

A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION
ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
IN THE CONTEXT OF INQUIRY INTO CAUSALITY



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

28/12/2022

Uğur Selçuk Güneşli

ÖZET

Bilinç konusu zihin felsefesinin güncel problemlerinden biridir. Birinci kişi bakış açısına göre öznenin kendi varoluşunu sezgisel olarak, başka bir kanıt gereksinim duymadan bildiğini kabul ediyoruz. Bu bilgi diğerlerinin erimine kapalı olduğundan üçüncü kişilere aktarımı mevcut bilgi ve imkanlarımıza göre olanaksızdır. Düşünürler bu uyumsuzluğu “açıklama boşluğu”, “epistemik asimetri”, “kognitif olarak kapalı olma” gibi ifadelerle tanımlamaya çalışmışlardır. Kanaatimize göre bu fark “bilateral kendilik” olarak tanımlanabilir. Bilincin konvansiyonel yaklaşımlarla değerlendirilmesinde nedensellik yönünün önemli olduğunu düşünüyoruz. Antik dönemden beri süregelen yaklaşımlara baktığımızda determinist/zorunlu nedensellik yaklaşımının, yerini giderek olumsal nedensellik yaklaşımlarına bıraktığı görülmektedir.

Bu çalışmada bilincin olumsal nedensellik yaklaşımıyla ele alınmasının insan doğasına daha uygun olduğu teziyle hareket ettik. İkinci bölümde antik dönemden beri öne sürülen nedensellik yaklaşımlarını bilinç ile ilişkisi içinde yorumladık. Aristoteles, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant ve Heidegger’in yorumlarına ek olarak olumsal nedensellik yaklaşımını tarihsel gelişimi içinde değerlendirdik.

Üçüncü bölümde çağdaş zihin felsefecilerinin bilince dair yorum ve değerlendirmelerine yer verdik. Bu tartışmalar arasında indirgemeci materyalist veya maddeci olan ancak indirgemeci olmayan fonksiyonel yaklaşımlar olduğu gibi, bilincin felsefe ve bilimin konusu olamayacağını savunan değerlendirmeler de mevcuttu. Çalışmaların bir kısmı, birinci kişi yaklaşımıyla üçüncü kişi yaklaşımını örtüştürmeyi amaçlıyordu. Bilinç ve bedeni ayrı birer fenomen olarak kabul edenler olduğu gibi

bilincin insan dışı varlıklarda da olan enerji yoğunlaşmasından ibaret olduğunu savunan görüşler de vardı.

Dördüncü bölümde çağdaş zihin felsefecilerinin görüşlerini birbirleriyle karşılaştırarak uyuşan ve çatışan yönlerini inceledik. Ayrıca özgün görüşlerimiz çerçevesinde neden-etki yaklaşımının etimolojik köklerine değinerek bilinç, olumsuzluk, olumsal nedensellik gibi ifadelerin tanımlarını yaptık. Bilincin sadece epifenomenal bir özellik olmadığına yönelik örnekler verdik. Neden-etki dikotomisinin özne-nesne ikiliğinin aşılmasıyla giderilebileceğine dair örnekler verdik. İnsan nörolojik ve genetik sisteminin determinist olmayan, olumsal dinamiklerle faaliyet gösterdiğini ve hatta gözlenebilir bir etki için nedensel uyarım olmadan da işlev görebildiğini örneklerle göstermeye çalıştık. Bu çalışmanın yukarıda vurgulanan özellikleri nedeniyle bilincin olumsal nedensellik yoluyla serimlenmesine dair gelecekteki çalışmalara ışık tutacağı düşünülmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Bilinç, nedensellik, olumsal nedensellik, zihin felsefesi*

ABSTRACT

Consciousness is one of the current problems of the philosophy of mind. From a first-person perspective, we assume that the subject knows his own existence intuitively, without needing any further proof. Since this information is not accessible to others, its transfer to third persons is impossible according to our current knowledge and capabilities. Thinkers have tried to define this incompatibility with expressions such as "explanatory gap", "epistemic asymmetry", and "cognitive closure". In our opinion, this difference can be defined as "bilateral selfism". We think that the causality aspect is important in the evaluation of consciousness with conventional approaches. When we look at the approaches that have been going on since antiquity, it is seen that the determinist/necessary causality approach has gradually left its place in the contingent causality approaches.

In this study, we acted with the thesis that handling consciousness with the contingent causality approach is more appropriate for human nature. In the second part, we interpreted the causality approaches put forward since ancient times in relation to consciousness. In addition to the comments of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Heidegger, we evaluated the contingent causality approach in its historical development.

In the third part, we have included the interpretations and evaluations of contemporary philosophers of mind on consciousness. Among these discussions, there were functional approaches that were reductionist materialist or materialist but not reductionist, as well as evaluations that argued that consciousness could not be the subject of philosophy and science. Some of the studies aimed to overlap the first-person approach with the third-person approach. While there were those who regarded

consciousness and the body as separate phenomena, there were also those who argued that consciousness was a condensation of energy in non-human beings.

In the fourth chapter, we compared the views of contemporary philosophers of mind with each other and examined their compatible and conflicting aspects. In addition, within the framework of our original views, we have made definitions of expressions such as consciousness, contingency, and contingent causality by touching on the etymological roots of the cause-effect approach. We gave examples that consciousness is not just an epiphenomenal feature. We have given examples showing that the cause-effect dichotomy can be overcome by overcoming the subject-object duality. We have tried to show with examples that the human neurological and genetic system operates with non-deterministic, contingent dynamics and can even function without causal stimulation for an observable effect. It is thought that this study will shed light on future studies on the exposition of consciousness through contingent causation due to the features highlighted above.

Key words: *consciousness, causality, contingent causality, philosophy of mind*

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1. INTRODUCTION

The investigations of the philosophy of mind focus on the “soul” in Antiquity and Middle Ages, on the “mind” with Descartes in the New Age (in modern philosophy), and on “consciousness” since the second half of the 20th century. The “traditional” soul/mind investigations of the philosophy of mind are only metaphysical/ontological in nature and have progressed over the centuries with some differentiations and diversifications in two main directions, namely dualism and materialism. It is noteworthy that the investigations on consciousness in the “contemporary” philosophy of mind are both ontological and epistemological investigations. It is possible to define the investigations of the philosophy of mind, which includes the subject of this dissertation, into “consciousness” as “contemporary mind investigations”. Contemporary mind/consciousness investigations is a unifying and encompassing scientific activity that started in the late 1950s and brings together the views and approaches of disciplines on this phenomenon (Kutlusoy, 2001, p.49).

It can be seen formerly that the interpretations of human consciousness were predominantly through behaviors. We see that the approach of thinking about human consciousness on behaviors is in parallel with scientific approaches that demand certainty and causality. The approach to explaining human behavior has always been important in the history of thought. Although there is a special discipline called “behavioral sciences” that deals with this, a wide list of disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, psychology, criminology, neurology, and anthropology can be given. The involvement of these disciplines was the beginning of revolutionary developments in the way of cognitivism. At this point, we should also emphasize the concept of data and information that paved the way for the cognitive revolution. In relation to the cognitive

revolution, thinkers started to produce new explanations of the structure and function of tissues related to cognition and other explanatory theories on human behavior. Among them, one of the most important was the psychologists J.S. Brunner and G.A. Miller's theory asserting that there is a mental structure to explain human behavior. Cognitiveists consider only mental events that cause observable behavior. In the Information Theory Symposium in 1956, it is asserted that the meaning of cognitivism is the doctrine that knowledge consists of symbols that replace real things and are identified with various states of the nervous system (Kutlusoy, 2005, p.283).

Thus, with the help of the evaluations in the symposium, mind researchers from different disciplines agree on a common concept of mind. This collective mind concept is an information processing (computation) system. The significance of this meeting, held on September 10-12, is that Miller defined September 11, 1956, as the birthday of cognitive science. Until 1985, we see that cognitive science has become intellectually and theoretically competent with the influence of linguistics, psychology, AI, and philosophy (Kutlusoy, 2001, p.51).

In the following years, there is a pause in the field of cybernetics. We see that linguistic studies come to the fore with the influence of Chomsky and his contemporaries in the interpretation of consciousness. Chomsky, under the influence of Cartesian rationalism, argues that in the universal language model he developed since the mid-1960s with a genuine mentalist approach, human beings have a universal grammar ability as an innate language acquisition mechanism. Chomsky distinguishes between the knowledge of the language in the mind, which he calls "language competence", which helps to understand the grammatical compatibility of sentences, and the linguistic activity, which he calls "language performance", which describes the embodied use of information. We see that Chomsky's influence continued even in the early 70s as an

anti-behaviorist (Chomsky, 2001, pp.148, 168, 173). Thus, Chomsky makes the distinction between surface structure and deep structure in language. He establishes the language-mind relationship with the claim that the analyses of the deep structure give information about the mind.

Another aspect of consciousness-related studies is oriented toward the epistemology of consciousness. There are two different ways of knowing consciousness (both its existence and nature) within the framework of epistemological investigations. These are the “first person” and “third person” perspectives as two different orientations/approaches to consciousness. A distinction is made between two different perspectives on the "self-consciousness of the self and being conscious of the other". According to D.C. Dennett, a contemporary philosopher of mind, however people know that they have brains and minds, they think that they are their minds indeed (Dennett, 1996, p.10).

Though Dennett could be accepted as a monist, the above suggestion is considered to be an explanation of the first-person approach from a dualist point of view. According to Dennett, what leads us to the existence of other minds is that we have "language". He associates this with the ability of other subjects to understand what we are talking about. He refers to the difficulty of predicting the mental life of beings that we cannot speak the same language (Dennett, 1996, pp.22-23). The investigation into other minds here is carried out by the third person approach or from the point of view. In this context, it also becomes clear that the dualist debates are carried out from the first-person perspective, whereas materialist debates are carried out from the third-person perspective.

The problem of consciousness related to the first-person and the third-person perspective may be illuminated by the togetherness of the philosophical investigation and the results of empirical data. In this context, G. Güzeldere, who draws attention to the “phenomenal/qualitative” face of consciousness and the “causal” face, attempts to explain the nature of consciousness with the combination of the two perspectives, one of which is subjective and the other, objective. According to Güzeldere; the first person singular perspective, in which consciousness is interpreted as “visible” emphasizes his phenomenal side while the third person draws attention to its causal feature from the physicalist point of view by considering consciousness as “the cause”. From the point of view of the first person, the phenomenal characteristics of the state of consciousness (experience) directly experienced are subjective features that are not accessible to others. Within the framework of the third-person point of view from the outside, the changes in the nervous system and neurophysiological definitions of a person are open to the observations of others (Güzeldere, 1998, p.4). Thus, among the first and third-person approaches - as Güzeldere named - an “epistemic asymmetry” emerges, and this asymmetric condition is seen to cause various difficulties (Güzeldere, 1998, pp.24-25).

The problem of phenomenal consciousness in relation to how the phenomenal appearance of the physiological basis of consciousness emerges is a problem that draws attention to the subjective approach that enables the direct understanding of consciousness by the first person's terms/discourse according to Güzeldere (Güzeldere, 1998, p.27).

In this context; as also emphasized in T. Nagel's article entitled, "What does it mean to be a bat?" in 1974, it is underlined that reductionist materialism cannot explain the

subjective nature of experience. Later, in 1983, J. Levine draws attention to this problem, which he called the “Explanatory Gap”. Regarding the relationship between the experiences and their causal interactions in the nervous tissue, the gap arises; “Thus it is the non-intelligibility of the connection between the feeling of pain and its physical correlate that underlies the apparent contingency of that connection” (Levine, 1983, p.359).

Also, D. Chalmers seems to distinguish the “difficult” problem from the “easy” problems of consciousness as a problem of experience in the context of the phenomenal consciousness problem in 1995 and emphasizes the difficulty in understanding how the experience occurs. According to Chalmers, although the experience is generally accepted as a physical basis, it is not understood why and how this happens (Chalmers, 2004, p.619).

Another interpretation of the problem of the phenomenal consciousness is the term *qualia*. *Qualia* can be defined as individual subjective, conscious experiences.

We state that causal consciousness is related to the third-person approach and phenomenal consciousness is related to the first-person approach. In the third-person approach, the possibility of conveying the activities of consciousness to others through images in mediators such as fMRI and EEG is advocated. In the first-person approach, it is sufficient for me to know my own existence intuitively and no further proof is required.

In this study, the problem of consciousness is evaluated from two perspectives. The first one is the illumination of “The Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness”, known as a problem caused by asymmetry between the first and third-person perspectives. The

second one is the thesis that the problem of phenomenal consciousness can be solved by the contingent causality approach.

In this context, C. Yıldırım, inspired by the views of P. Suppes, argues that contemporary thinkers do not have a deterministic understanding of causality. He proposed a "probabilistic" interpretation of causality instead of the "deterministic" interpretation.

In the second part of this study, it is deemed necessary to reconsider the phenomenon of consciousness with a consciousness approach that can be shaped on the basis of a non-deterministic understanding of causality. For this purpose, we have included the philosophers who deal with causality as a philosophical problem in the context of its relationship with the soul/mind/consciousness, within their historical perspective. For this purpose, we first examined the justification-causality relationship and then included the views of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Heidegger, respectively. The aforementioned thinkers are chosen because of their studies on causality and also consciousness. We tried to pick up relationships between causality and consciousness in their inquiries. To put it roughly, it was thought that Aristotle should at least be included in this dissertation with his "four reasons" approach and his work called *De Anima*. Descartes is important in separating man into two different substances (*res*) with the approach of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, and then establishing a causal relationship between them. Leibniz is a leading thinker in causality discussions with the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of non-contradiction. Hume, on the other hand, was included in this scope with his approaches such as the rejection of causality and the inability to establish sound knowledge based on experience. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant commented on the establishment of certain knowledge and the principle of sufficient reason. He treated causality and contingency as elements

of categories, and he objected to the absoluteness of space and time, which is the dominant paradigm of Newtonian physics, and presented the possibility of transcendental knowledge. Heidegger, on the other hand, has broadly evaluated the concept of *Grund* (reason, grounding) throughout the history of philosophy in his work *An Essence of Reason (Vom Wesen des Gründes)*. It has unique approaches that we can define as being in the world (*In der welt sein*) and conscious existence with the concept of *Dasein*. Details on the subject are given in the relevant sections.

In the third part of the study, we evaluated the consciousness approaches of contemporary thinkers and their relationship with each other. To this end, the studies of H.Putnam, S.A.Kripke, J.Heil, D.Davidson, J.R.Searle, D.Perebom and H.Kornblith, J.Kim, F.Jackson, J.Levine, C.McGinn, V.G.Hardcastle, E.Wigner, D. Dennett, Patricia, and Paul Churchland are evaluated. In the fourth chapter, we examined the contingent causality understanding of consciousness and evaluated the possibilities for solving existing problems with our original interpretations.

2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF CAUSALITY RELATED TO CONSCIOUSNESS

It can be asserted that the concept of causality was mentioned by some of the thinkers in the philosophy of mind who enrich our thesis. The term “consciousness” has been used by contemporary thinkers. It seems that Aristotle’s concept was the soul. With Descartes, it turned out to be the term “mind”. The details regarding the aforementioned terms are given in the related sections below.

The concepts of freedom and intentionality should not be present in nature, and also should be against determinism. Being the first philosophical discipline in which causality was discussed, it is asserted in the philosophy of history that causality should be free of humans’ voluntary acts, and *Zeitgeist* (the spirit of the time) should determine the history of communities (Aşkın, 2017, p.12).

One of the basic problems of history should be the presence or absence of causality. The problem is inspected as to whether or not there are necessary legalities, like natural laws independent of human actions or there is contingent legality that causes human freedom. (Aşkın, 2017, p.20). As cited in Aşkın, in grounding the principle of causality, J.G. Herder accepted that understanding was the central support in determining the methodology of the philosophy of history (Aşkın, 2017, p.27). The concept of understanding is also one of the main topics in the philosophy of mind regarding causality and consciousness. According to the explanations above, it can be asserted that the concept of causality as a problem is important since ancient times. It seems that history is the primary topic in which causality is criticized.

G. H. Von Wright who was a specialist in logic, dependent on the tradition of analytic philosophy asserted a quasi-causal explanation. It was an explanatory method that was

based on a logical explanation and in which the intentionality of action was carefully handled. As an example, feeling heat or sweating was the causal predisposition to the act of opening a window. To make a teleological explanation for an action, at first, it should be intentionally understood (Aşkın, 2017, pp.404-405).

As cited in Aşkın, A. Moles argues that the human sciences are faced with indeterminate facts and obscure concepts. For this reason, they had to develop a logic and epistemology that was indeterminate and probable (Aşkın, 2017, p.490). From this point of view, uncertainty should be accepted as a property of contemporary sciences, instead of an unlovely obstacle. Additionally, uncertainty should be a motive to develop contemporary sciences and philosophy.

In this section, we also present the proposals of the ancient thinkers related to causality, and lastly the suggestions of Heidegger, who exhibited an inclusive inquiry (*Vom Wesen des Grundes*), on the concepts of grounding and causality by including their relations to consciousness.

We believe that regarding the studies on consciousness, the perspective of causality should be productive. However, we noticed the uselessness of the conventional version of causality. Causality in the classical sense didn't work, because its meaning implying the necessity did not seem to be compatible with the contemporary facts and sciences. In our dissertation, we were aiming to create a new understanding of causality that was neither necessary nor contingent. But, after three years passed with reading and writing on causality, and consciousness, we decided to use the term causality in the contingent sense. The contemporary sciences, having the analytical concepts of uncertainty, entropy, space-time, etc. encouraged us to believe that our preference could be more productive in solving the problems of consciousness.

We also evaluated the causality with its relation to grounding. Because the German term *Grund* exhibits both of the meanings of reason and grounding. However, in the literature, it is hard to say that there were too many sources implying that. We had to evaluate the inquiries on reason and grounding separately. This also gave us ideas on the relationship between reasoning and grounding. In summary, we argue that reasoning could be accepted to be a component of grounding. However, because of the voluminous bulk of the literature on the discussions on grounding and reasoning, it should be a separate topic by itself.

2.1. The Problem of Causality with Relation to Grounding

The criticism on grounding should be accepted to be one of the most important subjects in philosophy. The attempts on grounding should be evaluated as parts of justification (*gerekçelendirme*), verification (*doğrulama*), explanation (*açıklama*), interpretation (*anlamlandırma*), etc. By this means it would be possible to build an accidental (*symbebekos:συμβεβηκός*) discourse. According to our opinion, the things that grounding would accompany would be related to the object of the problem. The problematic object here is consciousness itself.

It must be remembered that evaluations regarding consciousness would generally be accepted according to the first-person and the third-person point of view. It should be accepted that the attempts at grounding should be evaluated in terms of the third-person point of view. It is because we could refer to the meaning of an object through concepts. Then it is needed to cluster on a ground of meaning to reach a consensus on concepts. This consensus is also important for the attempts of grounding to produce an explanation, correction, and to produce meaning. But the meaning itself is frequently seen as a fiction that was imputed on objects and subjects. We could love or hate the

same person by imputing different meanings on her. In that case, we could argue that the weakest ring of grounding is to interpret meaning.

Verification should be accepted to be one of the elements of grounding. Verification could be performed with the help of logic, justification, introduction, intuition, and the five senses. However, it should be remembered that the five senses are fallacious, which is a property that reduces the five senses to be the weakest ring of verification. A pen plugged in water would be seen as it was broken. It is because of the refractive power of water. If we wouldn't know physics, we would be in a bizarre world full of hallucinations.

From that point of view, it should be asserted that the science of physics and also philosophy would affect our world of meaning, manage our point of view regarding the world, would uncover unsolved, meaningless, non-provable problems like consciousness, hard problem, and *qualia*. The extension of meaning in the grounding of light would also be different. The expression of light as wavelength would be different from the older expression that the knowledge of wavelength was lacking. With the help of this, the expression of "light" could be accepted no more as an abstract entity.

The concepts that do not have objectivity would become conveyed from subject to subject and this would unlock many keys in the philosophy of mind. Regarding the first-person point of view, we could not talk about a concept/ object/ fact of consciousness that would be grounded. It is because the subject intuitively appreciates her existence without any need for grounding. Despite that, the same sureness would not be accepted regarding other subjects. It could be argued that the problem of grounding is epistemological. It could be understood from the etymological roots of the

term “episteme” (*epi-*: on, *histēmi*: standing) that the term epistemological could be compared with the term grounding. According to Aristotle, there were subgroups of knowing (*eidenai*, *gnosis*, *epistastai*). It should be asserted that the term grounding has subgroups (metaphysical grounding, explanation, justification, building a relation of causality) indeed.

The relation of causality as a subgroup of grounding has been important since ancient times. The studies of arche in the Presocratic time should be accepted as efforts of grounding that were stated by causality. Through inspecting grounding by causality, critiques could be done according to the necessary or contingent character of causality. Causality in the meaning of necessity is at the forefront of the positivist paradigm. Causality by contingency is said to be supported by many contemporary philosophers. A relationship regarding causality in a way that is not in the form of necessity is one of the problems of this thesis. In that kind of relationship, it is probable that subject vs. object dichotomy should not be conserved as it is in the conventional arrangement. By that assertion, we could inspect a philosophical line of subject-object identity under the effects of Nagarjuna, F. Pessoa, and M. Merleau-Ponty. Additionally, we can inspect the paradigm in which subject and object build the world together and have no priority on each other. According to that design of the world, *I/consciousness/ego* is the subject and object at the same time. This point of view would not be contradictory. At this point for seeking an answer to consciousness, one of the options should be substituting the question “Who is” for the question “What is”. The term “what” is a categorical definition while the term “who” implies individuality. This kind of change in the points of view would leave us with a wider and free area of motion. According to N. Uygur “What is” questions ask the whatness of a certain word (or concept) contained in the question (Uygur, 1960, pp.32-34). It should be a tautology to think about consciousness.

