



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYEs
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**THE NEXUS BETWEEN MILITARIZATION
AND CORRUPTION IN ZIMBABWE**

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ABSTRACT

“The Nexus Between Militarization and Corruption in Zimbabwe”

The thesis explores a contemporary African entrapment trend through analyzing the nexus between the intensified militarization and the rising levels of corruption in Zimbabwe. To add to contentious academic debate on corruption, the study sought to inform an evidence-based understanding of a web of localized corruption tactics which emerged with the dawn of the Second Republic in Zimbabwe. The study goes beyond neopatrimonialism literature to empirically examine the shadowy scale and nature of corruption tactics being employed in Zimbabwe. The nation's fragility is typical of the perpetual decay of norms-based governance at the mercy of the military. Consequently, a fragile state with a militarized executive tends to neutralize and weaken good governance structures such as the judiciary, legislature and civil society. Corruption is not new in Zimbabwe, but after the 2017 military coup, the evident military cronyism in political appointments to serve economic interests of the elite, which was somewhat clandestine under Mugabe's rule, coincided with rising levels of corruption. An amalgam of purposive and quota sampling was used in this study, which are non-probability sampling techniques used to purposively select participants from relevant sectors such as governance, academia and the media to grasp the kleptocratic tactics, patronage networks which blossomed after 2017. The study observed that the development of private networks linked to the state have formed parasitic elements with hedonistic kleptocratic tactics that have deteriorated the formal state capacity. In this case a hoard of existential crises worsened by corruption form a variety of internal contradictions which act as obstacles of development and democracy.

KEYWORDS: *Militarized State, Corruption, Mnangagwa, Development, State Fragility*

ÖZET

“Zimbabve’de Askerileşme ile Yolsuzluk Arasındaki İlişki”

Bu çalışma, çağdaş Afrika’nın çıkmazlarından birini, Zimbabve’de yönetim erkinin askerileşmesi ve artan yolsuzluk seviyeleri arasındaki bağlantıyı analiz ederek araştırmaktadır. Yolsuzlukla ilgili akademik tartışmalara ek olarak çalışma, kanıta dayalı bir anlayışla, Zimbabve’de İkinci Cumhuriyet’in doğuşu ile ortaya çıkan yerel yolsuzluk yöntemleri ağını irdelemektedir. Çalışma, Zimbabve’de uygulanan yolsuzluk yöntemlerinin örtülü doğasını ampirik biçimde ele alabilmek için neopatrimonyalizm literatürünün ötesine geçmektedir. Ulusun kırılganlığı, normlara dayalı yönetimin yozlaşmasının tipik bir göstergesidir. Askerileşmiş bir yürütme erkine sahip kırılgan bir devlet; yargı, yasama ve sivil toplum gibi iyi yönetim yapılarını zayıflatma ve etkisiz hale getirme eğilimindedir. Yolsuzluk, Zimbabve’de yeni bir olgu değildir. Mugabe döneminde örtülü şekilde gerçekleşen yolsuzluk, 2017 askeri darbesi sonrasında görünürleşmiştir. Seçkinlerin ekonomik çıkarlarına hizmet eden siyasi askerileşme ile yolsuzluk seviyelerinin yükselişi birbirine paralel seyretmektedir. Bu çalışmada, 2017’den sonra gelişen yolsuzluk metodları ve patronaj ağlarını kavramak için kamu, akademi ve medya gibi ilgili sektörlerden katılımcılarla derinlemesine görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Olasılıksız örnekleme teknikleri olan amaç ve kota örneklemleri birlikte kullanılmıştır. Devletin kapasitesini tehdit etmekte olan hedonistik yolsuzluk metodları ile devlete bağlı gelişen özel ağların parazit unsurlar oluşturduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Netice olarak yolsuzlukla derinleşen varoluşsal krizler yığını, kalkınma ve demokrasinin önündeki engeller olan iç çelişkileri oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Militarize devlet, Yolsuzluk, Mnangagwa, Kalkınma, Devlet kırılganlığı*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FI	Fragile Index
GNU	Government of National Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JOC	Joint Operation Command
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCA	National Constitutional Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Program
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TI	Transparency International
WFP	World Food Program
WVCF	War Victims Compensation Fund
ZACC	Zimbabwe Anticorruption Commission
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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INTRODUCTION

Ending corruption and moving towards governance that prioritizes and serves the basic socio-economic rights of citizens is one of Africa's longest and pending struggles in the post-colonial era. Corruption has evolved to become more dynamic, opaque, and complex, and in more ways, resistant to solutions and attempts to address it (Hoffmann & Hendricks, 2018). Zimbabwe is not an exception in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The SSA region had the lowest ranking in the 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), scoring a regional mark of 32 out of 100. In Southern Africa, South Africa, which continues to grapple with state capture, public sector procurement corruption and local authority's corruption scored 44, Zambia 34 and Mozambique 26; with Zimbabwe scoring 24, the worst in comparison to its counterparts.

Corruption has manifested and evolved in a post-independent state that had a strong socioeconomic base at independence that would have catapulted it to be a top regional economic performer, had it kept corruption declining the past four decades. The Zimbabwe liberation struggle, which ended with the 1979 ceasefire and elections in 1980 based on the Lancaster House Constitution, focused on fighting white minority monopolism and corruption. White supremacist nepotism and unequal distribution of wealth were dominant corruption domains. After independence, under the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) led government for the first four years, Zimbabwe was a stable state politically and economically compared to its neighbors (Riddell, 1984). The government led by the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe worked to engender equality by implementing socialist policies. Zimbabwe was a relatively corruption free welfare state committed to highly effective poverty reduction, with evident potential for growth and transformation.

In 1987 Zimbabwe changed to executive presidency under Mugabe, centralization was implemented, and military obsession became more apparent. Zimbabwe became a securocracy beyond a de-facto military state. Ever since, Zimbabwe has degenerated into a perpetually unstable economic state characterized by economic failure. These failures paved

way for the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the early 1990s with the currency devaluation reforms greatly depleting its purchasing value, despite SAP's promises for recovery. By the time of the rise of opposition politics in 1999 and the land reforms in the early 2000, Zimbabwe was failing both politically and economically. The post-independence stability of the state was shaking and grand corruption cases had been recorded. ZANU PF policies of forced land takeover were broadly criticized, both the 2005, and later the 2008 elections were marred with electoral corruption violence, deaths, and high military involvement and the label 'military state' was revived in scholarly discourse.

A Unity Government was formed with the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2009 and 'the most democratic constitution' was enacted in 2013. Past the unity government, Zimbabwe further plunged into instability because good governance and obedience to democratic principles had failed to take root, three decades after independence, as though the call to arms that ignited the flame of the liberation struggle had been long forgotten with its lessons unlearned. At this point it is important to mention that the post-independence state can be seen as similar in morph and form to the pre-independent state, especially in the context of institutional cultures and governance philosophy, an argument warranting the assertion that colonialism merely changed color and race in Zimbabwe.

The occurrence of the November 2017 coup was a culmination of party factionalism rooted in corruption and struggle for avenues for extraction of kickbacks using public office. The military effectively took over and mutated from being a stakeholder to a stockholder in the Zimbabwean political matrix. Apparent in this historical synopsis is the assertion that political corruption is the root of corruption in Zimbabwe.

In literature, corruption has been discussed in its many forms (Mubangizi & Sewpersadh, 2017). Ranging from petit, systematic, and systemic corruption. Different causes and loopholes have been proffered as the sources of corruption, including nepotism (Apata, 2019), lack of constitutionalism, good governance and bureaucracy (Joslyn, 2019). This has caused a high compliance cost and political instability. Some authors have argued that state fragility arising from armed conflict is a permissive condition for corruption.

However, this piece contributes to literature by arguing that when state institutions are militarized, it increases rampant corruption which leads to state failure. This is manifest in Zimbabwe where corruption has escalated since the military coup in November 2017, despite the president's pledge to uproot corruption. Ever since, corruption has been facilitated by retired or active military individuals thereby plunging Zimbabwe into abject status of perpetuating state failure.

This study does not argue that state failure, corruption nor military obsession were absent in pre-coup Zimbabwe. Instead, to add to the contentious academic and policy debate on corruption the study focuses on the impact of the pronounced military takeover of the helm of government structures in the "Second Republic" under the presidency of Emerson Mnangagwa, himself a securocrat par excellence. While corruption in the first republic had strong military underpinnings, their continuation, dynamics, and evolution in the Second Republic to involve business acolytes makes for a strong case worthy of analysis. One key reason is that the Second Republic's key pledge to Zimbabweans towards a socioeconomic transformation that benefits all citizens was built on the pretext of purging corruption, which seemed and sounded genuine, transformative. Though this promise became an electoral buy-in, a key to democratic validation of a coup government, which the citizenry counted on, corruption became more pronounced in the Second Republic in comparison to the first.

The author argues that there is an associative relationship between militarization and corruption kleptocratic tactics which is debilitating strategic and key sectors crucial to social and economic development in the country. By corruption tactics the study refers to the methods used to maximize opportunities for corruption. Through a qualitative dominated explanatory case study approach rooted in Critical Discourse Analysis, the author examined media content (print and electronic), legal, carried out in-depth semi structured interviews and policy documents analysis of key reports as well as journal articles to present a case on the nexus between militarization and corruption with state failure as the ultimate outcome. The study also made use of the Contemporary Literacy on Anticorruption Global Summit by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research to collect data on Zimbabwe. The conference in which the author was part of the key group discussion proved to be valuable in

data collection. This context sets the qualitative epistemological basis upon which the quest for practical policy proposals can be pursued to deconstruct the militarization-corruption nexus which reflects and solidifies Zimbabwe's political hierarchy. Since the rule of law has been reduced to 'rule by law', this study proffers that constitutionalism and legalism alone will be inadequate to address Zimbabwean problems. It will be equally impossible without sustained regional and international diplomatic pressure on Zimbabwean politicians to act in the best interest of their citizens.



CHAPTER 1

1.1. BACKGROUND

The basic conception of corruption is the mis-governance and a disease of weak institutions; thus, the move from “functional good to dysfunctional bad” (Nichols, 2017). However, such simplicity in characterization does not imply the non-existence of complexity surrounding definitions and characterizations of corruption. Complexity is inevitable since corruption is an anthropological phenomenon tied to context with socio-political implications (Torsello & Venard, 2016). The Oxford English Dictionary describes corruption as “dishonest or fraudulent conduct of those in power, typically involving bribery”. The shortfall in this definition is twofold: first, it describes corruption as akin to the public office occupant’s personal benefit, second fraudulent conduct or abuse is broad (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017).

Characterization of corruption should capture its evolution and scope. Definitions fall into three major categories; public office centered, market centered (corrupt civil or private service worker treating their job as a market, and people centered (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). In support of this view, (Khan, 2006) notes that definition is much more relevant to Zimbabwe since it states corruption as a product of a malfunctioning governance system. Despite this characterization, corruption and how its manifestation and evolution unfolds is unique to a specific country or the smallest possible government unit invaded by it. Further, the phenomenon of corruption is also visible in the private sector between individuals and between domestic and foreign actors in their dealings.

To understand the full corruption spectrum, the levels of corruption, “grand, petty and state capture” levels can be used since all three are evidently existent in Zimbabwe (Shah & Schacter, 2004). Firstly, grand (systemic) corruption is purposive and secretive disregard of standards of moral behavior in a polity by politicians and other parties to corrupt acts (Africa, 2016). It can be the embezzlement of public funds, clientelism and patronage which are acts

that contradict the constitution, and different law regimes such as the African Union laws on corruption or the United Nations prescribed legal morals (Otaluka, 2017). In such a system, leaders maximize self-aggrandizement at the expense of the general populace. Petty corruption involves the use of public office for smaller economic gain in smaller transactions. It is prevalent in the middle to low grade public office holders

Lastly on state capture, Zimbabwe perfectly fits the descriptive underpinnings of the practice, where instead of being granted a consensual right to govern, violence and if necessary, death is used to extract, marshal and deploy resources of an economy and society, in the process asserting raw power to control the state (Bratton, 2015). State capture alone warrants an independent inquiry which this research does not intend to commit to, yet its magnitude and prominence demands the explanation hereunder given considering the intricate relationship with the sector capable of monopolizing violence, fear, force, death and the forms of control through which a nation's citizenry can almost or truly become subservient to the military.

In Africa and in Zimbabwe specifically, corruption has evolved and intensified to the extent of no return, the intensity of which has enabled it to evade succinct measure by the conventional tools for measurement currently in use (Vereinte Nationen, 2016). Corruption has been massively sector based and these trends have worsened in the past four decades. Since 1980 Zimbabwe has become a survivalist state sustained by corrupt activities of the political elite to preserve their power (Nyoni, 2017). To date corruption has been normalized as a top-to-bottom phenomenon. The lack of will to enforce anti-corruption measures in the form of laws or public administration ethics which constitute a good governance package at the political level has immensely catalyzed corruption (Maguchu & Maja, 2019). As constitutionalism and the rule of law declined in the past decade, corruption infested the Zimbabwean polity. Corruption has evolved from being predominantly political to encompass all state related sectors; for instance, the banking, mining, tendering and procurement, construction and local governance. Principal of these other sectors the driving force is politics since extracts from the corrupt dealings are used for political financing.

Since Zimbabwe's independence, there has emerged a complex network of corruption built by patronage networks that rely on co-opting strategies used at low levels of the bureaucratic structure to keep the positions of political elites (Wellington Garikai et al., 2015). It has been done by strategic recruitments and appointment of associates, this in turn compromises policies consistent with commitment to good governance and public administration ethics. It is imperative to the inquiry to note that corruption has become so engrained in the public sector that officials have become more powerful than the law and justifications of corrupt practices or the muzzling of voices that speak up about or against it are the key precepts to the normalization earlier stated.

1.2. THE SHADOW STATE THEORY AS AN ORGANIZING CONCEPT OF THE STUDY

The purpose of an organizing concept is to depict the nuances and structures which create loopholes that nurture corruption tactics reflecting a state imbedded in shadowy games. Within the African context this phenomenon was popularized by (Reno, 2000) who dissected and designated this theory to scrutinize collusion between the state and the private sector in grand corruption in Sierra Leone. Reno enlightens how internal networks between politicians and international businesses facilitate personal enrichment within the African context. Greater patronage and kleptocratic networks in Africa have weakened official state administrations in the state. (Reno, 2000) concurs that this system of governance should involve a system of governance which has a parallel government. Therefore, the conventional meaning of this is that there is a deliberate ethereal alliance of African rulers conniving with military elites, local business acolytes, intermediaries and some foreign companies to weaken the formal system of governance inversely emboldening the informal sector. This fits well within the confines of the study as bringing this to the Zimbabwean context there is an incontrovertible applicability of this theory which allowed the examination of the Zimbabwe case which harbors the monopolization of political and economic power in the hands of the military, small number of public officials with a cob web of business acolytes who represent the unelected officials.

(Mills, 1956) describes the shadow state as “power elites with a well-structured network of people located in government, state institutions, state owned enterprises, private business, security agencies, family networks and governing party distinguished by privileged intermittent access”. The innermost temple of decision making in Zimbabwe is now composed of unelected individuals and the study argues that they are culpable to the new corruption tactics. They have been given the power to wield substantial power because of their propinquity to power and advantageous relationship to the political leaders in the upper echelons of power. For this study focus on the role of unelected business acolytes and public officials is vital in understanding the relationship between increased militarization of the state and corruption which then act as obstacles to development and democracy. (Sardan, 1999) in studying the moral economy of corruption in Zimbabwe argues that the shadow state does not simply refer to any kind of abuse of office such as petty corruption perpetrated by politicians as their efforts to change the laws to expand the power of the government which has been documented in a broad range of political systems. In interregnum this study aims to expands beyond neopatrimonialism literature to empirically examine the scale, clandestine nature and the magnitude of corruption tactics being employed in Zimbabwe.

Growing government reliance in the security forces saw military figures increasingly taking on what had previously been civilian responsibilities in key ministries and the electoral commission Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). (Beardsworth et al., 2019) argue that the coup in Zimbabwe should be described as “the coup that was never a coup”. The tiptoeing and augmented level of the militarization of the state has raised a question on whether the president is cossetting and plateful to the predatory needs of the securocrats. (Sishuwa et al., 2021) argues that formal institutions in Zimbabwe have become fragile and lack of trust in ZANU PF has made the President to surround himself with family members and loyalist whose loyalty he can count on. The study therefore sought to depict the deterioration of the formal state capacity through the informal institutions of unelected business acolytes in decision making structures which have determined economic and political processes. However, in relation to the military the bonanza for their insurmountable role as the decisive political power broker in 2017 has been greater unbridled political and economic influence

in key sectors in the economy. The economic opportunities given to the military have enabled the New Dispensation to retain assertive loyalty of the coercive institutions. Corrupt patronage networks have penetrated different sectors of the economy distorting how they function with the negative repercussions being felt by the citizens. The extent and nature of the penetration having immense economic consequences.

1.2.1. Permissible Structures for Shadowy Activities

There are a lot structures that enable grand corruption in Zimbabwe and at the forefront of this is “a winner takes all approach to election which creates a political structure that enables grand corruption through engendering patronage networks through polarized non-inclusive constructions” (Hammar et al., 2010). In substantiating this attestation (Alexander & McGregor, 2013) concur that this political structure engenders a top leadership that is entrenched in a patron client relationship in complicit with the private sector, security sector, judiciary, traditional leaders, church leaders, party officials an rural households. This breeds a repressive state that is after political survival and power consolidation. Violent government transitions led by the military is another aspect of such political structures (Tshuma, 2020). This forms extractive institutions that eliminate the input of the populace in participating in the political, economic affairs. Therefore, this organizing concept is depicting the nuances and structures which create loopholes that nature corruption tactics in a state imbedded in shadowy games.

Furthermore, (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) argue such political structures included the recurrent use of violence to silence political dissent and peaceful protest. In terms of Economic structures, the main factor that enables grand corruption in Zimbabwe is a disreputable unstable macro-economic framework which forms the substratum of quasi economic activities International Monetary Fund (IMF 2020). In addition, Zimbabwe’s economy is reliant on resources such as platinum and gold. A key major structural loophole is the vulnerable cross border, illicit financial flows as which emanate from Zimbabwe ‘s position in which it is at the node of Southern African road networks. These structures permeate a conducive environment for private sectors to thrive as a source that highly

incentivized to target public expenditure as a source of income colluding with public officials. Externalization of foreign currency through colluding with public officials and guaranteed access to scarce foreign currency from the RBZ is also another structure that permeates corruption.

The Zimbabwean society has been described as a fractured society (Mangena et al., 2021). The moral decline evidenced by bouts of corruption is caused by successive grotesque acidic political polarization which has caused waves of divisions, violence and human rights abuses which destroys national cohesion depicting a declining moral campus of ubuntu. Limited social cohesion, lack of coalescence towards a united national building goal has led to divisions that have metastasized to all facets of governance which affects proper national dialogue and citizen agency. The cooptation of traditional, church leaders into politics which is a new phenomenon in the New Dispensation is another factor that requires dissection to depict how this affects social response as the church leaders are supposed to be the moral campus to speak and seek truth from political leaders. The issue property rights in Zimbabwe is another bone of contention that has led to the unlawful expropriation of properties from private ownership by the government. A key contributor to that is the selective application of the law towards political opponents.


