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**BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: A
CASE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM**

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Master of Art

Supervisor

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I hereby declare that all information/data presented in this graduation project has been obtained in full accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare all unoriginal materials and conclusions have been cited in the text and all references mentioned in the Reference List have been cited in the text, and vice versa as required by the above mentioned rules and conduct.

Osagwereme Martins AKOWE



DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Almighty God who has been faithful to me from the start of my program to this final moment, and to my wife Mrs Edith Akowe who has been instrumental through her unwavering support, making sure I see my program through to the end, my uncle, Chief Gabriel Iruolaje for his support and encouragement, and also to my brothers and sisters and my friends for believing in me, even when no one believed.



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ABSTRACT

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

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The Boko Haram insurgency has been a devastating conflict in terms of loss of lives, property and downfall of economic activity in Nigeria. Indeed, the Boko Haram Conflict has not only adversely affected the most populous country in Africa but affected all countries in the Chad Basin. Religious extremism has been identified as one of the factors behind the Boko Haram Sect but there is a dearth of quality research on that subject. Many other studies have explored the social and political factors behind the sect. This research has drawn a nexus between the activities of Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria to religious Extremism, as well as some remote social and political factors that have contributed to the rise of the sect.

The continuing terror being visited in several areas of Northern Nigeria and some other West African countries has necessitated the need of a probe into the root cause and factors influencing the growth of the sect. This is geared towards finding a sustainable solution to the conflict and similar conflicts that may want to arise in future. The research methodology deployed by the researcher includes qualitative and doctrinal methods.

The research is in 4 chapters and it explores the different conceptions of Terrorism, insurgency and religious extremism and how they can be used to explain the nature of Boko Haram's operations. In conclusion, the research recommends that Nigeria will need to address several issues ranging from economic challenges, as well as getting external support in fighting the Boko Haram insurgents.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Insurgency, Terrorism, Extremism, Nigeria

ÖZET

NİJERYA'DA BOKO HARAM İSYANI: DİNİ AŞIRICILIK ÜZERİNE BİR VAKA ÇALIŞMASI

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Boko Haram Ayaklanması'nın özeti, Nijerya'da can, mal kaybı ve ekonomik aktivitenin çöküşü açısından yıkıcı bir çatışma olmuştur. Nitekim Boko Haram Çatışması yalnızca Afrika'nın en kalabalık ülkesini değil, Çad Havzası'ndaki tüm ülkeleri de olumsuz etkilemiştir. Boko Haram örgütünün arkasındaki faktörlerden biri olarak dini Aşırılık olarak tespit edilmiş, ancak bu konuda düzgün araştırmalar sonucunda bir ölümden bahsedebiliriz. Diğer birçok araştırma, bu örgütün arkasındaki sosyal ve politik faktörleri araştırmıştır. Bu araştırma, Nijerya'daki Boko Haram isyancılarının dini Aşırılık faaliyetleri ile örgütün yükselişine katkıda bulunan bazı uzak sosyal ve politik faktörler arasında bir bağlantı kurmuştur. Kuzey Nijerya'nın çeşitli bölgelerinde ve diğer bazı Batı Afrika ülkelerinde bu Terör örgütünün ziyaret edilmeye devam edilmesi, örgütün büyümesini etkileyen asıl neden ve faktörlerin araştırılması ihtiyacını zorunlu kılmıştır. Bu, gelecekte ortaya çıkabilecek çatışma ve diğer benzeri savaşa temelli ve kesin bir çözüm bulmaya yöneliktir. Oradaki araştırmacı tarafından uygulanan araştırma metodolojisi, nitelikli ve öğretisel yöntemleri içermektedir. Araştırma dört bölümden oluşmaktadır: Farklı Terörizm, Ayaklanma ve dini Aşırılık kavramlarını, bunların Boko Haram'ın Terör faaliyetlerinin asıl maksadını açıklamakta nasıl kullanılabileceği araştırılıyor. Sonuç olarak; araştırma, Nijerya'nın Boko Haram isyancılarıyla mücadele etmede dış destek almanın yanı sıra, ekonomik sorunlar ile çeşitli sorunları ele alması gerekeceğini öngörmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Boko Haram, Ayaklanma, Terör, Aşırıcılık, Nijerya

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Boko Haram operations in Nigeria are focused mainly in the northern region, particularly in Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi and Yobe states of Nigeria. Recently, Boko Haram has advanced its movement of terror and has extended its operations to Kano State and also some parts of the Middle Belt region, especially the areas between the predominantly Islamic Northern part of Nigeria and the predominantly Christian Southern part of the Country. The Boko Haram terrorist organization started in Nigeria in 2009, when there was a clash in Borno State. Gradually, the organization has expanded its network to other states in the country such as Adamawa, Bauchi, Yobe and Kano States.

Nigeria has been made most noticeably awful by the various sorts of government following the introduction of majority rule administration in 1999. These adjustments range from ethnic dilemma, youth irritability to strict clash and revolts to flagrant psychological warfare. (Orhero, 2015). The result of these instances of brutality has radically intruded the public improvement for the most part.

Boko Haram, formally called “*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda' Awati – Jihad*” is a Jihadist fanatic gathering situated in north eastern Nigeria, additionally usable in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon (Walker, 2012). The gathering achieved themselves the name because of its intense enmity to anything western, which it sees as conflicting with Muslims' regulations. (Okemi, 2013). The expression, "Boko Haram" is an association of two Hausa-Arabic words signifying "western training is prohibited" (Ottuh and Idjakpo, 2010: p.95).

The defiance in north-eastern Nigeria, which initially appeared as religious fanaticism, ventured into full-scale psychological oppression/terrorism through worldwide ties and unions, making it a generally troublesome issue for the Nigerian government to manage. What began around 2002 in the country's distant north-eastern geo-political area as a little matter has become a public shame and has collected global consideration. The appearance of the death group, whose exercises were accepted to be a stressing propensity in 2009, has proceeded with a line of dread in numerous pieces of the country. (Agomuo, 2011). It is critical to reference that Boko Haram is a radical Islamist bunch that looks to impose sharia law in the northern states of Nigeria and past. The group is the most recent appearance of

Islamic fanaticism in northern Nigeria of extremist adaptations of Islam like Al-Qaeda, Ashabaab, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) among others, reflexes of which have unleashed destruction in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Turkey and Kenya; no big surprise the gathering has been named by certain individuals as a "Nigerian Taliban" (Ottuh and Idjakpo, 2010: p.95).

The assessment of the Boko Haram revolt is important to seeing how religious, social and political components consolidate to aggravate the pace of uprising. This research seeks to talk about the various zones of insurrection utilizing the fear exercises of the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria as a focal point of study.

Insurgencies have happened in various manners across the world. The Boko Haram insurrection has been a bloody socio-political clash that has unfavorably influenced the advancement in Nigeria. There are some principal ideas that have been utilized by scholars and security specialists to underscore the insurrection issue. It is imperative to appreciate the premise of a portion of these ideas that will be completely examined in this examination.

Roberts (2009) characterized insurgency as a revolt against an established position, when those participating are not perceived as belligerents. Morris (2005) seems to vary marginally on that by calling attention to the fact that not all revolts are insurgencies. There have been numerous instances of peaceful ones, utilizing civil obstruction such as the removal of Philippines' President Marcos during the People Power Revolution in the 1980s and the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 that toppled the government of President Hosni Mubarak. Kermit (2001) clarifies that where a revolt takes arms, such may not be considered as a rebellion if there is a condition of belligerency between at least a sovereign state and the radical powers. For instance, during the American Civil War, the warships belonging to the confederated States of America were accorded similar rights as the warships belonging to the United States at unfamiliar ports because as at the time, the Confederate States were not yet regarded as a sovereign state but as a combative force (Metz, 2007).

The utilization of the term "insurgency" perceives the socio-political inspiration of the individuals that take an interest in it, while the expression "brigandry" involves no political force (Goldstein, 2003). On the off chance that an uprising has minor support, taking the

individuals who keep on opposing towards the finish of an armed clash when the majority of their partners and the individuals who partake as scoundrels/brigands (North, 2008).

There are numerous international law and principles of war. However, as Nagl (2006) noted, unlike other areas covered by international law, there is no proper codification on the distinction between “insurgency” and “belligerency”. Nagl ventured two reasons for this lack of proper codification. Firstly, it is elementary knowledge that international law ordinarily does not intrude on matters that are entirely the within the internal affairs of a sovereign state (though it must be noted that contemporary developments such as the “responsibility to protect” has continuously subverted this traditional method). Secondly, there was a controversy between the Great Power in the Hague meeting of 1899, who regarded francstireur as unlawful fighting for capture and smaller states which claimed that they must be considered as lawful fighters (Nagl, 2006: p.21). The U.S. Defense Department (2007) describes insurgency as "an orchestrated effort to overthrow the constitutional government by using subversive and armed conflicts" (p.205). A structure including both insurgency and counter-insurgency is provided in the US Counter-insurgency Field Manual (2007). According to Grau (2004), these concepts provide sufficient basis for discussion, however they fail to adequately illustrate a crucial paradox: although insurgency and counterinsurgency are both sides of the phenomenon referred to as “civil war or internal war”, they are markedly diverse types of operations. In a wide category of violence, known as unconventional warfare, the potential insurgency and counterinsurgency are enclosed.

Ticehurst (1997) commented on the concept of rebellion by the US State Defense Department, explaining that it did not represent conflict morality or different governmental and rebel viewpoints. Rather, it focuses on the operational facets of the kind of actions undertaken by both the rebels and the counter-rebels.

According to Anderson (2007), every insurgency includes terrorism; he notes that there is no common concept of terrorism. However, its definition is not in international law, the United Nations (UN) has many working definitions, and these include one drafted by Alex (2002) for United Nations Policy Working Group on Terrorism and the United Nations. In its 2002 Report to the United Nation’s Secretary-General, the operational group stated that:

“It is intended to cause emotional and deadly harm to citizens and to conceive of an environment of fear towards a political or ideological purpose (whether irreligious or religious); it is an unlawful act, but it is more than just criminality and without asking for a detailed description of terrorism, it would be helpful to outline some of the vast features of the singularity. Terrorism is, in most cases, supported by the political elite. We need to consider its political dynamics in order to understand the issue of terrorism and its fundamental crime and psychology, and the United Nations needs to discuss all sides of this equation” (Alex, 2002: p.3).

Apart from the earlier discussed conflict between the depiction of “insurgency” and “belligerency”, there is another set of conflicting terms often used interchangeably – “insurgency” and “terrorism”. Michael F. Morris in his winning essay at the 24th Annual United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest, put it as follows:

“[Pure terrorist group] can follow political, even revolutionary agendas, but their violence replaces rather than complements the political agenda. Their convert wing is carrying out assaults on military forces with techniques such as airstrikes and ambushes, as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause intentional civilian casualties”(Morris, 2005, p.26)

It is submitted that the usage or non-use of terror does not describe insurgency, but that the organizational features have historically provided the means to conflate the two terms. Insurgencies usually field military powers in magnitudes greater than those of terrorist organizations (Morris, 2005: p.27). As Morris (2005) postulated, an insurgent group can have political intent and can even be organized in a manner that enable them to provide social services. Often, these insurgent groups have an open, and sometimes legal political wing.

Nigeria, as a country with a population of over 180 million people across 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) divided into 774 (seven hundred and seventy-four) local government areas, is made up of people from different ethnic and religious persuasion (Oyeniyi, 2012). Nigeria's political, economic, social and religious tendencies all add to the country's complexity as a nation state. Since independence, Nigeria has experienced several religious and ethnic crises of varying degrees and intensity (Gilbert, 2013). In the face of such

political and economic crises, successive Nigerian governments have been chastised, either by Muslim or Christian believers, when they have not been favoured. (Awortu, 2015: pp. 213).

Notably, Fall (1994) considers terrorism to be a central component of the first three stages of revolutionary warfare. Many insurgency models identify that full-fledged acts of terrorism widen the security chasm. Carlos Marighella, a Marxist guerrilla theoretician has explicitly proposed acts of terror as a way of achieving the concept of opening up the security loopholes.

From independence to the present, insurgency in Nigeria has come in different colors, from civil war to sectarian unrest, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), the Niger-Delta militants, the Fulani herdsmen attacks, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Boko Haram attacks (Agomuo, 2011). Previous insurgencies in Nigeria have varied in scale, complexity and severity, but Boko Haram stands out because they are a faceless community with contradictory ideologies.

In 2009, the government cracked down on its members but this has not stopped its subsequent evolution, its increasing frequency, and the geographical scope of its attack, indicating that the group has now grown past its original spheres of activity and religious composition and now includes criminal elements, vagabonds, discontented politicians and not just the Islamic extremists who made up its fold at inception (Okemi, 2013: p.240).

Jinkai (2015) and the Indigenous of Numa in Adamawa state say that Boko Haram is currently led by Abubakar Shekau and estimates that there are between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters in the group (Jinkai, interviewed by this researcher, 6th of June, 2015). According to Morgan (2015), the group originally had ties to al-Qaeda, but in 2014, Boko Haram voiced its support for ISIL - the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (popularly known today as ISIS) and eventually declared its formal allegiance to ISIS in March 2015.

In reviewing the success of Boko Haram, it is noteworthy that, following its formation in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalism led to a major ferocious and violent rebellion in July 2009. This ultimately led to the arrest, detention and the eventual execution of Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram leader.

After Yusuf's death, Boko Haram announced its sudden revival by organizing a mass jail break in September 2010. This was quickly followed by increasing coordinated destructions and attacks primarily on indulgent targets. In 2011, these attacks advanced to 2011 to suicide bombings of federal offices and government buildings such as the Police Headquarters and the United Nations Office in FCT, Abuja.

The spate of these attacks especially in 2012, led the Government to declare a state of emergency over some Northern States, this was eventually expanded to include the entire north-east of Nigeria in the following year. This also led to a marked rise in violations of human rights by both security forces and the militant terror groups. According to Newman (2013), Boko Haram killed over 13,000 civilians between 2009 and 2015, including about 10,000 civilians in 2014, mostly in north-eastern Nigeria. Michelle and Haruna (2015) argue profoundly that over 1.5 million Nigerians have been displaced from their homes and location by the resulting violence.

Gilbert (2014) has argued that the ongoing Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria's North-East geopolitical region, which started as sectary religious activity, has developed into an unrest with worldwide links and connections, making it difficult for the government of Nigeria to quell. The rise of a fundamentalist Islamic sect continues to lead to the flight of the safety and protection of the majority of Nigerians living in the North East, particularly Christians (Nwakaudu, 2012: p.5).

