Denemark, Donovan, & McDonnell, 2017; Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016). Although the examples of *the populism in opposition* are more common in contemporary politics, especially in Europe, there are many cases that populist actors gained power and took the lead (e.g., Trump in the US, Modi in India), and parties and leaders in power who are endorsing more populist politics in time (e.g., Erdoğan in Turkey, Putin in Russia) (see Aytaç et al., 2021; Lewis et al., 2019). Secondly, related to the first one, we focus on the effect of the populist leadership on *attitudes towards pro-refugee policies*, while research on populism and leadership generally focused on anti-refugee attitudes. Lastly, we tested our assumptions in a unique context where the majority national group and the refugees share the same religious identity as a potential superordinate identity (i.e., Muslim Turks and Syrians), while in Europe, the UK and the US, the research on populism, national identification, and anti-immigration are mainly conducted in an environment where the majority group and the refugees have conflicted religious identities.

Related to these three novelties of the thesis, Turkey appeared as a unique case in terms of the intersection of populism, leadership, identity, and attitudes towards the refugees. Across two cross-sectional survey studies, I investigate the role of national identity, support for Erdoğan and his government in terms of identity-leadership, and populist attitudes in support for pro-refugee policies among Turkish citizens by using variable-centered approach. Furthermore, I aim to focus on the role of national

identity, competitive victimhood, intergroup threat, political trust and intergroup emotions on populist attitudes, identity-leadership, and supporting pro-refugee policies by using person-centered approach. The hypotheses of two studies can be summarized as below:

- 1) Stronger identification with Turkish national identity would predict lower support for pro-refugee policies.
- 2) Populist attitudes would be a moderator between national identity and pro-refugee policies.
 - a. The negative relationship between national identity and pro-refugee policies would strengthen for higher populist attitudes, whereas it would weaken for lower populist attitudes.
- 3) Higher identity-leadership would predict higher national identity.
- 4) National identity would mediate the relationship between identity-leadership and support for pro-refugee policies.
 - a. Indirect effect of identity-leadership on supporting pro-refugee policies through national identity would be negative.
- 5) Participants who have higher competitive victimhood (e.g., Turkish citizens suffers more than Syrian refugees) would be less likely support pro-refugee policies in Turkey.
- 6) Participants who have higher perceived intergroup threat would be less likely support pro-refugee policies.
- 7) Participants who have higher political trust would be more likely to support pro-refugee policies.
- 8) Participants who have higher negative intergroup emotions (e.g., anger, injustice, frustration, and despair) would be less likely to support pro-refugee policies.

CHAPTER SIX

STUDY ONE

The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Faculty of Letters at Dokuz Eylül University.

6.1. METHOD

6.1.1. Participants and Procedure

By using convenience and snowball sampling via social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, we aimed to reach 18+ Turkish participants. We collected data in March 2020 using Google Forms. All participants completed the online questionnaire voluntarily. A total of 190 self-identified Turkish participants were recruited. Seventy-three participants self-identified as female, 111 as male, and six as other. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 62 years ($M = 28.7$, $SD = 7.35$). Fourteen participants had completed a Ph.D. degree, 43 an MSc degree, 105 a university degree, 26 high school, and two primary school. We asked the participants where they position themselves politically (1 = *radical left*, 5 = *centrist*, 10 = *radical right*). On average, the participants leaning politically moderate left ($M = 3.46$, $SD = 2.04$)

6.1.2. Measures

Except for the demographic items mentioned above, all items used 5-point response scales (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*).

6.1.2.1. Support for Pro-refugee Policies

Participants' views on the policies about Syrian refugees in Turkey were assessed by 7 items that generated by the researchers. These items are

“Syrian refugees who live in Turkey should be given citizenship,” “Syrian refugees should be sent back to their country,” “Syrian refugees should only live in

camps,” “Turkey has never welcomed Syrians as asylum seekers,” “Until the crisis in their country is resolved, Syrians should stay as long as they want as refugees,” “Policies should be developed to ensure that refugees are placed across the country and work and adapt to society” and “Syrian refugees should be given educational opportunities”. These items together formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .89$), loading one factor (59.48%) (Barlett’s test of sphericity: $\chi^2(21) = 642, p < .001$) according to findings of principal component analysis. Factor loadings of items ranges from .68 to .83.

6.1.2.2 Populist Attitudes

Although there are important populist attitudes scales in the political science and psychology literature, most of them created for liberal-democratic contexts and that’s why overwhelmingly focus on anti-establishment sentiments and relative deprivation that target liberal democratic institutions in Europe (see Akkerman et al., 2014; Rothmund et al., 2020; Spruyt, Keppens, & van Droogenbroeck, 2016). However, Turkey is an example of *populism in power* context as well as under the rule of a competitive authoritarian regime. Hence, the items about the anti-establishment and relative deprivation are mostly endorsed by leftists and opponents of the current government in Turkey. In order to include both right and left populism in Turkey, I used the relevant items from the scales I mentioned above and contextualized them, rather than using one of these scales.

I assessed populist attitudes with the 8 items. These items cover three specific, but inclusive aspects of populism described in the literature of psychology and political science: anti-establishment sentiments, belief in the will of the people, and Manichean worldview (see Table 1). These items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .70$; McDonald’s $\omega = .73$). The mean of inter-item correlation is .40. We carried out Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) via R Lavaan as the estimator in order to select the best indicators for each dimension and estimate the structure of Populist Attitudes Scale. CFA is a method for assessing the construct validity of measures. According to Byrne (2001), we aimed to less than 3 for χ^2/df ratio. Furthermore, to the excellent construct validity we expected higher than .95 for Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), the

Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and lower than .06 for Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Hu & Bentler, 1999). We performed CFA in order to assess goodness of fit statistics. Fit indexes indicated a good fit for the 3-factor model: $\chi^2 = 30.822$, $df = 17$, GFI = .96, CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .065, which reach an excellent fit, following the modification indices suggestions, we allowed to correlate a pairs of item error (Item 2 and Item 3): $\chi^2 = 23.639$, $df = 16$, GFI = .97, CFI = .98; TLI = .97, RMSEA = .050. The means of the factor loadings are .79 for anti-establishment, .64 for belief in people's will, and .71 for Manichean worldview. The findings of CFA showed that three social-psychological aspects of populist attitudes can be measured with the 3-factor structure scale.