1.2.2. Motivations for Shadowy Activities

The nomenclature and anecdote for the perpetuation of corruption have always revolved around rent seeking and political financing as there is a symbiotic relationship between the political actors involved in corruption and the cronies that seek self-enrichment through rent seeking (Maguchu & Maja, 2019). The ZANU PF regime uses the rhetoric of sanctions as an excuse and scapegoat for macro-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. As a convenient scapegoat sanctions are used to distract the public from the real and challenges affecting development in Zimbabwe. A key question that emerges in the typology of grand corruption is to what extent do sanctions from the West and the increased reliance on countries such as China creates vulnerabilities for the exportation of corrupt activities. For clientelist networks, on the apex of patronage is the authoritarian societies. The installation

of business acolytes, key family members, political allies and supporters in key institutions is part of a form of influence peddling which represents the trendy perpetual corrupt networks. Preferential access to government positions and appointments have been made out of loyalty to control key government economic sectors lucrative outcomes this has had an effect on warping Zimbabwean citizenry. The use of an organizing concept permeates the study to analyze how excuses, “whataboutism”, scapegoats like sanctions have ingrained the political and legal corruption tactics used to expand and entrench patronage networks between the private and public actors.

Achieved through nepotism and cronyism the exploitation of opportunities for personal enrichment depicts that there is a reliance and the subsequent rewarding of clientelist networks. At the apex of this web are patronage networks which are a feature of an authoritarian state. The apt of family members and close business associates in this web as illustrated by the diagram below is a form of influence entrenchment for preferential access to economic sectors and peddling which fulfils corrupt objectives. The Public and private sectors have formed a colossal web of patronage networks which is the bedrock of corruption activities.

Figure 1: A web of patronage networks of corruption



Source: Cheeseman (2021) A web of patronage networks of corruption.

In supporting the Zimbabwean case, the organizing concept illuminates how decision making is in the hands of a leader “single unit”. Patronage networks are predominantly dominated by a cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, predation is a style of administration within a polity. Under normal circumstances, the state is the ultimate authority but when failure strikes predation becomes “...an incentive for a government that has lost legitimacy” Jean Cartier Bresson (2004). The web of patronage networks depicts individuals as self-interested with the perennial desire to dominate and maximize personal accruals. In the Zimbabwean context the theory provides a framework for analysis on how leaders lean on security apparatus to sustain their rule.

In a system, the leader can be a single unit, however Levi (1981) suggests that it is common to have rulers in the form of a “committee or executive or legislature”. Which fits to the Zimbabwean body polity that has in other literatures been referred to as both martial and cabalistic Dawson, M., & Kelsall, T. (2012). One of the major propositions of the theory is a conundrum scenario between wealth and power, Levi states that “wealth is means to power or power as the means to wealth.” The theory also observes that once control and monopoly is gained, the predator leadership implement policies that solidify their position, mainly in terms of revenue or power. Parallel to Zimbabwe, Mnangagwa engrained the military into the political culture to protect and invest in his permanency in power. By comparison, Mugabe in the first republic applied very similar tactics and his disposition led and aided by the military speaks volumes to the true center of power in the country.

Leaders aim to maximize their wealth and power, as for some power is the means to wealth Levi (1981). This characteristic is notable in the ruling elites in Zimbabwe as the number of leaders involved in corruption cases show an element of rent seeking and maximization of personal wealth. The 2017 coup portended the explicit assertion of military authority within the political culture. Explicit because as earlier shown, a militarized political culture has been normative in Zimbabwe, all be it within a covert *modus operandi*, a part of which would be revealed by and through the coup. The shadow state theory, therefore allowed in this study the establishment of the causation relationship which exist between the militarization of the state and corruption as obstacles to development and democracy.

1.3. METHODOLOGY

For the study to garner and muster information that suited the objectives of the study to depict the nexus between increased militarization of the state and corruption as obstacles to development and democracy the study was profligately conversant. This section will focus on the methodology that was employed and adopted to gather the appropriate sort of data which the research endeavored to congregate. Furthermore, this chapter offers a synopsis of the research design employed, tools employed in data collection, sampling techniques used,

population purposively sampled, data analysis, reliability, secondary sources, research ethics, challenges met and improvisations made to ensure that quality information was collected to inform the study. This methodology is in tandem with the purpose of the study which is to understand the intersections between the increased militarization of the state and the stupefying increase in localized corruption tactics used to misappropriate funds, resources in Zimbabwe. Thence, it is important in understanding the full gamut of the challenge of corruption to development and a clean democratic Zimbabwean government.

Justification of the choice of the research design, data collection procedures, techniques employed and the target population purposively sampled were also explored and discussed in greater detail in answering the study's research questions on which economic sectors have expanded, are typically targeted and offer opportunities for grand corruption in Zimbabwe?, what non pecuniary activities drive corruption in Zimbabwe?, what are the legal and political corruption strategies tactics which spurred with the increased militarization of the state in Zimbabwe? Does cynicism about prospects for good governance increase the affliction of grand corruption. This study espouses a triangulation of qualitative and small quantitative research methodology in data collection.

The study required a research design which is a stratagem and methodical approach that the researcher employs in conducting a study. (Blaikie, 2009) views a research design as a process that connects research questions, objectives, empirical data, research conclusions, guides data collection and analysis. In corroboration (Gray & Grove, 2020) posits that in carrying out a study the research design helps the researcher to strategize and carryout a study in a structure that helps the researcher to acquire the intended results. Therefore, a research design is a sine qua non in increasing the chances of obtaining information that is in congruence with the real situation. In answering research questions and aligning the objectives of the study which is to analyze the nexus between militarization of the state in Zimbabwe and corruption a potent research design could be understood as the master plan which espouses the methods and procedures for data collection so that the information permeates a clear understanding of this problem. Core to this study is the use of

Zimbabwe as a case within the case study research design. (Yin, 2017) defined a case study as a detailed analysis and description of the activities of an area under study. This was in line with the objective of the study to proffer an evidence-based understanding of legal, political, financial, economic, political, branding and narrative-based corruption tactics which emerged with the New Dispensation.

To a greater degree the study was more qualitative as tables represented the quantitative part. Conflation of both methods was regarded by (Haralambos & Holborn, 2004) as methodological triangulation. With one of the study's intended objectives being to delineate and systematically investigate the suite motivations of domestic and transnational corruption tactics used to expand grand corruption in Zimbabwe. Triangulation was valuable and strategic because it examines a research problem from more than one view point so that the study becomes more robust.

Target population as explicated by (Bryman, 2021) is an aggregated population that the researcher studies and whose findings are used to generalize to the entire population. The target population is the total number of units from which data can be obtained. In this regard, the target population of this study encompassed experts in corruption, investigative journalism, health and governance.

In addition, without sampling it was impractical for the researcher to survey the entire population as time was a limiting factor. Sampling is commonly the process whereby a small segment or subsection of a populace is chosen for examination. (Bryman, 2021) states sampling as the act, process or technique of selecting a suitable sample or a representative part of the population for the purpose of determining parameters of characteristics of the whole population. The direct correlation between the increased militarization of the state and subsequent increase in corruption tactics shows how corruption should be identified as the major hindrance to economic growth. Therefore, an amalgam of purposive and quota sampling was used in this study, which are non-probability sampling techniques that purposefully selects participants who are relevant to the research and divides the target population into homogenous groups based on certain criterions respective. In this light the study selected participants in key sectors such as governance and investigative journalism to

grasp the kleptocratic tactics, patronage networks which blossomed after the increased militarization of the state. Purposive sampling was beneficial to the study as the researcher selected participants based on their adept or expertise in the field of corruption, governance and militarization of states in Africa.

However, just like other sampling techniques defaced by limitations, the obvious disadvantage of purposive sampling is that it is likely to be biased (Bryman, 2016). Hence, there is a risk of gathering repetitive low-quality information causing poor research outcomes. To circumvent this the study was strategic in selecting participants who understood how corruption undermines development in multiple ways by bleeding off government resources, tumbling the efficacy of government development efforts, and discouraging local and foreign direct investment.

Furthermore data collection is a crucial constituent in conducting a study. (Bryman, 2016) posits that data collection involves procedures and research instruments used to collect information. There are a *pot-pourri* of methods of data collection but in-depth interviews, document analysis were the core methods with observations playing a huge complementary role. The study predominantly employed the following research instruments; interviews, journal articles, indexes, government documents, parliamentary records, sector assessments, desktop review and secondary sources to gather information.

The overall intent of data collection was to procure, apprehend information related to corruption which translated and allowed incontrovertible answers to research objectives and questions. Furthermore, methods of data collection are methods that permit the researcher to collect information about the object of the study and about the setting in which they occur (Creswell & Clark, 2017). In this case considering the repressive nature of the Zimbabwean government the study was purely academic as issues pertaining to corruption are politically sensitive.

For this study document analysis was crucial given the scale and nature of the topic in Zimbabwe. (Gadwal, 2022) concurs that as a method of data collection document analysis form an intricate part of qualitative research which involves delving into the construal

examination of documents. In this study document analysis was rooted in dissecting and analytically dichotomizing reports, articles and studies that are correlated with the study that is the nexus between increased militarization of state and corruption as obstacles to development and democracy. In addition, documents offer the opportunity to trace the background information and broad coverage of information is specific timeframe which bordered well for this study.

Furthermore, in-depth semi structured interviews were preferred because of the nature of the research topic which required the maneuvering of triangulation as a way of collecting data, the number of respondents, easy means to reach student respondents, the ability to conflate closed, open-ended questions at once to provide numeric data and qualitative information. The study made use of in depth semi structured interviews to enable a platform to uncover and promulgate inner perceptions on corruption tactics and the increased militarization of the state. Interviews are very essential in carrying out a study as they offer direct antidotes to the weaknesses of other methods of data collection. For example, during the in-depth interviews, the researcher was able to observe responses from participants in relation to research questions and expression of words by the respondents which permeated a concoction of both observation and interviews abutted. Through organized dialogues with the research participants, the researcher managed to do 8 interviews to supplement the document analysis.

In this exploratory research study in depth semi structured interviews proved valuable as they enabled attainment of valuable information from the context of key informants, use of predetermined questions through an interview guide permeated uniformity in data collection and the nature of the discussions allowed data recording as the interview were held on zoom but written and verbal consent of the interviewees on the research aim and objectives was explained.

To a greater degree the researcher also wielded indirect observation through following corruption scandals that were aired on various social media platforms like Twitter. News sites have been immersed with corruption scandals in Zimbabwe which made it easier for the researcher to indirectly discern corruption tactics that emerged due to the increased

militarization of the state. To curtail bias from observation efforts were made to be concealed and inconspicuous during the research and importantly other methods of data collection supplemented the shortfalls of observation. In corroboration to this Saunders and Thornhill (2003) argue that, though it has threats to validity, reliability and raises ethical dilemmas through compromising the rigor and objectivity of the research, observation adds considerably to the richness of research data as it is a good way of explaining what is occurring in a particular natural setting

In addition, data analysis addresses each research question under the auspices of the research objectives. Data analysis is defined as construing convenient and pertinent information from qualitative and quantitative research methods (Bryman, 2016). Data analysis illustrates the process of systematically summarizing and evaluating information. The study traversed a range of sensitive topics some of which mentions powerful individuals and institutions in Zimbabwe. Qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews, document analysis and participatory/ direct observations was evaluated, examined, interpreted and categorized into significant statements which offered a narrative of respective variables subsequently suiting data presentation. Different methods of data presentation and analysis were used by the researcher. Thematic analysis according to (Willig, 2021) is a form of pattern recognition within the data. Within the study political, legal, economic, financial, branding and narrative-based tactics of corruption are themes that were dissected under corruption and the militarization of the state. In this study the objective of content analysis was to translate recorded “raw” information into data which is permissible and can be used in essentially a scientific manner so that a body of knowledge may be created. To a greater degree content analysis aided the study in connecting data analysis with research objectives and questions.

(Farrimond, 2012) concurs that ethical issues are paramount important matters not only in the primary research in particular, but also even in terms of using secondary data sets because there are ethical issues relating to fair and unbiased selection of sources and analysis. It is also conceivable that interfaces with participants may involuntarily offend them so in some instances the researcher had to elude lengthy dialogues with research participants.

(Farrimond, 2012) attests that maintaining the confidentiality of the results and anonymity of the participants is crucial. The study followed the following research ethics:

- To circumvent plagiarism borrowed information was referenced.
- The researcher informed participants that the study was purely academic by conveying a consent letter to participate in the research.
- Confidentiality and anonymity of study participant was ensured through coding alphanumeric names and labeling.
- The researcher assured all respondents their responses and names would remain confidential and anonymous.

The researcher also assured to safeguard the anonymity of some of the respondents who considered their given responses of being emotive.

CHAPTER 2: JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

2.1. MAPPING THE FORM AND FRAME OF THE STUDY

Corruption for a long time has been documented as a colossal menace, obstacle to sustainable development and democracy as it leads to the distortion of development incentives for citizens and the government alike. The logic underpinning this systematic study is to offer a comprehensive taxonomy of the detectability of the veneer of corruption, kleptocratic tactics employed from 2017 which concurred with the increased militarization of the state. Countries don't shutdown nor do they die but they fade away and adjudicating from this, in a cogent and simple way the Zimbabwean crisis which dates back to the 1980s fits perfectly. Understanding the intersections between the increased militarization of the state and the stupefying increase in localized corruption tactics used to misappropriate funds, resources in Zimbabwe is important in understanding the full gamut of the challenge of corruption to development and a clean democratic Zimbabwean government. In analyzing the corruption schemes which have derailed development in Zimbabwe, the study investigated political, vexatious legal tactics used in corruption such as the mounting and ensconcing patronage networks between public and private actors, the abuse of functions, the trading in influence and the cooptation of key government institutions in corruption schemes. The backfiring aspect of the adage of anticorruption messages in nudging government officials to the "whataboutism" tactic is another aspect the study covered in retrospect to the "present past".

The study also added an aspect of connecting Covid 19 as a global emergency which acted as blessing in disguise for the New Dispensation as transnational corruption tactics protruded to the limelight anchored on fraudulent procurements and political proximity. Corruption in Zimbabwe became a cause and both a consequence of global emergencies as it made the situation much worse Coercive and violence-based tactics to assuage public scrutiny and silencing dissent, image management, reputation laundering and development narratives canvass the hallmark of the gap this study sought to fill.

2.2. THE EXEGESIS AND TOPONYMIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS

Historical instabilities from a dysfunctional economy, massive emigration, contested elections and world record hyperinflation rates and perennial corruption scandals form the layer of dramatic destabilizations which have somewhat become normativised political practices. A compendium of these contestations have created the foundation for extreme fragility. However, the menace of institutionalized corruption accounts for stalled development of Zimbabwe despite the country being ranked among top economic giants in Southern Africa in the early 1980s. The study explores the trend of the dialectic nexus between the intensified militarization of the state and the rising levels of corruption in Zimbabwe as obstacles to sustain development and democracy.

The nation's fragility is typical of the perpetual decay of norms-based governance at the mercy of the military. Consequently, a fragile state with a militarised executive tends to neutralize and weaken good governance structures such as the judiciary, military and civil society. Though state fragility indicators are mainly discussed in relation to war-torn areas, in contrast, Zimbabwe's fragility manifests through economic, political, and social deficiencies springing from mis-governance. I acknowledge that corruption is not new but pose that after the 2017 military coup in Zimbabwe, the evident post-coup military cronyism in political appointments serving economic interests of the elite, which was somewhat clandestine under Mugabe's rule and localized coercive, political, legal and financial kleptocratic tactics coincide with high and rising levels of corruption without legitimate checks. This context sets the qualitative epistemological basis upon which the quest for practical policy proposals can be pursued to deconstruct the elitist-militarist-corrupt nexus which reflects and solidifies Zimbabwe's political hierarchy. Since the rule of law has been reduced to 'rule by law', this study proffers that constitutionalism and legalism alone will be inadequate to address Zimbabwean problems. It will be equally impossible without sustained regional and international diplomatic pressure on Zimbabwean politicians to act in the best interest of their citizens.

2.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- Evidence based understanding of legal, financial, economic, political, branding and narrative-based corruption tactics which emerged with the New Dispensation
- To contextualize the scale and nature of corruption as an obstacle to development and democratization in Zimbabwe.
- To analyze the impact of the increased militarization of the state in inuring the populace to inevitably become unobjectionable to normalizing corruption.
- To investigate to what extent has “whataboutism” been exploited to heighten motivations for corruption in Zimbabwe.

2.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study was framed under the auspices of the following key research questions:

- What are the legal and political corruption strategies tactics which spurred with the increased militarization of the Zimbabwe?
- Does cynicism about prospects for good governance increase the affliction of grand corruption?
- How does economic and financial based corruption affect sustainable development in Zimbabwe?
- How do the violent and coercive based corruption tactics affect democratization in Zimbabwe?
- How do the narrative and branding based kleptocratic strategies affect development in Zimbabwe?
- What are the motivations of domestic and transnational corruption tactics used to expand grand corruption in Zimbabwe?

2.5. ACADEMIC RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

After the coup in 2017 the increased militarization of the state saw the proliferation of illicit flows of minerals through smuggling and the engineering of new kleptocratic tactics which showed new strategies to enable elites to target and capture public finances, natural resources and strategic sectors of the economy. The transnational aspect of corruption became apparent. This study offers a taxonomy of the localized and transnational proliferation of corruption tactics which increased after the 2017 coup which have acted as obstacles to development and democracy. To surmount the ordinariness in conventional inquiries in scholarly work related to corruption which have dominated the field the study within the domestic realm, the thesis builds a systematic catalogue of domestic tactics employed to strategically expand opportunities for public resources theft, grand corruption and to suppress the efforts of the civil societies to expose and counter corruption.

Aimed at a broad readership this study will inform decision makers, frontline anti-corruption practitioners the pervasive nature of transnational kleptocratic tactics for corruption which are huge problem for a developing like Zimbabwe. The need for academic remedies to address the vulnerabilities that come from corruption is critical as to date there has been no comprehensive description of the domestic and developing transnational nature of corruption in Zimbabwe which is siphoning state resources for private gain and perpetuating the hold of power by the ruling elites.

Without evidence-based understanding of the tactics used due to the increased militarization of the state reform-oriented actors it is difficult to identify the strategies used to amass wealth through kleptocratic ways. As a comprehensive study covering the full gamut of corruption which has increased in tandem with the continued militarization of the state the study will cover political, legal, coercive, economic, violence based, branding and narrative-based corruption tactics. As a country teetering towards fragility corruption has deprived millions of Zimbabweans health care and a prosperous future for the youth. The corrosive reparations of corruption are increasingly being felt by the average Zimbabwean. Corruption has long been the lifeblood of ZANU PF as members of the regime routinely

engage in corruption activities for personal enrichment and to sustain political support networks. Research can be leveraged as a blueprint to produce new effective reforms to fight corruption. Cataloging the clandestine nature and spectrum of the corruption tactics which are a defining challenge which emanated after the 2017 coup which heralded the increased militarization of the state. The transnational aspect of corruption in Zimbabwe is a contemporary aspect which is a defining feature for the new dispensation. Expanding entrenched patronage networks that control state institutions and the private sector, bribing national public officials achieved through nepotism cronyism installing regime supporters in influential positions to enact the will of the regime to exploit opportunities for self-enrichment.

2.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Delimitations expound the parameters undergirding the original track of the study. In concurrence the study was purely academic not political. To remark the importance of periodisation the study was circumscribed to the events after 2017 which the researcher feels form the epoch of packed events worth of an exploration. Limitations reduce the upshot of research. Primarily because of fear that the conversation would be intercepted by state security agents' key participants declined to participate in fear of political victimization. Stereotypically, it is a challenge to conduct research when it involves issues of high politics like corruption, thus the researcher faced some limited access to information in public entities. Furthermore, with the narratives around corruption in Zimbabwe slanted against ZANU PF the research attenuated this limitation by focusing on issue in concomitant to nation building as opposed to one-sided data maligning certain political affiliations. The researcher guaranteed asserted and comprehended the extent of the study under examination as unambiguously for scholarly purposes as opposed to political witch hunt or practical. Despite the assurance of ethical handling of research information participants requested the withdrawal of their names and answers in the appendixes in fear of political victimization.