According to the contemporary paradigm, it could not be imaginable that something could objectify itself.

2.2. The Problem of Causality in Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant

2.2.1 The problem of causality in Aristotle

Aristotle gave special importance to the source which we would call “From which motion was originated” (Aristotle, 2002, 984 a25). This opinion should have special importance in evaluating consciousness because consciousness itself is deemed to be the origin of motion for many organisms. However, some actions (primary reflexes, tics, neuroregulatory internal biochemical events of the neurophysiological systems) are said to be performed without any conscious effect.

Because they rejected bodiless explanations, Aristotle criticized the previous philosophers who set down the wholes as one or more material things. Another problem for Aristotle was that the previous philosophers of nature abolished the cause of motion while inspecting the causes of coming- into- being and destruction. Additionally, they did not accept thinghood as a cause. They accepted the circumstance that the four elements transformed into each other exhibiting a property of priority. He affirmed that one thing came into being by combination or separation (Aristotle, 2002, 988 b25-35). The above authentic critiques of Aristotle could be accepted to enlighten forward studies on the ontological properties of consciousness. The acceptance of consciousness as an ontic or ontological entity could be said to have vital importance in explaining the thinghood of consciousness. Additionally, inspecting the truth of consciousness as a propositional truth or not has differentiating importance.

One of the main subjects of Aristotle's critique was whether there was something immaterial that was a cause in its own right. The properties of this possible being as

singular or plural, and the thinghood of it were questioned by himself (Aristotle, 2002, 995 b35- 996 a5). He asked whether it belonged to one or more kinds of knowledge to contemplate all the kinds of causes (Aristotle, 2002, p. 996 a20). Contemporary inspections of consciousness seemed to be parallel with that Aristotle's inspection regarding the being that was a cause in its own right.

Aristotle insisted on getting hold of the first causes of being as being, to find the sources and the highest causes that belonged to some nature in its own right (Aristotle, 2002, 1003 a 25-30). He argued also that it was impossible to conceive the same thing to be and not to be, as a critique of Heracleitus' inquiries (Aristotle, 2002, 1005 b25). He argued that it was impossible to demonstrate the thesis (the principle of non-contradiction) but added that through refutation it was impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be. However, he accepted that refutation was different from demonstrating, because demonstrating required the things to be shown (Aristotle, 2002, 1006 a5-20). With the help of Aristotle's assertions, the explanations of consciousness could be performed through refutation. Eliminating the opposites may give a chance of identifying the thinghood of consciousness.

Another explanatory argument for Aristotle was the element having a meaning that "Out of which something was composed, as the first constituent not divisible in kind into a different kind" (Aristotle, 2002, 1004 a25-30). From these explanations, we can start a discussion of consciousness depending on whether consciousness should be accepted as an element or not. It could be argued that if the consciousness is accepted to be dividable (such as arousal and awareness) then it should not be accepted as a being by itself. But if it is accepted that it cannot be divided into parts then the consciousness itself should be accepted to be an element of -for example- the mind or other being (brain, nervous system, etc.).

Aristotle analyzed the concept of necessity that had a meaning that without which it was not possible to be (Aristotle, 2002, 1005 a20). His assertion about the definition of necessity could be accepted to illuminate the discussions about consciousness. It's because the property of consciousness as a necessary or contingent being is important in verifying its thinghood.

Aristotle, in his work *On the Soul*, examined the properties of the soul and made comments whose effects were seen in later philosophers. It can be said that he questioned whether the soul was separate from the body, emphasized that he could not do anything without the body, and made the first dualist interpretations in a sense (Aristotle, 2004, 403a 5-10). He made the definition of the soul by including the views of the thinkers before him. According to Aristotle, all thinkers that the soul is “movement, sense perception, and bodilessness” (Aristotle, 2004, 405b 10). He underlined the property of the soul to recognize and perceive outer things (Aristotle, 2004, 409b 30). Aristotle accepted the soul as the cause of the body. He also pointed out the discriminating role of belief for humans (Aristotle, 2004, 428a 20).

Aristotle argued that as the place of forms, the soul thinks by intellect, which can be accepted as the criterion for the activity of the soul (Aristotle, 2004, 429a 20). He resembled the soul to a hand as a tool and accepted the intellect as a form (Aristotle, 2004, 432a 5). In light of the above comments, it can be argued that Aristotle evaluated the soul with its ontological and epistemological features. Approaches such as accepting the soul, which is the source of movement, as separate from the body and the existence of the soul in non-human beings require us to accept it as one of the first philosophers of mind.

2.2.2 The problem of causality in Descartes

It should be accepted that Descartes is the cornerstone of modern philosophy. His point of view should be among the ones building a new paradigm in physics as well as in the understanding of the soul. He favored to use of the term 'mind' and argued the dualist understanding in the philosophy of mind. After separating the mind from the body it is needed to assert and explain the connection between them. He asserted that for finding a result we should insist on finding the cause first (Descartes, 2016 a, p. 46). This could be accepted to be his attempt of asserting a causality connection between body and mind. In Descartes' explanations, it was argued that the mind should be understood as a being that could not be divided into parts and that could not be explained in terms of a place. He argued that the soul should be related to the whole body instead of a single part of it (Descartes, 2016 b, pp. 33-34). However, he added that a special part of the body should be accepted to be a place exerting more responsibility for the events of the mind. He explained the reason for this assertion with the idea that all other parts of the brain and other organs of the body consisted of double parts except for the pineal gland (Descartes, 2016 b, pp.34-35). Additionally, he added that the soul should be placed in the body (Descartes, 2016 b, p.132).

Descartes gave special importance to producing concepts regarding the soul and the body. He argued that the soul should be an infinite being and that a concept of a soul that was explicit, clear, and different from that of the body should be produced. He argued that as a result of evaluating the mind and body it should be argued that they would have different essences from each other and the mind or the soul of a human could be summed up as undividable (Descartes, 2019, p.38). He added that there would be no difference between the soul of a human and the mind. He also argued that the

body should not remain the same by changing some of its parts but the mind or soul should be immortal (Descartes, 2019 p. 39).

Descartes' arguments should be accepted to be classified in the first-person's point of view. He accepted that as long as I think that I was something, it would be impossible for a wicked evil to ensure that I did not exist. Afterward, he argued that the proposition that *Ego sum*, should be necessarily true (Descartes, 2019, p. 58). According to the explanations above it could be argued that Descartes favored the existence of an immortal mind apart from the body. However, some of his explanations would also favor the existence of the body to express the mind itself (Descartes, 2019, p. 61). Additionally, he argued that he could not separate himself from his body like he could separate himself from other objects (Descartes, 2019, p. 123). However, at the end of the Meditations, he inferred that he could exist without the existence of his body (Descartes, 2019, p. 125). He also added that without the effect of the human mind, the body would also continue to act. But the motion could be like in a machine by the effect of organs (Descartes, 2019, p. 131).

Descartes underlined the existence of I in *Discourse on Method* by thinking that everything could be false, except for the being (I) that was doubted on everything. Depending on this point of view he argued the famous proposition: "I think, therefore I am" as the first principle of his philosophy. He added that he could imagine himself without a body but could not imagine that he did not exist, as proof of his existence without any material thing (Descartes, 1975, p. 21). Descartes insisted on asserting that the essence of the soul is only to think (Descartes, 1975, p. 30).

Regarding the above explanations, it could be argued that Descartes' assertions depended on the dualistic explanation of the soul and the body. It could be understood

from the above explanations that the existence of *I* would be dependent solely on the soul which does not require a spatial elements such as the body. This point could be criticized as such an element (soul) that could not be correlated with another one (body) was expressed by similar parameters. This would be like correlating apples with pears. Another criticism that can be directed to Descartes may be related to the meaning of the concept of substance and its Cartesian use. If the meaning of substance is that it does not need anything else for its existence, then it can be considered as a contradiction that any of the *res cogitans* and *res extensa* need each other in the human body. However, Descartes' place in the philosophy of mind should be valuable for his courage in discussing much of the taboos at his age.

2.2.3 The problem of causality in Leibniz

Necessity is one of the important topics related to causality. Leibniz who was the creator of the law of sufficient reason and the law of contradiction was one of the most important philosophers. B. Russell had interpretations of Leibniz's approaches regarding the law of contradiction and the law of sufficient reason.

As cited in Russell, Leibniz's proposal about the principle of sufficient reason was that "No fact could be found true or existent, no statement veritable without a sufficient reason about why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually could not be known to us." He also proposed that there were truths of reasoning and of fact. Truths of reasoning were necessary and their opposite was impossible, while truths of fact were contingent and their opposite was possible. This is because the necessary truths could be found by analysis, but the contingent truths and the truths of fact also deserved a sufficient reason. For the created things, the reasoning would go to an endless beginning. This definition would necessitate questions to be answered on

the principle of sufficient reason (Russell, 1997, p.31). The question is which level will be accepted to be sufficient? The reasoning for the actual things goes back to the first reason. As the principle states, the reason for the first reason should be something obscure or should be the end of a syllogism. The challenging question should be, what creates the creation of consciousness? Another question should be, whether or not consciousness is something created or something out of the metaphysical pathway of creation. As cited by Russell, Leibniz asserted that activity must be distinguished from causation. He underlined that causation is a relation while activity is a quality in virtue of causation. (Russell, 1997, p. 45).

Starting from the explanations above, we can conclude that in terms of the third-person model, consciousness may be accepted as something like causation. Additionally, depending on the first-person model, consciousness may be accepted to be a quality of one phenomenon which tends to cause another.

Concerning the nature of monads, Russell noticed that perception and appetite were common qualities of them and added that monads cannot have shapes, otherwise they would have parts. Perceptions were internal qualities and actions of a monad. *Appetitions* were its tendencies to pass from one perception to another. Each monad was a mirror of the world endowed with inner activity (Russell, 1997, p. 131). The definition of consciousness should be similar to monad by its having perception and appetite and not having a shape.

Monads were divided hierarchically into three classes, which were bare monads, souls, and spirits. Bare monads (also called forms or entelechies) had minimal perception and desire. Souls (which animals but not humans have) had memory, feeling, and attention. Spirits which were specialized for humans were immortal and preserved

moral identity, which depended on the memory of self (Russell, 1997, p. 141). Depending on the proposals above, it can be asserted that consciousness should be included in spirits, while the former classes of monads should not exert a full degree of consciousness.

Leibniz argued that every created monad had an organic body. However, Russell had objections that every monad had an organic body if it consisted of subordinate monads (Russell, 1997, p. 150). It is implied by the third-person perspective that there should be one or more bodies for consciousness, inspected by fMRI, EEG, SPECT, or other methods. From the first-person perspective, there should not be such a place or with the contemporary technics, it cannot be known by others (The *qualia* problem).

Contrary to J. Locke, Leibniz argued that the soul always thinks, but it is not always thinking consciously. According to Locke, there could be nothing in the mind that the mind was not conscious of. However, Leibniz asserted that there was an absolute necessity for unconscious mental state by distinguishing perception (being conscious of something) and apperception (self-consciousness). The perception could be performed unconsciously but apperception necessitates being conscious of what we are doing. Leibniz identified perception as (1) unconscious perception, (2) confused perception, (3) minute perception, and (4) physical disposition. Russell argued that unconscious perception was proven by the endless regression resulting from self-consciousness. Confused perception was required for explaining sense perception and for the differences between different monads. Minute perception is derived from the argument that a finite perception had as many parts as its objects. An important point was that the number of its parts would be infinite since its objects would be the whole universe. Russell added that physical disposition was required to explain the sense in

which the truths were innate. The sense here is very likely that in which Kant's *a priori* is in the mind. All the definitions above were denied by Locke (Russell, 1997, pp.155-157). Perception without apperception could be accepted as one of the main details in consciousness studies. It can be argued that something (perception) cannot be falsified by denying its existence. History is full of examples regarding the denial of new scientific developments. Denial or not taking into account a discovery does not ignore its essence and prospective acceptance of it. But, we have to confess that the difference between perception and apperception could not be similar to the difference of the example about scientific development that we have given above.

There was a distinction between Locke's and Leibniz's understanding of truth. Locke's assertion that truths were gained after birth was contested by Leibniz. Because Leibniz argued that innate truths were waiting to be elicited by experience and education. The mind did not necessarily have the faculty of knowing them, but it had a faculty of finding them in themselves. The main difference between Locke's and Leibniz's philosophies seemed to be the presence of unconscious perception in Leibniz's philosophy (Russell, 1997, p. 158). Leibniz's theory of knowledge and unconscious truth exerts similarity with that of Plato's concept of anamnesis. The skeleton of the epistemology of Plato depended on recalling the knowledge buried in our minds. This approach (anamnesis) required "midwives" who were also philosophers. This kind of activity should require the spirits instead of the souls, which is an assertion favoring that consciousness requires the deep processing of the mind. At the same time this point of view implies that even if we don't notice what we are doing, there is still a brain process that would be named consciousness. Starting from that point, it can be argued that consciousness is always processed in living organisms.

As cited in Russell, Leibniz asserted that the intellect is the proof of innate knowledge and our perceptions of ideas. It came either from an external sense or from an internal sense (reflection) which were not limited to the mere operations of the mind (as was stated by Locke) and extended even to the mind itself. In perceiving a substance, we should perceive the mind itself (Russell, 1997, p. 162). Additionally, to get the subject clearer, we should notice that according to Leibniz the soul was innate to itself. Kant also argued that space and time and categories were innate. The qualities in space were not innate (Russell, 1997, p. 163). To specify this problem, we should focus on the term, innate. Innate means that comes from birth, like that of the soul, bodily properties, and even the existence itself. Having a naturally innate soul does not mean that the soul is sufficient to explain every kind of conscious property. Due to the properties attributed to consciousness, it can be a subject or an object. If I think about something (for example, myself) the one who thinks represents consciousness as a subject. And myself is the object. The subject is the necessary and sufficient reason for consciousness. The object (myself) is said to be necessary. However, it is hard to say it is sufficient for being conscious.

As cited in Russell, Leibniz asserted that the essence of matter was not the extension. For Leibniz, the extension was an attribute that cannot constitute a complete being and it was a mistake of Cartesians that they conceived the extension as something primitive and absolute, and that constituted substance. According to Leibniz, the notion of the extension was incomplete because the extension could not be conceived per se (Russell, 1997, pp.227-228). The assertions above should encourage us for studying consciousness on a platform that does not have an extension. We assert that consciousness could not be conceived by virtue of extension with the present physical, philosophical, and psychological meaning.

Kant's proposal regarding space (extension) was that time and space were needed for constituting knowledge and they were pure forms of intuition (Kant, 2010, A25). Similar to Leibniz's explanations, Kant's definition of space (extension) did not depend on material (related to a substance) being. Space was needed for grounding the shape, weight, and other properties of matter (Kant, 2010, B39). Similarly, consciousness can be assumed to be needed for grounding (for being necessary and sufficient) mental events. At the same time, consciousness can be accepted to be the ground for mental events.

As noted in Russell, Leibniz asserted that a substance, simple or compound was a mobile being and that simple substances and lives, souls, and spirits are unities (Russell, 1997, p. 239). According to these assertions, consciousness should have the character of being a unity instead of a plurality.

Leibniz had some proofs of immortality, of the nature of God and mind. They were based on the doctrine of the point, the instant, indivisibles, and conation. The actions of the body consisted of motion, and the actions of the mind consisted of conation (the minimum or point of motion). He argued that the mind consisted properly in only a point of space, while a body occupied a place. The mind must be the place (point) that motions impressed on us by the objects of sense concourse. Depending on the perception of luster, clink, and weight together, someone can conclude that the object presented to him is gold. If the mind is greater than a point, it is already a body and has parts that are external to each other. But Leibniz asserted that because the mind consisted of a point, it was indivisible and indestructible. He also added that a body (*Leib*) had a kernel of its substance, which was distinguished from the *caput mortuum* (Russell, 1997, p.253). Regarding the explanations above, because of mind was not a body according to Leibniz, it did not seem reasonable that the mind (and may also

consciousness) should not have a kernel of its substance. The explanations above may be interpreted as that consciousness could have a transcendental being.

Another important point is that Leibniz's concept of monad can be inspected concerning consciousness. Leibniz argued that the places of monads are designated by modifications or terminations of parts of the space. But monads were not modifications of a continuous thing. Monads produced mass but not space because space had a certain order (Russell, 1997, p. 256). This point of view can be said to be similar to Kant's critique of space as a form of intuition (*Anschauung*). From that starting point, we can think of consciousness as a condition that gives the chance of perceiving the world, instead of a being that has space-occupying property. This approach, giving a transcendental meaning to consciousness, can be said to be contrary to the third-person approach.

Leibniz's authentic idea about consciousness was important for enlightening forward studies. He delineated a distinction between perception, which was the internal state of the Monad representing external things, and apperception, which was the consciousness of the reflective knowledge of this internal state. He criticized Cartesians for their ignorance of the perception that we were not conscious of. Leibniz named the souls of rational animals –the ones that can produce infallible inferences- spirits (*espritis*). The spirits performed the acts of reflection. He defined the rational soul or the spirit as a mirror of the universe of created beings and an image of a deity (Russell, 1997, p. 264). Leibniz's explanations seemed to lead to the first-person approach to consciousness. Kant was also said to be stated transcendental apperception depending on Leibniz's apperception. Otherwise, apperception and internal feelings would inadvertently be accepted as the same (Gözkan, 2018, p. 231).

Leibniz noted the difference between monads or entelechies and souls. The souls had perceptions and appetites, which is a factor that allowed all simple substances or created monads to be called souls. He underlined that because the feeling was something more than a bare perception, the name of the soul should have been given only to those in which the perception was accompanied by memory, whereas monads or entelechies were simple substances that have only perception (Russell, 1997, p. 265). Leibniz's explanations reminded us of the being of consciousness as reflected by memory here. It is possible to assert that, without memory, the integrity of consciousness should be accepted to be deficient. As in the explanation of apperception, memory could be a differentiating factor for consciousness. It could be accepted that beings that do not have memories have the consciousness to a lesser degree.

He also added that consciousness or feeling of the *Ego* proved a moral or personal identity, which is a differentiating factor of a brute's soul -which is inaccessible- from that of a man -which is immortal-. A similar classification is present regarding the self which is a real and physical identity. Russell asserted that Leibniz distinguished the appearance of the self from consciousness. The appearance of the self that is accompanied by truth, joined personal identity to itself (Russell, 1997, p. 265). He essentially associated spirit with thinking and also added that as a fixed attribute, the reason could not always be perceived (Russell, 1997, p. 266). Depending on these proposals, Leibniz could be said to favor Cartesianism on the one hand, while he opposed it on the other hand.

Leibniz called a monad an organization or configuration, without a subsistent principle of life. He also added that a monad would not suffice for the continuation of the same individual because organized bodies remained the same only in appearance. He argued that even if a soul could have a body composed of parts animated by separate

souls, the form (soul) of the whole was not composed of souls or forms of the parts. Leibniz rejected the assertion that each soul had a quantity or portion of matter belonging exclusively to itself, which is an approach against the understanding of the transmigration of the soul and against the opinion of the spirit being entirely separate or disembodied. Russell cited that according to Leibniz God alone was completely bodiless (Russell, 1997, p. 270). This approach can be interpreted as an objection to Cartesianism. That is because Descartes by saying *Cogito ergo sum*, argued to be present (*sum*) by only thinking (*cogito*). He also tried to assign a place (pineal gland) to *res cogitans*. According to Leibniz's assertion above, as a thinking being (*res cogitans*) if God alone was completely without body, then to assign a place to *res cogitans* should have been useless. But as an alternative analysis, this can also be understood as an exceptional proposal.

There should have been a certain real metaphysical union between the soul and the organic body, which is a point that could be interpreted as the soul being in the body according to Leibniz. But this should be interpreted as the union of the soul, or the Monad itself with mass or other monads because every created monad was supported by some organic body (Russell, 1997, p. 272). This could be an important differentiating point in the philosophy of Leibniz that monads as thinking particles were supported by some organic body, which is a factor that one could think of monads in resemblance to consciousness.

Contrary to Locke, Leibniz asserted that we learned innate ideas and truths, whether by attending to their sources or by verifying them through experience. He asserted that the sweetness is not the bitterness, was not innate like that of innate truths, because the feelings of sweetness, as well as bitterness, come from the external senses. Another proposition, the square is not a circle, was innate, depending on the

subsumption of the principle of contradiction. As cited in Russell, Leibniz argued that there was a discussion with other philosophers who asserted that everything in the soul came from the senses (Russell, 1997, p. 276-277). According to these conclusions, one can assert that Leibniz's argumentation was favoring the first-person approach of consciousness, giving a special emphasis on its being without a space (*Raum*).

Leibniz also had suggestions regarding the internal experiences of Cartesians (I think, therefore I am, i.e. I am a thing who thinks). He argued that the proposal that "I think" was not clear to him as the one that I have different thoughts about. He asserted that the Cartesian principle was not the only one of its kind. Additionally, Leibniz criticized that saying "I think, therefore I am", was not proof of existence by thought. Because according to him, to think and to be thinking were the same, as it was true for saying I am thinking is already to say I am. He asserted that only God knows why I exist (Russell, 1997, p. 277). This approach could be accepted to be an alternative to that of Cartesians. However, it can be concluded that theological social hypersensitivities that originated from the construction of social life in the Middle Age were effective for philosophers of that century. This is a fact that gives us the idea that all priorities to God in philosophical suggestions should be interpreted depending on this reality.