6.1.2.3. Identity-Leadership Inventory

Steffens and colleagues (2014) developed the Identity-Leadership Inventory (ILI) to measure individuals' perspectives and support towards a particular leader in terms of four dimensions: group prototypicality, identity advancement, identity entrepreneurship, and identity impresarioship. Accordingly, success of effective leaders depends on whether the followers perceive themselves as 'one of us' - as a group representative (identity prototypicality), as 'crafting a sense of us' (identity entrepreneurship), as 'doing it for us' (identity advancement), and as 'embedding a sense of us' (identity impresarioship). In first study I used first three dimensions of ILI (identity prototypicality, identity entrepreneurship, and identity advancement). While the original scale has 15 items (four items for identity prototypicality, four items for identity entrepreneurship, four items for identity advancement, and three items for identity impresarioship), I used a version consisting of 12 items in the current study. Since Turkey's decision to change its regime into a presidential system in 2017, the president of the country can also be a president of a political party. Considering the items of the identity impresarioship sub-dimension of the Identity-Leadership Inventory (e.g., "This leader devises activities that bring [the group] together", "This leader arranges events that help [the group] function effectively"), I believe that these items are not fitted the context since only the members or supporters of AKP, rather

than citizens in general, participate in Erdoğan's activities, events, and meetings. Hence, I decided to use a 12-item version of the Identity-Leadership Inventory.

Table 1: Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Populist Attitudes, Study 1

	Factor Loading	SE	<i>p</i>
People's Will			
1. The people, rather than politicians, should make our most important political decisions.	.71	.09	< .001
2. The people should not be governed by elected representatives; they should directly govern themselves.	.74	.11	< .001
3. I'd rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than a professional politician.	.47	.10	< .001
Anti-Establishment			
4. The politicians talk too much and do too little work.	.73	.06	< .001
5. Political parties are only interested in my vote, not my thoughts and demands.	.80	.06	< .001
6. Politicians, who pretend to be one of us until they are elected, begin to consider their interests as soon as they are elected.	.83	.06	< .001
Manichean Worldview			
7. In today's world there is a war between good and evil, and people must choose one.	.80	.21	< .001
8. Politics is ultimately the struggle between good and evil.	.61	.16	< .001

Created by the author

Following the procedure used in similar studies that focus on followers' evaluations of group leaders (e.g., Uysal & Akfirat, 2021b), the participants were required to evaluate a leader who they see as responsible for refugee policies in Turkey. The participants were asked to rate this leader based on group prototypicality, identity advancement, and identity entrepreneurship, as in other research that focus on followers' judgments of group leaders (e.g., Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008). Sample items for ingroup prototypicality, identity advancement, and identity entrepreneurship read as "*This leader embodies what Turkish citizens stand for,*" "*This leader acts as an advocate for the Turkish citizens*" and "*This leader creates a sense of cohesion within the Turkish citizens*". The items together formed reliable subscales ($\alpha = .81$ for identity prototypicality; $\alpha = .92$ for identity advancement; and $\alpha = .72$ for identity entrepreneurship) and a reliable scale as whole ($\alpha = .89$).

6.1.24. National Identification

Turkish identification was assessed with 7 items which were adopted from the 5 items of Leach et al.'s (2008) and the 2 items of Mael and Ashforth (1992). These items are "*I am glad to be a Turkish citizen,*" "*When someone praises the Turkish citizens, it feels like a personal compliment,*" "*Being a Turkish citizen is an important part of myself,*" "*When I think the fact that I am a citizen of this country, I generally feel good,*" "*I feel a bond with the Turkish citizens,*" "*I have a lot of common with the Turkish citizens*" and "*When someone criticizes the Turkish citizens, it feels like a personal insult*". The items together formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .93$), loading one factor (71.2%) (Barlett's test of sphericity: $\chi^2(21) = 1048, p < .001$) according to findings of principal component analysis. Factor loadings of items range from .77 to .88.

6.1.25. Intergroup Threat

Perceived intergroup threat because of Syrian refugees in Turkey among majority group members was measured using 9 items that included both realistic and symbolic threat which were adopted from Stephan and Stephan's (2000) intergroup

threat scales. These items are *“Syrian refugees are taking jobs from Turkish citizens,”* *“Crime rates are increasing in the environments where Syrian refugees are settling,”* *“Having a large number of Syrian refugees in our country corrupts our values,”* *“Syrian refugees threaten the security of our country,”* *“Syrian refugees spoil our lifestyle,”* *“Syrian refugees are endangering the country's economy,”* *“Syrian refugees increase poverty,”* *“Syrian refugees cause an increase in societal problems”* and *“Syrian refugees are a threat to our country's culture”*. The items together formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .97$), loading one factor (80.5%) (Barlett's test of sphericity: $\chi^2 (36) = 2012.072, p < .001$) according to findings of principal component analysis. Factor loadings of items range from .87 to .92.

6.1.2.6. Competitive Victimhood

Intergroup competitive victimhood was assessed using 5 items that were adopted from Noor, Brown, Gonzalez et al. (2008) and Shnabel et al.'s (2013) competitive victimhood scales. Items read as *“Since Syrian refugees came to Turkey, Turkish citizens have suffered more than Syrians,”* *“Turkish citizens need more support than Syrians refugees,”* *“Since Syrian refugees came to Turkey, Turkish citizens experience more victimhood than Syrian refugees,”* *“The trauma of the migration has been more severe for Turkish citizens than it was for Syrian refugees”* and *“Turkish citizens have paid more price for the Syrian civil war than the Syrian refugees”*. The items together formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .95$), loading one factor (84.03%) (Barlett's test of sphericity: $\chi^2 (10) = 959.711, p < .001$) according to findings of principal component analysis. Factor loadings of items ranges from .88 to .93.

