

THE ROLE OF NATO’S ENLARGEMENT POLICY
IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS



KÜBRA SİVRİ

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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KÜBRA SİVRİ

SUPERVISOR
PROF. EMİN GÜRSES

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PLAGIARISM

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Date : 14.06.2023

Name/Surname: Kübra SİVRİ

ABSTRACT

In the era after Cold War, the changing balance of power following the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about fundamental structural changes, new security approaches, and debates in the globalizing international system. NATO, a military alliance established after World War II for common defense and security against the Soviet “threat”, continues to expand to create a new mission and legitimacy for itself despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This study emphasizes “the role NATO's enlargement policy played in the Russia-Ukraine crisis” in view of “new security strategies” and current developments that have emerged because of “NATO's transformation” process based on adapting to the changing international system in the post-Cold War. For this purpose, NATO's enlargement policy was studied considering the concept of security in international relations, taking into account its historical background, and has been evaluated using “the Copenhagen School's securitization theory” with the qualitative content analysis method, based on the “new imperialism approach” and changing security theories in the post-Cold War globalizing world. Within the scope of this study, “NATO's enlargement policy” is seen as “a key indicator that played a crucial role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis”, preventing the risks posed by security dilemmas from evolving into peace in line with the aim of containing Russia, let alone preventing the outbreak and escalation of conflicts. In the context of this main argument of the study, when we consider the steps taken by NATO in line with its “enlargement policy”, “new security strategies”, and “military interventions”, it becomes obvious that there is a strong direct relationship between “NATO's enlargement policy” and “the fundamental reasons for the Russia-Ukraine crisis”.

Keywords: Copenhagen School; globalization; NATO's enlargement policy; Russia-Ukraine crisis; securitization theory; security strategies.

ÖZET

Sovyetler Birliği'nin parçalanması ve Soğuk Savaş döneminin sona ermesiyle birlikte değişen güç dengeleri, küreselleşen uluslararası sistemde köklü yapısal değişiklikleri, yeni güvenlik yaklaşımlarını ve tartışmalarını beraberinde getirmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ortak savunma ve güvenlik amacıyla Sovyet tehdidine karşı kurulmuş askeri bir ittifak olan NATO, Sovyetler Birliği ve Varşova Paktı dağıldığı halde kendine yeni bir misyon ve meşruiyet alanı yaratmak amacıyla varlığını genişleyerek sürdürmektedir. Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişen uluslararası sisteme uyum sağlamaya dayanan "NATO'nun dönüşüm" süreci ve bu süreçle birlikte ortaya çıkan "yeni güvenlik stratejileri" ve güncel gelişmeler ışığında "NATO'nun genişleme politikasının Rusya-Ukrayna krizinde oynadığı rol" üzerinde durmaktadır. Bu bağlamda "NATO'nun genişleme politikası", uluslararası ilişkilerde güvenlik kavramı ve tarihsel arka planı dikkate alınarak incelenmiş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası küreselleşen dünyada değişen güvenlik teorileri ve "yeni emperyalizm yaklaşımı" temel alınarak, nitel içerik analizi yöntemiyle "Kopenhag Okulu'nun güvenlikleştirme teorisi" kullanılarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışma kapsamında "NATO'nun genişleme politikası", çatışmaların çıkması ve tırmanmasını engellemek bir yana Rusya'yı çevreleme amacı doğrultusunda güvenlik ikilemlerinin yarattığı risklerin barışa evrilmesine engel olan ve Rusya-Ukrayna krizinde büyük rol oynayan temel bir etken olarak görülmektedir. Çalışmanın bu temel argümanı bağlamında "NATO'nun genişleme politikası" doğrultusunda attığı adımları, "yeni güvenlik stratejilerini" ve "askeri müdahalelerini" dikkate aldığımızda, "NATO'nun genişleme politikası" ve "Rusya-Ukrayna krizini doğuran temel sebepler" arasında doğrudan güçlü bir ilişki olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Güvenlik stratejileri; güvenlikleştirme teorisi; Kopenhag Okulu; küreselleşme; NATO'nun genişleme politikası; Rusya-Ukrayna krizi.

*I would like to dedicate my thesis to the founder of our country, our great leader
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.*



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ABBREVIATIONS

AL	Albania
ATA	Atlantic Treaty Association
BE	Belgium
BG	Bulgaria
BP	British Petroleum
CA	Canada
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CZ	Czech Republic
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
DoS	Denial of Service
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DPR	Donetsk People's Republic
DRM	Democratic Russia Movement
EaP	Eastern Partnership Project
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EE	Estonia
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FR	France
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FSB	Federal Security Service
GATT	The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GB	Great Britain
GCASC	Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus
GMO	Genetically Modified Organisms
GR	Greece
HACCP	Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	Croatia
HU	Hungary
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICPO / INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	Implementation Force
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IS	Iceland
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISS	International Security Studies
IT	Italy
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LPR	Luhansk People's Republic
LT	Lithuania
LU	Luxembourg
LV	Latvia
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NL	Netherlands
NO	Norway
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty
NSC	United States National Security Council

OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PL	Poland
PT	Portugal
R2P / RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
RF	Russian Federation
RO	Romania
SARS / CoV-2	COVID-19/ Coronavirus
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SI	Slovenia
SK	Slovakia
SP	Spain
TR	Turkish Republic
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UN- HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
US / U.S.	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to examine and discuss “the role of NATO's enlargement policy in the Russia-Ukraine crisis” (Karolewski & Mai'A, 2017, pp. 137-152), as part of the “securitization theory of the Copenhagen School”, one of “the new security theories” developed by considering “the new imperialism” and “globalization” approaches after the Cold War. For this purpose, starting from the intellectual foundations of security, the new approaches and theories of security that changed with the Cold War in international relations have been analyzed in depth within the framework of the concepts of “new imperialism” and “globalization”. Emphasizing that “NATO's enlargement policy” adopted during the transformation process “acting an essential role in triggering the Russia-Ukraine crisis and continued conflict” (Albright & Appatov, 1999).

The thesis presents a broad historical perspective starting from World War II and its consequences, the establishment of NATO against the influence of the USSR, the breakup of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the present day. Therefore, by comparing “NATO's security strategies” before and after the Cold War, this analysis will reveal that NATO has undergone a serious transformation and has taken a pioneering role in today's world. The Russia-Ukraine crisis with the aim of creating a legitimate space for itself and expanding in “the new world order”. The analysis also focuses on Ukraine's geopolitical and strategic significance and its relations with global powers, as well as foreign policy options for Ukraine's future.

This analysis is aimed to highlight “NATO's transformation” and its securitization of non-security issues, i.e., a regional issue, as it seeks to create legitimacy for itself. The securitization of threat perceptions advocated by the Copenhagen School, along with the perception that “*the security spiral will make it difficult to solve non-security issues and that the process may lead to violent consequences*” (Bilgin, 2010, p. 83), emerged with the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the evolution of the crisis into violent conflicts.

In this context, this thesis helps to explore the basic dynamics of “NATO's enlargement process” and, considering “NATO's military interventions”, the basic dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which is one of the most recent international crises, and the main reason why the conflict has become an international security problem.

0.1. NATO's Enlargement Policy and Russia-Ukraine Crisis

In the literature, there are numerous studies on “NATO's enlargement, military interventions”, and “transformation process” and discussions on the future of NATO and Ukraine within the framework of these studies. There is also much research on the security problem and debates, in which security types and post-Cold War security theories are examined one by one and analyzed in depth. In studies on international organizations, NATO's establishment, objectives, and organizational structure are among the most important issues addressed. There are very few articles that deal with “the Russia-Ukraine crisis within the framework of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory” (Riddervold, Trondal, & Newsome, 2021, pp. 3-47), so this thesis is aimed to emphasize this theoretical discussion as the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an issue that remains topical today to evaluate the issue in the light of new developments.

The articles analyzed for this study show that most of the articles dealing with the Russia-Ukraine crisis address the issue based on “Ukraine's independence” and focus on the country's right to “self-determination”. By limiting the issue to this aspect, these articles ignore “NATO's unjustified interventions” and the strategies it has developed within the framework of its “enlargement policy”. This situation shows that there is a gap in the literature in terms of emphasizing “NATO's interventions” implemented in accordance with its “enlargement policy”, which it sees as a way to gain new legitimacy with its transformation process. This thesis fills this gap by addressing the problem from a diverse point of view and aims to support the literature in this context.

0.2. Thesis Structure

In *the introduction*, an in-depth literature review was conducted to provide preliminary information on “NATO's enlargement policy” and the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and previous academic studies on this subject were analyzed. As a result of the discussions and studies in the literature, a gap in the literature was identified and the purpose and contribution of this study were determined.

The first chapter includes discussions on the security problem in international relations. In this context, the conceptual framework of the issue can be found in the first sub-heading where “the concept of security” (Chandler, Müller, & Rothe, 2021) and its types are analyzed thoroughly. The intellectual foundations of “the concept of security” (Chandler, Müller, & Rothe, 2021) are analyzed under the second sub-heading based on the security conceptions of thinkers who are important in political science literature. In the next section, security theories in international relations are analyzed by comparing them periodically. In addressing “the issue in the context of security theories” (Barnes & Parkhurst, 2014), the method of comparative analysis of “the Cold War period and post-Cold War security understandings has been used” (Anas, 2022, pp. 289-308). The replacement of “Cold War-era classical security theories with post-Cold War new security theories” is an essential analysis in terms of revealing the changing security approach with the Cold War. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the conceptual debates on “globalization” and “the transformation of imperialism” into “neo-imperialism” and the relationship between these concepts and security.

Chapter II explains the historical background of the establishment of NATO and the historical development of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. It provides a broad historical perspective from the Second World War to the Cold War, from the Cold War to “Independent Ukraine” established after the collapse of the Soviet Union and up to the present day. The founding objectives, organizational structures, and functioning of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the international organizations established after WWII, are also examined. The importance of Ukraine in the context of geopolitics, strategical, and European security is emphasized and its post-Cold War regional interests and relations with global powers are discussed.

Chapter III includes a comparative analysis of “NATO's security strategies throughout the Cold War period” and its changing strategies afterward to explain the reflections of the changing security understanding and threat perceptions on “NATO strategies in the Post-Cold War”. This change in “NATO's security strategies” is explained with the concept of “NATO's transformation” and “NATO's summits” and “the New Strategic Concept” in the transformation process are analyzed in detail. The doctrines of Russian foreign policy, Russian security policy, and “the near abroad policy”, which is one of the most important ones, and “NATO's enlargement policy” are the main analyses of this chapter. The main dynamics of “NATO's enlargement process” are analyzed, and “the military interventions of NATO forces” in other countries and the consequences of these interventions are analyzed in depth in accordance with the post-Cold War “enlargement policy”.

Chapter IV is the analysis part of the study consisting of “conclusions and implications”. This chapter is devoted to foreign policy options for Ukraine's future. In this context, four different foreign policy options for Ukraine are discussed and analyzed in detail. Following the discussion on “the future of Ukraine”, “the future of NATO” is analyzed. The main topic of discussion is the fact that “*NATO continued to expand and grow after the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the post-Cold War period*”, even though “*the Soviet threat was removed*”.

Finally, because of the analyses, it is shown that there is a direct relationship between “NATO's enlargement policy” and the Russia-Ukraine crisis identified in the previous section.

1. CHAPTER I SECURITY PROBLEM AND DEBATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

According to the perspective of political realism, which argues that “*the international system has an anarchic structure*”, the environment of insecurity created by the absence of legitimate higher authority in the inter-state order triggers inter-state crises and conflicts. Security, which is characterized as safety against a potential threat in the insecure environment of this anarchic international system, has become one of the main discussion topics and problems in the discipline of international relations (Tanrısever, 2010, p. 107). According to Michael E. Smith (2020, p. 120), three different methods of analysis can be used in security studies: “*international / systemic, national / national, and human / individual*”. In this context, security studies have become a more comprehensive and detailed field of study with the prioritization of the security of individuals and societies, i.e. the humanitarian / individual dimension, rather than the security of states, i.e. the national dimension of security. In addition, “international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and local political actors”, in addition to nation-states aiming to ensure international security based on the global dimensions of security, have also tended to formulate various policies for this purpose. As a consequence of the September 11 attacks, “the qualitative transformation of international terrorism has been reflected in security studies, and the concept of soft security has been included in the international relations literature” (Keyman, Tanrısever, Tayfur, Yalvaç, & Eralp, 2010, p. 112). Another recent change is the preference for “new security theories” rather than “classical security theories” in security studies, and with this, it is seen that “human rights, equality, and justice” are frequently emphasized in issues related to international security and that “transatlantic and Western values” are used to solve these problems.

1.1. The Concept and Types of “Security”

Security, which is a basic concept in international relations, can be defined in the simplest way to be understood as “*the state of maintaining one's existence by being protected from danger, threat, and all kinds of harm*” (Ergül, 2012, p. 166). According to Arnold Wolfers, security is seen as “*the absence of a threat to the values acquired through objective thinking and the absence of fear of attack on the*

values acquired through subjective thinking" (Wolfers, 1962, p. 150). According to Abraham Harold Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory, needs consist of five different steps of the pyramid from bottom to top: "*physiological needs, need for security, social needs, need for value and respect, and need for self-actualization*" (Maslow A. H., 1943, p. 375). According to this theory, "*as long as the need for security is not met, individuals' social needs, the need to be valued and the need for self-realization cannot be met*" (Maslow A. H., 1943, p. 375). In cases where individuals cannot fulfill their need to feel safe and protect themselves independently in society, they create "public spaces" in order to ensure their individual security together with "the social contract" (Kaypak, 2016, p. 21).

Considering the physical areas of states, there are two different types of security: "*internal security*" within the existing borders of a country and "*external security*" beyond the borders. In addition, security can be analyzed in three various dimensions: "*active, passive, and method dimensions*". In this direction, the subject element that is considered to be secured constitutes "*the passive dimension*", the threats to that subject constitute "*the active dimension*", and the methods used to ensure security constitute "*the method dimension*" (Erdoğan, 2013, p. 276). The concept of security, which is shaped according to changing and increasing threat perceptions in different historical processes in which the Cold War is considered "a turning point", is analyzed from different aspects in view of various international relations theories. Still, "*there is no consensus on what the limits of security are in the context of these different theories*" (Ülger, 2002, p. 50). According to Brauch (2008, p. 5), a state can only feel completely secure "*if both military and non-military security elements coexist*". According to Peter Hought, "*the founding purpose of states is essential to ensure security*" (Özdağ, 2015, p. 7). In this context, states develop various national security strategies in order to ensure their national security and these strategies implemented by states represent the security understanding of the countries (Dedeoğlu, 2003, pp. 11-12). These security approaches, which are formed by the strategies determined by the states, can be classified into two different groups: "*traditional security approaches*" dominated by a military-oriented Anglo-American perspective, and "*new security approaches*" that dominate the political arena with the changing security understanding after the Cold War (Booth, 2002, p. 59).

With the new conceptualization of security after the Cold War, security has been re-conceptualized and diversified into “*border security, political security, collective security, human security, economic security, environmental and ecological security, energy security, food safety, water security, health security and finally cyber security and information security* (Müller, 2005, p. 369)” in addition to “*military security*” with an understanding outside and beyond the state. In the context of these developments, instead of “the narrow military security approach” of political realism, “the comprehensive security approach”, in which the future of the state is guaranteed through the interaction of all security approaches is preferable.

1.1.1. Military security.

“*The state of self-protection of states by preventing all threats that may come from inside and outside the country through the use of military forces of states*” is referred to as military security. While one of the main issues that military security is concerned with is “the offensive and defensive capacities of states”, the other is the intentions of other states, including their “future plans and moves” (Vural Ç. , 2018, p. 25). From this point of view, according to Barry Buzan (2011, p. 46), military security can be defined as “*the sum of the military capacities of states, whether offensive or defensive and all the perceptions they create*”. In this respect, Buzan differentiated from the realist security approach and adopted an approach that “*separates military security from political security*”, and in addition, he initiated a transformation in security studies by frequently bringing up the concepts of “*human, identity, and social security*” in his works (Sandıklı A. , 2011, p. 47). Contrary to Buzan's view, the US National Security Strategy of 2002, also known as the Bush Doctrine, is seen as “*the beginning of the process of politicization through the use of military power for political purposes*” (Silverstone, 2011, p. 2).

The securitization of military affairs can be analyzed in four various eras: “*the classical great power era of Europe from 1648 to 1945, the Cold War era, the post-Cold War era, and the post-September 11, 2001 era*” (Buzan, 2008, p. 108). After the September 11 attacks, with the increasing proliferation of uncertain global threats and the rise of realism, which prioritizes the security of the state, military security, and power issues have regained importance in security studies, including national security. In 2003, after the US military invasion of Iraq due to “*the perception of Iraq's*

weapons of mass destruction as a serious threat to the US” (Aksar, 2015, p. 117), the legal status of the concept of “preventive war”, which can also be defined as *“attacking before being attacked”*, started to be discussed (Erkul, 2018, p. 643). Following the US military intervention in Iraq, it was proved that there was *“no legal and legitimate basis for preemptive war on the grounds that Iraq did not possess the weapons of the nature claimed”* (Gray C. , 2014, p. 618). This situation shows that the US, which launched a pre-emptive war by claiming that it perceived a threat from Iraq, committed a legal violation that threatened international security. According to Levy (2008, p. 8), through preventive warfare, *“a possible threat to military security can be identified in advance and a situation of insecurity that may occur in the near future can be eliminated before it occurs”*. The most basic example of the concept of preemptive war is Article 7 of *“the Armistice of Mondros, signed on 30 October 1918 after the First World War, which includes the right of the Entente states to occupy strategic points that they perceive as a threat to their security”* (Türkmen, 2000, p. 619).

1.1.2. Border security.

Borders define *“sovereignty areas in the international arena through clear lines”*. In this way, in addition *“to being an important element used in “determining national identity, culture, common values, and national feelings”*, it is also critical with regard to *“protecting the national security of states and determining the boundaries of legal regulations”* by embodying the perception of homeland and citizenship through borders. The intellectual foundations of the concept of the border are the works of important thinkers such as “Immanuel Wallerstein, Michel Foucault, Anthony Giddens, and Peter Taylor”. The border region can be defined as *“multicultural places adjacent to and surrounding the tangible borders of any two states, where there are cultural and socio-economic interactions, where the controls of the law enforcement forces of the state are intense due to terrorism and illegal border crossing incidents”* (Baud & Schendel, 1997, p. 225). According to Baud and Schendel (1997, p. 225), boundary zones can be classified as *“infant borderland, adolescent borderland, and adult borderland”* in order from the first stage when they are drawn to the last stage when they are finalized. *“De facto-disputed boundary, which resembles a neatly drawn square”*, also called “de facto boundary”, expresses

the fact that “*the borders of a state are recognized by some states but not by others*” (Azarkan, 2013, p. 3). Examples of this situation are the “TRNC-GCASC, China-India, Azerbaijan-Armenia, and Ecuador-Peru borders”. “The overlapping borders” created by the colonial powers emerged during the decolonization processes and in the post-colonial period and continue to exist in Africa today. While the concept of “permeability of border” is used to express “the openness of borders”, the concept of “border people” is preferred to describe “*the people living in the border region*”.

From the city-states of the early ages to the emergence of modern nation-states after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the importance of borders in the context of national security has increased linearly. While in history, as in the examples of World War I and World War II, it was the wars that determined the borders, today borders are largely determined through international treaties, as in the case of Crimea. In the post-Cold War era, border security has “moved away from focusing only on domestic issues based on internal security” and has reached a position of critical importance for “global security” outside the country (Altınpinar, 2018, p. 73). States are no longer able to determine whether the main source of threat perception comes from within or from outside. Due to this situation, the distinction between internal and external threats has disappeared and the need to protect beyond the physical borders of states has been felt intensely by states.

After the break up of the Soviet Union, borders have taken on an ideological and political identity with the expansion policies of the EU and NATO. With this transformation, borders have moved away from being fixed and clear lines and have become fluid. The power struggle between localization and globalization is eroding political borders and making them more permeable, which is why “artificial borders” are among the most frequently discussed agendas in security studies in recent years. Along with the globalization process, the nation-state has been replaced by “global alliances such as EU-NATO-UN, multinational companies, and cyber/virtual alliances”. Moreover, with the increase in “human mobility and border permeability”, a number of global problems related to border security have emerged, such as “transnational crime, migrant smuggling, and illegal migration”. Along with the emergence of such global problems, the fields of study and research in international

relations literature have been increasing linearly in recent years (Waters W. , 2010, p. 220).

Together with the globalization process, which emphasizes that the market is a much more important means of control than the state, “the discourse of a borderless world” has also increased (Altınpınar, 2018, p. 74), and borders have become much more critical with “the concern of reaching beyond borders” (Paasi, 2005, p. 667). “The borderless world discourse” is a discourse similar to “Europe without borders”, which can also be summarised by the Schengen Treaty, which aims to eliminate the barriers between EU countries and is often used with the description of “an open world” in pro-globalization perception operations that are created in the pro-globalization perception operations that the end of nation states has come. Borders are not only a place where *“cultural and commercial interactions are intensely experienced and where national unity and identities are formed”*, but also an area identical to the concept of danger that differentiates states from each other, where *“perceptions of us and the other are formed and conflicts intensify”* (Akengin, 2010, p. 237). Salter (2006, p. 177) criticizes “the role of non-state actors” by evaluating the control of borders from the perspective of “International Political Sociology”. In this view, the security of individuals is at risk as a result of “global mobility” (Didier, 2002, p. 77). Examples of factors affecting the transformation of border security include “the increasing role of non-state actors and international organizations and the technology, satellite imagery, and advanced surveillance tools” that Ackleson (2003, pp. 56-74) claims are creating “smart borders” (Andrijasevic & Walters, 2010, p. 980). According to Latham (2014, p. 18), *“With the transformation of border security, although physical borders have not completely lost their importance, technological and smart borders have gained importance”*.

In order to protect the border security of a country, border control and surveillance of legal entries and exits are carried out through “border gates”. The European Union Agency (Frontex) for “the Management of Operational Cooperation at External Borders” established on 3 October 2005 in the European Union and “the Presidency of the Border Guard Organisation” to be established by the Ministry of Interior in Turkey show the importance attached to the protection of borders on a global and national scale. This indicates that borders have become an area of struggle

and conflict between global power centers in the historical process and today. In addition, “the irregular migration of Syrian and Afghan refugees” remains a controversial crisis issue in terms of border security and human security.

1.1.3. Political security.

“Political pressure by states or governments against their citizens, policies of exclusion or isolation of a state in the international arena, coup attempts, and deliberate creation of virtual crises” are among the main threats to political security (United Nations, 1994, pp. 24-33). Political security is concerned with “ideologies, forms of organization, systems of power, and government, which are the sources of governance and legitimacy of states” (Vural, 2018, p. 25). In regimes that are recognized as “legitimate by the people and adopt a style of governance in accordance with the laws of the country”, political security concerns are at a minimum level.

According to Buzan (1989, p. 121), “*the scope of political security expanded after the Cold War to include peripheral countries outside the two superpowers of the period, namely the USA and the USSR*”. “The security concerns and conflicts caused by the growing political Islamism in third-world countries”, including Middle Eastern and African countries, reveal the importance of political security in ensuring social security (Buzan, 1991, p. 433).

1.1.4. Collective security.

Along with globalization, the changing perception of security from national and international security to collective security and then from collective security to global security has paved the way for a global transformation in security studies (Brauch, 2008, p. 17). It was realized that the unipolar world order, in which the US was the superpower, was no longer functional and that a single actor could not build global security in the face of complex and multidimensional security problems.

Within the framework of the idealist understanding of security, “US President Woodrow Wilson's Principles of Post-War Peace Order” aimed to determine universal peace. With “the creation of the League of Nations” in 1919 within the framework of collective security based on international cooperation and alliances, the first important

example of an attempt to this end was demonstrated. According to the perspective that defends “the equality of the right to security of each member state of the League of Nations”, the members of the alliance will “*respond collectively to any attack against one of the member states of the League of Nations with the idea of collective security*” (Elmas, 2013, p. 48). The United States did not participate in this collective security decision taken by the League of Nations, citing that it was completely contrary to its national interests. Edward Hallett Carr argues that “*international organizations formed as a consequence of the international distribution of power are ineffective in preventing wars*”, he says that “*the League of Nations failed to prevent war in the run-up to WWII because states such as Germany, Japan, Italy, and later the USA and the USSR, which played a dominant role in power relations, did not support this international organization sufficiently*” (Archer, 2001, p. 116).

Another organization formed in line with the collective security understanding is the United Nations, which was established on 24 October 1945 for the purpose of collective security and international peace, replacing “the League of Nations” after WWII. The United Nations, like the League of Nations, is based on “the balance of power”, and decisions are left to the initiative of the five permanent members of the organization. Therefore, in the face of emerging security crises, “*the UN has not been able to produce the necessary solutions that serve to ensure the peace that the international community expects from it due to the veto votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council who have veto power*” (Kutlu, 2018, p. 184). In the post-Cold War period, the United Nations Security Council endeavored to “*find a unanimous solution to the “First Gulf, Somali, and Bosnian Wars within the collective security system*” (Yalçinkaya, 2008, p. 262). In 2003, the US invasion of Iraq was carried out without the permission of the United Nations. It caused the UN's role in the maintenance of international peace to be debated and questioned.

The USA, which makes unilateral military interventions without taking into account the resolutions of China and Russia, which is one of the permanent members of the UN, claims that “*it is against terrorism and aims to prevent human rights violations in order to legitimize these interventions, and does all these under the name of bringing and spreading democracy in the country it intervenes in*” (Güneylioğlu, 2021, p. 110). During the civil war that erupted in Libya and Syria in 2011 after the

Arab Spring, it became possible for NATO to intervene militarily in the name of “collective security based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter” (Howorth, 2013, p. 295).

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, which was established under the leadership of China and Russia to increase its influence in Central Asia, and “the Collective Security Treaty Organization”, which was established by “the Commonwealth of Independent States after the disintegration of the USSR”, have increased “the regional integration efforts of Central Asian countries” after the September 11 attacks against the US efforts to establish “a unipolar world order”, and the existence of these international organizations is of great importance in the context of “collective security” (Yesevi, 2013, p. 261).

1.1.5. Human security.

Human security, which emerged under the leadership of Barry Buzan at the end of the Cold War and aims to “*ensure the welfare, honor, and happiness of people against the perception of social threat, to meet their basic needs, and to ensure their active participation in social life*” (Booth, 1997, p. 86), is “*a new multidimensional security approach that complements other types of security*” (Aksu & Turhan, 2012, pp. 73-74). In other words, in its simplest form, this security approach aims to “protect people's lives”, and “protect people from threats” while at the same time “securing people's freedoms”. This individual-centered approach to security, which focuses on the security of people, critically opposes the state-centered understanding of security (Tigerstrom, 2007, p. 182). “The universality of threats, the priority of preventive interventions and context, and a comprehensive and human-centered approach” are the main characteristics of this understanding of security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22-23).

In line with the changing perceptions of security and threats after the Cold War, the scope of human security has become “multidimensional”, expanding to include new concepts such as “*hunger and infectious diseases, mass migration, poverty, unemployment, exploitation of women and children, drug and arms trafficking, socio-economic inequality, human rights violations, and internal conflicts*” (Ilgaz, 2017, p. 560). While taking steps toward their national interests,

states may ignore the security of their citizens, leading to insecurity in the long term instead of ensuring the security of individuals. It can be expressed by “the security dilemma metaphor” of the classical security approach. Considering the issue from this perspective, the idea that “*the security of individuals should also be guaranteed on the basis of the security of states is confirmed.*” In this direction, security has moved away from its military dimension and has become “a more comprehensive concept”, including “the social and human dimensions” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007, p. 289). In addition, “public order” is seen as the most important element that puts human security under legal protection (Ilgaz, 2017, p. 561).

Human security, which calls into question the modern understanding of state sovereignty, was first mentioned in “the United Nations Human Development Report” in 1994 (Pauline, 2010, p. 129). According to the main arguments set out by the United Nations Development Programme, human security is defined as “*living a dignified and happy life in an environment free from poverty and fear*” (Aksu & Turhan, 2012, p. 74). The 1994 UN Human Development Report (1994, p. 25) of the same program includes two important principles: “*freedom from wants*, which focuses on a holistic approach to sustainable development against natural disasters, unemployment, political repression, famine, environmental hazards, and epidemics that affect a higher proportion of people than violent conflict, and *freedom from fear*, which means protection of individuals in times of danger against violent conflict” (Aksu & Turhan, 2012, p. 74). Within the scope of this report, human security, which is claimed to be universal and individual-centered, is classified into seven different categories: “*economic, food, health, environmental, personal, social, and political security*” (United Nations, 1994, p. 25). According to the UN Commission on Human Security, human security means “*the protection of the fundamental freedoms of individuals against threats and dangers of a high degree of violence and the creation of a system that best suits people’s living conditions*” (Aksu & Turhan, 2012, p. 75). In 1999, “the Human Security Network and the UN Human Security Fund” were established under the United Nations with the participation of “nine states”, including “Austria, Canada, and Norway” (United Nations, 1999). As a consequence of these formations, “*human security serves as a stepping stone to global security and complements each other with human development*” (Hough, 2008, p. 15). In 2001, after “the Independent Commission on Humanitarian Security” came together, “the

Humanitarian Security Unit” was established in 2004. The first report on human security was submitted to “the UN Secretary-General” in 2010 (United Nations, 2012) and “the Strategic Plan” covering the period between 2014 and 2017 was developed with the contribution of the reports submitted in the following years (Madrueno-Aguilar, 2016, pp. 156-173). In this context, the prerequisite for ensuring human security and building rules of the international community that respect human rights is “*to act and cooperate with the responsibility to protect*” (Tepeciklioğlu, 2020, p. 236). NATO's post-Cold War transformation process introduced three new concepts to the international relations literature: “*human security, humanitarian intervention, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P / RtoP)*”. US-led NATO intervened in “Kosovo, Bosnia, Libya, and Afghanistan, using the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect, and the fight against terrorism in line with international organizations' understanding of the use of force to prevent human rights violations” (Bağbaşıoğlu, 2017, p. 520).

In “the United Nations Development Programme” (1994, pp. 24-33), the main characteristics of human security are stated as follows: “*Human security is a transnational phenomenon with universal and interdependent relations and aims to increase the welfare of all humanity as a whole*”. The main mission of this organization is “*to combat threats that exist regardless of national borders, such as epidemics, hunger, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, and environmental pollution*”. As Friedman (2000, p. 33) emphasizes in his metaphor of “*super-empowered individuals, the security of individuals, not states, is a primary task for this organization*” (United Nations, 1994, pp. 23-25). According to the realist perspective, human security is not as important as other theoretical approaches and critical security theories, since it is “state-centered” and “military power-oriented”.

Among the most fundamental concepts that human security perceives as threats are “the crimes of conflict, war, and genocide”, and “the rules of international law” are taken into account in order to prevent these threats. In poor countries, “hunger and infectious diseases” are often seen as threats to human security, while in rich countries “drug trafficking” is a common human security threat (Özdemir & Özdemir, 2017, p. 122). Any situation that adversely affects human life, such as “depletion of water resources, global warming, destruction of the environment,

international terrorism, and drug trafficking”, is seen as “a threat” to human security (Kanat, Kodaman, & İren, 2016, p. 579). In the 21st century, the main threats to human security in terms of human security include “*the inequalities of economic opportunity created by the migration policies at the national level*”, which started with “*rapid population growth in demographic terms, leading to mass population mobility under the name of irregular migrants*” (Smith M. E., 2020, p. 428). Therefore, the issue of “the increase in international migration” is best analyzed from “a human rights perspective” and evaluated within “the scope of human security” (Gök, 2016, p. 65). The dangers and threats faced by “Syrian refugee women” in “the insecure environments” of the countries they migrated to, especially after 2011, are evaluated in the context of human security based on “a gender approach” (Özdemir & Özdemir, 2017, pp. 113-143). As another example, the violations of the right to life experienced by the individuals of the society exposed to “terrorism and violence during the Iraq War in 2003” in an environment of insecurity are also seen as “a human security crisis” (Akca & Hamad, 2020, pp. 327-341). From a feminist perspective, it is stated that “*negative discrimination against women living in Middle Eastern countries such as Iran is caused by rights violations and human security vulnerability*” (Başaran & Kırılmaz, 2019, pp. 238-256).

The Covid-19 outbreak has shown that infectious diseases should not be perceived only as a health threat and that they directly affect many types of security, including human security, and in this regard, “the lack of sensitivity to human security” in some states has been an important but bitter experience for some countries in terms of “*causing even countries with the most advanced economic and military infrastructure to be caught unprepared for the epidemic*” (Duman G. , 2021, p. 118). The ineffectiveness of EU member countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and France in the early stages of the Covid-19 outbreak in the context of human security confirms this situation (Köksoy, 2020, pp. 663-682). In addition, “the restriction of the rights to travel, demonstration, and assembly”, which are among the measures taken to prevent “*the spread of the disease during the Covid-19 outbreak, shows that in the absence of human security, political security in the context of human rights can also be disrupted*” (Alameşe, 2021, p. 44).

1.1.6. Economic security.

With the end of the Cold War, the increase in economic interdependence and competition in the globalized world and the increase in threats and risks in direct proportion to the increase in economic interdependence and competition have led to an increased interest in economic security in security studies. The sustainability of the economic mechanisms of economic activities from the production process to the consumption process, “the ability of states to allocate the necessary financial resources to military power, and the accessibility of markets” are expressed by the concept of economic security. According to Nesadurai (2004, p. 473), economic security can be described in three different forms: *“the adequate level of income and consumption, the existence of income-generating features of the economy, and the minimization of injustice in distribution”*. According to mercantilism and neo-mercantilism, economic security is considered a concept linked to national security. According to liberalism, state intervention should be limited in order to ensure economic security, whereas according to socialists, it is *“the state that should protect the interests of the nation and the weak against external interference”* (Mesjasz, 2008, p. 138). According to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2005), economic security is defined as *“the state of keeping risks and uncertainties, i.e. insecurity, to a minimum level, including basic needs related to health, housing, education, information, and social protection, social security and job security”* (Kalay, 2021, p. 94). The ILO's main viewpoint is “the social security-based approach”, which is “indispensable for the welfare state approach” (Doğan, 2020, pp. 89-102). In a similar approach to the ILO, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 2015) has defined economic security as *“the ability of the state to meet the basic needs of individuals such as shelter, food, clothing, and hygiene”*. In the post-Cold War, economic security is expressed not only in respect of military power but also in respect of “the power to manipulate the economies of other countries and to protect their own economies from their manipulations” (Kahler, 2004, p. 486). The nature of warfare and the strategies used in warfare have changed radically as wars have evolved from the first generation of frontal warfare to “the fourth generation of warfare” in which fire or maneuver is no longer used. One of the methods used in “Hybrid Wars”, which take place on *“the blurred border between war and peace, that is, in grey areas”* (Erdoğan, 2006, pp. 41-53), is that *“financial terrorists who create*

financial crises deliberately create economic wars as a result of economic pressures” (Değirmencioğlu, 2019, s. 1-23). For this reason, ensuring economic security is crucial for the economic independence and survival of states.

Economic security is *“the guarantee of the independence, stability, and relative resilience of the national economies of states”*, and for this reason, especially after the oil shocks of the 1970s, economic security has become more important as a concept linked to national security (Veliyeva, 2020, p. 446). The most effective way to ensure national security is for countries to have economic sovereignty, which includes *“non-distributive economic authority”* and *“distributive economic power”*, which can be defined as *“resilience against foreign interventions and the ability to control its own economy”* (Yong, 2007, p. 67). In the view of Michael E. Smith, economic security can be classified at three various levels of analysis: *“the national level, including the welfare and competitiveness of states; the international level, including global institutions; and the individual level, including the competitiveness of firms”* (Smith M. E., 2010, p. 207). Economic security debates are shaped by three main actors, namely *“the American, European, and Asian approaches”*, and in a globalized world of economic integration, it is important for a successful economy to have the support of large states (Smith M. E., 2010, p. 208). According to Czeslaw Mesjasz (2008, p. 126), economic security is explained by two different levels of analysis: *“state security in terms of its impact on welfare and non-state security, which consists of organizations, companies, regions, or individuals”*, and emphasizes that the individual level has become much more important today. Cable (1995), Ronis (2012), and Moller (2000), besides, explain economic security at *“the individual and national levels of analysis”*, and in their security studies, they deal with *“the economic foundations of military power”*.