Russell pointed out that Leibniz made a classification of truths as the truths of fact and of reason. The truths of fact were a posteriori like the apperception of our existence. The truths of reason were identical propositions like the first experiences and were a priori truths like the apperception of our thoughts. He argued that both of them were incapable of being proven. Truths of fact were immediate because there was immediacy between understanding and its object. Truths of thought were immediate because there was immediacy between the subject and the predicate (Russell, 1997,

p.278). Leibniz distinguished between ideas and thoughts, depending on the fact that we always had all pure or distinct ideas independently of the senses where thoughts always corresponded to some sensation. Alternatively, Leibniz noticed the ideas of sensible qualities, which were only phantoms that came from our confused perceptions (Russell, 1997, p.280).

Leibniz studied on individuation at Leipzig University, in a manner consistent with nominalism. The principle of individuation was a problem of scholastic philosophy since 1663. He continued his inquiries at Jena University and researched combinational laws in philosophy, resembling mathematics. This was a process of reducing all philosophical problems to logical ones (Leibniz, 2014, p. 13). Descartes' doctrine about space as the essence of matter was regarded as incompatible with not only the dogma of transubstantiation catholicity but also the Lutan dogma related to the readiness for Leibniz.

The essence of substance should necessitate something which should be more than space and independent from it. As cited in Altınörs, according to Leibniz, this should be the essence (Leibniz, 2014, p. 16). Space and the essence of substance are important philosophical topics. Because in modern philosophy it may be argued that if space does not exist for a being (for example consciousness) then it is hardly possible to accept it as a being.

Leibniz was said to contribute to the human development of the mind. The studies of previous geometers were accepted to prepare his discoveries (Leibniz, 2014, p. 19). Specifically, Leibniz considered mathematics closer to physics. Altınörs indicates that infinitesimal calculus allows natural phenomena to be subject to mathematical analysis more than ever before. As inspecting motion enters him into the

world of metaphysics, inspecting infinitesimal calculus excites his mind about the nature of the operations of the spirit (Leibniz, 2014, p. 20).

According to Altınörs' suggestions, Leibniz took the concept of the essence as the core idea of his philosophy since 1671. His philosophical investigations took part in the last fifteen years of his life. In addition to philosophy, his studies on mathematics, religion, history, and politics were important also (Leibniz, 2014, p. 21). It is said that Leibniz gives attention to establishing the historical cause-effect relationship. The characteristic property of his historical investigation was to research the relationship between the human mind, and unfelt causes or things (Leibniz, 2014, p. 23).

Leibniz's other important thesis was that contrary to Descartes, clarity, and distinctness did not require each other. In Descartes' philosophy distinctness naturally accompanied clarity. Leibniz defined clarity as the knowledge enabling one to differentiate something from another. The distinction was to know something with details for him. This meant that a concept would be clear without being distinct (Leibniz, 2014, p. 27). Here is an important clue related to the studies of consciousness. If consciousness would be accepted as a being that may be known clearly without being distinctive, it could be argued that the studies regarding consciousness would settle on a more optimistic plane.

Leibniz made a distinction between the principle of contradiction which was related to the realities of sameness and the principle of sufficient reason which was related to the realities of fact. He also explained the roles of infinitesimals, continuation, and final cause in physics (Leibniz, 2014, p. 28). Leibniz used the term Monad firstly in 1697, in a letter to M. Fardella, as a synonym for essence. It could be argued that he surpassed Cartesian dualism in a letter to J. E. Hoffmann in 1699, by explaining that

the spirit was a power (Leibniz, 2014, p. 30). One of his important inquiries, *Nouveaux Essais*, in which he essentially inspected the spirit, was published about fifty years after his death (1765). In this inquiry, he explained the source of knowledge with the concept of *innéité* (innateness) which was a natural implicity that he proposed according to his philosophical general principles. Additionally, he accepted God as the essential model of the spirit of humans, arguing that the spirit of humans was an imperfect copy of it (Leibniz, 2014, p. 31)

According to Leibniz's definition, a monad was a simple essence joining to compounds and did not have parts. This meant that it had no space, form, or divisibility (Leibniz, 2014, p. 39). He added that the sun rising was an empirical expectation, arguing that to make a rational decision that the sun would rise tomorrow was peculiar to astronomers (Leibniz, 2014, p. 47). This perfect example was also accepted by Hume and was known as one of the most striking examples regarding the debate on causality.

Leibniz asserted in his *Monadology* that our reasoning was grounded on two principles. One was the principle of contradiction and the other was the principle of sufficient reason. According to the principle of contradiction, it could be argued that a proposition was false if it included contradiction and it was true which contradicts the false one. The principle of sufficient reason implied that nothing could be true without a sufficient reason that why it was that way and not another. He also inspected truth by making a definition of the truths of reason and the truths of fact. The truths that come from reason were necessary and the opposites of them were impossible. The truths that come from facts were contingent and the opposites of them were possible. Because being (*raison d'être*) of necessary truths could be found until the most primitives by analysis to barer ideas and truths (Leibniz, 2014, pp.47-48).

Leibniz's point of view regarding the organic body was that it was a divine machine or a natural automat that surpassed all of the artificial ones. Because all parts of the divine machine were composed of machines while the artificial ones were not (Leibniz, 2014, pp.55-56). Under the laws of the final causes, spirits acted with the help of opinions, aims, and mediators. Objects acted in accordance with the laws of the efficient cause or motion. He asserted that there was harmony between the final and efficient causes as a critique to Descartes who believed that the spirit could change the directions of substances and could not discern the natural law that the total direction was protected in the matter. Otherwise, Descartes could have met the system of harmony. The system is important because it delineated that substances and souls could interact and act as if they had no soul or substance respectively (Leibniz, 2014, p.59). The explanations above can be said to have vital importance in delineating the ontological properties of consciousness. A model of consciousness that is not a substance and still affects substances should be pretty suitable for the new generational explanations of consciousness.

Leibniz made a difference between Aristotle's causes favoring the final cause. His proposal for the final cause rested on the wisdom and superiority of God. Regarding Descartes' assumption that the final cause was mistakenly overemphasized throughout the middle age, this point of view should also be accepted to be an important difference between Descartes' and Leibniz's philosophies (Leibniz, 2014, p.94). He also had objections against the ontological proof of God which was produced by Anselm in the middle age and later developed by Descartes. The argument for Leibniz's objection was that something should not be present because we could think about it. He argued that fallacies and nonsense things that could not be true were also thinkable (Leibniz, 2014, p.103).

After all of the explanations above, Leibniz could be accepted as one of the cornerstones by virtue of gaining terms like the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of non-contradiction to the philosophy of mind.

2.2.4 The problem of causality in Hume

As an important philosopher, Hume had authentic ideas about causality. He approached the concept in an inclusive manner and enlightened subsequent thinkers like Kant. In his inquiry, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume inspected the concept of causality deeply, concerning identity, and the situations in time and place. According to Hume perception was possible by the presence of objects to the senses along with the relation. He added that causation depended not upon mere ideas and could be traced beyond our senses and informed us of existences and objects, which we did not see or feel. Hume inspected the origin of the idea of causation (Hume, 2014, pp.82-83). Hume assumed that ‘the idea of causation would be derived from some relation among objects and causes’ and ‘effects were contiguous’. The relation of contiguity was essential or may suppose causation. He also noticed the relation of priority as a kind of inference or reasoning (Hume, 2014, p.84). Hume was not contented with the relations of contiguity and succession to afford the idea of causality. He asserted that there should be a relation of necessary connexion which was more important than those above.

Regarding impressions that arise from the senses, Hume asserted that their ultimate cause was perfectly inexplicable by human reason. It was a mystery for Hume whether impressions arose from the object or were produced by the creative power of the mind or were derived from the author of our being (Hume, 2014, p.92). Hume’s point of view outlined above can be said to be accepted as an early question regarding the problem of phenomenal consciousness.

Hume asserted that the inference from cause to effect was not a dependence relationship. He also underlined that the objects in themselves did not imply the existence of others. (Hume, 2014, p.95). This part was highly suggestive of Kant's *Ding an sich*. Because contiguity and succession were not sufficient to make him pronounce any two objects to consist of cause and effect unless we perceived, that they were preserved in several instances, Hume proposed a new relation between cause and effect which was defined as Constant Conjunction. Constant conjunction led us to draw an inference from one object to another. He asserted that the transition from an impression presented to the memory or senses to the idea of an object, which we called cause or effect, was founded on past experiences, and our remembrance of their constant conjunction. He underlined that we inferred things that were not seen from the ones present in our minds that were seen or remembered before (Hume, 2014, pp.96-97). With these approaches, it can be argued that in addition to the causality approach inspired by previous philosophers that the temporal or spatial succession of objects cannot prove that there is a causal relationship between them, Hume added the idea of constant conjunction, which should be original.

The cause and effect as the only connexion or relation of objects could lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses. On the cause and effect, we could find a just inference from one object to another. Hume asserted that after experiencing the constant conjunction of certain objects, we reasoned that such an object produced another (Hume, 2014, p.98). It should not be forgotten that Hume's argument regarding cause and effect was a critique. He did not accept causality that was dependent on the concept of contiguity. Because he argued that reason could never show us the connexion of one object with another, although aided by experience and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. He classified the

principles of union among ideas as resembling, contiguity, and connection. He also asserted that the general principles, associated with ideas, were resemblance, contiguity, and causation (Hume, 2014, p.100). However, Hume asserted that causation was a philosophical relation, implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, his opinion was that causation produced a union among our ideas, that we reasoned upon it, or draw any inference from it (Hume, 2014, p.101).

According to Hume philosophers divided human reason into knowledge and probability and were obliged to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But he asserted that in common discourse, many arguments from causation exceeded probability, and would be received as a superior kind of evidence. He added that the one who would say that it was only probable that the sun would rise tomorrow would appear ridiculous. Though it was plain, we had no further assurance of these facts, than what experience afforded us (Hume, 2014, p.135). We assume that this should be one of the important details, leading Hume to be known against causation. It seems that he put a distance between causation and probability.

Taking into account that Hume defined the concept of idea as something derived from impressions, according to the Humean point of view, we should make an inference that if it should be accepted as an idea, consciousness should have an impression (Hume, 2014, p.169).

Hume's other assertion about necessity was that it was something that existed in the mind, not in objects; nor was it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. However, we have no idea of necessity, it is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union. Thus the necessity lies only in

the act of understanding (Hume, 2014, p.173). Drawing on the above ideas, we can be hopeful about explanatory contingent options for consciousness.

He resembled our reason to a kind of cause, of which truth was the natural effect, which was a fact that degenerated all knowledge into probability (Hume, 2014, p.185). Hume asserted that skepticism regarding reason should be in question in that way. He added that all reasoning concerning causes and effects was derived from nothing but custom; and that belief was more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures (Hume, 2014, p.188). In the relevant sections of this study, we have stated that the habit approach here is also found in N. d'autrecoart and some of the previous Islamic philosophers.

According to Hume, since a substance was entirely different from perception, we had, therefore, no idea of a substance. We had no idea of inhesion because inhesion in something was supposed to be requisite to support the existence of perception and nothing appeared requisite to support the existence of our perception. Hume argued that the argument about the immateriality of the soul was remarkable. Extended things consisted of parts; and whatever consisted of parts was divisible, if not in reality, at least in the imagination. It was impossible for something divisible could be conjoined to thought and perception, which was a being altogether inseparable and undividable. Likewise, it was impossible to think that undividable thought existed neither on the left nor on the right hand of the extended dividable body (Hume, 2014, p.233).

Hume asserted that our perceptions were all different, separable, and distinguishable from each other, and from everything else, which we could imagine, and therefore it was impossible to conceive, how they could be the action or abstract mode of any substance (Hume, 2014, p.242). The suggestion above should have been

made to defend that our perceptions were private. Hume also asserted that we should separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought and that motion would be and was the cause of thought and perception (Hume, 2014, p.245). It can be argued that questioning the substance of the mind and how it is constituted is one of the basic problems in exploring consciousness. Studies are focused on inspecting the probability of having a substance of the mind. Further questions were on the ontic/ontological thinghood of consciousness, and the real/propositional truth value of consciousness. They were also on the time that the consciousness is gained (as an assumption, consciousness could be gained in the first four months of pregnancy) and also what are the properties of consciousness in other living organisms.

The problem of personal identity was one of the important topics in Hume's inquiries. He asserted that the identity, which we ascribed to the mind of man, was only a fictitious one, and of like kind to that which we ascribed to vegetables and animal bodies. He regarded that every distinct perception, which entered the composition of the mind, was a distinct existence, and was different, indistinguishable, and separate from every other perception (Hume, 2014, p.255). In summary, it could be argued that Hume gave importance to experience and habit, as principles that led us to think about causality (Hume, 2014, p.260). In addition, we can say that Hume also benefited from the ideas of previous philosophers (such as habit, and rejection of necessity) and added his own original suggestions (such as constant conjunction) in the causality-consciousness relationship to his philosophy.

2.2.5 The Problem of causality in Kant

Kant inspected causality in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the section of The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas, and in other sections which are mentioned in another section of this inquiry. Kant asserted that causality under the laws of nature was not the only one from which all the appearances of the world could be derived. He favored another way of causality through freedom to explain them. He argued that causality must be assumed through which something happens without its cause being further determined by another previous cause. (Kant, 1998, A444/B472- A446/B 474).

In the Introduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is mentioned that Kant rejected the philosophy of his predecessors, especially that of Leibniz (Kant, 1998, p.24). Additionally, it is argued that Kant rejected the proof of the principle of sufficient reason offered by C. Wolff and A.G. Baumgarten (Kant, 1998, p.25). Kant's question was that "What was the ground of the relation of that in us which we call representation to the object?" This was a puzzle in the case of the relationship of pure concepts of understanding, which he asserted that they were originated from the soul to objects presented by sensible experience (Kant, 1998, p.48). The explanations above delineate that Kant did underline causality in a critical manner.

In the preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argued that human reason was burdened with questions that it could not answer since it transcended the capacity of reason itself (Kant, 1998, A viii). It may be an extreme approximation but the question of the thinghood of consciousness should remind us of Kant's assertions above.

Kant argued that the principle of causality and the mechanism of nature in determining causality would be valid of all things in general as efficient causes. Additionally, he asserted that concerning natural necessities, it was a contradiction whether the will of the human soul was free or not (Kant, 1998, B xxvii). Kant's other argument was that the principle of causality applied only to the objects of experience (Kant, 1998, Bxxviii). He argued that one could be conscious through the inner experience of his existence in time and this was more than merely being conscious of his representation because it was identical to the empirical consciousness of his existence (Kant, 1998, Bxl). Kant argued that *a priori* cognitions were the universal cognitions that had the character of inner necessity, and should have been clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience. *A priori* cognitions were subject to necessity whereas *a posteriori* ones were not (Kant, 1998, A2). Kant gave considerable importance to pure, merely speculative reason inasmuch that he named his philosophy as transcendental philosophy (Kant, 1998, A15/B29). Kant also underlined the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. He defined analytic judgments (affirmative ones) as those in which the connection of the predicate was thought through identity, but those in which this connection was thought without identity were to be called synthetic judgments (Kant, 1998, A7/B11). From this starting point, it can be asked whether the definition of consciousness can be made analytically or synthetically. It should be remembered that in analytical definitions, the problem should be identified by a detailed examination. The term analytical, in the Kantian sense, should refer to the ones that do not add new insights to a concept. So, the "analytical" decisions should only analyze concepts. They do not add new information about the concepts inspected.

He argued that the inferences of the mathematicians proceeded under the principle of contradiction (Kant, 1998, A10/B14). In the section of *The Transcendental Logic*, Kant's commentary was that our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind which were the receptivity of representations and the faculty for cognizing an object through these representations (spontaneity of concepts). By the receptivity of representations an object was given to us while through cognizing an object by these representations, it was thought. The elements of our cognition were intuition and concepts. Both were pure (no sensation was mixed into the representation) or empirical (sensation was contained therein). Kant argued that only pure intuitions and concepts were possible a priori, and empirical ones were possible a posteriori. Kant defined understanding as the faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition. He added that without sensibility no objects would be given to us, and without understanding, none would be thought. He added the famous assessment that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concept are blind" (Kant, 1998, A51/B75). This assertion deserves knowledge as a matter of an object that can be given in an intuition, whether pure or empirical. It can be argued that there should be no empirical source for consciousness. So, the knowledge regarding consciousness should be in a manner that pure intuition should be included. Then the knowledge regarding consciousness should be a priori. This inference starting from Kant's argumentations should be hard to apply to the studies of consciousness since a priori knowledge does not submit a sensible object.

Another problem that was noticed in Kant's inquiry was that, as the definition of truth was the agreement of cognition with the object, there should be difficulty in defining the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition (Kant, 1998, A58/B83). The truth value of consciousness, according to the definition above, should

be troublesome for estimation, because it should be problematic to estimate the agreement of cognition about consciousness with its object. The object of consciousness should be out of our imagination for the contemporary developments in philosophy and science. Kant gave special importance to the concept of causality and he accepted it as a category of relation (Kant, 1998, A80/ B106).

Kant's evaluation of consciousness was that he was conscious with the help of the inner experience of his existence in time in a manner more than merely being conscious of his representation. He added that the consciousness of his existence was identical to the consciousness of a relation to things outside. He asserted that the experience and sense joined the outer sense with the inner (Kant, 1998, Bxl).

Kant's assertions in the *Critique of Pure Reason* seemed to have importance in the studies about consciousness emphasizing the interest in causality. It can be seen that Kant placed the concept of causality under the category of relation. He also placed the concept of contingency and necessity under the category of modality. This can be regarded as he didn't assume a direct relation between causality and contingency/necessity. However, it can be argued according to Kant that both of them (causality and contingency/necessity) were needed in order to build knowledge and that's why they were important vehicles for processing the human consciousness/mind. However, regarding the huge capacity of the text, it is also needed to refer to other thinkers for achieving satisfactory conclusions.

2.2.6 The Problem of Causality in Heidegger

Like the Presocratics, Heidegger defined the nature of being in which the world was constituted as the central problem of his inquiry *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger, 1978, p. xiv). According to the translator of the book, T. Malick, Heidegger stated that his

concept of the world was different from E. Husserl's. Despite this difference, it can be stated that *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, despite its title, is heavily concerned with the concept of the World (Heidegger, 1978, p. xv).

As could be understood from the title (*Vom Wesen des Grundes*), one of the aims of Heidegger's inquiry could be said to be focused on the reason (*Grund*) related to the beings in the world or of the world –or *Dasein*- itself. The word *essence* (*Wesen*) can also be translated as *what*, giving a meaning of exploring the reasons for the inquiry. It can be inspected that the inquiry also had the property of exploring the philosophical literature regarding reason (causality). Additionally, Heidegger argued that the inquiry defined the ontological difference. In addition to the proposals above, it can be argued that the terms cause and reason have different meanings. The term cause could be said to be utilized for the previous studies of causality, such as that of Leibniz. The term reason could be said to be valid for the later studies of Heidegger on causality. Notification of this difference would prevent us from faulty proposals in the context of an inquiry into causality.

Heidegger asserted that Romans used the word *res* for the word *causa*, implying that the word *causa* meant the *cause* as a synonym with *res*. He noted that the word *causa* later come to mean *cause*, by means of causality. Indeed, the Old German word *thing* or *dinc* was suited for the Roman word *res* (Heidegger, 1975, p.175).

Heidegger noticed several meanings of beginning (*arkhe*) in Aristotle's philosophy. However, his proposal on Aristotle's concept of reason was that the inner connections were obscure (Heidegger, 1978, p.5).

As cited in Heidegger, Leibniz focused on the problem of reasons (causality) as the *Principium Rationis Sufficientis* (Philosophical Dissertation Concerning the Use

and Limits of the Principle of Determinative and Commonly Sufficient Reason.) Schopenhauer also inspected the problem of reasons in *Concerning the Fourfold Roots of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813). Kant noticed the problem of the principle of sufficient reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)*. Schelling's study that *Philosophical Investigations Concerning the Essence of Human Freedom and Pertinent Matters* (1809) included ideas about the problem of sufficient reason. The studies above implied that the problem of reasons was related to the realm of transcendence, as pointed out in the second section (Transcendence as the Realm of the Question about the Essence of Reasons) of Heidegger's inquiry (Heidegger, 1978, p.11).

According to Heidegger, the assertion that *nihil est sine ratione* (nothing is without reason) and the positive version of it *omne ens habet rationem* (every being has a reason) realized the relationship between being and the reason of it. So, it could be thought that the question of what constitutes the essence of reasons, needed to be specified. Another important problem to be solved was the meaning of reason (Heidegger, 1978, p.135).

Heidegger asserted that propositional truth originated from the predicative manifestness of being which could be called ontic truth. This definition was compatible with Heidegger's statements. Something was ontic if it was related to being (*Seindes*), while it is ontological if it is related to Being (*Sein*) or to *Dasein*'s understanding of Being. He also differed being discovered (the truth of that which is present at hand) of material things from being disclosed –of existing *Dasein*- (the truth of the kind of being which ourselves are) (Heidegger, 1978, p.21). There could be an important question in the debate on consciousness whether the truth regarding the essence of consciousness is ontic or ontological. Should it be handled as being disclosed or being discovered? If we accept the truth about consciousness as ontic truth, then we should focus on being.