6.2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Our analytical strategy included three set of analyses. Firstly, preliminary analysis including descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations were conducted. Second, we performed LPA to examine whether the participants were divided into distinct subgroups in terms of national identity, intergroup threat, and competitive

victimhood levels, in turn, we compared the populist attitudes, identity-leadership, and supporting the pro-refugee policies of these profiles. Last, we conducted mediation and moderated mediation analysis via Hayes' Macro PROCESS to examine the degree to which the identity-leadership and national identity would predict supporting pro-refugee policies (*Hypotheses 1 and 3*); to explore whether the populist attitudes moderate the relationship between the national identity and supporting pro-refugee policies (*Hypothesis 2*); and to test indirect effect of identity-leadership on supporting pro-refugee policies through national identity (*Hypothesis 4*).

6.2.1. Preliminary Analysis

In the preliminary analysis, we examined relations between the variables. Correlations among the variables and the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Inspection of the means showed that, on average, reports of national identification ($M = 2.39$) and support for the populist leader ($M = 1.73$) were below the midpoint of the scale, whereas mean reports of the populist attitudes ($M = 3.66$) and the support for pro-refugee policies ($M = 3.55$) were above the midpoint of the scale. Moreover, bivariate correlations indicated that higher national identification correlated with lower support for pro-refugee policies. At the same time, more support for the leader associated with greater support for pro-refugee policies.

6.2.2. Latent Profile Analysis

Afterwards, in order to examine the latent profiles of the participants in terms of national identification, intergroup threat and competitive victimhood levels, LPA was performed by using Latent GOLD version 4.5 (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). In other words, we explored which distinct subgroups the participants were divided into, in terms of national identification, intergroup threat, and competitive victimhood. Although in many social psychological research, it is assumed that the population is homogenous, we acknowledged that Turkish society is consisted of a heterogeneous population that have different perspectives in terms of national identification and Syrian refugees in general. As LPA tests the presence of subpopulations in particular samples, it gives a great opportunity to examine this heterogeneity and its

consequences. In doing so, we were also able to investigate whether subgroups differing in terms of the levels of national identification, threat perception because of Syrian refugees, and competitive victimhood differ in terms of populist attitudes, identity-leadership, and supporting pro-refugee policies.

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations in Study 1

Variables	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Support for Pro-refugee Policies	3.54 (1.08)	-	.01	.02	-.45***	-.88***	-.86***
2. Populist Attitudes	3.66 (.65)		-	-.11	-.07	.03	.09
3. Identity-Leadership	1.73 (.73)			-	.35***	.02	-.01
4. National Identification	2.39 (1.39)				-	.48***	.45***
5. Intergroup Threat	2.60 (1.39)					-	.87***
6. Competitive Victimhood	2.17 (1.32)						-

Note. *** $p < .001$

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The analysis was carried out based on the national identification, intergroup threat, and competitive victimhood scores only. According to lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz, 1978), 8-cluster solution fit the data better than others. However, we decided to merge two profiles, for these two profiles indicated lower national identification, intergroup threat and competitive victimhood with very small mean differences, therefore we had seven profiles. As summarized in Table 3 and Figure 2, largest subgroup included participants who have lower national identification, intergroup threat, and competitive victimhood (*Lows*: 36%), whereas second largest group included participants who have moderate national identification, intergroup threat and comparative victimhood (*Moderates*: 16%). Participants who have lower national identification, but moderate intergroup threat and competitive

victimhood appeared as third largest profile (*Moderates with Low Identity*: 13%). The smallest group is consisted of participants who have lower national identification while having higher intergroup threat and competitive victimhood (*Highs with Low Identity*: 6%).

Table 3: Sizes and Features of Latent Profiles, Study 1.

	National Identification (<i>M</i>)	Intergroup Threat (<i>M</i>)	Competitive Victimhood (<i>M</i>)	Size (%)
Lows	1.58	1.22	1.17	69 (36.3%)
Lows with Moderate Threat	1.90	2.34	1.23	23 (12.1%)
Lows with High Identity	3.98	1.47	1.35	13 (6.8%)
Moderates	3.40	3.57	2.67	30 (15.8%)
Moderates with Low Identity	1.94	3.40	2.83	24 (12.6%)
Highs	4.21	4.80	4.51	19 (10.0%)
Highs with Low Identity	1.76	4.68	4.32	12 (6.3%)

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
To compare the populist attitudes, identity-leadership, and supporting pro-refugee policies of latent profiles, we conducted One-Way ANOVA analyses.² Results showed that significant differences in identity-leadership ($F(6,183) = 5.037, p < .001$) and supporting pro-refugee policies ($F(6,183) = 102.944, p < .001$), whereas there is no significant difference in the populist attitudes between profiles ($F(6,183) = 1.972, p = .072$).

Both *Lows* ($M = 1.56$) and *Highs with Low Identity* ($M = 1.73$) had significantly lower identity-leadership scores than both *Moderates* ($M = 2.08$) and *Lows with High Identity* ($M = 2.29$). Furthermore, both *Lows* ($M = 4.48$) and *Lows with Moderate Threat* ($M = 4.00$) had shown significantly more support for pro-refugee policies than all other profiles, except for *Lows with High Identity* ($M = 4.24$). Accordingly, it would be fair to argue that the individuals who have higher national identification do not

² We conducted Levene's test to show homogeneity of variances across profiles. Accordingly, the variance across profiles are equal for supporting pro-refugee policies, $F(6,183) = 1.782, p = .105$ and populist attitudes, $F(6, 183) = 1.807, p = .100$; whereas the variance are not equal for identity-leadership, $F(6, 183) = 6.483, p < .001$.

inherently show lower support for pro-refugee policies. Moreover, both *Highs* ($M = 1.83$) and *Highs with Low Identity* ($M = 2.05$) showed significantly lower support for pro-refugee policies than all of other profiles. This finding also showed that individuals who have lower national identification do not inherently show higher support for pro-refugee policies.