In economic security studies, *“unequal exchange, fair trade, and philanthropic capitalism”*, also known as *“philanthrocapitalism”*, are among the main topics of discussion. The concept of *“philanthrocapitalism”*, which was *“first used by Matthew Bishop”* and can also be seen as *“an expression of neo-liberalism”*, refers to *“large donations made by the rich to tackle environmental and social problems”* (Bishop & Green, 2015, p. 541). Income inequality was also included in the scope of security studies by the Dependency School in the 1950s. The disadvantages of a country's late

development and “economic inequality create a vulnerability” (Buzan, 1988, p. 446)., as they make that country vulnerable to political pressure from other countries. As an economic crisis is subject to a “domino effect”, it spreads to all types of security and creates a “multidimensional impact” on security. For these reasons, according to Buzan, states that are “*economically weak and relatively powerless are more likely to resort to the use of force and to be dragged into internal conflicts*” (Buzan, 1988, p. 597). Although the Covid-19 pandemic in recent years has caused a sudden fluctuation in the economies of countries, economic crises, and global risks, no major weaknesses have emerged in the economic infrastructures of countries with sustainable economic security. The crisis between Russia and Ukraine poses potential risks to economic security, as do “*regional crises in the South China Sea, energy crises in the Eastern Mediterranean, and proxy wars in the Middle East*” (Çatal S. , 2019, p. 103). Russia's economic power due to its significant oil and gas reserves is an advantageous situation in regards to providing Russia with a significant advantage in terms of being a global and regional actor. In the context of all these approaches, it is seen that disruptions and weaknesses in economic independence and stability not only adversely affect the economic security of countries, but also pose a great risk to their national security.

1.1.7. Environmental and ecological security.

The concept of environmental security, also known as environmental sustainability, can be defined as “*a process in which extreme environmental events result in the destabilization of regions and countries*” (Ramsay & O'Sullivan, 2013, p. 11). In other words, environmental security is defined as “*the inequitable distribution of environmental resources, their qualitative or quantitative transformation, and the destruction or reduction of the rights of all living beings to reproduction, life, shelter and freedom*” (Uğurlu, 2009, p. 72). Whereas the concept of environmental insecurity is defined as “*the inability of individuals and societies to adapt to the environment and to remain vulnerable in the face of increasing environmental problems*”, environmental security is, on the contrary, “*the ability of individuals to prevent environmental problems or to adapt to the existing situation*” (Barnett, 2007, p. 5). In contrast to traditional security approaches, new post-Cold War security approaches address environmental problems and environmental protection issues as “global


threats and security problems”. In this framework, environmental security is evaluated in the context of “producing solutions and principles for environmental problems” within the post-Cold War security debates (Vural, 2018, pp. 20-38). The key reason for this is that “*the prejudices that the solutions of nation-states to environmental problems will be inconclusive have become the dominant paradigm*” that global problems should be evaluated on a global scale (Söker & Özlük, 2018, p. 229). According to Lester Brown (1977, p. 44), in addition to “military threats”, “the emergence of new threats such as climate change” has made it possible to establish a link between the environment and security. After the Cold War, environmental security, which attracted intense attention with the realization of the negative effects of environmental problems, was introduced to the international relations literature in the 1960s and 1970 (OECD, 2000, p. 5).

There are two different views for ensuring environmental security, namely “the Security Approach” and “the Development Approach”, and for this purpose, there are “law enforcement agencies” operating in many countries. Examples include “national law enforcement agencies such as the Environmental Police in the Netherlands, the Environmental Strike Force, and Environmental Police in the USA, the Environmental, Nature and Animal Protection Police/Team in Turkey, as well as international law enforcement agencies such as EUROPOL and ICPO / INTERPOL” (Bilgili, 2022, p. 250). Environmental security is a concept linked to “national security” as well as “ecological and human security”. The armed forces, as the most dominant actor of national security, are expected to “*contribute to environmental security through various activities such as providing humanitarian aid to environmental security threats, taking measures against environmental disasters, and mobilizing their armies to intervene*” (Ak, 2015, p. 142).

With industrialization, environmental problems have ceased to be a problem that countries can solve alone and solutions to environmental issues have begun to be sought on a global scale. As a result of the globalization process, the crimes committed have moved to an international dimension. International environmental crimes such as “*the dumping of chemical wastes into the environment or the seas, illegal fishing, seal and whale hunting, and cloning, which aim to destroy or damage environmental values*”, have begun to be considered genocide in this context since

they threaten the whole world and humanity, and such environmental genocides are called “ecocide” (Kaypak, 2013, p. 11). In an attempt to combat such environmental problems and genocides, “multilateral environmental treaties” have been concluded in the international arena (Kaya & Ertürk, 2008, p. 85).

Figure 1: The Scope of Environmental Security



Resource: (Allenby, 2000, p. 15)

As seen in Figure 1, environmental security is a multidimensional structure that includes the dimensions of “raw material security, energy security, biological security, including food security, and traditional security”, including competition between rare resources and raw material distribution (Pereira, 2015, p. 191). There are also approaches that categorize the dimensions of environmental security into three groups: “*national security, human security, and economic security*” (Çınar, 2022, pp. 21-26).


In 1972, “the Conference on the Human Environment”, also known as “the Stockholm Conference”, organized by “the United Nations (UN)” is considered to be the first step towards environmental security. “The Convention on Biological Diversity” and “the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change”, which were signed after this conference, are among the important developments in the field of

environmental security (Eminoğlu & Ülgül, 2021, p. 256). In the reports, “Our Common Future” and “Global Neighbourhood” (Yılmaz M. , 2020, p. 119), also known as “the Brundtland Report” (United Nations, 1987), “the UN World Commission on Environment and Development” focused on “the interaction between poverty, environment, security, sustainable development, and peace”. This report introduced “the concepts of environmental security and sustainable development” into the international relations literature by emphasizing that sustainable development can cause conflicts and international security problems (Brauch, 2008, p. 27). Subsequently, environmental security was extensively included in “the Paris and European Charter of Security, and the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties”. NATO (1991), which was established for military security purposes, expanded the definition and types of security in its “1991 Strategic Concept” to include “political, social, and economic elements”, as well as “environmental security”. In 1992, “the UN Human Development Report” addressed the concept of environmental security on the basis of sustainable development, and “the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change” was signed. In 1996, “the Habitat II Summit” was organized in Istanbul by the UN-HABITAT, and “population growth and urbanization problems” were included in environmental problems (Tarhan, 2018, p. 160). Subsequently, “the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change” was ratified in 1997. This protocol is recognized as the most significant internationally binding climate treaty. “2015 Climate Summit (Paris Summit-COP 21)”, the second binding climate treaty after “the UN Environment Conferences” organized in 2002 and 2012, was held (Erdem, 2016, p. 268). NATO is undertaking new missions in combating environmental challenges to environmental security. NATO's first concrete step towards environmental security was taken with “the Environment and Security Initiative” in 2004, followed by a NATO workshop in 2010, where “environmental and food security”, “eco-terrorism, and natural disasters” were among the topics of discussion (Çolakoğlu, 2012, p. 102).

Environmental security can be analyzed in three dimensions: “*an environmental crisis that threatens the lives of living beings, an environmental problem that threatens economic and political stability, and the risk of these problems turning into inter-state conflicts*” (Keleş & Ertan, 2002, pp. 240-241). Two environmental problems on which the international community has reached a consensus are “*ozone depletion, which is considered a global public good, and global*

climate change, i.e. global warming” (Smith M. E., 2020, p. 420). The damage to the environment caused by human activities is calculated by “ecological footprint and carbon footprint methods” (Kaypak, 2013, p. 156). Threats to environmental elements are categorized under four headings: “*land security*” (Koch, McBratney, & Lal, 2012), “*water security*” (Frone & Frone, 2015), “*air quality security*” (Tai & Martin, 2017) and “*biodiversity loss*” (Menteşe, 2020, p. 974).

Figure 2: Global Surface Temperature Change (1850-2300)



Resource: (Kirtman, 2013)

As seen in Figure 2, it is predicted that temperatures will gradually increase between 1.8 and 4 degrees by 2300 unless necessary measures are taken such as “reducing global greenhouse gas emissions for global climate changes” that deeply shake the ecological balance (Devlet Su İşleri, 2012).

According to Thomas Homer-Dixon, who has conducted research on scarce resources, it has been emphasized that “*social, political, or economic conflicts regarding the use of environmental resources will intensify into regional conflicts in undeveloped countries with rich resources and that this injustice will cause migration*” (Bakan & Şahin, 2018, p. 149). According to Uğurlu (2009, pp. 87-88), there are three ways to overcome resource shortages: “*reducing the need for resources by producing alternative energy sources using new technologies, using force if necessary to make it difficult to access resources, such as the hegemony of powerful*

and rich states over the powerless, and finally sharing resources among countries in need, as in the Israeli-Palestinian compromise on water issues”. The atomic bombs dropped by the USA on “Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine in 1986, and the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident in Japan in 2011” have made it necessary to give importance to policies aimed at taking measures within the scope of environmental security (Yılmaz M. , 2020, p. 123). Therefore, Gorbachev included “ecological security” in the Perestroika policy in 1987 after the Chernobyl disaster (Karabulut B. , 2015, p. 55). The issue of nuclear hazards, radioactive leaks, and nuclear contamination is seen in “the Our Common Future Report” as a risk that must be eradicated from the face of the earth and jeopardizes not only “environmental security” but also “human security” (Yılmaz M. , 2020, p. 126). Rachel Carson (2021)'s “Silent Spring”, written in 1962, and Richard Falk (1971)'s “This Endangered Planet” are important in terms of emphasizing the expansion of the concept of security by revealing the relationship between the environment and security.

Figure 3: Environmental Security Threats

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE	NATURAL DISASTERS	DESERTIFICATION	NUCLEAR BOMB TESTS	SETTLEMENT IN ECOLOGICALLY SENSITIVE AREAS
OZONE DEPLETION	FOOD SECURITY	SALTING	POVERTY	MIGRATIONS
EPIDEMIC DISEASES	WATER POLLUTION AND SCARCITY	POPULATION GROWTH	ARTIFICIAL GENETIC POLLUTION	WARS, CONFLICTS, UPRISINGS
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENTS	SOIL POLLUTION AND EROSION	DECLINE IN BIODIVERSITY	INFILTRATION FROM OLD WEAPONS STOCKS	FOREST FIRES, DEFORESTATION
OIL SPILLS AND POLLUTION	DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS/ TOXIC WASTE	RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT	NEWLY EMERGING DRUG-RESISTANT DISEASES	DESTRUCTION OF CORAL REEFS
USE OF CHEMICAL FERTILISERS, DETERGENTS AND PESTICIDES	LEAKING RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS FROM NUCLEAR SUBMARINES	INCREASING THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS	AIR POLLUTION AND QUALITY DEGRADATION	TRANSPLANTATION OF ALIEN SPECIES INTO NEW ECOSYSTEM

Resource: (Glenn & Gordon, 2000, p. 72)

Figure 3 ranks the environmental security threats according to Glenn and Gordon (2000, p. 72). In addition to these, “the destruction of agricultural lands and forest ecosystems, pollution of water resources, desertification, and famine” are also within the scope of environmental risks that can be evaluated in this context. When viewed from the Copenhagen School paradigm, it is observed that in recent years, “global climate change”, which is one of the environmental security threats, has been rendered “*visible through securitization and subsequently politicized and brought into the political sphere*” (Kaya & Ilgıt, 2021, p. 178). In this context, climate security is seen as “a sub-branch of environmental security” (Gönenç & Kibaroglu, 2017, pp. 1-24).

According to McDonald (2013, pp. 42-51), the answers to the questions of the subject and object of environmental security are explained by four different security approaches: “*traditional/national, common/international, humanitarian, and ecological security*”. According to realism, which is the first theory to consider the environment in regard to security, the thesis that “*injustices in the sharing of scarce resources will cause water wars in the near future increases the importance of environmental security*” (Barnett, 2000, p. 271). Liberal institutionalism is an approach that proposes the concept of “Global Environmental Governance” by approaching environmental problems on the basis of “collective action, multilateral treaties, and cooperation” (O'Neill, 2009, pp. 3-4). Non-governmental organizations such as “Greenpeace” also operate for environmental security in accordance with the liberal approach. The European Union, on the other hand, takes a number of measures for environmental security such as “the development of renewable energy sources, the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, the safety of nuclear energy, and energy efficiency”. According to “the Tragedy of the Commons” approach of William Ophuls and Garrett Hardin, which is based on this perspective, it is emphasized that “*states cannot produce solutions to environmental problems such as the pollution of the high seas, oceans, and rivers, which are seen as common goods, or the extinction of species due to overfishing and that the only solution is to end the tragedy through international governments with authority and authority*” (Ophuls & Boyan Jr., 1992, p. 265). These governments are also considered “Leviathan” by Stephanie Lawson (Lawson, 2015, p. 236). Deep environmentalists, who criticized the anthropocentric approach for leading to the destruction of the environment, put forward “the eco-

centric approach, which argues that humans are not superior and are a part of nature” (Eckersley, 1990, p. 748). Proponents of the green theory see the solution to global environmental problems in “decentralization” through local measures with the slogan *"Think globally, act locally"* (Paterson, 2013, p. 369).

Table 1: Approaches to Environmental Security

Environmental Security Approaches	Security Object	Actors	Objective
Traditional/ National Security	State	State	National Security
Common/ International Security	State	State, international organisations	National and International Security
Human Security	Individual	Individual, Society, State, International Organisations, Civil Society Organisations	Security of Human Life
Ecological Security	Ecosystem including all species, including humans	Individual, Society, State, International Organisations, Civil Society Organisations	Ecosystem Security

Resource: (Vural, 2018, pp. 20-38)

Table 1 shows that the different approaches to environmental security include “state-oriented” as well as “individual-oriented” approaches and encompass policies that require “global cooperation and multi-layered political structures” (Vural, 2018, p. 36).

Ecological security (Kaya Y. , 2019), which “centers on the biosphere and ecosystem”, is a type of security that puts forward principles that take high-level security measures against human activities that “harm the environment in order to protect the environment, and the most fundamental security problem to be solved is global climate change”, which is “perceived as a global threat that affects all living things and requires international cooperation and responsibility” (Vural, 2018, p. 34). Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev informed the world of the existence of ecological threats and called for “urgent action”, which led to “a global awareness of ecological security” (Timoshenko, 1990, pp. 127-145).

Environmental security and ecological security differ in scope and content. Environmental security is a type of security that is “people-oriented, has a political dimension, and is based on national security”. On the contrary, ecological security is a type of security based on international organizations and non-governmental organizations on the basis of “global cooperation, ecosystem-oriented and international security”. In ecological security, which aims to protect the dynamic balance and well-being in the ecological sense, unlike environmental security, the issue is approached from “a holistic and global perspective” (Vural, 2018, p. 36). Maintenance of ecological balance means that “human security reaches the maximum level” (Kaypak, 2013, p. 18). Ecological security, also known as ecosystem security, has “a very broad perception of threats, such as attacks by other species like locusts and flooding” (McDonald, 2015).

1.1.7.1. Energy security.

Energy, which has become one of the subjects of political economy research due to the limited energy resources, is seen as the “main interest, power, and competition element of nations” as well as an “element of cooperation” and “plays a significant role in determining the foreign policy processes of international organizations” (Çelikpala, 2014, pp. 74-99). Energy security encompasses “the security of the entire energy infrastructure that ensures the flow of oil and natural gas, which are part of the global economy and is considered one of the main objectives of energy policy” (Winzer, 2012, p. 36).


According to the European Union, energy security refers to *"the stable availability of energy on the market at a price that is affordable to the consumer and in a manner that complies with environmental and sustainable development rules"* (United Nations ESCAP, 2008). According to the United Nations Development Programme, energy security is *"the adequate availability of energy at acceptable prices and in different forms"* (United Nations ESCAP, 2008). According to the International Energy Agency, energy security is defined as *"an uninterrupted supply of oil and natural gas"* (Örmeci & Kısacık, 2021, p. 2). Dyer and Trombetta (2013, p. 3) considered energy as *"a high policy"*, emphasizing that *"the structural transformation of energy markets led to a linear increase in oil prices after 2002"*.

Energy security is analyzed under three main headings: *"physical energy security, economic energy security, and environmental sustainability"*. In recent years, as the world is under the threat of global warming, the demand for *"renewable energy sources such as solar and wind energy and sustainable development understanding has been increasing, unlike fossil fuels"* (Dışkaya, 2017, p. 130). The prerequisite for a region to be secure and stable is to have energy security. According to the political economy approach, a problem in energy security is seen as *"a national security crisis"*. In this respect, energy security is of vital importance for national and economic security. In ensuring energy security, three interdependent actors, *"exporting and importing countries and the transit country between these countries"*, play an important role in maximizing their own interests. *"The affordability of energy (affordability), ease of access (accessibility), sufficient quantity (availability), and sustainability"* are the four main components of energy security.

Winston Churchill, with his emphasis on *"diversity, only diversity"* before the First World War, paved the way for the concept of energy to come to the agenda as *"energy suppliers moved away from monopoly and affordable and uninterrupted energy supply became possible"* (Çelikpala, 2013, p. 8). During the Cold War, security problems, which *"deepened with the 1973 OPEC oil crisis and required global cooperation"* (Karabulut B. , 2016, p. 20), became a threat to the national security of states. The aftermath of the 1973 OPEC oil crisis and the use of energy, which is an economic tool, as a weapon in addition to military power is considered to be *"the beginning of the formation of energy security awareness in the modern sense"*

(Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017, p. 184). With the use of technological developments in the energy sector, “virtual elements” have also been included in energy security (Çelikpala, 2014, pp. 75-99).

Figure 4: Energy Dependency Rates of NATO Member Countries




Resource: (Biresselioğlu, 2012, p. 237)

As seen in Figure 4, although NATO member countries have 17 % of the world's oil production and 6 % of the world's oil reserves, their oil consumption corresponds to 40 % of the world's (Biresselioğlu, 2012, p. 237). A similar situation is also valid for natural gas production and consumption rates. Although NATO member countries have 7 % of the world's natural gas reserves, they account for 34 % of the world's natural gas consumption. This is evident in Figure 4, which shows that NATO member states are highly dependent on foreign countries for natural gas and oil (Çelikpala, 2014, p. 76).

Ukraine is “highly dependent on Russia's natural gas reserves”, imported natural gas supply, and hydrocarbon supply in terms of energy transmission lines supplying natural gas, as well as being “a transit country for natural gas flowing to Europe and even Turkey”. “The Druzhba (Friendship) Line”, which transports Russian oil, and “the Bratasva (Brotherhood), Soyuz (Unity), and Trans-Balkan pipelines”, which transport natural gas to Europe, place Ukraine in a geopolitically and strategically important position as “a gas bridge” (Karagöl & Kaya, 2014, p. 9). In 2006, “the G-8 Summit” was held in Saint Petersburg, where the issue of energy security was discussed on an international platform for the first time. In the Russia-Ukraine crisis, after “*Russia stopped Ukraine's natural gas flow to Europe in January 2006*”, the crisis in energy relations between the West and Russia intensified energy security problems in these regions and even “*Ukraine faced the risk of disintegration*” as it is today (Stern, 2006, p. 33). Launched in 2012, “the Nord Stream Pipeline Project” is an important development to “*reduce Ukraine's dependence on the EU and to increase Germany's geopolitical importance*” in the context of energy security. In recent years, Ukraine's willingness to act independently from Russia by submitting to NATO's and the West's expansionist policies has caused it to become the center of conflicts and crisis by being “stuck between West/NATO and East/Russia”. The fact that “*the inability to ensure energy security and independence leads to national security problems and conflicts*” was demonstrated in the Russia-Ukraine crisis that flared up again on 24 February 2022 (Mardan, 2021, p. 57).

NATO member countries adopt common policies in the context of energy security and participate in some operations for this purpose. During “the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-1988”, a coalition of NATO member countries was assembled and an operation was carried out in the region for energy security in order to access the oil in the Persian Gulf region. After 2000, as Russia entered the restructuring process during the Putin era, Putin started to use “the energy infrastructure as a countermeasure against the expansion policies of NATO and the EU” in line with Putin's foreign policy strategies, which is one of the strategies to strengthen the Russian sphere of influence.

Figure 5: NATO Member Countries' Dependence on Russia for Total Natural Gas Imports (2010 report, in %)



Resource: (Biresselioğlu, 2012, p. 241)

Figure 5 shows that NATO member states are highly dependent on Russia for their total natural gas imports (Biresselioğlu, 2012, p. 241).

NATO member states first addressed energy security in “NATO (1999)’s Strategic Concept in Washington in 1999”, but the most comprehensive approach to this issue was set out in “the NATO Strategic Concept” adopted at “the Lisbon Summit in 2010” (Demir, 2015, pp. 152-155). NATO’s desire to play a leading role in energy security is based on “NATO’s enlargement policy, its partnership agreements, and its status as an international security organization” (Ekşi, 2010, p. 44). NATO’s active role in this issue carries the risk of escalating conflicts with “the US monopolization of energy”. Russia’s and US-led NATO’s struggle for dominance in the supply and distribution of energy reserves, as well as the rising China’s desire to take part in this race, and these countries’ closer relations with oil-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran emphasize the importance of energy security for the continuity of international peace. “Geopolitical balances” are seen as the biggest threat to energy security. The South Ossetia War between Russia-Georgia and South

Ossetia in 2008 and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis from 2009 to the present day are examples of this situation.

In recent years, “Critical Energy Infrastructure Establishment Projects” have been initiated to take measures against threats to energy security such as “terrorism, cyber threats and attacks, theft, tenders and accidents, and natural disasters”. Nowadays and in the historical process, there are many disagreements between states about the sharing of energy reserves. The division of energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and the SCGA leads to disputes between Greece and Turkey. “The problems between Israel and Palestine over the Gaza Strip” are a manifestation of the same energy division disputes (Göknel, 2010, p. 44). Due to the rich natural gas and oil resources in “the Caspian Basin”, this region is the center of power struggles due to its geostrategic and economic importance. “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline with Azerbaijan, the Blue Stream Pipeline with Russia, and the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık Pipeline with Iraq” are examples of the steps Turkey has taken to ensure energy security as a national security issue and to meet its energy needs (Şimşek, Akyüz, & Güngör, 2018). “The Stuxnet cyber-attack on Iran in 2010”, which was “allegedly carried out by Israel and the US through worm software attacking Iran's energy infrastructure”, shows that the cyber dimension must also be addressed in energy security (Hatipoğlu, 2019, p. 9).

1.1.7.2. Food safety and water security.

Food safety, which is seen as one of the problems of environmental security and biosecurity, means *"the easy availability of sufficient, safe, and nutritious food for people to lead a healthy life"* (Parlak, 2020, p. 73). *"Foods offered for human consumption are free from physically, chemically, and microbiologically dangerous substances and contamination and do not harm human health with hygiene regulations"* is called food security (Pakdemirli, Birişik, Aslan, & Öz, 2021, p. 177).

Figure 6: “The Correlation between Food Security and Food Safety” (Risk & Risk, 2017)




Resource: (Yıldız & Arslan, 2018, p. 4)

Figure 6 schematically illustrates “the relationship between food security and food safety” based on their common and different characteristics (Yıldız & Arslan, 2018, p. 4).

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), there are four essential principles of food security: “*availability*, which means that there is enough food for everyone; *accessibility*, which means that everyone has equal access to food; *sufficiency*, which means that everyone has access to nutritious, safe and sustainable food; and *acceptability*, which means that there is food worthy of human dignity” (Paçacı, 2019, p. 24).

Figure 7: “The Correlation between Food Security and Other Types of Security”
(Risk & Risk, 2017)



Resource: (Yıldız & Arslan, 2018, p. 3)

Figure 7 shows “the relationship between food security and other types of security” (Yıldız & Arslan, 2018, p. 3). Access to safe food and ensuring food safety and security has become a principle to be implemented globally.

Table 2: General Food Security Environment: Top and Bottom-Ranked Countries in 2022

Best performers	2022 score	Weakest performers	2022 score
Finland	83.7	Syria	36.3
Ireland	81.7	Haiti	38.5
Norway	80.5	Yemen	40.1
France	80.2	Sierra Leone	40.5
Netherlands	80.1	Madagascar	40.6
Japan	79.5	Burundi	40.6
Canada	79.1	Nigeria	42
Sweden	79.1	Venezuela	42.6
United Kingdom	78.8	Sudan	42.8
Portugal	78.7	Congo (Dem. Rep.)	43

Resource: (Economist Impact, 2022)

One of the primary conditions for “exporting to developed markets such as EU countries and the USA, where foreign trade is intensive”, is food security (Oraman, 2014, p. 132). For this purpose, “the Global Food Security Index” study is conducted regularly every year by “the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)”. Table 2 shows the scoring of the top and bottom-ranked countries in terms of overall food security in 2022 (Economist Impact, 2022). According to Table 2, “*Finland is the highest-ranked country*” in terms of ensuring food security, while “*Syria is the lowest-ranked country*”


Negative developments such as “*the increase in population growth rate, industrialization, and urbanization, climate irregularity at the global level, destruction of forests, pollution of soil, and decrease in soil fertility*” have increased the need for food and water in states (Gleick, 1993, p. 83). In addition to these negative developments, “the increase in non-recyclable microplastics” leads to environmental problems and negatively affects food security (Atakan, Yücer, & Caner, 2021, p. 440). “Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and hormones” made by manipulating the gene sequence of living organisms through biotechnological methods are among “the new risk factors that threaten food safety and negatively affect the ecological balance” (Eştürk, Eştürk, Ören, & Ayhan, 2010, p. 668). The increase in such risks has contributed to the prominence of “organic food” in terms of food security. Aridity caused by climate

irregularity and insufficient rainfall threatens food security globally. The concept of “agroterrorism, which is “a sub-classification of bioterrorism” (Monke, 2007), reduces agricultural production by targeting agricultural products with certain chemicals in order to harm food security. Although it is known that “*people were not infected through food during the Covid-19 outbreak*” (Tayar, 2020, p. 63), “*the issue of whether the virus can be transmitted through food or food packaging has been a subject of debate for a long time*” in the context of the relationship of this outbreak with food security (Sağdıç, Kayacan, Dertli, & Arıcı, 2020, p. 928).

The number of people facing the problem of “hunger” is increasing day by day due to “disruptions in food production processes and food shortages” (Dokken, Mach, Mastrandrea, Field, & Barros, 2014, pp. 490-519). There are serious inequalities in access to food worldwide. While “the number of people living under the hunger limit in underdeveloped and poor countries” is increasing day by day, on the other hand, there is “an abundance of food and wastage in developed and rich countries”. For this reason, “humanitarian aid” under the name of “humanitarian diplomacy is provided to North African and Middle Eastern countries”, which are disadvantaged in terms of “food accessibility” (Aydın S. , 2016, pp. 101-107). This situation reveals the fact that the world will face “a serious global famine” in the near future, and as famine increases, the risk of “inter-state conflict” will also increase (Yoffe & Wolf, 1999, s. 197-213).

“The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)” has set a global standard through “ISO 9000: Quality Management System and ISO 22000 Food Safety Management System”, aiming to ensure the safe and quality production of food. In Turkey, this standard is “established by the Turkish Standards Institute based on HACCP principles” (Erkmen, 2010, p. 232).

Figure 8: Sources of Environmental Scarcity



Resource: (Deudney & Matthew, 1999)

Figure 8 shows “the economic, societal, and political impacts of environmental scarcity” based on the resources that cause environmental scarcity, and all these negative impacts result in “the weakening of states” (Deudney & Matthew, 1999). Among the measures to be taken against “climate irregularity and water scarcity” in terms of “ensuring food security, environmental development, and sustainability” of ecosystems, “Integrated Water Resources Management” is of great importance in terms of risk management (Yıldız, 2013, p. 21). Since the scarcity of water resources and the existence of various threats such as “flooding of rivers caused by global warming, water pollution and sea level rise” after natural disasters can lead to political conflicts, “the depletion of water resources” is an important security issue that requires measures to be taken at this point.

1.1.8. Health security.

In December 2019, with the COVID-19 outbreak, which is believed to “*have originated in Wuhan, China, and caused mass deaths worldwide through respiratory transmission*” (Tolunay, 2020), health safety has become one of the main security issues that are frequently discussed and increasingly important in security studies. According to “the World Health Report” published by the World Health Organisation in 2007, “*the whole of re-active and proactive activities that aim to reduce the problems experienced by the society against severe public health events, protect*

public health" is called health security (WHO, 2007). Due to the extraordinary security measures experienced after the coronavirus outbreak, the understanding of security has "undergone a radical transformation" and become *based on Internal Security Management and overlapping with public security as the Post-Covid Security Approach*" (Yılmaz S. , 2021, pp. 467-492). With globalization, "the protection of public health" has become the main objective due to transboundary health problems. In this context, the concept of "global health diplomacy", which aims for "*better health security, equitable systems ensuring greater equity, and enhanced global cooperation*" (Kickbush & Ivanova, 2013, p. 11), has been introduced and "*WHO, as the most comprehensive international health organization*", has been designated as the international organization to achieve all these goals (Gezer, 2022, p. 49).

The concept of "biosecurity", which is used as one of the concepts related to the concept of health security, is used as "*combating elements that threaten the health of plants and animals*". At the same time, "biological elements" have not only been used as weapons, but have also been used in the fight against epidemics in recent years, and solutions such as "vaccination and quarantine" have been produced within the scope of combating pandemics in this field (Yılmaz S. , 2021, p. 474). According to Elbe (2010, p. 28), this situation is called "the medicalization of security". Together with globalization, the rate of spread of epidemics and the situation of the disease becoming an epidemic and threatening the whole of humanity has increased. Nevertheless, with increasing income inequality, the risk of the spread of epidemics in countries with low income and quality of life is higher than in developed countries and threatens health security. "Increasing air pollution and ozone depletion" have negatively affected "biodiversity" and the number of people exposed to "lethal diseases such as cancer" has increased exponentially in recent years (Worldwatch Institute, 2005).

According to Brundtland (2003, pp. 417-423), health is “an essential element of a country's development, security, and stability”, and “Bacteria and viruses that cause epidemics spread as fast as e-mails”. “The Covid-19 / Coronavirus (SARS / CoV-2) pandemic”, continues to exist today, at a pace caused by “globalization, human mobility, and migration” (WHO , 2020). Beginning on 22 December 2020, it has “*spread all over the world*” (BBC News , 2021) and caused “*many people to lose their lives*” (Çınar, 2022, p. 15). Epidemics such as Covid-19 not only cause “a global loss of life” but also affect “the social, political, and economic systems of societies as a whole” and lead to serious effects such as “the instability of states” (Yılmaz S. , 2021, p. 473).

US President Donald Trump called the Covid-19 outbreak “the Chinese virus” and launched “psychological warfare” by moving health security into the realm of political security. Along with these developments, discussions on biological warfare, which is based on the use of viruses as “biological weapons, and biological terrorism”, which is the use of “*disease-carrying agents against target regions or individuals for ideological or political purposes*”, have started (Şahin S. , 2022, p. 248).

In accordance with these discussions, “*the radical changes in existing security approaches after the Covid-19 outbreak*” will necessitate “new measures” to be taken in the coming period in terms of the internal security management of states (Yılmaz S. , 2021, p. 468). “Pandemic measures”, which are considered within the scope of “International Public Health” in Smith's studies (2020, p. 376), have been a fundamental issue of security importance for global stakeholders. “Urgent health crises with high mortality rates, severe spread in a short period of time, and cross-border characteristics” constitute the main issue of health security (Feldbaum, Lee, & McInnes, 2004, pp. 19-28). “Social resilience”, which is the power of society to resist health crises, is important in the context of combating these crises. From this point of view, the adaptation and normalization process against Covid-19 has been quite late.


Table 3: Infectious Diseases in History

Epidemic	Time Period	Type and Output Source	Estimated Number of Deaths
<i>Antonine Epidemic</i>	A.D. 165-180	Smallpox or measles	5 million
<i>Justinian Plague</i>	A.D. 541-542	Yersinia Pestis	30-50 million
<i>Japan Smallpox Epidemic</i>	A.D. 735-737	Variola Major Virus	1 million
<i>Black Plague</i>	1347-1351	Yersinia Pestis Bacteria Mouse, Flea	200 million
<i>New World Smallpox Epidemic</i>	1520- later	Variola Major Virus	56 million
<i>Italian Plague</i>	1629-1631	Yersinia Pestis Bacteria Mouse, Flea	1 million
<i>London Plague</i>	1665	Yersinia pestis Bacterium	100 thousand
<i>Third Plague Epidemic</i>	1885	Yersinia Pestis Bacteria Mouse, Flea	12 million
<i>Yellow Fever</i>	End of 1880's	Virus - mosquitoes	100-150 thousand
<i>Russian Influenza</i>	1889-1890	H2N2 Virus	1 million
<i>Spanish Influenza</i>	1918-1919	H1N1 Virus/pig	40-50 million
<i>Asian Influenza</i>	1957-1958	H2N2	1.1.million
<i>Hong Kong Influenza</i>	1968-1970	N3N2 Virus	1 million
<i>HIV</i>	From 1981 to Present	Virus Chimpanzee	25-35 million
<i>SARS</i>	2002-2003	Coronavirus Bat Wild Cat	770 thousand
<i>Swine Flu</i>	2009-2010	H1N1 Virus-Pig	200 thousand
<i>Ebola virus</i>	2014-2016	Ebola Virus Wild Animals	11 thousand
<i>MERS</i>	From 2015 to Present	Coronavirus-Bat Camel	850 thousand
<i>Covid-19</i>	From 2019 to Present	Coronavirus	6.884.014

Resource: (Jones K. , 2020)

Table 3 shows the infectious diseases in history (Jones K. , 2020). About 20 infectious diseases, such as “tuberculosis, cholera, avian influenza, swine flu, and malaria”, and about 30 infectious diseases, such as “HIV, hepatitis C, West Nile virus, Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, Spanish flu, SARS coronavirus, and Ebola”, have become widespread since the mid-1070s (Price-Smith, 2008, p. 33).

Figure 9: Mission Areas of Security after Covid-19



Resource: (Yılmaz S. , 2021, p. 469)

As seen in Figure 9, “the traditional security approach” focused on “counterterrorism and public order” after September 11 has undergone a radical transformation with the Covid-19 outbreak, and “a post-Covid-19 security approach” has emerged in order to “take more collective measures against epidemics and global climate changes” that threaten health security (Yılmaz S. , 2021, p. 469). Human intervention in the environment and ecosystem has increased in recent years, and the concept of “other threats” (DHS, 2010), including “natural disasters” (DHS, 2007) and “epidemics” (DHS, 2011), has been included in the literature in addition to “terrorism” with a focus on “people's quality of life”. In addition, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, “a serious network of measures” has been established to identify infected cases and contacts, including “filiation studies, mass quarantine practices, and curfews”, which are similar to “intelligence studies” used to find terrorists (Yılmaz S. , 2021, p. 471).


1.1.9. Cyber security, and information security.

Cyber security and deterrence, which deals with “*the development of the necessary mechanisms against cyber threats in order to control the cyber environment*”, has gained importance to cover the protection and security of information with “*the transition to the information society, technological developments, and the widespread use of the Internet*”. During the Cold War era, “*allowing the use of the Internet by civilians for commercial purposes and the information technologies developed with military competition*” (Darıcı, 2019, p. 11) paved the way for the securitization of the environment called “*cyberspace, which consists of land, sea, air, and space components, which was first used by science fiction writer William Gibson (2017) in 1982 in his studies Burning Chrome*” (Çakır & Ada, 2017, p. 8).