Since the beginning of the terrorist actions of the sect, they have used a number of methods to terrorize the public. Most northern Nigerian states have been affected, but Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi, FCT (Abuja), Kano, Yobe and Plateau states have been the hardest hit. (Nwakaudu, 2012: p.6). Okemi (2013) argues that in Nigeria, the group is often viewed as a religious sect, partly because of the ambiguity of its classification or designation or the fear that the group has generated. For example, when US President Barack Obama called a terrorist group, Nigerian President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan replied to his comment by saying that the members were not terrorists (Chothia, 2012). The media have called the group a cult, possibly out of fear, in particular the assassination of a television journalist (Channels Television News, 4 May 2012) and the bombing of media houses (Thisday, June 7th, 2012: p.10). Farouk (2012) correctly argues that Boko Haram was founded as an Islamic group; but has over time become a sect because of its own beliefs or practices that distinguished it from

pure Islam. Okemi (2013: p.1) is often associated with the fact that the group birthed around 2002 as a religious sect but has gradually developed into a full blown terrorist organization, especially through its implementation and deployment of terror tactics. The question as to when it developed into a terror organization and whether there is a consensus among academics as to when the members descended into extremism remains a question.

The dynamics of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect can also be said to have been strongly influenced by institutional vulnerabilities and factionalized political elitism in some states. In his work on the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the political elites (Wisdom, 2018), he attributed the rise of the sect to four conjunctive but gradual proposals; the defense of sect identity at the sub-national level as an implication of factional politics at the national level; an increase in the relevance of sect identity due to the importance attributed to them by political groups; identity groups, upon gaining political relevance, makes extremist demands sparking antagonism among the ruling political elites; and a partial democracy is installed which cannot adequately stem the rise of fundamentalist insurgencies leading to fractionalization along identity lines.

On the part of Nigeria's security forces, which are to defend the counter-insurgency against Boko Haram. Onuoh (2014) believes that the spate of corruption among members of the security forces and the deplorable state of human rights abuses have negatively impacted on the efforts to put an end to the unrest. Since 2009, Boko Haram has kidnapped over 500 people including men, women and children. Notable among the abduction embarked on by the sect is the well reported abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014. By August 2014, 650,000 people had left the war zone, more than 200,000 since May, and 1.5 million by the end of the year. (Onuoh, 2014, p. 8). These figures and estimates add up to the counter- development narrative attributed to the activities of the sect.

Due to an entrenched culture of official corruption, the Nigerian army was initially ineffective in fighting the insurgency. This situation led to the militants taking charge and control of territories and swath area of lands around Borno State since mid-2014. By January 2015, the terrorists control an estimated 50,000 square kilometers (50,000 square miles) in Borno State, but have till date been unable to seize Maiduguri, the state capital, where the group was originally based (Aliyu, 2014).

This review has shown the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa. Having accessed and reviewed several materials on the topic of the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria and the analysis of the isolated effect of religious extremism on the rise of insurgency in Nigeria, it is clear that there is a lack of research that this work seeks to resolve. In later parts, this review will concentrate on how religious extremism as a major factor in the Boko Haram insurgency has affected the rise in violence and how the Nigerian government can react appropriately through other case studies.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

The Boko Haram insurgency has been a destructive war in terms of the loss of life, property and economic activity in Nigeria. Indeed, the Boko Haram conflict not only adversely affected the most populated black nation in the world and in Africa, but has also affected all the countries located in the Chad Basin.

The activities and operations of the Boko Haram Sect have been primarily attributed to religious extremism, but there is a lack of quality research on this topic. It is also notable that, besides religious extremism, certain external factors have led to the rise of jihadist. This research will therefore not only seek to link the activities and operations of the Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria to religious extremism, but will also draw on some remote features that have led to the gradual rise of the sect. The research questions were set out below

1. How did the Boko Haram sect rise to such prominence over the years?
2. How has religious extremism contributed to the rise of Boko Haram armed conflict in Nigeria?
3. What other factors influenced the growth and spread of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria?
4. What are the resultant impacts of the Boko Haram Insurgence on National development?
5. Could religion-driven efforts be sufficient to address the insurgence?

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Continued terror in different parts of the northern states in Nigeria and some other West African countries has necessitated the need for an investigation into the root cause and factors

affecting the growth of the sect. This is aimed at seeking a permanent solution to the conflict and similar conflicts that could occur in the future.

This thesis would also investigate the relationship between faith, religious extremism and the increase in rebellion and armed conflict of the Boko Haram sect over the years. Over time, the jihadist party has been associated with the Islamic faith and has in reality sought to lay the foundations for their actions from the Quran and other Islamic textual sources. But the Islamic clerics have come out to decry that stance. This study therefore examines the emerging questions as to the nexus and veracity of the same; and seeks to demonstrate how religious extremism is the root cause.

The Research Objectives are:

1. To critically examine the source of Nigeria's Boko Haram insurgency;
2. To evaluate the relationship between religion, religious extremism and the rise of armed conflict instigated by the Boko Haram Sect in Nigeria;
3. To analyze factors contributing to the rise and sustenance of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria;
4. To identify the implications of the insurgency on National development.

1.4 RESEARCH SCOPE

The scope of this research is limited to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

The methodology that will be deployed by the researcher includes qualitative and doctrinal methods. The research will consult official documents containing policies and plans on the subject matter. The research will also utilize the different literature that has been developed on the subject matter.

2. THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

For many nations, terrorism has become one of the most critical global security challenges. From 1970 to 2015, the Global Terrorism Database registered more than 150,000 terrorist events worldwide. All through the era of civilizations, there has always been one form of terrorism or the other. Analyzing the increase in the intensity and frequency of terrorism shows that it became more important in the 1960s and became a major global problem (Rapoport, 1984). Today, terrorists continue to use terrorism as a means of political speech and this has taken on different magnitudes by integrating transcontinental elements and thus generating what Jenkins (1975) defined as a "new mode of conflict" (p.1).

The word terror is best viewed from a point of view of the individual depicted. With the victims of terrorism, the perpetrator is a criminal, and for the perpetrator, terrorism is an act of reform or improvement. In this regard, Onwudiwe (2001) reported that some of the popular phrases adopted by researchers in describing terrorism includes "today's terrorist is tomorrow's freedom fighter," "terrorism to some is heroism to others," "and one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist" (p.28)

The operationalization of terrorism, as well as the idea of "terrorism," has been a difficult and fascinating subject for criminal justice scholars and practitioners. Determining whether terrorism is a true or imagined concept has sparked discussion for decades. This leads to the general meaning of terrorism which is yet to be established because the concept is theorized by different persons (Onwudiwe, 2001; Weinberg, 2005; Schmid & Jongman).

2.1 CONTROVERSIES AROUND THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

Terrorism has been a difficult term to learn from and has been a subject of controversy in academia and policy for many years now. Although some academics and experts have preferred to work with open definitions, others have described different types of definitions, all of which explore and seek to include several elements that explain the sense of terrorism.

2.1.1 Controversy in defining terrorism

One of the significant difficulties in describing “terrorism” is in deciding when the usage of violence (by whom, directed at whom, in what form and for what purposes) is valid; as a result, the current concept of terrorism is integrally contentious. Furthermore, both state and non-state groups have a history of using violence to achieve political goals. Most of the descriptions in use have been written by government-affiliated agencies and are systematically distorted in order to ensure that governments and their agencies are excluded from the classification. The current classification of "criminal" is extremely pejorative as it means a lack or absence of morality and legitimacy. In fact, so-called "terrorism" or "terrorism" actions are mostly strategies performed by the participants as part of a broader military or strategic agenda.

Various academics, assessors and specialists in criminal justice have studied the definition of terrorism in a variety of ways. (Onwudiwe, 2001; Weinberg, 2005; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Dyson, 2012; Poland, 2011). "Definition and conceptualization is generally a strictly theoretical concern (Boaz, 2002) – a framework for scholars to develop an acceptable set of criteria for the study they wish to pursue" (p.290). As a consequence, different viewpoints on the definition of terrorism are discussed below. In spite of the difficulties in defining the term, some scholars have provided strict definitions. For example, Weinberg (2005) observes terrorism as "a snare and an illusion, a way of diverting public attention from the failings of Western governments, especially the United States and the United Kingdom" (p. 1). Others have characterized terrorism as people's cogent and impartial opposition to state terrorism, imperialism, liberalism, mercantilism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and domination. (Herman and O'Sullivan, 1989). To put it another way, a rational and excusable answer to injustice; Weinberg (2005) exposed how terrorism has developed into a violent presence that negatively impacts on government policies and military operations, individual security and peaceful life in different countries. In addition, Weinberg described terrorism as "the deliberate development and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change" (p.3). As has already been said, the notion of terrorism is based on marking, specifically, who is labeled what and by whom. The perpetrators of such an act are deemed by the government to be terrorists, but supporters and loyalists consider them to

be freedom fighters. This research work defines terrorism in the following parts on the basis of the three key points of view.

2.1.2 The prevalence of terrorism

The number of terrorist-related deaths rose almost tenfold from 3,361 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014, with the rate of increase likely increasing by 61 per cent from 2012 to 2013 and 80 per cent from 2013 to 2014. On the other hand, the number of people injured is just a small proportion (7.5 per cent) of the overall number of people killed each year in murders (over 437,000). It is noted that the US\$52.9 billion projected economic costs of terrorism in 2014 amounted to just 3% of the economic costs of murder and violent crime. Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan accounted for about 78 percent of 'terrorist' deaths in 2014, and more than 80 percent of those in 2013, owing to ongoing violent war. Terrorism is linked to a variety of other crimes. Between 1989 and 2014, 92 percent of terrorist attacks happened in countries where there is a prevalent sense of governmental and institutional political aggression, while 88 percent of attacks by terrorist occurred in countries with violent conflicts. As a result of unprecedented levels of violence and the largest number of wars since 2000, terrorism could have escalated dramatically in 2013 or 2014 as just 0.6% of terrorist attacks occurred in countries where there was no ongoing war or political terror. The connection between terrorism and violent crime, as well as state and non-state terror, indicates that it might be more fitting to classify terrorism as a type of violent conflict instead of analyzing state and non-state terror separately. Despite the fact that terrorist incidents and casualties are concentrated in few countries, there has been an increase in the number of countries undergoing terrorist activities. In 2014, terrorist attacks occurred in 93 different countries and 11 countries reported the death of over 500 people, notwithstanding that the many countries in the world were free of terrorism-related deaths. Just a small number of terrorist acts occurred in the West, with the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe accounting for only 0.5 percent of terrorism-related deaths in the last 15 (fifteen) years, and

2.6 percent if September 11 victims are included. Individuals were responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks in the West. These individuals were fueled by different causative factors such as anti-government sentiment right-wing populism, political extremism, nationalism e.t.c and not Islamic extremism, were responsible for 80% of deaths in the nine years preceding 2014.

2.1.3 Context and causes of terrorism

Outsiders may not realize it, but terrorists' behavior is usually self-consistent and logical. As a consequence, it is beneficial to bear in mind the factors that increase the risk of terrorist acts being committed. The following are some of the hypotheses about the motives or causes of terrorism:

- Sociological hypotheses focused on the social standing of the offenders.
- Psychological reasons for why people enter terrorist groups must also be considered.
- The analysis of the relationship between perpetrators and those in positions of power was central to conflict theory explanations.
- Ideological justifications based on various agendas and/or philosophies.
- Theories based on media theory, with terrorism seen as a means of communication.
- Poverty and economic disparity within a society.
- Shifts in social and/or political circumstances, as well as volatility.
- Identities and/or cultural clashes.

The discourses about the bases of terrorism often focus on whether global terrorism is motivated by external or internal factors. Personal, societal, cultural, and government variables are all internal factors. External influences include other countries' foreign policies, developments in global military dispersion, telecommunications expansion, and an uneven circulation of affluence and power. Furthermore, since both internal and external factors can influence the causes, it is a good idea to research the relative significance of the various types of factors.

There are also distinctions between various theories that espouse the idea that terrorism is a moral decision to wage an intentional campaign of violence beyond the agreed-upon rules of warfare, such as colonialism, poverty, discrimination ethnic exclusion etc. and the concept that terrorism is an unethical choice to wage a campaign of violence beyond the agreed-upon rules of warfare, such as poverty, colonialism, racial alienation, and persecution. Arguably, terrorist attacks are executed by individuals with little power and are fueled principally by monetary and material support from government guarantors, as well as propaganda support. Some terrorist organizations obtain backing from external states, but not all, and some terrorist organizations will fail to survive without it. Several governments of different political

colors have supported and abetted so-called "terrorist" groups. This, however, does not excuse labeling those countries as "terrorists" or using this classification to justify war on them.

The key factors that have been shown to have a direct relationship with terrorism can be divided into three categories:

- Tensions amongst cultural, linguistic and religious groups, such as a lack of intergroup interrelation, social aggression, group protests, or denominational tensions.
- State-sanctioned brutality, such as extrajudicial executions, political terror, conflict-related deaths, violations of corporeal integrity rights, and continuing struggle.
- Some other forms of violence, such as guerilla warfare, organized group and vicious crime.

Policymakers have linked poverty to terrorism on a regular basis, but the evidence is mixed. Economic discrimination against minorities, on the other hand, has been shown to increase the probability and number of domestic terrorist events. There is a concave relationship between economic development and the absence of territorial disputes. (Non-state) extremism was found to be more prevalent in democracies between 1975 and 1997, at the very least. Although there are recommendations predicating this on rivalry faced intergroup fueled by political competition, the other plausible justification is that for terrorism to have an effect, a certain appearance of liberty is needed. As opposed to the amount of fear related with state terrorism, terrorist activity by non-state organizations may have marginal effects in highly authoritarian states. However, there is a link between state and non-state terrorism, as previously stated. More so, as majority of terrorist attacks now take place in five countries that aren't very democratic, terrorism and democracy are no longer related. Certain, although still not definitive, statistical evidence suggests that dishonor (probably linked to gender roles) is an issue, and that economic disparity and humiliation may also be associated. While it is evident that women are becoming more and more involved in terrorism, this remains mainly a male activity. Nevertheless, there appears to be a dearth of investigation on the creation of gender roles, especially masculinity, as well as the role of masculinity's construction and expectations in a given context, there is also absence of significant enquiry into how this constructed masculinity interact with humiliation, economic discrimination and other factors in the creation of terrorism and also in the motivation for individuals to participate in it.

Additional related factor that may lead to terrorist acts but need more evidence include:

1. Failure or a sluggish or inadequate answer to other approaches, as well as desperation due to the issue's (perceived) significance.
2. Exclusion from policymaking processes and access to decision-makers, as well as marginalization, inequality, and social exclusion.
3. Instrumentalization to delegate their interests and privileges, or alternatively the removal of the rights, dehumanization or even demonism of such people, thus justifying some kind of violence.
4. Foreign or internal interests strongly opposed to peaceful change, because their influence and control will be weakened as well as extremist organizations being sponsored and financed.