Otherwise, if we regard it as ontological then the point that must be focused on should be Being or *Dasein*'s understanding of Being. An inquiry into these differences should be valuable.

Dasein's understanding of Being has priority on an ontological approach to the problem of consciousness. But it is hard to agree whether the methodological type of solution should be in the version being disclosed or being discovered. Because consciousness in the form of Being is said to be heavily dependent upon the existence and cognitive activity of Dasein, which is the weak ring on the chain. The concept of consciousness as a universal problem is hard to be conveyed from subject to subject. It should be argued that an intersubjective interpretation should be preferred to criticize the essence of consciousness on an ontological basis.

Heidegger asserted that being discovered was possible for material things that were present at hand. Being disclosed of existing Dasein was identical with the truth of the kind of being which we ourselves were. He also asserted that the two kinds of truth mentioned above were ontical. Another point was that truth was defined as propositional truth as a combination of plain representations, instead of combinations. *Being* was objectified by representation (Heidegger, 1978, p.21).

Another point about consciousness should be its essence concerning metaphysics. The term metaphysics had different meanings in different philosophical ages. In Aristotle's inquiry (*Metaphysics*) the term was handled as ontology. Descartes defined metaphysics as the root of all the sciences. There were differences between Hume's and Kant's understandings of metaphysics also. Kant's drive for writing the *Critique of Pure Reason* could be said to be Hume's assumption that knowledge originated from the experience was not certain. That's why he attempted to clear and

make certain of some universal cognitions (*a priori* cognitions) that had the character of inner necessity, independent of experience (Kant, 1998, A2). That's why he desired to construct a way of certain knowledge that does not depend on experience but on metaphysics. According to Kant's definition, metaphysical knowledge was synthetic *a priori*. Heidegger's inquiry *What is Metaphysics?* is another important book. Regarding all the statements above, it can be argued that the essence of consciousness can be accepted as being something meta to the physical world. The main difference between physical and metaphysical –in contemporary meaning- could be said to have consisted of measurability. (However, it seems useless to insist on the conventional meaning of measurability.) An example can be given as follows: Light is the terminal energy that can be transformed from other energy sources like electricity, sun, wind, etc. Light is no longer an abstract being after the discovery of measurable wavelengths. Starting from this example let's make a syllogism: If the essence of consciousness will be disclosed in the future, it can be argued that level(s) of consciousness would be measured (or transmitted interpersonally) in a proper way.

The term world in the definition of *Being-in-the-world* meant something other than the entirety of being immediately present at hand. According to Heidegger, we cannot determine *Dasein* by exploring its factual existence. Thus the term Being-in-the-world has no ontic meaning, which is a point leading *Dasein* to be an ontological proposition. *Dasein* is not Being-in-the-world but its essential constitution lies in the Being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1978, p.45). A similar proposition can be made regarding consciousness. Consciousness may not be regarded as Being-in-the-world but similar to *Dasein*, it can be concluded that its essential constitution lies in the Being-in-the-world. It can be asserted that consciousness should be about the ontological existence of Being-in-the-world. This could be one of the basic differences between

humans and other animals. It is because it could be assumed that animals do not waste time by thinking about their ontological existences. It can be regarded that they simply use their conscious functions for their daily routine activities (feeding, seeking sexual partners, etc.). This suggestion could be related to Aristotle's definition of the soul in animals which was responsible for sensation (Aristotle, 2004, 413b1-5).

Heraklitus' definition of the world seemed to provide insight into social consciousness. He regarded the world of awakened people as a public area while everyone returns to his world during sleep (Heraclitus, 1954, Fragment 89). No one wants to make an anachronistic mistake but there seems to be a resemblance between the world of Heraklitus' sleeping person and qualia or first-person perspective on consciousness. The term, being accessible to everyone, reminds the third-person perspective.

Heidegger's definition that "World never 'is'; it 'worlds'" is important concerning consciousness (Heidegger, 1978, p.103). An interpretation of this commentary would be that concerning something, functions of the subject (thing) should be sufficient and it has not had to be propositionally defined. However, it has to be added that as in the example of epiphenomenalism, the functions of something are not always related to its essence. Vapor results from the functions of a locomotive but it is an epiphenomenon and can be accepted to be irrelevant to the essence of the locomotive. However, as can be seen from the example of concentrating before sports competitions, we understand that the functions of consciousness can make a visible and measurable difference so that we cannot only talk about the epiphenomenal side of consciousness.

Attempts of defining the essence of freedom in Heidegger's inquiries depending on transcendence -instead of spontaneity- allow us to point to a subtype of causality. A free act demands itself for the generator of itself. It has a *causa-sui* like its own. This approach hides the difference between initiation and happening which is an important point in the concept of causality. Heidegger asserted that *Dasein* defined the cause present in a peculiar mode of Being of the being. *Dasein* had an initiating property rather than it is a part or all of the happenings. (Heidegger, 1978, p.105). As a critique of Heidegger, it can be argued that an announcement demands a platform where the announced message can be transmitted to the recipient. In any communicational system, there should be a recipient for an announcement to be announced. In the absence of the recipient or deficient forms of the announcement, it can be argued that *Dasein* may not be able to announce itself. Alternatively, the announcement underlined here should be defined as that of the 'first-person' point of view. Heidegger asserted that neither transcendence nor freedom was fully defined (Heidegger, 1978, p.107).

Dasein was a being that found itself in being and also behaved toward itself. But this understanding may not explain the transcendental possibility of intentional possibility. Referring to Husserl, Heidegger asserted that intentionality could not be ignored in explaining transcendence (Heidegger, 1978, p.115). It can be concluded from the above assertions that Heidegger accepted intentionality and transcendence as similar to the problem of consciousness.

Heidegger asserted that the principle of sufficient reason originated from freedom (Heidegger, 1978, p.123). If we accept the being of consciousness as an ontological truth, then transcendence should be one of the properties of consciousness. According to Heidegger's arguments, freedom was the origin of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. We should add here the critique of being a starter or reason. For

being a sufficient reason, consciousness should be accepted to be the starter or reason for itself. But if consciousness is an epiphenomenon, then it should have such importance in the essence of the mind.

According to Heidegger, freedom was the reason for reasons but not as endless iteration (Heidegger, 1978, p.127). It can be argued from the explanations above that freedom may not be the source of itself. He added that *Dasein* disclosed as “freedom for reasons” (Heidegger, 1978, p. 131). If we try to summarize the suggestions above, we can conclude that *Dasein* as finite freedom for reasons needs a media that it can disclose itself and this media should be transcendence. Regarding the inquiries of consciousness, the conscious subject (for example *Dasein* here) needs to be in transcendence to get rid of determinism. Determinism here is closer to the third-person point of view of consciousness. The first-person point of view is more representative of the consciousness of freedom. This freedom inhabits a kind of finitude regarding its failure to initiate itself endlessly. In summary, causality can be added to consciousness studies in the way of accepting consciousness as a factor processing in transcendence and cannot be the cause but it grounds itself.

2.3. The Contingency Approach to Causality

In the above sections, after emphasizing the relationship between causality and consciousness, we consider the contingent causality approach, which is more suitable for the analysis of consciousness, after considering it from its historical perspective. The term contingency is used in the sense of being "not necessary". Regarding causality, it can be interpreted as a cause-effect relationship that is not necessary/deterministic, which can be otherwise. For example, while the adrenaline discharge or electrical stimulation in neuroanatomical tissues is necessary by

stimulating the relevant nerve cell, it is a contingent feature that the organism's response to this can be in the form of fight or flight. The variable structure of the mind and its subjection to multiple variables, and the reciprocity of the relations on the nervous system lead us to the preference for such an approach. In this section, the contingent causality approach is presented with its historical perspective, with the addition of its evolution from the necessary to the contingent perspective in relation to consciousness.

It is seen that modern science continued its development after completing its formation in the 17th century, but the current scientific approaches in the first half of the 20th century were insufficient to explain the relevant phenomena. On the other hand, the deterministic understanding that has accompanied science effectively since the 18th century with Newtonian mechanics reached its peak in the 19th century. In the book titled *Theorie Antique Des Probabilities*, published by P. S. de Laplace in 1820, it was argued that the future of the universe as a whole could be determined definitively based on its past (Yıldırım, 2021, p.186).

The deterministic approach that draws attention in this excerpt emphasizes an understanding of certainty and causality in a necessary sense dating back to Antiquity. When we trace determinism to antiquity, we encounter a breaking point in Epicurus. According to Leucippus and Democritus, as cited by H. Aydın, atoms necessarily form objects by encountering repulsions and collisions, which are the result of eddy movements whose origin and direction are not determined. However, Epicurus notices the deviation of atoms as the creator of things. This point can be regarded as the beginning of the transition from the necessity to contingency. There was no clear answer to the reason for the atoms deviating in Epicurus' model (Aydın, 2022, p.152).

As can be seen from the above subsections of the second main part of the study, concepts such as cause, cause-effect relationship, and causality principle have been among the important investigation subjects of philosophy since ancient times. As cited in Aydın, it is emphasized that Presocratic philosophy showed a two-dimensional change in the 5th century BC. The first is the use of plural explanations instead of the understanding of *arkhe* in the schools of Miletus, Pythagoras, and Elea. The second is conventionalism and synthesisism, which is an approach in which the previous unsuccessful ideas are eliminated and the successful ones are handled with new syntheses. In this period, in addition to the material cause (*causa materialis*) and the final cause (*causa finalis*), different effective causes (*causa efficiens*) were proposed in terms of causality, and materialistic-mechanical explanations emerged, as in the atomists. The first doubts about causality began to be expressed by the Sophists (Aydın, 2022, p.85).

It is seen that the causal approaches in the Middle Ages generally included divine causality. For example, Augustine tries to synthesize One of the Neoplatonists with the trinity God of Christianity. However, taking a stance in favor of creation out of nothing (*creatio ex nihilo*), not an emanation, like the Neoplatonists, he sees God as the "free-absolute creative cause" of the universe. While God is one and simple because he has no cause, the universe with a cause is multiplicity (Aydın, 2022, pp.235-236). As cited in Aydın, according to Augustine, while God created the universe completely at once, he also placed causal principles (*rationes causales*) or seed-like principles (*rationales seminales*) in it (Aydın, 2022, p.242). We see that Augustine uses the word ratio (reason) in an ontological sense as the principle regulating beings, the cause of beings, and actions (Aydın, 2022, p.246).

In the first half of the 9th century, when the works of ancient Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic, Islamic thinkers became aware of the causality debates among ancient philosophers (Aydın, 2022, p. 260). Islamic theologians have substituted God and divine will and power for the atomist worldview, which does not accept belief in God, and explains the events in the world with coincidence (Aydın, 2022, p. 263). The literature on this subject is very wide and in a sense, it is outside the scope of our dissertation. However, it would be appropriate to mention the name of Juveyni, who brought a contingent understanding of the universe among Islamic thinkers and argued that the cause-effect relationship cannot be proven. According to Aydın, Ghazali, in his book *Tehafüt el-Felasife*, argues that the causal relationship can be proven neither by reason nor by experience. He asserts that in fact, the relationship is essentially a side-by-side relationship (*iktiran*) and is an experience-based habit (*custom*) (Aydın, 2022, p. 379). Also, according to Avicenna, we should point out that contrary to the deterministic character of the superlunar universe, there is an indeterministic and contingent physical universe understanding in the sublunar world (Aydın, 2022, p. 391). In parallel with this approach, Avicenna argues that proving causality is a metaphysical problem and it cannot be proved that the cause necessitates the effect of the cause, both mentally and experimentally. By dividing Aristotle's four causes into two main groups, internal and external, the cause of existence and essence, he argues that God is the efficient cause that gives continuity to existence and existence in the metaphysical plane (Aydın, 2022, p. 392). As cited in Aydın, Ghazali questioned whether what philosophers call a necessary relation was an ontological (belonging to the external world) or an epistemological (mental field) necessity. He also asserted that at least in the field of the external world and objective realities, the cause-effect relation was not compulsory. According to him, carrying the logical necessity to the world of

objects stems from ignorance (Aydın, 2022, p.406). For Ghazali, observation shows that the cause coexists with the effect, not that the effect follows from the cause. This approach was also defended by thinkers such as Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus in the skeptic tradition in the Ancient period, and it has deep-rooted projections in Avicenna. With this approach, Ghazali reduces the cause-effect relationship to habit, as we have seen before in Avicenna and we will encounter later in N. d'Autrecourt and D. Hume (Aydın, 2022, pp.407-408).

According to Aydın, causality discussions in the early Christian world are mainly Neoplatonic versions of Plato's theory of ideas and the synthesis of Stoic seed causality with Christianity's understanding of logos and creation. Parallel to this, the Neoplatonic understanding and the approaches of the church fathers, which emerged most clearly in the thought of J.S. Eriugena, should be emphasized. The synthesis between Aristotelianism and Christianity, the most authoritative example of which we can see in T. Aquinas, is also important. The synthesis between atomism and Christianity should also be emphasized. At this point, N. d'Autrecourt, who belongs to the tradition of William of Ockham, comes to the fore. Described as the "Hume of the Middle Ages" by some researchers, d'Autrecourt adopts the atomist doctrine and offers a critique of the concept of causality like the Islamic theologians (Aydın, 2022, pp.469-470).

As quoted by Aydın, according to T. Aquinas, Augustine emphasized that God can act contrary to the established natural order (*contra solitum cursum naturae*); but he cannot act against his own supreme law (*contra summam legem*). With this approach, it is thought that Aquinas made a distinction between natural and divine law, in addition to the necessary and contingent reasons to ground the miracle. Aquinas focused on the God-nature-human relationship as the central problem in his God-oriented system of

thought, which included Christianity, Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, and Islamic Aristotelianism. It is seen that Aquinas, who included the problem of causality in almost every discussion, tried to synthesize the Christian understanding of God with the Aristotelian understanding of nature. Therefore, it is thought that he had a dual understanding of causality, one divine and the other natural. To make room for the miracle, he moved away from the notion that there was a rigid determinism in nature. According to him, there was determinism in the field of necessary causes in nature, and indeterminism in the field of contingent causes (Aydın, 2022, pp.516-518).

According to Aydın, d'Autrecourt criticized the dominant paradigm of the Middle Ages and Aristotle-centered authority with a probabilistic approach. We find that his epistemic probabilism was often based on the tradition of William of Ockham into which it was incorporated. He even argued that even his own criticism was not far from being certain and included probability. d'Autrecourt criticized Aristotelianism's first matter, substance (*ousia*), substance-accident (*ousia-accidens*), matter-form relation, causality doctrine, existence hierarchy, and understanding of goodness. In addition, he advocated an atomist doctrine that bore traces of the early atomist thinkers of ancient Greek and that of *Mu'tazilite* theologians (Aydın, 2022, pp.519-520). The results of his approaches can be summarized as follows:

1. Based on the experience, the concept of cause and causal link could not be reached.

2. Natural cause and causal link could not be proven logically. Since it could not be proven, the natural cause-effect relationship remained "contingent". These approaches were similar to that of Ghazali, who argued that the cause-effect relationship could not be proven either rationally (*a priori*) or experientially (*a*

posteriori). He argued that the necessity in the logical field was transferred to the world of objects stems from ignorance and that everything was possible in the world of experience without a logical contradiction (Aydın, 2022, pp.526-527). As cited in Aydın, according to d'Autrecourt, no empirical knowledge was certain except direct perception of sensory data (for example, perceiving a color) or perceptual awareness (our awareness of perceiving a color). It was a habit that is why we believed in causal connections in nature, even though logic and experience did not support it (Aydın, 2022, pp.530-531).

In the 20th century, it is seen that causality began to take a position far from the old rigid determinism. The literature in philosophy and sciences such as physics met explanations that were not deterministic. One of the leading theoretical approaches to this is the relativity theory, which argues that concepts such as space, time, and mass are relative rather than absolute. The other is the quantum theory which argues that the heat and light emitted by the matter are not a continuous flow, but on the contrary, consist of discontinuous packets called *quanta*. According to classical determinism, it was assumed that it was possible to determine the states of moving objects simultaneously in terms of location and velocity. According to quantum theory, the states of subatomic particles at any given moment cannot be determined from these two aspects at the same time. According to the famous uncertainty principle proposed by W. Heisenberg in 1927, we cannot predict the future location of a particle at the micro level by looking at its initial conditions, that is, its position and momentum at a certain past moment (Yıldırım, 2021, p.187). Yıldırım tries to explain this principle as follows:

To pinpoint an electron's exact location, the observer must use short-wave light, but the shorter the wavelength of the light he uses, the higher its frequency. As the frequency of the light is high, the energy of the photon striking the electron is large (the

energy of the light photon is equal to the light frequency multiplied by the Plank constant $h=6.6 \times 10^{-27}$). On the other hand, it is necessary to use long-wave light to determine the momentum (change in velocity) of the electron, but this time the position of the observed particle disappears under such light (Yıldırım, 2021, pp.188-189).

As cited in Yıldırım, H. Reichenbach by proposing a 3-valued (true-false-uncertain) logic approach instead of the ongoing 2-valued (true-false) classical logic, opposed the deterministic understanding in science and causal certainty. When we apply this multi-valued approximation of Reichenbach's logic to subatomic particles, if proposition P about the momentum of a particle in motion is true, proposition Q about its position is uncertain. Ironically, proposition Q here must be ambiguous (Yıldırım, 2021, pp.190-191).

For Yıldırım, science (or at least the natural sciences) does not, in fact, deal with the facts one by one, but instead attempts to identify and explain the relations between the facts. Stating that these relations have various forms, such as observational or theoretical, universal or statistical, Yıldırım draws attention to the fact that these relations manifest themselves as cause-effect relations in terms of their structural characteristics (Yıldırım, 2021, p.173). On the other hand, Yıldırım states that according to some thinkers and scientists in the 20th century, the concept of causality (causality relationship and principle) has no place in science, for example, according to Russell, this concept is a remnant of old ages (Yıldırım, 2021, p.180). However, Yıldırım, underlines that the concept of causality continues to exist, albeit implicitly. As seen from the latest developments in science, what is wanted to be abandoned because it contradicts science is actually the metaphysical interpretation or meaning of “cause”/“causality”. He asserts that in reality, the causality relation or the causality principle does not consist of a problem for science today. Yıldırım stated that the effort

to search for cause in Aristotle's tradition gave way to the causal relationship in modern science (Yıldırım, 2021, p.181). Regarding these approaches, we can emphasize that causality has been interpreted predominantly in a necessary/deterministic context from the ancient period to the modern age of science. It can be said that the modern scientific approach and later on, as a general acceptance, a relationality in which the causality relation can be interpreted other than its necessary/deterministic meaning has begun to be mentioned.

As cited in Yıldırım, P. Suppes, E. Mach and Russell's desire to replace the causal relationship with the concept of functional relationship can only be in question in terms of classical Newtonian physics. It is because the deterministic relations of this field are suitable for the functional relation, which can be expressed as a mathematical equation. Factual relations, which are the subject of contemporary physics and social sciences, on the contrary, are not exact and definite relations but have a contingent quality (Yıldırım, 2021, p.183). Therefore, in his book *A Probabilist Theory of Causality* published in 1970, Suppes attempted to make a contingent interpretation of causality rather than a deterministic one. In this direction, he offered a definition framework that included concepts such as seeming reason, negative reason, and sufficient reason. Suppes asserted that X is the cause of Y, if the emergence of a phenomenon Y follows the emergence of phenomenon X with high probability, and also if there is not a third possibility for the probability relationship between X and Y (Aydın, 2022, p.184).

Accordingly, for example, the apparent cause is the cause that makes a significant difference in the probability of occurrence of another phenomenon if it does not occur. The adverse cause is the reason that prevents the occurrence of a phenomenon, and sufficient reason is the cause that definitely brings about the result.

If we pay attention here, it will be seen that the old, deterministic interpretation of causality is a special case of the new, probabilistic interpretation (Yıldırım, 2021, pp.183-186). However, it should be noted that the discussion involving Suppes' explanations above is only in the context of quantum theory.

As can be understood from the above approaches, the deterministic and compulsory interpretation of the concept of causality does not comply with today's scientific realities. From this point of view, in our dissertation, we tried to interpret the relationship between consciousness and causality in its contingent context. From a contingent causality point of view, orientation to consciousness may offer an opportunity to save the problematic connection between organic structures such as the brain and nervous system and subjective sensory experiences called "*qualia*" from being unresolved. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, which includes original points of view and evaluations, the achievements of the understanding of contingent causality and its aspects that shed light on future consciousness studies are presented.

Compared to the above two subsections of Chapter 2, the contingent causality approaches in Chapter 2. 3, can be considered to be more appropriate for our era, where uncertainty replaced certainty. We think that the uncertainty approach is more helpful in solving problems such as the original interpretation of consciousness rather than initiating a chaotic process. For this reason, if a causal relationship is to be mentioned in problems such as the problem of phenomenal consciousness, we advocate that it should be contingent, not deterministic, but enabling many solution-oriented approaches. In the following sections, while presenting the approaches of contemporary thinkers and our original interpretations, the contribution of contingent causality to consciousness studies will be observed better.

3. CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS ON CONSCIOUSNESS

The importance of consciousness in the philosophy of mind has a persistent place in contemporary discussions as in ancient philosophy. It can be argued that the term consciousness should be preferred to define the contemporary meaning of all of the definitions above.

