

NEGOTIATED BOUNDARIES: IDENTITY AND TRANSNATIONAL
ATTACHMENTS AMONG THE TURKS OF BULGARIA

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ATTACHMENTS AMONG THE TURKS OF BULGARIA**

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes negotiated identity strategies of the Turks of Bulgaria in the two different national settings. The existence of the Turks of Bulgaria has been a problem since Bulgaria won independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Although discriminatory attitudes towards Turks continued throughout the history, the state policy of the assimilation of the Turkish minority peaked in 1980s. The assimilation policy resulted in the migration of Turks in 1989 with high numbers, which was described as a mass exodus of the time. Turks of Bulgaria have been living in the edge of homeland/motherland dilemma, with the feelings of in-betweenness. This thesis aims to understand a continuous migrant status of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey in relation to their minority status in Bulgaria. This thesis traces the ways of negotiating, expressing and performing who they are and where they belong.

Keywords: Forced migration, Ethnic identity, Transnational ties, Belonging.

ÖZ

MÜZAKERE EDİLMİŞ SINIRLAR: BULGARİSTAN TÜRKLERİNDE KİMLİK VE ULUSAŞIRI BAĞLAR

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
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Bu tez çalışması Bulgaristan Türklerinin sürekli olarak müzakere edilen kimlik stratejilerini Bulgaristan ve Türkiye olmak üzere iki farklı ulusal zeminde incelemiştir. Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığı, 1878 yılında Bulgaristan'ın Osmanlı'dan bağımsızlığını kazanması üzerine ülke için sürekli bir sorun teşkil etmiş ve Türk azınlık çeşitli yıllarda zorunlu göçe tabi tutulmuştur. Bulgaristan'da tarihsel olarak farklı zamanlarda ayrımcılığa uğrayan Türk azınlık 1980'li yıllarda başlayan ve devlet politikası haline gelen asimilasyon süreci ile birlikte 1989 yılında Türkiye'ye kitlesel bir göç gerçekleşmiştir. Bulgaristan Türkleri gerek tabi tutuldukları zorunlu göçler, gerekse etnik kimliklerine yapılan asimilasyon politikaları sebebiyle sürekli olarak arafta kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla memleket ve anavatan algıları kaygan bir zeminde süregelmiştir. Bulgaristan'da azınlık olarak kabul görmeyen Türkler, Türkiye'ye geldiklerinde de soydaş olarak görülmelerine rağmen hayatları boyunca göçmen kalmış, kendilerini anavatan saydıkları Türkiye'ye ait hissedememiş ve memleket dedikleri Bulgaristan ve Bulgaristan'da kalan akrabaları ile güçlü bağlarını ulusötesi yollarla sürdürmüşlerdir. Bu tez çalışması Bulgaristan Türklerinin etnik, göçmen ve azınlık kimliklerini sınır-aşırı olarak hangi yollarla ve stratejilerle müzakere ve inşa ettiklerini yanıtlamaya

alıřmıřtır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Zorunlu g, Etnik kimlik, Ulusařırı baęlar, Aidiyet.





*To my lovely mother Hayriye, and
to her people out there in a beautiful land...*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DPS	The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи)
EU	European Union



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The election law of Bulgaria limits the number of Bulgarian ballot boxes in non-European Union countries to 35 (the number was 139 before 2016). This is a discriminatory regulation. Many citizens of Bulgaria of Turkish descent live in Turkey. Their number is estimated to be more than 350 thousand. Therefore, 35 ballot boxes for so many people dispersed around the country are not enough. We believe that this regulation was specifically adopted to prevent the members of the ethnic Turkish community living in Turkey from voting. Citizens of Bulgaria living in Turkey should not have less democratic rights than those in EU countries¹.

This was a declaration of the Balkan immigrant association in Turkey, which was about Bulgarian parliamentary elections held on 4 April 2021. When I entered the garden of an elementary school in my neighborhood in which ballot boxes were established for the Bulgarian parliamentary elections in April 2021, there was a long queue waiting for registration to be able to vote in the Bulgarian elections. The reason for that long queue was the limitation of the ballot boxes. The ballot box in the school was the only one established for the district and people were grumbling about it, recalling that in the previous years there were more ballot boxes provided in the different parts of the district. In the entrance of the school, I witnessed two old men discussing about DPS (Движение за права и свободи/ The Movement for Rights and Freedoms/ Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi)² not putting any efforts for the Turkish language instructing at schools in Bulgaria. One of them replied, “The official language is Bulgarian in Bulgaria, likewise being Turkish in Turkey. You cannot demand Turkish spoken or being taught in Bulgaria”. The other old man was complaining about how cruel the Bulgarian communist regime was at that time. I

¹<https://www.facebook.com/BalgocGenelMerkez/photos/a.301047384508/10159060340344509/>

² Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi (The Movement for Rights and Freedoms). A political party in Bulgaria, which supports for the minority rights.

was interested in their conversation as it was fluctuating from one issue to another one. He added, “We were a cowardly community in Bulgaria. The communist regime made us blind, as we could not see what was coming for us”. This implies the assimilationist policies against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria back in 1984-85. The other one, by correcting that it was a socialist regime, not a communist one, replied “the socialist regime enhanced us in terms of culture. We did not know how to eat with a fork. Bulgarian teachers and doctors did not want to come to work in our areas in Bulgaria. They were hesitating. Those who came got double wages for the state. The areas we lived in were like the southeast of Turkey”. He said that in secondary school he heard a Bulgarian teacher talking on the phone saying that “they look like good people, there is nothing to fear. There are plenty of good eggs, milk, and yogurt here”. He added “the Bulgarian state established such an order, which you needed worship. It was such a system that if your wife was pregnant, the state knew it before you learn”. Many of the Bulgarian citizens in Turkey are expected to vote for the DPS, as it is a political party established by a Turkish man, promising to protect all minority rights in Bulgaria. A young man approached the conversation and said “Turks in Bulgaria are now able to be everything; doctor, teacher, police. Thanks to the DPS”. Another one approached and said, “We should vote only for DPS now in order not to get divided. It is the only party for Turks”. The discussions were passionate among the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants, even after thirty-two years since ‘89 göçü (the migration of 1989)³ happened. I was surprised when I realized how memory works if you have experienced such an intervention to your identity. And I kept thinking how unforgettable memories they have even after long years have passed and after they have established a ‘new’ life in Turkey.

My academic interest for the Turks of Bulgaria began with my first trip to Bulgaria in order to make some observations for my master’s thesis, whereas my personal interest for them began long before my trip. For the first time I visited Bulgaria in 2013 with my mother; after thirty-six years since she emigrated to Turkey. It was the first time for her to go back to her homeland. We were only the two passengers who

³ Also called as “mass migration of Turks from Bulgaria”, “mass exodus of 1989”, “big excursion”.

did not have Bulgarian passports, as the rest of the bus including the driver and cabin crew had Bulgarian citizenships. That's why all the people let us pass the Bulgarian customs police first. It was a dark night without electricity at the Bulgarian customs; I was a bit surprised after having passed the Turkish border full of lights and luster. The cabin crew explained that it was the economic policy of Bulgaria to use fewer lights at the border. He also helped us to talk to the Bulgarian police, however the police officer was able to speak a little Turkish, at least sufficient to make jokes with us. The Turkish people in the bus, despite having Bulgarian passports were so shy and withdrawn when engaging with the Bulgarian police. It seemed to me that they were afraid of doing something wrong. When we passed the customs police, we went to the toilet and the woman on the bus offered us some soap and wet towels by explaining that "It is not Turkey here, do not expect luxury in the toilets". On the way we returned back from Bulgaria to Turkey, Turkish people living in Turkey tried to bring a lot of food including meat and vegetables, which are also available in Turkey, and which are not allowed at the customs. I remember a woman trying to smuggle a huge bag of big cucumbers, telling that she could not find them in Turkey "These are the foods from my hometown"; this made me think that she could somehow revive the nostalgia of homeland by bringing the goods from Bulgaria. My very first impression about this border crossing experience left precious observations to think about how these people negotiate boundaries of identity and citizenship, in addition to experiencing transnationality.

1.1. The Subject Matter of The Thesis

In this thesis, I will attempt to understand how the Turks of Bulgaria negotiated their ways of explaining and expressing whom they are in different national settings divided by a long historical process. In that sense, how to position them throughout the thesis constituted a specific difficulty I need to overcome but also at the same time is the question of this thesis.

There is a difficulty in positioning Turks of Bulgaria, especially in referring to those who emigrated to Turkey and those who remained in Bulgaria as a minority community. In order to avoid the confusion of the positionality of the Turks of Bulgaria in this thesis study, when I refer to Turks in Bulgaria, I will call them “minority”, and when I refer to those who emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey, I will call them “migrants”. Throughout the thesis, I used the terms *Turks of Bulgaria*, *Bulgarian-Turks*, *Bulgarian-Turkish* interchangeably, instead of avoiding the use of the word *Bulgar*⁴ (Turks of Bulgaria refuse to be addressed as *Bulgar Türkleri*). Ironically the word *Bulgar* also refers to a Turkic tribe of Proto-Bulgarians in the 7th century; the Bulgars. My choices of using those terms do not necessarily imply a Bulgarian ethnicity, rather they render the authenticity of Turkish ethnicity in Bulgaria. In the literature some prefer using the term *Bulgarian Turkish* or *Bulgarian Turks* (Rudin & Eminov, 1990; Crampton, 2005), some use the term *the Turks of Bulgaria* (Elchinova, 2008; Fatkova, 2012), and currently, some use the term *Bulgaristanlı* (Parla, 2019).

In this thesis, I am going to elucidate the different processes, which generate and maintain ethnic groups and boundaries by focusing on a specific ethnic group living in two different settings, having influenced by a forced migration process either by migrating or by staying behind. This thesis aims to understand the continuous migrant status of Bulgarian Turks in relation to their minority status in Bulgaria. I try to analyze what has been changed while they turned out to be migrants after being minorities for a lifetime in Bulgaria.

I try to analyze their ways of explaining, expressing, and performing who they were, whom they become, and how they negotiate on this identity crisis. Nevertheless, the ways of negotiation between homeland and motherland designated through the feelings of in-betweenness. I attempt to understand how Bulgarian Turks construct

⁴ Ethnic Bulgarian (not to be confused with Proto-Bulgarians, who were the Turkic semi-nomadic tribes of the 7th century)

identity and perception of community with the effects of transnationalism, which was a result of the assimilation campaign in Bulgaria that ended up with mass migration to Turkey in 1989. This thesis is trying to understand how the shifting meanings of otherness, migration, and Turkishness play a role in the lives of a minority group by commenting on the results of fieldwork conducted in Bulgaria and Turkey with Bulgarian-born Turks. I seek answers to respond to my research question: Why do Turks of Bulgaria negotiate on their identity and what are their ways of the identity negotiation? My research question also evolved around these sub-questions throughout the thesis study: How has the perception of being a member of a community been changed in the wake of the migration of 1989 and during the post-migration period? How does ethnic identity of Turks of Bulgaria set boundaries with other identities? In what ways is citizenship being a part of identity negotiation? What are the roles of the transnationality and cross-border activities, in the identity constructions and strategies of Turks of Bulgaria?

I argue that there is a continuity and relationality in the ethnic identity of Turks of Bulgaria along with differentiation in defining themselves, which has changed as a result of the 1989 migration as a rupture point. They have also experienced the socialization processes, which differed in the two different national settings. “We are Turks” discourse retained in Bulgaria as a distinction from the majority population turns into “we are *soydaş*” discourse in Turkey as a plea to get accepted by the local community and legal authorities. This thesis pursues what endures and what has waned of the minority and migrant identity of a group of people who once shared the same setting in terms of culture, language, tradition, and geography. In order to find answers to these questions, I utilize multi-sited ethnography both in Turkey and in Bulgaria to reach a wider perspective of Bulgarian Turks, both as migrants and as a minority.

Turks of Bulgaria have existed as a minority community in Bulgaria, after Bulgaria won independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, and they have experienced several migration flows, either by force or by intent. A considerable number of

them have relatives and acquaintances in another nation-state, Turkey, which is occasionally defined as ‘motherland’. Hence, transnational and an unprecedented character of their boundaries, construct the identity of the Turks of Bulgaria in a constantly negotiated way. Nonetheless, identity of the ethnic Turks is neither a sole migrant identity, nor a dominant ethnic identity. Their identity leans on in-betweenness that migration brought, and which is consolidated with the encounters, that either entail differentiation or correspondence for the adaptation into a new society. Moreover, Turks of Bulgaria do not feel themselves adequate citizens in Bulgaria because of their ethnic minority status and do not consider themselves adequate Turks and Muslims in Turkey because of the history and consequences of the forced migrations, which entailed stereotyping for the Balkan migrants.

The concepts of home and exile are constantly blurred in their case because they were not born and raised inside the borders of their ‘motherland’ rather they were forcibly expelled towards Turkey. The forced migration process reflects an exceptionality; it was perceived as an ethnic community expelled from a foreign nation-state to their ‘natural homeland’, where their place should be inside its boundaries. However, based on their collective memory, narratives and experiences I have witnessed during the field research, we cannot end up conglomerating this community in that way. Turks of Bulgaria, as a minority community, are prone to define themselves through whom they are not, while constantly negotiating on the question of who they are. Hence, this specific minority group’s identity is constituted based on how they ethnically identify themselves by mainly distinguishing themselves from other groups in Bulgaria, and by infrequently converging themselves into the society in Turkey. Hence, the Turks of Bulgaria neither remain as solely migrant nor *soydaş*, but always a minority community whose boundaries of identity are in an ongoing negotiation.

As it will be discussed in the next chapter, the existing theories of construction of community, ethnic identity, citizenship and transnationality would explain the situation of the Turks of Bulgaria to a certain extent. While there is a

considerable literature on forced migration, transnationality and citizenship, I try to capture how an ethnic minority ascribes their identity in between and across borders of their homeland and motherland, which are less likely to respond their needs. The uniqueness of their case lies in the fact that, they remain as a minority community wherever they live; either in the country they were born as an ethnic minority or in the country where their ethnic identity, language and religion correspond but they constantly distinguish themselves from the rest of the society and occasionally perform adaptation to it. Thus, Turks of Bulgaria can be considered as transnational minority who oscillate between homeland and motherland by performing postnational/flexible citizenship, by keeping certain symbolic border guards to distinguish their boundaries from the local community or from other minority groups, by negotiating their ethnic identity as ‘real Muslims’ in Bulgaria and as ‘pure Turks’ in Turkey, by having transnational attachments in politics, daily life and culture between Bulgaria and Turkey. The goal of my inquiry into the lives of the Turks of Bulgaria in İzmir and Karlıca is to reveal interactions, encounters and performances that entail identities to be negotiated on. My research case focuses on a community, which forcibly expelled from their homeland towards their alleged motherland in terms of the ethnic kin and the mother tongue. Nevertheless, my research also extends the current literature on ethnic identity, symbolic boundaries of community, and citizenship of a specific minority community, which have been affected by a forced migration, and been torn between two nation-states having acquired transnational attachments across borders.

1.2. The Organization of the Thesis

In Chapter 1, the research topic is explained, by introducing the research questions and the major arguments underlying this thesis study. I explain the difficulty of positioning and naming the community, which is one of the problems and also of the questions of the thesis. This chapter also enlighten to how the case of the Turks of Bulgaria can be an exceptional case for the migration, citizenship and

transnationality research. The homeland/motherland dilemma is provided in this chapter, which will further become one of the major arguments of this thesis. The goal of the research, which is revealing interactions, encounters and performances of a community that entail identity negotiations, is also provided in order to open up for the further discussion throughout the thesis.

In Chapter 2, the boundaries that denote communities; and the conceptualizations of ethnicity in relation to the process of identity constructions of minority and migrant groups; and citizenship, which has been changing and evolving into a different structure via transnationality are explained. In this chapter, the theoretical background of the different processes, which generate and maintain ethnic groups and boundaries and which might be applied to a specific ethnic group living in two different national settings: Bulgaria and Turkey are also elucidated. In between these two national contexts, this chapter becomes a ground for understanding how the issues of assimilation, forced migration, and belonging of Turkey have affected the perception of identity and of being a member of a community. This chapter will also focus on citizenship in order to open up its relationship with community and ethnicity by elaborating on the meanings of citizenship, which turns into being flexible.

In Chapter 3, methodological position of the research is explained by giving references to ethnography and self-reflexivity. I elaborate on how ethnography is a suitable methodology for my research because it allows to study transnational social fields by utilizing participant observation and ethnographic interviews, which provide documentation of the cultural repertoires, identities and values of the community for the researchers. This chapter also presents the research procedures, the research sample, and the research settings. Further, I made some implications on self-reflexivity and the challenges and difficulties I faced throughout the research procedure.

In Chapter 4, the historical contextualization of the Turkish minority

in Bulgaria in order to understand the process of ethnic identity construction among the Turks of Bulgaria will be provided. This chapter explores how ethnic Turks have been assimilated and discriminated against under different political regimes in Bulgaria. The specific focus will be the assimilation campaign in the 1980s, which resulted in a mass exodus of Turks from Bulgaria and which has affected the lives of the Turkish minority in all senses; it does not only affect migrants but also the minority group who were left behind in Bulgaria and never be able to migrate to Turkey.

Chapter 5 analyzes and problematizes how the Turks of Bulgaria construct their Turkishness by exploring distinctions and comparisons between those who emigrated to Turkey and those who remained back in Bulgaria. I will also render how different groups distinguish themselves from Turks of Turkey, Turks of Bulgaria, emigrants, and other minority groups in Bulgaria as these discourses of differentiation hide hints of identification. I try to understand the elements of community formation in the experiences of my interviewees by asking the question “how does it appear to them” (Cohen, 2013, p.20), thus, I give voice to their narratives about what those who migrated to Turkey think about Turks who remained in Bulgaria. A series of questions will be important for me to conclude this chapter: how they compare and distinguish themselves with the local Turks in Turkey; how the Turks who stayed in Bulgaria and migrants in Turkey reflect on changing roles of religion and gender, which were affected by the 1989 migration. In the light of these questions and my interviewees, I try to understand how their identity construction was being engendered by the past memories, political violence they were exposed to, ongoing fear of being a minority, and the impressions about Turkey, and transnational mode of life. In addition to that, I will show my interviewees’ reflections of religion, gender, and local community culture, which are the core elements of their identity construction.

In Chapter 6, I will present my discussion on the research findings of identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria by integrating the research findings

into the theoretical issues raised by the ethnicity, migration, and transnationalism scholarship. This chapter underlines different processes, which generate and maintain ethnic groups and boundaries by focusing on a particular community living in two different national settings. I discussed the reasons for the identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria covering the changing perception of community and the emphasis on Turkish identity, the political reasons, the consequences of the migration of 1989, and the effects of transnationality. While harsh governmental assimilationist policies which resulted in a process of forced migration for some members of the community changed their lives, those who stayed behind in Bulgaria were also affected as they suffered from fragmented families or sought legal or illegal ways to escape to Turkey. Hence, this chapter aims to discuss the ways and reasons for the identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria.

Chapter 7 summarizes my arguments on the shifting meanings of community, otherness, migrant and Turkishness, by commenting on the results of the fieldwork conducted in Bulgaria and Turkey with Bulgarian-born Turks. This chapter provides a brief summary of the findings of this research, which fit within the framework of migration literature on ethnicity and transnationalism. The major points of the research, the analysis, and limitations are also provided by underlining the contributions of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: PROBLEMATIZING ETHNIC IDENTITY IN RELATION TO CITIZENSHIP AND TRANSNATIONALITY

Identity as construction of memory is a significant concept for understanding the historical background of migration in the Balkans. The identity of a migrant group or a minority group is constituted by remembering, calling out memories, constructing the present with the structure of the past, and keeping relations up with those who remained in the country of origin or those who migrated to a host country. A popular stereotype defines the Balkans as a region, cursed with excessive historical memory, a proliferation of hatred, and conflicts between ethnic and religious identities (Todorova, 2004, p.2). It is argued that the reasons that initiated those conflicts and turmoil in the Balkans were the rapid social change and strong identity transformations (ibid.), and Bulgaria as a Balkan country has been historically in the middle of ethnic and religious identity crises. Hence, as a minority community the identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria is very much related to how they perceive community and ethnic boundaries, how they make use of the institution of citizenship for the purposes of negotiation and how transnational attachments empower these boundary constructions and identity negotiations.

While minority identity is constituted by collective memory of the community, migrant identity is also shaped by collective memory, which can be observed in the case of the Turks of Bulgaria. Collective memory cannot be reduced to political interests, as it also belongs to the cultural space (ibid. p.3). The collective memory that is constructed by politicians and intellectuals is “largely public, often official and narrowly political memory”, however, the collective memory which is in the private spheres of family, friends, neighborhoods and workplaces is very likely to be different than what official histories offer (ibid.). It is argued that “collective

memory is an exploration of a shared identity that unites a social group, be it a family or nation whose members have different interests and motivations” (ibid., p.5). Nevertheless, the archeology of collective memory is fractured, since diasporas have traces of collective memory about another place and time in order to construct “new maps of desire and attachment” (Appadurai and Breckendridge, 1989, p.i). I will not go into details about the literature on collective memory; what I am trying to indicate throughout the thesis is that identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria are largely based on the experiences, memories, and narratives of these people, which I am going to discuss below. Nonetheless, the collective memory of the Turks of Bulgaria has truly affected their identity negotiations with the nation-states, and with the other groups that they live together, because their history about the assimilation and the forced migration are predominantly different than those which Bulgarian official historiography generates. Further, their identity has been as an interactive and constructed element, and it is also engendered in the process of cultural interaction (Barth, 1969), which is a result of living together with different communities for long years.

In this chapter, I will attempt to explore and analyze the identity boundaries that denote communities; and the conceptualizations of ethnicity in relation to identity constructions of minority and migrant groups; and citizenship, which has been changing and evolving into a different structure via transnationality. Hence, I try to elucidate the different processes, which generate and maintain ethnic groups and boundaries and which might be applied to a specific ethnic group living in two different national settings, in Bulgaria, and in Turkey, who have been exposed to an assimilation process and influenced by a forced migration process either by migrating or by staying behind. Keeping my research question in mind, which is tackling with reasons of identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria, I will focus on relevant literature on community, ethnicity, citizenship and transnationality. Thus, I try to find bases for how ethnic identity and the boundaries with other identities are constructed and negotiated by focusing on theoretical discussions of construction of communities and its elements, ethnic identity formations, evolution of the

concept of citizenship in relation to reacquiring rights, identity negotiations, and transnational attachments that migrants constitute and maintain.

2.1. The Symbolic Construction of Boundaries and Community

Boundaries with other identities or other communities determine distinctions by clearly identifying a specific community based on who they are or who they are not. Thus, boundaries are part of an identity negotiation for ethnic groups. The boundaries among communities are drawn by assigning certain commonalities to a group of people, hence, they become clearly distinguishable from another one in reference to this set of particular features (Cohen, 2013, p.12). A desire to express a kind of distinction, which might be opposition or discrimination to other communities, generates boundaries that imply the nature of the community (ibid.). Similarly, Barth (1969) argues that boundaries are determined in the ways that the community desires to be distinguished from others. Hence, a boundary has both a beginning and an ending, which indicates the identity of a community; boundaries might be national, administrative, statutory, physical, racial, linguistic and religious (Cohen, 2013, p.12). However, not all boundaries are clearly visible because they might be thought of in the minds of the community, rather than being existing apparently (ibid.). Nevertheless, the community members and outsiders perceive them differently (ibid.). In what circumstances the awareness for culture and community occur is an important question to investigate. Cohen argues that “culture does not consist in social structure or in ‘the doing’ of social behavior; it inheres, rather, in ‘the thinking’ about it... community exists in the minds of its members, and should be confused with geographic or sociographic assertions of ‘fact’”. Culture and community are defined by how people attach meanings to them; rather than being structural constructs, they are symbolic constructs (ibid., p.98). We can say that how people define and embellish themselves is more explanatory and real than any structural explanation. Nonetheless, boundaries which are shaped in the minds of people also reflects the relation between identity and memory, because memory

is critical in constructing a community's self-ascription and it is also significant for continuation of this construction of identity and of boundaries throughout generations.

The meaning of the boundary that people assign to it reflects its symbolic aspect of community boundary, which emphasizes people's experiences about it, and sometimes it is also possible that some boundaries are imperceptible to other people (Cohen, 2013, p.13). According to Cohen (p. 13,15,19), the construction of community is primarily related to the consciousness of communities, which is hidden in its boundaries that constituted by interaction. A community can have a symbol, which is a mental construct and a "boundary-expressing symbol". Community shares a sense of the primacy of belonging, which carries the community forward by keeping it alive and thus, being more immediate than the abstraction of society (ibid.). The community is also a greater entity than kinship and Cohen argues that in the arena of community, people learn social relationships such as kinship and friendship, acquiring the ability to perceive their boundaries. Hence community is where we learn to be social and where we acquire culture (ibid.). Explaining community by taking account of members' experiences and perceptions is rather preferred instead of approaching it as morphology or as the structure of institutions (ibid., p.20). Because there is an attempt to penetrate the structure itself rather than analytically describing the forms of it, thus, Cohen argues that asking these questions would be more appropriate: "What does it appear to mean to its members?" instead of asking its theoretical implications (ibid.). Throughout my research I tried to implement this approach because I believe that experiences of members of a community create a more meaningful description on their ascription about themselves, hence I avoid using categorical and fixed descriptions. In the findings and the analysis part of the research I make use of voices, memories and narratives of my respondents in order to reveal their truths about being members of a specific community.

The community has been explained differently throughout history. As a

functionalist approach, Durkheim (1964, p.129) emphasizes solidarity as the main source of social bonds and division of labor. Hence, while mechanical solidarity emphasizes socially constituted individuals, whereas organic solidarity refers to the society that is constituted by individuals (ibid.). For functionalist accounts community is treated as an integrating force, as Parsons uses (Cohen, 2013, p.20). The same tradition continues with Arensberg and Kimball (1965, p.ix) who developed a theory in which integration into the society becomes a key factor for community. The integrative feature of culture represents commonness among the members of a community, in terms of “a way of thinking, feeling and believing” (Kluckhohn, 1962, p.25). However, culture is not a fixed form, it is more of a content, which differs among members, thus, a community can be understood as a device/machine which aggregates individuals rather than integrating them (Cohen, 2013, p.20).

To what extent a group of people becomes a community is an important investigation. For instance, in the fieldwork study of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey, Elchinova (2012) explains why she uses certain terms in order to provide a better understanding of the experiences of this specific community. She uses the term “community” in a loose way; avoiding possible meanings of the term as fixed and given, rather she tries to elaborate on a group of people who share a particular experience. Nevertheless, a set of resemblances between different groups in a country may influence how we differentiate a community from others. Community boundaries might blur because of sharing similar culture, structures, political and educational institutions in a country (Cohen, 2013, p.44). Hence, different communities may resemble each other more than they do the same communities in other countries (ibid.). The resemblance between the Turks of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians as a result of living together in the same society for centuries are discussed in the further chapters, despite the fact that the differentiations which consequently made them ‘enemies’ for each other.

People’s motivation to sustain the belief in their communities may reflect how

they justify their actions. It is the symbolization of the community's boundaries, which keeps communities substantiated because the symbolic expression and affirmation of boundary raise people's attention to their communities (ibid., p.50). This type of justification for the actions is what Apter (1963) calls a political religion, as it reflects people's motivations to participate in rituals for different reasons. Cohen argues that participation in the rituals has social and psychological effects, which raise consciousness, social identity, and people's sense of social location.

The symbolic construction of community includes a strategy of symbolic reversal of the culture because some communities tend to behave as if they adapt to the other culture deliberately, just to make sure their boundaries marked (Cohen, 2013, p.58). For instance, the Saami, which is an officially recognized ethnolinguistic minority group, prefer not to disclose their identity when they encounter the members of the majority community in public space, in Norway, behaving like "white" Norwegians, and keeping their ethnic identity just in the private space (Eidheim, 1969). The boundaries of the communities are not absolute, they are relational; they appear in relation to other communities as "all social identities, collective and individual, are constituted in this way, "to play the vis-à-vis" (Boon, 1982 cited in Cohen, 2013, p.58). When people confront with others there is need to distinguish themselves from them, "since the vitality of cultures lies in their juxtaposition, they exaggerate themselves and each other" (ibid., p.115). Encounter with others is significant, since "every discourse, like every culture, inclines toward what it is not: toward an implicit negativity" (Boon, 1982, p.232) and people tend to be more sensitive about their culture especially when they encounter other cultures and when they realize that the boundary becomes weakened, they tend to create symbolic behaviors to empower it (Cohen, 2013, p.70). The tension between Turks and Pomaks despite sharing the same religion is indicating the clear boundaries that Turks generate in order to distinguish and sometimes canonize themselves, which will be further discusses in the analysis part of the thesis.

The term community seems to be slowly turning into the term ethnicity as a more structural explanation to understand people's motivations. The notion of "our people" is expanded to "our people versus them" (Berghe, 1981, p.243) and it can be empowered if "them" turns out to be a threat to "us" (Cohen, 2013, p.105). The term ethnicity was asserted in the 1960s and 1970s and it became popular to investigate ethnic identities and the concepts of assimilation, ethnic and racial sentiments were begun to be the research topics among social scientists during that period (ibid., p.4). Berghe also explains ethnicity as a strategy as it depends on choice and calculation of advantages; but he also expresses that the sociobiological basis for ethnicity lies in endogamy and extended kinship (Berghe, 1981 cited in Cohen, 2013, p.105). Berghe also analyzed ethnicity as a primacy because "ethnicity is more primordial than class" and "blood runs thicker than money" (ibid.). Cohen argues that this definition of ethnicity constitutes irrationality because according to Berghe's definition there is no need to justify ethnicity "other than common blood" (ibid.).

A community can serve as a strong structure for the needs of its members and because of this reason a community can actively be defended by its members. Although the community is a mental construct, it may serve as a structure, which is associated with social movements, and its character is changeable enough in which members do not need to compromise their individual identities with it (Cohen, 2013, p.109). There are some reasons coined by Cohen, which explains the question "why do communities respond assertively to encroachment upon their boundaries?" Communities do it because they feel that there is a threat against them, which should be spoken out loud now or it would be silenced; the voice of the community is recognized within those boundaries with their own experiences; the members of the community perceive their individual identities within the community's social space, so outsiders should not walk into these boundaries in order not to abuse the identities of the members (ibid.). The boundaries are considered as under threat because that there is always a fear of losing "way of life" which also means losing the sense of self, hence it is the tool for mobilization of the community (ibid.). The fear of losing a way of life can also mean losing the self-defined identity, which is

ascribed by the community and further it would result in losing the community due blurred boundaries. Thus, boundaries under threat constitute important signifiers for the identity negotiation for a community, who has an ongoing fear of losing identity.

The relationship between having an identity and being a member of a community is explained as “cultural totemism” or “ethnognomony” because community reflects the self of the members and identifies what it is and what it is not, which is an essential characteristic of the notion of boundary that empowers itself through comparisons and contrasts with others (Schwartz, 1975, p.108). By looking outwards of their cultural boundaries people engender a “self-reflexive portion” (ibid) of their culture which constructs what they see and perceive within the boundary of the culture, as Cohen (2013) argues that “community is the compass of individual identity; it responds to the need to delimit the bounds of similarity” and “people construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity”, which emphasize how the members of the community attach meanings to the boundaries. Hence, being a member of a community is one of the very reasons for identity to be constructed, with enhanced emphasis on protecting boundaries. It will be further discussed how identity is constructed and negotiated accordingly, by being a member of a minority community in Bulgaria and a migrant community in Turkey for the Turks of Bulgaria.

2.1.1. Negotiating Boundaries with Border Crossings

Boundaries as symbolic constructs may also imply the actual border crossings of people, which emanate demarcations and shape meanings of homeland and host country. People who cross national borders generate new kinds of boundaries both with those who stayed back and with those who are encountered in the host society. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, understanding of national borders has changed on the level of global culture, politics and economics because the flexible needs of people contradict the fixed requirements of nation-states and their

boundaries; “if the principle fiction of the nation-state is ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then borders always give the lie to this construct” (Donnan and Wilson, 1999, p.1-3). Crossing a border does not simply imply passing a physical location, but it also entails a variety of things as well as having a meaning in the eyes of migrants. Nevertheless, crossing a border does not only emphasize physical demarcated territories as geographers do, it also has more abstract meanings of bordering and intangible distinctions, which entail identity discourses, that sociologists tackle (Newman, 2006, p.173). Moreover, borders function as a methodological tool, which precisely affects cultural heritage and identity (Elchinova et al., 2012, p.5). Borders exist in spatial practices, memories, and narratives of those who cross the border and who have hopes and fear at the same time to an imagined territory that is expected to be arrived at, and thus, crossing the border causes both shifting time and physical location; and nevertheless, border crossers have to negotiate both the borders and the practices and memories that entails (Hurd et al., 2017, p.1). Narratives and practices render the subjectivities of those who cross the border; the border represents imagination and it is described as “countless points of interaction or myriad places of divergence and convergence” (Donnan and Wilson, 2010, p.7). There is also the time and the space dimension of border crossings because crossing the border entails “shifting patterns of spatiotemporal overlap and disjunction” (Hurd et al., 2017, p.2).

When crossing the borders, the feeling of in-betweenness is one of the most important experiences migrants might have, although they have proper documents and legal process, they would feel that they will not arrive where they are supposed to be due to the exclusion from the rest of the community (ibid., p.12). Putting more precisely; “one border (the physical) has been crossed while the new one (cultural) presents itself, which may never be crossed successfully in their lifetime” (Newman, 2006, p.179). It renders problems of migrants in terms of cultural adaptation to a new destination. Crossing a border is a one-time event physically, yet its social and cultural outcomes might be a “never-ending process”, that lasts for a lifetime for migrants although they gain material successes such as house and job, they still

may live on the outskirts of in-betweenness due to exclusion and isolation caused by the demarcation of boundaries of the host society (Hurd et al., 2017, p.12-13). Thus, some migrants strengthen their relationship with the relatives and friends who are left behind in the country of origin, which is a situation beyond political borders and social boundaries (Schiller et al., 1995, p.56). Moreover, migrants maintain “parallel time-spaces” with remittances, gifts, rituals, and marriage patterns, while at the same time they balance their lives through transnational connections which can be e-mail, Skype calls and visiting home as a “social glue of migrant transnationalism” (Vertovec, 2004), and these repetitive patterns are articulated as a part of everyday life for migrants (Hurd et al., 2017, p.14-15). Regardless of the migrants’ place of destination and polity borders, they still maintain transnational activities by participating in festivals at their home country, in order to “feel part of a higher collective”, and through these rituals, they are able to synchronize time-space between home and host (ibid.). Therefore, crossing a nation-state border does not limit people’s transnational attachments with the home country, despite the fact that it also creates spatiotemporal disjunctions and new boundaries with those who stayed back.

2.2. Ethnicity As a Forming Tool for Community

The identity is mostly considered as an ethnic identity in this thesis, hence, I try to elucidate the different processes, which generate and maintain ethnic groups and boundaries by focusing on a specific ethnic group living in two different settings, having influenced by a forced migration process either by migrating or by staying behind. In that sense, I initially explain different approaches focusing on the question of ethnicity including primordial, circumstantial, and constructionist approaches which are truly related to my research, and then I am going to elaborate on theories of ethnicity influenced by Barth who has a “transactional” approach, which deals with social boundaries; by ethno-symbolists (i.e. Armstrong, 1982; Smith, 1986) whose main concern is explaining ethnicity with persistence, change,

resurgence and past experiences (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996, p.9); by Brubaker (2002, 2004) whose main concern is to explain ethnicity, not as a unified entity, but taking community as a cognition which based on processes and relations.

2.2.1. Ethnic Groups and Different Approaches to Ethnicity

The definitions of ethnic groups and ethnicity are considered here in terms of a sense of sharing common features. Race is not a preferable term to use in social research because it might refer to essential features of humans, which brings racism along with other problems. Rather than using the term race, the term ethnic group is much more used due to the ethnocentric approach which believes in the superiority of a specific group of people without taking into consideration of biological or essential difference as in the case of explaining race (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.30-31). It was displaced to use the term race in social sciences to refer to for instance Slavs, Portuguese, Jews, Africans or Asians as Robert Park did because the term race here implied unchangeable and essential features (ibid.). Giving references from anthropological literature (e.g. Narroll 1964), Barth (1969, p.11) defines an ethnic group as constituting a population which is “biologically self-perpetuating; shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms; makes up a field of communication and interaction; has a membership which identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order”. Significantly, Barth emphasizes as the primary feature of ethnic groups that ethnic groups are made of ascription and identification provided by themselves, which have the ability to interact with other groups. Similarly, Schermerhorn (1978, p.12) defines an ethnic group as “a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood”. Symbols mentioned in this definition happen to be kinship, religions, language, dialects, phenotypical features, tribal or national affiliations.

Primordial approaches to ethnicity firstly appeared in 1975 as a basic group identity, when the political scientist Harold Isaacs wrote the book *Idols of the Tribe* (1975, p.38), which explains ethnic identity as such: “consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual share with other from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born at that given time in that given place”. “The assumed givens” of identity was accepted by Isaacs together with other scholars such as Geertz (1963) and Shils (1957) (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p. 48); they adapted to the primordial account of ethnicity claiming that ethnicity is a “natural phenomenon” which is based on family and kinship (Baumann, 2004, p.13) What Isaacs also accepts that ethnic identity is more basic and primary compared to the other secondary identities, such as class identity because primordial vision focuses more on the feeling of belonging, which is an internal aspect of ethnic group identity and ethnic group membership (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.50-52). Primordialism is functionally important because every society whether it is small or large-scale, needs relationships that promote feelings of connectedness and profound, which might be perceived as inexplicable attachments, however, these subjective feelings provide bases of collective identity and action (Alexander 1988; Connor 1978 cites in Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.55).

While being critical about primordialism, circumstantial accounts of ethnicity argue that it is not about roots of ethnicity that defines ethnic or racial identity, rather its practical uses and derivative circumstances engender ethnic identification and further, it is similarly argued that circumstantial accounts of ethnicity provide the basis for collective political mobilization according to interests of a certain group (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.56-57). Ethnic and racial identities are emphasized when they are advantageous on some occasions and they are used to keep apart some ethnicities who are not eligible for accessing some goods, such as jobs, housing, and schools, on the other hand, ethnical bonds can be ignored if circumstances change according to the interests of certain groups (ibid., p.58). Rather than seeing ethnicity as fixed and unchanging as primordialists do, circumstantial perceives it as fluid, contingent, and ephemeral because ethnicity is associated with the situation

or the moment, unlike primordial accounts of ethnicity being timeless and basic (ibid., p.67).

The constructionist approach claims that ethnic groups are constituted through self-ascription and ascription by others, referring to Barth (1969). Cornell and Hartmann (1998, p.77) highlight that ethnicity is not just a label but also an identity, which is accepted, resisted, chosen, redefined or rejected, so they are not only about circumstances but also people's responses to those circumstances according to their dispositions. In the construction of ethnic identity, ethnic communities themselves construct and reproduce their own existence by establishing organizations, promoting research on history and culture, retelling histories in different ways in order to be recognized, and reestablishing and inventing new cultural practices (ibid., p.79).

Identity negotiation is obviously related to how ethnic identity is constituted either in accordance with the circumstances or by construction and reproduction. Construction of ethnic identities comprises an interactive process which is an ongoing process rather than being a one-time event, because it both includes a passive experience of being made by others and an active experience of making themselves, in addition to that, the constructionist approach does not completely reject circumstantial approach of ethnicity; it also adds that there is a creative component in ethnic identity rather than only depending on a circumstance (ibid., 80). Cornell and Hartmann significantly express that there are three primary concerns regarding the process of identity construction; the boundary, the perceived position of the group, and the meaning that is attached to the identity. The boundary forms a set of criteria based on skin color, place of origin, cultural practices in order to separate group members from non-members; the perceived position helps situate the group in a specific context; and the meaning includes the assertion or the assignment of meaning, which might be "we are good/bad" or "they are inferior/superior" (ibid., 81). These three considerations fits well with my research problematization because the identity negotiation of the Turks of Bulgaria comprise of boundary construction which includes both relationality and disjunctions with other groups; the perceived position of the community which is occasionally determined; and the meaning

which is attached to the identity of the community through memories of a shared historical past. In that regard, Cornell and Hartmann (1998, p.83) define assigned identity as an ascription by others or circumstances, while asserted identity is ascribed by ethnic groups themselves; in addition to these claims, thick identity is identified as the organizer of social life while thin identity is minimally associated with social life, hence four identities are defined; assigned and thick, assigned and thin, asserted and thick, asserted and thin. All in all, the constructionist approach of ethnicity highlights the involvement of ethnic groups in constructing and reconstructing identity, asserted and assigned meanings of it, negotiated boundaries between groups, and constructing the past, present and future accordingly (ibid., 101).

Ethnic groups have self-consciousness which makes them distinct from other groups as ethnic group identity is mostly based on putative common descent, whereas there is also a belief in shared history and symbols, which might be constructed by assignment by others or assertion by selves; further, ethnic group identity might reflect power relations (ibid., p.19, 35). On the one hand, Smith (1986) argues that *ethnie* (Handelman, 1977) refers to

a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members.

According to Smith (1986), there are at least six categories that ethnic groups share; a common proper name, a myth of ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of a common culture, a link with the homeland, a sense of solidarity with the people in the same ethnic community.

While Barth (1969) argues that the porosity of the boundaries helps maintain the boundary more durable, he is also criticized (Francis, 1976; Wallman, 1986; Epstein, 1978 cited in Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, p.9) for taking ethnic identity as fixed and bounded; and for not taking into consideration the differentiation types of ethnic allegiance, individual subjective dimensions and some resources which shapes various ethnic groups. On the other hand, ethno-symbolists deal with

persistence, change, and resurgence features of *ethnies*, which are in relation with the ethnic past that determine current cultural communities (ibid., 10). Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p.10) argue that while Armstrong (1982) uses Barth's approach to pre-modern ethnic communities such as Islam and medieval Christendom, he does not neglect the infusion of cultural forms of it, unlike Barth, because for Armstrong and also for Smith (1986, p.15) to ensure maintaining a community relies on certain myths and symbols such as nostalgia for the past, religious civilizations, and language fissures, which also unify and shift ethnic identities. It is also argued that the resurgence of ethnicity is inevitable in the modern world as "intelligentsias have rediscovered ethnic roots as an antidote to the impersonality of bureaucratic rationalism" (Smith, 1981; 1991). However, the ethno-symbolist approach to ethnicity is also criticized for not sufficiently considering "the mass bases of ethnic phenomena" and also for "privileging the contents of myths and memories" (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996, p.10).

Scholars argue that ethnic identity has a malleable character while at the same time it can overlap with other social identities, which are both determined and undermined by migrations, colonization and intermarriage as discrete and persisting (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996, p.8). For instance, Barth argues that it is the social boundaries that makes ethnic groups persistent, that should be perceived as units of ascription, further, Barth put emphasis on the requirement of an intensive anthropological study of "symbolic border guards" such as language, dress, food, etc. which provide perpetuation and enclosure of the community (ibid., p.9). On the other hand, Manning Nash (1996, p.25) approaches this traits-language, dress and physical features- as secondary surface pointers of ethnicity because they all have the ability to separate groups and mark group differences. Dressing and language are both visible and public and hence, they reinforce group boundaries (ibid., p.26). Furthermore, physical elements such as skin color, hair, eye shape, height, and density as well as circumcision and tattooing are perceived as cultural stipulators, although they constitute the superficial elements to determine ethnic boundaries (ibid.). These secondary traits of cultural makers which indicate group

differences must be in relation to the core elements of ethnic group formation because “physical features, language, dress, and the others must stand for and imply differences in blood, substance, and cult and hence to the building blocks of ethnicity” (ibid.).

According to Nash, the core elements of ethnic inquiry include cultural categories, which are related to social and group referents. Nash implies that the very existence of cultural markers of difference rely on boundaries, which also contain the maintaining mechanisms. Moreover, Nash (1996, p.24) identifies cultural markers as “index features” which imply the differences among groups. Index features promote boundary marking and they are seen both by the members and nonmembers of a group, while these boundaries can be exposed to outsiders’ reaction as a caricature, exaggeration, and stereotyping (ibid.). Nash argues that there are three most important ethnic boundary markers, which are *kinship*, *commensality* and *common cult*. Kinship is defined as the most pervasive ethnic boundary marker because it brings along “the presumed biological and descent unity of the group implying a stuff or substance continuity each group member has and outsiders do not”; and the second boundary marker is commensality which emphasize eating together, equality and an intimate act that is slightly different than bedding together in terms of intimacy; and the last one is the existence of a common cult which implicates “a value system beyond time and empirical circumstance, sacred symbols and attachments coming from *illo tempore*⁵” (ibid., p.25). Nash explains that those “trinity of boundary markers” are the basis for differentiation of ethnic groups, because these “cultural markers of blood, substance and cults” can help differentiate other groups or entities. However, sometimes these basic symbols of ethnicity cannot be visible or graspable by the members, then, as it is explained above, the secondary surface features –language, dress, physical features- which are more shapable or changeable over time and less central could occur (ibid.).

The concept and the meaning of ethnicity have been affected by the political context

⁵ At that time (it implies the time before recorded history)

over years. The notion of ethnic cleansing has come to the fore due to the collapse of the communist regime in the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in intensifying the sense of ethnic belonging and creating hostility and genocide towards other ethnic groups that have been living together for decades (Guibernau & Rex, 2020, p.1). A similar problem has occurred in the European Union regarding the strengthening of the term ethnicity, since many migrants come from post-colonial countries and being exposed to cultural and identity problems in Europe (ibid., p.2). Hence, the concept of ethnicity has a very close relationship with race and nationalism in terms of political disrepute. There should be continuity with the past and common descent for the existence and sustainability of the nation, that is how ethnicity is becoming related to nationalism (ibid., p.5). The relationship between ethnicity and nationalism is not always based on a common belief of an ancestral origin, but it is also related to the distinction of the notions of “ethnic” and “civic” nationalisms, which Greenfeld (1992) argues. In this argument, while in civic nationalism “nationality is at least in principle open and voluntaristic, it can sometimes be acquired”, which is similar to principles of citizenship, in ethnic nationalism “to be inherent- one can neither acquire it if one does not have it, not change it if one does; it has nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic” (Greenfeld, 1992, p.11 cited in Guibernau & Rex, 2010, p.5). The distinction between the notions of ethnic and civic presumably entails a need for the concept of ethnicity politically.

Among other classical social theorists, Weber was the one who conceptualized the notion of ethnicity, explaining ethnic groups as “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonization of migration” (Weber, (1922) 1968, p.389). Weber has made some implications on the ethnic groups, as Guibernau and Rex (2010) juxtaposed as follows; first of all, Weber differentiates ethnic groups and races because race implies biological factors, however, ethnic groups are rather related to “common customs”. Secondly, ethnic groups are organized, political community, which are not influenced by political dissolutions; instead, there is a continuation of persistence of common ethnicity and

language, hence, united political action is the core element of ethnic groups (ibid.). Thirdly, Weber argues that history plays an important role in shaping ethnic groups as it implies such elements: common past, specific territory, certain traditions, and a way of life. Weber also elaborates on the importance of migrations and how migrations affect the ways of sense of belonging in terms of nation-states (ibid.). Fourthly, Weber recognizes that the constitution of a specific *ethnie* and “actual kin” is essential and to provide this, ethnicity creates certain symbols and myths, which prevents and delimits other groups that are not identical (Guibernau & Rex, 2010, p.2-3).

According to Weber, it is the language that exists no matter what changes occur among an ethnic group, because ethnic membership does not necessarily have to generate a community, the only important thing is to sustain the belief in common ethnicity. In other words, Weber discusses that it is the presumed identity among the citizens of a state, which implies the political community that was formed in the past and could not be dissolved due to the continuity of the belief in common ethnicity. Hence rather than the group itself, it is the group formation that ethnic membership engenders, Weber argues (ibid., p.13). According to Weber, it is the language group that is identified as the bearer of a “cultural possession of the masses” that can create sentiments of likeness among an ethnic group (ibid., p.21).

On the other hand, ethno-symbolist theory, which is formulated by Anthony D. Smith, expressed *ethnies* or ethnic communities as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity” (1986, p.32). Having explored nations and national identity, Smith expresses them as a pre-modern form of collective cultural identity, because collective cultural identity reflects “a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of the population; shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of the unit; and notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture” (Guibernau & Rex, 2010, p.14). Thus, Smith’s theory of ethno-symbolism emphasizes

national identity by employing notions of myths, memories, values, traditions, and symbols due to their important role in differentiating and reminding the specific culture and destiny of the ethnic communities (ibid.).

The ideal-typical characteristics of pre-modern ethnic communities were defined by Smith in five categories: the first one is peasants and artisans who largely had local folk cultures (legends, rural customs, rites, dress, music) due to restrictions such as serfdom and ghettoization on their freedom; the second one is a small number of urban elites such as rulers, bureaucrats, noble landowners, military leaders, who monopolized wealth and political power; the third one is priests or monks who acted as transmitters and agents of socialization between the urban elites and the peasants by holding the ritual and educational services and the belief system; the fourth one comprises of myths, symbols, memories and values that shape the perception of the community by being manifested in ceremonies, rites and laws; and the fifth one includes the total processes of communication, transmission and socialization of all of the myths, memories, and values of the community, which represent dissemination of precepts among both urban elites, their clients and the peasants (Smith, 1986, p. 42).

Considering the interaction that agents might have, ethnicity is also related to the social relationship between culturally distinctive members of groups (Eriksen, 2010, p.51). Therefore, it can be expressed as a social identity, which is related to otherness and contrast, as well as to fictive kinship that encourages endogamy most of the times as it might have practical significance; yet, ethnicity has political, organizational, symbolic and ideological aspects at the same time (ibid.).

A challenging approach to the constructivist expressions of ethnicity is engendered by Brubaker, who is against the tendency to define groups as unified categories, because rather than being fixed or given entities, Brubaker argues that groupness is an “event” and it is something that “happens” as it resembles what E. P. Thompson said about class (Brubaker, 2002, p.168). In the discussions of ethnicity, race

and nationalism, Brubaker defines groupism as

the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis; the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nation and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed (ibid., p.164).

In order to provide a brighter insight, Brubaker gives examples of those allegedly homogenous groups such as Serbs, Croats, Muslims and Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Turks and Kurds in Turkey, hence Brubaker explains that these groups are neither internally homogenous nor monochrome in terms of ethnically, racially and culturally (ibid.).

Rethinking ethnicity is what Brubaker suggests we take into consideration because what might be called ethnic conflict can be ethnically framed or ethnicized conflict and need not be perceived as a conflict between ethnic groups as in the similar cases of racially or nationally framed conflicts (ibid., p.167). Therefore, concepts of ethnicity, race and nation should not be considered as unified, unchangeable categories or entities rather they should be taken as relational categories which are entitled to dynamic processes and events, as Brubaker states;

this means thinking of ethnicity, race and nation, not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of *practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events*; and it means thinking of *ethnicization, racialization and nationalization* as political, social-cultural, and psychological *processes*.

Further, Brubaker states that it also means taking groupness as a basic analytical category and a fluctuating conceptual variable, instead of taking the group as an entity (ibid.). Considering ethnicity as a cognitive schema, ethnicity is a perspective on the world, rather than being a thing in the world (Brubaker et al., 2004, p.32). In that sense, the assimilation process and the forced migration of Turks can be considered as an ethnicized conflict or an ethnically framed conflict, because there were no tension between different ethnic groups in Bulgaria to entail such

an ethnic cleansing against the Turks. Details about this conflict will be explained historically and discussed in the further chapters.