Figure 2: National Identification, Intergroup Threat, and Competitive Victimhood Scores of Profiles, Study 1.




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6.2.3. Mediation Analysis

We first tested the mediating role of the national identity in the relationships between identity-leadership and supporting pro-refugee policies using PROCESS Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrapped samples (see Hayes, 2018). As Figure 3 illustrated, results indicated that identity-leadership was a significant predictor of national identity, $b = .537$, $SE = .106$, $p < .001$, and that national identity was a significant predictor supporting pro-refugee policies, $b = -.498$, $SE = .065$, $p < .001$. Identity-leadership was still a significant direct predictor of supporting pro-refugee policies once national identification was included in the model, $b = .299$, $SE = .101$, $p = .003$,

supporting *Hypothesis 3*. The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 samples; results indicated a significant indirect effect of support for the leader in supporting pro-refugee policies, $b = -.268$, $SE = .073$, 95% CI $[-.42, -.13]$, supporting *Hypothesis 4*. As I hypothesized, indirect effect of identity-leadership on supporting pro-refugee policies through national identity was found negative, while direct effect of identity-leadership was positive.

Figure 3: Results of Mediation Analysis, Study 1.



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
Notes. 95% CI $[-.42, -.13]$ for indirect effect; *** $p < .001$

6.2.3. Moderated Mediation Analysis

We later conducted a moderated mediation analysis using PROCESS Model 14 (see Hayes, 2018). Specifically, we investigated whether populist attitudes moderate the relationships between national identity and supporting pro-refugee policies. The results indicated that the interaction between national identification and supporting pro-refugee policies was significant, $b = -.245$, $SE = .105$, $p = .021$, suggesting that populist attitudes moderates the effect of national identification for

supporting pro-refugee policies (see Figure 4). While the negative impact of national identity on supporting pro-refugee policies was very high ($b = -.651$, $SE = .092$, $p < .001$) for high populist attitudes, it was relatively lower ($b = -.491$, $SE = .065$, $p < .001$) for moderate populist attitudes and was lowest level ($b = -.333$, $SE = .096$, $p < .001$) for low populist attitudes, supporting *Hypothesis 2a*. In sum, findings of mediation and moderated mediation analysis supported our *mediation and moderation hypothesis*.

Figure 4: The Interaction of Populist Attitudes and National Identification on Supporting Pro-Refugee Policies, Study 1.



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The findings of first study implied that it would be necessary to extend these findings and testing our hypotheses with a larger and different sample. Study 1 also showed that national identity, intergroup threat, and competitive victimhood emerged as barriers for supporting pro-refugee policies. In Study 2, we sought to extend these findings by examining how political trust, collective efficacy, and negative intergroup emotions impact individuals' political position on policies regarding Syrian refugees.

We did not include competitive victimhood and intergroup threat in Study 2 to avoid multicollinearity since they showed strong correlations with the outcome variable.



CHAPTER SEVEN

STUDY TWO

7.1. METHOD

7.1.1. Participants and Procedure

Since participants of Study 1 biased in terms of political orientation ($M = 3.46$ in the scale from 1 = left to 10 = right), in this study we targeted the university students that may provide politically heterogeneous sample than social media. We collected data from undergraduate students of the Dokuz Eylül University Psychology Department via distributing the link in some digital communication groups used exclusively by the students of the institution. Data were collected in April, 2020 using Google Forms. We recruited 306 self-identified Turkish citizens. Seventy-six participants self-identified as male, 228 as female, and two did not respond. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 43 years ($M = 21.03$, $SD = 2.33$). Regarding our aim for reaching more politically heterogeneous sample, mean level of political orientation was found 3.83 in the scale from 1 = left to 10 = right. Moreover, in comparison with first study, we obtained relatively more balanced and generalizable distribution in terms of political orientation: %49.7 of participants were left-wing, %45.7 were moderates, and %4.6 were right-wing (in Study 1; %62.7 of participants were left-wing, %31.4 were moderates, and %5.9 were right-wing).

7.1.2. Measures

We used the same measures that were used in Study 1 in order to assess supporting pro-refugee policies ($\alpha = .75$) and populist attitudes ($\alpha = .66$). Although Study 1 provided important results for LPA, I decide to focus variables that more directly associated with individuals' political stances such as political trust, efficacy, and collective emotions against the government. All items used 5-point response scales (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*).

7.1.2.1. Identity-Leadership Inventory

We used the 4 items-short form of the ILI (Steffens et al., 2014; van Dick et al., 2018) with the same procedure of the Study 1. These items are “*This leader is a model member of the Turkish citizens.*”, “*This leader acts as a champion for the Turkish citizens.*”, “*This leader creates a sense of cohesion within the Turkish citizens.*”, and “*This leader creates structures that are useful for the Turkish citizens*” ($\alpha = .90$).

7.1.2.2. National Identification

Turkish identification was assessed by adapting four items from Thomas and colleagues (2015). These items were “*I feel strong ties with other Turkish people,*” “*In general, I am glad to be a Turkish,*” “*Being a Turkish is an important part of myself*” and “*I have a lot of common with Turkish people*” ($\alpha = .89$).

7.1.2.3. Political Trust

Participants’ trust level to the current government was measured using 3 items. We asked participants how much they trusted to: i) president, ii) ministers, and iii) government ($\alpha = .91$).