Also in countries where terrorist attacks are common, they occur as isolated incidents or groups of incidents. This suggests that a terrorist act(s) must be preceded by a trigger case. The way the world reacts to these terrorist attacks will be determined by a several factors such as the vested interest of individuals, power blocs and the extant political regime.

- **Issue:** This involves political, ideological, religious or other problems and causes.
- **Context:** context of violent conflict, animosity among various groups, violence supported by the State and infringement of rights to physical integrity and other types of violence.
- **Trigger:** trigger event(s) or circumstances, such as massacres and the implementation of new laws of oppression, worsening the situation and making meaningful change, it is increasingly difficult to resolve issues or promote the cause.

This model is useful for demonstrating and comprehending the causes that contribute to terrorist attacks. The first two factors represent an unstable situation that could lead to terrorist activities, with the third factor serving as the "spark" or "last straw." The model also establishes a connection between attacks by terrorists and other types of aggression, such as war.

2.1.4 Individual and collective responsibilities

Typically, terrorism describes innocence as the absence or lack of complicity in the topic of concern. Nevertheless, there exist questions of individual and collective responsibility as well. In certain instances, terrorists can hold clusters in a specific state while everyone is collectively held accountable for injustices, however, retaliation cannot always be seen as a reason for terrorism. Conversely, defense against a tyrannical state may involve some kind of irruption on some of its members, even if their hands are clean in the oppression of the state. A difference can be established between distributive and non-distributive reciprocal obligations. Accountability for the consequences of decisions is the product of distributive responsibility, whereas non-distributive responsibility is not the result. Members of the government or municipal council, for example, bear the distributive responsibility for the repercussions of the decisions they make, while the inhabitants of the country or town do not. In certain cases, it is also argued that individuals are liable for acts they have not taken, such as failing to condemn injustices or trying to remedy them. There are also questions as to whether or not ordinary people are taking advantage of specific injustices. Some variables, including individual's personal circumstances and the level of risk, depend on the best way to carry out this duty in practice. However, it does not seem irrational to hold individuals, at least in part, responsible for the injustices committed in their name by their governments that they may benefit from. This raises the question of whether communal responsibility amounts to the same thing as communal guilt, it also questions if it is ethically justifiable to penalize individuals who are described as having collective responsibility, primarily for failing to prevent injustice.

2.2 TERRORISM DEFINED BY VARIOUS ACTORS/SECTORS

Despite the fact that revolutionary groups during the colonial period such as the Indian Independence Movement, Israel's freedom fighters, and the National Liberation Front sought to free themselves, their lands and their people from the control of the intercontinental empires of the day, does the illegal use of violence in the definition qualify them as terrorists? (Weinberg, 2005). As a result, despite the fact that the law classifies them as terrorists, the public views those terrorists as freedom fighters because they are fighting for liberty. Yassir Arafat (as quoted in Hoffman, 1999), once stated that

“the distinction between a revolutionary and a terrorist lies in the justification that everybody battles”. Thus, anyone who fights for the independence and liberation of his land from trespassers, immigrants, and colonialists cannot be considered a terrorist. (p. 26).

Terrorism exist in a violent form in which terrorists attempt to threaten and actually do threaten, instill fear, and disrupt the fabric of civilization and governments in order to compel them meet up with their demands. According to Makinda (2002) “terrorism maims and kills innocent people, undermines certainty in social activities, destroys property, and undermines the norms, rules, and institutions during which security is embedded” (p. 23). To Weinberg (2005), the aim of terrorism, is to scare, attract attention, generate an overreaction by powers that be, and preserve discipline within the terrorist group.

Notwithstanding the definitions above, the concept of terrorism isn't intrinsically monolithic. As Mitchell (1991) noted, there are several differences such as:

- a. the difference between state and non-state (sectarian) terrorism,
- b. domestic terrorism (e.g., the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City) and international terrorism such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States of America by al-Qaeda;
- c. repressive and criminal terrorism;
- d. religious-political terrorism (e.g., Boko Haram in Nigeria);
- e. single-issue terrorism (e.g., the Animal Liberation Front in the United States); and other conceptual differences (Mitchell, 1991).

2.2.1 International perspectives

On the global stage, numerous organizations have described terrorism as a set of behaviors that endorse the core characteristics of terrorism. Despite the lack of globally or generally acceptable definitions, international bodies' legal definitions, such as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006, the UK and a few European countries have given what may be stated as an "agreement" on the concept of terrorism.

(Walter, 2003). On December 9, 1994, the United Nations General Assembly an organ of the United Nations (UN) passed Resolution 49/60 tagged "Measures to Eliminate Terrorism,". The resolution describes terrorism as follows:

“Irrespective of the political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other factors that may be used to validate them, criminal acts planned or calculated to instill fear on a group of people, or a single person for political purposes are unjustifiable in either case.”

There is still no consensus among UN Member States on what constitutes terrorism, which has hindered substantive international countermeasures. A terminological agreement would be needed for a single all-inclusive convention on terrorism, which some countries prefer to the existing 12 piecemeal conventions and protocols. Many skeptics have observed that one country's "terrorist" is another country's "liberation warrior."

The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism ratified by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior, and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, in Cairo, Egypt is another international instrument that ventures to describe terrorism. In the convention terror was defined as "any action or threat of violence, irrespective of its motive or intention, which is to promote a personal or collective criminal agenda and seeks to cause people's panic, to cause them fear, or to jeopardize their lives, freedom or protection or to cause environmental or public-private harm or to seek to do so.”

2.2.1.1 United nations

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2004 sets out terrorist acts as “crimes against civilians committed in order to cause death or serious corporeal injury or to take hostages, in order to impress a state of terror within the general public or during a cluster of persons or individuals, to intimidate people or to compel a government or a world organization”. On St Patrick's Day 2005, a United Nations panel identified terrorism as any act “intended to kill or seriously harm citizens and/or non-combatants in order to threaten or force a government or international body to commit or abstain from attacks.”

2.2.1.2 European union

In Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, the European Union defined terrorism for legal and official purposes (2002). The article provides that terrorist offenses are specific crime which began during an inventory of large crimes against people and assets that, due to their character or background, could seriously harm a country or a world organization, when committed in order: to intimidate seriously a population; to injure seriously a country or world organization; or to compete unduly; Severe destabilization or destruction of a nation or a world organization's basic political, legislative, economic or social structures.

2.2.1.3 United kingdom

The UK's Terrorism Act 2000 describes terrorism as an act "seriously intended to interfere with or to disrupt an electronic system." This implies that an act of violence is not a requirement for terrorism to be established.

2.2.1.4 United states

The law that provides specific definition of terrorism in the United States is the Federal Criminal Code. Terrorism is specified in Title 18 of the US Code, which also contains a number of associated crimes. Section 2331 of Chapter 113(B) defines terrorism as: "...activities that involve violent... or life-threatening acts... that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and... appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and...(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States..."

Terrorist acts under the US Patriot Act of 2001 include:

- Threatening, conspiring, or attempting to hijack flights, vessels, buses, or other vehicles.
- Threatening, conspiring, or attempting to commit violent acts against any "protected" individuals, such as government officials.
- Any crime committed through "the use of any firearm or dangerous device," where the

motive of the crime is calculated to be endangering public safety or causing serious property damage rather than "simple personal monetary gain."

2.2.1.5 State terrorism

State terrorism is characterized as terrorism perpetrated by governments, or terrorism orchestrated directly by a state's (country's) existing government, or terrorism committed and supported by a government against its own citizens or in support of international terrorism. The idea of "state terrorism," like the concept of terrorism itself, is divisive. Terrorism is usually (but not always) characterized by these characteristics:

- the use or use of violence
- a political goal; the urge to change the status quo;
- the intention to instill fear by committing dramatic public acts
- and the deliberate targeting of civilians.

When attempting to differentiate between state terrorism and other types of state violence, the last element—targeting innocent civilians—becomes troublesome. Democratic regimes can encourage state terrorism by communities outside their borders or perceived as foreign; however, they would not terrorize their citizens because a system based on the violent oppression and suppression of the majority of citizens (rather than just a few) will cease to be democratic. In a dictatorship, the state terrorizes their own citizens; democratic governments do not; however, may engage or perpetrate state-sponsored terrorism in some other nations.

It is important to state that asserting war and sending armed forces to fight the militaries of other countries is not terrorism, neither is the use of violence to punish offenders accused of violent crimes. Although many might argue that democracies can also breed terrorists. For several years, critics, especially in the Arab world, United Nations Resolutions, and international human rights organizations have continued to accuse Israel of committing terrorism against the people who ordinarily reside on the lands and territories that Israel has occupied since 1967.

Some critics have also accused the US of terrorism for not only supporting the Israeli occupation of some territories, but also supporting other authoritarian regimes eager to terrorize their people in order to remain in control. It is not surprising and uncommon that Palestinian militants refer to Israel as a terrorist state, Kurdish militants also refer to Turkey as a terrorist state, Tamil militants refer to Indonesia as a terrorist state, and most of the nation-states refer to militants who criticize their regimes as terrorists.

The implication of the above analysis is that terrorism, just like beauty, is in the shadow of the beholder as a freedom fighter to one person is a terrorist to another. As a result of this, identifying terrorism is complicated.

The African Union (AU) defines terrorism as "any act that is a violation of a state party's criminal laws and which may endanger the life, physical integrity, or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any individual, any member or group of persons, or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental, or cultural heritage," according to Omotola (2010). The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 3034 (XXVII), the first resolution on international terrorism, on 18th December, 1972. This resolution outlined the measures to fight international terrorism, that puts people's lives in jeopardy by committing acts of violence and inflicting sorrow, exasperation, rage, injury, and agony on innocent citizens (Council on Foreign Relations, 1972). Terrorism is an assault on the United Nations Charter's fundamental values, which idealize human rights, strict observance to the rule of law, and the common purpose of keeping peace and resolving conflicts across the world. This viewpoint focuses mainly on the essential repercussions of terrorism, which was the resolution's aim. As a result, the United Nations considers acts of terrorism as violations and abuses of individuals' constitutional rights, implying that a variety of acts of violence can be classified as terrorism if they disrupt the fundamental human rights of individuals or result in the unlawful death of citizens.

Terrorism was described as "criminal acts directed against a state and intended to cause fear in the minds of particular persons, a group of persons, or the general public" by the League of Nations Convention of 1937 (which never came into force) (article, 1). The United Nations was founded in 1945, and the Council on Foreign Affairs was founded in 2017. According to paragraph 3 of Resolution 49/60 passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 9th December, 1994 (United Nations) terrorism is described as "criminal acts intended or

designed to trigger a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons, or particular persons for political purposes". Regardless of the circumstances or some kind of objectives to justify such acts of violence, these acts of terror are designed to be illegal and unjustifiable.

Other antecedents mentioned in the provision included racial, ideological, religious and ethnic factors. Furthermore, the International Convention for the Prevention of Terrorist Bombings (United Nations, 1997) stipulated that any act "calculated to cause a state of terror in the general public... or particular persons for political purposes, including actions that endanger friendly relations between states and peoples or threaten the territorial integrity and security of states and peoples" was prohibited (p. 2). Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings stated that such a state of terror must be politically motivated, reinforcing earlier US national agency definitions. Although the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 describes terrorism more generally by specifying different terrorist targets, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings on the hand excludes all but political objectives, narrowing the spectrum of terrorist motivations.

According to a more general concept of terrorism, it includes different acts of violence targeted at injuring, forcing, compelling or threatening populations in order to achieve political or ideological objectives as a result of religious extremism or economic and social causes. (Bullock, Haddow, Coppola, & Yeletaysi (2009).

As a fall out of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, religious fanaticism has undoubtedly continued to be a major factor that plays a part in the ideological motivations of groups like Boko Haram and Al Qaeda. Terrorism motivated by religious extremism or fundamentalism is not limited to Islam alone; in fact, several years ago, some White nationalist groups in the United States, such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), were driven by Christian extremism to commit acts of terrorism. In the opinion of Schmid and Jongman (2005), it is incorrect to simply equate terrorism with only political objectives since some terrorists' acts are motivated by economic, theological or social change. As a result, basing the whole concept of terrorism on political motivation is misleading.

Aside from the lack of agreement between governmental agencies and international institutions on a single concept of terrorism, experts and academics in criminal justice and

political analysts are equally unable to reach a consensus on the term. Alex Schmid discussed various definitions of terrorism in his first edition of "*Political Terrorism*" in an effort to define a fairly all-inclusive and adequate description of the word "terrorism" (Schmid, & Jongman, 1988).

In his second edition, his quest to solve this global puzzle dwindled. He admitted in the updated version of "political terrorism" that the quest for an appropriate concept continues because he did not achieve his objectives quickly enough (Schmid, & Jongman, 2005). Terrorism, according to Bockstette (2008), is political violence in "an asymmetrical war aimed at inducing terror and psychological fear (sometimes indiscriminately) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatants (often iconic symbols), with actions intended to convey a message from an illegal covert group". He goes on to say that the aim of terrorism is to use the media to gain as much attention as possible as a force to amplify their message and also as multiplier in order to manipulate the intended target(s) and achieve short and mid-term political objectives, as well as desired long-term goals. Scholars such as Walter Laqueur believe the initiative is futile due to the time and effort required to isolate the recurring elements of terrorism from the 109 (one hundred and nine) separate meanings. Several word classifications that appeared in the 109 (one hundred and nine) separate meanings defined by Schmid and Jongman support Laqueur's point (Laqueur, 2003; Hoffman, 2006).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned, Schmid and Jongman (2005) identified terrorism as a type of political crime, emphasizing the approaches for bringing about change. Terrorists are those who commit different terror acts with the intent of killing, destroying lives and property, and threatening violence against groups, societies and governments in order to achieve their objectives. Terrorists usually work in secret cells and employ techniques that include attacks quickly followed by swift escapes. They require tactics that provide them with an advantage and control over their opponents' physical superiority (Poland, 2011). Terrorism, according to Schmid (2011), is "a conspiratorial practice of deliberate, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral constraints on the one side, and a philosophy about the presumed efficacy of a specific type or technique of fear-generating, coercive political violence on the other." (pp. 86–87). Schmid provided a broad yet succinct description that has earned widespread acclaim from academics. He went into detail on what drives terrorists to commit

acts of terror. Most academic conceptions of terrorism, including local and foreign perspectives, asserted that terrorists' motives are criminal, political and personal in nature, according to his research. Notwithstanding the above, Schmid's concept of terrorism ignores the moral ambiguity of terrorism, which has sparked numerous debate among academics.