2.3. Citizenship as a Part of Identity Negotiation

The concept of citizenship is considered in this thesis as an element of identity negotiation. Thus, it consists of political participation of citizens, social and economic regulations, and rights covering them (Prokhovnik, 1998, p.84). Citizenship cannot only be thought of with identity cards or nationality as it consists of several identities, multiple socializations regarding diversities of gender, ethnicity, and cultural backgrounds. We should think of citizenship beyond the boundaries of political and social rights, because “access to citizenship is a highly gendered and ethnically structured process” (Walby, 1994, p.391). Thus, the aim of this thesis is not to give the historical explanations and definitions of citizenship, rather to provide how citizenship is bent and evolved through migrations and migrants’ experiences in relation to transnationality and reacquiring rights. I will focus on citizenship in order to open up its relationship with community and ethnicity by elaborating on the meanings of citizenship, which has changed in terms of nation-states and has been evolving something flexible; how minorities maintain its importance; and how dual citizenship becomes an institution with its relation to transnational mode of life.

2.3.1. The Basic Arguments on Citizenship

Citizenship as an institution has been defined specifically in different societies; nevertheless, it is also subject to changes. Despite the fact that citizenship seems to give promises to the majority of the people, it does not necessarily represent all of them, thus, there is a difference between who holds citizenship and who enjoys practicing it (Parla, 2011, p.77). Different ideologies both from the right and left-wing, have utilized citizenship as an inclusive and exclusive principle and as a

political tool for the mobilization of people (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.133). While including a group of people in the closure, citizenship also excludes some others (Janoski & Gran, 2002, p.35). When the early modern conceptualizations of citizenship firstly emanated in the 19th and 20th centuries with the rise of the capitalist market and the liberal ideals, it promised equality and universality, but rather liberal citizenship engendered social inequality in the society (Roy, 2005, p.12-16). The promised rights of citizenship were not applied to all, instead, it concealed the existing structures of inequality by excluding different genders, cultures and ethnicities from the rights of citizenship (ibid.). Hence, the question of how women, minorities and migrants could be regarded as citizens remained an important investigation.

Marshall and Bottomore (1950/1992) developed an important contribution to the theory of citizenship, emphasizing its evolutionary and progressive nature. In Marshall's analysis citizenship was categorized into three; civil, political and social. The civil rights, which correspond to the 18th century, include freedom of speech, thought and faith, individual property rights; the political rights, which correspond to the 19th century, consist of participating in the parliament and in the government with the political authority to exercise power; the social rights, which correspond to 20th century, include economic welfare security, heritage rights, educational rights and social services (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992, p. 8-10). Hence, Marshall denoted a citizen as a member of a community, who has a variety of rights and duties.

Marshall's contribution to the theoretical conceptualization of citizenship is undeniable, however, the concept of citizenship has been changing in accordance with the changes in the world. Citizenship was considered as a given status, which was guaranteed by the state, however social struggles have expanded the meanings of citizenship by giving voice to "political and social recognition" and "economic redistribution" (Isin & Turner, 2002, p. 2). State as an absolute authority, which imposes sanctions over people is contested. Hence, citizenship cannot be defined with the privileges given by birth, and in addition to that, differences of race,

gender, and ethnicity cannot be neglected if capitalism and liberalism encourage people to demand citizenship rights (Roy, 2005, p.5).

Citizenship cannot be considered only as a legal concept regarding state-society relations, rather it is also related to relationships and interactions between different social groups and their claims, needs, differences and identities. For instance, studies on the relationship between migration and citizenship provide new areas to discuss, such as marriage, family structures, multiplicity and pluralism (Isin & Turner, 2002, p.9). Thus, these definitions of citizenship should be taken into consideration; “global/world citizenship with its basis in human rights that delink the relationship between citizenship and the nation-state and the differential rights and differentiated citizenship for members of cultural groups which gives them rights not only as individuals but also as members of groups” (Roy, 2005, p.21-22). Citizenship should be defined based on the needs of different groups without excluding gender, ethnicity, culture and citizenship status.

2.3.2. The Changing Meanings of Citizenship

The meaning of citizenship has been changing through the post-The Second World War era with the changing institution of nation-states, hence a new concept of citizenship is more universal which is mostly based on universal personhood rather than being attached to a nation-state (Soysal, 1994, p.1). Having given examples from the experiences of guest workers, Soysal (1994), elucidates that the new concept of citizenship includes expanded personal rights while undermining and contradicting national belonging. The need for foreign workers in the postwar era caused many recruitments of guest workers in Europe, as a temporary expedient, however, the governments expected them to be excluded from the national polity and be sent home if there could be problems with their productivity (ibid.). Guest workers constitute a large foreign community; rather than going back, they participate in different aspects of life in the host countries such as educational

and welfare system, labor markets, trade unions, political and associational activities, hence guest workers are perceived as empirical anomalies considering the predominant conceptualizations of citizenship (ibid., p.1-2). Citizenship as definition refers to bounded populations who have specific rights and duties and who excluded some others on the basis of nationality and yet guest workers are granted rights, protection, and membership by a state which is not “their own” (ibid.). Soysal (1994, p.137) conceptualizes this type of citizenship as “postnational citizenship” which is “a new form of membership that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state”. Postnational citizenship derives from transnational discourse because it promotes human rights and participation on the basis of personhood regardless of the historical and cultural ties people belong to (ibid., p.3).

The institution of citizenship has expanded historically due to changes in the definition of the public regarding class, gender and age, which include workers, women and children into the definition of citizenship (Marshall 1964; Ramirez 1989; Turner 1986a; Turner 1986b). However, this inclusion of different groups into the citizenship was dependent on a membership, which was limited to belonging to a specific nation-state as Soysal contributes. On the contrary, in contemporary times post-national citizenship is opposed to the dichotomies created between the national citizen and the aliens, and includes people who remain outside the national discourse by extending rights to foreign people (Soysal, 1994, p.137). In order to explain how fluid is the boundaries of post-national citizenship, Soysal gives an example of a Turkish guest worker being a member of the French polity but not having French citizenship. Soysal summarizes the situation by putting: “By holding citizenship in one state while living and enjoying rights and privileges in a different state, guest workers violate the presumed congruence between membership and territory. The growing number of dual nationality acquisitions further formalizes the fluidity of membership” (ibid., p.141). The juxtaposition of several identities, such as political, ethnic and personal, are becoming blurred instead of addressing “win” or “lose”, due to political borders losing importance and nation-states being defeated by global-trade (Ong, 1999, p.12). Nation-states’ control over their subjects has become

weakened along with passports losing their significance and enshrinement, as Turner (1990, p.212) argues uncertainties may create strong political reactions in the local and national authorities over global and international ones (Ong, 1999, p.12). In a world within which nationalist discourses and the boundaries that nation-states draw blur, due to the rising of universalistic personhood, national citizenship is losing relevancy (Soysal, 1994, p.162).

“Flexible citizenship” is a term suggested by Ong (1999), unifying the notion of flexibility as the “modus operandi of late capitalism” (Harvey, 1989) with transnationalism that implies the tensions between movements and social orders rather than taking it as unstructured flows. What lacks in Harvey’s conceptualization of contemporary chains of capitalism which involves “the regime of flexible accumulation”, profit making, distribution, and consumption is that human agency and its relationships with cultural meanings produced and negotiated by human agency too (Ong, 1999, p.13). In the age of analysis of globalization which implies economic rationale of human agency, it is also understood that studying “the local” has importance because “multiple modernities” have been created by the global and the local, rather than opposing each other, in different cultures of the world (Pred & Watts, 1992). “Global production of locality” is constituted as a result of transnationality of people and knowledge, which are producing “virtual neighborhoods” (Appadurai, 1996, p.178-99), as the local is perceived as culturally creative and resistant, whereas the global is seen as macro economy-politic (Massey, 1993 cited in Ong, 1999, p.13). Therefore, the newly emerging concepts of citizenship are very much related to transnationality and transnational migrations.

2.4. The Conceptualization of Transnationality

The new conceptualizations of citizenship, including post-national and flexible citizenships emanated from transnationality, because where people belong to is not confined to having a passport of a nation-state or living inside the borders of a

nation-state; instead there are multiple belongings to more than one nation-state, which minority and migrants communities hold on to. I believe that the case of the Turks of Bulgaria should also include a transnationality perspective, as their transnational attachments and interconnectedness across borders define and regulate their identity negotiation strategies through different ways, which will be discussed in the further chapters.

Transnational communities have multiple attachments to more than one space, which may indicate an interplay between ethnicity and nationality. Borders are considered as important methodological tools for experts in terms of identifying political, social and cultural changes (Elchinova et al., 2012, p.5), yet, nation-state borders may only indicate political confinements. Therefore, the border between two states might only refer to a geographical limitation; it does not confine the perception of belonging to both sides. The interaction of ethnic identity and national identity among migrants is a significant determinant for the transnational identity as migrants tend to define ethnicity and nationality interchangeably, especially when they are asked where they come from. Migrants are supposed to cut their ties with any kind of relations left behind when the migration happens. For instance, many generations of researchers in the US have considered migrants, who climb the socioeconomic ladder and become socially upgraded, cut their ties with the home country (Schiller et al., 1995, p.48). However, migration scholars realize that some migrants do not cut ties with the left-behinds; on the contrary, they strongly remain connected with the home country and maintain social relations across national borders (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p. 1003). As Basch put it precisely, “no matter where they settle, or what passport they carry, people of Haitian ancestry remain an integral part of Haiti”, implying that neither the borders of the nation-states nor being a citizen can determine where people belong to (Basch et al., 2005, p.1). At the time the concept of transnationality has been called by the migration research scholars such as Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton –Blanc (2005), and a new approach that distinguishes the unity of society and the nation-state is generated based on the other transnational factors (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1003). A broad perspective is needed on the issue of

migration as the lives of individuals cannot be analyzed just by looking at national boundaries; hence the multiplicity of transnational social fields that migrants experience reflects a need for reassessment of the basic concepts of family, citizenship, nation-states (ibid.). As Schiller et al. (1995) highlight that transmigrants experience perpetual interconnections, which are related to more than one nation-state. This generates that nation-state borders are no longer able to define migration experience without emphasizing transnationality.

Transnationality refers to the condition of cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space, which implies cultural specificities and multiplicity of the uses of culture and those features are directly related to late capitalism (Ong, 1999, p.14). In addition to elaboration on new relationships between states and capital, transnationality also allows room for “

the *transversal*, the *transactional*, the *translational*, and the *transgressive* aspects of contemporary behavior and imagination that are incited, enabled and regulated by the changing logics of state and capitalism” (ibid.).

The forces of the global economy seem to be the reason for migrants living transnational lives in the capitalist cities across the world, hence there are several reasons for transnational migration related to the capitalist global economy that Schiller et al. (1995) put. Deterioration of conditions both in labor-sending and in labor-receiving countries as a result of the changing conditions of capital accumulation causes a lack of secure settlement locations (ibid., p.50). In addition to that, increasing racism in western countries leads to economic and political insecurity among migrants. Also, the projects and process of nation-building in the countries of origin and in the countries of migration require faithful citizens and migrants, which leads to maintaining social ties within both countries (ibid.).

One of the important elements of transnational communities, which constituted by migrants across borders, is the variety of networks they created in order to gain social recognition and economic advancement (Portes, 1997, p.812). Some defining features of transnational communities include having dual lives, bilingualism, moving easily between cultures, and maintaining homes in both countries in

order to preserve their economic, political, and cultural interests (ibid.). Portes (1997, p.813) also mentions some of the new characteristics of transnational communities including changes in the number of people involved, and their rapid communications across spaces, and the process itself becoming normative with some migrant groups. Nevertheless, Basch et. al (2005, p.8) clearly defines how transnationalism reflects multiple attachments of migrants:

We define transnationalism as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. . . . An essential element ... is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies. We are still groping for a language to describe these social locations.

2.4.1. Transnational Migration Theory

The history of transnational migration in academia indicates distinctions between different traditions (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1004). For instance, sociological and anthropological transnational migration research in the United States has been developed through criticizing classical migration research, which has an assimilationist approach, hence transnational migration research in the US emphasizes the economic and political transnational relations maintained and developed between the communities both in the sending and receiving countries (ibid.). On the other hand, the Oxford Transnational Communities Programme has developed a broader definition of transnationality, rather than putting emphasis only on networks between the country of origin and country of migration done by the US scholars. The British Ecole highlights the importance of distinguishing “the patterns of connection of the ground and the conditions that produce ideologies of connection and community” (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1006). Research done by the American and British scholars gave rise to the regenerated transnational kinship studies, which comprise of family networks and gender dynamics of the transnational migrants. These studies further emphasized the tension between

kin networks due to remittances sent and received, which cause exploitation of kin networks (ibid., p.1006). Moreover, in order to challenge social theory and to develop a new conceptualization of structuration, which attaches a dynamic relation of structure and agency to the transnational approach, another group of scholars utilizes transnational migration (ibid.).

As Faist (2006, p.3) expresses movements of persons and groups that across borders and their cross-border social and symbolic ties in a de-bordered world have long been neglected, however, they generate transnational social spaces, transnational social fields, and transnational social formations which reflect persons, networks and organizations which move across the borders. In that regard, Faist (2006, p.4-5) suggests four types of transnational spaces; small groups that include family and kinship groups; issue networks between persons and organizations that aim a common goal; transnational communities such as religious groups and diasporas; transnational organizations that consist of inter-state and para-state non-governmental organizations. All of these transnational spaces reflect the importance of understanding migrant groups with transnationality lenses.

Identifying transnationalism as tensions between movements and social order rather than taking it only as unstructured flows helps relate transnationality with systems of governmentality which is a Foucauldian notion that manages the movements of populations and capital in terms of techniques that control human behavior (Ong, 1999, p.15). The concept of governmentality, which is related to the deployment of modern forms of disciplining power that rules based on knowledge/power about populations (ibid., p.279), quoted from Foucault (1991), reflects the disciplinary purposes of truth and power, which causes to form our everyday practices. Tracing the different regimes, including state and family, helps us understand how these regimes determine transnational relations as well as border crossings and their patterns (Ong, 1999, p.15). Ong (1999) also argues that explaining the history of diasporan groups whose trade is significant in terms of understanding “the new modalities of translocal governmentality and the cultural logics of subject

making” because these patterns of transfers between state and capital are related to the logic of culture in regional contexts.

Moving beyond methodological nationalism, which takes nation-states and their boundaries as given social facts, will help understand that social life is not limited to the borders of any nation-state (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1007). Three variants of methodological nationalism coined by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003, p.578) suggest that ignorance of the importance of nationalism in modern societies can lead to the processes of naturalization and the notion that taken-for-granted boundaries of nation-states designate the unit of analysis, and lastly the geographical limitations cause confinement of the social process into the borders of a nation-state. Generating a transnational social field theory (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1007) helps better analyze social actors and their relations of power, their continuous movements, and their networks by putting emphasis on the concept of social. Hence, the social field (ibid., p.1008) is a necessary tool for tracing transnational migrants’ social movements, which transcend nation-states’ boundaries. The social field perspective, which is highlighted by Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004), influenced by Bourdieu and Manchester school of anthropology, reflects society and social membership on the basis of the distinction between ways of being and ways of belonging. Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004) clearly express those ways of being reflect individuals’ social relations and actual practices; it is not related to their identity which means people not necessarily identify themselves with any label or cultural politics, although they have a certain social field. On the other hand, ways of belonging reflect a conscious community identity that is practiced by concrete actions such as wearing a Christian cross (ibid., p.1010). Nevertheless, transnational social fields generate a combination of ways of being and ways of belonging, hence individual may act differently in different contexts (ibid.). By this approach, Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004, p.1008) give reference to Bourdieu’s conceptualization of social field, which defines social relations in the structure of power, as according to Bourdieu society is comprised of different fields structured by politics. Bourdieu explains fields with their relation to capital, declaring that “a

capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.101 cited in Calhoun, 2007, p.106). Concordantly, Bourdieu clearly expresses, people need to transform their capitals in accordance with their fields (ibid.). On the other hand, the Manchester school of anthropology seeks to explore the concept of the social field by demonstrating how migrants live both in tribal-rural localities and colonial-industrial cities, thus, the level of social analysis in social field studies is beyond the individual level (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1010).

How the social field is defined by Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004, p.1009) reveal the importance of the concept for transnational migration: “social field as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices and resources are unequally exchanged, organized and transformed”. In addition to consisting of multiple social relationships, social fields are multidimensional warranting different forms, depth and breadth in social theory, providing a tool for the relationships between migrants and non-migrants (ibid.).

A transnational approach to research should include some specifications. The research should be aware of the fact that the content of the networks is embedded in the operationalization of the parameters in the field research; consequently, an empirical analysis of the effects of transnational relations would be available (Levitt & Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1009). Concordantly, there is a need to alter the modernist dichotomies used in former migration studies, such as homeland/new land, citizen/non-citizen, migrant/non-migrant, in order to generate a transitional migration framework (ibid., p.1013). As Ong elaborates that instead of making a dichotomic explanation of global as political-economic and the local as cultural, which misses the different economic, social and cultural patterns across spaces and neglects different regimes of power, using the term transnationality covers meanings of moving through and across space and of changing the nature of something through lines (Ong, 1999, p.14). In addition, “transnational migration is a process rather than an event”, hence, a single analysis cannot capture migrants’ relationships and

engagements in the home and host countries (ibid.).

Migration is usually considered as a consequence of nationally-specific historical events or experiences regarding the mobility of people and their cultural diversity, which might be a problem in understating migration research (Castles, 2003, p.24). However, there are other important situations that affect migration research such as experiences with internal ethnic minorities and colonized people with whom an unquestioned common sense appeared with deeply embedded stereotypes in political and cultural discourses (Goldberg, 1993, p.41).

Transnational processes of migration require to analyze its effects on communities either national or local and individuals because existing paradigms of sociology of migration tend to focus more on institutional and conceptual frameworks which may only explain the status quo rather than focusing on the global changes in the world that shapes migration processes too (Castles, 2003, p.24). Therefore, particularly forced migration is considered as an important expression of global connections and processes which contribute to sociological inquiry particular to global sociology (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000 in Castles, 2003, p.24-25). Having thought of sociology of forced migration, Castles (2003, p.26) suggests some tips to researchers to get away with difficulties of studying forced migration, which emphasize the importance of linking forced migration research to different theories of social relations, structures and change, and bringing forward critical approach in order to understand and analyze how migrants participate in forced migration processes and how receiving societies response it. Local-level empirical research on migration, which focuses only on cultural distinctiveness should not cause underestimation of economic and social structures, which would also be the reasons for forced migration (Portes, 1997)

“A new transnational imaginary” can occur with the transformations of identity, memory, awareness and consciousness (Wilson and Dissanayake, 1996). Hence, in order to construct malleable identities, an “imaginary coherence” is required in

the everyday representations of diaspora or transnationalism (Hall, 1990), which shows the importance of collective memory among a migrant group. Furthermore, transnationalism also refers to migrants who are constructing a bridge of social fields between their country of origin and their country of settlement, called “transmigrants” (Schiller, 1992, p.185), who construct and sustain multiple relations, which are familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political and they are capable of transiting borders and yet “transmigrants take actions, make decisions and feel concerns and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously”. (Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc, 1992 in Schiller, 1992, p.185). Transnationalism also implies the reconstruction of place and locality because practices, which originated from specific geographical and historical places have been inevitably transferred and regrounded and, ultimately, transnationalism has changed people’s perception of space and territoriality since it produces transnational “social fields” or “social spaces” which bridges people to more than one single territory (Vertovec 2009, p.12). People have difficulties in setting themselves to a place, which has been dominated by a situated community, thus, “new localities” emerges (Appadurai, 1995, p.213) where there is no need for migration to take place because transnationalism can also be constructed where there are cultural artifacts made by a shared imagination (Cohen, 1996, p.516).

Connotations of migrant transnationalism have been transforming into different categories. There are “old” and “new” categories about migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2009). The old features of migrant transnationalism show that migrant families are divided between the countries of origin and destination, while they still have strong emotional ties; many migrants returned to their country of origin or move between the two countries over extended periods of time; many migrant associations are established with the increasing numbers of migrants; migrants keep pursuing their political interests in their homelands by lobbying and funding; some migrant-sending countries (migrant-receiving country in the case of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants) sustain concerns about their nationals abroad (ibid., p.14). On the other hand, there are some characteristics of a “new” migrant

transnationalism; technology of contact has developed through TVs, cell phones, the internet; even those who never migrated to any country are strongly influenced by events, values, and practices among their transnational relatives and villagers; practices of dual citizenship; 25 years of identity politics (anti-racism, multiculturalism, indigenous peoples, regional languages) in many western countries, which ease migrants' lives in displaying their transnational connections (ibid., p.15-16).

Koehn and Rosenau (2002, p.110) elaborate on some of the skills and competencies, which are acquired through transnational experiences. For instance, migrants can gain emotional competence in managing multiple identities, or they might acquire an "intercultural/transnational empathy" for the variety of values, traditions and experiences (ibid., p.114). On the other hand, migrants can acquire negative feelings rather than empathy towards different groups of people in the country of migration.

2.5. Flexible Citizenship, Dual Citizenship and Transnationality

Due to political reasons or migrations, people who hold multiple passports are important figures in terms of divided identities; one is state-imposed and the other one is personal identity (Ong, 1999, p.12). As Benedict Anderson (1994, p.323) elaborates that passports have become less indicator of citizenship or they do not provide loyalty to a nation-state anymore because the purpose of the nation-state project has been eroding due to changing regimes of culture, habits, or political participation. However, there are still some defining motives, which categorize the identities of people according to nation-state constructions. Irrespective of their mobility, individuals are being defined as "Chinese", "Muslims" as ethnic and racial categories, due to their subjectivities being shaped by particular kinds of citizens (Ong, 1999, p.29).

Flexible citizenship is about consolidating the relationship of

discipline and escape and hence, although mobility and flexibility are parts of human behaviors, they have gained new meanings with the effects of transnationality (Ong, 1999, p.29). Thus, flexibility, migration, and relocations have become new strategies for human beings instead of expected stability (ibid.). Considering and combining the views of Marx and Foucault in terms of subject formation and the strategies related to capitalist exploitation and governmentality associated with state power and culture, Ong (1999, p.29) clearly expressed that people who are on the move are still regulated by state power, market and kinship rules, hence, politics and cultural norms continue to discipline and regulate even, under conditions of transnationality.

Transnationalism refers to multiple belonging in which source of identity and source of rights are intertwined since the former reflects the country of origin and the latter is related to the country of residence, while transnational space turns out to be an arena for political actions (Kastoryano, 2000, p.311). Similarly, dual citizenship generates two consequences as Kastoryano (2005) implies: “it transforms nationality into an identity rooted in the country of origin and it makes of citizenship an entitlement within the country of residence; identity vs. rights”. In the case of the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants, this situation is vice versa; migrants claim identity by getting Turkish citizenship, since they are Turks and their motherland is Turkey, while they claim rights such as retirement benefits and free movement in the Schengen area by holding the Bulgarian citizenship. Thus, identity and citizenship have been intertwined in the case of the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants. Citizenship has become a part of an identity negotiation for the Turks of Bulgaria through transnational social fields across borders.

I believe that transnationality that highlighted with the rise of dual-citizenship is worth examining in the case of the Turks of Bulgaria. It has brought along many aspects that migrants engage transnationally. Although migrants initially hold Bulgarian citizenship for practical reasons such as free movement, later on, it might turn out to changing concept of the homeland due to frequent visitations to the country of origin. In addition to that, what makes migrants closer to Bulgaria is

not only the nostalgia of country of origin but also the relative alienation from Turkey, due to the complicated political atmosphere in the country, which led to the deterioration of several institutions. This bipolar tension has led migrants to live transnationally, and even sometimes to led them feel in-betweenness. As Levitt and Glick-Schiller (2004, p.1013) argue people who belong to multiple settings have to encounter institutions of regulatory powers and the hegemonic culture of more than one state, and these institutions of power led to determine gender, race, and class status of individuals who live in transnational social fields.

For instance, one of the significant issues that appear related to the 1989 migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey is definitely dual-citizenship. Since they were forced migrants, the Bulgarian state gave their citizenship rights immediately after migration to Turkey. The motivation for the Bulgarian state to give citizenship to the migrants in Turkey would be both economic and as an apology, hence the 1989 migrants easily took Bulgarian citizenship back in the 1990s. It means regular visitations to Bulgaria at least every five years to renew passports. However, for many migrants, the relationship with Bulgaria is not limited to the renovation of passports, but they regularly visit their relatives and some of them kept houses and go to Bulgaria to spend summers. Concordantly, the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants vote for Bulgaria in the political elections in ballot boxes established in several cities of Turkey.

European Union is the primary reason for the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants to have citizenship from Bulgaria. Benefitting from the free movement in the EU without visa requirement, education opportunities for children in Europe, free trade and work permits are the attractive reasons for migrants who hold dual citizenship. As Kastoryano (2005, p.695) implies European Union citizenship is defined in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992; “citizen of the Union is whoever holds the nationality of one of the member states”. Hence, to hold EU citizenship one needs to be a national citizen of a member state. The treaty seems to relate citizenship and nationality, however, there is also an extra-territorial aspect in the practice of

citizenship which provides the right to move, reside, and work to the citizens of the EU in the territory of a member state, and the right to vote and run in local elections and in European Parliamentary elections to the residents (Kastoryano, 2005, p.695). This extra-territorial aspect of the citizenship implies de-territorialization of the national community and re-territorializing the European space, although the Treaty of Maastricht highlights the concept of postnational, cosmopolitan, and transnational membership (Kastoryano, 2005, p.695). Therefore, there is still an emphasis on being a member of a nation-state, instead of emphasizing acquirement of rights and participation, without considering the cultural ties people have. The notion of citizenship has been serving to the nation-states by putting emphasis on membership, and it seems far from protecting rights of minority communities within a nation-state, whose access to citizenship rights is limited.

2.6. The Notion of Citizenship in Turkey and Bulgaria

It is argued that the new concept of citizenship includes expanded personal rights while undermining and contradicting national belonging, which is called postnational citizenship derived from transnational discourse on the basis of human rights and participation, regardless of the historical and cultural ties people belong to (Soysal, 1994). However, the tension between membership and acquisition of rights are still on the agenda, which led to citizenship becomes a part of identity negotiation among the minority communities whose congruence is considered as problematic between the nation-states. Thus, Turks of Bulgaria want to answer the question of “who are we” by giving references to their citizenship statuses as Bulgarian citizens, but at the same time they want to prove their loyalty by emphasizing their ethnic identity to Turkey. This duality indicates a negotiation of identity and transnational character of the their statuses.

Different citizenship regimes of the two nation-states make citizenship as a negotiating element for identity formation for the Turks of Bulgaria. Therefore,

the meanings of citizenship in their case have been oscillating between being a proper member of a nation-state and acquiring/reacquiring rights from another nation-state. Moreover, the exile policies of the two nation-states made the Turks of Bulgaria being got played like a fiddle in between and across borders. Their loyalty as citizens of the both countries has been always in question and found doubtful. My aim is not to give fully detailed description of citizenship conceptualizations of the two states, rather I try to provide a brief explanation of how the nature of citizenship has been perceived in these nation-states in relation to membership and duties, in order to understand the situations of the Turks of Bulgaria.

The elements of the establishment of Turkish nationalism and citizenship are historically based on the German and French nationalisms (Kadioğlu, 2012, p.173). While German nationalism is enhanced with the organic, the *Volk*-centered, ethno-cultural approaches, French nationalism is more of a political approaches which prioritize the state over nation (ibid., 172). Throughout the history of the modern Turkish Republic the gradation of nation-state and nationalism is important, because the state is prioritized over the nation and the feelings of nationalism in the Turkish Republic and it resulted in “the state searching for its nation” (ibid., 174). Hence, the state-centered political unity is the formative element for the Turkish nation-state (ibid.). Thus, citizenship in Turkey is more about the duties rather than rights (ibid., 177). In Turkey, the civil, social and political rights, which Marshall mentions, were not acquired by the demands of society, rather they were given from above by the republican elites (ibid., 181).

The issue of citizenship cannot be thought separately from the notion of Turkishness in Turkey. Barış Ünlü defines Turkishness as such “certain unrecognized ways/states of seeing, hearing, feeling, perceiving, and knowing- as well as not seeing, not hearing, not feeling, not perceiving, and not knowing” (Ünlü, 2014, p. 48). Turkishness is a crucial element in defining nation-formation of the Turkish nation-state, which excludes non-Turks and non-Muslims by signing a metaphorical Turkishness Contract (ibid.). The Contract emphasizes not speaking and

not writing about the massacres, deportations, assimilations done to the non-Turks and non-Muslim throughout the Turkish history, and those who break it would be punished while those who obey it enjoys the privileges of the Turkishness (ibid.). Therefore, Turkish state, nation and individual have revealed, constructed, produced and reproduced each other simultaneously by a gradual contract –namely Turkishness Contract and Muslimness Contract- which has a fundamental principle of Turkishness and Islam (Ünlü, 2018, p.184). Therefore, we can argue that the notion of citizenship goes hand in hand with nationalism and identity politics in Turkey. However, citizenship should be considered more than being a member of a national identity; it should be about rights of citizens, especially whose religion and language are different than the majority (Kadioğlu, 2012, p.184). The same problem is observed in Bulgaria too; the notion of citizenship is perceived as being a member of a specific national and religious identity in Bulgaria.

There has been a constitutive incoherence in the Bulgarian citizenship discussions. On the one hand there is a Bulgarian project, which prioritized identity-based citizenship and nationalism, on the other hand, there is an attempt to establish a more egalitarian political society regardless of ethnic origin (Smilov & Jileva, 2010, p.27). the Bulgarian project was a founding element of the independent Bulgarian state and made as a promise of a homogenous society, however, the communist takeover in 1944 changed the definition of citizenship from an ethnic into a rather civic one declaring that “a Bulgarian citizen by place of birth is every individual born or found inside the territory of the country” (ibid., 10). The current Bulgarian citizenship regulation also grants citizenship for those who were born the territory of Bulgaria. In 1990, the Bulgarian National Assembly passed the law which allows restoration of citizenship rights for those who were the victims of the assimilation processes in 1984-1985, guaranteeing their property rights, which were confiscated when they left (ibid., 11).

However, access to citizenship for diaspora members has been gradually made difficult in Bulgaria, while their voting rights influence the political

atmosphere in the country (Waterbury, 2014, p. 45). While the 1968 Law on Bulgarian Citizenship did not allow for the dual citizenship, with the 1991 constitution Bulgaria accepted dual citizenship, being one of the few countries in the Eastern Europe (Smilov & Jileva, 2010, p.13). Dual citizenship has been critically discussed by the public in Bulgaria, especially because of voting rights of the nonresidents. Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent in Turkey can vote for the national assembly elections in Bulgaria, however, the residency requirement for participating in the European Parliamentary elections was introduced in 2009 to prevent Turks to vote for the EU, because nonresident Turks living in Turkey are considered as the most politically active diasporic citizens (Waterbury, 2014, p. 45). The establishment of the DPS and efforts of nonresident Turks for representation of Turks in Bulgaria perhaps caused a change in the citizenship regime of Bulgaria, which required ten-year residency for voting for the European Parliamentary elections (ibid., 46).

Despite the efforts for easing the rules for the reacquiring of nonresident ethnic citizenship in Bulgaria, the issue of voting rights of the diaspora citizens has been continuing to be a controversy for the institution of citizenship in Bulgaria (ibid., 46). Hence, the adoption of nonresident ethnic citizenship is considered by “a great deal of fluidity, contingency and variability” (ibid.). It is also argued that the dominant public opinion about citizenship in Bulgaria has been lacking a “principled vision of citizenship”, because restricting voting rights of Turks are considered as a punishment for the allegedly ‘corrupt’ DPS, or it is considered by the far right parties such as ATAKA, that only ethnic Bulgarians should have political rights (Smilov & Jileva, 2010, p.23). Thus, identity-based considerations of citizenship prevail egalitarian efforts for the democratic citizenship in Bulgaria, preventing Turks from being full members of the national constituent (Smilov & Jileva, 2010, p.27; Waterbury, 2014, p.46). Turks who remain outside the borders of Bulgaria have been limited in terms of accessing to citizenship and citizenship rights, which is always fluid and exposed to the changing identity regimes (Waterbury, 2014, p. 47). The notion of citizenship lacks protecting rights of minority communities within a

nation-state, whose access to citizenship rights is limited and whose loyalty as citizens of the both countries has been always in question. Hence, intertwining of identity and citizenship can be considered as part of an identity negotiation for the Turks of Bulgaria due to living in transnational social fields across borders.

2.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, regarding the issue of ethnic identity, I tried to explore theoretical implications on the boundaries, which build communities; and the conceptualizations of ethnicity in relation to identity constructions of minority and migrant groups. Further, I aimed to give insights from theories of citizenship, which have been changing and evolving into a different concept in relation to transnationality and identity negotiation. And I wanted to provide how transnationality has been affecting communities, ethnic identities, and citizenship, prospectively. Nevertheless, transnational experiences have been changing the lives of migrants and the people who are left behind. In addition, I provided a section, which argues flexible and dual citizenships in relation to transnationality, which fits into my case on the Turks of Bulgaria. I also gave brief information about different notions of citizenship in Turkey and Bulgaria in order to understand identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria across borders.

I discussed the concepts of ethnicity, community, citizenship, and transnationalism in this chapter, as they correspond to the issues in my case, which is Turks of Bulgaria. The relevancy of these concepts lies in the fact that Turks of Bulgaria are at the intersection of ethnic and national identity, flexible citizenship, and migrant transnationalism, which entail their identity negotiations. Because, within the two different national settings and across borders, Turks of Bulgaria are in limbo in defining where the homeland is, as opposed to where the motherland is. Belonging to a 'homeland' or 'motherland' has always been a negotiable matter for the Turks of Bulgaria, as they have experienced detachment rather than feelings of attachment to both sides of the border, which will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

In the next chapter, I will explain methodological position of this thesis. After providing my motivations on writing about this particular issue, I will give explanations on my research methods based on my field research in Bulgaria and Turkey. Further, I aim to give insights from anthropological and ethnographic field research, and the problems I faced during my field research in order to indicate reflexivity part of the research.



CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

In “Out of Place” Edward Said explains that being an exile is the most destructive experience of his life which is constantly gnawing at his mind, despite having had “landed” on the shores and been living in New York for thirty-seven years. Being an exile is an irreparable feeling that the Turks of Bulgaria have been experiencing for years in between the two nation-states. Therefore, one of the reasons for me to choose conducting this research is that I witnessed how hard the Turks of Bulgaria have tried to hold on to where they live. Their case consists of exceptionality in terms of defining homeland and motherland, thus their identity negotiations oscillate between the two nation-states and between different cultures.

In this research, I am going to infer from the experiences of the Turks of Bulgaria based on my field research both in Bulgaria and in Turkey, enriched with reflections as a child of an immigrant family in the Bulgarian-Turkish community in Turkey. Nonetheless, there is no claim in this thesis study to represent all immigrant communities in Turkey or minority communities in Bulgaria. The thesis aims at contributing to migration, transnationality, and ethnicity research by demonstrating experiences of a group of people negotiating on their identities, which share commonalities and differences in similar or different settings. Therefore, in this chapter I will explain the methodology and the methods of the research as well as examining the issues of self-reflexivity and the challenges of the research process.

3.1. Ethnography and the Field Research

In terms of methodological position, ethnography is adopted in this thesis. Ethnography is a suitable methodology to study transnational social fields because it utilizes participant observation and ethnographic interviews which allow researchers “to document how persons simultaneously maintain and shed cultural repertoires and identities, interact within a location and across its boundaries, and act in ways that are in concert with or contradict their values over time” (Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004, p.1013). Individual stories and trajectories are important signifiers of migration research, which is intertwined with the social dimension in the migration that should be explained together. What Ong (1999, p.15) suggests for the anthropological research is that it should include everyday actions of subjects and people’s motivations because they constitute cultural politics and hence they would provide power relations embedded in particular cultural institutions, regimes, and projects. Similarly, Ong explains, separation of human agency and political economy cannot elaborate how practice, gender, ethnicity, race, class, and nation are reciprocally constructed in everyday actions and meanings of subjects.

In this thesis I adapted to an interpretive and interactionist understanding of ethnography. Hence, I tried to include my interpretative inscriptions to my field notes as “thick description” combined with observations of everyday activities of the people in the field in different contexts in order to reach up local meanings and culture. Following what Weber once said, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun”, Geertz also consider culture as being one of those webs, hence he defended an interpretative analysis in searching for the meaning and the culture (Geertz, 1973, p.5). Therefore, taking the notion of “thick description” from Gilbert Ryle, Geertz explains the importance of field notes as interpretative inscriptions. Emerson et al. summarizes the concept of thick description as such:

Field notes inscribe the sometimes inchoate understandings and insights the fieldworker acquires by intimately immersing herself in another world, by observing in the midst of mundane activities and jarring crises, by directly running up against the contingencies and constraints of the everyday life of another people. Indeed, it is exactly this deep immersion – and the sense of place that such immersion

assumes and strengthens – that enables the ethnographer to inscribe the detailed, context-sensitive, and locally informed field notes . . . [as] ‘thick description’ (Emerson et al., 2011, p.14).

There are some implications that thick description and interpretive ethnography requires, explained by Campbell and Lassiter. First of all, what is observed and what is found as data cannot be separable; secondly, the field researcher should pay attention to the indigenous meanings of the people being researched; thirdly, field notes written contemporaneously consist of grounding for the accounts of other people’s lives; and lastly, field notes should include interactional process of these people’s everyday lives (Campbell & Lassiter, 2014, p.15).

Ethnography deals with encountering with diverse people, interpreting and thinking, which implies a particular way of being because being an ethnographer mean changes in the ways of thinking, interacting, knowing about the world around us. (Campbell & Lassiter, 2014, p.1). Ethnography makes us think how we do ethnocentrism, stereotyping and overgeneralizing about other people’s experiences and thinking differently on gender, race and class; we would move beyond understanding and we would transform ourselves (ibid.2). Some unintended consequences may occur as a result of adapting new ways of navigating our relationships; for instance the process of ethnographic fieldwork help us understand our own experiences and memories with the people being researched (ibid.). Foley explains “- one person trying to understand him- or herself enough to understand other people- can lead us to understand others and our relations with them better.” (Foley, 1995). For instance, having conducted a field research about Mesquaki Indians, Foley learnt about his father whom he did not meet before, and he developed a better understanding about the community, about the “abandoned Mesquaki mother and grieving Mesquaki men”. Foley also argues that ethnographic research “takes much more than simple empathy; it takes endless hours of listening, observing and recording and reflecting, but knowing yourself always seems like the biggest part of understanding others”. Therefore, ethnography is considered more than a methodology, rather it is connected to histories, philosophies, epistemologies and ontologies (Campbell & Lassiter, 2014, p.4).

A significant statement made by Lindahl: “fieldwork can easily double the number of birthday cards you send and funerals you attend” (Lindahl, 2004 cited in Campbell & Lassiter, 2014, p.3). It implies the complexity of relationships we have developed during the field research; firstly with ourselves and then with others. I was introduced to a group of women who work for the social work projects and I visited Roma villages with them during my field research in Karlıca. I had only three village visitations with them, and after work we were going to a café to have a cup of coffee and chat. Hence, I did not spend much time with them, or I supposed they would never remember me again. However, after I returned to Turkey, my key person Naciye told me that those women asked when I went back to Turkey and if I ever come back again to the town. Many of them sent friend requests to me on Facebook. Then I realized that we put much more influence on each other, although we spent very little time together, and being remembered made me a bit sentimental afterwards. Moreover, I also attended funerals and several weddings of my respondents and their families’ in İzmir. I put efforts keeping in touch with the most of them, as much as I could. Therefore, I agree with the argument on “ethnographic practices is a relationship-based intersubjective practice” which is being “deeply personal”, “positioned” and “subjective” because it involves complicated intersection of worldviews, hopes, sensibilities and aspirations (ibid., 5).

Although individual narratives are important signifiers of the migration research, there is also a social dimension in the Bulgarian-Turkish migration, which affected the perception of identity both as a migrant and as a minority. Further, anthropological knowledge pays attention to human agency and with the use of ethnographic research we try to understand how subjects react to the structures of power, which influence them in a “given historical conditions” by “culturally specific way” because culture is not something different than “rational” institutions such as the economy and the state, rather it provides ethnographically grounded perspective (Ong, 1999, p.32). Thus, my research aims to overcome the “hegemonic powers of Home and Exile” (ibid., p.33), which refers to oppositional positions of

belonging and non-belonging, as Ong implies.

In order to have a better understanding of how people's perception of identity has been influenced by different factors such as migration, politics, religions, and gender, I analyzed biographical narratives (Karamelska & Geiselmann, 2010, p.128) of people who are Bulgarian-born Turks. Ethnic identity is also an element for "stabilizing the self-perception" of persons (ibid.). Therefore, I also approach ethnic identity as a self-definition, rather than taking it as an ontologically given entity (ibid.). In addition to that, rather than being interested in "what happened", I intend to understand more "what does it mean to the respondent" (ibid., p.126).

What makes this thesis an instance of ethnographic research is that it attempts to explain the ways of constructing an identity of a group of people who culturally have constituted an exceptional case. Nevertheless, I am aware of the tension between "the felt improbability of what I have lived in the field and the known impossibility of expressing it" (Goodall, 2000, p.7) in ethnographic writing. Regarding reflexivity, in ethnographic research our relationship with the research itself and with the researched is changing, thus we understand that we are also part of the research, which we conduct (O'Reilly, 2009, p.189). Our observations in the field are "filtered through our own experience, rather than seeking to provide the detached voice of authority" (ibid., p.191).

3.2. Self-Reflexivity and the "Observation of Participation"

My personal story with the Bulgarian Turkish migrants dated back to early 1990s, when migrants initially arrived at Turkey. I was a two-year-old toddler I slightly remember people were coming to our house, my grandparents were hosting them for days carrying hundreds of bread loaves with a shopping trolley in order to host and feed them adequately, thus, our house turned out to be a "refuge" for these people. My parents still make jokes about how surprised I was when I heard those people

using different words to speak with me. Well, it was different only to me because they were speaking a different accent of Turkish, which I was not familiar with at that time. And according to my parents again I was repeatedly saying, “migrants came to eat our bread” (*göçmenler ekmeklerimizi yemeye geldiler*). This was probably my first impression of Bulgarian Turks coming from Bulgaria. At that time, everybody considered them that they were going to stay for a long time; they were not temporary guests. Moreover, the migration stories of my parents started with the emigration to Turkey with the two major migration flows before the migration of 1989 from Bulgaria to Turkey. Parents of my father emigrated to Turkey in 1951, which was considered as a starting point of the mass exodus in 1989 (Zhelyazkova, 1998), and my mother emigrated in 1977 because of the family reunification agreement signed between Turkey and Bulgaria. In addition to that, I was raised and surrounded by the migrant culture in a *göçmen mahallesi* (migrant neighborhood) in Bornova, Izmir, where after for a long time I have not realized that these migrant people were speaking and living differently until I encountered people coming from different cultural backgrounds, although Izmir is one of the most multicultural cities in the country.

What entailed me to conduct research on the Turks of Bulgaria was my family history and my experiences with migrants as a second-generation Bulgarian-Turkish woman born and raised in a migrant neighborhood in Izmir. My parents’ migration story resided in 1951 and 1977 hence I did not have a chance to witness what was experienced, but I have observed the 1989 migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey because I have been surrounded by migrant relatives and acquaintances: firstly, in our house and then in our neighborhood. Nevertheless, since there were suicides in our family history and in other immigrant families I know, I have always asked myself if they had had not left their homeland, would it happen anyway? While conducting my field research in the little town in Bulgaria, I witnessed people who actually know my family and this tragic event, and I realized that it is something that haunts you wherever you go. Hence, this thesis is meant to revive the memory of those who lost their lives because of being expelled from their home.

A shift from participant observation toward the observation of participation in cultural anthropological methodology refers to ethnographers' experiences and observations of their own and encounters with others; both the *self* and the *other* are represented together in one ethnography (Tedlock, 1991, p.69). The strain of participant observation as a methodological stance is well defined as; "participation implies emotional involvement; observation requires detachment" (Paul, 1953, p.441 cited in Tedlock, 1991, p.69). It has been a true journey for me to conduct research on this particular issue, which touched upon my family history, both emotionally and tragically. Hence, I had a chance to observe my feelings, attachments and thoughts about those people who have had involvements in my life, directly or indirectly. As Atay (2017, p.193) expresses, anthropological field research does absolutely change the researcher. The relationship and interaction between the researcher and the members of the community constitute an epistemic change or dissolution on the character of the researcher (ibid.). At the beginning of the research, I was dubiously approaching the ideology of Turkish nationalism when my interviewees implied their nationalistic feelings for Turkey, and then I started to develop an emphatic understanding of what it means to be a "Turk", and the importance of speaking the Turkish language in the eyes of Turks of Bulgaria. It might be called serendipity, as my initial anticipations about the group have dramatically changed throughout the research process.

On the other hand, as one of the important methodological problems (Bora, 2005, p.31), I suppose I was not able to overcome the hierarchy between the researcher and the researched. The problem caught me especially in conducting fieldwork in Bulgaria. Although I was coming from Izmir with references from the former Bulgarian-Turkish migrants, and most of the people knew my grandfather in the town, since he was from there, I was a stranger to them. When my respondents were answering my questions, they were hesitating at the beginning of our acquaintanceship, trying to understand if I was really a student who came to the town to conduct research. Further, because my Turkish is different from theirs, and I

was coming from Turkey, they wondered if I was working for the Turkish state. These issues must have affected both my respondents and my assessment of the interviews. My foreknowledge and impressions about them were important as well as their perception of me and as Bora (2005, p.31) argues, it is a methodological problem to perceive them with my preexisting experiences about them. And Bora (p.31) suggests that in order to overcome this problem, it is necessary to recall their personal and unique characteristics, including their houses, the smell of their houses, the gestures and mimics when they speak, their clothes and their reactions and by this way, we can perceive them as subjects rather than seeing them as 'whole'. I tried to avoid this problem by perceiving their experiences as unique and subjective and treating them as a source of knowledge.

Treating experience as a source of knowledge, which is taken as an ontological input by anthropology and feminism requires a construction technique (ibid., p.32). Having experiences does not entail the knowledge itself because it also requires previously adopted values, notions, and attitudes, which provide experiences to come to light, thus experiences should not be taken into account as a sole source of knowledge, rather it should be considered as being constructed by the subject within all those previous entities as a level of the social reality (ibid.). I tried to see my respondents' experiences by taking my own questions and their categories into account, thus I tried to use a theoretical framework, which I let them be reshaped by the interviews I conducted, as Bora suggests. Thus, I have experienced how the pre-given and attributed identities at the beginning of the research as a researcher, a woman, a child of a migrant family is being transformed in the research process with the interactions and encounters with migrants. Hence, experiences, mistakes, memories, positive and negative sides of the research both in the process and at the end of the research (Harmanşah & Nahya, 2016, p.34) are truly included in the migration research.

The observation of participation also put emphasis on "how one's own experience shapes one's interpretation of others", which implies subjectivity, intersubjectivity and co-understandings between people (Campbell & Lassiter, 2014, p.64). My

foreknowledge about my respondents combined with their perception of me in the field and this research somehow created its own methodology with the “intersubjectivity” and “co-understandings” occurred between us while conducting fieldwork. As an unintended consequence, I also went through my relationships with Bulgarian Turkish migrants, I have realized that my perception about them have been truly changed through the fieldwork journey; before they were just migrant relatives who suddenly arrived at our country and in our house in my eyes, and then they transform into lively subjects who were intimidated and feared by the structural policies of the two states and excluded and marginalized by the different cultures. Nevertheless, the changes in my perception of migrants also navigate my relationships with my family members, especially with my mother whom suffered a lot due to the exclusion, poverty and desolation at the very young age in the first years of migration from Bulgaria to Turkey. I developed a certain kind of understanding for my migrant family members, I tried to conceive and reformulate the reasons for the tragic events that they have been through.

3.3. The Field and Data Collection

As a child of a migrant family, I always consider the role of my identity in conducting this research. Hence, I began observing my own environment in İzmir, which is surrounded by migrant families and neighbors as a starting point of this research. My family emigrated from Karlıca to İzmir and there are plenty of acquaintances that I knew the district, who have transnational ties and life styles. Thus, my access to the people living in these cities was easier and the research question I proposed for this research allowed to me to conduct the migrant and minority community in these cities, which have transnational characteristics.

I decided to conduct my research in İzmir, because of the appropriate conditions in my own environment, which provided easier access to the Bulgarian-Turkish immigrants. İzmir is also one of the popular migrant setting cities in Turkey.

I began interviewing some of my migrant relatives in several neighborhoods in İzmir. I met people in cafes, in their houses and workplaces. I also participated commemoration ceremonies of *Türkan bebek*⁶, which held in every December in several parts of the city. Moreover, with the references of my respondents, I met with some prominent people who were for example forcefully exiled in three days from Bulgaria because of initiating some political formations or I was introduced to some people who have higher educations, as people supposed they would know the issue better. My respondents in İzmir directed me to their family members, relatives, friends and acquaintances who live in Bulgaria. They provided specific addresses and telephone numbers, which truly helped me reach out my respondents in Karlıca. I combined my research with the observations and interviews that I conducted with Turks in Bulgaria in order to grasp a comparative understanding of this specific ethnic group.

I also conducted field research in the town of Karlıca⁷ in Kardzhali (Kırcaali) province, one of the Southern cities of Bulgaria, in which the Turkish population is higher, in order to observe the lives of stay-behind ethnic Turks who have migrant relatives and transnational networks in Turkey. I have selected the particular small town because this research site will in turn provide sub-sites for investigation (Burgess, 1982, p.116). Some of the characteristics of Karlıca are also provided in Chapter 5.

As primary research techniques, I used participant observations and semi-structured in-depth interviews in this research, which are also consistent with ethnography. I conducted 45 interviews with the Turks of Bulgaria, but I paid attention to more narratives during the period between 2015 and 2019. I interviewed twenty-two people in İzmir, Turkey, whereas I interviewed two people in Sofia, Bulgaria who

⁶ Türkan Feyzullah was a twenty months old baby who was murdered by the Bulgarian forced in 1984 in Kardzhali during the protests against the assimilation of the Turks. She was a symbol of the era and considered as a martyr by the Turks of Bulgaria.

⁷ I changed the original name of the town, hence I did not provide specific characteristics of the town.

were emigrants from Turkey. People who are to be researched were found by snowball sampling, provided by the key informants who were recruited via my participants I previously interviewed both in Turkey and Bulgaria. I interviewed twenty-one persons who were members of the Turkish minority community living in Bulgaria.

Among the migrant interviewees in Turkey, the age of the interviewees ranges from 29 to 73, and among the Turkish minority community in Bulgaria, the age of the interviewees ranges from 32 to 83. Twenty-two of my interviewees are university graduates (four of them have master's degrees), fifteen of them are high school graduates, and eight of them are secondary school graduates. I began my interviews as a form of a conversation, which also included probing, in order to make my respondents comfortable and to be able to understand them. In the interviews⁸, I asked about their migration stories, the meanings of homeland, citizenship and minority, their perception of discrimination, and the differences between the two societies in order to understand and map their perception of transnational identity. A schematic profile of the interviewees⁹ in this thesis study is provided as such:

Table 1: Profiles of the interviewees in Turkey

Name	Gender	Year of birth	Education	Occupation
Nesrin	F	1957	High school	Retired worker
Hayriye	F	1965	High school	Retired worker
Birgöl	F	1972	Secondary school	Retired worker
Tölai	F	1977	Secondary school	Textile worker
Aliye	F	1967	University graduate	Nurse
Gaye	F	1950	University graduate	Retired nurse

⁸ The interview questions are available in the Appendices section.