7.1.2.4. Collective Efficacy

We assessed collective efficacy using 6 items adopted from van Zomeren et al. group efficacy scale (2010). These items are read as “*Together, we can influence political decisions,*” “*We can change many things by voting,*” “*If we request all together, we can ensure that some mistakes are corrected,*” “*With our votes, we can ensure that a leader who represents us is elected,*” “*I believe we have an important impact on political decisions*” and “*It’s up to us to change something*”. The items together formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .88$), loading one factor (62.48%) (Barlett’s test

of sphericity: $\chi^2 (15) = 914.250, p < .001$) according to the findings of principal component analysis. Factor loadings of items range from .74 to .83.

7.1.2.5. Negative Intergroup Emotions

We asked participants that how strongly they felt the following emotions in recent weeks when they considered the politics and politicians in Turkey: *anger*, *injustice*, *despair*, and *frustration* ($\alpha = .85$).

7.2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Like the Study 1, our analytical strategy included four groups of analyses: preliminary analysis, LPA, mediation and moderated mediation analysis.

7.2.1. Preliminary Analysis

Preliminary analysis examined the relations between the variables. Correlations among the variables and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4. Inspection of the means showed that, on average, identity-leadership ($M = 2.10$) was below the midpoint of the scale, whereas mean reports of national identification ($M = 2.91$), populist attitudes ($M = 3.36$) and supporting pro-refugee policies ($M = 2.82$) were above the midpoint of the scale. Moreover, bivariate correlations indicated that higher populist attitudes correlated with higher support for pro-refugee policies. At the same time, greater identity-leadership scores associated with higher support for pro-refugee policies.

Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations in Study 2

Variables	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Support for Pro-refugee Policies	2.82 (.82)	-	-.13*	-.07	-.09	.09	.03	-.16**
2. Populist Attitudes	3.37 (.58)		-	-.25***	-.03	-.30***	.13*	.28***
3. Identity-Leadership	2.10 (.98)			-	.42***	.68***	.10	-.56***
4. National Identification	2.91 (1.05)				-	.52***	.23***	-.36***
5. Political Trust	1.99 (.95)					-	.04	-.68***
6. Collective Efficacy	3.79 (.86)						-	.05
7. Negative Intergroup Emotions	4.20 (.71)							-

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

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7.2.2. Latent Profile Analysis

To examine the latent profiles of participants in terms of national identity, political trust, collective efficacy and negative intergroup emotions (e.g., anger, injustice, despair, and frustration) levels, LPA was performed by using Latent GOLD version 4.5 (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). In other words, the analysis was carried out basing only on the items of national identification, political trust collective efficacy, and negative intergroup emotions. According to lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwartz, 1978), 8-cluster solution fit the data better than others. However, we combined two pair of profiles due to similar mean scores on national identification, political trust, collective efficacy, and negative intergroup emotions. Finally, we reached 6-cluster model for Study 2. As summarized in Tables 5 and 6 as well as Figures 5 and 6, while the largest group consisted of participants who have relatively moderate national identification, low political trust, high collective efficacy,

and high negative intergroup emotions (30.4%), second larger group comprised participants who have moderate scores for all variables (30.1%).

Table 5: Sizes and Mean Scores of Profiles, Study 2

	National Identity	Political Trust	Collective Efficacy	Negative Intergroup Emotions
1. Moderate Identity; Low Trust; High Efficacy (30.4%)	2.76	1.40	4.09	4.62
2. Moderates (30.1%)	3.53	2.80	3.54	3.71
3. Moderate Identity and Trust; High Efficacy (16.0%)	3.57	2.56	4.74	3.85
4. Low Identity and Trust; Moderate Efficacy (11.8%)	1.38	1.00	3.73	4.73
5. Mild Identity and Efficacy; Low Trust (9.2%)	2.45	1.52	2.29	4.56
6. Milds (2.6%)	2.13	2.04	2.90	3.53

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In order to compare populist attitudes, identity-leadership, and supporting pro-refugee policies of the latent profiles, we conducted One-Way ANOVA analyses³. Results showed that there are significant differences in respect to populist attitudes ($F(5, 300) = 1.418, p = .001$) and identity-leadership ($F(5, 300) = 13.916, p < .001$) between the profiles, whereas we could not find any significant difference in supporting pro-refugee policies ($F(5, 300) = 1.883, p = .072$).

³ We conducted Levene's test to show homogeneity of variances across profiles. Accordingly, the variance across profiles are equal for populist attitudes, $F(5, 300) = 0.207, p = .946$ and identity leadership, $F(5, 300) = 1.850, p = .103$; whereas the variance are not equal for supporting pro-refugee policies, $F(5, 300) = 3.008, p = .012$.

Figure 5: National Identification, Political Trust, and Collective Efficacy Scores of Profiles, Study 2.



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Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that first profile (*Moderate Identity; Low Trust; High Efficacy*) has significantly lower identity-leadership than second (*Moderates*) and third profiles (*Moderate Identity and Trust; High Efficacy*). Second (*Moderates*) and third profile (*Moderate Identity and Trust; High Efficacy*), on the other hand, have higher identity-leadership score than, fourth (*Low Identity and Trust; Moderate Efficacy*) and fifth profile (*Mild Identity and Efficacy; Low Trust*). These findings complement that first (*Moderate Identity; Low Trust; High Efficacy*), fourth (*Low Identity and Trust; Moderate Efficacy*) and fifth profiles (*Mild Identity and Efficacy; Low Trust*) have lowest political trust and highest anger, injustice and frustration scores. These findings also complement the result that second (*Moderates*) and third profiles (*Moderate Identity and Trust; High Efficacy*) have highest national identification, which is conformable with the findings of both studies indicating the strong relationship between national identification and identity-leadership. Last, post-hoc tests showed that first profile (*Moderate Identity; Low Trust; High Efficacy*) has significantly higher populist attitudes than second profile (*Moderates*). When we consider the lower identity-leadership and political trust as well as higher negative intergroup emotions and populist attitudes scores of the first profile (*Moderate*


Identity; Low Trust; High Efficacy), our findings may imply that the first profile reflects the contemporary left populism in Turkey.