Cyber security is defined as “*the risk management of the security of cyberspace*”, which is also called “*a cyber environment consisting of the internet, digital networks, and information*” (Göçoğlu & Aydın, 2019, p. 231). According to Yue (2003, pp. 566-568), cyber security has three basic tools: “*optimal design, which means that the network rebuilds itself, continuous network control, which means continuous surveillance, and the security of future generations provided by encryption systems.*”

Cyber-attacks, cyber-terrorism, and cyber-espionage can be defined as “*deliberate human-induced actions against targets in the cyber environment in order to create benefit or damage*” (Friedman & Singer, 2015, p. 362). These attacks can be carried out by “hackers” as well as by “nation-states and internal organizations” (Lu, 2014, p. 11). There are the following types of cyber attacks: “*Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), malware such as viruses, worms, robots and trojans, spyware, rootkit, phishing, zombie computers, and social engineering*”. Cyber defense, cyber power, and cyber security should be used effectively to protect against such malicious unlawful attacks on information security and information wars.

Figure 10: Increase in Total Malware (2013-2022)



Resource: (AV-TEST GmbH, 2022)

As can be seen in Figure 10, since 1960, when the Internet was established for information sharing, the increasing need for the Internet has increased the interest in malware from year to year (AV-TEST GmbH, 2022).

“Cyber exploitation” is the use and even abuse of the information obtained by “secretly infiltrating cyberspace”, where there are no national borders protected by the state, by “taking advantage of security vulnerabilities”. According to Joseph Samuel Nye (2004, pp. 16-20), as a result of developments in cyberspace, “*power is shifting from large states to relatively small states and the ultimate role of states remains unchanged*”, even if the role of non-state actors is increasing day by day compared to states. “Principles such as confidentiality, integrity, accessibility, continuity, traceability, reliability, non-repudiation, and authentication of information” are important for ensuring cyber security (Goodrich & Tamassia, 2011, pp. 1-4).

In 2007, in “the cyber war between Estonia and Russia”, Estonia had to ask for help from NATO against Russia, which shows that cyber deterrence measures taken for cyber security are of unique importance for the future of states. In this context, cyber defense includes various methods such as “firewalls, content filtering, electronic signature, anti-virus programs, and honeypot”. Since the 1990s, not only states but also many international organizations, including NATO and the EU, have started to develop strategic plans aimed at ensuring their cyber security by increasing their cyber defense and cyber attack capacities.

According to “NATO's Cyber Security Framework Guidelines”, “the protection of state secrets” is essential to ensure national security (Klimburg, 2012). “A powerful cyber defense, intelligence, offensive capability, coordination, and cooperation” are absolutely necessary for an effective cyber security strategy (Libicki, 2009, p. 31). Examples of cyber defense strategies include “*reliable application lists, correct configuration, and updates, reduction of attack areas, creation of a defensible environment and authorization system, reliability of remote access, monitoring, and defense applications*” (Libicki, 2009, p. 100).

Turkey established “the Cyber Security Board” in September 2012 to combat cybercrime. Subsequently, by preparing “the National Cyber Security Strategy” in January 2013, it has taken an important initiative to take measures and raise awareness of cyber security with “Action Plans” (T.C. Ulaştırma Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, 2013, p. 9) starting from 2013-2014 (Darıcılı, 2019, p. 27).

“The cyber homeland”, on the other hand, aims “*to protect information within Turkey's national borders and to own big data, which is now considered more valuable than oil*”, without being assimilated in the face of cultural change in cyberspace. In other words, it is a new concept of awareness that defines “the digitalized nation-state” (Memoğlu, 2021).

Table 4: Clarke and Robert's Cyber Security Scoring System

Components	China	Russia	USA	Iran	North Korea
Cyber Defence	6	4	1	3	7
Cyber Attacks	5	7	8	4	2
Cyber Addiction	4	5	2	5	9
Total	15	16	11	12	18

Resource: (Clarke & Knake, 2010)

As seen in Table 4, according to Clarke and Robert, the resilience of these five major countries, including “the United States, China, and Russia”, as well as “North Korea and Iran”, which are seen as the three superpowers in terms of cyber security, was measured by a scoring system. According to the result obtained in light of this data, “North Korea is the strongest state” in terms of its resilience in cyber security, followed by “Russia, China, Iran, and the USA” respectively (Clarke & Knake, 2010).

1.2. Intellectual Foundations of the Concept of “Security”

The intellectual background of the concept of security dates back to the thoughts of Ancient Greek philosophers living in pre-modern times. According to Plato (2010)'s “State”, security is “one of the survival goals of the ancient city-states” called “polis” in Ancient Greece, while Aristotle (1999) believes that security can “be ensured through laws”. Epicurus (1962, p. 62), on the other hand, believes that the reason for the existence of states, which he believes to have been artificially created by “the social contract”, is “to end conflicts and ensure the security of people”. As in Ancient Greece, the concept of security was given vital importance in “the Pax Romana”, which was defined as a long-term peace process in the Roman period. In the historical process leading to the Middle Ages, the concept of security underwent “a theocratic transformation”. According to St Augustine and Boethius, security is seen as an assurance that “*ensures the continuity of beliefs and their transmission to future generations*”. After the feudal order, special importance was attributed to the state as “the sole guardian of peace and tranquility”. According to Ibn Khaldun (2020)'s “Muqaddime”, the state is the power that “*should provide security with the transition to a settled order*” (Uygun, 2008, p. 93). “Universal peace” and “worldly security” are new concepts introduced to the literature by Dante Alighieri and Marsilius of Padua.

Founded in the 16th century with the formation of modern states, the intellectual background of “the security state concept” was established in Niccolò Machiavelli (1952)'s “The Prince” by emphasizing “the importance of laws and armies for security”. In addition, Jean Bodin's understanding of security based on the concept of “sovereignty” and Thomas Hobbes' (2005) “Leviathan”, which will be discussed in the future, and the understanding of the security state that “prioritizes fear and chaos” have an important impact on the shaping of the building blocks of the concept of security.

In the later periods, the understanding of the security state was abandoned and replaced by an understanding of security that reflects the idealist perspective, in which the attainment of “freedom” is a priority condition. According to Alberico Gentili's approach to security, which adopts this idealist view, security is seen as “the limit of sovereignty and covers only the security of nationals”. Hugo Grotius sees security as the source of law and includes the right to resist arising from the lack of security in his studies. Samuel Von Pufendorf, on the other hand, thinks that “*laws and the state must exist in order to ensure security*”, but similar to Gentili's view, he still sees “security as a factor that limits sovereignty and freedom”.

In the 17th century, on the basis of the liberal approach, Baruch Spinoza approaches “security as a virtue of the state”. This approach is similar to John Locke's understanding of the state that “*protects the inherent rights of human beings to liberty, property, and equality on the basis of a peaceful environment*”, which he sees as a state of nature. In the following part of the research, the security approaches of “Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Hugo Grotius” will be analyzed in detail.

1.2.1. Thomas Hobbes' conception of security.

Thomas Hobbes, one of the social contractual thinkers of the 17th century, who adopted “a traditional, state-centered, and realist understanding of security”, is seen as “the pioneer of modern state thought”. Hobbesian security, known as power and state-oriented, has its intellectual foundations in a theory of “the state that prioritizes chaos and fear”. In this respect, it can be said to be “a totalitarian approach” (Akal, 1998, p. 92). Based on Thomas Hobbes' (2005) statement “*Man is wolf to man.*”, people who think about their own interests and are selfish by nature need to feel safe in the insecure environment of “*the state of nature where there is the constant fear of death, war and struggles*” in order to survive. The fact that people who are equal in a designed state of nature as defined by Hobbes are in the struggle among themselves outside “the state of nature creates insecurity, and insecurity creates conflicts and war” (William, Wright, & Evans, 1996, p. 149). Based on this idea, Hobbes views foreign policy processes as “*a zero-sum game that includes an offensive dimension as well as a defensive dimension*” (Emeklier, 2011, p. 111).

As a result of “the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia” signed after “the Thirty Years' War” and the increase in colonial practices, states became “the main actors in the international system”. Thomas Hobbes (2005, p. 11) has witnessed these historical events and wars, and in “a world where everyone is in a struggle with everyone else” (Loughlin, 2017, p. 74), “living under the fear and threat of death”, he sees individual security as “the sine qua non of the state”. In this context, he sees the sole purpose of the state, which he equates with civil society, as “guaranteeing the security of its citizens” (Hobbes, 2005, pp. 124-125).

According to Hobbes, a state is “*an artificial object that emerged due to people's fears of the state of nature*”, based on the greed for power produced by people. Since there is “*no rule-making supreme authority in the anarchic international social order*”, Hobbes proposes “a social Leviathan” to fill this void (Özkan D. , 2021). “Leviathan”, which Hobbes characterized as “the Mortal God”, has transformed into “the concept of a security state” over time (Bayra, 2019, p. 94). According to Hobbes, if “*a country does not have a higher authority such as a state, war will be inevitable*” due to the anarchy that exists in that country. This view of Hobbes constitutes the outline of the realist understanding of security. According to Hobbes (1987, p. 96), the way to ensure “Leviathan” in a secure environment where peace prevails is “the social contract method”, which he characterizes as “the mutual transfer of rights to each other” by using people's reason (Hobbes, 2005, p. 99). In this way, people voluntarily give up their natural rights and freedoms and leave some of them to a higher authority in order to meet their security needs. According to Hobbes, the powers that gather the power to govern states in their hands can be formed by “the social contract”, as well as by two different means of coercion, namely “descent”, and “conquest”.

1.2.2. John Locke's conception of security.

John Locke is among the most important thinkers of the period that formed “the liberal political thought of the 18th century” and “the ideological, cultural, and historical background of the American Revolution” (Sigmund, 2005, p. 12). Locke's (1993, pp. 262-263) state of nature approach starts from the assumption that “*human beings are equal and free only at the beginning of their lives*” and emphasizes that over time this situation is “*limited by a universal law of nature discovered by human*

reason". According to Locke, the state of nature is seen as a context of "cooperation and mutual solidarity", in contrast to Hobbes's approach which shows human nature as evil (Yorulmaz, 2014, p. 112). For this reason, "Locke's state of nature" expresses an order in which "*people's natural rights are protected by the state*" and in which "*there is freedom and peace*".

Hobbes believed that "*the power to ensure security was a form of government based on monarchy*", whereas John Locke, unlike him, advocated "parliament" and "representative democracy". According to Locke, people delegate their freedom to "a natural government (state of nature), i.e. a civil government", through the contracts they make among themselves, which also have a moral aspect, or they choose to ensure their own freedom through "civilized governments" (Bagby, 2002, p. 88). As a result of "the social contract", in which individuals do not give up their rights and freedoms, the power created to protect the property of individuals is "legitimate but limited" (Tabanlı, 2018, p. 341). John Locke thinks that it is necessary to get rid of all kinds of authority and traditions and oppose absolutism, and in this respect, he is considered "*the pioneer of the liberal/pluralist understanding of democracy under the leadership of reason and the principle of separation of powers*".

1.2.3. Jean Jacques Rousseau's conception of security.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (2009), one of the most important thinkers of liberalism criticized the Enlightenment period for causing moral decadence and impoverishment, in his work "Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men", the state of nature, although it initially contained "equality and compassion", led corrupt and ambitious people who internalized sociality with "the emergence of division of labor and private property to an unequal and insecure process."

According to Rousseau (1990, p. 26), the way to ensure international security and peace is through "*the transformation of the general will of society into a common agreement through the existence of an international organization*", the foundations of which he laid with his theory of "the Social Contract" written in 1762. The transformation of inequality into equality and collective security will be possible in this way. The existence of a legitimate sovereign power to be formed by a permanent confederation that includes the international community should be a way to defend

“the common interest of everyone”, and by preventing members from resisting this power, members transfer their will to this confederation, that is, to “the general will”, which is the common interest of society. As a matter of fact, “the League of Nations” and “the United Nations”, which were established in the 20th century, are based on this main idea. “Rousseau's social contract theory and unity of powers approach”, which he saw as the source of general will and legitimacy, not only inspired the masses who carried out “the French Revolution” but also laid “the institutional foundations of the transition to a secular nation-state” (Geçgin, 2012).

1.2.4. Immanuel Kant’s conception of security.

Immanuel Kant (1960, p. 9), in his 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", which has a significant impact on security policies, emphasizes that in order to *“create international peace, the concepts of war and violence should be legally rejected and peoples should agree among themselves and assume some responsibilities for international peace”* (Hirş, 1947). Kant sees “autonomy”, which can also be characterized as being governed by laws that people create in line with their own decisions, as “a guarantee of freedom”. According to Kant, one of the causes of wars is “the maintenance of an army by states”, since it is perceived as a constant threat to other states. Instead of eliminating armies, he proposes the establishment of “a global federation of autonomous and independent states”. While he sees “political and economic developments” as a way to end wars, which he characterizes as unlawful, and to ensure a lasting peace, he believes that this will be possible through “a legal order that offers equality and freedom” and through “the relations of states with each other”. According to Kant (1960, p. 9), the primary conditions for “eternal peace” are that *“no contract containing a secret war clause should be considered a peace treaty, no state should be under the sovereignty of another state, standing armies should be abolished in time, states should not incur debts due to their interests, states should not intervene in the internal politics of another state by force and oppression, and states should not resort to contrary means that would cause a breach of trust in the peaceful environment at the end of the war.”*

Immanuel Kant believes that in a peaceful order, “moral action” and “the rule of law achieved” through reason bring states into existence as the best political order, and for this reason, “the trinity of reason, law, and morality” must exist in order to build peace in society. Another way of building peace is for “individuals to be free” and “states to be independent.” Freedom and independence can be guaranteed by “*a republic*” (Önal, 2010, p. 125). It also envisages “a collective structure”, which it characterizes as “a world society” in which all humanity becomes a common community. Accordingly, in Kant's approach to security, “a limited law of world citizenship” with the condition of “universal hospitality” and the concept of “collective security” gained importance. He believes that this situation can be possible through “Global Governance”, a federative form of government that includes all independent states, which he sees as “a collective structure” (Kant, 1796, p. 12).

1.2.5. Hugo Grotius’ conception of security.

According to Hugo Grotius, one of the 17th-century rationalist thinkers and one of the most important representatives of the liberal movement, man, as “an innately virtuous being”, has “the desire to live in peace and protect himself”. Grotius, who depicted “an anarchic international environment in which there is no superior authority”, did not characterize the international environment as an environment of absolute conflict like Hobbes. According to Grotius, the discipline of international relations exists as “a component of international society and the society of states” (Bull, 1981, p. 732). Even in the case where individuals choose to enter the rule of a sovereign through “a social contract”, this contract is sustained by “political and economic relations”, and here there is “a hierarchy shaped by nature” (Grotius, 1967, pp. 48-49).

States, which Grotius characterizes as “sovereign entities” are formed as a result of “natural tendencies and agreements between people”. Although customs regulating relations between states exist, they are insufficient to ensure international peace. For this reason, the international environment necessarily requires “international laws and organizations”. In this respect, according to Grotius, it is of vital importance that “*there is no unjust act that is incompatible with reason and the rules of society*”. For states, “adherence to the law” and “the right of citizens to private property” is of similar importance. Grotius expresses his point of view on the

idea of “the social contract as the emergence of the state as a result of the formation of civil society through two separate contracts, social and political” (Torun, 2005, p. 128).

Based on the relationship between defense and security, Hugo Grotius defined “*the measures taken by a state to defend itself against any attack as security*”. In this context, in “Hugo Grotius’ (1967, p. 47) *Law of War and Peace*”, the causes of “unjust war” and the concept of “just war” came to the fore. According to Grotius, wars occur for the purposes of “punishment, recovery of property, and self-defense” within the framework of certain rules (Yorulmaz, 2014, p. 111). In simpler terms, it does not accept wars other than for the purpose of defense as “legitimate wars” (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 30).

1.3. Security Theories in International Relations

Similar to the nuclear arms race created by the bipolar world order between the two superpowers during the Cold War, “classical security theories” and “new security theories” represent two different poles where the theoretical debates in security studies are in competition with each other. The proponents of the new understanding of security argue that there have been radical changes in the structure of the international system in the post-Cold War era and that these changes have reinterpreted security in international relations and gradually expanded its scope.

Contrary to this view, thinkers who adopt the classical approach to security emphasize that “*the Cold War did not cause significant differences in the international system and therefore it is not necessary to redefine the concept of security or to expand the scope of the concept*” (Miller B. , 2001, pp. 36-37). The classical approach to security argues for the primary role of states in international politics and that security should be limited to military capabilities, capacities, and strategies. The new security concept is rooted in cooperative security based on mutual security and common interests.

Table 5: International Security Studies (ISS) Approaches to Security

	Object	Priority Sector	Security Policy	Internal / External
Strategic Studies	State	Military (use of force)	Realistic	External Priority
Neo (realism)	State	Military-Political	Realistic	External Priority
Post-structuralist Security	Collective - Individual	All of them	Utopian but not idealistic.	Both (Legality of boundaries)
Post-colonial Security	State - Communities	All of them	Western domination can change, albeit with difficulty.	Both of them
Human Security	Individual	All of them	Transformational	Internal Priority
Feminist Security	Individual, Woman	All of them	Generally Transformational	Both of them
Critical Security	Individual	All of them	Transformational (Emancipation)	Both of them
Copenhagen School	Integrities - Environment	All of them	Neutral	Both of them

Resource: (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 38)

The study developed by International Security Studies (ISS) with reference to different security theories' approaches to security is summarised in Table 5 in terms of “object, priority sector, security policy, and internal/external threat perception” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 38).

1.3.1. Security perspective during the Cold War era: Classical security theories.

“The bipolar power hierarchy” of the Cold War period and “the balance of terror and competition” between the two superpowers, “the USA/Western Bloc and the Soviet Union/Eastern Bloc”, which did not directly turn into armed conflict, were reflected in security debates. In this period, “traditional/classical security theories” focusing on “state-oriented and military-based strategic moves” for defense measures were adopted due to the constant possibility of the war turning into “a hot war”. In this approach to security, which we can characterize as “traditional or classical security”, “military and political security types” come to the fore. The security concerns of the blocs based on the balance of power mechanism to ensure military security led to the establishment of two organizational structures, “NATO and the Warsaw Pact”. However, one of the international organizations established in 1945 to “ensure international peace and security is the United Nations” (Pazarcı, 2011, p. 190). These efforts of international organizations were neither fruitless during the Cold War period nor afterward. In this period, the USA and the USSR, which can be described as the two superpowers, attached great importance to “the production of nuclear weapons” for defense purposes. The threat perception created by nuclear weapons production includes “external military threats” and “a war-based approach”.

1.3.1.1. Idealist security.

In the aftermath of the First World War between 1914 and 1918, in order to “prevent the recurrence of the war and to establish a peaceful world order” after the devastation it brought, the idealist understanding of security emphasizes legal arrangements based on “the rule of law and the existence of a superior institutional judicial mechanism” (Elmas, 2013, p. 48). Based on the view that human behavior and political orientations of people will be transformed as a result of improvements in environmental conditions, it is thought that international systems with “representative democracies can determine a peaceful environment” and in this direction, “the right of nations to self-determination is defended” (Ari, 2001, p. 57). According to idealists, human beings are “inherently good and cooperative”, and therefore “*war is not a necessity for them*”. When the anarchic nature of the international environment disappears, war becomes “a preventable phenomenon”. “The prevention of wars” is

not the product of the efforts of individuals or individual states. On the contrary, this is possible with the logic of “collective security” that emerges as a result of collective consciousness. “The spread of democratic regimes and international organizations, the rules of international law, and the priority given to disarmament” (Karabulut B. , 2014, p. 66) are among the defining features of idealism.

“US President Woodrow Wilson”, who is considered the pioneer of the idealist approach, stated in his “14 principles” that “*the existence of an international status was necessary for the construction of international peace and security, and in this context, he proposed the concept of “collective security to the international community”*” (Gözen, 2015, pp. 68-69). According to Wilson, “international cooperation, democratically governed states, the sovereignty of free trade, and the education of societies” are seen as indispensable conditions for peace-building (Çalış & Özlük, 2007, p. 228). In this context, he emphasizes that the establishment of international organizations such as “the League of Nations and the United Nations” are extremely important steps for the establishment of “universal peace” (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 137). The adoption of “a closed foreign policy” by the USA after the economic crisis of 1929, “the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the totalitarian governments of Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Stalin in Russia in the 1930s”, and the beginning of a process leading to “the Second World War” caused the idealist security understanding to be replaced by “the realist security approach”.

1.3.1.2. Realist and neo-realist security.

With the emergence of “the Second World War”, the idealist understanding of security shaped by liberalism failed to find a practical response. Edward Hallett Carr (Carr, 2010), one of the founders of realism, harshly criticized idealism in his works and he states that Machiavelli's “The Prince (1952, p. 105)” explains “the origins of realism” by basing the preservation of the existence of states in an order dominated by the conflict of interests on power relations. In this work, the prince must know in theory and practice “*how to be hard-hearted when necessary in order to stay on the throne for a long time, and how to keep the army ready for war, even in times of peace*”, in order to protect the geography of his country (Niccolo, 1952). Nevertheless, Thomas Hobbes' “*Leviathan*” also inspired Carr's critique of idealism


by emphasizing “the interests of the state and the anarchy of the international system” (Hobbes, 2005). Therefore, realist security is a rational approach to security that focuses on “the distribution of power by placing the state at the center”. According to the realist perspective led by the views of Machiavelli, Morgenthau, Sun Tzu (2014, p. 159), and Hobbes (Kavka, 2001, p. 292), in the anarchic international system where there is no centralized higher authority, “war and, security issues in the context of conflict and radical uprisings are considered as *high politics*, while social, cultural and economic issues are considered as *low politics*” (Lopez & Stohl, 1989, p. 9).

The recognition of “nation-states as the main sovereign actors” in the international arena dates back to the “Treaty of Westphalia of 1648”. The belief in “the equality of the security of states and the security of individuals” is historically rooted in Thucydides’ (2000) “Peloponnesian War”. In this work, it is thought that the main cause of wars is “the perception of threat and fear” arising from the increase in the power of the opponent, and this situation is seen in the process of transformation of “the perception of threat between Athens and Sparta” into the war (Demet, 2018, p. 15). The fact that each state wants to protect its own interests and security causes “power struggles” between states. For this reason, the idea that the international environment outside the state is insecure and disorderly, while within the state it is safe and orderly, has become widespread, and “the gap between the intra-state and extra-state spheres” has deepened (Waltz K. , 1979). In contrast to the idealist security approach, the realist security approach, which focuses on the concept of “power and interest”, depicts “an insecure world order” in which international politics is based on “a power struggle” (Baylis, 2008), and states focus on "increasing their military power and capacity" in order to remain safe and sustain their national interest (Ari, 2001, p. 59).

In the international relations literature, “the first conceptual study on security” was created by Arnold Wolfers in 1952. According to this study, security is defined as “*the absence of a threat that puts the policy values of states at risk and the absence of the risk of attack on these values*” (Wolfers, 1952, p. 484) and in this context, it is conceptualized through an objective security approach that aims “to minimize the fear of the possibility of harm”. In contrast to Wolfers’ objective definition of security, which explains the future of the state with a state-centered approach, security in the

subjective understanding of security is defined as *"the absence of fear of the possibility of damage to the values that states hold in their policies"* (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485).

Table 6: Epistemological Differences in Security Approaches



Resource: (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 34)

As seen in Table 6, in addition to “Wolfers’ subjective and objective opinions”, “the discursive opinion” that these views are misleading is among the epistemological differences in security approaches (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 34).

“The permeability of political borders” between states with the globalization process has caused globalization to be perceived as “a threat” in terms of realist security. According to Goetschel (1999), who confirms this view, the transfer of problems that are supposed to be solved in the national sphere to the international arena and “the search for solutions through international organizations” and the process of globalization is seen as “a threat to reduce the importance of states” in the coming years. The realist approach to security, which dominated the international relations literature during “World War I and World War II” and during “the Cold War”, reaffirmed its dominance in the international relations literature by explaining wars with “preemption” and “prevention strategies” (Dündar, 2018, p. 53) with “the Bush Doctrine of the USA” (Karabulut & Değer, 2015, p. 75). Following September 11, the US, and Europe revised their security perception and started to see “radical religious terrorists as the primary threat”, and Bush declared his determination to fight

against terrorism with a doctrine: *"Let each nation decide on its own territory. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists"* (Bush, 09.09.2001).

In the 1980s, "the neo-realist security approach", also known as "constructivist realism", began to dominate security studies, and with it, the importance of "military security" came to the fore again. Unlike realism, the defensive neo-realist approach prioritizes security by focusing on "the limits of power" rather than power and "foresees cooperation and alliances" for this purpose. The neo-realist security approach does not see "the long-term continuity of peace or a world order without a power struggle" as possible (Küçüksolak, 2012, p. 203).

With the end of the Cold War, the uni polarisation of the bipolar military alliance system led to "the disappearance of the threat of nuclear war" (Giddens A. , 2000, p. 75) and the spread of "the new world order discourse". Against these discourses, Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the neo-realist security approach, argued in his "Theory of International Politics" that *"the Cold War did not create a fundamental transformation in the international system"*. In addition to this view, it is emphasized that technological, logistical, communicative, and military developments take place at "the unit level" and affect inter-state relations over time. While the classical realist security approach emphasized only "the military and strategic dimensions" of security, Kenneth Waltz introduced the concept of "economic security" to the literature (Waltz K. N., 2000, p. 5).

According to Kenneth Waltz (1991, p. 212), the post-World War II era starting from 1955 is considered *"the Golden Age"* in security studies, the era between 1960-1970 is *the end of the Golden Age*, and the era after the 1970s as *the Renaissance Period*". In international relations, the idea of "self-determination", whereby states determine their own destiny, is still relevant, but states remain "the determining actor" in Waltz's concept of "balance of power", which refers to the balance between the two poles during the Cold War (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 77). Waltz adopted "a defensive realism approach" with his views that states seek to increase their power to become "regional hegemony" due to "the security dilemma" created by the anarchic international environment. Since other states adopt the same goal as these states, it does not seem possible for states to ensure their security completely (Sönmezoğlu, 2012, pp. 167-169). The primary aim of politicians who adopt a defensive realism

approach is to “protect the existing values and existence of states rather than maximize their power”. He argues that “maintaining the status quo” is a more advantageous situation in the international system, based on the view that “the environment of insecurity” will increase linearly in parallel with the gaining power of states in the international arena.

John Mearsheimer, another important representative of the neo-realist security approach, emphasizes that states develop “new security policies” aimed at reducing the power of other states to increase their own power. In this respect, Mearsheimer (1994, pp. 5-49) criticized “Waltz’s defensive realism” and introduced the basic principles of “offensive realism” to the literature. “Aggressive realism” emphasizes the advantageous position of “the revisionist states” in this respect, stating that ensuring security in the international system will be possible by increasing the military power of the states (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 10). According to Brzezinski (2008, pp. 40-41), “the US gaining power through nuclear armament” would give it an advantage in attracting other states to its side.


1.3.1.2.1. *Security dilemma.*

The security dilemma, “a state-centered approach” first used by John Herz in “Political Realism and Political Idealism” (Herz, 1952), is seen as “a tragedy” according to Butterfield (1951, p. 21). The anarchic international system is characterized by the fact that “*some states are much more powerful than others*”, indicating that there is “a hierarchical order” in the distribution of power as opposed to the distribution of authority (Bilgiç, 2011, p. 124). One of the fundamental paradigms of the realist security approach is “*the perception of the threat that arming each state to ensure its own security would create for other states*”. The nuclear and conventional arms race leads to the armament of every state that perceives a threat, and these states, which perceive threats from each other, cause “a security dilemma”. In other words, even a small step in this direction by states that want to ensure their own security will cause other countries to perceive “insecurity and threats”. In this context, the security dilemma leads to a number of consequences such as “ambiguity, uncertainty, confrontation, worst-case thinking, and the process of action-reaction in relations between societies” (Ceylan & Kardaş, 2020, pp. 203-209). In alternative words, according to the security dilemma, “the security of one country means the

insecurity of another country”. This situation will perpetuate the state of conflict between states and in this environment of insecurity, *“threat perceptions and the possibility of war will always exist”*.

Instead of considering everyone's gains, states avoid cooperation based on their concerns of “relative gains” by identifying more profitable countries, and this process is viewed as “a zero-sum game” (Waltz & Quester, 1982, p. 46). According to this paradigm, the only way to talk about relative stability is “to maintain the existing balance of power”. In his article “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”, Robert Jervis (1978) developed a theory of security dilemma, the so-called “spiral model”, which emphasizes that *“the extent of tension is constantly increasing due to misperceptions between countries”*. According to Vinci (2008, pp. 310-312), the security dilemma between state and non-state armed organizations is called “the mixed security dilemma”.

Figure 11: Inter-State Security Dilemma Diagram



Resource: (Krickovic, 2016, p. 116)

As seen in the inter-state security dilemma diagram in Figure 11, State B, which is affected by the threat of State A, takes up arms against this threat and joins some alliances. When State B takes up arms, State A perceives a threat from State B and this dilemma is perpetuated as “a vicious circle”. This situation causes both states to take steps to “increase their military capacities” (Krickovic, 2016, p. 116). “The

Taiwan Issue between China and the US” (Olkan, 2021), “the arms race between Turkey and Greece”, “the Kardak crisis in 1996” and “the Eastern Mediterranean crisis in 2009” (Gök & Mavruk, 2022), “the high risk of nuclear war between the USSR and the US in the 1950s”, the steps taken by NATO in line with its “expansion policies” and “the Missile Shield Project” are examples of security dilemmas.

1.3.1.2.2. *Military power.*

With the transformation process of security that took place after the 9/11 attack, “the realist understanding of security” became dominant in the international relations literature. According to this approach, security approaches in “domestic and foreign policy” are completely divorced from each other. While there is a legitimate government as a supreme authority in “the domestic policy structure”, there is no single consensus or supreme authority in “foreign policy”. Regardless of how their domestic policies are shaped, states aim to “protect their national security through military capacity” building in foreign policy. In the realist approach to security, problems that can be solved “without the use of military force” are seen as “political problems”, while problems that can be solved by “using military force” are considered “security problems” (Tanrısever, 2010, p. 110).

Since the realist security approach is based on “citizen security” rather than individual security, it limits the issue of security (Krause & Williams, 1997, p. 43). In more simple terms, since the interests of states and individuals are considered to be common, it is possible to “ensure the physical security of individual members of society by ensuring the security of states”. In the realist approach to security, which is built on the concepts of “power and war” as a state-centered understanding of security, the state of “insecurity” is emphasized by considering wars as inevitable, and it is emphasized that “*states should be prepared as if they will face the situation of war at any moment*” (Bayır, 2013, p. 177). According to realists, in the distinction between primary and secondary policy, the type of security of “primary importance” at the top of the pyramid is “military security”, while “economic, social, and cultural issues” are considered “secondary policy” at a lower layer (Ayhan, 2016, p. 135).

1.3.1.3. Liberal and neo-liberal security.

The 1970s, was a period of increasing international instability, culminating at “the end of the Vietnam War”, “the decline of inter-bloc rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union”, and “the beginning of the post-Cold War détente period”. In this process, the liberal understanding of security, which questioned the classical understanding of security, represents “a transition period” in security studies (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 5). In this period, instead of the classical realist approach to security, which takes military security into account, “a pluralist and collective security approach” based on the freedom of individuals gained importance.

The foundations of the pluralist security approach were laid by “Karl Deutsch”, “the pioneer of functionalist theory” when he studied the emergence of political communities in the North Atlantic. It has been determined that states that come together within the framework of “peace and cooperation” by compromising as a result of “mutual dependence” on common security concerns have formed “security communities” similar to the European Union and NATO alliance. These alliances, which come together for security purposes, can sometimes acquire “a political and economic dimension” (Deutsch, 2015, p. 58). The intense efforts of neo-liberal views to preserve the existence of NATO for “global security and cooperation”, in the face of the views that NATO was no longer needed after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact after the Cold War, led neo-liberals to assume “the role of global police” (Şahin G. , 2017, p. 61). One of the criticisms of the classical realist approach to security is that “*it will never be possible to provide security completely and that only actors can decide to what extent security is sufficient*” (Tanrısever, 2010, p. 111). According to the pluralist approach, national military measures are not sufficient in combating the new global threats that have emerged, and for this reason, the importance of “integration and international cooperation” is emphasized along with the necessity of “transnational alliances” on the principle of functionalism (Miller & Lynn-Jones, 1995). In this regard, the pluralist security approach is also referred to as “cooperation-oriented security or liberal security”.

In the pluralist approach to security, security is seen as “high politics” due to “the relative superiority” given to this concept in the classification of high politics and low politics (Maghroori & Bennet, 1982, p. 10). According to Hugo Grotius (1967), one of the pioneers of liberalism, the innate desire of people to live in peace and to protect themselves makes “war and conflict inevitable”. This perspective led to the concepts of “just war” and “unjust war” (Grotius, 1967). Montesquieu, on the other hand, demonstrated “the relationship between war and governance” by emphasizing that “monarchies”, which he characterized as “authoritarian governments”, were “*more prone to war than democracies*”. In this direction, he emphasized the importance of “democratic regimes” for the establishment of peace.

With globalization, national security in the discipline of international relations has been replaced by “international security”. In “the unipolar world order” under the hegemony of the USA, the USA implemented “expansionist policies” during the Thatcher and Reagan periods in order to ensure the adoption of liberal policies worldwide (Harvey, 2012, pp. 68-69). Through international organizations such as “the World Trade Organisation (WTO)” and “the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” and dominant media outlets, “the liberal-capitalist system” is spread all over the world. The notion that “*liberalism is the last stage of history*” has been tried to be imposed with the belief that the expansion of the USA, which Fukuyama (2012) also claimed in his “End of History Thesis”, will continue in the East. Despite the end of the Cold War, the continued “enlargement policies of the EU and NATO”, the rapid integration efforts, and the steps taken in this direction are evaluated within the scope of “neo-liberal security theory” (Şatana & Özpek, 2010, p. 79). To conclude, according to the liberal approach to security, “world peace, and global security” can be achieved through “the cooperation of international organizations” (Özçelik, 2018; TUİC, 2014).

1.3.1.3.1. *Mutual dependency.*

Based on the understanding of liberalism that people are “innately inclined to peace”, the provision of liberal democratic order through constitutions is important in terms of “protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals”. There is a directly proportional relationship between “the interdependence and mutual gains of countries” and an inverse relationship between “the perception of threats” from each

other. Collective action against a common threat is advantageous for “collective security”. The fact that states with interdependence are less likely to conflict and go to war with each other shows that interdependence between states is of great importance for “collective security, the continuity of global peace, and the end of international conflicts” (Sandıklı & Kaya, 2013, pp. 62-63).

“Complex mutual interdependence”, one of the main models of neo-liberal security, was developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1987, p. 730) and according to them, in an international system of interdependence, states overcome problems by choosing to “cooperate with other actors” in a way that is most beneficial to them. The concept of interdependence is shaped by three key elements: *“the abundance of channels of communication, the limitation of military power, and the absence of a hierarchy of foreign policy issues”*. The understanding of interdependence has introduced concepts such as “integration and global governance” into the literature and new theories such as “functionalism, pluralism, and transnationalism” have emerged within liberalism. It is emphasized that “transnational and international actors” are the most important actors setting the global agenda (Keohane & Nye, 2007, pp. 349-352).

In this context, while the globalization process leads to the emergence of “new security approaches and strategies”, it also causes new security problems such as “terrorism, war crimes, cyber-attacks, and migration”. It is thought that the disappearance of “military and security-oriented issues” together with “the economic, social, and environmental issues” that have started to take place on the agenda will “indirectly reduce the use of military force” (Pirinççi, 2010, p. 25).

1.3.1.3.2. *Democratic peace theory.*

One of the important approaches of liberal thought is “the Democratic Peace Theory”, which is based on *“the belief that countries governed by democracy will not go to war with each other”* and often refers to Immanuel Kant's “Perpetual Peace” (Büyükbaş & Atıcı, 2012, p. 2). According to this approach, since a state's domestic form of government directly affects its foreign policy strategies, *“a country implementing the republican form of government, which is seen as equivalent to democracy, will adopt a peaceful foreign policy”*. Therefore, there are no wars

between countries ruled by republics and democracies, and “perpetual peace” prevails in a balanced order. According to this theory, “totalitarian or authoritarian states” that are not governed by democracy are seen as “the main cause of wars”. “The spread of liberal democracy” is seen as the only condition for global peace. The incompatibility of this theory, which is Eurocentric and serves to spread a liberal understanding, with practice can be seen in the results of “military interventions” by NATO under the hegemony of the United States under the pretext of “bringing democracy” and in the existence of conflicts between democratic countries.