Bruce Hoffman described the main features of terrorism as follows (Hoffman, 2006) in his updated version of *Inside Terrorism*:

“- ineluctably political in its goals and motivations; - violent – or, more importantly, threatens violence; - intended to have far-reaching psychological ramifications beyond the immediate victim or target; - carried out by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or a conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small group” (Page 43)

Terrorists are differentiated from other criminal groups based on the above statistics. Unlike some other kinds of criminals that do not have political motive nor do their actions usually have a great psychological effect on others, terrorism is planned deliberately to instill fear in order to achieve political aims through violence or a threat of violence. The word Hoffman sums up description features from a range of different outlets, including academics and legal bodies. Terrorism is described as "a type of violent interaction initiated by a non-state individual who is not formally recognized as a legitimate wielder of the means of violence ora legal initiator of violent interactions, directed against the representatives (human, material, or symbolic) of a formally recognized government," according to Lizardo (2008). (see page 102) Individuals, conspiratorial organizations, or autonomous ideological opposition groups within a nation use or threaten symbolic low-level violence, according to Crenshaw (1981)and Enders and Sandler (2006). As a result, the emphasis of these concepts is on violent acts committed by sub national or non-state actors aimed at instilling fear in a community targeted by these groups. Thus, Crenshaw's viewpoint backed up the common motive for terrorist attacks by claiming that terrorists are motivated to act aggressively by such political goals. Jalata (2011), on the other hand, saw Crenshaw's (1981) and Lizardo's (2008) concepts as concentrating on specific features of terrorism while ignoring the other forms of terrorism.

Terrorism, according to Thornton (1964), is characterized by the utilization of fear to manipulate political action. Terrorism, according to him, is a symbolic act. He emphasized the terror's effect and posited that the insurgents attempt to destroy or break the bond between the masses (the citizens) and the society's incumbents or office holders (the politicians). Secondly, he maintained that acts of terror would either destroy the vital underpinnings that reinforce society's moral fabric or mislead the masses into believing that the government is unconcerned about the people's critical problems. Thornton identified two forms of terror:

- a. **enforcement terror**, which includes government agents using terror to stop rebels from attempting to overthrow a government, and
- b. **agitation terror**, that deals with the form of terror employed by terrorists using violence to overthrow a government.

Terrorists may be described in this way as both states and insurgents. Governments use violence, while rebels use terrorism, according to Onwudiwe (2001). Terrorism is enacted by insurgents or rebels, whereas government officials such as police officers, military personnel and other law enforcement personnel create terror or threats and instill fear. This shows that terrorism and acts of terror are perpetrated by the state as well as by individuals and organisations. Terrorist strategies used by an existing government openly or indirectly by promoting or financing of some aspect of terrorism, this includes deploying violence against governments of other countries, their institutions or people, sub-national groups within the government, or international groups, must also be included in discussions of state terrorism (Herman, 1999).

Hence, the major features of terrorism include executing violent acts or using violence to intimidate the government, instill fear in the people in order to sway them to consent to the demands of the terrorists. Dyson (2012) noted that different special interest organizations describe terrorism to reflect their entity's interests. For example, a religious or ethnic group can define terrorism as the use of violence by individuals or government agencies against its adherents, loyalist, members or supporters, or against those that are ideologically opposed to their path.

Similarly, an anti-abortion organization might define terrorism as anti-abortion violence, whereas a timber company might define terrorism as environmental activists sabotaging their machinery in an attempt to avoid timbering (Dyson, 2012). As a result, identifying terrorism

is difficult because people view it differently depending on their beliefs—what is terrorism in one position can not be terrorism in another. Despite the various academic disputes, statements, postulations, and misunderstandings concerning the proper creation of terrorism, certain rudiments of criminological theories are significant in understanding terrorism and its propagation. To summarize, terrorism has frequently been used as a successful strategy by the weaker side in a war.

It confers forced control with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost of military force as an asymmetric type of conflict. Terrorist groups are also difficult to protect against or deter because of their secrecy and limited scale. Terrorism is a violent act that has an effect and impact on people other than the immediate victim. As part of the terrorists' tactic, they often commit violent acts that attract interest and attention to their cause from the government, the local community, and the rest of the world. Terrorists plot their attacks in order to attract the most attention, selecting targets that reflect what they are fighting against.

2.3 TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

There are three essential approaches that are pivotal to this project's topic. These are "terrorism", "insurgency" and "Boko Haram". Because of the existence of the dreaded Islamic terror group in Nigeria, the world has come to associate the term "Nigeria" with "Boko Haram." As a result, a thorough discussion and analysis of these three principles is important. Terrorism is characterized as the "use of violence and coercion on a regular basis to force a government or group to comply with specific political demands" (Pearsall & Trumble, 2006). Article 2 of the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism describes terrorism as:

"any person who commits an offence within the scope of this Convention if that person unlawfully and deliberately causes: death or serious bodily injury to any person; or serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility, or the environment; or damage to the property, places, facilities, or systems mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting in or likely to result in major economic loss; or damage to the property, places, facilities, or systems mentioned in

paragraph 1 (a) of this article, resulting in or likely to result in major economic loss” (Schmid & Graaf, 1980).

Terrorism is characterized in the United Kingdom by the Terrorism Act (2000) as “the use or threat of action where the action falls within a chapter, the use or threat is intended to manipulate the government or threaten the public, and the use or threat is made for the main purpose of promoting political, religious, or ideological causes”. According to the Act, an action falls under this classification if it involves serious damage to property, violence against a person, creates a serious risk to the public's health or safety or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic communication system (Terrorism Act, 2000). To Haviland, (2012) where an organized movement carries out acts aimed at overthrowing a legitimate government through intimidation, subversion and armed conflict, such a movement is known as an insurgency.

Insurgency, according to the Counter-Insurgency Initiative (2009), refers to the systematic utilization of “subversion and violence to capture, nullify, or question political power of a country”. Insurgents aim to overthrow or displace the institution of state and the government and gain full or partial control over a territory's wealth and population. They do this by deploying force (including propaganda, political mobilization, coercion or intimidation guerrilla warfare, subversion, and terrorism). The term “Boko Haram” the name of a sect whose philosophy is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam means “*western education is forbidden*” in English, though the official name of the sect in Arabic is “Jama’atu Ahlissunahlidda ’awatiwal Jihad” that translates to “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad”. This sect was established in Maiduguri, Borno State on Nigeria in 2002 by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic Muslim cleric. (Chothia, 2012).

Terrorist financing (TF) encompasses both the usage of complex financing structures to conduct large scale attacks or the simplistic models used to support small cells and groups and fund smaller attacks since Terrorist organizations all differ in their nature and objective, they all however, need a means for maintaining, facilitating and funding various types of attacks on their choice locations. Boko Haram is an Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic organization whose devotees ban Muslims or their organizations from participating in any social or political activity that are connected or derived from western ideology or education. According to the Islamic sect, the Nigerian society is so oppressive that a devout Muslim must move to a

society that is free of deprivation. Boko Haram's aims, according to Akanji (2009), are to take-over the Nigerian government, provoke religious tensions through violence, and ultimately declare an Islamic state in Nigeria.

There is a convergence of some designated terrorist groups in West and Central Africa, all of different natures working hand in hand with armed groups, violent political and criminal organizations. These terrorist groups are spread across Africa and they interact with one another in differing degree of co-operation to further their individual interests. Findings reveal that most of Boko Haram's bankrolling comes from within the territories in which they carry out their operations (Nigeria and its bordering zones), there have also been recent collaborations related to its to other designated terrorist organizations in Africa and the Middle East that Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to which may impact its future financing strategies. One of the 'major beneficiaries' of Osama bin Laden's support of approximately 1.8 million British pounds in local currency is alleged to be Boko Haram. The funding was reportedly sent through an aide to distribute among groups that shares Al-Qaeda's mission to impose Islamic rule on the world. Boko Haram has been pointed out as a group that receives funds from foreign donors especially those from the Gulf region.

To buttress the above, the account that Boko Haram has links with foreign donors was buttressed by the connections between the group and Alhaji Abdalla, a Cameroonian businessman. Abdalla was one of Boko Haram's nominated negotiators during the erstwhile French family hostage negotiation in 2013, this clearly shows that there was mutual intimacy and confidence between both parties. Apart from this fact, Alhaji Abdalla whose business centers around vehicle imports with dealings in Qatar is also alleged to have used his company to assist Boko Haram to sell vehicles stolen and hijacked by the group to people in Qatar. More so, in June 2014, the Cameroonian military discovered [receipts from Qatar as well as other travel documents](#) from Qatar and Libya in a Boko Haram camp.

According to several reports, the Boko Haram reports smuggles and rustles cattle, livestock, petrol ivory, arms, cigarettes and drugs through northern Nigeria on a consistent basis. As smuggling is a key area in which Boko Haram seems to harness their funds.

Nigeria is known in international circles as a transit hubs for drugs and though the gathered intelligences are most likely exaggerated, there are reports that Boko Haram regularly

interacts with drug smugglers. While the group is not believed to participate in transporting the drugs, it is believed that they tax the drug-dealers to pay import duties, as they would tax any other product coming through their area of control, thereby acting as middlemen in drug trades between Europe and Latin America.

Additionally, there are reports in Indian medias that Boko Haram teamed up with 'D-Gang', a Mumbai based criminal syndicate led by one Dawood Ibrahim. Allegedly, Ibrahim and Shekau met in Nigeria where they agreed that Boko Haram members would assist the D-Gang to export drugs to India. Moreso, Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, the former Defence and Foreign Affairs Minister of Mali stated that the Boko Haram group controls about \$800 million per year cigarette smuggling routes that run through the Sahel region, although it is likely that AQIM, al-Mourabitoun and Ansar Dine have a much larger share.

It is positive that while Boko Haram partakes in such trades, it is probably an exaggeration to suggest that Boko Haram controls all those smuggling routes. Some of the Boko Haram arms smugglers who have been arrested have confessed to law enforcement agencies that the incomes generated from arms deals are often bequeathed to Boko Haram. The breakdown of law and order and the Libyan chaos has further escalated the smuggling of arms into Nigeria, which Boko Haram is believed to have spearheaded and taken advantage of through their connections with other terrorist network such as ISIS.

Other small scale donations also occur and very there are little evidence of foreign funding from either the Gulf region or other areas. However, there happen to be infrequent donations from religious students in Cairo who were swayed by their Nigerian colleagues, and are now Boko Haram sympathizers. Certainly, there have been some active presence of Gulf-based charities in the Sahel region for years, this might certainly have played a role in ensuring that several people are exposed to a radical ideology. It also likely that there are individuals who have funded Boko Haram due to their support for ISIS and other bigger Islamic terrorist organizations.

While there is hazy information on the extent of Boko Haram's foreign sponsorship, there is more information about how the terror group receives support from state and non-state actors within Nigeria. This support that is allegedly from both the political and military

establishment and they are often motivated by selfish interests and political power moves rather than ideological alignment or religious persuasion.

There have also been accusations that some senior members of the country's military are either funding the terrorist group financially or diverting arms meant to fight the group to the hands of Boko Haram. According to one Sheikh Sani Haliru "General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, also known as IBB, funded training for Boko Haram in Libya and Pakistan, he has more than 600 men, women and children on his payroll." Haliru also alleged that President Buhari and other top government functionaries are part of the conspiracy.

According to Haliru, this information is not in the public domain as the main personalities involved such as IBB are people with vast connections in Nigeria's political spheres and print media, and that he was arrested when he attempted to present evidence to the public. However, the consensus from most observers of the Nigerian situation is that there is much less direct support for Boko Haram from the Nigeria's military now than around 2009 and 2010. Without substantiating Haliru's claims, it should be noted that there are occasions when the Nigerian military itself had discovered evidence that some of their personnel funded or aided Boko Haram. However, it should be noted that many of the allegations raised against some high-ranking officers remain uncorroborated and unconfirmed till date. Although there have been reports of several cases of 'inside jobs' concerning military personnel who provide intelligence to members of Boko Haram, there is little evidence to show that the Nigerian military has directly funded Boko Haram in recent years.

According to Stephen Davis, an Australian who was involved in the negotiation of the kidnapped Chibok girls, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) plays an instrumental part in making Boko Haram money untraceable and practically acts as a gatekeeper for the funds of the organizations. Supposedly, the Boko Haram fighters had informed him that the terror group's transactions to their main arms supplier, based in Cairo, are sent through the CBN without any detection or intrusion. Davis pointed to the fact that a senior official at CBN was very close to the mastermind of the April 2014 Nyanya bombing that killed 88 people, one Sodiq Ominu Ogwuche. Sheikh Sani Haliru continued his testimony by disclosing that several top officials in the CBN are Boko Haram agents through their connection and relationship with IBB. These claims have not been verified.

There is another ethnic aspect in which the conflict is being waged as a case of reinforcing fault lines even though the media has depicted the conflict in the Northern region as a Muslim vs Christian issue. As it might seem that Christians living in the north are a target for Islamist Boko Haram, the opinion is that the Hausa-Fulani Boko Haram are targeting the Igbo ethnic group, this leaves the Igbo with the notion that there's some sort of ethnic cleansing ongoing and that the 'Igbos should just secede'. This observation has received support credence from accounts rendered by people like Corinne Dufka, a senior West Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. Following her extensive research and analysis on the particulars of victims of Boko Haram violence, Dufka is of the opinion that, "Boko Haram is targeting and killing people in northern Nigeria based on their religion and ethnicity".

Also, while the intermittent violence that usually erupts in Jos has been portrayed as some sort of Muslim vs Christian violence, it appears that same is basically a land dispute between divergent ethnic groups who just happen to also belong to different religious faiths. Remarkably, the residents of Jos who are at the centre of the conflicts are more aware of the complexity and causative factors of the conflict than analysts who try to make sense of it from reported events. Vanda Felbab-Brown and James Forest has also made the point that much of the conflict in northern Nigeria emanated from the migration of the Hausa Fulani ethnic group into Yorubaland. They further noted that "... fact that the Yoruba are predominantly Christians and the Hausa Fulani Muslims matters only secondarily. Rather, the Hausa-Fulani Boko Haram is infusing religion into a long-churning brew of grievances about wealth and power distribution...". In spite of the religious connotations of the conflict which Boko Haram has stimulated in Jos, it cannot be disputed that the major issue there is a land dispute between parties of different ethnic groups and religious persuasion.

2.4 CAUSES OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

Terrorism is thought to originate from a variety of sources, according to several scholars. As a result, it's critical to investigate this on an individual and community level. Experts have differentiated rational, psychological, and cultural roots of terrorism at the person level. According to Simonsen and Jeremy (2000), realistic terrorists consider their objectives and choices, weighing the pros and cons. Terrorism is motivated psychologically by the terrorist's personal discontent with his or her life and achievements. Terrorism can emerge from a

climate of political activism when a group's aim is to attract the attention of a government or community to the protests of an activist social movement.