2.7. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The research is comprised of 6 chapters which are:

- **Chapter 1: Background**

This chapter distinctly presents the background, organizing concept of the topic under study and the methodology employed for the study.

- **Chapter 2: Justification of the study**

The chapter presents the frame, form, the statement of the problem, research objectives which were subsequently transformed into elementary research questions to guide the scope of the study. The delimitations of the investigation were also expounded.

- **Chapter 3: Literature Review**

This subdivision divulges existing scholarly work. Conspicuously, chapter two reviews writings concomitant with the political economy of corruption and militarization in Zimbabwe. Similarly, the chapter offers sound quintessence segmentation of the history of Zimbabwe from the first regime under President Mugabe background to the New Dispensation.

- **Chapter 4: Bounded reasoning and the nexus between militarization and state fragility**

This chapter delves into how militarization is a key component, multidimensional source and symptom of extreme fragility. In addition, a critical and reflection analysis of the concept is availed.

- **Chapter 5: Discussion and Findings**

In this chapter, the data acquired during the data collection process from the in-depth semi structured was presented and analyzed. Undoubtedly, it is also imperious to high point that

the focal thrust of this fragment centers on presentation of the corruption tactics used to siphon resources by patronage networks as obstacles to development and democracy.

- **Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations**

This chapter provides the epilogue of the thesis. An assessment of how the exploration responded to research question was done and lastly the chapter extricates recommendations for future studies and suggest enhancements towards the work on corruption.



CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a “longue duree” decorum segmentation of the political economy of Zimbabwe to grasp the antiquity of postcolonial corruption in Zimbabwe. As the study aims to analyze kleptocratic, corrupt tactics to engender a consensus to tackle cankering corruption in Zimbabwe. The “longue duree” segmentation method of analysis which entails tracing corruption from the post-colonial decade permeated the examination of the structural inheritance of a system which was susceptible to corruption as the British colonial settler’s government imposed draconian laws which primarily protected the material interests of the settlers over the indigenous masses. For the literature review to proffer a proper chronological segmentation of the deepening cancerous effects of grand corruption and kleptocratic tactics on democracy and development in Zimbabwe the literature review of the study was expanded, conflated, refined and employed within the Shadow State Theory as an organizing concept which was opined by (Reno, 2000) to comprehend the drench intricate correlation between the increased militarization of the state since 2017 and an increase in personalistic, kleptocratic tactics which have degraded institutional foundations surmounting neopatrimonialism.

A conflation of the shadow state theory into literature review as the overall theoretical framework works well as a model undergirding literature review as the analysis timeframes from the Mugabe regime to the New Dispensation is important. An essential feature of the organizing concept is its pertinency and presence in a range of empirical practices. Thus, the study used the organizing concept in literature review to go beyond the theoretical, adages on neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe as the concept served to organize corrupt kleptocratic activities as a concatenation of a deep-rooted crisis in an interdisciplinary perspective to dissect the complex and multifaceted links connecting militarization, corruption and democracy in the *longue durée*. The organizing concept permeated the perspicacious

examination of the derisive long-term legacies and limits of liberation movements their agenda, meaning to the broad debate of democracy and development, the politics of postcolonial Zimbabwe. From study's organizing concept the study was able to establish whether the relationship between increased militarization and corruption and democracy is either antagonistic or symbiotic. With the former detrimental to the latter. The malevolence influence of patronage networks is also depicted.

3.2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN ZIMBABWE

The focal point in explicating the suffocating, barraging effects of corruption in postcolonial African states is the question on what role does government, institutional design in tandem with perpetual poverty creates cyclical vicious circle that plummets communities into an anti-democratic and underdevelopment trap. (Zalanga, 2018) argues that despite a 50-year efficacious dispersion of Islam and Christianity in the continent African countries should not anticipate a religious miracle to solve this quagmire as the moral economy has failed to halt the waning problem of corruption in government institutions. Therefore, a question arises given the failure of the ruling elites who have the sole primary responsibility to uphold constitutionalism. Can a rise in citizen agency and social groups unite to fight grand corruption given the repressive nature of governments? To a greater degree corruption has become a "tragedy of the commons". (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) posits that general anecdotes within the African media presented Mugabe as the beacon and bearer of anti-colonialism, the archbishop of pan Africanism, anti-racism, anti-imperialism and the protector of African ideals. However, Zimbabwe stands as one of the most countries affected by grand corruption depicting how narrow focus has been put on the role Mugabe as a leader might have played in manufacturing the problems that Zimbabwe is facing. Therefore, (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) argue that conceptions on grand corruption in Zimbabwe should be mainly positioned on the role the ZANU PF ruling elites under the auspices of Mugabe and the military have played in causing problems that have trickled to affect the general populace in Zimbabwe. In corroboration with this view (Tendi, 2013) states that as a

president Mugabe's perpetual patronage interlinkages, lenience of his military personnel's and government ministers implicated in grand corruption scandals depicted a hedonist hidden complex power retention structure.

Members of the media fraternity with the exception of the state media houses like the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) have also bore the brunt of being maligned as agents of ZANU PF critics. In a democratic state journalism should not be symptomatic to the interests of the state. Therefore, exposing corruption should not be depicted as lacking patriotism for your nation. The Mugabe regime has often ridden this narrative which borders mainly on accusing the media of on betrayal and tarnishing the image of Zimbabwe in the ambit of international relations. This question is poignantly put in motion by (Nyarota, 2006) who argues that "in Zimbabwe it is believed that as a when a journalist becomes privy to information on corruption, a patriotic journalist is expected to dutifully hand over the information to relevant authorities for the interest of national building and cohesion". Therefore, the nuance of investigative journalism in Zimbabwe comes to fore as the question therefore becomes by exposing corruption does the journalist do it in the interest of upholding democracy or by ostensibly covering it up, he/she serves the nation's interests. (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) view this as the conundrum of the "journalistic flare". Media chastisement and the perspectives of the government towards investigative journalism captures trenchantly pertinent issues which are affecting Zimbabweans. In Africa the struggle for independence was led by African elites who were educated in western countries and afterwards nurtured under repressive colonial governments. Therefore (Zalanga, 2018) postulates that in retrospection the majority of nationalist were only focused in uniting to drive European colonizers out of power and remove the chains of marginalization rather than fundamentally committing to a developmental vision which promoted sustainable equitable, inclusive development. Consequently, in hindsight the pursuing nation building and development became a complex and chaotic adventure.

The callous struggle for power among African nationalist and liberations movements during the struggle for independence meant that the coalitions formed by the ruling elites in the postcolonial era were infested with lack of trust which bred a high sense of insecurity

(Zalanga, 2018). Their fear of being removed from power bred anxiety and uncertainty which can be key reason in explaining the formation of an environment susceptible to corruption. (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2001) argues after the liberation struggle the most ruling parties in Africa focused on eliminating emerging political parties and this had a debilitating which led to the lack of accountability subsequently leading to grand corruption. This form of subversion was done in a coercive manner which included the imprisonment of opposite political party leaders and this had huge influence in the consolidation and great centralization of power. The political system was converted a personalistic system of governance overriding normal function of democratic institutions (Zalanga, 2018). Therefore, this mode of government permeated political loyalism and cronyism as straitjackets for getting a government position as opposed to merit.

(Moore, 2022) attests that since the dawn of a new era in Zimbabwean politics which saw the ascension of the Mugabe regime little has been done to slacken primitive accumulation. Therefore, given Mugabe's unflinching denunciation homosexuality how did he fail to deal decisively with endemic corruption. Within the government bouts of grand, administration and petty corruption can be identified in Zimbabwe which primarily include bribes, defrauding the state and companies. In this study I argue that the post-coup Mnangagwa administration the scourge of overt and covert corruption has degenerated because of impunity, pernicious polarization involving the ruling elites. (Yamamoto, 2014) simply puts it as "follows "corruption is not a current phenomenon in Zimbabwe and the success towards fighting this problem depends on the executive who are involved".

For the Mugabe regime (Zalanga, 2018) posits that corruption had a massive functional role within the Mugabe regime and this was evidenced by the lack of political will and the moral authority to fight corruption. The failure to deal decisively with corruption shows that Mugabe could not alter a system that had overpoweringly worked in his favor to prolong ascertain his single objective which was to retain power. (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) concur that corruption should be depicted as part and parcel of power retention matrix tactic. More nuanced understanding of how ZANU PF has used corruption in postcolonial

Zimbabwe to accumulate personal wealth and Mugabe has in turn blackmailed his compromised comrades to support his political ambitions.

3.3. THE EVOLUTION AND NATURE OF CORRUPTION IN ZIMBABWE

The mode of decolonization is a crucial juncture in delineating corruption in Zimbabwe. (Tendi, 2015) concur that gained through a military standoff the nationalist leaders agreed to a political settlement with the British Colonial authority to a legal pack known as the Lancaster House agreement reached in 1979. The independence decade was primed and highlighted by an institutional structural legacy which saw the influx of development aid for the development of marginalized in rural areas. From the first decade of independence which began in 1980 the influence of an inherited interventionist state which protected the interests of the ruling minority whites against the black majority became apparent (Bratton, 2015). The proclivity of ZANU PF to use beset state concocted violence towards citizens was sowed through the formation of parallel military institutions and this heralded the inception of a shadow state. In corroboration with this view (Tendi, 2020) posits that parallel military wings which operated separately from the command of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) were a tool used to consolidate power by the ZANU PF regime.

3.4. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN 1980

The political culture in Zimbabwe after independence is an important aspect in understanding corruption in Zimbabwe. Under the ZANU PF government, the political culture that was developed became similar to the Rhodesia's racially, culturally, politically exclusionary culture which was characterized by predatory and separatist ethnic cultural economic and political institutional provisions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). The continuities from the Rhodesian government and Mugabe's political strategy depicts a political culture presided over by an intolerant repressive state. Colonial primitive accumulation was

succeeded by black primitive accumulation despite the pontification of Pan-Africanism, one party domination meant there was no radical changes in the political culture. The political culture in a country is a key determinant of governance and policies that lead to development and democracy. (Zalanga, 2018) states that the 1990s saw the Africanization of the civil service as migration of the white settlers was spontaneous due the fear of black peril. However, a key point that protrude from this is the fact that Mugabe had an overreliance on the military to keep the populace in line and this inadvertently led to the appointment of military personnel in position in which they had unbridled influence through interacting, mingling with civilians, electoral, governance decision, institutions and business strategies. The military was drawn into diamond mining through the same context especially after their involvement in the war in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Ibbo Mandaza (1986) in (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020) characterized the Zimbabwean state of the 1980 as “schizophrenic state”. This was linked to the fact that instead of trying to uplift the previously impoverished relegated black citizens the same state in turn tended to repress them politically. Unpopular economic policies, the perpetual subjugation of civil rights, continued centralization of power and the entrenchment of authoritarianism. Therefore, from the 1990s the nation question revolved around constitutionalism. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and the National Constitutional Authority (NCA) began to demand people driven policies as governance had become centered on Executive presidency. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015) states that an interventionist government challenged the separation of power as democratization and human rights discourses were being challenged. The dawn of a new era in Zimbabwean politics saw the formation of the MDC in 1999. This period heralded the culmination and gelling of human rights and democratic activism in Zimbabwe as the need for political opposition became apparent. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020) argues that high levels of polarization have affect social cohesion in Zimbabwe.

3.5. TRANSITION TO A SHADOW STATE IN THE MUGABE REGIME 1980-1990

Structural inheritance harbored constraints from a security and administration perspective. The dawn of the new decade in 1980 saw Zimbabwe holding its first elections. Therefore, in February 1980 after Zimbabwe had attained independence from British colonial rule it held its first elections. ZANU PF under the leadership of Robert Mugabe won 57 out of 80 seats, while the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo took 20 seats. Lastly the Rhodesian Front party under the leadership of Ian Smith won all 20 seats set aside for white minorities (Addison & Laakso, 2003). Mugabe was pronounced as the new prime minister of Zimbabwe and he went on to form a unity government. However, an instant challenge to this was the integration of several military wings namely, "the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) of ZAPU; the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) of ZANU PF; and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) of the Rhodesian Front" (Werner & Chitiyo, 2011).

To surmount this huge intricate problem in March 1980 a Joint High Command was designed to amalgamate the aforementioned military wings into the ZNA. In hindsight Mugabe gave precedence to the consolidation of power through emboldening his direct control over security organs by appointing his cronies and loyalists to top positions. The current President Emmerson Mnangagwa who was once Mugabe's personal assistant during the liberation struggle was appointed as the overseer and chair of this Joint High Command with their wartime friend Retired Major General Solomon Mujuru as the Commander after Walls had resigned (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). Despite the British Military Advisory and Training Team assisting in the integration process to create a professional army in Zimbabwe contrariwise Mugabe did not prefer a purely professional military army. (Werner & Chitiyo, 2011) state that Mugabe preferred a military force that was ingrained in Chinese systems. Therefore, an early signal of Mugabe's penchant desire to create a repressive state can be noted as he preferred parallel military wings which led to a dismal overall failure in the attempt to integrate the forces. Were these actions fortuitous? Mugabe later created a parallel

infamous military wing which came to be known as the 5th Brigade which was trained by Kore (Tendi, 2016). After a visit to meet the former North Korean Kim II-Sung in 1981 who offered Mugabe military support the 5th brigade under the command of the late Air Marshall Perence Shiri. In January 1983, the 5th Brigade was deployed to Matabeleland. Therefore, the first decade 1980-1990 saw the government of Mugabe propagating seeds and actions permeating the consolidation of power. This formed the hallmark and layered the root foundations of a shadow state as by forming parallel military wings separate from the Zimbabwean National Army, the use of force for political purposes became the modus operandi.

3.6. ZANU PF AND THE LEADERSHIP CODE 1980-1990

ZANU PF admittedly failed and struggled to reinvigorate the economy to a functioning economy after independence (Majonga, 2004). Since the leadership consisted of people who had been persecuted and incarcerated under the white minority rule. (Tendi, 2013) argues that they felt entitled to the new state. One of the major problems which can be attributed to misgovernance is that despite masquerading as a Marxist socialist state, the government had an ideological identity problem. Leading this behemoth was Robert Mugabe. Political squabbles within the top brass of liberation movements gave birth to paranoid leadership which was intolerant. The main question is that did the postcolonial government inherit a system that was marred and ridden with corruption from the outgoing Rhodesian government? As the system permeated corruption to thrive. (Mangena et al., 2021) posits that the military structures after the war of liberation nurtured and acted as havens for the institution of patron clientelist relations as appointments to top positions was based on loyalism. Therefore, what has morphed into corruption after independence can be described as an intricate clientelist system.

The relations which embed individuals, the networks, institutional politics in ZANLA, ZIPA and ZIPRA which date back to the liberation struggle was huge factor in the development of corrupt networks (Tendi, 2020). Corruption incidences and cumulative accumulation tendencies tremendously increased and this led to a fallout between Mugabe

and Edgar Tekere who was the secretary general of ZANU PF this led to his removal from ZANU PF and he went on to form Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). Tekere would later use fighting corruption as his trump and draw card for the 1990 elections. (Bratton, 2015) states that a number of government elites began to be implicated in corruption scandals which shows the remnants of structural inheritance of corruption. The ZANU PF government was met with public scrutiny due to the deepening bouts of incidences and scandals which were causing economic problems. It is against this backdrop that in August 1984 Mugabe launched the Leadership code to prevent leaders especially government ministers and members of parliament involved in corruption to use their influential and unbridled access to power to amass wealth. (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) argue that the code enunciated that ministers and government officials were supposed to declare their assets and they were prohibited from fronting and utilizing their relatives as holder of their business ventures. Celebrated as a monumental stride towards eradicating clientelism and widespread corruption within the Mugabe regime. However little did the populace comprehend that this was an over ambitious and public stunt to deter further public outcry as a leopard cannot hide its spots. (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) posit that despite harboring good intentions the leadership code was not effective in stopping the cancerous effects of corruption as politicians formulated ingenious tactics to circumvent and subvert the code. Corrupt politicians devised ways which included using distant relatives to acquire farms and large businesses. (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015) states that Mugabe failed to invoke the Leadership Code. With the failure of the code, the Willowave scandal which implicated senior government ministers and military officials who had amassed wealth through hedonistic ways by purchasing Toyota Cressida cars at government-controlled prices of Z\$ 27,000 whilst reselling them at Z\$110,000 on the black markets was a prime example of how rife and entrenched grand corruption the government system had become (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015). Implicated in this scandal were prominent government ministers including the minister of defense Enos Nkala, General Mujuru, Fredrich Shava. To investigate this scandal Mugabe established a commission of inquiry but he failed to punish his cronies as the Sandura Commission which was had the mandate to examine the scandal never produced tangible results to allow any prosecution and the recommendations were never published.

(Andersson, 2003) concurs that the implicated government and military officials were beneficiaries of leniency from Mugabe. The current minister of foreign affairs Frederick Shava and the current speaker of parliament were both implicated. At this juncture the decay in revolutionary ethos and state autonomy can be attributed as the main cause for bouts of corruption scandals (Chung, 2006). Cancerous, wayside, wanton corruption scandals as government officials with capitalistic predatory tendencies can be depicted from the above Willowave scandal. (Moore, 2022) argues that in Mobutu like fashion Mugabe granted extensive corruption opportunities to key figures at certain moments only to flag their crimes when he needed to sideline them into prison and this became part of Mugabe's modus operandi.

3.7. THE ASCENSION OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION IN 1990-2000

The abandonment of the Leadership Code and a myriad of scandals involving government officials depicted the pervasiveness of corruption in Zimbabwe. The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1990s did nothing for the betterment of the situation but rather it created a lot of opportunities for rent seeking and looting. A culture of impunity and the manner in which implicated government officials were let scot-free began to be a huge concern for democracy and sustainable development. (Zalanga, 2018) argues that Mugabe carved himself as a leader who was not after enrichment or worldly possessions inversely corruption, patrimonialism was rampant in his administration. A bone of contention which came in the 1990s was the 1997 War Veterans gratuities scandal. This scandal was the epitome of how rent seeking had become rife as depicted how rotten and imbedded in corruption the Mugabe regime had become. This was scheme which was introduced after Mugabe had faced pressure from war veterans who wanted compensation for their participation in the liberation struggle and the War Victims Compensation Fund (WVCF) would be commensurate with their percentage of disability (Zalanga, 2018). The corruption which came because of this program saw ZANU PF officials, ministers registering

their injuries as 90% disability which encapsulates the level of looting. From these scandals a penchant and proclivity towards lip service to dealing with corruption for political expediency for political survival.

3.8. POST-INDEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPEMNT OF A COVERT STATE 1990–2000

The post-independence decade saw no serious political threat to the ZANU PF political hegemony which began to sow the seed of a state within the state as the securocrats and military elites largely operated clandestinely behind the scenes controlling key decision within the government. (Maguchu & Maja, 2019) concurs that “Zimbabwe transposed into a de facto one-party state as the ruling party elites within ZANU PF cogently advanced their political hegemony through the establishment of a de jure one- party state”. However, resistance protruded from student coalitions like the Zimbabwe Unity Movement which was under the leadership of Edgar Tekere. As part of its consolidation of power ZANU PF begrudged and resented political opposition in all its forms reacting ruthlessly through the political persecution of protesters (Sachikonye, 2011). During this period as Mugabe traversed to assert total control over all state apparatus with the first apparent moves was to appoint his loyalists in a clandestine way and this meant the development of a gradual synergetic relationship between the military elites and ZANU PF though the military was kept in the background. (Tendi, 2013) states after the retirement of General Solomon Mujuru in 1992 Mugabe appointed Vitalis Zvinavashe as the new Army Commander who was one of his loyalists. the army was more involved in the Second Congolese War, from 1998–2003, where it established parallel and frontier companies to loot diamonds, timber and other resources.