As a historical footnote, explanations such as Leibniz's term apperception, Kant's definitions of transcendental apperception, *ich denke*, of Fichte's *Ideen I* do not seem to help to disclose or discover the factual being of consciousness (if there would be a factual being regarding consciousness). Yunus Emre's saying that "There is an I inside of me that is inner than me" should also underline the distinct and obscure character of consciousness. It can be argued that the second I in Yunus Emre's saying should not be so obscure. The subject and people around would agree on the separate and visible existence of the second I (whether it is a man or woman, young or aged, etc). However, the same assertion should not be valid for the first I. An example supporting the argument should be the fact that someone cannot believe how he made something mistakenly in the past. The answer should be replied carefully. Because it bears the risk of anachronism. But also the fact that being conscious about our own consciousness is a problematic point in the philosophy of mind. It can be argued that many of the explanations depend on propositions that are accepted to be true without questioning. For example, some arguments assert that we are conscious of ourselves without needing additional support. However, in analyzing the self, the answer should not be so easy. The self should consist neither solely of the thoughts about ourselves nor the neurochemical network of our body. The reason for it is hard to transmit as an explanation, the thought of the self should be accepted to be the problematic part. On

the other side, the neurochemical network is heavily studied in the studies performed from a third-person point of view. For philosophers, the problematic point in these studies should be the one that assumptions regarding the place of consciousness are made depending on the signals on images in EEG, fMRI, etc. That's why it can be argued that such a dichotomy is not useful in philosophical studies about consciousness. And at this point here comes the importance of causality and contingency. This means a possible necessity of another point of view exception on the first-person and the third-person points of view or the third one in between.

Putnam argues that intentionality matters and is responsible for representation. He claims that similarity does not mean real. The definition of "seeing as" is one of Putnam's individual assertions (Putnam, 2004, pp.1-3). Considering the approach that the reality of consciousness is in the image, it can be thought that this approach will be subject to criticism. The truth of an object (like a tree) cannot rely upon its picture and similar objects (Putnam, 2004, p. 4). Starting with these explanations we could assert that the term intentionality would be familiar with something in reality. But one of the problematic points is that we accept that non-physical concepts like freedom, eternity, etc. should also have intentionality. Their form of objectivity is different from that of the things having the objectivity of material objects.

He asserts that the "brain in a vat" model in which brains are placed nutrient media can be representative of a mind/world relationship. The brains in a vat could not infer that they are so. This can be explicated as in order to be aware of ourselves, there should be a perspective allowing us to see ourselves from the outside. Putnam underlines that there is a correlation between the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (Putnam, 2004, pp.6-7). The philosophical question regarding this should be what does Skolem's Paradox tell us about our understanding

of set theory and/or about the semantics of the set-theoretic language (www.plato.stanford.edu. Skolem's Paradox. Jan 12, 2009; substantive revision Nov 11, 2014. Reached on Oct, 10th 2019). The importance of the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem in the studies of consciousness should be whether we can produce more general argumentations (like the location of consciousness or other versions of the hard problem) by starting with some definite properties of consciousness (like those of behavioral sciences).

Putnam asserts that it is possible to pass the Turing test while referring to nothing. In the Turing test, if the answers of a computer convince a person as if it is a human, it is accepted that the computer passes the test. According to Putnam, the Turing test also aims to determine the existence of (shared) reference (Putnam, 2004, p. 9). In our opinion, passing the Turing test without reference to anything can be considered as a parallel interpretation of the fact that artificial intelligence is not conscious.

Putnam has critiques on reference also and gives an example that some pictures have no reference adding that the image of such a picture in the painter's mind cannot be accepted as a reference. According to him, the same analogy is possible on computers that are not conscious and play only on imitations. However the brains in a vat accepted to be conscious, their world should differ from ours and it is questionable whether they can refer to external objects (Putnam, 2004, p. 12). These suggestions above should be regarded as favoring that machines are not conscious. From that point of view it can be argued that regarding the Hard Problem, we can talk about the instability of reference. This means that we cannot be sure or persistent about the reference of the thing that is referred to by ourselves, as it is referred to by others.

Putnam attributes his objection to Brentano's approach to intentionality that we can think of external objects or properties without using representations. He also draws attention to the importance of the differences between concepts and images. He states that different objects cannot be distinguished by the senses, and he himself cannot distinguish between different types of trees. However, it is obvious that different objects cannot be considered the same, even if people cannot distinguish them. In the twin worlds example, he states that the same object can be named with different words. Thus, different concepts can be derived from the same appearance (Putnam, 2004, p. 18). The message that the twin world example wants to convey is that the meaning of words depends on the causal relationship between the spoken object and the thought object. We think that the approaches of Putnam allow us to move our perspective on the intentionality of consciousness beyond the old approaches. He argues that the claim that a concept must be related to its referent is logically flawed because concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not events. He claims that mental representations may not refer to external things (Putnam, 2004, p. 21). This point could be accepted to have major importance in the studies of consciousness because the term consciousness has nothing external (occurrence) but is said to be an ability. From Putnam's standpoint, it could be regarded that the term "consciousness" should not necessarily be originated from a physical origin. The argument for this question should lie in Putnam's assertion above (mental representations may not refer to external things). As an extraordinary way of thinking, someone may conclude that an origin (consciousness) referring to non-physical (non-existing) things should not be physical (existent). Also, it may be added that this point of view deserves many philosophical and physical studies.

According to Heil, we can emphasize that the functionalism approach can be initiated with Putnam's books *Minds and Machines* (1960) and *Psychological Predicates* (1967) and that they have an attitude against behaviorism. (Heil, 2020, p.170).

Heil argues that Searle's approach to consciousness, which he sees as a natural causal product of physical systems, is similar to Chalmers' approach to the hard problem. However, while Searle focuses on the biological nature of conscious organisms, he rejects the functionalist view taken by Chalmers. According to Heil, although consciousness originates in the brain, conscious attributes seem entirely new (Heil, 2004b, p. 678). Regarding the recent developments in neuro-medicine (happy gut, etc.), it can be argued that new insights about consciousness that question the central role of the brain are in the point of order. He asks; "How does a mental event have a physical effect?" He inspects the problem with the help of Pereboom and Kornblith's assertions of higher-level (H1 to H2) causal relations and lower-level (P1 to P2) causal relations. He adds that genetics, molecular biology, and physiology have such causal relationships, and mental causation can be added to this (Heil, 2004b, p. 680). As emphasized in the relevant sections of our study, we think that the same genotypic traits are associated with non-identical phenotypic traits, which can be interpreted as a manifestation of a contingent causality relationship that is not necessary for the human organism.

Heil acknowledges that minds are mysteriously dependent on material bodies and that non-reductionist materialism prevails in the contemporary philosophy of mind. He adds that there are also materialist, dualist, and idealist approaches (Heil, 2004b, , p.813). As quoted in Heil, Descartes defended the thesis that minds and bodies, although separate, can interact causally. Starting from the Newtonian causality approach, which allows material bodies to affect each other without touching each other, he included the

possibility that non-spatial minds can also affect material bodies (Heil, 2004b, p.814). Making predictions about consciousness based on Newton's gravitational force approach suggests that the unsolved problems in the philosophy of mind can be overcome with a multidisciplinary approach. However, it should not be forgotten that Newton evaluated the concepts of space and time as absolute. A breaking point has been experienced when this approach, together with Kant, interpreted space and time as "forms of intuition" that provide the possibility of knowledge. In our opinion, such developments make it possible to reach a thinking ground that allows contingent perspectives from the compulsory causality approach.

D. Davidson claims that mental events cannot be examined on the basis of physical laws. According to him, reconciling the causal role of mental events in the physical world is on the agenda as a problem in the philosophy of mind. This contradiction should be eliminated by referring to Kant, who argues that there is no contradiction between freedom and natural necessity (Davidson, 1980, p.207). It can be remembered that according to Kant, the reconciliation of freedom and maxims (individual principles) is possible by inspecting a critical point (*Critique of the Practical Reason*). The aim of the second critique could be accepted to answer the question: What are the principles regarding the problem; what can we do? Davidson asserts that at least some of the mental events interact causally with physical events but adds that there may be mental events that have no physical events as causes and effects. Secondly, Davidson defines this claim as "the principle of the nomological character of causality", pointing out that causality must exist by deterministic laws. Davidson also points out that there is no deterministic law based on which mental events can be explained. He defines this principle as "the Anomalism of the Mental" (Davidson, 1980, p. 208). We think that these approaches of Davidson are guiding the non-essential contingent interpretation of

consciousness. According to Davidson, mental events have mental explanations. He argues that the distinguishing feature of the mental is not being subjective, but intentional (Davidson, 1980, p. 211). We should assert objections to this point. Fear is an intentional mental activity from something but mental states like anxiety, boredom, etc may not have determined causes as that of fear.

Referring to Davidson C. Taylor, who denies that there are strict laws between the mental and the physical, states that the correlation or nomological relationship should be shown. Davidson gives the example of Kim's pain and brain condition B. Accordingly, if the pain is the same as brain state B, then the occurrence of pain and the occurrence of brain state B must be together. This identity realizes that the two expressions that 'being in pain' and 'being in brain state B' have the same extension. He also states that there are thinkers who reject these approaches as well as those who accept the existence of psycho-physical laws and the equivalence of mental events and physical events (Davidson, 1980, pp.212-213). To emphasize our point of view at this point, when we reduce pain to a brain state, we exclude its phenomenal aspect from consideration. As such, there is a risk of narrowing down a discussion ground that includes non-material elements such as consciousness with only material concepts by remaining in a materialistic determinism due to this approach.

There are four theories that Davidson underlined. Nomological monism accepts a correlation between laws and events (materialists etc.). Parallelism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism are in the group of the theory of nomological dualism. Ontological dualism and Cartesianism which accept the laws between the mental and the physical are combined in anomalous dualism. He argues that he can be regarded as favoring anomalous monism. With regard to this theory, it is claimed that all the events are physical but denies that mental phenomena can be given only by physical explanations.

We assert that there should be a contradiction here. If all events are physical, there should be no exceptions. This argument seems to give way to miracles. Anomalous monism denies that there are psycho-physical laws and also affirms that mental characteristics are related to physical characteristics. Having regard to the studies ever made, it can be argued that anomalous monism has important arguments about the problem of consciousness. Because it can be accepted that, even if the relations between mental and physical could not be explained within the scope of laws, it is irrefutable that a relationship is present between the mental and the physical elements. Davidson underlines the uniting role of the theory of anomalous monism for the other principles. He also emphasizes that causality and identity are relationships between individual events and that causal interaction is valid for objects that occupy space. When this is the case, he underlines that the causality approach cannot be associated with concepts with mental characteristics (Davidson, 1980, p.214-215). We think that this is an important detail in the grounding of the first-person approach to consciousness in the philosophy of mind. According to contemporary discussions like the above, the concepts that occupy space can be associated with causality, and concepts such as experiences that cannot be shown to occupy space are exempt from such a relationship. We think that developing a contingent causality understanding of the first-person approach is functional in transferring problems such as the phenomenal consciousness problem to the third person.

Another important argument by Davidson about anomalous monism is that every mental event causally related to a physical event must be physical. He also argues that mental events cannot be explained by natural sciences. He notices explaining free actions by desires, habits, knowledge, and perceptions. He accepts that the perspective of the anomalism of the mental is necessary for accepting action as autonomous

(Davidson, 1980, pp.224-225). In addition, Davidson's *Thought and Talk* (1975) and *Rational Animals* (1982) articles, which contain his views on the relationship between language and thought, should be accepted as important sources. We can emphasize that Davidson points to a distinction between mental and physical attributes, not factual, but in cognition. It can be argued that Davidson's thesis that the mental is connected to the physical with the anomalous monism approach was defended for the first time in the article *Mental Events* (1970). It can be said that causal approaches to consciousness are emphasized in Davidson's article *Radical Interpretation* (1973).

According to Searle, consciousness emerges as a result of some neuronal activity. This can be causally related to the behavior of the elements of the system, not to them. If we take water as an example, we can assume that the molecules that makeup water move even though they are not liquids (Searle, 1997, p.18).

Searle also examines reductionist claims. Regarding ontological reduction, he points out that material objects can be represented by other material objects, for example, that genes are composed of DNA molecules. Regarding the ontological reduction aspect, we can add that genes could be responsible for phenotypic changes in organisms, while such a responsibility is hard to be subjected to DNA molecules. He draws attention to property reductionism, where, for example, the heat of a gas can be regarded as the average kinetic energy of molecular motions. In order to give an example of the property ontological dualism regarding consciousness, it can be thought that the qualitative experiences and the neurochemical events related to them are different qualities of the same substance. To explain the theoretical reduction, Searle emphasizes that the laws of the reduced theory can be derived from the laws of the reduction theory. If we can derive a law regarding the material things of consciousness and use it to explain non-material phenomenal experiences, we may think that we will make

progress in terms of solving existing problems. However, according to the current paradigm, it is thought that the laws carried out about the material variables cannot be enforced on the non-material ones. Another form of reduction that Searle noticed is logical or descriptive reduction, in which statements describing one entity can be translated into statements referring to another entity. According to this approach, although the sentences are expressed in a different way, we think that this kind of reduction cannot be functional in a way that can lead us to new solutions about consciousness. Regarding causal reduction, which is a relationship that can be established between two causally effective things, Searle argues that the reduced being can be explained by the causal forces of the reducing being. (Searle, 1992, pp.70-71). Thus, we can think that by exposing the types of reduction, Searle made an introduction that consciousness cannot be reduced in the classical sense.

Searle questions whether it is an ontological reduction that neurobiological traits cause mental traits. Citing the definition of light by wavelength, he states that successful causal reductions have led to ontological reductions in the history of science. He also underlines that the irreducibility of consciousness is of little importance to the scientific world. He cites the work of Nagel (1974), Kripke (1971), and Jackson (1982). There are objections to the understanding that the argument that consciousness cannot be reduced as in heat is understood only as epistemic, not ontological (Searle, 1992, p.72). Based on these arguments, we can think that Searle is trying to continue his studies on consciousness by taking into account the causality features demanded by the scientific world. Indeed, one such approach is the "heterophenomenology" argument, which seeks to reconcile first- and third-person approaches and to fill the explanatory gaps that exist with the third-person perspective.

He gives the example that if we try to make an ontological reduction regarding the sensation of pain and the corresponding neuron firings of our brain, the experience of pain will not be taken into account. He states that Nagel is trying to explain the subjective qualities of consciousness with a third-person approach, with the example of the bat. What needs to be added here is that Nagel thinks we cannot understand what it means to be a bat from a human-centered perspective. Jackson's argument draws attention to the fact that someone with a deep understanding of the neurophysiology of pain cannot know what it is without knowing the feeling of pain. Based on this example, it can be considered that making the experiences of the first-person transferable to others will be an activity that brings a solution to the problems arising from the difference between the third and first-person perspectives on consciousness. According to Searle, there is an ontological irreducibility between my pain and my understanding that someone else is in pain (Searle, 1992, p.74). We would like to emphasize again that one of the preoccupations of the problem of consciousness is the problem of conveying ontologically expressed phenomena into epistemological elements for their transmission to others. According to Searle, heat has a physical aspect consisting of molecular movements, as well as a mental aspect that can be felt. Searle, who separates the experience of pain from this approach, draws attention to the irreducibility of the experience of pain. He argues that pain can be defined as a sensation whose source is neuronal activations that cause the subjective experience of pain (Searle, 1992, p.75). His approach brings to mind his own argument that consciousness is a biological phenomenon and that the so-called hard problems are actually not that difficult to explain. However, we argue that it must be remembered that the sense of heat and pain are carried by the same route which is the *lateral spinothalamic tract* (https://stringfinger.com/tr/Lateral_spinothalamic_tract). In our opinion, it is necessary

to explain the importance of the sense of pain and heat being carried by the same nerve. It is certain that pain and heat are different experiences. According to the first-person approach, sensations are limited in the subject and are closed to third persons. We think that transporting two separate experiences in the same and observable way will enable a bridge to be built between first-person and third-person approaches. Emphasizing that its appearance can be accepted as the reality of consciousness, Searle argues that the mysterious aspects will be illuminated in time by comparing consciousness to the previous state of electromagnetism. He also connects the irreducibility of consciousness to the inadequacy of existing paradigms, stating that he hopes that a reduction concept will be reached in the future, in which consciousness can also be reduced (Searle, 1992, pp.76-77).

Searle's discussion of the Chinese Room was first published in the journal *Behavioral Sciences* in his article *Minds, Brains, and Programs* (1980). He emphasizes that the mechanism he calls the Chinese Room is also not conscious, because syntax does not mean semantics. He underlines that the mechanism is only a simulation (Heil, 2020, p.200).

Perebom and Kornblith object to the approach of the multiple realizability thesis, which asserts that mental states cannot be reduced to neuro-physiological states. They assert that there are other features of irreducibility (Perebom, and Kornblith, 1991, p.125). They assert that the constitutional explanation which asserts that the thing that built something specifies its constitution can be helpful where the causal explanation is insufficient. They also argue that whether the constitutional explanation provides the relationship between causal forces depends on whether the constitutional explanation gives us a reduction. They give an example of a gene with causal powers that cannot be identified with the particular causal powers of the molecules that make up the gene.

They emphasize that physical causation cannot be applied to psychological states and also argue that irreducible sciences other than microphysics are unaffected by causal forces. They oppose attributing causal forces to biological types, such as genes and organs, as well as to psychological conditions (Perebom, and Kornblith, 1991, pp.129-131). We can interpret this approach as not all genotypic features of genes are seen in phenotypic features at the same rate. As emphasized in the relevant sections of our thesis, the above-mentioned relationship is not obligatory with the effect of other factors.

Perebom and Kornblith assert that Davidson also rejects the reduction of psychological features to physical. But they add that he denies any nomological relationship between them. They underline that since psychological phenomena do not cover the whole reality of life, laws in psychology cannot be without exception (Perebom and Kornblith, 1991, p. 133). We think that their approach to psychology is similar to the interpretation of psychology that Churchland criticizes by naming "folk psychology" which we shall refer to later. However, it should be emphasized that whether the basis of psychology as a working principle can be in nomological dimensions may be the subject of another study.

The reason for this is that we think that not every psychological condition causes the same repetitive behaviors. Since the environmental conditions and other factors in which the psychological state is experienced may be variable each time, their behavioral or experiential outcomes may also be different. Perebom and Kornblith argue that Humean rejection of causality should be valid for all sciences, including genetics which is subject to the dynamics of microphysics (Perebom, and Kornblith, 1991, p. 133). In light of these approaches, we can argue that the contingent versions of causality, apart from the necessary legality relationship, have a place in the explanation of the problems

related to the philosophy of mind and consciousness. Perebom and Kornblith argue that sensory receptors should be responsible for the relationship between physical structures and mental states. This approach is an example contrary to species-specific reduction (Perebom and Kornblith, 1991, p.136). This approach may form the basis of a claim in the philosophy of mind that consciousness is not species-specific and that the experience of qualia can be common to different species. From this point of view, we can imagine that artificial intelligence mechanisms may exhibit conscious behaviors in the future. However, it is clear that studies on this subject require a multidisciplinary effort beyond philosophy.

They state that although gas laws can be reduced to laws of kinetic energy, they cannot be applied to mental states. Perebom and Kornblith realize that mental states are disanalogous to temperature, undercutting the force of this example. A particular kind of temperature (in a gas) can be realized in only one way while belief in a human can be realized in many ways. Thus the arguments above should support that those psychological states should not be defined with neurophysiological laws. In light of the above explanations, it can be assumed that Enç and Churchlands do not provide strong evidence against non-reductionist materialism, according to Perebom and Kornblith. They also oppose Kim's claim that non-reductionist materialism explains psychological and physical qualities with a dualist view and argue that anti-reductionism can be considered pluralism at the ontological level, and even monism at its core. According to nonreductive materialism, the difference between psychological and physical attributes is similar to the differences between biological and physical attributes. This approach also applies to the differences between kind predicates in classical genetics and molecular biology (Perebom, and Kornblith, 1991, p.138). We know that some of the human characteristics are those that are laid out on the basis of genetical

background. Genes made up of molecules are also the subject of molecular biology. However, we cannot equate the properties of genes with the properties of their molecules. Although an interpretation of qualitative characteristics such as temperament can be made through genes, we cannot reach a similar interpretation through the laws of molecular biology. We think that this evaluation is a view that interprets the qualitative characteristics of human beings from a non-dualistic point of view, as in the approaches of Perebom and Kornblith.

Perebom and Kornblith point out that Churchlands opposes non-reductionist materialism by arguing that many psychological phenomena need neurophysiological explanations. They highlight the psychological effects of drugs, brain lesions, sleep, and fainting as examples, emphasizing that these cannot be reduced to more basic scientific explanations. The relationship between psychology and the more basic sciences can be examined from the perspective of non-reductionist materialism and antireductionism. Non-reductionist materialism should be consistent with the view that some phenomena in psychology can be explained causally in terms of some of the more fundamental sciences. They exemplify the causal relationship between physical needle pricks, biological tissue damage, and psychological pain (Perebom & Kornblith, 1991, p.140). They present this to show that a physical event can cause non-physical states. It should still be probable that the main problem should be present in expressing feelings. After recovery, many comatose patients would assert that they were conscious (in the sense of awareness) about the things that were happening around them, but the main blockage was in expressing them. It is also valid for newborns that were accepted to be organisms feeling no pain. Later studies have shown that they also suffered from pain. Although the underlying physical and biological effects of the sensation of pain remain the same, it is obvious that the psychological pain experience will be relative depending

on the changing conditions of the person. This is thought to be due to interindividual differences in pain threshold or medical conditions such as indifference to pain. Although it is not known exactly how pain is felt at different times or not at all in the same person, we hope that it will be illuminated by future studies.