1.3.2. Evolving security perspective after the Cold War: New security theories.


The changing approaches to international security in the globalized international arena have shifted away from the approach that prioritizes border security and military security and has been shaped by “individual security”, and the idea that security should be addressed as a whole has been put forward by scholars and academics who advocate the new understanding of security, which is also described as “soft security” (Bilgin, 2010, pp. 35-78). On the one hand, this situation has led to “the disappearance of the distinction between domestic and foreign policy”, while at the same time paving the way for “radical changes in the understanding of security”. In order to find solutions to security problems, “non-military civilian solutions such as democratization, alliances on the basis of interdependence, and non-governmental organizations” have come to the fore (Ağır, 2015, pp. 97-130). New security approaches are known as “multilateral security approach” that takes into account the security of other states (Özkan A. , 2008, pp. 12-13).

With the disappearance of the threat of communism, which the West perceived as a threat, the concept of “cold war” was replaced by the concept of “cold peace”. In order to legitimize its economic and military power through “international law”, the US has resorted to globalizing its perception of security by citing “9/11 attacks” against it. “The US International Security Strategy”, “NSS 02”, which was officially registered on 17 September 2002, was described under the headings of “preventive war, military intervention and preemption, new reciprocity, and democracy promotion” (The White House, 2002). New threats such as “international terrorism, smuggling, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, the use of cyber and biological weapons, economic crises, ethnic and

religious-based conflicts, civil wars, genocide, radical movements, illegal migration, environmental refugee movements, international organized crime, global epidemics (such as Covid-19), hunger and environmental problems” have emerged. For this reason, as with the change in the security approach, the perception of threats has changed away from the perception of “military or strategic threats to threats that undermine national interests and attack common values”. In particular, the US has labeled states that are not their own as “rogue and failed states”, assuming that they risk undermining global peace (Tansi, 2005), and “terrorism” is now perceived as the primary threat. In other words, the military threat perception has been replaced by “multidimensional and asymmetric threats such as psychological, biological, and cyber terrorism”, paving the way for the globalization of terrorism. Accordingly, NATO has used the concept of “preventive war” to legitimize its operations, and this concept has played “a redemptive role” for the United States in justifying its actions as the cause of many wars, including “the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002” (Tansi, 2005). The US wants to increase its influence in the Middle East in the context of “energy security” and plans similar to “the Greater Middle East Project” in this direction (Sandıklı & Dağcı, 2006, p. 206). After the Cold War, the US perspective has been replaced by an approach based on the concept of “soft power”, which can also be expressed as the ability to influence states based on economic power, i.e. the ability to influence states based largely on energy and diplomacy, which is included in “the new security theories”, from the hard power elements based on “military power”, which are emphasized by “classical security theories” (Dağcı, 2006, pp. 75-88). “Smart power”, one of the new concepts in the international relations literature, is defined by Nye as “*the ability to use soft power (liberal institutions and values, ways of life, political norms and rules) and hard power (military, economic, and political power) together in strategies*”. In addition, the idea of “collective security” has gained importance by foreseeing that states cannot fight against global threats alone. Although nation-states are still the main actors in the international arena, “international organizations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, and even individuals” play an active role in the international arena today as new actors on the basis of “interdependence and cooperation”.

Barry Buzan (1991, p. 232), one of the most prominent theorists of the Copenhagen School, pioneered the new security theories developed after the Cold War and analyzed “security” as interconnected elements at three levels: “*individuals, states, and the international system*”. According to Buzan (1991), there are five dimensions of security and in this context,” political, economic, social, and environmental security” is also very important in addition to “the military dimension”. According to Michael Dillon, security is shaped by “the perception of civilization, modernity, and time”, not as a concept in itself, but as a construct that includes various discourses using “parallel, contrasting, and complementary concepts” (Korkmaz, 2008, pp. 15-16).

Figure 12: The Concept of Security and Concepts Related to Security



Resource: (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 14)

As seen in Figure 12, “parallel concepts” such as “power, identity, and sovereignty” address security in a broader framework, while “complementary concepts” focus on narrower and more specific issues such as “containment, deterrence, and strategy”. Concepts such as “risk and peace”, which can be substituted for security, are called “opposite concepts” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 14).

Table 7: Security Redefinition and Expansion

What is the Source of the Security Hazard?		
Military	Military and/or non-military	Security for whom?
National Security (Security studies within traditional realism)	Redefining Security (Environmental, economic, feminist security)	States
Intra-State Security (Civil wars, state killing of its own people, ethnic conflicts)	Human Security (Environmental and economic threats)	Individuals, Groups, and Communities

Resource: (Paris, 2001, p. 98)

According to Richard Ullman (1983, p. 133)'s article "Redefining Security", national security, which focuses on "the military and traditional understanding of security", should be broadened and even redefined. In this context, Table 7 shows the classification of Roland Paris, an Academician at the University of Colorado, regarding "the redefinition of security and the source of security threats" (Paris, 2001, p. 98).

1.3.2.1. The Copenhagen School and security.

The Copenhagen School, which emerged in the 1980s and was named by Bill McSweeney after the University of Copenhagen, was established in 1985 as "the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research" and in its early years focused on "non-military issues and European security". The Copenhagen School's security approach is situated between "the classical security approach", which recognizes the state as the main actor, and "the post-structuralist security approach" (İyiat, 2020, p. 9). According to Buzan (1991, pp. 431-451), security is defined as *"the protection of states and societies, which they see as the basic unit of analysis, from any change in their freedoms and identities"*. The Copenhagen School disagrees with the classical security approach, which regards "military issues" as "high politics" and other issues


such as “migration and the environment” as “low politics” (Buzan, 1991, pp. 75-83). This new approach has led to “the diversification of actors” in risk societies and the consideration of “societies” as well as “states” as the unit of analysis, and “the balance between these two units of analysis” is extremely important for the individuals who make up societies (Buzan, 1989, p. 121).

The studies of the “Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI)”, a non-governmental organization, illustrate efforts to “redefine security” (Birdiřli, 2011, p. 111). The Copenhagen School, led by “Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde”, argues for the widespread use of “the strategy of desecuritization”, the exclusion of certain issues that have been in the realm of security in the past, and that “the only priority issues that concern the future of the state” should be addressed as security issues. The fact that Europe was associated with the concept of war due to its behavior during WWII and that it wanted to be identified with the concept of peace by destroying this perception after WWII led to “the efforts to unite Europe” and “the emergence of NATO” with the claim of ensuring international security against the USSR. This is considered “a strategy of desecuritization of inter-state relations” (Bilgin, 2010, p. 82). According to Barry Buzan (1991, p. 7), security is an ambiguous concept and he defines security as *“the absence of any threat to the fundamental values, existence and vital activities of individuals”*. According to this approach, security is *“the ability of states to protect their own identities by getting rid of all kinds of threats”* (Buzan, 1991, p. 433). The fundamental purpose of this school is to “move away from a narrowed military and political approach to security”, by saving the concept of security from being “an ambiguous and incoherent concept” (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p. 65).

The Copenhagen School's basic approach to problems is “to remove them from the security agenda” and perceive them as “normal political processes”, which it explains with the concept of “normalization”. In this security approach, national security can be seen as *“states' efforts to avoid potential threats and to protect their national identity against other states”*. Nevertheless, this approach, which emphasizes human security, believes that *“social groups should protect their own identities”* (Erdem, 2016, p. 269).

According to “the sectoral security approach”, also known as “sectoral analysis”, which is one of the basic paradigms of the Copenhagen School, which adopts “a multi-dimensional and comprehensive” understanding of security, security studies are carried out in five different dimensions: “*military, political, economic, social and environmental*”, and these sectors interact with each other (Miş, 2011, p. 347). The major contribution of this school to international relations literature is the concept of “securitization”. In this way, the Copenhagen School rescued security from being a one-dimensional concept and brought “a multidimensional approach” to this concept in the context of security types (Bakan, 2007, pp. 40-42). Another contribution of the Copenhagen School to the international relations literature is “the regional security complex”, of which Buzan is the architect. According to this approach, states are dependent on each other in terms of their security and the prevention of these threats in the face of common threats and enemies according to “the regional distinctions” in the geographical map where they are located (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p. 74).

Figure 13: Process of Securitisation of Problems



Resource: (Atlant & Bruusgaard, 2009, p. 336)

As can be seen in Figure 13, “the process of securitizing problems” starts with “speech acts” by authorized institutions and continues with “discourses” (Atlant & Bruusgaard, 2009, p. 336). In the following process, the importance of the issue to be securitized must be “understood and legitimized by the audience and a perception of threat must be created (stage of identification)”. In the period following this stage, the receptive audience is ready to “apply extraordinary methods (stage of mobilization)”. If a securitization decision is taken, “the urgency of the matter” is indicated to the relevant units in terms of “the continuity of the state (survival of the state)”. If this stage is also passed, “the state of exception and extraordinary conditions” are applied as the last stage. If this situation is completely eliminated, then the situation of “de-securitization” comes into play.

Table 8: Extended Security Concepts

Security Types	Security Dimensions	Security Subject (Whose security is being addressed?)	Referent Object (What is being threatened?)	Threat Source (Protection from who or what is required?)
National Security	Political and Military	State	Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty	Foreign States and Non-State Actors, Terrorism
Community Security	Communal	Social Groups and Nations	Identity and National Unity	Migrants, Foreign Cultures, Nations, States
Human Security	Communal	Individuals and Humans	Survival and Life Quality	Globalisation, Global Environmental Problems, Nature, Terrorism, State
Environmental Security	Environmental	Ecosystem	Sustainability	Humanity
Gender Security	Communal	Gender relations, indigenous people and minorities	Solidarity, Equality and Identity	Patriarchy, Intolerance, Totalitarian and Male Dominated Institutions (Governments, Elites, Culture, Religion)

Resource: (Brauch, 2008, p. 11)

In Table 8, in accordance with the sectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School, security dimensions are analyzed on the basis of “the subject whose security is addressed, the object under threat, and the sources of threat” (Brauch, 2008, p. 11). This approach is based on the perception of “social security”. As can be seen in this table, with the new post-Cold War security approach, the security of the state has been replaced by “the security of the individual and thus the security of society”, while national or national security has been replaced by “international security”. This situation expresses “the expansion process of security”.

1.3.2.1.1. *Securitization theory.*

One of the most important concepts that the Copenhagen School introduced to the international relations literature within the scope of security studies is the concept of “securitization”. According to Buzan, securitization can be explained in terms of two important concepts: “*the referent object*, which is existentially threatened and for whose survival measures must be taken, and *the securitizing actors*, i.e. the people who legitimize extraordinary measures together with the threatened objects” (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 36). In the process of securitization, while “the securitizing actors” are active, it is “the public opinion” that is affected by the process, i.e. passive. Through “discourses, actions, and visuals”, “new threats” are constructed within a social structure, and in this way, “*non-security issues are securitized*” (Bayır, 2013, p. 183). In other words, when an issue that does not fall within the field of security is explained with the concept of security, it is “transformed into a security problem” (Baysal & Lüleci, 2015, p. 71) and this is a problem that requires “urgent and extraordinary measures” without leaving it to political processes (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, pp. 23-24). The process of securitization is facilitated by the use of “identities and visuals” through “the control mechanisms of the media and bureaucrats” in order to strengthen discourses. The actor authorized to use this process most effectively is “government” (Tüysüzoğlu, 2019, p. 29). The success of political actors in securitization depends on their ability to “convince the target audience of the existence of the threat and the acceptance of the legitimacy of the threat by the target audience” (Akgül- Açıkmüşe, 2011, p. 61). While “the process of securitization” is based on creating a perception of threat and taking measures, in “the

process of politicization”, it is sufficient for the issue to be on the political agenda and state policies (Kaya & Ilgıt, 2021, p. 180).

This concept, which can also be expressed as *"the process of constructing security by making use of the relationship between action and speech"* through “discourse analysis” and “speech-act”, is known as “the securitization theory” in the security studies’ literature (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 491). Speaking is defined as “a way of acting (speech-act)” which is much more than just saying something (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). Wæver (2008, pp. 153-158), who laid the foundations of the concept of securitization, defines the security of societies not as individual or economic security, but as “trans-state collective identity security created against common threats”. The critical security approach holds that the creation of threats through “discourses” that “transform ideas into actions legitimizes violence” (Çelik & Ekşi, 2008, p. 99).

“Politicization” can be explained as *“making an issue the subject of state policies, making it election material, transferring resources when it is the responsibility of the state, making it visible in the public sphere, and giving it legitimacy”* (Wæver, 1995, pp. 55-56). In some cases, it may be an issue that should be taken *“out of the political sphere and does not require the state to work on it and take decisions”* (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 23). The concepts of “survival”, which Waltz believes to be the common desire of every state, and “existential threats” that threaten the security of states are among the concepts that this theory emphasizes.

The process of “taking certain measures against existential threats” with the aim of survival is explained by the concept of “securitization”. The counter-thesis to this theory is Weaver's concept of “de-securitization”, also called “reverse securitization”. This concept refers to the fact that “an issue perceived as a threat in the past ceases to be a threat over time”, in other saying, “the end of any threat perception”. As in the case of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, it is also considered “a normalization of the issue”.

“The perception of the Soviet threat” created by the US to ensure success during the Cold War and the US attempt to perceive “Iraq as a threat” are examples of “the securitization theory” (Buzan, 2008, p. 108). Another example that can be given to this theory is the inclusion of “the 9/11 attacks” in the scope of security through “the discourses of Bush and other American politicians”, thus legitimizing “American interventions” in the eyes of the public.

1.3.2.2. *The Frankfurt School and critical security.*

The most significant representatives of the theory today are “Robert Cox and Ken Booth”, who adapted Antonio Gramsci's concept of “hegemony” to critical theory. This theory advocates “radical transformation” and an understanding of “historical materialism”. The Frankfurt School approaches security problems based on the concepts of “prejudice and authority” rather than a class perspective like Marxism.

In the critical approach to security, the assumption that “*the risk of war has decreased worldwide with the end of the Cold War, and therefore the importance given to security studies should also decrease*”, has been put forward on the grounds that “*security academics could not predict the end of communist regimes*” (Keyman, Tanrısever, Tayfur, Yalvaç, & Eralp, 2010, p. 118). The opposite view is that post-Cold War security issues should have gained much more importance (Klein, 1994). In this context, the approach to security has changed considerably with the growing importance of the view that security is too diverse to be considered only as military security to solve international security problems. This change can be seen in the European Union's understanding of security in the context of “European security”.

According to this approach, the main ways for states to increase their security are seen as the promotion of “international solidarity and democratization, integration, rule of law, and human rights”. In this view, “the lack of these liberal values leads to instability” and there is “a normative approach” here. In this respect, “the redefinition of security” has gained vital importance in the discipline of international relations (Walker, 2002, p. 78). In this sense, it has introduced a security discourse that involves “a modern transformation of the political sphere” into the international relations literature (Walker, 2002, p. 79). Ole Wæver, who adopts “a critical security approach”, conceptualized security with its discursive dimension in the context of

"the legitimization of extraordinary measures to solve the problem by treating any issue as a security problem". Since these security measures may limit the political sphere in cases such as the suspension of political rights, a situation of "desecuritization of political issues" arises. Wæver sees this as "a security strategy" (Wæver, 1995, pp. 56-57). For this reason, it is of great importance to analyze "security discourse" in security studies in depth.

Ken Booth, a prominent representative of the critical security approach, sees states as a means rather than an end to ensure the security of individuals, and this main purpose is to ensure "the welfare, security, and happiness of individuals". He rejects "the state-monopolizing approach" of the political realist understanding of security by emphasizing the relationship between the concepts of security, which refers to "a state without threats", and "liberation", which refers to the avoidance of anything that prevents people from doing what they want to do freely (Booth, 1991, pp. 319-320). According to Booth (1991, p. 319), who seeks an answer to the question *"Does the security of individuals or the security of states take precedence?"*, it is possible for states to ensure real security not by using force but by adopting policies of emancipation. The critical approach, which is based on the security of individuals, introduces the terms "hard security" and "soft security" based on the distinction between "hard and soft threats" and emphasizes that *"hard security issues are in a priority position that needs to be addressed urgently"* (Bilgin, 2010, pp. 39-40). The prioritization of "hard security measures" against "hard threats, such as weapons of mass destruction", can lead to "economic crises and social problems" in less developed countries as defense expenditures increase. The security of states is directly related to "sovereignty" and the security of societies is directly related to "identity", and in this context, it is possible to talk about "the distinction between state and society" in Booth (1979)'s critical security approach.

In the critical security approach, "security" is considered not only on the basis of the state but also in the context of "the relationship between the individual, society, and the state, and in this approach, the state-centered approach is criticized" (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, p. 37). A parallel approach to this security approach, which attaches importance to "non-state subjects" such as individuals in security studies, is that Samuel Huntington (1993, pp. 22-49), a political realist, takes "civilizations as a

non-state actor” in security discourses. An important contribution to the critical security approach literature in the context of discussing Turkey's security problems has been made by “Pinar Bilgin, a faculty member at Bilkent University” (Bilgin, 2001, pp. 273-282; Bilgin, 2005, pp. 1-27). Within the scope of critical security understanding, security is considered “the most important concept that provides social order”, and the solution to security problems is possible through “the construction of new security culture and security networks” (Rothschild, 1995, pp. 53-98).

To summarise, according to the critical understanding of security, security is “a subjective concept” and unlike the realist understanding of security, it is not possible to speak of a single definition of security. In the classical approach to security, security is limited only to “state security”, disregarding “individual and social security”. “Ethical universality and a cosmopolitan worldview” are essential for global security, and “the hegemonic powers” are the actors that have a decisive role in these matters (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 32).

1.3.2.3. *The English School and security.*

The fundamental security problem of the British School, which includes thinkers such as “Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Martin Wight, and Edward Hallett Carr”, is “the anarchy” caused by “the absence of a central authority” in international relations, but despite this, these thinkers believe that “*an order can be built in the international environment*” (Erdem, 2016, p. 260). The main contribution of this theory to the international relations literature is its “comparative analysis of the common values, interests, and institutions” shared by people and states (Devlen & Özdamar, 2010, p. 48). One of the issues on which this theory cannot agree is “the pluralism-solidarism debate”.

Table 9: Classical Framework of Analysis of the English School

Key Concepts	World Community	International System	International Society
Theory	Revolutionism	Realism	Rationalism
Philosophical Approach	Kantian	Hobbesian and Machiavellian	Grotiusian

Resource: (Buzan, 2004, p. 9)

As seen in Table 9, The British School explains the political organization of international relations in terms of three basic concepts: “*world community, international system, and international society*”, and the relationship between these concepts (Tepeciklioğlu, 2020, p. 231). According to the British School, “the world community”, which is “a revolutionary approach”, consists of elements such as “universal and cosmopolitan values, rules, and interests” adopted by non-state actors and the responsibility to protect, consisting of “basic human rights”, undertaken by “the international community”. The most essential element of “the world community”, which advocates the disappearance of states, is the concept of human security based on “the norm of responsibility to protect”, which includes “military interventions”. Another concept, “the international system”, is called “a non-voluntary mechanical structure between states in which each state acts in consideration of the actions of another state” (Bull, 1985, p. 14). The international system is classified into six different models: “*hierarchical system, the balance of power system, universal system, unit veto system, and tight and loose bipolar system*” (Kaplan, 2005, p. 5). In contrast to the international system, “the international community”, whose intellectual background is formed by Grotius' ideas, is defined as “*the structure between states that come together voluntarily and share common values and interests*” (Bull, 1985, p. 13).

According to the main arguments of the British School, in the anarchic nature of the international system, it is “the states that are sovereign” and “the system of states” is formed as a result of the relations that these states establish with each other. The English School introduced an anarchic order of “international society” in which there are “common values, interests, and institutions” and there is “no supreme

authority” in the international relations literature. While this understanding does not deny the existence of conflicts, it argues that “*international law, international organizations, and peaceful methods such as diplomacy are inherent in international relations*” (Arıkanoglu, 2016, p. 172). The British School does not consider the League of Nations, which was established after WWI, as “an international community” because “*it did not include Russia and the USA, acted against the principles of the international system, and did not adopt some universal principles and values such as the equality of races*” (Koç, 2020, p. 149). According to the British School, “the United Nations”, similar to “the League of Nations”, does not have the status of “an international community”.

1.3.2.4. Aberystwyth/Galler School and security.

Against the Copenhagen School's emphasis on non-security and normal political processes, the Aberystwyth/Galler School, led by “Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones”, is one of the critical security studies that argue for “deepening security and broadening security”. “Deepening security” is an approach that emphasizes “other areas of security outside the control of the state”, such as environmental and health security. The Aberystwyth/Galler School has three main arguments: “*the strategic, ethical-political, and analytical of security*” (Bilgin, 2010, p. 85). The Aberystwyth/Galler School opposed the state-centered approach of the traditional understanding of security and considered the state as “a means of providing security” and attributed “an instrumental role” to security rather than an end (Booth, 1991, p. 320). Unlike the Copenhagen School, this approach, instead of trying to securitize any issue by evaluating it within the scope of security, treats security as “a derived concept” and emphasizes “the political aspect of security” by introducing a new formula with “freedom-based security codifications” (Bilgin, 2010, pp. 42-43). The main distinction of this approach is that it defines security by moving away from the perception of security as “a state free from threats” and linking it to “freedom”. Emphasizing “the strong relationship between the concepts of security and freedom”, which he sees as complementary to each other, Ken Booth prioritizes individual security, which means “*the liberation of all humanity, regardless of gender, from all human and physical constraints such as war and threat, poverty and political obstacles*” (Booth, 1991, pp. 313-326). The approach of Booth (2002) suggests that

“there is no freedom without security and no security without freedom”. Therefore, the basic paradigm of this school is shaped by the concepts of “liberation, identity, hegemony, and othering”. As an example of this situation, “the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan” with the claim of bringing “peace and eternal freedom” have deeply affected the security of societies. Although the societies of regimes under repression and control appear to be safe, their freedoms are “suppressed and alienated”. According to Booth (1991, p. 322), the most fundamental way out of such marginalization is the idea of “mutual liberation and trust”.

1.3.2.5. Social constructionist security.

Social Constructionist Security is “an interdisciplinary method” of analysis that questions all theories in a process in which the debates between neo-realism, which defends the environment of competition and conflict in the Cold War-era security debates, and neo-liberalism, which argues that *“cooperation is possible even in an anarchic order, intensified and is based on social realism”*. This approach was first taken up by “the US scholar Nicholas Onuf (2012)”, who, as “an identity-centered approach”, drew attention to the social rather than material dimensions of international and humanitarian communities. Based on the work of Alexander Wendt (1999), one of the most important theorists of the constructionist approach, in his “Social Theory of International Politics”, the ongoing debates focus on “the relationship between identity, security, and perception” by emphasizing quality rather than quantity (Bilgin, 2010, p. 71). In this context, the qualitative characteristics of “identity perception” are much more important than “the quantitative ones”. Wendt explains this situation with the example that *“five nuclear weapons of North Korea pose a much greater threat to the security of the United States than five hundred nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom”* (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Wendt redefined neo-realists' notion of “security dilemma” as *“intersubjective perceptions reflecting experiences and beliefs shaped by the interests of states”* (Wendt, 1995, p. 77).

“Non-security issues” such as “identity, norms, gender, social genes, beliefs, discourse, migration, and human rights”, which are not addressed within the scope of security in the traditional approach, have been included in the security agenda (Ayhan, 2016, p. 138). In international relations, “culture, identity, and group belonging “are the basic elements that determine the behavioral patterns that may emerge as “conflict or compromise, and the trust relations and prejudices that depend on threat perceptions”. As a consequence of the interaction between identity and interests, states create “a perception of us or the other” by characterizing another country as “a friend or foe” (Welton & Piccoli, 2003, pp. 93-94). The social constructionist approach emphasizes the relationship between political culture, which Almond and Sidney Verba defines as *“the set of values that influence political behavior and security culture, which emphasizes the psychological aspect of security”* (Birdiřli, 2017, p. 641). A country's feeling of security is closely related to its “perception of the other”. This is because “virtual threats” created through perception management constitute “the security strategies of states” and states legitimize “the security measures they take against virtual threats” in this way. In addition, according to this approach, while environments with similar identities give people “confidence”, environments with different identities are attributed to be “insecure”. Individuals feel safe as long as their identity is recognized by others. In this context, the example of “the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia” is given of “the emergence of war and ethnic conflict” as negotiations were delayed due to the rejection and non-recognition of different identities (İřyar, 2008, pp. 265-266). The perception of “the West and the Rest” in the examination of different civilizations in Huntington (2019)'s “Clash of Civilisations” is among the examples reflecting this understanding.

1.3.2.6. Marxist and neo-Marxist security.

Fukuyama's view in his "End of History Thesis" (2012) that with the collapse of the USSR, communism finally collapsed and a world order dominated by capitalist ideology began, is strongly opposed by the socialist thinker Immanuel Wallerstein with his criticisms of capitalism based on "equality and justice" (Küçük, 2015, p. 207). According to the Marxist understanding of security, "the ruling class" has formed security policies in favor of its own interests as it manages the relations of production (Birdiřli, 2017, p. 77). Marxism's approach to security is based on "class differences and inequalities". Marxist security, which focuses on "the critique of capitalism and interdependence", is dominated by an understanding of security policy dominated by "*a unilateral dependency in which the proletariat creates the perception that a threat to them is a threat to the whole society*" (Gilpin, 2012, s. 52). In "the structuralist" or "neo-Marxist security approach", also called "the Dependency School", there is "an economy-based security approach" and it tries to define security on the basis of levels of development through the political economy (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 27). This security approach adapts to the discipline of international relations "the center-periphery and metropole-satellite approach" mentioned by Immanuel Wallerstein in his "Modern World System Theory" (Aktoprak, 2004) and Johan Galtung (2004) in his "A Structural Theory of Imperialism". The Marxist approach to security argues that "*conflicts are not between East and West*", but between the developed northern countries in the center and the less developed southern countries in the periphery (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 28).

1.3.2.7. Post- structuralist security.

The 1980s, when "military security", which is the fundamental assumption of the realist security understanding, regained importance and the Second Cold War began, corresponds to the periods when the post-structuralist security understanding "reconceptualized the concept of security" with its scientific approaches (Matthews, 1989, pp. 162-177). According to Barry Buzan (1991, pp. 3-4), who developed the security concept of structuralist realism, there was no significant theoretical literature on this subject before this period and he describes security as "a simplified concept". Security is "the main purpose of states" according to post-structuralist security.

According to Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 126), security is seen as the "highest goal in an international system dominated by anarchy" for states, but states are not satisfied with this and compete with other states by acquiring new goals for themselves to "become stronger states and more security" after realizing their purpose of existence in the international system. Therefore, it is inevitable that "*there are secure states as well as states that are unable to ensure their own security*", and these states lead to "insecurity" in the international system as a whole. The security dilemma, which the structuralist approach fails to foresee, i.e. the view that "*states reduce the security of other states in order to increase their own national security*", is emphasized here.

In this respect, according to Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 96), security determines the ability of "states to continue their existence", and for this purpose, states undertake various roles such as "protecting their citizens against external attacks, meeting their food and shelter needs, and establishing and enforcing certain laws to ensure social order". Although the distinction between these roles has become blurred, the priority is "the survival of states". Once this priority is achieved, state resources can be used for other purposes. Therefore, according to this approach, the state is seen as "a zero-sum game". According to this security approach, "national security", which means the self-defense of states against external threats, is linked to the concept of "international security" in which states cooperate to ensure their common security, but unlike the pluralist security approach, post-structuralist security involves "conflict and competition" rather than cooperation.

In this approach, since it is assumed that security problems have "an international dimension", the concept of international security is used with "a more comprehensive approach" including military and technical issues. States in the international system develop certain security approaches in parallel with their positions on the basis of "the balance of power". According to this approach, the way states can maintain their current position in the international system depends on their pursuit of "an aggressive policy". According to this view, states cannot achieve absolute security even with such a policy; however, what is possible for states in this approach is "relative security".

1.3.2.8. Post- modern security.

Post-modern security, one of the post-Cold War critical theories, explained “the pro-Western, rational, and male-dominated structure of modernity” with the concept of “othering”. It is thought that the meta-narratives created by modernism such as “religion, ideology, nation-state, and capitalism”, and the discriminative discourses such as “us and them, friend and enemy, and me and the other” have caused “a serious security gap” between societies (Karabulut B. , 2016, p. 72). In this approach, which criticizes the efforts of nation-states to create uniform individuals and the perception of identity, “the emphasis on the individual” is at the forefront. Another point they emphasize is that “*the classical understanding of security is Western-centred and ignores human security by considering it within the context of social security*”. In the issue of international migration, modernism emphasizes “the security concerns of the Western society receiving migrants, ignoring the individual security of the migrant refugees”. Another example is “the self-centered approach” of the US after the 9/11 attacks, which saw its own security as a guarantee of the global security of the world, and the steps it took in this direction led to “the deaths of millions of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq”. This approach, which criticizes a system of international relations based on oppositions and contradictions such as “center-periphery, domestic policy-foreign policy, and war-peace”, also opposes “the hierarchical structure of the classical understanding of security” (Knutsen, 2011, pp. 365-366). According to the post-modern approach to security, which adopts “archaeology, deconstruction, and genealogy approaches”, individual security is undermined in “the Western-centred system” of international relations and this system prioritizes “the West” (Ayhan, 2016, p. 138). In addition, the most important contribution of this approach to the international relations literature is that it provides “a psychological perspective” on phenomena that are not independent of human beings.

The intellectual background of post-modernism, which is “an anti-modernist theory”, is formed by thinkers such as “Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger” (Aslan & Yılmaz, 2001, p. 102). Intellectuals such as “Richard K. Ashley, Rob Joseph Walker, James Der Derian, Cynthia Weber, Jenny Edkins, and David Campbell” are among the important scholars who adopt the post-modern approach (Chatterjee, 2010,

p. 46). Der Derian (1990), one of the thinkers who adopt the post-modern understanding, emphasizes that wars in the modern period are presented as “computer games” with the example of “the Gulf War”, which he sees as “the first virtual war”. This understanding prevents alienated people from looking at the process from “a human dimension” and ignores “the security of the individual who becomes vulnerable” to all kinds of threats. This creates “a new atmosphere of insecurity”.

1.3.2.9. Post-colonial security.

Post-colonial security studies, which are accepted as one of the critical security approaches, consist of “subaltern studies” by scholars such as “Edward W. Said, Homi J. Bhabha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak” (Young, 1995, p. 154). “The subaltern”, which is a dynamic and ever-changing concept labeled as “all kinds of class, gender, and identity-based sub-sections”, is the subject of post-colonial security studies (Yetişkin, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, this approach calls into question nation-states, the state as “the sole subject of security”, and “the othering discourses” in global politics on the grounds that they produce insecurity.

This theoretical approach views the idea that “*the Third World is differentiated from other nations*” as “a conscious perception operation of the West”. In the post-colonial security approach, it is argued that “*modernity is seen as identical to the West*” due to “a Eurocentric approach”, but in fact, this is not the case. The post-colonial perspective is an approach observed in “the imperial colonial approaches of the West” today.

1.3.2.10. Feminist security.

The reflection of “gender discrimination” in international relations due to male dominance in global political issues that emerged in the late 1980s has existed as “an effort to make women visible and increase their role in society” in security debates as well as in debates on international relations (Gürpınar, 2017, p. 471). In the feminist security approach, security is considered “a state of reduced violence” (Tickner J. A., 1997, p. 624). According to this approach, “the warlike and fearless endeavor inherent in the male-dominated structure” poses “security risks” in the international arena. In order to combat this situation, the feminist security approach advocates “a systematic

change” toward the inclusion of “women in governance and decision-making mechanisms in all areas of international security” (Gürpınar, 2017, p. 473).

The feminist security approach, like the post-modern security approach, adopts “an anti-modernity approach”. However, he criticizes the realist perspective of the classical conception of security as “an alienating realist perspective with the perception of friend-enemy or us-them and a state-centered approach”. By emphasizing the relationship between women's daily life practices and security, it opens “systematic and abstract discourses” to the discussion (Ataman, 2009, p. 23).

The concept of “violence”, which feminists place at the center of their understanding of security and which threatens women's security, is analyzed under two sub-headings: “*direct violence*, which focuses on inter-state conflicts, and *structural violence*, which focuses on global insecurity within the framework of social or individual security” (Tickner J. A., 1995, p. 48). According to this approach, it is “structural inequalities in the areas of gender, race, and class that create global insecurity” (Tickner, 2005, p. 6). Judith Ann Tickner (1997, pp. 625-626) is “one of the pioneers of feminist theory” and through some statistical reports in “the Human Development Reports of the UN”, she draws attention to “the discrimination suffered by women” and emphasizes their “individual insecurity”. Especially the rape incidents during the Bosnian War have led to the questioning of “the male-dominated international system” in terms of “human security”.

Feminists have likened the international environment to “a virtual structure of anarchy with many threats” (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 36). According to feminist security, “violent acts such as war, conflict, and terrorism”, which are considered traditional; security strategies adopted according to “the male-dominated way of thinking in which military service, statesmanship, and wars” are glorified are insufficient to ensure women's security and they are expected by male-dominated groups to play the roles they deem appropriate for them to play (Oğuzlu, 2007, p. 27). Feminist security argues that concepts such as “national interest, power, sovereignty, war, and conflict” adopted by the realist understanding are formed with “the metaphor of the ideal man” and that “*men are prioritized in security theory*” (Ataman, 2009, p. 23). From Katherine Allison (2015)'s perspective, feminist discourses are “peaceful and integrative”.

According to the feminist security approach, “the male-dominated structure of the international environment” brings insecurity (Sandıklı & Emeklier, 2012, p. 38). However, the concept of women is used as “a tool by the dominant powers to legitimize wars and military interventions”. The frequent portrayal in the international media of “a woman in a burqa” in need and in the US as “a heroic male figure” is a form of “perception management”.

Prior to the Syrian civil war, women were unable to claim their rights, could not make their voices heard on private and public platforms, and were exposed to “inequality”. Similarly, during the Syrian civil war, women were subjected to “gender-based structural violence, social pressures, and discrimination”, and the problems they experienced in the countries they went to as “refugees” afterward are evaluated among feminist security debates (Gürpınar, 2017, p. 479). In the context of this theory, the concept of “positive peace” is important for women to play “a leading role” in international initiatives to make their voices heard.

1.4. Globalization, New Imperialism, and Security

One of the key concepts to be addressed in security studies is “globalization”. In the process of globalization, where countries cannot remain indifferent to “cross-border problems”, the concept of security has undergone “a qualitative transformation” with the diversification of “security pursuits and threat perceptions”, and with this, national security has begun to be considered as “a stand-alone discipline” in international relations (Birdiřli, 2011, p. 153). In addition to the increase in the movement of “goods, capital, and people” with globalization, “state, and human security” have also been threatened by “the increase in terrorist and criminal organizations” that exist on a global scale.

Table 10: Conceptualisation of Globalisation: Three Different Approaches

	Radicals (Extreme/Hyper Globalists)	Sceptics (Counter- Globalisers)	Transformers
New feature	Global era	Trading blocs, lower levels of geo-governance than before	A level of global interdependence unprecedented in history
Dominant Feature	Global civil society, governance and capitalism	Less interdependence compared to the 1980s	Deep and high levels of globalization
Prevailing Motif	McDonald's, etc.	National Interest	Transformation of the political community
Historical Trajectory	Global Civilisation	Regional alliances and the Clash of Civilisations	Global integration and fragmentation, interdependence
The Power of National Governments	Tension and wear	Strengthening and reproduction	Reconstruction and restructuring process
Stratification Patterns	Erosion of the old hierarchy	Increasingly marginalised South (exclusion)	Reshaping the world order
The Driving Force of Globalisation	Capitalism and Technology	Markets and the State	The uniting forces of modernity
Conceptualising Globalisation	Reorganisation of the scope of humanitarian action	Regionalisation and internationalisation	Reorganisation of the interrelation of actions and territories at a given distance
Summary	End of nation-states	International government endorsement and support	Globalization as a force transforming state power and world politics

Resource: (Held D. , McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2000, p. 10)

As seen in Table 10, the concept of globalization has been examined in three different approaches: “*extreme/hyper-globalized*, also known as radicals, *counter-globalized*, also known as skeptics, and *transformationalists*” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2009, p. 131). Examples of extreme globalists are “Robertson, Fukuyama, Hobsbawn, Ohmane, Drucker, Greider, and Hardt”, who emphasize that “*globalization is the inevitable end*” with neo-liberal discourses. Among the radicals, Fukuyama’s (2012) “Thesis on the End of History”, which advocates “an extreme globalization approach”, is considered in this group as it declares “the final victory of capitalism and the end of nation-states and national values”. David Held (1995, p. 190) has adopted a parallel approach in pointing out “the weaknesses of nation-states in the face of international organizations”.