⁹ I did not use the real names of my interviewees.

Table 1: Profiles of the interviewees in Turkey (continued)

Müge	F	1977	University graduate	Nurse
Serkan	M	1977	University graduate	Teacher
Sadık	M	1976	High school	Worker in Bulgaria
Umut	M	1980	High school	Worker in Denmark
Hale	F	1980	Master's degree	Chemical engineer
Mustafa	M	1976	High school	Baker
Fahriye	F	1972	High school	Worker
Nuri	M	1946	Secondary school	Retired worker
Saniye	F	1944	Secondary school	Retired domestic worker
Berrin	F	1959	High school	Retired government official-Domestic worker in the UK
Ahmet	M	1990	University graduate	Textile engineer- Worker in Bulgaria
Embiye	F	1954	University graduate	Retired teacher
Murat	M	1954	High school	Retired technician
Orhan	M	1959	University graduate	Pharmacist
Eren	M	1974	University graduate	Dentist
İbrahim	M	1978	University graduate	Dentist
İsmet	M	1965	University graduate	Medical assistant
Fuat	M	1954	University graduate	Retired teacher

Table 2: Profiles of the interviewees in Bulgaria

Name	Gender	Year of Birth	Education	Occupation
Niyazi	M	1975	High school	Worker in Germany
Tuna	M	1980	Master's degree	Bank manager
Hasibe	F	1947	Secondary school	Not retired- domestic worker

Table 2: Profiles of the interviewees in Bulgaria (continued)

Mesut	M	1947	Secondary school	Retired watchmen
Aynur	F	1958	High school	Retired worker
Şevket	M	1956	High school	Retired worker
Ersin	M	1983	Master's degree	Insurance broker
Lale	F	1964	High school	Neighborhood representative- Mukhtar
Tunca	M	1973	High school	Neighborhood representative- Mukhtar
Zehra	F	1976	High school	Neighborhood representative- Mukhtar
Fevziye	F	1960	University graduate	Former teacher- local administrator
Lütfiye	F	1975	Master's degree	Teacher
Timur	M	1955	Secondary school	Cook
Hasan	M	1940	University graduate	Retired teacher
Bahar	F	1964	High school	EU Project official
Oktay	M	1980	University graduate	School Principal
Turhan	M	1970	University graduate	Neighborhood representative - Mukhtar
Latif	M	1936	Secondary school	Neighborhood representative - Mukhtar
Melik	M	1950	University graduate	Former Electrical Engineer- Photographer
Asiye	F	1950	University graduate	Retired government official
Aysun	F	1987	University graduate	Industrial engineer

I think it is very important to try to witness what these migrants have been through because in the 30th anniversary of the *Голямата екскурзия* (big excursion¹⁰) the memories are still alive and painful. Some of my interviewees were at further ages, and I believe it would be too late to postpone paying attention to the narratives of those who experienced the migration in a very bitter way. During the research procedure, after conducting an interview, one of my interviewees passed away and I participated in her funeral in Izmir with feelings of both shyness and relief as I brought about her story being revealed that would never be forgotten.

I spent nearly five months from February 2019 to June 2019 in Bulgaria as an ERASMUS exchange student. During this period, I spent three months in the capital city, Sofia by working at archival research, Bulgarian language course and academic seminars with professors at New Bulgarian University, I settled in the town of Karlıca for a month and a half for the field research. The reasons why I choose to study in this specific town vary. First of all, my family has a migration history from the town of Karlıca in 1977; hence we still have acquaintances in the town, who never migrated to Turkey or who migrated but returned back to Bulgaria slightly after the mass exodus of 1989. Moreover, people who migrated in the 1950s from Karlıca to Turkey have established a neighborhood with the same name in the province of Izmir, Turkey, which might reflect the transnational character of migrants' lives, as they have established neighborhoods with the same names as in their hometowns; they brought the nostalgia of homeland along with migrating to Turkey.

Before I went to Karlıca, I knew that the majority of people in the town are either Turks or members of Turkish-speaking communities, so the Turkish language is common in public spaces. A different dialect of Turkish is spoken in the town, which also varies in different villages. I had no difficulties in understanding people and explaining myself, as I anticipated before going to the field. In Karlıca, in order to

¹⁰ The massive expulsion of the Turks from Bulgaria was called ironically as "big excursion" by the Bulgarian government. President Zhivkov announced on TV to open borders with Turkey "to allow tourists to visit the neighboring country" on the May 1989. (see: <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bulgaria/The-big-excursion-of-Bulgarian-Turks-46489>)

access my informants, I utilized the snowball technique, as I already know some people from my family's acquaintances. Also, before coming to Bulgaria, I have already asked migrants in Izmir to put me in contact with Bulgarian-Turks in Karlıca.

In Karlıca, I stayed in my grandfather's cousin's house for one and half month in between May-June 2019. The house was in a village that was very near to the center of the town; I was able to walk to the center every day. The family I stayed with never migrated to Turkey. They have two sons. One of them left his children and wife in Bulgaria and has been living and working in Germany for many years. The other son of the family migrated to Turkey. He also left his family in Turkey and has gone to Belgium to work. Hence, the village house consisted of the wife and the husband in the first floor and their bride and her two children (their father lives in Germany) in the second floor. I sometimes helped Esra to read and write in Turkish as she does not study Turkish language at school but her family wanted her not to forget speaking and reading in Turkish. She was eight and she mostly speaks Bulgarian. With me around, Esra also got used to speak in Turkish, because I told her I could not understand what was going on if she insisted speaking in Bulgarian.

The family, the wife and the husband, are both cook and they are very well known people in Karlıca due to participating variety of organizations to work as cooks. The wife of the house, Naciye was my key person in the town. She introduced me some people and she made me go to some particular shops or places to conduct interviews with people. Every night when she got back to home from work, we were chatting for hours. She was telling me the stories about the assimilation process in 1984-1985 and migration stories of people from the town. Nonetheless, our chats consisted of gossips about the people in the town; who married whom, whose daughter escaped to marry a Roma, whose son not coming to the town for years from the Western Europe and etc. I got a general sense of the people in the town with her tips and I was able to observe people better with her helps. She arranged some meetings for me in other villages; with a writer, with local neighborhood representatives, with teachers, and with shop owners. Further, she explained me where to buy groceries and meat in the town in order to avoid undesirable shopping experiences, such as buying pork by

mistake.

I have learnt a lot from Naciye's experiences of being a non-migrant, being left back, being an only family member living in the town. Her mother, father and all of her siblings migrated to Turkey and she showed some regret about not being able to migrate and stay alone in Bulgaria. Yet, she is regularly visiting her relatives in Turkey and she is in the process of getting Turkish citizenship in order to get better and cheaper health care services in Turkey. Nevertheless, living with a local family and trying to be one of them contributed to my life in an undescrivable way beyond my research.

In Karlica, I used snowball technique for my interviews. I asked people to put me in contact with other Turkish-speaking people living in the town; most of them were very helpful. Some of the people whom I asked for help to put me in contact with others suggested to me some people who are educated and in higher positions, expressing that "they know these issues better than common people". For instance, I was suggested to talk to municipality officials, neighborhood representatives in villages (*mukhtar*), social work officials, and teachers. But I explained to them my questions do not require any official information or a sole truth, most of the people acted voluntarily to talk to me.

During my field research in Karlica, I participated some cultural, social and religious activities. I participated Ramadan meals at the mosque of the town. Sometimes I helped them prepare the meals. I had a chance to observe the Turkish community participating in these dinners where there were only Turkish Muslims –vast majority was elderly men-, so there was no Pomaks or Roma participating in these religious events. Moreover, I went to deliver some *akırtma* (*камму*) with Esra, which is a sort of pancake popular among the Turks of Bulgaria cooked in the day before Ramadan eve and delivered to the neighbors. We visited every neighbors' house and give a piece of *akırtma*, in return they put some candies, chocolates or some vegetables from their gardens on our table; nobody returned our plate empty. Naciye told me that the neighbors, which I treated to pancakes, asked about me, in the wake of my

return to Turkey. Some of them asked Naciye if I was single or not. I thought that it would be such a common thing to happen to the women researchers; another unintended consequence of being a woman researcher and doing fieldwork.

Also, I shortly visited some Roma villages with the social workers and I had a chance to observe living conditions of the disadvantaged groups in the town. Further, I also participated a graduation ceremony of a local high school in the town. Although the ceremony was in the Bulgarian language, it was a surprising experience to hear so many Turkish names among the students. I also participated the propaganda meeting of the political party DPS for the EU parliamentary elections in the center of the town. The leader of the party Mustafa Karadoğan shook hands of every each of us in the square. Despite the fact that the meeting was in the Bulgarian language due to the law, there was a Turkish singer at the end of the meeting singing the songs of Orhan Gencebay and Selami Şahin (famous Turkish singers of Turkey), which was again a surprising encounter for me to hear so much Turkish in the middle of a mountain town in Bulgaria.

With the use of multi-sited ethnography, my research aims to illustrate and interpret in what ways identity negotiations, transformation processes and empowerment strategies pursued by the Turks of Bulgaria are constructed in the Bulgarian-Turkish transnational context. The research is multi-sited because it traces Turks of Bulgaria in two different locations divided by a national border. I have used qualitative techniques including participant observation and semi-structured in-depth interviews which were conducted with the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants who experienced forced migration in 1989 and with the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, who have never migrated to Turkey or returned immediately after migration. I have written field notes, made everyday talks with the locals and taken photographs in the field. I did also participate in cultural events, observed their everyday life practices, asked my interviewees to tell me their biographical experiences in the years of 1980s during the assimilation process against the Turks in Bulgaria, and their migration narratives during 1989.

3.4. The Problems and Challenges Faced in the Field

The problem of voices of mine and my respondents' getting mixed in the writing the findings and analysis chapters of this research might be because of the issue what Emerson et al. (2011) explains as connecting and separating methods and findings. It is argued that "data" or "findings" cannot be separated from the "methods" which implies field researcher's experiences and learnt visions because the "what the ethnographer finds out is inherently connected with how she finds it out" (Gubrium and Holstein 1997 cited in Emerson et al., 2011, p.15). The process of observing other people's lives is also determined by how ethnographer makes sense of her own emotions, responses and activities in the field (ibid.). "Of course, the ethnographer can separate what she says and does from what she observes others saying and doing, treating the latter as if it were unaffected by the former, but such a separation distorts processes of inquiry and the meaning of field "data" in several significant ways" (ibid.). Emerson et al. argues that researcher's emotions and reactions are not independent from the "objective information" known as data, because all of the events happening in the field affect findings and observations simultaneously. Connecting methods and findings provides a recognition of findings not being an "absolute" or "invariant", rather they are "contingent upon the circumstances of the discovery by the ethnographer" (ibid., 16). Therefore, I faced the challenge of mixing what I observed in the field and what I have said about these observations in writing procedure of this thesis, but I believe what matters is that the "multiple and situational realities" (ibid.) of my respondents and their implications to my field research.

There were certain difficulties along with some unprecedented instances during my field research in Bulgaria. I could not get in touch with Alevi villages in my field town in Bulgaria. I attempted to talk to an Alevi shop owner, who was recommended by my key person, but she kindly rejected my request implying that there were any people who knew those issues better than her. Also a neighborhood representative promised to give me a ride to the Alevi villages nearby, but we could not arrange it. I realized that it was an unspoken reality; people in the town know who are Alevi but

they do not want to talk about them implying that is ‘shameful’ to point somebody as an Alevi. On the other hand, I had a chance to visit Roma-only villages with the social workers, which I did not expect before. However, I did not have a chance to talk to them either.

I was welcomed well by the local people in Karlıca. However, there were some trust issues, because of the exile policies of the two nation-states, minorities are hesitant to talk to the issues which would harm them in return. The common question that raised a lot was that if I am a journalist or an agent sent by the Turkish government. Most of the people did not let me use a voice recorder, so I had to note down as much as I could. Some people promised to help, but they were not able to reserve some time for me by pointing to the EU parliamentary elections at that time as an excuse for being busy. All in all, it was an excellent and teaching life experience for me. I was living with a local family in a village, which was very near to the center of the town. They hosted me as a part of their family and helped me introduce the people I interviewed and suggested some important tips about the people in the town. I have been also using a personal diary in the field, in which I wrote not only my observations but also my emotional statements. However, I suppose it would not be appropriate to mention everything my interviewees stated. The issue of ethnic minorities has been a contested issue in Bulgaria, as well as in the other nation-states. I observed that ethnic cleansing against the minorities has not been recognized in all senses and it is still contentious when Turks say something positive about Turkey. Therefore, I think I use some kind of self-censorship as a researcher to protect or not to harm the people I interviewed, which constitutes a disputed minority community in a nation-state.

3.5. Conclusion

This research is about how the Turks of Bulgaria identify themselves in the two different national settings and how and why their identity negotiations create its own boundaries. Hence, this research is meant to explore and explain how the subjects

perceive others while setting ethnic boundaries both for themselves and for others. Thus, in this chapter, I explained characteristic features of ethnography and fieldwork as methodological positions I adapted throughout my research. I tried to indicate how my research is consistent with ethnography and how conducting a fieldwork can affect and change the researcher as an undeniable way. And I tried to show how this research generated unintended consequences for my life. Therefore, I also made implications on self-reflexivity and the challenges I went through about it. I provided my research methods including participant observations, in-depth interviews and biographical narratives. Finally, I mentioned about the problems I faced in the field. In the methodology chapter, my aim was to point out the importance and challenges of conducting an ethnographic fieldwork in multiple sites, which was also a very significant and tough life experience for the researcher.

In the following chapter, I will try to elaborate on how these different processes generate and maintain identity negotiations and boundary formations of the Turks of Bulgaria. Turks of Bulgaria have been exposed to an assimilation campaign between 1984-1985 in Bulgaria, which they accept as their 'homeland'. In the wake of this assimilation campaign held by the Bulgarian government Turkish ethnic minority was enforced to migrate to Turkey, which is mostly defined as 'motherland'. However, being from the same ethnic kin namely *soydaş* did not immediately make them proper Turkish citizens, as their ethnic and religious identity has always been a question by the locals in Turkey. Their ethnic formation and consciousness of community have been thoroughly affected by these processes, along with the transnational ties they hold on in the two different national settings. Therefore, in the following chapter, I am going to provide a description of history giving insights from the existence of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, explaining the historical background and political atmosphere, which entail a significant assimilation process against the Turkish minority and the migration of 1989, as turning points in the construction and negotiation of their identity.

CHAPTER 4

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA

The Turkish minority has been living in Bulgaria even after Bulgaria won independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Ethnic Turks were once the majority in Bulgaria, however, over a period of more than 100 years, there are several migration processes towards Turkey, which resulted in ethnic Turks turned into being a minority group. There are several reasons for ethnic Turks emigrating from Bulgaria to Turkey; interventions of foreign organizations, ethnic problems, and strict nationalist propaganda that ended up with an assimilation campaign against the Turkish minority (Vasileva, 1992, p.343). Bulgaria was influenced by the events that happened after 1980; overturning communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc, political and economic instabilities in the region and strict migration policies of the EU, which made Turkey an attractive destination for migrants (Parla, 2007, p.158).

Eventually, the largest civilian mass migration after the Second World War took place because of the assimilation campaign of the Bulgarian state against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The migration of Turks in 1989 has happened with nearly 360.000 people emigrating to Turkey when the Bulgarian leader Zhivkov announced that the Turkish border was opened for those who “do not feel Bulgarian” (Anagnostou, 2005, p.91). It was argued that the Bulgarian Turkish immigrants constituted the majority of the migrant¹¹ population in Turkey, which specifically increased with the 1989 migration (Çetin, 2008, p.56). At that time, while the whole world’s eye was on the East Germans escaping to the West in 1989, a larger number of ethnic Turks was experiencing expulsion and deportation from the country they were born (Bates, 1994, p.201). Although some migrants returned immediately back

¹¹ Not only considered as migrants, but also as *soydaş*. See below.

to Bulgaria, migration flows of ethnic Turks continued throughout the 1990s either with tourist visas or with permanent residences. After the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria, the negative economic conditions dragged people to migrate to Turkey in the 1990s.

The Turkish minority used to have Turkish schools, cultural organizations, educational and sports activities and they could use their own language in public space from Bulgaria's independence in 1878 up to 1944 (Zhelyazkova, 1998), despite the fact that the Turkish minority has been continually facing discrimination in the country. The presence of the Muslim minorities that remained from the Ottoman Empire has emanated discomfort all the time (Bates, 1994), which led to continuing discrimination against the minorities. In spite of the years of coexistence between Muslims and Christians, the relationship between them was seen as antagonistic; there was an assumption that Muslims could not accept living in the non-Muslim rule, as a Balkan expert, Constantin Jirecek expressed "Christian states could not win the hearts and minds of the Muslims and prevent them from migrating" (Höpken, 1997, p.54).

In this chapter, I will attempt to contextualize the Turkish minority in Bulgaria historically, in order to understand the process of ethnic identity construction and negotiation among the Turks of Bulgaria. My aim is not to give a detailed description of historiography of Bulgaria; instead I will provide insights from important historical events, which caused exclusion, assimilation and exile of the Turks of Bulgaria. Firstly, I provide a short history of Bulgaria under the Ottoman rule in order to understand the continuing enmity for the Turks in Bulgaria. The conditions of the Turkish under different political regimes in Bulgaria will also be explored. I am going to elucidate how ethnic Turks have been tried to be assimilated and discriminated against under different political regimes in Bulgaria. The specific focus will be the assimilation campaign in the 1980s, which resulted in a mass exodus of Turks from Bulgaria. The 1989 migration has affected the lives of the Turkish minority in all senses; it does not only affect migrants but also the minority group who were left behind in Bulgaria and never be able to migrate to Turkey. In

addition to explaining the historical and political atmosphere, which was related to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, I will provide some demographic information; especially two related minority groups and ethnic composition of Turks in Bulgaria. Further, to understand the role of Islam and its connection to ethnic identity formation, I explain two ‘contested’ and ‘problematic’ minority groups in Bulgaria, which are Muslim minorities: Pomaks and Turks. The reasons I elucidate Pomaks here are the historical and contentious background of the community’s ethnic and religious identity and their connections and relations with the Turks of Bulgaria. Turks are not a homogenous group in Bulgaria; there are some cultural differences among the Turks of southern and northern parts of the country. Thus, I believe it is worth to mention the distinctions between the Turks of the different regions. Consequently, I will provide the migrations of Turks from Bulgaria throughout centuries as a result of the policies against the Turkish minority, in order to generate a transition between being migrants and *soydaş* in Turkey and the remaining minority in Bulgaria.

4.1. The History of Bulgaria under the Ottoman Rule

The Balkan region has experienced several political, ideological and cultural tragedies due to external interventions and it has been constructed as a negative image for Europe (Todorova, 1994, p.455). Although geopolitical distinctions of the Balkans, which has been predominantly Christians, was perceived as a justification for the enmity for the Ottoman past, it has not been forgotten as Kennan puts; "one must not be too hard on the Turks" as "in a sense, there was more peace when (the Balkans) were still under Turkish rule than there was after they gained their independence. (That is not to say that the Turkish rule was in all other respects superior to what came after.)" (Kennan, 1993 cited in Todorova, 1994, p.480). On the other hand, the former Ottoman rule in Bulgaria has been continuously affecting the ways people perceive Turks, their reactions against Turks and it has been structuring stereotypes and prejudices, although the Ottoman rule was over a century ago.

The April Uprising in 1876, which was a Bulgarian insurrection was suppressed brutally by the Ottoman Empire and led to the Russo-Turkish war in 1877 and eventually ended up with independence of Bulgaria in 1878. When the Russian Empire declared war on Ottoman Empire in 1877, Sofia was captured and afterward there came treaties for the liberation of Bulgaria. Eventually, the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 determined that the foundation of the Bulgarian Principality in the area between the Balkan Mountains to the Danube (Crampton, 2005, p.83). However, Bulgaria could not be considered as a nation in the cultural, ethnic or political sense when the Russian Empire established the autonomous Bulgarian Principality in 1878, thus, this new state wanted to create a “national-historical *raison d’etre*” by emanating an “ethnic-national homogeneity” in order to justify its nation-state formation (Karpat, 1990, p.2-3).

Bulgaria declared that specific parts of the territories were originally Bulgarian, but they were actually the land that belonged to other states: Thrace (Greece), Macedonia (Yugoslavia), Eastern Thrace (Turkey), Dobruca (Romania), and although the region was culturally, economically, demographically and historically considered as a part of the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria annexed the Eastern Rumelia in 1885 by opposing the 1878 Berlin Treaty and the governments in Bulgaria systematically tried to assimilate minorities to develop a nation-state (ibid.). Nevertheless, a third of the population was ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia before the April Uprising, however, the situation had changed because Bulgarians wanted to take revenge of the atrocities of 1876 by destroying Muslim buildings, cultural centers, and burning Turkish villages which ended up with many Muslims fled the country (Crampton, 2005, p.111-112). Despite the fact that minorities guaranteed freedom for religion and property rights in the Treaty of Berlin, Muslims had to emigrate from Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia due to cultural suppression, land tenures and taxation, and the reasons for the Muslims leave the country was based on the Christian lifestyles in everyday instances; for instance, women being uncovered in public and lived in the society with gender-mixed cultural occasions, picnics and balls and on the other hand, Muslims did not want to

be in the army where soldiers wore the cross, observing Christian festivals and eating Christian food, although afterward exemption from the military service was possible, conscription was obligatory for ten years after the independence in 1878 (ibid.). It is also argued that the first ten years of liberation were the most difficult and psychologically unbearable years for the Turkish and Muslim populations in Bulgaria (ibid., p.113).

The former Ottoman rule in Bulgaria has been continuously affecting the ways people perceive Turks, their reactions against Turks and it has been structuring stereotypes and prejudices, although the rule was over a century ago. I realized how people could have prejudices against Turks due to the history classes in Bulgaria, which had negative ideological connotations against the Ottoman Empire when I spent some time in Sofia, the capital city of Bulgaria. Moreover, most of the people I interviewed expressed that Turks cannot be thought of apart from the Ottoman past in Bulgaria. Hence, I believe that the history of Bulgaria under Ottoman rule is still relevant to the identity constructions and negotiations of Turks and of other groups in Bulgaria.

4.2. The Conditions of the Turkish Minority under the Communist Rule in Bulgaria

Since the Ottoman Empire ruled Bulgaria for nearly five centuries, the successor state, the Turkish state is seen as the ‘motherland’ for the Turks of Bulgaria, who have a kin-state (Mahon, 1999, p.152-154). This situation affects inter-ethnic relations between Turks and Bulgarians because there is a fear of Turkish irredentism in Bulgarian governments (ibid.). Turkey as a ‘motherland’ for the Turks of Bulgaria is perceived as the root for Turkish identity and pan-Turkic ideas that all Turkish communities are related to a larger ethnic identity, however, it is also argued that due to the lack of communication between the two countries Bulgaria did not really understand to what extent Turkey is interested in the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (ibid.). Bulgaria has assumed that the Turkish minority would like to have autonomy

but it was not the case because Turks in Bulgaria did not have an idea to have an autonomous Turkish region or territorial separation, what they have asked for was only respect for their existence and rights in Bulgaria (Karpas, 1990, p.20). The different political regimes in Bulgaria regulated the conditions of minorities, however, Turks have always been the notorious others and threats for the Bulgarian sovereignty. Especially regulations of the communist regime in Bulgaria have affected lives and faith of the Turkish minority by imposing a range of relatively positive incentives and mostly negative sanctions on the community.

When the military junta came to power in 1934, it was a period of “terror and darkness” for the Turkish minority as they were either kept ignorant to oppress or forced to migrate, in addition, the fascist government in Bulgaria closed ten Turkish newspapers, nearly 1300 Turkish schools in between 1934-1944 (the number of Turkish schools was 1713 in 1921) and banned Turkish associations and social organizations, thus, Turkish minority was exhausted as there was no protection for their properties and lives (Şimşir, 1990, p.165).

Bulgaria became the People’s Republic of Bulgaria under Soviet-led communist rule in 1946. Scholars argue that the policies towards the Turks in the communist regime in Bulgaria were inconsistent; policies began from a “benign neglect” to a regulated immigration policy towards Turkey before the Second World War, which turned out to be a “forcible assimilation” campaign with a “hegemonic control” under the communist regime (Kymlicka, 1995 cited in Mahon, 1999, p.150). Elchinova (2001) also argues that The policies of the communist regime towards Turks were inconsistent, and were changing from time to time. The communist regime promised Turks to be their “savior” declaring that the future of the Turkish minority will be brighter under the communist regime, which was written in a new Turkish newspaper *Işık* published in 1945 (Şimşir, 1990, p.166). Over two hundred Turkish delegates came to Sofia in December 1944 to discuss and negotiate about the human rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria; especially issues on education and religious matters were held, as published by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1945) in an Istanbul newspaper: “It is a fact that the Turks who were so unfortunate as to live in

Bulgaria until this date were deprived of their most inalienable human rights. But now the Turks in Bulgaria have raised their voices. They demand the new Turkish alphabet. They want teacher training colleges. They want a religious head of the Muslims not to be appointed by Bulgarians of a different religion but elected by Muslim people” (ibid.).

The Turkish education system was being operated by the Turkish minority until 1946, under the guarantee of international treaties (Şimşir, 1990, p.166). This private institutionalization of the Turkish schools was regulated during the Ottoman rule, and it continued even after Bulgarian independence, however, the communist regime nationalized the Turkish education system, by turning Turkish schools into state schools in September 1946, by disregarding the signed treaties, thus, the Bulgarian state-owned all the Turkish schools in the country and banned to open new schools (ibid.). All of the Turkish schools went under strict government supervision, apart from being nationalized (Eminov, 1990, p.210). The Turkish parents who were sending their children to Turkish schools were forced to give their children to Bulgarian schools, which resulted in many numbers of Turkish people migrating to Turkey between 1950-1951(Şimşir, 1990, p.168). It was one of the largest emigration flows of the Turkish minority, ended up with the Bulgarian government banned ongoing migration on 30 November 1951 (ibid.). Moreover, under the communist rule, Turkish minority was recognized as a national minority until 1984, with some exemptions (Mahon, 1999, p.155). The 1971 constitution of Bulgaria mentions “citizens of non-Bulgarian origin” without making a specific reference to the ethnic minorities, while in 1975 nationality section was removed from identity cards of Bulgarian citizens (ibid.).

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria was also prevented to establish its own intelligentsia which might have independent political sound, hence the department of Turkish Philology at the University of Sofia admitted Turkish student who were politically active, in order Bulgarian security services to keep eye on them easily (ibid.). Nevertheless the surveillance process increased during the 1950s and “the Communist Party took control of the Turkish elite and dictated much of the

professional orientation of the community members”, and the Department of Turkish Philology at the University of Sofia was also admitting Bulgarians who were under the control of the security service, which ended up the Turkish minority having no politically independent elite class in the country (ibid.).

In the 1980s, education in the mother-tongue was not provided for the Turks and this created a disadvantaged position as the communist government used education as a tool for propaganda, and although there were several attempts for affirmative action for the Turkish minority in terms of quotas in universities, the Bulgarian majority did not approve it; thus, the cultural organizations of the Turks (theatres, newspaper, magazines, dance groups) were very rare or absent which caused nonexistence of cultural autonomy for the Turkish minority (Kanev 1998, Büchsenschütz 2000, cited in Elchinova, 2005, p.7). Thus, “being different in a negative sense (uneducated, traditional, underdeveloped)” from the eyes of the Bulgarian majority did not lose its importance and could be observed in public discourses, political parties, and press, even in different parts of the country where the Turks were unfamiliar to the local Bulgarians, due to nonexistence in those particular areas (ibid.).

4.2.1. The Assimilation Campaign against the Turkish minority: *There are no Turks in Bulgaria!*

Repressive policies of the Bulgarian Communist Party started in the 1960s mostly targeting assimilation of Turks and Pomaks in order to reach the socialist ideal of a homogenous society (Zhelyazkova, 1998). The level of oppression increased when names of the Pomaks were changed forcefully in between 1972-1974 (Eminov, 1999, p.32), because Bulgaria realized that the birth rates of the country was the lowest among the socialist states, thus nationalists revival process (vazroditelen protses) was undertaken aiming at converting and assimilating ethnic Turks (Vasileva, 1992, p.346). On the other hand, Russia has had an influence on Bulgaria since 1878, when Bulgaria became an autonomous state as a result of the war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, as Russia would like to emanate a loyal, strong, and proxy state

that would provide Russian interests in southeastern Europe and in the Balkans (Karpat, 1990, p.10). According to Bennigsen, the Soviet Union used an experimental program over Bulgarian Turks by imposing forced name changes in 1980s, as it might be the plan to use the similar assimilation for the Muslims living in the USSR, so Bulgaria was used to test some social policies over minorities before the Soviets attempts (ibid.).

There have been always hints that the assimilation process against the Turks was coming through gradually but surely. The rise of Prime Minister Zhivkov brought about changes in the party program in 1971, which called for a unified socialist nation (Crampton, 2005, p.199). It caused assimilationist projects along, beginning in the 1970s with Pomaks being forced to adopt Slavic names and who refused it to be punished, thus in 1974 nearly half of the prisoners in Belene Camp were Pomaks who refused to change their names, whereas at the time Turks were not oppressed in that way, however, they were encouraged for migration; thus as a result of the family reunification agreement signed between Turkey and Bulgaria in 1968 led to 130.000 Turks migrated to Turkey within ten year period (ibid.). The agreement, which allowed departures of people as a family unification, implemented in 1968 and expired in 1978; it was the last negotiated mass settlement of Turks of Bulgaria under the communist regime (Mahon, 1999, p.155).

The assimilation campaign, which targeted Pomaks in 1970s and changing the place names in Dobruca in 1940s had signaled that there also comes threats for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The biggest minority in the country should have been assimilated with the more extreme actions than it was enforced to Pomaks, therefore in 1985 Turks were asked to change their names with Slavic ones from the list, and if not a name would be chosen for them (Crampton, 2005, p.204).

The highest echelons of the Bulgarian Communist Party made the decision of the assimilation of the Turkish minority by enforcing them to take Bulgarian or Slavic names (Crampton, 2005, p.204). The assimilation campaign, which was seen as the major reason for the change of the political regime in Bulgaria, as Zhivkov's regimes

were wrecked by it (Crampton, 2005, p.204), began at the end of 1984 with the replacement of Arabic-Turkish origin names to Bulgarian names as a compulsory administrative change that was applied to 900.000 people (180.00 of them were Roma), and it continued with other policies until the end of the communist regime in Bulgaria in November 1989 (Elchinova, 2005, p.8).

The largest military operation, after the Second World War, was undertaken against the Turks who refused and resisted, with troops, tanks and red beret units (Crampton, 2005, p.204). It is argued that especially Todor Zhivkov's administration was determined to assimilate Turkish cultural and religious identity into the Bulgarian society (Zhelyazkova, 1998), thus it is argued that what happened in between 1984-1989 in Bulgaria was an "ethnicized turn in the history of the Bulgarian nationalism" (Parla, 2009, p.758). The forced name-changing operation was well-organized and secret one and was part of the socialist policies in terms of national identity in the 1970s and 1980s, which began from the Southeast in December 1984, it reached out the north and west of the country and finished in the January 1985 (Elchinova, 2005, p.8). The name changing campaign has become a turning point in the lives of Turks, because the names are the indispensable feature of their ethnic identity, which was also associated with their cultural and historical existence in Bulgaria, but contradicted with Bulgaria's Slavic culture (Bates, 1994, p.206).

A systematic repressive renaming campaign continued strictly prohibiting the speaking of Turkish language and consequently denying the existence of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (Parla, 2006, p.545). Repressive policies of the Bulgarian state against the Turkish minority also included economic blackmailing, overt violence, and physical violence to women and children (Zhelyazkova, 1998). Nevertheless, the names written in the gravestones in Turkish and Arabic letters and patient files were changed to the Bulgarian language (Zhelyazkova, 1998). In addition to the systematic assimilation of the Turkish minority, social and cultural institutions that belong to the Turkish-Muslim identity, including mosques, madrasahs, fountains, and bridges were also destroyed (Çetin, 2008, p.56). The usage of Turkish language was forbidden in public space, Turkish newspapers and Turkish radio broadcasts

were banned, in addition to that instruction at schools in Turkish language and publications in Turkish were all forbidden (Eminov, 1999, p.41).

In addition to attacking the Turkish language and Turkish names, Islam was also targeted in relation to Turkish identity. Islamic rituals including, fasting in Ramadan, circumcision, washing of the dead, to go to pilgrimage to Mecca and religious holidays were all prohibited and also wearing clothes associated with the Turkish-Islamic tradition such as *şalvar* (baggy trousers) was banned (Eminov, 1999, p.41; Parla, 2009, p.758; Crampton, 2005, p.204). Turkish and Muslim women were restricted to enter to stores and restaurants with traditional dresses, and radios were not allowed for Turks in order to prohibit listening Radio Istanbul, Radio Free Europe and such independent radio channels (Eminov, 1990, p.203). Consequently, it went too far and in 1985 the Minister of Interior Affairs Dimitar Stoyanov declared that “There are no Turks” in Bulgaria (ibid., p.209), implying that the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were originally Bulgarians, who converted forcefully under the Ottoman rule. Therefore, Bulgarian government claimed that this “regenerative process” would help these ‘lost Bulgarians’ to get back their original mother nation (Crampton, 2005, p.204). There was always a perception that Islam being conservative and could not coexist with modern life and modern technologies, than Crampton (2005) asks “but if this were so, why attack the Turkish language as well as Islam?”.

The reasons behind the assimilation process have also shaped the ways Turks identify themselves and emanate life strategies among which the 1989 migration was one of the important consequences. There are three main points highlighted by Elchinova (2005, p.5) indicates the relation between demographic features and the identity construction of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria; the first one is ethnic Turks being perceived as a demographic threat in the 1980s, and the second one is ethnic Bulgarians being a minority in most of the Eastern Bulgaria where the Turks were the majority, and the last one is the Bulgarian language was rarely spoken in southern Bulgaria especially in mountainous villages in Kardzhali where the Turks constituted homogenous, compact and closed communities. The lack of education

was an important reason for the Turks to be lagged behind the majority of the Bulgarians, as of the 1980s there were many uneducated people especially among the Turkish women and there were few university graduates among the Turkish minority (Büchsenschütz, 2000 cited in Elchinova, 2005, p.7).

The nationalist communist historians created the grounds for the Revival Process by emphasizing that Bulgaria has been an ethnically homogenous country (Mahon, 1999, p.162), which was a justification for the assimilation and expulsion of Turks of Bulgaria. In addition to this, stereotyping Turks as “foreign enemy”, “traditional foe”, “subversive ally of Islamic Turkey”, caused antagonism and sharp ethnic boundaries between the Turks and the Bulgarians, that climbed up especially during the renaming campaign and hence, the legitimacy of the Bulgarian communist regime was questioned with a government crisis because of the Revival Process which ended up with mass immigration in 1989 (ibid.). In the communist era, “ethnically based religious heterogeneity” was not welcomed because Bulgarian communism perceived ethnic difference as a politically destructive factor, hence reaching national homogeneity was only possible with the elimination of the differences of the Turkish Muslim community by integration and assimilation, as Turkish identity was seen as “backward” and “reactionary”, which ended up denying the existence of Turks in Bulgaria by the Bulgarian Communist Party (ibid., p.149).

The motive was to achieve the ideal of a socialist nation, which ought to be homogenous in terms of ethnicity, religion, and social status (Gaille, 1996 cited in Elchinova, 2005, p.9). It was revealed that ethnicity as a category was not important in the socialist regimes, on the other hand, the nation was far from being homogenous due to important distinctions between the majority and minority groups, Turks, Pomak, and Roma, both in the city centers and in rural parts of the country (ibid.). Thus, the motivation was the integration of minorities by assimilation, which was the explicit and extensive policy in order to reach the ideal of the socialist nation (ibid.).

On the other hand, it is argued that the Revival process became somehow a surprise for the majority of Turks in Bulgaria because some of the Turks thought that the campaign would not touch them and some of them attempted to escape from it (Mahon, 1999, p. 158). It was claimed by the Bulgarian government that the name-changing policy was voluntarily accepted by the Turkish community, but there was not any report, newspaper, journal or book in the Western world to prove that claim (Karpas, 1990, p.1). The assimilation campaign beginning in 1984 would have shown the signals of a major event eventually would come.

Turkish resistance to the assimilation campaign was not reported as the way it was, because they resisted by digging trenches in some villages to protect from the tank attacks of the government using the newest Soviet weapons, and among those who resisted the campaign over 1000 people were killed, many of them were arrested and expelled to the Belene prison camp (Karpas, 1990, p.1-2). There were some protests, some of them were peaceful but some of them were anti-government that caused several bombings in Plovdiv, Varna, Sliven, and Kazanluk; nevertheless, the leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, Ahmed Dogan was imprisoned in 1986, accused of anti-government activity, and the Turkish embassy in Sofia was besieged in order to prevent Turks coming with complaints or managing to get political asylum and even the mails that were written in Turkish were controlled by being translated into Bulgarian, and moreover, ethnic Turks who were dissidents to the assimilation campaign were imprisoned in Belene prison camp, which was a notorious labor camp on an island in the Danube holding political prisoners in 1950s by the communist government, hence the assimilation campaign was associated with communist repression and got a reaction from the Bulgarian dissidents as well (Mahon, 1999, p.158). Three opponent associations were founded in Bulgaria; The Independent Association for the Defence of Human Rights was founded in 1988 by the six Bulgarian dissidents and Turks outnumbered Bulgarians within six months; the second one was The Democratic League for the Defence of Human rights was founded in late 1988; lastly, The Association for the Support of Vienna was founded in 1989 in order to take attention for the assimilation of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria at the time of the Conference on Human Rights in Paris in June 1989 (ibid.).

Hundred of thousands of Turks had been expelled immediately in May 1989 by being summoned to offices to take their prepared passports without notices, and were asked to leave Bulgaria immediately, without taking their assets and leaving behind their homes, land, property, bank account, and most importantly their families (Karpas, 1990, p.19). In the fall of 1989 the Bulgarian government waited to expel Turks who remained until the harvest time ended because Turks were the only field workers in the region because after the mass exodus of Turks, Bulgaria imported workers from Soviet Moldova with the help of the Soviet Union, where some ethnic Bulgarians inhabited (ibid., p.21). Further, Bulgaria wanted to settle ethnic Bulgarians to the regions where Turks were expelled, Bulgaria especially wanted to take control over Kustendil, Razgrad, Shumnu, Silistra, and Varna where the Turkish minority had power and rejected the policies of Bulgarization (ibid.).

There were hunger strikes in the Turkish towns in which the government reacted violently, and mass expulsions had begun where the government changed its policy allowing Turkish emigration to Turkey (Mahon, 1999, p.159). Nevertheless, the leader Zhivkov addressed the Turkish government to open the border in order to let people who wanted to go to Turkey (ibid.). It was seen as a voluntary emigration, however, after a failed attempt to assimilate Turks of Bulgaria, the government wanted to solve the problem by transferring as many people as possible, consequently, nearly 300.000 ethnic Turks left for Turkey by August 1989, as a result of “the big excursion” (ibid.). The Bulgarian government declared that it was a voluntary action, which Turks wanted to use “freedom of travel abroad” and could return back their homes, however it was not applied to other ethnic groups such as Bulgarians; on the other hand, Turks who did not return in three months had to pay penalties and who did not return in six months had already lost social rights and pensions and by August 1989, 310.000 Turks left the country (Karpas, 1990, p.19). The number of migrants differs in various sources¹²; Elchinova expresses that in 1989 between the beginning of June and the end of August, more than 350.000 Turks

¹² It is argued that 369.839 Turks left Bulgaria, while 154.937 of them returned back by 1990 (Stoyanov, 1998; Kanev, 1998; Zhelyazkova 1998). Some sources declared that the number was 320.000 (Dimitrova, 1998). (in Elchinova, 2005, p.1).

migrated from Bulgaria, and nearly half of the migrants returned back to Bulgaria by the end of 1989 (Elchinova, 2005, p.1). Although Bulgaria wished to get rid of 500.000-600.000 Turks, it did not happen due to the closing of the Turkish border, thus, if Bulgaria would say “all Turks have left Bulgaria” then, it would be a justification to assimilate all Muslims in Bulgaria, as Bulgaria perceive the Turks as a more political group who has the sympathy for Turkey, compared to the other minorities (Karpat, 1990, p.21).

What the Bulgarian government did to the Turkish minority was perhaps considered as attacking their identity in all senses. The assimilation campaign which resulted in the mass migration of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989 was defined as a form of “cultural genocide” because the assimilation campaign entailed the Turkish minority to give up their identity by forcefully changing their names, and prohibiting speaking of the mother tongue, aiming at merging Turkish community into Bulgarian society (Şimşir, 1990, p.173). Breaking the rules of international law, the Bulgarian government attacked the Turkish language by prohibiting the speaking of it and the communist government also prohibited the mother language from passing on younger generations at Turkish schools, by eliminating instruction in Turkish at schools; in addition, to that, Turkish periodicals through which Turkish community was informed, were banned along with the Turkish literary works being destroyed, and publishing new ones was also prohibited (ibid.).

The presence of Turks in Bulgaria has been undeniable, as there are plenty of arguments, which would prove it. There are numbers of acknowledged bilateral agreements signed between Bulgaria and Turkey, which accept the presence of the Turkish Muslim minority in Bulgaria, these are: the Treaties of Berlin (1878), Neuilly (1919), Lausanne (1923), and Paris (1947) (Eminov, 1990, p.211). Apart from international treaties, there are also other agreements that specifically focus on the presence of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, these are; Istanbul protocol, the Turco-Bulgarian Peace Agreement of 1913, Ankara Agreements of 1925, of 1950, and of 1968 emigration agreement (ibid., p.211). Nevertheless, Bulgaria additionally signed the Covenant of the United Nations and several universal declarations of

human rights, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, to acknowledge the rights of the minorities in the country who are not of Bulgarian origin, apart from its own constitution which also protects the rights of minorities; and further, there are numbers of scholars who specifically write on the Turkish history and culture, recognizing its presence as a distinct element in Bulgaria (ibid.).

4.2.2. The Results of the Assimilation Process

The assimilation process against the Turks has damaged their identities in an irreversible way. The name of the process itself “revival process” implies that the Turkish minority has never belonged to Bulgaria, thus they have to return to their origins as ‘Bulgarians’. There are some arguments about the reasons for the assimilation called so. First, the construction of Bulgarian national identity is based on empowerment of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and secondly, the name implies the historical process of Bulgarian national liberation from the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the country for five centuries –*Turkish yoke*- that emanated Turks as eternal enemies (Elchinova, 2005, p.9). The image of Turks who ruled the territories of Bulgaria with abuse, destruction, and death, was created with media, education, and arts and this image was strengthened in the communist regime as a ‘national enemy’, which was also related to Turkey for being a member state of NATO; the image of Turks as a national enemy is still used and reproduced especially when the policies about minorities and ethnic diversity in Bulgaria are on the stage (ibid.). The revival process emphasized the origins of Turks as Bulgarians, who were believed to be forcefully Turkified and Islamized by the Ottoman rule; now with the revival process, they were ‘reborn’ by changing their names voluntarily and integrated into the Bulgarian socialist state as equal citizens like the national majority (ibid., p.10).

The consequences of the assimilation process in terms of the effects for the identity construction of both Turks and the majority group were more than expected. First of all, the assimilation campaign made a wound in the traits of Turkish identity and their possibility of group mobilization (ibid.). As Barth (1969) implies the ‘other’ is

important for the sake of the self-ascription of the group, it does not matter how fluid it is, the group boundary is a must. Because of the assimilation process, long years of co-existence of Turks and Bulgarians have been affected negatively, further, the differentiation of the Turks from the Bulgarians was sharp due to assimilation of their cultural traits, Elchinova argues that it destroyed the boundary and unique identities between the two communities (ibid., p.11). It is also worth giving here how Elchinova (2005) theorizes the important consequences of the assimilation campaign as such; firstly, it worsened the negative public image of the Turkish community; secondly, it has expanded the social gap between Turks and Bulgarians; and lastly, it brought along ethnicity along with religion as a category in terms of determinants of identity.

Despite the fact that the assimilation campaign caused a mass emigration flow to Turkey and dramatically changed the lives of migrants; it has also severely affected ethnic Turks who stayed in Bulgaria. Apart from targeting the identity of the Turks, the assimilation campaign also affected friendly relations that continued for long years between Turks and Bulgarians -Muslims and Christians- thus it has a huge impact on “vernacular identity constructions and strategies” (Elchinova, 2005, p.2). Turks who stayed in Bulgaria had to put with the new conditions inherited from the near past, which constitute “divided families, lost property and deserted villages”, thus, many people have to live between the two countries, engaging with seasonal work or petty trade (ibid.).

One result of the assimilation campaign would be that all Muslim groups started to speak in Turkish avoiding Bulgarian words that were embedded in the language; not only Turks but also Pomaks tried to speak only in Turkish (Karpas, 1990, p.1-2). It was also seen that “national sentiment among the Turks increased in an extreme way” (ibid., p.9) as it would be expected from a minority group who were exposed to such an assimilation process.

The assimilation campaign against the Turks in Bulgaria was one of the major reasons for the fall of the regime. Zhivkov's regime faced the Turkish resistance in May 1989, with Turks going on hunger strikes especially in the northeast, and he declared on the TV that "if they really preferred capitalist Turkey to socialist Bulgaria the ethnic Turks were free to leave" he did not expect that kind of large scale emigration of Turks (Crampton, 2005, p.201).

The aim of the assimilation campaign was to provide political stability but it was a failure, which decreased the rank of Bulgaria in the world (ibid., p.208). The forced migration of Turks in Bulgaria did not take enough attention from the rest of the world. The Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania, or any of the former Yugoslavian countries did not react to the assimilation campaign and the forced expulsion of the Turks (Mahon, 1999, p.160-161). The press in the Soviet Union did not say anything on the issue as the Russian leaders claimed it was a "matter between Turkey and Bulgaria" (Karpas, 1990, p.1-2). On the other hand, the forced changes of the names of Turks, "a type of forced baptism" was protested by Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch Committee, and in the reports of the United States Congress (ibid.). Nevertheless, Turkey officially recognized the mass emigration by mid-June 1989 addressing the question "if there were no Turks in Bulgaria, who were they deporting now?", which could not avoid the mass resettlement of Turks (Mahon, 1999, p.160-161). Further, the Turkish government at the time did not prepare a migration agreement with Bulgaria, which might protect migrants' properties and social rights in Bulgaria, rather the Turkish government made use of this migration as a means of propaganda (Geray, 1989, p.13). Such a large-scale migration was difficult for both of the countries. Although President George H. W. Bush promised to help Ankara, they did not; and Moscow declared that they had no intent to involve in Bulgaria's domestic problems (Crampton, 2005, p.210). Thus, Turkish involvement in the 1989 migration was far from solving the problems of the migrants.

4.3. The Post-communist Bulgaria and the EU Membership

The political leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party came to an end in January 1990, and Bulgaria transited to democracy allowing multi-party elections and adopted a democratic constitution in 1991. In the wake of the Cold War, Bulgaria has adopted new regulations for the ethnic minorities, with the effects of internal dynamics and the international conjuncture at the beginning of the 1990s (Özlem, 2008, p.359). The foreign policy of Bulgaria has lean on the West both economically and strategically because Bulgaria aimed to have accession to NATO and the European Union (ibid.). As a result of this aim, Bulgaria has started to resolve their problems with the neighboring countries: Mesta River problem with Greece; the dispute about if the Macedonian language is different than the Bulgarian language with Macedonia; the Danube River problems with Romania; and the Turkish minority tension with Turkey (ibid.). Bulgaria had full accession to the EU in 2007, after several years of negotiations and regulations. The EU membership has become a prospect for Bulgaria in order to reach necessary reforms on the way to democracy and the market economy in the post-communist era (ibid., p.363). Having proved that Bulgaria is a part of Europe brought along some positive regulations for the minorities in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the efforts of DPS for declaring minority rights violations to the Western organizations and the efforts of the Bulgarian reformist politics on the minority rights, constitute positive aspects for the restoration of minority rights (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Turkish minority still has ongoing problems about unemployment, emigration, cultural representation, and education in the Turkish language. Turks of Bulgaria mostly live in the rural parts of the country, where there are not many investments unlike in the regions where the Bulgarians reside. It caused many young Turkish people to emigrate to Western Europe to find employment. In the cultural sphere, Turkish radio, broadcasts are limited and there is not a nationwide Turkish newspaper. Education in the Turkish language is limited and restricted to the off-hours, which students do not prefer to take. In addition to that, there is no chance to take a second language if the Turkish language course is already taken in the schools (ibid., p.365). Hence, the demand for a foreign language would not be the Turkish language for the students and their families, but it is mostly

English and German.

The European Union citizenship provides freedom of movement and employment in the Western European countries. Many Turks in Bulgaria, who live in the rural and underdeveloped parts of Bulgaria search for better employment opportunities in the West. While EU citizenship provides similar opportunities for the Bulgarians and ethnic Turks, Turks have also access to the Turkish diaspora and Turkish migratory networks in Europe, which bring together workers and Turkish business owners i.e. in Germany and in the Netherlands. There are people who work and live in Western Europe for a period of time among my interlocutors in the Turkish minority community in Bulgaria. They also mentioned that they usually found jobs through using Turkish migratory networks in Europe.

The transition to democracy in Bulgaria led to political movements of the minorities in the country. DPS was officially established by Ahmed Dogan in 1990, who became a natural leader of the movement because the possible founder elites of the Turkish political movement migrated from Bulgaria as a result of the migration of 1989 (Özlem, 2008, p.355). After being considered with suspicion for several years, due to the assumption of ethnic dissolution that DPS would cause, DPS became the third party who was part of the coalition in the Bulgarian parliament in the June 2005 elections, despite the political instabilities in Bulgaria during the process of the EU membership (ibid., p.358). In the wake of the transition to democracy and political achievements of minorities, the far-right, ultranationalist, anti-Turkish, anti-Roma, anti-Muslim political movement ATAKA¹³ was founded in 2005 and became the fourth party in the Bulgarian parliament in above-mentioned elections (Ghodsee, 2009, p.111). ATAKA got votes from people who were holding to religious orthodoxy in the region, as ATAKA was sending messages to the public implying “a straightforward insistence on ethnic and religious Bulgarian-ness to the exclusion of all other groups or faiths” (ibid.). Nonetheless, the ideals for the cultural and religious freedom of the minorities seemingly have not come through with the

¹³ The party slogan is “Let’s take back Bulgaria!”

accession to the EU. Despite the accession to the European Union and the proximity with the West, the position of the post-socialist countries, which are haunted by totalitarianism, are not clear in terms of democratic achievements and social rights (Ghodsee, 2009, p.196).

The Bulgarian Parliament officially recognized the 1989 expulsion as ethnic cleansing on 11 January 2012¹⁴, declaring that “condemning the attempt to forcibly assimilate Bulgarian Muslims”. The statement as follows:

1. We strongly condemn the assimilation policy of the totalitarian communist regime towards the Muslim minority in the Republic of Bulgaria, including the so-called "Revival Process".

2. We announce the expulsion of more than 360,000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin in 1989 as a form of ethnic cleansing by the totalitarian regime.

3. We call on the Bulgarian justice and the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Bulgaria to do the necessary to complete the case against the perpetrators of the so-called "Revival Process". The attempt to cover it with limitation transfers the guilt of the specific culprits to the entire Bulgarian people.

It was a very late apology. As Popov expresses “apologies often come with great delay and usually offered not by the people directly responsible”¹⁵. And the apology did not come from the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which is preceded by the Bulgarian Communist Party who was responsible from the assimilation process.