Table 6: Intergroup Negative Emotion Scores of Profiles, Study 2

		Anger	Injustice	Despair	Frustration
1.	Moderate Identity; Low Trust; High Efficacy (30.4%)	4.63	4.73	4.37	4.76
2.	Moderates (30.1%)	3.73	3.85	3.50	3.75
3.	Moderate Identity and Trust; High Efficacy (16.0%)	3.61	3.98	3.67	4.12
4.	Low Identity and Trust; Moderate Efficacy (11.8%)	4.67	4.83	4.50	4.92
5.	Mild Identity and Efficacy; Low Trust (9.2%)	4.39	4.71	4.64	4.50
6.	Milds (2.6%)	3.25	3.38	3.50	4.00

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Figure 6: Anger, Injustice, Despair, and Frustration Scores of Profiles, Study 2.




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7.2.3. Mediation Analysis

We first tested the mediating role of the national identification in the relationships between identity – leadership and supporting pro-refugee policies using PROCESS Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrapped samples (see Hayes, 2018). As Figure 7 illustrated, results indicated that identity-leadership was a significant predictor of national identification, $b = .448$, $SE = .055$, $p < .001$, and that national identification was a significant predictor supporting pro-refugee policies, $b = -.115$, $SE = .049$, $p = .020$. Identity-leadership was still a significant direct predictor of supporting pro-refugee policies once national identification was included in the model, $b = .110$, $SE = .053$, $p = .037$. The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap estimation approach with 5000 samples; results indicated a significant indirect effect of support for the leader in supporting pro-refugee policies, $b = -.051$, $SE = .024$, 95% CI $[-.10, -.01]$.

Figure 7: Results of Mediation Analysis, Study 2.




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Notes. 95% CI $[-.10, -.01]$ for indirect effect; * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

7.2.4. Moderated Mediation Analysis

We later conducted a moderated mediation analysis using PROCESS Model 14 with 5,000 bootstrapped samples (see Hayes, 2018). Specifically, we investigated the moderating effect of populist attitudes on the relationships between national identification and supporting pro-refugee policies. The results indicated that the interaction between national identification and supporting pro-refugee policies was significant, $b = -.173$, $SE = .077$, $p = .026$, suggesting that populist thinking moderates the effect of national identification for supporting pro-refugee policies (see Figure 8). National identification was not significant at $-1SD$ of populist thinking ($b = -.008$, $t(300) = -.11$, $p = .910$), but was significant both at the mean ($b = -.108$, $t(300) = -2.21$, $p = .028$) and at $+1SD$ of populist thinking ($b = -.209$, $t(300) = -3.12$, $p = .002$), supporting our moderation hypothesis. In sum, findings of moderated mediation analysis through PROCESS Model 14 showed significant moderated mediation, suggesting support for *Hypothesis 4* again.

Figure 8: The Interaction of Populist Attitudes and National Identification for Supporting Pro-Refugee Policies.



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Study 2 found support for our mediation hypothesis as well. Higher support for the leader would directly have predicted higher support for pro-refugee policies, however, it would have indirectly predicted less support for pro-refugee policies through the pathway of higher national identification. Study 2 also found support for the moderating effects of populist attitudes on the relationship between national identification and supporting pro-refugee policies.



CHAPTER EIGHT

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Across two studies, this research examines the role of a) national identity, b) support for the current government ⁴in terms of identity-leadership, and c) populist attitudes on support for pro-refugee policies. National identity predicts support for pro-refugee policies in Turkey negatively. Populist attitudes moderate the relationship between national identity and support for pro-refugee policies. The negative effect of national identity on support for pro-refugee policies tends to increase for higher levels of populist attitudes, whereas it decreases for lower levels of populist attitudes. Higher support for the current government in terms of identity-leadership associate with higher support for pro-refugee policies. Moreover, while higher support the current government directly predicted higher support for pro-refugee policies, it indirectly predicted lower support for pro-refugee policies through increased national identity. In other words, national identity mediates the relationship between identity-leadership and support for pro-refugee policies.

I found support for *Hypothesis 1* that higher national identity would predict less support for pro-refugee policies across Studies 1 and 2. The findings showed that higher national identity is correlated with low support for pro-refugee policies. Given how national identity is associated with negative attitudes towards outgroup members (Bağcı & Çelebi, 2017), low recognition of inequalities against the minorities (Doosje et al., 1998), and low support for minority rights (Çelebi et al., 2016; Uluğ & Uysal, 2021), the results complement the findings on the role of national identity as a predictor of negative attitudes towards refugees and pro-refugee policies.

Furthermore, we found support for the moderating effect of populist attitudes on the relationship between national identification and supporting pro-refugee policies in both studies. Why did we find support for our moderation hypothesis? The main reason behind this finding is that populism is a thin centered ideology that corresponds and enriches the nativist ideologies (Mudde, 2004, 2007). While the greater national

⁴ Although we did not explicitly ask participants' attitudes towards the current government or Erdoğan, we ask them to evaluate the most prominent leader in the country in terms of refugee policies. We discussed the findings by assuming almost all participants evaluated Erdoğan and the current government since Turkey is a competitive authoritarian regime since 2017.

identification is closely related to negative attitudes towards refugees, this effect can peak when combined with populist attitudes. This finding is complementing the discussion about populism which claimed that populism becomes more concrete when combining with other thick-centered ideologies (see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). This also shows why the success of populism in recent years has created such concerns. Populism is not only an emerging ideology that threatens some important democratic values, but it also escalates the adverse impacts of deep-seated ideologies.