The ruling party rather than the military became more visible in advocating for political domination by trying to superimpose its party committees on the bureaucracy, with rallying cries for a one-party state. In 2000, with the formation of the opposition MDC, the army became more overtly involved in running civilian affairs outside the legally defined scope of their operations and did so with impunity. Authoritarian politics became

increasingly militarized, as parallel operations became the modus operandi of governance. Economically during the early 1990s, sully foreign exchange shortages caused wholesome changes in the whole decorum of the economic structure as visible and voluble excessive spending by the government caused fiscal deficits, debt which reverberated through diminishing industrial outputs. Subsequently, (Sachikonye, 2011) states that the Zimbabwean government adopted the economic Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to minimize state expenditure, to introduce market deregulation and to try to resuscitate macro-economic stability in a reeling economy. The failure of this program had negative consequences economically, politically and socially. Inversely, instead of the ruling elites to be lenient and pro-poor the government traversed to a pro-elite regime rather than pro-poor as people who benefitted from business deals were mainly from the ruling party.

Inflation rates skyrocketed followed by declining annual growth rates within the economy which plummeted to unfathomable levels. (Majonga, 2004) posit that by 1995 wages, formal employment numbers and foreign currency earnings had declined and this had a direct impact on social cohesion as economic hardships began to cause general discontent and public outcry which translated to dwindling political support for ZANU PF towards the 1996 elections. In this context, in 1997 the aspect of power consolidation and political survival protrude again as Mugabe reverted to paying unbudgeted gratuities to war veterans to secure political loyalty as a power retention strategy. This catastrophic decision destabilized the government, technocrats and the subsequently the implementation of the ESAP. From a democratic perspective, the number of civil society organizations which began to challenge the government started to increase. (Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010) argues that this was a leading reason towards the formations of the ZCTU which surged but was immediately was met by severe state brutality.

As the winds of change began to growl as social forces began to contest the one-party state due to shrinking civic freedom. This in tandem with economic problems due to ESAP and deepening corruption combined to lead to the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly which campaigned for a new democratic constitution (Sishuwa et al., 2021). Subsequently in 1999 the National Constitutional Assembly, civic society groups and the

ZCTU combined and formed the MDC. Cheeseman argues that the Zimbabwean government succumbed to political pressure and created constitutional commission which was supposed to gather the views of the Zimbabwean citizens in order to draft a constitution, which was later acquiesced for a referendum in 2000. ZANU PF now faced a huge political threat to its political hegemony.

3.9. AN OVERT AND COVERT STATE IN CRISIS 2000-2008

The millennium marked the onset of Zimbabwe's descent into political terror and economic collapse. The turning point was a constitutional referendum, in which the opposition scored its first electoral victory. The Mugabe regime and the military elites mastered a series of land invasions, overt violence and the mobilization of small militias in rural areas which depicted a downward spiral into the abyss of fragility. A Joint Operations Command (JOC) of security chiefs usurped key policy making functions from the cabinet and the RBZ became a slush fund for the ruling party and armed forces. With the populace rejecting the draft constitution by 54 to 46 % Sachikonye (2003). The political hegemony of ZANU PF was in limbo as the upcoming elections were a portent reflection of the results that had come from the referendum. From this juncture the MDC was salted, soiled and disparaged as puppet contraband in cahoots with western imperialism who are stooges of neo-colonialism (Tendi, 2015). Therefore, this moment depicts a moment in which the opposition began to be maligned with a regime change agenda and ZANU PF viewed this as another war of liberation against white colonialists.

(Alexander & McGregor, 2013) argues that this argument and narrative only served as a justification for political violence and the overt deployment of the army in politics. To protect its political hegemony ZANU PF ingrained traditional leaders, war veterans, the youth and security forces towards their political, nationalism, ideological, patronage, violent mobilization campaign. Cheeseman (2021) states that this cooptation deeply transformed the political spectrum which entrenched the development of a shadow state and patronage networks. Formal state institutions were disordered and overlooked heralding the incarnation of an authoritarian and partisan domination. The appointment of serving and retired security

personnel to key government parastatals instigated the reality of state that was focused with the politics of survival. The JOC usurped the powers normally meant for cabinet ministers and the politburo as key decision-makers. By 2000 the JOC had been formed as it comprised of securocrats, security forces and it became the bulwark of Mugabe's regime as he ensured that JOC members were not only his loyalist but felt indebted to him Tendi (2013). As an example of this Mugabe appointed Constantine as the ZDF commander in 2004 and this was a clear indication of a power retention and loyalist matrix as the general was chosen ahead senior ZANLA commanders. In addition, Zamchiya (2021) notes that to ensure the success of this mobilizing funds for JOC activities became critical and Mugabe moved on to appoint Gideon Gono as the head of the central bank RBZ in 2004. As a close ally Gono was now in charge of rallying finances towards the parallel activities outside the cabinet which became the foundation for the financing of the shadow state.

To a greater degree this move catapulted and meant that the military commanders had direct control of all the parallel activities. Shaw (2009) argues that Gono by recklessly printing money he began to fund quasi-fiscal activities whilst sidestepping the finance ministry. Key appointment also extended to the judiciary system as Mugabe appointed Godfrey Chidyausiku to replace professional judges. The appointment of securocrats meant the judiciary has become handicapped in its role of overseeing constitutionalism as it has lost credibility in the public domain Ruhanya (2021). From 2000 onwards Mugabe used ZANU PF's militarized patronage to drive the capture of the judiciary ZANU PF military operation Fast Track Land Reform Programme in 2000 which targeted commercial white farmers who the government denigrated as conspicuously aiding the newly formed MDC showed how the judiciary served military interests.

Furthermore, the capture of the judiciary led to the resignation of reputable individuals like Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay, Nicholas McNally and Bartlett after the meddling of the military. In addition, the capture of the judiciary intensified simultaneously with the rise of MDC as a threat to ZANU PF's hegemony This move paved way for parallel activities led by the police and the military such as Operation Murambatsvina which means "drive the filth out" which was imbedded in impunity as this politicized mass urban

demolitions evacuations saw 700,000 people being disposed from their home which the government termed as informal urban settlement McGregor (2010). This move, was meant to ward off and drive out supporters of the main opposition MDC which had managed to garner a huge support base in urban areas in Harare. Operation Murambatsvina presented the key executive decision emanating from the JOC to consolidate power. Electoral politics also began to be part of the military's expanded parallel activities in the quest to consolidate ZANU PF's political hegemony. Ruhanya (2021) argues that the military capture of the electoral process involved the use of violence to manipulate the electorate, abductions, door to door campaigns interrogations of opposition supporters and spying on citizens all to further the interest of ZANU PF. In corroboration with this Tendi (2013) concurs that more than 200,000 cases of politically motivated violence were recorded by NGOs from January to June 200 the following 2002 presidential elections and the 2005 parliamentary elections were also won by ZANU PF but characterized by violence. In corroboration (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015) states that ZANU PF lost the 2008 general election, however. Memories of some exercises such as the Land reform in 2000, Operation Murambatsvina, Operation Makavhoterapapi (2008) which the government used the security sector depict and represent moments in which clampdown activities on citizen were done and political strategies to sabotage the opposition's strongholds were done.

In 2008 the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) after a dialogue and mediation led by Thabo Mbeki saw the incorporation of the MDC alongside ZANU PF. The GNU governed from 2009 to 2013. During the GNU, there was further informalization of power as ZANU PF sought to circumvent the MDC and consolidate its power base moving forward to the 2013 general elections, which it resoundingly won. In Zimbabwe military assisted transitions involve complex intra party electoral succession dynamics. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020) argue that elections in Zimbabwe represent electoral authoritarianism which include multiparty elections but the electoral process in twisted and slanted in favor of the ruling party ZANU PF. To a greater degree the use of the military as part of electoral campaigns has been a practise that has worked for ZANU PF since the 1990s, the deployment of retired securocrats into key position within the Electoral Commission and

war veterans creates a milieu full of terror, pre-election violence and penal implications if the opposition was to be voted into power. The main question become how did the state become militarized.

3.10. THE MILITIRIZATION AND PAROXYSM OF STATE INSTITUTION

Active military engagement in civil affairs in Zimbabwe “is based on the complex patronage systems and networks built around the ZANU PF’s liberation struggle ideologies”. Zimbabwe Democratic Institute Report (2017). Anchored in the military, since independence, ZANUPF has established an octopus state far reaching in all government agencies blurring the conventional dichotomy of political party and state. ZANU PF has assumed the role of the state and therefore the two are conflated and through the aid of military backing of the stated ideological origins. In Africa, the military has been used as a tool for promoting political interest rather than adhering to their moral duties. Houngnikpo (2010). Hence this reflects the militarisation of the state in Zimbabwe with the use of the military to protect its political interests which is political longevity.

With the political origin, it suffices to mention that the military is totally ZANU PF (with internal liberation-originating factions of course), albeit despite any attempts of denial by any of the military, ZANU PF or the state, a trinity whose autonomy is merely symbolic. Recruitments into government parastatals has been done under the auspices of patronage lines based on liberation war credentials, showing that the idea of disentangling the military from government structures remains an exotic conception, one which even bends the nature and form of the elusively adopted and conjured democracy, which the militarization of governance continues to make all the more difficulty to attain. Just as Zimbabwe has had a currency that is not a currency, a coup that is not a coup, the country has in equal measure a democracy that is not one.

The question then becomes when did this problem start? Hlatywayo and Mangongera state that there is no clear distinction between the party ZANUPF, the military and the state

due to integration of the military into governance structures. Hlatywayo and Mangongera, (2021). The militarization of the state in Zimbabwe bears semblance to the descriptions of Levitsky and Way, characteristic of a “competitive authoritarian regime, presence of electoral authoritarianism, liberations struggle inheritance and the military capture of the governing party”. Levitsky and Way (2002). In comprehending how the military has disconnected from its military duties and apolitical role to become active in Zimbabwean politics, it is important to give a brief historical background.

Following the liberation of Zimbabwe, a decision was made to form a national army which comprised of 3 groups namely ZANLA which was under ZANU PF led by Mugabe, the Rhodesian army and ZIPRA under ZAPU led by Joshua Nkomo Tendi (2013). The heterogeneous nature of ethnic groups within the army led to suspicions amongst themselves which culminated into the Gukurahundi massacres which targeted the ZIPRA forces as they were perceived to be rebels. From this event, rose the active use of the military to drive the one-party state agenda by ZANU PF earmarking the beginning of the unbridled dominance of military, party, and state alliance under Mugabe. Opposition would emerge at the turn of the millennium from within the trade unions when state failures mounted.

From 2000-2020 Zimbabwe has experienced an observable penetrability of key state parastatals and infiltration by the military. Generals and brigadiers from the liberation struggle became executives of parastatals, majority without the academic or managerial credence that most of these parastatals demanded from the seat of a chief executive. As part of his political strategy Mugabe did this to create an interdependence alliance between the state, ZANU PF and the military which reflected power politics and power consolidation during his tenure. For example, in 2009 in the media sector members of the military through the Ministry of Information were appointed into media related boards notably Brigadier General Epmarcus Kanhangira into ZIMPAPERS, Brigadier General Benjamin Mabenge and Major General Gibson Mashingaidze to ZBC Ruhanya, (2017). The same infiltration can be attributed to other state institutions and independent commissions such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). The ZDI Report observed that democratic principles in Zimbabwe and institutions that promote democracy are being suffocated by militarisation,

of these include the media, the rule of law, electoral processes, the land paradox and constitutionalism. Zimbabwe Democratic Institute Report (2021)

In consequence, ZANU PF maintained strong military presence in politically premeditated operations like land reform (2000), Operation Murambatsvina (2004) and Operation Makavhotera papi (2008). Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya (2021) These manoeuvres evidenced the use of the military for political gains. Military involvement in politics and key state institutions favoured Mugabe from 1980-2017, however the same structures that he created worked against him, ushering a new administration under Mnangagwa through a planned military aided coup, all under the guise of leadership change. Hlatywayo and Mangongera (2020) From these events it can be clearly stated that the gradual militarisation of the state led to the capture and subsequent failure of the political economy of Zimbabwe.

Yamamoto (2014) in his analysis of corruption in Zimbabwe highlighted how the political elite have unceasingly operationalized power to amass wealth without facing the wrath of the law. He argues that “the scandals have been popping out of the bottle one after another.” To name but a few, these include:

Popular Corruption Scandals in Zimbabwe

Table 1: Popular Corruption Scandals in Zimbabwe post-independence, post-coup and lost values

No.	Name of Scandal	Involved Institution/Person	Year	Amount/Value
1.	Paweni Scandal	Samson Bernard Paweni	1982	USD\$6 Mil
2.	NRZ Housing Scandal	National Railways of Zimbabwe	1986	Unknown
3.	Zisco Blast Furnace Scandal	Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company	1987	100 000 tonnes iron ore
4.	Fokker Plane Scandal	Air Zimbabwe	1987	US\$100 Mil
5.	Willowgate Scandal		1988	USD\$65Mil
6.	ZRP Santana Scandal	Zimbabwe Republic Police	1989	

7.	War Victims Compensation Scandal		1994	USD\$300Mil
8.	Grain Scandal	Grain Marketing Board (Zim)	1995	USD\$ 6Mil
9.	Soltran Scandal	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority	1998	Unknown
10.	Chinese Tender Scandal	Ministry of Water and Rural Development	1999	USD\$196Mil
11.	Harare Airport Scandal	Air Zimbabwe	2000, 2008,	ZWD7Bil USD\$54Mil
12.	Chiadzwa Scandal	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation, Kimberly Process	2006-2016	US\$ 15Bil
13.	Command Agriculture Scandal	Office of the President and Cabinet Ministry of Agriculture		USD\$3Bil
14.	Chivhayo Scandal	Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority	2017-2018	USD45Mil
15.	CovidGate Scandal	Minister of Health and Child Welfare Obert Moyo	2020	USD\$60Mil

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from Yamamoto 2014, Transparency International 2019.

Notably, the Covidgate scandal of 2020 involves those currently in power. What is apparent is that during Mugabe's reign this neo-patrimonial state (where those involved in the echelons of power continue to use state wealth for selfish gains) survived, ironically no minister implicated in corruption was arrested and most of them hold positions in the second republic. With the increasing presence of military officials in state institutions corruption has been permitted to further perpetuate in Zimbabwe, contrary to the ideals of military office that command order, discipline, and honesty among other moral obligations to a republic.

3.11. DISTORTED PARTISAN POLITICS AND TRANSITION TO A NEW DISPENSATION

Mugabe's rule was anchored by the interdependence between the military, the state and ZNU PF which forms part of his Machiavellian tactics. From 2013, ZANU PF remained inherently unstable due to the unresolved question of Mugabe's successor (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015). The succession fiasco caused contradiction, hostilities and fragmentation between rivaling factions in ZANU PF. The entry of Grace Mugabe into mainstream politics represented the tip of the iceberg as it is hugely attributed as the main trigger of elite in cohesion in ZANU PF. Multiple expulsions of key figures like Joyce Mujuru who was the former vice president due to corruption, insubordination and treason depicted a military intelligence engineered the unceremonious and gender-based political destruction of former ZANU PF vice president, Joyce Mujuru (Tendi, 2016). This created seedbed of unprecedented chaos, confusion as the demeanor resembled bedroom politics as she acted as she was in charge of both the state and the party without any legal constitutional basics. Grace's ubiquitous political interference in ZANU PF's affairs resembled a bedroom coup which superseded her role as the secretary of the Women's League. She led a rival faction angling to succeed Mugabe (Tendi, 2016). In 2014, Mnangagwa was appointed as vice president but his tenure was unstable. The succession scuffle reached its boiling point when the militarized state took over power through a coup in November 2017, destroying the political faction led by Grace Mugabe and facilitating the installation of Mnangagwa as president. Since then, there has been a reconfiguration of actors within the state as Mnangagwa is trying to build it in his own image. While the shadowy state activities depict attempt to have a grip on power, it is also characterized by internal contradictions in an inherently unstable polity. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020) concurs that the incorporation of the military in agrarian and economic policies depict an increasingly militarized state.

The breadth of patronage networks as a covert force of corruption has grown strenuously in Zimbabwe. Pyrrhic victories with regards to the Anti-Corruption Commission

arresting some government figures hold less value as the problem is deep-rooted within the government structure. This study will encapsulate how to a greater degree the Zimbabwean military elites epitomize and form a clandestine prism of power which controls key sectors of the economy. This enunciates the anecdotes of a repressive covert state in Zimbabwe. The study aimed to elucidate how the reparations of the activities of a covert state have acted as monumental obstacles to democracy and sustainable development in Zimbabwe and this has been colloquial with the increased militarization of the state. The scope and penetration of its economic activities show the depths of the shadow states in terms of economic interests which have deepened and broadened in Zimbabwe with more extensive economic penetration which has detrimental effects on the economy and democratization process in Zimbabwe.

In addition, shadowy state activities present a colossal barrier to development with the most pernicious effects on the economy in Zimbabwe. Funds meant for development are diverted as public service priorities such as education health, infrastructure remain underfunded. As a barrier to democracy stifling of dissent, weakening the opposition, checks and balances, political monopoly, no free media and democracy deficits. (Sishuwa et al., 2021) argues that a shadow state exists in Zimbabwe and this can be depicted by the increased curations of private networks linked to the state which form parasitic element with hedonistic kleptocratic tactics. In collusion with high levels public officers, senior government officials, permanent secretaries' private business networks have mushroom to form a very interesting development of corruption within the era of the new dispensation. Power retention and political survival tactics have been at the apex of the sore reasons of these activities as the generation of resources for political financing is potent for the ruling party. (Tendi, 2013) argues that within this whole fiasco the laxity and complicity of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) cannot be ignored this institution has played a crucial role in the fiscal activities which permeate a shadow state networks. However, the protection of members involved in the shadow state from prosecution from their illegal activities. The development of a shadow state in Zimbabwe can be attributed to state fragility in which formal state institutions have drastically debilitated.

This in corroboration with the ascension of the military aristocracy to the top of the governance axis beget seedbed for corruption networks which has expanded with the interlocution of key business man. Reno (1995) posits that a shadow state is a concoction of informal domestic networks and international actors who connive to wield economic and social authority to their benefits. Through this theory (Reno, 2000) tries to explicate how shadow states in their fragile nature are a powerful force in belittling official institutions which have the constitution mandate to govern the state which shows the integral antidemocratic nature of a Shadow state. The role that ZANU PF nationalist played during independence still plays a huge role in their status and opportunity (Tendi, 2013). Since 2000 the role of the military has grown with 2017 coup being the official entrenchment of the military into key positions. Neopatrimonialism represents one of the most popular contexts which have been used to intellectualize corruption in Zimbabwe. However, perpetual over generalization of neopatrimonialism as the sore underbelly of the corruption have failed to unearth the transnational nature, tactics and individuals which depict how corruption has evolved. The study of the increased militarization of the state should include how complex networks which wield considerable power and influence in Zimbabwe have affected the development trajectory.