Bulgaria’s accession to the EU has also affected the status of *soydaş* living in Turkey. Difficulties in getting visas to enter Turkey continued from the mid-1990s to 2001, and in 2001 a flexible visa regulation was accepted which requires entrance and exit every three months from Turkey, without requiring Turkish visas (Danış & Parla, 2009, p.142). According to Apap et. al this new regulation was as a result of

¹⁴ <https://www.parliament.bg/bg/declaration/ID/13813>

¹⁵ “Bulgaria, Turks and the politics of apology” <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/1/26/bulgaria-turks-and-the-politics-of-apology>

the Bulgaria's and Turkey's relationship with the European Union, as the European Council exempted Bulgaria from the Schengen negative list in 2001 (Apap et. al, 2004 cited in Daniş & Parla, 2009, p.142). Although, Turks from Bulgaria kept their privileged status as *soydaş*, compared to the other migrants in Turkey, a regulation accepted in 2007 required three months of stay in Bulgaria in a six months period of time made them vulnerable again, by keeping them in the edge of legality and illegality (ibid.).

Turks, who was perceived as “captive Turks” in the years of the cold war as a result of the anticommunist ideology, were instrumentalized for the sake of transnational policies as from 1990s (Daniş & Parla, 2009, p.155). Therefore, the politics of visa and residence are shaping according to the priorities of the foreign policies of the nation-states, which keep its importance as an actor in the international arena; thus, Turks outside of Turkey are perceived as “soldiers” for the Turkish state policy (ibid.). The politics about the Turks of Western Thrace (Hersant, 2008 cited in Daniş & Parla, 2009) are related to the JDP's desire to create a ‘Turkish lobby’ in the process for the European Union, as it was also seen in the politics for the Turks of Germany (ibid.).

4.4. Demographic Structure: Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Bulgaria

Minority issues in Bulgaria have emanated insecurities among the majority group, Bulgarians (Konstantinov & Simic, 2001, p.31). For instance, the major discourse which rests upon the high birth rates is in a couple of years Bulgaria will be captured by Roma and Turks, which resulted in Bulgarians saying “we are disappearing” (Creed, 1990, p.19). It is significant to explain other minority groups in Bulgaria along with the Turks in order to understand how the relationship between minority groups shape their identity constructions and to see the different policies and approaches towards various minorities in Bulgaria, which might tell us how Turkishness is internalized among the Turks of Bulgaria.

Religion is an important factor in defining minorities in Bulgaria in relation to its past with the Ottoman Empire. Crampton explains that, regardless of the religion of people, Ottoman Empire provided stability, security, and a degree of prosperity, although Ottoman Empire could not be defined as a “multi-cultural paradise” (2005, p.29). As Ottoman Empire had a theocratic regime, the head of state namely the sultan hold the power as a caliph, and the representative of the god; as the supreme religious authority; as the pope and the emperor (ibid.). Due to this theocratic Muslim authority, non-Muslims were exposed to discrimination in different ways: they were forced to pay higher taxes compared to Muslims, their churches could not be higher than mosques, Christians could not wear the color green because it was sacred, they were supposed not to carry weapons, they could not be tanners as it was Mohammed’s trade, they could not proselytize as Muslim law was superior over any religion (ibid., p.30). Although internal self-administration was possible for non-Muslims, legal disputes including at least one Muslim was supposed to be solved according to Muslim law, which indicates a subordinate position of non-Muslims (ibid.).

Bulgarian-speaking Muslims have always been a controversial issue in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Muslims are considered as they were converted to Islam in the 16th-18th centuries by successive campaigns for the religious conversions of the Ottoman rule (Bokova, 2010, p.170). Conversions to Islam took place during the Ottoman rule. According to Crampton (2005) because Bulgaria was intensively settled by Ottoman/Muslim elements, there was more pressure on Bulgarians regarding conversions. Motivations for conversions varied. While some landowners converted to Islam in order to keep their property, some Christian communities accepted Islam due to easier tax regulations and to benefit from the privileges offered by the dominant religion, but there were also forceful, violent conversions among the landowners in the third quarter of the 17th century around Rhodope mountains and these converts became entirely Islamicised and Turkified (ibid., p.34-35). Although some Bulgarians who converted to Islam became Turkified, some converted villages continued using the Bulgarian language along with Bulgarian folk traditions and costumes, whom are known as Pomaks (Crampton, 2005, p.35). Pomaks are

Bulgarian-speaking Muslims in Bulgaria, whom I am going to discuss in relation to Turkish identity having interactions with other identities.

4.4.1. A Contested Minority: Pomaks

Pomaks live not only in Bulgaria but also in Greece and Turkey. Being considered Bulgarian in Bulgaria, Greek in Greece, and Turk in Turkey, Pomaks are a Turkified Muslim community, who speak a dialect of Bulgarian as a mother tongue and speak Turkish as a second language, and whose ethnic origin is controversial or not determined (Fred de Jong, 1980 cited in Oran, 1993, p.112). Pomaks have been living in rural mountainous regions, practice Islam, and those who have encounters with Turks, speak Turkish (ibid., p.112). Oran states that Pomaks and Roma do not have kin-states whereas Turks have, which provides protection of the rights of the Muslim minority guaranteed in international agreements. Pomaks in the Western Thrace consider themselves as Turks because the minority is Muslim and the majority of the population is Greek Orthodox, which means if the minority under oppression have a different religion under the rule of the majority with another religion, the religion of the minority supports their “national” identity and associated with this identity, and further, Pomaks are economically weaker which does not need a comparison with the majority populations, hence, the belonging to the Turkish identity might be stronger in Muslim minorities in the Western Thrace, whose ethnic origin is not necessarily Turkic, than those who actually have the Turkic ethnic origin (ibid., p.114). A similar case from Bulgaria indicates that after the assimilation process of Turks in 1984, Pomaks increasingly started to speak in Turkish and avoid speaking in Bulgarian, although Turkish was not their mother tongue (Karpat, 1990, p.1-2).

The national identity of the minorities in the Balkans, to a large extent, depends upon Islam, as a heritage remained from the Ottoman *millet system*¹⁶; as a Macedonian

¹⁶A term to identify how to rule non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire; emphasizing and differentiating Muslims and non-Muslims.

proverb says “Imam migrates lastly” because the religion of the majority is different from those who were under the Ottoman Empire, in this sense religion was the most significant determinant of national identities of minorities in the Balkans (Oran, 1993, p.120). It is also argued that where the Turks constitute the fundamental minority, such as in Bulgaria and Greece, they tend to assimilate and make the other Muslim groups (ie. Pomaks) Turkified; on the other hand, where the fundamental minority group is not Turks, such as in Macedonia and Kosovo, Islam works for the benefit of another essential Muslim minority group such as Albanians, who also tend to assimilate Turks and Torbesh in the mentioned countries (ibid.).

Assimilation of the Bulgarian Muslims was on the agenda since the independence of Bulgaria in 1878 but it precisely began with forcibly name changes between 1960 and 1976 and continued with the closure of the schools and mosques, arrestment of religious leaders, imprisonment of those who resisted, forcing Pomak women to dress like Bulgarians and prohibition of religious festivities including circumcision, sacrificing lambs and funerary events (Eminov, 1990, p.206). To legitimize the anti-Turk and anti-Muslim propaganda and to homogenize the nation, it is believed that Bulgarian Muslims are “true Bulgarians” who were forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman times, hence they should have been reunited under the ideological frame of same ‘descent’ (Elchinova, 2001). In 1973-1974, the Bulgarian state changed the names of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (220,000 people), which was a total identity change (ibid.). However, these attempts to eradicate religious identity among the Pomaks caused some unintended consequences; there was increased intermarriage between Pomaks and Turks, which caused ‘Turkification’ of the Pomaks and further, many Bulgarian-speaking Muslims and Muslim Roma declared themselves as Turkish in order to avoid intense assimilation processes (Eminov, 1990, p.207).

The identity of Pomaks is contested because of several reasons. Bulgarian academic pronouncements, which is closely associated with Bulgarian nation-state discourse, tend to consider Pomaks as converts during the Ottoman period, on the other hand, there are other definitions, which is controverting to these explanations, declaring

that Pomaks are the local Thracians, who existed in the area long before the Ottoman rule (Konstantinov, 1997, p.37). The reasons for the search for the true identity of Pomaks are to raise their placement in the minority hierarchy in which the Turks lead and to have a 'better' religious identity in terms of Islam, which is also under the initiative of the Turks (ibid.). Further, the policies of Bulgaria made Pomaks a community, which does not have a well-defined ethnicity, as in the case of Turks or Bulgarians, thus, many Pomaks emigrated to Turkey with the mass exodus of 1989, although the exact number of them could not be specified, since they passed the border as defining themselves as Turks due to the fear of being sent back (ibid., p.39,51).

A contested identity, which Pomaks have in Bulgaria causes different identification strategies for the other minorities as well. The question of 'who is real Muslim?' is a tense issue among the minority groups in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, according to the Turkish community Pomak identity is the most controversial one among other groups for several reasons. Hence, Pomaks are related to my research because their relations with Turks generate a different identity negotiation processes for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, which will be discussed in the further chapters.

4.4.2. The “Problematic” Minority in Bulgaria: Turks

The Turks are the dominant group within the Muslim minority in Bulgaria. The presence of Turks in Bulgaria dates back to the 14th century when the Ottoman Empire conquered Bulgaria. It should also be noted that even before the Ottoman Empire conquered this geography, there were Turkic groups such as Cumans, Pechenegs, Gagauz, coming to the region around the 11-13th centuries directly from the north of the Black Sea, who were mostly converted to Christianity and assimilate into Slavic groups (Dayıoğlu, 2005, p.55).

In spite of the long coexistence of Turks, Bulgarians, and other ethnic groups, Turks have notoriety in everyday speech among Bulgarians in Bulgaria. While some

minorities are defined as “privileged”, some are defined as “un-privileged” in Bulgaria (Mitev, 2005, p.91). Minority studies in Bulgaria often depict Turks as “problematic” minorities along with Roma and Pomak (Bulgarian Muslims) minority, while the less numerous minorities Jews, Armenians, Vlachs, Karakachans or Gagauz are represented as “non-problematic” (Fatkova, 2012, p.316). Population censuses in Bulgaria include categories of nationality (ethnic self-ascription), mother-tongue and since, 1992, religion, however, due to assimilation processes categories of nationality and mother tongue were limited; there are only five nationality categories (Bulgarian, Turkish, Roma, Other and Not stated) in 2011 while it was twelve in 1985 (ibid.). Those who live in rural and mountainous areas to a large extent with closed neighborhoods, and have higher birth rates compared to the majority are perceived as “problematic”, while those who live in urban areas, sharing the lifestyle and demographic similarities with the majority are seen as “non-problematic” (Konstantinov & Simic, 2010, p.24). However, if there is a tension between the nation-states, any of these minorities can turn out to be “problematic”; for instance, Pomaks became “problematic” when they were the cause of tension between Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, and similarly a Romanian speaking minority “Wet Vlachs” are considered as problematic recently, due to the tense political relations between Romania and Bulgaria (ibid.).

The undergoing ‘others’ of Bulgaria has been the Turks. On the other hand, having applied Edward Said’s conceptualization of orientalism to the Balkans, Todorova (1997) expressed that the Balkans is considered “uncivilized” and “savage” for Western Europe, while Bulgaria creates its own discourse of otherness over the Turks and Pomaks (Todorova, 1997 cited in Fatkova, 2012, p.323). Muslims and Roma are considered as problematic minorities in Bulgaria, however, Roma does not have written history for constructing identity, thus, Turks are stereotyped as the “archetypal other” for the Bulgarians (ibid., p.324). Nevertheless, the other mentioned here is not the Turks of Turkey, but the Turks of Bulgaria, “because they do not share a common identity with Turks of Turkey”, and Bulgarian-Turks represent “Eurocentric picture of oriental others”, who consist of “despotism, disloyalty, laziness, apathy, and foxiness” in the public discourse (proverbs, songs,

phrases, fairy tales) of Bulgaria (ibid.). Marginalization of minorities in Bulgaria has been continuing with the public discourses coming from the government. For instance, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Borissov defines Roma as a nomadic tribe and blames Turks for displaying loyalty to Turkey in order to gain populist votes by emphasizing nationalist discourses, despite the fact that Turks in Bulgaria being loyal Turkey does not reflect the truth (ibid., p.325). Creating negative stereotyping against the Turks in Bulgaria has been very common in politics as a populist manipulation policy (ibid.). Negative stereotyping and exclusion of Turks do not necessarily lead them to be loyal to another country, but they entail feelings of isolation and alienation, which promptly affect the way of constructing an identity as a minority community.

Religious affiliation is one of the most important elements of identification for the Turks of Bulgaria. As Elchinova (2005, p.14) puts; “Turks’ pillar of identity are religion, the extended family and local affiliations”, thus it is worth elaborating on how the Turkish minority affiliated with religion. The spread of Islam in the Balkans and in Bulgaria took place during the Ottoman times, as most of the religious and historical studies examine so (Mahon, 1999, p.150). Ethnic Turks who settled in Bulgaria after the Ottoman conquest at the end of the 14th century, were dominantly Sunni Muslims preserving their language and customs (ibid.). During the Ottoman times in the 15th and 16th centuries, land ownership was based on Islamic rules of *mulks* and *vakifs*, in which the state was giving lands as an asset in order to empower the economy in the region but this caused an influx and migration of some groups who were nomadic and have mixed ethnic origin, while most of the Turks were poor without lands from Anatolia, there was a very small number of urban-education Turkish class in Bulgaria (ibid.). The *millet system* in the Ottoman Empire provided a relative cultural autonomy for all of the orthodox religious groups without making ethnic discrimination, which emphasizes the “trans-ethnic” (Mahon, 1999, p.150) feature of Islam as a “blueprint of a social order” (Gellner, 1981, p.1). When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Muslims became minorities in the Balkans where Christians are the majority, and the millet system replaced with nation-states, however, Bulgarian Orthodoxy resembled Islam in the ways of making itself close to

the political power instead of being considered as supportive for division of political and religious powers (Mahon, 1999, p.151). Mahon also argues that the Christians in Bulgaria used to have significant heterodoxical orientation/inspirations in reference to the history of Bogomilism¹⁷ in this part of the Balkans. This historical background of Christian unconventionalism provides a social ground on which inter-ethnic communication becomes possible among Christians and Muslims, thus Bogomilism is also blamed for conversions from Christianity to Islam (ibid.).

Having lived together with the Christian Bulgarians, the Turkish community is influenced by them regarding practicing Islam in a different way compared to the practicing orthodox way of Islam, which demonstrates the interaction and affection of the two communities. Rather than being a system of orthodoxy or orthopraxy, religion is more of a moral codex, which is possessed with acquisition and observation for the Turks in Bulgaria (Bringa, 1995 cited in Elchinova, 2005, p.13). In a similar way, Turks of Bulgaria belong to the Balkan Muslim community, who practiced Islam in a more unorthodox, heresy and mystic way, affected by elements of Christianity as well as 'Dervish', 'Bektashia' and 'Aliani' in Bulgaria (Mahon, 1999; Kiel, 1990). The peculiar faith of Islam that Bulgarian Turks practiced in Bulgaria led to the flexibility towards inter-ethnic contacts and relatively unproblematic relations between Turks and Bulgarians (Mahon, 1990, p.151).

Religion is a primary aspect for identity construction of the Turks of Bulgaria since the Turkish minority is considered as an ethnoreligious minority. The communist regime in Bulgaria did not tolerate religious practice in the country, neither for Muslims nor for Christians. Thus, it is argued that Muslims were more religious compared to the Christian Bulgarians, and it is perceived as backwardness and conservatism, which are also associated with their choices of occupation, education, gender roles, etc. (Elchinova, 2005, p.5-6). Further, there are certain premises about ethnicity, language, and religion, which consider every Bulgarian as an orthodox Christian and every Turk as Sunni Muslim, whereas the Bulgarian Catholics, and the

¹⁷ A Christian neo-Gnostic sect founded in the 10th century in Bulgaria. Bogomilism is mostly accepted as a heresy in Bulgaria, which caused most of the misfortunes in medieval Bulgaria (Crampton, 2005, p.19).

Gagauzes- Turkic speaking Christians- are perceived as “vague and vulnerable identities” (ibid. p,13). The identity of a certain ethnic, linguistic or religious group might blur if those premises are not fulfilled by a community. Through having the relevant social structure a person can complete her/his socialization in terms of religiosity; “a person is born a Turk, Bulgarian or Roma, but s/he becomes a ‘true Muslim’ if s/he adopts the culture and tradition of the community by learning, thus, although their religious affiliation is Sunni Islam, Pomaks could not achieve the position of ‘true Muslim’ because of being socialized in another community, which do not adopt Turkish traditions such as family structure, gender roles and the relations between different generations (ibid., p.13-14). This characteristic feature distinguishes Turks from other ethnic groups because Turks establish and maintain “the pattern for the transmission of culture and the preservation of the traditional value system” regarding religious identification (ibid.).

The notion of the “formerly dominant minority” (Mahon, 1999, p.149) of the Turks in Bulgaria has influenced the ways minorities are perceived in the modern Bulgarian nation-state. Turks are the largest minority group in Bulgaria that follows Pomaks and Roma communities whereas Turks, Pomaks, and some Roma constitute the Muslim minority. Because of the difficulties to resist the assimilationist policies of the totalitarian communist regime in Bulgaria, Turkishness is not perceived directly as a national but as a religious and linguistic identity, in contrast to the Turks in Greece, for whom nationality is the most significant aspect of their distinctiveness (Oran, 1993, p.114-115). In the meantime the Bulgarian government avoided the term “Turk” by replacing it with “Bulgarian citizen with Turkish origin” and then “Bulgarian-Turk” and in 1982-1984 they were called “Bulgarian Muslims” (ibid.).

Turks in Bulgaria are among the minorities whose rights are protected by certain international agreements including the Treaty of Berlin, United Nations Charter, and Helsinki Final Act, thus Turks were able to establish their own educational institutions, cultural and religious organizations, and foundations in Bulgaria (Şimşir, 1990, p.163). National minority rights are also under protection in the Bulgarian constitution. According to Judgment No:2 of 18 February 1998 in constitutional code

no: 15 of 1997¹⁸:

By virtue of Art. 8 of the Constitution "The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority has the right to profess his or her religion or belief, as well as the right to establish religious institutions, organizations, and associations (16. Under Art. 8 of the Convention).

Further, article 11¹⁹ states that

...it should be noted that the term "national minority" is not alien to Bulgarian law... the provision states that "National minorities have the right to study in their mother tongue and to develop their national culture, and the study of the Bulgarian language is mandatory". The fact that the current Constitution does not contain the term "national minority" is not an obstacle to the proceedings. The term "national minority" is a conventional term....

The politics of Bulgaria, both pre-communist and communist, have reinforced the local community being the most important socialization area for the Turks and other minorities in the country (Elchinova, 2008, p.6). Different policies ranging from granting minority rights and an assimilation campaign against the Turks have reinforced the effects of the local community on their social lives as a minority group; thus, Turks lack a proper political representation, education, and political elite, representation in official historiographies, and required occupational qualifications compared to the Bulgarian majority, which leads to belonging to "lower social strata" and "lacking proficiency in the culture of national majority-language, religion, lifestyle" (ibid.). Hence, Turks reinforced local community culture by performing Islamic identity and having a proper family, working and having material possessions, in order to create a social position (ibid.).

Turks of Bulgaria have been defined as a "passive minority" in Bulgaria (Mahon, 1999, p.149). This conception refers to the situation that the Turkish community in Bulgaria did not create pressure on the government for their rights and demands due to lack of independent political elite, having less chance of getting higher education,

¹⁸ <https://sites.google.com/site/pravosver/ksrb/ks-2-1998>

¹⁹ <https://sites.google.com/site/pravosver/ksrb/ks-2-1998/resenie-ks-2-1998-p>

non-existent of mixed marriages with Bulgarian, namely the Christian majority of the country, and “interrupted relationship with the mother country Turkey” (ibid.). Significantly, it is argued that the political passivity of the Turkish community in Bulgaria, until the collapse of communism, was because they neither participated in the process of the modern nation-formation of Bulgaria -as an intentional action the Turkish minority was excluded and marginalized after Bulgarian independence in 1878- nor the national development of the Republic of Turkey (ibid.). The exclusion of the Turkish minority from both the nation-formation of Bulgaria and Turkey has generated a passive identity ascription for them along with oscillating in between and across boundaries. Turks have lacked a proper ascription of national identity and belonging due to not participating in the nation-formation processes of the mentioned states. The lack of ascription of national identity is one of the reasons for the Turks who could not establish a necessary social and cultural adaptation into the Bulgarian society, along with being exposed to discrimination and exclusion. On the other hand, accepting Turkey as a motherland cannot be adequate to be socially and culturally involved into the Turkish society, as Turks of Bulgaria did not exist in the nation-formation process of Turkey.

Another reason for considering Turks as a passive community in Bulgaria would be their disinclination for having autonomy. Turks in Bulgaria did not have an idea to have an autonomous Turkish region or territorial separation; what they have asked for was only respect for their existence and rights in Bulgaria (Karpat, 1990, p.20). Turks are undemonstrative in public spaces in Bulgaria, as it is expected from all minority communities.

Nationalist sentiments were not strong among the Turks of Bulgaria in defining their identity, before the assimilation campaign in 1984-1985, although throughout the years Turks have been forced to leave or to be assimilated into Bulgaria, because they were perceived as “formerly dominant” community and recently they are considered as “potentially destabilizing factor” for Bulgaria (Mahon, 1999, p.152-154). The name-changing campaign beginning in late 1984 implemented by president Jivkov is argued that it was because of the fear of the increasing population

rate among ethnic Turks, which was over by the overthrow of Jivkov in 1989 (Oran, 1993, p.115). Having had passive attitudes towards politics until then, the Turkish minority established a secret organization called “Turkish National Freedom Movement²⁰” to resist the assimilation campaign especially the name changes, however, there were violent attacks and mass movements in different regions in Bulgaria, ended up with some killings and injuries (ibid.). As a result of these, 2500 Turkish intellectuals were deported from the country by June 1989, and people as masses were forced to go to Turkey. Why such a passive minority group resisted that much lies in the fact that name changes targeted their religions as well, because the Turkish names also include a religious meaning, and when the Turkish minority was forced to change their names to Bulgarian Christian orthodox names, it was perceived as an attack to their religion as well as their identity (ibid., p.155).

Turks have been living in the underdeveloped parts of Bulgaria, mostly dealing with agriculture, specifically tobacco cultivation in the rural areas or having unqualified labor such as construction work and living a certain lifestyle with extended families, many children, and sharing households with different generations (Elchinova, 2005, p.6). The Northeastern (Razgrad) area was relatively more developed as it had fertile territories which made production possible, however, collectivization of farms by the communist state forced Turkish people to migrate to Turkey in 1950-1951 (Kostanick 1957, Büchsenschütz 2000, Eminov 1997 cited in Elchinova, 2005, p.6). The Southeastern part of the country, which has a border with Turkey, was the most underdeveloped areas where the communist government worked for the development of this region by establishing factories of heavy industry and encouraging educated Bulgarians to come and settle in this region (ibid.). Thus, the regional differentiation between the Turks of different regions pictures northerners as more urban, civilized, and open, but make southerners more backward, conservative, and traditional (ibid.). However, despite the in-group diversity among the Turkish minority, it did not influence the negative perspective that the Bulgarian majority had about them (ibid.).

²⁰ This movement is seen as a root organization for Movement for Rights and Freedoms, which is a political party in Bulgaria constituted mostly by ethnic Turks, receiving support from minority communities. The party is not following a nationalist path, rather it claims to represent all minorities but also Bulgarians in the parliament (Oran, 1993, p.115).

The assimilation campaign, which took place in the years of 1984-1985 in Bulgaria ended up with substantial consequences one of which was the mass emigration of Turks to Turkey, thus, drastically changed many lives including both Turks and the other populations in Bulgaria. To investigate what lied behind the assimilation campaign, so-called “revival process” defined by the Bulgarian state, is possible with exploring demographic and social characteristics of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The Turkish minority as an inward-oriented ethnoreligious groups, were mostly living in the rural parts of Bulgaria and only a small part of them was living in the city centers until the Second World War (Parla, 2009, p.757). Nevertheless, recently, the majority of the Turks in Bulgaria live in rural parts of the country, mostly in the villages and densely in Northeastern Bulgaria (Razgrad, Shoumen, Silistra, Varna) and in Southeastern Bulgaria (Kardzhali, Burgas), which is near the border with Turkey (Elchinova, 2005, p.3). The Turkish minority was mostly an agrarian community, who had 2/3 of the tamed agrarian lands until 1876, just before the Bulgarian liberation (Çetin, 2008, p.57). The population of the Turks in Bulgaria has been always controversial due to political reasons regarding minorities and the Pan-Slavist ideals, which were not happy with the increasing numbers of the population of Turks (Çetin, 2008, p.57). Thus, Bulgaria has never declared the exact population of the Turks, nevertheless, it was always reported as less than 1.000.000 in the official population census in order to prevent cultural autonomy for the minorities whose population are over 1.000.000, in accordance with the Bulgarian constitution (ibid.).

As it is provided below, according to the 2011 census the percentage of Turks in Bulgaria is 8.8% of the total population²¹. The cities with the largest Turkish population is 66.2% in Kardzhali, 50.02% in Razgrad, 36.09% in Silistra, and 35.8% in Targovishte by 2011 Bulgarian census. There was no ethnic affiliation section in the population censuses of the 1970s and 1980s and hence the information about the ethnic minorities was indirect and relative, nevertheless, in 1983 it was reported that

²¹ <https://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/pressreleases/Census2011final.pdf>

population increase in the areas with a larger Turkish population was six times higher than the general population growth in the country (Stoyanov, 1998 in Elchinova, 2005, p.4-5). The population of Turks has never been declared more than 10% of the general population even if it might be the case. The statistical data from the censuses and number of immigrants from Bulgaria to Turkey after 1989 indicate that the rumors about the Turkish population was approaching to one million and was 10% and above in the 1980s seemed true (Dimitrova, 1998 in Elchinova, 2005, p.4-5). Thus, the demographic disproportions between Bulgarians and Turks, Pomaks and Roma in terms of increasing trend proved that it was the major reason for the so-called revival process (Stoyanov, 1998 in Elchinova, 2005, p.4-5). Turks constituted approximately 10 percent of the population in the 1980s and it could create difficulties in conscription and also the regime feared out that what if Turks would demand autonomy in any area of the country, which could be “the prelude to Eastern Rumelia”, (Crampton, 2005, p.206). Bulgaria was concerned about the example of Northern Cyprus, thus, in order to avoid such a demand for autonomy, the regime chose the option of assimilation of Turks, which would disappear the differences between the Turks and Bulgarians (ibid.).

According to the 2011 population census²² Turks comprise the largest ethnic minority in Bulgaria -588,318 persons, which represents 8.8% of the population. The Turkish language is spoken by 605,802 or 9.1% of the total population. Among those who identified themselves as Turkish ethnicity, 564,858 or 96.6% declared Turkish as a mother tongue, and 18,975 persons or 3.2% declared as Bulgarian. Among those who identified as Roma ethnic group, 21,440 persons or 6.7% declared the Turkish language as a mother tongue. People who declared dual citizenship are 22,152 or 0.3% of the population. Among them, 5,257 (23.7%) declared having Bulgarian and Turkish citizenship. The people who identify themselves as Turkish ethnicity by voluntary self-identification are settled in several districts, Kardzhali, Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen, Silistra, Dobrich, Ruse, Burgas. 63.7% of the Turkish population lives in these districts (ibid.).

²² https://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf




Figure 1: The ethnic composition of Bulgaria as of 2011 census²³.

Among the Turks of Bulgaria, coming from which part of the country matters and it creates a hierarchy. The striking example provided by Elchinova (2005, p.16) explains how local affiliation sets boundaries against other: “for Turks born and living in a certain village, their fellow Turks who have migrated from another part of the country are no less different than the local Bulgarians”. Interestingly, being a Turk does not create a difference among all the Turks, rather the Bulgarians, with whom Turks share the same locality become closer to them. Turks from the Northern Bulgaria (Razgrad region) look down upon the Turks in Southern Bulgaria (Kardzhali region) regarding their way of speaking, dresses, and habits and intermarriages between those are not tolerated due to emphasizing the ‘otherness’ of the Southern Turks, although endogamy is still common among Turks in Bulgaria (ibid., p.15). Another striking example also given by Elchinova (2005) indicates the category of “own Others as opposed to alien others” which means people in Bulgaria either Orthodox Bulgarians, Turks or other minorities identify who is their “own others” and who is not speaking such as “our Turks” or “our Gypsies” referring shared locality and community. Descriptions as such “our Turks are better than the

²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bulgaria_ethnic_map.svg

Turks of Turkey” or “our Gypsies do not steal compared to the gypsies who come from another place” emanate a relatively positive image of others who share the same territory and community (ibid.).

On the other hand, despite the Turks being a problematic minority community in Bulgaria, local affiliation can be a tool for identification and differentiation in the interactions between different groups. Although it seems they are two different communities regarding having different religions, Turks and Bulgarians have also similarities than it is expected. Nevertheless, Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam that Bulgarians and Turks belong to respectively, does not prevent these two communities to have a similar understanding of state and society, which is coming from the historical Balkan experience, that gives importance to the community rather than the individuals (Mahon, 1999, p.149).

In different settlements interactions between the Turks and different ethnic groups vary due to different perceptions of identity. For instance, in urban settings, there are Turks who are educated and modern and want to be part of modern Bulgarian society, whereas in rural areas, local affiliation becomes a matter of identification and differentiation (Elchinova, 2005, p.7). In terms of shared cultural practices and everyday interactions, coming from the same settlement becomes a determinant for identification regardless of ethnicity and religion. For instance, among the people in the rural parts of Bulgaria, the mutual problems were the deprivation of land property, practicing religion under the oppression of the communist regime, and complaining from an excessive ideological indoctrination (ibid., p.7-8).

4.5. Migrations from Bulgaria

Years	Number of Migrants
1878 - 1892	279.397
1893 - 1902	70.603
1912 - 1920	413.922
1921 - 1922	21.172
1923 - 1939	198.688
1940 - 1949	21.353
1950 - 1951	154.393
1952 - 1968	24
1969 - 1978	113.393
1979 - 1988	20
1989	313.894
1990 - 1997	209.500
Total	1.796.359

Table 3: Migrations from Bulgaria to Turkey

Source: Çetin (2008b, p.246), Şimşir (1985, p.51-55), Vasileva (1992, p.346), McCarthy (1999, p.175-177)

The migration flow of Turks from Bulgaria did not start with the migration of 1989; it dates back to 1878, when Bulgaria won independence from the Ottoman Empire. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1879 resulted in nearly one million Turks were exiled from their lands, and nearly half-million of them died due to the massacre, hunger, cold, and epidemic; and since then Turks became a minority in the Principality of Bulgaria (Şimşir, 1986, p.18). After Bulgaria declared independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, the Turkish community that remained in Bulgaria was systematically exposed to ethnic discrimination that resulted in several emigration flows from Bulgaria (Parla, 2009, p.757). The first migrations took place from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania after the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878

due to the end of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans (Vasileva, 1992, p.344-345). According to the archives of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist party, the plan was to decrease the Turkish population every 10-15 years to 10-15 percent by using forced migration and assimilation policies (Eminov, 1997 cited in Çetin, 2008, p.58). Some sanctions were undertaken, which resulted in the migration of the Turkish community; a law enacted by the Bulgarian government in 1880 anticipated compulsory military service for Muslims, another law in 1882 imposed a tax on land for Muslims (ibid., p.57).

Year	The number of Turks in Bulgaria (numbers)	The number of Turks in Bulgaria (percentage)
1880-1884	728,000	33% of the total population
1900	540,000	14% of the total population

Table 4: The total population of Turks in Bulgaria dropped drastically.

Source: (Crampton, 2005, p.13)

Not only Turks but some other Muslim groups such as Pomaks, Circassians, and Tatars had also emigrated from Bulgaria in the same period between 1878 and 1912 (Zhelyazkova, 1998). The total population of Turks dropped from 728.000 in 1880-1884 to 540,000 in 1900 and the Turkish-speaking population decreased from 33% to 14%, due to the emigration of the Turkish minority (Crampton, 2005, p.113). The second emigration flow from Bulgaria to Turkey took place between 1913-1934 with 10.000-12.000 migrants each year due to adopting an international law agreement (Zhelyazkova, 1998). In 1913 there was a population exchange between Bulgaria and Turkey as a result of the Istanbul Treaty. The agreement included a mutual population exchange of Muslim and Bulgarian populations who were living in between 15 kilometers of the Bulgarian-Turkish border. As a result of this population

exchange, 48,570 Muslims migrated from the Bulgarian side, and 46,764 Bulgarian migrated from the Eastern Thrace (Önder, 1990, p.29). The third emigration flow happened during the Second World War in 1940-1944 with 15.000 migrants and after the war, during the communist regime, due to the land collectivization imposed by the state, 155.000 Turks migrated to Turkey in 1950-1951 which was considered a starting point of the mass exodus, and in between 1968-1978, 130.000 people migrated to Turkey as a result of the family reunification agreement signed between Turkey and Bulgaria (Zhelyazkova, 1998). The numbers of migrants differ in various sources. For instance, Crampton (2005, p.190-191) argues that Prime Minister Chervenkov, Bulgaria's "little Stalin" threatened Ankara in January 1950 by declaring that they would send a quarter of a million Turks to Turkey, and negotiations allowed 162.000 migrants left the country before Turkey closed the border in 1952.

The migrants of 1950-1951 were mostly from Dobruca, the Northeastern part of the country with the rich soil, thus, Turks were displaced due to social and economic changes and collectivization of the land by Chervenkov (ibid.). The migration of Turks between 1950-1951 was out of Stalin's precept in order to punish Turkey for its involvement in the Korean war and also for joining NATO; this migration flow ended up with 152.000-156.000 migrants came to Turkey (Karpas, 1990, p.4). Thus, in the years between 1950-1960, 35.496 families who had migrated to Turkey with residence permits were settled in different provinces of Turkey (Geray, 1962, p.54). Among those who were peasant families out of 25.593 were settled in Adana (1442), Ankara (1136), Balıkesir (1474), Bursa (2185), Konya (1523), Manisa (1383), Tekirdağ (1619), and those of the artisan families were settled in Bursa (1356), Eskişehir (1116), İstanbul (3100), and İzmir (1160) (ibid., p.55). Migrants who came to Turkey in between 1968-1979 as a result of the agreements for family reunification settled in different provinces in Turkey with their own financial resources (DPT, 1990, p.7). Similarly, some of the 1989 migrants came along with their own financial resources, where some of them were provided houses by the Turkish state in 14 provinces and 23 districts, under the condition of paying it back in five years (Köy Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996).

Nearly 100,000 of the emigrants returned back to Bulgaria in September 1989 because the “mother country” did not provide the opportunities (land and social security), which were provided for the emigrants of 1950-1951 (Konstantinov, 1997, p.51). Another reason for the return was the “religious observance” and “models of propriety”, which were lacking in the Bulgarian Turkish migrants; those who were settled in rural Anatolia were having difficulties due to the Islamic orientation (ibid.). Nevertheless, one-year rent was provided for 40.000 families by the Turkish state, but employment and convenient settlement were not provided, as the Turkish state did not do any preliminary preparation for incoming migrants (Geray, 1989, p.13). As mentioned before, because of the lack of a migration agreement with Bulgaria, migrants’ social rights and properties remained unprotected (ibid.).

4.5.1. Who are These *Soydaşlar*?

Bulgarian Turkish migrants were considered as *soydaş*, when they emigrated to Turkey as a result of the migration of 1989. This discourse is important, as it is perceived as a plea to get accepted in the new country. In the scholarship it is defined as “ethnic kin” or “racial kin”; it has several meanings that covers root, race, ethnicity, lineage, blood, family, ancestry, something in common and being a fellow, and there is also an emotional part of belonging in the suffix ~daş, as it (Parla, 2019, p.6-7). Parla (2019) explains why she prefers to use the term “racial kin” as such; “it captures the nationalist preoccupation with sharing the same blood and thus better delineates the ethno-racial underpinnings of Turkey’s citizenship and migration regime”. Thus, claiming the same ancestry covers both a cultural and legal appeal, which migrants from the Middle East and Central Asia also used to get citizenship from Turkey, but Balkan migrants constitute the major part of the migrants who attained Turkish citizenship since the founding years of the republic (ibid.).

Danış and Parla (2009) want to draw attention to the issue of the hierarchy between different groups who claim to be *soydaş* according to the root country, as the migrants from the Balkans have a privileged position compared to the other migrants from other regions. The Balkan migrants are considered as the glue of Turkish nationalism but on the other hand, they represent Europe and the ties with Europeanness, which would be an important reason for the privileged position for national adaptation of them (Çağaptay, 2002 cited in Danış & Parla, 2009, p.134). However, even the ones who are on the top of the *soydaş* hierarchy are under suspicion because of their Turkishness, which is considered as not pure and doubtful (ibid.). Although the Balkans have an important position in the national cosmology, it is also considered a slippery signifier because of the trauma of losing the territory in the Ottoman times; thus a militant discourse constructed the Balkans as such: “together with the Ottoman past, Rumelia has to be erased from the memory” and “Rumelia has never been Turkified and Islamicized enough, and it has never been a homeland, despite being conquered” (Bora & Şen, 2009 cited in Danış & Parla, 2009, p.134-135). Therefore, the eligibility of the Balkan migrants due to being the reminiscence of the lost territories in the Ottoman times has become slippery because of the suspicion of not being pure Turks (ibid., p.135).

The discourse of *soydaş* helped the 1989 emigrants from Bulgaria to Turkey in terms of getting Turkish citizenship and some supports from the state. However, those who emigrated in the 1990s from Bulgaria could not get any help from the Turkish state, and they were exposed to different visa regimes; until 2001 difficulties in getting visas remained whereas after 2001, a flexible visa regime was accepted which requires an entry and exit in every three months without requiring a visa (ibid., p.142). This move-in changing visa regimes was due to political relations of Bulgaria and Turkey with the European Union, which removed Bulgaria from the Schengen negative list in 2001 and the visa regime accepted in 2007 requires a three-month of stay in Turkey in every six months period; which changed the status of 1990s emigrants as irregular, who did not want lose their jobs in the informal sector in Turkey (ibid., p.139). Hence, the *soydaş* status of the Bulgarian Turkish migrants has become futile and their privileged position disappeared as a result of oscillating

between legality and illegality and due to staying and working without permits in the informal sector in Turkey, although their entrance to Turkey was legal (ibid., p.142).

4.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to tackle the issues of the historical contextualization of the Turks in Bulgaria, and an attempted assimilation process, which entailed a mass migration of Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey. I gave insights into the different ethnic and religious minorities in Bulgaria and their relations with the Turks of Bulgaria. Because there are important interactions between the minority groups, which affect the ways Turks perform their identities by distinguishing themselves and setting boundaries with them. In addition to providing historical instances about the existence of Turks in Bulgaria, I also tried to render how they were systematically exposed to exclusion from the state formation and from the majority of the society, which ended up being a politically passive minority in Bulgaria. This exclusion truly affected how they formed a community and ethnic identity. Denial of their existence, prohibition of speaking the mother tongue, and forcibly changed names were traumatizing instances, that have been continuing even after migration to Turkey, and after the democratization process began in Bulgaria in 1990 and an apology came from the Bulgarian government in 2012.

In the historical contextualization of the Turks of Bulgaria, we have seen that after being a minority community in Bulgaria, Turks have searched for a real home where they would not be a minority anymore and where their ethnicity, language, and religion fit in. It was obvious that it was Turkey because Turkey is their kin state, where they define it as *anavatan* (motherland). Nevertheless, migrating from their homeland to the motherland also affected the ways of reconstructing ethnic identity for the Turks of Bulgaria. Throughout the years it was their dream to migrate to the country where they feel they belong, and where they want to live under its flag. However, migrating to motherland did not provide a 'real home' for them as it brought along difficulties along with requiring new ways of negotiating their identity

to get accepted.

In the following chapter, I will discuss the consequences of the assimilation process of 1984-1985 and the migration of 1989, which severely affected the lives of migrants and of those who stayed behind. I will tackle the issues of identity, ethnicity, religion, and gender, based on my field research in Bulgaria and my interviews with the Turks of Bulgaria. I will try to render to what extent they formed a distinct and negotiated identity, after having escaped from being executed and being a minority in a different nation-state. I will also try to understand how migrating from homeland to motherland affects the ways of being other, let alone being a minority community.

CHAPTER 5

STAYING BEHIND IN ‘HOMELAND’ AND MIGRATING TO ‘MOTHERLAND’ : THE TURKS OF BULGARIA

Home is hard to define and yet it is about the people around you, either family or acquaintances; and the environment you are surrounded with, which teaches you the language, the culture, and everyday practices. It is also about memories that you build, reproduce, and reconstruct over years with the past and the present moments. Turks who remained in Bulgaria after the mass exodus of 1989, had to negotiate their ways of expressing their identities as they became subject to harsh assimilationist policies held by the Bulgarian state, and a mass migration process, which caused many divided families, and the construction of new lives both for the migrants and for the minority group. Turks of Bulgaria live in a transnational social field, which transcends national borders and emanates new types of identity negotiations. On the other hand, what differ the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey from the Turkish minority group that remained in Bulgaria is that having experienced migration and the discourse from my interlocutors “we arrive in our mother country”. Migrants need to find new ways to express who they were. However, not only migration, constituting different strategies of citizenship and identity, redefining what is Turkishness and performing it accordingly, and experiencing upward social mobility are significant factors in constructing a particular identity for Bulgarian-Turkish migrants. In this chapter, I will try to render my field research findings, the ways of expressing what they were and what they become as a result of significant events that affected the Turks of Bulgaria. Thus, I try to understand how the perception and ascription of identity and community among the Turks of Bulgaria affected by the 1989 migration from Bulgaria to Turkey and how their relations happen to be with the migrant community in Turkey.

I do not have a claim to represent the category of the Turks of Bulgaria, rather I elaborate on a group of people who live in a specific rural town, which has a high Turkish population and transnational ties with the migrants in Turkey. Keeping in mind the relationality of the conditions and experiences of the minority and the migrant groups, I try to make sense of what it means to a Turk or what it means not to be a Turk in Bulgaria, and what strategies they have developed in order to survive in a country as a minority group. Nonetheless, I try to understand how the shifting meanings of identity based on being a migrant in a country where the majority is from the same ethnic kin and in what ways people define being in a “dream” country, in which they stated they belong to. I try to indicate identity strategies of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants or Turks of Bulgaria or just *Bulgarlar* (ethnic Bulgarian) –as they were initially called in Turkey- and I try to explain how they make sense of Turkishness in Turkey, in contrast to the ways they used to emanate in Bulgaria.

My research problem includes how the perception of identity and community among the Turks of Bulgaria affected by the migration of 1989 and transnational migratory ties, which bind them across-borders between Bulgaria and Turkey. Thus, the questions I asked in the interviews are conglomerated under the titles of identity, minority, religion, family, political representation, socioeconomic conditions, social networks, other groups that they live together, speaking the mother-tongue and culture with the purpose of understanding and analyzing the main structures reproducing and negotiating Turkish identity and in what ways the perception of these structures transformed by transnationality and the 1989 mass migration of Turks from Bulgaria. I conducted in-depth interviews with migrants living in Izmir and with the Turkish minority, who live in a small town in Southern Bulgaria, which I called Karlıca, during my field research in the region. The narratives of the migrants are going to be guidance in the way of analyzing their experiences and practices in terms of the transition between being a majority to minority or vice versa. I directly give quotations of my interviewees’ exact statements by providing their names, gender, age and location; yet the following statements, which comes after the direct quotations represent my own analysis on the issue.

5.1. Performing Turkishness Across Borders

Once I was on the way from *Kircali* (Kardzhali) to Tırnovo, Bulgaria chatting with the bus driver in Turkish, he was explaining how easy it was for him to get Turkish citizenship from Turkey, and I asked “Why did you get it?”, he suddenly answered, “What kind of a question is that, simply because I’m a Turk, of course, I have got Turkish citizenship!”. He was very eager to talk to me, as we were the only ones in the whole bus speaking in Turkish, and the rest of the bus were Bulgarians, somehow I felt that everybody was looking to us, thus I was quite hesitating to speak in Turkish in such a public sphere. He explained that he and his wife work for the bus company in Bulgaria and they have two kids and he added:

I decided to get Turkish citizenship when I visited my brother in Bursa, who migrated to Turkey in 1989. The officers were helpful. My children also have Turkish citizenship. My only regret is not paying for my pensions in Turkey, because it is a very long way to get retired here in Bulgaria.

He mentioned that those who could not migrate to Turkey in 1989 since there were patients and elderly people in his household, he was not able to leave Bulgaria for Turkey in 1989. “Those who stayed are working for peanuts; they are not good either for themselves or the state, as they engage with agriculture and animal husbandry, which has remained very little”. He also complained about the youngster, “The young generation do not make plans about the future; when they came from school, they think where they should go to drink and enjoy. We were not like them. When we got home there was tobacco cultivation, and there was no time for yourself.” He also complained about non-obligatory military service in Bulgaria, “It was no good for young men. In our times those who did not complete military service could not get married”. He also added that he paid 18,000 Turkish liras (8,219 US dollars) in 2014 in Turkey for his son to be exempted from the military service, which is obligatory in Turkey. When we arrived in Tırnovo, he stated that – it was like a warning to me- “There are no Turks in Tırnovo, there is *millet* here, those who are ‘dark citizens’” referring to Roma. The conversation with the bus driver generated new questions in my mind. Thus, I began to wonder to what extent Turks of Bulgaria perceive having Turkish citizenship as given, natural and well deserved; how they

ascribe an identity for themselves, which distinguish themselves from other minority groups in Bulgaria and from the Turks of Turkey; and where their boundaries of identity negotiation begin and end.

Schiffauer et al. (2003) argue that “identities and borders are legitimated and reproduced through a system of narratives, public rituals, and institutions” (Schiffauer et al., 2003 cited in Vertovec, 2009, p.87). The Bulgarian-Turkish migrants whom I interviewed, mostly cited the ethnic discrimination they experienced in Bulgaria as an important reason for migration, and the migrants explained that the consciousness of being a Turk and speaking their mother tongue was shaped by their subjective experiences of oppression as a minority in Bulgaria. “Nothing worse than being a Turk in Bulgaria, nothing worse than being an immigrant in Turkey”, as Bulgarian Turkish migrants say (Dimitrova, 1998, p.1). Bulgarian Turkish migrants had difficulties in both countries, because they were a minority in Bulgaria, and they became migrants in Turkey. As Parla (2006, p.546) indicated, one of the most common sentiments expressed by the Bulgarian Turkish immigrants was that they were persecuted in Bulgaria because they were Turkish, and in Turkey, because they were Bulgarian. The feeling of in-betweenness has been always there. Also, in the interviews, it was striking that one of the most common patterns of identifying themselves is the emphasis on being a Turk by putting efforts to sustain it. Murat (M, 1954, İzmir)²⁴ explains that: “Every nation can live only in its own state. Since the Ottoman Empire retreated from Bulgaria, it was our biggest dream to migrate to Turkey, because we were struggling with the racist propaganda against Turks in Bulgaria”. Emphasis on living in their ‘own’ nation-state is drastically observed in migrants’ narratives.

Two oppressive policies of the Bulgarian state, forceful name changes and prohibition of the use of the Turkish language have a big impact on migrants’ memories and thoughts. Some comments regretfully voice that they should have resisted those policies as Pomaks did. The issue is tackled as Pomaks giving up on

²⁴ Abbreviations show (gender, year of birth, the place of the interview) of my interviewees.

their religion while keeping their language, thus, as a strategy, Turks attempted to preserve their language in order not to lose their identity. When I posed questions about migration most of my interviewees tell the story beginning from the forceful name changes, which is precisely one of the strongest memories that belong to those times. The oppression and feeling of exclusion that they feel are still alive because one's name reflects her/his identity, culture, religion, and some of her/his life.

The migration of 1989 constitutes a turning point for the Turks of Bulgaria. Before 1989, their ways of explaining, expressing, and performing who they were determined by the assimilationist policies of the Bulgarian state, and they needed to negotiate identities to struggle with the political oppression. Despite the fact that it was a forced migration, migrating to Turkey was a way-out, because it was their 'motherland', where constantly appear in their dreams. Those who could not emigrate had several reasons; some of them could not get visas from the Turkish consulates, some of them had to stay because of the elderly and patients in the household, some of them had to wait for their sons who were on the military service at that time, some of them were late as Turkey closed the border as of August 1989, after a mass migration flow exceeded the expectations since May 1989. Nevertheless, those who emigrated to Turkey understood that identity problems do not come to end, although they were now in the motherland, in which the majority speaks Turkish and practice Islam. Their ways of explaining, expressing, and performing who they were, have still to be negotiated. Consequently, the ways of negotiation between homeland and motherland designated through the feelings of in-betweenness.

Migrants reshape their identity practices in accordance with the new places and new people, along with carrying old habits and communications with the home country. The issue of in-betweenness is also a problem in terms ethnic-based discrimination in Turkey. Bulgarian-Turkish migrants complained of being perceived as *gavur* (infidel) by the local people in Turkey. More precisely, Mustafa (M, 1976, İzmir) expressed "they should see us as Turks but media misrepresents us, it is very dangerous. People perceive migrant women as sex workers because they are

employed”. The image of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey is one of the problems coined by some interviewees; they could not escape stereotyping of being Turk in Bulgaria, and being *gavur* in Turkey. Similarly, Tuna (M, 1980, Karlıca) stated that:

We are always Turks for the Bulgarians. People cannot tell you not to speak Turkish when you are in the east of Filibe, especially in Kırcaali, Haskovo and Smolyan. Now, we can speak Turkish everywhere in Bulgaria, but there is always a warning not to do it. For example the general managers warned me not to speak in Turkish as far as I could do while working in the bank.

After he made this statement, I asked Tuna if he ever questioned these warnings against speaking Turkish. He replied that he never did it, but he also told me that he finally realized what his managers were doing was actually very racist.

All of my interviewees stated that they have Bulgarian citizenship in order to take advantage of the benefits of the European Union. Most of the migrants asserted that getting citizenship from the European Union is for their children; if they would like to live, settle and work in the EU, Bulgarian citizenship would be beneficial for them. Aliye (F, 1967, İzmir) expressed that she has been glad to migrate to Turkey, however, she hesitates about the future of her children in Turkey; “it seems that we are about to be the minority here because Kurds and Syrians have many children, they seem to outnumber us”. She also stated that “Syrians brought Orient culture to Turkey, which does not have a potential for the transformation. We brought the potential of the West, but it is not appreciated. We revive the country because our women work”, emphasizing the working culture that they brought from Bulgaria.

Similarly, Mustafa (M, 1976, İzmir) expressed that Syrians have difficulties in the education system in Turkey. He also stated that the other migrants from the Balkans are not Turkish, but those who migrated from Bulgaria are *özbeöz Türk* (purely Turkish). “You can immediately recognize who is pure Turkish and who is not. People compare us with the other migrants from the Balkans but we are completely different. 99% of the Bulgarian Turkish migrants are hardworking, they never borrow money from others” he concluded. Further, my interviewee Eren puts “we

felt excluded in the first years of migration, as an ethnic community. But now we climb the social ladder, some people see us as ‘superior’ because we have a qualified background”, emphasizing the educational skills and working culture that they brought from Bulgaria. Hence, it can be said that some of the Balkan migrants are also excluded from the discourse of ‘being one of us’ among the Turks of Bulgaria, although Balkan migrants relatively have ‘tolerance’ towards each other, compared to the other migrant groups in Turkey. Moreover, Turks of Bulgaria see themselves as more Turkish, more competent and well-deserved citizens compared to the other migrants, in order to justify their existence in Turkey.