Other causes would include:

1. Religious motivation: According to Hoffman (2006), religion has been a major motivator for a number of terrorist groups in Africa. Those who advocate and champion some radical view or opinion of Islam are disproportionately targeted among the organizations and individuals who have used religion as their inspiration to commit terrorist violence. The importance of extreme-right Christian organizations, on the other hand, is emphasized. The prevalence and importance of religiously inspired terrorist organizations, according to Gurr and Cole (2005), is noteworthy during the timeframe generally attributed to the rise of new terrorism. There has been an increase in the trend of religiously motivated terrorist groups in comparison to the total number of terrorist organizations in the world. As research shows, the numbers increased from less than 4% in 1980 to 42% by the mid-1990s (Lesser; Arquilla; Ronfeldt; Hoffman; Zanini & Jenkins, 1999). In support of this, Zalman (2014) claimed that religious fanaticism produces hostile environments for terrorism. Arms of war proliferation: Terrorism has been fueled by the availability and use of weapons of mass destruction and/or damage, such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Some claim that media developments have driven terrorists to become more aggressive and spectacular as a result of viewer desensitization (Neumann, 2009). Zalman (2014), who disagrees with the aforementioned thesis, believes that terrorist acts are motivated by social and political inequality. When people are seeking to correct what they consider to be a social, political, or historical wrong, such as when their land or rights have been taken away from them or denied to them, they turn to terrorism.
2. Corruption: Nigerian society is rife with corruption, which can be seen in any area of the economy (both private and public). The ruling government has struggled to carry out its responsibilities because officials are preoccupied with amassing money at the expense of society. The pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria led Transparency International to rank Nigeria as one of the world's most corrupt countries in 2012, ranking 139th out of 176 countries assessed.

3. Unemployment: As a result of unemployment, terrorist attacks have sprung up. This has become a serious problem in the country, resulting in long-term joblessness for our graduates, discontent, and a desire to engage in activities that are harmful to society. In 2014, Nigeria's high unemployment rate resulted in the deaths of 16 job seekers who died in a stampede as 500,000 unemployed youths rushed to apply for 5000 vacancies at the Nigeria Immigration Service. The World Bank estimated in 2014 that about 80% of people under 24 are unemployed.
4. Weak institutional structure: The institutional framework in place at all three levels of government in Nigeria is so pathetic that policies are haphazardly implemented; as a result, the government is unable to provide the society with public goods, and Nigeria is listed as a weak state. According to Wyler (2007), a "weak state" is a country whose government has collapsed to the point that it is unable to provide basic public goods to its citizens, such as defense, health care, and legal in situ. Nigeria's poor state structure has made it impossible for the government to deal with natural disasters and violent outbursts.
5. Poverty: The vicious cycle of poverty is still ravaging Nigerian society, with the majority of people unable to afford three square meals a day. According to Campbell and Bunche (2011), the majority of Nigerians' living conditions have only marginally improved since 1970. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2012), 25 percent of Nigerians lived in poverty in 1980, and this number has risen to 72 percent in 2010.

2.5 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

Religious extremism is a worldwide epidemic that creates concern and conflict in many countries. Religion has been exploited in many ways in Nigeria to serve the needs of certain groups of people who believe themselves to be custodians and guardians of religious beliefs and faith.

2.5.1 Concept of religious extremism

For a long time, religious extremism has posed a persistent security and social threat around the world. Nigeria has not been resistant to this form of adversity. The Boko Haram insurgency has raged in Africa's most populated country for years, with no apparent end in sight, this has led to the deaths of several people (numbering thousands) and the destruction of

properties and means of livelihood. Several scholars have actually debated the authenticity of the argument that the Boko Haram insurgency is an offshoot of religious extremism. This section discusses what forms of insurgencies, extremism, and conflicts can be described as religious extremism. The essence of this exercise is to determine the characteristics of religious extremism and to know what differentiates religious extremism from other forms of conflicts. In the long run, this will enable more efficient responses to the different forms of extremisms, whether political, social or economic.

Scholars have linked the occurrence of religious extremism to religious radicalization in many instances of religious extremism. Kris Christmann describes radicalization as a stage of transition, a political and personal shift from one state to another. Others, such as Horgan (2005) and Sibling and Bhatt (2007), argue that radicalization is always an incremental phenomenon that necessitates a systemic progression that does not occur quickly or easily. Another school of thought contends that events can catalyze or intensify the radicalization process. Al-Lami (Arabic: (2009:2).

McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) identified 12 (twelve) “mechanisms” of political radicalization that operate at 3 (three) different levels: person, party, and mass. The authors argue, in line with most terrorism research, that political radicalization would almost certainly require a few more mechanisms for an individual's journey to terrorism, confirming the widely held belief that "multiple and complex paths lead individuals and groups to radicalization and terrorism."

Despite the fact that different stages of the radicalization process have been identified, there are studies that agree that there is a point in an individual's change and development (for example, increased religiosity, or a search for identity) that is aided by external factors (such as experienced racism or discrimination, a perceived attack against Muslims or the religious groups of the individual, for example the wars in Bosnia and Iraq), followed by a move to violent radicalization.

It has proven difficult to integrate these levels of interpretation, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008: 429) are doubtful that there exist a single hypothesis that will account for all of the causes that contribute to radicalized abuse (although a conceptual scheme is not unthinkable).

Studies that have identified different possible factors, typically socio-psychological models, but did not define the interactions among them in any detail were more common.

Several theories have been used to discuss the concept of extremism globally. Biological theories from Bakker (2006) establish that research has overwhelmingly shown young, male persons in their mid-teens and mid-20s are more susceptible to extremism. Other studies also show that the role of women especially in Islamic radicalization is confined to supportive roles mostly. These developments show some trends which may be studied in discussing the spate of religious extremism using Nigeria as a case study.

The psychological theory, which uses factors such as mental illness, pathology, repressed sexuality, and other emotive signs to detect the cause for extremist beliefs in terrorists, is another theory that has been used in explaining extremism. This hypothesis may also play a role in assessing the psychological makeup of religious extremists. However, some researchers suggest that identifying the psychological makeup of terrorists could be more difficult. Societal theories have also been proposed as a form of extremism impact. Bad or failed integration, sexism, and the history of deprivation and segregation are all factors that could affect an individual's views on extremism, according to this theory. This theory is particularly applicable to the Nigerian case study since the Boko Haram insurgency has been more prominent in Nigeria's northern regions, which have done poorly in terms of social and economic growth.

2.5.2 History of religious extremism

According to Roberts (2009) Insurgency is a type of rebellion against a legitimate government in which the rebels are not regarded as belligerents. Morris (2005), on the other hand, points out that not all insurgencies are rebellions. There have been several instances of nonviolent revolts involving civil disobedience, such as the People Power Revolution in the Philippines in the 1980s, which ousted President Ferdinand Marcos, and the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. According to Kermit (2001), if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign states and insurgent forces, a revolt may not be considered an insurgency. For example, the Confederate States of America was not recognized as a sovereign state during the American Civil War, but it was recognized as a belligerent force, and therefore confederate warships were granted the same privileges as US warships in foreign ports (Metz, 2007).

The word "insurgency" recognizes the political motivations of those who engage in insurgency, while the term "brigandry" suggests no such motive (Goldstein, 2003). If an insurgency has little support, such as those who fight at the end of an armed struggle when most of their allies have surrendered, the revolt is referred to as brigandry, and those who participate are referred to as brigands (North, 2008). The distinction between what an "insurgency" means and what amounts to a "belligerency" has not been as clearly set out or documented as many other areas protected by internationally agreed laws of war, according to Nagl (2006), for two reasons. The first is that international law historically does not encroach on matters that are primarily a sovereign state's internal affairs; the second is that international law traditionally does not encroach on matters that are solely a sovereign state's internal affairs (although a recent development such as the responsibility to protect is starting to undermine this traditional approach). The second reason is that at the Hague Conference of 1899, there was a dispute between the Great Powers, who considered franc-tireurs to be illegal combatants subject to execution if captured, and the smaller states, who believed they should be considered legal combatants. (Nagl, 2006: p.21). The United States Department of Defense (2007) defines insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict" (p.205).

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual of the United States of America (2007) suggests a framework that encompasses both insurgency and counterinsurgency. These concepts, according to Grau (2004), are a strong starting point, but they fail to illustrate a central paradox: while insurgency and counterinsurgency are two sides of the same phenomenon known as civil war or internal war, they are two distinct types of operations. In addition, insurgency and counterinsurgency are also classified as unconventional warfare, a wide type of conflict.

Ticehurst (1997), reflecting on the US Department of Defense's concept of insurgency, believes that the definition ignores the morality of the war and the differing perspectives of the government and insurgents. It focuses on the tactical dimensions of the insurgents' and counter-insurgents' acts. In addition, the Department of Defense's definition focuses on the form of violence used (illegal) to achieve specific goals (political, religious or ideological). This definition ignores the moral relativity claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (see Morris, 2005: p.225). In essence, this goal to a suitable description

proposes that, while violence may be "illegal" under the laws of the victim, the cause served by those who perform the actions may represent a positive good in the eyes of impartial observers (Ticehurst, 1997: p.11).



3. BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

This chapter seeks to elaborate on the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. Since it began operations, the terrorist group has inflicted a large number of casualties, both military and civilian personnel around the country, especially in Northern Nigeria. In this chapter, we discuss the historical evolution of Boko Haram insurgency and evaluate the organization and efforts being made to counter the insurgency occasioned by the Boko Haram group whose activities are a threat to national development and security.

3.1 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

The sect now popularly known as “Boko Haram” has been working under the appellation “Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization” since 1995, with one Mallam Lawal as its leader. However, when Mallam Mohammed Yusuf became the leader of the group as Mallam Lawal travelled out of Nigeria to Saudi Arabia for further education (Ekareem and Ejue, 2012). Mallam Mohammed Yusuf's leadership is said to have helped the group gain political clout and popularity. As a result, Mallam Yusuf is credited with being the one who officially established Boko Haram in Maiduguri in 2002 with the major aim of establishing Sharia law in Borno and neighbouring states (Poli, interviewed on the 20th of June, 2015).

Mallam Yusuf actively participated in official efforts to introduce and enact Sharia in many states in Northern Nigeria in the 2000s, despite his criticism of the government. The failure to do so completely explains Muslim Youth's outrage at government deceit and insincerity, as well as their call for a genuine Islamic revolution (Kognet, interviewed by the Researcher, 28 April, 2015). In the 1990s, there was a group of radical Islamist youth that regularly worshipped at the Al-Haji Mohammed Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State, where boko haram originated from. (Walker, 2012). Mohammed Yusuf, the group's leader, began his career as a leader and preacher in the Shababul Islam of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. His basic and literal understanding of the Quran enabled him to argue for the prohibition of aspects of western education that he claimed were in contrast with the Holy Quran, such as the Darwinian theory of evolution, elements of chemistry, the big bang theory of universe creation, and the teaching of geography in Hausa schools (NIPPS, 2012 as cited by Awortu, 2015).

Subsequently, Mallam Yusuf, as well as his father-in-law and the sect's financier; Ustaz Buji Foi, while extra judicially killed in custody, and many members of the sect were incarcerated by state authorities, the nation began to question the sect's violent tendencies (Kognet, interviewed by the Researcher, 28th April, 2015). In light of this, the BBC speculates that the sect's current degree of radicalisation and extremism is due to the death of its initial leadership and the eventual crackdown by the new leader, Abubakar Shekau, a native of Kanuri who once bragged that, "I enjoy killing everyone that Allah orders me to kill the same way I enjoy killing chickens and rams". In order to execute its terrors on Nigerians, the Shekau-led Boko Haram began to use lethal weapons such as rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), armoured tanks, anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, A-K 47 assault rifles, as well as machetes and daggers. This has had a negative impact on the Nigerian economy due to the high rate of loss of lives and properties.

3.2 IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF BOKO HARAM

Terrorist organizations are often classified by their ideology. Boko Haram, according to Okemi (2013), started as an indigenous Khawrij group before becoming a Kharijee Jihadist group in 2009. Boko Haram began as a *Sunni* Islamic fundamentalist group promoting a rigid form of *wahhabi* rule, but in 2009, it morphed into a *salafist-jihadi* faction inspired by the wahhabi movement.

As previously reported, Boko Haram is firmly opposed to western education. As a result of their struggle against western education, the group received the name "Boko Haram," which means "western education is forbidden." Muhammad Yusuf said in a 2009 BBC interview that "the notion of a spherical world is contradictory to Islamic teaching and should be dismissed," he also dismissed the Darwinian evolution theory and the idea that rain comes from water evaporated by the sun as being contrary to Islam. He repeated the group's goal of reforming the existing educational system and opposing democracy before his death. As can be seen from the above, Boko Haram has similar backgrounds, roots, and ideological canvasses that are identifiable with terrorist organizations, thus, so we can easily identify it as a terrorist group.

Boko Haram intends to create an Islamic state in the sovereign state of Nigeria. It opposes Nigerian society's westernization and the accumulation of the country's resources among

associates of a tiny political elite, primarily in the southern part of the country's predominated by Christians (Ottuh and Idjakpo, 2010). Local authorities' imposition of sharia law, which began in Zamfara in January 2000 and spread to 12 northern states in Nigeria by late 2002, may have facilitated relations between Boko Haram and political leaders, but the community considers it to be corrupted (The Nation, Thursday, August 16, 2012: p.6). Boko Haram is ideologically isolated and lacks mainstream support from the general population and majority of Muslim leaders in the country (The Vanguard, 1st of September 2011: p.13). It is critical to comprehend Boko Haram's organization and function in order to properly assess the community.

Despite having a hierarchical and graded structure with a single overall leader, Boko Haram often acts as a covert cell system with a network of structures (Jinkai, interviewed by the researcher, 5th of February, 2015). The organization's limits are hazy; in many situations, leadership is directive, and in others, it is more inspiring. The organization acts as an insurgent and guerrilla army, with units ranging in size from 300 to 500 fighters (Suleiman, 2015). The total number of fighters is estimated to be between 5,000 and 9,000.

Mailafia (2003) highlighted that Abubakar Shekau is the overall religious leader of Boko Haram and he preaches to his followers daily in addition to his operational leadership. Under Executive Order 13224, the US Department of State named Abubakar Shekau as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2012. (Tribune, Wednesday June 27, 2012: p.17). Boko Haram's organizational capabilities have improved under Shekau's leadership (Daily Trust, 3 March, 2014). Momodu Bama, who was appointed second in command when Abubakar Shekau took over as the overall leader, is another notable leader. In 2013, Bama was assassinated. Abba was another regional leader who was assassinated. Aminu Sadiq Ogwechue is most likely a regional leader who has been arrested in connection with the 2014 Chibok girls kidnapping and as an alleged mastermind of the April 2014 Abuja bombing (Agencies France- Press, 26 March 2015: p.31).