Moreover, it is fair to argue that the moderator role of populism on the relationship between national identity and support for pro-refugee policies may stem from the different levels of populism implied different meanings of national identity. The rhetoric of successful identity-entrepreneurs challenges the previous meaning of national identity and established boundaries between national ingroups and other groups. Leaders can mobilize national ingroup members by shaping the meaning of national identity and group norms within the new framework of intergroup context (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Considering how Erdoğan constructs Syrian refugees as a part of national identity or shifts the group norms of national ingroup members into welcoming Syrian refugees as a national duty, the interaction between populist attitudes and national identity may imply contested meaning and shifted norms of the national ingroup. In other words, individuals who high and low populist attitudes are simply defining national identity and group norms differently.

In both studies, we asked participants to assess a leader who is most prominent in refugee policies of Turkey regarding factors of ILM such as group prototypicality, identity advancement, identity entrepreneurship, and identity impresarioship. ILM proposes that powerful leaders, based on the shared social identity, inspire the followers to take responsibility, and mobilize them to change the social reality, if they are seen as ‘one of us’ (identity prototypicality), ‘crafting a sense of us’ (identity entrepreneurship), ‘doing it for us’ (identity advancement), and ‘embedding a sense of us’ (identity impresarioship) by the followers (Steffens et al., 2014). There has been a lot of empirical evidence that when individuals are considered to share group memberships and are seen to fit the ingroup prototype, they are regarded to be more trustworthy (Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990; van Dijke & de Cremer, 2008),

and more efficient (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Haslam, 2006, 2007; Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012; Steffens et al., 2013; van Knippenberg, 2011). Social identity researchers have suggested that leaders are not only those who represent the ingroup but they are also those who actively shape the identities of the ingroup. Reicher and his colleagues pointed out that influential leaders must be identity entrepreneurs who play a key role in building a sense of 'us', bringing people together by generating a shared sense of 'we-ness', clarifying and shaping people's understanding of what the group represents by defining values, norms and ideals of the ingroup (Haslam et al., 2011; Reicher et al., 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Steffens et al., 2014). From this logic, it would be fair to claim that our findings in both studies indicating that people who perceived Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the current government as more prototypical and successful identity entrepreneur tend to support his pro-refugee policies are coherent with the social identity perspective of leadership research.

Reicher, Hopkins and colleagues argued and showed how of national identity sometimes contested by leaders' rhetoric (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996; Reicher et al., 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Political leaders, especially the successful identity entrepreneur ones, contest the national group's norms, boundaries, and content of the national identity following the changes in intergroup context and try to mobilize national ingroup members accordingly. Although Erdoğan generally uses discourse to form a superordinate Muslim identity in terms of Syrian refugees in Turkey, considering the intersection of nationality, religion, and politics in Turkish national identity, it can be considered as an effort for shifting in norms, meaning, and boundaries of the national identity. Hence, the identity-leadership of the current government is closely related to people's attitudes on refugee policies through contested meaning, norms, and boundaries of national identity.

However, our findings showed the conflicting impacts of the identity-leadership on the attitudes towards the refugees. In other words, supporting current government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly predict supporting pro-refugee policies positively and indirectly predict it negatively. According to Turkey's Directorate General of Migration, Turkey hosts 3,650,00 Syrian refugees with temporary protected status. When the civil war in Syria broke out in 2011, the Turkish

government did not close its borders and welcomed millions of Syrians. Although Erdogan has maintained the pro-refugee discourse for a decade, major parts of Turkish society have developed an antipathy towards refugees over the passing years. For instance, a representative poll showed that 86% of Turkish people think that the government should send the Syrian refugees back (Erdogan, 2018). Although supporting Erdogan related to greater support for pro-refugee policies in Turkey, the indirect effect of support for Erdogan through an increased level of national identification suggests that it decreased the supporting pro-refugee policies in the end. Our findings seem coherent with the results of the national pools about Syrian refugees. The increasing nationalist discourse of Erdogan causes the loss of people's support for the pro-refugee policies.

Populist messages form the in-group identity using shared grievances and blame-shifting to communize worldviews (Bos et al., 2020; Hameelers, 2020). Thus, salient ingroup identity increases similarity among in-group members and intergroup differentiation, in turn, it strengthens the credibility of in-group sources messages (Hogg & Reid, 2006) because individuals who have higher ingroup identity tend to be persuaded by populist messages focusing *us* and *them* distinction (Hameelers & Schmuck, 2017). When a populist actor addresses to shared grievances or societal inequalities by blaming not only the elites but also the non-natives including minorities and refugees (Bos et al., 2020; Hameelers & de Vreese, 2020), citizens who share the group membership (i.e., national identity) and see the populist leaders as a member of this group, internalize this populist messages and mobilize accordingly (Haslam et al., 2011; Hogg & Reid, 2006; Reicher & Haslam, 2017). Hence, the persuasion and mobilization power of populist messages is related to not only the fact that members of the group share the same salient identity, but also related to what extent the people see the leader as a representative member of that group. Hence, higher support for Erdogan and his government may create anti-refugee sentiments through increased and salient national identity by internalization of their populist messages, even though they maintain pro-refugee discourse.