The emphasis on Turkishness, specifically ‘pure Turkishness’ is very prevalent among the interviewees. Zehra (F, 1976, Karlıca) expressed “I’m not a nationalist but I love my nation. Although my Turkish language is not good enough, I always say thanks to God I’m Turkish.” Nevertheless, migrants consider themselves as fighters for Turkishness, who defended and protected Turkish identity in Bulgaria, thus, they assume that Turkey would appreciate it. For instance, according to Aliye (F, 1967, Izmir) “We, migrants, are more Turks than the locals in Turkey, because we made efforts to protect our Turkishness”. Moreover, as Eren (M, 1974, Izmir) puts it: “I am 100% Turk. Bulgaria is just a geographical place where I was born. When I say “I am from Karlıca, Bulgaria, it only represents a geographical place. The place where I belong is different than where I compose my future. My children also define themselves as being from Karlıca”. When I asked him about his thoughts about specific and distinct physical appearances of Bulgarian-Turkish people, he promptly told me: “We want to feel Turk, whether we are purely Turk or not is another question, which we do not want to deal with”. Similarly, one of my interviewees, Mustafa (M, 1976, Izmir) expressed, “We migrated to Bulgaria from Konya five hundred years ago”, emphasizing their *öz Türklük* (pure Turkishness). Another interviewee Melik (M, 1950, Karlıca) stated “if not first, Turkey is the second homeland for us; Turkey is our father. I would like to live in Turkey, here in Bulgaria people are still hesitating to speak Turkish”.

Name changes in Bulgaria constituted an important cause for the Bulgarian Turkish migrants considering their identity perception. The 'Rebirth campaign' held by the Bulgarian state aimed to assimilate the Turkish minority into Bulgarians; hence, the Turkish minority was forbidden to speak Turkish, their mother tongue in Bulgaria, after 1984. Some Turkish officers were forced to punish Turkish-speaking people in public spaces by writing out bills. Thus, it was expressed that Turks were forced to snitch on their ethnic community members, neighbors, colleagues who spoke Turkish, no matter in private or public spaces, which made people stressed out and ashamed. The pressure on people was one of the major reasons to seek an escape. Hasibe (F, 1947, Karlıca) expressed that "we could all speak Bulgarian in the workplace, but you feel estranged when somebody call you with a Bulgarian name. The name that you carried for thirty or forty years was suddenly vanished; we felt very resentful".

Migrants are performing their identity of Turkishness in Turkey. Since they suffer from discrimination against their ethnicity, religion, and culture in Bulgaria, migrants are mostly glad that they can freely perform their culture, religion and speak their language in Turkey. According to Park (2007, p.201), "many migrants construct their multiple identities in transnational social fields". Although migrants do not go and stay in Bulgaria for longer periods, they live in a transnational social field, which comprises memories, habits, lifestyle, and culture belonging to both Bulgaria and Turkey. Drastically, İsmet (M, 1965, İzmir) states that: "My dreams still take place in Bulgaria, although I was mostly humiliated there". Similarly, Ibrahim (M, 1978, İzmir) also highlights that Turks are still not welcome in Bulgaria; "We went on a holiday in Bulgaria, when we ordered some food in Bulgarian, people around us looked and laughed at us, they are still mocking us".

Some of the interviewees implied that the assimilation campaign determined to be a genocide-like ethnic cleansing, which caused inevitable traumas and wounds. One interviewee called me a night of the interview, expressing that talking about the migration for the first time have triggered her sentiments which she covered for years unconsciously. She stated: "I have never told it someone who really wants to

understand. At the age of establishing a career and experiencing love, we were forced to get accustomed to a new system in a new county". Nevertheless, she mentioned the psychological problems that she brought along and expressed that she wants to confront and forgive the things she has experienced.

5.2. Remembering as a Construction of Past: The First Years of Migration

Narratives of the migrants reveal that the Bulgarian-Turkish minority had only a couple of days to pack and leave Bulgaria because of the forceful regulations implemented by the Bulgarian state, thus, migrants had difficult conditions in the first years of the immigration and adaptation to a new country. It was surprising for me to witness how migrants remember the migration process with all details. Migrants mostly even remember what clothes they wore while crossing the border from Bulgaria to Turkey, although some of them were at very early ages. For instance, Aliye remembered that she was wearing a red jacket and a black skirt at the time of the migration; concluding that:

I was feeling like Gavroche, in the Les Miserables, as we were traveling in an open truck bed from the border to Izmir with very expensive prices. In our first house that we bought after three years in Turkey, we did not have glass windows; instead, we had plastic bags. The migration was a huge psychological trauma for me. I still do not want to remember those parts of my life.

She also asserted that they were investigated by the Turkish state because they were exiled in three days from Bulgaria. Aliye expressed that Turkish authorities gave them three kilograms of lentil and six months of housing benefit, but nothing else. She is a nurse but she had to work as a textile worker and as a waiter for a while after her diploma was approved. Her father was a teacher but he could not work anymore due to his psychiatric disease, which remained from the torture he was exposed to in the police investigation in Bulgaria, thus, he was a political exile. Her mother shouldered both her father's care and elderly care in the family. Aliye expressed her feelings as a major psychological trauma regarding all aspects of the migration.

“I remember all the things” Eren says, emphasizing the brown jacket that he was wearing during the migration and kept wearing it for three or four years more in Turkey, due to economic conditions. While president Zhivkov declared that the Bulgarian border was open to the Turkish minority, most of the Turks went to the border gate in a rush. As Eren puts it: “Migration was a big chaos. We ran from Bulgaria like cows whose ties are loosened”. He also remembers the exact date of the migration along with the belongings they were able to bring with them, such as kitchen cupboards, iron stove, beds, wardrobes, and even the windows. These were the properties needed for their new house construction in Bulgaria, which was never accomplished. “I define migration as a chaos” says Eren, and adds “they were preparing conditions in order people to escape from Bulgaria, our only exit was Turkey”. His family tried to migrate in 1978, however, the border was closed so they eventually migrated in June 1989 to Izmir. Eren expressed his impressions about Turkey as follow: “We expected to be welcomed with a red carpet because we were fighting for the sake of Turkishness in Bulgaria, but what we saw was very different from what we were told about Turkey”, implying the crowd of people, hot weather, massiveness of cities and class distinction, which were not seen in Bulgaria. What they were dreaming of about Turkey was way different than what they encountered. Similarly, Hale (F, 1980, İzmir) puts that “I used to see the Bosphorus in my dreams because my relatives were sending letters and postcards from Turkey, I knew one day we would migrate to Turkey”. Fuat (M, 1954, İzmir) recounts:

We were not poor in Bulgaria, we had everything. But when we were crossing the border the Turkish state gave us bread, halva, and cheese. If you are a migrant, you become in need of even just a package of biscuits. When we were crossing the Dardanelles, Turkish people were welcoming us, yelling “welcome Turks” and giving food to us.

Despite the fact that some of the interviewees migrated at adolescence age or younger, they even remember what was happening in Bulgaria in 1989. One of my interviewees, Mustafa, expressed that when their passports were ready to take in Bulgaria, they knew they would be exiled soon, and it happened so. “Those who have relatives in prison and those who seem to be smart and wise were the ones who were deported in the first stage” he included. Another interviewee Ibrahim states that: “Migration means starting over from scratch, risking everything in your life”.

Migration came with the increased cost of identity damages, as Ibrahim puts it: “I used to have high self-esteem in Bulgaria but when we migrated to Turkey I immediately turned out to be an introverted child”.

The issue of language unexpectedly became a problem for the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey. Seemingly, local Turks speak Turkish, which is quite different than the Turkish that the migrants spoke. It appeared that, again, they do not speak the language that the majority speaks, which was a “token of the distinctiveness” for the Turkish migrants and prevented them from certain advantages (Elchinova, 2008, p.19). Murat (M, 1954, İzmir) expressed that language was a real problem: “We did not know how to communicate. I did not know the terms which are related to my job, and that’s why I was fired for a couple of times”. Murat asserted that people hired him on the condition of he could use the language ‘properly’. On the other hand, while Hasibe²⁵ (F, 1947, Karlıca) was working as a domestic care giver in Turkey, she stated that “I used to say *да* (yes in Bulgarian) instead of saying *evet* (yes in Turkish) for everything in Turkey. In Bulgaria I could barely speak Bulgarian, but in Turkey I forget speaking in Turkish. I felt very ashamed”. It is obvious that Bulgarian-Turkish migrants have the feeling of in-betweenness on the issue of speaking the proper language both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. It can be said that what they assumed about Turkey, freely speaking the language would make them freer, seemed to come to grief. Not being able speak any of the languages properly puts them in a transnational social field, where entails to an ongoing search for a real home and a negotiation for the real identity.

Migrants have difficulties in adaptation to the structure of Turkish society, which is stratified in terms of socioeconomic status and education and which is quite different than the relatively homogenous socialist society in Bulgaria (Elchinova, 2005, p.17). Further, migrating mostly from rural villages or towns in Bulgaria to industrial and dynamic big cities in Turkey was an important change in their lives (ibid.). All of my interviewees have their own houses in Turkey. In few years most of them bought

²⁵ Hasibe migrated to Turkey in 1993, stayed for 20 years and turned back to Bulgaria to spend spring and summers in Bulgaria.

land and built their own houses. As Elchinova (2005, p.18) indicated their houses are mostly unroofed, which renders their intention to continue constructing new apartment storeys. Nesrin (F, 1957, İzmir) stated “it is difficult to live in a rented house for migrants. It is a must for migrants to have houses”. She also expressed that they had difficulties in saving money for the house, “we were limiting food expenses even for our children. I was buying mean apples from the bazaar. I was buying everything in mediocre. Now, I realized that we should not have limited our expenses that much, but we were afraid we remained living in rented houses”. Similarly, she expressed that she has observed a class distinction in Turkey, which was not seen in Bulgaria: “There are lots of rich people in Turkey. The economy is better here, but you can see people are eating from the garbage, you could not see that poorness in Bulgaria”. While they have limitations in food expenses in Turkey in order to save money for building or buying a house, they could take advantage of living in the village by getting food from their gardens and animals in Bulgaria. However, hard agricultural work is one of the things they were all complaining about in Bulgaria. Turks were dealing with tobacco cultivation in rural parts of Bulgaria, and those who work in public sectors had to work in tobacco cultivation too when they arrive home in Bulgaria.

5.3. Making Boundaries Clear: Distinctions between Those Who Stayed and Who Left

Borders are permeable which shapes migrants’ situations differently, as cross-border hierarchies are constructed based on either compatibility or incompatibility of migrants (Hurd et al., 2017, p.15-16). On the other side, there are also hierarchies between those who migrated and those who do not. For instance, it was a common narrative among Turks who remained in Bulgaria that migrants coming from Turkey adapted a different lifestyle, which differentiates the one that they used to before migration. It is said that migrants look down on those who stayed in Bulgaria with an old-fashion and traditional lifestyle. Lütfiye (F, 1975, Karlıca) expressed that “they don’t eat from the same plate on the table, when they visit us in Bulgaria, however, it

was the habit they used to do before migrating, they seem to forget what they were before”. Turks who remained in Bulgaria implied that Turks who migrated to Turkey have changed drastically, forgetting the lifestyle that they used to have in Bulgaria, and deep down inside they blame those who stayed in Bulgaria and did not migrate to Turkey for keeping a traditional and underdeveloped lifestyle. Thus, the gap is opening between who stayed and who migrated, despite the fact that they used to belong to the same community.

A couple of my interviewees in Bulgaria stated that some Turkish migrants who come to visit their relatives in Bulgaria, are behaving like ‘snobs’ and it is expressed that “they denied where they came from” were very common about the Turkish migrants. Lütfiye commented that the 1977-78 migrants criticize the 1989 migrants whereas the 1989 migrants criticize the 2000’s migrants in Turkey, implying that the newcomers are supposed to come to a place which is “completed and ready” by the old comers. There is a tendency to criticize and sometimes to exclude the newcomers, and those who never migrated. Intra-group diversity is the result of the migration processes towards Turkey. However, the migration of 1989 had a bigger impact on this because 1989 migrants were forced migrants, who were desperately seeking refuge in Turkey mostly using their migrant networks which was established by the old migrants. Old migrants in Turkey provided them shelter and work and it eventually generated a perception that the new comers reach everything ready-made, which were already accomplished by the old comers. On the other hand, those who mostly migrated to the industrial and big cities of Turkey having adapted to a modern lifestyle criticize those who remained in traditional, heterogeneous and small towns in Bulgaria continuing animal husbandry, agriculture and peasantry life style. This might be the reason for migrants to be perceived like ‘snobs’ for those who stayed and never migrated to Turkey. Nevertheless, although migrants criticize those who remained in Bulgaria, Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey keep emphasizing where they come from, as it represents the proximity to the western and European culture, which would distinguish them from the Turks of Turkey.

5.3.1. Relationality and Differentiation with People in Turkey

People's relation with other people, places, things, and accordingly identities have been in transition when they migrated to Turkey, even for a short time, as it is argued that "post-migratory identities are more multiple, fluid and multinational and are negotiated within complex transnational webs of association and communication" (Pettman, 1999, p.216). Among my interviewees in Bulgaria, it is also not unheard of that some of the migrants decided to go back after staying in Turkey for several years. Here are some observations of them expressing their feelings and thoughts about people in Turkey. Aynur (F, 1958, Karlıca) stated, "Everyone gets along well here in our town. Here, where twenty men sitting in a café, if a woman passes by everyone says 'hi', but in Turkey people shed blood because of these things. Women were not allowed to work in Turkey. Now, the system is changing in Turkey, they are growing into". Hasan (M, 1940, Karlıca) expressed that when he migrated to Turkey, he felt disappointed because of the people's distrust in Turkey; "I expected more trustful people in Turkey". He also contended that he was surprised when he witnessed that women did not work in public spaces in Turkey, and thus, he added that migrant women set a good example regarding the participation of paid employment for local women. "Todor Zhivkov taught us working" Hasan contended. He implied that their culture and discipline of work came from the Bulgaria's communist past. Ersin (M, 1983, Karlıca), who never migrated to Turkey, expressed that "Turkey is where our hearts belong to. If the majority is Muslim in a country, nobody should complain about conservatism, but I do not see religious communities good for Turkey". Similarly, Zehra (F, 1976, Karlıca) stated "Democracy seems to be in danger in Turkey. There are lots of *imam hatip* schools in Turkey. It is complicated when politics and religious are intertwined. The single party regime in Turkey resembles to the communist regime in Bulgaria".

On the other hand, my interviewee Lütfiye (F, 1975, Karlıca) expressed that her relatives who emigrated from Bulgaria before her family in Turkey did not provide any support for her in the first years of migration, although her relatives had higher socioeconomic status. She expressed that "people who were despised by migrants

helped me in Turkey, they were from Erzurum and Adana”. The place she settled in Turkey was comprised of internal migrants from all over Turkey, as well as Balkan migrants. Hence, the reason for this can be thought that there is a tendency to get along well with other people in these localities, instead of expecting social networking from the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants. For migrants, inclusion and adaptation into the Turkish society is related to how a community performs belonging to a specific locality; for instance, where everyone is from the Black Sea region migrant community behaves accordingly. “I understand Syrians in Turkey well” Lütfiye implied because her migration story was a very difficult one. She was seven months pregnant and having a 2-year-old infant with her when she had to walk for twenty-four hours in order to cross the border between Bulgaria and Turkey in 2000. She paid 1800 Mark to the smugglers because they could not get visas from the authorities in Bulgaria.

The political uprisings and chaos in Syria has led to millions of Syrians seeking refuge around the world since 2009. Turkey has the major number of Syrian refugees in the world by providing admission and accommodation for the Syrian nationals under the status of temporary protection. In Article 91 of Law No: 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection; Temporary Protection is defined as the following²⁶: “Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection.” There are 3.699,388 Syrian nationals living in Turkey under the status of temporary protection as of August 2021²⁷. Nearly twelve years in Turkey, there have been so many tensions and debates about Syrians’ adaptation and integration into the Turkish society. Nevertheless, Syrians have not been acknowledged enough into the Turkish society and yet they are constantly being attacked, despite the fact that Syrians have been trying to integrate into the society with participating in the education system and establishing businesses in

²⁶ <https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection-in-turkey>

²⁷ <https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>

Turkey. Syrians are also severely criticized by the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants for having allegedly easier accesses to the resources in Turkey, where they ‘did not fight for these rights’, unlike the Turks of Bulgaria, who consider themselves as natural and merited citizens of Turkey.

When the living conditions become better in Bulgaria in the 2000s, Lütfiye and her family returned back to Bulgaria, because Lütfiye’s brother suffered from unemployment in Turkey and they would have preferred to work on tobacco cultivation in Bulgaria. However, Lütfiye also stated “Turkey is one step further from Bulgaria, although it is not an EU member. Turkey’s economy is better and there are personnel cadres in the state. There are no cadres here, there is no reliability in the state itself”. She added that young people prefer to live and work in Western Europe; “there is no state planning for the young people in Bulgaria”. She expressed that her hometown is Turkey, whether she has a Turkish identity card or not; “I do not have to request for a Turkish ID, Turkey has indebted this identity card to us because my ancestors did not serve for Bulgaria, but Turkey”. When the issue comes to having a Turkish identity card, she condemns Syrians in Turkey, who are provided with an identity card. “Turkey opened its borders to millions of Syrians, while there are still Turkish migrants having no Turkish IDs. It was not a migration that happened in 1989, it was an expulsion”. She got emotional when I asked her “where do you think you are from”. In the beginning, she was empathic to the Syrians in Turkey, but in the end, she blamed them for having Turkish identity ‘in an easier way’, while the Turks of Bulgaria still suffer about not having it. Hasan (M, 1940, Karlica) also stated that he never saw a Bulgarian-Turkish migrant beggar in Turkey, slightly condemning Syrians begging in the streets in Turkey. He mentioned how hardworking Bulgarian-Turkish migrants are; “migrants worked in the factories of Turkey and they buy and build houses and become retired at the same time”. It can be concluded that there is a perception that only Turks should be in possession of Turkish identity, likewise being in the possession of Islam in Bulgaria. The degree of empathizing with the other migrants in Turkey is up to some extent when the issue of Turkish identity card is on the table for the Turks of Bulgaria.

5.3.2. Ethnic Distinctions and Relations of Different Minorities (*Minority within minority*) in Bulgaria

Discrimination and exclusion of specific communities imply how Turks define themselves within particular boundaries. For instance, there is a distinct discourse of identity between Turks and other Muslim communities such as Roma and Pomaks. As Ong (1999, p.65) clarifies that racial discourses can be used for oppressive and emancipatory purposes in determining social divisions in transnational spaces, in addition to being used for creating internal divisions of imagined communities as Anderson (1991) implies. Turks in Bulgaria increasingly contrast themselves as more homogeneous subjects to the more heterogeneous/backward ethnic groups such as Pomaks, Roma and, Alevi, which is called “internal orientalism” (Schein, 2000). While Turks constitute the major minority group in Bulgaria, they constantly make differentiations and comparisons that justify their ethnic and religious identity, between them and Pomak, Roma, and Alevi communities, which consequently generate minority within minority.

As Barth (1969, p.10) clearly puts ethnic distinctions are not a result of the absence of social interactions with other communities; on the contrary, they are constituted despite inter-ethnic interactions. Although my field research in Bulgaria focuses on Turks, it is important to explain the relationships of different ethnic groups in order to reveal how identity is constituted through cultural differences and distinctions. Hence, observations of the relations between Turks, Pomaks, Roma, and Alevi groups can explain how boundaries are constructed within ethnic groups. I believed that it was a good experience to see whether ethnic and religious identities precludes or intersect each other. Before coming to Karlıca, I anticipated that it would be difficult to get in touch with other Turkish-speaking people such as Roma and Alevi communities since I only have contacts with Sunni Turks, which has come true. Another issue that I did not think about before is relations and interactions with Pomaks. In daily life, people from different communities have peaceful communications, however, discrimination against Roma, Alevi, and Pomaks were very visible. Excluding Alevis is more common despite having similar cultural

markers compared to Bulgarians, Pomaks, and Roma. Bahar (F, 1964, Karlıca) implied her discomfort about the founder of DPS²⁸ was an Alevi, instead of a Turk, as the political party supports minority communities in Bulgaria, especially the Turkish community. Turks promptly differentiate themselves from Alevis in any matter in Bulgaria.

Marriage is a major issue, which is drastically rejected among the Turks, when it happens with other ethnic and religious groups. It is claimed that when a person marries Alevi and Roma, s/he would be excluded from the community. Oktay (M, 1980, Karlıca) contended as such “there is no Alevis in our village. I prefer my child to marry a Pomak instead of marrying an Alevi”. Marriage with Pomaks is not perceived that bad, but not preferable either. However, marriages with Alevis are strongly rejected despite the fact that they are Turkish and their language is Turkish. Marriage with a Pomak can be relatively preferable when it comes to marriage with an Alevi, even if Pomaks’ ethnic identity and language do not resemble Turks. I have observed only a couple of intermarriages. The striking one is a Turkish woman marrying a Bulgarian Roma who has been excluded from the family for 25 years; her parents did not communicate with her throughout these years. The woman has been totally excluded from the family; she has been not even called out for funerals or weddings. Emanating from this example, it can be said that ethnic distinctions have been made through specific cultural motives such as marriage. On the other hand, Ersin (M, 1983, Karlıca) expressed that rumors against Alevis are because of ignorance and of a false reading of the history as Alevis are also Muslim; however he adds that he would not marry an Alevi woman saying that “I cannot take a risk”. Oktay also asserted that “I would marry a Pomak instead of an Alevi”. Prejudices against Alevis are very prevalent. Şevket (M, 1956, Karlıca) stated that “Marriage with Alevis are very rare. Alevis are more democratic and progressive than us, but they are also vengeful. Alevis are the biggest enemies for the Muslims”.

²⁸ Movement for Rights and Freedoms. (detailed information provided below)

Further, circumstantial accounts of ethnicity argue that it is not about roots of ethnicity that defines ethnic or racial identity, rather its practical uses and derivative circumstances engender ethnic identification and further, thus, it is similarly argued that circumstantial accounts of ethnicity provide the basis for collective political mobilization according to interests of a certain group (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.56-57). Ethnic and racial identities are emphasized when they are advantageous on some occasions and they are used to keep apart some ethnicities who are not eligible for accessing some goods, such as jobs, housing, and schools, on the other hand, ethnical bonds can be ignored if circumstances change according to the interests of certain groups (ibid., p.58). For instance, the access of Roma in Bulgaria for certain things is restricted and difficult; their strategy for that would be defining themselves as Turks in order to gain easier access to things. Despite the fact that being a Turk is not a preferable identity in Bulgaria, another minority identity would be less preferable. Roma community indicates a symbolic reversal of the culture (ibid.), by adapting Turkish identity in the public sphere. A neighborhood representative Lale (F, 1964, Karlıca) explained that in the population census there is a tendency among the Roma to define themselves as Turks, as they speak Turkish and they are Muslims.

I have come across many localities and authentic features in the region. The naming for Roma communities also differentiates; Turkish-speaking Roma are called as *Çingene* while Bulgarian or Roma speaking Roma communities are called as *Dale* or *Kalaycı* among Turkish people. There is an implication of their occupation in naming Roma. I also witnessed in an everyday talk with a Turkish-speaking Roma man calling other Roma communities who do not speak Turkish and are not Muslim as *onlar bizim milletten değiller* (they are not from our nation). Şevket (M, 1956, Karlıca) expressed that “*Çingeneler* call themselves Turks or ‘clean Bulgarians’, they never call *Çingene* to themselves”. He told me that his tenants are Roma, but he sometimes calls them as *Dale*, as a pejorative term. Consequently, what I understood from these narratives was that allying with the Turks seems to provide advantages for Roma; at least they tend to define themselves as a part of the major minority group of Bulgaria, who have a ‘motherland’ over there, which can be considered as

an empowering situation.

Despite the fact that Turks and Pomaks have been living together and sharing the same religion in Bulgaria, there are some exclusionary discourses that appear when it comes to the justification of one's identity. Both migrants in Turkey and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria stated that the prohibition of the use of the Turkish language was one of the most important instances of oppression that came from the Bulgarian state. Nesrin (F, 1950, İzmir) puts it as follows: "Pomaks gave up their religion, but never gave up their language, why would we change our language?". Another interviewee Bahar (F, 1964, Karlıca) mentioned that she took back her Turkish name in 1990, -when the Bulgarian government allowed her to do so-, after her Pomak neighbors told her that they have already taken their names back. She expressed how ashamed she felt when she learned that 'even' Pomaks took their names back, before she did.

The assimilation of Pomaks in the 1970s eventually initiated the assimilation process of Turks in the 1980s. In addition to leading for the assimilation of other minorities, assimilation of Pomaks also caused the separation of families who have mixed marriages. Melik (M, 1950, Karlıca) dramatically expressed that "The wife of my brother was a Pomak from Asenovgrad. Because of the pressures, she escaped from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1977, leaving her husband and twin children behind. Her husband and children migrated to Turkey in 1989. For 12 years they were separated, this was a true tragedy".

Pomaks in the Western Thrace consider themselves as Turks because the minority is Muslim and the majority of the population is Greek Orthodox, which means if the minorities under oppression have a different religion under the rule of the majority with another religion, the religion of the minority supports their "national" identity and associated with this identity (Oran, 1993, p.114). The religion of the minority attaches as a national identity to the minority group, as it is seen in the Turkish and Pomak communities in Bulgaria. One of my interviews contented that Pomaks in the town are mostly converted to Christian/Bulgarian, but he added that in other cities

Pomaks are "more Muslim", however; he concluded that "how can Ivan be a Muslim?". Similarly, Timur (M, 1955, Karlıca) expressed that "old people used to call Pomaks as those who have half religion. Our imam does not go to funerals if the deceased does not have a Turkish name". In the interviews, there are always implications that Pomaks are not able to become 'real Muslims' due to their controversial history.

Before arriving in the field, there were some images about some minority groups in my mind based on what I have heard from my migrant interviewees in Izmir. Therefore, I would not anticipate that Pomaks are so diverse and heterogeneous in the town. Before coming to Karlıca, I only assumed that they are Muslim communities speaking the Bulgarian language. However, some of the Pomaks live as Muslim; some of them are speaking Turkish very well, while some of them live like Bulgarians and speak only Bulgarian, with having Christian names. Turks criticize Pomaks by taking Bulgarian names and living like Christians. Ersin (M, 1983, Karlıca) claimed that "most of the Pomaks live like Christians but want to be buried with Muslim rituals". Turks and Bulgarians do not accept Pomaks in their cemeteries so that Pomaks built their own cemetery in the town. Because Turkish imams do not accept to perform in Pomak funerals, thus I have been told that Pomaks also have their own imams. Another important discourse appeared in one of my interviews with a Turkish businessman in the town. When I explained the aim of my research before beginning the interview, Ersin suggested me to study Pomaks as well, "Pomaks need to be rescued because they are becoming more and more Bulgarian every day, they need to be regained in Islam". Because of the language barrier, I could not get in touch with Pomaks because the majority of the Pomaks do not speak Turkish in Karlıca; thus, the Pomak question has remained a controversial issue that requires further research.

Consequently, it can be rendered that every community has someone to discriminate against; Bulgarians against Turks; Turks against Alevis, Roma, and sometimes Pomaks; Roma against Roma. Although there are inter-ethnic interactions and communications which have been continuing for decades, differentiation of identity

among Turks is part of the identity negotiation that they rebuild by excluding who are not defined as Turks. Discrimination is considered as a rightful way for the identity negotiation, because Turks constitute the major minority community in Bulgaria, who also had a historical legitimacy in those lands. Turks also have a nation-state over there, which is called as ‘motherland’, whereas other minority groups, Pomaks, Roma and Alevi do not have a corresponding nation-state. It makes them more vulnerable in the eyes of Turks, and minorities are confined to the exclusion and discrimination by the other minority group. As if performing Turkishness is associated to the degree of discrimination against other ethnic and minority groups among the Turks of Bulgaria, which is observed in Turkey as well.

5.4. Political Violence as a Means of Memory

People call the “re-naming period” of 1984-1985 as *adcılık* (naming) in order to explain a period of time. Memories consist of many violent attacks towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. In childhood memories of Turhan (M, 1970, Karlıca) who is a neighborhood representative of a big village in Karlıca, violence was released clearly; “we were beaten up by the police because of watching videos of Turkish singers on the road to a school trip, as a result of somebody among us snatched out”. Another local authority from a village expressed how her grandfather was humiliated by the police because of speaking Turkish in the center of the town. She also remembers how police officers stood for long hours in front of a funeral of a Turkish child in order not to allow him to bury without a casket, which is not a Muslim tradition. Another interviewee Şevket (M, 1956, Karlıca) expressed that “in 1989 a police officer hit my stomach saying ‘here is not Istanbul, you cannot speak Turkish here’, then I decided to leave because I thought ‘here is *haram*²⁹ to us’”. My interviewee, Lale (F, 1964, Karlıca) expressed by getting emotional “there was a man who raids into the house to change our names, he was *çolak* (one-handed), he is still alive walking in the town. I feel very strange when I see him. He reminded me

²⁹ Forbidden by religion/ wrong.

of bad things that happened at that time”. Zehra (F, 1976, Karlıca) mentioned about the same man too: “The man who beat Turks at that time has lost his family, his son died, he had a traffic accident and he lost his hand and leg. Justice has come sooner or later”.

Military service memories also indicate the severity of trauma. One of the migrant interviewees in Izmir, İsmet (M, 1965, İzmir) dramatically recapitulated his situation about forceful name changes: “We have acquired a new identity in Turkey because we did not have any identity or self-respect in Bulgaria. My name is İsmet I used to be İsmet, and one day I became Ivan during my military service. People were yelling me “Ivan” but I was not responding. I still have this in my dreams as a nightmare. They gave us a ‘chance’ to choose a Bulgarian name, I chose ‘İsa’, but they told me that it reminds an Islamic name, so they named me Ivan”. The principal of the elementary school Oktay (M, 1980, Karlıca) also contended that he was humiliated during military service because the commanders were calling out him as *Turçin* in front of everyone, with negative connotations. Zehra (F, 1976, Karlıca) asserted that “I ran into one of my friends who returned from Turkey after a very long time, she called my ‘oh isn’t she our Zlatka?’ referring to my Bulgarian name. I didn’t get this name voluntarily, I feel so upset to be called with this name”.

The reflections of the assimilation campaign and its consequences are also tackled in the literature, which expresses how vivid the reality of discrimination was. “At that time, I called Bulgaria as my hometown, my country, my nest... I did not have a desire to escape from it... But Bulgaria threw us up as if we were a rotten food” (Şen, 2020)³⁰. “We were a lonely crowd somewhere in the world, mostly left by Turkey” (ibid., p.402)³¹ wrote the writer, implying the importance of Turkey in the lives of Bulgarian-Turks.

³⁰ “O zamanlar Bulgaristan’a ülkem derdim. Memleketim, vatanım, yuvam... Oradan kaçmak, gitmek, başka bir yer edinmek gibi arzularım yoktu. Yalandan değil, hakikaten severdim Bulgaristan’ı. O da beni, bizi sevsin isterdim. Ama bir şeyler yolunda gitmedi. Bulgaristan, senelerce nefretle beslenmiş gibi, bozuk bir yemek yemiş gibi bizi içinden kusarak çıkardı.”

³¹ “Biz dünyanın bir yerinde, bütün milletlerce, en çok da Türkiyece terk edilmiş yapayalnız bir kalabalıktık.”

5.4.1. Ongoing Fear of Being Minority

Once I mentioned the apology of the Bulgarian Parliament for the assimilation campaign my respondents stated that it does not mean anything to them, as they still have the fear of being assimilated. An interviewee expressed that it was very hard times and although it passed, they still have the fear that it is not guaranteed as similar things will happen to them again. “We still have the fear inside, especially when we see a police officer. We still feel repressed, no matter the changes in the politics of Bulgaria”, the same interviewee adds. Furthermore, a manager of a bank expresses that it is very difficult to become a manager among Turks. Tuna’s (M, 1980, Karlıca) individual story indicates the severity of discrimination in career ladders. “Normally there is no interview to become a manager, this was told by another manager to me, but I was invited to an interview in Sofia, which was really tough and long because I am Turkish. Mesut (M, 1947, Karlıca) expressed that “my daughter won the medical school exams, she went to *Eski Zara* (Stara Zagora) for the interview but she was not accepted because of her Turkish name. We felt so upset”. Şevket (M, 1956, Karlıca) stated “my children in the kinder garden were asked which language we spoke in the house, they answered as Turkish, even if I cautioned them to say that we spoke Bulgarian. The school summoned me to investigate if we ever spoke Turkish in the household”. Many people also asserted that there are no high-status state officials selected from Turks; concluding that there may rarely be police officers.

One of the most dramatic and compelling issues about the assimilation process in my interviews is the suicides of some people in the following years of the assimilation process of 1984-1985. The effects of these traumatizing suicides have been continuing for their families and acquaintances reminding them what they have been through and facing the truth that they are still living in the same country, which tried to assimilate them. Suicides of these people render that reactions against the forceful name changes were very harsh at that time. People gave up from their lives instead of converting into somebody else. The local authority of a big village told me that a man hangs himself on a tree near the center of the village that everybody saw him

during the year of forceful name changes. Another suicide committed by a young man who was stopped and beaten up because he refused to change his name, one day after this torture. He left a letter expressing that he did not want to change his name and there is no escape from this; the only solution he finds to kill himself. His father Hasan, who is a retired Turkish language teacher, wrote two books after 35 years of his son's death, expressing his thoughts and feelings belonging to the years of assimilation³². In the books, there are biographical stories and poems, which reflect the atmosphere of the years of 1984-1985 where the assimilation campaign initially took place. The writer expresses his feelings about the name changes in Bulgaria as follows; "A human was born once, and have a name once. You can not make a goat out of a sheep or you can not make a donkey out of a horse, so you can not convert a Turk into a Bulgarian" (Varadlı, 2018, p.168). He expressed that he 'sacrificed' his son for fighting for their identity.

³² Hasan Varadlı. "Varoluş Yollarında"; "Rumeli'den Tarihi Anılar ve Öyküler"



Photograph 1: Lost lives of the assimilation times. (Picture taken in Bulgaria, 2019).

Turks were imposed on some sanctions due to showing opposition to the assimilation campaign in Bulgaria. The incentives might make remarks on their identity in terms

of passivity on the political issues, specifically on minority issues. Those who refused to change their names or showed opposition were subjected to persecution, including imprisonment, expulsion, and internment in the -then reactivated- infamous Belene concentration camp. In addition to the 1989 expulsion, some interviewees expressed about the displacement of people who were not favored by the communist regime in the 1950s. In the 1950s many people among Turks were expelled to Northern Bulgaria, along with many Bulgarians who were also displaced in different regions of Bulgaria; “the two neighbors were not sent to same places, they divided neighbors”, an interviewee adds. Some writers argue that it was because of the collectivization of the farms, Turks were forced to migrate to Turkey in 1950-1951, especially those who used to live in Northeastern Bulgaria (Kostanick 1957, Büchsenschütz 2000, Eminov 1997 cited in Elchinova, 2005, p.6). These displaced people were registered as изселен (exile) in the archives. The displacement of Turks, along with other opponents of the government at that time is a controversial issue that some authorities do not accept. However, all of my interviewees mention that there are people who are still being paid by the state due to those exiles. People are afraid of the fact that the similar assimilation processes would happen again in the future. Timur (M, 1955, Karlica) expressed that “They will not want Turks again after forty or fifty years; same things are going to happen. But I don’t want younger generations to leave our lands, because these lands were where our ancestors lived”.

Some of my interviewees expressed that they get along well with Bulgarians because it was the state that imposed the assimilation process on Turks, not the Bulgarian people. Thus, it was expressed that there were some Bulgarians who were against the assimilation of Turks at that time, foretelling their Turkish neighbors about the home invasions of Bulgarian officials in order to change names forcefully. However, there is ongoing fear in the eyes of these people, although the Bulgarian government apologized from the Turkish minority for the assimilation campaign in 1984-1985, and Bulgaria is a current member of the European Union, for which human rights are under protection. Because the Bulgarian government at the time did something that cannot be erased even from the official records let alone from the minds of people.

5.5. The Construction of Community

I try to understand the notion of the community by “seeking to capture members’ experience of it” by asking the question “how does it appear to its members” (Cohen, 2013, p.20), because the main purpose of this research is to reveal the identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria and their ways of constructing a particular identity through political representation, religious affiliations, gender relations and transnational way of lives. DPS as a political party reflects an expression of being a community for the Turks of Bulgaria, which implies one of the features of the construction of a minority community. Therefore, defining what DPS meant for this community could indicate elements of their ways of constructing identity. Also, I make use of narratives about what migrants think about left behind Turks in Bulgaria; how they compare themselves with the local Turks in Turkey; how the Turks who stayed in Bulgaria reflect on changing roles of religion and gender, which were affected by migration. As my aim is to focus on the relationality of the ways of expressing and performing identity between the Turkish migrants and the Turkish minority in two different national settings.

5.5.1. The Political Representation of Turks in Bulgaria

In Bulgarian academic writing, the political conglomeration of representatives of the ethnic groups are called as “Bulgarian ethnic model”, which was coined in 1992 by the advisor of the ethnic issues of the time, Mihail Ivanov; the term meant to imply a “specific Bulgarian way of implementing European standards” (Mitev, 2005, p.77 in Fatkova, 2012, p.316). In accordance with this model, a political party emerged as a representative of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, and it became the third party in the parliament during the 1990s especially in coalitions, whereas there were three main parties in Bulgaria after the fall of the communist regime; the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP – *Българска социалистическа партия*), Union of Democratic Forces (SDS – *Съюз на демократичеките сили*) and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS – *Движение за права и свободи*) (ibid.). However, DPS has lost its

position as the third stabilizing party in the parliament due to the newly emerged populist parties in the 2000s (ibid.).

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms³³ (DPS – Движение за права и свободи), which is supported by the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was created in 1990 as a political organization in order to protect the rights and interests of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin. The initial intends and the principle of the party were to protect the rights and interests of only the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, however, the Bulgarian constitution does not permit the creation and operation of political parties based on race, religion, or ethnic origin (Ishiyama & Breuning, 1998, p.4), so the party broadened its goals and principles to protect the rights of all Bulgarian citizens. DPS adopted centrism and liberalism adhering to “the mission to defend the rights of all Bulgarians against any manifestation of national chauvinism, revenge, Islamic fundamentalism, and religious fanaticism”³⁴. The DPS put an emphasis on cultural demands rather than formulating a precise economic program, hence there have been some alliances with other political parties no matter what their ideological orientation is (Roger, 2002, p.21). The DPS wins the greatest electoral success in two regions where the Turkish minority predominantly live; Razgrad-Shumen in the Dobrudja plain, and Kardzhali in the Rhodope Mountains (ibid., p.22). The vice-chairman of the DPS declared that the party aspires to “safeguarding national identity and culture versus groups and values furthering national nihilism” (ibid., p.23) providing the example that the conditions in 1989 in Bulgaria were very similar to what has happened in Bosnia and Kosovo but the party worked hard to ease the conflict and restore peace in “a civilized way” for the Turkish minority (Holley, 2001 cited in Roger, 2002).

During my time in the town Karlica, EU parliamentary elections were on the agenda. Hence, I had a chance to witness a campaign meeting of the DPS in May 2019, as the

³³ Mostly known as “Turkish party”, although the members of the party come from different ethnic groups among Muslims in Bulgaria.

³⁴ www.dps.bg

party has the municipality and local authorities in the region. In the propaganda meeting the leader addressed the people in Bulgarian, spreading only a few Turkish words to provide enthusiasm because speaking in another language in political meetings is illegal in Bulgaria. During the interviews with the people in town, I asked whether the Turkish minority is represented in Bulgarian politics. Interviewees generally tended to mention the DPS as a political party established for the rights of Turks. Although the DPS has power in the region, I could not say that there is sole support for the party. Nearly, half of the people I interviewed are criticizing the party for initializing individuals' interests. Interviewees who criticized the party also added that DPS is very far from its establishment promises.

My interviewee Melik (M, 1950, Karlıca) expressed "When you were not from the communist party, you could not get anything in the past. Now if you do not support DPS, you cannot be a *muhtar* (neighborhood representative), so whether DPS represents the Turks here in Bulgaria is a controversial issue". An interviewee who is a party delegate also expressed "the founder of the party was an Alevi, the current leader is Pomak, probably the next one will be *Çingene* (Roma)". Hence, it is an implication of what is Turkish identity and what is not, which indicates that the party leader should be a "true Turk". On the other hand, those who support the party claimed that there would be a war as in former Yugoslavia, between different ethnic groups if DPS would not have been established. Ersin (M, 1983, Karlıca) stated that "DPS prevented Bulgaria to turn into Kosovo. Even if DPS would have been established by the Bulgarian intelligence service, it was necessary". It is the most famous rumor that the DPS was established by the Bulgarian state itself, to have control over the Turkish minority. Similarly, some interviewees mentioned that if DPS would not be doing active politics, the Bulgarian state would attempt to forbid speaking the Turkish language again.



Photograph 2: Billboards full of DPS campaign pictures during the EU parliamentary election times in May 2019.

Participation to the rituals has social and psychological effects, which raise consciousness, social identity and people's sense of social location (Cohen, 2013, p.50). Thus, participating events of a political party that supposedly support the rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria create a sense of belonging in terms of ethnic identity. Nonetheless, DPS is lobbying for the interest of the party in Turkey as well. Lütfiye (F, 1975, Karlıca) expressed that while she was living in Turkey as *kaçak* (without residence permit), Balkan migrant associations offer people to go to Bulgaria to participate in the elections and vote for DPS, in return these people would be guaranteed residence permits in Turkey. Balkan migrant associations provided ten buses only from Gebze to Bulgaria in the 2001 elections. Those who live in Turkey and could not go to Bulgaria due to economic reasons, sometimes consider these free trips not only for participating in political

elections but also to visit and see their families and relatives back in Bulgaria. The political party represents a feature of transnationality in terms of gathering people to cross the border for different reasons and maintain cross-border relations. Parla (2019, p.62) similarly elucidates that the timing of the amnesties granted by the Turkish government coincided with the political elections in Bulgaria; in 2001, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 amnesties were granted through circulars, which is announced on the Turkish Foreigners' Department³⁵ website. Nonetheless, the Turkish government “instrumentalized migrants’ illegal status for the benefit of the transnational political interests of the state” (ibid., p.63).



Photograph 3: DPS meeting in the town during the EU parliamentary elections in May 2019.

³⁵ A branch of the Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management in Turkey.



Photograph 4: People gathered to vote for the Bulgarian Parliamentary elections in April 2021 in Izmir, Turkey³⁶³⁷.

³⁶ The total number of the ballot boxes established for the Bulgarian citizens in Turkey was 35. Ballot boxes established in Ankara, Bursa, Edirne, Eskişehir, İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Manisa, Tekirdağ and Yalova. Due to the pandemic, the participation was expected to be low. The picture above shows the only one ballot box established in Bornova District of Izmir, where the migrant population are relatively high. Some voters argued that the number of the ballot boxes were limited this year due to the Bulgarian electoral code, which allows maximum 35 polling stations for the countries outside of the EU. See also: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/elections/bulgarian-citizens-in-turkey-will-vote-at-35-stations-for-elections>

³⁷ DPS received 87% of the votes in Turkey. There were allegations of violation of the election and machination. <https://www.bgonair.bg/a/208-izbori-2021/223079-frapantni-narusheniya-na-vota-v-turtsiya-nablyudateli-razkazvat-za-mashinatsii>

DPS represents a bond between the Turkish community in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian state; a bond, which has also mutual relations with Turkey. Perhaps, Turks feel under the wing of Turkish identity, provided both by the Turkish state and DPS. Nonetheless, DPS helps remembering Turkish existence in Bulgaria, regardless of the allegations of corruption. Even those who criticize the party are content with the existence of the party, which essentially supports minority communities.

On the other hand, the communist regime has still impacted on lives of the Turkish minority. The interviewees mostly mention the good sides of the communist regime. They stated that the health and education systems were very successful and there was no unemployment and no socio-economic gap between people. Some people mention that there was a threshold for Turkish students in universities and for the Turkish officers in the politburo. My interviewee, Latif (M, 1936, Karlıca) stated that there were factories in all prisons and a job was provided for the people who get out of the prison. He also mentioned that 8-year-education was obligatory for all people including the Turks, which provided an opportunity especially for the girls in Muslim communities. Hence, the communist system that they had experienced, has truly influenced the way of perceiving themselves as a minority both in positive and negative ways. The communist system is one of the reasons for what kind of people they have become now.

The other important issue raised by my interviewees is the economic conditions in Bulgaria. Negative economic conditions in Bulgaria sometimes prioritize ethnic identity concerns not only among the Turks but also among the other ethnic groups who suffer from unemployment and low standards of living. Şevket (M, 1956, Karlıca) explained that “between 1984-1989 a series of unfortunate events happened, we were concerned about our mother-tongue and *shalvars* (authentic baggy trousers) at that time, but in 2007 when Bulgaria entered the EU, we have seen how wealthy Europe is. And the Turkish people in Bulgaria forget about claiming mother-tongue and *shalvars* but demanded that richness too, blaming DPS for the economy”. It seems to me that the people are concerned about their futures because many young

people are going to Western Europe to work and live. For instance, Tunca (M, 1973, Karlıca) stated that “if a youngster is run away from a country, we should care about it” implying young people who go to Europe to work and settle. The priorities seem to have been changing among the younger generations in Karlıca. During my field research in the town, I have not seen many young people, when I asked the reason for this, people told me they all have gone to Europe. I have learned that there are only two initiatives in the town; an international gold mining operation company and a car tire company founded by a Turkish businessman. However, they are far from providing enough employment for the local people as most of the interviewees mentioned. People are criticizing the international gold mining company as responsible for an expected disaster in the future such as *Chernobyl* because it would necessarily cause negative effects for human health and the environment.

5.5.2. The Religious Affiliations of Turks of Bulgaria

The differentiation of the religious affiliations between the minority Turks and migrants Turks indicate how migration affected the ways people perceive religion and how people differentiate their identity by criticizing their fellowmen’s ongoing traditions and culture, which was shaped in the region they have been living. The perception of the migrants about the Turks who never migrate to Turkey may render the level of differentiation due to not sharing the same cultural environment anymore. For instance, one of the interviewees, Eren (M, 1974, İzmir) stated that “happiness is not related to money anymore for them, people become happy if they earn money enough for a bottle of beer. The perception of honor has even changed for them”. Eren also puts “Turkishness and Islam were inseparable whole in Bulgaria for us, but when we came to Turkey we became like an atheist” implying the difference in practicing Islam in Turkey. Practicing religion is a part of Turkish identity in Bulgaria among the Turkish minority, thus, migrants perceive practicing Islam as a more fundamental way when they observe it in Turkey, which makes difference in understanding of religion.

Encounter with other cultures determines a person's position about her/his own culture, as Cohen (2013, p.70) argues people become more fragile about their own culture, at the times of encounter with others, because "every culture inclines toward what it is not, toward an implicit negativity" (Boon, 1982, p.232). "Where you are excluded, your Muslim identity appears" says my interviewee Ibrahim (M, 1978, İzmir), emphasizing that they identify themselves with Islam in a more cultural way in Bulgaria. He also stated that Islam was not oppressive in Bulgaria but in Turkey, he felt the oppressive nature of practicing religion. "People used to drink alcohol in Bulgaria but in Turkey religion prohibits it" he included. Islam was one component that brings people together because rituals strengthen social identity and raise consciousness about the community (Cohen, 2013, p.50). Fuat (M, 1954, İzmir) expressed that "we were discriminated in Bulgaria because we were Muslim yes but, we are firstly Turkish and then Muslim". There is an implication of ethnic identity coming in the first place, before the religious affiliations.

Due to the prohibition of religious practice by the communist regime in Bulgaria, members of any religion could not perform religious rituals. However, the prohibition of Islamic rituals seemed to be restricted more as it contains Turkish features; what was seen as Muslim was most probably Turkish. One of my interviewees expressed that especially younger Turks were not allowed to enter into the mosques, and religious information they had was very limited in Bulgaria, however, she stated that she has become more religious when migrated to Turkey. She emphasizes that it was the communist regime, which prevented people to practice religion. Obtaining upward social mobility through participating in ethnic churches and congregation like other transnational migrants have done, is not the case for the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants because religion is not a constructive tool for an "assertive and positive group identity" for them, thus, they search for other options for upward social mobility such as having good economic status, having a car or a house (Warner & Wittner, 1998 cited in Elchinova, 2008, p.9).

Cultural differences entail some negative comments on the local Turkish society. For instance, one of my interviewee, Berrin (F, 1959, Sofia) stated: "we were very eager

to come to Turkey, but when we saw murders, naked women, violence against women and children in the newspaper, we were disappointed. What kind of a Muslim country is that?”. Moreover, she expressed that kin-marriage and cross-cousin marriage is very common in Turkey, which does not happen in Bulgaria, “we do not marry even our neighbors, it is a very strict rule”. Most of the migrants especially condemn these issues, stating that those cannot be related to religion.

Islam is more like cultural identity, rather than a religious affiliation for the Turks of Bulgaria. It seems to be another requirement for “Turkishness”. That is the reason why other sects are perceived as “other”. All Turks define themselves as Muslim here, but they do not practice the requirements of the religion. Consuming alcohol and pork meat is common, as people do not associate consuming them with religion but as habits. Latif (M, 1936, Karlıca) who has been a local authority in a village for long years mentioned that alcohol habit was something Turks have learned from Bulgarians in the times of the communist period where workers used to go for a beer or *rakia*³⁸ after work. Similarly, Hasan (M, 1940, Karlıca) expressed that “as a result of the shared life habits, Turks have learned consuming alcohol and pork from the Bulgarians”. Hence, consuming alcohol is not seen as forbidden for the Turks of Bulgaria, although it is forbidden in the practice of Islam. In addition to that, May was the Ramadan month here, but as far as I witnessed, very few people feast. I attended feast meetings in the evenings several times. Dinner was served only for males, most of the time for the elderly, in the central mosque. It remains a cultural tradition, which people make efforts not to make forgotten. However, some interviewees raised the issue of being identified as “Muslims in Bulgaria” as an attempt to erase Turkish identity.

³⁸ A type of fruit brandy popular in the Balkans.

5.5.3. Local Community as an Identifier

To what extent a group of people becomes a community is an important investigation. For instance, in the fieldwork study of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey, Elchinova (2012) explains why she uses some specific terms in order to provide a better understanding of the experiences of this specific community. The author uses the term “community” in a loose way; avoiding possible meanings of the term as a stable and given entity, rather she tries to elaborate on a group of people who share a particular experience. Nevertheless, the resemblance between different groups in a country may influence how we differentiate a community from others. Community boundaries might blur because of sharing similar culture, structures, political and educational institutions in a country. Hence, different communities may resemble each other more than they do the same communities in other countries (Cohen, 2013, p.44). Perhaps, the Bulgarians who share the same environment with the Turks in Bulgaria are likely to resemble them, compared to the Turks of Turkey. Because they have been sharing the same neighborhood, workplaces, and social spaces, which they gather frequently. As a result of the years of interaction, I witnessed Bulgarians speaking the Turkish language, in some of the cities in Bulgaria, where the Turks do not necessarily comprise the majority. The cases could be exemptions but it was very unfamiliar to me, as we do not expect the national majority to be able to speak the language of minorities. Although language, religion and ethnicity are the same, Bulgarian-Turkish migrants are perceived as a culturally different group by the local Turks in Turkey –perhaps as a minority like in Bulgaria- because of the certain lifestyle that migrants have, which is ‘better’, more ‘European’ –consumption of alcohol and certain food- and more civilized (Elchinova, 2008, p.21). Consequently, the degree of the otherness of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants is changing; Turkish migrants are perceived as more alien to the Turks of Turkey compared to their position in the eyes of the Bulgarian neighbors at the home country (ibid.).