If various reports from the Nigerian Defense Ministry are to be believed, Abubakar Shekau may have been killed in combat since 2014, enabling the name to act as a title to mislead Nigerian military forces. In 2015, Chad's President, Idris Derby, said that Boko Haram has a new leader who is not Shekau, but the group quickly refuted this claim in a video (Channels Television News, 3rd August, 2015) Both of these allegations, however, are unverifiable;

Boko Haram has always released videos and statements to refute these claims, claiming that Abubakar Shekau is still alive and well (Marama, 2015). Whether this is true or not is difficult to state with certainty.

In all this, it is critical to investigate how Boko Haram is financed to understand how the sect has risen to such importance over the years; funding is critical to the terrorist group's continued existence. While it is difficult to say with certainty how the insurgency is funded, one thing is certain: it does not come from a single source (BBC online, June 22, 2012).

Kidnappings, robbery and extortion provide support for Boko Haram (Isakpa, 2011). It was reported that Boko Haram terrorists abducted a family of seven French terrorists on vacation in Cameroon in early 2013. The kidnappers freed the captured hostages, along with 16 other hostages, two months later in exchange for a \$3.15 million ransom (Leadership Newspaper, 2nd April, 2014: p.4). According to newspaper reports in Nigeria, Boko Haram receives as much “as a \$1 million ransom for each wealthy Nigerian or foreigner kidnapped”. (Leadership Newspaper, 2nd April, 2014: p.4). Couriers transport cash, ensuring that it is difficult to monitor, and contact is done physically. They work in such a way that little money is needed to carry out attacks, and it is argued that this includes paying local youths to monitor army movements (Aljawri, 2011). Furthermore, the party is still well-supplied thanks to supplies confiscated from fleeing soldiers. Boko Haram also extorts local governments; according to a Boko Haram spokesperson, some former northern governors paid the party monthly to stop attacks on their states (Sahara Reporters, 16 May, 2014: p.2).

Boko Haram has also been linked with cocaine trafficking (Cockayne, 2012). However, according to some studies, there seems to be insufficient evidence to support of this funding method. In 2012, Cockayne, a senior fellow at the International Peace Institute and a former Co-Director of the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation wrote that:

“Carrier and Klantsching [Review of Africa and the War on Drugs, 2012] vigorously downplay the effect of cocaine trafficking on West African governance, which is surprising given their understanding of the contested existence of most African governments. Just three case studies were used: Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, and Nigeria. "Governmental complicity in the

African drug trade is rare," the authors conclude, and "repression is the dominant paradigm."

Boko Haram raises funds through importing drugs from Latin American drug cartels, according to Carson (2015), a terrorist finance specialist. However it appears that nobody wants to admit that cocaine reaches Europe through West Africa, and that it is a lucrative venture for Islamic terrorist organizations. Boko Haram also employs other smuggling methods. According to an Annual Defense Institute's report, the Boko Haram group has joined other criminal organizations in Africa in the billion-dollar elephant and rhino poaching industry (BBC online, June 22, 2015).

Donations from Islamist sympathizers are another source of funding for Boko Haram. Boko Haram obtained the majority of its funding after its formation from local residents and donors who backed its goals of enforcing Islamic rule and ridding Nigeria of any form of Western influences (Abdul, interviewed by this researcher, 26th May, 2015). Boko Haram has recently expanded its funding sources by enlisting the help of international donors as well as other business projects such as bogus charity organizations (Aljazeera, 2010). In February 2012, recently arrested officials revealed that while the organization initially relied on member donations, its links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb allowed it to obtain funding from donors in the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia (Okemi, 2013). Surprisingly, Boko Haram hides its financial sources by using a highly decentralized distribution network. The organization uses the *hawala* model of Islamic money transfer, which is predicated on an honor system and a global chain of agents, and this makes it extremely difficult to monitor the group's finance (Poli, 2015). The Boko Haram insurgency is likely to be funded from these and other sources.

It was tough to determine if Boko Haram had any links to other foreign terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda at the start of the insurgency, it seems to be more of a bandwagon effect to raise publicity (Ottuh and Idjakpo, 2010). Boko Haram, on the other hand, has recently been linked to other foreign terrorist organizations, according to new evidence. Boko Haram has been linked to al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates since at least 2002. According to Hogendoorn (2012), author of "A Study on Boko Haram for the International Crisis Group", the late Osama bin Laden, donated \$3 million to terrorist organizations in Nigeria as seed money to finance the propagation of his philosophies, and some of this fund was used to help

promote the Boko Haram group's earlier operations. Due to a lack of evidence, the credibility of a statement published by the Nigerian daily newspaper Vanguard in which Boko Haram's then "acting leader," Sanni Umaru, declares that "Boko Haram is just a variant of Al-Qaeda" and that the sect has "started a jihad in Nigeria" and will soon carry out bomb attacks in major Nigerian cities was thrown out (Bartolotta, 2011) is not sufficient to justify that link. However, correspondences between Osama bin Laden and the Boko Haram terrorist group was said to have been found in Bin Laden's compound after the raid that killed him in 2011.

When the Nigerian government attacked Boko Haram in July 2009, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) issued a declaration of support for the organization, and its members dispersed to different Al-Qaeda factions. Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, praised and publicly commended Al-Qaeda and also expressed condolences on the "martyrdom" of two top Iraqi al-Qaeda leaders in July 2010. (Aro, 2013). The US State Department classified Khahd al- Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kambar as lead terrorists with "links to Boko Haram and solid ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" in June 2012, at the same time when Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader was designated as a terrorist. Similar incentives were given to leaders in AQIM and its offshoots in June 2013, when the "Rewards for Justice" initiative offered to give out a \$7 million bounty for knowledge leading to the arrest of Shekau (Omankhamlen and Babajide, 2012). Shekau was charged with "expressing solidarity with al-Qaeda and threatening the United States," and that there are reported communications, training programmes, weapons and other links between Boko Haram on one hand, the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the al-shabaab, and the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), that could improve and enhance Boko Haram's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks, and that these three organizations are interconnected. (Gilbert, 2014).

The United Nations Security Council also holds the position that Boko Haram has strong links with al-Qaeda. In May 2014, when the UNSC listed Boko Haram under the al-Qaeda sanctions that it imposed, the UNSC noted that Boko Haram has sustained a relationship with AQIM for training support and material needs, as well as gaining useful expertise on improvised explosive device construction from AQIM. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, the leader of AQIM, one of al-regional Qaeda's branches, is reported to have sworn an oath of allegiance to the senior leadership of al-Qaeda (CGAR, 2014).

Nevertheless, it is critical to note that the al-Qaeda central unit has never formally recognized Boko Haram as its affiliate, and al-Qaeda did not praise the group after the Chibok schoolgirls were kidnapped, leading some observers to believe that the group was too brutal and violent in its operations for Al-Qaeda (Walker, 2012). The exact current status of relations between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda is unknown, and the form and function of al-Qaeda relationship with affiliates is still a subject of discussion within the US intelligence and counter- intelligence community. It is noteworthy that should AQIM and Boko Haram join efforts and coordinate their operations and attacks, the West Africa subregion that is already marked by insecurity and instability would face additional threats from these terrorist organizations. Not just because of the continuous violence of Boko Haram within the Nigeria space, but also as a result of the group's possible networks and relationship with AQIM, the North African al- Qaeda offshoot.

Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader released a 16-minute video in July 2014, in which he expressed support for ISIL's Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Ayman Qaeda's Al-Zawahiri, and Afghan Taliban leaders Mullah Omar (www.Youtube/bokoharam 2015). Later on in March 2015, Shekau officially announced and pledged Boko Haram's allegiance to ISIL, and same was accepted by ISIL's spokesman some days later. Although establishing those relations and their exact nature may be difficult, Nigerians appear to be secure in their presence. The involvement of highly educated former University lecturers among the sect's members, as well as the sect's heavy and sophisticated weapons, and the manner in which they carry out sophisticated attacks, all support those claims.

The most well-known position of Boko Haram is its outright rejection of Western education. However, the term "*Boko Haram*" refers to a wider criticism of Nigerian culture that targets the alleged fruits of such colleges. Notably, Boko Haram is not a solitary group that resents Nigeria's highly educated elites for failing to provide prosperity for the country's population. Many Nigerians also decry the government's pervasive corruption.

Some Muslims in the Northern part of the country, where classical Quranic and Islamic education is a strong social force, have diverse thoughts about the Western-style learning institutions. However, secondary and tertiary education are valued qualifications, and Northerners are proud of their universities and colleges. Some Northern Muslims, on the other hand, claim that Western schools fail to instill Islamic orientations and values in their

students. Boko Haram is an especially extreme example of this latter mindset. It opposes compromises like "Islamiyya" colleges, which combine both western style government education and Islamic religious education.

Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect was dissatisfied with the quality and outcomes of Western education. Darwinism, he said, was incompatible with the Quran. Muslim children were taught to imitate the mannerisms of Jews and Christians in schools. At school, children of various genders interacted, encouraging "fornication, lesbianism, homosexuality, and other [corruptions]" (Yusuf, Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna, 93). Yusuf argued that the British colonialism's "Christianizing" schools were not in any way different from postcolonial government established schools, but that the promise of material benefits have blinded Muslims to the extent that they cannot stick to the truth "Because of love for this world, many people's hearts have been saturated with love of these schools, until they do not see in them that which contradicts [Islam's] law". (Yusuf, Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna, 79). "Our movement rejects work under any government that rules by something other than what God has revealed" (Yusuf, Hadhihi 'Aqidatuna, 108). Yusuf's views on intra-Muslim solidarity, democracy, and Western-style education were all bundled together in one package.

In the background of Northern Nigeria, Yusuf's Islamist vision was serious. There are many Northern Muslims that claim that Islam offers policy making agendas that can affect the general life of citizens in a variety of ways. Despite this, only a few influential Nigerians advocate for a Sharia Islamic state. The enforcement of sharia was led by politicians from large, non-Islamist political parties, with support from a wide range of groups, including Salafis, Sufis, and unaffiliated Muslims. Many Sharia supporters believed it was consistent with a federal, representative government (Brandon Kendhammer)—rather than a theocracy ruled by unelected clerics, they advocated for elected officials to enact Islamic law.

In Nigeria today, some Muslim activists argued that at the federal and state level, there should be a co-existence of "Islamic" banks, courts, state-sponsored or subsidized pilgrimages, and other formal institutions. Non-jihadi Salafis, on the other hand, sometimes hold government positions or provide public "advice" to leaders, suggesting that they support electoral politics and a secular system for government.

For Boko Haram, a complete dedication to the concept of Islam is a social blueprint required for participation in politics. “The shari‘a of Islam is a fine and full shari‘a,” Yusuf wrote. It is acceptable at all times and in all places around the world (Yusuf, Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna, 143). He lamented,

“We see a state in which Muslims are living, but they refuse the Islamic shari‘a in its totality, and put in its place the system of democracy. And we see people with the name ‘ulama’ [scholars] calling for democracy and defending it, and making ugly refutations against the people who call others to follow the law of Allah” (Yusuf, Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna, 156).

According to Yusuf, democracy pits the people against God as a source of authority. He warned that majority rule in form of a democracy allows agreement and mistakes to be made, while Islam is predicated on total obedience and submission to the Quran and Sunna. Yusuf, Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna, 64–65), for example, he argued that "freedom of belief" provided for a situation of apostasy from Islam (Yusuf, Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna, 64–65). Condemning democracy was not enough; a real Muslim had to condemn it. Democracy is "the school of the infidels," according to Yusuf, and "following it, engaging with it, or using its structure is unbelief" (Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna, 63). Shekau, like Yusuf, ignores an entire set of concepts. He questioned President Goodluck Jonathan's portrayal of Boko Haram as a "cancer" in a 2012 video and proposed a counter-epidemiological metaphor:

“The disease is unbelief, and as Allah says, “Disorder is worse than killing” (Qur’an 2:191)... Everyone knows democracy is unbelief, and everyone knows the Constitution is unbelief, and everyone knows that there are things Allah has forbidden in the Qur’an, and that are forbidden in countless hadiths of the Prophet, that are going on in Western schools... We ourselves haven’t forbidden anything, we haven’t told the Muslim community to abandon anything, we simply stand on the path of truth” (Abubakar Shekau, “Message to President Jonathan,” January 2012).

Shekau considered Western-style schooling to be sinful not only because of its academic matter, but also because of its political implications. Shekau compared his confidence in God with the National Pledge recited in government schools in one post, telling listeners, “You are

worshipping the nation” (Boko Haram, “Min dunihi fa-Kiduni thumma La Tanzurun,” 5th May, 2014). The “*disorder*” that the Quran opposes has taken the form of a heretical scheme for Shekau.

The United States' policy toward Nigeria has aimed to strengthen political stability in the region. Nigerian elites and US legislators backed electoral reform were urged to hold elections in a peaceful and transparent manner during the 2011–2015 political periods. As Boko Haram grew in intensity, the US urged Jonathan to encourage socioeconomic growth in the Northeast and stop security forces from abusing civilians and detainees. Given Nigeria's oil reserves and arguable perception of itself as an African superpower, Washington, on the other hand, wields little influence in the region. The United States supported Nigeria to ensure that the conduct of the 2015 general elections was relatively, however, the U.S. encouragement for security sector reforms did not have any major impact.

Among Nigeria's neighbors, the US wields more power. American military forces and drones have bases in Niger. The US has provided military training in the region and has given border protection assistance to West African countries such as Nigeria and its neighbors. Countries like Niger and Nigeria were part of President Barack Obama's Security Governance Initiative, which that was set up to strengthen Africa's civilian and military institutions. Both of these efforts are beneficial, but policymakers in the United States should not compromise integrity in the name of cooperation: if a situation occurs when Nigerian, Chadian, or Cameroonian authorities restrict political space, the US should respond openly and change assistance as required. More so, the fact that attention is being paid to the insecurity created by Boko Haram's activities should not, however, overshadow attempts to counter Niger and Chad's other, more insidious challenges, such as food insecurity and climate change.

Some US officials and operatives may hope for a “reset” with Buhari and may call for renewed training of Nigerian forces to combat Boko Haram. Buhari, on the other hand, cannot reform Nigeria's security forces by decree; even though he rewards merit, changes policies and punishes wrongdoing. Insidious vices such as security abuses, indiscipline, and corruption are likely to continue in the medium term. This pattern could make extending U.S. training unwise from both a legal and practical viewpoint. Furthermore, military means alone are insufficient to eradicate the threat posed by Boko Haram, given the group's tenacity and adaptability throughout its history. If followed, US training could help reduce abuses and

increase professionalism in the Nigerian security sector, but policymakers should be wary about expecting any major changes.