“Skeptics”, who can be described as “anti-globalization” and who claim that “*globalization is not a new process*”, can be given as examples by thinkers such as “Noam Chomsky, Samir Amin, Huntington, Wallerstein, Gerbier, Martin, and Schuman”. According to this approach, “regionalization” consisting of economic cooperation constitutes an alternative to “globalization” and in this context, there is a risk of globalization causing “conflicts between regions and global disasters” (Dedeoğlu, 1996, p. 207). Transformation lists who argue that “*the distinction between domestic and foreign politics has disappeared with globalization, global markets have emerged, the service sector has gained economic importance and the world order has taken a new shape*” are examples of thinkers such as “Giddens, Friedman, Habermas, Bauman, Waters, Hirst and Thompson”. Transformationalists argue that globalization, which is “a de facto developing situation”, should be explained with new concepts by opposing the claims of extreme globalists “*The end of nation states has come*” and the idea of “*Nothing has changed*” of the opponents of globalization.

“Reflexivity”, one of the main concepts of Malcolm Waters (1995, pp. 2-25), one of the first globalization authors who adopted “the multidimensionality theory”, is seen as one of the concepts emphasizing that “*globalization is a new situation and a dynamic structure*” by “Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu”. Waters (1995, p. 22) explains the historical process of globalization in six articles under the name of “multidimensionality theory”, emphasizes “the transformational power of

globalization” arising from economic and social crises, and argues that economic globalization is nowadays taking place as “global capitalism”. The developments that laid the groundwork for globalization are classified into five stages: “*mercantilist capitalism* and *colonialism* (1500-1800), *financial capitalism* (1800-1875), *international capitalism* (1875-1945), *multinational capitalism* (1945-1960), and *contemporary global capitalism* (1960-1990)” (Waters, 1995, pp. 46-49). The process of globalization has neo-liberal consequences such as “homogenization, time-space compression, the information society, risk, and the ongoing spiral of networks” (Çiftçi, 2015, p. 19).

Contrary to thinkers such as Daniel Bell and Raymond Aron, who see the 20th century as “*the century in which ideologies ended*”, Şerif Mardin (1995, p. 13) sees it as “a highly ideological century”. Globalization, which defines “*the chaotic and slippery world as the spread of values across national borders too much wider circles and reaching more people faster*”, has shattered the hierarchy of values described by positivism as “the center-periphery dialectic”.

In the 1990s, Roland Robertson (1990, pp. 15-30) saw “globalization” as “the rise of the consciousness of universality and the magical code of happiness or unhappiness” which he thought had been “in development for several centuries” with an “emphasis on historicity” (Bauman, 1990, pp. 143-169). Contrary to Giddens' view, according to Robertson (1999, pp. 26-32), “*globalization is not a result of modernization*”, but it is important in terms of being “a process that enables globalization to spread”. Robertson's “global field” emphasizes that in the line of development from nationality to globality, “*self-consciousness in people rises and this development prepares the ground for dialectical conflicts*”. By using the concept of “glocalization” or “globality”, it emphasizes that “*the global field, which includes universal, global, and cultural values, involves mutual interactions*” (Robertson, 1999, p. 56).

Based on the Oxford Dictionary, Robertson (1999, p. 21) emphasized that the definitions conceptualized by Marshall McLuhan in 1962 as “a global village” (1964), “global armistice”, and “global embrace” have an extremely important place in globalization studies. John Burton, on the other hand, explained the globalized international system with the analogy of “a spider web”, in which he emphasized “the

interconnectedness of all actors” and the concept of “world society”. Marshall McLuhan (1962), who explains the speed in the field of communication by emphasizing that the world has turned into “an electronic global village” through the media, is seen by Giddens and many thinkers as “the namesake of the concept of globalization” (Giddens A. , 2005, p. 22) and according to Giddens (2000, p. 20), “*no text that does not mention globalization is fully accepted in academic and political terms*”.

Giddens sees globalization as “the highest stage in the development process of human history”, as “a natural consequence of the modernization process” with the increase in social relations on a global scale and the serious separation of time and space. With this approach, Giddens (2000, p. 54) reduced globalization to “the globalization of modernism”. According to Giddens (1997, pp. 74-79), “the dominant actors” in the global political order are “nations”, whereas, in the world economy, they are “international corporations” operating for profit. According to Giddens (2004, pp. 61-63), modernity has four institutional dimensions: “surveillance, capitalism, industrialism, and military power”. In modernity, nation-states will be transformed into “capitalism”, industrialism into “the capitalist world economy”, and finally the military world into “capitalist power”. Fuat Keyman, who opposes this view, emphasizes that “*modernism has national qualities*”, but on the contrary, “*globalization is a concept that conflicts with nationality*” (Keyman F. , 2002, pp. 27-53; Keyman E. F., 2006, pp. 1-20). However, although Giddens (2000, p. 65) thinks that “*conflicts will be at a minimum level with the democratization process becoming operational*”, he emphasizes that the creation of globalization from “manufactured uncertainty” also involves “manufactured risks”.

Zygmunt Bauman (2000, p. 58) evaluates this manufactured uncertainty with the concept of “global uncertainty” and emphasizes that the unipolar domination of capitalism as a result of the Cold War has created “disorder rather than a new world order”. Bauman (1999, pp. 68-69) emphasizes “the dominant position of nation-states” in the process of globalization by drawing attention to their “role in eliminating these uncertainties”. Bauman (2000, pp. 128-129) underlines that “the loss of legitimacy of nation-states” without the transfer of legitimacy to supranational

structures poses “the risk of social fragmentation” through the emergence of sub-identities, and in this context, he defends “Robertson's globalization approach”.

“The bipolar world”, which was positioned as “us and the absolute other of each other” with globalization, removed the thick curtain with the dissolution of the USSR and revealed “a universalist view” with the understanding that “*the world is a whole*”. The rise of anarchic capitalism in economic terms during this period was described by John Gray (1999, pp. 81-185) as “a false dawn” and “US global capitalism”, and he saw “Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, Friedrich Von Hayek, and Thomas Malthus” as “the four horsemen of the apocalypse”. Based on this approach, according to Gray (1999, p. 287), “*the rising US-led globalization is a nightmare world of war and scarcity*” and he explains this process as “the neo-liberal hegemony of the new imperialism” (Harvey, 2003, pp. 29-68).

According to David Harvey (1999, p. 65), globalization is explained by the concept of “time-space compression”, which describes “the increase in the speed of flow of life and the disappearance of spatial boundaries, i.e. distances”. Morley and Robins (1997, p. 160) interpret this process as “the formation of an instantaneous world without depth, that is, a superficial world”. Pierson (2000, p. 263), on the other hand, claims that “*the world is shrinking*” as a result of the processes resulting from globalization. According to Brown and Ainley (2009, p. 6), the globalization process is defined as “the Americanisation Process”.

Using “the world system paradigm”, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that there are developed capitalist countries centred in Europe in the centre and relatively weak countries in the periphery and that there is “a dependency relationship between these countries based on the creation and maintenance of the social division of labour”. The expansion of this interdependence into “a more comprehensive form” is called “globalization”.

In the globalized world, nation-states act primarily in accordance with “the national interests of their own states”, but they do not ignore the basic principles of multinational corporations and international organizations and seek their views and approval when necessary. As a result of this situation, “the question of the sovereignty of nation-states” has been one of the key topics of debate in international relations

since the 1960s. According to Weiss (1998), globalization is a process produced by “state policies”. According to Berger and Dore (1996), it is thought that countries will become “uniform” with globalization, in other words, the similarities between them will increase. According to Kindleberger (1969, p. 207), from an economic point of view, “*nation-states have ceased to exist*”. According to some proponents of globalization, this situation does not eliminate “the sovereignty or independence of states”; on the contrary, it contributes to the development of much better policies (Öztekin, 2018, p. 323). Kenichi Ohmae (2005), a supporter of corporate and individual-oriented wealth distribution, described “the loss of authority of nation-states over the economy as dinosaurs waiting to die”. According to Strange (1996), who adopts “an anti-globalization stance”, the economy in the globalized world is no longer dominated by “states” but by “international organizations, corporations, and even mafias”, and economic policies are imposed on politicians by them.

It is possible to observe the effects of globalization in many fields such as “economy, trade, investment and capital, communication, division of labor and labor market, culture, and politics”. Globalization in the economy differs from country to country according to “the level of development of the countries”. Although the role of states in economic policies is limited in developed countries, “*the sovereign role of states and national diversity persists*” (Sayarı & Bilgin, 2015, p. 227). In this context, Mosley (2005) explains “the limited impact of capital mobility on institutions domiciled” in developed countries with the view that “*states are neither masters nor slaves of capital markets*”. In contrast to this situation, in developing countries, the state's powers in the economic field are limited. This causes more serious problems in “markets where capital flows are under control” (Mosley, 2005, pp. 355-362).

According to the neo-classical theory, one of the reasons for “the fragile structure of state sovereignty” in developing countries is that “*in the conditions of the economic crisis that started in the 1970s and worsened in the 1980s, the World Bank, through Structural Adjustment Programmes, tied these countries to the IMF's Standby Agreements and put them into debt*” (Sayarı & Bilgin, 2015). The global world economy was designed through institutions such as “the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO”. This transformation in developing countries brought with it “the transition to the free market, where neo-liberal policies gained importance in the 1980s”. This

was followed by national economic crises in “Turkey (1994), Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2000)”. The peak of the risks of financial globalization was reached with “the 2008 economic crisis in the US”, and globalization became multipolar with “the rise of the Chinese economy” (Öniş & Güven, 2011, p. 469). After these crises, the need to regulate the free market economy through “reforms and independent regulatory agencies” emerged, and this was called “regulatory capitalism” (Braithwaite, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2012)

With globalization, developments such as “the spread of foreign trade and new communication technologies, increased competition, mechanization and flexibilization of production, and increased asymmetric mobility of international capital, goods, and means of production” are among the important changes. Since the 16th-century colonial period, “multinational corporations”, which Benedict Anderson (1993) defines as “imaginary communities”, are considered “the most important element of globalization and capital mobility”. One of the most important theses of globalization advocates is “*Think local, act global.*” (Naisbitt, 1994, p. 13). However, the globalization process has also brought about “the dominance of the financial sector”. According to Rodrik (2011), “the paradox of globalization” is that “*globalization offers both opportunities and constraints for countries*”. This paradox emphasizes that “economic globalization, democracy, and national sovereignty”, the so-called “political trinity”, cannot coexist in the same time frame.

One of the main global problems that threaten world peace and cause international conflicts is “imperialism”. “Imperialism”, which means “the re-establishment of power relations between two or more states”, is defined more than once by different theories. Hans J. Morgenthau, who focuses “not on what imperialism is but what it is not”, argues that “*not every attempt by a state to increase its power can be characterized as imperialism and that the efforts of a state with a superior position in the international arena to maintain that superiority should not be considered imperialism*” (Ari, 2001, p. 231). Morgenthau analyzes imperialism under three main headings: “*military imperialism*, which is based on military occupation and conquest; *economic imperialism*, which is the exploitation of other nations through economic control; and *cultural imperialism*, which means that a popular culture aims to replace other cultures.” According to Morgenthau, “military imperialism”, the most

ruthless of all, is the view that imperialist aims can be achieved more quickly through the conquest of one country by “military means”, but this carries the risk of failure, as in the case of “Hitler in Germany and Napoleon in France”. “Economic imperialism”, which is an effort to establish “non-violent domination” over other countries, emerged as “a natural consequence of mercantilism and capitalism” in modern times. “Cultural imperialism”, which is “the softest form of imperialism but has the greatest impact”, is when countries try to conquer or “control the thoughts and ideas of another nation”, not its territory or economy, and this method is seen as “a much more lasting victory” than other forms of imperialism. This is because “cultural imperialism” plays “an auxiliary and complementary role” in terms of preparing the ground for military and economic imperialism and influencing decision-makers. While “the globalization of communication” occurs through “global media and digital platforms”, “populism”, which is “the source of cultural imperialism”, which has become widespread through Western and US-based English, which makes its impact felt in post-modern approaches, plays an active role in “the globalization of civilizational values”. They all serve a single purpose: *“the establishment of a new world order in which imperialist countries will maximize their national interests and maintain their hegemonic claims”* (Ari, 2001, p. 233).

According to Marxism, which is based on the philosophy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, according to “dialectical materialism” and “economic determinism”, *“whoever controls the economic system controls the political system”*. Since economic forces are the source of all political phenomena, imperialism has emerged as a result of the economic system in which it exists, namely “capitalism”. The imperialist powers' desire to share the world among themselves as a result of their colonialist understanding is seen as “the source of international conflicts and wars”. Since capitalist societies cannot find enough market space in their own societies, they see other countries as “investment areas” and in this direction, they consider imperialism as “a necessary requirement of capitalism”. Marx, who thought that class conflicts consisted of the capitalist political system, which is the synthesis formed as “a result of the conflict between the thesis formed by *the bourgeoisie*, the dominant group that appropriates surplus value, and the anti-thesis formed by *the proletariat*” that opposes it, did not develop any theory of imperialism, although he put forward the intellectual foundations of imperialism. This gap was filled by “John Hobson,

Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolph Hilferding, Karl Kautsky, and Lenin”, followed by “Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Mao Zedong”, who modified and developed the theory of imperialism with their own unique applications.

According to “Lenin's theory of imperialism”, the pioneer of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, which brought a communist perspective to international relations, imperialism was explained by purely “economic factors” as “the result of capitalist countries' search for cheap labor and raw materials”. Capitalists control the economic system through “the monopolies, cartels, and trusts” they form within the country and this system is reflected in the world market as “international cartelization” (Lenin, 1993, pp. 490-500). Capitalists neutralize their competitors by replacing free competition with “monopolies”, and “*it becomes impossible to compete with monopoly capitalists*” (Ari, 2001, p. 400). The rise of capitalism leads to the need for raw materials, which in turn led to “the search and struggle for colonies” to share the world (Lenin, 1972, pp. 203-207). After the world was divided among capitalists, imperialist countries covet each other's countries, which makes wars permanent. According to Lenin (1972), “*The real evil is not imperialism, which is a necessary consequence of the development of capitalism, but capitalism itself*”.

The history of colonialism and imperialism goes back much further than modern capitalism, to Rome, which had a system of slavery. Lenin (1993, pp. 499-500) defined imperialism as “the highest stage of development of capitalism” and characterized it as “monopolistic”. According to Lenin (1993, p. 205), the transition from capitalism to imperialism must necessarily be characterized by: “*the formation of various monopolies with the intensification of production and the increase in the capital; the new role of banks and their merger with the capital of the industrial sector and the transformation of finance capital into a financial oligarchy; the replacement of the export of commodities by the export of capital; the formation of international capitalist unions with the aim of sharing the world; and the completion of the geographical division of the world by the greatest capitalist powers*”. According to Lenin (1972, p. 206), the imperialist powers' colonial competition for underdeveloped regions in Asia and Africa through financial capital is seen as “the main cause of wars”, and the alliances they come together to form prepare “the ground for international wars”, even if they temporarily interrupt the war. Therefore,

according to this perspective, the existence of capitalist countries perpetuates wars and disrupts international peace. From the Leninist point of view, the only way to prevent international conflicts and wars is for capitalism, “a parasitic and rotten system”, to disappear and for “the new man in a classless society to be freed from sin” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990, pp. 230-231). According to Stalin, the end of wars is possible with “the elimination of imperialism and the domination of socialism in the world”. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev thought that “*nuclear weapons would cause wars and destroy not only the capitalist world but also the communist countries - both sides*”. One of the main criticisms of Lenin's theory of imperialism is that “*the phenomenon of imperialism cannot be explained on economic grounds alone*” (Gönlübol, 1978, p. 316).

According to liberalism, it is not capitalism but “the incompatibilities within the capitalist system” that gave birth to imperialism (Hobson J. A., 1902). Similar to the Marxist approach, it is argued that “the surplus product within the country and the investment opportunities” created as a result of the search for markets in foreign countries cause imperialism. According to Hobson, an important representative of the liberal understanding and one of the first to use the concept of imperialism, “*Imperialism is not an inevitable and rational solution*”. The real solution lies in domestic welfare-enhancing solutions, as opposed to Marxist ones, through the use of economic reforms such as “increasing purchasing power, improving domestic investment opportunities and national market share, and preventing excessive savings” (Ari, 2001, p. 398). The fundamental problem facing capitalist societies is “the dilemma of too little consumption in the face of too much production”. Capitalists prefer to use the increased capital in the field of “foreign investment” rather than in the field of “social development”, and imperialism emerged as a result of this preference (Gönlübol, 1978, p. 306). According to Hobson (1993, pp. 476-489), the reason for the emergence of imperialism is “the wrong practices of capitalism, i.e. the transformation of capital surplus goods that are not consumed at home into investments abroad for profit-making purposes”, and the main factor that gives rise to imperialism and organizes other forces is “finance capital”.

Joseph Alois Schumpeter, who rejected Hobson and Lenin's economic foundations for their theories of imperialism, believed that wars were not fought for momentary pragmatic purposes, but rather for “the purpose of unlimited expansion”. Based on the idea that liberal institutions prevent wars, he explains capitalism and democracy as “concepts that promote peace and claims” that the development of these two concepts will destroy imperialism (Schumpeter, 1918). Schumpeter argues that *“humans are irrational by nature, driven by the instinct to fight and expand”*. He emphasizes that *“the development of capitalism will reduce the likelihood of war and promote peace with the idea that democracy will encourage people to think more rationally away from their irrational nature, which he sees as the cause of wars, and that rationally thinking individuals will bring democratic governments to power”* (Schumpeter, 1918).

Despite the economic and historical changes, it is possible to speak of the continuity of “a monopoly capitalism dominated by finance capital”. The US and European banks have a say in domestic and foreign politics in the world. In today's capitalism, where “financial oligarchies” control capital and foreign investment and capital exports continue at a remarkable rate, there is an increase in enterprises that monopolize by controlling prices and production. The financial sector has emerged as “the most decisive capital group” today.

While colonialism was centered in Europe until WWII “the new phenomenon of imperialism” that emerged after WWII took its place on the stage of history as “the US hegemony”. In 1957, Kwame Nkrumah (1966), “the first prime minister of Ghana”, which gained independence from Britain, emphasized that *“the old colonialism had been transformed into a new colonialism based on non-military methods”*. In “neocolonialism”, rather than being part of empires, colonies were given “a nominal independence”, and “a semi-colonial order” was built in which economic and political decision-making mechanisms were in the hands of imperialist powers. With this method, it has been emphasized that “the gap between rich and poor countries and income inequality” have increased globally.

After the First World War, US imperialism's "Marshall Aid" to the imperialist states of Western Europe, particularly "Britain, France, and West Germany", prepared the ground for them to unite against the socialist countries and become economically dependent on the US. "The 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" was replaced by "the 1955 World Trade Organization and the United Nations", which claimed to be neutral after the war, became the implementers of a new kind of colonialism. Finally, NATO, which is "the most fundamental implementer of the new stage of imperialism", aimed to keep the imperialist countries and the countries under the influence of the imperialist countries under the name of "collective security" under the roof of a single organization against the Soviet Union, which they saw as a common enemy.

Global imperialism entered a process of transformation in an environment of transnational actors. Following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the existence of a rival brought about "debates about NATO's existence and future". Although the USSR, which the US perceived as a threat, has disintegrated, it continues to organize "a state of perpetual war" with its military bases spread in various parts of the world, and this situation leads to a process of "globalization of security". While "international security companies and mercenaries" are becoming widespread, it is also possible to talk about the existence of "conventional tactical struggles" (Çiftçi, 2015, p. 114). "The Wolfowitz document", which serves the US's aim of becoming "the hegemon of the unipolar world", is important in terms of outlining "the US's imperialist ambitions". "The US invasion of Iraq in 1991 and Afghanistan in 2001, and the occupations in disintegrated Yugoslavia and Libya" are examples of "military interventions of imperialism" for this purpose. The fact that the US needed to gain the legitimacy of international organizations during "the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan" and that the war was generally declared as "a propaganda war" confirms the fallacy of the perception of unipolarity.

The increasing importance of “international organizations and the transnationalization of capital” do not mean that the nation-state paradigm has been replaced by a global state, even if it has been shaken. On the contrary, nation-states are “indispensable determinants of security and order”, but international actors sometimes violate their sovereignty. Wallerstein (2000, p. 86) defines this as “the sharing of sovereignty between states and international actors and the softening of state power”. In the new world order, where the sovereignty paradigm of nation-states has been reshaped, “*the control of military forces and the arms industry has also become uncertain with globalization*” (Nalbant, 1997, p. 223). According to Giddens, this situation is treated as “an inevitable fortuna (fate)” by addressing security at the international level (Çiftçi, 2015, p. 120). The discourses of “the end of nation-states and world citizenship” have been nothing more than the propaganda of extreme globalizers.

In the globalizing world, “the perception of the other / enemy” defined by Carl Schmitt is reproduced and “the working class”, the biggest threat to capitalism, is accepted as “the contemporary other” in the new world order. Temporary migrant workers with “asylum-seeker status”, “women, migrants, and children” can also be included in the classification of “the most victimized others” of the new world order (Eriksen, 2000, pp. 81-85). Globalization, by increasing “intercultural communication”, has brought not cultural solidarity but “cultural exclusion, the emergence of local and ethnic identities” (Kartarı, 2006, pp. 9-32), the weakening of national values, the formation of a new identity perception called “global human being” and, in Eriksen's perspective, “cultural terrorism” (Eriksen, 2000, p. 84). Globalization leads to the formation of “a multicultural and heterogeneous social order” by separating identities (Duman Z. , 2009, p. 93).

According to Fukuyama (1992), “the ideal human model desired by the US” is the type of person who adopts “the free market economy”, who is consumerist and lives focused on material gains, and the liberal-state model is seen as “the highest political organization”. According to Negri and Hardt (2001, pp. 313-314), this new world order emerging with globalization, where authority is decentralized and uncertain, is “the imperial order”. Today, the US and the EU are trying to play “the role of global police with virtual realities by using total perception management”

through the international media monopoly with the activation of soft power relations and actors.

After September 11 attacks, “Muslims”, whom the US sees as “a green threat”, are marginalized. On the other hand, there is “a rising Asia” that has the potential to change the course of history towards a new world order with China at its center, which is marginalized as “the yellow threat” this time after “the red threat” with post-modern discourses. “The civil war in Syria and the Russia-Ukraine crisis”, in which the struggle over the division of imperialist countries and NATO's expansion policy play a major role, and the US's efforts to "diminish the international influence of Russia", which it sees as “a potential rival”, confirm this situation. In this context, for a fully independent Turkey today, we should take inspiration from the anti-imperialist approaches of our great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with the approach of *"Peace at home, peace in the world."* in foreign policy and stand against all kinds of imperial formations and unity.

2. CHAPTER II THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO AND RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS

2.1. The Period towards the Establishment of NATO

In this section, “the process leading to the establishment of NATO” will be analyzed in depth under the sub-headings of “the consequences of the Second World War”, including “the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid”, “the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, and its aims”.

2.1.1. Consequences of the Second World War (1939-1945).

In the run-up to WWII, Nazi Germany's aim was to fulfill three basic obligations: to get rid of “the Treaty of Versailles”, to perpetuate anti-Semitism in accordance with the belief of "One people (Volk), one Reich", and to legitimize the occupation of other countries with “Lebensraum”, the so-called “living space” (Hitler, 2006). The Second World War, which started on 1 September 1939 when Hitler's Germany (2006), which adopted “revisionist, expansionist, and aggressive policies”, and wanted to “destroy the USSR and communism”, attacked Poland and was “the most destructive war” in world history (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 402), deeply affected “the political and economic processes of many countries covering a geographically large region and caused millions of people to lose their lives” (Cohen, 2016, p. 26). At a time when technology and the war industry were much more advanced compared to WWI, the intensity and scale of this war also increased at the same rate compared to the previous one. As in many other countries, “the European economy” has suffered serious economic damage (Kaiser, 2015, p. 170). In this period, the USA was the only country to gain economically, and as a result, the global balance of power, which was in favor of Europe, shifted towards America as “the USA gained a leading position in exports” (Akşin, 2014, p. 279). “A new polarised world order” emerged in the period leading up to the Cold War, in which new states emerged on the stage of history and there were administrative changes in “Bulgaria, Italy, Albania, Romania, Romania, and Yugoslavia” following the defeat of the totalitarian regimes in “Germany, Italy, and Japan” (Sertel, 2009).

It is possible to analyze the developments after the Second World War from three different perspectives: “*political, military, and economic dimensions*”. In 1945, “the establishment of the United Nations (UN)” is considered a politically important development, even though “*the UN General Assembly was under the guidance of the USA*”. From a military point of view, “the end of the fascist regimes in Europe” by the USA and the USSR led to the emergence of “a bipolar world order”, blocked behind these two superpowers. From an economic point of view, it is seen as “an important economic development” that the USA, together with “the Bretton Woods system” (Akşin, 2014, p. 280), prepared the ground for “the establishment of the World Bank and the IMF” and thus “the global capitalist economy” with this organizational structure (Oran, 2005, pp. 480-482).

Announced on 12 March 1947, “the Truman Doctrine” which was accepted as “the declaration of the Cold War” (Akşin, 2014, p. 284), provided “military and economic aid of 400 million dollars” to the states under the influence of the Soviets (Nevins & Commager, 1961, p. 453) in order to “protect Turkey and Greece from Soviet influence” (McGhee, 1992, pp. 52-55). The Truman Doctrine was based on the idea that the US perceived the USSR as “a threat”. With this perception of the Soviet threat, the colonial values of the past under the concepts of “democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” were reinterpreted with new imperial aims and concepts. By using such new methods, “the policy of containment of the USSR”, which was seen as a threat, was pursued. As a result of its aid, the US has created a legitimate basis for “the expansion of its interests and the realization of its imperial aims” (Morgenthau, 1969, p. 16). With the Truman Doctrine, the US was portrayed as “the guarantor of freedom and security” in Europe against the expansionist policies of Russia, which was seen as “a threat”. Following the establishment of “the Bretton Woods System”, international organizations such as “the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT” assumed important tasks serving the imperial world as “part of the US security circle protecting Western Europe”.

With “the Marshall Plan” announced in 1947, the US aims to “prevent the spread of communism, which it sees as a threat, through economic aid to these countries in order for Europe to overcome its current difficulties and regain its former power” (Rosamond, 2017, pp. 33-53). This situation shows that the Marshall Plan pursued political as well as economic objectives. However, with the emphasis on “an integrated Europe” within the plan (Walker & Vatter, 2015), it wants to bring Europe, which it sees as “a market area”, under US influence by freeing the regions under the USSR's rule from Soviet influence (Appel, 2017, pp. 294-322). For this purpose, between 1948 and 1951, “*at least 15 billion dollars of economic aid was provided to 16 different countries under the European Development Project*” (Appel, 2017, pp. 312-322). The Truman Doctrine, which was led by the USA and “heralded the Cold War and the bipolar world order” (Sander, 1969, p. 57), and the subsequent Marshall Aid were “the basic building blocks of the process leading to the establishment of NATO” (Sander, 1979, pp. 11-12).

2.2. The Establishment and Objectives of NATO

“The North Atlantic Treaty”, also known as “the Washington Treaty”, was signed on 4 April 1949 in “Washington, the capital of the USA”, with the participation of “the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and Denmark” (Sander, 1979, pp. 236-237), as “a collective defense organization based on Article 51 of the UN Charter” in order to create “a union of forces against the Soviet threat” (Öztekin, 2018, p. 341). With the entry into force of this agreement on 24 August 1949, NATO was officially established.

Following these developments, the perception that the USSR posed a threat was reinforced with “the Korean War, which broke out on 25 June 1950 when North Korea attacked South Korea”, and in this direction, “the NATO alliance strategy” was formed by the member countries of the alliance (Doğan N. , 2005, p. 73). As a result of common security concerns, NATO member states established this organization as “a military defense organization” against states outside the NATO alliance, which they considered being “unreliable states” to ensure their security and freedoms. Thanks to this organization, the US implemented its “containment policy against the expansion of the USSR” (Armaoğlu F. , 1991, pp. 447-448).

NATO develops “a common line of defense” by eliminating attacks against its member states and acting jointly. It aims to promote “international security and peace” in accordance with “the principles and objectives of the UN Charter, as well as military, political, and economic stability and cooperation among member states”. From this point of view, according to Harry Truman, “*the Marshall Plan and NATO complemented each other*”.

The main objectives of NATO's establishment can be listed as “preventing Soviet expansionism, preventing the revival of totalitarian regimes and nationalist militarism in Europe, deterring possible attacks against NATO members, and laying the foundations of an integrated Europe”. NATO's “military missions” include “the Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention in 1995, the air campaign against human rights violations in Kosovo in 1999, the Afghanistan intervention in 2001, and the Iraq intervention in 2004”. In addition, NATO's sending of aid in the aftermath of “Hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005 and the earthquake in Pakistan” are also considered “aid missions” (Ereker, 2019, pp. 6-7).


To summarise “the 14 articles of NATO's founding”, the first article lists “the basic principles necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, and NATO members have agreed to resolve disputes between the parties by “peaceful means” (NATO, 1949). In the second article, it was stated that “the purpose of NATO's establishment” was not only for military purposes but also included “economic and political cooperation”. In the third article, it was agreed that NATO member states would “increase their forces” to enable them to “respond collectively” in the event of an attack. The fourth article states that “cooperation between the parties” will be allocated in the face of a threat against any NATO member country, while *the fifth article* emphasizes that any armed attack will be met with “a total response”, taking into account “the right to the common defense”. The fourth and fifth articles of the Treaty, which are considered to be the two most important articles of the Treaty, establish “NATO's collective defense identity”. The next article, the sixth article, sets out the countries recognized as “the Atlantic region” in a comprehensive manner. In this context, “*Turkey and Greece became NATO members in 1952*” and were included in “the Atlantic region”. In Articles 7 and 8, NATO member states undertake not to contravene these provisions.

Article 9 provides for the establishment of bodies to put these provisions into practice, Article 10 gives member states “the right to invite other European states to join the pact”, and Article 11 emphasizes that the treaty should enter into force in accordance with “constitutional rules”. According to Articles 12 and 13, the treaty can be amended after “10 years”, and after “20 years”, NATO member states can leave NATO if they wish. Article 14 states that these texts, written in “two different languages, English and French, are equally valid” (Soysal, 1991, p. 391).

2.3. NATO's Organizational Structure and Functioning

In NATO (1949), each member has “veto power”, but decisions taken are based on “unanimity”. NATO (1949)'s military structure is made up of two important elements: “*the command structure*, which is responsible for command and control, and *the force structure*, which consists of military resources allocated by member states to NATO”

Figure 14: NATO's Decision-making Process



Resource: (Ada & Çakır, 2017, p. 638)

Figure 14 shows “the process of NATO decision-making” in stages. Decisions taken as a result of discussions are finalized by “unanimity”. NATO's organs are divided into four groups: “*the North Atlantic Council, the Defence and Nuclear Planning Committee, the Military Committee, and the NATO General Secretariat*” (Sönmezoğlu, Güneş, & Keleşoğlu, 2011, p. 92).

The first of these is “the NATO Council”, also known as “the North Atlantic Council”, which is “the highest and most authoritative decision-making body” within NATO's structure, consisting of “Foreign Ministers” and meeting “twice a year”. In this Council, “permanent representatives” meet “once a week” under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. The political authorities within the Council take all decisions on matters other than defense matters by “consensus”.

The second is “the Defence and Nuclear Planning Committee.” This committee, which meets “twice a year at the level of the defense ministers”, is “the highest authority on military matters” (Sönmezoğlu, Güneş, & Keleşoğlu, 2011, p. 92).

The third is “the Military Committee”, “NATO's highest military body”. “The Military Committee”, which includes “the Chiefs of Staff of NATO member states”, acts in “an advisory capacity”, gathering information with the support of “the International Staff Mission”, which is permanently based in Brussels for “the common defense of NATO member states” (Hasgüler & Uludağ, 2007, p. 311). It is also responsible for “ensuring international security” in times of peace by making recommendations and taking necessary measures against possible threats.

In order for “the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee” to continue its activities, “a Nuclear Planning Group” was established with the participation of NATO members “the USA, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Italy, and Turkey”. In military terms, NATO has established several regional defense areas, including “the US-Canada Regional Planning Group, the Atlantic Allied Command, the Allied Forces Command Europe, which includes Turkey, and the Channel Command” (Soysal, 1991, pp. 394-395). “The North Atlantic Assembly, the Eurogroup, and the Atlantic Treaty Associations”, which, although “not directly

affiliated with NATO”, operate in parallel and serve the same purpose as “an advisory organization” (Soysal, 1991, pp. 397-398).

The last is “*the Secretary General of NATO*”, based in Brussels, who is “the highest-ranking civilian official, the spokesperson of the organization”, performing “decision-making and advisory” services, chairing “the North Atlantic Council” and the main committees and bodies such as “the Defence Planning Committee”

Table 11: NATO Secretaries-General since the establishment of NATO

PERIOD	SECRETARY GENERAL	COUNTRY
1952-1957	Lord Ismay	United Kingdom
1957-1961	Paul Henry Spaak	Belgium
1961-1964	Dirk U. Stikker	Netherlands
1954-1971	Manlio Brosio	Italy
1971-1984	Joseph Luns	Netherlands
1984-1988	Lord Carrington	United Kingdom
1988-1994	Manfred Wörner	Germany
1994-1995	Willy Claes	Netherlands
1995-1999	Javier Solana	Spain
1999-2003	Lord Robertson	United Kingdom
2003-2009	Jaap De Hoop Scheffer	Netherlands
2009-2014	Anders Fogn Rasmussen	Denmark
2014-.....	Jens Stoltenberg	Norway

Resource: (Hasgüler & Uludağ, 2007, p. 370)

Table 11 lists “the NATO Secretaries General” since the establishment of NATO, based on the periods they have been in office. There are five specialized departments under the NATO Secretariat General: “*Political Affairs, Defence Planning and Policy, Scientific Affairs, Defence Support Affairs, Infrastructure, Logistics, and the Council Operations Department*” (Hasgüler & Uludağ, 2007, p. 370).

2.4. The Establishment and Objectives of the Warsaw Pact

In response to America's efforts to “contain Eastern Europe with the Marshall Plan”, Soviet Russia prepared “the Molotov Plan” and aimed at “commercial cooperation among Eastern European countries” (Armaoğlu, 1991, p. 444).

As a consequence of the polarisations that started after WWII, “the declaration of the Eastern bloc” was concretely realized with “the establishment of Cominform on 5 October 1947” (Armaoğlu, 1949, pp. 430-431), which aimed to “fight the imperialist Western bloc and destroy them” (Uçarol, 2000, p. 663). With this development, a period towards the Cold War period began, in which the USA and the USSR emerged on the stage of history as “two polarised superpowers”. During this period, Winston Churchill characterized the countries dominated by the USSR as “members of the Iron Curtain bloc” (Yalçın, 2002, pp. 463-464).

“The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)”, also known as “the Council for Economic Assistance”, was established on 5-8 January 1949 under the leadership of Russia against “the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)”, which was established on 16 April 1948 by Europe under the influence of “Marshall aid” aimed at “the integration and development of Europe”. “The Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria” attended the meeting in Moscow where “the COMECON organization” was established. “The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation”, led by the Soviet Union, and the subsequent “COMECON” can be considered “the basic building blocks of the process leading to the establishment of the Warsaw Pact”. In 1948, the same year that “Finland” came under the Soviet Union, “Czechoslovakia” also came under communist rule. Following these developments, with the establishment of government in China in 1949, all the steps of the process leading to “the establishment of the Warsaw Pact” were completed.