Furthermore, we performed LPAs to examine the features of sub-populations and their differences in terms of identity-leadership, populist attitudes, and supporting pro-refugee policies through the two studies. Specifically, in Study 1, we conducted

LPA with national identity, intergroup threat, and competitive victimhood, while we performed LPA with national identification, political trust, collective efficacy, and negative intergroup emotions such as anger, injustice, despair, and frustration in Study 2. We believe that the LPA findings showed the strong relationship between national identification and support for the current government in Turkey. Profiles who have lowest national identification (*Lows* and *Highs with Low Identity*) showed higher identity-leadership scores than profiles who have moderate and higher national identification (*Moderates* and *Lows with High Identity*) in Study 1. Furthermore, LPA findings of Study 1 showed the complexity of the link between national identification and attitudes towards refugees. We found that profiles who have lower national identification scores (*Highs with Low Identity*) showed significantly lower support for pro-refugee policies than profiles who have moderate and higher national identifications. Although social psychology research showed that higher national identification associated with negative attitudes towards refugees (e.g., Mummendey et al., 2001; Stewart et al., 2012); nature, content, and inclusiveness of the national identity as well as the variables that intersect with the national identification in predicting attitudes towards refugees need to be discussed and investigated further. Study 1 showed that variables such as intergroup threat and competitive victimhood that intersect with national identification may further complicate the relationship between national identification and anti-refugee sentiments. While *Highs with Low Identity* has really low national identification, they have higher intergroup threat and competitive victimhood, which may be the cause of the lower support for pro-refugee policies.

Moreover, LPA findings of Study 2 may strengthen our insight on populist attitudes and its correlates. Study 2 showed that the profile which has respectively low collective efficacy and intergroup negative emotions such as anger and injustice (*Moderates*) showed lower populist attitudes. This finding complements that populist leadership address the individuals' shared grievances to create *Manichean* distinctions in society and use citizens' strong negative emotions such as anger and injustice to blame previous governments or established democratic organizations (Aslanidis, 2018; Bakker et al., 2016; Erçetin, 2020; Hameelers & Schmuck, 2017; Mudde, 2017). Moreover, given the fact that populist leaders promise people to make an impact in

politics (Canovan, 1999; Uysal & Düzen, 2021), the idea that having lower collective efficacy also means lower populist attitudes makes sense.

8.1. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Our studies have a few important limitations. First, I could not ask participants to consider Erdogan because of political restrictions on academic freedom in Turkey while measuring the support for the leader via the Identity-Leadership Inventory (Steffens et al., 2014). Rather, participants were asked to consider the most influential leader on the policies about Syrian refugees. However, many people may acknowledge that Erdogan is the most influential leader in the policies about refugees in Turkey. Moreover, even if some people did not consider Erdoğan, the leader that evaluated was still one of the political leaders of the current government, because refugee policies in Turkey fully developed and policed by Erdoğan and his government. Nevertheless, this limitation may obscure the leader-follower relationships that the findings of the research implied. Future studies should be more certain about the measuring of attitudes towards the targeted leader.

Second, when we focused on the role of national identification (i.e., being a Turkish/Turkish citizen), we did not focus on ethnic identification (being a Turk). Studies examining the relationship between ethnic identity and outgroup attitudes found different results than studies focusing the relationship between national or civic identity and outgroup attitudes (Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014). Hence, we should be careful when we discuss the relationship between ethnic or civil identity and support for pro-minority policies in the light of our findings and avoid overgeneralization.

Beyond national identification, we believe that Muslim identification may be associated with attitudes towards Syrians and pro-refugee policies in Turkey. Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) argues that potential positive outcomes of recategorization with a broader group and shows a positive effect of recategorization with common ingroup identity on intergroup attitudes (Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990). Furthermore, within the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in Turkey, individuals who are more strongly identify with

Muslim identity show higher support for reconciliation between the Turkish and Kurdish communities by referring to common religious identity (Baysu & Coşkan, 2018). Future studies should be tested on the impact of Muslim identification and its interaction with populist attitudes on supporting the pro-refugee policies in Turkey.

Although the hypothesis on the relationship between identity-leadership and support for pro-refugee policies supported, bivariate correlations between these variables imply null findings across two studies. Bivariate correlations between identity-leadership and support for pro-refugee policies were nonsignificant. These different and null effects may stem from sample characteristics and sampling bias of the studies. In both studies, participants have relatively lower scores for support for the leader. It is important to remind that even if participants do not support Erdoğan as a leader, they can acknowledge their successful leadership skills in terms of group prototypicality and identity entrepreneurship. This two-way aspect of identity-leadership measuring may underlie null findings of identity-leadership. Future studies should be more careful about using the Identity-Leadership Inventory as a measure of support for the leader. Although sub-dimensions offered by the identity-leadership model is important to measure the perceived success of the leader, there is a need for further discussion that this may not directly mean the level of support for the leader.

In this research, I pointed the group prototypicality as an important aspect of identity-leadership and support for the leader, and approach Erdoğan and the current government as prototypical leaders. However, non-prototypical leaders have also been historically placed in positions of power, and then later perceived as more prototypical based on their position as a leader of the group. For example, Donald Trump was initially viewed as a non-prototypical American Republican candidate. Following his election to a position to power, he was viewed as a more prototypical Republican leader, as the Republican prototype also shifted (see, Gaffney, Sherburne, Hackett, Rast, & Hohman, 2019). We can discuss that Erdoğan may follow a similar career path in terms of prototypicality. Considering performative aspects of populism and unmediated communication styles of populist leadership (see Weyland, 2001), it is likely that contemporary populist leaders had viewed as non-prototypical leaders for an important proportion of the community at the beginning, then they become a prototypical leader for certain groups of the community. Future works that focus on

how this transformation occurred and what are the consequences of these dynamic processes in terms of policy support are needed.



CONCLUSION

In both studies, we examined the role and outcomes of national identification, identity-leadership, and populist attitudes for intergroup relations between Turkish people and Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition, Study 2 implied that the populist attitudes can peak the negative effect of national identification on the attitudes towards refugees. Our findings highlighted how complex might be the leader-follower relations. The results indicated that support for the leader has conflicting impacts on attitudes towards pro-refugee policies according to the leader's nativist and populist rhetoric. We hope that our studies may contribute to the positive intergroup relationship in Turkey by showing the effect of leader-follower interactions and its impact on national identification via ILM and pave the way for developing a social identity perspective for the populist leadership.

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