The wheels of power have always been in the hands of a small number individuals in Zimbabwe who form the complex multilayered networks for corruption. (Sishuwa et al., 2021) states that in studying corruption based on the shadow state theory the strength of political institutions, the historical process of state formation and nature of a country's economy is crucial. With perpetual institutional atrophy Zimbabwe fits impeccably into this category with democratic lapsation being a clear indicator. In comprehending shadowy activities within the state in Zimbabwe clearly depicts normative indicators which can be grasped from the structural inheritance which is the history of state formation the type of resources and perpetual conflictual phases due to foiled election processes. Zimbabwe makes a perfect case for this scope and breadth as illicit financial flows and the smuggling of precious minerals like the diamonds from Marange which have accurately traversed to be a key revenue for the shadow state. State formation since 1980, bouts of civil strife depicted

through high levels of repression, overt, covert violence, impunity and the rise of authoritarianist governance reputation, democratic backsliding envisaged by the withering of the strength of political institutions form the hallmark of the shadow state in Zimbabwe.

Most military personals and comrades who partook in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle against the British colonial rule consider themselves as the real custodians and curators of Zimbabwe's sovereign national interests. Therefore, they feel obliged to comport and conduct themselves as people who are outside the formal legalities and scope of the law and key decision-making institutions. Alexander (2016) posits that securocrats and the security sectors exercise, transpose their autonomous decision-making power through controlling key economic sectors such as farmlands, vast mineral assets, the agricultural sector, fuel sector, media, fuel sector, state enterprises and tertiary institutions.

To a greater degree it is imperative to note that the capacious reach of the military's power is undoubtably extensive. The military elites are also gaily tangled and party in the operations of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission which is the national election management board (Tendi, 2015) Tellingly military involvement also extends to ZANU PF's internal power struggles and the execution of electoral strategies. The cliché these days is resurgent authoritarianism because of widespread none-clandestine nature of the appointment of army personnel in key state institutions. Parallel operations and consensual pacts of the military also includes alliances with war veterans, local and international business elites and youth brigades. A sense of entitlement by the military and ZANU PF elites is embedded in the role they played during the liberation struggle and this is the frontage of their legitimacy and the root of survival political tactics.

However, an important aspect is that the military commanders are ostensibly subordinate to the ZANU PF leadership only if there is a mutual concomitant agreement with their own interest. November 2017 presented a glaring discord in Zimbabwe's political climate such as occurred and the military overtly engineered a coup under the guise of "Operation Restore Legacy "to remove the former President of Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe. This heralded the ascension of President Emmerson Mnangagwa which depicts that

the military elites exert and control the balance of power in Zimbabwean politics through their financial power, control the coercive apparatus.

Fast forward to 2017 this gridlock engenders a coup and the democratic build up is failing to achieve as the projected democratic transition is still a pipeline dream. Greeted with ululations and popular support by people desperate to see the end of Mugabeism this period did not lead to a refounding of national politics through rescuing the emancipatory aspects of the liberation and decolonization struggle. The military takeover dubbed as “Operation Restore Legacy” had everything to do with who had captured the state. Rethinking belonging, redefinition of being Zimbabwean lack of an ideological identity after Mugabeism, lack of inclusivity, reconciliation and healing through redistributive justice acknowledgement of past wrong doings were expected for the new regime.

Furthermore, Ruhanya using the hybrid regime theory by Levitsky and Way (2010) as a government which places civilians’ rule at the center of running of the state but in Zimbabwe the military factor and its liberation history stands as the defining fact as civilian authority is undoubtably nonexistent. It is arguably a *de jure* and in practise the military runs state affairs. The clash between Mugabe and the military was evident as his interest for his successor led to clashes with the military which ultimately led to his demise. The military controls key civilian institutions, the 2017 coup consolidated power as the military’s influence grew as depicted by the appointment of top military generals into key government positions. The history and state formation of Zimbabwe through former liberation movements show that the ubiquitous role of the military in public affairs and political affairs determines the politics of the state and ruling party. Cankering corruption.

3.12. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In summary the chapter provided a “*longue durée*” decorum segmentation of the political economy of Zimbabwe to grasp the antiquity of postcolonial corruption in Zimbabwe. For the literature review to proffer a proper chronological segmentation of the deepening cancerous effects of grand corruption and kleptocratic tactics on democracy and

development in Zimbabwe the literature review of the study was expanded, conflated, refined and employed within the Shadow State Theory as an organizing concept of the study. In direct linkage with the research objectives the study used the organizing concept in literature review to go beyond the theoretical, adages on neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe as the concept served to organize corrupt kleptocratic activities as a concatenation of a deep-rooted crisis in an interdisciplinary perspective to dissect the complex and multifaceted links connecting militarization, corruption and democracy in the *longue durée*.



CHAPTER 4: BOUNDED REASONING AND THE NEXUS BETWEEN MILITARIZATION AND STATE FRAGILITY

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter delves into how the increased militarisation of the state in concoction with covert violence and kleptocracy have engendered a huge obstacle for development and democracy subsequently leading to state fragility. State fragility is a complex concept which scholars have struggled to define precisely. It is broadly defined by a list of characteristics or elements that constitute a fragile state. These are elements critically monitored to determine whether there is stability or not; these can include rule of law, effectiveness of judicial organs, peace and security, economic stability, and other factors.

4.2. ANALYSING THE MILITARIZATION-STATE FRAGILITY NEXUS

This chapter explores how militarization is a key component, multidimensional source and symptom of extreme fragility. To understand the obstacles of development and democracy in Zimbabwe, comprehending the interconnectedness of state fragility is key as the nexus between state fragility and corruption has deepened since 2017. The Zimbabwean case depicts the brittle, persistence of state fragility as not only a complex case of slippage in development but a distinct typology of weakened governance, overt, covert violence, corruption and insecurity which swindles the normal process of sustainable development. Effort to battle corruption remain nonlinear due to political instability which emanates from the localized roots of fragility embedded in the political disequilibrium causing trifling, minor state capacity. With an eye on engendering an improved understanding of the political economy in Zimbabwe, the adequacy of current frameworks and instruments to tackle corruption is questionable as the overarching pillar is institutional resilience.

A state that is deemed fragile is the one which lacks ability to exercise any of the sovereign functions in the post-Westphalian era effectively Jonathan Fisher (2014). It is a concept that explains statehood and the capacity to execute the social contract. The aforementioned definition is broad enough to embrace the fact that fragility is an evolving condition, and it takes different intensity degrees with different effects in different contexts. Consequently, state fragility has evolved from being a unidimensional to a multi-dimensional concept. Since states execute functions through organs it is therefore logical to argue that fragility is a condition of ineffectiveness of institutions where the social contract is broken due to incapacitation or lack of political will to address human security and state security matters (European Commission, 2007). Existential crises in Zimbabwe since 1980 can be attributed as the main cause for this.

Kaplan opines that “Fragile states suffer from political-identity fragmentation (such that) when combined with weak (or dysfunctional) institutions (it) severely undermines the legitimacy of the state, leading to highly unstable political orders that are hard to reform” Seth Kaplan (2014). According to the OECD fragility is “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb, or mitigate... risks.” OECD (2021) Consequently, these lead to “negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement of resources, humanitarian crises or other emergencies.”

Despite diverse definitions, the concept revolves around three core aspects that are recurring in literature; that is authority, legitimacy, and capacity Seth Kaplan (2010). Firstly, authority in a fragile state may not exist at all in cases where there are warring parties struggling for authority Sebastian Ziaja (2012), or it may decisively exist but flowing from one social group Sonja Grimm et al (2021) thereby representing an exclusionary political settlement or establishment OECD (2011)

Secondly, legitimacy relates to the acceptability of the way authority is acquired and exercised, and thus determines the extent to which the authority can regulate basic parameters

of everyday activities in different sectors of the society Bellina, et al (2009). This concept is inherently political since it determines how the society interacts with political authorities. Under this description it captures issues regarding lack of democracy, the strong role of the military, acquisition of power by force, suppression of opposition, and control of the media. Basic representative issues to freedom of speech and general freeness in the community are key indicators. Legitimacy is also about justice, voice, and accountability. An examination of the Zimbabwean political spectrum shows that these elements are greatly compromised hence the longstanding legitimacy question in Zimbabwe. The 2017 coup aggravated matters as it increased military grip over key state institutions and has gradually resulted in exclusion of other civic and political groups. This has left the junta element with unquestioned control.

Thirdly state capacity is a critical element. It concerns “the aptitude of resources, relationships and facilitating conditions necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose” (Brinkerhoff, 2007: 13). The five pillars of capacity developed by Brinkerhoff (2007) are critical in explaining the Zimbabwean scenario; these include (1) capability to self-organize and act in financial and organizational aspects, (2) ability to generate development results, (3) establish working relationships with other non-state actors and civil society, (4) aptitude to adapt and renew to changing global circumstances, (5) capacity to have coherence in policy and developmental strategies Brinkerhoff (2007). These aspects allow evaluation as to whether capacity is developing or not. These pillars show clearly that capacity is institutional and can be effective only when actors act decisively.

There is a causal relationship between authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This can be demonstrated as follows; lack of authority negatively impacts service delivery which in turn triggers pessimism around legitimacy. On the other hand, lack of service delivery and large-scale inequalities threaten authority and legitimacy and lastly absence of legitimacy can threaten authority. Furthermore, the interaction of these variables determines state fragility since the seriousness of weaknesses in elements that make up a stable state may point to a certain category of fragility such as deterioration, post conflict transitional fragility, arrested economic development and inhibited early recovery Mazarr (2014).

Evidence on the ground shows that the militarization of state institutions is a key element promoting state fragility. Drawing from my own experiences and perceptive deductions, we can see a parallel of similarities between militarization in Zimbabwe and Myanmar which is in itself a fragile state, despite differences in underpinnings of the military power matrix. Militarization refers to a situation where the government is taken over by a military elite who use the state as a vehicle to pursue their political and private interests. In many times, such military elites lack long-term visions for the general society but are more concerned about maintaining order or creating temporary stability that serves their narrow interests Masunungure (2011). Militarisation tends to become more entrenched when transfer of power comes through unconstitutional means, such as a military coup d'état. This immensely increases state fragility especially since coups are prone to violence, either in their prosecution or after takeover in the processes of entrenching power.

Initial rise to power reflects disguised concerns towards championing the ideals of the people but with time the military elements clearly ally with governing individuals with whom they share certain socio-economic interests with Geddes et al (2014). In fact, in Zimbabwe the promotion from military officials to civil office, has often signalled that military life serves three fundamental purposes. Firstly, it is as a reward to the official for roles played in aligning power with factions or politicians to enforce or protect their power interests. Secondly, it transfers the power carried in the military into civil government institutions as embodied in the official(s) who will then assume the civil government with their militarized way of operating and ethos. Thirdly, on the note of a spend military life, the civil government office, for example the dysfunctional parastatals, become a place for the military-retired official to continue benefiting from the state.

With some ethos in civil government differing strongly from military institutions, added to the absence of merit, this is often to the peril of public institutions or parastatals. Because this occurrence in the system opens avenues for corrupt actors to engage in rent seeking activities and the lack of merit itself causes underperformance by the parastatal as enabled by executive incompetence. A lot of for-profit parastatals led by retired brigadiers

have perennially been running on a loss and their continued funding without structural reform signals the maintenance of power through powerful individuals controlling them.

However, whether the military will serve their interests and the few political elites, depends on domestic circumstances such as specific ideology and legal capacity of institutions. Another domestic factor is the tribal dynamics in which ethnical rivalries exist and actions to avoid tribal divides by sharing the spoils since governing leaders may not trust each other across military ranks. In stated instances the forces or individuals with military status become a law unto themselves.

4.3. CRITICALITY AND REFLECTION

One of the leading tools in explaining and measuring state fragility is the Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by the Fund for Peace. Though it has many criticisms like simplifying a complex concept into statistics and indicators, it provides the basis for seeing the magnitude of fragility by descriptive statistics which triggers curiosity to explore the subject. In the 2019 FSI report for instance, Zimbabwe was ranked a failed state in the “alert” category with a score of 99.5 and in the 2020 FSI report it has remained in the alert category with a score of 99.2. Though there is a slight improvement, remaining in the same category points to weakness of the Zimbabwean state.

According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD: 2020) state fragility is a crucial factor to development given the target for Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) OECD (2020). With the advent of coronavirus (COVID-19), state fragility has been exacerbated where it has been already existent, not just in Zimbabwe but globally. Thus, there are also strong external factors aggravating fragility where there are weaker governments and institutions, although they are not key to this inquiry. From these categories, Zimbabwe can be classified as a deteriorating state since the willingness to perform state functions is in decline. High levels of corruption and self-enrichment are also visible, compounded by chronic or low capacity for rule of law,

decreased cooperation with the civil society and rising possibilities of localised conflict (Brinkerhoff 2007).

A critical analysis reveals that in the past decade Zimbabwe has performed poorly in the three pillars of a functional and stable state (authority, legitimacy and capacity). The Zimbabwean state has questionable authority as the ruling party which has been in power since 1980 has been accused of rigging elections. The state has excessively exercised its authority and ability to use violence over its sovereign territory. However, the problem is the composition of such authority as it is derived from military elements who are backing civilian leadership in a leadership union where the republic cannot make a distinction of who is leading them, of where the military, the party, and the state begins and ends (Masunungure, 2011).

The army in Zimbabwe holds a strong influence on the presidential candidate in elections. For instance, in 2002 the army declared that it was not going to accept anyone without liberation struggle credentials to lead the country. The 2017 military coup was carried out in the name of “restoring the liberation legacy” and “targeting criminals around the president”. (Jonathan Chando 2020) Evidently, the military in Zimbabwe is not confined to the barracks as it meddles in ruling party politics thereby increasing the fragility of the state. There are also allegations that the security sector in Zimbabwe is deeply involved in the planning and implementation of election rigging strategies, which have manifested in violence sometimes including the 2000, 2008 and 2018 post-election violence where the military shot several protesting citizens.

The existence of vested military interests explains the undoing of the Zimbabwean government, or more precisely, of the citizens since the effects of the government’s undoing are felt and transferred to the ordinary citizen. In Zimbabwe state authority is vested in military authority and this dispels the importance of democratic processes as well as democratic institutions. In the same vein, there are no supportive relationships between the state authorities and civil society, further exacerbated by the perceived danger of civil society organizations as threats to national security through intent to effect regime change. While the

confrontations between civil society and the state calling itself the second republic warrants an independent analysis, on a fundamental level the battle can be written down as a tag of war on the status quo which we have in part been describing in this paper. With strong power, or perhaps the strongest of all institutions, the existence of unquestionable military authority accounts for failure to generate economic performance needed to transform the lives of citizens. Essentially, transformation and its prospects are a threat to the militarized state governing Zimbabwe.

In Zimbabwe, the military occupies the echelons of power and simultaneously the financial sector, social and health services sector, local governance, agricultural and other sectors which have significantly collapsed. Most of the Southern African countries in general and Zimbabwe in particular, have not been at war in the past decade, but still experience unprecedented high levels of poverty, hyperinflation, unemployment, gross corruption, inequality, and massive 'survival' migration. (Masunungure, 2011 Of particular interest in Zimbabwe as a country without an active war is the persistent high national, annual expenditure wherein for many years on record, funds allocated to the military and therefore defence are higher than what is allocated to health, education and sometimes to production sectors that enable the economy such as agriculture. A fundamental question in this light lingers, Expenditure in military and defence against who, or what, and for defending who, or what?

Guided by gauging the former question against where the military is playing its notable role in the second republic, evidence has sufficiently mounted to validate a nexus between militarization and state fragility in Zimbabwe, contrary to the conception that fragility is mainly induced by civil conflicts. Clearly, there is fragility in peace since sub-national level weaknesses are a common feature without armed struggle Ziaja et al,(2012). This situation has been persistent from the Mugabe regime from 1980 to November 2017 when the state was primarily securocratic and until the military took over where currently under the regime of Emmerson Mnangagwa it has become fundamentally militarized, albeit without shedding to the securocratic nature, but merely increasing to it and evolving from it.

CHAPTER 5: KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter concludes the researcher's findings and gives indispensable commendations with regards to the topic under discussion. The study aimed to dichotomize and connect the nexus between the increased militarization of Zimbabwe and corruption as obstacles to democracy and development. Therefore, building from the previous chapter which denoted militarization as the cause of fragility. This chapter takes on the knob stick and gives a labyrinth of corruption tactics in a localized conceptual analysis as obstacles to development and democracy. Networks of groups with interest have influenced not only economic but political outcomes which nominally avails all the power to them. From this study we can observe that Zimbabwe has been through a sequence of unsolved crises from the corruption crisis in the 1980's which was not resolved by the Leadership Code, the ESAP caused a debt crisis and hyperinflation which was not resolve. The Land reform crisis which heralded the isolation of Zimbabwe from the ambit of international relations was not resolved, the 2008 hyperinflation and human rights crisis was left unresolved with the nation divided and earmarking the inflammation of citizen agency. Subsequently the 2017 coup which saw the removal of the Mugabe regime depicted a moment of potential transformation but a drift in affairs when taken can lead to opulence, omitted all the voyage of its life is bound to fall into shallows and desolations. For Zimbabwe 1980, 2002, 2008 and subsequently 2017 represents the uncaptialized moments.

Remnants of existential crises and anecdotes of legitimacy still dangle due to the 2018 elections and this continues to haunt sustainable development. In this interregnum a hoard of existential crises forms a variety of morose symptoms for internal contradiction which affects the economy of Zimbabwe. With economics being the exhibition of how well organized a society is. I establish that a crisis is not the problem but how it is resolved is of great importance. At the epicenter of this is corruption which continues to be at the zenith of existential problems since 1980. Despite Zimbabwe being comparatively smaller to other

African countries the quantum of the effects of corruption depicts the importance of examining the linkages between increased militarization of the state and corruption. To engender potent reforms to minimize the immediate and long-term impact of corruption as an obstacle to development of the economy, politics, rule of law and the security situation in the country the identification of the corruption tactics and weak framework that enable cartels to thrive is vital.

5.2. OBJECTIVES

- Evidence based understanding of legal, political, financial, economic, political, branding and narrative-based corruption tactics which emerged with the New Dispensation
- To contextualize the scale and nature of corruption as an obstacle to development and democratization in Zimbabwe.
- To analyze the impact of the increased militarization of the state in inuring the populace to inevitably become unobjectionable to normalizing corruption.
- To investigate to what extent has “whataboutism” been exploited to heighten motivations for corruption in Zimbabwe.

5.3. BRIEF NOTE ON RESPONDENTS

The distribution of the participants reflects that the researcher purposively selected participants to balance the views perspectives from a diverse stakeholder ranging from media, the academic sector, governance, investigative journalist, strategy and development. During data collection both female and male respondents requested declined from participating possibly reflecting those issues to do with militarization and corruption are viewed as dangerous owing to the repressive nature of the state. The research emphasized that the study was virtuously academic. The female participants emphasized the effects of militarization and corruption as an obstacle to inclusive and equitable development. As a measure of anonymity, respondents were given individual codes and interview achieves were kept safe

as ethical as possible without names in protected folders. Coding as a measure of anonymity is presented in the table below and the assigned codes will be used when referring to participants during data presentation and thematic analysis.

Table 2: Description of Codes

Code	Description of Codes	Mode of Interview	Gender
COF	Centre for the Study of Corruption	Virtual Global Conference Group	Male
UNR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research. African Delegate	Virtual Global Conference Group	Female
IJ	Investigative Journalist	Skype	Male
NA	National Endowment for Democracy	Report Launch on Transnational Corruption	Female
RA	Rule of law and Anti-Corruption Centre	Skype	Male
IA 1	Interview with Academician	Zoom	Male
IA 2	Interview with Academician	Zoom	Male

Source: Designed by the author.