The Warsaw Pact was established on 14 May 1955 with the participation of “the German People's Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Hungary, and Romania” from the Eastern Bloc members under “the leadership of the Soviet Union” against the NATO alliance (Halle, 1976, pp. 97-98). “The Warsaw Pact”, which disintegrated on 1 April 1991, also known as “the anti-NATO organization”, was “a collective defense organization consisting of regional associations in the political, military, ideological, and economic fields” established under the leadership of the Soviet Union.

2.5. Cold War and its Consequences

“The USSR, which expanded its borders” as a result of its success against Germany in the Second World War, constitutes another “superpower element as a rival of the USA” in the bipolar international system (Sander, 1989, p. 201). Although the USSR lost a large number of people and was economically weakened during the Second World War, “Soviet-Russian nationalism” developed during this period as the Soviet people showed “a significant degree of integration” among themselves (Hosking, 2001, p. 718). “The USA”, the other superpower against the USSR, was the country that emerged from WWII with “the least economic and human losses”. One of the developments that marked this period and significantly changed the course of the war was “the atomic bombs dropped by the USA on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945”. This development not only shifted “the balance of power in favor of the USA” but also led to the start of “an arms race” among countries.

The Cold War era, which started as a result of “the arms race between the USA and the USSR as well as the ideologically based power struggle with global dimensions”, covers the period between 1947 and 1991. Although there was no intervention that could lead to “a hot war”, also known as “an armed conflict” between the Western Bloc countries led by the USA and the Eastern Bloc countries led by the USSR, this period was a period in which “psychological tension, ideological and economic provocations and a climate of fear consisting of mutual threats” were experienced at a high level (Gaddis, 2015, p. 26). After the liberation of Eastern Europe from “the Nazi occupation by the Soviet Red Army troops”, the USSR and the USA began “a struggle for dominance over the borders of Eastern Europe” (Karadeli, 2020, pp. 43-73).

In the conflicting ideological polarisation during the Cold War period, the USA was the wing that emphasized “liberal, capitalist, and democratic discourses”, while the USSR was the wing that emphasized “socialist and pro-freedom discourses”. After the end of the Cold War, the US became “the sole superpower” in the international arena, and “the unipolar world order” was established. As a result, the US has become more powerful in “the globalized world” and has been carrying out activities to spread “the liberal democratic order and free market economy” all over the world.

The process leading to the establishment of NATO and the Cold War was accelerated by “the USSR's possession of the atomic bomb, the Prague Putsch, the Brussels Treaty, and the emergence of the Western European Union”. In addition, another detail that draws attention in this period is the frequent “use of the media” for “propaganda and anti-communist perception management” in the news made by the US during the Cold War era (Özçağlayan & Apak, 2017, p. 108). US strategies during the Cold War were determined by NATO, which was used as “a tool” to spread the values of the new world order to the global community, and “NATO's Expansion Policies”, which aimed to “break the ties of European states with the Russian Federation and make them dependent on the Atlantic system”. Nowadays, the USA's continued efforts to “establish a national missile shield and the continued presence of nuclear weapons as a threat factor” in international conflicts indicate that “*the Cold War is still not over*” (Tellal, 2014, p. 207).

2.6. The Disintegration of the USSR and Russia's Post-Soviet Era

Gorbachev, who signed an important transformation that brought the end of the Soviet Union, initiated two main change programmes: “*Glasnost*, a policy aimed at creating a more open and transparent political environment based on democratization in the Soviet Union, and *Perestroika*, a transformation programme that introduced an innovative economic structure similar to the market economy, to reduce economic problems and political pressure in the country” (d'Encausse, 2020, pp. 42-44). Since these changes had heavy costs, the process was unfavourable to the USSR under Gorbachev.

In “the new world order”, as George Bush called it, the bipolar world order became “unipolar with the US as the hegemon” after the collapse of the USSR, and in this period, intensive efforts to “integrate Eastern European countries into the West” were particularly effective (Özarslan, 2012, p. 136). US-led military interventions in “Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and many other regions” have taken place (Arı & Pirinççi, 2011, p. 23). On 26 December 1991, with the dissolution of the USSR, “Yugoslavia was divided into six states, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro, and Czechoslovakia into two different states, namely the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in 1993” (d'Encausse, 2020, pp. 169-189). In addition to the newly independent states such as “Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan” in Central Asia and “the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus” in Eastern Europe, “15 independent countries and new borders” emerged (d'Encausse, 2020, pp. 169-189). With the collapse of the USSR, the USA, deprived of the USSR, which it perceived as “the empire of evil, the red threat, and the other”, has placed “militant Islamic countries in its new enemy perception with an othering discourse” based on the understanding of “islamophobia” within the scope of the fight against terrorism after the 9/11 attacks (Kedikli & Akça, 2017, p. 57). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the method of “hegemony”, which “Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci” had revealed, changed from being based on “consent to an imperial system based on coercion and domination” (Çiftçi K. , 2009, p. 203). In addition, international organizations such as “the IMF, the World Bank, and NATO”, which were created in this period to perpetuate American hegemony, have assumed “the task of being instruments of imperialism”.

2.6.1. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin era (1991-1999).

The period of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who became “the first president of Russia legitimately elected by the people” as a result of the elections held in 1991 at the time of the dissolution of the USSR, corresponds to 1991-1999. Boris Yeltsin abolished the Communist Party on the grounds that “*the Communist Party was collaborating with conservatives*” (Engel & Martin, 2020, p. 146) in order to “democratize Russia and strengthen relations with the West through economic liberalization” (Hosking, 2001, p. 812). Important political developments of this

period include “the White House riots of 29 April 1992, which saw protests sparked by the anger of the black community and resulted in the deaths of 55 people, and the Chechnya War between 1994 and 1996, in which thousands of civilians lost their lives” (Evtuhov & Stites, 2020, pp. 554-558).

In 1991, “the Commonwealth of Independent States” was established by the leaders of “Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus” to replace the former USSR to “ensure cooperation and economic stability” among the member states. The Boris Yeltsin era was dominated by “pro-Western policies” with the aim of democratizing Russia, and even “the Democratic Russia Movement (DRM)”, founded in 1988 under his leadership, aimed to “leave not a single trace of communism on Russian soil”. This movement, which aims for Russia to become a part of the West, believes that the current economic and political problems in the new world order can be solved by “modeling the West”.

According to Boris Yeltsin and his then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, “*Russia is a part of the West*” and therefore “*it is impossible to think of Russia separately from the West*”. From this point of view, these leaders are seen as “Atlanticists” because they advocate the necessity of reforms such as “Russia’s cooperation with Western states as an ally, democratization, and transition to a free market economy” (Dawisha & Parrott, 1995; Saikal, 1995; Bakshi, 1999). This is supported by “Boris Yeltsin’s cooperation with NATO and the UN through the NACC” on 10 March 1992 and his efforts to become a member of international organizations such as “the G-7 and the World Trade Organization” (Kemaloğlu, 2016, p. 7).

“The Economic Shock Therapy” program, modeled on the West, was introduced in 1991 by Boris Yeltsin, who implemented “neo-liberal economic reforms” for four years. In 1992, as a result of “the agreement between Russia and the IMF”, called “the Economic Stabilisation and Reform Programme”, socialism, the legacy of the USSR was abandoned “in favor of capitalism with an approach that was submissive to the West”. “Structural liberalization reforms” aimed at achieving macroeconomic stability through “privatization laws that abolished central planning, a free market economy with no state intervention, free trade, and tight monetary policies” (Kotz & Weir, 2012, pp. 243-244). Although this program was intended to

ensure “social welfare”, it failed because it caused “social unrest through the sale of public assets to oligarchs”. The main reason why these economic reforms did not achieve the expected success and were not legitimized in the eyes of the people is that Russia is seen as “the legacy of the USSR with its history, traditions, and inherited economic systems”. This failure, however, led to nationwide “hyperinflation with a decline in GDP and an increase in unemployment”. The impoverished social structure enabled “radical nationalist groups and communists to increase their power” (Federov, 1996; Bakshi, 1999).

Contrary to what was expected, such “pro-American Atlanticist policies”, in practice, led to “Russia's orientation to the East and South, to establish close relations with China, the Middle East, Central Asia, and India, and to Eurasianist ideas aiming to defend the rights of the peoples of the former USSR gaining strength in the international arena”. In this context, as “a result of the dominance of Eurasianist ideas over the legislature” after the 1993 elections, Russia decided to use “all means, including the establishment of military bases in the former USSR member states, in order to prevent NATO's expansion and to establish dominance over the former USSR member states” and adopted a foreign policy approach opposite to its previous foreign policy (Kemaloğlu, 2016, p. 8). They argued that Russia had “strong economic and historical ties” with these countries and wanted to establish “Russian influence” over them on these grounds (Djalili & Kellner, 2009, p. 180). Accordingly, it not only deployed Russian troops in these countries but also decided to “support Saddam Hussein in the Iraq crisis and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in the Bosnian Crisis” (Efegil, 2001, p. 10). Between 1997 and 1999, following these elections, Russia adopted “an anti-US and expansionist policy” and established “close relations with Japan, Iran, and China”.

With the 1996 elections, Boris Yeltsin, who was re-elected as the President of Russia, and Yevgeni Primakov, who was appointed as the Russian Foreign Minister, implemented “a new foreign policy approach”. In this new foreign policy approach, which was implemented as “the Primakov Doctrine”, according to Yeltsin, “a multilateral foreign policy” was implemented by pursuing “a policy of balance between the East and the West” (Hosking, 2001, p. 812). This period, in which “*oligarchs directly influenced the media, economy, and foreign policy and corruption*

increased”, ended with the resignation of Boris Yeltsin on 31 December 1999 with “a nationalist and Russian nationalist political discourse” (Akhundova, 2013, p. 58).

2.6.2. Vladimir Putin era (1999-2008).

Putin, one of “the most influential leaders of the United Russia Party”, who served as “a major in the Soviet Intelligence Service KGB” in 1985 after graduating from law school, was elected as “the President of Russia after Yeltsin with 52.94% of the vote” in the second general elections held on 26 March 2000. In the third presidential election held on 4 March 2004, Putin received “the legitimate approval of a high proportion of the population with 71.31% of the vote”, and thus rose to an important position in Russian history. On 2 March 2008, he remained in the presidency until Medvedev won the presidency.

Putin adopted a foreign policy understanding diametrically opposed to Yeltsin's foreign policy understanding and defended “a Eurasianist foreign policy” and the understanding of “governance inherited by the USSR” from the first moment he took office. Putin's continued “use of the Old Soviet anthem with minor changes, his use of the flag of Tsarist Russia as the Russian flag, and his preference for the red flag as the flag of the Russian army show” that he defends the understanding of “Russian patriotism” (Onay, 2002, pp. 141-142). Moreover, the Yeltsin-era understanding of nationalism based on “the Russian citizenship (*rossiyskiy*) of the people living in Russia” was replaced by “the ethnic Russian (*russkii*) discourse based on the Russian language, values, and culture” in the Putin era in 2014 (Vera, Saunders, & Autoun, 2015). In this period, stability and order were achieved by favoring tough “Russian nationalist, statist, and anti-Western policies that protected the rights and dignity of the Russian people, stopped the Chechen resistance, and ended the war” in order to rebuild Russia (Başlamış, 2016, p. 15).

Vladimir Kara-Murza and Boris Nemstov were “opposition activists defending democracy and human rights” who opposed this period of centralization and authoritarianism with the concept of “Putinism”. According to Putin, the main components of centralization are “the ideology of nationalism, the military and bureaucratic elites, former KGB employees called the Federal Security Service (FSB), and oligarchs” (Denkel, 2018, p. 65). The Putin era has been a period in which “*the*

media, NGOs, the army, and intelligence agencies are under state control, oligarchs are prevented from interfering in state affairs, the rising nationalist sentiments of the people are exploited, the CIS countries are united on the basis of Russian nationalism, and the state and the party are intertwined in an authoritarian regime” (Büyükkakıncı, 2004, pp. 137-144). Based on “Eurasianist policies” that do not surrender to the West and with an understanding that attaches importance to “European integration”, Putin has put the goal of becoming “a superpower” in front of Russia with the idea of empire and the slogan “*Strong and New Russia*” (Çomak, 2006). As “statism” gained importance in Russia, which was strengthened with this slogan, Russia's prestige increased and “*Russia became the eighth country among the G-7 countries*” (Akşin, 2014, p. 461).

The understanding of “Eurasianism”, which emphasizes the importance of geopolitics adopted by Putin, has taken its place in the literature as the concept of “New Eurasianism pioneered by Aleksandr Dugin, who sees the Western world as a threat to Russia”. In other words, the ideological infrastructure based on communism, which collapsed with the collapse of the USSR, was replaced by the idea of “Neo-Eurasianism”.

2.6.2.1. Putin Doctrine.

During Putin's term in office, “the National Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, which documents Russia's security policies, “the Foreign Policy Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, which sets out Russia's political interests in the face of globalization, and “the Military Doctrine”, which documents its military interests, were established. Among Russia's biggest threat perceptions are “NATO's expansion of its sphere of dominance up to the Russian border” as a result of “NATO's expansion policies and NATO's missile shields”, which are deployed in Europe and threaten Russia's borders. In addition, threats such as “separatist movements, terrorism, foreign dependence, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction” can also be mentioned. In this direction, “establishing close relations with the CIS countries” is among the most important foreign policy tools for “the prevention of international terrorism” (Cankara & Cankara, 2007, p. 197).

Putin, in particular, is concerned with producing “foreign policies toward the Middle East and Central Asia” to establish dominance in these regions (Mirzaliyeva, 2017). Drawing attention to the fact that “*Russia is a Eurasian country*”, Putin emphasizes that there is a risk of an “asymmetric dependency” if a foreign policy approach that is solely oriented towards the West is adopted. Based on this idea, Putin emphasizes the importance of conducting “a multilateral and rational foreign policy”, especially with countries such as “China, Turkey, Iran, and India”, by abandoning “the classical balance of power approach”. In this respect, the Putin Doctrine is based on “the Pragmatist Eurasianism foreign policy approach, which includes Multipolar World Order policies” aimed at ensuring national interests (Lo, 2015, p. 39).

2.6.2.2. *The Russian Federation’s near abroad policy.*

The target of the policies of the Russian Federation, which it refers to as “the neighborhood”, is “the Soviet bloc countries”, especially those established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It wants these countries in “the Caucasus, Central Asian Republics, Eastern Europe, and the Baltic”, which Russia considers as its “backyard” and “buffer zone” and emphasizes that they are in its “area of responsibility”, to behave in accordance with “the international law and consideration of Russian security policy”. To this end, the Putin era is the period in which “the near-abroad policy” announced under Boris Yeltsin has been most effective in defending vital regional interests.

Russia is very concerned about “the expansion of the US-led NATO towards Eastern Europe and the Baltic region” and the US desire to exert influence in what Russia calls its neighborhood. Since 1999, “NATO’s expansion efforts” have been directed toward the regions that Russia considers to be its immediate neighborhood. Russia intervened in “Ukraine and Georgia” in order to prevent their accession to NATO and the EU and subsequent militarization in accordance with NATO interests.

The main hypothesis of this thesis, that “NATO's enlargement policies were the main factor in the emergence of the Ukraine Crisis”, is also defended by Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 1990). In a speech in 2014, Putin confirmed this view, stating that *"Russia will respect the sovereignty of its neighbors as long as their sovereignty is respected and that it does not aim to build an empire by usurping sovereignty"* (Putin, 2014). At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin listed his views that *"the US has escalated conflicts due to its use of the monopoly of the use of force without relying on the UN convention and therefore has made interventions that are illegitimate and exceed its borders and that the unipolar order will become multipolar with economic empowerment in order to build global security"* (Putin, 2007). In addition, the conference underlined “the provocative nature of NATO's enlargement policies” and re-emphasized that *"NATO's expansion to its borders is the main threat to Russia's national security"*.


“The limits that Putin drew against the US' aggressive foreign policy preferences in the Georgia and Ukraine crises between 1999 and 2008” are considered a step in line with Russia's “soft balancing approach”, which does not include military alliances that Russia supports against the West in foreign policy (Ünal, 2016, p. 22). Putin emphasizes that the Ukraine crisis is a development that serves “NATO's aim of encircling Russia”, which he describes as “a besieged fortress”, with the concept of “homeland in danger” forming the main theme of Russia's defense policies. In light of recent developments, especially in the Ukraine Crisis, “the steps taken by NATO in recent years in line with its expansionist policies and Ukraine's desire to join NATO” have caused the Ukraine crisis to turn into “a hot war” and Russia has been forced to abandon “the soft balancing method” and switch to “hard methods by starting to use military force for self-defense at strategic points”.

2.6.3. Dmitri Medvedev era (2008-2012).

According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1936), the new president of Russia is Dmitri Medvedev, who was nominated by Putin as a candidate because “his term of office expired” and became president in the elections held on 7 May 2008. Since Putin was the prime minister in this period and “a dual-headed administration approach” was preferred, it is also considered “the Putin-Medvedev period”. The first foreign policy crisis that Medvedev faced was “the Georgian War”

which started on 7 August 2008. This war, which started with “Georgia's recapture of South Ossetia”, which wanted to secede from Georgia, escalated further when “Russia joined the war on the side of South Ossetia”. One of the main reasons for Russia's involvement in the war was “the discussion of Ukraine and Georgia's NATO membership at the Bucharest Summit organized by NATO” in the same year (NATO, 2008). Another foreign policy crisis of this period was “the global economic crisis of 2008” (Gençkaya, 2021, p. 278).

Figure 15: Impact of the 2008 Economic Crisis on the Russian Economy (2000-2009)



Resource: (Gençkaya, 2021, p. 278)

As can be seen in Figure 15, as a consequence of “the economic crisis in 2008”, the growth rate of the Russian economy decreased due to “the sudden drop in crude oil prices”, which directly resulted in “a contraction in the Russian economy” (Gençkaya, 2021, p. 278). However, this development has also directly affected Russia's foreign policy approaches, leading to the adoption of “a new foreign policy approach toward establishing good relations with China and emerging Asia”. Although the Medvedev era aimed to create “a democratic society” by pursuing “a policy of resetting the foreign relations inherited from the old Soviet legacy”, Russia's relations with other countries did not undergo a major change (Gençkaya, 2021, p. 278).

2.6.4. Vladimir Putin era (2012-.....).

The Russia-Ukraine crisis, one of “the current problems and geopolitical crises triggered by NATO and the EU's expansion policy towards the countries that were part of the former USSR” (Mearsheimer, 1990), has reached its peak with Putin's third term as president. With “the 2014 Maidan Crisis” in Ukraine, which Putin described as “a Western-backed coup d'état”, social movements increased and as a result of these developments, there was a change of power in Ukraine. These developments have also led to the introduction of “hybrid war strategies” in Putin's Russia (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 189). In addition, Russia, which came together with China through “the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation” in this period, tried to “exclude the USA”.

Subsequently, the establishment of “the Eurasian Economic Union on 1 January 2015” with the participation of “the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan” was aimed at breaking the influence of “rising China”. Other important developments during this period were “Russia's annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2014 and the operations in Syria between 30 September 2015 and 15 March 2016”. Russia's operations in Syria are significant in that they are “the first Russian military operation outside the territory” of the USSR outside Afghanistan”. The developments in “the 24 February 2022 Russia-Ukraine War” show that Putin has pursued “a much more active and aggressive policy in foreign policy” compared to the Yeltsin period due to his concern over “Ukraine's efforts to integrate with the European Union” and its intensive efforts to “join NATO” (Kemaloğlu, 2016, p. 13).

2.7. Independence of Ukraine

Ukraine, which served “as a buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe” (Akdemir, 2014, p. 64), gained its independence on “24 August 1991 after the dissolution of the USSR with 90.3% of the votes in a referendum” (Åslund, 2002, p. 63). Ukraine, which became one of “the founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States” after its independence (Büyükkakıncı, 2004, p. 321), has pursued “a policy of balance between Russia and Western countries” in order to maintain its “historical and cultural ties with Russia” while strengthening its relations with the

Western bloc consisting of “the US, the EU, and NATO”. Ukraine's “dilemma between the East (the Russian Federation) and the West (the US, NATO, and the EU)” negatively affects its security and stability and turns it into “a center of conflict” (Malskyy, 2010, p. 270).

The leaders who took over after Ukraine's independence have shown “different tendencies to pursue “pro-Western and pro-Eastern policies”. “The pro-European discourse” in the early years of independence was perceived as “an anti-Russian stance”. Russia tends to see Ukraine as “part of its historical and cultural past”, while the Western world continues to struggle to win Ukraine to its side. In 1991, Ukraine joined “the Commonwealth of Independent States”, which included “Belarus and the Russian Federation”, and tended to move closer to the East, while “in 1994 it joined the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and in 1995 the Council of Europe, in 1996 the Central European Initiative, and from the mid-1990s onwards the European Union (EU), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” (Åslund, 2009, p. 62).

Ukraine signed “the Lisbon Protocol” on 23 May 1992, joining “the START I Treaty” and a joint treaty with the United States and Russia. With this decision, Ukraine has taken the first step in the process of “rapprochement with the USA and NATO” by registering its independence from Russia (Büyükkakıncı, 2004, p. 410). In this context, Ukraine joined NATO's “Partnership for Peace Initiative” in 1994. In the same year, “the EU Joint Strategy Document on Ukraine” was published (Denys & Maksymenko, 2012, p. 14), emphasizing the importance of Ukraine to the EU. Ukraine also joined “the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)” in 1994.

Table 12: Comparative ideal type models of Eastern and Western Ukraine

Features	East	West
Spoken Language	Russian	Ukrainian
Religion	Orthodox	Catholic
Economic Profile	Industry	Agriculture
Geopolitical Preference	Pro-Russian, pro-CIS	Pro-European, pro-Western
General Assumptions/ Collective Memory	USSR: "legitimate state" Russians: "Slavic brothers"	USSR: "occupier" Russians "enemy"
Ethnic Composition	Ukraine-Russia	Ukraine
Urbanisation	High	Low
Population Density	High	Low
Political Tendency	Communism or liberalism	Liberalism - Radical or moderate nationalism

Resource: (Rodgers, 2006, p. 158)

As seen in Table 12, Ukraine is politically divided into “Eastern and Western regions”. This division not only makes “Ukraine a target for imperial powers” but also foreshadows internal conflicts within its borders” and “wars with neighboring countries on a wider scale”. The western part of Ukraine is demographically “Ukrainian-speaking and embraces Western values”, while the eastern part is “Russian-speaking and identifies with Russia through historical and cultural ties”.

2.8. Historical Development of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

The historical development of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis is analyzed under six sub-headings: “Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovich, Petro Poroshenko, and Volodymyr Zelenski periods”. Finally, “the current developments of the Russia-Ukraine crisis” will be analyzed in detail in this section.

2.8.1. Leonid Kravchuk era and nation-building (1991-1994).

Adopting “a multilateral foreign policy”, Ukraine's eastern provinces tend to adopt “a pro-Russian stance”, while the western provinces tend to establish “close relations with the West”. During the 1991 election of “Leonid Kravchuk, the head of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who was elected Ukraine's first president with 61.5 % of the vote”, the clash between Westernist and Eurasianist views was very intense. According to Shumylo (2006, p. 196), this situation has been described as "a gamble that Ukraine is playing between its Eastern and Western neighbors".

Kravchuk's main goal, even before economic and political reforms, was to create “a united Ukrainian nation through a national identity. “Othering” is an important element among the factors that are effective in “the nation-building process” adopted by Kravchuk. “The Russian image” was used as “the other” for the formation of Ukrainian identity. For the purpose of nation-building, Kravchuk first introduced “the Ukrainian flag, the state coat of arms, and the national anthem”, and made arrangements for “Ukrainian to become the official language of the state”. Kravchuk, who supported “the transformation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from Russian domination to an independent structure”, faced “the reaction of the Russian minorities living in the east of Ukraine” due to the nationalist attitudes he exhibited in the steps he took for the construction of national identity (Yekelchuk, 2007, pp. 200-201). During the Kravchuk period, Ukraine, together with “the financial support” it received from the USA, took a number of “military measures” against Russia. To this end, a number of decisions were taken in 1994 on “the limitation of nuclear and strategic weapons” and in 1996 on “the complete removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine's borders” (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 196). Kravchuk, who adopted “pro-EU and pro-US policies”, did not receive the attention he expected from the West between 1991 and 1994, and by 1994, with “Brzezinski emphasizing the geopolitical importance of Ukraine”, the attitude of the West towards Ukraine changed in the opposite direction.

2.8.2. Leonid Kuchma era (1994-2005).

In 1994, the Ukrainian presidential elections were won by “the pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma”. Viktor Yushchenko, who was “prime minister” at the same time, was uncomfortable with Leonid Kuchma's pro-Russian behavior and took an oppositional stance to him and founded “the Our Ukraine Party”. Among the most important developments during the Kuchma period were the introduction of “a national currency system and the adoption of Russian as the second official language of the country”. Kuchma, who claimed that he would adopt “a pro-Russian stance in his pre-election promises”, followed “a policy of balance”, which he called “bilateral politics or multi-vector diplomacy”, as he adopted a foreign policy approach that maintained “close relations with both the West and the East” (Torbakov, 2001, p. 297). In fact, the Kuchma period was a period in which relations with the USA were strengthened, and “pro-Western policies” were adopted by receiving “financial aid from the USA”. Not only that, in 1994 Ukraine joined “the Partnership for Peace Programme” to cooperate with NATO and also applied for “membership of the EU” (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 202). This period also witnessed unfortunate developments in terms of the strengthening of oligarchs and clans such as “Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk” (Heyden, 2015).

Leonid Kuchma was “re-elected president” in the second election held on 14 November 1999 with “56% of the vote”. Kuchma's foreign policy approach is based on establishing “good relations with the European Union” and ensuring “the Europeanisation of Ukraine”. “The Kuchmagate scandal”, also known as “Tapegate”, which broke out in Ukraine on 28 November 2000, alleges that Kuchma committed “the murders of Georgiy Gongadze, a journalist who opposed him” (Kubicek, 2008, p. 159), and several others on tapes released by “socialist leader Aleksandr Moroz in an attempt to break confidence in him” (Kuzio, 2007, pp. 30-56). This crisis, together with the increasing “anti-Kuchma protest movements”, triggered the process leading to “the Orange Revolution”, which would be effective in the following era.

In 2003, during “the demarcation of the Russian-Ukrainian maritime border”, Russia's attempt to “build a barrier on the border” and Ukraine's perception of this attempt as “an attack and threat to border security” caused a crisis. The settlement of the disputes that arose during this crisis has been realized, with “the suspension of the

construction of the border embankment and an agreement on the joint use of the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov”. The decision to establish “a Common Economic Space between Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan” under Leonid Kuchma is considered one of “the pro-Russian developments” (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 212). Just before “the Summit of Heads of State and Government of NATO and Partner Countries”, which took place in Istanbul on 28-29 June 2004, Ukraine's doctrine was to “abandon the goal of becoming a member of the European Union and NATO”, and instead to “seek closer cooperation and rapprochement with Russia” (Kamalov, 2008, p. 76). Subsequently, in 2004, Leonid Kuchma met with Putin in “Yalta and Sochi” and reiterated his firm stance on this issue (Kamalov, 2004, p. 60).

2.8.3. Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko era (2005-2010) and Orange Revolution.

In the September 2004 presidential elections, there was “a bitter struggle between Viktor Yanukovich, who was supported by the former president, “pro-Russian Kuchma, and the east of the country, and Viktor Yushchenko, who was supported by the West and the west of the country”.

Table 13: 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections

Parties	Candidates	First Round	Second Round	Third Round
Our Ukraine	Viktor Yuşçenko	%39,9	%46,7	%51,9
Party of Regions	Viktor Yanukoviç	%39,3	%49,4	%44,2
Socialist Party	Oleksandr Moroz	%5,8	-	-
Communist Party	Petro Symonenko	%5	-	-

Resource: (Kubicek, 2008, p. 170)

As seen in Table 13, four parties participated in the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, and the two candidates with “the highest number of votes, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich”, qualified for the second round of elections (Kubicek, 2008, p. 170). This situation caused the people to take to the streets and “mass mobilization” on the allegations of “irregularities and fraud in the election results”. Since the symbol of the dissidents who took to the streets in the western

regions of Ukraine, especially in Kyiv, was the colour orange, and this process was touted as one of “the colour revolutions”, it was called the “Orange Revolution”.

Following these protests, “the Supreme Court of Ukraine” decided to “annul the victory of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych” and ordered the election to be held again on 26 December 2004. “The PORA Movement” is the civil society organization that played “the most important role in the elections” in Ukraine, influencing the public and ensuring the participation of young people in the political process. In addition, “media outlets, websites, and empowered oligarchs”, in particular “Channel 5, owned by Poroshenko”, are among the important actors managing “the electoral propaganda processes in Ukraine”.

Following the announcement that “opposition leader Yushchenko had been poisoned with dioxin”, a third round of elections was held in 2005 and “Viktor Yushchenko, who advocated NATO and European Union membership”, was elected as “Ukraine's third President with 51.9% of the vote”, and Yulia Tymoshenko was appointed as “Prime Minister” (Kuzio, 2011, p. 88). In order to prevent this violence in Ukraine, “Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy”, tried to “mediate”. As a result of these developments, at “the European Union-Ukraine Summit” held in Kyiv in 2005, the European Parliament accepted “Ukraine's potential membership proposal to the EU for further consideration” (Milczarek, 2007, pp. 9-26).


During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, who received votes from “ethnic Ukrainian nationalists” in western Ukraine who saw “EU membership as a strategic goal”, Ukraine pursued “a European and Western-centred foreign policy”. In this period, “EU and NATO membership” was set as the most important foreign policy goal (Malek, 2009, p. 516). Instead of bringing “order and stability”, the Yushchenko era opened the door to a very complex process that led to “Ukraine's civil war and, with the involvement of the great powers”, to “a further escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis”. In addition, economic setbacks such as “increased unemployment and budget deficit” due to the impact of “the global economic crisis in 2008” and “Russia's interventions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” with the outbreak of the Georgian-Russian War were also experienced under Yushchenko. These

developments show that “the Euro-Atlantic alliance” established with the Orange Revolution has failed.

2.8.4. Viktor Yanukovych era (2010-2014) and Euromaidan Crisis.

The 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine witnessed “a rivalry between Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the Party of Regions, which favored pro-Russian policies, and Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of the Fatherland Bloc, which favored pro-Western policies”. Yanukovych has promised “pro-Russian policies” ranging from “the adoption of Russian as the second official language” to “the recognition of the identity of South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. In contrast to Yanukovych, Tymoshenko advocated pro-Western policies that “*no language other than Ukrainian was acceptable*” and that “*Russian bases should be withdrawn from Crimea*” (Akdemir, 2014, p. 70).

Figure 16: Presidential Elections in Ukraine in 2010



Resource: (CNN, 2014)

As seen in Figure 16, Yanukovych, who “abandoned pro-Western policies”, won the elections and Ukraine returned to “a pro-Russian trajectory”. During Yanukovych's presidency, Ukraine began to distance itself from the EU by “renouncing the Association Agreement with the EU”, which it had signed in 2013,

and also expressed its “opposition to Ukraine's NATO membership” (Kubicek, 2008, pp. 174-177). In addition, he transferred “11 deputies from the Our Ukraine Party” to his own party in order to be able to enact the decisions vetoed by Yushchenko in the parliament. Yushchenko, on the other hand, decided to hold “early elections” due to his discomfort with this issue. As a consequence of the political instability as a consequence of successive coalition governments, “pro-EU popular movements” started in Ukraine in 2013, leading to the “Maidan Crisis”, also known as “Euromaidan”.

Table 14: Comparative Assessment of the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan Crisis

	Orange Revolution	Euromaidan Crisis
President	Viktor Yushchenko	Viktor Yanukovich
Duration	November 2004-January 2005	September 2013-February 2014
Location	Freedom Square	Freedom Square
Participants	Opposition Parties and their supporters (western Ukraine, Crimeans, NGOs, and student groups)	Western Ukraine, Crimeans, NGOs, and student groups
Reasons	EU supporters' reaction to the election results and the Kuchma administration	Pro-EU reaction to Yanukovich's refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, as he pursued pro-Russian policies
Results	<i>Peaceful Conclusion:</i> Opposition Party wins elections and Yushchenko becomes prime minister	<i>Confrontational Conclusion:</i> Change of government and president, end of Tymoshenko's detention, signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, declaration of the republic by the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, the beginning of clashes between Ukraine and the separatists, and annexation of Crimea by Russia.

Resource: (Köroğlu, 2015, p. 45)

In Table 14, the Orange Revolution under “Viktor Yushchenko and the Euromaidan Crisis under Viktor Yanukovych” are analyzed by the comparative analysis method. As a consequence of the analyses, it has been observed that the Orange Revolution was “peaceful”, with “the Opposition Party winning the elections and Yushchenko becoming prime minister”, while the Euromaidan Crisis evolved into “a confrontational ending” that led to “changes in governance and protests against independence movements by the separatist faction, culminating in Russia's annexation of Crimea” (Köroğlu, 2015, p. 45).

2.8.5. Interim Oleksandr Turchynov period.

On 22 February 2014, after Viktor Yanukovych fled the country, a change of government was made and “an interim government” was formed to remain in office until the presidential elections of 25 May 2014, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk was appointed as “the prime minister” and Oleksandr Turchynov was appointed as “the head of this government”. Since this interim government headed by Turchynov pursued “pro-Western policies”, Russian supporters characterized this process as “a coup d'état” (Çomak & Şeker, 2018, p. 155). On 21 March 2014, when Putin announced “the annexation of Crimea to Russia”, Turchynov responded by signing “the Eastern Partnership Treaty with the EU”.

2.8.5.1. *Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea.*

“NATO and the European Union's interference in Ukraine's internal affairs” necessitated Russia's intervention in Ukraine, which is included in “the area of responsibility” that Russia has defined as its “immediate neighborhood”. After Crimea acquired “the status of an autonomous part of Ukraine” by exercising its right to “self-determination with its own constitution and president” in April 1993 (Gürseler, 2014, p. 88), on 27 February, Russia landed in Crimea, its “gateway to the Mediterranean Sea with an important historical and cultural connection”, and “de facto” occupied this region. In the referendum held on 16 March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were “transferred from the Ukrainian administration to the Russian Federation with 82% participation and 96.8%

of the votes” (Derman & Ongarova, 2014, p. 11). This referendum was characterized by Russian sources as “the end of the unipolar world”. The then “NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen”, did “not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea” and took action against the Russian threat, implementing “Cohesion Measures under the name of the Readiness Action Plan”. If “the annexation of Crimea to Russian territory” is recognized as legitimate by the international community, Russia will have considerably expanded its “exclusive economic zone” in the Black Sea (Keskin, 2015, p. 56).

Figure 17: Map of Crimea




Resource: (Economist, 2014)

As seen in Figure 17, Crimea has a very important geopolitical and geostrategic position for both Russia and Ukraine as “Sevastopol is the control point of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet” (Economist, 2014). “NATO’s expansion towards the Black Sea, including Ukraine and Georgia as a result of its enlargement policies”, is perceived as “a serious threat” to Russia’s national security in its immediate

neighborhood. Ukraine's being caught between Russia and the West has transformed the Ukraine Crisis from a national problem into an international one. During the Ukraine crisis, “a hybrid warfare strategy” was applied with new methods such as “information warfare, propaganda, cyber warfare, proxy wars, sabotage, and conventional operations, using a combination of traditional and modern techniques” (Aras & Yıldırım, 2022, pp. 499-516).

Figure 18: Russian-speaking regions in Ukraine



Resource: (CNN, 2014)

As seen in Figure 18, the western part of Ukraine is mostly inhabited by “Ukrainian-speaking pro-EU nationalist Ukrainians”, while eastern Ukraine is inhabited by “a Russian-speaking Russian minority or so-called external Russians who identify themselves as Russians” (CNN, 2014).