The recent deployment of 300 US troops to Cameroon to fight Boko Haram was a bad move, since it militarizes a dispute that will ultimately need diplomatic resolution.

Outside of the military domain, the United States can be particularly helpful, particularly in leading the charge towards providing humanitarian relief materials in response to the crisis that Boko Haram has generated. The US Agency for International Development has collaborated with many organizations in northeastern Nigeria to provide defence, food, health care and education to the displaced, but given the seriousness of the situation, the US can provide more assistance. It would not only be morally right to put a greater emphasis on alleviating suffering, it will also help combat myths in Nigeria that the primary foreign policy tool of the United States in Nigeria is force, and that the government of the US is unconcerned about innocent Muslims' suffering. The US should continue to impress it on the Nigerian government to reform their security forces in the long run. Furthermore, the US can adopt the use of legal and policy instruments, such as the revocation of visas, to indicate a zero- tolerance policy in Nigeria for bad governance and corruption. Finally, the US should refrain from taking a position or interfering if dialogues ensue between Lake Chad states and any Boko Haram terrorists that are willing to speak.

3.3 COUNTER-INSURGENCY AGAINST BOKO HARAM

Despite the above assaults, the Nigerian military and the Multinational Joint Force have launched a counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram. The army appears to have regained its steam after a slow start due to a shortage of resources and corruption in the ranks and files of the Nigerian military (Sulaiman, 2012). For example in March 2015, Boko Haram lost control of some of its captured territories in Northern Nigerian such as the towns Gwoza (thought to be its headquarters) and Bama to the Nigerian army. The Military announced that they had reclaimed all 14 districts earlier held by Boko Haram (Moore, 2015). In April 2015, the Nigerian military overran four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa forest, freeing nearly 300 women (BBC News, 27 March 2015). Boko Haram is thought to have fled to the Mandara mountains on the Nigerian-Cameroonian frontier. Furthermore, the Nigerian military's six-week bombardment of Boko Haram prior to the 2015 general elections, which

was continued after the elections, is thought to have weakened Boko Haram's control (Akin, 2015).

President Muhammadu Buhari addressed in his inaugural that the Army command will be relocated to Maiduguri. Since then, the Nigerian army has had a number of victories. The Nigerian army was confirmed to have demolished over 20 fortified Boko Haram camps in Borno State on October 25, 2015. (Channels News at 10, 25th October, 2015). If the current pace is maintained, local vigilante organizations, also known as Civilian JTF, will likely be able to put an end to Boko Haram's attacks in the near future. On the 12th of September 2015, for example, scores of Boko Haram members were confirmed to have surrounded the Nigerian military (Channels Television News, 2015).

The Boko Haram insurgency has carried out a number of attacks in Nigeria, claiming many lives and destroying many properties. Nigeria is gradually becoming a dangerous terrorist-infested country just like Afghanistan and others where it has become almost normal for people to wake up every day to hear or see terrorist attacks.

In the study and analysis of terrorism, it is factual that most contemporary terrorism exhibit an international bent, this has necessitated the formulation of mechanisms to prevent terrorism on an international scale. With specific regards to Boko Haram, these international mechanisms have taken the form of foreign governments and organizations aiding the Nigerian government in its efforts to fight terrorism. Often, the assistance comes either as money, intelligence, manpower, arms, ammunition or a combination of some of the above listed resources (Mishal & Sela, 2000). One of the ways in which terrorism can be thwarted is by identifying their sources of weapons and basic necessities and also cutting off the terrorists' lines of communication and. A government's counter-terrorism performance is defined by its effective use of resources at its disposal. These resources include finance, military, land reforms, external alliances, power, and organizational hierarchy. (Baylis; Wirtz & Colin, 2006). At the international, regional, and bilateral levels, there are a number of international policies and legal initiatives targeted at promoting and strengthening international cooperation against practices such as attacks on open source software, aircraft hijacking and so on.

In the United States, the intelligence community is reported to be "monitoring the expanding reach and diversity of 'facilitation networks,' which include semi-legitimate travel

consultants, lawyers, and other forms of practitioners, as well as corrupt officials who provide support services to criminal and terrorist groups.” Furthermore, repressive responses in the form of covert operations that appears to be covert operations that involve a variety of potential counter-terrorist initiatives such as infiltration and electronic warfare. Non-violent clandestine programs necessitate pioneering inventive and preventive approaches that are tailor-made to each terrorist situation. The international community also use economic sanctions to punish or disrupt state sponsors of terrorism. These sanctions may either limit a particular economic sector in order to hamper the target or restrict trade in general. The aim is to put pressure on state sponsors to change or stop supporting terrorism. Finally, defense assets can be deployed overseas in large or small tactical configurations. These deployments may comprise of land, air, or naval forces (Martin, 2010).

3.4 WHY BOKO HARAM REBELS?

There are factors that have influenced the growth and spread of Boko Haram Insurgency especially in the Northern parts of Nigeria, many experts have tried to figure out why the Boko Haram insurgents exist and why they are so violent (Onuoha 2012; Kukah 2012; Mustapha 2012; Agbiboa 2013; Zenn et al. 2013). There have been a variety of explanations have been advanced, including the following; a northern sense of isolation from Nigeria's more established and developed Christian south; widespread government corruption; inept and violent state law enforcement agencies and security services; the perception that ties with Western Countries serve as a corrupting force. Several hypotheses have arisen, some of which is that many southerners and Christians believe that Boko Haram is the work of disgruntled and out of favour northern Muslim elites and politicians seeking to make governance and life difficult for a Christian president from Southern Nigeria, a belief recently promoted by the eminent Wole Soyinka, Nigerian Nobel Laureate during an Oxford Annual African Studies Lecture. Whereas, for the Northerners and among Muslims, the prevalent conspiracy theory is that Boko Haram is the work of Islam's enemies who want to bring the faith into disrepute. In the North, a conspiracy theory espoused is that the administration of then President Goodluck Jonathan was supporting Boko Haram to depopulate the north ahead of the 2015 polls, either to ridicule Islam, make it look poor or to reduce the population of the northerners (Adibe, 2014). Apart from these local conspiracy theories, there is also the argument that Boko Haram is the handiwork of America, based on two US-based studies that forecast Nigeria's collapse

in 2015 and 2030, respectively (Mustapha 2012). These conspiratorial theories are often used by Nigerian politicians to "locate the blame for violence elsewhere, away from weak records of governance, state capacity, and representation" (Dowd and Raleigh, 2013: 498).

The level of relative poverty and injustice in the north is a recurring theme in Boko Haram literature, leading some scholars to suggest that under-development is the primary reason why radical groups like Boko Haram revolt. For example, Kwaja (2011:1) claims that "religious aspects of the conflict have been misinterpreted as the primary driver of violence when, in reality, disenfranchisement and injustice are the root causes." According to Mustapha (2012), Boko Haram is a symptom of Nigeria's inability to create a country and engage in democratic politics. He considered it as the "misplaced cries of a disgruntled youth who has been crushed by the socio-economic machine on the one side and repressed by the state on the other." With Reverend Father Matthew Kukah (2012:3), a northern cleric-scholar, we see a nuanced shift away from the poverty conflict nexus and toward the poor governance conflict nexus. Religion, according to Kukah, is used to "mobilize against modernity, which is seen as the root cause of social anomalies". According to Kukah, "the prevalence of corruption, collapse of public morality, inequality, and so on could only be traced to those who rule in the eyes of the [Boko Haram] sect members." Those who rule us [*yan boko*] do so, according to their logic, because they have obtained their tools through Western education [*boko*]. (See *ibid.*) On a broader side, Christopher Clapham (2004: 200), argues that "the collapse of law and order in African states was basically the product of the legacy of bad governance," finds a kindred spirit in Kukah. Others, such as Evans (1994: 3), argue that "a downward trend of economic decline, often compounded by official corruption and mismanagement, has produced regimes that are on the verge of collapsing and being challenged, often violently, by their own people. The process of national disintegration has been accelerated by economic downturn and vice versa."

The explanations above appear to rely on the human needs' theory of social conflict, which that every human being has essential needs that they aim to satisfy, and that if they fail to meet these needs, the resultant effect would be violent conflict (Rosati et al. 1990: 156-190).

Kelman (1999) claims that

"Conflict is caused and escalated to a considerable degree to unfulfilled needs
– not only material needs, but also such psychological needs as security,

identity, self-esteem, recognition, autonomy and a sense of justice. Parties in conflict, in pursuit of their own security and identity and related needs and interests, undermine and threaten the security and identity of the other” (cited in Azcarate N.D.).

The above expatiated human need theory is similar to the theory of “relative deprivation” which ties economic inequality to people's willingness to engage in violent political action. ‘Misery breeds rebellion,’ as T.R. Gurr (1970) puts it succinctly. The connection between relative deprivation and the inception of conflict, on the other hand, has been disparaged as “simplistic” because it fails to justify why certain poor places or people do not engage in abuse, and also because it does not provide any concrete policy recommendations (Agbibo, 2013). When people are subjected to group-based relative deprivation, they will actually benefit (Leach et al. 2007: 191-204). On the other hand, People can be comparatively disadvantaged without suffering hardship as a result of their disadvantage (Jost and Banaji, 1994: 1-27). This might explain why relative deprivation has been identified as a possible contributor to radicalization in social psychological studies (King and Taylor, 2011: 610). According to Krieger and Meierriek's study, “there is only insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that economic inequality causes terrorism. When institutional and political considerations are taken into account, weak economic conditions have less of an effect on terrorism” (2011:3, *ibid*). Likewise, James Piazza (2006: 171) who analyzed terrorism incidents and casualties in 96 (ninety six) countries from 1986 – 2002 employing a multiple series of regression argued that “variables like population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state subjugation, and, most importantly, the structure of party politics are found to be (more) significant predictors of terrorism’ than the ‘rooted-in-poverty’ terrorism.” However, this paper submits that the socioeconomic dimension cannot necessarily be ignored in the search for comprehension and understanding.

The uneven educational growth of the north and south is one the numerous legacies of disunity left to Nigeria by the British imperialists (Akinola, 2014). Northern Nigeria was still loosely governed by British colonial authorities when it gained independence in 1960, and it lacked the economic and educational growth of the south (Cook 2014: 5). The north which accounted for over half of the country's population, merely accounted for 10% of all primary school students as at 1965. The Northerners made up about 8% of the total student population

in higher education in 1965, compared to the 39% in the West, 48% in the East and 5% in Lagos (Agbibo, 2013a: 51). According to Akinola (2014), the apparently iniquitous Boko Haram's ideology of "Western education is evil" has its origins in the northern traditional rulers' once antagonistic attitude toward Western education. Sir Lord Frederick Lugard (Nigeria's first Governor General) and his successors that are colonizers like him, admired the northern Islamic clerics and their Emirs' hostility to Western education and *yan boko*, not least because the Emirs' prestige and authority had to be preserved (ibid). Furthermore, the discrepancy between the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria stemmed from the fact that the missionary activities of Christian missionaries, who are the *de facto* pioneers of education in the Nigerian colony, were basically restricted to the southern parts and the pagan areas in the north.

For Akinola (2014),

“Most of Nigeria's political leaders since independence from Britain in 1960 have come from the north. Were they to have been visionary, they would have appreciated the need to redress the historic imbalance in education between the regions of the Nigerian federation. It is not that they do not know that education is important. In fact, their own children receive education in the best schools and universities Europe and America can offer. That they seem comfortable with the poverty and servitude that surround them is amazing.”

Nigeria's poverty rate rose from “54.7 percent in 2004 to 60.9 percent in 2010”, according to estimates released by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in early 2013. In 2011, 100 million Nigerians were in absolute poverty, with another 12.6 million Nigerians in a relatively poor situation. Young people, especially those living in northern Nigeria, are the worst affected by these maladies (Onuoha 2014: 6). Considering the level of poverty in the north, it seems that the Boko Haram insurgency is being used as a means of protest to draw local and foreign attention to the dire situation of the region, as well as a bait to attract the poorest into the joining the sect. Elegbe noted that “In the north, unemployment is higher than in the south. When you combine this situation with radical Islam's pledge of a better life for martyrs, it's easy to see why the north is becoming increasingly violent” (cited in Agbibo 2013: 52).

Komolafe also claims that, even if poverty and unemployment aren't the primary causes of radicalization in Nigeria, "the propensity to produce suicide bombers is greater in a society characterized by mass deprivation and joblessness than in a community where the majority of people's basic needs of food, education, health, housing, and sanitation are met" (cited in Onuoha 2014: 6). Although there is a common feeling of alienation from the mainstream society that has become common among youths in the society, this rarely leads to an individual adopting the identity of a terrorist or taking to suicide bombing. However, as Schwartz et al. (2009: 540) argue, "when feelings of disenfranchisement is combined with fervent adherence to traditional, dichotomous "us versus them" religious principles justifying violence against those perceived to threaten one's religious or cultural group, a strong prioritization of the group over the person, and a belief that one's group is morally superior to the group being at odds, justify violence against those perceived to threaten one's religious or cultural".

Erikson wrote about the allure of extremism in teenagers who thought their individual and collective identities were being challenged nearly four decades ago:

"Where historical and technological development, however, severely encroach upon deeply rooted or strongly emerging identities (i.e., agrarian, feudal, patrician) on a large scale, youth feel endangered, individually and collectively, whereupon it becomes ready to support doctrines offering a total immersion in a synthetic identity (extreme nationalism, racism, or class consciousness) and a collective condemnation of a totally stereotyped enemy of the new identity. The fear of loss of identity which fosters such indoctrination contributes significantly to that mixture of righteousness and criminality which, under totalitarian conditions, becomes available for organized terror and for the establishment of major industries of extermination (cited in Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 21)."

Recently, the US Institute of Peace (USIP) commissioned a report called "Why Youths Join Boko Haram?" to investigate the issues that lead to youth radicalization and recruitments into Boko Haram. According to the results, widespread poverty and unemployment are among the important factors that make northern youths vulnerable to radicalization (Onuoha 2014). The report identified that the unchecked poverty and high rate of unemployment that continue to

conquer many northern states is the second most significant reason why young people participate in religious-based violence, the first being their ignorance of religious teaching opposed to the violent lifestyle that they have adopted. For example, in Kaduna state, 83% of respondents reported that poverty and unemployment are important factors whereas 92% cited them as important factors in Kano State (see Onuoha 2014:5). Unemployment and insecurity are significant factors for 83 percent of respondents in Kaduna state. They were cited as significant by 92 percent of Kano residents (see Onuoha 2014:5). Mustapha (2012) claims that "Boko Haram... is the misguided cry of a frustrated youth crushed on the one side by the socioeconomic system and then repressed by the state on the other."