5.4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Localized corruption tactics in Zimbabwe show the contemporary serendipity nature of corruption which has changed as a result of the increased militarization of the state. Corruption in Zimbabwe has bypassed the stage of being incidental, it is now deep-rooted systemic as a result of localized tactics. The structural nature canvasses the whole breadth of the countries' economy sectors and government state enterprises. It is now difficult to differentiate between public and private sector corruption. The ecology of corruption is now difficult to delineate as it has become complex. Public sector corruption influences private sector corruption in procurement and the awarding of tenders from public sectors makes corruption cascade to the private sector. The costs for corruption have expended to the lack of a moral climate as there is no ethical governance. There is economic turmoil due to the lack of price stability. Zimbabwe is on a treadmill. The lack of political will is a major cause of corruption. Institutions of accountability like the Zimbabwe Anticorruption Commission and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) should be given space to work. The moral rectitude is an important aspect. Perceptions of corruption are also important. Despite the battery of law and being signatory to international conventions the current legal landscape has loopholes. The depoliticization of public appointments to meritocracy is an important aspect as this has an effect on the nuances and operations of the economy. Intellectual richness should be government's priority. The 4th Industrial Revolution is also another aspects that can help in the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. Tech savvy in critical government departments to trace corruption is also important.

Zimbabwe is slowly becoming a regional rode for smuggling minerals and illicit financial flows. The decline in democracy, rise in authoritarianism and transnational networks. Billions of dollars have been lost over the last decade due to illicit financial flows which is a huge impediment to development. Localized corruption activities and tactics have moved billions of dollars from citizens to corrupt public officials and the private sector actors they collude with. Transparency International Zimbabwe (2021) notes that the "cost of corruption involving state officials, including the police, local government, education officials and transport sector regulators, is in excess of US\$1 billion every year". The stockholders of these activities are haggard into three main subsets which are business

acolytes, the ruling elites in ZANU PF and the military elites. Efforts to fight corruption through heartening political leaders to contrivance, uphold and inject the spirit of Ubuntuism through accountability, the rule of law have achieved limited success in Zimbabwe. The study acknowledges that “whataboutism” has been a main influence in anchoring certain corruption tactics and the consequent activities. In analyzing corruption tactics, the study recognizes the need to analyze the blind spots, narratives, incentives charting the current trends of kleptocracy and corruption in Zimbabwe. The functional essence and tendencies of corruption to influential leaders who if operating systematically in corrupt environments characterized by weak institutions have little to no motivation to enact reforms depicts why corruption tactics employed in Zimbabwe should not be tramped out at the margins as simply a policy bogeyman.

5.4.1. Political and Legal Tactics

Entrenched patronage network forms the macabre of networks which control huge sectors within the economy. Respondent IJ puts it succinctly that “corruption in state institutions has expanded into the private sector as the corrupt activities have the propensity to haze the lines between public and private sectors as there is an invariable level of nepotism and cronyism in tender and procurement processes”. Corruption has become a common feature which transcends both the public and private sector. The major formula of corruption has been the political installation of key supporters in influential positions so that they can countersign the regime’s fortitude, will while manipulating and mounting opportunities for spiritual, personal embellishment. Reliance on clientelist networks by these individuals depicts that at the apex of patronage networks is the ruling elites in Zimbabwe who are the gate keepers of wealth and opportunities. Respondent AII stated that “the proximity of people like Tagwirei to the upper echelons of power is perceptibly political and that a red flag”. Therefore, as tactic appointment of close family members, political allies and handy business associates engenders influence peddling in business decisions. These practices form the hallmark of the main kleptocratic, corruption tactic in Zimbabwe. Factionalism has been another way in which competition between different political factions have perpetuated

corruption in Zimbabwe. AI2 argued that “this was part of Mugabe’s regime as groups such as G40 were fighting for access to economic opportunities in Zimbabwe as sources of revenue are important in power battles”. Another key aspect is preferential access to government jobs, control of key economic sectors or some other lucrative outcome. As an obstacle to development this has caused the distortion of civic priorities.

The entrenchment of the autocratic state has an obstacle to democracy and development which has come through political corruption/ kleptocratic tactics. Respondent RA concurred that “Cartels and business acolytes linked to ZANU PF embedded in patronage networks are immersed into corruption tactics that lead to rent seeking for sponsoring political activities”. This forms the hallmark, motivation and bedrock which is imperative to the life support of ZANU PF. Political sponsoring helps the regime to stay in power. Manmade economic rents from business acolytes and patronage networks have been anchored on “Whataboutism” as a political tactics to serve the interest of their cartels and ZANU PF. This has been done through comparing the New Dispensation and Mugabe ‘s regime. The military elites and other key security sectors, the judiciary and members of parliament have wielded and made key state institutions they serve acquiescent to the interests of the corrupt patronage networks. In retrospection the mutual beneficial relationships that exist between corrupt actors is concomitant to the mutual desire keep ZANU PF’s political hegemony. Respondent AI1 stated that “the perpetual augmented militancy of the state depicts a new juncture and wave towards the militancy of the polity in Zimbabwean politics which cascades to ambiguities of fragility”. Warmongering sentiments which have been nurtured to threaten to unleash violence on opposition party members has shown greater propensity to violence as 2021 proved to be appalling when it came to democracy as fundamental freedoms, arbitrage and excessive use of force was used when it came to exposing people involved in corruption. The study establishes that anticorruption should be sectoral based were development policies and service delivery are affected by damaging variants of corruption. Respondent IJ noted that “the causticness is that the limits of current anti-corruption efforts is that anti-corruption efforts have been infested by

corruption and become embedded in politics”. However, the identification of corruption tactics and actors is vital in fighting this endemic problem.

5.4.2. Acculturation and Drafting of Key Institutions

The retention of key state institutions and government enterprises in Zimbabwe has created a situation in which they have become the rise, stand and fall upon which corruption activities are preyed upon. Respondent RA “stated that an important aspect with regards to this is that the propensity to engage in corrupt practices is reigned on the mutually reinforcing collusion of the security and law-enforcement agencies like the police which engenders the means for political coercion”. The cooptation of security agencies means that corruption allegations are merely investigated which allows the infamous “catch and release method”. Security agencies also have the ability to threaten the media which is an important tactic is deterring investigation of corruption cases. respondent IJ noted that “this is a critical tactic in reducing criticism of the government”. In corroboration Responded IJ postulated that “in exerting influence over key financial institutions like the RBZ have become implanted in systemic corruption as corrupt individuals and companies like Sakunda have wrest control and use it as their own personal piggybank”. This ultimately causes the weakening the macro-economic environment as an obstacle to development.

To a greater degree corrupt cartels and patronage networks have contributed to humongous policy mishaps and missteps by the government public officials in policy implementation and making. This has been a huge problem to development as inconsistency in policies has led to a significant weakening of the macro-economic environment. IA1 concurred that “keys sectors like the fuel, transport sectors and the importing business have been areas used as economic rents as businessman like Tagwirei have controlled these sectors. In hindsight involvement in corruption activities leads to huge retention rates. Respondent IJ argued that “the incident in 2019 which the Daily Maverick (2021) and the Sentry Report (2020) state as an “illegal payment of ZW\$3.3 billion to Sakunda in 2019, instead of ZW\$330 million, caused a massive devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar by 23

per cent”. He argued that this was not fair to the common Zimbabwean as it eroded incomes and savings of the poor in a day. In corroboration with his view Respondent IA2 concurred that ‘the issue which happened in 2019 is mind boggling as this tactic shows how corrupt business acolytes have the ability to influence the government to take a public debt which leads to meager credit rating, a distending domestic debt and further pushing the state into the abys of fragility”.

The acculturation of key institutions has pretentious obstacles to development and democracy through causing inconsistency in economic policy and high inflation. The printing of money to fund shadowy activities represent the kick and hop policies of the current dispensation which have caused high inflation rates which is currently the inflation is the highest in the world in 2022 according to Hanke’s Annual Inflation Measured Inflation rate at 96.4%. Respondent IJ stated that “the new government commandeered the return to the Zimbabwean dollar and quasi fiscal activities which are being undertaken by the RBZ at the directive of the state”. The state couched the return of the Zimbabwean dollar as an issue of national security however the usurpation of the role of the RBZ and the ministry of Finance by business acolytes like Tagwirei linked to certain patronage networks have played an immense role in affecting regularity of the economy in Zimbabwe. At the behest of the new regime illegal foreign currency trade has exacerbated inflation with the involvement of certain business elites and private companies who buy foreign currency on the parallel market.

5.4.3. Trading in Influence

This tactic is one of the main political methods used in Zimbabwe. Respondent AI2 stated that “public figures, government officials and prominent business people have excessively used their influence which they derive from their proximity to positions of power”. Therefore, they use this influence to not only obtain benefits but also master bribes. Influence communion is a corruption tactic which sprawled after the 2017 coup after the G40 faction was booted out of power. Routinely used in ensuring legal decisions but it has

traversed to a new form. Respondent IJ argued that this form of corruption was part of the Mugabe regime and it's still being continued in the current dispensation. Clientelism and brokerage ruling party patronage in urban markets. These have long been a site of contestations between the ruling party and the MDC now Citizens Coalition for Change as the opposition political party. There is an imbrication of coercion and patronage networks. Urban informal economies constitute an important financial and political resource for corruption and rent seeking and also in terms of elections urban markets are employed as vote banks. The further deterioration of the economy in Zimbabwe has been a major cause of the blooming informal sector. Respondent AI1 stated that “main urban markets are Mupedzanhamo and Coca Cola where they are space barriers and renting out of numerous tables for vendors are the main sites which are political defined and social bedded in this”. These informal markets act as sites of corrupt activities by the ruling party. The informal sector has also been a reservoir of political and economic corruption transactions and unrecorded business conflicts.

5.4.4. Coercive and Violence Based Tactics

Suppressing scrutiny through quieting dissensions which emanates from the corrupt scandals which makes itself to the mainstream media especially Twitter is a main tactic under this subsection. Social media activism and criticism of the government has generally been met with repressive elements of the state as prominent journalist like Hopewell Chinono have been incarcerated. This suppression has encompassed serious attacks on free expression especially on journalist, independent media and civil society organization. Respondent IJ concurred that “journalists working on exposing corruption have to circumnavigate complex, exasperating and dangerous impediments as corrupt officials and the government seek to dissuade their investigations”. These violence grounded tactics have been used to inure citizen to be passive and afraid of reacting to corruption scandals thereby making citizen tolerable to corruption as something normal. Respondent RA vehemently stated that “growth in cynicism in relation to future prospects for a clean government in Zimbabwe has been afflicted by empirical corruption scandals which have never been meticulously investigated

and the implicated individuals are free”. A key aspect under this has also been the use of “Whataboutism” by public officials as major grandiloquence coercive way to paradoxically place themselves as less inclined to corruption as compared to the previous regime.

5.4.5. Image Management and Reputation Laundering Tactics

This is a tactic to exert influence and distance or ward off association with corruption. This has been seen through contribution to the society to obscure association with corruption through donations to prestigious charities, football stars, purchasing football teams, sizeable donations to university and the poor. In analyzing these tactics, we depict the ways in which reputation laundering is a way of understanding corruption in Zimbabwe. Opaquer corruption is shadowy in Zimbabwe. Despite the maintenance of a democratic framework and nomenclature fraudulent elections and human right abuses have affected the legitimacy and prestige of the New Dispensation. Respondent IJ stated that “the use of the cleric man and church leaders has been another way of the regime trying to gains its way to regain citizen”.

5.4.6. Financial Tactics

A portfolio of companies have received the financial backing of the RBZ clandestinely and this has been done through off book transactions to keep government program afloat in the wake of a wave of sanctions. Respondent IJ attested that “functions of government enterprises such as the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority and other parastatals which are top income-generating institutions have been apprehended from serving national interests, to sum it up business acolytes started to dip their hands into these companies like the cashbox for self-enrichment. To disregards the sanctions and the anecdotes revolving around the RBZ engendered loopholes grey areas and loopholes which have foreshadowed the normal functions of the government as they have strewed as corruption tactics.

The Command Agriculture is a reference to a special form of agriculture that was created in the later stages of the Mugabe regime. Who knew this could stem as one of the major schemes which became a seedbed for corruption tactics? The principal movers of this

program were the current president Mnangagwa and apparatuses within the security sector. I argue that “Whataboutism” was at the epicenter of the formation of this program by its coprotagonist. The philosophy undergirding this program from the impetus was that since Zimbabwe’s has experienced successive periods of food discrepancies and given that people had land ironically from the land reform thus why not have a home-grown approach to food production. The government planned to commandeer farmers to produce certain hectares of maize in each region. The rule was that farmer would devote 100000 thousand hectares of maize in a region to guarantee self-sufficiency. However, from its name we can depict military connotations. What has emerged is that it has become a major vehicle and financial tactic of looting public funds from the public sector by ZANU PF elites and other corrupt cartels. AI1 stated that this program was a mastermind slanted as part of power struggles and subsequently engendered a grey area for asset stripping, arbitrage, predatory deals and rent seeking behavior which are closely adjacent to a form of state capture.

The Command Agriculture program commenced in 2016 and barely a year after that the in 2017 the Auditor General unearthed unallocated reserves in the sum of \$US 2.7 billion and in 2018 she found unallocated money of \$US 3.5 billion. The unallocated reserves misspaced usage refers to money used outside the approval of parliament. This caused a budget deficit of \$US2.7 billion in 2017 and \$US 3.5 billion in 2018. By 2019 the total sum of this money had reached \$US 6.8 billion. Responded IJ noted that “if you read through the Daily Maverick Report (2021) you can see that only around 700 million dollars of the money was used for Command Agriculture in 2017. Therefore, as financial corruption tactic the RBZ in tandem with Sakunda were operating a parallel budget which was being run without the approval and knowledge of the parliament as every government expenditure must be approved through the Parliament Consolidated Revenue Fund.

Respondent IJ stated that “Command Agriculture was being financed through paper instruments called Treasury Bills”. A treasury bill is a prescribed asset paper or an indivisible cheque which cannot be broken down. It must have a date of issue, interest rate, duration and the status/ type of the funding. From this it is clear the issuance of Treasury Bill in the sum

of \$1.2 billion in 2018 brings to the fore how treasury bills are a corruption tactic. Respondent IJ states that there were breaches of the constitution which is against democracy as the minister of finance was directing the RBZ and was just authorizing the issuance of Treasury bills which is breach of constitution as expenditure like that should be approve parliament”. Voluminous amounts of funds expended under the Command Agriculture program were a breach of law therefore we can depict a parallel budget operating outside the horizons of the state. There was a breach of the Public Finance Management Act as the government was running an expansionary fiscal policy deepening macro-economic crisis and economic disequilibrium through undermining the Zimbabwean dollar. The public debt because of Treasury Bills was \$US 11 billion by 2019. Zimbabwe’s stock of domestic debt was around \$US12 billion and the sovereign debt was \$US 8 billion causing deficit finance problems. Deficit financing problem is when a government enters into domestic borrowing every government runs on deficit financing but however the challenge in Zimbabwe is how you finance the deficit budgeting. This program affected the economic in an unpropitious manner causing hyperinflation, shortages of money and an overheated economy leading to the collapse of the Zimbabwean bond/ dollar.

Respondent IJ stated that “corruption tactics are depicted in that that there is no single voucher for this or supply of the agricultural equipment’s”. The fact that Zimbabwe is still a net a net importer of food and 7 million people are fed by the World Food Programme (WFP). AI2 noted that “the problem was that the Treasury Bills were being issued in a dollarized economy and when the ministry of Finance issues Treasury Bills, they are effected as printed money but Zimbabwe cannot print money as it is not a federal reserve”. Therefore, they were issuing billions of treasury bills to fund this Programme by issuing an IOU the government was in fact printing money. Respondent IJ stated that “billions of Treasury Bills were being issued to Sakunda Holdings and FSG through the Presidential input Scheme and Tagwirei was the main beneficiary and the legality of treasury bills needs to be challenged”. This case depicts a sophisticated gateway of corruption in the case of Treasury Bills which implicates the government as both gate keeper and gate crusher of corruption as there is no semblance for the public good but a paraphernalia for political funds. The functionality of the Command

Agriculture was spearheaded by Kudakwashe Tagwirei and his company Sakunda with the prerogative of providing farmers with inputs for maize and wheat production. The finance was recoupled from the government through providing for the guarantee on farmers' repayment. On paper it looked like a master plan that would remove Zimbabwe from the dungeons of poverty. Respondent IJ noted that this program engendered massive opportunities as a tactic for corruption especially after 2017. The leakages and ambiguities for arbitrage created room for overpricing of the agricultural inputs and this can be bemoaned as the major weakness and tactic for corruption. Furthermore, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe allotted non-tradeable Treasury Bills which was a major corruption tactic employed by the government after 2017 as in place of purchasing the inputs for the farming season straight from the suppliers the government left that duty to Sakunda and the funds were going to be raised through the allotted Treasury Bills. Largely steered under the New Dispensation of President Mnangagwa. Inputs like fertilizers, fuel, agro chemicals were procured from companies through patronage networks closely aligned to Tagwirei. This program led to the biggest heist in the history of Zimbabwe as in 2019 the Zimbabwean dollar depreciated. The repayment was supposed to be ZW\$3 billion but a preferential revaluation of its repayment meant the government received ZW\$330 million. This fiasco was created by the RBZ due to financial corrupt tactics which significantly led to the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar from a 1:1 with the US dollar to a 1:25 in one week.

A collegial and uncompetitive business macroclimate as an obstacle to development. Corruption has led to a collegial and uncompetitive business environment which has metamorphosed into an unattractive investors unfriendly place in a multiple way. AI1 stated that patronage networks and greedy cartels close the ruling elites have led to multiple distortions in the economy due to successive wobbly policies environment which has dissuaded the consideration of Zimbabwe as a country long-term institutional investment for example major banks like Barclays and Standard Banks have closed their operations in Zimbabwe. Ultimately this has pushed the government to focus on attracting investors who align with the interests of corrupt business acolytes which perpetuates economic predatory and rent seeking which does not cater for the citizens but rather serves the interest of the few.

IJ stated that in this interregnum creating an anti-competitive through stifling innovation and technological development can be said as a tactic that has been used by corrupt elites. As a solution the us dollar must be used as a transitional mechanism flat the Zimbabwean dollar, eliminate export surrender requirements, pay civil servants in us dollars. Deal with the debt burden deal with corruption to pursue normal fiscal consolidation. Fund the social sector and attend to Gross Capital Formation.

The entrenchment of corruption has had extraterrestrial impact both politically and economical in Zimbabwe. Inconsistence economic policies at the macro-economic level, hyperinflation and expanding militancy, undemocratic elections and a contested legitimacy, socioeconomic regression and human rights abuses.

5.4.7. Smuggling of Tobacco


Smuggling in Zimbabwe is governmentally distinct and a well-defined titular activity with blind spots, routes and actors socially embedded. The tobacco sector has been desolated by the smuggling of tobacco from Zimbabwe to South Africa which has been one of the major problems which have advanced after 2017. With Zimbabwe being one of Africa's largest Tobacco producers and concurrently its neighbor South Africa being one of the largest consumers of Tobacco/ cigarettes consumers this creates a direct linkage between the 2. Respondent IJ stated that "Weak laws and policies have orchestrated the smuggling of tobacco to South Africa as Zimbabwe's cigarettes supply South Africa's huge demand for cheap cigarettes". This has created an extensive network of underground smuggling of tobacco. The tentacles in this also include bootlegging smuggling as a huge corruption tactic. Respondent AII concurred that "the financial structure of South Africa has also facilitated corruption in Zimbabwe as South African companies and businessman are complicit in facilitating the looting of minerals like platinum and tobacco from Zimbabwe. Tobacco is one of the most smuggled commodities to South Africa.