To summarise, Russian-speaking foreign Russians played a major role in “Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014” and the Russian control of the region. It is possible to talk about “a Russia that realized its strategic and political goals in terms of weakening the relations between Ukraine and NATO as a result of Russia's intervention in Crimea”, which it described as “Russia's red line in the Black Sea”, and took revenge for the Orange Revolution. Due to “Ukraine's historical and cultural ties with Russia”, Russia cannot remain indifferent to the ongoing Ukrainian crisis.

2.8.5.2. *Russian Federation's intervention in Donbas.*

Russia used “hybrid warfare”, one of “the new-generation warfare techniques”, during the Donbas intervention (Özdemir & Eminoğlu, 2022). Donbas, which “has a land border with Russia and is located in the east of Ukraine”, is a region that is “prone to separatist movements” as 58.3% of its citizens are of “Russian origin”. The Donbas crisis, which started on 6 April 2014 in line with “the demands of the people in the Donbas region, including Lugansk with its capital Donetsk, to grant them cultural and administrative autonomy within Ukraine”, turned into “a growing regional crisis between Russia and Ukraine” after Russia supported these people.

Figure 19: Map of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics



Resource: (Aljazeera Turk, 2014)

In the referendum held on 11 May 2014, “the Donetsk People's Republic under the leadership of Aleksandr Zakharchenko and the Luhansk People's Republic under the leadership of Igor Plotnitsky” was established with 90% of the votes. The location of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics on the map can be seen in Figure 19 (Aljazeera Turk, 2014). On 24 May 2014, these two states were merged and a single confederal structure, “New Russia, called Novorossiia”, representing “the southeast of Ukraine”, was established (Uyaniker H. B., 2018, pp. 151-152)

On 17 July 2014, Russia was held responsible for “the crash of a Malaysia Airlines plane in Donbas”. Russia responded to these allegations as “a conspiracy by Ukraine”. Due to these allegations, “a number of sanctions” were imposed against Russia. On 31 July 2014, “MINSK I” peace talks were held with the participation of “Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, DPR, and LPR”, and on 12 February 2015, “MINSK II” peace talks were held with the participation of “Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany”, known as “the Normandy Format” (Koçak, 2015, pp. 20-21). On 1 October 2019, Ukrainian President Zelenski proposed granting “autonomy to the Donbas region” through “the Steinmeier Formula”, which will be explained in detail in the next section, but this statement was met with a reaction by “Ukrainian nationalists”. While “Russia's annexation of Crimea” was successful, its “intervention in the Donbas” is still far from conclusive.

2.8.6. Petro Poroshenko era (2014- 2019).

On 22 February 2014, after Viktor Yanukovych was “removed from power by the parliament and fled from Ukraine to Russia” and after the Euromaidan Crisis caused by “the anti-government protests in Kyiv”, a change of power took place in Ukraine in order to establish “a pro-Western government” and as a consequence of this event, the Ukrainian Crisis grew in intensity. Yanukovych, who pursued “pro-Russian policies”, was ousted after “the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv”, and Petro Poroshenko, who was in favor of “pro-Western policies”, took power in the presidential elections held on 25 May 2014. While pro-Russian sectors in Ukraine saw these developments as “a coup attempt”, Western supporters characterized them as “a justified resistance and freedom movement” (Shekhovtsov, 2013, p. 731). A number of regulations have been introduced, ranging from “the introduction of Ukrainian as the state language” to “the sale of Russian books and films and the prohibition of Russian speech in some areas, such as the education system and the service sector”. A series of regulations on “the introduction of compulsory Ukrainian in the media and in education” have been established.

Poroshenko, who rapidly started to implement “pro-Western policies”, first activated “the Association Agreement”, which had been suspended in previous periods, and with the support of Putin, Russian separatists living in Ukraine started to “riot in cities such as Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkiv, and Odesa”, and these riots turned into “violent clashes” over time. As a result of “political and economic instability”, Poroshenko was forced to sign “a ceasefire with separatist groups in Minsk, the capital of Belarus”.

2.8.7. Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelensky era (2019-....).

In 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky, “a comedian who emphasized his image as a man of the people as President of Ukraine”, was elected in the second round with 72.48% of the vote, far more than Poroshenko's 25.20%. Also during this period, Zelensky signed an agreement, the so-called “Steinmeier Formula”, to “end the conflicts with the pro-Russian sectors living in the east of Ukraine”. This formula, which aims at “the autonomy of Donbas”, is in fact coordinated by “Germany and France”. In addition, Zelensky has included in Ukraine's plans for the future the goal of increasing “Ukraine's trade relations with Poland” and holding “a referendum on NATO membership” (Khudyakova, 2019).

In May 2020, Zelensky signed a decree on “Ukraine's NATO membership”, publishing “an Annual National Programme” on this issue. However, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that “*NATO will provide Ukraine with all kinds of support, financial and military, for the reforms it needs to carry out in order to be included in the alliance*” (Stoltenberg, 2020). In 2007, the education law passed in Ukraine restricted the use of minority languages in education, which disturbed “Hungarian minorities”, and Hungary took “an opposing stance on Ukraine's EU membership” (Kovalenko & Kiseleva, 2020). Therefore, on 29 May 2020, “Ukrainian Foreign Ministers Dmytro Kuleba and Peter Siyarto” traveled to Hungary with the aim of improving Ukraine's trade and investment relations with the EU. Since these meetings did not produce a solution, but rather led to insolvency, “the pro-Western policies pursued by Zelensky” caused the crisis between Russia and Ukraine to deepen and evolve into a war.

2.8.7.1. *Current developments in the Russia-Ukraine crisis.*

On 24 February 2022, the process leading to the Russia-Ukraine War, which started with “Russia's aggression against Ukraine”, can be started chronologically from “the Euromaidan Crisis between November 2013 and February 2014, when pro-Western demonstrations and popular movements increased”. By February 2014, these protests by the pro-EU and pro-Western sectors of Ukraine were suppressed and the process ended with “the change of power in Ukraine when the then-president Yanukovich fled to Russia”. In February-March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and annexed it to Russian territory, and subsequently, in September 2014, in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, “pro-Russian separatists” expressed their demands for “the declaration of a people's republic in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”.

Following the ceasefire signed in February 2015, “Ukraine's request to join NATO” was put to “a vote in the Ukrainian parliament in June 2017. In September 2020, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that “*Ukraine's accession to NATO was among its strategic goals*”, and in March-April 2021, the Kremlin began deploying “Russian troops” to the Ukrainian border. In June 2021, talks between the United States and Russia in “Geneva” failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

In December 2021, Russia demanded “a promise from Ukraine to withdraw its request for NATO membership, which would guarantee its security”. After failing to get a favorable response from Ukraine on this issue, Russia increased the number of its troops on the Ukrainian border to “100 thousand”. In January and February 2022, talks between Western and Russian senior officials and diplomats to resolve the conflict failed. On 2 February 2022, military units were reinforced in support of “the US and NATO member bases in Eastern Europe”. On 10 February 2022, Russia, taking Belarus with it, carried out “a joint exercise” in a region very close to the Ukrainian border before the attack. Following this exercise, on 21 February 2022, “the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Noll, 2022) was recognized by Russia and “an order” was issued for the entry of Russian troops into those regions.

In the aftermath of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, “European security and Germany's role in ensuring this security” have been discussed, while “Sweden and Finland's NATO memberships” have been on the agenda. With “the accession of Finland to NATO” on 4 April 2023, which was seen as “an unexpected development for Russia”, another step was taken toward “NATO's expansion”. Turkey, on the other hand, preferred to pursue “a policy of balance between Russia and Ukraine” in this war and assumed “the role of mediator” in “the Antalya Diplomacy Forum” held on 11-13 March 2022 with the participation of the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Russia.

With the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, which escalated with the Russian army's attacks on Ukraine, the war between Russia and Ukraine has different aspects of “hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, and proxy war” (Karasoy, 2022, p. 45). It is possible to explain “the hybrid war characteristics” of the Russia-Ukraine War (Çelikaslan, 2022, p. 62) by the fact that it includes methods such as “the combination of unconventional and conventional weapons, cyber-attacks, economic tools, manipulation, and information warfare through the risk of Russia using nuclear warfare and disinformation campaigns about the sinking of the Moskva Ship, and the attempt to change the course of the war by using social media power through deep fake videos of Putin and Zelenski” (Karasoy, 2022, p. 49).

Table 15: Comparative Analysis of the Armed Forces of Russia and Ukraine 2023



Resource: (Guidelinelaw, 2023)


When the numerical data of the armed forces of Russia and Ukraine in 2023 are analyzed in Table 15, it is seen that Russia has “a comparative superiority” in terms of quantity compared to Ukraine, and this table shows that this war has the characteristics of “asymmetric warfare” in terms of the strong side wanting to take advantage of the weaknesses of the opponent (Guidelinelaw, 2023). This is exemplified by the fact that Russia wanted to take advantage of “Ukraine and Europe's natural gas dependence on Russia by starting the war in winter”. Europe and the West have “economic superiority” over Russia and use this economic superiority by imposing “economic sanctions”. In addition, “the military equipment, weapons, food, intelligence, and financial support” that the US and the Western world have provided and continue to provide to Ukraine throughout this war should not be ignored (Debusmann, 2022).

NATO's provision of “cyber security services and training” to Ukrainian soldiers to obtain “intelligence information” for support purposes can also be considered in this context (Foreks, 2022). This situation shows that the Russian-Ukrainian War has the characteristics of “a proxy war”. In this context, while Ukraine is “the proxy actor” in this war, “the main actors” are the Western countries and NATO.

2.9. Geopolitical and Strategic Importance of Ukraine

Located in “the north of the Black Sea”, bordering “Eastern Europe and Russia”, Ukraine, “the second largest country in Europe”, has historically maintained its “geopolitical and strategic importance for both Russia and the Western world”, and with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it is a country that has further increased its importance with its “proximity to energy resources”. It is “the wheat supplier” of both Russia and Ukraine. It is also a very rich industrial country in terms of “underground resources, especially coal”. According to Brzezinski (1998, p. 37), Ukraine is known as “the granary of Europe” thanks to its fertile soil called “chernozem”, which is suitable for agriculture.

Figure 21: Map of Pipelines passing through Ukraine



Resource: (Wikipedia, 2022)

As seen in Figure 21, another strategic importance of Ukraine is that it is “a transit country for transporting more than 90% of Russia's natural gas and oil to Europe through pipelines”. “The Drujba (friendship), Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines transporting Russian and Central Asian oil” are examples in this regard. “The presence of Russia's Black Sea navy, naval and air bases, and strategic waterways in Crimea” is another issue that increases the importance of Ukraine from a military and strategic point of view. Moreover, Ukraine is of great importance to both countries in terms of “ensuring European security”.

According to Brzezinski (2010, pp. 42-43), “Azerbaijan, Georgia, South Korea, Iran, Turkey, South Korea, Iran, and Turkey, as well as Ukraine”, are among the so-called “geopolitical axis countries” that are at risk of being subjected to foreign interventions implemented by global actors in line with their interests. “NATO's expansionist tendency”, which is in “the interest of the Western world”, and Russia's attempt to counter the threat it perceives in its neighborhood, which is in Russia's interest, show the indisputable geopolitical and strategic importance of Ukraine for both sides and the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, which has reached its peak again today, confirms “Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard approach” (Akdemir, 2014, p. 61). According to Brzezinski, the interests of the Western world are based on the idea of “blocking Russia's integrative role” in Eurasia through “the EU's soft power and NATO's policy of eastward expansion”.

2.10. Ukraine's Regional Interests and Relations with Global Powers after the Cold War

With its independence in the post-Cold War era, Ukraine has become a country that attracts the attention of “great powers seeking regional and global interests”. Especially due to the divided structure of Ukraine, “the power struggle and competition between the US-led NATO and Russia” have intensified in this region in recent years. Depending on “the pro-Western or pro-Eastern policy preferences” of the leaders who came to power after Ukraine's independence, the foreign policy approach followed by the country has also changed. In this section, “the relations of NATO and the US, Russia, and the EU with Ukraine” will be analyzed taking into account Ukraine's regional interests.

2.10.1. Ukraine's relations with the NATO and USA.

The US, which wanted to attract Ukraine, which saw the US as its “strategic partner” during the Cold War, to its side, wanted to “reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russia”, especially with “the economic aid” it provided before and after the Orange Revolution. “The US speculator George Soros”, founder of “the Open Society Foundation”, which operates in Ukraine and in many other countries, and his youth organization “PORA” have been financed by “American institutions” (Olçar, 2007, p. 277).

After Brzezinski emphasized the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Ukraine in his work “The Grand Chessboard”, the US pursued “active policies towards Ukraine”. Ukraine has always tended to keep its relations with the US in “balance”, as improving its relations with the US would open the door for Ukraine to “enter NATO and the EU”. The foundations of NATO-Ukraine relations began in 1994 when Ukraine became a member of “the Commonwealth of Independent States” by joining “the Partnership for Peace Programme”.

Subsequently in 1997, “the NATO-Ukraine Commission”, established following “the NATO-Ukraine Charter of Distinctive Partnership”, agreed on “Ukraine's areas of cooperation with NATO”. These areas of cooperation were translated into concrete practice with “the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan” of 2002. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine's relations with NATO, which Ukraine regards as “a strategic partner”, accelerated under Yushchenko, while Ukraine's relations with NATO were suspended under the pro-Russian Yanukovych. During this period, “Ukrainian troops” also supported American interventions in “Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq within NATO”. Especially in the Russia-Ukraine War, which continues today under Zelensky, the US provides “military and financial support to Ukraine”. In this context, Ukraine, which has been “instrumental in NATO's expansion policies” and at the same time used as a pawn of the great powers, is nowadays acting as “a pawn of the USA”.

2.10.2. Ukraine's relations with Russia.

“The decisive leader” in Ukraine's relations with Russia has been Volodomir Putin, who has shown great interest in the countries established after the disintegration of the Soviet Union within the scope of “the near-abroad policy”. Among the countries in Russia's neighborhood, Ukraine is one of the most important countries in terms of “geopolitical and strategic importance”. Ukraine is a significant country for Russia due to its geopolitical position in many aspects such as “transporting Russia's energy resources to Europe, having the Sevastopol navy, and the gateway to the Mediterranean in Crimea”. Moreover, according to Russian nationalists, who see Ukraine as “an artificial state”, “*Ukraine is historically, culturally, and linguistically an integral part of Russia*”. “Kyiv, where they believe the foundations of the Russian Empire” were laid, is today within the borders of Ukraine. For these reasons, Russia does not favor “Ukraine's NATO and European Union membership” and perceives the possibility of membership as “a threat to its immediate neighborhood”.

The Yanukovych period, which was openly financially supported by Putin, who advocated “the Great Russian Nation project”, was a period in which “Russia-Ukraine relations improved and Ukraine distanced itself from the West”. The 2004 Yushchenko era, which came to power after the Orange Revolution, is seen as “the first breaking point in Russia-Ukraine relations”. In this period, Russia used its natural gas resource as “a foreign policy tool” and in this direction, it imposed “natural gas cuts” in Ukraine in 2006 and early 2009, claiming that the Yushchenko administration, which pursued pro-Western policies, did not pay its debts.

Figure 22: Map of the Kerch Strait



Resource: (Milliyet, 2018)


Figure 22 shows another focal point of the disputes between Russia and Ukraine, “the Kerch Strait, which opens to the Black Sea and controls access to and from the Sea of Azov”. The island of Tuzla is “a small island within the borders of Ukraine” and the bridge built by Russia under the Kerch Strait in order to connect to this island is considered by Ukraine as “a violation of sovereignty in violation of international law”. For this reason, the Tuzla Island problem, which caused a dispute between Russia and Ukraine, was temporarily resolved as a result of “an agreement signed on 24 December 2003, which was based on Tuzla Island remaining under Russian sovereignty and Ukraine's freedom to land in the Black Sea using the Kerch Strait”.

2.10.3. Ukraine's relations with the European Union.

Following the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine has sought to establish close relations with the EU based on “common values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” on the basis of “the European Neighbourhood Policy”, which can be described as “the EU's Eastern enlargement”. Covering “16 countries”, this neighborhood policy was extended to “Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Georgia under the Eastern Partnership Project (EaP)”. In this context, a number of documents have been signed, including “the 1998 Treaty of Association and Cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union” (Karaca, 2008, p. 94).

Following the 2004 and 2007 steps towards “the enlargement of the EU”, Ukraine became one of the countries that attracted the EU's attention (Olçar, 2007, p. 262). In 2008, the provisions of these agreements were deepened with the introduction of “free trade and visa-free access”, and a new era of “the EU-Ukraine Partnership” began. In EU-Ukraine relations, Ukraine's reforms for EU membership within the scope of the Europeanisation process, especially after “the Orange Revolution in 2004”, were intensely felt with “the European Neighbourhood Policy document” (Karaca, 2008, p. 94). While Eastern Europe, especially Poland, supports “Ukraine's accession to the EU”, many countries, including Turkey, pursue “a balanced policy between Ukraine and Russia”.

Figure 23: EU-Ukraine Trade Volume



Resource: (Ukrstat, 2020)

As can be seen in “the import and export values between the EU and Ukraine between 2003 and 2009” in Figure 23, Ukraine's trade relations with the European Union intensified after Ukraine joined “the WTO” (Ukrstat, 2020). Ukraine, with the support of the media, support for the EU has been observed, ranging “from democracy promotion to economic cooperation and integration with the EU”, which has accelerated the transition to “a free market economy”. In addition, with “the structural reforms aimed at harmonization with the EU laws”, various arrangements have been made in the Ukrainian legal system for “justice and domestic affairs”, and thus “the Europeanisation process of the Ukrainian courts” has taken place. In addition, “the Sustainable Development Goal”, which was regulated by the EU in 2014, is integrated into “public administration policies” in the document “Ukraine 2020” with “the principles of transparency, professionalism, and efficiency” (Üste, Aydın, & Rasgen, 2020, p. 76). In Ukraine, structural reforms have been made in the direction of Europeanisation in the field of “energy and environment”, taking into account “EU environmental standards”.

3. CHAPTER III THE ROLE OF NATO'S ENLARGEMENT POLICY IN THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CRISIS

The transformed perception of security in the face of “changing threats” after the Cold War, especially during the First and Second World Wars, led to an increase in “the importance of security strategies”, and the task of ensuring “global security” was not only limited to “states”, but over time, “international organizations such as NATO and the UN” also took their place among the main actors that assumed some responsibilities in this regard (Sarinay, 1988, p. 75). Having adopted “democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as the fundamental principles of the organization at its founding” (NATO, 1999, p. 23), NATO transformed its common defense policy through “the New Strategic Concept, which redefined NATO's objectives in Europe” and was published at “the Rome Summit in 1991” to ensure global security.

Table 16: Changes in US National Security Policies

Period	National Security Concept	Events and Movements
Establishment	Defensive Isolation	Monroe Doctrine Manifest Destiny
First World War	Roosevelt: "Speak softly and carry a big stick"	New Deal Wilson Principles
Second World War	Solidarity-based Security	Marshall Plan Yalta Conference
Cold War	Nuclear Deterrence Allianceism Mergerist	Flexible Response Doctrine Containment Policy Eisenhower Doctrine Deterrence Policy
1990s	Besieger	Double Siege Strategy The Threat of Radical Islam Critical Dialogue
11 September and Later	Pre-emptive / Absolute Control / Avenger	Terror Attacks Great Middle East Project
2006 and Later	Soft Power Emphasis on Diplomacy Multilateralism	Nuclear Weaponisation Weapons of Mass Destruction Cyber Security

Resource: (Gündüz & Göçoğlu, 2020, p. 745)

The 11 September attacks caused NATO to “prioritize international terrorism” in its threat perception, and in this context, “military security” gained importance among security types and “NATO's new security strategies” were determined within this framework (Matlary, Janne, 2015, p. 37). In Table 16, “changes in the US National Security Policies and national security understandings” are grouped periodically on the basis of “events and movements” (Gündüz & Göçoğlu, 2020, p. 745).

In this section, “NATO's security strategies during and after the Cold War” will be analyzed through “comparative analysis” based on “changing security approaches”. In this context, based on the reflections of “NATO's transformation on US foreign policy”, “the role of NATO's enlargement policy in the Russia-Ukraine crisis” will be analyzed and discussed in depth.

3.1. NATO's Security Strategies during the Cold War Period

During his years in office during the Cold War, US President Harry Truman took “an active role” in foreign policy and implemented “a containment policy against the USSR”. In 1947, “the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which included aid packages for Greece and Turkey”, came into effect for this purpose. Despite these developments, there was “Communist Party rule in China” and “the USSR's nuclear weapons initiatives”, which included the possibility of building “atomic and hydrogen bombs in response to the USA” (Chomsky, Çakıroğlu, & Birkan, 2020, p. 56). The military-oriented National Security Council adopted “the NSC-68 report prepared by Paul Nitze (1992, p. 29) at the request of US President Harry Truman” with the outbreak of “the Korean War in 1950” (Nelson, 1996, p. 111). This report was seen as “NATO's official strategy during the Cold War at the Lisbon Summit of NATO in 1952” (Sander, 1979, p. 131) and in line with the decisions taken at this summit, which also saw “the accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO”, “political, economic and military structuring, isolation and war” were among the main policies to be followed. In addition, at this summit, “the Limited War Strategy” was adopted in order to “increase the number of troops” (Oran, 2005, pp. 522-542).

Figure 24: Historical Development Waves of Deterrence




Resource: (Biçer, 2022, p. 332)

During the Cold War, one of NATO's strategies that increased its influence in regions outside Europe was “the Nuclear Deterrence Policy” (O’neil, 2011, pp. 1439-1457). Figure 24 shows “the four waves of the historical development of deterrence”, which is the main element of this policy (Biçer, 2022, p. 332). According to Jervis (1979), the nuclear deterrence activities developed during this period occurred in three waves: “the development of nuclear weapons by the United States in 1940, the Soviet attempts to achieve nuclear balance with the first atomic bomb in 1949, and the hydrogen bomb in 1954, followed by the development of Sputnik and Soviet nuclear warhead missiles in 1957, and finally the development of missile defense systems by the US in the 1970s”. When the post-11 September developments are analyzed, with the initiatives of “rising China and Russia's nuclear deterrence policies in the Russia-Ukraine crisis”, this issue has come to the agenda again with the potential to become “the fourth wave” (Jeffrey, 2010, pp. 1-33; Lupovici, 2010, pp. 705-732).

“The National Security Strategy” developed by the USA, which positioned itself as “the superpower of the unipolar world in the new world order” established after WWII, to protect its nuclear weapons superiority and interests against the strengthening USSR, is called “the Grand Strategy”, which focuses on “cooperation with the countries surrounding the USSR”. This strategic approach is in line with “the fear-based, Hobbesian, and realist approach to security against the threat of the USSR” (Kennan, 1946). For this purpose, “international organizations such as NATO,

CENTO, SEATO, and the Balkan Pact” were created based on “cooperation with the countries surrounding the USSR” (Güdül, 2021, p. 292).


Figure 25: American Grand Strategy Diagram



Resource: (Ataç & Çam, 2020, p. 607)

Figure 25 shows the pyramid of “the American Grand Strategy”, which found application in US foreign policy in 1991 (Ataç & Çam, 2020, p. 607). Just below “the Grand Strategy” at the top of the pyramid, “the Stability Strategy”, implemented during “the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations”, includes “the NSC-68 National Security Documents”, which aim to increase nuclear capacity against the threat of the USSR's nuclear build-up. “The Vandenberg Decision in 1948”, which was a kind of measure taken by the state against “the risk of leakage of secret documents in the USA” and which proposed “international cooperation by ending the isolationist policy of the Monroe Doctrine” (Uçarol, 2015, p. 943), is also evaluated at “the Strategy” step in this pyramid.

Figure 26: Elements of the American Grand Strategy



Resource: (Ataç & Çam, 2020, p. 608)

In Figure 26, the elements of “the American Grand Strategy” are categorized into two separate categories: “*material* and *moral*” (Ataç & Çam, 2020, p. 608). The material basis for this strategy can be found in Nicholas Spykman's “Containment Theory of the USSR through the Rimland Theory” and George Kennan (1946)'s “Long Telegram” (Ataç & Çam, 2020, p. 605). According to this approach, Russia will be defeated by the United States in any case, but it is crucial to “be cautious” at all times and to use “the strategy of controlling Eurasia”, which Spykman calls “the Inner Crescent” (Kennan G. F., 1947). The metaphors used as “the spiritual element of the Grand Strategy” adopted by the USA during the Cold War era include “the free world and the American dream discourses”, which were frequently used to specialize the American way of life, including the themes of “democracy, Christianity and western civilization”, the foundations of which were laid by Truman (1947) in a congressional speech.

In “the Eisenhower era”, the concept of “Massive Retaliation Strategy”, which includes “NSC 162 / 2”, found application, while in “the Kennedy era”, this strategic concept was replaced by the concept of “Flexible Response Strategy”, which includes “NSC 5440 / 1”, which will be analyzed in detail in the following sections (Stromseth, 1988, pp. 122-126). Unlike the post-Cold War period, NATO presents strategic visions based on “continuity” rather than “transformation”.

Table 17: NATO's Security Strategies during the Cold War

1949-1962	• Massive Retaliation Strategy
1962-1968	• Flexible Response Strategy
1968-1990	• Advanced Defense Strategy

Resource: Created by the author.

In light of these data, in this section, NATO's foreign policy strategies adopted after “the Deterrence Strategy of 6 January 1950 and the Strategy for the Establishment of Integrated Forces of 3 December 1952” and the change of NATO's security strategies in the Cold War period will be examined under three headings, namely “*the Massive Retaliation Strategy* applied between 1949 and 1962, *the Flexible Response Strategy* covering the period between 1962 and 1968, and *the Advanced Defence Strategy*, which was implemented between 1968 and 1990”, as seen in Table 17.

3.1.1. NATO's massive retaliation strategy (1949-1962).

Following “the NSC-68 report”, which was accepted as “NATO's official strategy”, “the US National Security Council (NSC)”, on the recommendation of Arthur Radford in 1953, implemented “the NSC-162 / 2 report”, which had a major impact on the determination of “the United States Middle East Policy” (Gül, 2015, p. 255). Following this development, it was decided to use “the deterrent power of nuclear defense” in line with “the massive retaliation strategy” adopted at the NATO Council in 1954, and the decisions were put into practice that NATO member states would carry out “total defense” against all threats from the USSR through “sea and air power” and would “respond massively with nuclear weapons”.

On 4 October 1957, with “the USSR's launch of Sputnik into space” (Selahattin, 1974, p. 75) and the possibility of the USSR possessing “an Inter-Continental Long-Range Guided Missile (ICBM)”, the view that the USSR had “lost its former superiority in nuclear weapons” and was “vulnerable to missile threats” became widespread (Healey, 1958, p. 145). This is shown as a development that necessitated the introduction of “the massive retaliation strategy” between 1949 and 1962, which included the possibility of “the total use of nuclear weapons” in any operation if deemed necessary, in order to prevent the expansionism of the USSR. This strategy, also known as “Eisenhower's Doctrine of Hard Power”, was implemented by NATO countries as “a strategy against the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War”.

One of the strategies implemented during the Cold War was “the First Use Strategy”, which emerged in the early 1960s. This strategy implies that when all other means have been exhausted, NATO will be “the first to use nuclear weapons” to protect the member states of the alliance, even if “the enemy force has not used nuclear weapons”. In contrast to NATO, the USSR adopted a political stance by declaring that it adopted “the No-First-Use Strategy” and expected NATO to take a decision in this direction (Kibaroğlu, 2019, p. 35).

3.1.2. NATO's flexible response strategy (1962-1968).

The competition between the USA and the USSR for “first-strike superiority” led to “the Cuban Crisis” in 1962, and in “the post-crisis détente period” of 1963, “a communication network” was established between Washington and Moscow, known as “the Hot Line Agreement or the Red Telephone”. In 1957, the launch of Sputnik I into space by the USSR shattered the belief in “the superiority of the USA in terms of nuclear weapons” and NATO felt the need to change its security strategy.

“The Harmel Report”, which emerged to “reorganize NATO's strategy” in a period of a re-escalation of nuclear rivalry, brought “the gradual limitation of nuclear weapons” and “the Flexible Response Strategy” to the agenda, with the preference for “tactical nuclear weapons or conventional weapons” when deemed necessary to reduce the risk of nuclear war (Özlük & Özlük, 2014, p. 210). The replacement of “the massive retaliation strategy” with “the flexible response strategy” means that “*nuclear deterrence is somewhat reduced*”. In addition, “the US Agency for International Development (USAID)” was established under “the Flexible Response Doctrine” (Neumann, 2018). The main difference between this strategy and mass defense is the decision to respond in the event of an attack not only with nuclear weapons but also by taking into account “the enemy's preferred tactics of attack”.

3.1.3. NATO's advanced defense strategy (1968-1990).

Following “the SALT I Agreement signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev” on 26 May 1972 to limit strategic weapons as a result of “the Helsinki Conference, the Helsinki Final Act”, which aimed to ensure European security and led to “the establishment of the CSCE”, was signed on 1 August 1975 with the participation of “35 countries” in Europe. “The European Group within NATO” also serves this purpose.

“Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”, signed in 1983 between “USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan”, was an important step towards “the abolition of medium-range missiles”. In 1985, with “the election of Gorbachev as the President of the USSR”, “the Restructuring Process” started in the USSR. With “Gorbachev's Restructuring Reforms”, “the Advanced Defense Strategy”

has been implemented as “NATO's new strategy” in US foreign policy since the 1980s, in addition to the strategies used in previous periods. In line with “Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika”, which he characterized as “transparency”, it was deemed necessary to carry out “reforms in Eastern Europe” to keep pace with the requirements of the age. As a result of these developments, the basic building blocks of the process leading to “the dissolution of the USSR in 1991” and “the globalization process” were laid with “the unification of West and East Germany with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989” and the colour revolutions such as “the Velvet Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004”.

3.2. Reflections of the Changing Understanding of Security and Threat Perceptions after the Cold War on NATO Strategies

One of the most fundamental issues debated in the post-Cold War era is “the question of NATO's continued existence and purpose, even after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the disappearance of the threat of the USSR”. Contrary to the widespread view, NATO has preferred to “undertake new missions” and, instead of disintegrating, has adopted “a policy of enlargement”, aiming for further growth (Güzel, 2009, p. 34).

“NATO's new security strategy”, which emerged with “expanded security concepts” in the globalization environment of the post-Cold War period, was shaped around “new strategic transformations” in order to adapt to “the changing balance of power and new threats posed by asymmetric forces” within the framework of “more fundamental changes” rather than the approach based on the continuity of the Cold War period as a consequence of the decisions taken at “the NATO Rome Summit” in 1991. NATO's most fundamental strategic transformation during this period was the introduction of the concept of “out-of-area intervention”. In this context, similar to “the UN's Third and Fourth Generation Missions”, NATO has begun to assume “the right and responsibility to intervene militarily” when necessary to “end conflicts and ensure global peace”. However, NATO, which also undertakes “the mission of bringing democracy”, intervenes militarily in order to “create a democratic system and an institutional infrastructure suitable” for this system, and then applies “a holistic

or comprehensive security approach through humanitarian aid” in these countries (Gül, 2015, p. 258).

The new security approach in “the US National Security Strategy,” which was announced in 2002 following the 11 September attacks after the Cold War, is shaped around “the Bush Doctrine”, which includes the "New World Order" and "Greater Black Sea discourse" developed by George Bush. This doctrine includes “taking measures against weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, guaranteeing politic and economic freedoms, and acting together with allied countries in cases of conflict” (Bush G. , 2002). After 11 September, “the strategies of prevention, deterrence, and containment” were abandoned in the US foreign policy and “the Pre-emption Strategy" started to be implemented.

“The Gulf War” was “NATO's first military intervention outside the area” and one of the most important security crises of the Bush era. With this war, NATO's new strategy called “the Double Siege Strategy" came into effect during the Bush and Clinton eras, which marginalized “radical Islam”. With these developments, it is possible to speak of a US endeavoring to “gain influence” in the countries in the Middle East, particularly “Iraq, and Iran”, through “regime changes” (Kayar, 2003, p. 197). In later periods, this strategy was replaced by “the Critical Dialogue Strategy" (Uzgel, 2002, p. 246). In addition, “the Counter Defence Initiative" strategy was implemented against the so-called "rogue states", which were marginalized, and these states were tried to “be neutralized”. In addition, the foundations of “the Greater Middle East Project” were laid in this period in line with these US strategies. In addition, after the end of the Cold War, the US did not remain silent on Serbia's efforts to “gain influence over Yugoslavia”, which disintegrated after the dissolution of the USSR, and intervened in these regions through NATO in order to “ensure stability in the Balkans and to turn Russia's influence in this region” in its favor by tackling fundamental problems such as "democratization of Serbia through reforms, stability of Kosovo and resolution of ethnic issues in Macedonia" (Uğrasız, 2004, pp. 295-303).

3.3. The Transformation of NATO

NATO's new strategic principles, the basic building blocks of “NATO's transformation”, were first set out at NATO's “London Summit” in July 1990. As a result of changing security approaches after the Cold War, NATO assumed new tasks to “ensure Euro-Atlantic security”, including “Russia and Ukraine”, at “the Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991”.

In addition, “the first Strategic Concept” was determined in the context of the identification of four main tasks in line with “the common defense force” created to resolve current crises based on “NATO's objectives” (Gül, 2015, p. 257). The first of these tasks is to build “a secure and stable international space”, free from “coercion and oppression” between countries through “the spread of democracy”. Another is the task of “creating a transatlantic forum”, also enshrined in NATO's fourth article. The third task is to “defend the rights of NATO member states and to counter aggression and threats”. Finally, it is emphasized that NATO should pursue “a policy of strategic balance” in the context of “European security” (Erhan, 2003, p. 90). In summary, after defining the main characteristics of “NATO's transformation”, this strategic concept emphasizes that there are no longer any threats to the center and that “new security threats, such as threats to energy security”, have emerged in the new era. Instead of “the Flexible Response Strategy and the Advanced Defence Strategy” adopted in the late Cold War period, “the Reduced Forward Presence Strategy” has found application in United States foreign policy and a change has been made in terms of “reducing NATO forces quantitatively but increasing their operational capacities” (Goldstein, 1994, p. 11).

In NATO's new mission with the transformation of NATO, the realization of “restructuring in many international political, economic, and strategic areas outside the NATO alliance beyond the geographical borders” has become one of the main objectives of the organization. Moreover, at “the Washington Summit in 1999”, “NATO's 50th anniversary”, the importance of including new countries into the alliance as a result of “NATO's enlargement policy, disarmament, and preventive diplomacy” was emphasized as “NATO's new strategic mission”.

In this context, with “the transformation of NATO”, NATO has adopted” a more flexible and inclusive vision” than its previous vision. New threats that emerged after the Cold War, such as “international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational crimes”, have begun to be assessed under “Articles 5 and 6 of NATO”. In addition, NATO is granted “the right to intervene militarily” in times of crisis without a UN resolution in “Article 5 under the heading Crisis Intervention Operations”. NATO (1991) has also been assigned “a peacekeeping mission” through “the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)” under the name of “crisis management”.

In 2003, “the NATO Public Diplomacy Division” was established for crisis management as “a soft power element of NATO” (Oktay, 2012, p. 126). Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, “a Joint Action Plan and a Military Concept” were defined at “the Prague Summit in November 2002, and on 28-29 June 2004”, NATO’s global role was clarified with the establishment of “the Enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue and the Gulf Cooperation Council following the NATO Istanbul Summit”, transforming NATO into “an international counter-terrorism organization” (Aybet, 2004). As a result of 21st-century technological developments, new strategic changes have occurred in “cyberspace”, NATO’s new area of interest for “ensuring cyber security” (Polat, 2020, pp. 135-158).

Table 18: The Transformation of NATO (1949-1999)

	1949-1962	1963-1969	1970-1984	1985-1999
Change / Status Quo	Transformation	Transformation	Status Quo	Transformation
Global Causes of Organisational Change	Korean War (Political and military threat perception)	Cuba Crisis (Soviet development of nuclear and missile technology)	No change has taken place.	Collapse of the USSR (System change)
Regional Causes of Organisational Change	Prioritisation of economic development in Europe	Geographical proximity of Europe to the Soviet threat	The emergence of European security and the preservation of the status quo	Renewal of the European security system
NATO's Instruments	Massive Response	Flexible Response	Flexible Response	Strategic Concept and Expansion
NATO's Objectives	Soviet threat and German power	Soviet threat, German power and détente	Soviet threat, German power and détente	Russian power, German power and non-conventional threats

Resource: (Doğan N. , 2005, p. 101)

As can be seen in Table 18, “the North Atlantic alliance” has transformed into a much broader organizational structure covering “the Euro-Atlantic region” with the change in the organizational values of NATO between 1949 and 1999. It is clear from the table that with the disappearance of these main threats, to make way for “the creation of NATO against the Soviet and German threats”, a number of changes have occurred in “NATO's objectives, instruments, and strategies” (Doğan N. , 2005, p. 101).