The culture shock that Bulgarian-Turkish migrants encountered in Turkey was due to lacking the shared knowledge, which people learn and internalized at schools and

with the common living (ibid., p.7). Thus, migrants who did not have higher education and qualification experienced downward social mobility because of lacking necessary cultural tools of the majority in Turkey (ibid.). Those who could not deal with the social isolation, especially elderly migrants, returned back to Bulgaria, however, those who remained and established a new life in Turkey have developed a strategy, which is creating a local community in the same neighborhood as the migrants who migrated from the same villages or towns in Bulgaria (ibid., p.8). For instance, there are specific neighborhoods in Izmir, in which migrants are conglomerated. Further, there are specific neighborhoods, which took their names from the migrants' villages or towns back in Bulgaria. In the social network within the reproduced local community, migrants help each other to find employments, necessary equipment to build houses, and provide information from Bulgaria, which are necessary surviving tools and the surviving strategies especially for the first generation of migrants (ibid.). Apart from helping and benefiting from each other, migrants know that they are accepted in these local communities; however, they have experienced exclusion from the local Turks (ibid.). Elchinova argues that living in the local community has affected Bulgarian-Turkish migrants and also their families remained in Bulgaria, in terms of identity transformation, which further leads to the cultural transformation of an entire ethnic group, however, it would not offer much to the younger generations. Apart from constructing local communities and survive within them, encounters with the local Turks and differentiating from them by having upward social mobility, which inherited from being 'European' and being more prone to the West, demarcate their ethnic identity, entailing a reconstructed cultural identity for the Turks of Bulgaria.

5.5.4. Implications on Gender

The migration of 1989 from Bulgaria to Turkey has changed many patterns along with the gender roles of migrants. Women have lost relative autonomy after migrating to Turkey due to the patriarchal social structure in Turkey. The communist political history in Bulgaria provided better positions for women in Bulgaria, thus, its

effects are continuing in a sense. Turkish women are more visible in public space in Bulgaria, although belonging to an Islamic community may have restrictions on women. Despite the fact that the communist regime prescribed more equal gender roles, Turkish women have limited freedom compared to Bulgarian women due to the Islamic traditions in which the Turkish community lives.

The social services provided both by the communist regime and the current one are important for women. Especially child-care facilities are mentioned by most of the women because the state continuously provides child-care for all regardless of ethnicity. There are kindergartens and payments for all children in Bulgaria, thus, it enhanced public visibility of women. Women are not entitled to private space for childcare, as it is seen in Turkey. The labor participation of women in Bulgaria is not necessarily entitled to the gendered division of labor, however, after migration to Turkey their labor participation are mostly based on gender roles such as children and elderly care, domestic work, the nursery that reproduce gender norms in Turkey (Kaytan, 2014, p.82).

“Turks of Turkey are not educated and their perception of women are very different from us, so they cannot be considered as European” told Asiye (F, 1950, Karlıca), when she was mentioning the differences between Turks of Turkey and Turks of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, despite the fact that two groups of people sharing the same language, religion, and similar cultural traits, the perception of gender diverse due to the society in which they live in. Living in a European country, despite as a Muslim minority, perhaps seems to affect and shape how they perceive the place of women in society.

Bulgarian-Turkish migrant women who suffered from assimilation campaigns and ethnically discriminatory policies in Bulgaria, also have unforgettable memories about the difficulties of the migration process, which became more difficult with children, thus, the process eventually resulted in psychological damages for many of them. Narratives of migrant women render that they suffered poverty and were exposed to discrimination in Turkey. They encountered many problems in Turkey

along with childcare, elderly care, and difficult working conditions. Some women had to work as sex workers in Turkey, especially those who migrated in the 1990s as labor migrants due to the difficult economic conditions in Bulgaria. In addition to that, some migrant women who had professions in Bulgaria had to work in many different sectors and in two jobs at the same time in Turkey. Some women eventually quit their jobs to look after their children, while some of them sent their children to Bulgaria in order for their relatives to look after them, consequently experiencing the difficult process of transnational motherhood. Having worked in several jobs in Turkey, mostly without social insurance and without citizenship, lack of social services, especially childcare, forced migrant women at the risk of leaving their children or sending them away to Bulgaria.

Transnationalism has also implications on every day lives of migrants, especially of families. Vertovec (2009, p.61) highlights that families reflect the origins of everyday migrant transnationalism, as transnational families are both vehicles and agents of material exchanges, and they are responsible for the creation, recreation and transformation of cultures. Nonetheless, living a transnational life is a distinct kind of culture for migrant families (ibid.). Transnationalism precisely influences the lives of migrant women and children. The concepts of “transnational motherhood” or “overseas mothers” render practicing motherhood from a distance, and reflect women who have the position of the primary breadwinner for the children at home (Raijman et al., 2003, p.731). Many women coming from the former communist countries work as domestic workers in Turkey while experiencing transnational motherhood. Thus, kinship has a critical importance for migrant women practicing transnational childcare as migrant women trust other women -mostly mothers, or elderly relatives- with taking care of their own children in their home country. In some cases women and men live separately in different countries- one in Turkey, the other one in Western Europe- while their child is in the home country-Bulgaria-taken care of by an elderly relative and they maintain their lives through remittances sent by parents. Narratives of the migrants render that they also experienced separations from their families and relatives. Some of the families were broken because some members of a family could not get a visa to migrate to Turkey. Some

of them simply could not get a passport.

Some women work as transnational caregivers. For instance, Berrin (F, 1959, Sofia) is a retired government official from Turkey. She migrated back to Bulgaria in 2007 as her children were studying at the university in the capital city, Sofia. She was working as a caregiver to the children of the upper-class Turkish expats in Sofia. She could speak Bulgarian and French fluently. After having heard of the news from her sister going to work in the UK as a caregiver, she began learning English in Bulgaria, in order to go with her. After a couple of online interviews, she got acceptance as a caregiver for the elderly in Hampshire. As the company only accepts applications from those who have EU passports. Hence, Turks of Bulgaria can find employment in Western Europe with the help of Bulgarian passports, along with establishing Turkish migratory networks.

Migrant women's first impressions about Turkey on gender roles were negative because of the conservative norms and practices imposed on women. For instance, Aliye (F, 1967, İzmir) expressed that in the first year of migration people were coming to arrange marriage for her: "as if it was the only wish I have" she concluded, emphasizing how marriage is initially associated with women in Turkey. Moreover, migrant women are severely criticizing violence against women and honor killings in Turkey. Migrant women expressed that they encountered prejudices especially about their sexuality; they stated that "men assume that women from the communist system are available to immoral things" (Kaytan, 2014, p.105). One of my interviewees, Asiye (F, 1988, Sofia)³⁹ expressed that in Turkey she was exposed to prejudices "some people told me 'you were raised in Bulgaria, so you are probably more independent'", which means she would be freer to do everything.

Gendered division of labor has become more visible in the case of migration, because while men are engaging with public sphere tasks, migrant women are engaging with the private sphere responsibilities, such as child-care, elderly-care,

³⁹ Asiye came to Turkey to study university, after working for two years she returned back to Bulgaria.

and domestic chores, thus migrant men adopt hegemonic masculine identity both in the public and private spheres. Nevertheless, Bulgarian-Turkish migrant women have lost relative autonomy by confining to the private sphere largely, while they had relative freedom in Bulgaria (ibid., p.101). Thus, migrant women have been experiencing inequalities, which stem from migrating to a highly patriarchal society.

5.5.5. Transnational Migration Patterns

Transnational communities have multiple attachments to more than one space, which may indicate an interplay between ethnicity and nationality. Nation-state borders may only indicate political confinements. However, for Bulgarian-Turks, the border between Turkey and Bulgaria refers only to a geographical limitation; it does not confine the perception of belonging. Hence, a visible interplay between ethnic identity and national identity among the Bulgarian-Turks can be an important element for their transnational way of life. Migrants tend to equalize ethnicity and nationality in Turkey, as they acquired a majority status in Turkey. However, it is complicated when it comes to defining where the hometown is for these migrants. Although Bulgaria is a geographical homeland where they gained their citizenship for the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants, Turkey is the motherland where they could take refuge as the government in their homeland became hostile to their identity. Analyzing the transnationality of the Bulgarian-Turks –both the minority group and migrants- is possible by emphasizing their dual-citizenship statuses, political, social and cultural engagements with both Bulgaria and Turkey, experiences and collective memories about the migration process. I would like to explore to what extent the transnational perspective is embedded in migrants' identities, and in what ways these people construct a transnational identity thus, I try to elaborate on transnational practices and experiences of a group of Bulgarian-Turks and their appropriated identity construction.

One of the important elements of transnational communities is the variety of networks, which constituted by migrants through which they could gain social

recognition and economic advancement across borders (Portes, 1997, p.812). Some defining features of transnational communities include having dual lives, bilingualism, moving easily between cultures, and maintaining homes in both countries in order to preserve their economic, political, and cultural interests (ibid.). Portes also mentions some of the new characteristics of transnational communities including changes in the number of people involved, and their rapid communications across spaces, and the process itself becoming normative with some migrant groups (ibid., p.813). Nevertheless, Basch et. al (2005, p.8) clearly defines how transnationalism reflects multiple attachments of migrants: “We define “transnationalism” as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. An essential element is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies. We are still groping for a language to describe these social locations”.

Migrants who have transnational networks and lifestyles perceive the country of origin as a source of identity, yet the country of residence as a source of right; hence this results in complicated perceptions of identity, culture, rights, politics, states, and nations (Kastoryano, 2002, p.160). Bulgarian-Turkish migrants perceive their country of origin as *memleket* (homeland)-where they were born and raised-, however, they perceive Turkey as *anavatan* (motherland)- where they ethnically belong and have certain rights. For Bulgarian-Turkish migrants having Bulgarian citizenship along with Turkish citizenship mostly refer to their right to possess it since they were born and grew up in Bulgaria. For instance, Murat (M, 1954, İzmir) expresses: “I still have relatives, houses, and house deeds back there in Bulgaria. I am frequently going to Bulgaria with my old mother, we stay there for several months in summer. I have rights in Bulgaria; I lived there for 35 years. I gave my labor to the Bulgarian state for years”. On the other hand, Fuat (M, 1954, İzmir) explains: “I do not have dual-citizenship. Why would I hold it? I have bad memories about Bulgaria, which I do not want to remember”. However, holding dual-

citizenship is very common among migrants in order to take advantage of Bulgarian's EU membership, which provides freedom of movement in Europe. Migrants also suggest that dual citizenship is useful especially for their children to enter Europe without a visa. To some extent, migrants feel that they belong to both countries; hence it can be convenient to hold dual citizenship. Although the feeling of belonging to both countries may at the same time cause the feeling of belonging nowhere, migrants have substantial benefits by holding dual citizenship as well.

Turks who migrated to Turkey in 1989, did not lose their Bulgarian citizenship. Thus, when they first visited Bulgaria, they could get their Bulgarian passports immediately. As they still have families and relatives, most of them went back to Bulgaria throughout the 1990s; way before Bulgaria participated in the European Union in 2007. Having dual citizenship brings along some identity constructions, which might be contradicting with definitions of citizenship, membership and nationality. The dual citizenship of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants has flexible and postnational characteristics. Their boundaries of belonging to somewhere seem to be blurred, which reflects its postnational character, as they hold Bulgarian citizenship in order to make use of its rights and privileges, but they live in another state, thus, migrants "violate the presumed congruence between membership and territory", which "formalizes the fluidity of membership" (Soysal, 1994, p.141).

Bulgarian-Turkish migrants have been still visiting Bulgaria for the purposes of vacation and visiting relatives and in order to make their children see their homeland where they were born and where they spent their childhood since transnationalism has changed people's perception of space and territoriality, producing transnational "social fields" or "social spaces" which bridges people to more than one single territory (Vertovec 2009, p.12). Eren (M, 1974, İzmir) states that while he was a student at a university in Turkey, he was bringing goods from Bulgaria to sell them in bazaars in Turkey. He told that it continued for many years, in order to earn money for his studies. Still, many migrants are selling Bulgarian goods – chocolates, candies, tomato pastes- yet consuming these goods reflects nostalgia for migrants in Turkey. Currently, some Bulgarian-goods (chocolate, pastry, tomato pastes) are sold

and Bulgarian traditions (*marteniçka*) that brought along by the migrants are promoted popularly in Turkey through the social media profiles, in order to revive the nostalgia among the migrants in Turkey and to bring the ‘taste’ back, which they used to have in Bulgaria. Some Bulgarian products (the Balkan sauce: *lutenitsa*) are even produced in Turkey, to address the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants as well.

Transnational lives bring along different political strategies, which turn out to be determinants of reconstruction of identity and of cultural attitude. Political loyalty is one of the components, which was also affected by migration, along with the changes in identity, culture, local affiliations, religion, and understanding of family (Elchinova, 2008, p.5). Some migrants keep pursuing their political interests in their homelands by lobbying and funding (Morawska 1999; Glick-Schiller 1999; Foner 2000 cited in Vertovec 2009). In the case of Fuat⁴⁰, he mentioned that he is still going to Bulgaria for political mobilization during the election campaign of a Turkish political party, although he does not hold a dual-citizenship -which constitutes a very unusual situation among migrants of 1989. Elchinova (2008, p.11-12) explains participating in political elections is a cultural activity, which is celebrated for several days for the Bulgarian Turkish migrants, because the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) is sponsoring their trips from Turkey, which provide families and relatives reunite and Similarly, migrants who participate Bulgarian elections in Turkey can come together with their country fellows, discussing their migrant problems. Political behaviors such as voting for DPS is a “community ascription” and “meaningful tool for expressing their specific group identity and consolidating their community” (ibid.). Through participating in political activities, they are able to synchronize time-space between home and host countries, and they “feel part of a higher collective” (Hurd et al., 2017, p.15).

Migrants can gain emotional competence in managing multiple identities, or they might acquire an intercultural or transnational empathy towards people. (Koehn and Rosenau, 2002, p.114). However, Bulgarian Turkish migrants, have reflected new

⁴⁰ Fuat migrated to Turkey in May 1989, as a result of political exile.

kinds of negative attitudes towards the minorities in Turkey. Although migrants claimed that they did not hold exclusionary attitudes towards people in Bulgaria, when it came to marriage, they were against mixed marriages between the Turks and other ethnic or religious groups. All of the migrants I interviewed stated that Turks married only Turks in Bulgaria, and marriages with Bulgarians, Pomaks, Alevi or Roma were very rarely seen and met with disapproval within the Turkish community. In Turkey, migrants prefer for their children to marry other second-generation immigrants, especially those coming from Bulgaria or former Yugoslavia, as the belief in fitting in traditions and cultural habits in an easier way is common. Hence, patterns of endogamy⁴¹ are frequently seen in Bulgarian Turkish migrant families, because they prefer their children to marry children of other immigrants (Zhelyazkova, 1998, p.11). Nevertheless, desiring to have the feeling to be part of the majority -or at least not to be a part of a minority- in a specific society was sometimes comes along with exclusionary and discriminatory attitudes towards other groups. As Bulgarian-Turkish migrants consider Turkey as a tolerant country towards ethnic and religious groups as they supposed that they have not been exposed to ethnic or religious discrimination in Turkey. Facing ethnic discrimination in Bulgaria does not help migrants to avoid similar discriminatory attitudes towards different ethnic groups in Turkey. It can be observed widespread discrimination against Kurds, Alevis, and Roma people in Turkey among the migrants especially regarding the issue of marriage. Adapting to the pattern of discriminating against specific ethnic groups in Turkey might be the reason for Bulgarian-Turkish migrants to be accepted by the majority and to prove their integration into Turkish society.

The new patterns of migrant transnationalism indicate that those people who never migrated to any country are strongly influenced by events, values, and practices among their transnational relatives and co-villagers (Morawska 1999; Glick-Schiller 1999; Foner 2000 cited in Vertovec 2009). For instance, in the case of Eren (M, 1974, İzmir) who stated that photos coming from Turkey long before their migration, used to show how beautiful İzmir was –the city that they migrated to-and how they were

⁴¹ Endogamy, in this context, means as marriage within a specific ethnic group.

excited about migrating to Turkey because of these photographs. Nevertheless, Eren expressed that “it was very disappointing to see that Izmir was not the city that we were excited for, we thought everywhere in Izmir would be like *Kordon* –seashore- however, it was not like that”. In addition to that, İsmet’s father Ali Osman Bey, a poet and teacher in Bulgaria, was writing poems for many years, expressing his longing for the Turkish homeland, before the migration occurred.

Another new pattern of migrant transnationalism provides 25 years of identity politics (anti-racism, multiculturalism, indigenous peoples, regional languages) in many western countries, which eases migrants’ lives in displaying their transnational connections (Morawska 1999; Glick-Schiller 1999; Foner 2000 cited in Vertovec 2009). In that manner, the Bulgarian state apologized to the Turks for the assimilation campaign and forceful name changes between 1984-1989: “We firmly condemn the assimilation process against the Muslim minority living in the Republic of Bulgaria, including the so-called Revival Process. We declare that the expulsion of more than 360,000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent was a form of ethnic cleansing conducted by the totalitarian regime.”⁴²

The 1989 migration and post-1990s migrations from Bulgaria are classified as ethnic return migration. Returning to a homeland that was never visited before reflects the very existence of diasporas (Parla, 2006, p.546). Although the post-1990s migrants constitute irregular economic migrants who have difficulties in obtaining Turkish citizenship unlike the 1989 migrants who were granted citizenship immediately, they are considered as ethnic return migration because Turks migrating to Turkey are accepted as the same kin coming to the homeland (Parla, 2007, p.157). Those who have Turkic origin have privilege in terms of being accepted in the eyes of the Turkish society compared to the other migrants (Parla, 2011, p.67). Migrants who resided for two years in Turkey and provided a *soy belgesi* (documentation of ethnic origin) could obtain citizenship until 2009, others needed to reside for five years, but these were abolished, however, the new Settlement Law still continue to classify

⁴² <http://www.eurasiareview.com/18012012-bulgaria-apologizes-to-its-turks-for-revival-process/>

migrants through their Turkic origin (ibid., p.68). Not only Bulgarian-Turks but also those who have Turkic origin including Turks of Iraq, Western Thrace, Eastern Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan have more privileged positions in terms of obtaining work permits (ibid., p.69). On the other hand, the post-1990s migrants from Bulgaria had difficulties including precarious legal status, absence of social security and medical care, dependence on social networks in care and treatment, and even the possibility of being deported again, thus, the Turkish ethnicity they have did not provide taken for granted opportunities for them, because “ethnicity is a double-edged sword” (ibid., p.67-68).

Turks of Bulgaria migrated not only to Turkey but also to Western Europe in order to find better employment conditions, due to the negative economic situation in Bulgaria after the fall of the socialist system. Hence, it can be argued that there are two types of transnational migration among Bulgarian-Turkish migrants; one is migration to Turkey and labor migration to Western Europe (Elchinova, 2008, p.3). While the 1989 migrants acquired Turkish citizenship as legal migrants, migrants who came throughout the 1990s did not acquire legal status, some of them even transpassed the border illegally. The aim of these migrants was to settle down in Turkey, have a house and find employment with acquiring Turkish citizenship, on the one side they continued visitations to Bulgaria for holidays, political elections, and to study at Bulgarian universities, and plenty of these migrants developed transborder businesses, thus it is argued that these migrants have had a “truly transnational mode of life” (Elchinova, 2008, p.3). On the other hand, 1990 migrants were not welcomed by the Turkish government as it was the case with 1989 migrants as *soydaş*, who migrated as a result of political and forced migration, therefore, 1990 migrants had difficulties in finding employment and they were categorized as labor and irregular migrants; this different approach of Turkey affected the integration process of those migrants (Pusch, 2012, p.449).

The second type of transnational migration of Bulgarian-Turks includes migrating to Western Europe because of the economic conditions of Turkey, which is regarded as temporary labor migration (Elchinova, 2008, p.4). Migrant workers usually do not

take their families with them, and they are cyclically returning to their homelands due to visa regimes, bringing the remittances they earn from the West in order to provide a better standard in households (ibid.). It is argued that some of the migrants keep their non-Muslim names, which was given in the 'Revival process' in Bulgaria, in order to gain easier access to Europe and also, the Turkish identity provide employment for those migrants due to the Turkish minority and migrants in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands are mostly hired by the Turkish entrepreneurs in these countries (ibid., p.13). However, using non-Muslim names is something very rare that I encountered during my interviews. Şevket (M, 1956, Karlıca) stated that his daughters did not change their forcefully given Bulgarian names, because these names provide easier access in Europe. Nonetheless, using the Turkish language is common while working in Western Europe. One of my informants Niyazi (M, 1975, Karlıca) is working in Germany for four years at the airport transportation unit after worked for a chicken company in France for two years. He uses his original name and he is living with some fellow villagers, who persuaded him to go and work in Western Europe. After working a couple of years more, he would like to return to Bulgaria because he expressed that standards of minority groups such as Turks and Kurds in Germany are not good enough; "they are not treated as human", implying the social exclusion he has faced. In addition, he intended not to migrate to Turkey due to negative economic conditions and lower life standards.

Some migrants returned back to Bulgaria in order to find employment and enjoy the rights of the European Union. For instance, Aykut (M, 1990, Sofia) migrated in 2000 as an illegal migrant, two years after his family migrated to Turkey. He stated that he is not happy with the situation in Turkey and decided to return back to Bulgaria in 2019. He does not forget speaking the Bulgarian language, as he is visiting Bulgaria in summer. Although he is an engineer, he works as an online support technician in Sofia. He declared that he is more content in Bulgaria as he enjoys social life there; "In Turkey as long as you work there is no social life, no time for nothing. Here in Bulgaria, you have free time after work. I prefer working as a regular worker here, rather than working as an engineer in Turkey, I do not want to live in Turkey

anymore”. Moreover, he stated that it is not that difficult to be a minority in Bulgaria now, compared to back then. However, he remembers how his family suffered from the assimilation process in Bulgaria; his mother was discriminated against in university exams because of being a Turk, thus, she could not study in Bulgaria. He mentions the difficulties that his family has been through in Turkey; when his mother migrated to Turkey, she worked as a domestic worker and cleaning worker and his father worked as a technician in hotels. He declared that his sister has a Ph.D. in Turkey. It can be rendered that his family has upward mobility through their children’s education and career paths, despite the fact that the difficulties they experienced in Turkey.

The most visible specificity that the Turks of Bulgaria have is the reciprocal transition between the two countries, which results in the constant interplay among people. Almost all of the interviewees expressed that they intended to migrate to Turkey in 1989 when the mass exodus happened. However, because of a variety of reasons the Turkish minority could not migrate and had to stay in Bulgaria. All of them have relatives in Turkey and they frequently cross the border to go to Turkey. What Turkey means to the minority group seems complicated as they have emotional attachments with Turkey, although most of them have no official ties with the country.

Turks in Bulgaria are very keen on what is going on in Turkey regarding politics and media. The Turkish minority has been closely following the Turkish TV channels including news, TV shows, and soap operas. Interviewees stated that they rarely watch Bulgarian TV only for weather forecasts and for some news. Surprisingly, I have observed that in public spaces, for example in cafes, the Turkish minority has been discussing the political atmosphere in Turkey, sometimes by criticizing it severely, sometimes with support. I observed while walking in the center of the town, a car with *K. Atatürk* signature on its back, passed by singing a Bulgarian

*chalga*⁴³ song. Further, there are photos of Atatürk on the walls of many houses. These may reflect the transnational mode of living of minority people.



Photograph 5: A translation office in the town, which also arranges papers for Bulgarian citizenship.

⁴³ Pop-folk music in Bulgaria.



Photograph 6: Kapıkule border. Bulgarian citizens of Turkish descent go to Bulgaria in order to renew their passports.

5.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to understand how the Turks of Bulgaria negotiate their Turkishness by exploring distinctions and comparisons between those who emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey and those who remained back in Bulgaria. I also tried to render how different groups distinguish themselves from Turks of Turkey, Turks of Bulgaria, emigrants, and other minority groups in Bulgaria as these discourses of differentiation hide hints of identity negotiation. I tried to understand the elements of community formation in the experiences of my interviewees by asking the question “how does it appear to them” (Cohen, 2013, p.20), thus, I made use of their narratives about what migrants think about Turks in Bulgaria; how they compare and distinguish themselves with the local Turks in Turkey; how the Turks who stayed in Bulgaria and migrants in Turkey reflect on changing roles of religion and gender, which were affected by the 1989 migration.

Further, I tried to give insights from their transnational life patterns, and I aimed to show how transnationality entails different strategies for the Turks of Bulgaria. I also tackled the issue of political representation of Turks in Bulgaria and its implications of their existence as a minority community. In the narratives of my interviewees, I tried to understand how their identity construction was being engendered by the past memories, political violence they were exposed to, ongoing fear of being a minority, and the impressions about Turkey. Consequently, I added my interviewees’ reflections of religion, gender, and local community culture, which are the core elements of their identity construction.

In the following chapter, taking these issues into consideration, I will try to analyze and discuss the ways of identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria by taking theoretical implications of ethnic identity, community, transnationalism and my respondents’ answers and thoughts into consideration. Nevertheless, I will take a deeper look at how political reasons, performing Turkishness, the migration of 1989 and transnational way of life emanated particular ways of identity negotiation for the Turks of Bulgaria, considering the fact that the Turks of Bulgaria historically

constitute an exceptional case.



CHAPTER 6

IDENTITY IN CRISIS: NEGOTIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Migrants who were the bases for the New Turkish Republic were never discussed enough it was rather whitewashed; as Karpas (2003) argues that the *eski toplum* (old society) constitutes the thesis while migrants (newcomers) constitute the antithesis of the newly established society, thus the synthesis of those make the society more dynamic (Bora & Şen, 2009, p.1160). The forced or voluntary integration of migrants into Turkish society needs a detailed explanation to understand the assignment of the national identity of migrants and to follow their experiences; because traces of migrants' experiences about their approval/disapproval and their harmony/clash into the society give important insights into the integration processes, as migrants also have the capacity to change themselves and the society they live in (ibid.). It is also argued that migrants were denied to be explained in detail as if they were naturally integrated into Turkish society. However, confrontation with these experiences of migrants in the literature and in memories could be possible after the 2000s with the explosion of memory studies (Türkeş, 2004 cited in ibid., p.1161). In that sense, I believe that it is valuable to understand the experiences of an ethnic group before their narratives vanish, as the years pass on and memories are reconstructed in a different way.

The narratives of the interviewees in the previous chapter indicate that identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria have been developed through experiencing different processes both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. In the previous chapter, based on my interviews with the Turks of Bulgaria, I tried to elucidate how and why Turks of Bulgaria put a strong emphasis on the identity of pure Turkishness. Nonetheless, there is an assumption that the better they perform Turkishness, the more they would be accepted into the Turkish society in Turkey and the more they would be defended as a Turkish minority community in Bulgaria by Turkey. As Bulgarian-Turkish

migrants they also emphasize that they set an example for the Turkish society because of their work of culture and the culture of the West that they brought from Europe. In order to justify their competency the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants criticize the Syrian migrants in Turkey who were defined as unprogressive, who represent the Orient. The Bulgarian-Turkish migrants want to be accepted as more conceivable migrants, comparing to the other migrants in Turkey, due to their Turkish origin and their culture. During the field research in Bulgaria, I also tried to observe in what ways Turks of Bulgaria negotiate their identity through interacting with different ethnic groups in Bulgaria. Turks of Bulgaria differentiate themselves from Pomak, Roma and Alevi, creating a minority within minority discourse in Bulgaria. The base for the differentiation is largely because of religious competency over Islam. There is another claim among the Turks that the other minority groups cannot be representatives of real Islam, as they are considered as converts who did not originally belong to Islam.

Nevertheless, as I understood from my interviewees' responses and narratives, Turks of Bulgaria did not forget the difficulties that the migration of 1989 brought. Most of the migrants especially suffered from poverty, unemployment, psychological problems, educational difficulties such as diploma equivalency, language problems, problems of integration due to different religious practices and gender roles, problems of adaptation into industrial big cities in Turkey and problems of intra-group diversity with those who remained in Bulgaria. The latter difficulties also indicate the existence of transnational social fields in which Turks of Bulgaria perform and negotiate on their identity. Condemning other migrants in Turkey such as Syrians and making differentiations with those who stayed back in Bulgaria is a strategy of identity negotiation for being accepted into a new society, which is considered as the perpetual motherland. Nonetheless, the claim of 'we own this country more than anyone' is another strategy of the identity negotiation that the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants adopted in order to clarify their ethnic origin and belonging to Turkey. Moreover, the effects of the assimilation campaign, which was held by the Bulgarian state in between 1984-1985 have been still continuing for the Turks in Bulgaria. People especially suffered from the forceful name changes, which

directly targeted their identity. Further, those who were opposed to the assimilation were subjected to persecution, imprisonment, expulsion, internment and displacement. Among the Turks of Bulgaria, there is an ongoing fear of being minority community and being assimilated again in the future. Hence, in order to overcome the fear of being minority to some extent, they have constructed organizations and developed transnational ways of living across borders, which strengthen community ascription and group identity.

In this chapter, I try to find answers to my research question posed in the beginning: Why do Turks of Bulgaria negotiate on their identity and what are the ways of the identity negotiation? I try to analyze and discuss how explaining, expressing, and performing identity becomes a negotiation for the Turks of Bulgaria. Nonetheless, the ways of negotiation in between homeland and motherland generated through the feelings of in-betweenness, through “memories of a shared historical past” (Schermerhorn, 1978, p.12), and through reconstructed narratives of migrants who experienced a forced migration and adaptation process to a new society, which were indicated in the previous chapter based on the narratives of my respondents. Therefore, in this chapter in order to clarify and discuss the reasons and ways of the identity negotiation of the Turks of Bulgaria, I group the reasons under four subtitles: the changing perception of community and the emphasis on Turkish identity; the political reasons; the consequences of the migration of 1989; and the effects of transnationality.

6.1. The Changing Perception of Community and the Emphasis on Turkish Identity

I tried to understand the notion of the community by “seeking to capture members’ experience of it” by asking the question “how does it appear to its members” (Cohen, 2013, p.20). In order to do this, I tried to analyze narratives of the Turks of Bulgaria both in Turkey and in Bulgaria. I aimed to see what they think of each other and of other communities they live together, in between the two sides of the border, which

they frequently transit. Explaining community by taking account of members' experiences and perceptions is rather preferred instead of approaching it as morphology or as the structure of institutions (ibid.). Nonetheless, the identity of a community is targeted by an intrusion to its boundaries by others, who are not from the community. Feelings of fear, defense mechanisms, the anxiety of losing identity, and the constant feeling of being under threat can be observed in the narratives of the Turks of Bulgaria. Encroachment of the community's boundaries causes a response by the members because they need an urge to speak loud otherwise they could be silenced, and they feel that their boundaries are abused by others, which is a threat to their identity (ibid., p.109). Further, it does not matter whether the boundaries are intact or not, it is a perception of the community's members, which constructs culture of the community symbolically (ibid., p.118). As discussed in the theory chapter, the community constitutes a greater entity than kinship and in the arena of community people learn social relationships such as kinship and friendship, acquiring the ability to perceive their boundaries (Cohen, 2013, p.19).

The perception of community is rather complicated among the Turks of Bulgaria, because they neither fell belonging to somewhere nor they adjust to the Bulgarian or Turkish culture. The very first impression I got when I talked to Turks of Bulgaria is that they never feel to be a local of somewhere; neither in Bulgaria nor in Turkey. There is an obvious ambiguity in defining where the homeland is and it is a slippery floor to be on. Hence, they want to render themselves with certain cultural codes; housing style, dressing, not paying attention to things (such as keeping the house clean or cooking different meals for the purpose of showing off), which is paid attention by the local Turks in Turkey. Bulgarian-Turkish migrants tend to keep their distance from the Turks of Turkey. On the other hand, migration influenced the way they perceive their fellows in their hometowns in Bulgaria. The perception of the migrants about the Turks who never migrate to Turkey may render the level of differentiation due to not sharing the same cultural environment anymore. Migrants in Turkey criticize the perception of religion and honor of the Turks in Bulgaria; for instance, because consuming certain foods and drinks is not acceptable in Turkey, Turks who use them in Bulgaria are severely criticized in the interviews with migrant

fellows. Creating 'our others' works with the Turks who remained in Bulgaria as well, for the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants, because of changing perception of religion, adapting to different habits and life styles. There is also the time and the space dimension of border crossings, because crossing the border entails "shifting patterns of spatiotemporal overlap and disjunction" (Hurd et al., 2017, p.2). Similarly, Turks of Bulgaria have been experiencing this spatiotemporal overlap and disjunction due to the migration of 1989, border crossings and transnational activities. Those who stayed in Bulgaria have been criticized by the migrants, because those who stayed back experience different social and cultural formation, which migrants did not experience for thirty years of living in Turkey. As discussed in theory chapter, boundaries with other identities or other communities determine distinctions by clearly identifying a specific community based on who they are or who they are not. Thus, boundaries are part of an identity negotiation for ethnic groups.

Bulgarian-Turkish migrants have generated certain kinds of ethnic boundaries, which differentiate them from the local Turks in Turkey. Despite the fact that they would like to feel like "free" Turks in Turkey, there are boundaries created by the local community, which excludes and keep these immigrants in the periphery of ethnic identity. Although the migration of 1989 took place more than thirty years ago, "one border (the physical) has been crossed while the new one (cultural) presents itself, which may never be crossed successfully in their lifetime" (Newman, 2006, p.179) for the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants. As I mentioned in the theory chapter, Barth (1969) put emphasis on the requirement of an intensive anthropological study of "symbolic border guards" such as language, dress, food, etc. which provide perpetuation and enclosure of the community. Most of the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants particularly have a type of appearance, which determines and emphasizes their ethnic boundaries, such as circumcision, specific tattoos, specific types of physical features i.e. hair and eye color, and certain types of jewelry as cultural stipulators. Those traits differentiate them from others in Turkey; for instance, most of the 1989 migrants have blue uniforms that they brought from Bulgaria and wear them in Turkey while working. It is a specific marker, which distinguishes them, and causes them promptly to be labeled as a migrant from Bulgaria. It can also reflect

their specific culture of work that they brought from Bulgaria's communist past, which migrants are proud of and criticize local Turks because they lack it in Turkey. Women wearing a specific type of earrings reveal their Bulgarian migrant background because those earrings were brought from Bulgaria. One can easily identify Bulgarian migrants from their physical characteristics if s/he is familiar with what migrants look like. Similarly, men wearing specific tattoos on their arms that they got during the military service in communist Bulgaria, reveal their Bulgaria-Turkish migrant identity. Thus, those cultural markers sometimes provide them benefits via nepotism, especially in finding employment and housing. As Nash (1996, p. 26) argues that those secondary traits are cultural markers and indicators of ethnic group formation and building blocks of ethnicity because they imply differentiation from others.

In addition to the symbolic border guards, language also constitutes an important indicator of a community, which in return becomes a tool for the identity negotiation by proving belonging to a specific ethnic group. Nonetheless, language works as a cultural possession of an ethnic group, which creates likeness among the ethnic community (Weber cited in Guibernau & Rex, 2010, p.13). Although Bulgarian-Turkish migrants have experienced several migration waves from Bulgaria to Turkey, the common belief in ethnicity has persisted through speaking a certain dialect of Turkish, which would not have been assimilated. Turks of Bulgaria speak the Turkish language which is "slightly different from that of modern Turkey, but nonetheless distinctly Turkish" (Rudin & Eminov, 1990, p.149). During my interviews I realized that all interviewers call Bulgarian cities with the former Turkish names such as *Kırcaali*, *Eski Zara*, *Filibe* instead of using Bulgarian names. The importance of Turkish language also represents how Turks associate their Turkish identity with the geography they live in. Although the Turkish language has extensively lost its influence in the Balkans, Bulgaria is the only country where the Turkish language is still strong and widely spoken approximately by one million citizens (Csato & Johanson, 1998, p.4). My interviewee, Ibrahim (M, 1978, İzmir) is speaking a dialect of Turkish, which is common in Turks of Bulgaria. He was graduated from a university in Turkey, works as a dentist, and has a good

socioeconomic status. However, he is being judged by ‘not changing his way of speech’ in Turkey, because people in his socioeconomic status are not yet expected to speak in that way. The Turkish language is a glue for Turkishness among the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants, however, the way they use it differentiates them from the Turks of Turkey, thus migrants’ perception of Turkishness also differentiates from the perception of local people in Turkey. Speaking the Turkish language freely was an initial hope for these immigrants about Turkey, however, it did not happen the way they hoped. The perception of migrating to ‘motherland’ seems to come to naught due to encountering others, whose boundaries are seemingly different.

I argued that there is a continuity and relationality in the ethnic identity of migrants from Bulgaria and of Turks of Bulgaria along with differentiation, which are results of the 1989 migration as a rupture point and of the socialization processes retained in the two different settings. All of the participants I interviewed for this study put emphasis on their ethnic identity, Turkishness. Thus, the “We are Turks” discourse retained in Bulgaria as a distinction from the majority population turns into the “we are *soydaş*” discourse in Turkey as a plea to get accepted by the local community and the legal authorities. Nevertheless, the legal definition of the word *göçmen* (migrant) becomes synonymous with *soydaş* because Turkish descent becomes a prerequisite in all Settlement Laws⁴⁴ in Turkey, which makes Turkish migrants more preferable migrants (Parla, 2019, p.17). However, to what extent this community sustains this privileged status in Turkey is a controversial issue, as *soydaş* status did not bring along advantages in terms of cultural adaptation to a new society. When migrating to Turkey, Bulgarian-Turkish migrants had hopes to take advantages of being ethnic Turks in all segments of the country, however, sharing a common ethnic kinship did not open the doors for the migrants; they keep being a minority group in Turkey, and their identity has been shaped accordingly.

The emphasis on Turkishness, specifically ‘pure Turkishness’ is very prevalent among my interviewees. Bulgarian-Turkish migrants consider themselves as fighters

⁴⁴ Settlement Laws of 1934 and 2006 (Parla, 2019, p.17).

for Turkishness, who defended and protected Turkish identity in Bulgaria, thus, they assume that Turkey would appreciate it. Bulgarian-Turkish migrants frequently mention that they suffered from defending Turkishness in Bulgaria; hence, they consider themselves being more Turks than the local people in Turkey. Discourses such as “we, migrants, are more Turks than the locals in Turkey because we made efforts to protect our Turkishness” or “I am 100% percent Turk, Bulgaria is just a geographical place where I was born” are common in the narratives of Turks of Bulgaria, which implies a justification for their ethnic identity, that should be unquestionable and undoubtful. When I asked Eren (M, 1974, İzmir) about his thoughts on specific and distinct physical appearances of Bulgarian-Turkish people, he responded as; “We want to feel Turk, whether we are purely Turk or not is another question, which we do not want to deal with”. Thus, they do not entirely reject the possibility of intermarriages with other ethnic communities throughout the years, but they do not want to reveal this reality and prefer ignoring the issue. A sense of belonging to a “motherland” overcomes the possibility of not being a “pure” Turk.

Migrants mostly consider themselves as a minority in Bulgaria, whereas I understand from the interviews that they consider themselves part of the majority in Turkey – though they do not use the exact word of ‘majority’ - by claiming “every nation lives peacefully in their own homeland”. Since migrants can freely practice anything in Turkey, which was forbidden in Bulgaria due to their minority status, - like speaking the Turkish language, practicing their religion- they consider that they now live in their homeland. Nevertheless, when it comes to defining “homeland”; where they were born, Bulgaria becomes their homeland, although the perception of motherland is Turkey.

Therefore, there is an undergoing negotiation is embedded in migrants’ identities because of shared imagination of performing Turkishness, common migration narratives, considering homeland as a complex entity, and having multiple identities. Nevertheless, identities become multiple, fluid, and multinational during the cause of migration processes, as people’s relationships with people and places are reshaped by

the construction of a new home and carving a route for new citizenship (Pettman, 1999). However, people who experienced discrimination try to consolidate their identity perception, to attach themselves somewhere. In a country where people largely speak Turkish, Bulgarian Turkish migrants would like to feel that they are not excluded, or no longer discriminated against. Migrants feel that they are citizens of Turkey because they speak Turkish and they can practice their religion freely in Turkey, which indicates a sense of belonging to the Turkish majority in the country. Despite the fact that Turks were exposed to ethnic discrimination in Bulgaria, narratives of migrants sometimes indicate discriminatory attitudes towards the different ethnic groups in Turkey. It is perhaps related to the desire to be part of the dominant ethnicity in a society, which is mostly accompanied by discriminatory attitudes against other minority people. There is a tendency to consider Turkey as a tolerant country towards different ethnic groups because Bulgarian-Turkish migrants were not exposed to ethnic or religious discrimination in Turkey. When the issue of inter-ethnic marriage was asked, the interviewees stated that they would not their children to marry someone from the Kurdish, Alevi, and Roma communities in Turkey. They tend to justify this attitude by expressing cultural differences, which might cause problems in terms of understanding each other. The discriminatory attitude towards other subcultures and ethnic groups might be an effort to be accepted by the dominant majority in Turkey.

Changing the perception of religion seems to affect the thoughts of migrants about the secular lifestyle of the Turks in Bulgaria, which they also had back then. One of my interviewees expressed that especially younger Turks were not allowed to enter into the mosques, and religious information they had was very limited in Bulgaria, however, she stated that she has become more religious when she migrated to Turkey. She emphasizes that it was the communist regime, which prevented people to practice religion. However, it was not only the regime, which entailed a less religious life, Turks in Bulgaria are not recently more religious than they were before, it is the perception of religion that differed with the migration to Turkey.

Turkishness and Islam were inseparable whole and practicing religion is a part of Turkish identity in Bulgaria among the Turkish minority, but migrants perceive practicing Islam as a more fundamental way when they observe it in Turkey, which makes difference in understanding of religion among migrants and minority community. The Bulgarian-Turkish migrants tend to explain Islam as more oppressive in Turkey, due to restricting consuming alcohol and being non-egalitarian in terms of gender relations. Perception of women, and also working women are important differences the Turks of Bulgaria realized when they first arrived in Turkey, as migrants associated this situation with perceiving Islam in a different way in Turkey. On the other hand, Islam was practiced as a cultural ritual by the Turks of Bulgaria, rather than a fundamental religion or way of life. Islam is associated with ethnic identity that is Turkishness. Islam does not confine people's lives in Bulgaria in terms of consuming certain foods or adapting to certain gender relations. Turks does not prefer to be called as 'Muslims in Bulgaria' because it shadows their ethnic identity; Turkishness. Thus, being Muslim represents their cultural identity, which is inherited through generations in Bulgaria. The words of Fuat (M, 1954, İzmir) also imply the significance of the ethnic identity over the religious one: "we were discriminated in Bulgaria because we were Muslim yes but, we are firstly Turkish and then Muslim". Hence, it can be said that the religion is a cultural practice for the Turks of Bulgaria; it is revealed well when we observe how migrants and minority community perceive and comment on religion comparatively both in Turkey and in Bulgaria.

Encounter with others is significant, since "every discourse, like every culture, inclines toward what it is not: toward an implicit negativity" (Boon, 1982, p.232) and people tend to be more sensitive about their culture especially when they encounter other cultures and when they realize that the boundary becomes weakened, they tend to create symbolic behaviors to empower it (Cohen, 2013, p.70). Turks of Bulgaria have been constructing their identities not only through adopting and defending one but also through discriminating against some ethnic and religious identities in Bulgaria. As a minority group, they make a distinction between self and other, by defining, excluding, and marginalizing other minority groups. The antagonistic

tolerance explains communities who coexist and construct themselves as ‘self’ and ‘other’ in terms of religion but rejects intermarriage despite having lived as mixed communities for years and these communities are tolerant when they live together in peace and harmony with closeness to each other, but they become antagonistic when they define themselves distinctively from each other with contrasting interests in a shared environment (Hayden et al., 2016, p.20). In the Balkan context, especially in pre-war Bosnia, the practices of *kòmšija* (*komşu*- from Turkish; neighbor) is a more relevant structure in regulating relations between different communities living in proximity, because the idea of ‘citizen’ represents an abstraction, and ‘neighbor’ is more concrete to rely upon (Hayden, 2002, p.206). It also applies to the communities living in close proximity in Bulgaria, as they mutually exclude each other while having antagonistic tolerance due to the state policies, including violence, assimilation, and expulsion, imposed on them. Turks and Pomaks were living side by side in the village I stayed in Bulgaria, but I heard a lot of rumors about how they both celebrate Muslim and Christian religious holidays, which was unacceptable by the Turks. Turkish neighbors were gossiping about how some of the Pomak neighbors converted to Christianity again, by retaking their Bulgarian names. The confusion about Pomak identity for the Turks was being a justification for the exclusion of them, as Turks put in a claim for a ‘decent’ ethnic and religious identity.

National identity policies in Bulgaria affect how the minority group, the Turks, perceive their Turkishness as a distinct identity. Their ways of differentiating themselves from the other groups also reflect boundaries of ethnic identity. Turks clearly distinguish themselves from other Muslim groups in Bulgaria; Pomaks, Roma, and Alevis, which generates intra-group diversity. These Muslim groups constitute a minority within the minority. Rejection of intermarriages and exclusion of other Muslim groups’ funerals are significant examples of the symbolic construction of community and its boundaries. It can be said that ethnic distinctions have been made through specific cultural motives such as marriages and funerals. Taking their Turkish/Islamic names back as cultural and vernacular signifier is a matter of pride for Turks, which they cannot share it with Pomaks. Even sometimes, it sounded more antagonistic what they feel for the Pomaks, when compared to

Bulgarians, which were supposedly accountable for the assimilation. Some comments render how they needed to resist the sanctions of the Bulgarian government against the prohibition of the speaking of the mother tongue, as once Pomaks did. Because the Pomaks' conversion to Islam during the Ottoman times did not prevent them from keeping their mother tongue, thus, Turks needed to hold on to their language in order not to lose their identity.

Turks in Bulgaria sound more like to be in the possession of Turkishness and Islam, they do not want to share the honor of protecting their identity, which is based on certain ethnicity and religion, with the Pomaks. As Pomaks do not have a well-defined ethnicity (Konstantinov, 1997, p.39), Turkish identity has become a place where Pomaks also seek shelter, although Turkish identity has been the undergoing 'other' of Bulgaria. In addition, Turks patronize Islam in Bulgaria in an assertive way; by despising and criticizing the ways Pomaks and Roma practice Islam. Religion becomes attached to their national identity, in which they desire to be unique in terms of practicing Islam, in a country in which they constitute the major and the antagonistic minority. For instance, while conducting my field research in Bulgaria, I had a chance to observe how people engage in religious activities during the Ramadan month. The breaking of the Ramadan fast every day was in the local mosque in the town. The meal was prepared in the garden of the mosque and served to the elderly males. Among those who came to the mosque there were no Pomak or Roma, but only Turks, although a number of Muslim Pomaks and Roma live in the town. It was as if Ramadan month was only for Muslim Turks, and the rest of the Muslims do not involve and participate in religious activities. In addition to that, the cemeteries of Pomaks are different than the Turks'; this might reflect the perception that Pomaks are not seen as Muslim enough by the Turks in Bulgaria. Hence, Islam is not considered a unitary category as Turks embrace it as an articulation to their ethnic identity.

Similarly, those who emigrated to Turkey claim to deserve Turkish citizenship more than the other migrant groups, because Bulgarian-Turkish migrants are *soydaş* and 'pure' Turks who declared that they also fought for the Turkishness in a foreign

country. Above mentioned in the interviews, they are preferable migrants in Turkey, whereas there are unfavorable migrants such as Syrians, whom Bulgarian-Turks do not empathize with, because they want to be the only migrant group, who hold Turkish identity and the advantages it brought along, as they consider that they naturally deserve it by having a Turkish descent. Nevertheless, there is a perception that only Turks should be in possession of Turkish identity or citizenship, likewise being in the possession of Islam in Bulgaria. On the other hand, while Turks of Bulgaria, desire to lean their ethnic identity to the Turkishness of Turks in their motherland, Turkey, they differentiate themselves from the Turks of Turkey at the same time, criticizing some elements of the culture that migrants have adapted in Turkey.

6.2. The Political Reasons

The political approaches of the two nation-states, namely Bulgaria and Turkey, towards the Turks of Bulgaria have also determined their way of ascribing themselves in accordance with ethnic and religious identity. Denial of the existence and identity of Turks in Bulgaria strengthened their belonging to Turkishness as an ethnic identity. The oppression and feeling of exclusion that they feel are still alive because one's name reflects her/his identity, culture, religion, and some of her/his life. When the Bulgarian government attempted to forcefully change Turkish names into Bulgarian ones, supposing that would be the solution to deny the minority in the country, which would encourage Bulgaria to declare to the world: "we are not violating any treaty obligations"⁴⁵, toward our Turkish minority. There are no Turks in Bulgaria" (Eminov, 1990, p.74). It also meant violating the terms they agreed on previously; it was clearly public that the language, religion and culture of the Turks are different than the majority of the Bulgarian citizens in Bulgaria. Previous mass migrations⁴⁶ of Turks and bilateral agreements between the states were also the proof

⁴⁵ The Treaty of Berlin, United Nations Charter, Helsinki Final Act.

⁴⁶ 1878, 1912, 1923, 1950, 1969, 1989. See also Chapter-2.

for this reality. So the question would be “Why did the Bulgarian state enforce to change the names of the Turkish people and why did they ban speaking of Turkish language, if there were no Turks in Bulgaria?”.

As it is previously argued, until the collapse of communism, the political passivity of the Turkish community in Bulgaria was because they neither participated in the process of the modern nation-formation of Bulgaria nor the national development of the Republic of Turkey (Mahon, 1999, p.149). The exclusion of the Turkish minority from the nation-formation processes of Bulgaria and Turkey has entailed a passive identity ascription for them in addition to oscillating in between and across boundaries. The lack of ascription of national identity is one of the reasons for the Turks who could not establish a necessary social and cultural adaptation into the Bulgarian society, in addition to facing with discrimination and exclusion.

Nevertheless, perceiving Turkey as a motherland cannot be adequate to be socially and culturally involved into the Turkish society, as Turks of Bulgaria stayed out of the nation-formation process of Turkey. Their claim to be ‘pure Turks’ is not also enough to be integrated into the Turkish society, because they lack some unwritten features that Turkishness would require. Nonetheless, Turkishness is defined as such “certain unrecognized ways/states of seeing, hearing, feeling, perceiving, and knowing- as well as not seeing, not hearing, not feeling, not perceiving, and not knowing” (Ünlü, 2014, p. 48). Turkishness is a crucial element in defining nation-formation of the Turkish nation-state, which excludes non-Turks and non-Muslims by signing a metaphorical Turkishness Contract (ibid.). The Bulgarian-Turkish migrants tried hard to internalize exclusion of some minority groups in Turkey too, in order to get accepted as ‘decent’ citizens of the Turkish Republic. However, it remains controversial to what extent they have been integrated into the Turkish society in accordance with the Turkishness Contract.