They assert as a second example that antireductionism is efficient by means of reducing kinds to those of more basic sciences. For example, they argue that the psychological dimensions of fatigue can be illuminated by explaining its biological dimensions. They assert that beliefs and desires still seem to be irreducible to a biological phenomenon (Perebom and Kornblith, 1991, pp.141-142). As a footnote, it can be argued that in some sleep disorders (even in normal individuals) tiredness does not always cause or coexist with a tendency to sleep. Besides, tiredness would worsen to fall asleep.

Perebom and Kornblith point out that Kim argues that anti-reductionism faces the "explanatory exclusion problem". What is emphasized here is the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between both physical and psychological explanations. They state that Kim opposes the explanation that both reasons are considered insufficient separately and work together. They also give room and right to Kim's view that two independent causal chains cannot produce the same effect. Emphasizing that the problem of the "explanatory gap" is also between physical-based sciences such as genetics and molecular biology, they think that this will be a positive comment in eliminating the explanation gap between psychological and neurophysiological approaches (Perebom and Kornblith, 1991, pp.142-144). In conclusion, we can conclude that according to Perebom and Kornblith, non-reductionist materialism is particularly important in the explanation of the special sciences in the light of the above explanations, and will also shed light on the causal closure of the phenomenal consciousness problem

Kim, a philosopher of mind who accepted the MR Thesis, rejects psychophysical reductionism and accepts that living things with different biochemical structures experience different psychological states. He also emphasizes that the multiple realizability approach replaces theories such as “type physicalism”. He cites Putnam, Fodor, Davidson, G. Hellman, and F. Thompson as contributors to MR theory. He argues that the Correlation Thesis, which means that every psychological state has a physical counterpart, is empirically incorrect. According to Kim, in all types of organisms or physical systems, instead of a single neural type N that performs pain, there should be many neuro-physical types (Kim, 1992, pp.2-4). In light of these approaches, besides the fact that the qualitative characteristics of the senses cannot be expressed, we can accept that each qualitative sense manifests differently in different types. We think that this approach may further complicate the current phenomenal consciousness problem.

After emphasizing that psychology will move away from scientific foundations if we accept that MR is correct, he also objects to the suspicion that psychology should be reduced to the status of “pseudosciences” like astrology and alchemy. As a justification, he argues that behavior in psychology can be explained by the underlying physical processes (Kim, 1992, p.17). Although it is widely accepted that there are physical causes underlying the behaviors in psychology, it is worth mentioning here that studies like ours have been carried out since sufficient explanations have not yet been reached about how the inner qualities of sensations interact with tissues. He also adds that “psychological laws should be statistical rather than deterministic” (Kim, 1992, p.18). Considering the strictness of deterministic laws here, it is clear that even if we bring to mind a situation of legality in psychology, it cannot have a strict manifestation. When we think of psychology in the context of behavioral science, we argue that

environmental factors such as the bystander effect should be considered as causal factors as well as the biochemical events behind behaviors.

Heil considers the causal interaction between mental and material to be mysterious. He also states that while S. Stich and P. Churchland deny the existence of mental properties, everything is mental according to G. Berkeley, J. Foster, and other idealists (Heil, 2004b, p.755). It is worth noting here that according to eliminating materialism, the view represented by Churchland and others, psychological qualities are rejected. In addition, according to the idealism approach, it is argued that things are subject to the conscious subjects who perceive them, objecting to the existence of things on their own.

According to Heil, McGinn asserts that the human mind cannot understand itself and builds a similarity of this idea with that of Gödel's proof of the incompleteness of mathematics. In support of this approach, Heil also argues that conscious experiences should be outside the scope of objective natural sciences. To make a note here, we would like to state that we consider making a distinction between the human mind and the human self as a kind of dualism. In our opinion, such distinctions are approaches that will create unnecessary difficulties in the explanation of consciousness. As we emphasized in the following sections, we argue that definitions and approaches that will eliminate the subject-object duality will guide the original explanations of consciousness, aside from the subject being divided into two me and "myself". Heil also takes attention to the contingency thesis, implying that in a possible world, there could be more or fewer planets. In order to understand contingency, we can reason from necessity. What is necessarily true is considered true in every possible world. However, in the contingency approach, such a necessity no longer exists. We can imagine a universe in which some animals can fly, contrary to the laws of nature. Similarly, the experience of certain qualities by creatures with some material characteristics can be

given as an example of contingency. (Heil, 2004b, pp.756-757). He also argues that it is not known how physical events yield various mental outcomes. He asserts that mental and physical concepts cannot be unified in a single theory (Heil, 2004b, p.759). However, in our opinion, we suggest not ignoring the data in which different concepts are explained with the same theory, just as the kinetic energy laws explain the gas laws. As a matter of fact, according to some authors, there is no distinction between physical and mental ones. Jackson asserts that qualia are epiphenomenal. In the relevant sections of this thesis, we have expressed our objection by presenting examples contrary to the epiphenomenal feature of consciousness. He also reminds us that thinkers like Nagel argue that with our anthropocentric point of view, we cannot understand what it is like to be another living organism (like a bat) (Jackson, 1982, p.131). He states that the problem of *qualia* cannot be understood from the causality window and emphasizes that mental states cannot show physical effects (Jackson, 1982,p.133). According to this approach, it is emphasized that mentality cannot have an effect on the material body. In addition, as stated before and in other studies, we think that the relationship of mental states with material neuroanatomical structures and neurochemical events is one of the probes of the philosophy of mind. And also we argued our objections to the explanations that accepted consciousness as epiphenomenal.

One of Levine's contributions to the qualia debate concerns Kripke's work (Naming and Necessity and Identity and Necessity), which opposes materialism and promotes substance dualism. Kripke argues that, in certain circumstances, expressions of identity are true in all possible worlds. But he states that psycho-physical identity is not possible. In addition, according to E. Demircioğlu, Kripke is of the opinion that the feeling of pain cannot be identical to a cerebral condition (Demircioğlu, 2021, p.118). Levine implies transforming Kripke's argument from a metaphysical one into an

epistemological one. He also asserts that “psycho-physical identity statements” leave an “explanatory gap” instead of being false because we can't determine which “psycho-physical identity statements” are true. He states that he is not against materialism, but thinks that some problems regarding materialist explanations should be addressed. Levine states that according to materialism, pain is the stimulation of C fibers, the temperature is the movement of molecules, and according to Kripke, the correctness of these propositions includes necessity. Levine states that these propositions are contingent. If they were necessarily true, there should be no possible world where they were false. However, we can imagine that pain can be felt other than the stimulation of C fibers, or that the increase in molecular movement with heat is not necessarily accompanied. According to Kripke, while the increase in the molecular movements of the heat is contingent, the situation in which the pain is the stimulation of the C fibers is necessary. Based on these approaches, Levine states that psycho-physical identities cannot be necessary since they are subject to subjective experiences. Levine points out that according to functionalists, the mind will be likened to Software and our physiology to Hardware. He mentions that the presence of pain can be explained without C-fibers according to the MR approach (Levine, 1983, pp.354-355). Levine states that as a problem of the functionalist perspective, it is not known to what extent that the activation of the C fibers can be compared with the sensation of pain, and therefore how the pain will be perceived in alien creatures. Finally, he argues that the mind/body problem will remain unsolved unless the problem related to our qualitative experience is resolved (Levine, 1983, p.361). In light of Levine's approaches, we think that the solution to the ‘explanatory gap’ arising from the relationship between the neurophysiological and phenomenal experiences of consciousness will lead to original explanations, although it cannot be eliminated by current methods. One of the factors

limiting us in this regard is that we do not yet have the valid theories and methods that we will use in the comparison of mental and physical elements. Demircioğlu also refers to Levine's explanation gap in his inquiry and mentions the limitation experienced in associating the physical with the non-physical (Demircioğlu, 2021, p.21).

According to McGinn, who argues that the mind/body problem is insoluble, body parts outside the brain and neurons that create subjective awareness are unconscious. According to McGinn, the mystery will remain until we find out how the brain is the source of consciousness. According to McGinn, the first of the explanations for consciousness is those who claim that consciousness originates from the brain. He also emphasizes that there are explanations pointing to the supernatural nature of consciousness, and states that he thinks that consciousness has a natural explanation, but that our cognitive structure that there must be a causal connection between the brain and consciousness prevents us from finding a solution. McGinn introduces the idea of “cognitive closure”, in which he states that some mental states cannot understand certain features or theories. This argument was defended by N. Chomsky in *Reflections on Language* and by Fodor in *The Modularity of Mind*. Even though it cannot be perceived by a particular perceiving and perceiving mind. He argues that some features may be real even if they are not perceived. In this regard, he gives an example of the invisible parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, which must be as real as the visible parts. McGinn also argues that according to Hume, who argues that ideas are copies of impressions, perceptual closure determines cognitive closure (McGinn, 1989, s.349-351). But it must be remembered that Hume's assertions covered the ones that there should have not been a nexus via causality, even if for the concepts that were perceptually confirmed. That's why it may be argued -by ourselves- that the Humean example regarding cognitive closure should be selected as a mistake. Additionally,

Hume gave the example that somebody can probably detect the tone of the blue color that someone has never seen before. However, Hume asserted that this example was an extraordinary one (Hume, 1974, p.319). In McGinn's cognitive closure approach, there is an implicit assumption that there can be entities independent of our mind. In order to understand this, it is obvious that obstacles such as cognitive closure will be encountered when trying to understand abstract entities that do not have concepts in themselves, such as consciousness.

McGinn states that consciousness must be a natural phenomenon originating from matter, but conscious states cannot be observed. McGinn's other argument is that consciousness does not consist of spatial processes that the brain can reveal (McGinn, 1989, p.357). It can be thought that consciousness, which does not have a spatial feature, cannot be grasped through causality. Underlining the epiphenomenal feature of consciousness, McGinn states that consciousness can not only be solved by empirical approaches (McGinn, 1989, p.359). Regarding the debate on consciousness, McGinn seems to have a point of view that should be regarded to have both pessimistic and optimistic aspects, pessimistic for solving the mind-body problem, but optimistic about our hopes of removing philosophical confusion. He states that he thinks there will be scientific approaches in the future where the relationship between consciousness and body is as clear as the relationship between liver and bile (McGinn, 1989, p.361). Indeed, it should be emphasized here that the source of the problems caused by Cartesian dualism is the search for consciousness somewhere in the brain. We think that studies that show that the center of consciousness can be in any part of the brain or neurological system with fMRI and similar mechanisms with a third-person approach should be examined carefully whether they have sufficient philosophical foundations. McGinn argues that studies that affect the relationship between conscious states and

bodily states, transferred from Descartes to Kripke, are basically contingent. It is thought that this approach supports our belief in the elimination of unknowns about consciousness with a contingent causality approach. He argues that the physical features of the brain that we can understand affect our consciousness, but it is difficult to assess whether the structure of this connection will be contingent or necessary. He attributes this to the inadequacy of our concepts of the problem of consciousness. He proposes to develop a new metaphysical vision of reality, arguing that we cannot know whether it is possible to separate consciousness from the body (McGinn, 1989, pp.363-365).

Hardcastle claims that the unknowns of consciousness in physical properties will be transcended in the future. However, he states that there are those who argue that consciousness is a mysterious and abstract thing, and draws attention to Chalmers' approaches that associate the physical brain with non-physical consciousness, and objects to Chalmers at this point. Arguing that the phenomenal experiences of consciousness cannot be explained by causal relations, he adds that the examples of being conscious given by naturalists do not explain the cause of consciousness (Hardcastle, 1996, pp.7-8). Considering the approaches of previous contemporary philosophers of mind, it is noteworthy that the discussion on consciousness is generally related to the causality dimension of the relationship between physical properties and non-physical ones. Pointing to the question of "why", Hardcastle gives examples of its acceptance in different ways. We can give an example, a historian who asks why Brutus killed Cesar would be asking about the reasons and circumstances that prepared this murder. But a biologist who asks why litmus paper turns red will ask about the mechanism by which litmus paper, which was originally blue, turns red. Likewise, if questions about consciousness and possible answers address causality, then possible

answers point out which interpretation of causality will depend on. Hardcastle also criticizes Chalmers, who rejects that consciousness is biological, arguing that in order to know what consciousness is from a materialist point of view, we must separate the relevant components of the brain responsible for its activity. Hardcastle's claim that consciousness is a biological thing, which openly opposes the claim that structural and organizational arrangements explain everything about consciousness, should not imply the artificial creation of consciousness (Hardcastle, 1996, pp.9-10). What we would like to add at this point is that, although studies of artificial initiation of life have actually been achieved to some extent with in vitro fertilization methods and organ cloning, the creation of a life separate from living organisms will revolutionize the scientific world. According to Hardcastle, materialist explanations have a claim that identifies consciousness with the wetness of water. He states that he does not agree with the identity approaches produced by science (Hardcastle, 1996, p.12). After examining Hardcastle's proposals, the question arises whether Heil has left the consciousness work of philosophers and kept it alive to psychologists and neuroscientists (Heil, 2004b, p.807).

Wigner emphasizes that the qualities of our sensations cannot be explained by natural sciences. Underlining that the knowledge of our sensations is actually something that is directly grasped for ourselves, he states that third persons cannot have access to the knowledge of our subjective sensations (Wigner, 1967, p.176). According to this approach, we can argue that Wigner accepts the non-transferability of sensations from the first-person point of view and does this from a current scientific perspective. It is worth noting that one of the problems to be emphasized here should be the extent to which the natural sciences will deal with the senses in the future. The explicit expression of the phenomenal qualities of consciousness to our third person, just as it

was in the times before the expression of light with wavelength, will be groundbreaking in overcoming the problems and obstacles experienced today.

Wigner also emphasizes the traditionally accepted epiphenomenal aspect of consciousness, claiming that consciousness may be formed by proper physicochemical conditions and properties. As is underlined elsewhere, our objection is that conscious functions such as concentration or spectator influence, as seen at sporting events or community events, can alter the capacity of the physical body. This can be understood as the fact that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of the brain. It is important to note that Heil criticized Wigner for not knowing about the majority of all metaphysical theories (Wigner, 1967, p.177). Wigner underlines that the interaction between light quanta is not direct but through material objects, and argues that the qualitative properties of consciousness also interact through material components (Wigner, 1967, p.182). Depending on the explanations above, it can be argued that one of the main problems with consciousness is the demonstration of the possible effect of the non-physical side of consciousness on the physical parts. An enlightening example should be that excited people should have cognitive problems and physical (epiphenomenal?) projections like sweating, palpitations, flushing of faces, etc. However, it could also be asserted that if the possible effect of the non-physical parts of consciousness should be demonstrated by some methods, it would be expected to reach promising results, regarding the studies on consciousness.

As cited in Heil, P.M. Churchland points out that it is important to explain human and animal behavior. He argues that people assume they can understand the inner qualities of others based on their actions. It adds, however, that the disclosures assume laws regarding the behavior described. For this reason, he calls our effort to understand others by building a network of common sense laws "folk psychology" (P.M.

Churchland, 2004, p.383). Today, we know that the approach Churchland calls “folk psychology” is institutionalized all over the world and is in a guiding position for people's mental health. From this point of view, it can be thought that a philosophical approach to psychology can shape future approaches such as philosophy and therapy. However, when the content of our thesis is taken into consideration, we think that there is a need for studies that will evaluate this by itself. Churchland states that when we accept the folk psychology approach, we must also argue that it can explain the problem of other minds. However, if we try to infer that other individuals are conscious by inspecting their behaviors, he states that we should argue that beings with different characteristics from us are mentally similar. Churchland attributes the reason behind the analogy of folk psychology to natural sciences that the intentionality approach is in folk psychology (P.M. Churchland, 2004, p.384). It is noteworthy that the concept of intentionality has long been important in the philosophy of mind and problems of consciousness. The same is true for epistemology. Knowledge is the knowledge of something, that is, knowledge points to something, and orients towards something. Unless there is an objective structure on which intentionality can be directed in questions and problems about consciousness, both what the explanations are about and their transfer to others will remain a problem.

As quoted by Heil, Churchland claims that folk psychology approaches are built on false foundations. He states that identity theorists think that folk psychology can be reduced to neuroscience, but this is not valid according to dualists and functionalists. However, he states that it is necessary to accept that folk psychology has some successes (Churchland, 2004, p.386). To make an illuminating note here and to give a response to Churchland, we must emphasize that there is a subgroup of psychology defined as experimental psychology. It should be emphasized that experimental

psychology approaches represent an interpretation of psychology that is closest to the natural sciences, with studies of the causes behind human and animal behavior that is open to third-person scope as well.

As cited by Heil, Churchland argues that the positive and negative aspects of folk psychology, which is a superficial theory, should be evaluated together, and underlines that it has not made sufficient progress when looking at its history. However, he adds that folk psychology also has some positive aspects (Churchland, 2004, p.388). Another issue that we find appropriate to add as historical knowledge is that psychology was seen as a sub-branch of philosophy until the middle of the 19th century. It is noteworthy that philosophy, which is a discipline separate from philosophy, used experimental methods in accordance with the positivist paradigm of that time. When this is the case, it should be considered natural that psychology has approaches that give importance to the laws of natural sciences even today. Perhaps the problem is that the laws of the natural sciences evolve from necessity to contingency and that this issue is internalized by those who practice psychology. Beyond the criticisms of folk psychology, Churchland acknowledges that it still plays an important role in our lives and communication with others. He emphasizes that folk psychology is not an empirical theory and that functionalists try to interpret folk psychology, as a discipline explaining our internal states without referring to their internal nature or physical structures (Churchland, 2004, p.390). After arguing that folk psychology is a cultural theory that concerns humans and other higher animals and that it can superficially reflect human nature, he emphasizes that it resembles alchemy (Churchland, 2004, p.397). It is worth noting that the science of alchemy is now accepted and abandoned as a pseudoscience. Churchland suggests that sensations are only causal mediators in the perceptual process (Churchland, 2012, p.30). With that point of view, it can be asserted that Churchland

should be accepted to be one of the thinkers who exert assertions on conscious functions by means of causality. He states that common sense theories are wrong or insufficient and believes that their falsity can be disproved by observing and demonstrating the falsity of their background beliefs (Churchland, 2012, p.35). If we interpret this approach according to consciousness, a possible explanation can be that “Consciousness emerges in a way similar to waves from neuroanatomical tissues in which it is found as similar to particles”. Thus, we may have expressed a consciousness model that is both compatible with current physical parameters and can be demonstrated with appropriate methods in the near future. However, referring to Feyerabend, he underlines that the approach, in which theoretical terms gain meaning after being observable, is not exempt from criticism (Churchland, 2012, p.58). This should be another important point implying that to expect new scientific but still classical methods for conveying the meaning of consciousness intersubjectively, could be useless. When we look at the literature on observation, we would like to point out that being observable does not necessarily mean that the phenomena will be the same. We know that the rod immersed in it will appear to be broken due to the breaking power of the water. In addition, we can say that electrons can carry particle functions and wave functions, they behave like particles when observed, otherwise, they behave like waves. From this point of view, even if the problem of not showing the physical foundations of psychological states, which Churchland criticizes in psychology, is resolved, how experiences are associated with neuroanatomical tissue and neurochemical events may remain closed.

Churchland argues that Putnam's non-materialist and popular theory of functionalism is such a theory in which psychological circumstances are accepted to be functional and it is closely related to identity theory. As cited in Churchland, Putnam asserts that

psychological definitions are not reducible because of the multiplicity of different layers that could objectify these definitions. Churchland argues that if the psychological states are functional, then they could not be ontologically apprehensible (Churchland, 2012, p.151). It could be stated that, according to the multiple realizability theory, which is an argument of the functionalism approach pioneered by Putnam, it is accepted that phenomenological experiences such as the feeling of pain exist in other living things and beings as well as in humans. When this is the case, it can be thought that an artificial intelligence model that we can consciously accept in the future will have qualitative experiences like humans. When it is accepted that the neurons that play a role in the formation of a conscious structure are not conscious, the artificial intelligence model, which consists of various inorganic and non-conscious materials, can also be considered conscious from the perspective of functionalism.

Churchland speaks of the possibility of coherent materialism that does not advocate psychophysical identities and does not reject the mind at all. He claims that Putnam's views are prophecy, not analysis. He criticizes Putnam's argument that psychological definitions are functional and argues that his own common-sense descriptions are essentially reducible (Churchland, 2012, pp.152-153). Churchland argues that reducibility is a matter of degree and that eliminative materialism is a current option (Churchland, 2012, p.157). After all the descriptions and opinions above, it can be asserted that Churchland has objections to conventional behaviorism, in which a necessary cause-effect relationship is obtained regarding to the neurological system and experiences. He also argues that in order to convey the ontological features of the knowledge of the first-person, we need a contingent reductive solution that has the power of facing problems present today which are the problem of phenomenological consciousness, qualia, and hard problem, etc.