5.4.8. Gold Smuggling

The mining sector accounts for 60 per cent of Zimbabwe's export revenue and it also contributes to a significant share of the nation's foreign direct investment (FDI). However, this sector has for a long time been an easy target for man-made economic rent seeking. AI1 noted that "Widespread illicit activities which transpire in this sector have been scripted and this ranges from smuggling of precious minerals, hoarding of mineral concessions through patronage networks and trade mis invoicing through the now trendy Shell Companies". Respondent RA corroborated this notion noting that "the prime figure in all this is Tagwirei who has moved into the gold mining sector through a Shell Company based in Mauritius-based called Sotic International Sotic which recently acquired the rights to mine at Bindura Nickel Company (BNC), Shamva Mine and Freda Rebecca gold mine". However, a huge chunk of these assets are mined under Landela Mining Venture (Pvt). Ltd.

Furthermore, a significant amount of gold is being smuggled out of Zimbabwe. However, the most appalling thing about this is that enigmatic anecdotes and political protection of individual involved in smuggling is being undertaken which puts spanners in efforts to curb this. Given the militarized state of the country it is appalling why it is hard to track these illicit activities. Therefore, it is difficult to wholly determine how much gold is smuggled. Responded IJ concurred that a government report stated that "US\$ 1.2 billion worth of gold is smuggled yearly with 3 -4 tons of gold making its way to neighboring countries like South Africa through smuggling. In addition, approximately US\$210 million worth of gold is smuggled out of Zimbabwe to Dubai with no official paper work of the gold exports Daily Maverick Report (2021). In this interregnum Respondent AI2 argued that "who is mining this gold, because and the bulk of this gold that is being smuggled is being obtained from artisanal and small-scale gold miners". In corroboration Respondent IJ stated that "this is a huge corruption tactic loophole as some illegal and artisans' miners are linked to the ruling elites in ZANU PF".

Figure 2: Smuggling flows in Zimbabwe



Source: *Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime 2022.*

Furthermore in 2019 artisan miners produced 63% of the gold which was officially marketed but this was more than the one obtained from large mining companies who use sophisticated equipment's Daily Maverick Report (2021). Therefore, it is plausible to note that sophisticated straits of corruption are deep rooted in this sector which harvest smuggling as a corruption tactic. Respondent IJ stated that "he believes that Fidelity Printers and Refinery (FPR) which is a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe assigned to purchases all the gold mined in Zimbabwe is complicit in the with smuggling of gold. Therefore, smuggling involving the government elites creates a system in which corruption tactics involve "elite trafficking alliances" but the key actors mainly encompass people in proximity to government officials in key positions. The Daily Maverick Report (2021)

concur that 70% of gold from Zimbabwe is refined in South Africa. Respondent IJ argued that “there is need for a United Nations Convention against illicit flows of resources. Zimbabwe loses \$US 2 billion per year through illicit financial flow and smuggling. The regional aspect of transnational corruption and smuggling in Southern Africa depicts the exportation of corruption as another form of corruption.

5.5. LINKING GLOBAL EMERGENCIES WITH CORRUPTION

Corruption is both a consequence and cause of global emergencies like Covid 19. With the unfortunate dawn of the pandemic in 2020 in terms of governance there was also a huge attack on people’s rights. Corruption is on a rampage across the African continent as old forms of corruption like bribery, nepotism are transmogrifying into newer forms such as transnational corruption, capital flight, state capture and illicit financial flows. To a greater degree global emergencies have contributed to this indirectly by making the situation difficult or much worse through lower capacity in global health care systems due to corruption. Respondent COF stated that “money attracts corruption like magnets”. With the pandemic came social media activism and this bred the need for assertive authoritarianism which can be attributed as the main stay of humongous corruption as check and balances are removed. For Zimbabwe this subsequently depicts a grim trajectory concocted in impractical anti-corruption methods. Corruption thrives during emergencies.

The covid 19 pandemic has proved to be a boon in corrupt authoritarian states and leads to as is expanded opportunities for graft curtailing accountability and the deterioration of human rights and democracy. The influx and need for PEPs to fight the pandemic created opportunities for rent seeking and corruption. The deleterious effects of corruption were depicted as the opportunities for corruption increased. The pandemic was used as a way to clampdown on dissent, media and civil society. Respondent COF noted that “In Zimbabwe the web of shell companies formed a formidable intermingle of tactics for corruption leading to the extension of preexisting structural loopholes for financial straits”. Therefore, the corruption tactics represented a new operation system and the network of

enablers as the hard drive that stash ill-gotten wealth. Furthermore, Respondent COF stated that “social media is now a tool for anti-corruption activism”. The unexpected benefit of the pandemic is that technology has provided an outlet for citizens to express their discontent. The need to build strong coalitions. The new forms of journalist model that is now capable of responding to the multifaceted and complex nature of illicit financial flow, Investigative journalism in Zimbabwe launched the efforts to track and expose potential avenues for corruption turbo charged corruption tactics.

Respondent IJ concurred that “investigative journalism broke this vicious cycle which saw a blockbuster of corruption scandals erupt in 2020-2022. Respondent IJ doubled by stating that “these scandals were based on a cluster of leaked documents, receipts, illicit financial flows, names, agencies, foreign companies showing the power of deterring corruption through journalism”. The emergence of translational coalitions by journalist is an important aspect in fighting corruption. This is an agile, sufficient dynamic and capable concept to tackle corruption in Zimbabwe. Localized armory against grand corruption to discover corruption schemes. The fraught legal system needs to be strengthened which forms obstacles to democracy. Rigorous information and normative linking of sectors. Radical thinking of fighting corruption in an academic way. Tackling corruption is fundamental to preventing and controlling emergencies like the Covid 19 pandemic. Understanding corruption helps to understand emergencies.

5.6. CRITICALITY AND REFLECTION

This section proffers an overall reflection and criticality of the case under discussion. In comprehending the Zimbabwean crisis, conceptualizing the interconnectedness between the inception of military interest, involvement into the civilian business, the ensuing political-economic structure and the subsequent gradual predatory nature which has led to state fragility in Zimbabwe, it is key to understand the existence of existential crises as discussed above. In 1998, the Zimbabwean military intervened in the DRC crisis, which prompted

unbridled access of military personnel to diamonds. This would be the true inception of military involvement in civilian affairs and fraudulent activities such as looting. With the taste of the loot too good to give up, to the extent that it had to be domesticated on resources at home in Zimbabwe, a marriage of predatory conveniences had to be finalized with the military. Thus, during the Mugabe era the military played a significant role in strengthening his longevity in power, to the conveniences of benefits enjoyed there under with the consequences transferred to the citizenry. For example, the historically lavish state expenditure in the country has been bankrolled by and through taxing of civilians on one side while benefits from billions worth of mineral resources never made it to the public sector to benefit the same civilian.

2017 heralded a novel trajectory in Zimbabwean politics as the military entrenched its prominence as not only a game changer by ousting Mugabe but also aiding the preeminence of Mnangagwa's administration. By disregarding the coup due to fatigue over Mugabeism, a period stained with overt violence, electoral misconduct, and administrative lawlessness; the citizenry, opposition parties, western countries and government structures became complicit to the unconstitutional transference of power, which would be infamously labelled, "a coup that was not a coup". This earmarked hope for a new interlayered period in Zimbabwean governance history, one detached from Mugabe and Mugabeism. In it, Mnangagwa promised to further good governance and reconfigure the political spectrum to be amenable to democracy, a feature which was alien during the previous *modus operandi*.

Despite the euphoria, grand promises and speeches which had begot hope for a new chapter, the purported democratic transition of the post-Mugabe government began deeply rooted in patronage and nepotism and breadth of new corruption tactics expanding to the capture of the executive branch of the government. This laid the foundation for the unbridled dialectically interwoven militarisation of the state, increased and institutionalised corruption. The transition and ascendance of senior military commanders to key government positions heralded the first principal step which ushered in cronyism to preserve loyalty. In fact, one would argue it was business as usual, despite it being labelled and packaged differently; the era of Mugabeism would be gone, yet the governance that followed was merely a mirror of

it albeit with new evolved corruption tactics, features that sought to present it as a democracy, an illusory one considering the takeover of power and its later attempted legitimization which was heavily contested.

The New Dispensation to invest in its political longevity began ingraining the military in public affairs through rewarding the generals who spearheaded the 2017 coup with key government positions. Notably he appointed retired General Chiwenga as the vice president and in 2020 as the new minister of Health to solve major issues affecting the health sector in Zimbabwe after the advent of the Covid 19 virus (Herald, 2022). In addition, the late Sibusiso B. Moyo, a retired major general in the military was also appointed as the minister of foreign affairs and international trade and the late Perence Shiri a former general of the Air Force of Zimbabwe was the minister for land, agriculture, and rural resettlement. Therefore, these appointments depict a steady increase in the number of military personnel's occupying key executive positions, albeit without unquestionable meritorious credibility to occupy the positions despite the military power they bring to the table to control the key sectors that hold Zimbabwe together.

During the Mugabe regime sophistry and a clandestine approach guided the appointment of military personnel in public affairs as he deployed them to government parastatals, however this cannot be said for the Mnangagwa administration. Regulating key government decisions has become prone to abuse due to the military takeover of the executive. A key example that comes to the fold is at one point the threat to if not the firing of all nurses who had gone on strike, in a country with a longstanding human resources deficit in the health sector. To follow the trend of the rampant frequency in the capture of the executive, Air Commodore Jasper Chimedza was appointed as the secretary for the ministry of health. These cases illuminate premeditated structural, administrative capture and control by and through military power, the highest possible and strategic national institutions; from which corruption is enabled, constitutionalism rescinded, professionalism and democratic values put into disarray in the process undermining both government structures and daily civil life.

Evidently in Zimbabwe the military has become a stockholder and central in national decision making entrenching a patrimonial, hegemonic socioeconomic culture, where the elites and their spawn benefit from the key economic opportunities availed by the state. In a tweet, member of parliament Themba Mliswa said “I applaud Hon Chiwenga’s vision for the health sector, I have confidence in the professionalism and discipline of military personnel to formulate successful strategies, the health sector desperately needs a restore legacy approach”. His words came to fruition as the vice president militarized the health system as all aspiring health professionals in Zimbabwe are now obliged to join the ZNA first through the Défense Forces Service Commission as Junior Resident Medical Officers (Tweet et al., 2020). The perpetuation of uncontrolled military influence is now weakening professionalism and constitutionalism illustrating the levels of the militarization of the state. The above characteristics underscore an authoritarian regime which seeks to eliminate democratic processes such as the right to demonstrate, as the militarisation of the health sector was meant to stem strikes by health professionals over poor personal protective clothing during Covid -19.

To maintain its hegemony, ZANU-PF in tandem with the military has habitually used terror campaigns to instil fear on the rural populace to influence electoral procedures, mainly the outcome. Compounded with the deliberate appointment of military personnel within the ZEC which is responsible for administering elections, this was meant to buttress the cancerous political corruption, another signature of the Mugabe regime (ZDI Report 2017). The 2018 elections saw a similar trajectory, though in this instance choreographing the election process to appear more democratic than all prior included a complex militarization of the electoral process and judiciary system (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ruhanya, 2020). Ultimately the constitutional court announced Mnangagwa as victorious with 50.6%. Despite the presence of international observers and a new government under Mnangagwa, the commandeering of the 2018 electoral process showed the skewed favour of the military towards ZANU PF. Mnangagwa had failed to validate his “Zimbabwe is open for business” mantra which hovered around promises for a democratic transition, and the perpetuation of

political corruption reflects his government as a surrogate of a militaristic takeover, an evolution and upgrade of Mugabeism securocracy.

Cynicism towards the Mnangagwa administration has emanated from the marriage of convenience between ZANU PF, the military and a seemingly captured judiciary system which is an irrefutable game changer in power politics as it stifles any attempts to eradicate systemic corruption. Fast forward to 2020 the security apparatus and the judiciary have been used to weaken the opposition in a fashion that signals a potential to exterminate competitive politics. From the raiding and subsequent seizure of the opposition MDC Alliance now Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) headquarters to constant arbitrary arrests of government critics the political meddling and shrinking democratic space mirrors a militarised state. A purported democratic transition proved to be skimmed process to prolong ZANU PF's longevity in power and this has polarised the nation permeating fragility. Inversely Muronzi (2020) argues that a disconcerting feature arising from the political instability is that global interest over Zimbabwe has declined as the constant subjugation of human rights has dented the image of Zimbabwe dissuading foreign direct investment. The political fiasco has exhibited itself as a sole reason for the economic malaise and state fragility in Zimbabwe.

International integration and reengagement efforts have been stifled because of this political corruption as antagonism with countries like the US and UK has continued with Zimbabwe being tagged as a "foreign adversary" (Banda, 2020). State fragility in Zimbabwe can be attributed to the unbridled militarisation of government structures and systemic corruption which has become complexly rooted in all sectors. Whether it is the allocation of tenders to companies and individuals that cannot deliver for example in the procurement of PPEs in response to Covid-19 or the procurement of snow graders for a country temperate country that experiences snow by accident, the complicity of the military and benefitting of individuals connected to it resembles a country not fit for business despite being touted as open for business. Inevitably the transference of burdens of misgovernance axe basic human rights both directly and indirectly. With the government culpable, this has caused the continued ostracization of Zimbabwe from the international stage.

The new dispensation through the “Zimbabwe is open for business” mantra aspired to resuscitate the economy. However, with the current trajectory, the cartelised, militarised state with its cancerous systemic corruption at its core, this aspiration will remain a pipeline dream. Aljazeera (2020) reported that with high annual inflation rates fluctuating from 500%-837%, 7.7 million people being food insecure, a health system reeling from the Covid 19 pandemic and with Zimbabwe barred from debt relief, it remains a disturbing feature in Mnangagwa’s regime that corruption remains unabated (Muronzi, 2020). Signalled as the driver for the purported economic recovery agenda, the mining sector also blankets the bribery and extortions mirroring state fragility in Zimbabwe. The militarisation of the state instead of curbing the smuggling of natural wealth from Zimbabwe has generally heightened and permeated the haemorrhaging of mineral resources.

Njini and Marawanyika (2020) reported that Zimbabwe loses approximately \$100 million per month and \$1.5 billion annually due to illicit financial flows and smuggling of minerals like gold and diamond to countries like South Africa and Dubai. The main cause for this trend has been the control of mineral resources by the military which allows the looting of public resources with the aid of security apparatus. In 2020 Henrietta Rushwaya, the head of Zimbabwe Miners Federation tried to smuggle gold worth US\$366,000 with the aid of security apparatus and government acolytes portraying the red tape and rent seeking activities which are chocking Zimbabwe into the abyss of economic turmoil (Muronzi, 2020). This has affected the political economy of Zimbabwe through political instability in the form of violent protests, poor infrastructural development, weak social services, human capital flight and the disabling absolute capital accumulation. In addition, the militarization of the state has also allowed the unchecked abuse of property rights especially by security apparatus. Matimire (2021) reported that “Anjin Investment, a mining company linked to the military took the most lucrative diamond mine claim in Marange from the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company.” The dilemma of poor people in resource-rich communities argued for by Kativu (2020) within the context of unequal resources exchange assumes a strong institutional rooting difficult to challenge or displace in cases such as this. The abuse of property rights has caused major economic implications in Zimbabwe by

warding off potential investors and casting doubts on the promises made by Mnangagwa to ensure economic recovery.

The capture of the judiciary in tandem with a militarized state has developed a corrupt administration system which makes the judiciary system susceptible to political interference. Politicization and militarization of the judiciary system hinders pragmatic efforts to curb endemic corruption. Magaisa (2020) argues that “Chief justice Malaba, by demanding that each judge presents his judgement to a superior before delivering judgment shows the worrisome levels of judiciary capture”. This depicts an absolute veneer of extreme political meddling in the judiciary system which breeds systemic bias and bribery for personal interest.

The year 2020 was laden with scandalous corruption cases involving top military and government elites. From the Reserve Bank led Farm Mechanisation scandal which also implicated members of the judiciary system, to the \$20 million Covid 19 funds embezzlement scandal which included former health minister Obadiah Moyo a close ally of Mnangagwa. A bizarre feature from these corruption scandals is how instantaneously implicated government officials are released from custody, in what has been publicly dubbed and correctly perceived as “catch and release” in the public eye, albeit a ruse that the wheels of justice are turning within the realm of non-militarised territory and the fight against corruption is bearing fruits. Magaisa (2020) argues that this has set a precedence which allows an amalgam of the selective application of law and perpetuation of systemic corruption because of the biased conduction of courts cases. These cases demonstrated how hard it is to stop corruption in a militarized state. What followed was a sequence of public emotional outrage as protests against the self-aggrandizement activities were banned under guise of Covid 19 restrictions. However, the government went on a rampage arresting government critics including investigative journalist Hopewell Chin’ono who had exposed the fraudulent activities. Gruesome human rights abuses which followed the foiled planned protests affected the image of Zimbabwe.

By continuously thwarting the democratic space and the right to protest through using the military, the government has attracted global criticism which affects the political

economy of Zimbabwe as re-engagement efforts with multilateral institution to access financial assistance is hindered. Just as Zimbabwe was isolated from the international community in the era of Mugabe, it still remains to be seen the much-needed integration that the pledges of change by and through the second republic promised. In addition, the militarisation of the state has dissolved the independence of institutions in Zimbabwe. For instance, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) is headed by justice Loise Matanda Moyo who was appointed by Mnangagwa to fight corruption (Chronicle, 2022). However, she is the wife of the late general Sibusiso Moyo. While herself an accomplished professional in her own right, the hints of nepotism are too hard to ignore. The existence of an element of nepotism casts doubts on the operational independence of the commission as it compromises the fight against systemic corruption.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. CONCLUSION

The new dispensation has failed to create a strong core of state institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being captured by personal interest and detached from the influence of powerful rent seeking groups. The study managed to analyze the localized corruption tactics which are used to swindle, siphon public resources for individual gains. To understand the full scope of the corruption as an obstacle to development the effects were examined through the lens of political, legal, economic, financial, coercive, violence based and image management-based tactics. State fragility in Zimbabwe has been due to the associative relationship between the militarization of the state and systematic corruption. The military has been used to resolve civil disputes and maintain the grip to power. This can be termed as administrative insulation as the military has become the law. Arbitrary arrests, rape, abduction and gross human rights violation have become the governance culture, and this has been targeted at government critics and activists. The political polarization in Zimbabwe has caused instability, threatening the possibilities of integration in the international communities from which perceived support for development including financial resources are to be unlocked.

The liberation struggle, ideologically correct rhetoric and the anti-imperialism stances on which the country's leadership, the most powerful of them being of the military mindset, continues to stand on as being the fundamental problem of Zimbabwe that continues to cripple its economy has lately lost its validity as citizens have continued for years to confront the reality that the militarized state and the corruption that fuels it are more endemic and harmful to the country's socioeconomic and political progress. The militarization of institutions and the centralized power that comes with it is a frustration on many levels and a dissuasion of sustainable development that cannot continue to be ignored.