To what extent ethnicity is meaningful in the case of the Turks of Bulgaria is a contentious issue. Primordial accounts of ethnicity are denied in their case, because ethnic identity is not primary enough to consider Turkey as their motherland or to get

accepted by the Turkish society. Ethnic and racial identities are emphasized when they are advantageous on some occasions and they are used to keep apart some ethnicities who are not eligible for accessing some goods, such as jobs, housing, and schools, on the other hand, ethnical bonds can be ignored if circumstances change according to the interests of certain groups (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.58). Ethnicity of the Turks of Bulgaria can be considered as fluid, contingent, and ephemeral because ethnicity is associated with the situation or the moment, rather than being fixed and unchanging. Cornell and Hartmann (1998, p.77) highlight that ethnicity is not just a label but also an identity, which is accepted, resisted, chosen, redefined or rejected, so they are not only about circumstances but also people's responses to those circumstances according to their dispositions. In the construction of ethnic identity, ethnic communities themselves construct and reproduce their own existence by establishing organizations, promoting research on history and culture, retelling histories in different ways in order to be recognized, and reestablishing and inventing new cultural practices (ibid., p.79). It is also argued that the resurgence of ethnicity is inevitable in the modern world as "intelligentsias have rediscovered ethnic roots as an antidote to the impersonality of bureaucratic rationalism" (Smith, 1981; 1991). The resurgence of ethnicity can be observed among the Turks of Bulgaria as they have established an ethnic based political party in Bulgaria in the wake of the fall of the communist regime. However, it is also controversial to what extent people show ethnicity-based reactions due to prioritizing certain interests, as the political party has allegations of corruption. Nevertheless, for a community who were exposed to an ethnic cleansing campaign, ethnicity is still relevant and meaningful. What happened in Bulgaria in between 1984-1985 was an "ethnicized conflict" (Brubaker, 2002), which did not necessarily occur between two ethnic groups rather it was a politically constructed ethnicity-based tension.

The argument that ethnicity seems to be irrelevant, for the Turks who remained in Bulgaria (Elchinova, 2005, p.22), might be also because of the fact that they did not ask for an autonomous Turkish region and territorial separation in Bulgaria, (Karpas, 1990, p.20) although they were exposed to a structural assimilation campaign and ethnic cleansing. Keeping in mind the history of assimilation of minorities in

Bulgaria, speaking of ethnicity would not be irrelevant, as the assimilation policies targeted language, culture, and religion of minorities, which are obviously related to ethnicity. The fundamental ideas about migration are based on nationally specific explanations, thus, national ideologies tend to influence migration research by organizing what questions should be asked towards respondents in the analysis of forced migration (Castles, 2003, p.24). Perhaps, posing this question would be relevant: Is it because we choose to ask questions according to the imposition of nation-states, which demand to declare that ethnicity is irrelevant for the minorities? Ethnic identity has been an important element for the formation of the Turks of Bulgaria, initially because of its denial by the government authorities and also because of its negotiated character continuing in the two different national settings.

Therefore, the argument that Turks do not speak about themselves on the ethnicity level seems to be controversial, having thought of the forced migration they were exposed to, because of their ethnic identity. I witnessed in the official documents that how a person's name was changed three times and crossed out with red. Asiye (F, 1950, Karlıca) expressed that the Bulgarian government did something that cannot be erased from the records, implying the forceful name changes. Asiye's (F, 1950, Karlıca) words proved how dramatic it was; "I was born in 1960 as Asiye, I became Alexandra in 1984, and then I retook Asiye again in 1989. In the archives, you can see all these changes, including the Bulgarian name that was given to me forcefully". A neighborhood representative mentioned the same story, showing the documents as proof. A person's identity has been changed and attacked three times in the official documents of the state, which is rendered as blacklisted. The Bulgarian government at the time did something that cannot be erased even from the official records let alone from the minds of people, as it was a total intervention and perhaps an assignation to the identity of the Turkish minority.

Identity is also related to attribution of politics determining who is included, who is excluded, and determining what are their rights and duties (Pickus 1998 in Vertovec, 2009, p.88). Bulgarian-Turkish migrants are considered as *soydaş* (same ethnic kin) and it has several connotations related to their migration to Turkey in terms of their

settlement and incorporation as Turkish local authorities arranged settlement of these migrants according to their ethnic kinship. “Turkish nationalism designated their true, ancestral homeland as Turkey” although there was “an ambiguity about the original location of the homeland” (Parla, 2006, p.544) when the Turkish minority was expelled from Bulgaria in 1989. The Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, Turgut Özal declared that the Turkish borders open to *soydaş* coming from Bulgaria, despite the fact that the border was shut down immediately (ibid., p.546), due to the high number of migrants.

On the other hand, defining national identity is a contentious issue in Bulgaria. It is also related in what ways the other identities are being defined, either as an opposite or as a subordinate. According to Pilbrow, (1997) the discourse of national identity has been constituted based on the marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities because ethnic and religious identities are perceived as the obverse of “the national”. This definition of national identity based on the marginalization of ethnic and religious others, poignantly helps define Bulgarian identity as a European identity (ibid., p.63). The socialist ideal of a unified community required standardization of culture, which caused assimilatory processes in Bulgaria (Eminov, 1990, p.3). Bulgaria’s claims of belonging to European heritage entail marginalization and exclusion of Turkish and Roma as scapegoats, who are “un-European” and who separate Bulgaria from Europe (Pilbrow, 1997, p.70). The assimilation campaign did not work because Turks did not feel integrated into the Bulgarian majority, but instead, they retreat from social interaction with Bulgarians, because Turks were being made the “other” of the country with the use of violence (Bates, 1994, p.212).

The reasons for the feeling of in-betweenness of the Turks of Bulgaria show similarities with the reasons for their political passivity. While Mahon (1999) argues that the political passivity of the Turks of Bulgaria is because of their noninvolvement in the nation-state formations neither in Bulgaria nor Turkey, culturally discriminatory politics and attitudes of Bulgaria, including ethnic cleansing, closure of Turkish schools, ban of speaking of the Turkish language, and forcibly changed names –even though they were restored-, the forced migration of

1989 and its bringings such as cultural isolation and withdrawing are also undergoing reasons for their passivity and the feeling of in-betweenness. Because of these reasons they cannot claim they are living in their home country as there is very limited involvement in the social, cultural, and political environment of Bulgaria.

The feeling of living in limbo is also because of the stereotyping and appropriation of the Turks of Bulgaria, respectively by Bulgarian and Turkish politics. For instance, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borissov blames Turks for displaying loyalty to Turkey in order to gain populist votes by emphasizing nationalist discourses, despite the fact that Turks in Bulgaria being loyal to Turkey does not reflect the truth (Fatkova, 2012, p.325). Creating negative stereotyping against the Turks in Bulgaria has been very common in politics as a populist manipulation policy (ibid.). Negative stereotyping and exclusion of Turks do not necessarily lead them to be loyal to another country, but they entail feelings of isolation and alienation, which promptly affect the ways of negotiating on their identity as a minority community. On the other hand, Turks of Bulgaria was appropriated and welcomed by the Turkish state in 1989; the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, Turgut Özal declared that the Turkish borders open to *soydaş* coming from Bulgaria, despite the fact that the border was shut down immediately and migrants were not fully integrated into the Turkish society, as it was hoped.

Identity can be seen as a reactive construct among the Turkish minority, due to the continuing fear of being assimilated and attacked as a minority again. Negotiations with the Bulgarian ideal of homogenous citizens would be possible if there was not an intervention to their ethnic identity. As two of my interviewees expressed “the Bulgarian state at that time was in rush changing our names. If the assimilation process was not that early, we had been already speaking Bulgarian language and we would be assimilated naturally and eventually”. However, the forceful name changes have created a reactive tendency among the minority group; they held their names and their mother tongue tightly. Many interviewees expressed that an intervention to their identity, namely an assimilation process, has empowered their consciousness for Turkishness. Furthermore, negotiations based on identity was quite obvious;

many of the migrant interviewees expressed that if there was no attempt to change the Turkish names and to forbid speaking of the Turkish language, they would have stayed in Bulgaria, as they were content with the life in Bulgaria in general and they knew that the adaptation to a new country would be difficult, although it was seen as ‘motherland’.

6.3. The Consequences of the Migration of 1989

The migration of 1989 has several consequences for Turks of Bulgaria both for the migrants and for those who stayed behind in Bulgaria. The deserted villages, desolate houses in areas around Rhodope Mountains, especially in *Kircali* region cause feelings of being left behind and isolation. For those who migrated to Turkey faced with difficulties which they did not expect, as Turkey was their motherland. Nevertheless, the migration policies and citizenship regimes of the two nation-states made the Turks of Bulgaria being got played like a fiddle in between and across borders in the wake of the migration of 1989. They feel in-between in homeland and motherland dilemma and they hardly feel belonging to any country, while they hold dual citizenship. The cultural and social differences they faced in Turkey along with different perception of women and gender made it difficult to adapt to a new country. Those who migrated keep relations with those who stayed back in Bulgaria, which complicates the perception of homeland again.

Migration to Turkey brought along new strategies for the identity negotiation along with difficulties in the integration and adaptation processes. There was cultural disapproval for the Turkish migrants in Turkey, because of their differences in women’s working habits, gender roles and moral codes (Parla, 2019, p.12). Cultural stereotypes, which targeted Armenian and Greek women before, were transferred to migrant women from the Balkans (Özyürek, 2003 cited in Bora & Şen, 2009, p.1159). Although language, religion and ethnicity are the same, Bulgarian-Turkish migrants are perceived as a culturally different group by the local Turks in Turkey – perhaps as a minority like in Bulgaria- because of the certain lifestyle that migrants

have, which is ‘better’, more ‘European’ -consumption of alcohol and certain food- and more civilized (Elchinova, 2008, p.21). Consequently, the degree of the otherness of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants is changing; Turkish migrants are perceived as more alien to the Turks of Turkey compared to their position in the eyes of the Bulgarian neighbors at the home country (ibid.). Thus, Turks of Bulgaria were not fully accepted in the Turkish society as it was promised at the beginning of the mass migration of 1989, rather they were considered as intruders, who have explicit differences both in the private and public spheres.

When the Turks became a minority community in Bulgaria, they have been systematically exposed to discrimination in Bulgaria throughout history, but how they evolved from being a community to an ethnic group emerged with the assimilation campaign in 1984-1985, which resulted in a mass exodus of 1989, from Bulgaria to Turkey. This mass migration emanated new citizenship regimes and transnational ways of life. The borders have become blurred, along with the sense of belonging. The question of where homeland and motherland was/is for the Turks of Bulgaria has been interrupted many times.

The migration of 1989 blurred the boundaries of identity and citizenship for the Turks of Bulgaria. We should think of citizenship beyond the boundaries of political and social rights, because “access to citizenship is a highly gendered and ethnically structured process” (Walby, 1994, p.391). As I have discussed in the previous chapters, Turks of Bulgaria have been exposed to an ethnically structured process of accessing citizenship due to negative stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination, assimilation, and forced migrations. Nonetheless, being a minority community and having relatives in another nation-state, which they define as ‘motherland’ and at least once they wish to be under its flag, apparently put these people in a very precarious situation.

Being a citizen of a state does not necessarily fulfill its citizens’ needs and requirements as it was seen in the example of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, because people’s citizenship is much more related to how they perceive, feel and

define themselves (Kaytan, 2014, p.69). This specific minority group's citizenship is constituted based on how they ethnically identify themselves by distinguishing themselves from other groups in Bulgaria, where they feel they belong to, and what they feel they are, along with what they are not. Nevertheless, the common features raised both by migrants and the Turkish minority are forceful name changes and prohibition of speaking of Turkish language in Bulgaria, which truly has shaped their identity perception. In addition to those, feelings of isolation, exclusion, and disappointment in supposedly 'motherland' Turkey, affected the way the identity of the Turks of Bulgaria has been shaped, whether they migrated or remained in Bulgaria. They could have escaped the discriminatory attitudes of 'homeland' Bulgaria, but they could not assume how their life would be in 'motherland' Turkey. Returning back to the Bulgarian citizenship, not only to citizenship but also to the lifestyle, visits, vacations, half-year staying in Bulgaria, imply the ambiguity about the original homeland, or it raises the question whether there is a location of homeland or a feeling at home for these people.

A title⁴⁷ from a newspaper about Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey is striking: "in order not them to change our names, we hid in the woods". The memories of being assimilated have been still alive. An interviewee in the news stated "although we have been living happily in the Turkish Republic, our longing for Bulgaria keeps going. Those lands were inherited from our ancestors. We should live together fraternally in this geography". The reproduced identity of Bulgarian-Turkish migrants has been truly affected by the longing they feel for Bulgaria, in addition to the transnational way of life. Bulgarian Turkish migrants reproduce their identity as 'others', more precisely, different than the identity of local Turks in Turkey. Being 'other' here is not necessarily a negative fact, which was the case in the first years of migration. Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey consider themselves as different from the local community in Turkey by looking them up due to coming from Europe. Thus, they encounter a different culture, which obviously does not carry common features, despite the same ethnic kin. Their identity has been articulated with these

⁴⁷ <https://bakis.bg/2020/05/26/bulgaristan-turkleri-ismimizi-degistirmesinler-diye-ormanda-gizlendik/>

encounters, along with transnational way of life, as “they live across borders and they simultaneously incorporated in two societies” (Schaefer, 2008, p.1322), and with the feelings of longing, belonging, and nostalgia.

6.4. The Effects of Transnationality

Despite living in two different states, the border between Turkey and Bulgaria refers only to a geographical limitation; it does not confine the perception of belonging for the Turk of Bulgaria. Transnationality of the Turks of Bulgaria lies in their dual-citizenship statuses, their social fields which across geographic, cultural, and political borders, and multiplicity of involvements (Basch et al., 2005, p.8), in their transnational social spaces, transnational social fields, and transnational social formations, which imply persons, networks and organizations and which cross borders (Faist, 2006, p.3), in their political, social and cultural engagements with both Bulgaria and Turkey, and in their experiences and collective memories about the migration process. No matter where they settle and which passports they have, Turks of Bulgaria are part of Turkish descent and the vernacular of Bulgaria, but it still remains controversial if they are considered as a part of Turkey or of Bulgaria. Holding citizenship of a state does not guarantee the feeling of belonging, because migrants’ identity is constituted by how they identify themselves, both ethnically and nationally, and in which place they feel they belong. Through the systematic oppression tools in Bulgaria, their identity is defined, their feeling of belonging is constituted and their citizenship is affected, along with where they prefer to live, settle and raise their children.

With the effects of transnationality, the characteristics of holding a citizenship have also changed. On the one side, Turks of Bulgaria have a citizenship, which has an emphasis on Turkishness, on the other side, they have citizenship which is marginalized because of being an ethnic minority and non-residents. The minority group, Turks of Bulgaria, bend the rules of citizenship; citizenship is not anymore something that the state determines. Belonging to a specific community does not

correspond to the meaning of citizenship. Regional transnational actors such as the political party of minorities in Bulgaria, both enhance and tense the sense of belonging while blurring the positioning of citizenship. The minority seems to be torn between the two states, however, there is a tendency of bending the rules of citizenship according to their cross-border interests. There is also a negotiation withholding the Turkish citizenship as their ethnic and religious identity needs to provide well-deserved Turkish citizenship to them in Turkey, it does not matter whether they emigrated or continue living in Bulgaria. One of my interviewee, who never emigrated to Turkey but manage to get Turkish citizenship for all of his family, complained about non-obligatory military service in Bulgaria, as he sees military service as an instructive system for the young men, but he also said that by paying 18,000 Turkish liras he made his son to be exempted from the obligatory military service in Turkey.

Migrants who resided for two years in Turkey and provided documentation of ethnic origin –*soy belgesi*- could obtain citizenship until 2009 (Parla, 2011, p.68). Some Bulgarian-Turkish people had Turkish residence permits and Turkish citizenship from Turkey in order to be able to stay longer in Turkey and to benefit from its health care system. As they believe that Turkey has a better health care system, which is also cheaper than it is in Bulgaria. It would be difficult to explain having Turkish citizenship with cultural or identity motives, because Turks in Bulgaria are aware of the fact that having Bulgarian citizenship opens the doors for Europe, in which they might enjoy the right to move, work and live freely. The symbolic reversal of the culture (Eidheim, 1969) is also observed in the Turks of Bulgaria, in order to take advantages of holding Bulgarian citizenship. Some of them keep using forcibly given Bulgarian names in the public space in Europe. They think that keeping a Christian name would be more useful to find employment or not to be discriminated against as a Turk and Muslim in Europe. Hence, they prefer not to disclose their identity in public space, and they keep their ethnic identity in the private sphere. On the other hand, they know that these are the opportunities that holding Turkish citizenship would not provide. Once, before the collapse of communism in Bulgaria, having Turkish citizenship was a dream to catch for the

minority Turks in Bulgaria due to ethnic kin and the assimilation policies of the Bulgarian government, however recently, it seems that having Turkish citizenship means getting some material opportunities with cheaper prices but nothing more.

Among the types of identities, defined by Cornell and Hartmann (1998), the Turks of Bulgaria seem to have more of an assigned identity, which is ascribed by others and circumstances rather than having an asserted identity, which implies ascription by the group itself. Nevertheless, the identity of Turkishness is an imagined, desired and constructed identity for the Turks of Bulgaria. Bulgarian-Turkish migrants sustain the transnational bond and perform Turkishness through “a shared imagination” (Cohen, 1996, p.516). Yet, the identity of the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants has transnational elements and cross-border activities, because of the discrimination they faced in Bulgaria, of the migration process itself, and of what they have been through in Turkey after the migration. Their relations with Bulgaria has been continuing and complicated; they have Bulgarian passports, they vote for the Bulgarian political elections, some of them are getting retirement pensions, some have economic relations, some of them still have houses to stay in, and most importantly they have families and relatives, to whom they do not simply turn their back, while they have been living in Turkey and considering Turkey as their motherland, which they could not abandon.

On the other hand, politics is used to legitimize the transnational activities of the Turks of Bulgaria. For instance, Balkan migrant associations provided buses from Turkey to Bulgaria in the political elections to get votes for DPS. Those who live in Turkey and could not go to Bulgaria due to economic reasons, sometimes consider these free trips not only for participating in political elections but also to visit and see their families and relatives back in Bulgaria. These cross-border political activities of migrants also represent a characteristic of transnationality in terms of gatherings of people and maintaining cross-border relations.

Reconstructing identity is also possible with reproducing the nostalgia for the country and culture they emigrated from. In the first years of adapting to a new

country, which is supposedly motherland, migrants were behaving accordingly, to prove that their ethnic identification and belonging is Turkish, not Bulgarian. However, the situation seems to be changed recently. Younger generations increasingly reproduce the nostalgia of their migrant parents' homeland (Bulgaria) via sharing images, popular culture, food, and goods that belong to Bulgaria on social media. They generate an identity, which has nuances from the Bulgarian culture, even if they were born in Turkey. They see themselves distinctively from the local community in Turkey as a matter of fact that being European, or more progressive, is considered as a positive trait. There is a vast of social media profiles, which reproduce migrant culture. For instance, region-based (i.e. *Razgradlılar*, *Kırcaaliiler*) social media profiles produce content to keep alive Bulgarian-Turkish migrant culture through reproducing the nostalgia, creating events, which involve visitations to Bulgaria and by reminding people where they actually come from. It also implies identity construction, which continues through other generations of migrant communities, despite the fact that they did not experience migrations by themselves in person.

Migrants who have transnational networks and lifestyles perceive the country of origin as a source of identity, yet the country of residence as a source of right; hence this results in complicated perceptions of identity, culture, rights, politics, states, and nations (Kastoryano, 2002, p.160). Bulgarian-Turkish migrants perceive their country of origin as *memleket* (hometown)-where they were born and raised-, however, they perceive Turkey as *anavatan* (motherland)- where they ethnically belong and have certain rights. For Bulgarian-Turkish migrants having Bulgarian citizenship along with Turkish citizenship mostly refer to their right to possess it since they were born and grew up in Bulgaria. Almost all of the interviewees expressed that they intended to migrate to Turkey in 1989 when the mass exodus happened. The narratives, which indicates in what ways negotiations generated, revealed that if Bulgaria had not imposed sanctions and an assimilation policy on their ethnic identity, Turks of Bulgaria would have remained living in their homeland without being enforced to leave their families, relatives, lands, and memories, despite the fact that they would still have had an idealized motherland, in which they belong

to correspondingly in terms of their ethnic identity. On the other hand, because of a variety of reasons, some of the Turkish minority could not migrate and had to stay in Bulgaria. All of them have relatives in Turkey and they frequently cross the border to go to Turkey. What Turkey means to the minority group seems complicated as they have emotional attachments with Turkey. As Oktay (M, 1980, Karlica) expressed “it is easy to be a Turk in Turkey, but here it is very challenging”, implying to be in limbo for both sides of the border.

In what ways the patterns, which blurred the boundaries, are constructed is an important investigation because those patterns also blur the definitions of homeland and motherland for the Turks of Bulgaria. The feeling of in-betweenness blurs the border between two states for both migrants and minority, despite the existence of different strategies they have adopted for the processes of adaptation. What differentiate the migrant Turks and minority Turks, who remained in Bulgaria, is the experience of migration and the experience of staying behind with the ongoing effects of the assimilation. Those who emigrated to Turkey have adopted the discourse of “we arrived in motherland”, and negotiated on the new strategies of performing citizenship and identity by redefining Turkishness. Nevertheless, migrants develop a certain kind of exclusion for certain groups in Turkey, they have experienced upward mobility and developed transnational ties across borders. The effects of the assimilation process in Bulgaria have been mitigating for migrants, as they have to struggle for the new life in Turkey. However, the minority group in Bulgaria, who are a withdrawn and silent community, are still dealing with the negative effects of the assimilation, although the collapse of the communist regime, an apology for the ethnic cleansing, and the EU regulations relatively relieve the life for them. The Turkish minority does not seem to leave behind the effects of the assimilation process and the 1989 migration to Turkey, as they have been feeling a longing for the migration to Turkey. Although they live in a small town in which ethnic Bulgarians constitute the minority and the Turkish community has been ruling the municipality and relatively organizing the social life in the town, the Turkish community internalizes the patterns of being a minority that is articulated to their identity, in society and culture where the Bulgarians constitute the majority. They

can visit their family and relatives in Turkey, some of them hold Turkish citizenship, some continues business in between two societies with the use of transnational networks, some sees Turkey as a source of cheap goods and medical services, but in the narratives, Turkey is a nostalgic motherland that they could not emigrate anymore.

Although Turkey has always been a motherland for them that they could seek shelter and they keep the feelings of longing and belonging for Turkey alive, frequent visits to Turkey and transnational experiences indicate them it is no longer available to see Turkey in a way that they used to see before. What is told and what is real are different things, the Turkish community realized. The differentiation amplifies between those who emigrated and those who stayed behind.

6.5. Conclusion

The analysis of a group of people of Turkish descent in a small town in Bulgaria allows for the following conclusions. Having existed as a minority community in Bulgaria after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and having experienced several migration flows, either by force or by intent, and having had relatives and acquaintances and in another nation-state, which they occasionally define as ‘motherland’, and the relationality that has a transnational and an unprecedented character, designate the identity of the Turks of Bulgaria in a constantly negotiated way. Identity of the ethnic Turks has been constructed in a specific way, it is neither a sole migrant identity, nor a dominant ethnic identity; the identity which leans on in-betweenness that migration brought, and which is consolidated with the encounters, that either creates differentiation or correspondence. Turks of Bulgaria neither feel themselves adequate citizens in Bulgaria due to their ethnic minority identity nor consider themselves adequate Turks and Muslims in Turkey because of the place they come from and due to the stereotyping that Balkan migrants have encountered.

Neither remained as totally migrant nor *soydaş*, but always the minority, the Turks of

Bulgaria can be considered as on the contrary to all the conventional definitions of migrant. The Turks of Bulgaria were not born and raised inside the borders of the corresponding nation-state. Therefore, the concepts of home and exile are constantly blurred in their case. The forced migration process they were exposed to also reflects exceptionality because it seemed that an ethnic community expelled from a foreign country to their 'natural homeland', where they supposedly should be. Yet it was not that simple to conglomerate these people in that way, as we have witnessed from the narratives provided above. As a minority community, they tend to define themselves through what they are not, while constantly negotiating on the issue of what they are. There is a constant emphasis on who they are not; they are not Bulgarian, Christian, Pomak, Roma, Alevi, or Turks of Turkey. Hence, this specific minority group's identity is constituted based on how they ethnically identify themselves by either mainly distinguishing or infrequently converging themselves from other groups in Bulgaria and Turkey, with a constant negotiation. However, this dissolution seems to be an obligation rather than being a choice, because of the exclusion and disapproval of their identity by the local communities in the abovementioned states.

The endeavor to retain their existence in Bulgarian lands, where they mostly feel they belong, can be observable along with the feeling of in-betweenness that they internalize. Ethnic cleansing, expulsion, or genocide, whatever it is called, its effects have been still alive for the Turks of Bulgaria and yet these people believe that the significance of the assimilation process that they were exposed to, has not been acknowledged enough, especially by Turkey. Although motherland would occasionally be Turkey for some of them, based on the assumption that they would be easily integrated into Turkey because of the advantages of Turkish descent and Sunni Islam, the lands that they enroot and they would like to enroot are differentiated. Especially for those who remained in Bulgaria, it would be more difficult to enroot in their lands or leave these lands. The differentiation of feeling of belonging causes a significant disruption in their ways of expressing and redefining identity. In that sense, the ways that they negotiate identities might make the Turks of Bulgaria an exceptional case. A political intervention to their identity, namely an assimilation process, have empowered their consciousness for Turkishness, on the

other hand, if there was no attempt to change the Turkish names and to forbid speaking of Turkish language, they would have stayed in Bulgaria, as they were content with the life in Bulgaria. Yet, they were aware of the fact that the adaptation to a new country would be difficult, although it was considered as ‘motherland’, which consequently entailed to new types of otherness to negotiate with, which make Turkey as an alleged motherland for them. Hence, Turks of Bulgaria are doomed to be an undergoing minority community with transnational specificities, whether they live, settle or move across borders.



CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I analyzed the case of the Turks of Bulgaria as a community, whose identity is under constant negotiation because of oscillating between the two nation-states, and of distinguishing themselves from the other groups by indicating ethnic, cultural and religious boundaries, either in Bulgaria or in Turkey, and of living in transnational social fields, which also blur the boundary between homeland and motherland. As it is discussed in the theory chapter, the community is constituted by a group of people who believe in sharing something significantly common to each member of this sodality and this commonality can effortlessly be distinguishable from other groups of people (Cohen, 2013, p.12). Accordingly, boundaries are determined in the ways that the community desires to be distinguished (Barth, 1969). Boundaries as symbolic constructs may also imply the actual border crossings of people, which emanate demarcations and shape meanings of homeland and host country. However, we cannot see all boundaries with our eyes, because they might be thought of in the minds of the community, rather than being existed apparently hence the community members, as well as outsiders, perceive them differently (Cohen, 2013, p.12). Explaining community by taking into accounts of members' experiences and perceptions is rather preferred thus, referring to Cohen, I would prefer asking questions in that way: "What does it appear to mean to its members?" instead of asking its theoretical implications (ibid., p.20). Crossing a border does not only emphasize physical demarcated territories as geographers do, it also has more abstract meanings of bordering and intangible distinctions, which entail identity discourses (Newman, 2006, p.173).

Borders exist in spatial practices, memories, and narratives of those who cross the border and who have hopes and fear at the same time to an imagined territory that is expected to be arrived at, and thus, crossing the border cause both shifting time and

physical location; yet, border-crossers have to negotiate both the borders and the practices and memories that entails (Hurd et al., 2017, p.1). When there is a need for a more structural explanation of ethnic and racial discriminations and assimilations, the term community turns into the term ethnicity. In the construction of ethnic identity, ethnic communities themselves construct and reproduce their own existence by establishing organizations, promoting research on history and culture, retelling histories in different ways in order to be recognized, and reestablishing and inventing new cultural practices (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998, p.79).

On the other hand, while ethnicity prevails community, the meaning of citizenship has been changing through the globalization era with the changing institution of nation-states. A new type of citizenship, which is coined as “postnational citizenship”, “transcends the boundaries of the nation-states” because people “violate the presumed congruence between membership and territory” by holding citizenship of a nation-state while settling and living in another nation-state (Soysal, 1994). In addition to that, the number of dual citizenships is increasing, while blurring the formality of the membership (ibid.). Dual citizenship is related to transnationalism, and dual citizenship also “transforms nationality into an identity”, hence it becomes complicated where to demand rights and where to claim identity (Kastoryano, 2005, p.694). In the case of the Turks of Bulgaria, where they claim identity and where they live, settle, and claim rights are blurring the formality of membership and citizenship, although they have dual citizenship and cross-border attachments. Their situation is complicated; migrants claim identity by getting Turkish citizenship, since they are Turks and their motherland is Turkey, while they claim rights such as retirement benefits and free movement in the Schengen area by holding Bulgarian citizenship. Thus, identity and citizenship have been intertwined in the case of this community.

What entailed me to conduct research on the Turks of Bulgaria was my family history and my experiences with migrants as a second-generation Bulgarian-Turkish woman born and raised in a migrant neighborhood in Izmir. My parents’ migration story resided in 1951 and 1977 hence I did not have a chance to witness what they

have experienced, but I have observed the 1989 migrants from Bulgaria to Turkey because I have been surrounded by migrant relatives and acquaintances; firstly in our house and then in our neighborhood. Beginning from the first impression I got from the migrants in 1990 in our house, the narratives of migrants have affected and inspired me for countless things throughout my life. As a researcher, going to Bulgaria and staying in the town where my family emigrated from, to conduct my research was a very enlightening experience along with being sentimental. Hence, this thesis is meant to revive the memory of those who lost their lives because of being expelled from their homeland.

Turks of Bulgaria have experienced a tough process of assimilation campaign held by the state, and a mass migration process, which caused many divided families, and the construction of new lives both for the migrants and for the minority group. Further, they were systematically exposed to exclusion from the state formation and from the majority of the society, which ended up being a politically passive minority in Bulgaria and it truly affected how they formed a community and an ethnic identity. Denial of their existence, prohibition of speaking the mother tongue, and forcibly changed names were traumatizing instances. The effects of those instances have been continuing even after migration to Turkey, despite the fact that the democratization process began in Bulgaria in the 1990s; the Turks have been represented in Bulgarian politics and in the parliament, and an apology came from the Bulgarian government in 2012. Turks of Bulgaria have not remained as totally migrant or *soydaş*, rather they have been doomed to being a transnational minority community, whose identity leans on in-betweenness that migration brought, and which is consolidated with the encounters, that either creates differentiation or correspondence.

Identity negotiations have been affected by the distinctions between local Turks and Bulgarian-Turkish migrants in Turkey. The distinctions are based on different perceptions of religious identity, gender relations, work culture and different socialization processes caused by born and raised in different geographical and political settings. Turks of Bulgaria supposed that they naturally deserve Turkish

citizenship due to their ethnic kin, however, they were not welcomed in the first place in Turkey; they suffered from discrimination, unemployment, status inconsistencies, and integration problems. Hence, their ideal to be accepted as ‘decent Turks’ has not been accomplished.

On the other hand, those who stayed in Bulgaria have been suffering from being minority community, which is regarded as the most antagonistic one. We can say that Turks of Bulgaria become more and more minority after thousands of Turks left the country in 1989, because it was a massive migration of Turks from Bulgaria, which resulted in regime change in Bulgaria. Turks of Bulgaria have never felt as adequate citizens in Bulgaria, however this gap has widened in the wake of the mass migration of 1989. The feelings of isolation, loneliness, and being in-between have grown constantly. Those who stayed back had to live in the deserted villages with different neighbors. The social profile of the villages has changed. The Turks-only villages became mixed with Pomak and Roma communities. Moreover, those who stayed back could not get visas to enter Turkey in order to visit their families for couple of years, which entailed feeling of being left back in a country where your ethnic identity has always been considered as problematic. The socialization processes of those who stayed and who migrated entailed another disjunction among the Turks of Bulgaria, which also entailed different negotiations on identity. Turks as a minority community has been developing strategies for the possession of Turkishness and Islam, excluding other minority groups from these identity formations. They formed a political party, which also has transnational ties with the Bulgarian Turkish migrants in Turkey. The transnational activities create spatiotemporal overlap between those who stayed and who migrated, developing a shared imagination for the community. The common belief in community sustains with the transnationality. The transnational movements of people, values, political and cultural organizations both converge and differentiate Turkish minority and Bulgarian-Turkish migrants across borders, also creating newly emerged identity negotiations between borders of the two nation-states. In addition, the feeling of in-betweenness and the complication of homeland/motherland separation are also shared feelings among the Turks of Bulgaria, whether they stayed or migrated. The changed status from minority to

migrant/*soydaş* does not differ the shared feeling of belonging to nowhere.

Negotiation with Bulgaria has been happening in that way: leaving or emigrating from Bulgaria to Turkey to become a ‘majority’ but voting for Bulgaria, taking advantage of the Bulgarian citizenship to live and work in the European Union. Negotiation with Turkey has been continuing in order to become full and proper citizens of the Turkish society and adapting the necessary skills to get accepted but on the other hand keeping ‘European’ culture to show their differentiation from the local Turks, to engender a privileged status for themselves.

In this thesis, I attempted to elucidate the different processes, which generate and maintain ethnic groups and boundaries by focusing on a specific ethnic group living in two different national settings, having influenced by a forced migration process either by migrating or by staying behind. This thesis aimed to understand the continuous migrant status of Turks of Bulgaria in Turkey, in relation to their minority status in Bulgaria. I attempted to discover how Turks of Bulgaria negotiate their ways of expressing, explaining, and perceiving identity, community, ethnicity and citizenship with the effects of transnationalism, which was a result of the assimilation campaign in Bulgaria that ended up with mass migration to Turkey in 1989. This thesis tried to understand how the shifting meanings of otherness, migrant and Turkishness play a role in the lives of a minority group by commenting on results of fieldwork conducted in Bulgaria and Turkey with Bulgarian-born Turks. Hence, I tried to find answers to my research question: Why do Turks of Bulgaria negotiate on their identity and what are the ways of the identity negotiation? The perception of identity and community were affected by transnationalism and the migration of 1989 for the Turks of Bulgaria and consequently they have to negotiate on the boundaries of identity, ethnicity and citizenship. The Turkish minority accepted the ways of being ‘other’ as an articulation to identity and developed coping mechanisms for this ongoing minority situation.

Nevertheless, I discussed that there is a continuity and relationality in the ethnic identity of migrants from Bulgaria and of Turks of Bulgaria along with

differentiation, which are results of the migration of 1989 as a rupture point and of the socialization processes retained in the two different national settings. The discourse of Turkishness in Bulgaria turned into *soydaş* discourse in Turkey a plea to get accepted by the local community and legal authorities. Experiencing such a forced migration process, the ways of constituting different strategies of citizenship and identity, redefining what is Turkishness and performing it accordingly, and experiencing upward social mobility show hints of the ways of negotiating with the new identification. Therefore, this thesis pursued what endures and what has waned of the minority and migrant identity of a group of people who once shared the same setting in terms of culture, language, tradition, and geography. Nonetheless, home is about the people around you; and the environment you are surrounded with, which teaches you the language, the culture, and everyday practices; and it is also about memories that you build, reproduce and reconstruct over years with the past and the present moments. I argued that the question of where the homeland/motherland is for the Turks of Bulgaria always complicates in many ways when they try to define home in their narratives. It is neither a sole wish to live under a specific flag of a nation, nor spending their lives where they were born and raised but excluded.

The analysis of my research of the Turks of Bulgaria allows for the following conclusions. The reasons for the identity negotiations of the Turks of Bulgaria are the changing perception of community and the emphasis on Turkish identity, the political reasons, the consequences of the migration of 1989, and the effects of transnationality. After having existed as a minority community in Bulgaria and having experienced several forceful or intended migration processes, which resulted in having transnational ties, families, and relatives in another nation-state, that is occasionally defined 'motherland', formed the identity of the Turks of Bulgaria in a constantly negotiated way. The negotiated boundaries of their identity have a specific character; it is neither a sole migrant identity nor a dominant ethnic identity; the identity which leans on in-betweenness, which is consolidated with the encounters, that either creates differentiation or correspondence. Nevertheless, Turks of Bulgaria neither feel themselves adequate citizens in Bulgaria because of being an ethnic minority community nor consider themselves adequate Turks and Muslims in Turkey

because of the geography they come from and because of the historical construction of the identity of the Balkan migrants, which is expelled from the formation of Turkishness.

The case of the Turks of Bulgaria has exceptionality because their case represents a community, which was forcibly expelled from their homeland towards their alleged motherland or 'natural homeland' that shares the same ethnic kin, religion and mother tongue. Hence, their case goes beyond what the existing literature on migration, ethnicity and citizenship offer in terms of identity construction and negotiation of a community. The uniqueness of their case also lies on how transnationality works for them in terms of cross border activities between homeland and motherland, which occasionally interchange based on social, cultural and political interests. Significantly, Turks of Bulgaria can neither remain, as totally migrant nor *soydaş*, but they always constitute a transnational minority community. In this case, Turks belong to the ethnic minority community of Bulgaria, who were not born and raised inside the borders of the corresponding nation-state. Thus, they can be considered contrary to all the conventional definitions of migrants as the concepts of home and exile are blurred in their case. It has been always difficult for them to explain what they are, thus they rather tend to define themselves through what they are not; they are not Bulgarian, Christian, Pomak, Roma, Alevi, or Turks of Turkey. Thus their identity is constituted based on how they ethnically identify themselves by distinguishing themselves from other groups in Bulgaria, and by negotiating to prove that they are adequate citizens for Turkey, and by demonstrating ethnic and religious correspondence to their motherland Turkey. Nevertheless, the exclusion and disapproval of their identity by the local communities in the abovementioned states put them in a situation of being a minority community across borders.

The interest to retain their existence in Bulgaria is observed along with the internalized feelings of in-betweenness and longing for an idealized motherland. In addition, the effects of the assimilation process have been still alive for the Turks of Bulgaria. Turks of Bulgaria think that the significance of the ethnic cleansing has not

been acknowledged enough yet, neither by Turkey nor worldwide. Hence, the Turks of Bulgaria may constitute an exceptional case with the ways of expressing, explaining, and redefining who they are. Nonetheless, their consciousness and awareness for their ethnic and cultural identity have empowered with the assimilation and migration processes, but it is also the fact that, if there had not been a political intervention to their identity, they would have preferred to remain in Bulgaria. On the other hand, it was also the fact that migration and adaptation to a new country would also cause certain difficulties, despite the fact that it was considered as motherland.

I had certain difficulties that I anticipated at the beginning of my research. For instance, I could not manage to get in contact with Alevi villages in my field town in Bulgaria. On the other hand, visiting Roma-only villages was not something that I expected to do. I had a chance to visit three Roma villages shortly with social workers who regularly visit them in order to provide healthcare for newborns and children. What I observed was that especially in one village poverty was so visible; they have a lot of children and they get financial support from the state. However, I could not conduct interviews with them. I could not find all answers to my research questions. However, I can say that all this violence and discrimination the Turkish minority has been experiencing, has shaped their identity as a reactive construct. One of my interviewees, who was a local authority, stated that Turks are not mixed with other communities in Bulgaria, thus Turks would not disappear in few generations. The consciousness of identity is strong along with belonging to the geographical location they live in. Although most people suffer from lack of investment and poverty in the region, and discrimination in general, they describe the region, as “here is our land, Turkish land, where our people have been living for ages”⁴⁸.

Due to the limitations, the thesis could not focus on several issues. Because of the language barrier, I could not get in touch with the Bulgarian-speaking minorities in Bulgaria. I would like to spend more time in my field in Bulgaria, but economic

⁴⁸ This statement made by my interviewees got reaction from some of the Bulgarian academics, when I presented a part of my field research in Bulgaria.

conditions made it difficult for me. A comparative analysis of processes of construction of Turkish and Pomak identities in Bulgaria can be examined as a part of further research. Moreover, taking Turkish minority women's role into consideration especially after the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria can be another profound line of research in order to understand gender roles for the Turks who remained in Bulgaria. The effects of the 1989 migration on the migrants in terms rural-to-urban aspect of the migration can also be examined in further research.

Despite the limitations, this thesis may set an example to understand the current migration crisis in terms of forced migrations and asylum seekers. Turks of Bulgaria as an ethnic minority community turns out to be a part of the ethnic majority due to sharing the same ethnic kin with the majority in Turkey; however, a similar situation does not correspond to the Syrians, who escaped from the civil war in Syria and seek asylum in Turkey since 2011. Nonetheless, Turkey's historical record of immigration dates back to earlier periods; before the arrival of Syrian refugees, there were nearly 1 and 1.5 million undocumented migrants from different countries (former Soviet countries, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saharan Africa), however, they were far from getting Turkish citizenship or long-term legal status in Turkey, compared to the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants who have *soydaş* status and a privileged position (Parla, 2019, p.14). Due to the changing migration regimes in Turkey, the privileged position of the Bulgarian-Turkish migrants has waned. Until 2009, a reduced residence (two years of settlement in Turkey) was enough for citizenship, however, an unexpected change in the Citizenship Law passed in 2009 eliminate ethnicity requirement and put 5 years of settlement rule to all of the migrants who seek for Turkish citizenship (ibid., p.4). The change in the citizenship law seems to equalize the status of refugees in Turkey, however, the question on cultural adaptation and everyday discrimination of some preferred and unpreferred migrants is still on the table. Therefore, the case of the Turks of Bulgaria helps the problematization of ethnic return migration and its effects in migration policies in different settings.

In this research, I inferred from the experiences of the Turks of Bulgaria based on my semi-structured interviews with them both in Bulgaria and in Turkey, enriched with

reflections as a child of an immigrant family in the Bulgarian-Turkish immigrant society. Nonetheless, there is no claim in this thesis study to represent all migrant community in Turkey or minority community in Bulgaria. The research also aims to contribute to further research on the Turks of Bulgaria and migrations from the Balkans, along with transnationality and ethnicity research by demonstrating experiences of a group of people on negotiating their identities, which share commonalities and differences in similar or different settings. Finally, this thesis aims to understand to what extent Turks of Bulgaria negotiate their identities in order to enroot themselves in a place, by taking into account their experiences, subjectivities, memories, feelings, and thoughts.

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APPENDICES

A. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

A.1 Questionnaire in Turkish

Mülakat soruları-Türkiye

Demografi

1. Dogum tarihiniz?
2. Dogum yeriniz?
3. Ne is yapıyorsunuz?
4. Kendinizi nereli olarak tanımlıyorsunuz? Neden?
Türk
Bulgar
Bulgaristan Türkü
Göçmen
Muhacir
Soydaş
5. Göç hikayenizi hatırladığınız kadarıyla anlatabilir misiniz? Nereden geldiniz, ne zaman, neden?
6. Türkiye hakkındaki düşünceleriniz göçten önce nasıldı? Göçten sonra farklılık oldu mu?

Siyaset
Eğitim
Sosyal yaşam
Tv dizileri-filmleri
7. Zorunlu göç yaşanmamış olsaydı yine de Türkiye'ye gelmek/yaşamak ister miydiniz? Bulgaristan'da yaşamak ister miydiniz? Neden?
8. Anneniz ve babanız ne iş yapıyor?
9. Onların Türkiye hakkındaki düşünceleri neler?

Bulgaristan

10. Bulgaristan nasıl bir ülke? Orada kalmak ister miydiniz?
11. Bulgaristan Türkleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
12. Bulgaristan ile ilişkiniz ne durumda? Ne sıklıkta gelip gidiyorsunuz?
13. Bulgaristan hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? (Komünist rejim ve şimdiki rejim arasında farklar var mı?)

Siyaset- Türkler temsil ediliyor mu?

Eğitim

İş yaşamı

Maaşlar

Tatil olanakları

Sosyal yaşam

Sosyal olanaklar

Kültür aktiviteleri

14. Hangi dili kullanıyorsunuz?

15. Çocuğunuz aldığı eğitimden ne derece memnunsunuz? Kendi aldığınız eğitimle kıyaslayınca?

Kültür

16. “Yerliler” ile aranızda kültürel farklar olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

Eğitim

Giyim kuşam

Kadının çalışma hayatı/kadına bakış

Yeme-içme/eğlence

Ekonomik

17. Bulgarlarla aranızda kültürel farklar var mıydı?

18. Başka milletlerden insanlarla kıyaslayınca size iş hayatınızda ne kadar fırsat veriliyor? Ayrımcılığa uğradığınızı hissettiğiniz oldu mu?

19. Çocuğunuz aşağıdakilerden hangisini yapsa tepki gösterirdiniz? Başka milletten/dinden biriyle evlense –Bulgar, Pomak, Çingene vs. Kendini Bulgar olarak tanımlasa.

20. Mahallenizde nasıl problemler var?

Başka milletlerden insanların anlaşamaması.

Yasalara, devlete saygısızlık

Hırsızlık vs.

Temsiliyet

21. Bulgaristan’da iş yaşamında, siyasette, eğitim hayatında Türkler ne derecede temsil ediliyordu? Şu anda bir değişiklik var mı? Dönüm noktaları oldu mu?

Sosyal ağlar

22. Akrabalık ilişkileriniz nasıl? (Bulgaristan’da/ Türkiye’de nasıl?)

23. Akrabalarınızın Türkiye'ye göç etmenizde, yerleşmenizde rolü var mı?
24. Başınız sıkıştığında kimlerden yardım istersiniz? (komşu, akraba, tanıdık)
25. İş bulmanıza yardımcı olanlar oldu mu?

Mülakat soruları-Bulgaristan

Demografi

1. Dogum tarihiniz ve dogum yeriniz?
2. Egitim durumunuz ve mesleginiz?
3. Goc etmisseniz nerden ne zaman?
4. Kendinizi nereli olarak tanımlıyorsunuz? Neden?
Türk (Türkler nerden geldi, hep burada miydi sizce?)
Bulgar
Bulgaristan Türkü
5. Türkiye hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
Siyaset
Eğitim
Sosyal yaşam
Tv dizileri-filmleri
6. Türkiye'de yaşamak ister miydiniz? Neden?
7. Anneniz ve babanız ne iş yapıyor?
8. Aileniz Türkiye'ye göç etmek istedi mi?
9. Türkiye'ye göç hakkındaki genel düşünceleriniz neler?
10. Onların Türkiye hakkındaki düşünceleri neler?

Bulgaristan

11. Komunist rejimdeki Bulgaristan nasıldı?
12. Türklere davranışlar nasıl?
13. Sürgünden haberiniz var mı?

Belene hapşanesi?

14. Bulgaristan nasıl bir ülke? Burada yaşamaktan memnun musunuz?

15. Bulgaristan hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

16. Bulgaristan

Eğitim

İş yaşamı

Maaşlar

Tatil olanakları

Sosyal yaşam

Sosyal olanaklar

Kültür aktiviteleri

17. Bulgaristan'ın AB üyeliği hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? AB Parlamentosu seçimlerinde oy kullanacak mısınız?

18. Hangi dili kullanıyorsunuz?

19. Dini faaliyetlere katılıyor musunuz? Baska dinden insanlarla problem yaşadığınız oluyor mu?

Kültür

20. Bulgarlarla aranızda kültürel farklar olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

Eğitim

Giyim kuşam

Kadının çalışma hayatı/kadına bakış

Yeme-içme/eğlence

Ekonomik

21. Türkiyelilerle aranızda kültürel farklar var mıydı?

22. Başka milletlerden insanlarla kıyaslayınca size iş hayatınızda ne kadar fırsat veriliyor? Ayrımcılığa uğradığınızı hissettiğiniz oldu mu?

23. Çocuğunuz aşağıdakilerden hangisini yapsa tepki gösterirdiniz? Başka milletten/dinden biriyle evlense –Bulgar, Pomak, Çingene vs. Kendini Bulgar olarak tanımlasa.

24. Mahallenizde nasıl problemler var?

Başka milletlerden insanların anlaşılamaması.

Yasalara, devlete saygısızlık

Hırsızlık vs.

Temsiliyet

25. Bulgaristan'da iş yaşamında, siyasette, eğitim hayatında Türkler ne derecede temsil ediliyordu? Şu anda bir değişiklik var mı? Dönüm noktaları oldu mu?

Sosyal ağlar

26. Akrabalık ilişkileriniz nasıl? (Bulgaristan'da/ Türkiye'de nasıl?)
27. Başınız sıkıştığında kimlerden yardım istersiniz? (komşu, akraba, tanıdık)
28. İş bulmanıza yardımcı olanlar oldu mu?



A.2 Questionnaire in English

Interview questions in Turkey

Demographic Information

1. What is your place of birth, date of birth?
2. What is your education/occupation?
3. How do you define yourself?

Turk

Bulgarian

Bulgarian-Turkish

Migrant

Muhacir

Soydaş

4. Can you please tell you migration story? Where do you emigrate from? Why and when?
5. What was your opinion before migrating to Turkey? Did it change?
Politics
Education
Social life
TV programs
6. Would you still prefer to migrate to Turkey if you would have never been forced to leave Bulgaria? Or would you prefer staying in Bulgaria? Why?
7. What was occupation of your parents?
8. What were their thoughts about Turkey?

Questions about Bulgaria

9. What do you think about Bulgaria? do you want to live there?
10. What do you think about those who stayed in Bulgaria?
11. How frequent do you visit Bulgaria? how is your relationship with those who stayed?

12. What do you think about Bulgaria before and after communist period?

Politics- do you think Turks are represented?

Education

Working life

Social life

Cultural activities

13. Which language do you use?

14. What do you think about your children's education compared to your education you had in Bulgaria?

Culture

15. Do you think you have differences with locals in Turkey? In terms of:

Education level

Clothing

Perception of working women/ perception of gender

Culinary

Economic

16. Did you have cultural differences with Bulgarians in Bulgaria?

17. Have you ever experienced discrimination in Turkey? For instance in working life? Compared to other minorities how advantageous/disadvantageous are you?

18. Under which condition your reactions would be negative to your children?
i.e. marriages with Bulgarian/Pomak/Roma; or defining as Bulgarian)

19. Do you have any problems in your neighborhood? Do you get along with your neighbors?

20.

Representation

21. Do you think Turks in Bulgaria were represented in politics, working life, education? How was before and how is now? Any turning points?

Social networks

22. How are your relationships with your relatives in Bulgaria and in Turkey?
23. Do your relative play a role in migrating and settling in turkey for you?
24. Who do you use to ask for help when you are in trouble? (neighbor, relative?)
25. Did anybody help you in finding employment?

Interview questions-Bulgaria

Demographic Information

1. What is your place of birth, date of birth?
2. What is your education/occupation?
3. Do you emigrate from Bulgaria? (if yes from where and when)
4. In which country do you feel you belong? Why?
Turk (What do you think about history of Turks in Bulgaria?)
Bulgarian
Bulgarian-Turkish

Questions about Turkey

5. What do you think about these issues in Turkey?
Politics
Education
Social life
TV programs
6. Have you ever thought about living in Turkey? if yes Why?
7. What was your parents education level?
8. Did your family want to emigrate to Turkey?
9. What is your general opinion about emigrating to Turkey?
10. What was your family's opinions about Turkey?

Questions about Bulgaria

11. How was Bulgaria under the communist regime?
12. How did communist Bulgaria behave to turks?
13. Have you ever heard about the exile of Turks to the North Bulgaria in 1950s?
14. Have you ever heard about Belene prison?
15. What is your general opinion about living in Bulgaria?
16. How is Bulgaria in terms of these:
 - Education
 - Working life
 - Wages
 - Social life
 - Cultural activities
17. What is your opinion about Bulgaria's EU membership? Do you vote in the upcoming EU parliamentary elections?
18. Which language do you use?
19. Do you engage in religious activities? Have you experienced any problems with other religions?