Dennett emphasizes that words are the feature that distinguishes the human mind from other animals (Dennett, 2016, p.63). However, we think that it should not be forgotten that other animals communicate vocally or silently, even if not with words. When it comes to human communication, it should be emphasized that we live in a world where nonverbal communication is as important as words. As cited in Dennett, according to W. Bateson, one of the fathers of modern genetics, the characteristics of living things depend on chromosomes, which are a material basis. The fact that the material chromatin particles can provide all the properties of life is an approach that goes beyond the limits of materialism. Later, with the display of DNA, it was possible to explain how genetic information was transferred over generations (Dennett, 2016, p.101). Among this transmitted genetic information, we can mention that there are observable phenotypic characteristics such as eyelid shape, height, etc., as well as qualitative characteristics such as temperament and affect.

Dennett argues that if we assume that the brain is a computer, all of its actions can be understood. He claims that this is possible through “reverse engineering” (Dennett, 2016, p.108). Today, with the intelligent design approach that embraces the principles of the reverse engineering method, it is tried to find clues about the intelligence that designs the examined function. He also states that Turing made a significant contribution to science and civilization by putting forward a universal computer model (Dennett, 2016, p.134). However, it is worth emphasizing that there are many people who think there are doubts about the validity of the Turing test. Many models of artificial intelligence can pass the test today, but even if the tested computer model passes the test, we argue that it cannot be considered conscious. Dennett, who also goes to a classification related to neuroscience, states that procedural neuroscience is concerned with creating computer models that actually work. He states that cognitive

neuroscientists are interested in high-level competence and interaction that should be applied in lower-level models (Dennett, 2016, p.136). Böyle bir düzenlemenin termodinamik yasaların gazlarına uygulanabildiği bir üst yeterlilikle benzer anlama geleceğini düşünüyoruz.

Expressing his thoughts on algorithms on the subject, Dennett said that the origin of the word was based on the arithmetic al-Khwarizmi who lived in the 9th century (Dennett, 2016, p.137). He highlights three important features of algorithms as the topics of ‘substance neutrality’, ‘fundamental folly’, and ‘guaranteed results’. ‘Substrate neutrality’ implies the importance of the logical structure of the operation instead of the material used. ‘Fundamental folly’ notices the simplicity of the operative requirements, whether or not the complete system is too complicated. A ‘guaranteed result’ means that in order to reach the result, all the steps must be followed exactly (Dennett, 2016, p.138).

In this context, each computer program can be thought of as an algorithm consisting of simple steps. Based on this interpretation, it can be evaluated that computers can not be accepted as conscious in the current situation. In light of possible developments, it can be assumed that the computer system can be considered conscious, in which no algorithm is used and therefore the result cannot be predicted. Since this detail is in the field of computer/Software engineering, we chose to put this note as an evaluation emphasizing the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach in causality and consciousness studies. Emphasizing the importance of an individual will, Dennett states that the distinctive feature of the human mind is the individual will. He adds that this feature of the human mind is supported by J. Fodor and S.A. Kripke and is opposed to robot control systems (Dennett, 2016, p.152). We would like to emphasize the word "autonomy", which means the building of one's own laws in relation to the individual

will. It is conceivable that if conscious artificial intelligence thinking is possible in the future, it could be with computers making their own laws. We believe that this reveals the need to develop and change today's understanding of Computer Software.

He states that the substance from which the brain is made are molecular parts subject to physicochemical laws so that brains can be called syntactic motors (Dennett, 2016, p.172). It should be noted that, according to general acceptance, syntactic construction cannot be considered conscious unless it contains meaning. Dennett argues that in order to turn to consciousness, first of all, the content of the mind must be placed in its proper place (Dennett, 2016, p.191). Because of this approach, it can be thought that in Dennett's interpretation of consciousness, he argues that the mind is a causal role or a presupposition of consciousness that must be grounded. However, we also come across lines in which Dennett argues that consciousness is a problem that is too difficult for humans to understand. In this case, we think it would be useful to revisit Dennett's approaches in terms of consistency within themselves. We assume that Dennett's critique of Einstein's objection to the uncertainty of quantum physics makes him compatible with the uncertainty approaches of our time (Dennett, 2016, p.195). Dennett defines the efforts to search for a place in the brain for consciousness as 'Cartesian Theater' and claims that the thought that robots cannot be conscious is just 'hunch talking' (Dennett, 2016, p.264). According to our opinion, his objection to substance dualism, which allows the search for a topological place for consciousness, has been effective in its acceptance as a monist.

Dennett asserts that inner qualities make life worthy. He underlines that Prosopagnosia, which is the disease of those who cannot recognize faces, and the Capgras Illusion, which is the condition of those who have the illusion that strangers replace the people they know, are pathological conscious states (Dennett, 2016, p.282-

283). If we try to make inferences about the qualities of consciousness from these examples, we can think that the qualitative properties of consciousness are related to the underlying physical textures, with examples like these. According to Dennett, the problem of experience, which we call the hard problem of consciousness, is defined by Chalmers as the inexpressible, unanalyzable aspect of being conscious. A robot is a zombie devoid of inner life, although its behavior appears to be conscious. However, Dennett, admits that although the existence of the hard problem is an erroneous approach, he cannot prove it (Dennett, 2016, pp.290-291). Because according to the current understanding, objective criteria are needed to prove something. Since the phenomenal qualities of consciousness do not have objective criteria, it is not possible to prove them. Dennett also emphasizes that the hard problem is that it has worldly explanations that do not require new things to come up with physics and that it submits to the standard methods of cognitive sciences. We should also note that this approach contradicts Dennett's approach to Chalmers that the hard problem cannot be proven (Dennett, 2016, p.295).

Dennett emphasizes that Searle's Chinese Room experiment or a computer that passes the Turing Test is only as conscious as a zombie (Dennett, 2016, p.302). Emphasizing that the self is not a part of our brains like the amygdala or the hippocampus, Dennett argues that although the frontal lobes have a role in the evaluation of perceptions, intentions, and situations, they cannot be considered the center of the self in terms of location. According to Dennett, what we call the self is an abstraction tightly connected to the physical world (Dennett, 2016, p.311). When we accept something as the center of consciousness, we need to see that we are entering a dualism in the sense of consciousness and the place that hosts it. It is one of the contradictions since Descartes


in the philosophy of mind to try to associate a substance that does not occupy space with a topological place.

Dennett states that he developed further the phenomenology approach, which uses the first person method to purify the presuppositions for the purpose of examining subjective experience, under the leadership of E. Husserl. Dennett argues that consciousness can be studied objectively. For this purpose, as mentioned above, he developed his own heterophenomenology method as an alternative to Husserlian “autophenomenology”. This method opens up the analysis of first-person cases from a third-person perspective (Dennett, 2016, pp.318-319). With S. Blackmore's quote, Dennett considers heterophenomenology as the scientific catalog of things that need to be explained (Blackmore, 2021, p.108).

According to Dennett, who argues that philosophy is traditionally an a priori discipline like mathematics, there is an a priori methodology in philosophy (Dennett, 2016, p.387). We can think that he sees his own heterophenomenology as such a method. However, according to the philosophers mentioned in the relevant sections, the first-person approach cannot be associated with the third-person approach. According to the contemporary explanations, there are inconsistencies that we call *explanatory gap*, epistemic asymmetry, etc. While evaluating her own work, Dennett admits that we do not fully understand how consciousness works or free will and finds solace in making progress (Dennett, 2016, p.398).

After his explanations above, it can be seen that Dennett is one of the important thinkers who have worked on solving the problem of phenomenal consciousness. Based on his approaches, we can think, for example, that material chromosomes are related to non-material characteristics (disposition, temperament, perhaps virtue, etc.). It should be

considered that this relationship is contingent, not deterministic. Because not every genotypic structure can cause phenotypic traits at the same rate. We think that the same contingent features are associated with human disease resistance, reactions to exposure to oxidant stress, and even the risk of developing psychiatric diseases. It will be seen that the causes of diseases, which we called "essential" in the past in meaning having unknown origins, but named as "multifactorial" today, are in a contingent relationship with the human organism. As seen in the Covid19 pandemic, the same microbe does not affect everyone at the same rate. We think that Dennet's thoughts add new valuables to human consciousness and nature.



4. EVALUATIONS ON CONSCIOUSNESS

In this section, in the first part, we evaluate the ideas of contemporary philosophers who have arguments on the problem of consciousness. It seems that in general, they built their assertions by replying to each other, and by this means, the problem of consciousness seems to be evaluated in a limited intellectual media. In the second part, we assert our own ideas aiming to find new points of view and solutions to the problem of consciousness by virtue of the contingent causality approach.

4.1. Comparing Contemporary Discussions

In this section, we underlined the critiques of the authors about each other's views. It can be concluded that some of them can be classified in the same group while some others can be regarded as in different groups favoring different ideas. Chalmers points to Penrose's non-algorithmic processing that may play a role in conscious mathematical insight. He emphasizes that it cannot be answered why an algorithmic process as well as a non-algorithmic process, should lead to experience (Chalmers, 2004, p. 626).

M. McKinsey states that Putnam introduced 'narrow and wide psychological states', which he accepted as Cartesian concepts, with regard to logical probability. The existence of external objects can be deduced from a wide state, not the narrow one (McKinsey, 2004, p.590).

Heil argues that Putnam is often seen as the first to assert externalism. Externalists, sometimes described as anti-individualists, reject the Cartesian Picture. They argue that the content of our thoughts depends on our context (the region of the world we are immersed in). This is an approach that advocates interpreting the content of our thoughts according to the context in which they occur (Heil, 2004b, p.421). Putnam

gives the example of twin worlds where the colorless liquid consisting of XYZ elements is called 'water' and states that it is correct for the twin earthlings to describe this liquid consisting of XYZ as 'water'. According to externalists, expressions should be evaluated according to the context of the place (Heil, 2004b, p.422).

According to Heil, Putnam is regarded as the creator of contemporary functionalism. Predicates such as red characterize objects such as apples. The same is true for situations and events. According to functionalism, creatures with different physical characteristics can experience a mental experience such as pain. Pain in a human, an octopus, or a Martian is an expression of multiple realizability (Heil, 2004b, p.141-142). Putnam could be classified among the functionalists who take functionalism as showing that physicalism is probably false. Also, Block and Fodor could be grouped in this team. Other philosophers suggest that functionalism asserts that physicalism is probably true (Armstrong, D. Lewis, Smart). The approach through functionalism should be important since it dates back to Aristotle. Among the defenders, Putnam compared mental states with the machine table state of a Turing machine in his early studies while he rejected this kind of approach later even if he reversed again (Heil, 2004b, p.192). It is generally accepted that modern functionalism stems from Putnam's essay Psychological predicates. Fodor defends functionalism in psychology as mental facilities. Fodor implies that functional psychology requires the postulation of a biologically built-in language of thought.

Putnam is also regarded as a contemporary Berkeleyian in the pragmatist sense. From this point of view, Putnam was considered idealistic according to Heil. It was argued that Chalmers, on the other hand, advocated a kind of dualism similar to epiphenomenalism (Heil, 2004b, p. 879). It is also classified among philosophers who developed non-reductionist materialism, such as Putnam, Fodor, and R. Bond. In this

type of materialism, psychological explanations are not reduced to neurophysiological or physical explanations (Heil, 2004b, p.709). It is accepted that Putnam developed the multiple realization thesis based on the anti-reduction argument which is further elaborated by Fodor (Heil, 2004b, p.726).

According to Heil, functionalism as a third-person approach has a causal relationship between behaviors or mental states and beliefs, desires, and emotions (Heil, 2004a, p.334). Putnam can be considered among philosophers who study consciousness with behaviorism (with C. Hempel, R. J. Hirst, Smart, and Kripke), functionalism (with Lewis, Fodor, and Block), externalism, and mental content (with T. Burge, Heil). and Kim).

Davidson must be accepted to advocate compatibilism and accept anti-individualism; this is a claim that some of the neural cognitive states attributed to the actual attitude statements (for example, 'Oscar thinks the water is wet') depend on the presence of external objects. He asserts that anti-individualism is not against the first-person perspective (McKinsey, 2004. p.586). As quoted in Nagel, Davidson argued that while we do not have a general psychophysical theory, if mental phenomena have physical causes and consequences, they must have physical descriptions. However, Nagel states that the sensations are physical processes he argues that Davidson's assumption is that certain mental events are irreducible (Nagel, 2004, p.537).

It is argued that Davidson rejects any reduction of the psychological to the physical. He also denies the existence of psychological laws. With this approach, he seems to accept a Humean causality. Davidson argues that there is no law without exception in psychology because psychological events cannot be responsible for the whole of reality (Perebom and Cornblith, 2004, p.715). Heil's assertion is that Davidson defends 'token

identity' asserting that mental events are identical to physical ones, but denies type-identity, which advocates that mental types are reducible to or identifiable with physical types. It is a matter of discussion what are Davidson's reasons for rejecting type-identity (Heil, 2004b, p.749). Davidson's thesis of 'anomalous monism' should be accepted as an example of non-reductive materialism. He argues that mental concepts resist reduction to physical concepts, but material states and events are mental ascriptions (Heil, 2004b, p.750).

Pereboom and Kornblith underline that Davidson's abnormal monism denies any reduction of the psychological to the physical, and also denies the existence of psychological laws. It is also striking here that Davidson defends a Humean causality with the token-identity thesis. According to Davidson, mental states are identical to some physical states, but mental types cannot be defined by physical types (Heil, 2004b, p. 83). We can state that Davidson is also interested in interpretationism like D. Dennett and J. Heal. Searle, on the other hand, is interested in reductionism like Kim, Pereboom, and Kornblith. Nagel promotes subjectivity and self-awareness with J. Levine, Burge, and McKinsey.

Searle has suggestions about the irreducibility of consciousness. He argues that there must be some explanations beyond causality among the micro-level elements of the brain. He argues that, in his own opinion, consciousness emerges as a neurobiological event (Searle, 1992, p.69). He argues that there is an ontological (not epistemological) difference between someone else's suffering and our own suffering, and that this makes suffering, which is a subjective sensation, irreducible (Searle, 1992, p.73). According to Searle, the fact that a device behaves intelligently is not enough to accept that it is conscious. Arguing that passing the Turing test developed by A. Turing cannot make

artificial intelligence conscious, it focuses on 'understanding' and the material formation of consciousness (Heil, 2004b, p.206).

According to Chalmers, Searle thinks consciousness is dependent on certain biology but Chalmers argues that similar experiences like humans can also occur in artificial intelligence, objecting to the approach that human consciousness cannot have a replica made of silicon (Chalmers, 2004, p.635). Searle, who argues that mental states and events are a product of brain activity, argues that artificial intelligence is not conscious because the computer program is not a product of it (Heil, 2004b, p.249). It is claimed that Searle is trying to develop the 'heterophenomenology' approach, which combines the two in a sense, by emphasizing that science cannot capture the subjective first-person perspective due to its attempt to describe the world in third-person terms (Heil, 2004b, p.523). Searle can be studied in the group of authors interested in Artificial Intelligence (with Turing, M.A. Boden and Block) and reductionism (with Davidson, Pereboom and Kornblith and Kim). Pereboom and Kornblith are opposed to accepting Putnam's multiple realizability thesis as the most fundamental feature of irreducibility. They underline Fodor's anti-reduction bridge principles, which either translate species predicates in a science to those of a more fundamental science or specify a metaphysical relationship (an identical, necessary, sufficient condition) between the types of a science and those of reduction science. However, they imply that the kind of bridge principle required for reducibility will not exist (Pereboom and Kornblith, 2004, p. 712). Pereboom and Kornblith imply that Davidson's abnormal monism will be optimized by rejecting the Humean view of causality and accepting their non-reductionist version of materialism (Pereboom and Kornblith, 2004, p. 716). They can be grouped among those against reductionism (with Davidson, Searle, and Kim). Because Kim claims that psychological states are multiply realizable (MR), he should be accepted against

psycho-physical reductionism. It supports the physical irreducibility of the mental (Kim, 1992, p.3). Kim claims that since psychology has physical insights, it can be explained on the basis of physical interactions (Kim, 1992, p.17). He also adds that psychological laws are not strict laws. He can be included in the anti-reductionist group (with Pereboom and Kornblith, Davidson and Searle) and the externalism and mental content group (with Burge, Putnam, and Heil).

According to Heil, Jackson noticed Mary's plight, implying a scientist knows everything about color but she didn't see any colorful object because she has been confined since birth to a wholly black-and-white environment. He argues that conscious experiences must fall outside the scope of objective natural science (Heil, 2004b, p.756). It can be concluded that in his paper 'Epiphenomenal qualia' it could be inferred that physicalism is false (Levine, 2004, p.539). Jackson's, McGinn's, and Levine's arguments that creatures similar to humans have similar experiences depend on a contingency thesis (CT) (Heil, 2004b, p.757) Jackson could be inspected among the ones who are interested in the mind-body problem (with Levine, McGinn, Wigner, and Hardcastle).

Levine argues that we cannot determine exactly which psycho-physical expressions of identity are true. Because there is an 'explanatory gap' between psychophysical events and their corresponding experiences. He mentions that the computer, which is an example of functionalists, simulates human physiology with its Hardware and the human mentality with its Software (Levine, 2004, pp.772-774). He adds that functional states like pain could not be measured (Levine, 2004, p.779). At this point, it should be emphasized that we do not mean the interpretation of what is called measurement with today's classical methods and concepts. In the relevant sections of our thesis, we have stated our predictions for the inter-individual transfer of experiences that are considered

untransferable. In Searle's approach, which he also calls 'heterophenomenology', there is an effort to transfer the experiences that cannot be transferred to others according to the first-person view, although it is not the same as the third-person view, with an intermediate formula. Chalmers argues that we need an explanatory bridge to overcome Levine's explanatory gap (Chalmers, 2004, p.621). The contemporary approach does not seem sufficient to explain the experience problem (Chalmers, 2004, p.622). It has also been pointed out that Locke was the first to point to the 'explanation gap' (Heil, 2004b, p.808). Levine can be classified within the group dealing with the mind-body problem (along with Jackson, McGinn, Wigner, and Hardcastle). While McGinn argues that we are cognitively closed to the problem of consciousness, Chalmers expresses his hope that in light of developments in science, more useful explanations will be found about consciousness, just like electromagnetic processes. Chalmers argues that the coming possible theory of consciousness requires that experience as a fundamental problem be added to our ontology. The missing part must be something added to the physical laws as a non-physical feature from which the experience can be derived (Chalmers, 2004, p.629).

In addition, it is claimed that Block and McGinn present arguments against consciousness explanations that substitute representations for mental qualities (Heil, 2004b, p.673). Chalmers, McGinn, Block, Nagel, and Searle argue that science and causal interactions can explain physical phenomena, but qualia cannot be similarly explained. These approaches are parallel to Hardcastle's approach that naturalists know when we are conscious but they do not know why (Hardcastle, 1996, p.8).

McGinn argues that, in line with Gödel's approach to mathematics, the human mind is inherently incapable of understanding itself. Gödel showed that the formal systems that would produce the truths of arithmetic were incomplete. This means that the system is

incomplete if there are facts that can be expressed and implied by the system but cannot be proven true in the system (Heil, 2004b, p.756). It can be grouped into a class of philosophers interested in the mind-body problem (with Jackson, Levine, Wigner, and Hardcastle). Hardcastle divides writers on consciousness into two categories. One of them is naturalists who hope that all unknown parts of consciousness will be discovered in the future. The other group believes that the unknown part of consciousness is mysterious. For this reason, they argue that science will not say anything about the cause of consciousness (Hardcastle, 1996, p.7). Hardcastle, Churchland, O. Flanagan, and C.L. Hardin, can be counted among those who foresee the differentiation and modeling of causal interactions of consciousness. Block, Chalmers, McGinn, Nagel, and Searle are of the opinion that science cannot explain the qualia problem. (McGinn, 2004, p.799). He can be grouped into a class of philosophers dealing with the mind-body problem (along with Jackson, Levine, Wigner, and McGinn).

Wigner states that we can know our sensations directly, but this will not apply to others (Wigner, 1967, p.176). He traditionally argues that it has traditionally been accepted that consciousness does not affect physicochemical conditions (Wigner, 1967, p.179). According to Wigner, consciousness interacted with each other with the help of physical structures (Wigner, 1967, p.182). He may be included (with Jackson, Levine, McGinn, and Hardcastle) in the group of authors dealing with the mind-body problem.

4.2. Towards a Solution Proposal of Consciousness

We see that the discussion of causality has been discussed in philosophy texts with its ontic and epistemological dimensions since ancient times. The search for material causes, which started from the presocratics, gradually gave way to non-deterministic approaches. Besides, it draws attention that one-dimensional explanations

in the ancient period began to be abandoned in the context of the deviant movements of atoms of Epicurus after Democritus' atomism. The fact that some events of our age cannot be explained by a deterministic necessity supports the above advances (Aydın, 2022, p.152). Thus, it can be thought that a richer interpretation of the universe has been developing since Antiquity.

Regarding the concept of causality, with S. Kılıç's transference, Heidegger argued that the term real is defined to be manifest from being secret and is named *energeia*. The concept of *energeia* was not anything that appeared by itself for Greeks. Instead, it meant exposing itself by working. For that reason, the term real meant exposing hidden ones for Greeks. The meaning of the term *energeia* turned into the chain of cause and effect in Romans (Kılıç, 2019, p.186). This etymological note would lead at least in the Antique sense that the term causality would be proposed to have no causally bipolar deterministic meaning.

Although causality was important in Rome and in the rise of modern science, there were criticisms against a strict understanding of causality in the 20th century. We can give a supporting example from Wittgenstein against the deterministic understanding of causality. Wittgenstein asserts that we can think of alternative ways regarding the facts that are seemingly in a necessary causality relationship (Wittgenstein, 2017, p.167). It could be argued that Wittgenstein's argument on causality was in the manner of total rejection. However, there were other approaches in the modern history of philosophy like that of G. Deleuze asserting that causality is the ability to start something in the order of phenomena (Deleuze, 2007, p. 100).