3.3.1. New Strategic Concept.

With “the transformation of NATO”, the inadequacy of “the Strategic Concept” adopted at “the Rome Summit” in 1992 was identified and “the Washington Summit”, which took place in April 1999 on “the 50th anniversary of NATO's” founding, announced “the New Strategic Concept”, restructuring the old concept with an emphasis on “the importance of globalization”. The main objective of this new strategic concept is to “ensure the political security and stability of NATO member states”. In this new concept, as in the previous Strategic Concept, the importance of concepts such as “multidimensionality, defense, preventive diplomacy, crisis management, and deterrence” was emphasized, and “NATO's peacekeeping mission and the aim of eastward expansion” were emphasized (Purtaş, 2005, p. 10). According to this concept, NATO's main tasks are “to ensure Euro-Atlantic security, to provide a transatlantic forum for consultation, and to defend NATO member states against aggression through deterrence” (Gürkaynak, 2005, p. 12).

“NATO's area of responsibility” has expanded due to the perception of “a transatlantic threat” from non-state actors in “the New Strategic Concept”, and “the hybrid warfare strategy” has gained importance in US foreign policy. Moreover, according to this concept, the way to ensure regional security and stability is “to be prepared for any kind of crisis management and to build partnerships that foster cooperation” (Gürkaynak, 2005, p. 12). The main difference between this concept from the other concept is “the provision that interventions” can be made in crises other than “Article 5”, even in the absence of an attack, in order to “expand the scope of NATO's interventions”. This regulation is important in terms of “the legal legitimization of out-of-field interventions”. In this context, NATO no longer requires a country to “be a member of NATO” as a precondition for “NATO to intervene”. As

a result of these developments, it was decided to establish “the Defence Capabilities Initiative”, which has “the ability to rapidly intervene” in moments of crisis outside the borders of NATO member states. Another innovation that came with this concept was “the establishment of a national missile system” to protect against “rogue states” that oppose the United States, such as “Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea”. Among the primary objectives of this concept is “the expansion of NATO”, which has become “a global security organization”.

3.3.2. Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP).

One of “the preventive diplomacy programs” that have contributed to the development of NATO's relations with the countries of “the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, in particular the former USSR and Warsaw Pact members”, is “the Partnership for Peace Programme”, which was launched at “the North Atlantic Cooperation Council Summit in January 1994” and is a key element of “Atlantic and European security” (Koçer, 2007, p. 204). Through this programme, the primary objective is “to improve the political dialogue of these countries with NATO and to integrate them into the Western bloc”. In addition to this programme, “the Combined Joint Task Force”, which serves the same objective, was “unanimously approved by the NACC” at its summit in Brussels.

In 1994, “Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia” joined “the Partnership for Peace Programme”, followed in 1998 by the establishment of “the NATO-Russia Permanent Partnership Council” to counter Russian power as “an obstacle to NATO's enlargement”. Within this programme, “NATO's expansion, especially towards the Black Sea”, was targeted. In this context, “Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, and Estonia” joined the NATO alliance in May 2004, and “Croatia and Albania” in 2009 (Akdemir, 2014, p. 5). Moreover, following this expansion, “Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan” were likely to join the alliance. To this end, “the Madrid Summit” was signed by “Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic” with accession protocols in July 1997 and “the Washington Summit” in 1999 led to their “full membership” (NATO, 2001). This summit aimed to “transform NATO into a much stronger and more operational organization”.

NATO aims to ensure that “the countries participating in this programme modernize their defense systems through cooperation with NATO and the West, ensure border security and arms control, and be prepared for crisis situations such as disasters” (Özkan G. , 2010, p. 116). After “9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan”, the focus of this programme shifted to “the Caucasus and Central Asian countries”, which are of “strategic importance” to NATO. To this end, “joint exercises” have been organized in Central Asia, involving NATO member states, with the central liaison office in Brussels.

3.3.3. NATO summits after the Cold War.

Following “the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe” declaring the end of the Cold War and “the London Summit” in 1991, “the Rome Summit” was organized to define NATO's new strategy”. At this summit, “the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)”, later renamed “the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)”, was convened and the task of "democratizing the former Soviet states" was assigned to NATO on the basis of “preventive diplomacy”. In 1994, “NATO's Brussels Summit” established “the Partnership for Peace Programme”, which accelerated “NATO's expansion to the East up to the Russian borders”.

In 1997, following “the NATO Paris Summit”, a foreign policy transformation towards “an Open Door Policy” (Asmus, 2002, p. 105) took place with “the Madrid Summit”. With this summit, “NATO's relations with Russia” were regulated and its “expansion moves” gained momentum. With “the 1999 Washington Summit”, “the New Strategic Concept” was adopted, “crisis management” gained importance and a new era called "New NATO" began. Immediately after this summit, within the framework of “NATO's enlargement policy”, "The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary" became members of NATO. “The 2001 NATO Headquarters Summit” was organized as a special meeting in Brussels.

In 2002, following “the Rome Summit”, “the Prague Summit” legitimized “NATO interventions” with the adoption of the concepts of “preventive war and extraterritoriality”. In addition, with this summit, “NATO Emergency Response Force” was established within the scope of “the measures taken against global terrorism”. On 28-30 June 2004, “the Istanbul Summit” took place, where “Turkey hosted a NATO summit for the first time” (Uzgel İ. , 2004) and “the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)” was established. In 2005, NATO's twentieth summit took place in Brussels, and “the Riga Summit” in 2006 was the first summit to address “energy security” as a separate topic. At “the 2008 Bucharest Summit”, this topic was expanded and a report on the role of the organization in “energy security” was prepared. The footsteps of “the new strategic concept” to be prepared a year later were heard at “the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit” in 2009.

At “the 2010 Lisbon Summit”, NATO expanded “NATO's areas of intervention” with its new strategic concept defined as "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" for the fight against “terrorism”. In addition, with this concept, “cyber threats” have also been included in threat perceptions, thus emphasizing “the global role of the alliance, which has nuclear power” (NATO, 2010). “The 2012 Chicago Summit” took its place in the literature as “the Counter-Terrorism Concept" with NATO's efforts to raise “awareness on intelligence”, and with this summit, work on “the Missile Defence System”, especially “the smart defense initiative”, was initiated based on a security approach based on “cooperation and crisis management” (Başbaşlıoğlu, 2016, p. 217).

“The Wales Summit”, which took place on 04-05 September 2014, was convened during “the ongoing Russia-Ukraine Crisis”, which is the subject of this study. In this congress, it was stated that “*Russia was pursuing an aggressive foreign policy*”, and due to the increase in multidimensional threats to NATO's security, two separate plans consisting of "Adaptation and Assurance Measures" were prepared for NATO member countries within the scope of “the Readiness Action Plan (RAP)” (NATO, 2014). This plan, which focuses on “conventional wars”, is important in terms of laying the foundations of “the New NATO”. The most discussed issue during this summit was “the Russia-Ukraine Crisis”. In this crisis, “*NATO supported Ukraine and recognized Russia's annexation of Crimea as illegitimate and illegal*”. At “the

North Atlantic Council meeting” in 2015, the new NATO adopted a "Strategy for Combating Hybrid Warfare" to counter the Russian threat (Oğuz, 2016, p. 208).

After “the Warsaw Summit” on 8-9 July 2016 and “the Brussels Summit” on 25 May 2017, international efforts to combat terrorist acts have been limited to the fight against “the terrorist organization ISIS”, and the fight against “DAESH and PYD/YPG terrorist organizations” has been ignored (Ekşi, 2017, p. 58). In 2017 and 2018, NATO Summits were held in “Brussels”. Subsequently, at NATO's “London Summit” held in 2019, *"Russia was seen as the new enemy image, while China was seen as the new rival"* (Cook, 2022).

On 14 June 2021, “NATO's Brussels Summit” took place, and on 30 June 2022, NATO's last summit to date took place in Madrid. At this summit, “the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010” (Herszenhorn, 2022) was abandoned in favor of “the 2022 Strategic Concept” (NATO), which sees “Russia as a long-term direct security threat to NATO member states and China as a systematic competitor” (Amento, 2022).

With “the re-ignition of the Russia-Ukraine crisis” on 24 February 2022, “Finland and Sweden's NATO membership” was brought to the agenda at this summit within the framework of “NATO's enlargement policies”, and the NATO Summit to be held in 2023 is planned to be held in “Lithuania” on “11-12 July 2023” (Reuters, 2022).

3.4. NATO's Enlargement Policy

NATO's post-Cold War enlargement policy is based on three different perspectives: *“the Open Doors Policy, enlargement in direct proportion to the growth of the alliance, and a policy of limited enlargement”* (Adanmış, 2018, p. 102). It is possible to analyze the expansion phases of NATO, which has “12 founding members”, namely "The USA, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom", since 1949 as “nine expansion waves”.

Figure 27: Map of NATO member countries for the years 1949, 1952 and 1955


Founding Members:

(4 April 1949)



First Expansion:

(18 February 1952)



Second Expansion:

(30 May 1955)



Resource: (Eker, 2007, pp. 98-100)

Figure 27 shows the membership map of NATO in 1949, the year of its establishment, followed by the map of NATO member countries in 1952 and 1955, respectively (Eker, 2007, pp. 98-100). As can be seen in this map, “Turkey and Greece joined NATO on 18 February 1952” (Oran, 2005, p. 550), the first of NATO's expansion stops, and “the Federal Republic of Germany” joined the NATO alliance in 1955, the second. The membership of “Turkey and Greece” in NATO guaranteed “NATO's south-eastern border” and prevented the USSR from reaching “the Mediterranean and the Middle East”. The accession of “the Federal Republic of Germany” can be considered an attempt to create “a common Western identity” and this development paved the way for the formation of “the European Union”. In 1982, “Spain” joined the NATO alliance. Following this membership, NATO has further increased its “influence in the Mediterranean”. “Spain's NATO membership” is considered part of NATO's third wave of enlargement.

Table 19: NATO's Expansion Phases

EXPANSION	PARTICIPATION DATE	COUNTRIES
Founding Members	4 April 1949	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, USA
First Expansion	18 February 1952	Greece, Turkey
Second Expansion	9 May 1955	Germany
Third Expansion	30 May 1982	Spain
Fourth Expansion	12 March 1999	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
Fifth Expansion	29 March 2004	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
Sixth Expansion	1 April 2009	Albania, Croatia
Seventh Expansion	5 June 2017	Montenegro
Eighth Expansion	27 March 2020	North Macedonia
Ninth Expansion	4 April 2023	Finland

Resource: Created by the author.


Table 19 shows “the expansion phases of NATO” from its establishment in 1949 to the present day in chronological order, along with the dates of accession of countries to the NATO alliance. With the 1991 establishment of “the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)”, great importance has been attached to the development of relations between NATO and the former USSR and Warsaw Pact member states that disintegrated after the Cold War. As a result of these developments, the Eastern and Central European countries "Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Romania, Latvia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic" applied for NATO membership. As a consequence of the decisions taken at “NATO's Madrid Summit”, the fourth wave of NATO enlargement took place on 12 March 1999, when only three of the countries that had applied for NATO membership – “Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary” - were approved as candidates.

Although the Russian Federation opposed the accession of “Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia “to NATO, “NATO's Prague Summit” finalized the accession of these countries to NATO. In addition to “Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia”, “Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia” joined the alliance on 29 March 2004. As a result of these developments, NATO's fifth wave of enlargement was realized as "the most comprehensive enlargement move" in NATO's history.

NATO's sixth wave of enlargement took place in 2008 with “NATO's Bucharest Summit”, and “the Kehl/Strasbourg Summit” on 1 April 2009 decided to include “Albania and Croatia” in the NATO alliance. In this process, “Georgia's membership” was also a matter of debate, but “the reactions of the Russian Federation” prevented Georgia from becoming a member of NATO.

Another point of contention is Ukraine, which is of “geostrategic and geopolitical importance to NATO”. NATO's efforts to “expand towards Russia's borders” in a way to serve “the global interests of the US” were met with a great reaction by Russia, and for this reason, “the Russia-Ukraine crisis”, which flared up again after 24 February 2022, caused “serious tensions”. Following these developments, “Montenegro” became a member of NATO on 5 June 2017 as the seventh wave of NATO enlargement and “North Macedonia” became a member of NATO on 27 March 2020 as the eighth wave of NATO enlargement.

Figure 28: NATO Map during the Cold War Period



Resource: (Wikimedia Commons, 2020)

As can be seen in the map of “NATO during the Cold War Period” in Figure 28, with NATO's ninth enlargement, the number of members has increased from 12 at the time of NATO's establishment to 31 today with “the accession of Finland to NATO on 4 April 2023”. “Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sweden, Georgia, and Ukraine” are among the countries currently seeking to join NATO (2023). “Sweden” is “an official signatory” to the accession protocol but has not yet joined the alliance (NATO, 2023).

3.4.1. The dynamics of NATO enlargement process.

NATO wants to include the countries of the region in “the Euro-Atlantic bloc” with the purpose of “containment of Russia”. When we look at “the strategic tools” it uses for this purpose, the most basic tool among them is “the tactic of creating a suitable environment for colour revolutions to occur in the countries it wants to include in this bloc and to bring a pro-Western ruler to power and to oust the anti-Western ruler from power”. Another tactic used by NATO in this regard is “to improve relations with the countries in the region and to integrate their economies into the capitalist system and the free market economy by making them pro-Western with US aid”. In addition, “peacemaking and democratization activities” for the countries it wants to incorporate are among the tactics it uses. Moreover, through NATO, “Western values” are disseminated and “the cultural, economic, and political integration” of countries with Western countries is ensured. In addition to these, “the Partnership for Peace Project” is also considered “a strategic tool that serves NATO's expansionist purpose of separating the former Soviet countries from Russia” (Canar, 2012, p. 59).

The dissemination of “the common values of the European Union and the West” throughout the world and “the integration with the West” is an important factor that adds value to “NATO's enlargement policy”. In addition, the perception of “the Russian threat created by the US-Russian polarisation” on the US side and “NATO's Policy of Containment of the USSR”, which aims to prevent the spread of communist ideology, are among the main dynamics of the expansion process, especially in the case of “NATO's Kosovo intervention” (Tuncer, 2020).

3.4.2. Military interventions of the NATO alliances after the Cold War.

NATO, citing its new missions of “peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and counter-terrorism” in line with its new post-Cold War strategies, has not only defended the territories of its member states within the UN and OSCE but also “intervened out of the field against humanitarian massacres” around the world.

Since 1991, NATO forces have intervened within the UN in “the Gulf Crisis”, in “the Northern Reconnaissance and Hammer Force Operations” against Iraq, and in “the Somalia intervention” in 1992. “The first intervention by NATO in the Balkans” in 1995 was the intervention in “Bosnia and Herzegovina” after “the humanitarian drama between Serbs and Croats”, which was broadcast live in the US press and aimed to “create public pressure with the CNN effect” and to “prevent a major disaster” that caused many people to die (Carey, 2001, p. 74). This intervention can be evaluated as a process that resulted in “a hybrid peace” and was carried out by NATO forces deployed after “the Paris / Dayton Peace Agreement”, which “ended the war” within the scope of interventions serving the UN's purpose of stopping the war, except for “out-of-area and defense purposes”. In addition, as part of its responsibility to protect against “humanitarian crises”, NATO took part in “UN-led operations in Haiti and in Rwanda, Zaire, and Liberia in East Africa” in 1994, in “Gabon and Congo” in 1997, and in “Guinea-Bissau” in 1998 (Erhan Ç. , 2001, p. 88). NATO's intervention off the coast of “Somalia” in 1992 is an example of “NATO's intervention with the aim of combating piracy” within the scope of “NATO's out-of-area interventions” (Diriöz, 2012, p. 51).

NATO's next military intervention was the Kosovo intervention, which consisted of “an air campaign” on 24 March 1999 against “Kosovo”, which became independent after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. “The Kosovo intervention”, the second military intervention in the Balkans, has similar characteristics to “the Bosnia and Herzegovina intervention”. The similarity is that both are “out-of-area and non-defensive interventions”. In addition, similar to “the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Implementation Force (IFOR)”, which took part in the intervention in “Bosnia and Herzegovina” and caused the intervention to gain the character of “a multinational operation”, “the Kosovo Force (KFOR)” took part in “Kosovo, where Albanian-Serbian conflicts took place”.

“The Kosovo Intervention”, which was carried out under the umbrella of “humanitarian intervention” by “bypassing the UN”, was an intervention by NATO against “ethnic discrimination” in Kosovo's internal politics “without obtaining a UN resolution” (Gülgezen, 2020, p. 142). The purpose of this intervention is also characterized as “an attempt to break the power of Serbia, an ally of Russia”. After “the 1995 Dayton Peace Treaty”, NATO sent “UN IFOR and SFOR forces” to “Bosnia and Herzegovina” for intervention. After this NATO intervention, “*Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia*”. Moreover, the US has taken control of the energy lines in the Balkans and has proved to be “a hegemonic power” within the organization by bypassing it without taking into account the views of NATO members.

Apart from “Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo”, NATO's third military intervention was “the Macedonian intervention”, involving three operations organized at the request of Macedonia in 2001, together with the EU. With “the Ohrid Agreement” following the NATO intervention, the Macedonian conflicts came to an end. NATO's interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia” are cited as examples of “non-alliance peace operations in the Balkans”.

Following the 9/11 attacks, “the first NATO anti-terrorist operation” to eliminate the regime of Saddam Hussein on the grounds of its use of weapons of “mass destruction” was “the unilateral military intervention in Iraq in 2003 by US President George Bush”. Following “the Istanbul Summit” in 2004, NATO also undertook “the training of Iraqi troops and the responsibility to protect” under the Bush Doctrine's “preventive intervention approach”.

“NATO's first military intervention outside Europe” was “the out-of-area intervention in Afghanistan” in 2001, which was based on “the UN's BONN Declaration” with the aim of reconstruction and included “Operation Enduring Freedom” with the support of Western countries. Since the 11 September terrorist attack was proven to have been perpetrated by “the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban government”, NATO's intervention in Afghanistan involved “the elimination of the Taliban government”, which was in power and supported terrorism, and “public diplomacy in the fields of culture and education” in order to adopt Western values to a large extent (Aydemir, 2018, p. 1416). In “the post-intervention

Figure 29 shows “NATO's Eastern Enlargement” (Mammadov, 2014, p. 39). In “the war between Georgia and Russia”, which was shaped around “the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the problems over Russian military bases”, Russia intervened militarily against “Georgia” in 2008, and in the face of this situation, although “*NATO did not directly intervene militarily*”, it provided “political and military support in support of Georgia's territorial integrity” within the framework of its enlargement policy.

Another one of “NATO's out-of-area interventions” is the military intervention in “Libya”, which was “the first NATO intervention in the Middle East”, including air operations called “Operation Unified Protector”, organized in 2011 after “the Arab Spring” spread to Libya, and which was successful within the framework of “the responsibility to protect”. The intervention, which included the declaration of “a no-fly zone” after the protests aiming to oust Gaddafi from power turned into “a bloody civil war”, ended with “the end of the Gaddafi regime”.

In 2011, in “the Syrian crisis”, which turned into a civil war, “*Russia sided with the Bashar al-Assad regime*” in order to prevent NATO from carrying out a military intervention similar to the Libya military intervention in Syria. During this period, Barack Obama decided “not to intervene in the Syrian crisis”. Due to “Russia's dominance in Syria”, NATO has not been able to provide “a lasting peace environment” to end the civil war in Syria which has caused the tragedy to increase. The fact that the US supports “the PYD/YPG”, “the Syrian affiliate of the PKK terrorist organization”, against “DAESH”, also known as “ISIS”, in its policy towards Syria and does not consider this terrorist organization as “a terrorist organization” has a negative impact on Turkey, which is a neighbor of Syria, in terms of “counter-terrorism and border security” (Acun & Keskin, 2016, pp. 10-11).

3.4.3. Consequences of NATO military interventions.

The objectives of NATO's military interventions include "ensuring the security of NATO member states in the case of a threat to their territorial integrity, crisis management by providing humanitarian assistance when necessary to maintain international peace in crisis situations, conflict prevention, and stabilization through cooperation against international terrorism". Although there are views in the political science and international relations literature that NATO's interventions are an international organization that "ensures regional peace and stability, fights against terrorism and human rights violations, and carries out important activities to reduce civilian casualties and prevent ethnic cleansing", there are also opposing views that NATO's interventions "deepen the existing problems rather than solving them", and have "destructive consequences" by increasing conflict and violence with nationalist sentiments.

NATO military interventions have "significant political, military, economic, and human rights consequences". In political terms, the most basic result of interventions is "the removal of the old government and the transition of new leaders" to power as a result of military interventions aimed at changing the existing government. However, the interventions also resulted in the implementation of "pro-Western reconstruction policies" in the countries where NATO intervened militarily. The most basic example of this is the intervention in Afghanistan, where Western values were integrated through "public diplomacy in the areas of culture and education".

Although the Taliban was overthrown after this intervention, it came to power again in 2021 and "the instability" in the country continues today. "NATO's intervention in Libya", like "the intervention in Afghanistan", resulted in "the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime" as a change of administration. In some cases, NATO interventions have resulted in "political regime change or democratization of countries with the integration of Western values". NATO's military interventions have also led to the creation of "new independent states". The main case in point is the end of the war with "the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina", which "prevented ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ensured the country's existence as two independent states, "Bosnia and Herzegovina". Thousands of people lost their

lives after “the Kosovo intervention” and “Kosovo” continues to exist today as “an independent state”. The military consequences of NATO's interventions are “the damage to the military infrastructure of the countries” as well as “the loss of many military and civilian lives”. Moreover, although NATO is based on “humanitarian intervention and protection responsibilities”, “some human rights violations” may occur during its interventions. Finally, in terms of the economic consequences of NATO military interventions, there are “short-term breaks in the supply chain and high inflation”. In terms of long-term consequences, “the restructuring programs” implemented in the intervention countries are likely to lead to the integration of their economies into “the free market economy and the expansion of the capitalist economy” with the expansion of NATO.

“NATO's military interventions” can be seen as directly related to “NATO's enlargement policy”. NATO military interventions in “the Balkans, Libya, and Afghanistan” have contributed to “NATO's expansion”. NATO's interventions have “increased NATO's legitimacy” in the eyes of member states, and this has led to “new countries joining the alliance”.

3.5. The Role of NATO's Enlargement Policy in the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

NATO is “an intergovernmental military alliance whose primary purpose is to guarantee the collective defense of its members against external aggression”. However, NATO's enlargement policy since the end of the Cold War has been stretching the boundaries of “defense” out of proportion and become “a source of tension between Russia and the West”. The Ukraine crisis that first broke out in 2014 is intrinsically linked to “NATO's enlargement policy”.

“NATO's enlargement policy”, aiming at NATO membership of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact members and Eastern European countries after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, directly plays “an important role in the Russia-Ukraine crisis”. According to Russia, “NATO's eastward expansion” to its borders poses a significant threat to its “border security”. In the years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was unable to gain “legitimacy and true independence” across its borders due to “its historical and sociocultural ties with Russia” on one side and “the extensive influence of Western countries” on the other. So, inevitably,

Ukraine has been caught up in the middle of a dispute between NATO countries and Russia due to “its geostrategic and geopolitical importance”. In this confrontation, Russia could not remain silent and passive any longer as “NATO and the EU's enlargement policies” made Russia extremely uneasy.

Despite the risk of the outbreak of a massive war in Europe and destabilization of the region, the NATO countries tried to “increase Ukraine's integration with the EU” by increasing “its soft power and public diplomacy activities” as well as “supplying weapons and facilitating the integration of Ukrainian Armed Forces into NATO ecosystem and standards”, completely disregarding Russian leadership's concerns. Even 2022 significant conflict escalation did not stop the process of enlargement as “Finland's NATO membership” and “Sweden's recent application for NATO membership” clearly show.

NATO's inclusion of new countries in the alliance with “nine waves of expansion” within the scope of “NATO's expansion policy” and the efforts to make Ukraine, which NATO considers “a protective zone”, “a member of NATO and its rapprochement with the EU” as a result of its rapprochement with Russia's borders have further increased the threat perception of Russians. Due to NATO's military interventions and its “overt military and economic support” to Ukraine, Russia has increased its insistence on “intervening in Ukraine's internal affairs”, taking into account “its old historical ties with Ukraine”. Putin's perception that NATO's eastward expansion threatened Russia's “immediate environment and border security” further increased “tensions between the East and the West”, paving the way for “the re-ignition of the Russia-Ukraine crisis” on 24 February 2022.


As a result, in the background of “Russia's harsh reaction to Ukraine” in the recent Ukraine crisis, there lies the concern caused by NATO's and the USA's desire to develop its hegemony in the world as a result of “its support to Ukraine and its expansion policy”. Thus, “NATO's enlargement policy”, which can be seen “as the leading role” in the current conflicts, further escalates “tensions between Russia and Ukraine”. This proves that *“NATO's enlargement policy is the main actor in the Russia-Ukraine crisis”*.

4. CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

4.1. An Assessment of the Correlation between NATO's Enlargement Policy and Russia- Ukraine Crisis Since the Cold War

The NATO enlargement policy since the end of the Cold War has been “a major factor” in the tensions between the Western military alliance and Russia, contributing to the crisis in Ukraine. NATO's decision to expand its reach eastward has fueled “Moscow's perceptions of encirclement, insecurity, and exclusion”, leading to its assertive foreign policy and military intervention in Ukraine.

The roots of NATO's enlargement policy can be traced back to “the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR”, which created an opportunity for the US and its allies to promote their security interests in Europe by expanding the Western military alliance. NATO's first round of enlargement in 1999 included the former Soviet bloc countries of “Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic”, followed in 2004 by seven Central and Eastern European countries “Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia”. Since 2007, Russia has repeatedly expressed its concern that NATO's armed forces on Russian borders would not be tolerated. The next two countries, “Albania, and Croatia”, joined on 1 April 2009. This was followed by “Montenegro” joining on 5 June 2017, and “North Macedonia” on 27 March 2020.

Figure 30: Finland Becomes 31st Member of NATO

Resource: (Buchholz, 2023)

Finally, as shown in Figure 30, “Finland” formally joined NATO in 2023 and became the 31st member of the military alliance, with the ratification process for “Sweden” being in progress (Buchholz, 2023). “Finland's accession” roughly doubles NATO's border with Russia, which has threatened to take "countermeasures" and described the accession as “an encroachment on Russia's security and national interests”(Buchholz, 2023). These moves were seen as “provocative” by Moscow, which felt encircled and excluded from the new security architecture emerging in Europe. Russia perceived NATO's enlargement as “the expansion of Western hegemony towards its borders, encroaching upon its sphere of influence, limiting its national security options, and threatening its strategic interests”.

In 2007, Russia's President Vladimir Putin expressed concern about the expansion of NATO during “the Munich Security Conference”. Putin accused the West of encircling Russia, saying, *"NATO is moving its military infrastructure closer to our borders. We consider that a direct threat to the security of our country."* (Balmforth, 2022).

Figure 31: U.S./ NATO Military Bases



Resource: (Eisenhower Media Network, 2023)

Western European leaders assured Russian leaders that “NATO would not expand eastward and to Russian borders” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017; Wintour, 2022). On February 9, 1990, “U.S. Secretary of State James Baker” explicitly told Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev “*There would be no extension of NATO one inch to the east.*” (Baker & Gorbachev, 1990). Similar assurances from other U.S. leaders as well as from “British, German, and French leaders” throughout the 1990s confirm this (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2018). As can be seen in the United States / NATO Military Bases in Figure 31, NATO has broken this promise by expanding toward Russia's borders.

This was particularly significant in the case of Ukraine. Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, became “an important flashpoint” in this relationship due to “its strategic location, energy resources, and its deep cultural, political, and economic links with Russia”. “Ukraine's strategic importance” was evident to both Moscow and the West, and the country became “a battleground” for different geopolitical interests. Ukraine's desire to integrate with the West, coupled with Russia's fears of losing it to NATO's orbit, led to a series of events that culminated in “the 2014 Ukraine crisis”.

This way the role of the Ukrainian crisis as “a catalyst” for the escalation of tensions between the West and Russia was crucial. The crisis was the result of “a pro-Western revolution in Ukraine”, which led to the removal of President Viktor Yanukovich and his government after “the Euromaidan protests”. This change was seen as “a threat” by Moscow, which supported Yanukovich and opposed Ukraine's integration into the Western camp. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis has been linked to “NATO's enlargement policy” as Ukraine has been seeking “NATO membership since 2008 and officially applied in 2022”. Ukraine's NATO aspirations have been viewed by Russia as “a move to further encircle it and increase the West's influence in the region”.

The Ukraine crisis highlighted “the divide between the West and Russia”, with NATO and the EU supporting “Ukraine's pro-Western government”, while Russia accuses the West of meddling in its “backyard”. NATO's enlargement policy and its support for Ukraine and other former Soviet republics have created “a perception of threat in Russian foreign policy”, with Moscow perceiving the West as “a hostile and aggressive force”, limiting its room for maneuver, and raising its security concerns.

In conclusion, the relationship between NATO's enlargement policy and the Russia-Ukraine crisis is complex and multifaceted, with “historical, geopolitical, and security factors” contributing to the current tensions.

4.2. Debates on the Elimination of the Soviet Threat and Continued Existence of NATO in the Post-Cold War Period

After the collapse of the USSR, the world underwent “massive transformations”, and the strategic international system also underwent “a great change”. NATO's primary objective during the Cold War era was to “contain the Soviet Threat and maintain the territorial integrity of its member states”. With the elimination of the Soviet threat, many questioned “the relevance and continued existence of NATO”. However, NATO has continued to exist and has expanded its membership to include many Eastern European countries.

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was seen “as a significant threat” to the Western world, and NATO's primary objective was to contain that threat. Several factors contributed to “the removal of the Soviet threat”, including the following:

- *Economic pressure:* The Soviet economy was not as strong as that of the US, and the continuous “arms race” with the US strained it further. “The growing economic pressure” on the Soviet Union eventually led to its collapse.
- *Internal struggles:* The Soviet Union was faced with many internal struggles, including “social unrest and political instability”. These issues weakened the Soviet Union and contributed to its collapse.
- *Weak military capability:* The Soviet Union invested heavily in military capabilities, but they were ultimately unable to maintain the pace with Western technology. Finally, the Soviet Union's military arsenal became outdated, and it was unable to compete with the Western powers.
- *Reform movement:* The reformist movement in the Soviet Union, led by leaders like Mikhail Gorbachev, contributed to “the elimination of the Soviet threat”. The reforms implemented by the Gorbachev-led government led to “more openness and transparency”, which ultimately led to “the collapse of the USSR”.

The collapse of the USSR led to “the removal of the Soviet threat” that NATO was primarily established to contain, however, NATO has continued to exist and has undergone significant changes to remain relevant. Some of the reasons stated for “the continued existence of NATO” are as follows:

- *Deterrence:* While the Soviet threat has disappeared, new threats have emerged, including “terrorism, cyber threats, and regional conflicts”. NATO claims to serve as “a deterrent” to these threats and to promote “peace and security” worldwide.
- *Membership expansion:* NATO has expanded its membership to include several Eastern European countries. This expansion has bolstered the alliance's strength and improved its capability to address emerging threats.
- *Strategic partnerships:* NATO has established “strategic partnerships” with several non-member countries worldwide.
- *Joint military exercises:* NATO regularly conducts “joint military exercises” to enhance its military capabilities and to prepare for emerging threats. These exercises also facilitate “better coordination and interoperability” among its member states.

As NATO continues to evolve, it will face new challenges, and its relevance will continue to be questioned. However, it is essential to recognize that NATO remains “a significant organization” in the international arena.

4.3. Assessment for the future implications of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

The Russia-Ukraine Crisis is likely to have “long-term political, economic, and security implications” for the region, as well as globally, as it marks “a major shift” in the international relations paradigm and the geopolitical balance of power, with potential consequences for “the future of regional stability and international order”. The conflict has already caused “significant geopolitical upheavals”, disrupted international relations, and raised “the specter of a new Cold War and fears of World War III”.

The future of the Russia-Ukraine crisis is uncertain, and predictions vary depending on one's perspective. For instance, Russia could trigger further destabilization in Ukraine for strategic and territorial gains, leading to “a realignment of the security architecture of Europe”. On the other hand, Ukraine could continue being supplied with “military and financial aid” leading to “a protracted proxy war between the West and Russia”.

In this situation, the future direction of “Ukraine between the European, Atlantic, and Russian options” is a matter of debate. Ukraine would have four different foreign policy options for the future: *“Eurasianist foreign policy, Atlanticist foreign policy, multi-vector foreign policy, and EU integration based on Regional Cooperation”*.

Figure 32: An Open Letter Signed by a Group of Prominent US Diplomats and Senior Military Figures

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, MAY 16, 2023 Y A5

ADVERTISEMENT

The U.S. Should Be a Force for Peace in the World

The Russia-Ukraine War has been an unmitigated disaster. Hundreds of thousands have been killed or wounded. Millions have been displaced. Environmental and economic destruction have been incalculable. Future devastation could be exponentially greater as nuclear powers creep ever closer toward open war.

We deplore the violence, war crimes, indiscriminate missile strikes, terrorism, and other atrocities that are part of this war. The solution to this shocking violence is not more weapons or more war, with their guarantee of further death and destruction.

As Americans and national security experts, we urge President Biden and Congress to use their full power to end the war speedily through diplomacy, especially given the grave dangers of military escalation that could spiral out of control.

Sixty years ago, President John F. Kennedy made an observation that is crucial for our survival today. “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world.”

The immediate cause of this disastrous war in Ukraine is Russia's invasion. Yet the plans and actions to expand NATO to Russia's borders served to provoke Russian fears. And Russian leaders made this point for 30 years. A failure of diplomacy led to war. Now diplomacy is urgently needed to end the war before it destroys Ukraine and endangers humanity.

The Potential for Peace

Russia's current geopolitical anxiety is informed by memories of invasion from Charles XII, Napoleon, the Kaiser and Hitler. In 1918, 1919, and 1920, Russia's post-World War I borders were among an Allied invasion force that intervened in the Russian Civil War.

U.S./NATO Military Bases



What if the Shoe Were on the Other Foot?



Timeline

1990
U.S. assures Russia that NATO will not expand towards its border “...there would be no extension of...NATO one inch to the east,” says U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

1996
U.S. weapons manufacturers form the Committee to Expand NATO, spending over \$51 million on lobbying expenditures.

1999
NATO admits Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to NATO. U.S. and NATO bomb Russia's ally, Serbia.

2001
U.S. unilaterally withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

2004
Seven more Eastern European nations join NATO. NATO troops are now directly on Russia's border.

2004
Russia's parliament passes a resolution denouncing NATO's expansion. Putin

Resource: Tuesday, May 16, 2023. (The New York Times, 2023)

As stated in the 2023 open letter (see Figure 32) signed by many prominent Western diplomats and senior military leaders (The New York Times, 2023): “The immediate cause of this disastrous war in Ukraine is Russia’s invasion. Yet the plans and actions to expand NATO to Russia’s borders served to provoke Russian fears. And Russian leaders made this point for 30 years. A failure of diplomacy led to war. Now diplomacy is urgently needed to end the Russia-Ukraine War before it destroys Ukraine and endangers humanity” (Eisenhower Media Network, 2023).

Whatever the outcome, the Russia-Ukraine Crisis is a defining moment in the international relations paradigm, with “significant and long-term geopolitical implications for the region and globally, impacting energy security, trade, and investment”. Furthermore, the crisis could have far-reaching implications for “the future of the whole international system and the balance of power”.

Diplomacy and de-escalation are our only options for true security in this world. As our great leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said, “Unless a nation's life faces peril, war is murder.”

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