Culture

20. Do you think you have cultural differences with Bulgarians? In terms of:
 - Education level
 - Clothing
 - Perception of working women/ perception of gender
 - Culinary
 - Economic
21. Do you think you have cultural differences with those who emigrated to Turkey?
22. Have you ever experienced discrimination? For instance in working life?
 - Compared to other minorities how advantageous/disadvantageous are you?
23. Under which condition your reactions would be negative to your children? (i.e. marriages with Bulgarian/Pomak/Roma; or defining as Bulgarian)
24. Do you have any problems in your neighborhood? Do you get along with your neighbors? Any disobedience to laws? Robbery?

Representation

25. Do you think Turks in Bulgaria are represented in politics, working life, education? How was before and how is now? Any turning points?

Social networks

26. How are your relationships with your relatives in Bulgaria and in Turkey?

27. Who do you use to ask for help when you are in trouble? (neighbor, relative?)

28. Did anybody help you in finding employment?



B. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Besim Can ZIRH

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız doktora öğrencisi Özge KAYTAN'ın "Müzakere Edilmiş Sınırlar: Bulgaristan Göçmenlerinde Ulusötesi Deneyimle" başlıklı tezi, [REDACTED] tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay ve [REDACTED] tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.

Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN

Başkan V.

Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

Üye

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR

Üye

Doç. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI

Üye

Doç. Dr. Zana ÇITAK

Üye

Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK

Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Pınar KAYGAN

Üye

C. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Kaytan, Özge

[REDACTED]
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Gender and Women's Studies	2014
BA	Bilkent University, Political Science	2011
High School	Atakent Anadolu High School, İzmir	2006

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS

1. Kaytan, Özge (2016). "Gendered Citizenship: Experiences and Perceptions of the Bulgarian Turkish Immigrant Women" Chapter 3 in *Turkish Migration Policy* (eds.I. Sirkeci, B. Pusch) Transnational Press London.
2. Kaytan, Özge (2016). "Transnational Identity among the Bulgarian-Turkish Migrants in Turkey". Turkish Migration Conference 2016 Selected Proceedings. Transnational Press London.

3. Kaytan, Özge (2016). “Understanding Migration: Bulgarian-Turkish Women’s Narratives”. Proceedings of Papers of International Conference on Knowledge and Politics in Gender and Women’s Studies 2015, Middle East Technical University.
4. Kaytan, Özge (2015). “Gendered Citizenship: Experiences and Perceptions of the Bulgarian Turkish Immigrant Women”. Turkish Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceedings. Transnational Press London.

HOBBIES

Literature, Swimming, Movies



D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu tez alışmasının amacı Bulgaristan Trklerinin srekli olarak mzakere edilen kimlik stratejilerini Bulgaristan ve Trkiye olmak zere iki farklı ulusal zeminde incelemektir. Bulgaristan'daki Trk azınlığı, 1878 yılında Bulgaristan'ın Osmanlı'dan bağımsızlığını kazanması zerine Bulgaristan iin srekli olarak bir sorun teşkil etmiş ve Trk azınlık eşitli yıllarda zorunlu ge tabi tutulmuştur. Bulgaristan'da tarihsel olarak farklı zamanlarda ayrımcılığa uğrayan Trk azınlık 1980'li yıllarda başlayan ve devlet politikası haline gelen asimilasyon sreci ile birlikte 1989 yılında Trkiye'ye kitlesel bir g gerekleşmiştir. Bulgaristan Trkleri gerek tabi tutuldukları zorunlu gler, gerekse etnik kimliklerine yapılan asimilasyon politikaları sebebiyle srekli olarak arafta kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla memleket ve anavatan algıları srekli olarak kaygan bir zeminde kalmıştır. Bulgaristan'da azınlık olarak kabul grmeyen Trkler, Trkiye'ye geldiklerinde de soydaş olarak grlmelerine rağmen hayatları boyunca gmen kalmış, kendilerini anavatan saydıkları Trkiye'ye ait hissedememiş ve memleket dedikleri Bulgaristan ve Bulgaristan'da kalan akrabaları ile gl bağılarını ulustesi yollarla ve ağılarla srdrmüşlerdir. Bu tez alışması Bulgaristan Trklerinin etnik, gmen ve azınlık kimliklerini sınır-aşırı ve ulustesi olarak hangi yollarla ve stratejilerle mzakere ve inşâ ettiklerini yanıtlamaya alışmıştır.

Ulus devletlerin sınırları gmenlerin ulus-tesi kimlik deneyimlerini belirlemede yetersiz kalır. Gmenlerin kimlik algılarında, bu sınırlar siyasi kısıtlamalardan teye geemez. Ancak, Bulgaristan Trkleri rneğinde Bulgaristan ve Trkiye devletleri arasındaki sınır coğrafi bir yn gstergesidir; gmenlerin deneyiminde siyasi bir kimlik niteliği taşımaz. Bulgaristan Trkleri rneği etnik kimlik ve ulus kimliği arasındaki etkileşim dolayısıyla zgn bir rnek niteliğindedir. Bulgaristan Trklerinin Bulgaristan'da yaşarken gl bir etnik kimlik zelliği taşıyan kimlikleri, Trkiye'ye gle birlikte gl bir ulus kimliğine dnşmştr. Ancak, bu gmen grubu arasında etnisite ve ulus kimliklerini eşit grme eğilimi de gz ardı edilemez. Bu durumun nemli bir sebebi Trkiye'ye gle birlikte değışen stat durumlarıdır.

Azınlık oldukları bir toplumdan, “soydaş” ve dolayısıyla “çoğunluk” oldukları bir topluma göç etmişlerdir. Bu göçmenler iki devlet arasında ulus-ötesi sosyal bağlantılar geliştirmişlerdir. Bulgaristan Türkleri arasında memleket ve anavatanları ayrımlarının yapıldığı gözlemlenmiştir.

Bu tez çalışmasında, iki ulus devlet arasında tarihsel bir arka planda gidip gelen Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimliklerine dair müzakere yollarını ve kim olduklarına ve kim olmadıklarına dair deneyimlerini anlamaya çalıştım. Bulgaristan Türklerinin 1989 göçüne dair hatıralarını, Bulgaristan’da kalarak Türkiye’ye göç edemeyenlerin anlatılarını da ele alarak onların kimlik algılarını ve hangi yollarla kimlik pazarlığına giriştiklerini analiz etmeye çalıştım. Göçmenlerin ulus-ötesi sosyal bağlantılarından yola çıkarak onların memleket ve anavatan kavramları hakkındaki algılarını çözümlemeye çalıştım. Ancak tüm bu anlama süreçleri içinde Bulgaristan Türklerini konumlandırmak bu tez çalışmasının hem bir zorluğu hem de sorunsalı olmuştur.

Bu tez çalışması boyunca Bulgaristan’dan Türkiye’ye göç edenleri Bulgaristan göçmenleri olarak ele alırken, Bulgaristan’da kalan Türkleri azınlık grup olarak ele aldım. Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Bulgaristan göçmenleri olarak konumlandırıdığım görüşmecilerim özellikle “Bulgar” olarak anılmak istemediklerini dile getirdiler. Literatürde değişik kullanımlar olmasına karşın, görüşmecilerimin hassasiyetlerini de göze olarak bu iki terimi kullanmayı tercih ettim. Dolayısıyla bu tez çalışması zorunlu göçe tabi tutulmuş, iki ulus devlet sınırları arasında kalmış ve farklı etnik aidiyetler ve sınırlar geliştirmiş bir etnik grubun devam eden göçmen statülerini ve azınlık durumlarını karşılaştırmalı olarak ele alarak, onların kimlik pazarlıklarına dair anlatılarını ve deneyimlerini anlamaya çalışmıştır. Bulgaristan Türklerinin memleket ve anavatan olarak niteledikleri ikilikle, arafta kalmışlık duygusuyla, 1989 göçünün sonuçlarıyla ve ulusötesi ağlarla değişen ve dönüşen aidiyet, kimlik ve topluluk algılarına odaklanmak bu çalışmanın öncelikli amaçları arasındadır. Dolayısıyla tezin araştırma sorusu şu şekilde kurgulanmıştır: Bulgaristan Türkleri hangi sebeplerle kimliklerine dair bir pazarlık ve müzakere arayışındadır ve bu müzakerenin araçları ve yolları nelerden oluşur? Ana araştırma sorusunun getirdiği bazı yan sorular şunlardır: bir topluluğa ait olma algısı 1989 göçünden sonra nasıl

değişmiştir? Bulgaristan Türklerinin etnik kimlikleri diğer kimliklerle nasıl sınırlar örmüştür? Vatandaşlık olgusu kimlik müzakerelerinin içinde nerede durur? Ulusötesilik ve sınır aşırı hareketlilikler Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimlik kurgularına nasıl etki eder?

Bulgaristan göçmenlerinin Türkiye'ye göç etmelerinden sonra etnik aidiyetlerinde hem bir devamlılık hem de ayrışma gözlemlenmiştir çünkü 1989 göçü hayatlarını büyük oranda etkileyen bir dönüm noktasıdır. Bulgaristan Türkleri iki farklı ülkeden ve kültürde sosyalizasyon süreci geçirmişlerdir. Hem etnik çoğunluktan ayrılmak hem de yakınsanmak için Bulgaristan'daki "biz Türk'üz" söylemi Türkiye'de "bizler soydaşlarız" söylemine dönüşmüştür. Dolayısıyla bu tez çalışmasında göçmenlerde ve etnik azınlık grupta kültür, dil, gelenek ve coğrafya bakımından nelerin devam edebildiği ve nelerin şekil değiştirdiği veya yok olduğu da araştırılmıştır.

Bulgaristan'ın 1878'de Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ayrılarak bağımsızlığını ilan etmesi üzerine Türkler Bulgaristan'da azınlık bir topluluk olarak varlıklarını sürdürmüşlerdir. Bulgaristan Türkleri Bulgaristan'ın bağımsızlığından itibaren çeşitli göç dalgalarıyla zorunlu veya gönüllü olarak Türkiye'ye göç etmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla pek çok Bulgaristan Türk'ünün 'anavatan' saydıkları Türkiye'de tanıdıkları, akrabaları ve aileleri bulunmaktadır. Bu da iki devlet arasındaki sınıra ulusötesi ve özgün bir karakter kazandırarak, Bulgaristan Türklerinin aidiyet ve kimliklerini sürekli olarak müzakere edilen bir örüntüye dönüştürmüştür. Buradan yola çıkarak şunu söyleyebiliriz ki, Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimlikleri ne yalnızca bir göçmen kimliğidir ne de baskın bir etnik kimliktir. Bulgaristan Türkleri için zorunlu göçlerin sebep olduğu iki devlet arasında gidip gelmeler sonucu oluşan arafta kalmışlık duygusu, farklı gruplarla yaşanan karşılaşmalar, etkileşimler ve yeni bir topluluğa kabul edilme kaygılarının sonucunda kurulmuş bir kimlikten bahsedilebilir. Bulgaristan Türkleri kendilerini ne Bulgaristan'da yeterli ve tam vatandaş olarak hissedilmiş ne de Türkiye'de Balkan göçmenlerine yönelik önyargılardan ve tarihsel arka plan dolayısıyla yeterli ve düzgün Müslüman ve Türkler olarak görebilmişlerdir.

Sıla ve gurbet olguları Bulgaristan Türklerinde sürekli olarak kaygan zeminedir

çünkü onlar etnik köken, dil ve din olarak anavatan saydıkları ülkede doğmamış, bunun yerine bu ülkeye doğru zorunlu göçe tabi tutulmuşlardır. Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye 1989 zorunlu göçü bu anlamda özgünlük bir nitelik taşır; etnik azınlık bir topluluğun yabancı bir ülkeden 'doğal' anavatanlarına 'olması gerektiği gibi' göç ettiği varsayılır. Ne var ki, bu tez çalışmasındaki alan araştırmasında görülen kolektif hafıza, hikayeler ve deneyimler Bulgaristan Türklerini böyle kolay bir şekilde gruplayamayacağımızı göstermiştir. Alan araştırmasında gözlemlenmiştir ki Bulgaristan Türkleri süregelen bir kimlik pazarlığı içinde kendileri daha çok ne olmadıkları üzerinden tanımlamaya meyillidirler. Bulgaristan Türkleri kendilerini bir yandan Türkiye'ye yakınsamaya çalışırken bir yandan da etnik olarak ayrıştıkları toplulukların sınırlarını belirleyerek kendilerini onlardan ayrıştırmaya çalışırlar. Bu sebeple Bulgaristan Türkeri'nin kimlik aidiyetleri ne tamamıyla göçmen, ne de soydaş olarak tanımlanabilir; ancak süregelen kimlik pazarlığında azınlık kimlikleri bakidir.

Bu tez çalışmasında teorik çerçeve olarak kimlik, topluluk, etnik kimlik, vatandaşlık ve ulusötesilik literatürleri Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimlik çok yönlü ve müzakere edilmiş sınırlarını açıklamak için kullanılmıştır. Özgün bir topluluk olarak Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimlik ve aidiyet meseleleri var olan literatüre de katkıda bulunmayı amaçlar. Hafızanın kurgusu olarak kimlik Balkan göçlerinin tarihsel arka planını anlamlandırabilmek için çok önemli bir araçtır. Göçmen ve azınlık grupların kimlikleri hatırlamakla, hafızayı zorlamakla, geçmişin kurgusunu şimdiki an ile yapmakla ve sınır ötesi ilişkileri devam ettirmekle yakından ilgilidir. Popüler bir önyargı olarak Balkanlar coğrafyası aşkın bir tarihsel hafızayla, nefretin yayılmasıyla ve etnik ve dinsel grupların çatışmalarıyla anılır. (Todorova, 2004, s.2). Dolayısıyla çatışmalara sebep olarak bu coğrafyada yaşanan hızlı sosyal değişimler ve güçlü kimlik dönüşümleri gösterilir. (age.). Bulgaristan da etnik ve dini çatışmaların, sosyal değişimlerin ve kimlik dönüşümlerinin yaşandığı bir ülkedir.

Literatürde sembolik olarak kurgulanan topluluklar ve sınırlar bu çalışmanın temel argümanlarını desteklemektedir. Başka kimliklere ve topluluklara çekilen sınırlar bir topluluğun kim olduğunu veya olmadığını belirler. Dolayısıyla sınırlar bir topluluğun

kimlik pazarlığına dair çok şey söyler. Topluluğun sınırları belirli ortaklıkların altını çizerek ve yine belirli ayrımların yapılmasıyla oluşturulur (Cohen, 2013, s.12). Bir topluluğa karşı yapılabilecek ayrımcılığa rağmen belirli ayrımların yapılarak farkları vurgulamak topluluğun doğal kurallarından biridir (age.). Barth (1969) da aynı şekilde topluluğu belirleyen en önemli faktörlerden birinin o topluluğun diğerlerinden ayrıştığı noktalar olduğunu söyler. Dolayısıyla sınırların belirli bir başlangıç ve bitişleri vardır; sınırlar ulusal, idari, durumsal, fiziki, ırksal, dilsel ve dinsel olabilir (Cohen, 2013, s.12). Ancak her sınır gözle görülemez çünkü sınırlar topluluğun zihninde veya düşüncesinde oluşturulmuş olabilir, dolayısıyla topluluk içindeki ve dışındaki bireyler bu sınırları farklı farklı algılarlar (age.). İnsanların zihninden oluşturulan sınırlar kimlik ve hafıza arasındaki ilişkiyi de yansıtır ve bir topluluğun kendine atfettiği kimliklerle yakından alakalıdır. Cohen'in (2013) ele aldığı gibi topluluğu açıklarken teorik ve morfolojik açıklamalardan ziyade topluluğun üyelerinin deneyimlerini ve algılarını ön plana almak tercih sebebi olmalıdır. Bu tez çalışması boyunca topluluğun nasıl ele alındığını anlamak için bu yaklaşımı uygulamaya çalışarak görüşmeler yaptığım Bulgaristan Türklerinin deneyimlerini, seslerini, anılarını ve onların kendilerine yaptıkları atıfları öncelikli kıldım.

Topluluğun sembolik olarak kurulması kimi zaman kültürün sembolik olarak tersine çevrildiği durumları da içerir. Bunun sebebi diğer topluluğun kültürünü de benimseyerek topluluk sınırlarının kesin olarak çizmektir (Cohen, 2013, s.58). Etnik azınlık bir topluluk olan Samilerin Norveç'te kamusal alanda etnik kimliklerini açıklamamaları ve beyaz Norveçliler gibi davranmaları, sadece özel alanda etnik kimliklerini yaşamaları buna örnek verilebilir (Eidheim, 1969). Dolayısıyla topluluğun sınırları kesin değildir; ilişkiseldir ve diğer topluluklarla olan iletişimlerde ortaya çıkar. Cohen, 2013, p.58). İnsanlar başkaları ile karşılaştıklarını kendilerini ayırıştırma ihtiyacı duyarlar çünkü her söylem, her kültür değiline meyleder (Boon, 1982, s.232). Başka kültürlerle karşılaşmak insanları kendi kültürüne karşı daha hassas hale getirir ve kendi kültürünün sınırlarının zayıflayacağı endişesini doğurarak insanların sembolik davranışlar sergilemelerine sebep olur (Cohen, 2013, s.70). Daha sonraki kısımlarda tartışılacağı gibi, uzun yıllara dayanan

birlikte yaşama pratiği ve ortak din paylaşımına rağmen Bulgaristan Türkleri ve Pomaklar arasındaki tansiyon sınırların keskin bir şekilde çizme isteği ve kendilerini ötekinden ayırıştırma isteği ile doğru orantılıdır.

Sembolik bir inşa olarak topluluklar arası sınırlar fiziki olarak gerçekleşen sınır geçme deneyimlerini de vurgulayarak, ev, yurt, memleket, anavatan, sıra ve gurbet kavramlarının da sınırlarını çizer. Bir ulusal sınırı geçmek sınırı geçmeyenlerle ve sınırın geçilen tarafındakilerle farklı sınırlar yaratır. Soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde ulusal sınırları tanımlamak küresel ölçekte kültürel, siyasi ve ekonomik olarak değişmiştir çünkü insanların yeni ve esnek ihtiyaçları sabit olarak tanımlanan ulus devletler ve onların sınırları ile çelişmektedir (Donnan and Wilson, 1999, s.1-3). Bir sınırı geçmek sadece basitçe fiziki bir yerden geçmek anlamına gelmez; sınırı geçen kişilerin yani göçmenlerin gözünde yeni yeni anlamlar yaratır ve sınırı geçmenin daha soyut anlamlarına işaret ederek yeni kimlik söylemleri yaratır (Newman, 2006, s.173). Ayrıca sınırlar yönetsel araçlar olarak işlev görerek kültüre mirasları ve kimlikleri de etkilerler (Elchinova et al., 2012, s.5). Sınırlar mekana ait pratiklerde, hatıralarda ve sınırı geçen kişilerin anlatılarında var olurlar dolayısıyla sınırı geçmek zaman ve mekanda kaymaya sebep olurken sınırı geçen kişilerin sınırla ve onun yarattığı hatıralar ve pratiklerle müzakere etmesini gerektirir (Hurd et al., 2017, s.1).

Sınırı geçerken arada kalmışlık hissi göçmenlerin karşılaştığı en önemli deneyimlerde biridir. Her ne kadar gerekli evrakları ve meşru yolları olsa da sınır geçmek göçmenler için olmaları gereken yerde olmadıkları anlamına da gelir. Yani bir sınır geçilirken, kültürel olarak geçilmesi gereken yeni bir sınır ortaya çıkar (Newman, 2006, s.179). Göçmenlerin hedef ülkede karşılaştıkları sorunlar ve uyum problemleri uzun süren etkilerdir. Fiziki olarak bir sınırı geçmek bir kerelik bir olay olsa da, onun getirdiği sosyal ve kültürel sonuçlar hayat boyu süren deneyimlerdir ve göçmenlerin sınırlarla müzakere etme biçimlerine yansır (Hurd et al., 2017, s.12-13). Bazı göçmenlerin geride kalan yakınları ve aileleriyle olan bağlarını güçlendirmeleri siyasi ve sosyal sınırların ötesinde bir durumdur (Schiller et al., 1995, s.56). dolayısıyla göçmenler ulusötesi olarak paralel bir zaman-mekan düzleminde kültürel ritüellerini, karşılıklı hediyeleşmelerini, para alışverişini ve evlilik örüntülerini

çevrimiçi yollarla veya sık ziyaretlerle sürdürürler (Vertovec, 2004). Bu tekrarlanan ulusötesi örüntüler bir süre sonra göçmenlerin gündelik yaşam pratiklerine dönüşür (Hurd et al., 2017, s.14-15). Yüksek bir kolektifin parçası olarak hissetmek için göçmenler sınırlara ve siyasetlere rağmen ulusötesi hareketlerini sürdürürler ve bu yolla sıra ve gurbet arasında zaman-mekan senkronize edilir (age.). Dolayısıyla bir ulusal sınırı geçmek geride kalanlarla zamansal ve mekânsal bir ayrıma sebep olsa da, göçmenlerin köken ülkeleriyle olan ulusötesi bağlarını sınırlandırmaz.

Bu tez çalışmasında kimlik konusu etnik kimlik düşünülerek yapılmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma özgün bir etnik grubun iki ulus devlet arasında gidip gelen sınırlarını oluşturan farklı süreçlere odaklanır. Literatürdeki etnisite kuramlarında ilksel, durumsal, ve kurgusal olan kuramları kullanarak çalışmanın teorik çerçevesini oluşturmayı amaçladım. Barth'ın (1969) transaksiyonel analizini baz alarak sosyal sınırların nasıl çizildiğini bu çalışma bağlamında anlayabiliriz. Barth'a göre bir etnik grubu oluşturan en önemli özelliklerden biri atfedilen kimliktir. Bu atıf hem kendi kendine atfı niteler hem de başkaları yapılan atıfları anlatır. Öte yandan Nash'a göre etnik kimlik kültürel kategoriler içerir ve bunlar sosyal ve grup referanslarıyla ilgilidir. Bir etnik grubu oluşturan kültürel göstergeler o etnik grubun sınırlarını da oluşturur. Nash'a (1996, s.24) göre en önemli üç kültürel gösterge şunlardır; akrabalık, birlikte yeme içme eylemi ve ortak inanç. Ayrıca, Weber'e göre etnik grubun en önemli belirleyenlerinden biri dildir çünkü dil etnik grupta değişikliklerden etkilenmez. Etnik grubun varlığının devamı için üyelerinin ortak bir etnisite inancına da sahip olması gerekir. Weber bir devletin vatandaşlarını bir arada tutan şeyin varsayılan kimlik olduğunu vurgular, çünkü varsayılan kimlik ortak olarak inanılan siyasi bir cemaatin varlığını da niteler. Dolayısıyla etnik grubundan kendisinden ziyade o etnik grubun oluşumunda etkili olan, onu biçimlendiren öğeler daha önemlidir. Öte yandan Smith'in (2010) etno-sembolik yaklaşımı ulusal kimliği oluşturan mitlerin, anların, değerlerin, geleneklerin ve sembollerin etnik kimliğin oluşumunda etkili olduğunu savunur. Çünkü bütün bu örüntüler bir etnik grup için spesifik bir kültürü ve ortak bir kaderi oluşturur.

Bu tez çalışmasında vatandaşlık kavramını kimlik pazarlığının bir parçası olarak ele

aldım. Vatandaşlık sadece kimlik kartları ve milliyetle açıklanmaktan ziyade farklı sosyalizasyonlara işaret eden etnisite, kültür ve toplumsal cinsiyeti de içerir. Dolayısıyla vatandaşlığı siyasi ve sosyal haklardan öte bir şey olarak düşünmeliyiz çünkü vatandaşlık toplumsal cinsiyet ve etnisite temelli bir süreçtir (Walby, 1994, p.391). bu tez çalışmasının amacı vatandaşlığın tarihsel arka planı ve tanımlamalarını vermek değil, vatandaşlığın göçler ve göçmenlerin deneyimleriyle nasıl dönüştüğünü ve ulusötesi haklar bağlamında nasıl ele alındığını kendi saha araştırmam doğrultusunda tartışmaktır. Topluluk ve etnisite tartışmaları ile birlikte vatandaşlık kavramı ulus devletlerin dışına farklı ve esnek nosyonlara dönüşmektedir. Ulusötesi hareketlilikler ile birlikte vatandaşlık kavramı azınlıklar bağlamında çifte vatandaşlık kurumuyla yakından ilgili hale gelmiştir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra değişen dünyada ulus devletlerin de dönüşümüyle birlikte yeni, ulus devlete bağlı olmayana ve evrensel bir insanlığı tanımlayan bir vatandaşlık kavramı ortaya çıkmıştır (Soysal, 1994, s.1). Soysal'ın göçmen işçilerle yaptığı çalışma gösteriyor ki bu yeni vatandaşlık kavramı kişisel hak alanını genişletirken, ulusal bağlılığı sarsarak onunla çelişmektedir. Göçmen işçiler Avrupa'da istihdam edilirken ulusal bütünlükten dışarıda görülmüşlerdir ve işleri bittiği anda veya verimlilikte bir sıkıntı baş gösterdiğinde kendi ülkelerine geri gönderilmeleri beklenmektedir. Ne var ki göçmen işçiler geri gitmek bir yana kendilerine ait bir topluluk oluşturup ev sahibi ülkede farklı şekillerde hayata katılmışlardır. Göçmen işçilerin o ülkenin refah, eğitim, sağlık, pazar ekonomisine katılımı ve siyasi ve dernekleşme faaliyetlerine katılması vatandaşlığın klasik anlamlarına bakılarak ampirik bir anomali olarak görülmüştür (age., s1-2). Soysal tarafından post-ulusal vatandaşlık olarak tanımlanan bu vatandaşlık kavramı ulus devletleri aşan yeni bir üyelik şeklini ifade etmektedir. Post-ulusal vatandaşlık kavramı ulusötesi söylemler ile yakından alakalı olup tarihsel ve kültürel arka plandan bağımsız olarak insanlık temelinde hakları ve katılımı ifade eder. Ulusötesi alanla ilgili bir diğer vatandaşlık kavramı da Ong'un (1999) ortaya koyduğu esnek vatandaşlık kavramıdır. Esnek vatandaşlık hareketlilikler ve sosyal düzen arasındaki tansiyona işaret ederek geç kapitalizmin esneklik modeline tekabül eder.

Yeni ortaya çıkan vatandaşlık kavramsallaştırmaları ulusötesi hareketliliklerle ve göçlerin ulusötesi kimlikleriyle yakından ilgilidir. İnsanların veya toplulukların nereye ait oldukları sahip oldukları pasaportlarla sınırlandırılmayacağı gibi o ulus devlet içinde yaşayıp yaşamadıklarıyla da ölçülemez. Birden fazla ulus devlete çoklu ait olma biçimleri de vardır ve göçmen topluluklar buralarda tutunmaya çalışırlar. Bulgaristan Türkleri örneğinde de ulusötesi göçe ve hareketliliklere dair elementler vardır. Ulusötesi özellikler taşıyan toplulukların birden fazla yer bağları vardır ve etnisite ve milliyet gibi kavramların iç içe geçtiği durumlar yaşanır. Göçmenlerin geldikleri yerlerle bağlarının kopması beklenir ancak durum her zaman böyle olmaz. Aksine göçmenler geldikleri yerlerle olan bağlarını çeşitli yollarla güçlendirerek sınır ötesi ilişkiler kurarlar (Levitt ve Glick-Schiller, 2004, s. 1003). Dolayısıyla göç konusu ulus devlet perspektifinden bakılarak anlaşılamayacak kadar girift özellikler taşır. Ulusötesi sosyal alanlar perspektifiyle göçmenlerin deneyimleri ele alınarak aile, vatandaşlık ve ulus devlet kavramları incelenmelidir.

Bu tez çalışmasında metodolojik pozisyon olarak etnografiyi benimseyerek ve katılımcı gözlem ve derinlemesine mülakat tekniklerini kullanarak 1989'da ve 1990'lı yıllar boyunca Türkiye'ye göç etmiş göçmenlerle ve onların Bulgaristan'da kalan aile ve yakınlarıyla görüşmeler yaptım. Kendi aile geçmişim de Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye doğru göç hikayeleri barındırdığından bu çalışmasıyla kendi kişisel deneyimlerimi de anlamlandırmaya çalışarak reflektif bir biçimde göçmen bir ailenin çocuğu olmanın hangi anlamlara gelebileceğini bulmaya çalıştım. yine de bu tez çalışmasında tüm Bulgaristan Türklerini ya da Bulgaristan göçmenlerini temsil etme iddiası bulunmamaktadır.

Etnografi bu tez çalışması için uygun bir metodolojik pozisyonudur çünkü ulusötesi sosyal alanları çalışmak katılımcı gözlem ve etnografik mülakatları içermelidir (Levitt ve Glick-Schiller, 2004, s.1013). Kişisel anlatılar ve hikayeler göç çalışmaları için önem taşır. Dolayısıyla antropolojik nitelikli bir çalışma kişilerin günlük yaşamlarını ve motivasyonlarını anlamaya çalışırken kültür siyasetine ışık tutar ve güç ilişkilerini yüzeye çıkarmaya çalışır (Ong, 1999, s.15).Bu tez çalışmasında yorumlayıcı ve etkileşimci etnografi kullanarak yoğun tanım içeren kendi alan

notlarımla, sahadaki görüşmecilerimin günlük yaşamlarını gözlemledim ve yerel ve kültürel anlamlara ulaşmaya çalıştım. Saha araştırması deneyimi bu tez çalışması için çok anlam ifade etti çünkü Lindahl'ın (2014, s.3) da belirttiği gibi saha araştırması aldığımız doğum günü kartlarını iki katına çıkarırken katıldığımız cenaze sayılarını da bir hayli artırdı. Saha araştırması bir yandan da kendimizle ve başkalarıyla olan ilişkilerimize eleştirel bir gözle bakmayı öğretti. Bulgaristan'da sahadayken sadece birkaç kez Roman köylerini ziyarete gittiğim sonrasında bir kafede oturup konu hakkında sohbet ettiğim sosyal hizmet görevlisi olan kadınların beni bir daha hiç hatırlamayacaklarını düşünmüştüm. Ancak saha araştırmamı bitirip ülkeme döndüğümde kilit görüşmecimden o kadınların benim nereye gittiğimi ve bir daha gelip gelmeyeceğimi sorduklarını öğrendim. Bir çoğu bana sosyal medya üzerinden arkadaşlık teklifi gönderdi. O zaman farkettim ki saha araştırması asla arkamızda bırakabileceğimiz bir deneyim değildi. Ayrıca İzmir'de yürüttüğüm saha araştırmam boyunca tanıştığım kişilerin düğünlerine ve cenazelerine katıldım. Bir çoğu ile bağlantımı koparmayıp ilişkiyi sürdürmeye çalıştım. dolayısıyla etnografik pratiğin ilişki temelli öznelarası bir pratik olduğunu deneyimlemiş oldum.

Etnik Türkler Bulgaristan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan bağımsızlığını kazandıktan sonra da Bulgaristan topraklarında yaşamaya devam etmişlerdir. Bir zamanlar o topraklarda çoğunluğu oluşturan Türkler yüz yıldan fazla bir süredir Türkiye'ye göç etmişler ve Bulgaristan'da azınlık statüsüne düşmüşlerdir. Türklerin Bulgaristan'dan göçü çeşitli sebeplerle olmuştur. Yabancı devletlerin müdahaleleri, etnik problemler, katı milliyetçi propaganda ve asimilasyon politikaları sonucunda Türkler çeşitli göç dalgalarıyla Türkiye'ye doğru yola çıkmışlardır. Özellikle 1980 yılından sonra Doğu Bloku'ndaki komünist ülkelerde yaşanan gelişmeler, daha sonraları Avrupa Birliği'nin katı göç politikaları ve Bulgaristan'da yaşanan siyasi ve ekonomik belirsizlikler göçmenlerin gözünde Türkiye'yi çekici bir varış ülkesi kılmıştır (Parla, 2007, s.158).

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra yaşanan en büyük göç dalgası Bulgaristan'ın asimilasyon politikalarından sonra zorunlu göçe tabi tutulan Bulgaristan Türklerinin göçüdür. Çeşitli kaynaklarda sayıları farklı gösterilse de yaklaşık 360.000

Bulgaristan Türkü zamanın Bulgar lideri Jivkov'un "Bulgar hissetmeyenlere Türk sınırı açıktır" açıklamasıyla Türkiye'ye doğru yola çıkmıştır (Anagnostou, 2005, s.91). Bulgaristan göçmenleri Türkiye'de göçmenlerin çoğunluğunu oluşturturken sayıları 1989 zorunlu göçüyle birlikte daha da artmıştır (Çetin, 2008, s.56). bazı göçmenler ilk bir yıl içinde Bulgaristan'a geri dönmüş olsa Bulgaristan'dan Türklerin göçü 1990'lı yıllar boyunca gerek turist vizeleriyle gerekse kalıcı oturma izinleriyle devam etmiştir. Özellikle komünist rejimin yıkılmasından sonra 1990'larda Bulgaristan'da yaşanan ekonomik çöküntü göçmenleri Türkiye'ye çekmiştir.

Her ne kadar sistematik bir biçimde asimilasyona maruz kalsalar da, Bulgaristan'daki Türkler, Türk okullarına, kültürel organizasyonlara, eğitim ve spor aktivitelerine sahiptiler ve kendi dillerini 1878'den 1944'e kadar kamusal alanda kullanabiliyorlardı (Zhelyazkova, 1998). Ancak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan miras kalan Müslüman azınlıklar Bulgaristan içinde daima huzursuzluk yaratmışlardır ve bu durum da azınlıklara karşı sistematik ayrımcılığı beraberinde getirmiştir (Bates, 1994). Uzun yıllara dayanan birlikte yaşama deneyimine rağmen Müslüman ve Hristiyan topluluklar arasındaki ilişki düşmanca bir hale bürünmüştür ve bu durum Müslüman azınlıkların göçlerine sebebiyet vermiştir (Höpken, 1997, s.54).

Bulgaristan Türkleri çeşitli dönemlerde ayrımcılığa maruz kalmış oflasalar da 1980'lerde yaşanan sistematik asimilasyon kampanyası bunların en önemlilerinden biridir. 1984-1985 yılları arasında Türklere uygulanan asimilasyon politikaları sonucu 1989 yılında büyük bir göç yaşanmıştır. Bulgaristan Komünist Partisi'nin Türklere ve Pomaklara yönelik baskıcı politikaları 1960'larda başlamıştır. 1972-1974 yılları arasında Pomaklara yönelik bu baskıcı politikalar tepe noktasına ulaşmış ve Pomakların isimleri değiştirilmiştir (Eminov, 1999, s.32). Bulgaristan o dönemde tüm sosyalist ülkeler arsında en düşük doğum oranlarına sahip olduğundan azınlıklara yönelik baskılar homojen bir sosyalist ülke kurma idealinden kaynaklanmıştır. Bu sebeplerden, Türklere yönelik asimilasyon süreci "yeniden doğuş" olarak adlandırılmıştır. Türkler 1970'li yıllarda Pomaklara uygulanan asimilasyon politikalarından etkilenmemiş olsa da göç etmeye teşvik edilmişlerdir.

Bunun sonucunda 1968-1978 yılları arasında aile birleşimi anlaşmasıyla 130.000 Bulgaristan Türkü Türkiye'ye göç etmiştir. 1984 yılına gelindiğinde Türkler kendi isimleri yerine Slav kökenli isimler almaya zorlanmışlar yaklaşık 900.000 kişiye zorla isim verilme süreci yaşanmıştır. 1989 yılının sonuna kadar yani komünist rejimin yıkılmasına kadar olan süreçte asimilasyon farklı politikalar yoluyla devam etmiştir. Zorla isim değiştirmenin yanında, Türkçe konuşmak yasaklanmış, Türklerin Bulgaristan'daki varlıkları inkar edilmiş, ekonomik olarak tehdit edilmiş ve fiziksel şiddete maruz kalmışlardır. Bunlara ek olarak Türkçe gazeteler, dergiler, radyo kanalları yasaklanmış, okullarda Türkçe eğitim verilmesi ve Türkçe yayınlar kaldırılmıştır. Türklüğe yönelik bu saldırılar aynı zamanda İslam dinine de yöneliktir. Ramazan ayında oruç tutmak, cenazeleri yıkamak, sünnet, hacca gitmek gibi İslam ritüelleri yasaklanmış, kadınlar için şalvar giymek bile İslam'la özdeşleştirildiği için yasaklanmıştır. 1985 yılında İç İşleri Bakanı Dimitar Stoyanov "Bulgaristan'da Türk yoktur" açıklamasını yaparak asimilasyon sürecinin ne kadar ileri gidebileceğini kanıtlamıştır. 1989 yılına gelindiğine binlerce Bulgaristan Türkü ülkeden sınır dışı edilmiştir. Bulgaristan hükümeti siyasi olarak tehdit oluşturabileceğini inandıkları kişileri üç gün içinde apar topar sınır dışı etmiş, insanlara evlerini, mal ve mülklerini satma imkanı bile verilmemiştir. Birer valiz olarak Bulgaristan'dan kovulan Türkler Türkiye sınır kapısında uzun kuyruklar oluşturmuşlardır.

Bulgaristan Komünist Partisi rejimi 1990 yılının Ocak ayında son bulmuş, Bulgaristan çok partili demokratik rejime geçiş yapmıştır. Bulgaristan, Soğuk Savaş sonrası uluslararası konjonktüre de uygun olarak etnik azınlıklarla ilgili yeni kararlar almıştır (Özlem, 2008, s.359). Bulgaristan dış politikası NATO ve Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik emelinden dolayı ekonomik ve stratejik olarak Batı'ya bağlı kalmıştır. Seneler süren müzakereler ve düzenlemeler sonucunda 2007 yılında Bulgaristan Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üye olmuştur. Bulgaristan'da Türklerin kurduğu siyasi parti olarak bilenen DPS'nin tüm çabalarına karşın azınlıkların sorunları baki kalmış, Türkler problemlili azınlık olarak görülmeye devam etmişlerdir. İşsizlik, göç, kültürel temsil ve Türkçe dilinde eğitim gibi sorunlar Türkler için çözüme kavuşmamıştır. Türkler bulgaristan'da daha çok kırsal kesimde ikamet ettiklerinden yapılan yatırımlardan

faydalanamamışlardır. Bu yüzden birçok Türk genci batı Avrupa'ya iş bulmak amacıyla göç etmiştir. Avrupa Birliği'nin sağladığı serbest dolaşım ve çalışma hakkı sayesinde Bulgaristan Türkleri batı Avrupa ülkelerinde çalışmaktadır. Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde Bulgaristan Türkleri Türk diasporasına da katılarak göç ağırları oluşturmuş, hem Türkiye'den hem de Bulgaristan'dan giden Türkler birbirlerine iş ve yaşam konularında destek olmuşlardır.

Türklerin Bulgaristan'daki tarihsel olarak varoluşları gösteriyor ki, yüzyıldan fazla bir süredir azınlık olmaları onları dilleri, dinleri ve kültürlerinin yakınsanabileceği bir anavatan arayışına sürüklemiştir. Bu anavatan da doğal olarak etnik soy bağları olan Türkiye olagelmıştır. Memleket olarak gördükleri Bulgaristan'dan anavatan olarak gördükleri Türkiye'ye adapte süreci çok kolay olmamakla birlikte çeşitli zorlukları da beraberinde getirmiştir. Memleketten anavatana göç etmek etnik kimliklerinin nasıl kurgulandığını da etkilemiş, kimlik pazarlığına yeni maddeler eklemiştir. Azınlık olma durumları bir nebze de olsa iyileşse de Türkiye'de yaşadıkları zorluklar ve kültürel olarak adaptasyon süreçleri onları başka bir “diğer” olma kategorisine sokmuştur.

1989 büyük göçünden sonra Bulgaristan'da kalan Türkler uzun yıllar süren zorlu asimilasyon süreçlerinden sonra kimliklerini ifade etme konusunda müzakereler geliştirmişlerdir. Aileler parçalanmış, Bulgaristan Türkleri azınlık ve göçmenler olarak sınırın iki yakasında farklı hayatlar sürmeye başlamışlardır. Ulusötesi sosyal alanda yaşayan Bulgaristan Türkleri ulus devlet sınırlarını aşan ve yeni kimlik pazarlıklarına gebe yaşamlar sürdürmektedirler. Öte yandan Bulgaristan göçmenleri ile Bulgaristan'da kalan etnik azınlık Türkleri ayırıştıran söylemlerden biri de “anavatana vardık” söylemidir. Çünkü göçmenler Türkiye'de soydaşlar olarak kabul görmüşlerdir. Soydaş söylemi yeni kimlik pazarlığının bir parçasıdır. Türklüğün ne olduğunu yeniden kurgulayan göçmenler farklı vatandaşlık stratejileri de geliştirirken vatandaşlığın geleneksel söyleminin dışına çıkmışlardır. Çoğu göçmen Türkiye'de yukarıya doğru mobiliteye sahip olmuştur. Daha önce de belirttiğim gibi Bulgaristan göçmenlerini kategorik olarak temsil etme iddiasında olmayan bu tez çalışması spesifik kırsal bir kasabada yaşayan bir etnik grubun ulusötesi bağlarla anavatan

saydıkları Türkiye’de olan göçmen topluluğuyla nasıl iletişim kurduğunu da karşılaştırmalı olarak inceler. Türklüğün ne demek olduğunu ve aynı zamanda hangi anlamlara gelmediğini yeniden kurgulayan Bulgaristan Türkleri bizi ‘rüya’ ülke olarak gördükleri Türkiye’de gerçekten azınlıktan kurtulup çoğunluk olabilmüşler midir sorusuna yönlendirir.

Bu tez çalışmasının araştırma sorunsalı Bulgaristan Türklerinin topluluk ve kimlik algılarının 1989 göçü ve ulusötesi hareketliliklerle nasıl etkilendiği ve sınır aşırı olarak kimlik müzakerelerinin nasıl yapıldığını incelemeyi amaçlar. Dolayısıyla bu tez araştırmasının saha çalışmasında görüşmecilere sorulan sorular kimlik, azınlık, din, aile, siyasi temsiliyet, sosyoekonomik durumlar, sosyal ağlar, birlikte yaşadıkları diğer etnik gruplar, anadili konuşmak ve kültür başlıkları altında toplanmıştır.

Yeni kurulan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde göçmenler en az tartışılan topluluklar olagelmıştır çünkü göçmenler yeni gelenlerdir ve eski toplumun antitezini oluştururlar (Bora & Şen, 2009, s.1160). Göçmenlerin Türkiye toplumuna zorunlu veya gönüllü entegrasyonu detaylı açıklamalar gerektirir çünkü göçmenlerin deneyimleri onların toplum tarafından dışlanıp dışlanmadıklarını, o toplumu değiştirme kapasitelerinin olup olmadığını anlatır (age.). göçmenler sanki topluma doğal olarak entegre olmuşlar gibi bir algı vardır ve bu aldı göçmemelerin neler yaşadıklarını açıklamaktan kaçınmaya sebep olur. Ancak göçmenlerin anılarıyla yüzleşme meselesi ancak 2000’li yıllardan sonra hafıza çalışmaları alanının önem kazanmasıyla ortaya çıkmıştır (age., s.1161). Bu sebeplerden ötürü Bulgaristan Türklerinin deneyimlerini ve anlatılarını, onlar bu yaşamdan kopup gitmeden ve anılar silinmeye yüz tutmadan ortaya çıkarmak ve anlamaya çalışmak hayati önem taşır.

Saha araştırmasında görüşmecilerin anlatıları göstermiştir ki, Bulgaristan türklerinin kimlik müzakereleri Bulgaristan’da ve Türkiye’de yaşadıkları farklı sosyalizasyon süreçlerinden etkilenmiştir. Bulgaristan Türkleri Türklük kavramına vurgu yapmışlar ve Türklüğü iyi performe ederek, Türklüğü Türkiye toplumuna adapte olmaları ve kabul görmeleri için en önemli ve geçerli sebep olarak görmüşlerdir. Ayrıca

Türklüğü performe etmek Bulgaristan'da da onları diğer etnik gruplardan ayırtıran bir unsur olarak görülmüştür. Bulgaristan göçmenleri Türkiye toplumu için çalışma kültürleri ve batı kültürünü yerele entegre etmek açısından örnek vatandaşlar olduklarına inanırlar. Örneğin, Türkiye toplumunda yaşamayı ve kabul görmeyi en çok hak eden topluluk olduklarını kanıtlamak için Türkiye'deki Suriyeli göçmenleri eleştirirler ve onların gerici, Doğu kültürünü temsil eden bir topluluk olduklarından dem vururlar. Bulgaristan Türkleri kendilerini etnik kökenleri, dilleri ve kültürleri dolayısıyla Türkiye toplumu tarafından en çok kabul görmesi gereken göçmen topluluk olduklarına inanırlar. Bulgaristan Türkleri Bulgaristan'da da diğer etnik kimlikleri (Pomaklar, Roman ve Alevi topluluklar) kendilerinden ayırtırarak, kendi kimliklerini yeniden kurgularlar. Bulgaristan'da, Pomaklar, Romanlar ve Alevi topluluklar Türkler için azınlık içinde azınlık statüsündedir. Bu durum Türklerin etnik kimlik ve aidiyetleri hakkında nasıl müzakere ettiklerine dair ipuçları vermektedir. Öteki etnik grupları ayırtırmanın sebebi dini yetkinin kimde olduğu konusunda girilen yarıştır. Bulgaristan Türkleri, Bulgaristan'da kendileri dışında herhangi bir topluluğun gerçek İslam'ı temsil edebileceğine inanmaz ve diğer grupları İslam'a sonradan dönmüş olarak tanımlayarak bir nebze hakir görür.

Saha araştırmasındaki görüşmelerden çıkan bir diğer sonuç ise Bulgaristan Türkleri 1989 göçünün getirdiği zorlukları hala unutamamıştır. Göçmenlerin çoğu yoksulluk, işsizlik, psikolojik problemler, eğitim problemleri, diploma denkliği, dil problemleri, dini pratiklerin ve toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinin farklı olmasından dolayı sıkıntılar çekmişlerdir. Ayrıca çoğunluğu kırsal alandan gelmiş göçmenler Türkiye'deki büyük sanayi şehirlerine adapte olmakta da zorlanmışlar, Bulgaristan'da kalanlarla da ayrılarak çeşitli problemler yaşamışlardır. "Biz bu ülkenin herkesten daha çok sahibiyiz" anlayışı Bulgaristan göçmenlerinde belirgin şekilde görülen bir kabul görme anlayışıdır. 1980'lerde yaşanan asimilasyon sürecini unutamamış olmaları ve gelecekte bir daha böyle bir asimilasyona maruz kalma korkuları halen devam etmektedir. Bu korkularını bir nebze de olsa gidermek için çeşitli organizasyonlar kurmuşlar ve ulusötesi hareketliliklerle sınırın öte tarafıyla bağlarını koparmamışlardır.

Bulgaristan Türklerinde kimlik pazarlığının sebeplerini dört başlık altında incelemekteyim. Bunlardan ilki değişen topluluk algısı ve Türklüğe yapılan vurgudur. Bulgaristan Türkleri kimin gerçek Türk kimin Türk olmadığını ayırımını kendi kimliklerine vurgu katmak için katı bir şekilde yaparlar. Kendilerini Türklüğün savunucuları ve savaşçıları olarak gördüklerini ifade ederler. Bunun sonucunda ise Türkiye’de kendilerine verilen Türk vatandaşlığı hak edilen ve doğal bir süreçtir. Türklük vurgusunun yanı, Bulgaristan Türkleri kimin gerçek Müslüman olup olamayacağının ayırımını da net bir şekilde yaparlar. Dolayısıyla hem Türklük hem de İslam’ın onların tekelinde olarak tanımlanması durumu söz konusudur. Etnik ve dini kimlikten dışlanan diğer azınlık grupları da gözlemlenebilir şekilde ayrılmıştır. Ayrıca Bulgaristan’daki şehirlere eski Türkçe isimleriyle hitap etmeleri, o coğrafyanın onlar için halen Türk coğrafyasının bir parçası olageldiğini kanıtlar niteliktedir.

Kimlik pazarlığının ikinci nedeni olarak siyasi sebepleri sayabiliriz. Ne Türkiye’nin ne de Bulgaristan’ın ulus devlet inşa sürecine katılmadıkları için, Bulgaristan Türkleri hep dışarıda kalmışlar ve pasif azınlık olarak görülmüşlerdir. Bulgaristan’da etnik temizlik ve asimilasyon politikalarına maruz kalmışlardır. Bulgaristan’da farklı bir etnik grup olarak dışlanmışlardır. Bu da uzun yıllar birlikte yaşama deneyimi geliştirmiş olan Bulgarlar ve Türkler arasındaki ilişkileri olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir. Bulgaristan’da etnik azınlık olarak görülen bu topluluk Türkiye’de soydaşlar olarak görülmüş, dolayısıyla kimlik kurguları kesintiye uğrayarak farklılaşmıştır. Bulgaristan’da Türkiye’ye sadık olmakla suçlanmışlar, Türkiye’de ise zamanın başbakanı tarafından açılan sınır kapılarından geçmişlerdir. Çift vatandaşlık statüleri sebebiyle Bulgaristan seçimlerinde oy kullanmaya devam etmişler, iki ülke arasında kalarak ulusötesi ilişkiler geliştirmişlerdir.

Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimlik pazarlığının bir diğer nedeni 1989 göçü ve onun getirdiği sonuçlardır. Arafta kalma duygusu Bulgaristan Türklerinde çok güçlü olarak sezilir. Ne tam Türkiye’ye ne de tam Bulgaristan’a ait olmuşlardır. İki ülkede de görülen kültürel ve sosyal farklılıklar ve toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinin farklı oluşu da bu arafta kalmışlık duygusunu pekiştiren faktörlerdir. Bulgaristan’da geride

kalanlarla iletişimleri devam ettirmeleri de anavatan algılarını sürekli olarak sarsmıştır. Geride kalan terkedilmiş köyler ve kasabalar göçün bıraktığı derin izler taşıırken Bulgaristan Türklerinin asimilasyonu unutamamasına sebebiyet vermiştir.

Ulusötesi bağları korumak ve sürdürmek de kimlik pazarlığının bir parçasıdır. Bulgaristan Türkleri Avrupa Birliği'nin sağladığı imkanlardan faydalanmak için çifte vatandaşlık durumlarını korumuşlardır. Türk göç ağları kullanarak Batı Avrupa'da sosyal ağlar kurmuş ve orada çalışmaya ve yaşamaya başlamışlardır. Türkiye'deki Bulgaristan göçmenleri Bulgaristan siyaseti yakından takip eder, Türk partisi olarak niteledikleri siyasi partiye oy verirler ve onun lehine lobi faaliyetleri sürdürürler. Dolayısıyla Bulgaristan vatandaşlığını haklar alanı olarak görürken, Türk vatandaşlığı onlar için kimlik alanını temsil eder. Göçmen kültürünü sosyal medya aracılığıyla ve çeşitli organizasyonlarla yaşatırken, Bulgaristan'a sık sık yapılan ziyaretlerde yerel geleneklerini yaşatmaya çalışırlar.

Bulgaristan Türkleri ne tamamıyla göçmen kimliği be de tamamıyla etnik çoğunluk kimliği taşırlar; ancak azınlık durumları süregelmiştir ve bu durum kimliklerinin de spesifik bir şekilde kurgulanmasına ve müzakere edilmesine yol açmıştır. Bulgaristan Türklerinin kimlikleri deneyimledikleri göçlerle ve karşılaştıkları zorluklarla arafta kalmışlık duygusuna yaslanmıştır. Ne Bulgaristan'da yeterince vatandaş hissetmişler ne de Türkiye'de yeterince Müslüman ve Türk görülmüşlerdir. Geldikleri coğrafya itibariyle ayrımcılığa uğrama hissiyatı anavatanda da devam etmiştir.

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