Considering the approaches such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and quantum dynamics in our age, it is thought that a causality approach that is not

necessary to phenomena would be more appropriate. We think that these contingent approaches will be more useful in explaining the functions of the neurological system in humans and probably for making progress in the problem of phenomenological consciousness. The problems such as the *explanatory gap* (Levine, 2004, p.778), and *epistemic asymmetry* (Guzeldere, 1998, pp.24-25) regarding these relations are tried to be overcome with *explanatory bridges* (Chalmers, 2004, p.621). At this point, the explanatory bridges in question must be strong enough to carry satisfactory explanations of problems related to consciousness. Considering the studies so far, this brought different and richer perspectives to physics and other sciences on the one hand, and necessitated a contingent causality relationship on the phenomena in the philosophy of mind, on the other hand. Contingency can be defined as the occurrence of which is not certain and necessary, which may not exist or can be otherwise when it exists. Contingent causality, on the other hand, is the thought that the existence of an event or phenomenon is dependent on something else with a relationality that is not required by the law of nature. We think that the contingent causality approach is more consistent in explaining the functions of consciousness that are thought to be associated with neurophysiological activities in neuroanatomical tissues. We argue that the first steps of contingent causation may be possible by moving away from strict deterministic necessity. Softening the subject-object polarization may be an option to loosen a rigid causality. We think that the approaches produced by Merleau-Ponty to overcome the subject-object duality are important in this respect. We discuss these approaches below. In parallel with overcoming the subject-object duality, associating the states of consciousness in a contingency manner in the material realm (brain and neurological tissues) and the nonmaterial realm (such as qualia) may be useful. This approach should be valuable in overcoming the dilemmas we have encountered with the obligatory

causality approach, such as the 'explanatory gap' and 'epistemic asymmetry'. Although the problem of how this can be done is one of the dilemmas of the philosophy of mind today, examples of contingently oriented activities of the neurological system can be found in this study. We think that explaining some of the subjects that were not mentioned before in the history of philosophy of mind or that we think are wrong, are explained in a more compatible way with human physiology, which makes this thesis valuable. In one of them, the fact that the adrenaline discharge released from the nerve cells can cause two different effects in the human organism, such as flight or fight, can be defended as an example of contingent causality in the study of the human neurological system. Another example is the situation where genotypic traits do not necessarily lead to phenotypic traits because of the contingent relationship between genetic make-up and phenotypic structure. For example, every genetic disorder that is important in terms of susceptibility to diseases does not necessarily cause disease or the same severity of disease is not observed. Although non-genetic factors have an effect on this, we can say that only the genetic structure cannot necessarily cause some changes in the human body or spirit. As another example, it is important to mention the transport of pain and heat by the same nerves (*lateral spinothalamic tract*), which were evaluated separately in philosophical inquiries before. It shows that nerves, which are material structures, play a contingent role in the transmission of different qualia experiences (pain and heat). This can also be noted as an example in which the relationship between the material and the immaterial is shown in the human body.

As a matter of fact, in recent years, innovations such as alternative medicine approaches (as in the definitions of "happy gut"), expansions in physics regarding that consciousness is energy concentration, and the demonstration of the plasticity of the brain and neural tissues seem to be important steps. If we look at the problem of

consciousness in light of the information and explanations above, two approaches draw attention. Firstly, there is a subjective interpretation of consciousness that is not conveyable to others, which we call the first-person approach. Although it is accepted that this path, which includes the experiences of the subject, contains ontic integrity for its own subject, we cannot claim that it is valid for other subjects as well. At this point, Merleau-Ponty's suggestions on the qualia problem asserting people will never know how others see red should be notable (Merleau- Ponty, 2006, p.52).

Existing philosophical and scientific interpretations cannot go beyond an interpretation that starts with the subject and ends with the subject, about the content of experiences that are considered to be in relation to physical tissues such as the brain and nervous system. In the third-person approach, which is the other way, it is accepted that with the help of some technical tools (fMRI, EEG, etc.), what is experienced in the experiential field of the brain, and nervous system can be reflected in the observation of the third person. However, it is clear that the content of this transmission will be subjective in any case. At this point, it can be considered that approaches that go beyond subject-object dualism are important. We see that Merleau-Ponty's definition of flesh goes beyond the subject-object duality. Z. Direk argued that as a living body, the flesh includes both the subject (me, consciousness) and the object (corpse, body) in meaning (Direk, 2017, pp.130,150). In addition to this approach, the definition of "chiasm", which defines the intersection of consciousness and body, also means a non-deterministic "border" (Direk, 2017, p.136). Merleau-Ponty asserted that "there is no inner human with us, man is in the world and can only know himself in this world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1996, xi). We see that perceiving something is a negation in the sense that things on the horizon and in the background are not perceived (Direk, 2017, p.103).

According to B. Akarsu, it could be argued that only adults have a world of objects and the world of self separately. Humans have consciousness of the world, while animals have only consciousness of the environment (Akarsu,1998, p.174). We think that these approaches are non-deterministic phenomenological approaches to the interpretation of humans and the world and contribute to the contingent interpretation of consciousness by bringing an alternative to the subject-object duality.

Otherwise, we have to establish a causal relationship between the substances of the conscious being, which the Cartesian dualist approach distinguishes as a thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and a space-occupying substance (*res extensa*). This makes it mandatory to encounter problems such as the *explanatory gap* mentioned above. Based on the assumption that determinism goes with measurement, as Heisenberg said, if we cannot talk about things that we cannot measure, we will have to accept that we cannot find solutions to problems such as consciousness based on a contingent point of view (Feynman, 2019, p.183). As emphasized in the explanations in the previous sections, coexistence does not imply that one of the objects is a cause and the other an effect. If we can position cause and effect in a world model where both are in equal categories, we think that we can overcome an inefficient model in that we first separate and then have to establish a causal relationship between them, as in dualism. We argue that this is possible with the contingent causality interpretation.

When current scientific explanations cannot explain the events of the age, more comprehensive explanations may be needed. In this study, in which consciousness is evaluated in the context of causality, in terms of reaching satisfactory explanations, it will be useful to evaluate the problems like causality, consciousness, *qualia*, and phenomenal consciousness from new perspectives. At this point, we think that it is necessary to investigate beyond the conventional horizon of thinking such as every

effect has a cause, and If man consists of thinking and space-occupying substances, there is a causal relationship between two substances. Each effect may have one or more causes. However, with infinite regression, it is assumed that this approach will stop at a first cause. This first cause is generally thought of as transcendent. However, we can take a kind of contingent version of the first cause approach that is not based on transcendent causality, arguing that there may be entities or systems that are non-transcendent and also autonomous or become autonomic. As a matter of fact, the Purkinje fibers in the heart produce stimuli spontaneously without being stimulated by any other center. Thus, for example, in comatose patients, the heart often continues to beat even if respiratory and brain functions are impaired or even stopped (as in the case of brain death). To put it in a more general approach, in the elements included in the autonomic nervous system, the system works without conscious stimuli by the brain. It is seen that the beard and nails continue to grow for a day or two after death in the human body. However, by looking at these explanations, it should not be understood that we claim that the aforementioned organs and systems work completely independently of the body in general. What is meant to be emphasized here is that the relationship in question is contingent, not obligatory. The stimulation of the sympathetic nervous system with neuro-mediators and related hormones has a necessary causal relationship. But the resultant fight or flight reaction behavior of humans is contingent. The same neurological impulses may cause different behaviors.

Therefore, examining this contingent causality relationship can be useful in distinguishing consciousness and its relations. When the properties of consciousness like *qualia* are handled with a first-person approach, there does not appear to be a philosophical problem regarding their ontological existence. Since the existence of the mentioned concepts is intuitively limited to the first person, no further proof is required.

However, when we begin to question what our consciousness is, that is, when we attribute a whatness to it, we must first try to separate it as in the mind-body problem, and then try to establish a causal relationship between the parts. It should also be noted that we can only think of consciousness as existing together with its material carrier (body). This means building up a kind of causal relationship. It does not seem possible to imagine beings that have no space and that have the characteristics of consciousness. When we define causality as a relationship between two things that cannot be explained otherwise, the first causal link will lose its validity if a different and superior relationship from the first can be established. For example, considering the succession of day and night, for those who have no other explanatory reason, the night may be regarded as the cause of the day. However, by knowing the positions and movements of the earth and the sun from space, different reasons (the position and movements of the earth and sun relative to each other) will be valid for day and night. With the help of future scientific developments, a new causal explanation, such as reflection in a parallel universe giving birth to night and day, may possibly be valid. It can be accepted that the causality approach here is contingent.

In our view of consciousness, we propose to distinguish between the logical/ontic interpretation of causality and the factual interpretation of causality. In the first, there is a deterministic understanding of causality that is not based on facts and therefore cannot be thought otherwise, while in the second there is a contingent understanding of causality, which has an alternative because it is factual and is based on epistemic interpretations. An example similar to the first approach is what we call the easy problem. That is by electrical stimulation or damage to the physical brain and nervous tissue, the relationship of motor functions (hand-arm movement, speech, vision, etc.) experienced in the subject and observed from the outside is mandatory.

However, as in neuroplasticity, the replacement of the dead tissues of the brain by other parts indicates that the above relationship also has a contingent side. In support of this approach, it can be evaluated that the arousal part of consciousness is related to causality in a necessary sense, and the part of awareness is related to contingent causality. Thus, we think that we have presented examples of getting rid of necessity in our world where there are multiple variables. Because, as emphasized in the examples above, there are multiple variables in the brain and nervous system. Brain development is variable. The deterministic/obligatory cause-effect relationship is perceived as one-sided, but there is reciprocity in the brain and nervous system.

The externally observable changes caused by the mental concentration that is performed before sports competitions etc. and the spectator effect in social actions show that the feature of consciousness exceeds the limits of epiphenomenalism. Thus, we see that the content of consciousness, which is considered abstract, can cause concrete changes. We think that this approach moves the set of so-called hard problems towards more tangible explanations.

After all the suggestions above, we could argue that there would be the following assertions:

First, the conventional scientific and philosophical paradigms are not sufficient to give way to satisfactory explanations of consciousness.

Second, we should evaluate the possibility of the problem of consciousness may not be philosophical or scientific.

Third, we may be asking the question (What is consciousness?) mistakenly. Maybe the right question would be to start with “Who is?”

Fourth, we can assert that there is no sufficient data proving that the concept that is known as consciousness should be valid for only living objects. As outlined in Gaia Hypothesis, inanimate beings could bear consciousness also. It could be a property that could be expressed as something bearing a special kind of energy.

Fifth, the possible answer to the question of what makes me myself should be hidden beyond the limits of our understanding. Likewise, the problem of the ship of Theseus should not be answered by exact expressions. Instead, there should be limited areas between two (or more) borders. The thing that makes me myself should not be something physical. I could assert that I am (present) even if I would be unaware of my body.

Sixth, at least some examples of the problem of phenomenal consciousness should be accompanied by reciprocal conscious actions. For example, we could not fall in love with mentally handicapped persons. We could love them but could not fall in love with them.

Based on the suggestions above, we could assert some individual propositions regarding the concept of consciousness in the future:

First, with the developments in artificial intelligence (AI), we could assert that there would be a combinatory life with subjects (human consciousness) and objects (General AI). We could design special Software for our robotic assistants to look after our children, elderly or disabled persons. Probably there would be a unilateral transfer of affection from humans to their high-level AI robotic assistants. Babies would calm down when they would hear the voices of their AI assistants. Elderly people would be contented with their AI assistants listening to them. Disabled ones would also be happy for their AI assistants would not fed up with themselves.

Second, in light of the developments in neuroscience and the new paradigm of the probabilistic sciences, it should be argued that in the future we could talk about conveying abstract concepts more easily. For instance, we would argue that one's "index of fidelity" would be expressed in terms of numbers. To ground our assertion above, we would underlie that the MMPI (Minnesota multiple personality index) tests are effective to enlighten the properties of personality (a subjective phenomenon) objectively. It is argued that there should be some necessary additions to apply the objective test (MMPI) to inform subjective properties such as fidelity.

After all of the proposals above, we would hope that forthcoming philosophical studies would enlighten the mystery of consciousness. Time would show the intellectual world whether this would be true or not.

5. CONCLUSION

The history of the philosophy of mind showed that the interpretation of consciousness changed according to the ages. Religions, economical models, educational systems, wars, purity, and environmental changes should be the basic factors in the changes during the evolution of the human understanding of consciousness. With respect to this, the concept of the hard problem (phenomenal consciousness problem) that Chalmers added to the philosophy of mind has added a new perspective to human understanding. Chalmers' understanding of the relationship of the physical (brain, body) with the non-physical (thoughts, feelings, etc) motivated us to focus on the problem of consciousness. At first, we aimed to examine ideas and explanations on the relationship between the material and immaterial aspects of consciousness with our conception of contingent causality approach. However, during the long and tiresome period of exploring the literature on consciousness, we were convinced that there were more problems and conflicts than expected. For this reason, we felt the need to strengthen our thesis by focusing on the examples of contingent causality regarding the human organism.

A group of problems was related to the concept of causality which was inspected since ancient times but had different references according to philosophers. The meaning of cause in Aristotle's inquiries should differ from that of Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Heidegger. We evaluated the inquiries of the aforementioned philosophers in previous sections. Aristotle inspected the thinghood of objects and also had ideas on the soul. His inspections are important in the evaluation of the objective property of consciousness by means of reasons. His four-reasons approach was an important step in ontological evaluations of consciousness. Leibniz as the creator of the principles of

sufficient reason and of contradiction has an important place by means of the causality approach to consciousness. As another original expression, monads are among the topics discussed in both ontology and philosophy of mind, representing Leibniz. Russell, who has a doctoral study on Leibniz, also makes an important contribution to the comparison of Leibniz and his contemporary philosophers with his comments. Hume, on the other hand, has been another source we have benefited from in this study with his theses on human understanding and the untenability of the causality approach. Kant has been one of the sources of our study because of the criticism of reason, the establishment of mind, sound knowledge and the causality and contingency interpreted in our thesis. Heidegger's interpretation of the concept of cause in terms of both grounding and causation has been beneficial to our thesis. Additionally, his analytical interpretation of the concept of cause in a wide period of time in the philosophical literature, and his approach to building a world in the context of his original concept, *Dasein* are among the sources feeding this dissertation.

In the third chapter, we evaluated contemporary approaches to the problem of consciousness. These studies are generally about what the concept of consciousness is, the relationship between body and consciousness, and the difficulties in conveying phenomenal experiences to other individuals. Among them, we should emphasize that Putnam's non-reductionist understanding of materialism is an approach to liberating consciousness from monist and materialist explanations. His explanations on topics such as intentionality, 'mental representations', 'twin worlds', and 'brain in a vat' shed light on the studies of contemporary consciousness. Davidson occupies an important place in contemporary philosophy of mind with his 'anomalous monism' thesis about psychophysical relations. According to Searle, consciousness is a neurobiological

phenomenon that cannot be reduced as that of other material properties. Searle presents the 'heterophenomenology' approach, which he hopes will be a method that will overlap the first and third-person approaches. Pereboom and Kornblith, on the other hand, argue that Putnam's multiple reality thesis is an erroneous approach and they are against the nonreductive materialism approach. They emphasize Fodor's principle of the antireductionist bridge and underline the importance of receptors in the physical structures that give rise to mental states. They argue that the irreducibility of psychology does not mean dualism and they accept that even if antireductionism is accepted, this does not prevent some psychological laws are reducible neurophysiologically. Kim asserts that antireductionism has the problem of 'explanatory exclusion', meaning that the relationship between physical and mental events is hard to understand. Heil argues that understanding the human mind is difficult. McGinn's approach that brains are the causal basis of consciousness is among the important proposals. He asserts that the relation between the physical and mental is 'cognitively closed'. However, he adds that there should be a natural explanation regarding consciousness. Hardcastle advocates empirical approaches in explaining consciousness and asserts that biological things need not be artificially produced. Wigner points to the direct knowledge of sensations that can not be logically proved by others. P.M. Churchland asserts his critique of 'folk psychology' as a speculative theoretical approach to consciousness. As a monist, Dennett defines the attempts to find a place for consciousness as 'Cartesian theatre' and emphasizes that words distinguish the human mind from other animals.

When the aforementioned thinkers and studies are evaluated, although some of them have made important determinations and explanations, it is noteworthy that an original and satisfactory approach to the concept of consciousness has not been reached so far.

In this study, after evaluating the previous theories and studies on causality and consciousness, we thought that it is not possible to approach consciousness through causality with strict deterministic approaches. Because it is seen that the dynamics of the neurological system, which we can assume to include consciousness in the human organism, reveal a relationality that does not require necessity.

In the examples we gave in the relevant sections about the contingency of human cognitive activities, we stated that the flight-or-fight response of the sympathetic nervous system is mediated by the same neurotransmitter (adrenaline). The fact that two opposite effects are due to the same cause can be considered as an example of contingent relationality.

We argue that genotypic traits do not cause the same phenotypic effects, and this can be understood by knowing that the expression of related genetic traits and diseases is different from person to person.

The fact that some reflex movements (such as sucking, and grasping) can be performed voluntarily later before the myelination process is completed in the neonatal period suggests contingency as a valid process in the human organism.

As shown in will studies, fMRI and EEG studies have shown that the moment of decision is earlier than the moment when the person thinks he or she has made a decision. This, as a finding contrary to the first-person approach, makes us think that our own consciousness and organism are actually different from what we think. According to this example, the first-person approach, which is supposed to be intuitively aware of the first person but unable to convey it to others, is considered to be wrong.

We think that the explanatory effect of the contingent causality approach to consciousness, which is the subject of this thesis, may be possible with the philosophical interpretation of the cognitive activities presented above. Thus, we think that the contingent causality approach, which is a relationality that allows events and phenomena to be otherwise, allows us to interpret today's realities about the characteristics of consciousness in a more authentic way. We hope that future studies along this line of approach will more effectively illuminate the unknowns of consciousness.

In light of the above information and the approaches highlighted in our thesis, we can summarize our evaluations as follows. The problem of consciousness is one of the important areas of concern in the philosophy of mind. From the ancient period to the Middle Ages, and from the modern period to the present time, we see that thinkers interpret the problem of consciousness in accordance with their own age.

In particular, we can talk about the incompatibility between first-person and third-person approaches to consciousness in the contemporary philosophy of mind. Associating the qualitative experience with the first-person approach and the objective consciousness with the third-person approach is one of the subjects that our thesis deals with. In order to overcome this problem, we think that it will be an important step to soften the dualist approaches in the philosophy literature and to consider the consciousness with the interpretation that includes both the subject and the object characteristics. Because consciousness itself is so subjective that we cannot attribute any objectivity. In addition, it is an upper phenomenon that is related to the neurochemical and hormonal events of neurobiological structures that cannot remain only at the subjective level. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the phenomenal outputs

of conscious activities cannot be obtained without the material structures that consciousness is associated with.

Considering that the context of causality can only be shown with third-person interpretation in the current paradigm, we think that in order to overcome this, approaches that correlate with subjective experiences should be explained with additional supportive methods and examples. The "fidelity index" model, which is one of the examples given in our thesis, will be the product of such an approach if it can be developed. It can also take its place in the literature as an example in which a feature that was previously limited in the first person that cannot be transferred to others, can be conveyed to the observation of third persons.

It is thought that the fight-or-flight reaction caused by adrenaline discharge, which is discussed in our thesis, exemplifies the contingent aspect of cognitive activities. As a prediction, it can be thought that there may be subgroups of the hormone adrenaline (such as Adrenaline K, and Adrelinin S). Or, differences in receptor level can lead to a fight-or-flight reaction. Just as if the adrenaline hormone binds to receptor K, there is a flight reaction, and if it binds to receptor S, there is a war reaction. Since this issue has not been clarified yet, we must accept that the connection between them is not understood and the causality relationship here is inaccessible. As a matter of fact, when we look at the history of medicine, we see that it has become possible to explain how the different functions of T cells of the immune system are possible after showing subgroups such as T4 and T8. We interpret the same genotypic traits leading to non-identical phenotypic traits as an example of similar contingency.

Based on our example of pain and temperature sensations carried by the same nerve (lateral spinothalamic tract), we think that it is an important detail to underline the

transmission of these emotions together in a way that can be seen by others. Although the nature of the emotions in this example remains subjective, we think that the co-carriage of two different qualitative experiences that are said to be incomprehensible to third persons is a step in reconciling the first-person and third-person approaches.

We think that the observation of sucking and grasping behavior in the same organism (human) as reflex involuntary movements in the first six months and later as voluntary movements indicates the contingent side of consciousness.

Based on these approaches and examples, we think that a relationship based on contingent causality can be seen between first and third-person perspectives on consciousness. Based on these contingent relations, we think that we will lead the way in eliminating the unknowns by leaving the deadlocks of the necessary cause-effect relationship in eliminating the existing dilemmas regarding consciousness, and by enabling different perspectives and new definitions and concepts. In this regard, the "heterophenomenology" approach, which Searle claims is an attempt to establish a relationship between first and third-person approaches, stands before us as an example of interpreting first-person qualities from a third-person perspective. Our suggestion is to develop models such as the fidelity index and to increase studies on approaches that will allow more concrete steps to be taken to eliminate the gap in explanation.

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