It is conceivable that the prevailing dehumanizing condition in Zimbabwe requires a compendium of solutions to return the country to normalcy, if at all there is still known a normalcy to return to. International integration through resolving outstanding debts, perpetual international good will, image rebranding and normalization of relations with the western countries and international financial institutions is key in restoring Zimbabwe to bargain on the international grid. Despite the “Zimbabwe is open for business” mantra, open animosity has continued with countries like the US and UK due to the deteriorating human rights situation and endemic corruption. South Africa’s relationship with Zimbabwe is on a downward spiral following sequence of diplomatic spats from the ANC against ZANU PF to border disputes. what is left is the political will from the Mnangagwa regime. Critical to this aspect is need for flexible servant and malleable leadership in Zimbabwe which puts public interests ahead of individual interests. With the Southern African Development Committee and the African Union chinning in to help Zimbabwe in the fight against sanctions through the Anti-sanctions’ day commemoration on 25 October, however leaders like Paul Kagame and Cyril Ramaphosa need to use the same energy to support Zimbabwe by exerting pressure on the Mnangagwa regime to improve human rights conditions and end systemic corruption for the betterment of the citizens

Since 2000, the army has increased its decision-making role throughout the whole of Zimbabwe. Outside formal procedures, military elites have broadened and deepened their power and influence over electoral politics, the mining sector, farmland, the fuel industry and the agriculture sector. The aim of this militarized shadow state is to ensure the continuity of ZANU PF as a governing party with actors who are compatible with their interests, protect their personal sources of wealth accumulation and contribute to broadening their political power and influence. These moves are disguised by the ideological persuasions of protecting national sovereignty.

The entrenchment of the military in numerous organs of state has had negative consequences for democratic politics and economic reconstruction. It is important to note, however, that the military do not operate entirely outside the central state as in collapsed or

failed states. Nevertheless, the regression of the Zimbabwean state continues apace. This necessitates a comprehensive state-wide security reform programme before Zimbabwe degenerates into a perpetual political economy of conflict, inevitably leading to state failure and collapse.

The solution is a mix of carrots and sticks—positive and negative incentives—big and small actions, short and long-term plans, as well as overt and covert means to address this situation. Sticks alone will only cause the military and the military elites who benefit from the shadow state to dig deeper even if it means sinking with the nation—and resist any efforts at democratization. Even if change were to happen through a general election, there would still be a present danger of the military reversing such democratic gains, given how fully entrenched it is in the polity.

The massive costs of corruption continue to harm the Zimbabwean economy as anticorruption methods have become corrupted themselves. Corruption is the main obstacle to sustainable development and democracy as the huge consequences have affected the functioning of the Zimbabwean economy and government institutions through distorting the fiscal policies, parallel economic policies, market regulations, and macro-economic instability. As a localized means of responding to corruption focus should be on systemic corruption risks and illicit financial flows through tightening border securities which we thought by the increased militarization of the state border security would be tightened but they are loopholes now.

Visibly there is a need to elevate anticorruption in Zimbabwe. The priority should also commensurate with the threat corruption possesses and the propensity. The use of euphemistic language has been a major way in promoting good governance to gain political support but there is no real tangible action. This calculus should change in Zimbabwe. There is need for sensational tabloids of accounts of corrupt politicians and their glamorous lifestyles. The lack of mortal objection from the political leadership is glaring as there is need for servant leadership. We need to teach the public on how wealth is moved across borders.

Narratives have affected the fight against corruption. Modernistic law enforcement is important at the airport to fight a form of strategic corruption. The need for intercessions by all stakeholders from civil society, political parties, the youth, the ruling party, academia to build national compatibility coherence and citizen agency. This forms the hallmark of a broad consensus for citizen agency to solve the national question which is cancerous corruption. demilitarization and the reinstallation of democracy in Zimbabwe Demilitarization of state institutions.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

In in understanding the nexus between the increased militarization of the state and corruption as obstacles to democracy and development. Corrupt patronage networks in Zimbabwe which have included popular figures like Tagwirei are symbolic to the opaque colossal structural problems in Zimbabwe. A selective subset of business people, politicians, securocrats and military elites dominate hegemonize decision making with little or no scrutiny. An environment shrouded with impunity is decorated in the way the government functions as information with regards to opaque deals involving business acolytes which are interlinked with government public finances remain cloaked in secrecy. The possibility of state capture is raised due to the high access of business acolytes to power, patterns of decision making in the public domain from legal, regulatory and financial have been influence for the benefit of personal interest. Proximity to the highest echelons of power in Zimbabwe in concoction to a meteoric rise leads to allegations of cronyism and corruption. Understanding corruption tactics used by business acolytes and patronage networks in Zimbabwe which are inversely incapacitating and undermining democracy, development and economic growth is an ultimate step in tackling and determining methods to counter reduce this menace. Regional Communities like SADC should forge strong regional alliances alliance which encourage groups of anti- corruption kleptocracy activist. Bolstering, emboldening security apparatus to counter the smuggling of gold, tobacco and illicit financial flows through weak transnational sophisticated straits is also key.

- Promoting constitutionalism and improving civil military relations.
- A total divorce between the military, ZANU PF the party and the state or government which have lately become indistinguishable as separate entities.
- Revisiting legal statutes that establish independent commissions with an objective of improving independency.
- Promoting legal mechanisms which protect whistle blowers like Hopewell Chin'ono should be prioritized by the government as a way of curbing corruption.
- Independence of the judiciary to proffer uncompromised justice should be ushered through sustainable financial security for judges and magistrates.
- A judiciary that is immune from executive powers of the presidium, which is synonymous with the military state is necessary to remove judicial biases that have been rising in the courts and justice system.
- Serious implementation of mechanisms that safeguard property rights which is a critical aspect to attract foreign direct investment.
- Policy consistency
- Restructuring the prosecution channels with the objective of improving agility.
- An honest practice of commissions such as ZACC with independent, not symbolic power, sufficient to enforce anticorruption laws as its mandate allows and through the courts for which an honest possible indicator would be the removal of ministers involved in corruption cases from office; currently impossible as some officials remain more powerful than institutions.
- Retransferring power back into institutions from the military and individuals who control power.
- Transactions involving natural resources and public procurement which are carried out by financial institution like the RBZ should enact customer diligence activities especially if it involves people close to power.
- The breadth of transnational corruption should be taken seriously by law enforcement agencies especially digging deep into Shell Companies in South Africa and Mauritius.
- Regional bodies like the African Union and Southern African Development Community should put advisories on the risks of doing business acolytes with corrupt

patronages in Zimbabwe highlighting the regional effects of money laundering and illicit flows of minerals and money.

- There should be prioritization and due diligence by companies involved in the mining sector in Zimbabwe with key regulations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Guiding principles which govern the mining value, supply chains. Special attention should be put on mitigating the risk of smuggling.
- To hoist and strengthen the fight against systemic corruption political will and leadership needs to be retooled towards protecting constitutionalism to ward off vulnerabilities focus on democracy
- Empowering law enforcement agencies and the ZACC through resources and democratic political backing is key in tackling transnational corruption.
- Protecting democratic institutions to strengthen the fight against corruption tactics.
- Protecting whistleblowers, investigative journalist, civil society and media investigating corruption from violence and vexatious feeble legal allegations.
- Retrospective review of the mining sector leading Priorities for dismantling Zimbabwe's kleptocracy
- External stakeholders should deploy as benchmarks. strengthening oversight and accountability
- An inquisitive probe should be made into the accusations against the Tagwirei network as an utmost precedence to avoid anecdotes of preferential treatment and selection application of the law.
- The negotiation and consequential implementation of huge businesses with key state entities still remain shrouded in shadows. In interregnum critical information which include the conditions of agreements, date, interest, size of payment and the identities of beneficiaries is concealed from the public. As a panacea to this is revenue transparency especially involving natural resources as it away of the oversight of public finances by the citizenry.
- Dovetailed deficiencies and Opacity in key economic sectors like the agriculture, fuel, transport, health and murky mining concessions come on the heels of bouts of

controversial procurement, regulatory and policy decisions suspiciously benefiting business acolytes engender depicts red flags for conceivable corruption in Zimbabwe. Therefore, and online mining cadaster portal is necessary in Zimbabwe.



FUTURE RESEARCH

The transnational dimension of corruption should receive increased attention in social inquiries and regional studies alike. Future research should explore the exportation of kleptocratic tactics and corruption from autocratic states like Russia and China. In addition, the procrustean solution to smuggling of gold and illicit financial flows is an in-depth regional cross-national analysis of the relationship between corruption and regional development to explore the loopholes used by patronage networks to siphon ideational resources.

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APPENDIX

INDEPTH SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction and Research Ethics

Hello, my name is Armstrong Mudzengerere. I am student studying a Master's Degree in Africa Studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara. I am working on my final thesis which is focusing on analyzing the nexus between the increased militarization of the state and corruption as obstacles to development and democracy.

An academic study this evidence will be employed to support advocacy actions to curb transnational corruption and kleptocracy as they are the main obstacles to sustainable development and a clean government in Zimbabwe.

To proceed with my study I am kindly asking for your assistance through participating in this exercise based on your experiences, expertise and knowledge. I would to ascertain that the information that will be obtained from this study will be confidential information. The interview will be for approximately 25-30 minutes. Furthermore, in post research data storage is one of the most essential procedures when conducting research therefore no names will be used during data analysis. Softa data protection is crucial thus data will be stored and disposed after the interview as the discussed matters will be used in the study. The study is purely academic and the findings will be shared under the auspices of anonymity.

- Do you agree to participate in this discussion? (Please tick accordingly)

Yes, I agree Verbal consent provided No, I do not agree

Optional:

Name

Position

Organization

Signature

Date

female

Male

○ **MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS:**

The study will be framed under the following principal research questions:

- Which economic sectors have expanded, are typically targeted and offer opportunities for grand corruption in Zimbabwe?
- What non pecuniary activities drive corruption in Zimbabwe?
- What are the legal and political corruption strategies tactics which spurred with the increased militarization of the Zimbabwe?
- How does economic and financial based corruption affect sustainable development in Zimbabwe?
- How do the violent and coercive based corruption tactics affect democratization in Zimbabwe?
- How do the narrative and branding based kleptocratic strategies affect development in Zimbabwe?

○ **INDEPTH SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS**

A. Introduction to the Respondent

1. Do you have an understanding of the impacts of corruption on the prospects for democratization and sustainable development in Zimbabwe?
2. What do you understand with the term militarization?
3. Can you describe for me the why public official engage in corruption?
4. Which economic sectors have expanded, are typically targeted and offer opportunities for grand corruption in Zimbabwe?

5. What role do you currently have that interacts with the Zimbabwe's economy or governance?

B. Political, Structural, Legal and Historical Issues

1. In your own view which corruption tactics exist in Zimbabwe? If so, can you please provide me the examples?
2. What non pecuniary activities drive corruption in Zimbabwe?
3. From your perspective, which government institutions from the judiciary, executive to the legislature have permeated corruption activities and tactics?
4. Which sectors of the economy are most prone to these corruption tactics and why these sectors?
5. In your view are patronage networks more prevalent and pervasive now or in the past regime?
6. Do you have knowledge on the key actors and blind spot targeted by these corruption tactics?
7. What do you think motivates these actors?
8. What role do private companies and business acolytes have in these corruption tactics?
9. Which stakeholders and groups are the adversely affected adversely by corruption?
10. What role have independent commissions played in fighting corruption?

C. SOCIAL, NARRATIVE AND BRANDING

1. Does cynicism about prospects for good governance increase the affliction of grand corruption?
2. Does anticorruption rhetoric's and message encourage corruption in Zimbabwe?
3. Have you observed any change with regards to corruption activities during the Covid 19 pandemic?
4. What role has the churches played in denouncing or accentuating corruption in Zimbabwe?

5. What is the role of citizen agency against corruption?
6. Has social media activism been effective in Zimbabwe?
7. Have development narratives translated into action?
8. What role has investigative journalism played in exposing corruption scandals?

D. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC

1. Do patronage networks have impact on economic and politics in Zimbabwe?
2. How about their impact on macroeconomic, agrarian and monetary policies?
3. To what extent is the economic crisis attributable to patronage networks and corruption tactics?
4. Is the government facing challenges in accounting the economic losses and fighting corruption tactics like smuggling?
5. Are the policy and institutional frameworks in Zimbabwe enough for fighting corruption?
6. What is the role of politicians in enabling or preventing corruption?

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To fight corruption which recommendations do you give to the government?
2. In what ways do you think the government of Zimbabwe is responding to corruption?

GENİŞ ÖZET

“Zimbabwe’de Askerileşme ile Yolsuzluk Arasındaki İlişki”

Bu sistematik çalışmanın amacı, devletin artan militarizasyonuna paralel olarak, 2017’den itibaren uygulanan yerelleştirilmiş yolsuzluk ve kleptokrat taktiklerin kapsamlı bir sınıflandırmasını ortaya koymaktır. Zimbabve’de Birinci Cumhuriyet döneminde yozlaşmanın güçlü askeri temelleri olsa da, İkinci Cumhuriyet döneminde bu yozlaşmanın devamı, dinamikleri ve iş adamlarını dahil eden evrimi, konuyu analize değer güçlü bir vaka haline getirmiştir. Bunun temel nedenlerinden biri, ikinci cumhuriyet tarafından Zimbabvelilere verilen temel taahhüdün tüm vatandaşlara fayda sağlayacak bir sosyoekonomik dönüşümün, samimi gibi görünen ve kulağa hoş gelen “yolsuzluğu temizleme” bahanesi üzerine inşa edilmiş olmasıdır. Bu vaat, vatandaşların güvenini kazanarak bir darbe hükümetinin demokratik olarak onaylanması için oyları satın almaya evrilse de, İkinci Cumhuriyet döneminde yolsuzluk birincisine kıyasla daha belirgin hale gelmiştir.

Ülkedeki sosyo-ekonomik kalkınma adımları için hayati önemdeki sektörleri zayıflatan militarizasyon ve kleptokratik yolsuzluk taktikleri arasında bir ilişki olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Eleştirel söylem analizine dayanan nitel açıklayıcı vaka çalışması yaklaşımıyla, basılı ve elektronik medya içeriği taranmıştır. Yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşmeler neticesinde, nihai sonucu devlet başarısızlığı olan bir militarizasyon-yolsuzluk bağlantısı ortaya konulmuştur. Olasılıksız örnekleme teknikleri, araştırma tasarımına ve amaçlarına uygun olarak çalışmaya dahil edilmiştir. Doküman analizi, derinlemesine görüşmeler ve gözlemler toplanan verilerin temelini oluşturmuştur.

Ülkeler kapanmazlar veya ölmezler, ancak ortadan kaybolurlar. Bundan hareketle, işlevsiz bir ekonomiden kaynaklanan tarihsel istikrarsızlıklar, kitlesel göç, çekişmeli seçimler, dünya rekoru kıran hiperenflasyon oranları ve sonu gelmeyen yolsuzluk skandalları normatif siyasi uygulamalar haline gelen istikrarsızlaştırma katmanlarını oluştururlar. Bu nedenle, çalışma, devletin artan militarizasyonu ile yerel yolsuzluk taktiklerindeki artış arasındaki kesişme noktalarını anlamada varoluşsal krizlerin önemini analiz etmiştir. Militarizasyon, Zimbabve’deki aşırı kırılganlığın önemli bir bileşeni, kaynağı

ve belirtisidir. Zimbabwe vakası, devletin süregelen kırılganlığını, yalnızca karmaşık bir kalkınma sürecinden sapma vakası olarak değil, aynı zamanda olağan sürdürülebilir kalkınma sürecini sekteye uğratan zayıflamış yönetim, açık ve örtük şiddet, yolsuzluk ve güvensizliğin farklı bir tipolojisi olarak tasvir etmektedir.

Zimbabwe'de yolsuzluk münferit bir sorun olma aşamasını geçmiş olup yerleştirilmiş taktiklerin bir sonucu olarak köklü bir sistem haline gelmiş durumdadır. Yolsuzluğun yapısal doğası, ülkedeki sektörleri ve kamu işletmelerini kapsamaktadır. Gelineen noktada, kamu ve özel sektör yolsuzluğu arasında ayırım yapmak da zorlaşmıştır. Siyasi olarak, yolsuzluğun temel formülü, rejimin dayanıklılığının artırılabilmesi için kilit destekçilerin etkili pozisyonlara yerleştirilmesi olmuştur. Çalışma, iş adamlarından ve patronaj ağlarından elde edilen ekonomik rantların, söz konusu elit kesim ve ZANU PF tarafından siyasi bir taktik olarak “Peki Şunun Hakkındacılık” (Whataboutism) ile temellendirildiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Zimbabwe’de kilit devlet kurum, kuruluş ve işletmelerinin elde tutulması, bu kurum ve kuruluşların yolsuzluk ile yağmalanmasının önünü açmıştır. İtibar aklama ve imaj yönetimi, nüfuz artırmak, prestijli hayır kurumlarına bağış yapma, emekli futbolcuları kullanma vs. yolsuzluk ile olan ilişkiyi gizlemek adına kullanılan taktiklerdir. Hazine bonoları ile finanse edilen “Tarım Planı”, Zimbabwe’de paralel bir bütçe ve makro-ekonomik dengesizlik bağlamında en büyük finansal yolsuzluk metodunu temsil etmektedir. Bu plan nedeniyle 2017 yılında 2,7 milyar ABD doları ve 2018’de ise 3,5 milyar ABD doları bütçe açığı verilmiştir. 2019 yılına kadar toplam tutar ise 6,8 milyar ABD dolarına ulaşmıştır. Artizan madenciler aracılığı ile yapılan altın kaçakçılığı da bir diğer önemli yolsuzluk taktiklerindendir. Kaçakçılığı yapılan altının büyük bir kısmı artizan ve küçük ölçekli altın madencilerinden elde edilmektedir. Yılda 1,2 milyar ABD doları değerinde altın kaçakçılığı yapılmakta ve yaklaşık 3-4 ton altın Güney Afrika gibi komşu ülkelere kaçak yollar üzerinden ulaştırılmaktadır. Bunlara ek olarak, yaklaşık 210 milyon ABD Doları değerindeki altın, resmi bir evrak kaydı olmaksızın Zimbabwe'den Dubai'ye kaçırılmıştır.

Özetle, yeni dönemin ekonomik büyümeyi teşvik etme kapasitesine sahip güçlü devlet kurumları oluşturmakta başarısız olduğunu gözlemlemiştir. Ordu, sivil anlaşmazlıkları çözmek ve iktidarı elde tutmak için araçsallaştırılmıştır. Ordu, hukukun kendisi haline geldiği için söz konusu durum idari bir yalıtım olarak tanımlanabilir. Keyfi tutuklamalar, tecavüz, adam kaçırmaya ve ağır insan hakları ihlalleri yönetim kültürü haline gelmiş ve aktivistler ile hükümet karşıtlarınca eleştirilmiştir. Siyasi kutuplaşma, istikrarsızlığa neden olmuş ve finansal kaynaklar da dahil olmak üzere kalkınmaya destek verebilecek uluslararası entegrasyon şansını tehdit etmiştir. Çalışma, hukuki yaptırımların güçlendirilmesini ve yolsuzlukları araştıran gazetecilerin ve sivil toplumun şiddet ve asılsız yasal iddialara karşı korunmasını önermektedir. Politika tutarlılığı ve yolsuzluğu kovuşturan kanalların yeniden yapılandırılması, yolsuzlukla mücadelede çevikliğin artırılmasında kilit bir hedef olmalıdır. Bu sistemsel sorunu çözebilmek için ve olası zayıflıkları önlemek için siyasi iradenin ülkede anayasanın üstünlüğünü korumaya yönelik yeni araçlarla yeniden donatılması gerekmektedir.