The main argument here is that relative deprivation and severe deprivation that has become commonplace in the north are significant factors that have contributed to the emergence of an army of ready young men (and increasingly young women) willing to kill others or get killed themselves in the name of religious identity. Solomon(2013), argued that in situations of shrinking social resources, a retreat of state welfarism and its consequences on contracting socioeconomic services, struggling economic crises, a market ideology of "fend for yourself", sharp divisions in social relationships take place and the identity issue becomes a major weapon of economic and political warfare (cf. Solomon 2013). Political leaders take advantage of resurgent identities for economic and political benefits in this sense (ibid). Drawing on the earlier works of Erikson, Crenshaw aptly argues that:

"At the stage of identity formation, individuals seek both meaning and a sense of wholeness or completeness as well 'fidelity', a need to have faith in something or someone outside oneself as well as to be trustworthy in its service. Ideologies, then, are guardians of identity... political undergrounds utilize youth's need for fidelity as well as the 'store of wrath' held by those deprived of something in which to have faith. A crisis of identity (when the individual who finds self-definition difficult is suffering from ambiguity, fragmentation, and contradiction) makes some adolescents susceptible to 'totalism' or to totalistic collective identities that promise certainty. In such collectivities the troubled young find not only an identity but an explanation for their difficulties and a promise for the future (cited in Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 21-22)."

Boko Haram appears to be suffusing religious sentiments into a long-brewing lists of complaints about inequality, unequal wealth and power distribution and oppression (Felbab-Brown & Forest 2012). Indeed, the whole rationale of targeting “*boko*” and “*yan boko*” is not unrelated to shattered dreams of making a living through western/modern education or the modern infrastructure and resources constructed around it. For Boko Haram supporters, on the other hand, they want to ‘return’ to a community in which Western/Modern knowledge and education are banned. These adherents believe that a world that has been “cleansed” would better serve all their needs (especially spiritual and material needs). This echoes the views expressed by Ramsbotham et al (2008: .s 86) that “groups trying to fulfill their identity and security needs through confrontation are in fact seeking reform in the framework of their society.” While poverty and unemployment aren't always linked to youth abuse and radicalization, as the findings of Krieger and Meierriek (2011), Piazza (2006) has shown, Onuoha's (2014:6) argument that “privation and other frustrating conditions of life make youth highly susceptible to exploitation by extremist ideologues” is important to remember. Expatriating on the situation in Palestine, Pedhazur et al. (2003: 405-423) noted that the average suicide terrorist was just a “young, insecure individual with strong religious affiliations... (who) had been skillfully exploited to persuade him into participating in the terrorist attack.”

Apart from these explanations, Boko Haram's sudden violent turn can be retraced to the unlawful and extrajudicial killings of its Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s founder and many of his supporters. An understanding of “the psychology of revenge” is one of the most critical aspects of comprehending why people sometimes become ultra-radicals (Agbiboa 2014). Catalyst incidents (violent actions considered to be unjust) elicit intense feelings of anger as well as a strong psychological urge for vengeance and retaliation. Using the Boko Haram situation as a case in point, the unlawful killing of their founder acted as a trigger for pre-existing hostilities stemming from arbitrary and unjustifiable arrests, torture of arrested suspects, and sometimes execution of group members by state enforcement agents and security forces. Until 2009, Boko Haram was regarded as militant but not ultra-violent; some Boko Haram members were well-known in northern societies, rather than the “faceless” label that the then President Jonathan favoured. The assassination of the sect’s leader “provoked a fierce reaction from Boko Haram members who mainly want to settle their scores with the police and the army,” according to the study (Marchal 2012: 2). As a result, Boko Haram, has

been "led by a desire for revenge" since 2009, "but the group has proven to be very adaptable, adapting its tactics quickly and changing its goals" (Walker 2012: 2). The use of explosive materials and suicide bombers, in particular, has increased the group's ferocity, leading to widespread suspicions that the group is linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist group (Agbiboa, 2014). Abu Qaqa, a Boko Haram spokesman earlier stated in November 2011 that:

“We do, in truth, have links to Al-Qaeda.' They help us, and we help them' (Vanguard, November 24, 2011). Boko Haram has acknowledged developing relations in Somalia. ‘Very soon, we will wage jihad...,' according to a statement allegedly released by the group. Our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia, where they received real warfare training from our brethren who have rendered the country ungoverned... This time, our assaults will be more ferocious and wider than before” (The Weekly Standard, June 18, 2011).

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 CONCLUSION

In Nigeria, insurgency is not a new phenomenon and it has had far-reaching effects on the nation and its citizens. The government was unconcerned about the Boko Haram uprising, they were treating it as though it were a minor problem that would fade away easily. The government's response to the threat has been poor, alternating between lethal action, appeasement, amnesty, and negotiation. Clearly, the government has not been able to use its military to fight the Boko Haram insurgency for nearly a decade, prompting logistical support from neighboring countries and a joint multinational task force. A shift toward restorative and collective justice approaches as part of a counter-terrorism strategy may be vital to a long-term solution. Restorative justice is all about making amends.

In Nigeria, religion and terrorism are closely connected, but the theoretical foundations lead to the inference that religion is simply an excuse for the high level of anger in Nigerian society, which is exploited. The terrorism that occurs in Nigeria has always been focused on religious areas. Radicalization and extremism, especially in the Muslim North, sparked the rebellion that culminated in the terrorist attacks. Boko Haram, which fought for northern supremacy and the dissemination of its philosophies, has long been hostile to Christians who use the word "infidel." As a consequence, the fact that their numbers and beliefs are increasingly diminishing has fueled their animosity against Christians. They aimed their anger at unarmed Christians as a result of this understanding, and used violence as a weapon to instill fear and anxiety in the populace.

Northern Nigeria has serious development issues, maybe even more so than the other parts of Nigeria. The North currently suffers from some of the world's highest child and maternal mortality rates. The number of poor people and those suffering from other forms of poverty and deprivation are significantly higher than in the rest of the world, and active involvement in politics is poor, aside from allegiance and subservience to a small group of religious and political godfathers who hold onto power. As it stands, the viable and only long-term solution to the group's threat is widespread northern Nigerian reform that enhances the livelihoods of people in northern Nigeria and guarantee them a greater say in their government and politics.

Boko Haram's overall goal is to establish a state-like entity based on a strict interpretation and application of sharia law that will eventually rule all of northern Nigeria. As a result, the group's imminent path is likely to cause them to increasingly participate in the Jos crisis, where it will target northern indigenes of the Christian faith. Rather than attacking foreign targets within or outside Nigeria, Boko Haram will continue to strike softer targets in the northeastern part of Nigeria. The activities of this sect could continue for several years, financed by robberies and attacks on poorly secured banks, and even cash-in-transit convoy vehicles by militias armed with weapons smuggled into the country from Chad or guns stolen or even bought from the very law enforcement agencies and security services tasked with fighting the war on terror.

Boko Haram's barbaric acts of terrorism may be motivated less by ideology and more by hatred, and deprivation. Religion tends to act less as a form of worship and more as a means of ensuring that all residents are equally impoverished. As difficult as it may be for the Nigerian government to separate religion from the equation and focus more on inequity or some other factors like lack of justice, Nigeria's best hope for recovery may be in doing so. However, religious education actors, the faithful, policymakers, state actors, governments, and security experts are all expected to benefit from this research. Finally, since it reads current literature on Boko Haram's activities, this study will be useful in fostering a better relationship between religion and tolerance, stimulating student interest, conducting more research on terrorism, and serving as a source of knowledge, since it will read current literature on Boko Haram's activities. Both as a nonviolent group or a violent movement, the social structures of society, the political-economic environment, and the degree of culture can all affect how various religious patterns and desires behave and develop.

Nigeria's defence infrastructure has been harmed by the Boko Haram insurgency. The almost immediate drop in Foreign Direct Investment since Boko Haram's emergence was one of the first clear economic challenges (FDI). Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nigeria dropped by "20% in a year, from \$8.9 billion in 2011 to \$7 billion in 2012", according to the World Investment Report (WIR). The loss of \$1.9 billion was a massive blow to a country like Nigeria, which is in desperate need of cash (Gillespie, 2015). The insurgency's effects in Nigeria can be viewed from two perspectives: the individual members of the state (Nigerians), especially residents of Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, the plateau, Yobe, and neighbouring

northern states and the state (Nigeria) itself. The bulk of these countries' economic activities are focused on the land (Taiwo, 2012). The Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in not just the closure or abandonment of the means of livelihood and the businesses of people in the North-East area, but also migration out of the region and a decline in patronage of products produced in the north (Awortu, 2015). Murray Last of University College London, a Nigerian historian, points out that the Sahel region has a long history of heretical movements. These movements usually emerge in response to political or religious stimuli before dissipating. Others, such as the Maitatsine in the 1980s, are exterminated by the authorities, while others are ripped apart by factional warfare. Boko Haram, on the other hand, has arisen at a time when two major powers are working together to keep the country together and running smoothly.

The culture should have been nurtured from the outside in the first place. Money from Salafist groups in Saudi Arabia, according to religious sources in Maiduguri, may have aided it in the formative and early years. There are also reports that Boko Haram members seem to have been educated in rebel camps located in the Sahel during a time of crisis for the sect.

Secondly, the Boko Haram sect has grown exponentially at a time when many national issues are causing anger and providing fuel for the party. This includes the police's continued murders and corruption of people associated with the group; the violence with which the police handle the general public; the government's financial corruption; the religious establishment's spiritual corruption (as perceived and understood by Boko Haram); a simmering conflict in Jos and other areas of Plateau state; a perceived broader assault on Islam by a government then headed by Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian president; the end of the "zoning deal" that saw political power rotate between northern and southern blocs of the country; It is the group's frustration at these problems that keeps it moving and provides recruits to help it continue its work.

Apart from destroying religious structures such as churches and mosques, the insurgency also destroys commercial structures such as banks, agencies, and businesses, according to the 2010 Annual Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) (Orhero, 2015).

The Boko Haram sect poses a new threat to the Nigerian economy, which is already suffering from a drop in oil prices, the country's mainstay (Ewokor, 2015). In addition, the federal

government is investing heavily in the war against Boko Haram. Money meant for development projects is being diverted to Boko Haram's war (Ola, 2014). For instance, with a defense budget of \$5.8 billion, Akpan (2015) noted that "the country's defence budget accounts for more than a third of the annual budget". There can be no sustainable development if there is no peace, and this is the case in Nigeria, especially as can be observed in the north-eastern part of the country.

If some progress is to be made in gathering information on where—and who—the group is, drastic changes in policing policy are needed now that it has become obvious that the group has extended its operations beyond the few mosques where it started. Indeed, in Nigeria, widespread radical police reform has been long overdue. Firstly, prosecuting and incarcerating some of the police officers who are liable for human rights violations might help to alleviate one of the group's main concerns. Another step is to introduce community policing and ensure that the police force becomes more accountable and transparent, this will certainly be a positive move especially in the Northern parts of Nigeria, as well as Nigeria in general. Nonetheless, such changes are unlikely to convince the organization to fully lay down its arms and reintegrate into the society. The Boko Haram sect, which is a radical branch of an existing religion is seemingly advocating a return to a "pure" form of the Islamic religion, but it also has many characteristics of a personality cult (a messianic cult built in relation to the image of its leader). When the leadership considers it necessary, the group has demonstrated that it is able to adapt its goals and retaliation rationale to include some lightly classified "enemies" of the group as well as civilian (non-military) targets. Its leaders may twist and transform their own justifications to target whomever they want, with little regard for innocent bystanders. At this point, it is unclear if their rage can be fully assuaged by rational changes. It's much more likely that they'll return to their old ways and concoct new complaints to rationalize and justify new attacks. They already have a plethora of complaints to select from.

The wider penalties for Nigeria are dire if the Boko Haram group takes a more vigorous and active position over the crisis in Jos, increasing attacks on local residents, indigenous Christian communities and Igbo traders plying their trades in the northern part of the country. If the violence in the region erupts in a way that does not subside after a few days, this will definitely pose a serious threat to Nigeria's peace and unity. It might be difficult to fathom or

see how the US and Europe will help Nigeria solve this problem in a constructive way. The author isn't an authority on military assistance or international police training. European countries and the United States may have their own parts to play in helping Nigeria's law enforcement agencies such as the military and the police become more successful. However, in the past, such trainings and input seems to have had little impact other than to credential certain officers, who may or may not have lived up to their training. Such teaching is unlikely to be adequate to overcome the plethora of detrimental effects on these institutions. Sensitivities regarding such assistance could be raised as a result of the coup that took place in Mali in March 2012 that was led by a military officer who had lately completed military trainings in the United States.

It is noteworthy that the Boko Haram terrorist group currently poses little or paltry direct threat to US interests, offices and citizens in Nigeria, and that if the US publicly backed the Nigerian government, it and its people might become targets. Even so, there aren't many Americans in Nigeria, and their interests seem to be in the far southern part of the country, where the Boko Haram group hasn't yet extended its operations. The most significant threat raised by Boko Haram is to Nigeria's peace, unity and safety of its citizens. If Boko Haram remains in operation, the regional elites' agreement that holds the country united will become increasingly strained. Disagreements among elites are currently typically resolved through secret meetings characterized by give and take, horse trading and exchange of favours over the country's political capital. There is a risk that Nigeria will break if the crisis worsens and the elites' consensus is jeopardized. This will be a disaster if the United States were involved in a united Nigeria.

Attempting to control the situation on a government-to-government basis, on the other hand, comes with its own set of threats. Many in the north continue to doubt Jonathan's legitimacy, and it has become clear that he will seek re-election. This deal between Nigeria's elites is far more likely to be affected negatively by the US's ill-considered involvement, particularly if that involvement consists of large-scale financial injections into the government of Former President Goodluck Jonathan, rather than the conduct of the Boko Haram terrorist group. More positively, the US will be well advised to follow policies that identify and discover proceeds of corruption, economic and financial crimes that have been invested or concealed in the US by politically exposed Nigerians. The imprisonment of James Ibori, the former

governor of Delta state by a London court demonstrates the effectiveness of such a scheme. If the ability of these corrupt leaders to conceal money offshore is greatly reduced, it will potentially have a positive impact in Nigeria, as such money or stolen funds is likely to be rechanneled to the country's economy.

The United States of America should introduce and implement policies that will assist the Nigerian nation to diversify its economy, reduce its continuous over-dependence on oil. The US should particularly, implement plans and programs aimed at strengthening Nigeria's agricultural sector, which is the most likely sector to provide mass employment, means of livelihoods, and potential prospects for youths in the country, especially those in the Northern region.



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